Reconstituting sovereignty: the Young Turks’ efforts to secure external recognition and the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey, 1908 - 1923

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Declaration

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Abstract:

This thesis addresses the question of how states, meaning organised political communities, were historically able to secure their sovereignty through gaining the recognition of other states. As sovereignty refers to the presence of a state’s authority, its existence is premised on states and other internal and external actors recognising claims to sovereignty. Therefore, states, such as the Ottoman Empire, which historically had a different understanding of legitimacy, faced challenges to their sovereignty following the emergence of new global understandings of sovereignty in the late nineteenth century. The Ottoman Empire was distinct in that it was the only Islamic state that was not subject to and was able to avoid completely falling under the influence of then-dominant European states. However, the Ottoman Empire still experienced European intervention and there was a desire to end forms of European extraterritorial jurisdiction. Ottoman elites, who were affiliated with the reformist Young Turks, sought to secure recognition of their state’s sovereignty by reconstituting it along novel international standards of legitimate statehood. These standards were based on the concepts of “civilised”, “militarist”, “popular” and “national” statehood, and were reinterpreted by the Young Turks in the course of their efforts to secure the recognition of European powers. These efforts included diplomacy with European powers, institutional reform and conceptual innovation. However, it also involved engaging in practices associated with sovereignty such as the control of territory. In all of these areas, the Young Turks reinterpreted aspects of the existing Ottoman legacy of statehood and international norms, to secure their claim to sovereignty. Therefore, the Ottoman state elites sought to convey an impression of governing a state that could be recognised as sovereign by other European powers. Ultimately, the remnants of the Young Turks, secured international recognition of their state, reconstituted as the nation-state of Turkey in 1923.
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Introduction:

1. The problem and the question stated:

This thesis engages with and critiques two clashing accounts of the emergence of contemporary global international society. Global international society refers to a group of states that share common institutions. Crucially, the shared institution of sovereignty enables these states to view each other as possessing authority in their jurisdictions (Hinsley, [1966] 1986: 215 – 216). Sovereignty here is defined as the status of possessing ultimate authority over certain people, territories and other entities, which are collectively understood as falling under its jurisdiction (Beale, 1923; Philpott, 1995; 354; Poggi, 1990: 21). However, the question of how different forms of sovereignty emerged and came to sustain global international society has been left unanswered. One set of accounts in International Relations, seeking to explain how the current global international society of sovereigns developed, argue that it emerged in Europe and then spread globally (Boli, 2001; Meyer, et al., 1997; Meyer and Jepperson, 2000: 105 – 106; Thomas and Meyer, 1984). These accounts suggest that an international society of sovereign states emerged in Europe, which was then followed by similar developments occurring globally, following the template of European forms of state-building (Ayoob, 1995: 27 - 37; Lemay-Hébert, 2009: 25 – 26; Nardin, 2015; 2019). This strand of the literature has recently been labelled as broadly falling under what Buzan and Schouenborg (2018: 75) term the “like unit model”. Accounts under this model explain the formation of global international society through pointing to how it involved the emergence of a number of similar units (Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018: 75 - 95). Counter arguments stress the exceptionalism of non-European parts of the world (Acharya and Buzan, 2010; Buzan and Little, 2010: 206). They propose that theories used to explain developments in Europe cannot be used to understand “distinct” situations elsewhere (Acharya and Buzan, 2010: 2; see also Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018: 3, 96 - 122). Although the regional accounts capture the particular processes that enabled global

1 See Buzan (2010) for this definition of global international society and an overview of these two approaches.
2 See also Burgis (2009), Acharya and Buzan (2010), and other chapters in this volume, including Tadjbaksh (2010). On the regional dimension of global international society see Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez (2009), Schouenborg (2013), Zhang and Buzan (2012).
international society to be consolidated in these particular spaces, they are not sufficient in explaining the “binding forces” that hold global international society together (Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018: 237). This leads to the question of how exactly these forces constitute global international society.

This thesis argues that neither positions that focus on the agency of the West nor those that concentrate on regional and local developments can fully explain the emergence of global international society. It, instead, develops a more historically informed account. In particular, this thesis notes that several states existed prior to their integration into global international society (Alexandrowicz, 2017; Benton, 2001; Buzan and Little, 2010: 208). These states, generally understood to have been outside of international society for centuries, did not fully experience European colonisation and are therefore often assumed to be exceptional cases (Acharya, 2011: 622; Acharya, and Buzan 2010: 2; Suzuki, Zhang and Quirk, 2014). Such states, understood here as “institutional arrangements for rule” (see Poggi, 1978: 1), ranged from empires to nation-states. They can be identified as being present in different groups at various times throughout the world. Such groups have been termed “systems” (see Buzan and Little, 2001: 19) or “societies” (see Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018: 226) by different scholars. Each of these groups of states can also be said to have had their own set of constitutional rules, dictating proper conduct for their members (Reus-Smit, 1997; 1999). Many existing accounts in International Relations have not considered the different states within these groups, which may deviate from what we now take to be “modern states”, (see Poggi, 1978: 89) as states in their own right and have often sought to emphasise their differences (Bull, 1984: 123; Little, 2014: 162; Poggi, 1990; Suzuki, 2009: 35). These accounts have also argued that states that deviate from the idea of a “modern state”, (see Poggi, 1978: 89) either presently or historically, cannot be considered actual states, or only came to exhibit the full range of characteristics of states subsequently (Boli, 2001; Giddens, 1985). This echoes the idea of the standard of “civilisation”, (see Buzan, 2014: 576) which the established European sovereign states of global international society used to deny recognition of the sovereignty and status to these

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3 Cummings and Hinnebusch (2011: 1), Cooper (2014: 41 - 42) and Suny (2001) have recognised that sovereignty can come to be held by both empires and nations and that it is difficult, in many cases, to distinguish between an empire and a nation.
states (Anghie, 1999; Gong, 1984). Nevertheless, such non-established states are long-standing members of global international society (see Alexandrowicz, 2017; Buzan and Little, 2010: 208), even if they have not been considered equal to the established states of that society. How did these states later become recognised as equal to other members of global international society? The thesis addresses this question by focusing on the Ottoman Empire. This was a state that existed for centuries without being recognised as an equal sovereign by the European states (Pitts, 2018: 28).

The Ottoman Empire and Iran, prior to the recognition of their equal sovereignty in global international society, did in fact share a common genealogy with European states. These states were sovereign in the sense of being independent from other entities and in terms of how they asserted that they possessed supreme authority (Zarakol, 2018a). The literature on the “expansion of international society” (see Bull and Watson, 1984: 1), that focuses on the spread of shared international institutions, is hence mistaken insofar as it assumes that these non-European states were blank slates (Bull, 1984: 125 - 126; Buzan and Little, 2010: 206 – 207; Watson, 1992; Wight, 1977). Bull and Watson (1984: 2) argue that “Europe … dominated and, in so doing, unified the world” and hence focus on European actors as the shapers of international society. Instead, this thesis argues that states that were not a part of the European international society were able to become accepted as members of global international society and have their equal sovereignty recognised on the latter’s rules. Benton (2001: 253), though cognisant of the similarities between European and other empires, such as Islamic ones, does not consider how these other states, which were not colonised, came to be considered equal sovereigns in accordance with global constitutional rules. These rules, which included moral principles agreed upon by international actors, make it possible to speak of a global international society in the first place (Reus-Smit, 1997; 1999). They included rules which determined which entities could be considered fully sovereign (Barkin and

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4 For this definition of sovereignty, see James (1986: 25).
5 Reus-Smit (1997: 28) argues that ideas about morality, which he terms the “moral purpose of the state” form the basis of these rules, because of how all of the different members of international society, like any other group engaged in communication must “orient their actions to intersubjectively recognized validity claims” as Habermas (1986: 14) suggests. However, as will be made clear, this thesis uses an approach based on intellectual history and global history to explain how these rules emerge and develop.
Cronin, 1994; Glanville, 2016; Reus-Smit, 1999: 6; Sorensen, 1999). Non-European states enacted reforms to place themselves in a position to be recognised as fully sovereign (see Strang, 1996) under these constitutional rules. The statements that representatives of these non-European states made in writing and in speech, were complemented by reforms aiming to conform to these constitutional rules (Strang, 1996). The rules of international society, in turn, are not fixed and may change over time (Phillips, 2010; 2017). Therefore, states that were already sovereign, in the sense that they effectively had authority over their jurisdiction, eventually achieved their goal of gaining recognition of their sovereign equality.

Sovereignty is often equated with the recognition of a state as the ultimate authority over a given area, known as a jurisdiction. There is especially a stress, in definitions, on the significance of control over territory as part of this jurisdiction (A. Hudson, 1998: 89 - 90; C.-A. Schulz, 2019). But sovereignty is not merely territoriality, meaning control of territory, since sovereigns also engage in actions beyond their territories, citing how their jurisdiction may apply in these other geographies (Beale, 1923; Simpson, 2004: 64 - 65). Increasingly, sovereignty is also seen as entailing forms of extraterritoriality, including the right to secure citizen’s rights outside the territory of the state (Agnew, 1994; Collyer, 2014). Sovereignty also includes the ability of states to engage in diplomacy, which involves then the recognition of sovereignty by outside entities (Österud, 1997: 170). Additionally, sovereignty and statehood differ from each other both conceptually and historically. A state may exist and even become the sole authority within its own territory, while lacking other characteristics of sovereignty (Agnew, 1994). The recognition of a state’s sovereignty and of its sovereign equality are important processes and should be considered separately from the process of state-building (Mathieu, 2018a: 2 – 3; Simpson, 2004: 31; Zaum, 2007: 4). The literature on de facto states in International Relations has attempted to address the issue of the non-recognition of states (Fabry, 2010: 16; Kolsto, 2006; Pegg, 1998). But this literature continues to focus on the

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* Kayaoğlu (2010a: 119) goes some way towards developing such an account by explaining how “statebuilding” practices on the part of these states, such as Japan, China and the Ottoman Empire, can account for the ultimate recognition of their sovereign equality. See also Strang (1996) and Horowitz (2004).

* On the distinct history of territory and sovereignty see Elden (2010: 810), who discusses how Foucault (2004: 99 - 100) saw territory, alongside population, as concepts that played a role in allowing sovereign states to govern spaces and people.
moment of the inception\(^8\) of late twentieth century de facto states and their failure or success in gaining recognition throughout their often short-lived\(^9\) periods of existence (Caspersen, 2012; 2015; Caspersen and Stansfield, 2011; Florea, 2017; O Beachain, Comai and Tsurtsumia – Zurabashvili, 2015; Pegg, 1998). It overlooks the fact that states have also existed for long periods of time without having their claims to sovereignty or sovereign equality recognised by other states\(^10\). This literature also does not recognise how de facto statehood can be partial, since supposed de facto states may, in fact, enjoy some level of recognition from other states, even if they are not recognised as sovereign by all other states (Simpson, 2004: 31). The recognition of a state may also be withdrawn by other states, which had recognised it, such that a state may come to be rendered a de facto state (Lemay-Hébert, 2020). States can therefore exist without being recognised as possessing sovereignty or being equal to other sovereign states, in accordance with theories of sovereignty. This is because of how they are not recognised as sovereign under existing global constitutional rules.

The fact that a state may become a de facto state points to the significance of changes to the constitutional rules of global international society. Such changes can take the form of either alterations to the content of the rules or how these rules are enforced. States may be considered de facto because they no longer conform to international constitutional rules of statehood (Lemay-Hébert, 2020). Simpson (2004: 31) argues that many states experienced new hurdles to their recognition after the Vienna settlement of 1815. A system of international law that posited the idea of the standard of “civilization” to measure those entities that were worth being recognised, under the pretext of managing violence, also imposed obstacles to the recognition of non-European states as equal in sovereignty to European states (Bartelson, 2018: 130). Therefore, changes in the dominant states in global international society may also bring changes to the rules of global international society. Here, the concept of constituent power plays a pivotal role in the main argument of this thesis. Constituent power is a concept that was developed in

\(^{8}\) Fabry (2010; 2013) and Coggins (2014) engage in more historical studies but only focuses on how novel states were recognised, without studying the recognition of old states.

\(^{9}\) On explanations of the lifespan of de-facto states see Florea (2017) and Buzard, Graham and Horne (2017).

\(^{10}\) On de facto states and “sovereignty claims” see Berg (2009: 219). Many powerful states, such as China, the Mughal and the Ottoman Empires, existed in Asia without initially being recognised by European states (Suzuki, Zhang and Quirk, 2014: 8).
constitutional theory (Kalyvas, 2005; Loughlin, 2013; Müller, 2014: 87 - 90; Pfenninger, 2015). It denotes who or what authors a constitution, meaning the basic rules or norms of the society that a constitution sustains (Hardt, 2009: vii-viii; Kalyvas, 2005: 226; Tully, 2007: 230). It is often contrasted with the “constituted power”, meaning the existing power under a constitution (Hardt, 2009: ix). Sets of norms can also serve to define who or what the constituent power ought to be (De Ville, 2008: 96). Forms of constituent power may exist in a domestic or international context. At the domestic level, it refers to whoever or whatever creates the rules that form the constitution of a state (Kalyvas, 2005: 230). At the international level, constituent power refers to who or what authors the constitutional rules of global international society or establishes the norms that form the constitution of an international society (Müller, 2014: 88; Oates, 2017: 200; Thornhill, 2012a: 372). The French Revolution, for example, resulted in a shift in the understanding of constituent power at the international level (Thornhill, 2012a: 379). When combined with a historical study of how different constituent powers shaped constitutional rules in different contexts, the concept can be used to enrich Buzan and Schouenborg’s (2018) account of global international society. This is because it can build on Buzan and Schouenborg’s (2018: 237) concept of “binding forces”, by drawing attention to how forms of constituent power create the rules that determine how “binding forces” operate.

Specifically, this thesis argues that the concept of constituent power can be used to show how states that had not been recognised as equal came to be recognised as such by other states in time. Using the concept of constituent power as an analytical tool enables one to comprehend how alterations of the global constitutional rules, and the reactions of governments and movements within states to these changes, facilitated such recognition. The emergence of a rule in favour of democracy internationally, for example, may result in changes in the internal composition of states (Weinert, 2007). The recognition of states as equal sovereigns, which were sovereign but not considered equal was made possible because domestic forms of constituent power came to possess similarities with forms of constituent power.

11 In both the international and the domestic contexts, theories of constituent power have been used to provide a substantive definition of who the constituent power is in the form of a class, political party, political movement or other category, such as the people (Kalyvas, 2008; Oklopcic, 2014).
operating at the global level. The interaction between the local and the global forms of constituent power enabled states that were already in existence, but not recognised internationally, to be integrated into the contemporary global international society.

Contrary to a widely held view in International Relations theory, this thesis does not assume that states that are recognised as sovereign by other states adopted forms of sovereignty solely as a result of the direct and indirect influence of Europe. However, the thesis disagrees with the view that non-European states ought to be considered separately from studies of global international society, which is generally understood to be dominated by European states. This is because several non-European states later became a part of this global international society (Ayoob, 1995: 72). One is then led to question to what extent these non-European states or global international society itself changed to accommodate this development. The English School literature, focusing on how the spread of international institutions results in the ‘expansion of international society’, is an example of an approach that assumes that the European experience of history can or ought to be directly replicated in other contexts (Hobson, 2012: 223 – 226; Schouenborg, 2012). The modernisation approach, which views modernisation as a multi-faceted process of transformation, also shares the assumption that Europe should be taken as a paradigm (Hobson and Sajed, 2017: 554 – 556; Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004).

12 De Carvalho and Paras (2015) develop a similar argument concerning sovereignty without considering the role of constituent powers at the local and international level, which focuses on the role of solidarity between different international actors, in constructing their sovereignty. By “global”, what is meant here is that pertaining to different geographies throughout the world, as has been used in the discipline of International Relations by Acharya (2016: 4; see also Acharya, 2004, 2011; 2014).
13 Robert H. Jackson (1990: 54 – 55) argues that sovereignty spread as an idea as a result of the influence of European states, whereas Strang (1996: 44) argues that, in the face of European expansion, non-European states engaged in “defensive Westernisation”, in which they adopted Western practices and ideas to challenge Western power.
14 This is the case in studies such as those of Suzuki (2009) and Zhang and Buzan (2012). Similarly, Saikal (2008: 73) argues for a study of “Westphalian” and “Islamic” sovereignty in the Middle East, which involves suggesting that they are essentially separate concepts without considering how they may be interlinked.
15 Barnett (1995) develops a rich account of the Middle Eastern international system which nonetheless stresses its exceptionalism and does not serve to demonstrate how it is a part of the international system as a whole. For a critique of the supposed exceptionalism of sovereignty in the Middle East see Stein (2012).
17 Eisenstadt (2000) claims that different forms of modernity can be identified in various contexts outside of Europe. But Bhambra (2010: 127) asserts that the literature on multiple modernities
114). But, one can speak of notions such as sovereignty or the state beyond the geography of Europe and hence challenge perspectives which suggest that non-European contexts are exceptional\textsuperscript{18}.

This thesis explains how the process of the recognition of the equal sovereignty of the Ottoman and later the Turkish state, by the established sovereigns throughout the globe, occurred together with the emergence of new international constitutional principles. The Ottoman state had struggled to secure recognition of its claim to be an equal sovereign power under existing international constitutional norms in the nineteenth century (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 111 – 112; Simpson, 2004: 244). However, with changes occurring in the constitutional principles underpinning international society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Turkish state came to be recognised as an equal sovereign state by the established sovereign states (Fortna, 2011). Although the Ottoman state became the Republic of Turkey, the latter drew much of its population, many of its institutions and state officials, and even its early constitution (see Zürcher, 1992) from the Ottoman state (Zürcher, 2010). Focusing on the Ottoman case, this thesis shows how the external recognition of the sovereign equality of states that were not previously recognised as equal sovereign states by the established sovereign states involved the transformation of both these states and global international society. What was once a restrictive global international society became more accommodating of difference and this led to the recognition of non-European states as sovereigns equal to other European states (Bull and Watson, 1984; Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018). Previous practices of exclusion employed by members of global international society were removed or replaced.

2. Applying a global intellectual history approach: the case of the Ottoman Empire’s transition to the Republic of Turkey

A historical approach can demonstrate how the constitutional rules that composed global international society changed. It may also explain how states and

\textsuperscript{18} Theories and practices of sovereignty, in the sense of supreme authority, were common throughout the Islamic world (Crone, [2004] 2014: loc. 3289; Blaydes, Grimmer and McQueen, 2018; Zarakol, 2018a: 506 - 509). Studies have also focused on sovereignty in East Asia (Hui, 2005: 176; Zhang and Buzan, 2012: 15 - 18).
non-state actors came to adopt and shape these rules. It is important, here, to provide a critique of the existing literature in International Relations. There is a general assumption that the terms of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 resulted in the emergence of the dominant form of sovereignty in European international society (Aalberts, 2012: 12; Caporaso, 2000; de Carvalho, Leira and Hobson, 2011; Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004). This Westphalian notion of sovereignty was then supposedly projected globally through the agency of Western states and the submission of non-Western actors (de Carvalho, Leira and Hobson, 2011: 756 - 757; Ling, 2013; Schouenborg, 2017: 155). These assumptions, held by International Relations theorists, are problematic because they point to only the West playing an active role in the process of the emergence of the contemporary global international society (Hobson and Sajed, 2017). This privileging of Western European forms and ideas of sovereignty overlooks the actual presence and historical influence of other forms and ideas of sovereignty on the development of global international society (Hobson and Sajed, 2017). Certain advocates of social scientific approaches, including Marxists (see Rosenberg, 2006; 2007; Teschke, 2005), world systems theorists (see Wallerstein, 1974; 1980) and early works bridging historical sociology and International Relations (Hobden and Hobson, 2002; Lawson, 2007) claim to distance themselves from Eurocentric accounts, but they still contain assumptions regarding the inevitability of historical processes that occurred in Europe (Bhambra, 2010: 127 - 128). The meanings of concepts that play a role in such accounts, such as modernity, have themselves been historically contested by individuals holding different values (Cooper, 2005: 113 - 152). Many accounts overlook the plural and contested nature of sovereignty and statehood as they do not take into consideration the different interpretations of what it means to be modern which are often tied to subjective political processes instead of denoting objective social processes (Cooper, 2005: 113 - 152; Guillaume, 2009: 78 - 79). Therefore, an intellectual and global history of the emergence of the contemporary global international society would allow one to test the assumptions about global international society held by international actors and presented in scholarly accounts.

An approach combining global history and intellectual history can also reveal the role of global and local constituent power in the emergence of global international society. Ideas that later became the dominant ideas in global
international society, such as national sovereignty (see Bukovansky, 2002: 74; Sluga, 2013: chs. 1 - 2) or human rights (see Reus-Smit, 2001; 2013a), were advanced by actors (see Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 204) who can be identified as invoking local and global forms of constituent power. The literature on social movements and revolutions can show how social and political movements in certain states may receive support from movements in other states, which share their ideas (Brysk, 1993; Davies, 2014; 2019; Lawson, 2016; Ritter, 2015). Some of the social movements studied by this literature can also be termed “transnational” (see Davies, 2019: 264), on account of how they are present in areas falling under the sovereignty of more than one state (Colas, 2002). These social movements may shape global international society by assuming control of, or otherwise influencing, the states within the society (Allinson, 2019; Davies, 2019; Lawson, 2016). They may then reconstitute the basic rules within a state and within global international society (Bukovansky, 1999; 2002; Halliday, 1990; 1999). In other cases, the need to secure international support may result in a group of actors who take control of a state altering their interpretation of constitutional rules to ensure that their political project survives and thrives with outside support and the securing of recognition from states in global international society (Allinson, 2019; Thornhill, 2012b: 403 – 404; 2013).

Such interactions have historically resulted in the spread of new ideas of sovereignty, such as those present in ideas of republicanism or democracy (see Weinert, 2007), by revolutionary movements inspired and supported by states and other external actors upholding these ideas (Bukovansky, 1999; 2002; Halliday, 1990; 1999). In these instances, the global move towards reconstituting the rules of legitimate statehood would serve to support local processes of such transformation. This, in turn, points to the usefulness of the concept of constituent power in understanding how the constitutional rules of global international society developed and spread.

Three schools of intellectual history may be employed to gain an understanding of the moments when global and local forms of constituent power came to interact with each other. The Cambridge School of intellectual history provides an excellent set of tools to consider how texts gained their meanings in the contexts in which they were produced (Skinner, 1969). Skinner (1969: 10 - 11) argues that individual speech acts furnish the meanings of ideas by establishing connections between these ideas and other ideas and elements within a particular
context. This approach may be combined with the considerations of the school of conceptual history developed by Koselleck (2002), which focuses on how the meanings of concepts evolve as a result of broader historical changes. According to Koselleck (2002: 5), the period beginning in the late eighteenth and ending in the late nineteenth century, which he terms the ‘Sattelzeit’, involved the generation of the ideas that form the basis of European thought. The idea of the ‘Sattelzeit’ can also be used in the context of the transformation of global international society into its current form. Using the concept of the Sattelzeit as an analytical tool, one may identify a period of transition between the contemporary global international society and what preceded it. In this period of transition, it is possible to study the emergence and travel of different meanings of sovereignty. Ideas of sovereignty were developed in specific contexts, but later travelled to other contexts where they encountered other ideas of sovereignty and related concepts such as the state (Biersteker, 2002: 245). Skinner’s (1969) awareness of the importance of context needs to be complemented by the approach adopted by Lovejoy (1940), which acknowledges how ideas travel and interact with other ideas in different contexts (Herbhornsrud, 2019: 9). Lovejoy’s (1940) approach provides a means of combining the views of Skinner (1969) and Koselleck (2002) by focusing on the encounters between different contexts and ideas in the Sattelzeit leading to the emergence of the contemporary global international society.

Therefore, a global intellectual history can be used, together with a theoretically informed global history, to demonstrate the role of forms of constituent power in the reshaping and recognition of sovereign states that were initially excluded from contemporary global international society. Such an approach can be used to understand how the contemporary global international society emerged through the recognition of actors by others. The study of recognition necessitates a study of ideas, alongside a study of power relations which enable recognition, since acts of recognition are premised on impressions of the other being recognised (Markell, 2003: 28). A distinction can be made here between struggles for and struggles over recognition, developed by Tully (2004: 86 - 90) in his studies of recognition in

Motzkin (2005) demonstrates that the concept of the Sattelzeit can be used to denote other periods of transition in history, aside from that which Koselleck (2002) was focused on.

Struggles over recognition refer to struggles to define the very rules of recognition (Tully, 2000; 2004: 86 - 90). The emergence of contemporary global international society, involved actors being perceived as having met the requirements for being recognised as sovereign, through being successful in struggles for or over recognition. Historically, local and global forms of constituent power were invoked by different actors engaged in and responding to the struggles, which resulted in the consolidation of the rules of global international society (see Müller, 2014: 88; Oates, 2017) and forms of sovereignty (see Pfenninger, 2015) that its members recognised. These struggles involved the use of power and appeals to legitimacy on the basis of ideas, such as the ideas of “civilisation” (see Buzan, 2014: 576) or sovereignty (see Aalberts, 2014), by those seeking and those conferring recognition. In the context of states that were already existing but not recognised as equals, internal actors used local and global constituent power to secure the position of their own societies in global international society.

In this thesis, a combination of global intellectual history and a theoretically informed global history is used to examine the transition of the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey as a case of local and global constituent power resulting in the recognition of sovereign equality in global international society. The Ottoman Empire existed as a state for centuries, and was also able to maintain its distinct tradition of Islamic statehood in its encounters with European states (Bennison, 2009; D. Goffman, 2002; Kupchan, 2012: 47 – 57; Tadjbaksh, 2010: 178). Other states, such as Morocco20, Iran21, China22, Afghanistan23 and Siam24, experienced European-driven processes of state-building as European states carved their own spheres of influence within these states (Horowitz, 2004). In the case of Morocco25 and, to some extent, China26, this resulted in the colonisation of these states. However, the Ottoman Empire continued to be an empire controlling wide-ranging

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24 See Horowitz (2004: 446 – 447)
26 See Osterhammel (1986).
territory until its collapse after the end of the First World War. But, parts of the territory within the empire came to have uneven relations of authority with its centre. Japan also maintained its independence, but did not interact with European states to the same extent as the Ottomans (Trimberger, 1972). In contrast, the Ottomans had their own practices and ideas of empire, developed at least partly in interaction with European empires (Horowitz, 2004). Even when the Republic of Turkey was effectively formed, as a new government came together in a constituent assembly in Ankara in 1920, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire continued to shape the new state (Zürcher, 1992). The Turkish state claimed territories that consisted of the core of the Ottoman Empire and it gained international recognition of its jurisdiction over these territories in 1923 (Demirci, [2005] 2010). The founders of the new Turkish state were also originally members of the Ottoman bureaucracy and security forces, and they continued to play an active role in Turkish political life until the 1950s (Zürcher, 2010). Additionally, prior to the drafting and adoption of a new constitution in 1921 and the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the new Turkish state maintained several Ottoman institutions, including the Ottoman constitution of 1876 (Zürcher, 1992). Hence, the external recognition of Turkey as a sovereign state, with an equal right to asserting its jurisdiction over its territory, coincided with its transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey, which, in fact, involved the transformation rather than the destruction of the Ottoman state.

The Ottoman Empire’s transition to the Republic of Turkey coincided with the period in which the contemporary global international society emerged. This thesis therefore involves a study of two ‘Sattelzeits’. In the case of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, the period of transition was characterised by the presence of some ideas from the Ottoman past and some which would form the basis of the future Turkish state (Hanioğlu, 2005; Zürcher, 2010). Similarly, the first two decades of the twentieth century contained elements of older forms of international order as well as the beginnings of the contemporary global international society (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 7). Although sovereignty at the end of this period was still conditional on a state being understood as worthy of recognition as sovereign, the regime of sovereignty which became predominant in the post-First World War global international society differed in some respects from the earlier regime of sovereignty (Anghie, 2002). Specifically, “civilized” states were understood as being
deserving of equal external recognition before 1914 (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 59). In the post-war period, ‘civilisation’ came increasingly to be equated with nationhood (Allain, 2006; Anghie, 2002; Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 122 – 123). Nations were deemed to have a right to be recognised as sovereign, but the standard of “civilisation” continued to be used to judge the level of “civilisation” of different nations (Mayall, 1990: 46). Although the Ottoman Empire can be defined as a constitutional monarchy after the Young Turk revolution of 1908, carried out primarily by the eponymous group of political movements, by the end of the First World War the status of the Sultan had been greatly diminished. Although most often associated with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (see Zürcher, 2010), the “Young Turks” refers to several political organisations, which played their role in this transition (Hanioğlu, 2001: 95). The Ottoman state’s move towards adopting a more “national” character was later officially adopted by the Republic of Turkey in its constitution of 1923, which recognised the Turkey as a nation-state (Özkan, 2012: 3). This change in the form of sovereignty in the Ottoman and Turkish case points to how the two periods of transition were interconnected with each other. This was because the Young Turk revolutionaries acted to respond and contribute to changes to global international society.

The Young Turks sought to gain the external recognition of the state as an equal of other sovereign states by seeking to re-constitute their sovereignty. This was at a time when the Young Turks considered the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire to be under threat. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 aimed to end what were considered to be practices of intervention that ran counter to the sovereignty of the Ottoman state (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 2 – 3; 2000). The Young Turks sought to challenge the maintenance of extraterritorial consular courts by European states under trading treaties known as the “capitulations” and aimed to end other forms of European intervention in the Ottoman Empire (Ahmad, 2000: 1; Burgis, 2009: 59). In the nineteenth century, such interventions took the form of military actions intended to prevent the massacres of Christians and ensure stability within the Ottoman Empire (M. Schulz, 2011; Rodogno, 2011a; 2011b; 2012). The Young Turks were especially concerned with how the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, signed after the defeat of the Ottomans in the Russo-Turkish War, granted European states the power to oversee reforms in western and eastern provinces of the empire in what is
today’s Southeast Europe and eastern Turkey (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 167 – 168, 309 - 310). In the immediate lead up to and after the 1908 revolution, the Young Turks engaged in diplomacy and implemented reforms with the aim of ending these practices and thereby achieving the full recognition of the sovereignty of their state (Hanioğlu, 2001: 236). The capitulations and practices of humanitarian intervention had been developed over centuries by the Europeans in their relations with the Ottomans (Pitts, 2018: 30 - 43). To understand how the Young Turks, sought to secure a recognition of the sovereignty of their state, as an equal to other sovereign states, by challenging these practices, this thesis will engage in a study of communications made by the Young Turks to international audiences. In these communications, the Young Turks were seeking to shift their position in global international society by aspiring to gain recognition of what they perceived to be their rights as representatives of a sovereign state.

Studying the process by which the Young Turks oversaw a transformation of their state, from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey, in the context of broader transformations that were occurring throughout the world (see Buzan and Lawson, 2015; Kurzman, 2008; Sohrabi, 1995; 2011; Yenen, 2016), provides a means of theorising the role of local and global constituent powers in the emergence of global international society. Specifically, it accounts for how states that were already sovereign, but denied the full range of rights associated with sovereignty, gained recognition of these rights by other states in global international society, thereby moving to a condition of greater sovereign equality. Different movements, which had their origins in the Young Turks, engaged with understandings of sovereignty that were widely held in global international society to gain recognition of the sovereign equality of their state (Fortna, 2011). In this process, different Young Turk groups advanced an agenda for domestic reform to empower the state and enable it to be recognised as ‘civilised’ by the dominant states in global international society. This meant that, in different periods after the revolution, the Young Turks adopted forms of sovereignty that were associated with ‘civilised’ states. They also sought to influence how the constitutional rules of global international society were applied with respect to their state. In both cases, they wielded forms of constituent power at the domestic and international level. These forms of constituent power took the form of social and normative power (Kavalski,
2013; Mann, 1986: 1; Phillips, 2010: 19). Social power, in this context, involved the Young Turks using military, economic and other forms of power, to compel others to recognise their sovereignty, whereas normative power involved them seeking to achieve sovereign equality for their state by means of persuasion (Kavalski, 2013; Mann, 1986: 1 – 33). Constituent power was therefore deployed in struggles of and over recognition in global international society, which involved the use of social power and normative power on the part of the Young Turks. Both the normative and social power used by the Young Turks were forms of constituent power, insofar as diplomats, statesmen and intellectuals wielding them sought to secure the sovereign equality of their state in global international society.

3. Outline of the thesis:

The first chapter reviews the literature on sovereignty and the emergence of global international society in International Relations, demonstrating how there is a need to explain how states that were already sovereign came to be recognised as equal in the nature of their sovereignty to the established states in global international society. The chapter begins by defending the definition of sovereignty as supreme authority over a jurisdiction and reviews the existing literature on sovereignty in International Relations. It concludes its reviews of existing approaches to defining sovereignty by suggesting that a more comprehensive definition of sovereignty can be provided if facts from a greater historical and geographical scope are considered and compared. This points the way towards using a historical and global approach to the study of sovereignty. Historical accounts of the development of what has become the contemporary global international society

27 Kavalski (2013: 250) argues that those who wield “normative power” do so in the context of “struggles of recognition” (see also Ringmar, 2012: 19). This is because “normative power” can only be realised if it is recognised as such by those it is seeking to influence (Kavalski, 2013: 250). There is no reason why this argument cannot be understood as also being the case in the context of what Tully (2004: 84) terms “struggles over recognition” as well.
28 See Mann (1986: 1 - 33).
29 See Manners (2002: 253), Jay Jackson (1975: 237 - 239) and Kavalski (2013). As Kavalski (2013: 248) points out, Manners (2002: 253) also uses the term “normative power”, but Manners (2002: 253) argues that it ought to be understood as “the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics”. However, as Kavalski (2013: 248) notes, “normative power” was also used by Jay Jackson (1975: 237 - 239) to involve “the potential for influencing activity … [by] the power of norms.” This thesis follows Kavalski (2013: 248) in viewing both accounts as capturing different aspects of “normative power”, namely how it is tied to “legitimacy” and “ability” (emphasis in original). Phillips (2010: 19) uses the term “authoritative power” to refer to what is defined here as “normative power”.

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are then reviewed (Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018). Recent historical accounts of the development of the society have involved a greater awareness of the theoretical assumptions of earlier accounts and, in doing so, have produced more convincing theoretical arguments. Although studies of “stigmatisation” (see Adler-Nissen, 2014b: 143; Zarakol, 2014: 331) have helped demonstrate how states that were sovereign were not recognised as equal to other sovereign states, it is argued that they can be complemented by studies of “normalization”, (see Smetana, 2020: 27) to provide a more complete picture of the emergence of global international society (Berg and Toomla, 2009). The final section of the first chapter contends that much more attention needs to be given to the fact that different forms of states existed which were scattered throughout the globe prior to the recognition of their sovereignty. To this end, a “re-centering” of the concept of the state is needed to distinguish processes of the recognition of sovereignty from the processes of state-building (Grzybowski, 2018: 199). This involves considering how the state was a constant in the process of its representatives seeking to secure recognition of their equal sovereignty. This then makes it possible to study the historical processes involved in the recognition of the sovereignty of states and whether such recognition is also a recognition of sovereign equality or not.

The second chapter of this thesis outlines the specific theoretical framework, case selection and methodological approach that will be used to answer the specific research question of the thesis. A theoretical framework combining historical and philosophical studies of ideas, together with a focus on the concept of constituent power, will be used to answer the question of how the Young Turks gained external recognition of the sovereign equality of their state. Along with presenting the ideas of sovereignty that enabled the recognition of the sovereign equality of the state, this thesis also asserts that this recognition can be understood through a theoretical framework that builds on the concept of constituent power. It argues that global intellectual history can be used to explain the emergence of sovereignty in global international society through the practice of what Cornago (2017: 327) terms “constituent diplomacy”. “Constituent diplomacy” is therefore introduced as a concept that can convey the processes whereby the sovereign equality of states in global international society is recognised (Cornago, 2017: 327). This framework is then further outlined and the advantages of using it, when contrasted with other
explanations of the emergence of global international society, are highlighted. The final sections of this chapter demonstrate how this approach can be applied to the cases of the Ottoman Empire and the Young Turks.

The following four empirical chapters consider four key moments in the transition periods involving the re-constitution of international order and the re-constitution of the Ottoman and later Turkish state. The emergence of the standard of ‘civilisation’ was a significant development that would be echoed in later debates about trusteeship and intervention in contemporary global international society (Anghie, 2002; Matz, 2005). The subsequent attempt to bring about changes in the international order in the First World War and the various interpretations of national self-determination also left their mark on contemporary global international society. The forms of international cooperation in the post-war period, most notably the League of Nations, resulted in the re-introduction of the idea of the standard of ‘civilisation’ as a means of identifying which states were to be recognised as fully sovereign (Anghie, 2002). Additionally, a division of labour is observed between these empirical chapters. Firstly, both Chapters 3 and 5, in the respective periods 1908 – 1911 and 1918 – 1922, focus on how the Young Turks, sought recognition under existing constitutional rules in global international society. Secondly, Chapters 4 and 6 focus on how the Young Turks and their successors, in the respective periods 1911 – 1918 and 1922 – 1923, sought to influence how global constitutional rules were applied to secure recognition of their sovereign equality.

The first empirical chapter, Chapter 3, focuses on the efforts of the revolutionary Young Turk factions to gain recognition of the equal sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, in the face of the emergence of more stringent criteria of recognition in the late nineteenth century, based on the idea of ‘civilisation’ (Anghie, 1999). The period covered starts with the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and ends with the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish War in 1911. It argues that different Young Turk factions presented visions of the constituent power, within the Ottoman Empire, that was represented and shaped by a civilised “elite” which they identified as being themselves (Hanioğlu, 2001: 311). They therefore sought, in several political texts and communications, to demonstrate, to the dominant actors in global international society, their conformity with the idea of the standard of “civilisation”
(Buzan, 2014: 576; see also Gong, 1984). This mirrored the ideas expressed in other constitutional revolutions throughout the world which were occurring at the same time (see Blachford, 2019), such as those occurring in Russia, Iran, China and Mexico (Hanoğlu, 2001: 317 – 318; Kurzman, 2008; Sohrabi, 1995; 2011). Pursuing constitutional government was seen by all of the revolutionary factions as the best way to ensure that the standard of ‘civilisation’, understood as entailing representative forms of government, was fulfilled.

This resulted in the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, which the Ottomans had signed with the foremost European states after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 – 1878, agreeing to withdraw their military forces sent to oversee reform in Macedonia and to reduce their overseeing of reforms in the region (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 48). However, the Ottoman state lost territorial control over Bulgaria, Bosnia and Crete in this period. These losses of Ottoman territories resulted from the new regime seeking to centralise control and autonomous entities within the empire, such as Bulgaria and Crete, aiming to become independent. Bosnia’s annexation by Austria-Hungary was justified on the basis of Austria-Hungary’s responsibilities under the Treaty of Berlin (M. Schulz, 2011: 204). Moreover, the CUP and others in the Ottoman government, initially disagreed with each other on matters of policy (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 13 - 42). Different Young Turk factions and other political groups that emerged, such as the Muhammedan Union, disagreed with each other on how to realise constitutional rule (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 13 - 42). The Young Turks were able to achieve some of their goals in securing the recognition of sovereign equality in the aftermath of the 1908 revolution, but they also faced what they considered to be multiple new challenges to the nature and extent of Ottoman sovereignty.

The next empirical chapter, Chapter 4, focuses on how, soon after the revolution of 1908, the Young Turks came to recognise that there was no singular conception of ‘civilisation’ and other constitutional rules in global international society. As a result, and especially after the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911, the Young Turks sought to secure the position of the Ottoman Empire within one of the emerging global alliances. In the aftermath of the Balkan Wars of 1912 – 1913, greater urgency was attached to this desire, which was adopted by the military
government formed by the CUP. In the course of these conflicts, the Young Turks sought to secure the sovereign equality of the Ottoman state through an alliance with the Central Powers (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 120). Consequently, the CUP government entered the First World War with the intention of securing an end to the capitulations and gaining territory to prevent possible external intervention by enhancing their global standing (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 120 - 123; Kieser, Polatel and Schmutz, 2015; Landau, [1981] 1995: 34 – 35). Although the Young Turks later signed an armistice with the Allies in 1918, they did so only after US President Woodrow Wilson had promised that the rights of nations should be respected in the final peace settlement after the war.

Chapter 5 discusses how in the period from 1918 to 1922 the Young Turks and their successors sought external recognition of their claims to sovereignty by appealing to different interpretations of global and domestic constituent power. The National Movement formed by Mustafa Kemal, a Young Turk and a military officer, is the most well-known of these groups, but there were other bodies (Zürcher, 2010). An Islamic government, for example, was established in Kars (Göl, 2013: 89). Many other political movements emerged from within the Ottoman Empire to advance their own demands for national self-determination. Some Armenian and Assyrian political organisations advanced claims in Anatolia (Anzerlioğlu, 2010; Kaplan, 2004). The Greek government also argued that it had rights as an Allied power over Western Anatolia which it promptly invaded (Gingeras, 2016: 260 - 269). This chapter demonstrates how ideas of reconstituting international order to secure a durable peace as well as the notion of national self-determination were used by actors throughout the Ottoman Empire to advance their particular claims (Demirkent, 2017: 93, 101 - 104). The Ottoman post-war governments in Istanbul at times collaborated with the Allies in the aftermath of the war to secure stability and entertained the possibility of mandatory rule for the empire (Gingeras, 2016: 251 - 253; Göl, 2013: 87 - 88). The National Movement, on the other hand, drew upon ideas of national sovereignty, which were being promoted by Wilson and the Russian revolutionary leader, Lenin (Demirkent, 2017: 101 – 104; Throntveit, 2017).

Focusing on the period 1922 - 1923, Chapter 6 provides an account of how the National Movement was able to present itself as the representative of the people,
framed as the constituent power in the geography of the occupied Ottoman Empire. This chapter concludes with the Treaty of Lausanne which resulted in the Republic of Turkey being recognised as a sovereign state and which led to abrogation of the capitulations (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 144 - 145). The Treaty of Lausanne replaced the Treaty of Sèvres that had been signed by the Ottoman government in 1920 (P.M. Brown, 1924). The Treaty of Sèvres had envisaged the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire with territories to be given to Armenia and Greece, the introduction of special administrative measures for Istanbul and the formation of a new Kurdish state from Ottoman territory (P.M. Brown, 1924). Following the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, the Ottoman government was granted the right to control a small territory centred in Anatolia (P.M. Brown, 1924). Judging that the National Movement had gained the military advantage around Istanbul and other key locations, after defeating Greece’s invasion force, the Allies agreed to revise the Treaty of Sèvres (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 55). The National Movement’s assembly in Ankara responded by abolishing the sultanate and claiming the powers of the caliphate in the lead up to negotiations with the Allies (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 67). This prevented the Ottoman government in Istanbul from sending its own delegation to Lausanne (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 67). Both sovereignty and constituent power, therefore, had come to reside with the Ankara government (Demirkent, 2017: ch. 3). The Ottoman constitution had been effectively revised with the abolition of the sultanate. Following the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the Ankara government agreed to receive legal advisors from neutral states (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 144 - 145). In order to obtain the recognition of Turkey as a sovereign state in control of its territory, like the established sovereign states in global international society, these advisers were tasked with developing Turkey’s legal system in line with what can be said to be the standard of “civilization” (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 157). The recognition of Turkey as a sovereign nation-state, with equal rights to other nation-states, was partially premised on it accepting the post-war understandings of ‘civilisation’, progress and peace, as exemplified by the new international order being constructed through institutions such as the League of Nations (Anghie, 2005: ch. 3; 2006).

The conclusion summarises the argument of the thesis and demonstrates its broader implications for International Relations. The thesis argues that actors can invoke constituent power, when faced with changes to global international society, to
re-constitute their sovereignty. The conclusion begins by showing how the period from 1908 to 1923 demonstrates that local and global forms of constituent power best account for how states that were sovereign but denied sovereign equality in global international society came to be recognised as sovereign equals to the established states in global international society. Next, it highlights the theoretical contribution of the thesis and the different ideas that form its premises. In doing so, it explains how constituent power, understood as normative and social power, is deployed to overcome the challenge posed by stigmatisation to the recognition of sovereign equality. If successful, such attempts at using constituent power, either to gain recognition of one’s status under existing constitutional principles or to advance new constitutional principles, result in the normalisation of the sovereign equality of states. This argument provides a better explanation of the emergence of the contemporary global international society, in which sovereign states are granted equal rights, than accounts which stress the role of the diffusion of ideas (see, for instance, Boli, 2001) or the assertion of power (see, for instance, Aalberts, 2012: ch. 6) by actors. The final section of the conclusion demonstrates the broader significance of this argument for International Relations and contributes to theorising how change can occur to international society through constituent power.

4. A note on primary sources:

Both primary and secondary sources have been used in piecing together the events that posed challenges to Ottoman sovereignty and how the Ottoman authorities and others responded to these events. Primary sources, in the form of official communications or political texts contained in books and periodicals, have been used to convey the ideas and actions of the Young Turks. Diplomatic communications and consular correspondences stored in the British National Archives, including some not previously consulted by researchers, have been used. The use of archives, and in particular, state archives is always fraught with the problem of the accuracy of the information provided. This is because of how information may be presented by those who created the archive to reinforce a particular historical narrative (Stoler, 2008; Winrow, 2018). The intentions of those compiling the sources of an archive and deciding what should be made publicly available, there may be serious omissions and certain views and opinions may have
been thereby effectively silenced (Trouillot, 1995: 26). However, the British National Archives at Kew are an invaluable repository of information. They have been well-preserved and have avoided any war damage. These archives include records of the extensive consular network of the British Empire in the Ottoman Empire (see Berridge, 2009: 75 – 92, 160). Additionally and most crucially, the Foreign Office papers in the British National Archives also contain copies and/or originals of documents submitted to the Foreign Office from other states and actors, including many petitions and other communications submitted by Ottoman individuals. Many of these communications, which also include documents sent simultaneously to other states besides Britain, cannot be found in archives at their location of origin, due perhaps to their destruction or censorship. These communications, together with the impression they made on external actors, can serve to reconstruct the global history of the emergence of international society. A close reading of these documents, alongside other primary sources in the form of political texts, is therefore used to explain how the Young Turks sought to gain external recognition of their sovereignty as an equal state within international society.
1. Sovereignty in International Relations: states, normalisation and the emergence of global international society

1. Introduction

This chapter reviews the existing literature on sovereignty in International Relations and develops the concepts of stigmatisation and normalisation. The first section examines the definitions of sovereignty. It supports the definition of sovereignty in the current global international society as one entailing supreme authority over a jurisdiction. The second section presents the broader question of the thesis concerning how the current global international society, composed of multiple sovereign states, came to emerge. The various existing accounts of the development of sovereignty, understood as the basis of global international society, are critiqued and the need for a relational account is highlighted. A relational account is one which explains how the essence of a phenomenon forms over time (Emirbayer, 1997). It will be argued that studies of the recognition of sovereignty point to how the understanding of sovereignty shared by members of global international society came to be relationally constructed through acts of recognition. The third section demonstrates how a relational account must, however, consider how changes in power can impact on relations that produce and sustain the outcome of recognition. This is the case with the phenomenon of “normalization”, which refers to how previously shunned actors or practices come to be accepted (Smetana, 2020: 27). These forms of normalisation emerge whenever the power relations that facilitate stigma undergo change. The fourth section builds on this by arguing that powerful states existed prior to being recognised as sovereign by other states in global international society, and they were thus initially excluded from the emerging global international society. However, through a process of normalisation, these states came to be recognised as sovereign by other international actors and were integrated into global international society.

2. Defining sovereignty in International Relations

This section introduces and defends the definition of sovereignty that will be used in this thesis, to explain how states gained recognition of their sovereign
equality in global international society, by presenting and critiquing existing understandings of sovereignty in the discipline of International Relations. It first considers several existing definitions. The first of these is Carl Schmitt’s ([1922] 2005: 13) idea of sovereignty as the ability to declare an “exception” to existing constitutional rules, which has been influential in International Relations but is shown to be rooted in the specific intellectual context of the Weimar Republic. Next, Kelsen’s ([1934] 1970) understanding of sovereignty as a norm outlining the source of domestic and international authority, which emerged from the same historical context as the thought of Carl Schmitt, is shown to be influential over the discipline of International Relations. Subsequently, the argument presented by Walker (2010) for recognising the common intellectual heritage of both thinkers is presented and it is suggested that a more inclusive and global understanding of sovereignty needs to be advanced. Specifically, all of these ideas of sovereignty emerged, in the context of European political philosophy, as attempts to impose order on the world.

However, a separate approach to understanding sovereignty to those presented thus far is provided by the English School of International Relations, which incorporates studies of history in its approach (Hurrell, 2001). This means that its approach to the study of concepts, such as sovereignty, is not based purely on speculative thoughts on how order can be imposed on to the world, in the context of understanding it scientifically and/or ruling it, but also on how such concepts have been understood and used historically. As the recent turn to disciplinary history within International Relations demonstrates (see Guzzini, 2013), such historical studies can also show how the historical use of concepts, such as sovereignty, also came to influence how they came to be adopted in the discipline of International Relations. Finally, studying the history of the use of a concept, such as sovereignty, can reveal how any definition of a concept needs to be sufficiently broad to encapsulate how it may appear to have been developed in a specific context but, in fact, may have a parallel or earlier history in other contexts.

One definition of sovereignty advanced in International Relations is the idea of sovereignty as the ability to “decide” an “exception” to existing constitutional rules (C. Schmitt, [1922] 2005: 13). This definition, first advanced by Carl Schmitt ([1922] 2005: 13), later came to be highly influential in International Relations theory (Huysmans, 1999; Pichler, 1998; Scheuerman, 1999; Suganami, 2007: 513;
M.C. Williams, 2005: 84 - 100). Carl Schmitt ([1922] 2005: 5) developed his theory in the context of the debate over the source of sovereignty in the Weimar Republic, i.e. “the problem of sovereignty”, which emerged because the officially recognised sovereign may not in practice wield supreme authority within a state (Huysmans, 2008: 167). Here, Carl Schmitt ([1922] 2005: 13) sought to address this problem by asserting that, in practice, the sovereign was whoever had the power to determine the proper source of authority in a constitutional order through their “decision” (see also Huysmans, 2008: 171; M.C. Williams, 2005). This power included the ability to suspend existing rules (Huysmans, 2008: 171). Hence, Carl Schmitt ([1922] 2005: 5) argued that “the sovereign is he who decides on the exception”, regardless of whether the sovereign was the actual officially recognised source of authority. Morgenthau (1948: 268) builds on Carl Schmitt’s ([1922] 2005: 13) definition of sovereignty to argue that sovereignty referred to “the mightiest social force” within a nation. As Michael C. Williams (2005: 85 - 104) demonstrates, this understanding of sovereignty would form the basis of realist perspectives in International Relations, which recognise the presence of different states, wielding such sovereignty, engaged in relations among each other. However, more generally, this perspective is shared by all accounts that focus on sovereignty as a form of power or control over territory, which expresses itself as the ability to declare an exception to existing rules (see Duvall and Havercroft, 2008; Kratochwil, 1986; Wendt and Duvall, 2008).

Another strand of literature in International Relations, is influenced by the philosopher, Agamben’s (1998) work, which builds on that of Carl Schmitt ([1922] 2005), to argue that the power to decide the meaning of norms in sovereignty extends beyond arbitrating constitutional norms. Specifically, Agamen (1998: 6) suggests that sovereignty refers to the ability to produce “bare life”, meaning the ability to reduce individuals of all their characteristics aside from that of being biological beings. Studies have used Agamen’s (1998: 6) concept of bare life in different contexts such as the treatment of refugees in camps (Biswas and Nair, 2010: 3; Edkins and Pin-Fat, 1999; 2005; Salter, 2008; Vaughan-Williams, 2009a: 112 – 116; 2009b: 23 - 27). Studies using Agamen (1998: 6) have also focused on his concept of the “zone of indistinction”, which refer to contexts in which there is a

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confusion over proper legal categories. Agamben (1998: 6) adds that, within this “zone of indistinction”, decisions defining “bare life” can be made by sovereign actors (see also Hozic, 2009: 247 - 248). Carl Schmitt’s ([1922] 2005) idea of sovereignty has therefore also been indirectly influential in International Relations through influencing Agamben’s (1998) ideas of sovereignty.

However, Carl Schmitt’s idea of sovereignty emerged from a very specific historical context and was merely one possible response to the problem of sovereignty. Out of the range of different responses to this problem that were made in the Weimar Republic, Kelsen’s ([1934] 1970) definition of sovereignty as a norm that structures the behaviour of individual actors has also been influential in International Relations theory (Aalberts, 2012: 58 – 59; Suganami, 2007). As Suganami (2007) demonstrates, Carl Schmitt’s ([1922] 2005: 5) argument that sovereignty referred to the ability of an actor to declare an exception to existing rules was challenged by Hans Kelsen ([1934] 1970). Kelsen ([1934] 1970: 214), instead argued that sovereignty was a “basic norm” shared by those in the “international legal order” which gained its force through actors complying with it. This perspective, which extended beyond merely identifying the domestic source of sovereignty, would later inform subsequent discussions of sovereignty in International Law and International Relations (Aalberts, 2012: 58, 81 – 82; Koskenniemi, [1989] 2005: 227). According to Kelsen ([1934] 1970: 217), states have to conform to the international “norm” of sovereignty, given that they are a part of international society and need to abide by its principles of international law (Suganami, 2007: 518). This debate between Kelsen ([1934] 1970) and Carl Schmitt ([1922] 2005) over the definition and location of sovereignty suggests two separate understandings of sovereignty. However, both thinkers were involved in the debate over the nature of sovereignty in the Weimar Republic, which begs the question of whether their positions can be understood outside of their particular historical context (Walker, 2010: 51). Ultimately, both thinkers shared an understanding of law as an activity producing and imposing rules to define and order the external world (Walker, 2010: 51). As Walker (2010: 51, 117 - 119) suggests, Carl Schmitt ([1922]

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argued that sovereignty pointed to the ability of actors within states to impose order within their states, while Kelsen ([1934] 1970) referred to sovereignty as a norm that states are subject to internationally and domestically. In this sense, both thinkers may be said to have more in common than has been suggested by commentators who have been eager to contrast them, such as Suganami (2007).

Several definitions of sovereignty in International Relations have echoed Walker’s (2010) idea of sovereignty as a concept rooted in law that serves to impose order over the world. Walker’s (2010: 51) identification of sovereignty’s role in producing order stems from his reading of philosophical texts, namely of Hobbes ([1651] 1996) and Kant ([1784] 1991), that he claims have informed influential concepts of sovereignty, such as those of Kelsen ([1934] 1970) and Carl Schmitt ([1922] 2005: 5). As Walker (2010: 36) stresses, Kant ([1784] 1991) posited that individual human beings had the capacity to impose order on the world. According to Walker (2010: 100), Hobbes ([1651] 1996) instead argued that it was states which had this capability. Walker (2010: 51) asserts that the so-called Kelsen-Schmitt debate did not reveal a significant difference between Kelsen’s ([1934] 1970) and Carl Schmitt’s ([1922] 1985: 5) understandings of sovereignty. Both Kelsen and Carl Schmitt draw upon the ideas of sovereignty held by Hobbes ([1651] 1996), who points to the coercive power of states, and Kant, who focuses on the individual’s capacity to legislate and develop a conception of sovereignty as a means of ordering the world (Walker, 2010: 50 - 51). Separately, earlier accounts have emphasised sovereignty’s role as a concept that is productive of an international order of distinct sovereign states, which allow us to conceive of them as possessing a separate “inside” and “outside”, with different forms of action being possible in each of the two contexts (Bartelson, 1995: 51; see also Rengger, 2000: 6; Walker, 1991; 1992). Similarly, Ruggie (1993: 159) claimed that sovereignty, denoting a position of authority over the world, could only be conceived because of the rise of artworks depicting a linear perspective in Europe, which privileged the perspective of the individual. Bartelson (2014: 9), on the other hand, argues that sovereignty is a

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32 Walker (2010: 116) argues that Kelsen ([1934] 1970) develops a Kantian approach given how his definition of sovereignty is based on the concept of sovereignty as the ability to impose order on the world through laws. Hobbes’s influence on Kelsen, stems from how Kelsen ([1934] 1970) views the establishment of the idea of sovereignty in international society as an event similar to the founding of a sovereign order in Hobbes’s ([1651 1996]) Leviathan (Walker, 2010: 142).
“symbol” that allows the world to be ordered into an “international system” composed of different states. Bartelson’s (2014: 16) suggestion that sovereignty is a symbol captures how sovereignty does not need to be instantiated in reality, but can, and, in practice, is used, to point to a desired or hypothetical state of affairs. Insofar as it is capable of explaining how ideas of sovereignty, originally developed in political philosophy, come to impose order on the world, even where the idea of sovereignty may not be instantiated, Bartelson (2014) provides a highly convincing definition of sovereignty in International Relations.

However, the idea of sovereignty as ordering the world begs the question of how such ordering happens in time and space. An approach to the study of sovereignty that integrates a historical perspective is needed to understand how and why such ordering happens. The English School of International Relations is committed to studying historical processes and the ideas held by historical actors throughout the globe. Wight (2004), considered one of the founders of this school (see I. Hall, 2019: 189), argued that four distinct approaches to theorising, based on the ideas of Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant and Mazzini, were possible in International Relations. These approaches mirrored how ideas were used in relations between states. Wendt (1992: 425; 1999: 297), a constructivist scholar, would later argue that the theories of Locke, Kant and Hobbes similarly offered ways of understanding how states interacted at the international level. The international level, according to Wendt (1992: 391), can be defined as reflecting a state of “anarchy”, which states could respond to in different ways. All of the thinkers mentioned above, referred to by Wight (2004) and Wendt (1992), can offer different ways of understanding the nature of sovereignty in International Relations.

The fact that all of these thinkers hail from the West gives rise, however, to the question of whether other means of comprehending sovereignty present in other parts of the world can also be used to develop a more inclusive understanding of sovereignty. As Bartelson (2014: 2) demonstrates, the reliance on concepts drawn

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33 Bartelson (1995) earlier argued that it is a concept that points to the idea of an indisputable foundation, which is also needed to have any knowledge of the world.
34 Similarly, Lebow (2009: 12) argues that cartography can act as a conduit between visual representation and claims to sovereignty.
from a Western context has meant that the limits of what can be theorised and studied in the discipline of International Relations derive from what can possibly be thought or studied in Western political philosophy more broadly. Bartelson (2014: 2) contends that sovereignty came to be used by commentators in the West to understand and order the world, but this definition of sovereignty arguably does not capture all uses of the concept in contemporary global international society.36 Engaging with other geographies and histories can allow a comprehensive concept of sovereignty to be constructed (Waever, 2009: 202; Waltz, 1996; 1997; 2003; 2004). Such an approach to developing a theory of sovereignty is arguably employed by pre-nineteenth century European thinkers, such as Grotius. Grotius ([1609] 1916: 11) argued, in chapter 2 of his Mare Liberum (Freedom of the Seas) of 1609, that non-European sovereign states had “their own government (suam republicam), their own laws (suas leges) and their own legal systems (suas jura)”, including states in “Ceylon, Java and the Moluccas”, who were recognised as such by European actors (see also Alexandrowicz, 1959: 164; Keene, 2002: 50, 90 - 91; Phillips, 2016; Phillips and Sharman, 2015a, 2015b). These examples also show how sovereignty does not necessarily entail control over territory, but does involve the internal and external recognition of authority.37 (Zarakol, 2018a). Grotius’s ([1609] 1916) approach, therefore, demonstrates how it is possible to develop a theory of sovereignty that allows a clearer picture of the concept to be formed by observing and drawing comparisons from other times and places.

36 Bull ([1977] 2012: 9 - 10) distinguishes between an international system and society, arguing firstly that “[a] system of states … is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them … to cause them to behave … as parts of a whole.” Separately from this definition of an international system, “[a] society of states”, according to Bull ([1977] 2012: 13), “exists when a group of states … conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions”. However, James (1993: 272) argues that this distinction is problematic insofar as it assumes that “regular relations”, mentioned in Bull’s ([1977] 2012: 13) definition of an international system, can occur without rules. Additionally, the use of the term ‘society’ captures the processes of admission and exclusion that, following James (1993: 285 - 286), can be said to characterise the history of international societies. Therefore, this thesis will mirror James (1993: 272) in using the term “international society” without contrasting it with an “international system”.

37 Although Bartelson (1995: 30 – 31; 2014: 18 - 30) focuses on how the emergence of concepts of space resulted in the emergence of sovereignty as a form of control over territory, Keene (2002: 57) and Ruggie (1983: 274) both argue for how sovereignty can also involve jurisdictions being shared, as in the case of historical actors such as the British India Company pledging loyalty to different sovereigns (see Phillips and Sharman, 2015a: 441 – 442; 2015b: 85 – 89).
3. Sovereign states in history: the role of legitimacy in the emergence of global international society

This section reviews existing accounts of the emergence of the current global international society of sovereign states and argues that more of a focus on the role of arguments of legitimacy is needed in explaining its onset. It begins by introducing and critiquing accounts of the emergence of modern sovereign states in historical sociology, such as those of Tilly ([1990] 1992), Spruyt (1994) and Teschke (2003), which have sought to reduce this process into structural and causal explanations that discount the role of human agency in this process. Perspectives that focus on discourses as constitutive of sovereignty, are not susceptible to this charge, since they focus on how forms of speech produce knowledge that shapes both sovereign states and their international context (Aalberts, 2012: ch. 6). However, as the scholars of the “practice turn” (see Kustermans, 2016: 175) suggest, this perspective has often overlooked the role of other practices, meaning actions that individuals engage in, aside from speech, in the emergence of sovereignty (see also Neumann, 2002). Moreover, both the discursive and practice turn’s interpretations of the emergence of sovereignty involve privileging those who are able to speak and those who are able to act in their accounts, meaning that power is ultimately seen as explaining the emergence of sovereignty. Such an explanation cannot, however, explain how the emergence of sovereignty also involved states recognising each other as sovereign, in a process that ultimately resulted in the formation of a global international society. As Bull ([1977] 2012: 9) and Reus-Smit suggest (2001; 2002), this would suggest the presence of internal and external sovereignty, with separate institutions sustaining these two forms of sovereignty. Although Reus-Smit (1997; 1999) convincingly argues that the presence of such international societies point to constitutional rules, these constitutional rules can, in fact, be contested within international societies. This is demonstrated by the many historical examples of states seeking to justify their sovereignty claims by different arguments appealing

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39 Shinoda (2000: 80, 136) also identifies the emergence of theories of sovereignty that can be understood to be international and constitutional insofar as they defined the nature of the sovereignty to be possessed by actors in international society. Although Shinoda (2000) does not distinguish between global international society and international society, his study provides an account of the development of sovereignty throughout the globe.
to legitimacy. This, in turn, is taken to suggest that more attention needs to be paid to the role of legitimacy in enabling the emergence of a global international society of equal sovereigns.

Historical sociological accounts of the emergence of the modern sovereign state have identified the nineteenth century as the turning point which resulted in the emergence of the modern state (see Tilly, [1990] 1992), which, in turn, embodied sovereignty in its current form. Tilly (1985; [1990] 1992; 1994) focuses on how the contemporary state system emerged because of the coercive capacities and capital that nation-states possessed. This was a process which resulted in the emergence of a territorial state, which following Max Weber’s ([1921] 1978: 54) definition, is seen to hold a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order [emphasis in original]” (see also Neocleous, 2011: 200). Although the idea of sovereignty held by these states implied that violence within the state was illegitimate, such violence persisted outside of the state, as evinced by the rise of piracy in the early modern period (Thomson, 1994; 1995). The centrality of military technology in Tilly’s (1985; [1990] 1992; 1994) account, led Duvall and Havercroft (2008: 758) to point to the parallels in Tilly’s ideas with those of International Relations theorists such as Morgenthau (1948) and Herz (1957; 1959), who have also pointed to how military technologies resulted in the emergence of new means of exerting power (Duvall and Havercroft, 2008: 759). Spruyt (1994), building on this account, suggests that the development of the sovereign state occurred as other means of organising society, such as empires and city-states, came to be eliminated, whereas scholars influenced from a Marxist perspective, that class coalitions within and outside states resulted in the emergence of the state. The exact timing of this development has been discussed by those commenting on the development of sovereignty in the literature on historical sociology (Spruyt, 1994; Tilly, 1994). Reus-Smit (2002: 135) challenges accounts such as those of Ruggie (1993: 24) that suggested that sovereignty began to emerge in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by claiming that the international institutional framework, which enabled states to be understood as sovereign, only emerged in the course of the development of the concept in nineteenth century diplomacy. More recently, Buzan and Lawson (2015:

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have argued that contemporary sovereignty emerged through the influence of multiple processes of “rational state building”, “industrialization” and “ideologies of progress” culminating in a global transformation in the nineteenth century. Regardless of when and why they identify the sovereign state as emerging, these historical accounts of the emergence of sovereignty argue that sovereignty emerged fully in the nineteenth century, in conjunction with the emergence of the sovereign states.

These historical arguments have, however, been challenged by scholars who have argued that they are founded on assumptions concerning the forces that give rise to sovereignty, which post-structuralist accounts of the emergence of sovereignty do not possess (Lundborg, 2016). Both Lundborg (2016) and Bhambra (2011) have noted how historical sociological accounts have relied on drawing upon very particular European histories. However, Lundborg (2016) argues that insofar as the advocates of these approaches assume the presence of a “foundation of objectivity” (see Lundborg, 2016: 106) by positing a “structure” for history, they themselves, rely on “a sovereignty politics of time” (see Lundborg, 2016: 100). This is because, like historical sociological accounts which aim to explain how sovereignty emerged, the use of sovereignty can involve a similar foundationalism insofar as it involves asserting the rootedness of the sovereign in time and space (Lundborg, 2011: 71; 2016). Post-structuralist perspectives, then offer, according to Lundborg (2016: 116) a means of “[e]xamining this politics of grounding, rather than trying to articulate an alternative ‘ground’”. By pointing to how the idea of sovereignty and who or what comes to be considered is constructed through discourse, Aalberts (2012: 143) argues that studying forms of speech can demonstrate how this “ground” is constructed. Specifically, Aalberts (2012; 143) argues that the idea of “legal personality”, as advanced by Leibniz ([1706] 1989), made it possible to speak of sovereign states, as though they were persons, which is

41 On how the association of sovereignty with modern sovereign states serves to limit understanding of the nature of the concept of sovereignty see also Prokhovnik (2007: 1).
42 Lundborg (2016: 106) argues that Derrida’s ([1967] 2001: 199) identification of the tendency of thought to find a “common ground” forms the basis of the historical sociological approach in International Relations and informs many studies that have aimed to challenge the centrality of the idea of sovereignty (see Ashley, 1988; Campbell, 1992; Doty, 1997).
also echoed by the more recent idea of imputing “responsibility” to sovereign states. Following Foucault ([1976] 1980; 1982; [1978] 1991; 2007), Aalberts (2012: 134) argues in both cases that this is made possible by forms of knowledge, contained in speech, becoming dominant and thereby producing forms of what she terms “sovereign subjectivity”. Approaches that use discourse analysis also point to the emergence of sovereignty in the early modern period through the emergence of ideas of the political as a distinct activity (see Bartelson, 1995: 112, 138 and Leira, 2009: 478). These accounts show that as a result of the emergence of new discourses, which produced forms of sovereign subjectivity, sovereignty came to refer to an agent who was considered to be responsible for control over a specific jurisdiction.

The “practice turn” in International Relations offers an approach that has also been used to study the emergence of sovereignty in global international society. However, this approach has several problems (Kustermans, 2016: 175). The practice turn refers to a set of loosely similar approaches, which believe that International Relations theory should focus on the study of the individual actions, or practices, of actors (Adler and Pouliot, 2011a; 2011b; Bueger and Gadinger, 2014; 2015; Hopf, 2010; P. Jackson, 2008; Kustermans, 2016). It therefore maintains the post-structuralist focus on individual agency (Laffey and Weldes, 1998; Neumann, 2002: 630; Swidler, 2001: 75). However, rather than argue that discourses are the building blocks of reality, it suggests that other forms of human action, in the form of practices that do not necessarily involve speech, are also significant (Neumann, 2002). Bigo (2011: 227) argues, much like Lundborg’s (2016) critique of historical sociology, in favour of post-structuralism, that Bourdieu’s ([1972] 1977; 1985; [1980] 1990; [1994] 1998; see also Bourdieu, Wacquant and Farage, 1994) social theory, focusing on practices engaged in by actors in the social world, does not presume a “sovereign” position from which to study International Relations. Bigo (2011: 254) argues that such a perspective can, in turn, explain how sovereignty emerges in “transnational fields”, referring to the shared spaces where individuals representing sovereign states and international organisations, advance and defend claims of sovereignty. Adler-Nissen (2013: 183) develops an approach which builds on Bourdieu’s ([1980] 1990: 52 - 64) idea that there are different forms of capital, i.e. resources held by actors, namely economic, political, symbolic and cultural. Adler-Nissen (2013: 183) argues that sovereignty is a form of meta-capital, meaning
a means of converting one form of capital into another (see also Adler-Nissen, 2011; 2014a; 2014b). But accepting the definition of sovereignty, provided by Adler-Nissen (2013: 183), requires accepting Bourdieu’s ([1980] 1990: 52 – 64) framework, including the different forms of capital he develops. Bourdieu’s perspective, like that offered by discourse analysis, offers the means of developing an account of sovereignty, without assuming the presence of a pre-given structure of society (Bigo, 2011). However, it nonetheless contains concepts that point to its own assumptions about society being structured by different forms of capital.

Employing the practice turn to study the development of sovereignty is also problematic because of how it can involve making assumptions about practices, prior to studying practices historically. Approaches to the study of practices are also problematic because of how they advocate defining the practices in question prior to studying them, and thereby involve adopting the definitions of ideas that are present in existing discourses. This means that the practice turn cannot effectively account for the emergence of new practices, which deviate from existing understandings. For instance, Adler and Pouliot (2011b: 3) define practices as “competent performances”. However, such a definition is problematic as a guideline on how to define and then study historical practices, including sovereignty. This is because many of the institutions, ideas or actors that can be studied as practices, such as a sovereign state, can be defined in many different ways. These definitions could entail different meanings of “competence” in the context of sovereignty (Duvall and Chowdhury, 2011: 339). Duvall and Chowdhury (2011: 348) note, for instance, that the existence of sovereign states such as Haiti and Liberia, populated and governed by former slaves, challenged existing understandings of sovereignty. Initially, neither of these states were considered to be competent sovereigns and they were not recognised until much later. Hence, Duvall and Chowdhury (2011: 351) claim that the sovereignty of these states can be termed and studied as examples of “incompetent performance”. Branch (2013: 9) also adopts a practice turn approach to demonstrating how new technologies, such as those of map-making, made it possible for actors to advance territorial claims. The acts of making and defending such claims were therefore practices of authority, through which sovereignty, denoting the authority of states, came to be realised in global international society (Branch, 2013: 19). Consequently, even though it is faced with the question of how to define
practices that are ever-changing, the practice turn can be used to demonstrate how sovereignty emerged in the course of the development of contemporary global international society.

However, both the practice turn and discourse analysis can be criticised for privileging forms of speech or, in the case of the practice turn, actions more generally, that rely on power to be successful. Yet, as has been established, sovereignty is also understood to be tied to the recognition of the legitimacy of claims to authority (Bartelson, 2013; 2014: 8; Erman, 2013; Fabry, 2013: 168). Despite following the practice turn approach, Branch (2013: 20) suggests that any form of authority is tied to concepts which outline “who or what is subject to the authority in question and how the limits of that authority are understood”. Arguments about legitimacy accompany the use of power and, as Branch (2016) subsequently claims, shape how and to what extent power comes to be exercised. For instance, Branch (2016: 23) argues that the viability of the geographical shape and political constitutions of the territories that states govern or seek to govern have historically been used to legitimise their claims to sovereignty. The focus on ideas here may seem to mirror earlier post-structuralist concerns with identifying forms of knowledge that shape reality and subjects. The postcolonial perspective in International Relations, with its focus on how past beliefs about legitimacy are embedded in the actions of those who caused global international society to emerge, provides a means to consider questions of legitimacy in International Relations (Agathangelou and Ling, 1997; 2009: 54; Barkawi, 2013: 91; Grovogui, 2004: 33–34; 2013: 112; Helliwel and Hindess, 2013: 74; Jabri, 2012: 8–9; Pasha, 2013: 155). However, both of these perspectives can be said to focus on how ideas act as forms of power. In the case of postcolonial theories, they serve to maintain forms of colonial oppression, whereas in the case of poststructuralism, ideas, in the form of discourses, shape the subjectivity of actors. However, legitimacy can be conceived as distinct from the “logic of consequences” (see March and Olsen, 1998: 949)

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44 This was also recognised by M. Weber ([1919] 1994: 311), who stressed how states are sustained by legitimacy; see Laiz and Schlichte (2016: 1453).
45 Rosenberg (1994: 126 - 129) also argues that forms of sovereignty shape the internal nature of sovereign states, which serve, in turn, to sustain the public-private distinction that is central to capitalism. However, Rosenberg (1994: 126 - 129) assumes that sovereignty ultimately fulfils this role because of his belief, derived from Wood (1981), in the state’s central role in overseeing the process of economic production.
entailed by focusing on power and the causal relations it can trigger. Instead, legitimacy can be conceived as following a “logic of appropriateness” (see Hurd, 1999: 387). This, in turn, echoes the sociologist, Boltanski’s (2013: 44) claim that individual actors possess “critical capacities” that involve them engaging with arguments concerning legitimacy (see also Boltanski, 2011; Gadinger, 2016). It is therefore possible to conceive of an action or entity, including sovereignty, being sustained by legitimacy aside or alongside the assertion power.

The authors within the English School perspective work with a conception of sovereignty as authority, which they share with international lawyers (Hurrell, 2001). They do not merely associate sovereignty with power, as some historical sociological perspectives have done. However, English School theorists are divided between those, such as Bull ([1977] 2012: 18 – 19), who claim that external sovereignty emerges after recognition by other states and those, such as James (1986; 1999: 460) who believe that it is sovereignty that enables an international society, composed of distinct sovereign states, to be conceived. Bull ([1977] 2012: 30) recognises sovereignty as having external and internal forms and suggests that the recognition of each other’s external sovereignty, can ensure the “coexistence” of different states within international society. James (1999: 461), on the other hand, argues that sovereignty denotes the “constitutional independence” of states from other states and bodies in international society (see also James, 1986). This begs the question of the relationship between internal sovereignty, meaning control over a jurisdiction, and external sovereignty, meaning the outside recognition of this jurisdiction. Bartelson (2013: 113) argues that theorists he identifies as focusing on “political recognition” focus on how states come to exist after being recognised, but this begs the question as to what such states were, prior to being recognised. This suggests that states exist prior to their recognition (Bartelson, 1998). In International

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46 Epp (1998: 49 - 52, 56) also argues that the English School’s dedication to the interpretation of ideas of legitimacy demonstrates its continued value as an approach to International Relations.
47 Boltanski (2000) himself engages, as a part of his study of actors wielding their critical capacities, with arguments for and against humanitarian intervention - an issue which is tied to the question of whether or not sovereignty can be judged as legitimate, thereby allowing it to be infringed (see C. Brown, 2002; Glanville, 2013a; 2013b; Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995; Moses, 2014).
48 see also Mathieu (2018a: 9 – 10).
Law, a similar debate revolves around whether states come into being when they are recognised, according to the constitutive theory, or when they fulfil the condition of being a state, as suggested by the declaratory theory (Bartelson, 2013: 115; Kurtulus, 2005: 100 - 106). However, it can be argued that both theories “rely on a problematic distinction… between empirical facts, on the one hand, and social facts and norms on the other” (Erman, 2013: 130). Given how states can exist without being recognised, it would appear, as Fabry (2010: 7; 2013: 168) suggests, that a perspective that takes other explanations, aside from those in International Law, is needed to understand the recognition of states and their sovereignty.

An alternative to this purely legal understanding of sovereignty is provided by Reus-Smit. Reus-Smit (1997; 1999) argues that there are constitutional norms of international society, which enable it to facilitate co-existence amongst states through providing rules concerning the recognition of external sovereignty. Reus-Smit (1999: 33) demonstrates that it is these norms which provide standards of legitimate or acceptable sovereignty, alongside outlining forms of “procedural justice” that the members of different international societies are subject to. Although Reus-Smit (1999: 30 - 35) treats procedural justice as a separate category from sovereignty, procedural justice would, in the course of the nineteenth century, be equated with principles that “civilized” (see Reus-Smit, 1999: 35) states upheld. This fact is accounted for by James (1993: 285) who states that ideas of sovereignty can serve to exclude certain states from being recognised as fully part of international society, even if these states are sovereign in the sense of being constitutionally independent. Therefore, states that were deemed to be uncivilised were excluded from such forms of procedural justice and hence not treated as sovereigns equal to other states (Aalberts, 2014; Bartelson, 2018: 173 – 174; Buchan, 2006). Reus-Smit (1999: 31) stresses that sovereignty and procedural justice are, in turn based on different understandings of the “moral purpose of the state”, held by the members of these different international societies. Reus-Smit (1997: 557), here, draws upon Krasner’s (1983: 2) distinction between “rules” and “norms”, arguing that norms refer to general principles, whereas rules refer to written or agreed upon forms of conduct51. However, when individual actors seek to legitimise their actions, they blur

51 See also Krasner (1982: 186).
the distinction between norms and rules, since justifications can draw upon both written and unwritten understandings of legitimacy\textsuperscript{52} (Kratochwil, 1986: 33). Nevertheless, Reus-Smit (1997: 584; 2002) illustrates the continued relevance of the English School concept of international society by showing how sustained interactions between the members of an international society are productive of constitutional rules that shape how external sovereignty is understood and enacted by these members.

Reus-Smit’s (1997: 571, 578) argument of the significance of legitimacy in sustaining global international society is convincing, but his perspective is one that involves applying Habermas’s (1986) discourse ethics to suggest that moral principles always shape the meaning of sovereignty. Habermas’s (1986; 1990) assumption of the presence of an inherent rationality in interactions can be challenged. Tully (1983: 491, 502 - 505) argues that what is taken to be rationality, which Habermas (1986: 15 - 17) bases his understanding of morality upon, varies from context to context (Reus-Smit, 1997: 564). As there is no automatic consensus on moral principles of the sort implied by Habermas\textsuperscript{53} (1986; 1990), it is necessary to study the distinct contexts of those advancing constitutional principles of international societies. This can, in turn, demonstrate how international societies are often internally contested, with different state and non-state actors advancing separate understandings and justifications of sovereignty. Many states are compelled to make these justifications as a state that is recognised as sovereign has a greater chance of thriving and cooperating with other states, thereby sustaining its sovereignty over time (Pegg and Kolsto, 2015; Spruyt, 1994: 44 - 153). Such states are less likely to be the victims of interference, with “non-intervention” therefore being another important element of sovereignty (C. Weber, 1995: 11). Even when a state is constitutionally independent, in accordance with international law, it can simultaneously, be subject to other global forms of hierarchy (Bilgin, 2017: 133 – 151; Mattern and Zarakol, 2016; Park, 2017: 5 – 6; Zarakol, 2017). State representatives can then seek to argue for their sovereign right to challenge these forms of hierarchy by arguing that they possess specific rights over their

\textsuperscript{52} See also Smetana (2020: 6), Kratochwil (1989: 10) and Onuf ([1989] 2013: 128 - 144).

\textsuperscript{53} Habermas (1986: 17) argues that “a communicatively achieved agreement must be based \textit{in the end on reasons}” (emphasis in original; see also the discussion in Reus-Smit, 1997: 564).
jurisdictions as sovereigns (Kayaoğlu, 2007; 2010a; Thomson, 1994; 1995). Religious and other forms of solidarity can also be used to gain recognition of a state’s sovereign rights (de Carvalho and Paras, 2015; Philpott, 1997; 2001). These attempts to legitimise sovereignty claims can, in turn, influence the extent to which sovereign states enjoy sovereign equality in an international society.

4. Sovereignty and legitimacy: From stigmatisation to normalisation

In line with the previous section’s call for closer studies of legitimacy in accounts of the development of global international society, this section argues that the role of legitimacy may be studied by focusing on processes of normalisation. It begins by defending a relational approach to the study of legitimacy, since what is understood by legitimacy and who is considered legitimate both emerge in processes over time (Emirbayer, 1997; Jackson and Nexon, 1999). The section then reviews recent studies of the “expansion of international society” and notes how these studies have concentrated on issues of identity (Pella, Jr., 2014: 89; see also Neumann, 2011). It is important to note, here, how this process of expansion entailed states being seen as possessing different types of sovereignty. So-called “quasi-states” (see R.H. Jackson, 1990: 21) in global international society possess “negative sovereignty” (R.H. Jackson, 1990: 26). They are recognised as sovereigns internationally so that they are subject to non-intervention, but they do not exercise full control over their own jurisdiction. It has been suggested that these states are not fully sovereign when compared to other states within global international society (R.H. Jackson, 1990). The exclusion of these states from participation in global international society or the fact that they were not regarded as equal in their sovereignty to established states arguably reveals a hierarchy of sovereigns within global international society, sustained by stigmatisation (Zarakol, 2011; 2018b). However, studies of stigmatisation can benefit from a greater focus on relations, following the call of Emirbayer (1997) and Jackson and Nexon (1999) to focus on

54 R.H. Jackson (1990: 26) coins the term “negative sovereignty”, based on his reading of Berlin’s (1969: 122) concept of negative and positive freedom, where negative freedom is used to refer to the idea of freedom from outside interference, and positive freedom refers to the freedom to act. R.H. Jackson (1990: 26) uses this concept to explain how “negative” sovereigns are subject to freedom from intervention, even though they may not be free to effectively control their jurisdiction or engage in actions associated with statehood.
relations in social science and International Relations. Stigmatisation envisages international relations to be a closed system with established states exerting a gatekeeping function recognising and excluding states with certain identities from being recognised as sovereign states (Zarakol, 2011). However, the history of global international society shows that the so-called established states change over time. Stigmatisation is ultimately enabled by power relations that sustain the established states. Hence, changes in stigmatisation can occur after shifts in power. The concept of “normalization” can be used as a tool to understand how actors that were previously stigmatised came to be subsequently recognised as sovereign states (Smetana, 2020: 27; see also Xiaoyu, 2012). Using the concepts of normalisation and stigmatisation then, enables one to better understand the processes involved in the emergence of global international society.

The framework provided by the "relationalism" of Jackson and Nexon (1999: 291) allows one to study the role of legitimacy in the emergence of the form of sovereignty associated with contemporary global international society. Here, relationalism refers to the approach in International Relations and the social sciences more generally which rejects the view that there are fixed essences to objects of study (Emirbayer, 1997). Relationalist scholars have argued that the objects of study, such as states, cannot be assumed to be timeless entities which have always been present in the sense we understand them to be (Jackson and Nexon, 1999). Instead, they argue that these objects of study, like the state, emerged through processes, in which the interaction of different actors ultimately produced the idea of an entity being a state (Jackson and Nexon, 1999). These processes of interaction can involve the exchange of actions or meanings which create or “yoke” (Jackson and Nexon, 1999: 292), entities into being. This relational approach can be used to study legitimacy in International Relations because the content and meaning of legitimacy is contested (Hurd, 1999: 381). Disagreements in history over which forms of sovereignty are legitimate, reveal how there were separate ideas of legitimacy or differences over the applicability of these ideas (Benton, 2001; Sheehan, 2006). A relational approach can demonstrate how the role of legitimacy, alongside considerations of power, may determine whether a state is recognised as sovereign (Andersen, 2012; Jackson and Nexon, 1999: 315; Krebs and Jackson, 2007: 38; Lake, 2003; 2009b; 2009c; 2017; MacDonald, 2018). Such an approach can also
show whether and how states are able to maintain their sovereignty in the face of the threat of intervention or actual intervention (C. Weber, 1995). Although intervention has often been understood as a form of power, it is also tied to legitimacy insofar as interveners present arguments to counter the legitimacy of the sovereignty of those whom they are intervening against (Biersteker and Weber, 1996: 14; Hurd, 1999: 393 – 403; C. Weber, 1995). A relational approach, therefore, can be used to demonstrate how contemporary forms of sovereignty emerged by focusing on the role of power and legitimacy.

Some studies have used relationalism to explain the emergence of contemporary global international society. They challenged the belief that the spread of international institutions entailed the continuing outward expansion of such institutions, as suggested by Bull and Watson (1984). Robert H. Jackson (1990: 21), for instance, stresses that the postcolonial states that became independent through de-colonisation were “quasi-states”. Robert H. Jackson (1990: 27) argued that these states could not effectively assert authority over their territory and hence were not sovereign in the established sense of the term. While the authority of these states was recognised internationally, they were unable to effectively control their territorial jurisdictions domestically (R.H. Jackson, 1990: 27). Because they did not share a form of sovereignty with other states in global international society, Robert H. Jackson (1990: 50) argued that these quasi-states were effectively outside that society, even though their independence was recognised by other states. Some scholars (see Morozov and Rumelili, 2012; Neumann and Welsh, 1991) have noted how global international society is dependent on the presence of an “outside” or an “other” (Neumann, 2011: 465). They have suggested that this “outside” or “other” is constitutive as it allows the members of global international society to cohere around a shared and exclusive identity (Neumann, 2011: 465). Neumann (2011), accordingly, challenges the assumption that global international society will expand to cover the whole world by noting that some states may not be fully accepted in global international society. Neumann (2011) uses the example of Russia, which for centuries has interacted with broader international society. Therefore, the assumptions that ideas of sovereignty spread through the expansion of international society, and that international society has always expanded, may be challenged by
Examples of the exclusion of actors from the international society have recently been studied in the literature on stigmatisation in International Relations (Zarakol, 2011). This literature builds on studies of identity by focusing on what E. Goffman (1963: 19) understands as spoiled “social identity”. Stigma refers to the identification and exclusion of those from aspects of life which others are able to participate in (E. Goffman, 1963: 19). The excluded are deemed to have spoiled identities (E. Goffman, 1963: 19). Processes of stigmatisation, therefore, refer to those that enable and maintain stigma, which are carried out by established members of society (Adler-Nissen, 2014b; Zarakol, 2011: 95 - 102). These established insiders engage in gatekeeping practices, allowing some outsiders to become established members of society, while singling out others for exclusion (Zarakol, 2011: 27, 107). Applying this approach to the study of the emergence of what she terms the contemporary international state system, Zarakol (2011) argued that states that had been defeated militarily continued to endure forms of stigmatisation. These states, such as Japan, Turkey and Russia, were excluded from the international state system (Zarakol, 2011: 8). They were not recognised as possessing sovereignty equal to that of other states in the “international system” (Zarakol, 2011: 12). Adler-Nissen’s (2011; 2014a) study of sovereignty and the European Union (EU) demonstrates another form of stigmatisation. Britain and Denmark experienced stigma in the context of the EU because they opted out of several agreements as they sought to maintain a greater degree of control over their affairs (Adler-Nissen, 2014a: 174 - 178). The desire of Britain and Denmark to maintain control over areas of policy, such as immigration, was seen to derive from their understanding of sovereignty (Adler-Nissen, 2014a: 174 - 178). This resulted in them being stigmatised by other EU members (Adler-Nissen, 2014a: 174 - 178). The study of stigmatisation contributes to accounts of the development of sovereignty by pointing to how states may be stigmatised because of the nature of their sovereignty.

Relational accounts of the development of global international society have recently shifted from studying the formation and maintenance of identity through processes such as stigmatisation, to focusing on the study of hierarchy (Zarakol,
Hierarchy can be used to demonstrate how the development of global international society was not a process that led to the emergence of equal sovereigns (Mattern and Zarakol, 2016; Lake, 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; Zarakol, 2017). Some accounts in International Relations theory equated the process of the development of global international society with the emergence of sovereign equality (Cohen, 2012: 201; Donnelly, 2006: 145; Dunne, 2003: 310). However, sovereign equality as implied in the recognition of sovereignty, is open to question because of the persistence of forms of global hierarchy (Holm and Sending, 2018; Mathieu, 2018a). Simpson (2004: 63 - 67), for instance, argues that the development of legal pluralism in nineteenth century international law resulted in the emergence of different types of sovereignty existing simultaneously in global international society. ‘Civilised’ states were understood as having one form of sovereignty, while states that were viewed as not being as civilised were understood to possess another form (Aalberts, 2014; Bowden, [2009] 2014: 127 – 128, 136, 190; Buchan, 2006: 182; Gong, 1984; 2002: 78 - 79; Koskenniemi, 2001: 83; Reus-Smit, 1999: 47, 142; Welsh, 2017: 156). In effect, the difference in the forms of sovereignty translated to relations of hierarchy amongst sovereigns (Aalberts, 2014). Those states which were considered to be civilised were understood as having a form of sovereignty which entailed a greater scope of authority (Aalberts, 2014; Benton, 2001: 211; 2008; Buzan, 2014). For example, states that were not considered to be as civilised as others were subject to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of “civilised” states (Kroll, 2019: 144). States deemed to be ‘civilised’ were allowed to try their citizens in their consular courts located in states not deemed to be ‘civilised’ (Benton, 2001: 244 - 252; Donnelly, 1998: 4; Horowitz, 2004; 2019; Kayaoğlu, 2010a; Todd, 2018; Taha, 2019; Tzouvala, 2019). Powerful states, which could stigmatise other states because of their position in the global hierarchy, were therefore able to determine which states were quasi-sovereigns, quasi-states and proper sovereigns (Benton, 2008).

Studying hierarchy in international relations, therefore, points to how hierarchy can

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55 Quasi-soverignty differs from quasi-statehood as it questions the basis of sovereignty rather than questioning the extent to which the state, which is potentially sovereign, is functional or not (Benton, 2008; R.H. Jackson, 1990: 205; Schwarzenberger and Brown, [1947] 1976). Quasi-states can be said to possess juridical sovereignty, meaning that their sovereignty conforms to legal norms associated with sovereignty, but they lack the capacity to function effectively as states, see R.H. Jackson (1987; 1992) and Jackson and Rosberg (1986).
be understood as the product of the stigmatisation of actors on the basis of the type of sovereignty that they exhibit.

The idea of “normalization” can be used to understand the processes by which forms of international hierarchy – which may influence the form of sovereignty in global international society - are deemed normal or abnormal (Smetana, 2020: 48). Accounts of the emergence of global international society that focus on stigma argue that the forms of hierarchy that are enabled by stigma are highly durable (Zarakol, 2014; 2018b). Zarakol (2018b) claims that this includes forms of inequality and hierarchy that shape regimes of sovereignty that are present globally. However, the emergence of the contemporary global international society can also be said to have been a product of the processes of “normalization” (Smetana, 2020: 48). Although the remnants of many forms of historical hierarchy continue to be present in contemporary international politics, the history of global international society is also full of examples of the “normalization” of certain actors, ideas and institutions (Smetana and Onderco, 2018: 528). This is demonstrated in Smetana’s (2018) study of India’s nuclear weapons programme. Although India was initially stigmatised for pursuing a nuclear weapon’s programme, in time the idea of India possessing nuclear weapons became normalised to the extent that the effect of stigma was no longer felt (Smetana, 2018; Smetana and Onderco, 2018: 526). A similar process of normalisation occurred in the history of sovereignty with the literature on rogue states demonstrating how certain states and their sovereignty came to be recognised as being problematic (Bilgin and Morton, 2002: 63). National and popular sovereignty, which identified the source of sovereignty in the nation or the people respectively, emerged in Europe following the French Revolution (Barkin and Cronin, 1994; Heiskanen, 2019; Kolla, 2017). Initially, national and popular sovereignty were deemed to be a cause for stigmatisation and intervention by the established monarchies of the nineteenth century who formed the Concert of Europe.

Postcolonial approaches have demonstrated how significant aspects of the current world are the product of European colonialism, see Agathangelou and Ling (2009), Barkawi and Laffey (2002) and Epstein (2017).

Smetana (2020: 48) understands “normalization” as a strategy used by the stigmatised, wherein they present themselves as “normal” to gain acceptance, but this thesis uses normalisation to refer to the successful outcome of challenging forms of stigmatisation. Smetana (2020: 48) also alludes to this definition, by pointing to how changes in power relations in society, which sustain stigma (see Bauman, 1991: 68, Elias and Scotson, [1965] 1994: xx), can result in the end of stigmatisation through the successful normalisation.
(Holsti, 1991: 139 – 144; C. Weber, 1995: 40 - 60). However, by the end of the nineteenth century, the spread of ideas of national and popular sovereignty resulted in these states coming to accept, and thereby normalise, such forms of sovereignty (Holsti, 1991: 139 - 144). Therefore, unlike stigmatisation, normalisation can explain how certain ideas, including forms of sovereignty, came to be accepted as normal by other actors in global international society, even though they were once shunned by these same actors.

5. De-centring Westphalia and “re-centring” the state: accounting for the emergence of sovereignty

The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how viewing the emergence of contemporary forms of sovereignty through normalisation can answer the question of how states that were already in existence came to be recognised as part of contemporary global international society. Although the process of the ‘expansion of international society’ has been studied previously (see Buzan and Watson, 1984), the fact that this was a process that involved non-European forms of states becoming a part of global international society has not been considered. The agency of non-European states has been largely ignored and a narrative of inevitable Western domination has been advanced by accounts of the expansion of international society, even when these accounts have claimed to have focused on non-Western states. A critique of the so-called Eurocentric “Westphalian” model of statehood and sovereignty is required to help understand how states were able to exist prior to them being recognised as sovereign (Buzan and Little, 2001: 25; see also Inayatullah and Blaney, 1995; 2004). The section argues that a similar Eurocentrism is present in the accounts of the expansion of international society and the assumptions these accounts have about the spread of regimes of sovereignty from a European centre. Given that states did exist historically outside of the framework of Westphalia, it is necessary to recognise how different states can move from one sovereignty regime to another. This move, which is expressed in the phrase “re-centring the state” (see Grzybowski, 2018: 201), leads to the main question of this thesis: How did states that existed prior to their recognition as equal sovereigns, come to be understood as equal sovereign states at the time of the advent of global international society in the

late nineteenth and early twentieth century? This question is made more pressing by the acknowledgement that these states not only existed but were also recognised as having supreme authority over their jurisdictions by many internal and external actors. These states were considered legitimate by many within their jurisdiction and they, therefore, had their own ideas of sovereignty (Suzuki, Zhang and Quirk, 2014: 9). These states, by and large, maintained their sovereignty as a global international society emerged, but they came to be more widely recognised as sovereign (Kayaoğlu, 2007; 2010a; Phillips, 2016). The section will conclude by arguing that the sovereignty of these states can be studied using a global and historical approach, which is open to considering how non-European states can also be sovereign.

A range of different perspectives on the connection between states, sovereignty and international society are provided by the members of the English School, but there is a lack of agreement among English School theorists on the nature of the relationship between these three concepts. According to James (1986: 39), states are sovereign because they are “constitutionally independent”, meaning that they do not answer to any other authority. Sovereignty, according to James (1986: 39), therefore refers to a state having unrestricted freedom of action over its own jurisdiction and foreign policy, regardless of whether it is recognised by others (James, 1986: 39). However, another understanding of sovereignty, which is developed in Bull’s ([1977] 2012: 35) *Anarchical Society*, stresses that sovereignty refers to a set of rules that are vital for the “co-existence” of members of international society. James (1993: 272 - 273) argues that Bull’s ([1977] 2012: 41 - 47) understanding of international society, premised on the presence of shared rules, places stringent criteria on membership and effectively excludes many states. In addition, in his earlier writings, Bull ([1979] 2000: 149) argues that sovereignty is “conferred” by the “international legal order” to states. This view contrasts with that of James (1999), who argues that international society emerges as a result of the interactions between sovereign states. Yet all of these scholars fail to explain how sovereignty, in either sense, emerges in international society with James (1986: 40), as Aalberts (2012: 59) demonstrates, not explaining how external sovereignty differs from internal sovereignty through defining sovereignty solely as “constitutional independence”. Robert H. Jackson (1990: 50) suggests that former European colonies were recognised by other European states, but also suggests without
evidence that the first European sovereign states emerged without contact with each other. Wight (1977) provides a more convincing account that identifies the presence of many different states-systems existing throughout history in different times and places, such as in Ancient Greece and Persia (see also Bull and Holbraad, [1978] 2002: 14; Buzan and Little, 2000; Cox, Dunne and Booth, 2001). But how do states came to be recognised as sovereign in the context of the emergence of global international society? Specifically, were states recognised as sovereign because of their constitutional independence, or because they were recognised as members of global international society on the basis of their adherence to its constitutional rules?

The notion of the expansion of international society, developed on the basis of Bull’s ([1977] 2012) argument, suggests that his idea of sovereignty is based on a set of rules enabled the coexistence of states to be gradually accepted throughout the world (Bull and Watson, 1984). This occurred as more states adopted the institutions and practices associated with global international society, and were recognised by states who were a part of this society (Bull and Watson, 1984; Watson, 1992). As a result, international society became increasingly global as it encapsulated more states (Bull and Watson, 1984; Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018; Watson, 1992). James (1986; 1993: 285), while accepting that a single global international society has emerged today, argues that states need to be constitutionally independent in order to be members of it. According to this viewpoint, membership does not need to be premised on agreeing to a set of rules of co-existence. Independence is sufficient for membership, even though, struggles to define the constitutional rules of international society may occur. However, rather than acknowledging the presence of different types of states in international society, the English School instead focuses on a Eurocentric narrative of the spread and recognition of sovereignty (Bilgin, 2017: 133 - 138; Bull and Watson, 1984; R.H. Jackson, 1990). Although James (1986; 1999: 460) argues that international society emerges through the actions of states, very few accounts have focused on the actions of states and those that have, have focused on

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59 Specifically, R.H. Jackson (1990: 50) argues that “‘states’ appeared first in Western Europe. The original foundations were the region’s geographical and demographic configuration as ‘population islands’ in an ocean of forest and health.”

60 Suzuki (2005) recognises how international society moved from being more to less Western, but contained elements of its European origins.

61 The role of non-state actors has been emphasised in recent studies of the expansion of international society. Englehart (2010) argues that the aristocracy in Thailand adopted European cultural practices.
the diffusion of European ideas of the state and sovereignty throughout the world (Bull and Watson, 1984; Strang, 1990; 1991a; 1991b; 1992; 1996). Instead, they have been presented as passive recipients of European institutions, in processes of reception (Suzuki, Zhang and Quirk, 2014: 4 – 7). This is clear in the arguments of those who suggest that the practice of European states maintaining their extraterritorial jurisdictions in non-European states allowed these non-European states to develop their own institutions in the nineteenth century (Benton, 2002: 244 - 252; Horowitz, 2004). However, it is necessary to study the history of states which became a part of global international society in order to consider the nature and extent of the role of these states as constitutionally independent entities in the emergence of global international society.

Studies of the state in International Relations have recently contributed to developing an awareness of how the idea and practices of the state emerge in certain specific times and places (see Grzybowski, 2018), but they are problematic as explanations of how a global international society emerged. Definitions and histories of the state in International Relations have centred on the legacy of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which is also understood as marking the emergence of states as sovereign, in the sense of having their own distinct jurisdictions (de Carvalho, Leira and Hobson, 2011; Philpott, 1997; 2001). This is because the Peace of Westphalia has been assumed to be the moment when sovereignty, meaning the supreme authority of a state over its jurisdiction, came to be recognised by a host of international actors (de Carvalho, Leira and Hobson, 2011; Philpott, 1997; 2001). The Peace of Westphalia is understood in International Relations and International Law as an agreement which ended the Thirty Years’ War by bringing about a peace that involved different parties recognising the right of non-intervention in their

and symbols to secure recognition of their state in global international society. Cantir (2016; 2017) points similarly at the role of non-state actors, such as anti-slavery activists, in enabling the expansion of international society to Haiti. Pella Jr. (2013: 70; 2014; 2015) argues that the expansion of international society to Africa was made possible by non-state actors ranging from those engaged in the slave trade and other actors engaged in trade. Schouenborg (2017: 11 – 12, 113) also points to the significance of commerce in resulting in the emergence of a global international society.

Even accounts focusing on non-European developments in global international society focus exclusively on the agency of the West (Benton, 2001: 244 - 252; Clark, 2005; Keene, 2002; Strang, 1990; 1991a; 1992b; 1992; 1996; see also the critical overview of such works in Hobson, 2007; 2011; 2012; Hobson and Sajed, 2017). More generally, the chapters in Ejdus (2017) argue that memories of past subjection shape how sovereign states develop in their subsequent membership in international societies.
affairs (de Carvalho, Leira and Hobson, 2011). More specifically, it is understood as
ending the war between the “universalists”, in the form of the Catholic Spanish
Empire and Holy Roman Empire, and the “particularists”, in the form of the
Protestant states and the Protestant estates within the Holy Roman Empire (Osiander,
2001: 252). However, the significance of the Peace of Westphalia has been
challenged by Osiander (2001) and others who point to the nineteenth century as the
true date for the recognition of the importance of sovereignty (Anghie, 1999;
Benton, 2009; Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 116; Hinsley, 1973: 69 – 83; Sheehan,
2006: 6; Thomson, 1995: 215). Far from signalling an end to the challenge posed to
the sovereignty of smaller entities within Europe, according to Osiander (2001), the
Peace of Westphalia is better construed as shifting the balance in favour of smaller
units, such as the Protestant principalities, within the Holy Roman Empire. However,
the Peace of Westphalia, and similar “benchmark dates”63 (see Buzan and Lawson,
2014: 437) have continued to influence theories of International Relations with
regard to the emergence of sovereignty (de Carvalho, Leira and Hobson, 2011).

There is also an assumption that Westphalian sovereignty was constituted in
Europe and then diffused to the rest of the globe. This original Eurocentric narrative
of expansion has recently been challenged by scholars (Buzan and Schouenborg,
2018; Ejdus, 2017; Pella Jr., 2014; 2015). These scholars echo many of the earlier
arguments of the English School, which pointed to the presence of multiple
international systems throughout history (Wight, 1977). More recently, the role of
regional international societies has been promoted by theorists of the English School
(Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, 2009; Schouenborg, 2013. Buzan and Schouenborg’s
(2018) account of the development of global international society focuses on the
interactions between different regions. Regional international societies advance
different understandings of what they deem to be normal “institutions”
(Schouenborg, 2012: 40; 2013: 132). These understandings of “normal” institutions
provided templates for forms of sovereignty that states within global international
society could follow (Buzan and Schouenborg, 2018: 19). A state may therefore be

63 Wight (1977: 129), in fact, argues that the Council of Constance of 1414 - 1418 marked the onset
of the international system. This was because at the Council, the Byzantine Emperor and the Papacy
recognised the presence of different states as legitimate actors, instead of referring to a united
Christendom.
considered sovereign by members of one international society, but not by members of another international society (Batora, 2017: 139). However, Hobson (2009: 682) argues that the “geopolitical/military, ideological/discursive and political” basis of sovereignty partially originated in Asia. Hobson (2009: 680 - 682) contends that forms of connectedness emerged between Europe and Asia immediately prior to the onset of sovereignty, as an idea and a practice in the seventeenth century and became institutionalised in the nineteenth century. In addition to the similarities that existed in how sovereignty was understood in Asia and Europe in the seventeenth century, powerful states with their own understandings of sovereignty were historically present, which challenges the privileging of “Westphalian” sovereignty (Kayaoğlu, 2007: 649). Powerful non-European states, such as China, Japan, Iran and the Ottoman Empire, which often participated in sovereignty regimes shared by other non-European states, were present, and remained significant in the first half of the nineteenth century (Bull, 1984: 123–165; Neumann, 2014: 30; Suzuki, Zhang and Quirk, 2014: 8). It is hence necessary to consider the role of these non-European states with their own understandings of sovereignty, which were also often members of regional international societies, in the emergence of global international society.

Although many approaches have focused on explaining how the concept of the state emerged as a result of global developments, studies focusing on the role of states present throughout the world, in the emergence of global international society are still needed. Different sovereignty regimes, meaning rules concerning which states can be considered sovereign and how sovereignty can be achieved (see Agnew, 2005: 438 and Kuus and Agnew, 2008), were present historically at the global and regional level. Schouenborg’s (2012: 130) regional and historical approach towards studying the development of global international society points to how different forms of sovereignty are present at the regional level, which challenge the assumption of “Westphalian” sovereignty being universal. The presence of

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64 Hobson (2009: 682 - 686) here argues that once these connections were in place, interactions unfolded which resulted in the diffusion of new ways of conceptualising and controlling territory, such as the use of mapping techniques and gunpowder, which made it possible to think of the concept of sovereignty as exclusive control over territory.

65 Bull (1984: 123) and Little (2014: 162) suggested that states existed prior to the expansion of European power, even though they had not been viewed as such by nineteenth century Europeans.

different sovereignty regimes means that “Westphalian” sovereignty cannot be taken for granted as a characteristic present in all states (Kayaoğlu, 2007: 649). For instance, Grovogui (2002: 316 - 318) argues that European international thinkers believed that the various African polities in the Congo at the time of their colonisation were illegitimate. However, because of the limited degree of effective control in Belgium at the time of its colonisation of the Congo, Grovogui (2002: 316 - 318) claims that Belgium would also fail to satisfy then-widespread criteria for sovereign statehood. But accounts that aim to demonstrate how factors aside from the state played a role in the development of characteristics of contemporary global international society continue to rely on the concept of the state, as in their use of the concept of “non-state” actors (Corry, 2010: 158). Hence, Grzybowski (2018: 201) argues that such approaches “re-centre the state”, as a part of their ultimate aim to “de-centre” dominant understandings of the state. Similarly, Lottholz and Lemay-Hebert (2016) argue that a post-Weberian perspective is needed, which would involve recognising how states develop in contexts in which there are a wide-range of different ideas about legitimacy. Additionally, the act of recognising another state as sovereign, which historically played a role in the emergence of global international society, has always been carried out by the representatives other states (Koskenniemi, 1991; Lorca, 2014). This means that these other states’ ideas of legitimacy are also significant in the development of sovereign statehood (Lottholz and Lemay-Hebert, 2016). It is therefore necessary to focus on the state to explain how sovereignty in global international society developed, owing to how sovereignty highlights particular forms of state authority and can be conferred by existing to prospective sovereigns.

Hobson (1998: 295) earlier advocated a similar “Weberian” approach to demonstrate “the complex interrelationship between states, societies and international systems”. However, Hobson (1998: 295) here sees legitimacy as a causal factor in the emergence of international society (see Hobson, 1998: 287 and his discussion of J.A. Hall, 1986; Mann, 1986; 1993; Runciman, 1989). Similarly to Ruggie (1983: 275 - 276), Hobson (1998: 294) argues that the focus on sovereignty by neo-realists, such as Waltz (1979: 40 – 60), has prevented the causal role of the “international system” and “societies” from being understood. This means that Hobson (1998; 2000; 2002: 66) does not understand the process of the emergence of a state to be subject to what March and Olsen (1998: 949) term the “logic of appropriateness”. March and Olsen (1998: 949) distinguish the “logic of appropriateness” from the “logic of consequences” and stress that the latter logic is present in causal explanations. A perspective that acknowledges the importance of March and Olsen’s (1998) insights and shares the goal of explaining the interactions between states, other actors and international society is provided by Mabee (2007).
Assuming the presence of state-like entities throughout the globe also aligns with recent studies of the history of global international society, which focus on the encounters between different forms of states associated with different places and different times (Suzuki, Zhang and Quirk, 2014). Firstly, studies have focused on how states from different geographies interacted with each other, such as the initial interaction of non-European states with a powerful European international society (Suzuki, Zhang and Quirk, 2014). In these cases, as has been discussed, these states were unable to secure the full recognition of their sovereignty, which leads to the question of how these states which were sovereign were able to gain recognition of their equal sovereign rights in global international society (Kayaoğlu, 2007; 2010a). A clue as to how this may have been possible is present in how different forms of state and their respective forms of sovereignty may be associated with certain time periods (Lundborg, 2016). For instance, following the American and French revolutions, dynastic sovereignty, in which sovereignty was held by a monarch, came to be perceived as being of another time (Barkin and Cronin, 1994; Bukovansky, 2002; Kolla, 2017). Although democratic or republican states were once stigmatised for not satisfying accepted definitions of sovereignty, they gradually came to be recognised as equal sovereigns by the established states of global international society (Holsti, 1991: 139 – 144; Simpson, 2004: 254 – 255; C. Weber, 1995). This chimes with the argument that the constitutional rules of international society underwent change through processes of wars and religious change (Phillips, 2010). States played a crucial role in this process because once a group advancing a new understanding of sovereignty took control of a state, they were able to use their position to enter into relations of solidarity with other groups seeking to take control of or consolidate their control of states (Bukovansky, 1999; 2002; Halliday, 1990; 1999; Mabee, 2007). It is therefore possible to ask whether and how the established states in global international society came to recognise the rights of states with different understandings of sovereignty. In other words, how did states that were stigmatised by the dominant states in global international society later become accepted as normal states within it?

68 On the role of religious solidarity in facilitating the recognition of sovereignty in Europe see de Carvalho and Paras (2015).
6. Conclusion:

This chapter has demonstrated how our understanding of sovereignty can be furthered by asking the question how states that were sovereign in the sense of being independent later came to be considered equal sovereign states in the emergent global international society. It reviewed existing accounts of the development of the contemporary international society and noted how these accounts overlooked how states that exhibited a different form of sovereignty to the sovereignty recognised at Westphalia came to be a part of the global international society. The first section defended the idea of sovereignty as supreme authority over a given jurisdiction (see Kayaoğlu, 2007: 649 – 650; Thomson, 1994: ch. 1; 1995: 214; Zarakol, 2018a). It explained how such a definition of sovereignty was not Eurocentric because adopting a historical view of the development of sovereignty within global international society enables one to demonstrate the global relevance of the concept of sovereignty. Throughout history, both European and non-European states sought to assert their authority over jurisdictions (Alexandrowicz, 1959). The second section examined different applications of the concept of sovereignty within existing accounts of the emergence of global international society. It considered how sovereignty can be identified within these accounts and argued that sovereignty needs to be understood as both power and legitimacy. The third section argued that a relational account of the emergence of contemporary global international society could help trace how this society emerged. This section critiqued existing approaches for focusing exclusively on the emergence of hierarchy in global international society. It argued that a relational approach would necessitate also studying challenges to hierarchy and stigmatisation and thus pointed to the usefulness of the concept of “normalization” (Smetana, 2020: 42). The fourth section focused on how certain states, though not initially recognised as sovereign by the dominant states in global international society, had nevertheless for centuries had their own conceptions of sovereignty. Studying how these states became a part of global international society requires developing and applying a method of global history (Phillips, 2016). Such a global historical approach, which is developed in the next chapter, can demonstrate how these states came to be understood as sovereign in the same sense as the established states of global international society.
2. Global and local constituent power: The recognition of sovereign equality in global international society and the Ottoman/Turkish case

1. Introduction:

This chapter outlines how the research question of the thesis will be addressed. It presents the theoretical framework and justifies the application of this framework to the Ottoman/Turkish case. The first section demonstrates how an intellectual history approach reveals how the constitutional principles of global international society came to be understood. This section shows how this approach may be used to outline a theory of global constitutional change and explain concepts that are historically and theoretically associated with global constitutional principles, such as sovereignty and sovereign equality (Aalberts, 2014; Donnelly, 2006; Mathieu, 2018a). The second section presents the theoretical framework used to advance the argument that constituent power best explains the emergence of the constitutional principles of global international society. The third section reviews existing accounts of the emergence of the constitutional principles of global international society, such as those concentrating on the diffusion of ideas of sovereignty (see Boli, 2001) and the argument that sovereignty developed through an expression of state power (see Chowdhury and Duvall, 2014). These accounts have their merits, but it is argued that a focus on constituent power provides a clearer understanding of how these global constitutional principles emerge. A case is made for the use of the concept of “constituent diplomacy”, as pioneered by Cornago (2017: 327), to explain how actors engage in diplomacy to alter the constitutional principles of global international society. Here, constituent diplomacy is related to normative (see Kavakski, 2013: 250) and social power (see Mann, 1986: 1), and to the concepts of stigmatisation and “normalization” (Smetana, 2020: 42). The fourth section introduces the Ottoman/Turkish case. The Young Turks and their successors played a key role as the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the Republic of Turkey emerged (Zürcher, 2010). An argument is made for the study of this case given the significance of the Ottoman Empire’s position on the cusp of European international society (Rae, 2017). This European international society, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, became indistinguishable from global international society. Individual Young Turks formulated their ideas concerning the constitutional
rules of global international society, and, by engaging in constituent diplomacy, sought to gain external recognition of their sovereignty within it.

2. Global history, intellectual history, International Relations and sovereignty

This section introduces the specific approach of this thesis, combining global history and the history of ideas, and demonstrates how it can be used to understand sovereignty in International Relations, by showing how the concept has been understood and used historically, alongside its logical meaning. It firstly defends the use of intellectual history to advance theorising in International Relations. Here, the realist and non-ideal turn in political theory needs to be noted as providing a means of understanding how concepts can be studied in a historical and social context and philosophically (Bell, 2017; Galston, 2010). Koselleck’s (2002) conceptual history approach is then reviewed. How Koselleck’s (2002) approach may be integrated with other approaches to intellectual history is considered. In this context, the value of Koselleck’s (2002) concept of Sattelzeit for dating concepts in International Relations and for understanding how changes result in the production of new concepts is examined. Skinner’s (1969) contextualist approach to intellectual history is then discussed. This approach provides a crucial means to retrieve meanings from their specific contexts. It is invaluable for any study that seeks to explain how meanings have changed over time. However, Skinner’s (1969) approach is criticised for not being sufficiently global. He does not consider how ideas may move from one context to another. Lovejoy’s (1940: 4) “history of ideas”, which focuses on ideas as the unit of analysis, can be combined with Skinner’s (1969) approach to help understand how meanings may travel from one context to another (Herbjornsrud, 2019: 10). This section also considers how concepts tend to be closely related to each other. It explains how an approach to the study of the emergence of sovereignty throughout the world should focus on how concepts are tied to other concepts in terms of their actual and historical meanings. The section reviews different approaches to the history of ideas and presents what can be termed a connected intellectual history approach to the study of concepts in International Relations.
Prior to considering whether and how International Relations and intellectual history can be combined, it is necessary to understand the nature of the relationship between ideas and history. Various approaches contend that the study of philosophy can be reduced to the study of history, in the form of the study of ideas (Ball, 1988; Rorty, 1984; Skinner, 1969; 2002; White, [1973] 2014). However, other approaches have claimed that ideas actually shape the study of history (Bartelson, 2007: 103 – 112; Danto, 1953; Gorman, 2007; Schaff, 1976). Here, it is argued that even accounts which claim to be purely historical are actually proponents of various theoretical perspectives that are, in some cases, tied to the political convictions of historians (Kurki and Suganami, 2012; Suganami, 2017). This is because they are formulated with a number of theoretical beliefs in mind, which shapes how the original question of the research is formulated and determines what sources and facts are deemed to be significant (Danto, 1953; Kurki and Suganami, 2012; Suganami, 2013: 62; 2017). The argument stressing the primacy of theory over history is open to criticism by those who contend that all forms of theorising and philosophy are, in the last analysis, reducible to historical statements (Bartelson, 2007: 116). This argument, most clearly presented in the approach of Michel Foucault ([1969] 2002; see also the discussion in Bartelson, 2007: 116), claims that all ideas can only be expressed in language. Therefore, studying ideas merely involves studying what has been said about them. A summary of these different perspectives is provided by Mandelbaum (1965: 33), who outlines how the “history of philosophy”, “intellectual history” and the “history of ideas” are traditionally considered to be separate from each other. However, Mandelbaum (1965: 60 - 66) argues that this distinction is untenable if one challenges the separation between philosophy and other forms of thinking and reflection, given how forms of reflection in religion and science, for instance, may overlap with the concerns of philosophy. Moreover, the distinction between intellectual history and the history of ideas is also untenable once the movement of ideas from different contexts is acknowledged (Mandelbaum, 1965: 43 - 66). Recognising the mobility of ideas in time and space enables the history of ideas to be used to provide a more rigorous intellectual history (Herbjørnsrud, 2019). Yet concepts can also be said to have a logical existence outside of how they have historically been understood and used (Bartelson, 2007; Frazer, 2019; Green, 2015).
Therefore, sets of ideas can be understood to be coherent in two senses. Firstly, they may cohere historically. There is a history of them being used together (Geuss, 2001: 51 - 52). Secondly, they can be said to cohere logically, meaning that they are tied to each other in a logical argument (Bartelson, 2007: 115). Although scholars have tended to prefer one form of explanation over the other, this does not need to be the case (Bartelson, 2007; Frazer, 2019; Green, 2015; Nardin, 2015: 91).

However, given how the ideas that are available at any given time are limited, studies of the history of concepts must concentrate on the ideas that are available in the present (Bartelson, 2007: 105). The realist turn in political theory has acknowledged this (Galston, 2010). Contextual historians have also problematised how ideas are situated within specific historical and geographical contexts (Skinner, 2002). This means that it does not make sense to construct ideal theories, which are not informed by the actual history of concepts (Geuss, 2008: 38). Instead, realist political theorists argue for focusing on how concepts are actually used (Erman and Möller, 2018; Geuss, 2008: 38, 48 - 49; Valentini, 2012). Secondly, they call for a normative approach with regard to developing concepts that reflect reality (Bell, 2017; Prinz and Rossi, 2018). This amounts to critiquing historical uses of concepts, which may be overly idealistic, in favour of developing a more realistic understanding of a concept (Bell, 2017; Geuss, 2008; Hall and Sleat, 2018; Rossi and Sleat, 2014). Realist political theory, therefore, engages in intellectual history insofar as realists consider previous philosophical arguments to be historical artefacts that ought to be examined and critiqued if they do not take reality as their starting point (Bell, 2017; Galston, 2010). However, the form of history advocated by realist political theory does not necessarily result in a critique of past ideas, since the retrieval of ideas from the past may improve our understanding of the present (Rorty, 1984: 49 - 50). Therefore, seeking to reconstruct the contexts in which a concept that is available in the present was used in the past, can help uncover forgotten meanings of the original concept and allow us to develop more accurate concepts and theories to make sense of these contexts.

Sleat (2016: 34) argues that “realism” ought to be distinguished from “non-ideal” theory, since the former refers to a view that conflict is ubiquitous in society, whereas the latter opposes thinking in terms of ideal categories that are distinct from the lived experience of ideas. This distinction is not, however, adopted here. Both of these approaches, outlined by Sleat (2016), involve appreciating the value of studying the reality that concepts are embedded in.
The relationship between philosophy and history can be said to be mirrored by the relationship between political theory, an offshoot of philosophy, and International Relations, a field which was, at least partly, shaped by history. Specifically, the realist turn in political theory, which involves a focus on intellectual history, and the global and historical turn within International Relations, complement each other. This is because these perspectives can contribute to challenging the assumptions that are commonly-held in International Relations theory, including the view that sovereignty can only be understood within the European context of its origin (Bull and Watson, 1984). International thought throughout its history has been influenced by the broader political context in which it was developed (Armitage, 2014). Armitage (2014), and Acharya and Buzan (2010: 2), who focus on the context of the development of International Relations theories, echo Cox’s (1986: 207) view that in International Relations, as elsewhere, “theory is always for someone and some purpose”. This chimes with the idea that International Relations emerged as a science of Western colonial administration, as many of its concepts were developed as a means to aid the colonisers (Blaney and Tickner, 2017). A similar view is held by Guzzini (2013: 523 - 530), who claims that the theoretical concepts applied in International Relations have emerged from its practice. As International Relations is concerned with the actual practice of international relations, its relationship to theory bears a similarity to the realist approach to political theory. Geuss’s (2008) definition of the role of realism in political theory involves building arguments in political theory on the basis of facts concerning politics rather than on an ideal vision of human relations. However, realism can also be used to study how normative proposals in International Relations are produced, according to Carr (1939; see also the discussion in Bell, 2017: 8). Bartelson (2018: 1 – 3, 29), building on the constructivism of Hacking (2004: 1), has argued similarly for studying the “historical ontology” of concepts. This approach, similar to Reus-Smit’s (2008: 410) call to study “ideas in history”, involves studying how concepts historically emerged in philosophical theories and shaped reality by influencing practice. The

Reus-Smit (2008: 410) here argues that constructivist accounts, such as Finnemore’s (2003) account of the justifications provided for interventions and Rae’s (2002) account of the justifications provided for genocide in the course of state-building, involve studying how ideas are used to bring about certain changes in the world. Unlike Bartelson (2007) though, Reus-Smit (2002; 2008) does not suggest that ideas may have a coherence that stems from their logical connectedness, alongside how they happen to be used to bring about certain effects in the world.
work of Shilliam (2010) and Ayoob (1995; 2002), in this context, has stressed the need to study theorising beyond the original context of the emergence of International Relations in the West (Acharya and Buzan, 2010). Therefore, both International Relations and intellectual history may be combined to question the origins and usefulness of concepts used within International Relations.

Having demonstrated how International Relations and political theory can be combined, it is possible to review the different forms of intellectual history which aim to bridge philosophy and history. Here, the approaches adopted by Skinner (2002) and Koselleck (2002) can be combined with International Relations to provide an analysis of concepts in International Relations, including the concept of sovereignty. Both Skinner (2002) and Koselleck (2002) engage in a history of philosophy with a broader aim of contributing to the understanding of philosophy more generally. Skinner (2002: 4, 82) argues, on the basis of Wittgenstein’s ([1953] 1958: 146) consideration of how language is used in speech and writing, that it is impossible to conceive of the meaning of a term without relating it to its context and the individuals situated within it. Terms that are used in political and philosophical texts, such as sovereignty, therefore make sense in isolation or in relation to other concepts, insofar as they are used by their authors to convey particular meanings and bring about certain effects (Skinner, 2002: 82). Although this approach may not unjustifiably seem to deny theory any autonomy from its context, Skinner (2002: 4) argues that his ultimate goal is to clarify the terms which are used in theories.

Koselleck (1982), on the other hand, developed a project that was much more explicitly philosophical, insofar as he was motivated by the desire to provide a definition of various philosophical terms that were used in politics (Richter, 1986). In contrast to Skinner’s (2002) focus on particular contexts, Koselleck’s (1982; 2002) work involves identifying turning points in the history of ideas. This approach involves an intervention on the part of the intellectual historian to arbitrarily divide periods in the development of ideas, with Koselleck (2002) himself

71 Onuf (1991: 434 - 440) presents such a history of sovereignty, where he focuses on its early development in the sixteenth century. Onuf (1991: 434) here studies the emergence of the idea of sovereignty, by considering the writings of thinkers such as Bodin ([1576] 1992), and also focuses on how the historical trends of the collapse of theology, the emergence of republican ideas and their promotion by Protestant movements.

72 A similar notion is conveyed by R. Williams’s ([1980] 2012: 120) who urges the study of “new meanings and values, new practices, new significances and experiences”.
arguing that the period from the eighteenth to nineteenth century in Europe was seminal in the development of contemporary political theories (Motzkin, 2005). As these approaches employed by Skinner (1969; 2002) and Koselleck (1982; 2002) are intended to provide new tools for theorising, they may be combined to provide accounts of concepts that are used in International Relations, such as sovereignty.

Although Skinner (1969; 2002) and Koselleck (1982; 2002) provide useful approaches to trace the history of concepts in International Relations, they need to be supplemented by Lovejoy’s (1940: 4) work to account for the “travel” of ideas (Herbjornsrud, 2019: 13). Both Skinner (1969; 2002) and Koselleck (1982; 2002) have approaches that are ideal for answering the question of this thesis concerning how contemporary global international society emerged because of how they proceed from our present-day understanding of concepts. Skinner’s (1969; 2002) works, for instance, involve tracing the original interlocutors of texts that are now understood to be canonical works of political theory, to advance new interpretations of these texts and their contexts. Koselleck’s (2002: 154 - 160) work involves a study of the trajectory of contemporary ideas that examines how these ideas came to be formed. However, both works can be said to be distinctly narrow in their focus, overlooking the insights of the earlier approach of Lovejoy (1940) to the history of ideas (Herbjornsrud, 2019: 10). Lovejoy (1940) argued, in contrast to Skinner (2002) and Koselleck (2002), for an approach to intellectual history that would recognise how ideas have, throughout history, moved from one context to another (Herbjornsrud, 2019: 10). In contrast, Skinner (2002) only observes how ideas develop in singular contexts, whereas Koselleck (2002: 154 - 160) focuses on how ideas converge in the narrow context of the Europe of his day. Such a privileging of one context overlooks how these different contexts have been connected, as in the case of the emergence of global international society. Lovejoy’s (1940) approach can be combined with that of Skinner (1969; 2002), by highlighting how connections facilitated the transfer of ideas from context to context and that of Koselleck (1982; 2002), by demonstrating how the movement of ideas can result in the emergence of new periods in the history of ideas. By recognising how ideas are developed in individual contexts and then interact with each other through the establishment of connections between them such an approach can point to how ideas of sovereignty
and, related concepts, such as sovereign equality spread and develop in the context of the emergence of a global international society.

Focusing on Lovejoy’s (1940) approach also means that it is possible to combine philosophical and historical studies of ideas, given how it focuses on ideas and how they have historically moved from context to context. The contribution of his approach is to demonstrate how ideas can move into contexts and interact with other ideas already present in these contexts (Herbjornsrud, 2019: 10; Lovejoy, 1940). Moreover, ideas that are present in different contexts may have a shared origin, which can be revealed by tracing how the same ideas travelled from one context to another. Connections and comparisons can also be made between the contexts in which such ideas of sovereignty emerge and travel, thereby facilitating a dialogue between intellectual history and comparative politics (Simon, 2019). In the case of ideas of sovereignty, for instance, these may have travelled to different parts of the world from a single source (Hobson, 2009). As Herbjornsrud (2019) has noted, a connected history approach can reveal how the connections that once existed between different contexts can allow ideas to move from one context to another. By focusing on how the content of ideas was received and interpreted in different contexts, philosophical arguments concerning the true nature of such concepts can also be developed (Rorty, 1984). Moreover, attending to how various ideas are received in different contexts can also point to the similarities between ideas in these contexts (Herbjornsrud, 2019). In the context of state sovereignty, for instance, European states and Islamic states in Asia were influenced by ideas of sovereign statehood developed in antiquity (Crone, [2004] 2014: loc. 1201; Lambton, 1981; Vatikiotis, [1987] 2018). Identifying the connections between different contexts and how ideas of sovereignty travelled from one context to another can also point to how sovereignty came to be associated with other concepts, such as those of ‘civilisation’ and ‘nationhood’ in the nineteenth century. Similarly, it can demonstrate how ideas, such as sovereignty, came to be disassociated from other ideas in the nineteenth century, such as dynasticism (Barkin and Cronin, 1994). The way in which different ideas that came to be attached or detached from sovereignty

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73 See especially Lambton’s (1981: 72) discussion of how the late ninth and early tenth century Arabic thinker, al-Farabi, drew upon Plato and Aristotle to engage with political and social questions.
would also influence how actors would seek to justify their claims to sovereignty. It is therefore essential to adopt this approach to the history of ideas to understand how individuals historically understood sovereignty and sought to advance claims to sovereign equality in global international society.

3. Constituent power, diplomacy and the normalisation of sovereignty in international society

This section presents the conceptual framework used in this thesis, which argues that the concept of constituent power can be used to theorise how states that were sovereign, but not recognised as equals by the established states in global international society, came to secure recognition as equal sovereigns equals. It begins by outlining how this thesis argues that theory ought to be understood as a means of developing a clearer sense of reality and how a global intellectual history can aid in this process of theory-building. Next, turning to the development of global constitutional society, it argues that the idea of constituent power can explain the local and global processes that resulted in the emergence of a global international society in the nineteenth century. The concept of constituent power is then subjected to further analysis, on the basis of how it has been understood in constitutional and political theory. How instances of constituent power can take the form of different degrees of social power and normative power are then outlined. Social power refers to the ability of actors to enact their will over society (Mann, 1986: 1). Normative power refers to the persuasive force of the arguments of these actors, or to the legitimacy of the arguments themselves, which derives from their reference to ethical principles (Kavalski, 2013). The idea of “constituent diplomacy”, referring to how actors may wield constituent power at the global level, to achieve their diplomatic objects is then introduced and discussed (Cornago, 2017: 327). The connection between local and global forms of constituent power and how they may both be harnessed by constituent diplomacy is then discussed. Next, how this theoretical framework can be placed in dialogue with the ideas of normalisation and stigmatisation, presented and developed in Chapter 1, is discussed. Constituent diplomacy can, it is argued, by understood as a means by which stigmatisation can be challenged and normalisation advanced. Finally, the section concludes by noting how this normalisation can take the form of the normalisation of states in accordance
with global constitutional principles or it can involve the normalisation of new global constitutional principles, including new ideas of sovereignty and sovereign equality.

In order for a theory to be compelling, it must provide a clear means of understanding phenomena in the external world, thereby enabling one to visualise the developments it seeks to represent (see Waever, 2009). As was argued in Chapter 1, rather than assume that there are timeless concepts that can help understand phenomena, it makes sense to consider whether these concepts accurately convey the nature of reality. This can be done by studying whether and how the phenomena that these concepts seek to explain are instantiated in reality, thereby helping build an “analytical narrative”74 (P.T. Jackson, 2010: 157). This, in turn, can involve the use of global history, as many scholars working with the concept of international society have recognised (Phillips, 2016). Global history can draw upon global intellectual history, to describe the ideas that were available to actors in different historical contexts75. As noted in the first section of this chapter, when combined with a study of history, a study of concepts can demonstrate whether and how these concepts were realised by actors in international society (Lawson, 2010: 213 - 222). Such an approach can demonstrate how and to what extent the ideas contained in the constitutional principles of global international society came to be advanced by actors who adopted these ideas (Berenskötter, 2018: 817; Lawson, 2010: 219 – 222).

Additional concepts, aside from the concepts present in a historical context, can act as ideal types to develop a theory of how the ideas that are revealed in intellectual history impact on the external world (P.T. Jackson, 2010: 157; Lawson, 2010: 219 - 222)76. As Max Weber ([1921] 1978: 6) suggests, ideal types can assist in the

74 Patrick T. Jackson (2010: 157) argues that such an approach, which he characterises as “analyticist”, involves providing an “analytical narrative” of processes occurring in the world, which draws upon different concepts to provide an explanation. These concepts are “ideal types”, in the sense used by Max Weber ([1921] 1978: 9) that are not entirely instantiated in reality; they are “deliberate oversimplifications” of reality (P.T. Jackson, 2010: 157).

75 Many scholars, including Bell (2001; 2003; 2009), Armitage (2014) and Keene (2017) have argued for an intellectual history of the discipline of International Relations, rather than its objects of study (but see Bartelson, 2007 and Reus-Smit, 2008).

76 Jackson (2010: 221) argues that single case studies can demonstrate the usefulness of ideal types in providing a picture of reality. Lawson (2010: 220), however, argues convincingly that ideal-gyration, of the sort presented by P.T. Jackson (2010) can form part of a process he terms “nomothetic history”, whereby studying historical cases of a phenomenon can aid the process of the development of ideal types meant to convey a general sense of the phenomenon in question.
development of theories through the study of history because any deviation from an ideal type can contribute to developing more detailed and nuanced theories. Max Weber ([1921] 1978: 21) argues that “the more abstract and unrealistic” an “ideal type” is, “the better it is able to perform its functions in formulating terminology, classifications, and hypotheses”, before adding that “the procedure of the historian is essentially the same”. Ideal types can therefore be used to consider historical events, thereby demonstrating the weaknesses of existing ideal types. Such an approach can provide a means of understanding how ideas of sovereignty and sovereign equality, and those used in their justification, enabled these states to secure their desired status of sovereign equality in global international society.

The idea of constituent power can explain the local and global processes that resulted in the emergence of the constitutional principles of global international society, including sovereignty and sovereign equality. Constituent power was first used by Emmanuel de Sieyes ([1789] 2003) in his revolutionary tract, What Is The Third Estate?, written during the French Revolution (Rubinelli, 2018; 2019). The Third Estate, which included members of society who were not a part of the clergy or the aristocracy, were understood as those who actually constituted society and were thus able to legislate for all of society (Thornhill, 2014: 359 - 365). Although constituent power, therefore, refers to the force that creates a constitutional order in a given political community (see Arato, 2017; Del Lucches, 2017: 4 - 5), it can also be understood as being present at a global level (see Müller, 2014: 88 - 89). It can explain how the constitutional principles of an international society undergo change, in a way similar to how the constituent power can be employed to explain how domestic constitutions can undergo change (Oates, 2017; Patberg, 2013; Somek, 2012). Hardt and Negri (2001: 410 - 413) developed such an account of how a global constituent power could emerge by noting how different social movements throughout the globe could cooperate to challenge what they refer to as “Empire”

Reus-Smit (2008: 401) Philpott (2001: 28) and Phillips (2010: 23) use the concept of a constitution to explain the norms that exist internationally. Phillips (2010: 46) additionally uses the term “constituent phases” to explain the phases that different international constitutional orders tend to undergo in the form of “decay, crisis, collapse and reconstruction”. However, neither Reus-Smit (2008) nor Phillips (2010) use the term ‘constituent power’ or explain how such constitutional orders emerge. Reus-Smit (1997; 1999; 2008), argues that constitutional principles emerge through communication. Philpott (2001) and Phillips (2010) point to the causal force of wars and religion, but do not consider how other forms of normative and social power may bring about changes to local and global constitutional principles.
“Empire”, here, is taken to mean forms of global domination and exploitation that have emerged and replaced traditional forms of domination associated with sovereign states (Hardt and Negri, 2001: xii). However, as Barkawi and Laffey (2002) highlight, Hardt and Negri’s (2001) approach overlooks the various historical forms of states present throughout the world. In the context of the actual historical development of European and later global international society, sovereignty was understood as the constitutional principle that had a bearing on which actors were considered its members (Philpott, 2001: 28; Reus-Smit, 2008). Following a series of revolutions, which, included the late eighteenth century French and American (see Partlett, 2017) revolutions, the idea of sovereignty in European international society and, relatedly, how it could be gained and what it involved, underwent change as sovereignty increasingly came to be understood as held by peoples or nations within states (Kolla, 2017). The concept of constituent power can aptly explain how different ideas of sovereignty evolved in the context of international and domestic constitution-building efforts, either as novel constitutional principles or through the altering of existing constitutional principles.

Instances of constituent power, whether present at the local or global level, can be characterised as forms of social power or may derive from normative power. “Social power” refers to the ability to enforce one’s will over others in the social context in which they are present (Mann, 1986: 6). “Normative power”, refers to the power that is possessed by an actor on the basis of its “recognition” by those whose actions it is influencing (Kavalski, 2013: 50). “Constituent power” can take the form of normative power when it influences how actors behave by providing legitimate guidelines for them to follow in their actions, which also serve to constitute new

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78 Building on earlier critiques of sovereignty, such as that of Krasner (2001b; see also Krasner, 1999; 2001a) and Shaw (2000), Barkawi and Laffey (2002) argue that it is the agency of European empires and their continuing effects that can explain developments in International Relations. Barkawi and Laffey (2002: 121) accordingly criticise Held (1995), Bartelson (1995) and Bull and Watson (1984) for not considering how the same processes that resulted in the production of sovereignty also facilitated European imperialism and racism (see also Nişancıoğlu, 2019). However, recognising how the emergence of new rules of sovereignty facilitated such processes can contribute to developing a clearer historical understanding of sovereignty and does not mean that sovereignty ought to be sidelined as an area of study.

79 Popular and national sovereignty were also embraced by political movements in England, including those that facilitated the Glorious Revolution of 1688 (see Yack, 2001).

80 See Ringmar (2012: 19)
constitutional rules (Müller, 2014: 88). As Loughlin (2014: 219) suggests, existing theories of the constituent power often differ as to whether it should be understood as a form of normative power or social power. Normative legal theorists, such as Dyzenhaus (1997a; 1997b), are sceptical of the analytical utility of the concept of constituent power, since understanding law as ultimately being based on a set of norms that are already in existence does not require an explanation of how such norms emerge (Loughlin, 2014: 219). In contrast, as Loughlin (2014: 219) explains, Carl Schmitt ([1922] 2005) argues that law is premised on a “sovereign will”, which can be identified as the constituent power. This suggests that constituent power is reducible to social powers. However, Loughlin (2014: 219), adopts a “relationalist” perspective of the constituent power, which suggests that it is also based on conceptions “of political right … expressing the open, provisional, and dynamic dimensions to constitutional ordering”. Müller (2014: 97), who argues that legal studies of international constitutional rules can be combined with historical studies of the relations between states, advances a similar proposal. Specifically, Müller (2014: 97) contends that “normative” explanations for the emergence and development of constitutional structures, can be complemented by a study of other “conditions” and “driving forces” to account for this emergence. This provides a useful means of applying constituent power in explaining changes in how constitutional rules are understood. This captures how constituent power is related both to normative power, expressed through the concept of rights, and social power. Specifically, the concept of the constituent power can be used to understand how sovereign actors can seek to consolidate their perceived rights in global international society, such as their right to sovereign equality.

Cornago’s (2017: 327) concept of “constituent diplomacy” can explain how actors sought to use constituent power to alter the constitutional principles of global international society to gain recognition of the sovereign equality of states. This recognition may be achieved by using constituent power under existing constitutional rules, or by employing such power to secure changes to these rules to facilitate recognition. Cornago (2017) first advanced the idea of constituent

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82 See also Walker (2016).
diplomacy to explain how sub-state groups, such as pro-Basque and Catalan political actors within the Spanish state, sought to alter the constitution of Spain through engaging in diplomacy with the authorities in Madrid and in other states. Given how global international society can also be said to have its own constitutional rules, the concept of constituent power and diplomacy can be used, in a broader sense, to understand how actors seek to alter global international society and/or their place within it (Brunkhorst, 2016; Fierke, 2017; Kumm, 2016a; 2016b; Müller, 2014: 88; Patberg, 2016; Teubner, 2012: 61 – 66; Thornhill, 2013; 2014; 2017). Both state and non-state actors could engage in constituent diplomacy to restructure the constitutional rules in the various contexts in which they find themselves, including the domestic, regional and global contexts (Cornago, 2017; Lorey, 2019; Niesen, 2019a; 2019b). Thus, transnational social movements, as in the case of those who supported the French, American and more recent revolutions, may be viewed as actors engaged in constituent diplomacy in both global and local contexts (Chang, 2019; Lang, 2017; Murphy, 2019; Niesen, 2017; 2019a). As is often the case with nationalist movements, which can operate transnationally, actors engaged in constituent diplomacy can draw upon both social and normative forms of power. For instance, movements seeking national recognition could attempt to bring about constitutional change through wars (see Holsti, 2004: 122 – 123; Phillips, 2010) or through appealing to what they take to be their rights under the existing constitutional principles of global international society (see Griffiths, 2017; Thornhill, 2017). The significance of both ideas, and the historical contexts in which they are embedded in, to explain the emergence of international constitutional principles, has been stressed by Müller (2014: 72). Studying forms of normative and social power, revealed through the study of global intellectual history and global history can illustrate their role in constituent diplomacy. Constituent diplomacy, in the broad sense used here, can therefore involve actors at different levels seeking to secure their status under constitutional rules in different contexts, through the use of social and normative power.

83 See Thornhill (2013; 2014: 359 – 362) for the study of how ideas of the constituent power influenced both the American and French Revolutions.
These forms of constituent diplomacy can be understood as responding to stigmatisation. Constituent diplomacy can overcome forms of international stigmatisation given how the maintenance of stigma rests on the power of gatekeeping actors in global international society (see Zarakol, 2011: 107) who impose and maintain stigmas44 (see Adler-Nissen, 2014b). By the nineteenth century, when a global international society came to exist, states seen to be the most powerful European states, often termed the “great powers”, were arguably the gatekeepers of international society (Adler-Nissen, 2014b: 148; Simpson, 2004: 62; Zarakol, 2011: 64). The idea of the “great powers” heralded the emergence of an understanding of equality amongst states who were equal in their “greatness” (Simpson, 2004: 107). However, states which were not recognised as fully sovereign and which did not enjoy relations of sovereign equality with those states at the centre of international society, may have faced stigma as they sought to be recognised as worthy of the sovereign rights enjoyed by the “great powers” (Donnelly, 2006: 145; R.A. Klein, 1974: 73; Simpson, 2004: 62). According to these “great powers”, states needed to be accepted as “civilised” to be recognised as sovereign (Buzan, 2014: 581). States which failed to meet this standard of ‘civilisation’ could not be considered sovereign in the same sense as the “great powers” (Adler-Nissen, 2014b: 148; see also Aalberts, 2014; Buzan, 2014). This standard of ‘civilisation’ was enforced through a combination of normative and social power (Buzan, 2014; Gong, 1984). The foremost European states argued and used force to assert the standard of ‘civilisation’ as an idea of international hierarchy (Bowden, [2009] 2014: 97 – 139; see also Bowden, 2004; 2013; 2014). This presented different ways of measuring the level of ‘civilisation’ in a state, including its legal system, its form of government, and its ethical principles alongside other possible metrics (Buzan, 2014: 580 - 581; Gong, 1984; Schwarzenberger, 1955; Schwarzenberger and Brown, [1947] 1976: 84; Towns, 2010). Perceptions of the nature and extent of a state’s sovereignty were also used to judge whether a state could be recognised as sovereign. (Holsti, 2004; C. Weber, 1995). Constituent diplomacy, mobilising social and/or normative power, could, as cases when it was historically effective demonstrate, challenge these forms of stigmatisation. In response, those engaged in constituent diplomacy on behalf of

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44 As is suggested by the Greek etymology of stigmatisation, stigma refers to the marking of an actor as an outsider by a group of insiders (Adler-Nissen, 2014b: 145; E. Goffman, 1963; Link and Phelan, 2001).
stigmatised states sought to mobilise their normative and social power to undermine the forms of stigmatisation that they were subjected to. If the result of such constituent diplomacy would be the recognition of their state as ‘civilised’, this would remove the challenge posed to their recognition as sovereign states, equal in status to other states in global international society.

Constituent diplomacy, by challenging forms of global stigmatisation, such as those associated with the standard of ‘civilisation’, could facilitate the normalisation of a state within global international society or the normalisation of new constitutional principles within global international society. If constituent diplomacy results in the recognition of a state as equal to other sovereign states in global international society, in accordance with existing global constitutional rules, then the constituent diplomacy in question can be said to have been successful. States may, in this case, be deemed to have met a standard of ‘civilisation’, that they were previously unable or unwilling to meet, following successful constituent diplomacy by the representatives of the state. Constituent diplomacy in this instance can be likened to what Tully (2004: 86), in his discussion of recognition and constitution-building in domestic societies, terms a “struggle for recognition”. Alternatively, normalisation, meaning a move away from, or end to, stigma, can occur when actors succeed in changing the constitutional rules of international society, partially or wholly, or may be able to alter how these rules are applied to themselves (Smetana, 2020; Smetana and Onderco, 2018: 527 - 528). In the context of his discussion of recognition and domestic constitution-building, Tully (2004: 91) terms these struggles to define the broader rules constitutional rules, “struggles over recognition”. Instances of successful constituent diplomacy that fit the concept of struggles for recognition, in Tully’s (2004: 86 - 90) framework, can be interpreted as facilitating an expansion of global international society, insofar as they extend the status accorded to established states within global international society to other states. However, instances of successful constituent diplomacy, in global international society, which can be considered struggles over recognition result in

Adler-Nissen (2014b) argues that there are different ways in which states can manage the stigma they face. This idea that stigma can be managed, but not overcome, builds on Zarakol’s (2014) argument that stigma is one of the main sources that explains contemporary relations between states. As Link and Phelan (2001: 381) argue, however, another approach may involve undermining the “mechanisms” that sustain stigma.
changes to the nature of global international society, stemming from how they alter the constitutional principles that hold it together. This thesis will use this theoretical perspective, focusing on constituent diplomacy and its interaction with local constituent power, to advance an explanation of how states that were initially denied the status of being equal to other sovereigns were able to attain this status.

4. Global constituent power and rival accounts of the emergence of sovereignty and global international society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century

This thesis underlines the significance of constituent power to explain how states that were in effect sovereign, but not accorded the rights granted to other sovereign states, came to be recognised as sovereign in international society. However, there are other alternative arguments concerning the emergence of sovereignty which should be briefly considered. This section discusses the diffusionist argument that sovereignty, as an idea or a practice, emerged within Europe and then spread throughout the world in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Boli, 2001; Nardin, 2015). It notes how different understandings of sovereignty, tied to concepts such as quasi-statehood, intervention and sovereignty as responsibility have often been cited as examples of how ideas and practices diffused from Europe to the remainder of the globe (Benton, 2008; Lawson and Tardelli, 2013; R.H. Jackson, 1990). However, this diffusionist perspective cannot adequately explain how states that were not granted the rights usually accorded to sovereign states, and which were also not colonised by European states, eventually gained recognition of their sovereign equality. The unique position of the Ottoman Empire at the cusp of European international society, which would, in the course of the nineteenth century, come to be global international society, is then considered (Çapan and Zarakol, 2017: 196; Rae, 2017; Trimberger, 1972: 191 - 192). Although sovereignty as an idea was developed within Europe, because of its location the Ottoman Empire cannot be separated from intellectual developments in Europe (Horowitz, 2004; Palabiyik, 2014). The Ottomans also had a particular understanding of sovereignty, which was similar to, and stemmed partly from, older ideas that informed European conceptions of sovereignty (Kafadar, 1995:132 - 133). Ottoman exiles and subjects alike were, increasingly throughout the nineteenth century, interlocutors in debates
in European international and political theory (Çiçek, 2010). The unique historical position of the Ottoman Empire demonstrates the usefulness of the concept of constituent power. Specifically, it shows how sovereign states, such as the Ottoman Empire, which were not accorded all of the rights granted to sovereign states, eventually gained the recognition of these rights.

In the course of the emergence of the current global international society, sovereignty claims came to be subjected to stigma, with the basis of such stigmatisation arguably being laid before, and influencing, the subsequent development of the standard of ‘civilisation’. Bartelson (2018: 152) argues that, prior to the development of the idea of the standard of ‘civilisation’, European states developed a conception of warfare that contrasted it with the established order of sovereign states. This meant that all entities excluded from sovereign statehood could be considered to be in a state akin to that of warfare and hence were to be treated as such by European states ruled by individuals who had adopted this line of thinking (Bartelson, 2018). These different ideas of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘civilisation’ would later diffuse from Europe to the rest of the world. Examples of this include how the idea of race and religion was also used to justify denial of sovereignty to others by European individuals engaged in empire-building (Barkawi and Laffey, 2002: 121; George, 1994: 205; Keal, 1995; 2003; Nişancıoğlu, 2019; Shilliam, 2013; Reus-Smit, 2013b: 1075; Todorov, 1984). Notwithstanding these recent approaches suggesting that an understanding of sovereignty that involved different means of marking others as outsiders emerged in Europe and resulted in the exclusion of non-Europeans, the standard of ‘civilisation’ has also been identified as a means of facilitating such exclusion (C.-A. Schulz, 2014: 856; Zarakol, 2011: 150). The standard of ‘civilisation’, which emerged together with the development of a positivist understanding of international law, produced a new set of ways in which individual states could be subject to stigma, on the basis of their perceived

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86 The Spanish jurist and theologian, Vitoria ([1533 - 1534] 1991: 169; [1539] 1991: 272), for instance, argued that the Spanish Empire’s actions in the Americas were not always just, but nonetheless argued that the Catholic Church had the authority to spread Christianity and that any resistance to this, on the part of the natives, justified military action against them, see also Reus-Smit (2013b: 1072) and Mathieu (2018b).

87 However, as Carsten-Andreas Schulz (2014: 842) notes, many of the advocates of the standard of “civilisation”, such as Lorimer (1883: 101 as cited in C.-A. Schulz, 2014: 842), were, in fact, proponents of natural law, see also Koskenniemi (2001: 4).
shortcomings based on the standard (C.-A. Schulz, 2014: 847; Gong, 1984: 5, 240; 2002: 78; Simpson, 2004: 255; Weitz, 2008: 1319). The rise of the standard of ‘civilisation’ also coincided with the emergence of “quasi-sovereignty” (see Benton, 2008: 595) as a concept advanced by European empire-builders, serving to argue that the form of sovereignty possessed by rulers in areas of increasing European influence could not be considered equal to that of European states (see also Bergmann, 2016; Datla, 2015; M.D. Lewis, 2013; Saksena, 2019). The idea of a group of “great powers” was subsequently formalised in the Congress of Vienna of 1815, which established a system of diplomacy between them, known as the Concert of Europe (Keene, 2013b: 274; Simpson, 2004: 70; Zala, 2017: 367). By the nineteenth century, it is therefore possible to identify established understandings of sovereignty, linked to processes of stigmatising those entities who did not fit this definition of sovereignty, present throughout global international society.

The argument that an understanding of sovereignty which emerged as a form of stigma against others can be said to be convincing as an explanation of how stigma emerged as an obstacle to claims of sovereign equality is supported by developments in global history. In the nineteenth century, the emergence of the standard of ‘civilisation’ and the Concert of Europe’s promotion of dynastic sovereignty, resulted in the emergence of the practice of international intervention (Benton, 2011; C. Weber, 1995: 40 - 61). International intervention, since its heyday in the nineteenth century, has been premised on the identification of certain actors as appropriate for intervention and hence involved processes of marking or stigmatisation (Keene, 2013a; Lawson and Tardelli, 2013; Macmillan, 2013a; 2013b; Reus-Smit, 2013b; C. Weber, 1995: 27; Woodward, 2013). Similarly, in the context of the onset of colonisation, various states were identified as “backward” (see Aalberts, 2018: 874), thereby allowing European states to argue that they were allowing them to become a member of the “Family of Nations” (as quoted in Oppenheim, 1912: 110, 286; see also the discussion in Aalberts, 2018: 874), by convincing them to cede their sovereignty to them in treaties. Additionally, Robert H. Jackson (1990: 26 - 27) argues, in the context of decolonisation in the twentieth

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88 As Aalberts (2018: 874), notes, rulers who ceded their sovereignty, such as those in Africa, were not always aware of the implications. On the connection between intervention and colonisation see Shilliam (2013).
century, that certain states only possessed negative sovereignty because they were unable to exert complete control over their territories. Conversely, positive sovereignty referred to the possession of effective sovereignty, as exhibited by established European sovereign states (R.H. Jackson, 1990: 50 - 54). Aalberts (2004; 2012: 34) argues that these ideas of “negative” and “positive sovereignty”, as developed by Robert H. Jackson (1990: 30 as quoted in Aalberts, 2012: 108), can be understood as a “language game” (see Aalberts, 2012: 92) in the sense described by Wittgenstein ([1953] 1958). As language games, they refer to rules that determine how words are used in language to bring about effects in different contexts.

Sovereignty and stigmatisation have historically been identified as occurring simultaneously. But the very recognition of the sovereignty of an actor and subsequent successful attempts to gain recognition of its sovereign equality can be understood as challenging the validity of an account of sovereignty and stigmatisation that points to their simultaneity. As Mathieu (2018a: 2 -3) notes, a narrative of progress centring around the idea of sovereign equality has emerged which suggests that sovereign equality both goes some way towards describing the nature of international society and how it has varied historically. However, such an idea of sovereign equality can be criticised on the basis of how it involves accepting

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89 Language games have been used by constructivist scholars of International Relations, such as Fierke (2002), to explain how different meanings were mobilised by actors in their communications with each other.

90 Alongside quasi-statehood, the idea of sovereignty as responsibility also entails a form of stigmatisation, since those who are understood as failing to act as responsible sovereigns are stigmatised, with possible effects on the continued recognition of their sovereignty and sovereign equality (Aalberts and Werner, 2011; Lake, 2009c: 78; Wendt and Friedheim, 1995).
the idea of sovereign equality as an empirical reality, often as a result of the assumption that the anarchic nature of international society means that sovereigns within it can be said to be equal in their status (Aalberts, 2014; Buzan, 2017: 235; Mathieu, 2018a; Welsh, 2017: 156). But the idea of sovereign equality cannot be used to describe an existing state of affairs due to the compelling historical reasons to adopt theories that assume that hierarchy is a better reflection of the relations between states and other actors in International Relations (Lake, 1996; 2007; Mattern and Zarakol, 2016; Welsh, 2017: 156; Zarakol, 2017). Such hierarchy can, however, be interpreted as enabling the forms of stigmatisation that emerged simultaneously with the development of ideas of sovereignty in global international society (Zarakol, 2017). Yet postcolonial nationalism in Asia, Africa and the Arab world has often been cited as an example of the use of state and non-state power to advance an alternative vision of sovereignty through challenging such hierarchy and the forms of stigmatisation that are inherent to it (Suzuki, 2017: 226). Even though diffusionist accounts may insist that these regimes mirrored European states in the nature of their political ideas and institutions (see Boli, 2001; Nardin, 2015), including their dedication to sovereign equality (see Aalberts, 2018; Mathieu, 2018a), postcolonial theorists such as Chakrabarty (2000: 117) have countered that European concepts, such as nationalism are not able to fully convey the meaning of their political ideas. Therefore, the argument that the agency of actors resisting hierarchy, including a form hierarchy which facilitates stigmatisation, cannot explain the fact that actors who were initially denied sovereignty and/or sovereign equality were subsequently able to overcome stigmatisation and gain recognition of one or either.

By the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, global international society can be said to have emerged, and several states, including Japan and Turkey, the main successor state of the Ottoman Empire, were able to gain more equal recognition of their sovereignty, on a par with established states in international society. Unlike most other non-Western states, these states did not experience colonisation and were not subject to the division of their territory into spheres of
influence by European states, as had been the case with Iran\textsuperscript{91}, Siam\textsuperscript{92}, Afghanistan\textsuperscript{93}, China\textsuperscript{94} and Morocco\textsuperscript{95}. In the absence of a colonial past, diffusionist accounts and studies stressing the significance of power have explained how Japan and Turkey secured sovereign equality in international society (Bilgin, 2017: 135 – 139; Suzuki, 2005). Modernisation theorists, such as Eisenstadt (2000: 13 – 16, 20 - 21), for example, have argued that Japan and the Ottoman Empire, and later Turkey, underwent processes of modernisation modelled on the European experience, which would suggest that this enabled them to be recognised as equal sovereigns by the established states. The translation and spread of ideas from Europe, including political and social theories that contained understandings of sovereignty, has been cited in Wigen’s (2018) explanation of how the Ottoman Empire, and later Turkey, came to be recognised as equal sovereigns by the established states of global international society. Significantly, unlike the Ottoman Empire, Japan negotiated an end to extraterritorial consular courts maintained by European states following judicial reforms that were deemed to be satisfactory by European powers (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 66 - 103). Arguments that sovereignty in global international society came to be secured through power can also be applied to understand how these states were able in effect to maintain their sovereignty and gain recognition of what they deemed to be their sovereign rights throughout this period. The Ottomans, for instance, succeeded in defeating Russia at the end of the Crimean War in 1856 and enacted a set of reforms, which resulted in their inclusion in the Concert of Europe (Adanır, 2005). Japan, when governed by a constitutional government, defeated Russia in 1905, and thereby challenged ideas of racial hierarchy that were widespread in Europe at the time (Aydın, 2007: 71).

The Ottoman Empire, however, came to be closely involved in inter-imperial rivalries with European powers and it was subjected to sustained interaction with neighbouring European states. This was because the Ottoman Empire had, in fact, enjoyed diplomatic ties with the Byzantine Empire, and Italian and Balkan states, before conquering Byzantium and the Balkans (Hupchik, 2002: 100; Zachariadou,

\textsuperscript{91} See Bonakdarian (2006: 72).
\textsuperscript{92} See Horowitz (2004: 446 – 447).
\textsuperscript{93} See Bayly (2016: 48).
\textsuperscript{94} See Osterhammel (1986).
\textsuperscript{95} See Gershovich (2000) and Seoane (1998).
The Ottoman state was, however, largely excluded from diplomacy with European powers until the sixteenth century (Göçek, 1987; Rudolph, 2013: 167; Yurdusev, 2004: 16 – 17). During the nineteenth century, new communication and transportation technologies meant that Ottoman subjects were exposed to neighbouring European ideas (Emrence, 2011: 36 – 40; Göçek, 1996: 117 – 118; Hanioğlu, 2008: 62; Rae, 2017). Ottoman elites, who spent periods of exile in Europe and, later, the Young Turks who were influenced by ideas that were European or global in origin, came to hold increasing influence over the Ottoman state (Hanioğlu, 2008: 103; Taglia, 2015: 1 - 50). Japan struggled to secure recognition as a significant state by European actors in global international society 96.

In contrast, the Ottomans, owing to their geographic location in close proximity to Europe, experienced no difficulty in attracting the attention of the European states (Yurdusev, 2009: 78). The Ottoman Empire was perceived as a significant power that could challenge the ambitions of expansionist European states, such as Austria-Hungary, Britain and Russia (Hale, 2000: 3, 20). Moreover, in contrast to Japan, there were frequent exchanges of information between the Ottoman Empire and European states 97. Missionaries98, migrants99, students, and merchants travelled in both directions and prompted the Ottoman state to seek to regulate these flows (Can, 2016; Deringil, 1998; Gutman, 2016; Kasaba, 2009: 61). Certain transnational social movements, such as the networks established by Ottoman Muslims in recently lost territories and networks of exiled intellectuals operated in both Ottoman and European states and European colonies, such as Egypt (Emrence, 2011: 42; Hanioğlu, 2001: 62 – 77; Taglia, 2015: 3 – 5, 29 – 51). Unlike other non-Western independent states in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was, at least, partially integrated within European international society, even though Naff (1984) argues that it was always excluded from European international society (Yurdusev, 2004).

96 Suzuki (2005: 151) notes how the Japanese leadership throughout the Meiji period sought to secure their inclusion within the “international order of the Law of Nations”, in the context of rising European powers (see also Trimberger, 1972: 191 - 192). The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, developed an awareness of European international law from its onset at the end of the thirteenth century, as a result of the wars it fought and the agreements it concluded with European states (Palabiyik, 2014: 235 – 236).

97 Suzuki (2005: 151) notes that part of the reason why Japanese elites were eager to establish contact with European states was to ensure that Japan was aware of external developments in Europe.


Although Bartelson (2014: 2) has noted that sovereignty emerged as a “symbolic form by means of which Westerners have perceived and organized the political world” it can be argued that a similar form of sovereignty was present in the Ottoman Empire. Both the Ottomans and the Europeans were influenced by the political thought of the ancient Mediterranean. They drew upon the writings of Aristotle and Plato to justify their sovereignty (Sariyannis, 2019: 23, 91, 297). But, as Zarakol (2018a) notes, Islamic states, such as the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia, did have their own understandings of sovereignty based on the importance of authority, if not always territoriality. Moreover, internal sovereignty was established by the Ottomans through reference to the role of the state in securing justice\(^{100}\) (see Barkey, 2008: 100) and a founding narrative tied to an envisaged contract between the ruler and ruled\(^{101}\) (see Kafadar, 1995: 132). Bodin ([1530 -1596] 1969: xxi), indeed, also argued that the Ottoman state was a sovereign state, comparable to the Holy Roman Empire in terms of its claim to have inherited the legacy of the Roman Empire (Deringil, 2007: 712; Yerasimos, 2003). As İnalcık (1973: 11) notes, the Ottomans maintained suzerainty over “local lords”\(^{102}\) or potentates in the Balkans. This would suggest that forms of heteronomous sovereignty, similar to those identified as being shared by European and Asian actors in the Indian Ocean by Phillips and Sharman (2015a; 2015b) were present in the Ottoman Empire. Territorial sovereignty as a principle was stressed in treaties between the Ottomans and the Europeans. In the Treaty of Karlowitz of 1699, the Hapsburgs and Ottomans reached a settlement on the basis of the principle of uti possidetis, meaning that each side would keep the territories they were effectively controlling (Abou-El-Haj, 2004: 103). As Özsu (2016: 373) notes, the concept of “sovereign equality” in international law also allowed the Ottomans to develop claims that they saw as based on their sovereignty. Because of their situatedness on the edge of Europe, the Ottomans developed a familiarity with the European concept of sovereignty, which partially shared a common intellectual origin with Ottoman theories of the state. As the

\(^{100}\) Barkey (2008: 100) also argues that the Ottoman state had an understanding of a contract between the state and society, based on the provision of justice by the state, as expressed in the Ottoman historian, Kınalızade’s, idea of the “circle of justice.”

\(^{101}\) For the content and context of the dream narrative see Mikhail (2019: xi- xii). Osman I dreamt that a tree grew from his navel and that the world was covered by its shade (Mikhail, 2019: xi).

\(^{102}\) See also Sugar (1977: 175) and Barkey (1994).
military power of the empire declined, the interactions between the Ottoman Empire and the European states increasingly took the form of diplomatic communications in which issues of sovereignty were discussed (Palabıyık, 2014).

5. The Young Turks, their successors, their ideas and constituent diplomacy

This section provides an overview of the Young Turks. It explains how the subsequent four chapters of the thesis will focus on the efforts of this movement and its successors to gain recognition of their sovereign equality in global international society. Interacting with the increasingly more powerful European states, in the nineteenth century the Ottomans developed understandings of sovereignty that drew upon their own ideas and practice of sovereignty as well as European conceptions (Horowitz, 2004). However, in spite of the reformist efforts of Ottoman statesmen of the Tanzimat period and the Young Ottomans, the capitulations were not abrogated (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 120). This extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction had been initiated much earlier by the European powers in the Ottoman Empire. The capitulations persisted even though the Ottoman Empire was recognised as a significant state in the Concert of Europe in 1856 (see Adanır, 2005). The Ottoman statesman, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, codified the existing laws within the Ottoman Empire, in 1877, but this also did not result in the abrogation of the capitulations (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 120). After the Young Turk revolution of 1908, there was a period of transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey (Zürcher, 2010). Eventually, the Turkish state would be recognised as an equal sovereign in global international society. The case of the transition from the Ottoman Empire to Turkey therefore demonstrates the role of constituent power in the nineteenth and twentieth century and its role in the emergence of global international society. The Young Turks formed a new group of state elites, who quickly consolidated control over the institutions of the Ottoman state and society (Kansu, 1997; Zürcher, 2010). In 1913, the CUP assumed control of the Ottoman state in a dictatorship, which would remain in place until 1918 (Zürcher, 2010: 95). Their successors also played a role in the founding of Turkey. This section of the thesis provides an outline of how the following four chapters will focus on the Young Turks and their efforts to secure the sovereign equality of their state. The methodology applied in the thesis will also
be introduced and the range of sources used to trace the constituent diplomacy of the Young Turks is presented.

In the nineteenth century, Ottoman officials attempted to situate and define the Ottoman Empire in terms of international law as well as domestically through the so-called Tanzimat, or “re-ordering” reforms (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 20). As Çiçek (2010: 10) demonstrates, Ottoman diplomats engaged in these efforts in the context of the rise of the so-called “Eastern Question”, referring to the questioning of the international position of the Ottoman Empire by the European members of the Concert of Europe, particularly in light of their own clashing international interests (Aksan, 2003: 96; Frary and Kozelsky, 2014: 6; Schroeder, 1986: 6, 15; 1994: 121 – 122; Schumacher, 2014). The autonomy of the Ottoman state from the personal rule of the Sultan was asserted by instituting a form of “constitutional” rule (Horowitz, 2004: 459). However, the Ottomans were increasingly scrutinised on the basis of the standard of ‘civilisation’ (Finnemore, 1996). In the Greek war of independence, which ended in 1832, the French, British and Russians ultimately supported the Greeks who were seen as Christian peoples governed by “uncivilized” (see Stivachtis, 1998: 63) rulers (see also Holsti, 1991: 147, 169; Stivachtis, 2017). Ottoman diplomats, when confronted with these new conceptions of international law, sought to redefine their state in terms of the new forms of sovereignty present in these theories through a series of reforms (Horowitz, 2004: 485). For instance, following defeat in Greece and the signing of a free trade agreement with Britain (see Todd, 2018: 111), the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Mustafa Reşid Paşa, announced a series of reforms in the so-called Gülhane Decree of 1839 (Anscombe, 2014: 105). However, these reforms were preceded by, and shared the goal of, earlier reforms that aimed to strengthen the Ottoman state in the face of internal crises brought about by Greece’s war of independence103 (Anscombe, 2014: 90 - 100). They drew largely

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103 The Tanzimat reforms were introduced in the context of a revolt by Muhammad Ali Pasha, the governor of Egypt in 1831, who was advancing towards the Ottoman capital (see Anderson, 1966: 77 - 110). At this point, the Ottoman state sought to secure its legitimacy from its own population (see Abu-Manneh, 1995) and to ensure that it would be viewed as legitimate by European states (see Wigen, 2015). Anscombe (2014: 100) argues that the Islamic jurist, Muhammed Abduh (see Hourani, 1983: 130 - 160), argued that different aspects of Islamic law could be used to enable the state to secure its standing in the world. Islamic law therefore could be mobilised to defend these reforms that sought to empower the state (Anscombe, 2014: 100). Palabayik (2014: 238) argues that Koca Yusuf, the Grand Vizier, the second highest official in the empire, had also used this principle of citing the “order of the state” (nizam-ı mülk) to justify an alliance with Prussia in 1761.
from Islamic arguments to press, in effect, for a guarantee of individual rights (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 114). The Ottomans were only formally “admitted” to the Concert of Europe in 1856 after introducing additional reforms to protect the rights of their Christian population (Burgis, 2009: 65; Ringmar, 2014: 9). However, as Palabiyik (2014: 235) notes, the Ottoman state had an earlier awareness of international law, starting with the official translation of Emmerich de Vattel’s *Law of Nations* in 1837. Therefore, while drawing upon their own understandings of sovereignty, rooted in distinct political traditions, the Ottoman elite increasingly became more aware of and adopted to European understandings of sovereignty.

The accession of Abdülhamid II in 1876, soon followed by the Ottoman defeat to the Russian Empire, resulted in the Ottomans challenging the maintenance of extraterritorial jurisdictions. These jurisdictions had been established centuries earlier. Much of the initial contact between the Ottomans and Europeans had involved matters of trade and was promoted by European states, such as Venice (Yurdusev, 2004: 39). To facilitate trade, European states secured forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction, whereby their residents in the Ottoman Empire would be governed under European legal systems. This was justified by Islamic legal precepts that the Ottomans termed “ahdnames”, or “decrees of the sultan” (see Burgis, 2009: 57), which would later be known in Europe as the “capitulations” (Yurdusev, 2004: 3). After defeat by the Russians in 1878, when the Russian Empire attempted to regain territory lost during the Crimean War, the Ottomans introduced further reforms in an endeavour to bolster their waning international standing. This was in spite of the fact that the Ottoman parliament had been dissolved during the latest war with Russia (Anscombe, 2014: 117). This moment also coincided with Britain claiming extraterritorial rule in other parts of the empire, including the birthplace of Islam in the Hijaz, which had hitherto been excluded from such measures because of their remoteness (Low, 2016). The Ottoman statesman, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, produced a law code in 1877 based on common interpretations of sharia law, which points to an attempt on the part of the Ottoman elites to enable the abolition of the capitulations by adopting ‘civilised’ legal norms (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 120). Crucially, the end of the capitulations would allow the Ottoman state to consolidate its

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territoriality, meaning that it would extend exclusive control over its own territory, thereby ending the use of consular courts by European states to try their own citizens resident in the empire. This would, in turn, enable the Ottoman state, which continued to be sovereign, in the sense of being constitutionally independent, to be recognised as an equal sovereign in global international society.

However, this attempt to demonstrate the civilised nature of Ottoman law and thereby challenge one of the arguments for extraterritoriality would fail (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 120 - 123). Under the Treaty of San Stefano of March 1878, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia would become independent from the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria was declared an autonomous principality (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 28). The Ottoman attempt to challenge the gains of Russia received the support of Britain and its allies (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 28). The terms of the Treaty of San Stefano were revised by the Treaty of Berlin of July 1878 (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 25 - 26). The latter reduced the size of the territories that the Russians and their Allies claimed, and called for members of the Concert of Europe to oversee reforms in the western and easternmost provinces which Russia and its allies had sought to control (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 28). The treaty recognised the various Balkan and Caucasian populations as nations, in the sense of homogenous groups with political aspirations, in the areas where the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire had been fought (Biondich, 2011; Farrar Jr, 1996; Yasamee, 2011: 76). The reform proposals envisaged by the Treaty of Berlin were immediately criticised by the Ottomans because they would entail outside states having extensive control over the Ottoman Empire’s southeast European and western Caucasian provinces (Rodogno, 2012: 170). Throughout this period, the Ottoman state was seeking to standardise the form of Islam that was present within its borders, while also developing its international legal competence, through establishing an Office of Legal Counsel in 1883 (Genell,

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105 Yasamee (2011: 67) echoes this by noting how the Treaty of Berlin resulted in Muslim communities, such as the Albanian Muslims, becoming “the main prop of Ottoman rule in the Balkans” (see also Blumi, 2003a; 2003b).

106 Under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, a gendarmerie force, made up largely of foreign military advisors, had been formed following the Illinden Uprising of 1903 of Macedonian and Bulgarian nationalists against Ottoman rule, in the region known as Macedonia (Mahon, 1998: 393). The atrocities committed by Ottoman forces against rebels and civilians prompted the Treaty of Berlin powers to establish this international force, which would be responsible for security, alongside the Ottoman security forces (Mahon, 1998: 393).

The standardisation of Sunni and Hanafi Islam was intended to create a loyal populace, who could be recruited into the military as regular or irregular units of loyal Muslims (Deringil, 1998: 44 - 67; J. Klein, 2007). It also allowed the empire to use its Islamic legitimacy to secure the rights of Muslims in south-eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{108} The translation of international legal texts would, in turn, harness the ability of Ottoman diplomats to defend the interests of the Ottoman state who were often dismissed for not being aware of different languages and concepts in international law. Both of these moves were intended to limit foreign influence in the empire, through empowering the state and securing its legitimacy, and enabling it to make a case for sovereign rights over Muslim populations.

Disagreements, between the Ottomans and other signatories about how the terms of the Treaty of Berlin would be implemented, led eventually to the Young Turk revolution of 1908 (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 21 - 53). This revolution, in turn, triggered a series of events which would ultimately result in the transformation of the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey. Coming to power in the revolution of 1908, the Young Turks constituted a new state elite that dominated the politics of the Ottoman Empire until its demise (Zürcher, 2010). Many of the founders of the organisation had spent considerable time outside of the Ottoman Empire in European cities\textsuperscript{109} and had formed branches in exile, meaning that the Young Turks can be seen as a transnational network, seeking to create a movement within the Ottoman Empire. They also produced many of the political elites of the first generation of Turkey (Zürcher, 2010). As the Young Turks consolidated power, elements of the previous regime were removed and the Young Turks came to control most sectors of the Ottoman state and society (Kansu, 1997: 115 - 156). The CUP\textsuperscript{110}, a Young Turk faction, gradually consolidated its control over the Ottoman state (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 13 - 57). However, the CUP was only one of many groups which participated in the second and third conferences of the Ottoman opposition in Paris in 1902 and 1907 (Hanioğlu, 2001: 28, 91 - 97). Such movements also included organisations

\textsuperscript{110} The CUP emerged as a union of other groups, the earliest of which had been formed in Istanbul in 1889 (Taglia, 2015: 4). It later exited in exile in chapters organised by exiled intellectuals in Europe (Taglia, 2015: 4 - 9).
that represented various religious and ethnic groups, such as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Hanoğlu, 2001: 95). These organisations played an active role in the revolution of 1908 (Berberian, 2019; Der Matossian, 2014; Hanoğlu, 2001: 95). The CUP gradually consolidated its control over the Ottoman state. This started with its crushing of the counterrevolution of 1909 and led to the coup d’état of 1913, which was headed by Enver Paşa, a rising Ottoman general and member of the CUP (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 36 – 45, 104). The CUP went underground at the end of the First World War (Zürcher, 1984). But, the National Movement, formed by military officers who were resisting the Allied and Greek invasion of the Ottoman Empire, had figures who were closely associated with the CUP, and was composed of other political and military organisations (Zürcher, 1984). Consequently, it can be posited that a fairly homogenous class of state elites held state power in most of the period from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to the emergence of Turkey.

Even though the dominant notion of sovereignty in global international society emerged as a European concept and came to inform how Europeans understood and sought to shape the globe, the Ottomans, including those who would later found the state of Turkey, were exposed to the concept, through their inclusion in European diplomacy and through the influence of transnational movements. These transnational movements later invoked constituent power, which enabled the recognition of the Turkish state as an equal sovereign, even though the Ottoman state had previously been stigmatised for not meeting the standard of ‘civilisation’. This explanation of ideas and practices of sovereignty spreading throughout the world, for instance, is captured in the notion of a global constituent power, which can, through working in existing global connections, alter the constitutional principles of global international society, including sovereignty and sovereign equality. The idea of local constituent powers, creating or reconstituting a constitutional order within a state, demonstrates how local forms of power may also contribute to the development of the idea, and possibly the attainment of a state of affairs of, sovereign equality in global international society. Constituent powers at the global and the local levels may influence each other and facilitate the recognition of sovereign rights (Cornago, 111

111 Bhambra (2010) argues that International Relations ought to be mindful of connections between different historical contexts, rather than imposing one set of understandings, developed in a specific historical context, to understanding all historical developments.
They can also explain how states that are already sovereign in effect, may mobilise forms of local or global constituent power by wielding social or normative power to bring about constitutional change to enable greater international recognition of their sovereign equality. Normative power necessarily involves shared ideas of legitimacy, which must have diffused throughout the globe, such that they could be held in common by actors seeking recognition of their sovereign rights and by those acting as gatekeepers of the principles of sovereignty in global international society (Kavalski, 2013: 250). The idea of constituent power also accounts for how actors may seek to change the ideas of sovereignty within global international society, as well as aiming to alter domestic constitutional norms, in order to gain recognition of their desired status as sovereigns.

In the following four chapters, this thesis will focus on specific episodes in the course of the struggles of the Young Turk revolutionary and state elites to secure recognition of the sovereignty of their state in global international society in the period 1908 – 1923. Chapter 3 begins by focusing on the aftermath of the 1908 revolution, when the Young Turks sought, with some success, to present themselves as a new ‘civilised’ elite. However, as Chapter 4 demonstrates, the Young Turks found themselves embroiled in international alliances, resulting ultimately in their alignment with the Central Powers and their attempt, through war, to advance a new conception of national sovereignty for the Ottoman state and the global international society. Chapter 5 focuses on how, following the Ottoman defeat in 1918, individuals affiliated with the Young Turks, appealed to the idea of national self-determination to gain international recognition of their sovereign equality. As Chapter 6 will show, in 1923, the National Movement sought simultaneously to argue for their ‘civilised’ identity, to gain recognition of their actually existing sovereignty. Therefore, Chapters 3 and 5 focus on instances before and after the First World War, in which those who had ties to the Young Turks appealed to global constitutional principles of sovereignty to gain recognition as sovereign equals in global international society. Chapters 4 and 6 focus on two instances in which the Young Turks sought to alter how the existing constitutional principles of global

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112 See Corrias (2016: 6), who understands “populism” as referring to political projects that involve altering the constitution of a state, but keeping it intact during this process, by appealing to certain powers as constituent powers.
international society were enforced, by either attempting to change them by force or by seeking to influence how these principles were interpreted. In each chapter, the rich secondary literature on the period in question will be reviewed and primary sources will be used to show how the Young Turks and their offshoots sought recognition of their sovereign equality. These primary sources include communications submitted by the Young Turks and their successors to representatives of the dominant states at that time in global international society. After presenting the ideas that shaped the actions of the Ottoman/Turkish elites, each of the next four chapters will focus on how these ideas informed the actions of these elites and will examine to what extent and how these elites succeeded in securing the recognition of sovereign equality.

6. Conclusion:

This chapter has shown how the research question of the thesis will be addressed. It has presented the methodology which will be used and the theoretical framework that will be adopted in the thesis. It has demonstrated how the concept of sovereignty is connected to other concepts that are used to understand and justify it. Comprehending these different concepts and how they are deployed requires an awareness of how concepts are tied to each other historically and philosophically. A global intellectual history, together with global history, can be used to develop a theory of how states came to be considered sovereigns equal to established states in global international society. The argument of the thesis draws upon the English School of International Relations and builds on it by contending that the concept of constituent power can be understood as operating at both the local and the global levels to explain the emergence of global international society. The thesis also suggests that the concept of constituent power contains both normative and social power, meaning that both ideas and capabilities influence the success of constituent power. Other historical accounts of the development of global international society have been considered. One perspective suggests that global international society emerged as ideas of sovereignty spread throughout the world (Boli, 2001; Nardin, 2015). But, this suffers from a lack of emphasis on the local contexts which both challenged and altered Western ideas as they spread to different geographies (Hobson and Sajed, 2017). Arguing that global international society emerged
through the agency of states seeking sovereignty (see James, 1999) fails to account for how the commonly-held understanding of sovereignty as a constitutional principle of global international society (see Reus-Smit, 1997; 1999; 2008) emerged. In particular, it does not properly explain how states that were already sovereign, such as the Ottoman Empire, sought to secure sovereign equality in global international society. How the Young Turks harnessed constituent power in their attempts to gain recognition of the sovereignty of first the Ottoman, and subsequently, the Turkish state, provides an excellent case for demonstrating how such sovereign equality was recognised through the role of constituent power.
3. Constitutionalism and the standard of ‘civilisation’: The Young Turk revolution and the turmoil of post-revolutionary international politics, 1908 – 1909

1. Introduction

This chapter will demonstrate how the Young Turks, in the immediate period following the revolution of 1908, sought to secure recognition of their status as a sovereign state equal to that of the established European states. Current historical accounts have not considered the connection between the domestic and the global forms of constituent power. Studies have focused on the influence of the international standard of ‘civilisation’, which emerged in the nineteenth century and impacted on the Ottoman Empire (Buzan, 2014: 578 - 579). However, they have not concentrated on the constituent diplomacy deployed by the Young Turks in their attempts to gain full recognition of their equal sovereignty. The Young Turks employed arguments relating to the standard of ‘civilisation’ to secure sovereign equality. They advanced specific interpretations of the standard of ‘civilisation’ linking this standard to the presence of constitutional government. The Young Turks had developed notions of constitutionalism prior to 1908 when they were a transnational social movement. Soon after the revolution, the Young Turks persuaded European states to withdraw from overseeing reforms in the westernmost provinces of the empire (Tokay, 2003: 62). However, in the aftermath of the Young Turk revolution, the standard of ‘civilisation’ came to be mobilised by other groups, seeking to acquire territory from the empire, who claimed that they were more civilised than the Ottomans (Mirkova, 2013: 956). Different ideas on what it meant to be a civilised state also emerged from among the counter-revolutionaries in the Ottoman Empire in 1909. This opposition was crushed, but the Young Turks failed to prevent the loss of Ottoman territory by highlighting the empire’s purported level of ‘civilisation’.
2. The Theory and History of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908: Constitutionalism and the Standard of ‘Civilisation’:

This section will assess the existing historiography of the Young Turk revolution. According to much of the literature, the revolution was motivated by the desire to gain recognition of the equal sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire from the dominant states in global international society, through an understanding of constitutionalism as a standard of ‘civilisation’. Currently, several works, such as those of Kent (2005) and Bloxham (2005), point to how the period in the lead up to the revolution was marked by increased competition among empires. However, this period also witnessed the increased legalisation of global international society (Kingsbury, 2002: 410 – 411; Müller, 2014: 92 - 97; Reus-Smit, 1997). This was most clearly visible in the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907 (Kingsbury, 2002: 410 - 411; Reus-Smit, 1997). Much of the existing literature points to the Macedonian origins of the revolution, in which the Ottoman provinces in south-eastern Europe became the centre of competition between states pursuing their interests in the region (Zürcher, 2003). But, this unfolding competition was intertwined with the emergence of global constitutional rules which impacted on the Young Turk revolution (Blachford, 2019). Many accounts have explained the reforms that the Young Turks introduced as stemming from a process of “Westernisation” or “modernisation” (Heper, 1976: 510). The appropriateness of Westernisation as a label for this process can be questioned. The Young Turks drew inspiration from a range of sources, including the Iranian and Russian revolutions and the reforms undertaken by Japan (Sohrabi, 1995; 2011). Moreover, the Ottoman Empire had arguably always been open to certain influences from the West, stemming from its position on the cusp of the Islamic and Christian worlds (Horowitz, 2004; Rae, 2017). The practice of intervention in the Ottoman Empire by the dominant states in global international society also suggests that it is difficult to evade the consideration of the role of global international society in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire (Rodogno, 2011a; 2011b; 2012; M. Schulz, 2011). The interveners, in these cases, purported to act from a universal, and hence global, concern with upholding “civilization” (Rodogno, 2011b: 160; 2012: 12). It is in this context that the Ottoman revolutionaries of 1908 sought to present constitutional rule as a standard of “civilization” (Worringer, 2004: 207). Here, they aimed to attain a
favourable position in the emergent global normative hierarchies centred around the idea that there were ‘civilised’ states in a superior position in global international society.

Accounts of the Young Turk revolution have often pointed to how it can be read as a moment in the modernisation of the Ottoman Empire. Modernisation is equated with Westernisation (Heper, 1976: 510). Many of these studies, including some written in Turkey, were based on the assumption that the Ottoman Empire and Turkey had been undergoing a process of modernisation (Heper, 1976).

Modernisation theorists in Western social science examined the Ottoman and Turkish case to demonstrate the validity of their claim that societies experienced processes of social transformation (İnalcık, 1968; Karpat, 1968; İ. Kaya, 2004; Lerner and Robinson, 1960). These theorists sought to use sources that reinforced their own teleological assumption that societies were universally proceeding on the path to modernity.113 Movements such as the Young Turks, their predecessors in the reforming bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire’s so-called period of reordering, or Tanzimat, and the mid-nineteenth-century Young Ottoman movement of intellectuals and activists, are portrayed as facilitators of modernisation (Berkes, [1964] 1998; Bilgin, 2017; Mardin, 1971; [1962] 2000). This “modernization” is often understood as “Westernization” (Heper, 1976: 510). However, theories within the multiple modernities framework suggest that non-Western114 and non-secular115 forms of modernity are possible (Eisenstadt, 1999; 2000; 2001; Seth, 2014: 317; Therborn, 2000). Nevertheless, by assuming that all societies or regions of the world will or can experience “modernity” understood on the basis of the European experience, these theories are also West-centric (Bhambra, 2011: 667; see also Bhambra, 2007; Hobson and Sajed, 2017: 554 - 558). This criticism of modernisation theory, along with its selection of sources that affirm its own hypothesis, can be applied to other studies that seek to situate the Young Turk revolution in the framework of modernity (see Göksel, 2016; Kaya and Tecmen,

113 Heper (1976: 510) assumes that these reformers turned to the West. These perspectives also suggested that modernisation led to greater secularisation (Berkes, [1964] 1998).
114 See Wagner (2011).
For instance, Düzgün (2018a: 254 – 255; 2018b) situates the revolution in the context of the advance of modernity understood in the Marxist sense of the development of capitalism. According to Düzgün (2018a), this prompted the emergence of new property relations and movements for political change that reflected these relations. Hence, there are a number of studies of the Young Turk revolution which assume that modernisation can be studied as an objective social scientific process.

Other studies of the Young Turk revolution complicate the narrative of ‘modernisation’ or ‘Westernisation’. These draw attention to ideas and their meanings that were used by the revolutionaries. Such works interpret sources, as in the case of texts dating from the period, which were produced or read by individuals during the revolution (Hanioğlu, 1995; 2001; 2005; Taglia, 2015). Some accounts have reconstructed the context in which these ideas were developed to provide a more accurate sense of the meanings of these ideas, as understood by the individuals who used them (Özavcı, 2013; Wigen, 2015; 2018). However, certain concepts, such as Islam and ‘Western’ modernity, nationalism and internationalism, came to be interpreted by intellectual historians on the basis of how these concepts are currently understood. The supposed Turkish nationalism or Ottoman patriotism of the Young Turks, and their support for Islam and modernity, are understood to be in contradiction or in tension with each other (Öztan, 2018). But this was not necessarily the case (Hanioğlu, 2001: 295 – 302; Sohrabi, 2018). Hanioğlu (2001) and İrem (2004) go some way towards recognising the range of ideas held by the Young Turks. But, Hanioğlu (2001: 295 - 300) and İrem (2004: 88) assert that by 1908 the CUP, at least, were unquestionably nationalist idealists and only pragmatic Ottomanists. What is necessary, as Mikhail and Phillou (2012) urge in their review of historical literature on the subject, is to consider how actors in the Ottoman Empire were global. The Young Turks developed their ideas from multiple contexts in which they were present as individuals. Several recent studies have touched upon individual thinkers, such as Ahmed Rıza, who were part of an Ottoman diaspora

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116 See Göçek (1996: 119 – 125, 139 - 140) for a more nuanced version of this argument, stressing that Western ideas and practices diffused to the Ottoman Empire at this time, creating a bifurcated bourgeoisie, divided in terms of ethnicity and identity.
117 For a review and a critique of the Islam-secularism binary in the literature see Dressler (2015). For a review and a critique of the nationalism-Ottomanism binary see Öztan (2018).
within Europe and who developed ideas on issues such as positivism in a transnational context (Özervarlı, 2018; Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 96 – 114; 2017b). A greater consideration of the multiple contexts that the Young Turks found themselves in, and the relation of these contexts to the formulation of their ideas, is necessary to identify and study the impact of such ideas.

Although many intellectual histories of the Young Turk revolution failed to note how the revolution had a global dimension, works in diplomatic and political history have incorporated global developments in their accounts of the events of 1908. These accounts noted that an important motive of the Young Turk revolution was to secure the interests and ensure the recognition of the sovereignty of the Ottoman state (Ahmad, [1969] 2010; Fortna, 2011). Ahmad ([1969] 2010: 2 - 3), for instance, points to how the meeting between Edward VII and Nicholas II in Reval in 1908 prompted the revolution, because it raised fears that Britain and Russia had agreed to divide the Ottoman Empire. Intellectual historians have also focused on how the Young Turks disagreed over how to deal with Western intervention in the Ottoman Empire. These historians have suggested that the 1902 congress of the Young Turks resulted in a split between the followers of Prince Sabahaddin, the nephew of the Sultan, and those of a rival intellectual, Ahmed Rıza, over whether to accept foreign support to carry out the revolution (Hanioğlu, 2001: 28; Taglia, 2015). In practice, groups who would later be known as the CUP,118 founded by the efforts of Ahmed Rıza, and the Young Turk faction of the League of Private Initiative and Decentralisation (LPID; Teşebbüs-iŞahsi ve Adem-iMerkeziyet Cemiyeti), founded by Sabahaddin, both sought and received external backing. Nevertheless, the CUP and its forerunner, the CPU, were not opposed to seeking support from the outside world. Hanioğlu (2001: 265) notes, for instance, how immediately prior to the revolution, the CUP sent a communication to the consulates of European states in Macedonia in which they effectively sought recognition. However, studies have failed to note how the Young Turks were a transnational movement, as they were present in and drew support from individuals from a number of states and colonies

118 It is important to note that a faction of what would later become the CUP initially termed itself the CPU (Committee of Progress and Union) (Hanioğlu, 2001: 136) This was an organisation which had itself merged with the Ottoman Freedom Society in 1907 (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 72). In terms of links with foreign actors, the CUP had established links with the government of Greece and organised themselves in Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia (Hanioğlu, 2001: 77 - 78).

Therefore, the Young Turk movement, which was transnational in its onset, was embedded in the Ottoman diaspora of exiled intellectuals in Europe and sought to utilise these connections to advance its political aims.

Another strand in the historical literature focuses on the origins of the revolution in the three westernmost Ottoman provinces situated in Europe. Here, inter-imperial rivalries were felt most acutely by the Ottoman state. Three provinces of the Ottoman Empire, known as Macedonia by Europeans119, had been subjected to a regime of international reform according to the terms of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 (Rodogno, 2011a: 205 - 206; Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 25 – 28). This treaty, signed by Italy, Austria-Hungary, France, Britain, Russia, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, called for its signatories to oversee a multi-faceted reform programme in Macedonia to improve conditions in the region (Rodogno, 2011a; Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 25). The area had been contested by the Ottomans and the Russians, who had supported local elements in their desire to secure suzerainty from the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 – 1878 (M. Schulz, 2011: 190, 203). Other European powers were also drawn in due to their interests (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 25 – 28). Britain, France and Austria-Hungary, were concerned about Russian expansion in eastern Europe which could threaten their own interests, with Austria-Hungary especially being opposed to the empowerment of Russia and Russian subjects, protected under the capitulations, from extending their influence (Blumi, 2003a; Kent, 2005; Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 25). The Treaty of Berlin and its subsequent revisions, such as the Mürzsteg agreement of 1903, required international oversight of the Ottoman state’s activities in Macedonia (Rodogno, 2012: 188; M. Schulz, 2011: 203 – 204; Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 24 – 28, 35 - 38). Extensive administrative and judicial reforms and the formation of a special international force to aid and monitor the Ottoman security forces in the territory were envisaged (Rodogno, 2012: 163; Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 41 - 44). These policies, which amounted to an outside interference in the local society, could facilitate the advancement of the interests of those intervening within the province (Rodogno, 2012: 9). Historians of the period have also noted

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119 On the origins of the term “Macedonia” in late nineteenth century European cartography and its use of Roman place names see Yosmaoğlu (2013: 88). The Ottomans referred to this territory as “Rumeli” or “land of the Rum, or Romans” (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 86).
how most of the founders of the CUP, the ultimately predominant Young Turk faction, originated from Macedonia (Yosmaoğlu, 2006: 60; 2010: 160; Zürcher, 2003). Macedonia is understood, in these accounts, as a frontier area where the effects of international competing interests were most intense, and where the Ottomans would eventually react.

Historical accounts of other regions in the Ottoman Empire show how groups there also participated in the revolution and contributed to the emergence of a post-revolutionary Ottoman public sphere (Campos, 2011; Der Matossian, 2014). Alongside agitation amongst armed groups, including Muslim and Christian bands in Macedonia, some of which were co-opted by or cooperated with the CUP, tax riots also occurred in present-day eastern Turkey in 1908, with tax revolts starting in the city of Erzurum in 1906 and continuing intermittently until 1908 (Hanioğlu, 2001: 109 - 120; Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 47). These riots involved coordination between Armenian and Kurdish local groups and Young Turk groups (Berberian, 2019).

Unrest in eastern Anatolia had started the previous year, and these groups shared an opposition to the authoritarian rule of Abdülhamid II (Hanioğlu, 2001: 95 - 97). The coming together of these revolutionary movements would result in the emergence of a vibrant post-revolutionary public sphere in the Ottoman Empire (Der Matossian, 2014; Özbek, 2005; 2007: 797). This public sphere, which centred around the reopening of the Ottoman parliament and the preparation for elections, involved the formation of associations and the creation of an active press (Campos, 2011: 150 – 152; L. Hudson, 2006: 164 - 167). The onset of democratic politics meant that the Ottoman people were understood as the sovereign who would be represented in parliament (Campos, 2011: 43 – 58; Moroni, 2017). A degree of popular sovereignty, however limited120, was therefore established for a period after the revolution. This new public in Ottoman society began to engage in politics (Karamürsel, 2016: 143 – 150; Kayali, 1995: 271 - 273; Özbek, 2007). As Campos’s (2011) study of Ottoman Palestine and Jerusalem in this period demonstrates, different religious and ethnic communities forged new alliances and lobbied for their own interests, seeking often to frame them as a part of the general national interest.

120 A burgeoning literature has emerged stressing how the CUP was, ultimately, deeply illiberal and engaged in the silencing of dissent through political assassinations and censorship, see Göçek (1996: 130; 2008; 2011: 62 – 97), Hanioğlu (2011: 185 – 187), Sohrabi (2012) and Taglia (2015: 12).
The Ottoman people and the new Ottoman revolutionary state were therefore co-constitutive of each other, in accordance with the concept of popular sovereignty used by the revolutionaries.

Studies have not, however, focused on how constitutional developments within the Ottoman Empire were related to constitutional changes occurring elsewhere based on dominant European standards of ‘civilisation’. In considering the rise of anti-slavery movements and the general problematisation of slavery within the Ottoman Empire, Karamürsel (2016: 150) follows Weitz (2008) in acknowledging the significance of an international context that was more focused on outlining national boundaries and upholding ‘civilisation’ than on ensuring an extension of freedom. Further research can build on this insight to demonstrate how Ottoman elites and thinkers and those from other states they engaged with understood the standard of ‘civilisation’ and its implications. In contrast to republican or liberal notions of progress, which had been suppressed after the Napoleonic Wars, the idea of ‘civilisation’ gained the support of the influential conservative powers in Europe, including Russia and Austria-Hungary (Roshchin, 2017: 195). The Hague conferences in 1899 and 1907, which had been initiated by Russia, were important watersheds in the development of the idea of ‘civilisation’, as they condemned warfare and established an international court of tribunal (Abbenhuis, 2019; Kingsbury, 2002: 410-411; Reus-Smit, 1997: 578-579). Although the Ottoman Empire also had a delegation attending the conference, they were frequently interrupted by protests by Armenian movements and the Young Turks (Effynger, 2008: 22). After the revolution of 1908, the Young Turks would emphasise that the presence of constitutional rule demonstrated a state’s level of ‘civilisation’ (Blachford, 2019: 41; Jordheim and Neumann, 2011: 160 – 161). Theories of how Ottoman constitutional politics could and should unfold were produced by Ahmed Rıza (1907; [1922] 1990) and Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a; [1908] 1999b), before and during the period of the reintroduction of constitutional rule in 1908. Studying the impact of their theories can demonstrate whether the Young Turks, through introducing constitutional rule, were able to secure a general acceptance that the Ottoman Empire possessed a higher level of ‘civilisation’. This, in turn, can

demonstrate whether their theories facilitated the Ottoman state in its quest to gain recognition of its sovereign equality in global international society.

3. The Young Turks and constitutionalism as a standard of ‘civilisation’:

This section argues that the Young Turks developed an understanding of constitutionalism as a standard of ‘civilisation’ to secure recognition of the sovereignty of their state, which they deployed in their constituent diplomacy following the 1908 revolution. It considers how the Young Turks developed different understandings of the concept of the standard of ‘civilisation’ before the revolution, drawing from the Ottoman and European contexts in which they were situated in. Various interpretations of this concept resulted in the emergence of separate branches of the Young Turks following the 1902 Paris conference of the Ottoman opposition. The relevance of these different understandings of ‘civilisation’ for the constituent power at both the international and the domestic level is discussed. The Young Turk revolution is considered as a moment of both domestic and global reconstitution involving the defence of sovereignty (see also Fortna, 2011) through the idea of ‘civilisation’. This builds on accounts that have compared the impact of the revolution to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the Iranian Revolution of 1906 (Aydın, 2007: 71 - 92; Hanioğlu, 2001: 318; Kurzman, 1998; 2008; Sohrabi, 1995; 2011). The section then focuses on how the diplomacy that the revolutionaries engaged in differed from the Ottoman state’s established policy of accepting European reforms in its territory. The Young Turks were successful in advancing their conception of sovereignty insofar as they secured the withdrawal of the European gendarme force from Macedonia. Crucially, they were able to convince the European powers to withdraw the military force, that had been sent to oversee the reforms and maintain peace in Macedonia, by claiming that their revolution heralded the onset of a new civilised Ottoman regime. The constitutional nature of the regime persuaded the European powers to withdraw their force. This section shows how constitutionalism can be understood as a standard of ‘civilisation’. By demonstrating that they were civilised actors, the Young Turks were able to normalise the position of the Ottoman state in

global international society and secure the recognition of the Ottoman Empire’s sovereignty over areas of policy in Macedonia.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was subjected to considerable stigmatisation on the basis of its supposed failure to meet the standard of ‘civilisation’ (Ahmad, 2000). This prompted different reactions by individuals in the empire. The Ottoman Office of Legal Counsel had translated the texts of international lawyers such as Twiss, Lorimer, Westlake and Lawrence, who had discussed the standard of ‘civilisation’ (Genell, 2016: 269). These lawyers believed that international law ought to reflect what they understood to be the naturally occurring hierarchy of different actors according to their level of ‘civilisation’123. In response to the challenges of the standard of ‘civilisation’, Ottoman intellectuals and statesmen, such as the Islamic intellectual, Jamal-addin Afghani and other leading figures of Islamic authority, sought to show that the Ottoman Empire was the representative of a distinct, Islamic civilisation (Aydın, 2007: 448; Keddie, 1968: 30; Matthee, 1989: 153; Taglia, 2015: 35). In the course of his debate with the French thinker, Ernest Renan, Afghani attempted to portray Islam and Islamic states as compatible with ‘civilisation’ (Aydın, 2007: 48 - 52). Specifically, Afghani believed that the civilisational achievements of Islam were comparable to those of Christianity and stressed the role of Islam in preserving Hellenic thought, which Europeans saw as fundamental to Western thought and culture (Aydın, 2007: 49). These views also influenced intellectual leaders of the different factions of the Young Turks (Taglia, 2015). Ahmed Rıza, a Young Turk and a former Ottoman bureaucrat based in Paris, argued that the Ottomans could contribute to universal ‘civilisation’ (Taglia, 2015: 59; Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 100 - 101). He followed the positivist philosopher, Pierre Lafitte, in claiming that ‘civilisation’ was not limited to the geography of Europe (Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 100 – 101). On the other hand, Sabahaddin, argued that ‘civilisation’ ought to be understood as complying with international standards (Hanioğlu, 2001: 88 - 89). Sabahaddin envisaged a greater level of cooperation between the Ottomans and the Great Powers to enable the

empire to meet existing international standards, whereas Ahmed Rıza emphasised that the Ottomans were already ‘civilised’ by virtue of their embeddedness in Islamic civilisation (Hanioglu, 2001: 88 - 89).

At the start of the twentieth century, several intellectuals from the Ottoman Empire advanced proposals of what could be done to enable the Ottoman Empire to overcome the stigma it was facing at the international level. Foremost among these intellectuals were Sabahaddin and Ahmed Rıza, who, from their base of operations in Paris and notwithstanding differences in their views, were united in calling for the reintroduction of the Ottoman constitution of 1876 (Taglia, 2015: 4). Ahmed Rıza, especially, suggested that the removal of arbitrary despotism and the return of a constitutional regime would prevent the Ottoman Empire from being stigmatised in global international society. The Mevheret journal, which Ahmed Rıza published from Paris, presented itself initially, from 1895 to 1896, as a journal that would assist the Ottoman Sultan, urging him to reintroduce the constitution (Taglia, 2015: 62). However, by 1897, following a series of territorial losses, including the loss of effective Ottoman control over Tunisia, and parts of the Balkans, the Mevheret became far more critical of the Sultan (Taglia, 2015: 63). Ahmed Rıza, at this point, developed a positivist argument for the reintroduction of the constitution (Taglia, 2015: 63). Adopting a positivist approach would allow the Ottoman Empire to harness what Ahmed Rıza took to be its already relatively high level of “civilisation”, stemming from its connection to Islamic civilisation (Taglia, 2015: 72). This was because positivism entailed, as Comte (see the discussion in Taglia, 2015: 56) suggested, a belief in progress, but did not question the achievements of Islamic civilisations in the past (Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 101). Ahmed Rıza prepared a leaflet titled Crise de l’Orient (i.e. the Crisis of the Orient) and published by the

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124 France and Britain concluded an agreement in 1897 which consolidated France’s control over Tunisia, where there was already a French protectorate (M.D. Lewis, 2013: 65).
125 Ahmed Rıza followed Afghani and other Islamic reformists, such as Namık Kemal (see Aydin, 2007: 36; Deringil, 1993; Landen, 2006) and Rifa’a Badawi Rafi al-Tahtawi (see Taglia, 2015: 35 - 36), in defending the achievements of Islamic civilisation, in the face of criticisms. In doing this, he was also influenced by the arguments of the positivist thinker, Gustave Le Bon (see Taglia, 2015: 71). According to Turnaoğlu (2017a: 101) the ideas of the positivist Pierre Laffitte (1908: 196 – 197 as cited in Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 101), who published his The Positive Science of Morals: Its Opportuneness, Its Outlines and Its Chief Applications, in 1908, influenced Ahmed Rıza. Laffitte (1908) had argued here that Europe ought not to be considered the vanguard of human progress and that other geographies could also contribute to the evolution of humanity (Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 101).
Paris branch of his movement in 1907, effectively opposed claims that the Ottomans could never be considered civilised by challenging common European arguments used to explain the causes of the crisis. For instance, the idea of holy war, presented by European commentators, such as Gustave Louis Binger, who published his *Le Péril de l’Islam* (The Peril of Islam) in 1906, as one of the practices keeping the Ottoman Empire behind in terms of level of ‘civilisation’, was challenged (Ahmed Rıza, 1907: 29). Ahmed Rıza (1907: 29) argued that holy war did not necessarily clash with international law. In his leaflet, Ahmed Rıza (1907: 126) argued that if the Ottoman Empire could develop its own constitutional system it could overcome many of its supposed shortcomings, identified by European commentators.

Ahmed Rıza also presented an extensive account of how removing despotism could lead to improvements in other areas of society and thereby address what European commentators referred to as the “crise” (i.e. “crisis”, see Ahmed Rıza, 1907: 117) in the Ottoman Empire. Here, Ahmed Rıza (1907) provided various explanations to account for what he believed to be the problematic state of affairs in the Ottoman Empire. However, instead of arguing that these were indicators of the low level of civilisation in the empire, Ahmed Rıza (1907) emphasised that it was the continuing arbitrary rule of the Sultan which corrupted institutions in the Ottoman Empire. Ahmed Rıza (1907) inserted quotes in his booklet from European thinkers and referred to episodes from European history. Fatalism, for instance, was presented as potentially a mark of wisdom, involving an acceptance of things that one cannot change, as suggested by Auguste Comte in his *Cours de philosophie positiviste*, published in a series of texts between 1830 – 1841, from which Ahmed Rıza (1907: 18) cites the 28th page in defence of this point. The institution of the caliphate, on the other hand, was depicted as echoing Hegel’s claim that kings are essentially “the incarnation of the idea of the divine on Earth” (Ahmed Rıza, 1907: 19 – 20). Similarly, Ahmed Rıza (1907: 88) quoted the views of European thinkers, regarding the separate or unequal status of women, to justify polygamy and the institution of the Harem. Ahmed Rıza (1907: 40) claimed that the impression

126 On this particular text and its context see Richard (2018).
127 The quote that Ahmed Rıza (1907: 19 – 20) attributes to Hegel reads as follows, in its original French: “Le roi, c’est l’incarnation de l’idée divine sur la terre.”
128 Ahmed Rıza (1907: 88) claimed that contemporary European thinkers, including women, such as Santory, de Girardin, de Saumery, as well as men, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, George Sand and
of the “fanaticism” of Islam had been fostered by the Russian Empire and its own religious chauvinism, which had been discredited following Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905. According to Ahmed Rıza (1907: 141) the feeling of “injustice” was a major source of grievance of the Muslim population of the empire, who, unlike the revolutionary movements of their Christian compatriots, could not receive the support of the Great Powers in challenging the despotic state. Ahmed Rıza’s (1907: 141) stance on this matter was summarised in his following statement:

“Are they really braver or more miserable than the Turks? No. They revolted because they felt supported and pushed by a foreign Power.”

Ahmed Rıza (1907: 138) also stressed the importance of representative government, arguing that “blind and passive obedience to the whims of a despot is absolutely contrary to Islamic principles; many times, moreover, the Muslims have done themselves justice by dethroning their rebel rulers to the prescriptions of the law”.

Therefore, Ahmed Rıza drew upon both European ideas, and the commitment of the predecessors of the Young Turks, to demonstrate the ‘civilised’ nature of the Ottoman Empire and Islam, more generally.

Sabahaddin argued, though, that simply restoring the constitutional order of 1876 would not be sufficient for the development of ‘civilisation’ in the Ottoman Empire. Instead, Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 66 - 67) argued that other reforms were required so that Ottoman society could conform to the standard of ‘civilisation’ envisaged by the great powers. Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 64) argued that his goals involved

“demonstrating that the oppression experienced during the Abdülhamid II period by these Turks and the other Muslim elements of the Ottoman Empire were not due to one person or a group of persons, but instead surfaced because of lifestyles and social deficiencies.”

Napoleon Bonaparte asserted that excessive freedom was a vice, in the context of his discussion of the status of women in the Ottoman Empire.

129 The original French text reads as follows: “Sont-ils réellement plus courageux ou plus malheureux que les Turcs? Non. Ils se sont révoltés parce qu’ils se sentaient soutenus et poussés par une Puissance étrangère.” (Ahmed Rıza, 1907: 141).

130 The original French text reads as follows: “L’obéissance aveugle et passive aux caprices d’un despote est absolument contraire aux caprices d’un despote est absolument contraire aux principes islamiques; maintes fois, d’ailleurs, les Musulmans se sont fait justice en détrônant leurs souverains rebelles aux prescriptions de la loi.” (Ahmed Rıza, 1907: 138).

131 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Türkler ve umumiyetle anasır-ı müslime-i Osmaniye’ye karşı istibbadın bir veya bir kaç kişi tarafından değil fakat tarz-i ma’iset (yasam) ve naka’is-i içtica ’iyyemizden ne’şet (meydana gelmek) ettiği göstermek.” (Sabahaddin, [1908] 1999a: 64).
As one of his followers, Hersekli Satvet Lütfi ([1908] 1999: 63 - 69) pointed out, Sabahaddin argued that the original constitution of 1876, the Kanun-i Esasi, called for decentralised government (i.e. “adem-i merkeziyyet-i idari” as quoted from Hersekli Satvet Lütfi, [1908] 1999: 62), which would have enabled provinces to use their own resources rather than rely on the centre. Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 64) also argued that any future movement to transform the Ottoman Empire would need to explain its goals to the “civilised world”\textsuperscript{132} and to ensure “at least part of the Westerners, who are almost entirely against us, ought to be won over to support our national cause”\textsuperscript{133}. This clashed with Ahmed Rıza’s suspicious attitude towards the Great Powers. However, Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 74) argued that, even “if a nation was conquered by foreigners, the inhabitants of this nation can still regain their laws if their morality is not corrupted. But, nothing can save a nation if immorality has become embedded in them”\textsuperscript{134}. In addition, to end concerns that his programme would result in further intervention, Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 66 - 67) argued that

“because America and Europe have obvious interests in the progress of Turkey it is essential that all civilised countries in the world are agreed that the Ottomans resolve the eastern question on their own. Indeed, only this means of resolving the problem will not violate any interests, and will, in fact, contribute to transforming the bitter rivalries amongst states into beneficial competition, which will result in active initiatives and praiseworthy efforts…”\textsuperscript{135}.

Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 67) added that

“the day the Great Powers recognise the principle of freedom-loving Turkey that ‘the Ottoman state belongs to the Ottomans’ will be when a general peace emerges”\textsuperscript{136}.

\textsuperscript{132} Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 64) here uses the term “nizam-i alem”.

\textsuperscript{133} The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Ecnebi istilasına uğrayan bir millet ahlaki büsbütün bozulamanışa hukuкуnu yavaş yavaş istidad edebilir. Fakat ahlaksızlığın damarlarına işlediği bir milleti hiç bir şey kurtaramız!” (Sabahaddin, [1908] 1999a: 74).

\textsuperscript{134} The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Ecnebi istilasına uğrayan bir millet ahlaki büsbütün bozulamanışa hukuкуnu yavaş yavaş istidad edebilir. Fakat ahlaksızlığın damarlarına işlediği bir milleti hiç bir şey kurtaramız!” (Sabahaddin, [1908] 1999a: 74).

\textsuperscript{135} The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Avrupa ile Amerika’nın da Türkiye’nin terakkisinde menfa’at-ı azimeleri derkar olduğu için cihanın bütün nütæmeddinin devletleri şark mes’lestinin bi’z-zat Osmanlılar tarafından hallini temenni etmelidirler. Çünkü yalmız bu suret-i hall hiç bir menfa’ati ihlal etmeyecek, bi’l-akis devletler arasındaki mühlik rekabetleri yavaş yavaş naﬁ müsadakatları tahvil eyeleyeyecek, bu müsayakatin netayic-i ameliyyesi de en fa’al teşebbüslerle en namus-kar gayreterin mufafakıyyeti olacak!... ” (Sabahaddin, [1908] 1999a: 66 - 67).

\textsuperscript{136} The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Cihan-ı medeniyet bilmelidir ki ta’affün ve tefessûh eden resmi Türkiye’nin arkasında meftun-ı sa’y ve adalet bir içtima’i Türkiye yükselmekde! … ve hürriyyet-perver Türkiye’nin ‘Osmanlı devleti Osmanlılarındır’
Therefore, Sabahaddin presented a vision of constitutionalism that differed from Ahmed Rıza’s. Uniquely, Sabahaddin emphasised the need to take into account the interests of the Great Powers and advocated decentralisation and social reform as two means to consolidate his programme of ‘civilisation’.

In the lead up to the Young Turk revolution, Sabahaddin and Ahmed Rıza negotiated an agreement between their two factions in 1907. This enabled them to cooperate with each other during and after the 1908 revolution (Hanioğlu, 2001: 261 - 278). The revolution, orchestrated by military officers aligned with the Young Turks, who were mostly situated in the empire’s European territories, forced the Sultan to issue a declaration accepting the constitution of 1876 and the principle of popular sovereignty (Moroni, 2017: 267). During the revolution, the CPU External Branch sent two communications to the consulates of European states in Macedonia (Hanıoğlu, 2001: 265 - 271). The first of these criticised the policies of the Treaty of Berlin powers, singling out Russia as being more interested in the dismembering of the Ottoman Empire than in its rejuvenation (CPU, 1908; Hanıoğlu, 2001: 265). This rejuvenation could only be achieved through the establishment of a constitutional order guaranteeing the rights of all Ottomans in the empire (CPU, 1908; Hanıoğlu, 2001: 265). The second set of communications, on 12 and 22 July, were more emphatic in underlining the universalist perspective of the Young Turks, stressing that they were dedicated to the establishment of a constitutional system that would ensure the “liberty” of all Ottoman citizens (as quoted in Hanıoğlu, 2001: 271; Lamb, 1908). Because of the changes to the Ottoman constitution brought about by the 1908 revolution, the representatives of the great powers agreed unanimously to stand down the gendarmerie force in
Macedonia (Lange-Akhund, 1998: 324 – 325; Tokay, 2003: 62; 2013: 177 - 178; Ünal, 1998: 141). The end of intercommunal violence in Macedonia, brought about by the inclusion of most armed factions in the 1908 revolution, ended the pretext for the presence of the gendarmerie (Brooks, 2014: 656). Therefore, the Young Turks presented themselves and, indeed, became the constituent power in the Ottoman Empire, carrying out a ‘civilising mission’. This prompted the Europeans to withdraw their security presence, whereby the Young Turks moved closer to achieving their goal of attaining sovereign equality in global international society.

4. Limits of the revolutionary constituent diplomacy and the Young Turks: Crete, Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina

This section explains how the revolutionary constituent diplomacy of the Young Turks, centring on the use of the concept of civilisation to secure recognition of the sovereign equality Ottoman Empire, was unsuccessful in a number of cases. Reforming the Ottoman Empire, by presenting it as a constitutional state under popular sovereignty, failed to prevent the Ottomans losing control over Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Crete (Ünal, 1998). The section begins by noting how constitutionalism was taken to be a standard of civilisation by the Young Turks. However, civilisation, in this context, was a contested concept. In the post-revolutionary Ottoman Empire, it became possible to identify Islamic and other understandings of ‘civilisation’. Previously, under Abdülhamid II, the Ottoman Empire had been promoted as the representative of Islamic civilisation (Deringil, 1998: 44 - 67). However, several crises that occurred shortly after the revolution of 1908 revealed how outside actors continued to view the Ottoman Empire as only having a legitimate claim to sovereignty over Muslim communities (Mirkova, 2013; Ünal, 1998). Significantly, Bulgarian representatives argued that the Ottomans could maintain sovereignty over a part of Bulgarian territory by administering the needs of the Islamic community present there (Ünal, 1998: 142 - 143). Events in Bulgaria inspired certain political movements in Crete to declare union with Greece on similar terms and thereby challenge the Ottoman claim to sovereignty (Fujinami, 2016: 322; Ünal, 1998: 151). Bosnia-Herzegovina was annexed by Austria-Hungary soon afterwards (Ünal, 1998: 137 – 139, 146). As a signatory of the Treaty of Berlin, Vienna argued that annexation was justified on the basis of its right to intervene to
maintain order in the province (M. Schulz, 2011: 189 – 190, 199, 204). As in the case of Bulgaria, the Austro-Hungarians argued that a semblance of Ottoman sovereignty could be maintained in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the proposal that the Sultan may appoint religious officials jointly with the Emperor. The territorial losses of 1908 show how the attempts of the Young Turks to reconstitute their state and international society to safeguard the sovereignty of their state by appealing to constitutionalism as a standard of civilisation were only partially successful.

In their framing of constitutionalism as a standard of civilisation, the Young Turks sought to alter the relations of the Ottoman state with its periphery through the universalist, and therefore, all-encompassing vision presented by constitutionalism. Abdülhamid’s regime had underlined that Islamic civilisation was separate but equal to Western civilisation. In contrast, the revolutionaries claimed to be part of a universal civilisation and they aimed to preserve sovereignty in those areas which fell under Ottoman sovereignty. These areas included the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the principality of Bulgaria and the autonomous province of Crete (Kostopoulou, 2013; 2016). Under Articles 24 and 25 of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the sanjak of Novi Pazar, were occupied by Austria-Hungary (M. Schulz, 2011: 204). The aim was to maintain peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina which had seen anti-Ottoman uprisings and ethno-religious violence in the periods 1831 - 1832 and 1875 - 1877 (Babuna, 2011; Radusic, 2011). Bulgaria was originally recognised as an independent state under the Treaty of San Stefano of 1878 (Tokay, 2011: 253 - 257). However, due to the pressure of Britain, which opposed the extension of Russian influence in the Balkans, by the terms of the Treaty of Berlin Bulgaria became an autonomous principality and tributary of the Ottoman state (Tokay, 2011: 253 - 257). As a principality, Bulgaria could still conclude a military protocol with Russia in 1885 and expand its territory to include the province of Eastern Rumelia (Hacisalihoğlu, 2011: 138). The Ottoman

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142 A sanjak was an Ottoman military and political administrative unit (see Imber, [2004] 2019: 151 - 159).
143 The Eastern Rumelian tribute, here, referred to the funds that were expected to be paid by the province to the Ottoman Empire, according to Article 9 (Treaty Between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey for the Settlement of Affairs in the East, [1878] 1908: 407). The province had been recognised as a tributary territory within the Ottoman Empire in 1878 under Article 13 of the Treaty of Berlin (Treaty Between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey for the Settlement of Affairs in the East, [1878] 1908: 408).
province of Crete was also reorganised as an autonomous province in 1898 (Fujinami, 2013: 324). Inspired by the promise of reform, the Cretan Revolutionary Committee had previously revolted against the Ottoman state, before agreeing to extensive reforms in 1878, in the Pact of Halepa (Holland, 1999: 254). This pact would subsequently not be honoured by both sides (Fujinami, 2013: 324; Şenşik, 2011: 144). In 1898, in response to a revolt the previous year and after clashes with the Ottomans, Crete became, despite the protest of the Ottoman state, an autonomous state protected by the intervening powers of Britain, France, Italy and Russia (Fujinami, 2013: 324; Şenşik, 2011). While still technically a part of the Ottoman Empire, Crete came to enjoy extensive rights of local administration (Fujinami, 2013: 324; Şenşik, 2011). The Abdülhamid II regime had gradually come to represent the affairs of the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Crete. However, following the revolution of 1908, there emerged the view that the Ottoman subjects of these territories were all citizens under the constitutional order.

Although the revolutionary regime stressed constitutionalism as a standard of ‘civilisation’ to justify its claims to sovereignty, it was unable to prevent Bulgaria’s declaration of independence and Crete’s decision to unite with Greece. Significantly, both actions were justified on the basis of the perceived incompatibility of continued Ottoman rule with the supposed level of ‘civilisation’ of the territories that were governed by the Ottomans. This contrasted with Sabahaddin’s ([1908] 1999a: 65) vision of how the presence of a “civilised” and “reformed Turkey (sic) would be of benefit even to the Balkan states who have been independent for a long time”, as they could count on a reinvigorated Ottoman

144 The pact was integrated into the Treaty of Berlin in Article 23 (Fujinami, 2013: 324).
146 Prince George of Greece was appointed a commissioner of Crete (Fujinami, 2013: 324).
147 On how claims to sovereignty in southeast Europe in general and Bulgarian in particular came to be based on the perceived level of “civilization” of claimants, which, in turn, came to be understood as based on whether or not their religion was civilised, see Mirkova (2013: 956).
148 The Ottoman government had first been forced, by the “Great Powers”, to appoint a Christian governor to the island to prevent tensions and its officials understood their goal to be the securing of the legitimacy of the state, but the last governor, Beroviç Paşa, fled in 1897 (Şenşik, 2010: 31). However, they later found themselves defending the interests of the Muslim community of the island, who petitioned the Ottoman government to protect them from armed Christian groups (Şenşik, 2010: 38).
149 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Türklerden müddet-i mediiteden beri ayrılan Balkan avkmının bile ıslah edilmiş bir Türkiye’ye ihtiyacıyla sabit” (Sabahaddin, [1908] 1999a: 65).
Empire to check the expansionist efforts of “peoples to their north”\(^{150}\). However, Bulgaria requested the post-revolutionary Ottoman government to approve the establishment of a council of bishops, operating under the Bulgarian Exarchate (Buchanan, 1908a: 1). The aim was to unite Exarchist bishops in Bulgaria with those in Macedonia (Buchanan, 1908a: 1). But even though Sabahaddin had argued for the establishment of a decentralised form of rule, the CUP, which became an influential post-revolutionary faction\(^{151}\), sought to pursue policies of centralisation\(^{152}\). Hence Bulgaria’s request was not accepted by the CUP\(^{153}\) and tensions escalated between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. Although the Bulgarian declaration was opposed by the Treaty of Berlin powers, because it challenged the status of Bulgaria in international law\(^{154}\), the province ultimately became independent. Tensions had flared up before the declaration of independence, when the Young Turks sought to emphasise the status of Bulgaria as a province by not inviting the chief Bulgarian official in Istanbul, Getchov, to an ambassadorial banquet in honour of Abdülhamid II’s birthday (Ünal, 1998: 141). In line with the spirit of the Treaty of Berlin, involving the recognition of different religions and national groups and promoting their development, Paprikoff, the Bulgarian military representative in Istanbul, stated, after the Getchov affair, that the Bulgarian authorities would only welcome Ottoman officials in the country to administer the affairs of the vakıfs or Islamic

\(^{150}\) Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a: 65) refers to these as “akvam-i şimaliyye”. Fujinami (2013: 882) reads this text as justifying Ottoman rule over Balkan peoples who were still under Ottoman territorial sovereignty, but, as has been demonstrated, the Balkans was also a space which was shaped by global and international developments.

\(^{151}\) The CUP had established a line of communication with Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, the Ottoman inspector of the three westernmost provinces, i.e. Macedonia (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 18). Hilmi Paşa would later use his influence to ensure that Said Paşa, Abdülhamid II’s pre-revolutionary Grand Vizier, was dismissed and replaced by Kamil Paşa (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 18; Fujinami, 2013: 889). Kamil Paşa was later compelled to accept Recep Paşa as the Minister of War by the CUP (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 18).

\(^{152}\) Bahaeddin Şakir, one of the leaders of the CPU, which would subsequently be renamed the CUP, argued against Sabahaddin’s programme of granting local autonomy (Hanioğlu, 2001: 89). Although Şakir did not criticise the dedication of Sabahaddin’s movement to “international law” he nonetheless was eager to avoid autonomy, which he believed would result in the emergence of spaces of shared sovereignty between the Ottomans and other actors (Hanioğlu, 2001: 89).

\(^{153}\) The issue of ending religious conflict between the Greek and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches, which also shaped and fuelled their conflict in Macedonia and the Balkans more generally, was taken seriously by the CUP, who would later introduce a Church Law of 1910 that defined the identity of the Patriarchate of Constantinople as “Rum”, meaning Eastern Roman, as opposed to Greek (Fujinami, 2007: 108).

\(^{154}\) Britain’s representative in Sophia, Buchanan (1908b: f 87) argued that the Ottomans were acting on the basis of their “Treaty rights”. Both Austria-Hungary and Germany urged Bulgaria to avoid provoking the Ottomans (Lowther, 1908g).
associations (Buchanan, 1908c; Ünal, 1998: 143, 157). On 20 September 1908, following a dispute between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire concerning the Oriental Railway in Eastern Rumelia, Bulgarian troops acted independently of the Ottoman Empire, taking control of the railway (Ünal, 1998: 143). In opposition to Sabahaddin’s vision, Bulgaria stressed that the Ottoman Empire was not entitled to rule over any aspects of its politics aside from overseeing the affairs of its Muslims (Buchanan, 1908c). This echoed the Abdülhamid II regime’s approach of sustaining the empire through empowering the Islamic element, even though the connection between the Ottoman Empire and the Muslims was now used to justify Bulgaria’s independence.

The significance of religious arguments in Bulgaria’s declaration of independence was evidence that the Young Turk’s efforts to present constitutionalism as a standard of ‘civilisation’ had not succeeded. Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999b: 100) had argued, in an article clarifying his position, that decentralised rule would enable the Ottoman Empire to maintain control of Ottoman territories, such as the “islands in the Mediterranean”, because of the military benefits it would provide (Fujinami, 2013: 882). This was because, according to Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999b: 100), decentralisation would be conducive to “teşebbüs-i şahsi”, which can be translated as “private initiative”, which would, in turn, produce wealth that could be taxed for the purposes of funding military activities. However, ultimately, constitutional rule frustrated Bulgaria’s goal of gaining international support for and encouraging local armed groups seeking autonomy in Macedonia (Bechev, 2017: 45 – 47; Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 14 – 16). Autonomy could also enable the Ottoman Empire to maintain a limited form of sovereignty, in the form of quasi-sovereignty, also termed “suzerainty”, (see Bechev,

155 Simultaneously, a railway strike along the border between Bulgaria and the remainder of the empire resulted in both sides mobilising their troops (Mentzel, 2003).

156 This was to eventually lead Bulgaria to formally declare its independence on 5 October 1908 (Ünal, 1998: 146 - 147). Ünal (1996: 39) notes how Ahmed Rıza told Austro-Hungarian officials that their annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina encouraged Bulgaria to declare independence.

157 See also Fujinami’s (2013: 882) discussion of this article, where he points to how it played a crucial role in distinguishing between administrative decentralisation (“adem-i merkeziyet-i idari” as quoted from Fujinami, 2013: 881) and political decentralisation (“adem-i merkeziyet-i siyasi” as quoted from Fujinami, 2013: 881). Sabahaddin argued for administrative decentralisation, distinct from the existing forms of sovereignty in Crete and Eastern Rumelia, that Kostopoulou (2013) defines as shared, and Mirkova (2013: 970) understands as “quasi-sovereignty” (Fujinami, 2013: 881).

158 See also the discussion in Fujinami (2013: 882).
which would take the form of the empire representing and administering the interests of Muslims. The responses of various signatories of the Treaty of Berlin to the declaration of Bulgarian independence did not amount to a defence of Ottoman sovereignty in the Balkans (Ünal, 1998). On 22 September, Russia’s Acting Foreign Minister and the British ambassador in Russia, Nicolson (1908a), with whom he communicated, both believed that Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire would need to be warned to act with moderation. The Russian acting minister also added that Russia and the other powers could suggest that the planned withdrawal of the gendarmerie force, maintained in Macedonia by the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin, could be halted (Nicolson, 1908a). Six days later, Russia’s ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Tcharykoff, told Nicolson (1908b) that all of the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin should devise a means of responding to the declaration of independence. However, Tcharykoff also told Nicolson (1908b) that Bulgaria’s actions in occupying Eastern Rumelia had not been unlawful, since Bulgaria already held control over Eastern Rumelia, in contrast to the situation envisaged in 1878. With the Berlin powers divided on the nature of Ottoman sovereignty over Eastern Rumelia, Bulgaria was poised to declare its independence, while allowing the Ottomans to maintain some control over the Muslim populations’ affairs. This reflected the view that had been expressed in the Treaty of Berlin, according to which the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire were to be treated as if they were a distinct nation or minority, represented internationally by the Ottomans.

The Ottoman government responded to the declaration of independence by proposing a policy that would permit the Ottomans to maintain a degree of control over Bulgaria. The Grand Vizier, protesting at the declaration and Bulgaria’s seizing of the Oriental Railway, called for Ottoman sovereignty to be maintained under a

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159 Lowther (1908b) was informed by the British Consul at Serres that bands near Perin would fight alongside Bulgaria in the event of a war with the aim of seizing the strategically important Kresna Pass.
160 Although Eastern Rumelia was originally considered a separate administrative unit to Bulgaria, it had been accepted as a part of the then-Principality of Bulgaria in 1885, after which the Ottomans also recognised the Bulgarian Prince as the governor of Eastern Rumelia in the Tophane Agreement (Prévost, 2012: 30).
161 The Oriental Railway was a railway line situated between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, where, in the lead up to Bulgarian independence, a strike of workers, which the Bulgarians and Ottomans claimed the other had instigated, prompted Bulgarian troops to assume control of the line (Mentzel, 2003).
regime of international protection modelled on Crete, according to Lowther (1908f), the British ambassador in Istanbul. The Grand Vizier demanded that a similar system be introduced in the province of Eastern Rumelia, which included parts of eastern Bulgaria, in order to maintain Ottoman sovereignty over at least part of Bulgaria (Lowther, 1908f). The Ottoman Ambassador in London argued that Britain should not accept the Ottoman loss of Eastern Rumelia, but the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey (1908i: 1; 1908j: f 275) sought to reach an agreement with Russia on the fate of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. According to Lowther (1908f), the Grand Vizier intended Eastern Rumelia to become a buffer zone to defend the Ottoman Empire against possible encroachments by armed groups from Bulgaria. The Grand Vizier further added, in his communication to Lowther (1908f: f 239), that he believed that Articles 23 and 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, which restricted Ottoman sovereignty, as well as the capitulations, had “lapse[d] automatically as a result of the establishment of the Constitution.” Grey (1908i) later reported, how in the interests of calculating the tribute owed by Bulgaria to the Ottoman Empire, Rifat Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador in London, had stated that Eastern Rumelia should be considered separately from Bulgaria. By stressing that the Ottomans were entitled to tribute payments under the Treaty of Berlin, from Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, Rifat Paşa had essentially accepted that the province was no longer a part of the empire, but a tributary of it (Grey, 1908i). Ottoman arguments for retaining Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, on the basis of their constitutional and hence ‘civilised’ regime, were unsuccessful and the independence of Bulgaria provided a template for other states seeking independence from the Ottoman Empire. The declaration of Bulgarian independence provoked Crete to declare its union with Greece, which was not initially recognised officially by Greece (Ünal, 1998: 151). However the prominent Greek international lawyer, Georgios Streit, believed that it was justified because of Greece’s higher level of “civilization”, stemming from its adherence to the Christian religion (Fujinami, 2016: 333). Arguments highlighting the purported civilisational inferiority of the Ottomans were used to rule out any form of continued Ottoman sovereignty for territories aiming to secede, even after the revolution of 1908.

162 Buchanan (1908a: 2), a British diplomat, informed Grey that the independence of Bulgaria could be considered as a means of resolving the unrest in Macedonia, since it meant that Bulgaria could “content herself with the development of her internal resources”.
The Young Turks also failed to convince other states that they were ‘civilised’ enough to govern the Ottoman Empire when appealing to constitutionalism as a standard of ‘civilisation’ in the context of the Bosnian crisis. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was formally still a part of the Ottoman Empire, although it was occupied by Austria-Hungary since 1876. In 1881, during a meeting of the emperors of Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary’s right to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina was acknowledged (B. Schmitt, 1937: 3). To justify annexation, which ran counter to the Treaty of Berlin, references were made to the purported “civilising” mission of Austria-Hungary (Francis Joseph I, 1908: 3; see also Goschen, 1908b). According to Goschen (1908b: 1), the British Ambassador in Vienna, the annexation involved the creation of a “third divisional territory” in the form of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would be added to the two existing territories of Austria and Hungary. Customs duties were to be abolished between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the other territories, and Bosnia and Herzegovina was to be granted its own parliament, or Diet (Goschen, 1908b: 1). Describing its ongoing role as one of “civilising”, Austria-Hungary argued that the level of development of the two provinces required that they be annexed by Austria-Hungary as part of their natural evolution (Francis Joseph I, 1908: 3). The Young Turks’ support for a constitution for the Ottoman Empire did not prevent the Dual Monarchy from claiming that it was annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide it with a constitution (Francis Joseph I, 1908: 3 - 4). In his communication to Grey on 7 October 1908, Goschen (1908b) enclosed a translated speech by the Austro-Hungarian Emperor Francis Joseph I (1908: 3), explaining the reasons for the annexation. It read as follows:

“To raise Bosnia and Herzegovina to a higher level of political life, we have determined to grant these two lands a constitutional system, which will make allowance for their present condition and general interests, and so create a legal basis for the representation of their wishes and needs. You shall have a voice in the settlement of the affairs of your country, which shall, as before, have its separate Administration”.

Consequently, the Austro-Hungarian Empire referred to constitutionalism to advance its claim that it had reached a level of ‘civilisation’ that gave it the right to govern Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was when the Young Turks were deploying similar arguments to attempt to maintain control over their territory.
Prior to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, autonomous Islamic foundations had been established in the two provinces. The leadership of these foundations was to be determined by the ulema, meaning the Sunni Muslim religious officials of the Ottoman Empire and by local authorities (Goschen, 1908a). The Bosnian Muslims had, in fact, lobbied the Austro-Hungarian government for greater autonomy in 1900 (Goschen, 1908a). Following the annexation, they were granted the right to appoint three candidates for the position of Reis-ul-ulema, meaning the leader of the Muslim clergy in the territory, who would be approved by the Emperor of Austria-Hungary and confirmed by the Sheikh-ul Islam, the highest religious official under the Sultan (Goschen, 1908a). With the annexation of the provinces, Francis Joseph I (1908: 4) stated that the Dual Monarchy envisaged the “protection of spiritual welfare” and the “equal protection of all religious faiths” which would be guaranteed by the new constitutional arrangement. This meant that the sole role of the Ottoman state was to continue to provide joint leadership of the Islamic foundations. In the declaration of the annexation of the provinces, Francis Joseph I (1908: 4) stressed that Austria-Hungary would defend the “material and spiritual welfare” and progress of all subjects in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by building on the fact “that the civilizing influence of improved education has made itself felt”\(^\text{163}\) (as quoted in Francis Joseph I, 1908: 3). In response, the Ottomans emphasised the illegality of the action\(^\text{164}\), but the convincing\(^\text{165}\) legal points they made in their defence were overridden by concerns regarding the level of ‘civilisation’ in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was not considered to be an equal sovereign able to protest against the actions of Austria-Hungary. In a speech by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Baron d’Aehrenthal (1908: 2 - 3) to his colleagues in the

\(^{163}\) Lowther (1908d) reported that the Austrian ambassador in Constantinople also informed the Sultan that Austria would withdraw its troops from Novi Bazar in recognition of the Ottoman government’s good intentions after the revolution.

\(^{164}\) See Grey (1908c) for the Ottoman protest. The Ottomans had responded by demanding an international conference to be held on the Treaty of Berlin, but Grey (1908g) noted that such a conference would only be possible if the contents of the proposed conference were discussed beforehand. Lowther (1908e) argued that the Ottoman Foreign Minister, Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, had stated that the Austro-Hungarian invasion of Bosnia and Herzegovina was meant to be temporary, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Berlin. See also Goschen (1908c) conveying a message to this effect, from Baron d’Aehrenthal, and Grey’s (1908a; 1908b) replies.

\(^{165}\) Grey (1908b: 1) argued that the Permanent Undersecretary, Sir Charles Hardinge, had noted that Austria-Hungary had pledged on 17 January 1908 to make no changes to the Treaty of Berlin without first informing the Ottoman Empire or the other signatories, and that the Preamble of the Austrian Convention with Turkey of 1879 had stated that the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary would not have an impact on “the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan” over the provinces.
Ballhausplatz, which Goschen acquired, it was made clear that the reason why Bosnia and Herzegovina ought to be annexed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire was that it had “maintained order and tranquillity, has considerably raised the educational and political level of the population and has brought up a generation imbued with modern ideas. The moment has now come to draw the consequences from these results of our administrative activity, to allow the inhabitants to participate in the government…”

Because Austria-Hungary’s civilizational achievements were believed to be superior under the dominant interpretation of the standard of ‘civilisation’, the Ottoman Empire was deemed to have only very limited rights over the Muslim community of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. Failure of constitutionalism as a standard of ‘civilisation’: contested justifications of sovereignty

This section demonstrates how the Young Turk project of reorganising the Ottoman Empire along constitutional lines, based on viewing constitutionalism as a standard of ‘civilisation’, fell apart as the Young Turks split into different political factions. New political disagreements emerged among the CUP, the Grand Vizier Kamil Paşa, the LPID and the ultimately counterrevolutionary Mohammedan Union (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 35 - 36; Farhi, 1971). These disagreements also amounted to different means of advancing the interests and securing the sovereign equality of the Ottoman state in global international society. This meant that the forms of constitutive diplomacy that they promoted for the Ottoman Empire differed significantly. In the election of late 1908, the CUP advanced a notion of national sovereignty that was challenged by Sabahaddin, who argued for a system based on decentralisation and educational reform (Fujinami, 2013: 880 - 881). Following the counterrevolution of April 1909, the Mohammedan Union presented an Islamic vision of constitutionalism (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 35 - 41). This was in line with Islamic theories of sovereignty that emphasised the Sultan’s position as the Caliph of Islam and stressed the central role of the ulema in an Islamic state (Vahdeti [1909] 1992a). The Iranian constitutional revolution of 1906 was suggested as a model, since it maintained and empowered the ulema under a constitutional framework (Vahdeti, [1909] 1992a). The constituent diplomacy advocated by the Mohammedan Union involved supporting other Islamic movements, such as the Iranian
revolutionaries and Central Asian Muslims, while also supporting the attempts of Kamil Paşa, the Grand Vizier, to secure good relations with Britain (M. Ali ([1909] 1992). Although Kamil Paşa was dismissed and the counterrevolution, led by the Mohammedan Union was crushed (see Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 38 - 41), by the end of 1909 the CUP were confronted by the fact that their initial approach to constituent diplomacy had been only partially successful. Even though internal challenges to their particular vision of ‘civilisation’ had been overcome, the loss of territory in the aftermath of the revolution meant that they would need to pursue a new approach to constituent diplomacy.

The revolution of 1908 saw an end to some of the reforms that had been imposed on the Ottoman Empire and which were perceived, by the Ottomans, as threatening their sovereignty. These reforms included the gendarmerie and the Financial Commission. The Financial Commission166 had been established by the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin in 1905, to manage the finances of the provinces (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 44 - 47). Immediately after the revolution, the Berlin signatories, despite some disagreement, decided to end the presence of the gendarmerie force (Lange-Akhund, 1998: 324 – 325; Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 48). Nicolson (1908a), the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, was informed, by Russian authorities, that they were opposed to the planned withdrawal of the gendarmerie officers from Macedonia, after the Bulgarian deployment along the Oriental Railway, if tensions between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire persisted. The outbreak of war was a possibility as the Üsküb (present-day Skopje) branch of the CUP called for war with Bulgaria, even though this was challenged by the Monastir (present-day Bitola) and Salonica167 (present-day Thessaloniki) branches of the CUP (Lowther, 1908h). The continued possibility of conflict, highlighted by the rise in tensions, had been understood, by Grey (1908m) as well, as an argument that could be used by the advocates of maintaining the gendarmerie force. Two days earlier, Lowther (1908g)

166 Initially, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, the Ottoman inspector of Macedonia, had requested an increase of customs duties, from 8 to 11 per cent, to fund the Macedonian provinces (Tokay, 2003: 57). In response to Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa’s demands, the Financial Commission had been imposed on the Ottoman Empire by the Treaty of Berlin powers, excluding Germany, engaged in a naval demonstration of force off the Ottoman coast, together with the Greek navy (Tokay, 2003: 57).
167 The British consular official, Elliot (1908) reported to Grey that the Salonica branch of the CUP were requesting weapons from the Ottoman and Greek governments, to defend themselves in the event of a Bulgarian attack.
argued that the gendarmerie officers ought to be maintained in Macedonia, given ongoing tensions between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, but Grey (1908m) countered that this could be perceived as a threat by the Ottomans. Significantly, immediately after the crisis, Kamil Paşa had actively sought to defuse tensions between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, in contrast to those who were keen on escalating the situation (Lowther, 1908a; 1908f; Ünal, 1998: 137, 166 - 167).

Ultimately, the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin would judge that the Financial Commission was also no longer needed (Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 48). Therefore, the possibility of the outbreak of war between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, which some members of the CUP wished, but which Kamil Paşa opposed, almost prevented the withdrawal of the gendarmes and the end of the reform process.

The executors of the brief counterrevolution of 1909 presented an alternative vision of ‘civilisation’ and sovereignty to that of the revolutionaries of 1908. The counterrevolutionaries believed that the nature of the constituent power ought to be based on Islamic principles (Farhi, 1971). In the elections of November and December 1908, which had been called by the revolutionaries, there were debates over the nature of the Ottoman nation (Sencer, 2004: 41 - 42). The issue of how different groups claiming to be nations within the Ottoman Empire could be represented became especially pressing following the territorial losses of 1908, with the representatives of different Christian communities claiming allegiance to “imagined communities” beyond the empire (Sencer, 2004: 54). In principle, the CUP, and Hüseyin Cahit, the editor-in-chief of the CUP’s mouthpiece journal, Tanin, which could freely be published and distributed after the revolution, were not opposed to the representation of different ethnic groups in the Ottoman parliament (Fujinami, 2013: 883 - 885; Sancaktar, 2009: 175 – 178, 263). However, Hüseyin Cahit ultimately advocated recognising a single nation, namely the Muslims, as the dominant nation within the Ottoman Empire, claiming that their interests were identical with those of the state (Reynolds, 2011: 23 – 24; Sancaktar, 2009: 261 - 262). This concept of the dominant nation, or “millet-i hakime”, was similar to the

168 The financial commission established by the Great Powers in Macedonia would cease its operations on May 1909 (Tokay, 2013: 176).
169 Many deputies, such as the Greek deputy, Kozmidi, stressed the loyalty of the Greek element to the Ottoman Empire, while still arguing that the Bulgarians had challenged the interests of the Greeks in Macedonia (Sencer, 2004: 53 - 54).
Austro-Hungarian idea of considering the Germans of the empire the dominant nationality (Reynolds, 2011: 23). Relatedly, Hüseyin Cahid was critical of Sabahaddinn’s idea of decentralisation, arguing that “those outside of the Islamic element attach great importance”170 to Sabahaddinn’s political programme (Hersekli Satvet Lütfi, [1908] 1999: 80). Even though Fujinami (2013: 881 - 882) argues that Sabahaddin distinguished between political and administrative autonomy and argued for the latter, Hüseyin Cahit, according to Hersekli Satvet Lütfi ([1908] 1999: 80) disagreed171, claimed that decentralisation would result in other islands following the fate of Crete (Fujinami, 2013: 880 - 881). Therefore, according to the CUP, the policy of the League, amounted to a change in the constituent power and threatened the national basis of the CUP’s project of constitutionalism. It was perceived as challenging the claim of the Ottoman Empire to be a civilised state, and was, thereby understood as threatening to break up the empire.

The views of the leading counterrevolutionary figures were summarised in Volkan, a newspaper of the time, which has not been studied extensively by intellectual historians. One of the columnists of the paper, Derviş Vahdeti, the cleric and later leader of the short-lived political party known as the İttihad-ı Muhammedi (Mohammedan Union), presented a vision of constitutional politics that challenged the CUP and the LPID (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 35 – 36; Farhi, 1971). Arguing from his interpretation of Islam, Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c: 4 - 5) asserted that European nationalism was an aberration from the principles around which Ottoman society would need to be constructed. The manifesto of the counterrevolution accordingly suggested that:

“There’s it is in people’s nature to progress from being savages to nomads, from being nomadic to civilised, and from being civilised to becoming free, people contain the sacred gift of having a tendency to follow the path from individualism, which advances to collectivism, which then advances to tribalism and finally ends with the nation…”172 (Vahdeti, [1908] 1992c: 4).

170 The transliterated Ottoman text reads as follows: “gayr-i anasır İslamiyyenin … Sabahaddin Beğ’e karşı bu fikirlerinden dolayı gösterdikleri merbutiyet” (Hersekli Satvet Lütfi, [1908] 1999: 80).
171 Hüseyin Cahid equated it with “muhtariyyet-i idare”, which can be translated as “local government” (Hersekli Satvet Lütfi, [1908] 1999: 80).
172 The Turkish transliteration of the Ottoman text reads as: “İnsanlar fitrat itibariyle vahşetten bedeviyyete, bedeviyyetten medeniyyete, medeniyiyetten hürriyyete irtika ettiği gibi, ferdiyyetten ma’şeriyyete, ma’şeriyyetten kavmiyyete, kavmiyyetten millete i’tila edebilecek hasail-i aliye ile mütehalliktürler” (Vahdeti, [1908] 1992c: 4).
However, Derviş Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c: 4) here distinguished between the concept of a “tribe” (“kavmiyetçilik”), which he understood as entailing “arbitrary” (“keyfi”) rule, whereas the concept of “nation” (“milliyet”) entailed “subjecting different people to the same law”. Therefore, Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c: 4) echoed the ideas of ‘hierarchy’, ‘progress’ and ‘civilisation’ and argued that these were represented by Britain, France and Germany, who had embraced national politics. A column also appeared in Volkan that defended Sabahaddin’s official visit to the Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul, against Hüseyin Cahid’s criticism that claimed it was furthering the cause of Greek separatism (Vahdeti, [1908] 1992a: 3). Vahdeti ([1908] 1992a: 3) argued that Hüseyin Cahid falsely suggested that Sabahaddin kissed the hand of the Patriarch of Constantinople, even though he was greeting him in a respectful manner, in order to dissuade Muslims from voting for the League. Sabahaddin’s policy proposal of decentralised rule was also praised by Vahdeti ([1908] 1992a: 3) as allowing greater freedom (“hürriyet”)173. Vahdeti ([1908] 1992a: 3) argued that the constitution of 1876 was compatible with Islamic sharia law174, expressed his happiness at the end of “tribal” politics, and the birth of “national” politics after the Young Turk revolution. Crucially though, Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c: 4) argued against adopting French or German constitutional norms at the expense of maintaining the sharia. This vision challenged the CUP’s idea of constitutional, and hence civilised government, being that of the ‘millet-i hakime’, and Sabahaddin’s claim that supporting different religious communities in the empire would enable decentralisation.

As an alternative to national sovereignty and other ideas adopted from Europe, Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c) argued for the unity of Muslims throughout the world under the Sultan. Although Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c: 4) praised the virtues of ‘civilisation’, he ultimately believed in “higher” and “lower” human natures175 and that “the lesser form of humanity is the nation and the higher form of humanity takes

173 Karamürsel (2016: 142) identifies the concept of “hürriyet” as coming to refer to the absence of slavery in the late Ottoman Empire (see also Karamürsel, 2017: 708; Toledano, 1993).
174 On 20 February 1909, Ömer Ziyaeddin, one of Vahdeti’s followers, suggested that this was the case (Vahdeti, [1909] 1992b: 243 - 244).
175 Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c: 4) uses the terms “insaniyyet-i sugra”, which can be translated as “lesser humanity”, whereas “insaniyyet-i kübra”, which can be translated as “higher humanity”.

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the form of Islam.” The need to maintain the unity of Islam resulted in the counterrevolution seeking to empower the ulema, meaning the religious clerics of the Ottoman Empire. The Mohammedan Union also viewed the participation of the ulema in the 1906 Iranian Revolution as a model to be emulated (Vahdeti, [1909] 1992a: 271-272). Vahdeti ([1909] 1992a: 271-272) praised the Iranian ulema’s use of the principle of ijtihad, or interpretation, to support the revolution in Iran, but argued that ijtihad could also result in arguments for absolutism being advanced. Ultimately, the Mohammedan Union received the support of many members of the ulama and soldiers throughout the empire, during the counterrevolution (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 35 – 36; Farhi, 1971). The Mohammedan Union also opposed the policies of the Russian Empire in Central Asia, which they were informed, by Russian Muslims who wrote in Volkan such as Muhyiddin Bin Hacı Emin Uşi ([1909] 1992: 491 - 493) that Russian policies were discriminating against Muslims. Vahdeti ([1908] 1992b: 6 -7) also promoted good relations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire and hence praised the policy of the Grand Vizier, Kamil Paşa. The Grand Vizier challenged the CUP, which was more suspicious of the intentions of the dominant European states, and this resulted in his dismissal. In the lead up to the counterrevolution, a Volkan columnist, M. Ali ([1909] 1992: 341 - 342), suggested that the CUP’s dismissal of Kamil Paşa on 14 February 1909, had resulted in Britain pursuing a more distant policy towards the Ottoman Empire. Kamil Paşa was here presented as a skilful diplomat, who could ensure that Britain pursued a policy that was favourable to the Ottoman Empire (Vahdeti, [1908] 1992b: 6 -7).

The Mohammedan Union was focused on securing the status of the Ottoman Empire within global international society. It had believed that cooperation with Britain would help secure this objective, thereby empowering Islam and the Union’s interpretation of ‘civilisation’.

The counterrevolution challenged the idea of nationalism and national sovereignty that the Young Turk presentation of constitutionalism as a standard of ‘civilisation’ entailed. An argument promoting an Islamic vision of constitutionalism and sovereignty was provided. Though swiftly defeated by the Ottoman Third Army,

177 See Ünal (1996).
which was loyal to the CUP, the counterrevolution had revealed the different ways in which the standard of ‘civilisation’ continued to be understood in the Ottoman context (Ahmad [1969] 2010: 40). Different interpretations of how to reconstitute the Ottoman Empire, implying different interpretations of the constituent power were at play. Prior to the counterrevolution, the CUP argued, especially in its communications to European powers, for considering the Ottoman nation as a whole as the constituent power within the Ottoman Empire (Hanoğlu, 2001: 271). However, the elections of 1908, and the views of the counterrevolutionaries, led to different perspectives being advanced by the CUP, which now promoted the idea of a sovereign nation or “millet-i hakime” that was distinct from the autonomist groups pursuing their own interests in the parliament (Sancaktar, 2009: 261). The LPID, however, still believed that the Ottoman nation as a whole was the constituent power, insofar as it was now empowered in the assembly and would be able to overcome the challenges of international stigmatisation (Fujinami, 2013: 881). The Mohammedan Union, on the other hand, saw the constituent power as embracing the ulema, following the Iranian example (Vahdeti [1909] 1992a: 271-272). Although they were unsuccessful, the views of the Union shaped subsequent developments in the empire (Farhi, 1971). Prior to the counterrevolution, the CUP had cooperated extensively with Armenian political movements in the eastern provinces of the empire, but the counterrevolutionaries in Adana massacred members of the Armenian community (Der Matossian, 2011). The CUP promised to investigate the cause of these attacks, but they instead restricted political freedoms through repressive laws, such as the law on associations of 1909, which restricted the rights of citizens to form associations, if they were deemed not to be conducive to the public good (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 55). This made it difficult for alternative visions of the identity of the Ottoman nation to be expressed which ran counter to the views of the CUP. The revolution and counterrevolution of 1908 and 1909 demonstrate how the Young Turks and other groups attempted to make use of local and global

178 An initial tribunal held to investigate these developments was highly lenient towards the local CUP members and military officials who partook in the massacres (Der Matossian, 2011: 164). In spite of this, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation continued to cooperate with the CUP to consolidate constitutional rule in the empire (Berberian, 2019: 120). As Reynolds (2011: 62 - 63) and Kaligian (2008) note, the CUP had successfully disarmed the Armenian population after the revolution, but the Kurdish Hamidian Light Cavalry Brigades formed by Abdülhamid II as an irregular force to resist future Russian expansion into the eastern provinces of the empire, which had also carried out several massacres of Armenians (see J. Klein, 2011: 138, 143 - 144) had been reorganised rather than being disbanded.
forms of constituent power to gain recognition of the Ottoman Empire as a sovereign equal to the established states in global international society

6. Conclusion:

The revolutionaries of 1908 aimed to secure the sovereign equality for their state in global international society. What was not foreseen was that the revolution would result in the proliferation of different means to pursue the advance of ‘civilisation’ within the Ottoman Empire. As a result of the revolution, different Young Turk factions reopened the Ottoman Parliament that had briefly been in session in 1876 prior to its suspension by Abdülhamid II (Moroni, 2017). The intention of the revolutionaries to civilise the Ottoman Empire, did not prevent arguments concerning ‘civilisation’ being made by independence movements, such as those in Bulgaria and Crete, and by other empires, such as Austria-Hungary. These arguments challenged the revolutionaries’ claims regarding the extent of Ottoman sovereignty and argued that Ottoman rule over these territories ought to be limited to governing the affairs of their Muslim inhabitants. Both Sabahaddin’s ([1908] 1999a: 66 – 67; see also Fujinami, 2013: 881 - 883) decentralising and Ahmed Rıza’s (1907; see also Taglia, 2015: 122) centralising visions of constitutionalism, therefore, failed to legitimise Ottoman sovereignty and prevent the territorial losses of 1908. However, states responsible for overseeing reforms in Macedonia decided that their presence was no longer required given the emergence of a ‘civilised’ administration within the Ottoman Empire that was dedicated to constitutional rule (Lange-Akhund, 1998: 324 – 325). In their attempts to portray the Ottoman Empire as a civilised state, various Young Turk factions embraced different conceptions of the constituent power. The counterrevolutionaries pressed for an Islamic form of ‘civilisation’ and constitutionalism, focused on enforcing Islamic sharia law (Farhi, 1971). They sought to empower the ulema as a constituent power to further the development of ‘civilisation’ in the Ottoman Empire (Vahdeti, [1909] 1992a: 271 - 272). The concept of ‘civilisation’ was internally contested, and this influenced subsequent understandings of the constituent power in the Ottoman Empire. As Ahmad ([1969] 2010: 55) demonstrates, by 1909 the CUP opposed rival political projects concerning the future orientation of the Ottoman Empire, and in so doing they consolidated their control over the state.
4. War and standards of ‘civilisation’: Alliances, war and the construction of sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire, 1909 - 1918

1. Introduction:

This chapter examines how the Young Turks’ initial post-revolutionary struggle for the recognition of their sovereignty faced further obstacles with the emergence of different understandings of sovereignty among states that were consolidating competing alliances. The first section reviews the literature in history and International Relations which suggests that the sovereignty of an individual state can be secured through international alliances. In practice, these alliances also provide a means by which constitutional principles that form the basis of external sovereignty can be enforced or promoted. In the case of the Ottoman Empire after the 1908 revolution, the Young Turk leaders found that there was no one conception of ‘civilisation’ that was widely accepted. Instead, as the second section illustrates, seeking to convene a meeting of the states which had signed the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 to secure a revision of the treaty, the leaders of the CUP discovered that the Great Powers were no longer united in their approach towards discerning the level of ‘civilisation’ in the Ottoman Empire. Following successive outside interventions, the Ottomans found that European powers asserted their own interests within the empire while claiming to be acting to secure humanitarian concerns (M. Kaya, 2014; Rodogno, 2012). The third section considers how the defeat of the Ottomans in Libya and in the Balkans resulted in a change in the constituent diplomacy pursued by the Young Turks to secure recognition of their sovereign equality in global international society. The fourth section examines how Ottoman governments, in the lead up to and during the Second Balkan War and the First World War, sought to introduce reforms stressing the ‘national’ nature of Ottoman sovereignty to ensure that they were recognised as ‘civilised’. This marked a shift away from their earlier approach that involved seeking support from the Great Powers through demonstrating their adherence to standards of ‘civilisation’. Ottoman membership in the Triple Alliance was, in turn, intended to contribute, through the use and threat of the use of force, to the reconstitution of the constitutional rules of international society. Changing the rules of international society to allow national sovereignty to be recognised as a constitutional principle would allow the Young Turks to attain
their goal of securing the Ottoman Empire as a sovereign state equal to other nations in global international society.

2. The ‘standards’ of ‘civilisation’ and the Ottoman Empire in the First World War

This section reviews the existing historiography with regard to how the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War. This process can be studied as one in which the Ottomans sought to enter into an alliance with a prominent state or group of states, which could be considered one of the “great powers”\(^\text{179}\), meaning the prominent European states in global international society, to secure the sovereignty of their state (Kent, 2005: 1). Discussions about what was meant by ‘civilisation’ played a key role in this process, as developing alliances of states advanced different assessments of the level of ‘civilisation’ in the Ottoman Empire in their diplomatic communications. Focusing on how arguments about ‘civilisation’ were used to justify or consolidate membership in an alliance adds to existing studies in international history that have highlighted the roles of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance immediately prior to the First World War. The literature on nationalism, with its focus on developments within states, has also been employed to explain the First World War and the participation of the Ottomans within it (Aksakal, 2004; 2008: 2 – 3, 13 – 14; Ginio, 2016). However, at this time, the idea of the standard of ‘civilisation’ provided a set of criteria to assess the place of states in an international “normative hierarchy” (Kayaoğlu, 2010b: 202). Distinct assessments of the level of ‘civilisation’ came to be deployed by the representatives of states to justify their stances towards the Ottoman Empire. Regardless of how the positions of these states and their alliances may also be understood as based on the struggle for power (see Bloxham, 2005; Kent, 2005), normative visions of international order based on the idea of ‘civilisation’ played a key role in justifying the actions of these alliances, including their decisions to declare war. As Bartelson (2018) demonstrated, war has been justified by referring to, and is, indeed, intertwined with the concepts of sovereignty and ‘civilisation’. Specifically, war can be understood as

\(^{179}\) These referred to the powerful European states in global international society who had commitments to the Ottoman Empire under international treaties, such as the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, the Pact of Halepa of the same year, and their subsequent iterations (Kent, 2005: 1 - 5).
being an expression of constituent power at the global level, if those engaged in it see themselves as removing, replacing or enforcing the constitutional principles of global international society (Reus-Smit, 2013b). The Ottoman Empire, denied sovereign equality under the pre-war international order, sought to exploit the First World War to reshape the constitutional rules of international order to secure equal treatment in international society.

Traditional explanations in International Relations of the origins and causes of the First World War focused almost exclusively on changes in power relations amongst states. Bain (2003) argues, for instance, in a way that Buzan (2014: 591) interprets as demonstrating the relevance of the standard of “civilisation” in the post-First World War period, that the victors of the war presented themselves as civilised states which could and ought to “develop” (see Buzan, 2014: 591) other states. Such accounts therefore view the idea of the standard of ‘civilisation’ as fundamentally epiphenomenal to the power relations that emerged before and crystallised after the First World War. These explanations, including those seeking to explain how the Ottoman Empire became involved in the First World War, such as Reynolds’s (2011) study of geopolitical developments on the borders of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, have generally not considered the role of ideas alongside changes brought about by victory or defeat. They have tended to concentrate on how perceived interests led the Ottoman Empire to enter the conflict (Kut, 2016: 116-118). In practice, the Young Turks encountered an international order that was divided between rival alliances. The presence of these blocs meant that different

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180 Reus-Smit (2013b) suggests that a similar logic is present in wars of intervention.
181 Reynolds (2011: 4-6) argues, that it is necessary to follow Tilly (1975; 1985; [1990] 1992) to consider the interactions of states and other actors, without focusing on ideas, such as those of nationalism, in providing an account of the interaction between the two empires in the course of their collapse. This approach can, indeed, help demonstrate the role of the state and other actors in this process, but, like Tilly’s ([1990] 1992) account, it overlooks the significance of ideas, such as those of legitimacy and “social meaning”, in explaining the emergence of contemporary states (Steinmetz, 2010: 326).
182 Koskenniemi (2001: 291-297) provides a history of the ideas developed by international lawyers to make sense of historical developments in the lead up to, and after, the First World War, but does not focus on the connection between ideas and the historical events that international lawyers sought to understand. Separately, Johnson (2018: 143) notes that “ideology” motivated the participation of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War but merely focuses on its role in facilitating militarism and massacres.
183 Bobroff (2006) has reviewed the historiography on formation of rival blocs over control of the Straits connecting the Aegean to the Black Sea, and suggested that Russia acted, in the lead up to the First World War, to contain German control over the Straits.
understandings of ‘civilisation’ could be advanced by these blocs to further the interests of their alliance. Even if this was so, these disagreements nonetheless had consequences for how ‘civilisation’ was understood, and how sovereignty was constructed and justified through reference to the idea of ‘civilisation’. Unlike the unified international society the Ottomans confronted in the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, the Young Turks were faced with the lack of a unified international society (Housden, 2014: 29). This meant that it was not enough for the Young Turks to rely solely on arguments stressing their adherence to norms of ‘civilisation’ to secure the recognition of their sovereign equality. Historians have noted how the desire to secure the sovereign equality of the Ottoman Empire, resulted in the Ottoman decision to enter the First World War (Kayaoğlu, 2010a; Kut, 2016: 122). However, the background to this decision, involving discussions among the Young Turks about the different ideas of ‘civilisation’ held by various states, and the implications of this for the recognition of Ottoman sovereign equality, have been largely overlooked.

Rising nationalism has also been highlighted as a cause of the First World War and a reason for the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the conflict, which subsequently came to be embraced as part of the wartime propaganda of the Ottoman state. In their studies of nationalism, Aksakal (2004; 2008) and Ginio (2005; 2016) have pointed to how the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 resulted in the growth of nationalism in the lead up to the First World War. They argued that the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars led to the development of a more Islamic and Turkish form of nationalism. This was based on a narrative that suggested that the treachery of non-Muslims, in particular, was responsible for the defeat (Ginio, 2005; 2016). However, Öztan (2018) and Hanioğlu (2001: 40 - 41) have contended that there was more continuity in the CUP’s nationalism, prior to and after the Balkan Wars. According to Öztan (2018: 71 - 75), the CUP persisted in promoting Ottomanism as a form of nationalism even after defeat in the Balkan Wars. Hanioğlu (2001: 40 - 41), on the other hand, claims that the CUP from 1907 onwards was interested in advancing a Turkish nationalist agenda, which emphasised the supposed treachery of non-Muslims, but they concealed this by ostensibly promoting Ottoman nationalism

to maintain control of the empire. Gingeras (2009: 92) has focused on how the nationalism of the Young Turks changed after 1912, when the Ottoman state’s Special Organisation (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa) targeted Christians in the Balkans. The Ottoman defeat in 1912 prompted the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa to focus its attention on removing or controlling the Christian population who were perceived as potentially acting as a fifth column for a future Greek invasion (Gingeras, 2009: 97). Therefore, the forms of nationalism that were pioneered by the Young Turks after the Balkan Wars were shaped by their responses to the conflict. The loss of territories populated by non-Muslims and peoples who were not Turks, removed the pretext for continuing to pursue a policy based on Ottomanism.

The rise of nationalism was also driven by the desire of the Young Turks to gain recognition as a civilised power in global international society. Crucially, through defining how the nation or the people who held sovereignty were understood and represented internationally, theories of nationalism came to shape the Ottoman state (Özkırımlı and Sofos, 2008: 2). As theories of nationalism were adopted in many Western states that were understood to be “civilized”, starting with France, nationalism, including the national movements in the late Ottoman Empire, came to be interpreted as a “civilized” means to reconstitute a state (Mazower, 2001: 71; Özkırmızı and Sofos, 2008: 17; see also Sofos and Özkırmızı, 2009: 77). The Young Turks were especially influenced by two different intellectual tendencies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, which shaped their particular understanding of nationalism. Many of the Young Turks in Paris, either as exiles or as students, such as Ahmed Agayev (later Ahmet Ağaoğlu), and Yusuf Akçura, were influenced by French nationalism; a revanchist form of which came to be adopted

186 See Akçura (1998) and the discussion of his and similar ideas of nationalism in Özkırmızı and Sofos (2008: 27 – 30; see also Sofos and Özkırmızı, 2009: 85 - 97). Özkırmızı and Sofos (2008: 27 – 30; see also Sofos and Özkırmızı, 2009: 85 - 97) show how Turkish nationalism within the Ottoman Empire emerged as political and bureaucratic elites sought to empower the state by fostering a loyal populace. In 1904, Akçura considered Ottomanism, a dedication to the Ottoman state regardless of one’s national or religious identity, and Pan-Islamism, as two possible policies for the state to pursue, but later opted for Turkish nationalism, which appeared more feasible given what he considered to be the relatively greater loyalty of the Turks to the Ottoman state (Eisenstat, 2015: 429 – 431; Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 150; Üngör and Lohr, 2014: 501). Like Ağaoğlu, Turnaoğlu (2017a: 159; 2019: 228) has demonstrated how Akçura was also influenced by the idea of social revolution, which he termed “içtimai inkılab”, although the source of Akçura’s inspiration was Albert Sorel.
187 As Özavcı (2013: 650) suggests, Ağaoğlu viewed the “West” and “East” as distinct identities, owing to his Orientalist education (see also Kadioğlu, 2004: 205; 2007: 174 and Dalacoura, 2017: 131
by many intellectuals and political movements after the Franco-Prussian War (Özavcu, 2013: 22). At this time, nationalism was presented by French conservative thinkers such as Henri Bergson, as a means to curtail what were perceived to be the universalist excesses of the French Revolution (Hanioğlu, 2005: 63 - 65). The Young Turks were also influenced by Slavic socialist movements, whose ideas of social and popular revolution they were exposed to as Russian citizens prior to arriving in the Ottoman Empire, or through contact with such movements when in exile (Meyer, 2014: 104 – 105, 152; Reynolds, 2011: 129- 131). These movements combined an idealisation of the peasants in their societies and their folk culture with a commitment to extensive social reform and/or revolution (Meyer, 2014: 67).

Although Shissler (2003: 63 - 77) and Meyer (2014) have noted how both Russian populism and French nationalism influenced the ideas of the Young Turks, the question of how these ideas were adopted as a part of the broader strategy of the Young Turks to gain recognition of the sovereign equality of their state in global international society remains.

An awareness of how alliances can morph into international societies that are sub-global or global in scope can also demonstrate how ‘civilisation’ is connected to the idea of nationalism and warfare. Holsti (1991; 1996: 19 - 41), Phillips (2010) and Devetak and Tannock (2017: 135 - 144) have looked upon wars as periods that resulted in the emergence of different forms of international order. Although identifying the ends of wars as “major events” can seem arbitrary, as Holsti (2002: 27) later suggests, they point to moments when institutions may be created and relations forged through peace settlements. The “ontogenetic” theory of war, presented by Bartelson (2018: 24), also demonstrates how war can be understood as a means of creating a new reality, through destroying, altering and replacing existing institutions and practices. However, Barkawi and Brighton (2019: 103) have noted...
that it is necessary to distinguish between the “instrumental” and generative dimensions of war. “Instrumental” conceptions of war refer to the intentions of actors that are engaged in war-making (Barkawi and Brighton, 2019: 103). The generative component refers to how war-making as an activity generates new realities beyond what was originally envisaged by those engaged in war (Barkawi and Brighton, 2019: 103). Studying the instrumental component of the ideas of the Young Turks, in particular, can demonstrate the significance of ‘civilisation’ as a means of empowering the state and enabling it to be recognised as sovereign. Among the justifications and claims advanced by the Young Turks in the First World War and the conflicts immediately preceding it, the idea of “civilization” featured prominently (Aksakal, 2008: 36). Adopting the features of a ‘civilised’ state was understood as crucial for the Ottoman state to prepare for war through entering an alliance and, once victorious, for it to reshape the constitutional rules of international society together with other members of the alliance (Aksakal, 2004: 528 – 531; 2008: 36 - 37, 201). Prior to and during the First World War, arguments concerning the idea of ‘civilisation’, and the related concept of nationhood, were used to consolidate the external position of the Ottoman Empire, by anchoring the CUP as a ‘civilised’ force that could contribute to alliances of which they were a member.

Studying the texts of Ottoman thinkers in this period, one can discern how the Young Turks developed a vision of ‘civilised’ statehood. The Ottoman experience of “hierarchy in international society”, as expressed by Bilgin (2017: 129), meant that the Young Turks sought to situate the Ottoman state within an alliance, to advance constitutional rules of international society which were favourable to the Ottomans. Specifically, they sought, in the lead up to the First World War, to situate themselves in an alliance that would, if victorious, recognise the sovereign equality

190 For a similar understanding of the impact of war see Malesevic (2012: 43).
191 On the use of the concept of ‘civilisation’ to enable or challenge war in a separate context see Phillips (2012).
192 As Buzan (1993: 342) argues, alliances between states can serve to produce institutions in an international society that are held to be “common” by states in an alliance. Later studies, such as Holsti (1997), Finnemore (1996) and Schouenborg (2012) have demonstrated how the interests of states are defined by alliances.
193 See also Donnelly (2006) and Clark (2011: 30), who develop the idea of hierarchy in international society, which is arguably also expressed by Bull ([1977] 2012: 123) in his idea of the international institution of “great power management”.
of the Ottoman state. Before the First World War, the initial attempts of the Young Turks to present themselves as a ‘civilised’ elite capable of reforming the Ottoman Empire were not successful. This was because the emergence of different blocs and the collapse of the Concert system in Europe resulted in the breakdown of consensus over what was meant by ‘civilisation’ 194. A series of crises also transformed the Ottoman Empire and shaped the CUP’s ideas of national sovereignty (Ülker, 2005). Regardless of the absence or presence of Turkish nationalism as a state policy prior to the Balkan Wars, the period of conflict that began in 1909, following the Albanian and Yemeni uprisings, ushered in constitutional changes within the empire (Blumi, 2003a; 2012: 102, 157) 195. These uprisings, together with the later Balkan Wars, resulted in the CUP government abandoning attempts to adopt an Ottomanist perspective (Ülker, 2005: 617). Instead, the government focused on curtailing or excluding the expression of alternative visions of the role of the state that clashed with their perspective (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 54 - 56). The CUP also believed, even before the revolution 196, in the need to ensure that the empire was integrated into an international alliance (Trumpener, 1968: 16 – 20; Zürcher, 2019: 904 - 909). This could then enable them to resist calls for internationally-overseen reforms to be implemented in the empire (Kieser, 2011: 393; Kieser, Polatel and Schmutz, 2015). Warfare, ultimately, came to be a means by which the Ottoman alliance with the Central Powers could allow the CUP to wield global constituent power, in an attempt to alter the rules of international society (Aksakal, 2004; 2008; Kieser, 2011).

Specifically, the Central Powers pledged to end the capitulations, and the Ottomans aimed to regain recent territorial losses. The Ottomans, therefore, sought to re-engineer global international society by advancing a particular conception of ‘civilisation’ within the empire and in global international society more broadly, in order to gain recognition of their sovereign equality.

194 Ottoman propaganda prior to the First World War, and after the Balkan Wars, stressed how European states had disregarded the atrocities that occurred in the Balkans, in contrast to their avowed dedication to upholding “civilization” (Çetinkaya, 2015: 83).

195 After the counterrevolution of 1909, the CUP introduced a “law of associations” that allowed it to ban associations in civil society on the grounds of security (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 55). This law resulted in the closure of many non-Muslim and non-Turkish associations, thereby effectively curtailing the vibrant post-revolutionary public sphere (Ülker, 2005: 617).

196 Ünal (1996) has demonstrated how the CUP especially sought to secure alliances from any of the European powers.
3. The Young Turks’ confrontation with the standard of ‘civilisation’: 1908 - 1912

This section shows how the Young Turks, in their post-revolutionary diplomacy, engaged with various conceptions of what constituted ‘civilised’ statehood, in order to gain recognition as an equal sovereign in global international society. Following the rise to power of the Young Turks, and the Ottoman Empire’s loss of Crete, Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the signatory states of the Treaty of Berlin considered convening a conference to decide whether the treaty ought to be revised (Lowther, 1908c). The signatory states, therefore, mobilised themselves as a constituent power to decide how the constitutional principles of international society should be applied in the changing circumstances. The CUP hoped that the conference would allow them to seek recognition of their claim to sovereign equality from the European powers (Macfie, 1981: 321 – 322, 324). This is because they intended it to include securing the abolition of the capitulations (Macfie, 1981: 321 – 322, 324). Discussions over the possible holding of the conference enabled the representatives of different states to advance their positions (Macfie, 1981). Russia sought support for an agreement to compel the Ottomans to allow the free passage of its warships through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus Straits (Bobroff, 2006; Macfie, 1981). In turn, Russia was willing to recognise the Ottoman claim for sovereign equality (Macfie, 1981). On other issues, such as the status of Crete, seeking to further their interests within the Ottoman Empire, different states took certain positions on the level of civilisation supposedly attained by the Ottomans (Grey, 1908f). However, in 1910 and 1911, with the Lynch Concession and the Italian invasion of Libya, the Young Turks mobilised the Ottoman people to oppose the granting of concessions and further foreign economic penetration, which they believed laid the foundations for future colonisation of the empire (Childs, 1990: 98; Kayali, 1997: 101). A more suspicious perspective was taken towards the idea of seeking concessions to develop the Ottoman state and thereby enable it to be recognised as sovereign in global international society (Üngör and Lohr, 2014: 500 - 501). The conflict in Libya, and later in the Balkans, marked a period when the Ottomans found that they had lost their ability to persuade the great powers to recognise what they took to be their sovereign rights by simply appealing to arguments based on ‘civilisation’.
The call for a conference by the Berlin signatory powers was prompted by the failure of these states to reconcile their disagreements about whether provisions of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 had been violated with the territorial changes made in 1908 (Lowther, 1908c). The global constituent power of the states of the Concert of Europe had been challenged. At this point, the Ottomans again sought to secure sovereign equality by calling for an end to the capitulations which were preventing them from imposing customs tariffs on trade (Geyikdağ, 2011: 378 - 379). The capitulations allowed European powers to set the laws dictating commerce (Ahmad, 2000: 9). A leading intellectual, Ahmet Midhat Efendi, had argued that the Ottomans needed to impose tariffs to provide resources to ensure the survival of the state (Geyikdağ, 2011: 378 - 379). This view was shared by the CUP’s finance minister, Cavid Bey, who, according to Üngör and Lohr (2014: 500) argued that such investments were necessary to develop “civilization”. Imposing customs duties would compel foreign businesses to produce goods within the empire and thereby force them to invest in its economy (Geyikdağ, 2011: 381). By August 1908, the post-revolutionary press in the Ottoman Empire debated the abrogation of the capitulations (Ahmad, 2000: 11). Already in 1902, the Young Turk journal Şura-yı Ümmet had criticised the capitulations and pointed out how they were facilitating intervention by foreign states (Hanioğlu, 2001: 34). The capitulations were depicted as contrary to the sovereign equality and the sovereign right of territoriality of the empire (Kaya, 2014: 128). At the start of November, in the context of the Bosnian and Bulgarian crises, members of the CUP, including Nazım and the military officer, Ahmed Cemal, travelled to Paris and argued for the end of the capitulations and articles 23 and 61 of the Treaty of Berlin (Ünal, 1996: 39). As Andrew Ryan (1951: 68 – 69), Britain’s expert and translator (dragoman) in the embassy in Istanbul argued, Britain was willing to accept the introduction of the constitution as a precondition for the abrogation of the capitulations (Ahmad, 2000: 11). The convergence of the desires of the Young Turks to obtain sovereign equality and the concerns of the signatories of the Berlin treaty to secure stability provided an opportunity for the Young Turks to achieve their objective (Macfie, 1981: 321 – 322, 324). It was believed that demonstrating the civilised and liberal credentials of the new Ottoman government would persuade the European states to end the capitulations regime.
The Berlin signatory powers could not agree on what issues should be discussed at the planned conference. Britain and the Ottoman Empire were the leading advocates of the proposed meeting (Lowther, 1908c). Italy (see Grey, 1908d) and Germany were also supportive (see Lascelles, 1908b; Lowther, 1908f; Lascelles, 1908a). But, Britain and Russia clashed over Russia’s efforts to secure a deal with the Ottoman Empire which would allow the Russian navy to use the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus Straits to access the Mediterranean (Grey, 1908h). This threatened Britain’s naval supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean (Grey, 1908h). Moreover, Grey (1908h) stated that he had expected that the agreement between Russia and Britain in 1908 would result in growing trust between the two powers, including in matters concerning the Ottoman Empire. However, Grey (1908h) stated that this trust had been hampered by the anti-Russian sentiment generated in Britain, following Russian collusion in the suppression of the constitutional regime in Iran. Isvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister, countered that Russia wished a powerful Ottoman Empire to check Austria-Hungary’s possible expansionist ambitions in the Balkans (Grey, 1908h). Consequently, Grey (1908n) demanded an overview of the conference programme and urged Rifat Pasha, an Ottoman diplomat, to ensure that the rights of the Ottoman Empire were not threatened by Russia. Britain argued that it was defending the interests of the Ottomans. Nicolson (1908c), Britain’s ambassador in St. Petersburg, reported that Tcharykoff believed that it would be difficult to reach an agreement with the Ottomans on the question of the Straits. Grey (1908l) informed Rifat Paşa that Britain believed that pressure should not be placed on the Ottomans to consent to discussing the issue of the Straits. The unity of the great powers, which had been instrumental in achieving a settlement in 1878, could not be maintained with the territorial changes in 1908 (Sweet, 1977: 192). Aiming to pursue their separate interests, the ‘great powers’ could not agree on a united approach towards the Ottoman Empire. Seeking to secure the recognition of their sovereign equality, the Ottomans would not be able to attract the support of all states.

The disagreements between Britain and Russia over the Straits became intertwined with the issue of the capitulations and whether they should be abolished. Grey (1908n) noted how the Russian foreign minister, Isvolsky, suggested that
Russia would urge Britain and the other powers to push for an arrangement favourable to Russia in the Straits. Grey (1908i: 1) later claimed that Isvolsky indicated how Russia would pay for the Eastern Rumelian tribute and Bulgaria’s compensation for declaring independence (Ünal, 1998: 163). Britain was more concerned with securing recognition of the CUP’s moves towards establishing a constitutional regime which could allow Article 23 and Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin to be rescinded (Grey, 1908f: 1; 1908k: f 143). Article 23 had provisions for intervention in the Ottoman Empire for the purposes of reform, and Article 61 referred to this possibility with particular regard to the Armenian provinces (Treaty between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey for the Settlement of Affairs in the East, [1878] 1908: 422). Grey (1908k: f 143) further suggested that the capitulations could be removed and argued that “[t]reaties such as exist between other European states would be drawn up in the place of the Capitulations when the Constitution and other administrative reforms in Turkey appear to us to be satisfactorily applied and established”. Thus, the Russian ambassador in Istanbul, Tcharykoff, promised to support the Ottoman state in removing the capitulations provided it granted Russia’s navy the freedom to use the Straits (Macfie, 1981: 325). Therefore, whether or not the Ottoman Empire had met the standard of ‘civilisation’ no longer came to be premised on the general understanding that the Ottomans had attained such a standard. Instead, the recognition that the Ottoman Empire was sufficiently ‘civilised’, so that it would no longer be subject to the capitulations and would thereby become an equal sovereign, came to be conditional on the interests of external powers.

Italy and Austria-Hungary also pursued their own interests in the discussions over whether to convene the conference of the Berlin signatory powers. Eager to maintain its alliance with Austria-Hungary, with whom it had close historical ties as a mainly Catholic state, Italy was concerned over what it perceived to be the expansionist goals of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and in the Aegean (McMeekin, 2015: 62; Tokay, 2018: 105). Italy, therefore, argued that Austria-Hungary would have to renounce its rights of intervention in the Ottoman Empire, under Articles 25 and 29 of the Treaty of Berlin, in order to participate in the conference (Grey, 1908d). However, the Italians were concerned that Austria-Hungary would not participate in the conference if it was decided that the status of
Bosnia and Herzegovina would be debated (Grey, 1908d). Grey (1908f) also argued that it was impossible for Britain to accept the status quo created by Austria-Hungary and that it would be necessary to for the Ottoman Empire to be compensated. Further, Grey (1908f: 1) repeated his call for articles 23 and 61 of the Treaty of Berlin to be “revised”, provided the Ottoman Empire “established constitutional government and satisfactorily applied the principle of equality and modern methods of administration”. Austria-Hungary’s foreign minister, Metternich, argued that Austria-Hungary were not opposed to a conference, since this would allow them to demonstrate Austria-Hungary’s goodwill by evacuating its garrison in Novi Bazar and to negotiate the compensation of the Ottoman Empire for the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Grey, 1908f: 1). However, Metternich and Grey (1908f: 2) disagreed with each other over the inclusion of Crete in the conference programme, with Metternich arguing that the Ottoman Empire’s “authority in Crete had really disappeared”. However, Grey (1908f: 2) argued that this was a separate matter, which ought to be considered by the Ottoman Empire and the “four Powers” who had been recognised, in previous treaties, as the protectors of the island. Additionally, the Italian Foreign Secretary, Tittoni, argued that it would be necessary to include Crete in the conference to discuss the issue of properly compensating the Ottoman Empire for its losses (Grey, 1908e). Grey (1908f: 2) argued though that Britain could not argue that it was supporting Austria-Hungary in seeking for the discussion of Crete in the conference, since this would be an “insult” to “the new Government in Turkey (sic)”197. As Babanzade İsmail Hakki, a lawyer and politician aligned with the CUP, was to argue, Crete was still technically a part of the Ottoman Empire (Fujinami, 2016: 328). Therefore, the conference could not be convened because of how states, such as Italy, Austria-Hungary and Britain, disagreeing on whether to include discussions of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Crete in its programme.

The CUP-led Ottoman state, however, also needed to maintain good relations with at least some of the Great Powers as it needed to grant concessions to foreign companies to develop parts of Ottoman infrastructure and hence be able to exercise its internal sovereignty, in line with the principle of centralisation. This placed the Young Turks in a difficult position. This was because these foreign companies were

197 See also the discussion of Britain’s stance towards Crete in Sweet (1977: 180).
understood as often working in tandem with their own governments, and hence serving to further the interests of their countries of origin, which could run counter to the CUP’s desire to consolidate Ottoman sovereignty (Cole, 2018; Çetinsaya, 2003; Haddad, 1991; Kayah, 1997: 101 - 102). Different states also often competed to secure concessions. For instance, in 1911, the willingness of Ottoman officials to extend the German-supported Baghdad railway towards Alexandretta was opposed by Grey, because this would damage British interests (Earle, 1923: 259). The increase in customs duties that the Ottomans demanded to fund the project was accordingly rejected by Britain (Earle, 1923: 259). Some members of the CUP and other Young Turk factions argued that the awarding of concessions ran contrary to the idea of promoting the sovereignty of the people or the nation. The disagreement over the Lynch concession in 1910, granted to a British company to provide navigation for vessels in the rivers in Mesopotamia, was a case in point (Kayalı, 1997: 101). There was a suspicion, on the part of local MPs, including Babanzade İsmail Hakkı from the CUP, that the Lynch concession was part of a British scheme to economically penetrate Mesopotamia and undermine Ottoman authority in the region (Kayalı, 1997: 101). The calls for the British Indian Office to provide free postal services in Mesopotamia were also opposed, because of how this offer was seen as a means of extending Indian, and hence British, influence into Iraq (Cole, 2018). Boycotts of Italian goods were initiated and increased opposition to concessions were expressed after the Italian invasion of Libya (Gingeras, 2016: 74 – 75). The Italians argued that the invasion was necessary to defend economic interests in the province, but Italy had been eager to pursue a policy of expansionism to be recognised as a great power (Childs, 1990: 11). At this time, the CUP drew on their experience of boycotting Austro-Hungarian goods, following the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with all Iraqi politicians and the Ottoman people mobilising in protest against Britain in Iraq (Kayah, 1997: 102). Ottoman society, therefore, was mobilised to oppose concessions and other aspects of foreign economic influence which they believed were allowing foreign states to become

198 The Berlin - Baghdad Railway was a railway concession granted to Germany in 1888 to construct a railway line from Istanbul to Baghdad (Landau, [1971] 2016: 10; McMeekin, 2015: 28 - 29).
199 Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, the Grand Vizier, resigned after losing the vote in favour of the Lynch concession (Kayah, 1997: 101). Cole (2016) has also demonstrated how British influence spread in Iraq through the granting of concessions to navigate its rivers.
201 See Kayah (1997: 63) and Çetinkaya (2014).
increasingly influential within the geography of the empire. If such extending of foreign influence through infrastructure, which was understood as a precursor to colonialism, was not challenged, it could frustrate the CUP’s efforts to constitute the Ottoman Empire as a centralised nation-state.

Subsequently, as a result of the First Balkan War, which occurred after the states of the Balkan League attacked the empire in 1912, Ottoman territories in Europe were reduced to a foothold around Istanbul. The Russians had initially sought to mobilise the Ottomans with the other Balkan states to form a defensive alliance to check the expansionist ambitions of Austria-Hungary (Hardinge, 1913). Russia, under its foreign minister, Sazonov, also sought to pursue a Pan-Slavic policy in the Balkans and in south-eastern Europe (Tokay 2018: 102). However, given how Ottoman top-down reforms had angered the Balkan populations, the Ottomans were ultimately excluded from Russia’s proposed alliance (Hardinge, 1913). Buchanan (1913: 19 - 20), the British representative at Sofia, added that the Bulgarians had sought an alliance with other Balkan states in the course of the Italo-Turkish War, to prevent Italian and Austro-Hungarian expansion. The former Bulgarian representative in Istanbul, Getchov, contacted Naby Bey, an Ottoman bureaucrat in the Macedonian region, urging him to implement new reforms to improve the conditions of what he deemed to be the Bulgarian population of the province (Buchanan, 1913: 19 - 20). However, violence persisted in Macedonia, with killings that were attributed to Bulgarian armed organisations resulting in a massacre of Bulgarians in Shtip. The subsequent Kochana massacre, which resulted in the death of many Bulgarians, led to the start of the First Balkan War, which would drastically alter the approach of the Ottoman Empire to securing its sovereign equality (R.C. Hall, 1992: 238; Tokay, 2018: 101).

Aware of the chaotic situation within the province, in the lead up to the First Balkan War, the Ottoman government “offered to put into force the ‘law of the Vilayets’, drawn up in 1880 by an International Commission, but never carried into effect” (Buchanan, 1913: 29). In response to the massacre, Getchov, who was now...

202 For an overview of the impact of the First Balkan War see R.C. Hall (2000) and Ginio (2016).
203 This text appears as a minute in a despatch by Buchanan (1913), the British ambassador in Sofia.
the Minister President of Bulgaria, called for the Ottoman Empire to implement autonomy in Macedonia, in accordance with article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin (R.C. Hall, 1992: 239). Bulgaria was joined in these proposals by Serbia and Greece, on October 13, who also called for a representative of the Great Powers and the “Balkan states” to oversee this process (Buchanan, 1913: 29 - 30). This prompted the Ottomans to conclude a peace treaty with Italy at Ouchy, which resulted in an acceptance of Italian control over the Dodecanese Islands, on 18 October 1912 (Carabott, 1993: 307). Italy claimed that it would maintain these territories, which did not become Italian colonies, but, instead fell under the control of the Italian Foreign Ministry, until the Italians were convinced that the Ottomans had withdrawn their irregular forces from Libya (Carabott, 1993: 307 - 308). As they expressed to the then-chief British dragoman, Fitzmaurice (1912) the Grand Vizier and the Sheikh-ul-Islam favoured an agreement with Italy, but they also feared that involving European powers in the settlement, at a later date, would result in the loss of further sovereignty. The framing of the demands of the Balkan states provoked the Ottomans into attacking Bulgaria204, which provoked a retaliation by Greece205, Serbia and Montenegro, all of which could claim to be advancing the ‘civilising’ mission of the Treaty of Berlin (R.C. Hall, 2000: 14). This pointed to how appealing to ‘civilisation’ was not sufficient to secure the sovereign equality of the Ottoman Empire.

4. The collapse of ‘civilisation’-based constituent diplomacy and the onset of war, 1911 – 1913

This section illustrates how the Italo-Turkish War in 1911, and the later Balkan Wars, forced Ottoman elites to revise their constituent diplomacy, which had been geared towards the recognition of their sovereign equality. The efforts of the Young Turks to present themselves as a ‘civilised’ state had failed to convince the European great powers to restrain the Balkan League and Italy. This meant that the great powers were unwilling to defend the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire under the Treaty of Berlin. The Balkan states argued that they were expanding their territories in the interests of security and order (R.C. Hall, 2000: 14). The Ottoman

204 See Buchanan (1913: 30).
205 Greece also welcomed delegates from Crete to its parliament at this time (R.C. Hall, 2000: 14).
government, headed by the recently formed Freedom and Accord Party, after the initial military defeat in 1911, engaged in diplomacy, seeking to argue that the status of the Ottoman Empire as a sovereign state with rights in global international society justified its claims to lose territories (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 102 - 104). Rivalries amongst the great powers persisted during and after the Balkan Wars and prevented the emergence of a united response to the Ottoman claims, which pointed to the reality of the change to the settlement envisaged in the Treaty of Berlin. Following these military defeats, Sabahaddin ([1913] 1999) revised his vision to revive the Ottoman Empire. This marked a shift from his previous suggestion that the Ottomans should align themselves with Britain and France to empower the state through loans. Instead, Sabahaddin ([1913] 1999) argued that the Ottoman Empire needed to follow the trajectory of European states, rather than directly adopting practices and ideas from Europe. A military coup then ensued, led by the CUP member, Enver Paşa. Following the Second Balkan War of 1913, the former Ottoman territories in south-eastern Europe were retaken by the Ottomans through the projection of their power and their diplomacy with the Triple Alliance (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 107). This involved them conceding to some of their suggestions on the revision of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878. This combined projection of power and diplomacy allowed the CUP government to regain Edirne and formed the basis of their later attempts to gain recognition of their sovereign equality through situating their empire in the Triple Alliance.

Although the Balkan Wars are often interpreted as signalling a break from the Ottomanism espoused by the CUP after the revolution (see Ginio, 2005), the wars can be said to have resulted in the suspension of earlier methods of diplomacy employed by the CUP. Öztan (2018) has suggested that the CUP continued to believe in Ottomanism as a means of maintaining the integrity of the empire and securing its recognition. However, there was a change in the methods deployed by the CUP following the negotiations that ended the First Balkan War. In discussions with the Balkan League in London in 1913, the priority of the Ottoman officials was to secure the return of Edirne, the former capital, which had been taken by the Bulgarian army (McMeekin, 2015: 76 - 77). Although many European powers, such as France and Britain, acknowledged that the actions of the Balkan League were illegal, their priority was to maintain the ceasefire and prevent the escalation of the
conflict into a European wide war. In a message to Lowther, the British ambassador in Istanbul, Grey (1912b) noted that Tevfik Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador in London, and Sir A. Nicolson, the British ambassador in Russia, were both agreed that a Europe-wide conference should be held to ease tensions. Although Ottoman officials, such as Kamil, Nazım and Reşid Paşas, came to believe in the need for an armistice between the Balkan League and the Ottoman Empire, they also stressed that Edirne and “Dedeagatch” (Cavalla) should remain part of the Ottoman Empire (Grey, 1912c). Grey (1912c) insisted that the question of the future of Edirne should be discussed in a conference between the ambassadors of different Balkan states in London, but Nazım and Reşid opposed this plan. On the 29 November 1912, the Ottoman foreign minister, Gabriel Nouradongian, claimed in a communication to Grey (1912a) that the Bulgarians sought to retain Scutari and Edirne in any future negotiations. This meant that the negotiations were stalled (Grey, 1912a). In contrast to the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, the great powers had failed to act in unison to interpret and implement global constitutional principles.

The conflict between the Balkan League and the Ottomans continued.

The members of the Ottoman government who were overseeing negotiations were executed or removed by a coup d’état carried out by the CUP on the 23 January 1913. Led by Enver Paşa, the coup became known as the “storming of the Sublime Porte” (Wasti, 2002: 94). The government was brought down while the cabinet was in session (Ahmad, [1969] 2010: 76 - 78). As a result of the coup, a new approach was adopted by the CUP to secure recognition of their claims to sovereignty and

206 Lowther (1912a) reported that the Turkish Ambassador called on Sir A. Nicolson on November 21a to say that Kamil Pasha had to say that Kamil Pasha had proposed to the Allies an Armistice and the discussion of preliminaries of peace. However, as Lowther (1912e) previously noted, the Ottomans were eager to combine armistice negotiations with peace terms.

207 Bax-Irons (1912a), a British Foreign official based in Sofia, reported that the Ottomans and the Bulgarians were agreed on the need for an armistice, but Greece was not “willing to raise Aegean blockade” and Greece objected to the ceding of its claim to the province of Janina. Lowther (1913b: 2) later claimed that, during a meeting of the Grand Council at Dolmabahçe Palace, Nazım Paşa argued that the army “was fully prepared to do its patriotic duty. But unfortunately armies required other things besides ‘morale’.”

208 Bax-Irons (1912d) noted that the Bulgarian PM, Daneff, was contacting the German Foreign Minister in Berlin to arrange for him to persuade the Ottomans to accept the annexation of Edirne in return for peace. Bax-Irons (1912c) also earlier stated that Bulgarian politicians had debated whether an armistice was necessary to ensure that the Bulgarians could bring more troops into Macedonia and Edirne.

209 Tevfik Paşa later telegraphed the British ambassador in Russia, Sir A. Nicolson, to inquire about whether a conference would be held (Grey, 1912b). Nicolson responded that a conference could be held in a European capital to diffuse tensions (Grey, 1912b).
alleviate the military threat which threatened the continuation of their sovereignty. The former grand vizier, Hakkı Paşa held discussions with Nicolson in London (Mallet, 1913b). In line with the suggestion of the French foreign minister, Aristide Briand, it was proposed that all the Treaty of Berlin powers should be included in discussions (Mallet, 1913b). In this context, it was suggested that the basis of Ottoman sovereignty should be renegotiated by addressing the question of the Baghdad Railway and Ottoman rights in the Persian Gulf (Mallet, 1913b). Nicolson replied that “the Powers would be ready … to enter into communication with the Allies [the Balkan League] if the Porte accepted the advice of the Powers” (Mallet, 1913b: 2). Tevfik Paşa, an Ottoman diplomat in London, subsequently informed Grey (1913g) that it was therefore necessary for the powers, including Russia, to bring about a settlement210. Reşid Paşa, the Ottoman negotiator, who was threatening to abandon the talks, also argued that the great powers should intervene to allow the Ottomans to maintain Edirne. He was told by Grey (1913d) that this was unrealistic and that the Bulgarian government had been urged to act moderately211. Following the military coup, Said Halim Paşa (1913b), speaking on behalf of the government, accepted the inclusion of the powers in the peace process (Grey, 1913b; Lowther, 1913e). The new Ottoman government prepared a set of demands, which included calls for the abolition of the capitulations and foreign post offices. The government protested at the taking of territory, with Said Halim Paşa (1913a: 3) arguing that the Ottoman Empire sought to enter into treaties on the basis of

“des principes du droit modern et à l’application à l’égard de leurs sujets des lois fiscales Ottomanes”212 (see also Lowther, 1913c; 1913d).

The initial post-coup diplomacy continued, therefore, to stress Ottoman claims in the Balkans, but Said Halim Paşa also used the opportunity to initiate discussions on broader issues pertaining to the desire to attain sovereign equality for the empire.

Rather than rely on appeals to ‘civilisation’ to gain recognition of their sovereign equality, the Ottomans contemplated using force if other states did not acknowledge

210 Grey (1913d) had also told Reşit Paşa that, by insisting on regaining Edirne and seeking support from the Great Powers, the Ottomans were risking losing even more territory by not contributing to a stable peace.

211 Prominent members of the CUP, such as the general, Cemal Paşa, argued that the Ottomans needed to retake and maintain Edirne, owing to the significance of its status as an important city in Islamic history, its Muslim population and its strategic importance (Gingeras, 2015: 361).

212 The French original text can be translated into English as follows: “principles of modern law and the application of Ottoman tax laws to their subjects” (Said Halim Paşa, 1913a: 3).
what they took to be their rights. Present in London for peace talks, Tevfik, Reşid and Osman Nizami Paşas, acting as the Ottoman delegation, agreed with the British official, Crawford, who proposed, in reference to Edirne, that “full trade and other commercial and industrial facilities were accorded to Bulgaria, while the town itself remained under Ottoman sovereignty” (Grey, 1913c: 2). Said Halim Paşa (1913a: 3) also conceded to the demand for a four per cent increase in customs duties in the Ottoman Empire. Said Halim Paşa (1913a: 3) therefore used the peace negotiations as a platform to push for changes to the existing customs regime that was maintained as a corollary of the capitulations. In arguing for the Ottoman Empire’s continued sovereignty over territories lost in the Balkans, these diplomats were echoing the views of Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, a CUP politician and writer who focused on international and domestic constitutional legal issues (Fujinami, 2013: 328). He had argued that the Ottoman Empire continued to have rights over Crete because enosis had not yet been recognised by the international community (Fujinami, 2013: 328). However, Reşid Paşa’s statement that the Ottoman state would seek to negotiate the fate of Edirne resulted in Grey (1913f: 2) concluding that the future of Edirne “must be decided by war”, as the talks would not include Edirne. Tevfik Paşa also believed that it was essential for the Ottomans to seek mediation with the powers (Mallet, 1913a). At the same time, Bax-Ironside (1913: 42), Britain’s ambassador to Bulgaria, reported that following France’s proposal, Britain, Russia, Italy and Austria-Hungary agreed that the border between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria would run along the Maritsa River. The constituent power of the Great Powers was therefore wielded in an attempt to provide a peaceful solution to the conflict. However, the great powers thereby refused to accept the demands of the Ottoman diplomats.

The Ottoman government continued to press for at least a degree of Ottoman sovereignty over Edirne, which they believed they were entitled to, given the view that conquest was illegal under the sovereign rights of the empire and the importance of the city for Islam. Reşid and Osman Nizami Paşas had earlier contacted Grey (1913e: 1) and argued that unless their instructions were supported by the powers, further instability could occur in the Balkans and within the empire. Said Halim Paşa, (1913a), the Grand Vizier, had also proposed that the Ottomans should maintain a degree of sovereignty over Edirne. Said Halim (1913a: 2) argued that
placing the eastern part of Edirne under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire would ensure the protection of Islamic artefacts and buildings. This argument was similar to the practices of shared sovereignty implemented before 1908 in territories such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Crete and Bulgaria. Said Halim Paşa (1913a: 1) further contended that the Aegean Islands occupied by Greece were vital for the defence of Asia Minor and made the following statement:

“[l]e Gouvernement Impérial est persuadé que les Grandes Puissances, dans leur esprit de justice et d'équité, voudront bien reconnaître l'étendue des sacrifices déjà consenties, et convenir que la Sublime Porte serait en droit de rejeter toutes nouvelles exigences ou prétentions qui éventuellement pourraient être soulevées par les allies balcaniques.”213

Said Halim Paşa’s proposal was dismissed by the Balkan League (Grey, 1913c). Nevertheless, the Bulgarian diplomat, Daneff, informed the Ottomans that Bulgaria would accept a straight line as a border stretching from Enos to Imidia, which did not follow the Maritsa River214. This was, in turn, dismissed by the Ottomans (Grey, 1913a). The negotiations reached a standstill. The Ottoman desire to gain international recognition of a degree of sovereignty, in line with what they took to be the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire, was irreconcilable with the Bulgarian desire to enforce their own territoriality over Edirne.

In the wake of Ottoman defeats in Libya and in the Balkans, Sabahaddin advanced a new set of proposals for the Ottoman state to overcome the challenges faced by the empire. Here, he extended his earlier thoughts on decentralisation and constitutionalism. Sabahaddin had previously called for close cooperation between the Ottoman Empire and a powerful state to support the empire’s development. In 1913, Sabahaddin ([1913] 1999) prepared a book, titled Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir? (How can Turkey be saved?), where he argued that the Ottoman Empire could be empowered by encouraging the individual initiative of its citizens215. Sabahaddin ([1913]: 1999: 30) argued that hitherto, owing to “geography,

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213 The English translation of this communication reads as follows: “The Imperial Government is persuaded that the Great Powers, in their spirit of justice and equity, will be willing to recognize the extent of the sacrifices already made, and to agree that the Sublime Porte would be entitled to reject any new requirements or claims that could possibly be raised by the Balkan allies” (Said Halim Paşa, 1913a: 1).

214 In addition, this communication stressed that the Ottomans ought to give up completely their claim to Crete (Lowther, 1913a).

215 Sabahaddin began work on this book in 1913 (see Özavcı, 2013: 647), but it was eventually published in Istanbul in 1918 (see Taglia, 2015: 88).
society, and the absence of approaches basing the sciences on observation (the spirit of induction)” it has not been possible for the East to

“align itself with ideas and social currents that have come from Western Europe; namely, to find a foundational direction and see the reasons for moving society in that direction, in the absence of an awareness of social science” 216.

Sabahaddin foresaw that the political programme of decentralisation could be supplemented by encouraging independent-minded individuals to develop the local wealth of the empire. As Sabahaddin ([1913] 1999: 26) emphasised at the start of his treatise, this would involve challenging the practice of seeking to import or imitate Western ideas and practices, stating that the

“the issue is to be able to possess this power, this ability. If we continue to adopt or try to mimic the products of civilisation as they appear to our eyes, we will, far from being able to reach contemporary civilisation, move increasingly away from it.” 217

Sabahaddin ([1913] 1999: 40) emphasised this would be possible through focusing on agriculture and enabling the farmers of the empire to move away from sustenance towards commercial farming. Unless such reforms occurred, Sabahaddin ([1913] 1999: 40) argued that the

“result would be upsetting weakness, economic captivity, brought about by focusing on maintaining our political independence purely on administration and military measures, and the political captivity that this would give birth to.” 218

Sabahaddin ([1913] 1999: 26 - 27) argued that this was the best way to ensure that the Ottoman Empire could follow the same trajectory of development of European powers and thereby become ‘civilised’ without empowering Europe, by noting how

“we must not forget that we are still dependent the West’s financial strength to adopt the tools of contemporary civilisation. Receiving this financial support is inevitably dependent on us demonstrating the urbane nature of our society, meaning that it involves imposing the demands of social life on private life. This, in turn, means that these initiatives appear as though they

216 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Avrupa’yi Garbi’den aktar-ı sa’ırye müteveccih, cereyan-ı iclim’ın mahiyyeti ta’ayıının etmeden; hulasa ilm-i içlim’in keşfiyyattından istifade edilmenden ıslahat için bir istikamet-i esasiyye bulmak ve cem’iyeti o tarika sevk edebilecek avamili görmek mümkün değil.” (Sabahaddin, [1913] 1999: 30).
217 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Mes’ele işte bu kabiliyyete, bu kudrete temellük edebilmede! Yoksa bugünkü medeniyyetin yalnız göz önündeki eserlerini tanzir ve taklid etmekle onun derecesine varmak hatta yaklaşmak şöyle dursun bi’l-akis uzaklaşmada devamınız zarurdu!” (Sabahaddin, [1913] 1999: 26).
218 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “[n]etice, memleketimizin asırlardan beri yaşadığı bu za’f-ı elim, istikal-i siyasimizi yalnız vesa’ıt-i askeriyye ve idariyye ile mühafazayı çalıştığımız halde hedef-i istilasi olmaktan kurtulmak mümkün olmayan esaret-i ıktisadiyye ve bunun zaruri olarak tevlid edeceği esaret siyasiyye…” (Sabahaddin, [1913] 1999: 40).
are owned and enacted by the government, while, in fact, being the West’s.”

That Sabahaddin wrote his *Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?*, after Ottoman defeat in Libya and the Balkans suggests how these crises and the lack of faith in the great powers to support the Ottoman Empire moved him to turn to the idea of developing the self-sufficiency of the Ottoman people.

In the course of the Italo-Turkish and Balkan Wars, the competition between states seeking to establish more influence in the Ottoman Empire intensified. This had an impact on how the Ottomans presented their claims to sovereign rights with a shift away from seeking recognition as a ‘civilised’ state. Lowther (1912b) and his French colleague had urged the Ottomans to moderate their demands to the Balkan League, claiming that the Triple Alliance was also pushing for moderation (see also Bax-Ironsides, 1912c). The Ottoman desire to develop closer relations with Italy and its allies, Austria-Hungary and Germany, had begun when news reached the Ottomans of an alliance between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia in the Balkans (Tokay, 2018: 98 - 99). A new cabinet headed by Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, who advocated establishing close relations with the Italians, replaced the cabinet of Said Halim Paşa, who was held responsible for the defeat at the hands of the Italians in north Africa (Tokay, 2018: 98 - 99). Lowther (1913c) remarked that the new Ottoman government, in its communications to the Great Powers, sought to secure “Adrianople and the Aegean Islands” and that it had taken care, possibly under the advice of Austro-Hungarian diplomats in Istanbul, to distinguish between islands in the Aegean that were “occupied by the Allies” and those that were occupied by

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219 The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “Unutmayalım ki memleketimizi vesait-i hazra-i medeniyye ile techiz edebilmek için yine Garb’ın mu’avenet-i maliyyesine müraca’ata mecburuz. Bu müraca’at şera’it-i hazra-i ictima’iyyemiz dahilinde” (Sabahaddin, [1913] 1999: 26 - 27).

220 See Boeckh and Rutar (2018: 219) for how Western historiography has traditionally viewed the Balkan Wars from the perspective of Balkan exceptionalism (see Biondich, 2011 for an example and Todorova, 1997, for a critique) or has merely focused on the military history of the wars (see Erickson, 2003). New historical studies need to consider the non-military aspects of the conflict.

221 Bax-Ironsides (1912c) argued that the Ottoman proposal for an armistice was “without doubt the combined work of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Governments drawn up with German approval”, and stated further that “if Ottoman government refuse to cede all Macedonia together with Adrianople to the Allies, the war will be continued.” Relatedly, Bax-Ironsides (1912b) had reported that the representatives of the Triple Alliance in Sofia had misinterpreted the Bulgarians’ intentions as being driven by the desire to reach a peace with the Ottomans.
Italy.\textsuperscript{222} Tokay (2018: 104) also notes that the Ottomans sought to use Crete as a bargaining chip, whereby they would abandon Crete in return for the recognition of the Ottomans as sovereign over the other islands. This plan, which had been devised by the earlier Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gabriel Nouradongian (see Lowther, 1913c), failed. Lowther (1913c) also predicted that Italy would probably abandon the Sporades Islands, which it had occupied in the course of the Italo-Turkish War, in order to “show the Turks that the Triple Alliance is more favourable to Ottoman interests in the matter than the Triple Entente”. Ultimately, the Ottomans saw a possibility of attaining international recognition of their sovereign equality by gaining the support of the Triple Alliance, which also offered the prospect of securing the recognition of the Ottoman claim to Edirne.

The CUP government aimed to gain recognition of its sovereign equality by a combination of diplomacy and warfare, made possible by the support of the Triple Alliance. The CUP’s demand for the end of the four-percent increase on customs duties, which would allow the Ottoman state to develop its sovereign capacity in the face of the economic challenges posed by the capitulations, was met positively by the Triple Alliance (Lowther, 1913c) Italy agreed to this as part of its peace terms with the Ottomans. Germany’s control over the Baghdad Railway concession was recognised by the Ottomans, and Austria-Hungary secured the end of Ottoman claims to Bosnia-Herzegovina in return for supporting the increase on customs duties (Lowther, 1913c: 3). In the Balkans, the Ottomans benefitted from the onset of clashes between Bulgaria and Greece \textsuperscript{223} (Gingeras, 2016: 82 – 92). Enver deployed an irregular force, known as the Special Organisation, or Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, previously formed in the Italo-Turkish War, which was now tasked with waging an insurgency against Greek forces in western Thrace (Pelt, 2010: 236). The force established a de facto state, known as the Turkish Republic of Thrace, by exploiting divisions amongst Bulgarians and Greeks, but the form of sovereignty of this state

\textsuperscript{222} Gabriel Nouradongian had played an earlier role in preparing the legal defence of Ottoman sovereignty, starting from the period of the founding of the Ottoman Office of Legal Counsel, which was tasked with translating texts in international law (Genell, 2016: 262).

\textsuperscript{223} Lowther (1912d: f 286) notes that although the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Gabriel Nouradongian, recognised “the necessity of ceding Adrianople,” he argued that “in peace conditions it was quite impossible to persuade their military authorities that its retention was not indefensible.” See also Lowther (1912c), where Mahmud Şevket Paşa, a prominent Ottoman general (see Zürcher, 2010: 92), stressed that it was necessary to recognise that the defence of Istanbul required the Ottomans to maintain Edirne.
was unclear and it did not enjoy international recognition (Gingeras, 2009: 91 - 92). The Turkish Republic of Thrace was dismantled following further peace negotiations in London, where the Balkan states recognised Edirne as a part of Ottoman territory (Gingeras, 2009: 91 – 92). In the meantime, former Ottoman officials and units in the westernmost part of the Balkan territories were able, through diplomacy, to be recognised as the state of Albania (Blumi and Yavuz, 2013: 53, 55 – 56; Sezgin, 2013: 437). This resulted in the end of Ottoman sovereignty in this territory. Although their long-standing goal of ending the capitulations was not achieved, Ottoman officials had pursued a successful constituent diplomacy, insofar as they obtained approval from the Great Powers to regain control of Edirne and to negotiate a customs increase.

5. Warfare as a means of reconstituting international society: sovereignty, war and the CUP, 1914 - 1918

This section argues that by entering the First World War on the side of the Triple Alliance, the CUP sought to reconstitute international order along lines that would be more favourable to the recognition of their sovereign equality. How intellectuals affiliated with the CUP developed different social and political theories to situate their state in what they understood to be a more deserving position within global international society is demonstrated. At the eve of the war, these intellectuals no longer considered “civilization” as an idea that could be used to persuade the Great Powers to accept the empire as an equal sovereign (Aksakal, 2008: 37). Instead, thinkers such as Ağaoğlu and Ziya Gökalp, viewed civilisation as a concept that denoted empowerment of their state and society and the means by which their power could be projected internationally (Grassi, 2015; Özavcı, 2013). In this context, developing a Turkish nation within the Ottoman Empire was seen as essential (Aksakal, 2004; 2008: 36; Özavcı, 2013; Turnaoğlu, 2017a: chs. 6 and 7). The First World War also saw the Ottoman state revoke all of the capitulations (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 104). Thinkers advising the Ottoman state, such as Parvus Efendi, viewed the war as an opportunity to engage in extensive homegrown social,

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224 Grassi (2015) adds that, in addition to Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura and Munis Tekinalp were also significant Turkish nationalist intellectuals who sought to justify the involvement of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War.
economic and political reform that would empower the empire (Kieser, 2011). Defeating Russia, in particular, was seen as essential to avoid reforms from being imposed from outside that could curtail the territoriality of the empire (Kieser, 2011). This would, in turn, further consolidate the empire’s position in global international society, as an ally of the Central Powers. The threat posed by Tsarist Russia to the sovereignty and sovereign equality of the Ottoman Empire, and the nationalist goal of supporting Turkish movements, drove the Ottoman Empire to enter into an alliance with the Central Powers (Kieser, 2011; Trumpener, 1968). Ultimately, the doctrines of national sovereignty that were adopted during the war formed the basis of the agreement between the Bolsheviks and the Ottoman Empire, following the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of 1918 (Grassi, 2015: 185).

In the context of their struggle to gain equal recognition of the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, the CUP had established ties with thinkers who sought to bring about a transformation of forms of hierarchy throughout the globe. One of the main motives for the CUP to turn to the advice of the thinker, Parvus, and to enter the First World War, was to prevent a reform process being undertaken with international supervision in the eastern provinces under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin (Kieser, Polatel and Schmutz, 2015: 285 - 287). Kayaoğlu (2010a: 104 - 105) argues that it was primarily the need to end extraterritoriality that led to the entry of the Ottomans to the First World War and that their successful state-building meant that they could now end extraterritoriality. However, extraterritoriality was only ended with the support of the Central Powers – i.e. the Triple Alliance – only being granted after the war had been declared (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 104 - 105). Germany sought to prevent the expansion of Russian influence in the Armenian regions earmarked for reform (Kieser, Polatel and Schmutz, 2015: 290, 294 - 296). Following the Balkan Wars, Russia had suggested that a Christian governor be jointly appointed by European states and the Ottoman Empire to oversee these regions (Kieser, Polatel and Schmutz, 2015: 290, 294 - 296). The capitulations would also be abolished by the Ottoman state, with Germany and Austria-Hungary later supporting them, thereby normalising the Ottoman state in global international society and ending the persistence of forms of international hierarchy and stigmatisation (Kieser, Polatel and Schmutz, 2015: 298). The ideas of Alexander-Helphand Parvus, a German Social Democrat, Marxist theorist and businessman in Istanbul, who developed close
ties with the German and Ottoman states, provided justifications for the actions of the CUP at this time (Karaömerlioğlu, 2004; Kieser, 2011). Parvus, who wrote in the CUP-affiliated Turkish nationalist journal, Türk Yurdu, sought to reconcile the interests of the Ottoman Empire with Marx’s theory of the inevitability of a world revolution, which he believed could be achieved by Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire jointly toppling Russia’s autocratic government (Kieser, 2011: 389 – 390, 398 - 401). Parvus ([1914] 2013a: 213) hence argued that

“[a]ny future government in Turkey (sic) must be the current Ottoman government. If Turkey aptly uses its ability to choose a civilised government of a new style and pursues this strength and ability, it will fulfil a historical role worthy of its responsibility and prevent Russia’s expansion and domination of Asia”.225

By presenting a theory of history, Parvus was one of the thinkers affiliated with the CUP who questioned the existing rules of global international society by challenging the states that upheld these principles. His views would be realised in 1914, when the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on the side of the Central Powers by carrying out a naval assault on Russian ports in the Black Sea.

Parvus ([1914] 2014), claimed that the standard of ‘civilisation’ could be used as a concept to assess the level of development of the economy and society of the Ottoman Empire. Parvus ([1914] 2014: 130) expressed this view by stating:

“Esteemed readers, when we mention European civilisation it is necessary to note how it is not present to the same extent in every country. Therefore, whenever a state intends to implement military science, parliamentarism, and agrarian or industrial techniques from Europe, it is necessary to closely study the differences in civilisation amongst states.”226

The solution for the Ottoman Empire, according to Parvus ([1914] 2014: 13 - 14), was to encourage the development of the productive forces of the Ottoman economy and to challenge the capitulations and other restrictions on the economy that had resulted in the empire accumulating vast amounts of debt. Parvus called for the

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225 The Turkish transliteration and simplification of the original Ottoman text reads as follows,

226 The translation provided above is from the following passage in Parvus ([1914] 2014: 130):
“Kari’n-i kiram Avrupa medeniyetinden bafs ediliği zaman bunun her bir memlekte aynı derecede olmadığını görüyor. Binaenaleh kendi memleketine gerek fenn-i askeri ve gerek parlementarizm, gerek ziraat ve gerek sanayie dair Avrupa usullü ithal edileceği zaman her devlet arasında medeniyetçe olan fark iyice tekik edilmelidir.”
creation of a “National Economy”, along the lines proposed by the economist Friedrich List (see Toprak, 2012: 44), in which wealth would be held by the majority of the people within the Ottoman Empire, who constituted the dominant nation (Karaömerlioğlu, 2004: 153; Turnaçoğlu, 2017a: 157 - 158). This idea was also adopted by Munis Tekinalp (formerly Moise Cohen), a writer in a CUP-aligned journal called Genç Kalemler (The Young Pens), founded in Salonica in 1891 (Akçam, 2004: 67). Tekinalp not only believed in the necessity of creating a national economy, based on the ideas held by the German Social Democratic Party, but also came to believe, on the basis of the ideas of the right wing French thinker, Comte de Gobineau, that nations were themselves founded upon “race[s]” (Akçam, 2004: 67; see also Toprak, 2013: 297 - 301). The creation of such a national economy, according to its proponents, would ensure that the Ottoman Empire could harness its productive capacity and make the transition from state to national sovereignty. Tekinalp most clearly articulated this view, arguing that the Ottomans needed to create a ‘national economy’ and adopt irredentist Turkish nationalism to gain more global influence (Grassi, 2015; Landau, [1981] 1995: 34 – 35). This, in turn, could empower the Ottoman state and allow it to shape the constitutional rules of international society, through its alliances, to secure recognition of its sovereign rights in global international society.

Parvus’s views on ‘civilisation’, informed by his Marxist and Social Democratic perspective, coalesced with those of Turkish nationalist thinkers, who saw the war as an opportunity to realise their own political goals. Both Parvus and these nationalist thinkers, many of whom were associated with the CUP or sought to complement the CUP’s constitutional revolution with a Turkish national awakening, supported the idea of the “national economy” and saw the war as an opportunity to create it (Karaömerlioğlu, 2004:153; see also Kieser, 2011; Toprak, 2012). Ağaoğlu, a member of the CUP who had immigrated to the Ottoman Empire from the Russian Empire, did not share Parvus’s Marxism, but he nonetheless believed in a concept of universal “civilisation” which denoted a level of development (Özavcı, 2013: 22, see

227 Tekinalp’s equation of Turkism and Pan-Turkist irredentism was mirrored in the views of Celal Nuri, a journalist and intellectual, who stressed that the two ideas had become intertwined (Landau, [1981] 1995: 34). As Turnaçoğlu (2017a: 251) demonstrates, Celal Nuri was an advocate of “civilisation.”
also Shissler, 2003: 158). Sharing the late nineteenth century French conservative critique of schemes of universal emancipation, associated with thinkers such as the Comte de Gobineau, Ernest Renan and Gustave Le Bon, Ağaoğlu argued that nations and individuals were the only relevant forces in history (Shissler, 2003: 69 - 70). However, Ağaoğlu believed that the path of development of European societies could be emulated in the context of the Ottoman Empire (Özavcı, 2013: 22). Ziya Gökalp, another intellectual aligned with the CUP, came to argue that the Ottoman Empire needed to secure its own position within Western civilisation to empower itself. On 14 January 1915, Gökalp ([1915] 1981b: 41) argued that “the highest form of civilisation… is ‘capital civilisation’”, which he claimed emerged in “composite societies” in which the different components of these societies select and send representatives to confederal assemblies in the capital city of their country, thereby gaining a national character” Gökalp ([1915] 1981b: 41) concluded that “the greatest nations of Europe are taking this shape”. All these thinkers, therefore, presented arguments which echoed previous references to the standard of ‘civilisation’. They explicitly referred to the established European states as paragons of national development, to be emulated by the Ottoman Empire, but did not argue for proving the ‘civilised’ nature of the Ottoman Empire to the great powers, as a means of securing the recognition of sovereign equality.

Parvus was not a nationalist and remained committed to world revolution, believing that war could advance the cause of world revolution. But, both Ağaoğlu and Gökalp believed that ‘civilisation’ could be attained through nationalism (Özavcı, 2013). This is illustrated in how Gökalp ([1915] 1981b: 42) argued that the “Turkish nation” was a part of “communal societies”, but was “a candidate to being

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228 Gökalp ([1915] 1981b: 38) advanced terms such as “uzvi tesanüt”, which corresponded roughly to Durkheim’s concept of “organic solidarity”, present in primitive societies, and the concept of “mihaniki tesanüt” corresponded to Durkheim’s concept of mechanical solidarity, present in societies with more complex forms of the division of labour (Parla, 1985: 55).

229 The Turkish transliteration from the original Ottoman text reads as: “Heyeti cemiyetlerde … bu camialara mensup heyetler paytahta intihap ettikleri murahhaslardan mürekkep konfederasyon meclislerine malik olarak milli bir mahiyet alırlar. Medeniyetin bu şekline ’paytaht medeniyeti’ denilebilir. Ve medeniyetin en yüksek şekli budur” (Gökalp, [1915] 1981b: 41).

230 The Turkish transliteration from the original Ottoman text reads as “Avrupa’nın en yüksek milletleri bu şekle doğru ilerlemektedir” (Gökalp, [1915] 1981b: 41).
considered amongst composite societies”\textsuperscript{231}, which included the foremost European states. Gökalp ([1915] 1981b) argued for a typology of five different societies, each of which displayed greater complexity than the other and included the “zeami” (feudal) (see Gökalp [1915] 1981b: 40), “camiavi” (communal) (see Gökalp [1915] 1981b: 40), “medine” (urban) (see Gökalp [1915] 1981b: 40), “muzaf” (layered) (see Gökalp ([1915] 1981b: 41), and, finally “heyeti” (composite) (see Gökalp ([1915] 1981b: 41), societies. Gökalp ([1915] 1981b: 38) had developed a social theory to explain these societies, based on the ideas of the French sociologist, Emile Durkheim (Topal, 2017: 288). Accordingly, each of these societies had a different form of division of labour, which became more complex as the society advanced, and which was sustained through ties of solidarity amongst the members of the society. Ağaoğlu, on the other hand, believed in an ontology in which there was only room for nations and individuals, where national cultures would form the basis for the expression of individual rights. However, both Ağaoğlu and Gökalp contended that nationalism in the Ottoman Empire would need to draw upon local and European ideas. Commenting on the CUP’s annual 1916 conference, Gökalp ([1916] 1981a: 60) summarised his perspective as follows:

“[a]s a result of the religious debates that were held in the CUP Congress this year, a sincere opinion was expressed, which stressed how Islam and modern civilisation are entirely compatible with one another”.

Arguing that the Young Ottomans and politicians, such as Namık Kemal and Cevdet Paşa had previously voiced this opinion (see Gökalp [1916] 1981a: 60), Gökalp ([1916] 1981a: 61) argued that the mistake of the Tanzimat had been to assign the Sultan the status of the leader of the Muslim community in the empire.\textsuperscript{232} This institutional arrangement meant that the Sultan was both the sovereign of the whole of the empire and the representative of a particular religious group (Gökalp [1916] 1981a: 61 - 62). To end this situation, Gökalp ([1916] 1981a: 61) agreed with “Imam Mawardi, who stated in his ‘Al-Ahkam Al-Sultaniia’, that the caliphate could not be considered separately from the sultanate.”\textsuperscript{233} Gökalp ([1916] 1981b: 67 - 69) added

\textsuperscript{231} The Turkish transliteration from the original Ottoman text reads as: “Bu tasnife göre Türk milletinin camiavi cemiyetler nev’ine dahil olduğu ve istikbalde heyeti cemiyetler arasına girmeye namzet bulunduğunu anlaşılıyor” (Gökalp, [1915] 1981b: 42).

\textsuperscript{232} The Tanzimat reforms had resulted in communal autonomy for different religious groups in the empire, with each group ultimately answering to the Sultan as the sovereign (Gökalp, [1916] 1981a).

\textsuperscript{233} The Turkish transliteration from the original Ottoman text reads as: “Saltanat, İmam-i Maverdi’nin ‘Ahkam-i Sultanîyyesi’nden anlatıldığını vecihle, hilafetin sifat-i hukuîmanîsi (souveraineté) olup katîyen ondan ayrı şey değildi” (Gökalp, [1916] 1981a: 61).
that this confusion meant that the Islamic community in the Ottoman Empire was reduced to the status of being one of the religious communities, such as the Armenians, over which the Sultan would be considered sovereign. This, in turn, for Gökalp ([1916] 1981b: 69) would have the effect of

“preventing the Islamic state from being recognised as a contemporary state, hence preventing its independence both internally and externally. In this condition, we would also have no right to remove the capitulations.”

This meant that the Sultan and therefore the state could always be said to be privileging Muslims and hence the capitulations could be maintained in perpetuity. Therefore, even though Gökalp and Ağaoğlu prescribed separate means for the state to become more civilised, they both agreed that the Ottoman state should adopt Turkish nationalism (Özavcı, 2013). According to them, this would enable the Ottoman state to project its constituent power internally and internationally and thereby allow the Ottoman state to follow in the path of the ‘civilised’ and ‘advanced’ European Great Powers.

In addition to considerations of social and political theory, the CUP focused on reaping the perceived advantages of the geography of the empire to justify entering the First World War on the side of the Central Powers. If the Ottomans could exploit their unique geographic position, these thinkers reasoned that the Ottomans would thereby be empowered and would succeed in gaining recognition of their demands for equal sovereignty. Cami Bey (later Cami Baykurt) was one such intellectual, who was also a former deputy of the Ottoman Parliament and founder of the “Turkish nationalist” National Constitutional Party (Aksakal, 2008: 33). He argued that the empire could not be considered a European state on the basis of its location and that its former European territories had been mere colonies that had burdened it for some time (Aksakal, 2004: 526; 2008: 33 - 36). Gökalp ([1917] 1981: 119) situated the Ottoman Empire culturally within both Europe and Asia. However, Gökalp ([1917] 1981: 119) contended that both the Ottomans and the Germans were “in the process of purifying themselves from the influences of foreign countries in the fields of religion, morality, their legal consciences, their literature

234 The Turkish transliteration from the original Ottoman text reads as “O halde İslam devleti ötedenberi bazı Avrupa ülemasının idda ettiği vehile hiçbir zaman asır bir devlet mahiyetini alamayacaktır, binaenaleyh ne dahilen, ne de haricen müstakil olmayacaktı. Bu takdirce kapitülasyonları kaldırmaya da hiçbir hakkımız bulunmayacaktır” (Gökalp, [1916] 1981b: 69).
and linguistic tastes and their scientific and economic practices”235, even though both were a part of “European civilisation.” Focusing more on the specific location of the Ottoman Empire, Parvus ([1914] 2013a: 212) argued that it could challenge Russia through “controlling the keys to the only door that leads to the Black Sea”236 and also challenge Britain’s presence in Egypt (see Parvus, [1914] 2013a: 214). Parvus ([1914] 2013a: 213) argued that such an empowerment of the Ottoman state would enable it to defend its sovereignty, while also challenging Britain’s predominant position in the globe, making it “a natural ally of Germany and Austria in their fight against the Russian presence”237. Parvus ([1914] 2013b) further developed his views in a separate article, which discussed the possible outcomes if Britain emerged victorious from the war. Here, Parvus ([1914] 2013b: 223) argued that the maintenance of the status quo in terms of the level of development of states and their economies was centred around “desiring Turkey (sic) and China remaining backward both politically and economically”. Therefore, Parvus ([1914] 2013b: 223) suggested that the defence of Ottoman sovereign equality, which was already threatened by economic concessions that were conditional on the Ottomans relinquishing control of their finances, necessitated the defeat of Britain in the World War. Consequently, a view emerged that because of its geopolitical position, the most effective means for the Ottoman Empire to ensure its sovereign equality would be an alliance with Germany. This alliance materialised in the course of international calls for reforms in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

These thinkers also referred to the need to forge an alliance with the Central Powers in war-time in order to change international and local constitutional rules. Although Gökalp and Ağaoğlu did not have an explicit theory of how the globe ought to be ordered, they nonetheless stressed that nations were to be the main units that composed it. In the course of the First World War, the Ottoman state and

235 The original Ottoman text reads as follows in the Turkish transliteration available in Gökalp ([1917] 1981: 119): “Alman milleti, kendine mahsus olan dini, ahlaki, hukuki viedanları, bedii ve lisani zevki, ilmi ve iktisadi usulleri, diğer milletlerin bu gibi amillerinden temyize çıkarmaktadır.” Gökalp ([1917] 1981: 119) later adds that the Ottomans are engaged in the same process that he here ascribes to the Germans.

236 The Turkish transliteration and simplification of the original text reads as follows, “Karadeniz’e yol veren tek anahatların Türkiye’nin elinde bulunması…” (Parvus, [1914] 2013a: 212).

237 The Turkish transliteration and simplification of the original text reads as follows, referring to the Ottoman Empire: “…, Almanya ve Avusturya’nın Rus varlığına karşı girişikleri kaynağı ve güreşte bu iki devletin en emin ve en doğal bir mütefiki olurdu” (Parvus, [1914] 2013a: 213).
intellectuals affiliated with it promoted the idea of creating a Turkic and Islamic empire from territories conquered from the Russian Empire (Grassi, 2015). Parvus ([1914] 2013a: 213) believed that the defeat of Russia was a necessary step in the advance of history towards a world revolution. After these hopes were put on hold following the defeat of the Ottoman forces led by Enver Paşa in 1915, Gökalp ([1918] 2007) sought to support Turkish and Islamic peoples in the former Russian Empire, who sought to secure their sovereignty after the Russian Revolution of 1917. This was evident in his 1918 article addressed to the Turks of Russia. Here, Gökalp ([1918] 2007: 35) argued for the promotion of the “Idea of Muslim Turkishness”238, as the Turks of the Russian Empire had an opportunity to constitute their own societies after the collapse of the Tsarist regime. Challenging the policies of the Bolsheviks, which sought only to recognise class differences among individuals, Gökalp ([1918] 2007: 34) argued for national solidarity and the establishment of

“rulers, who can either have absolute or constitutionally limited power or operate in the context of republics. However, they must nonetheless not follow a political cause that privileges one class and threatens another”239. Therefore, even though the CUP had failed during the war to restructure international society with the weakening of Russia, they nonetheless continued to argue for the national sovereignty of Turkish and Muslim peoples (Khalid, 2011). By encouraging these revolutionary Turkish and Islamic nationalist movements that emerged after the Russian Revolution, and reconstituting the Ottoman Empire as a nation-state, the Young Turks believed that they could also empower and extend the influence of the Ottoman state (Reynolds, 2009). This would enable the empire to overcome external challenges to its sovereignty and assert its sovereign equality.

The focus on the instrumental conception of war, as exemplified in the justifications provided by the Young Turk intellectuals for involvement in the First World War to secure the recognition of sovereign equality, overlooks the unintended “consequences” of conflict (Barkawi and Brighton, 2019: 101). The use of nationalism, and the need to secure national sovereignty, had a tangible effect on the
nature and the extent of Ottoman sovereignty at the end of the war. The arguments of Parvus ([1914] 2014) and his followers, stressing that it was necessary for the Ottoman Empire to reconstitute itself as a national economy to secure its sovereignty, and Ağaoğlu’s (see Özavcı, 2013; Shissler, 2003: 161 - 162) belief that the borders of the state should be co-terminus with those of the nation, left their mark on the empire. As a result of the war, the Ottoman Empire increasingly resembled a national economy, with the position of non-Muslims in the economy and in the empire diminished through forced expulsions and massacres resulting in national homogenisation (Akçam, 2004: 67; Rae, 2002; Üngör, 2008; 2011).
Territorial gains were achieved through diplomacy and military operations which focused on establishing ties with Turkish populations to the east of the empire. Following the exit of Russia from the war in 1917 and the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, where the Turkish nationalist, Akçura, represented the Ottoman state, the Ottomans secured the return of the eastern provinces that had been conquered by Russia in 1878 (Grassi, 2015: 185). However, the Ottoman Empire would soon be forced to surrender to the Allied powers. The Armistice of Moudros was signed on 30 October 1918 (Gingeras, 2016: 248). This was after Talat Paşa, the Grand Vizier, had argued that the collapse of Ottoman armies on several fronts necessitated suing for peace on the terms that had been set out by US President Woodrow Wilson (Gingeras, 2016: 247). Significantly, among Wilson’s Fourteen Points for Peace was the call in point XII for the recognition of the “secure sovereignty” of the “Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire” (Wilson, 1918 quoted in Smith, 2009: 57). Point XIV, on the other hand, recognised the equality of “the political independence and territorial integrity” for “great and small states alike” (Wilson, 1918 quoted in Throntveit, 2017: 471). Consequently, the Ottoman Empire had been transformed, through the constituent power of the CUP, along the lines of Turkish and Islamic nationalism that had been articulated by intellectuals who had called for the empire to enter the war.

6. Conclusion:

The Great Powers failed to provide a united response to the Balkan states, following the invasion and annexation of Ottoman territory in the Italo-Turkish and First Balkan Wars. The European states had previously acted as a constituent power
to ensure that the interests of “civilisation” were ensured through reforms envisaged in the Treaty of Berlin (M. Schulz, 2011: 203). However, they failed to agree on how the treaty could be restructured after the changes that had occurred after the revolution of 1908. In these circumstances, some of the Young Turks concluded that instituting a constitutional regime would not lead to states accepting that the Ottomans had met the standard of ‘civilisation’. After a military coup by the CUP in 1913, the Young Turks came to equate the level of ‘civilisation’ in the empire with social power alongside normative power. Calls by certain Berlin signatory powers for reforms to be introduced in the eastern provinces of the empire pushed the CUP to opt for an alliance with Germany to challenge Russia’s perceived expansionism (Kieser, Polatel and Schmutz, 2015). As the 1916 conference of the CUP demonstrates, Islamic civilisation was presented as being compatible with the contemporary standard of ‘civilisation’ (Gökalp, [1916] 1981a; [1916] 1981b). Hence, civilisation came to be understood as denoting universal, rather than merely Islamic civilisation (Gökalp, [1916] 1981a; [1916] 1981b). This allowed the CUP to place their state on an equal footing with the other Great Powers, claiming that they were a civilised state and not merely an Islamic state (Gökalp, [1916] 1981a; [1916] 1981b). ‘Civilisation’, in turn, was equated with transforming society along national lines and through securing the recognition of the equal sovereignty of the state through alliances. Ottoman participation in the First World War was therefore an attempt to alter the constitutional rules of global international society to enable the sovereign equality of the state to be secured. Although the Ottomans were ultimately defeated, this concern with securing sovereign equality motivated them to enter into an armistice on the basis of Wilson’s Fourteen Points.
5. Sovereignty and the return of the standard of ‘civilisation’: struggles for the recognition of sovereign equality in the Ottoman Empire, 1918 – 1921

1. Introduction:

This chapter focuses on how events at the end of the First World War led to attempts to reorder international society. The Paris Peace Conference resulted in the development of new forms of global normative hierarchy. Key ideas articulated in the conference had previously been voiced by Woodrow Wilson in his efforts to end the war. Both Wilson and the Russian revolutionary leader, Vladimir Lenin developed their ideas of self-determination at the end of the First World War (Throntveit, 2011a; 2017: 246 - 249). The first section reviews the literature on International Relations and history in the period immediately after the First World War. Both Lenin and Wilson claimed to be opponents of imperialism (Manela, 2007: 38). This meant that the standard of ‘civilisation’ was no longer tied to the civilising missions of empires. It came to be associated with an outcome that would be brought about by the Paris Peace Conference and the institutions that it generated (Linklater, 2016). These included the practice of establishing mandates and the use of commissions to determine the fate of territories (Pedersen, 2015). States could be recognised as conforming to different categories along the normative hierarchy envisaged by the new standard of ‘civilisation’ (Anghie, 2002; 2005: ch. 3). In the post-war period, the recognition of states as fully sovereign continued to be conditional on them being acknowledged as having attained a specific level of ‘civilisation’ (Mazower, 2006). The second section considers how Ottoman political elites responded to the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by employing various methods to secure their recognition as an equal sovereign to the established states in global international society, in accordance with the new form of the standard of ‘civilisation’. The third section explains how, in this process, these elites overcame the challenge posed by the new conception of crimes against humanity, which was threatened to be used as a justification for the denial of sovereign equality. The fourth section examines how the National Movement, which emerged in Anatolia, organised a constituent assembly and government in Ankara, that enabled it to create the Turkish people as a constituent power that challenged the territorial settlement planned by the Allies.
2. The end of the First World War and the Ottoman Empire: theorising responses to hierarchy

Reviewing the existing literature, this section considers the development of ideas, such as those promoted by Wilson and Lenin, for the maintenance of peace after the war and the reordering of international society (Throntveit, 2011a). In place of the pre-war form of global hierarchy, centred around empires and their colonies, there emerged a new form of normative hierarchy that was facilitated by the system of mandates and commissions (Spanu, 2019a: 250; 2019b). Those who devised the new understandings of global hierarchy were not intent on extending equal treatment to all actors after the war, but as Manela (2001; 2007) notes, their anti-imperial stance nonetheless generated expectations, especially with regard to those challenging pre-war forms of hierarchy. The employment of the mandate system was especially significant in the context of the former Ottoman Empire, as several of its territories were deemed mandates to be entrusted to the League of Nations (Haas, 1952; Kedourie, 1968; Matz, 2005; Sluglett, 2008). In the former Ottoman context and in Eastern Europe, which partially overlapped with the former territories of the Ottoman Empire, the novel post-war conceptions of hierarchy shaped processes of social and political transformation, which were relevant to how sovereignty came to be asserted and recognised (Anghie, 2005: 115 - 195; Sluglett, 2008; 2014; Smith, 2019; Weitz, 2008: 1314). Historians, such as Gelvin (1998), Provence (2005; 2011; 2017: 56 - 100) and Gorgas (2018), have noted how in many parts of Europe, and in territories in the Middle East, there was a lack of formal state control and the presence of de facto states and movements for independence or self-determination. These entities, which were also classed as legitimate or illegitimate under the new conception of the standard of “civilization”, sought to secure recognition as sovereign states, in accordance with the standard of “civilization” (Anghie, 2002: 524; Smith, 2019; 565). Actors sought recognition of their sovereignty in an international context that contained new, tiered conceptions of sovereignty, as seen in the case of the mandate system. Adopting an approach based on the history of ideas, enables one to focus on the arguments over conceptions of sovereignty used by these actors within the defeated Ottoman Empire. Developing a theory of how these actors understood and deployed arguments based on sovereignty can provide a
clearer picture of the forms of constituent diplomacy engaged in by such actors in their efforts to secure recognition of their sovereignty.

Wilson’s post-war agenda has been interpreted in a variety of different ways, with Throntveit (2011a; 2017) and Manela (2001; 2006; 2007) arguing that it involved a reassertion of the standard of ‘civilisation’. Recently, though, noting how Wilson and Lenin advocated extensive changes to the post-war international order, commentators have argued that both drew upon each other’s conception of national self-determination (Abulof, 2016: 538 – 539: Chernev, 2011; Throntveit, 2017: 249). However, Wilson and Lenin had different perceptions of the end of national self-determination (Throntveit, 2011a; 2017: 246). The Wilsonian vision of national self-determination was, in many respects, still committed to the nineteenth century one of international society as a collection of ‘civilised’ states (Throntveit, 2017: 142 - 149). Wilson, for instance, praised the British Empire’s mode of organisation with its dominions and colonies (Throntveit, 2017: 102). He argued that the world should be organised so that there would be various types of states having different degrees of freedom in line with their level of purported development. This new standard of ‘civilisation’ upheld by Wilson demonstrated his adherence to a racial or ethnic conception of hierarchy, which viewed Britain and the USA displaying the highest level of human development (Anghie, 2006; Harrison, 2013: 194; Manela, 2007: 25; Niva, 1999: 156 - 160; Vitalis, 2015: 172 - 173). Until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Lenin had opposed both the state and the nation (Throntveit, 2017: 246). However, after the revolution, Lenin believed that national self-determination and, consequently, national sovereignty, when wielded by “oppressed nations”, could frustrate the ambitions of imperial powers (Throntveit, 2017: 246). Imperialism, which represented the current stage of capitalism that the Bolsheviks sought to destroy, could be disrupted through facilitating the establishment of different sovereign states (Throntveit, 2017: 246). Wilson, who differed from Lenin, was not opposed to self-determination, but believed that it only ought to be accepted in cases where he believed a people had developed a “civilized” character (Manela, 2007:

240 Throntveit (2017: 249) argues that Wilson did not endorse Lenin’s principle of “self-determination”, instead supporting the idea of “autonomous development”, which he had argued for different national groups in the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires.

25). This would be demonstrated in one of Wilson’s speeches, where he defended Russian self-determination on 8 January 1918\(^{242}\) (Manela, 2007: 36; Schild, 1995: 81). Thus, national self-determination was promoted by Wilson and Lenin for different ends. National self-determination shaped what Smith (2018: 17) termed the “discursive structure” of the immediate post-war period, because it was an idea that actors could use in speech and language to justify their actions.

For both Wilson and Lenin, self-determination placed an emphasis on the nation as the proper locus of sovereignty (Throntveit, 2011a). Aside from acting as a normative theory explaining how the world ought to be, the theories of national self-determination of Wilson and Lenin were also understood as being appropriate responses to post-war circumstances (Throntveit, 2011a). With the collapse of the Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, numerous political groups claiming to represent different ethnic groups seeking independence, such as the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, and Syrians, had opportunities to achieve their goal (Manela, 2001; 2006; 2007; Smith, 2018: 31 – 50, 121, 150). Wilson regarded the organisation and empowering of such new nation-states as a duty which would allow “civilization”\(^{243}\) to advance (Throntveit, 2017: 69). Lenin, on the other hand, saw their empowerment as the means to dismantle the empires, which he believed represented the last stage of capitalism (Throntveit, 2011a: 457). In many territories that had experienced war, such as the Ottoman Empire, with the flight of refugees and the massacre of individuals because of their ethnicity or religion, the population became more homogenous (Rae, 2002: 127). Because of the inability of states in these territories to maintain order, ethnic and revolutionary conflicts erupted as violent groups sought to fill the void (Smith, 2018: 180 - 221). Wilson and the other Allied architects of the post-war international order believed that these problems could be handled (Smith, 2009). They argued that the League of Nations should focus on minority rights and, where necessary, engineer territorial divisions to

\(^{242}\) Schild (1995: 81) adds that this speech was made after the Bolsheviks suggested that parts of the Russian Empire, such as Finland could secede, suggesting that Wilson sought to prevent the Russian Empire from fracturing.

\(^{243}\) Smith (2019: 572) suggests that Article 22 of the League of Nations, which argued for the consideration of the level of civilisation in territories before allowing them to govern themselves amounted to a focus on the “population” (see Smith, 2019: 569) of mandated territories, and whether they could be considered “civilized”, alongside the distribution of “territory” (quoted from Smith, 2019: 571; see also Smith, 2018: 128 – 131).
prevent further conflict, as was the case in the defeated Ottoman Empire, where the new state of Turkey had been founded (Mazower, 1997; Smith, 2018: 53 – 58, 156 - 165). Plebiscites, in particular, became a means to determine boundary disputes in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the former Ottoman Empire (Smith, 2018: 55, 83, 144 - 156). In the territories that once composed the Ottoman Empire, plebiscites were considered as a means of delineating Turkish territory, as in the case of Izmir (Smith, 2018: 55). The League of Nations came to promote a conception of sovereignty that focused on the nation, while also making the recognition of national sovereignty conditional on the acceptance of certain rights for minorities.

As a result of the “discursive structure” shaped by Wilson and Lenin in the interwar years, the League of Nations, which Wilson advocated, heralded the emergence of a new set of institutions in global international society (Smith, 2018: 17). These institutions were not only geared towards constructing a world organised on the basis of sovereign nation-states, but also involved a strong dedication to humanitarian principles (Watenpaugh, 2010; 2015a; 2015b). It was therefore understood that the League would assign mandatory status to certain territories and their populations for their protection (Watenpaugh, 2015a; 2015b; Wheatley, 2015a; 2015b). Measures to facilitate justice and reparations for war crimes would also be enforced in the post-war context by the League (Bass, 2000: chs. 2 – 3).

Commissions of experts were tasked with investigating what arrangements should be put in place by the League for certain territories (Pedersen, 2015; Smith, 2009). The mandate system was premised on a view of global hierarchy. Three types of mandates, known as A, B and C mandates, were imagined, in which descending degrees of control were granted to the inhabitants of the territories in question (Sluglett, 2014). Historical studies, such as those by Grant (2005), Ribi (2011: 94) and Pedersen (2007) noted that the mandate system advanced the cause of ‘civilisation’ through preventing slavery and enforcing labour standards. However, as Quincy Wright244 (1923) suggested, the exact location of sovereignty in the mandates was unclear. It was uncertain whether sovereignty resided in the population of the mandate, the League or with the state that had been entrusted the

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244 See also Throntveit’s (2011b) demonstration of the influence of Quincy Wright and his ideas on Woodrow Wilson and subsequent American foreign policy.
mandate by the League (Smith, 2018: 59; Wright, 1923). According to Pedersen (2015: 403), the mandate system “began as a project of imperial reconciliation and legitimization”. But, in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire, the Covenant of the League recognised that certain territories could soon become self-governing (Smith, 2018: 59). Agreements made by Allied powers during the war, though, meant that these commissions and mandates could not prevent the Allies dividing occupied territories among themselves (Smith, 2009: 57; 2014: 267 - 269). Studies of the mandates, commissions and other bodies associated with the League have not sufficiently considered how various actors sought to secure their sovereign rights within the emerging institutions and global constitutional structures.

Historical studies have pointed to how the institutions of Wilsonian international order either supported a new type of imperialism, securing of the interests of the victors, or backed a form of anti-imperialism (Manela, 2007). Only recently have works, including Wheatley’s (2015a; 2015b) study of movements in Palestine, focused on actors who were seeking recognition of their sovereignty by attempting to align themselves with Wilson’s ideas. In the territories of the defeated empires, groups lobbied the Allies to be recognised as sovereign (Gelvin, 1998; Wheatley, 2015a; 2015b). The different local political movements also used violence to advance their political goals (Gerwarth and Manela, 2014; Provence, 2011). Actors, therefore, responded in specific ways to the normative hierarchy envisaged by Wilson. Their response depended on the position they found themselves within the emerging hierarchy (Spanu, 2019a; 2019b). This hierarchy was sustained by the economic and military power245 of the victorious Allies. The response and impact of the challenges made to hierarchy by the defeated were shaped by their own power (Wheatley, 2015a; 2015b; Zarakol, 2011). The defeated Ottoman and German states, for instance, still had considerable fighting capacity (Smith, 2018: 17 - 18). Rustow (1959) demonstrates the difficulties involved in the Ottoman government’s attempts to demobilise its armed forces and their role in the formation of the state of Turkey. The emergence of the Bolsheviks, who pursued an independent foreign policy from the Allies, was also a challenge to the establishment of a new international society structured on the basis of the wishes of the Allies (Chernev, 2011; 2017; Gül, 2013).

245 On the rise of American power as a result of the war see Tooze (2015: 3 – 4, 515 - 516).
Movements opposing the Allies sought to forge alliances and shared ideas on how to tackle emerging forms of hierarchy (Aydın, 2007: 106 - 110; Manjapra, 2014: 127). A study of these movements, such as those in what remained of the Ottoman Empire, who resisted forms of hierarchy through wielding their constituent power, can demonstrate the limits of post-war forms of hierarchy that the victors of the war sought to impose.

At the end of the First World War, the Allies could not reach a consensus on how to deal with the Ottoman Empire. The empire was an established state in international society, but it had also been subject to forms of exclusion from this society. In what Manela (2007: 1) terms the “Wilsonian moment”, worldwide victims of colonisation anticipated that Wilson would help in their emancipation. Their immediate hopes were shattered by the introduction of the mandate system (Manela, 2001; 2006; 2007). In the context of the former Ottoman Empire, the application of the mandate system quickly turned into a discussion on the proper boundary of Europe, which was understood to be synonymous with the ‘civilised’ world (Anghie, 2006: 747. Negotiations also focused on examining the identity or the “self” of those claiming self-determination (Smith, 2018: 169). For example, the Council of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, convened by the Allies, argued that the Ottomans as “Muslims” and “Orientals” had oppressed the Greeks and others (Smith, 2018: 122). The French delegation, influenced by human geography, decided that the Ottoman Empire would be partitioned according to its different populations (Smith, 2018: 167, 174). The American delegation, responsible for preparing proposals to the conference, concluded that Christian peoples needed to be supported and that missionary activity in the Ottoman Empire should be encouraged (Smith, 2018: 169). Although the Armistice of Moudros of 1918 was preceded by Wilson’s announcement of his Fourteen Points and the Ottoman acceptance of these principles, Wilson himself also considered the possibility of the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire (Zarakol, 2011: 126; Zürcher, 1998). In what remained of the Ottoman Empire, Wilson’s ideas remained influential and a Wilson Prensipleri

246 A prominent French geographer, de Martonne, prepared maps that he claimed denoted the boundaries of “nationalities”, which he defined as emerging from social relations (Smith, 2018: 135). These were distinct from the maps of “races” provided by the South African leader, Jan Smuts (Smith, 2018: 129).
Cemiyeti (Association for the Promotion of Wilsonian Principles) was formed (Bajalan, 2019; Erimtan, 2008; Gürel, 2015). As will be demonstrated, the large number of petitions delivered by groups within what was once the Ottoman Empire to the Allies, shows how these groups sought recognition of their sovereign equality during the ‘Wilsonian Moment’.

It is a central contention of this thesis that the processes whereby international society and its rules were reconstituted also influenced processes of reconstitution in established states. At the end of the First World War, several established states altered their constitutions in line with emerging conceptions of sovereignty. The end of Wilhelmine Germany and its reconstitution as the Weimar Republic was one such example. Another case involved the rise to power of the National Movement in what remained of the Ottoman Empire, through the support of former Ottoman officials and members of the CUP (Zürcher, 1984; 2010). To a far greater extent than the other Central Powers, much of the Ottoman Empire’s remaining territories, including areas close to its capital, were contested by other actors on the basis of nationality (Criss, 1999; Gingeras, 2009; Kamouzis, 2013). This meant that the ‘selves’ seeking determination could not clearly be associated with a single territory. Considering how ‘determination’ was understood by both those seeking it and those granting it in this context can point to how the fate of these territories was decided. Pedersen’s (2008; 2015) study of the communications of League officials working in the Mandate Commission, indicates how the meaning of ‘determination’ was imposed by the League. Yet Pedersen (2007: 1101 – 1107; 2012) also acknowledges the relevance of petitions in possibly challenging the decisions of the League officials, particularly in relation to the recognised right of populations in mandates to voice their own views under Article 22 of the Covenant. Pedersen (2007: 1101 – 1107; 2012: 231) notes, though, that such petitions were rarely

247 Ambrosius (2002: 101 - 112) and Larsen (2013) explain how Wilson promoted his own political ideas as a template for Germany. Caldwell (1997: 1) demonstrates how the idea of “popular sovereignty” played a role in the politics and constitutional law of the Weimar Republic. Chickering (1968) points to how these understandings of sovereignty shaped conflicts in Weimar Germany.  
248 See Smith (2018: 6) for how the “self” entitled to self-determination was constructed. Macmillan and Quinton-Brown (2019) demonstrate how historical arguments were used to argue for self-determination.  
249 See also Lavi (2013) and Rifkin (2017), who argue that actors seeking self-determination engage in performances intended to strengthen their claims to self-determination by serving to present themselves as nations entitled to self-determination.
considered by League officials. In the Ottoman Empire, different understandings of self-determination, pointing to various understandings of the ‘self’ and the goal of self-determination, were advanced by the Young Turks and their successors. These actors sought recognition of their sovereign equality, based on what they took to be their right to self-determination, through engaging in constituent diplomacy with the victorious Allied states and the League.

3. ‘Civilisation’ and the constituent diplomacy of actors in the defeated Ottoman Empire, 1918 - 1919

This section considers how the remnants of the Young Turk factions and other groups, in what remained of the Ottoman Empire, engaged in constituent diplomacy to secure recognition from the powerful states in international society. Determining which parts of the Ottoman Empire would be assigned mandatory status proved to be problematic because of the agreements Allied powers had concluded with each other in the war (Bein, 2017: 8). Many Ottoman politicians came to believe that accepting mandatory status would be the best option to secure a degree of control over what remained of the Ottoman Empire (Göl, 2013: 87 - 88). This was because the mandate system appeared to be premised on accepting a degree of national and popular sovereignty. Mandates were organised along what were taken to be pre-existing national boundaries and were presented as vehicles through which populations could gradually become fully independent (Smith, 2009). Many, subjected to the mandate system, believed that it would enable them to eventually gain recognition of their sovereign equality (Wheatley, 2015a; 2015b). Others, sought to pursue their self-determination more directly by securing immediate independence (Provence, 2005). Movements seeking recognition as sovereigns emerged, such as the group surrounding Emir Feisal in Syria. The movement for Thracian independence was another example of such a movement. Although these movements challenged the Ottoman Empire, they were supported by many former Ottoman officials and intellectuals (Balistreri, 2015; 2016). In the remaining and former territories of the Ottoman Empire, actors sought to mobilise history to substantiate their claims. For example, the Thracians claimed an identity that stretched back to antiquity. Movements claimed that they had established identities as ‘nations’, which were entitled to ‘self-determination’. History was mobilised both by those movements
seeking mandatory rule for parts or all of the Ottoman Empire, and by those groups aiming to resist mandatory rule to secure sovereignty and sovereign equality.

With the end of the First World War and the launching of the League of Nations, the victorious Allies wielded global constituent power. The Allies had to decide how to assign mandates to states from territories within the Ottoman Empire. The British Foreign Office official and advisor, Arnold J. Toynbee (1919c), noted that it was unclear how the influence of the League of Nations in the Middle East would develop through the distribution of mandates by international commissions. Toynbee (1919c; 1919e) suggested that mandates could be introduced by commissions which were specifically tasked with studying conditions in the Middle East. In practice, commissions did not play a key role, even though Britain and France declared, in November 1918, that,

“[t]ar from wishing to impose on the populations of those regions any particular institutions, they [the British and the French] are only concerned to ensure by their support, and by adequate assistance, the regular working of Governments and administration freely chosen by the populations themselves; to secure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by promoting and encouraging local initiative; to foster the spread of education; and to put an end to the dissensions which Turkish policy has for so long exploited. Such is the task which the two Allied Powers wish to undertake in the liberated territories” (France and Great Britain, 1918 as cited in Smith, 2009: 57 – 58).

Eventually, mandates were allocated in line with earlier agreements concluded between the Allied powers, such as the Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France, involving the division of eastern Ottoman territory (Bein, 2017: 8). Therefore, when the US decided to send a commission to recommend assigning mandates in the Middle East, France and Britain, despite arguing that they supported popular sovereignty, did not send their commissioners to join the commission founded by the US and headed by American experts King and Crane (Smith, 2009: 58). Developing an approach towards the Armenian state proved to be especially problematic (Fisher, 1997: 72). Britain had established a presence in the Caucasus at the end of the First World War, which had been enabled by the French taking a position in present-day northern Syria (Fisher, 1997: 72). France needed, according to Andrew Bonar Law, to develop a pro-Armenian policy, to allow Britain to retain its military position, supported by the Allied French presence in the south (Fisher, 1997: 72). Although the King-Crane Commission recommended the establishment of
an independent Armenian state, the United States did not have any military power to enable its will to be realised (Smith, 2009: 65). In contrast, Britain and France held constituent power over areas they occupied. In 1919, both states were victors in the First World War with sizeable military forces in the Ottoman Empire who, although needing to refer to the principle of popular sovereignty, held sway over how it was implemented.

The British found it difficult to reconcile wartime agreements with Wilson’s idea of peace and therefore ultimately did not participate in the Interallied Commission, seeking to maintain their close relations with France. However, even though Britain did not participate in the King-Crane Commission, it provided logistical support and advice to the commissioners (Smith, 2009: 65). Shuckburgh (1919), the Under Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, argued that “every possible care will be exercised in selection of personnel and definition of their functions, in order that they may work in close co-operation with local British authorities”. Commenting on the intention of the US to send commissioners to the territories under Allied military control in present-day Syria and Iraq, Toynbee (1919f), noted the inclusion of Palestine within the boundaries of the area allotted to the commission. Toynbee (1919f) stated that it was wrong to assume “that the Commissioners are directed to frame their advice upon the wishes of the existing inhabitants of the country they are going to visit.” Wilson had stressed the importance of national or popular sovereignty. But, as Toynbee (1919f) seemed to suggest, national sovereignty did not necessarily need to be based on popular sovereignty. This was congruent with the then widespread view that nations were objective facts, which could be studied through the use of history, rather than entities which emerged from the will of individuals (Macmillan and Quinton-Brown, 2019; Sluga, 2001: chs 1 – 2; 2006: 8 – 36). Although Wilson argued for national self-determination, he also believed in the idea of distinct national characters, which could be observed empirically (Smith, 2009: 56). The American members of the commission argued that recognition would be premised on the presence of an identifiable “people”, which would have developed or have the ability to develop a certain degree of character (Smith, 2009: 56). Those failing to meet this standard would, as in the previous case of the standard of “civilization”, be subject to stigma from the League of Nations, until they could prove their advanced character (Smith,
2009: 61). Even though Britain and France withdrew from the commission that was sent to determine the future of the Arab territories of the empire, they cautiously agreed that this understanding of the standard of ‘civilisation’ (see France and Great Britain, 1918; as also discussed by Smith, 2009: 57), pioneered by Wilson and American diplomats and experts, should become a constitutional principle of post-war international society, and this principle would later be adopted by other Allies.

Following the Moudros armistice, Ottoman notables, including politicians, activists and military officers reacted to the emergence of this new standard of ‘civilisation’ by seeking to establish close ties with the victorious Allies. Referring to the promises made by Wilson in his Fourteen Points, the Ottomans aimed to secure immediate recognition of their status as a nation, as promised in Wilson’s twelfth point (Smith, 2009: 56). Failing this, they sought to obtain recognition by becoming a mandate of the League of Nations or by establishing close relations with the Allies, which could take the form of tutelage or guidance (Göl, 2013: 87 - 89). If this status of securing close relations with the victorious Allies was achieved, it was believed that it could be a stepping stone to later being recognised as an equal sovereign state in global international society. For example, the journalist Ali Kemal Bey, the religious cleric Sait Molla (see Calthorpe, 1919b) and Reschid Bey, the Interior Minister of the Ottoman Empire (see Hardinge, 1919 and Mallet, 1919d), were prominent Ottoman intellectuals who founded the Association of the Friends of Britain (İngiliz Muhipleri Cemiyeti). Talat Paşa, the wartime Grand Vizier of the empire, when interviewed by a British intelligence officer in Berlin, argued that he would be willing to agree to an independent and “united Turkey” with very close relations with Britain (Malcolm, 1919). The Sultan, the Grand Vizier Tevfik Paşa and Halil Paşa, a former provincial Ottoman governor, (see Blaker, 1919; British Embassy, Washington, 1919; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1919) explicitly requested a British mandate from Louis Mallet (1919a; 1919b), the British ambassador in Istanbul (see also British Delegation to Peace Conference, 1919). On the other hand, Satvet Lütfi, the associate of Sabahaddin, travelled to Paris, with the assistance of France, seeking to participate in the Paris Peace Conference by submitting a memorandum, partially prepared by the French Embassy’s dragoman, Ledoux (Rumbold, 1919). Toynbee (1919b) judged that the French were trying to develop a group of their own supporters in the Ottoman Empire and suspected that
Italy was also seeking to cooperate with the remnants of the CUP. Toynbee (1919b) also argued that “this points to the importance of getting the future of Turkey (sic) settled by the Conference, before such settlement is forestalled by private intrigues of different powers”. Therefore, individuals associated with the Ottoman government and the CUP, sought for the Ottoman Empire to be accepted as a ‘civilised’ state, within the post-war order (Gingeras, 2009: 251 – 253; Wigen, 2014; 2018; Zarakol, 2011). Formal efforts to define this relationship in conferences, in which the powers would constitute and apply the new constitutional rules of global international society provided one means to do this, alongside making informal arrangements to facilitate such diplomatic participation.

Other Ottoman groups and individuals appealed directly to the emerging constitutional principle of national self-determination to gain recognition of their sovereign equality. They argued that the Ottoman Empire, or parts of it, were national in character, and therefore, ought to be granted full independence without going through a period of mandatory rule. In mid-1919, the Ottoman naval cabinet minister, Mahmud Mukhtar Paşa (1919), in a communication to the British Foreign Office, pressed for a special relationship between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. He noted how the Ottomans, as an Islamic state, could act as a bulwark against Bolshevism. Clearer statements for the recognition of Ottoman sovereignty, on the basis of national self-determination, included presentations made by the official Ottoman Delegation (1919) to the Paris peace conference. A Turkish Congress, which met in Geneva on 16 January 1919, formed of Ottoman officials and intellectuals, received support from other individuals from different geographies, including in Egypt, where a communication in support of the Congress was submitted to the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George250 (Stevenson, 1919). The Congress made a number of demands, including the securing of Istanbul as a part of the Ottoman Empire in any future settlement (Stevenson, 1919). These movements, which also included the League for the Defence of the Rights of Ottomans (1919), pressed for keeping Istanbul under Ottoman jurisdiction on the basis of national sovereignty. However, the Ottoman Delegation (1919) in Paris also declared that

250 Stevenson (1919), the private secretary of the Foreign Office, forwarded a petition to the British Prime Minister, which contained 39 signatures of prominent Ottoman politicians and military officers.
they were open to their demands being considered alongside those of “toutes les éléments ethniques de la Turquie” (i.e. “all of the ethnic elements of Turkey”). The delegation claimed to be sincerely dedicated to the principle of self-determination, implying that Istanbul and most of the Ottoman Empire ought to be independent because of the Turkish national character (Ottoman Delegation, 1919). The delegates also argued that those territories which had a different national character could pursue their own right to self-determination (Ottoman Delegation, 1919). Consequently, individuals closely affiliated with the Ottoman government, who had maintained throughout the First World War an avowed commitment to Ottomanism, appeared to have abandoned this stance (Ottoman Delegation, 1919). Members of political movements, such as the CUP, supported Turkish or Arab nationalism (Provence, 2017). With the rise of Wilsonian and Leninist nationalism, these individuals argued in national terms for the recognition of the sovereignty and sovereign rights of their state.

There were also groups in the Ottoman Empire, including the Arab forces of the Emir Feisal, the son of the Ottoman notable, Sharif Hussein, and former CUP members, who by the end of the war acted independently of the central Ottoman government. They pressed the Allies to grant a form of mandatory status, which, they believed, would gradually enable them to secure their sovereign equality in the emerging post-war international society. Feisal (1919a), backed by former CUP members (see Gelvin, 1998: 110; Provence, 2011; 2017: 33, 208), sought a British mandate over Syria, as a step towards obtaining independence (Gelvin, 1998: 25). He opposed the idea of giving Syria to France (see Vansittart, 1919a) and argued that the Syrians and Arabs wished to avoid having “their country partitioned or divided into zones of influence among the Powers” (as quoted from Feisal, 1919a: 334). Following rumours that the French would sabotage or not participate in the Inter-Allied Commission dealing with Syria (see Gelvin, 1998: 34), with the implication

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251 For instance, having originally argued for an Islamic Ottoman nationalism after the Balkan Wars, the former officer and politician, Cami Bey, came to argue for the establishment of a smaller and more homogenous Turkish nation-state (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 108).

252 Sati al-Husri, a thinker influenced by Gökalp, shifted from being a proponent of Ottoman nationalism to becoming an Arab nationalist (Cleveland, 1971). Şekip Arslan, a Druze leader from Beirut, was also a staunch Pan-Islamist and Ottomanist, who was later expelled from the mandate of Lebanon by the French authorities and supported Arab nationalist causes for the rest of his life (Atçıl, 2013; Cleveland, 1985; Haddad, 2004).
that an independent Arab state or an Arab state mandated to Britain would not then be established, Feisal (1919b) issued a threat. Referring directly to the promises and goodwill displayed by the Allies in the past, who had pledged to support an Arab Kingdom, Feisal (1919b) warned that “the blood of innocent people, babies and women… would be upon the civilised nations who annulled their decision”. Seeking eventual independence, Feisal, therefore, sought to secure a British, rather than a French, mandate in Syria on the basis of the principle of self-determination and the pledges made to his movement by the Allies during the First World War.

Movements advocating an independent Thracian state spanning present day Edirne and western Thrace, also lobbied for ‘Thrace’ to be given mandatory status by the League of Nations. According to the British intelligence official, A.J. Wilson (1919: 1), the Thrace Committee aimed to “convince the European powers that Thrace was originally a Turkish country and as such should be governed by Turks and Turks alone”. This did not, however, mean that movements within Thrace were opposed to a mandate that could serve as the first stage in the attainment of their full independence. For instance, in a message signed by “Le Comité de la représentation politique” (1919), which included the Mufti of Edirne, Mertan, the mayor of Edirne, Cevket Bey, the deputy of western Thrace, Mehmed Djelah and the notables of Edirne, Xanthi and Dimotika, there was a call for Britain to assume a mandate for Thrace (Le Comité de la représentation politique, 1919). This letter argued that Thrace should be granted British mandatory or protectorate status, as a step towards securing full independence on the basis of national sovereignty. The message added that an American mandate would be inappropriate because the local population opposed republicanism (Le Comité de la représentation politique, 1919). According to British officials, the Thracian movement was also arming the population in Thrace, and was preparing to take action in the event of their wish for a British mandate for Thrace being declined (Crowe, 1919a; D.M.I (Director of Military Intelligence), 1919; Le Comité de la représentation politique, 1919; Mallet, 1919e; Nicolson, 1919; Samson, 1919). The prospect of becoming a mandate, as a stage towards the ultimate goal of attaining full independence in line with the doctrine of national sovereignty, was vigorously pressed in the constituent diplomacy of movements in the defeated Ottoman Empire, spanning from Syria to Thrace (Göl, 2013: 87 – 90; Wheatley, 2015a; 2015b). As with the Syrians, the Thracian
movement also threatened to use force if their constituent diplomacy with the Allies was unsuccessful.

In the context of claims for the recognition of national sovereignty and calls for the establishment of mandates, historical arguments were frequently employed by actors, engaged in constituent diplomacy, to demonstrate the historical presence of a collective ‘self’. Sources that have hitherto been largely neglected demonstrate this in the post-Ottoman context. Concerning Syria, for instance, Feisal (1919a: 334) claimed that a certain “Blue Book of 1858 “ written by “a prominent English statesman” had identified the presence of “secret societies formed under the former regime”. By referring to these societies, whose activities had culminated in “the Arab Conference held in Paris seven years ago”, Feisal (1919a: 334) aimed to demonstrate that these Arab national political organisations indicated the existence of an historic Arab nation. Historical arguments were also similarly used by a group of notables, including members of the Islamic clergy, from Van and the surrounding area in south-eastern Anatolia (Zia-ed-din et al, 1919). These individuals lobbied the Allies and the Ottoman state\textsuperscript{253} to exclude them from a future Armenian state, by advancing demographic, “historical” and “geographic” arguments to prove that the area around Van was essentially Muslim (Zia-ed-din et al, 1919). Feisal (1919a) had likewise claimed that Syria was basically Arab (Zia-ed-din et al, 1919). The Thracian Muslim movement used historical arguments to claim that the Thracians constituted a distinct nation, separate from other Muslims, Greeks and Bulgarians, and that they were thus entitled to their own state (Calthorpe, 1919g; Kassim Faik and H. Tahrim, 1919; Moslem Committee of Thrace, 1919). The British Foreign Office received several communications, which were signed by groups claiming to be the Thrace Committee or the Moslem Committee of Thrace (Moslem Committee of Thrace, 1919). These communications cited earlier references to Thrace, as in the work of the Carnegie Commission, established by the famous American philanthropist to investigate the cause of the Balkan Wars, which had concluded that Bulgarian demands in the region were illegitimate (Moslem Committee of Thrace, 1919). However, the Moslem Committee of Thrace (1919) also claimed that they

\textsuperscript{253} See also Calthorpe (1919c; 1919d), Webb (1919a) and La Ligue pour la Défense des Droits Nationaux de Trébizonde (1919).
represented the ancient Thracian people, who had converted to Islam with the
Ottoman conquest of the region centuries ago. Consequently, actors throughout the
Ottoman Empire sought recognition of their status as representatives of nations that
had supposedly existed in history, as a means to gain recognition under the post-war
constitutional rules of global international society. Under these rules, the conferral of
sovereign equality was conditional on proof of ‘civilised’ nationhood.

4. ‘Crimes against humanity’ as an affront to ‘civilisation’, national sovereignty and
enforcing global constitutional principles in the post-war Ottoman Empire, 1919 -
1920

In the post-armistice period, those affiliated with the Ottoman state faced an
unprecedented challenge to their sovereignty given how the Allies considered them
responsible for war crimes committed during the war, including the killing of large
numbers of Ottoman Armenian civilians (Bass, 2000: 118 - 119). An association
with such war crimes would have a serious negative impact on any claim to be
recognised as “civilized” (Mazower, 2006: 556). Ottoman elites could choose to
distance themselves from wartime policies or stress that their claims to national
sovereignty were valid regardless of past war crimes. Many argued that the
leadership of the CUP were responsible for the war crimes. Hence, the post-war
Ottoman government cooperated with the Allies to apprehend members of the CUP
who had been declared war criminals (Bass, 2000: 146; Gingeras, 2009: 251 - 253).
The situation was complicated, though by the presence of other groups, such as the
Greek and Armenian nationalists, who were seeking to secede from the Ottoman
Empire (Hovannisian, 1971; Kamouzis, 2013). These political movements were in
competition with the Ottoman state and with organisations promoting Turkish and
Islamic nationalism. With reports of massacres of civilians in the territory around
Izmir, the Allies considered organising a commission to investigate what happened
during the Greek invasion of 1919 and to address any issues of injustice (Buzanski,
1963). Therefore, both the Ottoman and Greek states and their representatives, were
confronted with possible war crimes which seriously endangered the prospects for
securing the recognition of sovereign rights. Here, the constituent power of the
victorious Allies, who were arguing for the trial of war crimes to be considered as a
constitutional rule of global international society, was being used to curtail the
ambitions of the Ottoman and Greek states.
The Ottoman Empire had agreed to the Armistice of Moudros and the CUP leadership had fled the country. But, the Ottoman state had not been fully defeated, so it could still be held responsible for war crimes. The novel use by the Allies of the concept of ‘crimes against humanity’, to define the deportation and killing of many Ottoman civilians, especially Armenians, posed a challenge to Ottoman sovereignty. The Allies claimed universal jurisdiction for the trial of these crimes against humanity. The idea of universal jurisdiction clashed with the principle that each sovereign had jurisdiction over its own state (Bass, 2000: 146). The concept of war crimes was a product of the Hague conferences and had been accepted by the Ottomans. But, the concept of “crimes against humanity” emerged to comprehend the killing of large numbers of Ottoman civilians (Mazower, 2009: 127). Britain had originally considered terming such crimes, “crimes against Christendom”, because mostly Assyrians, Greeks and Armenians had been targeted (Mazower, 2006: 556). However, it was believed that such a concept could offend the Muslim population of the empire (Mazower, 2006: 556; Tusun, 2014: 52). The new concept of “crimes against humanity” (see Tusun, 2014: 52) subsequently influenced the efforts of the Allies and the Ottoman government, to apprehend and detain CUP officials charged with participating in war crimes (Bass, 2000: 118). These officials, including Gökalp, were sent to Malta to await trial (Parla, 1985: 6 - 7). After leading members of the CUP fled the country in late 1918, those who considered themselves affiliated with the Ottoman state claimed that the CUP and not the Ottoman state, was responsible for war crimes. For instance, a group called the “Women of Turkey” (1919) contacted the British High Commissioner. They sought to deflect responsibility for the killing of the Armenians and other wartime atrocities from the state or “Turks” as a whole, by claiming that it was the CUP that was responsible for entering the war and for committing the later war crimes (Women of Turkey, 1919). The emergence of the concept of crimes against humanity, that was also tied to the emerging humanitarian understanding of ‘civilisation’, consequently posed new challenges to the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire.

Post-war Ottoman governments, with more moderate CUP members holding the office of grand vizier, such as Ahmet İzzet Paşa (14 October 1918 – 8 November 1918), Ahmed Tevfik Paşa (11 November 1918 – 3 March 1919) and Damad Ferid
Paşa (4 March 1919 – 2 October 1919), also failed to deflect responsibility away from the state and lay the blame for war crimes on individuals who were in positions of responsibility during the war (Aktar, 2007; Gingeras, 2009: 253). The Ottoman government sought to hand over many CUP members to await trial (Calthorpe, 1919b). Damad Ferid Paşa (1919a), requested that Germany comply with articles 228 and 229 of the post-war Treaty of Versailles, and hand over to the Allied authorities the leaders of the CUP, Cemal, Talat and Enver. The Ottoman delegation to the Paris peace conference stressed that the Ottoman state had been guilty of aggression towards the Entente Powers, and had perpetrated violence towards civilians during the war, but declared that the Ottoman people should not be blamed for such atrocities (Damad Ferid Paşa, 1919b; Şerif Paşa, 1919). However, the representatives of Britain, with the approval of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, formed during the Paris Peace Conference, believed that the current Ottoman state should be held responsible (British Empire Delegation, 1919). Balfour (1919b), the British Foreign Secretary, later noted how it was impossible to absolve the Ottoman government of its responsibility for conduct during the war because “[t]here was no revolution in Turkey comparable to the Russian revolution”. He then added:

“The new had been in power many years before the war, was diplomatically recognised by every other Power, and, as far as I can judge, was quite as representative of the Turk as any of its predecessors” (Balfour, 1919b: 1).

In the eyes of the victorious Allies, the post-war changes in government were not sufficient to free the post-war Ottoman state from responsibility for the war crimes.

Those seeking to maintain the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire continued to argue that the empire was not to blame for the war crimes and crimes against humanity that had been committed during the First World War. In early 1919, a petition was prepared by the League for the Defence of the Eastern Provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Members of the League included the former governor of the Hidjaz, Ahmed Nedim, the governor of Beirut, Ismail Hakkı, the former governor of Baghdad, Suleyman Nazif, and three former members of the Ottoman Parliament. The League contended that the CUP government had entered the war to secure

255 Ahmed Nedim was also the president of the League (Ahmed Nedim et al, 1919).
profits by cooperating with German imperialism (Ahmed Nedim et al, 1919). In the petition, it was suggested that the Muslim population of the eastern provinces should not be held responsible for the war crimes because they were not in control of the state at the time, which was being governed by the CUP’s dictatorship (Ahmed Nedim et al, 1919). Ahmed Rıza (1919: 3 - 4), who, in addition to now being a senior member of the Ottoman parliament, also headed an organisation called the League of Ottoman National Unity and called for an investigation, to be carried out by “the Great Entente Powers and the United States of America”. This investigation would seek, according to Ahmed Rıza (1919: 3 - 4), to ascertain claims

“that the Armenian population has suffered at the hands of Turkish gangs during the deportations decreed by the Military Authorities”

Ahmed Rıza echoed these views in his speeches in the Ottoman Parliament, where he argued that CUP leaders ought to be tried, but the Ottoman Empire as a whole should not be punished for their crimes (Aktar, 2007: 260 - 261). In line with the standard of ‘civilisation’ argument, Ahmed Rıza and Ahmed Nedim’s organisations were both attempting to prevent the curtailment of the sovereignty of the Ottoman state on the grounds that it had failed to prevent the committing of atrocities and hence infringed its responsibility as a sovereign, implied in the concept of war crimes.

The Ottoman state was also confronted by new political and armed movements that sought recognition of sovereignty for minorities within the empire. An Armenian state, intent on securing territories in the eastern Ottoman Empire, was established following the announcement that the Provisional Government in Russia would support the right to self-determination of national groups within the Russian Empire (Calthorpe, 1919e; Hovannisian, 1971). The Allies called for the military evacuation of the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire and decided to delineate the border for a future Armenian state, which could include parts of what were once the Ottoman Empire (Hovannisian, 1971; Rustow, 1959: 534). As can be observed from communications submitted to the Allies, the Greek armed separatist movement

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256 The French original of the text reads: “que la population arménienne a bu à souffrir de la par des Comitadjis turcs lors de déportations décrétées par les Autorités Militaires” (Ahmed Rıza, 1919: 3 – 4).

257 Toynbee (1919a) remarked that the League of Ottoman National Unity’s demands were essentially the same as those that had been made by the Ottoman government.
in the Black Sea region opposed both the Ottoman government, which had committed atrocities against them during the war, and the Armenian Republic, which sought to include the Greeks within its territory (Candidis, 1919; Constantinides, 1919a; 1919b; 1919c; Thoidis, 1919). Ahmed Rıza (1919: 3), speaking on behalf of the League of Ottoman National Unity, argued that “the allocation to the Republic of Armenia existing in the Caucasus of a certain portion of territory for Armenians who wish to settle there could also be envisaged, taking into account their number and the land they currently own in Turkey”. However, Ahmed Rıza (1919: 4) pointed to how Armenian groups had also carried out crimes, suggesting that “the Armenian Comitadjis who, after having committed so many crimes, walk freely in the Caucasus or elsewhere be also punished”258. The Greek invasion of Izmir, was another instance of a clash between different claims to national sovereignty, which saw the emergence of the Society for the Defence of Ottoman Rights and other societies (Göl, 2013: 88 - 90; Provence, 2017: 203 – 206, 211 - 212; Tanör, 1985). These societies had been secretly formed by the CUP, through Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa operatives such as Kara Vasif and Kara Kemal, to act as focal points of resistance which would mobilise Muslims in the event of the conquest of the Ottoman Empire (Avedian, 2012: 807 – 809; Hovannisian, 1973: 137). They would come under the control of the National Movement headed by Mustafa Kemal (Zürcher, 1984).

Mustafa Kemal, an Ottoman general, took a firm hold over these societies by organising a series of conferences, held in locations were tensions between Muslims and Christians were most pronounced (Adam, 1919; Calthorpe, 1919e).

Responding to these challenges, several Ottoman officials argued that even though war crimes had been perpetrated in the eastern provinces of the empire, the right to self-determination of the current populations in those provinces should not be considered. In a statement that arguably indicates the extent to which national sovereignty was not only a normative but also an analytical concept in this period, the League for the Defence of the Eastern Provinces of the Ottoman Empire sent a communication to the Allied forces, claiming that the eastern provinces were essentially Kurdish and Turkish (Ahmed Nedim et al, 1919). The League

258 The French original reads: “que la connaissance publique réclame que les Comitadji Arméniens qui, après avoir commis tant de crimes se promènent librement au Caucase ou ailleurs soient également punis” (Ahmed Rıza, 1919: 4).
acknowledged the acts committed by the Ottoman state against non-Muslim and especially Armenian citizens, but continued to espouse a conception of national sovereignty, arguing that the majority of the population of the provinces was Muslim and desired to be a part of the Ottoman Empire (Ahmed Nedim et al, 1919). However, the League sought to present themselves as representatives of the people of these provinces, which had become overwhelmingly populated by Muslims after the war. But, while the organisation saw the Russian Empire’s meddling in the Ottoman Empire as responsible for the wartime devastation of the eastern Ottoman provinces, it did not rule out trials for those CUP members responsible for war crimes (Ahmed Nedim et al, 1919). The demands of the League for the Defence of the Eastern Provinces were ignored. The League of Ottoman National Unity also submitted a petition, penned by Ahmed Rıza (1919), to the British Commissioner in Istanbul, Sir Richard Webb (1919b), which argued against ceding Ottoman territory in the west to Greece and in the eastern provinces to Armenia on the basis of the “Turkish” character of these territories. Ahmed Rıza’s (1919: 4) here echoed Wilson by arguing that each of these groups constituted a “minorité” (e.g. “minority”), which ought to be given rights, provided Turkish minorities living elsewhere were also given rights. Relying on the concept of national sovereignty, the League for the Defence of the Eastern Provinces had continued to advance territorial claims to provinces whose populations had become more homogenous in the course of the war through state violence. In these circumstances, both Sir W. Ramsay (1919) and Arnold J. Toynbee (1919d), experts on Anatolia and advisers to the British Foreign Office, signed a minute in a Foreign Office document stating that “in the interests of humanity”, the “Armenian vilayets” should be detached from the Ottoman Empire.

The protests of the Ottoman government over the treatment of the Muslim population in Izmir and its environs by the Greek forces demonstrated how the concept of war crimes could potentially be used to defend Ottoman sovereignty. Even though the victors of the First World War, who had originally developed the practice of enforcing war crimes, were able to ensure that Greece’s interests were secured. Following reports of massacres presented to them by the Grand Vizier,

259 Vilayet was the Ottoman word for province.
Damad Ferid Paşa (1919b), the Allies recognised the need to set up a commission to investigate these claims (Mallet, 1919f; Vansittart, 1919b). The British Admiral de Robeck (1919a) supported the establishment of a commission to ensure stability in the Ottoman Empire and secure the sympathy of the Islamic world. Because many of the world’s Muslims were British subjects, de Robeck (1919a) believed that Britain was the “greatest Moslem power”. The British General Milne, commanding the forces occupying present-day eastern Turkey, reported that he would have “difficulty” in controlling Turkey if a “body actually representing the Peace Conference” were not despatched to Izmir (de Robeck, 1919b). However, Greek officials objected to an Ottoman colonel being accorded the same status as his Greek counterpart, Colonel Markakis, on this commission (Buzanski, 1963: 329). Vansittart (1919b), the British expert in the Foreign Office, argued that it would be best if neither Turkish nor Greek officials were included in the commission. An agreement was later reached whereby the Allied Forces in Izmir would be commanded by British officers. A body, calling itself the Ottoman League, contacted the Foreign Office to give its backing to this decision (Berne, 1919). However, the Supreme Council of the Allies, to whom the report would be presented, would ultimately issue a decision on the basis of the commission’s report.

Even though the Ottomans were able to voice their concerns on the occupation of Smyrna, the commission was ultimately presented to the Supreme Council of the Allies, who would use their constituent power, stemming from their status as occupants, to determine its implications. The proposal to allow British officers to control the occupation was not followed through because it was ignored in a later agreement between Italy and Greece over their zones of occupation (Balfour, 1919a). In addition, the poor lines of communication meant that a message to the Greek forces stating that they could only proceed beyond a certain line under the command of a British admiral could not be delivered (Balfour, 1919a). Therefore, as a Foreign Office (1919a) instruction sent to de Robeck noted, because of the absence of other Allied troops to enforce the terms of the armistice, Greece was allowed to occupy Izmir regardless of the result of the commission. The commission’s findings were presented to the Supreme Council of the Allies, where Sir Eyre Crowe, Britain’s representative, expressed opposition at how the commission had studied the legitimacy of the Greek occupation, alongside considering crimes they had
committed (Helmreich, 1974: 170). The Supreme Council ultimately argued that it was right that Greece had acted to punish its military officers who had engaged in atrocities in the environs of İzmir and recommended, but did not call for, a smaller interallied force to replace Greece’s forces (Helmreich, 1974: 169). Colonel Markakis added that Greece should be commended to have brought order to the regions it was controlling, even though Italy and France were emphatic in pointing to how Greece’s presence had also caused reprisals (Helmreich, 1974: 170). The Council added that it would not decide whether the Greek presence was acceptable but would not press the matter of Greek atrocities any further, which Buzanski (1963: 325 - 326) and Helmreich (1974: 170) suggest was due to the desire of France, Britain and Wilson to prevent Italian forces from replacing Greece’s forces in the region. The Allies therefore acted as a constituent power to argue for the punishment of troops responsible for atrocities. Nonetheless, they disregarded Ottoman claims that the invasion as a whole was illegal, owing to France, Britain and the USA’s concerns with spreading Italian influence and because of how the Ottomans, as a defeated enemy, had no say on the Supreme Council.

5. Constituent diplomacy, internal and external constituent power and the gradual recognition of the Ankara government, 1920 – 1921

In the context of the emergence of new forms of normative hierarchy in the post-First World War period, this section shows how the remnants of the Young Turks sought, with a degree of success, to mobilise different forms of constituent power. On the one hand, actors associated with the Young Turks aimed to reconstitute their society in line with ideas of national sovereignty which were promoted by the constituent power of the victorious Allies after the end of the war. By invoking local forms of constituent power, these actors sought to situate their polity in post-war international society. However, the successors of the Young Turks also opposed and attempted to reshape the emerging constitutional rules of post-war international society. This section also considers how the Allied occupation forces, in response to the unstable situation in the Ottoman Empire, acted as a constituent power within the empire. The Allies organised several conferences to consider the nature and the

extent to which the Ottoman state’s sovereignty and sovereign equality would be recognised in post-war international society. The period following the Armistice of Moudros was one in which political parties and other actors, including armed movements, advanced various schemes to secure their international recognition as sovereigns and secure their sovereign equality in global international society. In the San Remo and London conferences, and on other occasions when the successors of the Young Turks engaged in diplomacy, various theories of sovereignty were drawn upon, which were congruent with the post-war standard of ‘civilisation’ (Macfie, 1983: 67 - 73). However, while the successors of the Young Turks sought to reconstitute what remained of the Ottoman Empire on the basis of the new post-war conceptions of ‘civilisation’ and national sovereignty, at the same time they also attempted to challenge how these new constitutional rules were applied. The Ankara government sought to gain recognition as a sovereign state, equal to others in global international society, and used both normative power, in the form of diplomacy, and social power, in the form of their military power, to achieve this goal.

With the Ottoman Empire greatly weakened after its defeat, individuals and groups aimed to secede and secure international recognition as protectorates of the victorious Allies in global international society. Assyrian and Lebanese movements sought to become British and French protectorates (Foreign Office, 1919b). Several Lebanese officials contacted the French to secure their position as administrators in a future French protectorate (Watenpaugh, 2003: 258 - 259). The Assyrian military leader, Agha Petros, utilising his influence gained through the previous support of the Russian Empire in the First World War, deployed military power to challenge other Assyrian leaders and the church establishment (Anzerlioğlu, 2010: 51 – 52; Reynolds, 2011: 158 - 159). Shamsie (1919), an Assyrian representative, also declared that the Assyrians wished to be considered a British protectorate. In Mardin, the local notable, Abdulkadir Bey, arranged for a meeting between the representatives of different national movements, to determine the future of the region (Buckley, 1919). Chaldean Assyrians, including the Archbishop Gabriel Tapponi, argued for an Allied protectorate for the region, but representatives of the Assyrian Jacobite community, a denomination within the

261 See Wratislaw (1920).
Assyrian Christians, believed that some form of Ottoman rule was still needed (Buckley, 1919). However, the Kurds who attended the meeting, favoured the establishment of Kurdistan (Buckley, 1919). A protectorate enjoyed a direct connection to another state, whereas a mandatory regime implied that the other state which controlled the affairs of the mandate would be acting on behalf of the League of Nations’ objective of advancing civilisation in that space (Wheatley, 2017: 760 - 762). The Assyrian leadership would later seek to and be granted considerable military power as an internal security force in areas under the control of Britain, such as the mandate of Iraq (Bein, 2017: 31). In Syria and Lebanon, France sought to establish ties with the Maronite Christians, with missionaries consolidating their ties with some of the leaders of the Church (Thompson, 2000: 60). Groups seeking to secure the status of a protectorate of one of the victors of the First World War therefore sought to ensure that they were granted some status or position within the emerging post-war global international order and hence sought to influence how its constitutional principles were applied towards them.

However, the main challenge to the Ottoman state came from its own bureaucrats and officers, including those who had been members of the CUP and its paramilitary units. Seeking to secure the recognition of what they took to be the rights of the Muslim and Turkish sections of the empire, several Ottoman officers partook in the process by which Muslims and Turks formed local assemblies to challenge the claims of other states, such as Greece. Some of these efforts, including the formation of the Islamic Council of Kars (Kars İslam Şurası), which later became the Republic of the Southwest Caucasus (Cenub-i Garbi Kafasya Cumhuriyesi), produced entities that could be compared to states in terms of their characteristics (Göl, 2013: 89). This republic had state-like features because it combined de facto military control over territory with a parliament in Kars legislating in the name of the Muslim Ottoman nation (Delegation of the South West Caucasus Republic, 1919; Fahreddin Bey, 1919; Göl, 2013: 898). However, the republic, which provided an example for later attempts by the National Movement to establish a similar representative

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Many of the individuals who organised these groups, known as the Association for the Defence of Rights (Mudafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti), were previously affiliated with the CUP and Ottoman intelligence services, but they now sought to present themselves as heads of national movements (Provence, 2017: 205, 211; Zürcher, 1984).
structure, failed to be recognised by the Allies as a sovereign state. As Toynbee (1919g: f 216) noted in a comment on a petition by the Islamic shura, “there is only a homogenous Moslem element in Kars because Armenians have been expelled” (see also Mallet, 1919c: f 222). The emphasis on presenting the Republic of the Southwest Caucasus as defending the interests of the Muslims of Kars in the face of the threat they perceived from the neighbouring Armenians, consequently backfired as the republic’s leaders were eventually arrested (see C.O.C. in Constantinople, 1919; Calthorpe, 1919f; Fahreddin Bey, 1919). Abdullah (1919), the representative of the League for the Defence of the National Rights of the Eastern Provinces in Sivas, similarly failed to secure international recognition for his organisation. After the Greek occupation of Izmir, various CUP-affiliated armed organisations organised the Muslim and Turkish population of the remaining territories of the empire to become a comprehensive resistance movement (Zürcher, 1984). Building on the template provided by the Southwest Caucasus Republic, these movements, aided by elements of the Ottoman state, established a rival government in Ankara (Göl, 2013: 88 - 91). The Ankara government resisted the Greek expeditionary force and acted as a constituent assembly that would represent and unite the many local assemblies and associations that had emerged in response to the invasion.

Different ideas concerning how the sovereign equality of the state could be secured were presented by Ottoman political parties in the elections held at the end of 1919. The rival governments in Istanbul and Ankara had reached a compromise to allow the elections to take place. Parties were formed, such as the Milli Ahrar Fırkası, or the National Liberation Party, under Cami Bey263, to lobby the Allies to secure the recognition of the sovereign equality of the Ottoman Empire (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 39 - 42). According to Cami Bey, he and Mahir Sabit, an Ottoman officer, had established their party to apply Wilson’s principles of national sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 68). Other parties, such as the ruling Freedom and Accord Party, argued for the closest possible cooperation with the Allies, including accepting the Treaty of Sèvres (Gingeras, 2016: 261; Göl, 2013: 87 - 88). These parties hoped that Ottoman rule could be maintained through gaining the

263 After the armistice, Cami had become the interior minister of the short-lived Tevfik Paşa government (11 November 1918 – 3 March 1919), which had come to power following the flight of Talat Paşa and other prominent government figures (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 39 - 42).
favour of the Allies and, in particular, the US, which was perceived as not harbouring imperial ambitions (Gingeras, 2016: 261; Göl, 2013: 87 - 88). However, after the Ankara government’s National Movement won the elections, the Ottoman parliament was closed by the Allies in March 1920 (Gawrych, 1988: 329). At this point, many MPs, including Cami Bey, fled to the assembly in Ankara (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 41). The official gazette of the Ankara government, known as *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (The Sovereignty of the People), published a number of articles revealing how the Ankara government sought external recognition of its sovereignty by continuing to appeal to Wilson’s principle of national self-determination “even while European politics are now being driven by imperialism”265 (*Hakimiyet-i Milliyete*, [1920] 2004d: 22). Both Cami and his Milli Ahrar Party (see E. Yılmaz, 2018: 204) and *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* ([1920] 2004d: 22) also defended granting sovereignty in the Arabic-speaking parts of the empire to the local Arab populations. Following the election, the idea of national sovereignty came to be embraced by all the popular political actors within the Ottoman Empire, even though support for national sovereignty was not permitted by the Allied occupation.

Given continuing conflict, and the opposition to the Ottoman government’s cooperation with the Allies, Japan, Britain, France, and Italy, with the US participating as an observer, organised the San Remo conference in 1920 to consider alternative arrangements for the future of the Ottoman Empire (Göl, 2013: 115). This conference involved efforts on the part of the victors of the First World War to bring about a settlement in the Ottoman Empire, which they claimed would allow the constitutional rules of international society, namely of national and popular sovereignty to be respected (Göl, 2013: 115). This allowed groups within the empire to organise their own constituent assemblies which were timed to correspond with the San Remo conference. Both the Ankara and Damascus assemblies argued for the right to self-determination over their respective regions (Gelvin, 1998: 47; Provence,

264 These writings were overseen by Mustafa Kemal, but were produced by various contributors, including Ahmed Agayev (later known as Ahmet Ağaoğlu), a former member of the CUP (Shissler, 2003: 186).

265 The transliterated and simplified text from the collection of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* ([1920] 2004d: 22), edited by Bolluk and Güran, reads: “Wilson prensiplerinin, artık Avrupa siyasetinde etken olan emperyализme karşı hayatımı muhafaza edemeceğiını de iddia edemeyiz”, which translates as: “We cannot assume that Wilson’s principles will continue to live in the context of imperialism, which now shapes European politics.”
Feisal, who had previously supported the Allies, boycotted the San Remo conference, after the Allied powers refused to grant Britain a mandate over Syria (Helmreich, 1974: 273). As in the case of Feisal’s supporters, Mustafa Kemal’s nationalist movement contained many former CUP members and Ottoman officers (Zürcher, 2010). In contrast to Feisal, Mustafa Kemal was not invited to San Remo (Provence, 2017; Zürcher, 1984; 2010). In order to secure the legitimacy of the Syrian National Congress, which convened in Damascus, Feisal (1920) informed the Allies that it had met previously and was an established “constitutional body” (see also Young, 1920b). Although British officials could not corroborate this (see Young, 1920a), Feisal (1920: 1) nonetheless claimed that the convening of the congress was in line with Wilson’s views, as expressed in Wilson’s Mount Vernon speech of 4 July 1918. As the representative, Aouni Abdul Hadi (1920) stressed, the congress would unite Syrians, in line with Wilson’s principle of allowing all “political or governmental” questions “to be solved in accordance with the liberal acceptance of the people directly interested in the case” (quoted from Feisal, 1920: 1). Feisal also informed the British that he would negotiate with a general Iraqi congress that had declared an independent Arab state “from the north of Mosul Vilayet to [the] Persian Gulf with political and economic union with an independent Syria” (Meinertzhagen, 1920: f 4).

Feisal (1920: 2) stressed how the Allies had de facto recognised the Arab nation in their statement of 14 February 1918, which had acknowledged the Arabs as partners in the First World War. However, the Syrian National Congress was unable to prevent the assignment of a French mandate to Syria in the San Remo conference, alongside the delineation and assignment of mandates to Palestine and Iraq (Gelvin, 1998: 47; Provence, 2017: 124 - 126). The global constituent power of the San Remo conference prevailed over the local constituent powers of the assemblies in Ankara and Damascus. Even though Feisal’s movement was defeated, following the arrival of French forces in Syria, the Ankara government would later be able to harness its social power to ensure that it represented what remained of the Ottoman Empire.

Excluded from the diplomatic efforts of the Allies after the First World War to reconstitute post-war global international society, the Ankara government sought support from the Bolsheviks. The disillusionment of the Ottomans with the Allies began with the King-Crane Commission, which was tasked by Wilson to develop
proposals for the reorganisation of the Ottoman Empire in 1919 (Smith, 2009: 58). It toured the Arab-speaking parts of the former Ottoman Empire from June – July 1919 and presented its findings to the Supreme Allied Council in August 1919 (Smith, 2009: 58 - 59). Divisions emerged among those Ottoman officials who communicated with representatives of the Commission. According to Howard’s (1963: 165) study of the King-Crane Commission, and later claims made by Mustafa Kemal, the Milli Ahrar Fırkası was prepared to cede territories in the east to Armenia, in return for the recognition of the sovereignty of an Ottoman state (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 104 - 106). The issue of the granting of territory to Armenia became an issue of further disagreement among the Ottomans, following the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 104 - 105). At Sèvres, the Allies agreed to cede Ottoman territory to Armenia and Greece and backed the establishment of a Kurdish state (Göl, 2013: 88). Three days after the treaty’s signing on 10 August 1920 by an Ottoman delegation composed of Hadi Paşa, Rıza Tevfik and Reşad Halis, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* ([1920] 2004b) produced an article. The article stated that the “Treaty of Versailles, which is the product of Britain and France, has hurt both the worker and the capitalist with the same level of violence and cruelty”266 (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, [1920] 2004c: 88 - 89). The same article stressed, in a manner that pointed out the challenges facing the Allies, that “the movement in Poland is moving towards Central Europe, with Poland being the broader gateway to Central Europe” and “the Bolsheviks are preparing to advance into the Balkans, from one side, and into Europe, on the other”267 (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, [1920] 2004c: 89). This article suggested that if the right of nations to be recognised as equal sovereigns was denied in global international society, then the social power of these movements would ensure that this right would be realised. Separately, in July 1920, the *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* ([1920] 2004b: 79) declared that “the greatest enemy”268 of the Ankara government and, indeed, all nations was capitalism, which was the root cause of the capitulations. This approach formed the basis of the subsequent

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268 The article was titled “En Büyük Düşman”, meaning “the greatest enemy” (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, [1920] 2004b: 79).
diplomatic efforts of the Ankara government, which sought to exploit divisions among the Allied powers and secure the support of the Bolsheviks to gain recognition of their sovereign equality in global international society.

By asserting its social power militarily and using it to reconstitute the areas it controlled, the Ankara government became a significant force that could not be ignored. This allowed the Ankara government to push its case for the recognition of its sovereignty as a condition for it to cooperate with other states. Through this approach, the Ankara government and the Bolsheviks established close relations. They concluded an agreement in 1921, which brought an end to the capitulations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire (Göl, 2013: 117). While the Milli Ahrar Fırkası may have envisaged relinquishing territory to comply with the principle of national self-determination, the Ankara government later claimed that defeating Armenia would enable the Bolsheviks and the Ankara government to challenge imperialism and thereby advance the cause of national self-determination (Hakimiyet-i Milliye, [1920] 2004a: 113 - 115). Military cooperation between the Ankara government and the Bolsheviks resulted in the former withdrawing its forces from Azerbaijan, in return for cooperation against Armenia (Göl, 2013: 100 - 102). Armenia became a Bolshevik state, after the Red Army defeated government forces in Armenia (Göl, 2013: 118). This established a corridor through which the Bolsheviks could deliver military and monetary support to the Ankara government (Göl, 2013: 100 - 102). Prior to the victory of the Ankara government and the Bolsheviks, Allied forces and movements opposed to the extension of Bolshevik influence, had threatened the Bolsheviks in the region. The Bolsheviks cooperated with the Ankara government to delineate the national boundaries of different groups in the region to curtail the ambitions of anti-Bolshevik elements (Göl, 2013: 111 - 129). The Ankara government received valuable military support to allow it to harness its social power and overcome rivals in the territories it hoped to govern in the future.

Hostilities between Greece and the Ankara government continued, in spite of the Treaty of Sèvres. This forced the Allies to consider alternative arrangements with regard to issues of sovereignty for what remained of the Ottoman Empire. Divisions between the Allies led to the convening of the London Conference in 1921 to
reconsider the Treaty of Sèvres (Macfie, 1983: 76). France, whose financial sector had interests in the Ottoman Empire, had challenged the British decision to remove the Sultan from Istanbul (Crowe, 1919b) and would later have an impact on the claims for recognition advanced by the Ankara government. Subsequently, France recognised the Ankara government’s claim to the region of Cilicia. The French withdrew their forces from the region by 1921, in return for the Ankara government ending its support for the Syrian movement which challenged French mandatory rule in Syria (Provence, 2017: 119 - 120). By 1921, British officials were referring to the need for an arrangement maintaining “Turkish Sovereignty” but also installing a “Christian Governor appointed by League of Nations and assisted by elected Assembly and Council” over Izmir (Foreign Office, 1921: 4). The Ottoman government in Istanbul also argued that the Greek decision to implement Greek law within the occupied areas ran counter to both “international law and the inalienable rights of Turkey” and urged all Allied governments to protest against Greece (Rumbold, 1921). In his capacity as the head of the Izmir branch of the Association for the Defence of Rights, Cami Bey had earlier established contact with Count Sforza, the Italian commissioner, who represented Italy in the occupation of the Ottoman Empire (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 73 - 76, 160 - 164). These contacts resulted in the Italians recognising the de facto sovereignty of the Ankara government over territories under the government’s control in return for protecting Italy’s trade interests (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 160 - 164). The Ankara government’s consolidation of power had prompted Italy and France to recognise its sovereignty and had pressured Britain to enter into negotiations with the Ankara government, which it had initially considered illegitimate. The idea that the Ankara government was becoming an established force would, subsequently, result in a change in how the Allies as a whole approached its claims to sovereignty and sovereign equality.

6. Conclusion:

This chapter has demonstrated how the Young Turks’ successors were confronted with a new form of the standard of ‘civilisation’. This emerged from the statements of Wilson and Lenin in which the nation-state was presented as the unit of post-war international society. Wilson’s ideas resulted in the emergence of a tiered form of international society which was divided into different mandates.
Groups within the Ottoman Empire responded to the Allied debate about how to apply the new constitutional principles, based on the new understanding of ‘civilisation’. Some sought closer cooperation with the Allies to ensure that a specific state would become a mandatory power to control part or all of the empire’s territory. The challenges faced by the political elites of the defeated Ottoman Empire were compounded by the fact that they were accused of being guilty of war crimes and ‘crimes against humanity’. This made it more difficult for their state to be recognised as ‘civilised’ and hence an equal sovereign to the established states in global international society. Other states, such as Greece, could also be seen to be guilty of similar crimes, but the defeated Ottoman state did not have the power to make the case for the Allies to recognise this. Instead, the reports of wartime atrocities committed by the Ottomans encouraged other movements to seek recognition of their sovereignty. They argued that such recognition was vital to protect their interests, because these atrocities had ended any possibility of them being included within an inclusive Ottoman nationalism. The Grand National Assembly of the Ankara government mobilised its own social power through centralising the power of the Muslim and/or Turkish assemblies throughout the Ottoman Empire. It received support from the Bolsheviks, and became a force that could not be ignored by other states which were forced to engage in diplomacy with the Ankara government.

1. Introduction

This chapter explains how the Ankara government was recognised as an equal sovereign, with full control over its territory, in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. In practice, though, the Ankara government had already gained recognition of its de facto sovereignty through a process of normalisation. The Treaty of Lausanne advanced conditions for the recognition of Turkish sovereignty, but this largely provided international legal recognition of what was a fait accompli. The Ankara government secured de facto sovereignty over what was left of the Ottoman Empire, prior to the conference at Lausanne, through harnessing military, political and ideological power as a form of constituent power. The Lausanne conference revealed that nationalism had emerged as an idea that served to constitute international society. İsmet Paşa (1922a, 1922b), the Ankara government’s negotiator, and his Allied counterpart, Lord Curzon (see MacArthur-Seal, 2018: 781), both used arguments based on nationalism, and this resulted in the Treaty of Lausanne reflecting the principle of national sovereignty. The idea of nationalism was promoted for separate ends by İsmet Paşa and Lord Curzon, but it nevertheless acted as a form of global constituent power that contributed to the reconstitution of post-war international society. The Ankara government at Lausanne sought to secure the recognition of its sovereignty from the established powers by presenting itself as a body that complied with notions that formed the constitutional rules of post-war global international society. Emphasising their supposed compliance with the post-war standard of ‘civilisation’, the Ankara government also pursued a form of statehood that harked back to earlier understandings of sovereignty. This was because the Treaty of Lausanne stipulated the conditions for the acceptance of Turkey as an equal sovereign to other sovereigns in global international society. These conditions crucially allowed the new Republic of Turkey to draw upon local and global ideas of sovereignty in order to be accepted internationally.
2. Sovereignty in the inter-war years: global and local state-building and conditional sovereignty in international society

This section reviews the literature on state-building in the inter-war period. Turkey is taken as a case study to analyse how sovereignty was recognised. The section notes the contribution of the literature that identifies the significance of different theories of the state which were presented by the victors and other actors in the post-war peace. It points to how notions of the role of the state and the nature of sovereignty provided ideas that informed processes of local and global reconstitution, carried out by local and global actors in the post-war period. Existing studies (see Barkin and Cronin, 1994; Philpott, 1997) have avoided focusing on how these ideas influenced the expression of the constituent power. This would involve examining the role of ideas in facilitating the international recognition of sovereignty. With the League of Nations and its promotion of democracy and liberalism under a new standard of ‘civilisation’, international actors assumed a key role in state-building. However, local actors also arguably invoked forms of constituent power when they were engaged in practices of de facto state-building. In some cases, this was preceded by revolutions which overthrew governments and challenged their established conceptions of dynastic sovereignty. In the post-war context, states drew upon local forms of constituent power, in the form of their mobilised populations and militaries, without necessarily seeking recognition from external actors. In the face of these state-building efforts, international actors offered conditional support, based on the emerging post-war normative hierarchy, and imposed demands on state-builders to secure their own interests. However, this support, premised on the recognition of these states as equal sovereigns, was based on the perception that they complied with post-war understandings of the standard of ‘civilisation’. Such perceptions were not always based on reality. Appeals to national sovereignty and liberalism could mask the actual ideas and practices which came to form the basis of sovereignty in different local contexts.

At the end of the First World War, different theories emerged about the state and whether states should be restructured or eliminated, allowing humanity to move to other forms of social organisation. As Bartelson (2001: 95) and Smith (2009: 70) suggest, the First World War had been defined by a clash between two distinct
understandings of the state held by Wilson and Lenin, on the one hand, and the Central Powers on the other. The German conception of the state, contrasted with the liberal conception, was presented as stressing its autonomy from its society (Bartelson, 2001: 95; Smith, 2009: 70). American experts sent to determine the fate of the Ottoman Empire, King and Crane, also argued that the killing of the Armenians by the Ottomans suggested that they had a similar understanding that valued the state over human life (Smith, 2009: 70). It was suggested that this understanding of the state, labelled alternatively as German or “Oriental”, required reshaping by the Allies, who believed that it had contributed to causing the war (Smith, 2009: 70). However, Lenin ([1917] 2014), in The State and Revolution, had briefly challenged the very idea of the state, suggesting that the state could be abolished. But, with the expected world revolution no longer imminent, Lenin began focusing on how to manage the Bolshevik socialist state (Armstrong, 1993: 112 - 157; Göl, 2013: 79). Both Lenin and Wilson developed an instrumental view of the state. Lenin came to see the state as a tool of revolution and socioeconomic development269, Wilson believed that the institution of the democratic state would assume the character of the population over whom it governed (Thorsen, 1988: 25, 171; Throntveit, 2011a: 452). In the absence of state institutions, the well-being of peoples could be entrusted to external forms of administration. These included the international administrations of regions such as the Saar and the city of Danzig by the League of Nations, and the establishment of the mandate system of the League (Pedersen, 2007: 1092). Both the Leninist and Wilsonian conceptions of the state emphasised cooperation at the global level, through revolution or cooperation through institutions, as a means to reconstitute international society through state-building.

The conception of the state promoted by Wilson and Lenin had global appeal because they provided alternative means to reconstitute local constitutional orders. Their normative ideas especially resonated in the context of revolution and the collapsing of empires in Central and Eastern Europe (Gerwarth, 2016; Roshwald, 2001). Although the Central Powers had been defeated, their defeat was not total and state institutions, including military command structures and armies, remained in the

territories they once controlled (Smith, 2018: 15). A wave of nationalist and socialist revolutions swept through areas previously governed by the Central powers (Gerwarth, 2016; Roshwald, 2001). These revolutions were attracted to the nationalist and liberal ideals of Wilson or the socialist views of Lenin (Albert, 2015; Smith, 2018: ch. 5). In these circumstances, local social forces could be harnessed as forms of constituent power, to rebuild and/or amend political institutions. Similar contestations over what form political institutions ought to take also occurred in the conquered territories of the Ottoman Empire, in what is now known as the Middle East (Provence, 2017; Tauber, 1994; Yenen, 2016). This was when the League of Nations intervened as a constituent power, through commissions and plebiscites, to determine the boundaries of states (Smith, 2018; Wheatley, 2015a; 2015b). The rise of nationalism also resulted in actors, including irredentist states, framing the nation as a constituent power to extend their control over more territory (Gerwarth, 2016). States, therefore, sought to govern on behalf of their populations, which were understood as being nations, in accordance with the ideas of self-determination and national sovereignty (Barkin and Cronin, 1994: 119 - 122). Global forms of constituent power, based on international constitutional principles informed by the ideas of Wilson and Lenin could be mobilised, although there were disagreements about how these principles should be applied in local contexts. This resulted in an interplay between local and global forms of constituent power, with those seeking recognition of their sovereign equality seeking to draw upon both these forms of constituent power.

Instead of merely recognising states as having control over territories, the League of Nations argued for conditional sovereignty in the territories it administered directly or in those areas it had entrusted to other powers as mandates. Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant noted that mandatory rule would be maintained as long as the standard of “civilization”, in the territories governed by the mandates, was deemed to be insufficiently developed (Anghie, 2002: 524). Historical and theoretical studies of international state-building have pointed out how the form of liberal democracy promotion pioneered by Wilson in the post-war context, influenced subsequent global efforts to promote democracy (Chandler, 2006: 476; Jahn, 2007: 88; Knock, 1992). The architects of the League did not make clear if ‘civilisation’ was a virtue that would eventually be recognised throughout the
world by the victorious Allied powers (Anghie, 2002; 2005: ch. 3; Smith, 2019). Given that civilisation was one of the conditions for the recognition of sovereignty, there was a danger that actors may be effectively condemned to perpetual sovereign inequality in global international society. An African conference, organised by prominent intellectuals such as W.E.B. DuBois, was convened at the same time as the Paris Peace Conference (Sluga, 2013: 51 - 52; Smith, 2018: 181). It drew attention to the global problems of racial inequality and colonialism (Smith, 2018: 181). However, racial inequality was not taken seriously by all of the participants in Paris (Vitalis, 2015: 67). The Japanese delegation’s proposal for the inclusion of a racial equality clause was rejected (Vitalis, 2015: 67). The mandate system of the League of Nations introduced a form of hierarchy that privileged European notions of ‘civilisation’ as the criteria for granting sovereignty to states that were, in theory, being developed in territories in Asia and Africa (Hobson, 2012: 47; Mazower, 2009: 28 - 65). Although Wilson, together with Lenin, had argued for national self-determination, in practice the League of Nations contended that the sovereign equality of states could only become a reality once states had met certain conditions which demonstrated that they were sufficiently ‘civilised’.

Recognition by external actors that a state had met the conditions for full sovereignty was seen to be crucial. This meant that ideas of what constituted a state worthy of being recognised as sovereign came to be adopted as a template by groups seeking such recognition. However, different ideas with regard to how a state should be organised led to the adoption of alternative templates, based on various ideas of sovereignty, by different groups seeking to gain independence for their state and recognition of its sovereignty (Barkin and Cronin, 1994; Philpott, 1997: 30 - 41). These different templates were also informed by how those who were then governed by mandates and seeking recognition of their sovereign statehood were subjected to new standards of “civilization”270 (Philpott, 1997: 42 see also Anghie, 2002). For example, in the Arab-populated territories that were once a part of the Ottoman Empire, ideas such as Bolshevism, liberalism, democracy and nationalism, and also Zionism and Pan-Arabism came to be advanced by local actors seeking recognition

270 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League stressed that mandatory status was temporary and intended to last only until the level of “civilization” in a mandate was improved (Anghie, 2002: 524).
as equal sovereigns in international society (Kelly, 2017; Tauber, 1994; Wheatley, 2015a, 2015b). Tunaya ([1984] 2000: 237) has noted how, in the immediate aftermath of the Armistice of Moudros, numerous political parties and associations were formed, which presented different visions of the status of the future Ottoman state in the emerging post-war international society (see also Zürcher, 1998). These groups sought not only to gain recognition on the basis of the post-war standard of ‘civilisation’. They also saw themselves as interlocutors in debates concerning the implications of these standards of ‘civilisation’ for the recognition of their equal sovereignty and attempted to influence how these standards were applied to them (Canefe, 2002; Zürcher, 1999).

Weitz’s (2008) influential article suggests that “civilization” (see Weitz, 2008: 1314) and progress were adopted as templates by states throughout the world, following the emergence of what he terms a new “Paris” (see Weitz, 2008: 1313) system, which replaced the “Vienna” (see Weitz, 2008: 1313) system of diplomacy that had been put in place after the Napoleonic Wars. However, the attempt to place this moment in a unidirectional process of progress or development can be criticised for confusing a process contingent on the beliefs and actions of individuals with an objective process of history (Cooper, 2005: ch. 5). At the end of the First World War, intellectuals questioned the very ideas of civilisation and progress (see Ifversen, 2002), and they challenged the argument that progress and modernisation were adopted by social movements worldwide. Berkes’s ([1964] 1998) earlier study of the emergence of the Republic of Turkey from the remaining territories of the Ottoman Empire, stressed the importance of Westernisation and secularisation. Importantly, the recognition of the state of Turkey as an equal sovereign by the Allies and the Bolshevik government by 1923 involved the state being recognised as “civilized” (B. Lewis, [1961] 1968: 292). This narrative is also reinforced by Turkish historiography. Intellectuals who later supported the new state of Turkey, such as Halide Edip, saw the process of the establishment of Turkey as one which involved the spread of liberal principles (Gürel, 2015). However, others have described this process as being based on Western ideas of corporatism271 or fascism272. More

271 See Parla and Davison (2004).
recently, Göl (2013: 167 - 174) has complemented existing accounts of the narrative of the founding of Turkey, which focus on the relations of the Ankara government with the West, by focusing on Turkey’s relations with its Eastern neighbours. Göl’s (2013: 26 - 34) account, however, focuses on modernisation as an objective process that the Soviets and the Turkish government in Ankara needed to respond to. But a study of ideas associated with ‘modernity’, and similar concepts, such as ‘civilisation’, can demonstrate how these were contested concepts. Consequently, although commentators have recognised how ideas of the state and ‘civilisation’, served to facilitate the recognition of the sovereignty of Turkey, they have only recently begun to note the role of ideas and politics at the local and global level in this process.

A certain strand of the historiography of Turkey and the Arab successor states of the Ottoman Empire has focused on the role of post-war nationalist and/or revolutionary regimes to explain how these states gained their political independence and came to be recognised as equal sovereigns in global international society (see Kandiyoti, 1991; B. Lewis, [1961] 1968: 239 – 293; Zürcher, [1993] 2017: 133). However, the developments that resulted in the post-war independence of these states which began in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has largely been overlooked. Throughout this period, the ideas used by those wielding constituent power in these different states were shaped by a variety of different international and local sources. This has not been considered in studies, such as those of Bernard Lewis ([1961] 1968) and Zürcher ([1993] 2017), which focus on the spread of Western ideas and practices. Arab or Turkish nationalism, though, drew upon a range of Western and Eastern ideas, including Islam, Bolshevism and a form of nationalism centring on the idea of self-determination (Akal, 2013: 108; Demirkent, 2017: 97 – 100, 142; Göl, 2013: ch. 3; Toprak, 2013: chs. 9 and 11; Turnaoğlu, 2017a; 2017b). However, in their relations with the Western Powers and the Soviets, the successor states of the Ottoman Empire also attempted to emphasise the supposed progressive nature of their regimes. As Wigen (2018) demonstrates, even when the early Turkish elites were translating ideas from European sources, they made connections between these ideas and local practices and institutions.

273 However, see the account of Göçek (1996).
Kayaoğlu (2010a: 145) argues that the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code demonstrates how legal competence formed the basis of state-building, which resulted in the end of extraterritoriality in Turkey. In particular, the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in Turkey has been interpreted as pointing to the spread of Western legal norms (Özsu, 2010: 64). However, as Özsu (2010: 64) notes, the Swiss Civil Code was translated and enacted in a manner that incorporated pre-existing sharia-based principles. Therefore, Turkey’s acceptance as an equal sovereign in global international society, which has often been understood as a process of Westernisation, can also be read as an instance of the normalisation of Turkey’s conceptions of sovereignty by international society.

3. The Ankara government’s consolidation of de facto statehood and the normalisation of national sovereignty prior to the Armistice of Mudanya, 1922

This section focuses on how the Ankara government utilised its military and political power to assert its de facto sovereignty. Prior to assuming control over Istanbul in 1922, the Ankara government had relied on many of the former personnel of the Ottoman state who had defected to the nationalist movement. Following military success against the Greek Expeditionary Force, the Ankara government secured the release of more former Ottoman personnel who were being tried for war crimes. By preventing the enforcement of war crimes, the Ankara government challenged the emerging global normative hierarchy. After the forces of the Ankara government entered the “Straits zone”274, the military governor of Istanbul, Rafet Paşa, introduced a number of sovereign practices in Istanbul (Montgomery, 1972: 781). These included controlling the customs administration of the ports and issuing passports (Henderson, 1922e). The introduction of such practices was opposed by those based in Istanbul who disagreed with the Turkish nationalist ideas of the Ankara government (MacArthur-Seal, 2018). However, because of disagreements among Allied powers, even after the Ankara government had assumed control of Istanbul, the Allies could not unite to challenge the Ankara government. Here, the Ankara government relied upon a global form of constituent power, by aligning itself

274 The “Straits zone” referred to a demilitarised zone that had been created around the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, under the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres (Macfie, 1983: 83; Montgomery, 1972: 781).
with those who looked towards a peaceful post-war international society. A new armistice was concluded and a conference arranged to revise the Treaty of Sèvres (Gingeras, 2016: 291). Prior to this conference, the Ankara government abolished the sultanate and transferred the powers of the caliphate to the Grand National Assembly (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 18). This allowed the Assembly to claim to be the sole representative of the remaining territories of the empire (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 18). In this period, therefore, exploiting divisions among the Allies, the Ankara government engaged in sovereign practices before being recognised as an equal sovereign.

The Ankara government’s eventual success in being recognised as the sole sovereign representative of the remaining territories that were formerly part of the Ottoman Empire was in part due to it mobilising what remained of the personnel and the institutions of the Ottoman state (Nezir-Akmeşe, 2005, Rustow, 1959). As early as 1919, the support the Ankara government received here was crucial to allow it to consolidate control (Nezir-Akmeşe, 2005; Rustow, 1959). This involved drawing on Turkish nationalism, appealing to religious solidarity and, at times, encouraging Kurdish nationalism. A number of “Committees for Turco-Kurdish Independence”, established along the Iraqi-Kurdish border, received the support of Ottoman bureaucrats, such as Kadri Efendi, the governor of Van (Gorgas, 2018: 816). The expansion of the Ankara government’s influence, while leading to violent clashes, often involved officials previously loyal to the Ottoman state choosing to ignore orders to confront the National Movement. For example, upon Mustafa Kemal’s arrival in Samsun, the Ottoman Commander of the Third Army Corps which was stationed in the vicinity, Colonel Rifat, defied instructions to challenge Mustafa Kemal (Calthorpe, 1919a: 1). The colonel stated that “he no longer accept[ed] responsibility for public order in Samsun” (Calthorpe, 1919a: 1). Colonel Rifat also refused to authorise the occupying authorities to send British elite Ghurkha troops to challenge the unauthorised landing of Mustafa Kemal in Samsun (Calthorpe, 1919a: 1). This led to the colonel’s resignation and his replacement by Colonel Selahaddin Bey, who was brought to Samsun aboard a British destroyer (Calthorpe, 1919a: 1). A British intelligence report by Brigadier General Spears (1919), suggested that the officers in the Samsun region were continuing to obey the CUP and that most of them were deserting their units. The Ankara government came to acquire significant
social power, chiefly in the form of manpower, as a result of securing the loyalty of local populations. This allowed it to challenge the Greek expeditionary force in Western Anatolia.

The defeat of the Greek expeditionary force by military forces aligned with the Ankara government, made possible by the support of Ottoman officials, resulted in the Allies revising their policy towards the Ankara government. One hundred and seventeen Hellenist associations in Istanbul had lobbied for the advance of the Greek military in Anatolia (British Delegation, 1922). The British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, had agreed to lend support to the Greek expeditionary force in Anatolia, which Greece had justified on the grounds that it was enforcing the Treaty of Sèvres. According to Gökalp ([1922] 1982c: 151), who had been imprisoned in Malta before escaping, Britain and other European powers sought to exploit for economic gain the ‘civilised’ workers of Turkey. Gökalp ([1922] 1982c: 151) argued that being successful in modern forms of “agriculture and industry” required “the attainment of a high level of civilisation”. Islamic territories possessed such an economy, but, in contrast to Far East Asia, these territories were not well-defended. Gökalp ([1922] 1982c: 153) also stated that to make way for settler colonialism, the “Greeks wanted to deprive us from not only our political but also our social homeland”. From 1921, some in the Foreign Office (1921) no longer pursued a policy exclusively tied to supporting Greece. Significantly, following the military successes of the Ankara government, Britain began to implement an agreement, finalised with Cami Bey, who was in Rome as the representative of the Ankara government (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 153 - 154). This concerned the transfer of remaining prisoners of war in Malta to the Ankara government, in return for British prisoners held by the Ankara government (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 153 - 154). The victory of the Ottoman forces at the Battle of Sakarya resulted in the release of more prisoners after a meeting of the British High Commissioner, Sir Horace Rumbold and Hamit (Hasancan) of the Osmanlı Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti (the Ottoman Red Crescent) on

275 See Kamouzis (2013: 34).
276 The transliteration of this text reads as “[z]iraatin ve sanayiin bugünkü şeklinde iyi bir amele olmak için yüksek bir medeni seviyeye çıkmış olmak lazım” (Gökalp, [1922] 1982c: 151).
277 The transliteration of the text reads as “Yunanlıklar bizi yalnız siyasi vatandan değil, içtimai vatandan da mahrum etmek istiyorlardı” (Gökalp, [1922] 1982c: 153).
278 The British informed Cami Bey that they would free forty of the 64 Ottoman prisoners they were keeping in Malta (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 154).
23 October 1921 (E. Yılmaz, 2018: 153). Arguably, the military successes of the Ankara government signalled to the Allies that they should open negotiations with the government. Utilising their social constituent power, the Ankara government had challenged the emerging concept of war crimes and removed one of the obstacles to the recognition of their state as a sovereign state equal to others in international society.

Following the entry of the Ankara government’s troops into the Straits Zone, the forces under the command of Rafet Paşa consolidated control over Istanbul. These forces implemented policies that can be characterised as practices that served to establish de facto sovereignty. Rafet Paşa issued orders that “all correspondence connected with Anatolian railway and Port of Haidar now under military control is to be sent to him” and he denied entry to Allied officers to Ottoman war materiel (Henderson, 1922c). The National Movement stated that they had powers of jurisdiction over individuals present in the occupation zone within Istanbul, but could not carry out arrests (Henderson, 1922c). This clashed with attempts on the part of the Allies to introduce new forms of extraterritoriality in occupied Istanbul (MacArthur-Seal, 2018). Many states, including Greece, had signed a series of agreements with Britain, which replaced the capitulations with British martial law (MacArthur-Seal, 2018: 778). However, the Ankara government sought to make companies conform to the Ottoman “company law of 1914” (Henderson, 1922d), which introduced new requirements that challenged their privileged status in the capitulations, such as necessitating the use of Turkish in company papers (see Toprak, 2012: 197 - 201). According to a report of the British General Commanding Officer in Constantinople, forwarded by Henderson (1922e), Rafet Paşa had disagreed with Allied commanders over the issue of passports. The Greek and Armenian Patriarchates had been issuing passports to Greeks and Armenians in the city who wished to leave (Henderson, 1922e). Rafet argued that these passports were void (Henderson, 1922e). He stated that the only valid passports would be those officially approved by the Ankara government, which would be issued following a payment of 100 liras by all males of “military age” (Henderson, 1922e). Following a

279 Sir Nevile Henderson was a Foreign Office diplomat attached to the embassy in Istanbul (Jeffrey and Sharp, 1993: 83).
four hour conference with Rafet Paşa, the Allied generals only secured a verbal promise that the nationalists would not extort Armenians and Greeks who were seeking to obtain passports to leave (Henderson, 1922e). Therefore, prior to the external recognition of its sovereignty, the Ankara government was able to implement policies to secure control over the Straits zone.

According to the terms of the occupation, the Allied forces were tasked with resisting any incursion into the Straits Zone. But, divisions among the Allies, and an unwillingness to engage in more fighting, enabled the Ankara government’s forces to enter the Straits zone and dictate terms (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 39 - 40). In the cases of Italy, Britain and France, these divisions were exacerbated by domestic constituencies who opposed war with the Ankara government (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 32, 39 – 40). Italy and France were also eager to trade with the Ankara government (Güçlü, 2001: 593; E. Yılmaz, 2018: 155 - 156). The British dominions of Australia and New Zealand also opposed despatching troops to enforce the Straits zone280 and the Conservative opposition forced the Lloyd George government to resign281. Britain could neither rely on Italy nor France for support against the forces of the Ankara government (Busch, 1976: 340 - 350; Demirci, [2005] 2010: 39 – 41; Macfie, 1979a: 341). Harrington, the British General, realised that the nationalists could easily overwhelm the British forces if they launched an attack on Istanbul together with “Turkish elements within the city” (Ryan, 1922). The French failed to comply with the British request that they supply troops to the Asian side of Istanbul (British Delegation, 1923; Henderson, 1922f). Opposing Rafet Paşa’s moves to assume control of Istanbul as part of the national boundaries of the Ankara government, the British pressed the Italian and French governments for support (Henderson, 1922c). The British delegation noted how “non-Ottomans” needed to be protected by the Allies (Henderson, 1922b). Hence, the Ankara government assumed control over what it deemed to be its territorial jurisdiction in the Straits zone without being challenged by the Allies. Here, the government used its social power

281 See Demirci ([2005] 2010: 40 - 42) and Steiner (2005: 114 - 116) for how the Conservative Party, headed by Andrew Bonar Law, refused to deploy British troops to challenge the advance of the Ankara government’s forces into the Straits.
as a form of constituent power to challenge the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 and seek to establish a state on the basis of the principle of national sovereignty.

These actions violated agreements that the Istanbul government had agreed with the Allies, which had extended the forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction granted under the capitulations (MacArthur-Seal, 2018). Following the arrival of the forces of Rafet Paşa, the Allied generals allowed joint management of “sanitary” governance in Istanbul and were willing to permit the creation of a Turkish police force under the control of the Allies (British Delegation, 1922: f 43). Such arrangements were to be maintained until the peace conference in Lausanne decided the future arrangement of the Ottoman Empire and Istanbul (British Delegation, 1922). However, Henderson (1922b: f 50) notes how Rafet Paşa had approached the Allied generals with a view to extend the jurisdiction of the Ankara government’s police force to include “Hellenes” and Russians in Istanbul. Rafet Paşa sought to realise the vision of territorial sovereignty, as defined in the National Pact, which envisaged the Ankara government ruling Istanbul and eastern Thrace. In response, the British pressed the Italian and French governments to oppose Rafet Paşa (see Henderson, 1922c). The British delegation noted how “non-Ottomans” needed to be protected by the Allies (Henderson, 1922b: f 50). Rafet Paşa had attempted to arrest the incoming Greek High Commissioner in Istanbul, General Katchakis, and the British feared that the National Movement would arrest the Russian diplomatic mission in Istanbul and replace them with Bolsheviks (Foreign Office, 1922; Henderson, 1922b). On 11 December 1922, Gökalp ([1922] 1982b: 149), arguing that the dominance of Christianity had resulted in “Crusader attacks and the compromises of the capitulations” wrote that the Ankara government should recognise the importance of socialism as

282 Following the occupation of Istanbul, a “Sanitary Commission” was formed with “one representative from each Allied Power, one Greek, and the medical officer from USS St. Louis” (Criss, 1999: 39).
283 Eastern Thrace was considered a part of the National Pact and a referendum was called to determine the status of Western Thrace (Gingeras, 2015: 391).
284 The terms used by Gökalp ([1922] 1982b: 149) here, when transliterated into Turkish, reads as “ehl-i salip hücumlari ve kapitülasyon imtiyazlari”.

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“…it would be beneficial for us for socialism to be dominant over the whole of Europe. Because, as socialism has the characteristic of a new religion, it is not subject to the logic of the Church.”

Rumbold (1922b), the British Commissioner in Istanbul, accepted the Ankara government’s call for Ottoman subjects to be tried by Turkish courts in Istanbul. However, Rumbold (1922b) argued that it was crucial that non-Ottoman Russians and Greeks should not be tried in Turkish courts. By exploiting divisions among the Allies, Rafet Paşa and the Ankara government overturned the forms of extraterritorial legislation that had been established in Istanbul with the previous consent of the Istanbul government.

The collapse of the legitimacy of the overlapping institutions of the caliphate and the sultanate established the conditions for the Ankara government to be recognised internally within what remained of the Ottoman Empire and externally, on the basis of national sovereignty. The Armistice of Moudros had been signed, in part, on the basis of the commitment of the Ankara government to allowing free passage to other states from the Straits, as called for by Woodrow Wilson (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 18; Dyer, 1972: 153 – 156). Following the signing of the Armistice of Moudros, the Ottoman government became a partner in what British officials termed the “freedom of the Straits” (as quoted in Nicolson, 1922; Macfie, 1979b). The arrival of the Ankara government’s forces in the Straits Zone threatened this agreement. Gökalp ([1922] 1982a: 136 - 137) noted that although “Britain claims to be defending the freedom of the Straits” the “true goal of [the British] is to deny political and economic freedoms to Turkey, Russia and all Black Sea nations”.

Reporting from Paris, the British diplomat, Hardinge (1922: f 62), stated that “there are considerable sects of Mohammedans who do not recognise the Caliph as their spiritual head.” Still divided, the Allies could not decide on whether they should declare a siege of the city on 4 November 1922, after Rafet Paşa had gained full control of Istanbul (British Delegation, 1922). The French response to the “flight of the Sultan from Constantinople” seemed to be one of “relief” because of how he

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285 The transliteration of this text reads as “… sosyalizmin bütün Avrupa’da hakim olması bizim için faydalu olacaktır. Çünkü, sosyalizm yeni bir din mahiyetinde olduğu için kilisenin mantığına tabi değildir” (Gökalp, [1922] 1982b: 149).

was regarded as a mere puppet in the hands of His Majesty’s Government” (Hardinge, 1922: f 62). This sentiment was also shared by actors affiliated with the Ankara government, such as Gökalp ([1922] 1982f: 145), who claimed,

“the British… took control over the institutions of the caliphate and that of the sheikh ul-Islam. First, using the authority of the Caliph, they dissolved the Ottoman Parliament without providing a date for it to reconvene. They then used the sheikh ul-Islam’s authority to issue fatwas [i.e. religious rulings] against the National Forces attempting to liberate İzmir.”

At this stage, the views of British diplomats had shifted radically. They no longer assumed that the Ankara government was pursuing a Pan-Islamist policy. Rather, they had come to believe that the Ankara government had adopted the idea of national sovereignty (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 55 – 56; Macfie, 1979b: 211). After the defeat of the Greek military, the Allies therefore signed an Armistice at Mudanya of 1922 (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 30). This agreement did not change the juridical status of the occupation of Istanbul (Henderson, 1922a). However, with the Bolsheviks to be observers, the Allies scheduled a conference to be held at Lausanne to determine the status of the remaining territories of the Ottoman Empire (Demirci, [2005] 2010). Both the Ankara and Istanbul governments were invited to attend. Even though social forces, including the military power of the Ankara government, had changed the actual political situation, the recognition of the Ankara government as an equal sovereign by the dominant members of international society was not yet a reality.

In the negotiations that led to the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the delegation of the Ankara government focused on revising the Treaty of Sèvres. The Ankara government was aiming to achieve its longstanding goal of securing the recognition of its state as an equal sovereign in international society, as expressed in its dedication to the National Pact (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 61 - 63). Although the national sovereignty of the Ankara government would be accepted by the Allies, the exact nature of the sovereignty of the state of Turkey was debated in the course of the conference. Turkey’s chief negotiator, the former intelligence officer, İsmet Paşa,

The Turkish transliteration of the original Ottoman text reads as follows: “İngilizler… Hilafet ve Meşihat makamlarını ele geçirmişlerdi. Evvela, halifenin bir emriyle, Meclis-ı Mebusan’ı toplanacağı zamanı bildirmekszin dağıttı. İzmir’i kurtarmaya çalışan Kuvay-ı Milliye aleyhine şeyhülislamdan fetvalar aldı.” (Gökalp, [1922] 1982f: 145).
argued that given its past political ties within the Ottoman Empire, according to the principle of self-determination Mosul should be considered a part of the new state of Turkey (Coşar and Demirci, 2006: 125). However, his counterpart, Lord Curzon, insisted that Turkey should accept borders that reflected its status as a national state (Venn, 2009: 419). The Allies, therefore, encouraged the Ankara government, which was by that time the only government in the Ottoman Empire, to withdraw its claim to Mosul and its environs in return for accepting a share in the oil production from the province (Venn, 2009). However, the Ankara government insisted that its territorial demands were grounded on national claims rather than on self-interest.

The Ankara government also argued that it would respect the rights of minorities, by which it meant the remaining non-Muslim population within the empire, provided its demands for sovereign equality and territoriality were met (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 6). The Ankara government’s negotiators, though, faced scrutiny from the Grand National Assembly (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 127 – 130; Demirkent, 2017: 180 - 185). The Assembly opposed territorial concessions and stressed the Islamic and Turkish nature of the Assembly as the constituent power of the new state (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 127 - 130; Demirkent, 2017: 180 - 185). A consensus emerged, however, between the Allies and the Ankara government concerning the national nature of the sovereignty of the new state, which resulted in the displacement of the Greek population. The Ankara government had already put in practice policies to advance national sovereignty prior to their formal international. However, the Lausanne Conference, and its scrutiny by the Grand National Assembly, demonstrated how forms of global and local constituent power resulted in the recognition and hence the normalisation of the national sovereignty of the Ankara government.

The recognition of the Ankara government as the sole representative of the remaining territories of the Ottoman Empire was a result of the decision of the government to abolish the sultanate on 1 November 1922 (Ardıç, 2012b: 254 – 255; Demirci, [2005] 2010: 66 – 68). At this point, the Allies and particularly Britain, were torn between recognising the Ankara government or the Istanbul government (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 66 - 68). Following the declaration of the end of the sultanate, the deposed Sultan, Mehmed VI Vahideddin, informed the British commissioner in Istanbul, Rumbold (1922a), that the declaration amounted to the Grand National Assembly of the Ankara government claiming the power of the
caliphate. The new decree passed by the Assembly, asserting its constituent power, argued that the sultanate was abolished and that the Assembly would, from now on, elect the caliph, who would act as the leader of Muslims throughout the world. The deposed Sultan suggested to Rumbold (1922a) that this declaration could have implications for Britain’s Muslim subjects in India and this prompted Rumbold to make inquiries (Oliphant, 1922). However, with the removal of the sultanate and the vesting of the power to elect the caliphate being granted to the Grand National Assembly, the Assembly and, arguably its leader, Mustafa Kemal288, claimed to represent the Islamic world and duly elected Abdülmecid II, a relative of the previous Sultan, as caliph (Aydın, 2007: 135 - 136). Gökalp ([1922] 1982d: 179) also stated that,

“[U]ntil now, the religious jurisdiction of the Ottoman caliphs extended only as far as their Muslim populations within their domains. The caliphate could not extend their religious guidance to the Muslim populations of states that had their own political sovereignty because of the obstruction of these states…However, as the caliph is no longer a sovereign of a state, the caliph can now be in communion with muftis from the whole world.”289 Hence, Gökalp ([1922] 1982d: 179; [1922] 1982e: 183) argued that the Ottoman caliphate could have a renewed global role, detached from the position of a political sovereign, but nonetheless involving “the Sheikh-ul Islam of each state being subject to the office of the caliphate”290. A clash therefore occurred between local forms of constituent power, invoked by the Grand National Assembly, and global forms of constituent power, envisaged by the mandate system and promoted by the victorious Allies.

Confronted with the territorial claims of the Ankara government, the Allies sought to counter them by offering material incentives. British negotiators aimed to resolve the Mosul question by offering the future state of Turkey joint control of the

288 Adam (1922b) suggested, in response to Hardinge’s (1922) view that the new caliph was pro-French, that it was highly unlikely that the Muslims of the world were taking a stance on the basis of the caliph’s orientation, but were rather “too much impressed by the doughty deeds of Mustapha Kemal” to object to the caliph elected by the Ankara government.

289 The Turkish transliteration of this text reads as follows: “Şimdiye kadar, Osmanlı halifelerinin dini nezareti yalnız siyasi metbuları arasında bulunan Müslümanlarla münhasırdı. Başka devletlere tabi bulunan Müslümanlara Osmanlı halifelerinin dini nezareti siyasi emellerin karşınılayacağna emin olamazlardı. Şimdi ise, Halife Hazretleri hiçbir devletin hususi siyasetine merbut merbut haline gelmemiştir, bütün alemdeki İslam müftüleriyile alenen mubahare edebilecektir” (Gökalp, [1922] 1982d: 179).

290 The Turkish transliteration of the text reads as follows: “Bütün milletlerin Şeyhülislamları da hilaflat makamına merbut olmadılar.” (Gökalp, [1922] 1982e: 183).
profits of a petroleum company which would exploit the oil reserves located there (Venn, 2009). Immediately following the end of the war, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company took over 40 per cent, and the Shell oil company obtained more than 12 per cent, of the Turkish Petroleum Company (Adam, 1922a). The Turkish Petroleum Company had been formed in 1912 as a consortium seeking to acquire a concession for exploring oil in the Ottoman Empire (Venn, 2009: 421). The San Remo conference of 1920 had decided, following Germany’s defeat, that France would acquire the share of the Deutsche Bank within this consortium with the French thereby receiving 25 per cent of the Turkish Petroleum Company (Adam, 1922a). Adam (1922a) of the Foreign Office challenged the Colonial Office’s argument that the Turks should not be permitted to participate in a concession of the Turkish Petroleum Company to explore oil in Arab territories (Venn, 2009: 419). Adam (1923c) called for the Ankara government to be sounded out on whether it wanted to participate in the oil company or receive any shares. This could allow the Ankara government to withdraw its claim to Mosul.

Curzon sought to encourage the Turkish government to accept shares of the profit to be made from oil, or oil itself, provided it withdrew its claim to sovereignty over Mosul (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 61; Venn, 2009: 421). Curzon, therefore, supported the suggestion advanced by the Ankara government’s negotiator, İsmet Paşa, that Turkey could own some shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 61). The Ankara government had sought to extend its territorial control to Mosul, through appealing to national sovereignty, which its diplomats were expected to uphold (Demirkent, 2017: 180 – 185; Coşar and Demirci, 2006). After İsmet Paşa left Lausanne in February 1923, he and the other delegates were scrutinised by the Grand National Assembly and its leader, Mustafa Kemal, who argued, in response to criticism from some members of the Assembly, that the Ankara government, known as Turkey, ought not to go to war over Mosul, but could regain Mosul through diplomatic means at a later date (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 125 – 130). Curzon had responded by proposing, instead, an arrangement whereby Turkey would share in the profits of oil production in the territory (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 61; Venn, 2009: 421). The local constituent power of the nation, represented in the Grand National Assembly, was successful in imposing constitutional rules on domestic society and its representatives, who now embraced

However, the Ankara government’s negotiators could not prevent the Allied negotiators from restricting the boundaries of the territory of the new Turkish state on the basis of this very principle of national sovereignty.

Curzon also sought to deny Mosul to the Ankara government by claiming that the area was largely populated by Kurds (MacArthur-Seal, 2018: 781). During the Lausanne negotiations, İsmet Paşa (1922a: 4) argued that Iraq, and especially Mosul, had been integral parts of the Ottoman Empire. İsmet Paşa (1922a: 4) opposed the imposition of a British mandate over Iraq, which would include Mosul, because

“(l)a situation des personnes qui vivent dans notre patrie et qui jusqu’aux confirme les plus recules du pays participent, comme citoyens, a tous les droits et a toutes les responsabilités, ne peut être comparée à la situation des habitants d’une sorte de colonie”.

İsmet Paşa (1922a: 4; 1922b: 5) stressed that Mosul had not been a “colony”, but was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, represented in its parliament and hence had ties to the Turks represented by the Ankara government. İsmet Paşa (1922b: 4) then produced a memorandum which he declared contained “ethnographic” proof that Mosul should be considered part of Turkey, because it was populated by “Turcs et .. Kurdes”, who had close ties to the Arab population. İsmet Paşa (1922b) claimed this information had been compiled before the war and thus could not have been manipulated to strengthen the Ankara government’s claim to the province. İsmet Paşa (1922b: 5) further referred to how the Iraqis had rebelled against Britain in 1920 – 1921 and dismissed the 1914 Bitlis uprising against the Ottomans as the agitation of “consuls”. However, British negotiators continued to dismiss these arguments. (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 103 - 109) This has been interpreted as a deliberate attempt to force the Ankara government’s delegates to leave the negotiations and thereby allow Britain to maintain its mandate over Iraq (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 103 - 109). The American negotiators at Lausanne believed that Curzon (1922c) had adopted an uncompromising attitude (Venn, 1990). They believed that the British dismissed arguments based on the concept of national

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291 The French text can be translated into English as follows: “The situation of the people who live in our homeland and who, including in the distant parts of the country, participate, as citizens, in all the rights and responsibilities, cannot be compared to the situation of the inhabitants of a kind of colony” (İsmet Paşa, 1922a: 4).
sovereignty in order to encourage the Ankara government to break off negotiations (MacArthur-Seal, 2018: 781). In this context, on 5 February 1923, Gökalp ([1923] 1982: 157) wrote that Curzon’s opposition to the Kurdish MPs, who had argued for the inclusion of Mosul within Turkey, had been met by opposition with “the whole of the Islamic world commending the Kurdish MPs” who had “become a nuisance to the British Foreign Minister”292. Nationalism, therefore, was used by Curzon and the Ankara government to bolster their positions with regard to justifying claims to sovereignty. However, both disagreed about the exact nature of the Turkish nation.

Britain argued that because the Ankara government might not respect minority rights it would require international supervision and this would restrict its sovereignty. This argument was used to oppose the Ankara government’s demands to extend its sovereignty to territories in Iraq, which were populated by Assyrians, Kurds and Arabs, as well as Turks. Adam (1923a; see also Anonymous, 1923) noted how Kurdish notables had sought to engineer an alliance with the Ankara government. These notables had contacted İsmet Paşa to establish ties with the Ankara government in order to control Mosul and to secure autonomy for the Van province. Sheikh Mahmud, a notable in Mosul, had sent three representatives to the Grand National Assembly at Ankara (Ali, 1997: 525). Some in the National Movement, such as Rafet Paşa, clamoured that “Mosul is Turkish” (Coşar and Demirci, 2006: 125). Adam (1923b) later reported that Curzon favoured informing Agha Petros, the leader of the Assyrians, and the Ankara government that the Mosul issue should be handled by the League of Nations. Curzon could have been aiming to prevent the Ankara government and the Assyrians reaching an agreement on Mosul. Curzon (1922a: 2) had also informed İsmet Paşa that the granting of Mosul directly to Turkey “is not even consistent with the first article of the National Pact to which he consistently appeals as Magna Carta of now Turkey.” The article had stated that areas which were inhabited by an Arab majority at the time of the Armistice Moudros would have their fate determined by a plebiscite (Hale, 2000: 47). The fate of Mosul, however, remained unresolved and Curzon and İsmet later agreed to discuss it at a further conference organised by the League of Nations (Coşar and

Demirci, 2006). İsmet Paşa, therefore, reiterated the commitment of the Ankara government to respect minority rights and guarantee political representation, which were post-war constitutional rules of global international society, thereby normalising the sovereignty of Ankara government in global international society.

The British delegation to Lausanne had decided, prior to the conference, that the issue of a future Kurdish state, which had featured in the Treaty of Sèvres, would be shelved. The issue of a Kurdish state, called for in the Treaty of Sèvres, would not be on the agenda (Ali, 1997: 522 – 524). Britain believed that the western frontier of Iran should be determined and Iraq should be empowered to prevent the spread of Bolshevism (Ali, 1997: 522 – 524; Schofield, 2008). Although the Ankara government failed to come to terms with representatives of other ethnic groups over autonomy arrangements, it eventually agreed to extend minority rights to some non-Muslims. Tyrrell (1922) noted that İsmet Paşa sought to distinguish between the Armenian and Greek populations. İsmet Paşa believed that the latter “will always be irredentists”, and so he would “reach an understanding with the Armenian national delegation to keep the Armenians in Turkey” (Tyrrell, 1922). But, Curzon (1922b: 11) was quick to point out that the Ankara government had already declared that it would support minority rights in Eastern Thrace, in its claim to extend its sovereignty to the region made on February 17, 1920. Curzon (1922b: 11) also noted, that on 4 October 1921 the Ankara government recognised “[t]he liberty of the Straits on the condition of assuring the security of Constantinople and of the Sea of Marmora, as well as the safeguarding of the rights of minorities in the limits in which it is compatible with the independence and the sovereignty of Turkey”.

Curzon (1922b: 11) indicated how the Ankara government, in its declaration concerning the Straits, had noted that “minorities have a right to protection” and that “the treaty of peace must contain special provisions to that effect”. Religious identities were taken as the basis of ethnicity by the Ankara government, thereby allowing emphasis to be placed on an Islamic Turkish nation and Christian minorities (Barkey and Gavrilis, 2016; Bayar, 2014b; Oran, 2007: 35). Therefore, the recognition of minority rights in Turkey reflected a combination of the concerns of the Allies and the particular views of the Turkish negotiators.
The Treaty of Lausanne therefore formalised the de facto emergence of national communities, which had occurred through the violent displacement of the non-Muslim population, particularly the Greeks, in territories controlled by the Ankara government. The population transfer, which the Turkish delegation justified on the grounds that it would prevent the Greek minority from seeking to unite with Greece, was welcomed by international actors (Özsu, 2015: 14 - 20). Here, attempts to reorder the international after the end of the war, which, as mentioned previously, owed much to the pre-war idea of the standard of “civilization” and nationalism, shaped local forms of constituent power (Özsu, 2015: 45). There was a process of what Özsu (2015: 20) terms the “formalization” of displacement, whereby the transfer of populations between Greece and the Ankara government, came to be legally sanctioned. Following Greece’s defeat, attention also focused on whether Thrace should remain part of Turkish territory (Coşar and Demirci, 2006: 125; Gingeras, 2015: 374 - 378). The Ottoman Empire, whose elites had now reconstituted themselves as the state of Turkey, had previously been perceived as a distinctly un-European power and hence its control of Thrace was deemed problematic (Morozov and Rumelili, 2012; Neumann and Welsh, 1991; Yosmaoğlu, 2013: 11). However, after the entry of the National Movement into Istanbul population transfer was viewed as a second-best solution to the question of Turkey’s status within Europe (Özsu, 2015: 72 - 73). Özsu (2015) documents the desire amongst international lawyers and the League of Nations for such a solution. Prior to such displacement being “formalized” in the manner suggested by Özsu (2015: 15) many Greeks were already being forcefully removed from Turkey. In light of this, the Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos (1922; 1923; see also Curzon, 1923) asked the Allies to pressure the Ankara government to postpone the ongoing forced removal of the Greek population of Anatolia, which preceded its official sanctioning in 1923 (Rumbold, 1922c; 1923; Toynbee, 1922; 1923). Because of economic imperatives, the Greek population of Istanbul was largely maintained, on the insistence of Nansen, the Norwegian expert who oversaw the transfer, alongside the Turkish population of Western Thrace293, now in Greece, who were exempt from the transfer (Ross, 2015: 144 - 145). Therefore, the Treaty of Lausanne saw international actors

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293 The Western Thracians were recognised as a minority in Greece who could possibly cede to Turkey in a future plebiscite, as originally called for by the Ankara government (Coşar and Demirci, 2006: 125; Ross, 2015: 144).
and the representatives of Turkey and Greece applying the principle of national sovereignty to determine the extent of the sovereignty of the two states (Ross, 2015: 144 - 145). This was understood as an expression of national sovereignty which was regarded as an institution in international society at that time, but it was preceded by the de facto practices of national sovereignty engaged in by the Ankara government.

5. The Treaty of Lausanne and the global and local constitution of national sovereignty in Turkey and international society

The Ankara government eventually secured recognition as an equal member of international society. This was achieved by skilful diplomacy in which representatives of the government spoke of having the potential to meet the standard of ‘civilisation’. Soon after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the caliphate was abolished on 3 March 1924, signalling that Turkey would be a secular state (Nafi, 2015: 31). The position had been recently filled by Abdülmecid I, a member of the ruling House of Osman, who was elected by the Grand National Assembly (Ardıç, 2012b: 273). This had shown how the Grand National Assembly had become one of the constituent powers over the new state of Turkey, alongside legal advisers and observers who had been despatched to Turkey in line with the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. An extensive programme of legal reform, involving the translation of numerous law codes was undertaken in the name of the people by the Grand National Assembly (Özman, 2010: 73; Öszu, 2010). This borrowing of legal codes occurred in the context of a rival form of constituent power to that of the Grand National Assembly, in the form of the caliphate, being eliminated. An argument for changing the role of the caliphate had earlier been made by Gökalp ([1916] 1981a; [1916] 1981b), who had spoken of combining political and religious authority in the Ottoman Empire, which now allowed the Ankara government to abolish the caliphate. This subsequently enabled the Ankara government, which became the Republic of Turkey, to accept legal reform, in accordance with globally accepted legal standards, in order to obtain the recognition of its equal sovereignty. In practice, this meant temporarily accepting an external constituent power, in the form of legal advisers from neutral states, who would oversee reforms (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 145). The activities of these legal advisers has not, however, been properly studied.

294 On the legal advisers assigned to Turkey see Kayaoğlu (2010a: 145) and M.O. Hudson (1927: 5).
One adviser, Sauser-Hall (1913), developed an approach to the historical and comparative study of constitutions, which arguably sheds light on how these legal changes occurring in Turkey were understood. This theory noted that it was possible for states to develop hybrid constitutions, drawing upon different legal traditions. These constitutions stemmed from different constituent powers, which corresponded to actual international and domestic social forces, and would therefore result in the reconstitution of both international society and domestic society.

The emergence of global norms of nationalism, and the view that their adoption would empower the Ottoman Empire, resulted in the abolition of the caliphate. The decision to abolish the caliphate was arguably a culmination of the division of labour between the interpretation of religion, i.e. “diyanet”, and enforcement of religion, i.e. “din” (Dressler, 2015: 522). Traditionally, both of these functions had been overseen by the Sultan and the caliph, but, Gökalp ([1916] 1981a; [1916] 1981b) argued that the Tanzimat reformers had assumed that they were one and the same when they developed a conception of the sultanate and the caliphate that framed the person of the Sultan and the caliph as the leader of the Muslims in the empire. During the First World War, Gökalp ([1915] 1981a) had argued that a division of labour concerning the interpretation and enforcement of religion was required because of the demands placed on the caliphate during the war, when state resources were scarce (Dressler, 2015: 513, 517 - 519). The proper task of the ulema was to engage in matters of “diyanet”, meaning guidance, whereas matters of “kaza”, meaning the enforcement of laws, needed to be separated from their purview (Gökalp, [1915] 1981a: 46). The religious authority of the caliphate, on the other hand, ought, according to Gökalp ([1916] 1981a: 62) to be understood as stemming from the power of the caliph to uphold the law, expressed in the notion of “kaza” and facilitated by subaltern officials, known as “kadıhs”.

Subsequently, after the sultanate was abolished prior to the Lausanne conference, tensions emerged over whether the Grand National Assembly could be considered merely a national assembly, or whether it was a body which could speak for the

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Islamic world, because it held the power to elect the caliphate (Arıç, 2012b: 259 - 262; Guida, 2008: 282 - 284). Gökalp ([1923] 2007: 311) recognised the national nature of the Ankara government’s sovereignty, and insisted that the seat of the caliphate should be in Turkey:

“as the caliphate cannot emerge from a non-Muslim country, it must be from a fighting Islamic state that has a strong army and is completely free. For many centuries, Turkey [sic] was the state that had these properties and, today, the new Turkey is the only state that possesses these properties.”

However, Sultan Mehmed Vahideddin, who had fled Istanbul as forces of the Ankara government arrived there, planned to organise his return as the caliph (Teitelbaum, 2000: 417 – 418). There were also moves to introduce an Arab caliphate with Emir Hussein, the Hashemite Arab leader and Sharif, or ruler, of Mecca, seeking recognition as the caliph (Haddad, 1997: 273; Teitelbaum, 2000: 422 – 423). Teitelbaum (2000: 424) claims that the Ankara government initially supported efforts to get Hussein recognised as the caliph. But, following the defeat of Hussein by the forces of Ibn Saud, a powerful family in Arabia, the Ankara government moved to abolish the institution of the caliphate (Teitelbaum, 2000: 422 - 423). The government later transformed itself into the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923. A special commission was formed to draft a new constitution, following the declaration of the republic (Demirkent, 2017: 190). Many members of the Grand National Assembly, such as Tunali Hilmi, who was a former member of the CUP (see Ateş, 2009) and Sheikh Servet, defined the new regime as a “halk cumhuriyeti” (“people’s republic”) (Demirkent, 2017: 190). This was reflected in the 1924 constitution, which stressed that the nation was the sole source of sovereignty (Demirkent, 2017: 190 - 192). Islamic concepts, such as those used in the theories of Ibn Khaldun, which equated the form of solidarity or “asabiyya” of a people with their capacity to rule as caliph, also overlapped with national and racial thinking, according to the Islamist cleric Rashid Rida (Arıç, 2012a: 315; see also Haddad, 1997: 273). As Celal Nuri, a delegate of the republic’s assembly suggested, this meant that if there was to be a caliph, he could only be elected by representatives from all Muslim nations (Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 229 - 230). This ended any claim that the Ottoman state had sovereignty over the Islamic world.

296 Throughout this period, the Indian Khilafat movement sought to maintain the institution of the caliphate and lobbied Britain to this end (see Gökalp, [1922] 1982g: 190).
297 Rashid Rida himself opposed this line of thinking (Haddad, 1997: 273).
The Ankara government had been perceived as a Pan-Islamist movement, which might cooperate with the Bolsheviks to lead a worldwide anti-colonial, and Islamic uprising. Perceptions changed with the abolition of the caliphate in 1924. Throughout the period from 1918 to the abolition of the caliphate, Britain believed that the National Movement and the government it formed in Ankara had an Islamic character (Yenen, 2018: 788). Intelligence and Foreign Office officials were wary of any threat posed to Britain’s colonies in Egypt and India and Britain’s presence in what is now termed the Middle East (Aydı'n, 2007: 135 – 136; Yenen, 2018: 77). The Ankara government had, indeed, sought to cooperate with the Bolsheviks, but the latter were more interested in working with other groups who were remnants of the CUP (Göl, 2013: 136 - 143; Yenen, 2016: 258 - 295). Enver Paşa was killed in August 1922 while leading an Islamist rebellion against the Bolsheviks, having previously sought to engineer cooperation between Central Asian Muslims, Turks and the Bolsheviks against British India (Ş. Yılmaz, 1999). The removal of the CUP further solidified the pre-existing ties between the Ankara government and the Bolsheviks, since the Ankara government no longer feared Soviet support of the CUP (Gökay, 1997: 120 - 122). In theory, both Pan-Islamism298 and Bolshevism299 corresponded to sets of universal ideas which were incompatible with the notion of having sovereignty over a specific area. In practice, the Ankara government and the Bolshevik regime limited their revolutions to territories over which they would exercise control. The Bolsheviks, for instance, did not protest at the assassination of the leadership of the Communist Party of Turkey in suspicious circumstances (Gökay, 1993: 221). The Ankara government adopted a territorial conception of nationalism, stressing Anatolia300 as the homeland of the Turks, rather than adopting Turkish irredentism (Durgun301, 2011: 111 – 117; Erimtan, 2008; Özkan, 2012).

298 Aydn (2017: 181) points to how Pan-Islamism previously allowed the Ottomans to claim "spiritual sovereignty" over the Islamic world. See also Kia (1996).
299 The Bolsheviks sought to start a “world revolution”, during the First World War, to spread communism throughout the world (Thomas, 2015: 284; see also Lih, 2016).
300 The pre-Islamic ancient civilisations of Anatolia were presented as the primordial Turks (Erimtan, 2008).
301 Believing that a nation was ultimately a construct that nationalists ought to defend and develop, Halide Edip challenged the arguments of Fuat Köprülü, a fellow nationalist and member of the Turkish Hearths, a nationalist association originally established by the CUP, just prior to the Balkan Wars (Durgun, 2011: 111 - 117). Köprülü had argued that the new state of Turkey ought to be recognised as representing all ethnic Turks worldwide (Durgun, 2011: 111). However, Halide Edip
constituent power in both polities, was consequently limited through a recognition of each other’s territory and the principle of non-interference.

Although the Ankara government relied on Islamist and Muslim elements to challenge the Allied occupation, the government increasingly came to adopt more nationalist characteristics and shifted from Muslim nationalism to Turkish nationalism. This was a product of how the Ankara government emerged from social and revolutionary movements seeking to represent the largely Turkish-speaking Muslim population of Anatolia in international peace conferences held after the First World War (Balistreri, 2015; Demirkent, 2017: 97). The Grand National Assembly claimed to represent the Muslim population and restricted suffrage to Muslim men (Demirkent, 2017: 117). However, its basic law of 1921 had directly referred to the Wilsonian and Leninist concept of self-determination (Demirkent, 2017: 94). Significantly, the 1923 constitution, amended after the Treaty of Lausanne, maintained the nationalist nature of the Ankara government, which was now known as the Republic of Turkey. But, instead of a conception of nationalism which equated being Muslim with being a member of the nation, the new constitution recognised Turkishness as the defining aspect. The end of the caliphate in 1924, which Gökalp ([1923] 1977a: 20) argued had “worked against Turkishness”303, meant that it was necessary to organise a political party to bring about the required social changes for the survival of national sovereignty. Gökalp ([1923] 1977e: 68) argued that even though he considered the “Turkish nation” to be the “most civilised of all Islamic nations”, he nonetheless believed that the “social division of labour” and the “ability to recognise value” of the Turkish nation needed to be improved.304 In this context,

argued that it ought instead to be considered to be sovereign over the territory of Anatolia and the remaining Ottoman territories in Thrace (Durgun, 2011: 111).

302 Non-Muslims were initially not allowed to vote in the elections for the constituent assembly, and were only allowed to vote when it was decided that it would be illegal, under existing Ottoman laws, to deny them from participating (Demirkent, 2017: 117).

303 This phrase is transliterated as “halifelik…Türklüğün zararına çalışmıştır” (Gökalp, [1923] 1977a: 20).

304 The transliterated text where these claims are made reads as follows: “[G]örüülüyor ki, Türk milleti, en medeni milletlerle musabakaya girecek derecede müttekamil bir içtimai bünyeye maliktir. Türklker’in, Müslüman milletlerin en medenisi olması ve medenilik yolunda onlara önmeklik rolünü yapması bundan gellyor… Demokrat bir cemiyet olmak itibariyle Avrupa milletlerinden hiç de geri kalmadığımız halde, medeniyetçe, onlardan henüz çok geride bulunduğumuz, inkar mümkün olmayan bir hakikattır…Bugün medeni milletlerin tealisine sebep olup ta, bize bulunmayan bilhassa iki meziyet vardır: Bunlardan birincisi (İçtimai iş bölümü), ikincisi (kıymetlerin tefazulu) dur” (This text translates to English as follows: “It is obvious that the Turkish nation contains a social body that means it can compete with some of the most civilised states. This is the reason why the Turks are
Gökalp ([1923] 1977e: 68) argued that recognising value meant that the tasks and duties of individuals produced and sustained by the division of labour should be respected. Images of nudity, for instance, could be great works of art and hence contribute to the development of this sphere of society, whilst being offensive in a religious context (Gökalp, [1923] 1977e 68). This turn to civilisation led to Gökalp ([1923] 1977e), as well as Ahmed Rıza ([1922] 1990: 21) arguing for a balancing of Eastern and Western influences. Ahmed Rıza ([1922] 1990: 21), in particular, believed that it was necessary to balance European and Islamic influences, arguing that he had personally

“worked to combat this hostility of the official Turkey of Abdul Hamid and to show, especially in the Turkish edition of this organ, the good sides of the European institutions, in order to attract the sympathy of my compatriots to true civilization.305”

Therefore, the remnants of the CUP, had organised the Muslim and Turkish population of what remained of the Ottoman Empire, to secure their participation in conferences that would facilitate the building of post-war institutions of international society (Demirkent, 2017: chs. 1 and 2). While these conferences, which ended with the Treaty of Lausanne, can be characterised as processes in which the constitutional rules of international society were invoked and/or established, the domestic society of Turkey also came to be established and altered in the same process.

According to Gökalp, state and society could be strengthened through the agency of a political party asserting the national rights of the nation. With the exception of Parla and Davison’s (2004: 116) and Topal’s (2017: 284) indirect focus on how Gökalp’s intellectual output was motivated by the need to ensure that the Ottoman Empire, and subsequently Turkey, could secure its place internationally following defeat, there is no study of Gökalp’s views on sovereignty and its internal and external dimensions. However, as a theorist of the new republic at the time of its founding, studying Gökalp’s ([1923] 1977a: 13) ideas can demonstrate how he considered the most civilised among the Muslim countries and why it plays the role of setting an example for them… Although we are no different from other European nations insofar as we are democratic, we cannot deny that we are far behind them in terms of our level of civilisation… Today there are two virtues that civilised states possess and which we lack: The first of these is the social division of labour and the second is the ability to recognise value” (Gökalp, [1923] 1977e: 68).

305 The original French text reads as follows: “j’ai travaillé à combattre cette hostilité de la Turquie officielle d’Abdul Hamid et à montrer, particulièrement dans l’édition turque de cet organe, les bonne côtés des institutions européennes, afin d’attirer la sympathie de mes compatriotes vers la vraie civilisation” (Ahmed Rıza, [1922] 1990: 21).
believed that “national sovereignty” in Turkey could only be enabled by the presence of a political vanguard. Gökalp ([1923] 2007: 305) argued that the vanguard was “the Peoples’ Party”, which would promote “internal politics… based on the principle of the self-government of the people, free from the sultanate” 306. According to Gökalp ([1923] 1977a: 13) under a system of “national sovereignty” 307 such a political party was necessary. This was “because the people themselves do not have a mind or nervous system of their own and hence do not have a pure social conscience” 308, which each individual conscience must embrace (Gökalp [1923] 1977a: 13). Such a party could also, according to Gökalp ([1923] 1977a: 14), “act as a lightning rod that can alleviate the negative effect of the individualism that may be fostered by a constitutional order” 309. Moreover, Gökalp ([1923] 2007: 306) argued that “national sovereignty” did entail responsibilities from a nation towards the individual, but noted that

“this moral responsibility cannot be suggested or forced upon it [i.e., the nation] by an outside force... That the only thing limiting a force is that force itself, does not pose an obstacle to its freedom and independence. Rather, because such a force would operate under the bounds of reason and logic, it enjoys an additional degree of freedom and independence. Reason and logic have an international sovereignty that is superior over political sovereignties. Alfred Fouillée thus refers to ‘logic’ as the ‘sovereign of the sovereigns.’ All forms of sovereignty must bow down before logic.” 310

According to Parla (1985: 82), Gökalp did not oppose the formation of a party, even though he feared that the presence of different parties would encourage “sectarianism and internationalism”. Gökalp ([1923] 2007: 306) also stressed how national sovereignty, which forms the basis of the Peoples Party’s platform, will

306 The Turkish transliteration of this passage reads as follows: “Halk Fırkası’nın dahili siyasetindeki esas, milletin ferdi saltanattan azade olarak kendi kendini idare etmesidir.” (Gökalp, [1923] 2007: 305).
307 Gökalp ([1923] 1977a: 13) here uses the term “milli hakimiyet” to refer to national sovereignty.
308 The Turkish transliteration of this phrase reads as follows: “Milletin kendisine mahsus bir dimağı, kendisine mahsus bir sinir manzumesi, (cümle-i asabiyesi) bulunmadığı için, içtimai vici dırı karşımızmış, saf bir halde bulunamayız” (Gökalp, [1923] 1977a: 13).
309 The Turkish transliteration in … reads as follows: “…fırka teşkilatının cemiyetçiliği kanun-u esaslarını ferdiyetçiliğinden doğacak mazurlara karşı bir yıldırım siperi (siper-i saika) hükümne geçer” (Gökalp, [1923] 1977a: 14).
310 The Turkish transliteration of this text reads as follows: “… bu ahlaki mükellefiyeti ona harici bir kuvvet teklif ve tahmi edemez... Bir kuvvetin kendi kendini tahdid etmesi hürriyet ve istiklaline münafı değildir. Bilakis, akl ve mantık dairesinde hareket ettiği için, fazla olarak ruhi bir hürriyet ve istiklale de malik demektir. Bundan dolayı ki Alfred Fouillée ismindeki feylesof, ‘mantık’a ‘hakimler hakimi’ unvanını veriyor. Her hakimiyet mantık karışıında ser-fûr etmek mecburiyetindedir.” (Gökalp, [1923] 2007: 306).
challenge threats to sovereignty from “external capitulations311”, “internal capitulations312”, the “sultanate” and “reactionaries313”. The defence of national sovereignty, for Gökalp ([1923] 2007: 306), in turn, would enable the emergence of a national will, with a “rationality” and “logic” of its own, which would allow it to govern most effectively in accordance with universal principles.

Turkey’s inclusion in global international society as an equal sovereign was facilitated by its conformity to the standard of ‘civilisation’. But, the recognition of Turkey meeting this standard was arguably tentative as Turkey still had to deal with its Ottoman legacy. A political party could enable solidarity between the state and society and thereby also allow the Turkish state to achieve its goal of situating its society within Western civilisation. Gökalp’s distinction between culture and civilisation is relevant in this instance. Gökalp ([1923] 1977b: 43) asserted that “culture is national and civilisation is international”, 314 after having suggested earlier (see Gökalp, [1923] 1977b: 42) that “for civilisation to enter into a country, it must first be imbued into its culture”315. This phrase summarises Gökalp’s view of the international and the local. Although Nomer (2017: 416) argues that Gökalp saw states and national cultures as shaped by their interactions with different civilisations, the above phrase suggests that Gökalp actually believed that a state could only become ‘civilised’ through the values of a “civilization” first becoming adopted by a nation. Gökalp ([1923] 1977b: 42), together with Ahmed Rıza ([1922] 1990: 121), who had cited Auguste Comte and Gustave Le Bon’s praise of the achievements of Arabic culture, then argued that the Tanzimat reforms of the nineteenth century were justified in order to adopt the values of European civilisation. They contended, though, that these values had actually been developed by Muslims at an earlier date. However, Gökalp ([1923] 1977b: 42), noted that the Tanzimat reforms had failed because they had not been imbued into the national

311 Gökalp ([1923] 2007: 306) understands these as the forms of extraterritorial legislation that grant privileges to foreigners.
312 These, for Gökalp, referred to the privileges accorded to non-Muslim religious communities.
313 Gökalp ([1923] 2007: 306) defined these groups and individuals as those “who try to use religion in politics” (“Dini siyasete alet etmek isteyen mürteciler”).
314 The Turkish transliteration of this text reads as follows: “hars millidir, medeniyet beynelmileldir” (Gökalp, [1923] 1977b: 43).
315 The Turkish transliteration of this text reads as follows: “Bir millette, medeniyet, tabii surette memlekete girebilmek için, mutlaka harse aşılanmalıdır; hars millidir, medeniyet beyenmilleldir” (Gökalp, [1923] 1977b: 42).
culture. Gökalp ([1923] 1977f: 50), therefore, promoted “abandoning Ottoman civilisation and discovering and promoting Turkish culture”316 in the new Turkey. Here, Turkey would join other nations that seceded from the Ottoman Empire (see Gökalp, [1923] 1977d: 56). Gökalp ([1923] 1977d: 56) noted that:

“other nations left the Ottoman community in a cultured, civilised and wealthy manner, whereas the poor Turks, with a broken sword in their hands, have been unable to secure any inheritance apart from an old plough.” 317

Gökalp ([1923] 1977c: 63) believed that Turkey could survive and secure its sovereignty, through positioning Turkey as an Islamic state within Western civilisation. But, in this regard, Gökalp ([1923] 1977c: 63) also referred to Japan as a template, since Japan had preserved its own culture in the context of its inclusion in global international society. Ahmed Rıza ([1922] 1990: 11), presented a similar argument, insofar as he recognised “the splendid results it [i.e. European civilisation] has brought in the material field”, but stated that one “must not forget the moral qualities of the ‘savages’, of which many civilised people today are sometimes deprived”. Gökalp ([1923] 1977c: 63) believed that the “Japanese and the Jews”318 were included as a part of the civilised world by Europeans, even though they were not Christian. This led Gökalp ([1923] 1977c: 63) to conclude that the Turkish people could be recognised as a part of Western civilisation. Such recognition would enable Turkey to be recognised as equal to other nation-states within this civilisation.

However, the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne demanded specific conditions for the recognition of Turkey’s sovereign equality, including the meeting of certain legal standards by the judiciary. Kayaoğlu (2010a: 145) has argued that the efforts of Turkish state elites to engage in state-building enabled Turkey to be recognised as an equal sovereign by established states in international society. Kayaoğlu (2010a:145) stresses that creating a state capable of enforcing laws removed any pretext for the continuation of extraterritorial practices, which had previously threatened the

316 The transliterated text where Gökalp ([1923] 1977f: 50) asserts this, reads as follows: “Osmanlı medeniyetini terk ederek Türk harsını bulmağa ve yükseltmeye”.
317 The transliterated text where Gökalp ([1923] 1977d: 56) asserts this, reads as follows: “[d]iğer kavimler, Osmanlı camiasından irfanlı, medeniyeti ve zengin bir halde ayrılırken, zavallı Türkler, ellerinde kırık bir kılınçla, eski bir sabandan başka bir mirasa nail olamadılar.”
318 The Turkish transliteration of the full sentence, in which this phrase is quoted from, reads as follows: “Bugünkü Avrupa medeniyeti, Avrupa beynelmilliyeti, bu iki enmuzecin intikal devresinde bulunuyor. Avrupa beynelmilliyeti, Japonlar’la Yahudiler’i müsavı seriati kendi medeniyetine mensup saydığı için, dini bir medeniyetten ve dini bir beynelmilliyetten çıkmak istediğini ima ediyor” (Gökalp, [1923] 1977c: 63).
Ottoman Empire from enjoying a form of sovereignty equal to that of other established states. However, one of the conditions of the granting of sovereign equality in the Treaty of Lausanne was the need for several legal advisers from neutral states to oversee legal reforms within Turkey (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 145; Özsu, 2011: 842 - 843). These advisers would ensure that Turkey’s legal system conformed to international judicial standards which required moving away from a judicial system that appeared to be based largely on religious law. Kayaoğlu (2010a: 145) has also noted, following İsmet İnönü’s memoirs, that the advisers assigned to Turkey under Lausanne did not play a significant role in reforming the Turkish legal system. However, the constitutional theories developed by Georges Sauser-Hall, a Swiss legal adviser and jurist, would appear to mirror the actual process of constitutional reform in Turkey. Advocating a comparative approach to the study of law, which he believed mirrored the “evolution of life”, Sauser-Hall (1913: 100) believed that it is

“necessary to divide the legal institutions into three groups - including of course a large number of subdivisions - some originating from savage peoples, the others corresponding to that state of semi-barbarism which the internationalists have accustomed to denominate by the name of Asian civilization, the last including the legislative documents of the Western States whose degree of culture is similar.”

Further, commenting on the emergence of European constitutions, Sauser-Hall (1913: 96), had argued that:

“[a]n institution frequently arises spontaneously among several peoples; sometimes, it owes its appearance only to a phenomenon of imitation; this genesis of legal rules, their adaptation to the genius of this or that race, the reasons for their transformation or destruction; it will be up to him [i.e. the scholar of comparative law] to make the distinction between the two elements that are present in each legal system: the native element and the foreign element; often, by striking contrasts, he will reveal the root causes of legal diversity.”

319 The original French text reads as follows: “Il faudrait alors diviser les institutions juridiques en trois groupes – comprenant cela va de soi un grand nombre de subdivisions - , les unes émanant de peuples sauvages, les autres correspondant à cet état de demi-barbarie que les internationalistes ont accoutumé de désigner par le nom de civilisation asiatique, les derniers comprenant les documents législatifs des États occidentaux dont le degré de culture est à peuples semblable” (Sauser-Hall, 1913: 100).

320 The original French text reads as follows: “Une institution surgit fréquemment avec spontanéité chez plusieurs peuples; parfois, elle ne doit son apparition qu’à un phénomène d’imitation; ce genèse des règles juridiques, leur adaptation au génie de telle ou telle race, les raisons de leur transformation ou de leur destruction; il lui appartiendra de faire la part des deux éléments qui se disputent tout système juridique: l’élément indigène et l’élément étranger; souvent, par de saisissants contrastes, il saura révéler les causes profondes des diversités juridiques” (Sauser-Hall, 1913: 96).
Bearing in mind the above, as Miller (2000: 352 – 353) and Özsu (2010: 74) argue, articles 140 and 132 in the Swiss and Turkish Civil Codes, respectively, both dealt with the procedures for divorce but differed in terms of the period of separation they recognised as legitimate for one partner to ask for a divorce in a marriage. Although the Swiss Code argued that this was six months, the Turkish Civil Code, on the basis of earlier requirements in the sharia, argued that this period could only be four months (Miller, 2000: 352 – 353; Özsu, 2010: 74). As Özsu (2010: 74) notes, Sauser-Hall (1926: 34), remarking on the translation of the code, was pleased with how it maintained “the spirit, the ordinance, the text and, finally, other respects” of the Swiss Civil Code. Consequently, arguably both global and local constituent powers, in the form of officials acting on behalf of the Grand National Assembly and outside legal advisers, played a role in the constitutional changes that were required for ending extraterritoriality in Turkey.

6. Conclusion:

This chapter has demonstrated how the Ankara government, which became the Republic of Turkey, gained recognition of its sovereign equality through firstly consolidating state control over territory and population, by means such as the issuing of passports. Subsequently, the Treaty of Lausanne enabled the Ankara government to gain conditional acceptance of its sovereign equality as the new state of Turkey. In the lead up to the Lausanne conference, the Ankara government had assumed de facto control over Istanbul and had exploited divisions amongst the Allied powers. These powers were unable to challenge the Ankara government or rely on their local supporters to do so. Instead, the Allies signed an armistice with the Ankara government. At Lausanne, the Turkish negotiators and the Allies made use of the national boundaries that had emerged after the end of the war and legally formalised the ongoing process of the displacement of populations. Both Turkey and the Allies used national sovereignty to advance their claims and counterclaims. This was because national sovereignty could be exploited to deny or to extend territoriality. However, the Allies also insisted that extraterritoriality within Turkey should end on condition that the legal system within Turkey conformed to ‘civilised’

321 The original text, as quoted in Özsu (2010: 74) reads as follows: “l’esprit, l’ordonnance, le texte de ce dernier ont été respectés” (Sauser-Hall, 1926: 34).
practices. This resulted in the Treaty of Lausanne requiring certain advisers to oversee the legal reform of the constitution of Turkey. These practitioners and theorists helped translate and apply the Swiss Civil Code which was perceived as providing the foundation for the removal of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Turkey. Turkey also voluntarily abolished the institution of the caliphate, which had previously functioned as one of the sources of law. However, even in the Ottoman period, some functions of the caliphate had been transferred to ministries. Turkish officials also ensured that the Swiss Civil Code was translated and applied in a manner that maintained elements of the previous legal system which was based on principles deriving from sharia law. Consequently, the recognition of Turkey as an equal sovereign in international society was made possible by the imposition of conditions that required a degree of conformity with international legal standards, while still allowing local forms of constitutionalism to remain. In this way, Turkey was normalised and accepted as a sovereign equal to the established states in global international society.
7. Conclusion:

1. Introduction:

This chapter presents a summary of the findings of the thesis. It highlights how the thesis contributes to International Relations theory and to historical studies of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. The first section argues that two tendencies can be identified from the empirical account of the struggles of the Young Turks to gain recognition of their sovereign equality in the period 1908 – 1923. In both 1908 to 1911 and 1918 to 1922, the Young Turks sought to gain recognition of the sovereign equality of their state, in line with widespread interpretations of the constitutional rules of global international society. Between 1911 - 1918 and late 1922 - 1923, on the other hand, different strands of the Young Turks sought to influence how the constitutional principles of international society were applied towards their state. They sought to secure recognition of their state as a sovereign, equal to other sovereigns in global international society. In the period 1911 - 1918, this involved attempting to alter, remove or replace the rules of international society through normative and social power. In late 1922-1923, the Ankara government brought about a legal system that appeared to be in conformity with international standards. The second section demonstrates how the concept of constituent power best explains how states such as Turkey came to be recognised as sovereigns that were equals to other sovereign states in global international society. The third section assesses how the argument of this thesis, based on the concept of constituent power, points to the weaknesses of earlier explanations of how the current global international society of sovereign states emerged. The broader implications of this for International Relations theory, intellectual history, and the relationship between theory and history are discussed in the fourth section. It is argued that this thesis can help develop non-ideal theories to explain changes in international society, through studying how changes to the constitutional rules of global international society involve interactions between different contexts tied to each other by transnational social movements and networks.
2. The struggle of the ‘Young Turks’ and their successors for sovereign equality: confronting the constitutional principles of global international society, 1908 – 1923

The history of the period from 1908 to 1923 is one in which the Young Turks and their successors adopted two approaches to secure the sovereign equality of their state. Between 1908 - 1911 and 1918 - 1922, the Young Turks attempted to gain recognition of their sovereign equality through demonstrating their adherence to various standards of ‘civilisation’. These standards of ‘civilisation’ involved different forms of criteria that highlighted which states could be considered ‘civilised’, and hence worthy of being recognised as an equal sovereign by the established states in global international society. After 1918, singular vision of ‘civilisation’, tied to Lenin and Wilson’s schemes for post-war global international society, provided the means for the recognition of sovereign equality under the framework of the idea of national self-determination. The nature of global international society in the period 1908 – 1911 was vastly different from global international society from 1918 - 1922. However, in both instances the idea of ‘civilisation’ came to be deployed as an argument by the Great Powers, to engage in gatekeeping and prevent other states in international society from being recognised as an equal sovereign, according to the constitutional rules of global international society. In the periods, 1911 – 1918 and 1922 – 1923, the Young Turks challenged how these principles of global international society were applied in the case of their own state. They also attempted to influence how these principles were applied more generally. In the period 1911 – 1918, the Young Turks, adopted an understanding of ‘civilisation’ that was closely tied to the concept of the nation. This allowed them to participate in attempts to reorder global international society. A convincing case was thus able to be made for the recognition of the sovereign equality of Turkey in the Treaty of Lausanne.

Immediately following the Young Turk revolution, internationally overseen reforms that had been envisaged in the Treaty of Berlin were abandoned by the signatories to the treaty. Building on Hanioğlu (2001) and several others, this thesis has demonstrated how the Young Turks, in the lead up to and after the revolution, presented themselves as a group of elites who could implement a ‘civilising’ process similar to that being carried out by European states within their own empires. In
contrast to the arbitrary reign of Abdülhamid II, parliamentary and constitutional rule was introduced by the Young Turks in an attempt to hold together and ‘civilise’ the empire in the face of groups who were threatening to secede. The centralisation of state power and the promise of reforms allowed the CUP to persuade the European states to terminate certain internationally overseen reforms within the empire. Although international commissions overseeing the security and finances of Macedonia and the foreign military presence, were brought to an end by 1909, the capitulations persisted (Tokay, 2013: 177 - 178). In addition, the declaration of Bulgarian independence, Cretan union with Greece, and the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, were justified on the basis of the concept of ‘civilisation’. Those challenging Ottoman rule, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria, suggested that the Ottomans could be allowed only a degree of sovereignty to oversee religious services for Muslims. The Ottoman government was recognised as a civilised state insofar as it was governed constitutionally, but the concept of ‘civilisation’ was also used to challenge Ottoman control over certain territories.

Between 1911 and 1918, the Young Turks made use of alliances and warfare to attempt to assert their sovereign equality in global international society. They not only challenged rival conceptions of the constitutional principles of global international society but also waged war against states and other actors that they deemed to be promoting them. The Young Turks sought assistance from external powers to realise their sovereign equality after it became clear to them that mere appeals to principle were insufficient to gain sovereign equality in global international society. It had become harder for the Young Turks to secure recognition of the sovereign equality of their state in global international society through appealing to the idea of ‘civilisation’ because this society was fracturing into rival alliances. Following defeat in the Balkan Wars, Ottoman officials found that their claims for sovereignty over conquered territories were dismissed by dominant states. These states deployed the concept of ‘civilisation’ to promote their own interests. In such circumstances, the Ottomans aligned themselves with Germany and the other Central Powers in the First World War and later unilaterally abrogated the capitulations. The concept of ‘civilisation’ was interpreted less as a normative concept and more as a means of enhancing Ottoman state and society. This could
provide an opportunity for the Young Turks to transform global international society by being in a position to change its constitutional rules. Young Turk-affiliated social theorists, including Ağaoğlu, Sabahaddin, Parvus, Cami and Gökalp, developed an understanding of ‘civilisation’ as a tool that could be used to empower the Ottoman state. The military power of the state could be harnessed to reconstitute global international society and its rules. However, the CUP’s attempt to change the rules of global international society by participating in the First World War failed given that Germany and her allies were defeated.

Following defeat in 1918, different political and military factions, filling the void left by the Ottoman state, sought to secure the global international society’s recognition of their claims for sovereign equality. As in the case of the pre-war years, the post-war period was marked by the emergence of a global hierarchy based on a renewed concept of ‘civilisation’. This new hierarchy centred around the ideas promoted by Wilson and Lenin, and the League of Nations and the concepts and institutions it promoted, such as national self-determination and the mandate system. The ideas of Lenin and Wilson provided opportunities for actors seeking recognition of their sovereign status (Manela, 2007: 37 - 38; Pedersen, 2015). However, these actors quickly encountered new forms of gatekeeping, on the part of the Allied victors and the Bolsheviks, who sought to control which claims to sovereignty and sovereign equality could be accepted (Göl, 2013: 138 - 155; Pedersen, 2015). As a result, many actors seeking recognition of their sovereignty found themselves in emerging global hierarchies based on a new standard of ‘civilisation’. The mandate system and its tiered vision of global international society was a clear manifestation of such hierarchy (Anghie, 2002). The Bolsheviks also found themselves favouring different national movements to pursue the goal of the world revolution. When the world revolution did not occur, the Bolsheviks backed movements which were seeking recognition of their sovereign equality on the basis of the right to self-determination. However, the interests of the Bolsheviks dictated which movements were granted such recognition (Göl, 2013: 138 - 155). In this context, as a result of their long history of interaction with Europe, the defeated Ottomans were faced with different possible outcomes regarding their position in international society. The possibility of accepting mandatory rule for parts or the whole of the empire, which would entail control by different states, was discussed. However, by presenting itself
as a movement expressing national sovereignty, along the lines promoted by Wilson and Lenin, and by using force against rival claimants to sovereignty over its geography, the Ankara government came to be recognised as an equal sovereign by other states in global international society in 1923.

The sovereign equality of Turkey was recognised by the Treaty of Lausanne. The treaty was signed after negotiations with the Ankara government following victory over the occupying Greek forces. The Ankara government was a successor of the military and political elites of the Ottoman Empire. Employing arguments based on national sovereignty and using military and political force, the Ankara government became recognised as the sole representative of the remaining parts of the Ottoman Empire (Demirci, [2005] 2010: 66 - 68). Through presenting itself as a government based on national sovereignty, the Ankara government won support from those who believed that what remained of the Ottoman Empire could attain a level of ‘civilisation’ that would enable it to be recognised as an equal sovereign. Force was deployed to challenge those who argued that the Ankara government should not be recognised as an equal sovereign state. When the Ankara government started talks with the Allied powers, their negotiators stressed their status as nationalists, but they also presented themselves as complying with ‘civilised’ standards of law. In reality, though, the legal system that emerged in Turkey contained many aspects of the previous Ottoman system (Özsu, 2010). The Swiss Civil Code was adopted, but traces of the Ottoman legal system remained. The end result of the reforms of the Turkish leaders mirrored the suggestions of the legal advisor, Sauser-Hall. Sauser-Hall (1913) had demonstrated how legal systems could draw upon and integrate laws developed in other contexts, provided they were fused with local legislation. Turkish officials thereby secured the recognition of Turkey as a sovereign state that was equal to the other members of international society and which was no longer subject to extraterritoriality. They achieved this by giving the impression that they complied with international standards, although in practice institutions in Turkey maintained some features from the previous legal system, which had previously been criticised for not meeting the standard of ‘civilisation’.

In the periods, 1908 - 1911 and 1918 -1922, the Young Turks adopted similar approaches based on global normative understandings of hierarchy to attempt to gain
recognition of their sovereign equality. In the first period, the Young Turks presented their constitutional project as ‘civilising’ the Ottoman empire. They persuaded the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin to end forms of extraterritoriality introduced in the empire’s westernmost provinces. This was achieved through the efforts of Young Turk ideologues, such as Ahmed Rıza (1907) and Sabahaddin ([1908] 1999a), who argued that a constitutional revolution would facilitate the development of ‘civilisation’ in the Ottoman Empire. Significantly, the opposition to the CUP from the PMU and Derviş Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c; [1909] 1992b) did not challenge the principle of constitutional rule or civilisation, but argued for an Islamic form of civilisation and constitutionalism. The global context after 1918 differed from that of 1908. Instead of empires justifying their conduct by reference to the idea of civilisation, international institutions and ideas emerged, centred around the League of Nations and the idea of national self-determination. Self-determination involved determining both the ‘selves’ that would be granted “self-determination” (see Smith, 2018: 6) and the form of ‘determination’ that they sought. As a result, different movements, both within what remained of the Ottoman Empire and throughout the world, referred to historical narratives to justify their claim to forming a “self” that could be considered as having a right to self-determination (see Smith, 2018: 6). However, these movements also referred to different constitutional rules in global international society. In the defeated Ottoman Empire, the writers of Hakimiyet-i Milliye ([1920] 2004d) sought to demonstrate how the Ankara government was committed to advancing the anti-imperial goals of Wilson and Lenin. Others, such as Gökalp ([1923] 1977c; [1923] 1977f) and Ahmed Rıza ([1922] 1990) stressed the Ankara government’s dedication to ‘Western civilisation’. The differences in the nature of global international society in the periods, 1908 – 1911 and 1918 – 1922, led to the use of differing strategies and ideas by the Young Turks and their successors. However, in both periods, these actors secured a degree of recognition of the sovereign equality of their state.

The recognition of Turkey as a sovereign state, with rights of territoriality similar to other states in global international society, was achieved following the ending of extraterritoriality in the Treaty of Lausanne. This was made possible by the Ankara government exerting influence over how global constitutional principles were applied in the context of Turkey. A similar approach had been attempted in the
period between 1911 and 1918. In this earlier period, the CUP had aimed to situate the Ottoman Empire in alliances with other states and to reorder the Ottoman Empire as a nation-state with a national economy, as suggested by Munis Tekinalp, Ağaoğlu, Parvus and Akçura (Özavcı, 2013; Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 157 - 158). The hope was that these alliances would project Ottoman power that would allow the Young Turks to influence the content and application of the constitutional principles of global international society, thereby facilitating the recognition of the sovereign equality of the Ottoman state. Variants of this approach were advocated by theorists such as Sabahaddin ([1913] 1999), Gökalp ([1916] 1981a; [1916] 1981b; [1917] 1981; [1918] 2007) and Parvus ([1914] 2013a; [1914] 2013b; [1914] 2014). But, the defeat of the Ottomans in 1918 ended their hopes of changing not only the rules of global international society but also the power relations within the existing international system. The attendance of the Ankara government at Lausanne allowed it to secure sovereign equality. Prior to the Lausanne negotiations, the Ankara government imposed military and political control over Istanbul to prevent the Istanbul government from also attending Lausanne. Entering talks from a strong position, the Ankara government ensured that the Allies called for favourable conditions to end extraterritoriality. The Ankara government guaranteed that the constitutional principles of global international society were applied in a flexible manner in the case of Turkey. Legal reforms undertaken by Turkey, including the reception and adoption of the Swiss Civil Code, ensured that Turkey was recognised as an equal sovereign to other states in global international society under the terms of the Lausanne treaty.

3. The recognition of sovereign equality in global international society and global and local constituent power

This section demonstrates how the Ottoman/Turkish case shows that states not initially recognised as fully sovereign in global international society can come to be recognised as such through the invocation of local and global constituent powers. It begins by outlining which actors were involved in this process, including states and non-state entities who wielded constituent power to gain recognition of their sovereign equality. It then considers the role of ideas of sovereignty in the attempts of these actors to gain recognition of their sovereign equality within global
international society. Two different sets of processes are then identified. The first involved efforts, of those engaged in constituent diplomacy, to appeal to the dominant interpretations of sovereignty as a constitutional principle in global international society. The second set of processes involved attempts by these actors to remove or replace the existing constitutional principles of global international society. These attempts could involve the use of social and normative power by those advancing new interpretations of sovereignty. They could also entail efforts to ensure that a specific understanding of sovereignty was recognised, through means such as the inclusion of certain provisions in an international agreement. Both sets of processes may include features of stigmatisation and normalisation. Efforts to gain recognition of the sovereign equality of one’s state may be frustrated by stigmatisation from powerful state actors. But those who are sufficiently powerful can overcome this stigmatisation. In such instances, sovereign equality is recognised and thereby normalised. The eventual recognition of Turkey as an equal sovereign shows that both sets of processes involve changes that impact on domestic and international societies.

This thesis has shown how the concept of constituent power can be used to explain how states that were sovereign, but subject to forms of hierarchy and inequality, could attain a position of greater equality with other states in global international society. According to Reus-Smit (1997: 556; 1999: 30), the “constitutional” principles present in international society can outline the proper means of conduct for states. They arise from interactions between states that result in the emergence of ideas which point to acceptable standards of “norms” of behaviour for states internationally (Reus-Smit, 1997: 556). These principles themselves are not formal, in the sense that they are not always derived from established forms of international law. However, through influencing states or assuming control of states, non-state actors may play an important role in the building of the constitutional principles of international society, including sovereignty (de Carvalho and Paras, 2015). Prior to 1908, the Young Turks maintained ties with the Ottoman homeland, but they had also become a transnational network, with widespread support in the former Ottoman territories of the Balkans and Egypt. The movement was influenced by European and Asian intellectual trends, such as Pan-Islamism and positivism. This was because of its transnational ties, stemming from its presence in North
Africa, the Middle East, Iran, the Americas, Europe, the Russian Empire and elsewhere (Berberian, 2019; Meyer, 2014). The CUP sought to exploit such ties during the Balkan Wars and the First World War. Various individual theorists, transnational social movements, states and alliances hence played a crucial role in the construction of global international society and the securing of the Ottoman Empire/Turkey’s place within it.

Ideas of sovereignty also played a crucial role in the eventual recognition of the sovereign equality of states which had initially not been recognised as equal in international society. Individuals aligned with the Young Turks and the movements that succeeded them, engaged with globally widespread ideas of sovereignty to make a case for the recognition of their sovereign rights. These actors aimed to develop theories that sought to justify what they took to be their claim to equal sovereign status alongside the established states in global international society. This was a process that did not solely involve the translation of the globally widespread ideas of sovereignty into their own immediate context (Wigen, 2018). Instead, drawing upon their presence in local and global contexts, the Young Turks developed their own conceptions of how the sovereignty of their state should be understood. In the theories that they produced and in their constituent diplomacy, the members of the post-revolutionary elite in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey defended the unique aspects of Ottoman sovereignty, such as its ties to the caliphate (see, for instance, Gökalp, [1922] 1982f). Defending the practices of the Ottoman/Turkish state, also meant that the Young Turks and their successors sought to mitigate the stigma faced by the Ottoman state. They attempted to demonstrate how the practices of the Ottoman state corresponded to similar practices in states deemed to be “civilised” actors in international society (Özavcı, 2013: 32). The exact ideas of what constituted a ‘civilised’ state fluctuated throughout the period 1908 – 1923. This meant that the Young Turks needed to develop new ideas of sovereignty that could draw upon new globally widespread ideas. The rise of the salience of national sovereignty is a case in point (Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 157 – 158; Üngör and Lohr, 2014).

The processes of normalisation and stigmatisation, as well as the constituent diplomacy of actors seeking recognition of sovereign equality, also help explain the emergence of global international society. Stigmatisation presents a compelling
account of how states were excluded from being equals in global international society (Adler-Nissen, 2014b; Zarakol, 2011: 29 - 108). “Normalization” explains how states that were excluded later came to be included (Smetana, 2020: 48). The arguments of the Young Turks to justify their claim to equal sovereignty in the periods 1908 – 1911 and 1918 – 1922 were successful insofar as they highlighted several of the contradictions involved in the stigmatising arguments directed towards the Ottoman/Turkish elites. However, the Young Turks had also faced stigmatisation after the Balkan Wars. The demands of the Young Turks for the recognition of their sovereignty over conquered territories resulted in European powers questioning their earlier view that the Ottomans should maintain sovereignty at least with regard to the religious affairs of Muslims. The Ottomans entered the First World War with the intention of becoming a sovereign state with full control over its territory, thereby securing its sovereign equality. But defeat in 1918 led to new forms of stigma. In particular, the war crimes that were carried out by the Ottoman state resulted in calls for it to be dismembered and disempowered in the Treaty of Sèvres. This was justified by the victorious Allies as the best means of enabling the realisation of the principle of national sovereignty in the post-war context of the Ottoman Empire (Smith, 2009). However, ultimately, through a combination of social and normative power, the Ankara government challenged this stigmatisation and was recognised as sovereign in accordance with theories of national sovereignty. This enabled the government to influence the terms of the recognition of its sovereignty. At Lausanne, the Ankara government exerted its influence in order to secure legal reforms that would lead to the normalisation of the sovereign status of Turkey.

The forms of stigmatisation and normalisation that were considered in this thesis also entailed intentional and unintentional forms of recognition, being granted to the states seeking recognition of their sovereign equality from the great powers. With stigmatisation, the sovereignty of the state in question was often considered to fall short of the standard of ‘civilisation’ exemplified by the established European states of global international society (Aalberts, 2014; Zarakol, 2018b). The level of ‘civilisation’ of a state was measured by various contentious means including, for example, the nature of the political and legal system, the role of religion, and the presence or absence of nationalism (Blachford, 2019; Gong, 1984). The gatekeeping
action of the established states in global international society, when they decided whether a state could be recognised as an equal sovereign was a form of recognition. Stigmatisation was an active process that required the gatekeeping states to repeatedly frustrate the efforts of the representatives of states seeking recognition as equal sovereigns (Adler-Nissen, 2014b). Normalisation can occur as an unconscious process, in which states that were previously stigmatised are no longer stigmatised by gatekeepers (Smetana, 2020: 48; Smetana and Onderco, 2018). This can occur if the originally stigmatised state can come to control how it is perceived by the gatekeepers. Therefore, normalisation may proceed through an act of misrecognition, wherein an actor that was once stigmatised may appear to be normal to the gatekeepers, but, upon closer analysis, it may only have managed to produce such an impression.

Normalisation may involve changes to the constitutional rules of both international and local society. In these processes of reconstitution, that enabled states to be considered equal sovereigns by other sovereigns in global international society, constituent power operated at both levels. For example, during the Young Turk revolution, local constituent power was activated by the revolutionaries, but they themselves were also influenced by a global constituent power, in the form of the revolutionary wave of constitutional revolutions in the early twentieth century (Sohrabi, 1995; 2011). Because of their presence in different geographies, the Young Turks were influenced by different schemes for transforming local societies that would also inspire the Chinese, Russian and Iranian revolutions in this period (Hanioğlu, 2001: 317 - 318; Sohrabi, 1995; 2001). By reintroducing their local constitution, the Young Turks hoped to be recognised as one of the ‘civilised’ states who were advancing ‘civilisation’ throughout the world. The Young Turks were partially successful in that they were able to gain recognition of some of their desired sovereign rights by convincing the European powers to withdraw from overseeing reforms in Macedonia. However, they had been unable to prevent the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and the secession of Bulgaria and Crete. The remnants and successors of the Young Turks later implemented further reforms and engaged in international diplomacy when seeking to align themselves with the new form of global constituent power centring around the League of Nations and the new understanding of civilisation. Ultimately, the Young Turks were able to secure
Turkey’s acceptance as sovereign in international society, based on the perception of the Ankara government as a modernising and ‘civilising’ force. The concept of constituent power, therefore, demonstrates the connections between the changes that occurred as the Ottoman/Turkish constitution and the constitutional norms of sovereignty in global international society underwent transformation.

The forms of local and global constituent powers presented in Chapters 3 – 6 of this thesis contained varying degrees of social and normative power. These were used by and against those seeking to secure recognition of what they understood to be their rights as sovereign states in global international society. Normative power concerned the ability of those seeking to secure recognition of their sovereign equality to convince actors in global international society that they ought to be recognised as possessing sovereign rights (Kavalski, 2013). The references to the idea of civilisation in the diplomacy of the Young Turks and their successors, following the revolution of 1908 and in the aftermath of the First World War, were attempts on the part of these actors to exert their normative power. These moments in which they wielded normative power allowed them to partially achieve their goal of gaining recognition of their sovereign equality. Social power refers to the mobilisation of resources to realise one’s will over society (Mann, 1986: 1 - 30). The CUP mobilised social power to attempt to transform local and global societies in the First World War and to exert de facto control over the geography they deemed to be part of their future state. The Ankara government also used social power to enact the reform programme it saw as necessary to ensure that it would gain recognition as an equal sovereign state in global international society. In these instances, the Young Turks and their successors also faced the challenge posed by rival forms of normative and social power held by states seeking to enforce the norms of global international society. However, through harnessing global and local forms of constituent power, in which elements of social and normative power were present, the successors of the Young Turks were able to gain recognition of their sovereign equality.
4. Global constitution-building as a superior approach to the diffusionist and realist perspectives of the spread of sovereignty

This thesis stresses that an approach building on the concept of constituent power offers a compelling way to explain how states secure the recognition of their sovereign equality. Two other prominent explanations have attempted to account for this recognition. The first of these points to the role of ideas and practices originating from Europe at a time when the contemporary global international society of equal sovereign states was emerging (Boli, 2001; Nardin, 2015). In this context, European practices, such as intervention (see Keene, 2013a; Reus-Smit, 2013b), and ideas related to sovereignty spread to other parts of the world, thereby creating the current global international society (Bull and Watson, 1984). These arguments highlighted the significance of worldwide connections that resulted in the emergence of global international society. More recent studies have focused on the hierarchical context in which these connections were established (Bilgin, 2017). However, these arguments have not been able to explain how different actors throughout the globe actively contributed to the emergence of global international society. Specifically, they do not consider that international society may have emerged as a result of the exercise of the sovereignty of states (James, 1999). Similarly, Chowdhury and Duvall (2014) argue that states used their power to bring about a global international society composed of different sovereign states (see also Duvall and Chowdhury, 2011). However, as will be demonstrated below, focusing on local and global constituent powers can show how the insights of the diffusionist and power-based accounts of the emergence of sovereignty in global international society can be combined and their shortcomings overcome. This, in turn, can produce a more convincing account of the emergence of global international society.

The ‘diffusion’ of sovereignty that Boli (2001) and Nardin (2015) point to can be said to have occurred indirectly through intermediaries or directly through colonialism. However, as the Ottoman Empire as a whole was not subject to colonial rule, studies focusing on the diffusion of external ideas of sovereignty have tended to focus instead on other explanations in the context of the Ottoman Empire. Studies inspired by the English School, for instance, concentrate on how diplomats and national elites adopted the ideas and institutions of global international society.
The history of the Ottoman Empire leading up to its collapse, has been looked upon as a period when the spread of European ideas and the replacement or removal of local ideas and institutions culminated in the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 (Bilgin, 2017; Turnaoğlu, 2017a; Wigen, 2018). Scholars pointing to how ideas were translated from one context to another have echoed the insights of the earlier modernisation school, arguing that European ideas were translated into the Ottoman context by reformers (Wigen, 2015; 2018). There is a disagreement here, though, with regard to what extent the Ottomans were subjected to the diffusion of Western ideas against their will, or whether the Ottoman and later Turkish elites facilitated the diffusion of these ideas to their subjects and citizens. Those focusing on the economic position of the Ottoman elites, such as world systems scholars (see İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1977) and others influenced by postcolonialism (see Çapan and Zarakol, 2017: 196 - 198), have argued that the Ottomans were an empire in name only given how they were threatened by the capitulations and European intervention. On the other hand, there are those who contend that the expansion of the institutions and ideas present in Europe can be understood through the spread of the conditions that gave rise to them, which are often referred to as modernity (Göksel, 2016; Göl, 2013; Kaya and Tecmen, 2011). This diffusionist perspective, focused either on the spread of ideas of sovereignty, and the role of intervention and colonialism in this process, remains the dominant theory to account for the emergence of global international society and the place of the Ottoman Empire, and later Turkey, within it.

The diffusionist perspective is able to explain certain historical developments involving the emergence of global international society, as it provides a means of understanding how ideas from one context come to be adopted and modified in other contexts. As Wigen (2018) and Kayaoğlu (2010a: 101 - 105) have demonstrated, the Ottomans and the Turks translated and adopted institutions and ideas from Europe in the late Ottoman and early republican period. The leading Young Turks were influenced by ideas that were of European origin, including ideas of national sovereignty and changing understandings of civilisation. For example, Ağaoğlu and Akçura were influenced by ideas of national sovereignty developed in Russia and Paris (Shissler, 2003; Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 150). Throughout the period 1908 – 1923, the Young Turks and their successors sought to learn and adapt to changing concepts.
in international society. Initially, the Young Turks advanced their own interpretations of civilisation to gain recognition of their sovereign equality after the revolution of 1908. Subsequently, the Young Turks embraced the alliance-based diplomacy in the lead up to and the course of the First World War and sought to shape the constitutional principles of global international society through warfare and alliances. This involved them advancing their own interpretation of the concept of the ‘nation’ as a constitutional principle in international society. Separately, the adoption of significant parts of the Swiss Civil Code in the context of the legal reforms demanded at Lausanne in 1923, provides an example of how the successors of the Young Turks adopted to changing circumstances. The Ottoman Empire, and its transformation into the Republic of Turkey, can therefore be understood as an example of diffusion, insofar as this process involved the translation of ideas and the adoption of institutions present in global international society.

However, the diffusionist account of the spread of institutions has its limitations. These stem from the assumption that ideas and institutions associated with global international society wholly transform the contexts that they travel to. This perspective is problematic because it overlooks how elements of previously existing ideas and institutions continue to be present within such contexts that become a part of global international society (see Topal, 2017). As much as the Young Turks and their successors adopted ideas from Europe throughout the period 1908 – 1923, they also challenged and changed these ideas and maintained and developed their own traditions of thought. Even when the Young Turks were in exile, many of them, such as Ahmed Rıza (1907), sought to defend the value of Islamic ideas and institutions, by pointing to historical examples of them serving the goal of ‘progress’. The Young Turks’ project of securing the sovereign equality of the Ottoman Empire also involved reforming and defending its constitutional institutions, such as the caliphate and the sultanate. However, studies focusing on the translation of concepts from global international society have not considered how these concepts were present within the context prior to and after their translation. As the process of the translation of the Swiss Civil Code demonstrates, even when it appeared that Islamic institutions were being replaced, the Turkish political elites, many of whom were Young Turks, were able to ensure that their own ideas and institutions were maintained. The leaders of the CUP also sought to diffuse their own particular understandings of the
constitutional principles of global international society. This is demonstrated by the promotion of Pan-Islamist and Pan-Turkist concepts during the First World War. Therefore, in the case of the Ottoman – Turkish transition, the diffusionist approach overlooks how actors situated in local contexts maintained some of their institutions, while at the same time adopting or moderating ideas prominent throughout the globe.

Another perspective, that has sought to explain the emergence of global international society, focused on the ability of groups to assert their sovereignty through force or the threat of force, instead of adopting existing ideas of sovereignty. This perspective concentrated on the abilities of states to assert power within their jurisdictions and how this enabled them to gain recognition externally (James, 1986; 1999; Duvall and Chowdhury, 2011; Chowdhury and Duvall, 2014). This allows states to recognise each other as sovereign even when common interpretations of the meaning of sovereignty are absent. However, this thin level of consensus can be challenged by proposing that different constitutional principles are constantly advanced by various actors in global international society. This recognition of multiple visions of global international society advanced by different state and non-state actors, points to how the power of actors to promote their own interpretations of the constitutional rules of global international society helped establish these rules. In addition, the development of new technologies, such as map-making technologies and novel military means of asserting state power have been identified as contributing to the assertion of sovereign power (Branch, 2013; 2016; Duvall and Havercroft, 2008; Hobson, 2009). They have also been viewed as contributing to the growth and competition of international societies, including the rise of Islamic and European international societies (Bennison, 2009). These different international societies had their own understandings of sovereignty which stemmed from the ability of their members to assert and justify their sovereignty. Accordingly, it would appear that a perspective focusing on the role of power could be useful in explaining how states that are already sovereign, in the sense of having authority over their own jurisdictions, came to have their sovereign equality recognised.

The emphasis on the role of power in the emergence of a global international society of sovereign states addresses some of the difficulties faced by diffusionist approaches. Specifically, a focus on power can reveal forms of resistance and can
show alternative forms of the spread of ideas and institutions, instead of merely focusing on their spread from the West or Europe (Bilgin, 2017). This approach can incorporate the often-neglected agency and ideas of non-European actors, who are invariably presented as passive recipients of processes of expansion that have their origin in Europe (Hobson and Sajed, 2017). Göl (2013) focuses on the role of power in the emergence of different sovereign entities within global international societies. This account focuses on how alternative paths to “modernity” allowed the emergence of the Ankara government, which collaborated with the Bolsheviks who were also challenging the established states in international society (Göl, 2013: 1).

In addition, resistance against what was deemed to be Western colonialism and imperialism was also facilitated by Young Turks, such as Celal Nuri (Aydın, 2007: 102 - 103; Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 169 - 170). This perspective is correct in stressing the local nature of the resistance against the West in the Ottoman Empire, both before and after the First World War. However, it fails to note how the Young Turks and their successors were also advancing their own ideas about the nature of global international society (Turnaoğlu, 2017a: 169). As this thesis has demonstrated, numerous intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire and early Turkey drew upon ideas present in their own context, but they also engaged with globally widespread ideas used to justify sovereign equality. Therefore, the Young Turks and their successors firstly resisted the diffusion of the Western ideas of global international society. However, as interlocutors, they later engaged with the dominant views concerning the constitutional principles of global international society and advanced their own views and proposals concerning these constitutional principles.

Insofar as the Young Turks and movements that emerged from them presented alternative constitutional principles of global international society, they were also able to alter the form of global international society and could negotiate their inclusion within it as sovereigns entitled to the same rights as other sovereign states. In so doing, they also sought to ensure that their ideas were intelligible to other prominent actors in global international society. For example, the legal reforms enacted by the Ankara government insisted on considering Turkey as not only equal but also similar to the established states within the emerging global international society. This differed markedly from the Islamist approach of Abdülhamid II, Vahdeti ([1908] 1992c) and others, which emphasised that the Ottoman Empire was
different but equal to the other Great Powers. This approach continued to an extent after the end of the Abdülhamid II regime, with Ahmed Rıza (1907; [1922] 1990) and Gökalp ([1923] 1977f) advocating respectively a recognition of Islamic civilisation and culture. Significantly, Ahmed Rıza (1907; [1922] 1990) believed in the possibility of a universal civilisation and claimed that Islam had contributed to this culture in the past, and could do so in the future. Gökalp ([1923] 1977f), on the other hand, sought to ensure that Turkey would become a part of Western civilisation while maintaining its Islamic religion and Turkish culture. Adopting an organic view of society, Gökalp ([1923] 1977b; [1923] 1977f) argued that Turkey could balance the three elements of Islamic religion, Western civilisation and Turkish culture. Gökalp ([1923] 1977b; [1923] 1977f) deemed that this was essential for Turkey to survive and thrive in the post-war international realm. This suggests that thinkers aligned with the CUP and the Ankara government, such as Gökalp ([1923] 1977b; [1923] 1977f), argued for some diffusion of ideas regarding sovereignty and they also actively sought to foster a ‘thin’ level of consensus between Turkey and the established states in global international society. This consensus over values would subsequently enable Turkey to control how it was perceived and recognised by the post-war gatekeepers of global international society.

Both the diffusionist account of the emergence of global international society, and the explanation focusing on the enlargement of this society through the power possessed by actors within it, have their strengths and weaknesses. However, the idea of constituent power, as presented in section 2 of this chapter, can best account for the emergence of global international society. Significantly, this perspective draws attention to the centrality of recognition in the emergence of the global constitutional principles that form the basis of global international society. In this sense, recognition can function not only as an affirmation of these principles, but can also be productive of these principles, since recognising a state of affairs as acceptable on the basis of an ideal of global international society serves to define what such a global international society looks like in practice. In addition, the theoretical framework drawing on constituent power, as expressed in section 2 can explain how actors, having recognised certain constitutional principles as significant, come to respect and uphold these norms of international society. This form of global constitutionalism is also attuned to the fact that some actors may have more power to
recognise that actors are complying with global constitutional principles. This includes here, the notions of sovereignty and sovereign equality. However, unlike theories of stigmatisation (see Zarakol, 2011), the theoretical approach presented in this thesis does not accept the presence of a closed social system in the world, with established insiders and outsiders. This is because even though certain actors may have more power, enabling them to recognise others as complying with global constitutional principles, this does not mean that these actors have unlimited power to enforce these principles. Accordingly, even though recognition is often treated as a good that is distributed in political theory (see Markell, 2003), similar to the understanding of the role of gatekeepers in the stigmatisation model, recognition can also be understood as an acknowledgement that an existing state of affairs is acceptable. This, in turn, means that those who recognise others as complying with a set of rules may not necessarily have a complete awareness that those they are recognising are actually complying with a set of norms.

The fact that the appearance of compliance may conceal a truth of non-compliance or deviance from ideal constitutional principles does not imply the irrelevance of global constitutional principles. Instead, as demonstrated in this thesis, it can be taken to show the extent to which the constitutional principles of global international society are open to interpretation. This openness, in turn, partly accounts for the normalisation of different states and their respective societies within global international society. Although a degree of power is required to secure recognition at the international level, this thesis has demonstrated how a state that was sovereign, in terms of having established authority over a jurisdiction, was able to gain recognition as an equal sovereign in global international society. The Ottoman, later Turkish state, was situated on the periphery of European international society (Rae, 2017). It had been stigmatised and excluded by the most powerful European states throughout the period. In contrast to states that experienced colonisation, the last generation of Ottoman leaders faced a separate challenge of stigmatisation on the basis of the standard of ‘civilisation’, which deprived them of recognition as an equal sovereign state by Western powers (Kayaoğlu, 2010a: 100). However, the Ottoman Empire and its final generation of leaders were in a unique position. These individuals were able to exploit this context and harness the power of their state, to ensure the recognition of their state as an equal sovereign in the
emerging global international society. Through these means, they ultimately succeeded in challenging the understandings of global constitutional principles held by sovereign states in global international society. The global constitutionalist perspective advocated throughout this thesis, and summarised in section 2 of this chapter, can therefore demonstrate how the Young Turks and their successors sought their recognition as equal sovereigns in global international society. It demonstrates how they did so through seeking recognition in line with or advancing specific interpretations of this society’s constitutional principles.

5. The constituent power in global international society

The argument of this thesis concerning the relevance of global constitutional principles for understanding the emergence of global international society has a number of implications for International Relations theory. It demonstrates how approaches drawing upon the history of ideas can contribute to developing non-ideal theories of International Relations. This thesis has provided a descriptive and non-ideal theory, examining the role of ideas in the emergence of global international society. It therefore points the way towards future normative and descriptive theory-building that can develop non-ideal theories of International Relations (Sleat, 2016: 34 - 36). The thesis also shows how studies of history and philosophy can be advanced, through revealing how concepts such as sovereignty evolved historically as different interpretations and practices were developed in various contexts. The thesis draws attention to the significance of transnational links of which the Young Turks were a part. Transnational links may continue to have an impact after non-state actors, such as the Young Turks, take control of states and use this position to influence constitutional principles of global international society (Davies, 2019). This thesis has also highlighted the importance of power relations, present locally and globally, in explaining the emergence of these constitutional principles of global international society. Studying power relations, and how they influenced the way constitutional principles of global international society were understood and applied, can take into account the processes of stigmatisation and normalisation of outsiders. This thesis has provided a novel conception of recognition beyond the idea of recognition as a good that is distributed by the gatekeepers of society, since the very rules concerning the recognition of sovereign equality can be changed by constituent
powers. All these implications for International Relations theory stem from the central aim of this thesis, which is concerned with how transnational networks of actors engaged in intellectual theorising in different contexts can explain the expansion of global international society.

This thesis has demonstrated how a non-ideal political theory of International Relations can be developed by using the concept of the constituent power to understand how actors advanced and contested the constitutional principles of international society. Ideal theories in International Relations advance a set of ideal types, prior to studying reality. However, this thesis has asserted the explanatory value of the concept of constituent power by showing how actors seek to challenge, appeal to or advance new forms of the constitutional principles of global international society. It then argued that the concept of constituent power can better account for the deviation from existing explanations of the emergence of sovereignty. The case of the transition from the Ottoman Empire to Turkey was presented as a deviation from existing “analytical narratives” of the diffusion or assertion of sovereignty (P.T. Jackson, 2010: 115). Studying this case has shown how the concept of constituent power can be used to understand how actors engaged with the constitutional principles of international society (P.T. Jackson, 2010: 115). The Ottoman Empire was already sovereign, in the sense of displaying “independence” (see James, 1986: 5), but it was not recognised as a sovereign, equal to established European states in global international society. However, through using their normative and social power, the Young Turks sought to gain recognition of their sovereign equality. The use of the concept of constituent power, in this context, builds on the existing tradition of the use of the concept of a constitution, to make sense of the basic principles that actors adhere to in an international society. Specifically, the concept of constituent power can provide an account of how constitutional principles may alter in time, or explain how the spatial extent of an international society could change. It can thus explain the local and global changes which occurred that allowed the elites of a state that was already sovereign to gain recognition of the sovereignty of their state, in accordance with the emerging constitutional rules of international society in the early twentieth century.
Drawing attention to the importance of different contexts in the construction of the current global international society, this thesis also shows the significance of traditions of philosophy in influencing history. A study that combines history and philosophy involves accepting the role of ideas in constructing social reality in the present and the past (Bartelson, 2007). As Hacking (2004) and Bartelson (2007; 2018: 23) suggest, ideas enable individuals to make sense of the world, which, in turn, shapes their actions (see also Geuss, 2008: 37 - 40). However, such an approach also involves studying philosophy historically. One must be mindful of how historical events have an influence on philosophical discussions (Bartelson, 2007). Events impact on philosophy by determining which interlocutors are engaged in philosophical debate and what tools are available to them. The ways in which historical events influence the development of ideas impact on how ideas come to influence reality after they are adopted by actors. According to constructivists, not only do these actors believe that such ideas are accurate representations of reality, but by acting on this belief, they serve to create a reality that is shaped by these beliefs (Bartelson, 2018: 23). An example of the interconnectedness between history and philosophy is seen in how the use of arguments to justify sovereignty based on an idea of the nation or the people in the French Revolution, spread and came to be accepted within European international society. It is possible to conclude that major historical events such as revolutions and wars that alter the nature of society should be studied to understand the emergence of novel ideas. However, it is equally important to consider how traditions of philosophy, such as political theories of sovereignty, and those individuals who sustain them, are able to respond to such events in ways that advance the proposals contained in ideas throughout their history (Reus-Smit, 2001; Rorty, 1984). This thesis has shown how the various events that occurred between 1908 and 1923 involved the Young Turks and their offshoots engaging with a wide range of intellectual traditions, ranging from Islam, positivism and nationalism.

Constituent power offers a means of ordering phenomena within International Relations and therefore allows theory-building to take place, in a way that is similar to how sovereignty informed many of the earlier attempts to

322 see Waever (2009).
conceptualise and understand what has variably been termed the international system or international society. Using the concept of constituent power, in the way it has been deployed in this thesis, does not assume that the object of study of International Relations consists of a static system, made up of different sovereign units subject to the same laws\textsuperscript{323}, even if the units themselves change. Instead constituent power, as a concept, offers a way of explaining how these units and the rules that allow them to coexist emerge and undergo change. Using the concept of the constituent power also adds to historical and historical sociological approaches that stress how events resulted in the emergence of global international society (Buzan and Lawson, 2015; Lawson, 2010). This is because the concept of constituent power also offers a way of supplementing analytical narratives, which are focused on events, by drawing attention to the intentions and actions of individuals. This thesis has demonstrated how this, in turn, involves studying how individuals use ideas in wielding constituent power. The use of the concept of constituent power can also demonstrate how proposals for specific constitutional rules, to be enacted in domestic or international contexts, are realised or thwarted. Hence, the concept of constituent power can be used to explain how states may undergo processes of reconstitution internally, when local forms of constituent power, are invoked, in tandem with historical changes to global constitutional principles. Finally, the use of the constituent power in this thesis has also illustrated how transnational actors can bridge local and global contexts and act as forms of local and global constituent power.

The central argument of the thesis, concerning the role of local and global forms of constituent power in enabling states that are already in effect sovereign, but which are not accepted as equals in international society, to be recognised as equal sovereigns in global international society, draws on the understanding of constituent power mentioned above. The thesis shows that sovereignty is not a timeless concept, but is one that explains certain phenomena in International Relations in conjunction with the emergence of a global international society in the early twentieth century. During this expansion, several states, including the Ottoman Empire, were, in fact, sovereign, in the sense of possessing ultimate authority over a jurisdiction, even if they were not recognised as such by European states. The Ottoman state was unique...
insofar as it had emerged on the periphery of European international society in the early modern period through sustained interaction with states on the boundary of Europe. By the early twentieth century, actors within the Ottoman Empire were in the unprecedented position of being excluded from global international society, even though the empire had interacted with European powers for centuries. The empire had previously been excluded on the basis of religious differences. It was now excluded on the basis of its supposed lack of conformity to the standard of ‘civilisation’. Yet, the constituent power of the Young Turks and their successors, expressed locally through their consolidation of internal sovereignty and internationally in their constituent diplomacy, challenged the exclusion of their state from global international society on the basis of the standard of ‘civilisation’. Both local and global constituent powers, which forcefully changed existing constitutional principles and put forward new ones, enabled the successors of the CUP to ultimately secure the recognition of Turkey as a sovereign equal to others in global international society. Justifications of sovereign equality, based on ideas such as ‘civilisation’, ‘nation’ and ‘self-determination’, therefore played a role in the processes of local and global reconstitution of domestic and international society that ended with the recognition of Turkey’s sovereign rights at Lausanne in 1923.
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