The Foreign Policy of Kenya 1963-1978

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This thesis analyses Kenyan foreign policy between 1963 and 1978 and provides a case-study of foreign policy-making in a developing state. It shows how the colonial heritage influenced the orientation of foreign policy through political, economic and cultural means. An examination of the domestic political structure shows that an elite group around Jomo Kenyatta controlled the policy-making process and gave little opportunity to competing elites to alter the country's foreign policy and development goals. These goals were pursued within the framework of the former colony's dominant aid and trading patterns and thus raised questions concerning neo-colonialist control and the dependence of Kenya upon the West.

In East Africa, Kenya sought peaceful relations to maximise economic benefits. The country capitalised upon its predominance caused by colonial and settler policies and formalised its position in the East African Community. Its relative strength, however, combined with political differences unsettled its neighbours and contributed to the Community's demise. The unresolved territorial dispute with the Somali Republic, added to the difficulties with Tanzania and Uganda, presented major problems for Kenya's foreign policy in the region. In international organisations, the government aligned with Third World countries on many issues, but the political and economic constraints emanating from the neo-colonial nature of the state made sure that policies were pragmatic ones.

In the final chapter, a theoretical approach is utilised to explain foreign policy behaviour and this draws together the major factors which made this period the 'Kenyatta Era'.

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Abbreviations

A.R.B.	Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural Series)
A.R.B. (E.F.T.)	Africa Research Bulletin (Economic, Financial and Technical Series)
E.A.A.	East African Airways
E.A.C.	East African Community
E.A.C.S.O.	East African Common Services Organisation
F.A.O.	Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations
I.B.R.D.	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
I.D.A.	International Development Association
I.F.C.	International Finance Corporation
I.L.O.	International Labour Organisation
K.A.D.U.	Kenya African Democratic Union
K. A. N. U.	Kenya African National Union
K. N. A.	Kenya News Agency
K.P.U.	Kenya People's Union
N.F.D.	Northern Frontier District
O. A. U.	Organisation of African Unity
0.U.P.	Oxford University Press
T.J.M.A.S.	The Journal of Modern African Studies
U.N.	United Nations
U.N.C.T.A.D.	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
U.N.E.S.C.O.	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
V.O.K.	Voice of Kenya
W.H.O	World Health Organisation
\$	U.S. dollar
£	pound sterling
K£	Kenyan pound

Chapter One

Colonisation and Independence

Introduction

This thesis presents an analysis of Kenyan foreign policy from the time of independence in 1963 until 1978, the year in which the 'founder' of the Kenyan nation, President <u>Mzee</u> Jomo Kenyatta, died. It is the first complete survey of Kenyan foreign policy and so provides a definitive case-study not only for scholars of Kenya but also for those interested in the wider fields of African politics and foreign policy analysis.

Scholarly work of any nature is difficult to accomplish, but a study of the political organisation of an African state presents extra problems to the student. The inadequacy and unavailability of sources and data throw a great responsibility on the student to sift very carefully through what material there is and to fill in the numerous gaps with intuitive thought. Allied to the unfavourable amount of literature on which to base one's study is the problem, faced by myself, that a student may be denied access to the country to undertake research upon such delicate issues as foreign policy, thus forcing the student into the guise of an 'investigative tourist'. Given these drawbacks, then, this thesis presents an accurate and analytical study of the derivation, nature and direction of Kenyan foreign policy since the time of independence.

The study is undertaken in a thematic manner with the dual aims of shedding light on the major areas of policy and providing a solid base for future work in this field. The boundaries of foreign policy analysis, especially for developing countries, are difficult to

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delimit, but this work has operated from the loose definition that foreign policy analysis is concerned with the actions of the state towards the external environment and how and why such actions are formulated. Chapter two concentrates upon the domestic structure of Kenya in relation to foreign policy-making and shows how both the domestic and external environments are interrelated. The later chapters look in turn at the economic development of the country and its bilateral and multilateral relations, the policies pursued in the East African arena, and those pursued in international organisations, with special reference to the Southern African problem. The final chapter pulls together the material in a more theoretical manner, focusing upon the determinants, rather than recipient fields, of foreign policy. Here the conclusions are reached that Kenyatta was the leading force in the formulation of Kenyan foreign policy and that his death closed a specific period in Kenyan politics.

The continuation of similar foreign policy goals under the new President, Daniel arap Moi, lends weight to the view that Kenyatta's policies were proved in practice. It is also possible to say that the new leadership merely reflects the old because the elite group formerly around Kenyatta is continuing under Moi to control the country and to benefit from the spoils of office. This brings us to the central theme of the thesis, that Kenya is a 'neo-colonial' society in which political activities are constrained and circumscribed by the need to maintain links with foreign financial and political interests. The term 'neo-colonialism' here is used to mean the survival of the colonial system of economic exploitation after independence, and despite independence, with the connivance of a domestic elite who gain in material terms from such an arrangement.

The existence of neo-colonialism in Kenya has a dominant influence on foreign policy. The thesis shows that at independence the aspirations of the African leaders in Kenya were, at least, compatible with and, at most, totally attuned to those of the outgoing colonialists. The foreign policy of the country in the years after 1963 was tentative and formative but displayed a tacit acceptance by the Kenyan elite of the parameters allowed it by the residual colonial interests. To understand fully the evolution of the neocolonial society and the composition and direction of Kenyan foreign policy after independence, it is necessary to sketch in the history of the country during the colonial period in order to illuminate the environment within which the Kenyan political character was moulded.


The initial Occupation

British involvement in East Africa gained pace in the 1880s mainly because of its strategic interest in controlling the headwaters of the Nile in order to protect Egypt and, in turn, the route to India. A civil war in Uganda forced the Imperial British East Africa Company into bankruptcy and caused direct British involvement resulting in protectorates being formed over Uganda and Buganda in 1894, and over the East African Protectorate (Kenya) in June 1895. A railway was built to link Uganda with the coast.^I Though the Asian was already prominent in East Africa because of trade, making the rupee the

I. For a more comprehensive study of the historical background see George Bennett, Kenya. A Political History. The Colonial Period (London, O.U.P., 1963); A.J. Hughes, East Africa: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1963, rev. 1969); Carl Hosberg and John Nottingham, The Myth of 'Mau Mau'. Nationalism in Kenya (London, Pall Mall, 1966); W.E.F. Ward and L.W. White, East Africa, a century of change (New York, Africana, 1971). The railway also fell neatly in line with the British legal obligation under the 1890 Brussels Agreement to try to suppress the slave trade in Africa.







recognised currency, several thousands more Asians were brought in by the British to build the railway because the native African was considered lazy and unsuited to this type of work. The racial consequences of the importation of Asian labour (and the consequent influx of Asian traders and businessmen) were considerable, both for the European settlers who continually strove to maintain their racial superiority, and for the Africans who found their path to development, politically and economically, blocked by the Asians. Here was the root of the 'Asian problem' which was to cause great unrest in independent Kenya.

The railway, started from Mombasa in 1895, reached Lake Victoria in 1901. There was no intention of continuing the railway any further and so the British Government, for administrative efficiency, cut off the Eastern Province of Uganda in April 1902 and transferred it to the East African Protectorate.² This decision proved to be important because the area transferred included that of the 'Highlands', the most suitable land for European settlement. The British Government began to entice settlers to the Highlands in order to help pay the large costs of the occupation and the railway. Pressure immediately arose from the considerably larger Asian community to be allowed to settle in the Highlands, but this was blocked by the settlers and the British Government. In 1908, Lord Elgin, Secretary of State for the Colonies, subtly reiterated the racial viewpoint of the British: "It is not consonant with the views of His Majesty's Government to impose legal restrictions on any particular section of the community,

 George Bennett, 'The Eastern Boundary of Uganda in 1902', Uganda Journal, March 1959, pp. 69-72. President Idi Amin of Uganda was to raise the question of Ugandan sovereignty over this area in 1976; see The Times, 28 February 1976.

but as a matter of administrative convenience, grants in the upland areas should not be made to Indians.³

After pressing hard for political representation, the settlers were rewarded in 1907 when a Legislative Council was established with themselves in a prominent position. The settlers were, however, primarily concerned with their land, and their need for labour was acute. The African was unaccustomed to, and resentful of, the wagelabour system and so the settlers sought ways of tying the African to his work. The results were seen in the 'Resident Native Ordinance' of 1918 and the 'Native Registration Ordinance' of 1920. The 1918 Ordinance forced Africans 'squatting' on European land to provide payment only in labour, so compelling them to work for the settler and preventing any form of tenant farming. The 1920 Ordinance provided for all Africans over sixteen years of age to carry identification papers, the <u>kipande</u>, so aiding the employer to hold the African to his contract.⁴

During the remainder of the colonial period, Kenya Colony (as it became known in July 1920) was the scene of a continual racial battle between European and Asian settlers. The British Government normally maintained the supremacy of the white settlers, but at the same time strove to promote the interests of the African. Though the settlers often took a more extreme line over African affairs than did the British Government, there was always the unifying belief that European cultural rule, however executed, was to the advantage of the African.

3. As quoted in Ward and White, op. cit., p. 104.

4. E.A. Brett, 'Development Policy in East Africa between the wars; a study of the political influences involved in the making of British policy 1919-1939' (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1966), pp. 166-182.

Consequently, the government's desire to protect African interests never went so far as to clash head-on with the interests of the settlers whose leaders were, after all, men of aristocratic background with influential contacts in London. The results of this were significant in that the exploited Africans came to distrust not only the settlers but also the British Government, and realised that only through actions of their own would they be able to regain their freedom.

The African Response

The first African political movement became active in the early 1920s. The Luo tribe in western Kenya began to form small associations,⁵ but the major activity centred upon the Kikuyu who felt the most threatened by the European occupation of the land. The East African Association (E.A.A.), and its predecessor the Young Kikuyu Association (Y.K.A.); actively campaigned against the <u>kipande</u>, the hut tax and the not infrequent cuts in wages. The E.A.A. became increasingly aggressive until in March 1922, Harry Thuku, the E.A.A. leader, was arrested for sedition and sent into exile at Kismayu.⁶

In the following year, the British Government again stressed its concern for the African and declared in the White Paper <u>Indians in</u> <u>Kenya</u> (Devonshire White Paper): 'Primarily, Kenya is an African territory, and His Majesty's Government think it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and

- 5. John M. Lonsdale, 'Political Associations in Western Kenya' in Robert I. Potberg and Ali A. Mazrui, <u>Protest and Power in Black</u> <u>Africa</u> (New York, O.U.P., 1970), pp. 589-638.
- 6. Harry Thuku, <u>An Autobiography, with assistance from Kenneth King</u> (Nairobi, O.U.P., 1970). Kismayu is now in the Somali Republic.

the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail.⁷

The Africans had already learnt not to accept the benevolent intentions of the British Government until they had been put into practice. Their caution proved correct because governmental policy never came to terms with its goal. Indeed, the same White Paper promised the settlers that there would be 'no drastic action or reversal of measures already introduced ... the result of which might be to destroy or impair the existing interests of those who have already settled in Kenya'.⁸

The E.A.A., proscribed after Thuku's arrest, was regrouped as the Kikuyu Central Association (K.C.A.) during 1925, and three years later Kenyatta became the Association's secretary. The Kenya Government confined the activities of the K.C.A. to the Kikuyu Reserves, and so there was little chance of the K.C.A. making any gains either with the other tribes or with the authorities. Abroad, however, there was great scope and freedom to present African grievances, and so in 1929 Kenyatta left for London to continue the fight for African rights. Kenyatta did not return (except shortly in 1931) until after the second world war, and this period of self-exclusion kept him out of the internal battles within the African ranks and undeniably helped to foster the image of Kenyatta as a leading African politician - at least amongst the Africans.

Land was the burning issue of the colonial period, and the

8. Ibid.

^{7. &}lt;u>Indians in Kenya Memorandum</u> (Cmd. 1922, London, H.M.S.O., 1923), p. 10.

alienation of land by the Europeans was to cause serious problems during the negotiations for independence. The 'Kenya Land Commission' (Carter Commission) reported in May 1934.⁹ The Commission added some 3,568 square miles of territory to the Reserves, but the Africans complained that this was in arid and semi-desert areas virtually useless for habitation.¹⁰ The boundaries of the Reserves were not rigidly fixed as provision was made for them to be altered if and when European mining companies became interested in a Reserve area. The boundaries of the 'European Highlands' were defined within which the Europeans held their privileged position. Both the Asian and African were now legally excluded.¹¹

During the second world war, African political rights improved even though the K.C.A. and two other tribal organisations were declared illegal as subversive in August 1940. The year of 1944 were significant in that the Kenya Legislative Council allowed for the first time one African official to represent African interests. Although he was to be chosen by the Governor and was to be one amongst forty officials, this was an important concession by the European minority to quell African discontent. In 1944, the Kenya African Study Union (K.A.S.U.) was established, a successor to the banned K.C.A. In February 1946, K.A.S.U. became K.A.U., the Kenya African Union,¹² and

- 9. <u>Report of the Kenya Land Commission. September, 1933</u> (Cmd. 4556, London, H.M.S.O., 1934).
- 10. Jomo Kenyatta, <u>Suffering without bitterness</u> (Nairobi, East African Pub., 1968), pp. 35-40.
- 11. Order-in-Council for the 'European Highlands' came into effect on 1 March 1939. Europeans wanted the Highlands protected by law in order to prevent expansion of the African Reserves; <u>Keesing's</u> Contemporary Archives, vol. 3, 3544C.
- Jeremy Murray-Brown, <u>Kenyatta</u> (London, Allen and Unwin, 1972), p. 226.

Kenyatta returned to an enthusiastic welcome in September 1946, 'a living legend entering upon his inheritance',¹³ to take over K.A.U. and take up the African nationalist cause.

In the early 1950s, growing tensions and frustrations over land overspilled into the violent 'Mau Mau' movement. The settlers considered this to be just another, though more serious, outbreak of tribal fighting led by dangerous and wicked men. 'Mau Mau', however, was a further outburst of African resentment to European domination and a genuine symbol of the growing African political awareness.¹⁴ The official view of 'Mau Mau' was presented in a White Paper in 1960 written by F.D. Corfield, a white settler in Kenya.¹⁵ The overwhelming theme of the Corfield Report was that 'Mau Mau' was an unfortunate disease of the African, a sickness to be cured. One extract from the Corfield Report will suffice to illuminate the European's view of the African and the battle to be fought by African political groups for recognition and respectability:

It has been suggested that had the hand of co-operation been given to Jomo Kenyatta, history would have taken a different turn, and there would have been no Mau Mau. But all the evidence points otherwise. The overwhelming impression left on my mind ... is that without the freedom afforded them by a liberal Government, Jomo Kenyatta and his associates would have been unable to preach their calculated hymn of hate and to exploit, through the medium of perverted witchcraft and of intimidation, the almost inevitable grievances which must accompany the rapid evolution of a primitive society. Can anyone imagine what sort of African State would have arisen in Kenya on the foundation of Mau Mau...? 16

During the extent of the crisis, between 1952 and 1956, African

- 14. Rosberg and Nottingham, op.cit.
- 15. <u>Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau</u> (Cmnd. 1030, London, H.M.S.O., 1960).
- 16. Ibid., pp. 283-284.

^{13.} Ibid., p. 224.

political organisations were banned, while Kenyatta was imprisoned for alleged leadership (never fully clarified) of 'Mau Mau'. Other African politicians were either imprisoned or exiled. The vacuum in African politics was filled by the organised Trade Unions, the leadership of which was taken over by a young man in his twenties, an able and ambitious Luo, Tom Mboya. When the ban was eased in 1956, there were the stipulations that political parties were to be allowed only at regional level and not at all in Central Province. This critically affected African politics as it prevented the Kikuyu from taking political action while it allowed the weaker tribes in outlying provinces to develop, with the Unions' assistance, political parties and policies of their own. The former political predominance of the Kikuyu was undermined, at least temporarily, and the centrifugal force of regional politics reinforced tribal allegiances by compelling politicians to seek support at a local level, thus halting any progress towards a full African nationalist party.

The British Government attempted to appease African protest by means of the constitutional amendments contained in the Lyttleton¹⁷ and Lennox-Boyd¹⁸ proposals, and by allowing the first elected African member on to the Legislative Council in 1956. But racial tensions prevailed and forced the British Government to convene a constitutional conference at Lancaster House, London, in January 1960. The conference proved to be a significant watershed in Kenyan political history. The composition of the Council of Ministers was altered to make the African body the largest, though still within a multi-racial framework. The restrictions on African eligibility to vote were relaxed, and the new

17. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 9, 13505A.

18. Ibid., vol. II, 16435A.

electoral list comprised 20,000 Europeans, 60,000 Asians and 1,300,000 Africans.¹⁹ Independence was not far away. This was a staggering blow to the majority of settlers who still perceived Africans as incapable of maintaining responsible government.

Pre-independence politics: 1960-1963

Though the Kikuyu and Luo traditionally disliked each other, their leaders saw their interests best served by uniting in the Kenya African National Union (K.A.N.U.) early in 1960. K.A.N.U.'s leaders, namely James Gichuru, Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga (and later Jomo Kenyatta), sought to gain support from all African groups and become a truly 'national' party. Suspicions of K.A.N.U., nevertheless, remained high and an opposing political party, the Kenya African Democratic Union (K.A.D.U.), was formed in June 1960. K.A.D.U., under the leadership of Ronald Ngala, Daniel arap Moi and Masinde Muliro, was composed of these smaller tribes who felt their safety was in numbers, notably the Masai, Kalenjin, Somali and Coastal groups, as well as the Kamba who were represented in their own African People's Party. K.A.D.U. was a coalition of the fearful, a protective umbrella for the weaker tribes. but it embodied some opposing political views to K.A.N.U. The peripheral tribes, particularly the Coastal and Somali groups, had always fought against direct control from the centre of the country. The central government had, in fact, always treated them as separate entities away from the mainstream of Kenyan life. A K.A.N.U.-K.A.D.U. clash over the future of the Highlands also seemed ominous, because the Kikuyu. Luo. Kipsigis and Masai (and other smaller groups) all had genuine claims to land taken from them by the Europeans, land that was the

^{19.} Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference. Held in London in January and February, 1960 (Cmnd. 960, London, H.M.S.O., 1960).

Population	Census	1969	: The Tribes
•			
Kikuyu			2,201,632
Luo			1,521,595
Luhya			1,453,302
Kamba			1,197,712
Kalenjin			1,190,203
Kisii	• •		701,679
Meru			554,256
Mijikenda			520,520
Somali			253,040
Turkana			203,177
Masai			154,906
Enbu			117,969
Taita			108,494
Others			498,594

Table 1:2

TOTAL 10,677,079

Source: <u>Statistical Abstract 1975</u> (Nairobi, Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1975).

most valuable in Kenya.

Foreign policy issues were important for K.A.N.U., whose members strongly supported Pan-Africanism and hoped to found an East African Federation. Kenyatta's visit to England in the 1930s had been a foreign relations exercise, and it had provided a mouthpiece for the African movement abroad. Kenyatta had helped to foster criticism against

the treatment of Africans in the colony and so had brought pressure directly to bear upon the British Government. The K.A.N.U. Constitution of 1960 contained in its 'Aims and Objects' three sections relating to foreign affairs:

- f. To work with other nationalist democratic movements in Africa and other continents, with a view to eradicating imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racialism, and all other forms of national, racial or foreign oppression.
- g. To support the United Nations Organisation and its various agencies and other international organisations for the promotion and consolidation of international peace and the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
- h. To strive for the closer Association of African territories and states, by promoting unity of action among the people of Africa and the ideal of Pan-Africanism. 20

The K.A.N.U. election manifesto of 1961 confirmed these aims and laid down specific policies for a future independent Kenya. K.A.N.U. forcibly rejected the presence of any foreign military base in Kenya, and proposed Africanisation of the civil service with only a minimum amount of help from the most necessary expatriates;

Our approach to foreign affairs will be on the lines of positive Independence and non-alignment with military or power blocks. The African personality must be the basis of our approach to peace and human welfare. Neutrality which would compromise truth is not our policy. We reserve the right to oppose or support all issues on their merits. 21

K.A.D.U. politicians were generally less interested in foreign policy questions. K.A.D.U. was a defensive organisation which aimed essentially to protect its members inside Kenya. K.A.D.U. did, however, wish to keep the British bases in Kenya after independence, both to provide security and to collect the income from the British presence estimated at between £6-10 million every year. K.A.N.U.'s

20.	The K.A.N.U.	Constitution	(Nairobi.	anon	1960).	,

21. The K.A.N.U. Manifesto for Independence, Social Democracy and Stability (Nairobi, Patwa News Agency, 1960). hostility to the concept of a foreign military presence after independence and the party's calls for a strong central government gained support from other powerful nationalist groups in East Africa. Links forged in the Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa (P.A.F.M.E.C.S.A.) were maintained.²² For the 1963 election, T.A.N.U. of Tanganyika supplied eleven Land Rovers to help canvassing and also financed the K.A.N.U. manifesto. The U.P.C. of Uganda was generous with funds as were the governments of Egypt, Ghana, Algeria and Ethiopia.²³ After many years of colonial rule, Kenyans wanted their country to play a strong role in African and world affairs. This gave K.A.N.U. a distinct advantage and gave little opportunity to K.A.D.U. to take any new initiatives of its own.

The British Withdrawal

While many observers focused their attentions upon the political struggle between K.A.N.U. and K.A.D.U., few contemporary observers grasped the true nature of the British withdrawal. Recently two excellent books have been published which probe deeply into the actions of the British at this time.²⁴ It is not the intention here to cover this ground again, except where it affects our understanding of foreign policy. It is now evident that the Corfield Report did not command complete acceptance from European settlers when published in 1960. Quite a large proportion of liberal settlers were already looking towards some form of broad-based alliance with moderate African leaders.

22.	Richard Cox, <u>Pan-Africanism in Practice: P.A.F.M.E.C.S.A. 1958</u> - 1964 (London, O.U.P., 1964).	
23.	Clyde Sanger and John Nottingham, 'The Kenya General Election of 1963!. T.J.M.A.S., 2, 1(1964), pp. 1-40.	

 24. Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya. The Political Economy of <u>Neo-Colonialism 1964-1971</u> (London, Heinemann, 1975). Gary Wasserman, Politics of Decolonization: Kenya Europeans and the Land Issue 1960-1962 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976). K.A.D.U. provided potential allies in the early 1960-1961 period. Its leaders were agreeable to close links with the metropole, most noticeably so in the retention of British troops in Kenya after independence. In terms of strategic and economic interests, Harold Macmillan's 'wind of change' was to blow through the country with little serious threat to British interests. However, the nationalists of K.A.N.U. proved that they, with or without Kenyatta, commanded majority support in the country and British interests reconciled themselves with this fact. By 1962, the British Government and liberal settlers in Kenya backed K.A.N.U. and desired early independence. Investments in the country and the economy in general had run down since 1960 and quick independence and a return to stability held out the only hope for European settlers and investors.

The crucial issue affecting peaceful withdrawal was that of land. The New Kenya Party (N.K.P.), the most influential settler group, had stressed the importance of land in its <u>Plan for Success</u>;

The Party recognises that many European farmers have grave doubts as to whether their individual mixed farming enterprises will be able to survive ... The whole weight of our efforts will therefore be thrown into policies designed to create conditions in which European farming enterprises can continue and prosper.25

Directly opposed to the settlers were the former 'Mau Mau' fighters who called for free land distribution after independence. Such an occurrence would have caused the flight of Europeans from Kenya and short-term, if not long-term, falls in agricultural production, the mainstay of the economy. Needless to say, other European investments in the country would have suffered and disappeared along with the farming interests.

K.A.N.U. politicians accepted the viewpoint that there were dangers

in a rapid take-over of land without due financial payment to Europeans. They decided to buy the land from those settlers who wanted to sell at market prices with loans granted by the British Government and the World Bank. The Kenyan elite gained by such a move because vast numbers of landless were resettled quickly on to small areas of land while large fertile farms were reserved for the rich Kenyans who could afford them. Potential unrest was nipped in the bud and the elite stepped into the shoes of the outgoing Europeans. Provision was also made for Europeans to stay if they wished. By agreeing to buy the land, the Kenyan nationalists turned their backs upon their ideology which stated that the land had been stolen from them by the Europeans. They accepted the colonial situation virtually without modification. This was to have serious consequences, because the options open to Kenyan leaders in foreign policy matters became linked to the evolving neo-colonial situation. The land transfer programme, the position in power of the Kenyan elite, the development targets of the country, all these came to rest upon the relationship of Kenya with the West, and in particular with Britain.

Many European settlers found it difficult to cast off their doubts about Kenyatta and saw in him the cause of their downfall. Gradually there was a change of attitude, perhaps best exemplified by Sir Patrick Renison who, in the early 1960s, was Governor of Kenya. In May 1960, he had said:

Jono Kenyatta was the recognised leader of the non-co-operation movement which organised 'Mau Mau'. 'Mau Mau', with its foul oathing and violent aims, had been declared an unlawful society. He was convicted of managing that unlawful society and being a member of it Here was the African leader to darkness and death. 26

26. Murray-Brown, op. cit., pp. 300-301.

Renison believed that the future prosperity of Kenya depended upon the co-operation of all races which, in simple terms, meant that an independent Kenya had to have a tacit partnership between Africans and Europeans. And as Renison stated, 'I have at present no evidence whatsoever that Jomo Kenyatta will help in these aims'.²⁷

Barely a year later, however, Renison had reversed his opinion and personally sanctioned the release of Kenyatta from detention. To support his views, Renison wrote to the Secretary of State in London:

... Kenyatta has given every indication that he is now in no way irreconcilable to the maintenance of law and order and to the association of all peoples of Kenya with its progress to independence in an East African setting based on a sound economy. 28

A 'sound economy' was obviously one which respected European interests and this showed that the Kenyan leader was willing to accommodate the various interest groups in independent Kenya. This was not only a sign of Kenyatta's compliance with foreign interests, but showed also a change of perception by the British Government and settlers. The realisation grew that Kenyatta was not really <u>Jomo</u>, the 'burning spear' of African radicalism, but had been a conservative nationalist all along.²⁹ He was a man who bore few grudges and could write of his <u>Suffering without bitterness</u>,³⁰ a man who had spent many years living in England (and had been educated at the London School of Economics) and who had assimilated the values and aspirations of the West and wanted the West's assistance to achieve similar goals in Kenya.

27. Ibid.

- 28. Despatch from Governor, Kenya to Secretary of State for the <u>Colonies. Release of Jomo Kenyatta</u> (Cmnd. 1459, London, H.M.S.O., 1961), p. 3.
- 29. Donald C. Savage, 'Kenyatta and the Development of African Nationalism in Kenya', <u>International Journal</u>, vol. xxv, no. 3, Summer 1970, pp. 518-537. Jomo means 'burning spear' in Kikuyu.

By 1962, then, the British Government and settlers had clearly switched their support from K.A.D.U. to K.A.N.U., but it remained to be seen to what extent K.A.N.U. could enforce its authority over the weaker party.

K.A.N.U. versus K.A.D.U.

With the solid support of the British Government, K.A.N.U. during 1963 gained control of the political apparatus of the country. The party won an overwhelming victory in the election of May 1963 despite serious internal squabbles.³¹ On 1 June, Jomo Kenyatta took office as Prime Minister within the framework of internal self-government. The new constitution had, in most parts, been settled a year earlier at the second Lancaster House conference, 32 but it had not been published until April 1963 owing to problems concerning constituency delimitation and the Northern Frontier District. It was the most complex constitution ever written for any British colony approaching independence, thus exemplifying the difficulties encountered in gaining the agreement of all the interested parties. Kenyatta, unconditionally released from detention in August 1961, had led K.A.N.U. in obtaining a constitution with a strong central government under the leadership of a Prime Minister who held a majority in the Lower House, the House of Representatives. K.A.D.U.'s fear that the 'Westminster model' gave too much power to the majority, however small, was catered for by having an Upper House, the Senate, composed of members from each of the regions of Kenya. Six (later seven) Regional Assemblies were established to devolve power away from Nairobi.

31. Sanger and Nottingham, <u>op.cit</u>. Also, Oginga Odinga, <u>Not Yet Uhuru</u> (London, Heinemann, 1968), pp. 193-238.

32. <u>Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1962</u> (Cmnd. 1700, London, H.M.S.O., 1962).

Under the constitution, the Governor remained in charge of Defence, External Affairs and Internal Security, but on 30 May the Governor, Malcolm MacDonald, acted within his powers of discretion and passed on these functions to Kenyatta. On the surface this presented a rather anomalous situation because Kenya's colonial status meant that in international law only Britain could act for Kenya in foreign affairs. But in reality, the British Government knew that its interests and those of the Kenya Government coincided, and so it risked nothing by such a magnanimous gesture. Indeed, the Governor confirmed that Jomo Kenyatta was very co-operative during this period to the extent that all government papers, irrespective of content, were sent to him for inspection without request.³³

In mid June, discussions were held in London to prepare the way for a final conference to settle the constitution which was to operate in Kenya after independence. Tom Mboya, the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, made it clear that the Kenya Government wanted specific dates both for the forthcoming conference and for independence itself. Independence was desirable before the end of the year, particularly to achieve two foreign policy goals, namely admission into the United Nations that session and to facilitate the continuing talks between Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika concerning possible federation.³⁴ Mboya repeated K.A.N.U.'s pledge to have a Republic immediately at independence with an executive President. Finally, he requested intergovernmental talks with only token K.A.D.U. representation, so reflecting the political situation in Kenya.

33. Interview with Malcolm MacDonald on 8 August 1978.

34. It appeared later that the federation issue was being used to hasten Kenyan independence rather than the goal of federation itself; see chapter four.

The British Government decided in $July^{35}$ that independence was to be granted on 12 December 1963 and that a conference to finalise the constitution was to be convened in London at the end of September. The third constitutional conference opened on schedule with Duncan Sandys, the Colonial Secretary, in the Chair. The Kenya Government had twelve representatives, with K.A.D.U. having half of that figure and the European settlers a quarter. The gulf between the government and K.A.D.U. over the constitution was apparent at the first session. Kenyatta made clear the position of his government:

We cannot agree that merely because the present constitution was the result of agreements at the last Lancaster House conference, it is sacrosanct The fact is that the present constitution was the subject of massive compromises, artificial feelings of mistrust and fear and arbitration by the Secretary of State. It failed completely to satisfy the majority of people whose lives it was supposed to govern and has brought contention after contention. In the interest of harmony in Kenya, and in recognition of the majority opinion in the country, the constitution must be amended. 36

The British Government informed the conference that it had no intention of changing the constitution after having spent so much time balancing the various interest groups. Pressure from the K.A.N.U. delegation forced a reversal of this position, highlighting Britain's commitment to Kenyatta's government, but this was not before K.A.D.U. had tried to exert its own pressure on London. On 9 October, K.A.D.U. leaders in Kenya produced a map of a secessionist 'Kenya Pepublic'. The 'Republic' consisted of a horse-shoe of K.A.D.U.-controlled peripheral regions, with really only the Central and Western Regions left to the K.A.N.U. government. The map was signed by twenty-five Senators and M.P.s, including Daniel arap Moi, the K.A.D.U. Chairman. The new state was to have Nakuru as its capital, and was to be

36. The Times, 26 September 1963.

^{35.} Kenya: Preparations for Independence (Cmnd. 2082, London, H.M.S.O., 1963).

represented and governed by Ngala (President), Moi (Vice-President) and Muliro (Prime Minister).³⁷ That secession was a possibility cannot be doubted, but it was not a very real one. It seemed more likely that this gesture was aimed to generate support for the K.A.D.U. negotiators in London, and perhaps to provoke government arrests in order to mobilise the angry smaller tribes.

The plan backfired on K.A.D.U. Ngala and Muliro dismissed the plan for secession out of hand, and they sent one of the party rushing back to Nairobi to discover exactly what the plan was and to urge all K.A.D.U. members to bide their time and wait for a settlement in London.³⁸ The British Government remained unimpressed and, if anything, became even less partial to the minority's views. On the day following the secession threat, Kenyatta made a radio broadcast calling on all Kenyans to 'keep calm',³⁹ though most remained so throughout the discussions. The continuing deadlock forced the Acting Prime Minister, Joseph Murumbi, to take his own action on 15 October. In a cable sent to Kenyatta, he said:

It is the unanimous desire of Kenya to call off the London constitutional talks in view of the Secretary of State's deplorable attitude which is a deliberate insult to the Kenya nation. In our opinion there is no need for the formality of an Independence Bill to be passed in the British Parliament. The nation wishes to declare 20 October as Independence Day for Kenya. We deplore the half-measures, vacillations, and double-dealing in the talks. Please come back in time for the full independence oath of office on 20 October. 40

- 37. Ibid., 10 October 1963.
- 38. East African Standard, 11 October 1963.
- 39. Ibid.
- 40. The Times, 16 October 1963. 20 October is 'Kenyatta Day' which commemorates the day Kenyatta was arrested in 1952 during 'Mau Mau'.

This was overt pressure upon the British Government to settle the constitution immediately. K.A.D.U.'s threat of secession had not carried much conviction, but the Kenya Government's plan for immediate independence, with or without formal blessing, was a more serious threat. A unilateral declaration of independence would have had disastrous consequences for British interests in Kenya and so had to be avoided. The British Government had agreed in principle to Kenyan independence in December and so there was little reason in British obduracy at the conference. Furthermore, bargains had been struck on all the important economic matters and so there seemed little sense in becoming bogged down in debates on constitutional details. The government had the support of three-quarters of the Kenyan population, and this made it unrealistic for the British not to lean towards the K.A.N.U. viewpoint. Duncan Sandys acted quickly and, having overruled K.A.D.U.'s objections. made the decisions public.⁴¹

The amendments to the constitution were of two types, namely those which had been agreed upon by all sides and those which, in effect, had been forced upon the K.A.D.U. minority by the two governments. Those amendments in the first group were not of a particularly serious political nature and concerned such things as the availability of Kenyan citizenship, the appointment when necessary of a Special Commissioner for the regions, and the bringing of statutes for Weights and Measures under the central government. Those amendments in the second group were clearly against K.A.D.U's interests and gave the party grounds for complaint. All were clearly aimed at reducing the threat which the Kenya Government believed regionalism held to national unity. Conversely, K.A.D.U. perceived national unity in the government's

41. Kenya Independence Conference 1963 (Cand. 2156, London, H.M.S.O., 1963).

terms as a threat to its own existence and interests. For example, it was decided that tribal origins were not to be specified when making an application for employment. The government considered this to be for the sake of national unity while K.A.D.U. saw it as a ploy for the Kikuyu and Luo to maintain their domination of the top positions. No attempt was to be made to aid the disadvantaged regions in balancing out employment ratios. As concessions by the government, however, the regional nature of the constitution, with all its safeguards, was accepted and the call to have a Republic at independence, with a strong executive President, was dropped.

After the conference, a leader in <u>The Times</u> spoke of the 'Broken Covenant' of the British Government to the people of Kenya, but was, nevertheless, hopeful of a just and lasting solution.⁴² Duncan Sandys held similar hopes:

I know that there are some who will consider it wrong of the British Government to approve any departure whatsoever from the provisions previously agreed. I fully understand their feelings; and I can assure them that before taking any decision we most earnestly considered our obligations. As a result we came to the clear conclusion that it was our duty to do what was in the best interests of Kenya in the years ahead. 43

The arrangements were also clearly in the best interests of the British Government and European financial interests in the country because the backing of a strong central government provided some hope for a quick return to stability. The British gambled that regionalism in Kenya was not the same force it was in other parts of the continent, such as in Nigeria. With hindsight, this appeared to have been a safe bet because the opposition party fizzled out within a year and the <u>majimbo</u> or regional constitution for which the party had fought so hard was

42. The Times, 21 October 1963.

43. Kenya Independence Conference 1963, op.cit., annex A, section 31.

scrapped when the country became a Republic in December 1964. K.A.D.U. leaders, as we shall now see, were then brought into the government and presented no further challenge to national unity.

The Outlook at Independence

At independence, contradictory forces appeared to be at work in Kenya. A strong nationalist party had wrestled independence from the British and stood ready to implement policies which aimed to change the country from an underprivileged colony to a strong and egalitarian African independent state. It seemed that this aim would force the new leadership to clash with traditional settler interests and so cause a setback in the economic position of the country. As it was, the British had managed to steer their way through the tangled web of nationalist movements and constitutional conferences and came out in 1963 relatively unscathed. The desire of the nationalists to maintain close links with Britain, even if it meant compromising their political ideology, gave a further positive impetus to the British position.

Within Kenya, the government faced the task of building a viable nation and forging unity within the country, which meant that any ethnic or secessionary pressures had to be dealt with swiftly and, if possible, justly in order to prevent their reoccurrence. Linked to this was another major goal of providing for the welfare and development of the people. Unless everybody felt that they were gaining something from the government, internal dissension was likely to grow. The possibility that development would reflect the relative influence of the various ethnic groups caused concern to many in 1963. Elspeth Huxley had felt in March 1963 that 'Kenya's gravest lack is in constructive African leadership able to transcend the deep-seated factionalism based on race and tribe. Uhuru could peter out like a clogged river in a welter of distrust, argy-bargy and hatred - and even in the ultimate civil war.⁴⁴ The <u>East African Standard</u> had written in a similar vein shortly after the achievement of internal self-government: 'What Kenya needs to cultivate is unity, not the prolongation of tribal differences through a sharpening of the regional system which, in the beginning, was agreed by both parties and the British Government in order to allay these very fears.⁴⁵

Initial fears that K.A.D.U. would not co-operate with the government were soon dispelled. The voluntary dissolution of the party in 1964 highlighted the fact that there were few, if any, ideological differences between the governing elite and the K.A.D.U. elite. Both favoured capitalist development in association with western countries and both hoped to gain, at a personal level, from such links. At a wider level, there were also benefits in supporting the government because this increased the chances of the K.A.D.U. tribes gaining their fair share of development funds. The raison d'être of K.A.D.U. was to gain whatever was possible for its supporters and, after 1964, this could be achieved more easily without the formal party apparatus.

A much more serious threat to the domestic and foreign policy orientations of the government was to emerge from the fact that it was difficult to implement the reforms originally promised by Kenyatta and still maintain the neo-colonial arrangements. In 1966, Jomo Kenyatta's close friend and the country's Vice-President, Oginga Odinga, broke away from K.A.N.U. and established the Kenya People's

44. East African Standard, 8 March 1963.

45. Ibid., 14 June 1963.

Union (K.P.U.). The K.P.U. called for a radical transformation of Kenyan society and an end to the dependence upon the West. Though the K.P.U. was pushed back largely on to a Luo tribal base, it formalised opposition on ideological grounds and represented alternative viewpoints on development and foreign policy which were prevalent throughout the 1970s, even after the party's proscription.

The problem of secession was also a serious one for the government to face. The amount of patience and severity, the use of carrot and stick, with the smaller tribes would be important if they were to be brought into the nation. The major difficulties, however, emanated from outside of Kenya's borders. The frontiers with Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Tanganyika were accepted by all and caused little concern. Two areas of contention remained to be settled. Firstly, the Kenya Protectorate, better known as the Coastal Strip, was historically linked to Zanzibar. Since the 1890s, the British Government had paid a rental for use of the strip to the Sultan of Zanzibar. The Sultan laid vague claims to sovereignty over the strip, but Kenyans opposed these claims. The strip, with the important trading port of Mombasa, was inextricably linked to the rest of Kenya. An agreement was reached in October 1963 whereby full sovereignty was granted to Kenya on the attainment of independence. 46 The Sultan's bargaining position had been a weak one, not helped by Zanzibar's heavy dependence upon British Nevertheless, before the Sultan had agreed to relinquish his aid. claims, he had received from Kenyatta a note committing the government

Kenya Coastal Strip: Agreement between the Government of the United <u>Kingdom, His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar, the Government of</u> <u>Kenya and the Government of Zanzibar</u> (Cmnd. 2161, London, H.M.S.O., 1963). Also, The Kenya Coastal Strip. Report of the Commissioner (Cmnd. 1585, London, H.M.S.O., 1961); Report of the Kenya Coastal Strip Conference 1962 (Cmnd. 1701, London, H.M.S.O., 1962).

to safeguard the interests of the Arab community in the strip.

The territorial dispute with the Somali Republic over the Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.) was a much more difficult problem to solve. The government always stated that the Somalis living in the N.F.D. had the right to be integrated into the country as a whole, and the dispute tested not only the finite resources of the new state but also the difficulties of moulding an ethnic conglomeration into a viable, meaningful nation. This dispute will be dealt with in detail in chapter three.

The foreign policy to be pursued in major international arenas, in particular the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, was influenced to a large extent by the country's own experience of, and revulsion with, colonialism. The government followed the common African path of a highly moralistic foreign policy, as well as a firm commitment to non-alignment, which was to allow the country's leaders to judge each issue on its individual merits and not how one or other of the power blocs wanted them to judge it. In practice, this policy of non-alignment was undermined to a large extent by the country's close economic relationship with the West. Certainly, European investment and settler interests were strong enough to influence Kenyan policies if and when necessary, but it was evident, and became increasingly evident throughout the years, that Kenyatta and his colleagues favoured these links not just for their own benefit (the thrust of the neo-colonial thesis) but because they sincerely believed that everybody in Kenya was to benefit from such links.

Conclusion

The colonial period witnessed a gradual hardening of attitudes

against the settlers by the African majority, a process which led eventually to independence for the colony. The assimilation of European values and aspirations by the African leaders during this period, rather than causing a rejection of the colonial links at independence, provided the stimulus for a pro-western orientation in foreign policy and development priorities. Britain's decision to axe the colony without any apparent bitterness laid the foundation for a friendly coexistence. Tensions between the two governments rapidly dissolved. The transfer of power was eased by the agreement to buy out the settlers at full face-value for their land, while trade between the countries remained as important as ever. In short, rather than break with the past, Kenyatta decided to continue and strengthen the links with the West in order to provide for the development of the country.

The effects of the close association were far-reaching as will be shown in future chapters. Foreign policy options became limited by western influence, and as the freedom for manoeuvre was confined to fixed parameters in foreign policy, so domestic unrest became apparent. In the East African arena, the economy, boosted by multinational interests, was too strong for the comfort of the country's partners and this problem lay at the heart of the East African Community's demise. Kenya's professed drive for capitalist growth, with European backing, led to unequal growth in the region.

Kenya's reliance upon the West for its military requirements in the East African and Indian Ocean arenas helped leave the country with one of the weakest military capabilities in the region, as well as the continent as a whole in Gross National Product to population terms. The war in the Horn of Africa in 1977-1978 and the perception that the West was backing the country's enemy, the Somali Republic, shocked

Kenyan leaders and forced them to reassess the country's position in relation to the West. This thesis shows the extent to which Kenya was dependent upon the West and thus highlights the difficulties which the country had, and will have in the future, in formulating a truly independent foreign policy.

Chapter Two

Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy

The development of foreign policy analysis as a subject in its own right has caused, and has been a cause of, a growing awareness of the interrelated nature of the domestic and external environments. Foreign policy analysis has added a further dimension to the traditional fields of political science and international politics by helping to explain the interaction, or linkage, of the two.

The aim of this chapter is to examine how the domestic political and administrative structure of Kenya shaped the content of foreign policy. This is not a straightforward exercise because it is often difficult to pinpoint from where a certain policy originated and whether domestic considerations affected external ones or vice versa. Furthermore, when the decision-making process is masked by extreme secretiveness, as is the case with Kenya, the problems of analysis are increased. It then becomes easy to accept the popular view that the domestic structure consists of a charismatic President and nothing else. Although there is more than a grain of truth in this assertion, it is by no means the complete picture of the decision-making process.

The importance of a variety of internal factors in the shaping of the foreign policies of less developed countries (L.D.C.s) has been doubted for many years, but has recently been recognised as worthy of study.¹ This is not to say that the internal political structures of African states are as complex or as important as those in more developed

 Christopher Hill, 'Theories of foreign policy making for the developing countries' in Christopher Clapham, Foreign policy making in developing states (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1977) pp. 1 - 16. countries, but that they should, nevertheless, be studied. This chapter looks, in turn, at the role of the governing elite group composed of the President and his Cabinet, the bureaucracy, the National Assembly, the Armed Forces, Trade Unions and business interests, and the media. The second part of the chapter discusses events within the domestic political arena during the 1960s and 1970s. This draws upon the material presented earlier to put into perspective the domestic sector and to show its relevance in the formulation and implementation of Kenyan foreign policy.

The governing elite: the President and his Cabinet

It is now commonly accepted that, in all countries, responsibility for foreign policy decision-making rests largely on an elite group within society. This elite group rationalises decisions taken to be in the interests of the nation as a whole, but often they are mainly to their own advantage. The 'elite' of Kenyan society can be seen in terms of a number of overlapping groups - military, business, administrative - but with the governing political elite wielding the most influence.

By far the most dominant actor within the political system was the President himself. In terms of domestic politics, his role was to hold the centre of the stage and bring together, as well as at times keep apart, the various competing groups within society. He had an equally important role to play in the formulation of foreign policy. It is interesting to consider how Jomo Kenyatta was able to achieve and maintain this prominence in the political system. The discussion can be framed around the words of Fred I. Greenstein who, writing on the impact of personality on politics, said in one section that 'the impact of an individual's actions varies with (1) the degree to which the

actions take place in an environment which admits of restructuring, (2) the location of the actor in that environment, and (3) the actor's peculiar strengths or weaknesses'.²

It can be concluded that Kenyatta was able to capitalise on all three qualifications and so take on the most influential role in the political system. The time of independence provided an excellent environment for restructuring the political nature of the state, although less so the economic, because of the residual colonial interests. Jomo Kenyatta's status as the nationalist hero, the 'burning spear', gave him the popular backing to control the government however he wished. His control over the spoils of office assured him the support of the majority of his colleagues. Finally, Kenyatta's shrewdness and ability, combined with his 'charisma', made him a very powerful political figure, and one against whom a serious political rival had very little chance of success.

During Kenyatta's long period in office, there were never any serious contenders for his position. The only two potential opponents, Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga, could not match the strength of Kenyatta, and only Odinga tried. Kenyatta's personal impact upon policy gave the country an overwhelmingly pro-western orientation. Kenyatta was a conservative, and so was happy to chart out foreign policy within the parameters of a loose association with the West. As far as day to day affairs, his advanced age made him reluctant to be personally involved in all but the most important decisions. He, nevertheless, was the final arbiter. Malcolm MacDonald, Britain's representative in Kenya

2. Fred I. Greenstein, 'The Impact of Personality on Politics: an Attempt to clear away underbrush', <u>The American Political Science</u> Review, vol 1Xi, no. 3, September 1967, pp. 633 - 634.

during the 1960s, witnessed this fact:

... he delegated a lot of the less important things to his ministers. Actually, if I may say so, he kept his eye on them, and they knew his eye was on them; and if they did something he disapproved of they would be ticked off. But he left them free in that sort of atmosphere to get on with the job. If they weren't sure whether the old man was going to agree with what they meant to do, then they mentioned it to him, and he said Yes or No, and that was the decision. But he himself concentrated on the major matters ... 3

Even on very important matters where Kenyatta personally took charge, he usually preferred to seek Cabinet backing for his plans before implementation.

The Cabinet, composed of selected ministers from the National Assembly, could be classed as the widest extension of the governing elite responsible for policy-making. The Cabinet was itself open to a series of pressures, notably bureaucratic and ethnic. The civil service is discussed in detail below, but it will suffice to say here that the administrative organisation of Kenya gave top civil servants direct access to the President and the Cabinet, and so they proved to be powerful in the domestic political structure.

Ethnic factors also played an important role in the decisionmaking machinery, at times uniting the various sub-groups into an homogenous unit and other times keeping these groups apart. The Cabinet itself was a symbol of the attempts made by Kenyatta to forge unity in the nation. All the various ethnic groups were represented in order to offset any doubts that certain groups were being favoured more than others in the development process. So, for example, after Tom Mboya's assassination in 1969, three other Luos were promoted in the

3. 'Kenyatta: The Man I Knew', <u>Commonwealth</u>, December - January 1979, p. 45.

Cabinet to appease the discontented tribe.4

The Cabinet formally held the initiative in formulating foreign policy but in practice often proved too large and unwieldly for either quick or crucial decisions. Within the Cabinet there developed an Inner Cabinet of a handful of Kenyatta's closest friends and colleagues who usually discussed and moulded a policy before it went on to the full Cabinet. The composition of the Inner Cabinet was also influenced by ethnic as well as political considerations. Those closest to the President, his confidants, were Kiambu Kikuyu - the Attorney-General, Charles Njonjo, the Minister of State at the all-important Office of the President, Mbiyu Koinange, and the sometime Foreign Minister and personal physician of Kenyatta, Njoroge Mungai. Two others could be designated in this intimate circle as close colleagues, even though they did not share the same ethnic bickground - the Finance Minister, Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu but not from Kiambu, and the Vice-President and Minister of Home Affairs, Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin.

It would be a miscalculation to lay too much emphasis upon ethnic considerations, certainly as far as foreign policy decision-making was concerned. There was a slight breach between Kenyatta's closest colleagues, re-emphasised after his death when the new President arap Moi spurned both Mungai and Koinange, though not Njonjo, and brought Kibaki in as Vice-President. Also, certain groups, especially the Luo, felt that the links with external capital were monopolised by the Kikuyu so leading to greater development in Central Province

4. Financial Times, 25 July 1969.

than in Nyanza.⁵ But so far as the major orientations of foreign policy, the capitalist development programme, the retention of close economic and political links with the West, support for the U.N. and O.A.U. on the southern African problem, these and other fundamental policy matters caused little dissent among the governing elite who all shared similar aspirations and goals with the President.

The homogeneity of the Cabinet, as witnessed by the absence of major splits or defections (except Odinga) as well as by the permanency of most of its members, allowed ministers to have freedom to act because Kenyatta felt whatever decision was made would reflect his own views. Despite this freedom, Kenyatta maintained a decisive position in policymaking, as well as the power of patronage within the political system. His strong position made him by far the most important actor in foreign policy decisions and gave him the opportunity to stamp his own personality onto the nation's political and economic plans. Kenyatta and the governing elite group as a whole were responsible for foreign policy, but they were open to pressure from other groups within society to which we shall now turn.

The Bureaucracy

The role of the bureaucracy or administrative organisation in foreign policy-making has increasingly attracted the interest of scholars. Whereas complex organisational models⁶ were drawn up to


- 5. Donald S. Rothchild, 'Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya', <u>T.J.M.A.S.</u>, 7, 4 (1969), pp. 689-711; David Court and Kenneth Prewitt, 'Nation versus Region in Kenya: a note on Political Learning', <u>The British Journal</u> of Political Science, vol. 4, part 1, January 1974, pp. 109-115.
- 6. For example, Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1971).


explain the position of the bureaucracy in developed countries, little thought was given to similar models for the developing countries where it was for a long time felt that the bureaucracy had an insignificant role to play in policy-making. For example, one scholar felt that the lack of information available in the bureaucracy of a developing country persuaded the President to consider any advice to be suspect and led him to act on his own judgement.⁷ However, to counter this, our awareness of perception and imagery can tell us that on many occasions the bureaucracy in a developed country could also be ignored by a President or policy elite group.⁸

In recent years, the balance has shifted in favour of studying the role of the bureaucracy in the decision-making process of developing countries.⁹ It has already been stated that the charismatic President, Jomo Kenyatta, was the principal actor in the decision-making apparatus, but he was dependent to some extent upon information and advice from those directly involved in foreign affairs. Consequently, we need to look at the organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its ability to collect accurate information on events outside of the country, and its role, along with other interested ministries, in the formulation of foreign policy.

An examination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as shown in

- 7. Joel S. Migdal, 'Internal Structure and External Behaviour: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Third World States', <u>International</u> Relations, vol. iv, no. 5, May 1974, pp. 510-525.
- 8. Peter R. Baehr, 'Small States: A Tool for Analysis', World Politics, vol. xxvil, no. 3, April 1975, pp. 456-466.
- 9. <u>Ibid.</u>; Hill, <u>op. cit.</u>; Franklin B. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia. An Approach to the analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries', <u>World Politics</u>, vol. xxiv, no. 3, April 1972, pp. 356-381.





N.B. Number of personnel in each division in brackets

Table 2:1, provides a breakdown of the various divisions or areas of interest. The largest division, after protocol, was concerned with economics and trade, thus highlighting their central importance in the country's foreign policy. The central pivot as regards the flow of information was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was in a position to absorb information presented by the divisions as well as by other ministries, and then represent these views in the Cabinet or personally with the President. In turn, the Foreign Minister passed on the decisions made on a specific issue to the division concerned for implementation.

The combined processes of information-collection and policyimplementation were carried out abroad by the country's embassies. As can be seen from Table 2:2, most of the Kenyan missions were to be found in the West and in Africa, and this quite obviously reflectal the country's interests and necessities. Further missions were to be found in Kampala and Dar es Salaam, though Community practice did not

VEST	AFRICA	INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS	OTHERS	
U.K.	Egypt	U.N. (New York)	U.S.S.R.	
U.S.A.	Somalia	F.A.O. (Rome)	India	
W. Germany	Zaire		•	
France	Ethiopia			
Sweden	Zambia			
•	Nigeria			

Table 2:2

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Source: Directory of Diplomatic Corps. May 1977 (Nairobi, Government Printer/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1977).

allow for them to be regarded as diplomatic missions. The government was clearly disadvantaged by the absence of missions in countries outside of the western orbit, and this affected the amount of information available on which to base foreign policy. Given this situation, it was unlikely that the prevalent image held by the governing elite of the non-western world would be changed, and there was little evidence to suggest that the government was concerned about a reevaluation of these relations.

In 1978, the Kenya Government announced it was opening more embassies as suited its requirements, but apart from reopening diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China after a break of over a decade, there was little surprise in the choices of Japan, Canada and the European Economic Community (Brussels).¹⁰ Additional information upon which to base policy decisions was forthcoming from the large number of foreign diplomatic missions accredited to Nairobi.¹¹ This provided the government with a greater variety of diplomatic contacts than could have been gained, or warranted in financial terms abroad.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while formally charged with the tasks of developing and implementing the country's foreign policy, was not engaged in policy-making on its own and was joined by many other ministries, notably Finance and Planning, Commerce and Industry, Defence, Agriculture and Education. This means that to understand the bureaucratic structure as it concerned foreign policy-making it is

10. A.R.B., 1978, p. 5100.

11. There were 79 missions in 1977; see <u>Directory of Diplomatic Corps</u>, op.cit.

necessary to look at many ministries acting together rather than one ministry, that of Foreign Affairs. It would be difficult, however, to draw up an accurate scenario of the interaction between the various ministries because of the secrecy in which the decision-making process was carried on as well as the fluidity of the machinery. It is possible, though, to isolate some measure of conflict between ministries over certain aspects of policy. For example, the decision not to break off diplomatic relations with Britain over Rhodesian 'independence' in 1965 clearly upset the Foreign Ministry which had supported the move at a previous O.A.U. meeting. It is clear that on this occasion the lobbying by commercial and business groups within the decision-making structure won the day. Another two examples can be noted from the mid 1970s. Firstly, the question of whether to support 'dialogue' with South Africa produced conflict within the civil service, with the Attorney-General leading the protagonists of dialogue against the Foreign Ministry. A second example can be seen concerning how to deal with the East African Community, where the Foreign and Finance ministries tried to influence those other sections of the bureaucracy which were less keen to maintain the links.¹²

These examples can provide us with tentative conclusions to show that there were times when different ministries clashed over what should be the nature of foreign policy, and so these bureaucratic 'imputs' were important considerations in the formulation of policy. In general, there appeared to be a common set of principles and goals which provided a unifying influence on both the bureaucratic and the governing elites. This set of values was largely a result of conditioning during the colonial period. Kenyatta realised at the time

12. See chapters four and five for in depth discussions of these issues.

of independence that to rule the country efficiently it was necessary to have a strong civil service. To facilitate this, he adopted more or less the same administrative structure which had been present during the colonial period and, to attract personnel, kept the same life-style and salary levels that Europeans had held previously. Of more importance in political terms, Kenyatta allowed the civil servants to hold effective power in the country rather than the elected representatives of the people. This assured the top administrators direct access to the President and an important position in the domestic political scene.

David Apter summed up his opinion of the importance of the bureaucracy in the political structure of developing countries as follows:

Civil servants, through their expertise and their modes of organization, comprise the single most important group for the translation of government policy into social practice. But they are a difficult group for political leaders to deal with or assimilate because, on the one hand, they are generally better educated than the politicians, with a subtler awareness of their own position, and on the other, they have a greater security of tenure, which creates a totally different outlook.13

In the Kenyan case, however, the relative permanence of the governing elite provided the opportunity for a strong partnership between the top civil servants and the government, though not the rank and file politicians. Two other factors can be added to exemplify the common outlook between the two elite groups. Firstly, the Ndegwa Report of 1970 allowed civil servants to take an active role in business as well as administration. This gave rise to many top administrators becoming

^{13.} David E Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, University of Chicago, 1965), p. 167. See also Cherry Gertzel, 'The Provincial Administration in Kenya', Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, vol. iv, no. 3, November 1966, pp. 201-215.

wealthy businessmen, so wishing to maintain the status quo in relation to the close links with western capitalism. Secondly, the presence of a sizeable minority of expatriate personnel helped to shape policies followed as well as moulded the ideas and values of their indigenous colleagues around them.¹⁴

To sum up, then, the civil service had a significant role to play in the collection of information as well as the presentation of policy alternatives. At times, conflict occurred between various ministries over which policy decision to adopt, but generally there was a consensus with the governing elite which, in any case, held the final word on the selection of policies.

The National Assembly

The level of influence which any legislature exerts over foreign policy is fairly small, though the governing elite normally pays lipservice to the principle of accountability, which is itself often formally limited. The status of the National Assembly in the decisionmaking structure in Kenya was that which could be expected, with the elite group shaping policies for the legislature to approve. The position of M.P.s was further undermined by their comparative political weakness vis-à-vis the civil servants of the administrative elite. This was noted by one scholar who commented that 'viewed from a national development perspective, one is especially struck by the general inability of politicians to effectively shape the public policy process in Kenya and to impose on administrators an instrumental

^{14.} J.R. Nellis, 'Expatriates in the Government of Kenya', Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, vol. xi, no. 3, November 1973, pp. 251-264.

orientation of service¹⁵ The government preferred to lay emphasis upon an association with senior civil servants rather than with politicians, but there was a need for the government to have an understanding with the M.P.s if only to get policies approved without too much rancour, though approval was almost always forthcoming.

Originally, the National Assembly was composed of two Houses, the Upper House or Senate, which had had membership on a provincial basis, and the Lower House or House of Representatives, which held M.P.s directly elected on a normal constituency basis. The government was always opposed to the establishment of the Upper House because it was tacit recognition of the need to cater for the fears of the minority tribes. In 1966, therefore, Kenyatta decided to amalgamate the two Houses in order to help forge national unity. Before this event took place, the opposition party, the Kenya African Democratic Union, had already been dissolved, thus leaving the country as a <u>de facto</u> oneparty state.

The one-party state allowed some measure of free speech and discussion on policy alternatives, but the initiative rarely lay with the Assembly. The power of the government was further increased by the steady decline in influence of the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union. The party presented an opportunity for grass-roots feelings to be carried through the political machinery to the highest levels, but its inactivity further weakened the ordinary M.P.'s chances of modifying or moulding the country's foreign policy. Claims

15. Robert H. Jackson, 'Administration and Development in Kenya: A Review of Problems Outstanding' in Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson and John Okumu (eds.), <u>Development Administration</u>. The Kenyan Experience (Nairobi, O.U.P., 1970), p. 324.

that K.A.N.U. was dead were often made,¹⁶ and elections for national offices were postponed by Kenyatta in 1972, 1976 and 1977 before President arap Moi finally held them after Kenyatta's death.

Table 2:3

Membership of the National Assembly

Speaker	(Ex	Officio	with Ministerial	stat	us)	1
Attorney-General	(•)	1
Elected Members					•.	1 <i>5</i> 8
Nominated Members						12 <u>172</u>

Source: <u>Statistical Abstract 1975</u> (Nairobi, Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1975).

K.A.N.U.'s demise was no doubt due to the fact that it was given little role to play in formulating the country's policies, and consequently support from within the country was not forthcoming. The most serious jolt to K.A.N.U., the National Assembly and the country in general came in 1966 when the Vice-President, Oginga Odinga, resigned from the government and formed an opposition party, the Kenya People's Union (K.P.U.). The impetus for the party's formation came from a rejection of the government's development strategy and the country's courting of western neo-colonial interests. The K.P.U.'s manifesto stated the principal aims and objectives;

- a) To fight for the economic independence of the people of Kenya.
- b) To promote national consciousness and to safeguard against foreign interference.

^{16.} For example, in 1969 Ronald Ngala resigned from the executive committee of K.A.N.U. saying that the party was 'meaningless, disrespected and ineffective'; The Times, 25 March 1969.

c) To serve as a genuine weapon for removing racial and social discrimination and all other forms of exploitation and oppression.17

The K.P.U. failed to make an impact as a 'competing elite' group and brought no change to the entrenched preferences in foreign policy. That the party was allowed at all was significant in that it showed the government was willing to tolerate some criticism of its policies, but the government's patience soon ran out and the K.P.U. was hounded out of existence in 1969. This ambivalence towards opposition in the political system also manifested itself in the government's handling of elections and party dissidents. Given the accepted restrictions of a one-party state, the elections held in 1969 and 1974 were quite remarkable in that on average two-thirds of the sitting members were ousted in both elections.

Working against this presence of democracy in the country were the increasingly cynical manoeuvres of the President as he tried to crack down on those criticising him and his policies. An early example of this came in 1963, when the government managed to prevent 1,800 K.P.U. candidates from taking part in the local government elections on the grounds that their registration forms were incorrectly completed.¹⁸ The culmination of these moves against the K.P.U. came in 1969 when the party was banned and its leaders imprisoned without trial. Kenyatta defended his actions against the K.P.U. on the grounds that it was a purely tribal organisation, but he found it more difficult to defend his actions in the mid 1970s when he acted against members of his own party, K.A.N.U., as well as closing down the National Assembly on

17. Constitution of the Kenya People's Union (Nairobi, 1966).

18. Daily Telegraph, 6 August 1968.

- 40

several occasions without explanation. His actions, as will be shown below, were clearly aimed to muzzle the more outspoken members of the Assembly and make M.P.s accept government policies, if not without question, then certainly with less criticism.

This situation of being a <u>quasi-democracy</u>¹⁹ allowed some room for M.P.s to become involved in the policy-making process, though only as peripheral actors. They did have the opportunity to challenge the government on domestic and foreign policy, and this they did on occasions, though not always with success. For example, a majority of the National Assembly favoured federation within East Africa, but the government ignored their appeals. Most M.P.s also wanted more positive actions taken against Britain in 1965, but the government rode out that storm also. On some occasions, especially concerning the regime of President Idi Amin in Uganda, verbal attacks by a majority of M.P.s on Amin were given tacit support by the government where it was unable to take any positive steps itself for fear of economic disruption.

Many M.P.s were not afraid to attack the government on controversial issues, such as when ministers awarded themselves tax-free gratuities in 1969²⁰ or following the assassination of J.M. Kariuki in 1975.²¹ Yet on the whole their power to influence policy was limited and their willingness to stand up strongly to the government was diminished after 1975.

19. This is a term used in S.E. Finer, <u>Comparative Government</u> (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1970).

20. The Times, 28 June 1969 and 18 July 1969.

21. The Assembly 'accepted' rather than merely 'adopted' the report on the assassination despite strong opposition from government ministers; The Standard, 12 June 1975.

The Armed Forces

In a continent renowned for its military <u>coup d'états</u>, the Armed Forces in Kenya were conspicuous if only for their comparative absence from political affairs. This could be partly explained by the successful record of President Kenyatta in maintaining domestic stability as well as keeping the army, navy and air force relatively contented.

As far as external policy during the period of study, there was little reason for a massive build-up in the strength of the Armed Forces. Admittedly, the threats from the Somali Republic in the 1960s and from Uganda in the 1970s (as well as Somalia in the mid 1970s) were sufficient to cause concern in the government, but as will be shown in the next chapter, Kenyatta preferred to look for assistance from Britain in times of crisis to the other option of increasing the strength of the army.

Kenyatta's desire to limit the army's strength emanated mainly from major domestic considerations. Owing to the colonial government's reluctance to arm and train its natural opponents the Kikuyu, the colonialists preferred to enlist members of other tribes, notably the Kamba. At independence, this left the Kikuyu-dominated government with Armed Forces of dubious loyalty, underlined by the mutiny at Lanet less than a month after independence.²² To have engaged in a rapid enlistment of Kikuyu men into the Armed Forces would have sparked off discontent among the other tribes, and so the government had to be satisfied with a steady increase in Kikuyu numbers.²³

22. Ali A. Mazrui and Donald Rothchild, 'The Soldier and the State in East Africa: Some Theoretical Conclusions on the Army Mutinies of 1964', The Western Political Quarterly, vol. xx (1967), pp. 82-96.

^{23.} Cynthia H. Enloe, 'The Military Uses of Ethnicity', <u>Millennium:</u> Journal of International Studies, vol. 4, no. 3, Winter 1975-76, pp. 220-234.

Table 2:4

Kenyan Armed Forces 1977

Population:	*	14,360,000					
Military Ser	rice:	voluntary					
Total Arned 1	forces:	7,700					
Estimated GN	P 1975:	\$2.8 m.					
Defence exper	diture 1976:	294 m. shillings (\$35 m.					
Army:	6,500	••					
Navy:	400						
Air Force:	800						

Para Military Forces 1,800 police

Source: The Military Balance 1977-78 (London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977).

Even in 1971, following a half-hearted <u>putsch</u>, a Kamba Chief of Staff was replaced by another Kamba and not a Kikuyu.²⁴

The government further sought to limit the influence of the Armed Forces in the domestic structure by maintaining a large number of expatriate, mainly British, officers on secondment in Kenya. Although nominally for training purposes, the presence of expatriates gave the government the opportunity to hold the ranks in place as well as have people on hand to hear of any impending disaffection. The government did not perceive the presence of expatriate officers to be any threat to political stability. At the same time as limiting the independent action and influence of the military, the government set about the / establishment of a para-military unit, the General Service Unit (G.S.U.),

24. The Times, 7 July 1971.

which was more under the sway of Kikuyu influence and so was a counterweight in the domestic arena to the military. The G.S.U. was heavily implicated in the assassination of Kariuki in 1975,²⁵ and a special airborne anti-cattle rustler branch was involved in an abortive coup d' 6 tat immediately after Kenyatta's death in 1978.²⁶

However much the government tried to improve its insecure grip on the military, it was still left with the necessity to appease the Kamba in order not to give them a reason for disaffection. The success of this appeasement was seen in the apolitical stance of the military, while some record of the methods used could be witnessed in the government's favourable handling of the Kamba's foremost representative, Paul Ngei. Ngei had shown his capacity for independent action when his African People's Party broke with the government in 1963.²⁷ Brought back into the government fold in 1964, he was heavily implicated on corruption charges in the Maize Marketing Board in 1966,²⁸ but with government support he was able to overcome that problem.

A far more serious and cynical manoeuvre took place in the mid 1970s. Paul Ngei was found guilty in court of gross electoral malpractices in the 1974 election (including threatening to kill his opponent) and his seat was taken from him.²⁹ Kenyatta quickly acted to

25.	It	was	the c	chief	of the	G.S.U.	who wa	s last	seen	with	Kariuki	when
	he	was	picke	ed up	outside	e the Na	irobi	Hilton	Hotel	Le		

- 26. 'Assassination Plot', Africa, no. 88, December 1978, pp. 29-33.
- 27. This was immediately prior to the Third Lancaster House conference, and so at a very crucial stage.
- 28. Report of the Maize Commission of Inquiry (Nairobi, Government Printer, 1966), chapter 12.
- 29. The Times, 20 November 1975.

have an act passed which allowed him retrospectively to pardon any M.P. found guilty of electoral malpractice. Paul Ngei was the first to benefit from this act, and following a second election, he took up his seat in the National Assembly as well as his Cabinet position as Minister for Co-operative Development.³⁰

The military, then, played a negative role in the decision-making process in that the Armed Forces were not a major influential force in domestic politics and had little role to play against external enemies of the state. The comparatively peaceful and stable nature of Kenya gave no real cause for a military takeover, and the small size of the army, the attempts to appease the Kamba, and the relatively strong counter-balancing forces all helped to nullify the position of the military in the country.

Trade Unions and Business

With economic growth and development the highest priority in Kenya, the position and influence of the trade unions and the business community were important considerations in the political structure of the country. Although one would have expected major clashes between the two groups, regular government intervention precluded this to a large extent and helped to provide a fairly stable economic base.

The unions played a significant role in agitating for the independence of Kenya, just as union movements did in other African countries. The absence of strong national parties in the 1950s because of government restrictions gave a further stimulus to the political prominence of the unions, which gradually became the power base of one of Kenya's most formidable politicians, Tom Mboya. Mboya used the unions to good

30. Ibid., 14 January 1976.

effect during the struggle for independence and then used them to consolidate his own political position. However, just as the political arena witnessed a division between the 'radicals' and 'conservatives', to be discussed later, so the union movement began to split into factions. One faction, patronised by Mboya, favoured association with external groups closely linked to the United States of America, while the second faction favoured a more independent line, both against Mboya personally as well as neo-colonial influence in the country, and looked to Oginga Odinga and socialist countries for assistance.

The ideological rivalry in the early years within the union movement not only disrupted economic relations in the country but also highlighted the incapacity to prevent foreign interference in the economy and politics of Kenya. After a fatal clash between the rival factions in 1965, the President stepped in to enforce unity in the union ranks. Through legislation, one central union, the Central Organisation of Trade Unions (C.O.T.U.) was established and all foreign affiliations and external funding of unions were outlawed by the government. Furthermore, Kenyatta strove to eliminate economic disruption by making strikes illegal and by making the leadership of C.O.T.U. a governmental appointment.³¹

Kenyatta's strong action served to mask rather than cure the ideological split in the labour ranks. The formation of the opposition K.P.U. party in 1966 confirmed this fact, and internal divisions reappeared. In 1966 the government introduced a preventive detention act under which the first to be imprisoned without trial were pro-Odinga unionists. Kenyatta continued to undermine the position of those who

31. David O. Brownwood, <u>Trade Unions in Kenya</u> (Occasional Paper no. 2, Nairobi, Kenya Insitute of Administration, 1969), pp. 9-11.

opposed his domestic and foreign policies, and in 1969 he detained Odinga and proscribed the K.P.U. The final outlet for radical unionism was sealed, and so protest was pushed underground. Support for a reorientation in economic thinking was forthcoming from students at the University of Nairobi, but the government again silenced its critics by proscribing the students' union.

The central importance of economic development, in association with countries from the western world, in Kenya's foreign policy will be detailed in the next chapter, but certain points concerning the position of the business community in the domestic structure can be made here. The business community was not a single homogenous unit, but was composed of several diverse groups. The most important of these was the elite group concerned with large-scale enterprises. These people were interlinked with those of the governing and bureaucratic elites, and frequently were themselves members of those elite groups, having business interests alongside their official duties. Consequently, there was a harmony of interests between the groups and this provided support for the maintenance of the association with the West within the framework of neo-colonialism, because it was through these links that the greatest benefits were achieved.

Of less significance in the political structure were those people working in smaller economic concerns. The desire by this group to advance themselves was accomodated by the government either by allowing some to join the ranks of the elite, thus gaining from the neo-colonial relations, or else by diverting them towards areas customarily held by Asians. The Asian community held most of the positions in commercial enterprises and so were a useful scapegoat towards which the governing and business elites could deflect the claims for economic advancement.

The residual group of the small-scale self-employed and underemployed could gain little by way of change in the government's economic strategy. This left them as an underprivileged majority and so made them an angry and dissatisfied group who will, in future, become increasingly significant in Kenyan politics.

The Media

The role of the media - the press, radio and television - in any country is difficult to assess accurately as the extent to which the media influence, or are influenced by, the government cannot really be gauged. However, it is possible to make some comments about the role of the press, as well as radio and television, in Kenya. In contrast to these institutions in many other African countries, there was a large measure of freedom in Kenya for the media to tackle any issue except a full-scale assault on the President. Most attention was concentrated upon domestic rather than foreign policy issues, and when foreign affairs were discussed, the emphasis was upon what was happening in those countries rather than what Kenyan policy towards them was.

The provision of foreign news came from the major international news bureaux represented in Nairobi. Local news was collected by the Kenya News Agency (K.N.A.) which served the press and the Voice of Kenya (V.O.K.). The V.O.K. was responsible for the radio and television services, and was under the control of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The number of television receivers in Kenya was small, with around 36,000 in 1977, but radio receivers totalled one and onequarter million.³² Although nominally government-controlled, the radio and television were not afraid to voice an independent opinion on

32. The Europa Yearbook 1978. A World Survey (London, Europa, 1978).

issues. So, for example, in 1978 the Voice of Kenya was very critical of members of the National Assembly who were calling for exorbitant pay increases. The M.P.s complained of these attacks, claiming that the V.O.K., as a nationalised institution, ought not to attack them. The Attorney-General, however, said that the V.O.K. ought to be free to do, within reason, how it wished.³³

Table 2:5

Foreign News Bureaux in Nairobi 1977

Agence France-Presse Agenzia Nationale Stampa Associata Ceteka Deutsche Presse-Agentur Ghana News Agency Reuters United Press International Tass

Source: The Europa Yearbook 1978. A World Survey, op.cit.

The major newspapers in Kenya also made significant contributions in informing the public of what was going on in the country as well as trying to formulate opinions on certain issues, though their effect on the government was probably marginal. Both the largest daily English language papers were foreign owned,³⁴ a rather strange occurrence in a

33. The Standard, 21 July 1978.

34. The Standard was 100 per cent. owned by Lonrho, while the Daily Nation was 60 per cent. owned by the Aga Khan.

continent full of nationalised presses. The biggest selling daily newspaper, with a circulation of 80,000 copies in 1977,³⁵ was the <u>Daily Nation</u>, which normally was closest to the government for accurate views and opinions. The other major English language paper, <u>The</u> <u>Standard</u> (before 1974 the <u>East African Standard</u>), had a circulation of 30,000 copies daily,³⁶ and had been in the pre-independence period the most important settler newspaper. Of the vernacular press, the largest was the swahili paper <u>Taifa Leo</u>, which had a similar circulation figure to <u>The Standard</u>'s. These three newspapers taken together, accounting for the assumptions that nobody bought more than one newspaper and that at least three people read each paper, only give a total readership figure of 420,000 people, or less than 5 per cent. of the population. The major Sunday newspaper, the <u>Sunday Nation</u>, had a circulation of 80,000 copies in 1977.³⁷

The newspapers played important roles in both explaining government policies and criticising them. On some occasions, the papers were muted in their criticism because of the need to avoid an explicit attack on the President. When Kenyatta prorogued the National Assembly in 1974 less than one hour after it met following the elections, <u>The Standard</u> only dared to express unhappiness but gave the President the benefit of the doubt that he knew what he was doing.³⁸ Early in 1975, <u>The Standard</u> strayed from the knife-edge of independent journalism by criticising the state of the country following the assassination of J.M. Kariuki. Kenyatta took this as an attack upon himself and

35. The Europa Yearbook, op.cit.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. The Standard, 7 November 1974.

deported the leader writer back to Britain and forced the newspaper to print an apology to him.³⁹ If attacks upon the governing elite were dangerous in that the effects were unknown, then similar attacks upon M.P.s were quite common and acceptable within the domestic system. One example, taken from the <u>Daily Nation</u>, should suffice to show the newspapers' ability to criticise M.P.s:

Some perform well; others - many say the majority cut a pathetic figure in the august house. Many hardly ever speak. Many attend only occasionally, else how can one explain the pitiful attendance and the many occasions when there is no quorum? Just as our M.P.s are the custodians of the people's interest, the people themselves, who elect these M.P.s, have the right to call them to question.40

The role of the press in the domestic structure was an important one, but was circumscribed by the small readership level as well as its limited capacity to influence. The newspapers normally only devoted marginal space to foreign policy issues, but one exception to this was the <u>Nairobi Times</u>, a Sunday paper started in October 1977 under the editorship of Hilary Ng'weno,⁴¹ which followed the format of the 'quality' British press and gave over more space to international issues.

As a final point in this section, it is necessary to consider the position and influence of foreign newspapers and broadcasting in Kenya. This is an area in which only speculative answers can be made, but it should be regarded as an important one. Through their respective external services, foreign governments hoped to influence the policies

39. A.R.B., 1975, p. 3628.

40. Daily Nation, 14 July 1978.

41. 'David and the press Goliaths', Africa, no. 80, April 1978, pp. 60-61.

of the Kenya Government, though this was not always made explicit. As one scholar has pointed out over the British Broadcasting Corporation:

The B.B.C. itself cannot be used by the Government as a direct instrument of its foreign policy, and it is precisely this lack of complete governmental control which has won the B.B.C. respect and makes it such an effective means for projecting Britain favourably abroad the international environment in which Britain makes her foreign policy is influenced in her favour. 42

This is perhaps true, but in the Kenyan case the government was more receptive to information expressed through the western media than 'disseminated' through the media of the Soviet bloc, and so the perception of the recipients is a very important consideration in weighing up the case of foreign broadcasting and newspapers.

The Political Arena

The aim of this concluding section is to draw together material presented above to give a balanced overview of the relationship between the domestic political arena and the nature of foreign policy. The crucial factor to note about the foreign policy decision-making structure is that it was elitist. The President was at the heart of the system and though he was the most important actor, he was open to suggestions and advice from small groups of people around him, whether from the Cabinet, civil service or other significant groups. However, the fact that the people gathered around the President shared his overwhelmingly conservative and pro-western sympathies made sure that the country's foreign policy remained on its fixed course.

The decision to promote economic development within the framework

42. James O.H. Nason, 'International Broadcasting as an Instrument of Foreign Policy', <u>Millennium: Journal of International Studies</u>, vol. 6, no. 2, Autumn 1977, p. 137.

of neo-colonialism brought protest from certain spheres in the domestic arena. In the 1960s, when the political system was more fluid, an opposition group emerged around Oginga Odinga. The Kenya African Democratic Union had quickly disappeared after independence having no ideological differences with the governing party, and so until 1965, the governing party allowed internal rivalries to form around the two poles of the 'radicals' and 'conservatives'.⁴³ From this time Kenyatta and his colleagues acted to preserve the prevailing political philosophy of the country and set out on a steady campaign to destroy all the centres of opposition to his government.

With hindsight, it is possible to link these events in a chain of repressive actions, although some, notably the assassinations, cannot be linked to anyone in person. In 1965, Odinga's main tactician, Pio Pinto, was assassinated, thus leaving Odigna without adequate guidance.⁴⁴ In the same year the Lumumba Institute was closed, apparently because it was communist-inclined, and in 1966 Odinga was humiliated at the Limuru Conference and felt he had no alternative but to resign. By forming his own party, the Kenya People's Union, Odinga left himself open to further pressure from the government. The defecting M.P.s were forced to fight a 'little general election'⁴⁵ for their seats in 1966, and the K.P.U. only won a handful of seats in Odinga's home area. This allowed

43. Cherry Gertzel, The Politics of Independent Kenya (London, Heinemann, 1970), pp. 32-72; also Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru (London, Heinemann, 1967), pp. 253-315.

44. The Kikuyu man found guilty of the murder referred to 'big men' behind the scenes, but nothing more came of the case. The author expresses his thanks to the Pinto family for allowing him to look at collected family papers.

45. Gertzel, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 73-124. Also George Bennett, 'Kenya's "little general election"', <u>The World Today</u>, vol. 22, no. 8, August 1966, pp. 336-343.

Kenyatta to claim that the K.P.U. was a Luo, tribal organisation rather than an ideological party opposed to the policies of the governing elite. The K.P.U. suffered increasingly severe harassment until it was finally outlawed in 1969.

The circumstances of the party's proscription are interesting to note. The assassination of Tom Mboya in mid 1969 sent a shock wave through the Luo people. Mboya was the government's prominent spokesman and had done the most to undermine Odinga's strength, but Mboya was a Luo, and so the assassination was perceived to be a direct attack upon the Luo by the dominant Kikuyu tribe. The President did nothing to deny the tribal connotations, and his government was seen to be defending predominantly Kikuyu interests. The unrest and rioting by the disaffected Luo led Kenyatta to act.

By taking such a stand, Kenyatta allowed Kikuyu interests to be regarded as government interests. His shrewdness allowed him to hold a snap general election at the end of 1969 which saw two-thirds of the sitting M.P.s removed. This 'bloodless <u>coup d'état</u>', as one commentator called it, ⁴⁶ gave the people the opportunity to let off steam without damaging the fabric of the neo-colonial state. Through the early 1970s, political opposition was not too vocal, but the governing elite continued to pursue policies which appeared to suit <u>its</u> preferences rather than those of the masses. The strength of the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association (G.E.M.A.) was noticeable in all political and economic spheres, where it represented the interests of the various elite groups. The growing awareness of the wealth of the 'Kenyatta

46. Colin Legum, 'A new chance for Kenya', Observer Foreign News Service, 8 December 1969. Royal Family'also provided for discontent. The manner in which the money was gained - shady deals concerning land, hotels, mines, ivory, charcoal, as well as more legitimate methods⁴⁷ - brought condemnation from abroad and at home.

Opposition to the government's political policies surfaced again in 1975 following the assassination of an outspoken M.P., J.M. Kariuki. Kariuki had resigned from his junior minister's position in 1974 complaining of 'mental torture', ⁴⁸ and though the government banned all his campaign rallies for the 1974 election, he won his seat with a large majority.⁴⁹ His assassination in March 1975 came as a great shock to the country, but the circumstances surrounding the killing remained shrouded in mystery. People close to the President were implicated in the murder and the 'cover-up', but no satisfactory results emerged.

Kariuki's assassination sparked off widespread protest and led to further arrests by the government of 'dissident' M.P.s, the radical scholar Ngugi wa Thiong'o, and also to the prorogation of the National Assembly on several occasions. Kenyatta's actions left no room for doubt that he would not allow any serious opposition to the domestic and foreign policies which the country was following. His cynical handling of political dissent tarnished the reputation of Kenya for its

47. A good account was given in a newspaper series; <u>The Sunday Times</u>, 10, 17 and 24 August 1975. Also see Peter Edwards, 'Ruby Scandal highlights Kenya's Corruption Problem', <u>Observer Foreign News</u> Service, 4 October 1974.

48. The Standard, 1 October 1974.

49. This can be contrasted with the fact that the President's son, Peter Kenyatta, only just won his seat by 260 votes; <u>The Times</u>, 24 October 1974.

prosperity and stability, and critics began to question who exactly was prosperous in Kenya and whether stability at any price was desirable. By not tackling these fundamental features of the Kenyan political system, Kenyatta left an inheritance of problems for his successor.

Chapter Three

Economic Development and Foreign Policy

The aim of this chapter is to explore in detail the relationship between economic development, trade and aid, and foreign policy. The interrelated nature of these factors is quite obvious, in that trade with foreign countries forms a natural branch of external relations, as do questions of foreign aid in national development. The first half of the chapter deals with the broad issues of development goals, trade, tourism, and foreign aid and investment. The remaining sections take a geographical perspective and examine Kenya's foreign policy towards Britain, the West in general, the communist countries, the Middle East and Africa, and with multilateral donors of aid. The conclusion to the chapter provides some answers as to the level of development achieved in the country as well as the level of dependence of the economy.

Development Goals

The issue of 'development' is undoubtedly a complex and controversial one, as there is disagreement as to how the concept should be defined. A working definition for our use can be as follows:

development is a process of social change which

- 1. increases the total benefits available;
- 2. distributes new benefits in some inverse ratio to the distribution of benefits already acquired;
- 3. offers some assurance of being a process that can be sustained over time.

If the first of these requirements is translated into economic growth and the second is translated into equity in the distribution of wealth and income, these are the elements of the definition which are most easily discussed in universal terms... 1

1. John White, The Politics of Foreign Aid (London, Bodley Head, 1974), p. 30. This definition is itself open to interpretation as to the exact path of 'economic growth' to be followed, or in the decision as to which 'benefits' should be acquired or redistributed before others.

The development strategy of Kenya was explicitly stated in the government's Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1963/65 entitled African Socialism and its application to planning in Kenya.² The desire for economic growth was clear, as in the first section of the paper it was stated, 'With independence, Kenya intends to mobilize its resources to attain a rapid rate of economic growth for the benefit of its people.³ The government believed that 'the only permanent solution to all problems rests on growth'. The growth of the economy in the period under study was quite impressive. In the period 1964-72, the gross domestic product (G.D.P.) rose at an average rate of about 7 per cent. a year. This rate allowed some absolute benefit to the country on top of the high population growth rate of over 3 per cent. a year. The government's faith continued in the 1974-78 Development Plan when the target of 7.4 per cent. was set, but the oil crisis and inflation on a world scale pushed this figure out of reach with 1.2 per cent. growth recorded in 1975 recovering to 5 per cent. in 1976.

The policy document also spelt out the immediate objectives of the government's development strategy:

In Kenya today, the pressing problems include the rapid development of agricultural land; laying a basis for accelerated growth of industry; attracting capital, domestically and from abroad

- 2. African Socialism and its application to planning in Kenya (Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1963/65, Nairobi, Government Printer, 1965).
- 3. Ibid., section 1.
- 4. Ibid., section 53.

while ensuring that it is used in a social desirable way; modifying the tax structure in the interests of equity and larger revenues; guarding foreign exchange reserves; providing for a fuller participation by Africans in an expanding economy; relieving unemployment; removing idleness; reconciling pressures for expanding welfare schemes with the need to grow rapidly; and conserving our natural resources of land, water, and forests. 5

The achievement of these goals depended largely upon the finance provided by the growing economy. The government felt that it was necessary for the economy to remain as unchanged as possible by independence in order not to disrupt its capacity. As Jomo Kenyatta said in a major speech in 1964:

The Government realises that Africans must be integrated into the commercial and industrial life of the nation. We are therefore instituting measures which will enable Africans to take an ever-increasing part in these fields.

But we are determined that the development of African business and industry should be carried out without damaging the existing fabric of the economy. 6

The fact that the independent government continued to implement economic policies comparable with those of its colonial predecessors provides two vital points to note. Firstly, the economy developed upon openly capitalist lines with the emphasis upon continual growth. The political repercussions of this act were many, but included the increasing inequalities in wealth within the country, the protection of foreign investments and interests, the postponement of full-scale Africanisation and, in general terms, the problem of independent action in a 'neo-colonial' setting. Secondly, and closely linked to the previous point, evidence shows that the leadership preferred the maintenance of the intimate relationship with the West in economic and political spheres to a total rejection of the past. This choice was made both for the practical benefits of keeping the economy geared to

5. Ibid., section 17.

6. Jomo Kenyatta, <u>Suffering without bitterness</u> (Nairobi, East African Pub., 1968), p. 237. the West and also for ideological or philosophical reasons, because Kenyatta and his colleagues were happy with this compatible association and saw little reason to break it.

The most prominent difficulty at independence was to provide the right balance in economic planning between the vested interests of the settlers and the aspirations of the Africans. The problems in the business sector will be treated later on in the chapter, but the foundation of the government's policy in the agricultural sector was the land settlement programme in which land was bought at a pace acceptable to the settlers. Sections of the African community, notably the more radical nationalists such as Oginga Odinga and some of the former 'Mau Mau' fighters, opposed this policy because they felt it pandered more to the wishes of the European minority than to them. This resentment became open in 1966 with the formation of the opposition party, the Kenya People's Union (K.P.U.).

By beginning the settlement programme before independence, Kenyatta was assured that those Africans in possession of land would support him in opposing any subsequent free distribution of land as called for by the 'radicals'. In implementing this policy, Kenyatta turned his back on the nationalist ideology, for which he was largely responsible, which stressed that the Europeans had stolen the land from their ancestors and so could not expect any repayment. Most significantly in terms of the country's foreign policy, Kenyatta 'implicitly acknowledged his inability to prevent Europeans from influencing his people's political strategy by manipulating the country's economy'.⁷

7. John W. Harbeson, 'Land Reform and Politics in Kenya, 1954-70', <u>T.J.M.A.S.</u>, 9, 2 (1971), p. 244.

At independence, Kenyatta appointed Mr. Bruce McKenzie, a settler of South African origin, as Minister for Agriculture and Animal Husbandry in order to satisfy the demands of the settlers for assurances. Kenyatta also stood firm against the claims by the landless and unemployed for free land and, with substantial foreign financial assistance,⁸ managed to resettle some 500,000 Africans by 1970 on two million acres in the former scheduled ('white') areas. The final European mixed farmer was to be bought out by 1979, but even by the mid 1970s four million acres of valuable ranching and plantation land was owned by non-citizens, a sign that the government did not wish to upset the large international companies and prosperous individuals still present in this sector.⁹

The pursuit of other developmental goals was similarly constrained by the need to maintain the 'neo-colonial' economy. The self-help or $harambee^{10}$ schemes were perhaps exceptions as they were usually financed from local contributions, but the major demands of total Africanisation and internal control of the economy were not met. While small-scale development projects could be fairly easily achieved, it was clear that a transition to the egalitarian society proposed in the populist policies of the development programmes was not to take place without a radical shift in the emphasis of government policy.

- 8. Up until 1969, the British Government had provided K£20 million, which was two-thirds of the total money utilised. Other sources were West Germany, I.B.R.D., C.D.C., and the Kenya Government; <u>An Economic Appraisal of the Settlement Schemes 1964/65 - 1967/68</u> (Farm Economic Survey Report No. 27, Nairobi, Government Printer, 1971), p. 8.
- 9. Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism 1964-1971 (London, Heinemann, 1975), pp. 63-64.
- 10. 'Harambee' is the swahili motto of the country meaning 'let's pull together'.

Trade

Kenya was typical of other African or Third World countries in that exports consisted of mainly primary products, while imports were expensive manufactured and industrial goods, as well as foodstuffs. The fluctuation of prices for primary products made Kenya's economic base an insecure one and weakened its capacity for political and economic independence. Table 3:1 provides a general impression of the country's exports. It should be treated with some caution because it can provide a slightly distorted picture owing to the fluctuating world market prices. By the mid 1970s, tea production had become the largest expanding sector of agriculture, which was itself the backbone of the economy in terms of numbers employed and export earnings, and in 1976 the country stood as the world's third largest tea producer. The Kenya Tea Development Authority (K.T.D.A.) made special efforts to help smallholder development and met with some success, but two-thirds of total tea production remained in the hands of large multinational corporations and this provided the government with the problem of outflow of profits from the country.11

The government aimed to strengthen the country's economic position by concentrating upon import substitution, and a fair measure of success was achieved with the establishment of medium-range industries such as in leather goods, food processing plants and pharmaceuticals. In May 1974, the government introduced the Local Manufacturers (Export Compensation) Act which allowed for a 10 per cent. bonus to be paid whenever goods were exported outside of the East African region,¹²

11. 'Coming of the little man', <u>Africa</u>, no. 75, November 1977, pp. 54-55; <u>Employment</u>, Incomes and Equality. A Strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya (Geneva, I.L.O., 1972), p. 441.

12. The Standard, 23 May 1974.

Domestic Exports: Principal Commoditi	les as a Percent	age of Total Valu
Iten	1970	<u>1974</u>
coffee, unroasted	31.1	23.6
tea	17.7	11.9
petroleum products	11.4	16.1
sisal fibre and tow	2.6	10.4
meat and meat preparations	4.0	2.8
pyrethrum extract and flowers	3.0	3.5
hide and skins	2.3	2.7
cement, building	2.3	2.4
others	25.6	26.6
	100.0	100.0

Source: <u>Statistical Abstract 1975</u> (Nairobi, Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1975).

and this attempted to switch the emphasis away from import substitution to exports.

By far the most important trading partners were, as Table 3:2 shows, countries in Western Europe which received a large proportion of the country's exports and provided Kenya's imports of industrial and manufactured goods. Although East Africa was relatively better off, the problem of communications within Africa as a whole limited the development of further trade in the continent. This lack of trade was reinforced by the fact that Kenya had little to trade in with other African states, because its major requirements could only be provided by the developed world, which naturally wished to maintain

Table 3:1

e Al feireann an t-				K£ *000
a An an		IMPORTS		100 000
	<u>1973</u>	1974	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>
	118,644	177,136	162,965	
B	5,847	10,903	3,496	182,55
C	17,259	27,022	33,928	3,742 30,069
D	62,009	141,968	134,527	170,696
E	15,733	18,731	12,489	16,594
F	9,060	5,449	15,270	3,343
•	· · · · · ·	EXPORTS	•	•
A	61,983	76,018	71,685	138,529
B	2,225	2,968	2,299	3,301
C	10,145	11,395	13,501	24,519
ם	18,848	24,522	23,567	29,450
E	55,703	73,478	73,973	84,073
F.	12,472	22,900	30,099	38,786
		VISIBLE BALA	NCE	
A (minus)	56,611	101,118	91,280	44,024
B (minus)	3,622	7,935	1,197	441
C (minus)	7,114	15,627	20,427	5,550
D (minus)	43,161	117,446	110,960	141,246
E (plus)	39,970	54,747	61,484	67,479
F (plus)	3,412	17,451	14,829	35,443
- ·				•
A - Western	n Europe	· · · ·	B - Eastern Europe	
C - North &	& South Americ	A	D - Asia	
E - Africa			F - Others (incl. Au	stralasia)

Table 3:2

Source: <u>Kenya Statistical Digest</u> (Nairobi, Ministry of Finance and Planning), vol. xv, no. 4, December 1977.

this dependent relationship.¹³ Trade deficits were recorded with all regions except Africa and 'Others' (mainly Australasia) but the largest deficits were with Western Europe, Asia (reflecting oil supplies) and the Americas. Trade with the communist world of Eastern Europe and the People's Republic of China (within Asia figure) was negligible. Kenya's largest surplus was with the continent of Africa, but at least half of this surplus came from trade with the country's partners in the East African Community, Tanzania and Uganda, and the remainder from other countries within the region, as well as Egypt.

Foreign policy aimed to improve the country's trading position with the developed world, but also made provision for the visible balance of payments deficit to be covered by 'invisible' earnings. The major areas of invisible earnings were the provision of services and tourism, as well as the influx of foreign aid and investment. All told, invisible earnings rose steadily throughout the years and in 1975 stood at K£57.5 million.¹⁴ In terms of services, Mombasa was an important port for the region's trade, and the carriage of goods by road and rail across the country brought in further revenue. The landlocked countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Zambia, as well as the eastern region of Zaire were the major users of these services. The growing competition to Mombasa from Tanzania's Dar es Salaam made it important for Kenya to maintain good relations with these countries and provide easy transit facilities in order to keep this trade. The open break in diplomatic relations with Tanzania in 1977 and the closure of the border between the countries seriously damaged the

13. See Kathryn Morton and Peter Tulloch, <u>Trade and Developing</u> <u>Countries</u> (London, Croom Helm/Overseas Development Institute, 1977).

14. Economic Survey 1976 (Nairobi, Government Printer, 1976).

transit trade because it made it very difficult for goods to reach Kenya through the normal route of northern Tanzania.

Tourism

The tourist industry was one of the largest in black Africa, capitalising upon almost ideal climatic and geographic conditions. Its growth rate brought in increasing amounts of hard convertible currency to the country and provided an example for other countries, such as Gambia, Ivory Coast (which itself came to boast of <u>le tourisme</u> <u>vrai</u>) and Tanzania, which gradually became competitors. Between 1964 and 1972, gross earnings from tourism increased at an average rate of 14.4 per cent. a year,¹⁵ and in 1977 reached a peak figure of Kf48.7 million.¹⁶ The Development Plan of 1974-78 set the growth rate at 16 per cent. and this target fell just within reach.¹⁷

The government had little reluctance in 'selling' the country to the rich, white tourists of the developed world, from where two-thirds of the total number originated. The susceptibility of tourism to political uncertainty helped to influence the government to pursue moderate policies both within East Africa and the wider international arena. It is known, for example, that the war in the Horn of Africa and the proximity of Uganda kept many North American tourists away from the country in later years.¹⁸ This was because of the political uncertainty itself as well as the fact that the normal continental route of the American visitor was blocked. This was a setback to the industry

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

^{15.} Development Plan 1974-78 (Nairobi, Government Printer, 1974), vol. 1, p. 20.

^{16. &#}x27;Nation Economic Report 1978/79', supplement in <u>Daily Nation</u>, 14 July 1978, p. 23.

because it was estimated in 1972 that North American tourists spent on average \$42 a day as compared with only \$25 a day by Europeans.¹⁹

The closure of the border with Tanzania in 1977 also seriously affected tourism and invisible earnings in the country. On average, 20 per cent. of total visitors²⁰ to Kenya were Tanzanians, and so this was a large slice of earnings lost. Furthermore, the game parks in the south of the country were linked to those in northern Tanzania, but most tourists started and ended their safaris in Nairobi, thus giving the lion's share of the income to Kenya. The Tanzanian Government plans to keep the border closed to tourists in the future and has embarked upon its own large-scale tourist programme. Tanzania's opening of its game parks to humters²¹ was perceived to be a deliberate attempt to get a step ahead of Kenya where hunting remained banned. The Sudanese have learnt their lesson from Tanzania and have prevented their parks in the south from being linked to the Kenyan circuit.

To some extent, then, these external political problems affected tourism in the country, but the steady growth rate and increase in earnings in this sector showed that the problems were only of a relative nature and were not really damaging to the economy. At the domestic level, tourism was a major political issue. The comparative luxury of the hotels, catering quite often for white tourists, and the poverty of the rural and urban areas showed up the inequalities of life to Kenyans. At present, they tend to show a complete disregard

19. New York Times, 31 January 1972.

20. Visits for tourism or business are included in one figure.

21. The Standard, 21 July 1978; also Brown Lenga, 'Tanzania goes it alone on tourism', Commonwealth, August-September 1978, p. 53. Kenya banned all hunting and trade in ivory in 1973; see East African Standard, 1 September 1973.

73 .

for the conspicuous tourists, but if and when pressure grows for a redistribution of wealth within Kenyan society, then the tourist industry could be the first to suffer.

Along with the export commodities of coffee and tea, tourism was one of the largest money earners for the country, and so it is very significant to note that the government allowed the tourist industry to be controlled mainly by non-citizens. Since 1966, the development of tourism has 'officially' been in the hands of the Kenya Tourist Development Corporation (K.T.D.C.), but it was only in 1972 that the first tentative steps were made to speed up Africanisation by not allowing non-citizen tour operators to expand unless (a mere) 15 per cent. of their shares were held by Africans. At this time of the ninety licensed travel agents in Kenya, half of them were completely owned by non-citizens.²² The government invested K£30 million in 1974 to accelerate Africanisation and by 1975 the K.T.D.C. had invested K£4.25 million, but the latter recognised the problem that 'there are not many Kenyans with the resources and expertise to go into business'.²³

It was difficult, therefore, for the government to act positively against non-citizen operators because they were largely responsible for bringing the tourists to the country, and action against them would only have led to a decline, if only temporary, in national income. As a result, the government was content to allow this situation to continue, but remained committed in the long-term to the goal of Africanisation.

22. East African Standard, 25 November 1972.

23. Kenya hosts U.N.E.S.C.O. General Conference 1976 (Nairobi, Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 1976), p. 99.

Foreign Aid and Investment

Foreign aid and investment cannot be regarded as earnings as such but, in general terms, they helped either to boost earnings by increasing potential, by balancing the budget, or by allowing money to be freed and invested in another sphere. To this extent, aid and investment remained very important for the country's economic development.²⁴

The 'aid debate' provides a minefield of explosive arguments for the political scientist to analyse. The aim here is to tread warily through this field, risking to stop only when necessary. The term 'aid', as one author has defined it, is 'used to cover any transfer of resources from rich countries to poor countries which the former choose to call "aid", i.e. any transfer the effectiveness of which is publicly assessed, though perhaps hypocritically assessed, in terms of the benefit to the recipient'.²⁵ To explain the nature of aid, therefore, requires an understanding of both the 'donor' and the 'recipient'. Similarly, private foreign investment (i.e. nongovernmental) calls for an investigation into the reasons behind the investments as well as the effects of them. This section deals with the questions of aid and investment in general in Kenya, and then turns to a specific appraisal of Kenya's relations with individual countries or groups of countries.

24. Robert Lacey, 'Foreign Resources and Development' in Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson and John Okumu (eds.), <u>Development Administration</u>. The Kenyan Experience (Nairobi, O.U.P., 1970), pp. 63-67.

25. White, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 22-23. For a critical account of aid see Teresa Hayter, <u>Aid as Imperialism</u> (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971).
For a spirited defence of the intentions of one major donor

state, the United States of America, see Lloyd D. Black, The Strategy of Foreign Aid (Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1968).

Much of the foreign aid received went towards development schemes rather than recurrent expenditure. In the early years after independence, foreign aid accounted for some 95 per cent. of the total development budget, but by 1970 this had been cut to under 40 per cent. and was cut down further during the 1970s.²⁶ The fact that the government allowed such a large measure of foreign aid is important to note, but the sources of the aid, as shown in Tables 3:3 and 3:4, prove that Kenya was firmly aligned with the West.

Table 3:3

Donors of Aid 1963-1978	(Percentages)
West	61.45
World Bank (& affils.)	31.65
East	4.4
Africa/Middle East	2.5
	100.00

N.B. 'East' refers to U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe and China

Source: Mwai Kibaki, Minister of Finance and Planning, reporting to

National Assembly; The Standard, 19 July 1978.

Formal non-alignment in economic matters was made explicit in the government's seminal document, Sessional Paper No. 10. Section 23 of that document stated:

The third conditioning factor is the need to avoid making development in Kenya dependent on a satellite relationship with any country or group of countries. Such a relationship is abhorrent and a violation of the political and economic independence so close to the hearts of the people. Economic

26. Employment, Incomes and Equality, op. cit., pp. 569-577.

non-alignment does not mean a policy of isolation, any more than political non-alignment implies a refusal to participate in world affairs. On the contrary it means a willingness and a desire

(i) to borrow technological knowledge and proven economic methods from any country - without commitment;

- (ii) to seek and accept technical and financial assistance from any source without strings; and
- (iii) to participate fully in world trade without political domination. 27

The pitfalls in receiving aid were clearly acknowledged by the qualifications to each of the three statements. However, there was a great difference between the rhetorical position of the government and the policies pursued in practice. Fears that an independent Kenya would leave the western fold evaporated as the leadership showed little enthusiasm for change. Over the period 1963 to 1978, by the government's own admission, the aid received from donors showed a clear political bias with over 90 per cent. of aid coming from western countries and the World Bank. Specific levels of aid did vary over the period, but not the basic pattern. So, for example, Britain provided 47 per cent. of the country's total aid in 1966. but this figure was cut in half by 1972. Similarly, the largest increase in the proportion of bilateral aid was from the 'non-committed' nations of Europe - Norway, Sweden, Denmark and West Germany - whose relative share trebled during the same period. Disbursements from multilateral agencies also increased dramatically in this period from 16 per cent. to 43 per cent., as Table 3:4 shows.

A significant proportion of aid was received in the form of technical assistance personnel (T.A.P.), whose job it was to help with projects and planning throughout the country. According to one

^{27.} African Socialism and its application to planning in Kenya, op.cit., section 23.

survey,²⁸ of the total number of T.A.P. in Kenya in 1971 almost 60 per cent. were British and a further 10 per cent. North Americans. Nellis also undertook a study of the number of posts held by Europeans in government ministries in Nairobi in 1972 and, though he admitted the possibility of his figures being slightly inaccurate, he found that Europeans occupied one-fifth of the posts in Education, and almost one-third in Agriculture, Works, and Finance and Planning. No names, however, were European in those ministries concerned with Defence and Foreign Affairs.

Source of Total Ai	d Disbursements	(Percentages)
•	1966	1972
Canada	1.9	2.2
Denmark	0.2	5.2
Netherlands	-	.5•3
Norway	0.7	3.5
Sweden	2.2	7.3
U.K.	47.4	22.6
U.S.A.	24.3	4.7
West Germany	6.3	4.7
Other bilateral	1.1	1.5
I.B.R.D.	9.9	29.6
I.D.A.	4.3	5.5
U.N.D.P.		3.5
Other multilateral	1.7	4.3
	100.0	99.9 (sic.)

Table 3:4

Source: Gerald Holtham and Arthur Hazlewood, <u>Aid and Inequality in</u> <u>Kenya, British Development Assistance to Kenya</u> (London, Croom <u>Helm/Overseas Development Institute, 1976), p. 50.</u>

28. J.R. Nellis, 'Expatriates in the Government of Kenya', Journal of <u>Commonwealth Political Studies</u>, vol. xi, no. 3, November 1973, <u>pp. 251-264</u>.

The influence of T.A.P. on policy-making decreased gradually through the years as more Kenyans came to occupy prominent positions. By the mid 1970s, Kenyans began to realise that many Europeans were not in fact 'experts' at all, but had come to the country only to learn.²⁹ Despite this, their role in society was important as they helped shape the development programme and, by inference, helped perpetuate western influence in the country. It would be misleading to see T.A.P. wholly as malevolent manipulators of Kenyan decisionmakers. as both European and African elites shared similar ideas and objectives for the country. If and when they did differ, however, the patronising benevolence of T.A.P. possibly distorted the policies which the government and civil service had wished to follow. The dependence, certainly in the 1960s, upon T.A.P. led to greater efficiency in programmes, but left Kenya less self-reliant than it should have been. It was only in the 1970s that more control over aid programmes was taken and efforts were made to decrease the dependent status and divert money to where it was wanted.

A major policy of the government throughout our period of study was to attract investment from overseas to assist economic development. Again, this restricted Kenya's freedom of action because investments had to be protected and had to be capable of realising profit. In 1964, the Foreign Investments Protection Act³⁰ was passed which protected foreign investors from arbitrary nationalisation and allowed them, after payment of a 40 per cent. profits tax, to remit

^{29. &#}x27;Controversy Again on Expatriate Issue', <u>New African</u>, no. 132, August 1978, pp. 18-19.

^{30.} Foreign Investments Protection Act, 1964 (Act No. 35 of 1964, Nairobi, Government Printer, 1964).

their earnings abroad. Jomo Kenyatta called upon Kenyan businessmen to 'reassure your associates overseas that it is the Government's intention, not only to continue to work together with private enterprise, but also to promote conditions in which private enterprise can thrive'.³¹

Evidence shows that many areas of the economy remained dominated by foreign interests and out of the control of the central government. In 1967, of the 'Top Fifty' people holding the most directorships in Kenya, only nine were Kenyans, and of them only five were African.³² In commerce and industry between 1964 and 1970, a 50 per cent. increase in output and a 100 per cent. increase in the annual level of investment accrued to foreign interests.³³ In the early 1970s external investment in the manufacturing sector accounted for some 65 per cent. of the total amount, while cement production was completely dependent upon foreign finance.³⁴ As a final example, in 1972 the multinational conglomerate, Lonrho, could boast of more than fifty subsidiary companies in Kenya.³⁵

The prevalence of foreign capital in Kenya, then, had many serious effects. At the East African regional level, the preference of investors for Nairobi as the centre of their regional operations helped to accentuate the pattern of unequal growth as perceived by

- 31. Kenyatta, op. cit., p. 238.
- 32. Who controls industry in Kenya? (Nairobi, National Christian Council of Kenya/East African Pub., 1968), pp. 145-146.
- 33. Leys, op.cit., p. 118.
- 34. Employment, Incomes and Equality, op. cit., pp. 437-444.
- 35. S. Cronjé, M. Ling and G. Cronjé, Lonrho. Portrait of a Multinational (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976), pp. 30-38.

neighbouring countries and was a contributing factor to the demise of the East African Community. At the domestic level, the political difficulties of managing external capital encouraged the government to accept the status quo. The growth of Nairobi caused massive social problems of congestion and unemployment and provided the breeding ground for discontent and political unrest. Calls for rapid Africanisation of the economy were outward signs of this frustration, but the government was content to pursue piecemeal Africanisation and retain the links with foreign capital. The following sections will consider the country's economic, political, and at times military, relations with the outside world.

The Special Relationship: Britain

Kenya's relationship with its former coloniser, Britain, would have been 'special' whatever form and content it took, but it was evident that the government favoured very close ties with the former metropole. Britain, for its part, was equally pleased to continue its close association with Kenya.

The exact nature of the aid received from Britain has been detailed in a recent study,³⁶ but it is necessary here to present the most significant facts again as well as add further information in order to understand fully the nature of Kenya's foreign policy. As Table 3:5 shows, on average Kenya received more bilateral aid from Britain than any other African country. This can perhaps partly be explained by the influence of the white settlers acting as a pressure group upon both governments, but also points to a measure of compatibility between the indigenous leaders and those of Britain. The

36. Holtham and Hazlewood, op. cit.

British Government had further cause to maintain a friendly relationship with Kenya owing to the favourable balance of trade with the country, as Table 3:6 shows, as well as to provide a better atmosphere for British investors.

The relative stability and durability of the governing elite combined with its dominant pro-western philosophy assured Britain of a continued close association with Kenya. Political unrest during the mid 1970s did little to deter British support for Kenyatta because it was perceived that problems in Kenya were not comparable with those of other African countries, and so there was little need to break the existing economic relations. Earlier in March 1973, a high-powered Kenyan delegation visited London and gained an extra £17 million in aid over the following three years.³⁷ In 1976, Britain gave a non-repayable gift to Kenya of \$48 million, 38 on top of other smaller amounts to help immediate balance of payments problems. The Kenya Government was aware that this favourable treatment was not without political strings in terms of maintaining a 'moderate' position in domestic and foreign policy and providing 'reasonable' economic opportunities in the country for British interests. These unwritten conditions were, however, acceptable to the Kenyan elite who had little opposition to an association which was considered to be an important foundation for the growth and strength of the Kenyan economy.

A good example of the privileged position held by the British in Kenya can be seen in the case of important railway contracts awarded in 1976. In August of that year, it was reported that Kenya

37.	Financial Times,	6	March	1973;	The	Times,	10	March	1973.
38.	Daily Telegraph,	3	April	1976.	•				

U.K. Bilateral	Ald (Disburs	ements) to Afri	can countrie	3
				£ million.
Country	1968	1970	1972	1974
Kenya	11.0	11.1	10.6	16.4
Tanzania	1.8	2.0	1.7	1.5
Uganda	3.9	4.4	3.3	0.4
E.A. Community	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.7
Malawi	7.8	7.7	8.2	8.1
Zambia	10.8	2.6	4.2	8.4
Nigeria	6.3	11.0	6.5	6.0
Others	30.0	21.1	22.5	31.1
TOTAL	73.6	60.9	59.0	74.6

Table 3:5

Source: U.K. Annual Abstract of Statistics 1976 (London, H.M.S.O.

Central Statistical Office, 1976).

Table 3:6

Trade with U.K.

			KE '000		
	Imports	Exports	Visible Balance		
1968	36,110	15,879	-20,231		
1970	41,459	15,585	-25,874		
1972	50,5 60	20,392	-30,168		
1974	63,949	18,702	-45,247		
1976	77,043	35,398	-41,645		

Source: Statistical Abstract 1971 (Nairobi, Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1971); Statistical Abstract 1975 (Ibid., 1975); Kenya Statistical Digest (Ibid.), vol. xv, no. 1, March 1977. Railways had agreed to sign the contracts with the United States of America, West Germany, Sweden and Japan.³⁹ Britain was expected to get a paltry £7 million order for steel rails, and so some intense lobbying was undertaken by the British Government. By early 1977, the whole composition of the contracts had been altered, with Britain awarded the major contract worth £40 million.⁴⁰ Protest against this reversal was articulated by some academics and politicians even though the decision had obviously received official sanction. One M.P., Mr. George Anyona, pressed for an inquiry into the whole affair, but in early May he was placed in jail under the preventive detention act.⁴¹ The Kenya Government closed the case.

The close economic relationship which the country enjoyed with Britain provided the impetus for a continuing military association after independence. Despite K.A.N.U.'s pledge to maintain a completely non-aligned stance in political and military affairs, after independence Kenyatta decided to keep the country's armed forces closely associated with those of Britain. Such a situation was favourable to the British Government. Kenya's strategic position on the Indian Ocean made the country an important ally to have, especially as events unfolded in the mid 1970s with the independence of Mozambique and the war in the Horn. The British also, no doubt, hoped to play a moderating role in the armed forces, so diminishing the chances of political unrest and economic losses.

The Kenyan elite of Kenyatta and his close colleagues also

39_	Financial	Times,	18	August	1976.

40. <u>Daily Telegraph</u>, 12 March 1977; <u>The Sunday Times</u>, 13 March 1977. 41. The Times, 6 May 1977.

perceived their best interests to be in maintaining the country's military links with Britain. It is not difficult to say that had the Kenya Government wished to break this relationship, it could have been done with the minimum disruption. Examples of similar moves in other African countries exist. For example, the Anglo-Nigerian defence pact was abrogated by the Nigerian Government in 1962 without any economic consequences. Similarly in 1964, Julius Nyerere was quick to relieve British troops of their position in Tanganyika following the mutiny there, again with no significant effect upon economic relations between the countries.

It must be concluded, therefore, that these military links were <u>willingly</u> maintained by the Kenya Government. Two other factors can be presented to support this view. Firstly, as shown in the previous chapter, the loyalty of the army was in doubt after independence. The Kikuyu had been deliberately excluded from the colonial army, which had consisted mainly of Kamba and Kalenjin men. It was difficult for Kenyatta to correct the ethnic balance too quickly for fear of increasing tribal antagonisms. The mutiny in January 1964 at Lanet Barracks, Nakuru, served to heighten the fears of the Kikuyu elite and allowed the opportunity for British troops to be recalled to quell the mutiny. The British Government, under Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was only too pleased to assist, fearing 'communist subversion' in the country.⁴²

^{42.} Ali A. Mazrui and Donald Rothchild, 'The Soldier and the State in East Africa; Some Theoretical Conclusions on the Army Mutinies of 1964', <u>The Western Political Cuarterly</u>, xx (1967), p. 95. Britain's obsession with communism in Africa was again highlighted in 1965 when the government presented a report on it to the West European Union; see <u>A.R.B.</u>, 1964, p. 259. This report incensed the more radical members of K.A.N.U.; see Oginga Odinga, <u>Not Yet Uhuru</u> (London, Heinemann, 1968), pp. 294-296.

The second argument which can be put forward concerned the perceived threat of attack from neighbouring countries. Certainly in the 1960s, there was no threat of attack from any neighbouring country except Somalia. The Somali threat, though, was a very serious challenge to the stability and composition of the whole country. The fact that Kenya did not radically strengthen its army, preferring to rely upon British military assistance, allowed the country to allocate more of its funds to economic development, and also showed the extent to which Britain would go to protect its own economic interests in Kenya. British forces were widely deployed in the North-Eastern province during the border war with Somalia in the 1960s, and finance from Britain helped to keep Kenya in control of the situation.⁴³ As late as 1966, there were still an estimated 300 British officers on secondment in the Kenya Armed Forces,⁴⁴ and expatriates in 1972 still commanded the Air Force and Navy.⁴⁵

More subtle assurances of support by the British Government for the Kenyan elite can be isolated during the 1960s and 1970s. British troops were present in Kenya in November 1969⁴⁶ during the elections which were especially tense following the assassination of Tom Mboya, the consequent Luo riots and banning of the opposition Kenya People's Union. The Conservative Government sent 700 British troops on 'routine training exercises' to Kenya in January 1971. Though they were

43. See Chapter Four.

44. David Wood, The Armed Forces of African States (Adelphi Paper No. 27, London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966).

45. Christian Science Monitor, 5 August 1972.

 46. Njoroge Mungai and Bruce McKenzie had been secretly to Britain in July 1969 probably to co-ordinate actions; <u>The Guardian</u>, 19 July 1969.

stationed in Mombasa, it was assumed that they were there to protect British property in case of riots when Britain announced its renewal of arms deals with South Africa at the Singapore Commonwealth Conference. 47 Other, more speculative reasons can be proposed. For example, Prince Charles and Princess Anne paid a visit to the country in that month and the troops could have been for their protection. Alternatively, there was the possibility that rumours had been heard of the forthcoming coup d'état in Uganda, and that troops were on hand for any eventuality. Whatever the reason - and it is difficult to say which was the real one - it can be stressed that the Kenya Government showed little reluctance or embarrassment in inviting British troops into the country in large numbers. The British Government, for its part. showed little hesitation in responding to requests of assistance. The appearance of around 200 troops in the country immediately after the assassination of J.M. Kariuki in 1975 again demonstrated explicitly the support of Britain for Kenyatta's government. 48

To sum up, then, it is quite obvious that the relationship with Britain was a special one. The government was happy to pursue its economic development programmes with a large measure of assistance from Britain in the way of aid and private investment. The country's trade pattern changed little over the period of study, thus providing further evidence of satisfaction with the existing association with Britain. The military factor, with Kenya receiving virtually all its weaponry as well as physical assistance in times of crisis, underpinned the whole fabric of economic relations between the countries. As an editorial in <u>The Standard</u> entitled 'Britain's record of generosity' put it,

47. Ibid., 19 January 1971.

48. The Times, 18 March 1975. Also A.R.B., 1975, p. 3562.

'the concrete and highly valuable projects which Britain has assisted in Kenya ... will forever remain monuments to the friendship existing between our two countries'.⁴⁹

Western Europe and the United States of America

The marked preference of Kenya's leaders for dealing with the West developed primarily from a similarity of values and goals, although the strength of the western economies gave little opportunity for Kenya to break away and still maintain in the short term a good rate of economic growth. The large numbers of western states willing to trade with the country and provide it with aid gave Kenyatta and his colleagues considerable scope for choice. Foreign governments, and investors from those countries, were in competition with each other to capture Kenvan markets. The view that western capitalism was linked in a conspiracy against Kenya did not ring true, though the belief that it did could have influenced decision-makers. One general study of the aid process stated that 'some co-ordination between donors takes place, but not much. In the main, each donor goes its own way, choosing its own beneficiaries and applying funds according to its own criteria, with little account taken of what other donors are doing.⁵⁰ There is little evidence, in any case, to suggest that the government accepted the conspiracy argument, although at times of popular unrest it became a convenient political scapegoat.

As was shown in Table 3:4, Western Europe (excluding Britain) provided 25 per cent. of the total foreign aid for the country in 1972. In terms of trade, the countries of Western Europe balanced Britain's share of exports and imports to and from Kenya, and no country was

49. The Standard, 21 July 1978.

50. George Gunningham, The Management of Aid Agencies (London, Croom Helm/Overseas Development Institute, 1974), p. 1.

really significant for trade as all had similar small-scale relations. In later years Kenya showed an increasing interest in improving relations with the 'non-committed' European countries, that is, those not tainted by colonialism. Terms of aid agreements were often softer from the Scandinavian countries, perhaps partly because of humanitarian motives as well as the desire to get a foothold in the African markets. In 1978, it was Sweden, Norway and Switzerland, as well as Britain, which moved to write off aid debts owed to them by Kenya to the total cost of K£21.69 million.⁵¹ The government also became increasingly interested in developing stronger links with the European Economic Community as well as the interrelated goal of breaking the 'francophone' barrier to gain closer links with France. It was no coincidence that the first official visit by President Moi in 1978, was to Paris and Brussels.⁵²

Kenya had fairly small, but still relatively significant relations with the United States of America. Aid received through the U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), an agency of the U.S. State Department, steadily decreased as a percentage of the whole, while trade remained at about one-quarter the volume of that with Britain. America's role in the country in the early years after independence has been covered in an interesting account by a former ambassador in Nairobi, William Attwood, in his book <u>The Reds and the Blacks. A</u> <u>Personal Adventure</u>.⁵³ It is evident from the book that Attwood, and one assumes the U.S. Government, perceived Kenyan politics in terms of a struggle between 'us' and 'them', the United States and Britain on

51. The Standard, 19 July 1978.

52. The Guardian Weekly, 19 November 1978.

53. William Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks. A Personal Adventure (London, Hutchinson, 1967).

the one hand and the Soviet Union and China on the other; whereas the communist states only aimed to manipulate and subvert the government, the American role was one of enlightenment and complete noninvolvement.

This was a rather naive, as well as negative, view of Kenyan politics and gave less than fair justice to the independent position of the government. Jomo Kenyatta was not as obsessed with communism as Attwood suggested, and publication of the book was not well received in Nairobi. However, what can be gained from the account is the accurate impression of the Kenyan elite being more responsive and attuned to the policy orientations of the U.S.A. than to those of the communist states. The Kenya Government's relations with America remained significant despite the early traumas of the Stanleyville operation in the Congo, where Kenytha perceived American action to be a direct insult to the President, who was Chairman of an O.A.U. committee mediating in the matter. The government took the pragmatic view that the economic links with the U.S. were too important to be jeopardised by this political dispute. This came from the realistic calculation that any economic action taken would more seriously affect Kenya than it would the United States.54

The common interest shared with the United States in maintaining a close economic relationship was, as with Britain, strengthened by a military association. The border crisis with Uganda in the mid 1970s prompted the government to look to the United States for military assistance. This was forthcoming,⁵⁵ which by itself is not very

54. Ibid., pp. 191-236. 55. See Chapter Five.

significant, but in December 1976 American planes flew past in the independence celebrations, the first time that any country had been given the honour. This symbolised Kenya's uninhibited friendship with the West and the government's policy of defending the country, whenever necessary, with support from the West. In turn, it showed the extent to which the U.S. was willing to defend its economic and political interests in Kenya.

The Communist World

Relations with Eastern European countries and the People's Republic of China were quite cordial at the time of independence. Kenyan embassies in Moscow and Peking were among the first to be announced and there was little sign of the overt conservatism such as there was, for example, in Nigeria, where in 1960 Prime Minister Sir Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa refused to have an embassy in Moscow. The communist countries had hopes of friendly relations with Kenya because of its turbulent past and 'Mau Mau' movement. In November 1964, Kenya agreed to several Soviet aid projects, including a cotton mill, a radio station, a fish canning factory, a processing factory for fruit and vegetables, and a hospital. Of these projects only one, the hospital in Kisumu, was ever finished, and the other plans were cancelled by Kenyatta in 1966.⁵⁶

Trade with Eastern European countries, as shown in Table 3:7, was very small. This showed that there was not a complete abandonment of the communist world by Kenya, but that there was little that those countries could offer to entice Kenya away from its intimacy with the

56. Christopher Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa (London, Macmillan, 1976), p. 71.

West. In terms of aid, the major donor to consider was the Soviet Union, whose projects were cancelled in 1966. The Kenya Government was initially dissatisfied because local costs of projects were to be financed by commodity credits, which meant that goods were sent from the U.S.S.R. and the Kenyans sold them and kept the money. Some of the Soviet commodities were already produced in Kenya and only served to flood the market. The government preferred direct cash to cover local costs.

The demise of the Soviet Union's fortunes in Kenya in the mid 1960s could be directly attributed to the fall from power of Oginga Odinga, even though the Kenyans sent a high powered delegation to Moscow as late as January 1966.⁵⁷ This is not to say that the Soviet Union could not have continued to co-operate with Kenyatta's government after 1966, but in the eyes of the conservative leaders, Odinga's radicalism was only an extension of Soviet subversion in the country.⁵⁸ The first major snub of the Soviet Union came in April 1965 when a shipment of Soviet arms (troop carriers and T34 tanks) arrived at Mombasa. The arms had been requested in the previous year, probably with Odinga's lead, but the government was apparently surprised by their arrival. After a close inspection of the arms, the government rejected them as being obsolete and sent the ship away.⁵⁹ This episode pointed to the declining influence of Odinga in the country, and this was confirmed later in 1965 with the closure of the Lumumba Institute. The Institute had been opened in December 1964 with a contribution of \$84,000 from the U.S.S.R. and was aimed at providing

57. Daily Nation, 8 January 1966.

- 58. Attwood, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 237-270. For Odinga's own version see Odinga, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 253-315; also Cherry Gertzel, <u>The Politics of</u> <u>Independent Kenya</u> (London, Heinemann, 1970), pp. 32-72.
- 59. Stevens, op. cit., p. 157; A.R.B., 1965, p. 284.

Trade with Easte	ern Europe (inclu	ding U.S.S.R.)	and the
	People's Republi	<u>c of China</u>	
			K£ 1000
	<u>19</u>	72	
	Imports	Exports	Visible Balance
U.S.S.R.	496	302	- 194
East Germany	203	18	- 185
Yugoslavia	449	249	- 200
Czechoslovakia	1,459	457	- 1,002
Rest E. Europe	1,496	412	- 1,084
China	1,213	1,618	+ 405
	19	74	
	Imports	Exports	Visible Balance
U.S.S.R.	256	414	+ 158
East Germany	331	l	- 330

Table 3:7

East Germany	331	1	- 330
Yugoslavia	607	1,054	+ 447
Czechoslovakia	1,913	1,258	- 656 (sic.)
Rest E. Europe	7,603	241	- 7,361 (sic.)
China	4,186	1,787	- 2,399

note: Rest Eastern Europe includes Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Rumania.

Source: <u>Statistical Abstract 1975</u> (Nairobi, Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1975). education and training for K.A.N.U. members. Within the first year of its operation, criticism of government policies from the Institute's students provoked the government into closing it down.

Relations with the Soviet Union since 1966 remained formal and cool. The differences between the two communist 'camps' had little influence on Kenyan policies because both were perceived as explicit supporters of Odinga. The close friendship which the Chinese had with Tanzania and the Somali Republic in the 1960s, together with the favourite comment of the Chinese that Africa (and Kenya) was 'ripe for revolution', did little to endear them to Kenyatta. Early in 1964, a consignment of Chinese arms en route from Tanzania to Uganda was stopped in Nyanza, Odinga's home territory. Though the arms were legitimately for Uganda, it appeared that the Kenya Government was not aware of the transit of the goods across the country, and rumouns of Olinga's subversive aspirations began to spread around the country. As had occurred with the Soviet aid deals, a Chinese agreement signed in June 1964 for equipment and machines, worth \$18 million to Kenya, was cancelled with Odinga's departure from the government. 60 Following this, relations between the two countries worsened until Kenya broke off diplomatic relations in 1967. This break continued right through Kenyatta's period of office and was not healed until 1978.⁶¹

It would be wrong to see Kenya's relations with the communist world solely in terms of a West versus East confrontation where Kenyatta responded to prods from the western countries to freeze out the Soviet Union and China. Kenyatta was no doubt aware of the

60. Alaba Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa 1958-1971 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 163-164.

61. A.R.B., 1978, p. 5076.

benefits of such a stance, and was encouraged to maintain it by the West, but internal political considerations as well as the political ideology of the majority of the government were influential factors in shaping relations with the countries of the East. These countries were disadvantaged in Kenya, because movement of their diplomats was more restricted than that of western countries' staff, and also they were more likely to be expelled for 'political' activities in the country. On the whole, then, the communist countries were able to maintain some links with Kenya, but the level of influence and warmth in these relations were low.

The Middle East and Africa

During the 1960s, most of Kenya's attention was fixed upon trade with the developed countries of the world, but in the 1970s the government aimed to increase its trade with the less developed countries (L.D.C.s) of the Middle East and Africa. Both regions provided a mirror image of the other in relation to trade. For example, in 1974 Kenya's deficit with the Middle East was Kf66.3 million, but it had a surplus with African countries of Kf61.1 million.

The deficit with the Middle East was almost wholly attributable to oil imports from Iran and Saudi Arabia. Very little else passed between Kenya and the region, although some attempts were made in the mid 1970s to increase exports of small manufactured goods. The large increases in oil prices after 1973 forced foreign policy to become attuned to the interests of the Arabs and Iranians, though this was by no means easy. In November 1973, the government broke off diplomatic relations with Israel because of that country's

"aggression" in the Yom Kippur war.⁶² This act came as rather a shock to many Kenyans, especially as the country had been tipped to provide troops for U.N. peacekeeping duties in the Middle East. At the end of the month Dr. Njoroge Mungai, the Foreign Minister, said quite bluntly that he now hoped for cheaper oil, more loans from the Middle East to Kenya, and greater support for the liberation movements in southern Africa.⁶³ Favourable reactions from the Middle East were not forthcoming which provoked tensions in Kenyan political circles, where talk of 'selling the Nile' and using the 'charcoal weapon' was increasingly heard.⁶⁴

The desire for economic benefits continued to persuade policymakers in Nairobi to take account of Arab interests. In January 1975, permission was granted for an office of the Arab League to be opened in the capital with full diplomatic immunity.⁶⁵ In September 1976, the country was successful in gaining \$5 million for agricultural development from the Arab Bank for Economic Development, the first such aid to Kenya by the Bank.⁶⁶ In 1977, the Palestine Liberation Organisation was allowed to open an office in Nairobi and, in the same year, an agreement was signed with Sudan for greater co-operation in the economic field including a road link between the two capitals.⁶⁷

Combined with these economic motives for an association with

- 62. East African Standard, 2 November 1973.
- 63. Ibid., 22 November 1973.
- 64. A.R.B., 1974, p. 3139.
- 65. Egyptian Gazette, 23 January 1975.
- 66. Ibid., 17 September 1976.
- 67. International Herald Tribune, 11 July 1977.

the Arab states was an undercurrent of, at times, conflicting political calculations. The Kenya Government perceived that the establishment of a strong anti-communist bloc around the north-west of the Indian Ocean, with Kenya in alliance with the conservative Arab states, would add to the overall security of the nation. However, this foreign policy goal suffered several major setbacks in the 1970s. Firstly, in 1976, Kenya's 'assistance' to Israel in its raid on Entebbe Airport, Uganda, upset many Arab (and African) countries. The second factor concerned the role of Somalia in the war in the Horn of Africa during 1977 and 1978. Although Somalia's Arab status was questioned by some, the country's position in the Arab League gained it the support of most Arab states in its confrontation with Ethiopia in the Ogaden. This was also implicit backing for Somalia's territorial claim to the North-Eastern Province of Kenya.

In February 1978, the Air Force intercepted an Egypt Air plane over Kenyan territory and upon inspection at Nairobi, the plane was found to be carrying weapons to Mogadishu. This unsettled the government whose problems were increased when, following a verbal attack upon Iranian support for Somalia, the Iranians closed down their embassy in Nairobi and put a large question mark over economic links between the countries.⁶⁸ As a final complication for policy-makers, the global implications of the dispute in the Horn caused a reappraisal of the country's close dependence upon the West because of the West's support for Somalia against the Marxist regime of Ethiopia. This prompted the Foreign Minister, Dr. Munyua Waiyaki, to comment that the government would welcome Soviet and Cuban assistance to defend Kenya

68. 'Kenya fires broadside at Arabs and the West', <u>New African</u>, no. 128, April 1978, p. 46.

Table 3:8

Trade with African countries

				K£ •000
		1972		•••
Country	Imports		Exports	Visible Balance
Tanzania	6,196	1995 - 1995 -	16,286	+10,090
Uganda	7,706		16,507	+ 8,801
Zambia	383		3,884	+ 3,501
Rwanda	1	and and a second s	946	+ 945
Sudan	1		462	+ 461
Egypt	42			- 42
Zaire	742		904	+ 162
Somali Republic	. 80		840	+ 760
Others	1,419	en de la composition de la composition de la composition de la composition de	5,031	+ 3,612
TOTAL	16,570	•	44,860	+28,290
		<u>1976</u>		•
Country	Imports		Exports	Visible Balance
Tanzania	12,406		22,995	+10,589
Uganda	818	· · · · · · ·	26,871	+26,053
Zambia	824		7,400	+ 6,576
Rwanda	765		4,857	+ 4,092
Sudan	136	•	1,807	+ 1,671
Egypt	57		2,637	+ 2,580
Zaire	410		1,975	+ 1,565

Kenya Statistical Digest (Nairobi, Ministry of Finance and Source: Planning), vol. xv, no. 4, December 1977.

103

1,075

16,594

Others

TOTAL

Somali Republic

2,030

13,501

84,073

+ 1,927

+12,426

+67,479

against aggression (from Somalia),⁶⁹ but little positive was done to alter the relationship with the West in the short term.

The economic relations with the rest of Africa were very important for the balance of payments, as Table 3:8 shows. As was noted earlier in the chapter, geographical as well as economic factors limited dealings to those countries in the eastern African region, and half of the visible surplus in trade resulted from links with the partners in the East African Community, namely Uganda and Tanzania. Kenya's economic relations in this arena were not without political difficulties and these will be discussed in depth in the next chapter. It can be stated here, though, that foreign policy within the continent, and specifically within the region, was geared to the maintenance of friendly relations in order to facilitate increased trade and economic benefits.

Multilateral Aid

Following the sections on the bilateral economic relations of Kenya, it is necessary finally to turn to discuss the status of multilateral aid. The amount of multilateral aid received increased gradually in the years after independence. To draw from the figures of Holtham and Hazlewood, multilateral aid increased as a percentage of total aid from 15.9 per cent. in 1966 to 42.9 per cent. in 1972.⁷⁰ This increase from multilateral sources helped to alleviate the embarrassing political difficulty of relying too heavily upon one or two states for assistance. It also helped to minimise the chances of manipulation by foreign governments, although it has already been

69. Ibid.

70. Holtham and Hazlewood, op.cit., p. 50.

stated that the Kenya Government did not feel unduly threatened by external interests.

By far the most important source of multilateral aid was the World Bank. As a global organisation, the World Bank projected itself as a non-political body, but the government was well aware of the political nature of the aid. The overall effect of taking money from the World Bank was that it pulled the country into the international financial 'system' and forced the government to abide by the rules of the system. This meant that prerequisites for aid were the promise of repayment, a 'steady' aconomy and the minimum amount of political unrest. Over the period in question, the government showed itself willing to meet these requirements. Kenyatta also showed little uncase at other features of the World Bank, including the 23 per cent. vote of the United States and the fact that 40 per cent. of all financial loans given by the Bank were spent in the United States, Britain and West Germany.⁷¹

The government's desire to work with international agencies was further underlined by the decision to have the International Labour Organisation make a full-length report on the Kenyan economy, particularly in the area of employment.⁷² In many places the report was a harsh one, but the government accepted most of its recommendations and decried critics who claimed it would not.⁷³ Acceptance was not, however, implementation and many of the worst aspects of the under-

71.	Encyclopaedia	of the Nations.	United Nations	(London, New	Caxton
•	Library, 1976), pp. 173-181.			

72. Employment, Incomes and Equality, op.cit.

73. The Guardian, 22 August 1973 and 8 September 1973; Financial Times, 29 November 1973.

Table 3:9

Multilateral Aid : A Sample of Projects

			\$ million.
Year	Donor	Amount	Project
1968	I.D.A.	16.4	agriculture and roads
1969	I.B.R.D.	26.1	roads and forestry
1970	I.B.R.D.	8.3	Nairobi water supply
	I.D.A.	18.7	education and roads
	I.F.C.	14.7	pulp and paper mills
•	W.H.O.	0.9	
1971	I.B.R.D.	23.0	Tana River (electricity)
	W.H.O.	1.0	
	U.N.E.S.C.O.	0.01	studies
1972	I.B.R.D.	29.0	Nairobi Airport dev.
	I . D . A .	28.0	small farmers and roads
	I.F.C.	2.4	tourism
	W.H.O.	1.0	
	U.N.E.S.C.O.	0.01	
	F.A.O.	1.7	
1973	I.B. R.D.	34.0	roads, Industrial
	•		Development Bank
	I.F.C.	2.8	tourism
1974	I.B.R.D.	10.4	tea factories
	I. D. A.	33•5	livestock development,
	•		population project
	I.F.C.	1.7	pulp and paper mills
1975	I.B.R.D.	473.8	education, oil pipeline,
	• • •	•	power, farms, balance of
		-	payments
·	I.F.C.	9.1	textile mill

Source: <u>U.N. Yearbook</u> (New York, United Nations), various years; <u>A.R.B.</u>, various editions; Holtham and Hazlewood, <u>op.cit.</u>, p. 68.

employment problem remained prevalent. A second report on the country by the World Bank⁷⁴ in 1975 reiterated many of the I.L.O.'s points and criticised governmental policy, but showed, nevertheless, that the government was willing to remain open to advice and assistance from international agencies.

Multilateral aid was also forthcoming from regional organisations. In the previous section, it was noted that aid was received from the Arab Bank for Economic Development. By 1978, three small loans had been received from the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (0.P.E.C.),⁷⁵ and it was hoped that larger amounts would be granted later. Since 1969, Kenya and its East African Community partners had been associated with the European Economic Community, and this provided another source of assistance in terms of aid as well as preferential treatment in trade.⁷⁶ The association with the E.E.C. was reconfirmed with the signing of the Lomé Convention in 1975. Although the gains from this were not as great as expected, the government continued to seek multilateral aid in order to promote the economic development of the country.

Conclusion: Dependence or Independence?

The aim of this chapter has been to plot the course of Kenya's economic development since the time of independence and relate it to foreign policy. It has shown how foreign policy affected the develop-

74.	<u>Kenya:</u> 1975).	Into the Second Decade (Baltimore, I.B.R.D./John Hopkins,	
75.	<u>A.R.B</u> .	(E.F.T.), 1978, p. 4973.	

^{76.} Simon M. Mbilinyi, 'East African Export Commodities and the Enlarged European Economic Community', <u>The African Review</u>, vol. 3, no. 1, 1973, pp. 85-110.

ment of the economy and, vice versa, how the requirements and necessities of the capitalist development programme helped to shape foreign policy postures. It would be difficult to say without reservation whether the country's economy was a dependent or independent one, because this would partly be influenced by one's approach to the question. Furthermore, since the 'O.P.E.C. revolution' of 1973, it has become evident that states are interdependent in the global economic system and that complete economic independence is not possible in normal circumstances.

Having stated this, it is clear that some states have more room for independent economic action within the framework of interdependence than others. Even within a relatively underprivileged continent such as Africa, there is a great disparity in the relative strengths of states. This chapter has provided some answers as to status of the Kenyan economy by studying the country's trading partnerships and channels of foreign aid and investment. It has also examined the aspirations of the governing elite group to show how its wishes were transformed into economic policy.

In essence, Kenya possessed a néo-colonial economy. There was a considerable amount of choice open to the government so long as it kept the economy - and the country as a whole - within the orbit of the West. It is debatable where the dividing line fell between pressure from abroad and friendly advice, between subversion through aid and genuine assistance, between leaders wanting help and having it thrust upon them. What must be stressed is that western countries, when acting in a loose association, had the capacity to prevent Kenyatta from changing dramatically the economic and political direction of the country.

The Kenya Government made some moves to ease away from too heavy a dependence on any single country by increasing the amount of multilateral aid it received as well as by improving relations with West Germany, the Scandinavian countries and the European Economic Community as a whole. The donors, for their part, appreciably increased the level of true 'aid' within their aid, by providing more for rural programmes than for impressive, industrial projects which benfited fewer people. On the other hand, it can be convincingly argued that aid, in whatever form, helped to tie Kenya to the donor country; and further, it was possibly in the best interests of the donors not to encourage largescale industrial expansion as this would have detracted away from Kenya's dependence upon developed countries to provide these facilities and goods. The conclusion upon whether or not 'development' took place in the country is a value-laden one to make. It would be fair to say that some absolute improvement in the living conditions of the majority took place, but that this was counteracted by the increasing inequalities between the various social and economic groups, a problem which threatened the political and economic structures of Kenyan society.

The Africanisation of the economy was potentially the most damaging force affecting foreign interests, but the government's actions in this field were low-key. Opposition to rapid Africanisation came from such diverse quarters as a high-powered committee at the University of Nairobi,⁷⁷ to Oginga Odinga, who saw that rapid Africanisation would only increase African unemployment rather than the reverse because the economy could not withstand the consequences of such actions.⁷⁸ The Asians, rather than the Europeans, bore the brunt

77. Financial Times, 11 March 1968.

78. Donald Rothchild, 'Kenya's Africanization Program: Priorities of Development and Equity', <u>The American Political Science Review</u>, vol. 1xiv, no. 3, September 1970, p. 746.

of the Africanisation which took place because they controlled the small managerial and commercial areas into which African entrepreneurs could easily move.⁷⁹ The stated goal of the Kenya Government was complete Africanisation of all sectors, but it must be asked whether this was really attempted, and, in philosophical terms, whether it should have been attempted considering the cosmopolitan nature of the society.

The conclusion one must draw is that Africanisation was only pursued in those areas which would not upset foreign interests. Government policy showed that moderate Africanisation and a continuing dependent relationship with the West were <u>not</u> incompatible. The longterm contradiction of such a relationship did not affect Kenyatta's period of rule to any great extent except perhaps after the mid 1970s. It will be left to future governments to deal with the mounting popular pressure against external control and 'neo-colonialism' in the economy and to deal with the problem of the 400,000 landless migrants (as of 1976) and the 250,000 new job seekers every year.⁸⁰ It is unlikely that the Kenyan economy will be strong enough, or the government willing enough, to reject totally the influence of the West in the foreseeable future.

79. Donald Rothchild, 'Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya', <u>T.J.M.A.S.</u>, 7, 4 (1969), pp. 689-711.

80. <u>A.R.B</u>. (E.F.T.), 1978, p. 4812.

Chapter Four

The East African Arena

The regional environment of East Africa is the focus of study in this chapter. Given the limited resources and interests of Kenya, East Africa was a very important arena for policy-makers, and one in which it was hoped the country could play a dominant role. Colonial policies were partly responsible for the faster growth and development of the country as compared with its neighbours, while the coastal location of Kenya made the country an important actor in the movement of goods to and from the landlocked states in the interior.

This chapter analyses the foreign policy towards the countries in the 'core' of the region, namely Tanzania and Uganda, as well as with those in the wider eastern African arena.¹ This provides quite a large field of enquiry for a single chapter, but it has been necessary because of the related nature of both geographical areas. Kenya's membership of the East African Community developed from out of a plan to be associated with all of the countries in the wider region, and these designs were rekindled following the demise of the Community in 1977. Similarly, Kenyan foreign policy and economic relations with countries such as Zaire, Zambia and Mozambique were markedly affected by the prevailing political climate of the Community. Kenyan foreign policy, therefore, was forced to take account of the interaction between the various sub-units of the East African region.

 ^{&#}x27;East Africa' normally refers to Kenya, Tanzania (Tanganyika before 1964) and Uganda, while 'eastern Africa' refers to those countries which form the sub-group of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa - Burundi, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Malagasy, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, Zambia. Countries technically from outside this region - Central African Republic, Congo, Mozambique, Sudan, Zaire - will be taken as within the 'wider eastern African arena'.

In this chapter, the major strands of Kenya's foreign policy in the region are outlined, and then more detailed studies are made of the abortive attempts at political federation with Tanzania and Uganda, the development and experiences of the East African Community, and the nature of policy after the collapse of the Community. Throughout the period since independence, a major threat to Kenya's territorial stability came from Somalia, and this specifically affected relations with states to the north of Kenya as well as having a marked impact upon domestic policy and relations with other East African countries. Because of the significance of this dispute, this chapter carries a case-study of the policies towards Somalia and analyses the most important aspects of the conflict.

Regional Foreign Policy

Kenya's major aim in the regional arena could best be described as <u>mutual good-neighbourliness</u>. Kenyan leaders generally followed policies which aimed to provide and maintain a friendly environment for trade and keep to a minimum any differences over political or economic matters. Contacts between Kenya and other countries in eastern, as well as central and southern, Africa dated back into the colonial period when nationalist groups from many countries worked together in the Pan-African Freedom Movement,² which coordinated the actions of the various nationalist organisations in the region.

In 1965, attempts were made to unite the eleven member states of the United Nations Economic Community for Africa sub-region in

2. Richard Cox, Pan-Africanism in Practice: P.A.F.M.E.C.S.A. 1958-1964 (London, O.U.P., 1964).



Eastern, Central and Southern Africa

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Ethiopia

Siler prost

Somalia

Indian Ocean

R - Rwanda B - Burundi M - Malawi L - Lesotho S - Swaziland Chad Sudan Central African Republic Cameroon Uganda Kenya Gabon Congo Zaire B Tanzania Angola M Zambia

D - Djibouti

EG- Equitorial Guinea



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an 'Economic Community of Eastern Africa'.³ Although the states initialled an agreement in Lusaka, practical difficulties in drawing up the bases of the organisation halted its development. It was natural that after independence most governments, including the Kenyan, wished to tackle their own problems, but some semblance of regional unity was maintained through the Eastern and Central African States Summit meetings, which originally were held annually, but after 1970 were held every two years.

Kenya's regional foreign policy of promoting <u>mutual good-neigh-</u> <u>bourliness</u> was well served by this loose association of states because it meant that all the states met together frequently to air their grievances and co-ordinate policies. Five separate committees were established to help with the implementation of regional policies on agriculture (headquarters in Sudan), industry and energy (Zambia), transport and communications (Ethiopia), trade and tourism (Central African Republic) and human resources (Uganda). Further benefits emanated from the association in that it was a leading protagonist in the attack on the white minority regimes of southern Africa, being responsible for the 'Lusaka Manifesto' of 1969,⁴ and this allowed Kenya to play a significant, active role in the liberation movement.

The importance and relevance of these Summits should, however, not be overstressed, because these meetings only helped to service the

- 3. Cherry Gertzel, Maure Goldschmidt and Donald Rothchild (eds.), <u>Government and Politics in Kenya</u> (Nairobi, East African Pub., 1969), pp. 606-607.
- 4. For text of Lusaka Manifesto see I. Brownlie (ed.), <u>Basic Documents</u> on African Affairs (London, O.U.P., 1971), pp. 526-533. The major stand was that 'dialogue' could only take place after white South Africans had accepted black Africans as their equals.

relations which developed from direct bilateral contacts between Kenya and its neighbours and did not replace them. The focus of Kenya's regional foreign policy was the East African Community, which between 1967 and 1977 formally tied the country economically and, to a large extent, politically with Uganda and Tanzania. Kenya's relations with those more peripheral states were not as intense as with its Community partners, but increased over the years as trade with them expanded and Kenya tried to avoid being dragged down in the ailing Community by attempting to unite all of the region in a wider economic association similar to its counterpart in West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (E.C.O.W.A.S.). The hazards facing Kenva's wider regional goal were many, but notably the long-standing border dispute with the Somali Republic and the sporadic war in the Horn of Africa, the lack of communications within the region as a whole, the irregular and irrational policies of President Idi Amin of Uganda and, in the mid 1970s, Tanzania's closure of its border with Kenya and its attempts to forge a socialist sub-group to the south of Kenya. None of these problems were satisfactorily settled at the time of Jomo Kenyatta's death and so represented continuing issues in Kenyan foreign policy.

The Federation Issue

During the colonial period Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda had close political and economic links and shared many common services. The British Government, in order to ease administration of these countries imposed common organisations on them notably for the sharing of facilities such as railways, postal services and shipping. All three countries used an interchangeable currency, yet despite these common bonds, federation was never implemented even though it was mooted on several occasions. Many of the African nationalists believed that the

colonial idea of divide and rule prevented federation, but they hoped to be able to succeed in this goal after independence had been granted to their respective countries. As it turned out, the independent states drifted further away from the goal of federation as years went by and each government looked towards national objectives before international, or rather supranational, aspirations. One high-ranking Kenyan official was to explain this failure later to this author by saying that the colonial period artificially stimulated the appeal for federation when the peoples and the countries of East Africa were so dissimilar.⁵

In the early 1960s at least, the prospects for federation appeared to be good, but difficulties emerged which had their roots in the colonial period. The British Government and settlers of European descent had allowed the Kenyan economy to dominate the region at the expense of neighbouring Tanganyika and Uganda.⁶ Nairobi became the focus for many industrial and commercial operations, and the other countries, without a settler community of any size, suffered from this economic neglect. Consequently, at the time of independence, the Kenyan economy was far stronger than any other in the region while the weakness of the others was structurally determined by the colonial heritage. Kenyan policies naturally took full advantage of this situation, but were moderated by the necessity of maintaining such a relationship without duress or opposition from Tanzania and Uganda.

It was this fear of domination by Kenya which was a major factor

5. Interview with a high-ranking member of the Kenya High Commission, London, 17 May 1977.

6. E.A. Brett, <u>Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa</u> (London, Heinemann, 1972). in regional politics throughout the period under study. Apart from the colonial influence already mentioned, Uganda's land-locked position made the country very aware of its precarious relationship with Kenya because it was dependent upon Kenyan roads and railways for most of its trade. Similarly, Tanzania's northern industrial pocket was tied more to Mombasa and the Kenyan rail-link than to Dar es Salaam. Such an influential position in the region provided a strong impetus for Kenyan foreign policy to be geared to maintaining the status quo, while the influx of foreign investment to Nairobi after independence helped the country to remain dominant vis-à-vis its neighbours.

At the end of the colonial period, attempts were made to organise the various common arrangements into some form of stable grouping. Following the Raisman Report,⁷ the East African Common Services Organisation (E.A.C.S.O.) was formed in 1961 and became responsible for regulating the shared services. To offset Kenyan dominance of the regional economy, a 'Distributable Pool' was established through which a fixed percentage of each state's Gross National Product was paid into the pool and then distributed in equal shares. Kenyans hoped that participation in the pool would dissipate calls for greater redistribution, but the view that federation was the key to the problem prevailed, at least in official declarations, in the three states.

Dr. Julius Nyerere had promised in 1960 to postpone Tanganyika's independence in order to allow Kenya and Uganda to gain their respective independences simultaneously with Tanganyika so that the three states could join together in a federation immediately afterwards. This offer proved to be unrealistic owing mainly to the problems of cooperation and the fact that the dates for independence for Kenya and Uganda were unknown. In June 1963, after Tanganyikan and Ugandan independence, but before a firm date had been fixed for Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere and Milton Obote of Uganda met in Nairobi and agreed to form a federation of states by the end of that year. Their declaration stated:

We share a common past and are convinced of our common destinies. We have a common history, culture and customs which make our unity both logical and natural. Our futures are inevitably bound together by the identical aspirations and hopes of our peoples and the need for similar efforts in facing the tasks which lie ahead of each of our free nations. 8

The declaration stressed the Pan-African intentions of regional integration which those favouring a continental union, notably Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, doubted, but a special demand placed near the end of the declaration concerned the immediate independence of Kenya;

The ruling party has a clear merdate for Independence and we must regard it as an unfriendly act if Britain uses the pretext of some minority interest or other to prevent Kenya joining the free nations at the earliest possible moment. We are closely involved in this matter now since a hold-up in Kenya's advance to Independence will hinder the achievement of Federation to which we are committed. The three Governments, having agreed to the establishment of a Federation this year, expect the British Government to grant Kenya's Independence immediately. 9

Through this declaration, Jomo Kenyatta used foreign policy the goal of federation - to further the more immediate objective of independence for Kenya. Likewise, Kenya's two independent neighbours were co-ordinating their foreign policies to favour the Kenyan nationalists. This declaration was partly responsible for making the British

- 8. Colin Leys and Peter Robson (eds.), Federation in East Africa. Opportunities and Problems (Nairobi, O.U.P., 1965), p. 205.
- 9. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 207. For another interesting discussion of this period see Joseph S. Nye, <u>Pan-Africanism and Fast African Integration</u> (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965).

Government decide firmly on a date for Kenyan independence, but it is difficult to say whether it had any direct influence over the timing of the event. However, after Kenyan independence in December 1963. the prospects of federation between the states diminished rather than grew, and this raised doubts as to the sincerity of the Kenyan leaders. as well as Nyerere and Obote, for federation. Early in 1964, the revolution in Zanzibar helped to spark off army mutinies in the three states. British troops were called in to suppress the mutinies. but whereas Kenyatta had little reluctance in taking this act only weeks after independence, Nyerere was acutely embarrassed by his actions and called upon O.A.U. troops, from Nigeria, to replace the British. There was no effort made to forge a united East African policy, and this event highlighted the differing perceptions held by Kenyatta and Nverere of their former colonisers. The emergence of a revolutionary Zanzibar, soon pulled into a federation with mainland Tanganyika. further worried Kenyan leaders, especially as the island was automatically allowed membership of any federal government.¹⁰

Kenyatta's apparent wavering commitment to federation in 1964 caused repercussions on the domestic scene. On 18 June, the House of Representatives called on the government to increase its efforts to gain agreement with the country's neighbours. An amendment was carried by fifty-nine votes to twenty-two votes, against vehement opposition from Kenyatta and his Senior Ministers, setting a deadline date for federation of 15 August 1964.¹¹ Kenyatta was adamant that he was not

11. East African Standard, 19 June 1964.

^{10.} Ali A. Mazrui and Donald Rothchild, 'The Soldier and the State in East Africa: Some Theoretical Conclusions on the Army Mutinies of 1964', <u>The Western Political Quarterly</u>, vol. xx (1967), pp. 82-96; also Michael Wolfers, <u>Politics in the Organization of African Unity</u> (London, Methuen, 1976), pp. 129-132.

going to allow pressure from the National Assembly to affect his control of foreign policy, though his reluctance to force the pace of federation raised doubts as to his commitment to this goal. Further evidence to support this view appeared on 2 August 1964, when in a major speech at Kisumu, Kenyatta hinted that the federation declaration of June 1963 had been a ploy to hasten the country's independence and was not to be taken as a literal policy statement.¹² However, he did state that the government remained committed to federation, but in its own time. A statement to the National Assembly on 13 August regretted the inability of the government to reach agreement on federation, but concluded: 'The Government would like to take the opportunity of once again assuring the Parliament and people of Kenya that everything will be done to expedite the establishment or formation of an East African Federation'.¹³

The country stood to gain substantially from any form of federation. In political terms, the Kenya African National Union (K.A.N.U.) was well organised and disciplined after the 1963 election and so would have gained considerable strength in an elective Assembly. As the dominant country of the region, Kenya was sure to prosper in relation to its neighbours owing to its strategic and historical advantages, and so there was less need for national safeguards. And as a bonus, Kenyatta, as the elder statesman, was almost certain to take the role of President of the regional government. In economic terms, some form of regional arrangement was of paramount importance, because on average 25 per cent. of the total exports were 'inter-territorial',

12. Ibid., 3 August 1964.

^{13.} Statement by the Kenya Government on The East African Federation (Sessional Paper No. 5 of 1964/65, Nairobi, Government Printer, 1964).

that is with Uganda and Tanzania, while the most favourable balances of trade were with these two countries. It is important to note, however, that Kenya's dominant economic position within the region was not dependent upon having a federal relationship but merely upon the continuation of friendly political relations. Any enforced federation would only have exaggerated the stains between the countries and so would have been detrimental to the country's economic development and prosperity.

There were. then, fewer difficulties for Kenya in a federation than for the other states, whose fear of being dominated would not have been totally laid to rest within a regional association. However, there is little concrete evidence showing Kenyatta and his colleagues to have been committed seriously and irrevocably to federation as their concern over national issues took precedence over any others. Talk of federation in the pre-independence period was perhaps based more upon the emotional appeal of Pan-Africanism and the pragmatic drive for independence than on any closely scrutinised plan for federation. After a vigorous nationalist struggle - Kenyatta had been in the vanguard of the movement since the early 1920s - the elite group felt it had deserved the spoils of government as well as the opportunity to tackle the country's problems as they felt best. The fact that the Kenyan economy was so strong could have caused problems as the partners would have wanted to cut it back to some form of parity. On balance, therefore, Kenyatta preferred to wait and see what Tanzania and Uganda wanted to do and, in essence, he allowed these countries to ruin the chances of federation and kept Kenya more or less on the sidelines.

The major political opposition came from Uganda, which feared

becoming a 'backwater' in East African affairs. Whereas Obote supported a truly federal arrangement, with sufficient checks on central control and a certain amount of state autonomy, he was wholly against the idea of a unitary government which he feared was what would come about. 14 As prospects for political unity dissolved, then the inadequacies of the current economic arrangements became increasingly apparent. Both neighbouring countries acted, though with varying vigour, to shift the balance away from Kenyan economic domination to shared benefit of regional trade. The Kampala Agreement of April 1964 (later modified at Mbale in 1965)¹⁵ aimed to divert new industrial projects from their more obvious location in Kenya to the more deserving, though less economically propitious, regions in Uganda and Tanzania. These arrangements failed to satisfy those who believed that Kenya continued to take the lion's share of the spoils of East African co-operation. In 1965. the Tanzanian Government decided to break away from the common currency arrangements and established its own currency. The Kenya Government was forced to a similar move and set up the Kenya Central Bank on 10 February 1966¹⁶ to look after the country's financial affairs. The potential damage to the region from this split never fully materialised, partly because the currencies maintained fixed parity (at least officially), but the fact that Tanzania had taken such a unilateral act left an imprint on the minds of Kenyan decision-makers.

- 14. Ali A. Mazrui, 'Tanzania versus East Africa. A Case of Unwitting Federal Sabotage', <u>Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies</u>, vol. iii, no. 3, November 1965, pp. 209-225; J.H. Proctor, 'The Effort to Federate East Africa; A Post-Mortem', <u>The Political Quarterly</u>, vol. 37, no. 1, 1966, pp. 46-69.
- 15. Arthur Hazlewood, Economic Integration: The East African Experience (London, Heinemann, 1975), pp. 57-61.
- 16. The Central Bank of Kenya Bill, 1966 (Kenya Gazette Supplement Number 10 (Bills Number 3), Nairobi, Government Printer, 1966).

In response to the deteriorating relations in East Africa, President Kenyatta called at the end of June 1965 for a review of E.A.C.S.O.'s operations and discussions on economic links in general.¹⁷ As a result of this request, a commission was established later in the year under the chairmanship of a Danish economist, Professor Kjeld Philip, to look into methods by which to improve the existing arrangements and eradicate the major problems. The terms of reference for this commission were as follows:

To examine existing arrangements in East Africa for co-operation between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda on matters of mutual interest, and having due regard to the views of the respective Governments, to make agreed recommendations on the following matters: a) How the East African Common Market can be maintained and strengthened and the principles on which, and the

manner in which, the Common Market can in future be controlled and regulated.

b) The arrangements necessary for effective operation of the Common Market consequential upon the establishment of separate currencies.

c) The extent to which services at present maintained in common between the three countries can be continued, and the form which such services should take.

d) The extent to which (if at all) new services can be provided in common between the three countries, and the form which such services should take.

e) The manner in which the common services should be financed.

f) The extent to which the management of different services can be located in different parts of East Africa.

g) The legal, administrative and constitutional arrangements most likely to promote effective cooperation between the East African countries in the light of the recommendations made under paragraphs a, b, c, d, e and f. To submit their final report to the Governments not later than 1 May 1966. 18

The commission, composed of three ministers from each country, deliberated for several months on the problems, which were exacerbated in December 1965 over the different reactions to the Rhodesian

17. Hazlewood, op.cit., p. 68.

18. Tom Mboya, The Challenge of Nationhood (London, Heinemann, 1970), p. 243. unilateral declaration of independence. In May 1966, the commission reported to the governments over its progress and following subsequent negotiations between the three Heads of State, a Treaty for East African Co-operation was signed in Kampala on 6 June 1967.¹⁹

The East African Community

The treaty of June 1967 established the East African Community, which highlighted the friendship and interdependence of the states but again left open the question of federation. An integral part of the Community was the Common Market, whose laissez-faire nature was tempered, to the advantage of Tanzania and Uganda, by two major innovations. A transfer tax was established which enabled the weaker countries to protect infant industries against competition from outside. In essence, this allowed Tanzania to tax products originating in both its neighbours, Uganda to levy it on Kenyan goods only, while Kenya was unable to make any use of the tax at all. The second innovation was for an East African Development Bank, which was to receive investment in equal shares from the three countries, as well as from outside the region, and then to provide loans on the basis of 22.5 per cent. to Kenya and 38.75 per cent. to each of the other two countries.²⁰

The Kenya Government accepted these innovations as a <u>sine qua non</u> for regional agreement. It was more important to retain the cooperation of its neighbours than to antagonise them by opposing redistributive principles. The moves made at decentralisation away

^{19.} Treaty for East African Co-operation (Nairobi, Government Printer for E.A.C.S.O., 1967).

^{20.} Kjeld Philip, 'Common Services for East Africa. A Model for Small Countries', The Round Table, vol. 58, no. 230, April 1968, pp. 151-158.

from Nairobi under the Kampala Agreement were extended, with headquarters of corporations shifted to locations in Uganda and Tanzania, while the latter gained the headquarters of the Community at Arusha. The figures in Table 4:2 highlight the importance of the Community partners to Kenyan trade. On average, as a percentage of trade with all African countries, the partners provided 80 per cent. of imports and received 70 per cent. of exports. Even in terms of total exports, the partners received between 15-30 per cent. of Kenya's exports. These economic figures translated themselves into the political necessity of a <u>good-neighbours</u> foreign policy, of which the Community was a formal manifestation.

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The East African Community worked well in the late 1960s and attracted a great deal of interest from other potential members in the region. The relations between Kenya and its partners remained class and the Community worked to the advantage of all in promoting trade, development and friendly political ties. Although the Community survived until 1977, and for most of the time functioned smoothly, there was always an undercurrent of political tension which threatened to erupt and disrupt the Community. The foundation of the tension remained the problem left over from the colonial period, namely Kenyan domination in the region, despite the transfer taxes and other equalising legislation. The Kenya Government refused to countenance further ideas that the country should hold back on development to allow the others to catch up, because this was clearly against Kenyan interests and was, in any case, not a practicable suggestion. Superimposed upon the fundamental inequality were the economic philosophies of the three countries. As shown in Chapter Three, Kenyan development was set firmly upon a capitalist programme chartered out during the colonial period. Tanzania and Uganda, on the other hand, were more committed through the

Table 4:2

Trade with Tanzania and Uganda (percentages)

Tanzania								
	Imp	orts	Expo	Exports				
		B	<u>c</u>	D				
1968	27	3	37	14				
1 9 69	31	3	33	13				
1970	34	4	34	14				
1974	57	3	26	9				
1975	72	3	27	9				
1976	75	3	27	7				

Uganda

Imports				Exports	
	A	<u>B</u>	C	D	
1968	64	7	38	15	
1969	60	6	41	16	
1970	57	6	39	15	
1974	21	1	40	14	
1975	12	0.4	35	12	
1976	5	0.2	32	8	

A - % of total imports from African countries

- B % of total imports
- C % of total exports to African countries

D - % of total exports

Source: Adapted from <u>Statistical Abstract 1971</u> (Nairobi, Ministry of Finance and Planning, 1971); <u>Kenya Statistical Digest</u> (Nairobi, Ministry of Finance and Planning), vol. xv, no. 4, December 1977. "Arusha Declaration" and "Common Man's Charter" respectively to more socialist-inspired development paths which aimed to spread the wealth of the country to the lowest levels of society.²¹ In Kenya, though politicians promised differently, the <u>wananchi</u>, or working poor, who perhaps constituted 90 per cent. of the population, saw little development as compared with what could have been possible. The economic inequalities and divergent philosophies provided the bases of tension which, in the end, helped to bring the Community to its end.

By 1970, relations with Tanzania and Uganda were already at a low point. The East African University was broken up in July 1970 into its constituent national institutions, though an inter-university committee was established to make standards comparable.²² The government was increasingly annoyed by the continual attacks on the country as 'imperialist' and 'capitalist' by the partners, and considered their lobbying in support of the detained leader, Oginga Odinga, to be too much of an incursion into the country's domestic affairs. In September, Uganda decided to expel all non-Ugandan workers from the country in order to control the outflow of money in workers ' remittances to Kenya and Tanzania. This move had serious repercussions on the Kenyan domestic scene as many thousands of workers were repatriated.23 The dispute quickly spiralled, as M.P.s threatened to withdraw from the Community while Mombasa dockworkers decided to cut the life-line to Uganda by boycotting all goods bound for the country. President Milton Obote, in turn, warned that Uganda would retaliate to these moves by

21. For outlines of these Charters see Gideon-Cyrus M. Mutiso and S.W. Rohio (eds.), <u>Readings in African Political Thought</u> (London, Heinemann, 1975), pp. 516-523 and pp. 550-579.

22. A.R.B., 1970, p. 1714.

23. A.R.B. (E.F.T.), 1970 p. 1757.

Major Trading Partners i	n Africa (1969	exports)
	\$ • 000	
South Africa to Zambia	106.49	
Kenya to Uganda	37.14	
Kenya to Tanzania	36.59	· · · · ·
Rhodesia to Zambia	31.60	
South Africa to Mozambique	27.59	· · ·
Uganda to Kenya	24.22	
Algeria to Ivory Coast	13.70	
Rhodesia to Malawi	12.50	
Tunisia to Libya	12.30	
Tanzania to Kenya	10.30	•
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		

Table 4:3

Source: A.R.B. (E.F.T.), 1972, p. 2291.

cutting the electricity supplied to Kenya. The Kenya Government acted swiftly to cool the situation down. The Minister for Labour, Mr. Mwendwa, was conciliatory towards Ugandan actions and said that Uganda was within its rights to expel the workers, because policies concerning nonskilled workers were within national jurisdiction. Mwendwa believed as few as 3,000 Kenyans had been displaced, and so helped to settle the breach without too much damage to Kenyan political and economic fortunes.²⁴

Kenya's problems with its partners were dramatically increased in January 1971 when a <u>coup d'état</u> in Uganda forced Obote out of office and brought to power General Idi Amin. Obote sought refuge in Dar es

24. Ibid., p. 1840.

Salaam where Tanzanian officials, joined by Zambian, protested bitterly against Amin's <u>coup</u> and the brutality which took place in Uganda in the subsequent months. The O.A.U. could not reach immediate agreement on what policy to take over Amin. An O.A.U. Council of Ministers meeting was postponed <u>sine die</u> on 1 March without recognising the Ugandan delegates, and so put off the problem for the June Summit to solve.²⁵

Kenyan foreign policy towards the Amin regime during 1971, and throughout most of the 1970s, aimed at total non-interference and disregard. Technically speaking, because of the Community arrangements, Kenya did not have formal diplomatic representation in Kampala, and so the question of direct recognition did not arise. However, a month after the coup the Foreign Minister, Dr. Njoroge Mungai, said that General Amin's government had to be accepted as it had complete control of the country.²⁶ Besides this formal stance, there was little official reaction in Nairobi to what was happening in Uganda. In March 1971, when General Amin claimed to have captured 750 weapons in Uganda which were being used to train a group plotting to overthrow the Kenya Government, he was politely ignored.²⁷ The aim of this policy was to stay as neutral as possible in the growing verbal war between Nyerere and Amin, because any sign of bias towards either side would have had serious repercussions on Community trade and relations. Kenya, of all African countries, was the one best placed to put pressure on Amin because of Uganda's dependence upon the Kenyan communications link with the coast. But the importance of Uganda's trade with Kenya and the policy of noninterference held by the Kenya Government, tempered by the knowledge

25. <u>A.R.B.</u>, 1971, p. 2007.

26. Fast African Standard, 27 February 1971.

27. <u>A.R.B.</u>, 1971, p. 2047.

that pressure could always be put on in the future, helped shape the policy of neutrality.

In July 1971, after the Tanzania-Uganda border had been closed, an Assistant Minister in the Office of the President, Mr. Munyi, reiterated the government's stance of impartiality, and stressed that the hope was to maintain the Community over and above political differences between the partners.²⁸ The attempt to divorce economics from politics was consistent with Kenya's regional strategy, though non-interference was itself a political posture. Pressure from Kenyatta upon the two leaders prevented a total collapse, but the Community was unable to keep out of the political troubles. The Higher Authority of the Community, composed of three Heads of State, was due to meet in February 1971, but this meeting and all subsequent meetings were cancelled. In March. Tanzania restricted the flow of money in or out of the country, and a week later the Kenyan authorities were forced to a similar move.²⁹ The Kenyans again had to follow Tanzanian monetary changes in October 1971 after President Nyerere had switched his country's currency from being pegged to sterling to the United States dollar. Because of the dollar devaluation, financial transactions with Tanzania caused a loss to Kenya of around 3 per cent., and so Kenyatta (and Amin) decided to switch also to the dollar so bringing conformity again to the Community.³⁰

Kenyatta's attempts at playing the 'honest Broker'³¹ succeeded in consolidating Community policy where otherwise the organisation might

28. Ibid., p. 2157.

- 29. Daily Nation, 23 March 1971.
- 30. A.R.B. (E.F.T.), 1971, p. 2124.
- 31. Africa Confidential, vol. 12, no. 24, 1971, pp. 4-5.

have collapsed much sooner. However, the lack of initiative from the Authority and the insecurity of regional operations served to disenchant member-states and the 'East Afrocrats', the body of civil servants entrusted with the task of maintaining the Community. Criticism within Kenya of the condition of the Community was increasingly obvious not only within the press but also between government ministers. During a debate in the National Assembly in June 1975, Mwai Kibaki, the Minister of Finance and Flanning, stressed the benefits of the Community to Kenya and called for continued faith in the regional body. Opposing him was Charles Njonjo, the Attorney-General and one of Kenyatta's closest advisers, who was adamant that the country stood to gain more outside of the Community straitjacket.³² Discontent not only focused upon the Community arrangements <u>per se</u>, but was also exacerbated by the deteriorating bilateral relations with partner states.

Relations with Uganda were marked by instability after the <u>coup</u> of 1971. It was this instability which so angered ministers because it was difficult to plan consistent and coherent policies when the response to them was often irrational and unpredictable. The mass expulsion of Asians in 1972 embarrassed Kenya which had similar repatriation policies, though not so extreme. Politically, the country suffered from being tarred with the same brush as Amin's Uganda, but the severest problems resulted in the economic field. Kenyan Asians had a large measure of influence in the country's commercial sector, but the close links they had with Asians in Uganda were disrupted, so leading to the dislocation of their businesses in Kenya.

32. The Standard, 26 June 1975.

In June 1975, President Kenyatta attempted to mediate between Uganda and Britain over the question of Denis Hills, a British lecturer about to hang in Uganda. President Amin was abusive of Kenyatta's actions and claimed the Kenyan leader to be involved in an imperialistic plot against him. The government immediately reacted by impounding a supply of Soviet arms in transit to Uganda and only released them after receiving an apology.³³ This episode increased the anti-Amin sentiments of the Kenyan public, who had grown tired of indiscriminate killings of Kenyans in Uganda and the unpredictability of Ugandan actions. The extent to which public opinion, or certainly the press, was against President Amin's regime became evident in February 1976, when the Ugandan leader laid claims to certain areas of western Kenya which had been severed from Uganda during the colonial period.³⁴ The question of boundaries and secession was a delicate point in Kenya because of the numerous ethnic difficulties and the border dispute with Somalia, and so opposition to the Ugandan claims was guaranteed. President Amin over-stepped the mark on this occasion because not only did he bring quite openly abusive rebuttals from Kenyan ministers, but he also sparked off strikes among Mombasa dockworkers against Ugandan goods, large-scale demonstrations, burning of effigies of Amin and the pledging of support for any government action against Uganda. 35 Even the influential and respected Standard was aroused to a near hysterical editorial in March:

Kényans, in their teeming millions, recently held countrywide loyalty demonstrations and, in the clearest language, dared those frowzy gunmen across the border (some of whom raped Kenyan women and harassed our freedom fighters during the colonial era)

<u>Ibid.</u>, 28 and 30 June 1975.
 <u>The Guardian</u>, 16 February 1976.
 <u>The Times</u>, 20 February 1976.

to try to snatch even an iota of our soil in which they were staking imperialistic claims in 1976. 36

Relations with Uganda were again strained to breaking point in July 1976 after the government had allowed passage of Israeli paratroopers bound for the raid on Entebbe Airport, Uganda, to rescue hostages held by Palestinians following an airplane hijack. President Amin threatened a war with Kenya in retaliation and killed about two hundred Kenyans resident in Uganda.³⁷ The government broke from its normally restrained posture and, while not accepting the charges of connivance with the Israelis, said that President Amin was a 'beserk Hitler' who deserved everything that happened. 38 Uganda's threat of war was drowned out by the cutting-off of oil supplies by Kenya, and Amin soon came around to a peaceful negotiated settlement.³⁹ It was important for the government to maintain trade with Uganda despite the hostilities because of the vast benefits involved, and this gave the impetus for some form of normalisation of relations.

- 36. The Standard, 30 March 1976.
- 37. Financial Times, 12 July 1976.
- 38. The Guardian, 8 July 1976; also Colin Legum, 'Kenyatta gunning for Amin', The Observer, 25 July 1976.
- 39. The settlement was based upon what had been Kenya's pre-conditions for negotiation, namely:
 - 1) Ugandan troops to be removed from the border.
 - 2) Claims stopped on Kenyan territory.

 - 3) Safety guaranteed of Kenyans in Uganda. 4) Threats of using force against Kenya to stop.
 - 5) Hate and smear ' campaign to stop.
 - 6) Goods received from Kenya to be paid for.
 - 7) Confiscation of goods en route to other countries to stop. see The Times, 28 July 1976.

The memorandum was signed on 6 August; ibid., 7 August 1976. Also an editorial, 'Threat to Good Neighbourliness averted', Inside Kenya Today (Nairobi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting), no. 33. September 1976, p. 2.

If the partnership with Uganda was stormy and unpredictable, then the problems with Tanzania were, in comparison, more subtle and philosophical, though in the long term probably more damaging to the national economy. Tanzania's attempts to develop upon a solid foundation of self-reliance and socialism placed it in natural opposition to the general laissez-faire attitude of the Kenyatta government. The differing rate and direction of growth between the two countries were marked, but were magnified by the fact that they were adjacent countries and, as such, often used as examples of contrasting development. The fundamental differences of opinion placed strains upon political goodwill and many times threatened the Community's existence. Verbal warfare was quite common, with Kenya criticised as the 'man eat man' society with the favourite rebuttal that Tanzania was a 'man eat nothing' society run by 'barefoot socialists'.⁴⁰

The political differences were also translated into economic problems quite often at Kenya's expense. For example, the shared income tax arrangements had to be scrapped in 1973⁴¹ because Tanzania's nationalisation policies meant that there were less taxes to be raised from private companies and this left Kenya paying an unreasonable proportion into the common fund. In 1974, Tanzania's pursuance of its <u>ujamaa</u> village collectivisation scheme caused tensions between the countries because President Nyerere ordered the expulsion of 10,000 Kenyans who refused to be settled.⁴² A final example of the contrasting development policies can be made from the expulsion of the multinational corporation, Lonrho, from Tanzania in 1978. Lonrho was

40. For example, see 'Back to Back. A Survey of Kenya and Tanzania', a supplement in The Economist, 11 March 1978.

41. A.R.B. (E.F.T.), 1973, p. 2678 and 1974, p. 3347.

42. A.R.B., 1974, p. 3450.

considered to have too many South African connections for Nyerere to accept, even though in Kenya the corporation was very influential, powerful and acceptable.

In December 1974, Kenya's regional economic policies were seriously threatened by the closure of all roads in the north of Tanzania to heavy goods traffic. The lucrative trade with Zaire. Rwanda, Burundi and, especially, Zambia was halted because goods travelled by road across northern Tanzania. The government feared that this was a deliberate attempt to divert goods away from Mombasa to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam, and its fears were justified when in January 1975 the Zambian Government gave notice of its intention to switch all import/export trade to Dar es Salaam. This decision coincided with the opening of the TanZam railway (or TaZaRa. the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority, as it is now known) which ---linked for the first time Zambia's copper mining areas with that coast. 43 Kenya managed to maintain some measure of trade and transit facilities with Zambia by using air transport and smaller, but acceptable. lorries. Trade was also aided by the fact that the port of Dar es Salaam was incapable of handling the increase of goods, and so Mombasa was the only viable alternative.

The final death-blow to the East African Community came in February 1977, with the government's decision to break from East African Airways (E.A.A.) and set up its own independent airline, Kenya Airways. Political and economic reasons were behind this decision. At the political level, Tanzania wanted E.A.A. to continue operating to all its internal airports as an essential service to the people even though

43. The Standard, 6 December 1974; A.R.B. (E.F.T.), 1975, p. 3383.

this was a very unprofitable exercise. Kenyans opposed this and felt that the Tanzanians ought to provide their own service if they wished, but at their own expense, as Uganda had started to do in the previous year. The purely economic problems centred upon the question of debt repayment. East African Airways had been hampered on many occasions because of non-payment of debts. On most occasions, such as in 1972,⁴⁴⁴ Kenya paid up promptly only to be held back by the slow action of its neighbours. In 1976 the World Bank suspended all loans to the Community because of outstanding debts, and these problems came to a head in 1977. East African Railways had a similar record of debts, and so the government pre-empted further trouble by establishing Kenya Railways and Kenya Airways early in 1977.⁴⁵

The actions taken in establishing Kenya Railways and Kenya Airway: reflected the antagonistic relationship with the country's partners and the frustration of working at an inefficient level. This was the antithesis of the reputation Kenya was attempting to build through its foreign policy of an efficient and business-like country. The reaction of President Nyerere to Kenya's actions was swift as he closed the border immediately between the two countries and sparked off a scramble for possession of whatever Community assets each country could find in order to strengthen the bargaining position at a later date. By June 1977, the Community arrangements had collapsed. Attempts at mediation by the Organisation of African Unity, as well as by Nigeria, Liberia and Ghana, all failed.⁴⁶ In the budget for 1976-77, the government refused to vote any money for the Community's

44. Daily Nation, 14 April 1972.

45. Ibid., 27 January 1977 and 4 February 1977.

46. A.R.B., 1977, p. 4312.

General Fund, and all services were taken over nationally. Kenya stood to gain most by such a seizure in terms of acquiring equipment and buildings, a large proportion of which were inside the country. In June and July, Uganda and Tanzania made attempts to resuscitate the Community by taking on the financing of it themselves,⁴⁷ but Kenyatta was adamant in striking out on a new foreign policy orientation, much to the relief felt in many quarters in Nairobi that a final decision had been made. The personal distaste felt between Amin and Nyerere, coupled with the lack of finances, made certain that little came of their attempts to maintain the Community.

One influential British newspaper summed up the episode by saying that 'the tragedy is that a naturally interdependent region should become further balkanised out of spite, jealousy and mismanagement'.⁴⁸ Although these factors did play a part in the Community's downfall, it would perhaps be a fairer and more balanced commentary to say that the political and economic differences between Kenya and its partners proved, in the end, to be too great to overcome, but this does not take away the fact that for many years the Community played an important and successful role in regional co-operation. In the end, the government realised that greater benefit lay outside the confines of a treaty agreement in ordinary bilateral ties.

With the Community gone and relations with partners in disarray, the government looked to countries further afield in the region for closer ties. Those to the south and west were temporarily blocked by the closure of the border with Tanzania, but we shall return to these

47. <u>A.R.B.</u> (E.F.T.), 1977, p. 4318. 48. <u>The Times</u>, 8 February 1977.

later. To the north lay countries which had virtually no trade and no communications with Kenya, but where great potential was obvious. However, the serious drawback concerned the relationship with the Somali Republic, and the claims which that country had on neighbours. These claims upset the peace in the Horn of Africa and so prevented normal relations there, but they also threatened directly the stability and composition of Kenya, because of Somali claims to parts of northern parts of the country. This threat provided the most serious secessionist problem which the government had to face, and so it is necessary that this dispute with the Somali Republic be looked at in greater detail.

The Somali dispute: Background and Issues

The Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.) of Kenya had always been a problematical district for the British colonial administration. The British had only reluctantly penetrated the district to help counter further westward expansion of Somali nomads, to prevent Ethiopian cattle raids and to provide some sort of "buffer" area between the tribesmen to the north and the prosperous white settler community to the south. The N.F.D. did not come under effective administrative control until 1919, when Wajir and Moyale were garrisoned by regular troops. But even this move failed to pacify totally the Somali tribes.⁴⁹

The tribesmen of much of the N.F.D. (particularly the eastern areas) were perceived to be distinct from those tribes further south. They were basically of Hamitic origins and so were antagonistic to,

^{49.} John Drysdale, <u>The Somali Dispute</u> (London, Pall Mall, 1964). Somali Republic technically refers to the territory merged from the former British and Italian possessions. However, here Somalia and the Somali Republic are used inter-changeably.

and suspicious of, the Bantus of southern Kenya. The peoples of the N.F.D. were partitioned, for security reasons, from the rest of Kenya, with movement to and from the district restricted to those in possession of a permit. This rigid control of movement reinforced the geographical disadvantages of the N.F.D. being remote from the heartland of the country. It also meant that the Somalis never came to feel to be an integral part of Kenya, and had virtually no interaction with the tribes who were to dominate African politics within Kenya at independence.⁵⁰

The Somali Youth League (S.Y.L.) had formed in Mogadishu in 1943 with assistance, rather ironically in a historical perspective, from Jomo Kenyatta.⁵¹ The S.Y.L. attempted to bind together the Somali peoples of the Horn of Africa, but its activities were deemed to be dangerous by the colonial authorities and so it was banned from Kenya in 1948 and its leaders exiled. The party was not allowed to reconvene in the N.F.D. until 1960, soon after the newly independent states of Somalia and British Somaliland had united in the Somali Republic. The flag of the Republic displayed a five-pointed star, signifying the ambition of Somalis to constitute a 'Greater Somalia', made up of five territories - Somalia, British Somaliland, French Somaliland (Djibouti), the Ogaden and the N.F.D.⁵²

- 50. Ibid. The N.F.D. was often used to exile Kenya's African politicians; for example, Thuku was exiled in Kismayu (now in Somalia), while Kenyatta spent some time in Maralal.
- 51. Jomo Kenyatta, <u>Suffering Without Bitterness</u> (Nairobi, East African Pub., 1968), p. 41.
- 52. A.A. Castagno, 'The Somali-Kenyan Controversy: Implications for the Future', <u>T.J.M.A.S.</u>, 2, 2 (1964), pp. 165-188; I.M. Lewis, 'The Problem of the Northern Frontier District of Kenya', <u>Race</u>, vol. v, no. 1, July 1963, pp. 48-60; I.M. Lewis, 'Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism', <u>T.J.M.A.S.</u> 1, 2 (1963) pp. 147-161.

The zestful renewal of Somali ambitions for a 'Greater Somalia' upset Kenya's African leaders who were naturally averse to any disintegration of what was soon to become independent Kenya. At the Lancaster House conference in 1962, no final solution was reached on the question of the N.F.D. A special delegation from the district had been allowed into the talks, thus showing not only the importance of the dispute but also the British Government's recognition of its importance. The Colonial Secretary, Mr. Reginald Maudling, promised an independent inquiry into the status of the N.F.D.:

This Commission would be appointed as soon as practicable so that its report could be available and a decision on its findings taken by Her Majesty's Government before the new constitution for Kenya was brought into operation. Meanwhile there would be no change in the status of the Northern Frontier District or in the arrangements for its administration. 53

Within Kenya, K.A.N.U. mobilised its forces to campaign against secession in the N.F.D. Tom Mboya gave instructions that 'the Party must begin a campaign in the province against the secessionists before the arrival in Kenya of the Commission to inquire into this matter'. K.A.N.U. had had little contact with the people of the N.F.D. owing to the restriction upon entry into the Northern Province. This severely hampered the campaign, but also gave K.A.N.U. valuable propaganda as the Somali tribes had never been treated before as an integral part of Kenya, then they could not possibly be aware of the great benefits which the country had to offer them. African leaders would develop the N.F.D. rather than allow it to stagnate as the Europeans had done. When giving evidence to the N.F.D. Commission in Nairobi, K.A.N.U.

^{53.} Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1962 (Cmnd. 1700, London, H.M.S.O., 1962).

^{54.} Tom Mboya, The New Constitutional Framework (Nairobi, K.A.N.U., 1962).

leaders rejected any transfer of territory to the Somali Republic and threatened any such action with immediate Kenyan demands for the return of Jubaland.⁵⁵

The N.F.D. Commission reported on 20 December 1962.⁵⁶ The report concluded that the tribes in the north-east of the district were in favour of secession. or eventual secession after a short period under direct British rule, to the Somali Republic. The rest of the district wished to remain in Kenya. Both sets of opinion were more or less clearcut along the Muslim and non-Muslim line. The Somali tribes, then, favoured secession and their case received a sympathetic hearing in many quarters. For example, in Britain the Daily Telegraph wrote editorially, 'Race, language and habit associate the northern tribes far more closely with the Somali than with the Kikuyu tribe. The only argument against secession in Kenya is that it is politically inconvenient. ' The newspaper accused the British Government of ignoring 'claims to secession from tribes that are small and weakly represented, while at the same time paying great attention to those that use the panga and the petrol bomb'.⁵⁷ It was widely feared in London at this time that Somali secession would force Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia into war. and this was one of the main reasons why it was 'politically inconvenient for the British Government to allow secession.⁵⁸ There was equal evidence to suggest, however, that Somalia would go to war if secession

- 55. Jubaland had been ceded in 1925 to Somalia as a token of British gratitude for Italian efforts in the Great War. This was covered in the 1915 Treaty of London.
- 56. Kenya: Report of the Northern Frontier District Commission (Cmnd. 1900, London, H.M.S.O., 1962).
- 57. Daily Telegraph, 21 December 1962.
- 58. Had been mentioned, for example, in The Times, 17 December 1962.

did not take place.

The report of the Regional Boundaries Commission was also published in London on 20 December.⁵⁹ This Commission had had the major task of drawing the boundaries of the regions to operate under the new constitution. Many of the former provincial boundaries were adjusted and new regions formed in order to reflect the interests and antipathies of each of the tribes.⁶⁰ Though the Somali Government had received assurances that this Commission would not interfere in the N.F.D., opinions were, nevertheless, sounded in the district. The report stated:

... the Somali delegations seen by us in these areas were unanimous in their desire not to be included in any region of Kenya ...

In the circumstances we would have considered it right to create a region consisting of the areas almost exclusively occupied by the Somali and kindred people ...

Our terms of reference, however, restricted us to providing six regions ...

After anxious consideration, therefore, we have included the area concerned in the Coast Region. One of the considerations which led us to this decision was that if at some time in the future this area should cease to be a part of Kenya its excision from the Coast Region would not adversely affect the viability of that Region or seriously upset the pattern laid down for Kenya as a whole. 61

The Boundaries Commission had reinforced the results of the N.F.D. report, that the Somali tribes favoured secession. It had been conceded that the Somali-populated areas had been included in the Coast Region on the future possibility that these areas would 'cease to be a part of Kenya'. However, the Boundaries report had also recommended the form-

59. Kenya: Report of the Regional Boundaries Commission (Cmnd. 1899, London, H.M.S.O., 1962).

60. Ibid. For example, Nyanza was altered to allow the Kipsigis to be in the Rift Valley. Western Region was formed to split the Luo and Luyia.

61. Ibid.

ation of a seventh region to account for the problem. Somalia sought clarification of the intentions of the British Government. Contrary to its previous promises, Britain decided not to settle the N.F.D. question before the new Kenya constitution was implemented. The British Government was not agreeable to any form of secession before Kenyan independence without the acquiescence of the country's leaders.⁶² This, in effect, meant that there would be no secession at all. In early March 1963, the new Colonial Secretary, Mr. Duncan Sandys, dealt Somali interests the crushing blow when, speaking in Nairobi, he accepted the formation of the seventh region.⁶³ The Somali Government broke off diplomatic relations with Britain.

Though the British bore the brunt of Somali anger, Jomo Kenyatta made it quite clear that he and his colleagues fully supported the 'seventh region plan'. On 14 March, Kenyatta stated that he would 'not entertain any secession or handing over of one inch of our territory We will not give in to threats and intimidation. We are going to rule this country and defend it. ⁶⁴ During May, the general election was held in Kenya, though not in the newly-formed North-Eastern Region. The Somali Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdullahi Issa, was one of the first to congratulate personally Kenyatta on his electoral success. Kenyatta, at least, was hopeful that the proposed federation of East African states would solve the problem, even though Somalia had stated that a settlement was required before federation took place.

62. Drysdale, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 127-145.
 63. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 140-141; also <u>Africa Diary</u> (New Delhi), 1963, p. 1090.
 64. <u>East African Standard</u>, 15 March 1963.

The Somali policy of soothing Kenyatta while attempting to get Britain to slice off the N.F.D. from Kenya was an impossible task, especially since formal diplomatic channels between the two countries were closed. A final opportunity, however, fell to Somalia when further talks were held in late August in Rome, a convenient neutral city. A token party of Kenyans, including Mboya, James Gichuru and Joseph Murumbi, was allowed into the talks as members attached to the British delegation. Any misgivings the Kenyans had that the N.F.D. would be handed over to Somalia at this late stage were allayed at the first session, when the British delegation stated that no decision would be acted upon without the full consent of the Kenya Government. This was a great success because it confirmed that no secession would take place. Little came from the conference as both Britain and Kenya rejected Somalia's plans either for joint Somali-Kenyan control of the N.F.D. or for United Nations intervention in the disputed territory.

Some observers remained convinced that it was wrong of the British Government not to hand over the N.F.D. to Somalia. For example, <u>The</u> <u>Guardian</u> wrote that, 'We think that if the British could summon up the nerve to make the change, even at this eleventh hour, it would be doing a very good turn to Kenya as well as the Somalis. Otherwise this will be a running sore for years. ⁶⁵ Such a move would only have damaged Britain's relations with Kenya and would have had serious repercussions both for the white settlers in Kenya and for the large European (mainly British) investment tied up inside the country as a whole. It was clearly more important for the British Governement to back Kenya rather than Somalia. But the failure of the Rome talks

65. The Guardian, 30 August 1963.

soured an already uneasy atmosphere existing between Kenya and Somalia.

The N.F.D. dispute was not in immediate terms about land <u>per se</u>, but rather the political significance of that land for domestic opinion in each country. The N.F.D. was virtually worthless being semi-arid desert sparsely populated by nomadic tribesmen, though after 1968⁶⁷ drilling began in the area for oil and radio-active minerals, but with little apparent success. The peoples of the N.F.D. were basically autonomous, never having been subdued totally nor having had to rely upon an outside body for their existence. The dispute, then, concerned people and politics, not economics.

Somalia's claim to the N.F.D. rested mainly upon the fact that the area was covered to a large extent by tribesmen akin to those within the Somali Republic. The N.F.D. Commission had reported that only the eastern parts of the N.F.D. supported secession, but Somalia claimed the whole district. Leading Somali politicians would admit in private that their claim was exaggerated, but this remained the official policy.⁶⁸ There was little attempt made to produce evidence of the area being occupied by Somali tribes in pre-colonial times. The Somalis had, in fact, entered this area at much the same time as the colonial

66. Problems had arisen in July, when Somalia refused to hand back to Kenya two murderers on the grounds that there was no extradition treaty existing between the countries. A District Commissioner and a Tribal Chief in Kenya were the victims, the murders being attached to the secessionist cause. This was the first case listed in the 'Narrative of Events' document published in May 1967, citing this as a provocation of Kenya (see below).

- 67. Financial Times, 6 September 1968.
- 68. Africa Confidential, vol. 6, no. 7, April 1965.

administrators, the latter to prevent the former's expansion. Somalia's case was that their people were presently in the N.F.D. so therefore the N.F.D. should be joined with Somalia. It was a problem of one nation being kept apart by artificial boundaries.

Pan-Somalism was described as a branch of Pan-Africanism, because once all Somalis had united in one nation, they would be able to play a major role in African affairs as a regional entity. One flaw in this argument, at least until 1967, was that Somalia was not totally committed to Africa. As a Muslim country, Somalia looked towards the Arab countries to the north for cultural affinity and had barely concealed disrespect for black Africans. To what extent this affected their position in Africa (and to what extent it was noticed) is difficult to calculate, but it could hardly have helped their cause.

The Kenya Government opposed the Somali claims. It saw Pan-Somalism as a tribalist doctrine based upon the ethnic homogeneity of the Somalis. The Somali Republic aimed purely for territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Kenya. The N.F.D. was an integral part of the country, and so the problem was a domestic one concerning internal security:

If anyone wishes to exercise his right of selfdetermination let him exercise that right by moving out of the country if necessary but not seek to balkanise Africa any further under the guise of so-called selfdetermination. The principle of self-determination has relevance where FOREIGN DOMINATION is the issue. It has no relevance where the issue is territorial disintegration by dissident citizens. 69

69. Memorandum submitted by the Kenyan delegation to the O.A.U. Summit in May 1963, as quoted in Catherine Hoskyns, <u>Case Studies in</u> <u>African diplomacy. Number Two. Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya dispute</u> <u>1960-1967</u> (Dar es Salaam, O.U.P., 1969), p. 39.

Kenyatta had to be firm with Somalia as any sign of generous statesmanship or weakness could have opened the floodgates to other tribes in Kenya, unhappy at their political fortunes and the demise of the <u>majimbo</u> regional constitution to seek some autonomous status outside of the control of the central government.

The clash of interests with Somalia was complete. The Somalis saw themselves engaged in a crusade, as a nation bestraddling borders, attempting to expand the artificial state boundaries to fit the nation. Kenyans were hoping to build up national cohesion within the confines of the similarly artificial boundaries in which they found themselves. Both countries needed success to maintain support at home. Somalis had to change the border which Kenya was to fight so hard to keep.

International Implications

Within the rest of Africa, the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia dispute attracted great interest and was to some extent a test case on the thorny question of territorial borders. African opinion in general had shifted over the previous years as regards the question of frontiers. In 1958, the All-African Peoples Conference in Accra had denounced 'artificial frontiers drawn by imperialist Powers to divide the peoples of Africa, particularly those which cut across ethnic groups and divide people of the same stock', and called for 'the abolition or adjustment of such frontiers at an early date'.⁷⁰ By 1963, many more states had gained independence in Africa and, consequently, their politicians took a more conservative view of the territory they now possessed. The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, drawn up in May 1963 at Addis Ababa, portrayed this

70. Mutiso and Rohio, op.cit., p. 365.

change of attitude. Article III, 3, of the Charter requested 'Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence'.⁷¹ A resolution at the first O.A.U. Summit in Cairo during July 1964 went further and stated that the Assembly, 'Solemnly declares that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence'.⁷²

The Somalis stressed at the O.A.U. that their case was unique and would not set a precedent. They were the only 'nation' to be split among several states. The Kenyan case was, however, stronger and gained easier support. Fears of secession were high in Africa, especially after Tshombe and the Congo secession and what was developing between the regions in Nigeria. Most states shared a similar problem with Kenya of 'minorities', and if a precedent for secession were set, then the whole continental structure could have fallen apart. Kenya's attempt at nation-building needed success to inspire the other 'new nations' of Africa. However influential the Organisation of African Unity might have been, both Kenya and Somalia used it only occasionally to bolster up their own individual positions. The O.A.U. was never a primary source of peace keeping. Both countries preferred direct negotiation as the problems were too close to 'national interests' to be passed over to a third party.

Somalia had a similar territorial dispute with Ethiopia concerning the Ogaden region.⁷³ Like Kenya, Ethiopia had possession of the

71. Ibid., p. 394.

72. Ibid., p. 406.

73. M.W. Mariam, 'The Background of the Ethio-Somalian Boundary Dispute', <u>T.J.M.A.S.</u>, 2, 2 (1964), pp. 189-219.

disputed territory and so both countries shared an interest in maintaining the status quo. In late September 1963, the then Acting Prime Minister of Kenya, Joseph Murumbi, paid a short visit to Addis Ababa and the two countries made agreements upon their own frontiers. A Kenya-Ethiopia defence agreement was announced in mid November, though it had been agreed upon as early as July. The ratification had to wait until after Kenyan independence, 74 but a united front against Somalia's expansionist policies was established. The text of the agreement was not made public, but it was known that both Kenya and Ethiopia had agreed to come to the aid of the other if attacked. Though the 'attacker' was unspecified, the treaty was obviously aimed at preventing Somalia from undertaking rash military action. It also had another advantage to Kenya which one scholar has pointed out. He realised that the pact "lessened the costs likely to be incurred by the increase in Somali armed forces by adopting the strategy of alliance in the hope that this would enable Kenya to avoid the alternative option - a costly and major expansion of the Kenyan armed forces to meet the apparent Somali threat.⁷⁵

The tension between the parties in East Africa was exacerbated by the rivalry of the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. The Somali Republic had received in late 1963 a positive offer of £11-14 million in Soviet military aid. Somalia had been forced to turn to the Soviet Union after the West had only offered half of what had been requested. The global implications of the dispute, then, were that the Somali Republic, backed by Soviet arms and Chinese aid, faced Ethiopia, supplied by the

74. The Times, 28 December 1963.

75. C.R. Mitchell, 'The Dispute over the Northern Frontier District of Kenya 1963-1967. A Study in Strategies of Conflict Resolution' (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1971), p. 3.36. United States with military hardware (the U.S. supplied an equal amount, approximately £14 million, to Somalia in economic aid) and Kenya, largely supplied by Britain.⁷⁶ By 1978, only the Kenya Government had maintained faith in its sponsor, as both Ethiopia and Somalia had switched backers, with the Soviet Union and Cuba moving to support Ethiopia, leaving Somalia no option but to seek assistance from the West. It would be wrong to suggest that the Great Power rivalry at any time over-shadowed the main dispute which was one about territory. The global powers were careful not to be drawn too deeply into the conflict and were prepared to remain interested, if not fully committed, onlookers on the scene.

The Border War

On Christmas Day 1963, Kenyatta declared a State of Emergency in the N.E.R. The government completely sealed off the border with Somalia by means of a five mile prohibited zone stretching the full length of the frontier. The policing operation was helped by British troops on the ground, while the Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) flew in supplies.⁷⁷ Kenyatta claimed that this action was aimed to stop the two thousand bandits, or <u>shifta</u>, operating against the country. Within a week of this, a domestic crisis blew up which threatened Kenyatta's control over foreign policy, when the Senate refused to grant its permission to the government to carry on the State of Emergency in the N.E.R. The House of Representatives had earlier given its overwhelming approval, but the Senate vote of twenty-three to fourteen only gave fractionally over 60 per cent. support instead of the required 65 per cent. The major reason for the Senate decision was the anger of the minority K.A.D.U.

76. 'The Armies of Africa', <u>Africa Report</u>, January 1964, pp. 8-18. 77. <u>New York Times</u>, 30 December 1963.

members that they had not been consulted in what was a national crisis. Tom Mboya, as Minister for Constitutional Affairs, used his legitimate right to speak to the Senate. Mboya stressed the importance of the <u>shifta</u> manace to the nation, and requested the full support of all the Senate members. It was made clear, however, that the government would overrule the Senate and continue the State of Emergency as it considered that the Senate had no right to interfere. After Mboya's talk, a second vote was taken and the opposition remained silent to the ayes of the government supporters.⁷⁸ A serious domestic situation, less than three weeks after independence, was averted.

The government reaffirmed its intentions to develop the N.E.R. when, on 2 January 1964, a five year development plan for the region worth K£300,000 was announced.⁷⁹ However, in late January, an army mutiny rocked the Kenya Government and forced Kenyatta to seek extra British assistance, both to help control the immediate insecurity and to lay down stable foundations for the new Kenyan army. The mutiny raised doubts as to the discipline of the army and to the overall authority and strength of the government to carry out its policies in the N.E.R. This question was more or less solved, at least in the short term, by the influx of British troops which served to shore up the Kenyan position in the N.E.R. The mutiny indirectly strengthened Kenya's diplomatic hand, though not at the O.A.U., by providing a satisfactory excuse for maintaining a British presence in the country.⁸⁰

At the beginning of February, a full-scale war blew up between

78.	The Times and East African Standard, 1 January 1964.	
79.	East African Standard, 3 January 1964.	
80.	Mazrui and Rothchild, op.cit.	

Ethiopia and Somalia. Kenya, though giving moral support to Ethiopia, remained out of the conflict. Some two weeks before the fighting broke out, Ethiopia and Kenya had sent a joint memorandum to the O.A.U. accusing Somalia of 'pursuing a policy of territorial expansion at the expense of neighbouring states'.⁸¹ The issue was included on the agenda of the Second Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, which convened in Dar es Salaam in mid February 1964. Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia all reiterated their positions on the disputed territories.⁸² The major task was to negotiate a ceasefire in order that talks between Ethiopia and Somalia could take place, and the conference called on them to do this.

The next Session of the Council of Ministers was held just a week later in Lagos, and in the short time between meetings, the two countries had agreed upon a ceasefire. Little progress, however, had been made on the Kenya-Somalia dispute, and the O.A.U. Ministers were 'Deeply concerned that the continuation of such regrettable incidents may aggravate tension between them and lead to hostilities the repercussions of which may seriously prejudice African Unity and peace in this Continent'.⁸³ The Ministers invited 'the Governments of Kenya and Somalia to open as soon as possible direct negotiations with due respect to paragraph 3 of Article III of the Charter with a view to finding a peaceful and lasting solution to differences between them', and called upon them 'to refrain from all acts which may aggravate or jeopardise the change of peaceful and fraternal settlement'.⁸⁴

- 81. Africa Diary, 1964, p. 1606.
- 82. Wolfers, op.cit., pp. 132-140
- 83. Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers. Resolutions of Ordinary and Extra-Ordinary Sessions (Addis Ababa, O.A.U. Secretariat, 1967), p. 28.

84. Ibid.

The Lagos resolution was to be taken as the starting-point for future negotiations with Somalia, but it had little immediate impact on the dispute. Militarily, Kenya tightened its grip on the situation. The increasingly obvious support of British forces was viewed with suspicion by Somalia. In March, Kenyatta gave permission for the British Navy to fly planes over Kenya from Nombasa harbour.⁸⁵ This was construed in Nairobi as harmless training exercises, but Mogadishu was quick to assess the potential threat of British planes in the N.E.R. if Somalia pressurised Kenya too much.

In May, Somalia accused British troops of being actively used in fighting the <u>shifta</u>. The British actions were cleverly likened to other simultaneous imperial missions in Aden and Rhodesia. Although the government strenuously denied the accusations,⁸⁶ the British were, nevertheless, closely involved in a support role as their political and economic interests were best served in helping Kenyan defence. In June, the government was informed that it was to receive Kf60 million in aid from Britain, half of which was to be an 'independence gift'. Even James Gichuru, Minister of Economic Flanning, was staggered by British generosity. Military assistance included a £3.5 million gift of arms equipment, partly made up in air craft - six Chipmunks, eleven Beavers and four Caribou. A further gift of Kfl million was towards the training of Kenya's forces by the British Army and R.A.F. Finally, more than Kf6 million worth of military property, including the modern Kahawa base, was presented free to Kenya.⁸⁷

85.	Africa	Confidential,	vol.	5,	no.	6,	March	1964	
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86. The Guardian, 18 May 1964.

87. East African Standard, 4 June 1964.

Of more immediate consequence to the Somali dispute, the British were maintaining the airlift to the N.E.R. free of charge. This operation, estimated to be costing fl,000 a day, led the <u>Bast African</u> <u>Standard</u> to comment: 'The thought arises as to how Kenya could possibly afford to conduct such a costly campaign on its own resources; and as it could never do so, taking this one item as illustrative of the drain, a political settlement of the dispute with Somalia is shown to be necessary just as soon as possible'.⁸⁸ Diplomatically, however, relations had worsened. On 7 April, Somalia's representative in Nairobi had been ordered to leave the country within twenty-four hours.⁸⁹ This rupture of diplomatic relations, not to be restored for almost four years, meant that normal negotiations between the countries became impossible and forced them into conveying their communications through third parties.

In stark contrast to the bitter relations with Somalia was the <u>entente cordiale</u> with Ethiopia, based on a natural friendship between the two veteran leaders but bound tighter in common animosity towards Somalia. Haile Selassie's State Visit to Kenya in June was greeted with such warmth that the <u>East African Standard</u> wrote that 'it is not revealing any State secrets to refer to the liaison existing for some time between the authorities in Nairobi and Addis Ababa and between headquarters in the field in the campaigns on two fronts to resist the armed pressures from Somalia'.⁹⁰ As well as the regular monthly defence meetings with Ethiopia, a permanent body was formed to co-ordinatejoint policies on international, Pan-African and East African affairs.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., 8 April 1964.

90. Ibid., 10 June 1964.

A communique released at the end of the State Visit said that 'Full agreement was manifested on all questions that formed the subject of the talks •.91

At the end of 1965, after a year of 'stalemate', a meeting was hastily arranged with Somalia in Arusha, Tanzania, after much preparatory persuasion by President Nyerere. The talks took place during 10-14 December, with Kenyatta present only in the latter half of the discussions. Hopes of a settlement soon evaporated. Kenya focused upon the <u>shifta</u> operations which were affecting normal life in the North-Eastern Province (the regions became provinces after the scrapping of the <u>majimbo</u> constitution in December 1964). The government wanted Somalia to condemn the <u>shifta</u>, cease to aid them and do all in its power to prevent their activities. This was the <u>sine qua non</u> for a normalisation of relations. The Somali Government would not move from its previous negotiating position and restated that selfdetermination for Somalis was the only practicable solution. The differences between the two sides could not, for the present, be bridged.⁹²

In mid 1966, embarrassing domestic unrest heightened tensions with Somalia. The government openly accused Somalia of assisting the opposition Kenya People's Union party, but both Oginga Odinga and Mogadishu denied this. However, deteriorating relations caused Mwai Kibaki, the Commerce Minister, to sever all trade with Somalia on 21 June. The loss of revenue for Kenya by this move was greater than for Somalia; Kenyan exports to Somalia had realised K£600,000 in 1964

91. Ibid., 13 June 1964.

92. See John Drysdale, 'The Situation in December 1967' in Hoskyns, op.cit., pp. 84-89.

and K£462,000 in 1965, whereas imports from Somalia only amounted to K£9,000 in each of the two years.⁹³

Table 4:4

Armed Forces in East Africa 1966

	Kenya	Somalia	Ethiopia	Tanzania	Uganda
Defence Estimate U.S. dollars m.	10.2	6.7	31.2	7.2	17.0
Army	4,175	8,000	32,000	1,700	5,700
Navy	150	180	930	- *	•
Air Force	450	1,250	2,000	100	260
Police	11,500	5,000	28,000	1,350	5,500

note: There were over 300 British Officers on secondment to the Kenya Army also.

Source: David Wood, The Armed Forces of African States (London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966).

In May 1967, the Kenya Government issued a large document entitled 'Narrative of four years of inspired aggression and direct subversion mounted by the Somali Republic against the Government and people of the Republic of Kenya'. This was the definitive Kenyan interpretation of the dispute, and copies of the document were sent to all Heads of State of the O.A.U. and to all member countries of the United Nations. The document warned that 'there comes a time when hostility, <u>de facto</u> if not <u>de jure</u>, is so blatant that hopes of possible conciliation backed by the weight of all regional advice must fade and when terrorism is so enhanced

93. Financial Times and East African Standard, 22 June 1966.

that it may no longer be contained within a policing operation.⁹⁴ The government stressed the significance of Soviet aid to Somalia as a major factor exacerbating the dispute. Somalia was quick to rebut this allegation and blamed Britain for causing the problem by not allowing self-determination in 1963 and by providing military aid to Kenya since that date.

Even though the level of hostility with Somalia was rising to its highest pitch, there were contradictory pressures working for some sort of settlement. Both countries had exerted a great amount of energy on the dispute and, after four years, the strain was beginning to tell. The cost to Kenya had worked out to about K£3 million annually and was estimated to be approaching Kf4 million in 1967.95 This was a large financial burden on a developing country, and would have been greater but for generous British aid. The army had also had a great deal of trouble prosecuting the war in the N.E.P. The shifta were fighting a guerrilla war and refused to be held in one position long enough to allow the army to engage in head-on battle. The government could not totally commit all its forces as this would have undermined the official comment that the shifts operations were organised by a mere handful of Somalis. Yet however many troops were pushed into the field, they could not come to grips with the problem. There appeared to be no outright military solution.

Somalia, similarly, faced many problems. The prohibited zone made it difficult for supplies and <u>shifta</u> to cross the border with impunity. Shops in the N.E.P. were no longer stocked from Somalia as lorries could

94. Quoted in <u>New York Times</u> and <u>East African Standard</u>, 3 May 1967. 95. The Observer, 8 January 1967.

not cross the border. The <u>shifta</u> were fighting in great hardship, with little aid and with little tangible reward. Morale was low, as exemplified by the surrender of 340 <u>shifta</u> under an amnesty in mid July.⁹⁶ Somalia's economy was in a poor state, only made worse by the dispute. Aid from the Soviet Union had not been as forthcoming as expected, and would not have solved the problem in any case. Somalia had been receiving arms from several Arab countries, notably Egypt, but these were likely to diminish owing to the outbreak of the 'June war' with Israel. The consequent closure of the Suez Canal also affected Somalia. Finally, the ruthless French manipulation of the referendum in March 1967 in French Somaliland (Djibouti), so maintaining it as part of the French Community, could not have encouraged those committed to Pan-Somalism. It appeared that the Somali Government would have either to step up operations into a full-scale war, which seemed unlikely, or to seek a settlement.

An election in June 1967 in the Somali Republic produced a new government composed of Dr. Shermarke as President and Mr. Egal as Prime Minister. There was immediately a change of emphasis in Somali policies which 'was accelerated by the economic straits in which the incoming Government found itself, as well as the apparent failure of the previous policy of militant confrontation'.⁹⁷ Egal aimed to clarify the policies of Somalia towards the border dispute. Propaganda attacks on Radio Mogadishu ceased as he tried to woo Kenya. On 8 August, Egal explicitly stated the Somali case:

We do NOT wish to annex the territory of any State whatever nor to expand into such territory. We DO intend to champion the cause of Somali territories under foreign domination, in order that they

96. East African Standard, 21 July 1967.

97. Mitchell, op.cit., p. 7.4.

may attain sovereign independent status through the process of self-determination. 98

Egal believed there to be a great difference between aggressive expansionist policies supposedly followed by Somalia, and the 'true' line of action which was merely to support Somalis who were fighting for self-determination. Though Kenyans did not bother to speculate over the metaphysics of the Somali policy, there was at least a slim chance of a settlement. Egal was from former British Somaliland and had played a major role in the Somali nationalist movement of the 1950s. This background, allied to his command of English, made him more compatible with the Kenyan leaders. Egal was also a Pan-Africanist and a believer in East African unity and federation. This was the best opportunity for Kenya to end the dispute which had severely hampered the country's development, and which had brought an estimated toll of about 2,600 dead for both countries combined.⁹⁹

The Truce

The fourth meeting of the O.A.U. Heads of State convened at Kinshasa in mid September 1967. Following an approach made to President Kaunda of Zambia by Egal, Kaunda asked Kenya and Somalia to further talks in Lusaka to try to settle the border dispute. Both countries accepted and issued a statement, known since as the 'Kinshasa Declaration', informing the O.A.U. of their decision. Notably, paragraph one stated that 'Both Governments have expressed their desire to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the spirit of Paragraph 3 of Article III of the O.A.U. Charter'.¹⁰⁰ Although this statement only conformed to an O.A.U. principle, the fact that

98.	Drysdale in Hopkins,	op.cit.,	p.	85.
99.	International Herald	Tribune,	29	August 1967.
100.	Hoskyns. op.cit., p.	82.		

Somalia had reaffirmed this was understood to signify a change in the political atmosphere in Mogadishu.

President Kenyatta had decided not to take part personally in the Lusaka talks, apparently because of his dislike of air travel. However, at the direct request of Egal, Kenyatta agreed to lead Kenya's delegation, and so the location was noved closer to Nairobi on his behalf. The talks took place in Arusha, Tanzania, at the end of October. Hopes for a settlement were this time high, especially since trade had already started moving between the countries without official approval. After a couple of days discussion, a 'Memorandum of Understanding' was issued on 28 October. Signed by President Kenyatta and Premier Egal, witnessed by President Kaunda, with Presidents Nyerere and Obote as observers, this was a significant occasion in East African relations. The primary clause of the memorandum was as follows:

Both Governments will exert all efforts and do their utmost to create good neighbourly relations between Kenya and Somalia, in accordance with the O.A.U. Charter. 101

The memorandum contained little specific detail, lacked clarity and had no timetable. Both leaders had agreed on 'the gradual suspension' of emergency regulations in the border area, the 'consideration of measures' to facilitate better trade, and the formation of a working committee to meet 'periodically' to review the implementation of the agreements and to examine ways of finding a satisfactory solution 'to major and minor differences between Kenya and Somalia'.¹⁰²

The memorandum was only a 'symbolic truce' to ease tension and to be built upon in future negotiations. It was a compromise agreement

101. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

102. Ibid.

that showed little advance on the diplomatic position at Arusha in December 1965. Though the memorandum paid lip-service to the Kinshasa declaration, a Kenyan concession meant that there was no direct reaffirmation of Somali respect for Kenyan territorial integrity, something the government had always previously demanded. The <u>quid pro quo</u> was a concession by Egal that there was no mention of the Somali 'right' to be the protector of Somali interests in the North-Eastern Province. The Arusha memorandum was a tentative attempt to formalise the improving relations with Somalia. It was a sensible agreement as it set guidelines for action rather than a rigid framework.

The memorandum was met with approval in the country as it was, in essence, a success against Somali subversion. In Somalia, Egal had a difficult time defending himself from charges of selling-out the <u>shifta</u>, and he continually stressed that 'it is our intention that the Northern Frontier District problem be kept alive on the conference table without making the N.F.D. people sacrificial lambs.... My Government seeks to foster an atomosphere suitable for negotiations at a round table. 103 In mid December, Kenyatta had further talks with Egal in Kampala, again under the guidance of Kaunda. They agreed upon the terms of reference for the working committee to control future developments between the two countries. During this conference, Egal made a formal application on behalf of Somalia for admission into the newly formed East African Community.¹⁰⁴ However, soon after this, Egal put into perspective his view of the <u>detente</u> with Kenya by saying that there had been no discussion whatsoever of the major differences between the countries, only

103. East African Standard, 2 November 1967.

104. Ibid., 16 December 1967.

an agreement that they needed to be discussed. 105

In the New Year, the 'Arusha Honeymoon' brought a freshening of the atmosphere with trade and diplomatic relations stabilised. At the end of January, President Kenyatta could characteristically forgive and forget saying 'it is a matter of history that our relations in the past were tense. We have now embarked on a new era of friendship, understanding and co-operation. ¹⁰⁶ Over the next twelve months, the situation in the N.E.P. improved so much that President Kenyatta felt confident in his government's ability to break down racial and ethnic boundaries and create a unified nation. Community projects, particularly in water supplies and education, were developed in the province while the emergency regulations were eased gradually until in October 1969 they were dropped completely.¹⁰⁷

In Somalia, however, detente came unstuck in October 1969 when a <u>coup d'état</u> took place after the assassination of the President. Egal was thrown out of office. The causes of the <u>coup</u> were domestic and not connected to the dispute with Kenya.¹⁰⁸ The new military government confirmed the continuation of friendly relations with Kenya, but the security of <u>detente</u> was now in doubt. The maintenance of the 'Arusha Honeymoon' depended primarily upon the mutual trust between Kenyatta and Egal. Friendship had grown between the countries, but little else. Certainly no final settlement had been reached as to the fate of the Somalis in the N.E.P., and none would ever be totally acceptable to Somalia without secession of the territory.

105. Somali News, 22 December 1967.

106. Africa Diary, 1968, pp. 3834-35.

107. East African Standard, 15 October 1969.

108. I.M. Lewis, "The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup", <u>T.J.M.A.S.</u>, 10, 3 (1972), pp. 383-408.

East Africa after the Community

The truce with the Somali Republic held good during the early 1970s. when attention was diverted towards the problems with the Community partners, Tanzania and Uganda. However, during 1977 the issue was reopened with the renewed fighting in the Horn of Africa. between Somalia and Ethiopia. Hostility was aroused in June 1977 when 3.000 Somali troops attacked a border post at Ramu on their transit to the battle in the Ogaden.¹⁰⁹ The war between Ethiopia and Somalia had been sparked off partly by the Soviet Union's decision to back the Ethiopians rather than the Somalis. This helped to provoke the Somalis into another campaign against Ethiopia and at the same time led them to a rapprochement with the West, both to maintain the country's economy and to prosecute the war, which was now interpreted as 'holding back communism' in the Horn. Aid was forthcoming from the U.S.A. in 1977 and Britain in 1978,¹¹¹ and, as shown in the previous chapter, this angered the Kenya Government intensely because it perceived the West to be now supporting the country's greatest enemy.

Defence of territory against aggression remained central to Kenyan foreign policy, and the government continued to support Ethiopia despite its Marxist orientation. As a government spokesman informed me:

The problems of the Horn of Africa created by policies of Somalia do not affect Kenyan foreign policy. Kenya is committed to the Charter of the O.A.U. which governs the question of boundaries inherited from the colonial history of Africa and therefore by definition Kenya must maintain its opposition to the policy of Somalia which seeks to create a Greater Somalia by acquiring neighbours' territories by force. This is a straightforward issue

109. The Times, 30 June 1977.

110. A.R.B., 1977, p. 4519.

111. Britain gave £2 million in aid; The Standard, 11 July 1978.

irrespective of the ideological orientation of the countries concerned. 112

Kenya's positive opposition to Somali expansionism stopped short of committing the country to war, because this would have sapped the country's finances and diverted energies away from the country's major goal, namely economic development. And yet the country's Foreign Minister, Munyua Waiyaki, left no room for doubt during a visit to Addis Ababa in March 1973 when he said, 'We never want to be caught napping and we want the whole world to know about our determination to resist aggression this year, next year, or at any time in the future.¹¹³

The outbreak of a full-scale war in the Horn of Africa, the continuing threat of attack from Somalia, and the unpredictability of Kenya's western neighbour, Uganda, all led to a rapid increase in the size of the country's Armed Forces in 1977. The government had always relied upon British assistance in times of trouble as well as for providing arms to the country, but after 1976 the United States of America and France began to take on some of this trade. Table 4:5 shows the military balance in the region and the attempt made by Kenya to increase its own military potential in relation to its neighbours, through the purchase of military hardware during that year.

Kenyan foreign policy, while taking into account the changing military horizons, still focused upon the goal of opening up the whole of the region to benefit the Kenyan economy. The East African Community had to some extent been isolated from those countries around it because of lack of communications, paucity of trading commodities and different

^{112.} Letter to author from Charles G. Maina, Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations, 19 June 1978.

^{113. &}lt;u>A.R.B.</u>, 1978, p. 4772; also 'Somalia's five-pointed Star and Kenya', <u>Africa</u>, no. 80, April 1978, pp. 41-44.

cultural/colonial backgrounds. The foundation of a reorientation of policy towards those states to the north came in June 1973¹¹⁴ when a tripartite agreement with Ethiopia and Sudan was signed which promised better communications and trade. The ousting of Haile Selassie in 1974 lost Kenyatta a close friend and ally, but also showed the President what could happen in Kenya if the calls for change were not met. Little change took place in Ethiopian foreign policy concerning the Somali and Eritrean situations, and the closure of the northern ports forced Ethiopia to seek a trade route through the south. A new road linking Addis Ababa with Nairobi, and from there the port of Mombasa, opened in June 1977 to make the expansion of trade feasible.¹¹⁵ In 1978, Kenya gave a free gift of oil tankers to Ethiopia, thereby encouraging the country to take its oil from the Mombasa refinery.¹¹⁶ A similar policy of attempting to increase trade was followed with Sudan, but although the potential is clear to see, only marginal successes were recorded up to 1978.

To the south of Kenya, the major aim of foreign policy was to disentangle the country from the debris left behind by the Community. The continued closure of the border with Tanzania left a question mark against trade with that country as well as those further afield, notably Zaire, Zambia, Rwanda and Mozambique. Despite these problems, trade with Zambia maintained a healthy growth rate, while that with Mozambique trebled in three years.¹¹⁷ Relations with Tanzania, on the other hand, failed to improve after the border closure of February 1977. The

114. East African Standard, 25 June 1973.
115. A.R.B. (E.F.T.), 1977, p. 4310.
116. Ibid., 1978, p. 4839.
117. Ibid.

Table 4:5

Armed Forces in East Africa 1977

	Kenya	<u>Somalia</u>	Ethiopia	Tanzania	Uganda
G.N.P. 1975 \$ billion	2.8	0.3 ¹	2.9	1.9 ²	2.0
Defence Expenditure 1976∮m.	35	25	103	70 ³	493
Army	6,500	30,000	50,000	17,000	20,000
Tanks	(40 ⁴)	300	140	34	35
Air Force	800	1,000	2,000	1,000	1,000
Combat Aircraft	21(+124)	55	35	29	24

1 - 1972

2 - 1974

3 - 1975

4 - On Order

Source: <u>The Military Balance 1977-1978</u> (London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977).

rupture between the two countries was a strange one, even by African standards, because even though tension was great throughout the period, there was never a sign that any form of military confrontation would take place, thus emphasising again the philosophical nature of the dispute. Many practical problems did result from the border dispute, notably in the loss of trade and the closure of the northern tourist circuit in Tanzania (including Mount Kilimanjaro, which Kenyan tourist information often portrayed as being in Kenya, much to Tanzanian anger) to travellers from Kenya. It appears that President Nyerere, even in 1979, remained equally determined as he was in 1977 to teach Kenya a lesson.

To the west of Kenya lay perhaps the most insoluble, and frustrating, problem, which was that of President Idi Amin's regime in Uganda. Admittedly, Kenya's trade surplus with the country reached its highest point ever in 1977, but the disadvantages offset this to a great extent in that large debts were outstanding from Uganda and few Kenyans could be sure of safe passage in the country. In May 1978, the airplane of the former minister, Bruce McKenzie, was blown up in mid air on a return trip from Kampala. Although no conclusive evidence could be found, the Kenya Government was convinced that Amin was behind McKenzie's death.¹¹⁸ A further difficulty caused by Amin's rule was that the Trans-Africa route, which passed through Uganda, was not used to its full advantage by Kenyans wishing to get to northern Zaire or the Central African Republic. The fall of Amin in 1979 raised the curtain of gloom to the west and opened up fresh opportunities for Kenya, but this lies outside the scope of this work.

Kenya's regional foreign policy continued to be determined by the desire to keep mutual friendship in order to help promote the country's economy. After the Community's demise, no formal association of states existed in the region, but this in itself had little serious consequence for the economy; political friendship was the prerequisite, not a formal political association. During 1978, the government was involved in two sets of talks, which on the surface appeared to suggest a contradictory foreign policy but which exemplified the regionalist aims of the

118. 'The McKenzie Affair', Africa, no. 83, July 1978, pp. 34-35.

country. Under the auspices of the World Bank and its Swiss mediator, Dr. Victor Umbricht, attempts were made to settle the outstanding financial disagreements with the Community partners and share out as equally as possible the assets of the organisation, most of which were located in Kenya.¹¹⁹ At the same time as the disengagement talks were taking place, ministers were working on plans to bring together all the countries of the region in a loose economic association.¹²⁰ The aim was to have an association comparable with the Economic Community of West African States (E.C.O.W.A.S.), formed in 1975, which provided a forum for the sixteen members to discuss economic and political matters. Whatever the hopes were for the future, there was little evidence to suggest that E.C.O.W.A.S. or the proposed association in eastern Africa would impose too many restrictions on national independence.

The development of this wider association will remain the goal of foreign policy in future years, but it is most unlikely that an association as tight as the Community will emerge. The benefits of an eastern African association of states to Kenya will be small at first, because few of the countries have an economy equivalent in strength and dynamism to Kenya's. In the long term, the prospects are very bright because of the country's geographical position and its present trend of being the stablest and most prosperous country in the region.

- 119. The Standard, 28 July 1978. Dr. Umbricht was appointed in January 1978.
- 120. A declaration of intent was signed by nine countries in March 1978 in Lusaka; <u>A.R.B.</u> (E.F.T.), 1978, pp. 4630-31. Further talks took place in June 1978 in Addis Ababa and were continuing; <u>The Standard</u>, 21 July 1978. For earlier discussions of this theme see <u>A.M. O'Connor</u>, 'A wider Eastern African Economic Union? Some Geographical Aspects', <u>T.J.M.A.S.</u>, 6, 4 (1968), pp. 485-493. Also Hazlewood, <u>op.cit</u>., pp. 146-172.

Conclusion

It is evident that the foundation of the East African Community was laid in the colonial period. The close co-ordination of the three territories, the shared cultural heritage, and the perception of a common bond between them all helped to provide the impetus for the attempt at federation in the early 1960s. This colonial heritage, however, had contradictory effects on Kenyan foreign policy. On the one hand, it helped to influence friendly relations with the country's neighbours and allowed President Kenyatta to accept legislation which aimed to hold back or balance out Kenyan development in favour of Tanzania and Uganda. On the other hand, the whole orientation of the economy was based upon the domination of the East African market as had been the case during the pre-independence period. This policy provoked resistance from Tanzania and Uganda and, together with mutual political antagonisms, brought the Community to its end.

Generally within the wider East African arena, Kenya's policy of <u>mutual good-neighbourliness</u> helped to bring political and economic benefits, but the lack of communications and trade with neighbours further afield limited any possible successes. The border war with the Somali Republic, as well as the direct interest in the more violent war in the Horn of Africa, made for problematical relations with the north. The unpredictable nature of Uganda's President Amin, coupled with the drifting away of the understanding with Tanzania, leading to the border closure, also questioned the extent to which future Kenyan successes could be scored to the south.

Despite these problems, the government was committed to continue its attempts to promote links with all countries of the region, and it was hoped that some form of association would develop to facilitate

these links. The economy, however, remained geared to the western economic system because of its 'underdeveloped' nature. The imports required for development, as perceived by the government, came from outside of the region. For there to be major growth of an integrated eastern African association, it is necessary for all the governments to redefine their country's economic policies. If such an event takes place and countries look within, rather than outside, the region for trade, then Kenya, and the neo-colonial interests in Kenya stand to have a strong economic future in the region.

Chapter Five

Foreign Policy and International Organisations

The previous two chapters have focused upon Kenyan economic development, discussing the relationship between economics and foreign policy, and the importance of the East African arena in the orientation of Kenyan politics. In this chapter, the area of study is widened to look at how foreign policy goals in the economic, political and social fields were pursued in international organisations, and specifically in the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and the Commonwealth. By far the most important political goal sought in these organisations was a solution to the problem faced in southern Africa, and this forms a separate case-study in the chapter. But before a close examination of these issues is undertaken, it is important to outline Kenya's major objectives in international organisations as well as the style of diplomacy used to pursue these goals.

Diplomatic Style and Objectives in International Organisations

Kenya's foreign policy in international organisations could best be described as being of <u>pragmatic radicalism</u>. The use of the words 'radical' and 'conservative' to describe African states' foreign policies at times clouds rather than clears one's understanding of the subject. To be 'radical' in African terms is not necessarily to be left-wing or communist, but helps to describe those states which have similar aspirations to bring down the white minority regimes in southern Africa, to change the world economic order in favour of the developing countries, and to unite Africans in a loose brotherhood of nations. At times, Kenya was criticised as being 'conservative' because of the country's capitalist development strategy and its spurning of socialism, and yet it appeared to be clearly 'radical' in other aspects of foreign

policy.

To avoid confusion, these terms are best omitted, though it is difficult to refrain totally from using them. The term <u>pragmatic</u> <u>radicalism</u> goes some way towards an accurate analysis of Kenya's international role. Policies were radical to the extent that they aimed to change the international status quo, and this helped Kenyan leaders to maintain their anti-colonial posture and friendly relations with the rest of Africa. But quite often the stand taken over a specific issue was 'positional' rather than 'positive', that is it expressed what the government would have liked to do rather than what it knew it could do. International organisations provided the ideal forum for Kenya's leaders to speak forcibly on many issues of concern and reach the widest audience possible. This declaratory policy showed that the government was not shirking its international responsibilities, and yet did not place any strain upon the maintenance of the country's <u>de facto</u> foreign policy.

Although Kenya played an active and committed role in international organisations, the government was always aware of the pragmatic considerations on policy. Kenyatta was happy to play a quiet - he would have said 'mature' - role in a particular dispute where a more outspoken and aggressive stance would have damaged Kenyan interests. So, for example, in 1965 the President preferred to maintain diplomatic links with Britain after Phodesian 'independence' rather than break them because of the damage such an action would have done to the economy. Conversely, Kenyan assistance to Israel in its commando attack on Uganda in July 1976 was also pragmatic, because the government rightly calculated that little would be lost in terms of trade with Uganda or friendship in Africa, while a lot was gained in teaching President Idi

Amin a lesson and diminishing the military threat to Kenya.

The Kenya Government was well aware of the country's limitations in pursuing a successful foreign policy. Tom Mboya, the leading minister of the 1960s, summed up this position most accurately in 1964, but the overall picture remained the same throughout the period in question:

In nearly every case, the achievement of political independence has not seen a corresponding radical change in economic relationships. Many countries of Africa still belong to the franc zone, the sterling zone or the dollar area. A glance at the trade figures for any African country will show how little the relationships with the former occupying power have changed in the economic field. Yet it is difficult to disentangle economic ties and political strings. If we are dependent upon one country or group of countries as far as markets for our main crops are concerned, our diplomats, and hence our foreign policy, will be subjected to all sorts of pressures, both subtle and not so subtle. 1

The country's attempts to maintain a non-aligned position in international affairs were undermined, as has already been noted in Chapter Three, by its military dependence. The bulk of Kenya's weaponry was purchased from Britain, but in the mid 1970s the United States of America supplied some goods, including in 1976 a large order worth \$75 million for the purchase of twelve Northrop F5 fighter planes, which were aimed to neutralise Uganda's airforce.² Later in 1976, a U.S. frigate and P3 Orion anti-submarine/reconnaissance plane arrived in Mombasa from the American base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and this was regarded as tacit support for Kenya in its 'cold war'

1. Tom Mboya, The Challenge of Nationhood (London, Heinemann, 1970), p. 236.

2. Financial Times, 30 June 1976.

against Uganda.³ This reliance upon the West for weaponry and assistance weakened further the ability to have true non-alignment in foreign policy and left the government to promote what could be classed as a 'diplomatic' form of non-alignment only.

Through international organisations, the government was able to gain a wider audience for its foreign policy statements. In the short-term, there was a limit as to what the government could achieve. but in the long term the aim was to build up the economic strength of the country and so be able to gain some future influence in the international system, though the policies to be followed then would be determined by the composition and ideology of the governing elite. The most important organisations in which the government worked were, as already noted, the United Nations, the O.A.U. and the Commonwealth. The European Economic Community increasingly received the attention of the government because of its significant role in the economy as well as its political stature in the western world. The objectives of Kenyan foreign policy as pursued in these international organisations could basically be divided into two broad areas - those with an explicit political motive, and those which were based mainly upon economic and social considerations. The political objectives were often those which engendered the most vocal support and earnest attention, especially when concerned with southern Africa, but the oil crisis of 1973 and the world inflation which followed helped to shift attention away to

^{3. &}lt;u>New York Times and Financial Times</u>, 13 July 1976. The British also supplied some weaponry at short notice, and a further agreement was made for 40 Vickers Mk 3 tanks. The U.S.A. has a security assistance agreement with Kenya, while Britain has overflying, training and defence agreements; see <u>The Military Balance 1977-</u> <u>1978</u> (London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977) pp. 43-45.

the economic plight of the developing countries⁴ and so gave some impetus for Kenyan policies in this field.

A qualification could be added to these two categories to highlight those goals which only affected the international environment or 'milieu' as opposed to those which had a direct impact upon the country.⁵ Kenya's support in the U.N. for the pacific uses of outer space had little direct impact upon the country, whereas the defence of the principle of territorial inviolability in the O.A.U. had a direct bearing on the dispute with the Somali Republic. Somewhere between these two poles was the policy on South Africa. Kenyan antagonism towards South Africa led the country to seek a change of attitude there, but this would not have had any direct effect upon Kenya which had few contacts with South Africa. However, perhaps in the long term, the emotional success would have been converted to more concrete results in terms of a new, influential trading partner.

Political Issues

At the global level, Kenyan energies were channelled through the United Nations and, to a lesser extent, the Commonwealth. At the U.N., many of the issues discussed had only a superficial relationship with Kenya, but the country's leaders nevertheless committed themselves to playing an active role in debates and decisions. Two areas, apart from southern Africa, on which the Kenyan delegations often spoke concerned

4. James Mayall, 'Foreign Policy in Africa: A Changing Diplomatic Landscape' in Peter Jones (ed.), <u>The International Yearbook of Foreign</u> <u>Policy Analysis</u>. <u>Volume 2</u> (London, Croom Helm, 1975), pp. 183-208.

5. See James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, jr., 'The Role of Environment in International Relations' in James Barber and Michael Smith (eds.), <u>The Nature of Foreign Policy: A Reader</u> (Milton Keynes, Open University and Edinburgh, Holmes McDougall, 1974). pp. 86-94. the security of the continent. The first was to do with the possible nuclearisation of Africa. The Kenya Government feared the consequences to the continent if any country, especially South Africa, gained possession of nuclear weapons, and always exhorted other U.N. members to condemn such a possible occurrence.⁶ The second aspect on which Kenya took a firm stand in the U.N. was on the question of arms control. It was the opinion of the government that many of Africa's problems were caused because most countries were armed far above what was necessary for their defence, owing to an obsession for weaponry as well as the influence of major external powers.⁷ In Kenya's own case, it was true that the country had a smaller armed force than its neighbours, but it was shown in chapter three that Britain's tacit and subtle forms of assistance at times of unrest strengthened the governing elite, and this fact undermined the credibility of Kenya's diplomatic position.

Kenya's concern over the militarisation of Africa was again evident in July 1978 when, following the invasion of Zaire and the consequent rescue operation of President Mobutu Sese Seko by Belgium and France, there was talk of having an O.A.U. Fire Brigade force to keep the peace between states. Apart from the logistical difficulties of such a force, the Kenya Government opposed the idea as an unnecessary, and potentially dangerous, plan to increase military capacity in the continent. Echoing government thoughts, <u>The Standard</u> wrote:

It would be a grave mistake - and, indeed, an act of betrayal - if the O.A.U. decided to set up a 'fire brigade' army of 'African mercenaries' whose sole mission would be to go to the rescue of any of the continent's shaky and unpopular regimes whenever

- 6. For example, see U.N. Yearbook 1965 (New York, United Nations, 1968), p. 78.
- 7. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 94; also <u>U.N. Yearbook 1966</u> (New York, United Nations, <u>1969</u>), p. 31.

they are faced with internal opposition. No superpower is ever likely to invade any of Africa's emergent countries - and our assorted regimes must not deceive themselves that there's any other word for democracy. 8

At the O.A.U. Summit Conference in Khartoum in July 1978, the government approved a recommendation for the 'reactivation of the O.A.U.'s Defence Commission in preparation for considering the need to establish an African military force under the supervision of the O.A.U. " This showed that if there was to be any kind of African army, the government preferred it to be organised and controlled rather than on a purely ad hoc basis. The Kenya Government was aware that agreement upon the details of such a force would be difficult to reach, and this suited the government's interests because, like most of the continent's governments, there was a great reluctance to lose national control over so vital an issue as military force. An earlier example of the government's desire to retain sovereignty over its affairs came in 1974 when Kenyatta vehemently opposed the decision taken by the O.A.U. Administrative Secretary-General, Mr. Nzo Ekangaki, that all African states should pass over to Lonrho their negotiating rights for oil.¹⁰ Opposition from other states as well as Kenya forced a reversal of the policy.

The Kenya Government did perceive a major role for the O.A.U. in being a body through which grievances could be channelled and aired, and also as a mouthpiece of the African people on issues such as apartheid and global economic relations. To this extent, the O.A.U. and

- 8. The Standard, 11 July 1978.
- 9. Resolution 10d; A.R.B., 1978, p. 4914.
- 10. S. Cronjé, M. Ling and G. Cronjé, Lonrho. Portrait of a Multinational (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976), p. 211.

the U.N. were similar in that they both provided arenas for policy statements on the major issues of the period. The O.A.U., as a purely continental body, was allowed a role in peace-keeping and mediation between partner states, as well as institutionalising the rule of respect for territorial boundaries. On this rule, the Kenya Government always supported the O.A.U. because it strengthened the bargaining position in respect of the claim on the North-Eastern Province by the Somali Republic. However, the government never considered handing over the dispute to O.A.U. arbitration, and this exemplified the consultative nature of the organisation as perceived by Kenya and most other African countries.

Southern Africa

Kenya was similar to other black African countries in considering the white minority regimes of southern Africa - South Africa, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) - and, before the mid 1970s, the remnants of the Portuguese empire in Angola and Mozambique, to be the greatest problem facing the continent. Kenyan leaders used the U.N., the O.A.U. and the Commonwealth to condemn the 'racist' regimes and to call for action against them.

South Africa remained a permanent target of Kenyan foreign policy, but it was the continually changing situation in Rhodesia which often attracted the greatest attention. Perhaps of all the British colonies in Africa, Kenya and Rhodesia were the most similar, notably for their substantial European population. It was natural that after a bloody struggle during 'Mau Mau', Kenyan leaders were greatly upset when the European minority, led by Mr. Ian Smith, declared unilaterally the independence of Rhodesia in November 1965. Immediately after this event, East African leaders met in Nairobi to consider how best to

co-ordinate their policies.¹¹ Little concrete progress was made on what action to take until early December, when the O.A.U. Council of Ministers decided that all the countries of Africa were to break diplomatic relations with Britain unless immediate action was taken to bring down the rebel government.¹² An O.A.U. Action Committee, composed of Egypt, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Kenya, was established to follow up developments.

Even though Joseph Murumbi, the Foreign Minister, had apparently committed the country to break off relations with Britain, President Kenyatta and a majority of his colleagues opposed the plan. Kenyatta believed that it was a decision to be made by individual governments and not by the O.A.U. On 10 December 1965, after consultation with the Cabinet, President Kenyatta announced that the government was not going to break diplomatic relations with Britain, but instead was going to intensify pressure on Britain to take action on Rhodesia.¹³ There was clearly opposition to the announcement among members of the National Assembly, but upon the Speaker's ruling, the President presented his decision to a silenced National Assembly.

Kenyatta's defence of an apparent reverse of policy placed emphasis on the fact that President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia was against such a move against Britain because it would have placed an intolerable strain on Zambia. The Kenyan President also believed that if the country made a break with Britain, then divisions would form in the O.A.U. as not everybody would support the break. This obscured the fact that divisions

- 11. Daily Nation, 15 November 1965.
- 12. Ibid., 6 December 1965.
- 13. Ibid., 11 December 1965.

were inevitable, as not all countries would agree on either line of action, even though the O.A.U. had apparently reached unanimity a week before. As a final explanation, Kenyatta said that he was holding back from action in order to get full co-ordination with the region, but this proved impossible in the end because of President Julius Nyerere's commitment to sever relations with Britain.¹⁴

Although the government's decision was defended on fairly solid grounds, no mention was made of a fundamental fact which must have influenced the decision - that such a break with Britain would have had serious repercussions on the Kenyan economy and the rate of development. Efforts to get Britain to take action were, however, continued, and the government used the U.N. and O.A.U. for this purpose. In 1966 at the U.N., Kenya again called for Britain 'to take all necessary measures, including in particular the use of force, in the exercise of its power as the administering Power, to put an end to the illegal regime Southern Rhodesia 15 As the dispute continued without a settlement into the 1970s, the government remained adamant that force had to be used against the white rebels, but hoped that the various nationalist groups could be reconciled around a conference table. In 1972, the Pearce Report, sponsored by the British Government, showed that the black population of Rhodesia did not favour the settlement drawn up at that time, and the report was welcomed by Dr. Njoroge Mungai, the Foreign Minister, because it exposed 'the intimidation against the African

15. U.N. Yearbook 1966, op. cit., p. 115.

^{14.} In the end Tanzania, Ghana, Algeria, Congo Brazzaville, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan and United Arab Republic broke off relations with Britain; see Michael Wolfers, <u>Politics in the Organization of African Unity</u> (London, Methuen, 1976), p. 158. Kenya did, however, join a walk-out at the U.N. when Mr. Harold Wilson, the British Premier, addressed the General Assembly; East African Standard, 17 December 1965.

majority by the rebel regime . 16

In 1973, Kenya used its position in the U.N. Security Council to good effect to keep up the diplomatic pressure on Britain as well as to give direct warnings to Rhodesia. Following the closure of the border between Zambia and Rhodesia, and sporadic clashes between troops. Mr. Odero-Jori, Kenya's Permanent Representative at the U.N., stated unequivocally that 'the States of Eastern Africa and all the members of the O.A.U. were determined to resist any aggression against Zambia. The Council could be assured that if there were such aggression, all O.A.U. members would dust off their rusty guns and go out and defend the honour and dignity of Zambia. "17 Kenyan hostility to Smith's illegal regime continued throughout Kenyatta's period of office. In 1977, the government supported the O.A.U.'s decision to recognise the Patrictic Front as the only representatives of the Zimbabwean people. As Dr. Munyua Waiyaki, the Foreign Minister, said, 'the important thing is that the fight against Smith must go on and it is the Patriotic Front which is doing the fighting'.¹⁸ It was a natural consequence of this stance that the Kenya Government rejected the 'internal settlement worked out by the Rhodesian Front party of Ian Smith and prominent African leaders, including Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Waiyaki said in July 1978 at an O.A.U. meeting:

... the expulsion of their representatives from Khartoum should at least give them a little inkling as to the degree to which Africa is hurt by their recent betrayal of Zimbabweans and of those who in their region continue to suffer from colonialism, apartheid, armed occupation and racial subjugation. 19

16. Daily Nation, 25 May 1972.

17. United Nations Monthly Chronicle, vol. x, no. 4, April 1973, p. 8.

- 'Kenyans will not eat rhetoric', <u>Africa</u>, no. 73, September 1977, p. 34.
- 19. The Standard, 12 July 1978.

The hostility shown to the rebel government in Rhodesia was naturally extended by Kenyan leaders to the minority regime in South Africa. For all of the intense anger this country aroused, African states made little progress in their attempts to force a change there. Kenya had had links with South Africa during the colonial period owing to the influence of the settlers, many of whom were of South African origin. The loss of trade at independence, estimated at K£2 million,²⁰ as well as the loss of further potential trade with South Africa was a serious consideration for policy-makers, but was clearly outweighed by the personal distaste for the regime as well as the desire to maintain close political and economic ties with the rest of black Africa.

The Kenya Government realised that the West held the key to the South African solution in that western economies could make or break the country. Kenyatta noted this in 1964:

Yet the countries of the West, and Britain and the United States in particular, pay lip-service to our cause, while they go on underpinning the South African economy by their investments, their buying, and their sales By refusing to participate in workable sanctions against South Africa, the countries of the West are creating a situation in which violence becomes the only answer. 21

The main reason why Kenya and other African states could do little to pressurise the West was because of the weakness and dependency of their economies. However, by the mid 1970s, African countries, led by Nigeria, were beginning to have greater confidence in their economies and started to threaten the West. The Vice-President, Daniel arap Moi, spoke in such a vein at the Commonwealth Conference in May 1975:

- 20. Cherry Gertzel, Maure Goldschmidt and Donald Rothchild (eds.), <u>Government and Politics in Kenya</u> (Nairobi, East African Pub., 1969), p. 578.
- 21. Jomo Kenyatta, <u>Suffering without Bitterness</u> (Nairobi, East African Pub., 1968), pp. 224-225.

We wish, therefore, to remind those outside powers who reinforce the evil philosophy of apartheid by pursuing economic objectives that in the long run their own interests will be in jeopardy unless they are prepared to change their attitude and promote political liberalism, racial harmony and stability in that region. 22

As far as direct negotiation with South Africa was concerned, the Kenya Government opposed the concept of 'dialogue' as first proposed by President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast. The government agreed that negotiations could take place, but only <u>after</u> South Africa had conceded to the principle of majority rule, and this had been the basis of the Lusaka Manifesto. The government realised that South Africa's own practice on 'dialogue' paid little attention to aiding the position of the black majority and only served to anaesthetise the opposition of many neighbouring African states.²³ Kenya's hostility to apartheid went to the extent of opposing O.A.U. efforts to negotiate with South Africa over the future of Rhodesia in 1975, but this hard-line stance was moderated at the Commonwealth Conference of 1975 after pressure from the 'front-line' states.²⁴

Generally speaking, the Kenya Government concentrated its attention on the economic development of the country, and so over the question of southern Africa the government chose to take a secondary role behind the 'front-line' states. It was true that Kenya was a regular contributor to the O.A.U. Liberation Committee as well as such bodies as the U.N. Programme for Education and Training of South Africans

22. Daily Nation, 2 May 1975.

- 23. 'Dialogue' was attacked by Kenya from the time it was introduced in 1972; see, for example, <u>U.N. Yearbook 1972</u> (New York, United Nations, 1975), p. 79.
- 24. Derek Ingram, 'Rhodesia: African Leaders rely on Vorster', Gemini News Service, G2 391, 2 May 1975.

abroad, while many of the more vocal states of Africa regularly failed to contribute.²⁵ But the government rarely took any initiatives on southern Africa, prefering to follow, rather than lead, others. Upon reflection, this should be considered as a realistic assessment of the southern African question because for all the diplomatic effort exerted by more committed nations, little progress was made. The government preferred to put its effort into developing Kenya.

The split within the O.A.U. over the question of 'dialogue'²⁶ began to manifest itself within the Kenya Government in 1978. The Foreign Ministry, under Dr. Waiyaki, maintained the official opposition to South Africa, but the influential Attorney-General, Charles Njonjo, made pronouncements on the need to open up channels of communication, as well as diplomatic representation in Pretoria, in order to break down the racial barriers.²⁷ Such a split was disturbing, but it appeared unlikely that Njonjo's views would become official ideology, because of the likelihood of both external and internal opposition. There was all along, however, tacit acceptance of indirect contacts with South Africa through the support for the presence of large multinational corporations in Kenya. For example, Lonrho, with all its southern African connections, had over fifty subsidiaries in Kenya as well as having a nephew of President Kenyatta as the first African director in London.²⁸

As far as dealings with the liberation movements were concerned,

Wolfers, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 178-179; <u>U.N. Yearbook 1966</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, p. 93.
 Mayall, <u>op.cit.</u>
 <u>A.R.B.</u>, 1978, pp. 4947-4948.
 Cronjé <u>et al.</u>, <u>op.cit.</u>, pp. 37-38.

the government usually favoured reconciliation between groups. This reflected the country's own experience in bringing together K.A.N.U. and K.A.D.U. at the time of independence. Kenyatta then supported dealing severely with any further opposition, as had occurred with the K.P.U. In June 1975, the Kenya Government managed to bring together the three rival Angolan liberation movements to sign a 'Nakuru agreement', though this soon broke down.²⁹ In 1976, the government voted at the O.A.U. for reconciliation of the parties rather than for the sole recognition of the M.P.L.A. Similarly over Zimbabwe, the government recognised the Patriotic Front, but hoped for talks between the nationalist groups before independence was granted.³⁰

To sum up, then, concerning Kenya's policies towards southern Africa, the government remained committed in its opposition to the white minority regimes and the attempts made by them to seek legitimacy in African eyes. The government, however, fell short of taking a leading role in the liberation struggle, prefering to concentrate its energies upon the specific issues affecting Kenyan development. South Africa was a political and emotional problem, and not necessarily an economic one for Kenya to handle. It was the economic factors, notably in Kenya's links with the West, which prevented Kenya, and the continent as a whole, from scoring greater successes in southern Africa.

International Economic Issues

While political issues were continually in the forefront of discussions in international organisations, the 1970s witnessed a growing awareness of the pressing need to alter the economic relations between

29. A.R.B., 1975, p. 3705.

^{30. &}lt;u>United Nations Monthly Chronicle</u>, vol. xiii, no.10, November 1976, pp. 67-68.

the countries of the world. The voice of the developing countries was institutionalised in the 'Group of 77', which by the mid 1970s had grown into a group of well over one hundred states.

The Kenyan economy provided a typical example of a developing country's economy where major earnings came from exports of primary products. It was natural, therefore, that the government strove to improve the terms of trade between rich and poor nations and supported measures to ease the problems of price fluctuations of primary products in order to maintain a steady flow of finance for development schemes. Great hope was pinned on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (U.N.C.T.A.D.) to formulate an integrated commodity scheme, as well as the Stabex scheme of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) started under the Lomé Convention of 1975.³¹ Although some small gains were made for the Kenyan economy from the E.E.C., the overall retulis were poor and led the Foreign Minister to comment at the U.N. that 'the progress of the negotiations towards the achievement of the new international economic order had been very disappointing'.³²

The economy had benefited since 1969 from links with the E.E.C. through the association agreement signed with the East African

^{31.} For the background to these schemes see Geoffrey Goodwin and James Mayall, 'The Political Dimensions of the U.N.C.T.A.D. Integrated Commodity Scheme', <u>Millennium</u>: Journal of International Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, Autumn 1977, pp. 146-161; see also Duncan Nderitu Ndegwa, 'The Developing Countries and the Quest for a New International Monetary Order' in Barbara Allen Roberson (ed.), <u>North-South Dialogue. Problems and Prospects of Developing Nations</u> (London, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Special Edition 1978), pp. 66-80.

^{32.} United Nations Monthly Chronicle, vol. xv, no. 10, November 1978, pp. 101-102.

Community.³³ This had allowed many Kenyan goods into European markets tax-free, but did little to break the predominant position of the developed countries of Europe. For this to happen, Kenyans realised that a radical change of opinion was necessary. But even given this change, the government was aware that there would still be disparity between states. As Mr. Eliud Mwamunga, the Minister for Commerce and Industry, said at the time of U.N.C.T.A.D. IV in Nairobi in 1976:

The change in the institutional structure of the world trade need not create any apprehension in the developed nations because they will always have special advantages by virtue of their advanced knowledge of science and technology and their ability to re-orientate the pattern of their industrial production in a manner so as to leave enough scope to developing countries to manufacture the less complicated products and sell them to the developed nations. 34

Whereas U.N.C.T.A.D. provided hope for the future, the government strove to improve the economic position of the country by gaining immediate assistance from the international community. As has already been shown in chapter three, the proportion of total aid provided by international or multilateral sources increased dramatically during Kenyatta's years in office and eased the dependence on bilateral assistance. For example, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D.) alone invested some \$604.6 million between 1969 and 1975 in Kenya.

The other major source of international assistance not touched upon already was the Commonwealth. Membership of the organisation had political relevance to Kenya and other members because it gave greater

34. Kenya Export News, vol. 23, no. 258, May 1976, p. 9.

^{33.} Simon Mbilinyi, 'East African Export Commodities and the Enlarged European Economic Community', <u>The African Review</u>, vol. 3, no. 1, 1973, pp. 85-110.

opportunity to pressurise Britain on the question of South Africa. It also contained a number of countries amenable to persuasion to take Asians who were expelled from Kenya because of being non-citizens. Above all, the Commonwealth was seen as a collection of diverse partners who would strive to help each other economically. This meant that the richer countries of the developed Commonwealth would be able to provide finance and technical assistance to Kenya and other poorer members. This is how Tom Mboya, when Minister for Economic Planning and Development, saw the Commonwealth's attraction:

If in the past the Commonwealth has derived its strength from similarities among its members, it must find its purpose in the future among the existing and emerging differences. Our similarities are the basis for association and indeed a source of strength, but it is our differences that can lend purpose and meaning to our future joint endeavours. In brief, the Commonwealth must be transformed from a social club into a purposeful society for mutual aid and assistance. 35

Even though the level of assistance for Kenya from Commonwealth countries (apart from Britain) was fairly low,³⁶ the Commonwealth remained an organisation in which the government could pursue its economic policies.

International Prestige

All states, to some degree or other, aim to win respect from other states in the international system. It is difficult though, to isolate the major factors concerned with international 'prestige', but success in one or more fields - economics, political stability, military prowess, cultural activities - would normally give some measure of prestige. It is the contention here that the Kenya Government consciously strove to promote a favourable image of Kenya to gain

35. Mboya, op.cit., p. 242.

36. For example in 1972 Commonwealth countries (excluding Britain) provided no more than 5 per cent. of the total bilateral aid to Kenya; see chapter three.

status and prestige among its fellow African countries, as well as to make an impact on the world scene.

Kenva's reputation for non-involvement in the affairs of other countries as well as its own record for political stability helped to bring respectability to its overall diplomatic position and status. Its pragmatic and generally moderate policies in international affairs helped to bring the country respect in most of the major diplomatic centres of the world. Of course, moderation and respectability are themselves political attributes which have to be treated with caution because of their subjective assessment. But the country's growing political stature as well as its ability to maintain planned economic (if openly capitalist) growth brought major gains to Kenya as Nairobi became accepted as one of the most important diplomatic centres in Africa. In an age of major international conferences, the completion in September 1973 of the Kenyatta Conference Centre gave Kenya the largest and most sophisticated centre in Africa.³⁷ The new Nairobi Airport opened in 1978³⁸ (later renamed the Jomo Kenyatta Airport) and the modern hotel facilities indicated a positive attempt to become the foremost diplomatic centre in Africa, aiming to overtake Addis Ababa and Johannesburg.

By the mid 1970s, the country had proved its capacity to host major international meetings. In 1972, Kenya hosted the All-Africa Trade Fair and then went on to become the first African country to host the assemblies of the World Bank in 1973, U.N.E.S.C.O. in 1976 and U.N.C.T.A.D. also in 1976. During this period the United Nations

37. <u>Africa Confidential</u>, vol. 14, no. 20, October 1973, pp. 5-7.
38. <u>Africa</u>, no. 80, April 1978, pp. 82-103.

Environment Programme (U.N.E.P.) was established with its headquarters in Nairobi, the first U.N. body to be based in Africa. Eleven other international organisations had major regional offices in Nairobi, as shown in Table 5:1, thus lending credence to the view that Nairobi was becoming the regional focus. In 1977, some seventy-nine diplomatic missions were accredited to the Kenyan capital, a figure which showed the regional significance of the country.³⁹

Another important area where Kenyans gained prestige for their country was in sporting successes scored in international competitions. Kenyans were particularly good at long-distance running, where the benefit of living at high altitude in the Rift Valley Province and similar areas gave them a physiological advantage over most other competitors. The rewards from athletic successes were largely intangible, but undoubtedly created a friendly and sympathetic outlook towards Kenya abroad. The fact that names such as Kip Keino and Henry Rono (a man who held four world records simultaneously in 1978) were known world-wide made people aware of Kenya's existence.

The government was well aware of the political usefulness of such athletic successes and gave full encouragement to national representatives. In December 1964, it was a Kenyan Olympic athlete, Wilson Kiprugut, who unfurled the flag of the new Kenya Republic. President Kenyatta always took it upon himself to see off and welcome personally all Kenyan teams competing in major international competitions, so

39. <u>Directory of Diplomatic Corps. May 1977</u> (Nairobi, Government Printer/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1977). A comparative study of the permanent missions in African capitals in 1974 showed Nairobi to have 46 permanent missions, Kampala 27 missions, Dar es Salaam 44 missions, Lusaka 29 missions and Addis Ababa, home of the 0.A.U. and U.N.E.C.A., 62 missions; Christopher Clapham, 'Sub-Saharan Africa' in Christopher Clapham (ed.), <u>Foreign policy making in developing states</u> (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1977), p. 102.

Table 5:1

International Organisations in Nairobi

1.	United Nations Environment Programme (Headquarters)
2.	Organisation of African Unity - Inter-African Bureau for
	Animal Resources (Headquarters)
3.	United Nations Development Programme
4.	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
•	Organisation (African Office)
5.	The World Bank (I.B.R.D.) and Affiliates
6.	United Nations Children's Fund
7.	Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United
	Nations
8.	World Health Organisation
9.	United Nations Information Centre
10.	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
11.	League of Arab States
12.	The Commission of the European Community

Source: Directory of Diplomatic Corps. May 1977, op. cit.

emphasising the fact that the athletes were "ambassadors" of Kenya. By coincidence, President Kenyatta's last formal engagement before his death in August 1978 was to greet Kenya's team which had done so well at the recent All-Africa Games in Algiers and the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton.⁴⁰

The use of boycotts of major international sporting competitions

40. Hilary Ng'weno, The day Kenyatta died (Nairobi, Longman, 1978), pp. 11-12.

by African states in order to isolate South Africa became prominent in the 1970s and put the Kenya Government in a dilemma as to whether to support boycott calls or to stay in the competitions to win medals and prestige for the country. In 1976, the Olympic Games in Montreal were boycotted by virtually all of Africa because of New Zealand's ties with South Africa. Kenya's reluctance to boycott the Games was well known, but after the O.A.U. Assembly of Heads of State came down firmly in favour of a boycott, the government decided to conform.⁴¹ On this occasion, the national goal of gaining prestige and glory was forfeited in order to support the international aim of isolating South Africa.

At the Commonwealth Conference in 1977, all members agreed upon the so-called Gleneagles Declaration which stated that it was 'the urgent duty of each of their Governments vigorously to combat the evil of apartheid by witholding any form of support for, and by taking every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organisations, teams or sportsmen from South Africa or from any other country where sports are organised on the basis of race, colour or ethnic origin'.⁴² In 1978, the government decided not to back a Nigerian call to boycott the Commonwealth Games in Edmonton, and so showed how delicate a topic such boycotts were.⁴³ How the government reacts to future boycott calls will depend very much upon political calculations made at that time.

- 41. Stephen Wright, 'Are the Olympics games? The Relationship of Politics and Sport', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 6, no. 1, Spring 1977, pp. 30-44.
- 42. Commonwealth Heads of Government. The London Communique (London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1977), pp. 21-22.
- 43. The Standard, 28 July 1978.

One sporting meeting which should be certain to take place is the All-Africa Games, and Kenya again showed its perception of the significance of sport by agreeing to host these Games in 1982.⁴⁴ The decision to build a major new sports complex in Nairobi gave the People's Republic of China an opportunity to regain a foothold in Kenya. The Chinese agreed to build the facilities, as they have already done in countries as far afield as Zanzibar and Sierra Leone.⁴⁵ This underlined the fact that even in sports, Kenya was dependent upon outside powers for assistance. Nany of the Kenyan athletes were at American universities which often made it difficult for Kenya to make them appear in certain competitions. Therefore, to some extent Kenya's future progress in international sports will require the assistance of more developed countries.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to analyse Kenyan foreign policy as pursued in international organisations. It has shown that these organisations provided Kenyan leaders with a much wider arena in which to promote policies, and also gave the opportunity to speak out against the injustices caused by the economic and political domination of the world by the developed countries. Foreign policy was pursued in a manner of <u>pragmatic radicalism</u>, where pragmatic considerations tempered the radical nature of policy. Kenya was able to maintain formal diplomatic non-alignment while keeping aligned with the West in crucial economic and political matters.

The most important issues towards which attentions were directed

44. 'Kenya to the Rescue', <u>New African</u>, no. 141, May 1979, p. 70. 45. <u>Ibid</u>.

concerned southern Africa. Kenya sought to work through the U.N., O.A.U., the Commonwealth and even the Olympic Games to bring majority rule and justice to this part of the continent. The government also worked through and with these organisations, as well as the European Economic Community, to improve the economic and social conditions of the country.

The government aimed to attract recognition for its controlled economic growth and moderate political nature in order to gain prestige for the country. This gave tangible rewards in that international organisations and conferences were attracted to Nairobi, which developed into one of Africa's, and the world's, leading diplomatic centres. This also provided the impetus for gaining aid and trade from countries impressed by Kenya's maturity. The prestige of the country was further enhanced. though in a more intangible manner, by the sporting success of its athletes.

Finally, President Kenyatta sought to maintain an active role in African and world affairs through international organisations, but a role which did not detract from, and was complementary to, the country's desire to gain recognition and stature, both politically and economically, in the international arena.

Chapter Six

Foreign Policy in the Kenyatta Era; A Conclusion

The previous chapters have dealt with Kenyan foreign policy on a thematic basis. This provided a means to understand the various levels, or areas, of foreign policy and to allow for comparison, for example, between the content and style of policy in the regional arena and the wider global arena. This chapter draws together the various areas of foreign policy and provides some conclusions as to its overall perspective. The chapter first analyses the major determinants of Kenyan foreign policy, and then goes on to outline the fundamental goals of the state and how policies were implemented to achieve those goals. Finally, it discusses the merits of calling this period the 'Kenyatta Era', and looks at the prospects for the future of Kenyan foreign policy.

Determinants of Foreign Policy

It is without doubt true that less work in the field of foreign policy analysis has been done for developing countries than for the developed world. Many hazards face the political scientist who attempts to undertake a study of an African country. The general store of information is miniscule as compared with the abundance of data on the developed world. Transport and communications within the country are also often poor, while media coverage is normally censored and lacking in critical commentary. On some occasions, the foreign scholar is even denied access to the country, thus placing his study in serious difficulties.

On the whole, this picture is a true one, but like all generalisations there are specific instances which show a different picture. Scholars are now adapting theories devised for the developed world to help our understanding of African countries.¹ Developed countries themselves are, perhaps reluctantly, becoming more interested in Africa and so seek more information about the continent. Finally, African scholars are now emerging in greater numbers and naturally strive to understand the workings of their own national governments.

The newness and the weakness of African states have led to the continent often being classified as a monolithic unit. I. William Zartman, while deliberately exaggerating his perspective, summed up the African predicament admirably:

African states are generally ruled by and for an urbanised, westernised minority administering national revenues which are based on small agricultural or mineral surpluses....African governments are highly centralized, executive-dominated, and much heavier in the bureaucratic and technocratic output sector than in the party and mobilization, input sector. 2

Zartman, in the same article, went on further to sum up the major problems remaining in Africa as border disputes, southern Africa and apartheid, and economic dependency.³ Zartman was well aware of the dangers of simplification and generalisation, but concluded that African states have enough things in common to warrant this.

It is most likely that greater differences between states will emerge in time as each state pursues its own foreign policy and more analyses of states are undertaken. There are similarities in the policies of African states, but at the same time each country responds

- 1. See especially Christopher Clapham, Foreign Policy making in developing states (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1977).
- I. William Zartman, 'Africa' in J. Rosenau, K. Thompson and
 G. Boyd (eds.), <u>World Politics</u> (New York, Free Press, 1976), p. 580.
- 3. Ibid., pp. 591-592.

to a unique combination of internal and external factors. Two major approaches can be used to help provide detailed information and to give the impetus for comparative work, through which the quasimonolithic African shell will be cracked open. For want of better titles, the labels 'scientific' and 'classical' are used. Both approaches concentrate upon the determinants of foreign policy, and so aim to show how and why policies are made, as well as their implementation and subsequent response.

The 'scientific' approach is best expounded by the works of Michael Brecher and his associates.⁴ Brecher's model is centred upon five internal and five external variables, and these are used to help explain why certain policies and not others are adopted by states. Each variable, such as military potential or relationship with the super-powers, is dealt with in turn in a taxonomic manner until all aspects of the operational environment are covered. Brecher then treats the ten variables to a second scrutiny, but this time from a psychological perspective, that is the environment as <u>perceived</u> by the decision-makers. After a full discussion of the factors determining a policy decision, Brecher's model then calls upon the analyst to compartmentalise the decision into one of four areas - military/ security, political/diplomatic, economic/developmental and cultural/ status.

It is the practical, rather than philosophical, problems which have so far hindered the further use of this model. Full utilisation

4. Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg and Janice Stein, 'A framework for research on foreign policy behavior', <u>The Journal of Conflict</u> <u>Resolution</u>, vol. xiii, no. 1, 1969, pp. 75-101; Michael Brecher, <u>The Foreign Policy System of Israel:</u> Setting, Images and Processes (London, O.U.P., 1972).

puts a heavy premium upon quantitative material - newspaper reports, government speeches - which in the Kenyan and general African contexts is insufficient and unreliable. A study by K.A. Good of Kenyan foreign policy in the early years after independence utilised parts of what was to become the Brecher taxonomy but as a series of static pigeon-holes rather than an organic framework.⁵ Brecher himself attempted to operationalise his model in a second study of his on Israel,⁶ but the problems of complexity of the model and paucity of data in the African context led one scholar of Egypt to trim the model to suit the problems encountered in his study.⁷ Dawisha's actions in simplifying the model highlighted a paradox - that the model's virtue lay in both its rigorous taxonomy of factors and its availability for comparative studies, and yet it is too sophisticated a model to be used for most, if not all, African countries at this present point in time.

While appreciating the need for scientific analysis and learning from Brecher's analytical precision, this study of Kenyan foreign policy has belonged firmly to what could be termed the 'classical' tradition. This approach is a more generalised one, concentrating upon the intrinsic issues which affect and shape foreign policy rather than on more specific and specialised variables. The danger of this approach is that it becomes easy to explain away foreign policy actions on a single factor, such as economic dependency or the colonial heritage,

- 5. K.A. Good, 'The Kenyans and their Foreign Policy. Pressures, Images and Decisions' (Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, 1969. Lodged at School of Oriental and African Studies). This thesis was obviously influenced by Brecher's research at McGill University.
- 6. Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (London, O.U.P., 1974).
- 7. A.I. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World. The Elements of Foreign Policy (London, Macmillan, 1976).

or else to slip into the habit of labelling policies as 'radical' or 'conservative', 'capitalist' or 'socialist', without actually coming to grips with their full meaning. Bearing these pitfalls in mind, it is possible to draw up a list of factors which have traditionally been used to explain the foreign policy-making process of governments in Africa. Olajide Aluko, in a recent book,⁸ has listed five major determinants of foreign policy: colonial history and heritage, economic dependency, ideology and perceptions of an elite group, internal political pressures, and the external environment. In order to maintain a consistent pattern in the study of African states' foreign policies, this chapter holds to Aluko's classification and so provides material for future potential comparative studies carried out within a similar framework.

The Colonial Heritage

The colonial period and its heritage are probably the most significant determinants of Kenyan domestic and foreign policies. Although colonialism lasted for the comparatively short time - in historical terms - of about seventy years, it structured and shaped what is today known as Kenya. During the colonial period the various tribes were brought together, willingly or unwillingly, into a territorial unity and a common language, English, was forced upon them. Like most African states, therefore, Kenya was an artificial creation of colonialism and one to which Africans found it difficult to relate. No firm answer can be made on the merits or demerits of the colonial exercise. Most attack colonialism, quite justifiably, as an inhuman exercise and attribute the problems of the continent today to

^{8.} Olajide Aluko, The Foreign Policies of African States (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1977).

the colonial penetration. Those who look for something useful and good emanating from it point to the fact that the continent developed more rapidly than could have been possible otherwise, and that the colonialists left a <u>lingua franca</u> to unite the various peoples, as well as railways, schools and hospitals.

As far as Kenya is concerned, there is little to be gained now in debating the pros and cons of colonialism, but it is best to concentrate upon what the heritage of colonialism was in Kenya. especially where it affects our understanding of the foreign policy process. In the economic sphere, the colonial heritage played an important role in shaping the country's foreign policy. The communications network revolved around the Highlands and Nairobi, where the vast majority of European settlers were to be found on the best farming land in the country. After independence, the emergence of the neo-colonial economy, to be described below, was naturally attributed to the colonial presence and control of the economic life of the country. The fact that the Kenyan economy had grown strong during the colonial period, owing mainly to the presence of the settlers, helped Kenya during the 1960s to expand into, and play a dominating role in, the East African arena. The assurance of these markets for Kenyan goods came in 1967 with the formation of the East African Community. The impetus from being the predominant market during the colonial era allowed Kenya to dominate economically the East African Community, although this superiority was itself a contributive factor to the Community's eventual demise.

The political system in post-independence Kenya also was shaped to a large extent by the colonial experience. The country took on a multiparty democratic system in 1963 and never legally blocked the formation

of opposition parties, though after 1969 Kenya was to all extents and purposes a one-party state. The colonial period had witnessed rule by bureaucracy through many local administrators. At independence. Kenvatta took over this apparatus intact and used it to rule. thus by-passing the elected representatives of the people in the National Assembly. The continuing presence of many European civil servants and advisers in most ministries in Nairobi further exemplified the colonial links as well as raised questions about the influence such expatriate personnel had on the policies of the new nation. This is a difficult question to answer with confidence, but their presence must have had at least a subtle influence upon policy decisions by helping to shape the attitudes and perceptions of the leading African bureaucrats. The smooth transition of power at the time of independence provides evidence for the view that the incoming African leaders had much in common with their predecessors and so slotted quite easily into the political, social, economic and bureaucratic structures left in the colonial heritage.

Colonialism also played a part in moulding the more intangible features of Kenyan foreign policy. The 'emotional' or 'radical' nature of the foreign policies of most African states can be explained in relation to the opposition and rejection of colonialism. The experience of the colonial period produced a reaction towards making highly moralistic and egalitarian pronouncements in world affairs which generally proved impracticable and naive in the international politics of the 1960s and 1970s. The shared humiliation of the continent led to a policy of Pan-Africanism, which meant various things to different people, but to the Kenyan leaders gave some measure of commitment to and alliance with the common pursuit of independence throughout the

continent from political and economic subjugation.⁹ Kenya's hostility towards the white minority regime in southern Africa could mainly be explained in terms of its own bitter experience of foreign domination.

The weakness of the new country in face of the strength of the former colonial power - as well as the rest of the developed world was not missed by Kenyatta who realised that the country's policies upon such issues as southern Africa could not be easily implemented. This made many aspects of foreign policy 'declaratory', and led to a certain amount of frustration at the country's incapacity to alter the international environment. This also pushed Kenya into closer cooperation with the rest of the continent - both in the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity - and at the regional level, through the association of states in eastern Africa.

It is impossible to deny the importance of colonialism in the composition and direction of the country's foreign policy after independence. The colonial heritage, in its broadest sense, can be seen to be the central determinant of foreign policy as well as the one to which all the other determinants related. And yet the status of the colonial heritage is a paradoxical one, in that the government strove after independence to break away from the colonial past as an unwanted evil, but at the same time wished to emulate its achievements. Kenyatta attacked the colonialists for what they did in the country and the rest of the continent, yet wished to maintain the closest links possible with the colonialists after independence. In short, the Kenyan elite felt an emotional antagonism towards the colonial

^{9.} At independence, a Ministry for Pan-African Affairs was established, but its general inactivity led to it becoming absorbed into the Office of the President.

heritage, but, through active policies, recognised the benefit of such links for the development of the country.

Economic Dependency

It is a common assertion that the African continent. no sooner free from the bonds of colonialism, was subjected to the more subtle though no less constraining force of neo-colonialism. The mood of optimism of the 1960s, when most African states gained their independence from colonial bondage, was replaced by a hardening dissatisfaction at being dominated by the stronger states of the world, and in particular those of the West. As seen by the late Kwame Nkrumah, •the essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is. in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its priitical policy is directed from outside. 10 The main objective of neo-colonialism is, according to its opponents, to sub-divide and balkanise Africa into weak, insignificant units and prevent any political initiative which would attempt to eradicate this system. It is against this background that the foreign policy posture of 'nonalignment' can be judged.

Kenyan political leaders always maintained that the country's foreign policy rested upon the principle of non-alignment, but President Kenyatta was aware of the delicate balance between economic aid and economic dependence, and how this in turn affected the orientation of policy:

In the party manifesto we made it quite clear that non-alignment did not imply non-commitment. We cannot stand aside when issues

 Kwame Nkrumah, 'A Redefinition of Neo-Colonialism' in Gideon-Cyrus M. Mutiso and S.W. Rohio, <u>Readings in African Political Thought</u> (London, Heinemann, 1975), p. 415. confront Africa or the world....But let me say it quite plainly today that Kenya shall not exchange one master for a new master.... We welcome genuine friendship but we detest flattery. We welcome co-operation and assistance, but we shall not be bought or blackmailed. We may be underdeveloped, and our people may walk barefoot, but we are a proud people....It is natural that we should detest Western colonialism, and associate the word imperialism with the West. But if we are truly non-aligned we must not avoid making friends with those Western countries who extend an honest hand in the field of co-operation and trade. To do this is just to prove that we are not free and cannot separate good from bad. 11

The implementation of such a chimerical policy was open to criticism from many quarters. The opposition leader, Oginga Odinga, was one of many to be aware of the fact that it was difficult to say exactly whether the government chose to maintain contacts with the West, so rejecting aid from the East in a free and open-handed manner, or whether this policy was imposed upon Kenya by its continued economic dependence upon the West. Kenyatta naturally intimated that the government's policies were freely chosen and not dictated, but it is worthwhile evaluating and balancing the evidence to present as objective an assessment as possible.

The issue of economic dependency touches on many other areas, such as the influence of colonialism and the ideology of the governing elite. Keeping these factors in mind, the pattern of trade and aid partnerships as discussed in chapter three lend credence to the view that Kenyan policy was locked into the neo-colonial machinery of the western powers. A wast proportion of aid and trade links throughout the period in question were with western states and the lack of any attempt to alter this relationship added further weight to the view that Kenya was unable to break the neo-colonial stranglehold. The blatant military weakness of Kenya vis-à-vis its neighbours also made the country seek

11. Jomo Kenyatta, 'Kenyatta's Views on Non-alignment' in Mutiso and Rohio, <u>ibid.</u>, p. 649. assistance from external forces at times of crisis, thus weakening the capacity for independent action.

Several other factors can be considered, however, which put into perspective the nature of the neo-colonial state. Firstly, during the period as a whole, Kenya's dependence upon bilateral aid decreased quite significantly as the country sought assistance from multilateral sources with less explicit political strings attached. Secondly, it appears that little co-ordination took place between donors of aid, and so allowed ample opportunity to diversify, and play off, donors and so limit the level of political control. A third factor to note is that despite the problems facing the economy, a growth rate of some 7 per cent. a year was averaged during the first decade after independence. Much of this growth was as a direct result of foreign assistance, both governmental and private, but there is little or no evidence to suggest that it was in sectors not desired by the Kenyans themselves.

A fourth point to be considered is the level of dependence in Kenya as compared with other states in the continent. For example, Kenya was not dependent upon external links to the same extent as Zambia, which was continually forced to trade, against its will, with South Africa in order to survive. Kenya was also in a stronger position vis-à-vis Tanzania, which lacked the economic base which the Kenyans inherited from the whites in 1963. However, as compared with the oilrich country of Nigeria, the Kenya Government realised it did not have an equal amount of political clout and room for manoeuvre as did the Nigerians.

The term economic dependency, then, must be handled with some

caution, but it is difficult not to agree with the conclusion of Colin Leys that Kenya was a neo-colonial society with all that implied for foreign and domestic policies.¹² However, the all-embracing nature of the neo-colonial thesis can provide answers for almost everything and so is difficult to counter. For example, if the government decided to nationalise a foreign company it could be said to be buying off the masses with piecemeal reform in order to protect its position as a comprador group. Conversely, if the government did not nationalise that same foreign company it would be because external forces were more important considerations at that time than the masses, and so the government acted in league with foreign capital interests. How to counter such a philosophy - though it is one to which this thesis adheres - is problematical. It appears, though, that the emphasis nust be placed not only upon the relative strength of the economy but also upon the ideology and commitment of the indigenous elite, something to which we shall now turn.

Elite Ideology

The foreign policy of any country is partly determined by the ideology of the governing elite group. By elite is meant a small group of people who take the major decisions in society, often to their own advantage yet rationalised to be in the interest of the nation as a whole. The elite group formulates policies upon its perception of what should be done, given certain conditions in the internal and external environments, and holds to an ideology, composed of guidelines and policy preferences, as a yardstick by which to work as well as a means to explain its choice of policy to the people.

^{12.} Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya. The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism 1964-1971 (London, Heinemann, 1975).

It would not be an over-statement to conclude that the ideology of the governing elite after independence was largely one conditioned by colonialism. The economic dependency of Kenya forced the government to take account of western interests, but the ruling group of Kenyatta and his closest advisers all shared a sympathetic attachment to western values and ideas, brought about largely by their conditioning in a western environment. Most of the leading members of government had spent some time in Britain and the United States of America. and some had been educated there. Although there was a possibility that such an experience would turn them against the West, it was evident that familiarity with the West had brought respect and admiration, and shaped the Kenyan elite's ideas and values to reflect and emulate the West. In this respect, Kenya was similar to many of the former French colonies, which maintained a close affinity with France even after independence, and this at times raised criticisms against Kenyan leaders as the 'lackeys' of the West. Such accusations must be handled with some care, as close examination of most African countries would reveal closer ideological association with the West than many indigenous leaders would like to admit.

The Kenyan leaders held to the belief that they were the best equipped for the task of running the country and formulating its foreign policy. This superiority emanated from educational, social and economic advantages which had largely been gained during the colonial period. As one scholar has written:

Rule by an elite for the sake of administrative and economic efficiency, and because the masses are unfit and possibly dangerous, are strongly held images. Antipathy for revolution is the associated notion. Kenyatta's repeated denunciations of 'Mau Mau' as 'a disease which must never be remembered' and his praise of 'orderly government', Mboya's subscription to the theme of 'forget the past', Njonjo's sincere incomprehension of the idea that, as he put it, 'beggars might be found in parliament', the Kenyan government's official

statement that it 'intended to avert all revolutions irrespective of their origins', and the admission by Mwai Kibaki, that 'austerity programmes were laughed at in high places', established the dual image of elitism and suspicious concern for the mass of Kenyans. 13

The view propounded that the elite group ruled for the good of the nation was a tenuous one, as it was very difficult to define the national 'good' or 'interest'. Furthermore, there were various elite groups, or 'functional pyramids' as Marshall R. Singer calls them,¹⁴ within Kenyan society which overlapped and occasionally competed with each other for control of the governmental apparatus. The political elite could be delineated as the Cabinet which was the major coordinating force in the political system. However, within the Cabinet there was what could be classed as an Inner Cabinet of Kenyatta's closest friends, and so it might be more accurate to define this group as the political elite. This inner circle also displayed an ethnic foundation, and so tribal affiliation was an important factor in one's membership of this elite group.

Surrounding this small political elite were several other elite groups which at times became part of the top decision-making group. The bureaucratic elite was an obvious supplement to the political elite in that its support and confidence was required to govern successfully. As a result of the Ndegwa Report of 1970, civil servants in Kenya were allowed to take part in business activities alongside their other duties, and so this group also had an influential role to play within the economic sector. The business elite group was composed largely, though not exclusively, of the Kikuyu and had many

13. Good, op. cit., p. 549.

14. Marshall R. Singer, 'The Foreign Policies of Small Developing States' in Rosenau et al., op.cit., p. 279. contacts with the governing elite. Many members of the political elite were, in fact, wealthy businessmen and so shared a common understanding and desire for profitable enterprise. Superimposed upon these overlapping groups was the ethnic element, in that those of one tribal group could at times be more influential in getting policies adopted than those from other groups. This was either because that particular tribal group dominated the decision-making process, or else its support was needed to consolidate national unity. The most important competing elite group during the period in question was the political leadership of the Kenya People's Union (K.P.U.). This group's opposition was largely ideological, but in the end was forced back onto tribal support from the Luo people.

The main thrust of the K.P.U.'s ideological attack concerned the path of economic development which the government was following. The K.P.U.'s argument was that the capitalist development strategy was an elitist one, in that only a small minority of the people stood to gain anything at all. The K.P.U.'s programme was basically a populist one, but it failed to catch on significantly, owing to general apathy and the determination to prevent it gaining support by the government, who perceived it to be against the national - and their own elite group's - interest.

At the East African regional level there was some measure of ideological affinity between the respective elite groups of the three countries. The colonial experience gave them all a shared desire to build up national strength and to work through the U.N. and O.A.U. for the end of apartheid in southern Africa and for economic justice in the world. At the specific level, however, there were serious disagreements between the governments. Tanzania, under President Julius

Myerere, aimed to follow a socialist path of development. This was anathema to the Kenyan leaders, and this ideological divergence was a major factor in the collapse of the Community. The anarchical condition of Uganda post-1971 also greatly upset the Kenyans, although it was not until President Idi Amin laid claims to Kenyan territory, a very sensitive topic within Kenya, that Kenyatta's government waived all diplomatic finesse and engaged in a verbal onslaught on Amin. But in general, the East African arena gave a typical example of Kenyan foreign policy, in that economic gain was the fundamental branch of the ideology and the governing elite was responsible for the maintenance and selection of such policies, irrespective of the views of other groups or the public, when articulated through the media, as a whole.

Internal Political Pressures

Chapter two discussed the domestic political structure in relation to the foreign policy process. It is the intention here to recap briefly on the points made previously, and also to broaden the scope of the study to encompass a wider spectrum by looking at the economic, political and social forces which provided the impetus for internal pressure on governmental policies.

The formal authority to make foreign policy lay with the President, who was assisted by a small group of advisers. Around the President were various interest or pressure groups which, as a rough rule of thumb, had less influence upon decision-making as the size of the group increased. The most significant group was an Inner Cabinet of trusted, mainly Kiambu Kikuyu, men who were Kenyatta's close confidants. Although access to the President was not blocked, these aides normally provided the link between Kenyatta and other influential circles bureaucracy, National Assembly, Cabinet, press - as well as the people

as a whole. To talk of 'public opinion' as a factor in policy-making would be inaccurate as the vast majority of people had little interest or influence in politics. Even the National Assembly was largely insignificant as a foreign policy pressure group because the President held full power to act irrespective of the wishes of other groups. At best, the President was aware of what was, in a general way, the 'people's wish', and attempted to accomodate this, but there was no political compulsion for this.

Tribalism and the military, both common features in the internal politics of many African states, had contrasting roles to play in Kenya. The military remained weak throughout the 1960s and 1970s and had no real influence in internal or external affairs, except the negative one of being a weak force. The reasons for this have been explained earlier, but rest mainly upon the lack of a serious external threat, the reliability of the former metropole to help in times of crisis, and the unreliability of the Armed Forces because of their tribal composition. Kikuyu domination of the political and economic life of the country - though not the military because of the former British reluctance to recruit the Kikuyu - produced ethnic hostility between various groups in society as well as governmental actions to prevent the worst excesses of tribalism. The most serious breach of unity came in the mid 1960s when the opposition party, the Kenya People's Union (K.P.U.), appeared to be backed mainly by the Luo people of western Kenya. The K.P.U.s raison d'être was ideological disagreement with the path of Kenyan development and foreign policy, but the government refused to be bent from its openly capitalist, development strategy, and cleverly manoeuvred the K.P.U. solely onto tribal support. thus making its eventual proscription easier.

Internal pressure on the government emanated from several economic issues in Kenyan society. The desire for land at the time of independence forced the government to take steps to allow for some measure of redistribution among the tribes, while at the same time maintaining the friendship and confidence of the white settlers, and through them. foreign investors. Kenyatta managed to achieve some success here, but the 1970s witnessed continuing pressures from the landless for land. though this time to be taken from the African elite who had been able to take a disproportionate share. Alongside this contest for land was a similar wrangling for control of the modern commercial and industrial sectors. The emergent African bourgeoisie, mainly Kikuyu but not exclusively so, solicited the government to help provide opportunities for economic advancement. Like in neighbouring Uganda, it was the Asians who were eased out of their positions of influence in the commercial sector, though many still remain today. The Europeans engaged in larger financial enterprises were required to make basically cosmetic adjustments towards Africanisation, but they will come undergreater pressure in the coming years from Africans, both on political as well as economic grounds.

On the whole, Kenya presented a fairly peaceful face to the world, as internal political pressures were through legitimate channels. The press was fairly free by general African standards, and elections were held regularly with results honoured. The political problems of the mid 1970s, including the assassination of J.M. Kariuki and the detention of several outspoken M.P.s, darkened the political record of Kenya and at the same time illuminated the continuing opposition, in some quarters anyway, to the domestic and foreign policies of the government.

External Environment

The final determinant of Kenyan foreign policy to consider in this

classification is the external environment. The African continent is unique in that although it is a continent of weak states, it has no super-power overshadowing its existence as is the case in Latin America and Asia. This fact allowed Kenyan decision-makers some latitude in formulating foreign policy as no direct physical threat to the country existed from the developed world. Of course, the economic threat must be borne in mind, but it had a different role to play in that it was not a purely visible, direct threat.

Perhaps of more immediate importance to Kenyan leaders was the country's predominant position in the East African arena. The colonial era had placed Kenya in relative strength to its neighbours because of the influential white settlers in the colony. After independence, Kenya continued to dominate regional trade, helped by the development of Nairobi as the regional focus. This had consequences for Kenyan foreign policy in that it angered the country's neighbours and caused Kenyatta to be aware of the risk involved in allowing the Kenyan economy to suffocate the weaker markets of its neighbours. This trend helped bring the East African Community to its knees, but the promise of a larger, but looser, association of states in the region can only further strengthen Kenya's regional status and position.

Kenya's geographical location on the Indian Ocean also had important consequences for foreign policy. The deep-water port of Mombasa gave the country an opportunity to become a major transit centre for goods in and out of the landlocked countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia and eastern Zaire. Mombasa also handled goods from countries to the north of Kenya, notably Ethiopia and Sudan. The problem of communications with these countries limited Kenya's greater trade expansion in the region, but given time the prospects appear bright.

Another factor concerning the location on the Indian Ocean was that of security. Mombasa was an ideal port of call for ships in the Indian Ocean, and the British Navy had agreements with the Kenya Government for its naval vessels to dock there from time to time. The demise of the Simonstown agreement for naval security between Britain and South Africa combined with the increased presence of the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean boosted the strategic significance of Mombasa. The Kenya Government favoured the idea of western navies being present in and around Mombasa, but was, nevertheless, opposed to the idea of giving <u>carte blanche</u> to the West because of the desire to maintain its nonaligned posture in international affairs.

The absence of clearly defined territorial borders gave rise to problems with two of the country's neighbours, the Somali Republic and Uganda. The dispute with the Somali Republic has been dealt with in depth in Chapter Four, but it can be noted here that the major problem arose from out of the fact that there were people of Somali origin in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya at the time of independence. The border between the two countries was a peculiarly artificial one, having no reference to either geographical or ethnographic factors. Kenya's reluctance to secede the territory was based on the fear that other secessionary movements would claim similar rights and thus would break up the nation. During the 1960s, the border war dragged on without solution, forcing Kenya into diverting precious resources into the war as well as calling on the help of British forces. In the 1970s the dispute took on more ideological connotations when the Somali Republic appeared to switch allies from the Soviet Union to the United States of America, and left Kenya to maintain a defence pact with the Soviet-backed Ethiopia. This regional problem continued into the late 1970s.

The impasse with Uganda over its claim to Kenyan territory in the mid 1970s emanated as much from the vagaries of President Idi Amin as any serious geographical factor. Such was the reputation in Kenya of Amin at this time that the government did not perceive it to be a serious threat, but one which nevertheless required a complete rebuttal. Kenya's geographical position vis-à-vis Uganda gave Jomo Kenyatta a good bargaining position as the country controlled the lifeline to Uganda. The antics of the Ugandan President did affect Kenyan foreign policy in that normal trade with Kenyan neighbours became difficult as some of the major road routes with other countries came through Uganda. Problems also arose as to how to treat the Ugandan regime - whether to ignore it as diplomatic rules demanded, or else to mobilise resources to bring the regime down. Kenyan foreign policy was committed to the former choice, but the downfall of Amin in 1979 could only have brought relief to Kenyan policy-makers.

The final factor to consider in this section is the geographical nature of Kenya itself. Although not an external determinant, except in the sense that it was outside of the decision-makers' control, the geography of Kenya had important effects on foreign policy. With the mainstay of the country's economy agriculture, and with less than half the land of any use at all, there was a large amount of pressure, both financial and social, to make the best possible use of the land. The lack of mineral resources of any great quantity gave Kenya little variety even in primary products and left the country squarely at the mercy of the international market. In the mid 1970s, a world boom in coffee and tea prices gave Kenya very great returns, but by 1978 these had turned downwards and the economy suffered as a result. Kenya's heavy population density in the Highlands region, as well as the country's rapid population growth rate, forced the government to

balance between large estates, which were financially advantageous but offered little employment, and small subsistence farms which offered the reverse. The government's decision to help both sides as far as possible naturally affected the country's foreign policy in terms of relations with external marketing interests and the financial rewards from agricultural exports.

The absence of oil in the country (though attempts were made to find some in the north) has had serious repercussions on foreign and domestic policies. The rise in oil prices following the O.P.E.C. revolution of 1973-74 left Kenya with a severe balance of payments deficit and forced Kenyan leaders into seeking better political, as well as economic, relations with the Arab states. The problems which Kenva faced were similar to all the other non-oil-producing countries of Africa, but there were special circumstances in which the country found itself. On the one hand, Kenya was more industrialised than many of its neighbours, and so the oil was more necessary for the Kenyan economy to keep moving than for the less-industrialised neighbouring countries. On the other hand, Kenya was itself an exporter of refined oil to countries within the region and so it was able to offset slightly its losses by charging higher rates for its refined oil. However, the general result of the oil crisis was to depress rather than stimulate the Kenyan economy, and the problems of this are still with the country today.

Goals and the Implementation of Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of any country is conditioned by factors emanating from the internal and external environments. In the previous section, the determinants of Kenyan foreign policy were drawn together into five broad catagories to show the pressures and influences being

exerted upon Kenyan policy-makers. These factors helped determine the broad parameters of foreign policy or, to put it another way, showed Kenyan decision-makers what was possible and what was impossible in the country's external relations.

This rather bald statement does require some interpretation and qualification as the Kenya Government was faced with a more complex situation than that. Firstly, although independence was achieved in 1963 and a fresh political chapter opened, the government could not ignore the continuing influence of the colonial period in its foreign policy. The new government could not start afresh, but 'fitted in' to the international environment around it and in the crucial areas of foreign policy, namely defence and economic development. continued largely with the policies of the colonial government. Secondly, it is accepted that the government acted mly upon the capabilities at its disposal, or, as one scholar has written, what was its 'hand of cards by circumstances. There is no freedom to play a card not in the hand.¹⁵ Furthermore, perception was an important factor as the decision-maker was forced to select the best policy to follow, the best card to play, and it was not until after the event that it was known for certain whether it was the correct decision to make. The policies pursued by the government to obtain its goals were not 'obvious' and could not be selected 'objectively', but were chosen in a human environment of subjectivity and imagery.

The third qualifying point to be made is that many of the goals of Kenyan foreign policy were declaratory or rhetorical, rather than ones actually physically pursued by the government. This is not something

15. F.S. Northedge, 'Continuity, Change and the Aims of Foreign Policy' in James Barber and Michael Smith (eds.), <u>The Nature of Foreign</u> <u>Policy: A Reader</u> (Milton Keynes, Open University and Edinburgh, Holmes McDougall, 1974), p. 173.

peculiar only to the weaker states of the developing world, but nevertheless is perhaps more conspicuous in that these states have less capacity to affect the will of other states. Many declaratory goals of Kenyan policy were long-term, where there was a declaration or statement of intent to do something. So, for example, Kenya's aim to unite with the rest of Africa in order to wrestle economic power from the developed world was not something to be achieved overnight, but simply set the tone and level of Kenya's long-term policy, as well as satisfied the government and the Kenyan people that the country was following the correct course of action.

Many decisions in Kenyan foreign policy, for a fourth point, aimed not specifically to benefit the national interests <u>per se</u>, but more the general African or Third World environment, or 'milieu'.¹⁶ It could not be said that Kenya's support for the non-militarisation of outer space made any difference to interests integrally associated with the country. Likewise, Kenya's hostility towards the minority regimes of southern Africa was determined more by the continental aspirations for independence from colonialism and subjugation than from any specific, concrete gain to Kenya, although this could have emerged at a later date with the opening of trade relations with a blackruled country.

The fundamental goals of Kenya were, in essence, territorial security and economic well-being. Territorial security had a double meaning for Kenya, because there was a need to repel both external and internal threats to the unity of the country. The major external

16. For a discussion of 'milieu' goals see Arnold Wolfers, 'The Goals of Foreign Policy' in Barber and Smith, <u>ibid.</u>, pp. 179-182.

threats emanated, as outlined above, from the Somali Republic and Uganda. While the latter threat did not really materialise, the challenge to Kenya by Somalia was a serious one.

Kenvan fears of allowing the Somalis to secede highlighted the internal security threat that many of the Kenyan tribes - Somalis. Masai and coastal groups in particular - felt uneasy at being forced to live with other tribes within the confines of the nation-state. The government used the carrot and stick method to good effect in trying to engender the spirit of national unity. The carrot came mainly in the form of economic development to all areas of the country and the chance for every tribe to gain something from uhuru. The government's attempts met with some success, but there remained disgruntled sections of the Community, particularly those Luo in the West of the country who suffered along with the political fortunes of Oginga odinga.¹⁷ Where the government met with a serious challenge to its authority, such as in 1969 and in 1975, then it was not afraid to use naked force to hold the nation together. Such tactics gained adverse reaction from some sections abroad, but did little to threaten the basic economic interests of the country.

The second goal of economic well-being was firmly linked to the first goal, in that the people of Kenya would feel greater attachment to the country if they were gaining something from it. This was the thrust of Kenyatta's argument with the Somalis and with the Luo people, that loyalty to the state would bring economic rewards. These rewards

^{17.} Oginga Odinga, <u>Not Yet Uhuru</u> (London, Heinemann, 1968); also David Court and Kenneth Prewitt, 'Nation versus region in Kenya: a Note on Political Learning', <u>The British Journal of Political Science</u>, vol. 4, part 1, January 1974, pp. 109-115.

however, could only be available with the steady growth of the economy, and to assure the country of this goal, Kenyatta firmly aligned the economy with the western capitalist system.

The implementation of Kenyan foreign policy is the final area of study to be looked at briefly in this section. The methods of implementation were not unusual by comparison to other African countries and could be classified under the following headings diplomacy, economic methods, radicalisation of policy, propaganda and military pressure. Normal diplomacy was by far the most used method of implementation of Kenyan foreign policy. This was carried out through bilateral negotiations with other states as well as in international organisations. President Kenyatta's retiring role in foreign policy and his dislike of foreign travel gave other Kenyan leaders the duty of representing the country at the highest levels abroad. This did not mean that Kenyatta was not in control of policy, but helped to present the picture of Kenya as a less-personalised regime than other neighbouring countries.

Economic methods of implementation of policy are normally associated with stronger states. Kenya was at times a recipient of this sort · of treatment from developed countries, but the Kenyan economy was sufficiently developed for it to be used at times to strengthen Kenya's position in relation to its neighbours. A good example of this was the relative ease with which Kenya halted Ugandan hostilities in 1976 by threatening to take up economic sanctions against that country. Similarly, Ethiopia and Zambia were both drawn into closer co-operation with Kenya because of the relative weaknesses and difficulties of their economies and the advantages which trade with the more stable Kenyan economy offered. The economic weapon was used effectively against Kenya over oil supplies by Arab states, thus pushing Kenya towards breaking off relations with Israel, as well as throughout the period after independence by the western neo-colonial interests operating in Kenya.

Radicalisation of policy and policy speeches was a further method by which Kenyan leaders sought to set out the country's foreign policy. The forums of the U.N., the Commonwealth and O.A.U. gave Kenya the opportunity to unite with its fellow African states and make pronouncements upon major issues in international politics. Often the issues were beyond the level of Kenyan foreign policy in that the country did not have the capability to effect them. But this active strategy helped to satisfy the elite group that it was attempting something of note in foreign policy. The effect of such radicalised policies should not be over-stressed, but by the same token, continued vocal support for the blacks in southern Africa, for example, did have some role to play in modifying the West's stand on the issue. It is normally assumed, also, that violent speeches at the U.N. or elsewhere on a foreign policy issue helped to detract attention away from domestic problems.¹⁸ This may well be the case elsewhere, but there is little evidence to support this in the Kenyan case, partly because of the President's low profile and also by the comparative absence of serious domestic troubles. Perhaps the Kenyan handling of the Ugandan territorial border dispute in 1976 gives us the only example of the government taking a very strong initiative in foreign affairs at a time of acute domestic problems in the political arena at home.

Kenya's resort to propaganda was not to the same extent as could

 Henry A. Kissinger, 'Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy' in James N. Rosenau (ed.), <u>International Politics and Foreign Policy</u> (New York, Free Press, 1969), pp. 261-275. be said for, say, Egypt¹⁹ and Tanzania.²⁰ The government believed that actions were more important than words, that the best possible form of propaganda was the successful political and economic record of the country. Within East Africa, Kenya was known to scorn other states' attempts at socialism and attempted to win over these countries to its own form of development. Likewise in the wider international arena, the aim was to impress the developed world by Kenya's efficiency and level-headedness and put distance between itself and the less developed the more backward - African states. This form of propaganda had its successes in attracting major international conferences to Kenya and gave foreign investors more confidence to invest in the country.

Finally, there is the military form of implementation. Only the dispute to the north of Kenya (although marginally in the west also) called for a military form of foreign policy, though the government remained open to genuine diplomatic overtures. The small size of the Armed Forces gave them little weight in the domestic or foreign policy arenas, but the escalation of the Somali dispute in 1976-77, combined with the problems with Uganda, led to a large-scale development of the Armed Forces' strength. By 1978 this had not in any way affected their relative strength in the political system owing to its basic stability, but it is impossible to say whether or not this will remain the case.

The Kenyatta Era

As a final consideration in this thesis, it is worthwhile dis-

19. Dawisha, op.cit.

20. This is evident in the copious writings of Julius Nyerere. See, for example, Julius K. Nyerere, <u>Freedom and Socialism</u> (Dar es Salaam, O.U.P., 1968); Julius K. Nyerere, <u>Freedom and Development</u> (Dar es Salaam, O.U.P., 1973).

cussing the merits of labelling Kenyatta's period in office from 1963 to 1978 as an 'era'. By definition, an era must have a distinctive character marked by a fairly precise time-scale, and so this discussion must hinge upon three basic questions. Firstly, did Jomo Kenyatta play a distinctive role in the making and execution of Kenyan foreign policy? Secondly, would the country's policies have been markedly different if another politician had been President during that period? And thirdly, was there, or will there be in the near future, a radical shift in the composition and outlook of foreign policy consequent upon the death of Kenyatta? All of these questions are interrelated in themselves and also touch upon other related issues. They all, for example, lay emphasis upon the internal environment as an important variable in decision-making rather than on purely external forces. But accepting the fluid nature of these questions, some progress can be made.

A close examination of the role of the President in foreign policy decision-making was made in Chapter Two. It was shown that whereas most African Heads of State revel in the public limelight and play a leading role in political life, Kenyatta preferred a more retiring role. This fact presented difficulties in understanding the President's position in Kenya, but sufficient evidence was available to show beyond doubt that the President played the dominant role in the making of foreign policy. At times, through speeches, he also helped to defend policy, but as he grew older he preferred to let this burden fall on younger shoulders.

Perhaps Kenyatta's greatest feat was in providing for the peaceful transition from colony to independent state. The memory of 'Mau Mau' combined with the tensions among the white settlers in the early 1960s forced Kenyatta to go out of his way to placate the Europeans and impress upon them his desire, and the country's need, for them to remain in Kenya. That Jomo Kenyatta, the alleged leader of 'Mau Mau' and the anti-hero of the Europeans achieved this goal was remarkable, but it was even more so when it is put alongside his handling of the explosive land issue, and the hordes of landless Africans who sought free land at the time of independence. The fears of a revolutionary, anarchical Kenya in 1963 had dissipated by 1965, when Kenyan political and economic stability, within the western orbit, was assured.

Kenyatta was clearly the key figure in the orientation of Kenyan domestic and foreign policies in these early years, when he gathered sufficient like-minded figures around him to continue with these policies into the 1970s. Certainly Kenyatta was helped by historical forces in that he was tailor-made for his role in 1963 as a former freedom fighter par excellence and that there was room to stamp his mark onto the developing, yet still embryonic, Kenyan nation. Whether another leader could have followed a different foreign policy and maintained widespread support calls for a speculative answer, but an examination of the other political leaders at the time of independence would draw a negative conclusion. Two other candidates only spring to mind, and both of them not from the dominant Kikuyu tribe but from the Luo people. This fact alone would have severely undermined their chances, but neither actor had the credentials of Kenyatta. Tom Mboya was a gifted politician and was a staunch supporter of Kenyatta's pro-western policies, but he would have upset the Kikuyu as well as the country's radicals and would not have been able to hold the country together. Oginga Odinga opposed Kenyatta's development policies, but loyalty to the President never forced him to the extremes of dissent. However, his inability to rouse the country during the late 1960s -

admittedly with the national apparatus against him - showed also that he did not have total national backing.

Jomo Kenyatta, then, was the person who could command the most support in the country, and so he built on this popularity his power and influence to shape and control Kenyan politics. It was more than anything else his own personality which helped to mould the deliberately quiet nature of foreign policy and its concentration on economic development, and yet at the same time maintain its concern for Pan-African unity and close co-operation with the Third World. Following the death of Kenyatta in August 1978, the new President, Daniel arap Moi, showed little interest in changing the fundamental characteristics of the country's foreign policy. President Moi visited Britain, thus expressing his desire to maintain the close association with that country. He also called for closer links with the European Econcaic Community and with Japan, and upon a visit to Addis Ababa, assured the Ethiopian Government of the Kenyans' resistance to Somali expansionism.

The new government of President Moi, therefore, showed little desire to break with the pattern of foreign policy laid out by Kenyatta. Several conclusions can be drawn from this. Firstly, the country's foreign policy was established in such a dominant manner by Kenyatta that nobody wants change or, at least until the death of Kenyatta has long passed into memory, nobody wishes to alter or tamper with the prevailing pattern of policy determined by <u>Mzee</u>, the founder of the nation. This gives credence to the view that this was Kenyatta's era, and that it has and will extend into the future through the continuation of his policies.

Secondly, it appears that the new President and his advisers are

<u>content</u> to follow a similar foreign policy to the one of Kenyatta. This is hardly surprising because there are no new faces in President Moi's government and all are men committed to the same values and principles as the former President. This is not to say that Moi is just the reincarnation of Kenyatta, because he has taken policy initiatives of his own since August 1978. But the new leadership feels satisfied with the success of the domestic and foreign policies during the 1960s and 1970s, and will continue to follow that tradition.

Thirdly, and finally, the internal and external environments within which the new government is now working remain the same as during Kenyatta's period in office. The need to maintain the economic links with the West to preserve development - as perceived by the government - remains as does the neo-colonial nature of the state. Kenya's geo-political strategy is fixed by the need to expand further its markets in eastern Africa as well as hold off secessionary threats from the north.

It is in the domestic arena that the greatest changes are likely, and these will in turn affect the country's foreign policy. The growing inequalities in wealth within Kenya will increase unless some radical action is taken immediately. As this action seems unlikely to happen, it is probable that domestic unrest will increase and that the events of the mid 1970s, with political assassination and detentions without trial, will re-emerge. The outcome of these clashes will be vital to foreign policy, because if this populist movement gains the upper hand then the whole pattern of Kenya's economic and political policies, as well as foreign policy, may change. That is for the future to decide.

APPENDICES

Appendix One

The Kenya Government's definitive view of the country's foreign policy as contained in Kenya. An Official Handbook (Nairobi, Kenya Government/East African Pub., 1973), pp. 41-44.

Foreign Policy

Kenya became an independent state only nine years ago, and its foreign policy is, therefore, still formative. At first, Kenya needed time to develop a solid team of diplomatic personnel capable of identifying the major issues of national interest and able to determine the extent to which these interests can be promoted in terms of economic development and world peace. Since independence, Kenya's relations with the external world have been handled with a great deal of caution. very much uncharacteristic of many African governments whose external activities tend to be openly aggressive on issues concerning decolonisation, liberation, non-alignment and other question connected with the yearning for complete independence. Kenya's policy, in effect, is one of quiet diplomacy.

At the approach of independence, many radical foreign scholars tended to agree that Kenya, having experienced an extreme colonising process that led to the outbreak of the Mau Mau in the early 1950s, would adopt an aggressively leftist-orientated stance in world affairs. This interpretation dominated the period shortly before, and immediately after, independence in December, 1963. By the end of 1964, it became evident that this interpretation had no foundation and that Kenya's relations with the outside world are governed by a strategy best conducive to peace and good neighbours.

Basic principles

From the outset, non-alignment has been the basic principle of Kenya's foreign policy. Simply defined, it is non-commitment to any of the world's dominant ideological blocs, in particular, the West, clustering around the United States of America, and the East, so far championed by the Soviet Union, Kenya is fully aware that non-aligned states are characterised by varying degrees of underdevelopment. On the other hand, non-alignment does not mean non-commitment on all issues. What Kenya claims through non-alignment is a right to preserve its hard-won independence, and its ability to judge world issues on their merit without undue external influence. This stand is, of course, a reaction against cold-war alignments where, to members of one camp, anything done by any member of the other camp calls for condemnation or distrust.

To Kenya, non-alignment means friendship to all nations of the world. This can be realized only on condition that such nations want our friendship and that friendship does not give the big powers a licence to choose enemies or friends for Kenya. The President of Kenya, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, has given particular emphasis to this principle. In other words, while Kenya may have economic, cultural and other ties with one or the other of the aligned major powers, she constantly guards against involving herself in agreements, military alliances or pacts that may limit her freedom of action or choice when called upon to take a stand on international issues in which the major powers are involved.

Thus through non-alignment, Kenya rejects military bases belonging to committed nations on her soil, and argues persuasively that mutual defense pacts between the aligned powers and the non-aligned states

would force the latter, and Kenya in particular, into conditions requiring a show of military strength. As a peace-loving nation, Kenya's armed forces are not meant for offensive ventures but for defensive purposes and the development needs of her people.

In its abhorrence of ideological conflicts and undue commitment to the big powers, Kenya also exhibits her ardent desire for, and commitment to, the pursuit of peace in the world, for in peace lies security and a guarantee of national independence and sovereignty. The devotion to world peace by Kenya as a young nation was described by Dr. Njoroge Mungai, Kenya's Minister for Foreign Affairs:

This positive attitude is based on fundamental considerations. Cold-war manoeuvres, overt or covert, accompanied by power blocs for convenience, military alliances for the promotion of ideologies and national self-interests, are repugnant to Kenya's stability and understanding. The government (of Kenya) shall not be party to any movement which tends to undermine or to render meaningless the concept of world peace. Nor shall the Kenya Government tolerate subversion on Kenya's Suil which even in the remotest sense, prejudices its declared policy of non-alignment and its national interest.

Thus, at one level, the concept of non-alignment is one way by which Kenya can reassert the principles of self-determination. It is upon this right that Kenya has consistently stated that no nation should have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another, a principle upheld by the Charter of the United Nations Organization and that of the Organisation for African Unity. Thus, foreign policy and its management are basic to Kenya's defense and economic development, for before Kenya's economy develops to maturity, her foreign policy must remain flexible and forward looking. This, however, does not imply that Kenya cannot take positive and firm stands on world issues she considers critical to man's survival in a nuclear age. For it is evident that Kenya has taken definite stands on question of selfdetermination for all peoples still living under colonial rule, and has

accordingly stood for certain universal human conditions like human equality, and hence, its support for the United Nations irrespective of its limited power, and for other international organisations founded upon similar principles.

The Southern African question

As a country which won independence through a bitter struggle. Kenya supports the yearning of Africans, the majority, in South Africa and Rhodesia for self-determination. The "Southern African Question" is important to Kenya's national interest in that since the closure of the Suez Canal, Kenya gets the bulk of her supplies round the Cape of Good Hope. It is the country's main link with the Western world. Dependence on the southern sea route does not mean support for the racist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. This is why Kenya opposed Britain's proposal to sell arms to South Africa in 1970. Kenya took a firm stand on this issue, for if anybody's security is threatened by South Africa's possession of destructive weapons, it will be the countries of East and Central Africa. This stand not only applies to British sales of arms to South Africa, but to any other country in the world that supplies or intends to supply arms to South Africa or Rhodesia. For it is these armaments which continue to give confidence to racist minority regimes to suppress the majority. Through her membership in the United National Organization, the Commonwealth and the Organization for African Unity, Kenya appeals to all countries and member states of these organisations to live up to the principles upon which these organisations are founded.

Good-neighbour policy

Kenya has through the good ofices of the Organisation for African Unity (O.A.U.), played a key role in creating a good-neighbour policy in Eastern and Central Africa. Through the O.A.U., African states get to understand their basic commitment to development through friendship and co-operation rather than the use of war and violence as mechanisms for settling disputes. Kenya hopes that this development, among others, will enable African countries to join together in the struggle for the total liberation of the entire African continent, and Angola, Mozambique, South-West Africa and Rhodesia in particular.

Critical to the good-neighbour policy is the promotion of regional economic groupings such as the East African Community.

In a speech made by Mzee Jomo Kenyatta in July, 1964, at the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the O.A.U. in Cairo, he emphasized the significance of regional co-operation in promoting African unity. Kenya's support for regional economic co-operation is best demonstrated in its unreserved support for the East African Community to enable it to strengthen regional trade and other shared facilities. This is a difficult task which demands maximum restraint by member states. This is significant in the sense that the East African Community through its Authority, has had to develop a better understanding towards conflict resolution as a means of strengthening the community. Kenya has taken a major lead in this development, one that goes hand in hand with the Kenya government's policy of peaceful resolution of international and domestic disputes.

Appendix Two

Tom Mboya writing on the development of a foreign policy in his book The Challenge of Nationhood (London, Heinemann, 1970), pp. 236-239.

Economically speaking, colonial Africa was merely an appendage of Europe. This is no time to get involved in consideration of whether imperialism brought economic advantages to the colonies. What I am saying is that a fundamental motive of colonialism was that an empire provided a source of cheap natural resources for the metropolitan power and an outlet for its manufactured goods.

In nearly every case, the achievement of political independence has not seen a correspondingly radical change in economic relationships. Many countries of Africa still belong to the franc zone, the sterling area or the dollar area. A glance at the trade figures for any African country will show how little the relationships with the former occupying power have changed in the economic field.

Yet it is difficult to disentangle economic ties and political strings. If we are dependent upon one country or group of countries as far as markets for our main crops are concerned; our diplomats, and hence our foreign policy, will be subjected to all sorts of pressures, both subtle and not so subtle. Similarly if those same countries supply us with a large proportion of our imports, the opportunities for pressure to be brought upon us in political matters will be so obvious.

If we trade with both the East and the West we shall be able to create for ourselves an economy which is not based entirely on the circumstances of one specific bloc. In the period of economic reconstruction we can avoid the situation of colonial days when we had to conform to one set of economic theories. We can build a structure of our own design, based on the principles of socialism, drawing what we consider appropriate both from the East and from the West.

Apart from the new economic structures needed, we need also to look at our political institutions. As we begin to develop these we are accused of moving too closely to the East. This is because the colonial period has left us with a structure of Western institutions and ideologies. As we abandon these for a way of our own choosing, those who see events only in their own blinkered Cold War terms will make allegations against us.

As the representatives of neutral nations, we must express our determination to devise such systems as we think fit without having them interpreted in terms of leaning Eastward or Westward.

Many African states are finding that the most appropriate form of political structure for their people at this time is a one-party state. It so happens that such a structure is also found in the communist state. It would be most short-sighted of the communist states if they rejoiced in this as a move by African states into their orbit and equally unobservant of western countries to see it as a move against them. It cannot be stressed too often that we are for Africa. These people must be made to realise that we want recognition that we are seeking our own way.

One way in which Africa can demonstrate its independence most clearly is by refusing to have a foreign military base of the major powers and their allies on its soil.

We in Kenya have taken steps to have the British base removed and it is already being dismantled. The speed with which this is being done and the alacrity with which British troops were withdrawn from Tanganyika after their brief assistance, indicates that the major powers have come to appreciate our feelings on this matter.

The question of military bases leads on to the general problem of nuclear disarmament. I think the Afro-Asian nations have made it quite clear that this is something which concerns them as much as it affects those powers which possess atomic weapons. If the horrors of a nuclear war were to occur we would all suffer. It might well mean the end of human life and our new nations would be denied the chance to show what they are capable of achieving. In fact our people would hardly have had the chance to start living as men. This explains the extent of our investment in world peace.

yet so often when the major military powers discuss disarmament they are only interested in gaining tactical advantages and in scoring debating points over their opponents. They are so committed to the idea that world peace can only be maintained through nuclear deterrents that they have little room to look at disarmament from a dispassionate and non-involved point of view. The non-aligned states of Africa, Asia and elsewhere can desire for the lessening of world tension.

In their meeting, held at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1961, representatives from twenty-three non-aligned countries declared that it was essential they should 'participate in solving outstanding international issues concerning peace and security in the world, as none of them can remain unaffected by, or indifferent to, these issues.'

An incidental benefit of disarmament would be that the skills, resources and manpower now wanted in preparing for destruction could be put to some positive use. Part of the efforts and resources could be diverted to succouring the sick and starving peoples of the underdeveloped countries.

It has been estimated by some people that one tenth of the expenditure involved in armaments would be enough to raise the whole of the less-developed world to the level of a self-sustaining economy.

I have already spoken of our intention of keeping foreign armies out of Africa. This is closely linked with the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone throughout the continent. That is to say that Africa should not be used as a testing ground, as a store or as a base from which atomic attacks can be launched. In present terms we can achieve this by keeping our foreign bases. But with the development of nuclear weapons there is a terrible possibility that their ownership will spread. The more countries there are having atomic weapons, the more chance is there that they will be used and that a local conflict may spread into a world-wide nuclear war. The intention to declare Africa a nuclear-free zone is therefore a self-denying ordinance. It is something which the statesmen and diplomats of Africa will be concerned with in the immediate future. This question has been discussed by the 0.A.U. and a resolution adopted accordingly.

But I am sure that Africa will need the use of nuclear power or energy for peaceful development. Our vast deserts and forests and some of our soil research and development could receive a real boost if we were able to share effectively in the peaceful use of atomic energy. Africa more than any other continent, needs to train scientists who can

cope with our urgent development problems. I must therefore state very clearly that while we denounce and seek the control of nuclear weapons, we are anxious and must in fact insist on being able to benefit by this most precious of man's scientific achievements.

There is one fundamental aspect of foreign policy which I have not yet discussed, yet which is implicit in nearly all that I have said. This is the question of Pan-African unity. Those who belittle our achievements and mock our hopes should ponder how much constructive work has been done. Can any other continent claim to have realised such unity of purpose and of action?

I can tell you that in this, as in all other diplomatic activities, there will be difficulties. Consider how limited we are in resources, in facilities, in individual men and women of experience and in the traditions of diplomatic activity.

Most African countries can only afford to establish representation in half a dozen or a dozen states. The total staff of our Ministry of External Affairs, in Kenya and overseas, is smaller than that of just one embassy of some of the big powers. Our poverty means that we cannot afford the technical facilities - the libraries, the telecommunications systems and so forth - to the extent that we would like to have them.

Appendix Three

Opposition to the government's foreign policy came from Oginga Odinga in his book <u>Not Yet Uhuru</u> (London, Heinemann, 1968), pp. 285-286.

I believe in making the democratic process work in the party, in government, among the people. We fought for uhuru so that the people may rule themselves. Direct action, not underhand diplomacy and silent intrigue by professional politicians won uhuru, and only popular support and popular mobilization can make it meaningful. This is one of my convictions repeated with, to some, monotonous regularity over the years. My second conviction is that at this time in history if Africa is to be really free, if we are to attain true economic independence - and let us remember that this stage is crucial for if we fail to attain true economic independence we will rob our political freedom of its lasting guarantee - we must follow a policy of nonalignment, of relations with both 'east' and 'west', with both capitalist and socialist countries. If our aid and investment come from one source only we can banish the prospect of pursuing an independent policy, for we will be brought under control by the withholding of aid, or by some other economic pressure. As an African nationalist I cannot tolerate an African regime dominated by either the 'west' or the 'east'. If non-alignment is used to justify relations with one of these worlds alone, it is not non-alignment. Kenya is still today largely part of the western sphere of interest and investment. To reach the non-aligned position we must break this predominantly western influence, and develop relations with the east. It was with the deliberate intent of making Kenya less dependent on the colonial powers that I have worked for relations with the socialist countries, and this. not the development of relations with the west alone, is the true policy

of non-alignment for Kenya. The fiercer the attacks on the socialist countries - and on me for visiting them - the more convinced I became that we in the colonial countries struggling for full freedom can find much in common with socialist policies and economic planning, and that if the colonial powers that have tried for so long to keep us inferior are so alarmed at our efforts to seek friendly relations with the socialist world, this must be the true path of non-alignment. Nonalignment, let us remember, means that we shall tie ourselves to no power bloc; and that while we shall not necessarily opt for neutrality on every issue, ours will be the freedom to decide.

The danger in Kenya has never been communism but imperialism and its remnants. I told the Pafmesca conference at Addis Ababa that the snake in the bush is less dangerous than the snake in our house, which is imperialism. Why seek a non-existent enemy when we already have a fight on our hands against the remnants of imperialism? If communism were to prove a problem in the future we would deal with it, I told the conference. Nothing had happened in Kenya between the 1963 Addis Ababa Pafmesca Conference and the end of 1964 and Jamhuri to make me change my mind that no communist forces were actively plotting against Kenya. I am convinced that the external vested interests at play in Kenya are not Communist forces, but the result of the involvement of an increasing number of politicians in British, American and West German commerce and big business.

Central Government Functions and Organisation as detailed in the <u>President's Circular No. 1 of 1967</u>, 5 January 1967 and reprinted in Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson and John Okumu (eds.), <u>Development</u> Administration. The Kenyan Experience (Nairobi, O.U.P., 1970), pp. 346-347.

Office of the President

Functions

State House and lodges

Cabinet Office

Administration, including provincial adminstration

Ministers' and Assistant Ministers' appointments and leaves of absence

Appointment of ambassadors

Organization of government

Kenya Flag and Coat of Arms

Kenya Seal

East African Community

National Assembly

Civil Service - establishments, africanization and training

Public holidays

Reception of visitors

National fund

Ministers' and Assistant Ministers' terms of service and housing

Honours and awards

Foreign policy

International organizations

Pan-African affairs

Kenya embassies abroad

International treaties, conventions and agreements

Diplomatic privileges and immunities

Protocol and credentials

Consular matters

Note: From 1970, the last eight functions above were combined to form a separate Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Vice-President's Office and The Ministry of Home Affairs

Functions

Police

Internal security

Prisons

Immigration, passports and visas

Alien refugees

Approved schools

Criminal lunatics

Firearms

Government chemist

Lotteries and betting

Probation services

Registration of persons

Remand homes

Repatriation

Restriction

Citizenship

Ministry of Finance

Functions

Supervision, control and direction of all matters related to financial affairs of the country, including:

Government expenditure, revenue and borrowing

Taxation

Exchange control

Balance of payments

Banks and banking

Custodian of government property

General economic policy in consultation with Ministers concerned in

economic matters

Civil service - terms of service

Ministry of Economic Planning and Development

Functions

Development planning

Co-ordination of economic matters

Population census

Statistics

Technical assistance

Ministry of Defence

Functions

Defence

Kenya Armed Forces

Kenya Air Force

Kenya Navy

Appendix Five

Resolutions and Statements concerning the border dispute with the Somali Republic.

Source: Organization of African Unity. Council of Ministers. Resolutions of Ordinary and Extra-Ordinary Sessions. (Addis Ababa, General Secretariat of the O.A.U., 1967).

The Council of Ministers meeting in Lagos, Nigeria, from 24 to 29 February 1964, for its Second Ordinary Session.

HAVING heard the statements of the representatives of Kenya and of Somalia on the border incidents which have occurred between Kenya and Somalia.

RECALLING resolution ECM/Res.4 (II) of 15 February 1964 and particularly operative paragraphs 1 and 2,

DEEPLY concerned that the continuation of such regrettable incidents may aggravate tension between them and lead to hostilities the repercussions of which may seriously prejudice African Unity and peace in this Continent,

RECALLING paragraph 4 of Article III of the Charter,

1. <u>REAFFIRMS</u> paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution ECM/Res. (II) adopted by the Council of Ministers at its Second Extraordinary Session held in Dar-es-Salaam from 12 to 15 February 1964;

2. INVITES the Governments of Kenya and Somalia to open as soon as

possible direct negotiations with due respect to paragraph 3 of Article III of the Charter with a view to finding a peaceful and lasting solution to differences between them:

3. <u>INVITES</u> them further to refrain from all acts which may aggravate the situation or jeopardise the change of peaceful and fraternal settlement and to report on the results of these negotiations to the next Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity.

Full text of statement given by Mr. Joseph Murumbi, Minister for External Affairs, at Arusha, Tanzania, on the 14 December 1965. As reported in <u>East African Standard</u>, 15 December 1965.

Discussions between Heads of State and the Governments of Kenya and Somalia took place in Arusha last night. The President of Tanzania, Dr. Nyerere, who convened the meeting at the request of the Somali Government, presided.

The Kenya delegation was led by President Kenyatta and included the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Murumbi, the Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Moi, the Minister of Education, Mr. Koinange, the Attorney-General, Mr. Njonjo, and the Secretary of the Cabinet, Mr. Ndegwa.

The Somali delegation comprised President Osman, the Prime Minister, Mr. Hussein, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dualeh, and the Minister of State for Somali Affairs, Sheik Farah.

The purpose of the meeting was to make a move toward the normalisation of relations between Kenya and Somalia in accordance with the 1964 O.A.U. resolution passed in Lagos, Nigeria, calling upon the two countries to meet and settle their differences by peaceful means. The first meeting was arranged in Cairo, but proved abortive because of Government changes in Somalia.

Nevertheless, it was in the spirit of the Lagos resolution that Kenya responded to the invitation by President Nyerere to hold further talks, and being inspired by the need for brotherly relations between the African states in the spirit of the Charter of the O.A.U., Kenya put forward the following points as a basis for discussion and as a prerequisite for the normalisation of relations between the two countries:-

1. Firstly, the Government of Somalia should condemn the shifta in the north of Kenya and, secondly, cease to aid in any way nor supply arms to the shifta.

 The Government of Somalia should cease all hostile propaganda directed towards inciting the shifta against the Government of Kenya.
 The Government of Somalia should instruct their administrative, army and police units to co-operate with their opposite numbers across the border in order to jointly suppress shifta operations.

4. After a period set by mutual agreement for the implementation of the above, and if there was evidence of no shifta incidence on the Kenya side, the Government of Kenya will consider the establishment of diplomatic relations between the countries.

5. Meanwhile, both Governments will immediately use all forms of publicity, radio and otherwise, to make it known that they are against violence and are determined to use all possible measures to suppress the shifts operations in the North-Eastern Province.

After prolonged discussions it became clear to the Kenya dele-

gation that the intention of the Somali Government was to revive old arguments for territorial expansion by incorporating certain areas in Kenya into Somalia.

This is in clear conflict with the O.A.U. resolution calling upon member States to respect and accept State boundaries as at the time of independence.

In these circumstances the Kenya Government could not see how the discussions could proceed, and made it clear that Kenya will not allow any part of its territories to be dismembered, and will defend her territorial integrity by every means.

The President of Kenya wishes to take this opportunity to pay tribute to both President Nyerere and Vice-President Kawawa for their assistance in conducting the two meetings with the Somali delegations.

Aims of the Kenya Government, as set out in the 'Narrative of Events' document in May 1967. Also reprinted in East African Standard, 3 May 1967.

Bearing in mind the advised reservation, by the Government of the Republic of Kenya, of the inherent right of self-defence in confronting a situation fully described, it should be re-emphasised that the Kenya Government maintains its readiness under proper and fruitful conditions to participate in negotiation leading to conclusion of a peaceful settlement.

In view of the Government of the Kenya Republic, the following would be prerequisites to the opening of such negotiations; 1. The Government of the Somali Republic should renounce all territorial aspirations in respect of the six stipulated administrative Districts of Kenya, declaring concurrently its readiness to recognise -

a) that the "Northern Frontier District" of Kenya is an integral and <u>de jure</u> part of the Kenya Republic;

b) that this recognition implies the lauching of an era of peaceful and constructive co-existence between Kenya and Somalia.
2. The Government of the Somali Republic should overtly disband the widely publicised 'High Command of the Northern Frontier District Liberation Movement' in Mogadishu.

3. The Government of the Somali Republic should take immediate measures -

a) to halt the supply of arms and ammunition, plastic land mines and demolition material to shifta gangs;

b) to recall from Kenya as much of this equipment and material including land mines - as may be practicable, by available means;

c) to ensure henceforth that no arms, ammunition or explosive supplies be permitted to move into Kenya from Somalia.

4. The Government of the Somali Republic should close down the shifta training centres at Bula Hawa, Bur Hache, Belese Cogani and Lugh, converting these camps and bases to such internal purposes as the Somalia Government may see fit.

5. The Government of the Somali Republic should recognise the right of those Somalis who are citizens of Kenya - whether residing in the six stipulated Districts or elsewhere - to live in peace under the laws of Kenya and in accordance with the leadership and guidance of their political and religious leaders and chiefs.

6. The Government of the Somali Republic should affirm that Somalia and Kenya - both as free and sovereign States - must henceforth conform with the equal scruple to resolutions of the Organisation for African Unity (sic.) applying to -

a) recognition that the boundaries of States at the time of independence be accepted and held inviolable by all O.A.U. members;

b) the primary need to deal with all disputes through measures of conciliation and negotiation;

c) the impropriety of such activities as subversion and hostile propaganda calculated to disrupt relationships between free and equal member States.

7. The Government of the Somali Republic, as precursor to permanent cessation of all hostile propaganda between Mogadishu and Nairobi, should express readiness to join with the Kenya Government in broadcasting some jointly agreed policy declaration condemning violence in the N.F.D. and looking forward (within a context of peaceful coexistence) to an era of constructive economic and social development.

Given action and/or agreement on these seven points, then:-8. The Kenya Government would at once be prepared to discuss with the Government of the Somali Republic the re-opening of diplomatic relations between the two States, to facilitate the completion of all immediate negotiations together with ensuing examination of all constructive elements of an era of peaceful co-existence.

9. The Kenya Government would at once be prepared to consider the removal of the existing ban on trade transactions between the two States, and revocation of the ban on air movements between Kenya and Somalia.

10. The Kenya Government would be prepared to join with the Somalia Government in drafting a mutually agreed report to the Organisation for African Unity (sic.), declaring that a dispute which had existed between the two member States had been settled by peaceful means. 11. The Kenya Government would be prepared to nominate representatives for discussions with appointed representatives of the Somalia Government - at any mutually agreed level - on means of co-operation between the two States in matters of economic and social development on both sides of the border.

These matters might include communications networks, water supplies, range management and veterinary control, local administration and social welfare, including education and health services, frontier formalities, crime prevention and other items of practical mutual interest.

Source: Daily Nation, 18 September 1967.

The Assembly of Heads of States and Governments meeting in its fourth ordinary session in Kinshasa, Congo, from 11 to 14 September 1967:

Desirous of consolidating the fraternal links that unite us, recalling further the attempts that have been made by the Governments of Kenya and Somalia at Arusha in December 1965, through the good offices of His Excellency Julius K. Nyerere of the Republic of Tanzania;

Mindful of the new and welcome initiative taken by His Excellency President Kenneth D. Kaunda of the Republic of Zambia in Kinshasa during the fourth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments;

Notes with pleasure the joint declaration mutually and amicably

reached between the Governments of Kenya and Somalia, as represented by the Vice-President Daniel arap Moi and the Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, respectively, through the good offices of the President of Zambia, which reads as follows:

1. Both Governments have expressed their desire to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the spirit of paragraph 3 of Article III of the O.A.U. Charter;

2. The two Governments have further undertaken to resolve any outstanding differences between them in the spirit of paragraph 4 of Article III of the O.A.U. Charter;

3. The two Governments have pledged to ensure maintenance of peace and security on both sides of the border by preventing destruction of human life and property;

4. Furthermore, the two Governments have agreed to refrain from conducting hostile propaganda through mass media such as radio and the Press against each other;

5. The two Governments have accepted the kind invitation of President Kaunda of Zambia to meet in Lusaka, during the later part of October 1967 in order to improve, intensify and consolidate all forms of cooperation.

Resolves to express its sincere gratitude and congratulations to President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia as well as the Governments of Kenya and Somalia for their positive efforts to overcome differences in a fraternal manner;

Requests the Governments of Kenya and Somalia, as parties to the declaration, and the Government of the Republic of Zambia, as host and convenor, to submit a progress report on the proposed meeting in Lusaka to the Secretary-General of the O.A.U. Source: East African Standard, 30 October 1967.

Meeting in the Arusha Town Hall, the Kenya President and the Somalia Premier expressed their desire to consolidate the Kinshasa declaration on Kenya-Somali relations and recognized the need to restore normal and peaceful relations between Kenya and Somalia.

They have towards this end reached agreement on the following points:

1. Both Governments will exert all efforts and do the utmost to maintain good neighbourly relations between Kenya and Somalia in accordance with the O.A.U. Charter.

2. The two Governments agree that the interests of the people of Kenya and Somalia were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries.

3. They, therefore, reaffirm their adherence to the declaration of the O.A.U. conference at Kinshasa, a copy of which is attached to this memorandum of understanding.

4. In order to facilitate a speedy solution to the development and to ensure maintenance of continued good relations, both Governments have agreed to:

A. The maintenance of peace and security on both sides of the border by preventing the destruction of human life and property;
B. Refrain from conducting hostile propaganda through mass media such as radio and Press against each other and encourage propaganda which promote the development and continuance of friendly relations between the two countries;

C. The gradual suspension of any emergency regulations imposed on either side of the border;

D. The reopening of diplomatic relations between the two countries;

E. A consideration of measures encouraging the development of economic and trade relations;

F. The appointment of a working committee consisting of Somalia, Kenya and Zambia, which will meet periodically to review the implementation by Somalia and Kenya of points agreed in this document and also to examine ways and means of bringing about a satisfactory solution to major and minor differences between Somalia and Kenya.

They (Somalia and Kenya) invite the President of Zambia to witness this memorandum of understanding.

Appendix Six

Full text on the Kenya Government's decision not to break diplomatic relations with Britain in 1965 following the failure to act against Rhodesia following its declaration of 'independence'. As reported in the Daily Nation, 11 December 1965.

Since the declaration of U.D.I. the Kenya Government has been in close contact with other African States to ensure concerted action against the rebel regime in Rhodesia. The Government has also brought pressure on the British Government to take decisive action to crush the rebellion and lead the country to majority rule.

The Kenya Government must make it clear that responsibility for the present conditions in Rhodesia lies with the British Government. The British must use force to restore constitutional government and create the necessary conditions for democratic majority rule. In our efforts to help our brothers in Rhodesia we have called for unity and positive action by all the nationalist forces in Rhodesia.

The Kenya Government has considered the resolutions passed by the assembly of Heads of State and Government at its meeting in Accra in October this year. The Government has severed all trade and economic relations with Rhodesia and has stopped all money transactions between Kenya banks and Rhodesia. We have in addition decided to refuse to recognise any travel documents issued or renewed by the illegal Government. We have further cut off all communication channels including telegraphic, telephone, tele-printer and radio-telephone and all air services with Rhodesia.

The Kenya Government has all along been concerned that actions

taken are co-ordinated with our East African neighbours and especially Zambia.

It will be remembered that a meeting of representatives of the four states took place in Nairobi recently. The Kenya Government remains fully committed to the decisions taken at that meeting and will continue to consult with the governments concerned on any new developments or changes in measures to be taken. We believe that Zambia's interests must be taken into consideration at all times since we must help her safeguard her sovereignty.

The recent meeting of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers proposed that all African countries sever diplomatic relations with Britain on December 15, if by that time Britain has not crushed the rebellion. The Kenya Government supports all O.A.U. resolutions and efforts and will remain a faithful member of the organisation.

It is, however, obvious that since this resolution was announced there have been conflicting reactions by various African States. This means that action taken would not be effective and could in fact be abortive. We are particularly concerned that the Zambian Government has expressed serious doubts about the wisdom of breaking diplomatic relations with Britain. We believe that any action taken must advance the cause that we are supporting in Rhodesia.

Division among African States could have serious repercussions, not the least of which would be the threat to the O.A.U. itself. In the circumstances, the Kenya Government has now decided to consult more fully with our East African neighbours including Zambia and the other African States to determine the best action to take. We feel that unilateral action by an African State would not meet the situation.

Appendix Seven

The Cabinet: January 1964

The Prime Minister: Jomo Kenyatta Home Affairs: Oginga Odinga Justice and Constitutional Affairs: Tom J. Mboya Finance and Economic Planning: James S. Gichuru Minister of State (Prime Minister's Office): Joseph Murumbi Education: J.D. Otiende Local Government: S.O. Ayodo Commerce and Industry: Dr. Julius G. Kiano Works, Communications and Power: D. Mwanyumba Labour and Social Services: Eliud N. Hwendwa Natural Resources: L.G. Sagini Health and Housing: Dr. Njoroge Mungai Information, Broadcasting and Tourism: R. Achieng-Oneko Minister of State for Pan-African Affairs: Mbiyu Koinange Agriculture and Animal Husbandry: Bruce R. McKenzie Lands and Settlement: Jackson H. Angaine

The Cabinet: January 1974

President and Commander-in-Chief: Mzee Jomo Kenyatta Vice-President and Minister of Home Affairs: Daniel T. Arap Moi Minister of State at the President's Office: Mbiyu Koinange Foreign Affairs: Dr. Njoroge Mungai Finance and Economic Planning: Mwai Kibaki Defence: James S. Gichuru Agriculture and Animal Husbandry: Jeremiah J.M. Nyagah Health: Dr. Zachary Onyonka Local Government: Dr. James C.N. Osogo Power and Communications: Isaac E. Omolo Okero Labour: Eliud N. Mwendwa Tourism and Wildlife: Juxon L.M. Shako Lands and Settlement: Jackson H. Angaine Housing: Paul J. Ngei Attorney-General: Charles Njonjo Minister of Information and Broadcasting: Robert S. Natano Natural Resources: William O. Onamo Co-operatives and Social Services: Masinde Muliro Commerce and Industry: Dr. Julius G. Kiano Education: Taita A. Towett

The Cabinet: January 1973

President and Commander in Chief: Mzee Jomo Kenyatta Vice-President and Minister of Home Affairs: Daniel T. arap Moi Minister of State at the President's Office: Mbiyu Koinange Foreign Affairs: Dr. Munyua Waiyaki Finance and Economic Planning: Mwai Kibaki Defence: James S. Gichuru Agriculture: Jeremiah J.M. Nyagah Health: James C.N. Osogo Local Government: Robert S. Matano Power and Communications: Isaac E. Omolo Okero Labour: James Nyamweya Tourism and Wildlife: M.J. Ogutu Lands and Settlement: Jackson H. Angaine Housing and Social Services: Dr. Zachariah T. Onyonka Information and Broadcasting: D.M. Mutinda Natural Resources: S.S. Oloitiptip Co-operative Development: Paul Ngei Commerce and Industry: Eliud T. Mwamunga Education: Taaitta Towett Water Development: Dr. Julius G. Kiano Attorney-General: Charles Njonjo

The Cabinet: October 1978

President and Commander in Chief: Daniel T. arap Moi Vice-President and Minister for Finance: Mr. Mwai Kibaki Defence: Mr. James Gichuru Natural Resources: Mr. Mbiyu Koinange Agriculture: Mr. J. Nyagah Health: Mr. James Osogo Lands and Settlement: Mr. Jackson Angaine Labour: Mr. James Nyamweya Attorney-General: Mr. Charles Njonjo Water Development: Dr. Julius Gikonyo Kiano Power and Communications: \ Mr. Issac Omolo Okero Local Government: Mr. Robert Matano Housing and Social Services: Dr. Zacharia Onyonka Education: Mr. Taita Towett Foreign Affairs: Dr. Munyua Waiyaki Information and Broadcasting: Mr. Daniel Mutinda Commerce and Industry: Mr. Eliud Mwamunga Tourism and Wildlife: Mr. Matthew Ogutu Home Affairs: Mr. Stanley Oloitiptip Co-operative Development: Mr. Paul Ngei Works: Mr. Nathan Munoko

Economic Planning and Community Affairs: Dr. Robert Ouko Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Civil Service: Mr. G.K. Kariithi

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Appendix Eight

Some physical and financial statistics:

Total Area of Kenya: 582,646 sq. km.			
Population	1 at 1969 cer	nsus: African	10,733,202
		Asian	139,037
		European	40,593
	an a	Arab	27,886
		Other	209,503
· ·			10,942,705

Estimated Population in 1977: 14,337,000

Exchange Rates: Before 1967, £1 was equal to K£1 (one Kenyan pound) or 20 Kenyan shillings.

In 1967, fl was equal to 17.10 shillings.

In December 1973 the rate was: £1 = 16.003 shillings \$ = 6.900 shillings

In December 1977 the rate was:

£l = 15.207 shillings \$ = 7.947 shillings 253

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