The London School of Economics and Political Science

Individual advantage, economic context, and stigmatising stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients

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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 57,261 words, including tables and footnotes, but not including appendices and bibliography.

Abstract

In this thesis I investigate how an individual's economic position and the context they live in affects their sympathy for the poor. Poverty and welfare receipt are stigmatised across high income countries; such attitudes reduce support for redistribution and exacerbate the negative impact of poverty on wellbeing. Across three empirical chapters, I use attitudinal data from the UK and Europe to investigate the relationship between individual advantage, broader economic context, and the prevalence of stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients and the poor. I apply an innovative perspective combining qualitative research on the experiences of people in poverty and comparative political economy work on inequality and redistribution to address neglected topics in the study of deservingness perceptions.

In the first empirical chapter I argue that those in more disadvantaged economic positions have more sympathetic attitudes towards welfare recipients. However, this relationship is counteracted by the role of social status and authoritarian attitudes, which can make the disadvantaged hold less sympathetic views. The second chapter uses survey data from twenty-seven European countries to show that individuals in more unequal nations are more likely to believe that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty. I argue that a plausible explanation of this relationship is status anxiety among disadvantaged individuals. In the third chapter I conduct the first longitudinal analysis of the association between area level unemployment and attitudes towards the unemployed, finding little evidence of a meaningful effect of exposure on stigmatising stereotypes. Overall, this thesis argues that status anxiety plays a major role in shaping stigmatising stereotypes, explaining why people are less sympathetic towards the poor in high inequality contexts, and why disadvantaged individuals often hold especially negative attitudes.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

> *'When a quarter of a million miners are unemployed, it is part of the order of things that Alf Smith, a miner living in the back streets of Newcastle, should be out of work. Alf Smith is merely one of the quarter million, a statistical unit. But no human being finds it easy to regard himself as a statistical unit. So long as Bert Jones across the street is still at work, Alf Smith is bound to feel himself dishonoured and a failure'* – George Orwell in *The Road to Wigan Pier* (1937: 86).

1.1 Overview

How does the economic structure of a society affect attitudes towards its poorest members? In this PhD thesis I investigate the relationship between individual advantage, broader economic context, and stigmatising stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients.[1] Across three empirical chapters, I use attitudinal data from the UK and Europe to investigate whether economically advantaged people, and those living among greater inequality or unemployment, are more or less sympathetic towards the poor.

I find that being economically advantaged, while living in a more unequal country or time period, is associated with holding higher levels of stigmatising stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients. However, local economic context seems to be less important: living in an area with higher unemployment does not seem to have a meaningful effect on attitudes towards the unemployed. Furthermore, low levels of education, and the authoritarian values that accompany them, play at least as important a role as economic position in explaining why people hold such stigmatising attitudes. My results suggest that status anxiety may play a role in shaping the association between individual advantage, inequality, and attitudes towards the poor.

This thesis makes a number of contributions to existing research. I innovate theoretically by drawing on rich qualitative work on the experiences of people in poverty to understand the complex ways in which economic position and social status affect perceptions of the poor and welfare recipients. Empirically I address the neglect of income inequality in existing research on

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[1] In this thesis I use the term 'welfare' to refer specifically to social security benefits for working age people on low incomes. Specific welfare benefits include unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, tax credits and other in-work income supplements, child benefits, and other forms of social assistance. 'Welfare recipients' are those who are receiving such benefits. The set of institutions and policies that administers these benefits is the welfare state, though welfare states typically deliver other benefits such as old age pensions.

perceptions of welfare deservingness. I also argue against an idea which is popular in some political economy work: that inequality worsens perceptions of the poor by increasing their social distance from the affluent.

1.2 Why the stigmatisation of poverty and welfare receipt matters

Since the 2008 financial crisis and the austerity policies that followed, scholars have become concerned with low levels of support for redistribution and the welfare state (Geiger and Meueleman, 2016; Taylor-Gooby, 2013). In some high-income countries, especially the UK, political justifications for cutting public spending have focused heavily on abuses of the benefits system by recipients, or the perverse effects of welfare policies on individual work motivations (Hills, 2015; Hoggett, Wilkinson and Beedell, 2013; Jensen and Tyler, 2015). Individuals who believe that the poor are at fault for their situation, are abusing the benefits system, or are otherwise undeserving, are less likely to support redistribution or welfare spending (Aarøe and Petersen, 2014; Daniele and Geys, 2015; Georgiadis and Manning, 2012; Van Oorschot and Roosma, 2017). As a result, negative stereotypes about welfare recipients pose a major threat to support for welfare spending.

Stigmatising stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients are especially concerning in a context where levels of inequality are high and rising (Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2011; Neckerman and Torche, 2007; OECD, 2011). In their influential work *The Spirit Level*, Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett (2009) popularised the idea that high levels of inequality have a corrosive effect on social relationships. Consistent with their argument, high income inequality is associated with lower social solidarity (Paskov and Dewilde, 2012), social trust (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005), and tolerance for minorities (Andersen and Fetner, 2008) as well as higher violent crime (Elgar and Aitken, 2011; Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 2002; Whitworth, 2012). As a result, rising inequality may set in motion a self-reinforcing upward spiral whereby inequality generates negative stereotypes about welfare recipients which further reduces public support for redistribution and potentially exacerbates inequalities (Kelly and Enns, 2010; Luttig, 2013; Piketty, 2014; Wright, 2018).

Stigmatising stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients are also partly responsible for the psychological harm caused by poverty. There is evidence that people in poverty experience feelings of shame and inadequacy, which are reinforced by stigmatisation in everyday social interactions with neighbours, employers, or public services (Jarrett, 1996; Mckenzie, 2015; Walker, 2014). Stigmatisation can thus worsen the subjective wellbeing of the poor,

exacerbating the already negative effects of poverty (Bosma et al., 2015; Peterie et al., 2019; Walker et al., 2013). Discrimination by employers can trap people in unemployment (Oberholzer-Gee, 2008; Van Belle et al., 2018), and punitive welfare conditionality policies, built on stigmatising assumptions about the morality and behaviour of the poor, can deprive individuals of access to the welfare state (Reeve, 2017; Reeves and Loopstra, 2017; Schram, Fording and Soss, 2008; Wacquant, 2009).

Furthermore, common negative stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients are often inaccurate. Many people in poverty are in work, most spells of welfare receipt are short-lived, and families where multiple generations have never worked are incredibly rare (Brady, Baker and Finnigan, 2013; Hick and Lanau, 2018; Macdonald, Shildrick and Furlong, 2014; Macmillan, 2011). Less-advantaged individuals generally perceive a stronger moral obligation to work than those who are better off (Dunn, 2013). The UK Department for Work and Pensions estimates very low levels of benefit fraud, in contrast to popular perceptions that it is widespread (Geiger, 2018). Misperceptions about welfare spending in general are rife, with spending on out-of-work benefits generally overestimated relative to pension spending (Hills, 2015). Moreover, stereotypes about the laziness of the poor or unemployed are contradicted by rigorous economic research on the major role that economic circumstances outside an individuals' control play in explaining rates of poverty and unemployment. These include exogenous shocks like recessions caused by banking crises, the decline of industries due to globalisation and deindustrialisation, or the scarring effects of growing up in a poor area (Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013; Chetty and Hendren, 2018a, 2018b; Davis and Wachter, 2011; Redbird and Grusky, 2016). Such misperceptions have a major effect on beliefs about the deservingness of welfare recipients (Geiger, 2017; Reeskens and Van der Meer, 2017).

Stigmatising attitudes towards the poor and welfare recipients thus have the potential to exacerbate existing economic and social inequalities, and worsen the already harmful economic and psychological consequences of poverty. Those striving to reduce poverty and increase the well-being of the poor have strong reasons to care about who holds inaccurate and harmful stereotypes about welfare recipients and the poor and why they do so.

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1.3 This PhD investigates the role of individual advantage and economic context

In this PhD thesis I contribute to such a challenge by placing stigmatising stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients into a structural economic context. I investigate the following research question: *What is the relationship between individual advantage, broader economic context, and the levels of stigmatising stereotypes that people hold about the poor and welfare recipients?* The thesis is structured around three questions that address specific aspects of this relationship. Each empirical chapter is a separate piece of research that explores one question, and in doing so makes a distinct contribution to existing scholarship.

Question 1: Are economically advantaged individuals more likely to hold stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients and the poor? The most direct way that the economic structure of society could shape such attitudes is through individuals' personal experience of advantage and disadvantage. As a result, Chapter 2 investigates the role of individual economic position, focusing on why the highly educated are more sympathetic towards welfare recipients. Using British survey data over thirty years I show that an advantaged economic position is associated with less sympathetic attitudes towards welfare recipients. However, economically disadvantaged individuals tend to have authoritarian attitudes, which are associated with higher levels of stigmatising stereotypes, possibly reflecting the role of a low social status in shaping attitudes.

Question 2: Are higher levels of economic inequality associated with higher levels of stigmatising stereotypes? The second question provides a contrasting perspective to the first by looking at the influence of macro scale economic context on attitudes towards welfare recipients and the poor. I focus on income inequality because of the important role that attitudes towards welfare recipients could play in setting in motion a self-reinforcing upward spiral of inequality. Chapter 3 addresses this question using attitudinal data from twenty-seven European countries to investigate whether individuals who live in more unequal contexts are more likely to believe that the poor are responsible for their situation. It finds that individuals in more unequal countries, or time periods, are more likely to believe that laziness causes poverty, though this relationship is heterogenous, and is not observed in post-communist countries. I suggest that one explanation for this relationship is status anxiety on the part of lower status individuals.

Question 3: Does living in poorer areas make people more or less sympathetic towards the poor and welfare recipients? The third question links the first two questions by investigating the role

of economic context at a spatial scale closer to everyday life. This allows me to investigate mechanisms that could link national level economic context to individual attitudes. Chapter 4 therefore looks at how local exposure to unemployment benefit claimants affects attitudes towards unemployed people. Using British survey data, I conduct the first longitudinal analysis of the association between area level exposure to welfare recipients and negative stereotypes, finding little evidence that attitudes towards the unemployed respond to small and short term changes in aggregate levels of unemployment benefit claims.

The concluding chapter (Chapter 5) shows how the results of each empirical chapter suggest an answer to the overarching research question and discusses some theoretical and practical implications of my findings. In the rest of this introductory chapter I explore in more detail the central concepts this thesis addresses: stigmatising stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients, social status and status anxiety. I then discuss the literature and theory I draw on, pointing out the gaps that my research fills. Following a brief discussion of methodology and case selection, I preview each of the empirical chapters, setting out their argument, methods and data, and unique contribution to existing scholarship.

1.4 What are stigmatising stereotypes?

Stigmatisation is a process that involves the labelling of human difference and the association of those differences with negative stereotypes. On the basis of these stereotypes, the stigmatised individual is othered[2] and treated as an outgroup, and hence experiences status loss and discrimination (Link and Phelan, 2001: 367).[3] I focus specifically on the stereotyping aspect of stigma – the extent to which people associate poverty and welfare receipt with moral or behavioural failings.[4] Measures of commonly held negative stereotypes about the poor or welfare recipients are response variables throughout the empirical analysis.

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[2] For further discussion of othering see section 1.7.3.

[3] While the classic sociological account of stigmatisation comes from Erving Goffman (1968) I rely on Link and Phelan's (2001) reconceptualization. Their account is useful because it highlights the multifactorial nature of stigma, allowing me to elucidate the specific component on which this PhD focuses.

[4] A stereotype is a cognitive representation, like a belief (Hilton and von Hippel, 1996). Beliefs are typically distinguished from attitudes, which combine a cognitive representation with an evaluative judgement (Bergman, 1998). In this PhD I am specifically interested in stereotypes that have a clear evaluative component and negative valence, and can thus be used to other the poor and justify discrimination and status loss. As a result I use the terms stereotypes, beliefs, and attitudes interchangeably to describe the concept I am interested in, even though they are in principle distinct. I do not investigate the possibility that judgements about the deservingness of welfare recipients are shaped by *implicit* rather than *explicit* prejudice (de Vries, 2017).

Robert Walker and colleagues argue that for most of written history, and in contemporary contexts as diverse as the UK, Norway, Uganda, and South Korea, poverty is negatively stereotyped and associated with moral failure (Walker, 2014; Walker et al., 2013).[5] One common stereotype in high income countries is that people are poor because they are lazy and unwilling to work hard   (Kallio and Niemelä, 2014; Lepianka, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2010). Unemployed people in particular are often stereotyped as refusing to look for work and being happy to live on benefits, rather than comply with social norms of self-reliance (Macdonald, Shildrick and Furlong, 2014; Somers and Block, 2005). The morality and trustworthiness of the poor and welfare recipients are also seen as questionable. An important stereotype of this kind is that welfare recipients often try to claim benefits they are not entitled to, whether by breaking rules around earnings thresholds, job search requirements, or by faking illness or disability (Geiger, 2018; Golding and Middleton, 1984). Stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients are often closely bound up with class identities. The poor may be presented as a moral underclass who are unintelligent, lacking ambition or aesthetic taste (Tyler, 2013; Welshman, 2006). A stereotype of this kind is that women in poverty are promiscuous, and have children they cannot afford to raise if incentivised to do so by the welfare system (Skeggs, 2004; Welshman, 2006).

1.5 Who are the poor and welfare recipients?

In this thesis I examine stigmatising attitudes towards two distinct groups: people in poverty and welfare recipients. The definition of poverty is heavily contested by scholars, with substantial debate over the merits of specific criteria and thresholds (Hills, 2004; Walker, 2014). Furthermore, the poor and welfare recipients are two distinct groups that overlap to different extents in different contexts: in some countries welfare benefits are highly targeted towards those on low incomes, while in others they are almost universal, or even targeted at relatively affluent people employed in the formal or state sectors (Brady and Bostic, 2015). I cannot take these subtleties directly into account because I am exploring the beliefs of non-experts and am hence dependent on their understandings of who the poor and welfare recipients are.

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[5] I am not arguing that people in poverty are never seen in a sympathetic light or positively stereotyped. There are historical and contemporary views of people in poverty as genuinely needy; as victims of injustice, misfortune, or disaster; and humble, hard-working, or even holy (Walker, 2014). Many of these views are widespread, including the belief that poverty is caused by injustice in society (Lepianka, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2010). However, given the potentially deleterious effects of stigmatising ideas about the poor on the wellbeing of those in poverty I focus in this section on establishing the enduring existence and popularity of stigmatising ideas about poverty over an exceptionally wide range of contexts.

Nonetheless, understanding public attitudes towards both these groups are relevant to the overall aims of this thesis: attitudes towards redistribution depend in part on perceptions of the (potential) recipients of inequality reducing welfare policies (Aarøe and Petersen, 2014; Van Oorschot and Roosma, 2017), while people in poverty are often stigmatised in the media and interpersonal interactions specifically for their alleged receipt of, and reliance on, welfare (Harkins and Lugo-Ocando, 2016; Jensen and Tyler, 2015; Mooney, 2009). Pragmatically, measures of attitudes towards welfare recipients are measured more reliably in some contexts and attitudes towards people in poverty are in others.[6]

When using data from the UK, I make the assumption that understanding negative stereotypes about welfare recipients can tell us something about attitudes towards people in poverty, and vice versa. This is justified on three grounds. Firstly, the UK welfare state is quite targeted towards those on low incomes, especially when working age people are concerned, so that most of those who receive benefits are poor, even if there are many people in poverty who do not receive welfare due to non take-up or eligibility restrictions (Baumberg, 2015; Marx, Salanauskaite and Verbist, 2016). Secondly, qualitative research in the UK tends to find that respondents associate all poverty with welfare receipt and are perhaps unaware of the prevalence of in-work poverty, or the substantial public spending directed towards the affluent (Chase and Walker, 2012; Hills, 2015; Walker, 2014). Thirdly, in appendix 1 I use British data to directly examine the relationship between attitudes towards welfare recipients and the poor. The overlap between attitudes towards welfare recipients and people in poverty is not perfect, therefore some care should be taken in generalising findings from one group to the other. Nonetheless, the results broadly confirm the assumption that people who believe that the poor are responsible for their situation are more likely to be unsympathetic towards welfare recipients.[7]

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[6] In particular, chapter 2 focuses on attitudes towards welfare recipients because they are measured over a long period using a reliable multi-item scale, while attitudes towards people in poverty are measured in fewer years with only single item measures. By contrast chapter 3 focuses on beliefs about the causes of poverty, which are likely to be easier to compare across welfare states than attitudes towards welfare recipients. Chapter 4 focuses on attitudes towards the unemployed – a demographic who are both at high risk of poverty and commonly claim means-tested welfare benefits.

[7] Appendix 1 also addresses a specific reason why measures of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients might tell us little about attitudes towards people in poverty. It is possible that negative stereotypes about welfare recipients mainly reflect the resentments that individuals in a targeted welfare system such as the UK possess when they are little better off than welfare recipients but nonetheless do not receive benefits themselves. However, I find that the positive association between stigmatising beliefs about the causes of poverty and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients is generally consistent across individuals in more or less advantaged economic positions. Thus, the results presented in chapter 2, which focus on negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, are unlikely to be

The extent to which perceptions of the poor and welfare recipients overlap in other contexts is likely to depend on the extent to which their welfare states are targeted towards those on low incomes (Marx, Salanauskaite and Verbist, 2016). In countries where welfare spending is more universal (such as Sweden), or targeted towards the relatively advantaged (like Greece), individuals may be much less likely to interpret welfare recipients and people in poverty as the same group (Larsen, 2007). As a result Chapter 3, which makes cross-national comparisons, looks at attitudes towards the poor so that cross-national differences in welfare state structure do not bias the results.

1.6 Social status and status anxiety

While they do not directly feature in my empirical analysis, the concepts of social status and status anxiety are key to understanding why an individual's economic position and the broader economic context they live in might affect the levels of stigmatising stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients they hold. They provide the unobserved mechanisms that I believe link economic circumstances to attitudes towards welfare recipients and the poor.

Social status is a hierarchy based on 'widely shared beliefs about the social categories or 'types' of people that are ranked by society as more esteemed and respected compared to others' (Ridgeway, 2014: 3).[8] Social status hierarchies are conceptually and empirically distinct from pure economic hierarchies of income, wealth, or occupational class (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007; Weber, 1974). However, in practice individuals who are economically disadvantaged are more likely to see themselves as occupying a low position in the status hierarchy than those who are better off (Evans and Kelley, 2004; Miyakawa et al., 2012; Poppitz, 2016; Singh-Manoux, Adler and Marmot, 2003).[9] Of particular importance is the concept of status anxiety, a negative social emotion experienced by people who feel that they have failed to live up to shared ideals of esteem and respect (de Botton, 2004; Schneider, 2019; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).

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entirely driven by resentments that are specifically related to whether people are just above or just below cutoffs entitling them to means-tested benefits.

[8] I am using a Weberian conception of social status, which distinguishes stratification on the basis of honour and esteem (status) from that based on market position (class) (Weber, 1974). I focus on notions of social status that are based on individuals self-reported perceptions of their relative position (e.g. Evans and Kelley, 2004; Noord et al., 2019; Singh-Manoux, Adler and Marmot, 2003), rather than those which seek to infer a collectively accepted status hierarchy based on the levels of prestige associated with specific occupations (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2004, 2007).

[9] This also reflects how people classify themselves and others into social classes (Andersen and Curtis, 2012; Stubager et al., 2018; Surridge, 2007).

Status anxiety is closely linked with economic inequality: Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) argue that status inequalities are higher in more unequal contexts because the material differences between individuals are more pronounced, and hence more people are unable to live up to social expectations regarding consumption and living standards (Delhey and Dragolov, 2014; Layte and Whelan, 2014; Lindemann and Saar, 2014; Schneider, 2019). As a result, there is a clear link between an individual's economic position, levels of economic inequality in the context in which they live, and their experience of status anxiety.

There is also a relationship between how people perceive their own social status and that of others and the attitudes they hold towards outgroups. There is a long tradition in sociology of seeing racial prejudice as shaped in part by perceptions of the position of one's own group with respect to outgroups (Blumer, 1958). For dominant group members, the prospect that subordinate groups might improve their relative position and threaten dominant group privileges provokes prejudiced responses (Bobo, 1999; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Quillian, 2006). Recent research has suggested that threats to social status can explain white Americans opposition to welfare spending on minorities (Wetts and Willer, 2018), while erosion in the economic position of white non-university educated men relative to women and minorities explains support for the radical right in rich democracies (Gidron and Hall, 2017). As a result, social status and status anxiety play an important role in linking individual economic position with attitudes towards outgroups. This PhD is the first to apply such ideas to the relationship between economic position, income inequality, and stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients. I argue that social status and status anxiety play a key role in explaining the relationships I observe in my empirical analyses.

1.7 Literature review

In this section I explain how my project relates to existing research and the contribution my findings make to it. In doing so I develop some of theoretical ideas that I engage with in the empirical chapters. I focus on three literatures: perceptions of the deservingness of welfare recipients, comparative political economy research on inequality and redistribution, and cultural class analysis in sociology and critical social policy.

1.7.1 Perceptions of deservingness of welfare recipients

Understanding popular support for public spending is a major goal of welfare state research across social policy, sociology, and political science. One important strand of this work is the deservingness literature, which aims to understand how support for welfare spending is conditional on public perceptions of the behaviour and attributes of (potential) recipients (Van Oorschot, 2000; Van Oorschot and Roosma, 2017), and how such perceptions are shaped by individual economic position (Bucca, 2016; Kallio and Kouvo, 2015), political values (Van Oorschot, Reeskens and Meuleman, 2012), and economic or institutional context (Laenen, 2018; Larsen, 2007). This research draws on macro-comparative studies in the tradition of Esping-Andersen's *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990) and Hall and Soskice's *Varieties of Capitalism* (2001) in order to understand how systematic cross-national differences in the institutional structures of welfare states influences public support through mechanisms such as policy feedback and path dependency (Korpi and Palme, 1998; Larsen, 2007; Pierson, 1998, 2000). Distinctively, the deservingness literature also draws on a sociological and social psychological literature on popular beliefs about the causes of poverty (e.g. Alston and Dean, 1972; Feather, 1974; Furnham, 1982; Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Will, 1993). This literature has been used to show how perceptions of the work ethic of specific groups, especially African Americans in the US context, undermines support for the welfare state (Fox, 2004, 2010; Gilens, 1995, 1996b).

One useful contribution of the deservingness literature is to set out why the recipients of certain benefits are seen as more deserving than others. Van Oorschot argues that welfare recipients are seen as deserving on the basis of five criteria:

> "*1. control*: poor people's control over their neediness, or their responsibility for it: the less control, the more deserving; *2. need*: the greater the level of need, the more deserving; *3. identity*: the identity of the poor, ie their proximity to the rich or their 'pleasantness'; the closer to 'us', the more deserving; *4. attitude*: poor people's attitude towards support, or their docility or gratefulness: the more compliant, the more deserving; *5. reciprocity*: the degree of reciprocation by the poor, or having earned support: the more reciprocation, the more deserving" (Van Oorschot, 2000: 36 [my italics]).

On this basis of these criteria, he shows that the elderly/retired and sick are seen as most deserving and the unemployed and immigrants are seen as least deserving, and that this hierarchy of deservingness is very consistent across Europe (Van Oorschot, 2006: 30). Survey experimental research shows that perceptions of deservingness have a major effect on

preferences for redistribution and welfare attitudes (Aarøe and Petersen, 2014; Reeskens and Van der Meer, 2017).

The deservingness criteria suggested by Van Oorschot are important for my research because they systematise a wide range of historical and contemporary ideas about how the poor ought to behave, and hence show what kinds of behaviour they will be negatively stereotyped for failing to adhere to. The *control* and *reciprocity* criteria are most relevant. Stereotypes that welfare recipients are in poverty due to their own lack of effort, and fail to reciprocate public generosity by abusing the system, are both common in media and elite discourse (Golding and Middleton, 1984; Walker, 2014; Welshman, 2006). Such stereotypes are shown by survey-experimental research to be especially important determinants of deservingness perceptions (Aarøe and Petersen, 2014; Reeskens and Van der Meer, 2017). As a result, I measure stigmatising stereotypes about the poor using survey questions on beliefs about the causes of poverty or unemployment (the control criterion), as well as beliefs about whether welfare recipients are looking for work or abusing the system (measuring the reciprocity criterion, as well as the attitude criterion).

The deservingness literature pays much attention to cross-national and over time comparisons. For example, Uunk and Van Oorschot (2018) use cross-sectional time series from the Netherlands to show how support for the welfare system is greater when unemployment is higher but also when economic growth is higher.[10] Buss and colleagues use cross national data for 23 European countries to show how macroeconomic and institutional context influence support for unemployment benefit conditionality (Buss, Ebbinghaus and Naumann, 2017).[11] The aggregate level variable to which the deservingness literature pays most attention is welfare state type (Kallio and Niemelä, 2014; Roosma, Van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2014; e.g. Van Oorschot, 2006). Drawing on the three worlds of welfare capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990), public opinion in social democratic welfare states is usually thought to be more sympathetic to

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[10] By contrast, McArthur and Reeves (2019) find that media rhetoric about the poor in the UK was more negative in years where unemployment was higher. They also provide suggestive evidence that this increase in negative rhetoric might have been associated with increasingly negative public attitudes.

[11] This analysis is one of the few in this literature that compares both across countries and time (see Van Oorschot and Halman, 2000 for another example). Chapter 3, which uses data from multiple waves of the European Values Survey, also makes a contribution in its use of data that has both cross national and over time dimensions. Other common vectors of comparison in this literature include comparing the attitudes of social workers with those of the general public (Kallio and Kouvo, 2015), or comparing attitudes towards different benefits (Hedegaard, 2014; Laenen, 2018).

welfare recipients than in conservative, liberal, and especially eastern European welfare regimes (Larsen, 2007).

Work in the deservingness literature almost never looks to smaller spatial scales than a country to understand how the economic or social context that individuals live in shapes their deservingness perceptions (the use of regions in da Costa and Dias, 2015 is the only exception I know of). This neglect is unsurprising given that the deservingness literature draws heavily on welfare state feedback effects, which are likely to follow welfare policy in general and operate on a national scale (Kumlin and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014). Studying only national contexts misses important ways in which individuals might form views about whether welfare recipients are deserving or not. Personal observation of welfare recipients could provide information about whether unemployed people appear to be looking for a job, abusing the welfare system, or living in material conditions consistent with a high level of need. I address this neglect in Chapter 4, which looks at the relationship between local economic context, unemployment benefit claims, and attitudes toward the unemployed.

Another gap in the deservingness literature is its' lack of attention to how economic inequality might shape deservingness perceptions, despite its well established association with low social cohesion and intolerance of minorities (Andersen and Fetner, 2008; Paskov and Dewilde, 2012). I know of no studies of deservingness perceptions that focus on inequality as the main explanatory variable of interest, although some include it as a predictor with mixed results. Van Oorschot (2006) finds no association between inequality and deservingness perceptions, but also finds evidence that people perceive fewer negative consequences of the welfare state when inequality is higher (Van Oorschot, Reeskens and Meuleman, 2012). Gugushvili (2016) investigates whether income inequality modifies the association between experience of social mobility and beliefs about the causes of poverty. Chapter 3 addresses this gap with a detailed analysis of the association between economic inequality and stigmatising attitudes towards people in poverty.

1.7.2 Comparative political economy research on inequality and redistribution

To understand how economic inequality is likely to be linked to stigmatising beliefs about welfare recipients and people in poverty, I draw on work in economics, political science, and sociology on the consequences of economic inequality for individuals' attitudes and beliefs, focusing on preferences for redistribution in particular. I use this research to argue that the

effect of inequality on stigmatising stereotypes is likely to be different for individuals in different economic positions. I also set out a theory about how inequality affects individual attitudes towards people in poverty. By increasing the social distance between the affluent and the poor, inequality makes the affluent less sympathetic towards the poor. Implications of this theory are tested in Chapters 3 and 4.

One of the central debates in political economy stems from Meltzer and Richard's (1981) argument that democracy should automatically correct rising inequality: when the median voter's income is less than the mean income, a self-interested electorate should vote for a government that will equalise this gap. A great deal of work has thus addressed the question of whether rising inequality is indeed associated with increased (demand for) redistribution, and if not, why not (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Bonica et al., 2013; Iversen and Soskice, 2006)?[12] Scholars have found evidence that higher inequality is associated with greater demand for redistribution (Rueda and Stegmueller, 2016; Schmidt-Catran, 2016), greater observed redistribution (Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005), lower observed redistribution (Kelly and Enns, 2010; Moene and Wallerstein, 2001), and no straightforward relationship (Breznau and Hommerich, 2019; Georgiadis and Manning, 2012; Kenworthy and McCall, 2008).

An important feature of this literature is its interest in how the effects of inequality on support for redistribution are different for individuals at different points in the income distribution.[13] Inequality is relational, summarising the differences between a set of individuals or entities. As a result, it seems plausible a priori that it would affect individuals at different points in the income distribution differently. Secondly, examining heterogenous responses to inequality across the income distribution can give useful insight into underlying mechanisms.

Several scholars have argued that inequality provokes attitudinal convergence across the income distribution. For example, Rueda and Stegmueller (2016) make the case that inequality has a different effect on demand for redistribution among individuals at different positions in the income distribution. Individuals on low incomes will always support redistribution from self-

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[12] Some of the research reviewed here studies the relationship between inequality and actual redistribution rather than public support for redistribution. This is because many scholars test theoretical models of the reaction of public opinion to higher inequality using data on observed redistribution on the assumption that public preferences are accurately transformed into policy. There is a good deal of debate on whether this is the case or not (Brooks and Manza, 2006; Erikson, 2015; Gilens and Page, 2014).

[13] This contrasts with the deservingness literature, which tends to see macro-level economic and political variables as having a similar effect on all individuals. For an exception see Uunk and Van Oorschot (2018).

interest because they personally benefit from it. The support of high-income individuals, however, is conditional on aggregate levels of inequality. When aggregate inequality is higher, high income individuals will have higher levels of support for redistribution because they are negatively affected by the 'externalities of inequality' (Rueda and Stegmueller, 2016: 472) – the negative social consequences of inequality, exemplified in their discussion by higher crime rates. As a result, the association between income and support for redistribution is smaller in higher inequality contexts.

Similarly, Schmidt-Catran (2016) finds that within-country increases in inequality are associated with increased demand for redistribution across Europe, but that income differences in attitudes are less pronounced in countries with higher inequality. Carrierio (2016) and Fernandez and Jaime-Castille (2018) both argue that social class differences in redistribution preferences are smaller in high inequality or low redistribution contexts. There is generally less evidence for increasing attitudinal polarisation in response to increased inequality, though in a study using US data Newman, Johnston, and Lown (2015) argue that higher inequality polarises individual belief in meritocracy along income lines. Other scholars argue that macroeconomic changes have similar effects on attitudes and policy preferences at different points in the income distribution (Gonthier, 2015; Soroka and Wlezien, 2014).

Much research in both the deservingness and comparative political economy literatures is built on the idea that people's attitudes towards redistribution and public spending are ultimately grounded in economic self-interest, although the way self-interest is conceptualised varies substantially. In comparative political economy there are some formal rational choice models of self-interested utility maximisation (Benabou, 2000; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Moene and Wallerstein, 2001) and much research focusing on the role of income or other measures of economic position such as wealth or unemployment risk (Ansell, 2014; Doherty, Gerber and Green, 2006; Doyle, 2015; Rehm, Hacker and Schlesinger, 2012). In contrast, the deservingness literature is more likely to mobilise the tripartite schema of 'interests, institutions, and ideas' as an explanatory heuristic (Hall, 2002). In this model an individual's economic position affects their deservingness perceptions mainly through material self-interest, while values, attitudes, and beliefs are jointly conceptualised as 'ideas', and constitute a separate influence on deservingness perceptions (see Kallio and Niemelä, 2014; Van Oorschot, 2006 for examples of this kind of reasoning). Institutions enter into the model mainly through processes of policy feedback and path dependency (Laenen, 2018; Larsen, 2007).

This reliance on economic self-interest does not fit well with my focus on stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients and the poor. Using the logic of self-interested utility maximisation to provide the microfoundations linking aggregate inequality to individual preferences makes sense when studying redistribution. This is because the financial benefits and costs of redistributive policies generate clear predictions about individual incentives. Such models have often been empirically successful in explaining variation in support for redistribution and welfare spending (Ansell, 2014; Busemeyer, Goerres and Weschle, 2009; Doherty, Gerber and Green, 2006; Schmidt-Catran, 2016). However, it is very unclear what incentives self-interested individuals have to hold specific beliefs about the world such as stereotypes that don't appear to materially benefit the holder. Even a generalised incentive to hold true beliefs is likely to be weak in a domain such as politics over which individuals have little control.[14, 15]

My research breaks with this focus on economic self-interest. In Chapter 2 I set out an account of the relationship between economic position and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients that does not use the concept at all. I do so partly because of the limited relevance of self-interest for explaining why individuals hold stereotypes, but also because I draw on theories (explained in Section 1.7.3) that are rooted in detailed qualitative discussion of the lived experiences of people in poverty rather than abstract theory. As a result I use concepts that are

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[14] This is a point which has been made in democratic theory since Schumpeter (1943), who argued that most ordinary people are ill-informed about politics simply because they have very little incentive to be right about issues they are personally unable to affect. Some researchers examine departures from perfect information, studying the information that individuals in different social locations are likely to be exposed to and how their capacity to interpret it may vary based on education, interest in politics, or cross-national differences in welfare state 'visibility' (Geiger, 2017; Gingrich, 2014; Iversen and Soskice, 2015).

[15] Researchers drawing on behavioural economics and evolutionary psychology have modified self-interest explanations by arguing that individuals are conditionally altruistic: they will support welfare for the poor only if they believe that the poor are not free-riders and will reciprocate in future (or have already reciprocated) (Petersen et al., 2012). As a result, individual support for redistribution is conditional on perceptions of deservingness (Aarøe and Petersen, 2014; Fong, 2007). Once again, however, the origin of deservingness perceptions is often left unspecified. Other researchers have argued that considerations of reciprocity matter for some but not all of the population. Analysing British survey data Sefton (2005) argues that around half of the population are committed to redistribution provided that recipients have paid into the system and are abusing it. The rest of the population is subdivided into two groups for whom reciprocity is less important – whether because they think people are entitled to welfare regardless of their contribution, or because they are opposed to redistribution of any kind. This possibility deserves further investigation in the literature on how deservingness perceptions influence support for redistributive policies.

rarely discussed in the comparative political economy or deservingness literatures, such as social status, identification, and othering.[16]

Nonetheless, there is some research into the attitudinal consequences of inequality that does not draw on economic self-interest and is highly relevant to my interest in stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients. It examines the ways in which rising inequality might transform the structure of society, and how these structural changes might affect attitudes. When inequality is higher, residential segregation by income is higher (Musterd et al., 2017; Reardon and Bischoff, 2011; Watson, 2009), as is segregation in schools (Owens, 2016; Owens, Reardon and Jencks, 2016). Furthermore, the social networks, consumption practices, and housing, among other features of how people organise their lives, are expected to polarise by income as aggregate inequality increases. This polarisation between, and homogenisation within income groups, is likely to affect beliefs and attitudes about the world.

Lupu and Pontusson (2011) draw on the idea that inequality leads to social polarisation to argue that it is not just the level, but also the structure of inequality that can affect preferences for redistribution. Whether middle income groups will ally with the poor to support more redistribution, or the rich to seek less redistribution, depends on which of the two groups they are closer to in income terms. They argue that people who are closer in income have greater affinity for one another, and are hence more likely to behave altruistically towards one another. This example is valuable because it draws on a theoretical model that is not grounded in self-interest, and also specifies how the relationship between inequality and attitudes depends on an individual's position in the income distribution: the redistribution preferences of middle-income voters depend on their income relative to both high and low income voters (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011: 319). However, as Luebke (2019) points out, Lupu and Pontusson's model assumes the ability of middle income voters to accurately perceive the extent of skew in the income distribution. This assumption is challenged by a large body of research that shows how individuals generally misperceive both their own relative position in the income distribution and overall levels of inequality in their society (Cruces, Perez-Truglia and Tetaz, 2013; Gimpelson and Treisman, 2018; Karadja, Mollerstrom and Seim, 2017).

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[16] On the occasions such concepts are used in the deservingness literature, they tend to play a subordinate role as contrasting predictions or as alternative hypotheses to self-interest related theories such as competition for scarce welfare state resources (Lepianka, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2010; Roosma, Van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2014).

Jonathan Mijs' (Mijs, 2018, 2019) recent work on how inequality reinforces belief in meritocracy is an example of research with similar theoretical foundations that does not require individuals to accurately perceive aggregate levels of inequality. Indeed, individuals' perceptions of the causes of success and failure are directly shaped by aggregate levels of inequality:

> 'unequal societies are marked by greater social distance, such that the rich and poor develop an understanding of society and their own place in it from a position of socioeconomic insulation. As a result, people in more unequal societies underestimate the extent of inequality and the role of structural advantages or barriers that help or hurt them' (Mijs, 2019: 7).

Several scholars have recently provided micro-level evidence of these claims from studying the consequences of being educated in homogenous or diverse contexts. Individuals who are socialised in more homogenous educational contexts are more likely to attribute success or failure to their own efforts (Mijs, 2016). Similarly, those who are educated in more socially advantaged schools (Gingrich, 2019), or colleges (Mendelberg, McCabe and Thal, 2017) are more likely to hold economically conservative attitudes.

However, none of these works specifically investigate stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients and the poor. As a result chapters 3 and 4 contribute to this literature by empirically testing whether social distance is a good explanation for how the economic structure of society shapes such stereotypes. In doing so, I examine how the effect of inequality on attitudes depends on an individuals' relative position in the economic structure of society. To do this it is necessary to understand how an individuals' economic position is likely to affect their attitudes towards the poor and welfare recipients. This is not something that the literature reviewed in this section can provide, given its orientation towards economic self-interest. Therefore I also draw on the cultural class analysis literature to think about the relationship between an individual's economic position and stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients and the poor.

1.7.3 Othering, identification, and moral deviance in cultural class analysis

The cultural class analysis literature is a very important source of research on the stigma associated with welfare receipt, poverty, and social class. It provides powerful theoretical resources for thinking about the relationship between individual economic position and stigmatising stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients that are grounded in rich and detailed qualitative research. I innovate by applying several ideas developed in this literature to

quantitative attitudinal research, including othering, identification, and the importance of moral deviance in non-economic domains. My research contributes to this literature with a stronger focus on how economic context shapes attitudes towards welfare recipients and the poor.

Cultural class analysis is a tradition in sociology that uses Bourdieusian theories of social class to reinvigorate class analysis (Bourdieu, 1984; Savage et al., 2013). A lot of work in this literature studies class identity, and the ways in which individuals are shaped by class even if they disidentify with traditional social classes (Bottero, 2004; Reay, 1998; Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst, 2001). From this perspective influential ethnographic work by Beverley Skeggs (1997) has taken an interest in how social class is embodied, and in doing so has paid a good deal of attention to lived experience of social class stigma (see also Mckenzie, 2015). This is complemented by work inspired by cultural studies that shows how stigmatising stereotypes about working class people and welfare recipients are created and circulated. Imogen Tyler's (2008) analysis of the 'chav' stereotype is a good example of such work (see also Harkins and Lugo-Ocando, 2016; Hayward and Yar, 2006; Jensen and Tyler, 2015).

Similar themes appear in qualitative social policy research, especially in response to welfare retrenchment and increased conditionality in the aftermath of the 2008 recession. Research of this kind can be traced back to Golding and Middleton's *Images of Welfare* (1984), which examined the emergence of 'scroungerphobia' (a moral panic about abuse of the benefit system) in the late 1970s. Recent scholarship has focused on qualitative studies of the living conditions of welfare recipients and people in poverty (Garthwaite, 2016a; Shildrick, 2012) and analyses of political and policy discourse (Hoggett, Wilkinson and Beedell, 2013; Mooney, 2009).

The ideas of identification and othering are based on the premise that an individual's attitudes towards the poor and welfare recipients depend on how they understand themselves. Identification expresses the idea that disadvantaged individuals will be more sympathetic towards the poor because their similar living conditions lead them to empathise with the struggles and difficulties faced by others in the same situation, as well as giving them additional information about the causes of poverty and difficulties of escaping it (Roosma, Van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2014).

One good example of identification comes from the work of Edmiston (2018). Using a qualitative vignette study, he argues that affluent individuals have a 'poor sociological imagination.' They

are much less able to appreciate the structural causes of poverty than people with personal experience of hardship, who are much better able to understand the constraints poor people typically face (see also Patrick, 2016).[17] Other researchers show that welfare recipients are often frustrated with how they are portrayed in media or political discourse, and may draw on their own experiences to critique popular narratives (Pemberton et al., 2016). The implication is that less advantaged individuals will be more sympathetic towards welfare recipients.

Othering starts from the idea that individuals respond to possessing a low social status or stigmatised identity by disidentifying with that identity. Othering or stigmatising those who also possess it may enable them to protect their own compromised self-image (Henry, 2011). It is far more commonly reported in the cultural class analysis literature that people in poverty and welfare recipients other those in a similar situation to themselves, rather than identify with them. Othering has been observed in the UK (Chase and Walker, 2012; Garthwaite, 2016b; Patrick, 2016; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013), Germany (Fohrbeck, Hirseland and Ramos Lobato, 2014), the USA (Desmond and Travis, 2018; Sennett and Cobb, 1972) and Norway (Gubrium and Lødemel, 2014).

Chase and Walker describe how respondents '*who were working but still hard up saw themselves as having a strong "work ethic" and a track record of previous work. This … enabled them to distance themselves from those they considered to be "happy" not working or "not bothered about" claiming benefits'* (2012: 749). Ruth Patrick describes how welfare recipients implicitly seek *'to emphasise their own deservingness by critiquing and "othering" those who were unable to display the same characteristics as themselves… The disabled participants were particularly likely to talk of undeserving disability benefit claimants who were not really disabled.'* (2016: 255). These examples provide evidence of low-income individuals, in some cases benefit recipients themselves, using othering language to distance their own lifestyles and behaviours from those stigmatised in the media and popular culture.

Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb's account in *The Hidden Injuries of Class* (1972) makes clear the role that a low or threatened social status plays in othering. They argue that welfare claimants who do not want to work deeply and profoundly threaten the pride that their working-class male respondents have in making difficult sacrifices to support their families through work:

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[17] Similar arguments are made in quantitative work on beliefs about meritocracy or the causes of poverty, where more advantaged individuals are generally more likely to attribute individual wealth or poverty to individualistic factors (Bucca, 2016; Gugushvili, 2016; Mijs, 2019).

'If there are people who have refused to make sacrifices, yet are subsidised by the state, their very existence calls into question the meaning of acts of self-abnegation. Since sacrifice is a voluntary virtue, a meaning the sacrificer has created out of the material circumstances of his life, it takes only one "welfare chiseller" getting sympathy and help from the authorities without any show of self-sacrifice, to make that willed, that created meaning ever so vulnerable' (Sennett and Cobb, 1972: 137).

The concepts of othering and identification are central to this thesis because they suggest ways in which an individual's economic position could affect attitudes towards the poor and welfare recipients. These ideas are grounded in rich contextual detail about how people in poverty think about their situation and the behavior of others like them, unlike the self-interest based explanations common in the deservingness and comparative political economy literatures. This PhD is one of the first to apply ideas from the cultural class analysis literature to quantitative welfare state research (see Baumberg, 2015; de Vries, 2017 for rare exceptions). The concepts of identification and othering appear in all three empirical chapters of this PhD in some form or other.

I also build on an idea explored in the cultural class literature that welfare recipients are seen as morally deviant in non-economic domains. This theory originates in the Bourdieusian idea that an individual's perceptions of their place, and that of others, in a social hierarchy is fundamentally embodied and shaped by emotional responses (Bourdieu, 1984; Calhoun, 2000). A particularly important example is the role that emotions of disgust play in shaping social class: stigmatising portrayals of working class individuals reinforce social boundaries by provoking disgust reactions that dehumanise and thus justify unequal conditions or treatment (Lawler, 2005; Tyler, 2013).

Imogen Tyler's (2008) work on the 'chav' phenomenon shows how disgust reactions are used to stigmatise working class people in the media and popular culture.[18] She characterizes the stereotype of the 'chav' thus: *'chavs are white, live on council estates, eat junk food, steal your phones, wear crap sports wear, drink cheap cider…chavs are disgusting'* (Tyler, 2008: 24). The 'chav' stereotype circulates through newspapers, television, internet culture, and other media, before finally permeating political discourse. The 'chav' stereotype is partly characterised by indicators of poverty and welfare receipt such as unemployment, living in public housing, and

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[18] 'Chav' is a term of abuse aimed at white working class people in the UK.

(allegedly) having children to claim additional child benefits. However, many stereotypes about poverty, welfare receipt, and working class identity are from non-economic domains. One example links social class with (excessive) consumption of substances such as alcohol, cigarettes, or illegal drugs (Graham, 2012; Wincup and Monaghan, 2016). Another is that working class people lack aesthetic taste, engaging in consumerism in a trashy and vulgar manner (Hamilton, 2012; Hayward and Yar, 2006; Lawler, 2005). An especially important stereotype that Tyler mentions relates to sexual immorality. The idea that poor women are promiscuous has a long history (Skeggs, 2004; Welshman, 2006), and is part of contemporary stereotypes (Mckenzie, 2013; Tyler, 2008).

The idea that welfare receipt and poverty are perceived as morally deviant in non-economic domains is important for this research for two reasons. Firstly, the relationship between economic position and attitudes towards welfare recipients may be confounded by the values that individuals in different structural economic positions possess. I investigate this possibility in Chapter 2, and draw on the cultural class analysis literature by investigating whether individuals who are authoritarian and hence intolerant of diversity in non-economic domains are less sympathetic towards welfare recipients.[19] Similarly, individuals who encounter people in poverty or welfare recipients in their daily lives might become less sympathetic towards them – not because they are failing to look for work or abusing the welfare system, but because they are deviant from social norms in non-economic domains. This provides a further justification for investigating how local exposure to welfare recipients affects attitudes, as demonstrated in Chapter 4.

One important limitation of the cultural class analysis literature is a lack of attention to structural economic differences between places that might affect attitudes towards the poor and welfare recipients. Some of this literature draws on ethnographic work in specific times and places (e.g. Garthwaite, 2016b; Mckenzie, 2015) and thus discusses economic structure mainly in reference to that specific context. For example, Shildrick and MacDonald (2013) discuss the economic context of Teesside where they conducted their research – focusing especially on deindustrialisation.[20]   However, they draw few general conclusions about the role that

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[19] This represents an important contribution to the existing literature on welfare attitudes, especially work in the deservingness literature. While research in this tradition pays a good deal of attention to the effects of political values on deservingness perceptions (Kallio and Niemelä, 2014; Van Oorschot, 2006), very few of these look specifically at the role of authoritarian values.

[20] Teesside is a de-industrialised area of northern England, once known for shipbuilding and steel production, which is now one of the most deprived in the UK.

deindustrialisation or its economic consequences might have for the way people in poverty understand their economic situation.[21]

Even work that tries to explicitly compare across individuals and contexts can have difficulty separating out the role economic context can play. Edmiston (2018) studies how both poor and affluent individuals explain the causes of wealth and poverty. On the basis of qualitative interviews he argues that affluent individuals are much less likely to appreciate the structural causes of either wealth or poverty than individuals in a more disadvantaged position. However, his sampling strategy for participant recruitment selects poor individuals from deprived areas, and affluent individuals from affluent areas (Edmiston, 2018: 986). If contact with the poor improves attitudes towards them (Bailey et al., 2013; Lee, Farrell and Link, 2004), or if affluent individuals who are unsympathetic towards the poor are more likely to move to affluent areas (Gallego et al., 2014; Gimpel and Hui, 2015), his research design is likely to lead him to overstate the difference between the poor and affluent.[22]

By contrast, research that focuses on the media and political rhetoric makes more general claims about the causes of the stigmatisation of welfare recipients. The main explanatory focus tends to be on neo-liberalism interpreted variously as a political ideology, a set of cultural dispositions, and a method of governance (Allen et al., 2015; Jensen and Tyler, 2015). For example, Tyler argues that the stigmatization of poverty operates 'as a form of governance which legitimises the reproduction and entrenchment of inequalities and injustices' (2013: 8). This is part of an interesting account of a self-reinforcing relationship between stigmatization and inequality, similar to that examined in Chapter 3. However, most of the explanatory work in her account is done by 'neoliberalism as a form of governance… through which public consent is procured for policies and practices that affect inequalities and fundamentally corrode democracy' (Tyler, 2008: 5). This explanation is not especially helpful for understanding how economic and political context affects attitudes towards the poor for two reasons. Firstly, there are conceptual difficulties in specifying the countries, time periods, and even features of a society to which the term 'neo-liberalism' applies (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009). Secondly, Hudson and colleagues (Hudson et al., 2016a) find very little evidence that British welfare attitudes have significantly

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[21] See Surridge (2007) for an example of work that uses quantitative evidence to put generally qualitative debates on class identity into broader context.

[22] The existence of such contact or selection effects is considered in Chapter 4.

hardened between the 1960s and the present day. As a result, it is difficult to see any clear shift in welfare attitudes that can be related straightforwardly to the rise of 'neo-liberalism'.[23]

While the cultural class analysis literature provides a number of useful theoretical resources for this project, it does not focus on how perceptions of the poor may be influenced by economic context, or how individual economic position might interact with it. This PhD makes an important contribution to the cultural class analysis literature by examining variation in stigmatising stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients over space and time. I draw on political economy theories of inequality and redistribution (discussed above) to consider how individual economic position and economic structure interact to shape attitudes towards the poor. In doing so I show how processes such as othering and identification, which are very useful for understanding the link between individual economic position and attitudes, may be conditional on the economic context in which individuals live.

1.8 Methodology and case selection

The empirical chapters report results from the quantitative analysis of large secondary survey data that contain questions measuring common stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients and the poor. This data is combined with administrative or survey data on the economic context of countries or sub-national units such as towns or neighbourhoods in which individuals live. This quantitative approach fits the overarching purpose of my research, which is to place stigmatising attitudes about the poor and welfare recipients into a broader structural context. To do so I need to systematically compare the beliefs of individuals across as wide a range of economic positions and contexts as possible. This approach justifies the specific datasets and variables I work with which, especially in Chapters 2 and 3, are selected to maximise variation in variables of interest as well as the external validity of my conclusions.

My methodological choices are also guided by the literature review. The cultural class analysis literature draws primarily on qualitative methods, primarily interview or ethnographic research on people in poverty alongside content analysis of political, media, or popular culture discourse. This rich qualitative data makes the cultural class literature an important source of hypotheses and mechanisms. However, this literature has difficulty accounting for the role of economic structure, tending to focus either on the specificities of a given time or place (Mckenzie, 2015;

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[23] See Mijs and colleagues (2016) for a rare attempt to quantitatively study the implications of neo-liberalisation for attitudes towards the poor.

Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013), or making broad generalisations using vague concepts such as neo-liberalism (Jensen and Tyler, 2015; Tyler, 2008). As a result my PhD contributes to this literature by drawing on quantitative data to enable structured comparisons across individuals living in a wide range of economic contexts. By contrast my contributions to the deservingness literature are more theoretical in nature, as the data and methods used in this work are very similar to those I use.

My empirical approach has both advantages and disadvantages: by using quantitative methods I trade off the empirical and conceptual richness possible in more qualitative work for broader empirical reach. As I use observational data that is largely cross-sectional in nature, many of the results need to be viewed as descriptive rather than as providing strong evidence for causality (Freedman, 1991; Gerring, 2012). Chapter 4 is an exception to this, as it uses longitudinal data with fixed effects regression models to deal with a variety of threats to causal inference (Allison, 1994).

Chapters 2 and 4 use data from the United Kingdom, while Chapter 3 uses data on 27 countries across Europe. All data falls within the period from 1987-2016. These countries and time periods are selected both for practical and conceptual reasons. While there is survey data asking questions about preferences for redistribution and support for the welfare state covering both a very large number of countries (e.g. Steele, 2015), and long time periods (Hudson et al., 2016a; MacLeod, Montero and Speer, 1999), data on attitudes towards welfare recipients or the poor is rather more scarce. As a result, the selection of cases is partly driven by the availability of survey questions measuring attitudes towards welfare recipients or the poor over a large number of years or countries, as well as high quality measures of income inequality.[24] The data used in Chapter 4 is the only publicly available longitudinal survey data that contains measures of attitudes towards welfare recipients.

One conceptual reason for my focus on Europe and the UK is to ensure consistency with the literature that I use to frame my analysis and interpret empirical results. The cultural class analysis literature has a strong focus on the UK context, and ideas of welfare deservingness have been most thoroughly explored in rich Western European countries with highly developed

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[24] For attempts to measure stigmatising attitudes towards welfare recipients over a longer time period than available in repeated cross-sectional surveys such the British Social Attitudes survey, see Hudson and colleagues (Hudson et al., 2016b). Similarly, there have been surveys of attitudes towards the poor in Latin America (Bucca, 2016) and Central Asia (Habibov, 2011).

welfare states such as the Netherlands or Scandinavian countries. I rely on these literatures both for the background assumptions on which my analysis is built and also to derive interpretive tools for understanding results. Restricting the empirical scope of my study to European countries helps to ensure that I do not apply concepts in contexts to which they cannot be generalised.

Within this set of European countries, Britain[25] makes an especially good case study for two reasons. Firstly, there is a high level of overlap, both empirically and in public attitudes, between welfare recipients and the poor. The UK welfare system has a moderate to high level of targeting towards the poor, ensuring that a large proportion of welfare recipients are poor (Brady and Bostic, 2015; Marx, Salanauskaite and Verbist, 2016). Furthermore, qualitative research tends to find that British people closely associate poverty and welfare receipt (Chase and Walker, 2012; Walker, 2014). As a result, survey questions relating to attitudes about welfare recipients are likely to be informative of attitudes towards the poor, unlike in countries where benefits are more universal, or even targeted towards the rich.

Secondly, the UK is a country in which attitudes towards welfare recipients and the poor appear to matter strongly for redistributive and welfare policy. Levels of public spending and benefit entitlements have been politically contested many times over the history of the British welfare state (Golding and Middleton, 1984; McArthur and Reeves, 2019; Somers and Block, 2005). The most recent period of contestation following the 2008 financial crisis led to major retrenchment and increased conditionality. This political contestation took place after a decade in which attitudes towards welfare recipients had been getting progressively more negative and support for redistribution was in decline (Geiger, Reeves and de Vries, 2017; Georgiadis and Manning, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2013). While drawing causal links from public attitudes to economic and political outcomes is not always easy, it seems plausible that low public support for the welfare state played a role in legitimating retrenchment (Geiger and Meueleman, 2016). Understanding the structural economic context in which stigmatising attitudes towards welfare recipients are formed has relevance in the UK, perhaps more so than in a country without substantial welfare spending, or one where the welfare system is more securely entrenched.

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[25] Given a lack of available data, all of the empirical analyses focus on Great Britain and do not include Northern Ireland.

1.9 Overview of empirical chapters and their contribution to the literature

1.9.1 Are economically advantaged individuals more likely to hold stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients and the poor?

In Chapter 2 - *Why the highly educated are more sympathetic towards welfare recipients: economic position, authoritarianism, and social status* - I apply the concepts of identification and othering from cultural class analysis to understand the relationship between an individual's economic position and stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients. I do so by addressing a puzzle which has not been given adequate attention in the deservingness literature, the strong association between high levels of education and sympathy towards welfare recipients. Given that education is an important source of economic advantage, is a disadvantaged economic position associated with higher levels of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients? Such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the idea of identification discussed in Section 1.7.3.

I argue that the association between education and negative stereotypes does not reflect economic advantage but rather the values, and perhaps the social status, associated with high levels of education. Using cross-sectional survey data from the 1987-2016 British Social Attitudes surveys I show that controlling for other measures of economic position does not explain the association between education and welfare attitudes, indicating that economic advantage cannot explain why the highly educated are more sympathetic to welfare recipients. By contrast, authoritarian values are strongly associated with negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, and I report the novel finding that controlling for them explains a substantial portion of the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. To the extent that authoritarianism is measured accurately, this finding suggests that perceptions of deviance in non-economic domains play an important role in shaping attitudes towards welfare recipients, as predicted by the cultural class analysis literature.

Drawing on research on the effects of education on authoritarian values (Stubager, 2008; Surridge, 2016; Weil, 1985), as well as the concept of othering, I argue that less educated individuals other welfare recipients in order to protect their own vulnerable social status. I show that in contexts where fewer people are highly educated the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients is stronger. When more people are highly educated it is a less distinctive status symbol, and hence this relationship provides evidence that perceptions of welfare recipients are shaped by relative social status. There are alternative explanations for this finding, and further research is needed to directly examine the role of social

status. Nonetheless, this chapter shows the potential of conceptual tools from the cultural class analysis literature to illuminate an empirical puzzle in welfare state studies that would not be possible from a self-interest perspective.

1.9.2 Are higher levels of economic inequality associated with higher levels of stigmatising stereotypes?

In Chapter 3 - *Inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty* – I draw on the comparative political economy of inequality and redistribution to address a neglected topic in research on deservingness perceptions: how income inequality shapes attitudes towards the poor. I investigate whether living in a more unequal country or time period makes individuals more or less likely to believe that the poor are at fault for their situation. I use data covering 27 countries over a 20 year period from the European Values Survey, with measures of income inequality from the All The Ginis (Milanovic, 2014) database and multilevel logistic regression models. Individuals in contexts with higher income inequality are more likely to believe that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty. To the extent to which my findings are robust to unmeasured macro-level confounders they are consistent with the idea that higher inequality damages support for redistribution, hence further increasing inequality in a vicious upward spiral (Kelly and Enns, 2010; Luttig, 2013; Mijs, 2019; Wright, 2018).

To understand the mechanisms linking unequal contexts and individualistic explanations for poverty, I investigate whether the role that inequality plays is conditional on an individual's economic position or social status. I find that the association between income inequality and the probability of holding individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty is greater among low income and low education individuals. Theories of social distance imply that the attitudes of advantaged individuals are more responsive to levels of inequality, as it is they who are increasingly segregated from the poor in high inequality contexts. As a result this finding is inconsistent with the idea that inequality increases social distance between the affluent and the poor, making the affluent less able to identify with people in poverty. My results thus challenge the extent to which influential theories about the attitudinal consequences of economic inequality in sociology and comparative political economy can be applied to attitudes towards welfare recipients and the poor (e.g. Lupu and Pontusson, 2011; Mijs, 2019).

While these results are hampered by small sample sizes at the country level, and have some alternative explanations, I argue that they are compatible with an explanation derived from the concept of othering in the cultural class analysis literature. According to this theory, in higher

inequality contexts disadvantaged individuals are more likely to feel status anxiety, they then respond to this status anxiety by othering the poor and blaming them for their poverty rather than structural forces. By contrast, more advantaged individuals do not need to protect their social status by othering those less well off than they are. This explanation further demonstrates the value of cultural class analysis for generating hypotheses about how an individual's economic and social position can affect their attitudes towards the poor, and the relevance of this literature to comparative work on inequality and welfare deservingness.

1.9.3 Does living in poorer areas make people more or less sympathetic towards the poor and welfare recipients?

In Chapter 4 - *Neither threat nor contact: Exposure to local unemployment and negative stereotypes about the unemployed* - I investigate whether individuals living in areas where unemployment benefit claims are more prevalent are more or less likely to hold stigmatising stereotypes about the unemployed. This study addresses some of the difficulties that cultural class analysis has in incorporating economic structure into studies of welfare and poverty stigma. Many studies in this literature report individuals drawing on examples from personal experience in their neighbourhood or town to justify their views about the poor and welfare recipients. However, it is unclear whether these comments reflect how individuals actually form their views or whether they are used to justify beliefs that are held for other reasons. Work on the control criterion from the deservingness literature (see discussion in section 1.7.1), which has hitherto neglected the role of local context in shaping attitudes, combined with research on threat and contact theory (Lee, Farrell and Link, 2004; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006), suggests that interpersonal contact could affect attitudes towards welfare recipients.

Using data from the British Election Study Panel Survey combined with administrative data on unemployment benefit claims in 2014-15 I examine whether individuals living in areas where unemployment rose became more or less sympathetic towards welfare recipients. I use fixed-effects regression models to adjust for the selection of individuals who are sympathetic towards the unemployed into high unemployment areas, something which has rarely been done in the existing literature (Bailey et al., 2013; Danckert, 2017; Merolla, Hunt and Serpe, 2011). I find little evidence that living in an area with higher unemployment makes people either more or less sympathetic towards the unemployed. One possible explanation is that unemployment is a hidden social status, meaning that individuals attitudes are not especially responsive to local unemployment rates because they don't know whether people they encounter in their area are unemployed or not. These results may not generalise beyond the low levels of unemployment

benefit claims observed in this study, and the short time period (one year) over which it was conducted.

Nonetheless, this finding has potentially important implications for the comparative political economy of inequality and redistribution. In particular, the social distance hypothesis discussed in section 1.7.2 is based on the assumption that higher inequality worsens perceptions of the poor by increasing residential segregation by income and hence contact across income groups. By finding little evidence that short-term exposure to unemployment affects attitudes towards the unemployed, the results of this chapter challenge the idea that residential segregation is likely to worsen attitudes towards the poor. As a result, this chapter, alongside the results of Chapter 3, challenges the applicability to negative stereotypes about welfare recipients of the theory that higher inequality shapes at attitudes by increasing social distance between the poor and the affluent.

See Table 1 below for a brief summary of the research questions, variables and data, findings, and contribution to the literature of each empirical chapter.

Table 1: Summary of empirical chapters

	Detailed research question(s)	Key variables	Cases and data	Main findings	Contribution to literature
Chapter 2 *Why the highly educated are more sympathetic towards welfare recipients: economic position, authoritarianism, and social status*	Why are more educated individuals more sympathetic towards welfare recipients? Can this relationship be explained by the economic advantage, values, or social status associated with high levels of education?	Negative stereotypes about welfare recipients (4 item scale) Individual and contextual levels of education. Right-wing and authoritarian values.	Britain, 1987-2016. British Social Attitudes Survey.	Economic advantage unable to explain association between education and negative stereotypes. Authoritarian values and contextual levels of education play important role. Social status associated with education may be important.	Fills gap in deservingness literature on relationship between economic position, education, and welfare attitudes. Shows theoretical value of cultural class analysis, especially othering and moral deviance in non-economic domains.
Chapter 3 *Income inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty*	Are individuals living in more unequal countries or time periods more likely to believe that poverty is caused by laziness? Is the association between inequality and individualistic beliefs more or less strong for	Belief that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty. Income inequality (Gini coefficient). Individual income and education.	27 European countries, 1990-2009. European Values Survey. All the Ginis Database.	Higher inequality associated with increased likelihood of believing laziness causes poverty. Association stronger among low income and education individuals. Consistent with status anxiety rather than social distance theory.	Addresses neglect of inequality in deservingness perceptions literature. Finds no evidence for social distance theory from comparative political economy literature.

	disadvantaged individuals?				Reinforces importance of social status and othering.
Chapter 4 *Neither threat nor contact: Exposure to local unemployment and negative stereotypes about the unemployed*	Do individuals living in areas where unemployment benefit claims are more prevalent hold more or less negative stereotypes about the unemployed?	Belief that unemployment is fault of those who lose their jobs. Local unemployment benefit claims.	Britain, 2014-15. British Election Study Panel Survey. Nomis Claimant Count.	Very little evidence that greater exposure to unemployed affects negative stereotypes about the unemployed.	Places accounts from cultural class analysis literature into structural economic context, using ideas from deservingness literature. Provides further evidence against social distance theory.

Chapter 2 - Why the highly educated are more sympathetic towards welfare recipients: economic position, authoritarianism, and social status[26]

'Dole scroungers are regarded as the new middle class while the rest of us who struggle working to support them become the new poverty-stricken social underclass' – in the Daily Express, 9 September 2007 (cited in Walker, 2014: 169)

2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 Education and advantage: conflicting findings

Many people think that personal experience of poverty and disadvantage make individuals more sympathetic towards the poor, whether by giving them an understanding of the factors that push people into poverty, debunking negative stereotypes, or promoting feelings of identification and sympathy (Edmiston, 2018; Roosma, Van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2014). Individuals with personal experience of poverty or welfare receipt tend to be more sympathetic towards the poor or welfare recipients in general (Danckert, 2017; Hedegaard, 2014; Roosma, Van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2014), suggesting that similarities in structural economic position promote sympathy. The implication is that economically advantaged individuals are less sympathetic towards welfare recipients.

The association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients is inconsistent with this expectation. Many studies from the UK and Europe find that individuals with degrees hold the lowest levels of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, and individuals with no qualifications the highest levels of negative stereotypes (Bailey et al., 2013; Grasso et al., 2019; Kallio and Kouvo, 2015; Roosma, Van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2014; Van Der Waal et al., 2010).[27] This association is surprising because education is a major source of economic advantage in service-sector dominated liberal market economies like the UK (Hout, 2012; Walker and Zhu, 2008). The implication is that greater economic advantage is associated with sympathy for welfare recipients, contradicting the idea that personal experience of poverty leads to sympathy for welfare recipients. Education is not only a source of economic advantage: many commentators have seen education as a key dividing line in 'postmaterialist' (Inglehart,

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[26] The empirical analyses reported throughout this PhD were conducted in Stata 15.1. I use the user-written commands *eststo, esttab,* and *coefplot* (Jann, 2007, 2014) to create regression tables and plots of coefficients, as well the graph schemes *plotplain and plotplainblind* to render plots (Bischof, 2017). I am very grateful to the authors for making these brilliant commands available.

[27] See figure 2 in section 2.5.1 for a further replication of this finding.

1990) or 'new politics' cleavages (Knutsen and Kumlin, 2004), because of the socially liberal attitudes of the highly educated (Stubager, 2008, 2013). Furthermore, education is an important source of social status and personal identity in societies where the ideology of meritocracy is widely accepted (Kuppens et al., 2015; Noord et al., 2019; Stubager, 2009).

2.1.2 Social status and authoritarianism explain the association between education and negative stereotypes

In this chapter I investigate the extent to which the association between education and negative stereotypes can be explained by the economic advantage associated with high levels of education, or the distinct cultural orientations and social status associated with high levels of education. I argue that the association between education and negative stereotypes does not reflect the economic advantage associated with high levels of education but rather the values and social status associated with it.

Using cross-sectional survey data from Britain covering almost thirty years, I show that adjusting for measures of economic advantage does not explain the association between education and negative stereotypes. Furthermore, other indicators of economic position, such as unemployment and to a weaker extent low income, are associated with lower levels of negative stereotypes. I then show that a large part of the association between education and lower levels of negative stereotypes is related to the distinctive socio-political values of the highly educated. My measure of authoritarian values is highly correlated with negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, much more strongly than right-wing values. This is an important finding in itself, and, assuming it can be replicated with other measures of authoritarianism, suggests that attitudes towards welfare recipients have more to do with intolerance for diversity in non-economic domains than is often recognised. Furthermore, authoritarian values explain a substantial portion of the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. This is consistent with a literature showing that education makes individuals less likely to hold authoritarian values at least in part by reducing the sense of cultural or status threat they feel (Achterberg and Houtman, 2009; Gidron and Hall, 2017; Lipset, 1959).

I provide some tentative evidence that social status explains the association between education and negative stereotypes by looking at how the relationship between these two variables has changed over time: even as higher education has expanded in the UK, the gap in negative stereotypes between individuals with and without a degree has decreased. I show that in years and cohorts where fewer people were degree educated the association between holding a

degree and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients is more pronounced. While there are alternative explanations for this finding, I argue that when more people have a degree it is a less distinctive status symbol. Hence the declining association between holding a degree and negative stereotypes provides evidence consistent with social status as an explanation for the association between education and negative stereotypes.

2.1.3 Empirical and theoretical contribution

Increases in levels of education in the 20th and 21st centuries have transformed the economic, social, and cultural life of the UK and other advanced democracies (Noord et al., 2019; Schofer and Meyer, 2005). Profound attitudinal consequences of this shift have been identified, mainly on non-economic issues, such as the role of religion in society, gender attitudes, and postmaterialist concerns such as environmentalism (Inglehart, 1990; Loftus, 2001; Stubager, 2009). By contrast, the implications of higher levels of education for attitudes towards poverty and welfare recipients have been investigated much less frequently. This chapter is the first research to systematically investigate why education is associated with lower levels of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, and whether this reflects the economic advantage or social status associated with high levels of education. While a number of studies of welfare attitudes and deservingness perceptions show that individuals with higher levels of education are more sympathetic towards welfare recipients (Bailey et al., 2013; Deeming, 2015; Grasso et al., 2019), few focus on explaining the association between these variables in detail (Kallio and Kouvo, 2015; Van Der Waal et al., 2010).[28] As a result, this chapter provides a possible answer to a problem in the existing literature on perceptions of welfare deservingness, and complements existing studies that focus on the association between income (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015) or employment status (Danckert, 2017) and attitudes towards welfare recipients.

I also take an innovative theoretical approach by applying ideas from two literatures that have rarely been combined and applied to quantitative research on perceptions of welfare deservingness. I draw on qualitative research in the cultural class analysis literature on how welfare recipients and the poor are presented in the media and by people in poverty

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[28] Exceptions include van der Waal and colleagues' investigation of the association between welfare chauvinism and education (2010). In a similar vein to this chapter, they argue that the higher levels of welfare chauvinism among the lower educated can be explained by the lower level of cultural competence, and greater cultural threat in this group. Also see Kallio and Kouvo's (2015) study of deservingness beliefs in Finland among welfare professionals and the general public. They show that social workers and deacons of the Church of Finland, highly educated professionals, perceive welfare recipients as more deserving than benefit officials in the Finnish Social Security Administration, who have more diverse educational backgrounds (2015).

themselves, (e.g. Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013; Tyler, 2008) to argue that individuals who hold authoritarian values and have a low social status are less likely to be sympathetic towards welfare recipients. This represents an important contribution to the deservingness literature, which has paid little attention to the possible role of authoritarian values in shaping welfare attitudes. While some researchers have noticed the association between authoritarian values and perceptions of welfare state consequences (Van Oorschot, Reeskens and Meuleman, 2012), I am aware of no research that directly studies the association between authoritarian values and welfare attitudes nor the possibility that authoritarian values might explain educational differences in negative stereotypes. The link between high levels of education and low levels of authoritarian values is well known, and there is a large literature in sociology and social psychology that explores it in more detail (Lipset, 1959; Stubager, 2008; Surridge, 2016; Weil, 1985). I draw on this literature to understand how education is a source of social status, and why a low social status might lead individuals to other welfare recipients.

2.2 Background and empirical predictions
2.2.1 Education and economic advantage
A high level of education is a major source of economic advantage in advanced capitalist economies. A large and robust literature in labour economics has demonstrated that higher levels of education, especially to degree level, are associated with a substantial earnings premium across the life course (Hout, 2012; Oreopoulos and Petronijevic, 2013). Furthermore, higher levels of education are associated with a decreased risk of unemployment, and better physical and mental health (Easterbrook, Kuppens and Manstead, 2016; Hout, 2012). Degree-educated individuals in the UK have a substantial economic advantage over individuals with lower levels of education (Walker and Zhu, 2008). They are also substantially more sympathetic towards welfare recipients than individuals with lower levels of education (Bailey et al., 2013; Grasso et al., 2019; Kallio and Kouvo, 2015; Roosma, Van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2014; Van Der Waal et al., 2010). This relationship is puzzling given that there are strong theoretical reasons for expecting individuals who are economically better off to be less sympathetic towards welfare recipients. Individuals with personal experience of poverty or unemployment are better placed to appreciate the structural causes of poverty or inequality, and be more aware of the constraints or barriers that make it easy to fall into poverty and difficult to escape it (Edmiston, 2018). As a result they might be expected to sympathise with welfare recipients and be less likely to believe negative stereotypes about them than more advantaged individuals.

Some authors have argued that individuals who are economically worse off might be less sympathetic towards welfare recipients due to fears or resentments related to competition over scarce benefits or public services (Hoggett, Wilkinson and Beedell, 2013; Roosma, Van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2014). If this were true, we would expect individuals who are on low incomes or unemployed to be less sympathetic towards welfare recipients. However, there is good empirical evidence that individuals who are personally unemployed or welfare recipients tend be more sympathetic towards unemployed people or welfare recipients in general (Danckert, 2017). As a result, a more plausible explanation for this inconsistency is that the relationship between education and negative stereotypes is driven by some feature of high levels of education other than economic advantage. If the economic advantage associated with high levels of education cannot explain its association with negative stereotypes about welfare recipients then the following hypothesis should hold:

Hypothesis 1: the association between education and negative stereotypes will not decrease after controlling for other indicators of economic advantage.

If higher levels of education are associated with negative stereotypes about welfare recipients for some reason other than the economic advantage associated with high levels of education, and individuals in a disadvantaged economic position identify with welfare recipients the following hypothesis should hold:

Hypothesis 2: indicators of economic advantage other than education are associated with higher levels of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients.

2.2.2 Authoritarianism and perceived moral deviance

In this section I explore how the distinctive socio-political values of the highly educated might explain the relationship between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients.[29] I focus on right-wing values and authoritarian values (following the terminology introduced in Evans, Heath and Lalljee, 1996). *Right-wing values* measure individuals' tolerance

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[29] I am not investigating whether there is a causal relationship of right-wing and authoritarian values on negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. Instead, I follow much work on public opinion in conceptualising political beliefs as a network of interrelated opinions on different issues, which are presumably related by a process of mutual influence and constraint (Boutyline and Vaisey, 2017), and thus cannot be modelled as unidirectional causal relationships. As a result the purpose of this section is to account for variation in the distribution of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, and interpret such variation using information about the other values that individuals hold.

for inequality, economic insecurity, and support for laissez faire economic policies, in opposition to *left-wing values*. By contrast, *authoritarian values*, which are opposed to *libertarian values*, measure the extent to which individuals are tolerant of hierarchy, and intolerant of diversity and difference in non-economic domains. These two sets of values are often seen as the two fundamental dimensions of political conflict (Achterberg and Houtman, 2009; Caughey, O'Grady and Warshaw, 2019; Evans, Heath and Lalljee, 1996; Malka, Lelkes and Soto, 2019).[30]

Attitudes towards the poor and welfare recipients are often thought to be associated with left-right values (Kallio and Niemelä, 2014; Lepianka, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2010). This makes a good deal of substantive sense: a desire to reduce inequality and economic insecurity, especially through collective solutions such as the welfare state, are fundamental to left-wing values. Given that beliefs about the deservingness of welfare recipients play an important role in shaping welfare attitudes and support for redistribution (Aarøe and Petersen, 2014; Van Oorschot and Roosma, 2017) it seems plausible that right-wing individuals will be less sympathetic towards welfare recipients. However, there are grounds for scepticism that left-right values will provide a good explanation for the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. This is because welfare attitudes are multidimensional: individuals may be quite supportive of additional welfare spending, but at the same time believe that quite harsh conditionality is required to prevent recipients from abusing the system (Furaker and Blomsterberg, 2003). In particular, Cavaille and Trump (2015) argue that attitudes towards inequality and redistribution have two distinct dimensions, one of which reflects self-interested support for redistribution 'from' the rich, while the other reflects levels of altruistic desire to redistribute 'to' the poor (see also Achterberg, Houtman and Derks, 2011). As a result, left-right values may not be as strongly associated with attitudes towards welfare recipients as sometimes thought, and may not explain their relationship with education.

In this chapter I make a case for the importance of authoritarian values in explaining negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. Low levels of education are one of the strongest known predictors of authoritarian values, and the association between them has been documented in a wide range of countries and time periods (Kalmijn and Kraaykamp, 2007; Lipset, 1959;

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[30] Most evidence in political science suggests that opinions on economic and cultural issues are separate and there is no fundamental reason why they should be associated with one another. Indeed, there is a body of evidence showing that the extent to which left-right (economic) attitudes, and libertarian-authoritarian (non-economic) attitudes are correlated varies a good deal across demographic groups and contexts (Achterberg and Houtman, 2009; Malka, Lelkes and Soto, 2019).

Weakliem, 2002).[31] Furthermore, the cultural class analysis literature provides strong indications that individuals who are more authoritarian are likely to be less sympathetic towards welfare recipients. Research in this literature shows that the poor and welfare recipients are often presented in the media, popular culture, and in ordinary people's accounts, as morally deviant in a variety of non-economic domains. For example welfare recipients and people in poverty are often stigmatised for alleged failings such as promiscuity and uncontrolled sexuality (Mckenzie, 2013; Skeggs, 2004; Tyler, 2008), addiction to smoking, alcohol, or illegal drugs (Golding and Middleton, 1984; Graham, 2012; Wincup and Monaghan, 2016), and criminality, violence and lawlessness (Jensen and Tyler, 2015; Mooney, 2009; Tyler, 2013). In a similar vein, there is a great deal of research showing how opposition to the welfare state, especially in the USA, is tied up in heavily racialised perceptions of recipients (Fox, 2010; Gilens, 1996a; Wetts and Willer, 2018). In Europe antipathy to immigrants can play a similar role (Schmidt and Spies, 2014). If welfare recipients and the poor are presented in the media and popular culture as morally deviant in non-economic domains, then individuals who are more authoritarian and thus less tolerant of diversity and difference are likely to hold negative views about them. Given the strong association between education and libertarian-authoritarian values I argue that the higher levels of authoritarianism among the less educated may well explain their unsympathetic attitudes towards welfare recipients.

This section thus suggests three hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: higher levels of authoritarian values will be associated with more stigmatising attitudes towards welfare recipients.

Hypothesis 4: the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients will diminish after controlling for authoritarianism.

Hypothesis 5: while right-wing values are associated with higher levels of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, this will not explain the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients.

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[31] The idea that a highly educated intelligentsia places particular value on open intellectual discourse, and are hence tolerant and opposed to censorship plays an important role in sociological theory about social class, cultural capital, and intellectuals (Gouldner, 1979).

2.2.3 Social status, othering, and the expansion of higher education[32]

Researchers have extensively debated why education is associated with more socially liberal values (Campbell and Horowitz, 2016; Elchardus and Spruyt, 2009; Lipset, 1959; Surridge, 2016; Weil, 1985). One answer focuses on the social status associated with high levels of education. In societies where the idea of meritocracy is widely accepted, high levels of education are often seen as an authoritative and legitimate source of merit, hence granting higher social status to the highly educated. There is substantial evidence that higher education is indeed associated with higher subjective social status (Evans and Kelley, 2004; Miyakawa et al., 2012; Noord et al., 2019; Singh-Manoux, Adler and Marmot, 2003). Furthermore, the highly educated identify with and gain a sense of positive group membership from their education, which is not the case for the less educated (Kuppens et al., 2015; Stubager, 2009). As a result, the less educated may denigrate and other members of a variety of low status groups, such as ethnic minorities or immigrants, in order to preserve their own relative position, as well as identifying more strongly with status-enhancing but potentially exclusionary groupings such as their nationality (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Han, 2016; Henry, 2011; Kuppens et al., 2015).

Welfare recipients are one group that might be othered in this way.[33] Indeed, existing research on how social status explains the association between education and authoritarianism has remarkable similarities with qualitative accounts of the way that disadvantaged individuals other and disidentify with welfare recipients and the poor. A number of researchers have shown how people in poverty and welfare recipients aim to present themselves as deserving of benefits and respectable by denigrating the behaviour of other welfare recipients (Chase and Walker,

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[32] In a series of papers on the association between education and left-right values, authoritarian values, and attitudes towards the welfare state Achterberg, Houtman, and colleagues (Achterberg and Houtman, 2009; Achterberg, Houtman and Derks, 2011; Van Der Waal et al., 2010) develop a similar explanation of why economically disadvantaged individuals hold authoritarian or exclusionary attitudes. They focus on cultural insecurity among those with low levels of cultural capital, rather than social status, but the logic is similar.

[33] There are many possible low status outgroups that individuals could disidentify with and other to protect their relative position. The specific groups that are stigmatised are likely to vary to depend on the identity of the low educated individual in question, and the context they live in. For example, members of ethnic minorities are probably unlikely to adopt racial stereotypes about a group that they personally claim membership of, but they may adopt such stereotypes about a different minority from which they may wish to distance themselves, or a group defined by a different characteristic, such as a sexual minority. Similarly, low social status individuals may be more likely to disidentify with members of groups that are salient, and stigmatised, in media and political discourse. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine these processes in detail. Its main claims are that low educated individuals have a lower social status on average, and that they are hence more likely to stigmatise and other outgroups in order to protect their social status. Welfare recipients are one possible target of this reaction to a low social status, and based on the existing qualitative research there are good reasons for thinking that, in practice attitudes towards welfare recipients are shaped by status maintenance motives of this kind.

2012; Desmond and Travis, 2018; Patrick, 2016). In their classic work *The Hidden Injuries of Class* Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb (1972) argue that the existence of welfare claimants who refuse to work directly threatens the pride that their working-class male respondents' take in making difficult sacrifices to support their families through work.

While existing accounts tend to focus on the social status granted by labour market participation, there is some evidence that education may also be relevant. In research on moral responsibilities to work and welfare conditionality, Andrew Dunn (2010, 2013) finds that individuals with university education are more likely to reject the idea that individuals have a moral obligation to support themselves through work. By contrast, those with little education are likely to articulate a moral duty to work, even for low pay or in unpleasant conditions. As a result, it seems plausible that stigmatising attitudes towards welfare recipients among low educated individuals are at least in part driven by a process of othering intended to protect their own vulnerable social status. Thus the associations between education and libertarian-authoritarian values and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients may share a common underlying cause: the high social status associated with high levels of education.

To explore whether social status shapes attitudes towards welfare recipients I look at the way that the social status associated with achieving a specific set of credentials has changed due to the massive expansion of higher education in countries like the UK. Advanced capitalist economies have seen a huge expansion in education across the twentieth century, including university education (Ansell, 2010; Schofer and Meyer, 2005). The economic advantage associated with holding a university degree has not diminished over this period of expansion, and education has become the basis of important political divisions. However, this expansion has also been marked by an internal differentiation in the economic returns and social status associated with university level education. As more people and more people come to hold a degree, the relative advantage that university education confers in a variety of domains reduces (Horowitz, 2015, 2018). Simply holding a degree becomes less important as a signal of merit in itself than the specific discipline studied and the institution at which it was granted (Bolliver, 2011; Bukodi and Goldthorpe, 2016; Lucas, 2002; Sullivan et al., 2014).

Consistent with this argument, Nord and colleagues (2019) show that when aggregate levels of education are higher, the gap in subjective social status between individuals with high and low levels of education is smaller. As a result, if the social status associated with holding a degree is

smaller in contexts where high levels of education are more prevalent, and the social status associated with high levels of education explains its association with negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, then the following hypothesis should hold:

Hypothesis 6: the association between degree level education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients will be weaker in contexts where more people are degree educated.

2.3. Data and variables
2.3.1 British Social Attitudes Survey

I investigate these predictions using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey (hereafter BSAS). The BSAS is a nationally representative repeated cross-sectional survey that asked questions about attitudes towards welfare recipients over 25 years between 1987 and 2016.[34] The BSAS is a good dataset for investigating the association between education and welfare attitudes because its long temporal reach ensures that results are not driven by short-lived aspects of the macroeconomic or political environment in which surveys were conducted. It also asks a large number of attitudinal questions in many different years, allowing me to construct attitudinal scales with greater precision and reliability of measurement than is possible with single item measures.

2.3.2 Measuring attitudes

The questions I use to measure negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, authoritarian values, and right-wing values are presented in Table 2.[35] Respondents answered all questions on

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[34] The BSAS is intended to be representative of the adult (18+) population of Great Britain resident in private households. It is conducted using a stratified multistage design, which has changed slightly over time, with the Postcode Address File used to sample addresses nested within postcode sectors since 1993, and the electoral register within constituencies used prior to 1993. The BSAS is conducted face-to-face, though the attitudinal questions I focus on were usually contained in a self-completion questionnaire. In many years, only a random subset of one third or two thirds of the total sample received certain questions, including those about welfare recipients. There are measures of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients available for the following years: 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993-1996, and 1998-2016.

[35] The BSAS contains pre-existing left-right and libertarian-authoritarian scales that are calculated from the same questions as those I use in table 2. I calculate the scales myself from the individual questions in order to investigate their unidimensionality and reliability. The BSAS also contains a 'welfarism' scale which contains all of the four questions that I use to measure negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, as well as several other questions. I do not use this scale for several reasons. Some of the questions that comprise it are about respondent attitudes towards the welfare state itself, rather than welfare recipients, such as '*The government should spend more money on welfare benefits for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes*' and '*The creation of the welfare state is one of Britain's proudest achievements*'. Another question '*Cutting welfare benefits would damage too many people's lives*' is not available in all years. There is one further question that measures attitudes towards welfare recipients in all years '*The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other*'. I do not use this question

a five point scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. For each set of questions, Table 2 reports factor loadings and goodness of fit indices for a one factor confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model to assess the extent to which the questions measure a unidimensional construct, and Cronbach's Alpha to measure the reliability of the resulting scale. For each set of questions I calculate factor scores to use in further analysis, all of which are standardised to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

The items I use to measure negative stereotypes about welfare recipients cover a variety of common stereotypes such as questions about the work ethic of the unemployed (*'around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one')*, immoral behaviour by welfare recipients (*'most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another')*, and general perceptions that welfare recipients are undeserving (*'many people who get social security don't really deserve any help')*. The goodness of fit statistics suggest that a one-factor model fits the data adequately well, and that this set of questions is reasonably unidimensional. Furthermore, a scale using these four questions has a very good level of reliability (alpha = .83). The scale is coded such that higher values indicate more negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. Appendix 1 provides an additional check on the validity of this measure by showing that individuals with higher values on this scale are more likely to hold stigmatising attitudes towards people in poverty, and that this relationship is largely consistent across individuals with differing levels of education and economic position.

Right-wing values are measured using a set of items covering, among other things, perceptions of inequality (*'Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation's wealth')*, inequalities in treatment under the law (*'There is one law for the rich and one for the poor')*, and exploitation in the workplace (*'Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance')*. All questions are reversed so that higher values equate to a more right-wing attitude. A scale from the five items has a high level of reliability (alpha = .81). However, the fit statistics imply only a moderate level of fit, and thus some possible multidimensionality in responses to these questions. However, removing the question with the smallest factor loading (*'Government should redistribute income from the better-off to less well-off')* does not improve model fit or reliability, and in any case redistribution is so central to left-right political conflict that I retain this question to ensure adequate domain coverage.

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because initial factor analyses fitting a one factor model to this question and the four that I ended up using indicated that this item had a weaker loading than the other four, and the unidimensionality and reliability of the resulting scale were increased by removing it.

Examples of the items measuring authoritarian values include punitive attitudes towards crime ('*People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences')*, a preference for hierarchy in educating children ('*Schools should teach children to obey authority'*), and a desire to suppress potentially dangerous diversity ('*Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards'*). One missing topic is items covering sexual morality and gender roles (Evans, Heath and Lalljee, 1996). While this set of items has only acceptable reliability (alpha = .71), the fit statistics suggest that these questions are measuring a slightly more unidimensional construct than those for right-wing values. Removing the question with the smallest factor loading 'C*ensorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards'* does not improve model fit or reliability.

Table 2: Measuring negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, right-wing values, and authoritarian values

Negative stereotypes about welfare recipients		Right-wing values		Authoritarian values	
Questions	Factor loadings	Questions (REVERSED)	Factor loadings	Questions	Factor loadings
Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one	0.65	*Government should redistribute income from the better-off to less well-off*	0.58	*Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values*	0.63
Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help	0.77	*Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers*	0.72	*People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences*	0.76
Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another	0.75	*Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation's wealth*	0.71	*For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence*	0.60
If welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on own feet	0.80	*There is one law for the rich and one for the poor*	0.73	*Schools should teach children to obey authority*	0.63
		Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance	0.68	*Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards*	0.41
Fit statistics					
N	64,086		73,130		70,985
RMSEA	0.051		0.093		0.071
CFI	0.996		0.972		0.976
TLI	0.989		0.944		0.951
Alpha	0.831		0.810		0.718

Notes: Factor loadings and fit statistics are from one-dimensional confirmatory factor analyses. Alpha calculated from scale of each set of items. Data from 1987- 2016 BSAS. Author's calculations.

2.3.3 Education

Education is the main explanatory variable in this research. In the BSAS educational level is measured as the highest level of education completed, coded as a five category variable with the following categories: no qualifications, lower secondary (GCSEs), upper secondary (A-levels), post-secondary non-tertiary (higher education), and tertiary education (degree) completed.[36] In some analyses this variable is dichotomised into individuals with and without a degree (tertiary education), both to simplify analyses and also because of the distinctiveness of individuals with a degree in terms of social status and political attitudes.

2.3.4 Cohort and period trends in education

To examine how the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients varies based on the share of the population with university education, I calculate the proportion of the population aged 25 and over with a degree by year and over five-year birth cohorts from 1910-14 to 1980-1984. I look at aggregate education across birth cohorts as well as years because social status may be affected more by levels of education within reference groups of individuals who went through education at the same time, rather than the country as a whole.

Figure 1 plots levels of education over years from 1987-2016 and five year birth cohorts from 1910-14 to 1980-84. The most profound change is the sharp decrease in individuals with no qualifications, which falls from about 45% of the population in the late 1980s to about 20% in 2016. After about 2000 no qualifications is replaced by GCSEs as the modal level of education, possessed by around 25-30% of the population. Underlying this is an even greater change across birth cohorts, with around 70% of the 1910-14 and 1915-19 cohorts having no qualifications, compared to under 10% of cohorts born in 1970 and onwards. By contrast, the proportion of the population who are university educated has dramatically increased from around 10% between 1987 and 1999 to about 25% by 2010. Fewer than 5% of pre-1920 cohorts were university educated, compared to 35% of the cohorts born in 1975 onwards.[37]

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[36] I use current names for qualifications of a given level. For example GCSEs, the main secondary school leaving qualification at 16, were created in 1988 replacing CSEs and O-levels, which themselves replaced the School Certificate in 1951. I treat all of these qualifications as equivalent and as measuring completion of lower secondary education.

[37] The figures presented here should not be taken as authoritative estimates, both because of possible misreporting by individuals, and also because differential mortality by social class (and hence education) is likely to overestimate the numbers of highly educated individuals in the oldest cohorts. Administrative or census-based data are likely to provide superior estimates.

Figure 1: levels of education by survey year and five-year birth cohort. Calculated for all individuals not in education and aged 25 or older. Data from BSAS 1987-2016, authors' calculations.

2.3.5 Economic position variables: income, social class, work status

In addition to education, I use three variables to measure an individual's economic position: *income*, *occupational class*, and *economic activity*. *Income* is one of the most commonly used empirical proxies for an individual's material self-interest, and hence economic position. I use a measure of self-reported household income coded into quintiles.[38] This is a measure of the relative economic position of an individual in the year in which they were surveyed, rather than an absolute measure of their economic resources.

Occupational class is a useful measure of economic position because it is well known to predict individuals long-run life chances in a manner that is much less volatile or confounded by life-cycle changes than income (Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2004). I use a five category measure of occupational class that is designed to be comparable across the changing ways in which social class has been measured over the life of the BSAS: salariat; clerical and routine; self-employed; higher manual/ routine; and lower manual/routine. Occupational class is assigned to individuals who are currently not working based on their previous job. [39]

Working, as opposed to unemployment or non-participation in the labour market, has important effects on an individual's current and future economic position, even after controlling for their income or occupational class. I measure individual *economic activity* in the following five categories: working, unemployed, permanently sick or disabled, retired, and looking after the home. Occupational class is assigned to individuals who are currently not working on the basis of their previous job.

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[38] The data was collected by the BSAS in different ways in different years. In the 2010-16 BSAS income is reported in deciles, with cut points set according to estimates from the Family Resources Survey. Prior to 2010, income was coded into an arbitrary number of categories, coded such that they contained roughly equal numbers of respondents. These categories were recoded into quintiles, which are the most granular grouping that is roughly comparable over time. The coding is approximate and some individuals may be misclassified.

[39] I harmonise two slightly different class variables into a common set of five categories, following recommendations in the BSAS user guide (NatCen Social Research, n.d.). Prior to 2001 I use the five category version of the Goldthorpe-Heath class schema (Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero, 1979). This comprises the following five classes: professional/managerial, routine, small petty bourgeoisie/farmers, manual, other manual. This is coded from the Standard Occupational Classification 1990 (SOC 1990). After 2000 I use the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NSSEC), the measure of occupational class used in most British official statistics (Rose, Pevalin and O'Reilly, 2005). This comprises the following five classes: salariat (higher and lower), clerical (junior non-manual), petty bourgeois, foreman/technicians, working class. This was coded from the SOC 2000 from 2000 to 2010, and from the SOC 2010 since 2011. Both schemas are based on similar underlying principles of asset specificity and ease of monitoring (Goldthorpe, 2007).

2.3.6 Demographic covariates and missing data

I also use a wide variety of demographic background variables that could be associated with both education and attitudes towards welfare recipients: gender, age, religious denomination (Church of England, Roman Catholic, other Christian, non-Christian, and no religion), ethnicity (white, Asian, black, mixed/other), marital status (married/ living as married, separated/divorced, widowed, and never married), the number of people in the household, housing tenure (owner occupier, renting - social, and renting - private), and trade union membership. Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for all variables in the analyses. I exclude all respondents aged under 25, or who were still in education, to ensure that the analyses focuses only on respondents who have finished full-time education. All missing values are deleted listwise, and the final sample size for all analyses is 44,343.

It is important to note a substantial amount of missing data in these analyses. Table A2 in appendix 2.1 summarises levels of non-response. The total number of respondents to the BSAS in the 25 surveys between 1987 and 2016 that I use (who were aged over 25 and not in education) is 81,486, hence the final analytic sample of 44,343 comprises only about 55% of available observations. The variable that contributes most to this non-response is the response variable, negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, which is only available in 57,945 (59%) of cases. This is partly because only a random subset of two thirds or one third of respondents received the version of the questionnaire containing these questions in some waves of the BSAS. These cases can be considered missing completely at random and ignored. However, this still leaves a substantial missing data driven by item non-response. The demographic variable contributing most to missing data is income, which is missing in 16% of cases. Other demographic variables, including education are missing in fewer than 5% of cases.

Non-response conditional on demographic variables is adjusted for by controlling for a wide range of such variables in all regression models. However, it is possible that the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients is biased if non-demographic factors predicting item non-response are correlated with both negative stereotypes and education. This could happen if there are social desirability considerations that lead individuals with high levels of negative stereotypes not to answer the questions on attitudes towards welfare recipients, and these social desirability considerations are more prevalent among the highly educated (see An, 2015 for evidence of this kind of bias in the case of attitudes towards immigration). This extent to which non-response bias of this kind exists for attitudes

towards welfare recipients has received little attention in prior research. As a result it is unclear

whether, and to what extent, such biases could affect my results.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics for all variables

	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max
VALUES				
Negative stereotypes about welfare recipients	0.01	1.00	-2.44	2.16
Right-wing values	0.00	1.01	-1.98	3.28
Authoritarian values	0.01	0.99	-4.31	1.63
EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC POSITION				
Education				
Degree	0.18	0.38	0	1
Higher education < degree	0.14	0.35	0	1
A-level	0.13	0.34	0	1
GCSE	0.28	0.45	0	1
No qualifications	0.27	0.44	0	1
Household income				
5th quintile	0.23	0.42	0	1
4th quintile	0.21	0.41	0	1
3rd quintile	0.21	0.41	0	1
2nd quintile	0.19	0.39	0	1
1st quintile	0.15	0.36	0	1
Occupational class				
Salariat	0.40	0.49	0	1
Clerical routine	0.18	0.39	0	1
Self-employed	0.08	0.27	0	1
Higher manual	0.11	0.31	0	1
Lower manual	0.23	0.42	0	1
Economic activity				
In work	0.57	0.49	0	1
Unemployed	0.04	0.20	0	1
Sick or disabled	0.05	0.21	0	1
Retired	0.25	0.43	0	1
Looking after the home	0.09	0.29	0	1
AGGREGATE LEVELS OF EDUCATION				
% of population holding degree in year	15.90	5.43	7.18	24.32
% of population holding degree in 5 year cohort	16.65	8.34	2.44	34.82
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS				

Gender

Male	0.45	0.50	0	1
Female	0.55	0.50	0	1

Housing tenure

Owner occupier	0.73	0.44	0	1
Social rent	0.19	0.39	0	1
Private rent	0.08	0.28	0	1

Marital status

Married/ living as married	0.62	0.49	0	1
Separated/ divorced	0.14	0.34	0	1
Widowed	0.11	0.31	0	1
Never married	0.14	0.35	0	1

Religion

Church of England	0.29	0.46	0	1
Roman Catholic	0.09	0.29	0	1
Other Christian	0.16	0.37	0	1
Non-Christian	0.03	0.16	0	1
No religion	0.43	0.49	0	1

Ethnicity

White	0.95	0.21	0	1
Black	0.02	0.12	0	1
Asian	0.02	0.14	0	1
Other/mixed	0.01	0.10	0	1

Union membership

Non-union member	0.77	0.42	0	1
Union member	0.23	0.42	0	1

Household size

1 person	0.27	0.45	0	1
2 people	0.36	0.48	0	1
3 people	0.15	0.36	0	1
4 people	0.15	0.36	0	1
5+ people	0.06	0.24	0	1

Age	50.88	15.85	26	95

Region

North	0.17	0.38	0	1
Yorks and Humberside	0.09	0.28	0	1
East Midlands	0.08	0.27	0	1
West Midlands	0.09	0.28	0	1

East and South East	0.24	0.43	0	1
London	0.09	0.29	0	1
South West	0.09	0.29	0	1
Wales	0.05	0.22	0	1
Scotland	0.09	0.29	0	1

Notes: Data from 1987-2016 BSAS. Means of categorical variables can be interpreted as proportion falling into category. Sample size = 44,434 for all variables. Author's calculations.

2.4 Two analytical approaches

The majority of the analysis uses linear regression models with negative stereotypes about welfare recipients as the response variable, and education, income, occupational class, and work status treated as categorical predictors. All models include demographic background variables as controls, though their inclusion makes very little difference to results. Deservingness perceptions and attitudes towards welfare recipients are heavily influenced by wider context, including macroeconomic fluctuations (Uunk and van Oorschot, 2018) and political or media debate (Deeming, 2015; Reeves and de Vries, 2016). Similarly, long-standing regional differences in economic performance, political representation, or media markets might also shape individual attitudes towards welfare recipients. To limit the impact of this context on estimates of individual level relationships, all models include fixed effects for year to adjust for time-varying shocks that affect the entire country simultaneously, and fixed effects for nine regions to adjust for time-invariant geographical variation. [40]

I use a different approach to investigate how the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients depends on aggregate levels of education. To answer this question I estimate two separate multilevel linear regression models. In the first, individuals are treated as nested within survey years, and in the second they are nested within five-year birth cohorts. I measure education using a dummy variable for whether an individual has a degree or not. I interact this variable with a measure of the share of the population who are degree educated in the respondents' survey year or birth cohort. The model includes a random-slope on degree-level education (Heisig and Schaeffer, 2019).

This analysis is exploratory, and results need to be interpreted with caution for two reasons. Firstly, the second-level sample size in both models is small (26 years and 16 cohorts), with the resulting possibility that standard errors on cross-level interaction terms are underestimated (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016; Stegmueller, 2013). Secondly, I model aggregate education in years and birth cohorts separately, and do not attempt to empirically differentiate between, or adjust for, cohort or period effects. Differentiating between age, period, and cohort effects is very challenging (Bell and Jones, 2014), and as such I leave it to future research.

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[40] The North, Yorkshire and Humberside, East Midlands, West Midlands, East and South East, London, South West, Wales, and Scotland. This regional classification is based on the nine Government Office Regions (GORs), plus Scotland and Wales. I combine the North Eastern and North Western GORs into a 'North' region, and the South East and East of England GORs into an 'East and South-East' region. This is done to make the regional categories compatible over time, as GORs were not used in the BSAS prior to 2000.

All the analyses reported in this chapter plot model coefficients or estimated marginal means to save space and for easier comprehension. Full regression tables can be found in Appendix 2.2. All analyses are weighted using BSAS sample weight. The analysis begins by investigating whether the association between education and negative stereotypes can be explained by the economic advantage associated with higher levels of education (section 2.5.1), and then investigates how right-wing and authoritarian values shape the association between education and attitudes towards welfare recipients (section 2.5.2). Results in these sections use linear regression models with year and region fixed effects. Section 2.5.3 begins by showing how educational differences in negative stereotypes about welfare recipients have declined over time, before introducing multilevel regression models to explore how educational differences in negative stereotypes are shaped by aggregate levels of education.

2.5 Results
2.5.1 Education and economic position
I first investigate whether the association between education and negative stereotypes can be explained by the economic advantage associated with higher levels of education. Figure 2 plots model coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for linear regression models of the association between economic position and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. All models control for demographic background variables. The models in the left-hand panel estimate the association of each economic position variable with negative stereotypes separately. All models in the right-hand panel include education, and each model adds a different economic position variable as a control, before adding all of them together.

As seen in in previous research (Bailey et al., 2013; Grasso et al., 2019; Kallio and Kouvo, 2015; Van Der Waal et al., 2010), a higher level of education is associated with more sympathetic attitudes towards welfare recipients. Individuals educated to degree level have, all else equal, 0.4 standard deviations lower levels of negative stereotypes than individuals with just A-levels or higher education, and 0.65 standard deviations lower levels of negative stereotypes than individuals with no qualifications. Importantly, comparing the right and left-hand panels of Figure 2 shows that controlling for economic position variables makes very little difference to the association between education and negative stereotypes. Controlling for any or all of the other three measures of economic position does not change the size of the association in any substantively meaningful manner. This provides a strong indication that the association between

education and negative stereotypes is unlikely to be related to the economic advantage associated with higher levels of education.

The relationship between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients is quite distinct from that between other economic position variables and negative stereotypes. Individuals outside the labour market hold lower levels of negative stereotypes than those in work: in particular, individuals who are unemployed or sick and disabled have, all else equal, 0.6 and 0.4 standard deviations lower levels of negative stereotypes than individuals in work. This effect is almost as large as the role of education, and is robust to the inclusion of controls for education and other economic position variables. This pattern is consistent with the idea that individuals who are in more disadvantaged structural positions sympathise with welfare recipients and are thus less likely to hold negative stereotypes.

The association between income or occupational class and negative stereotypes is weaker, and more vulnerable to the inclusion of controls for education and other economic position variables. The results for income are also somewhat supportive of the identification perspective. With only demographic controls, having an income in the bottom quintile is associated with the lowest level of negative stereotypes, and an intermediate/high income (3rd-4th quintile) is associated with the highest levels of negative stereotypes. After controlling for education and other economic position variables levels of negative stereotypes increase monotonically with income. The case of occupational class is somewhere between that of income and education: individuals in intermediate classes, self-employed and higher manual/routine, have the highest levels of negative stereotypes, and those in the salariat the lowest. However, the relationship is not especially strong, and is diminished in size by controls for education and other economic position variables. Thus, individuals with the highest levels of negative stereotypes are likely to combine low levels of education with a comfortable economic situation, being in work and earning a high income, but in a self-employed or higher manual occupation. By contrast, individuals with high levels of education, but low household incomes, who are also out of work are likely to be most sympathetic.

There are two key conclusions from this set of results. Firstly, in line with Prediction 1 the association between education and negative stereotypes cannot be explained by the economic advantage associated with high levels of education – as controlling for other measures of economic position does not affect the size of the association. Secondly, the associations

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between work status or income and attitudes towards welfare recipients generally support Prediction 2, that individuals who are less economically advantaged are more sympathetic towards welfare recipients. The next section will investigate whether the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients can be explained by the distinctive values that the highly educated hold.

Figure 2: Association between education, economic position variables, and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from eight linear regression models. Left-hand panel presents four models, each of which contains one economic position variable. Results for these models in table A3 in appendix 2.2. Right-hand panel contains coefficients from four models, all of which include education, and successively add economic position variables. Results for these models in table A4 in appendix 2.2. All models include demographic controls, year and region fixed effects, and are weighted using BSAS survey weight. Sample size = 44,434 in all models. Data from BSAS 1987-2016.

2.5.2 Education and authoritarian values

Figure 3 plots coefficients from regressions of right-wing values and authoritarianism on negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. All estimates include region and year fixed effects. Consistent with Prediction 5, the results suggest a strong association between authoritarian values and attitudes towards welfare recipients: 1 standard deviation higher authoritarianism is associated with 0.5 standard deviations higher levels of negative stereotypes, whether right-wing values are controlled for or not. Surprisingly, the association is five times larger than that observed between right-wing values and negative stereotypes. The implication is that sympathetic attitudes towards welfare recipients are strongly associated with the non-economic values of tolerance for diversity and distaste for hierarchy on the libertarian-authoritarian dimension. This association is much stronger than it is for economic values such as a desire for equality, state intervention in the economy, and redistribution that are commonly thought to shape attitudes towards the poor. This is itself an important finding and contribution to the literature, and is discussed further in Section 2.6.3 below. I now investigate whether right-wing or authoritarian values can explain the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients.

Figure 4 shows how the association between education, other economic position variables, and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients change when controlling for right-wing or authoritarian values. The plot contains coefficients from three regression models: the first contains no values and is presented for comparison purposes, the second adds right-wing values, and the third, authoritarian values.

The strength of the association between education and negative stereotypes is dramatically reduced by controls for authoritarian values. All else equal, an individual with no qualifications would be expected to have 0.7 standard deviations higher levels of negative stereotypes than a degree holder with no value controls, but only 0.25 standard deviations higher negative stereotypes when authoritarian values are controlled. Similarly, the corresponding coefficient for individuals with A-levels is reduced from 0.4 standard deviations to 0.15 standard deviations. By contrast, the introduction of right-wing values leaves the association between education and negative stereotypes completely unchanged relative to the model with no value controls.

Similarly, the association between other measures of economic position are generally unchanged by the introduction of either right-wing or authoritarian values.[41]

Figure 3: Association between authoritarian values, right-wing values, and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from three linear regression models. First two models, denoted 'one value' in legend, estimate coefficient of right-wing and authoritarian values on negative stereotypes separately, while 'both values' model includes both sets of values together. All models include year and region fixed effects and are weighted using BSAS survey weight. Sample size = 44,343 in all models. Data from BSAS 1987-2016. Authors' calculations. See Table A5 in appendix 2.2 for full results.

The results in this section point to several important conclusions. Firstly, consistent with Prediction 4, the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients can to a large extent be explained by the lower levels of authoritarian values possessed by the highly educated. Secondly, authoritarian values do not change the association between other economic position variables and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. This suggests that identification or sympathy with welfare recipients may still explain why individuals who are in less advantaged economic positions hold lower levels of negative stereotypes. Thirdly, right-wing values do not appear to explain the association between education, economic position variables, and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients.

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[41] One exception is that the association between social class and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients is somewhat weaker after controlling for authoritarian values.

The results of this section provide clear evidence that the association between education and negative stereotypes in part reflects the greater tolerance for diversity observed among the highly educated. In section 2.2.3 I argued that individuals who are relatively low status other welfare recipients to protect their own threatened self-image. Drawing on the literature on the effects of education on libertarian-authoritarian values, I argue that the association between education and both negative stereotypes and authoritarian values is likely to stem from a common cause: status anxiety among the low educated, which translates into a desire to protect a threatened self-image by othering outsiders. While the results presented in this section are consistent with social status playing such a role, the next section more directly investigates this question by examining how the relationship between education and negative stereotypes depends on aggregate levels of education.

Figure 4: Effect of controlling for right-wing and authoritarian values on the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from three linear regression models. First model contains education, all economic position variables, and no value controls, second adds controls for right-wing values, and third instead controls for authoritarian values. All models include demographic controls, year and region fixed effects, and are weighted using BSAS survey weight. Sample size = 44,434 in all models. Data from BSAS 1987-2016. See Table A6 in appendix 2.2 for full results.

2.5.3 The effect of degree-level education is smaller when more highly prevalent

Figure 5 plots educational differences in negative stereotypes about welfare recipients over time. The estimates are contrasts of marginal means from a linear regression model where education is interacted with dummy variables for year. The reference category is individuals with a degree, allowing the difference between university educated individuals and the rest of the population over time to be observed. One message of this plot is the stability over time of educational differences: individuals with a degree are estimated to have lower levels of negative stereotypes than individuals with fewer qualifications in every year. However, it is also clear from the plot that the difference between individuals with a degree, and those with other educational levels has been declining over time. Individuals with A-levels had about 0.6 standard deviations higher levels of negative stereotypes than those with a degree in the late 1980s and early 1990s, declining to around 0.2 standard deviations in 2010, and rebounding slightly thereafter. Individuals with no qualifications saw a corresponding decline from about 0.9 standard deviations higher than individuals with a degree in the late 1980s to about 0.4 standard deviations in 2010.

This decline in educational differences is surprising: the rise of 'postmaterialist', 'new politics', or populist political cleavages across this period would all be expected to increase education-based political polarisation (Inglehart, 1990; Knutsen and Kumlin, 2004; Stubager, 2013). As a result I explore whether the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients depends on the share of the population in a given year or birth cohort who are degree educated.

Figure 5: Over time variation in the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. Figure plots contrasts of estimated marginal means with 95% confidence intervals and degree as reference category from linear regression model with interaction between education and dummy variables for year. Model includes region fixed-effects and is weighted using BSAS survey weight. Sample size = 44,434. Data from BSAS 1987-2016. Author's calculations.

Figure 6 plots the results from multilevel regression models examining how the association between degree level education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients depends on the share degree educated in a given year or five-year birth cohort. Both models include a cross-level interaction between degree level education and the aggregate share degree educated, a random slope on degree level education, and controls for all economic position and demographic background variables.[42] The full results are displayed in Table A7.

The plot displays contrasts of estimated marginal means, showing the difference in negative stereotypes between those who are degree educated against those who are not. In both cases, the slopes are positive, implying that the association between degree level education and attitudes towards welfare recipients is weaker in contexts where more people have a degree. In both models the interaction effects are precisely estimated with 95% confidence intervals that do not include 0 (for *degree X % degree educated in survey year* β = 0.015, 95% CI: LB = 0.009, UB = 0.02, for *degree X % degree educated in five year birth cohort* β = 0.039, 95% CI: LB = 0.034, UB: 0.045). Moving from 8% of the population degree educated, which was the case in 1987 or 1989, to 24% as observed in 2013-16 is associated with -0.2 standard deviations decline in the difference between individuals who are degree educated and not. Similarly, moving from 5% of the population degree educated, which was the case in the 1920-24 and 1925-29 cohorts, to 30% in the 1970-74 cohort is associated with a -0.2 standard deviations decline in the difference between individuals who are degree educated and not.

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[42] The associations are in the same direction, but smaller in magnitude if authoritarian values are controlled for. It is not clear that authoritarian values should be controlled for, as they are potential mediators of the association between education and negative stereotypes.

Figure 6: association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients conditional on aggregate levels of education in year or birth cohort. Figure plots contrasts of estimated marginal means with 95% confidence intervals from multilevel linear regression model, with cross level interaction between dummy for degree level education and aggregate share degree educated. Models are estimated using maximum likelihood and include random slope on degree. Model in left-hand panel nests individuals within years, and measures share degree educated in that year. Model in right-hand panel nests individuals within 5 year birth cohorts, and measures share degree educated in that cohort. Both models control for economic position, demographic background, and region, and are weighted using BSAS survey weight. Individual level sample size = 44,343. Aggregate level sample size either 26 years or 16 cohorts. Data from BSAS 1987-2016. Author's calculations. See Table A7 in appendix 2.2 for full results.

These results suggest that the association between degree level education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients is weaker in both years and cohorts where more people are educated to such a level. This pattern is consistent with the idea that the expansion of higher education has changed the composition of the degree educated population such that the relative advantage to degree level education in terms of social status is lower. As a result the difference between individuals with and without a degree in terms of their attitudes towards welfare recipients is diminished. This analysis provides indirect evidence for the idea that the association between education and attitudes towards welfare recipients is driven by the higher social status associated with increased education. It is important to note that this analysis is

exploratory and a certain amount of caution needs to be taken with the results due to small sample sizes at the aggregate level and the possible confounding of period effects by cohort effects and vice versa. [43]

2.6. Discussion and conclusion
2.6.1 Authoritarianism and social status explain the role of education in negative stereotypes

This chapter began with a puzzle. High levels of education are strongly associated with sympathy towards welfare recipients, and education (especially to degree level) is an important source of economic advantage. Does this imply that a disadvantaged economic position associated with higher levels of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients? Such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the idea that economically disadvantaged people identify with welfare recipients and the poor and are more sympathetic towards them because of their personal experience. I argue that this puzzle can be solved by considering education not only as a source of economic advantage, but also a source of high social status, and hence a distinctive set of socio-political values characterised by low levels of authoritarianism. I find no evidence that the association between education and negative stereotypes can be explained by the economic advantage associated with high levels of education. Furthermore, a disadvantaged economic position, such as experience of unemployment, is associated with a more sympathetic attitude towards welfare recipients, consistent with the idea that experience of hardship leads to identification and sympathy. However, a high level of education also appears to be associated with more sympathetic attitudes.

The association between education and attitudes towards welfare recipients can to a large extent be explained by the higher levels of authoritarian values that go with low education. Authoritarian values are strongly associated with negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, much more so than right wing values. This provides evidence that attitudes towards welfare recipients are related to a desire for hierarchy and intolerance of diversity, which is heavily influenced by a low or threatened social status. Furthermore, I find evidence that the strength of the association between education and negative stereotypes has been decreasing over a period of major expansion in higher education: the association between holding a degree and

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[43] These results suggest the resolution to a potential hole in my analysis. If education is associated with greater sympathy for welfare recipients, and levels of education are increasing, then shouldn't attitudes towards welfare recipients be getting more sympathetic? However, increasing education is compatible with flat or declining sympathy for welfare recipients because the gap between individuals with different levels of education reduces as the overall share of the population highly educated increases.

negative stereotypes is smaller in years or among birth cohorts where more people are educated to degree level. This is consistent with the idea that a degree constitutes less of a status symbol the more prevalent it is in the population. I argue that these patterns are consistent with the idea that individuals with low social status other disadvantaged groups in order to reinforce their own threatened self-esteem.

2.6.2 Alternative explanations and suggestions for future research

It is important to note that the status anxiety explanation developed in this chapter is not the only possible account of why highly educated individuals are more sympathetic towards welfare recipients. One alternative explanation builds on a literature showing persistent differences in political attitudes among generations who were socialised in different political contexts (e.g. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2014; Tilley, 2002). In particular, the generations who came of age in the 1980s to mid-1990s under Thatcherism ('Thatcher's children) and those who came of age between 1997 and 2010 under New Labour ('Blair's babies) are more authoritarian and hold more stigmatising attitudes towards welfare recipients than the cohorts of the 1960s and 1970s (Grasso et al., 2019; Russell, Johnston and Pattie, 1992). These cohort differences in political context could confound the status anxiety explanation because younger generations have higher levels of education. However, identifying cohort differences between generations gives no necessary indication of the mechanisms that explain these differences (depending on the specific method used - see Winship and Harding, 2008). Furthermore, it is possible that a mechanism like status anxiety might explain within-cohort or within-year educational differences in stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients, even if political context is driving period and cohort trends in welfare attitudes.

Another set of alternative explanations argue that there is a causal effect of education on attitudes towards welfare recipients that works through a different mechanism than by inducing differences in social status and hence status anxiety. For example, education could improve attitudes towards welfare recipients by developing critical thinking skills and knowledge of the world, as well as socialisation into the culture of academic social science and humanities (Elchardus and Spruyt, 2009). These experiences might make the highly educated better able to reject inaccurate and misleading stereotypes about welfare recipients (Bailey et al., 2013; Geiger, 2018). If explanations of this kind are correct then they will need to account for the declining association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients in contexts where more people are highly educated. This could be done by assuming that most of the expansion takes place in vocational or practical subjects that do not impart the requisite

critical faculties or worldview, for example. Future research could aim to distinguish the status anxiety explanation I present here from these other explanations by incorporating social status directly into the analysis, rather than the indirect role it plays in this chapter. Measures of self-reported subjective social status could be used (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Noord et al., 2019) to see whether individuals with lower self-reported social status hold more negative stereotypes about welfare recipients and whether subjective social status mediates the relationship between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients.

In addition to these alternative explanations of my findings, there are problems with interpreting my results in causal terms. The effects of education on either economic or attitudinal outcomes are very difficult to estimate because there are profound and often unmeasurable selection effects (often stemming from formative background) that affect both an individual's level of education and other outcomes (Campbell and Horowitz, 2016; Cavaille and Marshall, 2019; Surridge, 2016). For example, growing up in more advantaged circumstances may confer a higher social status on people that persists into adulthood, even as a more advantaged upbringing increases the likelihood of high levels of educational attainment. Treating my regression model estimates of the association between education and negative stereotypes as causal relies on the assumption that this selection bias has been controlled for, which may not be the case. As a result, the estimates presented in this chapter should be read as descriptive, concerned primarily with understanding how the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients changes when a variety of other variables are conditioned on, and then interpreting these patterns in line with existing theory. One solution to problems of this kind could be to measure negative stereotypes about welfare recipients in long-running cohort studies, allowing detailed information on formative context to be linked to adult social status and welfare attitudes (for research designs of this kind see Gingrich, 2019; Surridge, 2016).

It is also important to note that my results are potentially vulnerable to measurement error in the attitude scales used to measure negative stereotypes, right-wing, and authoritarian values. While all these constructs are more reliably measured than with single item scales, the reliability of the authoritarianism scale in particular is only moderate. It also lacks coverage of several important authoritarian values relevant to attitudes towards welfare recipients, especially attitudes towards gender roles and sexual morality (Evans, Heath and Lalljee, 1996; Mckenzie, 2013; Tyler, 2008). While my findings about educational differences in negative stereotypes

about welfare recipients and the role played by authoritarianism are large and robust it would be no bad thing to replicate these associations with different attitudinal measures.

The status anxiety explanation for the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients accounts for the weakening role of education when more people are highly educated, and is consistent with the role of authoritarian values in shaping welfare attitudes. However, as this section shows, there are a number of alternative explanations that are broadly consistent with the data. As a result, the status anxiety explanation for educational differences requires corroboration by future research designed to rule out some of these alternatives before being widely accepted.

2.6.3 Authoritarianism and support for welfare conditionality

The strong association between authoritarian attitudes and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients is rather surprising given that welfare attitudes are usually thought to be closely associated with economic attitudes towards inequality, redistribution, and the role of the state. This result has strong commonalities with research on welfare chauvinism (Schmidt and Spies, 2014) and perceptions of the undeservingness of ethnic minorities (Harell, Soroka and Iyengar, 2016; Wetts and Willer, 2018), all of which suggest that welfare attitudes tap into concerns that are at least partly non-economic. I argue that thinking about attitudes towards welfare recipients as shaped by non-economic concerns about hierarchy, authority, and tolerance for diversity has important implications for the study of welfare attitudes.

One area of social policy in which authoritarian values may play an important role is in understanding public support for welfare conditionality policies such as job search requirements and sanctioning regimes for the unemployed. Such policies, often under the guise of Active Labour Market Policies, have been increasing in popularity in advanced democracies (Buss, Ebbinghaus and Naumann, 2017; Fossati, 2018). Historical and contemporary scholarship has shown that the design of welfare policies in the UK and USA have been shaped by culturally authoritarian assumptions about the morality and behaviour of their intended recipients. These include racist stereotypes about the work ethic of African-Americans and other minorities, and Malthusian concerns about the sexual morality and self-restraint of the poor and working classes (Schram et al., 2009; Schram, Fording and Soss, 2008; Somers and Block, 2005; Welshman, 2006).

As a result, there are strong reasons to think that individuals who are more authoritarian, and hence less tolerant of diversity and more supportive of hierarchy are likely to be more supportive of punitive conditionality policies which punish deviance from a perceived social norm of self-reliance (Dunn, 2010). Indeed, there may be an especially strong link between punitive attitudes towards crime and law breaking and punitive attitudes towards the structure of the welfare state. This would be an interesting topic for future research on public attitudes towards welfare conditionality, which has thus far measured political orientation using political party support or self-placement on a unidimensional scale (Deeming, 2015; Fossati, 2018).

2.6.4 Implications for the history of welfare retrenchment

My findings have important implications for understanding why disadvantaged people support welfare retrenchment and increased conditionality. The alleged undeservingness of welfare recipients has been used to justify major cuts to the British welfare state, including the 'Scroungerphobia' panic of the mid 1970s (Golding and Middleton, 1984) and the major welfare reforms that followed the 2008 financial crisis (Jensen and Tyler, 2015). These welfare reforms had broad popular support, even though they came in periods of heightened unemployment, when the increased personal experience of unemployment and financial hardship should have made individuals more sympathetic towards welfare recipients.

One explanation of public support for welfare retrenchment in periods of high unemployment focuses on how political and media elites frame debates about the behaviour and living conditions of welfare recipients. Such elites have a major influence on public attitudes towards welfare recipients, in part because of the control they have over the framing of political issues.[44] Scholars have identified an increasingly individualistic and pathological framing of welfare issues by the media, echoed by New Labour under Tony Blair, as the explanation for increasingly negative attitudes towards welfare recipients over the 1990s and 2000s (Deeming, 2015; Grasso et al., 2019; McArthur and Reeves, 2019; Reeves and de Vries, 2016).

If the media predominantly frames the behaviour of welfare recipients in terms of socially authoritarian attitudes and provokes feelings of status threat, then low status individuals who

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[44] There is a large and robust body of evidence showing that the way the media frames a political issue affects individuals' attitudes (e.g. Chong and Druckman, 2007). Furthermore, there is an influential literature in social policy which argues that the design of welfare policies has feedback effects on attitudes towards welfare recipients by the way that differing levels of means-testing and universalism whether discussion about deservingness takes place or not (Larsen, 2007).

hold authoritarian attitudes will become less sympathetic towards welfare recipients. As a result, individuals with low levels of education will become less sympathetic towards welfare recipients, despite their relative economic disadvantage, which would otherwise make them more sympathetic towards welfare recipients due to their personal experience of hardship (Danckert, 2017; Edmiston, 2018).

While further research is needed to explore this specific explanation in detail, it is consistent with much work on how welfare recipients and the poor were presented in the media and political rhetoric between the mid 2000s and early 2010s. Newspapers and politicians presented welfare recipients as morally deviant in a variety of non-economic domains, including criminality (Mooney, 2009) and sexual morality (Tyler, 2008). A rhetorical focus on the allegedly undeserved luxury and ease in which welfare recipients lived presented the welfare recipients as a threat to the social status of the working poor (Baumberg, Bell and Gaffney, 2012).[45] The results of this chapter suggest why individuals might support welfare retrenchment even when their personal experience of disadvantage should make them more sympathetic towards welfare recipients: media framings provoke perceptions of the undeservingness of welfare recipients among low status and authoritarian individuals, who are low educated and economically disadvantaged.

2.6.5 Conclusion

This chapter is the first analysis of the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. I show that university educated individuals are much more sympathetic towards welfare recipients than those who are less well educated using British survey data covering almost thirty years. To explain the association, I draw on an innovative combination of the cultural class analysis literature and work on the relationship between education and libertarian-authoritarian values. I argue that the libertarian values, and possibly the social status, of the highly educated explain why they hold low levels of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients.

My results also reinforce the idea that a disadvantaged economic position is associated with more sympathy for the poor, and that the economic disadvantage associated with low levels of education cannot explain why low educated individuals stigmatise welfare recipients. By contrast, authoritarian values explain a large part of the association between education and

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[45] See for example the quote from the British tabloid newspaper, the *Daily Express* with which I began this chapter.

negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, suggesting that future work on welfare attitudes should take account of tolerance for diversity in non-economic domains. The association between education and negative stereotypes has been declining over time, as the share of the population which is degree educated increases. This association is consistent with the argument that the high social status associated with university education explains why degree-holders are more sympathetic towards welfare recipients: they have less of a need to shore up a threatened social status by othering the poor. However, further research is needed to overcome challenges of a small aggregate level sample size and to rule out alternative explanations such as cohort differences in attitudes based on formative political context or confounding by an advantaged social background, and validate the hypothesised mechanism of subjective social status.

Chapter 3- Income inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty

'A lot of people round here are living in poverty but I think a lot of it's their own doing. (Laura, 31, unemployed)' (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013: 285).

3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Inequality and solidarity with the poor

The widespread increase in income inequality across the developed world since the 1980s has provoked considerable academic and popular concern about its social and political consequences (OECD, 2011; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). There is a large body of research suggesting that higher income inequality reduces social trust (Buttrick and Oishi, 2017; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005) and tolerance of minorities (Andersen and Fetner, 2008). It also increases violent crime (Elgar and Aitken, 2011; Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 2002; Hsieh and Pugh, 1993). Together, these studies suggest that rising inequality erodes social solidarity (Paskov and Dewilde, 2012). Under such conditions, rises in inequality have the potential to be self-reinforcing: if solidarity with the poor is eroded by inequality then support for welfare policies that reduce inequality will fall. As a result, welfare retrenchment is more likely, increasing inequality further, in a vicious upward spiral.

There is a large literature in political science that aims to understand this issue by investigating whether increasing inequality produces increased demand for redistribution, or whether by contrast it can have self-perpetuating effects (Breznau and Hommerich, 2019; Kelly and Enns, 2010; Kenworthy and McCall, 2008; Schmidt-Catran, 2016). An important determinant of public support for welfare policies that could potentially reduce inequality is beliefs about whether welfare recipients are 'deserving' of help or not (Aarøe and Petersen, 2014; Fong, 2007; Van Oorschot and Roosma, 2017). One of the most important determinants of deservingness is the extent to which individuals are seen as responsible for their own poverty or not (Fong, 2007). Individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty assert that the poor are responsible for their situation because of faults of character, and are thus not deserving of help. By contrast, those who think that poverty is caused by structural economic forces, or discrimination and injustice may be more supportive of redistributive policies.

As a result, understanding the relationship between economic inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty is central to understanding whether economic inequality has

a self-reinforcing dynamic. While a number of scholars have investigated the cross-national distribution and correlates of beliefs about the causes of poverty, there has been very little research on the role that economic inequality plays. This is very surprising given the large literatures on the effects of inequality on social trust and support for redistribution.

I address this neglect by investigating whether individuals in countries and years with higher levels of income inequality are more or less likely to hold individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty. Using data from three waves of the European Values Survey covering 27 countries, I find evidence that people are more likely to believe individualistic explanations of the causes of poverty, and less likely to believe structural explanations, when income inequality is higher. This relationship is robust to a wide set of controls for demographic composition, two different measures of inequality, and controls for whether a country has a communist past. Furthermore, within countries, in years when inequality is higher, individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty are more common. While I am unable to rule out confounding by macroeconomic context or welfare state structure, this finding is consistent with the idea that rising inequality can be self-reinforcing.

There are a number of mechanisms that are consistent with a positive association between inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty. To differentiate between some of them I examine whether the association between inequality and individualistic beliefs is different for more or less advantaged individuals. I find evidence that individuals with higher levels of education, and higher incomes are less sensitive to between-country variation in income inequality than those who are less advantaged. One explanation for this pattern is that inequality affects individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty by increasing levels of status anxiety. As argued in chapter 2, less well off or lower status individuals respond to status anxiety by othering the poor, and blaming them for their poverty.

This explanation is necessarily speculative as there are a large number of confounding variables at the country level that are very difficult to incorporate into this analysis. Nonetheless, my findings should encourage researchers working on deservingness perceptions and beliefs about the causes of poverty to engage with the role that income inequality may play in shaping stigmatising stereotypes about the poor. This is especially true given that my argument suggests that higher income inequality poses a potentially serious threat to welfare state legitimacy,

eroding support for the very people that are most disadvantaged by increased income disparities.

3.1.2 Contribution

The principal contribution of this chapter is to the literature on perceptions of the deservingness of welfare recipients. A number of authors have examined the structure, cross-national distribution, and correlates of beliefs about the causes of poverty (Larsen, 2007; Lepianka, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2010; Van Oorschot and Halman, 2000). However, they have largely neglected the role of economic inequality. As a result, this chapter fills a major gap in the deservingness literature by investigating the effects of inequality, which is central to a wide range of debates across the social sciences and has a crucial theoretical connection to attitudes towards the poor.

This chapter also represents a methodological advance on much of the previous literature. Unlike most other work on deservingness and beliefs about the causes of poverty I use multiple waves of cross-sectional survey data, giving my analysis a temporal dimension which is lacking from most research in this area.[46] The survey data I am using cover almost 20 years (1990-2009) and a diverse set of countries across Western and Eastern Europe, enhancing both the external validity of my conclusions and the ability to identify heterogeneity and potential confounders. The use of repeated cross-sections allows me to decompose the relationship between inequality and individualistic beliefs into within and between country components (Fairbrother, 2014). This is important because the question of whether rises in inequality are self-perpetuating is inherently about processes that evolve over time, and so cannot necessarily be identified in a purely cross-sectional research design.

My results also contribute to a debate on the ways in which aggregate level inequality affects individual attitudes. I distinguish two different explanations of how inequality affects beliefs about the causes of poverty: *social distance* and *status anxiety*. Social distance explanations focus on how inequality transforms social relationships by increasing residential segregation by income, increasing homophily in marriage or friendship, and polarising the living conditions of the affluent and the poor. As a result, social attitudes polarise – with the rich becoming less altruistic towards the poor (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011; Newman, Johnston and Lown, 2015). By

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[46] Most of this literature uses data from one survey wave only. See Buss and colleagues (2017) for a similar analysis to mine.

contrast, status anxiety explanations focus on how inequality can, paradoxically, increase support for the status quo amongst those disadvantaged by it. Status anxiety increases as inequality increases – and disadvantaged individuals can react to such anxiety by othering or discriminating against those less well of than themselves in order to protect their own insecure position (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Sennett and Cobb, 1972; Wetts and Willer, 2018). My finding that individuals with higher levels of education and higher incomes are less sensitive to variation in income inequality than less advantaged individuals, suggests that in the case of attitudes towards the poor the status anxiety perspective is better supported.

3.2 Literature and theoretical expectations
3.2.1 Why individualistic beliefs?
Unlike in chapters 2 and 4, where I examine negative stereotypes about welfare recipients and unemployed people, this chapter focuses on *individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty*.[47] Individualistic beliefs locate the causes of poverty within the behaviour or character of poor individuals rather than in structures external to them (job loss due to economic downturns, racial or gendered discrimination, tax and welfare policy) or bad luck (common misfortunes such as ill health or bereavement). Furthermore, such beliefs stipulate that poverty is primarily caused by faults of character: laziness and lack of effort, bad decisions, a lack of personal responsibility, and immorality on the part of individuals who are in poverty.[48]

Probably because of the centrality of ideas of free will and personal responsibility to popular understandings of moral desert, beliefs about the work ethic and effort of welfare recipients are central to deservingness perceptions. Experimental evidence (Aarøe and Petersen, 2014; Fong, 2007) shows that providing information about the work ethic of welfare recipients has a large effect on perceptions of whether they are seen as deserving of help or not. Reeskens and Van der Meer (2017) use a vignette experiment on Dutch respondents to investigate how the characteristics of hypothetical unemployment benefit claimants affect perceptions of deservingness. They find that the 'control criterion' – whether an individual is responsible for their unemployment or not – has a strong effect on whether they are seen as deserving or not.

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[47] I use the term individualistic in keeping with the existing literature on beliefs about the causes of poverty. I use this term in preference to descriptions such as 'moralising' (see e.g. Dunn, 2013) to denote a specific class of explanations for poverty that both locate the cause of poverty within the behaviour of poor individuals and specifically stipulate that poverty is caused by faults of character.

[48] In the English-speaking world at least, the idea that the poor are lazy, and will choose not to work if they are given welfare has a long history. Such ideas date back at least as far as the 16th century, and played a major role in punitive welfare reforms in the early 19th century (Golding and Middleton, 1984; Somers and Block, 2005).

As a result, the extent to which individuals believe that poverty is caused by individual flaws of character is crucial to levels of support for redistribution and welfare state legitimacy.

Furthermore, individualistic beliefs about causes of poverty are central to the stigmatisation of poverty and welfare receipt. Focusing on the character and behaviour of the poor rather than external causes of poverty is an essential part of making poverty into an individual 'mark' of deficiency rather than an externally imposed condition (Goffman, 1968; Lawler, 2005). Many researchers have noted how the issues of welfare fraud and dependency are often central frames for discussing poverty in liberal welfare systems such as the UK and USA (Gilens, 1996a; Golding and Middleton, 1984; Lundström, 2013; Misra, Moller and Karides, 2003). By focusing on laziness and immorality as causes of poverty such accounts seek to other the poor by presenting them as deviant from collectively valued social norms of hard work and self-reliance (Dunn, 2010, 2013).

Individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty are much better suited to cross-national comparison than negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. Negative stereotypes about welfare recipients have fundamental problems of cross-national measurement equivalence because the groups denoted by terms such as 'welfare recipients' or 'benefits recipients' are fundamentally different in different welfare systems. For example, in liberal welfare states with high levels of welfare targeting and means-testing, individuals who are described as 'welfare recipients' or 'benefits recipients' are likely to be a fairly small and impoverished part of the population (Brady and Bostic, 2015). In such cases, the population of welfare recipients and 'the poor' are likely to overlap to a reasonable degree. By contrast, in social-democratic welfare states benefits are far more universal in coverage and 'welfare recipients' are a far larger, and on average more affluent, segment of the population (Larsen, 2007). As a result, in a cross-national context where there is substantial variation in welfare state design, it is very difficult to tell whether high levels of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients (e.g. in the European Social Survey question 'many get benefits and services not entitled to') reflect differences in the population of welfare recipients, or differences in welfare state design (Roosma, Van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2014). Negative stereotypes about welfare recipients are as a result ill-suited to cross-national comparison. By contrast, beliefs about the causes of poverty focus on the poor, a category of individual who are of direct substantive interest in this PhD.

3.2.2 The neglected role of income inequality

The literature on beliefs about the causes of poverty stems from mainly social-psychological research attempting to classify popular beliefs (Feather, 1974; Furnham, 1982; Smith and Stone, 1989). This literature has consistently found that explanations of poverty focusing on faults of character among the poor are widespread (da Costa and Dias, 2015; Lepianka, Van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2009; Van Oorschot and Halman, 2000). More recently, understanding popular beliefs about the causes of poverty has become an important part of the comparative analysis of welfare attitudes and deservingness perceptions.

Much of this research has examined the effects of an individual's economic and social position on their beliefs about the causes of poverty (Gugushvili, 2016; Habibov, 2011; Kallio and Niemelä, 2014). Other studies have examined the role of social and political values (Lepianka, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2010; Stephenson, 2000). In a study of beliefs about the causes of poverty and wealth in Latin America, Mauricio Bucca argues that compositional demographic differences between countries are unable to explain cross-national variation in beliefs (2016: 110) – suggesting that aggregate level explanatory variables are likely to play an important role.

Much of the existing comparative literature focuses heavily on the role of country-level explanatory variables. Welfare state characteristics are especially popular, whether operationalised using welfare state typologies (Larsen, 2007; Van Oorschot and Halman, 2000) or welfare spending (Kallio and Niemelä, 2014). Individuals in social democratic welfare regimes are less likely to hold individualistic beliefs than individuals in liberal welfare regimes (Larsen, 2007). Other studies focus instead on societal affluence, whether GDP per capita (Gugushvili, 2016), poverty risk (da Costa and Dias, 2015), or the Human Development Index (Lepianka, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2010).

This literature has very little to say about the relationship between inequality and individualistic beliefs. A paper by Gugushvili (2016) is the only one I know of that includes measures of inequality. However, he treats inequality as a control variable and moderator rather than as a central predictor of interest, and does not derive a clear theoretical prediction about the relationship between inequality and beliefs about the causes of poverty. As a result, the existing literature on beliefs about the causes of poverty lacks both a detailed empirical investigation of the association between inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty, and also sustained theoretical attention to what kind of relationship we might expect to see.

3.2.3 Reacting to high inequality with concerns about social mobility

The simplest mechanism linking inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty is that individuals' beliefs about the causes of poverty react directly to levels of aggregate inequality. When aggregate inequality is higher, individuals may be more aware of the structural barriers that prevent individuals from escaping poverty, and as a result are less likely to believe that poverty is the result of laziness or other personal failings.

Perceptions of meritocracy and social mobility may be especially important in this context: there is a strong negative relationship between levels of economic inequality and rates of intergenerational income mobility (Corak, 2013; Jerrim and Macmillan, 2015). As a result, when inequality is higher, individuals may be more aware of the structural barriers to upward mobility that low-income individuals face such as poor schooling, low quality housing in neighbourhoods with concentrations of crime, and the ability of the wealthy to buy educational advantage or access to elite social networks. Recent work by Leslie McCall has argued that in the US, concern with economic inequality is mainly motivated by perceptions of the negative effects of inequality on fair equality of opportunity (McCall, 2013; McCall et al., 2017). If individuals in higher inequality contexts are more aware of barriers to equality of opportunity they should be less likely to believe that poverty is the result of individual laziness, and more likely to believe that it is the result of structural factors. This suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Higher inequality should be associated with lower levels of individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty, and higher levels of structural beliefs.

3.2.4 Social distance

The basic idea that motivates this chapter is that rising levels of economic inequality somehow erode the social ties between individuals, leading to lower levels of solidarity with the poor. One way in which solidarity and support for redistribution could be negatively affected by increased inequality is if beliefs about the causes of poverty are affected by economic inequality. If individuals become more likely to hold individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty, and less likely to hold beliefs attributing poverty to injustice when economic inequality is higher, then they may also be less likely to support social policies that could reduce inequality. I discuss two theories that link higher inequality with higher levels of individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty: the social distance theory and the status anxiety theory.

According to the social distance theory, inequality affects individual attitudes because of the way it transforms the structure of society: when inequality is higher, individuals at the top and bottom of the income distribution are less likely to interact with one another, and have divergent lifestyles and concerns. Residential segregation by income is higher when inequality is higher (Musterd et al., 2017; Reardon and Bischoff, 2011; Tammaru et al., 2017; Watson, 2009), as is segregation in schools (Owens, 2016). Furthermore, the consumption practices, housing, educational and occupational decisions, and other features of how people organise their lives, may all diverge as aggregate inequality increases.

As a result, when income inequality is higher, more affluent individuals should have less contact with poorer individuals, and their lifestyles should diverge more. This increase in social distance between income groups should lead the affluent to be less sympathetic towards the poor, both because of reduced contact and interaction, and also because it is more difficult to sympathise with individuals whose lives are different from one's own (Larsen, 2007; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011; Mijs, 2019; Paskov and Dewilde, 2012). Individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty should be more prevalent because a lack of empathy for the poor makes individuals less likely to trust that the poor are impoverished through no fault of their own, and more likely to be suspicious of their character or motives in claiming welfare. Hence the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of income inequality will be associated with higher levels of individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty.

This theory has a clear empirical implication that can be used to distinguish it from other explanations for a positive association between inequality and individualistic beliefs: in higher inequality contexts, it is high income individuals that become less sympathetic towards the poor when inequality is higher because they have reduced contact and more dissimilar lifestyles (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011). By contrast, the views of low-income individuals should not differ across contexts with differing levels of inequality. Thus the social distance perspective implies the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: High income individuals should hold higher levels of individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty in higher inequality contexts, while for low income individuals inequality should have no relationship with the levels of individualistic beliefs they hold.

3.2.5 Status anxiety

Status anxiety is a negative social emotion where individuals feel inferior to others when they perceive themselves to be failing to live up to shared ideals of success. It is often thought of as being motivated by upward comparisons with others who are better off (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Status anxiety plays an important role in the 'spirit level' hypothesis – that income inequality has negative effects on health and a number of social problems (Pickett and Wilkinson, 2015; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009) by the feelings of anxiety and stress it causes. There is evidence that levels of status anxiety are higher in higher inequality contexts (Layte and Whelan, 2014), and mediate the negative effects of income inequality on subjective wellbeing (Delhey and Dragolov, 2014; Schneider, 2019), and mental ill health (Layte, 2012). Status anxiety is also thought to drive processes of conspicuous consumption, indebtedness, and over-work in high inequality contexts (Bowles and Park, 2005; Carr and Jayadev, 2015; Levine, Frank and Dijk, 2014).

There is a wide range of evidence that individuals who experience a loss of, or threat to, their social status often respond by becoming less tolerant towards minorities or other stigmatised groups, and identifying with status enhancing but potentially exclusionary groups such as their nation (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Han, 2016; Ridgeway, 2014; Wetts and Willer, 2018). This generalised tendency to stigmatise minorities can affect attitudes towards many specific groups. The existing literature has focused in particular on attitudes towards immigrants and ethnic minorities, but there are good reasons for thinking that attitudes towards people in poverty may be shaped by the same processes. In particular, a large qualitative literature documents the ways in which relatively poor individuals stigmatise people in poverty and welfare recipients in order to deflect anxieties over their own social status (Chase and Walker, 2012; Patrick, 2016; Sennett and Cobb, 1972; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013).[49] Poor or low status individuals may express stigmatising views about others in poverty to shore up their own threatened social status – either as someone who has worked hard to support their family (Sennett and Cobb, 1972), is genuinely deserving of welfare (Chase and Walker, 2012; Patrick, 2016), or simply not the poorest (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). In doing so, they are likely to emphasise their own virtues of hard work, self-reliance, or thrift, and exaggerate the corresponding vices among those they seek to distance themselves from. In short, they are likely to emphasise individualistic causes of poverty, rather than structural injustices or misfortune. Indeed, Monica Prasad and

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[49] See Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb's Hidden Injuries of Class (1972) for a particularly vivid account of the social psychological mechanisms that connect status anxiety to the stigmatisation of welfare recipients.

colleagues (2016) argue in the context of explaining working class support for the Republican party that developing such individualistic understandings of poverty is essentially a generalisation of disadvantaged individuals' own survival strategies. If levels of status anxiety are higher in more unequal contexts, and individuals respond to status anxiety by othering those who are (perceived to be) less well off than themselves, as predicted in hypothesis 2, *individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty will be more prevalent in higher inequality contexts*.

In a context where rises in income inequality are driven primarily by increasing top income shares (Piketty, 2014), it may be the case that rises in status anxiety are felt across much of the income distribution, and that othering people in poverty is a widespread response. However, Lindemann and Saar (2014) show that gaps in subjective social status between individuals with high and low levels of income or education are greater when inequality is higher. Thus, increases in status anxiety in higher inequality contexts are likely to be concentrated among low income and low education individuals. The implication is that low income and low education individuals are relatively more likely to hold stigmatising attitudes towards minority groups in general, and people in poverty in particular, when economic inequality is high.

Even if inequality does not increase status anxiety more among low income or education individuals (Layte and Whelan, 2014), there are good reasons for thinking that low status or low income individuals will respond to a given level of status anxiety by othering people in poverty more than advantaged individuals will. This can be thought of in terms of social proximity: individuals are likely to respond to status anxiety by othering those who are relatively similar to them. Only individuals who feel that their occupation, income, or living standards leave them open to shaming responses from others (Walker et al., 2013) will attempt to draw a sharp social boundary between themselves and people in poverty: for example articulating an identity as 'respectable' working poor rather than 'disreputable' non-working poor. Thus the status anxiety theory suggests the following hypothesis, with the opposite empirical implication to that suggested by the social distance explanation:

Hypothesis 4: the relationship between income inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty will be stronger among less advantaged individuals.

3.3. Data and methods

3.3.1 European Values Survey 1990-2009

I empirically investigate the relationship between income inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty using individual level data from three waves of the European Values Survey (EVS) carried out between 1990-1993, 1998-2001, and 2008-2009 respectively (EVS, 2015a). The EVS is a repeated cross-sectional survey that has been extensively used for cross-national comparative research on attitudes (EVS, 2015b). A major advantage of the EVS is that it measures beliefs about the causes of poverty over both a large set of countries and multiple time periods. This compensates for some of its shortcomings, such as relatively crude measurement of income and education.

In this chapter I focus on countries that participated in more than one wave of the EVS, allowing me to investigate the role of within-country as opposed to between country inequality, and had measures of inequality available. The following countries are included in all analyses: (1) Data for all three waves: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain. (2) Data for 1999-2001 and 2008-9 only: Belarus, Greece, Luxembourg, Russian Federation, Sweden. (3) Data for 1990-3 and 2008-9 only: Norway. This gives a total of 27 countries and 75 country years.[50] The countries form a fairly heterogeneous group, including rich Western and Northern European countries, Mediterranean countries, and post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and the former USSR.

3.3.2 Beliefs about the causes of poverty

I measure individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty using answers to the following question: *'Why are there people in this country who live in need? Here are four possible reasons. Which one reason do you consider to be most important?'* Respondents were able to choose from five possible options: *'because they are unlucky', 'because of laziness and lack of willpower', 'because of injustice in our society', 'it's an inevitable part of modern progress'*, and *'none of these'* (EVS, 2015b: 618).[51] I focus on the answer *'because of laziness and lack of*

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[50] Inequality data over time is available for West Germany and the unified Germany, but not for East Germany. As a result in 1990 I exclude East German respondents and in 1999-2001 and 2008-9 I cluster respondents from both the former East and West Germany in a single unified Germany. Sweden in 1990-3 is excluded due to missing income data for all respondents.

[51] Respondents were able to choose two options in order of importance. I focus only on the first response because of the additional complexity involved in jointly modelling these two ranked choices see (Lepianka, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2010).

willpower' as a measure of individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty. This response explains poverty by deficiencies in the character of the poor rather than features of their environment. I create a binary response variable which codes respondents as 1 if they selected this option and 0 if they selected *'because of injustice in our society'*, which I use as a measure of belief in structural causes of poverty. In the analysis I thus model the probability that a respondent holds individualistic rather than structural beliefs about the causes of poverty.

I do not use the '*modern progress*' and '*unlucky*' options for three reasons. Firstly, existing research suggests that these two options do not neatly measure either individualistic or structural beliefs about the causes of poverty – respondents who choose either of these two options also seem to hold beliefs that blame both the behaviour of people in poverty and broader economic structures (Lepianka, Van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2009). As a result incorporating these response options into the binary measure described above makes it more difficult to interpret the results. Secondly, analysing all four response options as a categorical response variable substantially increases model complexity by requiring a multinomial logistic regression model to be used, for an uncertain theoretical payoff given the ambiguous interpretation of the '*modern progress*' and '*unlucky*' options. Thirdly, there is a body of literature that analyses all four response options in detail (Gugushvili, 2016; Habibov, 2011; Lepianka, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2010).[52] Appendix 1 provides additional evidence on the validity of this measure using data from the UK: individuals who believe that poverty is caused by laziness have the highest levels of negative stereotypes, those who believe it is caused by injustice have the lowest levels, while those believe poverty is inevitable or caused by bad luck are intermediate. I present robustness analyses in appendix 3.2 table A12-13 that use *'laziness'* against all other variables as the response variable. The results are very similar in terms of both the direction and the magnitude of the relationship between inequality and individualistic beliefs.

3.3.3 Income inequality

I measure income inequality using the Gini coefficient a commonly used measure of income inequality scaled to run from 0 (indicating perfect inequality) to 100 (indicating the concentration of all income in one person's hands). The Gini coefficient is useful both because

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[52] Note that the *presence* of the '*unlucky*' and '*modern progress*' options will affect individuals' likelihood of choosing either '*laziness*' or '*injustice*'. As such these response options could bias my results even though I do not analyse them.

it summarises inequality across the entire income distribution (unlike income ratios)[53] and also because it is very widely available. I use estimates from the All the Ginis Database (ATG), which is a comprehensive repository of Gini coefficients calculated from microdata rather than interpolated or estimated from other sources (Milanovic, 2014). To ensure cross-national comparability I restrict my focus to a common inequality concept: household net income. I linearly interpolate a few missing values (over gaps of five years or fewer) and replace a few missing values (Ireland in 1990 and Belgium and Sweden in 2009) with the next or previous year. As a robustness check I replicate some of my results using a very different measure of inequality: the income share of the top 1% of the income distribution, from the Wealth and Income Database (Alvaredo et al., 2016). See appendix 3.2, table A17 for details.

3.3.4 Individual income and education

My empirical analysis focuses not only on the association between inequality and individualistic beliefs, but also on whether that relationship differs between more or less advantaged individuals. I use two distinct measures of individual advantage: income and education. Income is taken as a proxy for an individual's current economic position, while education captures aspects of long-term economic advantage as well as social status (Hout, 2012; Kuppens et al., 2015; Noord et al., 2019).

Income is measured using a set of country specific household income scales, which are then converted into tertile groups, based on the income distribution in that country-year. As a result the measure captures an individual's economic position relative to others in their country and year.[54] Levels of education are measured using the respondent's age when they left education. This is divided into three categories: younger than 17, 17 to 20 and 21 or older, to roughly proxy individuals who have completed secondary education, those who have post-secondary non-tertiary education, and those who have tertiary education. In the analysis I dichotomise both of these variables: comparing individuals in the highest third of the income distribution to those in

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[53] Though the Gini coefficient is often thought to be especially sensitive to the middle of the income distribution (Coulter, 2018: 55–58).

[54] These measures of education and income are quite crude. However, they are the only measures available in all three waves of the EVS. In any case, the relationships between these measures of education and income and beliefs about the causes of poverty are very similar to those reported between more sophisticated measures of education, income, and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients reported in Chapter 2.

the lowest third, and individuals who left education younger than 17 to individuals who left education when they were 21 or older (Gelman and Park, 2008).[55]

3.3.5 Controls

My models include a set of individual level controls, to ensure that my results are robust to demographic variation across countries and time-periods. These include gender, age (21-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 65+), marital status (married, divorced/separated, widowed, single), work status (working, retired, looking after home, unemployed), the presence of children in the household (no children, 1-2 children, 3+ children), and religion (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish, other).

There are a large number of potentially relevant macro-level control variables. Examples that have been studied in the literature on individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty include poverty rates (da Costa and Dias, 2015), religious background (Lepianka, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2010), and a variety of welfare state characteristics (Kallio and Niemelä, 2014; Lepianka, Gelissen and van Oorschot, 2010). I discuss in detail why the empirical analysis does not include such variables in Section 3.5.4.

All respondents with missing values are deleted listwise. I also exclude all respondents who are younger than 21 or older than 90 and all those who are still in education. This gives a total sample size of 43,739, an average of 1620 respondents per country and 583 per country wave. The minimum sample size per country wave is 226, in Ireland in 2008-9. The sample size for models that investigate whether high or low education individuals respond differently to inequality is 27,345, while the sample size in the corresponding models for income is 26,564. See Tables 4 and 5 below for descriptive statistics for all individual level variables.

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[55] Respondents in intermediate categories are excluded to minimise the number of cross-level interaction effects and random-slope terms in the multilevel models.

Table 4: descriptive statistics for individual level variables

Variable	% in category	Std. Dev.	Variable	% in category	Std. Dev.
Beliefs about cause of poverty			*Age group*		
Injustice	57.3%	0.49	21-24	5.4%	0.23
Laziness	42.7%	0.49	25-34	18.6%	0.39
			35-44	21.1%	0.41
Age left education (interaction models)			45-54	19.0%	0.39
16 or younger	61.3%	0.49	55-64	16.4%	0.37
21 or older	38.7%	0.49	65+	19.6%	0.40
Age left education (control)			*Marital status*		
12 or younger	6.7%	0.25	Married	64.8%	0.48
13 – 16	31.6%	0.47	Divorced/separated	8.8%	0.28
17-20	37.5%	0.48	Widowed	10.6%	0.31
21 or older	24.2%	0.43	Single	15.8%	0.36
Income group (interaction models)			*Religion*		
Lowest 1/3	54.2%	0.50	Catholic	38.9%	0.49
Highest 1/3	45.8%	0.50	Protestant	12.8%	0.33
			Orthodox	13.7%	0.34
Income group (control)			Muslim	1.0%	0.10
Low	32.9%	0.47	Jewish	0.1%	0.03
Medium	39.3%	0.49	Other/none	33.5%	0.47
High	27.8%	0.45			
			Children		
Work status			No children	53.4%	0.50
Working	59.9%	0.49	1-2 children in hh	39.6%	0.49
Retired	26.4%	0.44	3 + children in hh	7.0%	0.25
Looking after home	8.4%	0.28			
Unemployed	5.3%	0.22			
Gender					
Male	46.5%	0.50			
Female	53.5%	0.50			

Notes: N = 43,739 for all variables except age left the measure of age left education and income group used in the interaction models, for which N = 27,345 and 26,564 respectively. All data from 1990, 1999, and 2008 European Values Survey. Percentages are unweighted.

Table 5: Descriptive statistics for all country level variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Gini coefficient	30.29	4.85	18.00	42.20
Between country inequality	30.33	3.82	23.00	39.45
Within-country inequality	-0.04	3.05	-8.70	8.42

	% of respondents	Frequency		
Year				
1990	22.2%	9,692		
1991	6.7%	2,933		
1992	1.2%	544		
1993	1.6%	700		
1999	30.0%	13,103		
2000	2.0%	888		
2008	30.9%	13,510		
2009	5.4%	2,369		
Communist countries				
Western and southern Europe	53.3%	23,330		
Post-communist countries	46.7%	20,409		

Notes: N = 43,739 individuals, 75 country-years, and 27 countries for all variables. Gini coefficient data from ATG database. Between country inequality is the country average Gini coefficient, while within country inequality is the difference between country-year level Gini coefficient and the country average. See Section 3.3.6 below for detail on these measures. Sections

3.3.6 Methods

I use multilevel models to analyse the association between income inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty. As the response variable is binary I use logistic regression models throughout. Following the recommendations of Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother (2016) I adopt a three-level structure, with individuals nested within country-years (e.g. Italy in 1999) which are then nested within countries. Clustering respondents within country years is required to correctly estimate standard errors on inequality – which is constant within country years but varies between countries and time periods. Further clustering respondents within countries is required because individuals at two time points in the same country are likely to be more similar than two individuals in different time points in different countries. As there are too few years (8 in most models) to include a random-effect for years, I include a fixed effect for time by adding year dummies to the model. The basic specification below is used throughout:

$$log \frac{\pi_{iyc}}{1 - \pi_{iyc}} = \alpha + \beta_1 gini_{yc} + \delta_1 year_{yc} + \gamma_1 X_{iyc} + u_{1yc} + u_{1c} \quad (1)$$

Where π_{iyc} is the probability that individual *i*, in country-year *y*, and country *c* believes that laziness rather than injustice is a cause of poverty. The main coefficient of interest is $\beta_1 gini_{yc}$ which captures the effect of a 1 point increase in inequality on the log odds of believing that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty. $\delta_1 year_{yc}$ is a set of year dummies, while $\gamma_1 X_{iyc}$ is a set of individual level controls that are included in some models. u_{1yc} and u_c represent random intercepts at the country-year and country levels respectively. Some models also add a dummy variable for whether a country has a communist past or not.

In equation (1) above country-year level measurements of the Gini coefficient are the principal explanatory variable. However, inequality varies both between countries and within countries over time. There is no reason why within and between country relationships should be the same. While knowing whether country-years with higher levels of inequality have higher or lower levels of individualistic beliefs is useful, much of the substantive concern with economic inequality is specifically about over-time changes within countries (see e.g. Kelly and Enns, 2010). Furthermore, the existence of an over-time relationship is usually taken as stronger evidence of causality than a cross-sectional relationship (Fairbrother, 2014: 121).

In order to distinguish within-country and between-country effects of inequality on individualistic beliefs I calculate $\overline{gini}_c$ the mean level of inequality for each country across all

years. I then mean-centre each country-year level observation $gini_{yc}$ by subtracting them from $\overline{gini}_c$ from to give $gini_{ycM}$ which represents the difference between country-year level inequality and the mean value for each country. These two variables, which are orthogonal by design (Bell and Jones, 2015; Fairbrother, 2014), represent the between country effect, and the within country effect respectively. The resulting model specification is:

$$log \frac{\pi_{iyc}}{1 - \pi_{iyc}} = \alpha + \beta_1 \overline{gini}_c + \beta_2 gini_{ycM} + \delta_1 year_{yc} + \gamma_1 X_{iyc} + u_{1yc} + u_{1c} \quad (2)$$

To investigate whether more advantaged individuals are more or less responsive to levels of inequality I introduce a cross-level interaction between either education or income and inequality. This allows the coefficient of education (or income) to vary across countries and country years with varying levels of inequality. I illustrate this model below in the case of income:

$$log \frac{\pi_{iyc}}{1 - \pi_{iyc}} = \alpha + \beta_1 gini_{yc} + \beta_2 highinc_{iyc} + \beta_3 gini_{yc} * highinc_{iyc} + \delta_1 year_{yc}$$
$$+ \gamma_1 X_{iyc} + u_{1yc} + u_{1c} + u_{2yc} highinc_{iyc} + u_{2c} highinc_{iyc} \quad (3)$$

Where $u_{2yc} highinc_{iyc}$ and $u_{2c} highinc_{iyc}$ represent random-slope coefficients for income at the country-year and country levels respectively (Heisig and Schaeffer, 2019). I apply the same logic to the within-between model, allowing income (or education) to have a cross-level interaction with both within-country and between-country inequality.[56]

$$log \frac{\pi_{iyc}}{1 - \pi_{iyc}} = \alpha + \beta_1 \overline{gini}_c + \beta_2 gini_{ycM} + \beta_2 highinc_{iyc} + \beta_3 \overline{gini}_c * highinc_{iyc}$$
$$+ \beta_4 gini_{ycM} * highinc_{iyc} + \delta_1 year_{yc} + \gamma_1 X_{iyc} + u_{1yc} + u_{1c}$$
$$+ u_{2yc} highinc_{iyc} + u_{2c} highinc_{iyc} \quad (4)$$

It is important to note that when there are only a small number of cases at the highest level point and standard error estimates in multilevel models can be biased. This bias is particularly a problem in non-linear models, such as the logistic regression models I am using, and in models with random-slopes (for simulation evidence see Bryan and Jenkins, 2016; Stegmueller, 2013). For this reason, coefficients and standard errors may be biased in some models, especially those

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[56] In order to keep the model simple at the country-level, where there are relatively few cases, I do not interact within country and between country inequality.

that focus on within and between inequality – given that there are only 27 countries, as opposed to 75 country-years.[57] All models are unweighted, because weights are not available for many country-years. Models were estimated by maximum likelihood in Stata 15.1 using the *melogit* command.

3.4. Results
3.4.1 Bivariate relationship between inequality and individualistic beliefs is heterogeneous

Figure 7 plots the association between the proportions of individuals in each country-wave who believe that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty against the Gini coefficient. Each wave is plotted separately, as are Western and Southern Europe and the post-communist countries. Very high levels of individualistic beliefs appear in post-communist countries such as Russia, Slovakia, and especially the Czech Republic. Of countries in Western Europe, Austria in 1990-3, Portugal in 1999-2001, and Greece in 2008-9 have high levels of individualistic beliefs. Countries with few individuals choosing laziness over injustice include Sweden, France, and Norway, but also Bulgaria in all three waves and several of the Baltic States.

In Western Europe there appears to be a positive association between individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty and inequality in all three waves. By contrast, in Eastern Europe the association is negative in 1990-3 and 1999-2001, and very weakly positive in 2008-9. These provide no evidence for a strong relationship between inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty. To investigate the heterogeneous and time-varying association between inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty in more detail I plot both inequality and individualistic beliefs over time by country in Figure 8. Once again, a heterogeneous set of relationships makes it hard to draw strong conclusions. In a number of countries, Portugal, Latvia, and Romania in particular, higher levels of inequality appear to go together with higher levels of individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty. In others, such as Finland, Spain, and Slovakia, individualistic beliefs appear to be lower in high inequality years.

All of the post-communist countries in my data show an increase in inequality from the first wave of the EVS, immediately after the fall of communism, to 1999-2001 (see Bandelj and Mahutga, 2010; Heyns, 2005; Milanovic, 1998 for further discussion). In many of these countries

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[57] As the existing simulation studies focus on two-level rather than three-level multilevel models it is hard to directly apply their results to my research.

(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty also fall, before changing direction to rise alongside rising inequality in Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania. This suggests that the severe economic consequences of the transition to a market economy might have affected individual beliefs about the causes of poverty. I will return to this issue in Section 3.5.3.

In the regression models in the next section I deal with over time heterogeneity in the association between inequality and individualistic beliefs by including time dummies in all models, and checking the robustness of my results to controls for whether a country has a communist past or not. Appendix 3.2, table A16 and Figure A6 present further checks of whether results differ between countries with a communist past or not.

Figure 7: Association between income inequality and proportion of the population that believe that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty, by survey wave and communist past. Lines of best fit are calculated on aggregate data. Proportions are unweighted and calculated from 43,739 respondents, 75 country-years, and 27 countries with non-missing data. Data from EVS and ATG database.

Figure 8: Within country association between income inequality and proportion of the population that believe that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty, by year. Proportions are unweighted and calculated from 43,739 respondents, 75 country-years, and 27 countries with non-missing data. Data from EVS and ATG database.

3.4.2 Multilevel model results: inequality associated with higher probability of holding individualistic beliefs

Figures 9 and 10 present estimates of the association between income inequality and believing that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty from three-level random-intercept logistic regression models with individuals nested within country years and countries. The plots displays odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals. I present results for three different inequality measures. The first (in figure 9) is the Gini coefficient, while the second and third (in figure 10) are measures of within-country and between-country inequality, which are estimated in models of the form of equation (2). The left-hand panels in both figures add controls for whether a country has a communist past or not, while each model is estimated both with and without demographic controls. All models contain year fixed effects. Full regression tables are available in Appendix 3.1.

Figure 9 indicates that a Gini coefficient one point higher is associated with 1.03 higher odds of choosing laziness rather than injustice as a cause of poverty, holding year constant. Adding demographic controls, controls for post-communist countries, or both leave this estimate essentially unchanged. The odds ratios in figure 10 for between country and within country inequality are very similar – between 1.02 and 1.03. Once again, these estimates change very little when demographic controls and controls for communism are included. However, the coefficient on within-country inequality is much more precisely estimated in all models than between country inequality. As such the 95% confidence intervals for within country inequality indicate a positive association between inequality and individualistic beliefs, but those for between country inequality are consistent with either a positive or negative relationship.

To give a sense of the substantive size of this relationship Figure 11 plots the predicted probability of believing that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty against the Gini coefficient, using estimates from a model with no additional controls (model 1 in table A8, appendix 3.1). The plot also displays country-level raw data, similarly to Figure 7. Results from other models are very similar. Moving from a relatively equal country with a Gini coefficient of around 25 to a relatively unequal country with a Gini coefficient of around 35 is associated with a 6 percentage point increase in the probability of an individual believing that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty. This is the equivalent of moving from a Scandinavian country such Norway, or a post-communist country such as Poland in 1990-3, to a southern European country like Italy, or the UK in 1999-2001. While this is quite a weak relationship, it is important to note that the vast majority of the variation in beliefs about the causes of poverty

is at an individual rather than an aggregate level. The intra-class correlation for an empty model is .06 within countries, and .09 within countries and country-years, which is typical for cross-national comparative research (Bryan and Jenkins, 2016; Stegmueller, 2013). The raw values for many countries do not fall within the 95% confidence intervals predicted by the multilevel model, providing further evidence of heterogeneity in the relationship between inequality and the belief that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty. I will return to possible explanations for this heterogeneity in Section 3.5.3.

The analysis presented in this section provides a fairly unambiguous answer to the overall question posed in this chapter: individuals living in country-years with higher levels of inequality, all else equal, appear to be more likely to hold individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty. This association is observed within countries over time, increasing my confidence that it is not confounded by unobserved cross-sectional differences between countries. This positive association is inconsistent with the idea that individuals react to higher inequality with greater awareness of the barriers to social mobility. It is consistent with the two theories that specify a positive association between inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty: social distance and status anxiety. In the next section I will investigate which of these explanations better fits the data.

No controls for communist past　　　Controls for communist past

Gini coefficient

.96　.98　1　1.02　1.04　1.06　　.96　.98　1　1.02　1.04　1.06

Odds ratio on believing that laziness rather than injustice cause of poverty

Controls:　○ Year FEs　× + Demographic background

Figure 9: Association between income inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty. Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from three level random-intercept logistic regression model with individuals nested within country years and countries. Inequality is measured at the level of country-years using the Gini coefficient. All models include year dummies. Demographic controls include income, education, gender, age, marital status, work status, presence of children in household, and religion. See equation 1 for full details on model specification. Sample size: 43739 respondents, 75 country-years, and 27 countries for all models. Data from EVS and ATG database. See table A8 in appendix 3.1 for full results.

No controls for communist past   Controls for communist past

Between-country inequality

Within-country inequality

.96 .98 1 1.02 1.04 1.06   .96 .98 1 1.02 1.04 1.06

Odds ratio on believing that laziness rather than injustice cause of poverty

Controls: ○ Year FEs   ✕ + Demographic background

Figure 10: Association between within country income inequality, between country income inequality, and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty. Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from three level random-intercept logistic regression model with individuals nested within country years and countries. Inequality is measured at the level of country-years using the Gini coefficient, decomposed to give estimates of within-country and between country inequality, which are included in same models. All models include year dummies. Demographic controls include income, education, gender, age, marital status, work status, presence of children in household, and religion. See equation 2 for details on model specification. Sample size: 43739 respondents, 75 country-years, and 27 countries for all models. Data from EVS and ATG database. See table A9 in appendix 3.1 for full results.

Figure 11: Predicted probability of believing that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty against income inequality. Fitted line and 95% confidence interval estimated from three level multilevel logistic regression model with year controls. Raw proportions calculated as in Figure 7. Data from EVS and ATG database. Estimated from model 1, Table A8, Appendix 3.1.

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3.4.3 Education and income interactions

In this section I report results from random slope multilevel logistic regression models based on equations (3) and (4). These interact income inequality with measures of individual advantage, in order to understand whether more or less advantaged individuals appear to be driving the association between inequality and individualistic beliefs observed in the previous section. Figures 12 and 13 plot the predicted probabilities of believing that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty for individuals with different levels of education and income. Figure 12 plots interactions with the Gini coefficient. Figure 13 plots interactions using within country and between country inequality (between and within country inequality interactions are estimated in the same models). All models include demographic controls and year dummies, though results are very similar without the former. Full regression tables are in Appendix 3.1.

For the Gini coefficient in figure 12 the predicted probability of believing that laziness is the cause of poverty increases more steeply with inequality among individuals who left education at 16 or younger, than it does among those who left education at 21 or older. This is also the case for individuals in the bottom 1/3 of the income distribution compared to those in the top 1/3 of the income distribution. In both cases, the size of the difference is not large: a 10 point increase in the Gini coefficient is associated with a 6 percentage point increase in individualistic beliefs for low education or income respondents and a 3 percentage point increase for high education or income respondents. The odds ratios of the estimated interaction effects for both education and income are weak, and have 95% confidence intervals that are close to 1 (for the interaction between high education and Gini coefficient OR = 0.99, 95% CI:, LB= 0.97, UB=1.02, for the interaction between income X Gini coefficient OR = 0.98, 95% CI:, LB= 0.96, UB=1.01).

The predicted probabilities of holding individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty increase alongside within-country inequality at very similar rates for individuals with high and low education or income. As a result, living in a country-year with inequality that is higher than the country mean has a similar effect on individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty among both advantaged and disadvantaged individuals. As with the overall Gini coefficient the odds ratios of the estimated interactions between within country inequality and both education and income are weak, and have 95% confidence intervals that are close to 1 (for the interaction between high education and within

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country inequality OR = 1.00, 95% CI:, LB= 0.97, UB=1.03, for the interaction between high income and Gini coefficient OR = 0.99, 95% CI:, LB= 0.97, UB=1.02).

Living in a country with higher levels of mean inequality (between-country inequality) has divergent effects on individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty among individuals at different levels of education. Among individuals who left education aged 16 or younger a 10 point increase in between-country inequality is associated with a 6 percentage point increase in the probability of holding individualistic beliefs, but a 4 percentage point *decrease* in the probability of holding individualistic beliefs among individuals who left education at 21 or older. The pattern for income is similar: a 10 point increase in between-country inequality is associated with a 7 percentage point increase in the probability of holding individualistic beliefs among low-income individuals, but a less than 1 percentage point decrease in the probability of holding individualistic beliefs for individuals with high-incomes. Unlike the overall Gini coefficient or within country inequality the odds ratios for the interactions of between country inequality with education or income are somewhat larger. In the case of education the 95% confidence intervals do not include 1 (OR = 0.95, 95% CI: LB= 0.91, UB=1.00), and the odds ratio is significantly different from 1 at p<.05 (p = 0.031). In the case of income the 95% confidence just includes 1 (OR = 0.97, 95% CI: LB= 0.94, UB=1.01) and the odds ratio is significantly different from 1 at p<.10 (p=0.093).

These results suggest that the relationship between inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty either does not differ among more or less advantaged individuals, or is stronger among less advantaged individuals. This finding is inconsistent with the social distance explanation – which predicts that relatively advantaged individuals will be less sympathetic towards the poor when inequality is high while the views of less advantaged individuals will not change. By contrast, the interactions of between-country inequality and both education and income support the status anxiety explanation: higher levels of individualistic beliefs in more unequal countries are driven by low income and low education individuals. The attitudes of high income individuals have no association with country-mean levels of inequality, while high education individuals actually have lower levels of individualistic beliefs in countries with higher mean inequality. While this evidence is consistent with the status anxiety argument, it is less strong than an interaction effect based on within-country inequality would be. This is because between-country inequality is much more likely

to be confounded by compositional differences in the population of highly educated or high income

individuals, which are likely to vary more between countries than within countries over time.

Figure 12: Predicted probability of believing that laziness rather than injustice is cause of poverty against income inequality for individuals with varying levels of education and income. All estimates from three level random slope logistic regression models. Estimates on left interact education with inequality, estimates on right interact income with inequality. All models include year dummies and demographic controls. See equation 3 for model specification. Individual level sample size: 27345 respondents for models interacting education and inequality, 26564 respondents for models interacting income and inequality. Aggregate level sample size: 75 country-years, and 27 countries for all models. Covariates held at observed values. Data from EVS and ATG database. See model 2 in Table A10, and model 2 in table A11, Appendix 3.1 for coefficient estimates and further details.

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
Figure 13: predicted probability of believing that laziness rather than injustice is cause of poverty against within country and between country income inequality for individuals with varying levels of education and income. All estimates from three level random slope logistic regression models. Estimates on left interact education with inequality, estimates on right interact income with inequality. All models include year dummies and demographic controls. See equation 4 for model specification. Individual level sample size: 27345 respondents for models interacting education and inequality, 26564 respondents for models interacting income and inequality. Aggregate level sample size: 75 country-years, and 27 countries for all models. Covariates held at observed values. Data from EVS and ATG database. See model 4 in Table A10, and model 4 in table A11, Appendix 3.1 for coefficient estimates and further details.

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3.4.4 Robustness checks

I conduct a number of additional analyses to investigate the robustness of my results. Full details of all analyses are given in Appendix 3.2. In Tables A12-13 I check that my results are robust to defining my response variable as all individuals who believe that poverty is caused by *'laziness and lack of willpower'* against all other response options, rather than just *'because of injustice in our society'*. Results are very similar in terms of both direction and magnitude. To check that results do not depend on my decision to use logistic regression, Tables A14-15 replicate my main models using linear probability models, which are otherwise identical to the three-level random-intercept models reported in Section 3.4.2. Results are very similar.

I also investigate whether the association between individualistic beliefs and inequality differs between Western and Southern Europe and the post-communist world. I do so by re-estimating regression models separately for countries in Western and Southern Europe and the post-communist world, and by interacting the dummy for post-communist countries with the Gini coefficient.[58] Regression models are presented in table A16, and fitted values from one of the interaction models in figure A6. Both methods suggest a positive association between inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty in both Western and Southern Europe and the post-communist countries.

In table A17 I examine how my results change when a different measure of inequality is used: the share of national income going to the top 1% of the income distribution. Despite their contribution to rising inequality (Piketty, 2014), top income shares have seen little use in the literature on redistribution or welfare attitudes (exceptions include Meuleman, 2018; Scruggs and Hayes, 2017). The income and consumption of the rich has a close theoretical association with status anxiety, through concepts such as conspicuous consumption (Bowles and Park, 2005; Carr and Jayadev, 2015; Levine, Frank and Dijk, 2014). I re-estimate some of the models presented in Figure 9, replacing the Gini coefficient with the top 1% share of national income.[59] Once again the estimated

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[58] The models for Western and Southern Europe contain 23,330 individuals in 44 country-years in 16 countries, while the models for the post-communist countries include 20,409 individuals in 31 country-years in 11 countries.

[59] Measures of the income share of the top 1% are only available for 23,498 individuals in 43 country-years and 16 countries.

association between inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty are positive, and of similar size to models using the Gini coefficient.

Looking at the effects of individual level demographic variables on beliefs about the causes of poverty gives some confidence that answering that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty provides a good measure of attitudes towards the poor. Figure A7 and table A18 report results from three-level logistic regression models investigating the association between demographic variables and individualistic beliefs. Individuals with less education and higher incomes are more likely to believe that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty, consistent with the results reported in Chapter 2. The similarity of these relationships with those seen in other data is reassuring because it also suggests that problems with how education and income are measured in the EVS are unlikely to be biasing the results too significantly. The results for all other variables, including unemployment, age, and gender, are also very similar to those seen in Chapter 2, where the response variable is attitudes towards welfare recipients, and in other literature on beliefs about the causes of poverty (e.g. Gugushvili, 2016).

3.5. Discussion
3.5.1 Inequality associated with higher levels of individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty
The main finding of this chapter is that individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty are more common in contexts with higher levels of income inequality. A 10 point increase in the Gini coefficient is associated with a 6% increase in the probability of believing that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty. This result is robust to controls for demographic variation, an alternative measure of inequality, and a variety of adjustments for the effects of a communist past. The association between inequality and individualistic beliefs is driven by within-country inequality, implying that increases in inequality are associated with increases in the probability of holding individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty.

I find no evidence consistent with the idea that individuals in higher inequality contexts respond to heightened barriers to escaping poverty and achieving upward social mobility by being less likely to believe that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty. Even if individuals are more concerned about barriers to social mobility when inequality is high, this may not translate into less

individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty. People may be more concerned about social mobility into elite positions rather than the ability to escape from poverty or hardship. Concerns about the concentration of power and advantage among the wealthy and concern with the disadvantage experienced by the poor are not necessarily correlated (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015). As Chapter 2 noted, the correlation between left-wing values and sympathetic attitudes towards welfare recipients is very low, especially when compared to libertarian-authoritarian values.

3.5.2 Status anxiety is a better explanation than social distance

The association between inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty appears to be driven by low education and low-income individuals – who are more likely to hold individualistic beliefs in countries with high levels of inequality. The probability of high income and high education individuals holding individualistic beliefs increases with inequality either at the same rate or a lower rate than among low education or income individuals. High education and income individuals are actually less likely to hold individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty in countries with high average inequality. This pattern is inconsistent with the social distance explanation of the association between inequality and individualistic beliefs, which predicts that advantaged individuals will be less sympathetic towards the poor in higher inequality contexts. The lack of evidence for the social distance explanation is surprising: the idea that higher inequality leads to polarisation in living conditions, which leads to polarisation in social attitudes is long-standing and popular. It appears in work on residential segregation by social class (Dorling and Rees, 2003; Musterd et al., 2017), perceptions of meritocracy (Mijs, 2019; Newman, Johnston and Lown, 2015), and comparative research on the determinants of redistribution (Larsen, 2007; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011).

One explanation for this inconsistency could be that the social distance theory does not apply well to beliefs about the causes of poverty. Attitudes towards redistribution are multidimensional, with many people supporting inequality reducing redistribution 'from' the rich, while being opposed to redistribution 'to' the poor (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015; Roosma, van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2014). Analogously, increased social distance from the poor may alter how higher income people perceive the causes of success, and hence their perceptions of meritocracy (Mijs, 2019) while having little impact on their perceptions of the causes of poverty. This could happen if information about the causes of poverty in the neighbourhoods or social networks of high-income people is less salient

than information about the cause of success or affluence. For example, if people who have been successful are often open about their success and spend time attempting to justify how their success was the result of hard work then living in a context with more affluent people should expose individuals to more of these ideas, potentially increasing their belief that success is the cause of hard work. By contrast, people who are poor or unsuccessful may be unlikely to advertise their lack of success, due to a fear of being perceived a failure. People who are unemployed or in poverty will often attempt to disguise the fact from friends, family, and others in their social networks (Patrick, 2016; Walker et al., 2013) to avoid shaming responses from others, in addition to generally disengaging from their social networks (Peterie et al., 2019). As a result, living in an area with a higher share of poor people might not expose affluent individuals to additional information about the causes of poverty. A similar idea about the low visibility of people in poverty, especially the unemployed, is explored in chapter 4. This explanation is necessarily speculative, and it is worth considering other reasons why higher inequality might not polarise attitudes along income lines in the way that the social distance theory predicts.

The social distance explanation is based on a causal narrative where higher country level inequality polarises residential segregation by income and increases homophily of social relationships, and that this causes the advantaged to be less sympathetic towards the poor. It is worth considering some ways in which this relationship could break down. Income inequality may take a long time to increase residential segregation by income (Tammaru et al., 2017), be mediated by planning policies or welfare systems (Musterd et al., 2017), or fail to impact other relationships relevant for political attitudes such as friendship networks (Smith, McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 2014). Furthermore, the effects of increasing social distance could be counteracted by other processes that cause convergence in the attitudes of advantaged and disadvantaged individuals as inequality rises. For example, Iversen and Soskice (2015) suggest that in higher inequality contexts the poor are less likely to have the education and access to political information that lead them to identify with the political left. Rueda and Stegmueller (2016) argue that high income individuals become more likely to support redistribution in high inequality contexts. The most direct tests of the social distance hypothesis for redistribution and attitudes towards inequalities (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011; Mijs, 2019) cannot necessarily rule out these alternative explanations, in particular because they use measures of inequality at a country level and do not measure social distance directly. Much of the research that provides evidence for the micro-foundations of the social distance theory uses data

from schools or universities and may not generalise beyond these contexts (Gingrich, 2019; Mendelberg, McCabe and Thal, 2017; Mijs, 2016).[60]

By contrast, my results are consistent with the status anxiety argument: in higher inequality contexts individuals are more susceptible to high levels of status anxiety. Disadvantaged individuals respond to status anxiety by othering those worse off than them, in an attempt to distinguish themselves from stigmatised outgroups. As a result, low income or education individuals are more likely to hold individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty in high inequality contexts, while the relationship is less strong for high income or high education individuals. Indeed, in countries with higher levels of mean inequality, high education or income individuals are less likely to hold individualistic beliefs than in low mean inequality countries.

This explanation should be treated with caution, even apart from the causal inference issues discussed in Section 3.5.4, because it is based on a between-country relationship rather than a within-country relationship. As a result there is a high risk of confounding by cross-national differences in the composition of high educated and high income groups. One alternative explanation is that the attitudes of high-status individuals tend to vary less across countries than those of low status individuals. This could be because of a homogenising effect of higher education (especially in universities) or common trajectories of professional managerial careers that reduces cross-national variation in a variety of attitudes relevant to shaping beliefs about the causes of poverty. Another possibility is that more highly educated and higher income individuals are more likely to look beyond their own national contexts when making up their minds about the causes of poverty, whether because of better access to information, a more cosmopolitan outlook, or greater experience of travel or migration (Delhey and Kohler, 2006). As a result, the beliefs of low status individuals are more closely tied to cross-national variation, whether in inequality or some other variable.

Assuming that the status anxiety explanation has some empirical validity, it suggests that researchers interested in the attitudinal consequences of inequality should pay attention to psychological mechanisms that can lead individuals in high inequality contexts to other those most

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[60] See Thal (2017) for an exception.

disadvantaged by the status quo. This is consistent with a large literature in social psychology on system justification theory (Jost and Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji and Nosek, 2004), which has been recently extended to economic inequality (Trump, 2017). Similarly, researchers should shift focus from how inequality polarises patterns of social interaction to think about broader processes of social comparison that can change as inequality increases. These could include interpersonal comparisons based on consumption practices (Blake et al., 2018; Hamilton, 2012; Walasek and Brown, 2015) or those that take place through the media. Christopher Hoy's (2018) recent finding that Indonesians were better able to place themselves in the income distribution after they gained access to television suggests that social comparisons capable of inducing status anxiety can be mediated.

3.5.3 The role of inequality-increasing reforms in Eastern Europe

In the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe the descriptive relationship between inequality and individualistic beliefs is flat or, in 1999-2001 especially, negative. This relationship changes direction in the regression models, perhaps due to the inclusion of time fixed effects that control for year-specific shocks: the regression models in Section 3.4.2 all imply a positive association between inequality and individualistic beliefs in post-communist countries. Nonetheless, this unexpected relationship in post-communist countries suggests the presence of one or more confounding variables. Such a variable is likely to be time-varying, rather than representing a long-term feature of demographic composition or culture, because the relationship changes from wave to wave.

Economic fallout from the transition to a market economy seems a likely candidate: many countries saw large increases in inequality caused by extensive welfare retrenchment and privatisation of state-owned enterprises (Bandelj and Mahutga, 2010). [61] As a result, increased sympathy for the poor could have been driven by opposition to cuts in social welfare spending at the same time as inequality was increasing. This conclusion fits well with research showing how growing up under socialism increased support for redistribution and state intervention in the economy (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2014). Another possibility is that the effect of increasing inequality on individual attitudes depends on what the public believe about whether

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[61] Though see Heyn (2005: 168–9) for discussion of how communist social welfare was provided in a very different form to welfare states in market economies.

increased inequality stems from legitimate sources, and whether they will benefit through increased growth or not. Grosfeld and Senik (2010) use data from Poland to argue that in the period from 1992-6 there was a positive association between income inequality and individual satisfaction with how the country was progressing. After 1996 however, this relationship turned negative, a change that they attribute to a perception that changes in the income distribution were the result of corruption. Similarly, Cheung (2015) uses Chinese data to argue that higher inequality leads to higher life satisfaction when people are optimistic about future prospects for upward social mobility.

The effects of a major political and economic shock such as the fall of communism on beliefs about the causes of poverty are important and under studied. The post-communist transition could be used as a kind of natural experiment in future research, because it allows researchers to study the effects of a set of political and economic shocks that dramatically increased inequality. In doing so it could build on a literature which looks at the cohort effects of socialisation under communism on attitudes towards redistribution. (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Ignácz, 2018; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2014).

3.5.4 Difficulty of adjusting for macro-level confounders

The results presented in this chapter are not necessarily evidence of a causal relationship because there are potential confounding variables at a country level that may be correlated with both income inequality and beliefs about the causes of poverty. Examples in the literature on welfare attitudes and deservingness perceptions include economic growth and GDP (Gugushvili, 2016), welfare state universality and generosity (Larsen, 2007; Sumino, 2018), and the political power of the rich (Gilens and Page, 2014; Scruggs and Hayes, 2017). For example, in contexts with more generous welfare states, economic inequality should be lower (Brady and Bostic, 2015). At the same time, however, welfare state generosity may affect beliefs about the causes of poverty. On the one hand, when generous welfare payments are available, individuals may be more likely to regard poverty as the fault of the laziness of the poor. By contrast, Larsen argues that in more generous welfare states the poor are less likely to be othered because their living standards will be more similar to those of other citizens (2007: 152–156). In either case welfare state generosity is a potential confounder of the association between inequality and beliefs about the causes of poverty.

Adjusting my estimates of the relationship between inequality and individualistic beliefs for all such variables is very difficult for several reasons. Firstly, the limited number of country and country-year level cases constrains the number of aggregate level variables that can be simultaneously included in a multilevel model. Secondly, limited data availability (particularly for measures of welfare state generosity and universality) reduces the number of aggregate level cases, especially in the early 1990s and post-communist countries. Thirdly, the causal pathways linking these confounding variables to inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty are complex and poorly understood. Nate Breznau's (2017) research on feedback effects between social policy and public spending suggests an endogenous and self-reinforcing relationship, which is very challenging to empirically estimate. As a result, macro-level covariates may be endogenous, mediators, or colliders on causal paths connecting inequality to individualistic beliefs and as a result should not unthinkingly be included as controls in regression models (Elwert and Winship, 2014).

This is even the case for a variable such as GDP per capita, which is often treated as an uncontroversial control variable in cross-national comparative research. If higher GDP per capita causes higher economic inequality, perhaps because the returns to growth are disproportionately captured by high income groups (Hacker and Pierson, 2010), and higher GDP makes people more likely to believe the poor are lazy (Gugushvili, 2016), then GDP per capita will indeed confound the relationship between inequality and beliefs about the causes of poverty. However, it is at least as plausible that inequality could have a direct causal effect on GDP per capita. Many scholars believe that excessive economic inequality restricts economic growth (e.g. Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; de Dominicis, Florax and de Groot, 2008; Neves, Afonso and Silva, 2016; Stiglitz, 2012). In these circumstances, controlling for GDP per capita would be inappropriate. If GDP per capita does not cause beliefs about the causes of poverty then including it in regression models could be over-controlling, whereas if GDP per capita has a causal effect on beliefs about the causes of poverty it would be mediating (some) of the effect of inequality on beliefs about the causes of poverty. In neither case would it be appropriate to control for GDP per capita (Elwert and Winship, 2014). The presence of these potentially confounding, endogenous, or mediating relationships is not a reason to rule out the results I present in this chapter as such problems are inherent in almost all cross-national comparative research interested in the effects of macro-level variables. Nonetheless, the findings of this chapter must be regarded as, at best indicative of causal relationships, given the clear potential for confounding.

One way of avoiding some of these problems in future research might be to look at the effects of inequality within countries at smaller geographical scales – regions, cities, or neighbourhoods. Doing so makes it possible to hold features of country level context constant. A few researchers use regional or local inequality in work on redistribution preferences (Johnston and Newman, 2016; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2016) or beliefs about meritocracy (Newman, Johnston and Lown, 2015). The role of local context in influencing individual attitudes about welfare recipients will be investigated in Chapter 4, albeit with a focus on unemployment rates rather than economic inequality.

3.6 Conclusion

The main finding of this chapter is that higher levels of income inequality are associated with a higher probability of holding individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty. This association is consistent with the idea that higher economic inequality erodes solidarity between individuals such that they become less trusting of the people in poverty and thus more likely to believe that the poor are to blame for their situation. I find no evidence that higher levels of inequality make individuals more aware of structural economic barriers to escaping poverty or upward mobility. Scholars interested in beliefs about the causes of poverty, perceptions of deservingness, and welfare attitudes should engage more closely with the role that income inequality may play in shaping attitudes towards the poor. This is especially the case given the importance of inequality to debates in closely related areas such as preferences for redistribution (Kenworthy and McCall, 2008; Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Schmidt-Catran, 2016), political polarisation (Bonica et al., 2013; Garand, 2010; Iversen and Soskice, 2015), social trust (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005), and tolerance for minorities (Andersen and Fetner, 2008). Future research should aim to address some of the shortcomings of this chapter, including the lack of controls for country level confounders and small aggregate level sample sizes. Possibilities include holding country level context constant and increasing area level sample sizes by studying smaller spatial scales, or finding ways to leverage the sudden increase in inequality induced by the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe to aid causal inference.

The association between inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty appears to be driven by low income and education individuals who are relatively more likely to hold individualistic beliefs in high inequality contexts. I thus find no evidence for the idea that the

association between inequality and individualistic beliefs is explained by increasing social distance between the affluent and poor. By contrast, the association provides support for the idea that low status individuals are more likely to respond to the heightened status anxiety induced by high inequality by stigmatising the poor. While this association has alternative explanations, and is also hampered by small area level sample sizes, I argue that other researchers interested in the effects of economic inequality on attitudes towards people in poverty should focus less on the way that patterns of interaction and segregation between income groups are altered by rising inequality, and more on processes of social comparison and status anxiety.

If my results do represent a causal effect of inequality on individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty then they present a depressing prospect for those who support increased redistribution in response to high economic inequality. The association between income inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty implies that individuals become less sympathetic towards the poor in high inequality contexts. Such decreases in sympathy will not necessarily reduce support for redistribution, as low income individuals might continue to support the welfare state for self-interested reasons (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2016). However, rising inequality may nonetheless increase support for degrading or stigmatising treatment of the poor through welfare conditionality and sanctioning (Buss, Ebbinghaus and Naumann, 2017; Furaker and Blomsterberg, 2003; Reeves and Loopstra, 2017), as well as punitive treatment in other spheres such as housing, education, and the criminal justice system. Either way, stigmatising attitudes towards the poor have the potential to set in motion a feedback loop whereby unsympathetic attitudes further entrench existing inequalities, which then lessen support for reducing those same inequalities.

Chapter 4 - Neither threat nor contact: exposure to local unemployment and negative stereotypes about the unemployed

'Where is the fairness, we ask, for the shift-worker, leaving home in the dark hours of the early morning, who looks up at the closed blinds of their next door neighbour sleeping off a life on benefits?' (George Osborne, then British Chancellor in 2012)

4.1 Introduction

Public support for redistribution and the welfare state is shaped by beliefs about whether welfare recipients are deserving or not (Aarøe and Petersen, 2014; Van Oorschot and Roosma, 2017). There is a great deal of variation in support for the recipients of different kinds of benefits, with unemployment benefit recipients often regarded as relatively undeserving of help (Laenen and Meuleman, 2017; Van Oorschot, 2006). A number of experimental studies find that the most important determinant of whether unemployed people are seen as deserving of help is the extent to which they are responsible for their unemployment (Fong, 2007; Reeskens and Van der Meer, 2017). Did they lose their previous job because of a recession or mass layoffs, or were they fired for low productivity? Are they actively searching for a new job or are they happy to live on unemployment benefit indefinitely? This popular uncertainty about the work ethic of the unemployed is reflected in the popularity of welfare conditionality policies that include often punitive sanctions for failure to comply with job search and training requirements (Buss, Ebbinghaus and Naumann, 2017; Deeming, 2015; Fossati, 2018). In addition, negative stereotypes about the unemployed contribute to both the stigmatization faced by unemployed people, with resulting feelings of shame and inadequacy (Walker et al., 2013), as well as discrimination by employers, making it harder to return to work (Gibbons and Katz, 1991; Oberholzer-Gee, 2008; Van Belle et al., 2018). As a result it is important to understand how people decide whether unemployed people are responsible for their situation or not.

One explanation for why individuals hold negative stereotypes about this group is that they have personally encountered unemployed people in the places they live who appear to be failing to look for work and exploiting the welfare system. This idea is popular among conservative critics of the welfare state (such as in the speech by George Osborne, the then British chancellor, with which I begin this chapter) - who argue that popular antipathy to welfare recipients is shaped by personal

observations of individuals abusing the system (Baumberg, Bell and Gaffney, 2012). This same account is implicit in qualitative work with people who are in poverty, many of whom justify stigmatising views about others in poverty based on first-hand personal observation in their neighbourhood or town (Chase and Walker, 2012; Golding and Middleton, 1984; Patrick, 2016; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). However, this perspective conflicts with the large body of experimental evidence which finds that contact with outgroups usually improves perceptions (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Likewise, other research shows that unemployment among family or friends improves perceptions of the unemployed more broadly (Danckert, 2017; Newman and Vickrey, 2017).

I contribute to this debate by investigating whether individuals who live in areas where unemployment benefits claims are more prevalent are more or less likely to hold negative stereotypes about the unemployed. Using data from The British Election Study Panel Survey, I provide the first longitudinal analysis of the association between area-level welfare claims and attitudes towards welfare recipients. In the analysis I use fixed-effects regression models to adjust for the selection of individuals into high unemployment areas, something which has not been possible in the existing literature (Bailey et al., 2013; Baumberg, 2015; Merolla, Hunt and Serpe, 2011).

My results provide no evidence at all for the view that opposition to unemployment benefits and recipients stems mainly from personal encounters with people who are perceived to be exploiting the system or receiving undeserved benefits. Higher levels of unemployment benefit claims are in fact associated with lower levels of negative stereotypes about the unemployed. However, this relationship is both small in magnitude, and sensitive to the inclusion of time fixed effects in regression models. Furthermore, I use data from the British Social Attitudes survey to show that my results are unlikely to depend on the spatial scale at which I measure unemployment benefit claims.

As a result, I argue that, at least in the short term, there is very little evidence that individual attitudes towards the unemployed depend on the levels of unemployment benefit claims in their area. My results differ from studies of the effects of contact with the homeless, ethnic minorities, and immigrants (Enos, 2014; Lee, Farrell and Link, 2004; Rink, Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2009). One possible explanation of this divergence is that an individuals' unemployment status is a social status

that is not necessarily easy to perceive during encounters in public space. This article thus suggests an important limit to the generalizability of contact and threat theory, though it is important to note that the study was carried out over a short time period in which unemployment benefit claims were small and declining. Future research focusing on long-term exposure and large effects may find different results. My findings also suggest that the scope for current local context to affect attitudes may be limited compared to the importance of national level political or macroeconomic changes.

4.2 Inequality and spatial segregation

This chapter is closely linked to the broader purpose of my PhD: to put stigmatising stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients into a structural economic context. In doing so I address some of the difficulties that the cultural class analysis has in incorporating economic structure into its analysis. Many studies in this literature report individuals drawing on examples from their local area to justify stigmatising attitudes (Baumberg, Bell and Gaffney, 2012; Chase and Walker, 2012; Hoggett, Wilkinson and Beedell, 2013; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). Indeed in Golding and Middleton's classic study of welfare attitudes, 'personal experience' was the most common reason respondents gave for their views (1984: 173). However, it is unclear whether this is an accurate reflection of the process that leads individuals to form their views, or rather a justification of views that individuals hold for other reasons, such as influence from the media or political ideology or the media. As a result, I investigate whether exposure to local unemployment affects attitudes towards unemployed people.

This chapter also plays a role in understanding the relationship between inequality and attitudes towards the poor by investigating how increases in spatial segregation by income are likely to affect attitudes towards welfare recipients. According to the social distance theory, outlined in section 1.7.2 of the introduction and tested in Chapter 3, higher inequality increases spatial segregation by income, reducing contact between the affluent and poor, and hence worsening perceptions (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011; Mijs, 2019). This theory depends on the assumption that contact with welfare recipients or the poor actually improves perceptions, such that declining contact can worsen perceptions. This chapter seeks to test such an assumption, and hence provide evidence about the microfoundations of the social distance theory.

4.3 Background: Neighbourhoods and attitudes

The idea that an individual's residential context affects their attitudes and behavior is widespread across the social sciences. Residential context is especially important for thinking about attitudes towards outgroups. Given that people's close relationships tend to be with those of similar ethnic origin, educational status, and social class, (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2004; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001; Schwartz, 2013; Smith, McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 2014) interpersonal interaction in the local area is arguably a key venue for individuals from different backgrounds to interact and form views about one another.

The neighbourhood effects literature suggests that observation of others in public space may be an important mechanism for transmitting values and social norms (Galster, 2012: 25). Observing the behaviour of unemployed individuals in public space may provide important cues to other individuals about their work-ethic, adherence to social norms, and living standards. Mechanisms like territorial stigmatisation are also important in this context (Galster, 2012; Mckenzie, 2015): awareness of deprived areas may shape attitudes towards those who are thought to live in them.

The data I use in this research do not contain any direct measures of interaction with unemployment benefit claimants (see Hedegaard, 2014; Lee, Farrell and Link, 2004 for research using self-reported contact). Instead I adopt the metaphor of 'exposure' from Lee and colleagues (Dinesen and Sønderskov, 2015; Lee, Farrell and Link, 2004). I assume that levels of unemployment benefit claims in the area an individual lives in affect the probability of observation of, or interaction with unemployed individuals, and hence the probability of exposure. In this article I use measures of area level unemployment benefit claims to study the relationship between exposure to unemployment and attitudes towards the unemployed.

4.4 How exposure could improve perceptions

The large experimental literature on the contact hypothesis suggests that contact with members of outgroups makes individuals more sympathetic towards that group, whether by debunking negative stereotypes or reducing anxiety about the group's behavior (see Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006 for meta-analytic evidence). Personal experience of unemployment and claiming benefits, as well as knowing friends or family in such a situation, makes individuals more sympathetic towards unemployed people in general (Danckert, 2017; Hedegaard, 2014; Newman and Vickrey, 2017). This

suggests that encounters with, or observation of, unemployed people could improve perceptions by reducing individuals' suspicion or anxiety about whether unemployed benefit claimants are genuinely looking for a new job, and debunking often negative media stereotypes about their behavior. Similarly, exposure to unemployment could affect individuals' beliefs about the causes of unemployment, making them more aware of structural economic causes of unemployment and local job market conditions that may make it difficult for individuals to find new jobs (Bisgaard, Dinesen and Sønderskov, 2016; Thal, 2017). This suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: higher levels of unemployment benefit claims are associated with lower levels of negative stereotypes about the unemployed.

4.5 How exposure could worsen perceptions

However, the processes underlying the contact hypothesis are often thought to depend on close and sustained personal contact, of the kind that is induced in experimental research, or occurs naturally among friends or family (Pettigrew, 1998; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010). Exposure at the level of a neighbourhood, community, or town, is likely to increase the probability of encounters characterized by brief and impersonal observation or interaction in public space. There is no necessary reason to expect such encounters to improve perceptions. Indeed, there is strong evidence that exposure in a residential context to ethnic minorities and immigrants can trigger threat effects, worsening racial attitudes (Bowyer, 2009; Dixon, 2006; Enos, 2014; Weber, 2018) and promoting political mobilization, including extreme-right voting (Biggs and Knauss, 2012; Enos, 2016; Rink, Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2009). Qualitative research with individuals who live in high poverty neighbourhoods provides a variety of examples of individuals drawing on their neighbours or local area to argue that welfare recipients abuse the system, or are otherwise undeserving because they fail to live up to social norms of respectability or hard work (Dunn, 2010, 2013; Sennett and Cobb, 1972; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013).

Increased exposure to unemployment benefit claimants could worsen perceptions of the unemployed if encounters with the unemployed tend to reinforce rather than debunk negative stereotypes about their behavior, work-ethic, or general deservingness. Similarly, higher levels of unemployment benefit claimants in the area an individual lives in could provoke fears about competition over scarce public services, or fears about the sustainability of the welfare system or

public finances. This suggests my second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: higher levels of unemployment benefit claims are associated with higher levels of negative stereotypes about the unemployed.

4.6 Why local exposure might not matter after all

One assumption underlying the idea that residential exposure to an outgroup can affect attitudes is that individuals are aware if those they encounter in public space are a member of that outgroup. Such an assumption may be somewhat plausible in the cases of ethnicity, national background, rough sleeping, and some symptoms of disability and mental illness. While often subject to misperceptions and inaccuracies, all of these social statuses can leave 'marks' on an individual that can be noticed by others who share social space with them (Goffman, 1968). By contrast, it is not necessarily possible to tell whether an individual is employed or not based on observation in public space. Due to the feelings of shame associated with unemployment individuals may even hide their status from friends and family (Patrick, 2016; Walker et al., 2013). As a result an individual's attitudes to the unemployed may not respond to changes in levels of contextual unemployment simply because they may not be aware that the number of unemployed people in their area has changed.

It is well known that voting decisions and approval of current governments are very responsive to the macro-economic context and deservingness perceptions are no different (Reeves and de Vries, 2016; Uunk and van Oorschot, 2018). If individuals form views about whether unemployed people are generally at fault for their unemployment on the basis of their perceptions of the state of the national economy, then they may not respond especially strongly to neighbourhood context. As a result, area level unemployment rates will not necessarily have a meaningful association with attitudes towards the unemployed.

4.7 Existing literature characterized by mixed findings and vulnerability to selection bias

The small existing literature on how residential exposure to the unemployed, welfare recipients, and the poor affects attitudes provides only limited support for either the contact or the threat perspective. Lee and colleagues (2004) find that self-reported contact with homeless people

improves perceptions, while Baumberg (2015) finds that individuals resident in areas with high levels of welfare uptake were more likely to feel that people should feel ashamed for claiming benefits. Merolla and colleagues (Merolla, Hunt and Serpe, 2011) argue that individuals living in neighbourhoods with higher levels of 'concentrated disadvantage' are simultaneously more likely to subscribe to individualistic and structural explanations for poverty. Furthermore, Bailey and colleagues (2013), and Hopkins (2009) find little evidence for a direct effect of area level deprivation or poverty on welfare attitudes or explanations for poverty.

One difficulty with these studies is that they rely on cross-sectional data, making it difficult to adjust for the selection of individuals who are sympathetic towards welfare recipients into high poverty areas.[62] While individuals are unlikely to move into areas specifically based on their attitudes towards the unemployed, unmeasured aspects of formative economic context and adult economic position have the potential to induce indirect selection bias.[63] Formative affluence is likely to influence both attitudes towards the unemployed and whether individuals live in high unemployment neighbourhoods as adults. Adult political attitudes, including preferences for redistribution and left-wing values, are shaped by the affluence of the family in which individuals grew up in (O'Grady, 2019b; Surridge, 2016). As a result, those who grow up in families with experience of economic disadvantages such as unemployment may be more sympathetic towards welfare recipients as adults. However, the levels of unemployment in the places that individuals live in is also likely to be affected by the affluence of their formative environment. Whether because many people tend to live in the area they grew up in, the intergenerational correlations in earnings and occupation leading to differences in the areas individuals can afford to live in, or even the inheritance of housing wealth allowing the children of the affluent to buy houses in advantaged neighbourhoods, individuals who grew up in disadvantaged households are likely to end up in less advantaged and thus higher unemployment areas as adults (Chetty et al., 2014; Coulter, 2017; Van Ham et al., 2014). As a result, formative affluence could induce a spurious correlation between area level unemployment benefit claims and attitudes towards the unemployed. As a result, individuals

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[62] Danckert (2017) and Newman and Vickrey (2017) report no association between local unemployment rates and attitudes towards the unemployed in longitudinal studies. However, in both cases area level unemployment is a covariate in their models rather than the main focus, so it is not clear how robust their findings are.

[63] While there is some evidence that individuals are differentially likely to move into areas where people with similar political views (partisanship in particular) are concentrated (Gallego et al., 2014; Gimpel and Hui, 2015), indirect selection biases of the kind I discuss here are more likely to be relevant.

who are more left-wing, and thus sympathetic towards the unemployed may happen to select into less affluent areas where unemployment is more prevalent.

The magnitude of selection biases of this kind are unknown, and they may be small, or possible to control for by controlling for measures of contemporaneous economic position. However, in practice carefully controlled longitudinal and quasi-experimental research designs often invalidate cross-sectional results (e.g. Gallego et al., 2014; Oreopoulos, 2003). As a result this paper adopts the conservative strategy of using panel data to provide a more rigorous adjustment for selection bias than is possible in existing literature that uses cross-sectional data.

4.8 Data, variables, and methods
4.8.1 Panel data on attitudes towards the unemployed
I measure attitudes towards the unemployed using data from waves one and four of the British Election Survey Panel Study, conducted in February 2014 and March 2015 respectively. The BES panel is a web survey, with respondents selected from YouGov's pool of survey takers by a form of quota sampling designed to ensure the achieved sample is representative of the population on a number of demographic characteristics (British Election Study, n.d.). This survey is the only widely available panel survey that asks questions about attitudes towards welfare recipients. It has a large sample size (approximately 30,000 respondents in any one wave), both providing a good deal more statistical power than comparable studies, and also ensuring adequate numbers of respondents at smaller geographical scales.

4.8.2 Measuring negative stereotypes about the unemployed
I use the item *'when someone is unemployed, it is usually through no fault of their own'* to measure levels of negative stereotypes about the unemployed. This question is taken to measure the extent to which respondents believe that unemployment is caused by individual failings or inadequacies rather than structural economic forces, societal injustice, or bad luck (Lepianka, Van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2009). As such, respondents who disagree are assumed to believe that unemployed people are usually at fault for losing their job or failing to find a new one. Respondents answer on a 5 point strongly agree to strongly disagree scale, where higher values indicate a more negative attitudes toward the unemployed. I rescale it to run from 0 to 100 to make the regression models easier to

interpret. Table A24 in appendix 4.2 shows that my results are very similar when a question about welfare receipt in general is asked instead.

4.8.3 Exposure is measured at local authority scale

I measure exposure to unemployment using the local authority district in which individuals were living when they entered the survey.[64] Local authority districts are the smallest unit of local government in Britain, varying in population from around 20,000 to over 1 million (mean =161,600, SD =110,800).[65] They are thus larger than the neighbourhood scale at which much research on contact with outgroups is conducted (Bisgaard, Dinesen and Sønderskov, 2016; Dinesen and Sønderskov, 2015). However, the larger size of local authorities allows them to capture some social processes which take place at a larger spatial scale: processes of observation in social space that take place in locations like town centres, waiting rooms for welfare or medical services, as well as territorial stigmatisation based on the reputations of specific areas such as public housing estates (Besbris et al., 2015; Mckenzie, 2015). I examine the consequences of measuring exposure to unemployment benefit recipients at the scale of local authorities further below and in table A26 in appendix 4.2.

4.8.4 Explanatory variable: unemployment benefit claims

My explanatory variable is the proportion of individuals in a local authority who are receiving unemployment related benefits – known at the time in Britain as Jobseekers Allowance. There are a number of other means-tested benefits available in the UK, including tax credits aimed at in work families with children and disability benefits. While contact with recipients of these benefits are just as relevant for attitudes to welfare recipients as unemployment benefits claims (Hedegaard, 2014), the BES does not include questions measuring attitudes towards these groups specifically. I focus on unemployment benefit claims to ensure a clear correspondence between the measure of exposure and the specific attitudinal outcome. In particular, if no relationship between benefit

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[64] The fact that residential moves are not observed has the potential to bias results. Over the one year period of the study we would expect approximately 4.5% of the population to have changed addresses – based on estimates by Champion and Shuttleworth (2017). However, over half of these moves are over a distance of fewer than 10km, potentially leaving them in the same local authority. As a result, the scale of residential migration over a short time period such as 1 year is probably too small to have a major impact on results.

[65] The BES panel survey has no respondents for 4 out of 381 local authorities in wave 1. In addition, two small local authorities (Isles of Scilly and City of London) are merged with neighbours, giving a total sample size of 375 at the local authority level.

claims other than unemployment benefits and attitudes towards the unemployed is found, it would be unclear whether this represented a genuine finding, or was an artefact of exposure to the wrong group being measured.

Due to a combination of eligibility restrictions and non-take up, unemployment benefit claims are typically a few percentage points lower than the unemployment rate, but highly correlated over time and space (r= 0.93 in my data). While the data is published monthly, I average over the 3 months before the BES wave was fielded to smooth out short-term fluctuations. Data were obtained from Nomis.[66] Table A22 in appendix 4.2 shows that results are robust to alternative specifications of claimant counts as well as using unemployment rates instead of claimant counts as the explanatory variable.

4.8.5 Covariates

My use of fixed-effects regression models eliminates the effects of all time-invariant or slow changing variables on attitudes towards the unemployed. As a result, the influence of variables such as gender, race, religion, levels of education, and social origin are removed from models. One downside of the BES panel survey is that a number of potentially time-varying covariates such as household income and housing tenure are only measured on entry to the survey, and thus cannot be included in my regression models.

However, the survey does contain time-varying measures of work status, which is a strong predictor of welfare attitudes (Danckert, 2017). This is coded as a set of dummy variables with the following categories: working, unemployed, in education, and retired (indicators for being out of the labour market due to illness or looking after the home are not available). I also control for individuals' subjective perceptions of their economic situation using their responses to the question '*during the next twelve months, how likely or unlikely is it that there will be times when you don't have enough money to cover your day to day living costs*'. Respondents answer on a 5 point scale from very likely to very unlikely, which I treat as a categorical variable. At a local authority level I also control for gross disposable income per head, to capture the affluence of the area in which individuals live.

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[66] Nomis is a repository of official labour market statistics for the UK available at
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/. Accessed 27/09/2018.

Missing values were deleted listwise, giving a total of 30,466 observations across 15,233 respondents in 375 local authorities. Descriptive statistics for all variables are given in table 6.

Table 6: Descriptive statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Belief that unemployed responsible for situation	44.6	23.5	0.0	100.0
% of local authority claiming unemployment benefit	2.4	1.2	0.5	7.0
Belief that R will be unable to cover living costs in next year				
Very unlikely	0.30	0.46	0	1
Fairly unlikely	0.32	0.47	0	1
Neither likely or unlikely	0.16	0.37	0	1
Fairly likely	0.14	0.35	0	1
Very likely	0.07	0.26	0	1
Work status				
In employment	0.58	0.49	0	1
Unemployed	0.02	0.13	0	1
In education	0.03	0.16	0	1
Retired	0.38	0.49	0	1
Local authority level gross disposable income per head /1000	18.1	4.5	11.7	59.9

Notes: Sample size: 30466 observations on 15233 individuals in 375 local authorities. Individual level data from BES panel survey waves 1 (Feb 2014) and 4 (March 2015). Unemployment benefit claims and gross disposable income per head data from Nomis. Means of categorical variables can be interpreted as proportion falling into category. Author's calculations.

4.8.6 Fixed effects regression models

I use linear regression models with individual fixed effects to model the association between exposure to unemployment benefit recipients and negative stereotypes about the unemployed.[67] Fixed-effects models are appropriate because they remove the effects of all time-invariant variables that could affect selection into high unemployment areas, using only within-individual variation in the explanatory variable.

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[67] While this response variable is technically ordinal I treat it as continuous and estimate a linear probability model because it is very difficult to estimate ordinal (logistic) regression models with fixed effects. Figure 17 in section 4.9.4 reports results from fixed effects logistic regression models with a dichotomised response variable.

In all models the response variable is negative attitudes towards the unemployed. The main explanatory variable is local authority level unemployment benefit claims. All models include individual fixed effects. Some models also include a time dummy to control for time-varying political or macroeconomic shocks that affect the entire country simultaneously, as well as individual and local authority level controls. I cluster standard errors by local authority to deal with the measurement of my 'treatment' at an area level and the serial correlation of unemployment benefit claims (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004).

4.9 Results
4.9.1 Distribution of welfare attitudes and unemployment benefit claims

Figure 14 plots both levels of attitudes towards unemployment and the proportion claiming unemployment related benefits and the changes in these variables over the two waves I study. Panel (a) displays respondents' attitudes towards the unemployed. The British public are fairly positive about the unemployed according to this measure, with about 40% agreeing that people become unemployed through no fault of their own, and only about 20% disagreeing with the question. This is a rather more positive attitude than is usually found in British welfare attitude studies, which tend to find that negative stereotypes about the unemployed are widely believed (Geiger, Reeves and de Vries, 2017).[68] This might be because people are more sympathetic about job loss than they are about individuals' attempts to find a new job – the question that is normally asked in other research. Table A24 in appendix 4.2 shows that the main results of this article are largely replicated if the question 'too many people rely on government handouts', with which 65% of the sample agree, is used instead.

Panel (b) shows that individual attitudes are relatively stable over time. About 50% of respondents did not change their views over the year between the two survey waves, while about 40% changed their views by one point on a five point scale. About 8% of respondents transitioned from agreeing to disagreeing or vice versa, a substantial proportion given the short time scale over which the study was conducted. Figure 17 in section 4.9.4 reports an analysis that focuses on these individuals who change their minds in particular, with similar results to those in the main analyses. Panel (c) shows the distribution of unemployment benefit claims over local authorities. The average proportion of

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[68] In the 2014 British Social Attitudes Survey 58% of respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement 'around here most people could find a job if they really wanted'.

local authority population claiming unemployment benefit is 2.2%, and as Panel (d) suggests this declined over the period of the study. Panel (d) also shows that all areas experienced declines over the study period – evidently rates of unemployment benefit claims are highly correlated across areas – probably reflecting national trends in macroeconomic performance. As a result, modelling the relationship between unemployment benefit claims and attitudes towards the unemployed must take into account country-wide shocks.

a) Negative stereotypes about the unemployed

b) Change in negative stereotypes about the unemployed

Q: When someone is unemployed, it is usually through no fault of their own

c) Unemployment benefits claims

d) Change in unemployment benefit claims

Percent of working age population claiming unemployment benefit

Figure 14: Levels of and changes in negative stereotypes about the unemployed and unemployment benefits claims. Panels a) and b) display negative stereotypes about the unemployed measured by the question 'when someone is unemployed, it is usually through no fault of their own'. Panels c) and d) display the proportion of the working age population receiving unemployment benefits. Panels a) and c) display the levels of each variable, while panels b) and d) display changes over a one year period. Individual level data from BES panel survey waves 1 (Feb 2014) and 4 (March 2015). Sample size = 30,466 observations over 15,233 individuals. Unemployment benefit claims are 3 month averages to smooth out short term fluctuations. Data from Nomis for 375 local authority districts. Author's calculations.

4.9.2 Individuals in areas with higher unemployment benefit claims more sympathetic towards unemployed

Nonetheless, there is a cross-sectional association between unemployment benefit claims and attitudes towards the unemployed in the direction predicted by the hypothesis 1. Figure 15 plots levels of unemployment benefit claims against local-authority level mean levels of negative stereotypes about the unemployed. Individuals in areas with higher levels of unemployment benefit

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claims are on average more sympathetic towards the unemployed, though this relationship flattens out when claimant counts are above 4% (Table A22 in appendix 4.2 demonstrates that the relationship is robust to using logged claimant counts as the response variable).

Figure 15: Local authority level association between unemployment benefit claims and negative stereotypes about the unemployed. Mean negative stereotypes about the unemployed at a local authority level are calculated from a random-intercept multilevel regression model with observations nested within local authorities, dummy variables for wave and government office region included in the model, and individual level survey weights to adjust for unequal probabilities of sample selection. The 'partial pooling' property of multilevel models adjusts estimates for small sample sizes in some areas. Relationship is summarised using Lowess line. Individual level data from BES panel survey waves 1 (Feb 2014) and 4 (March 2015). Unemployment benefit claims data from Nomis. Sample size: 750 local authority-waves. Author's calculations.

4.9.3 Association between unemployment benefit claims and attitudes not robust to time fixed effects

Figure 16 plots estimated coefficients of the effects of unemployment benefit claims on attitudes from linear fixed-effects regression models, with full results in table A19-20 in appendix 4.1. All models include person fixed effects. Models with and without time fixed effects are plotted separately because they have a major effect on estimates. Model (a) estimates the effect of percent claiming unemployment benefit on attitudes, and models (b)-(d) each add one covariate – work status, subjective poverty risk, and GDI per head. Model (e) includes all covariates together.

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Among the models with person fixed effects only, a one percentage point increase in proportion claiming unemployment benefits is associated with an approximately one percentage point decrease in negative stereotypes about the unemployed. This is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and contact theory. The coefficient estimate is essentially unchanged by the introduction of controls, and while 95% confidence intervals are wider in the model with all controls included they still provide evidence for a negative effect of claimant counts on attitudes (CI: -1.60, -0.72 in model with no controls, CI: -1.70, -0.40 in model with all controls). This effect is very small in substantive size: an increase in claimant counts from one to six percent (almost the entire observed range), would reduce negative stereotypes about the unemployed by only six percentage points.

The inclusion of time fixed effects has a major impact on estimates of the association between unemployment benefit claims and attitudes towards the unemployed. While the point estimates are still negative, coefficients are half the size (B=-1.00 to -1.07 with individual fixed effects only, -0.41 to -0.31 after adding time fixed effect), and all 95% confidence intervals are consistent with both a positive or a negative association (CI: -1.60 to 0.77 with no controls, -1.52 to 0.89 with all controls). The evidence from these models provides very little evidence for either Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2.

By contrast, the estimates for measures of individual work status and subjective economic position are essentially unaffected by the inclusion of time fixed effects. As expected, individuals who are currently unemployed are more sympathetic towards the unemployed (by around 3 percentage points). By contrast, there is little evidence that individuals' subjective poverty risk predicts their attitudes towards the unemployed, confirming the findings of weak effects of changes in income on welfare attitudes in other research (Margalit, 2013; Naumann, Buss and Bähr, 2016). These results provide essentially no support for the threat hypothesis, which predicted that individuals would be more likely to hold negative stereotypes about the unemployed when unemployment benefit claims are more prevalent. While the coefficient estimates are in the direction predicted by the contact hypothesis, the estimates are both small in magnitude and not robust to controls for time-fixed effects.

1) Person fixed effects   **2) Person and wave fixed effects**

Coefficient on negative stereotypes about unemployed

○ a) No covs   □ b) + work stat   ◇ c) + pov risk   △ d) + GDI ph   + e) all covs

Figure 16: Coefficient estimates from fixed effects regression models of unemployment benefit claims on negative stereotypes about the unemployed. Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from linear fixed effects regression models. All models include individual fixed effects, while those in panel 2 also include time fixed effects. In each panel, model (a) includes no additional covariates, while model (b) adds controls for work status, model (c) poverty risk, and model (d) GDI per head as separate controls. Model (e) adds includes all covariates. The response variable, negative stereotypes about the unemployed, is on a 0-100 scale. Sample size: 30466 observations on 15233 individuals in 375 local authorities. Standard errors are clustered by local authority. Individual level data from BES panel survey waves 1 (Feb 2014) and 4 (March 2015). Unemployment benefit claims and gross disposable income per head data from Nomis. See tables A19-20 in appendix 4.1 for full results. Author's calculations.

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4.9.4 Association between exposure to unemployed and attitudes is robust to modelling choices

One concern with results presented above is that attitudes towards the unemployed change little over the short time period of the study, making it difficult to detect an effect of changes in unemployment benefit claims even if one exists. I address this concern by looking specifically at those respondents who change their mind about whether unemployed people are at fault for their situation, moving from agreeing or strongly agreeing to disagreeing or strongly disagreeing or vice-versa. Only 8% of respondents change their views in this way, but given the large sample size of the BES this gives 2300 observations on 1150 respondents, a sufficient number to be the focus of an additional analysis. Because this response is binary I fit a fixed effects (conditional) logistic regression model with unemployment benefit claims as the explanatory variable, and the same covariates as the linear fixed effects models used in the previous section. Estimated odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals are displayed in figure 17, with full results in table A21 in appendix 4.2. Models with and without time fixed effects are plotted separately because they have a major effect on estimates. Model (a) estimates the effect of percent claiming unemployment benefit on a change in attitudes, and model (b) includes all covariates together.

Results are very similar to those from the previous section. Odds ratios are affected very little by the inclusion of covariates, and in the model without time fixed effects they suggest that an increase in unemployment benefit claims is associated with lower odds of changing view about the unemployed from positive to negative (OR = 0.68, 95% CI: LB = 0.58, UB = -0.78 in model with no covariates; OR = 0.73, 95% CI: LB = 0.61, UB = 0.87 in model with all covariates). Once again, the models that include time fixed effects now have much wider 95% confidence intervals consistent with both increased and decreased odds of changing opinion to become less sympathetic towards welfare recipients (OR = 1.10, 95% CI: LB = 0.79, UB = 1.53 in model with no covariates; OR = 1.12, 95% CI: LB = 0.80, UB = 1.58 in model with all covariates). These results indicate that the findings reported in the previous section are not an artefact of the low levels of change in attitudes towards welfare recipients – as they are replicated when focusing on those individuals who do in fact change their views.

Figure 17: Odds ratio of unemployment benefit claims on change from disagreeing to agreeing that unemployed responsible for situation. Odds ratio estimates and 95% confidence intervals from fixed effects (conditional) logistic regression models. All models include individual fixed effects, while those in panel 2 also include time fixed effects. In each panel, model (a) includes no additional covariates, while model (b) all covariates. The response variable, negative stereotypes about the unemployed, is a binary variable, where 0 = agrees/strongly agrees that unemployed not responsible for their situation and 1 = disagrees or strongly disagrees. Model only estimated on respondents who changed their view between the two waves. Sample size: 2300 observations on 1150 individuals in 319 local authorities. Standard errors are clustered by local authority. Individual level data from BES panel survey waves 1 (Feb 2014) and 4 (March 2015). Unemployment benefit claims and gross disposable income per head data from Nomis. See table A21 in appendix 4.2 for full results. Author's calculations.

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In appendix 4.2 I present further evidence that my results are highly robust to a wide variety of variable operationalisation and modelling choices, including the following:

- Alternative measures of exposure to the unemployed: logged and dichotomized (top decile) unemployment benefit claims, unemployment rates to deal with non-uptake of unemployment benefits (table A22). The results are even weaker when unemployment rates are used as the explanatory variable, with 95% confidence intervals including 0 even for the model with person fixed effects only.

- Weighting and sample exclusion rules to adjust for non-probability sample nature of BES data (Table A23).

- An alternate response variable: 'too many people rely on government handouts' to ensure results aren't driven by idiosyncratic aspects of the question I use (Table A24).

- Adding an additional wave of data from 2016 (without individual work status measures) (Table A25).

- Measuring unemployment benefit claims at the scale of parliamentary constituencies, which are somewhat smaller and more evenly sized than local authorities (Table A26).

The results overwhelmingly confirm my main conclusion that there is little evidence for an association between unemployment benefit claims and negative stereotypes about the unemployed.

4.9.5 Relationship between unemployment and attitudes at multiple spatial scales

The biggest problem with the results presented in the previous sections relate to the scale at which I measure unemployment benefit claims. Local authorities are much larger than the neighbourhood scale at which many (but not all) of the processes of interaction and observation that underpin the threat and contact hypotheses are supposed to operate. I address this concern by investigating the extent to which the association between unemployment and attitudes towards the unemployed depends on the spatial scale at which unemployment is measured. If the relationship varies substantially across spatial scales, and differs from my results above, then this casts doubt upon the conclusions of the longitudinal analysis.

As the BES Panel data does not contain any neighbourhood scale geographical indicators, I use cross-sectional survey data from the 2004 British Social Attitudes Survey combined with neighbourhood

level data. Neighbourhoods context is measured using Local Super Output Areas (LSOAs), census output areas with a population of around 1500. LSOAs thus approximate the spatial scale of a neighbourhood much more closely (Bailey et al., 2013; Baumberg, 2015). This is not a direct replication of my analysis of the BES panel data: in addition to being cross-sectional rather than longitudinal I measure responses to a slightly different (though closely related) question ("when someone is unemployed it is usually through no fault of their own" on a 1-5 point scale), and unemployment rates (from the 2001 census for LSOAs, from Nomis in 2004 for local authorities) rather than claimant counts as the response variable. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in these analyses are provided in table A27 in appendix 4.3. (see Bailey, 2011; Bailey et al., 2013).

I estimate the association between area level unemployment and negative stereotypes about the unemployed using multilevel linear regression models, where respondents are nested within LSOAs, which are nested within local authorities. Each coefficient in Figure 18 presents results from a separate model, with full results in tables A28-29 in Appendix 4.3. The top model in each panel measures unemployment at the scale of a neighbourhood/LSOA, while the second model measures unemployment at a local authority scale. As the data is cross-sectional, I cannot use fixed effects estimation to difference out time invariant individual characteristics. As a result, each panel successively adds controls for demographic background, economic position, and LSOA characteristics.

A one-point increase in neighbourhood/LSOA level unemployment rates is associated with between -0.35 and -0.61 percentage points lower levels of negative stereotypes about the unemployed. The corresponding estimates for unemployment at a local authority level are slightly larger in absolute size, ranging from -0.88 to -0.43. For each set of models there is a great deal of overlap between the 95% confidence intervals of unemployment measured at a neighbourhood/LSOA and local authority scale. Once again, all coefficients are negative, consistent with Hypothesis 1, and comparable in size to the effect of claimant counts on attitudes towards the unemployed reported in the longitudinal analysis in figure 16 (which are between -1.07 and -0.38). As a result I find very little evidence that the relationship between the exposure to unemployed people and attitudes towards the unemployed depends on the scale at which unemployment is measured. This provides further confidence in my central finding: that increases in unemployment benefit claims are associated with a small and non-robust reduction in negative stereotypes about the unemployed.

a) No controls   b) Demographic controls

c) + Economic position controls   d) + Area level controls

Coefficient of unemployment rates on: *Most people round here could find a job if they really wanted*

Figure 18: Association between unemployment rates and attitudes towards the unemployed at local authority and neighbourhood scales. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals calculated from three level random intercept linear regression model with individuals nested within local super output areas (LSOAs) which are nested within local authorities. Each coefficient is from a separate model. Each panel successively adds additional controls to the model. Demographic controls = gender, age, marital status, and ethnicity. Economic position controls = education, income, and work status. Area level controls = % of LSOA population non-white, LSOA population density. The response variable, negative stereotypes about the unemployed, is on a 0-100 scale. Sample size: 1837 individuals, 887 LSOAs, 139 local authorities. Individual level data from 2004 British Social Attitudes Survey, LSOA unemployment derived from 2001 census data by Nick Bailey (2011), and local authority level unemployment data for 2004 from Nomis. See tables A28 and 29 in appendix 4.3 for full results. Author's calculations.

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4.10 Discussion

There is very little evidence that changes in area level unemployment benefits claim rates are associated with changes in individual attitudes towards the unemployed. Individuals who live in areas with high rates of benefit claims are, consistent with the contact hypothesis, more sympathetic on average to the unemployed. However, the size of this effect is very small, and greatly weakened by the introduction of time fixed effects, which control for shocks affecting all local authorities simultaneously. These results are robust to a plethora of alternative measures of both response and explanatory variable, and the relationship between unemployment and attitudes appears to vary very little over multiple spatial scales.

4.10.1 Hidden status of unemployment

My finding that increases in unemployment do not seem to have a strong or straightforward effect on attitudes towards the unemployed conflicts with several bodies of evidence. The first shows that individuals with unemployed friends or family are more sympathetic towards unemployed people in general (Danckert, 2017; Hedegaard, 2014; Newman and Vickrey, 2017). The second set of studies examine contact with ethnic minorities and immigrants in a residential context, finding evidence of threat and contact effects in different contexts (Enos, 2016; Rink, Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2009; Schmid et al., 2008).

While speculative, one way of reconciling my findings with these literatures is to note that the receipt of unemployment benefits is a social status that is hard to identify by casual observation in public space. It is an identity that is stigmatisable, but not necessarily stigmatized in all social interactions because it carries no obvious visual mark that can be used to identify an individual as unemployed (Goffman, 1968). Indeed, many individuals who lose their jobs or receive unemployment benefits conceal this status from others due to fear of shaming reactions (Patrick, 2016; Walker et al., 2013). By contrast, ethnicity and national background, as well as homelessness, carry visual marks which can be used to identify group members in casual interaction in public space – even if such markers often rely on inaccurate stereotypes.

The relative visibility of different kinds of outgroup signifiers has only very rarely been considered as a mediating variable in studies of the effects of contact on attitudes towards outgroups. Cowan (2014) shows that information about stigmatized life events such as abortion are less likely to be transferred through social networks than comparable but non-stigmatised events such as miscarriage. As a result, individuals are less likely to learn about stigmatising events that have happened to their friends or family, reducing the scope for contact to improve attitudes (see also Gelman and Margalit, 2017). As

a result area level exposure may be less relevant for understanding attitudes towards the unemployed or welfare recipients than it is for attitudes towards ethnic minorities, immigrants, or the homeless.

This suggests an important limit on the generalizability of contact and threat theories, and one that future research should consider when investigating the effects of contact with outgroups who are stigmatized due to potentially 'hidden' marks. Future research interested in contact with people in poverty or welfare recipients should use more direct measures of encounters such as self-reports (Hedegaard, 2014) and genuine measures of interaction in realistic settings, such as welfare offices or foodbanks (Kallio and Kouvo, 2015; Williams et al., 2016). Similarly, the effects of poverty on the built environment, or the presence of highly visible groups such as the homeless, may be more relevant for individual attitudes (Lee, Farrell and Link, 2004; Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004; Sands, 2017).

4.10.2 Alternative explanations and external validity

Some limitations of the research design and data suggest alternative interpretations of my findings as well as limits to their generalisability. I looked at changes in unemployment benefit claims over a short period of time (one year) in which individual attitudes towards the unemployed remained fairly static. Furthermore, levels of unemployment benefit claims declined across the country from an already low base. As a result, it is possible that instead of unemployment being a hidden status, individuals did not have a long enough period to change their attitudes towards the unemployed and that changes in unemployment benefit claims were not large enough to meaningfully alter levels of exposure to claimants.

Concerns about the short time period are partially allayed by the finding that although the study was carried out over a short time period a non-negligible share of respondents changed their views about the unemployed. Results in section 4.9.4 confirmed those of the main analysis even when focusing only on those individuals who changed from agreeing to disagreeing that the unemployed are responsible for their situation, or vice-versa. Furthermore, this study has a much larger sample size than existing research (e.g. Bailey et al., 2013; Baumberg, 2015; Hopkins, 2009; Merolla, Hunt and Serpe, 2011) at the individual level, and a substantial sample size at local authority level, likely giving it adequate power to detect even a small association between changes in unemployment benefits claims and beliefs about the causes of unemployment. However, the generalizability of my findings to longer periods of exposure, higher levels of and greater changes in unemployment benefit claims are unknown. For example, only high levels, or large changes in unemployment benefits claims may have a meaningful effect on individual attitudes, and may require highly visible social consequences such as queues outside unemployment offices and soup kitchens, or social unrest (Enos, Kaufman and

Sands, 2019). Alternatively, moderate differences in unemployment benefit claims may take a long time to affect perceptions of the behaviour of the unemployed. Studies examining long-term, or even formative exposure to unemployment might find stronger evidence for contact or threat effects (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2013; O'Grady, 2019b).

As a result the findings of this chapter can be best thought of as evidence against a strong effect of exposure to unemployment benefit claimants on beliefs about the causes of unemployment that operates over a relatively short time period. These results are inconsistent with those finding an immediate effect of changes in personal economic circumstances on attitudes towards the unemployed (Danckert, 2017), or natural experimental research showing how events like riots can immediately affect attitudes towards welfare recipients (Reeves and de Vries, 2016). Future longitudinal research should aim to study how individual attitudes towards the unemployed respond to longer periods of exposure, larger changes in unemployment such as the onset of a recession (Naumann, Buss and Bähr, 2016; Wiertz and Rodon, 2019), or exogenous shocks to local unemployment rates such as plant closures or mass layoffs.

The lack of robustness of the relationship between area level unemployment and attitudes towards the unemployed to time fixed effects implies that individuals are responding to changes in the national economy or political sphere rather than local economic conditions, which tend to move together in response to macroeconomic changes. This is consistent with the idea of 'parallel publics' where different population subgroups tend to respond to changes in macroeconomic conditions in very similar ways, including their attitudes towards the unemployed (Gonthier, 2015; Uunk and van Oorschot, 2018). As a result, researchers need to be aware that the responsiveness of public opinion to national political or macroeconomic changes reduces the scope for local context to affect individual attitudes.

4.10.3 Implications for social distance theory

My results contribute to a debate on how aggregate income inequality affects individual attitudes towards the poor and welfare recipients by providing evidence against the social distance theory: the idea that higher economic inequality worsens attitudes towards the poor by increasing residential segregation (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011; Mijs, 2019). This theory is built on the presupposition that exposure to the poor or welfare recipients improves perceptions, and declining exposure correspondingly worsens them. However, if unemployment is a hidden status then differences in levels of exposure to unemployment benefit claimants may not translate into differing information about the behaviour of unemployed people, and hence area level unemployment benefit claims may

not affect beliefs about the behaviour and morality of the unemployed. While my results are in the direction predicted by the social distance theory, they are small in magnitude and not robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects. As a result, this chapter suggests that, in the case of attitudes towards the unemployed at least, a key microfoundation of the social distance theory may not be supported.

The broader implication is that changes in spatial segregation by income (Bailey and Minton, 2018; Dorling and Rees, 2003; Fransham, 2018; Reardon and Bischoff, 2011) is unlikely to have a direct effect on attitudes towards the unemployed, and perhaps other welfare recipients.[69] This has implications for the prospects of public policies promoting 'mixed neighbourhoods' as a way of enhancing attitudes towards redistribution (Bailey et al., 2013; Kearns et al., 2014). However, the attitudinal consequences of socio-economic residential segregation is a little researched topic, with much room for further development. In particular, there is much scope to use more sophisticated measures of exposure to outgroups, such as exposure indices (Massey and Denton, 1988; Thal, 2017), as well as constructing measures of local income inequality (Johnston and Newman, 2016; Newman, Johnston and Lown, 2015; Newman and Kane, 2017).

4.11 Conclusions

Public perceptions of whether unemployed people are responsible for their situation or not are crucial for understanding the political legitimacy of unemployment benefits, as well as the stigmatization that workless individuals often face. One possible mechanism by which individuals make up their minds about the deservingness of the unemployed is based on observation or interaction with unemployed individuals in the places they live. This study is the first to use panel data to investigate whether exposure to the unemployed makes people more or less likely to hold negative stereotypes about the unemployed. Panel data allows me to employ superior methods for adjusting for the selection of individuals into high unemployment areas than have been possible in the existing literature.

My results provide no evidence for the view (exemplified by the George Osborne quote with which I began this chapter) that opposition to unemployment benefits and recipients stems mainly from exposure to people who are perceived to be exploiting the system or receiving undeserved benefits. By contrast, individuals who live in areas with higher levels of unemployment are generally more sympathetic towards the unemployed. However, at least over short time periods and for fairly small changes in unemployment benefit claims this relationship is substantively small and noisy. While the

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[69] If other groups of welfare recipients, or specific kinds of poverty, are systematically more visible than people who are unemployed, then local exposure to these groups may affect attitudes.

data provide no evidence regarding the specific processes involved, the fact that unemployment is a hidden social status may explain the discrepancy between these results and those obtained in the cases of ethnic minorities and immigrants. My results thus suggest limits to the generalizability of contact theory to groups who possess stigmatized characteristics that are hidden, at least in the absence of direct measures of contact or large changes in area level exposure (Cowan, 2014).

Chapter 5 - Conclusions and implications

5.1 Introduction

Stigmatising stereotypes about people in poverty and welfare recipients have major implications for both welfare state legitimacy and the wellbeing of the poor. Individuals who believe that the poor are at fault for their situation or are abusing the benefits system are much less likely to support redistribution (Aarøe and Petersen, 2014; Daniele and Geys, 2015; Georgiadis and Manning, 2012; Laenen and Meuleman, 2017). These attitudes are especially important at a time of high and or rising inequality (Taylor-Gooby, 2013), as they raise the possibility of a vicious upward spiral: if higher inequality erodes sympathy with the poor, decreasing support for redistribution, then inequality will rise further. Furthermore, the stigmatisation of poverty is likely to have a negative effect on the poor themselves, whether through discrimination by employers (Gibbons and Katz, 1991; Oberholzer-Gee, 2008; Van Belle et al., 2018), through institutional mechanisms like welfare conditionality (Reeve, 2017; Reeves and Loopstra, 2017; Schram et al., 2009; Schram, Fording and Soss, 2008; Wacquant, 2009), and internalised feelings of shame with their consequent impacts on health and wellbeing (Bosma et al., 2015; Patel et al., 2018; Walker et al., 2013).

The aim of my PhD thesis is to place the stigmatisation of poverty and welfare receipt into a structural economic context. I investigate the following research question: *What is the relationship between individual advantage, broader economic context, and the levels of stigmatising stereotypes that people hold about the poor and welfare recipients?* In this concluding chapter I draw together the results of the three empirical chapters and examine some of their broader implications. I first explain how the findings of each empirical chapter answers the overarching research question. I then draw out some general themes that emerge from the thesis as a whole. In discussing these issues I articulate how my PhD contributes to three key literatures: cultural class analysis and critical social policy, comparative political economy analyses of the attitudinal consequences of income inequality, and studies of welfare attitudes focusing on perceptions of the deservingness of welfare recipients. In doing so I make some suggestions for further research, and finally some practical implications of my findings.

5.2 Summary of findings

Question 1: Are economically advantaged individuals more likely to hold stigmatising stereotypes? In Chapter 2 I seek to understand the relationship between economic advantage and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients by explaining why individuals with higher levels of education are more sympathetic towards welfare recipients. Given that education is a major source of economic advantage, such an association appears to imply that an advantaged economic position makes people

more sympathetic towards welfare recipients. This contradicts the idea that similarities in structural economic position lead disadvantaged people to be more sympathetic to others in poverty (Edmiston, 2018; Roosma, Van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2014). Using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey from 1987-2016 I show that the association between education and negative stereotypes cannot be explained by economic advantage but rather by the values, and possibly the social status, associated with high levels of education. The relationship between education and negative stereotypes is not diminished by controlling for other measures of individual economic position, implying that the economic advantage associated with high levels of education cannot explain its relationship with attitudes towards welfare recipients.

Controlling for a measure of authoritarian values markedly reduces the association between education and negative stereotypes. Furthermore, the association between holding a degree and negative stereotypes is weaker in contexts where more people are degree educated. While there are alternative explanations such as cohort differences in formative political context, I argue that the exclusivity, and hence the relative social status associated with a degree is an intriguing explanation for attitudes towards welfare recipients (Noord et al., 2019). The association between high levels of education and attitudes towards welfare recipients may be driven by the values and possibly the social status of the highly educated rather than by the economic advantage associated with high levels of education. Other indicators of economic position such as unemployment, and to a lesser extent low income, are associated with lower levels of negative stereotypes, and these relationships are unchanged by controls for right wing or authoritarian values. Hence I conclude that a disadvantaged economic position is associated with more sympathetic attitudes towards welfare recipients, but that this association is counterbalanced by authoritarian attitudes, and potentially low social status, which are associated with less sympathetic attitudes.

Question 2: Are higher levels of economic inequality associated with higher levels of stigmatising stereotypes? Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between aggregate level economic inequality and stigmatising stereotypes about the poor. Using data from three waves of the European Values Survey, I investigate whether individuals in time periods and years where inequality is higher are more or less likely to hold individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty. I find that individuals are more likely to believe that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty when aggregate inequality is higher. This relationship is strongest within countries over time, reducing the likelihood of confounding by time-invariant country level variables (Fairbrother, 2014). However, due to small country level sample sizes and uncertainty about the direction of causality, I am unable to control for

country level confounders. Furthermore, the descriptive association between inequality and individualistic beliefs is weak, or even negative in post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, especially during the economic transitions of the 1990s. This suggests the presence of confounding variables related to public dissatisfaction with welfare state retrenchment or political corruption (Bandelj and Mahutga, 2010; Grosfeld and Senik, 2010).

This association between aggregate inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty is stronger among individuals with low incomes or low levels of education. This interaction between individual income or education and income inequality is consistent with the idea that higher levels of inequality affect beliefs about the causes of poverty by provoking status anxiety, though once again there are possible confounding variables, a problem exacerbated by small country-level sample sizes. This finding adds nuance to the conclusions of Chapter 2 by implying that the relationship between individual economic advantage and stigmatising stereotypes about the poor depends on levels of aggregate inequality.

Question three: Does living in poorer areas make people more or less sympathetic towards the poor and welfare recipients? In Chapter 4 I investigate how the local economic context in which an individual lives can affect their attitudes towards the poor. Using data from the British Election Study Panel Survey I investigate whether individuals living in areas with higher unemployment benefit claims are more or less sympathetic towards the unemployed. I use fixed-effects regression models to adjust for the selection of individuals who are sympathetic towards the unemployed into high unemployment areas.

Individuals who are more sympathetic towards the unemployed tend to live in areas with higher unemployment benefit claims. However, in conditions of low unemployment overall, I find little evidence that living in an area where unemployment benefit claims increase makes individuals either more or less sympathetic towards welfare recipients. One possible explanation is that unemployment is a hidden social status, meaning that individual attitudes are not especially responsive to local unemployment rates because they don't know whether people they encounter in their area are unemployed or not. As a result the micro-level economic context that individuals live in may not provide a good explanation for their attitudes towards welfare recipients, at least over the short term, and macroeconomic context, political ideology, or the media may instead be important.

5.3 Themes and contributions
5.3.1 The relevance of cultural class analysis to deservingness research

One broad conclusion that emerges from this PhD stems partly from its theoretical orientation. Unlike much research on deservingness perceptions or demand for redistribution I make little use of self-interest based explanations for individual attitudes. Instead this PhD draws on a literature which is not often used in quantitative studies of welfare attitudes: cultural class analysis and critical social policy research on the way welfare recipients and the poor are presented in the media, popular culture, and by people who are themselves in poverty. The empirical results of this PhD show the value of drawing on this largely qualitative body of research as a source of research questions, hypotheses, and mechanisms.

One powerful illustration of the value of cultural class analysis is its ability to predict the correlation between authoritarian values and stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients. In Chapter 1 I find that libertarian-authoritarian values are strongly correlated with attitudes towards welfare recipients, much more so than left-right values which we might expect to be predictive of attitudes towards the poor. This result makes complete sense from the perspective of cultural class analysis, where a number of researchers have demonstrated in great detail how people in poverty and welfare recipients are stigmatised based on alleged moral deviance in *non-economic domains* (Mckenzie, 2013; Skeggs, 1997; Tyler, 2013; Walker, 2014). From such a perspective, it is unsurprising that individuals who are less tolerant of diversity are more likely to hold negative stereotypes about welfare recipients.

Future research into deservingness perceptions should further investigate the role of authoritarian values. One way of doing so might be to include indicators of moral deviance or diversity in non-economic domains in vignette survey experiments that randomly assign characteristics of hypothetical welfare recipients to respondents to understand their impact on deservingness perceptions (examples include Fong, 2007; Reeskens and Van der Meer, 2017). If the predictions of cultural class analysis are correct, signalling deviance in non-economic domains should reduce perceptions of welfare deservingness, especially among authoritarian individuals.

Another contribution of the cultural class analysis literature is as a source of mechanisms that link an individual's economic position to their attitudes towards welfare recipients. Work in this tradition has intensively researched the experience and attitudes of people in poverty and welfare recipients (Chase and Walker, 2012; Edmiston, 2018; Sennett and Cobb, 1972; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013). In Chapter 1 I use such research to develop the ideas of identification and othering to explain the

potentially complex and contradictory relationship that economic position and inequality might have with attitudes towards welfare recipients.[70]

Identification and othering prove invaluable in Chapter 2, where they illuminate the contradictory relationship between an individual's economic position and their attitudes towards welfare recipients. Consistent with the idea of identification, I show that individuals who are unemployed or sick and disabled have lower levels of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients than those in work. However, this relationship is counteracted by education: I argue that less educated individuals hold more negative attitudes because they other welfare recipients to shore up their own vulnerable social status. The concept of othering also plays an important role in Chapter 3, explaining why the association between inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty is stronger among lower education or income individuals.

The concepts of identification and othering thus provide a powerful framework for thinking about the relationship between individual advantage, economic inequality, and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients and people in poverty. My thesis thus demonstrates the important theoretical contributions of cultural class analysis which have been largely neglected in existing quantitative welfare state research (for an exception see Baumberg, 2015). Laenen and colleagues (2019) call for deservingness theory to pay more attention to qualitative research. I concur, and further suggest that research on perceptions of deservingness would greatly benefit from engagement with theories developed in rich qualitative research on the attitudes and experiences of people in poverty.

As the introductory chapter notes, the cultural class analysis literature has difficulty systematically incorporating economic structure into its analysis. This PhD has begun the process of addressing this gap. For example, Chapter 4 interrogates a common finding in the cultural class analysis literature: that people often refer to encounters they have had in their neighbourhoods when justifying attitudes towards welfare recipients. My results suggest that such examples are likely to reflect individuals' justifications for beliefs they hold for other reasons, such as political ideology or the media, rather than reflecting a genuine process of contact affecting attitudes. I suggest that other researchers could

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[70] Identification expresses the idea that disadvantaged individuals will be more sympathetic towards the poor because similar living conditions and experiences lead to understanding and sympathy (Edmiston, 2018; Roosma, Van Oorschot, et al., 2014). By contrast, individuals possessing a low social status or stigmatised identity may respond to it by othering those in a similar position to themselves (Henry, 2011; Patrick, 2016; Sennett and Cobb, 1972).

use the tools of quantitative social science to contextualise other arguments from cultural class analysis literature.

In particular, many of the results of Chapter 2 would benefit from being placed in a broader cross-national context. Researchers should investigate the relationship between economic position, socio-political values, and attitudes towards the poor and welfare recipients in a range of countries, to understand whether processes of othering, identification, and tolerance for moral deviance in non-economic domains are universal, or instead reflect features of the British economy, political system, or welfare state structure.

5.3.2 Social distance and status anxiety: two perspectives on why inequality matters.

The results from my empirical chapters provide an opportunity for broader reflection on how economic inequality affects individual attitudes towards the poor. I focus on two arguments: social distance arguments, and status anxiety arguments. The core of social distance arguments is the idea that rising inequality increases socioeconomic segregation, causing a divergence in the social relationships and contexts individuals at different points in the income distribution live in. This divergence leads the advantaged to have less solidarity with the poor (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011; Mijs, 2019). By contrast, status anxiety arguments focus on how higher levels of inequality affect the kinds of social comparisons that individuals make. Higher inequality causes increased levels of negative social comparisons, which leads to increased status anxiety (Layte and Whelan, 2014; Schneider, 2019; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Status anxiety may lead individuals to protect their threatened social status by distancing themselves from stigmatised others (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Henry, 2011; Wetts and Willer, 2018). In the case of low income or status individuals in particular this may lead them to hold stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients and the poor.

The findings of this PhD provide more support for the status anxiety perspective than the social distance perspective. In Chapter 3 the association between inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty is stronger among individuals with lower levels of education or income. This finding is consistent with the idea that lower social status individuals stigmatise the poor to protect their own threatened social status, and become more likely to do so when inequality is higher, and status anxiety more prevalent. By contrast, the social distance perspective predicts a stronger effect of inequality on individualistic beliefs among affluent individuals. The results of Chapter 2 provide further evidence for the role that social status plays in shaping attitudes towards welfare recipients

by showing how the role of education varies across contexts where individuals are more or less educated.

While the results of Chapters 2 and 3 are consistent with the idea that status links income inequality to stigmatising stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients, the evidence is indirect, compatible with alternative explanations, and potentially confounded. Further research should directly investigate the role that status anxiety plays in shaping welfare attitudes. An important first step is to test the relationship between a measure of subjective social status and attitudes towards welfare recipients and the poor. Higher social status should be associated with fewer stigmatising stereotypes, conditional on an individual's economic position, and social status should mediate the association between income inequality and attitudes towards welfare recipients.

An unsolved problem in the literature on inequality and status anxiety concerns the micro-level mechanisms by which aggregate income inequality can affect individual status anxiety, especially given the large body of evidence showing that individual perceptions of inequality are often inaccurate (e.g. Gimpelson and Treisman, 2018). One possibility is that status anxiety is largely mediated, rather than being formed through direct interaction and transmission of information through personal social networks. As a result, researchers should investigate whether exposure to symbols of affluence, conspicuous consumption, or consumerism in the media (including social media), might provoke status anxiety, and whether exposure to such content is more likely when aggregate inequality is higher (Blake et al., 2018; Hamilton, 2012; Hoy, 2018; Walasek and Brown, 2015).

The results of Chapter 4 also contribute to the debate on how income inequality affects individual attitudes by providing evidence against a key premise of the social distance theory. The applicability of the social distance theory to attitudes towards the poor rests on the assumption that exposure to the poor or welfare recipients improves perceptions. However, changes in area level unemployment rates do not appear to affect attitudes towards the unemployed, provoking scepticism about the possibility that other features of local context will affect attitudes towards welfare recipients. Future research should attempt to confirm my conclusions by investigating whether local level inequality does in fact affect attitudes. This would be a stronger test of the implications of the social polarisation argument for attitudes towards the poor than using unemployment benefit claims alone. Existing work on the effects of local inequality or income segregation on political attitudes finds results that are compatible with the social distance perspective (Newman, Johnston and Lown, 2015; Newman and

Kane, 2017; Thal, 2017), but do so with outcome variables distinct from attitudes towards the poor and welfare recipients.[71]

5.4 Practical implications

Given the potentially major implications that stigmatising stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients have for welfare state legitimacy and the wellbeing of people in poverty, those who are interested in reducing poverty rates and improving the lives of disadvantaged people should be interested in stigma reduction (Walker, 2014). Despite its importance, poverty destigmatisation has a fairly peripheral role in both research related to the welfare state and sociological research on destigmatisation in general (Clair, Daniel and Lamont, 2016; Lamont, 2018). In particular, ideas of deservingness have only rarely been used to evaluate whether specific proposals for welfare reform will receive popular support or not (Geiger and Meuleman, 2016).

In this section I consider some practical implications that the results of my PhD have for efforts to destigmatise poverty and welfare receipt. These are addressed towards political and civil society actors such as thinktanks and charities who are interested in building political support for proposals to tackle poverty. All of the ideas I mention would require more detailed testing, whether through survey experiments, focus grouping, or more participatory venues such as democratic fora, especially if applied to contexts other than the UK, but I believe all offer interesting possibilities (O'Neil et al., 2018; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018).

Implication 1: Higher inequality appears to undermine support for welfare policies by increasing belief in the idea that laziness is the cause of poverty. As a result, attempts to reduce poverty without reducing inequality are potentially self-defeating.

In principle it is possible to reduce poverty without reducing inequality. Low levels of poverty relative to a given income threshold can coexist with high inequality at the top of the distribution. Indeed, high inequality might provide the financial incentives necessary to encourage economic growth that lifts the absolute standard of living of the poor, or even increases the size of the 'pot' available for redistribution. However, high inequality and low poverty can on only coexist if income inequality does not create feedback effects that might undermine attempts to reduce poverty.

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[71] One difficulty with doing so is that small area inequality statistics are not readily available for many countries, including the UK (Bartle, Birch and Skirmuntt, 2017).

One such feedback effect that has been discussed extensively in this thesis is the idea that higher inequality undermines support for redistribution by reducing levels of solidarity with the poor. The results of Chapter 3 are consistent with one part of this vicious upward spiral, as higher inequality is associated with a greater likelihood of blaming the poor for their situation. Beliefs about the causes of poverty influence support for redistribution (Fong, 2007; Reeskens and Van der Meer, 2017), hence suggesting that higher inequality may not increase support for redistribution (see Breznau and Hommerich, 2018; Kenworthy and McCall, 2008 for evidence that increases in inequality do not necessarily lead to increased demand for redistribution).

This finding is completely consistent with the conclusions of a recent report on the relationship between poverty and inequality by researchers at the Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion (Hills et al., 2019). They argue that, in practice, there is a strong positive correlation between levels of inequality and poverty suggesting either a causal link between them, or a common dependence on some third factor. My results thus strengthen their argument that policymakers interested in tackling poverty need to address inequality as well.

Implication 2: Welfare policy needs to be designed with an awareness that status anxiety and status threat can cause a backlash amongst disadvantaged populations.
Several findings in this PhD are consistent with status anxiety playing an important role in explaining why disadvantaged individuals hold negative stereotypes about welfare recipients and why attitudes are more negative in high inequality contexts. My results agree with the abundant evidence suggesting that some working class people perceive welfare policies as a threat to their social status, in particular their sense of having worked hard and made sacrifices to support their families, threatening a hard won relative social position (Buell et al., 2014; Dunn, 2010, 2013; Sennett and Cobb, 1972). These findings have broader implications for how actors who are interested in poverty reduction and destigmatisation should evaluate whether specific welfare policies are likely to win popular support.

While building sympathy or altruism towards the poor among affluent individuals, and especially elites, is an important goal that is discussed further below, it is also crucial to ensure the legitimacy of the welfare state amongst more disadvantaged groups. In the UK at least, backlashes against the welfare state have not been confined to the affluent or right-wing (Golding and Middleton, 1984), and declines in support for the welfare state have occurred among traditionally supportive constituencies such as working class people and Labour voters (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015; Deeming, 2015). Furthermore, a lack of trust in or support for the welfare system among working class individuals is

especially problematic given their low levels of political participation and representation in the political system (Heath, 2018; O'Grady, 2019a). Welfare policies need to be designed and framed so that they do not provoke a backlash based on status anxiety among individuals who do not personally benefit from them despite being relatively disadvantaged. Such status considerations are most likely to be decisive for benefits that only cover a small part of the population at any one time, or that many individuals feel they will never need, hence muting self-interested reasons for support (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015; Gilens and Thal, 2018; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2016).

One way to avoid provoking status anxiety among disadvantaged people when designing welfare policy is to ensure that the benefits system has high coverage of the low-income population, and that benefits are delivered through a fairly small number of programmes that cover individuals who are both in and out of work.[72] This recommendation is distinct from the longstanding argument in social policy that welfare policies should be universal in order to attract middle class support for them (Brady and Bostic, 2015; Korpi and Palme, 1998; Sumino, 2018).[73] Rather I am arguing that as much as possible of the *low-income* population should be covered by similar benefits. As Hedegaard (2014) shows, individuals are much more supportive of increased spending on targeted benefits if they, or someone they personally know, receives that benefit. Similarly, the integration of in-work and out of work benefits is likely to reduce status anxieties related to work ethic by making targeting of welfare spending at out of work individuals less salient (Larsen, 2007). In addition to being an important anti-poverty tool in a high-employment, low-wage context like the UK, increasing benefit integration and coverage of the low income population has the potential to prevent more generous spending on vulnerable groups from leading to a backlash from low income individuals.

Implication 3: Socially liberal values might provide a useful way of framing welfare reforms when targeting highly educated and elite groups.

The results of Chapter 2 have several implications for thinking about the political coalitions that might support specific kinds of welfare reforms. I find that the highly educated are more sympathetic towards welfare recipients, even though they are no more supportive of redistribution (for other evidence that welfare attitudes are multidimensional see Cavaillé and Trump, 2015; Roosma, van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2014). This suggests that different kinds of arguments for reducing poverty

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[72] Ironically, one welfare reform that fits this proscription is the UK's recently introduced Universal Credit. The many and serious problems with this policy are less about its attempt to simplify the benefits system and integrate in and out of work benefits than they are about its punitive conditionality requirements and other design flaws such as lengthy waiting periods (Alston, 2018; Dean, 2012; Fletcher and Wright, 2018).

[73] Similar arguments are often made in support of a Universal Basic Income as well.

and inequality might appeal to different groups. In particular, low education and low status groups are more likely to be supportive of redistribution (especially 'from' the rich), while highly educated and high status individuals are relatively more supportive of welfare recipients (redistribution 'to' the poor).

One way in which this multidimensionality could be used by advocates for welfare reform might be by appealing to highly educated groups on socially liberal rather than left-wing grounds. When arguing against welfare retrenchment or conditionality policies the obvious arguments are often about need, for example the hardship caused by inadequate entitlements or unfair rules. However, individuals with high levels of education might be better persuaded by arguments that draw on socially liberal values. I suggest that arguments against welfare retrenchment or punitive conditionality should draw on values of tolerance for diversity and distaste for hierarchy. Examples include: that welfare retrenchment excessively hurts minority groups or women; that welfare state support enables creativity, risk-taking, and entrepreneurialism (Hombert et al., 2014); that welfare conditionality imposes hierarchical authority and restrictive rules on claimants; and that excessive emphasis on job search requirements unnecessarily restricts individual life choices e.g. to care for others or do voluntary work.

Arguments of this kind could be surprisingly effective at building support for welfare reform among constituencies of highly educated individuals. They might be useful for persuading elites with influential positions in interest groups, policy-making organisations, the media, or politics of the value of generous welfare provision. By the same token, arguments that emphasise socially liberal values are especially likely to be ineffective in persuading low income or status individuals and groups. As a result, exploiting such multidimensionality relies on the ability to politically target messages at distinct socio-demographic groups.

Implication 4: Individuals who do not personally experience the adverse effects of welfare reform or retrenchment are unlikely to learn about them unless political actors raise awareness of the problem. The results of Chapter 4 cast doubt on the ideas that exposure to unemployment benefit receipt leads to a backlash against the unemployed and that increasing residential segregation by income will reduce solidarity with the poor by decreasing exposure among the better off (Bailey et al., 2013; Lupu and Pontusson, 2011). While there are many good reasons to advocate for greater social mix in housing and other policies to reduce socio-economic segregation, shaping attitudes towards welfare recipients may not be one of them (Lacey and Soskice, 2015; Mayer, 2002; Owens, 2018).

My results imply that at a local level, there is little reason to think that changes in the living conditions of people in poverty will straightforwardly affect the attitudes of individuals who are not personally affected.[74] As a result, rising economic hardship at a local level may not be transformed into political opposition or outrage, especially in the absence of organisations such as trade unions that can play a role of political mobilisation. Thus people who are not personally affected by poverty, or specific welfare reforms, will not develop a strong opinion about them unless political or civil society actors raise awareness of them (Hopkins, 2010). Recent examples from the UK where this has been done effectively include debates over food poverty and food bank usage, and hardship caused by misapplied or overly punitive sanctions as part of recent Universal Credit reforms (Alston, 2018; Wells and Caraher, 2014).

5.5 Final Conclusion

In this PhD I have investigated the relationship between individual advantage, economic context and levels of stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients and the poor. Across the three empirical chapters I have explored specific aspects of this overall question, drawing on survey data from Britain and Europe. I find that living in a more unequal country or time period, and being economically advantaged, is associated with higher levels of stigmatising stereotypes about the poor and welfare recipients. However, local economic context seems to be less important: living in an area with higher unemployment does not seem to meaningfully change attitudes towards the unemployed, in the short term at least. Furthermore, authoritarian values, and potentially the low social status that accompanies them, play at least as important a role as economic position in explaining why people hold stigmatising attitudes towards welfare recipients. My results suggest that status anxiety may play a previously underappreciated role in shaping the association between individual advantage, inequality, and attitudes towards the poor.

This thesis makes a number of contributions to existing research. I innovate theoretically by drawing on rich qualitative work on the experiences of people in poverty to understand the complex ways in which economic position and social status affect perceptions of the poor and welfare recipients. Empirically I address the neglect of income inequality in existing research on perceptions of welfare deservingness. I also argue against an idea which is popular in some political economy work: that inequality worsens perceptions of the poor by increasing their social distance from the affluent. In

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[74] Increases in more visible forms of poverty, such as street homelessness, may have a greater effect on attitudes towards the poor (Lee, Farrell and Link, 2004; Sands, 2017).

addition to its contribution to the academic literature, I hope that the ideas in this thesis will prove useful for those interested in finding ways to reduce the stigmatisation of the poor and welfare recipients. My findings suggest the importance of avoiding status anxiety when proposing welfare reforms, and that poverty and inequality need to be reduced simultaneously.

Appendices

Appendix 1: The relationship between stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients and people in poverty

A1.1 Importance of the relationship between attitudes towards welfare recipients and people in poverty

An important starting assumption of this PhD is that, in targeted welfare states like the UK at least, stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients and people in poverty are closely related and shaped by economic position in broadly the same ways. If this assumption is valid then learning about stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients can tell us something about attitudes towards the people in poverty and vice versa. The purpose of this appendix is to examine the extent to which this assumption is justified. Using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey I investigate the relationship between stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients and beliefs about the causes of poverty.

Following the argument of chapter 3 (see section 3.2.1) I use beliefs about the causes of poverty as a measure of stigmatising stereotypes about the poor. Individualistic beliefs that attribute the causes of poverty to the laziness of poor people are stigmatising, while those who locate the causes of poverty in misfortune, economic structure, or injustice and discrimination have a less stigmatising view of poverty. I expect those who believe that people are in poverty due to their own laziness should be more likely to hold negative stereotypes about the behaviour and morality of welfare recipients. By contrast, those who believe that poverty is caused by injustice in society should be less likely to believe that welfare recipients are lazy or immoral.

I also examine whether the relationship between beliefs about the causes of poverty and stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients differs across individuals in different economic positions. I do so in order to check that conclusions about the relationship between economic position and stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients apply well to attitudes towards people in poverty more broadly, at least when using British data. One particular concern of this kind is that individuals who are economically struggling, but who are not poor enough to be entitled to means-tested welfare, might resent welfare recipients and hence hold negative stereotypes about their morality and behaviour, even if they are quite sympathetic towards poor people in general.

The justification for this concern starts from the perspective that attitudes towards the welfare state are heavily shaped by norms of fairness (Hoggett, Wilkinson and Beedell, 2013; Sefton, 2005; Svallfors,

2006). In a targeted welfare system such as the UK, there will inevitably be people who fall outside the income thresholds to receive targeted welfare. Such individuals might resent those who do receive welfare, especially if they feel that they have 'done the right thing' by complying with social expectations to work even if the pay or conditions are bad, or striving to earn more, and face losing means tested welfare payments (Dunn, 2010, 2013; Prasad, Hoffman and Bezila, 2016). As a result such individuals may be very unsympathetic towards welfare recipients while at the same time identifying with people who are economically struggling and hence unlikely to believe that laziness is the cause of poverty.

Fully addressing the role that such resentments play in shaping welfare attitudes is a broader project than this appendix is intended to address. It would require detailed information on the precise incomes of individuals and their benefit entitlements. However, we can perform a face value check on its' plausibility by examining whether the association between individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty and stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients is weaker, or even non-existent among individuals who are in disadvantaged or intermediate economic positions. If so, it will indicate that a mechanism of this kind may be operating. If there is good evidence for such a resentment mechanism, it will cast doubt on the generalisability of findings based on the stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients to attitudes towards people in poverty more broadly, as well as suggesting an alternative explanation for the educational differences in negative stereotypes about welfare recipients advanced in chapter 2.

A1.2 Data and measures

The British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) in 1989, 1994, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2010 contains measures of both negative stereotypes about welfare recipients and beliefs about the causes of poverty. The measure of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients is the same as that used in chapter 2 (explained in detail in section 2.3.2 especially table 2). It uses four questions measuring agreement or disagreement with common negative stereotypes: '*around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one*', '*most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another*', '*many people who get social security don't really deserve any help*', '*if welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on own feet*'. The questions are combined into a factor score calculated from a one factor CFA model and standardised to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

The measure of beliefs about the causes of poverty is based on a very similar question to that used in chapter 3 to measure individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty, where it is explained and

justified in detail (see sections 3.2.1 and 3.3.2). Respondents were asked '*Why do you think there are people who live in need*'. Respondents were able to choose from five possible options: *'because they have been unlucky', 'because of laziness or lack of willpower', 'because of injustice in our society', 'it's an inevitable part of modern life*, and *'none of these'*. The option *'because of laziness and lack of willpower'* measures individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty, while the option *'because of injustice in our society'* measures structural beliefs about the causes of poverty. I also use the *'because they have been unlucky'* and *'it's an inevitable part of modern life'* options, which are expected to be intermediate between laziness and injustice in terms of their association with negative stereotypes about welfare recipients (Lepianka, Van Oorschot and Gelissen, 2009).

I use four variables to measure economic position: quintiles of household income, economic activity, occupational class, and education. The way all these variables are measured is identical to their use in chapter 2, where they are described in detail (see section 2.3.3 and 2.3.5). Missing variables were deleted listwise, giving a total sample size of 11,754. Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in table A1.

Table A1: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Negative stereotypes about welfare recipients	0.06	0.96	-2.44	2.16
Beliefs about the causes of poverty				
Laziness	0.24	0.43	0	1
Social injustice	0.23	0.42	0	1
Been unlucky	0.14	0.35	0	1
Inevitable part of modern life	0.39	0.49	0	1
Household income				
5th quintile	0.20	0.40	0	1
4th quintile	0.22	0.41	0	1
3rd quintile	0.21	0.41	0	1
2nd quintile	0.20	0.40	0	1
1st quintile	0.16	0.37	0	1
Economic activity				
In work	0.57	0.49	0	1
Unemployed	0.04	0.20	0	1
Sick or disabled	0.05	0.21	0	1
Retired	0.23	0.42	0	1
Looking after home	0.09	0.29	0	1
In education	0.02	0.13	0	1
Education				
Degree	0.16	0.37	0	1
Higher education	0.13	0.34	0	1
A-level	0.14	0.34	0	1
GCSE	0.30	0.46	0	1
No qualifications	0.27	0.44	0	1
Occupational class				
Salariat professional/managerial	0.37	0.48	0	1
Clerical routine	0.20	0.40	0	1
Self-employed	0.08	0.27	0	1
Higher manual/routine	0.11	0.32	0	1
Lower manual/routine	0.24	0.43	0	1

Notes: Means of categorical variables can be interpreted as proportion falling into category. Sample size = 11,754, all missing values are deleted listwise. Data from 8 BSAS surveys between 1989 and 2010. Authors calculations.

A1.3 Association between negative stereotypes about welfare recipients and beliefs about causes of poverty

Figure A1 plots the distribution of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients by their beliefs about the causes of poverty. Solid lines display the 25th percentile, median, and 75th quartiles of the distribution. Because the measure of negative stereotypes is standardised 0 is the overall mean level of negative stereotypes. As expected those who believe that laziness is the cause of poverty tend to have relatively high levels of negative stereotypes. Fewer than a quarter of those who believe that laziness is the cause of poverty have levels of negative stereotypes below the overall mean, while the median respondent is about 0.7 standard deviations above the overall mean. This distribution overlaps somewhat with those who believe that injustice is the cause of poverty, well over a quarter of whom are above overall mean levels of negative stereotypes. Nonetheless, the median respondent who believes that injustice is the cause of poverty has negative stereotypes about 0.4 standard deviations below the overall mean. The median levels of negative stereotypes for those who believe that bad luck and progress are the causes of poverty are close to the overall mean, between those for laziness and injustice, as expected. They are also less skewed towards either high or low levels of negative stereotypes.

These results broadly support my assumption that individuals who hold more individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty are also likely to hold negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. However, they also suggest that attitudes towards welfare recipients and the poor are not identical, and care must be taken before extrapolating from one to another. There are a variety of possible explanations for this overlap, including measurement error in either negative stereotypes about welfare recipients or especially beliefs about the causes of poverty, which is measured using only a single item.

Figure A1: Association between beliefs about the causes of poverty and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. Data from 8 BSAS surveys between 1989 and 2010. Sample size = 11,754. Authors calculations.

A1.4 Relationship consistent across economic position

In this section I investigate how the relationship between negative stereotypes about welfare recipients and beliefs about the causes of poverty varies between individuals with varying levels of economic advantage. I fit four linear regression models with negative stereotypes about welfare recipients as the response variable and beliefs about the causes of poverty interacted with one measure of economic position as the explanatory variables. Each model also includes time and region fixed effects and uses the BSAS survey weight to adjust results for population representativeness. I present estimated marginal means from each of these models in figures A2-A5.

While there are some exceptions, the main finding conveyed by these plots is that the relationship between beliefs about the causes of poverty and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients is consistent across individuals in different economic positions. There are no population subgroups in which those who believe that laziness is the cause of poverty have lower than average levels of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, and none in which those who believe that injustice is the cause of poverty have higher than average levels of negative stereotypes. Those who believe that laziness is the cause of poverty have levels of negative stereotypes about 0.5 to 0.6 standard deviations higher than the mean at all levels of income quintile, education, and occupational class.

The results among those who believe that injustice is the cause of poverty are less clear-cut, with individuals with higher levels of education having lower levels of negative stereotypes, though even among those with no qualifications a belief that injustice is the cause of poverty is associated with lower than average levels of negative stereotypes. This educational difference is consistent with either the idea that the high levels of education make people more aware of structural causes of inequality and injustice (Elchardus and Spruyt, 2009; Kallio and Kouvo, 2015), or the idea that the highly educated have more tightly structured sets of political values, leading to closer correlations between different attitudes on related issues (Achterberg and Houtman, 2009). With the exception of those who are unemployed or sick and disabled the associations between the belief that poverty is inevitable or caused by bad luck or economic position and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients are weak and reveal no clear pattern.

These results present little evidence that the relationship between beliefs about the causes of poverty and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients breaks down among individuals on low or moderate economic positions. The relationship between beliefs about the causes of poverty and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients is essentially constant across income quintiles and while the relationship is slightly stronger among those in the salariat it nonetheless varies fairly little

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between occupational classes. Unemployed people who believe that laziness is the cause of poverty have average levels of negative stereotypes about 0.15 standard deviations above the mean, but with 95% confidence intervals overlapping 0. This seems to be a consequence of very low levels of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients among unemployed people across all beliefs about the causes of poverty, rather than a weakened association between beliefs about the causes of poverty and negative stereotypes among the unemployed.

Figure A2: Association between beliefs about the causes of poverty and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients by income quintile. Estimates and 95% confidence intervals are marginal means from linear regression models interacting belief about causes of poverty with categorical income quintile measure. Model includes time and region fixed effects. Data from 8 BSAS surveys between 1989 and 2010. Sample size = 11,754. Authors calculations.

Figure A3: Association between beliefs about the causes of poverty and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients by economic activity. Estimates and 95% confidence intervals are marginal means from linear regression models interacting belief about causes of poverty with categorical economic activity measure. Model includes time and region fixed effects. Data from 8 BSAS surveys between 1989 and 2010. Sample size = 11,754. Authors calculations.

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
Figure A4: Association between beliefs about the causes of poverty and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients by level of education. Estimates and 95% confidence intervals are marginal means from linear regression models interacting belief about causes of poverty with categorical education measure. Model includes time and region fixed effects. Data from 8 BSAS surveys between 1989 and 2010. Sample size = 11,754. Authors calculations.

Figure A5: Association between beliefs about the causes of poverty and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients by occupational class. Estimates and 95% confidence intervals are marginal means from linear regression models interacting belief about causes of poverty with categorical occupational class measure. Model includes time and region fixed effects. Data from 8 BSAS surveys between 1989 and 2010. Sample size = 11,754. Authors calculations.

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A1.5 Summary of findings

Individuals who believe that laziness is the cause of poverty are likely to hold above-average levels of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, while those who believe that injustice is the cause of poverty tend to hold lower than average levels of negative stereotypes. As expected, those who believe that poverty is inevitable or caused by bad luck, have intermediate levels of negative stereotypes. This relationship is not perfect, and the distributions of negative stereotypes about welfare recipients among those who believe that laziness and injustice overlap to some extent. It is obviously important not to assume that conclusions derived from the study of attitudes toward welfare recipients can be straightforwardly applied to attitudes towards the poor, especially when generalising to contexts beyond the UK. Nonetheless this analysis broadly justifies my assumption that those who hold negative stereotypes about welfare recipients are also likely to hold stigmatising beliefs about the causes of poverty, at least in a targeted welfare state such as the UK.

The second stage of the analysis confirms that the relationship between beliefs about the causes of poverty and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients are broadly similar across individuals in different economic positions. In particular, the association between laziness and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients is consistent across income groups, occupational classes, and educational levels. The relationship is more variable for the belief that injustice is that cause of poverty, and across levels of economic activity. There is little evidence that individuals in low or moderate economic positions have an especially weak or non-existent association between stigmatising beliefs about welfare recipients and about the causes of poverty. This suggests that resentments about the targeting of welfare benefits, while potentially important for explaining welfare attitudes, do not distort the relationship between welfare attitudes and beliefs about the causes of poverty in some population subgroups.

A2 Appendices to Chapter 2 - *Why the highly educated are more sympathetic towards welfare recipients: economic position, authoritarianism, and social status*

A2.1 Missing data

Table A2 Summary of missing data in BSAS.

Variable	Missing	Non missing	% missing
Negative stereotypes about welfare recipients	23,541	57,945	40.6%
Right-wing values	15,353	66,133	23.2%
Authoritarian values	17,184	64,302	26.7%
Education	3,649	77,837	4.7%
Household income	11,195	70,291	15.9%
Occupational class	2,389	79,097	3.0%
Economic activity	562	80,924	0.7%
Housing tenure	976	80,510	1.2%
Marital status	61	81,425	0.1%
Religion	508	80,978	0.6%
Ethnicity	1,602	79,884	2.0%
Union membership	1,661	79,825	2.1%
Household size	4	81,482	0.0%
Age	218	81,268	0.3%
Gender	0	81,486	0.0%

Notes: Summarises individual level variables only as aggregate level variables such as region, year, and aggregate levels of education are present for all observations. Data from 1987-2016 BSAS. Authors calculations.

A2.2 Full regression tables

This section presents full results tables for all analyses reported in section 2.5.

Table A3: Association between education, economic position variables, and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. Coefficients plotted in figure 2.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Education (ref=Degree)				
Higher ed < degree	0.40***			
	[0.36,0.43]			
A-level	0.42***			
	[0.39,0.45]			
GCSE	0.53***			
	[0.50,0.56]			
No qualification	0.68***			
	[0.64,0.71]			
Income (ref= 5th quintile)				
4th quintile		0.087***		
		[0.059,0.12]		
3rd quintile		0.094***		
		[0.064,0.12]		
2nd quintile		0.030		
		[-0.0049,0.065]		
1st quintile		-0.077***		
		[-0.12,-0.034]		
Occupation (ref=salariat)				
Clerical routine			0.17***	
			[0.14,0.20]	
Self-employed			0.31***	
			[0.27,0.34]	
Higher manual/routine			0.34***	

			[0.31,0.37]	
Lower manual/routine			0.26*** [0.23,0.28]	
Economic activity (ref=working)				
Unemployed				-0.56*** [-0.61,-0.51]
Sick or disabled				-0.39*** [-0.44,-0.33]
Retired				-0.087*** [-0.12,-0.050]
Looking after home				-0.21*** [-0.25,-0.17]
Gender (ref=male)				
Female	-0.016 [-0.035,0.0036]	0.0039 [-0.016,0.024]	0.025* [0.0040,0.046]	0.015 [-0.0055,0.036]
Housing tenure (ref=owner)				
Social rent	-0.18*** [-0.21,-0.15]	-0.020 [-0.050,0.011]	-0.12*** [-0.15,-0.095]	0.046** [0.017,0.075]
Private rent	-0.080*** [-0.12,-0.042]	-0.054** [-0.092,-0.016]	-0.090*** [-0.13,-0.052]	-0.027 [-0.065,0.010]
Marital status (ref=Married/ cohabiting)				
Separated/divorced	-0.19*** [-0.23,-0.16]	-0.15*** [-0.19,-0.12]	-0.18*** [-0.22,-0.14]	-0.14*** [-0.18,-0.10]
Widowed	-0.093*** [-0.14,-0.045]	-0.031 [-0.079,0.018]	-0.078** [-0.13,-0.030]	-0.053* [-0.10,-0.0050]
Never married	-0.22*** [-0.26,-0.18]	-0.22*** [-0.26,-0.18]	-0.23*** [-0.27,-0.19]	-0.19*** [-0.23,-0.15]

Religion (ref = CofE)				
Roman Catholic	-0.074***	-0.095***	-0.092***	-0.096***
	[-0.11,-0.036]	[-0.13,-0.057]	[-0.13,-0.053]	[-0.13,-0.058]
Other Christian	-0.085***	-0.13***	-0.11***	-0.13***
	[-0.11,-0.056]	[-0.16,-0.099]	[-0.14,-0.082]	[-0.16,-0.100]
Non-Christian	-0.17***	-0.20***	-0.20***	-0.18***
	[-0.26,-0.089]	[-0.28,-0.11]	[-0.28,-0.12]	[-0.26,-0.098]
No religion	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.11***
	[-0.12,-0.077]	[-0.14,-0.087]	[-0.14,-0.088]	[-0.14,-0.090]
Ethnicity (ref=white)				
Black	0.11**	0.088*	0.086*	0.086*
	[0.034,0.18]	[0.013,0.16]	[0.011,0.16]	[0.011,0.16]
Asian	0.40***	0.34***	0.35***	0.33***
	[0.31,0.49]	[0.25,0.43]	[0.26,0.44]	[0.25,0.42]
Other/mixed	-0.037	-0.073	-0.073	-0.048
	[-0.14,0.064]	[-0.18,0.030]	[-0.18,0.030]	[-0.15,0.053]
Union membership (ref=non-member)				
Union member	-0.080***	-0.14***	-0.11***	-0.18***
	[-0.10,-0.057]	[-0.16,-0.12]	[-0.14,-0.091]	[-0.21,-0.16]
Household size (ref=1 person)				
2 people	-0.087***	-0.072***	-0.078***	-0.052**
	[-0.12,-0.051]	[-0.11,-0.036]	[-0.11,-0.042]	[-0.088,-0.017]
3 people	-0.091***	-0.056**	-0.072***	-0.038
	[-0.13,-0.050]	[-0.098,-0.015]	[-0.11,-0.030]	[-0.079,0.0031]
4 people	-0.10***	-0.073**	-0.088***	-0.057*
	[-0.15,-0.060]	[-0.12,-0.028]	[-0.13,-0.043]	[-0.10,-0.012]
5+ people	-0.16***	-0.12***	-0.14***	-0.089**
	[-0.21,-0.10]	[-0.18,-0.066]	[-0.20,-0.089]	[-0.14,-0.034]

Age	-0.034***	-0.030***	-0.031***	-0.027***
	[-0.038,-0.030]	[-0.034,-0.025]	[-0.035,-0.026]	[-0.032,-0.023]
Age^2	0.00032***	0.00032***	0.00032***	0.00030***
	[0.00028, 0.00036]	[0.00028, 0.00036]	[0.00028, 0.00036]	[0.00026, 0.00034]
Constant	0.23**	0.47***	0.39***	0.49***
	[0.086,0.37]	[0.33,0.62]	[0.25,0.53]	[0.35,0.63]
R^2	0.113	0.075	0.088	0.088

Notes: Coefficient estimates from linear regression models with 95% confidence intervals in brackets. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Response variable is negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, standardised to have mean = 0, SD = 1. All models include area and region fixed-effects, which are omitted from output. Survey weights included in all models. Sample size = 44,434 in all models. Data from BSAS 1987-2016. Author's calculations.

Table A4: Association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients with controls for economic position. Coefficients plotted in figure 2.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Education (ref=Degree)				
Higher ed < degree	0.42***	0.38***	0.41***	0.40***
	[0.38,0.45]	[0.34,0.41]	[0.37,0.44]	[0.36,0.43]
A-level	0.45***	0.39***	0.43***	0.41***
	[0.41,0.48]	[0.35,0.42]	[0.40,0.46]	[0.37,0.44]
GCSE	0.58***	0.49***	0.55***	0.53***
	[0.55,0.61]	[0.46,0.52]	[0.53,0.58]	[0.49,0.56]
No qualification	0.75***	0.62***	0.71***	0.68***
	[0.72,0.79]	[0.58,0.66]	[0.68,0.75]	[0.64,0.72]
Income (ref= 5th quintile)				
4th quintile	-0.028*			-0.032*
	[-0.056,-0.00033]			[-0.060,-0.0043]
3rd quintile	-0.084***			-0.066***
	[-0.11,-0.054]			[-0.097,-0.036]
2nd quintile	-0.20***			-0.13***
	[-0.24,-0.17]			[-0.17,-0.097]
1st quintile	-0.34***			-0.22***
	[-0.39,-0.30]			[-0.26,-0.17]
Occupation (ref=salariat)				
Clerical routine		0.016		0.040**
		[-0.013,0.045]		[0.011,0.069]
Self-employed		0.16***		0.16***
		[0.12,0.19]		[0.12,0.20]

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Higher manual/routine		0.15***		0.18***
		[0.11,0.18]		[0.14,0.22]
Lower manual/routine		0.052***		0.10***
		[0.022,0.082]		[0.071,0.13]
Economic activity (ref=working)				
Unemployed			-0.60***	-0.53***
			[-0.65,-0.55]	[-0.59,-0.48]
Sick or disabled			-0.46***	-0.42***
			[-0.51,-0.41]	[-0.47,-0.36]
Retired			-0.10***	-0.054**
			[-0.14,-0.064]	[-0.091,-0.017]
Looking after home			-0.25***	-0.22***
			[-0.29,-0.22]	[-0.26,-0.18]
Gender (ref=male)				
Female	-0.0038	0.012	0.00093	0.032**
	[-0.023,0.016]	[-0.0091,0.033]	[-0.019,0.021]	[0.011,0.053]
Housing tenure (ref=owner)				
Social rent	-0.095***	-0.18***	-0.084***	-0.060***
	[-0.13,-0.064]	[-0.21,-0.15]	[-0.11,-0.054]	[-0.090,-0.029]
Private rent	-0.041*	-0.087***	-0.045*	-0.034
	[-0.078,-0.0037]	[-0.12,-0.049]	[-0.082,-0.0085]	[-0.071,0.0029]
Marital status (ref=Married/ cohabiting)				
Separated/divorced	-0.13***	-0.20***	-0.17***	-0.13***
	[-0.17,-0.096]	[-0.23,-0.16]	[-0.20,-0.13]	[-0.17,-0.095]
Widowed	-0.050*	-0.096***	-0.094***	-0.072**
	[-0.098,-0.0022]	[-0.14,-0.048]	[-0.14,-0.047]	[-0.12,-0.025]
Never married	-0.17***	-0.22***	-0.18***	-0.15***
	[-0.21,-0.13]	[-0.25,-0.18]	[-0.22,-0.14]	[-0.19,-0.11]

Religion (ref = CofE)				
Roman Catholic	-0.069***	-0.074***	-0.071***	-0.069***
	[-0.11,-0.031]	[-0.11,-0.036]	[-0.11,-0.034]	[-0.11,-0.031]
Other Christian	-0.083***	-0.084***	-0.082***	-0.079***
	[-0.11,-0.054]	[-0.11,-0.055]	[-0.11,-0.053]	[-0.11,-0.050]
Non-Christian	-0.15***	-0.17***	-0.14***	-0.12**
	[-0.23,-0.063]	[-0.25,-0.089]	[-0.22,-0.057]	[-0.21,-0.044]
No religion	-0.099***	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.10***
	[-0.12,-0.075]	[-0.13,-0.078]	[-0.13,-0.079]	[-0.13,-0.079]
Ethnicity (ref=white)				
Black	0.12**	0.11**	0.10**	0.11**
	[0.047,0.20]	[0.031,0.18]	[0.026,0.18]	[0.032,0.18]
Asian	0.42***	0.40***	0.39***	0.41***
	[0.33,0.51]	[0.31,0.49]	[0.30,0.48]	[0.32,0.49]
Other/mixed	-0.022	-0.038	-0.0073	-0.0036
	[-0.12,0.079]	[-0.14,0.064]	[-0.11,0.092]	[-0.10,0.096]
Union membership (ref=non-member)				
Union member	-0.099***	-0.075***	-0.13***	-0.14***
	[-0.12,-0.076]	[-0.098,-0.052]	[-0.16,-0.11]	[-0.16,-0.11]
Household size (ref=1 person)				
2 people	-0.11***	-0.090***	-0.078***	-0.098***
	[-0.14,-0.074]	[-0.13,-0.054]	[-0.11,-0.044]	[-0.13,-0.063]
3 people	-0.12***	-0.095***	-0.085***	-0.11***
	[-0.16,-0.080]	[-0.14,-0.054]	[-0.13,-0.044]	[-0.15,-0.068]
4 people	-0.14***	-0.11***	-0.098***	-0.12***
	[-0.18,-0.094]	[-0.15,-0.065]	[-0.14,-0.054]	[-0.17,-0.081]
5+ people	-0.19***	-0.17***	-0.14***	-0.17***

	[-0.24,-0.14]	[-0.22,-0.11]	[-0.19,-0.083]	[-0.22,-0.11]
Age	-0.037***	-0.035***	-0.032***	-0.033***
	[-0.041,-0.033]	[-0.039,-0.030]	[-0.036,-0.028]	[-0.037,-0.029]
Age^2	0.00036***	0.00032***	0.00031***	0.00032***
	[0.00032, 0.00040]	[0.00028, 0.00036]	[0.00027, 0.00035]	[0.00028, 0.00036]
Constant	0.32***	0.22**	0.21**	0.24***
	[0.17,0.46]	[0.082,0.36]	[0.072,0.35]	[0.100,0.38]
R^2	0.120	0.116	0.134	0.138

Notes: Coefficient estimates from linear regression models with 95% confidence intervals in brackets. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Response variable is negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, standardised to have mean = 0, SD = 1. All models include area and region fixed-effects, which are omitted from output. Survey weights included in all models. Sample size = 44,434 in all models. Data from BSAS 1987-2016. Author's calculations.

Table A5: Association between authoritarian values, right-wing values, and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. Coefficients plotted in figure 3.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Right-wing values (standardized)	0.061***		0.12***
	[0.051,0.072]		[0.11,0.12]
Authoritarian values (standardized)		0.49***	0.50***
		[0.48,0.50]	[0.49,0.51]
Constant	-0.33***	-0.46***	-0.45***
	[-0.40,-0.25]	[-0.52,-0.39]	[-0.51,-0.38]
R^2	0.050	0.280	0.293

Notes: Coefficient estimates from linear regression models with 95% confidence intervals in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Response variable is negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, standardised to have mean = 0, SD = 1. All models include area and region fixed-effects, which are omitted from output. Survey weights included in all models. Sample size = 44,434 in all models. Data from BSAS 1987-2016. Author's calculations.

Table A6: Effect of controlling for right-wing and authoritarian values on the association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients. Coefficients plotted in figure 4.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Education (ref=Degree)	0.40***	0.39***	0.14***
Higher ed < degree	[0.36,0.43]	[0.36,0.42]	[0.11,0.17]
	0.41***	0.40***	0.13***
A-level	[0.37,0.44]	[0.37,0.44]	[0.098,0.16]
	0.53***	0.52***	0.18***
GCSE	[0.49,0.56]	[0.49,0.56]	[0.16,0.21]
	0.68***	0.69***	0.28***
No qualification	[0.64,0.72]	[0.65,0.73]	[0.25,0.32]
Income (ref= 5th quintile)	-0.032*	-0.0094	-0.057***
4th quintile	[-0.060,-0.0043]	[-0.037,0.019]	[-0.081,-0.032]
	-0.066***	-0.034*	-0.093***
3rd quintile	[-0.097,-0.036]	[-0.065,-0.0031]	[-0.12,-0.066]
	-0.13***	-0.095***	-0.18***
2nd quintile	[-0.17,-0.097]	[-0.13,-0.057]	[-0.21,-0.15]
	-0.22***	-0.17***	-0.28***
1st quintile	[-0.26,-0.17]	[-0.22,-0.13]	[-0.32,-0.24]
Occupation (ref=salariat)	0.040**	0.047**	0.0021
Clerical routine	[0.011,0.069]	[0.018,0.076]	[-0.024,0.028]
	0.16***	0.15***	0.11***
Self-employed	[0.12,0.20]	[0.12,0.19]	[0.075,0.14]
	0.18***	0.20***	0.095***
Higher manual/routine	[0.14,0.22]	[0.16,0.23]	[0.063,0.13]
	0.10***	0.12***	0.042**
Lower manual/routine	[0.071,0.13]	[0.088,0.15]	[0.015,0.069]
Economic activity (ref=working)	-0.53***	-0.53***	-0.47***
Unemployed	[-0.59,-0.48]	[-0.58,-0.48]	[-0.52,-0.42]
	-0.42***	-0.40***	-0.44***
Sick or disabled	[-0.47,-0.36]	[-0.46,-0.35]	[-0.49,-0.39]
	-0.054**	-0.057**	-0.074***
Retired	[-0.091,-0.017]	[-0.094,-0.021]	[-0.11,-0.041]
	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.21***
Looking after home	[-0.26,-0.18]	[-0.26,-0.19]	[-0.24,-0.17]
Right-wing values		0.073***	
		[0.062,0.084]	

Authoritarian values			0.46***
			[0.46,0.47]
Gender (ref=male)			
Female	0.032**	0.026*	0.061***
	[0.011,0.053]	[0.0044,0.047]	[0.042,0.080]
Housing tenure (ref=owner)			
Social rent	-0.060***	-0.046**	-0.068***
	[-0.090,-0.029]	[-0.077,-0.015]	[-0.097,-0.040]
Private rent	-0.034	-0.024	-0.032
	[-0.071,0.0029]	[-0.061,0.012]	[-0.065,0.00082]
Marital status (ref=Married/ cohabiting)			
Separated/divorced	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.093***
	[-0.17,-0.095]	[-0.17,-0.091]	[-0.13,-0.059]
Widowed	-0.072**	-0.069**	-0.041
	[-0.12,-0.025]	[-0.12,-0.021]	[-0.084,0.0023]
Never married	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.078***
	[-0.19,-0.11]	[-0.19,-0.11]	[-0.11,-0.044]
Religion (ref = CofE)			
Roman Catholic	-0.069***	-0.058**	-0.037*
	[-0.11,-0.031]	[-0.096,-0.021]	[-0.070,-0.0026]
Other Christian	-0.079***	-0.077***	-0.048***
	[-0.11,-0.050]	[-0.11,-0.048]	[-0.074,-0.022]
Non-Christian	-0.12**	-0.12**	-0.050
	[-0.21,-0.044]	[-0.20,-0.037]	[-0.12,0.021]
No religion	-0.10***	-0.090***	-0.0076
	[-0.13,-0.079]	[-0.11,-0.067]	[-0.029,0.013]
Ethnicity (ref=white)			
Black	0.11**	0.12**	0.066
	[0.032,0.18]	[0.043,0.19]	[-0.0038,0.14]
Asian	0.41***	0.41***	0.21***
	[0.32,0.49]	[0.33,0.50]	[0.14,0.29]
Other/mixed	-0.0036	0.015	-0.014
	[-0.10,0.096]	[-0.084,0.11]	[-0.10,0.073]
Union membership (ref=non-member)			
Union member	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.096***
	[-0.16,-0.11]	[-0.14,-0.093]	[-0.12,-0.075]
Household size (ref=1 person)			

2 people	-0.098***	-0.090***	-0.11***
	[-0.13,-0.063]	[-0.13,-0.056]	[-0.14,-0.078]
3 people	-0.11***	-0.098***	-0.12***
	[-0.15,-0.068]	[-0.14,-0.057]	[-0.15,-0.081]
4 people	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.12***
	[-0.17,-0.081]	[-0.16,-0.072]	[-0.16,-0.085]
5+ people	-0.17***	-0.16***	-0.17***
	[-0.22,-0.11]	[-0.21,-0.10]	[-0.22,-0.12]
Age	-0.033***	-0.032***	-0.026***
	[-0.037,-0.029]	[-0.036,-0.028]	[-0.030,-0.023]
Age^2	0.00032***	0.00031***	0.00026***
	[0.00028,0.00036]	[0.00027,0.00035]	[0.00022,0.00029]
Constant	0.24***	0.16*	0.29***
	[0.100,0.38]	[0.022,0.30]	[0.17,0.42]
R^2	0.138	0.143	0.319

Notes: Coefficient estimates from linear regression models with 95% confidence intervals in brackets. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Response variable is negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, standardised to have mean = 0, SD = 1. All models include area and region fixed-effects, which are omitted from output. Survey weights included in all models. Sample size = 44,434 in all models. Data from BSAS 1987-2016. Author's calculations.

Table A7: Association between education and negative stereotypes about welfare recipients conditional on aggregate levels of education in year or birth cohort. Contrasts of estimated marginal means plotted in figure 6.

	(1)	(2)
Education (ref= no degree)		
Degree	-0.73***	-0.62***
	[-0.84,-0.62]	[-0.70,-0.54]
Percent degree educated in survey year	0.030***	
	[0.020,0.041]	
Degree X Percent degree educated in survey year	0.015***	
	[0.0092,0.021]	
Percent degree educated in cohort		0.039***
		[0.034,0.045]
Degree X Percent degree educated in cohort		0.0074***
		[0.0039,0.011]
Income (ref= 5th quintile)		
4th quintile	-0.028	-0.024
	[-0.057,0.0010]	[-0.057,0.0091]
3rd quintile	-0.049**	-0.048**
	[-0.079,-0.019]	[-0.083,-0.013]
2nd quintile	-0.092***	-0.11***
	[-0.14,-0.041]	[-0.15,-0.064]
1st quintile	-0.16***	-0.16***
	[-0.20,-0.12]	[-0.24,-0.080]
Occupation (ref=salariat)		
Clerical routine	0.076***	0.069***
	[0.049,0.10]	[0.039,0.099]
Self-employed	0.20***	0.19***
	[0.16,0.24]	[0.15,0.22]
Higher manual/routine	0.24***	0.25***
	[0.20,0.28]	[0.23,0.27]
Lower manual/routine	0.18***	0.16***
	[0.15,0.20]	[0.14,0.19]
Economic activity (ref=working)		
Unemployed	-0.55***	-0.56***

	[-0.60,-0.50]	[-0.62,-0.51]
Sick or disabled	-0.41***	-0.41***
	[-0.48,-0.34]	[-0.45,-0.38]
Retired	-0.058***	-0.092***
	[-0.088,-0.029]	[-0.14,-0.040]
Looking after home	-0.22***	-0.24***
	[-0.26,-0.18]	[-0.28,-0.20]
Gender (ref=male)		
Female	0.038**	0.044***
	[0.015,0.062]	[0.024,0.065]
Housing tenure (ref=owner)		
Social rent	-0.034*	-0.055**
	[-0.064,-0.0035]	[-0.091,-0.019]
Private rent	-0.026	-0.067**
	[-0.071,0.019]	[-0.11,-0.023]
Marital status (ref=Married/ cohabiting)		
Separated/divorced	-0.14***	-0.11***
	[-0.18,-0.11]	[-0.14,-0.075]
Widowed	-0.069*	-0.078***
	[-0.12,-0.015]	[-0.12,-0.034]
Never married	-0.16***	-0.17***
	[-0.21,-0.12]	[-0.22,-0.12]
Religion (ref = CofE)		
Roman Catholic	-0.070***	-0.074***
	[-0.11,-0.031]	[-0.099,-0.050]
Other Christian	-0.087***	-0.093***
	[-0.12,-0.058]	[-0.11,-0.073]
Non-Christian	-0.13***	-0.12**
	[-0.19,-0.067]	[-0.19,-0.046]
No religion	-0.10***	-0.098***
	[-0.13,-0.075]	[-0.14,-0.060]
Ethnicity (ref=white)		
Black	0.084	0.078
	[-0.00037,0.17]	[-0.039,0.20]
Asian	0.40***	0.36***
	[0.30,0.50]	[0.27,0.45]
Other/mixed	-0.016	-0.028
	[-0.10,0.071]	[-0.11,0.054]
Union membership (ref=non-member)		

Union member	-0.14***	-0.15***
	[-0.17,-0.12]	[-0.17,-0.13]
Household size (ref=1 person)		
2 people	-0.090***	-0.099***
	[-0.12,-0.060]	[-0.13,-0.066]
3 people	-0.10***	-0.11***
	[-0.14,-0.065]	[-0.15,-0.066]
4 people	-0.12***	-0.11***
	[-0.16,-0.079]	[-0.16,-0.064]
5+ people	-0.16***	-0.15***
	[-0.21,-0.10]	[-0.24,-0.066]
Age	-0.032***	0.015*
	[-0.040,-0.024]	[0.0017,0.029]
Age^2	0.00032***	0.000066
	[0.00026,0.00039]	[-0.000052,0.00018]
Constant	0.47	-1.30
Variance (year)	0.019	
Variance (cohort)		0.011
Variance (degree)	0.0021	0.00021
Covariance (degree, year)	0.0035	
Covariance (degree, cohort)		0.0010
Residual	0.86	0.87

Notes: Coefficient estimates from multilevel linear regression models with 95% confidence intervals in brackets. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Random slope models with cross level interaction between dummy for degree level education and aggregate share degree educated. Models are estimated using maximum likelihood. Response variable is negative stereotypes about welfare recipients, standardised to have mean = 0, SD = 1. All models include region fixed-effects, which are omitted from output. Survey weights included in all models. Sample size = 44,434 in all models. Aggregate level sample size either 26 years or 16 cohorts. Data from BSAS 1987-2016. Author's calculations.

A3 Appendices to Chapter 3 - *Inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty*

A3.1 Full regression tables

This section presents full results tables for all analyses reported in section 3.4.

Table A8: Association between income inequality and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty. Estimates are odds ratios, plotted in figure 9, predicted probabilities plotted in figure 11.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Gini coefficient	1.03[*]	1.02[*]	1.03[*]	1.03[*]
	[1.00,1.05]	[1.00,1.05]	[1.00,1.05]	[1.00,1.05]
Communist past (ref=no communist past)				
Post-communist countries			1.31	1.44
			[0.89,1.92]	[0.98,2.11]
Age left-education (ref= 12 or younger)				
13 - 16		0.89[*]		0.89[*]
		[0.81,0.97]		[0.81,0.97]
17-20		0.75[***]		0.75[***]
		[0.68,0.82]		[0.68,0.82]
21 or older		0.65[***]		0.64[***]
		[0.58,0.71]		[0.58,0.71]
Economic activity (ref= working)				
Retired		0.89[**]		0.89[**]
		[0.82,0.96]		[0.82,0.96]
Look aft home		1.00		1.00
		[0.92,1.08]		[0.92,1.08]
Unemployed		0.54[***]		0.54[***]
		[0.49,0.60]		[0.49,0.60]
Income (ref= lowest 1/3)				
Middle 1/3		1.10[***]		1.10[***]
		[1.05,1.16]		[1.05,1.16]

Top 1/3	1.32***	1.32***
	[1.24,1.40]	[1.24,1.40]
Gender (ref=male)		
Female	0.82***	0.82***
	[0.78,0.85]	[0.78,0.85]
Age (ref = 24 and under)		
25-34	0.95	0.95
	[0.86,1.05]	[0.86,1.05]
35-44	0.86**	0.86**
	[0.78,0.95]	[0.78,0.96]
45-54	0.84***	0.84***
	[0.75,0.93]	[0.75,0.93]
55-64	0.98	0.98
	[0.88,1.10]	[0.88,1.10]
65+	1.15*	1.15*
	[1.01,1.30]	[1.01,1.30]
Marital status (ref= married)		
Divorced/separated	0.93	0.93
	[0.86,1.01]	[0.86,1.01]
Widowed	1.09*	1.09*
	[1.01,1.17]	[1.01,1.17]
Single	0.95	0.95
	[0.88,1.01]	[0.88,1.01]
Religion (ref = Catholic)		
Protestant	0.89**	0.89**
	[0.81,0.97]	[0.81,0.97]
Orthodox	0.82***	0.81***

		[0.74,0.91]		[0.73,0.90]
Muslim		0.88		0.87
		[0.71,1.09]		[0.70,1.09]
Jew		0.91		0.91
		[0.49,1.68]		[0.49,1.68]
Other		0.78***		0.78***
		[0.74,0.83]		[0.73,0.82]
Children in household (ref = no children)				
1-2 children		0.94*		0.94*
		[0.90,0.99]		[0.89,0.99]
3 + children		0.90*		0.90*
		[0.82,0.98]		[0.82,0.98]
Constant	0.29***	0.52	0.26***	0.45*
	[0.14,0.59]	[0.26,1.05]	[0.13,0.53]	[0.22,0.91]
Variance (country-year)	0.076	0.069	0.076	0.069
Variance (country)	0.23	0.24	0.21	0.21

Notes: Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from three level random-intercept logistic regression model with individuals nested within country years and countries. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All models include year dummies. Variance components not exponentiated. Sample size: 43739 respondents, 75 country-years, and 27 countries for all models. Data from EVS and ATG database.

Table A9: Association between within country income inequality, between country income inequality, and individualistic beliefs about the causes of poverty. Estimates are odds ratios, plotted in figure 10.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Between-country Gini coefficient	1.02 [0.97,1.07]	1.01 [0.97,1.07]	1.03 [0.98,1.08]	1.02 [0.98,1.07]
Within-country Gini coefficient	1.03* [1.00,1.05]	1.03* [1.00,1.05]	1.03* [1.00,1.05]	1.03* [1.00,1.05]
Communist past (ref=no communist past)				
Post-communist countries			1.30 [0.88,1.93]	1.43 [0.97,2.11]
Age left-education (ref= 12 or younger)				
13 - 16		0.89* [0.81,0.97]		0.89* [0.81,0.97]
17-20		0.75*** [0.68,0.82]		0.75*** [0.68,0.82]
21 or older		0.65*** [0.58,0.71]		0.64*** [0.58,0.71]
Economic activity (ref= working)				
Retired		0.89** [0.82,0.96]		0.89** [0.82,0.96]
Look aft home		1.00 [0.92,1.08]		1.00 [0.92,1.08]
Unemployed		0.54*** [0.49,0.60]		0.54*** [0.49,0.60]

Income (ref= lowest 1/3)

Middle 1/3	1.10***	1.10***
	[1.05,1.16]	[1.05,1.16]
Top 1/3	1.32***	1.32***
	[1.24,1.40]	[1.24,1.40]

Gender (ref=male)

Female	0.82***	0.82***
	[0.78,0.85]	[0.78,0.85]

Age (ref = 24 and under)

25-34	0.95	0.95
	[0.86,1.05]	[0.86,1.05]
35-44	0.86**	0.86**
	[0.78,0.95]	[0.78,0.96]
45-54	0.84***	0.84***
	[0.75,0.93]	[0.75,0.93]
55-64	0.98	0.98
	[0.88,1.10]	[0.88,1.10]
65+	1.15*	1.15*
	[1.01,1.30]	[1.01,1.30]

Marital status (ref= married)

Divorced/separated	0.93	0.93
	[0.86,1.01]	[0.86,1.01]
Widowed	1.09*	1.09*
	[1.01,1.17]	[1.01,1.17]
Single	0.95	0.95
	[0.88,1.01]	[0.88,1.01]

Religion (ref = Catholic)

Protestant		0.89**		0.89**
		[0.81,0.97]		[0.81,0.97]
Orthodox		0.82***		0.81***
		[0.74,0.91]		[0.74,0.90]
Muslim		0.88		0.87
		[0.71,1.09]		[0.70,1.09]
Jew		0.91		0.91
		[0.49,1.68]		[0.49,1.68]
Other		0.78***		0.78***
		[0.74,0.83]		[0.73,0.82]
Children in household (ref = no children)				
1-2 children		0.94*		0.94*
		[0.90,0.99]		[0.89,0.99]
3 + children		0.90*		0.90*
		[0.82,0.98]		[0.82,0.98]
Constant	0.35	0.70	0.27	0.48
	[0.079, 1.58]	[0.15,3.20]	[0.059, 1.22]	[0.11,2.15]
Variance (country-year)	0.076	0.069	0.076	0.069
Variance (country)	0.23	0.23	0.21	0.21

Notes: Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from three level random-intercept logistic regression model with individuals nested within country years and countries. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. All models include year dummies. Variance components not exponentiated. Sample size: 43739 respondents, 75 country-years, and 27 countries for all models. Data from EVS and ATG database.

Table A10: Association between belief that laziness rather than injustice is cause of poverty against income inequality for individuals with varying levels of education. Estimates are odds ratios. Predicted probabilities plotted in figures 12 and 13.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Gini coefficient	1.03[*] [1.00,1.05]	1.03 [1.00,1.05]		
Between country Gini coefficient			1.03 [0.98,1.08]	1.03 [0.98,1.08]
Within-country Gini coefficient			1.02 [0.99,1.05]	1.02 [0.99,1.05]
Age left education (ref = 16 or younger)				
Left education 21 or older	0.94 [0.42,2.10]	1.01 [0.45,2.25]	3.05 [0.86,10.8]	3.14 [0.82,12.0]
Left education 21 or older X Gini coefficient	0.99 [0.97,1.02]	0.99 [0.96,1.02]		
Left education 21 or older X between-country inequality			0.95[*] [0.92,0.99]	0.95[*] [0.91,1.00]
Left education 21 or older X within-country inequality			1.01 [0.98,1.04]	1.00 [0.97,1.03]
Income (ref= lowest 1/3)				
Middle 1/3		1.07[*]		1.07[*]

	[1.00,1.14]	[1.00,1.14]
Top 1/3	1.29***	1.29***
	[1.20,1.40]	[1.20,1.40]
Economic activity (ref= working)		
Retired	0.93	0.93
	[0.84,1.02]	[0.85,1.02]
Look aft home	0.98	0.98
	[0.89,1.09]	[0.89,1.09]
Unemployed	0.51***	0.51***
	[0.44,0.58]	[0.44,0.58]
Gender (ref=male)		
Female	0.83***	0.83***
	[0.78,0.88]	[0.78,0.88]
Age (ref = 24 and under)		
25-34	1.00	1.00
	[0.87,1.16]	[0.87,1.16]
35-44	0.93	0.93
	[0.80,1.08]	[0.80,1.08]
45-54	0.89	0.89
	[0.77,1.04]	[0.77,1.04]
55-64	1.02	1.02
	[0.87,1.20]	[0.87,1.20]
65+	1.23*	1.22*
	[1.03,1.46]	[1.03,1.45]
Marital status (ref= married)		
Divorced/separated	0.86**	0.86**
	[0.78,0.95]	[0.78,0.95]

Widowed		1.06		1.06
		[0.97,1.16]		[0.97,1.16]
Single		0.95		0.95
		[0.87,1.04]		[0.87,1.04]
Religion (ref = Catholic)				
Protestant		0.84**		0.84**
		[0.75,0.93]		[0.75,0.93]
Orthodox		0.82**		0.82**
		[0.72,0.94]		[0.72,0.94]
Muslim		0.89		0.89
		[0.68,1.18]		[0.68,1.18]
Jew		1.78		1.78
		[0.81,3.91]		[0.81,3.90]
Other		0.75***		0.75***
		[0.70,0.81]		[0.70,0.81]
Children in household (ref = no children)				
1-2 children		0.91**		0.91**
		[0.85,0.97]		[0.85,0.97]
3 + children		0.85**		0.85**
		[0.76,0.95]		[0.76,0.95]
Constant	0.32**	0.42*	0.31	0.41
	[0.14,0.72]	[0.18,0.95]	[0.072,1.30]	[0.096,1.77]
Variance(country-year)		0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
Variance(country)		0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18

Level 2 variance (education)	0.078	0.079	0.075	0.077
Level 3 variance (education)	0.15	0.17	0.13	0.15
Level 2 covariance (education, intercept)	-0.057	-0.058	-0.056	-0.058

Notes: Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from three level random-slope logistic regression model with individuals nested within country years and countries. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Sample size: 27345 individuals, 75 country-years, and 27 countries for all models. All models include year dummies. Variance components not exponentiated. Data from EVS and ATG database.

Table A11: Association between belief that laziness rather than injustice is cause of poverty against income inequality for individuals with varying levels of income. Estimates are odds ratios. Predicted probabilities plotted in figures 12 and 13.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Gini coefficient	1.04** [1.01,1.06]	1.03* [1.01,1.06]		
Between country Gini coefficient			1.03 [0.98,1.09]	1.03 [0.98,1.08]
Within-country Gini coefficient			1.03* [1.00,1.06]	1.03 [1.00,1.06]
Income (ref = lowest 1/3)				
Highest 1/3	2.04* [1.01,4.13]	2.04* [1.03,4.05]	3.05* [1.00,9.23]	3.21* [1.07,9.65]
Income in highest 1/3 X Gini coefficient	0.98 [0.96,1.00]	0.98 [0.96,1.01]		
Income in highest 1/3 X between-country inequality			0.97 [0.93,1.00]	0.97 [0.94,1.01]
Income in highest 1/3 X within-country inequality			0.99 [0.96,1.02]	0.99 [0.97,1.02]
Age left-education (ref= 12 or younger)				
13 - 16		0.99 [0.88,1.11]		0.99 [0.88,1.11]

17-20	0.85**	0.85**
	[0.75,0.96]	[0.75,0.96]
21 or older	0.74***	0.75***
	[0.65,0.85]	[0.65,0.85]
Economic activity (ref= working)		
Retired	0.86**	0.87**
	[0.78,0.95]	[0.78,0.95]
Look aft home	0.95	0.95
	[0.86,1.06]	[0.86,1.06]
Unemployed	0.50***	0.50***
	[0.44,0.57]	[0.44,0.57]
Gender (ref=male)		
Female	0.81***	0.81***
	[0.77,0.86]	[0.77,0.86]
Age (ref = 24 and under)		
25-34	0.89	0.89
	[0.78,1.02]	[0.78,1.02]
35-44	0.83**	0.83**
	[0.72,0.95]	[0.72,0.95]
45-54	0.81**	0.81**
	[0.71,0.93]	[0.71,0.93]
55-64	0.92	0.92
	[0.79,1.07]	[0.79,1.07]
65+	1.16	1.16
	[0.98,1.36]	[0.98,1.36]
Marital status (ref= married)		
Divorced/separated	0.89*	0.89*

		[0.81,0.98]		[0.81,0.98]
Widowed		1.06		1.06
		[0.97,1.16]		[0.97,1.16]
Single		0.87**		0.87**
		[0.80,0.95]		[0.80,0.95]
Religion (ref = Catholic)				
Protestant		0.83***		0.83***
		[0.74,0.92]		[0.74,0.92]
Orthodox		0.77***		0.77***
		[0.67,0.87]		[0.67,0.87]
Muslim		0.86		0.86
		[0.64,1.14]		[0.64,1.14]
Jew		0.68		0.68
		[0.32,1.45]		[0.32,1.45]
Other		0.75***		0.75***
		[0.69,0.80]		[0.69,0.80]
Children in household (ref = no children)				
1-2 children		0.93*		0.93*
		[0.87,1.00]		[0.87,1.00]
3 + children		0.88*		0.88*
		[0.78,0.99]		[0.78,0.99]
Constant	0.21***	0.43*	0.23	0.47
	[0.095,0.48]	[0.20,0.96]	[0.050,1.04]	[0.11,2.08]
Variance(country-year)	0.11	0.094	0.11	0.094
Variance(country)	0.21	0.2	0.21	0.2

Level 2 variance (income)	0.086	0.072	0.086	0.072
Level 3 variance (income)	0.093	0.096	0.089	0.092
Level 2 covariance (income, intercept)	-0.057	-0.041	-0.057	-0.041

Notes: Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from three level random-slope logistic regression model with individuals nested within country years and countries. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Sample size: 26564 individuals, 75 country-years, and 27 countries for all models. All models include year dummies. Variance components not exponentiated. Data from EVS and ATG database.

A3.2 Robustness checks of main results

This section reports full results tables for all robustness checks reported in section 3.4.4.

Table A12: Robustness of association between Gini coefficient and belief that laziness rather than injustice is cause of poverty to definition of response variable as laziness vs all other responses (injustice, bad luck, or modern progress). Estimates are odds ratios.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Gini coefficient	1.02*	1.02*	1.02*	1.02*
	[1.00,1.04]	[1.00,1.04]	[1.00,1.04]	[1.00,1.04]
Communist past (ref=no communist past)				
Post-communist countries			1.62***	1.71***
			[1.22,2.16]	[1.32,2.22]
Age left-education (ref= 12 or younger)				
13 - 16		0.95		0.95
		[0.88,1.03]		[0.88,1.03]
17-20		0.82***		0.81***
		[0.75,0.89]		[0.75,0.88]
21 or older		0.69***		0.69***
		[0.63,0.75]		[0.63,0.75]
Economic activity (ref= working)				
Retired		0.94*		0.94*
		[0.88,1.00]		[0.88,1.00]
Look aft home		0.95		0.95
		[0.89,1.02]		[0.89,1.02]
Unemployed		0.58***		0.57***
		[0.52,0.63]		[0.52,0.63]
Income (ref= lowest 1/3)				
Middle 1/3		1.09***		1.09***

	[1.04,1.14]	[1.04,1.14]
Top 1/3	1.14***	1.14***
	[1.09,1.20]	[1.09,1.20]
Gender (ref=male)		
Female	0.84***	0.84***
	[0.81,0.88]	[0.81,0.88]
Age (ref = 24 and under)		
25-34	0.94	0.94
	[0.86,1.02]	[0.86,1.02]
35-44	0.88**	0.88**
	[0.80,0.96]	[0.80,0.96]
45-54	0.87**	0.87**
	[0.79,0.95]	[0.79,0.95]
55-64	1.01	1.01
	[0.91,1.11]	[0.91,1.11]
65+	1.12*	1.12*
	[1.00,1.25]	[1.00,1.25]
Marital status (ref= married)		
Divorced/separated	0.97	0.97
	[0.91,1.03]	[0.91,1.03]
Widowed	1.03	1.03
	[0.96,1.09]	[0.96,1.09]
Single	0.95	0.95
	[0.89,1.00]	[0.89,1.01]
Religion (ref = Catholic)		
Protestant	0.89**	0.89**
	[0.82,0.95]	[0.82,0.95]

Orthodox		0.93		0.92
		[0.85,1.01]		[0.84,1.00]
Muslim		0.93		0.92
		[0.77,1.13]		[0.76,1.12]
Jew		1.11		1.10
		[0.66,1.85]		[0.66,1.85]
Other		0.86***		0.86***
		[0.82,0.90]		[0.82,0.90]
Children in household (ref = no children)				
1-2 children		0.95*		0.95*
		[0.91,0.99]		[0.90,0.99]
3 + children		0.94		0.94
		[0.87,1.01]		[0.87,1.01]
Constant	0.16***	0.26***	0.13***	0.21***
	[0.094,0.29]	[0.15,0.46]	[0.075,0.23]	[0.12,0.35]
Variance (country-year)	0.045	0.041	0.044	0.041
Variance (country)	0.17	0.16	0.11	0.091

Notes: Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from three level random-intercept logistic regression model with individuals nested within country years and countries. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. All models include year dummies. Variance components not exponentiated. Sample size: 74193 respondents, 75 country-years, and 27 countries for all models. Data from EVS and ATG database.

Table A13 Robustness of association between within-country inequality, between-country inequality, and belief that laziness rather than injustice is cause of poverty to definition of response variable as laziness vs all other responses (injustice, bad luck, or modern progress). Estimates are odds ratios.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Between-country Gini coefficient	1.02 [0.98,1.06]	1.02 [0.98,1.06]	1.03 [1.00,1.07]	1.03 [1.00,1.06]
Within-country Gini coefficient	1.02* [1.00,1.04]	1.02 [1.00,1.04]	1.02 [1.00,1.04]	1.02 [1.00,1.04]
Communist past (ref=no communist past)				
Post-communist countries			1.65*** [1.24,2.20]	1.73*** [1.33,2.26]
Age left-education (ref= 12 or younger)				
13 - 16		0.95 [0.88,1.03]		0.95 [0.88,1.03]
17-20		0.82*** [0.75,0.89]		0.81*** [0.75,0.88]
21 or older		0.69*** [0.63,0.75]		0.69*** [0.63,0.75]
Economic activity (ref= working)				
Retired		0.94* [0.88,1.00]		0.94* [0.88,1.00]
Look aft home		0.95 [0.89,1.02]		0.95 [0.89,1.02]
Unemployed		0.58***		0.57***

	[0.52,0.63]	[0.52,0.63]
Income (ref= lowest 1/3)		
Middle 1/3	1.09***	1.09***
	[1.04,1.14]	[1.04,1.14]
Top 1/3	1.14***	1.14***
	[1.09,1.20]	[1.09,1.20]
Gender (ref=male)		
Female	0.84***	0.84***
	[0.81,0.88]	[0.81,0.88]
Age (ref = 24 and under)		
25-34	0.94	0.94
	[0.86,1.02]	[0.86,1.02]
35-44	0.88**	0.88**
	[0.80,0.96]	[0.80,0.96]
45-54	0.87**	0.87**
	[0.79,0.95]	[0.79,0.95]
55-64	1.01	1.01
	[0.91,1.11]	[0.91,1.11]
65+	1.12*	1.12*
	[1.00,1.25]	[1.00,1.25]
Marital status (ref= married)		
Divorced/separated	0.97	0.97
	[0.91,1.03]	[0.91,1.03]
Widowed	1.03	1.03
	[0.96,1.09]	[0.96,1.09]
Single	0.95	0.95
	[0.89,1.00]	[0.89,1.00]

Religion (ref = Catholic)				
Protestant		0.89**		0.89**
		[0.82,0.95]		[0.82,0.95]
Orthodox		0.93		0.92
		[0.85,1.01]		[0.84,1.00]
Muslim		0.93		0.92
		[0.77,1.13]		[0.76,1.12]
Jew		1.11		1.10
		[0.66,1.85]		[0.66,1.85]
Other		0.86***		0.86***
		[0.82,0.90]		[0.82,0.90]
Children in household (ref = no children)				
1-2 children		0.95*		0.95*
		[0.91,0.99]		[0.90,0.99]
3 + children		0.94		0.94
		[0.87,1.01]		[0.87,1.01]
Constant	0.16**	0.28*	0.094***	0.16***
	[0.045,0.56]	[0.081,0.97]	[0.031,0.29]	[0.057,0.44]
Variance (country-year)	0.045	0.041	0.044	0.041
Variance (country)	0.17	0.16	0.11	0.09

Notes: Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from three level random-intercept logistic regression model with individuals nested within country years and countries. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All models include year dummies. Variance components not exponentiated. Sample size: 74193 respondents, 75 country-years, and 27 countries for all models. Data from EVS and ATG database.

Table A14: Robustness of association between inequality and belief that laziness rather than injustice is cause of poverty to specification as three-level linear probability model with random intercepts.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Gini coefficient	0.0060*	0.0055*	0.0062*	0.0056*
	[0.00097,0.011]	[0.00063,0.010]	[0.0011,0.011]	[0.00082,0.010]
Communist past (ref=no communist past)				
Post-communist countries			0.059	0.080
			[-0.027,0.15]	[-0.0048,0.16]
Age left-education (ref= 12 or younger)				
13 - 16		-0.030**		-0.030**
		[-0.051,-0.0085]		[-0.051,-0.0087]
17-20		-0.068***		-0.068***
		[-0.089,-0.046]		[-0.090,-0.046]
21 or older		-0.100***		-0.10***
		[-0.12,-0.077]		[-0.12,-0.077]
Economic activity (ref= working)				
Retired		-0.026**		-0.027**
		[-0.043,-0.0095]		[-0.043,-0.0096]
Look aft home		-0.00049		-0.00034
		[-0.019,0.018]		[-0.019,0.018]
Unemployed		-0.13***		-0.13***
		[-0.15,-0.11]		[-0.15,-0.11]
Income (ref= lowest 1/3)				
Middle 1/3		0.022***		0.022***
		[0.010,0.033]		[0.011,0.033]
Top 1/3		0.061***		0.062***

	[0.048,0.075]	[0.048,0.075]
Gender (ref=male)		
Female	-0.045***	-0.045***
	[-0.055,-0.036]	[-0.055,-0.036]
Age (ref = 24 and under)		
25-34	-0.011	-0.011
	[-0.033,0.011]	[-0.033,0.011]
35-44	-0.034**	-0.034**
	[-0.057,-0.011]	[-0.057,-0.011]
45-54	-0.040***	-0.040***
	[-0.064,-0.017]	[-0.064,-0.017]
55-64	-0.0036	-0.0036
	[-0.029,0.022]	[-0.029,0.022]
65+	0.032*	0.032*
	[0.0030,0.060]	[0.0031,0.060]
Marital status (ref= married)		
Divorced/separated	-0.015	-0.015
	[-0.031,0.0020]	[-0.031,0.0020]
Widowed	0.019*	0.019*
	[0.0016,0.036]	[0.0015,0.036]
Single	-0.012	-0.012
	[-0.028,0.0030]	[-0.028,0.0032]
Religion (ref = Catholic)		
Protestant	-0.028**	-0.027**
	[-0.047,-0.0086]	[-0.047,-0.0082]
Orthodox	-0.044***	-0.045***
	[-0.068,-0.021]	[-0.068,-0.022]

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Muslim		-0.029 [-0.076,0.019]		-0.029 [-0.077,0.018]
Jew		-0.024 [-0.16,0.11]		-0.024 [-0.16,0.11]
Other		-0.055*** [-0.068,-0.042]		-0.055*** [-0.068,-0.042]
Children in household (ref = no children)				
1-2 children		-0.013* [-0.024,-0.0015]		-0.013* [-0.024,-0.0016]
3 + children		-0.024* [-0.044,-0.0041]		-0.024* [-0.044,-0.0041]
Constant	0.22** [0.059,0.38]	0.35*** [0.20,0.51]	0.19* [0.030,0.35]	0.32*** [0.16,0.48]
Variance (country-year)	0.0039	0.0034	0.0038	0.0034
Variance (country)	0.011	0.012	0.011	0.010
Residual variance	0.23	0.22	0.23	0.22

Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from three level random-intercept linear probability regression model with individuals nested within country years and countries. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. All models include year dummies. Sample size: 43739 respondents, 75 country-years, and 27 countries for all models. Data from EVS and ATG database.

Table A15: Robustness of association between within-country inequality, between-country inequality, and belief that laziness rather than injustice is cause of poverty to specification as three-level linear probability model with random intercepts.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Gini coefficient				
Between-country Gini coefficient	0.0041	0.0028	0.0054	0.0045
	[-0.0068,0.015]	[-0.0082,0.014]	[-0.0054,0.016]	[-0.0061,0.015]
Within-country Gini coefficient	0.0065*	0.0061*	0.0064*	0.0059*
	[0.00087,0.012]	[0.00075,0.011]	[0.00072,0.012]	[0.00055,0.011]
Communist past (ref=no communist past)				
Post-communist countries			0.058	0.078
			[-0.030,0.15]	[-0.0080,0.16]
Age left-education (ref= 12 or younger)				
13 - 16		-0.030**		-0.030**
		[-0.051,-0.0086]		[-0.051,-0.0087]
17-20		-0.068***		-0.068***
		[-0.090,-0.046]		[-0.090,-0.046]
21 or older		-0.100***		-0.10***
		[-0.12,-0.077]		[-0.12,-0.077]

Economic activity (ref= working)

Retired	-0.026**	-0.027**
	[-0.043,-0.0095]	[-0.043,-0.0096]
Look aft home	-0.00046	-0.00033
	[-0.019,0.018]	[-0.019,0.018]
Unemployed	-0.13***	-0.13***
	[-0.15,-0.11]	[-0.15,-0.11]

Income (ref= lowest 1/3)

Middle 1/3	0.022***	0.022***
	[0.011,0.033]	[0.011,0.033]
Top 1/3	0.061***	0.062***
	[0.048,0.075]	[0.048,0.075]

Gender (ref=male)

Female	-0.045***	-0.045***
	[-0.055,-0.036]	[-0.055,-0.036]

Age (ref = 24 and under)

25-34	-0.011	-0.011
	[-0.033,0.011]	[-0.033,0.011]
35-44	-0.034**	-0.034**
	[-0.057,-0.011]	[-0.057,-0.011]
45-54	-0.040***	-0.040***
	[-0.064,-0.017]	[-0.064,-0.017]
55-64	-0.0036	-0.0036
	[-0.029,0.022]	[-0.029,0.022]
65+	0.032*	0.032*

	[0.0030,0.060]	[0.0031,0.060]

Marital status (ref= married)

Divorced/separated	-0.015	-0.015
	[-0.031,0.0020]	[-0.031,0.0021]
Widowed	0.019[*]	0.019[*]
	[0.0016,0.036]	[0.0015,0.036]
Single	-0.012	-0.012
	[-0.028,0.0031]	[-0.028,0.0032]

Religion (ref = Catholic)

Protestant	-0.028[**]	-0.028[**]
	[-0.047,-0.0087]	[-0.047,-0.0083]
Orthodox	-0.044[***]	-0.045[***]
	[-0.067,-0.021]	[-0.068,-0.022]
Muslim	-0.029	-0.029
	[-0.076,0.019]	[-0.077,0.018]
Jew	-0.024	-0.024
	[-0.16,0.11]	[-0.16,0.11]
Other	-0.055[***]	-0.055[***]
	[-0.068,-0.042]	[-0.068,-0.042]

Children in household (ref = no children)

1-2 children	-0.013[*]	-0.013[*]
	[-0.024,-0.0015]	[-0.024,-0.0016]
3 + children	-0.024[*]	-0.024[*]
	[-0.044,-0.0040]	[-0.044,-0.0041]

Constant	0.28 [-0.060,0.61]	0.43[*] [0.097,0.77]	0.22 [-0.12,0.56]	0.35[*] [0.020,0.69]
Variance (country-year)	0.0039	0.0034	0.0038	0.0034
Variance (country)	0.011	0.012	0.011	0.010
Residual variance	0.23	0.22	0.23	0.22

Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from three level random-intercept linear probability regression model with individuals nested within country years and countries. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All models include year dummies. Sample size: 43739 respondents, 75 country-years, and 27 countries for all models. Data from EVS and ATG database.

Table A16: Alternative adjustments of association between belief that laziness rather than injustice is cause of poverty and income inequality to take account of communist past. Estimates are odds ratios.

	No communist past		Communist past		Interaction model	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gini coefficient	1.01	1.01	1.04*	1.04*	1.02	1.02
	[0.98,1.05]	[0.98,1.04]	[1.00,1.08]	[1.00,1.08]	[0.99,1.06]	[0.98,1.05]
Communist past (ref=no communist past)						
Post-communist countries					0.92	0.89
					[0.21,3.98]	[0.22,3.57]
Post-communist country X Gini coefficient					1.01	1.02
					[0.97,1.06]	[0.97,1.06]
Age left-education (ref= 12 or younger)						
13 - 16		0.96		0.83*		0.89*
		[0.86,1.07]		[0.71,0.98]		[0.81,0.97]
17-20		0.76***		0.79**		0.75***
		[0.68,0.86]		[0.67,0.93]		[0.68,0.82]
21 or older		0.56***		0.79**		0.64***
		[0.50,0.64]		[0.66,0.93]		[0.58,0.71]
Economic activity (ref= working)						
Retired		0.89*		0.89*		0.89**
		[0.80,0.99]		[0.80,1.00]		[0.82,0.96]
Looking after home		0.99		1.05		1.00
		[0.90,1.10]		[0.90,1.22]		[0.92,1.08]

Unemployed	0.50***	0.59***	0.54***
	[0.44,0.58]	[0.51,0.68]	[0.49,0.60]
Income (ref= lowest 1/3)			
Middle 1/3	1.03	1.18***	1.10***
	[0.96,1.11]	[1.09,1.27]	[1.05,1.16]
Top 1/3	1.16***	1.54***	1.32***
	[1.06,1.26]	[1.41,1.67]	[1.24,1.40]
Gender (ref=male)			
Female	0.70***	0.98	0.82***
	[0.66,0.74]	[0.92,1.04]	[0.78,0.85]
Age (ref = 24 and under)			
25-34	0.91	1.03	0.95
	[0.80,1.05]	[0.89,1.20]	[0.86,1.05]
35-44	0.87	0.88	0.86**
	[0.75,1.00]	[0.75,1.02]	[0.78,0.96]
45-54	0.87	0.84*	0.84***
	[0.75,1.00]	[0.72,0.98]	[0.75,0.93]
55-64	0.96	1.06	0.98
	[0.82,1.12]	[0.89,1.25]	[0.88,1.10]
65+	1.19	1.13	1.15*
	[1.00,1.42]	[0.94,1.36]	[1.01,1.30]
Marital status (ref= married)			
Divorced/separated	0.85**	1.01	0.93
	[0.76,0.95]	[0.91,1.12]	[0.86,1.01]
Widowed	1.14*	1.08	1.09*
	[1.02,1.28]	[0.97,1.19]	[1.01,1.17]
Single	0.93	0.98	0.95

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		[0.85,1.02]		[0.88,1.09]		[0.88,1.01]
Religion (ref = Catholic)						
Protestant		0.78***		1.04		0.89**
		[0.70,0.87]		[0.90,1.20]		[0.81,0.97]
Orthodox		1.28		0.87*		0.81***
		[0.90,1.83]		[0.77,0.98]		[0.73,0.90]
Muslim		1.27		0.79		0.87
		[0.90,1.78]		[0.60,1.05]		[0.70,1.08]
Jew		1.21		0.67		0.91
		[0.56,2.62]		[0.26,1.76]		[0.49,1.68]
Other		0.69***		0.89**		0.78***
		[0.64,0.75]		[0.81,0.97]		[0.73,0.82]
Children in household (ref = no children)						
1-2 children		0.95		0.93		0.94*
		[0.88,1.02]		[0.87,1.00]		[0.89,0.99]
3 + children		0.91		0.90		0.90*
		[0.81,1.03]		[0.78,1.03]		[0.82,0.98]
Constant	0.42	0.96	0.24**	0.30*	0.32*	0.58
	[0.15,1.20]	[0.37,2.49]	[0.091,0.63]	[0.11,0.79]	[0.11,0.92]	[0.21,1.63]
Variance (country-year)	0.06	0.053	0.057	0.054	0.074	0.066
Variance (country)	0.21	0.16	0.28	0.27	0.22	0.22
Observations	23330	23330	20409	20409	43739	43739

Country-years	44	44	31	31	75	75
Countries	16	16	11	11	27	27

Notes: Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from three level random-intercept linear probability regression model with individuals nested within country years and countries. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All models include year dummies. Variance components not exponentiated. Care should be taken interpreting confidence intervals because of small sample sizes at country and country-year levels. Data from EVS and ATG database.

Figure A6: Predicted probability of agreeing that laziness rather than injustice is cause of poverty against income inequality by western and southern Europe vs post-communist countries. Fitted line estimated from model 5 in table A16, appendix 3.2. Raw proportions calculated as in figure 7. Data from EVS and ATG database. All covariates held at observed levels.

Table A17: Association between top 1% income share and belief that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty. Estimates are odds ratios.

	(1)	(2)
Top 1% share of national income	1.05	1.06*
	[1.00,1.11]	[1.01,1.12]
Age left-education (ref= 12 or younger)		
13 - 16		0.89
		[0.80,1.00]
17-20		0.74***
		[0.65,0.84]
21 or older		0.62***
		[0.55,0.71]
Economic activity (ref= working)		
Retired		0.86**
		[0.77,0.95]
Look aft home		1.03
		[0.92,1.14]
Unemployed		0.52***
		[0.46,0.60]
Income (ref= lowest 1/3)		
Middle 1/3		1.08*
		[1.01,1.16]
Top 1/3		1.34***
		[1.23,1.45]
Gender (ref=male)		
Female		0.74***
		[0.70,0.79]
Age (ref = 24 and under)		
25-34		0.89
		[0.78,1.02]
35-44		0.80**
		[0.69,0.92]
45-54		0.79**
		[0.69,0.92]
55-64		0.91
		[0.78,1.06]
65+		1.13
		[0.95,1.35]
Marital status (ref= married)		
Divorced/separated		0.97

		[0.87,1.08]
Widowed		1.11
		[1.00,1.24]
Single		0.97
		[0.88,1.06]
Religion (ref = Catholic)		
Protestant		0.85**
		[0.76,0.94]
Orthodox		0.70***
		[0.57,0.85]
Muslim		0.88
		[0.62,1.23]
Jew		0.85
		[0.35,2.06]
Other		0.73***
		[0.68,0.79]
Children in household (ref = no children)		
1-2 children		0.93*
		[0.86,1.00]
3 + children		1.00
		[0.89,1.13]
Constant	0.37***	0.64
	[0.23,0.59]	[0.38,1.07]
Variance (country-year)	.059	.053
Variance (country)	.19	.2

Notes: Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from three level random-intercept logistic regression model with individuals nested within country years and countries. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. All models include year dummies. Variance components not exponentiated. Sample size: 23,498 individuals, 43 country-years, 16 countries. Controls for communist past not included in models because most countries with top income data are in Western Europe. Data from EVS and WID database.

Figure A7: Association between demographic variables and belief that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty. Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from three level random-intercept logistic regression model with individuals nested within country years and countries. 'Separate variables' plots estimates from 8 separate models with each demographic variable entered separately, 'full model' includes all variables together. All models include time dummies. The coefficient for religion = 'Jewish' is omitted because of a very wide confidence interval. Data from EVS. Coefficient estimates in table A18 appendix 3.2.

Table A18: Association between demographic variables and belief that laziness rather than injustice is the cause of poverty. Estimates are odds ratios.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age left-education (ref= 12 or younger)					
13 - 16	0.85***				
	[0.78,0.93]				
17-20	0.72***				
	[0.66,0.79]				
21 or older	0.65***				
	[0.59,0.71]				
Economic activity (ref= working)					
Retired			1.14***		
			[1.09,1.19]		
Look aft home			0.98		
			[0.91,1.06]		
Unemployed			0.51***		
			[0.46,0.57]		
Income (ref= lowest 1/3)					
Middle 1/3		1.04			
		[0.99,1.09]			
Top 1/3		1.17***			
		[1.11,1.23]			
Gender (ref=male)					
Female				0.84***	
				[0.81,0.87]	

Age (ref = 24 and under)

25-34	0.97
	[0.88,1.07]
35-44	0.91*
	[0.82,1.00]
45-54	0.91
	[0.83,1.00]
55-64	1.08
	[0.98,1.19]
65+	1.27***
	[1.15,1.40]

Marital status (ref= married)

Divorced/separated

Widowed

Single

Religion (ref = Catholic)

Protestant

Orthodox

Muslim

Jew

Other

Children in household (ref = no children)
1-2 children

3 + children

Constant	0.84	0.60***	0.64***	0.70**	0.64***
	[0.65,1.08]	[0.47,0.76]	[0.50,0.81]	[0.55,0.89]	[0.50,0.83]
Variance (country-year)	0.22	0.23	0.22	.23	0.23
Variance (country)	0.082	0.085	0.084	.086	0.084

Notes: Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from three level random-intercept logistic regression model with individuals nested within country years and countries. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All models include year dummies. Variance components not exponentiated. Sample size: 23,498 individuals, 43 country-years, 16 countries. Data from EVS.

Table A18 continued. Estimates are odds ratios.

	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Age left-education (ref= 12 or younger)				
13 - 16				0.89*
				[0.81,0.97]
17-20				0.75***
				[0.68,0.82]
21 or older				0.65***
				[0.58,0.71]
Economic activity (ref= working)				
Retired				0.89**
				[0.82,0.96]
Look aft home				1.00
				[0.92,1.08]
Unemployed				0.54***
				[0.49,0.60]
Income (ref= lowest 1/3)				
Middle 1/3				1.10***
				[1.05,1.16]
Top 1/3				1.32***
				[1.24,1.40]
Gender (ref=male)				
Female				0.82***
				[0.78,0.85]
Age (ref = 24 and under)				

25-34			0.95
			[0.86,1.05]
35-44			0.86**
			[0.78,0.95]
45-54			0.84***
			[0.75,0.93]
55-64			0.98
			[0.88,1.10]
65+			1.15*
			[1.01,1.30]
Marital status (ref= married)			
Divorced/separated	0.82***		0.93
	[0.76,0.88]		[0.86,1.01]
Widowed	1.15***		1.09*
	[1.07,1.22]		[1.01,1.17]
Single	0.90***		0.94
	[0.85,0.95]		[0.88,1.01]
Religion (ref = Catholic)			
Protestant		0.89**	0.89**
		[0.81,0.97]	[0.81,0.97]
Orthodox		0.80***	0.82***
		[0.72,0.89]	[0.74,0.91]
Muslim		0.81	0.88
		[0.65,1.00]	[0.71,1.09]
Jew		0.88	0.91
		[0.47,1.63]	[0.49,1.68]
Other		0.75***	0.78***
		[0.71,0.79]	[0.74,0.82]

Children in household (ref = no children)				
1-2 children			0.90*** [0.86,0.94]	0.94* [0.89,0.99]
3 + children			0.85*** [0.78,0.92]	0.90* [0.82,0.98]
Constant	0.65*** [0.51,0.82]	0.74* [0.58,0.94]	0.68** [0.53,0.87]	1.06 [0.80,1.40]
Variance (country-year)	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.23
Variance (country)	0.084	0.081	0.085	0.077

Notes: Odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals from three level random-intercept logistic regression model with individuals nested within country years and countries. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All models include year dummies. Variance components not exponentiated. Sample size: 23,498 individuals, 43 country-years, 16 countries. Data from EVS.

A4 Appendices to Chapter 4 - *Neither threat nor contact: Exposure to local unemployment and negative stereotypes about the unemployed*

A4.1 Full regression tables

This section presents full regression tables that are plotted in section 4.9.3.

Table A19: Fixed effects regression of association between % claiming unemployment benefit and negative stereotypes about unemployed with person fixed effects only. Coefficients plotted in figure 15.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
% claiming unemployment benefit	-1.155***	-1.119***	-1.162***	-1.155***	-1.052**
	[-1.595,-0.715]	[-1.562, -0.675]	[-1.606, -0.718]	[-1.744, -0.566]	[-1.701,-0.403]
Work status (ref=working)					
Unemployed		-2.981			-3.742*
		[-6.359, 0.397]			[-7.294, -0.190]
Education		-0.114			0.0700
		[-3.251,3.023]			[-3.187,3.326]
Retired		0.773			0.480
		[-1.326,2.872]			[-1.701,2.661]
Risk of poverty (ref= Very unlikely)					
Fairly unlikely			1.123*		1.221**
			[0.242,2.005]		[0.309,2.133]
Neither likely nor unlikely			0.602		0.592
			[-0.584,1.787]		[-0.693,1.878]
Fairly likely			0.505		0.589
			[-0.926,1.936]		[-0.876,2.054]
Very likely			-0.244		-0.145
			[-1.885,1.397]		[-1.897,1.607]
gross disposable income per head /1000				-0.000238	-0.104
				[-1.099,1.099]	[-1.235,1.027]

*Notes: Coefficient estimates from linear regression models with person fixed effects, with 95% confidence intervals in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p <*

0.01, *** p < 0.001. The response variable, negative stereotypes about the unemployed, is on a 0-100 scale. Sample size: 30466 observations on 15233 individuals in 375 local authorities. Standard errors are clustered by local authority. Individual level data from BES panel survey waves 1 (Feb 2014) and 4 (March 2015). Unemployment benefit claims and gross disposable income per head data from Nomis. Author's calculations.

Table A20: Fixed effects regression of association between % claiming unemployment benefit and negative stereotypes about unemployed with person and time fixed effects. Coefficients plotted in figure 15.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
% claiming unemployment benefit	-0.414	-0.416	-0.395	-0.331	-0.315
	[-1.598, 0.771]	[-1.602, 0.771]	[-1.579, 0.789]	[-1.534 ,0.871]	[-1.520, 0.889]
Work status (ref=working)					
Unemployed		-2.952			-2.822
		[-6.330,0.427]			[-6.208,0.563]
Education		-0.0791			-0.0319
		[-3.215,3.057]			[-3.144,3.080]
Retired		0.691			0.718
		[-1.416,2.798]			[-1.383,2.819]
Risk of poverty (ref= Very unlikely)					
Fairly unlikely			1.145*		1.152*
			[0.264,2.027]		[0.269,2.035]
Neither likely nor unlikely			0.627		0.659
			[-0.557,1.812]		[-0.527,1.845]
Fairly likely			0.546		0.592
			[-0.883,1.975]		[-0.836,2.021]
Very likely			-0.212		-0.0965
			[-1.855,1.430]		[-1.746,1.554]
Gross disposable income per head /1000				-0.600	-0.610
				[-1.880,0.679]	[-1.902,0.683]

*Notes: Coefficient estimates from linear regression models with person and wave fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals in brackets. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. The response variable, negative stereotypes about the unemployed, is on a 0-100 scale. Sample size: 30466*

observations on 15233 individuals in 375 local authorities. Standard errors are clustered by local authority. Individual level data from BES panel survey waves 1 (Feb 2014) and 4 (March 2015). Unemployment benefit claims and gross disposable income per head data from Nomis. Author's calculations.

A4.2 Robustness checks of main results

This section presents full results tables for all robustness analyses reported in section 4.9.4.

Table A21: Odds ratio of unemployment benefit claims on change from disagreeing to agreeing that unemployed responsible for situation.
Estimates are odds ratios, plotted in figure 17.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% claiming unemployment benefit	0.682***	0.733***	1.095	1.124
	[0.597,0.779]	[0.612,0.877]	[0.786,1.525]	[0.799,1.582]
Risk of poverty (ref= Very unlikely)				
Fairly unlikely		1.453**		1.481**
		[1.095,1.930]		[1.112,1.972]
Neither likely nor unlikely		1.099		1.107
		[0.754,1.602]		[0.757,1.619]
Fairly likely		1.336		1.356
		[0.921,1.940]		[0.933,1.970]
Very likely		1.176		1.182
		[0.757,1.827]		[0.761,1.838]
Work status (ref=working)				
Unemployed		0.544		0.556
		[0.250,1.186]		[0.250,1.234]
Education		0.672		0.691
		[0.256,1.763]		[0.264,1.810]
Retired		1.135		1.076
		[0.605,2.130]		[0.574,2.015]
Gross disposable income per head /1000		1.244		0.881

	[0.848,1.824]	[0.572,1.356]
Wave 4 (ref=wave1)	1.625**	1.755**
	[1.187,2.225]	[1.179,2.612]

Odds ratio estimates and 95% confidence intervals from fixed effects (conditional) logistic regression models. All models include individual fixed effects, while models 3 and 4 also include time dummies. The response variable, negative stereotypes about the unemployed, is a binary variable, where 0 = agrees/strongly agrees that unemployed not responsible for their situation and 1 = disagrees or strongly disagrees. Model only estimated on respondents who changed their view between the two waves. Sample size: 2300 observations on 1150 individuals in 319 local authorities. Standard errors are clustered by local authority. Individual level data from BES panel survey waves 1 (Feb 2014) and 4 (March 2015). Unemployment benefit claims and gross disposable income per head data from Nomis. Author's calculations.

Table A22: Robustness of association between unemployment benefit claims and negative stereotypes about the unemployed to alternate measures of exposure to unemployment.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% claiming unemployment benefit LOGGED	-3.434***	-1.959				
	[-5.029,-1.839]	[-6.312,2.394]				
% claiming unemployment benefit TOP DECILE			-0.295	-0.624		
			[-2.843,2.253]	[-3.074,1.826]		
Unemployment rate					-0.332	0.284
					[-0.712,0.0485]	[-0.236,0.804]
Wave 4 (ref=wave1)		0.627		1.347***		1.663***
		[-1.095,2.348]		[0.710,1.984]		[0.786,2.540]
Fairly unlikely	1.142*	1.151*	1.061*	1.153*	1.086*	1.157*
	[0.260,2.023]	[0.268,2.034]	[0.181,1.942]	[0.270,2.036]	[0.206,1.965]	[0.274,2.039]
Neither likely nor unlikely	0.653	0.661	0.549	0.659	0.587	0.674
	[-0.533,1.839]	[-0.525,1.847]	[-0.638,1.736]	[-0.527,1.845]	[-0.601,1.776]	[-0.511,1.860]
Fairly likely	0.569	0.589	0.376	0.593	0.441	0.603
	[-0.854,1.992]	[-0.841,2.018]	[-1.046,1.798]	[-0.835,2.021]	[-0.989,1.870]	[-0.823,2.029]
Very likely	-0.115	-0.0972	-0.326	-0.0925	-0.260	-0.0912
	[-1.764,1.534]	[-1.749,1.554]	[-1.974,1.322]	[-1.742,1.557]	[-1.906,1.385]	[-1.741,1.559]
Unemployed	-2.851	-2.834	-3.002	-2.837	-2.940	-2.830

	[-6.237,0.534]	[-6.220,0.551]	[-6.385,0.381]	[-6.222,0.549]	[-6.324,0.445]	[-6.222,0.562]
Education	-0.107	-0.0691	-0.336	-0.0531	-0.212	-0.0670
	[-3.218,3.003]	[-3.181,3.043]	[-3.440,2.769]	[-3.162,3.055]	[-3.310,2.885]	[-3.183,3.050]
Retired	0.725	0.707	0.960	0.703	0.887	0.698
	[-1.374,2.825]	[-1.392,2.806]	[-1.146,3.066]	[-1.396,2.802]	[-1.218,2.992]	[-1.400,2.796]
Gross disposable income per head /1000	-0.522	-0.671	1.464**	-0.684	0.872	-0.648
	[-1.704,0.659]	[-1.925,0.583]	[0.533,2.395]	[-1.953,0.584]	[-0.275,2.019]	[-1.920,0.625]
Observations	30466	30466	30466	30466	30454	30454

Notes: Coefficient estimates from linear regression models with person fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The response variable, negative stereotypes about the unemployed, is on a 0-100 scale. Sample size: 30466 observations on 15233 individuals in 375 local authorities. Standard errors are clustered by local authority. Individual level data from BES panel survey waves 1 (Feb 2014) and 4 (March 2015). Unemployment benefit claims, unemployment rates and gross disposable income per head data from Nomis. Author's calculations.

Table A23: Robustness of association between unemployment benefit claims and attitudes towards the unemployed to adjustments to make results more representative of British population

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Core respondents only		Survey weight (wave 1)		Longitudinal weight	
% claiming unemployment benefit	-1.134*	-0.0262	-1.020	-0.398	-0.672	-0.179
	[-2.037,-0.232]	[-1.653,1.601]	[-2.085,0.0460]	[-2.079,1.282]	[-2.034,0.689]	[-2.437,2.079]
Risk of poverty (ref= Very unlikely)						
Fairly unlikely	0.408	0.437	2.110**	2.135**	1.742	1.766
	[-0.901,1.716]	[-0.873,1.747]	[0.823,3.398]	[0.843,3.427]	[-0.0273,3.512]	[-0.0147,3.546]
Neither likely nor unlikely	0.115	0.146	1.539	1.560	2.477*	2.497*
	[-1.450,1.680]	[-1.417,1.710]	[-0.184,3.261]	[-0.167,3.287]	[0.108,4.847]	[0.113,4.880]
Fairly likely	0.0260	0.102	1.369	1.413	1.102	1.137
	[-1.979,2.031]	[-1.902,2.106]	[-0.587,3.326]	[-0.550,3.376]	[-1.515,3.719]	[-1.491,3.764]
Very likely	-1.357	-1.294	0.137	0.184	-0.419	-0.383
	[-3.700,0.986]	[-3.644,1.056]	[-2.099,2.374]	[-2.059,2.426]	[-3.354,2.515]	[-3.322,2.556]
Work status (ref=working)						
Unemployed	-2.692	-2.662	-4.618	-4.596	1.317	1.342
	[-7.886,2.503]	[-7.850,2.526]	[-9.560,0.324]	[-9.542,0.350]	[-4.387,7.020]	[-4.355,7.040]
Education	3.179	3.182	-1.566	-1.567	-1.538	-1.555
	[-3.630,9.989]	[-3.620,9.985]	[-5.209,2.077]	[-5.214,2.080]	[-6.105,3.029]	[-6.136,3.026]
Retired	-1.151	-1.289	0.595	0.523	-0.233	-0.296
	[-4.286,1.984]	[-4.451,1.873]	[-2.258,3.447]	[-2.336,3.382]	[-3.438,2.972]	[-3.496,2.904]

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Gross disposable income per head /1000	0.295	-0.579	0.770	0.248	1.244	0.829
	[-1.516,2.107]	[-2.745,1.588]	[-1.695,3.235]	[-3.111,3.607]	[-1.788,4.276]	[-3.244,4.902]
Wave 4 (ref=wave1)		1.441		0.841		0.675
		[-0.321,3.202]		[-1.276,2.959]		[-2.019,3.370]
Observations	21321	21321	30344	30344	26902	26902
Individuals	14041	14041	15172	15172	11434	11434
Local authorities	375	375	375	375	375	375

*Notes: Coefficient estimates from linear regression models with person fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals in brackets. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. The response variable, negative stereotypes about the unemployed, is on a 0-100 scale. Models 1 and 2 use subset of respondents who are more representative of the adult British population, models 3 and 4 use survey weights for wave 1, while models 5 and 6 use longitudinal weights. Standard errors are clustered by local authority. Individual level data from BES panel survey waves 1 (Feb 2014) and 4 (March 2015). Unemployment benefit claims, unemployment rates and gross disposable income per head data from Nomis. Author's calculations.*

Table A24: Association between unemployment benefit claims and alternative response variable "Too many people rely in government handouts"

	(1)	(2)
% claiming unemployment benefit	-1.049***	-1.233*
	[-1.550,-0.548]	[-2.183,-0.283]
Risk of poverty (ref= Very unlikely)		
Fairly unlikely	-0.558	-0.564
	[-1.468,0.353]	[-1.473,0.346]
Neither likely nor unlikely	-0.322	-0.328
	[-1.455,0.812]	[-1.460,0.804]
Fairly likely	-0.576	-0.587
	[-1.884,0.732]	[-1.894,0.720]
Very likely	1.136	1.124
	[-0.502,2.774]	[-0.516,2.765]
Work status (ref=working)		
Unemployed	-3.001*	-3.007*
	[-5.865,-0.137]	[-5.872,-0.141]
Education	-2.144	-2.150
	[-6.202,1.914]	[-6.206,1.906]
Retired	-0.698	-0.680
	[-2.361,0.965]	[-2.354,0.995]
Gross disposable income per head /1000	-0.349	-0.214
	[-1.267,0.569]	[-1.246,0.819]
Wave 4 (ref=wave1)		-0.234
		[-1.239,0.770]
Observations	30202	30202

Notes: Coefficient estimates from linear regression models with person fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The response variable, responses to the question "Too many people rely in government handouts", is on a 0-100 scale. Sample size: 30202 observations on 15101 individuals in 375 local authorities. Standard errors are clustered by local authority. Individual level data from BES panel survey waves 1 (Feb 2014) and 4 (March 2015). Unemployment benefit claims and gross disposable income per head data from Nomis. Author's calculations.

Table A25: Robustness of association between unemployment benefit claims and negative stereotypes about the unemployed to additional wave of data

	(1)	(2)
% claiming unemployment benefit	-1.049***	-0.678
	[-1.451,-0.648]	[-1.396,0.0394]
Risk of poverty (ref= Very unlikely)		
Fairly unlikely	-0.155	-0.105
	[-0.765,0.456]	[-0.713,0.504]
Neither likely nor unlikely	-0.346	-0.290
	[-1.145,0.453]	[-1.089,0.508]
Fairly likely	-0.925*	-0.885
	[-1.843,-0.00806]	[-1.805,0.0342]
Very likely	-1.928***	-1.938***
	[-2.948,-0.908]	[-2.954,-0.923]
Gross disposable income per head /1000	-0.00103***	-0.000142
	[-0.00135,-0.000704]	[-0.000586,0.000302]
Wave (ref=wave1)		
Wave 4		0.514
		[-0.223,1.250]
Wave 6		-0.990
		[-2.056,0.0748]
Constant	65.33***	48.32***
	[58.85,71.82]	[40.44,56.20]

Notes: Coefficient estimates from linear regression models with person fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals in brackets. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. The response variable, negative stereotypes about the unemployed, is on a 0-100 scale. Sample size: 66276 observations on 26908 individuals in 379 local authorities. Standard errors are clustered by local authority. Individual level data from BES panel survey waves 1 (Feb 2014), 4 (March 2015), and 6 (April-May 2016). Individual work status not included as covariate as it was not measured in wave 7. Unemployment benefit claims, unemployment rates and gross disposable income per head data from Nomis. Author's calculations.

Table A26: Robustness of association between unemployment benefit claims and negative stereotypes about the unemployed to measurement of unemployment benefit claims at parliamentary constituency rather than local authority level.

	(1)	(2)
% claiming unemployment benefit	-1.117***	-0.319
	[-1.539,-0.695]	[-1.273,0.635]
Wave 4 (ref=wave1)		0.822
		[-0.0647,1.709]
Risk of poverty (ref= Very unlikely)		
Fairly unlikely	1.114*	1.143*
	[0.226,2.003]	[0.256,2.030]
Neither likely nor unlikely	0.623	0.657
	[-0.599,1.845]	[-0.564,1.879]
Fairly likely	0.541	0.589
	[-0.878,1.960]	[-0.826,2.005]
Very likely	-0.134	-0.0966
	[-1.872,1.603]	[-1.832,1.639]
Work status (ref=working)		
Work	0	0
	[0,0]	[0,0]
Unemployed	-2.859	-2.818
	[-5.991,0.273]	[-5.953,0.316]
Education	-0.0736	-0.0202
	[-3.539,3.392]	[-3.491,3.450]
Retired	0.820	0.708
	[-1.191,2.831]	[-1.310,2.726]
Observations	30450	30450

*Notes: Coefficient estimates from linear regression models with person and wave fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The response variable, negative stereotypes about the unemployed, is on a 0-100 scale. Sample size: 30466 observations on 15225 individuals in 624 parliamentary constituencies. Standard errors are clustered by constituency. Individual level data from BES panel survey waves 1 (Feb 2014) and 4 (March 2015). Unemployment benefit claims data from Nomis. Author's calculations.*

A4.3 Robustness of results to measurement of unemployment at multiple spatial scales

This section presents descriptive statistics and full results tables for all analyses reported in section 4.9.5.

Table A27: robustness of results to measurement of unemployment at multiple spatial scales - descriptive statistics for all variables.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Individual level variables – British Social Attitudes 2004				
Negative stereotypes about the unemployed	69.00	21.35	0.00	100.00
Gender (ref=male)	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
Age	49.14	16.92	18.00	99.00
Marital status				
Married/ living as married	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00
Separated/divorced	0.14	0.34	0.00	1.00
Widowed	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00
Never married	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
Ethnicity				
White	0.96	0.20	0.00	1.00
Asian	0.02	0.14	0.00	1.00
Black	0.01	0.12	0.00	1.00
Mixed/other	0.01	0.09	0.00	1.00
Education				
No qualifications	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Lower secondary	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00
Upper-secondary	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
Higher education	0.11	0.32	0.00	1.00
Degree	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Household income (£000s)	25.90	16.82	2.00	56.00
Economic activity				
Working	0.60	0.49	0.00	1.00
Education	0.02	0.13	0.00	1.00
Unemployed	0.03	0.16	0.00	1.00
Permanently sick or disabled	0.05	0.22	0.00	1.00
Retired	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00

Looking after home	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00

LSOA level variables – 2001 Census

Unemployment rate (LSOA)	3.08	1.86	-0.10	12.65
% of LSOA population non-white	6.04	9.84	-4.78	87.45
LSOA population density	23.36	25.57	0.27	250.18

Local authority level variables – Nomis 2004

Unemployment rate (Local authority)	4.32	1.76	1.80	11.20

Notes: *Sample size: 1837 individuals, 887 LSOAs, 139 local authorities. Individual level data from 2004 British Social Attitudes Survey, LSOA unemployment derived from 2001 census data by Nick Bailey (2011), and local authority level unemployment data for 2004 from Nomis. LSOA level variables have a small amount of random noise added to prevent disclosure of areas, this is why some minimum values e.g. for unemployment rate, are less than 0.*

Table A28: Association between LSOA level unemployment and attitudes towards the unemployed in British Social Attitudes data. Coefficients plotted in figure 18.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Neighbourhood level unemployment		
LSOA level unemployment	-0.608*	-0.496	-0.562	-0.350
	[-1.174,-0.0425]	[-1.070,0.0776]	[-1.149,0.0243]	[-0.990,0.289]
Ethnicity (ref=white)				
Asian		-2.773	-0.991	0.458
		[-9.652,4.105]	[-7.790,5.809]	[-6.524,7.440]
Black		3.011	3.277	4.816
		[-5.481,11.50]	[-5.079,11.63]	[-3.704,13.34]
Mixed/other		1.257	1.190	2.343
		[-9.501,12.02]	[-9.536,11.92]	[-8.445,13.13]
Gender (ref=male)		-0.351	0.494	0.547
		[-2.335,1.632]	[-1.526,2.513]	[-1.474,2.567]
Age		-0.596**	-0.739***	-0.740***
		[-0.956,-0.236]	[-1.111,-0.366]	[-1.112,-0.368]
Age^2		0.00494**	0.00594**	0.00596**
		[0.00148,0.00841]	[0.00218,0.00971]	[0.00220,0.00972]
Marital status (ref=married)				
Separated/divorced		-3.233*	-2.756	-2.649

	[-6.178,-0.289]	[-5.804,0.292]	[-5.696,0.398]
Widowed	-2.145	-2.669	-2.650
	[-6.114,1.823]	[-6.601,1.264]	[-6.580,1.281]
Never married	-5.913***	-4.706**	-4.643**
	[-8.811,-3.016]	[-7.702,-1.710]	[-7.647,-1.639]
Education (ref= no qualifications)			
GCSE		-3.701*	-3.618*
		[-6.560,-0.842]	[-6.476,-0.759]
A-level		-6.208***	-6.151***
		[-9.689,-2.727]	[-9.630,-2.673]
Higher ed < degree		-3.350	-3.353
		[-7.090,0.390]	[-7.090,0.383]
Degree		-11.20***	-11.02***
		[-14.71,-7.682]	[-14.56,-7.491]
Household income in £000s		0.0285	0.0312
		[-0.0501,0.107]	[-0.0476,0.110]
Work status (ref=working)			
Full time education		-1.186	-0.362
		[-8.648,6.276]	[-7.896,7.171]
Unemployed		-13.81***	-13.97***
		[-19.82,-7.792]	[-19.98,-7.953]

Permanently sick or disabled			-2.849 [-7.536,1.838]	-2.843 [-7.526,1.839]
Retired			-2.533 [-6.382,1.317]	-2.505 [-6.351,1.342]
Looking after home			-7.000*** [-10.78,-3.225]	-7.013*** [-10.79,-3.238]
% of LSOA population non-white				-0.110 [-0.239,0.0190]
LSOA population density				-0.000204 [-0.0487,0.0483]
Variance (LSOA)	13.2	12.2	11.0	11.8
Variance (local authority)	1.53e-08	1.25e-06	1.24	0.53
Residual variance	440.8	434.6	417.7	417.1

Notes: coefficients and 95% confidence intervals calculated from a multilevel linear regression model with individuals nested within local super output areas (LSOAs) which are nested within local authorities. The response variable, negative stereotypes about the unemployed, is on a 0-100 scale. Sample size: 1837 individuals, 887 LSOAs, 139 local authorities. Individual level data from 2004 British Social Attitudes Survey, LSOA unemployment derived from 2001 census data by Nick Bailey (2011), and local authority level unemployment data for 2004 from Nomis. Author's calculations.

Table A29: Association between local authority level unemployment and attitudes towards the unemployed in British Social Attitudes data. Coefficients plotted in figure 18.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Local authority level unemployment		
Local authority level unemployment	-0.881[**]	-0.804[*]	-0.655	-0.431
	[-1.533,-0.228]	[-1.461,-0.148]	[-1.311,0.000190]	[-1.257,0.395]
Ethnicity (ref=white)				
Asian		-2.521	-1.012	0.368
		[-9.399,4.357]	[-7.807,5.783]	[-6.659,7.396]
Black		3.494	3.334	4.731
		[-5.003,11.99]	[-5.022,11.69]	[-3.835,13.30]
Mixed/other		1.664	1.446	2.474
		[-9.097,12.42]	[-9.283,12.17]	[-8.373,13.32]
Gender (ref=male)		-0.245	0.616	0.611
		[-2.230,1.739]	[-1.404,2.637]	[-1.421,2.643]
Age		-0.583[**]	-0.727[***]	-0.734[***]
		[-0.942,-0.223]	[-1.099,-0.355]	[-1.108,-0.360]
Age^2		0.00480[**]	0.00589[**]	0.00594[**]
		[0.00134,0.00827]	[0.00212,0.00965]	[0.00215,0.00973]
Marital status (ref=married)				
Separated/divorced		-3.426[*]	-2.831	-2.701

		[-6.349,-0.503]	[-5.875,0.213]	[-5.764,0.363]
Widowed		-1.987	-2.484	-2.570
		[-5.956,1.983]	[-6.426,1.457]	[-6.533,1.392]
Never married		-5.878***	-4.592**	-4.607**
		[-8.768,-2.987]	[-7.593,-1.590]	[-7.631,-1.584]

Education (ref= no qualifications)

GCSE			-3.567*	-3.539*
			[-6.421,-0.714]	[-6.409,-0.670]
A-level			-6.101***	-6.083***
			[-9.576,-2.625]	[-9.578,-2.588]
Higher ed < degree			-3.048	-3.137
			[-6.777,0.681]	[-6.889,0.615]
Degree			-10.80***	-10.81***
			[-14.30,-7.286]	[-14.35,-7.269]
Household income in £000s			0.0401	0.0377
			[-0.0377,0.118]	[-0.0406,0.116]

Work status (ref=working)

Full time education			-0.632	-0.117
			[-8.132,6.868]	[-7.699,7.464]
Unemployed			-13.69***	-13.92***
			[-19.71,-7.673]	[-19.97,-7.861]

Permanently sick or disabled			-3.148 [-7.800,1.503]	-3.048 [-7.726,1.630]
Retired			-2.497 [-6.347,1.352]	-2.496 [-6.367,1.375]
Looking after home			-7.095*** [-10.87,-3.321]	-7.069*** [-10.87,-3.273]
% of LSOA population non-white				-0.112 [-0.243,0.0182]
LSOA population density				0.00754 [-0.0463,0.0614]
Variance (LSOA)	12.4	11.4	11.2	13.2
Variance (local authority)	2.09e-04	3.53e-12	1.95	1.00
Residual variance	440.8	434.5	416.8	421.2

Notes: coefficients and 95% confidence intervals calculated from a multilevel linear regression model with individuals nested within local super output areas (LSOAs) which are nested within local authorities. The response variable, negative stereotypes about the unemployed, is on a 0-100 scale. Sample size: 1837 individuals, 887 LSOAs, 139 local authorities. Individual level data from 2004 British Social Attitudes Survey, LSOA unemployment derived from 2001 census data by Nick Bailey (2011), and local authority level unemployment data for 2004 from Nomis. Author's calculations.

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