"All Politics is Local": How Local Context Explains Radical Right Voting

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Statement of Originality

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Abstract

People do not form their political preferences in a vacuum. They are deeply influenced by everyday experiences in the communities where they live and work—experiences that cannot neatly be categorised as 'economic' or 'cultural'. These insights, this thesis argues, are crucial to understanding why people vote for radical right parties in Europe. The thesis examines these local contextual factors using panel regressions and multilevel analyses based on original and existing datasets of fine-grained census, electoral and survey data. It makes three main contributions. First, the thesis adds a spatial dimension to the study of radical right voting behaviour by showing how local sociotropic mechanisms—such as local labour market competition from immigrants with similar skill levels (paper 2) and the degradation of local socio-cultural spaces (paper 3)—affect people's vote, alongside individual and national factors. Second, the thesis reconciles competing theories about the influence of economic and cultural factors on radical right support by pointing to the role of additional variables. Paper 1 shows how 'subjective social status' intermediates the relationship between economic distress and the rejection of cultural outgroups (a radical right catch-cry). Paper 3 explores how the decline of everyday opportunities for communal interaction—here, the closure of British pubs—fuels radical right support. Paper 2 looks at the economic effects of immigration at a more granular level, showing that it is neither immigration nor unemployment *per se* that boosts radical right support but rather localised competition between

immigrants and natives with similar skillsets. This finding points to the third contribution of this thesis: it explains why middle-class voters are also drawn to the radical right. Overall, this investigation of local contextual factors adds a crucial new dimension to our understanding of what drives people to vote for radical right political parties.

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1 | Introduction

How can we explain subnational variations in support for the radical right in Europe? Providing explanations of different radical right vote shares within a country in Europe is a difficult exercise. To give one example, the contrasting electoral results of the French radical right, the Front National, in Neuwiller and Villing in the last 2017 presidential race would leave anyone confused. Despite sharing similar demographic, contextual and political characteristics, these two municipalities register very different radical right vote shares. Both municipalities are located on the border with Germany, with around 500 inhabitants mostly composed of retirees and professionals. Both have a large immigrant population of similar ethnicity, low unemployment and an independent mayor. Yet, the electoral support of the Front National was 2.5 times higher in Neuwiller than in Villing. What could explain this difference?

The puzzling variation of radical right vote shares has raised several important questions for political scientists. One relates to the fact that similar sociodemographic features may not necessarily lead to similar radical right vote shares. Compositional studies at the cross-national and national levels, which suggest that areas with a larger concentration of white male manual labourers or white-collar professionals with low disposable income should receive more radical right support, do not resolve this puzzle (Mayer, 1995; Arzheimer, 2009). Since Neuwiller and Villing do not have such a population, why would they not

both register low levels of radical right support? Another important question taps into the ongoing debate behind demand-side explanations of radical right support: whether people are voting as a result of an economic backlash or as a way of expressing their anti-immigrant stance. Most analyses highlight that areas with high levels of unemployment (or any feature of economic deprivation) and/or with a rapid change of (preferably low-skilled) immigration should fuel more radical right support, and thereby oppose economic versus cultural factors (Golder, 2003; Golder, 2016). Since Neuwiller and Villing both register low rates of unemployment and high levels of immigration, why would Neuwiller have more radical right votes than Villing? Not only is the variation of the two municipalities surprising, but the larger radical right support occurs in the municipality that, of the two, would be less expected to display such support. Why would Neuwiller, the town with a majority of high-skilled immigrants, register the largest radical right vote share? This finding goes against the conventional wisdom that low-skilled migration is the radical right's breeding ground. It also casts doubt on the validity of the economic and cultural contextual indicators that are commonly used to explain radical right support. The levels or inflows of immigration, as well as the unemployment rate, may not provide unique associations with the radical right.

My answers to these questions focus on the local dynamics of the two municipalities and the type of local labour market competition in particular. Neuwiller and Villing are distinguished by the occupational activities of immigrants and native residents. Radical right support increases in areas where immigrants and native residents with similar skillsets are directly interacting with each other. Inhabitants of Neuwiller, who are mainly high-skilled, are competing locally with high-skilled newcomers. This competition triggers processes of

nativism and rejection towards immigrants that are then expressed through a radical right vote. By contrast, residents of Villing, where recent immigrants are predominantly low-skilled, do not face any direct local market competition. It is the absence of local competition, rather than the number or type of immigrants, that explains the distinction in radical right support between Neuwiller and Villing. Economic and cultural factors are also not mutually exclusive since immigration, the cultural contextual factor, has an economic component in the form of occupational status. Unemployment, an economic variable that is extensively employed in the literature, even compounds the local competition between immigrants and natives and demonstrates that economic and cultural variables complement rather than exclude each other.

This comparative example, which is drawn from the second paper of the dissertation, highlights the need to recognise dynamic local contextual drivers in explaining radical right support. Often these understated and neglected factors remain mysterious to most academics, policymakers and journalists. Within the recent literature there has been relatively little development, in terms of of theoretical arguments and empirical investigation, as to how local contexts ought to matter, which would advance some long-standing debates. This dissertation extends previous work on demand-side factors behind radical right support by adopting a local contextual perspective. In a series of papers, I explore how local context advances our understanding of radical right support by revisiting well-debated theories of radical right support. While the first paper reconciles the false dichotomy between economic versus cultural grievances with a probit analysis at the regional level, the two other papers investigate patterns of local labour market competition and local socio-cultural degradation with constituency-level and individual-level analyses. I find that local context helps

resolve contested issues surrounding explanations behind the rise and sustained success of the radical right. The three papers provide nuanced contributions - both theoretically and empirically - to our understanding of radical support and point to key policy implications for containing its spread.

My dissertation on the analysis of local context behind radical right support produces novel findings and contributes to important debates on the radical right. I focus on four debates in my thesis. The first relates to the relevance of local sociotropic accounts as an alternative to individual pocketbook or national sociotropic evaluations. I provide an explanation of the undetected contextual effects at the national and individual levels by showing that the local surrounding of voters shapes their political preferences. The second debate addressed by my thesis deals with the prevailing economic versus cultural debate. I go beyond this dichotomy by demonstrating that economic and cultural factors become intertwined and complementary at the local level. The third debate revolves around the investigation of new contextual factors that can equally contribute to the mobilisation of radical right support. Moving down to the local level allows me to explore the complex dynamics of the local environment and investigate another driver of radical right support, the social component. Finally, the last debate that this thesis relates to is the question of the socio-economic diversity of the radical right's voting base. I show that local contextual dynamics explain why voters who belong to the middle-class can be attracted to these parties to the same extent as traditionally radical right blue-collar supporters.

1.1 Contributions to Debates

The Local Sociotropic Account

This dissertation contributes to the literature on the radical right by examining local contextual effects which are unobservable at the national and individual levels. Building on ethnographic works (Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 2016; Gest, 2016), I argue that individuals are politically embedded in their proximate environment and these local geographies shape their voting preferences.

In my first paper, I provide a pan-European comparative analysis of local factors behind the radical right. This comparison is at the regional level; the finest grid at which a vast number of socioeconomic contextual variables are available across countries. The regional scale increases sample sizes, provides more accurate data for comparison and makes the comparison more appropriate as regions are units of comparable size (Snyder, 2001). No effect of contextual variables is detected at the regional level, which stresses the need to go down to a lower level of analysis to draw valid inferences on their importance. It is however worth noting that, despite not directly examining local contextual features, this first paper focuses on a concept, Parent-Relative Subjective Status, that relates to another characteristic of people's local contexts: their family networks. I test how the decline of younger generations' social status of younger generations relative to their parents affects radical right and radical left support. This psychological phenomenon involves social comparisons that imply a strong role for local context in the sense that one's parents are a key local-environmental influence on one's expectations and interpretations of the world.

In my second paper, I analyse the impact of immigrants in the local labour markets of native residents on radical right support. I argue that this is

the ideal level of analysis because it is the context in which residents interact with immigrants on an everyday basis. I find that changes in local labour markets positively affect radical right support, a hypothesis that has previously been unsupported by empirical evidence at the national scale (Kriesi et al., 2012). Immigration at a national level is unlikely to have affected the job prospects of the average native-born worker, but at a local level it does have an effect. In the same vein, I revisit the social isolation thesis, an under-studied hypothesis, with a local perspective in my third paper. I demonstrate that the disappearance of everyday local social spaces (i.e. pubs in my paper) strongly fuels radical right support in Britain. Social isolation can only be perceived if individuals witness some form of local degradation in their immediate surroundings. All the three papers show that local unemployment compounds the effects of status anxiety, labour market competition and local socio-cultural degradation on radical right voting.

This local sociotropic account has received relatively little development in existing work on the radical right. Radical right studies are mostly based on cross-national, national aggregate or individual-level panel data, which disregard the country specificities and large subnational variations in radical right support (Mudde, 2007; Golder, 2016). While contextual analyses would focus on immigration and unemployment (Golder, 2003; Golder, 2016), the individual-based studies would highlight the anti-immigrant, Eurosceptic and anti-democratic attitudes of a similar sociological radical right electorate in an area (Arzheimer, 2009). Yet, the range in far-right support across regions and constituencies, from 4.97% to 31.5% in France, 0% to 44% in the United Kingdom and 0.30% to 24.3% in Germany, which cannot be explained by national and individual-level analyses (Golder, 2016). These subnational variations call into question

what is being captured by national measures and, ultimately, the usefulness of theories that focus solely on national-level or individual features. With this local perspective, my dissertation accounts for these large subnational variations and gives prevalence to theories whose effects were masked in aggregate analyses.

Theoretical arguments about the local sociotropic account and how exactly local geographies ought to condition voting preferences have also been lacking in the voting behaviour literature more generally. Scholars often distinguish between individual or pocket-book effects on citizens' attitudes and sociotropic effects on preferences and behaviour that are presumed to descend to an individual's preference from characteristics of a geographic scale larger than themselves. First, the pocketbook approach looks directly at how socioeconomic characteristics of voters correlate with their radical right political support (Erikson et al., 2002). This approach focuses on questions like whether rich individuals support right-wing parties or whether working class individuals are more drawn to left-wing parties (Evans, 1999). In contrast, a second literature has looked beyond the individual properties and individual-level features to consider the context in its broader sense. In this sociotropic view, people are not motivated by their atomistic, individual sense of economic wellbeing or distress, but rather by the larger society they inhabit (Fiorina 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck 2011). The level of analysis that is frequently used is the country or nation and the research agenda is to explain how changes in national GDP or unemployment influence voting.

This local sociotropic account offers a way to move beyond this deadlock by looking to shared communities of interest to generate a fuller account of how people make sense of their local preferences (Enos, 2017). This specific, geographically scaled economic reality intends to override individual and more

national level considerations. These accounts do not simply seek to link individual preferences to their own sense of atomistic, individual or egocentric interests, but to broader sociotropic spheres of membership. Individuals' views are informed by the larger communities with which they identify. They formulate preferences not just as individuals, but also as part of a particular geographic locale and set of everyday cultural and economic experiences. Distinguishing between national and local sociotropic accounts allows me to revisit the contemporary debate about radical right support. It gives credence to the labour market competition and social isolation hypotheses which have previously been neglected due to their lack of significance at the national or individual levels. This thesis suggests a research agenda for pushing forward a more complete understanding of the ways in which local sociotropic mechanisms are at work in individuals' voting behaviour and how this may be shaping politics today.

Bridging Cultural and Economic Factors

A second debate that I contribute to in this dissertation relates to the opposition between economic and cultural explanations behind radical right support. I show how the investigation of the local context can overcome this false dichotomy. Scholars and pundits alike tend to respond to the question of what pushes people to vote for a radical right party with contesting explanations that have economic conditions on the one hand and culture on the other. Instead, this thesis supports the notion that the interaction of material and cultural factors shapes political preferences and outcomes. My first article posits that economic and cultural factors work in tandem through social status. The subjective position of a person within the social hierarchy is a dynamic relational variable which results from both economic and cultural factors. A growing literature

uses social status as a mechanism through which economic and cultural developments contribute to radical right voting behaviour (Gest et al., 2018; Gidron and Hall, 2017; Mutz, 2018; Kurer, 2018). The shift of the white-working class from the centre to the periphery, after globalisation, de-industralisation, and the migration crisis, has pushed this social class to reject immigrants, which can be expressed in an electoral setting with a vote for the radical right. This decline of status indicates a discrepancy between the working class people's understanding of an idealised vision of a homogenous constituency and their current situation with either the perceptions of competition or actual competition with immigrants over jobs, cultural heritage and other public services. I find that people with higher status decline relative to their parents are more likely to support a radical right party and the effect is magnified for those with anti-immigrant attitudes.

Thinking through the status anxiety component offers an alternative that prevents us from relying on the overly simplistic narrative of economics versus culture. This consideration of status anxiety has not been taken from most research studies, mainly because economic and cultural factors tend to be treated separately in opposition. On the one hand, scholars defend the economic anxiety thesis that associates labour market competition between immigrants and natives with radical right support (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013; Pardos-Prado and Xena, 2019). The collapse of manufacturing coupled with the transition to knowledge economies, technological automation and more global flows of capital and labour (including the inflow of migrants and refugees) have led to growing inequalities in income and wealth. This has slowly eroded organised labour, welfare benefits and precipitated the introduction of austerity measures. These economic transformations have af-

fected the low-waged unskilled workers, the unemployed and the individuals dependent on shrinking social benefits. Since they lack the economic and human capital to attain the same standards of living as in the past, they become more economically insecure and more threatened by the arrival of immigrants, which eventually leads to a radical right vote (Betz, 1994; Minkenberg, 2000; Golder, 2003). On the other hand, there is the perspective that the arrival of newcomers has prompted a cultural backlash against the threat immigrants hold over cultural heritage (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; McLaren, 2002; Sniderman et al., 2004). In the context of mass immigration and multiculturalism, native residents may be nourished by 'retro reactions' against the cultural change that has taken place (Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Ignazi, 2010). Given the shift from materialist to non-economic values during the silent revolution, cultural considerations have been put to the centre of political issues (Inglehart, 1990). Through their nostalgic rhetoric, radical right parties construct an image of the glorified homogenous nation as under threat from increased immigration. The nationalist credo of these parties provides a psychological comfort to socially conservative individuals that seek stability. Individuals' inherent desire for self-esteem pushes them to perceive their ingroup as superior and to reject their outgroup - the immigrants.

I also argue in this dissertation that one critical way for both material economic conditions and cultural dynamics to play out is through their local contextual characteristics, as different local economic and cultural geographies generate different lived experiences, and thus contrasting identities, that may fundamentally condition how people see their interests and how they perceive politics. A localised perspective goes beyond the arbitrary consideration of economic and cultural factors as separate entities where the relationship is, in fact,

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more complex. My second paper looks at the economic threat of immigration by evaluating how the skillset of immigrants can influence the political behaviour of native workers in French municipalities. I develop a set of hypotheses as to how cultural threat with immigration is expected to have different effects on natives' economic risk depending on how immigrants affect competition within their occupational category. I find that it is the local competition of natives and immigrants of similar skillsets, and not simply the immigration rate, that boosts radical right support at the local level. Areas with a large share of natives with high-skills are more likely to register larger radical right support as long as there is also a large concentration of high-skilled immigrants. I also show that the presence of difficult economic conditions in municipalities, measured as unemployment, intensify the effect indicating the relevance of the economy to any cultural threat. Stressing the importance of the local context therefore facilitates a more helpful bridging of the economics and cultural identity divide while likely better accounting for the pattern of political transformations.

Local Socio-Cultural Factors

The third advance I make in the radical right literature relates to new indicators explaining radical right support, which are examined through a local contextual perspective. Local context matters in the study of radical right support because it transcends the simple consideration of material or cultural factors that condition people's voting behaviour. While market transitions and immigration are identified as responsible for the radical right's electoral support in Western Europe, the social transitions that accompany modernisation also impact individuals' voting patterns. Since people's views are informed by the immediate communities with which they identify, social interactions shape individuals'

identities and give meaning to how they understand their political preferences. Unlike the more nationally focused work of sociotropic studies and individual preference formation, this thesis casts light on a more-communal sense of identity, rooted in the everyday, lived experiences in conditioning how people make sense of their political interests.

The third article of this thesis unpacks the undeveloped theoretical ideas behind the notion of local experience as a driver, with attention to the social logics inherently at work when moving from the attitudinal determinants at the individual level to the notion of local socio-cultural degradation shaping radical right support. I first build on the social isolation hypothesis which has arisen from the deterioriation of traditional community bonds and the emergence of increasingly fluid and anomic societies (Gusfield, 1962; Kornhauser, 1959; Putnam, 1993). The increasing individualisation and de-massification effects have alienated the community and increased support for the radical right following the decline of collective movements and organised labour (Rydgren, 2009:78). New forms of local loyal 'quasi-communities' and ethnic nationalism have replaced decaying identities and social attachments (Kornhauser, 1959; Fennema and Tillie, 1998; Rydgren, 2009; Coffée et al., 2007; Veugelers, 2015). I then combine the social isolation hypothesis with the local sociotropic account to generate a new thesis, the 'local socio-cultural degradation'. This thesis argues that the disappearance of everyday social spaces with the closure of community pubs positively affects the radical right vote in British local authorities. Pubs represent the heart of the community where people can frequently meet. Their disappearances have accelerated the processes of social marginality and have particularly questioned the socio-cultural heritage of the people affected by these closures, the white working class.

This 'local socio-cultural degradation' thesis advances the debate on the social isolation effect behind radical right support, which has been theoretically understudied and rarely empirically examined. The associations between social isolation, such as (lack of) friendship relations, (weak) family structures, (no) membership in civil society organisations, and radical right voting show no consistent results (Mayer and Perrineau, 1995; Eatwell, 2003, 2005; Fennema, 2005; Fennema and Tillie, 1998; Rydgren, 2009; Coffée et al., 2007; Veugelers, 2015). This closer look at local social dynamics not only revives the under-explored social isolation thesis, it also invites me to explore the two ways the local context can influence individuals' political preferences. Local context refers to 'spaces', objective and more easily measurable distributions of economic, social and demographic statistics, and to 'places', subjectively experienced but geographically bounded communities, which shape political self-understanding (Agnew, 2011). These two dimensions provide a better account of the complex influences and interactions of local geographies on individuals' political behaviour, thereby bridging the disciplines of political geography and political science.

A Diversified Radical Right Electorate

The finale debate to which I contribute with a local contextual perspective involves explaining the significant variety amongst radical right supporters. Although the radical right is traditionally known to attract low-skilled workers and those who are more vulnerable to the rise of unemployment, as shown in my third article, its electoral base also includes middle-class groups. This thesis provides an explanation to the socio-economic diversity of this group of voters by examining how local contextual dynamics can push any socio-economic group to vote for the radical right. My second paper highlights that local labour

market competition between natives and immigrants, and not immigration *per se*, is what triggers voters to cast a radical right ballot. Municipalities with direct competition between immigrants and natives with similar skillsets are likely to register more radical right support because the economic risk associated with their occupational categories has intensified. This work advances the existing research agenda on the electoral sociology of the radical right. The majority of studies usually defend the perception that typical radical right voters are the most marginalised individuals in economic and social terms who are most vulnerable to de-industralisation and globalisation processes (Rydgren, 2009). Those who are manual workers with little education and low disposable income are more prone to to the radical right's ethno-nationalist and anti-immigrant rhetoric (Betz, 1994; Arzheimer, 2009; Golder, 2016; Gest et al., 2018). However, radical right parties have also attracted other segments of the population who are part of the middle class (Mayer, 2005; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016). The electorate is now considered a conglomerate of voters with diverse socio-economic backgrounds such as the white-collar workers and employees who are situated a few rungs higher up (Bornschier and Kriesi, 2012; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016; Gidron and Hall, 2017). Focusing on local contextual dynamics presents an explanation for these varied socio-economic bases of electorate support.

Another explanation behind a large public support for the radical right, which is presented in my first paper, is the perception of decline in people's socio-economic positional relative to that of the past and/or relative to other groups. I advance the argument that those who have experienced relative decline in their status compared to previous generation are more prone to cast a radical right vote. This does not only include low-skilled workers but also encompasses

people who feel discarded for their skills or economic value (Gest et al., 2018). I find in my first paper that small business owners and unskilled workers are equally likely to support a radical right party in Europe. This is in line with previous research that considers why people who do not necessarily belong to the poorest strata of society are also drawn to the radical right (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Gest et al., 2018). This thesis helps us to understand the wide variety of the radical right's electoral base and advance the knowledge of the radical right's electoral sociology.

I now turn to the methodology and the explanation of various statistical methods, data sources and variables.

1.2 Methodology: Model and Data Contributions

Most of the comparative research on demand-side factors have been mainly operationalised in three ways: survey data that capture voters' attitudes towards economic conditions and immigration (Tillie and Fennema, 1998; Van der Brug et al., 2000); multilevel analyses that combine aggregate and individual data to address the structural conditions and individual perceptions linked to radical right electoral support (Lubbers et al., 2002; Kessler and Freeman, 2005; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Arzheimer, 2009); and national-level contextual studies that combine socioeconomic factors to the radical right at the most aggregated level of analysis (country) (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Knigge, 1998; Golder, 2003). Most studies are restricted to a handful of attitudinal measures and a set of simple sociodemographic variables that were consistently replicated over time and at a macro-level.

These studies raise some methodological issues. On the one hand, aggregated units of analysis tend to produce stronger correlations across variables of

interest and alter the types of statistical conclusions that one can draw. The risk of ecological fallacies is also important. For instance, the effect of immigration on the radical right was shown to vary depending on the levels of analysis. Contact effects that result in more inter-ethnic tolerance and less anti-immigrant electoral support have been found in smaller geographical units (Kaufmann and Harris, 2015; Della Posta, 2013); ethnic competition and the threat of the white natives towards immigrants increase as unit size increases (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). On the other hand, individual level studies do not acknowledge the local surrounding that may impact individuals' voting behaviour and may suffer social desirability bias due to an under-reporting of radical right supporters (although the effect is less strong nowadays).

It is, however, empirically difficult to define the relevant geographic boundaries for testing local experiences. The local level includes several geographical sub-levels and unit sizes that range from the regional down to the micro-local level (Savelkoul et al., 2017: 218). Regions, cities, towns, municipalities, voting districts, and neighbourhoods can all equally detect various local spatial scales (Biggs and Knauss, 2011). The definition of local for purposes of hypothesis testing unavoidably depends upon the convenience of data availability for operationalising alternative contexts (Huckfeldt 1983). There is spillover and frequent interaction across geographic boundaries, and data that are not spatially aggregated are often costly or simply unavailable. The choice of the geographic scale and the particular borders among geographic units of a given size is therefore often arbitrary. In light of these limitations, this thesis pays close attention to the most appropriate unit of analysis. It departs from the traditional techniques used in the literature to combine individual and meso-level contextual data. The first paper adopts a cross-regional comparison in 19

countries over fourteen years (from 2002 to 2016) that combine data at the individual and regional levels. Since this paper does not find any contextual effect at the regional level, the other two papers go one level lower to adequately assess the changing local context at the municipal and district level in two Western European democracies, France and the United Kingdom.

These smaller units of analysis offer 'an ideal mix of specificity and generality', therefore overcoming the pitfalls of both micro and macro units of analyses (Little, 2010: 16). In comparative politics, a turn towards the sub-national level has increased sample sizes and provided more accurate data for comparison (Snyder, 2001). Firstly, the meso-level is able to capture effects that might omit both individual and national analyses. With these levels of analysis, individuals may more readily recognise their locales in terms of their own position in the socio-economic or political distribution. I use the municipality level in France for my second paper because municipalities are very small geographic areas of 1,200 inhabitants on average that are directly relatable to inhabitants. My third paper also explores the closures of pubs for each district in Britain (there are 317 districts in Britain) in order to evaluate the decline of socio-cultural hubs that individuals are exposed to. Secondly, meso-level analyses use units of analysis of comparable size which facilitates the accurateness of the study. My first paper compares NUTS 2 regions which are very similar in sizes and population density across countries (226 NUTS regions in 19 European countries). The exhaustive and reliable data for a large panel of countries help to provide original and accurate insights of factors behind radical right support. Thirdly, meso-level studies can observe within-country variations over time that contribute to radical right voting. My second paper shows that it is the direct competition between immigrants and natives in municipalities that affects radi-

cal right support. Finally, my local-level analyses enable me to control for other significant, time-invariant local socioeconomic factors which are unobservable or very difficult to measure quantitatively. This prevents any omitted variable bias at the local level which can affect the estimation of my variables. The use of panel data and fixed effects in my three papers also contribute to reducing such biases.

This thesis has also constructed three unique datasets. In my first paper, I combine European Social Surveys, Eurobarometer Surveys and Eurostat data to evaluate the level of status anxiety, individual determinants and contextual variations on individuals' propensity to support a radical right or radical left party. My second paper uses an original longitudinal dataset of fine-grained municipal electoral, demographic and economic data from France over the 2002-2017 period to provide empirical evidence of local contextual influences of economic competition between natives and immigrants. This paper presents the skill level of immigrants and natives, respectively classified as unemployed-, low-, medium- and high-skilled. Some local contextual variables, such as the type of urbanity (rural, suburban or urban municipalities), of economic activity (residential-, industrial or service-based areas) as well as the share of Mosques are also added to the models. My third paper combines data on pubs from the Local Data Company (LDC), district-level data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) with individual-level data using the multi-wave UK Household panel data from 2013 to 2016. The district of respondents is the common variable between the three datasets. A district-level analysis that merges district data from the LDC and the ONS replicate the analysis at the district level.

In addition to these new datasets, I have introduced novel variables in my analyses. The Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status (PRSSS) variable

in my first paper is created from calculating the mean values of the subjective social status for each age categories and country of the 2017 Fairness, Inequality and Inter-Generational Mobility Survey. These values are then allocated to each individual in the European Social Survey. This offers a cross-national and up-to-date measure that assesses the subjective social status relative to individuals' parents. In my second paper, I gather the data of each skill level, low- medium- and high-skilled level, for immigrants and natives in each municipality from 2002 to 2017. The data distinguish between the share of immigrant workers and the share of native workers for each sector. It is more precise to evaluate what type of immigrant population triggers radical right support than relying on an overall level of immigration that would mask skill differences across immigrants. My third paper combines rich individual data from the UK Household Panel with the number of community pub closures per number of pubs for each district from the Local Data Company. Pub closures represent the proxy for testing the 'local socio-cultural degradation' hypothesis as the breeding ground for radical right support. The results are unique to the community-style pubs as there is no effect for pub chains, pubs located in the city centres and gastropubs.

Since this thesis uses observational studies with cross-sectional and longitudinal datasets, I cannot unpack the causal mechanisms between local dynamics and radical right support. It is difficult to establish a causal chain because context is likely to be endogenous to the locality and individuals decide where to live. For instance, one may not disentangle social deprivation from material degrading conditions because these factors can go hand-in-hand: materially deprived towns cumulate economic and social deprivation and the closure of pubs may reflect the degrading material conditions of the local communities. I am therefore not able to isolate which of the economic, cultural and social variable,

or which of their interaction, causally affects radical right voting. Experiments are also not an obvious solution to draw causal inferences about context because they most likely show individuals' attitudinal and behavioural change from text cues rather than from contextual cues.

Identifying these economic, cultural and social associations are nonetheless crucial because it shows that the potential relationships between local context and radical right behaviour are real before establishing causal patterns. This leaves researchers more confident in making causal assertions about the true nature of the relationships they found. For instance, knowing that a local socio-cultural factor also plays a role in explaining radical right support pushes researchers to consider causal mechanisms that capture this feature. Testing various covariates (economic, cultural and social factors) also enables to have a more precise estimation of the predictor coefficient. In order to reduce omitted variable bias, I include regional fixed effects and municipality fixed effects in my first and second paper respectively. I use regional fixed effects with clustered standard errors at the district level in my third paper to observe the local variations of radical right support while taking into account the fact that there are multiple respondents in each district.

1.3 Defining the Radical Right

Before embarking on the summary of each research paper, it is useful to define what I mean by radical right parties. Multiple terms can be used to categorise these parties, such as 'extreme right-wing', 'far right' or 'populist radical right'. However, this thesis follows Norris' oft-cited and widely used conceptualisation, 'radical right parties' (Norris, 2005), because the core of the thesis addresses the factors behind support for these parties instead of debating their ideology.

I understand radical right parties as parties with a nativist policy agenda, which is reflected in an anti-immigrant and nationalist stance (Mudde, 2007; Halikiopoulou et al., 2012). Examples of radical right parties include the Italian Lega Nord , the Austrian Party for Freedom, the Belgian Vlaams Blok and Front National, the Dutch Freedom Party, the French Front National, the Norwegian Progress Party and Alternative for Germany. Despite their diverse ideological appeals, organisational structures and leadership rhetoric, these parties all prioritise a vision of an idealised homogenous nation over individual rights and equality. Non-native groups are identified typically on the basis of cultural traits such as race, ethnicity, or religion, but can also include minorities from within the native ethnic group, such as homosexuals, as well as sections of the international community. This ethno-nationalist stance can be expressed by proposing the exclusion of immigrants or stronger immigration controls, or by prioritising social benefits and employment for the native group (for more discussion on welfare chauvinism, see more in Schumacher and Kersbergen, 2014 and Roth et al., 2017).

Radical right parties count as 'radical' because their platforms reject core ideals of liberal democracy, albeit without threatening the constitutionality of the state (Mudde, 2004; 2007). Unlike extreme parties (i.e. Britain First and Golden Dawn in Greece), radical right parties openly distance themselves from historical fascism by refusing to display any affinities with fascist legacies (Ignazi, 2010). They remain within the country's political and electoral system and express formal loyalty towards the democratic regime (Mudde, 2007). Radical right parties are not totally hostile (Eatwell, 1983) to representative democracy but present themselves as anti-system parties that challenge the establishment. They are willing to break with mainstream policies and traditional party compe-

tition but they do not intend to tear down the political system (Givens, 2005:20). Radical right parties also share another feature: authoritarianism. These parties are loyal to a central authority figure who is perceived as embodying the popular will and capable of asserting control hierarchically. They also respect law and order and are known to value and respect authorities (Adorno et al. ,1969).

While recognising different party systems and social contexts in Eastern and Western Europe, radical right parties share similarities in their approach towards immigrants and the valorisation of a cherished national past among radical right parties, which enables them to be studied from a pan-European perspective. Building on Mudde's 2007 classification, this thesis will first start with a regional comparison of radical right parties in 19 European countries before narrowing down to subnational variations of prototypical radical right parties, in France and the United Kingdom. A detailed classification of radical right parties is presented in Table 1.1. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) expert party placement, radical right parties are positioned between 7 to 9 out of 10.

Each of the following three articles of this thesis contributes new knowledge to the study of the radical right by investigating the local context. The following section provides a detailed overview of the findings and implications of each article.

Table 1.1: Classification of Radical Right Parties

(a) CSES Score: 7/9= Radical Right Parties

Country	Radical Right Parties
Austria	Freedom Party(FPÖ) (8/10) (1/10)
	Team Stronach for Austria (7/10)
	Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) (7/10)
Belgium	Flemish Interest (VB) (8/10)
	Front National (FN) (8.3/10)
	Parti Populaire (7.2/10)
	Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (NV-A) (7.6/10)
	Lijst Dedecker (8/10)
Bulgaria	Attack (9/10) , Reformist Block (7/10)
	Patriotic Front (8/10)
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DPP) (7/10)
Estonia	Estonian Independence Party (EIP) (8.7/10)
Finland	Finns (PS) (9/10)
	Freedom Party – Finland's Future (8/10)
France	Front National (FN) (7/10)
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD) (8/10)
	Republikaner (8/10)
Great Britain	UK Independence Party (UKIP) (8.2/10)
	British National Party (BNP) (8.7/10)
Hungary	Jobbik (9/10), Fidesz (8.7/10)
	HTJP-Hungarian Truth (8.9/10)
Italy	Northern League (LN) (8/10)
	Tricolour Flame (8.5/10)
Latvia	National Alliance
The Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV) (7.8/10)
	List Pim Fortuyn (8/10)
Poland	Law and Justice (PiS) (6.2/10)
	Wolność (Liberty) (7/10), Kukiz'15 (7.5/10)
	League of Polish Families (7.8/10)
	Congress of the New Right (7.6/10)
Slovakia	Slovak National Party (SNS) (7/10)
Slovenia	Slovene National Party (SNS) (7/10)
Sweden	Swedish Democrats (SD) (7.6/10)
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SPP) (8/10)
	Swiss Democrats (8.2/10)

1.4 Paper 1: The Janus-Faced Nature of Radical Voting: Subjective Social Decline and the Radical Right and Radical Left Support

My first paper tests the effect of status anxiety on radical right and radical left support across 226 NUTS 2 regions in 19 European countries between 2002 and 2016. Using multiple rounds of the European Social Survey (2002-2016) and Eurobarometer Survey, this article shows that people with steeper declines in status relative to their parents are more likely to support a radical right or a radical left party. The traditional attitudes of each voting group increase the effects of social decline on radical support: it is magnified by anti-immigrant attitudes for the radical right and by preferences for redistribution for the radical left. This is a new finding in research on support for radical right parties.

Article one has important implications for the study of the radical right and party politics in general. Firstly, it broadens previous research on demand-side approaches of the radical right by combining both cultural and economic factors into a middle ground position with the role of status anxiety. It then elaborates on the growing literature on status anxiety by analysing a new reference group - individuals' relative status to their parents. Radical right supporters are nostalgic for a cherished past with a homogenous nation (Mudde, 2007; Gest et al., 2018), radical left voters are nostalgic of a socialist past with economic equality and lavish welfare provisions. The structural effects of de-industrialisation, globalisation and automation may have particularly affected the young, well-educated and middle-class who missed this past. As Millennials entered the labour market during the financial crisis and austerity, their pathway to adulthood has been more economically insecure than previous gen-

erations. Coupled with the effects of de-industrialisation and policy responses to the financial crisis, they have experienced higher housing costs, greater work scarcity and lower wages than their parents did at the same age. Finally, this paper makes significant contributions to the understanding of party behaviour. The nascent literature on status anxiety omits consideration of how this concept could be applied to other party families. My first paper discusses how some of the well-researched topics of economic deprivation and status anxiety can be extended to an understudied party family, the radical left. Considerable attention has been paid to the most-studied party family within political science, the radical right. However, its widely explored themes may equally resonate with other party families. Some elements of economic and cultural grievances that are common among radical right voters can be shared with the radical left, such as relative social decline in comparison to parents.

In a nutshell, this first article reconciles a disputed debate by focusing on a new concept, status anxiety, develops the reference group of status anxiety, and stresses the need to broaden the scope of widely debated theories behind the rise of the radical right to the radical left.

1.5 Paper 2: Local Labour Market Competition and Radical Right Voting: Evidence from France

My second paper re-examines the economic threat of immigration with a local perspective. The so-called 'labour market competition' hypothesis, which establishes economic competition between immigrants and natives as drivers of radical right support, has been rejected by experimental and observational studies (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Malhotra et al., 2013; Hainmueller et

al., 2015). It has also been mostly conducted at the individual and aggregate levels. This paper argues that the influence of labour market competition on radical right voting can only be identified at a local level where native workers are directly affected by the arrival of immigrants who have similar skillsets. The influence of immigrants on local job competition and pressure on local wages is more likely to be reflected in individuals' immediate surrounding and masked in aggregated context. I find a strong and positive local labour market effect for all types of competition, whether between natives and immigrants of low-, medium- or high-skill levels. The effect is amplified under higher levels of unemployment. This hypothesis therefore enables me to explain why individuals of diverse socio-economic backgrounds, such as the middle class, are voting for the radical right.

An important implication of this work includes paying more attention to local variations when testing well-debated demand-side hypotheses. This paper runs counter to existing work that disproves the relevance of the labour market competition thesis. It does so by analysing the economic impact of immigration on radical right voting in French municipalities, which have an average of 1,200 inhabitants. As much as cultural and status threats affect radical right voting, direct labour market competition at a local level also matters and should be re-evaluated by scholars specialised in the discipline. This paper reappraises the economic anxiety thesis to explain radical right support by using accurate variables that may reflect the competition between immigrants and natives. One novelty of this paper is to distinguish between native workers and their skill levels with immigrant workers and their skill levels. Most studies confound the share of immigrant workers with the share of native workers for each occupational sector. These studies do not consider that occupation-specific

employment statistics are averages which ignore the large variations between immigrants and natives with respect to the occupational categories. This consideration enables me to assess what types of immigrants are more likely to fuel radical right support than other. This paper captures the reality of the labour market by acknowledging that the labour market access is likely to vary between immigrants and natives. Given the specificities of the host country market, immigrants are facing greater disadvantages in getting a job that matches their skill levels. The language barriers, lack of connections, and qualifications of the host country are all factors that prejudice against immigrants. This thesis therefore defends and shows that immigrants with medium- or high-skilled skills will be more likely to threaten natives' jobs.

1.6 Paper 3: Pissed! Local Socio-Cultural Degradation and Radical Right Support: The Case of British Pub Closures

My third paper revisits the social isolation theory with a local contextual perspective. It argues that the socio-cultural degradation of the community symbolised by the decline of local socio-cultural places boosts radical right support. This 'local socio-cultural degradation' hypothesis captures the loss of sense of community and the decline of cultural identity embodied in these socio-cultural places. To test this hypothesis, I investigate the relationship between the decline of community-style pubs, as opposed to pub chains, gastropubs or pubs located in city centres, and UKIP support at the individual and district level. Community-style pubs define the local community by existing for years in the area and are representative of the white working class. I find that the decline of these particular pubs contributes to the rise of UKIP over the last year, unlike

the other types of pubs. The closure of each community pub relative to the total number of pubs in the district leads to the increase of individuals' propensity of UKIP support by 1.63 percentage points. This effect is magnified under conditions of economic deprivation.

These findings call into question some of the implications highlighted in the existing research on the radical right. Contrary to previous research, when a social component is combined with a local sociotropic account it influences the way that people see their political interests and vote. The social grievances linked to the local decline of socio-cultural heritage should not be ignored in the overall understanding of the radical right support. This focus on original spatial factors that potentially influence people's voting preferences highlights the implications of using empirical operationalisations of political geography on the study of political behaviour. This paper has particular implications for the white working class as a social group. The use of community pub closures in a British context perfectly captures the erosion of white working-class identity as these places embody the distinctive traditions and rituals of this social group. This paper also brings more nuance to the understanding of the social isolation thesis. By reporting the gradual decline of socio-cultural hubs since 2013, it distinguishes between people who have always felt isolated and those who have become isolated after experiencing local decline. The former will be more likely to abstain from voting whereas the latter will be more sensitive to radical right parties. This distinction enables me to explain why this newly socially isolated group is more inclined to cast a radical right ballot than to abstain, whereas standard social isolation theory allows for both of these possibilities (Kornhauser, 1959; Hirschman, 1978).

1.7 Road Map

The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: each of the chapters includes one paper, which is a self-contained piece of research. Chapter two analyses the effect of status anxiety on the radical right and radical left of 226 NUTS 2 regions in 19 European countries. Chapter three examines the relationship between local labour market competition and radical right support in France. Chapter four evaluates evidence of the impact of local socio-cultural degradation on radical right support in the United Kingdom. In the final chapter, I discuss the theoretical and policy implications of the papers, address some general limitations of the thesis, and highlight avenues for future research.

2 | The Janus-Faced Nature of Radical Voting: Subjective Social Decline at the Roots of Radical Right and Radical Left Support

Abstract

While a growing literature examines the effect of the relative social and economic decline of the white working class on radical right parties, few studies reflect on this psychological phenomenon on radical left parties in Europe. Yet, the young, well-educated middle class is likely to perceive relative decline in comparison to their parents given the rising levels of unemployment and social inequality, and declining income. These structural changes may eventually push them to favour a party which stresses rising income inequality, a catchcry of the radical left. Drawing on multiple rounds of the European Social Survey (2002-2016) and the Eurobarometer survey, probit models show strong and positive association between lower levels of Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status (PRSSS) and support for right- and left-wing radicalism at the regional level (NUTS

2) in 19 European countries. The traditional attitudes of each voting group magnify the effects of social decline on radical support: it is reinforced by anti-immigrant support for the radical right and by preference for redistribution for the radical left. This study shows the relevance of including social decline relative to the parents as a reconciling factor among radical right and radical left supporters despite diverging socioeconomic and attitudinal features.

2.1 Introduction

The rapid rise of radical right and radical left parties has led to a wave of public and scholarly interest in recent decades. While there has been a wealth of research studies on the electoral fortunes of radical right parties (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2002; Ivarsflaten, 2008), few analyses focus on the growth of radical left parties. Yet, the recent triumph of the Left Bloc in the governing coalition in Portugal, Syriza in Greece and the breakthrough of Podemos in Spain, to name a few, are all signs of radical left emergence.

The studies that compare the radical right and radical left together often place them in opposition. The radical right parties embrace nativism, rejecting non-native individuals who pose a threat to the nation (Mudde, 2007), whereas the radical left parties endorse the egalitarian interests of the common working man against the interests of the business elite (March, 2007:74). The rare articles that align radical left and radical right together have looked at their common characteristics. These parties share Eurosceptic (De Vries and Edwards, 2009), nationalist (Burgoon, 2013; Halikiopoulou et al., 2012), anti-elitist traits (Mudde, 2004; Otjes and Louwerse, 2013) and populist traits in which they represent the 'virtuous and unified population' against the corrupt political establishment (Taggart, 2000:95; Mudde, 2007).

Meanwhile, the literature on the radical right has largely devoted its attention to debating the economic versus cultural drivers behind its electoral success. The economic anxiety thesis advances that globalisation and technological change have created economic losers who later express their economic fear by casting a radical right ballot (Dancygier and Donnelly, 2013; Malhotra et al., 2013; Ford and Goodwin, 2014). The cultural backlash argument posits

that the recent and rapid surge of immigration has threatened the alleged homogeneity of the nation and its cultural heritage which is eventually translated into radical right support (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Shayo and Harel, 2012; Goldstein and Peters, 2014; Hainmueller et al., 2015).

While no consensus over these determinants has been found, a growing literature is now turning to the psychological phenomenon of subjective social decline to overcome the dilemma (Gest et al., 2018; Gidron and Hall, 2017; Kurer, 2018). It states that absolute material hardship does not matter as much as the relative deprivation of the current status individuals are entitled to. This fear of status decline is characterised by the perceived shift of the once-dominant white working class, the radical right supporters, to the periphery of the social order in comparison to the emerging ethnic groups. It is eventually translated into anti-immigrant attitudes and radical right voting support. Yet, this subjective sense of social decline can also be felt among another voting group. The young and well-educated middle-class may perceive status anxiety since the present economic and social circumstances are not as favourable as past ones. Rising levels of unemployment, social inequality and declining income may eventually push this group to turn their back on the mainstream left and support a party that embodies such concerns: the radical left.

Reconciling the radical left and radical right into a unifying theoretical framework that goes beyond the 'economic versus cultural' dichotomy, this paper draws on the understudied psychological factor of status anxiety that is commonly shared by radical leftists and radical rightists. My theory builds on and incorporates existing approaches from political psychology and social hierarchies to formulate an individual-level theory of perceived relative depri-

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vation to explain radical left and radical right support. I argue that radical right and radical left voters, despite belonging to different social groups, share a subjective sense of decline compared to their parents. Combining the Eurobarometer Survey on Inter-Generational Mobility with the multiple rounds of the European Social Survey, I use probit models to show that a declining sense of social status relative to the previous generation is associated with radical left and radical right support at the regional level in 19 European countries from 2002 to 2016. The radical right voters are mainly young white working class men with low education and the radical left supporters are mainly young highly educated individuals from the middle class. Moreover, traditional attitudinal determinants of each voting group— anti-immigrant attitudes for the radical right, and pro-redistribution attitudes for the radical left—reinforce the effect of declining subjective social status for each radical party. My results are unique to radical voting and robust to a variety of alternative specifications (using social placement in general, comparing between Eastern and Western Europe) and modelling choices.

The contribution of this paper is fourfold. Firstly, it sheds light on a rarely studied concept, i.e. status anxiety. While the concept has been explored in qualitative ethnographic studies (Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 2016), evidence of its use in comparative politics is still very scarce. This cross-sectional study uses an original measure to broaden the scope and understanding of the impact of relative social deprivation to a large set of Western and Central European countries. Secondly, I conduct a cross-regional analysis of 226 NUTS 2 regions in 19 countries between 2002 and 2016, which allows me to capture effects that might evade both individual- and country-level analyses. While previous research usually focuses on single case studies, this study relies on extensive

and reliable data to provide a pan-European comparative analysis at the finest grain. Thirdly, I show the strong electoral base of each radical party. While there has been an abundance of studies on white working class men as important voters for the rise of the radical right, the political affiliation of the young, well-educated and middle-class to the radical left has been understudied. Finally, by incorporating the nascent literature on subjective social status into an analysis of radical left support, I show similarities between the radical right and radical left supporter bases. The structural effects of de-industrialisation, globalisation and automation can also lead to subjective social decline among the young, well-educated and middle-class. As the source of radical support is common, solutions to limit its ever-growing appeal may require similar policy and social reforms.

The paper is structured as follows. After reviewing the literature on status anxiety, radical right and radical left voting, I outline the hypotheses and present the data, models and variables. I then comment on the estimation tables and finally draw limitations and conclusions.

2.2 Similarities: Status Anxiety, Radical Right and Radical Left Voting

Cultural and economic changes have produced uneven development trajectories within European states. Despite the wide range of studies on their political consequences for the rise of radical right voting, there is still an ongoing debate about the radical right's electoral success. The lack of consistent evidence in favour of economic explanations and the dominance of seemingly cultural drivers in experimental analyses have led some to claim that 'it's not the economy stupid' (Mudde, 2007). However, more recent studies called for a

re-conceptualisation of economic factors with a closer look into the regional and local dynamics of trade and ethnic competition (Colantone and Stanig, 2018a, 2018b). Economy and culture cannot simply be regarded as independent and competing explanations of radical right voting since individuals use intertwined frames of economic and cultural explanations to interpret the social world which surrounds them (Walsh, 2012; Hochschild, 2016).

A growing literature is suggesting an approach that goes beyond the debate between economic and cultural factors, and instead focuses on anxiety about social status (Gest et al., 2018; Gidron and Hall, 2017; Kurer, 2018). Drawing on the psychology and social status literature, this understudied concept refers to the subjective positioning of a person within the social hierarchy. Individuals subjectively rank their level of social esteem or respect that society is according to them. Subjective social status is a relational variable because it measures where people stand in comparison to the full social order. It also reconciles both cultural and economic arguments by capturing the personal perception that is not reducible to one factor or the other. It has been suggested as a mechanism through which economic developments, such as globalisation, de-industrialisation, or technological change, and cultural developments, as manifested by high-profile waves of migration, translate into radical right voting behaviour (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Kurer, 2018).

Initially advanced by Lispet (1955) and relayed by Gest et al. (2018) and Gidron and Hall (2017), 'social status anxiety' forms the conceptual basis for a compelling theoretical argument to explain radical right voting. There are two main reasons why 'social status anxiety' is linked to radical right support. The first is instrumental. Individuals who feel that their social status has suffered along with their material circumstances are more inclined to support radical

right parties. These individuals are most likely to belong to the working class. And because these working-class individuals desire an alternative to the parties that have altered their socioeconomic conditions, the anti-establishment appeals that radical right leaders make may be especially attractive to these voters (Gidron and Hall, 2017). The second reason why 'social status anxiety' boosts radical right support is emotional. Since threats to an individual's social status evoke feelings of hostility to outgroups (Tajfel et al., 1978; Leach and Spears, 2008; Gidron and Hall, 2017), individuals who feel that their social status is threatened may be sensitive to the anti-immigrant discourse of radical right parties. Appeals that evoke threats to the status of white men for more gender or racial equality may have parallel power. Hence, white working class men who perceive a loss of social status are especially drawn to radical right parties (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Gest, 2016, 2018).

Gest et al. (2018) used original survey data that measured individuals' sense of economic, political and social deprivation in the United States and the United Kingdom to demonstrate that greater perceived threat of relative deprivation, which they called 'nostalgic deprivation', explains radical right voting better than absolute economic deprivation. Gidron and Hall showed with the International Social Survey that the loss of perceived social status is largely associated with radical right support in 19 developed democracies (Gidron and Hall, 2017). They add that the radical right supporters are not the individuals at the bottom of the economic ladder but the 'declining middle' a few rungs up. The fear of losing established status is indeed prominent among those with some status to defend. Their higher social positions make them more inclined than others to defend the social boundaries that separate them from groups they consider socially subordinate, e.g. immigrants.

Drawing from these readings, I explore the relevance of status anxiety to radical left voters. Gest et al. (2018) qualify nostalgic deprivation as 'the discrepancy between individuals' understandings of their current status and their perceptions about their past'. Here I contend that radical right supporters are nostalgic about a unified and ethnically homogenous heartland. They are attracted by the radical right discourse which promotes the values of an idealised past where blue-collar workers used to be valued as crucial pillars of society. Yet, there is no theoretical reason to uniquely associate nostalgic deprivation to the radical right. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2018a) argue that almost all political parties, and especially populists, use nostalgic rhetoric to sell their political ideas. Their discourses often construct a cherished and mystified heartland where uncomplicated and non-troublesome politics cohabit. Radical left supporters could also be nostalgic of a socialist past with larger welfare spending and economic equality. Some studies have already linked left-wing radical voting with greater support of economic equality (Akkerman, Zaslove and Spruyt, 2017; Salmela and Scheve 2017). European countries have experienced increased levels of unemployment, precarity, economic inequality, and declining income in recent years. For example, the top 20 per cent of Europe's population by income received 5.2 times as much income as the bottom 20 per cent (with some cross-national variations ranging from 3.6 in Finland to 8.2 in Bulgaria) (Eurostat data, 2017). These kinds of trends may contribute to the sense of relative deprivation among middle class left-wing radical supporters. The identification of these trends in the rhetoric of radical left parties across Europe, moreover, may attract voters who perceive their subjective status declining alongside their economic situation. This leads to my first hypothesis:

H1: Individuals who perceive subjective social decline compared to their parents have a higher probability of supporting radical right or radical left parties.

Dissimilarities: Two Different Voting Groups

Despite sharing status anxiety in relation to the previous generation, radical right and radical left supporters belong to different socioeconomic groups. Radical right supporters are expected to be white men with low levels of education. Their profile has been widely examined in the literature (Arzheimer, 2009) and is in line with the psychology literature that has shown that threats to a person's social status evoke feelings of hostility to outgroups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Leach and Spears, 2008). The transformation of the economy has contributed to the gradual disappearance of decent and secure low-skilled jobs in manufacturing sectors and the rising demand for highly-skilled employees with higher education (Gidron and Hall, 2017). It has relegated low-skilled white workers to the fringes of the social order. Meanwhile, demographic changes from successive and rapid waves of immigration have fueled a sense that they must compete with immigrants over scarce economic and welfare resources (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Pardos-Prado, 2011; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013). Loss of status inspires a diffuse cultural resentment against those perceived to have displaced them in the social hierarchy. This resentment is channeled into a radical right vote, since these individuals are responsive to the conservative radical right rhetoric which scapegoats immigrants and takes the side of manual workers.

By contrast, a relatively unexplored topic is the socioeconomic characteristics of the radical left electorate across European countries. There is a

growing consensus that the highly educated, young, urban and male population is more sensitive to the radical left discourse in Southern Europe (Bordignon and Ceccarini, 2013; Vezzoni and Mancosu, 2016 in Italy; Fernández-Albertos, 2015; Orriols and Corderos, 2016; Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2016 in Spain). This study will include Eastern and Northern European countries to assess whether this hypothesis is tenable across a larger number of European countries. The aftermath of the economic crisis has created higher levels of unemployment and declining incomes which have mainly affected the well-educated but inexperienced young population (March and Mudde, 2015, 2018). It has pushed them to endorse riskier career trajectories with self-employment jobs and short contracts (e.g. bartenders, Deliveroo bikers, etc). Their precarious situation, coupled with disenchantment from lack of work opportunities appropriate to their educational attainment, have led them to feel worse off than their parents' generation. Their parents' lives were synonymous with economic mobility, the rise of the middle class (Crafts and Toniolo, 1996; Marglin and Schor, 1992), and a wave of political cohesiveness (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) in the second half of the 20th century.

By contrast, the young generation may perceive themselves worse off because their parents used to earn higher, unionised wages that are mostly out of reach today. They feel a relative decline in comparison to their previous generation since their aspirations are paralleled to their parents'. I would expect that this parent-relative social subjective status decline mostly concerns a young population who belongs to the middle class because these structural changes have mostly affected middle class households. The following figure, which presents the mean values of social placement in comparison to their parents for each generation, confirms that the Millennials, those born after 1980,

perceive themselves to be in the lowest social position relative to their parents'
situation (Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1: Mean Values of Social Placement in Comparison to their Parents
for Each Generation

As a result, radical left parties appeal to this segment of the population[1]
by predominantly focusing on problems of social inequality and welfare cuts
while providing anti-neo-liberal economic policies (March and Mudde, 2015).
These parties campaigned on anti-austerity policies, like expanded welfare and
public spending, which were ignored or triangulated away by the centre left or
the Greens (Bremer and McDaniel, 2019). Recent anecdotal evidence has sug-
gested a 'youthquake' in the radical left, with Mélenchon's 'Unbowed France'
being the most popular party among 18-25 year olds in the 2017 French presi-

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[1]It is important to remember that I do not try to prove that all radical left voters are
the young, well-educated and middle class nor that all these voters support the radical left
(Roodjuin et al., 2017; Visser et al., 2014 show radical left voters are from the working class)
but rather that they constitute a strong electoral base for the radical left.

dential election, and with the youth-led grassroots movement, Momentum, contributing to the large Labour support in the 2017 UK election. These parties are particularly attractive to highly-educated Millennials who are less prone to blame immigrants for the decline in their social status, unlike radical right supporters. A recent study has demonstrated the causal effect of higher education on increased tolerance towards ethnic minorities (Cavaillé and Marshall, 2018). High education has socialised the values of equality and democracy to students and has contributed to the cosmopolitan embrace of egalitarian treatment of immigrants.

One particular sociodemographic feature that radical right and radical left voters share is that men are more likely to vote for radical parties than women (Mayer, 1995; Kimmel, 2009, 2013; Spierings and Zaslove, 2017). Gidron and Hall linked status anxiety and gender by arguing that the rise of women's status in society and in the workplace contributed to the declining subjective social status of men with no education, which is eventually translated into radical right support (Gidron and Hall, 2017). Economic and cultural developments all led to the increase of social status of women relative to men. Between 1980 and 2010, the share of women between the ages of 25 and 54 in gainful employment rose from 54 per cent to 71 per cent across the OECD (OECD data); and, in many countries, women are taking a growing share of well-paid occupations whereas men who move into occupations previously dominated by women are moving mainly into lower-paid jobs (Roos and Stevens, 2017). The cultural developments relate to mainstream shifts towards greater gender equality, which trigger action in governments, social organisations and firms (i.e. gender quotas) (Dobbin, 2009).

Yet, more should be done to understand the gender gap in radical left

parties or, more generally, the mechanisms behind why women are less prone to support radical parties. One explanation that could explain the predominantly male radical right and radical left electorate relates to a gendered nature of radical support (Mudde, 2007). It is known that political socialisation is gendered in the sense that women and men tend to be socialised differently (Sapiro, 1983; Trevor, 1999). Parents and society reward different behaviours by girls and boys, and different examples are set about 'correct behaviour' in many fields including political behaviour. For instance, the media depict female and male politicians differently as women are often portrayed as less aggressive, more consensus-seeking and friendlier (Ross and Sreberny, 2000; Sawer, 2002; Van Zoonen, 2001).

These differences in gender representation is reflected in political attitudes and can explain certain political behaviours. For instance, Golebiowska (1999) shows that women are more politically tolerant than men. Verba et al. (1997) attempt to explain why men are more engaged in politics than women and note that considerations that are normally associated with political engagement (such as education or income) do not explain the gender gap. Rather, the authors claim that, on average, it appears that men and woman may have different 'tastes for politics'. Fish (2002) makes the differences even more tangible, arguing that men are more prone to conflictual politics and women prefer consensus-seeking. Mudde goes one step further by arguing that the radical or even extreme image of the parties may explain the gender gap in radical right and radical left parties (Mudde, 2007). Since the women often have lower levels of political efficacy and lower levels of political interest, they are more likely to vote for 'established parties' (Mudde, 2007). Thus, the genderedness of political socialisation provides a compelling justification for the predominantly male

radical right and radical left electorate.

I therefore argue that:

H2: White working class men with low education and occupational status have a higher probability of supporting radical right parties.

H3: Young, well-educated and middle class individuals have a higher probability of supporting radical left parties.

2.3 Additive Attitudinal Effects on Status Anxiety

Attitudinal determinants that are traditional characteristics of each radical party should be expected to reinforce the effects of declining social status. While the radical right and radical left share economic vulnerabilities, they are expected to express the sentiments associated with their respective mainstream counterparts with respect to (non)-egalitarian and (non)-altruistic values (Visser et al., 2014; Rooduijn et al., 2017). Anti-immigrant attitudes are usually associated with radical right support (Lubbers et al., 2002; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Arzheimer, 2009) whereas preferences towards redistribution are linked to radical left support (March and Mudde, 2015). Such socio-political attitudes are known to strongly determine voting preferences and different electorate composition for the radical right and radical left (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007; Rooduijn et al., 2017). As a result, I posit that:

H4: The probability of supporting radical right parties is magnified when individuals' declining social status compared to the previous generation is combined with anti-immigrant attitudes.

H5: The probability of supporting radical left parties is magnified when individuals' declining social status compared to the previous generation is combined with preferences towards redistribution.

2.4 Data

Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status as a Measure of Status Anxiety

The theoretical understanding of subjective social status is operationalised by constructing a measure of status anxiety from the Eurobarometer Survey. This survey, entitled the 2017 Fairness, Inequality and Inter-Generational Mobility Survey, includes a question on social status: individuals' social position relative to their parents in their country ('Where would you place your parents on this ladder in comparison to you in your country?')[2]. This measure, which I call Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status (PRSSS), tests how people are doing compared to the standard of living of their parents' generation for radical right and radical left support. The larger the value, the better off people rank their parents compared with themselves, and thus the larger the perceived social decline compared to their parents' generation. I hypothesise that individuals who assign themselves relatively low social status in comparison with their parents will be more susceptible to support radical right or radical left parties. This measure offers more cross-national comparability and greater independence from political context than alternate measures that ask respondents to identify as part of the working or middle class.

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[2]The data has another measure linked to subjective social status: individuals' placement on social ladder ('Where would you place yourself on the social ladder in your country?') but I only include this in the appendix because it does not fully capture the social decline relative to the past generation.

Previous studies on social status did not meticulously differentiate individuals' identity from their group's identity in their surveys. By asking respondents 'where they thought *people like them* were situated one or two generations ago', Gest et al. (2018) measured people's expectations of relative group position over time—in this case, white people—instead of the individual's position. This question therefore wrongly assumes the loss in group position to be equal to the loss in one's own interpersonal-relative position over time. Respondents' self-understandings and perceptions of the past are conflated with the groups' understandings. This could explain why Gest et al's measurement of nostalgic deprivation specifically correlates with radical right-wing support: respondents are strongly disposed to assimilate themselves into the white working class. By including individual-level survey data in which individuals are asked to compare *they themselves* and *not people like them*, my study avoids this problem of having to interpret the 'self' in terms of one's group identity.

The mean values of this PRSSS measure are calculated from the distribution along higher, neutral or low values of each status variable for each country. The mean values are then combined with individuals' data from the cumulative file data of the eight rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) (2002-2016). I allocate each individual in the European Social Survey to their corresponding subjective social status (obtained from the Eurobarometer Survey) according to their year of birth and country. There are seven year-categories: 1900-1941, 1942-1951, 1952-1961, 1962-1971, 1972-1981, 1982-1991 and 1992-2001. The categorisation by age enables me to better capture status anxiety in relation to past generations (Figure 2.1). It was also the common variable shared between the two datasets with the largest number of categories (8 age groups) to provide

more empirical variation in the result[3]. Age is included as a control variable to ensure the PRSSS measure is solely capturing status anxiety.

Figure 2.2 displays the distribution of the PRSSS variable in the 19 countries in this analysis. More people place themselves in the middle of this social ladder relative to their parents, which proves that this is a good measure as the majority of people would position themselves in the middle of society in comparison to their parents. There is also a significant number of people who report lower subjective social status relative to their parents, and my premise is that those who place themselves on lower rungs of this ladder believe that they have a more lower social position relative to their parents than those located higher up on it.

Figure 2.2: The distribution of Social Distance to Parents across the full sample and by occupational class

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
[3]There was no data available by year of birth but only by age group in the Eurobarometer Survey.

It is important to observe the relationship between the PRSSS variable and standard objective socioeconomic status indicators to validate this measure as an indicator of status anxiety. In Table 2.1, Model 1 reports the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with region, year and round fixed effects in which the dependent variable is our PRSSS measure of status anxiety, and the main independent variables are the respondent's income decile, level of educational achievement, and occupational class. Age is the strongest predictor of PRSSS as expected: the younger you are the more likely you feel subjective social decline relative to your parents. Being an ethnic minority and only having primary education also boost PRSSS decline. Interestingly, although levels of PRSSS are generally lower among unskilled workers, even individuals within other occupational groups, such as small business owners or skill workers, can feel that they have lower PRSSS than higher-grade service workers, as Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1 indicate. Income does not show any correlation with PRSSS Income does not show any correlation with PRSSSS and will therefore not be included in the main analysis.. These results indicate that together the three standard components of socioeconomic status (income, education and occupational class) explain only a limited amount of the variance in subjective social status. The PRSSS measure is therefore not simply a proxy for objective socioeconomic status variables but it also captures more subjective features.

Other Variables

Other classic variables need to be included in my analysis as they are liable to influence individuals' subjective social status. The way people see themselves as central or marginal members of society is likely to be mediated by the social esteem that society as a whole assigns to the social roles those people occupy.

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	Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status
Age	-0.012***
	(0.000)
Female	-0.000
	(0.000)
Income Decile	0.000
	(0.000)
Class (0=Higher-Grade Service)	
Lower-Grade Service	-0.000
	(0.000)
Small Business Owners	-0.001**
	(0.000)
Skilled Workers	-0.001*
	(0.000)
Unskilled Workers	-0.000*
	(0.000)
Ethnic Minority	-0.001***
	(0.016)
Education (0=Primary)	
Secondary	0.002***
	(0.000)
Vocational	0.002***
	(0.000)
Tertiary	0.002***
	(0.000)
Constant	0.393***
	(0.004)
Observations	84,670
Number of Countries	19
Number of Regions	226
Region, Year and Round FE	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

Objective measures of social status like education, income and occupation confer certain positions within a social hierarchy (Marmot, 2004). Lower levels of educational attainment, lower incomes and manual routinised occupations usually convey a lower level of 'objective' status within society. I include education and occupational class based on Oesch's (2006) class scheme in my analysis. Age is included since the social comparison relative to parents is likely to be affected by age, as seen earlier. Gender is also included since I expect a larger support of men for the radical right and radical left, as explained previously, (Mudde, 2007; Gidron and Hall, 2017; Spierings and Zaslove, 2017) despite the recent decline of the gender gap (Mayer, 2015).

Attitudinal determinants are also strongly linked with radical right or radical left support. There is consensus in the literature that anti-immigrant attitudes are associated with radical right support (Ivarsflaten, 2008; Arzheimer, 2009) whereas redistribution and social equality are associated with radical left support (March and Mudde, 2015). The strongest predictor of radical right support in the European Social Survey is unsurprisingly anti-immigrant attitudes with regards to the cultural heritage of the nation. The best attitudinal predictor of radical left support is respondents' opinions on redistribution (on whether the government should reduce income inequality). Those in favour of redistribution are likely to lean more to the radical left. I therefore use these two variables as proxies for the main attitudinal determinants of each respective radical party (other alternative variables are used as a robustness check in Table A.6, see Appendix).

Three other socioeconomic, individual-level features can mediate subjective social status: location, ethnic minority status, and financial prospects. People living in less prosperous regions compared to residents of economically

vibrant regions (Jennings and Stoker, 2019), or who are ethnic minorities are likely to have lower levels of subjective social status (Gidron and Hall, 2017). By the same token, people's future's financial situation is worth considering since secure material conditions can increase people's social esteem (Miyakawa et al. 2012) and economic risk can be linked to status loss (Kurer, 2018). To account for these mediating factors, I use, respectively, regional fixed effects, a dummy variable that accounts for whether an individual is a member of an ethnic minority, and a variable that captures individuals' perception of their future financial prospects to the classic socioeconomic variables. I also include contextual variables at the regional level that are likely to influence radical right and radical left support: unemployment rate, immigration stock and income inequality (Gini Index).

When appropriate weights are applied, each survey provides a representative sample of the adult population, usually based on 1,270-1,570 respondents for each country, but the sample size varies from 900 to 2000 respondents. 19 countries from Western and East Central Europe available in both surveys are included in my analysis (see Appendix)[4]. I rely on the standard literature to classify the radical right and radical left parties because of its controversial nature (Mudde, 2007; March and Mudde, 2015; Van Kessel, 2015). I also test the position of radical right or radical left parties on the left-right spectrum from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data (see Appendix). There are 36 radical right and 38 radical left parties in total.

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[4]I include countries that featured in all survey years.

2.5 Empirical Strategy

I combine individual-level survey data from the eight rounds (2002-2016) of the European Social Survey with data on individuals' Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status (PRSSS) provided by the Eurobarometer Survey on 19 European countries. I employ probit models[5]. My baseline specification is:

$$P(RadicalRight_{il}) = F(\alpha_{il} + \beta_1 SocialStatus_{il} + L_{il} + Z_{il} + \epsilon_{il}), \qquad (2.1)$$

where $_i$ indexed regions and $_l$ individual respondents. The dependent variable is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if individual$_l$ declares support for a radical party. I run separate regressions for the radical right voters and the radical left voters. In respect of the radical right regressions, the indicator variable takes value 1 if individual $_l$ supported a radical right party in the last election, and value zero if the individual supports any other party (including a radical left party). In respect of the radical left regressions, the indicator variable takes value 1 if individual $_l$ supported a radical left party in the last election, and value zero if the individual supports any other party (including a radical right party). L_{il} is a vector of individual variables that account for gender, education, occupation, and future financial situation. Z_{il} is a vector of contextual variables that include immigration, unemployment and income inequality. ϵ_{il} is an error term.

The baseline model is a probit model with year, ESS round and region fixed effects and standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. This low level of analysis is the most appropriate level of analysis for several reasons. Firstly, it is able to detect effects that might go unnoticed by individual or country-level

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[5]Robustness checks include hierarchical linear probability models which show similar results.

analyses. For instance, regional unemployment will be directly felt by individuals who live in the region. By contrast, individual unemployment status cannot capture the effect of the threat of unemployment to those still employed, while country-level unemployment is likely to mask this effect by pooling regions within the same country. Secondly, using regional data is a more accurate basis for comparative analysis because they involve units of comparable size and population density. Regional level data also permit observation of within-country variation in immigration, unemployment and inequalities which will enrich the demand-side explanations behind radical political support. Finally, operating at such a low level enables me to control for unobservable time-invariant socioeconomic factors which are often difficult to measure quantitatively. Controlling for region-specific heterogeneity reduces omitted variable bias and bolsters the robustness of my results.

Radical parties are classified following the academic consensus regarding this party family (Mudde, 2007, for radical right parties and March, 2011, and March and Rommerskirchen, 2015, for radical left parties). Communist, Post-Communist and Left Socialist parties are included among radical left parties because they propose radical changes in the mode in which capitalist market societies and economies are organised. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) expert party placement, radical right parties are positioned between 7 to 10 out of 10 on the left–right ideological dimension, whereas radical left parties are ranked between 1 to 3 out of 10 on this scale. Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix include the descriptive statistics, the codebook and the classification (with the CSES left-right score) of radical right and radical left parties for each country.

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2.6 Results

Table 2.2: Status Anxiety, Radical Right and Radical Left Support

	Radical Right Support		Radical Left Support	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Social Decline Compared to Parents	2.090***	1.647**	4.316***	2.339**
	(0.585)	(0.718)	(0.916)	(0.357)
Immigration Attitudes (0=Agst)	0.625***	0.584***	-0.247***	-0.273***
	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.067)
Redistribution Preferences (0=Agst)	0.113*	0.078*	0.551***	0.482***
	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.112)
Age	-0.006***	-0.007***	-0.012***	-0.011**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Female	-0.105***	-0.061	-0.111***	-0.084
	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.066)
Class (0=Higher-Grade Service)				
Lower-Grade Service	-0.043	-0.015	-0.051	0.059
	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.104)
Small Business Owners	0.123**	0.065	-0.213***	-0.103
	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.082)	(0.148)
Skilled Workers	0.224	0.183	0.134**	0.268**
	(0.056)	(0.073)	(0.065)	(0.113)
Unskilled Workers	0.233***	0.192**	0.035	0.143
	(0.109)	(0.123)	(0.002)	(0.126)
Ethnic Minority	-0.208*	-0.215	-0.042	0.134
	(0.114)	(0.203)	(0.167)	(0.253)
Education (0=Primary)				
Secondary	0.048	0.075	0.014	-0.048
	(0.057)	(0.081)	(0.067)	(0.107)
Vocational	0.236***	0.246**	0.133	0.001
	(0.080)	(0.100)	(0.080)	(0.124)
Tertiary	-0.323***	-0.348**	0.220**	0.061
	(0.080)	(0.098)	(0.079)	(0.129)
Constant	-3.745***	-4.542***	-3.954***	-4.938***
	(0.528)	(0.543)	(0.578)	(0.532)
Observations	87,670	82,210	86,500	81,613
Number of Countries	19	19	19	19
Number of Regions	226	226	226	226
Region, Year and Round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contextual Variables	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

Table 2.2 reports results from the estimations of radical right and radical left support. Columns 1 and 3 refer to the probit estimation of radical right and radical left support with clustered standard errors, individual covariates, region, year and round fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 report findings with contextual

variables. In line with my expectations, it shows that individuals' lower sense of PRSSS is largely associated with support for radical right and radical left parties rather than any other party. The results suggest that the probability of respondents supporting radical right parties increases by 0.554 percentage points (0.436 with contextual variables) as the PRSSS variable changes from its minimum (0.195) to its maximum (0.46) value. The probability of supporting radical left parties increases by 1.144 percentage points (0.620 with contextual variables) as the PRSSS variable changes from its minimum to its maximum value. This provides support for hypothesis 1. Multilevel models in Table A.9 of the Appendix show similar results.

Figure 2.3 corroborates the hypothesis by showing increasing predictive values of radical right and radical left party support as PRSSS declines. As in Table 2.2, the effect is bigger for radical left support. This steeper effect can be explained because the data is classified along age which is a measure that inevitably captures the intergenerational differences of status. Radical left support is particularly triggered among young voters who feel generational social immobility, as shown with the moderate negative coefficient of age. Age is also negatively associated with support for the radical right, although the effect is less strong than for radical left support. This result is more surprising as the radical right electorate either has no particular age categories (Ford and Goodwin, 2014) or tends to be older (Mayer, 1995). However, one may assume that young working class men might be more inclined to the radical right as they could not aspire to the same status expectations than their parents once benefited from as blue-collar workers (e.g. coal-miners). This finding highlights another (unexpected) similarity between radical right and radical left supporters : their young sociological profile.

Figure 2.3: Predicted Values of Social Distance Relative to Parents on Radical Right and Radical Left Voting

Table A.4 (see Appendix) also demonstrates that higher levels of social status with no reference point to parents leads to negative radical right or radical left support, which confirms that status decline is positively related to radical right and radical left voting. However, since its effects are not as strong as they are when using the status decline relative to parents, the latter is used in the main analysis. This also shows that it is subjective social decline relative to parents that drives radical support, which is in line with previous findings (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Gest et al., 2018).

The results also hold when I exclude Eastern European countries, which have more extreme right parties than radical right parties[6], or when I exclude the Scandinavian countries, which are likely to have more generous welfare systems

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[6]Extreme right parties work outside the country's political and electoral system, can share some fascist lineage and intend to tear down the current political system. By contrast, radical right parties remain within the country's political and electoral system and express formal loyalty towards the democratic regime (Mudde, 2007).

(see table A.7 of the Appendix). Table A.8 of the Appendix shows the effect of the two measures of social decline on mainstream parties or Green parties (=1) versus other parties (=0). While the association is insignificant between status decline and Green support, the negative correlations of the right- and left- wing parties mean that status anxiety decreases the probability of supporting mainstream parties. This provides evidence that status anxiety is only shared among radical right and radical left supporters. In line with Roodjuin et al's 2017 study, radical right and radical left supporters share discontent and economic difficulties, which explains their disaffection from their respective mainstream parties.

Despite similar levels of status anxiety in relation to their parents, some socioeconomic features differentiate radical right and radical left sympathisers. Table 2.2 confirms that radical right voters are white men with no college education who come from lower socioeconomic positions, as with previous studies (Lubbers et al., 2002; Werts et al., 2013; Rooduijn et al., 2017). Small business owners and unskilled workers are more likely to vote radical right rather than individuals in the higher-grade service class (financial managers, public administrators). This provides confirming evidence for hypothesis 2. Radical left supporters are also more likely to be skilled workers than higher-grade service workers, which confirms that the young individuals who suffer from loss of PRSSS belong to the middle class. This provides evidence for the hypothesis 3[7].

Table 2.2 also shows the divergent ideological attitudes of radical right and radical left supporters. While anti-immigrant attitudes are strongly asso-

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[7]I also find that radical left voters are also more likely to belong to the higher-grade service class than the small business class. However, the effect is small, only significant at the 0.05 level and is insignificant in other models.

ciated with a radical right vote, support for a more egalitarian system largely predicts radical left support. Both effects are large and statistically significant. Radical left support is negatively associated with anti-immigrant attitudes, as found in previous studies (March, 2011; Rooduijn et al., 2017). However, redistribution preferences are also linked to radical right support, albeit at 0.05 confidence level. This can be justified on the grounds that radical right voters also share redistribution preferences since radical right parties have adopted a protectionist economic agenda in the 2010s that is in favour of government spending to increase social subsidies for natives (Schumacher and Kersbergen, 2014; Roth et al., 2017). These parties have attracted a larger electoral base that is concerned about economic inequalities. The most economically insecure, low-skilled workers are sensitive to this welfare chauvinist discourse (Bornschier and Kriesi, 2012; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016). Other traditional radical left and radical right attitudes are strongly correlated with support for each respective radical party (see table A.6 in Appendix).

Table 2.3 presents the interaction terms between subjective social status and attitudinal determinants for each party and Figure 2.4 demonstrates the interaction effects. The columns 1 and 3 show the reinforcing effect of traditional attitudes of each respective radical party family when combined with declining social status. The probability of supporting radical right parties increases by 0.22 percentage points for individuals whose declining PRSSS is combined with anti-immigrant attitudes in comparison to individuals with declining social status but no anti-immigrant attitudes. The probability of supporting radical left parties is magnified by 0.13 percentage points for individuals with a declining PRSSS and pro-redistribution attitudes in comparison to individuals with a declining social status and anti-redistribution attitudes. This supports hypotheses

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Table 2.3: Interaction Effects

	Radical Right Support		Radical Left Support	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Social Decline Compared to Parents	-1.473*	2.052	-3.613	3.092**
	(0.866)	(0.591)	(2.334)	(0.718)
Immigration Attitudes (0=Agst)	-0.272***	-0.584***	-1.110***	0.027
	(0.067)	(0.043)	(0.078)	(0.290)
Redistribution Preferences (0=Agst)	0.092*	0.088*	-1.899**	0.557*
	(0.067)	(0.049)	(0.789)	(0.320)
Social Decline × Immigration Attitudes	3.968***			-2.616***
	(0.715)			(0.259)
Social Decline × Redistribution Preferences		-0.419**	8.154***	
		(0.900)	(0.630)	
Age	-0.003***	-0.004***	-0.012***	-0.012**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.061*	-0.062**	-0.084*	-0.083**
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Class (0=Higher-Grade Service)				
Lower-Grade Service	-0.026	-0.030	0.138	-0.023
	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.096)	(0.095)
Small Business Owners	0.062	0.122*	-0.016*	-0.153*
	(0.083)	(0.065)	(0.130)	(0.065)
Skilled Workers	0.188	0.229	0.275***	0.201***
	(0.073)	(0.083)	(0.100)	(0.060)
Unskilled Workers	0.227***	0.246***	0.151	0.142
	(0.085)	(0.066)	(0.113)	(0.085)
Ethnic Minority	-0.417**	-0.432***	0.110	0.099
	(0.168)	(0.124)	(0.229)	(0.124)
Education (0=Primary)				
Secondary	-0.018	-0.076	-0.055	0.021
	(0.079)	(0.059)	(0.102)	(0.036)
Vocational	0.312**	0.328***	0.054	0.157
	(0.112)	(0.085)	(0.140)	(0.079)
Tertiary	-0.355***	-0.472***	0.044	0.140*
	(0.097)	(0.077)	(0.129)	(0.076)
Constant	4.812	-2.976***	1.954	-3.275***
	(0.536)	(0.574)	(0.660)	(0.592)
Observations	87,670	82,210	86,500	81,613
Number of Countries	19	19	19	19
Number of Regions	226	226	226	226
Region, Year and Round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contextual Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

4 and 5. While both radical right and radical left supporters share discontent and economic difficulties, as manifested by status anxiety, they still express attitudes and sentiments that are commonly associated with their respective mainstream parties.

It is even the case that radical right support decreases for individuals with higher social decline who favour immigration, while individuals with higher social decline and anti-redistribution attitudes are less inclined to support a radical left party. Placebo tests, shown in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.3 and Figure 2.5, demonstrate that status decline and traditional attitudes of the opposite radical party are not attributable to more radical right and radical left support. Whereas pro-redistribution attitudes and status decline have a negative effect on radical right voting, anti-immigrant attitudes and higher PRSSS are negatively associated with radical left support. As Figure 2.5 shows, the traditional attitudinal determinants of each respective radical party decrease the overall support for the other radical party. This corroborates previous findings that showed voters who hold a left-wing ideology are more likely to vote for a radical left party whereas voters with a right-wing ideology are more inclined to vote for a radical right party (Roodjuin et al., 2017).

The explanation for such divergent ideology comes from these individuals' different socioeconomic features, as explained above, but also from their different levels of educational attainment. In line with previous studies (Werts et al., 2013; Roodjuin et al., 2017), my results show that radical left voters are highly educated whereas radical right voters are more likely to have primary or vocational rather than tertiary education. This provides evidence in support of hypotheses 2 and 3. A recent study by Cavaillé and Marshall has for the first time shown that education causally reduces anti-immigration atti-

Figure 2.4: Interaction Effect of Attitudinal Factors and Social Placement on Radical Right and Radical Left Voting

tudes and contributes to cultural openness and tolerance (Cavaillé and Marshall, 2018). Highly educated individuals are also more inclined to support egalitarian and altruistic attitudes by socialising political values of equality and democracy among university students (Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf, 2004; Stubager, 2008; Roodjuin et al., 2017).

With regard to other socioeconomic determinants, my data show that radical right supporters are less likely to be an ethnic minority whereas there is no effect among radical left supporters. In line with the hypotheses, both radical right and radical left voters tend to be men. The image of radical right and radical left parties as more radical and extreme parties may explain the predominantly male electoral base of the two party families, as defended in the theory section. This argument of genderedness of political socialisation deserves more empirical investigation in future research.

The socioeconomic and attitudinal profile of radical right supporters ex-

Figure 2.5: Placebo Tests

plains why their subjective sense of declining status is translated into radical right support. Their position as white working class makes them more sensitive to the racialised discourses of radical right parties who construct this category of 'white working class victims, losers of globalisation' in opposition to the emerging ethnic diversity of their society. The myth of the long-lost golden age of sovereign nation-state with cultural and racial homogeneity from past generations resonates with members of this class, making them more likely to cast a radical right ballot as a result.

By the same token, the sociological and attitudinal portrayal of the radical left supporters explains how the subjective sense of declining status relative to their parent is eventually expressed through a radical left vote. Highly-educated young individuals from the middle class with egalitarian attitudes who feel a decline in their social status are more responsive towards the radical left political rhetoric of rising social and income inequality and a shrinking

welfare state.

2.7 Conclusion

This paper shows the importance of considering individuals' psychological experience of declining social status compared with their parents as a common feature among the radical right and radical left. The investigation of status anxiety relative to the previous generation captures more subtle differences in the social order than social placement with no reference group. By systematically examining the effect of declining social status in 19 Western and Central European countries, I demonstrate that lower levels of subjective social status are associated with radical right and radical left support. I also show that socioeconomic attributes differentiate radical right and radical left supporters. The former are white men from the working class without education, as largely defended in the literature. The latter are young, highly educated individuals from the middle class. Finally, attitudinal determinants that are traditional to each respective radical party (and its core supporters) reinforce the effect of social decline. While anti-immigrant attitudes increase the effect of status anxiety on radical right support, status anxiety boosts radical left support when it is combined with pro-equality attitudes.

This paper has some limitations. It would be interesting to empirically link people's status anxiety with the environment they live in. Although this paper accounts for regional disparities, it does not include whether respondents live in rural or urban areas due to data unavailability. However, a recent study by Haerteveld et al. (2018) has shown that radical right support (less about radical left) is rooted in context-specific manifestations of social change that induces anxiety differently between urban and rural areas. While the presence of many

immigrants explains the radical right success in urban areas, the decline in social and transport services and the exodus of young people are better indications of radical right support in rural areas. This resonates with qualitative ethnographic studies that show that the radical right topics in rural and middle-sized political arenas are mainly emerging from the local mismanagement of social and political infrastructure rather than national issues of immigration (Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 2017; LSE report, 2018). This leads to the consideration that further studies should look at the theoretical association between status anxiety and feelings of neglect. There is a need to go beyond the 'left-behind' catch-all terminology, which is associated with a limited set of socioeconomic contextual indicators, and to measure a broader set of objective indicators of deprived areas.

This paper also cannot infer causal claims about whether immigration attitudes (redistribution preferences) cause radical right (radical left) support and vice versa. Given the observational nature of the study, with the use of cross-sectional data, the reverse causality cannot be rejected. It is worth mentioning that parties can equally influence individuals' political attitudes with their anti-immigrant rhetoric (for radical right parties) and pro-redistribution messages (for radical left parties). In particular, studies have shown how ethno-nationalist frames are instrumental in influencing voters to support radical right parties (Rydgren, 2003; Mudde, 2007; Elgenius and Rydgren, 2019). The latter frame their discourses by portraying immigrants as illegitimate competitors over scarce resources, such as jobs and housing; by pitting the supposed costs of immigration against welfare state benefits that could have been enjoyed by the native citizens (i.e. welfare chauvinism); and by depicting immigration as a threat to the ethno-national identity of the majority and as a major cause of

criminality and other kinds of social insecurity (Rydgren, 2003). That is why, while this paper has focused on the demand-side, supply-side factors should also be acknowledged. This paper recognises that radical right and radical left voters can develop their anti-immigrant attitudes and pro-redistribution preferences as a response to the narratives of these parties that tap into these issues.

This paper has important implications for scholars, policy-makers and pundits alike. It complements and enriches demand-side explanations behind radical support by investigating the subjective social effect, perceived economic and cultural threat at the regional level. Status anxiety is a powerful measure with the potential to bridge the seemingly large differences between supporters of radical right and radical left parties. Since some of the roots of radicalism prove to be similar at both ends of the political spectrum, patterns to counteract them might require similar policy and societal responses.

3 | Local Labour Market Competition and Radical Right Voting: Evidence from France

Abstract

How do the economic threat of immigration affect radical right support? The evidence in support of the labour market competition theory—which posits that the economic threat posed by immigration to jobs and wages leads to radical right voting—has been mixed. On the one hand, individual-level surveys underreport economic drivers because of social desirability bias. On the other hand, contextual studies show contradictory findings due to an over-reliance on units of analysis that are too aggregated to meaningfully capture the competitive threat posed by immigrants. This paper identifies the influence of labour market competition on radical right voting at a local level in contexts where native workers are directly affected by the arrival of immigrants who have similar or higher skillsets. Using an original longitudinal dataset of fine-grained municipal electoral, demographic and economic data from France over the 2002–2017

period, the paper provides empirical evidence of local contextual influences of economic competition between natives and immigrants of any skillset. Under local conditions of material deprivation, measured by the local unemployment rate, the effect of labour market competition on municipalities' radical right vote share is amplified. Moreover, higher radical right support is observed in municipalities with a higher share of any one of the following groups: low-skilled natives; medium-skilled immigrants; or high-skilled immigrants. This supports the hypothesis that immigrants with higher qualifications are compelled to accept lower-skilled jobs, and are thus perceived as a competitive threat to low-skilled natives. By reconciling radical right contextual studies and research on the political economy of immigration policies, this paper highlights the importance of a local analysis in detecting the effect of labour market competition on radical right support. This paper also explains why some local areas are more prone to radical right support than others over time.

3.1 Introduction

The rise of the radical right[1] in Western Europe has generated a wide range of theoretical explanations behind its electoral appeal[2]. These range from demand-side theories, with the study of microlevel processes of individual and attitudinal determinants (Evans, 2000; Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Ivarsflaten, 2008), to supply-side theories with the investigation of political opportunity structures and electoral systems (Kitschelt, 1995; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). Most seminal studies conclude that immigration and economic hardship are major predictors of radical right performance. Structural changes of de-industrialisation and globalisation have weakened the economic situation and status of low-income voters who are (or are perceived to be) in direct competition with immigrants for jobs or wages[3], and who eventually respond to such threat by supporting the anti-immigrant and anti-globalisation radical right parties.

While this labour market competition (LMC) theory has been commonly reprised by scholars, journalists and policy-makers, most studies have tested its validity at the individual- or macro- levels (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Arzheimer, 2009; Golder, 2016; Pardos-Prado and Xena, 2019). On one hand, a large group of individual-level survey studies has consistently rejected the economic argument that native workers who share similar skills with immigrants are more inclined to support anti-immigrant radical right parties (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Hainmueller et al., 2015). On

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[1]See more on the choice of the terminology in section 2.

[2]While this paper recognises alternative hypotheses behind radical right support, it specifically aims to revisit the labour market competition hypothesis by adopting an innovative empirical investigation at the local level with more accurate indicators.

[3]Competition can also occur over public resources but this is beyond the scope of labour competition and hence of this paper (see more in de Koster et al., 2013).

the other hand, contextual studies have found mixed evidence linking ethnic groups' economic competition with radical right support (Golder, 2003; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2005). However, both sets of studies have significant limitations inherent to their respective observational scales: the former are more likely to detect a cultural effect by basing their studies on self-reported radical right respondents, whereas the latter rely on aggregated geographical units and variables that mask the potential competition between groups.

Little scholarly attention has been given to the impact of immigration in the local labour markets of native residents. Yet this is the ideal scale at which to test the LMC theory because it is the context in which residents interact with immigrants in their day-to-day lives. Native workers are directly exposed to and affected by labour market changes in their immediate surroundings. The presence of immigrants is likely to increase local job competition and suppress local wages for similar skill groups in some areas to an extent that is somewhat masked in aggregate indicators.

Following this hypothesis, this paper aims to investigate the effects of labour market competition on radical right voting from a local contextual perspective. Does local exposure to immigration affect natives' radical right voting differently, depending on the level and type of labour market competition?

To answer this question, I use a unique panel dataset which accounts for the French census data to test the impact that the skill composition of the French-born versus the foreign-born population has on the French vote share of Front National (FN), France's main radical right party, in four presidential elections (2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017) by municipality. I examine intra-municipality

variation in the skills-based composition of immigrants and natives while controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity[4].

I find consistent results that confirm the presence of labour market competition at a local level. This effect is strong and positive for any type of competition, whether it is between natives and immigrants of low-, medium- or high-skill levels. The effect of labour-market competition on the vote share of the radical right is amplified in more economically deprived areas. I also show that the composition of immigrants and natives in municipalities can explain local variations in radical right support over time. Municipalities with a higher share of low-skilled natives or of medium-skilled or high-skilled immigrants, are more likely to register a higher radical right vote share because these immigrants are compelled to take up low-skilled natives' jobs.

The contribution is five-fold. Firstly, this paper adopts a close investigation of contextual factors at the lowest administrative level available, the municipalities. Such a fine-grained level of analysis allows the evaluation of local contextual effects that directly affect voters, avoiding the need to infer local effects from national or sub-regional aggregated levels and thus minimising issues of ecological fallacy.

Secondly, this paper extends the analysis of contextual effects on radical right voting by operationalising economic circumstances with indicators other than unemployment rate and immigrant population size. Most of the macro-economic aggregate indicators mask considerable variation in the types of immigration and therefore do not adequately capture labour market compe-

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[4]Although alternative theories of radical right voting can be specifically attributed to the French case, such as local supply factors to explain the different radical right support between the North and the Southeast part of the country, this paper rather focuses on the intra-municipal factors (and not inter-municipal factors) with regards to the ethnic composition behind radical right vote share over time in light of testing the LMC theory.

tition. The local unemployment rate or size of the immigrant population may be irrelevant for natives working in occupations facing little competition from immigrant workers. Despite the large concentration of immigrants, certain areas might register a low radical right vote share because most natives are not in direct economic competition with immigrants. Moreover, most labour economics studies use proxy variables like education that cannot directly assess the labour market dynamics. Although education is surely associated with people's skill level, it is also correlated with cultural tolerance and cosmopolitan attitudes (Nie et al., 1996; Chandler and Tsai, 2001). Cultural intolerance may not directly come from the labour market competition between workers of similar skill level but rather from the fact that lower-educated individuals are on average more culturally intolerant of foreigners than highly-educated individuals. By focusing on the economic activity and job security of immigrants and natives, this study contributes to the missing link between immigration and economic conditions in studies of radical right voting.

Thirdly, this paper brings evidence that actual economic threat related to job competition impacts radical right voting. Through isolating the economic threat according to the skill levels of natives and immigrants, I control for the cultural predispositions of immigrants using education and job activity. Without denying that cultural factors may affect the relationship between immigration and electoral preferences, the economic threat I find on radical right voting stress the need for scholars and policy-makers to be less quick to dismiss economic considerations.

Fourthly, this paper provides an explanation for the socio-economic diversity of the radical right's voting base, which typically includes both blue-collar workers and the middle class. Yet the existing literature contains few thorough

explanations of why this may be the case. By highlighting that local labour market competition occurs between immigrants and natives of similar skillsets, I identify one such explanation.

Finally, this paper sheds light on how and why the radical right's appeal in national elections varies considerably within municipalities over time. This fine-grained longitudinal analysis of the skills-based composition of immigrants and natives from 2002 to 2017 shows that municipalities with a higher concentration of medium- or high-skilled immigrants are more likely to register higher radical right share. This complements previous research studies that mostly focused on the composition of the native population, unemployment or immigration while neglecting the specific skillset of immigrants.

This paper is organised as follows. I first briefly introduce the radical right party family, and place the present study in the context of recent trends in the evolution of its electoral platforms and voting base. I then provide an overview of the labour market competition thesis, summarise the extant literature on contextual features and radical right voting, and outline my hypotheses. I then lay out my data, research design, results and robustness checks. The final section of the paper discusses the limitations and potential implications of my findings.

3.2 The Radical Right

Within the wealth of scholarly research on the radical right in Europe, multiple labels have been advanced to define this party family. They range from 'extreme right' (Ignazi, 2003), 'far-right' (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016), 'populist radical right' (Mudde, 2007) and 'radical right' (Norris, 2005). What unites

such parties is their nativist policy agenda, which is expressed by a strong anti-immigrant and nationalist stance (Mudde, 2007; Halikiopoulou et al., 2012). The *Front National* (aka the National Front; hereafter FN) in France—whose support base is the subject of this article—is prototypical in this regard. This party counts as 'radical' in virtue of its opposition to key features of liberal democracy: it advances an idealised ethnically and culturally homogenous nation at the expense of individual rights and equality. It is however not 'extreme' because it does not share any lineage with the fascist parties (Norris, 2005).

More recently, radical right parties have combined their traditional nativism with an interventionist economic agenda (Roth et al., 2017). Despite initially supporting economic liberalism and espousing deregulatory beliefs in the 1980s and 1990s (Kitschelt, 1995), over the last decade these parties have gradually adopted a domestic economic agenda focused on government spending to expand public services for natives (Schumacher and Kersbergen, 2014) and have incorporated protectionist economic positions in their platforms (Roth et al., 2017). Moreover, most radical right parties have actively scapegoated immigrants as responsible for taking natives' jobs and suppressing natives' wages.

By aligning their economic positions with a nativist viewpoint, radical right parties have expanded their voting base into new socioeconomic demographics, in particular attracting economically left-leaning supporters (Kitschelt, 1995; Roth et al., 2017). In the 1980s, it was the anti-state *petite bourgeoisie* that constituted the main electoral base of radical right parties (Norris, 2005). But with the recent tacking onto the economic left, they have gained support among the most economically insecure individuals (Arzheimer, 2009). Low-skilled workers and those who are most vulnerable to the rise of unemployment are more sensitive to the radical right's ethno-nationalist and anti-immigrant

rhetoric. Interestingly, the radical right's electoral base also includes middle-class groups: those who are not in the lowest income stratum but rather a few rungs up (Bornschier and Kriesi, 2012; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016). One explanation for support among such groups is that they perceive a decline in their socio-economic position relative to that in the past and/or relative to other groups (e.g. immigrants) (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Gest et al., 2018). This article highlights an additional explanation for radical right support among socio-economically diverse groups of voters: local labour market competition between natives and immigrants.

3.3 Local Labour Market Competition and Radical Right Voting

The LMC theory has been one of the most common explanations for the emergence and sustained success of the radical right. It posits an interest-based form of threat to 'native' residents from the arrival of immigrants, which is characterised by the fear of losing jobs and wages (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Pardos-Prado, 2011; Pardos-Prado and Xena, 2019). Echoing social psychology's 'group conflict theory' (Blumer, 1958; Tajfel and Turner, 1979), the LMC theory holds that the economic competition between natives and foreign-born workers of similar skills pushes the former to cast a radical-right ballot. It thus implicitly assumes an in-group bias in which natives will always prefer giving a job to natives rather than to immigrants[5]. Some variants of the LMC theory have been developed with an identity-based form of ethnic threat rooted in the fear of losing cultural resources (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Sniderman et

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[5]Although one may find examples in which natives may not necessarily have an in-group preference, these examples cannot be shown using the methodology of the present study. This paper therefore relies on the in-group bias assumption at the core of the LMC hypothesis.

al., 2004; Inglehart and Norris, 2016) and more recently with a status-based form of threat that arises from the loss of subjective status following economic and cultural change (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Gest et al., 2018).

Yet, while the LMC has been extensively discussed, the economic determinants of ethnic competition have been supported by weak empirical evidence. The individual-level studies have concluded that the cultural form of ethnic threat has more explanatory power (Hainmueller et al., 2014) whereas macro-contextual studies have yielded inconclusive findings (Golder, 2016). This paper argues that these results stem from an over-emphasis on individual and macro-level studies that cannot account for labour competition, which plays out at the local level.

On the one hand, individual-level survey data fail to adequately capture natives' actual labour market exposure to immigrants. Survey studies base their results on a selected sample of radical right voters who are more likely to represent the most radicalised voters because they have to self-identify as radical right sympathisers. Oesch finds that only 11.4 per cent of the respondents to the 2002/2003 wave of the European Social Survey acknowledged having voted for the Front National while the party registered 16.9 per cent of valid votes in the first round of the 2002 presidential election (Oesch, 2008). Oesch demonstrates that self-identified radical right supporters tend to hold the strongest xenophobic sentiments and to disregard economic considerations. Although this 'social desirability bias' is less important nowadays given the success, and hence mainstreaming, of radical right parties and the use of online surveys, it was a significant phenomenon during the earlier part of the period covered by the present study (2002–2017), and thus remains a relevant point of comparison. In addition, the absence of attention to the local factors in which electoral deci-

sions are made, e.g. satisfaction with the local environment and public services, can also result in biased estimates in individual-level analyses.

On the other hand, macrolevel studies, because of their aggregated level of analysis, cannot meaningfully depict local lived experiences of competition between natives and immigrants. Not only do they include large geographical units like national, regional or district levels which mask local dynamics (Jesuit et al., 2009; Golder, 2016), but they also mostly focus on two large-scale macro indicators, immigration and unemployment, which fail to produce consistent findings. Journalistic discourses and conventional wisdom would assume that areas with a large concentration of immigrants and high unemployment rate are traditional radical right strongholds. Yet, while the effect of immigration seems unequivocal (Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002; Golder, 2003; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006), findings on the effects of unemployment and its interaction with immigration are mixed. While Golder (2003) shows that high levels of immigration and unemployment lead to larger radical right vote share, Arzheimer (2009) finds that the effects do not reinforce each other and Lubbers et al. (2002) report no significant effect of unemployment.

Instead, this paper draws on theory that highlights the importance of lived experiences between immigrants and natives in a local environment. Any actual direct economic threat is most likely to be experienced by natives in their municipality. Immigration at a national level is unlikely to have substantially affected the wage or job prospects of the average native-born worker. However, if immigrants are concentrated in small spatial units, then native-born workers in those geographic areas with similar skills to foreign-born workers might be affected by their arrival. Local immigration increases the supply of labour competing for local jobs and may therefore increase local labour market pressure

(Card, 2001). Small labour markets influence the relationship between local wages and employment. Since individuals are more likely to vote according to the changing socio-economic structure in their immediate environment, it is necessary to investigate panel data at a low level of analysis.

Also, the economic impact of immigration on radical right voting should be tested while differentiating between, on the one hand, native workers and their skill levels and, on the other hand, immigrant workers and their skill levels (Dancygier and Donnelly, 2013). Few studies demarcate the share of immigrant workers relative to native workers for each sector. Yet, occupation-specific employment statistics are averages which often mask considerable variations across occupation-types with respect to the relative share of natives and immigrants. For instance, there is a gap between the foreign-born unemployment rate and the native one in Europe (INSEE). Similarly, very few studies specify that actual economic competition affects individuals differently according to their skill level. Some rare exceptions have shown material self-interest behind radical right voting, but this has been limited to the national aggregates (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001) and industry sectors (Dancygier and Donnelly, 2013); none of these have looked at the local level.

Malhotra et al. (2013) find that labour-market concerns only drive anti-immigration voting behaviour when actual economic competition between natives and immigrants is present. Immigration is expected to have very different impacts on natives' risk exposure on the labour market depending on how immigrants affect competition within their occupational category. Thus, differentiating the native-born and foreign-born populations according to their skill level is useful to test more accurately the economic competition between the in-group and out-group, in line with the LMC theory. This leads me to develop

two primary hypotheses.

The first hypothesis focuses on low-skilled natives. The economic threat of immigration on radical right voting is likely to vary according to how secure native workers feel in their jobs, and it is workers in the lowest-skilled, most routine jobs that are least secure. Their employers can more easily replace them, and they also tend to have lower income-earning potential. Studies on labour market outcomes in western democracies have detected negative effects of immigration inflows on local wages only among low-skilled workers (Card, 2001). That is why I expect municipalities with a higher share of low-skilled natives to exhibit higher radical right support, all else equal.

However, it does not necessarily follow that a larger concentration of low-skilled immigrants would increase a municipality's radical right share. The economic threat of immigration on radical right voting is also likely to vary according to immigrants' labour market access. Indeed, due to language barriers, lack of connections, and qualifications that are insufficiently specific to the host country market (INSEE, 2009), immigrants are more likely than other sociodemographic groups to have higher qualifications than those required by their jobs (Quintini, 2011) and thus tend to compete with lower-skilled natives. For instance, countries tend to have distinctive legal traditions and restrictive regulations on who can practice law, which pose barriers to the entry of immigrant lawyers into a host country's market for legal services. I therefore expect that areas with a large share of medium- or high-skilled immigrants will be more likely to threaten low-skilled natives' jobs.

Accordingly, my first hypothesis is as follows:

Labour Market Access Hypothesis: *Municipalities with a higher share of any of the following three groups are more likely to register*

higher radical right vote shares: low-skilled natives; medium-skilled immigrants; or high-skilled immigrants.

My second hypothesis focuses on similarities among the skill levels of natives and immigrants.

Local Labour Market Competition Hypothesis: *Municipalities with larger shares of natives and immigrants of similar skills are more likely to register higher radical right vote shares.*

My third hypothesis considers the contextual effect of economic deprivation. The positive effects of immigration on radical right voting are expected to be compounded when economic resources are scarcer. Halla et al. (2017) have found that labour market competition intensifies when unemployment is high. Poorer economic circumstances are likely to increase job competition and scapegoating of immigrant populations by natives, as suggested by the ethnic competition thesis. Higher unemployment also heightens the risk of unemployment to those workers on temporary contracts as their perceptions of insecurity increases when market conditions deteriorate (de Witte, 1999; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2016). As a result, I expect that a combination of a larger concentration of immigrants (no matter their skill level) with higher background unemployment is likely to increase radical right voting. Accordingly, my third hypothesis is:

Contextual Hypothesis: *Municipalities with larger shares of immigrants and higher levels of economic deprivation, i.e. more unemployment, are more likely to register higher radical right vote shares.*

3.4   Data and Research Design

The main novel contribution of this paper is to combine municipality-level radical right vote share with information about skill levels and influx of migrants in France over a fifteen-year period (2002-2017). This analysis differs from past research by (1) focusing on the actual economic threat by differentiating between the various types of occupational activities of immigrants[6], (2) applying a skill level classification based on job security and ease of labour market entry, and (3) examining the interaction between workers of similar skill level to directly assess local labour-market competition when such threats exist.

Case Study

Including local observations for a closer examination from a single country helps to avoid ideological and programmatic idiosyncrasies between radical-right wing parties in different countries and keep institutional factors constant (Kestilä and Söderlund, 2007). Contradictory contextual determinants of labour market competition also result from the local idiosyncrasies of cross-national studies which ignore the national institutional arrangements and the history of each radical right party (Mudde, 2007).

The choice of France is justified by its obvious pragmatic reasons of data availability, but there are also more substantive considerations. As the third political force in France, the Front National (FN) is a thriving party that has proven to be successful in national, regional and departmental elections since 2002. Its leader, Marine Le Pen, has managed to garner more electoral support in the past five years by softening the openly racist discourse of her

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[6]In light of testing the LMC theory, this paper aims to capture the effect of actual economic competition without discounting the importance of perceived economic threat behind radical right support. See Stockemer, 2015, for more information on this debate.

father (Evans and Ivaldi, 2013). Despite having retained most of its core authoritarian, nativist, protectionist and anti-immigrant policies (Stockemer and Barisione, 2017), the recent FN and Marine Le Pen's 'de-demonisation' strategy has contributed to FN's unprecedented electoral gains. Not only has the FN increased its vote share from 11.2 per cent to 19.1 per cent in the first round of the presidential elections from 2007 to 2012 but it came second in the 2017 presidential race (second round) with 21.7 per cent.

The FN is thus an emblematic successful radical right party that benefits from a long-lasting and growing success. It has been the prototypical party commonly used by researchers to explain theoretical patterns of the emergence and sustained electoral support of radical right parties (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt, 1995; Mudde, 2007). Although radical right parties differ in terms of their precise ideologies, they pertain to the same party family (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). In spite of their inconsistent findings, all cross-national studies have included the FN as part of the West European radical right party family, along with parties from the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2002, 2005; Arzheimer, 2009; Golder, 2003). The FN traditionally embodies a successful radical right party among this party family. One instance of its wider implications for the West European radical right party family was its ideological refinement of combining ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-political establishment populism in 1984, which was later reprised by the majority of West European radical right parties (Rydgren, 2005). The findings of this study of the FN may therefore have important implications for understanding the local electoral success of other radical right parties in Western Europe.

Moreover, the case of France is particularly relevant to test the local LMC

theory. Firstly, the recent large immigration influx in France allows us to test the effect of recent immigration on radical right electoral support. Immigrants represented 8.9 per cent of the French population at the beginning of 2013 compared with 7.3 per cent in 2000 (INSEE, 2016b). This recent surge explains why the radical right party has centered its narrative on immigration. As the arrival of distinct ethnic populations with varying skill levels has skyrocketed, the potential for political protest against ethnically distinct newcomers to translate into radical right support becomes more likely (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). The focus on the economic occupations of the immigrant population has been endorsed by Le Pen's rhetoric since the early years of the party. Jean-Marie Le Pen's xenophobic resentment was initially expressed in economic terms in 1972 when he stated "two million immigrants equals two million unemployed people". Despite a recent ideological focus on the religious attributes of the recent non-European immigrants, the socio-economic features of the foreign-born population constitute a major issue dimension among FN voters (Evans and Ivaldi, 2013).

Not only has immigration increased in recent years but there has been a rise in qualification levels of immigrants since 2008. 63 per cent of the immigrants who arrived in 2012 had at least a high school diploma (INSEE, 2017a). As of 2015, 10.4 per cent of immigrants were manual labourers and 11.4 per cent were unemployed, but 14.6 per cent were public servants, private administrative employees, commerce employees, and people working in the personal services sector or CEOs (INSEE, 2016b). France has recently witnessed a rise of foreign workers in IT services, especially from the Northern African and former French colonies. This influx was facilitated by France's immigration and integration law in 2007, which encouraged high-skilled migration in fields experiencing profes-

sional shortages, like the IT sector. The work permit *Passeport Talent*, created in 2016, has also facilitated the arrival of entrepreneurs, engineers and managers by extending the duration of residence to four years for ten categories of high-skilled immigrants. In addition, recent immigration has included highly qualified Spaniards and Italian workers who fled their home country after the economic crisis (INSEE, 2016b). This case study therefore enables us to test the LMC theory for all skill levels.

Labour market competition is expected to be particularly acute in France since most immigrants take jobs in regulated sectors. As over 20 per cent of immigrants in the labour force are blue-collar workers or lower grade white collar workers (INSEE, 2017a), their presence is more likely to increase unemployment because wages in these sectors cannot be suppressed below the regulated minimum. If they were more numerous in the unregulated sector, like in the United Kingdom, the effect would have been directly felt on wages as no minimum wage is applied. Manual labourers also tend to face more job insecurity in France than in any other European countries as around one third of them hold a temporary contract, whereas permanent contracts are predominantly awarded in medium-and highly-skilled jobs (INSEE, 2017a). These factors contribute to unemployment risk among low-skilled natives during immigration inflows.

It is also relevant to use the French example because the FN puts the economic consequences of immigration at the forefront of its agenda. The party has regularly addressed anti-immigrant positions from an economic perspective as well as from a cultural one. Since 2012, under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, the FN has departed from its previously rightist economic platform of small government and tax cuts, and has endorsed an economic protectionist agenda that prioritises government spending for natives (Stockemer and Bari-

sione, 2017). Marine Le Pen has explicitly blamed immigrants for taking over natives' jobs and suppressing natives' wages.

France is also a very practical case study to test the economic competition at a local level given the availability of data at a very granular scale. Not only does this allow this study to have dramatically more observations than any other studies for a long period of radical right electoral success (N = 117,872), but it increases the theoretical relevance of the findings, since municipalities are very small geographic areas that are directly relatable to inhabitants. There is an average of 1,200 inhabitants for each municipality. This means that, if a certain municipality is characterised as having a large share of high-skilled immigrants, one can safely assume that most residents of this municipality will live close to high-skilled immigrants. Of course, it is worth acknowledging that there is still some risk of ecological fallacies despite the fine-grained analysis. I cannot draw conclusions about individual-level behaviour from this subnational study.

Lastly, economic competition is intensified in France because residential mobility is low. Indeed, the relevance of the local context depends on individuals' low mobility. If individuals are very mobile and easily move between municipalities, then economic competition will be attenuated. In the 2006-2013 period, the share of households that moved residence decreased by seven percentage points from 17.8 per cent to 10.8 per cent (INSEE, 2017b). This general mobility decline is similar among all types of housing status (landlords and tenants)[7].

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[7]One might assume that the level of mobility might vary across skill levels: low skilled workers are less likely to travel for employment than those with higher skills because of high moving costs (Amior, 2015). While acknowledging this fact, I examine whether the competition between immigrants and natives happens more frequently for certain skills than for others. Rather, I test the effect of competition between workers of similar skills on radical right support when the competition happens.

Data

The hypotheses are tested with the statistical model in equation (1).

$$\gamma_{it} = \alpha_{it} + \beta_1 X_{1it} + \beta_2 X_{2it} + \beta_3 X_{1it}X_{2it} + \epsilon \qquad (3.1)$$

The dependent variable γ is the vote share of the FN of votes cast in the first round per municipality$_i$ in the presidential elections$_t$ of 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017. The data is drawn from the French Ministry of Interior. In the first round of France's presidential elections[8], tactical voting is less prevalent than in the second round (where many vote for the lesser of two evils). The model which includes the registered FN vote share along with all blank and invalid votes for each municipality presents similar findings (see in the robustness checks section). I only account for the presidential electoral results because they exclude the vote share of the immigrant population, which would have biased the estimates (immigrants can only vote in local or European elections). Presidential elections are also more appropriate than parliamentary elections to conduct a fine-grained analysis of local contextual factors because data on the latter are only available at the voting district level, which is an aggregated measure of combined municipalities (there are only 577 voting districts by comparison to 35,287 municipalities). In addition, detailed demographic data of the composition of immigrants and natives according to their skill level is only available at the municipal level. Four presidential elections are included to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. α is the constant term.

The municipal scale of analysis is the finest aggregation level available, and enables a precise accounting of local contextual effects on electoral out-

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[8]French presidential elections are based on the two-round system where voters cast a single vote for their preferred candidate in the first round and the two best candidates compete in the second round if no single candidate receives the absolute majority in the first round.

comes. Municipal characteristics are taken from population census data (IN-SEE). They include the whole French population and minimise measurement issues. There were 35,287 municipalities (called communes) in mainland France in 2017. Since the municipalities are registered for four consecutive presidential elections, the number of observations amounts to 117,872 with 29,709 munici-palities[9]. Because of their size, big cities like Paris, Lyon, Marseille and Lille will be defined according to their arrondissements (neighbourhoods). The number of inhabitants per municipality (including neighbourhoods) varies from 200 to 22,000 with a mean of 8,100. The contextual characteristics correspond to the 2007 Census for the 2002 and 2007 elections, and to the 2014 Census for the 2012 and 2017 elections. The electoral results are between zero and five years from a census (for the 2002 presidential elections). Year and municipal fixed effects are included to control for the over-time changes and between-municipal variation[10]. They enable identification of within-municipality changes in the composition of immigrants and natives over time.

X_{1it} measures the varying job qualifications of immigrants per municipality$_i$ in presidential elections $_t$. I sort the socio-economic situation of immigrants from the national skill and job cell approach available in the French National Statis-tics to measure the distribution of labour market status. I classify job occu-pations of immigrants according to their economic status, hierarchical position and job security. It includes continuous variables of (i)the *low-skilled position*, manual labourers, domestic helpers, plumber heating contractors, and routine

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[9]The number of municipalities who remain the same over time accounts to 29,709, which represents 15.8 per cent of missing values. It originates from the merging of towns and cities over time.

[10]Using municipal fixed effects enables me to hold constant the average effect of the local municipality-level variables so that none of these variables can affect my analysis. A robustness check that includes local control variables confirms that these additional variables do not change my results (Table 3.3).

non-manual employees such as account clerks, sales workers and personal assistants with the lowest pay and status and weakest employment protection, (ii) the *medium-skilled position*, the white-collar workers like clerical, administrative and management workers with higher work security, income and prestige, (iii) the *high-skilled position*, composed of managers, administrators, supervisors and professionals with higher educational attainment, career security, salaries and status who are more likely to have permanent and 'protective' contracts than any other labour position and (iv) the *unemployed*. The detailed classification of occupations according to skill levels are set out in Table B.2 of the second Appendix.

The status of immigrants includes those who are born a foreigner and abroad but reside in France. Those who were born abroad but who are of French nationality and live in France are not counted. Those counted as immigrants will remain immigrants despite acquiring French nationality unlike the category of foreigners registered in the census data. It is the country of birth and not nationality at birth that is registered. This allows me to include individuals that eventually obtained the French nationality according to the "right of soil" after fifteen years of permanent residence, unlike foreigners. It also enables me to avoid any compositional effects by excluding the immigrants with French nationality who can vote. However, it does not capture the second or third generation of immigrants that are born in France but can be perceived a threat by the native population and targeted by radical right parties in their anti-immigrant narrative.

The local sectoral composition of occupational activities is drawn from the French National Statistics. The low-skilled immigrant rate is calculated as the share of low-skilled immigrants aged 18-64 relative to the immigrant labour

force in each municipality. In the same vein, the medium-skilled, high-skilled and unemployed immigrant rates are obtained from the share of immigrants aged 18-64 in the immigrant labour force.

X_{2it} represents the shares of the occupational activities of natives per municipality$_i$ for each presidential election$_t$. These demographic control variables are classified similarly for immigrants along low-skilled, middle-skilled, high-skilled and unemployed status.

Empirical studies of immigration have obvious endogeneity concerns given that immigrants themselves choose where to live. Voters who feel uncomfortable with the social and political atmosphere in their neighbourhood may also choose to move elsewhere, to more politically like-minded surroundings. White progressive residents might have chosen an ethnically dense residential location whereas white conservative individuals might have decided to move to more homogenous places to live. But few recent studies attempt to account for geographical sorting through an instrumental approach of immigrant historical settlement patterns (Halla et al., 2017), or share of housing stock (Harmon, 2017). The choice of instruments remains questionable since they are likely to violate the exclusion restriction by affecting the outcome variable.

Also, the origin of the ethnic composition of immigrants is known to affect radical right voting differently. The recent wave from the Middle East and North Africa by a large new Muslim population has been perceived as threatening the lifestyle and culture of the in-group. Most leaders of far-right parties have adopted anti-immigrant political strategies that specifically target Muslims. 30 per cent of the foreign-born population is from Maghreb (INSEE, 2016b). Savelkoul et al. (2017) identify that not only is ethnic minority density positively associated with the likelihood to vote for the Party of Freedom

in the Netherlands but the relationship is also even more significant towards non-Western migrants who do not mingle with their ethnic neighbours. While recognising the significance of the origin of the ethnic composition in determining far-right voting, this study cannot include this ethnic composition variable due to a lack of data availability at a local level. A French law passed in 1978 has prevented individuals from being counted by race or ethnicity on the grounds that it is contrary to the Republican principle of equality.

$X_{1it}X_{2it}$ represents the interaction terms between the different skill levels of natives and immigrants per municipality$_t$. They first help to evaluate the direct competition of natives and immigrants of similar skill level (low/medium/high) under varying levels of local labour market conditions. They then measure the conditional effect of unemployment and the different occupational categories of immigrants on FN vote share. This helps to test the contextual hypothesis that immigrant populations (no matter their skillset) are likely to boost radical right support when unemployment is high. ϵ is the error term.

3.5 Results and Discussion

Local Labour Market Competition and Radical Right Voting

I first investigate the Market Access Hypothesis in Table 3.1 which presents the linear fixed effect regression of the effects of labour market competition between natives and immigrants according to their skill levels on the FN vote share in the 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017 presidential elections. The first model shows that the different local employment compositional factors are able to explain why certain municipalities have a higher share of radical right votes than others over time. Having a higher share of any of the following groups boosts the radical right

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Table 3.1: Local Labour Market Competition and Radical Right Voting

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Immigrants' Skill Levels					
Low-Skilled	0.011	-0.195***	0.011	0.016	0.005
	(0.025)	(0.057)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Medium-Skilled	0.073**	0.076**	-0.035	0.064*	0.077**
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.064)	(0.033)	(0.033)
High-Skilled	0.086**	0.084**	0.088**	-0.521***	0.074**
	0.036	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.059)	(0.036)
Unemployed	-0.493***	-0.493***	-0.458***	-0.440***	-1.306***
	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.118)	(0.461)
Natives' Skill Levels					
Low-Skilled	0.019***	0.013***	0.019***	0.018***	0.019***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Medium-Skilled	-0.014**	-0.014**	-0.017***	-0.014***	-0.014***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
High-Skilled	0.085***	0.085***	0.086***	0.063***	0.084***
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.059)	(0.036)
Unemployed	-0.086***	-0.086***	-0.086***	-0.086**	-0.151***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.027)
Low-Skilled Immigrants × Low-Skilled Natives		0.010***			
		(0.002)			
Medium-Skilled Immigrants × Medium-Skilled Natives			0.011*		
			(0.006)		
High-Skilled Immigrants × High-Skilled Natives				0.066***	
				(0.004)	
Unemployed Immigrants × Unemployed Natives					0.291***
					(0.085)
Constant	16.382***	16.503***	16.399***	16.583***	16.580***
	(0.183)	(0.186)	(0.183)	(0.184)	(0.193)
Within R-sq	0.670	0.670	0.670	0.671	0.670
Between R-sq	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Overall R-sq	0.343	0.344	0.343	0.341	0.342
Municipal Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	117,872	117,872	117,872	117,872	117,872
Number of Municipalities	29,709	29,709	29,709	29,709	29,709

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

support in a municipality: low-skilled natives; medium-skilled immigrants; or high-skilled immigrants. A one percent increase of medium-skilled immigrants in a municipality leads to an increase of 0.073 percentage points of the municipality's radical right vote share, and a one percent increase of high-skilled immigrants leads to an increase of 0.086 percentage points of the municipality's radical right vote share. In addition, the effect of low-skilled immigrants is insignificant while the presence of unemployed immigrants strongly decreases the radical right vote in a municipality.

These findings corroborate the Market Access Hypothesis that medium- or high-skilled immigrants, and not low-skilled or unemployed immigrants, represent a direct economic threat to low-skilled natives. One telling illustration is the comparison between Neuwiller and Villing. These two rural municipalities of less than 1000 inhabitants are from neighbouring departments in the north-east of France, and both register a majority of low-skilled natives. They both share low unemployment rates and a high immigrant stock (immigrants comprise above 30 per cent of the local population in each municipality). Yet in Villing FN registered a 40 per cent share of the vote share in the first round of the 2017 election, by comparison to a 16.1 per cent share for the FN in Neuwiller. The skill levels of the immigrant labour force provide a valid justification for different radical right electoral results. While medium- and high-skilled workers together comprise 40 per cent of the immigrant labour force in Villing, they comprise only 4 per cent of the immigrant labour force in Neuwiller. This shows that it is not immigration *per se* but rather the immigrants' position within the labour market that affects the radical right's electoral support in an area. Unlike previous contextual literature which used the macro indicator of immigration (Lubbers et al. 2002; Golder, 2003), my model provides a more detailed un-

derstanding of the types of immigration that drive radical right support at the municipal level over time.

Model 1 also confirms the diverse socio-economic backgrounds of radical right voters. Larger concentrations of low-skilled and high-skilled natives lead to an increase in radical right vote share within municipalities. Areas with a one percent increase of low-skilled natives register a 0.019 percentage points increase of their radical right vote share whereas the increase is 0.085 percentage points with a one percent increase of high-skilled natives. This finding is in line with individual-level survey studies that show similar ethnic threats among low- and high-skilled natives (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Malhotra et al., 2013). Outer suburbs, where blue-collar and low to medium service workers are concentrated, are FN bastions. For example, in the first round of the 2017 election FN received 31.85 per cent of the vote in Meaux and 24.7 per cent in Melun. Surprisingly, Model 1 also shows that a larger concentration of medium-skilled immigrants decreases the FN vote share. However, this finding is only tentative since it has not been supported by all models (see robustness check section)[11]. Areas with more unemployed natives are also likely to register a lower FN vote share. This is in line with recent studies that show stronger radical right support among people a few rungs from the bottom of the occupational hierarchy who perceive a threat to their position (Bornshier and Kriesi, 2012). Because the unemployed natives have no job to defend, they are less likely to perceive immigrants as a threat.

Models 2, 3 and 4 of Table 3.1 test my second hypothesis. They look at the interaction effects of economic competition between immigrants and natives

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[11]One may argue that medium-skilled workers have less direct competition with immigrants because their jobs mostly involve service-based occupations which are more difficult for immigrants to obtain because they will need to speak and understand the language of the host country.

Figure 3.1: Marginal Effects of Local Labour Market Competition for each Skill
Level on Radical Right Voting

for low-, medium- and high-skilled workers on radical right voting. The signif-
icant and positive interaction terms for each skill level suggest that local eco-
nomic competition between natives and immigrants of similar skills compounds
the positive effects on radical right support within municipalities[12]. This cor-
roborates the local LMC hypothesis. Figure 3.1 shows the interaction effects
of local labour competition between natives and immigrants for each skill level.
It evinces the positive marginal effects of immigrants on municipalities' radical
right support as the share of the native population with a similar skill level
to immigrants increases. There is a positive effect for all skill levels, but it is

[12]Although the interaction term is not significant for the medium-skilled workers, the figure
still shows a positive conditional effect, which corroborates my hypothesis for this skill level
too.

particularly strong among high-skilled workers[13]. Brousse is an example of a municipality in which a large concentration of native and immigrant workers with similar skill levels (61.2 per cent of the total local labour force in 2017) is associated with higher support for the radical right: in the first round of the 2017 election, FN came first, receiving 27.7 per cent of the vote.

Local Labour Market Competition, Economic Deprivation and Radical Right Voting

Table 3.2 examines the third hypothesis concerning the intervening effects of scarcer economic resources on municipalities' FN vote share as the population of immigrants increases (for each respective skill level). The effect is strong and significant no matter the immigrants' skill level. Not only does it corroborate the contextual hypothesis but the finding is also in line with the current literature that demonstrates the additive effect of unemployment on radical right support (Golder, 2003; Malhotra et al., 2013; Halla et al., 2017). Figure 3.2 shows the impact of different shares of low-, medium- and high-skilled immigrants on radical right voting as economic deprivation increases. This finding is in line with the contextual hypothesis because it shows a strong and positive trend of immigrant influx (for each skill level) on radical right voting, conditional on the shares of unemployment increasing. Areas with scarcer economic resources have more local labour market competition for all skill levels of immigrants[14].

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[13]Interestingly, the effect is strongest among high-skilled workers. This result is unpredicted by the theories I have considered. If similar research bears out this effect, these theories will need to be supplemented with additional explanation.

[14]Even areas with more unemployed immigrants are likely to register increased radical right support in the presence of higher overall local unemployment because the latter captures the local workforce as a whole, which for all municipalities in my study is composed of a majority of unemployed natives. The data show that, although it is the case that, for most municipalities, the majority of the immigrant population is unemployed, there are in all municipalities more unemployed natives than unemployed immigrants among the total labour force.

Table 3.2: Local Labour Market Competition, Economic Deprivation and Radical Right Voting

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Immigrants' Skill Levels			
Low-Skilled	-0.305***	0.005	0.006
	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Medium-Skilled	0.088**	-0.351***	0.047
	(0.033)	(0.056)	(0.033)
High-Skilled	0.028	0.025	-0.544***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.073)
Natives' Skill Levels			
Low-Skilled	0.019***	0.020***	0.020***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Medium-Skilled	-0.012*	-0.012*	-0.013**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)
High-Skilled	0.082***	0.081***	0.082***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Unemployment	-0.384***	0.318***	0.343***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Low-Skilled Immigrants × Unemployment	0.118***		
	(0.008)		
Medium-Skilled Immigrants × Unemployment		0.152***	
		(0.016)	
High-Skilled Immigrants × Unemployment			0.196***
			(0.025)
Constant	17.338***	17.173***	17.272***
	(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.186)
Within R-sq	0.672	0.671	0.672
Between R-sq	0.003	0.003	0.003
Overall R-sq	0.337	0.338	0.337
Municipal Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	117,872	117,872	117,872
Number of Municipalities	29,709	29,709	29,709

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p $<$ .05, ** p$<$ .01, *** p $<$ .001.

Figure 3.2: Marginal Effects of Local Labour Market Competition and Economic Deprivation on Radical Right Voting

This result follows previous findings that difficult economic circumstances positively impact the anti-immigrant effect on radical right voting (Golder, 2003; Malhotra et al., 2013). In my study, it plausibly explains the radical right strongholds like Hénin-Beaumont or Liévin in Pas-de-Calais, which have experienced difficult economic transitions after the shutdown of coal-mining industries and subsequent attraction of white-collar workers during the reconversion of these cities into service-based areas. The local residents in these areas are predominantly low- and medium-skilled workers. In the context of high local unemployment, competition for jobs with immigrants has escalated, and this has translated into strong electoral support for the FN, with Le Pen receiving over 60 per cent of the vote in these towns in the 2017 election.

3.6 Robustness Checks

As a last step, I address some questions that might be asked of the presented results with several robustness checks. The first model of Table 3.3 shows that my findings do not hinge on the exact specification of the dependent variable. The results are similar if I change the expressed FN vote share per municipality (excluding blank and invalid votes) to the registered FN vote share per municipality including blank and invalid votes. Including blank and invalid votes does not affect my results.

The second model of Table 3.3 presents the squared term of the immigration inflow to test whether the relationship between the inflows of immigration and radical right support follows a curvilinear pattern, as one study previously found a threshold at which the arrival of foreigners becomes negatively associated with radical right vote share (Charitopoulou and Garcia-Manglano, 2018). These authors posit a non-linear effect since the radical right vote in a municipality may decrease when there are large inflows of immigrants provided that a majority of the immigrant population supports a party that is not anti-immigrant. On the contrary, I obtain a positive but insignificant effect of the quadratic term, which indicates that my models are not biased by any potential curvilinear effect. This is probably due to the fact that the immigrant population cannot vote in French presidential elections.

The third model of Table 3.3 shows the effects of various immigrants' occupations relative to the population of each occupation, and not the whole labour force, on municipalities' radical right voting. The findings are very similar to my previous models, which corroborate my previous estimates.

Finally, one might be concerned that my estimates are biased by un-

Table 3.3: Robustness Checks

	Registered FN Vote Share	Non-Linear Effect	By Occupation	Additional Variables
Immigrants' Skill Levels				
Low-Skilled	-0.011 (0.019)	0.030 (0.026)	-0.033 (0.152)	0.008 (0.025)
Medium-Skilled	0.029 (0.027)	0.079** (0.033)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.103*** (0.033)
High-Skilled	0.099*** (0.030)	0.084** (0.037)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.065* (0.037)
Unemployed	-0.427*** (0.109)	-0.474*** (0.123)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.530*** (0.126)
Students				0.811*** (0.058)
Retired				-0.019 (0.022)
Natives' Skill Levels				
Low-Skilled	0.014*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.005)	-0.049 (0.046)	0.010*** (0.005)
Medium-Skilled	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.022*** (0.006)	-0.025*** (0.006)
High-Skilled	0.055*** (0.005)	0.085*** (0.006)	0.089*** (0.006)	0.101*** (0.015)
Unemployed	-0.063*** (0.019)	-0.087*** (0.023)	-0.067*** (0.022)	-0.108*** (0.022)
Students				-0.084*** (0.008)
Retired				-0.041*** (0.006)
Immigration		-0.039*** (0.001)		
Net Immigration2		0.000 (0.001)		
Urbanity Score				
Towns and Suburbs			0.819 (0.659)	
Villages			0.620 (0.600)	
Economic Activity				
Service-Based				-0.177 (0.209)
Residential				-0.273 (0.194)
Number of Mosques				0.192*** (0.026)
Constant	12.167*** (0.149)	16.469*** (0.186)	16.835*** (0.134)	16.938*** (0.704)
Within R-sq	0.668	0.670	0.670	0.674
Between R-sq	0.003	0.000	0.002	0.000
Overall R-sq	0.352	0.345	0.338	0.374
Municipal Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	117,872	117,872	117,872	117,872
Number of Municipalities	29,709	29,709	29,709	29,709

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*$p < .05$, ** $p< .01$, *** $p < .001$. The baseline for Urbanity Score is Cities. The one for Activity is Industrial Areas.

observed compositional and contextual features. The last model of Table 3.3 addresses this concern by including segments of both the native and immigrant populations that are not part of the labour force, namely students and retired persons, and local contextual variables. I include categorical variables about the level of urbanisation (cities; middle-sized towns or suburban areas; and rural areas), the predominant type of economic activity (classified as industrial, service-based or residential areas) and the share of Mosques (only available at the departmental level) from INSEE administrative data. Although municipalities with higher-skilled immigrants now perceive a lower FN vote share, the other results are not affected by the addition of these variables. Among the compositional features, only having a higher number of student immigrants in a municipality has a statistically significant and positive effect on the FN vote share. This finding suggests an effect—beyond the scope of the LMC theory—consistent with the finding that international students represent a symbolic and realistic threat to natives (Charles-Toussaint and Crowson, 2010). The negative and significant effects of retired natives and student natives are consistent with the economic logic of the LMC theory in that these segments of the population are less likely to perceive that they are in direct economic competition with immigrants. As for the contextual features, only the share of Mosques is statistically significant, which confirms the independent importance of cultural factors on radical right support (Dancygier, 2010).

Another objection that might be raised is the lack of consideration of the effects of changing local dynamics on support for the radical right. The temporal variations in immigration and unemployment levels have been proven to affect radical right parties' performance. Kaufmann (2017) has recently found

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Table 3.4: First Difference Model

Election Years (t2 - t1)	(1) $\Delta 2017 - 2002$
Immigrants' Skill Levels	
Low-Skilled	1.113
	(0.862)
Medium-Skilled	-1.513
	(2.464)
High-Skilled	1.062***
	(0.958)
Unemployed	-1.976**
	(0.955)
Natives' Skill Levels	
Low-Skilled	0.079
	(0.099)
Medium-Skilled	0.072
	(0.227)
High-Skilled	0.155
	(0.323)
Unemployed	0.471
	(0.295)
Constant	9.341***
	(3.386)
Within R-sq	0.072
Between R-sq	0.004
Overall R-sq	0.041
Municipal Fixed Effects	Yes
Observations	36,162

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001. The baseline for Urbanity Score is Cities. The one for Activity is Industrial Areas.

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that ethnic change is likely to increase radical right support in the UK but higher rates of ethnic minorities have the opposite effect. Table 3.4 therefore explores a first difference model, depicting the effect of changes in the shares of immigrants and natives of each skill level over time on changes in radical right voting from years 2002 to 2017. This cyclical approach can eventually estimate causal relationships between variables. While most variables are insignificant, the effect of unemployed immigrants on the performance of the radical right is strong. A one percent increase of unemployed immigrants from the years 2002 to 2017 decreases the radical right support by 1.976 percentage points within municipalities. Despite the lack of other significant coefficients, this finding corroborates my previous results.

3.7   Conclusion

This paper provides a novel empirical investigation of the way immigration affects radical right voting at a local level using the skill composition of immigrants and municipal fixed effects. It contributes evidence of an economic dimension to radical right voting.

Using French electoral results and census data over a fifteen-year period from 2002 to 2017, this study finds empirical evidence of the impact of local contextual influences of economic competition on radical right vote share at the local level for immigrants and natives' skills. A greater correspondence between the skills of native and immigrant workers in a municipality has a positive effect on the municipality's support for the radical right. Moreover, the conditioning effects of material deprivation, measured as unemployment, increases the labour market competition effect on municipalities' radical right support; radical right electoral fortunes are likely to be boosted in areas where

the immigrant population (no matter its skill level) increases and economic conditions become poorer. But this paper also shows that some local areas are more immune to radical right vote share than others over time, based on their demographic composition. Municipalities with a higher concentration of any of the following groups register higher radical right support: low-skilled natives; medium-skilled immigrants; or high-skilled immigrants.

There are some limitations to this study. The lack of local data on the composition of both natives and immigrants remains a concern since ethnicity can be correlated with the skill level of immigrants, as found in previous studies (Savelkoul et al., 2017). Future contextual studies in other countries should take this aspect into consideration where data is available. Moreover, actual economic threat could also take the different form of competition for social welfare provision as distinct from labour market competition. Further studies could usefully elaborate on this welfare-based source of immigrant-native economic competition. Furthermore, some institutional variables with a focus on party competition and the role of the local institutions could also play a role in radical right voting. Arzheimer and Carter (2006) have examined the political opportunity structures and found that political institutions have some impact on radical right voting, but no study has been undertaken at the local level.

This study has important implications for our understanding of the relationship between immigration and radical right voting. It reinforces the importance of labour market competition as one source of anti-immigrant radical right voting behaviour which should not be dismissed. As much as perceived cultural and status threats affect radical right voting, actual labour market competition at a level more proximate to individuals matters too. Material considerations are still worth putting front and centre of future research on radical right vot-

ing. The measurement of economic competition in multiple units of analysis and across different occupation and industry levels deserves further investigation.

This study also has important implications for policy-makers in light of the politics of immigrant integration. Without discounting the cultural dimension, local labour market competition and resource scarcity are the breeding grounds for radical right parties to crystallise ethnic competition in their narratives to garner support. Highlighting the economic issues behind ethnic conflict lends urgency to state politics to prompt immigration integration policies in economically deprived localities. This concern is particularly acute in immigrant-receiving societies after the migration crisis.

4 | Pissed! Local Socio-Cultural Degradation and Radical Right Support: The case of British Pub Closures

Abstract

While individual and macro factors behind radical right voting are well understood, little is known about the local drivers that may shape people's choice to support the radical right. Although recent studies have focused on material deprivation, this paper advances the theory that the degradation of local socio-cultural hubs is linked to radical right support by contributing to the loss of a sense of community and cultural identity. I examine the social sources of radical right support in Britain by exploiting an original dataset on community pub closures, which serves as a novel empirical indicator. It is proposed that the disappearance of community pubs triggers social isolation and signals the decline of the British working-class condition, which is associated with UKIP support. Combining district-level Office for National Statistics (ONS) data with individual-level data using the multi-wave UK Household panel data from 2013 to

2016, logit and hierarchical models provide evidence of the effect of community pub closure on radical right support. Individuals living in districts that experience one additional community pub closure (relative to the total number of pubs in the community) are more likely to support UKIP than any other party by around 1.63 percentage points. The effect is substantial in its size and magnified under conditions of material deprivation. Overall, this paper highlights the theoretical and empirical significance of local socio-cultural degradation as a mechanism that complements material deprivation to explain radical right support.

4.1 Introduction

The sustained and growing electoral successes of radical right parties in several Western European countries has provoked extensive media coverage and widespread public concern. The question of how to explain such parties' electoral support has also been the subject of intense academic study, including by scholars such as (Evans, 2000; Lubbers et al., 2000; Norris, 2005; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Kitschelt, 1995), among others. Drawing from cross-sectional or individual-level survey data, the majority of studies have focused on the macro-level and individual-level factors behind. It is theoretically and empirically agreed that radical right supporters are socially conservative individuals who live in countries experiencing rapid changes in immigration and high levels of material deprivation, mostly measured as unemployment rate (Mayer, 1998; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006).

Yet, the individual and macro factors fail to explain all variation in radical right support. On the one hand, contextual studies restrict themselves to aggregate national or regional indicators that ignore local variations and potential ecological fallacies (Golder, 2003). On the other hand, individual-level data are detached from any local contextual dynamics and suffer from an under-reporting of radical right supporters in surveys due to social desirability bias. Studies that combine the two units of analysis mostly use hierarchical models with cross-sectional data consisting of a handful of attitudinal measures and a set of simple sociodemographic variables from which causal claims cannot be warranted (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). The rare exceptions have investigated the role of local economic shocks and austerity in driving radical right nationalism (Colantone and Stanig, 2018b) and Brexit (Colantone and Stanig, 2018a;

Fetzer, 2019). While these studies bring important causal evidence of economic factors behind radical support, their focus is limited to material deprivation.

I advance in this paper that another significant motivator pushes individuals to support a radical right party: the decline of local socio-cultural hubs, which increases the sense of social isolation and status anxiety among the affected community. I develop what I call the 'local socio-cultural degradation' thesis, building on two existing theoretical sources: the social isolation theory, which links people's lack of connectedness in their community with radical right support at the individual level; and the local sociotropic literature, which stresses the importance of people's local socio-cultural hubs in shaping their political behaviour. The closure of social places that are at the heart of a local community sparks a sense of social marginality among the people who used to frequent these places, residents, causing them to question their place in their society. For many such people, these closures also mark the disappearance of their cultural heritage, and experience a loss of cultural identity as a result. These two processes, I propose, ultimately lead these individuals to vote for radical right parties, whose rhetoric and ideology tap into precisely such social and cultural grievances (Norris, 2016; Gest, 2016).

In my study, I aim to provide accounts of the role of local socio-cultural degradation in driving radical right support by using a novel empirical indicator: community pub closures in the United Kingdom. Community pubs are a focal point of local communities in Britain, through which social connections are established and sustained. My study focuses on community pubs because they embody the traditional 'working-class white' identity, meaning their decline is likely to foster the processes of social isolation and cultural identity loss that eventually translate into radical right votes. Combining the UK Household

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panel study with a pub closure ratio—the ratio of the number of community pub closures per year to the number of pubs per district— I examine vote preferences for individual voters with logit and hierarchical models. I use year, wave and regional fixed effects in order to observe the intra-regional variability of radical right support while keeping time and wave constant. Conditional on individual and contextual variables, I find that individuals living in districts more affected by the closure of community pubs are more likely to vote UKIP. The propensity for an individual to support UKIP increases by around 1.63 percentage points as the pub closure ratio increases by one percent over time. In addition, the effect of social deprivation is amplified under conditions of local material deprivation at the district level. My results are robust to controlling for several pub types, district characteristics and alternative dependent and independent variables.

The contribution of this study is twofold. It proposes a new theory behind radical right support, the local socio-cultural degradation theory, that builds on and improves the social isolation and status anxiety theories by incorporating a spatial dimension. It does not simply consider individual isolation in a vacuum but highlights the importance of socio-cultural places as subjectively experienced and geographically bounded communities whose closures reinforce feelings of social exclusion and cultural identity loss, which eventually shape radical right support. Empirically, it employs an original empirical variable which goes beyond the unreliable and undetectable social capital indicators. The closure of community pubs provides a powerful explanatory variable of local socio-cultural degradation by capturing both the effects of social isolation and cultural identity of the white working class in Britain. Finally, this study offers an analytic way to integrate the role of local social factors over time, while still considering the importance of material considerations in the study of

radical right voting.

The paper is organised as follows. I first give an overview of the social isolation and radical right voting literature to highlight its theoretical and empirical limitations and advance the local socio-cultural degradation hypothesis. After introducing community pub closures as a new indicator of this hypothesis, I lay out my data, empirical strategy, results and robustness checks. The final section of the paper discusses the potential implications of my findings.

4.2 The Local Socio-Cultural Degradation Theory

I draw from the social isolation thesis, the local sociotropic account and status anxiety literature to develop the local socio-cultural degradation theory. The social identity theory highlights social factors behind radical right support. It derives from the mass society theory which links structural changes of modernisation with the rise of the radical right. It proposes that a new form of society, characterised by growing atomisation and loss of community, is more likely to embrace new radical ideologies (Kornhauser, 1959). Following processes of globalisation and de-industrialisation, the modern individual is lacking local bonds and is becoming increasingly detached and alienated from her community (Gusfield, 1962; Putnam, 1993). The absence of involvement in voluntary associations, which used to give meaning to communal existence, renders individuals less secure and less able to establish interpersonal relations. A sense of belonging is gradually replaced by unfulfilled needs for a community identity

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and a distanced and distrustful relationship to the country as a whole[1] (Gusfield, 1962).

This, in turn, is said to lead to a rise in radical right support. The diminished role of community structures—families and local voluntary or professional organisations—offers an opportunity for charismatic leaders to lure atomised individuals (Gusfield, 1962; Kornhauser, 1959). A thriving radical right movement or party then provides local loyal 'quasi-communities', which fill the void left by decaying identities (Kornhauser, 1959). It also prevents individuals from responding to isolation through political disengagement (Kornhauser, 1959; Hirschman, 1978). A telling example is the large decline of trade unions and local working-class organisations which removed significant affinities with the white working class and eventually contributed to a growing support of former blue-collar and low-skilled workers for radical right parties (Mayer, 1998). The radical right has managed to tap into some elements of white working-class angst. US President Donald Trump proved successful in parts of the so-called 'rust belt' in the United States, while in Britain the former leader of the far-right English Defence League, Tommy Robinson, poses as a kind of working-class hero.

While the mass society theory has largely been explored in ethnographic studies (Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 2016; Gest, 2016), it has not been widely substantiated with empirical evidence- a problem exacerbated by a lack of satisfactory indicators. Although the theoretical underpinnings sound intuitively

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[1]Theories rooted in the mass society tradition and reinforced by the mainstream social capital literature predict that higher social bonding will reduce radical right support. However, the few available "dark-side social capital" accounts, mostly developed in social psychology, highlight the opposite effect: higher social interactions related to the attachment to the local area may engender defensive and extremist political behaviour (see more on this debate in Fitzgerald, 2018). Empirical evidence of this effect is still scant. While acknowledging this potential theoretical pattern, I do not develop it further given that my results do not provide evidence of this trend.

convincing, only a few quantitative studies have empirically tested the claimed link to radical right voting. These studies operationalised the relationship between social isolation and radical right support using either an objective indicator of social isolation, such as (lack of) friendship relations, (weak) family structures, (no) membership in civil society organisations (Fennema and Tillie, 1998; Rydgren, 2009; Coffe et al., 2007; Veugelers, 2005), or measures of people's subjective feelings of social isolation, such as feelings of loneliness, alienation, and distrust (Shils, 1996; Fennema and Tillie, 1998). Yet, these studies fail to show consistent results since the direction of the effect is variously negative, positive or null. They also often conflate social sources of radical right support with economic parameters, as with Jesuit et al. (Jesuit et al., 2009), who used an indicator of economic equality to assess the role of regional social capital on radical right voting. This tendency illustrates just how vague the term "social capital" is. It has become a catch-all, umbrella term rather than a clear concept. In addition, the lack of fine-grained systematic investigation of its links to radical right over time has prevented researchers from identifying local dynamic patterns.

The social capital literature also does not take into consideration the theoretical importance of place. Feelings of insecurity, attachment and belongingness do not occur in a vacuum but can be heightened by individuals' local surrounding. The link between social isolation and radical right voting is incomplete without considering people's connection to their local place and the way this shapes their political attitudes and voting behaviour. That is why I advance the 'local socio-cultural degradation' hypothesis in line with the nascent literature on 'local sociotropic' accounts of voting (Enos, 2017). It contextualises the social isolation theory by considering the declining social-cultural hubs of

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people's lived experiences as a trigger for radical right support. These hubs are gathering places in which people meet to socialise. They can be bowling leagues, sports bars or pubs to name a few, and are signs of a healthy and cohesive community.

More importantly, these socio-cultural hubs form an integral part of people's sense of socio-cultural identity which, when lost, triggers not only the individual pain of losing something valued but a sense of one's distinctive social-cultural group (and its distinctive traditions and values) become marginalised and abandoned (while other groups ascend). These social places are not only functional enablers of social interaction; they also convey historical, geographical and social meanings that their inhabitants internalise and re-enact in their daily interactions within such spaces. They develop a distinctive character, and become associated with distinctive traditions, for a specific social group, which has been described in sociology as a 'communal ethos' (McQuarrie, 2017). In turn, people come to feel a sense of belonging in, and develop attachments to, these places, groups and traditions; they become a part of their inhabitants' cultural identity. The subjective cultural identification with these social places explains why their closure may be experienced as a loss of cultural identity of what it means to be the white working class.

The local socio-cultural degradation thesis incorporates elements of the growing literature on status anxiety (Gest et al., 2018; Gidron and Hall, 2017). It highlights the strong effect of individuals' sense of relative deprivation with the disappearance of these socio-cultural hubs on radical right support for a particular segment of the population, the white working class. Gest et al. (2018) and Gidron and Hall (2017) stress how this class has perceived they are shifting to the periphery of their society relative to a new dominant white class of profes-

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sional elites, amid rising immigration and economic crises. The transformation of the economy has contributed to the gradual disappearance of low-skilled, decent and secure jobs in manufacturing sectors and the rising demand for highly skilled employees with higher education (Gidron and Hall, 2017). It has relegated low-skilled white workers to the fringes of social order. Low levels of status inspire a diffuse cultural resentment against the previously established dominance in the social hierarchy, which is then translated into a radical right vote. This white working class is inclined to respond to such threat by supporting radical right parties that evoke a sense of nostalgia and pledge to return to an idealised image of the past characterised by its social cohesion and cultural homogeneity.

In addition, the local socio-cultural degradation thesis focuses on the relative decline of community and cultural identity with a dynamic pattern. Drawing from the nascent theoretical argument that adverse (economic) change over time drives radical right support (Gidron and Hall, 2017; Gest et al., 2018), it proposes that it is the deterioration of these socio-cultural places that plays a role in shaping radical right support. Being exposed to a community in decline, manifested by the gradual disappearance of everyday socio-cultural experiences, can contribute to people's sense of social isolation because people typically compare their experience to that which they have had in the past—and have come to expect—but now see 'others' as having. Local inhabitants who are witnessing the gradual decline of vibrancy in their community experience disappointed expectations relative to their own prior social circumstances. This disappointment, in turn, leaves them open to radical right appeals, given that these parties invite reactionary nostalgia for earlier times. People who feel disillusioned with the decline of community cohesion are more inclined to reject mainstream par-

ties who appeal to the status quo—or to a form of "progress" with which these groups do not identify—and to support a party that celebrates a return to lost traditions. Recent ethnographic studies have endorsed this link, documenting people's feelings that their local communities had deteriorated and suggesting that this has contributed to radical right support (Hochschild, 2016; Cramer, 2016), though quantitative studies of dynamic changes have, as noted earlier, focused mostly on economic factors (Colantone and Stanig, 2018a, 2018b).

In that sense, the local socio-cultural degradation thesis does not predict that who experience this kind of socio-cultural marginalisation will abstain from voting. Rather, unlike the social isolation theory, it distinguishes between those who have always felt isolated and those who have become isolated after experiencing a decline of activity in their local area. People who have always felt isolated, as assumed in the social isolation theory, could equally respond with a radical right vote and an abstention. The relative loss of social interactions compared to the expectations is what leads to radical right support. This sense of relative decline provides fertile ground for the nostalgic rhetoric of radical right parties and figures (e.g. "Make America Great Again") (Norris, 2016; Gest et al.,2018). Following these assumptions, I theorise:

Local Socio-Cultural Degradation Hypothesis: The decline of local socio-cultural spaces increases the propensity for an individual to support a radical right party.

Finally, I argue that the impact of the local socio-cultural degradation on radical right support can be amplified under certain contextual conditions. Individuals can be influenced by changes in their local environment and express their resentment through a radical right vote. Previous studies argue that local change either in terms of relative economic decline or increased migration can

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have positive effects on radical right support (Golder,2003; Golder, 2016). Proponents of an economic variant of this view posit that a rise in immigration can put economic pressure on local residents' jobs and wages (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013; Pardos-Prado and Xena, 2019), while others posit that right-wing radicalism emerges in response to threats to natives' cultural heritage (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; McLaren, 2002; Sniderman et al., 2004). However, the local socio-cultural degradation specifically looks at dysfunctional local conditions that translate an internal threat caused by the national structural changes rather than an external threat caused by the arrival of newcomers. Of course, one could assume that the radical right supporters may conflate the two threats and easily scapegoat immigrants for downward social changes, especially as the radical right parties would actively participate in this blaming strategy. Yet, the reality might be different. While the worsening economic conditions may degrade the social conditions of local residents (unemployment reinforces social isolation for instance), the actual number of immigrants is unlikely to affect the closure of community pubs. Indeed, social places that are characterised by a 'communal ethos' with a distinctive cultural identity are for that reason less likely to attract other social groups. For instance, community pubs in the UK are unlikely to attract large numbers of Muslim immigrants because of distinctive cultural or religious practices in relation to alcohol consumption[2]. As a result, local socio-cultural degradation is likely to be affected by the economic circumstances only. Following these assumptions, I therefore hypothesise:

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[2]I do not deny that the perceived threat of rise of immigration might interfere in the local socio-cultural degradation effect but the actual immigration influx is unlikely to do so. Unfortunately, my dataset does not have a question on individuals' attitudes towards immigration to test this hypothesis.

***Material Deprivation Hypothesis**: Higher local levels of economic deprivation increase the effect of local socio-cultural degradation effect on individual's propensity to support a radical right party.*

4.3   Data, Case Study and Research Design

Closures of Community Pubs as indicators of Local Socio-Cultural Degradation in Britain

Pubs in the United Kingdom represent a compelling indicator of social-cultural hubs that defines the place-rooted way of life of its residents. Being the central element of peoples' social life at the local level, they are the platforms through which social connections are established. They are channels in which 'people formulate their preferences not just as individuals, but also as part of a broader social community, rooted in a particular geographic locale and set of cultural practices and everyday experiences and interactions' (Enos, 2017). Dunbar et al. (2017) have shown that frequenting a local pub can directly affect people's social network size and how engaged they are with their local community, which in turn can affect how satisfied they feel in life. As a focal point of community, they represent a routinised way to maintain bonds with a local community. This is even the case for individuals who go to pus alone. 'Old folks who could sit quietly and enjoy the ambiance and be accepted as part of the furniture, they were alone, but they were never lonely' (Gest, 2016: 48). Dunbar and his research team even consider a biological effect of alcohol as triggering the endorphin system, which promotes social bonding (Dunbar et al., 2017). Like other complex bonding systems such as dancing, singing and storytelling, alcohol consumption has often been adopted by large social communities as a ritual associated with bonding.

Pubs play a unique role in offering a social environment to enjoy a drink with friends in a supervised community setting.

This paper is particularly looking at community-style pubs since they serve as one of the last bastions of British culture for the white working-class identity. Their closure not only induces a loss of community but also a loss of cultural identity, as proposed in the local socio-cultural degradation thesis. Community pubs are pubs that have been existing in the community for more than a decade and connect individuals together in a 'deep horizontal comradeship' around traditions and values which are representative of the British identity (Gest, 2016). In my empirical analysis, they are pubs which are not owned by chains, are not located in city centres and are not gastropubs. Gest reports from his ethnographic fieldwork of pubs in deprived and gentrified areas of East London that community pubs are channels for working class whites 'to convene in a relatively homogenous environment to meet, crack inside jokes, make obscure references, and retell stories of each other and, in doing so, to preserve a situated sense of solidarity' (Gest, 2016:48). They replace the lost trade union community centres to become a venue for the development of working-class consciousness. Community pubs manage to recreate the norms of reciprocity and implicit solidarity that the regulars like to think once existed in their local area. The barman of a community pub in East London says of her community pub: 'We don't really get any strangers in here. It's a community, and don't get me wrong, we serve anyone. But all these guys are on the estate. It's like a family' (Gest, 2016:48).

Community pubs are attended mainly by a particular segment of the population: white male, low educated with low disposable income (Gest, 2016). Gest reports a remark by 18-year-old Terry Hammonds: 'People come to the

pub to have a rest from the outside. This is where they have their time to-gether. They're just looking for a beverage and a chat with other Englishmen. They can't get that outside. Here, you can play darts, watch sports, and talk.' (Gest, 2016:49). By contrast, gastropubs are frequented by the middle-class and ethnically diverse communities in gentrified areas at the expense of local, deeply-rooted white working-class communities, and tourists and larger groups go to pub chains and pubs in the city centers (Dunbar et al., 2017). Dunbar et al. (Dunbar et al., 2017) also showed that those who drink at community pubs tend to socialise in smaller groups, which encourages whole-group conversation, while those drinking in city-center bars tend to be in much larger groups, and participate much less in group conversation. The symbolic role of the commu-nity pub has been reprised by the radical right leader himself, Nigel Farage, who identifies himself as 'a man of the people who like to drink beer in the local pub'[3].

As a result, the disappearance of community pubs signals both the ero-sion of local social bonding (loss of community) and the marginality of the working-class white population in Britain (loss of cultural identity). Their clo-sure reflects the degrading conditions of local neighbourhood. More than 25 % of pubs[4] have closed since 2001 (ONS data) due to the increase of the cost of beers after a wave of government taxes on alcohol, the 2007 national smoking ban, housing price inflation and the decline of manufacturing work that made

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[3]Farage frequently uses pubs on the campaign trail as a platform to convey his radical views. He considers that 'every pub is a parliament'. One might think that this might indicate that the closure of pubs should retard the spread of UKIP ideas and support. However, this kind publicity is a PR tactic: when broadcast via the media and UKIP campaign materials, the occasional pub visit is enough to communicate the intended message without actually going to many pubs to actively foment support. In reality, Farage only appears in pubs on rare occasions, in a few places and closer to elections. By contrast, the closure of community pubs is a much more generalised phenomenon that has occurred over the past twelve years and has affected large segments of the British population.

[4]I mean total pubs.

Figure 4.1: Mean of Community Pub Closures per Year for each Region in Britain

Figure 4.2: Pub Closures (left) and Community Pub Closures (right) since 2003

the working class less able to spend money on pints. Figure 4.1 shows the rise

of community pub closures from 2003 until 2015 (data is drawn from the Local

Data Company). The maps in Figure 4.2 demonstrate that all pub closures

and closure of community pubs are scattered across Britain[5]. Community pub

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[5]Unfortunately, the study is only investigating England and Wales as data is not available in Northern Ireland and Scotland. However, the two regions are considered outliers because the UKIP support is very low (the UKIP discourse mostly raises the importance of the English identity).

closures range from 1,718 in the North East to 6,951 in London. It implies that the effect can be felt by all residents, no matter their place of residence.

The local socio-cultural degradation thesis predicts that community pub closures would trigger both processes of social isolation and loss of cultural identity and can eventually lead to radical right support, as suggested by the local socio-cultural degradation thesis. The disappearance of social spaces to bond with the closure of community-style pubs would affect the well-being of their 'communal ethos' and increase their resentment towards the status quo and mainstream governing parties. They can therefore translate their desire to 'take back control' of their vibrant community with a radical right support. The local socio-cultural degradation thesis also predicts that community pub closures would particularly affect the white working class given its perceived shift to the periphery of social order.

The rise of UKIP as a Radical Right Party

The United Kingdom provides a relevant case study to examine radical right voting given the rise of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) as an emblematic radical right party in Western Europe. From being a fringe party led by a London School of Economics (LSE) academic (Alan Sked), UKIP became the third national party in terms of popular support in the period of 2013– 2016. Nigel Farage, its charismatic leader from 2006 to 2016 (with the exception of an 11-month period), managed to attract large media attention to promote anti-EU, anti-immigrant and anti-establishment issues that deeply affected the UK political landscape (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Evans and Mellon, 2019). These socio-cultural political concerns are commonly raised by the radical right parties of Western Europe, to which UKIP belongs to (Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2009).

UKIP also appeals to traditional radical right supporters[6]. Substantial support is heavily concentrated among the white, working-class, low-educated men who live in declining industrial towns, and who feel threatened by local Muslim communities and hostile to the political establishment (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Evans and Mellon, 2019). They represent the 'left-behind' losers of economic and cultural globalisation (Arzheimer, 2009; Betz, 1994; Mayer, 1998). Moreover, UKIP offers programmatic positions which appeal to a sense of Britishness, nostalgia and community that are resonating in light of the decline of community pubs. By having Farage stressing the importance of the local pub, UKIP not only invokes a lost sense of community, but also a sense of threatened white working-class identity.

Beyond traditionally embodying the West European radical right party family, UKIP's sustained success from 2013 to 2016 makes it interesting to study. The party garnered approximately 15.6% of the electorate in the 2013 local elections, became Britain's largest party in the European Parliament as of 2018 (with 26.6% of votes and most seats in the 2014 EU parliamentary Elections) and 13% of the popular vote in the 2015 British General Election. UKIP's apogee occurred with the victory of the Leave vote in the 2016 referendum on Britain's membership of the EU— a watershed moment for the radical right force in the country. UKIP was crucial in making the referendum possible and fiercely campaigned for the Leave vote. Although the UK's Brexit vote should not be equated with UKIP support or radical right voting, studies have shown that UKIP support is strongly predictive of the Leave vote (Hobolt, 2016;

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[6]Although the segment of the population under investigation in this paper is the working class, I do not deny that UKIP supporters also include the professional and managerial middle classes (see more in (Evans and Mellon, 2019). The focus is on the working class because it is the segment of the population that is expected to be the most affected by the decline of community pubs.

Jennings and Stoker, 2017). UKIP has lost considerable political power after the Brexit victory as a result of Farage's resignation following the referendum and internal leadership disputes. It currently has no Member of Parliament in the House of Commons. As result, despite using year dummies, I do not expect strong differences between years since my analysis covers the successful years of UKIP from 2013 to 2016.

Data

Local Socio-Cultural Degradation is measured by the pub closure ratio - the ratio of community pub closures to the number of pubs for each local authority district in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016[7]. Data are drawn from the Local Data Company, are only available for England and Wales and their lowest scale available is the district level[8]. It registers pub closures that are not replaced by any other pubs[9]. Figure 4.3 displays the distribution of the community pub closure ratio in the districts. The variable is normally distributed as there are fewer outliers on the high and low ends of the data range and the majority of pub closure ratio occurs in the middle of the data range. The available data enables me to distinguish community pubs from city centre pubs, pub chains and gastropubs. The robustness section shows no effect of these other pubs, which confirms the singular impact of closure of community-style pubs on radical right voting.

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[7]Other examples of local socio-cultural hubs in other countries are cafés, bars and beer halls

[8]There are 317 districts in Britain, including 32 London Boroughs. The population goes from 53,800 in Eden to 545,500 in the City of Manchester. Although districts do not represent a single local community, it is the lowest administrative level available.

[9]Pubs counted as having closed on this measure have either been replaced by other restaurants, cafes and shops or have been converted or demolished for residential use. They have not been replaced by other pubs. Pubs which have changed ownership but have remained pubs are not counted.

Figure 4.3: Normal Distribution of Community Pub Closure Ratio

I then combine this pub data with the multi-wave panel individual-level survey data of the UK Household Longitudinal Study (also known as Understanding Society) using the district of respondents. The panel data allows me to assess the gradual decline of community cohesion over time. All adult members of Understanding Society households and the British Election Study (since 2010), who form a representative sample of the population, are interviewed each year; original sample members are followed if they leave their original household and new (or newly eligible) members of the Understanding Society household are also added to the survey. Only interviewees who respond in waves 5 (2013-2014), 6 (2014-2015) and 7 (2015-2016) are included in the analysis (N=44,157).

It is important to evaluate whether the community pub closure ratio is a good proxy for the sense of loss of community and cultural identity. To assess this, I examine the relationship between this measure and indicators that tap into these proposed mechanisms. Unfortunately, the UK Household Longitudinal Study only has one variable that relates to these channels and that variable is only available for one wave (2014-2015): Buckner's neighbourhood

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cohesion scale. This instrument measures three latent constructs: attraction to neighbourhood, neighbouring and psychological sense of community. It examines perceptions of trust and mutual-reliance among community members based on the quality, frequency and variety of their communications and social contacts. This continuous measure is coded from 1 (distrust of the neighbourhood, no mutual reliance among community members) to 5 (active neighbourhood organisation with multiple and trustworthy social networks). The higher the number the stronger the neighbourhood social cohesion. Table 4.1 reports the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with region and year fixed effects in which the dependent variable is our pub community closure ratio and the main independent variable is the Buckner's neighbourhood cohesion scale. I find a significant and negative relationship between the two variables which indicates that the larger the closure of community, the lower the neighbourhood cohesion. Despite not directly measuring loss of community and of cultural identity, this validity check proves that the community pub closure ratio is a good proxy for measuring loss of a sense of community and cultural identity.

Table 4.1: Community Pub Closures and Community Cohesion

	Community Pub Closures
Buckner's Neighbourhood Cohesion Scale	-0.305* (0.014)
Constant	-4.135*** (0.150)
Observations	10,159
Region, Year FE	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

The question on respondents' vote, which asked for 'Which party re-

spondents will vote for tomorrow ?' and is available in all waves[10], is the binary dependent variable. It takes value 1 if a respondent declares support for UKIP and 0 for any other party. Other dependent variables that include not only UKIP but also either the British National Party (another radical right party) or test the closeness of UKIP (the survey question is 'Which party do you feel the closest to ?') relative to others are included in the robustness section.

Using information about the place of residence of the respondent, I allocate each individual to a local authority district with its corresponding yearly closure of community pubs. The assignment of individuals to community pub closure per district is completed for each year. Since the interviews are completed within two years, I assign each individual to their year of interview, and not their year of wave completion[11]. The longitudinal study also contains information on demographic characteristics: gender, ethnicity, and education. Age, occupation and urbanity (rural or urban areas) are not used because they show no correlation.

Finally, I add contextual variables of each individual's district from the 2001 and 2011 Census Data available from the Office for National Statistics (ONS). They include the share growth of EU Migrant population from 2001 to 2011, the share growth of non-EU migrant population from 2001 to 2011[12], the share of residents older than 60 years old[13] and the 2015 index of multiple

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[10]Checks on support before 2013 cannot be done because the survey only started to ask about respondents' support for UKIP in 2013.

[11]This means that a respondent who was interviewed in 2013 (despite being included in the 2014 Wave 5) will be allocated the community pub closures/number of pubs in 2013.

[12]It is important to dissociate the effects of EU resident members and non-EU members as UK voters, including Leavers and UKIP voters, as UKIP cares more about reducing non-EU immigration than reducing EU immigration (Hix et al., 2017). The levels of immigration are also included in the robustness section but inflows are preferred as previous literature has shown a larger positive effect of rapid inflow of immigrants on UKIP support than levels of immigration (Kaufmann, 2017)

[13]I include this variable because the older generation is expected to be more directly affected by the decline of trade unions and community pubs.

deprivation[14]. The unemployment rate from the Annual Population Survey/ Labour Force Survey is also included. Other contextual variables are tested in the Robustness section.

Empirical Strategy

I use three-wave individual-level survey data that combine yearly closure of community pubs and other control contextual variables to conduct logit models. The baseline specification for these estimations is :

$$P(UKIP_{il}) = F(\alpha_{il} + \beta CommunityPubClosures_{il} + L_{il} + Z_{il} + \epsilon_{il}), \quad (4.1)$$

where i indexes district and l individual respondents. The dependent variable UKIP takes value 1 if individual l declares to support the UKIP party and 0 if individual$l$ declares to support any other party [15]. I include a vector of individual variables, L_{il}, accounting for gender, ethnicity, education and types of jobs and a vector of contextual variables, Z_{il}. I perform a logit estimation with region, year and panel wave fixed effects as well as random effects varying across individuals. Standard errors are clustered by district, since I have multiple respondents within each area. District clusters also enable me to take into consideration the local variations of radical right support. I then use a hierarchical logistic model to take into account the fact that individuals are nested in districts and waves. I estimate a model consisting of two levels, one is the respondent, and the other is the district*wave level. ϵ_{il} is the error term.

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[14]This measure includes levels of deprivation with regards to income, employment, health, education, skills, barriers to housing, crime, and living environment. Each separate factor will be tested in the robustness section.

[15]Don't know and non-responses are coded as missing values.

4.4 Results and Discussion

Main Results

Table 4.2 displays the baseline estimate of equation 1 with logit and hierarchical models. I first look at the individual-level effect of closure of community pubs on UKIP support without including any control variables (Models 1 and 2). Models 3 and 4 present the effect with individual characteristics while Models 5 and 6 add both individual and contextual characteristics. All the specifications include regional and year dummies, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. The coefficient on the community pub closures is statistically significant and positive across the board, regardless of the estimation method. This result corroborates my socio-cultural degradation hypothesis.

How strong is the effect of community pub closures? Individuals who are exposed to one more community pub closure per number of pubs in their district are .999 more likely to support UKIP than any other party, while including individual and contextual control variables (exp (6.509)/ 1+ exp(6.509)). This implies that a change in the closure of community pubs/pub closure ratio from the minimum(0) to the maximum (0.25) would induce an increase in the probability of a person supporting UKIP by around 1.63 percentage points (6.509*0.25). The effect is strong given that the average UKIP vote share is 5%. This provides evidence of a social-cultural deprivation as a driver of radical right support in Britain.

Models 3 and 4 corroborate the sociological profile of the traditional radical right voter. The logit and hierarchical models confirm that the UKIP supporter is more likely to be male, of white ethnicity, with a General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) or equivalent or no qualification (rather than

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a higher degree) and a routinised or intermediate job rather than a managerial position. These results are in line with previous studies on UKIP voters (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Evans and Mellon, 2019), Brexit voters (Jennings and Stoker, 2019) and radical right voters in Western Europe (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt, 1995; Ivarsflaten, 2005). The closure of community pubs particularly affects the most vulnerable segment of the population. This result is also expected given that white, male individuals with low qualifications are those who most usually frequent community pubs (Gest, 2016). In Table C.3 of the Appendix, I replicate the data with entropy balancing in order to reweight the survey sample to known characteristics from the target population, that is to say the white working class. The results are unaffected by using the entropy balancing model that reweight the sample to a white working-class population (see the Appendix for more information on this point).

Models 5 and 6 include local contextual variables behind radical right support that are commonly defended in the literature. Local change either in terms of relative economic decline or increased migration can have positive effects on radical right support. While the unemployment rate and changes of EU or non-EU migrant population shares are insignificant, an increase in the index of multiple deprivation has positive effects on individual support for UKIP in the logit models. This means that only economic deprivation, and not immigration, amplifies the socio-cultural decline. This constitutes evidence for the contextual hypothesis and corroborates previous findings that material deprivation matters in detecting radical right support (Colantone and Stanig, 2018a, 2018b; Fetzer, 2019; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Pardos-Prado and Xena, 2019; Lancee and Pardos-Prado, 2013). Table C.5 of the Appendix, which uses new data collected in 2017-2018, shows a correlation between negative

Table 4.2: Local Social Degradation and UKIP Support

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Community Pub Closures	5.512**	4.617**	5.270**	5.088**	6.509**	4.754**
	(2.389)	(1.939)	(2.199)	(2.259)	(2.937)	(2.346)
Female			-0.313***	-0.314***	-0.388***	-0.286***
			(0.097)	(0.094)	(0.146)	(0.098)
White British			2.130***	1.966***	2.652***	2.065***
			(0.256)	(0.236)	(0.327)	(0.253)
Education (0=Higher Degree)						
High School or Vocational			-0.413	-0.611	-0.380	-0.249
			(0.412)	(0.394)	(0.537)	(0.425)
GCSE or Equivalent			0.729***	0.724***	1.066***	0.777***
			(0.118)	(0.114)	(0.195)	(0.120)
No Qualification			0.630***	0.563***	0.888***	0.685***
			(0.149)	(0.140)	(0.231)	(0.148)
Job (Managerial and Professional)						
Intermediate			0.748***	0.746***	0.987***	0.708***
			(0.136)	(0.133)	(0.207)	(0.139)
Routine			0.729***	0.686***	0.981***	0.699***
			(0.138)	(0.126)	(0.209)	(0.132)
EU Migrant Population Growth					-0.247	2.522
					(5.429)	(3.375)
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth					-1.108	0.693
					(4.149)	(2.685)
Population 60 and Older					5.705*	3.836**
					(2.984)	(1.801)
Unemployment Rate					0.073*	0.046
					(0.041)	(0.031)
Index of Multiple Deprivation					-0.008	-0.011
					(0.016)	(0.009)
Constant	-6.092***	-4.179***	-6.623***	-6.606**	-11.119***	-7.407**
	(0.292)	(0.118)	(0.384)	(0.295)	(1.047)	(0.540)
N (Individuals)	40,784	44,157	22,465	24,414	21,024	21,024
N (Groups)		1,026		956		812
Region, Year, Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Models	Logit	Hierarchical	Logit	Hierarchical	Logit	Hierarchical

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

perceptions of the neighbourhood and radical right support, and confirms this result.

Interaction Effects

Table 4.3 and Figures 4.4 and 4.5 present the interaction terms of community pub closures with individual demographic determinants to evaluate who is inclined to vote UKIP when faced with closures of community pubs. Table 4.3 reports a statistically significant effect for the interaction with ethnicity and type of jobs. This shows that the white British respondents are more likely to support UKIP as the closure of pubs increases. The same goes for respondents with jobs with routinised tasks, by comparison to those with managerial or intermediate positions. This confirms that the relation between community pub closures and UKIP support is a white working-class phenomenon which is similar to the socio-demographics of community pub attendees and UKIP supporters (Evans and Mellon, 2019). Table 4.3 also includes the gender interaction (model 3) as I would expect men to be more affected by these pub closures since they go to the pub much more than women. 34% of men say that they go to the pub once a week or more by comparison to 12% of women (Camra Data, 2009). The effect is in the right direction but is, however, not significant. This result could be due to the fact that pubs have become more family-friendly after accepting the presence of children in the last years, which may have increased the attendance of women in pubs. Not having many observations to work with since so few women support UKIP in the first place could also explain the absence of a gender effect.

Table 4.4 and Figure 4.6 present the interaction terms of pub community closures with local contextual drivers to test the material deprivation hypoth-

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Figure 4.4: Interaction Effects: White population

Figure 4.5: Interaction Effects: Working Class

Table 4.3: Interaction Effects (Individual Features)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Community Pub Closures	0.992	0.439	3.744*
	(0.732)	(1.336)	(1.968)
White British	-0.824***	-2.6***	2.075***
	(0.073)	(0.141)	(0.198)
White British × Community Pub Closures	4.622***		
	(1.788)		
Jobs (Managerial and Professional)			
Intermediate		-0.002***	
		(0.060)	
Routine		-0.301***	
		(0.060)	
Intermediate Jobs × Community Pub Closures		0.340	
		(0.374)	
Routine Jobs × Community Pub Closures		3.939**	
		(1.976)	
Female	-0.091***	-0.076*	-0.214**
	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.078)
Female × Community Pub Closures			-0.412
			(2.115)
Education (0=Higher Degree)			
High School or Vocational	0.018	-0.105	0.008
	(0.118)	(0.156)	(0.300)
GCSE or Equivalent	0.344***	0.362***	0.833***
	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.103)
No Qualification	0.347***	0.290***	0.834***
	(0.045)	(0.063)	(0.115)
EU Migrant Population Growth	1.341	-1.063	1.993
	(1.170)	(1.411)	(2.794)
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth	-1.742*	-2.840**	-4.730**
	(0.933)	(1.172)	(2.316)
Unemployment Rate	0.009	0.019	0.019
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.025)
Index of Multiple Deprivation	0.000	-0.005	0.005
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Constant	-2.081***	-2.044***	-5.989***
	(0.074)	(0.103)	(0.758)
N	36,220	22,150	36,220
Region, Wave, Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

esis. Table 4.4 reports a statistically significant effect for the interaction with economic local drivers. This confirms the material hypothesis in line with the local socio-cultural degradation hypothesis. Figure 4.6 shows strong and positive marginal effects of economic local conditions on UKIP support. This means that individuals who are exposed to both an increase of unemployment (or to an increase of material deprivation in general) and community pub closures in their district are more inclined to support a radical right party. This is in line with previous studies which highlight the compounding effects of economic deprivation on radical right support (Golder, 2003; Jennings and Stoker, 2017).

Figure 4.6: Marginal Effects

Table 4.4: Interaction Effects (Contextual Features)

	(1)	(2)
Community Pub Closures	-4.231	-9.209
	(4.652)	(7.830)
Female	-0.288***	-0.393***
	(0.103)	(0.148)
White British	2.098***	2.688***
	(0.265)	(0.333)
Education (0=Higher Degree)		
High School or Vocational	-0.274	-0.380
	(0.414)	(0.546)
GCSE or Equivalent	0.791***	1.081***
	(0.127)	(0.200)
No Qualification	0.672***	0.905***
	(0.159)	(0.236)
Job (Managerial and Professional)		
Intermediate	0.720***	1.004***
	(0.141)	(0.212)
Routine	0.713***	0.994***
	(0.146)	(0.215)
EU Migrant Population Growth	-0.905	-0.501
	(3.896)	(5.579)
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth	-0.507	-0.641
	(3.160)	(4.179)
Population 60 and Older	4.014*	5.921*
	(2.050)	(3.024)
Unemployment Rate	0.030	0.068
	(0.032)	(0.042)
Index of Multiple Deprivation	-0.005	-0.016
	(0.011)	(0.015)
Unemployment Rate × Community Pub Closures	1.611**	
	(0.727)	
IMD × Community Pub Closures		0.847**
		(0.413)
Constant	-7.452***	-11.153***
	(0.593)	(1.064)
N	21,024	21,024
Region, Wave, Year FE	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*$p < .05$, ** $p< .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Robustness Checks

As a last step, I address some concerns that might be raised to the presented results with several robustness checks. The first four models of Table 4.5 show that the community-styles pubs are uniquely affecting UKIP support given the insignificant effects of other types of pubs. The logit models show no effect for pub chains, pubs in the city centres and gastropubs. This can be explained by the fact that those types of pubs attract another part of the population who is not supportive of UKIP. Indeed, this corroborates previous findings which showed that middle- or upper-class voters with higher education and more ethnic diversity, as well as tourists, are more likely to frequent pubs in the city centre and gastropubs (Gest, 2016).

The last column of Table 4.5 presents the logit model with additional independent variables. The closure of community pubs is still significantly and positively affecting UKIP support, which aligns with my previous results. New control variables include other immigration variables that focus on stock of EU migrants and non-EU migrants in order to test the effect of levels, and not change, of immigration on radical right support. The absence of significant effects is consistent with previous studies that show an effect of rapid changes in ethnic diversity but not of immigration stocks (Kaufmann, 2017). The last model also adds other economic variables at the district level that may play a role in boosting radical right electoral support. The quantum of EU structural funds per capita[16], the growth in the share of low-skilled workers and the number of total fiscal cuts from 2005 to 2010 are known to have predicted UKIP and Brexit (leave) votes (Jennings and Stoker, 2017; Colantone and Stanig,

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[16]The European structural funds provide funds to help local areas to grow. The funds support investment in innovation, businesses, skills and employment and create jobs.

2018a; Becker et al., 2017). However, despite the positive signs, no coefficient is significant. Finally, I add the change of business tax rates[17] in the last 10 years and other deprivation variables, which include average scores for levels of crime, barriers to housing and services, living environment, income deprivation (affecting old people), and health deprivation. No effect has been found and the models remain unchanged.

Table 4.6 reports the estimation of community pub closures on UKIP vote share (in the 2014 EU elections) at the district level. The independent variable is the ratio of community pub closures in the last five years (2011-2016) to the number of overall pubs in each district. District-level models show similar results to those that use the individual level survey data: one standard deviation increase of community pub closures in the last five years increases the radical right vote share by 9.204 percentage points. While the effect is also strong and significant for the number of community pub closures in the last ten years, it is not significant for the last fifteen years. This confirms that the rapid decline of pubs that started in 2007 with the national smoking ban provoked a surge of radical right support, even ten years ago when UKIP was not as successful as in recent years. This table therefore shows that changes in the rate of community pub closures affect radical right support.

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[17]I include business tax rates since they could privilege pub companies and harm community pubs (by discouraging people to deposit licence to open a local pub).

Table 4.5: Local Social Degradation and UKIP Support

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pub Chain Closures	0.802 (0.568)			
Closures of Pubs in the City Centre		0.209 (0.452)		
Gastro Pub Closures			0.056 (0.490)	
Community Pub Closures				4.066** (0.789)
Female	-0.067*** (0.032)	-0.067*** (0.032)	-0.067*** (0.038)	-0.032*** (0.044)
White British	0.710*** (0.070)	0.710*** (0.070)	0.710*** (0.071)	0.410 (0.375)
Education (0=Higher Degree)				
High School or Vocational	-0.197 (0.167)	-0.199 (0.167)	-0.198 (0.167)	-0.128 (0.133)
GCSE or Equivalent	0.268*** (0.042)	0.368*** (0.042)	0.366*** (0.042)	0.212*** (0.173)
No Qualification	0.345*** (0.048)	0.344*** (0.048)	0.344*** (0.048)	0.178*** (0.164)
EU Migrant Population Growth	1.389 (1.284)	1.341 (1.303)	1.380 (1.303)	2.137 (1.048)
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth	-0.760 (1.078)	-0.721 (1.077)	-0.714 (1.080)	-0.213 (1.048)
Population 60 and Older	1.937** (2.984)	1.872** (1.801)	1.881** (2.984)	1.247** (1.575)
Unemployment Rate	0.008 (0.041)	0.008 (0.031)	0.007 (0.041)	0.006 (0.024)
Index of Multiple Deprivation	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	
EU Migrant Population Share (2001)				-10.299 (6.234)
Non-EU Migrant Population Share (2001)				0.011 (1.492)
EU Structural Funds per capita				-0.000 (0.001)
Change in Low-Skilled Workers				-1.568 (3.547)
Total Fiscal Cuts				0.001 (0.001)
Business Rates Change (2010-2017)				0.005 (0.004)
Crime-(other index of deprivation) (2010-2017)				-0.228 (0.189)
Housing and Services-(other index of deprivation)				0.001 (0.009)
Living Environment-(other index of deprivation)				0.004 (0.008)
Income (Old People)-(other index of deprivation)				2.049 (1.264)
Health Deprivation				-0.055 (0.189)
Constant	-3.245*** (0.181)	-3.226*** (0.182)	-3.220*** (0.182)	-2.547** (1.502)
N (Individuals)	31,650	31,650	31,650	30,821
Region, Year, Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

Table 4.6: Local Social Degradation and UKIP Vote Share (2014 EU Elections)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Community Pub Closures (last 5 years)	9.204*** (3.404)		
Community Pub Closures (last 10 years)		8.630** (3.805)	
Community Pub Closures (last 15 years)			-0.031 (0.042)
Population 60 and Older	13.463 (9.236)	14.196 (9.292)	2.082 (10.323)
Share of People with No Qualification	64.236*** (6.300)	63.637*** (6.282)	98.162*** (10.431)
EU Migrant Population Growth	-55.605** (26.385)	-55.762** (26.901)	-42.095* (24.178)
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth	-66.161*** (15.817)	-66.791*** (15.955)	-58.950*** (14.157)
Total Economy EU Dependence	66.972*** (11.918)	66.641*** (11.948)	54.062*** (12.466)
Manufacturing Employment Share Change (2001-2011)	59.907*** (16.636)	58.206*** (16.612)	71.082*** (19.464)
Unemployment Rate	-0.097 (0.121)	-0.098 (0.120)	0.112 (0.125)
Index of Multiple Deprivation	-0.326** (0.078)	-0.328*** (0.088)	-0.036*** (0.090)
Constant	3.085 (2.660)	3.249 (2.669)	3.025 (3.114)
Observations	326	326	326
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

Table 4.7: With Additional Dependent Variables

	UKIP/ BNP Support	Closeness to UKIP	Closeness to UKIP/BNP	Leave Vote	Without London
Community Pub Closures	5.366***	5.777*	5.433*	5.153***	5.095***
	(3.560)	(2.279)	(1.200)	(2.561)	(2.454)
Female	-0.034	-0.163***	-0.160***	-0.019	-0.044*
	(0.028)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.050)	(0.027)
Education (0=Higher Degree)					
High School or Vocational	-0.145	0.227*	0.213*	-0.009	-0.190
	(0.102)	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.158)	(0.142)
GCSE or Equivalent	0.210***	0.242***	0.249***	0.029***	0.278***
	(0.099)	(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.250)	(0.069)
No Qualification	0.187*	0.326***	0.327***	0.036	0.252***
	(0.097)	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.234)	(0.069)
Percentage Leave Vote				0.013	
				(0.008)	
Constant	-2.132***	-2.742***	-2.692***	-0.336	-2.771***
	(0.786)	(0.538)	(0.573)	(2.657)	(0.477)
Observations	31,650	31,650	31,650	31,650	26,554
Region, Year, Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Contextual Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p $< .05$, ** p$< .01$, *** p $< .001$.

Table 4.8: Local Social Degradation and Support for Mainstream Parties

	Labour Support	Conservative Support
Community Pub Closures	0.947	-0.193
	(0.625)	(0.702)
Female	0.185***	0.006
	(0.024)	(0.023)
White British	-0.455***	0.084**
	(0.037)	(0.036)
Education (0=Higher Degree)		
High School or Vocational	0.066	-0.067
	(0.076)	(0.086)
GCSE or Equivalent	0.085***	-0.035
	(0.027)	(0.030)
No Qualification	-0.076*	-0.094***
	(0.032)	(0.032)
Constant	-1.420***	-1.731***
	(0.150)	(0.131)
Observations	31,650	31,650
Region, Year, Wave FE	Yes	Yes
Contextual Variables	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

Finally, I need to ensure that my results do not hinge on the exact specification of the dependent variable. The last two robustness models include variants of the UKIP support variable. It first includes in Model 1 the individual support for both UKIP and the British National Party (BNP), another radical right party (of lesser popularity). Respondents who indicated they would vote tomorrow for either UKIP or BNP take value 1 and those who indicated they would vote tomorrow for other parties take value 0. Model 2 and 3 use a different party identification variable that looks at respondents' closeness to UKIP (Model 2) or their closeness to UKIP and the BNP (Model 3). The question asked respondents 'Which party do you feel the closest to ?'. The findings

are similar to previous models, which corroborate my findings. Model 4 then includes the percentage of Brexit support in the district given the last correlations of UKIP and Brexit found in previous studies (Jennings and Stoker, 2017; Becker et al., 2017). The effect of community pub closures remains strongly significant and positive in all models. The last column of this table tests my model by excluding London, an outlier with its relatively large presence of non-UKIP supporters by comparison to other regions. Results are unchanged by the exclusion of this outlier. Finally, the last table (Table 4.8) uses logit models to test whether the effect of community pub closures applies to other mainstream parties. The lack of significant effect for Labour or Conservative party support confirms that the closures of community pubs uniquely lead to UKIP support.

4.5 Conclusion

This paper provides evidence of a local socio-cultural driver of radical right voting by deploying an original empirical indicator, the closure of community-style pubs in Britain. The presence of community pub closures is associated with the propensity for an individual to support a radical right party. One percent rise of community pub closure per number of pubs in the district increases the individual's likelihood to support UKIP by around 1.63 percentage points. The impact is magnified under conditions of material deprivation. It is also unique to the community-style pubs since no effect has been found for pub chains, pubs in the city centre or gastropubs. My findings are robust to additional dependent and independent variables, entropy balancing models and the exclusion of an outlier (London).

Although this study applies to the UK context with its distinctive pub-going tradition, similar empirical data can be applied to other case studies in

Western democracies. These countries either have an equivalent to the community pub, such as bars or cafés, or are home to other socio-cultural hubs that embody distinctive local traditions. Moreover, this study should pave the way toward using other original local contextual drivers that also capture social capital as a socio-cultural hubs, such as the growing decline of post offices, independent stores or recreational centres. More innovative avenues should be considered in the future to find other empirical indicators of local socio-cultural degradation. Future research should also evaluate the causal nature of this local socio-cultural factor.

This study has important implications for our understanding of the relationship between social capital and radical right voting. It sheds light on a non-negligible socio-cultural component of radical right support which accompanies structural material changes in Western countries. The socio-cultural dimensions of white working class marginalisation should not be neglected in the overall understanding of the rise and success of radical right parties.

This study also has significant implications for policymakers, suggesting the importance of initiatives to maintain vibrant local communities. Without discounting the material dimension, the disappearance of socio-cultural hubs provides window opportunities for radical right parties to galvanise behind a powerful 'left-behind' narrative and get larger electoral gains. Highlighting the decline of local social activity lends urgency to state policies to prompt social cohesiveness in economically deprived localities.

5 | Conclusion

This dissertation has argued that local context can help to explain radical right support. The main assumption is simple: individuals' perceptions of the world are rooted in the everyday, lived experiences which in turn shape how they cast their vote. While not discounting the relevance of national and individual motivators, I consider that the level of analysis in which individuals make sense of their political preferences is the level in which they live, work and observe change in their immediate environment. My dissertation pursued three novel lines of enquiry. First, I examined how individuals' evaluations of self-esteem, which may be influenced by economic and cultural factors, impacts their political preferences. Second, I considered how the changes in immigrant skill levels and unemployment in individuals' local areas affect the way their frame politics and cast their vote. Here, I found that the way individuals form an opinion on immigration is likely to be influenced by the local level dynamics of immigration. Third, I investigated how the disappearance of individuals' socio-cultural heritage in a proximate surrounding can be strongly linked to radical right support.

In this final chapter, I summarise the empirical regularities of each individual research paper and highlight my broader contributions and comment on the limitations of the papers. I conclude by outlining a number of potential avenues for further research and draw out the broader theoretical, empirical and

policy implications of this thesis.

5.1 Summary of Key Findings

The three empirical chapters of this thesis presented a series of conclusions regarding the local context and its effect on radical right support. Drawing from the 2017 Eurobarometer Survey, my first paper uses a novel variable, Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status, and combines this variable with the multiple rounds of the European Social Survey to test its effect on radical right and radical left support in 19 countries over a fourteen-year period (2002-2016). This paper overcomes the dilemma of attributing economic or cultural factors to the radical right vote by considering this new status variable as combining both economic and cultural features. This variable means that where individuals stand in comparison to the full social order results from economic developments, such as globalisation, de-industrialisation or technological change, and cultural developments, as manifested by the migration crisis. A decline of an individual's social position eventually translates into a voting preference towards the radical right. This paper makes two novel contributions to the political behaviour literature. First, the paper applies this social status variable to the radical left, since economic threat resulting from the economic crisis have affected the social status of an overlooked and vulnerable voting group: the young well-educated middle class. Although an exhaustive list of factors is developed to explain radical right support, very few research studies have explored drivers of the radical left.

Second, this paper includes a reference group to the position that individuals compared themselves vis-à-vis their parents. Instead of being asked to compare oneself to anyone in society as existing research on social status does

(Gest et al., 2018; Gidron and Hall, 2017), this study tests how people are doing compared to the standards of living of their parents' generation. This better captures the nostalgic deprivation that radical right and radical left supporters may perceive. While the white working class is nostalgic for a homogenous nation where manual labourers were crucial pillars of society, the young well-educated middle class is sensitive to a society with social and income equality. Using regional, year and round fixed effects, the paper finds that subjective social decline can be attributed to both the radical right and radical left parties in 19 European countries. Such effects are amplified under the traditional attitudes of each respective party family: immigration for the radical right and redistribution for the radical left. Two different voting groups support these parties. While the unskilled and low-educated working-class men are more drawn to the radical right, the young well-educated middle-class voters are more attracted to the radical left. This paper therefore presents a reconciling feature between radial right and radical left voters and provides the first cross-national comparison of this feature across 19 European countries at the finest grid available, the regional level.

My second paper uses an original longitudinal dataset of fine-grained municipal electoral, demographic and economic data from France over the 2002–2017 period. Unlike previous research on the labour market dynamics between immigrants and natives, this paper has data on the respective share of immigrants and natives per occupation, which take into consideration variations across occupation-types between immigrants and natives. This fine-grained analysis that examines the local dynamics responsible for radical right support has reached three conclusions. First, it finds that what drives radical right support in French municipalities is not immigration and unemployment *per se*,

but it is rather the actual local competition between immigrants and natives with similar skillsets. Second, natives of any socio-economic class may support the radical right if they enter in local labour competition with immigrants with similar skills. This finding helps explain why the socio-economically diversified voting base of the radical right is not restricted to low-skilled voters. Third, the within-municipal variations shed light on the skills of natives and immigrants that contribute to larger radical right support. While this paper confirms the traditional low-skilled profile of the radical right voters, it also highlights that more middle- and high-skilled immigrants fuel the rise of the French's Front National (FN) over time because immigrants with higher qualifications are compelled to accept lower-skilled jobs, and are thus perceived as a competitive threat to low-skilled natives. My second paper therefore offers insights into how the economic threat of immigration still matters in people's radical right voting behaviour.

My second paper also demonstrates that immigration reduces radical right support at the local level. Interestingly, net immigration has a significant and negative impact on far-right vote share in most models, which gives credence to the contact theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Mclaren,2002). A higher share of ethnic minorities in a given environment can reduce negative radical right voting by favouring positive inter-ethnic interactions. Among the 69 empirical studies of ethnic change on immigration opinion or far-right voting since 1995, 52 tests prove that increased far-right voting or anti-immigration attitudes are linked to ethnic change. 87 percent of those 52 studies find a significant threat effect and only four studies demonstrate a significant contact effect.

Yet, the contact theory has been poorly operationalised because the effects of inter-ethnic contacts are only empirically detectable in small geographies

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(Della Posta, 2013) and only five per cent of these studies have been conducted at a low level of analysis. My analysis is therefore in line with previous studies that looked at low geographical units. It reinforces the importance of investigating contextual predictors (i.e. immigration, unemployment, etc) at various levels of analysis.

The third paper puts forward groundbreaking theoretical and empirical evidence of an overlooked social component behind radical right support. I advance the local socio-cultural degradation hypothesis and use a new indicator that allows for a novel and direct test of this hypothesis at a local level. I argue that the decline of socio-cultural hubs embodies the sense of loss of community and cultural identity and is related to more radical right vote. Using the community pub closures as a proxy of the local socio-cultural degradation hypothesis, the final paper shows that the increase of community-pub closures is linked to UKIP support in Britain. This innovative indicator allows for closer mapping between theory and empirics than has been possible in previous ethnographic fieldwork is unable to conduct systematic investigation over time (Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 2016; Gest, 2016). The third paper finds that a particular segment of the population is disproportionately affected by community pub closures: the white working class, who are more inclined to perceive that their cultural identity has been under attack. This 'left-behind' feeling is exemplified through the closure of these community hubs that defined the culture of the white working class.

The final finding of the third paper is that the effect of socio-cultural degradation only increases when there are more difficult economic circumstances. This socio-cultural factor reflects an additive effect of local socio-cultural degradation under conditions of material deprivation. The fact that radical right

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support does not operate solely through anti-immigrant sentiments but rather through material worsening conditions is an important finding. This opens the door to an appreciation of the different ways in which social identifications and societal cleavages are established and politicised in modern politics. Cleavages not only arise between natives, members of the 'ingroup', and immigrants, members of the 'outgroup', but also between natives living in deprived areas and other natives. These new powerful social cleavages appear to invigorate radical right support.

5.2 Contributions

This dissertation has made significant contributions to the debates about the factors behind the radical right support. It offers the most wide-ranging and fine-grained study of local contextual dynamics behind radical right support to date. When explaining factors that influence voting behaviour, most studies either look at national or individual factors. The first view, conducted by Erikson et al. (2002), shows that national level events, like the national economy or unemployment, dictate people's voting behaviour. The second view, as stated by Fiorina (1981), Kinder and Kiewiet (1979), and Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck (2011), argues instead that voters care more about their personal economic conditions. This study rather defends that an under-developed account is equally important: the local sociotropic voting account. Individuals' voting preferences are not formed in a vacuum but are conditioned by everyday experiences in their local areas. By offering wider appreciation of local sociotropic accounts, this thesis brings a new dimension that should be considered when identifying the factors that affect individuals' voting behaviour. This thesis addresses this 'black box'

of factors and shows how immigration, economic conditions and social factors at a local level can play a huge role in influencing people's voting preferences.

This thesis' consideration of local sociotropic considerations also mitigates some key methodological concerns that attend national-level and individual-level research on the radical right, in particular by resolving issues of ecological inferences and offering consistency to mixed results at the national and individual levels. The local perspective adds knowledge to the complex interactions that occur at the meso-level but are usually omitted at individual or aggregate levels of analysis. The first paper investigates results at the regional level (in 226 NUTS 2 regions) in order to compare support for radical parties across units of comparable size and test effects which are usually overlooked in individual- and national-level studies. This paper also uses a concept which refers to another key local sociotropic influence on people's expectations and political behaviour: Parent-Relative Subjective Social Status. This psychological mechanism involves social comparisons between a person and his or her parents, which helps to explain radical right and radical left support among a younger cohort. The second paper suggests that labour market competition can be detected if it is measured at a municipal level where natives can be directly affected by the arrival of newcomers. The third paper uses the decline of community-style pubs per district in Britain to show that local socio-cultural degradation also contributes to radical right support. These papers establish that no theory should be discounted without having been investigated at various geographical scales. This novel and more nuanced geo-political account of the local sociotropic forces underlying individuals' voting behaviour therefore brings new insights to the study of voting behaviour, comparative politics and public opinion.

Second, this thesis engages with the fundamental debate concerning reasons behind radical right support. Most scholars have identified factors behind the radical right as pertaining to either the economic camp or to the cultural camp. On the one hand, scholars like Norris and Inglehart (2019) and Kaufmann (2016) contend that cultural backlash provides the most consistent and parsimonious explanation for radical right support. The older generation, men, the religious, and less educated sectors of society who are or feel left behind following progressive waves of cultural change respond to the erosion of their predominance and privilege in the 1950s/1960s years with a radical right vote. The change of value system in the 1970s appears to have fomented an angry and resentful counter-revolutionary backlash today. On the other hand, other studies have shown that economic anxiety drives radical right support (Fetzer, 2019; Colantone and Stanig, 2018a, 2018b). The worsening economic conditions have forced vulnerable people out of their job and increased their resentment, later expressed by radical right support. While this study speaks to both of these camps, it offers remedies to this unhelpful dichotomy. First, this thesis challenges prominent narratives of recent radical right success as primarily a cultural backlash that has little to do with economic grievances (Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Kaufmann, 2016) by revealing strong and consistent material bases underpinning radical right support (Paper 2). Second, it argues that once the local conditions that influence voters' political preferences are examined, the economic versus cultural arguments are complementary rather than antagonistic. Through an emphasis on political geography and subnational level dynamics, I show that local contextual dynamics that combine economic, cultural and social features can play a role in influencing radical right support. My first paper demonstrates that the coupling of economic difficulties and cul-

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tural arrivals can be characterised by an intervening variable, the decline of subjective social status. My third paper identifies an important, yet neglected, social dimension related to socio-cultural disappearances in the closure of pubs as being linked to radical right support. Therefore, by focusing on the intertwined economic, cultural and social facets of the local context, this thesis adds new insights to scholarship on how economic and cultural factors interact and structure spatial divides in radical right voting behaviour.

Third, this thesis contributes to our understanding of political behaviour by applying well-conceptualised approaches and well-tested factors behind radical right support to other party families. The first paper of the thesis showed how the rich literature of the radical right can be used to understand support for the radical left. Examining radical left political behaviour through the lens of status anxiety reveals the strong material and economic underpinnings underlying radical left voting. The analysis of subjective social status as the reconciling factor between radical right and radical left parties reveals the need for further research on the commonalities of these two party families. Factors that are understood to explain the rise and success of the radical right could be extended to other new challenger or niche parties. For instance, using the literature on local context, one may assume that the presence of natural disasters or rise of the temperature can influence individuals' voting preferences to the green parties.

Overall, by applying insights from political geography to puzzling political phenonema, this dissertation not only contributes fresh knowledge to the study of radical right behaviour in Western Europe, it also provides a general framework for investigating the complexities of local drivers. This framework consists of three steps. First, it involves endorsing the local sociotropic account that local socio-cultural spaces can shape people's political behaviour. While

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not discounting national-level and individual patterns, adopting an analysis from a local focal point paves the way for more innovative theoretical considerations. Second, it requires considering alternative options to the unhelpful dichotomy between the economic and cultural factors behind radical right support. Third, it involves thinking about novel local data which may entail that existing theories can be revisited in innovative ways. This paper has done so by examining psychological factors like subjective social status or the under-explored socio-cultural degradation. This implies analysing how such specific local drivers can be operationalised within various European contexts.

5.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Avenues

The three papers in my thesis bring accounts of whether and how locally oriented factors can motivate support for the radical right and the radical left, thus inspiring further exploration of the ways in which the local connects to the politically radical. One way to further improve our understanding implies delving deeper into the varied and complex meanings of 'place'. It can represent 'objective' factors; observable economic, political or demographic characteristics at some geographical level; and 'subjective' understanding of geographic communities. However, the level of analysis that ought to be relevant to best depict these geographic communities have been rarely explored in political science. The level can either mean higher levels of aggregation like the meso-level with a region or lower levels like a municipality, a distinct neighbourhood, housing estate, or street corner. It is crucial for political scientists to think more seriously about which geographies should matter, and how, to answer political questions. Smaller measures of local context which are relatable to people's

daily lives could be envisaged in future studies. While I investigate regions, municipalities and districts in my three papers, I cannot infer that effects will be the same at other 'local' levels. That is why more precise units that can capture the 'context' that most individuals see in their day-to-day lives should be considered. That is also why further investigation of the way each predictor of the radical behaviour acts at different levels of aggregation is needed (King and Wheelock, 2007; Savelkoul et al., 2017). Accounting for different dynamics of each effect operating at distinct geographical levels can be insightful. For example, contact effects have been found to exist in smaller units of analysis (Kaufmann and Harris, 2015; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010). But, as the size of unit increases, anti-immigrant attitudes of natives and ethnic competition are reinforced (Della Posta, 2013).

'Local' may also entail different theoretical understandings. The thesis has given significance to how the contextual sense of 'place', materialised by local economic competition, immigration and local socio-cultural hubs, have radical electoral impacts. The concept of status anxiety that is tested in the first paper refers to local context as social comparisons with parents. However, this local meaning can be extended to people's local entourage. Scholars advance that 'local context' can refer to a social network in which people communicate with their neighbours and peers to convey ideas and political opinions (Agnew, 1983; Cutts and Webber, 2010; Johnson and Pattie, 2006). Local context can also be understood in policy terms; a local area is likely to be largely influenced by the implementation of a local policy (for example, an increased budget for certain services i.e. accommodating the arrival of asylum seekers). Further studies that consider the impact of these variants of local factors should be undertaken. In addition, there is a great scholarly potential to explore the connections between

politically relevant local attachment and radical right support. A radical right vote might be reflective of people's feelings of attachment and belonging to their local communities against the rise of globalisation or centralised trends. Fitzgerald (2018) has shown early evidence of this phenomenon but we still know very little how local attachment influences political extremism and radical right support.

Since this thesis has shown the importance of local context to radical right support, more research is needed to understand the effect of local context on attitudinal determinants. A wide range of studies has looked at the link between immigration and radical right voting but few have looked at how local conditions can foster anti-immigrant sentiments. The influence of the local context on individual attitudes such as the perception of neighbourhood or perception towards immigration could lead to fruitful research in the future. Table C.4 of the third appendix uses a new dataset to show that individuals' perception of neighbourhood degradation in the last five years positively impacts radical right support in the United Kingdom but more of these questions should be systematically included in cross-national surveys. Understanding the ways in which local contextual conditions influence people's attitudes towards the government, the political system, or immigrants could also be enriching.

The thesis has focused on the demand-side factors behind radical voting. While it does it for the sake of precision, coherence and consistency between all chapters, an analysis that can include some supply-side parameters could be worth considering in future work. The literature recognises that both demand-side and supply-side factors jointly determine the electoral success of the radical right (Golder, 2016). The political opportunity structure may well interfere with the level of radical right support by determining the extent to which demand

is translated into radical right success (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). The first and third papers assume that the nostalgic appeal of the radical right to the white working class is a response to the radical right rhetoric and narrative that precisely taps into these social and cultural grievances. In particular, if the theme of local context is reprised, an investigation of local politics with radical right local mayors (or local media) and how it is linked to higher levels of radical right support could enrich our understanding of how supply-side factors can mediate popular demands for the radical right. More progress can be made by including the inherent interactions between demand-side and supply-side factors.

With regards to methodology, this thesis relies on observational data that makes it hard to claim any causal mechanisms between local factors and the radical right being inferred. Establishing causal linkages about local contextual factors is difficult since context is likely to be endogenous to the locality and individuals might self-select where they want to live. However, other empirical strategies could remedy these shortcomings. The development of new longitudinal data in European countries, in addition to the German or UK household panel studies, could enable us to better understand how attitudes and voting preferences of individuals may change over time according to the varying local contextual conditions. A recent cross-national funded project conducted in the Netherlands, the UK and France that use geocoded survey data to match electoral census data paves the way towards more innovative empirical tools to explain the role of local context on the radical right support (SCoRE project).

Researchers might also want to use experimental designs to judge how different local parameters are causing radical right support. For instance, one might present different local scenarios which vary depending on the number of

available public services, on the types of economic activity and/or on the levels and types of immigration to see which factor(s) drive(s) radical right support. A specific example of detecting social drivers of the radical right support is the Wigan Deal, a social contract that has empowered communities through a 'citizen-led' approach to public services in the Wigan Council since 2011. This initiative resembles a natural experiment that can assess its effect on electoral outcomes by contrasting Wigan to other councils with a similar contextual and compositional makeup that did not implement this policy. Quasi-experimental designs could enlarge our knowledge of the effects of local factors on radical right voting.

Not only would experimental techniques contribute to this research agenda, but more data access at lower levels of analysis could also greatly advance knowledge on this matter. The thesis either does cross-national comparison at the regional level or single-case studies at the municipal level to test the various demand-side approaches. So far, studies of radical right voting behaviour that focus on smaller spatial units are hardly comparative due, mostly, to limitations in getting exhaustive and reliable data for a large panel of countries. The rapid expansion of accessible new data – many of which have been used in this thesis – has created unprecedented opportunities to improve our understanding of sub-national variations of the radical support. Future research should attempt to use this data to systematically measure these variants at a lower unit of analysis of comparable size across countries.

5.4 Implications for Research into the Radical Right and Political Behaviour

This dissertation generates far-reaching implications for political science, particularly in the study of radical right voting behaviour, political behaviour, political sociology and political geography. With its innovative local dimension, this thesis has shaped the debate on theories linking demand-side factors and radical right voting behaviour. It extends previous research on the study of the radical right and party behaviour by demonstrating how the local context can play a fundamental role in explaining the radical right support. A local analysis contributes to enriching the understanding of radical right support and party behaviour in four regards. It first allows us to explain the subnational variations which existing studies, that mostly employed national-level and/or individual indicators, failed to prove. These analyses masked effects which are only visible at a level of analysis in which people can make sense of their political interests. Second, an investigation of the local context helps to reconcile the two dichotomised camps, economic and cultural, together by showing that the two are not so indistinguishable when looking at what influences voting at a proximate level of study. Third, a closer look into the local context invites us to explore the complex features of what influences individuals to cast a vote for the radical right beyond economic and cultural characteristics. By examining other facets of the local changing dynamics, I identify the socio-cultural component as being part of the complex picture of what truly motivates people to form certain voting preferences.

The local sociotropic account of voting has gained a degree of flavour in the field of political science (Enos, 2017). It has recently received more scholarly

attention by providing a convincing explanation for the geographic divisions of the Brexit and Trump vote (Hochschild, 2016; Cramer, 2016; Jennings et al., 2016; McKay, 2019). One instance is Coyle and Ford's argument that political discontent has become entrenched in 'left behind' areas since the 1980s, after the decline of economic and social fabric and the failed attempts of governments to reverse this trend (Coyle and Ford, 2017:67). While this thesis uses this local sociotropic account, further examination and refinement are needed to unveil the effect of local context on political behaviour and attitudes in general. In particular, it empirically means that obtaining more local data across European countries, and having questions in the Eurobarometer Survey or other EU-wide survey data about the local conditions of the neighbourhood, could greatly advance the understanding of local factors on voting behaviour. Some questions are already part of the UK Household Panel Study but they were only asked in one wave (wave 6). A more systematic use of these questions across years would be very valuable.

Greater attention to the local level would also involve more questionnaires that would tackle the unresolved question of what 'local context' and 'place' truly mean to people. Recent experiments have come up with innovative ways to overcome this ambiguity like Bowlers et al.'s working paper (2017) which has asked respondents to locate their 'place' on a map to directly attach this ambiguous term to what it really means to each respondent. Or, a question that answers 'When you think about places with political influence, what areas matter?' could be considered. Scholars have attempted this on small scales but have not yet developed effective tools for measuring the local environment of individuals in large-scale research (Enos, 2017). More sophisticated techniques to refine the link between local context and political outcomes would be needed.

Second, the findings of this thesis have theoretical implications for the study of demand-side approaches to explaining radical right behaviour. This includes avoiding cultivating the spurious dichotomy between economic and cultural factors to explain the radical right support. Instead, understanding these two forces as complementary rather than mutually exclusive will allow us to better assess their interaction. Including both of their effects will also add complexity to the reasons offered for why people vote for radical right parties and not restrict them to stereotypical and artificial reasons. This thesis also illustrates the theoretical and empirical benefits to using more innovative ways to capture economic or cultural forces that influence radical right voting. Debates over economic priorities have to a large extent given way, and cultural backlash explanations have gained significant ground (Hainmueller and Malhotra, 2015; Mutz, 2018; Norris and Inglehart, 2016). Yet, new ways to empirically demonstrate the way the economy influences radical right voting support could be insightful. Using skill levels of native and immigrant groups, my second paper has shown that economic factors are non-negligible drivers in fuelling radical right support. My third paper in particular helps to show that only economic deprivation boosts the local socio-cultural degradation effects on radical right support. Recent studies have also endorsed this view and showed that economic shock (Colantone and Stanig, 2018a, 2018b), or austerity measures (Fetzer, 2019), are causally increasing the support for radical right parties and UKIP. These new findings call for a re-appreciation of the economic explanation by scholars and for greater caution in implementing austerity-induced reforms by politicians.

Third, this thesis has provided new insights into the political sociology of radical right parties. The sociodemographic characteristics and attitudes of

radical right supporters have been extensively investigated (Arzheimer, 2012; Golder, 2016; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2007), but no explanation has been generated as to why people from the middle-class can be attracted to the radical right parties. By exploring local contextual dynamics, this thesis has demonstrated why these parties have a socio-economically diverse voting base. Natives with any skillset can be supportive of the radical right as long as they are under direct local competition with immigrants of similar skill levels (Paper 2). My third paper demonstrates that the white working class is more likely to be affected by the closure of community pubs since they embody a British working-class heritage. This conclusion permits important insights into ways of understanding how local contextual dynamics can trigger certain socio-economic groups to support radical right parties. The political sociology of radical right parties, and parties in general, is contingent on the local contextual dynamics. This presents a theoretical consensus between compositional and contextual features.

Finally, this thesis has implications in the field of political geography by contributing to the scholarly debate on the geographic effect of immigration on voting patterns. Recent elections have presented the paradox of having higher anti-immigrant radical right support in areas with few immigrants. Political geography has traditionally offered two conflicted explanations to justify why radical right voting behaviour dramatically varies between geographic areas. Some would explain it by the fact that any individuals who live under certain contextual conditions, difficult local economic conditions, would share similar negative views of their community which is then reflected in radical right voting preferences (Pattie and Johnson, 2006; McKay, 2019; Jennings and Stoker, 2019). Others would advance that it is the ethnic composition in these areas,

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older individuals with lower education, which drives this radical right support (Maxwell, 2019; Cunningham and Savage 2017; Oberti and Préteceille, 2016). This thesis provides a more nuanced understanding of compositional versus contextual predictors of radical right support. My second paper finds a middle-ground position which shows that both contextual and compositional factors are of relevance: while contextual factors (immigration) influence radical right voting behaviour, it is the specific skill composition of these immigrants and the relative skill composition of the natives that eventually leads to radical right support. It is only the direct competition between immigrants and natives of similar skill levels that will push natives to cast a radical right ballot. As for my third paper, although local closures of community pubs influence radical right support, these contextual phenomena particularly hit one socio-economic group who most usually frequent these social spaces - the white working class. Moreover, these two papers also consider how some contextual levels can compound the radical right effect. My second paper demonstrates that the competition between natives and immigrants is magnified under conditions of unemployment. My third paper also shows that the local socio-cultural degradation impact on radical right support is reinforced when there is larger economic deprivation in the area. This reinforces how radical right support is contingent on local contextual features and how local economic hardship is a fertile breeding ground of radical right support.

5.5 Policy Implications

This thesis has shown how individuals are politically embedded in their local context and how in turn this local context conditions their radical voting behaviour. Above scholarly implications that aim to develop this theoretical and

empirical linkage, this thesis has broader policy horizons. It has informed us of the need for politicians and policy-makers to acknowledge the local context in their political messages and policy recommendations. Most studies link the national political distrust directed towards the workings of social and political institutions to heightened party dealignment and support for non-mainstream parties. This study stresses how the factors that directly affect voters in their proximate level can also affect their views on parties, politicians and representative democracy. A national-level discourse by politicians can only exacerbate the contention raised by individuals about feeling unrepresented by their 'out-of-touch' representatives, which ultimately offers windows of opportunity for radical right politicians to instrumentalise the message of 'us' versus 'them' and gain supporters. This study has provided a large exploration of the fact that the local communities in which citizens are embedded - economically, culturally and socially - shapes their political views and their likelihood of supporting radical right parties. This calls for further attention to the local context as one pathway for politicians to address the crisis of representative democracy. Despite the importance of national considerations and political parties, the local matters in shaping individuals' view on democracy. Local economic conditions and the lived experiences of the individuals will mediate the global phenomena to which they are exposed. That is why politicians and policy-makers should tailor their messages to specific audiences by taking into account local conditions.

This thesis helps inform politicians and policy-makers about the need to avoid any territorial reform that would increase regional differences. This directly goes against the narrative that dominated urban economics and governmental policies in the 2000s in the United Kingdom. Following failed waves of regeneration policy aimed at revitalising middle-sized towns, the policy remedy

was to first focus on parts of the country that were prosperous and dynamic (i.e. London and the South East) and, second, to allow people from other cities (i.e. Manchester, Sunderland) to move to these affluent places to benefit from the material opportunities there (Rodríguez-Posé, 2018). These policies have contributed to greater regional disparities that, as this thesis identifies, have electoral implications. Marginalisation in rural areas due to the growing mobility of capital and people, and the rationalisation of public services have created a further spiral of emigration and decline. Jennings and Stoker (2018) advanced that more deprived areas in the UK voted to Leave in the 2016 EU referendum, which confirms the combination of higher radical support in more deprived areas. The UK has prioritised 'place-based' policies that try to ensure more regionally inclusive economic growth instead of relying on 'people-based' policies that focus on economic efficiency with prosperous big-cities. Therefore, the evidence explored in this thesis all seems to indicate that 'place-based' policies instead of 'people-based' policies should be privileged, as suggested by other political scientists (Jennings and Stoker, 2018) and economists in geography (Rodríguez-Posé, 2018; Barca et al. 2012). These 'place-based' policies involve higher regional development intervention in order to prevent a larger exodus of young aspirational individuals from middle-sized towns and reduce regional inequality.

This thesis also sheds light on the need to consider variation on the local level when thinking about policy making. Understanding the subnational variations with a local outlook is a central prerequisite for the formulation of neat and appropriate policy proposals. Differences within local areas are as important as differences between local areas; therefore, policies should be targeted to specific localities. They should be frequently reviewed and updated

to respond to changes in local communities and guarantee a better provision of public services.

Since the findings of the thesis speak to economic and cultural factors, policy reforms that aim to tackle anti-radicalism should combine both aspects. Since the roots of radicalism are similar for both ends of the political spectrum, as shown in my first paper, counteracting the rise of radical right and radical left parties might require similar policy tactics. Policy reforms should equally help facilitate the integration of immigrants and prevent any local subsidy cuts that could further harm the poorest places and the poorest people. Central governments should shift their agenda from short-term cuts and savings to longer-term reforms with more substantial support for communities. This is particularly acute in the era of Brexit given the large loss of spending power of 27 per cent in local authorities in England between 2010/2011 and 2015/2016, with the most deprived authorities witnessing greater cuts (National Audit Office, 2017).

Finally, this thesis addresses concerns about the way radical right support might be addressed. Some who view the radical right as a 'revolt against globalisation' suggest that a way to cope with it would be to provide more compensation to people on whom international trade has imposed concentrated losses. Redistribution policies are the solutions to the subsequent economic inequalities that globalisation has created (Colantone and Stanig, 2018a, 2018b; Astryan et al., 2014). The fact that radical right support is more prevalent in areas which are most exposed to the strains of globalisation seems to fit the rationale. However, my study advances that compensation in the form of social benefits may not be enough to discourage voters from supporting radical right parties, insofar as it may not resolve the deeper concerns that these voters are

facing. As shown in my third paper, the increasing social marginalisation of the white working-class identity, which has been pushed to the periphery of society, remains a stronger predicament that is likely to incentivise this voting group to cast a radical right ballot. My third paper highlights that ways to counteract radicalism do not only concern objective measures of living conditions and individual characteristics, but also include socio-cultural ones. More comprehensive policies that aim to preserve local assets of communities - libraries, local pubs, community centres and so on -could be the first step towards reappraising these local socio-cultural communities. Radical right support can be mitigated by supporting socio-cultural communities.

The question of the extent to which subjective social decline, labour market competition and local socio-cultural degradation lies behind radical right support in Europe is unlikely to be tackled quickly or by any single set of politics, whether oriented to economic compensation or restrictions on immigration. Addressing problems of status anxiety and local social decline are long-term endeavours which will require economic, cultural and social measures that both improve the material situation of people disadvantaged by the current globalisation shift and also build national narratives that accord respect to all groups and regions. Restoring the pride of places with high street vibrancy in town centres would bring an end to national malaise that contributes to radical right support. Accomplishing these tacks is not easy, but stemming the tide of radical right support depends on bold policies that consider economic conditions, tolerate diversity and restore the social glory of groups of people who have been relegated to vulnerable positions.

In hindsight, the papers in this thesis have offered contributions and insights into this broad research agenda, and represent a starting point for

further enquiry into the multifaceted economic, cultural and social features of local context and radical right support.

A | Appendix 1

Table A.1: Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Radical Right Support	87,670	0.141	0.348	0	1
Radical Left Support	86,500	0.072	0.259	0	1
Mainstream Right Support	87,670	0.191	0.220	0	1
Mainstream Left Support	86,500	0.170	0.375	0	1
Green Support	86,452	0.060	0.039	0	1
Social Distance Compared to Parents	87,697	0.360	0.756	0.195	0.46
Social Placement	87,697	0.331	0.031	0.202	0.39
Immigration Attitudes_Culture	87,320	0.466	0.499	0	1
Immigration Attitudes_Economy	87,320	0.568	0.495	0	1
Rights for Immigrants to Reside	87,125	0.629	0.483	0	1
Against Immigrants (Same to Population)	87,323	0.281	0.450	0	1
Against Immigrants (Different to Population)	87,316	0.428	0.495	0	1
Against Immigrants (Non-EU)	87,316	0.449	0.497	0	1
Redistribution	87,196	0.873	0.332	0	1
Equality	87,028	0.707	0.455	0	1
Fair Society	87,113	0.815	0.388	0	1
No Trust of EU Parliament	84,478	0.682	0.466	0	1
Against Further EU Integration	84,506	0.587	0.492	0	1
No Trust in Politicians	83,712	0.772	0.420	0	1
Gini Index	88,546	.293	4	0.929	100
Unemployment Rate	88,546	0.040	6.890	4.234	46.050
Immigration Stock	88,546	0.038	7.865	0.929	58.789
Age	82,785	48.374	18.626	14	123
Gender	82,785	0.524	0.499	0	1
Class	82,240	3.186	1.400	1	5
Ethnic Minority	82,604	0.043	0.203	0	1
Education	82,534	1.447	0.964	0	3
Region	88,546	6.610	3.622	1	226

Table A.2: Codebook

Variable	Source	Label	Operationalisation
Radical Right Support	European Social Survey (ESS)	Who did you vote for in the last election?	1= Radical Right; 0=Other parties; .= Inapplicable, Don't Know, No Answer
Radical Left Support	ESS	Who did you vote for in the last election?	1= Radical Left; 0= Other Parties; .= Inapplicable, Don't Know, No Answer
Mainstream Right Support	ESS	Who did you vote for in the last election?	1=Mainstream Right; 0 = Other parties ; .= Inapplicable, Don't Know, No Answer
Mainstream Left Support	ESS	Who did you vote for in the last election?	1=Mainstream Left ; 0=Other parties ; .= Inapplicable, Don't Know, No Answer
Green Support	ESS	Who did you vote for in the last election?	1=Green ; 0=Other parties ; .= Inapplicable, Don't Know, No Answer
Social Decline Compared to Parents	2017 Eurobarometer Survey	Where would you place your parents on this ladder by comparison to you in your country ? (Top, Middle, Bottom)	I build mean values for each year group (1900-1941, 1942-1951, 1952-1961, 1962-1971 1972-1981, 1982-1991 and 1992-2001). For instance, there are 15 % of 1992-2001 with high values, 70 % of 1992-2001 with middle values and 14 % with low values The mean value for year group (1992-2001)= ((0.15*3)+(0.7*2)+(0.14))/6=0.332
Social Placement	2017 Eurobarometer Survey	Where would your place yourself on the social ladder? (Top, Middle, Bottom)	Mean values calculated for 7 year groups *1 if in lowest position, *2 if in middle position *3 if in higher position
Immigration Attitudes_Culture	ESS	Is your country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants?	0=Good for Culture; 1=Bad for Culture; .= DK
Immigration Attitudes_Economy	ESS	Is Immigration bad or good for country's economy?	0=Good for the Economy; = Bad for the Economy; .=DK
Rights for Immigrants to Reside	ESS	Do immigrants make country worse or better place to live?	0= Better ; 1= Worse; .=DK
Against Immigrants (Same to Population)	ESS	Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority	0= Allow many; 1=Allow none, .=DK
Against Immigrants (Different to Population)	ESS	Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority	0= Allow many; 1= Allow none; .=DK
Against Immigrants (Non-EU)	ESS	Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	0=Better ; 1=Worse; .=DK
Redistribution	ESS	Government should reduce differences in income levels	0=Against government reducing income inequality 1=For government reducing income inequality ; .=DK, No Response
Equality	ESS	Social benefits/services lead to a more equal society	0=Against benefits and equality 1= For benefits and equality; .= DK, No Response
Fair Society	ESS	For fair society, differences in standard of living should be small	0= Against small differences of living standard for fair society 1=For small differences of living standards for fair society, .=DK, No Response
No Trust of EU Parliament	ESS	Do you trust the EU Parliament?	0=Yes ; 1=No , .=DK, No Response
Against Further EU Integration	ESS	Do you think the European unification should go further or has gone too far?	0=Go further ; 1= Went Too far; .=DK, No Response
No Trust in Politicians	ESS	Do you have trust in politicians?	0= Yes; 10=No; .=DK, No Response
Gini Index	Eurostat SILC- European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions	Gini coefficient of equalized disposable income for each Region	Continuous Variable
Unemployment Rate	Eurostat	NUTS 2 regional long-term unemployment share in the total active population	Continuous Variable
Immigration Stock	Eurostat	% immigrant population	Continuous Variable
Age	ESS		Continuous Variable
Gender	ESS		1=Female; 0=Male
Class	ESS	Based on Oesch's class position 5 Classes	1= Higher-grade service class; 2= Lower-grade service class; 3-small business owners 4 Skilled Workers; 5=Unskilled Workers
Education	ESS		0=Primary, 1=Secondary, 2=Vocational, 3=Tertiary Education
Ethnic Minority	ESS		1=an Ethnic Minority; 0=Not an Ethnic minority

Table A.3: Classification of Radical Right and Radical Left Parties

(a) CSES Score: 1=Extreme Left / 10= Extreme Right

Country	Radical Right Parties	Radical Left Parties
Austria	Freedom Party(FPÖ) (8/10)	Community Party (KPÖ) (1/10)
	Team Stronach for Austria (7/10)	Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) (7/10)
Belgium	Flemish Interest (VB) (8/10)	Worker's Party (PTB) (3/10)
	Front National (FN) (8.3/10)	PVDA+ (Partij van de Arbeid) (2.5/10)
	Parti Populaire (7.2/10), Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (NV-A) (7.6/10)	
	Lijst Dedecker (8/10)	
Bulgaria	Attack (9/10), Reformist Block (7/10)	
	Patriotic Front (8/10)	
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DPP) (7/10)	Socialist People's Party (until 2012) - Red-Green Alliance (EL) (2/10)
Estonia	Estonian Independence Party (EIP) (8.7/10)	Estonia United Left Party (EURP) (2.3/10)
		Constitution Party (1.3/10), Estonian United People's Party (2/10)
Finland	Finns (PS) (9/10)	Left Alliance (VAS) (6/10)
	Freedom Party – Finland's Future (8/10)	Communist Party of Finland (and Communist Workers' Party of Finland) (1.2/10)
France	Front National (FN) (7/10)	Workers' Struggle (LO) (2/10)
		Left Front (FDG, former PRG) (3/10)
		Anti-Capitalist Party (NPA) (2/10)
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD) (8/10), Republikaner (8/10)	Die Linke (The Left) (previously Party of Democratic Socialism PDS) (2/10)
	National Democratic Party of Germany (NDP) (9.5/10)	
Great Britain	UK Independence Party (UKIP) (8.2/10)	
	British National Party (BNP) (8.7/10)	
Hungary	Jobbik (9/10), Fidesz (8.7/10)	Communist Party (MKP) (2.1/10)
	HTJP-Hungarian Truth (8.9/10)	Workers' Party (2.5/10)
Italy	Northern League (LN) (8/10)	Communist Refoundation Party (2.7/10)
	Tricolour Flame (8.5/10)	Party of Proletarian Unity (3/10), Party of Italian Communists (2/10)
Ireland		United Left Alliance (3.5/10), Sinn Féin (3/10)
		Workers' Party, Socialist Party – United Left Alliance (until 2013) (3/10)
		Independents (3/10), Anti-Austerity Alliance–People Before Profit (3/10)
The Netherlands	Party for Freedom (PVV) (7.8/10)	Socialist Party (3/10)
	List Pim Fortuyn (8/10)	
Poland	Law and Justice (PiS) (6.2/10)	Razem (Together Party) (3.5/10)
	Wolność (Liberty) (7/10), Kukiz'15 (7.5/10)	
	League of Polish Families (7.8/10), Congress of the New Right (7.6/10)	
Portugal	National Renovator Party (PNR) (8.5/10)	Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU/PCP/PEV) (2/10)
		Bloco de Esquerda (BE) (previously Democratic Popular Union) (2/10)
		Portuguese Communist Party (1/10)
Slovakia	Slovak National Party (SNS) (7/10)	Communist Party of Slovakia (2.2/10),
		Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS) (2.3/10)
Slovenia	Slovene National Party (SNS) (7/10)	United Left (2/10)
Spain		Unidos Podemos (3/10)
		United Left (previously PCE-Communist Party of Spain) (2.8/10)
Sweden	Swedish Democrats (SD) (7.6/10)	Left Party (previously VPK-Left Party-The Communists) (3.4/10)

Table A.4: Social Placement, Radical Right and Radical Left Support

	Radical Right Support (1)	Radical Left Support (2)
Social Placement	-1.662** (0.654)	-2.083** (0.842)
Immigration Attitudes (0=Agst)	0.624*** (0.035)	-0251*** (0.043)
Redistribution Preferences (0=Agst)	0.108* (0.049)	0.549*** (0.079)
Age	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.012*** (0.001)
Female	-0.108*** (0.032)	-0.110*** (0.039)
Class (0=Higher-Grade Service)		
Lower-Grade Service	-0.041 (0.058)	-0.045 (0.062)
Small Business Owners	0.124** (0.061)	-0.215*** (0.082)
Skilled Workers	0.236*** (0.055)	0.149** (0.064)
Unskilled Workers	0.244*** (0.061)	0.054 (0.073)
Ethnic Minority	-0.205* (0.115)	0.040 (0.166)
Education (0=Primary)		
Secondary	0.080 (0.056)	0.136** (0.063)
Vocational	0.240*** (0.071)	0.208 (0.082)
Tertiary	-2.272*** (0.077)	0.216*** (.076)
Constant	9.277 (0.536)	1.954 (0.660)
Observations	87,670	86,500
Number of Countries	19	19
Number of Regions	226	226
Region, Year and Round FE	Yes	Yes
Contextual Variables	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

Radical right and radical left parties have overlapping positions and preferences. Table A.5 confirms the populist attitudes that are common among radical right and radical left supporters. They are against further European integration while the effect is slightly more important among radical right than

radical left voters. Such finding is commonly defended in the literature (Mudde, 2007; Rooduijn et al., 2017, Santana and Rama, 2018). Radical right supporters are also untrustworthy of the EU Parliament, but there is no effect on radical left support. Both radical right and radical left supporters are dismissive of politicians. In line with previous studies (Mudde, 2004), the feelings that politicians are out of touch and that the political system and parties are unaccountable have been largely found among supporters of radical left and radical right parties.

Table A.5: With Populist Attitudes

	Radical Right Support (1)	Radical Left Support (2)
Social Decline Compared to Parents	1.721* (0.895)	4.458** (0.101)
Immigration Attitudes (0=Agst)	0.458*** (0.059)	-0.216** (0.096)
Redistribution Preferences (0=Agst)	0.123* (0.057)	0.186** (0.160)
Eurosceptic Attitudes		
No Trust of EU Parliament	0.302*** (0.066)	0.156 (0.111)
Against Further EU Integration	0.356*** (0.066)	0.167* (0.083)
Trust Measures		
No Trust in Politicians	0.016* (0.066)	0.262** (0.112)
Constant	-3.363*** (0.701)	-4.412*** (0.055)
Observations	87,316	82,500
Number of Countries	19	19
Number of Regions	226	226
Region, Year and Round FE	Yes	Yes
Individual and Contextual Controls	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

Table A.6 shows the results are the same when we use similar attitudinal determinants. The regional contextual variables have no significant effect on radical right and radical left support. The fact that Gini index and unemployment have not impact radical left support and radical right support goes against previous findings (March, 2011; Golder, 2003, 2016). However, it confirms that a better assessment of the influence of contextual variables on radical right and radical left support should be conducted on a smaller scale. Immigration at the regional level does not positively affect radical right and radical left parties, which goes in line with the contact theory that advances that tolerance towards immigrants increases the lower the level of analysis (McLaren, 2013).

Table A.6: With Other Attitudinal Determinants

	Radical Right Support		Radical Left Support	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Social Decline Compared to Parents	2.518***	2.026**	4.240***	4.793***
	(0.610)	(0.644)	(0.218)	(0.143)
Immigration Attitudes_ Economy (0=Agst)	0.203***			
	(0.039)			
Right For Immigrants to Reside (1=Agst)	0.192***			
	(0.039)			
Against Immigrants (Same to Population)	0.101**			
	(0.045)			
Against Immigrants (Different to Population)	0.214**			
	(0.050)			
Against Immigrants (Non-EU)	0.152***			
	(0.045)			
Equality			-0.078	
			(0.101)	
Fair Society			0.143	
			(0.152)	
Contextual Variables				
Gini Index		7.266		4.346
		(0.028)		(0.017)
Unemployment Rate		7.266		8.211
		(3.098)		(2.465)
Immigration Stock		-3.266		-2.761
		(0.008)		(0.991)
Constant	-3.825***	-4.946***	-4.093***	4.087***
	(0.528)	(0.543)	(0.578)	(0.532)
Observations	87,670	87,670	86,500	86,500
Number of Countries	19	19	19	19
Number of Regions	226	226	226	226
Region, Year and Round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

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Table A.7: Without Different Set of Countries

| | Without Eastern European Countries | | Without Scandinavian Countries | |
	Radical Right	Radical Left	Radical Right	Radical Left
Social Decline Compared to Parents	5.162***	6.367***	3.454***	5.770***
	(0.298)	(0.435)	(0.836)	(0.450)
Immigration Attitudes (0=Agst)	0.674***	-0.239***	0.561***	-0.263***
	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.046)	(0.063)
Redistribution Preferences (0=Agst)	-0.102	0.431***	0.116*	0.373***
	(0.082)	(0.120)	(0.076)	(0.122)
Constant	-0.332	-2.780***	-2.300	-2.871***
	(0.325)	(0.729)	(0.103)	(0.735)
Observations	43,567	43,567	54,789	54,789
Number of Countries	13	13	15	15
Number of Regions	226	226	226	226
Region, Year and Round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual and Contextual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

Table A.8: Status Anxiety and Mainstream Parties

	Mainstream Right Support (1)	Mainstream Left Support (2)	Green Support (3)
Social Decline Compared to Parents	-3.359***	-2.372**	-0.164
	(0.556)	(0.693)	(0.725)
Immigration Attitudes (0=Agst)	0.207***	-0.254***	-0.395***
	(0.025)	(0.059)	(0.037)
Redistribution Preferences (0=Agst)	0.180*	0.527***	0.591***
	(0.023)	(0.068)	(0.043)
Constant	0.757***	0.259	-3.539***
	(0.240)	(0.282)	(0.510)
Observations	87,670	86,500	86,085
Number of Countries	19	19	19
Number of Regions	226	226	226
Region, Year and Round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual and Contextual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

Table A.9: Hierarchical Models

	Radical Right Support (1)	Radical Left Support (2)
Social Decline Compared to Parents	0.359** (0.181)	0.191* (0.102)
Immigration Attitudes (0=Agst)	0.115*** (0.010)	-0.021*** (0.006)
Redistribution Preferences (0=Agst)	0.031* (0.015)	0.028** (0.013)
Age	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.012*** (0.001)
Female	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)
Class (0=Higher-Grade Service)		
Lower-Grade Service	0.010 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)
Small Business Owners	0.015* (0.016)	-0.002 (0.009)
Skilled Workers	0.033** (0.015)	0.021* (0.009)
Unskilled Workers	0.059*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.011)
Ethnic Minority	-0.078*** (0.016)	0.020 (0.038)
Education (0=Primary)		
Secondary	0.018 (0.016)	0.006 (0.014)
Vocational	0.040** (0.019)	0.011 (0.022)
Tertiary	-0.050*** (0.021)	0.012 (0.015)
Constant	-0.067 (0.071)	-0.093*** (0.039)
Observations	84,670	84,500
Number of Countries	19	19
Number of Regions	226	226
Region, Year and Round FE	Yes	Yes
Contextual Variables	Yes	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

B | Appendix 2

Table B.1: Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
FN Vote Share	117,872	19.465	8.578	0	72.22
Registered FN Vote Share	117,872	15.689	6.935	0	59.09
Low-Skilled Immigrants	118,023	0.791	1.402	0	50
Low-Skilled Natives	118,023	24.521	6.960	0	100
Medium-Skilled Immigrants	118,023	0.324	0.756	0	16.667
Medium-Skilled Natives	118,023	10.203	4.578	0	60
High-Skilled Immigrants	118,023	0.277	0.768	0	20
High-Skilled Natives	118,023	8.957	6.924	0	50
Unemployed Immigrants	117,872	0.194	0.348	0	25
Unemployed Natives	117,872	3.320	1.534	0	40
Unemployment	118,023	2.716	1.717	0	23.856
Immigration	118,023	24.61	9,21	0	100
Retired Immigrants	117,872	0.754	1.474	0	37.04
Retired Natives	117,872	23.696	8.074	0	100
Student Immigrants	117,872	0.187	0.535	0	15.77
Student Natives	117,872	9.883	10.252	0	52.17
Urbanity Score	117,872	2	0.152	0	2
Economic Activity	117,872	2.189	0.828	0	3
Share of Mosques	117,512	8.160	4	0.929	29.050

Figure B.1: The Spatial Distribution of FN Vote Shares in Presidential Elections

Figure B.2: The Evolution of the Net Migration Rate

1999-2009

2009-2014

Table B.2: Reconfiguration of Socio-Professional Categories along Skill and Education Levels

Skill level Classification	Socio-Professional Categories (INSEE)	Education
Low-Skilled Workers	Manual Workers	No Higher
	Account Clerks, Sales Workers, Administrative	Education
	Employees and Personal Assistants	
Medium-Skilled Workers	Craftsmen, Merchants, Managing Directors	> 2 years of
	Intermediary Office Staff	Higher Education
	Civil Servants, Police and Military	
High-Skilled Workers	Higher Office Staff, Entrepreneurs, Head of Industry	> 2 years of
	Professionals, Executive Employees	< Higher Education
	Intellectual Professions, Teachers, Art Specialists	

Figure B.1 shows the spatial distribution of FN vote shares (in percentage). Dark orange corresponds to communes with strong FN support whereas light yellow represents communes with low levels of support. Most of the FN support is located in Northern, Eastern and Southeastern areas of the country.

Figure B.2 depicts the evolution of net migration rate across two time periods 1999-2009 and 2009-2014. Bright orange represents municipalities with a positive net migration rate whereas blue represents municipalities with a negative trend. Overall, net immigration has decreased between 1999-2009 and 2009-2014. The downward trend is larger in Northern, Eastern and Southeastern areas which are areas with the biggest FN support. This confirms previous findings that immigration inflow has a negative effect on radical right vote share.

C | Appendix 3

Table C.1: Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
UKIP Support	47,473	0.019	0.137	0	1
UKIP/BNP Support	47,473	0.216	0.145	0	1
UKIP Closeness	47,473	0.022	0.148	0	1
UKIP/BNP Closeness	47,473	0.023	0.151	0	1
Labour Support	34,557	0.097	0.296	0	1
Conservative Support	34,557	0.109	0.311	0	1
Community Pub Closure	44,157	0.010	0.019	0	0,25
Gastropub Closure	44,157	0.031	0.047	0	0,667
Pub Chain Closure	44,157	0.022	0.031	0	0.4
Closure of Pubs in the City Centre	44,157	0.043	0.054	0	0.667
Gender	47,473	0.527	0.499	0	1
White British	47,473	0,699	0.459	0	1
Education	47,473	2.331	1.251	0	4
EU Migrant Population Growth	45,214	0.028	0.028	0.01	0.138
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth	45,214	0.036	0.040	-0.021	0,179
Population 60 and Older	45,214	0.205	0.037	0.127	0,360
Unemployment Rate	45,205	5,802	2.223	1.6	12.1
Index of Multiple Deprivation	39,196	22.633	8.691	5,009	41,997
EU Migrant Share 2001	45,214	0.014	0.010	0.003	0.112
Non-EU Migrant Share	45,214	0.076	0.086	0.007	0,382
Low-Skilled Workers Change	45,214	0.026	0.035	-0.042	0,146
EU Structural Funds/Capita	43,992	47.463	84.500	0.991	829.705
EU Fiscal Cuts	43,992	46.234	21.500	0.999	25.678
Crime – Average Score	39,196	0,064	0.492	-1.22	1,019
Barriers to Housing	39,196	22.915	6.956	8.343	41.892
Living Environment	39,196	23.058	10.236	4.315	66.56
Income Deprivation	39,196	0.186	0.086	0.062	0.497
Health Deprivation	39,196	0.025	0.628	-2.191	1.489
Assets of Community Value	44,834	0.884	0.319	0	1
UKIP Support (SCoRe project)	25,001	0.472	0.499	0	1
UKIP/BNP Support (SCoRe project)	20,809	0.074	0.261	0	1
Brexit Support (SCoRe project)	20,844	0.506	0.500	0	1
Neighbourhood Degradation in the last 5 years	22,981	0.517	0.309	0	1
Gender (SCoRe project)	25,001	1.517	0.500	0	1
White British (SCoRe project)	25,001	0.911	0.285	0	1
Education (SCoRe project)	25,001	1.072	1.074	0	3
Jobs (SCoRe project)	25,001	4.913	2.264	0	3
Buckner's Neighbourhood Cohesion Scale	10,191	3.590	0.734	1	5

Table C.2: Codebook

Variable	Source	Label	Operationalisation
UKIP Support	UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS)	If there were to be a general election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most likely to support?	1=UKIP, 0 =Other Parties, .=DK, No answer, Non Applicable
UKIP/BNP Support	UKHLS	If there were to be a general election tomorrow,which political party do you think you would be most likely to support?	1=UKIP/BNP, 0 =Other Parties, .=DK, No answer, Non Applicable
UKIP Closeness	UKHLS	Which party do you feel the closest to?	1=UKIP; O=Other Parties; .= DK, No answer, Non Applicable
UKIP/BNP Closeness	UKHLS	Which party do you feel the closest to?	1=UKIP and BNP; O=Other Parties; .= DK, No answer, Non Applicable
Labour Support	UKHLS	If there were to be a general election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most likely to support?	1=Labour, 0 =Other Parties, .=DK, No answer, Non Applicable
Conservative Support	UKHLS	If there were to be a general election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most likely to support?	1=Conservative, 0 =Other Parties, .=DK, No answer, Non Applicable
Community Pub Closure	Local Data Company		Number of Community Pub Closure/ Nb of Overall Pub in the district[per yea
Gastropub Closure	Local Data Company		Number of Gastropub Closure/Nb of Overall Pub in the district[per year]
Pub Chain Closure	Local Data Company		Number of Pub Chain Closure/Nb of Overall Pub in the district [per year]
Pub Closure in the City Centre	Local Data Company		Number of Pub Closure in the city centre/Nb of Overall Pub in the district [per year]
Gender	UKHLS		1=Female; 0=Male
White British	UKHLS		1= White British; 0=Any Other Ethnicity
Education	UKHLS		1= Higher degree; 2= High School or vocational; 3= GCSE; 4=No qualification
EU Migrant Population Growth	2001-2011 UK Census Data		Growth rates in the local resident shares of EU population
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth	2001-2011 UK Census Data		Growth rates in the local resident shares of non-EU population
Population 60 and Older	2011 UK Census Data		Share of residents of over 60 years and older
Unemployment Rate	Annual Population Survey/ Labour Force Survey		Unemployment Rate per District in 2015
Multiple Deprivation Index	2015 Government Data		Score from 0 (low deprivation) to 100 % (high deprivation)
EU Migrant Share	2011 UK Census Data		Share of EU residents in 2011 per district
Non-EU Migrant Share	2011 UK Census Data		Share of non-EU residents in 2011 per district
Low-Skilled Workers Change	2001-2011 UK Census Data		Change in the share of low-skilled workers
EU Structural Funds/Capita	Government Data		EU structural funds per capita from 2007 to 2013
Crime Average Score	2015 Government Data	Measure the risk of personal and material victimisation	
Barriers to Housing	2015 Government Data	Measure the physical and financial accessibility of housing and	local services
Living Environment	2015 Government Data	Measure the quality of the local environment	
Income Deprivation	2015 Government Data	Measure the population living in income deprived households	
Health Deprivation	2015 Government Data	Measure the risk of premature deaths and the impairment of	quality of life through poor physical or mental health

Table C.3: Entropy Balancing Model

	(1)
Community Pub Closures	3.332*
	(1.925)
Female	-0.233***
	(0.087)
White British	2.020***
	(0.261)
Education (0=Higher Degree)	
High School or Vocational	0.148
	(0.301)
GCSE or Equivalent	0.844***
	(0.159)
No Qualification	0.892***
	(0.178)
EU Migrant Population Growth	2.387
	(2.917)
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth	-2.170
	(2.385)
Population 60 and Older	3.869**
	(1.718)
Unemployment Rate	0.010
	(0.026)
Index of Multiple Deprivation	0.005
	(0.008)
Constant	-6.756***
	(3.042)
N (Individuals)	34,194
Region, Year, Wave FE	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*$p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

In table C.3, I replicate the data with entropy balancing in order to reweight the survey sample to known characteristics from the target population, that is to say the white working class. The results are unaffected by using the entropy balancing model that reweight the sample to a white working-class population.

Using a recent survey data from the SCoRe project (Evans et al., 2019), I show that negative perceptions on the neighbourhood in the past five years is correlated with UKIP (or UKIP and BNP) support. The SCoRe project, which investigated subnational context and radical right support in four countries in Europe (UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands), has contributed to large-scale representative surveys conducted between March and May 2017. The surveys consist of questions on people's surrounding neighbourhoods, their political attitudes and behaviour. I use the UK dataset and conduct logit models with ward fixed effects to test the perception of the neighbourhood and radical right voting while accounting for any local contextual unobservables. I find that those who vote UKIP (or UKIP and BNP) think their neighbourhood conditions have worsened in the past five years. Table C.4 also shows that the targeted population that is more likely to be perceiving neighbourhood degradation is the white working class (columns 2 and 3). Finally, this table shows that this negative perception on the neighbourhood also concerns those who vote UKIP, BNP and Brexit (columns 4 and 5). All these findings provide supportive evidences of the ones found in the main body.

Table C.4: Neighbourhood Degradation and Radical Right Voting

	UKIP	UKIP	UKIP	UKIP/BNP	Brexit
Neighbourhood Degradation in the last 5 years					
	0.095*	-0.329*	0.461***	0.838***	0.700***
	(0.080)	(0.199)	(0.143)	(0.153)	(0.074)
Gender	-0.024	-0.054	-0.056	0.026	0.008
	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.098)	(0.055)
White British	0.165*	-0.109	0.228***	1.215***	0.295***
	(0.086)	(0.119)	(0.076)	(0.207)	(0.099)
Education (0=Higher Degree)					
A-Levels or Equivalent	0.033	0.101*	0.109*	-0.161	0.379***
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.129)	(0.066)
GCSE or Equivalent	0.400***	0.492***	0.499***	0.284***	0.909***
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.127)	(0.066)
No Qualification	0.892***	-0.109	0.228***	1.215***	0.295***
	(0.178)	(0.119)	(0.076)	(0.207)	(0.099)
Jobs (0=Professionnals)					
Clerical and Intermediate	0.148**	0.165***	0.209*	-0.053	0.060
	(0.073)	(0.062)	(0.126)	(0.161)	(0.087)
Administrators	0.531***	0.470***	0.831***	0.300*	0.203***
	(0.088)	(0.073)	(0.126)	(0.182)	(0.083)
Technical and Routine	0.538***	0.583***	0.523***	0.626***	0.569***
	(0.118)	(0.977)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.118)
Managers or CEOs	0.075	0.142*	0.176	0.425**	0.244*
	(0.099)	(0.076)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.126)
Anti-Immigrant Attitudes	1.208***	1.106***	1.009***	1.870***	1.287***
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.042)	(0.016)	(0.019)
White British × Neighbourhood Degradation		0.765***			
		(0.210)			
Clerical and Intermediate Jobs × Neighbourhood Degradation			-0.102		
			(0.226)		
Administrator Jobs × Neighbourhood Degradation			-0.759***		
			(0.251)		
Technical and Routine Jobs × Neighbourhood Degradation			0.046**		
			(0.252)		
Managers and CEOs × Neighbourhood Degradation			-0.074		
			(0.312)		
Constant	4.55	4.582	4.609	4.575	4.673
	(1.264)	(1.269)	(1.263)	(1.26)	(1.256)
N (Individuals)	13,411	14,249	14,249	14,002	11,082
N (Wards)	3,069	3,188	3,188	2,900	2,675
Ward FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Age and Urbanity Control Variables	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

Table C.5: With Assets of Community Value

	(1)
Community Pub Closures	6.660**
	(3.148)
Female	-0.380***
	(0.163)
White British	2.969***
	(0.377)
Education (0=Higher Degree)	
High School or Vocational	-0.241
	(0.571)
GCSE or Equivalent	1.123***
	(0.227)
No Qualification	1.072***
	(0.283)
EU Migrant Population Growth	-2.339
	(6.075)
Non-EU Migrant Population Growth	-0.677
	(4.408)
Population 60 and Older	6.460*
	(3.416)
Unemployment Rate	0.074*
	(0.044)
Index of Multiple Deprivation	-0.004
	(0.017)
Assests of Community Value	0.124
	(0.294)
Constant	-12.249***
	(1.321)
N (Individuals)	19,519
Region, Year, Wave FE	Yes

2cm

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,*p < .05, ** p< .01, *** p < .001.

Table C.5 shows that the data is not affected by the protection policy established by the Localism Act in 2011. The Act assigns local public places as assets of community value to prevent their potential demolition, the majority being local pubs. I test its potential by assigning districts with assets of community value (any types of public houses) the value 1 and districts with no asset of community value the value 0. Table C.5 presents the probit model with this new variable. The results show that individuals who live in districts with assets of community value are not less likely to vote UKIP. It means that the protection policy has not affected the results. The fact that this policy has not yet impacted the pub closure ratio is due to its recent implementation and its effects are more likely to be noticeable in the future.

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