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THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

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A B S T R A C T

This study is concerned with the League of Arab States as an expression of the pan-Arab movement. The activities of the League from 1945 to 1955 are analysed in order to illuminate a passing phase in Arab nationalism.

Part One of this thesis is an analysis of Islam and some of its political and sociological concepts which have shaped the present Arab trends. This approach allows one to consider the intricate relationship between pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism.

Part Two covers the diplomatic activities, inside as well as outside the Arab world, which led to the birth of the League. Inter-Arab relations, during the Second World War, are studied on the basis of the documentation which has been published by the League about the Arab consultations which preceded the signing of the Charter in March 1945.

In Part Three, the work of the League during its first ten years is assessed and evaluated in terms of inter-Arab relations, in particular, and international relations, in general. The emphasis is on the political activities. The Palestinian question is treated as an "Arab tragedy" rather than as an Arab-Zionist conflict.

The Conclusion is more concerned with Arab nationalism as a movement striving for Arab unity and seeking a doctrine, than with the League which is taken as a transitory institution reflecting inter-Arab tensions and the handicaps in the way of Arab aspirations.

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## I N T R O D U C T I O N

In its relation to recent Arab history, the League of Arab States is "neither a beginning nor an end, it is rather a stage in a series of developments which is by no means over."<sup>(1)</sup> Any study of the Arab League must therefore start with an analysis of the various social and political forces which have brought about this "series of developments".

The main concern of this work will be with that movement which is known as "pan-Arabism" - the common denominator of contemporary Arab history. This movement is gaining considerable strength throughout the Arab world. It is easily observed but very hard to define because it means different things to different people. If its political and economic aspects can be clearly detected and analyzed, the same cannot be said for its emotional or psychological foundations. In order to evaluate the latter we must view the whole movement historically and give the proper weight to the sociological and spiritual forces which propel it.


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(1) C.A. Hourani, "The Arab League in Perspective", The Middle East Journal, April 1947.

"Pan-Arabism", as a political trend, is an "Arab" phenomenon but not all of its foundations are exclusively Arab as we shall see when we consider the intertwining of "pan-Islamism" and "Pan-Arabism". The word "Arab" is being used here in its widest and most accepted sense, with no ethnological pedantry, i.e. a people who speak the Arabic language, share a common cultural heritage and are conscious of the historical and spiritual ties which unite them.

As a cultural, psychological or spiritual phenomenon, the pan-Arab movement has its roots in the Seventh Century with the coming of Islam and the foundation of an Arab Empire. Not only was the Arab community geographically enlarged but more important, the tribal loyalty was gradually replaced by a fervent attachment to the Islamic "Nation" (Umma).

As a political force, the pan-Arab movement goes back to the latter part of the Nineteenth Century when the Ottoman Empire was declining. Although it contributed to the collapse of the latter, the pan-Arab movement did not gain momentum until after the breakdown of Turkish rule and the division of the "Fertile Crescent" into artificial and historically illegitimate "states". The first concrete political outcome of the pan-Arab effort was the creation of the League of Arab States in March 1945.



PART ONE

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THE PAN - ARAB MOVEMENT

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(A) THE ISLAMIC SETTING

CHAPTER I: ISLAM AND UNITY

Geographically the Arab world stretches from the Atlantic seaboard to the Persian Gulf. Its population is estimated at about 80 millions and more than 90% of it is Muslim.<sup>(1)</sup> The hard core of this area is referred to as the Middle or Near East. Its place in the history of mankind and civilization is too apparent and obvious to deserve any mention here. It is known as the "cradle of civilizations" and has been the most fertile ground for the rise of universal religions. The latter distinction has left a permanent mark, and today the Middle East is still totally impregnated with a deep religious feeling. This is clearly distinguishable in the attitudes of its inhabitants in every aspect of their life:

"Religion (in the Middle East) is the fundamental motivating force in most phases and aspects of culture and has its say in practically every act and moment in life... A moral law dissociated from religion cannot even be conceived of people steeped in Middle Eastern culture." (2)

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- (1) See A.H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World, p.13, London (1947) for some non-Muslim minorities figures. It is very hard to obtain exact figures on minorities because statistics in this domain are not reliable and countries like Lebanon have abandoned the idea of providing statistical figures about minorities.
- (2) Ralph Patai, "The Middle East as a Culture Area" in the Middle East Journal, Winter 1952, pp. 19-20.

T A B L E I:

POPULATION OF THE ARAB WORLD AS AT MID - 1954:

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1.- Aden	800,000
2.- Algeria	9,369,000
3.- Bahrain	112,000
4.- Egypt	22,651,000
5.- Gaza Strip	310,000
6.- Iraq	4,948,000
7.- Jordan	1,384,000
8.- Kuwait	200,000
9.- Lebanon	1,383,000
10.- Libya	1,092,000
11.- Morocco	9,540,000
12.- Muscat and Oman	550,000
13.- Qatar	30,000
14.- Saudi Arabia	7,000,000
15.- Sudan	8,900,000
16.- Syria	3,670,000
17.- Tunisia	3,680,000
18.- Yemen	4,500,000

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T O T A L :                      80,119,000

(Source: Population and Vital Statistics Reports,  
U.N. Statistical Papers Series A. Vol. VII,  
No. 1, January 1956, New York)

It is very hard, if not impossible, to appreciate Arab affairs without taking into serious consideration the influence of Islam as a religion, a philosophy, a culture, and above all - as a way of life. The pan-Arab Movement is an Arab phenomenon and the Arabs are predominantly Muslim. This can be a source of confusion just as it can be a source of enlightenment. The foundations of pan-Arabism must be <sup>Sought</sup> ~~seeked~~ in the individual loyalty of the men who give it its strength and weaknesses, as well as in the collective force engendered from the amalgamation of these loyalties. It is at this point that Islam - as a spiritual, social and political power can assist us in an understanding of the pan-Arab Movement.

In comparison with the other major religions, Islam stresses faith where Judaism stresses hope and Christianity charity. For Islam faith is not merely of a theological or metaphysical nature; it is the Muslim's basic point of reference and his primary guiding principle. <sup>(-)</sup> Whereas Christianity, for instance, is regarded as a heritage by its followers; Muslims

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- (1) H.A.R. Gibb, Whither Islam, London (1932), p. 12:  
"Islam is indeed much more than a system of theology; it is a complete civilization. If we were to seek parallel terms, we should use Christendom rather than Christianity, China rather than Confucianism."

look upon Islam as a living reality and a true spiritual  
(1) nourishment. Moreover the Muslim cannot, theoretically,  
distinguish between temporal and spiritual matters, in  
the same manner as a Christian, because Islam is a  
complete system - it is an organic whole. This is best  
illustrated by the Islamic concepts of legislation,  
government and nationhood.

In Islam, legislation has a divine origin because  
all power and authority emanates from God. The source  
(2) ('ain) of law is divine and so are its foundations (usul).  
Its substance is also divine for many regulations have  
been established in the Koran and in the traditions of  
the Prophet Muhammed. But man retains the power to  
interpret the law and expand its regulations as long as  
he remains within the boundaries set by the divine  
principles. The importance of Islamic Law as a unifying  
force cannot be overestimated because it is at the root  
of the moulding of the Muslim community into a cohesive  
society:

"The law gave unity to Islamic society, from  
Cordoba to Multan. It gave unity also to  
the individual Muslim his entire life activity  
being organized into a meaningful whole by

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(1) On this point, see Guy Morissée, Le Proche Orient à l'Heure Occidentale, Paris (1957), p.27.

(2) See, M. Hamidullah, Muslim Conduct of State  
(Hyderabad-Deccan, 1942) p. 5.

this divine pattern. It gave unity also in time, providing the community with continuity, as dynasties rose and fell and could be regarded as episodes in the persisting enterprise of Islam's endeavour to build on earth the kind of social order that the divine imperative prescribes." (1)

Culturally speaking, Islamic law (Sharia) was the field to which the Arabs contributed most in Islamic civilization as shall be seen below.

Islam has its own concept of the "Nation" or "Umma". The term is used in the Koran much more in the sense of "community" than anything else. For in Islam the emphasis is on the brotherhood and common purpose of all believers: "The believers are naught else than brothers". All Muslims belong to one and the same "Nation" - the "Umma Muhammadia" (the community of ~~Muhammed~~)<sup>(2)</sup>. Abu Hahnifah, the founder of one of the main Muslim schools of law, says:

"All parts of the Muslim territory are under the authority of the Imam (ruler) of the Muslims, and his authority is the authority of the 'Umma' of the Muslims." (3)

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(1) W.C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, p. 29, Princeton (1957); also, H.A.R. Gibb Mohammedanism, New York (1955), p.84:

"The Sharia always remained in force as an ideal and a final court of appeal, and by its unity and comprehensiveness it formed the main unifying force in Islamic culture."

(2). The idea of the "Umma Muhammadia" is what probably has led some Westerners to speak of "Muhammedans" and of Muhammedan Law, and the using of these terms as synonyms for Muslim and Islamic Law.

(3) Quoted in M. Hamidullah, op. cit., p.54.

The first definition of the "Umma", from a constitutional point of view, can be found in the Charter of Medina (622 A.D.) which contains the embryo of the Islamic State:

"This is a document from Muhammad the Prophet (governing the relations) between the believers and Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib, and those who followed them and laboured with them. They are one community (umma) to the exclusion of all men." (1)

"They are one community to the exclusion of all men" is the substance of Islamic "nationality". Religion was to replace blood ties as the basis for the community as had been the practice in pre-Islamic Arabia. This is what has given an almost sacred quality to the "Umma Muhammadia".

"Since it has been in existence, to become a Muslim means to join that community; and to take part in the enterprise of fulfilling God's pleasure on earth. The enterprise is hardly less important than the revelation. The privilege and duty and experience of taking part in it are central to the Muslim's faith".

(2)

Islam, in short, does not recognize political or geographical boundaries but only sharp divisions between Islamic and non-Islamic "Houses" - "Dar al-Islam"

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(1) Quoted in Ibn-Ishaq, Sirat Rasul Allah (The Life of Muhammad), transl. by A. Guillaume, (London, 1955), p. 231; for complete text, see *ibid.*, pp. 231-3.

(2) W.C. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17; the same author makes the following analogy on p. 19: "Just as to be a Communist involves being a member of the Party, so the religious conviction of a Muslim implies participation in the group."

(The House of Islam) and "Dar al-Harb" (The House of War).<sup>(1)</sup>

For a Muslim, the main purpose in life is to serve God and the primary duty of any government within the community is to see that this purpose is rendered possible. Mawardi, a prominent Muslim jurist (d. 1058) sums up to duty of Caliph as, "the defence of religion and the administration of the State." (2)

The Koran is full of warnings for those who might disrupt the unity of the "Umma":

"... and be not of those... who have split up their religion, and have become sects, where every party rejoices in what is their own."  
(XXX: 30-31)

"And be not like those who have formed divisions, and fallen to variance after the clear proofs have come to them. These a terrible chastisement doth await them." (III: 101)

"And hold fast by the cord of God (Koran), all of you, and break not loose from it; and remember God's goodness towards you, how that when ye were enemies, He united your hearts, and by His favour ye became brethren." (XXX: 98)

Before proceeding to a study of the pan-Arab Movement one must attempt to determine the position of the "Arab" vis-a-vis the "Muslim". Whereas the term "Muslim" is easily and unambiguously defined the same cannot be said of "Arab". A definition of "Muslim" can be provided

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- (1) Hamidullah, op. cit., mentions a third "House" - "Dar al-Ahd", a "House" with which treaty obligations and relations exist - see *ibid*, p. 77.  
(2) Mawardi, Al-Ahkam As-Sultaniyya.

without racial, cultural or linguistic references. The term "Arab", on the other hand, is more difficult to handle because its understanding requires all of the above specifications plus a historical context because its meaning has varied throughout history.

(1)

Western historians divide the history of the Arabs into three main periods: The Sabaean and Himyarite Period (800 B.C. to 500 A.D.), The Pre-Islamic Period (500 to 622 A.D.), and The Islamic Period (622 A.D. to the present).

Arab historians, on the other hand, think only in terms of two periods: The Pre-Islamic and the Islamic. (2)

And even this distinction is only made by the erudite because the great majority of the Arabs ignore the pre-Islamic era and do not include it as a part of their historical heritage, feeling that the "true" period of Arab history begins with the mission of the Prophet. (3)

For the ordinary Arab therefore, Islamic history and

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(1) See, R.A. Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs, London (1953).

(2) The pre-Islamic period is referred to as the "Jahilia" or "Age of ignorance". The latter term has been interpreted differently throughout history. When there is an islamic emphasis we find the term taking a literal meaning but when the emphasis is an "Arab" one the ignorance refers to the purely religious field, the ignorance of God's existence. In the latter instance, the cultural achievements of pre-Islamic Arabia are glorified.

(3) See, N.A. Faris, This is the Arab World, Beirut (1953) (in Arabic).

Arab history, when he makes such a distinction, begin at a common source - the appearance of Islam.

The Arabs have a special position in Islam. They owe it mostly to the fact that the Prophet of Islam was an Arab and that the Holy Book - the Koran - is written in Arabic. The place of the Prophet Muhammad as an Arab and as a Muslim leader is an uncontested one.<sup>(1)</sup> The first pillar of Islam is the "Shahada" (Testimony) which consists in saying: "There is no God but one God and Muhammad is his Prophet." Muhammad, as a person, dominates the history of Islam and "Arabism". This fact has been so well realized by Westerners that one often sees them using "Muhammadanism" as a synonym for Islam. The theological as well as literary role of Muhammad is best expressed in the collections of his sayings or "hadiths" which are the second most important source of Islamic Law.<sup>(2)</sup> His conduct (Sira) and his practices (sunna) are thought of by all Muslims as exemplary if not ideal.

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- (1) "The sense of devotion to the person of Muhammad and the enthusiasm which is evoked amongst all classes may well prove to be one of the most significant features in modern Islam. 'They call me an atheist', said recently one of the most prominent exponents of western thought in Egypt, a propos of certain European works on the early history of Islam, 'but when I read what L... writes about Muhammad I am so filled with indignation that I feel myself a stauncher Moslem than any of my critics'." - H.A.R. Gibb, in Whither Islam, op. cit., p.350.
- (2) "Among all peoples Moslems stand unique in having developed a science ('ilm) out of their mass of religious traditions (Hadiths).", P. Hitti, History of the Arabs, London (1953 ed.), p.127.

The oldest Arabic book and the holiest for all Muslims is the Koran. This fact is always stressed by Arabs who refer to Koranic verses emphasizing that it is an Arabic book.<sup>(1)</sup> The influence of the Koran on Arabic literature was very great:

"Its literary influence may be appreciated when we realize that it was due to it alone that the various dialects of the Arabic speaking peoples have not fallen apart into distinct languages, as have the Romance languages." (2)

The language of both the Arab Culture and Islamic Civilization is the language of the Koran. The contribution of the Arabs to Islam is to a great extent a linguistic one. Professor Gibb puts it this way:

"The Arabian colouring which has clung to Islam came not so much through the direct social influence of its early Arabian environment and Arab adherents as from the Arabic Koran and the intellectual bias which this gave to the nascent Muslim culture." (3)

The Koran is the final authority as far as the Arabic language and its grammar are concerned. Its reading and

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(1) "Verily We have made it an Arabic Koran that you may haply understand", (XLIII, 2-3); "And thus We have revealed to thee an Arabic Koran that thou mayest warn the mother of cities and those around it", (XLII, 5); "An Arabic Koran, free from toruous (wording), that haply they may fear (God)", (XXXIX, 28-29); "Verily the Lord of all creatures hath this (book) come down... in the clear Arabic tongue", (XXVI, 192 - 195).

(2) P. Hitti, op. cit., p.127.

(3) H.A.R. Gibb, Muhammedanism, op. cit., p. 11.

mastery remain a necessity for anyone who wants to learn the language. This is worth keeping in mind because the trends of modern Arab nationalism put a very important emphasis on the Arabic language as a foundation stone for Arab unity.<sup>(1)</sup>

Arabic, as a language has a sacred value for the Muslims - "Arabic is the language of Paradise".<sup>(2)</sup> After the race of the Prophet, and the language of the Koran - the vehicle of Islamic civilization and Arab culture - the next contribution of the Arabs to Islam was in the field of Muslim jurisprudence.<sup>(3)</sup> The latter contribution had far-reaching consequences in the cultural and sociological domains.<sup>(4)</sup><sup>(5)</sup>

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- (1) See for instance, Sati' al-Husri, Views and Commentaries on Arab Nationalism, Cairo (1951); Abderrahman Al-Bazzaz, This is our Nationalism, Baghdad (1955) - (all in arabic).
  - (2) See the references in the Koran to the Arabic language quoted above on p.
  - (3) G.E. Von Grunebaum, Islam, p.42, London (1955); cf. for the phrase, Suyuti, Al-Muszhir fi ulum al-lugha (Cairo, 1282), I, 162 (Reference given in Von Grunebaum, op. cit., p.53, note 75).
  - (4) J. Schacht, in his book, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, London (1953), attributes a predominant role to Ibn Idris al-Shafi' (768-820 A.D.) (an Arab from Quraysh), in the early development of Islamic law.
  - (5) H.A.R. Gibb, op. cit., p. 17: "But apart altogether from its intellectual pre-eminence and scholastic function, Islamic law was the most far-reaching and effective agent in moulding the social order and the community life of the Muslim peoples."

A brief attempt has been made to show that the principal contributions of the Arabs to Islamic civilization have been of a purely religious nature. The intellectual systems and methods evolved by the Arabs were from the start closely connected with Islam as a civilization. This is what makes it extremely hard to find a line of demarcation between Islamic culture and Arab culture. The Arabs were not the only contributors to Islamic civilization and Islam is not an "Arab" religion although some Medieval Arab writers have claimed that it was: "Our religion and the empire are Arabic and they are twins-  
dinu-na was daula 'arabiyyani wa-tau amani." The fact remains that the Arab is very proud of Islam as a rule.

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- (1) "Thus Islam, although a religion physically centered on Mecca, is not an Arabian religion, on the contrary, the whole function of Islam was to raise the Arabian and non-Arabian religious conceptions and ethical standards to the levels set by the preaching of the earlier prophets." H.A.R. Gibb, Muhammedanism, op. cit., p.44.
- (2) Beruni (d. 1048 A.D.), quoted in Von Grunebaum, op. cit., p.51, note 36.
- (3) W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 94, "The Arab Muslim, is like other Muslims, proud of his faith: no other religion has been so successful as Islam in eliciting a confessional pride in its adherents."; see also, H.A.R. Gibb, op. cit., p.15 and P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 393.

Before considering the relationship of Arab culture to Islamic civilization it would be worthwhile to glance over the metamorphosis which the term "Arab" has undergone. Before the rise of Islam, the word "Arab" meant Arabian or any inhabitant of the Arabian Peninsula.<sup>(1)</sup> This remained largely so during the Umayyad Period (661-751 A.D.) when the Arabs were conquerors of large territories outside the Peninsula. They formed what amounted to a military governing aristocracy.<sup>(2)</sup> During the Umayyad period there was a continuous struggle between the Arabians and non-Arabians;<sup>(3)</sup> a situation which has led Hitti to write, "It was Arabianism and not Muhammadanism that triumphed first" because it took two centuries before the bulk of the populations began to profess Islam.<sup>(4)</sup>

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(1) The original meaning of "Arab" was "bedu" or "Bedouin", i.e. nomad.

(2) Sir Thomas Arnold, The Caliphate, London (1924) p. 24: "In place of the theoretical equality of all believers in the brotherhood of Islam, we find the Arabs asserting themselves as a dominant aristocracy ruling over subject peoples."

(3) R. Levy, The Sociology of Islam, London (1931), Vol. I, p. 82: "The battle was fought out in the three centuries following the prophet's death. On the one side stood the Arabs, on the other the new Moslems of non-Arab extraction, the mawali, or 'clients', as they came to be called. Under the old customary law of the Arabs the Mawla was a man from one tribe who had after a period of probation, become affiliated to another, with the members of which he stood on an equal footing as regards duties and privileges."

(4) P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 145.

Arab writers, although admitting the discriminatory policy of the Umayyads, claim that it was a victory for Islam since the "Arabianism" of the conquerors was rather different from the tribal one of pre-Islamic times; the Arabians of the Islamic conquests being imbued with the spirit of a new religion which had given them a sense of unity and an ideal to fight for. <sup>(1)</sup> Administratively and politically it was an Arab victory because politics came before religion. <sup>(2)</sup> This struggle between Arabs and non-Arabs (Mawalis) was best expressed in the Shu'ubiyah (belonging to the peoples, i.e. non-Arabians) movement which sought to fight the superior attitude manifested by the Muslims of Arab descent. <sup>(3)</sup> This movement did not come to the fore until the early centuries of Abbasid rule, but its predecessors contributed to the fall of the Umayyads.

The Shi'a, or supporters of Ali, mostly Persians (but quite often under Arabian leaders) <sup>(4)</sup> appeared on the scene

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- (1) See for instance, Ali Ibrahim Hassan, General Muslim History, in Arabic, Cairo (1953), pp. 270-93.
- (2) Hassan I. Hassan, Islamic Organization, in Arabic, Cairo (1939), p. 49- the author says that Mu'awiya, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, altered the Caliphate system into a monarchy, that is to say, "from a system resting on religion to a monarchy based on heredity and resting on politics first and religion only secondly." See *ibid.*, p. 372 for the discriminatory policy of the Umayyads.
- (3) The word Shu'ubiyah is derived from the word "sha'b" (people) found in the Koran (49:13); see P. Hitti, *op. cit.*, pp. 401-2, and Brockelmann, A History of the Islamic Peoples, New York (1947), p. 118.
- (4) See, Ahmad Amin, The Dawn of Islam, in Arabic, Cairo, (1955), pp. 264-78.

after the murder of Othman, the third Caliph, when the Muslim community was split into supporters of Mu'awiya and those of Ali. It all began as a political movement, but since in Islam, as it has been noted earlier, the political and the religious are intricately blended, it could not but end as a comprehensive split. The Persians gave their full support to the Shi'a because they were opposed to the discriminatory policy of the House of Mu'awiya. The Shi'a which was Arab in origin ended by being not merely anti-Umayyad but also anti-Arab.

With the rise of the Abbasids in the latter part of the eighth century, a victory for the non-Arabians, one can begin to detect an important change in the concept of "Arab":

"As Persians, Syrians, Copts, Berbers and others flocked within the fold of Islam and intermarried with the Arabians the original high wall raised earlier between Arabians and non-Arabians tumbled down. The nationality of the Moslem receded in the background. No matter what his nationality may originally have been, the follower of Mohammad now passed for an Arab. An Arab henceforth became one who professed Islam and spoke and wrote the Arabic tongue, regardless of his racial affiliation. This is one of the most significant facts in the history of Islamic civilization." (1)

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(1) P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 240; J.C. Risler, La Civilisation Arabe, Paris (1954), writes very much the same thing, p. 54: "Celui qui professait l'Islam, parlait et écrivait la langue, en vint à passer pour un Arabe; il y a là un fait majeur dans l'histoire de la civilisation Islamique!" See also, G.E. Von Grunebaum, Islam, op. cit., p. 33, "Gradually the concept 'Arab' widens to include those not of Arab birth..."

Hence, the first change that the word "Arab" underwent was from a racial into a religious meaning. At this point "Muslin" and "Arab" became synonymous - "Whoever accepted (1) Islam became an Arab by virtue of it..." The victory of the Abbasids which was responsible for this identity brought with it an element which contributed to its eventual downfall. With the Abbasids "International Islam" appeared (2) but under the leadership of the Persians and this could not help but lead to the reawakening of a Persian national consciousness which had never really died down and which had been kept alive by the Shu'ubiya movement in the literary circles.

If "Muslin" and "Arab" were identical for some time it is proper to speak of an Islamic Empire - after the Umayyads - rather than of an Arab Empire. The Abbasids tried to identify themselves with no national group whatsoever, being convinced that only "Islam provided henceforth the sole means for peacefully continuing the

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(1) C. Brockelmann, op. cit., p.61.

(2) P. Hitti, op. cit., p. 294, "As Arab Islam succumbed to Persian influence the caliphate became more of a revival of Iranian despotism and less of an Arabian sheikdom... In two fields only did the Arabian hold his own: Islam remained the religion of the State and Arabic continued to be the official language of the state registers." Ahmad Amin, The Dawn of Islam, op. cit., p.96 agrees with the latter part of Hitti's statement and says that the two most important victories of the Arabs were: language and religion.

co-existence in one empire of antagonistic groups." (1)

These antagonisms however were very strong and could not be held in check by any force whether it be religious or otherwise. In more than one respect, the disputes which arose about interpretation of dogma and the appearance of sects were a mask for a cultural nationalism.

When the Arabic language began to lose the monopoly it had acquired among all Muslims, another change in the concept of "Arab" is noticed. About the 10th Century a reawakening of national consciousness is observed in Persia, and gradually the Persian language began to re-  
place Arabic as the vehicle of a truly Iranian culture. (2)  
In the year 1001, Firdawsi of Tus completed his reknown Shahname (the Book of Kings) - a Persian epic; the Persian poet Omar Khayyan, the author of the Ruba'iyat was born between 1038 and 1048 A.D.

From this time onward Arab and Muslim were no longer identical in the way they had been. Until about the mid-nineteenth century not every Muslim was an Arab but every Arab was a Muslim. This was due to the rise of separate cultures which in turn was the outcome of the

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(1) Von Grunebaum, op. cit., p.38.

(2) Brockelmann, op. cit., p. 166.

revival of "national" languages such as Persian. "Arab" therefore began to mean those Muslims who still cherished the Arabic language:

"All those are Arabs for whom the central fact of history is the mission of Muhammad and the memory of the Arab Empire and who in addition cherish the Arabic tongue and its cultural heritage as their common possession." (1)

So the second development of the term "Arab" introduces a linguistic qualification into its Islamic sense. It is worthwhile to note however that even after the rise of other Islamic languages, Arabic remained for many centuries, and even up to the present, the Islamic language par excellence. Non-Arab Muslims continued to write in Arabic on subjects such as theology, jurisprudence, the Prophet's traditions and life, etc.... In a sense,

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- (1) H.A.R. Gibb, *The Arabs*, p. 3, London (1940). Gibb gives this definition for the present days, but it does not leave room for the Christian Arabs. We are using his definition but applying it to a specific historical context. Christian Arabs began to be thought of as "Arab" when they began to feel that they were so, and this can be said to have started in the second half of the nineteenth century when they first took part in the "Arab Awakening". Present day Arab nationalism does not question the "Arabism" of these Christians. The question is not that clear cut however because for the masses as has been pointed out by C.W. Smith, "Muslim Arabs have never quite acknowledged, have never fully incorporated into their thinking and especially their feeling either that a non-Muslim is really a complete Arab, or that a non-Arab is really a complete Muslim. Arab Islam has never given much serious thought to either group." *op. cit.*, p. 94.

non-Arabs were contributing to the Arabic cultural heritage and at the same time developing a separate culture of their own in the purely literary domain. This contribution was of a religious characteristic and that is why we find today that the Arabic heritage is to such a great extent Islamic.

It should be specified that by the time the term "Arab" underwent the second evolution mentioned above, (1) Islam had already gone through its 'formative' period. It can be said therefore that the cultural heritage of the Arabs today is to a large extent the one of the period when it was not possible to distinguish between "Arab" and "Muslim". This fact throws much light on the interweaving of "Arabism" and "Islamism" which is still very much apparent to this day - it is the evolution of this relationship which shall determine the course of pan-Arabism or "Arabism" as it is now called.

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- (1) This is by no means an original interpretation - Von Grunebaum, op. cit., p.38, states, "The concept of an Arab culture within the civilization of Islam may be accepted as useful abstraction, somewhat like that of an Italian or German culture within the civilization of Western Christendom before the mergence of Italy and Germany as political units." Hitti, op. cit., p.402, writes, "What we call 'Arabic literature' was no more Arabic than the Latin literature of the Middle Ages was Italian. Its producers were men of the most varied ethnic origins and in its totality it represents the enduring monument of a civilization rather than a people."

It is advisable to clarify the usage of "Arab civilization" and "Islamic civilization". "Arab civilization" is a much more recent idea than "Islamic civilization", and perhaps it cannot be found before the beginnings of modern Arab nationalism at the end of the 19th. century. "Arab civilization" is also a more subjective idea than "Islamic civilization". To be a Muslim is, in the great majority of cases, a matter of birth. To be an Arab is a matter of choice, of how a man feels about his heritage. In this analysis we have preferred to use the term "Arab culture" and think of it as an important fragment of "Islamic civilization". Many contemporary Arab writers like to speak of an "Arab civilization". From an ethnological point of view there is no "Arab civilization" because the racial connotation of "Arab" was lost at a very early stage and the contribution of the Arabs by race was very restricted.

(1)

A. Mieli, in his book La Science Arabe, could not find in his survey of "Arab science", from the 8th century to the 13th, on single Arab scientist by race. Of all the

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(1) Leiden (1938) - referred to in G.E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, p.35, London (1948); See also De Lacy O'Leary, Arabic Thought and Its Place in History, p. 103, where he suggests the use of Arabic Philosophy, Arabic science, etc.... instead of Arab Philosophy and Arab science.

great "Arab" philosophers only one was ethnically Arab and that was Al-Kindi, commonly known as "the philosopher of the Arabs."<sup>(1)</sup> The greater number of theology and Islamic law scholars were of Arab descent while the majority of mathematicians, physicians, etc... were of Persian origin.<sup>(2)</sup> Ibn Khaldun, in his Prolegomena, attributes the relatively small contribution of the Arabians to Islamic civilization to the fact that they were too pre-occupied with military and administrative matters. He is also the one who cites the Prophet's saying: "If knowledge were attached to the ends of the sky, some amongst the Persians would have reached it."

Whether one should speak of an "Arab civilization" or of just an "Arab culture" within the Islamic civilization is not a matter which can be answered today. Much will depend on future developments and particularly upon the outlook which the "Arab" will choose. To be more precise, it will depend upon the outcome of a current struggle

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(1) See Hitti, op. cit., p.370.

(2) Ibid., p. 174; see also, Gibb, Mohammedanism, op. cit. p. 15. R.A. Nicholson, op. cit., p. 277: "The first thing that strikes the student of mediaeval Arabic literature is the fact that a very large proportion of the leading writers are non-Arabs, or at best semi-Arabs, men whose fathers or mothers were of foreign, and especially Persian, race. They wrote in Arabic, because down to about 1,000 A.D. that language was the sole medium of literary expression in the Muhammedan world..."

between a Western type of secular nationalism, trying to centre its aspirations around a purely cultural heritage stripped of much of its religious significance; and a primarily Muslim revivalist movement. Even here the two movements are not so clear cut because it is very hard to ask the Muslim Arab to make a choice:

"Though Arabism and Islam are ultimately different things, yet the Arab tends as ever to identify them, at least within himself. He is the one or the other as the case arises; or what amounts to much the same thing, he is the one and the other at once." (1)

This double loyalty - which some think of as a single one - is intricate and complicates any study of pan-Arabism because Islamic patterns keep re-appearing in the patchwork of Arab union. This interweaving of "Arabism" and "Islam" will be pointed out throughout this study. In the meantime it will suffice to end the survey of the developments of the term "Arab" by saying that it has reached a stage where it has an almost purely linguistic and cultural connotation coloured with the modern notions of nationalism and an attempt to underplay<sup>(2)</sup> but not to eliminate the Islamic context. The degree to which the

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(1) W.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 101.

(2) E. Atiyah, The Arabs, London (1955), p.10: "The second point to make clear is that though Arabism and Islam are subtly inter-related, and were indeed coterminous (save for the Ghassanid and Hira pre-Islamic Arab Kingdoms) they are not so today. Arab does not always mean Muslim, nor does Muslim always mean Arab."

latter attempt has been successful will be decisive for the political outcome of two movements: "Pan-Arabism" and "Pan-Islam".

The purpose of this chapter has been to show the unifying characteristics of Islam. More questions have been raised than answered. An awareness of the points raised here is necessary for an understanding of the pan-Arab Movement which produced the League of Arab States.

## CHAPTER 2: THE PAN-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT

The nineteenth century saw the rise of both an Arab and an Islamic "Awakening" which have expressed themselves in many ways: literary revival, rise of a political consciousness, religious reform and modernist movements, and several types of nationalism (religious, militant, romantic, local and regional). One should not see these nineteenth century eruptions as 'spontaneous' reactions, but rather as an outcome of older under-currents emerging on the surface with a suddenness characteristic of the history of Islam. <sup>(1)</sup> In this instance the suddenness was further emphasized by the confrontation of two civilizations - Islamic and Western. The confrontation was not the cause of the Awakening, but has more likely

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(1) L. Massignon, in Whither Islam, Gibb ed., op. cit., p. 77: "It is with just cause that the Islamic conception of history is in general atomistic and not cyclic. In Islam the movements of opinion brood secretly and in silence, and suddenly break out without giving, so far as can be seen, any warning indications." This may be so in fact. In theory, the above statement should be qualified by a Koranic verse which would tend to contradict the assumption that the Islamic concept of history is not cyclic: "If a wound hath befallen you, a wound like it hath already befallen others: we alternate these days of successes and reverses among men." (III: 134).

served the function of a catalyser.<sup>(1)</sup>

The purpose of this chapter is to continue within the broad path already started in the preceding one - that is an understanding of the historical process through the Islamic setting which permeates the Arab world.<sup>(2)</sup> The theoretical legal foundation of the unity of Islamic society and the relationship of Islamic civilization and Arabic culture have been discussed. Now, a movement which attempted to make use of these foundations, for political purposes, by centering its activities around the "universal church" of Islamic society will be studied, and an effort shall be made to understand how and why it failed to make use of these potential strengths of the Islamic system. The pan-Islamic movement will also be regarded as a "parent" movement of pan-Arabism - the inheritor of the former's dynamism and moving forces.

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- (1) W.C. Smith, op. cit., p.6: "There has been talk of the 'impact' of the West, or of the twentieth century, upon Islam, almost as though the latter were inert, the passive recipient of influence. But Islam, too, is a force, one that has been in motion for more than thirteen centuries. Upon the modern Muslim and his society there is the powerful impact of Islam."
- (2) L. Gardet, La Cité Musulmane, Paris (1954), p. 19: "Vouloir étudier sur un plan de politique concrète immédiate les Pays de Proche ou Moyen Orient... sans références aux valeurs musulmanes qui les informent, serait se condamner à ne pénétrer point la mentalité profonde des peuples et ses possibilités d'évolution."

Through pan- Islamism one can see only the political strength of Islam upon a collectivity which includes separate groups with varying cultural developments and environmental differences. A conclusion, therefore which would imply the failure of this specific political movement - pan-Islamism - would not of necessity prove the political weakness of Islam upon a more restricted collectivity, nationally and internationally (within a limited society, e.g., the Arab society). Allowance should also be made for the circumstances which surrounded this movement as well as for its instigators.

"pan-Islamism" is one of those words which have been coined so that an intricate movement could be condensed into an "ism". The term was actually "invented" by a French journalist, Gabriel Charmes, in 1881.<sup>(1)</sup> It was much

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- (1) "Vocabolo coniato per la prima volta, a quanta parae; nel 1881 dal pubblicista francese Gabriel Charmes, sul modello di pangermanismo e panslavismo, per designare un insieme di movimenti e di tendenze di popoli musulmani verso una stretta unione politica e spirituale fra loro, avente come meta suprema, anche se non dichiarata, la liberazione dei musulmani dal dominio europea e la loro costituzione in unita politica attorno a uno stato indipendente, forte abbastanza per tener testa all' Europa, cche sembrava a molti poter essere l'Impero Ottomano, retto da Abd ul-Hamid II (1876-1909)" C.A. Nallino, "Pan-Islamismo", in Enciclopedia Italiana, Vol. XXVI, p.196. See also E.G. Browne, "Pan-Islamism" in Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge (1902), who thinks that the term was first used in a letter from the correspondent of the Times in Vienna (March 22, 1900) to describe movements of Muslims, in Africa, directed against the British forces in order to rally around the Turkish Caliph - p. 323.

in vogue from that period until the late 1920's. It was associated, historically speaking, with the policy of Abdul Hamid II; intellectually, with the reformer Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani (1839-1897); politically and culturally it coincided with, and was inspired from, an anti-Western opposition to the European colonial policy in the East; and religiously, it was a reaction against the Western criticisms on Islam and the Christian missionary activities.<sup>(1)</sup>

The movement with which we are concerned can be said to cover a period starting about 1860's and ending with the Caliphate question in the 1920's. It should be noted that the term "Pan-Islamism" was not much in use from about the 1920's until the Second World War when there was talk about "Arab unity".<sup>(2)</sup> The delimitation in time suggested is not so unfounded when one scans the writings of Westerners and sees how the term "Muslim" or "Mohammedan" has been used, during this period, with relatively little emphasis on nationality as compared with

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(1) G. Wynan Bury, Pan-Islam, London (1919), p. 12: "...it (pan-Islamism) is really the practical protest of Muslims against the exploitation of their spiritual and material resources by outsiders."

(2) See A.M. Goichon, "Le Panislamisme d'Hier et d'Aujourd'hui" in Afrique et Asie, Vol. I, 1950.

(1)  
the approach prevailing today.

A last few remarks must be made about the etymology of the term "pan-Islamism". At first sight this term might seem a tautology since the meaning of unifying all Muslim countries is already implied in Islam. This could explain the amazement of Professor E.G. Browne who could not find an Arabic equivalent or description of this phenomenon in Arab or Islamic literature of the period. For Muslims, "pan-Islamism" had meant a return to the way things were in the 'glorious' past - a political union of all Islamic countries in accordance with the Koranic prescriptions. They could not therefore tag a label to the movement which was taking place, and only spoke of "Islamic union". An Arabic name was finally attributed - "Islamia" - for several reasons: the ambitious policy of Abdul Hamid II was perceived in its true light; nationalism had gained ground and influenced the viewing of the movement as an effort to unite national entities;

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- (1) Of all Western writers, historians and journalists, the French seem to have been the only ones not to have followed this trend. This can probably be explained by the fact that they always tended to think of France as an "Islamic power" (whereas Britain thought of itself as an "Arab power") and their inclination towards a policy of "assimilation" could not permit the introduction of a "national" approach. See, R. Montagne, "French Policy in North Africa and Syria", International Affairs, March 1937; and Ch. A. Julien, "France and Islam", Foreign Affairs, July 1946.

the desire for a more easily achievable union (pan-Arabism) was occupying the minds of many Arab politicians and writers, and made a distinction between Arab unity and Islamic unity necessary; and the controversial debate over the Caliphate was reduced to an academic level and emptied of political potentialities. Viewed in this manner a distinction was noted between Islamic universalism and pan-Islamism.

The "Awakening" of the Islamic world in the nineteenth century started an avalanche of discontent and saw the rise of reformers in every field. This was not something new within Islam for there had been many previous instances in which discontent came into the open in the form of a revolt against authority. What was new, however, was that whereas before most of the dangers threatening the Islamic community had come from within the community itself, <sup>(1)</sup> now they had become external as well as internal.

The Wahhabi movement, which had started in 1747 when a religious leader, Mohamed Ibn Abdul-Wahab (1703-1791) formed an alliance with a member of the House of Saud in

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(1) The Mongol attack was an "external" threat at first but the Mongols adopted Islam and became ipso facto a part of the Islamic community.

(1)  
the Arabian Peninsula, initiated a trend for the re-thinking of Islam and its rejuvenation. It was in the main, a reaction against the unorthodox accretions such as the veneration of "saints", the spread of suffi (mystic) "fraternities" which insisted upon the "immanence" of God as contrasted with the transcendental God of the Koran. (2)  
It was a puritan effort to go back to the practices of Islam as they were in the early days of the "Rashidun" (the First Four Orthodox Caliphs).

Arising against the secular tendencies of the Ottoman Caliphs and their neglect of religion, Wahhabism could not but end up as a political movement as well. Politically, it took on such an importance that the Ottomans ordered Mehmet Ali to carry on a campaign against its supporters - a campaign which lasted seven years (1811-1818). One may ask whether this fratricidal campaign, a war within "Dar al-Islam", did not contribute in the long run to the Arab

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- (1) H.A.R. Gibb suggests that the Arabian Peninsula was chosen for this movement because it was out of reach of organized political authority of the Ottoman Empire - see Modern Trends in Islam, Chicago (1947), p. 26.
- (2) This theme has been the cause of several theological disputes in Islamic history. It always ended in a balance between the two points of view. Abdul Wahab is often thought of as the continuator of the effort of Ibn Taymiyah (1263-1328) who in turn had been a follower of Ibn Hanbal (d. 855 A.D.) against heterodox innovations; see P. Hitti, op. cit., pp. 399, 430 and 689.

view of the Turks as "bad" Muslims and "anti-Arabs", and thereby prepare the ground for the awakening of an Arab consciousness.<sup>(1)</sup> This becomes more plausible when it is realized that no Arab had played any significant political role since the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258 A.D. The primary concern of the Wahhabis, however, was with Islam as a religion and the internal threats to its purity. If the Wahhabism prevailing in Saudi Arabia today is regarded as "reactionary" it played nonetheless a very salutary role and led to a revitalization of Islam.<sup>(2)</sup>

Wahhabism points out that the first signs of a "revival" had come about as a result of inner tension rather than as a consequence of external contacts. The first important indirect cultural communication between the Arab world and the West was the arrival of Bonaparte in Egypt in 1799. The contact with the West introduced,

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(1) C. Antonius (a Christian Arab), in The Arab Awakening, London (1938), p.13 treats the Wahhabi Movement as an "Isolated" movement "due to particular causes rather than steps in the march of an advancing Arab nationalism.

(2) "But in its ideal aspect, in the challenge which it flung out to the contamination of pure Islamic monotheism by the infiltration of animistic practices and pantheistic notions, Wahhabism had a salutary and revitalizing effect, which spread little by little over the whole Muslim world." Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, op. cit., p.26. For a detailed analysis of Wahhabism see A. Le Chatelier, L'Islam au Dix-Neuvieme Siècle, Paris (1888); D.B. Macdonald, Muslim Theology, London (1903); and C.C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, London, (1933).

in the long run the conception of nationality into Islamic political thought - a concept unknown to Islam and indeed anti-Islamic.<sup>(1)</sup> This alien contribution did much to upset the social and political framework of the Islamic world. Being alien, it was only natural that it should undergo an indigenous influence, and acquire a religious tinge. The result was "Islamic nationalism". But nationalism is the antithesis of Islam, and the turmoil of the Muslim world in the past hundred years can be seen as the attempt (consciously or otherwise) to reconcile these two contradictory doctrines.

The paradoxical nature of Islamic nationalism, a characteristic upon which the pan-Islamic movement relied very heavily, can only be understood if the Muslim reform movements of the period are considered. The reform movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had been started by Wahhabism but its continuators had to adapt themselves to new circumstances. They had a double concern: on the one hand, to bring Islam back to a purer state, which implied also recovering the prestige, culture and power of the days of Islamic ascendancy; on the other hand, they sought a defence against Western penetration.

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(1) See below, pp. 58 - 60

It was realized (even if not admitted) that the best way to do this was by adapting certain "foreign" methods as well as revitalizing Islam. The reformers were therefore trying to build a Western dam against the Western current. Ibn Khaldun had already described this process, in the fourteenth century, when he wrote:

"A subjugated people tends to imitate the customs and institutions of its victors partly out of blind reverence, partly because of a psychological reluctance to admit that its defeat was due to a lower morale, and a preference for attributing the other side's victory to superior techniques, weapons and institutions; and lastly, because of the belief that the secret of the victors' success is to be found in some particular habit or institution of theirs which, if imitated, will ensure an equal measure of success for others." (1)

Reformers arose throughout the Muslim world. Their programmes were very similar in outlook. It was insisted that Islam is a rational religion and compatible with science. (2) No blame could be put on Islam for the state of

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- (1) An Arab Philosophy of History, Selections from the Writings of Ibn Khaldun, translated by C.A. Hourani, London (1947).
- (2) "We must study European scientific works, even though they are not written by Muslims and though we may find in them things contrary to the teachings of the Koran. We should imitate the Arabs of olden days, who did not fear to shake their faith by studying Pythagoras." - Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-98), quoted in L. Stoddard, The New World of Islam, pp. 30-31, London (1922)

affairs in Islamic countries, but rather on their  
inhabitants being bad Muslims<sup>(1)</sup> The most often quoted  
verse of the Koran became: "Verily God will not change<sup>(2)</sup>  
the state of a people until they change their own state."  
Non-Islamic intrusions had to be fought against, and the  
goal was to adapt the faith and the dogma to the political  
and social evolution which was taking place.

Generally speaking, two different schools of thought  
appeared from the start. There were those who felt that  
no adaptation was needed, that all that was necessary was  
a return to the original Islam. This attitude was  
adopted by the linear heirs of the Wahhabi Movement.<sup>(3)</sup>  
The modernist school, on the other hand, undertook a "re-  
interpretation" of Islamic theology.<sup>(4)</sup> Toynbee has made the  
following parallel:

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- (1) This was the attitude constantly shown by the founders of Al-Manar (The Lighthouse) an Arabic review put out in Cairo starting in 1898 under the most influential of Muslim reformers, Sheikh Mohamed Abduh (1849-1905). See Rashid Rida, Biography of Sheikh M. Abduh, in Arabic, Cairo, 3 volumes, (1324 A.H.)
  - (2) The Koran, XIII: 12.
  - (3) For the resurgence of Wahhabism in Arabia, see, A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1925, Vol. I, "The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement", pp. 271-324, London (1927).
  - (4) See Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1876-1938), Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Oxford (1934); and Ameer Ali, The Spirit of Islam, London (revised ed. 1922).

"In modern Islam, under the pressure of the West, the same two contrasted tendencies were discernible as had been produced in Jewry, in the time of Jesus, by the pressure of Hellenism. There were 'Zealots', in whom the touch of a stronger civilization awoke a fear and an antipathy which they expressed by falling back upon everything in their own tradition that was antithetical to the intrusive force; and there were 'Herodians' who were moved to admiration and imitation by a recognition of superiority." (1)

The above distinction did not last long, at least outwardly, in the Muslim world when it was transplanted to the political field. In face of a common danger, no allowance could be made for internal divisions. Differences remained as to the ends but agreement was easily reached on the means - a militant religious pan-Islamic nationalism. (2)

This common Islamic solidarity had constituted a powerful backing for the political pan-Islamic movement. It even extended to a co-operation between the Sunnis

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(1) A.J. Toynbee, Survey ... (1925), op. cit., p. 6.

(2) Ibid., p. 6: "Thus the forces of Islam, which the first impact of the West had driven out of their traditional formation and even into collision with one another were re-forming on a new common front."

(1)  
(Orthodox) and Shi'is. A schism which had perturbed the Islamic community for centuries was now subordinated to an external threat. From the Koran the following verse was now emphasized:

"O ye who have believed! form not intimacies among others than yourselves. They will not fail to corrupt you. They long for your ruin. Hatred hath already shewn itself out of their mouths, but more grievous is what their breasts conceal. The tokens thereof We have already made plain to you, if ye will comprehend."  
(III: 114). (2)

And there could be found several sayings of the Prophet on brotherhood and unity of all believers such as:

"Believers are in relation to one another as (parts of) a structure, one part of which strengthens the other." (3)

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(1) This co-operation culminated in the invitation in 1931 to Shi'ites to attend the Islamic Congress held in Jerusalem, "The invitation to the Shi'iah divines to participate in the Congress was an even more striking innovation, inasmuch as it was the first outward manifestation of a new spirit of co-operation (born in part of a common adversity) which held out the hope of healing the age-long breach between the Sunni and the Shi'ah branches of Islam, and which had been encouraged by the Shi'ite support given to the Arab claims before the wailing Wall Commission" - H.A.R. Gibb, p. 101, Survey of Int. Aff. 1934. One could say that the feud between Sunnis and Shi'is came to an end formally and politically with the signing of a treaty of friendship between Persia and King Ibn Saud on August 24, 1929 - see Survey of International Affairs, 1930, p. 172.

(2) See other Koranic verses quoted above on p.13.

(3) Muhammad Ali, A Manual of Hadith, p. 379, Lahore (1945)

"Thou wilt see the faithful in their having mercy for one another and in their love for one another and in their kindness towards one another like the body; when one member of it ails, the entire body (ails), one part calling out the other with sleeplessness and fever." (1)

The Koranic verses and sayings of the Prophet were used to their fullest extent, and had a powerful effect upon Muslim minds. They were used to spread the pan-Islamic idea, but when that idea failed politically they were equally effective in promoting pan-Arabism. (2)

Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani (1839-1897), a Persian, was the leading political reformer. (3) He is considered as the principal promoter of the reaction of Islam against Western penetration, and the main propagator of the pan-Islamic movement. Al-Afghani supported the view that the

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- (1) Ibid., p. 379; Other pertinent sayings may be cited: "Help thy brother whether he is the doer of wrong or wrong is done to him", (p.378); "A Muslim is the brother of a Muslim; he does him no injustice, nor does he leave him alone (to be the victim of another's injustice); and whoever does the needful for his brother, Allah does the needful for him; and whoever removes the distress of a Muslim, Allah removes from him a distress out of the distresses of the day of resurrection; and whoever covers (the fault of) a Muslim, Allah will cover his sins on the day of resurrection" (p.378).
- (2) See below, p. 57.
- (3) For the biography of Al-Afghani see E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution, 1905-9, Chapter I, Cambridge (1910); See Rashid Rida, Biography of Muhammad Abduh, op. cit., pp. 25-102.

best step in the direction of Islamic unity was to revolt against the existing order. This was already taking place and Al-Afghani's campaign helped in giving these separate upheavals a coherent significance. Among the examples of these 'insurrections' that could be cited, were the Algerian upheaval in 1871, the Senussi rebellion in Libya, the Mahdist revolt in the Sudan, stirrings in Afghanistan, India, China (in Turkestan and Yunnan), and the Atchin War in the Dutch East Indies. (1)

The Ottoman Empire, which was becoming more and more threatened, tried to make use of these 'revolutions' by offering them a symbol to rally around. It was a shrewd way of attempting to resuscitate the disintegrating Empire by resorting to a policy which would inspire the loyalty of all Muslims around the Ottoman Caliphate. (2) It was also a masterly move to gain more respect in the eyes of the European States - by having the Ottoman Caliph

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(1) All of these uprisings took place in the 1870's, see L. Stoddard, op. cit., p.41...

(2) The Ottomans had taken over the Caliphate after the victory of Selim I in 1517 over the remnants of an Abbasid Caliphate in Cairo. It has been claimed that Selim took the Caliphate officially from al-Mutawakeel but Sir Thomas Arnold, The Caliphate, London (1924), finds no historical evidence in support of this view. The fact remains that the Ottomans took the title and were recognized by the bulk of the Muslim countries (exception, Morocco which had its own Caliph from about 1519 onward).

recognized as a Muslim "Pope". Abdul Hamid II did much to encourage the latter conception of the Caliphate. (1) In essence, it is this political manoeuvring of Abdul Hamid which has been specified as the "pan-Islamic" Movement in this analysis. The Ottoman mover of pan-Islamism had his own ambitious plans in mind but they happened to coincide with a period in which Islam found itself on the defensive. (2)

The pan-Islamic Movement rested on two Islamic institutions: the Caliphate and the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca. (3) (4) The former was symbolized by the person of Abdul Hamid II himself and the latter was used as an opportunity to spread his propaganda. He also played an important part in raising funds throughout the Islamic world for the

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- (1) See A.J. Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 32-34 (Abdul Hamid II became Caliph in 1876); Sir T. Arnold, op. cit., p.14, "The orthodox Muslim world has never accepted the existence of any functionary corresponding to a Pope.." p. 15, "Islam knows of no priesthood, of no body of men set apart for the performance of religious duties which the general body of the faithful are not authorized to perform." Abdul Hamid II tried to compare the position of the Caliph with that of a Pope only in his dealings with Westerners in order to impress them.
- (2) "The chief factor in favour of the pan-Islamic movement was that the Muslim world was everywhere on the defensive, and eager to find a means by which it might regain control of its own destinies." - H.A.R. Gibb, Whither Islam, op. cit., p.41.
- (3) On the Caliphate, see T. Arnold, op. cit.
- (4) "As a means for reviving religious zeal and strengthening the conviction of Muslim unity, the institution of the Pilgrimage still retains its ancient virtue." - Gibb, op. cit., p.19.

construction of the Damascus-Mecca railroad line.<sup>(1)</sup> For his propaganda he gathered four prominent Muslims: Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani, Abdul-Hoda el-Sayadi (Syria); Ahmed Asaad (Turkey); and Sheikh Zafar (Tripoli).<sup>(2)</sup> Al-Afghani<sup>(3)</sup> was the most distinguished and the most active amongst the four. His zeal as a reformer was his greatest asset. He failed to see (or did not care to see) the intentions behind Abdul-Hamid's policy. The fact remains that he worked until his death for the spreading of the pan-Islamic ideal. He saw in it the only way to combat the threatening 'materialistic' Western wave. Patriotism was his arch-enemy because he looked at it as a materialistic substitute for the spiritual role played by religion.<sup>(4)</sup>

Yet in order to fight the Western infiltration, the pan-Islamic Movement, as a political means, was doomed to take on a nationalistic flavour. It is a question

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(1) A.M. Goichon "Pan-Islamisme ..." op. cit.

(2) Ibid., p.22.

(3) G. Antonius, op. cit., p. 69: "The movement known as the pan-Islamic revival, which stirred the Muslim world in the last quarter of the nineteenth century was largely his (Al-Afghani) creation; and it was while Jamaluddin (Al-Afghani) was at the height of his powers and his activity that Abdul Hamid began to lay the foundations of his own Islamic policy."

(4) See Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani, The Refutation of the Materialists, French translation by A.M. Goichon, Paris (1942)

whether this initial conditioning of nationalism in the East was not the predominant contribution to the present day form of nationalism. This question is vital to the understanding of the trends which "Arab Unity" is likely to undergo. And it is here that one can detect the point of intersection between the Arab unity and Islamic unity movements.

In 1884, Al-Afghani and the Egyptian reformer Mohamed (1) Abduh (2) founded in Paris a newspaper 'Al-Orwa al Wothqa (The Indissoluble link)' to propagate the pan-Islamic programme, and set up a secret organization under the same name. The paper was sent to Muslim leaders all over the world and made an effort, on occasions to take on an

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- (1) Mohamed Abduh (1849-1905), to some extent a student of Al-Afghani, he differed from the latter in that he preferred to stick to the theological aspects of Islam rather than get involved with the political entanglements - see H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, op. cit., p.29; see also, A.S. Eban, "The Modern Literary Movement in Egypt" in International Affairs, April 1944, p. 169: "Abduh taught that Islam and modernism were compatible; and this became and has remained the axiom of modern Arabic literature, the starting point of all its contemplation. I am not aware of any Muslim writer who doubts it."
- (2) The first issue of the paper came out on March 13, 1884; it was eventually suppressed by the French Government after the eighteenth issue, see Ahmad Amin, The Day of Islam, p. 140, in Arabic, Cairo (1952).

"Eastern" rather than a specifically Islamic line.<sup>(1)</sup> Its real purpose was to plead in favour of an Islamic League, the resurrection of Islam and its political power, and the recovering of the territories which had been lost to Western imperialism. The benefits which could be gained from unity were elaborated upon and the example most often cited was the unification of Germany.<sup>(2)</sup> The theme of religious or spiritual consciousness as a higher and more respectable concept than racial consciousness was often brought up.<sup>(3)</sup> The notion of an Islamic "nationality" was put forward as the basis for a political unity, and the degradation of the Muslims was attributed to the political subdivisions which had taken place in the Muslim world and to the rivalries which resulted from these divisions and the resort in many instances by Muslim Princes to

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(1) See issue of May 10, 1884, in which it is said that the purpose of the newspaper is to awaken and alert colonial peoples throughout the "East" against the dangers of the "West" - referred to in Rashid Rida, op. cit., p. 289, vol. I.

(2) Rashid Rida, op. cit., p. 307, vol. I. This point is interesting because it is the same one which the proponents of Arab unity have been making since the mid-thirties and which is still very current today in the writings of people like Sati' al-Husri, Abderrahman al-Bazzaz, Nabih Faris etc...

(3) Ibid., p. 308. The proponents of Arab unity would substitute spiritual consciousness by cultural-political consciousness in order to underplay the problem of ethnic minorities, e.g. Kurds, Berbers, etc.

a non-Muslim Power in order to defeat a Muslim rival. (1)

The initial reaction of Abdul Hanid II was to combat the work of Al-Afghani and Mohamed Abduh, especially that of the former who preached revolt against the established order as a first step in the direction of an Islamic

(2)  
revival and political unification. Thereafter, Abdul Hanid realized how he could make use out of the Muslim reformers and radically changed his attitude. He picked Al-Afghani, as was seen above, to carry the pan-Islamic political campaign, and he supported the very influential

(3)  
review Al-Manar which was directed by Mohamed Abduh and Rashid Rida in Egypt and which was a successor of Al-Orwa Al-Wothqa of Paris.

Abdul Hanid enjoyed, at first, the support of Great Britain for his pan-Islamic policy and she encouraged the Muslims in India to take part in and sympathize with the pan-Islamic effort. Great Britain wanted to gather the

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(1) Ibid., pp. 328-30. Here again one can find an almost identical outlook on the part of present day pan-Arabs; all that one would have to do would be to replace the references to "Islam" with "Arab" and it would sound like a broadcast from the "Voice of the Arabs" in Cairo or any Arab newspaper for that matter. The contribution of the pan-Islamic to the pan-Arab Movement becomes very obvious at this point.

(2) Ahmad Amin, op. cit., p.140. (3) The first issue of Al-Manar came out on March 13, 1898, on this review, see Rashid Rida, op. cit., and J. Jonier, Le Cornetaire Coranique du Manar, Paris (1954)

forces of Islam against Russia, especially during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8, but she was forced after 1880 to change her policy when the increasing pan-Islamic propaganda was beginning to threaten British control over Muslim populations. (1)

The tendency of pan-Islamism to appeal to an "Eastern" mentality in a common struggle against the West became most obvious at the time of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. (2) Abdul Hamid even went to the point of sending a warship with a pan-Islamic delegation to Japan and there was much talk about the conversion of Japan to Islam. (3)

With the death of Al-Afghani in 1897, the pan-Islamic Movement lost one of its most ardent campaigners. The Turkish Revolution of 1908 dealt a blow to it by withdrawing the official governmental support which the Movement had hitherto enjoyed. The attacks on the Ottoman Empire of Italy, in 1911, and of the Balkan States, in 1912, brought about the sympathy of Muslims all over the world but by this time, the tension between the Arabs (particularly

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(1) See A.J. Toynbee, Survey .... (1925), op. cit. pp. 40-41

(2) See L. Stoddard, op. cit. p. 59.

(3) Ibid., p. 59, see also, F. Farjanel "Le Japon et l'Islam" in Revue de Monde Musulman, November 1906.

those of Syria) and the Young Turks was reaching its culminating point.

Turkey attempted to inject some new vitality into the Movement, at the beginning of the First World War, through the Ottoman declaration of a "Holy War",<sup>(1)</sup> and Germany came to her aid with an intensive "Pan-Islamic" propaganda.<sup>(2)</sup> Great Britain had given up its support for pan-Islamism a few decades before and was now doing its best to canalise the pan-Islamic fervour of the Arabs into a purely Arab movement:

"L'Angleterre cherchait à désagréger le bloc islamique du Califat, d'une part contre les Turcs, en groupant le plus possible de leurs subordonnés Arabes, d'autre part, contre l'Inde, en présentant de préférence l'Islam comme une question Arabe." (3)

This is how Britain's support for pan-Arabism came about and the term "Arab Nation" in English official correspondence was introduced in 1914 to stress Arab unity. In a telegram dated October 31, 1914, Kitchener wrote to King Hussein: "... if the Arab Nation helps England in this war..."<sup>(4)</sup> The new British policy was welcomed by

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(1) "Fetwa" (ruling) by the Ottoman Sheyk al-Islam of November 23, 1914 in the name of the Ottoman Caliph; For text, see (French translation) in A. Mandelstan, Le Sort de l'Empire Ottoman, Paris (1917), pp. 372-3

(2) See G.W. Bury, op. cit.

(3) A.M. Goichon, op. cit., p.28.

(4) G. Pueux, "La Ligue Arabe" in La Revue de Paris, p.69, April 1955.

many Arabs who were opposed to Turkish rule. In India, however, the Muslims had not felt the Turkish oppression, and pan-Islamism remained an important force kept alive by the fear of the Hindu majority.

As to the call for the "Holy War" there does not seem to be any reliable historical evidence for judging the degree of Muslim participation. The Great Sanussi and the Imam of San'a were the only Muslim Chiefs who took up arms officially on the Ottoman side. <sup>(1)</sup> The feeling of the Muslim masses is not easy to assess. The "Arab Revolt" against the Turks has been glorified and romanticized, thanks to the personality and writings of Lawrence of "Arabia". The "Arab" consciousness of that period was rudimentary. It has been said that the Islamic bond was strong enough to make the Muslims fight on the side of Turkey or at best remain neutral. <sup>(2)</sup> What is important to note is that the idea of two movements, a "Holy War" called by the Turks and an "Arab revolt", helped to bring out the diversity of interests between the Turks and the Arabs.

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(1) A.J. Toynbee, op. cit., p.44.

(2) See, M. Abdel Gamal Yehia, The Pan-Arab Movement, Ph.D. Thesis, L.S.E., London University (1950), Part I, pp. 44-79 for a discussion of the "Arab Revolt" and the degree of Arab participation.

After the defeat of the Turks and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey was no longer interested in the pan-Islamic movement. On November 1, 1922, it passed a law which took away the temporal powers of the Caliph - a move which deeply shocked the Muslim world.<sup>(1)</sup> And on March 3, 1924, another law was passed, this time it was to abolish the institution of the Caliphate altogether.<sup>(2)</sup> This abolition created problems which seemed almost insurmountable at first.<sup>(3)</sup> The pan-Islamic movement was not preoccupied with the Caliphate question. The non-Arab Muslims were much more disturbed by the new situation since they had always hoped to seek some sort of moral, and even political, support from this institution. Internationally speaking, the Caliphate question is of much more interest to the student of Indian Islam.<sup>(4)</sup> In the Arab world it stirred up less enthusiasm although a whole series of Islamic Congresses were held to attempt to find a solution to the problems raised by the absence of a Caliph.<sup>(5)</sup>

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(1) See A.J. Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 50-67.

(2) For Text of the law see ibid, p. 575.

(3) See Oriente Moderno, IV, No. 4, pp. 211-42

(4) See W.C. Smith, Modern Islam in India, London (1946)

(5) See below, p. 62.

The pan-Islamic Movement had failed because there had been no agreement about its basis nor its aims. For Jamal-Din Al-Afghani and the other reformers who supported it for some time, it could be said, that their programme was somewhat utopian and that they did not sufficiently realize the handicaps facing them. Sufficient consideration was not given to the helpless status of the Islamic countries at that time, nor to the international situation and the political interests of the Western Powers. The religious zeal which was the best, if not the only, weapon in the hands of the reformers was used to combat the foreign Powers. And it was precisely this struggle which brought about a diversification within the Islamic "Umma" for the problems presented themselves in a different way in the various entities. Local nationalist movements developed, and their efficiency depended on the degree to which they were attuned to the 'national' conditions.

The interests of Abdul-Hamid II, and the Turks in general, were very different from those of the reformers. Turkey saw in the pan-Islamic movement a way of consolidating its power and its trump card against the West. This was later realized by the Arabs and created a

(1)  
division within the movement. A new brand of Islamic union appeared on the scene - Muslim pan-Arabism and its protagonist was Abderrahman Al-Kawakebi (1849-1903). His programme was elaborated in a book: Umm al-Qura (a Koranic designation for Mecca). He felt that one of the first requisites for the revival of Islam was the restoration to the Arabs of their proper, and historical role in the destiny of Islam. His platform solved the problems of many Arabs who were in favour of Islamic unity but were at the same time oppressed by Turkish rule:

"Al Kawakebi was not the only nationalistic writer of his time, but was one of the first to throw suspicion on the right of the Ottoman Turks to the Caliphate, a matter which had been taken for granted for nearly four centuries."(2)

The pan-Islamism of Al-Afghani was based on a spiritual and intellectual unity and its weakness (but also its honorable distinction) lay in its totally dismissing the racial basis of unity. The latter consideration was introduced by Kawakebi and it carried some weight even if, in effect, the ethnological basis for an

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(1) "As a world-force this brand of pan-Islamism had failed because it had been invoked by the wrong people for a wrong cause." - G. Wyman Bury, op. cit., p. 80.

(2) N. Ziadeh, "Recent Arabic Literature on Arabism", in the Middle East Journal, Autumn 1952, p. 468.

"Arab" race could not be scientifically determined.

Psychologically, however, there was an advantage in being able to speak of "brother by blood" and "brother by race"<sup>(1)</sup> as well as of "Muslim brother". This was, in principle, non-Islamic,<sup>(2)</sup> but the influence of Western nationalism and particularly that of patriotism was beginning to make its inroads into the Muslim political scene. The Muslim pan-Arabism of Kawakebi also coincided with the Syrian Arab revival and was one of its important sources:

"The doctrines preached by Kawakebi contributed, as was inevitable, to the gradual transference of the leadership in the Arab movement to Muslim hands." (3)

The various nationalist movements of the Arab world have had from the very first to contend with Islam because the Muslim masses could not (and many still cannot today) draw any distinction between the movement for Arab independence and that for the revival of Islam.<sup>(4)</sup> So regardless of the origins of the "Arab Awakening" to which George Antonius has devoted such a masterly study, the

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(1) See below, p. 63.

(2) e.g., saying of Mohamed, "O man! God hath taken from you the arrogance of heathen days and the ancient pride in ancestry; an Arab hath no other precedence over a non-Arab than by virtue of the fear of God; ye are all the progeny of Adam, and Adam himself is of earth."

(3) G. Antonius, op. cit., p. 98.

(4) See, S.A. Morrison, "Arab Nationalism and Islam", in Middle East Journal, April 1948, p. 148.

Arab revival must be seen and understood within that much greater movement for the resuscitation of Islam. The Christian leaders within the Arab movement were aware of this and realistic enough not to ignore its importance. (1)

The pan-Arab movement had to constantly make use of Islam to achieve its aims, and the Christian Arabs began to show a nationalistic pride in Islam, "I defend Islam because it is the religion of my fatherland" said Salama Musa. (2) The Copt Makram 'Ebeid, once Egyptian Minister of Finance, could say, "I am Christian by my religion, it is true, but I am a Muslim by my fatherland." (3) Unless this phenomenon is understood, the appreciation of pan-Arabism will never be complete. It also becomes almost useless to speak of a totally secular nationalism for the Arab world. Even the first political organization, in the Arab

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(1) H.A.R. Gibb, Whither Islam, op. cit., writes on p. 368: "In the Arabic-speaking areas of Western Asia, Arab national sentiment has undoubtedly been attracted to the ideal of Muslim Arab unity by a revival of national pride in the historical background of the Islamic movement, and the Christian journals are even more zealous than the Muslim journals in preaching the gospel of pan-Arabia. It was a Greek Orthodox organ which opened with a leading article on the Jerusalem congress (1931) with the words: 'Welcome to those who have come to lay with sound judgment the foundation for a restoration of the days of Omar, the builder of the glory of Islam, upon the lines of his master, Muhammad son of Abdullah - upon him be the peace of God.'"

(2) Quoted in L. Gardet, La Cité Musulmane, op.cit., p. 211.

(3) Ibid.

world, which was formed by Christian Arabs, had to resort to religious issues in order to awaken the Arab populations. (1)  
Von Grunebaum has written:

"The tendency to identify Arab and Muslim issues is unmistakable in some quarters. It is not surprising that Arab nationalism in its fight for a new unity should avail itself of the traditional feeling of religious unity premeating the majority of its actual or prospective converts." (2)

On the other hand, if the Islamic revival has given a distinctive character to the Arab national movement, the latter has in turn deeply shaken some fundamental Islamic traditions. The Arab movement has introduced the concept of "patriotism", "fatherland" and a western type of romantic nationalism into an area where they were completely unknown, if not totally opposed, to the theoretical foundations of the prevailing religion. (3)

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- (1) See, G. Antonius, op. cit., p. 83; this organization was formed in 1875 by five Christian Arabs. Describing the content of some of the placards put out by this organization, Antonius writes, "It strikes a religious note in describing the Sultan's tenure of the Caliphate as a usurpation of Arab rights and accusing the Turks of habitually transgressing the laws of Islam."
- (2) G.E. Von Grunebaum, Islam, London (1955), p. 60; *ibid.* p. 59: "The Arab belt is dominated by Islam. Founded by an Arab prophet, codified in a sacred book, developed by an Arab state, and promoting Arab supremacy, Islam and Arabism have to be largely identified."
- (3) See E.G. Browne, "Pan-Islamism", op. cit., p. 308.

In the West, the introduction of nationalism led to a separation of the "Church" and the "State" - a separation which was not very new in many respects since "throughout the centuries during which the Holy Roman Empire was a living force in Europe, the distinction between temporal and spiritual authority was never lost sight of."<sup>(1)</sup> In Islam this distinction has never existed because of the nature of Islamic law and because Islam has no priesthood nor any ecclesiastical hierarchy. This point is worth stressing because many people have felt that in order to "secularize" Islam all you had to do was to take the authority to interpret the law out of the hands of the "Ulemas" (jurists). This is an erroneous conclusion for the divinity does not reside in the hands of those who interpret the law but rather in the law itself.<sup>(2)</sup> This is the core of the problem and the source

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(1) Sir T.W. Arnold, The Caliphate, op. cit., p.10.

(2) L. Gardet, op. cit., p.118: "Il ne s'agit plus, pour les lois fondamentales qui régissent les sociétés humaines, de respecter la Loi divine révélée, ni même de s'y subordonner: elles s'y identifient... Tout est remis en droit à l'inscrutable Volonté divine; en fait les textes coraniques protègent la cité contre l'arbitraire. Réalité concrète, qui est à l'honneur et à l'avantage de l'Islam, et que nous ne devons jamais perdre de vue quand nous voudrions apprécier l'efficience politico-sociale de la cité musulmane."

of most of the political and social problems of Arab nationalism as well as its lack of clear orientation. It is not that Arab nationalists have been slow to make up their minds on the matter; rather do they find themselves torn between incompatible ideals. (1)

(2)  
It is hard to agree with writers who trace the existence of an Arab "national" consciousness to the early days of Islam if not to the pre-Islamic period. It might be easy to agree with them if one were to take Toynbee's metaphor "the spirit of Nationality is a sour ferment of the new wine in the old bottles of tribalism" literally. There was a tribal racial consciousness, at all times, among the Arabs but this is a very different thing from the prevailing Arab nationalism of today. It might have contributed to the latter (and thereby distorting the

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- (1) H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, op. cit., p. 115: "The nationalist solution is even more clearly opposed to the Islamic principle. No matter how sincerely nationalists may profess their devotion to the doctrines and the ethical teachings of Islam, they are committed to setting up a second principle alongside it; and there is no way to avoid the resulting division and conflict of duties except by separating the spheres of Church and State."
- (2) e.g. Von Grunbaum, Islam, op. cit., p. 64, "The misconception that Arab national self-consciousness is an outgrowth of the nineteenth century must be guarded against with great care. The nineteenth century saw its revival, its quickening into a political force, and, of course a substantial enlargement of scope and territory, but the sentiment dates back mutatis mutandis to the days of paganism."

imported Western type of nationalism) but it cannot be said to have been its cause. National consciousness is a very recent phenomenon in the Arab world and is not yet a fixed feature of all the Arab countries.

The importance of the pan-Islamic Movement is that it was the first vehicle of nationalism in the Arab world. Pan-Islamism also encouraged the idea of unity after the units became self-governing and thereby led to an Islamic nationalism.<sup>(1)</sup>

Arab nationalist leaders, at the turn of the century, were for the most part brought up in the pan-Islamic tradition. Mustafa Kamal (d. 1908), "the father of Egyptian nationalism", as he became to be called, was the founder of Al-Liwa, a pan-Islamic newspaper, as well as the founder of the Egyptian National Party. Zaghlul Pasha, the founder of the Wafd party in Egypt was deeply influenced by the work of Sheikh Mohamed Abduh.<sup>(2)</sup> And it

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(1) "We must thus provisionally define Muslim nationalism as the effort to reorganize Islamic society on the basis of self-governing units. It is the outcome, on the one hand, of the introduction of western political conceptions, on the other of hostility to western political and economic supremacy." H.A.R. Gibb, Whither Islam, op. cit., p. 340.

(2) See Rashid Rida, op. cit., vol. I, p.1069.

was Rashid Rida, the greatest disciple of Mohamed Abduh, who was elected President of the General Syrian Congress, "a representative assembly in the true sense of the word",<sup>(1)</sup> after the end of the First World War. This Islamic Congress of Jerusalem,<sup>(2)</sup> in 1931, is a good illustration of the relationship between Muslim preoccupations and Arab affairs. Although, "particular care was taken for both internal and external reasons, that the Congress should not assume the appearance of a pan-Arab rather than a pan-Muslim gathering"<sup>(3)</sup> many delegates took this opportunity to call an Arab conference and draw up an "Arab Pact".<sup>(4)</sup> It might also be pertinent to mention that the largest "national" Arab political party, the Wafd, had sent an official delegation to this Congress.

Finally, there sprang up throughout the Arab world a whole series of Muslim organizations which were more or less directly connected with the respective nationalist

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(1) G. Antonius, op. cit., p. 293.

(2) There had already been two Islamic Congresses before this one; in May 1926 in Cairo to solve the Caliphate problem (see *Revue du Monde Musulman*, 1926, Deuxieme Trimestre for proceedings), and in June 1926 in Mecca (See A.J. Toynbee, *Survey ...* (1925), op. cit. pp. 312; and *Revue du Monde Musulman*, op. cit.)

(3) H.A.R. Gibb, "The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in Dec. 1931", in *Survey of Intern. Aff.*, 1934, pp.106-7.

(4) See *ibid.*; and below, chapter 4.

movements. In 1927, the Association of the Muslim Young Men (known as the Y.M.M.A.) was formed in Egypt with branches in Syria and Iraq; there were also the "Nahdat al-Ulama" in Syria; The Supreme Muslim Council in Jerusalem and Beirut; the Association of the Algerian Ulemas; The Society of Islamic Guidance in Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Egypt; The Association of Muslim North African Students in Paris; and the famous "Ikhwan al-Muslimin" (Muslim brotherhood).

The relationship of Islamic "brotherhood" and "Arabism" was also observed on the Governmental level. There were a number of treaties of friendship between the Arab countries: in July 1933, a Treaty of Friendship was signed between Ibn Saud and Transjordan; in May 1934,

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- (1) On this association and many of the others mentioned on this page see, G. Kampffmeyer, in Whither Islam, op. cit., p. 112.
  - (2) This Association formed by Hamid Ben Badis (d. 1940) chose as its motto, in its publication, "Spokesman of Islam and Arabism". Its founder was a disciple of the Salifiya reformist movement and it had an important influence on the rising North African nationalism. See below, Chapter 12, "The League and the 'Maghreb'".
  - (3) Founded in 1927; See P. Rezette, Les Partis Politique Marocains, pp. 76-7, Paris (1955).
  - (4) Formed in 1929 by Hassan al-Banna, in Egypt with branches in other Arab countries. See Heyworth-Dunne, Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt, Washington (1950);

the Treaty of Taif between Saudi Arabia and Yemen - "a  
Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Arab Brotherhood" <sup>(1)</sup> which  
stated in article 16, "united by the bonds of Muslim  
fraternity and Arab race". Other treaties of "Brotherhood  
and Alliance" followed between the years 1934 and 1936  
between Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen and Egypt. <sup>(2)</sup> All of  
these treaties show that the notion of Islamic unity as  
envisaged by Jamal-Din Al-Afghani had undergone a marked  
change and that the emphasis had become one on "Arab  
brotherhood" "with due regard to national unity":

"The old Muslim loyalties and ideology and the  
old hostility to Western Christianity, which  
constituted the driving force of pan-Islamism,  
had been carried over into the pan-Arab move-  
ment. But the Western idea of nationalism  
had entered into it also." (3)

The pan-Islamism associated with Al-Afghani was thrown  
aside and the Arabs became more and more interested in  
"Arab unity". The failure of the pan-Islamic policy did  
not mean the abandoning of the Islamic principles upon

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- (1) The traditional Islamic concepts would have associated  
"Brotherhood" with "Islam" and "friendship" with "Arab" -  
here we have the reverse.
  - (2) For the texts of all these Treaties, see R.I.I.A., Doc-  
on International Affairs, 1937, p.517 onward: See also  
Survey of International Affairs, 1934, p.107 and pp.318-  
320. The 1936 Treaty was concluded in accordance with  
"the spirit of mutual Islamic friendship and with due  
regard to national unity", the parties resolved to  
"foster the unification of Arabic Muslim culture and  
military training through the exchange of educational  
and military missions." See also below, pp.
  - (3) H.A.R. Gibb, "Toward Arab Unity", in Foreign Affairs,  
October 1945, p. 124.

which it rested. Undoubtedly some of the "Westernized" Arab political leaders were trying to think in terms of a more 'secular' nationalism but they could never find any understanding on the part of the masses for it, even less so could they find popular support. This is natural because as Albert Hourani has said:

"Short of the emergence of something new, the mind can only proceed by developing what already exists; and in the first instance any intellectual revival in the Arab world will take the form of more serious, responsible and troubled reflection on Islam." (1)

It is necessary to keep in mind the Islamic setting of the "Arab revival" intellectually and politically, for any analysis of pan-Arabism - a movement which will now be considered.

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(1) A. Hourani, "The Decline of the West in the Middle East (II)", in International Affairs, April 1953, p.181.

(B) PAN -ARABISM

CHAPTER 3: PAN-ARABISM AND THE BREAKDOWN OF OTTOMAN RULE

Only twice during the history of Islam have there been quasi-universal Islamic Empires. The two instances were the Empire of the Abbasid Harun al-Rashid, and the Ottoman Empire which collapsed in 1918. The manner in which the latter broke down has had a vital and determining influence on the pan-Arab movement.

The extent to which pan-Islamism could be considered as a parent movement of pan-Arabism has been discussed in the preceding chapter. During World War One however, the pan-Islamic policy of Abdul Hamid <sup>(1)</sup> clashed with the pan-Arab aims of the Arab Revolt led by the Sharif Husain of Mecca. This was not the first case of a split within "Dar al-Islam", but it was the first one where the issue behind the conflict transcended the Islamic setting and was promoted by vague, but apparent, nationalistic tendencies. The Shu'ubiyah movement, previously discussed, also had at its root what could be called 'nationalistic' motives but they were in no sense comparable with the ones

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(1) Abul Hamid II was deposed in 1909 but his pan-Islamic policy was revived under his successor Mohamed V (1909-1918) during World War I.

(1)  
prevailing the Arab world at a time when the Western concept of "Nation" was combatting the traditional Islamic notion of "Umma".

The nascent Turkish and Arab nationalisms were inherently incompatible. Western intervention managed to hasten a split, geographical and otherwise, which was bound to come. The Turkish as well as the Arab policies felt the necessity and the convenience of justifying their behaviour in Islamic terms. It would be wrong therefore to discuss the events of the First World War in the Ottoman Empire in terms of "Arabism" versus "Islamism". This clarification permits us to appreciate the pan-Arab movement and its affiliation to the Islamic movement. (2)

The pan-Arab movement can be said to have passed through six phases: (I) The attempt of Mohamed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha to set<sup>up</sup> an Arab Empire in the 1830's; (II) The "Arab Awakening" in the second half of the nineteenth century; (III) The "Arab Revolt" of 1916 and Husain's project for an Arab State; (IV) the pan Arab

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(1) "Arab World" in this context, refers to the Arab territories which were under effective Ottoman rule on the eve of the First World War.

(2) M.A. Yehia, The Pan-Arab Movement, unpublished thesis, op. cit. p.15, "The pan-Arab movement... may be inserted in the pan-Islamic movement but does not coincide with it."

activities of the inter-war period; (V) The Arab governmental negotiations leading to the founding of the League of Arab States in 1945; and (VI) the post-World War II period where "Arab nationalism" and "pan-Arabism" tend to become synonyms. These six stages will be discussed, in the course of this study, with reference to the degree of Arab national consciousness prevailing at the time; in respect to the geographical delimitation of the "Arab Nation" as conceived at each period; in terms of the relationship between 'local' nationalism and the pan-Arab movement at large; with due regard to the prevailing inter-Arab relations and the motives of pan-Arab leaders; keeping in view the institutional vehicles of the movement; and finally in terms of international relations.

It is arguable whether the period of Mohamed Ali and his son, Ibrahim Pasha, falls within a study of pan-Arabism proper. <sup>(1)</sup> Its inclusion in the pan-Arab movement probably derives from the desire of some Egyptians to think of their country as the birth-place of pan-Arabism. A close look at the attempts of Ibrahim Pasha would lead one to discard his efforts from the genesis of the movement.

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(1) Whereas Ibrahim Pasha's attempt to build an Arab Empire deserves a mention in a study of pan-Arabism, the idea of Midhat Pasha of uniting Syria and Mesopotamia, in 1876, is definitely outside the scope of the movement.

At his time there was very little, if any political consciousness, nor much of an awareness of being "Arab" in the nationalistic sense. (1)

Ibrahim Pasha himself was not an Arab and his occupation of Syria from 1831 to 1840 must be regarded as a matter of personal ambition. (2) His statement: "J'irai jusqu'où je serai compris en arabe" (3) was a geographical convenience, Arabic being the language of all the bordering countries of Egypt. His project was doomed to failure, not only because Arab consciousness was lacking, but because the international situation would not permit it. Great Britain, the predominant Power in the Middle East after Napoleon's retreat from Egypt, was basing her policy

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- (1) G. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, London (1951), p. 99: "The idea of nationality was unknown; all were subjects of the Padishah, but no one thought of himself as belonging to a Syrian or an Iraqi, still less an Arab nation. Instead men were distinguished by their millet, or by the town of their origin..."
- (2) G. Antonius, op. cit. p.27, "Their (Mohamed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha) driving motive was personal ambition, and their desire to revive the Arab Empire sprang primarily from their desire to acquire an Empire."
- (3) Quoted in E. Rabbath, Unité Syrienne et Devenir Arabe, Paris (1937), p.331.

on the maintenance of the status quo in the area. (1)

The destruction of the 'Sublime Porte' would have threatened the European balance of power. It is worthwhile to point out that the moves of Ibrahim Pasha had the support of the French whose interests were diametrically opposed to those of Britain. The conflict of French and British interests in this area of the world need to be kept in view because it is constantly at the root of the major problems of the Arab world from the nineteenth century onward.

(2)  
Up to the opening of the Suez Canal, an operation strongly opposed by the British Government, the interest of Britain in the Middle East was secondary to its concern

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- (1) G. Antonius, op. cit., quotes on p.31 the following official British communication, "His (Ibrahim Pasha) real design is to establish an Arabian kingdom including all the countries in which Arabic is the language. There might be no harm in such a thing itself; but as it would imply the dismemberment of Turkey, we could not agree to it. Besides Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arabian sovereign would be". Palmerston's instructions in 1839 were: "The maintenance of the Turkish Empire is, therefore, the primary object to be aimed at." Quoted in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, New York (1956) Vol.I, p.112.
- (2) The definitive concession for the construction of the Canal was concluded on January 5, 1856; and two months later (March 30, 1856) the Treaty of Paris was concluded to guarantee the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. For text see, Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol.I, p.153 (this treaty was signed after the end of the Crimean War and Great Britain re-asserted the principle of safeguarding the Ottoman Empire).

with India. Thereafter the "Eastern Question" took a primary role and the support of the "sick man of Europe" remained the basis of British policy up to the turn of the nineteenth century.<sup>(1)</sup> In 1898, Lord Salisbury proposed the partition of the Ottoman Empire to Russia and outlined what he considered to be the traditional spheres of influence.<sup>(2)</sup>

At the time of Ibrahim Pasha's venture in Syria, French policy was very different from that of Great Britain. He found a willingness, if not an encouragement, on the part of France for his projects. But France could not help him much after he was faced with a British ultimatum in 1840. French policy in the Middle East was dictated by her desire to reintroduce herself in the area. Meanwhile she encouraged any scheme which could reduce the power of Great Britain and carried on her policy of

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- (1) The possibilities of the destruction of the Ottoman Empire became more and more plausible and British policy was already beginning to consider the possibility seriously from about 1879: "It should further be borne in mind that if the Ottoman Empire were to fall to pieces..." Instructions from British Foreign Secretary, *ibid.*, pp. 191-4.
- (2) See E. Kedourie, Britain and the Middle East, The Vital Years, 1914-21, London (1956), p. 22.

protecting the Catholic minorities in the Levant.<sup>(1)</sup> In sum, France was not strong enough nor willing enough to support Ibrahim Pasha to the point of entering into war against Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Ibrahim Pasha was forced to retreat and see his dream of an Arab Empire fall to pieces.

The formative period of Arab nationalism dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century. A discussion of nationalism in the Arab world is made difficult from the start. The use of the term "nationalism" brings with it an element of confusion because this word has different meanings when translated into Arabic or more probably because it does not have a true equivalent in the Arabic language.<sup>(2)</sup> The two words that are often used to translate nationalism are: "qawmiyah" which is derived from "qawm" (a people) and "wattaniah" which is derived from "wattan" (homeland). These two terms have their own connotations in Arabic but have been used by some

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- (1) See Metellus, "Politique de la France au Moyen Orient" in *Politique Etrangere*, December 1955.
- (2) See Sylvia Hain, "Islam and the Theory of Arab Nationalism" in *Die Welt Des Islam*, N.S. Vol. IV, Nr. 2-3, pp. 132-5; Sylvia Hain discusses the evolution of the meaning of "Wattan" from homeland to fatherland; Leiden (1955).

(1)

"westernized" leaders - or Levantines - in their Western sense while the Arab layman continued to give them their local meaning. The resulting misunderstanding between these two segments of the Arab community has produced a lack of communication which can be said to be one of the main causes for the kind of separating wall which has arisen between the "leaders" and the "led".

Political classification by nationality is not only a very recent element in the Middle East but even goes against the Islamic tradition which rested on the millet system. Even the notion of fatherland or motherland, and its sentimental implications in the West, had no counterpart, politically speaking, in the Arab world. Poets, writers and singers praised their land of origin not out of political concern (in the national sense) but from a natural and human reaction due to the ties which one develops in his place of birth which is also the place of his family, his clan and tribe.

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- (1) Description of 'Levantine' as given by A.H. Hourani in Syria and Lebanon, (London), 1946, pp. 70-1: "To be a Levantine is to live in two worlds or more at once, without belonging to either; to be able to go through the external forms which indicate the possession of a certain nationality, religion or culture, without actually possessing it. It is no longer to have a standard of values of one's own, not to be able to create but only to imitate; and so not even to imitate correctly, since that also needs a certain originality. It is to belong to no community and to possess nothing of one's own. It reveals itself in lostness, pretentiousness, cynicism and despair."

The origins of Arab nationalism are not universally agreed upon. Professor Bernard Lewis, for instance, believes that the national idea came to the Arabs more directly from the Turks, who were in contact with the Eastern European 'romantic' nationalism, than from the work of the American missionaries in the Levant in the nineteenth century. George Antonius, on the other hand, attributes a decisive role to the activities of the latter and their contribution to the cultural revival which took place in Syria after the 1840's.<sup>(1)</sup>

Sati' al-Husri analyzes the origins of Arab nationalism in terms of Christian Arab and Muslim Arab contributions. He says that Arab nationalism first began among the Christian Arabs who had never willingly accepted Ottoman rule and who were more closely in contact with the West. Through this contact they appreciated the modern historical methods of the West which permitted to discover that the Arabs had a culture before as well as after Islam. As to the Muslim Arabs, al-Husri finds that the idea of nationalism started among them from the minute they began to question the validity of the Ottoman's right to the

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(1) G. Antonius, op. cit., p.13.

Caliphate and ended by concluding that they were usurpers of an institution which belonged to the Arabs. <sup>(1)</sup>

Albert Hourani views the birth of Arab nationalism in terms of the "westernization" of Arab society and the dislocation which resulted within that society from the Western impact. <sup>(2)</sup> Abdelaziz Dourri is also of the opinion that Arab nationalism received its first impact from the West but adds that it has evolved in relation to the Muslim revival; this he considers to be the source of its originality as well as the cause of some of its contradictions. <sup>(3)</sup>

All of the above theories complement each other and can serve for the drawing of a few conclusions about the "Arab Awakening" of the second half of the nineteenth century. Arab nationalism found its original expression in the cultural field because the mass was very weak and had no political consciousness. There was no awareness

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(1) Sati' al-Husri, Nushu' al-Fikra al-Qawmiyah (Birth of the National Idea), in Arabic, Beirut (1955 edition), pp. 152-193.

(2) See A.H. Hourani, op. cit., Chapters III, IV and V.

(3) Lecture on Arab nationalism delivered at the London School of Economics on January 26, 1956. Dourri is the Dean of the Faculty of Arts in Baghdad.

of a common solidarity among the Arabs (except the Islamic one) nor a will to work together for a common aim. The aim itself was non-existent and if there began to develop a loyalty for an Arab culture this remained restricted to a very small minority.

Arab nationalism began therefore as a kind of 'Volksgeist' and not as a nation-state western type of nationalism. The movement did not rest on any specified geographical boundaries. It started in Syria and found some outlets in Baghdad and Cairo through Syrian immigrants who were active in the nascent Arab journalism. The few societies which were formed served as vehicles for the new activities which concentrated on the revival of the Arabic language and culture. The Christian missionaries were very helpful in this respect. Having appreciated the importance of Arabic for the carrying out of their work, they began to set up Arabic schools and to deliver sermons in Arabic. The Greek Orthodox Church elected, in 1899, a Syrian Arab as Patriarch. This has been considered by al-Husri as "the first practical victory for Arab  
(1)  
nationalism".

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(1) Sati al-Husri, op. cit., p. 162.

There was no international preoccupation with Arab nationalism until the turn of the century when the Arab movement begins to appear as a political force to be contended with. It is here that one begins to find a distinction between pan-Arabism and its parent movement - pan-Islamism. At this point the notion of nationalism and union is centered, were it only vaguely, around geographical delimitations - a foreign concept for "Dar al-Islam". The Arab nationalists began to preoccupy themselves with the fate of the regions under Ottoman rule in which Arabic was spoken. Taking the Arab world of today, it is seen that the above delimitation excluded, at the time, North Africa, Egypt, the Sudan and the Arabian Peninsula.<sup>(1)</sup> In other words, Arab nationalism, from the second half of the nineteenth century up to the First World War referred strictly to the Fertile crescent area.<sup>(2)</sup> There were however certain

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(1) The Arabian Peninsula was nominally under Ottoman sovereignty but in effect, had always been free from more than a symbolical sovereignty. It was Sultan Abdul Hamid II, for instance, who appointed Husain as Sherif of Mecca in 1908.

(2) It is true that the Sherif of Mecca, Husain, and his sons Abdullah (later king of Transjordan) and Faisal (later king of Iraq) played an important role in the Arab movement but the same could not be said of the bulk of the population of the Arabian Peninsula.

relations between what was taking place in Syria and Mesopotamia, on the one hand, and the rest of what is known as the "Arab Nation" today, on the other. (1)

This period of the pan-Arab movement which led to the Arab Revolt saw an innovation - the holding of Congresses. The Arab Congress held in Paris in 1913 (June 18-23) was the first of its kind and illustrates the prevailing trends of the time. Arab nationalism was inspired by the Eastern European type of nationalism which emphasized race, culture and descent rather than geographical boundaries. One sees this emphasis of race elaborated in the Paris Congress by N. Mitran, who stated:

"The Arabs are zealous about their race before their religion and this is the virtue of living nations. A virtue of the nations who refuse to die." (2)

There was a definite attempt, at the Congress, on the part of Muslims and Christians alike, to avoid and minimize the religious factor in the Arab movement. This is what has

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(1) Egypt in particular - in 1912 was founded in Cairo the Ottoman Decentralization Party which according to Antonius "became the best organized and most authoritative spokesman of Arab aspirations", op. cit., p.109. There was however very little Egyptian participation in the party which was mainly made up of refugees from Syria.

(2) For the proceedings of the Arab Congress in Paris, see The First Arab Congress (Al-Mu'tamar al-'Arabi al-awwal), in Arabic, Cairo, (1913)

led some of the delegates to put such a stress on the racial element because at the time they could not yet speak of a definite "Arab culture" as distinct from an Islamic one hence the emphasis on race. It is doubtful whether by race these people meant physical characteristics - they more probably meant a way of living. At any rate, the attempts to separate Islam from the Congress were not totally successful even if everything was done to avoid giving the impression that the Congress had any religious colouring. This effort led the President, Abdel Hamid Zahraoui to state, in an interview, that religious ties have always been a handicap to political unification. On the other hand, Ismail Fawzi, an Egyptian journalist, is reported to have said at that Congress, "Nous pensions pouvoir parler entre Arabes, nous nous sommes retrouvés entre musulmans." (2)

Another factor stressed at the Congress was that of language. The Arabic language had always played an important role in Islam, but now a revolutionary element was added - that of politically classifying people according to their language. It led in the Arab world to a

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(1) See Le Temps, Paris, June 10, 1913.

(2) Quoted in Guy Morissee, Le Proche Orient à l'Heure Occidentale, Paris, (1957), p.100.

break with the established Islamic tradition concerning pre-Islamic culture. Now glory was derived not only from the Muslim Arab heritage but from the pre-Islamic one as well. This allowed the Christian Arabs to consider the Arab heritage as something more than just the Islamic one. The new importance given to language contributed, in some degree, to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire for the Arab leaders began to ask more and more for the institution of Arabic as an official language and for the opening of Arabic secondary schools:

"The Arabic language must be recognized in the Ottoman Parliament and considered as an official language in Syrian and Arab countries."  
(1)

This consciousness and concern with the Arabic language can claim to be the most important source of the Arab national movement and has permitted a trend which allows the Arab to think of his language as the source of his culture independently of religion. The degree to which Arab national consciousness has evolved could be measured if it could be determined to what extent the Arabs still think of their religion as the main source of

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(1) Part 5 of the Resolution adopted at the Arab Congress in Paris (June 21, 1913), English translation in G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the War, Vol. 10, p. 826.  
For complete text of the resolution,  
See below, p. 104.

their cultural life. This is the question which all pan-Arabs like to evade for its asking brings up a whole problem which they hope to see solved with time. In the meantime they unconsciously copy Western concepts and Western historical precedents. An Arab leader has defined the "Arab Nation" in the following terms:

"La population qui habite sur le territoire Arabe et qui est unie par la communauté de langue, de mentalité, de souvenirs historiques, de mœurs et de coutumes, d'interets et d'espérances." (1)

In the above definition one finds a cocktail of different Western theories of nationalism: Herder's and Fichte's emphasis on language; Rousseau's stress on customs and traditions; and Renan's accent on common griefs and hopes. The definition also purposely evades the religious bond or implies it in the "souvenirs historiques".

The notion of an "Arab Nation" however was not widely talked about before the First World War because the Arab nationalists were still hoping to co-exist with the Turks and the other minorities within the Ottoman Empire.

(2)

The Arab delegates at the Paris Congress made quite clear

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(1) Chekib Arslan, in La Voix Indigene d'Alger, Oct. 28 1936, quoted in R. Rezette, Les Partis Politiques Marocains, op. cit., p. 73.

(2) See, in particular, the interventions of Abdel Hamid Zahraoui, Askander Amoun and Ahmed Tabara, in The First Arab Congress, op. cit.

that they had no intention to secede from the Ottoman Empire. From the resolution passed at the congress one gathers the impression of dealing with two kinds of nationalism - a "Syrian" and an "Arab".<sup>(1)</sup> It would be going too far to speak of two nationalisms but it would be reasonable to speak of narrow regional affiliations. The feeling of a union of all Arabs, merely because they were Arabs, had not yet developed and there was even a certain feeling of superiority on the part of Syrians who knew that they were much more advanced than the other Ottoman Arabs.<sup>(2)</sup>

Since the Arab delegates did not speak of an "Arab Nation" one cannot delimit it geographically at this time. The participants however were mostly from Syria (including Lebanon), Mesopotamia and a few Syrian immigrants from the United States. Their motive was based on the desire to take a greater part in the administration of their own regions within the Empire and to imitate the Turkish nationalist whose rebellion had proved profitable.

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- (1) See parts 3, 5 and 6 of the Resolution passed at the Congress (full text, below on p. 104)
- (2) Ibid., part 3, "... suitable to their needs and aptitudes."

Hans Kohn says that "nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness..."<sup>(1)</sup> States of mind and acts of consciousness are determined by the environment; now the environment which shaped the ideas of the Arab nationalists who met in Paris in 1913 and that which affected the Arab masses, Christian and Muslim alike, were very different. This is a good illustration of the dichotomy which existed from the start in the Arab world between the "elite" and the "masses" - they were in fact living in two different realms with different 'states of mind' and different 'acts of consciousness' (although at first the act of consciousness was limited to the former category). This dichotomy sets up a conflict whereby the "elite" thinks one way but expresses itself in another, trying thereby to influence the other group; the latter, on the other hand, acts on the basis of its own state of mind and its actions determine the expression chosen by the first group to drive the second to act.

Thus, whereas the Arab leaders were talking about the secondary importance of religion in the political sphere, and the pre-eminence of a common language, culture and history, the Arab layman was still politically dormant

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(1) Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, New York (1944), p.10.

but fairly awake religiously. The irrelevancy of religion could not be comprehended by the Arab Muslim; the Christian Arab felt the weight of a possible Muslim domination, and his sense of security, if not of survival, led him to rely, deep inside him, on the protection of a foreign Christian Power. The problem was therefore one of loyalty to a religion before anything else.

At the time of Ottoman rule, the loyalty of the Muslim Arab was not so much to a representative of a religion as it was to the religion itself. The Christian Arab had no loyalty to the Ottomans and knew that his safety depended upon the willingness of the Christian Powers to intervene any time his life was endangered. One could not expect this outlook to change overnight and it can be said that the constant effort of the pan-Arab movement has been to educate these Arabs, Muslim and Christian, and make them realize that their loyalty ought to be to the "Arab Nation" before anything else.

On the international scene, the French adopted a clear stand in the early years of the Twentieth century in regard to the Arab nationalist movement. The "sick man of Europe" was getting sicker and France wanted to be there and ready to take over some regions of Ottoman Empire when the dismemberment would take place. France

was in a good position to do this for she had always been in good relations with the Catholic minorities in the Arab regions and many of the leaders of the Arab movement were Maronites.

The Maronite community came under French protection in 1649, at the time of Louis the XIV; and after the 1860 riots in the Levant when thousands of Christians were killed, the French (and the British) used pressure on the Porte until a Convention was reached in September 1860 between the Ottoman Empire and the European Powers about the protection of minorities within the Empire. This agreement permitted France to send her troops to the Lebanon.<sup>(1)</sup> The French troops remained until a regulation about the administration of the Lebanon was drawn up with the Sublime Porte on June 1861. This regulation was ratified in 1864 and is known as the "Réglement Organique". It gave local autonomy to the Lebanon which became thereafter an independent Seljuq (Department) under a Christian Governor appointed by the Ottoman Government.<sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) Article II, see, J.C. Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol. I. pp. 163-8.

(2) See A.H. Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World, op. cit., pp. 32-3

In 1896, an Arab National Committee was founded in Paris. This committee was enlarged in 1904 and took the name of "Ligue de la Patrie Arabe" under the presidency of the Lebanese Nejjib Azuri. It has been suggested that Azuri was a French agent.<sup>(1)</sup> He published a book, Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe dans l'Asie Turque. In this book he described the state of affairs in the Ottoman Empire and the dissatisfaction of the Arabs, and concluded by advocating: the unification of the Catholic Churches under the name of the "Arab Catholic Church"; the withdrawal of the Arab provinces from the Ottoman Empire; and the formation of a united Arab nation including Iraq, Palestine, Syria (and Lebanon) as well as the setting of an Arab Muslim Caliphate in the Hejaz. Azuri was the only Arab to propose such arrangements back in 1905, and even in 1913, the Arab nationalists were still thinking in terms of the unity of the Ottoman Empire. Antonius' opinion

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(1) See the correspondence of Azuri in E. Jung, La Révolte Arabe, Paris (1924). Jung was an ex-official of the French colonial service and had helped Azuri with the foundation of the "Ligue de la Patrie Arabe" in 1904, as well as with the foundation of the newspaper "L'Indépendance Arabe" in April 1907.

of Azuri's activities is noteworthy:

"Azuri's campaign attracted some attention in Europe at the time, but so far as the Arab movement itself was concerned its effect was negligible. Its main value in this history is that it provides an example of the extent to which, as a result of foreign education, certain advocates of the Arab Revolt had strayed from the sources of its inspiration." (1)

The French were quite pleased to have Paris used as a centre for Arab nationalist activities. In 1913, Al-Fatat, The Young Arab Society, founded in 1911, called the Paris Congress. There was the prevailing feeling, if not to say certitude, among Turkish officials, that some of the Arab delegates in the 1913 Congress were working for France. The Turkish authorities had asked France to forbid the Conference from taking place but were unsuccessful in their intervention. Djenal Pasha wrote in this respect:

"... there was not the slightest doubt that the Arab revolutionaries were working under French protection for the benefit of the French Government." (2)

This assertion of Djenal Pasha, not a very objective source on this subject, may be an exaggeration but there is some

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(1) G. Antonius, op. cit., p. 99.

(2) Djenal Pasha, Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913-19, London (no date), p. 197; ibid., p. 58, "In this way, the Congress under French patronage, changed its form and constitution, and it seemed certain that it would be followed by French intervention in Syria."

grain of truth in it. The Congress itself did not hide its gratefulness for the French Government:

"The Congress conveys its grateful thanks to the Government of the (French) Republic for its generous hospitality" (Resolution).

The Arab Paris Congress also decided to communicate its resolution to all "friendly" Governments of the Ottoman Empire. The Arabs at the time were trying to make profit out of the international situation by playing European Powers against the Ottoman Empire and by indirectly threatening the latter. They found in the French a very willing partner.

The demands formulated by the Arab nationalists, in their Paris resolution, never materialised in spite of pledges on the part of the Ottoman Government. The Arabs soon lost faith in the Turks and were attracted by the idea of rebelling against Constantinople during the First World War. Their goal was suddenly altered and now they were no longer satisfied with decentralization and reform, but began to aim towards an independent "Arab Nation" which would cover the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula. In this they were more than encouraged by the promises of the Allies and of Britain in particular. (1)

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(1) Britain made six offers of independence to the Arabs during World War I: October 31, 1914 - Kitchener's offer to Husain; June 15, 1915, British Cabinet offer; December 13, 1915, McMahon's offer; February 8, 1916, Balfour's offer; June 16, 1918, Foreign Office offer; November 7, 1918, Offer in Official Communique of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

The Husain-McMahon correspondence (July 14, 1915 - March 1916) has been the subject of several studies and does not need much elaboration in the present analysis. It will suffice to mention the current usage of the expression "the Arab Nation" throughout the correspondence by both parties, and to stress the fact that Great Britain was well aware of the appeal which independence and union could have for the Arabs. British support of the idea of an independent and united Arab State, in 1915, was a landmark in British foreign policy. The intention of Britain was to neutralize the Middle Eastern region by winning an important fragment of the population, and erect a friendly Power which could be handled with ease from London. This solution had the added advantage of preventing any other European Power from setting foot in the Arab areas hitherto under Ottoman rule.

It is often alleged that the League of the Arab States was a creation of the British.<sup>(1)</sup> This is true to some extent, but its creation could not have come about had not the Arabs always aspired to some form of union. What should be said therefore, is that British policy makers were astute enough to determine what would impress and

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(1) See below, chapter 5.

please the Arab nationalists and further British interests simultaneously. This applies equally well to the policy initiated during World War I as to its revival in the Second World War. It is apparent in the Husain-McMahon correspondence just as it is in Eden's Mansion House speech of 1941. In 1915, McMahon was writing to Sharif Husain:

"Great Britiin is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs... On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek advice and guidance of Great Britain only... I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her friends the Arabs and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate result of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries." (1)

It is hard to establish when the idea of an "Arab Nation" began to take hold of the Arab nationalists. Maybe it was the natural outcome of a nationalist movement, beginning in a cultural medium, which had to finally express itself, politically, in a nation-state type of nationalism. It has been shown that there had not been as late as 1913, any talk of secession from the Ottoman Empire among the Arab intelligentsia. On the other hand, it could be argued that the mere fact that the Arab delegates "had been at pains to stress the general desire

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(1) Quoted in G. Antonius, op. cit., p. 419 (Sir Henry McMahon's Second note to the Sharif Husain, October 24, 1915).

to maintain the integrity of the empire", <sup>(1)</sup> during the Paris Conference, shows that the idea of erecting an Arab State was subconsciously at work and waiting for a favourable international situation. At any rate, the ground had been prepared for the pan-Arab ideal which Great Britain was now proposing to materialize. <sup>(2)</sup>

But even granting that the pan-Arab ideal was already widely accepted by the Arab "elite", it remains even more difficult to gauge the degree of Arab national consciousness among the people at large. Up to 1916, year of the "Arab Revolt", the Arab nationalist activities had been carried on within secret societies or outside the Ottoman Arab regions. At the time, the masses had not yet entered into the picture of the movement. The nature of their participation in the "Arab Revolt" in 1916 is not universally agreed upon. It must be realized that most Arab military activity during World War I took place in the Arabian Peninsula, a place, in the Arab regions, where national consciousness was almost inexistent and where

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(1) Antonius, op. cit., p. 115.

(2) "His Majesty's Government and their allies... are determined to stand by the Arab peoples in their struggle for the establishment of an Arab world in which law shall replace Ottoman injustice, and in which unity shall prevail over the rivalries artificially provoked by the policy of Turkish officials." - Communication from the British Government to King Hussein (February 8, 1918).

the material advantages ensuing from such a participation were more than rewarding.

The policy adopted by Djenal Pasha, Ottoman Governor of Syria during the War, and his harsh treatment of Arab nationalists contributed very largely to the Arab political awareness which expressed itself on a mass level at the time of Faisal's entrance to Damascus in 1918.

There was not much unanimity at first, among the Arab leaders, about the course to adopt towards the Ottoman regime. It is relevant to mention that the first contact which had taken place between the British authorities and the Arab movement was that between Kitchener and the Emir Abdullah in February 1914. Abdullah's motive was, (1) according to Antonius, his concern with the Turkish secret decision to depose his father, the Sherif Husain. This could very well be considered as a personal matter because at the time Husain had not yet acquired the leadership of the Arab movement which he assumed later thanks to the British initiative. This is mentioned in order to illustrate the role played by personality in Arab politics from the very start. That original interview is what has

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(1) Antonius, op. cit., p. 127.

probably led to the long and firm friendship which developed between the Hashemite dynasty and Great Britain. The propaganda which was carried in the Arab world under the British Command was made in the name of the Sherif Husain. (1) This was effective for Husain held a religious post being the guardian of the Muslim Holy Places. His word carried some weight not so much as an Arab leader as a high ranking Muslim personality.

It has been pointed out how, for instance during the Paris Conference of 1913, the Arab speakers tried to underplay the role of religion and emphasize race and culture. This was a nationalist trend and we see Faisal, in 1918, keeping in pace with it: "The Arabs were Arabs before Moses, Jesus or Mohaned". (2) This kind of statement falls within the realm of political education or that of alleviating Christian Arab fears of a united Arab State. On the other hand, when it came to moving the masses to political action, one had to resort to the intrinsic loyalty of the majority which was a loyalty to Islam.

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(1) Except in the Lebanon where no mention was ever made of Husain since most of the Arab Christians were concentrated in that area.

(2) Speech by Faisal in Aleppo, November 11, 1918, quoted by Mohaned Harb Farzat, Life of Political Parties in Syria (1908-1955), in Arabic, Damascus (1955), p.50.

This is best illustrated by the Proclamation of Sharif Husain at the start of the "Arab Revolt",<sup>(1)</sup>

The geographical delimitation of the "Arab Nation" during World War I was restricted to the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula. At that time, Arab nationalism excluded Egypt and the rest of North Africa from its movement. One of the first acts of Great Britain, after Turkey's entering the War, was to declare the establishment of a British Protectorate over Egypt (December 18, 1914). Yet two months earlier, on October 31, 1914, Kitchener had made an offer of independence to the Arabs. At the time this did not appear as a contradiction and there was not any reaction on the part of the Arab nationalists. Great Britain had, at this time, been emphasizing the racial unity

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(1) "In that first and most important of his proclamations", says Antonius, "the Sharif explained his action and appealed to Muslims to follow his example. He took his stand on the two platforms of religion and nationalism, but spoke as one who was primarily concerned with the welfare of Islam...It (the Proclamation) represented the Revolt as a religious and national duty, and as a God-Given opportunity for the attainment of independence... the signification of the proclamation, however, lay not so much in its apology of the Revolt as in its appeal to Muslim insurgence against Turkey." - Antonius, op. cit., pp. 207-8

(1)  
of the Arabs.

Egypt which had been a refuge for the Arabs persecuted by the Turks, had evolved its own national movement which was specifically Egyptian. As far back as 1860, Egypt was experimenting with parliamentary government and the British occupation in 1882 increased the rise of an Egyptian nationalism as distinguished from the Arab nationalist movement. This was natural for Egypt was faced with different problems from those facing the Ottoman Arabs. The development of an Egyptian nationalism was enhanced by Egypt's geographical entity and by the resurrection of the Pharaonic past which was undertaken by Western archeologists. The separatist nationalism of Egypt went a long way before it began to converge with the Arab movement on the eve of the creation of the League of Arab States in 1945, and more conspicuously since the Egyptian Revolution of 1952.

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- (1) Hogarth note (B.P.P. Cmd. 5964) of January 1918: "The Entente Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world. This can only be achieved by the Arabs themselves uniting, and Great Britain and her allies will pursue a policy with this ultimate unity in view."

The contradictions in the Allies' diplomacy during the First World War left a scar on the Arab movement. After the end of the War, the Arabs were faced with an ironical situation; they had to combat the imminent threat of disunity which was inherent in the Treaties concluded among the Allied Powers <sup>(1)</sup> - the very Powers which had encouraged the idea of Arab union.

The armistice of Mudros, ending the hostilities in the Middle East, was signed on October 31, 1918 by Turkey and Britain. This was the 'coup de grace' for the Ottoman Empire. A week later, on November 7, 1918, Great Britain and France issued a common declaration defining their intentions:

"The goal envisaged by France and Great Britain... is the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of national governments and administrations that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous population.

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(1) Namely, the Tripartite (Sykes-Picot) Agreement for the partition of the Ottoman Empire (Britain, France and Russia) of 1916; the Tripartite (Saint-Jean de Maurienne) for the partition of the Ottoman Empire (Britain, France and Italy); British (Balfour) Declaration on Palestine, November 2, 1917.

"In pursuit of these intentions, France and Great Britain agree to further assist in the setting up of indigenous governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia which have already been liberated by the Allies..." (1)

The first contradiction with previous British and Allied declarations which appears in this communication is the mention of "national governments and administrations" (in the plural) which implies something less than unity and independence, instead of "Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs..." (2) or, "His Majesty's Government and their allies... are determined to stand for the establishment of an Arab world... in which unity shall prevail over the rivalries artificially provoked..." (3) or again, "Great Britain and her allies will pursue a policy with this ultimate unity in view..." (4)

These contradictions became more apparent by the time of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Britain wanted to revise the arrangements provided in the Sykes-Picot Treaty in order to satisfy the Arabs, and more important in order to further her own interests since a revision of this treaty would have meant the squeezing out of French ambitions in the Middle East.

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(1) Full text in G. Antonius, op. cit., p. 435.

(2) McMahon's note to Husain (October 24, 1915)

(3) Communication from the British Government to Husain (February 8, 1918)

(4) Hogarth note (B.P.P. Cmd. 5964), January 1918.

The desire of the Arabs as defended by Emir Faisal at the Peace Conference was as follows:

"The aim of the Arab nationalist movements is to unite the Arabs eventually into one nation... We believe that our ideal of Arab unity in Asia is justified beyond need of argument." (1)

It is seen that Faisal speaks of Arab unity in Asia and his use of "eventually" shows that the Arabs were beginning to understand that their union could not be realized in the prevailing circumstances. (2)

After the occupation of the Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire, during the War, General Allenby set up the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration. The Arabs had understood that this was going to be a provisional arrangement until the formation of the Arab State- to be, and went ahead with their activities preparing for the awaited day. In 1919, the Party of Arab Independence was founded. (3) It was approved by Faisal and elections were held in the O.E.T.A. (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration). Eighty-five deputies were elected and thirty-five others were appointed to represent the various tribes and religious

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(1) For complete text of Faisal's memorandum (Jan. 1, 1919) to the Supreme Council at the Peace Conference, see J.C. Hurwicz, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 38-39.

(2) Ibid., p. 38, Faisal's definition of Arab Asia, "Syria, Irak, Jezirah, Hedjaz, Nejd, Yemen."

(3) See M. Harb Farzat, op. cit., p. 64.

(1)  
denominations. The Assembly thereby constituted was called the General Syrian Congress.

It would be pertinent to ask whether the General Syrian Congress should be regarded as an institution serving pan-Arabism or one serving Syrian nationalism. As a result of what the Arabs considered a betrayal on the part of the Allies, who had not fulfilled their promises, the nationalists began to think in terms of "possibilities" rather than "expectancies". This is more than noticeable in Faisal's intervention at the Peace Conference: (2)

"... I have come to ask that the Arabic-speaking peoples of Asia be recognised as independent sovereign peoples... the confirmation of the States already existing in the area, the adjustment of their boundaries with one another... and the formation of such new states as are required, and their boundaries, are matters of arrangements between us."

The first thing to notice in these excerpts is the phrase "Arabic-speaking peoples" - an interesting new approach for it stresses language as the most important common link

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- (1) The elections had taken place in Syria only, and only sixty-nine of the elected representatives were able to attend the opening session of the Congress (July 2, 1919) since the French had prevented the deputies elected in their areas from going to Damascus. See M. Harb Farzat, op. cit., p. 65.
- (2) For the statements of Faisal at the Peace Conference, see D.H. Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris Volume IV.

(1)

between the Arabs. Then it is seen that Faisal, the spokesman of Arab nationalism and Arab unity, is talking of (Arab) "States" and of the "formation of new States".<sup>(2)</sup> Faisal must have realized, after his discussions with European statesmen, that it was going to be impossible to execute the pledges which were made during the War. He tried therefore to adjust to the new situation as well as he could. Nor was he the only one for we find the General Syrian Congress adopting resolutions demanding the complete and absolute independence of Syria,<sup>(3)</sup> the crowning of Faisal as King of a Syrian Constitutional Monarchy, and the complete independence of Mesopotamia. One does not encounter in these resolutions a single mention of the

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- (1) This terminology or more precisely "Arabophone" (a term much used by the French) was very much resented by the Arabs later on when the French began to use it in order to hamper and fight any feeling of Arab solidarity. See Sati' al-Husri who discusses this point in his Nushu' al-Fikra al-Qawmiyah, op. cit., p. 213, and who says that the French policy amounted to saying that "the Syrians are not Arab even if they speak Arabic". See also, Robert Montagne, "French Policy in North Africa and Syria", in *International Affairs*, March 1937.
- (2) Faisal had already stated, on January 1, 1919, "The various provinces of Arab Asia... are very different economically and socially, and it is impossible to constrain them into one frame of Government." J.C. Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 38.
- (3) Syria here refers to the "Geographical" Syria (Hinterland Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan).

contemplated unity of the "Arab Nation" so much discussed during the "Arab Revolt". The nearest thing which one finds is a demand that "there should be no economical barriers between the two countries (Syria and Mesopotamia)<sup>(1)</sup>."

In this light one could very well see the General Syrian Congress as an instrument of nascent Syrian nationalism. The development of Syrian, Lebanese and Iraqi nationalisms was encouraged by the manner in which the Allies administered the O.E.T.A. Artificial barriers were erected and the apparent mistrust in Franco-British relations made them more intense.

In November 1919, Faisal came to terms with Clemenceau over a provisional arrangement which allowed for French occupation of Lebanon and a part of Syria. He returned to Syria in January 1920 and was met with a coldness which could only be explained by the general dissatisfaction of Arab leaders over the agreement which had been reached in Paris. The General Syrian Congress was moved to act quickly and in its reunion of March 7, 1920, it passed a

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(1) For complete text of the Resolution of the General Syrian Congress, (July 2, 1919) see Antonius, op. cit., pp. 440-442.

(1)  
resolution which proclaimed (instead of "demanding" as had been done in 1919) Syria a totally independent country with Faisal as its first constitutional monarch. The resolution also demanded the total independence of Iraq with the reserve of a political and economic union between the two countries.  
(2)

The activities of the General Syrian Congress were in vain for one month later, on April 25, 1920, the division of the O.E.T.A. into mandates was agreed upon at the San Remo Conference. The arrangement provided for a French mandate over Syria and the Lebanon, and for a British mandate over Palestine (and Transjordan) and one over Iraq. The French thereafter faced "King" Faisal with an ultimatum - amounting to the acceptance of the French mandate over Syria - which

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- (1) For the complete text of the Resolution see, La Documentation Francaise, No. 1502, July 9, 1951, "Aperçu sur l'évolution politique de l'Iraq", pp. 2-3.
- (2) Ibid., p. 3, "Etant donné que la révolution arabe a été entreprise en vue de libérer le peuple arabe du joug turc, que les raisons invoquées par la Syrie pour obtenir son indépendance sont également valables pour l'Iraq et que les deux pays sont étroitement liés par la langue ainsi que par des liens historiques, économiques, géographiques et raciaux, qui les rendent indispensables l'un à l'autre, nous réclamons l'indépendance totale de l'Iraq, sous réserve d'une union politique et économique entre les deux pays." A group of Iraqi leaders also had met and declared Iraq an independent country with Emir Abdullah as its first constitutional monarch.
- (3) Transjordan was made a semi-autonomous principality under Emir Abdullah in 1922.

he accepted. The ultimatum was followed by the French occupation of Syria and the departure of Faisal on July 28, 1920.

With the San Remo Conference, the Franco-British scramble for Middle Eastern territory was formally ended. The disillusionment of the Arab world was great:

"It was not only the denial of the two cherished goals of independence and unity that provoked the revulsion of feeling, but also, and more profoundly, the breach of faith. The distinction is an important one: it foreshadows the subsequent transition from disappointment to despair, and in it lies the key to the upheavals that followed."(1)

The Western opposition to Arab independence and union has greatly helped the development of an Arab national consciousness as well as a more serious desire for the emergence of an "Arab Nation". This opposition also set about a psychological defence mechanism among Arab nationalists - a mechanism which when carried to its extreme could turn into xenophobia. A complete re-examination of the problems had to take place in the minds of the Arab leaders and it became apparent that the pan-Arab dream could not materialize as long as it encountered international opposition.

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(1) G. Antonius, op. cit., p. 305.

RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB CONGRESS AT PARIS (June 21, 1913)

- 1) Radical and urgent reforms are needed in the Ottoman Empire.
- 2) It is important to guaranteed the Ottoman Arabs the exercise of their political rights by making effective their participation in the central administration of the Empire.
- 3) It is important to establish in each of the Syrian and Arab vilayets a decentralized regime suitable to their needs and aptitudes.
- 4) The vilayet of Bayrut, having formulated its claims in a special project adopted on 31 January 1913 by an ad hoc general Assembly and based on the double principle of the extension of the powers of the general council of the vilayet and the nominations of foreign councillors, the Congress requests the execution of the above project.
- 5) The Arabic language must be recognized in the Ottoman Parliament and considered as an official language in Syrian and Arab countries.
- 6) Military service shall be regional in Syrian and Arab vilayets, except in case of extreme necessity.
- 7) The Congress expresses the wish that the Ottoman Imperial Government will provide the mutasarrifik of Lebanon with the means of improving its financial situation.
- 8) The Congress affirms that it favours the reformist and decentralizing demands of the Armenian Ottomans.
- 9) The present resolution shall be communicated to the Ottoman Imperial Government.
- 10) These resolutions shall be communicated to the powers friendly to the Ottoman Empire.
- 11) The Congress conveys its grateful thanks to the Government of the (French) Republic for its generous hospitality.

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(Text in G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the War, Vol. X, p. 826.

CHAPTER 4: PAN-ARABISM AND THE INTER-WAR PERIOD.

The peace-settlement after the First World War divided the Arab Ottoman area into five units: Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Palestine, Iraq and Saudi Arabia - five out of the seven founding members of the Arab League. In the political development of the West, the formation of the "nation" had preceded that of the "state" while in the Arab world, the "nation" grew up within a "state" organization. This reversed process of nation-formation is one source of the confusion which surrounds any study of Arab nationalism or pan-Arabism.

The term "nationalism" has been used so far as a matter of convenience. If one were to be precise, it would appear that there can be no nationalism proper without the physical existence of a nation. The Arabs, at the time of the "Arab Revolt", spoke of the "Arab Nation" - a very unprecise political and geographical ideal; the post-war settlement, having created a patch-work of "states", was followed by the development of a political consciousness directly related to administrative and political institutions. The institutions which had evolved for centuries under Ottoman rule had to be thrown aside and the problem of their replacement by something new soon appeared:

"When this western conception of nationality penetrated into the Islamic world, Islamic society was theoretically confronted with two alternatives. It might either refuse to try a shoe which had been shaped for other feet, or it might mutilate itself for the sake of wearing Cinderella's slipper. In practice, however, it was impossible for the weaker society to remain impervious to the stronger society's prestige and refuse to follow its fashions; and therefore the fate which brought Islam into contact with the West doomed Islamic society to turn and rend itself." (1)

The choice, if there was one, was made, and could only have been made, by the Arab "elite". From then on the whole effort of the nationalist movement in the Arab world was to inform their respective populations and make them understand the new language of the day: "We have to be firm in the belief that our age is the age of nationalities (al-<sup>(2)</sup> qaumiyyat), not the age of religions" said Sami Shawkat.

As if the problems introduced by the new concept of nationality were not enough, there was added the confusion of "Arab" nationalism at large which preoccupied the minds of Arab leaders simultaneously with that of 'local' nationalism. It must be pointed out that the appeal of an

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(1) A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs (1925), op. cit., p.18.

(2) Quoted in Sylvia G. Haim, "Islam and the Theory of Arab Nationalism" in Die Welt Des Islam, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 124.

"Arab" nationalism had a greater attraction for the masses than the local types of nationalism because the former coincided much more with the Muslim ideal of union and the concept of the "Umma Muhammadia".

If the appeal to Arab nationalism was more effective in attracting the attention of the Arab layman, the development of local nationalisms, on the other hand, was enhanced by the particular environment and circumstances, was more feasible, practically speaking, and held more material gains for the ambitious politicians. Local nationalisms in the Arab countries developed separately, but were all spiritually and ideologically inspired by the general pan-Arab movement which was more suitable for a people unfamiliar with the western concept of nation-state nationalism.

The pan-Arab movement and the particular nationalist movements were complementary at times and contradictory at others. Before the formation of separate Arab "states", the Arab movement revolved around the idea of a single Arab community with identical problems and aspirations. The appearance of the political entities - in itself a marked failure of the Arab movement and its aims for unity-initiated separate nationalist movements whose point of

reference remained, nonetheless, the larger pan-Arab movement. It is at this juncture that one can begin to speak of pan-Arabism since new efforts were being made individually by each Arab nationalist movement to attain some of the goals which had been frustrated by the European intervention in Arab affairs.

It was logical and natural for the local nationalist movements, as well as the pan-Arab movement, to take a similar stand on foreign intervention and the Palestine question; and every local movement based its platform on independence and union. In order to attain independence, effective and mature local movements were needed, but, ironically enough, the rise of such efficient movements carried with it an inherent opposition to the larger union because various political, economic and personal interests crystallized in the process.

What gave the continuous impression of the existence of similar aims behind the two kinds of movements was the presence of a common adversary: Western control. It could be said therefore, that on the theoretical level the two types of movements were complementary, and even part of the same thing, since there could be no union without independence and no independence without a strong local

nationalist movement. Practically speaking however, the result has been the erecting of economic, political and sociological barriers between the two movements - barriers which were, and had to be, underplayed by the local nationalist movements in order to gain a psychological and spiritual hold on the masses for whom the difference between an "Arab Nation" and the traditional Islamic "Umma" was not apparent.

The contradiction between these two types of nationalism is the obstacle which has faced, and still is, facing the movement for Arab unity. Once the separate movements matured and attained their first goal - independence - they began to seek the second - union, not by identifying their aspirations with those of the larger movement of pan-Arabism but rather by doing the reverse. They began to identify the aspirations of all Arabs with those of say the Syrian, Iraqi or Egyptian movements - in other words, they began to look upon themselves as the centre of the pan-Arab movement and expected all the other movements to come around and join them as if their particular nationalism was in effect the

(1)  
nationalist movement of all Arabs. This is most apparent in the negotiations which took place before the creation of the League of Arab States.

After the First World War, the link which had existed between the different political societies in Syria and Iraq was interrupted by the occupation of these territories by two different Powers. From that moment onward, each country was faced with internal problems and was forced to evolve a policy peculiar to the prevailing circumstances.

After 1920, the only kind of union discussed was that of "Geographical Syria" as the Arabs began to name the area made up of Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine. The desire for such a union was expressed by the respective nationalist movements as a reaction against the French division of Syria, and as an effort to solve the problem of Palestine by including the latter in a greater unit. It was also one way of combatting Western domination - that is by playing the interests of France against those of Great Britain. This was facilitated by the fact that

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(1) N. Nashashibi writing in Al-Akhbar, Cairo, 14 November 1955, "I have noticed that all the Arabs have become Egyptians. On the face of every Arab I have met, I have seen that admirable mixture of revolt, anger, enthusiasm and determination which prepares the way for unity."

Great Britain had always been willing to encourage such projects of union. Britain's policy was so planned as to make her benefit from any scheme of Arab unity since it would have resulted in the end of Western control but would have allowed her to re-enter from the back door thanks to her relations with the Hashemite dynasty.

The local nationalist movements were preoccupied with various uprisings. Iraq was the scene of a major upheaval in 1920, the Arabian Peninsula was the field of dynastic rivalries and tribal rebellion; Syria saw an important popular reaction against French rule in 1925; and Palestine was dominated by the Arab-Zionist relations which led to the Palestinian rebellion of the 1930's. These events had an effect which could not but alter the path of the early Arab movement.

The Arabian Peninsula which had been the starting point of the "Arab Revolt" began to play a secondary role. This was not surprising for its previous contribution was mainly that of one man, the Sharif Husain, or of one dynasty - the Hashemites. Once its role was played, Husain was no longer powerful and found himself unwanted by the British and Arabs alike - especially after his defeat by Ibn Saoud. The politics of the Arab world were, and still

are to a lesser extent, a matter of personalities and not so much those of a specific programme. It suffices to point out the ease with which Faisal was, within the span of three years, the delegate of the Hedjaz at the Paris Peace Conference, the spokesman of the "Arab Nation", King of Syria and then King of Iraq. There had not been at the time any crystallization of national feeling nor of loyalty to a state, and the popularity of the individual allowed him to fill different roles at different times.

The deception of the Arab nationalists led them to be more cynical and to adopt a more "realistic" approach. It was realized that if any union of the Arab countries were to take place it could not do so without the backing of some Great Power. This was the assumption adopted by the Hashemite dynasty - King Faisal in Iraq and the Emir Abdullah in Transjordan.

The determining influence of Great Britain and France on the pan-Arab movement can hardly be over-stressed. This influence was indirect where it affected the local nationalist movements and direct, particularly in case of Great Britain, when it was related to the pan-Arab movement itself.

The attitude of France which had consisted, in the very beginning of the twentieth century, in an encouragement of Arab nationalism, was radically changed after the First World War from fear of finding herself outplayed by Great Britain. France, therefore, from the moment it took hold of Syria and Lebanon, began a policy of assimilation and anti-Arabism:

"Whereas you (the British) have no great difficulty in playing the card of 'Arab unity' throughout your vast zone of influence, we (the French) unfortunately see the flames from the heart of this great Arab Empire spreading all around and reaching North Africa, where we have evolved a totally different policy to maintain French sovereignty and to favour assimilation rather than autonomy." (1)

The worry of France was not limited to the effect of pan-Arabism on her North African possessions. The shelved report of the King-Crane Commission had clearly shown that in any event, the Syrians (more exactly Faisal and his party) would prefer Great Britain as a mandatory. France

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(1) R. Montagne, "French Policy in North Africa and Syria, in International Affairs, March 1937, p. 272.

(2) See the report of one of the officers of the King-Crane Commission about how the Commission's work was "rigged", in Documents on British Foreign Policy, Series I, Vol. IV.

attempted everything which could pull Syria from the Arab  
(1)  
movement.

This trend was accompanied by the division of Syria  
into four "Senjaks" including the Greater Lebanon.

Great efforts were made to pull the Lebanon from the Arab  
world by asserting that its cultural past was different  
from the Arab one and that it was essentially Phoenician. (2)

The minority problem was also played up and led to a  
revival of sectarian disputes. Toynbee is of the opinion  
that:

"The Christian minorities resident in the French  
mandated territories, as well as the Syrian  
Christians living abroad, would probably have  
come to terms with the majority of the Syrian  
people if the mandatory Power had not fostered  
a separate Christian nationalism by creating the  
Great Lebanon State and undertaking to uphold its  
independence as against the State or States of  
Syria." (3)

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- (1) "Text-books were specially composed for history classes  
of all standards, in which the Arab achievement in  
Syria was watered down and the ties uniting her to the  
rest of the Arab world represented as fictitious."  
G. Antonius, op. cit., p. 374; see also, Sati' al-  
Husri, Nushu' al-Fikra al-Qawmiyya (Birth of the  
National Idea), in Arabic, op. cit., p. 213.
- (2) See N.A. Faris and M.T. Husayn, The Crescent in Crisis,  
Kansas University Press (1955), pp. 140-44; see also  
A. Rustum and F.A. al-Bustani, Ta'rikh Lubnan al-  
Mujaz (in Arabic), Beirut (second edition, 1937).
- (3) A.J. Toynbee, op. cit., p.20.

France's policy in the Lebanon was aided by the fact that "the majority of the Lebanese Christians welcomed the advent of France as a mandatory Power as against the establishment of an independent Arab State in which the Muslims would be in a majority."<sup>(1)</sup> The effect of this French policy of "divide and rule" has been very harmful to the pan-Arab movement for it made the Christian Arabs, who had been among the most efficient pioneers of Arab nationalism, hesitant. It has reinforced certain fears which still characterize the general feeling of the Christian Lebanese. This trend was by no means a universal one and many Christian Arabs reacted against it and identified it with the colonial interests of France.<sup>(2)</sup>

In Syria, the anti-Arab policy of France is precisely what kept alive the militant pan-Arab spirit to the extent that it was very rarely disassociated from the local nationalist movement - even to the point where no clear distinction could be drawn between the two. Aside from the traditional inclination of Syria for Arab unity, there was now added the opposition to a colonial policy. The

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(1) E. Atiyah, The Arabs, p. 119, London (1955)

(2) See E. Rabbath, Unité Syrienne et Devenir Arabe, Paris (1937)

attitude of France made pan-Arabism, automatically and by reaction, worthwhile in the eyes of the Syrian nationalists. In this sense, the Syrian upheaval of 1925 was incontest-  
(1)  
ably "Arab".

The policy of Great Britain, in regard to the pan-Arab movement, was, on the other hand, antithetical to that of France. Great Britain learned an important lesson from the Iraqi Revolution of 1920. The settlement which she concluded with the Iraqi nationalists served her interests while giving the nationalists the impression that they had obtained what they had been seeking. Nonetheless it was more realistic than the French stand and -  
(2)  
superficially - more in line with Arab opinion.

The crowning of Faisal as King of Iraq in 1921 was a

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(1) E. Rabbath, op. cit., p. 39: "Mais c'est incontestablement au cours de l'insurrection de 1925, que l'arabisme s'est manifesté en Syrie, avec le plus de fervour. Hymnes, étendards, devises, nous de guerre, des bandes et des sections de bandes, tout est arabe, s'inspire de l'histoire arabe."

(2) "Unlike France, however, Great Britain realized the strong national grievances of the Arabs and was ready to follow a more sympathetic policy towards them by recognising, though slowly and piecemeal, certain fundamental national aspirations", M. Khadduri, Independent Iraq, a Study in Iraqi Politics since 1932, p. 158, London (1951)

(1)  
move decided by Churchill at the Middle Eastern Conference of Cairo that same year. It was staged in such a way as to make it coincide with the aspirations of the Iraqi nationalists. Hubert Young, who was Secretary General and Private Secretary to Churchill during the Conference, wrote: "Mr. Churchill had already made up his mind that Faisal would be the best person with whom to make a treaty." (2)  
On June 14, 1921, Churchill told the House of Commons:

"I do not hesitate to say that, if the Emir Faisal should be acceptable to the people generally, and to the assembly, a solution will have been reached which offers, in the opinion of the highest authorities on whom I am relying, the best prospects for a happy and prosperous outcome." (3)

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- (1) The Conference took place from March 12th to the 24th (1921) and had been called following the creation of a Middle Eastern Department (which came into being on February 14, 1921) put under the direction of the Colonial Office headed, at the time, by Winston Churchill. The creation of this department had been strongly recommended by the latter, "I therefore pressed most strongly for placing the whole responsibility for the Middle East under a single Minister..." Churchill before the House of Commons, in his policy statement on the Middle East (June 14, 1921), Parl. Deb., House of Commons, Vol. 143, p. 268.
  - (2) See Major Hubert Young, The Independent Arab, p. 326, London (1933); also P.W. Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development, p. 314, "When Mr. Churchill arrived at Cairo for the Conference, he had made up his mind that Faisal was the only possible candidate with whom such a treaty might be negotiated", London.
  - (3) Parl. Deb., H. of C., op. cit. p. 275. Khadduri, op. cit., p. 7, "Faisal's greatest asset was his ability to hold a balance between the British and the Iraqi nationalists"; P.W. Ireland, op. cit., "Mr. Churchill believed moreover that if Faisal were installed in Iraq, the British Government would acquire increased control both over him and over his father the Sharif of Mecca..."; ibid., p. 316, "Churchill declared that Faisal should be made to realize that his father's subsidy ... depended on Faisal's own behaviour."

The crowning of King Faisal is taken as an example to illustrate the policy of Great Britain which was intended to calm the mounting Arab nationalist fervour. In so doing the nationalist force could be controlled and even directed with the aid of a "suitable candidate":

"We should like to have the best candidate chosen but we must in any case have a suitable candidate".  
(1)

The British policy was one of long range, and by satisfying certain demands of the nationalists it erected a solid dam against the waves of a movement which would have destroyed British power in the area. By reacting so early, Great Britain satisfied the ambitions of a restricted circle of nationalists which it protected until the latter became convinced of the identity of interests it had with the allied power. (2) Great Britain also knew how to profit from Arab opinion, which gave her the benefit

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(1) Parl. Deb. H. of C., op. cit., p. 276.

(2) The benefits of this policy, for Great Britain, are still apparent, at least in the case of Iraq. As late as December 1956 this can be impled from the speech of Nuri Said (the man who had been the intermediary between the Iraqi nationalists and the British for the nomination of Faisal in 1921) when he declared on December 17, "It is evident that the policy of the Communists, the Zionists and of French imperialism complement each other in the Middle East" (Le Monde, December 13, 1956) - not a single mention of Great Britain although the latter took an active part in the Israeli-Franco-British intervention in Egypt in November 1956.

of the doubt, after she had managed indirectly to put the blame for the post-war settlement on France's shoulders by continuing to favour Arab unity while France did everything to oppose it.

Great Britain established "Treaty relations" with Iraq so that King Faisal and the Iraqis "could maintain that they knew nothing of a 'mandate' and that they were merely in treaty relations with Great Britain while the League of Nations would hold Great Britain responsible for observance of the mandate by means of the Treaty."<sup>(1)</sup> In this policy one can see how well Britain understood the Arab mind which puts more emphasis on form than substance.<sup>(2)</sup> Iraqi nationalism was gratified by the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations in 1932 - an international manifestation of its newly acquired independence.

On February 23, 1922, Great Britain extended her policy to Egypt when she unilaterally terminated the

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(1) Hubert Young, op. cit., p. 327.

(2) E. Atiyah, op. cit., p. 96, "It is a characteristic of the Arab mind to be swayed more by words than by ideas, and more by ideas than by facts. Transcendental principles, especially when put into resonant speech, seem to the Arabs to have a power capable of conquering the greatest practical realities."

(1)  
Egyptian Protectorate; and on August 1936, a Treaty terminating British military occupation of Egypt was signed and Egypt was admitted to the League of Nations on the 26th of May 1937.

In a treaty signed with Ibn Saoud in 1927, Britain recognized "the complete and absolute independence of the dominions of His Majesty the King of the Hedjaz and of Nejd and its dependencies."  
(2)

Another marked difference between British and French policy, in the Arab world, was the former's outward support of pan-Arabism after the First World War which gave British policy the appearance of being in conformity with the pledges made during the War. The intention of Great Britain was to derive benefits from its relationship and alliance with Iraq by making her the spearhead of the pan-Arab Movement. Churchill expressed it in these terms:

"Broadly speaking there are two policies which can be adopted towards the Arab race. One is the policy of keeping them divided, of discouraging their national aspirations, of setting up administrations of local notables in each particular province or city, and exerting

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(1) Egypt was not considered "Arab" at that time.

(4) For the full text of the treaty (May 20, 1927), see J.C. Hurewicz, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 148.

influence through the jealousies of one tribe against another... the other policy, and the one which, I think, is alone compatible with the sincere fulfilment of the pledges we gave during the war to the Arab race and to the Arab leaders, is an attempt to build around the ancient capital of Baghdad, in a form friendly to Britain and to her allies, an Arab State which can revive and embody the old culture and glories of the Arab race... of these two policies we have definitely chosen the latter."

(1)

The first policy mentioned by Churchill could very well serve as a description of French policy in the Arab world. After that, the contrast between the policies of France and Great Britain becomes quite clear. Britain however, did not initiate the movement for Arab union; she realized its potentialities. It then tried to materialize these potentialities with the aid of the Hashemite dynasty. It adopted what Churchill called the "Sharifian solution."

(2)

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- (1) Parl. Deb., H. of C., op. cit., pp. 274-5; note the constant reference to the "Arab race" - this was to keep in pace with the prevailing mood of the pan-Arab movement which stressed, at the time, race in order to underplay religion.
- (2) Churchill stated in his House of Commons speech on the Middle East in 1921, "We are leaning strongly to what I may call the Sherifian solution, both in Mesopotamia, to which the Emir Faisal is proceeding, and in Trans-Jordan, where the Emir Abdulla is now in charge" - Parl. Deb. H. of C., op. cit., p. 276; also ibid., pp. 288-9, "I had a long conference with the Emir Abdulla at Jerusalem. He has undertaken to maintain order in Trans-Jordan and to prevent any hostile action against the French... should he find it necessary to lay down the charge which we have persuaded him to assume, I trust it will be possible to find another Arab ruler who will, no doubt, command his goodwill and influence over the tribes."

Apart from British support, there were many factors which favoured Iraq in the role of leader of pan-Arabism at that time. She was the first truly modern Arab State, her monarch had been from the start closely identified with the Arab movement, and after she obtained her independence, "a number of Arab nationalists found refuge in Iraq and came to regard her as another 'Piedmont' which would eventually achieve the pan-Arab union."

The inter-war period saw ~~the~~ the revival of the pan-Arab ideal with a certain amount of rivalry between King Faisal and King Ibn Saoud for the leadership of the movement. Ibn Saoud had always sought the leadership of the Arab world, and his whole diplomacy was inspired from this ambition. One of his first moves was to attempt to mitigate the feud between his dynasty and the Hashemites. To this end a meeting was arranged between him and King Faisal. It took place aboard a British warship, the *Lupin*, on the Persian Gulf. The role of Britain in this meeting

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(1) Egypt was not considered, at the time, an "Arab" country.

(2) E. Rabbath, op. cit., p. 330, "Fayçal... s'efforçait de faire de Bagdad le centre de l'arabisme moderne. Sa mort n'a pas arrêté l'élan. L'idée est transmise aux hommes politiques issus de l'Irak".

(3) M. Khadduri, Independent Iraq, op. cit. p.159. Khadduri makes the point that Faisal's actual policy was not exclusively pan-Arab when he writes, "The pan-Arab school, however, also claimed to derive its ideology from the broad pan-Arab ideas of Faysal, which, however, were not clearly evident in his actual conduct of foreign policy." Ibid. p. 156.

can be deduced from the presence of the British High Commissioner for Iraq at the meeting. This interview prepared the ground for the conclusion of a treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Saudi Arabia and Iraq which was signed in Mecca on April 17, 1931. This treaty was to be the first of a whole series of treaties of Friendship which were concluded between 1931 and 1936 between the Arab countries. They became an important vehicle of the pan-Arab movement.

These treaties had followed the various Islamic Congresses which were held to discuss the future of the Caliphate after it was abolished by Turkey in 1924. It has been shown how advantage was taken of the Islamic Congress held in Jerusalem in 1931 to hold a pan-Arab Congress which formulated an Arab Covenant. This Covenant was one of the first steps toward Arab union, it outlined the goals of the Arab movement in these terms:

"The Arab lands are a complete and indivisible whole, and the divisions of whatever nature to which they have been subjected are not approved or recognized by the Arab Nation.

"All efforts in every Arab country are to be directed towards the single goal of their complete independence, in their entirety and unified; and every idea which aims at limitation to work for local regional politics must be fought against.

"Since colonization is, in all its forms and manifestations, wholly incompatible with the dignity and highest aims of the Arab Nation, the Arab Nation rejects it and will combat it with all its forces." (1)

At that same meeting, the Arab delegates instituted a pan-Arab committee to take all the necessary measures and recommendations for the furtherance of Arab union. (2)

The sequence of treaties to be signed between the different Arab countries in the 1930's was a natural outcome of the "Arab Covenant" and coincided with Ibn Saoud's active campaign. The 1931 Treaty between Iraq and Ibn Saoud was followed by another treaty between him and Transjordan in 1933. On May 20, 1934 was concluded a "Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Arab Brotherhood", otherwise known as the Treaty of Taif, between the Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The treaty starts out in these terms: "... Being desirous of uniting the Islamic Arab Nation...", and goes

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(1) Quoted in A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1934, p.107, R.I.I.A., London (1935); see also Oriente Moderno, January 1932, p. 43.

(2) This Committee was to operate from Baghdad and amongst its members was Azzam Pasha who was to become the first Secretary General of the League of Arab States in 1945. The Committee did not do much except for its mediation in 1934 between the Yemen and Saudi Arabia which resulted in the signing of a peace treaty between the two in that same year. Azzam Pasha had become to be active in pan-Arab campaigns; In 1932 he wrote an article called "The Arabs, People of the Future" in a review El-Arab, for extracts from this article see France, Notes Documentaires et Etudes, No. 342, pp. 10-11, (July 2, 1946)

on to state in article 16 that "their two nations are one nation". It also provided for a common representation abroad in case only one of the two countries had a representative in some area and allowed for a joint effort in view of determining a common political action in the interest of their "one nation".<sup>(1)</sup>

The Treaty of Taif was followed, on April 2, 1936, by a similar treaty between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. This treaty also started with "... in view of the ties of the Islamic faith and racial unity which unite them..." In terms of the pan-Arab movement this treaty was more advanced than any of its predecessors for it left open accession, by other Arab States, to the Treaty.<sup>(2)</sup>

Yemen adhered to the 1936 Treaty on April 29, 1936.<sup>(3)</sup> But the most important event was Egypt's adherence to the

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(1) Article 20. For text see, Documents on International Affairs, 1937, p. 517; see also above, pp. 63-65.

(2) Article 6: "Any other independent Arab State shall on request be permitted to accede to this Treaty". Article 7 states, "The two High contracting Parties will co-operate with a view to unifying the Islamic and Arab culture and the military systems of their two countries..."

(3) For Act of adhesion of the Yemen see Documents on International Affairs, op. cit., pp. 527-8.

same treaty, on May 7, 1936, in the form of a treaty signed between Saudi Arabia and Egypt in Cairo. This move can be considered as the formal entry of Egypt into the pan-Arab scene - an act which has had some very important repercussions on the Arab movement.

It must be noted that the most active person in all of these treaties was Ibn Saoud. His Foreign Minister, Fouad Hamze, was carrying an intense pan-Arab diplomatic activity as can be seen from a declaration he made in Cairo, a few days before the signing of the Egypto-Saudian treaty:

"L'Unité Arabe est aujourd'hui le souhait de tout serviteur de l'arabisme. Elle se réalisera bientôt, sans doute aucun, parce que les arabes ont compris le mal que leur cause leur dispersion, leur éloignement les uns des autres... En Arabie comme en Iraq régnent un violent désir d'unité, un espoir ardent dans le triomphe final. Après n'avoir été qu'un rêve, l'idée arabe devient aujourd'hui une réalité vivante qui se développe et s'amplifie vers son épanouissement total." (2)

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(1) For text, see, British and Foreign Papers, vol. 140, pp. 449-50, (1936).

(2) Al-Ayam, Damascus, 3 May 1936 (as translated and quoted by E. Rabbath, op.cit.).

The final point which must be made about these treaties is that Great Britain encouraged their conclusion. Some of the Arabs were quite aware of Great Britain's moves and were suspicious of her actions in favour of Arab union. Others went so far as to consider Britain as the arch-enemy of pan-Arabism.<sup>(1)</sup>

During the inter-war period, the year 1936 was a rallying point for pan-Arabism. The Arab insurrection in Palestine reached a critical stage and an open and violent campaign was started against the British mandate and Zionist activities. In Syria there were more moves in favour of Arab unity. The year 1936 was also important, because, as it was seen, Egypt entered into the Arab community by joining "Arab Brotherhood" Treaty in May 1936.

In Palestine, British policy of a Jewish National Home<sup>(2)</sup> was failing and the Arabs were already angered at the

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(1) E. Rabbath, op. cit., p. 355, "Son adversaire véritable c'est l'Angleterre, qui l'a nourri pour mieux le juguler" ibid., p. 343, "Baghdad, soutenu par l'Angleterre, intéressée à créer en Orient une masse agencée de défense pro-Britannique, a fini par le enboîter le pas au maître du Hedjaz à l'exemple de Fayçal, qui comprit son rôle futur et fit taire ses ressentiments." This was written in 1937 not in 1955.

(2) A.J. Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 21-22: "Any observer who did not allow his feeling to get the better of his reasons was bound to reflect that the undertaking was a tour de force. At a moment when, in the Islamic world as a whole, minorities were rapidly disappearing... it was audacious to attempt in one tiny corner of this world, to bring a new minority into being."

French who were drawing political gains in Syria and Lebanon from another minority problem. The Arabs in Palestine were becoming more and more impatient for some degree of independence because they were quite aware of the progress which was being made by the other nationalist movements in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan. They were also increasingly alarmed at the rise of Jewish immigration into Palestine which had doubled the Jewish population between the years of 1930 and 1936.(1) The Mufti of Jerusalem was representative of Arab opinion when he said:

"We have had so many commissions; so much has been recommended by them in our favour; and what is the result? Over 60,000 Jewish immigrants in one year." (2)

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(1) This increase was of course due to the persecution of Jews under the Nazi regime in Central Europe. It is relevant, at this point, to quote from the statement of policy made by Churchill before the House of Commons on June 14, 1921: "The Arabs believe that in the next few years they are going to be swamped by scores of thousands of immigrants from Central Europe, who will push them off the land, eat up the scanty substance of the country and eventually gain absolute control of its institutions and destinies. As a matter of fact these fears are illusory." Parl. Deb. H. of C., p. 285.

(2) Humphrey Bowman, Middle East Window, p. 335 (quoted in G. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, op. cit. p. 183).

Faced with the Palestine disorders of 1936, the British Government knew how to make use of the Arab monarchs of Iraq Transjordan and Saudi Arabia who had attained their position with the help of Great Britain. The Arab monarchs appealed to the Arab Higher Committee in these terms:

"The prevailing situation in Palestine has greatly pained us. We, in agreement with our brothers the Arab Kings and the Emir Abdullah, ask you to resort to quietness in order to avoid bloodshed, relying on the intentions of our friends the British Government and its declared desire to ensure justice. You may rest assured that we will continue to endeavour to help you." (1)

In Syria, the nationalist movement kept fighting for the unification of the "Greater Syria" and favoured any move which would encourage Arab unity. On June 10, 1936, the National Bloc, meeting in Damascus, elaborated a National Pact which recommended the unification of Syria, the repudiation of the Balfour declaration, the combatting of Zionism, and the federation of Arab countries. (2)

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(1) Quoted by N. Barbour in Nisi Dominus, London (1946), p. 171; see ibid., p. 173 for the effectiveness of the Arab Kings' advice during the next year (1937) when the Royal Commission for Palestine was being boycotted by the Arab Higher Committee.

(2) See L. H. Ferzat, op cit., pp. 128-129.

The idea of an Arab Federation was gaining solid ground in Syria.<sup>(1)</sup>

In 1936, both Lebanon and Syria had signed Treaties of Friendship with France<sup>(2)</sup> and there were, in both countries, high hopes for genuine independence. Arab nationalists in the Levant wanted to be ready for union as soon as possible and they feared that Lebanon might want to stay away from the 'Greater Syria' Plan.

As pointed out earlier it was in 1936 that Egypt began to be considered as "Arab" country. That same year, the Iraqi delegate at the League of Nations, commenting on the settlement between Egypt and the United Kingdom, was reported as having "seized this opportunity to express the gratification which every Iraqi must feel at the recent settlement" and as stating that "Iraq looked forward to welcoming this Sister-Nation very soon as a fellow member of the League...."<sup>(3)</sup>

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(1) See E. Rabbath, op. cit., p. 33, "Il n'y a pas de nation Syrienne. Il y a une nation Arabe, produit de cet agglomérat de peuples qui, jadis, forma l'Empire Arabe." The Syrian nationalists understood, at that time, "Arab unity" to mean: "Par unite arabe, l'on doit donc entendre aujourd'hui, la reunion de quatres etats qui formaient un tout dans l'Empire Ottoman; Syrie, Trans-jordanie, Irak, Ialestine" - ibid. p. 343.

(2) See A.H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, op. cit, Appendix A.

(3) Records of the 17th Assenbly (1936), Leauge of Nations, special supplement, No. 161, Minutes of the Sixth Committee (October 8, 1936), p. 50.

Egypt had begun, since the time of Mohamed Ali, when she achieved a degree of independence from the Ottoman Empire, to evolve a nationalism of an exclusively Egyptian nature. This trend, although outside the Arab movement, was an indirect contribution to the development of Arab nationalism. The emerging Egyptian nationalism created a modern nation and thereby "opened a wide field for the development of an intellectual and literary Arab revival." (1)

The Syrians who had migrated to Egypt, at the time of the Hamidian oppression, devoted themselves to the fields of publishing and journalism and tried to propagate the ideals of pan-Arabism among the Egyptians. They found in Egyptian nationalism, however, a strong adversary because of its 'Pharaonic' inspiration:

"L'Arabisme pourtant n'est pas meconnu en Egypte, dans la litterature, les idees politiques voient l'esprit public. Mais il n'arrive pas a triompher du 'pharaonisme' local (l'expression est en usage parmi les ecrivains du Caire), qui a preside a la formation du nationalisme Egyptien moderne et continue a l'inspirer." (2)

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(1) Sati'al-Husri, Nushu' al-Fikra al-Qawmiyah, op. cit., p. 154.

(2) E. Rabbath, op. cit., p. 323. On the other hand, it was on May 25, 1932 that was founded in Cairo the "Club of Arab Union" - see Yusuf Haykal, About Arab Union, in Arabic, p. 96, Cairo (1945).

Egypt had been acquainted with Western imperialism before the other Arab countries and was therefore much more suspicious of British and French intentions. This is not at all surprising for at the time when the Allies were encouraging the Arab movement, Great Britain, as it was seen, decided to declare Egypt a British Protectorate. It was natural therefore for the Egyptians to be under the impression that the "Arab Revolt" was nothing more than the work of British spies and ambitious self-seeking Arabs and to begin to "hate the Arabs and Arabism".<sup>(1)</sup>

After the end of the First World War, some of the Arab nationalists had wanted to form a common front with Sa'ad Zaghlul, the leader of Egyptian nationalism, but he refused to associate with them and went so far as to declare that the cause of Egypt was not an Arab one.<sup>(2)</sup> This Egyptian attitude led to a reciprocal mistrust on the part of the Arab nationalists:

"For some time... nationalist Arabs and those involved in Arab problems in general looked upon Egypt with grave suspicion and mistrust in all matters pertaining to Arab nationalism".<sup>(3)</sup>

Egyptian nationalism was culturally and spiritually inspired from the Islamic revival as well as from the Pharaonic heritage. The contribution of Muslim reformists,

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(1) Sati' al-Husri, op. cit., p. 219.

(2) See, Yusuf Haykal, Nahw al-Wahda al-Arabiya (in Arabic) About Arab Union, op. cit., p. 26.

(3) Nahib Amin Faris & M.T. Husayn, The Crescent in Crisis, op. cit., p. 137:

such as Mohamed Abduh, was mentioned earlier; but one can say that this contribution was the common denominator between the Egyptian and Arab nationalisms. The Pharaonic flavour of Egyptian nationalism, in the first few decades of the twentieth century<sup>(1)</sup> was natural in that great national pride could be derived from the "glorious" past - an important stimulus for nationalist movements which are on the defensive. It was at the very same time somewhat artificial in that it was given a preponderant importance by a particular group - the Copts, mainly, who feared a Muslim supremacy and wanted to reduce it by pointing to something much older than Islam.<sup>(2)</sup> In this they were encouraged by the desire of the Egyptians of Turkish descent to minimize the Arabic cultural heritage of Egypt:

"The spread of the Pharaonic idea was further promoted by the fact that the majority of the modern educated Egyptian Moslems were then offspring of Turkish families which had settled in Egypt and became Egyptians only in name. These Egyptians of Turkish descent despised the Arabs and disliked the budding Arab movement because of its potential threat to Turkish hegemony." (3)

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- (1) The Pharaonic movement died out in Egypt as the latter began to play a more and more important role as a leader of the pan-Arab movement until she emerged as the main architect of the League of Arab States in 1945.
  - (2) The Copts in Egypt began vigorously to support the Pharaonic movement especially after the assassination of Butrus Ghali in 1910. Butrus Ghali was the first Copt to become Prime Minister and was killed by a Muslim fanatic "who could not tolerate the idea of a Christian in the post of prime minister" - see N.A. Faris & M.T. Husayn, op. cit., p. 136.
  - (3) Ibid.

There were several other factors which prevented Egypt from joining the pan-Arab movement earlier. The Egyptians were almost totally ignorant of, and lacked an interest in, the Arab countries and Arab affairs.<sup>(1)</sup> There also emerged a sort of 'Levantine' movement headed by Taha Hussain, a leading Egyptian intellectual and an influential reformer of education. In 1938, Taha Hussain wrote a book on the future of culture in Egypt,<sup>(2)</sup> in which he claimed that Egypt had more in common with Europe than with the "Orient".<sup>(3)</sup> He used to discuss Egyptian culture in a historical context which went beyond the Arab and Islamic frames of reference as can be seen from the following passage:

"When did this nation ever die ? Was it dead when it absorbed Greek philosophy and stamped it with its special stamp? Was it dead when it absorbed the Christian religion and stamped it with its special stamp? Was it dead when it absorbed Islam and stamped it with its special stamp? ~~Was it dead~~ Was it dead when it harboured the civilisation of the

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- (1) It is interesting to note that the reverse was not true, for Egypt was considered by almost all Arabs as the modern center of Arab culture whether it be literature, music, poetry, education, and so forth. At the same time the other Arab countries resented Egypt's aloofness when it came to their affairs. See Sati' al-Husri, op. cit., p. 216; and Yusuf Haykal, op. cit., p. 25.
- (2) Mustaqbal ath-Thaqafah fi Misr, Cairo (1938)
- (3) See a discussion of this point in Pierre Cachia, Taha Huesayn, pp. 86-103, London (1956)

Greeks and the Arabs, and the literature of the Greeks and the Arabs?" (1)

Taha Hussain had also taken a clear stand in regard to the question of Arab unity and argued that whereas it might be worthwhile to unify the school curricula throughout the Arab world and even to have some sort of economic cooperation, it was not however to the advantage of Egypt to join any political union with the Arab countries since Egypt had a history of her own which was completely independent from that of any other Arab country.<sup>(2)</sup> Yet the same Taha Hussain could speak of Egypt, a few years later, as a part of "the Arab mother-land".<sup>(3)</sup> An important change had taken place and one which affected all of Egypt and gave an impetus to the pan-Arab movement. The change was apparent when Egypt took the lead in the founding of the League of Arab States in the 1940's, it was total and complete with the new Egyptian Constitution of January 16, 1956.<sup>(4)</sup>

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- (1) Taha Hussain, Hadith al-Arabi'a, vol.III, p.111, Cairo (1945) quoted in Pierre Cachia, op. cit., p. 101.
  - (2) See Sati' al-Husri, Ara' oua Ahadith fi al-Qawmiyyah al-Arabia, in Arabic, Opinions and Talks on Arab nationalism, 2nd. edition, Cairo (1954), pp. 96-106 for a discussion by al-Husri of an article written by Taha Hussain on Arab union in 1938.
  - (3) In Taha Hussain's welcome to the Arab delegates who had come to the Arab Cultural Congress held in Cairo in 1950. See Pierre Cachia, op. cit., p. 71.
  - (4) The new Egyptian Constitution starts out by asserting that "Egypt is part of the Arab Nation".

The Egyptian change of mind had come about as a result of the attainment of independence which allowed Egypt to look beyond her frontiers and to take a greater interest in the neighboring Arab countries. She soon realized that Arab nationalism was an authentic movement the leaders of which were far from being British spies. The question of Palestine, which interested Muslims as well as Arabs, gained a great deal of importance throughout the Arab world and influenced Egypt's stand towards the pan-Arab movement.<sup>(1)</sup>

In the cultural field Egypt was the leading country in the Arab world and her help was constantly sought, especially on the question of school teachers and cultural exchanges. The improvement of communications and the development of media such as the radio and the cinema helped the Egyptians to realize that they had much more in common with the Arabs than they had hitherto believed. The use of Cairo as a seat for pan-Arab activities, in itself an indication of Egypt's ever-increasing participation in the Arab movement, helped to spread the ideal of Arab unity among the Egyptian masses and influenced the political underatknings of politicians. It was Farouk's ambition to be a successful modern Mohamed Ali and to lead the Arab world, after he had abandoned the

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(1) As can be gathered from the holding of an "Arab and Muslim inter-parliamentary Congress" in Cairo, in 1938, to consider the question of Palestine.

hope of reviving the Caliphate. The Wafdist Nahas Pasha also had his own ambitions and proved to be successful in outdoing Nuri Said, a few years later, during the negotiations which established the League of Arab States.

Before the pan-Arab Congress of Bludan, in 1937, there were people who raised questions such as: "Are we heading towards a pan-Arab Pact and towards an Oriental League of Nations the seat of which would be in Cairo?".<sup>(1)</sup> Cairo had already been chosen as the seat of the Arab Medical Congress of 1936 in which Nahas Pasha had stated, "the benefits of such a Congress do not benefit the bodies only but the minds also."<sup>(2)</sup> The Egyptian pan-Arab interest was also apparent among the students, who, when preparing for an Arab Students Congress in 1937, considered "as necessary the fusion of all the Arab countries in a solid and indefectible fashion" and made an appeal to "the noble Arab peoples in favour of the unitary principles which will make out of the countries of the Arab Orient, in spite of the external frontiers, a common motherland..."<sup>(3)</sup>

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(1) Elie G. Hawawini quoted by R. Genton, "Avant le Congrès Pan-Arabe Le Caire deviendra le siège d'une S.D.N. Orinetale", L'Orient, March 9, 1937 (Beirut)

(2) R. Genton, "Avant le Congrès Pan-Arabe...op. cit.,

(3) Ibid.

In short, Egypt had become the focussing point of the whole pan-Arab movement and thereby inherited a responsibility for Arab and Muslim affairs which the Ottomans had failed to make use of.<sup>(1)</sup> With Egyptian participation the pan-Arab activities took on a more impressive importance. At the pan-Arab Congress of Bludan, held between September 8 and 11, 1937, over 400 unofficial delegates were present.<sup>(2)</sup> The Congress had been called by the Syrian Committee for the Defense of Palestine following the publication of the Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine<sup>(3)</sup> and which recommended the division of Palestine. This Report referred to Arab unity in these terms:

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- (1) Ibid. "C'est vers l'Egypte que L'Orient Arabe tourne volontiers les yeux. Pour avoir repudié l'islamisme qui faisait jadis sa force mondiale, la Turquie moderne a légué à l'Egypte un héritage prestigieux qui l'incite à se mettre à la tête du réveil panarabe."
- (2) See, *Oriente Moderne*, October 1937, pp. 497-9. Nahib Bey Al-Azmah opened the Congress, "in the name of God and the Arabs"- an appropriate illustration of the intertwining of "Arabism" and "Islamism" discussed earlier.
- (3) This report known as the Peel Report recommended the division of Palestine into three parts - a permanent British mandate, a Jewish State and an Arab portion to form together with Transjordan another independent Arab State. The Peel Report was published on July 8, 1937 under the title of Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine.

"The Arabs would obtain their national independence, and thus be enabled to co-operate on an equal footing with the Arabs of the neighboring countries in the cause of Arab unity and progress." (1)

The Bludan Congress rejected the partition plan overwhelmingly<sup>(2)</sup> and declared Palestine an "inseparable portion of the Arab homeland".<sup>(3)</sup>

The problem of Palestine continued to preoccupy the mind of the pan-Arabists and the following year another Congress was held, in Cairo this time, to elaborate an Arab policy for Palestine. The Congress was called "the Arab and Muslim inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Defense of Palestine" (al-Mu'tamar al-Barlamany lil adifa' 'an Filistin)<sup>(4)</sup> and had been initiated by an Egyptian deputy,

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(1) Ibid.

(2) "The only notable Arab who did not immediately declare his opposition to the scheme was the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan, who stood to be the chief, and indeed, the only, Arab beneficiary of the project. The result of his ambiguous attitude was a great loss of popularity in the Arab world. In some cases where his portrait was displayed with those of other Arab kings and princes it was noticed to have been disfigured."- N. Barbour, Nisi Dominus, op. cit., p. 182

(3) Oriente Moderno, Oct. 1937, p. 498.

(4) See, Oriente Moderno, (1938), pp. 587-601.

Mohamed Ali Allubah Pasha.<sup>(1)</sup> At the Cairo Congress there were for the first time delegates from North Africa, and the presidency of the Congress was given to Bahiddin Barkat Pasha, President of the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies. The latter's presence gave the Conference something which had been missing up to now in all pan-Arab congresses - a quasi official outlook.

The congresses of the pan-Arab movement were not efficient vehicles for the pan-Arab ideal - an ideal which was not very clearly defined not universally appreciated. The problem of Palestine was an important contribution to the trend for union among the Arabs because it faced them with a concrete question which needed concrete answers. The weakness of the Arab countries however and the lack of responsible leadership prevented the pan-Arab movement from

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(1) Ibid., p. 589

taking a stand proportional to the gravity of the situation<sup>(1)</sup>

Inefficient as the pan-Arab congresses may have been, they permitted the development of an Arab solidarity which had to be reckoned with on the international scene. This became apparent when the British Government organized the Round-Table Conference on Palestine which took place in London in February 1939. This Conference implicitly recognized the existence of a community of Arab States, for Britain had invited Arabs from Palestine as well as governmental delegations from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Transjordan, Egypt and the Yemen:

"This was an important event in the history of Arab nationalism, both because it constituted the first recognition by the outside world of the reality of Pan-Arab feeling, and because of the opportunity for practical co-operation which it gave to the Arab Governments." (2)

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- (1) "When the pan-Arab congresses are held, as in Syria in 1937 and Cairo in 1938, the participants are malcontents rather than men of authority. The Arab Kings are not represented, and the cabinet ministers who accept the invitations are seized at the last moment with illness or pressure of work, and stay away. In fact, wherever you go you see evidence that the centrifugal force of self-interest is stronger than the centripetal force of racial unity." - E. Monroe, The Mediterranean in Politics p. 233, London (1938). The reference about cabinet ministers who do not appear after having accepted invitations refers to the case of Nuri Said who had agreed to preside over the Bludan Congress but did not attend (See Oriente Moderno, Oct. 1937, p. 497.).
- (2) A.H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, op. cit., p. 115. G. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, op. cit. p. 32: "The first formal recognition of a community of Arab States was seen in the participation of all the Arab Governments in the Palestine conference in London in 1939."

In sum, the pan- Arab activities, in the inter-war period, were marked by the holding of several congresses and the signing of treaties of Arab brotherhood and alliance; the Arab movement was stimulated by the entry of Egypt into the pan-Arab community, and was kept active by the Palestinian problem; the official participation of Arab Governments in affairs considered of interest to all Arabs was the first concrete step in the direction of an Arab union; but it was left to the Second World War to bring about an international situation which made the birth of the League of Arab States possible in 1945.

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PART TWO :

BIRTH OF THE LEAGUE

OF ARAB STATES

CHAPTER 5: PAN-ARABISM AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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It has been shown how idealistic and nebulous the pan-Arab movement had been up to the eve of the Second World War. If it were to become an effective political force, it would endanger the status quo, and this required the approval of the real power-holders in the area - France and Great Britain. Just as the First World War had stimulated the latent forces which were at the root of pan-Arabism, it remained to the Second World War to bring radical changes in the Middle East.

The Middle East was of great strategic importance to the Allies during the Second World War, and they treated the area, strategically, politically and economically, as a unit. The political activity in the Middle East engendered by the War, the resulting internal upheavals, and the desire of Arab politicians to formulate demands as a reward for their co-operation or neutrality, contributed to a relative political maturing of the Arab leaders. The impact of the war, and its economic and social consequences, inevitably enlarged the degree of political participation in the Arab world and introduced the masses (mainly mobs in the larger Arab cities) into politics. These masses were potentially valuable supporters of Arab union. Finally, the desire of the Arab countries to gain from a post-war settlement encouraged them to adopt a united front.

One could begin to detect a change in the policies of the Allies towards Arab nationalism before the beginning of the war. This change was much more evident in the case of Great Britain as could be seen from the publication of the Palestine White Paper on May 17, 1939.<sup>(1)</sup> Although rejected by the Arabs, this document has been interpreted as a victory for the Arabs.

The imminent threat of a war made all the Great European Powers seek the sympathy of the Arab nationalist movement. In effect, this meant active propaganda campaigns in which Germany and Italy took the lead from the beginning through their political agents in the Middle East and their Arabic radio broadcasts.<sup>(2)</sup> Axis propaganda increased with the outbreak of war and relied on two powerful radio stations, Radio Bari in Italy and Radio Berlin, along with some secret stations such as that of the "Arab Nation". These broadcasting

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- (1) Cmd. 6019; this White Paper was the result of a conference called by Great Britain in order to gain the good will of the Arabs, it allowed for the creation of an independent Arab State in Palestine, within a period of ten years, having special treaty relations with Britain. It also satisfied, in parts, the Arab demands on Jewish immigration and land transfer.
- (2) For detailed studies of Axis propaganda in the Middle East during the War, see: C.L. Sulzberger, "German Preparations in the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, July 1942; Seth Arsenian, "Wartime propaganda in the Middle East", in the Middle East Journal, October 1948; and N. Barbour, "Broadcasting to the Arab World: Arabic Transmissions from the B.B.C. and Other Non-Arab Stations", in the Middle East Journal, Winter 1951.

stations were much better suited to the Arab temperament than the B.B.C. broadcasts which were started in 1938.<sup>(1)</sup>

Axis propaganda included a formal declaration of sympathy with Arab aspirations which was made over German and Italian radio stations on October 23, 1940. This declaration stated:

"Great Britain watches with much preoccupation the increasing sympathies of the Arab countries with the Axis Powers, who (the Arabs) await as their liberators from British oppression... Italy has always watched with interest the struggle (of the Arabs) to achieve their independence and, in striving for this end, they can depend upon the full sympathy of Italy in the future. Italy makes this declaration in full agreement with Germany." (2)

Britain was forced to take a more friendly attitude towards the Arab nationalist movement in order to counteract the anti-British Axis propaganda and attract the Arabs to the side of the Allies. The Palestine White Paper of 1939 and most of the actions undertaken by Great Britain in regard

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(1) See N. Barbour, op. cit., and Seth Arsenian, op. cit., p. 419.

(2) Translation as quoted in M. Khadduri, Independent Iraq, op. cit., p. 165; See also Oriente Moderno, December 1940, p. 577.

to the Middle East, during the War, must be seen in this light.<sup>(1)</sup>

Before discussing the effect of Allied and Axis propaganda on the Arab political situation during the War, it is worth noting that the first conciliatory British move was on the question of Palestine. This move proved to be of some value to Great Britain. It pushed the Palestinian dispute out of the forefront of the Middle Eastern political scene thereby eliminating the rise of problems which could have been most cumbersome for the Allies' planning.

One of the effects of Nazi propaganda was the coup d'etat of Rashid Ali in Iraq in April 1941. Rashid Ali al-Gailani seized power with the aid of some army officers who were extremely anti-British and who found it convenient to lean in favour of the Axis. The episode did not last long although Great Britain encountered some difficulty at first when it tried to send troops into Iraq. More British troops were called in, and on May 29th Britain had the situation

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(1) "The truth of the matter was that in 1938 and 1939 Nazi and Italian propaganda among the Arabs assumed alarming intensity and took full advantage of increased Jewish immigration to blame Britain and place her in a very embarrassing position. The tenseness of the international situation in the months preceding the outbreak of the war led Britain to adopt a conciliatory policy towards the Arab world, situated as it was astride the vulnerable part of the English imperial life line." - G. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 272, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (New York), (1952).

well in hand. Hitler was counting on such upheavals and was well aware of the use which could be made of the Arab movement as can be seen from his directive No. 30. of May 23, 1941:

"The Arab Freedom Movement is, in the Middle East, our natural ally against England. In this connection the raising of rebellion in Iraq is of special importance. Such rebellion will extend across the Iraq frontiers to strengthen the forces which are hostile to England in the Middle East, interrupt the British lines of communication, and tie down both British troops and English shipping space at the expense of other theatres of war. For these reasons I have decided to push the development of operations in the Middle East through the medium of going to the support of Iraq." (1)

German plans were, however, thwarted by the British success of May 29. Great Britain had been alarmed by the coup of Rashid Ali and feared similar upheavals in other Arab countries. With this in mind, Eden made a speech at the Mansion House, on the same day that British forces had gained control of Iraq, referring to the traditional of Britain with the Arab world and pledging British support for Arab unity. After mentioning the coup of Rashid Ali in Iraq and saying that "reports from that country are encouraging", he continued in these terms:

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(1) Quoted in W. Churchill, The Second World War, Volume III, The Grand Alliance, p. 264, U.S. edition (1951)

"This country has a long tradition of friendship with the Arabs, a friendship which has been proved by deeds, not words alone. We have countless well-wishers among them, as they have many friends here. Some days ago I said in the House of Commons that His Majesty's Government had great sympathy with Syrian aspirations for independence. I should like to repeat that now. But I would go further. The Arab world has made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of last War, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out towards this unity they have our support. No such appeal from our friends should go unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries and the political ties too, should be strengthened. His Majesty's Government for their part will give full support to any scheme that commands general approval." (1)

A month after Eden's declaration of sympathy for the pan-Arab movement, a Minister of State for the Middle East was appointed (Oliver Lyttleton) and a Middle East Supply Center was attached to the new office. These steps meant that the Middle East was to be treated, politically and economically, as a unit; they were therefore in line with the idea of an eventual Arab union.

Before considering the further developments which led to the birth of the League of Arab States, it is necessary to consider the common allegation that the League was the "creation" of Great Britain. The distinction must be made

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(1) The Times, May 30, 1941.

between a political, religious, social and economic movement on the one hand, and an institution which purports to embody the aspirations of the movement, on the other. The institution can not precede the movement; and whereas one can speak of the "creation" of an institution, the same can not be said of a movement. One must conclude therefore that the pan-Arab movement - an authentic expression of Arab aspirations - had not yet engendered any permanent institution of its own, and that the latter was not so much supplied by an external agency but rather permitted to develop. It is clear enough that no such institution could have been developed by weak States unless international approval was obtained. This is what Eden provided for the Arabs in his declaration.

Great Britain, in the early years of the war, was more concerned with the winning of the war than with the order of things after the war. Her whole energy was concentrated on military victory and she could not devote much time to the planning of a policy which would bear fruits only after the end of the war. It would have been impractical, and unreasonable for her to do so because there were many unknowns, and no one could predict then that events were going to turn out the way they did, particularly when it is remembered that at the time of Eden's declaration, the United States had not yet entered into the war and that France was under German occu-

pation. The Mansion House speech must therefore be looked at as a tactical manoeuvre dictated by the necessity of the war and governed by political considerations directly related to the war and not to the post-war period:

"In view of the precariousness of Britain's position in the Middle East in these early years of the war, it was essential for her to economize her limited resources by retaining the maximum goodwill and co-operation of the Governments and peoples of the region, which meant, in the first place, the moderate pan-Arab movement." (1)

If this view is accepted, it would become apparent that for a tactical move to be effective it must coincide with some well-founded aspirations in order to produce the expected results in the shortest possible time.

A study of the birth of the League of Arab States must take into account the existing trends in the Arab countries themselves as well as international politics. One must realize that there was a considerable lapse of time between Eden's declaration of May 29, 1941 and the signing of the Charter of the League of Arab States on March 22, 1945. To avoid the errors of hindsight, and the attribution of non-existent motives, one must place Eden's declaration

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(1) George Kirk, Survey of International Affairs 1939-46, The Middle East in the War, p.21, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London (1952) - henceforward referred to as G. Kirk, Survey.

in its original setting, and see it as a victory for the Arab movement. It can never be over-stressed that Eden's move was dictated by the necessity to please the Arabs and to prevent other incidents such as the coup of Rashid Ali. After speaking of British support for Syrian and Lebanese independence, Eden said, "But I would go further". In other words, he considered a sympathy for Arab union as being even more important than the independence of Syria and Lebanon as far as the Arabs were concerned.

Anyone concerned with the shaping of a policy for the Arab world, at the time, would have advised a similar step to the one taken by Eden. The Axis Powers in their propaganda were also speaking of Arab independence and union although they never made any formal declaration about Arab unity. One can not help but conclude that the British encouragement for union was merely in line with the existing Arab feeling:

"The suggestion that the movement for Arab unity and the Arab League were British creations is absurd, for British policy did no more than follow the trend of the politically active Arabs and seek to restrain their more intemperate ardours." (1)

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(1) G. Kirk, Survey, op. cit., p. 23.

The British intention was to gain the goodwill of the Arabs and to strengthen at the same time the 'Liberal' segment of the Arab movement which had been weakened as a result of the effective Axis propaganda. But at the same time, when viewed in the light of the period when Eden made his declarations, it must be considered as a bold and courageous step because the pan-Arab movement was in its essence an anti-foreign movement. (1) (2)

In a leading article, The Times of September 20, 1941, showed how natural and justified the Arab aspirations for union were:

"The vision of Arab federation has long been cherished by many Arabs of the Middle East. Whatever the scale on which that ideal can be realized in the near future there is clearly no justification whether in Arab sentiment or in historical tradition or in practical convenience, for the division effected in 1919 between the Arab lands

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- (1) M. Khadduri, "Towards an Arab Union: The League of Arab States", American Political Science Review, February 1946, p.91: "Under the circumstances, Great Britain, with a foresight worthy of its traditional prestige of the liberal nationalists by promising support of Arab unity and independence.
- (2) "The underlying motive of Arab Federation is in its essence anti-foreign, and any discussion of it must therefore be likely to arouse anti-foreign feeling, however much it may be the desire of the Arab State Governments to avoid it." - The International News Bulletin, R.I.I.A., "Arab Unity: a note on recent developments", p.804, September 30, 1944.

shores of the Mediterranean. The partition then established between British and French zones of interest or influence has proved detrimental to all concerned... Now that Syria has been liberated from the designs of the Axis, and Palestine rendered secure against them, by the joint effort of British and Free French forces, no reason can arise for perpetuating a wholly artificial discrimination between them." (1)

Even if one wanted to attribute the most Machiavellian intentions to Britain's pan-Arab policy one could not claim that in 1941 she had a definite plan in mind. As a matter of fact, one of the most frequent and most valid criticisms by Arab nationalists of British policy at the time was that:

"There was no attempt to understand the problems of the Arab world and to think out a coherent policy... There was no unified policy for the Arab world as a whole. This was because it was not fully understood that there was a single Arab world; after a time the artificial frontiers erected at the last peace settlement came to appear natural. Another and perhaps more important reason was that there was no machinery for formulating a unified policy." (2)

It must be remarked that the appointment of a Minister of State for the Middle East, the creation of the Middle East Supply Center, and the other British actions which permitted the formulations of policies for an area which was

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(1) The Times, Sept. 20, 1941

(2) A.H. Hourani, Great Britain and the Arab World, p. 26, London (1946)

considered thereafter as one entity, all followed rather than preceded Eden's Mansion House speech. From an administrative point of view therefore, Eden did not have, at the time of his declaration, the appropriate body which could have planned such a declaration or the actions to implement it.

Once the theory that Great Britain "created" the League of Arab States is corrected it becomes easier to analyze the British moves which were intended to "encourage" the creation of such an institution, and the care which was taken to see that the latter would not contradict British interests.

After making the declaration of intention, Great Britain undertook to try to put it into effect or at least to give the impression that she was doing so. During a visit of Oliver Lyttleton, the Minister of State to the Middle East, to London in September 1941, discussions took place and led to a request from the official Middle East Committee to study the possibilities of Arab union. This Committee reported on the possibilities of an Arab federation at that time. It said that no project of political federation could be executed and recommended that Great Britain concentrate on economic co-operation and cultural exchanges between the Arab States.<sup>(1)</sup>

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(1) G. Kirk, Survey, op. cit., p. 162

From then on Britain remained, at least outwardly, as an observer and carefully watched the Arab reactions and the ensuing rivalries. The team of British diplomats in the Middle East was keeping in close touch with the responsible leaders of the pan-Arab movement. The Arabs realized however that if Britain was ready to support "any scheme that commands general approval", it also meant that such a scheme should have her own blessing. And alongside with the inter-Arab contacts which took place in view of an Arab federation, many direct contacts between Arab leaders and British officials were held.

After Eden's statement the idea of an Arab federation was tossed around by the Arab press and by Arab politicians but the Arab Governments themselves were much preoccupied by the war and could not devote their full attention to the problem until 1943. In the meantime everyone spoke of Arab union, but there was no universal agreement among the Arabs as to what was meant by such an idea. Some unofficial talks were begun however, in June 1941, in Cairo between representatives of Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon.<sup>(1)</sup> The Cairo talks were given added weight by the presence of Nuri Said who was, at the time,

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(1) Daily Mail, June 25, 1941.

Iraqi Minister to Egypt. According to the British Press, the object of these talks was "closer economic and political cooperation between themselves (the Arab countries) and collectively with Britain."<sup>(1)</sup> Saudi Arabia and the Yemen kept distant, at the time, from any involvement in this matter.<sup>(2)</sup> The main purpose of these talks was the necessity for the Arab countries to present a united front as German troops were approaching the Egyptian border. In other words they were related to the war efforts rather than to a political union.

Among the Arab leaders, the Emir Abdullah had been the first to react officially to the British move in favour of Arab union. He had always aspired to being the monarch of a "Greater Syria".<sup>(3)</sup> On July 26, 1941, Arab chiefs and members of the Legislative Council of Amman telegraphed to the British, as well as to the Free French authorities, in Egypt and Syria, that they considered Transjordan an

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(1) Daily Herald, July 15, 1941.

(2) New York Times, September, 19, 1941, reported that Oliver Lyttleton, British Minister of State, was hard at work preparing an Arab federation, and that Saudi Arabia was not included.

(3) Abdullah had sent a note to the British Government, back on Feb. 22, 1936, demanding union with Syria (See E. Rabbath, op. cit., p. 338).

"integral part of Syria."<sup>(1)</sup> Abdullah addressed himself to Saudi Arabia in order to alleviate the dynastic friction between Ibn Saud and the Hashinites.

Abdullah's response was followed by that of Nahas Pasha. In 1942 it appeared officially that Egypt was disposed to take the lead in an Arab federation. Speaking on the occasion of the Egyptian celebration of Independence Day, Nahas Pasha, who was to play a dominant role in the negotiations which led to the birth of the League of Arab States, declared to the Wafd on November 13, 1942:

"The bonds which bind us to the Arab and Eastern peoples are many beyond numbering and solid beyond disturbing. They have been increased in firmness and strength by their common attitude towards this war, in that all of them look for the victory of democracy and await the dawn of the day in which the right of the young peoples to determine their own future shall be uppermost. On that day these Arab and neighbouring Eastern States will present, with Egypt in the forefront, a powerful and cohesive bloc, capable of fulfilling its international responsibilities and its moral duties, and of taking its fitting place among the free peoples."<sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) Daily Express, October, 17, 1941: "Emir Abdullah, the shrewd pro-British ruler of Transjordan, is travelling between Baghdad and Mecca on a mission that may have the most far-reaching consequences."

(2) Quoted in G. Kirk, Survey, op. cit., p. 335.

That same year Cairo was the seat of two pan-Arab conferences. The first was called in order to aim at the standardization of educational syllabuses in the Arab countries.(1) The second was the Fifth Arab Medical Congress, which took on a particular importance, in 1942, as a result of the discussions on Arab union which were the issue of the day throughout the Arab world.(2)

Pan-Arab leaders were encouraged by Egypt's stand in favour of an Arab federation, although Nuri Said and the Emir Abdullah received it with mixed feeling fearing an Egyptian domination to the detriment of their own ambitions. The fact remains that Cairo during the Second World War had become the center of all pan-Arab activity. Many people who had not been accustomed to thinking of Egypt as an intrinsically Arab country felt that she could play the role of a neutral or mediator in the preparations for the founding of an Arab federation. There was also the fact that Egypt was

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(1) See Oriente Moderno, Vc. XXII, pp. 56-7.

(2) Ibid., vol XXIII, p. 95: in his address to the delegates, Nahas Pasha, the Egyptian Premier said, "Egypt has been shown to be a second fatherland to you... and when you return to your countries you will remember Egypt in your surroundings and will speak sincerely of her to your fellow countrymen, ensuring that scientific and intellectual relations be consolidated and the social bonds increased, to attain the unity which will reunite our divided parts."

the most important and relatively most powerful country in the area. The participation of such a Power in the scheme of Arab union would only increase its chances for success as well as its international importance.

During December 1942, the Regent of Iraq, Abdul Illah, accompanied by Nuri Said, in his capacity as Prime Minister, went to Cairo. During the visit Nuri Said said in an interview:

"Arab unity is one of our first aspirations. I cannot tell you when and how it will be achieved, but the important thing is to prepare for it by all the means in our power." (1)

While saying that he did not know how such a unity would be achieved, Nuri Said had already submitted that same month a memorandum to the British Minister of State in the Middle East, Richard Casey. In that memorandum, known as the "Blue Book" which remained secret for some time, Nuri Said put forward a plan for the unity of the "Fertile Crescent". This was the first clear plan forwarded by any Arab Leader. Officially, at least, Great Britain remained uncommitted to any specific program of union.

On February 24, 1943, Eden was asked in the House of Commons, "Whether any steps are being taken to promote

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(1) Al-Wafd al-Misri, Dec.27. 1942, quoted in G. Kirk, Survey, op. cit., p. 335.

greater political and economic cooperation between the Arab States of the Middle East with a view to the ultimate creation of an Arab Federation" he replied:

"As they have already made plain, His Majesty's Government would view with sympathy any movement among Arabs to promote cultural or political unity. But clearly the initiative in any scheme would have to come from the Arabs themselves, and so far as I am aware no scheme, which would command general approval, has yet been worked out." (1)

Eden must have known, at the time of this statement, about Nuri Said's proposals and one must assume that he either preferred not to divulge them or that he considered that they would not "command general approval". The Emir Abdullah had also made known <sup>his views</sup> on Arab union before Eden's second statement on Arab unity, when he stated on January 15, 1943:

"As to countries likely to comprise the federation, that will be decided in the future when equality prevails among the Syrian group of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Transjordan on the one hand, and Egypt and Iraq on the other." (2)

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- (1) Hansard, February 24, 1943, vol. 387, col. 139.  
(2) The New York Herald Tribune, January 16, 1943.

King Saud remained uninvolved for several reasons. There was no British encouragement to draw him within the proposed Arab federation;<sup>(1)</sup> he was suspicious of both the Hashinites and the ambitions of King Farouk;<sup>(2)</sup> he also aimed at remaining neutral during the war, and his participation in a plan proposed by Great Britain would not have been in line with his policy.

Eden's reaffirmation of Britain's support for Arab union in which he declared that "the initiative in any scheme would have to come from the Arab countries" led Egypt, or to be more exact, Nahas Pasha, to take this initiative. On March 30, 1943, he was quoted by the Minister of Justice, in the Egyptian Senate, as saying:

"I must therefore give careful consideration to the statement of Mr. Eden. I found the best method would be to approach separately the Governments of Arab

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- (1) J. Carmichael, "Prince of Arabs" in Foreign Affairs "In the vagueness necessarily characteristic of post-war projects today, one of the few likely things is that Ibn Saud is not being considered in connection with such a federation. The way the word is being used indicates that it is meant to imply a cluster of handgroomed, federated 'states' bound together solely for the greater convenience of London."
- (2) For the ambitions of King Farouk, see Marcel Colombe "L'Egypte et les origines du nationalisme Arabe" in L'Afrique et l'Asie, 2<sup>eme</sup> trimestre (1951), p. 27. In his Speech of the Throne of November 18, 1939, King Farouk had already spoken of Egypt's "noble mission" in the Middle East.

countries and learn their views on the subject and then try to reconcile their ideals. We are inviting them to a conference in Cairo so as to start efforts for unity with a basic aim in view. If an understanding of the important issues is established, the Egyptian Government will invite delegates to a congress in Egypt to conclude the examination and take whatever decisions are necessary." (1)

There are reasons to believe that Nahas Pasha was encouraged by the British authorities to undertake this important step. Britain's faith in his Anglophile tendencies was well illustrated on February 4, 1942 when he was imposed on King Farouk with British tanks surrounding the royal palace. The British Ambassador was reported to have delivered a note on that date at noon in which he warned the King that, "unless I hear by 6 P.M. that Nahas Pasha has been asked to form a cabinet, His Majesty King Farouk must expect the consequences." (2) This British intervention had a serious effect on Anglo-Egyptian relations, but what interests us here is its effect on the development of the League of Arab States. The personality and activities of Nahas Pasha greatly influenced the negotiations which led to the signing of the Charter of the League of Arab States. The tension between Nahas Pasha and King Farouk had its effects on the negotiations which took place while Nahas

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(1) The New York Times, April 1, 1943.

(2) Quoted in G. Kirk, Survey, op. cit., p. 210.

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was leading the project for an Arab federation. These points are brought up in order to show that it is reasonable to suppose that Nahas had received some British encouragement for the initiative he undertook. (2)

Negotiations as outlined by Nahas Pasha began in July 1943 and will be considered in the next chapter. Meanwhile it remains for us to briefly consider two factors of some importance in a study of the pan-Arab movement during the Second World War : the increase of mass participation in politics, and the concern of the pan Arab movement for economic questions. (3) These two elements are related because the mass participation in politics meant the search by politicians for measures or policies which would satisfy the impoverished masses, and also because the economic crises resulting from the war helped to drive the masses into the political scene.

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(1) See below Chapter 7

(2) M. Khadduri (at the time in the Iraqi Foreign Office), "Toward an Arab Union", op. cit., p. 92, "The Egyptian Government has taken the initiative in the present Arab movement, because it is conscious of the immense tangible advantages to be gained...In assuming such a leadership the Egyptian Government may have been encouraged by Great Britain."

(3) H.A.R. Gibb, "Middle Eastern Perplexities", in International Affairs, October 1944, p. 458, "In the Middle East the war has produced an entirely new orientation. For the first time, economic questions have thrust politics out of the front rank of public interest and attention."

The war had produced two major dislocations in the economy of the Middle Eastern countries. The first was a reduction in trade resulting from the shortage of ships available for civilian activities; and the second was an ever increasing inflation because of the reduction in supply and the relative increase in demand. This inflation was ever more problematic because of the Allies' expenditures in the Middle East for military purposes. It was in order to find urgent solutions to these problems that the Middle East Supply Centre was created in 1941 by Great Britain to become an Anglo-American enterprise in (1) 1942. The major contribution of the M.E.S.C. was that it managed to avert serious economic crises by controlling imports and exports and by studying the economic problems from a regional point of view. It also encouraged the industrialization of the Arab countries and attempted to make the whole area as economically independent from the outside world as possible.

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(1) For detailed studies of the M.E.S.C. see, Guy Hunter, "The Middle East Supply Center" in Survey, op. cit., pp. 169-193; Middle East Supply Center, Reports of the Proceedings (of Regional Conferences held in 1944); Keith A.H. Murray, "Feeding the Middle East in the War-Time", Journal of the Royal Asian Society, July-Oct. 1945.

(1)

The introduction of the "masses" into politics in the Middle East had several consequences foremost amongst which was a certain confusion in aims, principles and loyalties. For it was now that the separate frames of mind of the "elite" and the "masses" became most apparent. The gulf between them was economic as well as intellectual and spiritual in nature:

"The same gulf which separates the masses economically from the narrow apex of the elite also separates them intellectually: providing no vent for the energies of the intelligentsia and so throwing it back on political activity, it also constrains this political activity into an abnormally shrunken, sterile, and self-stultifying arena." (2)

The Arab mass participation could not but have a considerable influence on the orientation of the leaders of the Arab nationalist movement. The latter became much more aware of the historic and traditional ties which conditioned the behaviour of these masses. The process has been described by H.A.R. Gibb in these terms :

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- (1) The word "masses" is used here to refer first of all to the urban populations which had increased as a result of emigration from the rural areas- politically speaking these meant the "mobs"; it also refers to all the people within earshot of public radios. It can not be applied, at this time, to all of the Arab countries because Saudi Arabia and the Yemen for instance were not as much shaken by economic and political consequences of the war.
- (2) J. Carmichael, "Notes on Arab Unity", in Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1943, pp. 152-3.

"What has happened is only that Arab nationalism has moved on toward the second stage of nationalism- a stage which even yet we too rarely appreciate. In its first stages nationalism tries in every way to assimilate the culture of its people to that of the West; in the second stage it stresses difference; it absorbs more and more the colour of its environment; it adapts the tradition of its own people and, in adapting it, attributes a new and heightened significance and value to it; it moves away from the standard and ideology derived from its Western liberal origins and substitutes new standards and a new ideology more attuned to the historic past of its people."(1)

This adaptation to the tradition of the people meant most of all a recrudescence of Muslim sentiment. At this point it is illuminating to reconsider the intertwining of Arabism and Islam which has been discussed earlier. The Arab revival had always been closely associated with Islam; the participation of the masses only made this association more apparent. (2) The leaders of the pan-Arab movement put an accent on the political side in order to reduce the fears of the minorities in the Arab world.

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(1) H.A.R. Gibb, "Social Change in the Near East", in The Near East, P.W. Ireland ed., Chicago (1942), p. 57.

(2) Taha Hussein, "Tendances religieuses de la littérature Egyptienne" in L'Islam et l'Occident, p. 235 : "Si l'on veut caractériser le réveil de la conscience arabe, on peut dire qu'il a eu deux aspects souvent distincts, mais finissant toujours par se confondre. Le premier est religieux, le second politique."

The majority of the followers of the pan-Arab movement were attracted to its aims primarily because they appreciated the Islamic characteristic behind the concept of union.

The movement for Islamic union was not as organized as that for Arab union but it continued as a force within the latter for those who did not distinguish between the two. For some of the fervent proponents of Islamic union, the idea of an Arab union represented a non-Islamic tendency. They argued that Islam was against the notion of racial distinction and that in Islam all believers were equal in the eye of God and that the degree of faith is the only element which favours one Muslim over another. The religious institution of Al-Azhar in Cairo was the major defender of this thesis.

In 1928, the rector of Al-Azhar, Abulfadl al-Djizari, combatted both "Arabism" and "Pharaoism" on the ground that in Islam, nationality could only be conceived in virtue of religion. <sup>(1)</sup> In 1938, Shaikh Mustafa al-Maraghi, also rector of Al-Azhar, invited the Muslims to realize "Muslim union without any preoccupation for Arab unity", <sup>(2)</sup> and declared at another time, "I do not desire pan-Arabism and I am not fighting in its favor." <sup>(3)</sup>

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- (1) See Marcel Colonbe, "LEgypte et les Origines du Nationalisme Arabe", op. cit., p. 26.  
(2) Ibid.,  
(3) Quoted in Gabriel Puaux, "La Ligue Arabe", La Revue de Paris, April 1955, p. 73.

The basically Islamic character of the pan-Arab movement, at least as popularly understood in the Arab world, can be best evaluated when the Egyptian orientation towards "Arabism" is analyzed. Islam was the only link which kept Egypt from going "Pharaonic" and thereby allowed her to continue to share some of the griefs and sorrows of the other Arab countries. The Egyptian reactions against the bombarding of Damascus in 1925; Abdelkrin's Revolt of 1924-5 in Morocco; the Wailing Wall incident of 1929; the Berber Dahir of 1930; and the Zionist movement were all based on the Islamic link which Egypt had with the rest of the Arab world. The example of Egypt is noteworthy because she took the lead in the erection of the League of Arab States and because she is at present the leader of the movement for greater Arab unity.

The pan-Arab protagonists nowadays consider a discussion of the relationship between Islam and Arab unity almost as taboo. They suppose that such discussions only embitter the Christian minorities who are recalcitrant about Arab union because they fear Muslim supremacy. Evading the question however does not solve the problem but only increases the fears. The study of this question is of absolute necessity for understanding the establishment of the League of Arab States as well as its activities and difficulties.

The fact remains that pan-Arabism derives the greater (1) portion of its spiritual value from Islam. The Islamic contribution evidently began to play a greater role with the increase of mass political participation which reduced the Western or 'foreign' elements characterizing the earlier leadership of the Arab nationalist movement:

"The nationalist movements were originally led, in most countries, by a small group of Westernized intellectuals. As these movements grew into nation-wide organizations, the leaders were far outnumbered by the mass of their followers. These followers were not Westernized in the same degree, or at all; they accepted, externally, the political aims and objectives of the leaders, but interpreted them in terms of their own traditional concepts of the state and society, and of their own political grievances." (2)

The hold of Islam on the Arab masses was well appreciated (3) (4) by the British Government and the Axis Powers alike during

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- (1) Louis Gardet, La Cite Musulmane, op. cit., p. 211, "Le panarabisme cultive et exalte l'Islam qui lui permet, sur le double plan national et religieux, d'affirmer sa suprematie."
  - (2) H.A.R. Gibb, "Near East Perspective, The Present and the Future", in Near Eastern Culture and Society, T.C. Young, ed., Princeton (1951), p. 203.
  - (3) A declaration published in London at the beginning of the war declared, "Tous les musulmans, conscients de la noble mission que leur a leguee le Prophete, n'hesiteront pas un seul instant a accomplir le devoir que l'histoire leur dicte, en s'opposant aux forces de tyrannie nazies qui menacent le monde... Le nazisme... est un effroyable danger pour les nations arabes et pour le veritable esprit de l'Islam." quoted in E. Laissy, Du Panarabisme a la Ligue Arabe, p. 95.
  - (4) See, Seth Arsenian, "Wartime Propaganda in the Middle East", op. cit., p. 421, "Berlin broadcasts attempted consistently to arouse and strengthen Arab nationalistic attitudes and to appeal to Muslim religious feelings."

the Second World War just as it had been during the First. The Axis Powers relied upon religious leaders such as the Muphti of Jerusalem, and Mussolini tried to pose as the "protector of Islam". The confusion about Arab union and Islamic union which prevailed during the Second World War was most apparent when non-Arab, but Muslim, countries like Turkey, and Iran, made proposals indicating their willingness to join the projects of union under discussion at the time. Mahmoud Den, Iran's ambassador to Egypt, in an interview on Arab federation, said:

"Persia is happy to see the efforts which lead to collaboration among Arab nations. She hopes for a union not only of the Arab countries but of the Orient and of Islam."(1)

Turkey, on the other hand, proposed a scheme of union which provided for a political reorganisation of Muslim countries. This proposal included a North African federation comprising Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya; a federation of the Arab Middle Eastern countries; and a third one including Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. These groups were to be provided with an over-all organization.<sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) France, October 9, 1943.

(2) See, M. Laissy, op. cit., p. 109.

In a banquet attended by Arab dignitaries, in his capital in 1943, King Ibn Saud declared: "It is our duty as Muslims to form a union. An Arab union will unite us. We thank God that a new spirit has appeared among Muslims." That same year, the Emir Feisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, stated in a discussion about Arab union that:

"There is one thing that should be taken into consideration regarding the constitution of any federation. That is the Koran. The Koran contains religious, social, commercial, and even political aspects. It preaches cooperation when interests are common. It prescribes means for improving everything in life. Some would protest that there are Christians among the Arabs but they were always part of the Arab nations. They were good friends and good citizens. The Koran gives everyone the right to worship as he thinks." (1)

These last remarks are to be expected from an Islamic and Wahhabite State like Saudi Arabia, but they denote a sentiment which was, and still is, shared by many Arabs outside the Arabian Peninsula. A keen observer of Arab affairs wrote in 1944 that "pan-Arab feeling tends to ally itself more and more with the anti-Western 'Moslem Revolution' and to become fanatically opposed to everything and everybody not Moslem." (2)

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(1) The New York Times, December 22, 1943.

(2) H.A.R. Gibb, "Middle Eastern Perplexities", in International Affairs, October 1944, p. 466. This point needs stressing because one often encounters the view that pan-Arabism is "areligious" in origin: "De par son origine areligieuse, le panarabisme...", Chafic Malek, "Les Tendances internationales des Peuples Arabes..." in Revue de Droit International pour le Moyen Orient, May-June 1951.

The "Revolution of the Masses" which began to be felt during the Second World War in the Arab world revised the ideas of the nationalist parties. The war was seen as an opportunity to gain the maximum independence from the foreign Powers. The vast majority of the Arabs was uninterested in the conflict of Democracy versus Fascism. It can even be said that many Arabs looked upon the Axis with some degree of favour because they saw them mainly as the opponents of countries which were limiting the exercise of Arab sovereignty. The anti-Zionist feeling of the Arabs (particularly in the uneducated circles which could not easily draw the distinction between anti-Zionism and anti-semitism) was another reason for sympathizing with the Axis.

The pro-Axis tendencies among the Arab masses diminished as the defeat of Germany and Italy became more obvious. Moreover, British policy had gained the good-will of Arab leaders who could rally Arab opinion. The popular reaction in favour of Arab union was encouraging and was further enhanced by the journeys of notable Arab statesmen from one Arab country into another. These journeys and visits were widely publicized by the press and radio. <sup>(1)</sup>

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(1) The importance of the medium of the radio can not be underestimated. It had a major effect on the Arab way of thinking. It also contributed to the consolidation of the ties which united the Arabs: "Arabic transmissions of one kind or another were inaugurated from Turkey, France, the United States of America, the U.S.S.R., Spain, China and Japan, as well as from Britain, Italy and Germany. All this gave the Arab world a new unity of ideas and ideals." N. Barbour, Nisi Dominus, op. cit., p. 212.

Great Britain, on her part, continued a pro-Arab policy which consolidated the position of those Arab leaders who had faith in her. Apart from her encouragement of Arab union, Britain used her diplomatic skill and military superiority in order to give full effect to the independence of Syria and Lebanon which was proclaimed by the Free French authorities in 1941. Her policy in the Arab world was dictated by the recommendations of a "powerful team of Arabists"<sup>(1)</sup> who were eager to eject France from the Middle East and who wanted to see Arab-British relations started on a new ground. It was to this end that they favoured Arab union- a union which could serve Arab as well as British interests. This was to be a policy of "interdependence" rather than one in line with the traditional

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- (1) G. Lenczowski, op. cit., pp. 401-2: "From 1941 British action was consistent and purposeful, and it was well synchronized with the action of the Arabs themselves. In this work British interests were well served by a powerful team of experienced Arabists such as Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, ambassador to Iraq; Brigadier E.H. Clayton... Brigadier Clubb Pasha, commander of the Arab Legion; Sir Walter Smart, Oriental Secretary (and later Minister) at the British embassy in Cairo... and General Edward Spears, Chief of the British mission to the Levant. General Spears in particular did his best to remove French influence from Syria... Neither the De Gaulle-Lyttleton agreement nor official British denials could conceal the fact that, having to choose between Free French authorities or Arab friendship, the British had chosen the latter."

colonial policy which had been condemned by everyone in the Middle East. This new trend did not prevent certain segments of the British press from questioning the intentions behind the proposed Arab union; the Manchester Guardian asked:

"...is it an arrangement for guaranteeing Arab independence or is it a device for extending British influence over Arab lands? That is an issue which cannot be burked."(1)

British support for pan-Arabism was intended to strengthen those Arab "moderates" who believed in cooperation with Great Britain either out of personal conviction or out of political opportunism. This support was also based on the belief that it would be much simpler to deal with a united group than with a divided one seeking unity.<sup>(2)</sup> The British stand in favour of Arab unity also allowed Great Britain to evade the question of Palestine. By turning Arab eyes in the direction of Arab union, it placed the Palestine problem out of the international political arena during the war years. Many Arabs were under the impression

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(1) Issue of June 14, 1943.

(2) The New York Herald Tribune, November 7, 1943, pointed out that the British "might find it easier to cooperate with representatives of an Arab confederation which enjoyed their support than to deal with a multitude of small states which felt they were being prevented from uniting."

that any Arab union would include an independent Arab State of Palestine promised in the White Paper of 1939. The result of this policy during the Second World War was to weaken the more radical Arab nationalists and to limit their demands. Many Arab writers go further and add that the main interest of Britain in backing the creation of the League of Arab States was to frustrate the degree of union which might have otherwise taken place.

The negotiations which produced the League of Arab States, as will be seen, were characterized by serious rivalries among the Arab representatives and by a fervent desire on the part of many delegates to conserve as much political sovereignty as possible. It must also be added that the concept of sovereignty in most of the Arab countries was a political one before being a legal one because it was seen primarily as the will of the ruling personality.<sup>(1)</sup> The relations between the Arab States were therefore entangled by the ambitions of these personalities who felt that giving up some of the sovereignty of their countries amounted to giving up some of their own power. Added to all of these

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(1) G. Moussa Dib, The Arab Bloc in the United Nations, Amsterdam (1956), p. 22: "Sovereignty, not as a legal idea, but as a political force, as a tendency to assert one's will as the final will, is not the will of the State as such, still less the will of the citizens; it is rather the will of the ruler with all his ambitions, all his likes and dislikes."

difficulties were the natural fears of the Arab Christians in Lebanon and Syria about a great degree of Arab union. In view of all these purely Arab problems it is not reasonable to blame Britain for the limited degree of union embodied in the Charter of the League of Arab States. The same conclusion may be drawn from a comparison between the Alexandria Protocol of 1944 and the Charter of the League. The Protocol contained articles which were later amended because some Arab representatives declared themselves in favour of a more gradual process of Arab unification.

It is sometimes argued against this that the responsible Arab leaders of the time were themselves acting under the orders of Britain. It must be remembered that Arab public opinion, which only began to be felt as a result of the war, was not yet clearly aware of the aims of the pan-Arab movement nor politically conscious enough to distinguish between one project for union and another. In short, the majority of the Arabs then did not know precisely what they wanted, although there were factors which allowed them to look favorably upon some form of union. There had not been any crystallized loyalties for most of the new "nations" and the idea of Arab union, understood by the majority in an Islamic context, was appreciated by those who gave it some thought. Finally, it is clear that no serious step

in the direction of Arab union could have been taken without the consent of Britain because she was the master Power of the area, especially after the defeat of France. Those Arab leaders who were under the orders of Britain were also astute enough to benefit from her power and to gain her goodwill. It did not take long for Britain to realize that the pan-Arab movement which she had encouraged was backfiring.

The most important point to keep in mind about the pan-Arab movement during the Second World War is that it was associated with Arab leaders who were considered "moderate" and who were on the side of Great Britain. This was only a passing phase of the pan-Arab movement, because as it has been said earlier, it was essentially an anti-foreign movement and it eventually became much more associated with the "Arab movement of liberation" and with the anti-Western and radical type of Arab nationalism.

CHAPTER 6: NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARAB UNION (1)

(July 31, 1943- February 9, 1944)

On July 31, 1943, Nahas Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, formally began negotiations, in accordance with the program which he had elaborated earlier, (2) for the formation of an Arab union. Nuri Said, Prime Minister of Iraq, was the first to come to Cairo for these preliminary talks which were to lead to the calling of a General Arab Congress.

The negotiations with Nuri Said, from July 31 to August 6, consisted in six meetings in the course of which Nuri expounded his views on the prospective Arab federation. The first agreement which was reached between the Iraqi and Egyptian ministers was that these negotiations should be restricted and carried only with those Arab countries which were independent. Nuri Said was insistent on this point, "this pact or union, if it is realized, should be limited to independent nations.

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(1) See bibliographical note, at the end of this chapter, about the documents used in this analysis. The main one is the Minutes of Negotiations of Nahas Pasha with Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and the Yemen, published in Arabic by the League of Arab States, Cairo (1949)- referred to henceforward as Negotiations.

(2) See above, p. 162.

This would not prevent such a union, or any of its members, to provide all the possible aid to those Arab countries lacking sovereignty."<sup>(1)</sup>

When asked about the aspects of Arab cooperation which he envisaged, Nuri Said remarked that, in his view, there were three: (a) political cooperation which would include the problems of defence and foreign affairs as well as the protection of minorities; (b) economic cooperation which would cover the matters of currency, communications, customs and trade; and (c) cultural and social cooperation.

Nahas Pasha then inquired about the form of federal government to be envisaged and its relation with the local governments in existence. Nuri Said said that it would be impossible to have a central executive federal government, at this time, because of the different problems facing the Arab countries internally and externally, and added that, "investigations about a federal government are a mere waste of time."<sup>(2)</sup> At this point it was agreed that, in the course of these negotiations, the idea of one

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(1) Negotiations, op. cit., p. 2.

(2) Ibid.

central and executive federal government will be laid aside. Nuri Said continued his exposition and maintained that there were only two alternatives facing the founders of an Arab union. The first possibility would be the creation of a federation with limited executive powers in which the Arab countries would be represented proportionally to their populations and budgets; the second alternative would be the creation of a union in which the decisions would only be binding on those who accepted them. The latter form of union would have to be organized on the basis of equal representation and  
(1)  
be unexecutive.


The negotiations between Nahas Pasha and Nuri Said ended after they had agreed that the discussions with the other Arab countries, which Nahas was about to have, should be based on a consideration of the two alternatives suggested by Nuri Said.

The discussions of the Egyptian and Iraqi Prime Ministers were more important than those that followed, because their countries were the two most influential Arab Powers. The mere presence of Nuri Said in Cairo for

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(1) Ibid., p. 3; see below, pp. 182-3 for a schematic illustration of these two proposals.

Proposals of Nuri Said on Arab Federation (A)




(1) Proportional representation in the Assembly

(2) To be elected or appointed.

Source: Negotiations, op. cit., p. 3.

Proposals of Nuri Said on Arab Federation (B)



(1) Equal representation in the Assembly.

(2) To be elected by the Assembly.

(3) The Committees to have direct relations with the respective Ministries in the member States

these talks was important. He had already presented a  
(1)  
detailed plan of Arab unity to Richard G. Casey, British  
Minister of State Resident in the Middle East, in December  
1942. In that memorandum, he had proposed that Syria, Le-  
banon, Palestine and Transjordan be united into one state;  
and had suggested the creation of an Arab League which  
would have included this united Syrian State- known as  
"Greater Syria"- and Iraq, and which "can be joined by the  
other Arab States at will." This Arab League was to have  
a permanent Council which would have been responsible for  
defence, foreign affairs, currency, communications, customs,  
the protection of minorities etc... The main theme of Nuri  
Said's scheme was to "create a Confederation of Arab States  
including Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Transjordan"- this  
plan is what is commonly referred to as the "Fertile Cres-  
cent" scheme of Arab union.  
(2)

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- (1) For text of this plan, known as the "Blue Book", see below, Appendix (A). This "Blue Book" was published by the Iraqi Government Press in 1943, but remained a secret until 1948, at which time it was published and disclosed by "Al-Zanane"- a Cairo newspaper in January 1948 ( Numbers 41 to 47 ). The plan for the creation of a "Greater Syria" was originally voted upon in a resolution passed by the General Syrian Congress on March 8, 1920- See Sati' al-Husri, Al-'Uruba bayna du'atiha oua Mu'arydiha (Arabism between its supporters and opponents), pp. 140-1, Cairo, 2nd. ed., (1954). It is interesting to note that when the idea of the union of "Greater Syria" came up at the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Congress of 1938, in Cairo, the Iraqi delegate objected to it; see, Survey of International Affairs, 1938, vol. I, pp. 441-2).
- (2) See Majid Khadduri, "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity" in The Near East & the Great Powers, Frye (ed.), (1951).

The presence of Nuri Said in Cairo also indicated that Iraq recognised, if she did not accept, Egyptian leadership of the pan-Arab movement. The question which may be asked is whether Nuri Said had changed his views on Arab unity at the time of these negotiations. Egyptian initiative may well have contributed to such a change. Nuri Said, on his way to Cairo, had sounded Arab opinion in Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine, and must have realized that Egypt's initiative was welcomed, and therefore adjusted himself to this new factor in inter-Arab relations. In substance however Nuri Said was still in favour of a closer integration of a "Greater Syria" within a loose Arab League as it became apparent in the debates which led to the drafting of the League's Charter. (1)

The beginning of Arab negotiations was well received throughout the Arab world and there was much optimism in the Arabic press, but it was understood that the proceedings were likely to be slow. There was some talk about Egypt's "right" to lead the movement for Arab unity. This comes out (2)

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(1) See below, Chapter 7.

(2) "We must expect negotiations to move slowly, particularly when one recognizes the extreme Oriental sensibility in everything that concerns prestige, priority and rank. Egypt is incontestably first among the Arab nations in population, economic riches, and general evolution... But these apparent truths are not seen everywhere in the same light, Baghdad being the only Arab capital at war with the Axis, Damascus laying claim to moral leadership, and Mecca claiming the proud Ibn Saud." - quotation from the Egyptian press, in the Christian Science Monitor, July 28, 1943.

clearly in the following excerpt from the Egyptian Arabic daily, Al-Sabah:

"We shall answer all those who attempt to prevent Egypt from assuming first rank in the Arab world; Egypt alone has the right to that supremacy which is shown by past, present and future facts. We loudly assert that fact which is asserted by every Arab. Egypt should remain at the head of the Arabic East, whose present weak state has encouraged other Powers to subjugate it. How could such servitude last if Egypt were leader of the Orient." (1)

Even Nuri Said had to realize that Egypt had started the game and to accept the idea that Nahas Pasha "resume his consultations with the leaders of other Arab countries with a view to securing a working agreement." (2)

Negotiations with Transjordan: (August 28- September 1, 1943)

In his negotiations with Tawfiq Abu El Hoda, Prime Minister of Transjordan, Nahas Pasha once again put forward no project of his own, but simply sought the views of his visitor. (3) Abu El Hoda did not want to begin negotiations until he made certain introductory remarks.

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(1) Ibid.

(2) Joint communique released at the end of the negotiations between Nuri Said and Nahas Pasha, for text, see The Times August 7, 1943.

(3) During all of his negotiations with Arab leaders, Nahas never put forward any particular plan or scheme, but simply asked questions in order to assess the general feeling of the different Arab Governments.

He said that whereas it was easy for Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia - if she cared to - to discuss and agree on a scheme for union since all of these countries were completely independent and sovereign; the same did not apply to those four countries which originally constituted the "Greater Syria". In the instance of Syria, he said, the customs, national security and foreign affairs were still under French control and there was no Syrian diplomatic or consular representation abroad. He then added that before Syria or Lebanon, who found itself in the same situation, could express themselves on Arab union, their complete independence should be effective. (1)

The first steps to be envisaged, in the opinion of the Transjordanian Government, should be the complete independence of the four countries in question; then, as had been outlined by Nuri Said in his memorandum to Richard Casey, the unification of these four countries which could then enter into an Arab federation as one entity. (2)

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(1) Negotiations, op. cit., p.6.

(2) Ibid., p.7.

The Transjordanian Minister then asked Nahas Pasha to use all of Egypt's influence for the realization of such a programme and said that unless this were realized the four countries of "Greater Syria" would be unable to co-operate, as fully as it is hoped by all Arabs in the proposed Arab federation.<sup>(1)</sup> In his view, this was the only possible solution for it would do away with the Zionist problem in Palestine; would secure the independence of Syria and Lebanon, from French designs; and would make Transjordan less dependent on British economic assistance.<sup>(2)</sup> The above Transjordanian stand, implicitly supported by the other Hashimite Kingdom - Iraq, was destined to meet the staunch opposition of Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. From the moment of this split, and, from the moment that the Hashimites made the "Greater Syria" scheme a condition for an Arab federation, the Arab League was bound to be a loose arrangement debarred of any authority or power. Abu El-Hoda concluded his introductory remarks by saying, "And all of us are counting, for the realization of these hopes, on Nahas Pasha in his capacity of leader of the Arab countries."<sup>(3)</sup>

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(1) Ibid., p.8.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid., p.9.

Nahas Pasha replied that before he could do anything in regard to the union of "Greater Syria" there should first be an agreement between the countries in question as to the kind of union they wished to enter into. In the meantime, he would gladly hear Transjordan's views on "Greater Syria". Abu El-Hoda admitted that there was a lack of agreement as to the form of government which the union of "Greater Syria" would have, but added that this difficulty should in no way stand in the way of unity which the majority of these people would like to see - at least in the case of Transjordan, Syria and Palestine. In his view, the problem was that of Lebanon and possibly of Palestine. Nahas ~~replied~~ that in such a case, "it would be better to stay away from this form of union".<sup>(1)</sup>

Abu El-Hoda was undeterred and continued to harp on the union of "Greater Syria" and felt that if it could not be realized completely there should, at least, be, at first, a union of Syria and Transjordan.<sup>(2)</sup> After an insistence on the part of Nahas, he answered that the union to be formed should be a monarchy. Nahas then observed that Syria was a Republic, to which the Transjordanian Minister replied that he was confident that the majority of the Syrian people would opt for a monarchical regime.<sup>(3)</sup>

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(1) Ibid.

(2) This idea is usually referred to as the "smaller Syria" plan.

(3) Negotiations, op. cit., p.9.

This question of "Greater Syria" has been a very important element of disunion in inter-Arab relations <sup>(1)</sup> and has had a determining effect on the League of Arab States and its Charter. It contributed to the very loose degree of unity which was attained. Now the Hashimite view on Arab unity should be analyzed in terms of the international situation of that time, if one is to assess the way it influenced the formation of the League, as well as in terms of the influence of British policy. Britain, after the first few years of the League, did support the idea of the union of "Greater Syria", partly because difficulties in Anglo-Egyptian relations drew her closer to the Hashimites. However, at the time of these negotiations Britain seemed to encourage as inclusive a union as possible among the Arab countries. She favoured the entry of Saudi Arabia and Yemen into the League and might even have encouraged such a step. <sup>(2)</sup>

The last phase of the negotiations between the Trans-Jordanian Minister and Nahas Pasha was concerned with the general Arab federation and the kind of government this federation should have. On this issue, Abu El-Hoda said

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- (1) See, M. Khadduri, "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity: a study of inter-Arab relations", op. cit.
- (2) This point is hard to prove although it has been advanced in the American press, (see, for instance, Chicago Daily News, October 10, 1944); earlier the opposite point had been made, see above, p.162, note 1.

that his country had treaty relations with Great Britain and that she would co-operate with the other Arab countries as much as possible within the limits of her treaty obligations. He added that when Transjordan would attain her full independence she "would co-operate fully in foreign affairs" with the other Arab countries.<sup>(1)</sup> She was willing to co-operate in the economic, social, and cultural fields. As to the form of federation which should be erected, he said that he was in favour of Nuri Said's first alternative - a limited executive federal assembly, but that he would accept the second alternative (non-executive federal assembly) if the first view were unacceptable to the other Arab countries.

It is sometimes said that the League of Arab States does not represent the degree of unity which the Arabs desired; that this was due to the rivalry between the Hashimite projects and the other Arab projects; that Great Britain encouraged the Hashimite project; and, therefore, that Britain is responsible. But Britain did not, at that time, encourage the "Greater Syria" plan.<sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) Negotiations, op. cit., p.12.

(2) See below, pp. 192-4.

The negotiations with Abu El-Hoda were mainly concerned with the "Greater Syria" plan.<sup>(1)</sup> He made it known that Transjordan had already taken steps to fulfil this scheme. His Government had sent several notes to the British Government, after Eden's declaration of May 29, 1941, and he had personally discussed the question of Syrian union with Oliver Lyttleton in 1941 in Amman. He said that the British Government had replied that it was premature to discuss such projects<sup>(2)</sup> before the end of the war. In his opinion, Great Britain felt that it would be better to wait until Syria had achieved her independence, in words and deeds, from France, before embarking on such a scheme. After consultations between British representatives in the Middle East and London, he gathered that "Great Britain would see no harm in Transjordanian efforts to unite with Syria" but, "We disagreed in one single thing and that is the appropriate time for such a move, and they, (the British Government), feel<sup>(3)</sup> that the best time would be after the end of the war".

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(1) The instructions which Abdullah, the Emir of Transjordan, had given him were centred around this plan. See, Philip P. Graves, ed., Memoirs of King Abdullah, London, (1950), pp.254-5, the Emir asked Abu El-Hoda "to aim first and foremost at achieving the union of Syria". p.254, "As long as the Syrian countries remain without full sovereignty....and separate from each other, co-operation between them and Iraq and Egypt will be ineffective..."

(2) Negotiations, op. cit., p. 11.

(3) Ibid., p.12.

When this Transjordanian official account is analyzed in the light of other known facts such as the British "banning" of Abdullah's "Proclamation to the Syrian People" of April 8, 1943,<sup>(1)</sup> and similar British moves to restrain Abdullah, it becomes apparent that the British Government was not ready, at least during the war years (which is to say during the years which saw the erection of the League)<sup>(2)</sup> to encourage the "Greater Syria" plan. Had Britain wanted to encourage such a scheme, at that time, there is reason to believe that it might have succeeded since she was the master of the area after 1943 and had some influence, as well, over Nahas Pasha who was carrying on the ground work for Arab union.

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- (1) Memoirs of King Abdullah, op. cit., pp.266-9, under the title of "A banned proclamation". Abdullah's proclamation, which invited the Syrian leaders to discuss Syrian union in a Congress to be held in Amman, was banned by the British authorities in Palestine, by the Free French authorities in Syria and Lebanon, and by the Egyptian Government. At the time, Nahas Pasha had already announced the beginning of Arab negotiations for Arab union to be followed by the holding of a General Arab Congress. Nahas Pasha's banning of this proclamation was probably dictated by a desire not to upset the forthcoming negotiations, and especially to attract Ibn Saud to his plan; there might also have been some British suggestion to ban such a proclamation.
- (2) M. Khadduri, "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity...." (op. cit., p. 171, "The argument that King Abdullah has been induced by Great Britain to advocate Great Syria seems to be unjustifiable in the light of Abdullah's correspondence with Britain on that scheme. In view of the strong opposition of Lebanon and Syria, might it not be also true that Abdullah has been restrained by Britain from pushing his plan against Arab opposition?")

It would have been, however, a political mistake and would have been harshly criticised by the Free French authorities as aiming to replace France in the Levant. Finally, support of the "Greater Syria" plan would have meant an implicit solution of the Palestine question in the spirit of the 1939 White Paper, because Palestine was to become a part of this "Greater Syria". Now, Britain at that time wanted to isolate the problem of Palestine, because it would have embarrassed her during the war years. Once the Palestinian question was geographically solved with the creation of Israel and the annexation of its North-eastern portion by Jordan it became more feasible, politically speaking, for Great Britain to support the "Greater Syria" plan. But the meaning of this plan had undergone, by necessity, a notable change - it no longer included the unification of Palestine with the other Arab surrounding countries because a Jewish State had been erected. In effect, therefore, the "Greater Syria" plan of the early 1940's and of the late 1940's were two different projects in two different international conjunctures. This is the essential distinction which must be kept in mind when assessing British influence on the Arab union movement and its source as an element of disruption in inter-Arab relations.

In the formative years of the League of Arab States, Great Britain was interested in seeing some sort of Arab union. Whether she had a particular project in mind or not

will not be known until the contents of the archives on this question are made public. However, it can be safely assumed that Eden's declaration of May 29, 1941 started a chain of events which led to the conclusion of the Charter of the League in March 1945. Some sort of Arab union was likely to occur, with or without British encouragement; but the British initiative only hastened the development during the war years, when events move more rapidly than in times of peace. Had such an initiative come from the Arabs themselves, and had the British Government opposed it, it is very likely that the League of Arab States would not have been formed as early as 1945.

Negotiations with Saudi Arabia (October 10-15, 1943):

The arrival of the delegate of Saudi Arabia in Cairo for negotiations on Arab unity was a diplomatic victory for Nahas Pasha and for Egypt. The attitude of Saudi Arabia up to that time had been one of mistrust, fear and aloofness. Ibn Saud feared the outcome of any project which would be elaborated by the Hashimites, <sup>(1)</sup> and had some reasons to suspect the

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(1) About the time of these negotiations, the Emir Abdullah wrote about the Saudi dynasty in these terms: "It should not be forgotten that the fanatic minority which now rules the Hejaz had done nothing for Islam, neither of old nor in modern times", Memoirs of King Abdullah, op. cit., p. 250; in terms of Ibn Saud's religious feelings and in view of what the Holy Cities of Islam, under his control, represent for the Muslims, this is about as insulting as could possibly be.

personal ambitions of King Farouk. (1) He might also have been irked by the fact that he was not consulted before Nahas Pasha started these negotiations. (2)

In August 1943, Nahas Pasha had asked Ibn Saud to send a delegation to Cairo in order to discuss the question of Arab unity and the formation of an Arab federation. The latter answered by mail requesting more information about the talks which had taken place in Cairo. Nahas then decided to send an envoy, Kamel Haneicha Bey, Egyptian Undersecretary of State, in September to discuss the matter with Ibn Saud. (3)

On October 10, 1943, Sheikh Youssef Yassin, private secretary of Ibn Saud, arrived in Cairo. The negotiations were tortuous because Yassin maintained, on practically every point of importance, that he could not express the views of his country before discussing the question with his sovereign. These negotiations may have been discouraging for Mahas Pasha and may have made him aware of the divergence of views among Arab leaders. The negotiations with Saudi Arabia were

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(1) See above, pp.200-1.

(2) See, G. Kirk, Survey, op. cit., pp. 337-8.

(3) The Times, September 17, 1943.

summarily reported in the documents published by the League of Arab States in 1949.<sup>(1)</sup>

In the first meeting with Yussuf Yassin, both parties agreed that every endeavour should be made to safeguard the overriding aims and interests of the "Arab Nation". The proceedings of the second and third meetings are reported in one innocuous sentence each. In the course of the fourth meeting the Saudi representative indicated that his country would be glad to cooperate with the other Arab countries in agricultural and cultural affairs. He felt however that it would be better to postpone the consideration of political cooperation until a more appropriate time.<sup>(2)</sup> It is not clear what Saudi Arabia understood by "a more appropriate time". No doubt, Ibn Saud wanted to have a clearer idea about Hashimite plans and about Farouk's ambitions. The fifth and last meeting was an occasion for the Saudi representative to sum up Ibn Saud's views in four points: (a) he viewed with great sympathy the Arab movement in Syria and Lebanon and hoped for the independence and sovereignty of the republican form of government of these two countries; (b) the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was doing its best to see the question of Palestine resolved and the rights of its inhabitants restored; (c) the

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(1) They were reported in one page and a half, Negotiations, op.cit., pp. 15-16; see the bibliographical note at the end of this chapter.

(2) Negotiations, op. cit., p. 15.

question of Arab cooperation in all its aspects would be considered favourably by Saudi Arabia when the time was appropriate; and (d) as to the meeting of a commission to investigate these matters, the Saudi Arabian Government, when the time came, would give its views on the place and date. The following communique was released after these talks:

"A complete agreement has been realized on the general principles, but certain details having to be submitted to King Ibn Saud, it has been decided to consider the consultations as suspended and not as terminated. They will be taken up at an ulterior date when King Ibn Saud will have made his point of view known."(1)

The most important aspect of Arab relations, in the view of Saudi Arabia, was the maintenance of a republican form of Government in Syria and Lebanon. For Saudi Arabia this was not due to any love for republican regimes nor was it really based on a desire to safeguard the interests of Syria and Lebanon. It was above all, the best possible means of checking the ambitions of the Emir Abdullah and his dynasty. We see this Saudi Arabian view coming up over and over again, particularly in the discussions about the drafting of the Charter of the League as shall be seen in the next Chapter. In a sense it was no more than the question of "Greater Syria" all over again.

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(1) France, October 21, 1943.

The Saudi Arabian delegation was the first to raise the Palestinian question in the course of these negotiations. Ibn Saud wanted to discuss the Palestinian problem simultaneously with the problem of Arab union whereas Nahas Pasha wanted to keep the former out of the agenda until after the war. It is over the question of Palestine that one may suspect that the British Government officials in the Middle East had made their point of view prevail in their contacts with Nahas Pasha, and must have 'advised' him to keep this issue out of the discussions as much as possible. The Saudi stand on this matter was constant. It was reported, at the opening of the Alexandria Conference of September 25, 1944, that the main source of misunderstanding between Nahas Pasha and Ibn Saud was about Palestinian representation, and that this was the reason behind the Saudi delay in sending a representative to Alexandria. The first speech of the Saudi Arabian delegate in this Conference was about Palestinian representation, and he insisted upon it until it was finally decided to invite Musa Al-Alami- a candidate, chosen by all the Arab parties of Palestine, who had participated in the London Round Table Conference

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(1) The New York Times, October 21, 1943; France, Oct. 21, 1943.

(2) The New York Times, September 23, 1944.

(3) Ibid.

This revival of the question of the Caliphate shows again that intertwining of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism.

Saudi Arabian policy towards Arab union sometimes coincided with Lebanon's. The Lebanese also feared the ambitions of Farouk because they wanted Arab union to remain free from Islamic considerations. Although the goals of Lebanon and Saudi Arabia were very different (indeed, they represent the two extremes of the Arab spectrum) they often found themselves agreed on the means (1) to carry out their policies.

Nahas Pasha's negotiations with Saudi Arabia were "suspended" and resumed again on November 2, 1943. Not much progress was noted however until Farouk sent Azzam Pasha, in December 1943, to Saudi Arabia to smoothen relations with Ibn Saud. This interview prepared the ground for the Yanbo meeting, of the Egyptian and Saudi Kings during the first half of July 1944, which cleared the last obstacle to the creation of the League of Arab States.

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(1) This is still true fourteen years later. In reference to the meeting, in Cairo, of the heads of State of Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia (February 1957), Le Monde of February 27, 1957 reported: "On apprend de source bien informée à Beyrouth que le Liban accepterait toute décision qui pourrait être prise à la conférence... et qu'aura approuvée le roi Seoud d'Arabie. Selon la même source un message dans ce sens aurait été adressé par M. Camille Chamoun au roi Seoud."

Negotiations with Syria: (October 26 - November 3, 1943)

On October 21, 1943, an impressive Syrian delegation, headed by the Syrian Prime Minister, Saad Allah Al-Jabiri, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Djanil Merdam Bey, arrived in Cairo for talks with Nahas Pasha. It was apparent from the very first day that Syria attached great importance to these discussions. <sup>(1)</sup> She had always been the spiritual centre of pan-Arabism and was therefore willing to contribute as much as possible to the realization of an Arab federation. On August 26, 1943, a motion had been passed in the Syrian Parliament asking the Government to work for the creation of an Arab federation as a step towards total unification of the Arab world. <sup>(2)</sup>

The negotiations began formally on October 26, 1943. The question of "Greater Syria" was the subject of a long and elaborate expose by the Syrian Prime Minister. He traced the history of "geographic" Syria which, in his interpretation, had always constituted one unit and which had been divided after the first world war by foreign Powers. <sup>(3)</sup> The chief obstacle to the union of "Greater Syria"

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(1) Before discussing the question of Arab union with Nahas Pasha, the Syrians and Lebanese had decided to hold a meeting at Shtoura, on October 10, 1943, in order to exchange their views on this matter. See M. Laissy, op. cit., p.106.

(2) See International News Bulletin, R.I.I.A., Sept.30,1944, p.802.

(3) Negotiations, op. cit., p.20.

in his view, was the question of Palestine. He felt that this problem could be resolved on the basis of the 1939 White Paper; "As to the solutions provided in the White Paper, the Arabs now seem to lean in their favour as a result of a 'fait accompli'... the main problem is that of working out the details... We think that there should be a conference of Palestinian Arab representatives and those of other Arab countries in order to work out a solution for the Palestinian question."<sup>(1)</sup> Thus, Syria and Saudi Arabia agreed on the necessity of discussing Palestine along with Arab unity. This view was not shared by the other delegations who probably preferred to wait until the end of the War, as recommended by Great Britain. Their silence about the Palestinian problem suggests that they believed it could be separated from the policy of Arab union.

Al-Jabiri said that Nahas Pasha should meet representatives of the Arab parties in Palestine to discuss union between Syria and Palestine. But he added that, "there is a very important point which should be thought about. This is the likelihood of a spreading of Palestinian Jews throughout the Arab countries in case Arab unity is achieved. We

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(1) Ibid., p.22.

are against and opposed to such a spread." (1)

The Syrians naturally stressed the role of Syria in the Arab movement, and asserted that neither Amman nor Jerusalem nor Aleppo could take the place of Damascus in Arab affairs, "Damascus is the one which has protected Islam and perfected Arabic... every Arab cause has seen its birth in Damascus before spreading throughout the Arab world..." (2)

This was meant to show that the Syrians would not accept Transjordanian, Palestinian nor Lebanese leadership in the Greater Syrian context. It was not a challenge to Egyptian leadership of the movement, because Al-Jabiri was quick to add, "Syria recognised and accepted Egyptian leadership out of her own free will and choice." (3) He even added that he would be prepared to follow the path of Egypt and make every necessary sacrifice in the cause of Arab union; that the Syrian people were in favour of as complete a union as possible and would like to see a federation with some central and executive powers; and that he was ready to give "carte blanche" to Nahas Pasha in this matter because Syria would accept any plan which was agreed upon by the other Arab countries. (4)

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(1) Ibid - Nahas Pasha agreed with Al-Jabiri on this point, see, *ibid.*, p.24.

(2) *Ibid.*, p.22.

(3) *Ibid.*

(4) *Ibid.*, p.27.

The only reserve of Syria was about the Hashinite plans for the union of the four components of the "Greater Syria". Al-Jabiri made it quite clear that Syria was a Republic and wanted to remain so, <sup>(1)</sup> and that if a union of "Greater Syria" were to take place Damascus should be the capital and re-<sup>(2)</sup>publicanism the form of Government. Syria feared the ambitions of the Hashinites and those of the Emir Abdullah in particular. Abdullah must have made his views known to the Syrians, who sought an understanding with Lebanon and Saudi Arabia to check his plans. Abdullah was aware of this opposition as can be seen from his writings in early 1944: "It is therefore the duty of Baghdad and Amman to follow a united Hashinite policy, and to try to put an end to any attempt to dissociate the Arab cause from the principles of the first Arab rising. This is especially important in Syria, where a dangerous Saudi-Syrian-Lebanese understanding has lately been reached". <sup>(3)</sup>

As in the preceding negotiations, Nahas Pasha rarely made his own views known although one could detect, from his encouragement of the Syrian stand, that he did not look upon

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(1) Ibid., p.22.

(2) Ibid., p.26.

(3) Memoirs of King Abdullah, op. cit., p. 250.

the "Greater Syria" plan as formulated by Abdullah with favour. He was greatly encouraged by the Syrian views on Arab unity and by their willingness to go as far, in this respect, as any other Arab country. Apart from the historical tendency of Syria to champion Arab unity, there must have been a doubt about French and Allied promises in regard to Syrian independence and the realization that the inclusion of Syria in some sort of Arab union would guarantee such an independence. The same view must have prevailed in the minds of the Lebanese negotiators when they met with Nahas Pasha.

Negotiations with Lebanon (January 9 - 13, 1944):

Negotiations with Lebanon were meant to start in November 1943, but were delayed by the crisis between Lebanon and the French. Ironically, the French contributed most to Lebanon's orientation in favour of Arab union.<sup>(1)</sup> The crisis of November and December, 1943, between the newly-constituted Lebanese

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(1) The crisis between the Free French authorities and the Lebanon had arisen as a result of the Lebanese Government's decision to make certain constitutional changes without the consent of the French. On November 10, 1943, the French declared the changes null and void and dissolved the Lebanese chamber, (See, Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, op. cit., pp 285-8); Hourani writes, *ibid.*, p. 285: "Lebanon was only half-heartedly Arab nationalist, and nothing would strengthen her Arab sentiment so much as a practical demonstration of the concern of the other Arab countries for her welfare and of the benefits she could obtain from their assistance."

Government and the Free French authorities showed the Lebanese the advantages which an Arab union held for them.

The Lebanese delegation arrived in Cairo on January 5, 1944, headed by the Prime Minister, Riad Es-Solh. This delegation aroused a great interest in Egypt especially since the latter had contributed to the solution of the Lebanese crisis. <sup>(1)</sup> As a result of Nahas' support of Lebanon, the atmosphere was more conducive to an agreement on some form of Arab union than it could have been at any other time.

The minutes of the negotiations have not been published. The joint communique which was released at the end of the talks between Nahas and Riad Es-Solh was very short and gave no information on the negotiations:

"The spirit of the talks was that of the complete understanding and cordiality that have always existed between Lebanon and Egypt, and that have vividly manifested themselves during the recent incidents in Lebanon." (2)

The only available document on these talks is a long communique released by the Lebanese delegation on the subject of Arab union. The attitude of Lebanon on Arab

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(1) For the role of Egypt in this crisis, see the Times, January 17, 1944.

(2) The New York Times, January, 14, 1944.

(3) The full text of this communique is quoted in Negotiations, op. cit., p. 33.

unity was well-outlined in the communique: Arab union should be based on the reduction of foreign influence (the main concern of Lebanon which was still unsure of its independence of French control); it was to be understood in terms of the completely sovereign States with definite boundaries and fully independent; Syro-Lebanese co-operation in the economic and cultural fields would not be extended to foreign relations and defence. Finally, Lebanon showed a willingness to co-operate with the other Arab countries in cultural and social affairs; indicated that she was preoccupied by the Palestinian problem; and proposed that the contemplated union aid the Arab countries still under foreign domination.

Lebanese policy may be contrasted with that of Syria in these negotiations. Lebanon insisted on her full sovereignty and complete independence and was unwilling to co-operate institutionally in foreign Affairs and defence. In the declaration which the Lebanese Prime Minister made before his departure to Cairo, he emphasized that the Lebanese participation in the talks about Arab union in no way affected Lebanese independence; and added, "Lebanon has an Arab face but takes Western attire."<sup>(1)</sup>

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(1) The Times, January 4, 1944.

Lebanon feared Arab unity because Lebanese Christians understood it as meaning Muslim unity. The Maronite priests, with the Patriarch in the forefront, led the anti-Arab union movement. On September 6, 1944, the Patriarch, Antun Aridha, declared that Lebanon would not submit to any form of union, and went so far as to demand a guarantee from France, Great Britain and the United States for Lebanon's independence. <sup>(1)</sup>

The success of these negotiations with Lebanon helped towards the establishment of the League of Arab States and encouraged Saudi Arabian and Yemeni support for such an institution; for these countries were also suspicious and fearful of a close union - although for different reasons.

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(1) See M. Khadduri, "The Scheme for Fertile Crescent Unity...", op. cit., p.143; see also, Akhbar al-Yawm, Cairo, November 3, 1945. The French were conscious of these Lebanese fears. Here is what Catroux wrote to De Gaulle on March 8, 1943:

"In Lebanon I shall exploit the old sentimental link with France, the instinct of defence against the plans for her absorption. Lebanese nationalism has at present many supporters, even among the Muslims, and the notion of the identity of French and Lebanese interests is gaining ground. It is felt that only France can guarantee the integrity of Lebanon, her creature; and this idea is penetrating all the Christian circles, even those of Egypt who were long opposed to it." - quoted in G. Kirk, Survey, op. cit., p.272.

The negotiations with the Lebanese delegation ended on January 13, 1944, and on the 18th of the same month, The Times could write, in a leading article, that the negotiations which took place in Cairo revealed that the leaders of the different countries unveiled "a surprising identity of views" and that an agreement of one kind or another was likely to be reached. The press in the West had been doubtful about the possibility of union among the Arab countries in view of the prevailing rivalries and were indeed surprised to see that some kind of union might be attained. In the Arab world there was a good deal of optimism and the public heard more and more about the proposed Arab federation. In Syria, hopes were high and President Shukri El-Kouatli said in January 1944:

"Nous ne nous contenterons pas de peu de chose; au contraire, nous aspirons à co-opérer à la construction d'un grand monde arabe qui donnera au Levant sa grandeur, sa sécurité et sa puissance." (1)

The next month, on February 6, there began negotiations between Nahas Pasha and the last Arab country to be consulted (or rather the last to agree to send a delegation) - the Yemen.

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(1) Quoted in M. Laissy, op. cit., p. 111.

Negotiations with the Yemen: (February 6-9, 1944).

Negotiations with the Yemen were the least rewarding of all. Nahas Pasha encountered in the arguments of Hussain al-Kibsi, Yemen's Minister of Waqfs, the same difficulties which he had met with the Saudi Arabian representative. On each point the spokesman for Yemen would say that he would have to consult his sovereign before answering. It was clear, however, that the Yemen was reluctant to enter into a union which would impede its sovereignty in any way. Yemen would be in favour of cultural and economic co-operation with the other Arab countries, but no mention was made of political co-operation. Finally, Yemen supported the principle of equality in representation in the institution which was to be created.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Yemeni stand showed a policy which has remained constant since 1944 and which is similar to that of Saudi Arabia. Nahas Pasha was quite aware of this and therefore made use of Saudi Arabia in order to attract the Yemen to participate in these negotiations. Azzam Pasha did likewise in order to obtain the Yemen's ratification of the Charter of the League of Arab States.

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(1) Negotiations, op. cit., p. 34; the minutes of the negotiations with the Yemen are reported in half a page.

Yemen did not take part in the deliberations of the Political Sub-committee of the Preparatory Committee for a General Arab Congress which elaborated the Charter of the League, and only sent an observer to the Alexandria Conference of September 1944. But the views of the Yemen had to be taken into account because the Arab countries were interested in reaching a unanimous agreement.

The talks with the Yemeni representative ended on February 9, 1944, thus concluding the negotiations which had begun on July 31, 1943. By the end of these negotiations public optimism was inversely proportionate to that among the Arab politicians. At the outset the politicians were talking in terms of Arab federation with some degree of executive power, but it had now become apparent that such hopes were unlikely to materialise. Even the Arabs themselves had underestimated their rivalries; and the more likely the project of union, the more substantial these rivalries became. Public opinion took little account of this; the man in the street began to hear more and more about Arab unity and was impressed by the comings and goings of Arab Statesmen.

## Bibliographical Note:

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The basic documents used in this chapter and the next one are three official publications of the League of Arab States:

- (1) Summary of the Minutes of the Consultations (of Nahas Pasha) with Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen (in Arabic) Cairo (1949) - 34 pages.
- (2) Minutes of the Meetings of the Political Subcommittee for the Drafting of Charter for the League of Arab States (in Arabic), Cairo (1946) - 101 pages.
- (3) Minutes of the Preparatory Committee for a General Arab Congress (in Arabic), Cairo (1946) - 66 pages.

The second and third documents are complete and straightforward; they were published in 1946, that is to say very shortly after the events which they report.

The first publication, on the other hand, is not a complete account of the consultations of Nahas Pasha, for an Arab union, with the Arab countries. The document reports on events which had taken place in 1943, that is to say six years before its publication. It is very difficult to say why the League of Arab States - or to be more precise, its Secretariat (if not the Secretary-General, Azzam Pasha himself) - decided to publish these minutes in 1949. The only explanation which can be advanced is that it was an attempt to hinder the "Greater Syria" plan which was being revived at the time (1949) by the Hashimites. This interpretation is based on the contents of the document in question:

- (a) The consultations with Iraq (Nuri Said) which lasted four meetings are reported in four pages;
- (b) those with Transjordan, three meetings are recorded in ten pages;
- (c) those with Saudi Arabia, five meetings are reported in one page and a half, with the second and third meetings reported in half a line each;

- (d) those with Syria, four meetings are recorded in sixteen pages;
- (e) those with Lebanon are not reported at all and one only finds a Lebanese communique;
- (f) those with the Yemen are reported in one third of a page.

The only consultations reported at any length are those with Syria and Transjordan; even in these instances one does not find a balanced recording. The first meeting of Nahas Pasha with the Syrians, for instance, is reported in nine pages whereas the second one is reported in only one third of a page.

The document manages to give the impression that all Nahas Pasha's consultations in 1943 centred around the "Greater Syria" plan. It shows that Syria was greatly opposed to such a plan and that she wanted to retain her republican form of government. It also makes it very clear that Transjordan was determined that the unification of "Greater Syria" should precede any type of Arab union.

The publication, therefore, implicitly puts a good amount of blame on the Hashimites because they appear as the main stumbling block to Arab unity. The negotiations with the Yemen, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, who were all very careful about Arab unity, are only scantily reported, or not at all, in order to let the Hashimite policy stand out in contrast to that of Syria.

CHAPTER 7 : FINAL PREPARATIONS.

The Arab press was impatiently demanding the Arab Conference which was supposed to follow the preliminary negotiations. On July 12, 1944, in an answer to a question in the Egyptian Senate, Nahas Pasha tried to calm public opinion by declaring:

"I am still immensely interested in the project of Arab unity and my efforts in a liason capacity for its success continue... I have recently written to the Governments of Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the Lebanon, and Yemen, notifying them of the formation of a Preparatory Committee to record the views agreed upon in our preliminary meetings, to complete any investigations required on any particular subject, and to prepare for a general Arab Conference." (1)

This statement of Nahas had been facilitated by two events. First, the Yanbo meeting between King Farouk and Ibn Saud; secondly, it had become certain that an Allied victory was near, and the Arab countries were eager to reach agreement before the end of the war so as to be able to present a common front at the peace conference.

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(1) Quoted in M. Khadduri, "Towards an Arab Union", op. cit., p. 95.

On September 25, 1944, an unprecedented Arab Conference was held in Alexandria. For the first time the heads of five Arab Governments - the Prime Ministers of Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt - met and discussed Arab affairs; and it was more than indicative that their meeting place should be found in Egypt. The purpose of the Conference was, as outlined in Nahas' statement before the Egyptian Senate, to register the agreement which had been reached as a result of the preliminary negotiations. At the time of this Conference there had not yet been any agreement on the kind of Arab union to be formed. Transjordan was still holding unto the "Greater Syria" plan and was supported by Iraq.<sup>(1)</sup> Yemen and Saudi Arabia were hesitant; they were

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(1) France, May 9, 1944, quotes the following declaration of the Transjordanian Prime Minister: "The union of Iraq, Palestine, Syria and Transjordan is not outside the possibilities. Will the great Arab State be a Kingdom or a Republic?... I think that the Arabs would like to have a King, with a Constitution and a Government chosen by the people." About this time also, the Transjordanian Government was opposed to the participation of Saudi Arabia in an Arab Union; this was made clear in a communication on July 27, 1944 from the Egyptian Consul in Palestine and Transjordan, in which he stated that the Emir Abdullah accepted the idea of an Arab union but refused to enter into any union with Saudi Arabian participation. See, Notes Documentaires et Etudes (Paris), "Les Pays Arabes et l'Union Arabe" (No.342), op. cit., p. 6. For the Iraqi support on the "Greater Syria" plan, see The New York Times, August 13, 1944.

guided, above all, by a negative principle - the desire to prevent the realization of the Hashimite plans. Egypt, which had taken the lead in the preparatory work for the creation of a pan-Arab institution, had not put forth any specific programme and preferred to evaluate those of the other Arab countries. The main interest of Egypt was to see an Arab union formed which would allow her to become the spokesman of the Arab world and which would enhance her prestige internationally. Lebanon was half-heartedly interested and was willing to participate in some form of union so long as her complete independence was not impaired; she, therefore, sought an Arab union which would precisely guarantee this independence instead of acting on the principle that the notion of union pre-supposes the surrender of some degree of sovereignty. Syria was about the only Arab country anxious to see the fulfilment of pan-Arab ideals, and willing to follow any plan commanding general approval - but even the Syrian stand was coloured by a fear of the Hashimite ambitions of Abdullah.

On September 28, the first plenary session of the Conference was held; Saudi Arabia and the Yemen were not represented, nor had the parties of Palestine been invited to send a representative. It has been reported that the main hesitation of Ibn Saud was based on the question of Palestinian representation; he had insisted that a representative from the Arabs of Palestine be present at the

(1)  
Conference. The first aim of the Conference was to pass a resolution demanding a united Arab representation at the peace Conference and other world conferences. At the time, only one Arab country, Iraq, qualified for a seat at the  
(2)  
peace table.

Next, the Conference considered that Palestinian problem. One often encounters the view that the question of Palestine was the main factor which led the Arabs to unite as they did in 1945. In the light of further developments, and in view of the amount of time devoted by the League of Arab States to the question, the latter interpretation may seem plausible. If one evaluates the moves of the Arab statesmen who founded the League, in the light of their deliberations, it would appear that the concern with the Palestinian problem played  
(3)  
a secondary role in the formation of the League.

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- (1) See, The New York Times, September 23, 1944. The Saudi delegate, on his arrival to Alexandria, on September 29, stressed this point and consequently Musa al-Alami arrived as an "observer" from the Palestinian Arab parties.
- (2) Iraq had declared war on the Axis on January 11, 1943, and signed the declaration of the United Nations.
- (3) See, below, pp. 221-25.

(1)  
On October 7, the Alexandria Protocol was signed by Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq. The Yemeni and Saudi Arabian representatives were observers and had no mandate to sign the document. The Protocol was the first concrete result of the discussions and negotiations for the formation of an Arab union. It was much less substantial than what had been expected, especially when one looks back at the first negotiations of Nahas Pasha and Nuri Said.

The Alexandria Protocol provided for the creation of a League of Arab States which would be restricted to independent countries. This League was to have a Council which would "execute the agreements concluded among the Arab States". Its decisions would be binding only on those States which accepted them, except in the case of a dispute between two members of the League at which time they would be executory. The Protocol was firm about the foreign policy of the Arab States which was "in no case" to be detrimental to the policy of the League or that of any member State.

The Protocol contained provisions for close economic, cultural, and social co-operation between the member States.

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(1) For text, see below, Appendix (B).

It referred hopefully to the possibility of a closer union, in the future, than the one to be provided by the League. It contained two specific decisions, one about Lebanon and the second about Palestine. The first was a unanimous confirmation by all Arab States of Lebanon's sovereignty and independence. <sup>(1)</sup> The one about Palestine stressed the need to safeguard the Arab population's interests and demanded that the provisions of the 1939 White Paper be executed. Finally, the Protocol established a sub-committee to draft the charter of the League of Arab States.

The remaining handicap in the way of the creation of the League of Arab States was the attitude of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen who had not signed the Alexandria Protocol. Abderrahman Azzam Pasha, Egypt's Minister of Arab Affairs, managed to obtain, on January 3, 1945, the signature of Ibn Saoud for the Protocol. <sup>(2)</sup> On February 5, the Egyptian ministry of Foreign Affairs received Yemen's agreement. This cleared the way for the convening of the sub-committee to draft the League's Charter as provided by the Alexandria

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(1) See below, pp. 227-32.

(2) After Ibn Saoud had given his approval to the Alexandria Protocol, Farouk went to visit him in Saudi Arabia that same month. This visit was followed by that of Shukri Kowatly, President of Syria, on February 9, 1945.

Protocol. Effectively, on February 6, Nuqrashi Pasha, the  
(1)  
new Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced that  
he had invited the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Arab  
Governments to an Arab conference for the elaboration of  
the League's Charter.

The Political Sub-committee for the Drafting of a Charter  
for the League of Arab States, as it was officially called,  
met in Cairo on February 14, 1945. The deliberations of  
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this Sub-committee provide us with a very clear picture  
of inter-Arab relations on the eve of the founding of the  
League. The debates centred around the very reserved attitude  
of Lebanon on the one hand, and the Hashimites' desire  
to produce a Charter which would allow for the realization  
of the "Greater Syria" on the other.

The question of Palestine's participation in the League  
took up the main portion of the first meeting which lasted  
almost three hours. The Arab leaders, at this time, did  
not seem to be greatly concerned with the fate of Palestine.  
This is a fact which must be elaborated upon because it

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(1) Right after the signing of the Alexandria Protocol, Farouk fired Nahas Pasha and a new Egyptian Government was formed under Ahmad Mahir Pasha. The latter was assassinated on February 25, 1945 and was succeeded by Nuqrashi Pasha.

(2) The minutes have been published by the League of Arab States; they will be referred to henceforward as Minutes, See bibliographical note, above, pp. 213-4.

explains many of the League's mistakes during the Palestine crisis and provides us with a forecast of its failure in this domain.

The Arab States were all aware of the Biltmore declaration of May 11, 1942, which called for the establishment of a Jewish State to include all of Palestine and for the repudiation of the 1939 White Paper. Yet the minutes of the preliminary negotiations of Nahas Pasha with the Arab Governments, for an Arab union, did not show any signs of concern. The annex in the Alexandria Protocol was certainly far from being an answer to Zionist efforts on the international scene. The Arabs may have felt comfort in the fact that Zionist activities were largely aimed against British officials in Palestine and may have counted on the sympathy of the British Government; but they must have been acquainted with the effects of Zionist propaganda in Great Britain. They must have been cognizant of the British War Office decision of September 20, 1944 - five days before the opening of the Alexandria Conference - announcing that "the Government have decided to accede to the request of the Jewish Agency... that a Jewish Brigade Group should be formed to take part in active operations."<sup>(1)</sup>

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(1) The Times, September 20, 1944.

Despite the above, Fahmi Nuqrashi Pasha, when he opened the first meeting of the Political Sub-committee for the drafting of a Charter for the League of Arab States, on February 14, 1945, did not make a single reference to the Palestinian problem. <sup>(1)</sup> Nor did Henri Far'on, the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his opening policy speech. <sup>(2)</sup> The other Arab Ministers not having made any opening speeches, it is hard to say whether they would have mentioned the question of Palestine or not.

The representation of Palestine in the Sub-committee was raised by the Transjordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sameer Rifa' Pasha, in his first intervention: "I am taking advantage of this opportunity, asking you to excuse me for a question as to whether there shall be a Palestinian representative among us in these deliberations or not?" <sup>(3)</sup> To this question the President of the Sub-committee, the Egyptian Prime Minister, Nuqrashi Pasha, answered that he had "referred to the minutes of the Preparatory Conference" and "found that it had limited and designed the ones who were to participate in this sub-committee..." <sup>(4)</sup> Azzam Pasha, a member of

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(1) Minutes, op. cit., p. 12.

(2) Ibid., p. 13.

(3) Ibid., p. 3.

(4) Ibid.,

the Egyptian delegation, then said that the question rested with the Sub-committee itself.<sup>(1)</sup> The Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Djemal Merdam Bey, pointed out that the question of Palestine was very important and that, "if it were possible to find a way for Palestinian participation our work would be more complete and better..."<sup>(2)</sup> Nuri Said saw no "objection" to the presence of a Palestinian delegate; but the Lebanese Minister, Henri Far'on, said that, "from the legal point of view it would not be possible for us to allow Palestine to participate officially with us"<sup>(3)</sup>, and then went on to point out that Palestine was not independent and that her participation in the deliberations might "weaken" Arab interests. Nuri Said pointed out that from a political point of view, Palestinian representation would show the world that the Arab countries are concerned with that part of the Arab world.<sup>(4)</sup> The Lebanese delegate proved to be the main opponent of Palestinian representation<sup>(5)</sup> until Djemal Merdam Bey of Syria presented a compromise solution which accepted the presence of a Palestinian delegate who would not take part in drafting the Charter.<sup>(6)</sup> Nuqrashi

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(1) Ibid., p.4.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid., p.5.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid., p. 6.

(6) Ibid., p. 7.

Pasha, fearing that some of the delegations might not be satisfied with the compromise, suggested:

"there is another idea which would satisfy all the different points of view, and that is that we go on as representatives of the Arab countries in the drafting of a charter for the League, and, in view of the fact that Palestine has a special position in our sentiments and efforts, we should add a special annex in the Charter expressing our concern with this question and making this concern known to the whole world."(1)

It seems that the chief worry of the Arab Statesmen was to give an impression that they were much concerned with the question of Palestine. Perhaps, the widely current illusion that Palestine had a prime importance in the foundation of the League of Arab States testifies to their success, and the annex in the Charter of the League may have consolidated this belief. But there was not unanimous agreement on the necessity of such an annex and the views on what it should say were divergent. (2)

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(1) Ibid., p. 8.

(2) Sameer Rifai of Transjordan declared that, "it would not be possible to devote a special part in the Charter of the League to the question of Palestine..." Ibid., p. 9. It is interesting to note that once an agreement was reached to invite Musa al-Alami, as a representative for Palestine, there was much discussion as to how the invitation was to be couched (see Ibid., pp. 9-10); Nuqrashi Pasha suggested that the invitation should only mention the name - Musa al-Alami; the Syrian Minister then wanted that label "representative of Palestine" added to the name but Nuqrashi objected to this because he felt that they might have to add "representative of Palestinian Arabs" and that this would create problems.

The Arab statesmen who created the League had only one common aim: Arab participation in the peace conference after the end of the war. This question was first brought up in the negotiations which Nahas Pasha had with Nuri Said in the summer of 1943. It was then agreed that the decision on this matter "will be left to the Arab Congress,"<sup>(1)</sup> which was to meet to approve the work of the Preparatory Committee. At the first meeting of the Political Sub-committee, on February 14, 1945, Nuqrashi Pasha announced that he had received copies of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals from the American Charge d'Affaires, and all of the Arab Governments were aware of the fact that an international organisation was about to be formed. In order to guarantee their participation in such an organisation and to benefit from any eventual peace arrangement, the Arab countries realized the importance of presenting a united front. They, also, knew that the new international organisation would provide for regional organisations such as that the Arabs themselves were trying to erect. In order to jump on the San Francisco band wagon, most of the Arab countries declared war on the Axis.<sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) Negotiations, op. cit., p. 74.

(2) See intervention of Djemal Merdam Bey, in the sub-committee, *ibid.*, p.74, in which he speaks of "unexpected developments" and adds, "we, and you (Lebanon) and Egypt have only declared war because we found that it would be to our advantage and to the advantage of the other Arab countries."

Arab public opinion played an important role in the creation of the League. The idea appealed to the masses who were playing an increasing role in Arab politics; many national organisations such as the Club of Arab Union, founded in Cairo, were actively propagating the idea of Arab unity, and pan-Arab conferences became more frequent.<sup>(1)</sup> Most of the Arab Governments tried therefore to attain some concrete result to satisfy their public opinion, but, at the same time, made use of the pan-Arab negotiations in order to further their own national policy. Lebanon was the frankest Arab State in this respect, and her stand was the subject of some very sharp exchanges in the Political Sub-committee which drafted the Charter.

The attitude of Lebanon was clear. She wanted to participate in a pan-Arab union but did not want the latter to limit her sovereignty; on the contrary, she wanted to make use of the League so as to safeguard her boundaries. The best illustration of this can be found in the special annex, pertaining to Lebanon, in the Alexandria Protocol, which affirmed and guaranteed Lebanon's "independence and sovereignty within its present boundaries." That this guarantee was accepted unanimously shows a change in the Syrian outlook; for in his negotiations with Nahas Pasha,

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(1) Two pan-Arab conferences were held in 1944: one of Arab students, and the other of Arab women.

in 1943, the Syrian Prime Minister, al-Jabiri, had said that if Lebanon did not accept unification with Syria the latter would insist on the return of those parts which were added by force when the French formed the "Greater Lebanon".<sup>(1)</sup>

Lebanon's concept of a League of Arab States was set forth in a proposed draft<sup>(2)</sup> for this organisation. The Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs insisted that the name of the organisation be "League of Arab States" instead of Nuri Said's suggestion - "Arab League".<sup>(3)</sup> The distinction is substantial: the former expression emphasises "States", whereas "Arab" is the keynote of the latter.

Lebanon insisted upon restricted membership in the League. It wanted it to be left to the Council of the League to determine whether a country was qualified to become a member or not. Lebanon opposed the idea of "universal" membership of every "Arab" country "in case a country which considers itself Arab and which we don't consider as such"<sup>(4)</sup> presents itself. Here Lebanon feared

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(1) See, Negotiations, op. cit., p. 28.

(2) Minutes, op. cit., pp. 22-25.

(3) Ibid., p. 32.

(4) Ibid., p. 33.

that the Arab League may turn into a Muslim League with the admission of countries like Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, etc... In this context, Nuri Said's view prevailed because almost all of the other delegates were agreed that the admission to the League was a "right" of every independent "Arab" State without defining what was meant by an "Arab State". (1)

The Lebanese delegate made it clear from the beginning that it was decided at Alexandria to dismiss the possibility of an Arab central government as well as the idea of a federation. (2) He also insisted on the inclusion in the Charter of a provision allowing for withdrawal from the League. (3) Almost every intervention of Henri Far'ou included a reference to the principle of "complete independence", "full independence", and "territorial integrity of the member States. (4) One could easily analyse the whole deliberations which led to the drafting of the Charter as an attempt to satisfy Lebanon's views. Practically every

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(1) See Article 1 of the Charter of the League.

(2) Minutes, op. cit., p. 28.

(3) Ibid., p. 30.

(4) Ibid., see, p.13; pp. 22-25; p. 27; p. 28; p. 30; p. 31; p. 33; p. 44; p. 69, "the essence of our work is the preservation of the independence and sovereignty of each nation"; p. 71; p. 72; p. 73; p. 74; p. 75; p. 91.

article was discussed in the light of Lebanon's opposition \*  
to this or that principle. It appears that Lebanon had a  
definite policy in regard to Arab unity; she knew that the  
popular current in favour of such a union, throughout the  
Arab world, was very strong, and she realized that unless  
this union was limited, she would be swept away by the pan-  
Arab tide. The whole Lebanese effort, therefore, was spent  
on limiting the kind of union which was to be attained. (1)

It must be admitted, however, that Lebanon's task was ✓  
eased by the disunity among the Arabs. There was great mis-  
trust between the Arab delegations. Most of the discussions  
were devoted to the question of aggression by one member  
State against another, and the way in which the League was  
to intervene in such a case. The whole question was brought  
up in the Lebanese draft proposal for a Charter of the  
League. (2) Lebanon feared an aggression from Syria or from ✓

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(1) The Lebanese attitude has to be understood in terms of  
its defender, Henri Far'on, one of the Arab Christians  
who did not have much trust in the pan-Arab movement.  
The Lebanese stand was greatly altered during the  
meetings of the Preparatory Committee for an Arab  
Congress (March 17-20, 1945) which agreed upon the  
final form of the Charter of the League before it was  
signed on March 22. The reason for this change might  
be found in the fact that Lebanon was then represented  
by Hamid Karama, a Muslim.

(2) Minutes, op. cit., see pp. 22-25; seven whole meetings  
(third to tenth) were spent on what eventually became  
article VI of the Charter; see ibid., pp. 36-59.

the Hashimites who might use force in order achieve their plans for a "Greater Syria". It was not surprising to find that Saudi Arabia supported the Lebanese view<sup>(1)</sup> whereas Transjordan opposed it.<sup>(2)</sup> Nuqrashi Pasha, President of the Sub-committee, pointed out that the possibility of aggression by one member State against another should not be mentioned since the Charter states that the member States shall not resort to aggression.<sup>(3)</sup> Nonetheless, the Lebanese view prevailed as can be seen from the final text of article VI of the Charter. Lebanon had insisted on the principle that it should be left to the country, which has been the subject of an aggression, to call for a meeting of the Council, and to no one else.<sup>(4)</sup> This view, also, finally prevailed in article VI of the Charter.

A point was reached where some of the delegates were irked by Lebanon's stand. The Lebanese delegate insisted that the Preamble of the Charter should embody this re-

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(1) Ibid., p. 45.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid., p. 44.

servation:

"The representatives have agreed on the following articles which do not in any way limit the internal and external independence and sovereignty of the member nations, and each nation will remain sovereign internally and externally." (1)

(2)

Azzam Pasha, who was presiding that day, observed irritably that the substance of the Charter should be in agreement with the views of all the Arab countries and not those of Lebanon alone. (3) This did not silence the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. "The essence of our work" he said, "is the preservation of the independence and sovereignty of each nation". (4)

Lebanon also opposed the suggestion that the League of Arab States be an organisation with international personality capable of representation in the United Nations. (5) She feared that such a principle might reduce the sovereignty

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(1) Ibid., p. 69.

(2) February 26, 1945 - the day after the assassination of Maheer Pasha, the Egyptian Premier.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid., p. 73. Far'on, "I have come here on the assumption that the League was not an international organisation", ibid., p. 74.

of the members of the League. Azzam Pasha remarked to Far'on, the Lebanese Minister, "you are willing to accept foreign intervention but not from between ourselves." (1)

Azzam's criticisms became more frequent when it appeared that the work of the Sub-committee was very far from representing the mood of Arab public opinion: "I am sorry to say that some observers have noted that the orientations of the draft Charter have gone very far away from the widely desired objective implied in the Alexandria Protocol." (2)

It should not be assumed, in the light of what has been said, that Lebanon was the sole handicap to a closer Arab union. Iraq, which had always been one of the leading pan-Arab centres, also did her best to limit the degree of union between the members of the League. Her aim, in so doing, was to prepare the ground for a closer union, other than the League, of those members wishing a more integrated Arab co-operation. In other words, Nuri Said was still interested in his original project for a Fertile Crescent union, and

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(1) Ibid., p. 73. Azzam also observed that, in case they followed Far'on's suggestion, there might be closer relations between the members of the United Nations, such as Russia and Chile for instance, than between members of the League of Arab States, since the Charter of the United Nations may be a more comprehensive one than that of the Arab League.

(2) Ibid., p. 72; see also p. 77.

was able to obtain the insertion of the following principle in article IX of the Charter:

"States of the League which desire to establish closer co-operation and stronger bonds than are provided by this Pact may conclude agreements to that end."

This article caused a heated argument between the Lebanese Foreign Minister and Nuri Said. Far'on insisted that there was no need for such an article since it is understood that the Charter of the League does not prevent any member from entering whatever agreements it wants to. <sup>(1)</sup> In order to allay the fears of Lebanon and to reach a compromise, article VIII of the Charter was agreed upon. It said:

"Each member state shall respect the system of Government established in the other member states and regard them as exclusive concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government."(2)

Yussif Yassin, the Saudi representative, was the first one to discourage the reserves made by Iraq, and came to the aid of Lebanon by proposing the above article. Djemal Merdam Bey, the Syrian Minister, also, was critical of the Iraqi attitude; "what worries me", he said, "is that I

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- (1) Ibid.
- (2) Ibid., p. 66, Yussuf Yassin, "We are going along a path which is much narrower than the real nature of present Arab relations."

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see Iraq which used to go ahead of everyone (in pan-Arab ideals) now making more reserves and taking more precautions than everyone else... It is not to be expected from Iraq to be so cautious and reserved when it was the first country to proclaim the Arab cause, to work for its realization and to make this meeting possible." <sup>(1)</sup> This was not so much a flattery as it was a way of saying to Nuri Said to forget about his plan of union.

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Syria did everything which was possible in order to reach the greatest degree of integral Arab union but did not find much support amongst the other Arab delegations. The Egyptian delegation, which was dominated by the personal views of Azzam Pasha, tried not to expound any particular views since it was attempting to play the role of mediator. The Egyptians desired a common agreement between all of the Arab countries, but they favoured an elastic one which could evolve in accordance with the necessities of the international situation. <sup>(2)</sup>

Saudi Arabia also wanted an elastic Charter which could be interpreted in such a way as to allow for a greater and

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(1) Ibid.

(2) Ibid., p. 74.

greater degree of Arab union. Yussuf Yassin said that he had orders from Ibn Saoud to work towards a wide interpretation of Arab union rather than a narrow one.<sup>(1)</sup> This did not, however, prevent Saudi Arabia from supporting the narrow interpretations of the Lebanese delegation when it was felt that they might limit the Hashimite ambitions.

The other points which emerged in the deliberations of the Sub-committee were concerned with the participation of the non-self-Governing Arab territories in some of the activities of the League and with the annexes about these territories as well as the annex about Palestine in the Charter. Agreement on these last points was easily reached although Lebanon objected to any kind of participation of the non-independent Arab countries.<sup>(2)</sup>

The work of the Sub-committee lasted from February 14 to March 3, 1945. On March 18, the Arab Preparatory Conference was called and met in Cairo. It was transformed on March 20 into a General Arab Congress which signed, on March 22, the Charter of the League of Arab States.<sup>(3)</sup> The Yemen had not sent a delegate at the time of the signing of

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(1) Ibid., p. 83.

(2) Ibid., p. 91.

(3) Text of Charter, see, below, Appendix (C).

the Charter, but Azzam Pasha announced on May 4, 1945 that the Yemen had ratified the Pact.

From the beginning of the negotiations for Arab unity until the signing of the Charter, the Arab statesmen gradually accepted a looser and looser form of union. The main concern of the Arabs was to reach some agreement regardless of its substance. If common agreement was finally reached on a text, the Charter, it was a compromise between different Arab views as it was a concoction of contradicting principles.

Before considering the activities of the League of Arab States during the first decade of its existence, it is necessary to dwell upon the following points: (a) Egypt's role in the birth of the League; (b) the policy of Great Britain; (c) the degree to which the creation of the League changed the status quo in the Middle East.

Egyptian leadership of the movement for Arab unity was unchallenged after the initial steps undertaken by Nahas Pasha. It is not possible to say with certainty what were the reasons which led the Wafd, in Egypt, to adopt the policy it did towards pan-Arabism. The Egyptians had not been eager pan-Arabists until very recently, and it must be assumed that their support of Arab unity in the 1940's was

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mostly dictated by national considerations.

Nevertheless, Egypt was the Arab country most likely to guarantee the success of any Arab union. The Arab delegates at the preparatory conferences which led to the signing of the Charter accepted with very little opposition, if any, the designation of Cairo as the permanent centre

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of the Secretariat of the League. Article XV of the Charter states that "the first meeting of the Council shall be convened at the invitation of the Head of the Egyptian Government." Azzam Pasha, who had been Secretary of Arab Affairs in the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was elected unanimously as the first Secretary-General of

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(1) H.A.R. Gibb, "Anglo-Egyptian Relations", in International Affairs, October, 1951, p. 442, "Whatever the aims may have been of the Wafd Government which took the initiative in founding the League in 1944, their successors have too often seemed to the other Arab States to have aimed at converting them into Egyptian satellites..."

(2) Article X of the Charter.

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the League.

There are reasons to believe that Great Britain may have encouraged the Egyptian Government to take the leadership of the pan-Arab movement. (2) It has been suggested that Egyptian leadership of the movement of Arab unity, "which fortunately encouraged other Arab countries to join,

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(1) Azzam Pasha had always been a fervent pan-Arabist. He, also, had the advantage of belonging to Ali Maher's party which was on the side of Farouk most of the time. This is important to keep in mind because there had been some kind of competition between Nahas Pasha and Farouk; they both had their own ambitions as to the leadership of the pan-Arab movement. This led to the firing of Nahas the day after the signing of the Alexandria Protocol. Aside from this, Azzam was the perfect example of the moderate pan-Arab nationalism of that time and was associated with many projects of Arab union since the 1930's. Robert Montagne has written about his nomination in these terms: "Aucune nomination ne pouvait mieux établir le lien qui unit la période d'élaboration des idées à celle qui a vu la réalisation des projets". - "L'Union Arabe", in *Politique Etrangère*, April, 1946, p. 200. See, also, articles of Azzam in *Al-Mussawar* (Cairo), No. 948, December 11, 1942, in which he writes, "No life for Egypt and her sister countries except by unity."

(2) See M. Khadduri, "The Arab League as a regional arrangement" in the *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 40 (1946), p. 763.

such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen, had compromised the possibility of achieving a close and integrated union such as that contemplated by General Nuri." <sup>(1)</sup> This is too optimistic an interpretation of inter-Arab relations of the early 1940's - the "Greater Syria" plan as much as it appealed to Syria was unacceptable to the Syrians because it implied being ruled by Abdullah who was not willing to give up such an ambition. It was, also, obvious that Lebanon would not join and that Palestine while a mandate could not have been integrated into a greater Arab State.

In conclusion, one can say that Egyptian leadership of the movement for Arab union undoubtedly facilitated the formation of the League of Arab States and allowed the Arab States to give the impression, for a short while, that they formed a common front. On the other hand, it is easily understandable that Egypt wanted to make use of the League in order to further her own national policy. In this regard, she was not the only Arab country to want to do so but the only one able to do so.

The policy of Great Britain in respect to the formation of the League is difficult to discuss because very few documents are available on this question. A few points,

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(1) M. Khadduri, "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity...", op. cit., p. 140.

however, can be established. It is often forgotten that the great majority of Arab leaders welcomed the British initiative in favour of Arab unity. The British declaration in favour of Arab union was backed by British sympathy with the independence movements in Syria and Lebanon, and, therefore, could not fail to be welcomed by the Arabs. Azzam Pasha declared in February, 1943, following Eden's statement on Arab unity, "The Arabs have always waited for Britain to take them by the hand for a positive action regarding the realization of Arab unity..."<sup>(1)</sup> Two years later the same Azzam Pasha, in his capacity of Egyptian Minister for Arab Affairs, told the press that Arab unity plans ran parallel to British policy in the Middle East and added:

"We are fortunate that this policy (of Arab unity) runs parallel to British policy here. Arab unity stands for peace, and is not directed against any nation or group of nations. We find ourselves in these matters in full understanding with the British."<sup>(2)</sup>

It may well be asked whether the League of Arab States could have been formed in 1945, had not Great Britain shown a willingness to encourage such a step. What is harder to

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(1) Al-Ahram, February, 28, 1943, in Oriente Moderno, Vol. XXIII, p. 159.

(2) The News Chronicle, February 5, 1945.

answer is whether Great Britain had a specific plan in mind for the sort of Arab union to be erected or whether she suggested the idea of Arab unity merely to attract the support of the Arabs during the war years. Certain British moves, however, determined the kind of union which emerged finally. Britain wanted as inclusive an Arab union as possible, and one can cite the British interventions which prevented Farouk from dismissing Nahas Pasha until the latter had completed the ground work for the League of Arab States and until the signing of the Alexandria Protocol. Farouk had already attempted, in April, 1943, and again in April, 1944, to dismiss Nahas but "was deterred by the British ambassador from exercising his constitutional rights to dismiss the Prime Minister, on the ground that Nahas' Government, 'whatever its demerits, was affording the Allies full and valuable support'." <sup>(1)</sup> And again, in September, 1944, the British Embassy intervened and prevented Farouk from dismissing Nahas Pasha and asked him to withhold the dismissal <sup>(2)</sup> until the completion of the Alexandria Conference. The dismissal of Nahas prior to the signing of the Alexandria Protocol would have undoubtedly postponed an agreement between the Arab countries about any kind of union.

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(1) G. Kirk, Survey, op. cit., p. 9.

(2) Ibid., pp. 262-3. See, also, The Times, October 11, 1944.

The Arab statesmen, whether they were "pro-British", like Nahas Pasha and Nuri Said, or not, all realized the advantage of British willingness to encourage an Arab union. The Arabs were fully aware of the fact that for any sort of Arab unity to be attained the support of some Great Power (1) was necessary.

The British Government astutely refused to give any opinion on the kind of union they favoured. Even as late as January 17, 1945, that is to say, after the signing of the Alexandria Protocol, Mr. Eden replied, to a question raised by Major-General Sir Edward Spears, in these terms:

"As the discussions in regard to Arab unity are continuing in Cairo in accordance with the provisions of the Alexandria Protocol, it would be premature for me to make any statement except to repeat what has been already made clear, namely that His Majesty's Government are watching with sympathy and interest the efforts of the Arab States to reduce the barriers between them." (2)

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(1) The Economist, April 30, 1943, wrote, "The people of the Middle East are asking what is to come out of the struggle in which they have all been more or less involved. They are looking to Great Powers for some indication of their policy... all these schemes political and economic, depend on the energy and influence of the Great Powers, and particularly Great Britain."

(2) Hansard, January 17, 1945.

The British press came out in full support of Arab unity and went to the extent of criticizing previous British and French policy in the Middle East. The Times of December 1, 1944 stated:

"Instead of pursuing the ideal of stability, they (France and Great Britain) created an unstable equilibrium and maintained it by applying military sanctions when it sagged. Both Powers thus prevented each group and region, within the separate mandates and in the Middle East as a whole, from being keyed into a solid structure. Each local government and community acquired an inflated idea of its strength and importance, and has been more concerned to defend its exaggerated claims than to provide public-spirited leadership in the immense tasks which lie ahead. New vested interests in separatism have been created and old ones strengthened."

The Arabs, however, did not take full advantage of Great Britain's sympathy for Arab union, and ended by reaching a Charter which was less than Arab public opinion was expecting (1) and less than the degree of Arab union which (2) Great Britain would have allowed. It must be realized that the League of Arab States was the work of the "moderate" (3) Arab nationalists and that the nature of inter-Arab

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- (1) Nuqrashi Pasha admitted in the Arab Preparatory Conference that the League was far from what the Arab people expected, see Minutes of the Arab Preparatory Conference, in arabic, (Cairo), 1946, p. 26.
  - (2) Great Britain had not made any objections to the Alexandria Protocol which provided for a greater degree of unity than the Charter.
  - (3) C.A. Hourani, "The Arab League in Perspective", in the Middle East Journal, Vol. I, No. 1, 1947, p. 134: "The League, as it stands, represents a victory for moderate Arab nationalism."

relations of that period did not allow for the elaboration of anything more daring.

The creation of the League of Arab States may have, outwardly, brought about a change in the status quo of the Middle East. Substantially, however, it did not alter the situation and any real change in the political structure of the Middle East must be attributed to the Second World War (the League itself being a product of the latter) rather than to the newly-founded institution. Arab unity as understood by the pan-Arab idealists implied a radical change in the status quo - a thing which the Arab leaders at that time interpreted as a change in leadership as well as a change in the political organisation of the Arab world. The Arab League for those Arab statesmen was merely a new method for furthering national policies of their respective countries and thereby a new way of fulfilling their personal ambitions.

The creation of the League coincided with the eviction of the French from the Middle East, and the first action of the newly-created Arab organisation was concerned with the problems of Syria and Lebanon. France had always combated pan-Arabism and could not adjust herself to the new trends of Arab nationalism:

"La France, attardée dans les Etats du Levant  
au concept periné de la protection des minorités,  
habituée au vain encens des nesses consulaires,

fallacieusement protégée par une armée d'autochtones simplement encadrée de Français, incapable de concevoir l'idée d'une évolution rapide, plus incapable encore de s'adapter au jeu britannique, devient désormais, aux yeux du Colonial Office, un partenaire gênant dans la partie qu'il faudra jouer serré demain avec les nationalistes arabes." (1)

The importance of the League of Arab States must be found in the effects it produced on the Arab masses who became increasingly aware of the existence of an "Arab Nation". From then on, Arab nationalism became synonymous with pan-Arabism and the principle of Arab unity became the slogan of almost every Arab political party. Hence in any analysis of the birth of the League one must distinguish between its effects on the practical plane - designs to fulfil certain national interests - and on the ideological plane - the encouraging of pan-Arab ideals and a unifying force for Arab nationalism.

It must be stressed that in 1945 the birth of the League was welcomed by almost every Arab political group, and it is not until after the failure of the League to deal with the Palestinian problem that one begins to hear criticisms of the League. The League mirrors the constant conflict between the ideological aspirations of Arab nationalism and the concrete divisions between Arab States. It was nothing more than a Charter signed by different Arab countries; but a necessary transitory step for the movement of Arab unity.


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(1) R. Montagne, "L'Union Arabe", op. cit., p. 195.

P A R T   I I I

T H E   L E A G U E   I N   A C T I O N

# ORGANIZATION OF THE LEAGUE



There had been, from June 12, 1946 until January 27, 1954, a Palestine Committee. All the committees listed above are permanent committees. Libya does not participate in the work of the Defence Council and its affiliated bodies.

( This chart is based on the table found in B.Y. Bourtos-Ghali, The Arab League, International Conciliation, No. 498, May 1954, New York, pp. 416-7. )

CHAPTER 8 : SYRIAN AND LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE

The political work of the League is carried out by a political committee which makes recommendations to the Council. All the decisions rest with the Council which accepts or rejects the resolutions forwarded by the Political Committee. During the first ten years of its existence the Council of the League has passed 933 resolutions <sup>(1)</sup> and has held twenty-three sessions. <sup>(2)</sup> Among the resolutions passed 438, or approximately 40% of the total number adopted, are of a political nature. The Palestinian problem seems to have been the subject of the greatest number of resolutions: a total of 190; it is followed by the relation of the League with international organisations: 114; third in numerical importance is the question of North Africa: 31 resolutions. The number of resolutions passed is not by itself an indication of the importance of the question treated by the Council but it gives an idea about the amount of time spent on each of these issues. This quantitative evaluation, and the comparative amount of space in the reports of the Secretary-Generals suggest the following order of importance for the League's political

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(1) This number is for the period June 1945-March 1955; see table below, p. 250.

(2) Twenty-one of these sessions were ordinary; two extraordinary sessions (the fourth and nineteenth) were held during this period. See Table below, Appendix (D).

# GENERAL BREAKDOWN OF RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY THE COUNCIL (1945-55)

ISSUES	145	146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155	Total
SYRIA & LEBANON	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
PALESTINE	11	28	12	8	5	12	9	14	16	61	14	190
EGYPT	-	2	2	-	-	-	1	-	2	2	-	9
LIBYA	-	4	2	1	2	1	3	-	2	-	1	16
INDONESIA	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	4
NORTH AFRICA	1	4	-	4	-	3	3	1	6	11	1	34
U.N.O.**	-	1	3	3	1	8	28	14	13	31	12	114
PROPAGANDA	2	4	2	-	1	-	6	2	3	8	-	28
ARAB RELATIONS	-	6	2	2	1	3	2	1	4	10	-	31
AFRO-ASIAN "	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	3
YEMEN	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	3	1	6
<u>NON-POLITICAL</u>												
ECONOMIC	-	1	4	1	1	-	3	1	3	9	1	24
COMMUNICATIONS	-	9	1	2	2	2	-	-	8	17	5	46
SOCIAL & HEALTH	1	8	11	-	-	-	4	2	6	27	2	61
CULTURAL	1	10	1	4	5	-	3	27	6	49	22	128
ISLAMIC	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	7	-	11
LEGAL	-	-	1	3	3	4	4	7	5	18	5	50
AGRICULTURAL	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	5
OIL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3	7
ADMINISTRATIVE	4	28	8	6	12	25	19	13	22	46	12	195
MISCELLANEOUS***	-	6	-	1	2	4	-	-	1	10	3	27
<u>TOTALS:</u>												
<u>POLITICAL:</u>	16	56	23	18	12	30	52	32	46	134	30	438
<u>NON-POLIT.:</u>	6	61	27	17	24	33	34	52	52	186	52	555
<u>GRAND TOTAL:</u>	22	117	50	35	36	63	86	84	98	320	82	<u>993</u>

\* : These are the figures for the first session of 1955 (March)

\*\* : By U.N.O. is meant all international organizations

\*\*\* Among the miscellaneous resolutions there were 7 about Spain; 3 on Kashmir; 1 on Saudi Arabia; 3 about Oman; 6 about Pakistan; 1 on Iran; 1 on Cyprus; and three about Jordan (Transjordan at the time).

activities: Palestine; North Africa; Anglo-Egyptian  
(1)  
relations; and Libyan independence.

It will be noted that the Syrian and Lebanese crisis is not listed among the major items considered by the League. The crisis did not last long enough to take up the time of the Council; and the contribution of the League to its solution was small.

The League was instituted a few weeks before the end of war in Europe, and by that time practically all of the member States had declared war on the Axis and signed the United Nations declaration. They were therefore entitled to representation in the San Francisco Conference of 1945. In effect all the member States of the League, with the exception of Transjordan and the  
(2)  
Yemen, were invited to this international gathering. This was an opportunity for the Arab delegations to demonstrate their spirit of solidarity and the political value of their unity. They succeeded in giving this

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- (1) These questions will not be discussed in the above order but rather in a chronological one.
- (2) Syria and Lebanon were not invited at first because France had objected to their presence in San Francisco. They were finally invited after some amount of pressure from the Arab countries with the help of Great Britain. See Kamil Sham'un, Marahil al-Istiqlal (in Arabic), pp. 149-175, Beirut, (1949).

(1)  
impression for a short while. It was while this spirit of unity was still apparent that the League of Arab States considered the question of Syrian and Lebanese independence in the first meeting of its Council held on June 4, 1945.

The Free French Authorities had, on June 8, 1941, with some pressure from Great Britain, declared the independence of Syria. Before giving any concrete meaning to the promise, France insisted that there should be signed a treaty guaranteeing French rights and interests in that area. Syria and Lebanon refused to agree to these conditions and were supported in their demand for total independence by the Arab States and even by the "Big Three". In May 1945, tension reached its climax, and in the face of the Syrian (and Lebanese) refusal to agree to the French demands, the French troops bombarded Damascus and other Syrian cities on May 29. On May 31, British troops intervened in order to re-establish "order". The question of Syrian and Lebanese independence was finally settled by the United Nations. The evacuation of foreign troops from the Levant was discussed in the Security Council on February 15, 1946 on the demand of the Syrian Government.

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(1) R. Montagne, "L'Union Arabe", p.179, in Politique Etrangère, April 1946: "On n'est pas sans quelque surprise que l'opinion Occidentale a observé, depuis un an, au cours des grandes conférences internationales de San Francisco ou de Londres, l'attitude concertée et disciplinée qu'adoptent cinq Etats arabes du Proche-Orient, L'Egypte, L'Arabie Saoudienne, l'Iraq, La Syrie et le Liban, dans toutes les circonstances où sont en jeu les intérêts des pays arabes dans leur ensemble."

On March 22, 1946, exactly one year after the signing of the Charter of the League of Arab States, agreement was reached, in the United Nations, providing for the evacuation of French troops from Syria by April 15, 1946, and from Lebanon by August 31, 1946. It remains to determine the role played by the League of Arab States in this affair.

It will be remembered that the British declaration of sympathy for Arab unity, in May 1941, was soon followed by declarations of independence in Syria and Lebanon, and that these moves were thought to be related. So it was natural for the League to pay some attention to the situation in the Levant, which had reached a dangerous point two months after the signing of the Charter of the League.

The role played by the inter-Arab organisation in the solution of the Levant crisis was thought of, at the time, as a preponderant one. This belief was derived from the united front which the Arab States were presenting internationally and from French hostility towards the League on the grounds that it aimed to replace French interests in the Middle East by British ones. When the actions of the League in this matter are analyzed in the light of the facts available today, it is seen that its role was very small. The Syrian and Lebanese questions

would have, very likely, found the same solution with or without the existence of the League. Most of the books dealing with Syria and Lebanon do not mention the role of the League when discussing the question of their independence.<sup>(1)</sup>

On June 5, 1945, the Council of the League passed two resolutions dealing with the question of Syria and Lebanon - its first two resolutions.<sup>(2)</sup> The first one stated that "any international meeting held to solve the dispute between Syria and Lebanon, on the one side, and France, on the other, should include the League of Arab States and any negotiations on this question is to be based on the principle of independence and sovereignty of these two countries."

The second resolution stated three principles: first, France was to be held responsible for the aggression committed in Syria and Lebanon; secondly, the presence of French troops in these countries was in contradiction to their rights and a threat to the security of the area

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- (1) Here is a list of books which do not mention the role played by the League: N. Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon, London (1957); Mustapha Baroudi, "Historia internacional de Syria", in Problemas del Mundo Arabe, Madrid (1954); Kamil Sham'un, Marahil Al-Istiqlal, op.cit.; George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, London, (1952), The Middle East 1945-1950, London (1954); G. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, Ithaca, New York (1952)
- (2) Resolutions No. 1 and 2, in Resolutions of the Council of the League of Arab States, 1945-1955, (in Arabic), Cairo (1955), p.4; henceforward referred to as Resolutions.

at a time when the Allies were still engaged in the war against Japan; thirdly, the "Troupes Speciales" should be transferred to the Governments of the two Arab countries. This resolution also said that, in accordance with article VI of the Charter of the League of Arab States, the Council would aid the two countries by all possible means to attain their full sovereignty and independence, and the evacuation of foreign troops from their soil.

It may well be asked what "possible means" the Arab countries could have exerted in order to enforce their decision. The League, at that time, could only count on one thing: the support of Great Britain. It was this support along with that of the United States and the Soviet Union, at the United Nations, which determined the outcome of this crisis, and not any intervention on the part of the League of Arab States. Two resolutions were the sole work of the League on this question. Another resolution was passed on March 25, 1946 on this issue, but it was a mere formality to congratulate Syria and Lebanon on the decision of the United Nations about the evacuation of foreign troops from their soil.

It must be said however, that the League's "intervention" in this matter was of some psychological import-

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ance. It re-inforced, were it only for a very short period, the notion that this new Arab organisation might work marvels. It inflated the prestige of the League before its failure to deal with the Palestinian problem. It gave disproportionate self-confidence and self-importance to the Arab States.

If any doubt remains as to the real contribution of the League in the Syrian and Lebanese question, it suffices to point to the Report of the Secretariat of the League on the actions undertaken to execute the decisions of the Council. In this Report, exactly two lines are devoted to the matter: "the first problem which faced the League was that of Syria about which the Council held a meeting in which it passed secret resolutions which have had an effective influence on the solutions of this problem."<sup>(1)</sup>

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(1) Report of the Secretariat-General on its activities during the first ten sessions of the Council (June 4, 1945 - March 21, 1949), in Arabic, Cairo, (1949) - henceforward referred to as Report.

CHAPTER 9 : THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN DISPUTE

(1)  
Immediately after the end of the Second World War, the Egyptian Government wanted to see the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty revised in order to realize two national demands: British evacuation of Egyptian territory and the unity of the Nile Valley (i.e. of Egypt and the Sudan). In December 1945, Nuqrashi Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, was forced by public feeling in Egypt (2) to take the initiative and ask for Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on these two questions. It took over three months for a British answer; in the meantime, owing to serious anti-British riots in Cairo and Alexandria, Nuqrashi Pasha had to resign in February 1946 and was succeeded by Sidqi Pasha. The latter began negotiations with the British Government in May 1946, and on October 9, an arrangement known as the "Sidqi-Bevan Agreement" was reached. It provided for the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal and the rest of the Egyptian territory by

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(1) Nahas Pasha, in 1942, and Ahmed Maheer Pasha, in 1945, had both demanded the revision of the 1936 Treaty but were asked by Great Britain to wait until the end of the war; see G. Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, op. cit., p. 331.

(2) Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Middle East, London (1954), p. 189.

September 1949, and vaguely accepted the principle of unity of Egypt and the Sudan. This agreement however never materialized because Great Britain took refuge in ? some demonstrations which took place in the Sudan after the announcement of the principle of the unity of the Nile Valley.

The problem of the Nile Valley union and that of British evacuation from Egyptian territory remained unsolved until the Egyptian Revolution when Egypt decided to separate the two problems. Thereafter the "Suez Agreement" was reached in July 1954. Before this solution was attained, Egypt had taken the question before the Security Council, in August 1947, which was never able to find a satisfactory solution. In April 1951, Mustapha Nahas Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister, asked for a complete evacuation of British troops and for the unification of the Nile Valley. On October 15, 1951, the Egyptian Parliament annulled the 1936 Treaty and abolished the 1941 laws relating to Anglo-Egyptian rule over the Sudan. The situation in Egypt worsened and led to the Cairo riots of January 26, 1952. The Egyptian Revolution came about July 23, 1952, and in October 1954 was signed the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement which provided for the departure of British troops from Suez. And on June 18, 1956, the last British soldier left Egyptian soil. Let

us now analyze the efforts of the League of Arab States to find a solution to this Anglo-Egyptian dispute.

Egypt is the undisputed leading member of the League of Arab States: she contributes about 40% to the total budget of this organization, the headquarters of the League are in Cairo and the Secretary-Generals have so far always been Egyptians.<sup>(1)</sup> It was natural for Egypt, therefore, to make use of the League in order to further her national policy. The way in which the League dealt with the Anglo-Egyptian dispute is important for understanding relations between the new Arab organization and Great Britain.

The League intervened in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute before Nuqrashi Pasha asked for negotiations with Great Britain, and even before the Council of the League passed its first resolution on this question on March 25, 1946.<sup>(2)</sup> Azzam Pasha, the active Secretary-General of the League, discussed the Egyptian problem with various British statesmen and officials during his visit to London between September 27 and October 26, 1945. He did so, as he

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(1) For the figures of the Budget of the League from 1945 to 1955, and the contributions of the member States, see, below, p. 260. The two Secretary-Generals during the first ten years of the League were Azzam Pasha (1945-1952) and Abdelkhalek Hassouna (1952 - ).

(2) Clare Hollingworth, The Arabs and the West, London (1952), p. 69: "to all intents and purposes Azzam is the Arab League..."

BUDGET OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES (1945-1957)

Y E A R	A M O U N T ( in Pounds)
1 9 4 5	75,000
1 9 4 6	150,000
1 9 4 7	170,000
1 9 4 8	210,240
1 9 4 9	210,240
1 9 5 0	137,938
1 9 5 1	151,298
1 9 5 2	182,143
1 9 5 3	342,960
1 9 5 4	396,796
1 9 5 5	395,980
1 9 5 6	631,510
1 9 5 7	561,493

CONTRIBUTIONS OF MEMBER STATES

COUNTRY	1945-1949	1950-1952	1953-1956	1957
SYRIA	16%	17%	13.5%	12.69%
JORDAN	7%	3%	3 %	2.82%
IRAQ	20%	20%	17 %	15.98%
SAUDI ARABIA	7%	8%	15.5%	14.57%
LEBANON	6%	7%	6 %	5.64%
EGYPT	42%	42%	40 %	37.60%
YEMEN	6%	3%	3 %	2.72%
LIBYA	--	--	2 %	1.88%
SUDAN	--	--	--	6.00%

emphasised, in his capacity of a spokesman for the League. (1)  
He reported to the League that "the demands of Egypt were  
the subject of several discussions that I have had with  
officials of the Foreign Office and some of the political  
leaders on several occasions." (2)

It is doubtful whether Azzam Pasha had any directives  
from the member States of the League to discuss, in their  
name, the Egyptian question. On the other hand there is  
a prevailing view that the League of Arab States was  
reluctant to take up the Egyptian demands and did so rather  
belatedly. (3)

The first official and unanimous intervention of the  
League in the Egyptian question can be found in the  
resolution passed by the Council on March 25, 1946, during  
its third session. This resolution stated that the Council  
supported the national demands of Egypt and expected to see  
the realization of Egyptian rights and the evacuation of  
British troops from Egyptian territory in a short time. (4)

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(1) League of Arab States, Report, op. cit., see report of  
Secretary General on his trip to London, pp. 98-126.

(2) Ibid., p. 104.

(3) See Seton-Williams, Britain and the Arab States, op.  
cit., p. 233; and M. Laissy, op. cit., p. 164.

(4) No. 25, Resolutions, op. cit., p. 10.

It added, "this is considered one of the strongest conditions for the maintenance of the good relations and friendship between the Arab countries and Great Britain." It was agreed that the content of this resolution should be forwarded to Great Britain by the Secretariat and that the member States should do likewise according to the means at their disposal. A similar view was recorded in the communique published at the end of the Inshass Conference, in Egypt, called by King Farouk, in May 1946. At the end of the Conference, where the Heads of Arab States met for the first time, a communique was released on May 29, it stated that the Arab States:

"se sont trouvés d'accord sur le fait que la réalisation des demandes nationales de l'Egypte, le parachèvement de sa souveraineté et l'évacuation des forces britanniques sont une chose indispensable, que la cause égyptienne est une cause générale pour tous les pays arabes qui appuient ses justes demandes et la soutiennent avec tous les moyens dont ils disposent." (1)

In a special session held in Bludan, Syria, between June 8 and June 12, 1946, the Council of the League passed another resolution, (2) on June 11th, reaffirming the "absolute support" of the League for "Egyptian aspirations" and for "the unity of the Nile Valley". This is the first

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(1) Quoted in M. Laissy, op. cit., p. 164.

(2) No.61, Resolutions, op. cit., p. 17.

time that the League comes out in support of the union of the Sudan and Egypt. The Bludan resolution expressed the worries of the League about the suspension of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations and stated that the friendship between the League and Great Britain could not be maintained unless the demands of Egypt were fully satisfied. The tone of this resolution was therefore much stronger than the earlier one, and the communique released at the end of the special session of the Council stated:

"The Arab States represented in the Council of the League of Arab States proclaim their total support for the demands of Egypt about the unity of the Nile Valley and the complete evacuation of British troops."

On September 14, 1946, Azzam Pasha, the Secretary-General of the League, declared, in an interview in Paris, that Egypt, being the most important member of the League, was aware that her future was linked to that of the League and of the other member States, and that in her struggle for unity and independence she could rely upon the support of the Arab countries. (1)

The League's intervention in the Egyptian question showed that this creation of the "moderate" Arab nationalists (that is to say those who were willing to play the

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(1) For the complete text of this interview see Report (1st - 10th. Sessions) op. cit., pp. 18-20.

British card at that time), was being used in order to combat British interests in the Arab world, and tended to dissipate the idea that the League was nothing more than an instrument of British policy in the Middle East:

"Peut-être convient-il dès lors de reviser l'opinion généralement admise en Occident selon laquelle la Ligue n'est qu'un instrument entre les mains de la Grande Bretagne... Il n'est pas moins vraie que, dirigé par l'Egypte, l'organisme inter-arabe a graduellement échappé à l'influence de Londres." (1)

By supporting Egyptian demands, the League not only disappointed British policy-makers who had some hope of using it as an instrument for British policy in the Middle East, but also embarrassed them by making the realization of Egyptian aspirations a condition for the continuation of Anglo-Arab friendly relations. From then on the League, in the eyes of Britain, was seen as another department of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is what pushed Great Britain to encourage the union of "Greater Syria" in order to produce another Arab bloc which could compete with Egypt for the leadership of the Arab world. (2)

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(1) Marcel Colonbe, "L'Egypte et la Crise Actuelle de l'Arabisme", in L'Afrique et l'Asie, 1950, 3ieme Trimestre, p. 38.

(2) See The Economist of March 5, 1949, "Arab Post-Mortem" which encouraged the withdrawal of some pro-British Arab countries from the influence of Egypt in order "to remove from a group of States that is not fundamentally anti-British, a leading member has spread much ill-will toward Britain" - p. 442.

The League continued to support the Egyptian case in all its resolutions, and on March 23, 1947, the Council adopted a resolution backing the Egyptian decision to take the Egyptian question before the Security Council:

"Whereas the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations have not led to any agreement, and the Egyptian Government having declared its intention of submitting its case to the United Nations, the Council of the League seizes the opportunity of its present session to reaffirm, once more, the absolute support of the Arab States to Egypt's national aspirations." (1)

On September 19, 1947, the Political Committee of the League, meeting in Lebanon, pledged its support of Egypt's claim to the Sudan. On October 15, 1947, the Council of the League took up again the Egyptian case (2) and adopted a resolution which referred to the intervention of the Egyptian Prime Minister, Nuqrashi Pasha, in the deliberations at the United Nations. In that resolution the Egyptian Prime Minister expressed his thanks to the Syrian delegation at the Security Council for the stand it adopted when the Egyptian case was discussed before the latter body. The resolution also went on to state that it regretted the inability of the Security Council to find a solution to this question,

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(1) No. 148, Resolutions, op. cit., p. 34.

(2) No. 184, Ibid., p. 43.

and reiterated its complete and absolute support for Egyptian demands.

From 1947 to 1951 the League did not concern itself with the Egyptian question because the Palestinian problem eclipsed almost every other Arab problem. During that same period, and as a result of the Palestinian crisis, inter-Arab relations showed much disunity and it is probable that Egypt felt that it would be useless to make the League take a stand on Egyptian aspirations.

From 1951 onward Egypt began to make her relations with Great Britain dependent on the defence of the whole Middle East. This needed the support of the League of Arab States. On January 1, 1951, Fikri Abaza Pasha, President of the Egyptian Press Syndicate, stated in his paper "El-Mussawar" that the Egyptian Government favoured the transfer of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, in regard to the defence of the Suez Canal, from a bilateral basis to a broader one involving all the member States of the League, on one side, and the British Government and the United States, on the other. The Council of the League concurred. The problem of Middle Eastern defence is not within the scope of this study, but it suffices to say that the other resolutions <sup>(1)</sup> passed by the League's

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(1) See Resolutions 570, 571, 597 and 804.

Council in regard to Egypt in 1953 and 1954, after the change of regime in that country, were all based on the inseparability of the general Arab problem from that of Egypt.

On October 10, 1951, the Council of the League adopted a resolution<sup>(1)</sup> approving Egypt's abrogation of the 1936 Treaty two days earlier. The next resolution passed by the Council on this question was on April 4, 1953:

"Seeing that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egyptian territory, without any conditions, is a natural Egyptian right, and seeing that the Egyptian question is one of the whole Arab world, the Political Committee confirms again its absolute support for the sister country and makes it known that the failure to solve the Egyptian problem in a manner which would achieve the fulfilment of Egypt's lawful demands prevents the establishment of stability and tranquility in the Arab world and prevents international co-operation based on mutual confidence and friendship." (2)  
(3)

The same view was in another resolution passed on the same day about the international situation which concluded that there should be found a just solution for the Arab problems - foremost amongst which are the Palestinian and Egyptian problems. On January 1, 1954, the Council adopted a resolution which deplored the fact that the

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(1) No. 390, Resolutions, op. cit., p. 86

(2) No. 570, *ibid.*, p. 132.

(3) No. 571, *ibid.*,

Egyptian problem remained unsolved and stated that "the Council rigorously upholds Egypt in its just attitude and calls upon the Arab States to consult among themselves for the purpose of revising their policy so as to befriend nations on the sole basis of justice, truth and dignity." (1)

These resolutions of the League of Arab States had little practical effect on the Egyptian problem, but they supported Egyptian policy of diverting the League from the pro-British tendencies of Iraq and Jordan towards a more neutral line. The language of the above resolution was in itself an innovation in the terminology used by the League. The signing of the Arab Treaty of Joint Defence by five members on June 17, 1950 was a victory for Egyptian diplomacy. (2)

(3)  
The last resolution passed by the Council about the Egyptian question, within the first ten years of the League, was the one adopted on October 30, 1954. It was a mere formality in which the Council congratulated the Republic

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(1) No. 597, *ibid.*, p. 139.

(2) The idea of such a treaty was approved by the Council of the League on April 17, 1950. It was signed by Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Yemen, and Egypt on June 17, 1950; by Iraq on February 2, 1951, and by Jordan on February 16, 1952.

(2) *Ibid.*, No. 804, p. 197. The same resolution congratulated Nasser for his having escaped from the attempt against his life, a survival which, according to the resolution, will allow him to continue his work for Egypt and the Arabs.

of Egypt about the agreement providing for the evacuation of foreign troops from its territory.

The League's Secretariat-General did little to carry out the Council's resolutions about the Egyptian case. It released a few communiques, wrote some articles and made occasional declarations. <sup>(1)</sup> On the other hand, there was co-operation and co-ordination between the Secretary-General of the League, Azzam Pasha, and Nuqrashi Pasha when Nuqrashi was defending the Egyptian case before the Security Council in New York. <sup>(2)</sup> During that session of the Security Council, the Secretary-General of the League did his best to enlighten public opinion about the Egyptian problem. <sup>(3)</sup> It must be added that in its reports to the Council of the League, the Secretariat followed the Egyptian line and argued that the security of the whole Middle East was dependent upon a solution of the Egyptian question. <sup>(4)</sup>

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(1) See Report (1st-10th Sessions, op. cit., p.24.

(2) For the activities of the Secretary-General of the League at the United Nations during the discussion of the Egyptian question see, *ibid.*, pp.122-3.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 123.

(4) At this time Azzam Pasha was no longer Secretary-General of the League as he had been succeeded by Abdelkhalak Hassouna; see *ibid.*, (10th - 18th Sessions), Cairo (1953), pp. 142-3.

A few conclusions may be drawn from the manner in which the League of Arab States dealt with the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. This dispute encouraged the League to adopt a more independent policy from that of Great Britain. If the League's intervention did not prove to be decisive, it at least showed that the Arabs could present a united front even at times when they are divided internally. It allowed Egypt to attract the support of Arab public opinion thereby creating difficulties for the more pro-British Arab leaders. Indirectly, it successfully hindered the conclusion of a Western sponsored scheme of Middle Eastern defence since it made an Anglo-Egyptian understanding the condition to any co-operation with the West. It enhanced Egyptian leadership of the League by handicapping the "Greater Syria" plan which was seen as a pro-British move at a time when an Arab country was having serious difficulties with Great Britain. In short, it provided Egypt with a very good trump card within the League - a card which Egypt did not fail to use in a most able fashion.

RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE  
ON THE EGYPTIAN CASE

Y E A R	RESOLUTION No.	SESSION No.	DATE
1 9 4 6	25	3rd	25 March
	61	4th	11 June
1 9 4 7	148	6th	23 March
	184	7th	15 October
1 9 4 8	--	--	--
1 9 4 9	--	--	--
1 9 5 0	--	--	--
1 9 5 1	390	10th	10 October
1 9 5 2	--	--	--
1 9 5 3	570	18th	9 April
	571	18th	9 May
1 9 5 4	597	20th	11 January
	804	22nd	30 October
1 9 5 5	--	--	--

## CHAPTER 10 : LIBYAN INDEPENDENCE

The birth of Libya as an independent State on December 24, 1951 can be seen either as a result of the Great Powers to agree, or as a victory for the League of Arab States. The independence of Libya was not an issue over which the Arab countries could differ. On the contrary it was one of those rare occasions when they could present a united front - a much needed opportunity for an organization whose prestige was very rapidly disappearing after the Palestinian fiasco. The Western Powers may have felt that they had sufficiently antagonized the Arab countries over the Palestinian problem, and the Libyan issue was one which allowed them to regain Arab goodwill. This does not diminish from the contributions of the League of Arab States towards Libyan independence.

Libyan nationalists had asked for the support of the League before the signing of its Charter. On February 21, 1945, when the Political Sub-committee of the Arab Preparatory Conference was meeting in Cairo, a letter was received from Mohaned Idriss Senoussi expressing Libya's anxiousness to join the League and the hopes which the Libyans were attaching to it. A similar letter from

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(1) See Minutes, op. cit., p. 48.

(1)  
notables of Tripoli was received on that day. The influence of the Libyan and other North African nationalists was seen in the special annex in the Charter about non-independent Arab countries and in article four which provided for representation of Arab non-member countries in the committees of the League.

During his visit to London in September 1945, Azzam Pasha discussed the Libyan question with British officials and was supported in these manoeuvres by the note which the League of Arab States sent on September 28, 1945 to the Foreign Ministers Conference in London. This note requested the independence and unity of Libya and her membership in the League, and said that if it were decided that this country was unable to govern itself, it should then be left to the League to look after her development. The Egyptian Government also sent a similar note to the London Conference in which it demanded that it be left to the Libyans to determine their own status.

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(1) Ibid.

(2) See, Report (1st - 10th Sessions), op. cit., p. 104.

(3) Ibid., p. 6 and p. 104; See also A Brief Survey on the Activities of the League of Arab States in ten years, published by the League, in Arabic, Cairo (1955), p. 16; henceforward referred to as Brief Survey.

(4) Resolution 239 of the Council of the League (March 21, 1949) restated this principle by saying that the League was best qualified to be the mandatory over Libya if this proved to be necessary - Resolutions, op. cit., p. 52.

On April 6, 1946, the Secretary-General of the League reported on the Libyan situation to the Council and said that Italy, Great Britain and France wanted to divide Libya between themselves.<sup>(1)</sup> This led the Council to send another note to the Council of Foreign Ministers reiterating the previous demands for Libyan independence and unity.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Libyan problem was taken up again by the Council of the League at its extraordinary meeting in Bludan; a resolution<sup>(3)</sup> was adopted and its content was transmitted to the Council of Foreign Ministers. The League explained that it wanted to be represented in the investigating commission which was about to be sent to Libya to inquire about the wishes of the Libyans and the solution not likely to be accepted by the populations of Tripoli, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan. The League based its demand on the Charter which "requires it to be concerned with the affairs and interests of these countries and, therefore, it is desirous of being associated with the body to which the British proposals refer."<sup>(4)</sup> The next day, on June 11, another

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(1) For text of this report, see Report (10th - 18th Sessions), op. cit., pp. 83-6.

(2) Resolution 41, Resolutions, op. cit., p. 13.

(3) Resolution 59, ibid., p. 16.

(4) Ibid.

(1)  
resolution was adopted on the same issue; it restated the demands for the independence and unity of Libya and allowed the League to "take action" and "supervise the investigating work" of the Commission even if the League were not invited to participate in the work of this body. On December 12, 1946, on a request from Libyan nationalists, the Council of the League adopted a resolution (2) drawing the attention of the British Government to illegal Italian immigration into Libya. Shortly afterwards Britain informed (3) the League that she would take action about this.

The League of Arab States was continuously concerned with the Libyan question; the reports of the Secretariat-General (4) show how much attention was devoted to it. The manoeuvres of the League were complemented by the diplomatic activities of Egypt which had taken it upon herself to

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- (1) Resolution 62, *ibid.*, p. 17; this resolution was adopted because the League was expecting a refusal in regards to their application for participation in the work of the investigating commission.
- (2) Resolution 143, *op. cit.*, p. 33; see also, Report (10th - 18th Sessions), *op. cit.*, pp. 88-9.
- (3) Great Britain was responsible, from 1945 to 1950, for the administration of Libya.
- (4) Report, *op. cit.*, see pages, 6-7; 20; 23; 24; 28; 57-8; 74-91; 92-6; 98-9; 102-106; 118-119; 129-130; 149-152; 172-173.

provide the Libyan nationalist movement with all the support within its means. (1) The League acknowledged these Egyptian efforts and some of the resolutions of the Council (2) left Egypt responsible for supervising Libyan developments.

On March 24, and again on October 15, 1947, the Council gave its complete and absolute support to Libyan independence and unity and called upon all the members of the League to use the best diplomatic means at their disposal in order to further the aspirations of the Libyan people. (3) The October resolution was an answer to the publication of the "Big Four" about the fate of the former Italian colonies which was vague and stated that the Four Powers "would take into consideration the views of other interested Governments". (4) The work of the Council of the Four Foreign Ministers was resumed in London on October 3, 1947 and they were unable to reach a satisfactory solution because each of the four Powers, except the United States,

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- (1) It has been mentioned that Egypt had presented a memorandum on the Libyan question to the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1945; in January 1947, it was reported that Egypt had a plan for uniting Libya with Egypt - see M. Laissy, op. cit., p. 197.
- (2) Resolutions 333 and 405 for instance.
- (3) Resolutions 157 and 183, Resolutions, op. cit., p. 36 and p. 42; the principles embodied in these resolutions, and which can be taken as the constant stand of the League on this matter, were elaborated in a note to the Four Powers through the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 18, 1947 - for text of this note, see Report, op. cit., pp. 93-6.
- (4) This declaration is quoted in M. Laissy, op. cit., pp. 197-8.

had its eyes on a mandate over some part of Libya. Britain wanted to be entrusted with Cyrenaica, the U.S.S.R. showed an interest in Tripolitania and France asked for the Fezzan, whereas the United States favoured a collective trustee-ship under the auspices of the United Nations.<sup>(1)</sup> The Big Four representatives met again in September 1948 in order to solve the question of the former Italian colonies but were unable to find a working solution. As a result the problem was referred to the United Nations which began to debate it during the third session of the General Assembly in April 1949.

The first proposal to be considered by the United Nations was that of Britain which provided for Libyan independence within a period of ten years; in the meantime Britain would be given a trusteeship over Cyrenaica and the rest of the Libyan territory would come under the supervision of the United Nations. The United States supported this British proposal, but it was not put to a vote because another draft resolution was presented in its place following the conclusion of the Bevin-Sforza Agreement on May 7, 1949. This agreement between the Foreign Ministers of Britain and Italy allowed for independence within a ten year period but granted France,

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(1) Report (10th - 18th Sessions), op. cit., p. 85.

Britain and Italy the trusteeship of the Fezzan, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, respectively, during the interim period. The Boivin-Sforza agreement failed to obtain the necessary vote in the General Assembly which was interpreted as a victory for the League of Arab States. This led Italy and Britain to try and reach some workable solution by dealing directly with the League. These diplomatic contacts outside the United Nations prepared the way for the decision of the General Assembly of November 21, 1949 which recognized the unity of Libya and provided for her independence before January 1, 1952.<sup>(1)</sup>

From 1948 onwards the League sought to influence the members of the United Nations in favour of Libyan independence on the one hand, and to unite the ranks of the different Libyan nationalist groups so that they might present a united front before the General Assembly, on the other hand. In its resolution<sup>(2)</sup> of November 15, 1948, the Council of the League decided to budget 10,000 pounds to aid the activities of the Libyan nationalist movement. This movement, thanks to mediation by the League, allowed the Libyans to reach a common agreement about their aims and policies. When the question of sending a Libyan delegation to the United Nations arose, the League under-

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(1) United Nations, resolution of the General Assembly No.289 (IV).

(2) Resolution 222, Resolutions, op. cit., p. 49; the Council granted another 5,000 pounds for the Libyan question on February 14, 1950 - resolution 274, *ibid.* p.59.

took the selection of Libyan representatives; a resolution to this effect stated:

"The Council delegates the Secretariat-General with the supervision of the trip of the Libyan delegation to the United Nations, knowing that it is capable of obtaining the concensus of the Libyan parties over the appointment of one or two representatives to undertake this responsibility." (1)

The reports of the Secretariat of the League mention the efforts to unify Libyan nationalist ranks. (2) The League succeeded in this task, before the arrival of the international investigating commission, with the formation of the National Liberation Movement which was a coalition of Libyan political groups. (3) The Unity of the Libyan nationalist elements - however superficial it may have been - prevented the European Powers from taking advantage of the intra-Libyan political conflicts, facilitated the work of the League, and gave greater weight to the latter's diplomatic interventions.

After the failure of the Great Powers to obtain the necessary vote for the Bevin-Sforza plan in the United

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(1) Adopted on March 21, 1949, Resolution 240, *ibid.*, p.53.

(2) Report (10th - 18th Sessions), see pp. 97-99. For an appeal of the League's Secretary General to the Libyan people about union, see *ibid.*, p. 98.

(3) The National Liberation Movement was formed in March 1947 under the auspices of the League; for its composition, aims and purposes, see, *ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

Nations, the League of Arab States, having scored a victory in the General Assembly, tried to achieve its objectives by contacting Britain and Italy. Before it found time to influence the British policy, the League was faced by Britain's recognition of Cyrenaica's independence on June 1, 1949.<sup>(1)</sup> The League henceforth sought to bring about a change in Italy's Libyan policy. The Secretary-General's reports<sup>(2)</sup> argued that Italy was willing to adopt a conciliatory attitude but had been encouraged by France and Great Britain to persist in her demands for a mandate over Tripolitania. The United Nations rejection of the partition plan for Libya prepared the ground for an Italo-Arab understanding. Many official and unofficial contacts were made, and on June 10, 1949, Il Tempo published an interview with Azzan Pasha on the Libyan problem.<sup>(3)</sup> In this interview which was solicited by the Italian Govern-

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- (1) This announcement was made by E.A.V. de Candole, head of the British administration in Cyrenaica. For text of his announcement see, The Times, June 2, 1949, a partial quotation may be found in B.Y. Boutros-Ghali, "The Arab League 1945-1955", International Conciliation, May 1954, No. 498, New York (1955).
- (2) See, Report (10th - 18th Sessions), op. cit., pp. 100-106 for the part of the Secretary's report on Libya dealing with the contacts with Italy and entitled "point of transition".
- (3) The full interview is quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 101-102.

(1)  
ment, the Secretary-General of the League said that there were no reasons to prevent an Italo-Arab agreement over the Libyan question, "on the condition that it be a fruitful, friendly and sincere agreement".<sup>(2)</sup> The same issue of Il Tempo included an answer by Count Sforza, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the statements of Azzan Pasha.<sup>(3)</sup> Sforza said that he was in full agreement with the ideas of the Secretary-General of the League and that Italy was "ready to negotiate with the Arabs on the widest basis possible...".<sup>(4)</sup> When asked how he reconciled this view with the principles embodied in the Bevin-Sforza agreement, Sforza replied that a solution to the Libyan problem did not depend on Britain and Italy alone but on several factors including the decisions of the United Nations, the opinions of the Arab countries and the situation in Libya itself.

The failure of the Bevin-Sforza agreement, Britain's unilateral recognition of Cyrenaica's independence, and

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(1) Ibid., p. 101: it is implied that it was Italy that sought a resumption of Italo-Arab negotiations.

(2) Ibid., p. 101.

(3) Text in *ibid.*, pp. 103-106.

(4) Ibid., p. 103 (translated from the Arabic text in *ibid.*)

Sforza's declarations to Il Tempo made an Arab victory in the United Nations almost certain. And when the General Assembly met for its fourth session, in 1949, a resolution which guaranteed Libyan independence and unity, within a period of three years or less, was passed with very little difficulty on November 21.<sup>(1)</sup> The principles of this resolution were, in essence, the same as those of the resolutions adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States. Nonetheless the League did not sit back and enjoy its victory, but continued to watch the developments of Libyan independence and unity with a constant care and attention until December 24, 1951 when these two aims<sup>(2)</sup> materialized.

The contribution of the League of Arab States to Libyan independence can be seen in the resolutions adopted by its Council, in the reports of its Secretary-General, the diplomatic activities of the Secretariat of the League

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(1) United Nations, General Assembly resolution 289 (IV); the vote was: 49 in favour, 1 opposed, 8 abstentions.

(2) In 1951, the Council of the League adopted three resolutions in regards to the Libyan question. Resolution 333 (Feb. 2) stressed again the principles of Libyan unity and independence and directed Egypt, a member of the Security Council at that time, to look after the execution of the United Nations resolution (for text of the League's resolution, see, Resolutions, op. cit., p. 71); Resolution 405 (October 13) was essentially similar to 333 (see *ibid.*, p. 89); and in Resolution 343 (March 17), the Council objected to British political activities in Cyrenaica and denied the representative character of the "National Congress" which was constituted under Britain's auspices (see, *ibid.*, p. 74).

in the United Nations. The League continued to concern itself with this problem, unlike the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, even when it was absorbed by the Palestinian issue.

The League's handling of the Libyan question was another occasion to oppose British interest and policy in the Arab world: a difficult endeavour for the Arab States, at a time when British support was badly needed over the Palestinian problem. One could see in Libya's application for membership of the League of Arab States, very shortly after its independence, a sign of gratitude.<sup>(1)</sup>

In conclusion, it can be said that the League of Arab States realized, in its handling of the Libyan question, the two primary objectives of its Charter - the strengthening of the "close relations and numerous ties which bind the Arab States" and the guaranteeing of "the realization of their aspirations".<sup>(2)</sup> There are not many other examples in the history of the League in its first ten years.

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(1) Libya's application for membership in the League was decided upon on March 28, 1953 (Resolution 497 of the Council). Libya became the eighth member of the League of Arab States. One can see in its admission to the League an assertion of sovereignty; on the other hand there are examples of Arab countries who did not join the League so rapidly after having acquired their independence - i.e., Morocco and Tunisia.

(2) Preamble of the League's Charter.

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL ON THE LIBYAN QUESTION

Y E A R	RESOLUTION No.	SESSION No.	DATE
1 9 4 6	41	3rd	6 April
	59	4th	10 June
	62	4th	11 June
	143	5th	12 December
1 9 4 7	157	6th	24 March
	183	7th	15 October
1 9 4 8	222	9th	15 November
1 9 4 9	239	10th	21 March
	240	10th	21 March
1 9 5 0	274	11th	14 February
1 9 5 1	333	13th	2 February
	343	14th	17 March
	405	15th	13 October
1 9 5 2 ***			
1 9 5 3	497	18th	28 March
	592	19th	7 September
1 9 5 4	--	--	--
1 9 5 5	922	23rd	31 March

\*\*\* : Actually the Libyan problem as such was over on December 24, 1951 when the United Nations decision of November 21, 1949 was made effective and Libya emerged as an independent and united state.

CHAPTER 11 : THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION.

This study is concerned with the League of Arab States as expressing a stage in the evolution of Arab nationalism and political consciousness, and as throwing light on the relations of the Arab States both between themselves and with international society at large.

There is no better example of both these than the manner with which the League handled the Palestine question. The political and still more the psychological implications of Palestine, transcend the military episodes, the continuous political tension, the constant violations of armistice agreements and United Nations resolutions. It has become a symbol of an era of Arab nationalism; it has been the cause of much of the prevailing uneasiness in a strategic area of the world; the source of serious internal Arab crises and unrests; and has provided Arab political reformers with a handy campaign issue.

The Palestine question has been the subject of a very wide range of literature, academic and otherwise, which makes an evaluation of Arab and Zionist claims and counterclaims unnecessary. A resume of these attitudes would be useless, because it is more than a matter of facts and data; it is a question of deep-rooted beliefs and, therefore, a problem of emotions.

In this chapter, no mention will be made of the background of this dispute. The Palestine question will be discussed primarily in an effort to appreciate inter-Arab relations, Arab reasoning, beliefs and assumptions, and, above all, in order to test the strength of the pan-Arab movement, as expressed in an institution on the one hand, and as a popular reaction against the work of that very institution, on the other hand.

When the issue of Libyan independence was discussed in the last chapter, it was shown how the League of Arab States had fulfilled two of its cardinal aims - the re-inforcement of Arab ties and fulfillment of Arab aspirations. In the instance of Palestine, for reasons that shall be discussed below, the League succeeded in doing the very opposite: it re-inforced divisions within the Arab world and frustrated the aspirations of Palestinian Arabs who found themselves ejected from their homes without ever seeing the realization of their cherished dream - an independent Arab State of Palestine.

Before proceeding any further some clarifications are called for. The responsibilities for the Palestine fiasco rest on the League of Arab States in two ways: as an institution representing the total weakness of its components, and as an institution which failed to make efficient usage out

of the potentialities - few as they may have been at that time - of its members. This distinction serves to differentiate between the individual responsibilities of the Arab States, and their collective responsibility within the inter-Arab organisation.

This is more than academic. It is reasonable to argue ✓ that the existence of the League hindered rather than helped that Arab cause during the height of the Palestinian crisis, and the Arab Governments themselves realized the possibility of this. But it needs to be asked why the League survived none the less?

It was the question of Palestine which made the religious-cultural Arab realize that he was politically Arab. In other words, it crystallized Arab solidarity by providing a common aim and a common enemy. The question of Palestine, probably more than any other factor, drew Egypt and the rest of North Africa into the Arab political movement. (1) It was, also, a cornerstone of the very first schemes for Arab unity. It

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(1) "It was, however, primarily the Jewish question which brought home to the Arabs of Libya and North Africa the fact they were Moslems and had a certain solidarity with the Arabs of Palestine and the Middle East. It awakened an unusual hostility to the Jewish communities of these regions, and, with that, an increased dislike of Europeans." - Clare Hollingworth, The Arabs and the West, op. cit., p. 239.

came to be the principal Arab cause. Growing nationalism within the Arab countries made the Palestine question a tempting and fruitful tool for political (and religious) propaganda and for furthering personal ambitions.

During the Second World War, the Palestine issue was quiescent because of the hostilities, the presence of British security forces, and the hopes the Arab Governments placed in the 1939 White Paper. Palestinian leadership was compromised by the association of certain Palestinian Arab leaders with the Nazis, which Zionist propaganda made able use of. <sup>(1)</sup>

In the negotiations which produced the League of Arab States, the Palestine question was not an issue. Certain Arab States, notably Transjordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt, preferred not to have Palestine represented in the League for fear of antagonizing Britain. Hashinite ambitions and the "Greater Syria" scheme made it more difficult to discuss Palestine. The Alexandria Protocol of 1944 contained a reference to the Palestinian problem and defined Arab policy by stating that "Palestine forms an important element among Arab States and that any action affecting Arab rights in that country would affect the peace and stability of the Arab world." It, also, approved the policy on Jewish

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(1) See, for instance, L'Effort de Guerre Arabe, and Le Haut Comité Arabe, both published by the "Editions de la Terre Retrouve", Paris, (1947).

immigration laid down by Great Britain in the 1939 White Paper, and made known the intentions of the Arab States to establish an Arab Nation Fund for saving Palestinian Arab lands. It made no reference to any threats or measures which the Arab States would undertake in case of opposition by outside Powers.

The Charter of the League contained an annex about Palestine which was as anodyne as the Alexandria Protocol. It says that the "de jure" independence of Palestine cannot be questioned but that circumstances have not permitted its realization. It does not say what the Arab States would do to fulfil Palestinian independence. But it provided for Palestinian representation in the activities of the League pending the attainment of sovereignty and independence. Either the Arabs were sure of a diplomatic victory over Palestine and did not feel the need of saying what must be done to secure its independence, or they were divided about the necessity of expressing such intentions. The minutes of the Political Sub-Committee which drafted the Charter support the second assumption. (1)

Palestinian independence, after the end of the Second World War, had begun to have two different meanings in Arab

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(1) See, above, Chapter 7.

politics. It meant independence from Great Britain; and in some Arab quarters it meant independence from Hashinite rule as implied in the "Greater Syria" plan. The activities of the League show that the Arab States were more concerned with the second kind of independence than with the first. They were about to fight a double war in Palestine - one against Zionist pressures, with powerful international support, and the other between themselves.

The League found itself combatting French and British interests from its beginning. In the Levant, Egyptian and Libyan questions, it contradicted Western interests in the Arab world. British support and encouragement of Arab nationalism backfired and it soon became apparent that Britain would no longer be able to handle Arab countries in the manner that it had become accustomed to since the First World War. The hopes that a British observer might be allowed to attend the meetings of the League <sup>(1)</sup> were soon

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(1) Sir Reader Bullard, Britain and the Middle East, London (1952), p. 157. "The formation of the League was welcomed by H.M. Government, who appointed a senior officer to maintain liaison with it." This appointment had led to certain reports such as the one found in Pravda of March 24, 1948 as translated in Articles et Documents, La Documentation Francaise, No. 1266, April 23, 1948: "Ainsi est nee le 22 Mars 1945, la Ligue arabe, ou le delegue permanent semi-officiel est le general Clayton. Aucune reunion importante de la Ligue ne se tient sans sa participation." Seton-Williams, Britain and the Arab States, op. cit., p. 234: "It was reported in February (1946) that Sir Gilbert Clayton has been appointed British representative to the Arab League" - the source given is Beirut Radio (February 7, 1946).

dissipated, and the Foreign Office found itself instead receiving notes and telegrams of protest from the Secretariat of an institution upon which it had placed high hopes towards the end of the War. This change in Anglo-Arab relations was not sudden, but it was encouraged by the admission of five Arab countries to the United Nations, the irritation of the French Government against Great Britain which led to a French encouragement of anti-British feeling in the Arab world,<sup>(1)</sup> and the growing importance of Arab public opinion which was felt in serious anti-British riots and demonstrations.

None the less, the League was generally thought of as a protege of Great Britain. This belief was common in France, in the Soviet Union and in the American oil industry. It is not easy to ascertain how much truth there was in it. Many Arab countries were clearly unwilling to antagonize Britain. On the other hand, the fears and suspicions of Britain about the possible orientation of the League made her cautious in support of Arab policy; and caution became indecision when she abstained in the United Nations over the Palestine partition resolutions. She turned rather to support Hashimite plans for a "Greater Syria", which undermined Arab solidarity at a time when it was needed most. Consciously or unconsciously, the British policy of uniting the Arab world was slowly

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(1) The escape of the Muphti to Egypt was arranged with the co-operation of the French.

replaced by the old principle of "divide and rule". It is, therefore, almost impossible to talk about the actions of the League over Palestine without referring to the inter-Arab struggles about the "Greater Syria" scheme.

The League underestimated the strength and influence of the Zionists inside Palestine as well as outside. And it was late in realizing the seriousness of the Palestinian problem. The famous secret resolutions of the Bludan Conference in 1946 only hinted that the Arabs would use military force to defend Palestinian aspirations, but no arrangements were made to unify the Arab military effort, nor were the necessary military and economic precautions taken.

In a period of ten years, the League adopted a total of 190 resolutions on the Palestine question - an impressive number at first sight. <sup>(1)</sup> Yet only 24 of these resolutions were passed during the three year period from 1947 to 1949 - the most decisive years of the Palestine crisis. Hence the years 1948 and 1949, during which the war was taking place in Palestine, and the United Nations was most preoccupied with this problem, are the years with the smallest number of resolutions on this issue.

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(1) A complete list of resolutions adopted by the Council of the League about Palestine will be found at the end of this chapter.

Arab efforts during this initial period contrast sharply with the activities of the different international Zionist organisations. At a time when the Zionists were pooling their common strength and elaborating long range and short range policies, carrying on an active propaganda campaign in the main capitals of the world and through the most influential sections of the Western press, the members of the Arab League were wasting their time on such matters as who was to represent Palestine in the meetings of the League and in what capacity, on empty declarations in the Arab press, and on threats which they did not take care to back up with the necessary military and political precautions. But the Arab League could not have formulated a policy nor plans like the Zionist organisations because the member States of the Arab organisation were directed by conflicting ambitions and rival personalities rather than by common principles or policies. Arab public opinion, which was barely beginning to play a role was drugged with speeches, communiques and impressive meetings of Arab rulers and monarchs.

In spite of all that has been said so far, the League did have what may be loosely termed a Palestinian policy. It consisted in opposing Jewish immigration, boycotting Zionist products, preventing the transfer of land ownership from Arab to Jewish elements, seeking independence for a

unitary Arab State in Palestine, trying to unify political parties and Arab opinion inside Palestine, and propagating this policy through the use of its Secretariat in Cairo and the Arab offices in London and Washington. This is the theoretical side of the League's policy; its practical realization was a difficult one although all of the member States agreed on the above principles. The difficulty was one of Arab divisions and lack of power. The League as an institution was not united nor did it have the power, constitutionally and politically, to enforce its resolutions. Arab divisions led to a division of Arab public opinion and political parties inside Palestine. The Arab States, who had a few trump cards at their disposal in international diplomacy, such as the question of oil, their stand on the problem of East-West relations, the Suez Canal and Western economic interests and military bases in the Middle East, did not make use of them - or rather used them in order to consolidate their ambitions. Hence, even the little effect that concrete Arab unity and sacrifice could have produced was non-available. The well-informed capitals and Zionist organisations knew that there were no teeth behind the overpowering Arab declarations.

The bulk of the Palestine resolutions were adopted after the establishment of Israel and the signing of the permanent armistice agreements; in other words, after the failure of

the League to guarantee the aspirations of the Arab world. It is worthwhile to note that in the period between May 14, 1948, the date of the British withdrawal from Palestine and the beginning of hostilities, and March 1949, that is after the signing of the Armistice Agreement on February 24, 1949, the Council of the League adopted only one resolution over the Palestine question - a protest to the United Nations about Zionist atrocities in Palestine. <sup>(1)</sup> The League was inactive not because the Council did not debate the question, but because no agreement could be reached between the member States.

The Palestine issue came before the Council of the League, for the first time, on November 8, 1945, while the Second Session was in progress. Most of the resolutions adopted in 1945 were protests and demands which made no attempt to take into consideration the prevailing international situation. One does not even find a demand for Palestinian independence in the 1945 resolutions of the League. <sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) Resolution 218, November 3, 1948.

(2) The first resolution dealing with Palestinian independence was adopted on March 24, 1947 (Resolution 150).

The documentation of the League of Arab States on the Palestine question is indicative. The resolutions, most of the time, run as follows: "After a consideration of the proposal put forth by the Political (or Palestine) Committee, the Council recommends that the Secretary-General undertake the necessary steps for the communication of a memorandum on this issue to the British and American Governments, and the member States do likewise according to the means at their disposal." When one refers to the Reports of the Secretary-General in order to check what the Secretariat has done about the Council's resolution, one comes across the following formula: "the Secretariat has deployed considerable efforts on the question of Palestine between the two sessions of the Council, and, in accordance with resolution X, the Secretary-General has handed a note to the American and British Governments in which he expressed the views of the League." A few illustrations of this process can be found very readily, and it suffices to refer to the questions of Jewish immigration, and the activities of the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee on Palestine - the two most important issues during the initial period of the Palestine question - to see this method at work.

In September, 1945, President Truman made an appeal to the British Government for the admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine. On November 13, 1945, an Anglo-

American Committee to investigate the problem of Jewish immigration was created. The Committee published its report on April 20, 1946.<sup>(1)</sup> It recommended the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine as well as a free policy in regards to the sale of land in that country. These principles were in complete contradiction with the resolutions and policy of the League.

The Council of the League considered the question of Jewish immigration in November 1945. A resolution was adopted on November 10; it stated:

"The Council accepts the memorandum which has been presented by the committee concerned with the investigation of the Palestine question and entrusts the Secretary-General with the responsibility of communicating it to the American and British Governments. Every Government of the member States of the League shall do likewise." (2).

One does not find another resolution on this subject until November 28, 1946, exactly one year later. This second resolution reads:

"The Council sees, in the aggravation of Jewish immigration into Palestine, a serious danger for the Arabs and for any solution which could be based on the recommendations of the London Palestine Conference. The Council entrusts the Secretariat to protest to the

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(1) Cmd. 6086 (1946).

(2) Resolution 11.

British Government for its neglect over this question, and decides that the continuation of immigration is in contradiction with the British promises of 1939 as well as threat to peace in the Middle East. The Arabs consider that any Jewish immigration to Palestine is illegal and, therefore, considers all immigrants into Palestine as illegal ones who should be returned to their points of departure." (1).

This resolution was adopted seven months after the publication of the Anglo-American report. The third and last resolution to be adopted by the Council on this matter was the one of March 24, 1947:

"The Council of the League opposes the continuation of Jewish immigration into Palestine, whether it be allowed by Great Britain or not, just as it very strongly opposes the weak measures undertaken to combat this immigration which the Council considers to be one of the most serious injustices ever inflicted upon the Arabs of Palestine." (2)

A reading of these three resolutions - the sole work of the Council on the problem of Jewish immigration - is almost comical. All of these resolutions had no substance, and much more they are a sign of a blatant naivete. The communiqués and the reports of the Secretary-General follow the same line. At the end of the Inshass meeting of Arab rulers, in March 1946, the following communique was released:

"It is not possible for the rulers of the Arab States to agree in any manner whatsoever to a

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(1) Resolution 95.

(2) Resolution 156.

new immigration which they consider to be in explicit disregard of the "White Book" to which the United Kingdom is bound by honour."(1)

The League, as an institution, can be blamed for having <sup>x</sup> failed to even suggest solutions or measures to enforce policies such as its opposition to Jewish immigration - a matter on which all of the members agreed. The League might have done much better if it had kept silent on this issue. Its poor showing on this question helps to understand and explain its other failures and to confirm the assumption that the Arab Governments really did not have the welfare of the Palestinian Arabs at heart, and they were much more preoccupied by their own ambitions and rivalries.

(2)

At the Inshass Conference the Arab States pledged their full support for the independence of Palestine.

According to the communique:

"They have considered that the question (of Palestine) did not concern the Arabs of Palestine alone, but that it constituted the cause of all the Arabs; that Palestine is Arab, and that it is the duty of all the Arab States and peoples to safeguard its Arab character... They have entrusted the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to transmit the results of their deliberations to the Council of the League..."(3)

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(1) Quoted in Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 407; for the complete text of the Inshass communique, see M. Laissy, op. cit., pp. 233-37.

(2) This Conference was called by King Farouk and lasted from May 28 to May 29, 1946.

(3) Translated from the French text quoted in M. Laissy, op. cit., pp 233-37.

Shortly after the Inshass Conference, the Council of the League held an extraordinary session in Bludan, from June 9 to June 12, 1946, in order to consider the implementation of the Inshass recommendations. Sixteen resolutions on Palestine were adopted and, as usual, an over-powering communique was released at the end explaining that the holding of the extraordinary session "was the result of the fact that the Arab Nation, sovereigns, Chiefs of States, Governments and peoples alike, realize the great danger which menaces Palestine, and with it, the Arab Nation." (1)

(2)

Two of the Bludan resolutions were about the report of the Anglo-American Committee. They stated that "it be left to each Government represented in the League to answer the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee within the spirit of the report of the League's Special Committee..." The member States could not agree on the points to be included in a collective answer to the Anglo-American Committee, and it was decided that each Arab Government retain its freedom to answer as it pleased. By adopting these resolutions the League showed that it was useless and incapable of dealing with a problem as important as that of Jewish immigration. } x

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(1) See Report (1st - 10th Sessions), op. cit., pp. 10-11

(2) Resolutions 75 and 78, June 12, 1946.

Almost half of the Bludan resolutions on Palestine dealt with the creation or reorganisation of organs of the League. A Permanent Palestine Committee was instituted and made responsible for all financial matters pertaining to the Palestine question. (1) A Palestinian Fund, under the supervision of (2) the Permanent Palestine Committee was initiated. A Propaganda Committee, a Boycott Committee, a Committee of Assistance to Palestinian Arabs, and a Committee for the Defence of Palestine (3) was created. Finally, after consultations with Palestinian Arab leaders it became possible to replace the two important political Palestinian Arab coalitions with a newly-created Arab Higher Executive. (4) One may well (5) question the value of so many committees on Palestine, especially when it is remembered that the Budget of the League, in 1946, was 150,000 pounds. They became cumbersome because their functions were not clearly defined and because there were not the necessary funds to make them function properly. Their work was disposed of by the Council through resolutions reading, "The Council has considered the reports and recommendations of... and requests the Secretary-General to send a memorandum to..."

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(1) Resolution 60, June 12, 1946.

(2) Resolution 68, June 12, 1946.

(3) Resolutions 69, 70, 71, 72, respectively: June 12, 1946.

(4) See Resolutions 65 and 82, June 12, 1946.

(5) One finds very little reference in the resolutions of the Council or in the reports of the Secretary-General about the activities of these numerous committees.

Two items on the agenda of the Bludan session of the Council need elaboration: Palestinian leadership and negotiations with Great Britain. It has been said that, "One important and continuing activity of the League has been the effort to reconcile differences and create a united front among the various Arab parties in Palestine." <sup>(1)</sup> There is no denying that the League's resolutions on the issue of Palestinian leadership would indicate an effort "to reconcile differences and create a unified front." The basic differences between the Palestinian leaders, however, were political. Some of them favoured the Hashinite plans and others opposed them; that is to say, some were "anti-Muphti" and others "pro-Muphti". These differences came to be centred around issues which could be considered as being outside the realm of direct Palestinian concern. On the other hand, the League of Arab States was the centre where these issues were introduced and debated in every question dealing with inter-Arab relations. It can be said, therefore, that, although the Council was passing resolutions in an effort to "reconcile" the Palestinian parties, the very nature of inter-Arab relations, at that time, led to an accentuation of the prevailing differences. There were very few disinterested Arab Palestinian leaders; they were all thinking

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(1) B.Y. Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 409.

in terms of their ambitions and based their actions on the effects they would have on inter-Arab relations rather than on international relations. The fate of Palestine itself was almost ignored by the Palestinian leaders just as it was by the Arab Governments. Only personal and dynastic ambitions mattered. It would be somewhat untrue, therefore, to say that the League continuously tried to reconcile differences and unify the ranks of Palestinian leadership. The League, in fact, increased these differences by introducing a choice between two Arab policies. The schizophrenic nature of the Palestinian leadership was another source of the Arabs' failure in Palestine.

The Council of the League in its Bludan session adopted a resolution which stated:

"The Council has decided that a note inviting Great Britain to start negotiations (on the future of Palestine) be sent; and asks all of the members of the League, who are, also, members of the United Nations, to send notes to Great Britain in her capacity of a member of the United Nations, asking her to enter into negotiations with the Arab countries, in accordance with article 79 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council requests that these notes be sent before June 20, (1946)." (1)

The terms of this resolution were executed, and a meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers was held on August 12 in Alexandria to discuss and elaborate an Arab policy for the forthcoming

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(1) Resolution 79, June 12, 1946.

Anglo-Arab conference on Palestine. At Alexandria, the Arab Governments reached one agreement and that was that they (1) would reject any proposal based on a partition of Palestine.

The London Conference on Palestine, with the participation of Great Britain and the members of the League, was held between September 10 and October 2, 1946 and resumed (2) again on December 16. The first disagreement, in the Conference, arose about Palestinian representation in the London talks. The Arab States insisted on the presence of Arab Palestinian representatives during the Anglo-Arab negotiations whereas Great Britain wanted to keep them out of these official discussions. The Arab point of view finally prevailed and an Arab Palestinian delegation was present when the Conference resumed its work on December 16.

In the meantime, the Council of the League approved, during its fifth session, the principles elaborated by the Committee of Arab Foreign Ministers, and agreed on the necessity of Palestinian participation in the London Conference. (3) On December 12, it rejected, "completely and absolutely", any project which favoured the partition of

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(1) See, Report (1st - 10th Sessions) op. cit., p.11.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Resolution 127, December 10, 1946.

(1) Palestine. The League's stand on this question was firm and it was not possible for any Arab Government to retract from it. From then on, Anglo-Arab negotiations became (2) useless. The London Conference proved to be inconclusive, and on February 18, 1947, Mr. Bevin, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, announced in the House of Commons that Great Britain was handing over the Palestine problem to the United Nations.

It was precisely when the Palestinian question was going to be discussed in the United Nations - a time when international public opinion would be most needed - that Arab solidarity began to show its cracks as a result of the revival of the "Greater Syria" plan. On May 25, 1946, Abdullah was proclaimed King of Transjordan, and on November 11, the new Arab monarch made it clear, in his speech from the throne, that the "Greater Syria" scheme was the guiding principle of Transjordanian foreign policy. On September 20, it was announced that a project of political union

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(1) Resolution 142, December 12, 1946.

(2) The London Conference implied, however, an official recognition of the League of Arab States in Great Britain. This might seem superfluous since it was Britain that encouraged its creation, but it must be pointed out that, as late as June 12, 1946, the Council of the League adopted a resolution (number 76) asking the Arab Governments to request Great Britain to recognise the League of Arab States and to consider the actions of its Secretary-General as directives from Arab Governments.

between the two Hashinite Kingdoms of Transjordan and Iraq had been elaborated during King Abdullah's visit to Iraq on that same month. The press in Syria and Egypt started a violent campaign against this project, as soon as it was hear of, until it was finally reduced to a Treaty of Allia-  
(1)  
nce and Brotherhood.

The dispute over the "Greater Syria" scheme came before the Council of the League on November 26, 1946, when the Syrian Foreign Minister said, "Much controversy recently has been made about Greater Syria, and the press has discussed it fully while we (in the League) - who should be more concerned about it - have kept silent. We (in Syria) repudiated the scheme from the very beginning, because we want to abide by the Arab Pact."  
(2) While the Sixth Session of the Council was being held in March, 1947, Transjordan closed its Consulate in Damascus on the grounds that the

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(1) Signed on April 15, 1947, see M. Khadduri, Independent Iraq, op. cit., p. 260. The same author wrote in "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity...", op. cit., p. 151, "Abdullah's failure to achieve his Greater Syria scheme prompted Iraq and Transjordan to reconsider their relations vis-a-vis the Arab League States. Iraq, in spite of certain local opposition, has directly or indirectly, supported Transjordan's expansionist policy on the grounds that what benefits Transjordan today may benefit Iraq tomorrow. Opposition to Abdullah's policy has aroused Iraq's anger and induced the two Hashinite Kingdoms to strengthen their position not only by cementing their relations by a formal treaty of alliance, but, also, by seeking support of a non-Arab power - Turkey." Treaties of friendship were signed between Iraq and Turkey on April 29, 1946; and between Transjordan and Turkey on January 11, 1947.

(2) Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 148.

Syrian Government was tolerating, if not encouraging, elements hostile to King Abdullah.<sup>(1)</sup> Arab tension was felt in the Council when on March 24, 1947, Iraq and Transjordan did not vote with the rest of the members on a resolution dealing with the financing of the Arab Higher Executive and propaganda activities for the defence of Palestine:

"The Council has taken note of the reserves made by the Iraqi representative about the freedom which his Government intends to retain in the matter of financing Palestinian activities."<sup>(2)</sup>

That same day, Nuri Said convened a joint session of the two Houses of the Iraqi Parliament and asked that a firm stand be adopted on the Palestine question. He, also, took advantage of this opportunity to make the Iraqi point of view crystal clear and went so far as to say that in case the League did not take a more energetic stand on Palestine<sup>(3)</sup> "there no longer will be an Arab League." At this point, Arab differences were quite apparent and the Arab press was making them more so. The Council of the League had to adopt a special resolution on March 26 (two days after Nuri

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(1) See, M. Laissy, op. cit., p. 155.

(2) Resolution 154.

(3) Quoted in M. Khadduri, "The Scheme of Fertile Crescent Unity", op. cit., p. 155.

Said's statement of policy) which stated:

"The Council urges the member States to adopt the necessary measures which would prevent the press within their countries from harming the relations between the members of the League." (1)

The Arab leaders were actually doing much more harm to inter-Arab relations than the Arab press. This, however, was only the beginning of the clouding of inter-Arab relations; more was to come at an even more crucial point - a time of a war which was to decide the fate of Palestine.

1947 was the key year of the Palestine crisis. It was a decisive year because of the combined detrimental effects of both inter-Arab and international relations. Great Britain requested the United Nations, on April 2nd, to have the Palestinian question placed on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. (2) The United Nations did not wait for the regular session of the Assembly, and, on April 28, a special session of the General Assembly - the first one in the history of the United Nations - was called to discuss the Palestinian problem. The Arab States which could not agree on a policy within their own organisation could not be expected, in spite of an outward front of

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(1) Resolution 188.

(2) U.N. Document A/286, April 3, 1947.

unity, to impress other States in an international organisation. The echo of the heated discussions in the League's Council was still ringing in the ears of the respective Arab delegations at the United Nations. <sup>(1)</sup> At the special session no solution of the problem was reached but the Zionists had scored a few victories. First, an Arab proposal dealing with Palestinian independence was not accepted on the agenda; <sup>(2)</sup> then, the question of Jewish refugees was tied up with the over-all Palestinian problem. Once this link was achieved, humanitarian considerations and emotional factors entered into the picture, and, with a little shrewdness and an intelligent Zionist propaganda, the next step <sup>(3)</sup> was the discussion of a partition resolution. The Special Session of the General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the creation of a Special Committee on Palestine to investigate the prevailing situation and to report to the

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(1) At that time these were: Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.

(2) U.N. Document A/294 (April 25, 1947): the item was rejected on May 2.

(3) The first resolution on the partition of Palestine was adopted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947 with a vote of 33 for, 13 against and 10 abstentions. It was rejected by the Security Council on March 19, 1948, when it was realized that the partition could not be carried out peacefully.

General Assembly before September 1, 1947.<sup>(1)</sup> The five Arab members of the United Nations voted against this resolution, but were supported in their opposition by only two delegations - Turkey and Afghanistan.<sup>(2)</sup> This minority position was a good indication of the League's failure in international diplomacy.

Actually, the League was in a very awkward position internationally. By combatting the French in Syria and Lebanon, it had been danned by France. The Soviet Union saw in the League nothing more than an instrument of British policy, and had not forgotten that when she had brought the question of inquiring into the presence of foreign troops on non-enemy territory, before the Security Council, Egypt, a member of the League which was having a dispute with Great Britain over the presence of British troops on her territory, abstained. King Abdullah, most of the time, referred to the Zionists as communists and was reported to have said, "I shall go into action as soon as I shall smell the odour of communism in Palestine". Here is what Pravda was writing

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- (1) U.N. Resolution 106 (Special Session I), May 15, 1947; the committee was known as the U.N.S.C.O.P.
- (2) Both of these countries were Islamic; and Turkey had just signed friendship treaties with Iraq and Trans-jordan - see note 1 on p. 306 above.

about the Arab League on the eve of the Palestinian war:

"Since the formation of that League, it becomes evident that it was not in the least instituted by the Arabs alone nor in their own interest, but in the interest of the British imperialists... At this hour, the decision of the United Nations about Palestine has started a febrile activity within the League. Armed units are constituted, and several protests are being published against this decision which is unfavourable to Great Britain..." (1)

This short excerpt explains two things about Soviet Arab policy at that time. The League was considered as a British instrument and the only Soviet concern in the Middle East was the disappearance of British and Western interests in that area. On the question of Palestine, the Soviet Union sided with the Zionists because it felt that it was the best manner to expel the British from Palestine definitively, and because she was confident that a Zionist State, inspired with socialistic ideas, would be less docile to British (2) Policy than an Arab independent Palestinian State. The Pravda article shows that the only factor which interested the Soviet Union was how its vote in the United Nations would affect Great Britain - not Arab interests.

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(1) M. Melekhov, "The Arab League and independence of the Arab countries", Pravda, March 24, 1948; translated into French in Articles et Documents, No. 1266, op. cit.

(2) See G. Moussa Dib, The Arab Bloc in the United Nations, pp. 38-9, Amsterdam (1956).

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Deprived of French and Soviet support; confronted with a double-faced and undecided British policy which led, most of the time, to abstentions in the United Nations; not in a position to rival Zionist pressures on American policy; and unable to impress or convince the major portion of the smaller powers, the Arab League was doomed to failure on the international front. The resolutions of the League, however, do indicate that the Arab States were not aware of their weak position on the international scene. This is another sign of the League's carelessness about the fate of the Palestinian Arabs and its greater concern with the ambitions of the respective Arab "bloes". This is a harsh assessment but not one which is hard to substantiate. What could the League have done? The Arab States, individually and collectively, were very weak and there was very little they could do. They were not willing to play their most important - if not only - trump card: oil. Their weakness may explain the eventual loss of Palestine, but it does not justify the manner in which the loss came about. This may seem irrele-

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(1) "The complete dependence of the State finances on the royalties received from Aramco caused the late King to resist proposals made in the Arab League for suspending foreign oil concessions as the most powerful political weapon in the Arabs' hand." Middle East Survey, R.I.I.A. op. cit., p. 90.

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vant, but it is most important in a study which is concerned with an analysis of inter-Arab relations and Arab nationalism. It must be realized that the manner in which the Arab States contributed to the loss of Palestine has had deeper psychological - and, therefore, political - consequences on the Arab nationalist movement and Arab politics than the actual loss itself. Musa Alami, who represented the Palestinian Arabs in the Preparatory Conferences of the Arab League, wrote in 1949:

"The Arabs were faced by a challenge, the first since their liberation from foreign rule; and they did not meet it. A great national disaster has been inflicted upon them, exposing them in turn to further blows and disasters. The challenge and disaster are those of Palestine." <sup>a</sup>

(2)  
The following quotation from General Neguib's book, Egypt's

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(2) Mohamed Neguib, Egypt's Destiny, London (1955) - the first chapter of this book is entitled "The Lost War" and deals with Palestine; General Neguib writes on p. 16: "We might not have won the war, but, at least, we would not have lost it as decisively as we did."

(1) Musa Alami, "The Lesson of Palestine", in the Middle East Journal, October, 1949, p. 373.

Destiny, sums up Arab feeling very concisely:

"We seized power because we could no longer endure the humiliation to which we, along with the Egyptian people, were being subjected. For most of us the breaking point was our inexcusable defeat in Palestine.."(1)

The helplessness of the League, on the international scene, was accentuated by its internal divisions. These internal schisms ended in a quasi-paralysis of the League's activities on the Palestine question. No compromise could be reached, even in view of the critical nature of the political situation at the United Nations, and the military one within Palestine, because the Arab Governments did not have the Palestinian Arab rights at heart:

"What concerned them most and guided their policy was not to win the war and save Palestine from the enemy, but what would happen after the struggle, who would be predominant in Palestine, or annex it to themselves, and how they could achieve their ambitions."(2)

The activities of the Arab League in 1948 and 1949, serve to uphold this interpretation. During these two years which witnessed the U.N. deliberations, reports of special

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(1) M. Neguib, op. cit., p.14. Neguib, also, says that fearing death on the Palestine front he wrote a testament in which he said to his children: "Remember that your father died honourably and that his last desire was that you should avenge our defeat in Palestine..." ibid., p. 27.

(2) Musa Alani, op. cit., p. 385.

committees and commissions, adoption of partition resolutions, guerilla warfare, terrorist activities, military action, international supervision of truce, violations of that truce, Arab refugee problems, the Council of the League did not give sign of a positive stand on the Palestine question.

Amongst the resolutions which the Arab members of the League were able to reach agreement, on the issue of Palestine, one finds only two dealing with the United Nations while the latter was still in a position to alter the outcome of the Palestinian problem.<sup>(1)</sup> These resolutions recommended that the Arab members of the U.N. appoint, right away, the delegates which will represent them in the forthcoming session of the U.N. They, also, deal with the providing of information, in co-operation with the Arab Higher Executive, to the Arab delegations at the U.N., on the Palestinian question. The variations between the two resolutions was a slight one, but they reflected the prevailing Arab differences - even on questions of details. The first resolution had recommended that each Arab member of the U.N. be provided with information on Palestine in the form of a report to be prepared by the Arab Higher Executive, whereas the second one, number 179, stated "that each Arab country

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(1) Resolution 167, 27/3/1947.  
Resolution 179, 29/3/1947.

undertake the measures which it deems necessary for the defence of the Palestine question before the United Nations." This amended form was probably a result of the League's inability to agree about the role which the Arab Higher Executive was to play in the preparation of the Palestinian case. The outcome was less co-ordination at a time when it was most needed. And whereas the first resolution specified the date of a meeting of the Palestine committee to take place in order to review the Arab position to be adopted at the U.N., in the light of the Arab Higher Executive's report, the second resolution mentions that "the Arab countries are to co-ordinate their activities within the United Nations in the same manner as they were used to in the previous sessions." In short, although many new factors had to be taken into account in the consideration of the Palestine question, the League was not in a position to suggest a new orientation to the Arab members at the United Nations. These two resolutions, adopted within an interval of two days, have to show how serious Arab disunity really was, inside the Arab League, on this question of Palestine. Here again one may ask whether the Arab States would not have made a better showing on this issue had the League not been there. In other words, did not the existence of this institution, created in order to bring about a closer union between Arab countries and defend their aspirations, produce more

disunity which, in turn, led to the destruction of one segment of the "Arab Nation"? To quote Musa Alami once more:

"But no doubt the biggest political failure we recorded was our inability to create some kind of real unity among ourselves in the face of a united enemy, at a most critical moment, in a historical and decisive struggle, with disaster facing us." (1)

The Council of the League was not able to elaborate a definite policy on the Palestine problem. This is the only conclusion which one can reach from the available documents of the League. There is not a single resolution referring to principles of policy which the Arabs were to adopt at the United Nations. This can mean only one of two things: either the League did not pay proper attention to the question, or else it was unable to reach unanimous agreement on any one policy. In view of what has been said so far, one may easily accept the latter explanation.

In 1948, the Council of the League adopted seven resolutions on Palestine. And, as usual, the first of these was on the question of Palestinian representation in the deliberations of the League; one was entitled "Defending Palestine";  
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(1) Musa Alami, op. cit., p. 384.

(2) Resolution 194, February 12, 1948.

(3) Resolution 196, February 17.

one was about the Arab refugees who had begun to run away from Palestine; (1) two dealt with the raising of funds; (2) one was about the control of news, within the Arab countries, about the Palestinian situation; (3) and the last one was a "Protest to the United Nations Against Jewish Atrocities". (4) None of these resolutions could be said to have a shade of substance, with the possible exception of the one dealing with the defence of Palestine but which can not be analyzed since it merely stated that the Council agreed on the secret decisions of the Political Committee, which were signed on April 16, 1948, by the heads of the delegations at the League.

In his report to the Council, the Secretary-General of the League was writing on October 30, 1948, that is to say after the beginning of hostilities in Palestine and after the establishment of the State of Israel politically and militarily :

"Under the pressure of events the Secretariat of the League has become like a Palestinian administration which had replaced the British mandate. Everyone considered the Secretariat as responsible for whatever touched that country..."(6)

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- (1) Resolution 205, February 22;
  - (2) Resolution 208 and 209, February 22;
  - (3) Resolution 215, February 22;
  - (4) Resolution 218, November 3.
  - (5) Israel had already been recognized by several countries amongst which were the United States and the U.S.S.R.
  - (6) Report (1st - 10th Sessions), op. cit., p. 43.

Azzam Pasha's report was characterized by a certain disillusionment if not bitterness because he was the main target of criticism for the League's military failure.

This led him to write in the same report:

"It will please the Council to know that these last few months which have been characterized by violations of the truce have not affected the Arab countries or their power. And I personally believe, from the information at my disposal, that the Arab countries are now, in view of their present strength in soldiers and ammunitions, in a position to resume hostilities and thereby attain decisive results and a manifest triumph." (1)

A statement like the last one, and from as responsible a source of the League as Azzam Pasha, can serve to show how poorly the inter-Arab organisation handled the Palestine question. The Report of the Secretary-General is one of those things which has nothing to do with Arab weaknesses or Arab disunity - it is a responsibility of the League independently of anything else. Azzam Pasha must have known that, as a result of the first truce, <sup>(2)</sup> Great Britain was no longer supplying the Arab countries with ammunitions and that the weapons of these States were predominantly

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(1) Ibid., p. 45.

(2) Hostilities had begun in Palestine on May 15, 1948, as soon as the British forces had withdrawn, and the first truce was concluded on June 11, 1948, thanks to the mediation of Count F. Bernadotte.

British. He was more aware, than anyone else, of the inability of the Arab States to agree on a unified command and on a common military leadership.<sup>(1)</sup> He had witnessed the showing of the Arab forces during the first round of the Palestinian War. His assessment of the military situation is inexcusable in the light of the factors which were known to anyone as closely concerned with Palestine as he must have been. Nor can his Report be excused on the ground of propaganda or psychological warfare since it was prepared solely for the member States of the League who were much more in need of an objective and even harsh assessment of the situation than of a highly-inflated and misleading summing-up of the Palestinian picture. How much did the Arab States base their policy on Azzam's report<sup>(2)</sup> is an

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(1) Boutros-Chali, op. cit., p. 411: "When the issue of a Commander-in-Chief for the Arab armies arose, each State claimed this honour. They met time after time but no decision was taken. Iraq refused to accept an Egyptian commander. Egypt rejected an Iraqi general. The Commander-in-Chief of the Jordan army was of British origin and, therefore, out of the question. The result was that each Arab army that entered Palestine fought on its own."

(2) This report was presented to the Council on the occasion of the opening of its ninth session, and one does not find the Council adopting a single resolution on the question of Palestine during this session which was held in November, 1948!

irrelevant question, in some sense, in a discussion of the League's responsibility. It is very hard to believe that Azzam was earnest in what he wrote - and, if he were, then this would be even more inexcusable and would imply that the League was not even in a position to realize what was actually taking place in Palestine.

The irony of Azzam's optimism becomes more apparent when his wishful thinking is contrasted with the prevailing mood of inter-Arab relations at the time. The Arabs were fighting two wars in Palestine: one against Israel and a cold one among themselves. After the outbreak of hostilities in Palestine, the League was, for all practical purposes, non-existent. The gap between the two main Arab "blocs" was so wide that it was impossible to reach a compromise even in the face of a common enemy. When the United States was faced with Soviet vetoes in the Security Council, it tried to widen the powers and responsibilities of the General Assembly. Likewise, when the Egyptian "bloc", in the Arab League, found itself paralyzed by the Iraq-Jordanian opposition, it came to rely more and more on the Secretariat of the League without seeking the Council's approval.

On July 8, 1948, the League of Arab States "decided to endow Palestine with a 'Provisional Civilian Administration' and on September 23 an 'Arab Government of All-Palestine'

met in Gaza." (1) A reference to the League's documents on the question of the All-Palestine Government's formation would prove useless for one does not find any resolutions of the Council dealing with this matter, nor is there a mention of it in the Reports of the Secretariat. (2) Although instigated by Egypt, the creation of the All-Palestine Government in Gaza is an enterprise of the League of Arab States because one finds resolutions of the League's Council dealing with the budget of the Gaza Government. (3) This makes it abundantly clear that the League could, when it cared to do so, undertake certain steps without the unanimous consent of member States; and amounts to saying that had the League cared to adopt an effective policy on Palestine, internal opposition would not have stood in its way. One can carry this a little further and arrive to the conclusion which has already been discussed, namely that the League did not care about Palestine in a disinterested fashion, but only

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- (1) Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 412. Hilmi Pasha was appointed head of the All-Palestine Government.
  - (2) Report (1st - 10th Sessions), op. cit., no reference is made to the All-Palestine Government in this document.
  - (3) The first Council resolution about the All-Palestine Government was the one adopted on September 23, 1952 (Resolution 472) which said that, in view of the suspension of the activities of that Government, its Prime Minister would represent Palestine in the Council and would receive 1500 Egyptian pounds from the League's budget. There are other resolutions dealing with the financing of the All-Palestine Government in 1953 and 1955.

in so far as it touched upon the direct interests of the different member States.

The creation of the All-Palestine Government was the source of further feuds within the League. (Faced by the League's policy of the 'fait accompli') the Hashimites did not remain silent. <sup>(1)</sup> Being the minority within the League they had to retaliate externally. In October, 1948, on the eve of the Ninth Session of the Council of the League, King Abdullah assembled, in Amman, a "Palestine Congress". The Palestine Congress did not recognize the constitutionality of the All-Palestine Government and leaned in favour of Abdullah's project for the annexation of Palestine to Transjordan. On December 1, 1948, King Abdullah proclaimed the annexation of Eastern Palestine, thereby, answering the Arab League by another 'fait accompli'.

The inter-Arab struggle about Palestine annihilated whatever little hope may have remained for the Arab League to solve the Palestinian problem. This struggle reached such bitterness that King Abdullah was reported to have decided to deal with Israel independently of the other

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(1) King Abdullah said that he would not recognize the formation of a Government "within the Security zone of the Transjordan Government, which extends from the Egyptian Kingdom's frontier to the frontiers of Syria and Lebanon." - quoted in the Middle East Journal, Chronology, Vol.I, 1949.

(1)  
member States of the League. The impact of the inter-Arab dispute was beginning to be felt in the internal politics of all the Arab countries and more particularly in Syria which saw three successive 'coups d'etats' in 1949. (2) The issue behind the Syrian upheavals was the question of "Greater Syria" which had been linked with the Palestine question.

One does not need to go into these events in detail but it must be pointed out that the League of Arab States was always late in tackling them. One does not find any resolutions of the League dealing with Abdullah's Palestinian policy until April, 1950. (3) By that time the Palestine question was, for all practical purposes, already settled and Israel had become a member of the United Nations. (4) This again goes to prove how inefficient - if not how useless - the League was on this question of Palestine. A brief analysis of the League's handling of the Palestine issue in the years 1949 and 1950 is called for in order to emphasize this assessment.

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- (1) For a very elaborate and well-documented study which attempts to show how King Abdullah "double-crossed the Arab League" see A. Yehia, The Pan-Arab Movement, Ph.D. Thesis, (Econ), 1950 (London University), Part Three, pp. 104-186. See, also, M. Ierrett, "King Abdullah and the Arab League", in Contemporary Review, April, 1949.
- (2) See A. Carleton "The Syrian Coups d'Etats of 1949" in the Middle East Journal, Vol. IV, January, 1950.
- (3) See, below p. 327.
- (4) Israel was admitted to the United Nations on May 11, 1949.

Hostilities were over in January 1949<sup>(1)</sup>. After having  
failed to demonstrate a united policy on the Palestinian<sup>(2)</sup> war front in 1948, it could have been expected, that once the fighting was over, the Arab States, in spite of their internal divisions, would pool their strength and tackle the Palestine question in a new spirit and with more seriousness. The very opposite was witnessed. The activities of the League over the Palestine question in 1949 and 1950- the 'hangover years'- are at best a record of Arab disputes and disagreement.

In 1949, the Council of the League adopted five meaningless resolutions on Palestine. The first was about Arab refugees<sup>(3)</sup> and simply said that the situation of the Palestinian refugees was alarming, and demanded that they should return to their homes- an order from a defeated and divided League with no hint as to how this was to be accomplished. The other resolutions were about aiding Palestinian students, subsidizing "Arab volunteers", creating a new Permanent Palestine Committee, and the necessity of coordinating Arab policy vis-a-vis the Armistice Commission of the United Nations<sup>(4)</sup>.

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(1) The armistice agreements were recognized by the Security Council on August 11, 1949.

(2) The Arab States were so much disunited on the question of Palestine that it was not felt necessary to hold a special meeting of the Council of the League during the hostilities.

(3) Resolution 231.

(4) Resolutions 243, 242, 256, and 234 respectively.

The Reports of the Secretariat of the League, presented to the Council on that year contained nothing more than a very poor journalistic account of well known events such as the resolutions adopted by the United Nations, the negotiations for an armistice etc... nothing about the activity of the Secretariat of the League itself.<sup>(1)</sup>

In 1950, inter-Arab quarrels which had arisen in the preceding years were finally aired in a stormy session of the Council held between March 25 and July 17, 1950. The bringing up of these disputes was the outcome of Arab frustration following the loss of Palestine.<sup>(2)</sup> Every Arab country was trying to put the

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- (1) See Reports (1-10th Sessions), op. cit.,  
(2) A few remarks about the highlights of the dispute about Jordan's annexation of East Palestine.: On March 27, 1950, King Abdullah sent a note informing the League of his intentions to boycott the 12th Session of the Council. On March 28, Jordan changed its mind but decided to be represented by its diplomatic agent in Cairo instead of sending a delegation from Amman. (See Marcel Colombe, "L'Egypte et la Crise Actuelle de l'Arabisme" in L'Afrique et L'Asie, 1950, IIIieme Trimestre). On April 11, 1950, elections were held throughout Jordan (at a time when the Council of the League was discussing Jordanian annexation of East Palestine). On April 24, the newly elected Parliament opened and proclaimed the union of the two sides of the Jordan River, it notified the United Nations as well as all of the Arab Governments about this decision. On that same day, the new Parliament voted in favour of a move suggesting the negotiations with Israel for a peace treaty. On April 27, Great Britain approved officially the Jordanian annexation. (For the continuation of this footnote, see, below, p.327).

blame on some other party in order to make her stand look more honourable. It was at this twelfth session of the Council that "some pro-Mufti extremists tried to have Jordan expelled from the League, using the argument that its occupation of Arab Palestine was contrary to the aims and principles of the Pact of 1945."<sup>(1)</sup>

In the course of that session, the first resolution adopted was, as usual, about Palestinian representation in the Council.<sup>(2)</sup> The matter was left to the discretion of the Council which meant that the "All-Palestine" Government would be represented in the debates thanks to the support of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. The two main issues brought up in the twelfth session of the Council dealt with the policy of Jordan in regards to the latter's negotiations with Israel and the Hashimite annexation of East Palestine.

On April 1, 1950, the Council laid down the con-

(Continuation of footnote (2) p. 326) : During the meeting of the Political Committee of the League (May 10-15) - Egypt asked for the expulsion of Jordan from the League and obtained the votes of Saudi Arabia, Syria and the Lebanon on this point with Iraq and the Yemen asking for more time until they consult their Governments. (See *ibid.*, p.37). On May 13th., Jordan's Foreign Minister, Muhammad Shurayqi Pasha walked out of the meeting of the Political Committee. And on the 15th., the Committee decided that the Jordanian annexation was a violation of its April 12, resolution.

(1) Boutros-Ghali, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

(2) Resolution No. 280, March 27, 1950.

ditions for any negotiations with Israel. (1) It stressed that it was not permitted "for any member of the League of Arab states to conclude a bilateral agreement of any nature with Israel, and that any member of the League which shall do so will be automatically considered expelled from the League in accordance with article 18 of the Charter." There was no doubt as to whom this resolution was aiming at. On April 13, another resolution running along the same lines, but much stronger in tone, was passed. (2) It reasserted the previous principles and provided for other measures, beyond the expulsion of the member State who would infringe the conditions set by the Council in regards to negotiations with Israel. These other measures included the interruption of political, diplomatic, consular, economic and commercial relations as well as the closing down of common frontiers with the State which would violate the resolution of the Council on this matter. This is one of the strongest and firmest resolutions ever adopted by the Council in the realm of inter-Arab relations. The opposition of Jordan to such a resolution was, constitutionally speaking, useless since it was aimed against her. It should be pointed out again

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(1) Resolution 292.

(2) Resolution 314.

that the League of Arab States could, when it cared to, \*  
adopt strongly worded resolutions even when unanimous  
Arab support was not available. The League however  
did not follow such a course of action when the crisis  
of Palestine was at its highest peak. The relevant ✓  
point is not the adoption of a resolution - however  
firm or strongly worded it may be - but rather how far  
that resolution is implemented.

It was seen that Abdullah had annexed the eastern  
portion of Palestine on December 1, 1948<sup>(1)</sup> but it was ✓  
not until April 13, 1950 that the League came around to  
tackling this question. On that date the Council of  
the League stated that the presence of the Arab armies  
in Palestine was to be considered as temporary pending  
the liberation of Palestine.<sup>(2)</sup> The strong censure of ✓  
Jordanian policy by the League of Arab States in regards  
to the former's annexation of East Palestine and the  
reported bilateral negotiations with Israel were soon  
forgotten. On June 12, 1950, the Council of the League  
was "informed by the Political Committee about the annex-  
ation of East Palestine to the Hashinite Kingdom of  
Jordan and awaited the results of mediation".<sup>(3)</sup> No trace

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(1) The annexation was consecrated by the holding of  
elections on both sides of the Jordan river on April  
24, 1950.

(2) Resolution 320.

(3) Resolution 323 of the Council of the League.

can be found in the documents of the League as to the ✓  
"results of mediation" in this matter. In effect, "a x  
practical but illogical compromise was reached: while  
the government of All-Palestine in Gaza maintained its  
seat in the Council of the League, the annexed section  
of Palestine was entrusted to the administration of  
Jordan."<sup>(1)</sup> This was no more than an acceptance of the  
status quo by the League of Arab States. At this point  
it is necessary to make a few comments about the often-  
heard theory that it was the question of Palestine, and  
the presence of a common enemy, which kept the Arab  
States united and prevented the collapse of the League.  
From what has been said so far, it would appear that  
the opposite would be closer to the truth since it was  
precisely on this question of Palestine, and its related  
problems, that the members of the League diverged most.

Since 1950 the League's major concern was the ✓  
economic and political boycott of Israel.<sup>(2)</sup> From Septem-  
ber 1952 until March 1955, the Council adopted 110  
resolutions about Palestine and 66 of these, or 60%,  
dealt with boycott matters. The greatest number of  
resolutions adopted over Palestine was during the  
Twentieth Session held in January 1954; 35 resolutions  
were then voted on Palestine, 25 of them boycott resolut

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(1) Butros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 413.

(2) See Graph below at the end of this Chapter.

ions. From 1951 onwards, the Arab States could agree on very little else and were not in a position to do much more than adopt boycott resolutions.

In 1950, a resolution forbidding the entry into the Arab States of any one carrying a passport indicating that he had been in Israel, or intending to go<sup>(1)</sup> there, was adopted by the Council of the League. That same year it was decided not to supply ships stopping<sup>(2)</sup> in Arab ports and carrying arms destined to Israel.

In 1951, out of the five resolutions adopted about Palestine, three dealt with boycott matters. On February 2, the Council decided to boycott conferences to<sup>(3)</sup> which Israel had been invited, the same principle was<sup>(4)</sup> elaborated on May 19th. The setting up of a central Arab Boycott Office with national branches throughout<sup>(5)</sup> the member States was also recommended on May 19th.

In 1952, out of the fourteen resolutions dealing with Palestine, nine referred to boycott matters. The Council defined the activities and responsibilities of<sup>(6)</sup> the Boycott offices during its sixteenth session held in September 1952; it also recommended the drafting

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- (1) Resolution 299, April 7, 1950.
  - (2) Resolution 300, April 7, 1950.
  - (3) Resolution 334, February, 1951.
  - (4) Resolution 356, May 19, 1951.
  - (5) Resolution 357, May 19, 1951.
  - (6) Resolutions No. 463 and 467, Sept. 23, 1952.

of a common Boycott legislation to be implemented in all the Arab States.

The most important question in the field of the boycott, during the years 1952 and 1953, was that of the Israel-German negotiations for a reparations agreement. The goal of the League was to obstruct the outcome of these negotiations and to try, at the same time, to obtain compensation for Palestinian Arabs from the reparations which Germany would be paying to Israel. To this end the Council of the League decided to send an Arab delegation to Germany.<sup>(1)</sup> The League continued its effort on these lines until the Germano-Israeli agreement was ratified on March 1953 and even after.<sup>(2)</sup> In 1953, the Boycott offices presented their reports and outlined a co-ordinated boycott policy for the Arab States.<sup>(3)</sup>

The year 1954, the record year for the number of resolutions adopted on the question of Palestine, saw the passing of 39 boycott resolutions out of the 60 dealing with Palestine.<sup>(4)</sup> Most of the boycott resolutions dealt with diplomatic interventions; the boycott

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(1) Resolution No.486, Sept. 23, 1952; see also resolution No.426.

(2) See, for instance, resolution No. 500 adopted on April 4, 1953.

(3) See resolutions Nos. 520, 522, 559, 560, and 567 all adopted on April 4, 1953 and resolution No.578 adopted on May 10th.

(4) See, list below, .pp. 341-49

of specific foreign firms, with branches in Israel; and the organization of the Arab Boycott offices.

The effectiveness of the Arab boycott of Israel can be gathered from the report presented by the Boycott Office, for the year 1954, to the Council of the League.<sup>(1)</sup> It indicated that fifty companies severed their ties with Israel in order to maintain their business with the Arab States.<sup>(2)</sup> The value of the boycott for the Arab League was seen not only in economic terms but much more in terms of its psychological effects. One of the aims of the League is to show that Israel's economy is dependent on foreign assistance, and that it can not be sustained without it, in the midst of an area totally hostile to this "foreign creation". The boycott must also be seen as a justification of the League's existence and as an effort to satisfy the revengeful nature of the Arab masses. Nonetheless it is an implied recognition, on the part of the Arab States, that there is very little else for them to do, for the moment at least, about the Palestinian question. ✓ x

The boycott has been more respected than many of the other decisions of the League. No Arab State was ✓

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(1) See resolutions Nos. 932, 933, 934 and 935 adopted on March 31, 1955.

(2) See Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., p. 419.

willing to infringe it for it would provide the other Arab States with a very fertile ground for their propaganda against the party violating the boycott resolutions. Every once in a while one encounters a reserve about a particular boycott resolution of the Council. These reserves have always been those of Lebanon as in the instance of a threat to boycott the French Airline company of Air France.<sup>(1)</sup>

The work of the Arab League on the question of Arab refugees was very slight except in the problem of educating the refugees' children. It is often said that the League does not want to help in the solving of the problem of Arab refugees because it wants to keep it as a trump card in the field of international relations. There is some truth in this assessment but there are other factors which must be taken into account. The first is that the League feels that the only possible solution of the problem is the return of the refugees to their homeland. The majority of the refugees themselves do not want to think about any other solution and prefer to live in very poor conditions rather than settle definitely anywhere else.<sup>(2)</sup> The League tried, +

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(1) See Resolution No. 766, of April 5, 1954, in which the Lebanese reservations are explicitly expressed.

(2) See F.C. Bruhns, "A Study of Arab Refugee Attitudes" in the Middle East Journal, Spring 1955, p. 132, "Individual resettlement outside Israel...appears to be acceptable as a permanent solution only to a small minority, perhaps 10%."

of course, to make the same humanitarian appeal to international public opinion on this matter as international Zionism had done about the fate of Jewish refugees at the end of the Second World War. It must not be forgotten nonetheless that the League was not, and is not, in a position to dictate a solution to the Arab refugees. To this must be added the problem of inter-Arab relations and the competition of the various sections of the Arab world for the loyalty of the close to one million refugees. This competition has led to a re-enforcement of the refugees' determination to return to Palestine.

In 1951, the Council of the League outlined the principles which were to guide the League's stand on the problem of Arab refugees in the following terms:

"the United Nations was responsible for the return of the refugees and the payment of compensation to those unwilling to return; the obligation of financing these projects should not devolve upon the Arab countries...each country should have full control over projects carried out in its territory, including supervision, guidance and execution."(1)

It can be seen, from the above resolution, that the Arab States ruled out the possibility of a joint Arab supervision of the refugees. This attitude, which was the result of the continuation of the inter-Arab quarrel about Jordanian annexation of East Palestine and the

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(1) See Resolution No. 389, Oct. 10, 1951.

Egyptian sponsored All-Palestine Government, plus the fact that the League did not have the adequate finances nor the necessary administration to supervise a refugees programme, made it almost impossible for the League to undertake any positive or constructive work in the settling of Palestine refugees. After this assertion it is necessary to repeat that the attitude of the Arab refugees themselves was not prone to facilitate such an enterprise independently of the League's willingness or unwillingness to co-operate with the United Nations projects.

The striking feature of the League's activities from 1949 onwards about Palestine is that one does not encounter any sign of a desire to co-ordinate Arab policy in the United Nations. In 1950, the Council passed a resolution (1) called "The Arab stand on Palestine", in which it asserted that Arab policy on Palestine would be dictated by the principles adopted by the Political Committee of the League on April 12, 1948. On the whole, this resolution dealt with inter-Arab policy more than it did with the international situation. It is not until three years later that one comes across a resolution dealing with the general problem of Palestine. On May 9, 1953, the Council adopted a resolution (2) which was entitled, "The problem of Palestine

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(1) Resolution 320.  
(2) Resolution 571.

and the international situation". It merely stated that the Arab States were very keen on contributing to the consolidation of international peace and security, that one of the main threats to this peace and security was the existence of problems - such as that of Palestine - which remained to be solved with due consideration to the principles of international justice. This resolution, therefore, can not be thought of as a co-ordination of Arab policy since it is no more than a declaration of principles. Resolution No. 573, adopted on May 9, 1953, and entitled "The Palestinian Question" is, also, a declaration of principles and an expression of the desire of the Arab States to do their utmost in order to alleviate the suffering of Arab refugees. But again one does not find the slightest reference to the need for the co-ordination of Arab policy, on this matter, in the arena of international relations. The last resolution dealing with the general situation in Palestine, to be passed during the first ten years of the League, was the one adopted on March 31, 1955. It was entitled: "The General situation in Palestine" and read as follows: "The Council decides to agree on the following resolution of the Political Committee: 'The Committee has studied the general situation in Palestine in the light of the memorandum

presented to it by the Secretariat-General of the League." (1)

Aside from the resolutions cited above one does not find any indication of an attempt of the League of Arab States to study the Palestine problem comprehensively, nor a sign of an effort to co-ordinate Arab policy before the debates of the United Nations on the Palestinian problem. Any observer of the Arab-Israel situation would agree that, since the establishment of Israel, the dominating question has been that of controversies arising from the violations of the armistice agreement and the debates in the United Nations over these violations. A look at the collection of the resolutions adopted by the Council of the League would show that only twice, from 1949 to 1955, did the League pass a resolution on this subject. These two instances were on May 19, 1951, when the Council adopted resolution No. 353 entitled "Israeli aggression on neighbouring Arab Countries and Syria"; and again on April 6, 1954, when it adopted resolution No. 780 entitled, "Israel's violations of the Armistice". The conclusion which one can deduce from this situation is that the League did not expect any satisfactory solution to arise from the debates in the United Nations; that the Arab States themselves did not think that the League

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(1) Resolution 913.

could serve as an arena for the co-ordination of Arab policy on this subject because a discussion of this problem was always likely to bring up old disputes. In this regard, the following conclusion of Lenczowski is not very far from the truth:

"So long as the League was not expected to do more than pass resolutions and make diplomatic representations the problem of Palestine elicited nothing but solidarity. But as soon as the League was called upon to act, Palestine proved a stumbling block, which almost destroyed the League."

A true estimate of the League's work on the question of Palestine can be best assessed from a publication of the Arab League itself. In a pamphlet of 31 pages entitled The Arab League, and published in New York by the Arab Information Centre in 1955, one finds exactly one line and one half about the League and the Palestine question: "The League's efforts to achieve an equitable solution of the Palestine problem are well known." (2)

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(1) Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, op. cit., p. 405;

(2) p.17.

----- TOTAL NUMBER OF RESOLUTIONS OVER PALESTINE  
----- NUMBER OF BOYCOTT RESOLUTIONS (ECONOMIC & POLITICAL)

Session	Resolutions adopted by Council (Solid line)	Resolutions adopted by Council + League (Dashed line)
1	0	0
2	1	12
3	1	4
4	1	16
5	0	11
6	1	11
7	1	8
8	1	1
9	0	0
10	0	4
11	0	1
12	2	12
13	1	1
14	1	4
15	0	4
16	8	15
17	0	0
18	9	18
19	0	1
20	25	35
21	5	12
22	7	15
23	10	17

-- Sessions of the Council of the League --

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OVER PALESTINE

1 9 4 5:

No. of Res.	Session	Date	Topic of Resolution
8	2	Nov. 8	Palestinian political refugees and prisoners.
9	2	Nov. 8	Saving Palestinian Land.
1 0	2	Nov. 8	Arab propaganda offices in London and Washington.
1 1	2	Nov.10	Jewish immigration.
1 3	2	Nov.12	Unification of Arab political parties in Palestine.
1 5	2	Nov.29	Bevin's declarations.
1 6	2	Dec. 2	Boycott of Zionist goods
1 7	2	Dec. 4	Palestinian representation in the Council of the League.
1 8	2	Dec.14	Saving Palestinian land.
1 9	2	Dec.14	Arab Offices.
2 0	2	Dec.14	Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on Palestine.
2 1	2	Dec.14	Palestinian political refugees and prisoners.

1 9 4 6:

2 6	3	Mar.28	Palestinian representation in Council of the League.
2 8	3	Mar.28	Saving Palestinian land.
2 7	3	Mar.30	Boycott of Zionist Goods.
5 0	3	Apr.10	Office to save Palestinian land.
6 0	4	Jun.11	Negotiations with Great Britain.
6 5	4	Jun.12	Palestinian Higher Commission.
6 6	4	Jun.12	Palestine Committee.

1 9 4 6 (cont.)

6 7	4	Jun.12	Aid. for Palestine - issuing of stamps etc...
6 8	4	Jun.12	Fund for Palestinian Arabs.
6 9	4	Jun.12	Functions of Palestine Higher Committee.
7 0	4	Jun.12	Boycott of Zionist Goods.
7 1	4	Jun.12	Palestinian Arabs Assistance Committee.
7 2	4	Jun.12	Committee for the defense of Palestine.
7 3	4	Jun.12	Combatting Zionist arming.
7 4	4	Jun.12	Sale of land to Zionists to be considered a criminal act.
7 5	4	Jun.12	Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on Palestine.
7 7	4	Jun.12	U.S. stand on Zionism.
7 8	4	Jun.12	Decisions of Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry.
8 2	4	Jun.12	Negotiations with Great Britain.
9 3	5	Nov.23	Arab Real Estate Company.
9 5	5	Nov.28	Jewish immigration.
1 0 0	5	Dec. 2	U.S. intervention in Jewish immigration.
1 2 6	5	Dec.10	Participation of the Arab Higher Committee in the London Conference.
1 2 7	5	Dec.10	London Conference.
1 2 9	5	Dec.11	Sale of Arab lands to Jews.

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\*\*\* : Resolutions No.60 to No.82 were all adopted during the extraordinary session of the Council held in Bludan on June 11 and 12, 1946.

1 9 4 6 (cont.)

1 3 0	5	Dec.11	Financing Arab Higher Exec.
1 3 1	5	Dec.11	Mufti's entry to Palestine.
1 4 0	5	Dec.12	Jewish terrorism.
1 4 1	5	Dec.12	Association for saving of Palestinian land.
1 4 2	5	Dec.12	Rejection of partition plan.

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1 9 4 7:

1 4 4	6	Mar.17	Palestinian representatives in Council.
1 4 5	6	Mar.17	Palestinian representatives in Council.
1 4 9	6	Mar.24	Negotiations with Great Britain.
1 5 0	6	Mar.24	Palestinian independence.
1 5 1	6	Mar.24	British and U.S. responsibil- ities.
1 5 2	6	Mar.24	Boycott of Zionist goods.
1 5 3	6	Mar.24	Study of Palestine Question.
1 5 6	6	Mar.24	Jewish immigration.
1 6 7	6	Mar.27	Palestine & United Nations.
1 7 6	6	Mar.29	Syrian contribution.
1 7 9	6	Mar.29	Palestine & United Nations.
1 8 1	7	Oct. 9	Defending Palestine.
1 9 0	7	Oct.15	Boycott of Zionist goods.

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1 9 4 8:

1 9 4	7	Feb.12	Palest. repres. in Council
1 9 6	7	Feb.17	Defending Palestine.
2 0 5	7	Feb.22	Palestinian Refugees.
2 0 8	7	Feb.22	Syrian proposition for fund raising (taxes)
2 0 9	7	Feb.22	Contributions for Palestine.
2 1 5	7	Feb.22	Control of News on Palestine.
2 1 8	8	Nov. 3	Protest to U.N. against Jew- ish atrocities.

1 9 4 9:

2 3 1	1 0	Mar.17	Palestinian Refugees.
2 3 4	1 0	Mar.19	Conciliation Commission.
2 4 2	1 0	Mar.21	Arab volunteers for Palestine.
2 4 3	1 0	Mar.21	Aid to Palestine students.
2 5 6	1 1	Oct.30	Creation of Palestine Comm.

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1 9 5 0:

2 8 0	1 2	Mar.27	Palest. repres. in Council.
2 9 2	1 2	Apr. 1	Truce with Israel - no unilateral peace.
2 9 9	1 2	Apr. 7	Passports with Israeli visas.
3 0 0	1 2	Apr. 7	No supplies for ships with arms for Israel.
3 0 1	1 2	Apr. 7	Jerusalem.
3 0 2	1 2	Apr. 7	Jerusalem.
3 0 3	1 2	Apr. 7	Jerusalem.
3 0 4	1 2	Apr. 7	Jerusalem.
3 0 5	1 2	Apr. 7	Palestinian civil servants.
3 1 4	1 2	Apr.13	No unilateral peace with Israel.
3 2 0	1 2	Apr.13	Arab stand on Palestine.
3 2 1	1 2	Apr.13	Palest. repres. in Political Committee of the League.

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1 9 5 1:

3 3 4	1 3	Feb. 2	Boycott of Conferences.
3 5 2	1 4	May.18	Arab interests in Israel.
3 5 6	1 4	May.18	Conferences with Israeli participation.
3 5 3	1 4	May.19	Israeli aggression on neighbouring Arab countries and Syria.
3 5 7	1 4	May.19	Creation of Boycott offices.

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1 9 5 2:

4 2 2	1 6	Sep.14	Israel and WHO regional Office.
4 2 4	1 6	Sep.14	Passports for refugees.
4 2 6	1 6	Sep.14	German reparations to Israel.
4 2 7	1 6	Sep.14	Israeli Government transfer to Jerusalem.
4 6 2	1 6	Sep.23	Refugees.
4 6 3	1 6	Sep.23	Boycott of Conferences.
4 6 7	1 6	Sep.23	Boycott of Israel.
4 6 8	1 6	Sep.23	Boycott of Israel.
4 7 1	1 6	Sep.23	Financial questions of refugees.
4 7 2	1 6	Sep.23	All Palestine Government.
4 7 4	1 6	Sep.23	£3,000 for Palestine administration of Secretariat (ref. No. 468).
4 8 2	1 6	Sep.23	Boycott of Israel.
4 8 6	1 6	Sep.23	Sending of Arab delegation to Germany.
4 9 3	1 6	Sep.23	Aid to Palestinian students.

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1 9 5 3:

5 0 0	1 8	Apr. 4	German reparations to Israel.
5 1 4	1 8	Apr. 4	Financial questions of refugees.
5 2 0	1 8	Apr. 4	Report of Boycott offices.
5 2 2	1 8	Apr. 4	Report of Boycott offices.
5 2 4	1 8	Apr. 4	Passports for refugees.
5 2 5	1 8	Apr. 4	Arab property in Israel.
5 2 6	1 8	Apr. 4	Education of Arab refugees (aid).
5 2 9	1 8	Apr. 4	£15,000 for Boycott Offices.
5 3 7	1 8	Apr. 4	Budget of All Palestine Government.
5 5 9	1 8	Apr. 4	Activities of Boycott Office.

1 9 5 3 (cont.)

5 6 0	1 8	Apr. 4	Recommendations of Boycott Conference.
5 6 2	1 8	Apr. 4	Economic relations between Ethiopia and Israel.
5 6 7	1 8	Apr. 4	Boycott of Israel.
5 7 1	1 8	May 9	International situation and the problem of Palestine.
5 7 3	1 8	May 9	The Palestine question.
5 7 6	1 8	May 10	Arab property in Israel.
5 7 8	1 8	May 10	Organization of Boycott Office.

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1 9 5 4:

6 0 1	2 0	Jan. 1	Passage of oil to Israel.
6 7 1	2 0	Jan.27	Diplomatic relations between Burma and Israel.
6 7 2	2 0	Jan.27	Diplomatic relations between India and Israel.
6 7 7	2 0	Jan.27	Boycott of Israel.
6 7 8	2 0	Jan.27	Israelo-Austrian negotiations.
6 7 9	2 0	Jan.27	Israel and German firms.
6 8 0	2 0	Jan.27	Boycott of sport meetings with Israeli participation.
6 8 1	2 0	Jan.27	Economic boycott of Israel.
6 8 2	2 0	Jan.27	Economic boycott of Israel.
6 8 3	2 0	Jan.27	Economic boycott of Israel.
6 8 4	2 0	Jan.27	Boycott of foreign firms taking part in industrialisation of Israel.
6 9 0	2 0	Jan.27	Foreign Jewish-owned film industries.
6 9 1	2 0	Jan.27	Shipping companies making stops in Israeli ports.
6 9 2	2 0	Jan.27	Warning to foreign firms which violate boycott regulations.
6 9 3	2 0	Jan.27	Commercial agreement with Turkey so as to stop trade relations between Turkey and Israel.

1 9 5 4 (cont.)

6 9 4	2 0	Jan.27	Bata Company.
6 9 5	2 0	Jan.27	Economic Boycott (new measures).
6 9 6	2 0	Jan.27	Uniform laws against violations of boycott.
6 9 8	2 0	Jan.27	I.C.I and boycott of Israel.
7 0 0	2 0	Jan.27	Banks with branches in Israel.
7 0 1	2 0	Jan.27	Encouraging foreign firms which decide to transfer their industries from Israel.
7 0 3	2 0	Jan.27	Ships on Black List.
7 0 5	2 0	Jan.27	Palestine Committee abolished an advisory body created.
7 0 6	2 0	Jan.27	Aid to Palestine refugees.
7 0 8	2 0	Jan.27	U.S. and Palestine refugees.
7 1 2	2 0	Jan.27	Passports with Israeli visas.
7 1 3	2 0	Jan.27	Israel's membership in WHO.
7 1 4	2 0	Jan.27	Free passports & visas for refugees.
7 1 5	2 0	Jan.27	Uniform passports for refugees.
7 1 6	2 0	Jan.27	Finances for All-Palestine Government.
7 1 7	2 0	Jan.27	Israel's mistreatment of Arabs on her territory.
7 2 1	2 0	Jan.27	Abolishment of the Higher Council for aid to Palestine refugees (conflict with Egypt).
7 3 0	2 0	Jan.27	Budget for All-Palestine Govt.
7 4 9	2 0	Mar.11	Proposal to entrust the military secretariat with boycott matters.
7 5 7	2 1	Apr. 5	American financial aid to Israel.
7 5 8	2 1	Apr. 5	Israelo-German reparations agreement.
7 5 9	2 1	Apr. 5	Organizing & financing the refugees educational project.
7 6 0	2 1	Apr. 5	U.S. Congress & Arab refugees.
7 6 3	2 1	Apr. 5	Israel's membership in WHO.

7 6 5	2 1	Apr. 5	Economic Boycott of Israel.
7 6 6	2 1	Apr. 5	Economic Boycott & Air France.
7 8 0	2 1	Apr. 6	Israel's violations of armistice.
8 0 0	2 1	Apr.30	Proposal that each member State arm 5,000 Palestinian Arabs.
8 2 0	2 2	Nov.29	Opposing transfer of UNRW to Arab countries.
8 2 4	2 2	Nov.29	Question of refugees settlement in Libya deferred on request of the latter.
8 2 6	2 2	Nov.29	Israel's demand for a German loan.
8 3 2	2 2	Dec.11	Israel's intention to alter the course of Jordan (river).
8 3 4	2 2	Dec.11	Members' stand on international conferences where Israel is represented.
8 3 5	2 2	Dec.11	Israel's efforts to obtain uranium.
8 3 6	2 2	Dec.11	(same as No.826).
8 3 7	2 2	Dec.11	Suggestion to open a boycott office in London.
8 3 9	2 2	Dec.11	Treatment of Arabs in Israel.
8 4 9	2 2	Dec.11	Uniform Arab law for Economic boycott.
8 5 0	2 2	Dec.11	Boycott matters.
8 6 2	2 2	Dec.11	Project for refugees' education.
8 7 6	2 2	Dec.11	Aid to Palestinian students in Egyptian universities.
8 9 9	2 2	Dec.11	Budget of the All-Palestine Government (£3,528).

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1 9 5 5:

9 1 3	2 3	Mar.31	General situation in Palestine.
9 1 4	2 3	Mar.31	Granting of nationality to refugees.
9 1 5	2 3	Mar.31	Jordan river waters.
9 1 6	2 3	Mar.31	Treatment of Arabs in Israel.
9 3 2	2 3	Mar.31	Report of Boycott Office (1953-54).

1 9 5 5 (cont.)

9 3 3	2 3	Mar.31	Economic Boycott of Israel.
9 3 4	2 3	Mar.31	Economic Boycott of Israel.
9 3 5	2 3	Mar.31	Economic Boycott of Israel.
9 3 6	2 3	Mar.31	Israeli investments in Turkey.
9 3 7	2 3	Mar.31	Arab trade with Cyprus.
9 3 8	2 3	Mar.31	Close down of Boycott Office branch in Lebanon.
9 3 9	2 3	Mar.31	Arab oil and Israel.
9 4 0	2 3	Mar.31	Boycott matters.
9 4 2	2 3	Mar.31	Report on Boycott activities.
9 8 4	2 3	Mar.31	Financial matters (Palestine).

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CHAPTER 12 : THE LEAGUE AND THE "MAGHREB" \*

The efforts of the League of Arab States to assist the Maghrebi, or North African, nationalist movements of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, in their quest for independence, must be appreciated from two angles. The first one being the pan-Arab movement and the place of the Maghreb within it, while the second is that of the functioning of the League as an Arab institution, defending Arab rights and attempting to fulfil Arab aspirations.

The fact that the Maghreb is thought of today as a part of the "Arab Nation" is due to Islam. The Islamic conquest of North Africa has forged strong links between this area and the rest of the Islamic world. This is stressed in order to provide another illustration of the intertwinement of the pan-Arab and pan-Islamic ideals. The case of the Maghreb is noteworthy because this region can serve as an excellent example of the process through which a set of countries began to think of themselves and be considered as Arab. In other words, the tracing of how this came about can help us to understand one instance of the evolution of the concept "Arab" while appreciating

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\* In Arabic "Maghreb" means west and is used when referring to North Africa - i.e., the western portion of a whole - the Islamic world; now one hears much more the expression "Al-Maghreb Al Arabi" meaning the Arab West.

the place of North Africa in the pan-Arab movement.

The first task is to determine the point at which the Maghreb began to be considered as a part of the "Arab Nation". This happened only very recently, and prior to it North Africa was merely the western portion of the Islamic world. The Maghreb has known Islam through the Arabs, and the Arabs through Islam. The first principle to be expounded in the Charter of the Arab Maghreb Bureau, created in Cairo in 1947, was that, "The Arab Maghreb was created by Islam, has lived for Islam, and will guide itself by Islam in the future." (1) The culture of North Africa is Arab in the sense that it is written in the Arabic language, but this region did not take part in the literary revival which appeared in the Eastern portion of the Arab world in the latter half of the 19th Century until a few decades later, and only in an indirect manner via Egypt. As a matter of fact, it was about the time of the Syrian revival that North Africa began to fall under Western control: Algeria in 1830, Tunisia in 1881, and Morocco in 1912.

It was shown, in the early part of this study, how

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(1) The text of this Charter can be found in, Allal El Fassi, al-harakat al-istiqlaliya fil maghreb al-al-Arabi, pp 409-10, (in Arabic), Cairo, (1948) - (The Independence Movements of the Arab Maghreb).

the Arab world experienced two simultaneous revivals - complementary at times and contradictory at others - one literary and the other religious. It is the impact of the latter which influenced the rising Maghrebi nationalist movements and which led North Africa to consider itself, more and more, as an integral part of the "Arab Nation".

The activities of the Salafi movement, under the aegis of Sheikh Mohamed Abduh and his disciple Rashid Rida, met with great success in the Maghreb and could be said to have been the most important contribution to the infant Maghrebi nationalist movements. <sup>(1)</sup> The Maghreb, like Egypt, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, was not interested in the activities of the pan-Arab movement which pervaded the Arab countries formerly under Ottoman rule. The North African military resistance to Western colonialism during that period, and the campaigns of Abd el Krim against France and Spain in Morocco, must <sup>(2)</sup> be seen as a part of the Islamic movement and not as an indication of an Arab nationalism - at that time such

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(1) See, Allal el Fassi, op. cit., pp. 153-159.

(2) See A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs (1925), The Islamic World, op. cit., pp. 105-163.

a distinction could be safely made.

The three most influential personalities in the early history of Maghrebi nationalism were: Sheikh Abdelaziz Taalbi in Tunisia; Sheikh Abdelhamid ben Badis in Algeria; and Sheikh Bouchaib el-Doukkali in Morocco. They all had one thing in common, namely their distinction as leading 'ulemas (Moslem jurists). The first one organized the first Tunisian political organisation - the Destour Party which in 1934 broke up into the "Old" and the "Neo" Destour parties. Sheikh Taalbi was "l'homme qui compte sur les seules forces de l'Islam (1) pour regenerer son pays et le mener vers l'indépendance".

In Algeria, Sheikh Abdelhamid ben Badis organized the first association dedicated to the combatting of French colonialism and the purification of Islam. This organization named the Association of Moslem jurists (2) (Jam'iyat al-'Ulama al-muslineen) was founded in 1927 and was greatly inspired from the works of Mohamed Abdouh:

"Ce furent les Oulemas qui tirèrent l'opinion indigène de sa léthargie... ils possédaient, eux, une doctrine religieuse qui pouvait

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(1) Charles-Andre Julien, L'Afrique du Nord en Marche, p. 112, Paris, (1952).

(2) See Allal el Fassi, op. cit., p. 16 for the role of Ben Badis in the spread of Moslem and Arab consciousness in North Africa.

servir de base à des aspirations nationales... le titre d'oulemas reformistes leur convient mieux car ils s'inspirent surtout de l'enseignement du Cheikh Abdo et de son disciple Rachid Rida." (1)

Ben Badis had also started the publication of a review, El-Bassair, for the new organization. This review had a very strong influence on the other North African nationalist movements specially that of Morocco. It is interesting to point out that El-Bassair had chosen as its motto: "Spokesman of Arabism and Islam". This is probably the earliest reference which one can find to "arabism" in Maghrebi literature, and it can be seen that "arabism" was associated with Islam from the very first moment. Ben Badis dedicated himself to the combatting of the excessive ritualism of the religious brotherhoods. Aside from the religious aspect these brotherhoods were playing an important role politically because they were being used by the French authorities to further colonial aims. On this last point, El-Bassair of September 3, 1937 wrote:

"The brotherhoods are the domestic animals of colonialism, they are the hand which executes its calamitous acts, and the bridge which clears its way. They have never ceased to contradict God by showing their pride towards the people and by their servility towards the colonialists and the despotic Administrative chiefs."

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(1) Ch. A. Julien, op. cit., p. 111.

Sheikh Bouchaib el-Doukkali, who had widely travelled in the Orient and was very much respected for his vast Islamic culture and erudition, was the counter-part of Ben Badis in Morocco:

"Sous l'impulsion du vizir cheikh Bouchaib Doukkali, qui multiplia pendant des années les tournées de conférences à travers le Maroc, le mouvement Salafi devint essentiellement une réaction contre l'encadrement des musulmans au sein des confréries. L'éloquence de Doukkali, qui savait se mettre à la portée des esprits les plus divers, eut une grande influence sur toute la population marocaine et les confréries, de 1924 à 1930, enregistrèrent un recul important, sinon durable." (1)

Allal el Fassi, later leader of the Istiqlal Party, became famous mostly through a series of lectures which he delivered at the Qaraouine University in Fez about the unorthodoxy of religious brotherhoods.

The organized Maghrebi nationalist movements have, as it has been shown, all begun as a defense of Islam against local perversions and foreign intrusions. Even after a western-educated elite was formed the latter found it beneficial, and necessary, to collaborate with the "old turbans" and, at times, to outdo them in the defense of Islam. This is a typical feature of Maghrebi nationalism. In 1919, after the French administration's attempt to dispose of the 'Habous' (land under the control of the

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(1) R. Rezette, Les Partis Politiques Marocains, p. 63, Paris (1955).

religious bodies), there appeared, in Tunisia, a collaboration between the "old turbans" and the "young Tunisians":

"This collaboration between the Old Turbans and the Young Tunisians is the first example of the eclectic dualism - Western modernism and traditional Islam - that characterize Tunisian nationalism to this day." (1)

A similar process was witnessed in Morocco after the famous "Berber Dahir", of May 16, 1930, decreed by the French administration in order to withdraw the Berber populations from the jurisdiction of the Moslem Shari'a:

"L'affaire du Dahir Berbère ne marqua pas seulement la prise de conscience du nationalisme marocain, il intégra le Maroc musulman à l'Islam oecuménique, en faisant participer tous les fidèles aux épreuves de leurs frères maghrébins. L'affaire savamment orchestrée par Chekib Arslan prit une ampleur orientale." (2)

It was at this juncture that the impact of the Arab nationalist movement of the Middle East began to be felt in North Africa through the work of Shekib Arslan who had a strong influence on the orientation of the Maghrebi nationalist movements. (3)

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- (1) Benjamin Rivlin, "The Tunisian Nationalist Movement", in the Middle East Journal, Winter 1952.
  - (2) Ch. A. Julien, op. cit., p. 148.
  - (3) The eclectic dualism of Tunisian nationalism was also seen in the case of Morocco, after the Berber Dahir, and was made more apparent through the contribution of Shekib Arslan, "...les jeunes Marocains, inspirés par Chekib Arslan, engagèrent une campagne contre une mesure qui soustrayait des croyants à la justice de Dieu. Aussi parurent-ils comme des champions de l'Islam, même aux yeux des anciens à qui leur culture occidentale les avait rendus suspects." Ibid., p. 146. On Shekib Arslan, see Rezette, op. cit., pp. 62-74.

From 1930, and after the contact with Arslan, the Maghrebi nationalists came into closer and closer touch with the rest of the Arab world. The Jerusalem Congress of 1931, and the pan-Arab Conference which took place on that occasion, allowed the representatives of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria to take part in the Islamic movement as well as to begin their integration into the pan-Arab movement. The latter two movements started to appear as one and the same thing to the North Africans:

"Ces deux mouvements (Arab and Islamic) seront fondus en 1930 au sein d'un seul mouvement panarabe relié plus étroitement à Chekib Arslan." (1)

The Maghrebi delegates swore, in 1931, to the "Arab Pact" elaborated in Jerusalem. <sup>(2)</sup> The point which has to be made crystal clear is that, at this juncture, the Maghrebis did not distinguish between pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism and saw no essential contradiction between their attending a pan-Islamic Congress and swearing to an Arab Pact. This is easy to explain, in the case of North Africa, because it is a part of the Arab Moslem world where the problem of minorities did not play the same role as in Syria and Lebanon where there were Christians with Arab loyalties, or in Egypt where the Copts were considered as Egyptians. In North Africa,

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(1) R. Rezette, op. cit., p. 66.

(2) See Oriente Moderno XVII (1932), pp. 24-43; and above, pp. 123-4.

with the exception of the Jewish populations, the minorities were classified as foreigners.

The question of Palestine and the Holy Islamic places accentuated the 'rapprochement' between the Maghreb and the pan-Arab movement. As early as 1929, Ahmed Balafrej<sup>(1)</sup> undertook the initiative of collecting funds for the Palestinian cause. The first Moroccan political party, the Hizb al-Wattani (The Nationalist Party) founded in 1937, had a committee known as "The Committee for the Defence of Palestine and the Holy Places."<sup>(2)</sup> An identical interest in the Palestine problem was witnessed in Algeria and Tunisia.

The determination of the nationalist movements in North Africa to defend the Arabic language,<sup>(3)</sup> combat French cultural assimilation; and the sending of Maghrebi students to Egyptian and other Arab universities cleared the way for

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(1) See R. Rezette, op. cit., p. 144; Balafrej is presently Secretary of the Istiqlal Party and the first Minister of Foreign Affairs after Moroccan independence.

(2) See Allal el Fassi, op. cit., p. 240 for the activities of this committee.

(3) On May 22, 1933, the pan-Maghrebi association, "The Star of North Africa", demanded that education in Arabic be made compulsory throughout the Maghreb; see *ibid.*, p. 15; The Algerian Moslem Congress of June 7, 1937 demanded that Arabic be recognized as the national language of Algeria - *ibid.*, p. 21.

an active participation of the Maghreb in the Pan-Arab movement. This was even more enhanced by the immigration<sup>(1)</sup> of North African nationalists to the Arab world. In 1937, five students from the French Zone of Morocco went to Cairo to finish their studies.<sup>(2)</sup> The next year, the Khalifa of the Sultan in the Spanish Zone, Moulay El Hassan Ben el Mehdi sent an official cultural mission of 40 students to Cairo and made arrangements for the opening of a "Moroccan House" in Egypt.<sup>(3)</sup>

A source - as well as an effect - of the spread of pan-Arabism in North Africa was the development of a pan-Maghrebi movement aiming at the independence and unity of the area. Shekib Arslan did much to encourage this trend. In 1926, the Algerian Messali Hadj founded the association known as "The North African Star"; in 1927, in Paris, the North African students organised the "Association des Etudiants Musulmans d'Afrique du Nord" and, in 1936, the Tunisian Mohamed el-Aid Djebari formed an organisation known as

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(1) The first of these leaders to escape from the French authorities and go to the Middle East was the Tunisian nationalist Taalbi - see Ch. A. Julien, op. cit., p. 75.

(2) These students played an important role, later on, in the Maghrebi activities in Cairo. See, below, p. 363.

(3) Moulay Hassan Ben El Mehdi, after the independence of Morocco, became the first Moroccan Ambassador to the United Kingdom; for details about the cultural mission which he sent in 1938 see Al-Wahdah al-Maghribiyyah (Tetouan), 9-9-1938 and Oriente Moderno, XVII (1938), p. 547; see, also, the Dahir (decree) of the Khalifa on July 29, 1938.

"The United North African Youth." The pan-Maghrebi and pan-Arab ideals complemented each other and in 1937 a Moroccan newspaper, El-Horria (Liberty), stated that its purpose was to be: "...le messenger du Maroc auprès de l'Orient, raffermissant les liens qui l'attachent à ses frères, les pays arabes, et il prendra part à la solution de la question de l'islam universel."<sup>(1)</sup>

A brief summary of the common characteristics of the Maghrebi nationalist movements would entail the recognition of four features: (a) all of these movements started as a result of an Islamic salafi movement; (b) their success<sup>(2)</sup> depended on an Islamic approach in their activities; (c) they have all been influenced by the impact of the pan-Arab movement and the ideals of the "Arab Nation" but were unlikely to understand the latter in an Islamic framework; (d) all of them were inspired by pan-Maghrebi ideals.

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(1) El Horria (Tetouan), March 14, 1937 - quoted in Rezette op. cit., p. 118.

(2) Adhesion to the first Moroccan political party had to be preceded by the following oath: "Je jure par Dieu devant son Livre saint et je m'engage sur mon honneur à agir avec sincérité pour ma religion, ma patrie et le C.A.M. (Comité d'Action Marocaine). J'en prends Dieu à témoin." The oath for membership in the Istiqlal Party is very much the same, see Rezette, op. cit., p. 277 and p. 305.

It was shown earlier how France combated the pan-Arab movement in the Levant and how one of the main reasons for this attitude was the threat of pan-Arabism to French interests in North Africa.<sup>(1)</sup> The Maghrebi nationalists were well aware of the anti-pan-Arab French policy but this only made them more enthusiastic about the pan-Arab ideals:

"L'arabisme lorsqu'il est combattue, en Afrique du Nord, possède, aux yeux des musulmans réformistes, un attrait de plus."<sup>(2)</sup>

The independence of Iraq and Egypt in the 1930's had an important effect on Maghrebi nationalism. It provided them with a political asylum and opened a new field for their propaganda hoping thereby to obtain a solid support from these newly-independent Arab States. It is indicative, in this context, to mention that the first formulated demands of the Moroccan nationalist movement, in 1934, were written in Arabic and printed in Cairo first.<sup>(3)</sup>

The pro-Arab propaganda, of the Allies and Axis alike, during the Second World War and the increased nationalist

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(1) See, above pp. 113-16

(2) R. Montagne, "L'Union Arabe" in *Politique Etrangere*, April - May, 1946, p. 212.

(3) R. Rezette, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

consciousness in the Maghreb led the North Africans to become passionately pan-Arab. And when the negotiations for the creation of the League of Arab States came about, the Maghrebi nationalists in Cairo did their utmost to be heard and taken into account. Professor Montagne put it in these terms:

"Que nous le voulions ou non, l'arabisme progresse au sein même des Etats que nous organisons ou controlons en Afrique du Nord, parce que les peuples musulmans de ces pays sentent en eux l'attrait de l'Orient moderne." (1)

The opening of the preliminary negotiations of Nahas Pasha about Arab unity, in 1943, prompted the formation of the first Maghrebi political organisation in Cairo: "The Union for the Defence of Morocco" <sup>(2)</sup> whose cardinal aim was to obtain the admission of Morocco into the prospective Arab union. The Arab negotiators for Arab unity did not pay any attention to the possibility of including North Africa in the Arab League which they were about to form. The first principle upon which these countries agreed was that the League was to be an association of independent States. The

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(1) R. Montagne, op. cit., p. 212.

(2) Organised by a few Moroccan graduates from Egyptian universities, (Abdelmajid Benjelloun, Abdelkrim Ghallab, Abdelkrim Ben Tabet, Mohamed Ben Abboud, Larbi Bennani, Bel Mlih) - see, Allal el Fassi, op. cit., p. 269.

North Africans, at that time, were not well organised, and, although they managed to get a few articles written in the Egyptian press <sup>(1)</sup> about the rights of the Maghreb to participate in the pan-Arab negotiations, and succeeded in having the question raised before the Egyptian Senate on February 29, 1944, <sup>(2)</sup> their efforts were in vain.

The Maghrebis were doing their best to be heard and some of the North African political parties were already basing all of their future policy on pan-Arabism. The Istiqlal Party of Morocco, founded in November, 1944, for

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(1) See The Egyptian Gazette, October 27, 1943; Akheer Sa'a, October 29, 1943; See, also, The New York Herald Tribune and The Christian Science Monitor of November 6, 1943.

(2) The question put to Nahas was about what was being done in order to allow the North Africans to participate in the talks about Arab unity and to defend the rights and aspirations of the Maghreb. Nahas answered that the intentions of the Arab Union was to include all of the Arabs "in the fruits of the Arab Union Movement" but that so far only independent States were invited to the negotiations with no invitations being sent to North African leaders. Nahas concluded by saying, "Nevertheless, that is not to say that we are neglecting to work for our Arab brothers in the Maghreb. In the interest of the area itself we demand that it be left to the Government to take the measures it judges necessary." The Times, March 2, 1944.

instance, wrote in its platform that:

"The relations of Morocco should be more closely in line with those of the Arab countries, with which we have historical, cultural and racial ties which can not be numbered. These relations should lead to membership in the Union which unites all of the Arab countries into the Great family of Arabism..." (1)

What happened is that, aside from the pan-Arab tendencies of the Maghreb, the North Africans were putting much hope on the future Arab Union because they felt that it would be one way of solving their problems with France. They needed encouragement and support on the international arena and were impressed by the manner through which Syria and Lebanon obtained their independence against the will of France. When it began to appear that they were being neglected there was great disappointment throughout the Maghreb:

"The Arab press in Tangier... protested that in all the published accounts of recent talks on Arab unity no mention has been made of Morocco. It was pointed out that there were a great many Arabs in Morocco who did not wish to be left out of any scheme for Arab unity." (2)

This protest was a result of the publication of the

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(1) Quoted in Allal el Fassi, op. cit., p. 296.

(2) International News Bulletin, R.I.I.A., September, 1944, p. 802.

Alexandria Protocol which made no reference to North Africa although it had annexes about Syria, Lebanon and Palestine and which stated that the Arab League in view would be an association of independent States.

In November, 1944, the Maghrebis in Cairo organised "The Front for the Defence of North Africa" with the expressed purpose of impressing upon the Arab countries the necessity of including the Maghreb in the League of Arab States. This group sent a number of petitions to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking for the support of Egypt in the talks about Arab union and for her backing of the North African aspirations for independence. (1) A contact was also established with the Political Sub-Committee, created to draft the Charter of the League, and which received, on February 22, 1945, letters from: The Ulema of Al-Azhar about the Algerian question; the Supreme Committee for the Defence of Algeria; the Union for the Defence of Morocco; the Union for the Defence of Tunisia; and the Front for the Defence of North Africa. (2)

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(1) See Al-Ahram, Cairo, February 2, 1945.

(2) The acknowledgement of these letters can be found in Minutes, op. cit., p. 50 and it will be seen that the content of these letters was not even discussed or commented upon by the Arab delegates participating in this committee. Similar letters were received on March 17 and again on March 18, 1945 by the Arab Conference Preparatory Committee.

The North Africans were doing their best to be heard but met with little success. Azzam Pasha alone intervened on their behalf when he raised on February 28, 1945, during the twelfth meeting of the Political Sub-Committee, the question of the participation of Arab non-self-Governing territories in the activities of the League. His initiative did not meet with any great enthusiasm but it facilitated the adoption of Article IV of the Charter.

On March 8, 1945, The Istiqlal Party of Morocco sent a memorandum, to the President of the Arab Preparatory Committee, elaborating the ardent desire of Morocco to participate in the activities of the League of Arab States, and stating that Morocco was an inseparable portion of the Arab Nation. A few days later, on the eve of the signing of the Charter of the League, the Sultan of Morocco, in a speech he made in Marrakesh, spoke of "the great and happy events for Islam and Morocco" which were about to take place. Commenting on this statement, Professor Charles-

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(1) See, Minutes, op. cit., pp. 78-81.

(2) See, below, Appendix (3)

(3) For the text of this memorandum see Allal El Fassi, op. cit., pp. 429-493.

Andre Julien wrote:

"Ces paroles prononcées à la veille du Congrès d'héliopolis traduisaient les espérances que les musulmans marocains, comme ceux de Tunisie et d'Algérie, mirent alors dans la constitution de l'unité arabe."(1)

The publication of the Charter of the League was another disappointment to the North Africans. Article IV (second paragraph) stated:

"Representatives of the other Arab countries may take part in the work of the aforesaid committees. The Council shall determine the conditions under which these representatives may be permitted to participate and the rules governing such representation."

The Charter contained a special annex on Palestine, and one on "co-operation with countries which are not members of the Council of the League". The latter stated:

"...Whereas the Council has to take into account the aspirations of the Arab countries which are not members of the Council and has to work toward their realization;...it particularly behoves the States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League to enjoin the Council of the League, when considering the admission of those countries to participation in the committees referred to in the Pact, that it should do its utmost to co-operate with them, and, furthermore, that it should spare no effort to learn their needs and understand their aspirations and hopes; and that it should work thenceforth for their best interests and the safeguarding of their future with all the political means at its disposal."

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(1) C. A. Julien, "L'Afrique du Nord en Marche", op. cit., p. 352; *ibid.*, p. 353: "Les Marocains suivirent avec un intérêt passionné les événements qui marquèrent la naissance de la Ligue Arabe."

Now, this was a great advancement for the Maghreb when contrasted with the Alexandria Protocol, but it was resented just the same because no reference is made to North Africa by name. It was none the less sufficient to irritate the French Government. The objections of the Maghrebis were that North Africa was a part of the Arab Nation, that its problems were very much the same as those of Palestine, and that, therefore, they should have been admitted to the Council of the League pending their independence as was done in the instance of Palestine.<sup>(1)</sup> Some of them went so far as to say that the Charter of the League left some doubt as to whether the Maghreb was considered a part of the Arab Nation, and asked that the Council adopt a resolution defining the Maghreb as an inseparable portion of the Arab world.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Maghrebis found no other choice but to obtain the maximum aid from the League as it was not as they would have liked it to be. The aid of the League was of help to these movements within their respective countries as well as internationally. Some of the North African political

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(1) Allal El Fassi, op. cit., pp. 526-528.

(2) Ibid.

parties had oriented their adherents in a strongly pan-Arab direction, <sup>(1)</sup> from genuine idealism as well as from a desire to succeed. A student of the Moroccan political parties has written:

"Il est permis de se demander si l'utilisation de l'idée panarabe, avec les appuis extérieurs dont elle s'accompagne, n'est pas une des conditions essentielles de tout succès profond et durable du parti politique Marocain." <sup>(2)</sup>

It is true in the case of Morocco, which in the past has led a more isolated life than the rest of the Maghreb and which is geographically further away from the heart of the Arab world, how much truer can it be expected to be in the instances of Algeria and Tunisia.

As soon as the League was formed, a few of the North African political parties wrote to Nuqrashi Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, informing him that they had charged their representatives in Cairo to look after the interests of their country in co-operation with the League. <sup>(3)</sup>

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(1) See Allal El Fassi, op. cit., pp. 491-498.

(2) R. Rezette, op. cit., p. 19.

(3) This was done by the Istiqlal Party of Morocco and the Party of Reform (Spanish Zone of Morocco) - interview with Abdelmajid Benjelloun, in charge of the Moroccan Section of the Arab Maghreb Bureau in Cairo, (November 28, 1955).


The Maghreb question is one of those rare political questions which, when brought up before the League of Arab States, did not lead to any divisions between the members of the inter-Arab organisation. In terms of Arab relations, the affairs of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco have been one of the strongest unifying factors, after the Palestine fiasco; and an important contribution to the 'momentum' which prevented the League from falling to pieces. Arab defeat in Palestine, increased tension and violence in the Maghreb, and a constant improvement of North African propaganda throughout the Arab world, and Cairo in particular, all led to the more serious attention which the League began to devote to the North African questions after 1949. Prior to that time, the League was very much ill-informed about the situation in the Maghreb, to preoccupied by its internal divisions and the problem of Palestine, and somewhat uninterested.

The disastrous events of May 8, 1945 in Algeria, which took place barely one month after the creation of the League, and, which according to the League's own estimate (1) cost more than 20,000 Algerian lives were met by an almost complete silence by the Arab League. The only initiative

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(1) See, League of Arab States, Summary of the League's Activities, 1945-55, (in arabic), Cairo (1955), p. 9.

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE LEAGUE'S COUNCIL  
ON NORTH AFRICA (1945-55)



\* The figure given for 1955 refers to the Spring Session only.

of the League was that of Azzam Pasha who discussed the matter with French officials during his visit to London (!) in the autumn of 1945.<sup>(1)</sup> It is claimed that the League had not been fully organised yet and that its Council had only met once but that the Secretary-General did his best to alleviate the situation.<sup>(2)</sup> How? It is not said. No hint on this matter can be found in all of the documents published by the League up to this date. The truth of the matter is that,

"in the beginning, the League was very cautious and very conciliatory in regard to the Maghreb question... In fact, the League relied in great part on the good will and understanding of France regarding the North African problem."<sup>(3)</sup>

As a very young institution the League could not afford to irritate a power like France more than it did on the question of the Levant. And whereas the League's Levant policy was backed by British and American diplomacy this was far from the case in the question of the Maghreb. It must be added that the League was ignorant of North African affairs and was prone to be influenced by the active French

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(1) See, Réports (1st - 10th sessions), op. cit., p.105.

(2) Ibid., p. 9;

(3) Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., pp. 426-7; the same view is expressed in M. Laissy, op. cit., p. 194.

propaganda. Allal El Fassi, in his study of the North African Liberation Movements, asserts that the League doubted the strength of the Maghrebi nationalist movements and the extent to which they could be relied upon. (1)

The first official intervention of the League on the questions of North Africa was recorded in the Council's resolution of December 4, 1945 (No.17) which was entitled: "North Africa: An effort to alleviate the situation". No reference is made to the principle of North African independence until April 13, 1946 when the Council expressed its sympathy for "our Arab brothers in the Maghreb" and its support for their demands of "justice, liberty and independence". (2)

A reference to North Africa is to be found in the communique released on May 29 after the Inshass Conference of Arab Chiefs of State. But it is an indirect reference because North Africa is not mentioned by name but only as "the other Arab countries". The Arab Chiefs of State agreed on the principle of liberty for these countries and decided

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(1) Allal El Fassi, op. cit., pp. 393-4. El fassi also states that Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the League, expressed these doubts to a delegation of the Istiqlal Party in Paris in November, 1946, and that these doubts were not only about Morocco but all of North Africa.

(2) Resolution No. 57.

to leave it up to the League to undertake the necessary measures for their liberation and their adhesion to the League.<sup>(1)</sup>

During his visit to Paris, in October 1946, Azzam Pasha met "in a private capacity" some French leaders and discussed with them the problems of the Maghreb.<sup>(2)</sup> He, also, met, on that occasion, some North African leaders who told him that their countries were putting much hope in the League for the solution of their questions.<sup>(3)</sup> It was during that visit that Azzam Pasha made a few declarations on North Africa to the press. He did not speak of independence for the Maghreb but only hinted at it by speaking about universal rights:

"Les peuples Nord-Africains sont des peuples Arabes qui sont attachés à nous par tous les liens du sang, de la langue, de la culture et de la civilisation. Nous demandons pour tous les peuples: la liberté et le droit de disposer d'eux-mêmes."<sup>(4)</sup>

The North Africans were a little dissatisfied by the League's ineffectiveness, but they realized that they had

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(1) For text of the Inshass Communique, see M. Laissy, op. cit., p. 236.

(2) Reports (1st - 10th sessions), op. cit., p. 13.

(3) See Allal El fassi, op. cit., p. 340.

(4) Quoted in M. Laissy, op. cit., p. 184.

to be better organised in their propaganda in the Arab world first. The importance of the League did not diminish in their eyes because they were seeking the internationalization of their disputes with France, and no one could help them in this desire more than the League of Arab States. To this end, the North Africans in the Arab world decided to unify their ranks and to organise a common campaign.

From February 10th to February 22nd of 1947, a Conference of The Arab Maghreb was held in Cairo. It was organised by the representatives of the Tunisian Neo-Destour in Cairo and Damascus; the Cairo office of the Algerian Popular Party; and by the Union for the Defence of Morocco, the members of which belonged to the Istiqlal Party. The purpose of the Conference was to study the problems of North Africa and the solutions which could be envisaged with the help of the Arab world in general and the League in particular. The Conference was a demonstration of pan-Maghrebism, pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. The North Africans were presenting a common front, and the Conference opened in the Young Muslims Association's club with the reading of the Koran, and Azzam Pasha, the Secretary-General of the League presided over the

(1)  
ceremonies. In his opening speech, Azzam declared:

"This Conference is restricted to the Maghrebis and I have no right, as Secretary-General of the League, to assume the responsibility for the outcome of their work and decisions...but I shall shoulder this responsibility for the cause of the liberation of all the Arab countries, with the Maghreb, which is so dear to us all, in their forefront." (2)

The Secretary of the League, also, stated that, "The Maghrebis can rest assured that this League of Arab States considers colonialism as its first enemy in the East and West (of the Arab world) alike." (3) The main theme of the Conference was that French colonialism was attempting to hinder the historical and cultural ties which exist between the Maghreb and the rest of the Arab world. This is how (4) the Secretary of the Conference, Abdelkrim Ghallab, put

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(1) See, The Arab Maghreb Conference (Mu'tamar al-Maghreb al-'arabi) published by the Maghreb Bureau in Cairo (1947) in arabic.

(2) Ibid., pp.10-12;

(3) Ibid., p. 11;

(4) Presently in charge of the Middle East Department of the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

it:

"The aim of French colonialism is to separate, completely and definitely, the left wing of the Arab union from the right one, the stratum being the prevention of this League - upon which all Arabs in the East and in the West have put all of their hopes - from developing."  
(1)

The most important decision of the Conference was to ask for the formation of one common office to defend the North African cause in the Arab world. It was to be known as the Arab Maghreb Bureau, its headquarters were to be in Cairo, and all of the participating organisations in the Conference were to take part in its administration. (2) The Conference, also, asked the League of Arab States to pursue the following policy:

- " (a) To declare as invalid the Protectorates imposed on Tunisia and Morocco, and make known the illegality of the conquest of Algeria and its occupation; to declare the independence of these countries and to appoint representatives from them to the Council of the League.
- " (b) To bring up the questions of the Maghreb before international organisations and provide the North African countries with all the possible aid for the fulfilment of their complete independence.
- " (c) To ask the member States of the League to appoint representatives to the Maghreb.

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(1) Ibid., p. 15;

(2) Ibid., p. 52;

- " (d) To discuss the cultural situation in North Africa and undertake the spread of Arab culture in all the countries of the Arab Maghreb; and to find a solution to the problems which the Maghrebi students encounter upon their arrival to the Arab States."(1)

The Maghrebi demands are a good indication of how much the North Africans over-estimated the powers of the League of Arab States in international affairs. One can, also, find a definite eagerness to participate in the activities of the League. This North African enthusiasm for the League was not merely derived from pan-Arab idealism but, also, from a need to be recognised. In 1947 the eyes of the Maghreb were cast on the Arab world and Cairo - the seat of the Arab League. It was during that year that other influential Maghrebi leaders like Allal El Fassi<sup>(2)</sup> and Abd el Krim,<sup>(3)</sup> the hero of the Riff, arrived in Cairo. This

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- (1) Ibid., p. 36;  
(2) Allal El Fassi arrived in Cairo in May 1947;  
(3) Abd El Krim escaped from a French ship which was transferring him from his place of exile to France while the ship made a stop in Port Said on May 30, 1947. The French, it is said, were bringing him to France in order to threaten the Sultan of Morocco after the latter's speech of Tangier. It is reported that Mohamed Ben Abboud of the Maghreb Bureau spent a night aboard the ship, asking Abd el Krim to write a letter to Farouk requesting that he be permitted to stay in Egypt. Abd el Krim wrote this letter (for text see Allal El Fassi, op. cit., p. 496) "thereby putting an end to the intrigues which the French were carrying on in order to threaten the Sultan of Morocco after his Tangier Speech"-  
Three Years of the Arab Maghreb Bureau, p. 36, (in arabi), Cairo (1950).  
The Council of the League had adopted on November 23, 1946, resolution No. 92 entitled "Efforts to liberate Emir Abd El Krim".

influx of Maghrebi personalities was accompanied by a famous speech which was made by the Sultan of Morocco, in Tangier, on April 13, 1947. But it was, also, during 1947 that the Council of the League did not adopt one single resolution on the questions of the Maghreb. In a speech, which has had serious repercussions on the internal situation in Morocco and which resounded on the international scene, the Sultan said:

"Il va sans dire que le Maroc est un pays arabe, attaché par des liens solides aux pays arabes d'Orient, et qu'il desire que ces liens deviennent de plus en plus forts, surtout que la Ligue Arabe joue un rôle important dans la vie mondiale.

"Nous sommes persuadés que les liens culturels contribueront à renforcer davantage ces liens. C'est d'ailleurs pour ces raisons que nous cherchons à éclairer l'esprit des Marocains par la création d'instituts d'enseignement supérieur dont les programmes seront identiques à ceux des facultés d'Egypte, de Syrie, du Liban et d'Irak."(1)

This declaration was in line with the decisions of the Maghreb Conference of Cairo held a few weeks earlier. The League was pleased by the Tangier Speech and its Secretary-General expressed himself to send a telegram to the Sultan

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(1) See, M. Laissy, op. cit., p. 191, and Ch.A. Julien, op. cit., p. 364.

(1)  
informing him of the League's support. The Sultan's speech had a good effect throughout the Arab world and was a great encouragement for the Maghrebi campaign in Cairo and the rest of the Arab world.

On December 7, 1947, the decision of the Arab Maghreb Conference to form an Arab Magreb Bureau was implemented; (2)  
Abd El Krim and Bourguiba were elected President and (3)  
Secretary-General respectively.

The Charter of the Arab Maghreb Bureau was based on (4)  
Islamic considerations; it also declared that "the Maghreb is an inseparable portion of the Arab world" and added

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(1) The French Government was not pleased by this speech and decided to replace the diplomat Eirik Labonne who was Resident General in Morocco at that time by a military leader, General Juin (now Marshal). The latter made it clear from his first declarations that Morocco would not be permitted to be an Arab country: "Le Maroc...doit etre un pays Occidental qui doit se detourner des combinaisons orientales." Ch. A. Julien, op. cit., p. 365.

(2) Bourguiba was then, and still is, the leader of the Tunisian Neo-Destour; after the independence of Tunisia he became its second Prime Minister and its first President.

(3) See Allal El Fassi, op. cit., p. 408.

(4) See, above, p. 351.

that "co-operation with the other Arab countries, on an equal footing, in the League of Arab States is a necessary and natural thing."<sup>(1)</sup> The Maghreb Bureau met with a few difficulties when it attempted to convince the League about its representativeness. A trouble which was further complicated by serious internal divisions between some of the leading North African nationalists.<sup>(2)</sup> The League, at first, was not in a position to recognise who were the responsible leaders. It by-passed these questions by providing all the 'leaders' who presented themselves with equal financial aid to carry on their travels and campaigns in the Arab world. This irritated the more truly representative Maghrebi leaders who were at pains to make the League understand that some of these 'leaders' were merely 'charlatans'. This misunderstanding with the Arab League can be clearly felt in the study of Allal El Fassi on the North African liberation movements. El Fassi gets to the point of talking about the "mistreatment", by the League, of the more responsible Maghrebi leaders and says that "anarchy in the contact with the men of the Maghreb leads to anarchy in the orientation of Maghrebi affairs."<sup>(3)</sup>

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- (1) See Allal El Fassi, op. cit., for text of the Charter pp. 409-10.  
(2) Most of these divisions arose from misunderstandings between Abd el Krim and other Maghrebi leaders who did not like some of his "irresponsible" statements to the press.  
(3) Allal El Fassi, op. cit., p. 530.

The growing importance of the Palestine question eclipsed the Maghreb issue, as it did all the other issues before the League, in the years 1947 and 1948. One does not find any resolutions about North Africa in the decisions of the Council of the League in the year 1947 but the League was not idle on the Maghreb situation. It was during this period that the League was being approached by Spain who needed Arab backing in the United Nations. <sup>(1)</sup> The League responded to this 'reapprochement' with Spain because it felt that some gain for the Spanish Zone of Morocco could be obtained from France. On April 1, 1946, it decided to accept official delegates from the Spanish Zone of Morocco and allowed them <sup>(2)</sup> to participate in the activities of its Cultural Committee.

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- (1) The Spanish question was brought up before the Security Council on April 9, 1946 and was thereafter referred to the General Assembly which discussed the matter and adopted a resolution on December 12 debarring Spain from membership in any international organisation related to the U.N. (Text of Resolution U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1, pp.63-64).
- (2) The official delegates were Mohamed Ben Ahmed Ben Abboud, Mohamed Ben Abdesslan el Fassi, and Mohamed Ben Abboud; See R. Rezette, op. cit., pp. 150-153 - according to Rezette, the Moroccan delegates each received prior to their departure to Cairo 40,000 pesetas from the Spanish authorities. (See Reports (1st - 10th Sess., op. cit., p.12), and Resolution 36 of the Council, April 2, 1946.)

Thereafter Spain asked for a copy of the Arab Cultural Treaty and the Council of the League "after taking cognizance of the letter of the Spanish Minister in Cairo (decided)... (1) to send the demanded copy of the Arab Cultural Treaty."

The Hispano-Arab relations continued to evolve in a friendly and cordial manner through exchanges of visits between the Arab countries and Spain, (2) and through a cultural revival of the Arab heritage in Spain. These relations, in terms of North Africa, culminated in the pro-Arab stand of Spain on the question of the French exiling of the Sultan of Morocco on August 20, 1953 as will be seen later.

The defeat of the Arab League over the question of Palestine (3) produced a great disillusionment in North Africa,

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- (1) Resolution of the Council No. 125, Dec. 10, 1946. When the League realized the new orientation of Spain's policy it adopted on December 12, 1946 resolution 138, in which it referred to a letter from the Minister of Spain in Cairo (in which Spain indicated her desire to introduce some changes in the administration of the region of Morocco under its control) asking the Secretariat of the League to obtain more detailed information about the nature of these contemplated changes.
  - (2) King Abdullah paid a State visit to Spain in August, 1949.
  - (3) The Maghreb had shown its solidarity with the rest of the Arab world on the question of Palestine by sending volunteers (See The Maghreb Bureau, The First Three Years, op. cit., p. 37) and through the declarations of its leaders such as that of the Sultan of Morocco on April 23, 1948, and the message of the Nationalist leaders of Tunisia to the French Government which stated that recognition of Israel would be regarded as a hostile gesture toward North Africans - (See The Middle East Journal, Chronology, Winter 1948).

as it did in the other parts of the Arab world, and the prestige of the inter-Arab organisation suffered tremendously from it. The League, on the other hand, having made such a poor showing in Palestine and having encountered an anti-Arab French stand in the United Nations, decided to adopt a firmer stand on the questions of North Africa.

In 1948, the Council of the League adopted three resolutions<sup>(1)</sup> on North Africa one of them dealing with financial aid to the cause of the Maghreb. The latter resolution, voted on November 15, 1948, allocated the sum of 10,000 pounds for the opening of an account for the questions of North Africa.<sup>(2)</sup> This was considered as a step in the right direction by the Maghrebis. But in 1949, as in 1947, the Council of the League was again silent on the problems of North Africa. The next year, the Council adopted two resolutions on the Maghreb<sup>(3)</sup> - both of them dealing with

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(1) Resolutions Nos. 211 and 212 (February 22, 1948) and 222 (November 15, 1948).

(2) According to one of the leaders of the Arab Maghreb Bureau, the latter organisation received in cash about 15% of its total budget from the League of Arab States (interview with Abdelmajid Benjelloun, in Cairo, on November 28, 1955 - this estimate was confirmed through an interview with Nasser Kettani who used to be in charge of North African affairs in the League's political section until very recently - interview, in the headquarters of the League on December 1, 1955).

(3) Resolution 274 and 275, February 14, 1950.

financial support. The first one was about the contribution of 7,000 pounds to the North African question while the second appropriated a monthly allowance of 250 pounds to the Arab Maghreb Bureau. The second resolution was an explicit recognition of the Maghreb Bureau which had been created three years earlier.

In 1950, the League attempted to pursue its cordial  
(1)  
policy with Spain and recommended, on April 1, 1950, that the Arab States continue their policy vis-a-vis Spain in the United Nations in the same manner as before. In the Spring of 1950, Franco made the following address:

"Spain feels, as a European nation, that the ill-will and the misunderstanding shown her have driven her toward other people who, linked with her by ties of blood, language or faith... may constitute a decisive force in the future of mankind. The Arab nations, with their chivalrous traditions similar to our own, have captured the sympathy of the Spanish nation, which for so many centuries has lived with them."(2)

(3)

In its resolution of April 13, 1950, the Council made it very clear that the League's friendly policy towards Spain was inspired by a desire to better the situation in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, and asked the Arab States to put

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(1) Resolution No. 2.8.

(2) Quoted in "Spain's Arab Policy", p. 210 in the Middle East Journal, Spring, 1952.

(3) Resolution No. 315.

some diplomatic pressure on Spain so that she might activate her promised liberal Moroccan policy.

From 1950 onwards, the situation in the Maghreb was deeply altered by several factors: the political tension within the North African countries had broken into violence and the events of the Maghreb were attracting the attention of the press throughout the world; the divisions of the Maghrebi nationalists became more apparent; and there appeared a pro-Western camp, which did not put much hope in the League particularly after the latter's failure in Palestine, versus a pan-Arab one which continued to feel that the League was the best available means for the internationalisation of the North African questions. In 1950, negotiations between the Neo-Destour of Tunisia and the French Government were opened and carried on in a manner which brought the Tunisia party under "sharp criticism (1) from pan-Arab and pan-Islamic circles".

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(1) B. Rivlin, "The Tunisian Nationalist Movement", op. cit., p. 182; the Neo-Destour had taken a solemn pledge in Cairo, with the rest of the Maghrebi nationalists not to enter into separate negotiations with France. The Neo-Destour had not only undertaken bi-lateral negotiations with France but a Neo-Destourian had entered into a Tunisian Cabinet approved by the French authorities: "Les militants de l'U.D.M.A. (of Algeria) et de l'Istiqlal considérèrent M. Bourguiba comme un traître parce qu'un destourien était entré au ministère"- Ch. A. Julien, op. cit.

Bourguiba, trained in the Western tradition, was not in a position to impose himself in Cairo <sup>(1)</sup> and on his return to Tunisia toward the end of 1949, "son enthousiasme mystique avait durement souffert du contact avec les réalités égyptiennes. Les rivalités qui déchiraient le bureau du Maghreb, l'hostilité du Vieux-Doustour qui l'avait poursuivi non sans effet, le triomphe des éléments marocains représentés par Allal El Fassi et Abd el-Krim et les intrigues de la Ligue Arabe le poussèrent à maintenir au nationalisme tunisien son originalité au lieu de le subordonner au panarabisme." <sup>(2)</sup>

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- (1) Bourguiba who had been elected Secretary-General of the Maghreb Bureau in December, 1947, was replaced by Allal El Fassi on May 10, 1948, during the elections which took place on that date. Allal El Fassi was undoubtedly the most active Maghrebi leader in the Arab world. His Arab erudition and his appeal to the Arab character facilitated his work in Cairo and the other Arab capitals: "Mais ce sont surtout les Marocains qui sont les plus actifs et les plus remuants. C'est même le chef de l'Istiqlal (Parti de l'Indépendance) Mohammed Allal El Fassi, qui s'impose le plus au Caire" - M. Laissy, op. cit., p. 187.
- (2) Ch. A. Julien, op. cit., p. 186; see, also, B. Rivlin "The Tunisian Nationalist Movement", op. cit. which points out how the opposition to Bourguiba within the Tunisian nationalist movement made use of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic ideals in order to criticize the latter; see Indépendance, Tunis, April 19, 1951. In February, 1952, Bourguiba stated that he was opposed to the policy of Arab neutralism in the East-West conflict and stated that this was one of the reasons for his reserved attitude towards the League of Arab States, and added, "The interest of the Arab nations lies in a loyal co-operation... with the free world." - see B. Rivlin, op. cit. and Mission, Tunis, February 1, 1952.

In Morocco, the French Resident General Juin, in 1951, was carrying on an active campaign in order to dethrone the Sultan. The League received an extensive report (1) on these manoeuvres and the Council adopted a resolution (2) on March 17, 1951, outlining the League's Moroccan policy. This resolution was the strongest to be adopted by the League up to that time. It was the outcome of an emergency meeting of the Political Committee of the League, requested by Egypt, on May 10, 1951. There had been strong reactions throughout the Arab and Islamic world to the French attempts to depose the Sultan. On March 3, thousands of Egyptian students demonstrated in the streets of Cairo; (3) on the next day the Egyptian authorities proclaimed a state of emergency while re-inforcing the police forces in Cairo in order to restrain the demonstrators who were calling for a war against France; (4) in Beirut the schools closed as a gesture of sympathy for the Moroccan nationalist movement. (5)

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(1) See, Summary of the League's Activities, 1945-55, op. cit., p.10.

(2) Resolution No. 342.

(3) The New York Times, March 4, 1951;

(4) Ibid., March 5, 1951;

(5) Ibid., March 7, 1951; it was reported on March 13, that King Abdullah had asked President Truman to try to restrain French policy in Morocco, Ibid., March 14, 1951.

The resolution of the Council on Morocco, mentioned above, asked France to grant independence to Morocco and said that in case this request was refused the League would undertake other steps which were "studied from every possible angle with no possible action, on the part of the League, being left out from this study." Other decisions of the League on this question of Morocco were the sending of: an envoy of the League to study the tension prevailing in that country, a delegation of journalists, and another one of Egyptian lawyers to defend Moroccan nationalists before the Tangier Tribunal. <sup>(1)</sup> The Arab visitors did not only study the political situation in Morocco but, also, managed to convince the Moroccan nationalist organisations about the necessity of forming a common front. The outcome of this mediation was the signing of the "Tangier Pact", on April 9, 1951, by all the Moroccan political parties. Article 6, of this Pact, of the "Moroccan National Front", stated that the "collaboration of Morocco with the League of Arab States in the framework of the activities of the League, before and after the realisation of independence, is a national duty." <sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) See Reports, (10th - 18th Sessions), pp. 144-5; and R. Rezette, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

(2) *Ibid.*

Although on October 3, 1951, the Council of the League  
adopted a resolution <sup>(1)</sup> on Algeria and Tunisia in which it  
said that it would continue to support the case of these  
two countries in accordance with the principles of the  
Pact of the League, it was the Moroccan question which  
dominated the work of the Council in its meeting in the  
autumn of 1951. On September 1, the Political Committee  
of the League heard reports from Allal El Fassi and Abd  
El Krim about the Moroccan situation <sup>(2)</sup> and decided to vote  
in favour of the raising of the issue of Moroccan independ-  
ence before the United Nations. The Council ratified this  
recommendation <sup>(3)</sup> on October 10, 1951, on the grounds that  
its previous demands to the French Government were not  
rewarded by a favourable response and, therefore, decided  
to present the Moroccan question before the Sixth Session.

On October 4, before the decision of the Council of  
the League to bring the Moroccan question before the  
United Nations had been taken, Mohamed Salah-el-Din, the

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(1) Resolution No. 379.

(2) See, Arab News Agency dispatch of September 1, 1951.

(3) Resolution No. 387.

Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a telegram to the Secretary-General of the U.N. asking for the adoption of the item in the agenda of the Sixth Session of the General Assambly. This telegram concluded:

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"The friendly representations made to the French Government by the Arab League States having proved unsuccessful, my Government feels obliged to bring the matter before the General Assembly of the United Nations, in order to satisfy the just aspirations of the Moroccan people and avoid the developments to which this state of tension dangerous to peace in that region might give rise."(1)

The other Arab members of the United Nations backed the Egyptian initiative by sending similar communications (2) to the Secretary-General of the U.N. It is interesting to point out, here, that all of the Arab States sent their support for the adoption of the item before the League Council's decision of December 10th. In other words, the members of the League did not wait for the Council to approve the recommendation of the Political Committee (October 3rd) before contacting the United Nations. If the Charter of the League had been followed to the letter they would have waited for the Council to pronounce on the matter. It would be more appropriate,

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(1) Document A/1894 (United Nations);

(2) Iraq: October 6, (Doc. A/1898)  
Saudi Arabia: October 6, (Doc. A/1918)  
Yemen: October 9, (Doc. A/1909)  
Syria: October 10, (Doc. A/1908).

therefore, to say that the Council's resolution was not so much a decision but merely an official approval of something that had already taken place.

The debate on the adoption of the Moroccan question began on November 8th, before the General Committee of the U.N., and was taken up again before the Plenary Session of the General Assembly on November 13th, with no definite decision being reached. The item was debated again on December 13th, during the 354th meeting of the General Assembly, at which time it was dropped after the Arab delegations failed to obtain the necessary vote for its adoption.

The relevant point, here, is that the League's members \* had resolved themselves to internationalize the questions of the Maghreb. The discussions in the U.N. about the adoption of the Moroccan question were not in vain. They actually provided the Arab League itself with more information about the situation in the Maghreb because the Arab delegations at the U.N. had to make their case good, which meant that they had to contact the Maghrebi nationalists so as to be better informed about that part of the world.

In 1952, the Council of the League passed only one

(1)

resolution about the Maghreb, in which it decided to bring the question of Tunisia before the United Nations. As in the instance of Morocco, the League's resolution came after the step to inscribe the question had already been undertaken. Actually, about five months before the Council's decision, the Arab-Asian bloc in the U.N. tried, on April 2, to inscribe the Tunisian question on the agenda of the Security Council - an attempt which failed on April 14. But on August 5, the Arab and Asian delegations submitted a formal note to the U.N. renewing their earlier attempt, and meeting the same opposition to the adoption of the item in the agenda of the Security Council.

In 1952, the Arab-Asian bloc succeeded in having the Tunisian and Moroccan questions inscribed in the agenda of the Seventh Session of the General Assembly. <sup>(2)</sup> This victory <sup>(3)</sup> was followed by the adoption of similar resolutions on Morocco and Tunisia in December, 1952. The Arab States were satisfied because they had managed to dispose of French argument about domestic jurisdiction (Article II (7) )

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- (1) Resolution No. 469 (September 23, 1952).
  - (2) Tunisian question on October 12, 1952 and the Moroccan one on October 17, 1952.
  - (3) Tunisian question: U.N. Resolution No. 611 (VII), December 17, 1952.  
Moroccan question: U.N. Resolution No. 612 (VII), December 19, 1952.

thereby setting a precedent which could prove useful<sup>(1)</sup> in the future. And in effect, from that time onwards, the questions of Morocco and Tunisia appeared in the agenda of every session of the General Assembly until these two countries obtained their independence.

Once the Maghrebi nationalists had succeeded in their desire to internationalize the North African questions, the importance of the League lessened in their eyes. There was of course the drive to obtain the same result on the question of Algeria. But even on this point the League's intervention was not as vital as before because the Maghrebis had developed direct relations with the Afro-Asian bloc on the spot and no longer needed to pass<sup>(2)</sup> through the Secretariat of the Arab League in Cairo.

The League continued, after the internationalization of the questions of Morocco and Tunisia, to help the Maghrebi nationalist movements morally and materially. In 1953, the Council of the League adopted seven resolutions<sup>(3)</sup> about North Africa - an unprecedented number. It was also in 1953 that the League appointed a special

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(1) See Georges Day, Les Affaires de la Tunisie et du Maroc Devant les Nations Unies, Paris (1953).

(2) See, below, p. 397.

(3) See, below, at end of this chapter, the list of all the resolutions adopted about North Africa.

sub-committee to study the questions of the Maghreb and to present a report on this matter to the Council. <sup>(1)</sup> This sub-committee recommended, in a resolution adopted by the Council, on April 9, 1953, an increased Arab diplomatic activity in order to influence the United States of America on which the League put much hope for the solution of the Maghrebi problems; an intensified co-operation with the Afro-Asian delegations in the United Nations to facilitate the discussion of the questions of Morocco and Tunisia before the Security Council; the bringing up of the Algerian question before the Third (Social and Humanitarian) Committee of the U.N.; and an increased effort of the League's Secretariat aiming at the unification of the political organizations working for the liberation of the Maghreb. <sup>(2)</sup>

From the Above recommendations one can see that the policy of the League was to support Algeria from a 'humanitarian' angle before the United Nations; and Morocco and Tunisia from a political one. The consolidation of the Arab-Asian bloc is seen to be dictated, above all, by a desire to defend the Maghrebi questions in the U.N. Finally, the question of the inter- and intra-Maghrebi disputes and

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(1) This sub-committee was composed of the head of the Lebanese delegation to the League, the Egyptian delegate and the Assistant-Secretary General of the League.

(2) Resolution 523.

rivalries were considered as a major obstacle for the elaboration of a coherent Maghrebi policy. These quibblings were so annoying that the League decided, in one of its resolutions on financial aid to the North African movements, to make the signing of a common agreement, between the different Maghrebi organizations, a condition to the appropriation of 15.000 Pounds. (1)

The deportation of the Sultan of Morocco, Mohaned V, on August 20, 1953, attracted world-wide attention and gave the Maghrebi nationalists in Cairo, Paris and New York a good case to present to international public opinion. It was also a severe test for the Arab League. The Arab States called an extraordinary session of the Council of the League. This session was held on September 7, 1953, and four resolutions on North Africa were adopted. Having decided an extraordinary session, the Council of the League failed to impress the Maghrebi leaders by the decisions which were adopted on that occasion. The resolutions reiterated the League's support for the Maghrebi cause and "hoped" that the General Assembly of the United Nations would help in the elaboration of a just solution for Morocco and Tunisia; they (2)

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(1) Resolution No.755, April 4, 1954: "The Council decides that the Secretariat-General should not spend any amount of this sum (£ 15.000) until the leaders of the Maghreb sign an agreement of union."

(2) Resolution 584, September 7, 1953.

also spoke about the manner in which these questions should be brought before the United Nations by merely stating that the matter should be left to the discretion (1) and judgement of the Arab delegations in the United Nations. The Extraordinary Session of the Council of the League had taken place three days after the Security Council had voted against the adoption of the question of the Sultan's deportation. Yet, no reference to this initiative can be found in the resolutions adopted by the League during the Council's extraordinary session of September 7th. Nor did the Council pronounce itself about the matter of the diplomatic and (2) economic boycott of France.

From this time onward the Maghrebis put very little hope on the League of Arab States for the solution of their problems. Most of the North African countries had by that

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(1) Resolution 586, September 7, 1953.

(2) On August 22, 1953, Allal El Fassi, leader of the Istiqlal Party of Morocco, handed a note to the League of Arab States asking the Arab States to break their diplomatic relations with France and to call for a meeting of the Security Council. See Rezette, op. cit., p. 221.

time opened offices in New York and developed direct contacts with the Afro-Asian delegations in the United Nations. This point is worth considering for two reasons: (1) first, it is very revealing as to how the League of Arab States fails to co-ordinate Arab policy in the United Nations; and second, it throws some light on the relationship of the League with the Maghrebi nationalist movements.

When the Charter of the League was being drafted there already appeared a disagreement between the Arab States as to whether the League was to have an international personality or not, and about the relations which the League was to entertain with other international

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- (1) The Istiqlal Party opened a "Moroccan Office" in New York in November 1952; the Tunisian Neo-Destour, in April 1952 opened a "Tunisian Office"; The Algerian Front of National Liberation opened its New York office in September 1955. Were working for the Moroccan office: Dr. Mehdi Ben Aboud, now Morocco's Ambassador to Washington; Abderrahman Ben Abdelali, now Morocco's Minister Plenipotentiary in London; Abderrahman Anegay, now Director of the Royal Cabinet and member of the Moroccan delegation to the United Nations; and Mehdi Bennouna who represented the Party of Reform of the Spanish Zone of Morocco. The Tunisian Office was under the direction of Bahi Ladghan, now Tunisia's Vice-Premier and Minister of Defence. The Algerian Office was opened by Hussein Ait Ahmed, one of the five Algerian leaders to be kidnapped by the French in November 1956, and Mohamed Lyazid.

(1)  
organizations. An agreement was finally reached about that portion of Article 3 of the League's Charter which reads:

"It likewise shall be the Council's task to decide upon the means by which the League is to cooperate with the international bodies to be created in the future in order to guarantee the security and peace and regulate economic and social relations."

The Arab delegations, at the Preparatory Conference of San Francisco, had their say on what eventually became Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations although their views did not prevail and no mention of the Arab League as a regional organization was made. The League, on the other hand, was rather late in the elaboration of an Arab policy within the United Nations. This point has to be discussed if one is to appreciate how the League failed to co-ordinate Arab policy in the U.N., and how it failed to make proper use of the questions of North Africa for the development of such a policy.


A statistical survey of the resolutions adopted by the Council of the League would show that from its origin up to its Spring Session of 1955, it adopted 112 resolutions dealing with the United Nations. The great majority of these resolutions were passed after 1950 - the year in which the

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- (1) See, above, p. 232; and Minutes, op. cit., pp. 74-5.  
(2) See, G. Moussa Dib, The Arab Bloc in the United Nations, pp. 27-29, Amsterdam (1956)

United Nations sent an invitation to the Secretary-General of the League to attend the meetings of the General Assembly as an observer.<sup>(1)</sup> However, very few of these resolutions dealt with political matters, most of them having to do with the nomination of U.N. members to the different organs of that international organisation. Now, except for two resolutions dealing with the Palestinian problem and which were adopted in 1947;<sup>(2)</sup> one resolution having to do with Spain<sup>(3)</sup> and one with the problem of Kenya;<sup>(4)</sup> all of the other political resolutions related to the U.N. were about North Africa. In terms of the League's activities, therefore, it can be said that the Arab States were always able to agree on the question of nominations, agenda questions, matters dealing with economic, social, and cultural relations with the organs of the U.N., but when it came to political questions their only common agreement was about North Africa.<sup>(5)</sup> This does not amount to saying that they always voted differently within the United Nations about other matters except North Africa, but it does mean that within

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- (1) The invitation of an observer from the League to attend the U.N. was first agreed upon by the Legal Committee of the U.N. It was voted upon by the General Assembly on November 1, 1950, the vote being 49 in favour, 5 abstentions and 1 against (Israel) - see *ibid.*, p. 29.
- (2) Resolutions 167 (March 27) and 169 (March 29);
- (3) Resolution 288 (April 1, 1950) - see, above, p. 385.
- (4) Resolution 588 (September 7, 1953);
- (5) For the League's resolutions dealing with the U.N. see Chart, below, p. 401.

RESOLUTIONS, DEALING WITH THE U.N.  
ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE



the Council of the League they always agreed when a resolution about North Africa and the United Nations was put forward. It has been shown, however, that even on this question of North Africa the resolutions of the League having to do with the United Nations were, almost always, adopted after the initiative had already been taken in the United Nations itself. In other words, as it has been said earlier, these resolutions of the League were only meant to confirm steps already taken and not as new political measures.

The second point which will now be considered is the effect of the League's handling of the North African questions on the relations between the former and the Maghrebi nationalist movements. After the North Africans had opened their own offices in New York they began to depend on their own activities more than on their relation with the League of Arab States. Moreover, the North Africans realized that the League as an institution had very little to do with the formulation of the policies of its members. This led the Maghrebis to get in touch directly with the different Arab delegations in the U.N. as they did with the Asian ones. Psychologically speaking, and in the context of the pan-Arab movement, the Arab and the Asian States, in the eyes of the Maghrebi nationalists,

became of equal practical value. This factor sapped away one of the strongest appeals which the League had represented to the North Africans at the time of its formation. The Maghrebi offices which had opened in New York did not even develop a strong tie with the Arab Office which the League had decided to open in New York City in 1953<sup>(1)</sup> with an initial investment of 70,000 pounds.<sup>(2)</sup> The North African offices obtained some material facilities such as the printing of pamphlets and a relatively small financial assistance from the New York Arab Office but the latter did not develop into a co-ordinator of Arab policy in the United Nations, most of the work for North Africa being done through the periodical meetings of the Afro-Asiatic bloc.

The activities of the North African nationalists in New York, Washington, and Paris, on one side and those of the Maghreb Bureau in Cairo on the other, had the effect of increasing a split within the different North African nationalist movements. The split was between the Western-inspired nationalists such as Bourguiba and the Moroccan

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(1) Resolution 533 (April 9, 1953);

(2) Resolution 577 (May 10, 1953).

(1)

Bouabid and Balafrej on the one hand, and the Arab-inclined Allal El Fassi from Morocco and Salah Ben Youssef from Tunisia on the other. Since it is the former group which came to power after the independence of Morocco and Tunisia, it becomes easier to explain why these two countries did not seek membership in the League of Arab States - "a right" of all the independent Arab countries according to the Pact of the League - soon after their independence.

The way in which the questions of North Africa came before the United Nations, from the time of the deportation of the Sultan in August 1953, up to 1955, is revealing for anyone wishing to understand the mechanism of the League, as an institution, and its contribution - or lack of it - to the formulation of "Arab policy".

The day of the deportation of the Sultan, on August 20, 1953, the Moroccan Office in New York undertook the initiative of getting in touch with the Afro-Asian delegations who, in turn, called for a meeting of the Security Council, on August 21, "to investigate the international friction

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- (1) These two comments of Bourguiba, now Prime Minister of Tunisia, and Bouabid, Minister of National Economy in Morocco, about Nasser and Kuwatly are revealing in this respect: Bourguiba: "I don't see how Nasser in Egypt and Kuwatly in Syria can take help from the Russians and still say they are against Communism. Its irrational and it does not make sense." Bouabid: "Nasser is a patriot...but he talks too much; his speeches do more harm than his actions. The trouble with Egyptians is they haven't suffered enough. They've been talking about freedom while we fought for it." Life, international edition, p. 86, May 15, 1957.

and the danger to international peace and security which has arisen by the unlawful intervention of France in Morocco and the overthrow of its legitimate sovereign and to take action under the Charter." <sup>(1)</sup> Now, the extraordinary session of the Council of the League which met to consider the situation in Morocco did not convene until September 7th - by that time the attempt of the Afro-Asian bloc to inscribe the Moroccan question in the agenda had already failed three days earlier. All of the resolutions adopted about North Africa during that extraordinary session of the Council as well as those adopted from March 28, 1953 up to October 1954 do not appear in the Reports of the Secretary-General of the League which were presented to the Council during that same period. In these reports no mention is even made about North African questions. <sup>(2)</sup> There was no need. The problems had become international ones and, since the League had very little to do with the elaboration of Arab policy in the U.N., nothing could be done in Cairo which was likely either to help or hinder the deliberations in New York. This is what is meant by the opportunity which the

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(1) Moroccan Office - Press release, August 21, 1953, New York.

(2) See Reports, (18th - 20th Sessions) - during this period a total of 13 resolutions had been adopted on North Africa; see list of resolutions at end of this chapter.

League lost on these questions of the Maghreb. All of the Arab States were agreed on the same policy but no use was made of the League in order to elaborate a "League policy" and thereby set a precedent which might have turned out to be useful and which would have increased the prestige of the organisation.

There is one thing which the League continued to do about the Maghreb and which must be mentioned, and that is its interventions with Spain about the Spanish Zone of Morocco. This turned out to be useful because at the time of the crisis about the Sultan of Morocco, Spain did not recognize the substitute of Mohamed V who was put on the throne in Rabat. The policy of the League vis-a-vis Spain was not a new one, nor was it inconsistent. On April 4, 1952, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Don Alberto Martin Artajo, had begun a tour of goodwill in the Arab countries. On that occasion, the Spanish Chief of State, General Franco, made a special broadcast to the Arab countries in which he said:

"Notre generation assiste a un relevement parallele des peuples arabes et hispaniques, contrastant avec la decrepitude d'autres pays... Comme vous le voyez, les mobiles de la visite de mon ministre aux nations arabes sont hauts et elevés, autant que clairs et limpides en sont les buts et les objectifs... elle (l'Espagne) est disposée, sur le terrain de ses ileaux et les interets communs, a resserrer ses liens avec le monde arabe car elle sait

bien que par lignage historique, par parenté raciale et, surtout, par leur affinité dans l'ordre et dans l'esprit, les Espagnols ont une place dans son coeur. A leur tour, les Arabes en trouverons toujours une dans le notre, et aussi large que dans le coeur qui la leur fera la plus large, dans celui de leur Caudillo qui vous salue et vous envoie la paix avec la louange à Dieu." (1)

On March 22, 1953, the anniversary of the League of Arab States was celebrated officially in Tetouan, the capital of the part of Morocco under Spanish control at that time. On April 9, 1953, the Council of the League adopted a resolution recommending the admission of the latter zone to the World Health Organisation. (2) From December 8 to the 11th, Ahmed Shoukeiri, Assistant Secretary-General of the League, paid a visit to Tetouan after his return from Spain where he had met Spanish officials and (3) discussed the Moroccan question with them.

On January 1, 1954, the Council of the League recommended the formation of a Postal Union between the Arab States and Spain. (4) In May 1954, Khalek Hassouna, Secretary-General of the League, went to Madrid in order to ask

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(1) Quoted in French, in Problemas del Mundo Arabe, pp. 181-4, Madrid, (1954).

(2) Resolution No. 503;

(3) See Rezette, op. cit., p. 237.

(4) Resolution No. 611; the same question was discussed again on December 11, 1954 - see Resolution No. 755.

General Franco to assist the League in its efforts to evict France from North Africa.<sup>(1)</sup> In the course of that visit, the Secretary-General of the League took part in a Seminar on the Arab world organised by the Institute of Political Studies in Madrid. In the paper which he presented about the Arab League, Khaled Hassouna opened his talk in these terms:

"Je suis heureux de saluer, au nom de la Ligue Arabe, l'Espagne, jeune et forte, qui occupe une place d'avant-garde dans le concert du monde civilisé. C'est également un honneur pour moi d'adresser mon salut à son héros et à son renouvateur, le Generalissimo Franco, qui l'a sauvée du péril et lui a fait franchir d'impressionnantes étapes dans la voie de l'unité, de la force, de la dignité et de la prospérité."<sup>(2)</sup>

Soon after these flattering remarks, the Secretary-General of the League added:

"Les Arabes espèrent trouver une formule d'entente sur l'avenir de la région Khalifienne du Maroc, formule qui marquera le début de l'ère nouvelle souhaitée."<sup>(3)</sup>

In August 1954, the Secretary-General of the League went so far as to declare that Spain was about to accord

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(1) See, Le Monde, "Le General Franco veut-il déborder la France au Maroc" December 23, 1954; see, also, League of Arab States, Reports (21st - 22nd Sessions), p. 6. Cairo (1954).

(2) Problemas del Mundo Arabe, op. cit., p. 261.

(3) Ibid., p. 263.

independence to Morocco - a declaration which the Spanish Government, at that time, felt the necessity of denying. <sup>(1)</sup>

The opening of a special fund for North Africa and a decision to internationalise the question of Algeria, by bringing it before the United Nations, were the only new elements of the League's Maghrebi policy in 1954 and 1955. The idea of a Special Fund for North Africa was accepted by the Council of the League on January 27, 1954, and it was suggested that the Secretariat collect money for this fund from Arab and Islamic countries whether they be members of the League or not. <sup>(2)</sup> The same question was discussed again by the Council, on April 5, 1954, and a resolution asking the Arab Governments to send their contributions as soon as possible was adopted. <sup>(3)</sup> But apparently, as late as the winter of 1955, only Saudi Arabia had sent its contributions to the fund. <sup>(4)</sup>

After the outbreak of the Algerian revolution on November 1, 1954, the Council refused to accept the recommendations

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(1) See, Le Monde, December 23, 1954.

(2) Resolution No. 720.

(3) Resolution No. 761.

(4) Interview with Abdelmajid Benjelloun of the Maghreb Bureau, in Cairo, on November 28, 1955.

of the League's Political Committee about the bringing up of the Algerian question before the United Nations through the intermediary of Saudi Arabia. On that instance, Le Monde made the following comments:

"Mais il est heureux de constater que la Ligue, pour une fois, n'ait pas cherché à refaire son 'unité' sur le dos de la France." (1)

On December 11, 1954, the Council of the League decided to postpone any decision about Algeria. So it is not until March 29, 1955 that the League decided to bring the question of Algeria before the United Nations. But just as in the Moroccan and Tunisian questions, the decision of the Council had come after something had already been done in the U.N. by one of the Arab or Asiatic countries. On January 5, 1955, the Saudi Arabian delegation at the United Nations, in a letter to the President of the Security Council, stated that it reserved the right to ask for the convening of the latter in order to look into "the grave situation in Algeria". (2)

On March 29, 1955, the Political Committee of the League asked the Member States of the League to support the Saudi

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(1) Le Monde, 14 December, 1954.

(2) U.N. Doc. S/3341; in this document the Saudi Arabian delegation stated that its Government and people "have long watched with profound anxiety the French attempt to obliterate the national, cultural and religious character of Algeria."

Arabian intervention about Algeria to the United Nations.

Commenting on the Saudi Arabian protest, Le Monde wrote:

"Le mois dernier déjà l'Arabie avait annoncé son intention de présenter les affaires d'Algérie à l'Assemblée des Nations Unies, qui était alors en session. Elle a finalement renoncé à prendre cette initiative, en partie sous la pression des autres délégations arabes. Il est possible que cette fois encore l'Arabie Saoudite ne mette pas ses intentions à exécution." (1)

It can be clearly seen, therefore, that on the question of Algeria, much more than on the questions of Tunisia and Morocco, the League was late and hesitant about bringing the problem before the United Nations. Yet this was the most substantial thing which the League could do for the Maghrebis. In terms of financial aid to the Maghreb, the League never contributed more than five per cent of its budget although the questions of North Africa were the most urgent problems before the League - particularly after the loss of Palestine. The hesitancy of the League was due to a disagreement between the member States as to how far they should go in their attacks against France. Certain countries like Saudi Arabia, the Yemen, Iraq and Syria, who had few economic ties with France, were willing to go a long way. But Egypt, and Lebanon in particular, wavered in their fervour to defend the Maghrebi cause.

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(1) Le Monde, January 5, 1955.

The stand of Egypt is the more interesting one because Egypt contributed financially, and independently of the League, to the Maghrebi movements much more than all the rest of the Arab countries put together. Egypt was, also, the country which sent out the most vehement anti-French broadcasts from the "Voice of the Arabs" to North Africa and which trained commandos to fight in the Maghreb. But the policy of Egypt was not always consistent - a study of the broadcasts of the "Voice of the Arabs" would show periods of total silence on North Africa followed by strong waves of anti-French propaganda. The root of this outward inconsistency is to be found in the economic relations between France and Egypt.

French investments in Egypt averaged about \$500,000,000.<sup>(1)</sup> France used to be one of the first buying countries of Egyptian cotton and a supplier of arms to Egypt. To make this point clear, the following quotations taken from Al-Ahram and Le Monde (and written within the same 48 hours) will suffice. Al-Ahram of November 28, 1955 wrote:

"Il y a lieu de souligner que la France venait au premier rang parmi les pays qui achetaient

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(1) See, Le Monde, June 3-4, 1956;

notre coton. Aujourd'hui, elle se classe au cinquieme rang. Mais elle demeure au premier plan des pays qui entretiennent des rapports commerciaux avec nous... Nous avons exporte (1955) a destination de la France 11.17% de l'ensemble de nos importations. A cet egard, elle tient la premiere place..."

The next day, Le Monde of November 29th wrote:

"Les difficultés françaises en Egypte sont en voie d'appaiesement. On fait notamment remarquer que les émissions de propagande hostile à la France faites au Cairo par la 'Voix des Arabes' ont cessé. Enfin l'Egypte n'a pas repris l'instruction des cadres arabes destinés à participer à la révolte en Afrique du Nord. Cette instruction avait été interrompue au début de cette année, mais la menace constante d'une possible recouverture de cette école revolutionnaire pesait lourdement sur les relations Franco-Egyptiennes."

This can be easily explained if one mentions that at this time Franco-Egyptian negotiations for the mode of payment of Egyptian debts to France were in progress.

It must be said, however, that the silence of Egypt on North African questions was an exception rather than a rule. Some of the broadcasts of the "Voice of the Arabs" could not have been more anti-French. Here is, for instance, the broadcast of November 1, 1954, made a few hours after the outbreak of the Algerian upheaval:

"Frères, l'Algerie est retournée à l'héroïque et glorieuse lutte pour la cause de la liberté de l'arabisme et de l'Islam. Après une deroute voulue par l'imperialisme et qui a duré neuf ans, l'Algerie leve aujourd'hui partout fierement

la tête."(1)

It was Egypt that presented the resolution on North Africa during the Bandung Conference of April 1955. As to the substantial Egyptian aid to the Maghrebi nationalist movements, a reference to France's Foreign Minister's intervention in the United Nations debate on the question of Algeria during the twelfth session of the General Assembly, would suffice.

The League of Arab States during the first ten years of its existence paid much attention to the problems of the Maghreb, assisted the North African leaders financially, and contributed to the unification of their ranks during times of crisis. The contribution of the League was above all of a psychological importance in the fight against France, and it is true, as Gabriel Puaux has written, that:

"La France n'a jamais eu à se louer de la création de Sir Anthony Eden. Si l'Etat israélien a été proclamé par la Ligue, l'ennemi No. 1, la deuxième place a été réservée à la France..."(2)

The League, also, contributed, although belatedly, to

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(1) Quoted in Le Monde, November 4, 1954 - see, also, "L'Appel à La Guerre Sainte des radios arabes est inspiré par Nasser" in Le Temps de Paris, April 23, 1956.

(2) "La Ligue Arabe" in La Revue de Paris, April, 1956, p. 79.

the internationalization of the Maghrebi problems. Its X  
hesitancy on the Algerian question in 1955 disappeared  
when the question was adopted in the agenda of the Eleven-  
th session of the General Assembly. The activities of  
the North African leaders in Cairo and their co-operation  
with the League of Arab States - which tended to look at  
their problems as one and the same <sup>(1)</sup> - led to the increas-  
ing of a strong pan-Maghrebi feeling which is very apparent  
today that Morocco and Tunisia have obtained their indep-  
endence. <sup>(2)</sup>

The League can be criticized for its slow, and at  
times unenthusiastic handling of North African problems.  
This criticism came from militant Maghrebi leaders at  
a time when they were combating French colonialism.  
Another often heard criticism amongst North Africans is  
that the League never seemed to be informed about the  
"true" situation in the Maghreb. The blame for this rests  
partly on the Maghrebis themselves who were divided at  
times and, therefore, unable to present the same picture

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(1) On April 4, 1954, a Pact of Liberation was signed by  
Tunisians, Algerians and Moroccans at the headquarters  
of the League.

(2) The League of Arab States recognized the independence  
of Morocco and Tunisia on April 9, 1956. (See, Le  
Monde, April 10, 1956).

to the League. One must, also, remember that the League was never permitted by the French authorities to send delegations to study the situation on the spot. X

On the whole, it can safely be said that, although the League's North African policy had several shortcomings, the Maghrebi countries felt the desire of the Arab States to help them in their quest for independence. The feeling that they were not alone during the dark hours of their struggle has tended to increase the pan-Arab orientation of the North African people. On the international plane, the League was looked upon as an organisation dedicated to the defence of North African rights. If, for political and internal considerations, the League was unable to do as much as it could have for North Africa, it did, on the other hand, do enough to cause embarrassment to France and thereby contributed to Tunisian and Moroccan independence. The League is still considered to be very useful by the only Maghrebi country still under French control. ✓

Although Tunisia and Morocco have been granted their independence, the Algerian Front of National Liberation has not yet considered the possibilities of moving its propaganda headquarters from Cairo to Rabat or Tunis. An indication that the Algerians feel that Cairo, the centre of Arab politics and of the League of Arab States, is much more suitable for their activities on the international

level than any other place.

If one is to judge the work of the League of Arab States on the question of the Maghreb by contrasting it with its other political activities, it would then appear that the League, relatively speaking, was more successful in this domain than anywhere else. It can always be argued that this is no valuable standard since the other political activities of the League were unimpressive. By not having deployed more activity and more enthusiasm on the Maghrebi questions - at the proper time - the League lost a good opportunity of victory. But, in terms of comparison again, it can be safely said that the League contributed effectively much more to the independence of Tunisia and Morocco than it did to that of Syria and Lebanon.

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE  
OVER NORTH AFRICA (1945-1955)

No. of Res.	Date	Topic of Resolution.
<u>1 9 4 5:</u>		
1 7	Dec. 4	"North Africa: Effort to alleviate situation".
<u>1 9 4 6:</u>		
5 7	Apr.13	"Support for the Maghreb".
9 2	Nov.23	"Efforts to liberate the Emir Abd el Krim".
1 3 8	Dec.12	"Spanish stand on Morocco".
<u>1 9 4 7:</u>	--	--
<u>1 9 4 8:</u>		
2 1 1	Feb.22	"The Maghreb Questions".
2 1 2	Feb.22	"The Events of Tetouan".
2 2 2	Nov.15	"Financial aid for the Maghreb Questions".
<u>1 9 4 9:</u>	--	--
<u>1 9 5 0:</u>		
2 7 4	Feb.14	"Budget for North Africa".
2 7 5	Feb.14	"Aid for the Maghreb Bureau".
<u>1 9 5 1:</u>		
3 4 2	Mar.17	"The Moroccan Question".
3 7 9	Oct. 3	"The Algerian and Tunisian Questions".
3 8 7	Oct.10	"The Moroccan Question".
<u>1 9 5 2:</u>		
4 6 9	Sep.23	"The Tunisian Question".

1 9 5 3:

5 0 3	Apr. 9	"Support for Morocco's (Spanish Zone) admission to the W.H.O."
5 2 3	Apr. 9	"The Questions of North Africa".
5 7 4	May. 9	"Tunisia".
5 8 4 *	Sep. 7	"Tunisian and Moroccan Questions".
5 8 5 *	Sep. 7	"Support for the Arab view on the questions of Tunisia and Morocco".
5 8 6 *	Sep. 7	"Discussion of Moroccan and Tunisian questions before the U.N".
5 8 7 *	Sep. 7	"Contacting Asian and African Nations about the questions of Morocco and Tunisia".

1 9 5 4:

7 2 0	Jan.27	"Special Fund for North Africa".
7 2 2	Jan.27	"Moroccan Question".(SECRET RESOLUTION).
7 2 3	Jan.27	"The Sultan of Morocco" (SECRET RESOLUTION).
7 4 0	Jan.27	"Request of the Maghreb Bureau about a special budget for the Maghreb".
7 5 4	Apr. 3	"French terrorism in Morocco and Tunisia - Protest to the U.N".
7 5 5	Apr. 4	"Aid to the Victims of North Africa".
7 6 1	Apr. 5	"Steps undertaken for the creation of a North African Fund".
8 0 7	Nov.29	"The Questions of North Africa".
8 3 0	Dec.11	"The Algerian Question".
8 3 1	Dec.11	"The Education of Arab Algerians".

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1 9 5 5:

9 1 8	Mar.31	"The Arab Maghreb".
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( \* : adopted during an extraordinary session of the Council about North Africa).

( \*\*\*\* : Spring Session of 1955 only).

## C O N C L U S I O N

An attempt has been made in this study to appreciate the League of Arab States as an expression of the pan-Arab movement. The political activities of the League have been analyzed in order to understand inter-Arab relations and their impact upon the Arab world as well as on international politics. No study of the League would be complete without a mention of its non-political activities. These are hard to analyze because it is almost impossible to tell to what extent the resolutions of the Council have been implemented by the member States. All that one can do is either list all of the non-political resolutions of the League and dwell upon their substance without being able to say whether they have been executed or not, or try to point out the few accomplishments of the League in the economic, social and cultural fields with an emphasis on the approach used by the inter-Arab organisation in these domains. The latter method will be adopted because it is more in line with the aims of this work.

If one were to judge the non-political activities of the League in terms of the available documentation, it would seem that this institution has accomplished wonders which outstrip its mild results and outstanding failures

in the political field. This view is usually supported by the suggestion that non-political activities are as a rule much less publicised and, therefore, under-estimated. The pamphlets published by the League are based on this assumption and one finds that a disproportionate amount of space is devoted to the non-political activities in terms of the decisions of the League without mentioning which of these decisions have been implemented. In the ten years of its existence, from 1945 to 1955, more than one third of the total number of the resolutions of the Council have dealt with economic, social and cultural matters; <sup>(1)</sup> several treaties, agreements and conventions have been concluded between the member States in these fields; <sup>(2)</sup> and the League has sponsored a number of meetings and conferences of Arab engineers, Arab teachers, Arab doctors, Arab athletes, Arab lawyers, Arab statisticians, Arab tourist agencies, Arab archeologists, etc. The indirect value has been to drive in the qualification of "Arab" and to prepare many blue-prints. It has, therefore, encouraged people to think in a broader frame of mind and to do some groundwork for a

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(1) See, table above, p. 250.

(2) See, League of Arab States, Treaty Series, Agreement and Conventions concluded within the framework of the Arab League, one volume, Cairo, (1955), in English.

possible future when all of these recommendations and suggestions might become feasible. But, at the same time, it has brought out an apparent contradiction between the resolutions of these bodies and the existing narrow-mindedness of the member States.

The major achievement of the League has been in the cultural field because of the common Arab culture, language, and because it does not bring into play the notions of sovereignty nor the erection of supra-national bodies to supervise this progress. The first agreement to be signed between the member States was the Cultural Treaty which was approved by the Council of the League on November 7, 1945.<sup>(1)</sup> It provided for cultural exchanges and the standardization of the curricula in primary and secondary schools. The League has, also, established, in 1953, an Institute of Advanced Arab Studies in Cairo in order to train scholars and disseminate Arab culture. And, since 1949, a Yearbook of Arab Culture has been published by the Cultural Committee of the League.<sup>(2)</sup>

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(1) The Governments of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen made reservations about this Treaty. They agreed to the terms of the treaty, "except to what it does contradictory to Islamic faith or is inconsistent with its local organisation and the situation". - See, League of Arab States, Treaty Series, op. cit., p. 5. note 1 (d).

(2) Hawliyat al-Thakafah al-'Arabiyyah (Yearbook of Arab Culture), 1949-54, 4 volumes (in Arabic). The League has, also, set up an Institute for the Revival of Arab Manuscripts; about 8,000 manuscripts have been micro-filmed.

In the economic field, the results are small although a Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation has been approved by the Council on April 17, 1950 (but it did not become effective until October 11, 1953), and several Conventions have been ratified for trade exchange and the regulation of transit between the member States, for the settlement of payments of current transactions and the movement of capital, for the creation of an Arab Postal Union and another for the establishment of an Arab Union for Wireless Communications and Telecommunications, a Federation of Commercial, Industrial and Agricultural Chambers has been founded, and an Arab Tourist Association created.

The League has studied proposals for an Arab Bank, a common Arab market, a unified Arab currency and the discontinuance of passports between member States, but none has so far been implemented. The member States are still holding to the notion of absolute sovereignty. This has handicapped progress in the development of integrated Arab economic and social policies. Boutros-Ghali has concluded that "actually the achievement of purely technical agreements among the Arab states involves a far more cumbersome process than the conclusion of political agreements with foreign states...the whole approach is

predicated upon the idea that the political frontiers established in 1919 by the West will remain intact forever." (1)

The manner with which the League of Arab States was created foreshadowed the spirit of its activities. The negotiations leading up to the Charter, as we have seen, fell into phases: the first from 1941 to 1943 in which general principles were discussed and there was an outwardly cordial and united attitude; the second, the years of 1944 and 1945 which found the negotiators divided about the concrete aspects of Arab union. In the activities of the League during its first ten years, from 1945 to 1955, one can again distinguish two different stages: the first, from 1945 to 1949, in which the League managed to give the impression of a united Arab policy in the international arena; the second dates from the Arab defeat in Palestine, a defeat which resulted in the erection of the state of Israel and which was a blow to the prestige both of the League and its membership, clearly reflected inter-Arab disagreement.

The League of Arab States failed in its handling of what is termed the "Arab Tragedy" - Palestine. This has

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(1) Boutros-Ghali, op. cit., pp. 437-8.

had serious repercussions on its prestige in the Arab world and internationally. The man in the street is not in a position to distinguish between the failure of a group of Arab States and that of an institution in which these States are represented. These repercussions can be best evaluated when it is remembered that the Arabs were not impressed by the loss of Palestine to the same degree that they were by the insult to their honour which is the most highly-prized Arab virtue. The "Arab Tragedy" hurt the Arab very deeply and has been the guiding factor of his political behaviour since 1948. The Arab has been confirmed in believing that it is neither Zionism, nor even the State of Israel, which he has to fear, but Western imperialism. Palestine has thus become a symbol which is vividly present in the minds of all the Arabs and which has been even more encrusted by fear.

There is an analogy between the failure of the League of Arab States and that of the United Nations. They have both survived their breakdown as peace-and-security organisations, and have continued to show vitality in other directions. Why did the League of Arab States not collapse in spite of its failure in Palestine and the inter-Arab conflicts? Because the leading Arab Power wished to keep it alive. Egypt needed the League of Arab States if only to prevent the formation of a more restricted Arab union

covering the Fertile Crescent. A union of the Fertile Crescent would have been the natural outcome of a collapse of the League. The League survived for this negative reason, and this is the root of its ineffectiveness. Ever since its failure in Palestine, the League of Arab States has been the lesser of two evils for the anti-Hashemite group. It is doubtful whether Arab public opinion played a role in the maintenance of the League because the most articulate segment of Arab public opinion was ready to put the blame for the Palestinian fiasco on the League itself. It was kept alive for want of a better system and because it was realized that the source of trouble lay in the nature of inter-Arab relations. Iraq's signing of the Baghdad Pact made Arab discord even more apparent. None the less, the League had not become useless.<sup>(1)</sup> It permitted the different Arab groups to keep in touch and air their disagreement in the meetings of the various committees and in the Council of the League. The League, however, did not develop into a strong regional organisation, the decisions of which could

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(1) "The League had seemed to lie in ruins, its decayed fabric torn irreparably by the strife between its two main members. For two or three years, its reputation had declined among the Arabs themselves. It had ceased to be identified with the 'Arab Renaissance' and the sophisticated townsman spoke of it with contempt. Yet, in all their disillusionment, the Arabs still wanted the Arab League to meet" - T.R. Little, "The Arab League: A Reassessment", in the Middle East Journal, Spring, 1956, p.139.

be given serious thought, by other Powers.

The League of Arab States was a product of moderate Arab nationalists, and is still thought of as such inside the Arab world, but it is now considered by the West as an "extremist" Arab organisation. This is partly due to the dominant role of Egypt and its headquarters being in Cairo. However, it is precisely this Egyptian role which has led Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and sometimes Saudi Arabia, to bring the work of the League to a standstill. The pro-Western members of the League have preferred to paralyze the League rather than admit Egyptian leadership.

The League of Arab States is the product not only of Arab moderates, but, also, of the pan-Arab movement. The important change which has taken place in the Arab world after the creation of the League is that people are talking of Arab nationalism which implies Arab unity rather than of pan-Arabism which implies disunity. The nuance is more than academic. No Arab nationalist, in the recent meaning of the term, will accept the League as an institution of the Arab nationalist movement. <sup>(1)</sup> This suggests the erection

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(1) The Ba'ath Party of Syria, for instance, considers that the League does not conform to the true spirit of Arab nationalism and has no faith in it - interview with Hafidh Al-Jamali, in Damascus, on December 19, 1955. Sati' al-Husri said in November 1955 that the League had done more harm than good to the Arab world internally and very little good externally; al-Husri, at the time, was head of the League's Institute of Advanced Arab Studies (interview on November 25, 1955).

of a new organisation in the future.

The founders of the League operated on the assumption - a valid one at the time - that the approval and support of the Western Powers (mostly Great Britain) was necessary to the success of the pan-Arab movement. Arab nationalists now start from the premise - also a valid one today - that the survival of interests from the period of Western colonization is at the root of the divisions within the Arab world. Whereas the founders of the League were thinking of Arab unity as an end, Arab nationalists today envisage this unity as a means to free the Arab world from the vestiges of Western imperialism and to raise the standard of living of the Arab countries. Arab nationalists nowadays consider the obstacles to Arab unity to be: (1) the ties of some of the Arab countries with foreign Powers; (2) the existence of the State of Israel; (3) the diversity of political regimes within the Arab world; and, (4) differences in the standards of living, cultural and social developments.

The first three of these obstacles to Arab unity, the Western Powers would like to see preserved. The ties between some Arab countries and foreign Powers are the Baghdad Pact, military bases, bi-lateral treaties, Western oil and other economic interests. The continuance of Israel as a State is at the basis of British, American and French Middle

Eastern policies. The diversity of political regimes allows the Western Powers - as well as the non-Western ones - to play one part of the Arab world against the other and thereby maintain some sort of "balance" in the area. Thus the aims of the Arab movement and the policies of the Western Powers are, for the moment, incompatible.

Britain has long since stopped supporting Arab unity. After having encouraged the creation of the League, she found that British policy in certain Arab countries was seen as the League's main stumbling-block.<sup>(1)</sup> The change of British policy was due to the change of regime in Egypt, in July 1952, and Egyptian leadership of the Arab movement since the end of the Second World War. This movement is a threat to British interests in the Persian Gulf, Jordan and Iraq. This became most apparent when Britain joined France and Israel in their attack against Egypt in November 1956. It is not impossible that the underlying aim of

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(1) Gabriel Puaux, "La Ligue Arabe", Revue de Paris, April, 1956, p. 72: "Ainsi celle-ci, qui a suggéré et encouragé la création de la Ligue Arabe, s'est trouvée contrainte de constater que son intervention dans quelques-uns des Etats Arabes devait apparaître comme l'un des principaux obstacles à l'harmonieux équilibre et à la vitalité de cette organisation."

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this action was to weaken or even overthrow Nasser.

During the height of the crisis, Eden said:

"Fear had been gradually spreading in these Middle Eastern lands while the Egyptian Government under Colonel Nasser sought to establish its dominion over them all. As a consequence, the danger of an outbreak of war, which would have spread through the whole of the Middle East - make no mistake about that - was immediate and menacing. It was not only a question of the Arab-Israel conflict, which has been with us since the armistice of 1949. Graver still in the long run, both for our interests and for peace, was the growing military power of the Egyptian dictator, framing plans of conquest which he has never attempted to conceal." (2)

This was the same Eden who had made the Mansion House speech in favour of Arab unity in 1941. The change which had taken place was that of the Arab movement itself. It now aimed at a complete change of the status quo in the Middle East.

The United States had originally welcomed the idea of Arab unity and the creation of the League of Arab States in

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(1) "As far as London is concerned, the impression one has is that the Government is still thinking in terms of trying to isolate Egypt and Syria from the other Arab States. There still seems to be the hope, for instance, that if we are sufficiently aloof and unbending towards Colonel Nasser he will either be removed by his own people or will feel so out in the cold that he will make big concessions,...", Manchester Guardian, "Western Powers Should Help Arab Unity", October 18, 1957.

(2) Quoted in The Observer, November 18, 1956.

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1945. The pro-Zionist Truman policy, in the election year of 1948 and thereafter, introduced certain changes in the policy of the United States towards the Arab world. The United States, at first, looked upon the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 with favour. But the Egyptian reaction to the Baghdad Pact; the Egyptian-Soviet arms deal in September, 1955; Egypt's recognition of Communist China; the Egyptian and Syrian policy of "positive neutralism"; and Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal, changed American views. The Eisenhower Doctrine, which was the first precise American Arab policy and the official entry of the United States into the Arab world, did not meet Arab views about Israel and backed one group of Arab States against the other. American policy-makers have now come to think of Arab unity

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- (1) William Phillips, Special Assistance to the Secretary of State, at a dinner in New York in honour of the Regent of Iraq on June 2, 1945 said:  
"We welcome the development of Arab co-operation and are confident that the strengthening of the ties between the various Arab countries will not only be to their common benefit but will, also, enable them to make important and constructive contributions to the great tasks awaiting the United Nations." Department of State Bulletin, June 3, 1945.

(1)  
as implying Arab 'rapprochement' with the Soviet Union.  
They fear that the change of regimes which is advocated by the Arab movement might remove one of their greatest allies - the reigning family in Saudi Arabia, and would, therefore, endanger their oil interests. They are, also, for domestic as well as international reasons determined to maintain the existence of Israel - a State which America has helped to erect as well as to maintain.

France has always been a bitter enemy of the movement for Arab unity in its old as well as modern form. This (2)

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- (1) The New York Times, July 29, 1957, editorial, "Another Balcony Caesar", commenting on the celebrations in Egypt of the anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution, "The significance of this week-long demonstration should not be lost on either the West or Nasser's neighbours. In keeping with his oft-expressed ambitions, he again extolled his concept of Arab 'nationalism' reaching 'from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf' on which he proposes to build his pan-Arabic and ultimately a pan-Islamic empire. He paid homage to Soviet Russia for supplying him with arms and for ending the Israeli-British-French military intervention with an 'ultimatum' and he denounced the West, including the United States, for trying to hamper his schemes by political and economic pressures. In another editorial, on August 19, 1957, the N.Y.T. associates the idea of Arab nationalism with the qualifications of "pro-Soviet", "pro-Communist", etc... when speaking about the Oman crisis, "It has been organised by the Arab League dominated by Nasser and is signed not only by Egypt but, also, by Soviet-armed Yemen and pro-Soviet Syria, now controlled by a pro-Communist clique that is waging diplomatic war against the United States."
- (2) See the intervention of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Pineau, in the First Committee of the United Nations, on February 5, 1957, for a severe attack on the Arab movement for unity.

hatred has been confirmed by the Nationalist movements in North Africa, which have led to the independence of Morocco and Tunisia, and now threaten Algeria.<sup>(1)</sup> Observers of French politics are generally agreed that France went to war against Egypt in November 1956 to do away with Nasser's regime, which symbolizes the movement for Arab unity, and supports the Algerian movement for Liberation. France is thinking about the possibilities of a North African Federation which might be included in some sort of French Union as well as in N.A.T.O. and does not want the Arab movement to upset her plans. She is, at present, benefiting from the pro-Western attitudes of some North African leaders<sup>(2)</sup> such

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- (1) The former French Governor of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle, has said: "Je serais tenté de dire que l'Algérie n'est qu'un objet, voire une occasion, qu'elle prend place dans un grand rêve - mais l'histoire est faite de rêves qui deviennent réalités - attache à la conception d'un empire arabe unissant l'Orient à l'Atlantique, perspective qui exclut fatalement l'Occident et singulièrement la France." Le Monde, March 3, 1956.
- (2) Al-Istiqlal, a weekly organ of the Moroccan Istiqlal Party (Independence) appearing in French, wrote in its editorial of April 20, 1957, "Nous n'avons, à ce jour, cessé de reporter, à tous les échelons de la hiérarchie nationale, que nous entendions construire, avec elle (France) l'avenir et la prospérité de l'Afrique du Nord". Moulay Hassan, the Crown Prince of Morocco, declared during one of his visits to Paris, "Si le Maroc doit choisir, il est assez grand pour le faire. Mais il ne peut faire qu'une politique inscrite dans le contexte occidentale, c'est-à-dire dans le contexte franco-marocain." - Le Monde, December 11, 1956. This statement and many other similar ones should not be taken literally because they are, at times, merely political moves in view of an Algerian solution. Moulay Hassan, for instance, declared on the same day as the above, "Morocco is an Arab and Muslim country which must co-ordinate its foreign policy with that of the Muslim and Arab countries." Al-Alan, Rabat, December 9, 1956.

as Bourguiba, fears that a wave of Arabism may render these leaders useless. In this respect, France is backed by the United States who places much hope on Bourguiba,<sup>(1)</sup> whom they look upon as a potential leader of a North African Federation including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and maybe Libya. A federation which could serve as a counterweight to Nasser's influence in the Arab world, and which would safeguard Western military and economic interests in the Mediterranean.<sup>(2)</sup>

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- (1) In January, 1957, Bourguiba declared, "Du fond du coeur et après réflexion, je déclare que l'intérêt de la Tunisie est d'adhérer à la nouvelle politique américaine" - quoted in Le Monde, January 13-14, 1957, p. 4. See, also, the article of Bourguiba in Foreign Affairs, July 1957, entitled "Nationalism: Antidote to Communism", in which he writes on p. 649: "From the very first stirrings of their independence movement, North Africans have had a latent tradition of democratic liberalism which binds them to the nations of the free world" and again, on p. 650: "As for Tunisia, it has chosen unequivocally to follow the free world of the West." See, also, the statement of Bourguiba on his becoming the first President of the Tunisian Republic, "I have gone on record before, Tunisia is part of the free Western world and she will remain so. The new Government policies are my policies; members of the new Cabinet are my secretaries of state, not independent ministers, and they will carry out my policies." The New York Times, August 2, 1957; see ibid., July 27, 1957, editorial, "A New Arab Republic".
- (2) The New York Times, July 29, 1957, in an editorial about Nasser's policy, "However, he now faces two new forces trying to check him. One, to the east, is represented by King Saudi...The other, to the west, is represented by President Bourguiba of Tunisia, who is pressing for a North African Federation independent of Nasser's projected empire. The policies of these two dissimilar rulers cross at some points the policy lines of Western nations. But, in so far as they work to stop Nasser and his Communist allies, they deserve Western support."

France has also shown, as a result of her hatred for the Arab movement, much friendship to Israel. Mollet said in March 1957:

"To speak of aid to Israel at this time is a vain word. There has never been a time when it was more urgent for all free men who care for justice and democracy to demonstrate their solidarity with the gallant people of Israel." (1)

On January 21, 1957, when the United Nations' General Assembly voted on a resolution calling for the evacuation of Israeli troops from Egyptian territory, 74 nations voted in favour of the resolution and two against - Israel and France. The following statement of General Dayan of Israel is, also, noteworthy:

"Notre victoire est due en majeure partie à l'équipement de l'armée israélienne pour lequel nous devons de la gratitude à la France, à cette nation qui de toutes est la plus amicale à notre égard...qui a compris le véritable caractère du dictateur Egyptien avant les autres nations." (2)

The Soviet Union used to look upon the movement for Arab unity as a British attempt to control the Middle East. When the aims of the Arab movement changed, and consequently the policies of the West, Soviet policy underwent a corresponding change from an anti to a pro-Arab unity outlook.

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(1) Quoted in The Observer, March 24, 1957.

(2) Le Monde, December 18, 1956.

The Soviet Union knows now like everyone else that the Arab movement is based on a determination to do away with the remnants of Western imperialism. She is happy to encourage such a movement and hopes to replace Western influence by concluding arms deals, economic and commercial agreements with some of the Arab countries. The Soviet Union which had been one of the earliest countries to recognise Israel is now the first one to use its veto in the Security Council in favour of the Arabs. The new Soviet policy was outlined in the resolution of the Twentieth Communist Congress of November 24, 1956:

"The desire of the peoples of the Arab countries to defend and strengthen their national independence, a desire which is becoming greater, corresponds to the cause of strengthening peace and democracy. The twentieth congress notes with satisfaction that friendly and good neighbourly relations have been established between the Soviet Union and almost all the countries neighbouring it."

For the first time, on November 23, 1955, a Soviet official visited the headquarters of the League of Arab States in Cairo, when the Russian ambassador in Cairo, Daniel Solod, was received by Raif Bellana, acting Secretary-General of the League. After this visit, Bellana made the following comment: "In any case, the present attitude of the Soviet Union consists in supporting the Arabs." <sup>(1)</sup> In January 1956,

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(1) See, La Bourse Egyptienne, November 24, 1955.

Khrushchev declared: "worthy of condemnation are the actions of Israel, which from the first days of its existence began to threaten its neighbours and pursues an unfriendly policy towards them."<sup>(1)</sup> A soviet-Egyptian communique released on June 23, 1956, after talks between Nasser and Shepilov, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated, "Mr. Shepilov and Mr. Gamal Abdel Nasser have arrived at a total identity of views on the questions which they have examined during their talks."<sup>(2)</sup> Two days later, during a banquet offered in his honour by the President of the Syrian Republic, Shepilov said:

"Je vais vous révéler le secret de ma mission dans le Proche-Orient: l'U.R.S.S. ne possède pas de bases militaires dans cette région parce qu'elle est en principe opposée à l'établissement de bases militaires en territoire étranger. Elle ne cherche pas à obtenir des concessions, pétrolières ou autres, parce qu'elle est par nature hostile à toute sorte d'asservissement et d'exploitation économique. Elle ne vise pas non plus à semer la discorde entre les pays arabes, mais elle appuie tout rapprochement et toute collaboration entre les pays arabes frères qui parlent la même langue et qui ont une civilisation et des intérêts communs."<sup>(3)</sup>

The last passage of Shepilov's statement sounds like an echo of Eden's speech on Arab unity fifteen years earlier.

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(1) Manchester Guardian, January 16, 1956.

(2) Le Monde, June 24-25, 1956.

(3) Ibid., June 26, 1956.

It is clear that the Arab movement will meet opposition from the Western Powers in its attempts to unite the Arab countries. To be successful any new move for Arab unity will have either (1) to seek international approval, (2) to be a gradual one by making use of the existing League of Arab States, or (3) to be limited geographically. The first possibility could be foreseen only if Western and Soviet influence in the Middle East neutralise each other by coming to terms on an agreed policy so as to permit the local forces to operate freely as was the case for some time with the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century. The only handicap here would be the existence of Israel on the one hand, and the opposition of certain indigenous elements. The possibility of a gradual Arab union through the use of the League is unlikely because this organisation represents a black period of Arab history. The third alternative is more likely; this form of Arab union could prepare the ground for a more comprehensive Arab unification through the grouping of four major portions of the Arab world:

- (a) The Fertile Crescent which would include Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and eventually Lebanon;
- (b) The Arabian Peninsula;
- (c) The Nile Valley;
- (d) North Africa.

These four units could constitute four Arab Federations to be merged later into one Arab Confederation.

Fertile Crescent unity is natural because the countries within this area have much in common and have experienced identical forms of administration, culture, and traditions in the past. Ethnologically they are closer to each other than to any other Arab group. Fertile Crescent union has been opposed since the Second World War by the anti-Hashimites on the ground that it was an imperialistic scheme of the British advanced by Nuri Said. <sup>(1)</sup> The main obstacles to this form of union are the dynastic interests of the Hashimites who will not be willing to let themselves be submerged by Syrian leadership, and the preference of Egypt for a total Arab union although not an integral one. Egypt would prefer a union which would maintain the independence of all the Arab States and which would simply unify and co-ordinate the foreign, defence, educational, and possibly economic policies of these sovereign States. <sup>(2)</sup> She would, also, like to maintain her leadership of the Arab movement without submerging her individuality.

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- (1) Hafidh al-Janali of the Syrian Ba'ath Party has said that his party was in favour of Fertile Crescent Union but that unfortunately it could not plead in its favour for the moment because it has been associated with Hashimite and imperialistic schemes. (Interview in Damascus, December 19, 1955).
- (2) The recent Syrian-Egyptian agreements about a unified military command fall within the aims of this Egyptian policy. There is not any serious contemplation of a Syro-Egyptian Federation because these two countries have no common frontiers and their economies are more competitive than complementary.

The Union of the Nile Valley is quite possible in the long run especially if it is understood to be a step in the direction of a larger Arab Confederation. The Sudan as a newly-independent nation is likely to be mistrustful at first, but this could disappear once it has enjoyed a period of "full independence and sovereignty". The only obstacle to the union of the Nile Valley is a psychological one because of the previous relationship between the Sudan and Egypt which has appeared domineering to the former.

The federation of the Arabian Peninsula might be much slower, by reason of Western oil interests and local royalties as well as of the rivalries between British and American oil companies. A major obstacle here would be Britain whose most important remaining interests in the area are in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, political consciousness is lagging in this part of the Arab world.

A North African Federation is not impossible and might come about as a solution to the Algerian problem. It would probably start as a Franco-Maghrebi co-operation, but would sooner or later participate in the larger movement for Arab unity. In the long run, it might even prove worthwhile for Arab unity to make use of the present Western support for a North African Federation because it might come faster than if it were faced with international opposition. The

Union of North Africa once accomplished could not be expected to remain long under French influence for the same reasons which have not permitted Britain to dominate the League of Arab States for any length of time, and because Algeria once independent is very likely to be much more embittered against France than the two former French Protectorates.

Until some such scheme of union comes about, it is most likely that the League of Arab States will be maintained, because no-one will suggest its abolition unless some other form of Arab co-operation is put forward. It is possible that a small, localised war in the Middle East, either as a result of East-West rivalries or as an outcome of the Arab-Israeli conflict, might well speed up an Arab "prise de conscience" and thereby bring about some form of Arab union which could replace the Arab League as the United Nations replaced the League of Nations.

All that has been said so far has been of a political nature. But there is, also, an obstacle to Arab unity in an intellectual and spiritual Arab crisis. There is, at present an undeniably strong Arab nationalist movement, but, outside of the political sphere, no-one knows what this movement represents exactly. Much of the instability in the Arab world today has to be sought in the lack of a definite Arab "doctrine". The Arab renaissance is still

entangled with Islamic reform, and, for a long time to come, Arab nationalism will maintain its Islamic flavour. Nasser, the protagonist of the Arab movement today, has written:

"Can we ignore the existence of an Islamic world, with which we are united by bonds created not only by religious belief, but, also, reinforced by historic realities?" (1)

Arab nationalism is still proud of its Islamic tradition. It is true that some have suggested a secularization of Arab Muslim society through a mere "change of epitaph":

"It would be misleading to overemphasize the rootlessness of a modern secular Arab nation or to exaggerate the dichotomy between an Arab and an Islamic tradition. In many instances little more is required than a change of epithet. Thus, instead of being referred to as a religious saint, Caliph Omar is referred to as a national hero." (2)

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- (1) Egypt's Liberation, The Philosophy of the Revolution, p. 86, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., (1955). Anwar Sadate, Editor of Al-Gounhouriah, the official Egyptian newspaper, has said in a lecture delivered at Al-Azhar on November 23, 1955: "The Egyptian Revolution will see to the realization not only of the Egyptian or Arab aspirations but to the aspirations of the whole Muslim world."
- (2) Hazen Zaki Nuseibeh, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, p.62, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y. (1956); the same author, also, suggests (p.62) a change in the interpretation of Arab history, "A modern Arab nationalist, if true to his nationalist creed, would have to reassess and re-interpret the historical verdict of his forefathers on the record of the Umayyads. In the light of modern nationalist categories, what was once condemned in the Umayyads as villainous secularism must now be lauded as praiseworthy nationalism, for the foundation of Umayyad policy was the Arab-state principle; and Arab fortunes went down with the demise of the Umayyads." (This footnote is continued below on p. 443).

Such simplifications only muddle the issues facing Arab thinkers. Secularization might be a good thing in itself (it has proved to be so in some parts of the world); the question, however, is whether it will be feasible in the Arab world, and, if so, how long a process should it be. . Some form of secularization has already begun in the Arab countries, but it is the product of the "elite" rather than an aspiration of the bulk of the population. The constitutions of Iraq, Jordan and Egypt still recognise Islam as a state religion; <sup>(1)</sup> Article 3 of the Syrian Constitution says that Islamic law shall be the main source of legislation. <sup>(2)</sup> When the present trends of secularization in the

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(continuation of footnote 2, p.442).

Nuseibeh's suggestions are nicely answered by his own words on p. 67, "Theorists of Arab nationalism, under the spell of Western ideas, have made no serious attempt to accommodate Western experience to their own historical background and environment. In most instances they have glossed over the whole issue as being too delicate and embarrassing, or they have advocated the secularization of national life in deference to modern progressive ideas and the need to keep pace with the rest of the world."

- (1) Article 13 of the Iraqi Constitution (as amended on October 27, 1943); Law No. 3 of 1947 of the Jordanian Constitution of December 7, 1946 - See, Helen M. Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws...in the Near and Middle East, Durham, N.C., (1953).
- (2) The preamble of the Syrian Constitution reads, "...We also declare that our people are determined to cement the ties of friendship and co-operation with the peoples of the Muslim and the Arab world, and to build their modern state on those sound ethical bases advocated by Islam and the other theistic religions and to combat atheism and moral decadence." Ibid., p. 403.

Arab world are compared with the earlier orientation of the first Arab nationalist activities, one has to conclude, as Albert Hourani has done when speaking of the trends of secular nationalism in Egypt, that:

"The old secular nationalism which inspired the original Wafd as it inspired Ataturk is weaker than it was, and the new social democracy of Western Europe seems scarcely to be born." (1)

The new trends of Arab nationalism should not be understood as a step "backward", on the contrary, they have to be appreciated as a desire by Arab leaders to adapt Arab nationalism to the local social and spiritual forces rather than copy Western principles. In other words, the "Levantines" are leaving room in the Arab world for a new class of intellectuals who are realising that you can not imitate foreign institutions and political theories. These Arab nationalists, Muslim and Christian alike, are aware of this situation throughout the Arab world, and are agreed that the Arab movement, to be successful, has to rest on religion. Abderrahman al-Bazzas says that as long as Islam "remains a political

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(1) Albert Hourani, "The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement", in Middle East Journal, Summer 1955, p. 250.

religion, it will not necessarily contradict Arab nationalism".<sup>(1)</sup> Constantine Zurayk, a Christian Arab and the President of the American University in Beirut, is reported to have said:

"True nationalism (pan-Arabism) can in no case contradict the true religion... it is the duty of every Arab, of whatever sect or religion he may be, to give an importance to his past culture and his new renaissance - and this care is one of the duties which his nationalism dictates. He should study Islam and understand its true meaning and respect the memory of the great Prophet to whom Islam was revealed."<sup>(2)</sup>

It is doubtful whether one could find a Christian outside of the Arab world who would speak of Islam as a "revealed" religion. Nabih Faris stresses the hold which Islam still has on the majority of the Arabs and maintains that, "the truth is that the masses of any Arab country look at those of other Arab countries as brothers united by religion first and Arabism secondly."<sup>(3)</sup>

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(1) Islam and Arab Nationalism, p. 20, Baghdad (1952), in Arabic. Al-Bazzaz adds, on p. 45, "The national (pan-Arab) form of Government which we are aiming at does not in any small or large way conflict with the spirit of Islam"; p. 49, "An Arab nationalism devoid of the spirit of Islam is like a body without a soul."

(2) Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 50-1

(3) N.A. Faris, This is the Arab World, in Arabic, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-8.

Having realized the profound hold of Islam on the Arabs, the theorists of Arab nationalism have proceeded on the assumption that the cultural and intellectual contents of Islam can easily be carried over into Arabism and allow for some form of gradual secularism. But they overlook how the hold of Islam on the ordinary Muslim Arab is more spiritual and psychological than intellectual. Here again, the gulf between the "elite" and the "masses" has not yet been overcome. Whereas the first think of Mohamed as a national hero, the Koran as a literary achievement, and Islamic civilisation as an Arab product; the second see Mohamed as the "Seal of the Prophets", the Koran as the revealed word of God, and Islamic civilisation as the product of the way of life prescribed by Islam.<sup>(1)</sup> This difference of interpretation is the outcome of the process of Westernisation<sup>(2)</sup> which has had such an impact on the "elite".

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(1) See, N.A. Faris, op. cit., pp. 204-215 for a detailed comparison between the assumptions of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism.

(2) Raphael Patai, "The Dynamics of Westernization", in the Middle East Journal, Vol 9, No. 1, 1955, p. 5: "Westernization, in its impact upon the traditional Middle Eastern social structure, resulted in a widening of the distance between the top and the bottom layers of society... the culture of the upper class (prior to the impact of Westernization) was identical in kind with the culture of the masses. Thus, there existed what can be termed a lower class-upper class cultural continuum. This continuum was disrupted with the impact of Westernization, which hit first and foremost the upper class. Members of this class, to the extent to which they were attracted to Western culture, ceased to be creators, inspirers, (This footnote is continued below on p.447).

For the Arab intellectual, "Islam would seem to become something to be proud of, rather than something to be lived."<sup>(1)</sup>

The Arab movement is doing its best to rid itself of political and economic vestiges of Western imperialism. In the cultural sphere it would be erroneous to speak of "imperialism", but one may say that the Arab world has not yet produced an authentically indigenous product and is still too much under the spell of its contact with the West. Psychologically this is the outcome of an inferiority complex which might be overcome with more self-assurance once a victory has been scored on the political level. This is the major failure of the Arab world - a twofold failure which surpasses the political blunders. On the one hand, if Arab thinkers had properly understood Western culture and civilisation, they would have understood that it is the outcome of Western social, economic, and political forces which have been at work for centuries, and that such a heritage can not be transplanted or even grafted into an alien body. On the other hand, in their attempt to west-

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(Continuation of footnote 2, p.446).

and consumers of native cultural products. The local culture became to all practical purposes non-existent for them, and they became avid consumers in all fields of importations from the countries of the West". See, also, Habib Amin Kurani, "Islamic and Western Thought in the Arab World", in Near Eastern Culture and Society, p. 162, Young (ed), Princetown, (1951).

- (1) W.C. Smith, "The Intellectuals in the Modern Development of the Islamic World", in Social Forces in the Middle East, Fisher (ed.), Cornell University Press (1955), p. 199.

ernize the Arab world, the Arab "elite" has not made a great effort to appreciate the local forces operating within the Arab world itself and has too often dismissed them as "backward", "traditional", or "static". The constant political tension in the Arab world and the urgency of everyday problems has not allowed the Arab countries to think about their intellectual crisis in any comprehensive fashion. In this sense, political liberation can be seen as a means to solve bigger and more important problems.

To this day the Arab movement is still part of a larger Islamic movement. The majority of Arab nationalists assume that there is an Arab society as distinct from an Islamic one. In fact, however, it might be closer to the truth to speak of an Arab community within an Islamic Society, as one should speak of an Arab culture within an Islamic civilization. Politically and socially the community interests are preponderant, but in the spiritual and intellectual realm the interests of the society prevail. The confusion in the Arab world today is about the existence of these two entities. The pan-Arabs see them as distinct and the pan-Muslims think that they should be identical.

The Islamic movement has not died down in the Arab world although it has suffered a political set-back as a result of the association between some of the Islamic

countries with the West in the Baghdad Pact; and from the activities of reactionary organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhoods. Many of the pan-Arabs are in some sense pan-Muslims without realizing it as when they preach in favour of Arab unity as a step in the direction of Islamic solidarity. They argue that Islamic unity, at present, is quite unpractical and that, in the meantime, one should settle for an Arab union which would facilitate an eventual grouping of all the Islamic countries.<sup>(1)</sup> The strength of Islam as a political factor is still noticed today in public pronouncements of Arab leaders. Sabri Assali, when Prime Minister of Syria, declared that his Government "would reinforce the relations between the Arab nation and the Islamic peoples".<sup>(2)</sup> Fadhil El-Jamali, Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs, said:

"Arab nationalism derives from Islam, and Islam is the message of the Arab Nation to the world at large. We can not imagine how a young man can claim Arab nationalism and disavow Islam. If he abandons Islam he would have abandoned the best in Arab nationalism...Our Arab nationalism is not an atheist nationalism."<sup>(3)</sup>

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- (1) See, N. Faris, op. cit., pp. 205-212. The Muslim Brothers made it known that they were supporting Arab unity as a step forward toward Muslim unity - See, Al-Ahram, Cairo, October 9, 1952.
- (2) Le Monde, June 29, 1956.
- (3) Al-Alan, Rabat, July 9, 1956.

The Sultan of Morocco has stated:

"Depuis que l'Islam a répandu ses lumières dans ce pays, il a cimenté l'union de ses habitants, en a fait une nation puissante et solidaire qu'aucune force au monde ne pourrait diviser."(1)

In the ceremonies which preceded the announcement by Nasser of the new Egyptian Constitution, "proceedings were opened by the chanting of verses from the Koran, interrupted frequently by cries of appreciation from the audience - much as elsewhere in the civilised world a crooner is interrupted by the shrieks of the swooning."(2).

The average Muslim Arab is loyal to an Arab movement for unity because he is aware that this movement is not only compatible with, but, also, inspired from, a greater Islamic movement. If one asks whether the Arab movement would still be supported if it were to disavow any contact with Islam as a religion, it becomes clear that there is not yet any large degree of loyalty to "Arabism" by itself. Compact societies such as Islam are not transformed within decades, nor are they radically changed when a transformation appears on the surface:

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(1) Le Monde, July 13, 1956.

(2) The Manchester Guardian, January 17, 1956.

"The Islamic society was the heir of the oldest and most stable societies in the world. Its peoples, including the Arabs, have inherited what we may call a social sense - a capacity for preserving the social balance under even the worst calamities... Such a society will not readily place the lives and happiness of its people at the mercy of experimenters with this or that new idea."(1)

The future of the Arab world and the Arab movement rests on a change of the application of Islamic principles which has not evolved with social and political changes. This is to say that the theoretical foundations of Islam are at the root of the problems facing the Islamic society today. (2) The cause of backwardness is due to a schism between the "elite" and the "masses" and, also, to a break between the "moderns" and the "traditionalists". As the impact of Westernization will make itself less felt among the "moderns" and more so among the "traditionalists", communication between the two groups will become easier. "In the final resort, the movement for political and economic unity in the Arab world cannot succeed unless it is based upon stable moral foundations; and in the Arab world, the only moral foundations which can possess any

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(1) H.A.R. Gibb, "Social Change in the Near East", in The Near East, p. 61, F. Ireland, ed. Chicago (1942).

(2) "The whole future development of the Arab countries depends on a change in the spirit of Islam; not its theoretical formulations, but the living creative spirit which moulds the life of the Islamic community." Albert Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World, op. cit., p. 123.

stability are those cemented by the faith and ethic of  
(1)  
Islam."

In the meantime, it can not be expected that the Arab world will proceed very far until it has found stable moral foundations - in short: a doctrine. If the Arabs are to reassert themselves they have first to establish a coherent continuity with their past heritage:

"Never has mankind been able to maintain a level of culture which it had once attained", says Karl Mannheim, "without establishing some sort of continuity with the bearers of the older cultural heritage and their technique of rationalization and sublimation. Just as a revolution, however radical, should not destroy the machinery of production, if there is not to be a relapse into backward standards of living, so the bearers of the accumulated cultural heritage cannot be cast aside if one wants to avoid a cultural catastrophe."(2)

Viewed from this standpoint and compared with the more substantial problems confronting the Arab world, the League of Arab States can be seen as a little experiment or as a first step in the dark. The cultural and spiritual often enlightens the political but the reverse is rarely true.

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(1) H.A.R. Gibb, "Toward Arab Unity", in Foreign Affairs, October, 1945, p. 129.

(2) Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, p. 227, London, (1940).

## A P P E N D I C E S

- (A) NURI SAID'S FERTILE CRESCENT SCHEME.
- (B) ALEXANDRIA PROTOCOL.
- (C) CHARTER OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES.
- (D) SESSIONS OF THE LEAGUE'S COUNCIL.

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GENERAL NURI AL-SAID'S FERTILE CRESCENT SCHEME

(DECEMBER 1942) \*

In my view the only fair solution, and indeed the only hope of securing permanent peace, contentment and progress in these Arab areas is for the United Nations to declare now:-

(1) That Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan shall be reunited into one State.

(2) That the form of government of this State, whether monarchical or republican whether unitary or federal, shall be decided by the peoples of this State themselves.

(3) That there shall be created an Arab League to which Iraq and Syria will adhere at once and which can be joined by the other Arab States at will.

(4) That this Arab League shall have a permanent Council nominated by the member States, and presided over by one of the rulers of the States who shall be chosen in a manner acceptable to the States concerned.

(5) The Arab League Council shall be responsible for the following:-

- (a) Defence.
- (b) Foreign Affairs.
- (c) Currency.
- (d) Communications.
- (e) Customs.
- (f) Protection of Minority rights.

(6) The Jews in Palestine shall be given semi-autonomy. They shall have the right to their own rural and urban district administration including schools, health institutes, and police subject to general supervision by the Syrian State.

(7) Jerusalem shall be a city to which members of all religions shall have free access for pilgrimage and worship. A special commission composed of represent-

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\* Source: General Nuri-al-Sa'id, Arab Independence and Unity (Baghdad, 1943), pp. 11-12. Text as found in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near & Middle East, vol.II, p.236.

atives of the three theocratic religions shall be set up to ensure this.

(8) That if they demand it, the Maronities in the Lebanon shall be granted a privileged regime such as they possessed during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. This special regime like those to be set up in paragraphs 6 and 7 above shall rest on an International Guarantee.

It is possible in the manner suggested above to create a Confederation of Arab States including Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan at the beginning, to which other Arab States may later adhere, then a great many of the difficulties which have faced Great Britain and France in the Near East during the past two decades will disappear. The Arabs of Palestine at present fear that they will become a minority in a Jewish State, and therefore bitterly oppose the grant of special rights to the Jews, but this hostility would be allayed if Palestine became part of a large strong Arab State. The Jews could establish their National Home in those parts of Palestine, where they are now the majority with a greater feeling of security, because there would be more goodwill on the part of their Arab neighbours, and as a semi-autonomous community in a much larger State their economic opportunities would increase.

The British Empire is not founded on negations but on positive ideals. Free institutions and free co-operation give it a living force of tremendous strength. Upon this foundation of free co-operation a true union of many diverse peoples and countries has been formed, depending less upon stipulations and statistics and more upon the nobler and more permanent principles which are written on the heart and conscience of man. If an opportunity is given to the Arab peoples to establish such a free co-operation among themselves they will be prepared to deal generously with all the Jews living in their midst whether in Palestine or elsewhere. Conditions and guarantees there must be, but let them not constitute a dead hand lest they become a dead letter, as so many minority provisions in European constitutions became during the past twenty years.

If my proposals meet with favour they will require

careful examination, so that the appropriate steps are taken at the right time and in the right order. Obviously, the union of the various parts of historic Syria must come first. It may at first take the form of a federation of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan, each state continuing its own local administration, leaving defence, foreign relations, currency and customs to the Central Government. On the other hand it may be found possible to unite Syria at once, making provision for the Jewish enclaves and the Jerusalem regime at the same time. Steps should be taken at once to define these enclaves for this purpose it would be necessary to prepare an accurate ethnographic map of Palestine showing the number of Arabs and Jews in each Nahya and town, also, a map on the same scale showing the land under cultivation and the land which can be cultivated intensely in the future. An inquiry should also be made as to the number of Jews who have settled in Palestine since the outbreak of the war in September, 1939.

To secure Arab union sacrifices of sovereignty and vested interests may have to be made. Similar sacrifices have been made in the British Dominions and can be equally demanded from Arab leaders.

I have throughout assumed that as France before the war declared that she was prepared to grant independence to Syria and the Lebanon she will not be allowed by the United Nations to repudiate her offers, nor to obstruct any federation of Arab States by insisting on old privileges or antiquated rights.

(1)  
THE ALEXANDRIA PROTOCOL.

The undersigned, chiefs and members of Arab delegations at the Preliminary Committee of the General Arab Conference, viz:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PRELIMINARY COMMITTEE.

H.E. Mustafa Al-Nahhas Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs; head of the Egyptian delegation;

SYRIAN DELEGATION.

H.E. Sa'dallah Al-Jabiri, Syrian Prime Minister and head of the Syrian delegation;

H.E. Jamil Mardam Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

H.E. Dr. Nagib Al-Armanazi, Secretary General of the Presidency of the Syrian Republic;

H.E.M. Sabri Al-Asali, deputy of Damascus;

TRANS-JORDINIAN DELEGATION.

H.E. Tawfiq Abdul-Huda Pasha, Trans-Jordanian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, head of the Trans-Jordanian delegation;

H.E. Sulayman Sukkar Bey, Financial Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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(1) This protocol was drawn up at the end of the Conference on October 7, 1944.

IRAQI DELEGATION.

H.E. Hamdi Al-Bahjaji, Iraqi Prime Minister and head of the Iraqi delegation;

H.E. Arshad Al-'Umari, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

H.E. Nuri Al-Sa'id, former Iraqi Prime Minister;

H.E. Tahsin Al-'Askari, Iraqi Minister Plenipotentiary in Egypt;

LEBANESE DELEGATION.

H.E. Riyad Al-Sulh Bey, Lebanese Prime Minister and head of the Lebanese delegation;

H.E. Salim Taqla Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

H.E. Musa Mubarak, Chief of the Presidential Cabinet;

EGYPTIAN DELEGATION.

H.E. Nagib Al-Hilali Pasha, Minister of Education;

H.E. Muhammad Sabri Aub-'Alan Pasha, Minister of Justice;

H.E. Muhammade Salah-Al-Din Bey, Under Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab countries and to direct them toward the welfare of the Arab world, to improve its conditions, insure its future, and realize its hopes and aspirations,

And in response to Arab public opinion in all Arab countries,

Have met in Alexandria from Shawwal 8, 1363 (September 25, 1944) to Shawwal 20, 1363 (October 7, 1944) in the form of a Preliminary Committee of the General Arab Conference, and have agreed as follows:

## 1. LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES.

A League will be formed of the independent Arab States which consent to join the League. It will have a council which will be known as the "Council of the League of Arab States" in which all participating states will be represented on an equal footing.

The object of the League will be to control the execution of the agreements which the above states will conclude; to hold periodic meetings which will strengthen the relations between these states; to co-ordinate their political plans so as to insure their co-operation, and protect their independence and sovereignty against every aggression by suitable means; and to supervise in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.

The decisions of the Council will be binding on those who have accepted them except in cases where a disagreement arises between two member states of the League in which the two parties shall refer their dispute to the Council for solution. In this case the decision of the Council of the League will be binding.

In no case will resort to force to settle a dispute between any two member states of the League be allowed. But every state shall be free to conclude with any other member state of the League, or other powers, special agreements which do not contradict the text or spirit of the present dispositions.

In no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be prejudicial to the policy of the League or an individual member be allowed.

The Council will intervene in every dispute which may lead to war between a member state of the League and any other member state or power, so as to reconcile them.

A subcommittee will be formed of the members of the Preliminary Committee to prepare a draft of the statutes of the Council of the League and to examine the political questions which may be the object of agreement among Arab States.

2. CO-OPERATION IN ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, SOCIAL AND OTHER MATTERS.

A. The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee shall closely co-operate in the following matters:

- (1) Economic and financial matters, i.e., commercial exchange, customs, currency, agriculture, and industry.
- (2) Communications, i.e., railways, roads, aviation, navigation, posts and telegraphs.
- (3) Cultural matters.
- (4) Questions of nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgements, extradition of criminals, etc.
- (5) Social questions.
- (6) Questions of public health.

B. A subcommittee of experts for each of the above subjects will be formed in which the states which have participated in the Preliminary Committee will be represented. This subcommittee will prepare draft regulations for co-operation in the above matters, describing the extent and means of that collaboration.

C. A committee for co-ordination and editing will be formed whose object will be to control the work of the other subcommittees, to co-ordinate that part of the work which is accomplished, and to prepare drafts of agreements which will be submitted to the various governments.

D. When all the subcommittees have accomplished their work the Preliminary Committee will meet to examine the work of the subcommittees as a preliminary step toward the holding of a General Arab Conference.

3. CONSOLIDATION OF THESE TIES IN THE FUTURE.

While expressing its satisfaction at such a happy step, the Committee hopes that Arab States will be able in the future to consolidate that step by other steps, especially if post-war events should result in institutions which bind various Powers more closely together.

4. A SPECIAL RESOLUTION CONCERNING LEBANON.

The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee emphasize their respect of the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its present frontiers, which the governments of the above States have already recognized in consequence of Lebanon's adoption of an independent policy, which the Government of that country announced in its program of October 7, 1943, unanimously approved by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies.

5. A SPECIAL RESOLUTION CONCERNING PALESTINE.

A. The Committee is of the opinion that Palestine constitutes an important part of the Arab World and that the rights of the Arabs in Palestine cannot be touched without prejudice to peace and stability in the Arab World.

The Committee also is of the opinion that the pledges binding the British Government and providing for the cessation of Jewish immigration, the preservation of Arab lands, and the achievement of independence for Palestine are permanent Arab rights whose prompt implementation would constitute a step toward the desired goal and toward the stabilization of peace and security.

The Committee declares its support of the cause of the Arabs of Palestine and its willingness to work for the achievement of their legitimate aim and the safeguarding of their just rights.

The Committee also declares that it is second to none in regretting the woes which have been inflicted upon the

Jews of Europe by European dictatorial states. But the question of these Jews should not be confused with Zionsim, for there can be no greater injustice and aggression than solving the problem of the Jews in Europe by another injustice, i.e., by inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Palestine of various religions and denominations.

B. The special proposal concerning the participation of the Arab Governments and peoples in the "Arab National Fund" to safeguard the lands of the Arabs of Palestine shall be referred to the committee of financial and economic affairs to examine it from all its angles and to submit the result of that examination to the Preliminary Committee in its next meeting.

In faith of which this protocol has been signed at Faruq 1 University at Alexandria on Saturday, Shawwal 20, 1363 (October 7, 1944).

(1)

CHARTER OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC;  
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF TRANS-JORDAN;  
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF IRAQ;  
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF SAUDI ARABIA;  
HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE LEBANESE REPUBLIC;  
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF EGYPT;  
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE YEMEN;

Desirous of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States;

And anxious to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these states, and to direct their efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future, the realization of their aspirations and hopes;

And responding to the wishes of Arab public opinion in all Arab lands;

Have agreed to conclude a Pact to that end and have appointed as their representatives the persons whose names are listed hereinafter:

The President of the Syrian Republic; who has appointed as representatives for Syria: His Excellency Faris al-Khuri, Prime Minister; His Excellency Jamil Mardam Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

His Royal Highness the Amir of Trans-Jordan; who has appointed as representatives for Trans-Jordan: His Excellency Samir al-Rafa'i Pasha, Prime Minister; His Excellency Sa'id al-Mufti Pasha, Minister of the Interior; Sulayman al-Nabulusi Bey, Secretary of the Cabinet;

His Majesty the King of Iraq; who has appointed as representatives of Iraq: His Excellency Arshad al-'Unari, Minister of Foreign Affairs; His Excellency 'Ali Jawdat

al-Ayyubi, Minister Plenipotentiary of Iraq in Washington; His Excellency Tashin Al-'Askari, Minister Plenipotentiary of Iraq in Cairo;

His Majesty the King of Saudi Arabia; who has appointed as representatives for Saudi Arabia: His Excellency the Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs; His Excellency Khary-al-din al-Zirikli, Councillor of the Saudi Arabian Legation in Cairo;

His Excellency the President of the Lebanese Republic; who has appointed as representatives for Lebanon: His Excellency 'Abd-al-Hamid Karami, Prime Minister; His Excellency Yusuf Salin, Minister Plenipotentiary of Lebanon in Cairo.

His Majesty the King of Egypt; who has appointed as representatives for Egypt: His Excellency Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrashi Pasha, Prime Minister; His Excellency Muhammad Husayn Haykal Pasah, President of the Senate; His Excellency 'Abd-al-Hamid Badawi Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs; His Excellency Makram 'Ubayd Pasha, Minister of Finance; His Excellency Muhammad Hafiz Ramadan Pasha, Minister of Justice; His Excellency 'Abd-al-Razzaq Ahmade al-Sanhuri Bey, Minister of Education; Abd-al-Rahman 'Azzan Bey, Minister Plenipotentiary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the King of the Yemen; who has appointed as representatives for the Yemen: His Excellency Sayed Hussein El-Kabsi.

Who, after having exchanged their plenary powers, which were found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

#### ARTICLE 1.

The League of Arab States is composed of the independent Arab States which have signed this Pact,

Any independent Arab State has the right to become a member of the League. It is desirous to do so, it shall submit a request which will be deposited with the Permanent Secretariat General and submitted to the Council at the first meeting held after submission of the request.

## ARTICLE 2.

The League has as its purpose the strengthening of the relations between the member states; the co-ordination of their policies in order to achieve co-operation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. It has also as its purpose the close co-operation of the member states, with due regard to the organization and circumstances of each state, on the following matters:

- A. Economic and financial affairs, including commercial relations, customs, currency, and questions of agriculture and industry.
- B. Communications; this includes railroads, roads, aviation, navigation, telegraphs and posts.
- C. Cultural affairs.
- D. Nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgements, and extradition of criminals.
- E. Social affairs.
- F. Health problems.

## ARTICLE 3.

The League shall possess a Council composed of the representatives of the member states of the League; each state shall have a single vote, irrespective of the number of its representatives.

It shall be the task of the Council to achieve the realization of the objectives of the League and to supervise the execution of agreements which the member states have concluded on the questions enumerated in the preceding article, or on any other questions.

It likewise shall be the Council's task to decide upon the means by which the League is to co-operate with the internal bodies to be created in the future in order to guarantee security and peace and regulate economic and social relations.

ARTICLE 4.

For each of the questions listed in Article 2 there shall be set up a special committee in which the member states of the League shall be represented. These committees shall be charged with the task of laying down the principles and extent of co-operation. Such principles shall be formulated as draft agreements, to be presented to the Council for examination preparatory to their submission to the aforesaid states.

Representatives of the other Arab countries may take part in the work of the aforesaid committees. The Council shall determine the conditions under which these representatives may be permitted to participate and the rules governing such representation.

ARTICLE 5.

Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes arising between two or more member states of the League is prohibited. If there should arise among them a difference which does not concern a state's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, and if the parties to the dispute have recourse to the Council for the settlement of this difference, the decision of the Council shall then be enforceable and obligatory.

The Council shall mediate in all differences which threaten to lead to war between two member states, or a member state and a third state, with a view to bringing about their reconciliation.

Decisions of arbitration and mediation shall be taken by majority vote.

ARTICLE 6.

In case of aggression or threat of aggression by one state against a member state, the state which has been attacked or threatened with aggression may demand the immediate convocation of the Council.

The Council shall by unanimous decision determine the measures necessary to repulse the aggression. If the aggressor is a member state, his vote shall not be counted in determining unanimity.

If, as a result of the attack, the government of the state attacked finds itself unable to communicate with the Council, that state's representative in the Council shall have the right to request the convocation of the Council for the purpose indicated in the foregoing paragraph. In the event that this representative is unable to communicate with the Council, any member state of the League shall have the right to request the convocation of the Council.

#### ARTICLE 7.

Unanimous decisions of the Council shall be binding upon all member states of the League; majority decisions shall be binding only upon those states which have accepted them.

In either case the decisions of the Council shall be enforced in each member state according to its respective basic laws.

#### ARTICLE 8.

Each member state shall respect the systems of government established in the other member states and regard them as exclusive concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government.

#### ARTICLE 9.

States of the League which desire to establish closer co-operation and stronger bonds than are provided by this Pact may conclude agreements to that end.

Treaties and agreements already concluded or to be concluded in the future between a member state and another

state shall not be binding or restrictive upon other members.

ARTICLE 10.

The permanent seat of the League of Arab States is established in Cairo. The Council may, however, assemble at any other place it may designate.

ARTICLE 11.

The Council of the League shall convene in ordinary session twice a year, in March and in October. It shall convene in extraordinary session upon the request of two member states of the League whenever the need arises.

ARTICLE 12.

The League shall have a permanent Secretariat-General which shall consist of a Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries, and an appropriate number of officials.

The Council of the League shall appoint the Secretary-General by a majority of two-thirds of the states of the League. The Secretary-General, with the approval of the Council shall appoint the Assistant Secretaries and the principal officials of the League.

The Council of the League shall establish an administrative regulation for the functions of the Secretariat-General and matters relating to the Staff.

The Secretary-General shall have the rank of Ambassador and the Assistant Secretaries that of Ministers Plenipotentiary.

The first Secretary-General of the League is named in Annex to this Pact.

ARTICLE 13.

The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft of the budget of the League and shall submit it to the Council

for approval before the beginning of each fiscal year.

The Council shall fix the share of the expenses to be borne by each state of the League. This share may be reconsidered if necessary.

#### ARTICLE 14.

The members of the Council of the League as well as the members of the committees and the officials who are to be designated in the administrative regulation shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunity when engaged in the exercise of their functions.

The buildings occupied by the organs of the League shall be inviolable.

#### ARTICLE 15.

The first meeting of the Council shall be convened at the invitation of the head of the Egyptian Government. Thereafter it shall be convened at the invitation of the Secretary-General.

The representatives of the member states of the League shall alternately assume the presidency of the Council at each of its ordinary sessions.

#### ARTICLE 16.

Except in cases specifically indicated in this Pact, a majority vote of the Council shall be sufficient to make enforceable decisions on the following matters:

- A. Matters relating to personnel.
- B. Adoption of the budget of the League.
- C. Establishment of the administrative regulations for the Council, the committees, and the Secretariat General.
- D. Decisions to adjourn the sessions.

ARTICLE 17.

Each member state of the League shall deposit with the Secretariat-General one copy of every treaty or agreement concluded or to be concluded in the future between itself and another member state of the League or a third state.

ARTICLE 18.

If a member state contemplates withdrawal from the League, it shall inform the Council of its intention one year before such withdrawal is to go into effect.

The Council of the League may consider any state which fails to fulfill its obligations under this Pact as having become separated from the League, this to go into effect upon a unanimous decision of the states, not counting the state concerned.

ARTICLE 19.

This Pact may be amended with the consent of two-thirds of the states belonging to the League, especially in order to make firmer and stronger the ties between the member states, to create an Arab Tribunal of Arbitration, and to regulate the relations of the League with any international bodies to be created in the future to guarantee security and peace.

Final action on an amendment cannot be taken prior to the session following the session in which the motion was initiated.

If a state does not accept such an amendment it may withdraw at such time as the amendment goes into effect, without being bound by the provisions of the preceding article.

ARTICLE 20.

This Pact and its Annexes shall be ratified according to the basic laws in force among the High Contracting Parties.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretariat-General of the Council and the Pact shall become operative as regards each ratifying state fifteen days after the Secretary-General has received the instruments of ratification from four states.

This Pact has been drawn up in Cairo in the Arabic language on this 8th day of Rabi' II, thirteen hundred and sixty-four, (March 22, 1945), in one copy which shall be deposited in the safe keeping of the Secretariat-General.

An identical copy shall be delivered to each state of the League.

(Here follow the signatures).

(1) Annex Regarding Palestine.

Since the termination of the last great war the rule of the Ottoman Empire over the Arab countries, among them Palestine, which had become detached from that Empire, has come to an end. She has come to be autonomous, not subordinate to any other state.

The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her future was to be settled by the parties concerned.

However, even though she was as yet unable to control her own affairs, the Covenant of the League (of Nations) in 1919 made provision for a regime based upon recognition of her independence.

Her international existence and independence in the legal sense cannot, therefore, be questioned, any more than could the independence of the other Arab countries.

Although the outward manifestations of this independence have remained obscured for reasons beyond her control, this should not be allowed to interfere with her participation in the work of the Council of the League.

The States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League are therefore of the opinion that, considering the special circumstances of Palestine and until that country can effectively exercise its independence, the Council of the League should take charge of the selection of an Arab representative from Palestine to take part in its work.

(2) Annex Regarding Co-operation With Countries Which Are Not Members of the Council of the League.

Whereas the member states of the League will have to deal in the Council as well as in the committees with matters which will benefit and affect the Arab world at large;

And whereas the Council has to take into account the aspirations of the Arab countries which are not members of the Council and has to work toward their realization;

Now, therefore, it particularly behoves the states signatory to the Pact of the Arab League to enjoin the Council of the League, when considering the admission of those countries to participation in the committees referred to in this Pact, that it should do its utmost to co-operate with them, and furthermore, that it should spare no effort to learn their needs and understand their aspirations and hopes; and that it should work thenceforth for their best interests and the safeguarding of their future with all the political means at its disposal.

(3) Annex Regarding the Appointment of a Secretary-General of the League.

The states signatory to this Pact have agreed to appoint His Excellency Abd-ul-Rahman 'Azzan Bey, to be the Secretary-General of the League of Arab states.

This appointment is made for two years. The Council of the League shall hereafter determine the new regulations for the Secretariat-General.

Appendix (D)

MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

SESSIONS	NUMBER OF MEETINGS	NUMBER OF RESOLUTIONS PASSED.
1st: June 4 - June 16, 1945	6	4
2nd: October 31 - Dec. 14, 1945	1 4	1 7
3rd: March 25 - April 13, 1946	1 1	3 6
4th: June 8 - June 12, 1946 (Extraord)	7	2 5
5th: October 30 - Dec. 12, 1946	1 6	6 1
6th: March 17 - March 29, 1947	7	3 6
7th: October 17, 1947 - Feb. 22, 1948	1 0	3 7
8th: March 21, 1948	1	1 2
9th: November 3 - Nov. 15, 1948	5	1 6
10th: March 17 - March 21, 1948	3	2 4
11th: Oct. 17, 1949 - Feb. 15, 1950	8	3 5
12th: March 25 - June 17, 1950	7	5 1
13th: Oct. 23 - Feb. 2, 1951	3	1 4
14th: March 17 - May 19, 1951	4	2 8
15th: October 3 - October 13, 1951	3	5 6
16th: March 29 - Sept. 23, 1952	5	8 1
17th: October 1, 1952	1	2
18th: March 28 - May 1, 1953	5	8 9
19th: Sept. 7, 1953 (Extraordinary)	1	1 0
20th: Oct. 23 - March 30, 1954	1 1	1 5 8
21st: March 31 - Sept. 9, 1954	7	5 1
22nd: October 30 - Dec. 11, 1954	6	1 1 0
23rd: March 31, 1955	1	8 1

FIRST TO TWENTY-THIRD SESSIONS (JUNE 4, 1945 - MARCH 31, 1955).

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	SYRIA	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	IRAQ	SAUDI ARABIA	YEMEN	SUDAN	EGYPT	LIBYA	TUNISIA	ALGERIA	MOROCCO
OTTOMAN EMPIRE.	1 5 1 6 - 1 9 1 8					NOMINAL CONTROL		1516-1806		NOMINAL CONTROL			
BIRTH AS A NATION-STATE	1920	1925	1923 *	1920	1920	1925	1934	1955					
COLONIAL STATUS	FRENCH MANDATES 1922-1941		BRITISH MANDATE 1922-1946 1922-1948 (Israel May 1948) 1922-1932					Anglo-Egyptian Cond. 1899-1955.	Occupied. 1882. Prot. 1914-22	Ital. Colony 1911-45 Indp. 1952	French Prot. 1881-1956.	French Colony 1830	French Prot. 1912-1956
ADMISSION TO THE U.N.	OCT. 19 1945	OCT. 15 1945	1956	Israel May 11 1949	OCT. 30 1945	OCT. 24 1945	SEPT 30 1947	NOV. 1956	OCT. 22 1945	1956	NOV. 1956	--	NOV. 1956
MEMBERSHIP IN THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES.	Founding Member. 1945	F.M. 1945	F.M. 1945		F.M. 1945	F.M. 1945	F.M. 1945	1956	F.M. 1945	1953			

\* Trans-Jordan. Known as Jordan after 1950.