
McDonald Lewanika

A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, December 2019
DECLARATION

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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ABSTRACT

This thesis engages the puzzle of why competitive authoritarian regimes campaign when they could achieve their desired ends through violence, electoral manipulation and other illicit strategies to retain power. It uses Zimbabwe’s ruling party - the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front’s (ZANU-PF) election in the run-up to the 2008 and 2013 presidential campaigns. The thesis bases its analysis on the classification of constituencies into three main types: ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies (ZACs), opposition-aligned constituencies (OACs), and battleground constituencies (BCs). It identifies an overarching strategic logic behind ZANU-PF’s campaigning in 2008 and 2013 as a risk mitigation strategy against its loss of power and legitimacy. ZANU-PF pursued this broad strategy through attempting to maximise votes and voter turnout for itself while achieving the inverse for the opposition, i.e. minimizing its vote and turnout. I argue that ZANU-PF achieved its strategic logics through the deployment of combinations of seemingly competing strategies that included persuasion, intimidation, and clientelist inducements, deployed differently across space, depending on constituency type. I also argue that ZANU-PF implemented a spatially variegated strategy of mobilising its core-constituents (especially in 2008) and chasing more independent voters (especially in 2013). The differences in strategic thrust between 2008 and 2013 suggest that contrary to popular analysis, ZANU-PF was a learning organisation, adept at adapting its strategies over time and space to preserve power as well as enhance its legitimacy. The thesis employs a nested subnational comparative analysis research design, which combines nested analysis (Lieberman, 2005) and the subnational comparative method (Snyder, 2001). It combines descriptive statistics with detailed qualitative description in analysis of presidential election campaigns at the national and subnational level.
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In both literal and figurative terms, I started my PhD journey late. At 35, I was the oldest candidate in my PhD cohort by some distance and I had delayed joining the program by over three weeks. My first weeks, having missed two weeks of class, suffering from imposter syndrome, intimidated by the LSE’s exacting standards and not knowing how I was going to finance my program for four years, were tough. It was a blessing then that in these early days and throughout my PhD journey, Professor Catherine Boone and Dr Omar McDoom, who constituted my supervisory team, went over and above the call of duty to ensure that my journey not only started but would also end, successfully. I owe these two academics a great intellectual debt for their academic mentorship, guidance and support. I was never an easy student, and never really felt like a student proper, but their patience and skilful alternation at playing academic “good cop/bad cop” made sure that my journey continued and as best as possible on time. Beyond this dutiful academic support, Professor Boone particularly went beyond the call of duty to ensure that I had fewer worries than I would ordinarily have had if left to my own devices. For this, I am grateful not just to her but also to her husband, Peter Trubowitz, their family and their legendary December parties.

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but because it was too bright.

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated first, to my mother, Hilda Lewanika, who had the burden of raising four children alone in the ghetto as an uneducated general worker, from the time I was ten years old. All I can say is thank you. I pray that this makes up for all the hurt I caused during the few times I got expelled from school and did not complete my studies (properly).

I am sorry for the pain, but look mama, we did it! I hope your boy has made you proud and that I was worth the effort and sacrifice.

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Peoples Movement For The Liberation Of Angola</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
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<td>BACOSI</td>
<td>Basic Commodities Supply Intervention Facility</td>
<td>RAU</td>
<td>Research And Advocacy Unit</td>
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<td>BCs</td>
<td>Battleground Constituencies</td>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Rhodesian Front</td>
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<td>BDM</td>
<td>Bratton, Dulani &amp; Masunungure</td>
<td>SEOM</td>
<td>SADC Election Observer Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Chama Cha Mapinduza</td>
<td>SBO</td>
<td>Sample Based Observation</td>
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<td>CYL</td>
<td>City Youth League</td>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Commander Of The Defence Forces</td>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South West Africa People’s Organisation</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Competitive Authoritarian Regime</td>
<td>SRANC</td>
<td>Southern Rhodesia African National Congress</td>
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<td>DCC</td>
<td>District Coordinating Committee</td>
<td>TIZ</td>
<td>Transparency International Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>ESAP</td>
<td>Economic Structural Adjustment Program</td>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration Of Independence</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
<td>UANC</td>
<td>United African National Council</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
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<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Constitutional Assembly</td>
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<td>OACs</td>
<td>Opposition-Aligned Constituencies</td>
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<td>Parallel Vote Tabulation</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army</td>
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1 CAMPAIGNING, COERCION, AND CLIENTELISM: ZANU-PF’S STRATEGIES IN ZIMBABWE’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 2008 – 2013

Why do competitive authoritarian regimes campaign? Do they even bother? If they do, why do they campaign when they can achieve their desired ends through violence, electoral manipulation, and other illicit strategies to retain power? This thesis engages with the puzzle that is generated by these questions. It addresses these questions using Zimbabwe's ruling party - the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front's (ZANU-PF) election campaign in the run-up to the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections. The thesis bases its analysis on the classification of constituencies into three main types: ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies (ZACs), opposition-aligned constituencies (OACs), and battleground constituencies (BCs). It identifies an overarching strategic logic behind ZANU-PF's campaigning in 2008 and 2013 as a risk mitigation strategy against its loss of power and legitimacy. ZANU-PF pursued this broad strategy through attempting to maximise votes and voter turnout for itself with the inverse holding for the opposition, i.e. vote and turnout minimisation.

I argue that ZANU-PF achieved its strategic logics through the deployment of combinations of seemingly competing strategies that included persuasion, intimidation, and clientelist inducements. It deployed these strategies differently incumbent on constituency type. I also argue that ZANU-PF implemented a spatially variegated strategy of predominantly mobilising its core-constituents (especially in 2008) and chasing more independent voters (especially in 2013). In this thesis, I use “campaigning”, “coercion” and “clientelism” mainly as descriptive and partially analytical categories. In a departure from popular analysis, I also posit that the differences in strategic thrust between 2008 and 2013 suggest that ZANU-PF learnt from experience and adapted its strategies over time and space to preserve power and enhance its legitimacy. The primary academic task of this thesis is to evidence this case using descriptive inference on whether and how, in its efforts, ZANU-PF campaigned to win hearts and minds of more independent voters to enhance its legitimacy.

The thesis utilised a *nested subnational comparative analysis* research design. This design combined Nested Analysis (Lieberman, 2005) and the Subnational Comparative Method (Snyder, 2001), yielding a consolidated framework which
systematically mixed methods. It combined national descriptive statistics with detailed qualitative description and analysis of presidential election campaigns at the national and subnational level. The descriptive statistics were drawn from an original dataset on Zimbabwe's elections from 2002 to 2018 which I assembled for this study. I augment these descriptive statistics with subnational analysis of ZANU-PF campaigns across space and time based on a year of fieldwork in nine electoral constituencies in Zimbabwe. These are Mount Darwin North, Mount Darwin East, Mount Darwin South (in Mashonaland Central province), Goromonzi North (Mashonaland East province), Pumula, Makokoba (Bulawayo province), Lupane East, Tsholotsho North and Tsholotsho South (Matebeleland North).

The findings in this thesis challenge explanations of ZANU-PF's longevity that overemphasise the party's authoritarian character and its reliance on force and fraud. The thesis contributes to several conversations in the African and comparative politics literature, including conversations about elections, clientelism, political parties and the emergent literature on electoral campaigns and rallies. I designate competitive authoritarianism as the ZANU-PF regime type. This marks the conceptual starting point of my analysis, but I try to avoid conflating the party, state and regime, and attempt to analyse ZANU-PF's efforts as a ruling political party.

In this introductory chapter, I briefly present the study’s puzzle in section 1.1. followed by the study's operational research questions in section 1.2. Section 1.3 outlines the three main components of my argument -- the temporal, spatial, and genetic (or historical) components. Section 1.4 provides a conceptual overview of the analytic descriptor that I apply to Zimbabwe in this thesis -- "the competitive authoritarian regime." I review three strands of regime characterisation for the case of Zimbabwe, and show how I build on as well as depart from these characterisations. Section 1.5 briefly reviews the African political parties literature and outlines ZANU-PF’s emergence as a dominant authoritarian and electoral party between 1980 and 2008. The section also describes Zimbabwe’s party system, and identifies ZANU-PF as a dominant authoritarian party. Section 1.6. concludes this chapter and summarises its contents before moving to section 1.7, which outlines and provides brief vignettes of the chapters that make up the rest of this thesis.
1.1 The Puzzle

Competitive authoritarian regime as an analytical descriptor for the ZANU-PF led Zimbabwe regime offers a useful lens to explore the inherent paradox in which illicit and licit means of acquiring and retaining power stand side by side. Howard & Roessler (2006: 369) characterise this paradox as an inherent contradiction. On one hand, these regimes are unrepentant authoritarian machines ruling with clear evidence of might, resorting to dirty political tactics to win elections. On the other hand, they allow the opposition to exist and also compete in elections whose outcomes, while tilted in the incumbent's favour, are often not as foregone a conclusion as popular commentary often suggests.

Like most African regimes, the ZANU-PF governed Zimbabwean state is a hybrid regime, which operated in Carothers's (2002) grey-zone between democracy and authoritarianism. The ZANU-PF government allowed some essential elements of democracy -like regular multiparty elections - to exist, but with the state exhibiting some fairly severe democratic deficits. It also mixed legitimate modes of political activity and organisation with coercive means of compelling support. The latter, coercion, is usually stressed in the literature explaining ZANU-PF's stranglehold on power, while the former, legitimate modes of political activity and organisation, are relatively downplayed. This thesis attempts to explain the paradox presented by the unusual alchemy of competitive authoritarian regimes by acknowledging both their authoritarian character and their competitive political demeanour.

This is the inherent contradiction that this thesis describes and undertakes to explain. My goal is to elucidate why ZANU-PF still campaigned rather than just resort to political bully tactics and taking voters for granted, given their control of electoral processes and the coercive apparatus of the state. The thesis examines ZANU-PF's campaigns in order to determine the extent to which the party campaigned to win the hearts and minds of more independent voters.

In examining ZANU-PF campaigns, the study also covered how opposition political parties and interested international audiences impacted and responded to ZANU-PF's electoral campaign efforts and political manoeuvres. In its efforts to win elections, ZANU-PF was not operating in a political vacuum. It faced and responded to local opposition, most prominently from the Movement for Democratic Change after 2000, and was constrained by geopolitical scrutiny and
interest in how it conducted itself politically. Nonetheless, this thesis is about ZANU-PF. While acknowledging local partisan competition and international dynamics, the study focuses mainly on comparing ZANU-PF's campaigns against one another over time and space.

1.2 Research Questions

I sought to answer the question: why do competitive authoritarian regimes campaign? I pursue an answer to this question through a series of questions about ZANU-PF as follows:

1. How and where did ZANU-PF campaign using its bigwigs (praesidium) during the 2008 and 2013 harmonised elections in Zimbabwe?
2. What campaign strategies did ZANU-PF employ at national and sub regional level in 2008 and 2013?
3. What are the politically relevant variations of the constituency types in which ZANU-PF campaigned?
4. What accounts for ZANU-PF’s dramatic shift in electoral fortunes between 2008 and 2013?
5. Why does ZANU-PF campaign, given its easy access to tools of manipulation, and the means to coerce?

Answering questions about what, where, how, and with whom ZANU-PF campaigned produced descriptive material (Shapiro, Smith, & Masoud, 2004) that serves as the basis for drawing descriptive inferences about whom, where and what kind of legitimacy ZANU-PF seeks, and thus, about why ZANU-PF campaigns.

1.3 Thesis Argument

I present an argument with three nodal elements or components: a genetic element (or historical analysis, having to do with the genesis of the phenomenon at hand), a spatial element, a temporal element. Broadly, I argue that there was a spatial and temporal logic to ZANU-PF's campaign strategy. This logic revolved around a risk mitigation strategy to prevent loss of power and legitimacy. I accept that violence and intimidation (coercion), as well as electoral manipulation and vote-rigging, were realities in Zimbabwe's post-2000 elections. However, the explanation of ZANU-PF's continued hold on power is incomplete when restricted to these illicit methods of power retention alone. I suggest that ZANU-PF's attempts to win hearts and minds of voters, although neglected in the
literature and popular opinion on Zimbabwe’s elections, also constituted an essential element of ZANU-PF’s success. No narratives and analyses of the elections studied here are complete without attention to these aspects of ZANU-PF’s campaigns. ZANU-PF's persuasive election campaign efforts matter, and are an integral part of the story of both ZANU-PF’s uninterrupted hold on power in Zimbabwe, as well as the opposition's failure to wrestle the state from ZANU-PF. Although must not be taken to mean that ZANU-PF's election campaigns were "the" sole element that explains ZANU-PF's electoral success, ZANU-PF's election campaigns were indeed crucial to the party's overall strategy for holding onto power. I provide evidence for this through analysis of ZANU-PF strategies, their changes and continuities over time and space, as well as of the relationship between changes in strategy and electoral outcomes.

My argumentation builds Skinner, De Mesquita, Kudelia, & Rice (2010) as well as Boone & Wahman's (2015) arguments around the contingent nature of political contests and resulting strategies, which are conditioned by temporal and spatial contexts. I also leverage de Mesquita et al.’s (2002) thinking on the logic of political survival. The resulting descriptions, explanations, and hypotheses are grounded in empirical findings based on a nested subnational comparative analysis of the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections. Following Skinner, de Mesquita, Kudelia, & Rice (2010:7) who argue that every political contest occurs within a unique context defined by its time and place, I base my analysis and arguments on an explicit time context (2008 and 2013 elections). I highlight some historical antecedents to this period and foreground a genetic explanation of ZANU-PF's inherent political contradiction as a competitive authoritarian regime and its “split personality.”¹

My spatial arguments show that, despite the presence of general campaign strategies and tactics, the particulars of specific campaign efforts in constituencies were dependent on factors unique to the institutional, social and political contexts of the constituencies. The subnational campaign strategies and tactics were often combinations of seemingly competing logics. Nonetheless, they fed into ZANU-PF's overarching objective of risk minimisation to protect its power and legitimacy. I develop this argument by demonstrating how the strategy played out spatially and temporally, as revealed by a genetic analysis of

¹ I use the concept of split personality as a figure of speech. In persons this relates to a dissociative identity disorder (DID) where at least two distinct and relatively enduring personality states exist. I see this as similar to ZANU-PF’s enduring authoritarian and persuasive traits.
the party's character and strategy. Below I expand on the three elements of my argument in turn.

1.3.1 The temporal argument

The temporal element of the argument is that ZANU-PF's engagement in political contests in 2008 and 2013 was contingent on particular a time context and informed by background conditions shaped by their local opponents and other actors. In addition, a particular geopolitical context also informed ZANU-PF's campaign strategy. These include the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) mediation process from 2007 to 2009, and its curatorship of the Government of National Unity (GNU) from 2009 to 2013. The curatorship arrangement required that Zimbabwe's 2013 elections abide by some SADC accepted standards, norms and values around democratic elections. It was apparent in this election that the ruling party's legitimacy would be a function of both the peoples' will and consent, as well as international recognition.

ZANU-PF's campaign strategy evolved over time. Part of the reason for the change in ZANU-PF's political fortunes in 2013 was its ability to learn from the 2008 electoral process, and to change its campaign strategy. Whereas in March 2008 ZANU-PF targeted ZACs with most bigwig campaign visits, in 2013 it targeted OACs and consolidating ZACs with the most bigwig visits. I argue that this represented an important change in ZANU-PF's campaign strategy. Rohrschneider's (2002) conceptualization of campaign strategies distinguishes between mobilising and chasing strategies. According to Rohrschneider (2002), a mobilising campaign strategy (1) is motivated primarily by policies, (2) focuses on reaching core voters, (3) primarily relies on the party’s ideological heritage, (4) predominantly emphasizes a party’s core constituencies, and (5) mainly views the organization as an instrument to contact voters, not to attract new voters on the basis of attractive participatory opportunities within parties (2002:376). A chasing strategy, by contrast, is one in which a party aims at maximising its vote share through attracting new, previously unaligned and/or opposition voters. It limits its recourse to ideological persuasion, and emphasises the qualities of its leaders while using the party organisation to increase its electoral attractiveness. The chasing strategy assumes that these elements are in addition to mobilising to turn out core-constituents, which continues (Rohrschneider, 2002:376-377).
I use findings from ZANU-PF bigwig rallies to modify and contextualise Rohrschneider’s (2002) concepts. I argue that ZANU-PF generally moved from a predominantly persuasive "mobilising" strategy in March 2008, to a coercive strategy (violence and intimidation) in June 2008, to a predominantly persuasive "chasing" strategy in 2013. It switched from paying limited attention to OACs and preferring to mobilise mostly its members and structures in ZACs in 2008, to mainly mobilising and persuading non-core members and structures in 2013. The switch avoided overt physical violence and had three main components:

1. Chasing opposition leaders’ constituencies during the interregnum of the Government of National Unity.
2. Pivoting from "star rallies" where Mugabe was the main speaker to the greater use of "bigwig rallies" at which other members of the ZANU-PF praesidium took the lead.
3. Rebranding ZANU-PF to become fashionable and programmatic, to chase the urban and youth vote.

Over time, ZANU-PF's also developed a kind of "permanent campaign mode." Following a disputed election outcome in 2008, ZANU-PF and the opposition had to share power in a Government of national Unity (GNU). During this shared, ZANU-PF blurred the lines between governing and campaigning. Its general strategic shift partly account for the spectacular 2013 election results where it was able to win the presidency outright without the need for a second round.²

1.3.2 The spatial argument

I make three main arguments about spatial variation the party's campaign strategy at the constituency level, depending on constituency type. ZANU-PF attempted to minimise the risk of losing power and legitimacy by deploying strategies that maximised voter turnout and ZANU-PF votes in ZANU-PF aligned constituencies (ZACs). At the same time, it geared its strategies in opposition-aligned constituencies (OACs) towards minimising voter turnout and opposition votes. In battleground constituencies (BCs), ZANU-PF's campaign strategies depended on the geographic and perceived political location of the constituency with respect to the ZACs and OACs. This dyadic approach to constituencies - seeing them basically as either ZANU-PF or opposition - was both a function of,

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² In the 2013 presidential election, ZANU-PF was reported as mastering a spectacular Butlers Swing from opposition to ZANU-PF of over 20% (and from MDC-T to ZANU-PF of about 17%).
and underlined by, the polarised nature of Zimbabwe's politics. The dyadic approach also meant that ZANU-PF made little effort to send its "bigwigs" to campaign in battleground constituencies (BCs) because these were not part of its strategic calculus. Even so, ZANU-PF's presidential election campaigns in battleground constituencies were often quite vigorous. In some instances, they were also creative and spawned the creation of extra-constitutional ZANU-PF organisational structures at the local level.

Second, I underscore that the African voter is not homogenous. Voter heterogeneity includes class, socio-demographic diversity, and partisanship, apart from ethnic differences. I argue that during the 2008 and 2013 elections, the geographic, political, institutional, social and political characteristics of various subnational electorates informed ZANU-PF's campaign strategy. The foci of ZANU-PF's bigwig visits, and the variation of its campaign messages and campaign tactics at subnational level, suggest that ZANU-PF understood the politically relevant heterogeneity of its electorate. Consequently, ZANU-PF's election campaign messages and strategies across space were not a one size fit all effort. The campaign messages that party bigwigs issued during campaign visits, and the strategies that ZANU-PF employed at the subnational level, varied depending on the type of voters that ZANU-PF targeted. Not only did it matter for campaign strategy and messaging whether the voter was considered a ZANU-PF or an opposition supporter, but it also mattered where the voter was located, i.e. whether they were resident in rural or urban Zimbabwe, and whether they stayed in a ZANU-PF-aligned, opposition-aligned, or battleground constituency.

Third, ZANU-PF campaigns were marked by the differential use of persuasion, coercion and clientelist distribution across constituency types. In ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies (ZACs), legitimacy-seeking bigwig and persuasive appeals at the sub-national level sat side-by-side and, in uncomfortable ways, with electoral manipulation, violence, and intimidation. ZANU-PF generally instituted a three-tier political game where it first attempted to persuade voters through bigwig rallies, as well as local meetings and canvassing. It also attempted to solidify and attract support through inducements and partisan distribution of electoral goodies, land, jobs as well as food and agricultural implements in a clientelist exchange for support. Nevertheless, ZANU-PF’s strategy in ZACs was in the main, coercive clientelist mobilisation. This was buttressed by ZANU-PF attempts to turn its core-constituencies into what it termed "one-party state
constituencies." To achieve this, ZANU-PF blocked, disrupted, and limited opposition campaigns, and it also coerced suspected opposition members into fleeing, reforming, voting for ZANU-PF at the polls, or joining the party. In ZACs, ZANU-PF generally could police, monitor and enforce voter compliance through a wide range of local patrons and facilitators drawn from party organisational structures, traditional leaders, war veterans and party youths.

Initially (2008) ZANU-PF paid limited attention to opposition-aligned constituencies (OACs), and focused its campaign efforts on getting its members to the polls. This changed in 2013 when ZANU-PF's pursuit of opposition constituencies became more spirited. I argue that the strategy in OACs in 2013 was a dynamic mix of clientelist mobilisation and persuasive chasing, as opposed to the coercive clientelist mobilisation observed in the ZACs. On clientelist-mobilisation, ZANU-PF adopted what its members referred to as a “hands-on approach” which centred on building ZANU-PF structures through expanding its patronage network. I argue that this hands-on approach represented an embedded mobilisation on ZANU-PF’s part, which it hoped would later translate to electoral dividends. The underlying logic was that service provision could win votes, although this was not a purely material exchange. ZANU-PF’s also asked for a quid pro quo. It offered solutions (jobs, housing stands, food and other material rewards) in exchange for support. It also pursued the youth vote and made use of its party structures to offer a multiplicity of clientelist bargains, enticements, tailored messaging and creative campaigning. ZANU-PF used persuasive appeals through bigwig rallies and clientelist enticements to retain, as well as attract support in the OACs with far less violence and intimidation than it deployed in ZACs. In OACs, the party could not police, monitor, and ensure voter compliance. Its party structures were generally weaker, and its ability to coerce limited. This was partly because it was not in control of the local state in the way that it was in ZACs, especially when it came to its relations with traditional leaders. ZANU-PF's campaigning in OACs was, surprisingly, based on more legitimacy-seeking methods than on coercion, despite the patent hostility of the territory within which its campaigns were staged.

Although ZANU-PF deprived battleground constituencies of bigwig attention, subnational politics in BCs was extremely competitive. There was hybridity in strategy deployment across this constituency type. I refer to much of this hybridity as "persuasive-clientelist mobilisation" as opposed to the coercive
clientelist mobilisation of the ZACs, and as opposed to the persuasive clientelist chasing strategy the party employed in OACs. Across the BCs, patronage-based distribution of resources and campaign "gifts" was present. Constituents also generally accepted patronage as a critical element of the electioneering process. This led to processes of clientelist outbidding between ZANU-PF and the opposition regarding who could buy more votes through the distribution of goods and amenities to targeted voters.

The spatial logics, partisan identifications, temporal factors, and geopolitical dynamics all impacted how ZANU-PF strategised to ensure its political survival. They also impacted the kinds of political, institutional, and socio-economic tools that it leveraged to this end.

In advancing a spatial analysis, the evidence presented in this thesis questions the utility of notions of the "rural and urban divide" in describing campaign characteristics and voters. The rural-urban distinction follows age-old analytical traditions of the “traditional” and “modern” settings as tropes for analysis in African politics. Lermachand & Legg’s (1972) influential conceptualisation of political regimes focused on patrimonialism and what they termed the patrimonial-clientage system. They argued that the system took two forms: the traditionalistic, where the patron-client relationship permeated the entire political system, and the modernising patrimonial system, where the higher rate of social mobilisation led to discontinuities in patron-client relations (Lermachand & Legg’s (1972:166-167).

The above logic generally saw ruling parties as patronage dispensing machines and often painted their rural targets as possessing limited agency, and participating in political activities to placate their patrons (Chabal and Daloz 1999 also Koter 2013). Conversely, It also depicted the urban constituents as exercising agency. Urbanites are seen as unreceptive to clientelism due to their social structural situation, and higher levels of education and enlightenment. These caricatures of urban and rural areas mimic Elster’s (1986) contrast between the market and the forum in his conceptualization of varieties of democratic theory. The urban areas are the market, where the act of voting is private and is the product of an individual’s aggregate interest. In contrast, the rural areas are the forum, where the private is public, and politics is about collective solidarity, and it is divorced from decision-making and the exercise of influence on events
(Elster 1986). Under these caricatures, the city is considered as opposition territory. In contrast, the country is considered incumbent territory, and the opposition and incumbents seldom make forays into each other’s territories.

The evidence from ZANU-PF campaigning that is presented here does confirm some of these distinctions. Yet it also demonstrates that the rural-urban binary is limited as an organizing concept, and that the traditional-modern dichotomy, as well as the forum-market distinction, are relatively unhelpful. I rely, instead, on the demarcations of space based on variation in constituency type, and on characterisation of constituencies along politically relevant dimensions that go beyond urban and rural. The Zimbabwe elections reveal the perverse nature of clientelism, persuasion and coercion across both traditional and modern, rural and urban, and market and forum spaces. The distinctions are not first and foremost geographic. I follow Erdmann & Engel, who argue the closely interwoven nature of patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination in most African polities, transcending the spatial distinctions between a "traditional" periphery and "modern" centre (Erdmann & Engel, 2007:99).

1.3.3 The genetic argument

My premise for this argument is an acceptance that institutions, forms of behaviour, and character have a history, or genesis, that informs what we eventually see in the present. The historiography of political institutions allows us to understand the political actors and events we study. In the case of Zimbabwe, this requires a historical study and periodisation that is not reductionist, and is nuanced in its embrace of a full ZANU-PF history.

I reject as inadequate explanations of ZANU-PF's electoral conduct that limit their historical dive to ZANU-PF's existence as a guerrilla movement during Zimbabwe's war for independence in the 1960s and 1970s. Tracing ZANU-PF's authoritarian tendencies to its existence as a guerrilla army is a selective rendering of history, and while perhaps compelling, it is also inadvertently dishonest. An honest tracing of ZANU-PF's origins, grounding in its founding, is necessary for an explanation for its electoral conduct after 2000. This entails analysing how ZANU's predecessor movements are part of the origin story of ZANU-PF. This background offers a possible explanation of the contradictions inherent in ZANU-

3 Like Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) from which ZANU split, the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC) and City Youth League (CYL) and others that I cover in chapter 3.
PF and other parties like it. The origins of ZANU-PF as a party contained democratic and popular elements, but they were infused with violent and coercive politics. This could have led to its intractable competitive authoritarian disposition.

1.4 Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: Locating the concept

1.4.1 The Zimbabwean authoritarian state: some extant characterisations

Although the characterisations vary, there is a fair amount of consensus that post-independence Zimbabwe was an authoritarian state. Authoritarianism is a prominent regime type, and is often contrasted in the scholarship to totalitarianism and democracy (Gasiorowski, 1990:109; Alvarez, Cheubub, Limongi, & Prezeworski, 1996). Linz (1970:225) defines authoritarianism as a system of rule in which a leader or a small group of leaders control the state and affords very limited political pluralism. Schedler (1998:93) places authoritarianism at one end of a continuum with democratic sub-types (electoral, liberal and advanced democracy) anchoring the other end. Despite Schedler's (1998) emphasis on democratic sub-types, Geddes (2004:5) argues that authoritarianism also has many subtypes which differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy. Zimbabwe's multiple characterisations of a type of authoritarian state lend credence to Geddes' point. Three categories of authoritarian regime (or authoritarian variants) that have been used to describe the Zimbabwe government under ZANU-PF are summarized below as follows:

1. Entrenched socio-economic authoritarianism, characterised by extractive, predatory accumulation as part of the power politics of the state.
2. Militarised electoral authoritarianism, informed by legacies of the colonial past, guerrilla struggle for liberation and an easy resort to violence.
3. Authoritarian nationalism, undergirded by anti-imperialism, manipulation of history and binaries between contesting nationalisms along liberal and nationalist lines.

The entrenched socio-economic authoritarianism scholarship is allied to the developmentalist school. It fashions its critiques around the state's attitude towards socio-economic development, with implications on the nature of politics and emergent regime. Bracking (2005), for example, characterised the Zimbabwean state as an "entrenched social authoritarianism," which in the 2000s, resulted in pre and post-election spoils politics. This stemmed from its turn to authoritarianism after its failed postcolonial social democratisation project of the 25
1980s, and the onset of structural adjustment in the 1990s. Bracking (2005: 343) saw this authoritarianism as the default mode of a state that was anti-development, and built on a spoils-based political economy. She argues that in the 2000s, international isolation and illiquidity forced ZANU-PF to pursue a zero-sum extractive form of accumulation at the expense of its citizens.

The power politics that Bracking outlines, and her characterization of the state as vehicle for extractive, predatory and primitive accumulation, are recurring themes in many characterisations of the Zimbabwean state (Bond, 2002; Bratton, 2014; Mawowa, 2013; Moore, 2001, Shumba, 2016). Bratton (2014:191) argues that ruling elites purposely blurred the boundaries between political, economic and military institutions for purposes of power capture and retention. Meanwhile, the military increasingly gained institutional vetoes in politics, which effectively blocked Zimbabwe's transition to democracy (Mangongera, 2014:68). Also, the elites were exploitative and deployed repressive state machinery to serve the class interests of a few well-connected bureaucrats, military, and paramilitary leaders. This elite predatory accumulation went on without the strictures of transparent regulation and was devoid of the systematic 'empowerment' and redistributive concerns that ZANU-PF often preached in public (Bond, 2002; Saunders, 2008:129). The existence of such a predatory elite allowed party credentials and personal relations to trump professional competencies. As a result, the predatory state placed ruling party business and interests above the rest of the polity and the state -as distinct from the party (Shumba, 2016).

The literature characterizing the Zimbabwe state as "entrenched social authoritarian" outlines long continuities and legacies that stretch back to "an uninterrupted progression of various shades of authoritarianism" from 1890 to 1979 (Masunungure, 2011:49). This includes the colonial regime's militarisation of politics and primitive accumulation, including land grabs at the start of the colonial era in the 1890s (Bratton,2014; Moore, 2003:34). Post-independence, Shumba (2016:188) argues that the further from independence the country moved, the less developmental the state became. Predation, according to Shumba (2016:188), stood opposed to the developmental state, spawning a rentier state wherein the party and military were dominant. State domination and capture shaped state-business relations while violence and patronage shaped state-society relations (Shumba, 2016:192).
This literature shows the extent to which predatory elites had penetrated the state and private-sector space. This thesis further exposes the complex web that translated into ZANU-PF’s incumbency advantages at elections. These endowments were sophisticated. While described in the above literature, these authors offer few indications as to how they morphed into financial support and deployable muscle for ZANU-PF at election time. This literature also pays limited attention to the changing face of Zimbabwe’s authoritarianism, as well as its contesting transitions as Mkandawire (2020) argues. I argue that while the legacies are real and inform the character of the "ZANU-PF regime", and while there are continuities, ZANU-PF changed over time. Seeing this, requires disaggregating the party-state conflation to analyse actions between state, party, and the party-state. I see the failure to draw these distinctions limits analysis of how the state and the party manoeuvred to deal with domestic, regional, international, and donor pressure during elections. It also limits our understanding of how the predatory authoritarian elites circumvented and or co-opted local networks, and deployed patronage along selective lines.

The post-cold war rise of "hybrid regimes" informs the second characterisation of Zimbabwe’s authoritarianism. In electoral authoritarian regimes, rulers permit constrained pluralistic competition but prevent the regular rotation of elites. The Zimbabwe literature that employs this concept is heavily informed by Schedler's (2002; 2006) definition. These are authoritarian regimes that hold elections, but that systematically violate liberal democratic principles in ways that render multiparty elections instruments of authoritarianism rather than democracy (Schedler, 2006:3). Bratton & Masunungure (2008:42), as well as Masunungure (2011) and Bratton (2014), described the Zimbabwean regime as a "militarised form of electoral authoritarianism." They argue that this regime is supported by a destructive mix of violence, ideology and patronage. The military element stems from the military's overt intrusion into the political arena and elections. The post-2008 first-round elections are a prime example of this military execution of ZANU-PF's Machiavellian vision of hanging on to power (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008; Masunungure, 2011; Alexander & Tendi, 2008). The electoral element of the regime emanates from Zimbabwe's ability to conduct of elections consistently since independence in 1980. Yet allegations of severe manipulation abound (Masunungure, 2009; 2011; 2014), producing what Schedler (2006) lamented as the spread of multiparty elections without democracy.
The scholarship traces military intrusion into civilian politics to the liberation movement's modus operandi during the struggle for independence (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008; Dorman, 2006; Kriger, 2005; Levitsky & Way, 2012; Masunungure, 2011). This line of argument enjoys a rich intellectual tradition in African politics. Hyden's (2006) "movement legacy" theory summarises this tradition, as do Leys & Saul (1994:146) who argued that liberation struggle processes tended to generate undemocratic post-independence political practices. Similarly, Levitsky & Way (2012) argue that authoritarian durability and popular support during times of crisis can stem from identities, norms and organisational structures forged during times of sustained violent and ideologically driven conflict. They argue that this shared history of violent conflict not only lends regimes like Zimbabwe's their military element, but also forms the glue in authoritarian regimes born of conflict. LeBas (2011) extends this line of thinking by arguing that this regime durability is also due to the strengthening of polarised identities and within-group ties. These identities and ties link party members' fates within the party, and make supporting it a moral obligation. The obligatory and moralistic nature of this support traps potential defectors within the ruling party in ways that go beyond the role of material benefits in tying them to the regime (LeBas, 2011). This literature thus characterised the Zimbabwe regime as a cohesive militarised authoritarian regime on account of stable identities, post-material solidarity ties, ideology, shared 'war ethos', discipline, and violent origins.

The characterisation of the state as nationalist is central to the third broad way of characterising Zimbabwe's authoritarian state. Scholars stressing this angle see the ideological element as ZANU-PF's nationalism covering for authoritarianism (Cameron and Dorman, 2009, Sithole, 2001; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009 and Tendi, 2010). Influenced by Gramscian analytics, Raftopoulos (2003; 2006) characterises Zimbabwe's authoritarian nature as a decentralised, authoritarian, nationalist regime. The Gramscian analytics produce a focus on the regime's turn to populism, its hijacking of popular discontents, neutralising of the opposition, incorporation of popular opinion, as well as leveraging of national identity and patriotism as part of hegemonic and power retention designs and also regime characteristics (Gramsci 1971; Hall, 1988; Mouffe, 2014;). Raftopoulos (2003: 17) outlines how the Zimbabwean state historicised and racialised land restitution and justice, while introducing new forms of indigenous nationalism based on
claims of loyalty and national sovereignty. He shows how the state leveraged anti-colonial critiques of the West, and claimed to hold a political monopoly on the commitment to radical land and economic redistribution (Raftopoulos, 2003). This line of analysis of authoritarianism is also influenced by postcolonial and decolonial thinking about culture and ideology. Mamdani (1996), Ake (2000) and Mbembe (2001), among others, have argued that the colonial state informed the general practice of power in postcolonial African states, and postcolonial political culture. The interpellation of African nationalism with colonialism contributes to the reproduction of colonial violence and authoritarianism as traits of postcolonial regime governance (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).

These different characterisations of the Zimbabwean post-independence regime are useful, and proffer a convincing characterisation of the regime. Yet this literature has two important limitations, which I address in this thesis.

First, the electoral authoritarian regime literature focuses rather one-sidedly on the illicit dimension of the longevity of authoritarianism in Zimbabwe. It covers violence, coercion, patronage, theft, and chicanery, which are all elements of what Masungure (2014) following Schedler (2002; 2006; 2013) defined as "the menu of manipulation" and the dynamics of unfree competition in Zimbabwe. This strand of literature concerns itself with the characterisation of regimes as authoritarian, and analyzes the regime's practices as instances of undemocratic conduct, despite electoral procedures. The guiding concept, electoral authoritarianism, is itself a diminished subtype of authoritarianism. It thus covers one side of the continuum instead of possibly adopting "a double root strategy that maps contemporary regimes from both sides of the spectrum," that is, both the authoritarian and democratic sides (Boggards, 2009:400).

Second, the "electoral authoritarianism"-inspired literature is steeped in liberal conceptions of democracy. In this liberal frame, ideology is also often viewed from the negative rather than the positive side. This buttresses the (un)witting location of authoritarian electoral regimes within the framework of liberal, democratic norms. In the process, the focus on the illicit makes the literature fail to capture how autocrats also solicit the cooperation of those they govern, as shown elsewhere (e.g. Gandhi & Prezeworski, 2007). As Sim (2006:145-6) argued, the liberal frame's ability to see ideology as a part of everyday governance is limited. Literature in this vein therefore fails to capture, let alone accept, that
ideologically-strong authoritarian governments can secure as much legitimacy as democratic ones. Such legitimacy can be due to a variety of factors, including economic or policy-based authoritarian bargains, or the regime pandering to the electorate to win elections and/or legitimacy (Mesquita, Smith, Morrow, & Siverson, 2005; Desai et al. 2009).

1.4.2 A note on Clientelist appeals, distributive and patronage politics

Knowledge gaps thus exist around how ZANU-PF and the state deploy ideology, where, and how diffusion occurs from the authoritarian leadership to the variegated masses in different constituencies. When we add the concept of authoritarian nationalism to assist in answering the questions around the place of ideology, further questions arise about how these shared historical solidarities and ideologies are brought to bear on the electorate in both urban and rural settings during elections. How ZANU-PF separates ideology and populism on the ground, and how this plays out across highly differentiated geographic, demographic, and political terrains, remains unclear. How ZANU-PF mastered its clientelist politics and selected targets for patronage distribution also enjoys little space in the literature, beyond acknowledging their prevalence. However, the literature does establish that patronage politics, while not the be-all and end-all of ZANU-PF’s tactics, occupies a key component of their election campaign strategy.

Clientelism and patronage constitute a large part of the explanation of the political phenomenon in Africa in general. They, together with reservations around the presence of programmatic politics, also feature prominently in this thesis. At a basic level, clientelism revolves around the disbursement of particular benefits by a patron/agent in exchange for votes from clients/principals (Resnick, 2012; Robinson and Verdier, 2013: 62; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007, Gans-Morse et al. 2014). Stokes (2007:649) defines it as a method of electoral mobilisation where politicians give material goods in return for electoral support from voters both retrospectively and prospectively. According to Gans-Morse et al. (2014), the exchange is informed by the role of the individual, context, and purpose of clientelism (whether the agent is negotiating for the principal’s vote [vote buying] or participation/abstention on the voting day [turn out buying]). Clientelist patronage can be (1.) direct, or (2.) involve intermediaries/brokers to enforce and monitor the transfer (Resnick, 2012), often through the use of chiefs as a technology to deliver resources to communities (Baldwin, 2013:796). According to Van de Walle, (2007: 3), there are varieties of political clientelism that include
tributary, elitist, and mass clientelism. Randal & Svasand (2002) and Van De Walle (2003) believe that clientelism in African politics exists in the elitist and tributary form. This, they argue, is due to the weakness of African political parties, which they argue, impedes their ability to master the kind of organisation required for mass clientelism.

The generalisation that African parties were too weak to have the organisational strength required for mass clientelism is one of the things that this thesis claws back on. It is simply untrue for ZANU-PF. Because it could conduct mass clientelism, it also blurred the lines between this and programmatic politics, given that both material appeals based on material exchanges (Wyatt, 2013). The distinction, which this thesis tries to make, relates to partisan selectivity in clientelism’s beneficiaries, whereas in programmatic appeals, citizens benefit regardless of political affiliation.

There also is a tendency in the literature to use clientelism and patronage interchangeably. This thesis continues this practice but is cogniscent of the distinctions that Stoke (2007) and Stokes et al. (2013) make. That is between patronage, where politicians (office holders) use of public resources in return for retrospective or prospective electoral support from individuals, and clientelism, which is the broader use of material inducements to seek electoral support (Stokes, 2007). Pork barrel politics, i.e. the channelling of benefits to particular geographic areas for political reasons, is another element of clientelism (Stokes et al., 2013:12). Pork barrel politics will be at play later in this thesis, but is not emphasised and is, instead, blanketed under clientelism and the thesis’ use of patronage politics.

While the definitional issues are of importance, they often defy consensus and take up acreage in the literature. However, more empirically and theoretically relevant discussions that this thesis engages are two-fold. The first relates to issues that Gans-Morse et al. (2014) raise around what informs the clientelist exchange and its use purposes, with debate suggesting that it is either for vote-buying or turn out buying as informed by the role of the individual, and context. The second relates to the targets of clientelist appeals, i.e. is it convinced (loyal) or unconvinced (swing) or opposed voters. An extension to the second issue which directly relates to the thesis is whether these targeted are targeted as individual voters or as constituencies of voters, i.e. is clientelism targeted at loyal
constituencies rather than loyal voters or swing constituencies rather than swing voters.

The literature varies greatly regarding targeting of clientelism. Cox & McCubbins (1986) argued that parties would target core supporters while Dixit & Londregan (1996) as well as Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) hypothesised that opposing parties tended to strategically target undecided voters with limited partisan inclination who could be swayed. Their modelling suggested that parties would neither spend clientelist effort on their secured supporters because the votes were secured nor on dyed-in-the-wool opposition adherents, whose support they were unlikely to get regardless of the efforts they made. Stokes (2005:323) produced a similar theoretical model for Argentina which predicted that party machines would target “…people in the middle of the distribution of partisan predisposition..”, i.e. swing voters who are indifferent about their preferences. The assumption in both models was not just that swing voters allegiance was cheapest to buy through targeting the poorest of these because of their weak attachment. It was also that these were probably the only votes available to buy given that the other supporters and opponents were dug in. However, there has been limited empirical evidence to support the above hypothesis, and what evidence has been available has been at aggregate constituency, municipal or district levels. Nonetheless, given the scarcity of individual-level data, Golden & Min (2013:79) correctly argue that the evidence shows that political parties may be targeting swing constituencies rather than swing voters.

When tested empirically, Stokes’ (2005) produced results that went against the swing voter predictions. It showed that at least in Argentina the dominant party targeted its supporters rather than swing voters with clientelist emoluments. Stokes et al. (2013) labelled this the loyal-voter anomaly. The so-called anomaly thus clawed back on Stokes (2005), Cox & McCubbins (1986), Dixit & Londregan (1996) as well as Golden & Min (2013) ’s assertions on targeting of swing voters and voters. This thesis encounters and tries to explain the loyal voter anomaly when it looks at ZANU-PF’s campaigns in ZACs in chapter 6. The findings in this chapter closely align with the thinking forwarded by Stokes et al. (2013), who posit the broker mediated distribution theory. They argue that while national politicians might want to target swing voters, their brokers at the local level instead target loyal voters because their votes are cheaper to purchase, creating room for local brokers to convert the excess to personal use. This
phenomenon is true in Zimbabwe, but in this thesis, I also mediate it with findings from Zambia by Kate Baldwin (2013) which show that rural voters do not just voter with their chiefs, the putative brokers in rural Zimbabwe, simply because their chiefs say so. She highlights how rural voters also make sophisticated calculations centred on the performance of elected officials; status of their relations with local patrons; and how this impacts their ability to deliver on promises and programs that affect the self-interests of rural citizens (Baldwin 2013; 2015). This finding suggests that the rural populations are not as beholden to patronage and clientelist politics as uniformly or as generally thought. Bratton, Bhavnani & Chen (2012) also echo these findings from a 23 country study which suggests that contrary to conventional thought, voters in Africa value economic voting more than ethnic and other considerations.

Nevertheless, the loyal voter anomaly holds at a general national-level analysis but gets complicated at the subnational level. The data presented in this thesis shows that ZANU-PF did not totally neglect swing constituencies and even opposition areas with clientelist politics. Of interest from the battleground constituencies (Goromonzi and Tsholotsho) covered in this study’s chapter 8, is also that when it does target swing constituencies, ZANU-PF does not target swing voters. Instead, the findings suggest that it sticks to loyal supporters and party structures, thus replicating the loyal voter anomaly despite the change in constituency type. To address the loyal voter anomaly, Nichter (2008) using the same data as Stokes (2005), argued that because parties cannot monitor and ensure the vote, clientelist appeals were made to secure or buy turnout of already loyal but unmobilised supporters, rather than vote-buying. Nichter (2008) defines turnout buying as a strategy by which parties reward supporters for showing up at the polls rather than for changing their vote. However, Like the submissions from Stokes (2005) and others, Nichter’s (2008) thesis only partially holds when applied to the Zimbabwean elections and subnational analysis in this thesis. The assumption of an inability to monitor the vote doesn’t hold for ZANU-PF in ZACs although it does in OACs. As such, in ZACs, ZANU-PF deployed clientelist emoluments to secure both the vote and turnout in what Nichter (2008) and in his later work with Gans-Morse et al (2014) correctly labelled double persuasion. ZANU-PF demonstrated in the 2008 elections that there were violent consequences to not following through on the vote. In 2013 it demonstrated capacity to monitor the vote. The thesis highlights both these elements at length in Chapter 6. In chapter 7 and 8, which focus on OACs and BCs, ZANU-PF had
limited capacity to monitor and ensure the vote, and in these spaces, turnout buying makes sense. Following Gans-Morse et al. (2014), this thesis will show that the emerging picture across space is that there is variation to the purposes of clientelist and patronage politics, and the combination of strategies deployed across space dependent on constituency type and voter targeted.

1.4.3 Competitive authoritarianism as analytical descriptor

This study builds on the above understandings of the Zimbabwean state and governing arrangements. It aligns closely with the literature on electoral authoritarianism and hybrid regimes. There is sufficient consensus that a significant number of African countries that pass the procedural minimums test are neither democratic nor outright authoritarian, but exist in a 'grey-zone' (Carothers 2002) or 'halfway house' between democracy and authoritarianism (Huntington, 1991). This zone, according to Schedler (2002:47), constitutes the modal form of regime in Sub-Saharan Africa and around the world. Opalo (2012:83) hazards that 43% of African state regimes were autocratic, 25% consolidating democracies in some way, while 32% were of ambiguous regime orientation at the time of his writing. These trends show the uneven advance of democracy (Lynch & Crawford, 2012:276) and provide context for Cheeseman's (2015:4) findings that democratic breakdowns amongst the grey-zone countries continue to be a prominent feature of multiparty politics in Africa. Democratic breakdowns led to the development of concepts of subtypes of authoritarianism and democracy to describe the grey-zone regimes. These include electoral authoritarianism, competitive authoritarianism (Levistky and Way, 2002), and disguised dictatorship (Brooker, 2000:228).

This study adopts competitive authoritarianism as its analytical descriptor for Zimbabwe, rather than the other regime characterisations mentioned above, for several reasons. In Zimbabwe's case, I contend that competitive authoritarianism offers some explanatory and analytical power. It renders an accurate description of the Zimbabwean state. Its nodal analytical probes (link and leverage and strength of the political party and state organs) provide guidance for structured analysis. This is critical, as it allows the study to separate the party from the state, thus allowing for a closer study of ZANU-PF as a political party during election campaigns. Second, competitive authoritarianism does not focus on the mere presence of elections as the defining regime characteristic. Instead, it defines the competitiveness of the system as an essential element, i.e. the opposition must
compete and believe it stands a chance to win elections. This competitiveness is what distinguishes these types of regimes from full-blown autocracies. At the same time, I deliberately move away from characterising the Zimbabwean regime as a diminished type of democracy. It is clear from the literature and empirics that the Zimbabwean state was some kind of an authoritarian rather than some kind of democratic regime. The term competitive authoritarianism does not meet Bogaards (2009) "double root" exhortation. However, it acknowledges the authoritarian roots and character of the regime and opens the door for analysis of contestation in situations where the opposition participates and can win elections.

Levitsky & Way (2010:3) define competitive authoritarian regimes as civilian regimes in which incumbents combine electoral competition with varying degrees of authoritarianism. They categorise Zimbabwe as a stable competitive authoritarian regime where formal democratic institutions, like elections, are considered the primary means of gaining power. The formal democratic institutions are not entirely insulated from the incumbent's abuse of the state to gain a significant advantage over their opponents (Levitsky & Way, 2010:4; Morse, 2012). As such, while competition between incumbents and opposition is "real," it is also "unfair," with incumbents typically resorting to coercion, intimidation, and fraud to ensure electoral victory and transgress voter choices (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Collier & Vicente, 2012).

The reality that the opposition uses democratic institutions to vigorously and sometimes successfully compete for power is the distinguishing marker for competitiveness (Levitsky & Way, 2002:59; 2010:4; Howard & Roessler, 2006:368). Elections in these regimes are competitive because of the strength of democratic procedures in which the opposition can win, and elections are arenas through which opposition parties can contest for power (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2009:3). Levitsky & Way (2010:6) outline how competitive authoritarian regimes differ from out-and-out authoritarianism as follows: In competitive authoritarian regimes

1. legal channels exist through which opposition parties compete seriously for power,
2. elections are held regularly, and opposition parties are not legally barred from contesting them,
3. opposition activity takes place above ground,
4. civil liberties are sufficiently respected for opposition parties to open offices, recruit candidates, and organise campaigns, and
5. leading opposition figures are generally not exiled or imprisoned.

Competitive authoritarianism, like its related concepts, is steeped in the Schumpeterian procedural minimums of democratic philosophy. Part of the foundations of Levitsky & Way's analytics are four key attributes that Dahl (1971) outlines for democracy. These are regular, competitive, free and fair elections; universal suffrage; protection of civil liberties; and non-tutelary limitations to the winners' effective power to govern. Levitsky & Way (2010) add a fifth proviso, the existence of a reasonably level playing field between incumbents and opposition, despite some incumbency advantage. This advantage may include patronage, pork-barrel spending, clientelist social policies, and privileged access to media and finance but in ways that are not systematic enough to seriously undermine the opposition's capacity to compete (Levitsky & Way, 2010:5). An uneven playfield exists when there is rampant abuse of state institutions, systematic favouritism of the ruling party at the expense of the opposition. There will also be severe handicaps to opposition abilities to campaign, including through skewed access to resources, media and the law - including through partial electoral institutions and courts (Levitsky & Way, 2010:9).

While all this precludes competitive authoritarian regimes from being viewed as democratic (Levitsky & Way, 2010:1), elections still provide regime opponents with focused organising opportunities to defeat dictators (Geddes, 2004), as happened during Zimbabwe's 2008 March election. Competitive authoritarian regimes fail to meet the procedural minimums criteria for democracy outlined above because they fall short on one or more of these key attributes of democracy: (1) free elections; (2) broad protection of civil liberties; and (3) a reasonably even playing field (Levitsky & Way, 2010:6). The critical difference between competitive authoritarianism and outright authoritarianism is levels of regime effort at elections. Under authoritarianism, incumbents can rest easy ahead of elections, if they conduct them, knowing there can be no other result except a win. Under competitive authoritarianism, incumbents sweat to thwart opposition efforts through fair means and foul.
Competitive authoritarianism is also an analytical concept that is invoked to explain the democratisation, or lack thereof, of such regimes. A stable competitive authoritarian regime is conceptualized as one that survives for 15 years or more. Scholars identify two factors as key in explaining stability or lack thereof: the regime's link with and leverage from the West, and ruling party and state organisational strength. Levitsky & Way hypothesise that if a regime's linkage to the West is extensive, it democratises, and where linkage was low, regime outcomes hinge on incumbents' organisational and coercive capacity. They also argue that in situations where incumbent capacity is high, regimes remain stable and authoritarian. In contrast, where incumbent capacity is low, regimes tended to be unstable and authoritarian (Levitsky & Way, 2010:2).

This thesis does not dwell on Zimbabwe's relations with the West. It takes as given that relations were tenuous, and the West had little leverage on the Harare regime. It does, however, explore an adapted version of the linkage and leverage theory by looking at Zimbabwe's relations with South Africa, and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). These are important because of the governing arrangements that Zimbabwe adopted after the disputed elections in 2008. The other key element, the strength of the ruling party and state organisations, is more pertinent for this thesis, given my focus on ZANU-PF as a political party and its election campaigns in the run-up to the 2008 and 2013 elections.

1.5 ZANU-PF’s Emergence As The Dominant Authoritarian Support Party of Zimbabwe’s Competitive Authoritarian System

ZANU-PF was formed in 1963 but participated in its first elections in February 1980, when it won and began its journey as the predominant political force in Zimbabwe. It’s 1980 victory came as a surprise to the colonial regime; some pundits and scholars who thought the electorate would reject ZANU-PF because it was too radical, and was based in exile. This was in contrast to some pundits' favourite, Bishop Abel Muzorewa’s United African National Council (UANC), which had been active inside Rhodesia and organising since 1970 (Gregory, 1981; Cliffe, Mpofu & Munslow, 1980). The UNAC had also won a landslide in the delegitimised Zimbabwe-Rhodesia elections of 1979, and was well resourced. Its
moderate stance made it a more acceptable compromise for white Rhodesians (Cliffe, Mpofu & Munslow, 1980). 4

The independence elections took place under the administration of an appointed British Governor, Lord Soames. The Soames administration maintained a standing state of emergency and martial law, together with various repressive pieces of legislation that the colonial regime had used to quash dissent and criminalise political and guerrilla activity (Kriger, 2005:3). Zimbabwe held its founding elections under a system that sought to control every facet of political activity (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1980:16). Under this system, the transitional state was defined by restricted freedom of expression, licensed and controlled freedom of assembly, while restraining freedom of movement through curfews and summary detentions (Commonwealth Observer Group, 1980:16). These restrictions, implemented by a biased civil service which also ran the elections, affected ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU more than other parties that contested the 1980 elections (Commonwealth Observer Group, 1980:20-22). However, ZANU-PF was not just a victim of the system. It was also a perpetrator of some less-than-democratic tactics. As Kriger (2005:6) noted, many election observer groups and scholars deliberately ignored, peppered over, or justified ZANU-PF’s electoral infractions, especially when it came to the party’s violence and intimidation. Observers and even electoral authorities often excused ZANU-PF’s ills to avoid antagonising it, and forcing a return to war and collapse of the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. Many observers suspected that ZANU had stopped about 4,000 of its guerrillas from reporting to demobilisation camps. Instead, it deployed these guerrillas to various rural locations as part of its election machinery. This posed a real threat to the transition process. The prevalence of nationalist historiographers sympathetic to ZANU-PF in the post-1980 years also helps explain why much of the scholarship turned a blind eye to these aspects of ZANU-PF’s electioneering (Kriger, 2005; Gregory, 1981).

4 The 1979 elections were an outcome of the 1978 internal settlement and saw black Zimbabweans being able to vote on a common roll separate from the white roll, for the first time. The UANC, a moderate nationalist party, had agreed to an internal settlement with the Rhodesian government leading to the March 1979 election where its President, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, was formerly elected the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was condemned as illegal by the United Nations Security Council, (resolution 423 of 14 March 1978). However, it existed until the end of 1979 when the country returned to British dominion pending formal independence in April 1980 and first elections in February 1980. Other internal settlement parties were ZANU (later known as ZANU-Ndonga) led by Ndanbaningi Sithole, United National Federal Party (UNFP) led by Chief Kayisa Ndweni, and the Rhodesian Front led by Ian Smith. The internal settlement was deemed a "sell-out" act by the main nationalist movements, ZANU and Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) which boycotted the 1979 election (Sithole, 1985).
It was in this challenging political environment, in which ZANU-PF was both victim and perpetrator, that multi-party politics in Zimbabwe were born. ZANU-PF won these founding elections with 63% of the vote share, claiming 57 of the 80 available seats on the common roll. PF-ZAPU (running as Patriotic Front Party-PFP) got 20 seats, and the UANC won the remaining three seats. As shown in Figure 1-1, ZANU-PF would go on to dominate Zimbabwean politics and establish electoral hegemony with only weak opposition challenges for the next 20 years (Sithole and Makumbe, 1997:122). In the 1985 election, ZANU-PF increased its seat tally from 57 to 64 seats, and popular vote share to 77%, while ZAPU suffered a decline from 20 seats to 15 seats in the House of Assembly, with the remaining seat going to ZANU-Ndonga (Kriger, 2005; Sithole, 1986; Sachikonye, 1989).

At independence, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe attempted to settle the nerves of former opponents and the international community by adopting a policy of national reconciliation (Mandaza, 1986; Raftopoulos, 2004; Eppel, 2004). Despite this policy, ZANU-PF’s authoritarian underbelly, initially hidden behind goodwill and broader transitional interests, as well as its pretensions towards political hegemony, were soon in evidence. It was soon clear that ZANU's reconciliation policy placated the whites and international community while subordinating other political parties and civil society (Raftopoulos, 2004: ix). This especially applied to ZAPU and its armed wing, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), which ZANU continued to mistrust. The divisions had their roots in ZANU's split from ZAPU in 1963, persisting throughout the liberation struggle and often manifesting in fierce fighting between ZANU and ZAPU activists as well as ZIPRA and ZANLA combatants (Eppel, 2004; Karekwaivenani, 2017; Doran, 2017; Scarnechia, 2008). At independence, this mistrust was manifest in the caching of arms by both ZANU and ZAPU during the demobilisation and military integration processes of 1979 and the early 1980s. Mistrust was also evident in clashes, like the ones in Bulawayo between former combatants of the two liberation armies in late 1980 and early 1981, and the emergence of about 300 ZIPRA dissidents who seemed intent on disrupting ZANU’s rule post-independence (CCJP & LRF, 1997; Eppel, 2004). Continued mistrust, and ZAPU’s good performance in the 1980 elections and sweep of all

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5 ZANU-Ndonga was a small political party which retained the support of Sithole's co-ethnics in Chipinge, in eastern Zimbabwe. Sithole was able to hold on to this seat as Chipinge's Member of Parliament From 1985 until his death in December 2000.
the parliamentary seats in Matebeleland in 1985, showed ZANU-PF that ZAPU constituted a potent political threat.

In addition to local skirmishes between ZANU and ZAPU adherents, apartheid South Africa’s deliberate destabilisation of Zimbabwe through various acts of sabotage using dissidents known as super ZAPU also complicated Zimbabwe’s internal dynamics and divisive politics. Despite knowledge of South Africa’s involvement, ZANU-PF blamed ZAPU for the sabotage acts. It used this as a premise to unleash the North Korean trained Fifth or Gukurahundi brigade to deal with the dissidents in Matebeleland and Midlands provinces. Once deployed, the brigade tortured and killed thousands of civilians on the premise that they were Ndebele and supported ZAPU. The Fifth brigade’s atrocities were estimated to have reached 20,000 deaths and included depriving the bulk of the Matebeleland South population of food aid during the drought years of 1984 and 85 (CCJP & LRF, 1997; Eppel, 2004; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). In the run-up to the 1985 election, ZANU’s youth brigade joined the Fifth Brigade’s terror campaign. The violence moved to urban areas and included torture, beatings, abductions and the burning of homes of suspected ZAPU members (Eppel, 2004: CCJP & LRF, 1997).

Further ZANU-PF efforts at political hegemony during the first ten years of independence included its concerted drive towards turning Zimbabwe into a one-party state. De jure one-party state-ism was ZANU-PF’s main campaign issue in the 1990 election where it faced opposition from the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) led by former ZANU-PF Secretary General Edgar Tekere. The agenda failed because of the contest and protest locally, and international pressure against one-party states (Hatchard, 199; Mandaza and Sachikonye 1991; Moyo, 1992). Nonetheless, with the abolition of the white roll in 1987 and increase in the number of constituencies from 100 to 120, ZANU PF won 117 seats out of 120 in both the 1990 and 1995 general elections, with ZUM only getting two seats in 1990 (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997; Moyo, 1992; Makumbe & Compagnon, 2000). The 1995 general elections saw a large number of other former ZANU-PF members leaving the party to contest as independents. The result was

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former ZANLA combatants made up the bulk of the Fifth Brigade. Gukurahundi meant the ‘storm of the summer that sweeps away the chaff.’ ZANU-PF adapted it from the liberation war where it used it to refer to dealing with ZANU-PF opponents considered to be wavering from the liberation struggle (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997:133). The strategy became especially prominent in 1979, a year that ZANU-PF declared “Gore reGukurahundi [the year of the storm]” to deal with the white settler colonial regime as well as the “internal settlement puppets” (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012).
unprecedented numbers of independent candidates (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997; Makumbe & Compagnon, 2000; Dorman, 2000, Kriger 2005). Zimbabwe’s first Presidential election, held in 1990, saw Robert Mugabe winning with 83% of the vote increasing to 93% of the vote in 1996 (Sithole and Makumbe 1997: 131-132). While the numbers in figure 4-1 suggest increased ZANU-PF dominance, the victories in the 1990s were made hollow by increasing apathy and declining turnout.
Source: Author’s Data multi-sourced All election years affixed “p” were parliamentary elections, while those affixed “PresE” were presidential elections. The figures have been rounded off to the nearest percentage and are based on vote share, i.e. popular vote rather than seats.
1.5.1 The Party System and the Party

Zimbabwe’s party system has been described in several different ways. Kuenzi & Lambright (2001:459) classified it as *hegemonic in transition* to denote the high levels of party institutionalisation but weak party competition that characterized ZANU-PF’s electoral dominance. Kuenzi & Lambright (2001:461-2) argued that ZANU-PF’s long history, and its control of the state, allowed it to emerge as a strong party and to elicit long term loyalty.

While the extent of party institutionalisation is not a significant source of divergent scholarly opinion in the case of ZANU-PF, the source of this institutionalisation may be. While the Kuenzi & Lambright (2001) argument is plausible, Riedl (2014), writing on Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Benin, raises another plausible explanation of ZANU-PF's high degree of institutionalization. She offers a path dependent explanation which suggests that party institutionalisation is also a function of new authoritarian regimes' ability to conscript, and incorporate local notables into the party and state. Much of the Zimbabwe scholarship shows how ZANU-PF at different times conscripted and incorporated key actors and institutions to strengthen its ranks, and to institutionalise. This includes labour and civil society at independence, war veterans circa 2000 (Moyo and Yeros, 2007), and economically powerful whites, and traditional leaders and various points in time (Alexander, 1994; Kriger, 1992; Raftopoulos, 2001; Sithole, 2000; Yeros, 2013; Moyo, 1992, and LeBas 2011; Zamchiya, 2011). As Reidl (2014) argues, the strategy to engage and integrate local notables often strengthened ruling parties, which took advantage of local notables capacity to mobilize voters and to assist rulers in managing populations at the local level. This is another avenue through which unfair rules of the game were institutionalized in future civilian political processes.

However, outside ZANU-PF, Zimbabwe has enjoyed a long history of parties that have proved reasonably sustainable and rooted in various segments of society: the UANC existed from the 1970s to 1985, ZAPU 1961 to 1987, when it merged with ZANU-PF, ZANU (Ndonga) from about 1973 to the 2000s. After independence, ZUM lasted through the 1990s and MDC has been in existence since 1999. These parties met Mainwaring’s (1999: 26) definition of institutionalized parties. They were relatively stable and rooted in society through fairly strong organisations, with status and value to society. Reasonable party (and in some cases, party system) institutionalisation in sub-Saharan Africa’s
party systems is not unique to Zimbabwe. Tanzania’s party system is reasonably institutionalised, as are party systems in South Africa, Mozambique, and Botswana. ZANU-PF’s dominance is also not unique. It mirrors that of other political parties in sub-Saharan Africa which started as liberation or nationalist movements in countries like Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, South Africa, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Mozambique. However, some aspects of ZANU-PF’s stability and institutionalisation as a party contrast with those of other parties. This is especially so when it comes to the "musical chairs" characteristic of parties in Kenya, Zambia, and Malawi, amongst others, where parties are weak coalitions of elites which often change both composition and party names from election to election (LeBas, 2019:18).

In some ways, ZANU-PF’s story and that of Zimbabwe’s party-system is a departure from received wisdom around party institutionalisation and the fragility and weakness of African political parties and systems. Mainwaring (1999) associates party institutionalisation with low electoral volatility, and limited personalistic and neo-populist leadership. It is also associated with policy stability and better representation of popular sectoral interests. The case of ZANU-PF departs from Mainwaring’s (1999) conceptualization along all these dimensions. As Figure 1-1 shows, in ZANU-PF’s case, institutionalisation did not reduce electoral volatility, understood as the entry and extinction of ephemeral parties in between election cycles (Weghorst & Bernhard, 2014:1708). Healthy political competition increased with the formation of the MDC. And while the MDC and ZANU-PF were the significant electoral parties post-2000, new parties continued to emerge to contest elections, including splinters of the MDC, and defectors from ZANU-PF. Mugabe's dominance in the party, state, and nation means that a personalistic neo-populist leader existed alongside a well institutionalized party. Finally, a ZANU-PF's post 2000 governance was replete with policy inconsistency, and suffered severe legitimacy deficits. Concepts developed for the study of political parties elsewhere, such as Mainwaring's, do not always fit perfectly when imported to Africa.

Yet there has been a significant effort to tailor typologies that are suitable for Sub-Saharan Africa. The consensus is that African party systems are, in the main, dominant (one) party systems (Bogaards, 2004; Bratton, 1998; Doorenspleet & Nijzink, 2013; Erdmann, 1999; LeBas, 2019; Reynolds, 1999; Sartori, 1976), with a few exceptions. These exceptions include systems that are fragmented
(Van De Walle & Buttler, 1999), unstructured, pulverised (Satori, 1976), inchoate, or unstructured (Lindberg, 2007). There is also increasing recognition in the literature that not all dominant parties and party systems are the same. This leads to a further distinction between dominant and dominant authoritarian party systems, following Sartori (1976). Dominant parties are defined in different ways. For LeBas (2019), these are parties that have enjoyed 20 consecutive years in power. Bogaards (2004) and Doorenspleet & Nijzink (2013) define "dominant" as crossing Satori’s threshold of winning over 50% of the electorate in at parliamentary and presidential elections in three consecutive multi-party elections. Van De Walle & Buttler (1999) defined dominant parties as parties which enjoyed more than 60% of legislative seats. Table 1-1 highlights the differences between some of the existing definitions of dominant parties.

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<tr>
<td>Threshold of dominance</td>
<td>70% (seats)</td>
<td>60% (seats)</td>
<td>50% (seats)</td>
<td>50% (seats)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Dispersed</td>
<td>Divided</td>
<td>Several smaller parties</td>
<td>Multiple opposition helpful</td>
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<td>President</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Analysis limited to single election</td>
<td>Analysis limited to single election</td>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>Three consecutive elections</td>
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Broad generalisations of parties in ‘neo democracies,’ including those in Africa, exist. The European experience of party formation and institutionalisation has heavily influenced many of these (Erdmann, 2004:63). According to Carothers (2006:4), parties in emerging democracies are almost invariably corrupt, only active around elections, do not stand for anything, and are directed by party leaders who are selfish and preoccupied with squabbling instead of governing the country (Carothers, 2006: 4). Schmitter (2001:67-89), writing on parties in neo democracies in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe, echoes Carothers. He argues that common features can be discerned amongst these parties. These include fewer members, weaker organisations, less distinct programmes, weaker linkages with (civil) society, weaker party identification, and thus higher volatility. Van de Walle and Butler's (1999:15) early work argued that African political parties were plagued by "weak organisations, low levels of institutionalisation, and weak links to the societies they are supposed to
represent." This analysis portrayed incumbent regimes in Africa as, mainly, patronage and clientelist electoral machines that are almost without agency outside the state, and that had little regard for distinguishable policy platforms. The perception is that ruling parties are distributors of ethnicised patronage (van de Walle & Butler, 1999; van de Walle, 2003). When they do have some semblance of policy platforms, these are judged to have little relevance to what politicians did once they were in office (Randall and Svasand, 2002: 10; Van de Walle and Butler 1999).

Most accounts of African political parties consider them as ideologically vacuous and intent on collecting support, mostly through the manipulation of ethnic cleavages but thereafter, on any grounds (as catch-all parties). This thesis shows that the ZANU-PF experience calls for a rethink of this stereotype of African parties as ethnic parties. ZANU-PF is not the only party to break this mould. Exciting literature on politics in Ghana, Senegal, Namibia and other places is beginning to dispel the exaggerated view of ethnicity as the sole organising principle for most parties on the continent (Brierley & Kramon, 2018; Elischer, 2013; Koter, 2013a; 2013b). Even so, ethnicity remains a geographically circumscribed yet salient feature of politics in some parts of East Africa (e.g. Kenya and Ethiopia), and other places (e.g. Zambia).

In this thesis, I take dominant authoritarian parties as the foundation stones that support competitive authoritarian regimes. Parties are often the vehicles through which some of the characteristics of competitive authoritarian regimes manifest. For instance, dominant authoritarian parties are often responsible for creating the uneven playing field in which opposition parties compete. Uneven electoral playing fields are usually the function of unjust laws as well as unfair coverage enforced by police as an arm of the state, and partisan or state controlled media. However, this thesis also demonstrates how dominant authoritarian parties like ZANU-PF also tilt the playing field at local level and take over, complement and enforce the institutional arrangements that impede equal and fair competition at the national level. It is dominant authoritarian parties that often act in ways that make power alternation possible in theory, but very difficult in practice as I will show through the analysis of ZACs and BC, where political opposition was often rendered virtually non-existent or merely tokenistic (Bogaards, 2004:176; Joseph, 1998:6). The African politics literature widely accepts that many or perhaps most of the parties that rule in Africa fit the this mould, benefiting from
the advantages of unlevel electoral playing fields and often using repression, manipulation, patronage, and control and the incumbency to win elections (Arriola, 2013; Blaydes, 2009; Cheeseman, 2010; Lebas, 2019; Van De Walle, 2003).

Although its search for complete hegemony was elusive and often viciously contested (Moore, 2008: 25; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012; Raftopoulos, 2002), “dominant authoritarian party” seems a fitting epithet for ZANU-PF. In explaining this, the literature on ZANU-PF has closely mirrored the arguments advanced in the comparative and African politics literatures. This includes a focus on a sufficient measure of elite cohesion and organisational strength (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997; LeBas, 2019); violence, intimidation, demonisation of the opposition in every election since 1980 (Kriger, 2005); effective use of propaganda and instrumentalisation of laws on the free press, expression and assembly (Bratton, Chikwanha & Sithole, 2005); and post material solidarity ties from the shared suffering of the liberation struggle (Levitsky & Way, 2012). After the 2002 Presidential elections, the literature also emphasises ZANU-PF’s electoral manipulation, including vote rigging, skewed registration, and gerrymandered constituency delimitation (Bratton, 2014, Bratton & Masunungure, 2008; Bratton, Dulani & Masunungure, 2016; Dorman, 2005; Makumbe, 2002; 2006; 2009; Masunungure, 2008; 2009; 2011; 2014; Raftopoulos, 2002; Zamchiya, 2013).

This thesis attempts to show how the above factors variously contributed to Zimbabwe’s party system, and the kind of party that ZANU-PF became. It uses ZANU-PF’s 2008 and 2013 electoral campaigns as the lens through which to observe the party in action. Some of the literature cited above fails to disaggregate the various components of the regime’s make up, to disentangle the regime’s supporting political party from other elements of the regime. This thesis aims to do this. Although the party-state conflation does present challenges when it comes to attributing specific actions to specific components of a conflated state, the party remains significant in itself. It can be defined as distinct from the state, following Erdmann (2004: 66), as an association of like-minded people who pursue common political goals and for which they, usually, try to get into government, is the instrument through which they attain power and exercise political dominance within a state. For some, the separation of party and state in Zimbabwe is rendered difficult because “ZANU-PF never fully transformed itself
from an armed liberation movement into a democratic political party, and it has revealed its true temperament during times of political crisis” (Bratton et al., 2008). For Bratton & Masunungure, (2008) and Bratton (2014), as well as others, ZANU-PF, the party, is just one of several other factors that that sustained the regime. While this argument can be accepted, that the party is "just one factor" does not negate the need to expose its workings and explain its efforts. Doing so tells us something about how the party sought to generate legitimacy, expand its appeal, and remain in power when it came under real challenge from a credible opposition party.

The multi-level study of ZANU-PF and its campaigns at national, provincial and local levels that is presented in this thesis bears witness to both the imbrication of the party with the national and local state, but also its separateness as an organisation with its own modus operandi. This includes its own line of command and structures, different processes and procedures, as well as activities distinct from those of the state. As the empirical chapters will show, the party runs its own intelligence and surveillance, public as well as private and or secret activities that are rarely exposed to the public glare, and are largely invisible in analysis that centres on the national party, and conflates this with the state. I demonstrate that during the 2008 and 2013 elections, ZANU-PF was a strong political party. It organised outside of and along with the state, and demonstrated as a political party per se. I seek to get into the "black box" of ZANU-PF as a party. The goal is to understand its organisation, formal and informal structures, and how ZANU-PF used these in service of its interests in retaining power and enhancing its legitimacy through the vote and turnout maximisation.

There is consensus in the competitive authoritarian and hybrid regimes literature that illicit methods of power retention are not enough to stabilize regimes, and that a significant number of authoritarian regimes invest heavily in their "support party," and spend "heavily on pre-election political campaigns" (Geddes, 2006:1). The support party is an organised movement that performs the orthodox roles of a political party, but in service to the incumbent regime and presiding autocrat. As Geddes (2006:3) argues, support parties, whether created to support a new

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7 Bratton & Masunungure (2008) list these other factors as: ZANU-PF's ideological belief in its right to rule in perpetuity; A corrupted economy vested in the hands of party loyalists. An institutionalised role in policymaking for military commanders; Heavy reliance on violence, increasingly outsourced to auxiliary forces. It is this "heritage" that forces Mandaza and others to conclude that ZANU-PF as a party only exists in respect to its conflation with the militarised state.
regime or inherited by autocrats through other mechanisms, can play a potent role in prolonging the life of the regime. It is often through them that regimes, both, sponsor and quell protests, reorganise, purge, and engage their supporters, frustrate and hound the opposition, and persuade general public.

Precisely because opponents cannot always be bribed or beaten into submission, huge investments into party building and operation become requisite. Such huge investments point to the party as a critical institutional trench used to mobilise widespread support for incumbents, creating the possibility for authoritarian regimes to win elections on the strength of “popularity” (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007:1293). There are clear political dividends from investment in the support party and attendant electoral campaigns. The creation and support of a standing organised cadreship, provides the infrastructure for incumbent parties and regimes mobilise on short notice, campaign and triumphing at elections, and prolonging the life of the regime (Geddes, 2006: 12). As Brownlee (2005:1) notes in his study of 135 competitive authoritarian regimes between 1975 and 2000, authoritarian regimes with ruling parties tend to be more robust than other nondemocratic systems.

Competitive authoritarian regimes also invest in parties to appease opponents and entrench incumbents (Markoff 1996:1010). This is because illicit methods of power retention like fraud and violence, while increasing incumbents’ chances of electoral victory, do not always guarantee victory (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, & Jablonski’s, 2014). While violence is often a result of incumbent insecurity, incumbent regimes are also wary of the effects of excessive interference in election procedures, and of how excessive vote inflation can discredit the legitimacy of their rule in the post-election period (Hafner-Burton et al., 2014; Bratton et al., 2016: 17). In Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF learnt this lesson in 2008, and endured the costs of its excessive violence and electoral manipulation in that election. I argue that the need to minimise the use of illicit methods to mitigate the post-election impact and fall-out forced ZANU-PF’s resort to strategies that did not over-rely on illicit methods. This lead to their sparse use in 2013.

This thesis attempts to demonstrate that this pressure to economize in the use of illicit methods is what leads competitive authoritarian regimes to rely on licit means of power retention, like campaigning. Campaigning can fill the gap that exists between the levels to which regimes can realistically manipulate elections,
and their extant level of popular support. The gap between what such effort can achieve, and a regime's willingness to resort to illicit techniques, is what makes such regimes susceptible to defeat and the changeover of leadership (Schedler 2002:38; Levitsky and Way 2002: 54:55).

1.6 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the study. It explored the concept of competitive authoritarianism and presented the thesis’ puzzle, which revolves around the contradiction inherent in this type of regime. I presented the study’s main lines of enquiry regarding ZANU-PF election campaigns in 2008 and 2013 and outlined my main argument. It highlighted the temporal, spatial and historical aspects of these arguments. The chapter also located the study conceptually with respect to political science literatures on authoritarianism and political parties in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian political systems.

The next part outlines the chapter structure for the rest of the thesis. The next chapter engages some of the key concepts that are the center of this thesis, including election campaigns, types of campaigns, rallies, and legitimacy as a normative and empirical proposition.

1.7 Chapter Outline

The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents a conceptual overview of the comparative politics, African politics, political communications, and political sociology literature on election campaigns, political parties, rallies and legitimacy. It clarifies the use and definitions of these key concepts that will recur throughout the thesis, and on which it builds its theoretical and analytical framework. In the process, it delimits how, and in which forms the thesis applied these concepts. It drills explicitly down on the rally-intensive ground campaign (Paget, 2019) as the most apt description for campaign types in new democracies and most applicable to Zimbabwe. It showcases types of rallies, i.e. the national or “star” rally and the “ordinary” or “local rally, and introduces a third type of rally, the “bigwig” rally as distinct from the other two. The chapter sketches out this concept of bigwig rallies and how the thesis uses it as a critical indicator of campaign intensity and campaign strategy. It also engages the literature on legitimacy to outline the
study’s understanding of legitimacy, legitimation, and claims to legitimacy. It presents the scheme of claims to legitimacy that the thesis uses to engage its empirical findings.

Chapter 3 outlines the study's "Nested Subnational Comparative Analysis" research design. It justifies the design choice and also presents the case selection criteria and justification for studying ZANU-PF campaigns as cases, and the in-depth study sites the research selected. The chapter also outlines the study's scope conditions and briefs the reader on the step by step implementation process that occurred for the study, as well as processes implications on analysis. It presents the thesis' broad theoretical propositions and the hypotheses that support them before transitioning to data collection methods, and the sampling strategies for document analysis, archival research and interviews. It ends with a methodological note on the thesis' use and citation of newspapers.

Chapter 4 is one of five chapters that engage directly with the thesis’ questions and presents answers and results. This chapter explores pivotal moments in the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) ’s history to provide a deep historical context for this study and presents a new genetic explanation for its competitive authoritarian character. It presents a more complex picture of ZANU-PF through a review of the historical record, and analysis of its primary data from interviews carried out with a wide variety of political stakeholders, some of whom were nationalists and combatants during Zimbabwe’s liberation war. The chapter rejects as inadequate some of the extant historically grounded political explanations for ZANU-PF’s current form. This is because some of the accounts are limited to ZANU-PF’s existence in the late 1960s and 1970s guerrilla war, and often emphasise only ZANU-PF’s coercive methods of operation before and after Independence in 1980. The chapter advocates for a more in-depth historical dive. It succeeds in being a historical context-mapping of pre-independence ZANU-PF politics and the changes and continuities these histories flag regarding ZANU-PF’s modus operandi during elections post-2000. The chapter neither seeks to re-write history, nor accomplish the impossible task of a ‘complete’ or ‘correct’ history of ZANU-PF. Instead, it builds on the vast amount of historical work done on ZANU-PF, Zimbabwean liberation and nationalist politics through different varieties of its political history.
Chapter 5 is a bridge from pre-independence to post independence Zimbabwe; from ZANU-PF as a nationalist movement committed to liberation through the barrel of a gun to ZANU-PF as a political party in government, contesting in elections for the right to govern. It presents an overview of Zimbabwe’s electoral terrain, and outlines Zimbabwe’s electoral system, framework, and allied management bodies. It picks up from where Chapter 4 left off and cuts a path to the two elections of interest in this thesis, i.e. the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections. On the way, the chapter details the constitutional amendments that had an import on elections, flags the problematic role of the Registrar General in elections, engages the state-of-the-art in Zimbabwe focused literature on elections, and especially engages the issue of systematic manipulation and electoral fraud around the 2008 and 2013 elections. The chapter ends its bridging functions by presenting the results from the study’s large-N statistical analysis, especially vital descriptive statistics that emerged at the first moment of analysis which informed targeting and selection of sites for further in-depth qualitative research. It presents an overview of the data on bigwig rallies in 2008 and 2013 across several variables including, constituency types, rural-urban divide, land reform, and electoral outcomes. Following chapter 4’s historically grounded proposition on why ZANU-PF campaigns, chapter 5 offers the global picture regarding bigwig visits as material for inference and dispensing with the question of whether ZANU_PF campaigns or not, and where it campaigned using bigwigs in 2008 and 2013.

Chapter 6 focuses on ZANU-PF’s presidential election campaigns in ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies (ZACs), constituencies that typically incline towards ZANU-PF. The presidential election results from 2008 and 2013 show that a total of 113 of the 210 House of Assembly constituencies were ZACs at some point during these elections. The chapter looks at how ZANU-PF campaigned in ZACs and how these campaigns connected national and local-level politics and campaigns. It uses three constituencies in Mount Darwin District to describe and explain the subnational politics of the 2008 and 2013 presidential races in Zimbabwe. The chapter tests the study’s primary hypothesis that ‘ZANU-PF campaigns to win the hearts and minds of voters to enhance its legitimacy’ through analysing bigwig appeals during rallies in ZACs and the subnational politics of the Mount Darwin constituencies (East, South, West) and surrounding areas. These Mount Darwin constituencies, located in Mashonaland Central province, fit the designation of ZACs in both the 2008 and 2013 presidential
elections. The electoral politics and campaign activity that occurred in these constituencies is representative of the ZANU-PF presidential election campaign modus operandi in ZACs in general.

Chapter 7 discusses ZANU-PF’s campaigning in the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections in opposition-aligned constituencies (OACs). The OACs category includes opposition strongholds (where the opposition’s winning margins against ZANU-PF were over 52.75%), consolidating-opposition constituencies (where the winning margins for the opposition against ZANU-PF were between 31.3% and 52.75%), and constituencies where the opposition scored narrow victories (between 15.1% and 31.3%). While the primary presidential competition in 2008 and 2013 was between Robert Mugabe of ZANU-PF and Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC, the opposition’s winning margins, which inform the OAC category in this chapter, are calculated based on combined opposition votes (MDC-T and other parties) against the incumbent, ZANU-PF. The calculation follows a simple formula of subtracting the second placed candidate’s votes from the winning candidate’s votes and dividing this by the total number of votes cast. The chapter analyses the presidential election campaigns in OACs at the national and sub-national levels in 2008 and 2013, when ZANU-PF appeared resurgent.

Chapter 8 covers ZANU-PF campaigns in battleground constituencies (BCs). It will overview of battleground constituencies from 2002 to 2018, i.e. one election before and after this study’s elections of interest, 2008 and 2013. The chapter will outline and analyse ZANU-PF bigwig visits to battleground constituencies in 2008 and 2013 as well as the kinds of appeals that Mugabe and other members of the ZANU-PF praesidium made during these visits. In contrast to the preceding chapters, chapter 8 will also describe ZANU-PF’s efforts to engage with the economic and social crisis that was part of the 2008 election context and explain why there was this difference in approach. It also covers developments and extant analysis on the 2008 run-off election and will describe and analyse ZANU-PF’s ground game in battleground constituencies. It will argue that despite the general approach of analysing ZANU-PF as a monolith, some of the ways in which it conducted its presidential election campaigns in the battlegrounds show an interesting amount of variation in strategies and tactics, not just across constituency types and time, but also within constituency types as shown in battleground constituencies. The chapter will attempt to bring out these different strategies and tactics within battleground constituencies in four respects: party
organizational structures and the game of numbers; patronage politics; traditional leaders and their mediating role; and lastly coercion (physical violence and intimidation).

Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. It restates the study’s main findings, main arguments and main theoretical and empirical contributions. It reflects on the latter contributions with a special focus on campaigns, rallies and political parties.
2 CAMPAIGNS, RALLIES & LEGITIMACY: A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW.

This chapter presents a conceptual overview of the comparative politics, African politics, political communications, and political sociology literature on election campaigns, rallies and legitimacy. It clarifies the use and definitions of these key concepts which recur throughout the thesis, and on which it builds its theoretical and analytical framework. The chapter defines and discusses types of election campaigns, rallies, and legitimacy. In the process it delimits how, and in which forms the thesis applied these concepts. It drills explicitly down on the rally-intensive ground campaign (Paget, 2019) as the most apt description for campaign types in new democracies and most applicable to Zimbabwe. It showcases types of rallies, i.e. the national or “star” rally and the “ordinary” or “local rally, and introduces a third type of rally, the “bigwig” rally as distinct from the other two. The chapter sketches out this concept of bigwig rallies and how the thesis uses it as a critical indicator of campaign intensity and campaign strategy. It also engages the literature on legitimacy to outline the study’s understanding of legitimacy, legitimation, and claims to legitimacy. It presents the scheme of claims to legitimacy that the thesis uses to engage its empirical findings.

The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.1 introduces election campaigns and defines, debates, and delimits the concept. In section 2.2, it drills down on types of campaigns, focusing on the rally-intensive ground campaign which it accepts as the underlining assumed type of campaign in the terrain that the thesis investigates. Section 2.3 performs a similar task regarding rallies. It highlights the national and local rallies as defined in the literature as well as the two primary forms that these take in Zimbabwe, i.e. the “star” rally and “ordinary” or “local rally. It introduces “bigwig” rallies as distinct from the others. This section sketches out what a bigwig rally is in this thesis and attempts a mapping that can apply beyond the thesis and beyond characterising ZANU-PF rallies. It also explains why the study adopts bigwig rallies as a critical indicator of campaign intensity and strategy. Section 2.4 presents a conceptual definition of and discussion on legitimacy. It engages the comparative politics and political sociology literature on legitimacy from Weber to contemporary understandings of claims to legitimacy and types of legitimacy. It presents the study’s understanding of legitimacy and outlines the scheme of claims to legitimacy that
it uses to engage with this thesis’ empirical findings. It ends by briefly laying out
the theoretical expectations of the types of claims to legitimacy expected of
competitive authoritarian regimes.

2.1 Election Campaigns: Towards A Contextual
Understanding

The increased imprint of marketing techniques, the social media revolution, rise
of satire as an information source, and the advent of big data as critical resources
to election campaigns have all had an impact on perceptions and definitions of
what campaigning is. This is especially so in the West, where these developments
have been rapid. The variety of interests, competencies, targets and perspectives
on election campaigns have spawned a wide variety of definitions and thoughts
around what they are within and beyond the field of political science.

Most of the existing campaign literature focuses on electoral campaigns in the
West, and as such, speaks with a distinct Western accent, evident from definitions
to theory to empirical applications and manifestations. I reflect this in the brief
review that I undertake below. In it, I try to move the conversation along, from
the political communications and comparative politics stylised understandings of
campaigns to how the scholarship has treated these understandings in the African
context. In these days, where decolonising the academy is on trend, I am fully
aware of the legitimate objections to the explanation of African political
phenomenon by reference to western cannons and archives, which more often
than not condescendingly treat African political phenomenon as aberrations and
pathologies of Western sponsored theories and frames. Nothing would have
pleased me more in this section, than to review and build on a solid African
archive and Zimbabwean theories, but the reality, as I qualify in chapter 4, is that
this archive is either absent or inadequate, forcing us to review and build on
Western cannons. On account of this, one of the tasks of this thesis is to perform
a “keep, drop and create” task regarding extant explanations, and in a small way,
take the opportunity to refine the vocabulary and concepts wherever I can through
contextualisation. In this chapter, I make a first attempt at this through presenting
some contextualised understandings of election campaigning in Zimbabwe as
well as sketching out bigwig rallies. However, it is on comparative politics,
political sociology and political parties literature on which I build the foundations
of my theoretic, and then later I use the Zimbabwe focused and African politics
literature as the mortar for the analytical façade, that I build in the rest of the thesis.

Bates (2005) described election campaigns as moments in an electoral cycle in which candidates mobilise large portions of the population for political action. This temporary specified understanding is not far from Nimmo’s (1970:9) perspective of political campaigns as a form of persuasive communication designed to influence the actions of people. The general thrust of these two definitions are not in dispute, but beyond them, Farrell and Schmitt-Beck (2003:3) specify political campaigns based on (1.) their intents - to influence the process and outcomes of governance, and (2.) the actors who sought to influence the outcome of processes of political decision making by shaping public opinion and action. This precision advanced the conversation to agendas and actors, and closer to an understanding of electoral campaigns as different from broad political campaigns, although they are part of this group (Farrell & Schmitt-Beck 2003:5). According to Farrell & Schmitt-Beck (2003), in electoral campaigns, competing actors (parties or candidates) campaign on a range of issues with electoral success as the chief imperative. From this perspective, election campaigns are the conduits through which different candidates compete to win votes through asserting their capacity and testifying to their competence to lead, serve, decide, and command political affairs.

Rose (1967) departs from the above rational vote-maximising campaign definitions and suggests that irrational campaign behaviour is just as commonplace as the rational variant. His import is that not all parties campaign to win elections, thus going against the conceptions of election campaigning mentioned above. But why should a party or candidate campaign if not to win? In this thesis, I adopt and forward the understanding that it is not always the case that political parties campaign to maximise votes, although invariably there is a maximisation of campaign efforts at stake. This may mean that while a party is not maximising votes to win elections in a particular area, their efforts may still contribute to maximising electoral outcomes when aggregated with efforts elsewhere. Parties may well campaign as some of the hypotheses in the literature suggests, to suppress votes, pilot a run, raise morale, spread patronage, identify and strengthen networks, among other things. In this respect, while electoral candidates are not maximising votes, their efforts are still tailored towards maximising the party's chosen electoral outcome.
From a market rationale and exchange theory perspective, Kotler (1999) saw election campaigns as political marketing. From this perspective, candidates and parties staged election campaigns in a political market, where sellers (the politicians) have something of value to trade (representation) to customers (the electorate) in return for support (votes). In a similar mould, Downs (1957:137) hypothesised that political parties in a democracy formulated policy strictly as a means of gaining votes to get into office. To achieve this, they served particular interests to get into office, rather than, the generally accepted notion of gaining office to serve particular interests. Downs (1957) argues that governments and parties act to maximise votes and are akin to entrepreneurs selling policies for votes, competing with other parties in the political market, with their final product dependent on the nature, type and intensity of the competition for power.

Marketing's contributions to the study of campaigns, especially regarding terminology and types of actions is well acknowledged. However, as a discipline, it was often chastised for lacking theoretical tools beyond rationalising success and or failure in hindsight (Bowler & Farrell, 1992:6). The exchange and or consumer model was also adjudged to be a poor fit in politics (Baer, 2018). Nonetheless, to adequately cover Rose’s “rational” and “irrational” campaign behaviour, I adopt Bowler and Farrell's (1992: 11) definition of campaigns as:

The process by which a party or candidate seeks to maximize electoral gains, consisting of all the efforts (promotional, financial, organisational) made by the party or candidate to meet the goal. (Bowler and Farrell, 1992: 11)

The above definition facilitates the introduction of context into the understandings of electoral campaigns. For instance, when Harowitz’ (1985:332) conceptualisation of campaigns as exercises in the mobilization of pre-existing (often ethnic) cleavages, Lindberg’s (2003) description of electoral campaigns as a time for voters to extract resources from politicians, and Makumbe & Compagnon’s (2000) dismissal of election campaigns as a smokescreen for illicit power retention, are all instances of understandings of election campaigns that are moderated by context. They may apply to Kenya, Ghana and Zimbabwe respectively, but may not characterise election campaigns in Mozambique, Namibia, or Senegal. I raise this, not to suggest that all election campaigns in all contexts are idiosyncratic, but to acknowledge that while we can generalise, campaigns are also products of context. Campaigns serve multiple purposes and
can be rational and irrational, to attain maximisation of electoral gains. For instance, I learnt the value of contextual appreciations of campaigning early during my fieldwork when I interviewed political party leaders and presidential aspirants as well as leading civil society campaigners. MO0410, an Executive Director of one of Zimbabwe’s leading advocacy and human rights organisations, described electoral campaigns as:

[A] programme to achieve massive support from citizens regarding its objectives, aims and impact. It is defined by how it is rolled out to the communities in an effort for a candidate or party to be liked, and or supported (MO0410-Interview, 2017).

MO0410’s conception of electoral campaigns raised two exciting points which brought out different shades of campaigning. He explicitly mentioned campaigns as a programme (deliberate, planned effort) where candidates seek to “be liked” which connotes persuasion, but also “to be supported” as a different element suggesting that citizens could support candidates without liking them.

Nelson Chamisa, the leading presidential election challenger in Zimbabwe's 2018 election, and former opposition MDC-T Organising Secretary offered an elaborate understanding of campaigns during an interview for this study. He outlined what he called the political frame within which ZANU-PF forced political competitors to fit and campaign hinged on four elements. Chamisa termed the first element the material dimensions, expressed in Lindberg like terms as a period when the campaigner is giving something to the electorate. He opined that "even giving a cup of rice or a small tin of beans or a cup of maize seed from a 25kg bag, solar-powered torches, will make a difference and meaning" (Chamisa1010-Interview, 2017). The second element he expressed was the temporality of campaigning, expressed as the seasonal and non-continuous nature of the campaign period in an election year. He shared that:

Campaigning is always around elections. The visibility and presence of the campaigner or politician is around them trying to come and solicit favour, assistance or votes from the electorate. For ZANU-PF, this is a bribe in some cases, and other cases, it’s an open carrot system (Chamisa1010-Interview, 2017).

The third element that Chamisa mentioned was persuasion. He, however, noted that for ZANU-PF, campaigning appeared to be a moral obligation, “to be seen to be there not necessarily to get a vote, but just to fulfil the rituals”
(Chamisa1010-Interview, 2017). The last element he mentioned was coercion, which he credited to “Zimbabwe's authoritarian nature”.

The above conceptions constitute part of the concrete reality regarding campaigning in Zimbabwe. While both civil society and opposition party interlocutors claimed to have an alternative conception, it was never fully enunciated. Both the cited conversations placed on the table, the concrete realities of both the persuasive (liked) and coercive elements of electoral campaigns in Zimbabwe, a contention that most conceptions of election campaigns in the West would not consider as part of campaigning.

With this understanding, I explore as much as possible “all the efforts made by the party or candidate to maximise electoral gains” at different levels (national and subnational). In doing this, I produce a portfolio of legitimacy-seeking and non-legitimacy seeking campaign strategies and tactics. The intention is to present a "holistic portfolio" of campaign strategies that include illicit and licit campaign strategies and tactics. Like Brierley & Kramon (2018:1), I appreciate that these strategies are not mutually exclusive of each other and explore how ZANU-PF deployed them across different local political contexts and times.

### 2.2 Election Campaign Types & The Rally-Intensive Ground Campaign

Most of the literature on campaign taxonomies deal with categorisation from an evolution or modernisation perspective (Norris, 2004; Gibson & Römmele, 2001; Gibson, Römmele, & Ward, 2004). Others refer to this as stages of campaign professionalisation (Farrell & Webb, 2000), ages of political communication (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999) or orders of political communication (Epstein’2018). Resultantly, what emerges are types of campaigns associated with the state of modernisation, especially of communication and channelling technologies. Theorists of modernisation, understood as both the literal adaptation to modern needs and the Weberian and Parsonian model of progressive societal transition from pre-modern traditional society to a modern one, see structural changes at the macro level as causing adaptive change at the micro-level. Transnational diffusion theorists argue a uni-directional convergence process where American practices (and practitioners) and axioms influence electoral campaign management and execution abroad (Schafferer, 2006; Plasser, 2000). Plasser & Plasser (2002:17) saw these changes in media,
political and social structures as impacting parties, candidates and journalists, resulting in gradual modifications of traditional styles of campaigning and strategies of political communication.

Norris (2004) argued that these changes were not an "Americanisation" per se but could be understood as part of the modernisation process rooted in technological and political developments common to many post-industrial societies. She added that the changes were also highly contingent on context, i.e. electoral system, campaign regulation, and organisational resources (Norris, 2004:3). Norris (2000; 2004) advanced a theoretical typological framework that showed the evolution of campaigns from the pre-modern (often called traditional) to the modern and post-modern. According to Norris (2004:3), pre-modern campaigns display three main characteristics, i.e. interpersonal communications between candidates and citizens at a local level, extensive use of the partisan press as the intermediary between parties and the public, and strong party loyalties. As Scammell (1999) put it, these kinds of campaigns were by armies of volunteers, canvassing, leafleting, organizing meetings, and mobilising supporters to turnout on election day. They were low technology affairs, and the local party managed the campaign and decisions thereof, in a local-active campaign (Norris, 2004). More central coordination, the entry of professional consultants, with the news media, especially television, becoming the principal locus of campaign events characterised modern campaigns (Norris, 2004). These modern campaigns are capital intensive, rely on a much smaller base of volunteers and more central direction of campaign operations. They rely more on non-party experts (pollsters, media and image consultants, and marketers), involve far less face-to-face communication with voters, and increasingly target floating voters (Scammell, 1999).

Despite the salience of the modernisation thesis and its attendant categorisation of campaign types, Nickerson & Rogers (2014) argue that modern innovations have not radically transformed campaigning in quiet the same radical fashion that television did in the 1960s in developed economies. This is true in advanced democracies and also in emerging or new democracies and competitive authoritarian settings. Norris accepted this. She argued that the features of her model varied from place to place and that rather than replacements, each evolution stage supplements rather than replaces direct forms of campaigning in the pre-modern category (Norris, 2004:4).
Given the above, rather than pure types, campaigns embody hybridity dependent on context. This is a function of not just electoral systems, organisation capacity, and campaign regulations as Norris posited, but also media environments (plural or closed media space), and technological advancements (Epstein, 2018; Chadwick, 2013). Whether, and how, these technological developments impact campaigning, and campaign type also goes beyond these technological and media innovations. It includes other modernisation related variables like spatial and economic inequalities, urbanisation, education and development amongst other things, as factors that affect whether and how constituents adopt technology as part of their access to political and campaign information. For instance, although television may have revolutionised campaigning in the West in the 1950s and 1960s, in Africa today, it plays second fiddle to the radio which remains the medium of the people. This is true of countries with different democratic and authoritarian credentials. For instance, Ghana, which is Africa's poster child for democracy and enjoys a free media environment, 56% of Ghanaians, across all levels of education listen to the radio daily and see it as their primary source of news and politics. Social media lags at 15% in terms of everyday use, although TV is not far behind the radio at 42% (Isbell & Appiah-Nyamekye, 2018). Across Africa, Conroy-Krutz & Appiah-Nyaekye Sanny (2019) report that the highest proportion, 42%, access information through daily radio consumption, 34% through TV, while new technologies, the internet and social media though rising (from 13% and 14% respectively in 2015), are at 18% and 19% daily consumption rates respectively.

These realities impact the extent to which campaigning in Africa has "modernised" and renders the typologies posited by most of the literature on political communication, marketing and campaigns, ill-fitting to the African context. Developing a taxonomy of campaign types and attendant strategies was beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I agree with Paget (2019:446) that the rally is still the predominant form of campaign communication in Africa, dwarfing other forms of campaign engagement. Further, I endorse his modification of Norris' campaign types through the development of an alternative schema, but one that is devoid of the modernist and patronising nomenclature that Norris and others adopted. Paget (2019:454) outlines these as; the ground-intensive campaign, the mass-media intensive campaign, and the hybrid campaign ecology. He further distinguishes these ecologies on the rally-
intensiveness of the ground campaign as a something present in all other campaign types, creating a dimension on which all these other types could place, as well as a fourth ideal type, the rally-intensive campaign. Rally-intensive campaigns "are those in which the ground campaign is rally-intensive, and the campaign as a whole is ground campaign-intensive" (Paget, 2019: 454). He distils four features of the rally-intensive campaign as follows: national and local leadership efforts into convening rallies, aggregate rally attendance, mass meetings versus canvassing as campaign contact, and rally production (Paget, 2019:446).

Paget (2019) is joined by some relatively recent literature that also acknowledges that traditional rally-intensive campaigns are still the order of the day in Sub-Saharan Africa. This literature focuses on diverse elements like campaign resource targeting across different types of electoral constituencies (Brierley & Kramon, 2018) ethnic mobilisation and campaign targeting (Cheeseman & Lamar, 2015; Harowitz, 2016), messaging, rally performance, appeals and contesting populisms (Tendi, 2013; Cheeseman & Lamar, 2015; Lamar & Fraser, 2007; Southall, 2013; Moore, 2014). While some of it does not focus enough on the campaigns themselves, the majority of this literature uses election campaigns as part of the explanations for election outcomes, which is part of what I argue in this thesis. This expands the African politics conversation beyond received wisdom around incumbency advantages, violence and fraud (Cheeseman & Klass, 2018; Collier & Vicente, 2012; Bratton & Masunungure, 2008). It paves the way for much-needed analyses of elections that includes results and campaign strategies that account for those results, bearing in mind that legitimacy-seeking and non-legitimacy seeking tactics are not mutually exclusive in sub-Saharan Africa.

This above shift in conversation is also important when allied with other literature that has begun to dispel the notions of "issuelessness" of African electoral contests and clawing back on the neo-patrimonial African story. For instance, Cheeseman, Lynch, & Willis (2017) showed that government performance was integral to Ghanaian voters during the 2016 polls and perceptions of failure to deliver on crucial economic and programmatic issues contributed to the incumbent losing the presidency. Brierley & Kramon (2018) argued that ground campaigning, beyond just canvassing or organising rallies also offered candidates and activists opportunities to discuss national and local policies. While in
Zambia, Baldwin (2013) showed that contrary to perceptions of Africa's rural voters as following their putative local patrons when voting due to vote-buying and deference, they made considered inferential decisions around the development and provision of local public goods to inform their decisions. In Zimbabwe, both Tendi (2013) and Zamchiya (2013) focusing on ZANU-PF and opposition MDC-T campaigns respectively, also showed how issues, ideas and programs appeared to be the centrepieces of each parties’ campaigns. As Tendi (2013:967) and Zamchiya (2013:956-7) show, Land, indigenisation, sanctions, and the liberation war (for ZANU-PF), and social and economic values, education, jobs, rural and urban housing, foreign direct investment (for the MDC) were clear campaign issues supported by facades of ideas on tackling them. This understanding, as I will show in later chapters, was shared by a significant number of other scholars (like Moore, 2014; Southall, 2013 and others).

The above literature motivates for a closer look at electoral campaigns in Africa, with an eye for testing the extent of a shift from violence and fraud narratives to a more substantive politics around issues, and the extent to which these disjointed logics exist side by side. They call for a closer look at whether there is a more deliberate logic to campaign strategies of political parties in new democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa. This thesis attempts to do the above using ZANU-PF's electoral campaigns in 2008 and 2013. The centrepiece of this analysis is the study of bigwig rally distribution across constituency types, and the kind of appeals made thereof. I tie this to local politics to present a mid-level and national analysis of ZANU-PF's 2008 and 2013 presidential election campaigns. However, as a precursor to this analysis and for purposes of properly grounding this thesis, the next section briefly engages the concept of and literature on political parties before getting into rallies and fleshing out the thesis' conceptualisation of bigwig rallies and why I give them pride of place in this study.

2.3 Rallies: “Star” “Ordinary” And “Bigwig” Rallies

The impression of rallies as expensive, messy outdoor mixtures of entertainment and political discourse culminating in a speech by a presidential candidate is relatively widespread (Langstone & Rosas, 2018). Despite the archaic nature of the rally as a technology and their preponderance in Norris' pre-modern type of campaign, they are still the mainstay of campaigning in Sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the world that are yet to reach the liberal democratic destination.
(Paget, 2019; Szwarcberg, 2012; Langstone & Rosas, 2018). However, while the focus on presidential candidates speaks to the national nature of elections, in this thesis, I draw attention to the fact that rallies at which the presidential candidate addresses, referred to in the Zimbabwean context as "star rallies", is only one type of rally. Following, Holbrook (1999:156) I draw attention to the reality that presidential campaigns are conducted at many levels beyond the national and local levels and have scope for different types of interlocutors and main speakers, as I will expand on below.

Paget (2019:451) defines a rally as a public event at which speakers address an audience face-to-face for the ostensible purpose of politically mobilizing it. Paget's definition, while clear on rally's setting (public), mode of engagement (face-to-face) and purpose (political mobilisation), leaves the issue of who is mobilising open (agency) and restricts the purpose of the rally (to mobilising). Gilman (2009:339) offers a purpose/intention driven definition with form, intention and meaning as other vital characteristics. She sees the rally as a set of elaborate performances (form) orchestrated to disseminate political messages and promote political parties and candidates (intention and purpose). Gilman speaks to the agency by arguing that rallies are controlled through the party higher-ups in charge of producing the rally and determining key aspects (timing, venue, content, sequence and physical placement of the rallies various components). The aspect of control is critical because outside achieving stated goals, the rally must also minimise the possibilities of dissent and achieving unintended consequences (Jourde, 2005). Gilman (2009), based on her study of rallies in Malawi paints a picture of the rally as also characterised by dynamic and multiple performances which include slogans, praise-singing, speeches, dances and visual symbols. The rally, outside its location, who controls it, and its purpose, is also a unique feature of ground campaigning. This stems from its designation as an event that is outside the day to day activities of constituents and party agents alike. It is a special occasion also delineated from other events by the types of participants and activities that it is associated with.

Paget (2019) limits the purpose or intention of the rally to mobilising in his definition. I argue that, because of the primacy of the rally as a campaign tool in Sub-Saharan Africa and limited penetration of new communication technologies, the rally serves similar communication functions as the broader campaign. In this respect, rallies in most places outside major urban centres become the channel
through which constituents are informed, agendas set, issues framed, and positions primed (Sceufele & Tewksbury, 2006). Although Gilman (2009) focuses on the performative role of the rally, rallies are more than political theatre, and as Jones (1998) argues, rallies inform, exhort, and influence their publics. Conroy-Krutz’s (2016) study in Uganda, where until recently elections and campaigns have been uncompetitive, showed that election campaigns had a tremendous contribution to voters’ political knowledge across class and societal cleavages. Also, because rallies are spectacles and not ordinary day to day events (Gilman, 2009), they attract the attention of voters and the media. They can be broadcast through various technologies from word of mouth to the press, beyond attendees of the rallies. This broadcast communicates important messages around electoral viability, access to social services. Also because of the station and stature of speakers, rallies can act as a call to action through encouraging people to participate in the electoral process (mobilisation) and directly persuading citizens to vote for the candidate (Jones, 1998).

The above is the good side of rallies, but they can also be a tool for itinerant rulership in service of authoritarianism. In this mould, rallies become a manifestation of authority where the very presence of the incumbent, even as an election candidate, makes their "infallibility" and power tangible (Jourde, 2005; Wedeen, 1999). It is partly in this way that rallies also become a theatre and a performance conveying to attendees’ specific definitions and conceptions of reality (Goffman,1951 cited in Jourde, 2005:425). They broadcast power, and in addition to giving out information and framing certain conceptions of reality, rallies can also gather information about the organisational strength of the party organisation on the ground, and also act as an intimidating feet to opponents.

Given the existence of the national campaign space, as well as the provincial, administrative district, constituency, ward, branch, and cell in Zimbabwe campaign space, rallies differ. Paget's (2019) rally intensive ground campaign ecology spells out national and local rallies. These rallies differ in size, scope, speakers and attendees. In the Zimbabwean context, the national rallies are star rallies. Star rallies usually occur at the provincial level, with every party organisational structure required to both mobilise for and attend the rally. At these rallies, the presidency addresses and attendees are bussed in from all corners of the host province and beyond (Makumbe, 1991:182). Very rarely is the president’s speaking role delegated. Usually, when this happens, the rally seizes
to be referred to as a star rally, but it is also not a local one. Local or ordinary rallies have the same pomp and fanfare as the star rally, with the same intents but are organised at the constituency level and below. Marongwe (2013) describes these rallies as carnivals where political education and articulation of party policy takes place, interposed with a wide variety of spoken and sung entertainment utilising a variety of instruments like drums (Ngoma), whistles (pito), and other percussion instruments (Marongwe, 2013: 258). This carnival nature of ordinary rallies is replicated at star rallies where famous music stars provide entertainment together with party musical groups. The entertainment is meant to act as a time management device in between speakers, and also as a morale-boosting exercise (morari).

The literature on rallies in Zimbabwe is relatively limited despite the prevalence of rallies. The little that exists focuses on the two types of campaigns covering the national and local rally activity. I coined the concept of "the bigwig rally" to denote rallies that take place at the figurative mid-point between the local and the national configurations. Bigwig rallies are rallies presided over by senior members of the party at the highest level, the praesidium. They include star rallies because the party president, whose address defines the star rally, is also a member of the praesidium, joining a small circle which includes a president’s deputy, party chair and secretary general, where they exist. The bigwig rally is defined by the presence and honouring of these officials more than by location. As such, a bigwig rally can take place in a constituency to cover that constituency only, or the district within which the constituency is located. Because of the inclusion of the presidential candidate or party president as a bigwig, rallies can therefore also attract a province wide audience. What differentiates them from orthodox national rallies or star rallies in Zimbabwe’s case, is that the president doesn’t have to be the main attraction, any member of the praesidium can be the main attraction. What separates bigwig rallies from local rallies, is that no one else outside the praesidium is considered a bigwig for purposes of this study. I am aware that for a big party like ZANU-PF, all 49 members of the politburo are party bigwigs, but I limit that to the top 4 or 5 officials because these are the ones who operate nationally whereas everyone else, in the politburo and central committee are seconded from and to represent provinces. As such, central committee members, politburo members, members of parliament and provincial leaders are not included in this thesis’ definition of bigwigs and their rallies. Although, this thesis does not focus on them, for the opposition party bigwigs
would include the party president, his two deputies, party chairperson and the secretary-general (top 5).

The choice to sketch out the bigwig rally was not arbitrary. I made it after reviewing the literature and newspapers where I realised that it was not just the party presidents who conducted national rallies across the provinces. As Tendi (2013) notes, ZANU-PF made use of its Vice President, Joyce Mujuru, during the 2013 election. I will show that this applied to party chairperson Simon Khaya Moyo, as well who campaigned extensively in particular locations in 2013. In short, the following characteristics differentiate bigwig rallies from their star and local counterparts:

1. They are a public partisan mass meeting at which a member of a party’s praesidium or top five leadership is the main speaker and primary guest.
2. They are organised by regional party leaders (i.e. inter-district or provincial leaderships not district, ward or cell members,) party in liaison with provincial and national party structures and organs.
3. They are explicitly staged in the run-up to elections to drum up support for a national presidential candidate and local members of parliament in a region.
4. The speeches, messages, and appeals made speak to both national and local issues and questions and are geared for a cross-sectional audience of locals and other national audiences.
5. Despite their location (in a constituency, at a business centre, or school) they have at least administrative district-wide reach increasing to province-wide and national reach, especially when the party president or presidential candidate is the main attraction.
6. They are always mass gatherings to project strength and popularity of the party and are a measure of the mobilising capacities of local notables.
7. Attendance is open to the public and local party members for whom attendance is treated locally as a measure of commitment and loyalty to the party.

In this thesis, I use the bigwig rally as a proxy for campaign intensity given the extra amount of effort in organising that goes into their production. This effort is usually in addition to local campaign activity that is expected of political operators on the ground on during on a regular basis. The bigwig rally comes in as an addition and not a replacement of regular local campaigning and indicates
a vital investment of additional capacity, resources (human and material) and attention for ZANU-PF. These additional political investments set the constituency that is visited apart from those that are not. Because of this, bigwig rallies are an excellent indicator of the areas that ZANU-PF prioritised and were (possibly) integral to ZANU-PF’s electoral fortunes and signalled which kinds of voters ZANU-PF targeted in its campaigns.

To my knowledge, bigwig rallies as a critical variable have not been used in studies of Zimbabwean politics and sub-Saharan Africa. However, I see their categorisation, characterisation, and profiling as a proxy for campaign intensity as a critical academic end. This is because the amount of organisational and political legwork that members of the praesidium put in during elections and the heightened political and organisational activity in the locale visited suggest an increase in political activity, if not campaign intensity. The effort that goes into the making of such rallies is complex and demands extraordinary effort to ensure that bigwigs are not embarrassed, for instance by empty chairs at rallies or by a hostile audience. Bigwig rally production is both a test of the popularity of the party and of the ability of the local leadership to mobilise participants and create a good impression of themselves to national leaders. Besides the increased investment in organising on the ground, bigwig visits also signal an increased investment in clientelist handouts from both local notables and the visiting bigwigs. Bigwigs ordinarily do not travel empty-handed, and they are better placed to leverage the incumbency advantage to distribute campaign largesse. In the context of scarce material resources and limited time, bigwig visits are a good indicator of where the party places its priorities.

Nevertheless, I use bigwig rallies to offer a layer of analysis that brings the national and local campaigns into fuller perspective. This analysis allows one to explore the middle layer, often missing, between the star and ordinary rallies, national and local campaigning, and the presidential candidate and the grassroots. This synthesising role of the bigwig visit also allows the study to escape the dangers of over-generalisation and the "mean spirited-ness" usually associated with national unit analyses. It also allows me to escape the parochialism of purely local (subnational) unit analysis. The local unit analysis is often disconnected and separated from broader developments at regional and national levels.
The analytical strategy adopted in this thesis also allows the thesis to escape the usual, (although at times warranted) confluations of party leader with party and party with the state. By going beyond 'the' party leader to the party leadership (bigwigs), the study treats ZANU-PF as an *organisation*. It avoids treating the party leader as the personification of, and a replacement for, the party. It this way, the thesis also then treats ZANU-PF as more than its occupation of and conflation with the state or a regime, and analyses it as a political party, without forgetting that it controlled the state and enjoyed attendant incumbency advantages.

### 2.4 Legitimacy, Political Legitimacy, & Claims To Legitimacy

I build part of my analytical framework for this thesis around authoritarian regimes' need to mobilise consent, secure compliance, and legitimacy. I draw on theories of legitimacy like Weber's (1978) theory of domination and typologies of legitimacy, as well as political legitimacy (Barker, 1990; Beetham, 1991) and claims to legitimacy (von Soest & Grauvogel, 2017). I also draw on theoretical accounts of how authoritarian regimes seek consent, including but not limited to the theoretical work by De Mesquita et al. (2002).

I attempt to bring Weber's theory of domination and legitimacy into congruence with Levitsky & Way's (2002; 2010) competitive authoritarianism - a regime type that was non-existent at the time of Weber's theorising. I proceed on the assumption that despite ageing, Weber's theory can still aid the explanation of characteristics, not just of democratic states, but also of authoritarian hybrids. I base this assumption on the premise that patterns of legitimation define regimes, and that it is from these patterns of legitimation that historically and theoretically sound answers can be found (Weber, 1978; Beetham, 1991, Baker, 1990). I approach my analysis in this thesis from a process and sequencing perspective. I attempt to find the roots of legitimation of the competitive authoritarian ZANU-PF regime in the claims to legitimacy it makes as a political party on the campaign trail. I discern the claims to legitimacy from the appeals ZANU-PF makes and the modes of politics it employs at the national and subnational levels during its presidential election campaigns.

While the particulars of this thesis and the case it makes are specific to the study of ZANU-PF's election campaigns in 2008 and 2013, the assumptions mentioned above follow a robust scholarly tradition. Rothchild (1979:44) argued that to
understand the criteria that are used to attribute legitimacy to a system or regime, 
the priority is to establish what the political elites offer as theories or claims to 
legitimacy. These are usually discernible at the point of interaction between the 
state and its agents with constituents or society (Crook, 1987:554) within the 
realm of legal institutions and "impersonal" due process (Poggi, 1978:102). In 
this regard, I consider the manifestations of Zimbabwe's party-state legitimacy as 
the effects of the ruling party's claims to and appeals for legitimacy at the point 
of its interface with society (the campaign) within an established legal framework 
(the election). It is this premise that I test on the 2008 and 2013 presidential 
elections in Zimbabwe. I do this through connecting the dots from campaign 
targeting choices through bigwig rallies, to appeals made, claims inferred, as well 
as subnational politics employed as indicative of the type of legitimacy sought 
and reasons for campaigning that this infers. More recently, the above approach 
has been recommended by von Soest & Grauvogel (2017) who analyse the 
different foundations upon which various regimes claim legitimacy, focusing on 
the 'supply-side' of legitimacy, i.e. claims to legitimacy and endorsement or 
rejection by citizens (von Haldenwang, 2016). von Soest & Grauvogel accept that 
legitimation strategies or claims to legitimacy can be both instrumental 
manipulations to safeguard political power or sincere beliefs of the political elite. 
When sincere, these appeals can be of strategic value and may also express 
political elites’ true convictions about their perceived entitlement to rule (von 

Although the distinctions are not always clear, this study approaches legitimacy 
as both a normative and an empirical concept. Normatively, legitimacy is 
concerned with standards that actors, institutions or political orders must conform 
to in order to be considered legitimate. Empirically, legitimacy is about whether, 
how, and why people accept (or reject) actors or institutions (Bellina, Darbon, 
Eriksen, & Sending, 2009:8). Weber, in his theory of domination (Herrschaft), 
ventures an empirical definition of legitimacy as the belief in the rightfulness of 
a given institutionalised authority, domination or rule (Weber: 1978: 53). Weber 
(1978: 213) bases his theory of legitimacy on three ideal types of authority based 
on kinds of claims to legitimacy. These include: (1.) Legal-Rational Authority, 
which is legitimacy based on the belief in the authority of rules established by 
formally correct procedures. Under this ideal type, citizens owe obedience to 
impersonal rules and to a Beamte/officer whose authority comes from the 
impersonal rules. (2.) Traditional authority, which is legitimacy based on a belief
in the sanctity of tradition where citizens owe obedience to the person of Herr/Lord. Personal discretion within the spirit of traditional norms and obligations determine the Herr's sphere of authority. (3.) Charismatic Authority/domination, which is legitimacy - based on the belief in the exceptional qualities of an outstanding individual, with citizens owing obedience to the person of the Fuehrer/leader, whose authority stands outside any rule or precedent, and depends on the continued demonstration of charismatic qualities.

In the above sense, legitimacy is an abstract concept where political authority is both based on the authority's stated claim to legitimacy, as well as the moral basis and belief on which its subjects render compliance to that Authority (Crook, 1987:553). Weber (1978) is clear that while legitimacy is usually a concomitant of authority, it is not a necessary condition of rule because rulers can also acquire subordination to authority through coercion. However, when we approach legitimacy empirically, greater use of coercion, rights violations and low indicators of popular support (for instance at elections) are indicative of and may lead to, low legitimacy (Easton, 1965:163). The import of Easton's intervention, shared by Dogan (2009:209), is that the legitimacy of any regime is always based on the consent of only part of the population. This can be argued to rest on the consent of what De Mesquita et al. (2002) referred to as the winning coalition within the selectorate, through which the regime receives diffuse support (Easton 1965). This understanding of legitimacy is key to this study. However, support, though closely related to legitimacy, and a critical node of it- express consent (Beetham, 1991), it is not the same as legitimacy. As noted earlier, in the discussion on campaigning, political parties can aim for political support knowing that this they can coerce this support. This coercion can be on account of rationalities of fear and asserted beliefs in the superior morality of a ruler. Support can also be attained based on persuasion founded on rationalities of gains, benefits, habit, and performance (Weber, 1978; Marquez, 2016; Haldenwang, 2016:6).

As the conceptualisations of legitimacy above indicate, not all strategies that allow for power retention promote a bid for domination – conceptualised as power and legitimacy – equally, or even as the same type of legitimacy, or uniformly. Boone (2003) argued for a variegated understanding of the topographies of the African state, showing that different subnational territories can be imbued with different sets of institutions, which impact authority
differently. I will show in this thesis that the same institutional differences are understood by incumbents who then model their attempts at securing consent and legitimacy based on the requirements of different political and socio-economic topographies, based on a clear spatial logic. It is this that perhaps saves Weber’s (1978) theory from being as anachronistic, simplistic, and ill-suited to explain the political legitimacy of the modern state as, for instance, Dogan (2009); Beetham (1991) and Matheson (1987) allege. I categorically disagree with Dogan (2009:195), who argues that traditional and charismatic authority are no longer present in the current political conjuncture. I argue that Weber's theory still has some applicability and explanatory power. This is because of the varying political topographies of the African state, where regimes and parties may use different types of appeals and strategies across space to acquire consent and win the hearts and minds of voters. They also do this, often selectively but, within the confines of the constitution and notional acceptance of the supremacy of the will of the people (Friedrich, 1974:37).

Matheson (1987:199) concedes that, while Weber's classification is triadic, it comprises five separate principles of legitimation: convention, sacredness, personal ties, personal qualities and rationality, which retain complexity. Beetham (1991:42-43) however, argues for greater precision and argues that that political power is legitimate to the extent that (1.) It is acquired and exercised following the rules or laws (Legality). (2.) The rules or laws embody an acknowledged principle of political authority, regarding which they can be justified (Normative Justifiability). (3.) There is evidence of express consent to authority on the part of those qualified to give it (Express Consent). By Beetham's concession, all his elements are hidden in and can be pulled out of Weber's typology (1991: 42). Weber (1978) has consent as the cornerstone of his theory by definition and typology.

However, while both Weber (1978) and Beetham (1991)’s types of legitimacy and political legitimacy are useful heuristics, for my empirical analysis I adopt von Soest & Grauvogel’s (2017:288) approach of analysing legitimacy through the analysis of legitimation as a strategy used to seek legitimacy, rather than legitimacy itself. I also adopt their six authoritarian regimes legitimacy claims and use them as the benchmark for observation in the empirical chapters of this thesis. von Soest & Grauvogel (2017:290-291) describe the six claims as follows:
8. **Foundational myths**: where ruling elites and parties refer to their role in the state-building process to legitimate their rule. This build from Beetham (1991:103) who argues that argues that historical accounts are significant precisely because of their relationship to the legitimacy of power in the present. It also borrows from Levitsky & Way (2012:5) who argue, with Zimbabwe in mind, that strong solidarity ties established during periods of violent struggle such as war, revolutions, and liberation movements are often used as compelling legitimation narratives.

9. **Ideology**: Following Easton (1975) and Linz (2000) this speaks to narratives regarding the righteousness of a given political order, and ideology as denotative of a belief system intended to create a collective identity and or a specific societal order.

10. **Personalism**: Pertains to a discourse focusing on the ruler to boost their appeal. It comprises two aspects: (1.) Following Weber (1978: 133–136) and Fagen (1965:275–277), it refers to charismatic authority as an important source of legitimacy stemming from the ‘extraordinary personality’ and leadership qualities of a leader who is portrayed as chosen ‘from above’ to fulfil a particular mission and as having traditional authority. (2.) Following Isaacs (2010) and Nelson (1984), it also refers to a discursive mechanism that emphasises the ruler’s centrality to specific achievements such as the nation’s unity, prosperity, and stability.

11. **Procedure**: This includes attempts to create procedural legitimacy based on the carrying out of elections and other rule-based mechanisms for handing over power through ‘orderly’ process.

12. **Performance**: Following Easton (1965) this is based on the notion of specific support, which refers to regime legitimacy that stems from success in satisfying citizens’ needs. It focuses on the extent to which there is deliberate citation of real or imagined achievements and fulfilling societal demands (material welfare and security).

13. **International Engagement**: Not to be mistaken with external legitimacy; this speaks to how regimes use external engagements as legitimation narratives at home.

The above claims to legitimacy constitute the categories that I use throughout the thesis’ empirical chapters to organise the appeals that ZANU-PF officials made during bigwig visits to various constituencies. In the process I also test von Soest
& Grauvogel’s (2017) expectations around the kinds of appeals that rulers in competitive authoritarian regimes make to claim legitimacy. They lay out several expectations, some of which this thesis serendipitously assesses. Following Schedler (2013:121), who assumes that the institution of elections fundamentally changes how rulers relate to society because of the institution of the principle of popular consent, even when this may be subverted in practice, von Soest & Grauvogel (2017:292) expect that competitive authoritarian regimes will focus strongly on procedural claims to legitimacy—Expectation 1. In addition, they also assume that all types of regimes need output legitimacy and following Easton (1965) they expect competitive authoritarian regimes to strengthen beliefs in their economic, distributional and security performance. So, performance-based claims to legitimacy—Expectation 4—should be central to competitive authoritarian regimes as well (von Soest & Grauvogel, 2017:293). This study’s focus on bigwig rallies and the appeals that ZANU-PF made on the campaign trail in 2008 and 2013 present a ready-made testing field for the above stated assumptions and expectations, and I duly oblige.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter presented overviews of the comparative politics, African politics and political sociology literature on competitive authoritarianism, election campaigns, rallies, and legitimacy. It defined, debated and adopted, as appropriate, these key terms and concepts that will recur in the thesis and are the foundation of its analytical frameworks. It specifically focussed on the rally-intensive ground campaign which it adopts as the most appropriate campaign type to characterise the campaigns that it studies. It did the same with rallies, where it first outlines popular and scholarly characterisations of the national also referred to as star rallies (in Zimbabwe) and local also referred to as ordinary rallies (in Zimbabwe). It clarified the understanding of star rallies. It introduced a third form, the bigwig rally, as a distinct type of rally from the star and ordinary rallies or national and local rallies. It sketched out this concept and differentiated it from its appears, and also justified its adoption and use in this thesis as an indicator of campaign intensity. Last, the chapter highlighted the six claims to legitimacy and expectations on what kinds of claims to legitimacy competitive authoritarian regimes make. These claims and expectations inform the analyses of causal process observations in the rest of the thesis. I operationalise these claims to legitimacy by way of broad theoretical statements and hypotheses in the next chapter, chapter 3. In addition to the broad theoretical statements and hypotheses,
Chapter 3 will also present and justify this thesis’ research design, case and site selection. It also maps the thesis’ scope conditions, report on the implementation of the research design, and outlines the data collection methods that the study utilised.
3 THE NESTED SUBNATIONAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS

The research for this study utilised a design that combined the Nested Analysis (Lieberman, 2005) and the Subnational Comparative Method (Snyder, 2001) research designs. The combination yielded a consolidated framework, the Nested Subnational Comparative Analysis, with the amalgamation benefiting tremendously from the strengths of each design. The nested analysis involves the systematic mixing of methods in a unified manner, combining the statistical analysis of a large sample of cases with the in-depth investigation of one or more of the cases contained within the large sample/Large-N (Lieberman, 2005:435-436). The subnational comparative method entails scaling down the sample of cases to conduct systematic comparison of two or more subnational cases in a controlled comparative fashion to discern subnational variation (Snyder, 2001:95; Sinha, 2003).

The study employed this amalgamation to conduct a nested subnational comparative analysis of ZANU-PF's presidential election campaigns in 2008 and 2013. Through this, the study was able to examine its research questions and draw inferences on why ZANU-PF campaigned.

This chapter outlines this research design. It justifies the design choice (Section 3.1) and the case selection criteria and justification for studying ZANU-PF campaigns as cases (Section 3.2). In the same breath, it outlines the study's scope conditions. Section 3.3 briefs the reader on the step by step implementation process that occurred for the study. It shares the implications that the research process has for analysis. Section 3.4 outlines how the critical element of constituency type was developed and operationalised in this study while Section 3.5 outlines the study's broad theoretical propositions and the hypothesis that support them. Section 3.6 covers how data was collected for the study to inform casual process observations. It ends the chapter by explaining the sampling strategies for document analysis, archival research and interviews, as well as a methodological note on the use and citation of newspapers in the study.
3.1 Research Design Justification

Both the nested analysis and subnational comparative method are robust research designs for increasing the numbers of observations in Small-N (small sample or a small number of selected cases) research, as well as making controlled comparisons between cases. As is evident, any one of these research designs could have adequately supported the pursuit of both exploring general relationships and explanations as well as specific explanations of individual constituent cases (Lieberman, 2005:436). Beyond their face value propositions, the real value of this combination lies not in significant differences regarding the underlying assumptions that inform each of the designs, but in the strength generated from the whole, which is greater than the sum of the two parts.

Nested analysis has a broader and more general application (comparisons between national cases, subnational cases, institutions etc.). It places primacy on the development or utilisation of a large quantitative dataset to denote patterns and trends that can inform further case selection choices for in-depth small-N research (Lieberman, 2005). The subnational comparative method is more specific in its focus to comparisons. It limits comparisons to subnational units and desists from assumptions of unit homogeneity simply because the units belong to the same country (Snyder, 2001:96). From the onset, it assumes cultural, social, economic and political heterogeneity amongst subnational spaces. It also avoids the challenges usually associated with the "whole nation bias" where researchers unreflectively gravitate towards national-level data, which often has some contrived internal heterogeneity, or a false universalism (Snyder, 2001; Rokkan, 1970; Tillin, 2013: 236).

However, escaping the false universalism through the use of the subnational comparative method alone could have meant foregoing a national level analysis which nested analysis affords. As a result, the research design retains the national-level analysis, while the cases selected for in-depth qualitative research assist in focusing the study and facilitates rich descriptive analysis. It also facilitates a closer examination of ZANU-PF’s electoral campaigns within context (as per Brady & Collier; 2010; Gerring, 2004:347 as well as Stake, 1995). The design also allowed for the utilisation of multiple quantitative and qualitative data sources to reveal and explain the various features of ZANU-PF’s campaigns.
George & Bennet (2005) advocate for a clear division of labour between quantitative and qualitative methods and suggest that rigorous analysis is a task best left to quantitative, while exploration is best left to qualitative technics. In respect of task allocation within the research design, I perform the inverse of that suggestion. For this thesis, nested analysis is the primary source for analysis at the national level and in respect of trends analysis for further exploration. It plays an exploratory rather than explanatory function, although I do maintain a high level of rigor in the descriptive statistics this produces. It assists to answer the first questions around whether ZANU-PF campaigned using bigwigs in 2008 and 2013, as well as where these bigwig visits occurred. In this respect, it precedes the subnational analysis, and allowed for the quick evaluation of extant arguments and explanations. For instance, a juxtaposition of bigwig visits against land resettlement would quickly show whether ZANU-PF campaigned in places where land had been redistributed or not. Or to take on another received wisdom, juxtaposing bigwig rallies against rural/urban classifications would quickly review whether ZANU-PF campaigned in rural areas where its support is believed to be strong and neglected urban areas believed to be opposition bastions.

Beyond the abovementioned tasks, I do not subject the dataset to more rigorous, extensive, and advanced quantitative analysis in this thesis. This approach is in line with Lieberman (2005:440) who argues that Large-N analysis provides trends and hypothesis which are then investigated through small-N in-depth study, while the Large-N analysis only comprises dataset observations. The latter then combines small number of dataset observations with a host of casual process observations (Brady, Collier & Seawright, 2004; Lieberman, 2005). Subnational comparison is the thesis’ primary analysis at the subnational level, facilitating the exposure of variation regarding national and local ZANU-PF elite’s decision making within and across constituency types. The analysis here is much more rigorous than the initial national level analysis. It involves within-case analysis of variation and leans heavily on the process of valuing temporal change and events across time. In this respect, process tracing and causal process observations are streamlined into the subnational comparisons that occur. It investigates specific processes and actions of groups (e.g. ZANU-PF, SADC, the opposition, traditional leaders, war veterans) individuals (presidential candidates, campaign managers, parliamentary candidates, other bigwigs, opposition leaders) to evidence patterns, trends and hypothesis from the large-N analysis and the
literature. The interest is not restricted to hypothesised relationships and outcomes but is also to inductively generate alternative explanations and hypothesis based on causal process observations at this level. This element strengthens the study’s descriptive inference and allows for extensive conversation between rival explanations (Lieberman, 2005).

The nested subnational comparative analysis design allowed this research to circumvent the dangers of mean-spirited analysis and over-generalization. It did this through having the national-level analysis but testing its emergent results, patterns and trends against small-N analysis. This also allowed for better coding and classification of electoral constituencies along this thesis' variables to produce more accurate subnational narratives that may assist, as Snyder (2001: 98-99) suggests, to inform future national coding. Figure 3-1 is a mock-up of the research design and its various components and analytical moment.
Figure 3-1: The Thesis' Nested Subnational Comparative Analysis Research Design

Preliminary Large N-Analysis
Data set of Zimbabwe's 210 House of Assembly (HOM) constituencies
(socio-demographic data & election returns 2002-2018)

Small-N-Analysis
In-depth sub-national Analysis (deliberate selection)

ZANU-PF-Aligned Constituencies
  - Mount Darwin East
  - Mount Darwin South
  - Mount Darwin North
  Analysis: campaign strategy in ZACs across time.
  Hypothesis: on Why ZANU-PF campaigned in ZACs

Opposition Aligned constituencies
  - Makokoba
  - Pumula
  Analysis: campaign strategy in OACs across time.
  & Hypothesis: on Why ZANU-PF campaigned in OACs

Battleground Constituencies
  - Goromonzi North
  - Tsholotsho North
  - Tsholotsho South
  Analysis: campaign strategy in battleground constituencies.
  & Hypothesis on Why ZANU-PF limited campaigns in Battleground constituencies

National Level Analysis
Distribution of bigwig visits & appeals
+ Implications for legitimacy thesis
  - Types of constituencies favored with bigwig visits
  - Types of appeals made at bigwig rallies

New alternative analysis & explanation on why ZANU-PF campaigns and its strategies for power retention
3.2 Case Selection Justification And Scope Conditions

I purposively selected ZANU-PF's campaigns in 2008 and 2013 for analysis, because of its seeming success to retain power and its longevity, which are noteworthy and thus, as Arneson (1993: 164) argues, appropriate for in-depth study. ZANU-PF (formed in 1963) and its leader Robert Mugabe were in power in Zimbabwe from independence in 1980 and through to 2013 and beyond. This long life makes ZANU-PF a prime candidate to study both the durability and changing face of authoritarianism over time and to explore how it has used the electoral process to make claims and stake claims to legitimacy. Because it is a well institutionalised competitive authoritarian regime, ZANU-PF is an excellent case, not just of authoritarian longevity, but also authoritarian elections. Studying it allows us to understand how similar competitive authoritarian regimes balance the modern pre-requisites of democracy with standing beliefs around the sacrosanctity of their right to rule. Chapter 4 offers a more developed, fully-fledged historical picture of ZANU-PF that assists with justification for its selection in a critical review of its history and historically grounded analysis of its electoral conduct.

However, the above sits on the assumption that ZANU-PF, as a party, is not \textit{sui generis} and that studying it will inform us of the modalities and dynamics of similar types of regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa. As Gerring (2004: 341) argues, the in-depth study of single units, have the potential to allow the scholar to elucidate the features of a broader class of similar phenomenon. While making no claims to ZANU-PF's representativeness as African political party, studying it allowed for the generation of empirically grounded working hypotheses. These hypotheses can be tested further within Zimbabwe and, at the highest level of ambition, in other competitive authoritarian regimes. In the Sub-Saharan Africa region, competitive authoritarian regimes are a dime to a dozen. As Cheeseman \& Klass (2018), as well as others, have argued, autocrats learn from each other, and it may be interesting to subject these similar regimes to similar studies.

Nonetheless, this study is generalisable to other constituencies in Zimbabwe and can be comparable to the election campaigns of other electoral authoritarian regimes that are competitive authoritarian, rather than hegemonic authoritarian, regimes, and have a liberation movement background. While these qualifiers
limit the number of cases to which study can be generalisable and or comparable, it also sharpens the scope conditions to several countries and regimes. For instance, in Southern Africa these would include ruling parties in Mozambique, the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO); Namibia, the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO); South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC); Angola, the Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); and in Tanzania, Chama Cha Mapinduza (CCM). These parties in Southern Africa share a similar history with ZANU-PF and are still in power. However, the study's outcomes can also be generalisable to similar regimes in other parts of Africa, as well as other regimes at particular points in time in the past. This could illuminate why other former liberation movements succumbed to defeat and failed to stay in power. ZANU-PF's politics and political approach can assist in showing where and how the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Zambia, Malawi's Malawi Congress Party (MCP), or Kenya's and ZANU-PF's namesake, Kenya African National Union (KANU), faltered. Beyond these parties, understanding and explaining why ZANU-PF campaigns also has the possibility of illuminating characteristics of similar regimes, elsewhere in the world.

3.3 Research Design Implementation And Analytical Approach

The nested subnational comparative analysis research design that I employ in this thesis produces three analytical moments, as follows: (1.) National-level analysis based on descriptive statistics from the dataset created for this study. (2.) Mid-level, possibly district and provincial level analysis based on a study of the bigwig visits that took place in 2008 and 2013. Outputs from the dataset as well as newspaper reports on campaign visits inform this analysis. (3.) Subnational analysis of electoral politics clustered into three categories: ZANU-PF-Aligned constituencies (ZACs), Opposition-aligned constituencies (OACs) and Battleground Constituencies (BCs) across the two election periods, as well as analysis of electoral activity in specially selected constituencies from the nine that I targeted for in-depth research. Overall, this approach allowed for the comparison of political activity at all levels across time (2008-2013), as well as across space (comparisons of campaign activity and appeals across the three broad constituency types). The adoption of the nested subnational comparative analysis research design entailed several steps that integrated the procedures from
the two founding designs. I proceeded with research for this thesis as shown below in section 3.3.1.

3.3.1 Construction of Large-N dataset of Zimbabwe’s 210 House of Assembly Constituencies (2002-2018)

The process started with the construction of a large-N dataset of Zimbabwe's 210 House of Assembly constituencies. The dataset has most presidential election returns (results, eligible voters, voter turnout, vote shares, and winning margins) at constituency level from 2002 to 2018. The only exception is the 2008 Presidential election run-off whose results were only made public in aggregate form at the provincial level. The dataset uses 2002 as its baseline year. However, this immediately created challenges on account of changing constituency boundaries. In 2002, Zimbabwe had 120 House of Assembly seats, but in 2008 and 2013, it had increased these constituencies to 210. As Figure 3-2 below shows, there were a significant number of grey areas (the new constituencies) which I could not initially code as either ZANU-PF or opposition. Figure 3-2 also shows the baseline conditions regarding electoral competition ahead of this study's elections of interest in 2008 and 2013.

However, I was able to identify and code the new constituencies based on the electoral districts from which they were hewn out. In all instances, new constituencies were cut-out from existing ones, and the 2008 delimitation report showed the wards that constituted each constituency. Also, the parliament of Zimbabwe, as well as the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), produced brief constituency profiles which indicated which of the old constituencies the new ones had been part. The constituency changes were characterised by the movement of wards from pre-existing constituencies to new constituencies. As such, while the constituencies changed and new ones were created, the ward boundaries remained the same. After dealing with this challenge, I created two new election-related variables. The first was constituency type, fashioned as a categorical variable with values from zero (0) to six (6) based on winning margins, which I explain below. The second, was campaign intensity using bigwig visits as a proxy. Campaign intensity features as a discrete variable and the number of bigwig rallies in the constituency establishes its range, from zero (0) to four (4).
Figure 3-2: 2002 Presidential Election Results Map on the 210 New Delimited Constituencies For the 2008 Elections

Source: Author’s data gathered from official 2002 presidential election results; ZEC’s 2008 Constituency delimitation exercise report, and ZESN’s 2008 Parliamentary election constituency profiles.
3.4 Categorisation Of Constituency Types And Designation Of Bigwig Rallies

The dataset categorised all 210 constituencies into seven sub-constituency types which constituted the three main types, i.e. ZANU-PF-Aligned Constituencies, Opposition-Aligned Constituencies, and Battleground constituencies. The sub-constituency types were as follows: ZANU-PF-strongholds, Consolidating-ZANU-PF Constituencies, Marginal-ZANU-PF constituencies; Opposition-strongholds, Consolidating-opposition, Marginal-opposition constituencies, and Battleground Constituencies. This thesis’ use of “marginal” is different from conventional use. For instance, in the United Kingdom (UK) and other places, marginal refers to a very close contest where the winner’s victory is almost negligible, minor, and perhaps even fairly inconsequential. In this thesis, marginal refers to a narrow victory, but one that is not sufficiently borderline to be described in the foregoing terms. So, it is not borderline or negligible – for this I use the term battleground instead. Marginal constituencies are then those whose vote tally is not sufficiently borderline to warrant battleground status, but also not sufficiently strong to warrant comfort for the winner or for the constituency to be seen as beyond the reach of competitors.

While acknowledging the importance of the local political economy and social geography in determining the character of constituencies, and in shaping political outcomes (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Boone and Wahman, 2015), the above typology only accounted for measures of constituency type based on voting returns and winning margins. Socio-demographic data was, however, coded. This included population size and density, location and development morphology-rural, peri-urban and urban characterisations-, ethnicity, land tenure regimes, and poverty prevalence. This data is not incorporated into constituency type characterisation as used in this thesis in the interest of keeping the constituency type variable basic and easily replicable in other settings for purposes of comparability. Nonetheless, the thesis utilises descriptive statistics relating to some of the socio-demographic variables to assess whether there were any theoretically relevant trends and characteristics relating to certain types of constituencies. It also utilised them to inform in-depth study site selection and provided general background data to inform some of the analysis in the thesis' empirical chapters.
Table 3-1 shows the categories and winning margins that qualify constituencies for particular categories. The range for each category was initially based on quartile analysis of the winning margins during the baseline election, and the 2008 and 2013 elections. This was then moderated by theoretical hunches on the ranges and where to place them after accounting for the volatility of election outcomes that characterises post-2000 Zimbabwe elections, as shown in chapter 4.

**Table 3-1: Constituency type framework and constituency type definitions based on margins of victory**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Valid Range</th>
<th>code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Stronghold</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposition vote lead between 52.75% to 83.05</td>
<td>52.75% to 83.05</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZANU-PF vote lead over MDC-T vote lead between</td>
<td>46.67% to 77.63%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZANU-PF vote lead over Opposition between</td>
<td>52.75% to 83.05</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZANU-PF vote lead over MDCT between</td>
<td>46.67% to 77.63%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal-Opposition</td>
<td>Constituency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposition vote lead over ZANU-PF between</td>
<td>15.01% and 31.33%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MDC-T vote lead over ZANU-PF between</td>
<td>12.03% and 27.99%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Marginal ZANU-PF</td>
<td>Constituency</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposition vote lead over ZANU-PF between</td>
<td>15.01% and 31.33%</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZANU-PF vote lead over MDCT between</td>
<td>12.03% and 27.99%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Consolidating</td>
<td>Opposition constituency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposition vote lead over ZANU-PF between</td>
<td>31.33% to 52.75</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MDC-T vote lead over ZANU-PF between</td>
<td>27.99% to 46.66%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidating-</td>
<td>ZANU-PF vote lead over Opposition between</td>
<td>31.33% to 52.75</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF constituency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZANU-PF vote lead over MDCT between</td>
<td>27.99% to 46.66%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleground</td>
<td>Constituencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZANU-PF/Opposition vote lead is less than 15.01%</td>
<td>0-15.01%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZANU-PF/MDC-T vote lead is less than 12.03%</td>
<td>0-12.03%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Constituency</td>
<td>Initially designated as 7 before being allocated</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to other constituency types depending on the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>preponderance of the wards they were composed of</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and the political heritage of the original</td>
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<td></td>
<td>constituency.</td>
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</table>
The opposition votes captured in table 3-1 and used throughout the essay refer to the collective opposition vote, not just Tsvangirai’s alone for both elections, 2008 and 2013. In 2008, when a third candidate, Simba Makoni, got a significant proportion of the vote (about 8%), this is reflected in some of the analysis in empirical chapters, but it is not the primary focus. If the thesis’ analysis was focusing on parliamentary seats, it would have been prudent to separate the opposition vote, but it focuses on the presidential runs and campaigns. The impact of vote splitting is huge as 2008 showed and but is almost non-existent in 2013. Consolidating the opposition vote against the incumbent thus may provide some misconceptions around, not opposition strength generally, but the strength of the main competitor against ZANU-PF. As 2008 showed, this phenomenon led to the opposition failing to capture the presidency in the first round of elections in March, when its combined strength suggested that it could have.

3.4.1 Bigwig rallies: identification and coding

The study codes bigwig rallies as a continuous variable. As such, the number of times a constituency is visited is the code that applies. As mentioned above, this range does not go too far and is only from zero (0) to four (4). The study used newspaper archival research for 2008 and 2013 elections to generate and curate accurate data on bigwig rallies. The searches, were, however, restricted to bigwig rallies that took place within approximately two months of the elections (February and March for 2008 and June and July for 2013, as well as May and June for the June 2008 presidential election run-off).

In the main, the study incorporates rallies that occurred after the sitting of the nomination court for presidential elections. This invariably gave the parties between six and eight weeks within which they could vigorously campaign after their candidates were certified as candidates in the presidential elections by the nomination court. In both the 2008 and 2013 elections, the ZANU-PF election manifesto and campaign launches happened after the stated nomination court seating. The nomination court date constitutes a key marker for the inclusion and exclusion criteria for rallies in this study.

The selection criteria for the rallies that were included in the dataset for this study followed the criteria on what constitutes a bigwig rally captured in chapter 1, section 1.3, especially these elements:
1. They were public partisan mass meetings at which a member of a party’s praesidium or top five leadership is the main speaker and primary guest.
2. They were explicitly staged in the run-up to elections to drum up support for the national presidential candidate and local members of parliament in a particular region.
3. The speeches, messages, and appeals made speak to both national and local issues and questions and are geared for a cross-sectional audience of locals and other national audiences.
4. Despite their location (in a constituency, at a business centre, or school) they had at least administrative district-wide reach.

3.4.2 Initial Large-N Analysis

Following the completion of the dataset, I sought to answer the question of whether and where ZANU-PF campaigned using bigwig rallies in 2008 and 2013. I conducted some basic statistical analysis for descriptive statistics on the key variables, bigwig visits, against other variables on the dataset. This produced descriptive statistics of the distribution of variables in the dataset and trends and patterns amongst the constituencies. These descriptive statistics partly informed further analysis and investigation in step 3. Of particular interest were trends and patterns that emerged regarding campaign intensity at constituency level as this produced the universe of cases that the study could invest more time in because they had hosted bigwig rallies.

The trends that emerged from the analysis limited the number of possible destinations for in-depth qualitative research. The data showed that across the two elections, ZANU-PF had deployed bigwigs to 41 of the 210 constituencies in 2008, and 34 of the 210 constituencies in 2013. It is from this universe of fewer than 75 constituencies (some were visited more than once across the two elections as detailed chapters 6, 7 and 8) that the nine constituencies selected for in-depth research were selected from. I added maps to the data presentation to clarify further and sharpen the analysis around this variable. The maps were generated using ArcGIS mapping and analytics software. They consist of maps that overlay bigwig rallies against the other variables and characteristics that spoke directly to the thesis' hypothesis.
3.4.3 Subnational Diverse Case Selection Justification: Purposive Sampling for In-depth Qualitative Research

Based on observation of the patterns around bigwig visits from the large-N analysis, nine constituencies were purposively selected for further in-depth study which took place from August 2017 to July 2018. In-depth qualitative research assisted in answering questions around ZANU-PF's political practice, strategy and organisation at a local level. Given this, the nine constituencies selected were diverse cases. As Gerring (2008:651) explained, the essence of selecting diverse cases is to ensure maximum variation across categorical variables and dimensions of interest. In the case of this study, this was constituency types and bigwig visits, regardless of outcomes (such as voter turnout, winners) and to ensure representativeness of the selected sites in respect of the three main constituency type categories. In this respect, the nine constituencies represented the three main constituency types, as well as their natural breakpoints, as follows: ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies – Mount Darwin East, Mount Darren South, and Mount Darwin North.; Opposition-aligned constituencies – Makokoba, Pumula, and Lupane West; and Battleground constituencies – Goromonzi North, Tsholotsho South and Tsholotsho North. The selected constituencies represented wide variation across sub-categories of constituency types. They were drawn from five provinces, i.e. Bulawayo, Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Matebeleland North, and Harare, where I conducted some historical and national level key informant interviews. The geographic clustering of these constituencies allowed for a fair measure of unit homogeneity through intentional selection (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994:115-116), which expanded the spread of variation regionally as well as ethnically. All this enhanced the possibilities of the diverse cases illuminating different causal mechanisms and pathways across cases.

I also selected these sites because at some point during the campaign periods of the two election years, they had entertained some bigwig visits. I also possessed a priori knowledge on some of the constituencies from previous involvement in all post-2000 Zimbabwe elections as an election observer, democracy and governance practitioner, and civil society leader. King, Keohane, & Verba (1994:140) state that intentional selection can be based on a priori knowledge of some of the explanatory variables. I, however, augmented this with information from document analysis during the construction of the dataset to strengthen the selection criteria for in-depth research sites.
I noted that Zimbabwe’s political parties and campaign dynamics are also influenced by long histories and forms. In this respect, despite the attempt to vary regions, it is possible that some of the variation that emerges is steeped in long historical explanations that date back to areas within which different liberation movements operated and set up bases in during the liberation war. As I acknowledge elsewhere in this thesis, it is received wisdom that ZANLA and ZIPRA’s military approaches, as well as ZANU and ZAPU’s political approaches differed. These differences have long lasting legacies which continue to inform local level politics in the different areas they operated and mobilised prior to independence. These legacies have implications for the conduct of politics, as well as the kinds of strategies that are tenable in particular constituencies depending on historical legacies of political organising.

3.5 Broad Theoretical Statements and Hypotheses

This thesis generally sought to inductively generate hypotheses on the research question at a subnational level. The intention was to explain what campaign strategy revealed about how (and with which voters) the competitive authoritarian regimes like ZANU-PF seeks legitimacy. Alternative hypotheses, in the spirit of low-level typological theory based on empirical findings of ZANU-PF’s campaign methods in ZANU-PF-aligned, opposition-aligned, and battleground constituencies, was the task.

At a national level, this study sought to explain overall ZANU-PF campaign strategy as informed by the unique conjunctures within which the different elections took place. In this respect, the study followed Skinner, Kudelia, de Mesquita, and Rice's (2007:7) wisdom that every political contest is informed by a time and place context and tried to describe and explain the temporal and spatial contexts of the 2008 and 2013 elections. However, while inductive, the theoretical and empirical literature had some hypotheses that sought to explain ZANU-PF’s electoral behaviour. This study took these explanations and hypotheses into consideration and developed some broad theoretical statements and allied hypotheses that structured and informed casual process observations during data gathering.
3.5.1 Broad theoretical statement 1

ZANU-PF campaigned in 2008 and 2013 to win the hearts and minds of more independent voters to enhance its legitimacy.

Allied hypothesis 1:
If ZANU-PF campaigns to win the hearts and minds of more independent voters, we would expect it to campaign:
1. In battleground and opposition constituencies in both rural and urban constituencies, through bigwig visits, using persuasive appeals, especially programmatic, performance, and procedural appeals.
2. In ZANU-PF aligned constituencies in rural areas, especially in zones of neo-customary land tenure, not campaigns using bigwigs Campaigns will use local patrons, surrogates, brokers, and intermediaries at local levels using performance, ideological, historical and programmatic appeals.

3.5.2 Broad Theoretical statement 2:

ZANU-PF varied its election campaign strategies in 2008 and 2013 depending on the type of constituency it was competing based on election results from previous elections.

Allied hypothesis 2:
1. In ZANU-PF aligned constituencies ZANU-PF used clientelist patronage, and political persuasion strategies to appeal to voters
2. In opposition-aligned constituencies, ZANU-PF employed coercion, violence and electoral manipulation.
3. In battleground constituencies, ZANU-PF used clientelist patronage and persuasive appeals and strategies.

Table 3-2 shows a hypothetical matrix of constituency-type and strategy application based on a simple ordinal ranking of intensity (H= High, M= Moderate and, L= Low). The table hypothesises what strategies ZANU-PF would employ in what constituencies at Times, 1., 2., and 3.
Table 3-2: Hypothetical ZANU-PF subnational strategies across time and constituency types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSTITUENCY TYPE</th>
<th>APPEALS &amp; STRATEGY</th>
<th>HYPOTHESES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VIOLENCE</td>
<td>MANIPULATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME 1 (T.1) – MARCH 2008 GENERAL &amp; PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF Aligned</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleground Constituencies</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition-Aligned constituencies</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME 2 (T.2) – JUNE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RUN-OFF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Stronghold</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleground</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Stronghold</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME 3 – 2013 JULY GENERAL &amp; PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleground constituencies</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition-aligned constituencies</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clientelist patronage, ideological, historical & programmatic appeals.

Clientelist patronage, Manipulation and programmatic appeals.

Low effort: moderate manipulation and programmatic appeals.

ZANU-PF resorts to coercion, violence and fraud to retain power at all costs.

ZANU-PF pursues the same working formula from T.1-

ZANU-PF ratchets-up political appeals and clientelist patronage

ZANU-PF still exerts the least effort here but increases violence from low to moderate through threats and reminders around what happened at T.2. Battleground.
3.6 Data Collection Methods

The thesis benefitted from a variety of primary data collection methods to acquire both quantitative and qualitative evidence. This variety in data collection methods as well as the mix in approaches espoused by the nested subnational comparative method offered me, as Dunning (2007) argues, the possibility of triangulating on a given research problem to leverage the distinctive but complementary strengths of different research methods, and to make progress on substantively important topics. It broadly allowed me to maneuver between evidence on aggregate correlations (the data set observations) and evidence on mechanisms (the interview and document based observations), to combine broad general theory with fine-grained detail from case studies. I was thus able to combine “data set observations” to “causal process observations” (Dunning, 2007:22) allowing for triangulation at the level of broad methods.

Beyond the dataset, my main methods of data collection included a variety of interviews (elite, in-depth and group interviews), document analysis, and newspaper archival research. While all of these methods are legitimate sources that allowed for sufficient variation and triangulation at the level of data collection methods, they also have inherent weaknesses. For instance the reliability of interview data when based on the reliability of respondents recall of incidents from over a decade ago is a legitimate cause for pause. There are also possible interviewer effects that could have stemmed from my positionality as a researcher. In a past life I had been a “prodemocracy” activist, led a big non-profit organisation, and had been labelled a “regime change agent” by ZANU-PF. These past identities were known by some of my interviewees from across the political divide and could have influenced the types of responses they provided me. The heavy use of state-owned newspapers as sources also raises some questions around reliability. I attempted to mitigate the challenges of the former through triangulation of both perspectives and methods.

Regarding perspectives and possible biases in interview data, I varied the types of respondents I engaged in the field without introducing too much variation of types of interlocutor from site to site to facilitate comparability of perspectives as well as the cases. This allowed me to have multiple takes on the same issues from different members of the community and political leadership class. I also managed my profile and made sure that my identity was clearly that of a
researcher. I was also circumspect about the narratives that political leaders, especially those who still held positions of authority in their parties, shared. Nonetheless, the narratives, even when suspected to be contrived were very useful and allowed me to peek into how ZANU-PF wanted to be portrayed to external audiences.

Method triangulation, the mix of interviews and archival data as well as other sources strengthened the validity of the observations that the thesis presents. The evidence to support this thesis’ arguments, claims and propositions, from the inputs that came from respondents, as well as data from documented data sources assisted with verification of certain assertions and the development of a reasoned take on what the correct positions were. I deal with issue of reliability of state owned newspapers separately below, but first I explain and detail the methods below.

3.6.1 Document analysis

Review and document analysis were the first data collection method for this research project. It assisted in building a foundation for the study that benefitted from a tremendous amount of extant qualitative and quantitative information and accounts on Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF and Zimbabwean elections. Document analysis enjoyed three primary forms (1.) Socio-demographic and elections-related materials, (2.) Peer-reviewed and grey literature on Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF and elections pre and post-independence, and (3.) Analysis and review of press reports from 2008 and 2013, which this section reflects on separately in the next sub-section.

Initially, this document analysis involved gathering and reviewing official demographic data from the 2012 census, Demographic Health Surveys, Poverty Atlases, and Labour Market Surveys, all from the Zimbabwe Statistical Office (Zim Stats) and its partners in the international development organisation community. This data was mostly at the provincial level and administrative district level, and because electoral constituencies are not an administrative organising element, the data did not exist for them. I was, however, able to access the lists of wards which formed the administrative districts from Zim Stat, and the wards that formed constituencies from the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission's 2008 Constituency delimitation report. This allowed me to disaggregate census and other data to ward level and aggregated this up to the constancy level, which
is this study's level of analysis. It also involved official and civil society reports on elections and election returns at the constituency level for all presidential elections from 2002 to 2013, and later 2018, although none of the 2018 data is used in any substantial way for this thesis. This data was statistical and informed the quantitative dataset referred to above and referenced throughout this thesis.

Document analysis also entailed visiting the extensive body of peer-reviewed literature on comparative politics and African politics regarding election campaigns, clientelism coercion, and political parties. It mainly involved literature on Zimbabwe, and ZANU-PF pre and post-Independence, and elections post-independence. The peer-reviewed literature on Zimbabwe informs a lot of the evidence and analysis in chapter 4 and 5, as well as the main empirical chapters 6, 7, and 8. I also engage this literature more in the chapters that follow as part of the evidentiary base, and explanations that the thesis engages as it develops its arguments, analysis, and alternative descriptive explanations. As such, document analysis of primary and secondary sources from the academy constituted a running analysis and review throughout the research process.

Beyond the primary purpose of building the dataset, both the socio-demographic and electoral data as well as the peer-reviewed and grey literature on ZANU-PF, and Zimbabwean elections allowed the study to corroborate information, refute observational data and contest information received from other sources (Yanow 2007). Nonetheless, document analysis was part of sourcing information on the studies variables of interest as outlined throughout this document. This is highlighted in table 3-4, which lists data sources and provides examples of the sources and shows which type of information was gathered.

### 3.6.2 Newspaper archival research

As part of building the study's dataset and also fieldwork, the researcher conducted archival research at the Zimbabwe Newspapers 1980 Limited (Zim Papers). Zim Papers, a publicly traded company in which the government has a controlling stake, publishes 13 newspaper titles. These include three daily newspapers, The Herald (Zimbabwe’s oldest and largest daily newspaper by print run. Established in 1891, it is published from Monday to Friday), The Chronicle, and the H-Metro, a tabloid. The Zim Papers catalogue also includes two Sunday papers, The Sunday Mail and Sunday News, as well as the Saturday Herald. Zim Papers reporters religiously followed and reported on ZANU-PF rallies in 2008.
and 2013. *The Chronicle* and *the Sunday News* predominantly cover regional news from Matebeleland, but they also serialise major national stories from *the Herald* and *the Sunday Mail*. Zim Papers also runs a Broadcast division incorporating two radio stations and one television network.

A significant amount of the material regarding bigwig rallies, i.e. their locations, attendees, and content of speeches, is drawn from this archive. Inevitably, as a state-controlled entity, the reporting in the Zim Papers newspapers was slanted towards ZANU-PF. This would ordinarily raise issues around objectivity and validity of information gathered from such a partisan source. However, for this study, this did not constitute a considerable disadvantage because the research was not geared towards gathering the stable's analysis of elections but specific factual information on dates, locations and messages. Zim Papers' unfair, but massive coverage of ZANU-PF during elections, instead, constituted a rich archive for the study to draw from. This included acres of space given to verbatim pronouncements by ZANU-PF bigwigs at rallies, as well as full coverage of the rallies as they occurred. In 2013, the Zim Papers archive went digital and began to include live updates from rallies as they occurred. This too became a useful source of information, and a refreshing departure from having to comb through and scan physical copies of newspapers, as was the case with the 2008 materials.

The study also involved further archival research on newspapers at the Media Monitors Zimbabwe, formerly Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe (MMPZ) who kept a digital archive of newspapers and radio and television news stories from the 2008 and 2013. A large number of the private newspapers' stories used in this study were collected from this archive. The researcher also collected radio and television broadcasts which are not used in this study due to time constraints associated with sorting such huge audio and video files.

### 3.6.3 Interviews

Interviews constituted the primary data collection method for this thesis during the in-depth qualitative study phase and are easily the most significant source of primary data that the bulk of the analysis in this thesis relies upon. They allowed the researcher to engage with the actors that the literature theorises about and to test some of the study's hypotheses and broad theoretical propositions with a wide range of actors on the ground. Given their value to this study, the research project treated interviews as a distinct, stand-alone empirical tool to test and generate a
hypothesis (Mosley, 2013). The study accounts for no less 128 interviews with over 160 people across Zimbabwe. Table 3-3 breaks down the interviews conducted for this thesis by location.

**Table 3-3: Interview Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Interview</th>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>In-depth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makokoba</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pumula</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lupane East</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsholotsho North</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsholotsho South</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goromonz North</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Darwin North</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Darwin East</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Darwin South</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The bulk of these interviews -110, were elite interviews. These are interviewing that targeted people directly involved in the particular political process, in this case, electoral campaigns, and with unique insights into causal processes of specific political processes (Dexter, 1970; Beamer, 2002; Marshal 1996). Most of the interviews were with local elites who included ZANU-PF and opposition local officials, previous election observers, campaign managers, Members of Parliament, local chiefs and headman, war veterans, and local businesspeople. ZANU-PF officials were the priority, and all respondents except for a few of the national elites mentioned below, are anonymised.

Seven of the 110 interviews, listed under Harare and Bulawayo, were with national level elites. These included national leaders of political parties (ZANU-PF, the MDC) and civil society leaders with knowledge of the 2008 and 2013 electoral processes. Three of these interviews’ respondents had run or were going to run as presidential election candidates, i.e. Dumiso Dabengwa, ZAPU Presidential candidate in 2013, Simba Makoni, Mavambo Presidential candidate in 2008, and Nelson Chamisa, MDC Alliance Presidential candidate in 2018. The remaining four were: former leader of the war veterans association, Jabulani Sibanda, former ZANU-PF Spokesperson in 2013, Bright Matonga, civic leader, Okay Machisa, and a member of the ZANU-PF Commissariat department who preferred anonymity despite his station. While amongst the 103 interviews, others
occupied national offices and responsibilities, this thesis treats them as local elites as this, in most instances was the politics in which the study was interested. These include former ministers and members of parliament as well as sitting members of parliament from across the political divide, and civic leaders who were interviewed in their different local settings or on specific local matters.

As Table 3-3 shows, nine interviews were in-depth interviews because of the extensive amount of time that they took. These were interviews with high-level contacts from ZANU-PF, the opposition and ZAPU, all of whom were former liberation war veterans and were instrumental either in the popularisation of ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU or the formation of the opposition MDC. Five of these interviews had to be conducted over multiple sessions and proved invaluable to understanding origins and histories. However, this thesis does not use the bulk of data gathered from these interviews. Twelve group interviews were also part of this study. The group interviews were not part of the study's initial design, they occurred serendipitously. As table 3-3 shows, most of these were in the three Mount Darwin constituencies. This was because some respondents from both ZANU-PF and the opposition MDC-T preferred to talk in the company of at least one other person. On enquiring why, I learnt that this was for both safety and accountability reasons. I adapted to these preferences, and the numbers did not impact the process negatively, in some instances, they allowed for dynamic exchanges amongst the research's respondents. In Lupane, the group interviews were based more on the convenience of respondents choosing to meet centrally than anything else.

In all cases, the study adopted a non-random sampling strategy to identify respondents. This purposive sampling included a quota to ensure the variation of perspectives amongst interlocutors. Theoretically, the chosen respondents were the most likely to possess enough information at the right level to pass as causal process observations and to suggest well thought out answers to the study's questions. Some of the respondents had multiple identities, which allowed the study to benefit from, for instance, a war veteran's take who was also a ZANU-PF district organisational structure member. As such, targeted respondents were considered to have the right knowledge, access, and influence. Local contact persons greatly assisted the research process by identifying and approaching respondents. In Mount Darwin and Goromonzi, the local contact persons were provincial chairpersons for the Zimbabwe Human Rights Organisation
In Bulawayo, it was the director and staff of the Bulawayo Progressive Residents Association (BPRA), while in Lupane and Tsholotsho it was a combination of BPRA, and ZANU-PF and MDC officials. While both ZimRights and BPRA are respected organisations, like most civil society organisations in Zimbabwe, they are perceived to be pro-opposition. However, this perception is at the national level, and the kind of access they were able to facilitate on the ground showed that in communities they operate, community members are aware of their nonpartisan stand. This reality allowed me to have access to respondents across the political divide. In addition, in some instances, the organisations only provided contacts as seeds, with the rest of other people engaged being identified by other members of communities that I engaged with.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter outlined the study’s research design and data collection methods. It outlined the nested subnational comparative analysis research design and justified this design choice on the strength of methods mix. It also justified the purposive selection of Zimbabwe’s ruling party, ZANU-PF and its election campaigns as a case of competitive authoritarian election campaigns. It presented the scope conditions where the study could be generalisable and also comparable. The chapter provided an outline of the data collection process sequence, as well as an outline of the data collection methods. It explained and justified the method choices and explained the utility of all three methods stressing the ability to triangulate methods and perspectives as well as to verify data. The chapter also outlined the study’s operating hypotheses and theoretic statements. The chapter ends with the presentation of table 3-4 below which illustrates the type of data and its sources that this thesis utilised.
### Table 3-4: Illustrative Matrix of Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>Violence</th>
<th>manipulation</th>
<th>clientelism</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>socio-demographic</th>
<th>ethnicity</th>
<th>EXAMPLE OF SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Monitoring reports</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) Zimbabwe Human Rights NGOs Forum (NGO Forum), Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term election observation reports</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe election support network (ZESN), elections resource centre (ERC), SEOM,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Election reports</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>International crisis group (ICG) human rights watch (HRW), crisis coalition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Observers reports</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local and International Observer Groups, e.g. SEOM, AUEOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court cases/records</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>The ruling party and opposition contestans, ZLHR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidates reports</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>The ruling party and opposition contestans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party manifestes</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Incumbent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>campaign trail itineraries</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td>Press, incumbent archives, Social Media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign advertisements</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Press &amp; party archives, e.g., Media Monitoring Project Reports and archives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian NGOs reports</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Care International, Save the Children, World Vision, ZPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press reports</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
<td>National Dailies, local Press, Online Press, e.g. The Herald, Sunday Mail, News Day, Bulawayo 24, News 24,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech Transcripts</td>
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This chapter explores pivotal moments in the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) ’s history to provide a deep historical context for this study and presents a new genetic explanation for its competitive authoritarian character. It presents a complex picture of ZANU-PF through a review of the historical record, and analysis of its primary data from interviews carried out with a wide variety of political stakeholders, some of whom were nationalists and combatants during Zimbabwe’s liberation war. The chapter rejects as inadequate some of the extant historically grounded political explanations for ZANU-PF’s current form. This is because some of the accounts are limited to ZANU-PF’s existence in the late 1960s and 1970s guerrilla war, and often emphasise only ZANU-PF’s coercive methods of operation before and after Independence in 1980. The chapter advocates for a more in-depth historical dive. It succeeds in being a historical context-mapping of pre-independence ZANU-PF politics and the changes and continuities these histories flag regarding ZANU-PF’s modus operandi during elections post-2000. The chapter neither seeks to re-write history, nor accomplish the impossible task of a ‘complete’ or ‘correct’ history of ZANU-PF. Instead, it builds on the vast amount of historical work done on ZANU-PF, Zimbabwean liberation and nationalist politics through different varieties of its political history. These varieties of Zimbabwe’s political history were products of their political moments and are used as the compass to map the historical antecedents to ZANU-PF campaigns in the 2008 and 2013 elections.

The chapter explicitly makes two main arguments. First, it argues that tracing ZANU-PF’s authoritarian tendencies to the guerrilla war is selective, and while compelling, is also inadvertently incomplete and dishonest. The chapter argues for and provides a deeper history that goes back to the genesis of the nationalist

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8 This refers to “Nationalist Historiography” - history in service of nationalism, as the first variety of Zimbabwe’s political history. The second is “The history of the nation and nationalism”: a post-independence variant of historical and political analysis that critiqued the first variety and presented a more balanced account of history through highlighting the darker aspects of ZANU-PF and its armed wings, missing voices beyond elites, and other organizations that were also part of the liberation struggle. This chapter focuses on these two varieties, but there is a third and possibly a fourth which the next chapter and the rest of the thesis touch on. The third variety is “Patriotic History”: a hagiographic and convoluted reconstruction of history as told by ZANU-PF for political experience and instrumental purposes. A fourth variety is a set of more recent histories that have sought to explain the rapid political developments of the late ‘90s and early 2000s. This can be divided into two parts. First, liberal internationalist critiques of the ZANU-PF state which focused on its excesses and authoritarianism. Second, nationalist intellectual averments which sought to rationalize the Zimbabwean crisis as the continuation of a radical national democratic revolution, thus justifying ZANU-PF’s authoritarian nationalism as the necessary pangs of this continuing revolution.
movement and ZANU’s predecessor organisations and parties, thus covering the extant politics, organisation, cultures, and personalities of key actors who would lead ZANU post 1963 and ZANU-PF post 1987. Second, the chapter argues that the ZANU-PF origin story is a complex mix of a politics of democratic aspiration and mass-based politics mixed with nascent violence and a polarisation subculture. It argues that these founding ingredients, perhaps even more than the guerrilla war, account not just for ZANU-PF’s coercive politics, but also its competitive authoritarian nature.

Allied to the above point and building on Cliffe (1980) and Moore (1991), the chapter argues that ZANU was a broad church of sometimes contradictory interests, which during the struggle for independence spawned several “generations” of leadership and supporters. It expands on Cliffe’s “generations” argument by extending its logic to ZANU-PF in its post-2000 form. Since 1987 ZANU-PF not only carried these multiple generations which differed in age, ideology, military training, war experience and forms of politics, but also another set of “generations” from its liberation war counterpart-cum-foe, Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), and its armed wing, ZIPRA. The complexity and diversity of ZANU-PF’s post-2000 political settlement, the chapter argues, have produced an authoritarian politics that neighbour’s democratic contestation.

The chapter argues that the two points made above were manifest throughout ZANU’s pre-independence existence and render the debate on ZANU’s historical popular support inconclusive. The background provided in this chapter offers a possible explanation of the contradictions inherent in ZANU-PF’s broad church and other parties like it. It suggests that while the origins of ZANU-PF were democratic and popular, later events infused the party with a violent and coercive politics. This helps explain their intractable competitive authoritarian disposition that makes it a hybrid regime and illuminates our understanding of why it campaigns in the way it does.

The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 briefly explains why historically based political explanations are important in the Zimbabwean

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9 The party only became ZANU-PF in 1980 at election. PF, Patriotic Front had been the joint moniker under which ZANU and ZAPU had negotiated at the independence talks at Lancaster House in London (1979) and its adoption was also meant to differentiate it from ZANU (Ndonga) a splinter of the party which founding ZANU president Ndabaningi Sithole ran. At the 1979 Internal Settlement elections and 1980 independence election, Sithole had registered his party as ZANU. The moniker stuck in 1987 when ZANU and ZAPU merged.
context. It locates this importance in contestations over this history, as well as ZANU-PF’s instrumentalization of it during electoral campaigns as an appeal and claim to legitimacy. Section 4.2 focuses on ZANU’s origins, tracing its formation as a breakaway party from ZAPU, the motivations for its formation, and its founding vision. It leverages what its leaders articulated, the reasons given for the split, and the intellectual positions of the leadership to argue that it was founded on a mass popular base on account of the popular nature of the grievances it sought to address. It also highlights ZANU’s early efforts at organisation building. In the same section, the chapter covers ZANU’s predecessor movements and organisations and argues that part of its founding character was borrowed from these movements and their struggles. Section 4.3. Traces ZANU-PF’s roots to its precursor movements. It spotlights a few of the major predecessor movements and highlights that even in the early days of nationalism, a violent sub-culture was emerging. covers ZANU-PF during the guerrilla war and extends the conversation on its coercive politics and the debate on popular support. Section 4.4 focuses on ZANU’s pre-independence party structures which ZANU-PF transitioned into post-Independence Zimbabwe with. Section 4.5 is the last substantive section. It looks at ZANU-PF’s electoral dominance after independence up to 2000 as part of the background to this study’s elections of interest.

4.1 The Importance Of Political History To Understandings And Explanations Of ZANU-PF

Terence Ranger, one of the most prominent historians on Zimbabwe, remarked in a 2004 article, that while history is often relegated as an area of study and circumstance in other places in Africa, in Zimbabwe, history, did not only seem to matter, but was enormously important (Ranger, 2004:217). Ranger rightfully located some of the post-2000 political dynamics in Zimbabwe as a struggle over the past because liberation war and contemporary history in Zimbabwe is a viciously contested terrain. Part of the importance of history in Zimbabwe stems from the fact that a significant amount of scholarship on Zimbabwe traces ZANU-PF’s authoritarian tendencies to its past. This approach has a rich heritage in politics and follows the thinking of Hyden (2006) and his movement legacy thesis, and was earlier captured by Leys and Saul (1994) who, writing on Namibia, suggested that ‘the very process of struggling for liberation, especially by resort to force of arms, may generate political practices that prefigure undemocratic outcomes in the wake of revolutionary success” (Leys & Saul,

Leys and Saul’s (1994) was a legitimate suggestion, and the points made by the Zimbabwe-specific scholarship are quite correct, with the cited studies representing some of the better articulations of this argument. However, as Radcliffe-Brown (1935) suggested, “one ‘explanation’ of a social system will be its history, where we know the detailed account of how it came to be, what it is and where it is. Another ‘explanation’ of the same system is obtained by showing what it is and does” (Radcliffe-Brown, 1935: 401). Part of the broad argument this thesis makes is that popular scholarship on ZANU-PF’s strategies focuses inordinately on the first source of explanation, i.e. the history. In doing so, it misses some critical elements of the second form of explanation, i.e. what it is and what it does. So, while history is important, a significant amount of analysis is informed by ZANU-PF’s pre-independence existence as a guerrilla movement and argues that it hasn’t changed. This thesis finds this approach inadequate for two primary reasons.

First, it selectively periodises ZANU-PF’s history to a late pre-independence period when the war period, which was sporadic until escalation in the mid-1970s (Alexander & MacGregor, 2004), rather than holistically looking back at where the party came from. Doran (2017:1) rightfully points out that many Zimbabwean observers wrongly see Zimbabwe’s modern history as defined by two defining periods, i.e. “The civil war of the 1960s and 1970s” and “the decade and half since 2000 during which land has been expropriated.” Doran (2017) makes a case for the importance of the period 1980-87 as a defining period which the literature has neglected, yet it is during this period that ZANU sought to impose its vision on the new state through implementing its pre-independence aims. Doran (2017) is justified, and I follow suit in this thesis, by arguing that the initial period need not be about the “civil war of the 1960s and 70s” but should go to the period prior to the so-called civil war, at least to the mid-1950s where most scholar agree the nationalist movement began to find its feet.

Second, while there is value in historically grounded explanations, the major focus on ZANU-PF’s often subsumes some changes that constitute and may explain better ZANU-PF’s contemporary conduct. In addition, some of this
history and associated arguments fall into the trap of considering ZANU-PF history to be the history of ZANU, yet ZANU-PF is an institution that post-1987 could count amongst its number, not just members from ZANU’s political leadership, nationalist struggles and armed wing Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army ZANLA, but also the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and its ex-combatants from the Zimbabwe Peoples Liberation Army (ZIPRA). Both the parties and the armed wings diverged in political approach and military execution, and this diversity is often missed in analysis and historical recounting that stresses the ZANU elements in understanding ZANU-PF.

History and historically informed political explanations of ZANU-PF are also important in Zimbabwe because of ZANU-PF’s use of (its) political history. The use and abuse of history, as well as its contestation in Zimbabwe is encapsulated in a variety of academic, journalistic, and political articulations spawning several varieties of pre- and post-independence nationalist struggle history which this chapter reviews in the next section. ZANU-PF has sophisticatedly used political history as a claim to legitimacy. As this thesis will show, it consistently made historical appeals as part of its persuasive arsenal to win the hearts and minds of voters. However, more than just being a claim to legitimacy, this thesis argues it was also an articulation of performance legitimacy as part of ZANU-PF’s efforts to gain consent to govern with(in) the legal-rational tradition and political legitimacy.

4.2 The Origin & Formation Of ZANU

The formation of ZANU was officially announced on 8 August 1963 as a breakaway party from ZAPU, in the founding presidents’ words, closing a chapter on “evasive, short sighted and elusive leadership” (Sithole, 1963 cited in Doran, 2017). Robert Mugabe, ZANU’s founding secretary general and former ZAPU secretary for information and publicity, in an interview with the Herald newspaper in 1983, reflected on ZANU’s formation and stated that the official reason for the breakaway was:

Because of disagreements as to the direction the leadership was giving, some of us decided that a change of leadership was desirable … [but] Nkomo quickly suspended those of us who were thinking along those lines, and we had no alternative but to quit and form ZANU (Mugabe, cited Doran, 2017)
In addition to general leadership challenges as averred by Sithole and Mugabe, the break-away from ZAPU, which was then led by veteran nationalist Joshua Nkomo, also followed some concrete strategic and “tribal” disagreements amongst the leadership of ZAPU (Moore, 1991; Sithole, 1979). The biggest of these strategic challenges emanated from Nkomo’s thoughts on establishing a government in exile in response to the increasingly repressive white settler regime of the Rhodesian Front, while others on his national executive, like Mugabe and ZAPU’s external Affairs secretary, Leopold Takawira, felt that “the credibility of the executive depended on a preparedness to remain in Southern Rhodesia, showing loyalty to the party’s followers.” (Doran, 2017). In addition, these other ZAPU leaders argued that Joshua Nkomo was spending too much time seeking foreign support instead of building a domestic revolutionary liberation movement with a mass popular base (Kriger, 1992; Riley, 1982). According to Riley (1982), ZANU’s founding fathers set up the party as an anti-colonial, pan-African, and socialist movement intent on direct confrontation with the Rhodesian state. Despite Mugabe’s clarity in 1983 on why ZANU was formed, some accounts suggest Mugabe was ambivalent and stayed loyal to ZAPU longer than some of his other colleagues. According to Mazarire (2017) and Riley (1982) Mugabe was initially retained as ZAPU secretary for publicity and was elected as ZANU Secretary General in absentia, a bigger post that is argued to have finally convinced him to cast his lot with ZANU rather than with ZAPU.

There is very little dispute regarding the above framing of ZANU’s origin story, 1963 and its events, including Nkomo’s denouncing in May 1963 of 11 members of his national executive for “nicodemously” plotting to form a new party, and the suspension of Mugabe, Takawira and Sithole whom he fingered as ring leaders (Doran, 2017). However, as KTC2711, a 67-year-old former ZANLA combatant and ZANU-PF member who later became an opposition strategist, minded me, we need to:

[g]o back to what exactly is ZANU PF? Where did it come from? How did it come to be? If we miss that, we miss a lot of things. That is why in Shona culture when we ask you for your name, and you say Lewanika, we ask you for your totem, and your original home, which is your rural home. We ask for your totem and rural home because that is your source, and from it, there are things intrinsic to you on account of your source that we will not understand without knowing this. So that is what you also need to do with ZANU-PF (KTC2711-Interview, 2017).
In respect of the advice from KTC2711, the preceding narrative on ZANU’s formation shows us the two primary terrains on which the nationalist movement was waging its struggle, i.e. the home front, through building mass support, and the international front, through a campaign of diplomacy. At this point, the war front (which would gradually become the main terrain of the struggle for liberation after 1972), had not yet emerged as a strategic terrain, although, as Doran (2017) shows, consideration on it in ZAPU had begun to be made in the early 1960s. It also gives us the immediate reason(s) for ZANU’s formation, summed up as: (1.) leadership division over the need to expand ZAPU’s popular base, entrenching its local presence through present leaders who led from the front, and engaged in more direct confrontation with the Rhodesian Front (RF) regime, as opposed to (2.) the diplomatic and symbolic actions meant to place reputational pressure on the Rhodesian state which ZAPU president Nkomo preferred.

Hence, ZANU’s origins were in part based on mass politics and mobilisation before the more violent and coercive elements that could have been corollaries of waging a guerrilla war for independence against a settler state. KTC2711 corroborated the above and shared that as far he could recall,

ZANU was a national nationalist political party formed to fight for independence or against colonisation. It emerged with a national character from birth, due to the national nature of the grievance it sought to address. … It is a party that emerges from national grievance, a national outcry for independence from colonial rule. Both ZANU and ZAPU which are now one, came from the National Democratic Party, so the politics that informs the formations of ZANU and ZAPU were the politics of democratisation, liberation, and self-determination. No one is against self-determination. So, it enjoyed a mass base from the onset on account of the agenda that it sought to address. (KTC2711-Interview, 2017)

While its base could be grown, as Mugabe and others were intent on in the last days of a unified ZAPU and early days of ZANU formation, ZANU appears to have been formed with fairly high mass appeal as a party, or at least with expectations of mass appeal. This was despite the fact that at ZANU’s formation ZAPU still enjoyed the lion’s share of ‘popular support’, until ZANU established rear bases in Mozambique in the 1970s. Besides being bestowed this mass character by virtue of the grievances it sought to address, Doran (2017) also shows how, unlike other breakaway nationalist parties, which were crushed
through vilification and accusations of wanting to split the liberation movement, ZANU survived. That it did so was a testament not just to the leadership that founded it but also because it had genuine supporters on the ground who could withstand vilification and even physical attacks from ZAPU cadres. In addition, its founder’s preference for domestic organising, as well as a commitment to escalating the political struggle to armed struggle, were popular positions that were able to win people’s imaginations of which movement could take the people across the finishing line of decolonisation. In part this entailed building that popular base and winning the hearts and minds of people on the ground – something, that Doran (2017) notes, Nkomo was left with no choice but to do likewise. The result was the rapid development and cultivation of popular appeal especially in the urban areas and townships of Rhodesia of both political parties.

The possibility of waging an armed struggle was also part of the calculus of both parties which constitute ZANU-PF today, and is part of what elevated Mugabe and led to the deposition of Ndabaningi Sithole whose commitment to the war, his national executive now doubted. It is clear that the aspiration to extend the battlefield from the political to include military action was achieved on account of the formation of ZANLA and ZIPRA, and the onset of guerrilla war in the late 1960s which the next section covers. However, as argued above, ZANU, its founding leadership and the general nationalist leadership were initially more intent on less violent or radical means of attaining independence. It appears the escalation to the bush war was as a result of the failure of the politics of engagement, and limitations of the politics of mass mobilisation and civic disobedience, especially in light of the incessant proscription of African nationalist parties and detention and restriction of the leaders. These origins have important bearings on the institutional character of ZANU ever since.

In 1960, a young Nathan Shamuyarira, who would go on to become a high ranking member and spokesperson of ZANU as well as Minister of Information and Foreign Affairs, viewed nationalism’s potential turn to violence and armed struggle as a failure of the British government to act decisively in regard to decolonization and its abandonment of moderate African leadership (the intellectuals) (cited in Moore, 1991). The loss of reformist African leaders, he argued in his article entitled “‘Revolt of the intellectuals: eggheads join NDP”, would inevitably see the rise of more radical men who had the possibilities of leaning “east” towards socialist states. Saul (1979) shared some of Shamuyarira’s
understanding of the calibre of the nationalist leaders who were emerging, which I critically expand on in the next section. Regarding ZANU’s formation via split from ZAPU, Saul argued that it was a “confrontation between a faction of educated middle class, rather elitist elements who joined the nationalist movement in the early sixties” versus “populists from the mid-1950s” whom he argued had “much firmer roots among migrant workers and the peasantry itself” (Saul, 1979:112).

I argue that understanding the founding of ZANU as a mass movement, albeit, led by a leadership that some admired for being educated and others condemned for being elitist, can assist us in understanding why ZANU-PF continues to placate, nourish, pander to, as well as manipulate this mass base. It can also aid our understanding of why it has been important for ZANU-PF to engage in polemics against the opposition and the West, and why ideology, its articulation and winning the political debate appears to matter to ZANU-PF today despite its other violent and coercive characteristics. The base referred to above was, in the main, rural areas where nationalism’s roots lay in people’s violent opposition to the Land Husbandry Act & Land Apportionment Acts, which had robbed many people of their cattle and their land. This was central to the early days of nationalism in the 1950s.

In addition, rural areas as a base were central by virtue of demographics and Zimbabwean culture. For most people, cities and towns were places of work. “Everyone” came from a rural place, which is what most referred to as home. Rural Zimbabwe, in this sense, is ZANU-PF’s symbolic original home, and whether it goes to look for allies in the “East”, seek “rapprochement with the “West”, or pays lip service to urbanites, it still returns to its base, during elections, to fortify and retain its mandate from those who gave it in the first instance. As KTC2711 put it, for ZANU to remain relevant at whatever stage in its organisational life, it had to address its roots – the mass base. This, he suggested was part of why it campaigned – to nurture its political base and regain its own sense of identity. (KTC2711-Interview, 2017).

KTC2711’s reference to a mass base and roots referred to rural Zimbabwe. In both pre- and post-Independent periods, Zimbabwe retained most of its population in rural areas. Returning to his roots analogy, KTC2711 equated the life of ZANU and its constant return to its base to the life of an ordinary
A Zimbabwean who is a resident in the city, but who religiously sends plough heads and seeds back to his parents in the rural areas. This child also builds a house at the rural homestead, in which he perhaps sleeps once in 5 years. All this, the son does to stay in touch with his base, to remain rooted and relevant, remain ‘themselves,’ because if they neglected their roots, they would be no longer themselves but something else (KTC2711-Interview, 2017).

The above analogy suggested that ZANU-PF just doesn’t campaign to win elections, but also to remain relevant to the key constituency, the rural mass, that brought its political agenda into being. Moyo (1992) argues a similar point to explain why despite considerable doubt on its ability to implement it, ZANU-PF removed the moratorium on land allocation and repossession in 1990 through a constitutional amendment that allowed it to acquire both utilised and unutilised land with “fair” compensation. This step was critical considering the struggles against the land apportionment and land husbandry acts referenced above. As Moyo reported:

Some informed observers wonder to what extent, if at all, ZANU-PF intends to implement what is really a political statement designed to remind all concerned that the peasants form the social base of the ruling party, and that they need to see (or, at least, to hear) that something is being done about their demand for more land if the present national leaders are to maintain their legitimacy (Moyo, 1992: 321).

Moyo noted that given the social origins of the ZANU-PF government and reservations on the initial moratorium on land acquisition from the 1979, Lancaster House agreement, “At long last, the peasants, who are pressing for more and better land, have the constitution supporting their political demands, at least symbolically” (Moyo, 1992:321). However, despite attempts to placate and appease the social base, evidence, as will be shown later in this chapter and elsewhere in the thesis, suggests that ZANU-PF is unlike the child in KTC2711’s analogy. ZANU-PF has used coercion, manipulation, and intimidation as part of its political toolkit. This in part raises the contradiction that forms part of this thesis’ puzzle. For KTC2711, however, there is no contradiction because, for ZANU-PF

 campaigning is still important because today you rule at the will of the people. Whether that will be coerced or otherwise. The will has to be there, how it is secured is another question, if the people agree that we [ZANU-PF] are the ones who are in power (KTC2711-Interview, 2017).
The preceding demonstrates the complexity of ZANU’s story and of ZANU-PF, the party. While I argue that its violent element is emphasised to the extent of blinding analysis to other elements, the reality is that violence and coercion are part of the ZANU-PF story. These were not just part of the ZANU-PF story from its days in the bush, but also part of its constitutive process at formation. This, as I expand on below, was due to the existence in the African nationalist movement, in the late 1950s and 1960s, of a violent subculture.

KTC2711’s initial injunction cited at the top of this section advises a slightly deeper revisiting of ZANU-PF’s history, to get and provide a sounder genetic explanation thereof of why ZANU-PF operates the way it does over 50 years after its formation. In doing this the study then presents a slightly more complex picture of ZANU-PF’s “totem” and “original home” as suggested by KTC2711, as these origins help provide a slightly better historically based political explanation of why ZANU-PF competes (even in a pseudo-competitive ways) in elections by campaigning. The next section looks at ZANU’s predecessor organisations before moving onto the onset and analysis of historical accounts of the liberation struggle as waged through the guerrilla war.

4.3 ZANU’s Precursor Movements & The Emergence Of A Violence Sub-Culture

Rodwin (1979) rightfully suggests that it is difficult to place a date of birth on the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe, but one can trace the precursor or predecessor movements and parties to ZANU-PF to as far back as 1934 when the Rhodesia version of the African National Congress was initially founded. In this section, the chapter traces the origins of ZANU to at least the mid-1950s, which a significant amount of scholarship agrees is when Zimbabwe’s African nationalism came into its element (Mlambo, 2014; Moore, 1991; Sithole, 1979; Riley, 1982; Rodwin, 1979, amongst others).

ZAPU, from which ZANU split, had been formed in 1961 as the successor party to various nationalist formations which the Rhodesian government had banned. With each ban, the African nationalists created a new party but retained, in the main, the same agenda and leadership. It is this consistency of agenda and leadership that makes ZANU’s predecessor movements and parties important to quickly review, as similar casts of actors recurred in the different party formation and dissolution episode prior to 1963. The predecessor parties included the
African National Congress (ANC) of 1948, the City Youth League (CYL) of 1955, the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC) of 1957, which Moore (1991) argues was the beginning of modern Zimbabwean nationalism through a merger of the moderate (ANC) and militants (CYL). ZAPU’s immediate predecessor was the National Democratic Party (NDP) of 1960, which was founded after the SRANC was banned in 1958.

Joshua Nkomo was the president of the SRANC and the successive NDP. Between these organisations, a significant number of Nkomo’s SRANC executive were retained in the leadership of the NDP. Robert Mugabe later joined the NDP in 1960 as its publicity secretary. When the NDP was banned in December 1961, ZAPU was formed to take its place later that same month. Joshua Nkomo again became its president, Ndabaningi Sithole became its national treasurer and chairman, Mugabe became its secretary for publicity, and a significant number of the NDP leadership were retained in the ZAPU executive. ZAPU was banned in 1962 and split in 1963, with ZANU becoming a separate entity under the leadership of Ndabaningi Sithole. Because the Rhodesian government had proscribed ZAPU, Nkomo and those who remained resolved not form a new party, but to stay independent as ZAPU. Instead they resolved to form an association, the People’s Caretaker Council (PCC), for above ground operations. The PCC became ZAPU’s effective operational counter to ZANU for some time.

These predecessor formations to ZANU, like most nationalist movements in Africa at that time, embodied some form of black pride and sought the representation of the black majority by radically reforming the colonial political system. They protested, lobbied at home and abroad, and organised in urban and rural areas for the extension of the franchise to the black majority and its just weight in governance through the slogan of ‘One Man, One Vote’, but with limited serious militancy and ideological grounding. A renowned leader of Zimbabwe’s liberation war veterans and former ZIPRA combatant, SJ1212, characterised the foundation stones of the liberation and nationalist movement as follows:

The politics in the 1960s, 50s, even 30s was simple. It was for independence of the black man from a foreign white rule. Because of that, there were no ideologies. People just wanted to be free. What to do with that freedom was something else (SJ1212-Interview, 2017).
Speaking on the character of the leadership that emerged to lead these movements, SJ1212 painted a picture that is similar to the leadership that emerged from almost everywhere else in Africa. The leading personnel came from colleges and religious mission schools, and “their leadership skills and approach were initially products of that socialisation in terms of how they looked at an African and how they wanted to develop that African” (SJ1212-Interview, 2017).

A cursory look at the leading personnel in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle proved SJ1212’s point as many nationalists fit this description, in addition to having further education abroad in South Africa and the United States amongst other places. Doran (2017) remarked how, on returning to Rhodesia in 1948, Nkomo was elected to lead as president of the Railway Employees Association reflecting a “hunger amongst Africans for educated organisers” (Doran, 2017:306). Shamuyarira celebrated intellectuals joining the NDP. 10 Shamuyarira, himself a Princeton educated journalist wrote:

The voices of these men will be dominant in the organisation, curbing feelings of violence where they existed, and bringing home the realisation of that the struggle is a moral, not physical one. Such moderation should be tremendously reassuring to those Europeans and Indians who fear for their future and their property. Edgar Whitehead [Rhodesian prime minister] could not afford to ignore the opinion of the cream of African society. He could no longer say that the nationalists were non-working spies, who had made thuggery and intimidation the law in African townships…it will not be easy to accuse names well established in the professions of self-seeking thuggery” (Shamuyarira, 1960, cited in Moore 1991: 487).

Although the struggle for Zimbabwe’s independence became more radical and militant in the 1970s, SJ1212’s sentiments and Shamuyarira’s celebration suggest that the nationalist movement and ZANU’s foundation stones were fairly moderate and steeped in a basic democratic thesis centred around franchise and reasoned debate. Shamuyarira stresses this point in 1960 that the struggle is not amongst other things “physical”, and that the voices of educated elites would curb “feelings of violence where they existed” (Moore, 1991). This moderation, appeal to reason, and engagement are well captured in Joshua Nkomo’s sentiments, on

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10 These included Herbert Chitepo (later ZANU Founding Chairperson and definitive leader between 1964 and 1975), Ndabaningi Sithole (later ZANU founding President), Dr. Bernard Chidzero later Minister of Finance in Independent Zimbabwe, and Robert Mugabe (later ZANU First secretary, President and independent Zimbabwe’s first prime minister and head of state).
reflection, of the usefulness of the SRANC which the NDP succeeded. Nkomo remarked that it was “a ‘weak organisation’ that could do little more than listen to grievances and petition the authorities on them (cited in Doran, 2017:306). SRANC is not the only organisation that fit this bill. Charles Mzingeli’s Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (RICU) which was dominant in township politics in the 1950s pursued modest aims like black peoples’ access to the city centre, and advocated for blacks to attain more education. The latter was sponsored so that the black men could “obtain greater respect so that they could in turn make greater claims to an imperial working-class citizenship” (Scarnecchia, 2008). The CYL, which was amongst the more radical of the 1950s movements, had emerged initially out of the frustration that young urban black men felt left out of opportunities availed to ‘educated’ Africans then under racial partnership in the 1950s (Karekwaivanane, 2017).

In addition, Shamuyarira’s emphasis on the credibility of leaders and “names well established in the professions” spoke to the character of the nationalist movement at that time. A movement, which Karekwaivenane (2017) shows in the 1950s and 1960s, was heavily reliant on the law, from which it borrowed “both language and locale for debates between Africans and the settler authorities over the political questions that were vexing the Rhodesian body politic” (Karekwaivanane, 2017:2). He shows how African Nationalists like Joshua Nkomo, Herbet Chitepo and others were able to utilise the courts to great political effect as stages upon which they could articulate their causes, and expose the ridiculousness of the efforts at repression of the Rhodesian establishment. He also shows how the CYL was able to oppose the Land Husbandry Act through supporting public interest cases by villagers to sue local authorities (Karekwaivanane, 2017:81-111).

The above is not to suggest that this emphasis on reasoned discourse and the use of legal language was itself democratic or nonviolent. As already conceded, there was a violent subculture that was already existent in the nationalist movement, where organisations would at times confront each other violently to hold monopoly claims of representing the black Rhodesians. In addition, the law, for the long period during the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe, was used by the state to quash nationalism. This is clear from the use of bans demonstrated above, and later in the 1960s, of detentions, clamp-down on protests, and eventually criminalisation of nationalist organisations, and parties.
Karekwaivenane (2017:6) argues that besides the symbolic and constitutive powers of the law, there also was an intimate relationship between it and violence, which was simultaneously repressive and productive as well as coercive and constitutive. A review of the historical record shows a clear pattern of escalation regarding how the Rhodesian state instrumentalised the law, as did the nationalist movement too for its own political showmanship and purpose, until the state got fed up and upped the ante. The reasons for the state’s frustration included an embarrassment and irritation “at the fact that nationalists had become sufficiently knowledgeable of the legal system that they could use it to frustrate government designs” (Karekwaivanane, 2017). This was coupled with the rise of a rightwing ultra-racist regime in the form of Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front which came to power in 1963 promising a tougher hand on black dissent and championing the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 (Riley, 1982). As prominent ZANU-PF leader Edisson Zvobgo would admit later in post-Independence Zimbabwe, “The Rhodesian Front of Ian Smith plunged us into war” (Zvobgo cited in Laakso, 1999). How the Rhodesia Front plunged ZANU-PF into war was eloquently summarised by Sachikonye (2004:14) as follows:

A conventional nationalist movement, which arose in the 1950s, was confronted by an obdurate white minority regime that refused to concede independence but instead went on unilaterally to declare independence in 1965. The regime used repressive means to try to contain African nationalism but was ultimately unsuccessful. The nationalist movement then mutated into a liberation movement that grew in strength and spread its tentacles in the 1970s and subsequently forced the minority regime to the negotiating table (Sachikonye, 2004:14).

The above pages have shown, some of ZANU’s precursor movements were mass-driven parties and organisations which were at times fairly moderate. Even the radical variants did not seriously set about organising an armed struggle until after 1965. ZANU’s genesis starts with these movements and parties. Their politics was not always clean and they fought against each other, but these fights were often rooted in monopoly claims to represent the people, and a tendency towards polarisation. As Mlambo (2014:148) argues the rivalries in the nationalist movements were intense and political intolerance and polarisation turned parties against each other and presaged a cycle of political violence between the two main movements during the liberation struggle and after independence.
The armed struggle literally meant that by the late 1970s there were two armies fighting for liberation, whose parties were rivals. Both the monopoly claims to representing the people and polarisation are characteristics of ZANU-PF and general politics of representation in Zimbabwe that persist to day. The former is an integral part of the patriotic history discourse, whose segregation of citizens into “patriots” and “sell outs” is also part of a culture of the latter polarisation.

As LeBas & Munemo (2019) show, polarisation has endured amongst parties and political elites in post-independence Zimbabwe, coming to a head first in the 1980s between ZANU and ZAPU, and later post-2000 between ZANU-PF and the MDC. Nevertheless, Doran (2017) extensively covers the violent and coercive elements of early nationalism prior to the onset of the liberation war. He covers the PCC/ZAPU and ZANU polarisation and inter-party skirmishes in Highfields after the formation of ZANU in 1963. In addition, evidence abounds of how the City Youth League, saw it fit to intimidate RICU, including beating its leaders to monopolise the black people’s representational space in urban areas prior to the existence of ZAPU and ZANU (Doran, 2017; Raftopoulos, 1995; Karekwaivanane, 2017).

The above supports my argument that when looking into ZANU-PF history as explanation for its modern day modus operandi, a deep dive is in order. As the above paragraph shows, doing so does not negate the analysis around the existence of violence as part of ZANU culture pre-independence. It shows that contrary to most analysis and narratives, this was not founded during the war years, but was part of the toxic culture even as the nationalist movement was coming into being. As Scarnecchia (2008) shows, the nationalist ‘sell-out’ discourse, which was used to justify violently targeting political opponents during the war of liberation and in post-independence Zimbabwe emerged in the late 1950s. The violent roots of ZANU-PF can thus be established without resort to selective periodisation, because they were present, at founding, in the two parties that constitute ZANU-PF today, and in some of their predecessor organisations.

Outside intra-party skirmishes, the violence that nationalists were accused of by the state was often civil disobedience which is not so different than what a lot of so-called pro-democracy movements engage in today, with ZANU-PF applying remarkably similar laws and policing instruments to the Rhodesian ones to deal with them too. I also argue that the closing of the limited space for democratic
contestation which Ian Smith’s government championed, strengthened the hand of a radical flank in the nationalist movement which had always thought that the Rhodesians needed to be fought through arms. This was exacerbated by the incarceration of almost the entirety of nationalist leaders across ZAPU, PCC and ZANU who were in Rhodesia in the mid-60s. This left leadership to their exiled and external colleagues. It also made the guerrilla war inevitabile, perhaps in part, as Shamuyarira had thought, without the moderating influence of a lot of the learned men whose entry into politics, he had praised. The guerrilla war then started modestly in the mid-1960s as a sabotage campaign, involving a few cadres to convince the whites to grant majority-rule to the Zimbabwean people (Raftopoulos & Mlambo, 2008; Mlambo, 2014; Seegers, 1983; Riley, 1982).

This is the background to ZANU formation, and the background informing ZANU’s predecessor movements, in whose ranks its old guard and founders had plied their political trade as leaders. However, it is the onset of and experiences during the guerrilla war that most analyses base their historical explanations of contemporary ZANU-PF. The next section reviews part of this narrative and the challenges with this approach to understanding ZANU-PF.

4.4 Violence and Popular Support Within the Limited Frame of the Guerrilla War

Levitsky and Way (2012) argue that ZANU-PF endured in power because it possessed strong identities and post-material ideological solidarity ties generated during the collective colonial experience of violence (Levitsky & Way, 2012:874-876). In arguing that ZANU-PF’s coercive politics, choice of methods, and claims to legitimacy lie in its history, Levitsky & Way (2012) are joined by a plethora of scholars (e.g. Sithole and Makumbe, 1997; Bratton and Masunungure, 2008; Kriger, 2005; Sachikonye, 2011). In the main, these scholars trace ZANU-PF’s coercive politics to its colonial existence and the legacy that this bestowed on the post liberation party and governments (see Leys & Saul, 1994:146; Hyden, 2006). Hyden (2006) termed this the “movement legacy” of symbolic power of the collective experience of colonialism.

However, Hyden (2006) notes the differentiated impact of the movement legacy depending whether the pre-independence movement was a wholly nationalist movement or a liberation war movement, which he argues qualify as even more representative of the movement legacy than the nationalist movements that were
rewarded with political victory without physical struggle. Given this differentiation, ZANU-PF would qualify as a Liberation movement given its turn to arms in the late 1960s and 1970s. It had to operate from exile, often in underground conditions without the same access to the majority of the population as the nationalist movements elsewhere had, or as it initially had to openly campaign for independence. This, Hyden (2006) argues, imbued liberation movements with a legacy of secrecy, relying on military means to achieve their objectives, coming to power by way of the barrel of a gun, with attendant post-liberation complications on norm compliance, transparency and respect for human rights, and failing to transcend the military component of the movement legacy.

Bhebhe & Ranger (2003) concur with this line of argument, and note that African nationalism in Zimbabwe was hegemonic, intolerant of diversity, criticism, and dissent, as well as sweeping in what it claimed and annihilatory in what it rejected. On this wisdom, the violent methods that ZANU-PF used to safeguard its power post-1980 have their roots in the pre-independence liberation war, and the violence ZIPRA and ZANLA forces were subjected to by the Rhodesian forces in combat and by the coercion they may have had to institute to galvanise support amongst the masses in rural areas. As Kriger (1992) shows rural participation in the war of liberation was not always positively induced. Some peasants, for instance, did not readily support ZANU and ZANLA out of fear of reprisals from the Rhodesian forces, but had to support it paradoxically also out of fear of reprisals from guerrilla forces, who did not tolerate “sell outs” (Masunungure, 2009: 42; Sachikonye, 2011). As Kriger (1992: 27) notes, to mobilise a nationalist consciousness in the rural areas, the guerrillas often utilised coercion rather than persuasion. Firstly, due to the constraints on time for careful mobilisation, but also secondly, because the rural population had various generational, status and community cleavages. For instance, Kriger notes how the youth were generally supportive of the struggle, while some peasants were not because of the fear mentioned above, as well as the material deprivation that supporting the guerrillas led to (Kriger, 1992). The variation in reasons for guerrilla support show that the incentive structure was not made up of homogenous factors, and that both positive and negative sanctions resulted in “support”.
The above analysis is correct and not disputed by members of ZANU-PF and former liberation combatants today. They accept ZANU-PF’s characterisation as violent, but clawback on being called authoritarian because it is a “Western” interpretation. In the patriotic history formulation non-Westerners who use the characterisation and the labelling of ZANU-PF as authoritarian rather than revolutionary fall into the category of Western handmaidens and imperialist lapdogs. As MB0704, a former government minister and ZANU-PF spokesperson during the 2008 election, remarked at the beginning of an interview for this study,

when I saw your topic [Why do competitive authoritarian regimes campaign?], I was not offended because I was in the West and I understand their thinking, so I quite understand where you are coming from (MB0704-Interview, 2018).

I was coming from London and was possibly lumped in MB0704’s head as a lapdog, coming with labels received from his imperialist masters. But secondly, MB0704 accepted the characterisation of ZANU-PF as violent with justifications, arguing that the brutality of the colonial regime could only be met with, and also ensured by the brutality of the liberation movement. According to MB0704,

The background to ZANU-PF or ZANU is that it was a guerrilla movement fighting a system that was oppressive, and that was evil. That was the white settler regime that occupied Zimbabwe for a century. Blacks were never allowed to vote, so really it was the white man, the Indians, and dogs in that order. It was that bitterness from ZANU’s perspective that when dealing with the white man you have to be firm. Our grandfathers experienced the ruthlessness of the white minority. They used all derogatory terms on blacks, so this is where we were coming from resulting in the emergence of the 1st Chimurenga and the 2nd Chimurenga which some of us participated in. You have this evil white man presented. So, when you see evil, how else do you fight it except through ways it understands. Besides, we believed that the only good white man was a dead white man (MB0704-Interview, 2018).

This narrative was supported by other respondents, like former soldier and ZIPRA combatant, MI1312, who agreed that the coercive elements of ZANU-PF were throwbacks from the liberation struggle, but also ‘normal’ and a function of necessity to safeguard the gains of liberation. MI1312 argued that,

Because we attained our liberation through the barrel of the gun, it creates that coerciveness. The fact that you will have been forced to change your attitude, that you have to be a revolutionary, you have to fight, go through
tough terrains, and so on. Now when you are there, Independent, the economy is not doing well, people are becoming very lazy, you start thinking of forcing them….In democracy, there are many things that are to be considered and if you are revolutionary and you think that if you consider all of them, and lose elections, what will happen?(MI1312-Interview, 2017).

The above statements by MB0704 and MI1312, capture the characterization of ZANU-PF that is predominant in the post-2000 liberal scholarship and popular imaginary, both as critique and justification. However, as Dorman (2006) reminded us, despite incessant references to attaining freedoms through the barrel of a gun, Zimbabwe actually attained freedom through a negotiated settlement. And MI1312’s allusions to coercion being part of the everyday political culture of former liberation movements needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. It is again one of those things that are easier said, but Zimbabwe’s near neighbours like Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique are all presided over by former liberation movements without the loud outcries around coercion that Zimbabwe has often attracted.

While the guerrilla struggle had indeed initially been a modest insurgent sabotage campaign, in which “guerrillas who infiltrated Rhodesia from 1966 to 1971 were annihilated by the Rhodesian army”, it still would have taken a toll on the liberation movement and would have been met by both a sense of profound loss, anger and a hunger for revenge (Mlambo, 2014:162). As Kriger (1992:153) points out, from the perspectives of the guerrillas, their coercion was best understood as arising from the extremely difficult environment that they had to mobilize support in, rather than as a function of their poor training (Kriger,1992:153). In addition, Alexander, McGregor & Ranger (2000) observed, intense colonial repression and war ruled out open, democratic practice and tolerance and of alternative views, fostering a ‘culture of authoritarianism’. They also argue that, violence in post-independence Zimbabwe, therefore, was the consequence of a strong state, itself in many ways a direct Rhodesian inheritance, and a particular interpretation of nationalism. It is undeniable that since ZANU-PF was not operating in a vacuum, their culture during and after the liberation war would have been impacted by the systems, actors and circumstances they were encountering.
African postcolonial theory lends a useful lens through which to understand the above. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ndlhovu (2013) argued, African Nationalism itself was deeply interpellated by colonialism, and reproduced colonial violence and authoritarianism, bequeathing it on postcolonial Africa as a mode of governance. In arguing this way, Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ndlhovu posit an explanation for both the behaviour of the guerrillas during the fight for independence, as well as the behaviour of the ruling party after attaining independence. This is in sync with the generality of the African postcolonial trope which generally argues that colonial legacies shaped post-colonial states into all powerful and arbitrary political formations, which continued the colonial legacy of turning against democracy (Mamdani, 1996; Ake, 2000; Mbembe’s 2001). Mbembe (2001) also argues that the general practice of power in postcolonial Africa, thereof, has followed directly from colonial political culture.

The preceding portrayals of ZANU-PF’s are generally correct, but in some respects, the above are a fitting description for ZANLA and or ZIPRA rather than for ZANU-PF whose existence, as shown above predated the war, and whose foundations were not in the throes of war, in addition to counting amongst its number non-combatants. I argue that ZANU-PF was never one thing, even after the onset of the war which added to its cast of politicians and nationalists with their largely urban activist supporters, ideologically trained and battle-hardened guerrillas, together with the rural supporters they were politicising, educating and recruiting. I find Cliffe’s (1980 cited in Sithole, 1984:119 and also Moore, 2016) outline of key leadership generations in Zimbabwe’s nationalist politics persuasive. He outlined these generations as follows:

1. The early nationalist leaders detained internally by Ian Smith (1964-1974);
2. Early nationalists’ leaders leading exile politics after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI);
3. Nationalists who lived in more distant exile (academics);
4. Guerrilla cadres (military-cum-political);
5. Internal political leaders.

Although labeled as key generations of leaders, all the five groups that Cliffe (1980) outlined existed at the same time, as part of one organisation during the struggle and also after independence, and almost all had some kind of ground organisation and grassroots support. Of course, as Sithole (1979) and others posed, this coexistence was not devoid of ractious factionalism among, within
and between the generations, some of which led to expulsions and purges by one group or another, or even within people who belonged to the same group. The ZANU-ZAPU split, ZAPU and ZANU internal fights circa 1972 between Sithole and Mugabe, and between Jason Moyo and James Chikerema, show the latter. Nonetheless, I agree with Moore (1991) that ZANU was an intricate ideological fusion where perverse antimonies, including between principles of liberalism and authoritarianism, populism and elitism, Marxism and capitalism, military action and popular mobilisation existed. For various reasons, including legitimation and the need to put out a united narrative, as well as enemy action, these intricate fusions are sometimes not on display in today’s accounts of ZANU-PF and seem to have been expunged from memory. Yet, as I highlight elsewhere, Chung (2006) highlights Mugabe’s ability to keep this complex group together, pre- and post-independence as the ZANU-PF political settlement, as an astounding task that is seldom acknowledged. I argue that this mix-and-holding it together is also part of what makes ZANU-PF complex. At the same time the existence of a complex cast of characters provides the beginnings of an explanation for ZANU-PF’s inherent contradictions and evident political duality as a party. This dualistic character is apparent in both its make up and its operations.

Kriger (1992) and Raftopoulos (1999) among others, acknowledge that the ZANU and ZANLA’s strategy changed over time. They highlight that the last years of the war witnessed more general indiscipline among guerrillas who were sensing a political settlement, and who concentrated less on patient politicisation and more on increasing guerrilla numbers in a more strictly militarist strategy. These references to and a focus on the “later years of the war” often hide that prior to the reported period, presumably the guerrillas were more disciplined and concentrated on more patient perhaps even persuasive politicisation of the masses. It also subsumes the reality that the war effort was secondary to initial attempts at politically attaining independence without a resort to guns. In addition, it was initially a modest insurgent sabotage campaign, not a continuous campaign (Alexander & MacGregor, 2004). As attested by Flower (1987 cited in Mlambo 2014:163), the performance of the early guerrilla forces, including their annihilation, called for a new strategy, which ZANU Chairman Hebert Chitepo articulated as “… politicising and mobilising the people before mounting attacks” (Mlambo, 2014:163).

11 During the liberation struggle there were several internal fights within both ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU and their respective military arms. Masiphula Sithole offers an interesting account of some of these in his 1979 book, “Zimbabwe: Struggles within the struggle”. Moore (1991) and others do a good job of flagging the fights in ZAPU.
The change in strategy described by Chitepo does not present a counter-narrative to the history of violence and coercion, but it shows that besides the military action, which most scholarship uses to characterise it, ZANU also politicised and mobilised people as part its 17-year existence prior to Independence. During and interview, SJ1212 grudgingly acknowledged ZANU’s engagement with the masses as part of core ZANLA approaches which they (as ZIPRA) did not adopt. He stated that ZAPU did not believe in beating people and forcing or coercing them. We did not have “pungwes”[overnight political meetings or vigils conducted for political education and sometimes intimidation purposes by ZANLA forces during the liberation struggle] because at pungwes people would come and sing in the evening, and then in the morning “Mabhunu” [the Whiteman] would come and shoot all those people. Here [referring to Matabeleland] we had no pungwes because we needed to protect the people we were fighting for. We did not want to expose them to unnecessary gunfire... No, we did not want to do that. We did not want to expose our people to our enemies. We wanted to expose ourselves (SJ1212-Interview, 2017).

The pungwes were ostensibly meant to politicise the rural masses and strengthen their spirit and resolve in fighting against the Rhodesian establishment. They are also often referred to as “moraris” because of their stated intentions of raising the morale not just of the suffering masses, but also the fighting guerrilla forces, who together with appointed civilian commissars would preside over the pungwes (Kriger, 1992).

Two things emerge from SJ1212’s input. The first is the clear demonstration of ZANU’s attempts through political commissars, in its armed wing, to politicise the masses, i.e. to build some form of popular support alongside the fighting, and attendant coercion referred to above. The second is the fact that although ZANU and ZAPU as well as ZANLA and ZIPRA operated differently during the liberation struggle, post-1987, these different parties, forces, modes of operation and understandings of politics were brought together under one political roof, ZANU-PF in 1987. In this respect, I argue that the bringing together of these varied actors and experiences must be accounted for when one conducts a historical analysis of ZANU-PF, remembering that ZANU-PF is not ZANU, it is ZANU and ZAPU plus their armed wings.
While coercion is easy to prove by way of testimony because people are prone to believe these horror stories and be sympathetic to and empathetic with victims, the question of popular support, post-facto, is still difficult to prove and disprove. Even as this thesis moves to the elections of interest, the issue of the extent to which people are forced to, or voluntarily support ZANU-PF continued, to be a slippery slope. This is even made more difficult given the suspicions and often unreliability associated with election returns, which the thesis covers in the next chapter, a phenomenon which started with the very first post-independence elections. For purposes of this thesis, it is enough to note that, outside the violence and coercion as well as the danger and fear narratives around ZANU’s liberation war tactics, some elements of popular mobilisation existed and are often underplayed because of the limited dramatic and even emotional effect of fair play.

While *pungwes* and *moraris* were indeed phenomena of the war given their nature, they were not the only mobilisation tool in ZANU-PF’s kit, and broader politicisation and mobilisation were not strategies introduced in the middle of ZANU’s struggle for independence. MB0704 cites politicisation and mobilisation as prior to military engagement. Explaining ZANU’s modus operandi, MB0704 states that:

ZANU was a guerrilla movement, so we would mobilise the mass first without using a gun, telling them how bad the Whiteman was, and these are things which they were seeing and experiencing, and we worked underground. So quietly ZANU managed to mobilise people using their political commissars, which made them to improve their strategies in damaging the white regime. (MB0704-Interview, 2018)

The view that MB0704 expresses is the standard fare in the conduct of guerrilla warfare à la Mao Tse Tung, based on the dictum that the people are the sea and the guerrillas the fish. It echoes what ZANU Chairperson Chitepo meant when he stated a change in strategy above, and it speaks to process, rather than the origins, which the chapter has also covered above. A look at those origins show that ZANU’s founding strategy was mass mobilisation of the urbanites. The guerrilla war changed the locus of those efforts from being predominantly urban, where the township dweller and town worker were the targets, to the rural areas where the peasant was the target.
4.5 Pre-Independence Party Organisational Structures (Party Organs)

The complexity of the ZANU-PF story, and its ability to attract support, popular or otherwise, in both pre and post-independent Zimbabwe is in some respects complicated as well as evidenced by its party organisation. In this section, I turn to the issue of ZANU’s party organisational structures just before independence to show the kind of organisation that they had built on the ground, a fact which most of the scholarship acknowledges, but with disputes on whether this was based on popular support.

In the run up to independence, ZANU had built an organisation that included both formal and informal structures and apparatuses of power in rural areas in the eastern side of Zimbabwe. ZANU and ZANLA’s Political Commissars built and extended an informal infrastructure of male (Mujibha) and female (Chimbwido) aids who operated after the party was banned in in 1964. Cliffe, Mpofu, and Munslow (1980:44-67) mapped the vast ZANU political organisation at independence. They argue that, while there were few ZANU cells in some parts of the country in the 1960s, on account of ZANU being banned a few months after its formation and its leaders detained, by 1972, ZANU had established itself as a party, organisationally (Cliffe et al., 1980: 49). By the 1980 election, ZANU had established peoples’ committees (at kraal and village level) and Mujibha and Chimbwido networks, in addition to some more orthodox election-oriented party organs like provincial and district committees. Kriger (1992) agreed that ZANU had a formidable organisation on the ground, but rather than being for political organising purposes, Kriger highlighted other utility functions of the structures like efficiency. According to Kriger (1992) young boys and girls were drawn in to help transport and cook food, married adults formed village committees, and unmarried youths over the age of fifteen formed youth wings.

Kriger (1992) also shows how, in 1977 and early 1978, ZANU introduced branch committees composed of a cluster of villages. These committees had a chairperson, secretary, treasurer, security officer, organizer, ‘logistics’ representative, and a political commissar. Each of these positions was filled, with an alternate on standby for when the incumbent was ill or absent. According to Kriger, the roles of the committee members were as follows:

The chairman coordinated the various tasks and ensured that the guerrillas got the resources they asked for; the secretary kept records of who
contributed what. The security officer detected potential spies by tracking movements of strangers into the village and of village residents to Mutoko centre and other areas where security forces were based. The organizer went from house to house collecting rice, maize, vegetables, and other food supplies, and collected money to buy meat, cooking oil, salt, bread, sugar, and other cash items. The ‘logistics’ staff supervised cooking for the guerrillas and ensured that there was adequate food for them. The political commissar gave political instruction to the people and conveyed what happened at moraris (political education sessions conducted by the guerrillas) to those who did not attend. (Kriger, 1992:132)

Cliffe et al (1980) and Kriger (1992) both agree that a formidable structure existed pre-1980 but disagree on the utility functions of the structures and on whether ZANU-PF victory and perceptions of popular support are attributable to these structures. However, Kriger’s outline of ZANU branch committee roles above shows clearly that there was a multiplicity of use functions to the structures based on the role a member was assigned, including surveillance (security officer), logistics (organiser and logistics committee) as well as popular education and mobilisation (political commissar). Kriger (1992:133) also adds that “Teachers, clergymen, nurses, and storekeepers who often lived among peasants in the Tribal Trust Land but who had more resources than them, preferred to organize as occupational collectives rather than become integrated in a system with the peasants” forming an additional layer of ZANU support structures. But, besides being an extra layer of support, these status hierarchies of the patrilineal system-induced structures also laid the foundation for emergent class conflict between elites and peasants. Besides the struggles within the struggle of guerrilla movements and parties which Sithole (1979) and others outlined, the conflict between “elites” and “peasants” represented a second strain of struggles within the struggle amongst different supporters of the struggle for independence, something which several scholars acknowledge (Saul, 1979; Cliffe, 198; Kriger, 1992).

Cliffe et al (1980:54) and Gregory (1981) saw a duality of functions for the ZANU/ZANLA structures which Kriger (1992) points out as functional. They argue that by 1980 ZANLA had achieved a system of ‘dual power’ in which the guerrillas challenged and destroyed the colonial civilian administration and established a civilian network of councils and committees responsible for providing support for the insurgency campaign in catering to the local population’s needs. The above scholarship (Cliffe et al, 1980; Kriger, 1992 and 127
Gregory, 1981) agree on the existence and utility functions of these committees, while they disagree on the extent to which the structures were the product of or a manifestation of popular support. They also disagree on whether they serviced rural communities materially instead of just taking away materially.

Gregory (1981) argues that it was “…this organisation of the peasantry in the rural areas during the war that provided the cornerstone for ZANU-PF’s triumph at the polls” in 1980 (Gregory, 1981:69). This view is supported by Cliffe et al (1980:54) who also argue that the victory was in addition to popular support, because of the rejection of the internal settlement parties (like UNAC), and citizens’ belief in ZANU’s ability to end the war. They further credit ZANU’s success in 1980 to a clear articulation of the grievances and aspirations of the workers, peasants and other classes, in addition to the formidable organisation on the ground built during the liberation struggle. These ZANU-PF structures seemed to have formed an intractable ground presence for ZANU’s opponents, which organised and campaigned in ways that made up for ZANU’s severe resource constraints. In the tradition of machine politics, the structures educated voters on the election process, and turned them out on election day (Gregory, 1981).

4.6 Conclusion

In the preceding pages, the chapter presented a dynamic outline of ZANU-PF the organisation in historical perspective, and used the different varieties of history, as well as more recent accounts of this history to produce a fuller portrait of it as augmented by primary data from interviews conducted for this study. Critical to this re-composition is the founding of ZANU-PF as a mass-based persuasive organisation, which both the accounts that vilify it as violent as well as those that glorify the violence as revolutionary often underplay. While accepting genetic explanations of present-day ZANU-PF’s conduct, the chapter argued that this history shows multiple shades of ZANU-PF, and shows that ZANU-PF’s, is not a single story, and its part was not and continued not to be homogenous in various respects. These included ethnically, as well as in relation to “generations” of key leaders, the coming together of ZANU and ZAPU as ZANU-PF, and the extent of its formal and informal structures and support networks.

The chapter argued that this diversity of actors in ZANU-PF as a political settlement, as well as its mixed heritage of being formed on the strength of
popular grievance and intent on building a mass party, alongside an emergent subculture of violence in the nationalist-cum-liberation movements, may assist to explain the often-contradictory modes of operation that ZANU-PF exhibits today. In addition, the chapter showed how in the late 1950s and early 1960s the nationalist movement emphasised both fighting through and fighting the law as part of nationalism. It also showed that use of demonising discourse like ‘sell-out’ to legitimate violence against political opponents has an even longer history than PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF.

As this thesis transitions to focusing on post-independence Zimbabwe, this chapter, in tracing and outlining ZANU-PF’s colonial existence, poses a cautionary note to students of ZANU-PF, and urges that analysis of ZANU-PF be attentive to the changes in its endowments as it transitioned from being a liberation movement to being a post-liberation party in power. The history of ZANU-PF pre-Independence is of a movement, party and guerrilla army, which as Kriger (1992:11) noted, had limitations on its control over territory and the extent to which it could offer positive utilitarian appeals (e.g. land redistribution and alternative marketing systems). Post-Independence, ZANU-PF, on the other hand, still had the endowments of the liberation movement, but now also had the effective power to govern, control over territory, and possessed the ability to offer and deliver on ‘positive utilitarian appeals’. The above are also in addition to other post-independence endowments like control over a supportive public press and other incumbency advantages.

This transition, as the next chapter will show, altered ZANU-PF’s form, structure, and function. These alterations or changes in ZANU-PF alongside well-articulated continuities, especially on violence and coercion, are a running argument in this thesis. It basically will continue arguing that ZANU-PF’s long stay in power since independence in 1980, could not have been tenable had ZANU-PF atrophied. ZANU-PF’s long incumbency suggests that it may have been more dynamic than the literature acknowledges. This dynamism was enough to allow ZANU-PF to reproduce itself and maintain a strangle hold on power through different periods of political and socio-economic crisis during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. These various moments of crisis were also moments of deconstruction and reconstruction of the ZANU-PF body politic. During these political conjunctures, ZANU-PF sought refuge in history and historical methods that had served it well during the liberation struggle. It also reverted to coercion
and looking to the past to state its claims to legitimacy and reignite its founding anti-imperialist ‘revolutionary discourse’ around chimurenga.

The import of the preceding pages is that analysis of ZANU-PF must retain vigilant watch on its origins beyond the short period of serious guerrilla war in the 1970s, its multiple identities or “generations”, methods and tactics, and its changes and continuities. The next chapter begins the process of outlining some of these changes and continuities in ZANU-PF after independence. It will outline the legislative and electoral regulatory framework that conditioned elections in Zimbabwe. It will also specifically begin to engage systematically with literature on Zimbabwe’s post-2000 election literature. The chapter acts as bridge between these three foundation chapters and the thesis’ three main empirical chapters. In this respect, outside painting the political and electoral context, the chapter will also present the findings from the study’s large-N analysis before moving the chapters that focus on subnational politics.
This chapter presents an overview of Zimbabwe’s electoral terrain. It briefly outlines Zimbabwe’s electoral system, framework and management bodies. It picks up from where sections of Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 left off. It acts a bridge from the historical context provided in chapter 4 to the study's two primary elections of interest, i.e. the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections.

The chapter is structured as follows: In section 5.1, it presents Zimbabwe's electoral system and the legal and institutional frameworks that conditioned elections in the country from independence in 1980 to 2013. It details the constitutional amendments that had an import on elections and section 5.2 briefly outlines the election management bodies that presided over the 2008 and 2013 elections. Section 5.3 closes the gap on electoral contests, picking up these contests from the year 2000 when ZANU-PF's dominance started to wane. Section 5.4 engages the comparative politics and Zimbabwean politics literature that sought to explain developments around elections post-2000 and organises it into patriotic history, liberal critiques of the state and nationalist averments of Zimbabwe as a radicalised state.

Section 5.5 introduces the two electoral periods of interest to this thesis (2008 and 2013). Section 5.6 engages in a robust conversation with systematic manipulation and electoral fraud literature on the two elections. Section 5.7 continues this conversation by looking at presentations from practice (election watchdogs) and the academy on detecting fraud and manipulation. Section 5.8 updates the conversation on ZANU-PF’s electoral politics through an engagement with two clusters of work, the ZANU-PF-Continuity group and the ZANU-PF changed group. This literature is integral to the thesis as it is what the study engages and compares its findings with the most in later chapters. Section 5.9 is a brief on the results from the study's large-N statistical analysis based on vital descriptive statistics that emerged at the first moment of analysis which informed targeting and selection of sites for further in-depth qualitative research. It presents an overview of the data on bigwig rallies in 2008 and 2013 across several variables including, constituency types, rural-urban divide, land reform, and electoral outcomes. Following chapter 4’s historically grounded proposition.
on why ZANU-PF campaigns, chapter 5 follows up by presenting the global picture regarding bigwig visits to dispense with the question of whether ZANU-PF campaigns and the kinds of constituencies it targeted with bigwig rallies in 2008 and 2013.

5.1 Electoral System: Legal, Institutional, And Management Frameworks (1980 To 2013)

Zimbabwe’s first post-liberation elections in 1980 were a product of the 1979 Lancaster House talks which culminated in an agreement and constitution that facilitated a transition from colonialism to independence. The Patriotic Front, a combination of ZANU and ZAPU, attended the talks together with the internal settlement parties like the United African National Congress (UANC). The delegates to the talks agreed on a raft of constitutionally guaranteed transitional compromises which included reserving 20% of the 100 parliamentary seats for whites elected from a separate “white” voter roll for the first ten years after independence. It also maintained the economic power structures of colonialism, especially white-biased property relations, and placed a moratorium on compulsory land acquisition for 10 years with no amendments to the bill of rights for 10 years, and the preservation of the special white seats for seven years (Bratton, 2014; Caute, 1983; Davidow, 1984; Herbst, 1990; Mandaza, 1986). According to Hatchard (1991), this meant that for any amendments to the cited issues, it would take a unanimous vote of parliament. At the expiry of the periods, it would take a two-thirds majority of parliament voting in favour of changes.

The Lancaster deal left some in the liberation movement uncomfortable as they viewed it as being too compromised, and a “sell-out” deal (Caute, 1983; Herbst, 1990; Mandaza, 1986). Some of the commentaries in the aftermath of independence praising the new government's upholding of the criticised compromises heightened this discomfort (see Davidow, 1982). Mugabe knew of this problem and, as prime minister, often expressed disdain on the provisions, calling them “pepper cones needed to attain independence” while continuing to hold the country hostage (Levy, 1987:142). The Lancaster House Constitution followed the Westminster model. This was meant to introduce liberal notions of limited government, separation of powers - an independent judiciary and legislature, and a justiciable bill of rights (Hatchard, 1991:79; Ncube, 1991: 171). In many respects, as Madhuku (1999:91) argues, the Lancaster House Constitution was a codification of the British constitutional system with a non-
executive president taking the place of the British Queen. Under this constitutional framework, Zimbabwe held her first independent election based on a party-list proportional representation (PR) system (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997). The Party-list PR system, which was adopted not because it was the fairest or most preferred, but because it was the most practical given the challenges of doing a constituency delimitation process in a country at war, required parties to breach a 5% threshold to get seats in parliament. The new government discarded it ahead of the 1985 elections in favour of the first past the post (FPTP) system based on 100 single-member districts for the house of assembly and 40 senate seats filled by the house of assembly sitting as an electoral college (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997; Madhuku 1999). The motivation for abandoning the PR system, which, then as now, most political scholars saw as a fairer and more representative political system for divided societies, was ZANU-PF’s suspicion that white politicians could use the system to prevent its clear victory, and/or band together with moderate parties to form a coalition government against ZANU-PF (Gregory, 1981).

The year 1987 was a significant political year in Zimbabwe for three reasons. First, it saw the signing of the Unity Accord between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU on 22 December 1987, which turned the two parties into a united party, ZANU-PF in December 1989 (Hatchard, 1991; Sithole & Makumbe, 1997; Moyo, 1992). The agreement brought to an end the civil strife and genocide that had been occurring in the southern part of the country where Mugabe’s government had deployed a paramilitary group, the 5th brigade, ostensibly to crush a rebellion, but actually to quell political opposition. This dark period in Zimbabwe’s past, would account for an estimated twenty thousand deaths and tens of thousands of displacements (Scarnecchia & Sisulu, 2008; CCJP & LRF, 1997) and was a calculated measure to ensure ZANU-PF’s dominance in the political field and elections after 1980. Second, there were two significant amendments to the constitution, amendment numbers 6 and 7. Constitutional Amendment Number 6 abolished the reserved white seats elected from the white roll, ending the era of racial segregation in Zimbabwe’s representative politics (Levy, 1987; Hatchard, 1991). This amendment came soon after the expiration of the constitutionally inscribed seven-year period within which no one could make changes to the provision. The Mugabe government replaced the reserved seats with an equal number of seats filled by parliament seating as an electoral college (Madhuku, 1999: 90; Hatchard, 1991).
Constitutional Amendment Number 7 of 1987 switched the Zimbabwe political system from a full parliamentary system and “…metamorphosed [it] into some obscure system, most of whose features exhibited a presidential character” (Madhuku, 1999:91). It abolished the ceremonial president and office of the prime minister and introduced an executive president directly elected by voters every six years. The new arrangements collapsed the powers of the prime minister and president under the Lancaster house constitution into the presidency in an arrangement that "…created an all-powerful president who enjoyed the "best" of both the parliamentary executive system and the American style executive presidency"(Madhuku, 1999: 92). With this amendment, the executive president now had the power to dissolve parliament, dismiss the cabinet, legislate through presidential emergency powers, as well as veto legislation from parliament.

In 1989, constitutional amendment Number 9 abolished the bi-cameral parliament, leaving an expanded single-chamber parliament of 150 members. In the expanded parliament, voters would directly elect 120 members while 30 members were appointed by the president as follows: 8 provincial governors, ten chiefs, and 12 others appointed by the president (Hatchard, 1991; Madhuku, 1999). In 1990, constitutional amendment Number 10 was made, which added to the president’s powers the discretion to appoint no more than two vice presidents. The introduction of two vice presidents was a replication in the state structure of the Unity Accord arrangement where ZANU-PF was operating with two Vice-Presidents, one each from ZANU and ZAPU (Madhuku, 1999). Constitutional amendment Number 11, was an omnibus amendment which represented the first attack on the bill of rights and amongst other things extended the voting franchise in Zimbabwe to permanent residents, followed in the same year (Madhuku, 1999).

The above amendments, some of which strengthened the powers of the executive, governed the electoral system of Zimbabwe almost unaltered until 2005 when a ZANU-PF dominated parliament reintroduced the 50 seat Senate soon after the 2005 general election, in which ZANU-PF secured a two-thirds majority. However, the subsequent senate election saw one faction of the MDC which had split on the issue, not participating in the Senatorial elections, thus leaving ZANU-PF to snatch 43 of the 50 senatorial seats, with the remaining seven going to the MDC faction that had decided to participate.
In 2007, following a SADC facilitated mediation process, ZANU-PF and the MDC factions were able to agree on Constitutional Amendment Number 18, which harmonised elections leading to Presidential, Parliamentary and Local government elections taking place concurrently, and with the same term. This amendment also increased the number of seats in parliament, from 150 to 210 all contested seats. The 2008 elections were governed by the Constitution of Zimbabwe as amended by Amendment Number 18, the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:11], the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act [Chapter 2:12] as amended by the Electoral Laws Amendment Act of 2008. These legal arrangements provided the parameters for the conduct of elections, the delimitation of constituency boundaries, the operation of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, the enfranchisement of voters, the establishment of the Electoral Court, and the resolution of election disputes, results management and transmission, amongst other things (ZESN, 2008).

The above represented the electoral system and the set of institutional arrangements that were at play in the 2008 election. However, at the turn of the 21st century, ZANU-PF increased its instrumentalization of law and order to maintain its hold on power. It introduced a suite of repressive pieces of legislation that impacted freedoms of association, assembly and speech. These included:

1. The Broadcasting Services Act of 2001 (BSA) which restricted the communicative rights of citizens, silencing rather than liberating previously unheard voices and made it difficult for new players to enter the broadcasting market. (Moyo D., 2005). It set up the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ), whose board was controlled by the national executive which appointed it. In 2011, BAZ licenced two new "private" radio stations to "expand" media space. These were AB Communications which was run by ZANU-PF MP and later Deputy Minister of information, Super Mandiwanzira, and Zim Papers Talk Radio, which was run by Zim Papers who ties to the state I highlighted in chapter 2 (Media Institute of Southern Africa, 2010; 2011).

2. The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act of 2002 (AIPPA): ZANU-PF promulgated this but with reservations even within ZANU-PF. Then chairperson of the parliamentary legal committee, Edison Zvobgo, saw it as "the most calculated and determined assault on our liberties guaranteed by the constitution." He argued that it was...
poorly drafted, "obscure, vague, overbroad in scope, ill-conceived and dangerous" (Zvobgo cited in Media Institute of Southern Africa, 2010:2).

3. The Public Order and Security Act of 2002 (POSA), which extended police power and surveillance of political groups and individuals, through requiring police clearance for meetings of more than seven people. Police application of POSA to stop the opposition and civil society from convening meetings and arresting offenders after 2002 was especially rampant. However, a study of 1981 such cases revealed on only four (4) convictions by 2005, indicating that the law was an intimidation and disruption tool more than anything else (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2006)

The above were in addition to other laws like the Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act (The Code) of 2005, and amendments to the electoral Act which restricted the rights of citizens in unwieldy ways. In March of 2013, four months ahead of the elections, Zimbabwe promulgated a new constitution and parliament made amendments to the electoral law. However, in the main, the 2013 Elections were conducted using the old constitution and its supporting legislation on elections.

5.2 Election Management

Popular and scholarly articulations of the post-2000 ZANU-PF regime paint it as a seasoned autocratic regime, which was militarised, conflated with the state, and which masterfully used its over-lordship of the state and electoral infrastructure to rig elections (Masunungure, 2009; Bratton & Masunungure, 2008; Matysak, 2017; Moore, 2014; Makumbe, 2009, Zamchiya, 2013). Given the above, ZANU-PF created an uneven playing field for elections and held sway over election management bodies (EMB) from independence in 1980. As Collier & Vicente (2012:118) argue, this incumbency advantage provides fertile ground for electoral fraud because of the incumbent's control of electoral processes and institutions.

Between 1980 and 2004, elections were supervised by the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC). Its task was to monitor and oversee the administration of elections. It also oversaw the work of the delimitations commission, the elections directorate, and the Registrar General of Elections. The Registrar, with the
assistance of the directorate, had the primary management role (Moyo, 1992: 53; Makumbe and Compagnon 2000). The ESC had five members, all appointed by the president of Zimbabwe and was by most accounts, an ineffective watchdog (Makumbe & Compagnon, 2000; Dorman, 2005). According to Moyo (1992) and Makumbe and Compagnon (2000), there were two main challenges associated with the ZANU-PF-EMB relationship. First, the EMBs were captured institutions, held hostage by and deferring to ZANU-PF and the executive. Second, the EMB leadership was accused of lacking the political courage to rise to the challenges of their public responsibilities (Moyo, 1992: 53). Raftopoulos (2002) and Dorman (2005) amongst others argue that these challenges found their way to all post-2000 elections.

In 2004, the ZANU-PF regime overhauled the management of elections and established a new, notionally Independent Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) through a ZEC Bill and gave it constitutional grounding through Constitutional Amendment Number 17. In principle, the ZEC Bill made it clear that the body was supposed to function without being subject to the direction of any person or authority. However, civil society lamented that excessive ministerial intervention and executive as well as partisan appointments undercut the commissions' independence and impartiality. It also lamented that the new framework returned the Registrar General as Registrar of voters, very much in the mould of the old Electoral Supervisory Commission that ZEC sought to replace (ZESN, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2004; Linington, 2009). According to Linnington (2009:99) ZEC’s structure “ to put it mildly, was not designed to facilitate fairness”.

Adding to reservations about ZEC’s independence, military men were brought in to preside over its essential functions, with Colonel Gula-Ndebele chairing the commission; Brigadier Nyikayaramba, being its Chief Elections Officer, and Brigadier General Chiweshe chairing the Delimitation Commission (Dorman, 2005:162). Mugabe later appointed Brigadier General Chiweshe as Chairman of the new ZEC, with his tenure lasting until 2009 when an inclusive government emerged as a resolution to the disputed 2008 election. However, opposition parties, civil society, and scholars concur that the most significant challenges on elections relate to the role of the Registrar of Elections. They alleged that the Registrar manipulated the voters' roll, and registration to ensure ZANU-PF
victories (Southall, 2013: 137). Section 4.3. will explore these allegations and analysis from the literature and critical electoral stakeholders after introducing the two election years at the centre of this study.

5.3 Electoral Contests 2000-2008

While the ZANU-PF regime faced opposition at elections from 1980, it was with the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, that elections became very competitive in Zimbabwe. In February 2000 a constitutional referendum took place in which civil society and the newly formed MDC campaigned for the rejection of a government-sponsored draft constitution. The “NO” vote won the referendum with 53% of the vote to the “Yes” vote’s 44%, marking the first time that ZANU-PF had politically hit the canvass. It was not a knockout, and what was supposed to be one by way of officially accepted electoral defeat would come eight years later.

The referendum was followed up by a tightly contested Parliamentary election, where the opposition MDC took 57 of the 120 contested seats, with ZANU-PF getting 62 seats (Dorman, 2005; Hatchard, 2001; LeBas, 2006). In the Presidential elections of 2002, Mugabe’s vote share fell from the 93% of 1996 to 56.2%, with MDC candidate Morgan Tsvangirai getting 42%, amidst allegations of violence and vote-rigging (Sachikonye, 2002; Raftopoulos, 2002; Dorman, 2005; Kriger, 2005). The allegations were serious enough to warrant action by the international community. They led the European Union, United States of America, United Kingdom and Nordic countries to impose (smart) sanctions and targeted measures on Zimbabwe's ruling elites and state-owned companies (Chingono, 2010; Grebe, 2010).

In the sections that follow, I review the literature that attempted to explain the above developments and Zimbabwean politics general state of play post-2000. I do this through organising the literature into three streams, i.e. patriotic history, liberal and nationalist critiques of the state. This literature constitutes the veritable scholarship that I engage, test, refute and build on, as appropriate, in the rest of the thesis.

12. For more accounts of this from 1990 to 2013 see also Moyo (1992), Sithole & Makumbe (1997), Dorman, (2005), Masunungure (2008), and Moore (2014) among others. The voters’ roll integrity was an issue in all elections amidst allegations that ‘errors’ were deliberate to inflate votes in favour of ZANU-PF.
5.4 The Academic State-Of-The-Art And Cotemporally Analysis Of Zimbabwe's Post-2000 Elections

Tremendous economic and political changes preceded the onset of the new Millennium in Zimbabwe. Economically, as Patrick Bond and his colleagues demonstrated, this period saw the onset of austerity and strife. This strife was the aftermath of the introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP), the rise of popular socio-economic discontent leading to crippling national strikes and bread riots, the increase in ZANU-PF war veterans discord, Zimbabwe's involvement in the DRC war, the eventual pay-out of war veterans, and the fall of the Zimbabwe dollar (Bond, 1998; Bond & Manyanya, 2002; Mhone & Bond, 2001; Bond, 2005). Political events in Zimbabwe unfolded quickly, and scholars attempted to keep pace with developments. I classify their efforts as the fourth variant of varieties of Zimbabwean political history articulated alongside nationalist historiography, the history of nationalism, and patriotic history.

For ease of review, I borrow from Tendi (2010) and divide this cotemporary political analysis stream into three tracks: patriotic history, liberal critiques of the state, and nationalist intellectual defences of the state, all of which I detail below after briefly introducing them. Through patriotic history, ZANU-PF sponsored a convoluted version of history that was hagiographic and meant to stake ZANU-PF’s claim to leadership through an exaggerated image of its role during the liberation struggle. Patriotic history translated Liberation struggle history into an official discourse aimed at giving legitimacy to authoritarian nationalism and a selective image of citizenship reinforced by the instrumentalisation of the land question (Hammar et al., 2003).

According to Tendi (2010), it was also a narrow and authoritarian repackaging of history which placed land at the center. It also espoused race-essentialism, which entailed that white people could not be Zimbabwean. The purveyors of this ideology were smart intellectuals and media sympathetic to ZANU-PF who deployed their talents and standing recklessly, to help legitimise violence, persecution and a calculated assault on human rights (Tendi, 2008). These intellectuals made sustained attempts to propagate the repackaged, authoritarian
version of Zimbabwe’s liberation history in the media, schools and universities. Outside what Werbner (1998) characterised as the quasi-national character of the party-political nature of the liberation war discourse, scholars invested an immense amount of academic effort in understanding and explaining the ZANU-PF regime through liberal critiques and nationalist averments of developments in Zimbabwe.

The liberal critique of ZANU-PF generally saw ZANU-PF as a norm violating authoritarian regime that used the coercive apparatus of the state to prolong its stay in power. Moyo and Yeros (2007), whom I associate with the nationalist intellectual stream, argued that the liberal critique was subject to Eurocentric and populist influences, and failed to recognise that what Zimbabwe was going through was the continuation of the national democratic revolution. However, the liberal critiques generally argue that the post-2000 Zimbabwean crisis was that of a liberal norm violating regime which used militarisation, violence, coercion, and limitations of democratic space as means of disciplining dissent and maintaining its dominance. While it had international interlocutors amongst the scholarship, locally, the proponents of the liberal critique were mostly intellectuals critical of ZANU-PF who often had leadership roles in civil society organisations (Tendi, 2010).

Zimbabwe’s nationalist intellectuals, on the other hand, were in the main pro-ZANU-PF or at least not too critical of it regarding their own intellectual and ideological positioning. The nationalist intellectual accounts portrayed Zimbabwe as a radicalised state suffering the pangs of a nationalist redistributive project. To them, ZANU-PF was conducting the historical task of taking the independence struggle to a higher level of economic redress and of fighting neo-colonialism, i.e. the second liberation, especially where the land question was concerned (Moyo, 2001; Moyo & Yeros, 2005; Osaghae, 2005; Tendi, 2010). At times it was difficult to separate these nationalist intellectuals engaged in

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13 Professors Tafataona Mahoso, Vimbai Chivaura, Claude Mararikhe, Godfrey Chikowore, Sheunesu Mpepereki and lbo Mandaza, are amongst some of the intellectuals who were purveyors of patriotic history identified by Tendi (2008).

14 For instance Professor Brian Raftopoulos (University of Zimbabwe’s (UZ) Institute for Development Studies and also Chairperson of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition), Professor Lovemore Madhuku (UZ Law School and Chairperson of the National Constitutional Assembly), John Makumbe (UZ Political Science department and Chairperson of Transparency international Zimbabwe), Masipula Sithole (UZ Political Science Department and founder of the Mass Public Opinion Institute) and others.
legitimate intellectual discourse from a perspective different from their liberal colleagues and intellectuals sponsoring patriotic history.

5.4.1 Patriotic History

Patriotic history closely approximated what Henning Melber (2003:11), writing on Namibia, defined as the “situational application of militant rhetoric as a tool for inclusion or exclusion”. It constituted ZANU-PF's ideology and propaganda outlet. It consisted of historiography that, in addition to offering a highly selective and streamlined version of the anti-colonial struggle, promoted a doctrine of “permanent revolution” intolerant of questions or alternatives (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008; Ranger, 2004). Part of the instrumentalisation of patriotic history also included vilifying civil society and opposition political parties as “western puppets” and “sell-outs” engaged in a treasonous endeavour to restore the colonial status quo ante (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008). In sum, it was a doctrinal ensemble hinged on land, race, a dichotomy between “sell-outs” and “patriots”, and the rejection of Western interference based on “Western ideals” such as human rights (Tendi 2010).

One of patriotic history's leading developers and interlocutors, Jonathan Moyo, termed it the Third Chimurenga: Hondo yeminda [Third War of liberation: The struggle for land]. The impetus for doing this stemmed from the formidable opposition challenge after 2000. Given these new circumstances, it was easy to think of patriotic history as new, but it had roots in the past (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008; Muzondidya, 2010; Waldahl, 2004; Ranger, 2004; Kriger, 2004; Saunders, 2011). Patriotic history borrowed from the Marxist-Leninist/nationalist ideology built around the concept of liberation war, Chimurenga that ZANU-PF had adopted during the liberation struggle.

Parallels could be drawn between patriotic history and parliamentary debates in the 1990s between nationalists and combatants in ZANU-PF (Kriger,2004), between it and Rhodesian propaganda (Ranger, 2004), and as Scarnecchia (2012) showed between it and the discourses in the early nationalist movements of the late 1950s. Tendi (2010) argues that the Third Chimurenga promoted the political contest in Zimbabwe as a “war” between nationalism and sovereignty versus the imperial recapture of the Zimbabwean state by Britain and its allies aided by the opposition and civil society as proxies. This war had economic empowerment and Indigenisation as its rallying cry. This cry was allied to the centrality of land,
race, and polarisation of citizens into sell-outs and patriots (Tendi, 2010; Hammar et al., 2003:17). Viewed this way, it is clear that patriotic history was not just an attempt to re-write history during the post-2000 era. It was also a reinterpretation of the past, and an explanation of the present during the post-2000 political conjuncture.

During successive elections, this historically tinged ideological narrative recurred and was central to ZANU-PF’s campaign messages in all elections between 2000 and 2013. I argue that patriotic history, barring reservations one might have on its character and truthfulness, was deployed as part of ZANU-PF claims to legitimacy. It was an attempt to appeal to people’s affinities for patriotism, liberation and freedom and made opposing views and perspectives appear like self-harm. Tendi (2010) argues that liberal-leaning intellectuals opposed to the state lost the debate to their nationalist colleagues in the court of public opinion. He argues that the liberal scholars failed to articulate, for the Zimbabwean public, an alternative to patriotic history and misjudged the extent to which the nationalist narrative swayed the public.

However, Tendi’s (2010) judgements must be mitigated and qualified by the reality that was there around unequal platforms on which to spread messages. As Moyse (2009: 48) shows, during the 2008 elections, patriotic history was incessantly churned out through the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Commission (ZBC) which gave 80% of its television coverage to ZANU-PF and its interlocutors while opposition voices received 12% coverage. This was the same for radio, as the ZBC appeared privatised by ZANU PF (Moyse, 2009:49). This phenomenon had worked in the past to condition citizens' perceptions of ZANU-PF. In the run-up to the 2005 general elections, ZBC behaved like a virtual organ of ZANU-PF (Bratton, Chikwanha, & Sithole, 2005). Waldahl (2004) found the same for the 2000 elections and argued that the politics of persuasion, through the press, was a critical cog of ZANU-PF's electioneering.

The skewed coverage enunciated above by Moyse (2009) worked in ZANU PF's favour. Bratton, Chikwanha, & Sithole (2005) found that public trust in Mugabe's leadership had risen from 20% in 1999 to 46% by 2004. Mugabe’s job approval ratings also increased from 21% to 58% over the same period, despite the onset of a debilitating economic crisis. While propaganda paid dividends, ZANU-PF augmented it with ruthless attacks on independent media, including banning, newspapers, 'pirate' radio stations, foreign journalists and international media.
outlets, as well as constant arrests and harassment of journalists (Bratton et al., 2005). With limited choice and information, Bratton et al. (2005) conclude that many Zimbabweans were persuaded by ZANU–PF’s view of a country beset by internal and external enemies.

5.4.2 Liberal critiques: The violent underside of patriotic history and ZANU-PF’s militant politics

While patriotic history constituted the ideological and propaganda arm of ZANU-PF politics, its use of election-related violence is also well elaborated in contemporary Zimbabwean historical and political accounts. Bratton and Masunungure (2008) and Alexander (2011) explain how the militarisation of civilian political processes was on the increase during this period. Rupiya (2004) argued that the reciprocal phenomena of the politicisation of the military, and the militarisation of politics, characterised Zimbabwe's crisis.

The literature suggests that violence was part of ZANU-PF's electoral campaigns for all post-2000 elections (Kriger, 2005; Raftopoulos, 2002; McGregor 2002; Alexander and Tendi, 2008; Masunungure, 2010; Sachikonye, 2011; Collier Vicente, 2012 and Alexander and Chitofiri, 2010). This also included ZANU-PF virtually locking out the opposition from campaigning in rural areas especially between 2000 and 2005. Here, ZANU-PF set up over 150 bases, ostensibly as campaign centres to win the 'hearts and minds' of the people, but as LeBas (2011:4) observes, they also served as staging centres for violent campaigns, and intimidation of opposition supporters and election agents. In rural Matabeleland and Midlands, the violence ahead of the 2002 presidential elections secured ZANU-PF's control of the local state where the opposition had begun to penetrate rural areas. Former liberation war veterans closed schools, rural district offices, and demanded the removal of officials they deemed sympathetic to the opposition. The war veterans complemented this with a ruthless campaign of abductions of MDC youths amid reports of increased political rape cases McGregor (2002: 10 & 24-25).

The Human Rights Forum (2002) indicates that ahead of the Presidential election, political murders stood at 120 from March 2000 to February 2002, with 25 of these having taken place between the beginning of January and mid-February 2002. The MDC reported that it could not adequately monitor just over 2250 of
the 4584 polling stations set up for the election due to abductions and threats to its polling agents (Raftopoulos 2002).

The run-up to the 2008 presidential election run-off, constituted the worst post-2000 political violence. Two hundred senior army officers were deployed to different areas to take charge of the ZANU-PF’s election campaign (Crisis Coalition, 2011; Masunungure, 2009). In the aftermath, ZESN reported that April alone witnessed 4359 incidents of violence indicating, up 470% from pre-election levels of 795. By May, election violence had shot up to 6288, but retreating in June and July to 3735 and 1123 respectively. By July, the Zimbabwe Peace Project had recorded 17 605 incidents since April. In July, ZESN could verify 171 deaths, 9148 assaults and 16 rape cases (ZESN, 2008:48). The 2008 violence started in rural areas and ZANU-PF strongholds and spread to cities. Masunungure (2009), like Alexander and Tendi (2008), argues that the violence was meant to punish, terrorise and re-educate in fashions similar to guerrilla operations from the 1970s. They, however, do not explain why ZANU-PF would terrorise, punish and re-educate even in areas it had huge pluralities in the March 2008 election.

Collier & Vicente (2012) suggest that voter intimidation is not used to win support, but to dissuade soft-core supporters of opponents from participating in the political process (Collier and Vicente 2012). They support this thesis using Zimbabwe’s June 2008 Presidential election run-off. Given the widespread nature of the violence, Collier & Vicente’s explanation fails to explain why there would be violence and coercion in areas the incumbent was strong. Hafner-Burton et al. (2014) argue that the utility of election-related violence is both, to dissuade opposition voters, and encourage opposition boycotts, increasing, in both instances, chances of incumbent victories, albeit with amplified risks of post-election costs to the incumbent regime regarding legitimacy. This explanation is also borne out by the 2008 Presidential elections, where after an initial first-round loss to the opposition, the incumbent instituted a violent campaign, achieving both opposition-voter apathy and an opposition boycott, but with consequences that eventually led to ZANU-PF sharing with the opposition (Alexander & Tendi, 2008; Masunungure, 2009).
Figure 5-1: Zimbabwe’s Post-2000 Elections Dashboard (ZANU-PF/MDC Vote Shares & Voter Turnout- 2000-2018 Across All Elections

Source: Author’s data from official election results as reported from the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) and later the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. All figures have been rounded off to the nearest percentage for ease of presentation.
Figure 5-2: Presidential Elections Results Map March 2008

Figure 5-3: Presidential Election Results Map 2013
5.6 Harmonised Elections – 2008 & 2013

In 2008 ZANU-PF, suffered its first official electoral defeat at the parliamentary and presidential levels since 1980. The results showed the opposition had won 110 (100 MDC-T, 10 MDC-M) of the 210 available seats in parliament. As can be seen from Figure 5-1, a dashboard of all presidential elections since 1990, Robert Mugabe lost the first round of the Presidential election, gaining 43.2% and trailed opposition candidate Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) who got 47.9% of the vote. The remaining 8% of the ballot accrued to another opposition candidate, Simba Makoni of Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn party. The post-March 2008 election map based on presidential results is shown in Figure 5-2.

In instances where neither candidate running for president gets 50+1%, the law demanded a run-off election between the two top contenders. What followed was a violent campaign towards the run-off election. Tsvangirai withdrew from the run-off leaving the incumbent to stage a show election which, as Figure 5-1 shows, he “won” by 93% up from 42 % just three months earlier (Alexander & Tendi, 2008; Masunungure, 2010). While securing Mugabe’s re-election, the violent campaign robbed him of legitimacy and forced ZANU-PF to share power with the MDCs in a SADC and South African President Thabo Mbeki facilitated deal.

As Figures 5-1, 5-2 and 5-3 show, in 2013 there was a reversal of fortunes. Mugabe was able to win the presidential election without the need for a run-off, garnering 63,09% of the vote to Tsvangirai’s 33,94%. This was a huge swing, signalling a national Butler’s swing from opposition to ZANU-PF of over 20% (MDC-T to ZANU-PF swing is about 17%). Attempts at explaining the huge swing and dramatic change of fortunes for the respective political protagonists from 2008 to 2013, is an allied puzzle that this study also answers. In past elections, like the 2008 Presidential run-off election, the 2002 Presidential elections and 2000 general election, ZANU-PF’s electoral victories were attributed to a combination of the margin of terror, patronage, and the margin of error.

The margin of terror was explained as the negative consequences on free choice of violence and intimidation, while the ‘margin of error’ was described as the
effects of vote-rigging, i.e. vote inflation (Masunungure, 2014; Zamchiya, 2013). As shown in the previous section, violence was a real concern, especially during the run-off election of 2008. Violence and the March 2008 election has been a largely ignored subject in the literature, either because it was not there or because it paled in comparison to what followed ahead of June 2008. Later chapters will try to resolve the empirical question as it relates to this March 2008 election. However, the next section engages the margin of error thesis, i.e. election fraud through vote inflation in the 2008 and 2013 elections below.

5.7 Election Manipulation, Malpractice And Fraud

While there have been many allegations of electoral fraud in Zimbabwe’s post-2000 elections, evidence has been in short supply. This is normal. As Lehoucq puts it “no one who stuffs the ballot box wants to leave a trail of incriminating evidence” (Lehoucq, 2003:233). Lehoucq (2003:233) defines electoral fraud as clandestine efforts to shape election results, which explicitly break the law (235). Attempting to narrow and sharpen this definition, Vickery & Shane (2012) define electoral fraud as deliberate wrongdoing by election officials or other electoral stakeholders, which distorts the individual or collective will of the voters. They define systematic manipulation as the use of domestic legal provisions or electoral rules and procedures that run counter to widely accepted democratic principles and international standards that purposefully distort the will of the voter (Vickery & Shein, 2012:13). Below I engage these two elements as they relate to Zimbabwe, starting with election manipulation then fraud. I treat both as instances of vote-rigging but with qualified differences.

5.7.1 Systematic Manipulation

It is only amateurs who manipulate elections on election day because seasoned autocrats do this well in advance of elections; Cheeseman & Klaas (2018) argue. One of the main ways in which ZANU-PF has been accused of this long-range manipulation is through redistricting or constituency delimitation, and voter registration. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) completed a delimitation exercise in January 2008 that increased House of Assembly constituencies from 150 to 210. During this and previous delimitation exercises, speculation was rife that the Delimitation Commission gerrymandered constituencies to favour ZANU-PF through placing more constituencies in rural areas. That the 2008 delimitation exercise produced 143 rural, 50 urban, 17 peri-urban constituencies is often used as evidence of this rural favouring.
However, at 68% of all constituencies, the proportion of rural constituencies is in line with world bank figures which suggest that Zimbabwe’s rural population stands at 67.79% (The World Bank, 2018). Boone & Wahman (2015:339) also found that rural-favouring malapportionment, while rampant in Africa, is generally low in Zimbabwe. They define malapportionment as the unequal assignment of legislative seats so that the votes of some citizens weigh more than others, running counter to the democratic principle of ‘one person one vote,’ thus creating strong biases in electoral systems (Boone & Wahman, 2015:337). Table 5-1 shows that their general judgement on Zimbabwe is supported by the figures on average constituency sizes per province. The table outlines the changes in the number of Single Member Districts (SMBs) or House of Assembly constituencies after the 2008 constituency delimitation exercise.

### Table 5-1: Pre & Post Delimitation Number of Constituencies by Province & Party Alignment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>General Party Alignment in 2008</th>
<th>Number Pre and post 2008 Delimitation</th>
<th>Average Constituency Size Registered Voters</th>
<th>%age Increase in SMDs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=120</td>
<td>N=210</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>Toss-up</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>Toss-up</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland North</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland South</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>ZANU-PF</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26,411</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-1 shows that the numbers of registered voters per constituency were within the acceptable range in 2008. However, the Research and Advocacy Unit in Zimbabwe argues that for 2013, at least 40 constituencies out of 210 deviated from the acceptable margin of 20% (RAU, 2013).
The bulk of the 90 new constituencies from the 2008 delimitation process were in areas where ZANU-PF enjoyed more support than the opposition. Electoral returns aggregated at provincial level show that four out of 10 Zimbabwean provinces were ZANU-PF aligned, four opposition-aligned, and two were toss-ups. The four provinces where the opposition had more support than ZANU-PF received, on average, 37.5% increases in the number of constituencies, while the four considered ZANU-PF aligned had increases on average of 45% (ZEC, 2008: xi). This favouring of ZANU-PF aligned provinces appeared to follow a pattern from the previous delimitation process in 1995 and 2004 where Harare, Bulawayo and Matabeleland North lost constituencies while Mashonaland West, Mashonaland East, and Manicaland picked up new constituencies (Boysen & Toulou, 2009; EISA, 2000).

The data used to determine apportionment, that is, the number of registered voters, has often been argued to be a poisoned chalice. These allegations have been because of alleged ZANU-PF manipulation of voter registration processes through its control of state institutions and the EMB from the 1990s to 2013. The alleged manipulation favoured rural areas while instituting urban voter suppression during registration processes (Southall, 2013: 137, Moyo, 1992; Sithole and Makumbe, 1997; Dorman, 2005; Masunungure, 2009; Moore, 2014). According to Dorman (2005:163-164), in 2002, voter registration was unofficially extended for three months in ZANU-PF's rural strongholds but not urban areas. In 2013, an urban voter registration exercise that was supposed to last for three weeks only lasted three days in urban but not rural areas. The result was that in 2013, voter registration in the countryside was 99%, but only 68% in urban areas (Southall, 2013:140). Because of this, the differences in voter registration numbers would inevitably produce a rural favouring delimitation process. This bias is not readily discernible when one looks at constituency sizes because the gerrymandering is hardwired into voter registration rather than in the delimitation processes.

5.7.2 Vote Rigging And Electoral Fraud

Analysis of Zimbabwe's elections post-2000 is replete with allegations of election fraud. When one considers these allegations within the framework of what Gandhi & Przeworski (2009) layout as facilitating the emergence of competitive elections, Zimbabwe comes across as ripe for both fraud and competitive elections, at least in 2013. Gandhi & Przeworski (2009:2) broadly argue that
sheer force, the manipulation of rules, and fraud could keep incumbent rulers in power independently of the voice of the people, but not without risk. They also argued that

The conditions for the emergence of competitive elections are narrow because the prospect of losing coercive power as a consequence of an electoral defeat makes the incumbent rulers less inclined to hold elections, while the prospect of having to leave office induces them to engage in fraud. Elections are competitive when incumbents cannot remain in power by force alone and when they fear to be abandoned by their armed allies if elections were discovered to be fraudulent (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2009:1).

Based on the above logic, and considering that ZANU-PF enjoyed a two-thirds majority in parliament towards the 2008 elections, the prospects of leaving office via electoral defeat were remote. Fraud would not have been expected at scale in the March 2008 election. This may also suggest why ZANU-PF lost that election, and why it resorted to violence in the run-off election. The 2013 elections, however, presented a different set of circumstances, and the prospects of leaving office, given what happened in the presidential election in 2008, would have been real, and the incentives to turn to fraud, high. ZANU-PF would have had to factor in that incumbency was shared and that the ZEC commission was a multiparty constellation based on secondments from all parties represented in parliament.

The scrutiny on the election from the guarantors of the Government of National Unity (GNU), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the international community was high. In this situation, while the incentive to use fraud would have been high, the impetus towards competitive elections would have been high as well. This is because it was reasonably clear that, while it was unlikely that the army would desert ZANU-PF, it was also clear that brute violence would not secure their legitimacy at home and abroad. These circumstances are discussed further below, especially the fraud element, while in chapter 7, the thesis delves deeper into the competitiveness of the 2013 election, and chapter 8 on the other external and internal pressures around ZANU-PF in both 2008 and 2013.

Zamchiya (2013:956) and Moore (2014:60), looking at the 2013 elections argued that the opposition failed to deal with ‘technical’ elements of the election, allowing ZANU-PF to manipulate the elections. Moore (2014:55) and Masunungure (2013:100) argue that the opposition’s failure to take advantage of
intelligence reports around possible rigging by an Israeli company, Nikuv, led to its defeat in 2013. Besides, the numbers of "assisted voters" in rural areas were, at every election, inordinately high (Lewanika & Ndou, 2014; Bratton & Masunungure, 2008; Linnington, 2009; Makumbe, 2008; Southall, 2013; Zamchiya, 2013; and Moore, 2014). Interestingly, after the March 2008 election, ZANU-PF also alleged rigging. Mugabe’s election agent, Emmerson Mnangagwa protested giving the following reasons:

Given the many anomalies, malpractices, deflation of figures of ZANU(PF) candidates as information was transmitted upwards, inflation of figures relating to opposition candidates as information was transmitted to higher command levels, multiple voting and people who are not on the voters roll being allowed to vote, persons on the voters roll being turned away and not allowed to vote, and irregularities in the manner that handicapped persons were assisted to vote (Saturday Herald, 3 May, 2008)

Mnangagwa alleged that there had been a pattern of anomalies that they identified during an official recount process in 21 constituencies which showed a systematic bias against ZANU-PF in the management of the electoral process. He added that ZANU-PF, "especially its presidential candidate fe[lt] aggrieved and were greatly prejudiced by attempts by the MDC and its sponsors to tamper with the electoral system" (Saturday Herald, 3 May, 2008).

In later chapters, I argue that the above allegations articulated by Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF, were part of ZANU-PF’s political script in 2008. As part of this script, ZANU-PF incessantly blamed the position, "victims", for all the infractions that observers laid on ZANU-PF’s door. This included violence and electoral manipulation of the kind that Mnangagwa outlined above. Also of note is that the recounts that Mnangagwa referred to were unlawful having been conducted out outside the legally prescribed time. They served to delay the announcement of presidential election results, which were only officially released on the same day that Mnangagwa made the above remarks to the press.

5.8 Detecting, Documenting And Deterring Electoral Manipulation In 2008 And 2013

The literature cited in sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 above provides a sense of the possibilities and range of ZANU-PF’s electoral manipulation. However, it is generally inconclusive on the specifics and extent of electoral manipulation and its direct bearing on electoral outcomes in various types of constituencies. In
attempting to add some clarity on the matter of ZANU-PF electoral manipulation, I briefly analyse poll projections based on the ZESN’s Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) exercises for 2008, a Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU) voters roll audit and engage in a bit of detail Bratton, Dulani, & Masunungure’s 2016 paper on detecting electoral manipulation in Zimbabwe.

5.8.1 The Zimbabwe Election Support Network’s (ZESN) Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) 2008

In 2008, ZESN conducted a PVT or Sample Based Observation (SBO). PVT/SBOs entail the observation of polling day events and activities at polling stations that end with an estimation of final results based on the collection and aggregation of election results obtained from a representative sample of polling stations (EISA, 2011:2). PVT's are believed to generate an independent basis for evaluating the performance of authoritarian systems forced to hold elections (Lehoucq, 2003). Their strength and also part of their weakness is that PVTs are based on actual results as counted by polling-site officials and verified by partisan poll watchers and other eyewitnesses at the close of polls (Garber & Cowan, 1993:97).

Using data collected from 435 randomly selected polling stations, the ZESN PVT in 2008 gave Morgan Tsvangirai the lead with 49.40% of the vote, while Mugabe had 41.80% of the vote, and Simba Makoni, 8.2% of the vote, with projections at 95% confidence levels. The margin of error ranged from +/-1.1 for Makoni to +/-2.60% for Mugabe, with margins for Tsvangirai in between but closer to Mugabe’s (ZESN, 2008:39-40). When ZEC announced the official results, they had Tsvangirai in front but with 47.9% followed by Mugabe with 43.2%, and Makoni with 8.3%, with the remaining 0.60% going to other candidates (Saturday Herald, 3 May, 2008:1). The official results closely mirrored ZESN’s projections and were within the margins of error. Ordinarily, when official results align with PVT projections, this signals that officials have not tampered with results (too much). However, in this case, several things were a cause for concern.

First, when ZESN presented its projection, the MDC-T rejected it, saying that their (own) PVT had them winning the election without the need for a run-off. MDC-T Secretary-General, Tendai Biti, held a press conference and announced that their tabulation showed that Tsvangirai led with at least 50.30% of the vote, while Mugabe trailed with 43.8% of the vote and Makoni with 7% (The
Guardian, 2 April, 2008). Like ZEC’s, the MDC-T results were within the ZESN margins of error. Second, The ZESN announcement was on 31 March 2008, the MDC-T’s on 2 April 2008, but the ZEC announcement only came on 2 May 2008, five weeks after the poll. ZEC's late announcement was suspicious and increased speculation that it was trying to engineer a run-off.

It is likely that the ZESN PVT deterred fraud at scale, and that if ZEC and ZANU-PF manipulated the results, they were forced to do so within ZESN's announced margin of error. That no independent observers or opposition agents could verify the results announced by ZEC as the EMB had closed shop from the 6 April 2008 to 1 May 2008, only fed the above speculation (ZESN, 2008:40). As a result, there were apparent issues around the credibility of the results, chain of custody of ballot materials, inordinate delays, and ZEC's impartiality.

ZESN's projections were probably correct, but the PVT process is based on official results from polling stations, as I have argued above, some of the processes of manipulation raised in the literature are prior to election day. It is possible that just like the delimitation process, election day results could have already been a poisoned well. This limits the ability of the PVT to act as a deterrent of fraud and manipulation. It is a stable door that the stable boy possibly closes after the horse has already bolted.

5.8.2 Research and Advocacy Unit’s (RAU) Voters Roll Audit

In 2013 and 2014, RAU, a respected think-tank from Harare conducted audits of the voters roll used in the 2013 election to ascertain its state at the point of the election. For the 2013 report, RAU compared the roll against the national census and concluded that:

1. Overall, the voters' roll had about 773,664 more registered voters than the census indicated the country had eligibble voters.
2. 63 of the 210 constituencies had over registration, that is, more registered voters than the census indicated there were eligible voters,
3. 23 constituencies of the 210 were above the maximum threshold of voters (33,566) while 17 were below the threshold allowed of a minimum of 22,378.
4. Nearly two million potential voters aged under 30 were unregistered and over one million people on the roll were either deceased or had relocated.
RAU concluded that the gap between the ideal voter figures as per registration and actual figures on the roll impinged on the integrity of the electoral process. In 2014, RAU continued the process. However, this time focusing on election results. RAU concluded that the additional 1.03 million votes gained by Mugabe could not have been a result of a significant increase in registered voters, although there were a reported close to 800,000 new voters with a significant swing in allegiance toward Mugabe and away from Morgan Tsvangirai (RAU, 2014). Also, RAU (2014) argued that ZEC had not been entirely in control of the electoral process and that this created possibilities for manipulation, especially on voter registration. RAU surmised that even if every one of the 792 279 newly registered voters were Mugabe supporters and voted for him in 2013, about 200 000 votes (about 6% of the poll) remained unexplained.

RAU's findings highlighted some of the severe challenges regarding the integrity of the voters’ roll, which eventually led to the ZEC adopting a Biometric Voter Registration process to avoid duplications and starting the registration process from scratch after the 2013 elections. Despite the seriousness of the challenges posed by the data they presented, fraud, as a consequence remained relatively speculative, and a number of the issues they raised could have been functions of ineptitude and malpractice, although manipulation cannot be dismissed.

5.8.3 Bratton, Dulani & Masunungure’s (BDM) Survey versus Actual Results Comparison

Bratton, Dulani & Masunungure (2016) -BDM, made the most authoritative and scholarly attempt at detecting manipulation for the 2013 elections. Their effort tried to show the extent of manipulation and fraud and where it could have taken place. They compared official 2013 election results against survey projections based on vote intentions from an Afrobarometer survey conducted in May and June 2013, at least a month ahead of the 2013 elections. They assumed that the survey was reliable based on an ample and randomly selected sample of N=2400, a small sampling error of plus or minus 2, where any excesses outside this margin became a suspect for manipulation. They also assumed that the timing of the survey was close enough to the election to avoid dramatic shifts in opinion (Bratton, Dulani, & Masunungure, 2016:15). The survey had predicted that:

1. Among eligible voters, Mugabe would enjoy an 8-point advantage over Tsvangirai (42.7% versus 34.9%), with one in six respondents (16.5%) declining to answer, whom they labelled reticent.
2. Among registered voters, the ZANU-PF candidate's advantage would expand to 10 percentage points (44.8% for Mugabe versus 35.1% for Tsvangirai). This statistic did not change dramatically for those who said they were going to vote (45.6% for Mugabe, 35.6% for Tsvangirai).

3. Among those registered and likely to vote, Mugabe’s margin increased to 11% (46.30% for Mugabe, 35% for Tsvangirai).

4. Amongst all ordinary Zimbabweans, the margin increased to 12% (45.1% for Mugabe, 33.2% for Tsvangirai).

They compared the above results to ZEC’s official results shared as 60.60% for Mugabe, 33.70% for Tsvangirai, with the remaining 5.7% spread across smaller candidates. There was a discrepancy between the official results which gave Mugabe a 27 percentage-point lead, and the survey which predicted an 11%-point lead. While BDM expected Mugabe to win, they had not anticipated that the winning margin could be as large as ZEC proclaimed. On this reasoning, BDM concluded that about 16 percentage points possibly inflated the national vote. BDM posit that Masvingo province was a prime candidate for rigging, as was Manicaland, Mashonaland East, and Matebeleland South because of the huge variances. The assumption was that the swing vote was the stolen vote. BDM’s study is not exact and does not show precisely how ZANU-PF manipulated the election. If ZANU-PF manipulated it, why did it manipulate that excessively beyond what Mugabe required for a comfortable win?

The argument that BDM made was easy to understand despite the complexities of their methods. The effort assisted readers to see areas where fraud could have been prevalent. However, the challenges of conducting surveys in undemocratic settings are known and do not bear repeating at length. Nevertheless, the study makes a problematic assumption that the timing of the survey was close enough to the election to avoid dramatic shifts in opinion because election campaigns had not started at the time the enumerators administered the Afrobarometer survey. Zimbabwean elections generally have a constrained campaign period, usually not more than two months, and they intensify towards the election date. For instance, in 2008, ZANU-PF launched its election campaign on 29 February, exactly a month ahead of elections (ZESN, 2008). In 2013, the Supreme Court ruled on 31 May that the elections should be held by 31 July 2013 (BBC News, 31 May, 2013). The parties in government and civil society organisation spent the better part of June fighting this decision at SADC summits and the courts, with the
courts deciding at the end of June that the poll would go ahead on 31 July. This June is the latest point at which the survey was conducted. The MDC-T launched its campaign on 7 July, and as I will show in Chapter 5, Mugabe only started his national campaign through a manifesto launch on 5 July 2013 (*Mail and Guardian*, 12 July, 2013), and only staged his first campaign rally on 11 July in Chiweshe, Mashonaland central.

The above suggests there was ample time, opportunity, and effort invested during July, for Zimbabweans to "change their minds" after the survey had been administered. Ferree, Gibson & Long (2014) show, for Kenya's 2013 elections using exit polling data, that, issues, candidates claim, ownership of success, and allocation of blame in power-sharing arrangements matters. They also show that it mattered for voting intentions who acted or was treated as the incumbent in popular opinion also mattered for voting intentions.

This thesis offers an ex-post analysis of the 2008 and 2013 elections, which shows that some of the things, inadvertently neglected by the survey mattered for the elections in question. It cannot be assumed lightly that the difference between the survey’s projected margins and announced margins, i.e. the swing, was down to manipulation. I argue that there is no narrative on the elections in Zimbabwe that can be reasonably complete without factoring in campaigns with the exception of “non-elections” like the run-off of June 2008. To do so is to assume that campaigns do not matter, and that electoral legwork around canvassing, pamphleteering, advertising, propaganda (including slander) and rallies do not move the needle in Zimbabwe politics. Yet they do.

On account of the above, I argue that there can be added value to BDM's study if it is juxtaposed with legitimate campaign activities. I do just that below and demonstrate that through this, readers can see where campaigns may have been targeted and may have yielded results, and where campaigns were limited, yet the results are not commensurate with effort. The data for this study suggests that ZANU-PF did not target Masvingo, Manicaland, and Mashonaland East provinces (the top three highest targets for fraud, according to BDM) for intense campaigning through bigwig rallies. Figure 5-4 shows the places that ZANU-PF targeted in 2013 with bigwig rallies. As is evident from the map, Manicaland, Masvingo, and Mashonaland East hardly received any bigwig attention, while Matebeleland South did.
If Bratton, Dulani, & Masunungure (2016) are correct, what are the implications for this study? A sceptic might argue that this study's concern with campaigning is misplaced because ZANU-PF may have campaigned through bigwig rallies in areas it intended to rig.

Fortunately the sites for the thesis' in-depth study mostly fall outside the zones of possible high fraud that BDM highlight. This study's sites are in Bulawayo (Makokoba and Pumula), where the variation between survey and official election results is below zero (-2), Mashonaland Central (Mount Darwin constituencies), which is outside the top four for possible manipulation, as is
Matebeleland North (Tsholotsho North and Lupane East). Gormonzi South is the only one located in the possibly "high fraud province" of Mashonaland East. However, the above allows the thesis to continue with limited concern for high levels of electoral fraud but does flag these where they were encountered (chapter 6 and 8).

However, as is visibly apparent, from Figure 5-4, if ZANU-PF intended to rig in Masvingo, Manicaland, Mashonaland East and Matebeleland South Provinces, Figure 5-4 shows it did not attempt to cover up such electoral fraud through bigwig campaigns to these areas. The study's findings show that, on the contrary, the locus of ZANU-PF intense campaigning through bigwig visits in 2013 was away from the provinces identified as the top four zones of possible manipulation and fraud. Figure 5-4’s import is that not campaigning in the areas (Manicaland and Masvingo) heightens the possibility that ZANU-PF's gains in those areas could have been the products of fraud. Many possibilities can account for ZANU-PF's victory in these areas. In chapter 7 and 8, this study will highlight the subnational politics away from bigwig visits in two constituencies in Matebeleland North, Lupane East and Tsholotsho North. This could help answer questions related to its neighbouring province, Matebeleland South, which as Figure 5-4 shows, received some bigwig attention in 2013.

5.9 Continuity Or Change ? or Change in continuity: ZANU-PF’s campaign strategies for the 2008 and 2013 Presidential Elections

Beyond the above-cited literature, some scholarship has attempted to explain the outcomes of the 2008 and 2013 elections. For 2008, however, most of this literature focuses, in the main, on the run-off election, with limited coverage on the March 2008 election. Below, I conduct a quick scan of this literature and then present this thesis' take on the two elections regarding broader strategy issues as part of building a foundation for the three chapters that follow. For ease of analysis, I divide this scholarship in two, the ZANU-PF continuity group, and the ZANU-PF change group. The continuity group suggests that there was minimal to no change in ZANU-PF strategy and is similar to the accounts reviewed above. It argues that ZANU-PF did not divert from its historical, illicit approaches to power retention, attributing much of ZANU-PF's victory to opposition weakness,
external connivance, and the incumbency advantage. Matyszak (2017) presents the extreme version of the continuity argument. He posits that:

There has been no shift in Zimbabwean politics for the past two decades. ZANU-PF won the elections in July 2013 in exactly the same way (with a few variations on a theme) as they won those in 2000, 2002, 2005 and June 2008 (Matyszak, 2017:9).

Matyszak credits ZANU-PF’s electoral fortunes in 2013 to substantial malfeasance and its control of electoral institutions. He accuses any scholarship that attempts to explain ZANU-PF’s 2013 victory as the result of an enlarged support base as being without empirical backing and perpetuating ZANU-PF legitimating narratives. For him, 2008 and the attendant Tsvangirai and opposition victories were mere aberrations.

Moore's less "radical" version of the continuity argument suggests that the 2013 result was due to ZANU-PF’s adept incorporation of “coercion, cheating, and [SADC] regional connivance (with the opposition's hapless performance)” (Moore,2014:47). This, he argues, was augmented by meticulous preparation; populist strategies; and MDC-T’s ill-preparedness (Moore,2014:47-60). Others argue that ZANU-PF ran a "careful scam" with no “single rig”(Chan, 2013) augmented by ZANU-PF’s control and conditioning of the elections and associated electoral machinery, ensuring its victory in advance (Southall, 2013:137). In this genre, there is also an emphasis on ZANU-PF’s manipulation and MDC-T’s poor technical and political performance (Zamchiya, 2013; Masunungure, 2014).

Except for Moore (2014) and Southall (2013) who grudgingly accept that ZANU-PF may have out campaigning the opposition, the bulk of the continuity literature gives little to no credit to ZANU-PF's political gamesmanship as a party. It falls into the all too familiar tragedy of analysing the party as what it is in the state. There was indeed party-state conflation in Zimbabwe. However, it is also true that analysis that limits its lens to that configuration often fails to see what ZANU-PF does as the party presiding over the state, and what it does as a political party. In sum, this brand of scholarship mainly concurs with Bracking’s (2013) verdict that in the 2013 election, ZANU-PF employed “a multi-pronged, multi-dimensional, very traditional set of tactics from the best practise handbook of stealing elections”.

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The change group generally starts from the premise that because ZANU-PF made the electoral gains it did in 2013 without recourse to violence or visible intimidation, repression and the manipulation of elections arguments are insufficient as explanations for the stunning electoral reversal. As such, something significant, must have changed. While I present it as one group, this literature varies on what it thought changed, or how ZANU-PF changed.

Some argue that part of what changed was structural and institutional. The very nature of governing arrangements through the GNU, the institutions it spawned, and structures it erected had an impact on the kinds of politics at play in the lead up to the 2013 elections. In this realm, LeBas (2014) attributes part of what changed to the "perils of power-sharing" which she argues disadvantaged the opposition and created opportunities for ZANU-PF (LeBas 2014:53). Raftopoulos (2013:983) argues that ZANU-PF changed its electoral strategy in 2013, from its dominant reliance on violence in the June 2008 run-off to a combination of coercion, consent and deliberately stalling on political reforms during the GNU and succeeded because of a reconstituted social base.

Others argue changes in political demeanour and Mugabe’s personality. Chan & Gallagher (2017:15) argue that ZANU-PF reconnected with its base during the GNU and “unleashed a charm offensive”, where its leaders reconnected, apologized and promised reform while distributing largesse and preached policies that promised to enhance the people’s material well-being. Tendi (2013:965) puts the change down to ZANU-PF not employing overt violence, reducing Mugabe’s exposure through campaign appearances but making sure that when he did, he was much more personable than he was in 2008. Table 5-7 shows Mugabe’s official campaign itinerary for 2013. It evidences Tendi’s change and shows why looking at bigwig visits is important. As is evident, Mugabe had a lighter load to carry, but the reality that this thesis highlights is that he was not working alone.

The change group treats ZANU-PF a bit more like a party. However, some of the analysis, for instance, impressions of Mugabe switching from being combative, to a charm offensive and becoming more personable, is not denotative of a change. Mugabe, even in 2008 was a "charmer" and charismatic and often elicited bouts of laughter from his audiences across the country. It is this charisma that endeared him to many of his admirers. Articulation of this kind of change is informed by what I call headline analysis, where scholars and the public engage
in the formation of opinions based on newspaper headlines or prevailing opinion. This is especially so for 2008, where I have already stated, the scholarship and analysis overly focus on the violent run-off election, when indeed Mugabe was more combative, less humorous and “charming”. Nevertheless, this was a president who after 30 years in power was on the verge of losing to political "novices" who had not let out blood, sweat and tears for the independence of the country. What could one expect of him? A study of the March 2008 election presents a different picture and pulls down the façade on some of the alleged changes.

The analysis that in this thesis broadly supports the conclusions of the second group. I note the importance of an analysis of ZANU-PF that is steeped in the longue durée and speaks to ZANU-PF's traditional conduct and history. However, I argue that the focus on how ZANU-PF stuck to its old form boxes the scholarship into an expectations trap. The analysis is limited to expectations of ZANU-PF as a historically authoritarian party rather than a more empirical focus on what it did. I argue that ZANU-PF learnt from 2008 and adapted in 2013, while the opposition in 2013 was still caught up in its 2008 glory and overestimated its chances because of the “absence” of violence. I note three things that contributed and influenced changes to ZANU-PF’s 2013 election campaign strategy and eventual election outcomes. These three things enjoin my analysis to the change group, but as I will show in the coming chapters, it also separates it from some of the changes or types of changes that the change group forward. I introduce these three things that I argue forced ZANU-PF to change, here and flesh them out in later chapters.

First, the costs of violence to ZANU-PF's legitimacy at home and abroad were a well-learnt lesson from 2008. In some respects, ZANU-PF's resort to brutal violence and increased patronage control and distribution of campaign largesse (after the March 2008 election and in the run-up to the presidential election run-off in June 2008) was the first and noticeable change in its strategy (Alexander and Tendi, 2008; Alexander and Chitofiri, 2010). This election violence, in which the military was implicated, had, as Hoglund (2009:416) notes, the objective of influencing the election process in ways similar to earlier attempts in 2008 by Mugabe to intimidate and dissuade soft-core opposition supporters from voting as I elaborate in Chapter 7. This was not out of character for ZANU-PF (Kriger, 2005; Sachikonye, 2011), as competitive authoritarian ruling parties are known
to use election violence and political repression to contain the democratic uncertainty at elections (Collier & Vicente 2012; Schedler 2002:104). It, however, came after an attempt at being elected within accepted Weberian legal-rational premises, which spoke to the intention in March 2008 to claim some procedural legitimacy.

The military and violent incursion into civilian electoral processes of June 2008 came at a cost. As Hafner-Burton, Hyde, & Jablonski (2018) note, the use of violence as a tactic of manipulation increases post-election challenges to the incumbent's rule, leading to high costs and concessions. In Zimbabwe, the African Union Election Observer Mission and SADC Election Observer Mission (SEOM) unequivocally stated that the June run-off elections did not represent the will of the people of Zimbabwe (SEOM, 2008:6). The African Union's Heads of State Summit issued a communique calling for dialogue, a Government of National Unity, and SADC mediation (AU, 2008:2). ZANU-PF had secured Mugabe's place as President in 2008. However, Tsvangirai had pulled out of the election because of violence, denying Mugabe legitimacy at home (Reuters, 9 March, 2008) while the SADC and AU’s condemnation denied him legitimacy among his peers, forcing Mugabe into a Government of National Unity (GNU). These circumstances, I argue, were a catalyst for change and are part of the causal pathway to ZANU-PF's 2013 election campaign and victory as chapters 7 and 8 will elaborate.

Second, like LeBas (2014), I argue that some of the changes to ZANU-PF's campaign strategy and resultant electoral fortunes in 2013 were a product of the GNU as a political moment where ZANU-PF shared incumbency with the opposition MDC formations. The very existence and operation of the GNU affected the modus operandi of not just the opposition, but also ZANU-PF. The genesis of the GNU forced ZANU-PF to shift its campaign strategies and tactics. The 2008 electoral process showed that ZANU-PF was on the back foot, and the GNU was a constant reminder of its failure to govern alone and as it wanted. Linked to this, and third, the 2013 election presented Mugabe and ZANU-PF with a chance to take corrective measures to allow it to govern alone and how it liked. This message, as chapters 6, 7 and 8 will show, was consistently bellowed out at bigwig rallies. As Hall (1988) notes, in situations where incumbent authoritarian parties are cornered, the old order cannot be preserved. It is left with the choice to reform or die. ZANU-PF chose to live, which entailed reform. Based on the
wisdom of hindsight it imperfectly adopted and adapted legitimacy-seeking methods to contest in the democratic field of elections in 2013.

5.10 Overview Of ZANU-PF National Level Campaign Strategy For The 2008 And 2013 Presidential Elections

ZANU-PF's change in strategy was evident at several levels. At the national level, this study's evidence suggests that ZANU-PF changed its primary campaign targets. Whereas in 2008 ZANU-PF targeted ZANU-PF aligned constituencies (ZAC) with the most bigwig visits, in 2013, it targeted opposition-aligned constituencies (OAC) and consolidating ZACs more. I argue that this is both indicative and a result of ZANU-PF's changes in its campaign strategy. Following Rohrschneider (2002), I characterise these strategies related to whom ZANU-PF targeted with enhanced campaign efforts as "mobilising" or "Chasing" strategies. In 2008 ZANU-PF's targets for the intensive campaign through mainly Mugabe's rallies suggest that the party at the national level was engaged in a mobilising strategy that targeted its core-constituencies.

In 2013, the data suggests that at the national level, ZANU-PF had switched campaign targets from its core-supporters to unaligned and opposition voters, indicative of a predominantly chasing strategy at that level. However, as I will show in the chapters that follow, this "neat" national strategy was much murkier at the subnational level, where the demands of local contexts disciplined variations and adaptations of these broad national strategies.

The results displayed in Table 5-2 support the above position. The study catalogued 81 bigwig visits within two months of each of the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections. It mapped these bigwig visits across constituency types, as shown in Table 5-2. I mapped the bigwig visits onto constituency types that emerged from the results of the previous presidential elections. That is, 2008 bigwig visits mapped onto 2002 presidential election results-based constituency types, and 2013 visits mapped onto March 2008 presidential election results constituency types.
Table 5-2: ZANU-PF Bigwig visits for 2008 and 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency Type</th>
<th>2008 Bigwig Visits</th>
<th>2008 Aggregate proportions per Major Constituency type</th>
<th>2013 Bigwig Visits</th>
<th>2013 Aggregate Bigwig visit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF Strongholds</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidating ZANU-PF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal ZANU-PF</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleground Constituencies</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Strongholds</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidating Opposition</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal Opposition</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Data based on cataloguing campaign stops of the ZANU-PF Praesidium during the 2008 (March and June) and 2013 elections.

Table 5-2 shows that in 2008 ZANU-PF invested 53% of its bigwig visits in ZACs, and 34% of its effort in OACs, while BCs received only 14% of visits. It also shows that in 2013, ZANU-PF changed its locus of attention from ZACs, to which it invested 26% of its bigwig efforts, thereby almost reducing its attention there by half. It then paid closer attention to OACs, where it invested 64% of its bigwig visits. It barely visited BCs at 8% of all bigwig visits.

Of the 41 nationwide bigwig visits mapped for 2008, 31 bigwig visits were staged ahead of the March Presidential election, while ten bigwig visits were after the March Presidential election but ahead of the ill-fated June Presidential Election Runoff. The constituency sub-type that ZANU-PF paid the most attention to was marginal-ZANU-PF constituencies which attracted 29% of all visits and about 55% of visits to ZACs. Marginal ZANU-PF constituencies were constituencies where ZANU-PF had narrowly won. However, the margin of victory was not low enough for the constituency to slip into the BC category, and also not large enough to be in the safer consolidating category. ZANU-PF paid the least attention to opposition strongholds (10%) and consolidating ZANU-PF constituencies.
The above results are generally consistent with the mobilising strategy. They show that ZANU-PF focused on shoring-up support in "its" core-constituencies, but mainly in the ones which, in 2002 had shown signs of slipping through narrow margins of victory. It paid little attention to battleground and opposition constituencies. I argue that this was because the 2002 election results as well as the two-thirds majority in parliament that ZANU-PF enjoyed, provided it with a sense of confidence in 2008. All things being constant, shoring up its support in the marginal constituencies and maximising in its strongholds should have been able to keep its political dominance intact. Nevertheless, this strategy did not work with dire consequences for ZANU-PF's hold on power, and later, its legitimacy. Figure 5-5 shows ZANU-PF's 2008 bigwig visits mapped on constituency types.

**Figure 5-5: ZANU-PF Bigwig 2008 visits x Constituency Types**

In 2013, of the 39 catalogued visits, ZANU-PF deployed most of its bigwig visits to marginal-opposition constituencies (28% of all visits) and opposition strongholds (23% of all visits). These two constituency sub-types alone accounted for over half of ZANU-PF's bigwig rallies, indicating a concerted effort on ZANU-PF's part to campaign to non-core voters. Targeting of marginal-
opposition constituencies made sense because of the narrowness of the margins, and ZANU-PF's need to recover from the 2008 defeat. On face value, the attempts on opposition strongholds made no strategic sense.

However, beyond face value, I argue in chapter 7 that ZANU-PF saw an opportunity through the GNU and decided to take advantage of MDC leaders’ preoccupations with government business to attempt takeovers of the constituencies represented by MDC ministers. The fact that ZANU-PF targeted opposition constituencies goes against the thinking in the majority of the literature. For instance, Bratton et al. (2016) and ICG (2013) argued that ZANU-PF appeared to be concentrating its efforts in its rural strongholds, something that the data for this study disputes.

The results accord with the thesis' general positioning that ZANU-PF proved adept at learning and shifted to a chasing strategy. A reasonable basis on which one can question the assertion that ZANU-PF had switched strategies can be regarding why it then did not target battleground constituencies. In chapter 8, I argue that BCs were not part of the election campaign calculus of ZANU-PF and that in its eyes, there were opposition and ZANU-PF constituencies, although some of these were easier to win than others. Figure 5-6 shows ZANU-PF's bigwig visits for 2013 mapped on constituency types from the 2008 election results.
Figure 5-6: ZANU-PF Bigwig visits 2013 x Constituency Type

The data displayed in Table 5-2 and Figure 5-5 and 5-6 clearly shows that ZANU-PF paid the least attention to its core constituencies in 2013. ZANU-PF made bigwig visits to its strongholds and consolidating constituencies the least visited (8% of all visits each) in 2013. This is consistent with a chasing rather than mobilising strategy. On face value, the data also suggests a reduction in bigwig visits for 2013 from the 2008 level of 41 to 39, which is counter-intuitive to a hearts and minds and chasing campaign that would entail more campaigning not less. This observation is buttressed by ZANU-PF spokesperson, Rugare Gumbo, who in 2013 announced that Mugabe would make ten appearances at star rallies (Daily News, 2013, July 11). Tendi (2013) points out that opposition pundits ascribed this to ill-health and ZANU-PF's attempt to manage both the workload for the then 89-year-old Mugabe, as well as managing the optics around over-exposing a visibly fragile and weak candidate. The official rally schedule for
Mugabe as announced by Gumbo after the politburo meeting is shown in table 5-7 below

**Table 5-3: Mugabe's Official 2013 Campaign Itinerary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Provincial Capital (y/n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nzvimbo Growth Point, Chiweshe</td>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>Thursday 11 July 2013</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marange, aerodrome</td>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>Saturday 13 July 2013</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudhaka Stadium, Marondera</td>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>Monday 15 July 2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chibhuku Stadium, Chitungwiza</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>Tuesday 16 July 2013</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinhoyi Stadium</td>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>Thursday 18 July 2018</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lupane</td>
<td>Matabeleland North</td>
<td>Friday, 19 July 2018</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pelandaba Stadium Gwanda</td>
<td>Matabeleland South</td>
<td>Saturday, 20 July 2018</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>Thursday 25 July 2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White City Stadium, Bulawayo</td>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
<td>Saturday 27 July 2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Sports Stadium, Harare</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>Sunday 28 July 2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author’s Data based on ZANU-PF Politburo announcement on 10 July 2013

It is worth noting that the visits for 2008 included about ten which where after the March 2008 election and were staged as Mugabe's effort towards the election run-off. In real terms, on an election by election basis, the reduction in 2013 is an increase of bigwig campaign activity in the first round of the Presidential election. Also, as this thesis will show in chapters 6, 7 and 8, while Mugabe’s workload was reduced, that of other bigwigs, especially Vice President Joyce Mujuru, and Party Chairman, Simon Khaya Moyo, was increased. It is precisely because of this shift that this study focuses on bigwig rather than "star" rallies.

Strategically, the deployment of bigwig visits during the two elections was a study in contrast. Beside the de-escalation of attention to ZACs from highest priority in 2008 to lowest priority in 2013, and the escalation of OACs from low (2008) to high priority (2013) the data showed other shifts. For instance, in 2008, 68% of ZANU-PF’s 2008 bigwig visits (28 out of 41) were to rural
constituencies, with urban areas only accounting for 17% (7 visits) and peri-urban areas 14% (6 visits). The majority of these visits were to new constituencies (63.5% of total visits) which had emerged from the delimitation process, but which mostly carved off old ZANU-PF strongholds that were predominantly rural. In 2013, most of the constituencies that ZANU-PF targeted with bigwig visits were still rural. However, the proportion had gone down from 68% to about 54%, while the proportion of urban bigwig visits more than doubled, increasing from 17% of all visits in 2008 to about 37% of all visits in 2013.

The study’s data suggest that in the 2013 Presidential election, ZANU-PF changed tactics and went after opposition constituencies. It is also plausible that ZANU-PF was going after the “new” constituencies it had lost to the opposition in 2008. Chapter 6 and 7 will take a closer look at why and how ZANU-PF campaigned in opposition-aligned and battleground constituencies in both the 2008 and 2013 elections in a bit more detail. As this section demonstrated, a large part of the national level analysis for this study hinges on bigwig rally allocation and deployment as a proxy for campaign intensity, and the basis on which the study infers which kinds of constituencies were important to ZANU-PF in the two elections.

5.10.1 Some Notes On New Constituencies

Chapter 4 outlined the delimitation exercise that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission conducted in 2008. This delimitation exercise increased the number of single-member districts for House of Assembly elections from 120 to 210, creating 90 “new” constituencies. These new constituencies attracted a significant amount of ZANU-PF’s campaign attention through bigwig visits. Bigwig visits to new constituencies accounted for 17 of the 41 bigwig visits (about 42%) catalogued for 2008 in this study. Battleground constituencies received the second highest amount of attention, followed by ZACs, with OACs received the least attention.

Table 5-3 shows the new constituencies that ZANU-PF bigwigs visited. As stated above, when new constituencies are factored in separately, it is clear that they were the most targeted with bigwig rallies. The make-up of the new constituencies that ZANU-PF targeted with bigwig rallies shows ZANU-PF targeted new constituencies drawn from consolidating ZANU-PF the most followed by battleground constituencies. The politics of this approach makes
sense and tallies with general thinking that ZANU-PF had increased the number of house of assembly constituencies to its benefit. Rallies in new, formerly ZANU-PF constituencies would ensure that the anticipated electoral dividends could come. However, the fact that ZANU-PF targeted new constituencies with traditional ZANU-PF DNA, i.e. the bigwig visits to the new constituencies did not constitute the bulk of non-ZAC visits in 2008. This data does not change the analysis when the new constituencies are coded along the seven categories without the new designation.

Table 5-4: 2008 Bigwig Visits To New Constituencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Constituency At 2008 Presidential Election</th>
<th>Constituency Type Pre-Delimitation in 2008 Based On 2002 Presidential Election Results</th>
<th>Number Of ZANU-PF Bigwig Visits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mbire</td>
<td>ZANU-PF stronghold</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo Urban</td>
<td>Battleground</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Darwin East</td>
<td>ZANU-PF Stronghold</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiredzi West</td>
<td>Consolidating-ZANU-PF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chirumanzu Zibagwe</td>
<td>Consolidating-ZANU-PF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goromonzi West</td>
<td>Consolidating-ZANU-PF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chegutu East</td>
<td>Battleground</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marondera Central</td>
<td>Battleground</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goromonzi North</td>
<td>Consolidating-ZANU-PF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hwange Central</td>
<td>Marginal-Opposition</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zengeza East</td>
<td>Opposition Stronghold</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bikita South</td>
<td>Consolidating-ZANU-PF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gokwe-Gumunyu</td>
<td>Consolidating-ZANU-PF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magunje</td>
<td>Marginal-ZANU-PF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lupane East</td>
<td>Consolidating-Opposition</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsholotsho South</td>
<td>Battleground</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beitbridge West</td>
<td>Consolidating-ZANU-PF</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

So while the picture presented in Table 5-3 above is accurate, this section proceeds from the premise that this picture treats these new constituencies erroneously as a *tabula rasa*. They were not tabula rasa and to treat them as such would distort the analysis of the kinds of constituencies that ZANU-PF targeted for the 2008 presidential election race. A review of the genetic codes of the new constituencies based on the electoral histories of the constituencies, from which they were cleaved, shows that 59% of the new constituencies, to which ZANU-PF deployed bigwig rallies in 2008 (10 of the 17), were cleaved from ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies. Only three of the 17 (about 17%) were drawn from
opposition-aligned constituencies. Four were cleaved from existing battleground constituencies.

5.11 Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the legislative and institutional framework under which elections were conducted in Zimbabwe. It provided a historical background of constitutional and legislative amendments that had an impact on elections from 1980 up to 2008. The chapter also reviewed the state of electoral contests in Zimbabwe after 2000, focusing specifically on presidential elections. This review included an analysis of extant literature on post-2000 elections, and the 2008 and 2013 elections. It highlighted the issue of violence and fraud and dealt explicitly with the later based on interventions to detect fraud from civil society organisations and the scholarship.

The chapter argued that while violence and fraud were realities, the literature often overemphasises these elements because of their historical significance and recurrence. However, this leads the literature to review ZANU-PF as its past rather than its current form. In the process, it misses ZANU-PF's "current" actions and what they import as it looks to the familiar as informed by ZANU-PF's past form. It also misses changes that are often present even in continuity regarding ZANU-PF and its electoral strategy. The chapter dispensed of arguments that argue continuity rather than change in ZANU-PF and located itself with scholarship that discerned some change in ZANU-PF and or its campaign strategy in 2013.

The chapter ended by presenting the study's findings around national-level campaigning based on an assessment of bigwig visits and how ZANU-PF deployed them to different constituency types. It showed that ZANU-PF concentrated its efforts in 2008 to ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies and argued that this was indicative of a generally mobilising campaign strategy at the national level. It also showed that in 2013 ZANU-PF shifted its focus through bigwig rallies to opposition-aligned constituencies and argued that this represented a strategic shift from mobilising to a generally chasing campaign strategy at the national level.

The chapter cautioned that while the initial findings are almost clear cut, the picture was more diffuse and sophisticated at the subnational level. The next
chapter begins to look at ZANU-PF campaigns from both a national and local perspective. It starts the process of illuminating the complexity of ZANU-PF's campaigns at different levels and vantage points. Specifically, the next chapter studies ZANU-PF campaigns in ZANU-aligned constituencies, ZACs. It presents further dataset observations as they relate to bigwig rallies and ZACs and uses Mount Darwin constituencies to show how ZANU-PF campaigned at subnational level, the kinds of appeals it made during bigwig rallies to ZACs in general and Mount Darwin in particular. It uses its evidence to engage with specific explanations from the literature. It infers what the findings mean for ZANU-PF's attempts at gaining consent to govern from the people and the kinds of claims to legitimacy that it staked in ZACs.
This chapter focuses on ZANU-PF’s 2008 and 2013 presidential election campaigns in ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies (ZACs). ZACs are constituencies that typically incline towards ZANU-PF. They include ZANU-PF strongholds, consolidating and marginal constituencies, as defined in Chapter 2. The presidential election results from 2008 and 2013 show that a total of 113 of the 210 House of Assembly constituencies were ZACs at some point during these elections. The chapter looks at how ZANU-PF campaigned in ZACs and how these campaigns connected between the national level presidential campaign and local-level politics in Mount Darwin District, whose constituencies this chapter focuses on, to describe and explain the subnational politics of the 2008 and 2013 presidential races in Zimbabwe. The chapter tests the study's primary hypothesis that 'ZANU-PF campaigns to win the hearts and minds of voters to enhance its legitimacy' through analysing bigwig appeals during rallies in ZACs and the subnational politics of the Mount Darwin constituencies (East, South, West) and surrounding areas. These Mount Darwin constituencies, located in Mashonaland Central province, fit the designation of ZACs in the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections. The electoral politics and campaign activity that occurred in these constituencies is reasonably representative of the ZANU-PF presidential election campaign modus operandi in ZACs in general.

The chapter concludes that ZANU-PF campaigned in legitimacy-seeking ways through bigwig visits to Mount Darwin and ZACs. However, at the local level, it engaged in a coercive mobilisation campaign and used clientelism as both a carrot and a stick through denial of access to clientelist benefits. ZANU-PF flattered to deceive as it publicly sought legitimacy, but privately compelled support in wicked ways that were inimical to legitimacy-seeking modes of electioneering. I argue that in ZACs across both the 2008 and 2013 elections, ZANU-PF generally adopted a mobilising campaign strategy with coercive and clientelist features. Despite the continuity of the coercive mobilisation strategy in ZACs across time, there were significant variations to the implementation of the coercive-clientelist mobilising strategy. The chapter outlines how ZANU-PF generally instituted a three-tier political game of (i) persuasion at bigwig rallies and (ii) persuasion, as well as (iii) coercion at the local level. Party organisation, restricting opposition
campaigns, and instrumentalising traditional leaders, war veterans and party youths were central cogs of ZANU-PF's subnational politics. ZANU-PF expected to win in these constituencies as well as nationally through mobilising sufficient turnout of what it imagined was its huge popular base, especially in 2008. Whatever inducements ZANU-PF offered; were to "buy" ZANU-PF members' turnout.

Meanwhile in 2013, while still mobilising constituents in these core-ZANU-PF areas, ZANU-PF campaigned to increase the turnout, not just of its members, but members of rural communities in general. Whatever inducements it offered were effectively monitored and played a dual role of "vote and turnout buying." The monitoring ensured that as many people as possible in ZACs, beyond formal ZANU-PF structures, voted for ZANU-PF. This led to ZANU-PF not only winning but doing so with telling winning margins.

In light of the above, the chapter finds, against the study's hypothesis that ZANU-PF campaigns to win the hearts and minds of more independent voters to enhance its legitimacy. At least not in ZACs. ZANU-PF initially restricted its efforts to established support bases. However, even when it was generally chasing new support in 2013, the politics in ZACs remained toxic, with intimidation quite rife. The evidence suggests that in these types of constituencies, ZANU-PF campaigns to establish its credentials as the party of liberation and expects voters to support it on this account. This generally speaks to identity-based claims to legitimacy, and as expected, ZANU-PF centred these claims on foundational myths (history) and ideology.

I organise the rest of the chapter using two main sections. Section 6.1 covers ZANU-PF's campaigns in ZACs in 2008 using bigwigs and provides an overview of ZANU-PF aligned constituencies across time (2002-2013). It then looks at the appeals that ZANU-PF made during rallies. It finds history and ideological appeals, opposition vilification and the instrumentalisation of chiefs as the most prominent. None of the appeals spoke to procedural or performance legitimacy. This was mainly the same for both the 2008 and 2013 election. The appeals made spoke to identity and foundational myths, as well as traditional legitimacy in the Weberian sense. Section 6.2 covers ZANU-PF's ground game in ZACs. It outlines the local appeal of history and ideology, the kinds of clientelist bargains the local organisers made with supporters and suspected opposition members and how
ZANU-PF treats its organisation as part of the campaign strategy. It studies ZANU-PF's voluntary and involuntary conscription of traditional leaders, and its more virulent politics. The section will describe and explain the return of the colonial type of exclusionary politics, as well as the use of violence and intimidation.

6.1 Preaching To The Choir: ZANU-PF’s Mobilising Campaign Strategy In ZACS (2008 And 2013)

In this section, I outline the prevalence of ZACs across time and the extent to which ZANU-PF campaigned in them during the 2008 and 2013 elections through bigwig visits. I argue that in 2008 ZANU-PF implemented a campaign strategy aimed at energising its base, which it targeted with the most bigwig visits. Within this base it targeted marginal constituencies the most to shore up its support based on the assumption that ZANU-PF strongholds and consolidating constituencies were fairly secure. After outlining the extent to which ZANU-PF campaigned using bigwig visits in ZACs in 2008, I describe the kind of appeals that ZANU-PF bigwigs made during campaign stops. I do the same for ZANU-PF bigwig visits for 2013, where I argue that in ZACs, ZANU-PF maintained the mobilising strategy, but modified it to capture the opposition vote. Unlike in opposition strongholds and battleground constituencies in 2013, where ZANU-PF adopted a persuasive chasing strategy to capture the votes of non-ZANU-PF members, in ZACs, especially Mount Darwin, ZANU-PF compelled this support. The section that follows this one will explore in greater detail this compulsion, and how ZANU-PF put in place measures that ensured that beneficiaries of its patronage voted as expected.

As Zimbabwe went to the polls in March 2008, ZANU-PF was confident. It had a two-thirds majority in parliament from the 2005 parliamentary elections, and in the 2002 presidential poll, its presidential candidate, Robert Mugabe, had garnered 56.2% of the vote, against his rival Morgan Tsvangirai, who had obtained 42%. Based on the solid parliamentary showing from 2005, and the substantial lead from the 2002 presidential election, ZANU-PF had at least 106 constituencies, out of 210, that were in the ZAC column and could be considered relatively "safe" prior to the 2008 Harmonised election. The 106 ZACs included 39 strongholds, 34 consolidating constituencies, and 33 marginal constituencies. Table 6-1 shows the distribution of ZACs across all post-2000 presidential elections in percentages and absolute numbers.
### Table 6-1: ZANU-PF Aligned Constituencies (2002-2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Number Of Constituencies Per ZAC sub-Constituency Type</th>
<th>Total ZACs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongholds</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1-2002</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of 210 districts</td>
<td>18.57%</td>
<td>15.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2-2008</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of 210 districts</td>
<td>4.28%</td>
<td>9.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3-2013</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of 210 districts</td>
<td>21.90%</td>
<td>14.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T4-2018</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of 210 districts</td>
<td>16.19%</td>
<td>17.61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s data computed from official presidential election results

As Table 6-1 shows, the 2008 presidential election outcome left the number of constituencies in the ZANU-PF aligned category at 48, with the number of strongholds declining from 39 to 9, the number of marginal ZANU-PF constituencies falling from 33 to 20, and the number of consolidating ZANU-PF constituencies also declining from 34 to 19. The ZANU-PF base had weakened, with reductions across all ZAC constituency types, and some going into either the battleground or opposition aligned category.

The 2013 presidential election outcomes show a dramatic recovery for the numbers of constituencies falling into the ZAC category. The total number of ZACs increased from 48 to 120, almost tripling the category’s tally. As illustrated in Figure 6-1, the number of ZANU-PF strongholds increased from 9 to 46, and the numbers of marginals and consolidating constituencies increased to 30 (up from 20) and 44 (up from 19) respectively. Of the 113 constituencies that remained in the ZAC category across time, 103 were rural constituencies, with the remainder being peri-urban constituencies. No urban constituency entered the ZAC categories. Of the 103 ZAC rural constituencies, 68 had benefitted from the post-2000 Fast Track Land Reform process, which was mostly ‘complete' by the time of the 2008 presidential election process.
6.1.1 ZANU-PF’s Bigwig Visits In 2008

During the 2008 March presidential elections, ZANU-PF concentrated most of its bigwig visits to ZACs as shown in Figure 6-2. It spared 53% of all bigwig visits for ZACs while battleground and opposition aligned constituencies (OACs) took up the remaining 47% of visits at 14% and 34% respectively. Table 6-2 shows both the percentages (rounded off to the nearest whole number) and absolute number of bigwig visits per sub-constituency type for 2008. It shows that the majority of ZANU-PF’s bigwig visits to ZACs, about 55%, were to marginal ZANU-PF constituencies, while strongholds received 32% and consolidating ZANU-PF constituencies about 14% of all visits to ZACs.
I argue that the fact that ZANU-PF's main focus in 2008 was on its regions of perceived strength, particularly marginal constituencies, indicates two things. First, the fact that ZANU-PF paid the most attention to its core-areas suggests that at the national level ZANU-PF was implementing a mobilising campaign strategy. A mobilising campaign strategy emphasizes policies, pre-dominantly appeals to core voters, primarily relies on ideology, emphasizes leaders, and mainly views the party organization as a means to reach voters (Rohrschneider, 2002:368).

In the sections that follow, I will show how ZANU-PF’s 2008 campaign placated its base, focusing on ZANU-PF friendly policies, its ideology and selling hagiographic accounts of its candidate while using its party organisation as a key vote mobilisation vehicle.
Table 6-2: ZANU-PF Bigwig Visits to ZACs in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency Type</th>
<th>2008 Bigwig Visits N = 42</th>
<th>2008 Aggregate proportion of ZANU-PF Bigwig visits to ZACs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF Strongholds</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidating ZANU-PF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal ZANU-PF</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s data based on media bigwig rally coverage

The data also indicates that ZANU-PF’s focus on marginal constituencies more than any other ZAC sub-type suggests that ZANU-PF strategically targeted its weaker areas of support and considered consolidating and stronghold constituencies fairly secure. This sense of security emanated from ZANU-PF’s past electoral form. In the 2005 general election, the ZANU-PF base had delivered a blistering victory against the opposition, attaining a two-thirds majority in the House of Assembly. The 2005 results appeared to consolidate ZANU-PF’s electoral gains following its win in the violent 2002 presidential election, where Mugabe had triumphed with a vote share of 56.2%. The scare from the close competition of the 2000 election where ZANU-PF had barely scraped through with 62 of 120 seats but with only a vote share of 48% seemed to be comfortably behind them (LeBas, 2006; Hatchard, 2001) I contend that that this electoral history and the successful propaganda campaign, as well as the private and foreign media clampdown between 2002 and 2005 (Bratton, Chikwanha, & Sithole, 2005), led ZANU-PF to believe that it was in peak electoral form. With the electoral patterns reasonably stable, it is probable that ZANU-PF believed that to win the 2008 presidential election it could mobilise its core-voters, whose volumes, on past form, could deliver a victory for Mugabe, especially if it bettered its performance in marginal constituencies.

6.1.2 ZANU-PF’s Appeals On The 2008 Campaign Trail

Based on how it distributed its bigwig visits in 2008, ZANU-PF campaigned to energise its base and get it to turn out. This being the intent, ZANU-PF did not need to tone-down its “red meat” rhetoric. Mugabe and other bigwigs went all out with ideological, historical, and anti-imperialist rhetoric, as well as opposition demonisation and other polarising discourses. As LeBas (2006:435) notes, political parties are best able to accomplish the task of mobilising constituencies
and maintaining party cohesion when they use confrontational or polarising tactics to draw sharp boundaries between themselves and their opponents. The next section will explore how, and with what appeals, ZANU-PF went about mobilising its constituents. It will show how ZANU-PF deployed ideological and historical appeals that hagiographically elevated Mugabe’s role in the past and depicted him as the best candidate to lead the country.

The section that follows will explore how ZANU-PF maintained its party cohesion using its organisational structures as well as other social capital institutions in Mount Darwin. It will catalogue the tactics that ZANU-PF employed at the subnational level in Mount Darwin during the 2008 election as part of the national mobilising campaign strategy for the 2008 presidential election.

6.1.3 More than votes: fighting for sovereignty and defending independence.

Where we are now going, to the 29th of March, we must go and vote. We must prepare for the vote that will come out then. A vote that shows that we are of Chimurenga, a vote that shows that we fought for this country, and that we did not fight for it so that it can go back into the hands of the British. Our fist is tightly gripping the country and we will not let go, we will not open it up to allow our country to be taken again (Mugabe quoted in Saturday Herald, 15 March, 2008).

The 2008 ZANU-PF presidential candidate, Robert Mugabe, who was also sitting state president made the above call to thousands of supporters at a rally in Mount Darwin, at the Kamutsvenzve Grain Marketing Board Silos on 14th March 2008. Mugabe made the case that, despite there being opposition candidates in his former lieutenant Simba Makoni, who was running as an independent candidate having left ZANU-PF a few months earlier, in addition to his primary challenger Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC, the election was a fight against the British. The 2008 election fight, according to Mugabe, was a contest, not just between parties, but more importantly between preserving Zimbabwe’s independence in the hands of ZANU-PF or returning it to the British and the Rhodesians through the opposition (Saturday Herald, 15 March, 2008). By making this case, Mugabe was continuing a narrative from earlier post-2000 election campaigns and dipping into a rich vein of emotive struggle and postcolonial state formation tensions that dated back to the struggle for liberation,
not only in Zimbabwe, but also across Africa and the colonised world (Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004; Raftopoulos, 2002; 2006).

Mugabe dedicated much time to the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, whom he called more stupid than his predecessor, Tony Blair. At the Mount Darwin rally, he revealed that this was because Gordon Brown had admitted in writing to the British Law Society that he had increased funding for the opposition in Zimbabwe from 2.5 million British Pounds to 3.3 million British Pounds (Saturday Herald, 15 March, 2008). In pursuing this line of attack, Mugabe was picking up from the 2005 general election, where ZANU-PF had devoted acres of space in its election manifesto and campaign to the so-called Bush and Blair factors in Zimbabwe’s politics (ZANU-PF, 2005:4-7). ZANU-PF accused the opposition of being a “political mongrel of Blair, Bush and the West” who were puppets in a war to push back the "clock" of the African revolution in Southern Africa, and to perpetuate western dominance with Zimbabwe as the chosen battlefield (ZANU-PF, 2005:7).

This acerbic rhetoric was initially Mugabe’s way of placing the Zimbabwean problem at the centre of a more fundamental anti-imperialist and pan-African ideological battle. I was also a response to widespread local and international critiques around property and human rights violations in Zimbabwe and the absence of the rule of law post-2000 (Phimister & Raftopoulos, 2004:385). As such, besides connecting to earlier election campaigns, Mugabe’s sentiments connected with longer running pan-African battles and were characteristic of post-colonial Africa’s challenges with its former colonisers. Post-colonial states are generally animated by a search for identity, being recognised as responsible agents whose opinions matter and who are self-determining, as well as the practical dynamic of building an efficient modern state characterised by the good life, political order, and playing a role in the international commonwealth of nations (Geertz,1973:258). Mugabe’s rhetoric during the 2008 election, 28 years after independence, still betrayed this dual challenge, and an attempt at resolving it through asserting and defending the country’s national sovereignty. The claims around the battle being between independence and subjugation by former colonisers tapped into “…the widespread concern in Africa that there is a process of 're-colonisation' going on under the ideological cloak of globalisation and structural reform”(Bush & Szeftel, 2002:5).
Phimister and Raftopoulos (2004) are right about the genesis of the anti-imperialist discourse, but as I will show below, during the 2008 election campaign in places like Mount Darwin, ZANU-PF’s use of the sovereignty and anti-imperialist discourse did more than galvanise pan-African solidarity, it also acted as a potent local persuasive appeal. ZANU-PF’s National Party Commissar and Mashonaland Central provincial kingpin during the 2008 election, Eliot Manyika, was an eloquent purveyor and disciple of the anti-imperialist rhetoric. He helped to spread in the message in his province and argued that:

Everyone should understand that if we lose this election, we would be going back to the period where we were under control of the Whiteman. The MDC agenda is foreign sponsored [and] the Western imperialists are not kind people, they do not do anything because of compassion but are just trying to run the country by remote control to loot our resources (Chronicle, 3 June, 2008).

In Mount Darwin, Mugabe ensured that allusions to the liberation struggle were not just declarations and claims to legitimacy because Mugabe and ZANU-PF had led the liberation struggle. They were also a collective identity that included Mugabe and the people of Mount Darwin as one “we” who had fought for the liberation of the country and had a responsibility to protect it from falling back into British hands directly or by proxy. This is an approach that Mugabe used again to great effect in the 2013 election, as I will show in the sections that follow. Nonetheless, Vice President Mujuru, during her March 2 visit to Mount Darwin West, struck a similar chord, and expressed confidence that the people of Mount Darwin knew whom to vote for because they knew their history and had seen the ugly face of the liberation struggle (Chronicle, 3 March, 2008).

While sometimes vile, hateful and maligning, the ideological and historical discourse was resonant in Mount Darwin, where some members of ZANU-PF embraced the argument, and indicated to me their belief that Zimbabwe was under siege from the West. This resonance in ZACs has to be understood in the context of ZANU-PF feeding its base “red meat rhetoric” and the ZANU-PF’s ideological appeals, in this case, being targeted at already believing core-constituents. As such, Mujuru’s sentiment above, and Mugabe and Manyika’s references to history have to be understood in the particular context of Mount Darwin and much of Mashonaland Central. Mount Darwin borders Mozambique, and houses Mukumbura Border post, which served as a useful channel for guerrilla crossings to and from Mozambique’s Tete Province during Zimbabwe's liberation struggle.
in the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, some parts of Mount Darwin were at the forefront of the war of liberation, and significant numbers of its sons and daughters participated in the war effort at home and across the border in Mozambique.

The amount of guerrilla activity in Mount Darwin and the surrounding ‘tribal trust lands’ between Chiweshe (further inland in Mashonaland Central) and the border with Mozambique, led the Rhodesian settler regime to introduce Protected Villages in 1973 as part of an operation code-named Hurricane. This operation also included the establishment of a "cordon sanitaire" minefield along the border with Mozambique (Mazambani & Mashingaidze, 2014; Mills & Wilson, 2007: 23). Rhodesian Lieutenant Colonel Bates, quoted in Cilliers (1985:15), summarised the strategy as:

...large external operations to turn off the tap; a cordon sanitaire with warning devices, patrolled and backed by a 20 km wide no-go area; population control consisting of Protected Villages, food control, curfews and (eventually) martial law, and massive psychological action (Lt Colonel T Bates quoted in Cilliers, 1985:15).

At the time of writing, R2M2 landmines left over from the liberation struggle still litter parts of Mount Darwin, leaving large sections of the district inhabitable, and the land unavailable for productive agricultural purposes (Munyukwi, 2017). While the landmines are a clear and present danger, they are not the only surviving legacy of the liberation struggle that is impacting daily life in Mount Darwin. As I will show later, when covering the local politics of presidential elections in Mount Darwin, the liberation war history and associated narratives have a ‘sweet and sour place’ for and in Mount Darwin, and continue to shape the conduct of politics, including electoral politics in the constituencies.

6.1.4 Blurred Lines: Pragmatic, programmatic and clientelist appeals in 2008

Despite the serious economic challenges that Zimbabwe was going through in 2008, Mugabe, running in the election as an incumbent, neither apologised nor explained. Instead, he blamed the British for the imposition of sanctions and sabotaging the Zimbabwean economy, which he argued the British still controlled (Saturday Herald, 15 March, 2008). It was the western sabotage and sanctions that Mugabe presented responses to, announcing that his government had instituted a “Look East” policy focusing on trade and investments from China, and other Asian countries to deal with the sanctions. In regard to the British
economic control and sabotage, Mugabe presented the indigenisation and economic empowerment act, which he had signed into law a few days earlier on March 8. This law, promulgated three weeks before the presidential election, prevented foreigners from holding more than 49% equity in local companies and businesses (Reuters 9 March, 2008). While presented as part pragmatic and part programmatic, Mugabe located these solutions within a historical balance of forces and ZANU-PF’s liberation credentials trope, with the Chinese captured as the all-weather friends, and the British and their American “cousins” as the coloniser and traditional enemy.

ZANU-PF touted the land reform process and its historical and practical implications for economic emancipation as its biggest achievement. It sought to build on this success with Mugabe pledging to set up a results-based government to continue empowering people through supporting “new farmers” with implements to increase productivity (Saturday Herald, 15 March, 2008). This promise of support was predicated on a government instituted US$ 180 million farm mechanisation programme, which together with grain and fertiliser distribution to new farmers, the government had instituted in June 2007 (Financial Gazette, 13-19 March, 2008). Through this initiative the government had, between June 2007 and March 2008, given newly resettled farmers at least: 2725 tractors, 746 boom sprayers, 608 fertiliser spreaders, 466 planters, 105 combine harvesters, 210 hay bailers, 78,000 scotch carts (Ox drawn carts), 46,000 cultivators, 2000 planters, 100,000 ploughs, 130,000 animal drawn harrows, 92,000 knapsacks, 200,000 chains, and 3120 heifers and bulls.

While new rural farmers were the beneficiaries of the farm mechanisation programme, most of the animal drawn implements (scotch carts, ploughs) and simple tools (Harrows, chains) were manufactured locally, creating employment and access to economic opportunities for urban locals (Financial Gazette, 13-19 March, 2008). New farmers, given the politics of the country and the land reform, were mainly perceived to be ZANU-PF supporters, and their privileged access to the above stated programmes was adjudged to be a form of bribery for political ends (Human Rights Watch, 2002; Murisa, 2011; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2006; Zamchiya, 2013b Solidarity Peace Trust, 2006). The timing and selective distribution of farming inputs had an impact on election campaigning and appeared calculated to (i) benefit perceived ZANU-PF supporters as rewards for loyalty, and (ii) demonstrate Mugabe and ZANU-PF’s ability to honour their
“programmatic” promises. The interventions were deliberate although public officials, like the Reserve Bank Governor, Gideon Gono, whose quasi-fiscal activities supported these initiatives, denied it.

President Mugabe deserves to be rewarded by the voters if they, on their own, judge that the farm mechanisation programme is a good one and that it is succeeding because the President is behind it. That cannot be said to be a March 29, 2008 campaign strategy, but if it is, then surely there is nothing wrong with it because it is part and parcel of the democratic process (Sunday Mail, 23-29 March, 2008).

Mugabe also made programmatic appeals specifically targeted at provinces. For instance, he pledged rural electrification in Mashonaland Central, and stated that his government would harness solar energy and increase the electricity generation capacities of thermal power stations to electrify schools and clinics (Saturday Herald, 15 March, 2008). In addition to the above, at every star rally, Mugabe officially handed over 23 buses from the Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO), a state enterprise, to support provincial transport needs. These buses were among the 300 bought through the Reserve Bank ahead of the 2008 elections. While Mugabe’s programmatic appeals were grand, and some, national in scale, in Mount Darwin, Mujuru made locally focused programmatic appeals around irrigation schemes and poultry projects (Herald, 3 March, 2008). Mujuru’s campaign efforts, in their tone and focus, show the fluidity of the concept of bigwig, because despite being Vice President of ZANU-PF, she was also a local patron in her home area. Mujuru would switch between operating as a parliamentary candidate (local patron) and campaigning for Mugabe and ZANU-PF as a bigwig, as it suited her.

The above attempts at programmatic appeals by Mugabe and ZANU-PF also illustrate the extent to which ZANU-PF blurred the lines between pragmatic interventions, programmatic delivery, and clientelist distributions. Nonetheless, the appeals mainly targeted perceived ZANU-PF supporters, solidifying our argument that ZANU-PF was not chasing new votes, but was mobilising its base as the 2008 strategy in ZACs. As part of this strategy minimal effort was made at influencing vote choice because the targets were perceived as being ZANU-PF core-supporters already. Instead, the programmatic and policy appeals as well as the clientelist distribution of farming implements and other goods acted more as a reward for support and a demonstration of the benefits of loyalty to ZANU-PF rather than an attempt to “buy” votes. In this respect the encourage was for
constituents to go and vote more than it was to persuade them to vote ZANU-PF. This is normal, given the situation and akin to what Nichter (2008) terms turnout rather than vote buying in his model. Turnout buying targets supporters and the monitoring that takes place is not of the vote choice per se but whether the rewarded voter actually turned out to vote (Nichter, 2008:19). The way that ZANU-PF stated and operationalised programmatic appeals also shows the blurring of lines regarding the extent to which clientelist appeals and distribution were accepted as part of the political game.

### 6.1.5 ZANU-PF’s Bigwig Visits To ZACs In 2013

In 2013, ZANU-PF decreased its attention to ZACs, staging 11 bigwig visits out of the 39 in the period immediately preceding the election. As Table 6-3 shows, this constituted about 26% of all catalogued bigwig visits in 2013, down from 53% in 2008. The biggest share of this attention still remained on marginal constituencies, with consolidating and stronghold constituencies accounting for 8% each of the total visits. ZANU-PF’s strategy at the national level had clearly changed with this departure from a primary focus on ZACs to OACs, which this thesis describes and explains in Chapter 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency Types</th>
<th>2013 Bigwig Visits</th>
<th>2013 Aggregate Bigwig visit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N = 39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF Strongholds</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidating ZANU-PF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal ZANU-PF</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author’s data based on media bigwig rally coverage

The data shows that 10 out of the 12 visits were to Mashonaland Central with Mount Darwin accounting for 33% of the bigwig visits to Mashonaland Central, and 25% of the total bigwig visits to ZACs. The increased attention that ZANU-PF paid to Mount Darwin can be plausibly explained by the fact that one member of the ZANU-PF Praesidium in 2008 and 2013, Vice President Joyce Mujuru, who did most of the campaigning in Mount Darwin, hailed from Mashonaland Central and had been a Member of Parliament for Mount Darwin since 1980. This, however, does not negate the fact that ZANU-PF targeted the province for
intensive campaigning. The Vice President also campaigned in other provinces, registering at least 14 campaign stops out of a total of 39 bigwig visits catalogued for 2013, and staging 11 of the 12 bigwig visits to ZANU-PF aligned constituencies. At times she conducted several rallies in different places in one day. Some of these rallies are not catalogued because they were neither Star nor Bigwig rallies in the sense adopted in this thesis, but local rallies, or they took place outside the window of visits catalogued for this study. The above suggests that other ZANU-PF bigwigs dealt with the base, while Mugabe, the principal, went elsewhere. As shown in Table 6-4, Mujuru’s 2013 campaign performance was a marked departure from her 2008 performance in both its scale and substance, and this was one of the changes to the broad campaign strategy that ZANU-PF implemented between the two elections. This increased campaign activity on the part of Mujuru in Mashonaland as well as ZANU-PF Chairperson Simon Khaya-Moyo's deployment to his native Matabeleland are elaborated in Chapter 7 and 8.

Table 6-4: ZANU-PF Particular Bigwig Visits to ZACs in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Bigwig</th>
<th>Date of Visit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zvimba North</td>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>Chairman S.K. Moyo</td>
<td>21 April 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Darwin West – Mudzengere School, Dotito</td>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>V.P Mujuru</td>
<td>7 July 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Darwin West – Chakoma Primary school</td>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>V.P Mujuru</td>
<td>7 July 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Darwin West – Nembire Primary School</td>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>V.P Mujuru</td>
<td>7 July 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muzarabani South – Nzvimbo Secondary School</td>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>President Mugabe &amp; V.P. Mujuru +</td>
<td>11 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mudzi West – Chitumba High School Suswe</td>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>V.P Mujuru</td>
<td>16 July 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muzarabani North – Muzarabani Business Centre</td>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>V.P. Mujuru</td>
<td>18 July 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guruve North - (Gono)</td>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>V.P Mujuru</td>
<td>July 22 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbire - (Mushumbi)</td>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>V.P Mujuru</td>
<td>22 July 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shamva South - Chakonda</td>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>V.P Mujuru</td>
<td>24 July 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bindura North</td>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>V.P Mujuru</td>
<td>July 24 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rushinga North – Chimhanda Primary School</td>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>V.P Mujuru</td>
<td>26 July 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Data generated from media coverage of 2013 Elections
6.1.6 Ideological and historical appeals on the 2013 campaign rail in ZACs

There were a number of changes to the tenor and content of the bigwig appeals on the 2013 campaign trail, but one of the things that remained constant was ZANU-PF’s resort to history and ideological appeals. References to ZANU-PF and Mugabe’s role in the liberation war and defeating western hegemony and its attempt at neo-colonialism in Zimbabwe were integrated into ZANU-PF’s campaign messages as in 2008. During her rallies, Mujuru consistently reminded her audiences of how ZANU-PF had fought for their freedom and given them land at the cost of sanctions by the west. For instance, speaking at Nembire on 6th July 2013, Mujuru located Mugabe as the people’s champion who deserved to be thanked in order to fully “…defeat the illegal sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe at the instigation of some western askaris pretending to be forces of democracy” (Mugabe, 2013). How this “thanks” would translate to the defeating of sanctions was something that was left to the voters imagination, but the form of the ‘thank you’ was “my vote and your vote” to Mugabe, whom she argued had, since the liberation struggle, fought for the empowerment of the people (Share, 2013). In Rushinga, Mujuru urged the 30 000 registered voters to turn out, and advised “…those who are illiterate to ask for help from polling officers so that the number of spoiled papers is reduced” (Ruwende, 2013). Mujuru’s professed task at these rallies was to make sure that the people knew who to vote for and express the will of Mugabe for ZANU-PF to win, because “we don’t want to go back to Rhodesia” (The Herald, July 23, 2013).

While Mugabe did not make many, campaign stops during the 2013 election, his first Star Rally was in Mashonaland Central at Nzvimbo Secondary School in Chiweshe, close to Mount Darwin on 11th July 2013. Mugabe’s message was in sync with part of Mujuru’s approach highlighted above, and probably informed the Vice President’s approach in her solo outings. His main message comprised historical and ideological appeals, an appeal for support and votes to undo the 2008 “mistake”, and a call for peace.

Mugabe first acknowledged and reminded the people in the area of its revolutionary place in the struggle for Zimbabwe through giving a deep historical background that transcended his usual starting point of the second war for liberation from the 1960s and 1970s. He went back to the 1800s, and skilfully played to the “revolutionary” history of Chiweshe, home of the ancestral spirit
and fabled leader of the first Chimurenga (first war for liberation), Ambuya Nehanda.

…from the beginning we recognise that here in Chiweshe is where the war for liberation got its fire, sound leadership, wisdom and the illumination of the spirit. It is here that I am starting my campaign, so that I can remind you of your pedigree, remind you of your liberation war history which you fought hard in. Let that word spread from Nehanda’s first chimurenga, to the second chimurenga for independence, and the third chimurenga for the land (Herald, 11 July, 2013).

Mugabe reminded the people of Chiweshe that despite the liberation pedigree, it was also in Chiweshe that “we were betrayed and misled, put to sleep through some kind of muti that I do not know of” (Mugabe, ibid). He accused the people of Chiweshe of forgetting the history of the liberation struggle and that people had died for the country, something which, as shown earlier, was believed to be a betrayal of the legacy of the living and the dead heroes of the liberation struggle (ZANU-PF takes , 2008). Beyond the symbolic betrayal, Mugabe also saw the fact that Chiweshe, located in Mazowe Central constituency, had voted more for the opposition than for him and ZANU-PF in 2008, as an actual betrayal (Muzulu, 2013). In addition, the voter turnout for the constituency in 2008 had been uncharacteristically low for Mashonaland Central, at 42.8%, and Mugabe’s vote share, at 4133, was about 22 percentage points lower than Morgan Tsvangirai’s haul of 6622. This, for Mugabe, had been an unbelievable and disappointing feat, which, in jest, he ascribed to witchcraft, and called a mistake. Mugabe called on Mashonaland Central in general, and Chiweshe in particular to correct this ‘mistake’ and asked that the people not forget that people had fought and died for the country and that the living had a responsibility to the dead to take care of the country. Mugabe argued that:

We must see to it that no foreigner will come again saying I have white skin, so I am superior. NO. We liberated the country let us not fall into the slumber of 2008. Let’s be weary of imperialist lapdogs, British puppies that are tempted by leftovers thrown to them by the master (Herald, 11 July, 2013).

In both the 2008 and 2013 elections, ZANU-PF bigwigs placed historical and ideological appeals at the centre of their campaigns to motivate voters to support ZANU-PF. I argue that these historical and ideological appeals, as shown by the above excerpts from rally speeches, were emotional appeals that sought to ignite voters’ pride around their role in the liberation struggle and bring back painful
memories of the realities they had lived and the atrocities they had survived. I agree with LeBas (2006:435), who, while referring to the opposition, argues that unreasonable qualities of the opposing party and the language of betrayal and “forgetting” of past suffering were potent means of reinforcing party unity. They also reinforced commitment to continued confrontation, and saw this as true for ZANU-PF’s use of historical and ideological appeals in 2008 and 2013. ZANU-PF also appealed to voters’ mind and to voters as rational beings through portraying and arguing a “just” war against neo-colonialism, anti-imperialism and the preservation of self-determination and the country’s sovereignty. This was a serious ideological pitch despite being embellished with lies around the opposition giving land back to whites and placing Zimbabwe back under British and Rhodesian dominion.

The argument I make above about the historical and ideological appeals and their purpose is a slight departure from the arguments made by Bratton & Masunungure (2008) and other scholars on ZANU-PF’s use of history and ideology. For instance, Bratton & Masunungure (2008) argue that ideology and history were used to claim power and an almost divine right to govern by ZANU-PF. This reasoning neglects the reality that history and ideology are part of ZANU-PF’s claims to legitimacy and were also tools deployed to win the hearts and minds of voters, and not, as Bratton & Masunungure (2008: 43) argue, just a shabby cover for the personal interests of a narrow clique, or ZANU-PF’s crude attempt to hold on to power. I argue that there is little wrong with a party using ideology and history as a claim to legitimacy in the traditional and charismatic tradition of Weber’s characterisations or what von Soest & Grauvogel (2017) register as identity based claims to legitimacy.

Nonetheless, the point is that history and ideology, although manipulated and convoluted, were in many respects used to persuade and demonstrate a track record that showed ZANU-PF’s “viability” as a governor ahead of other parties. The above review of the bigwig rally appeals shows that ZANU-PF’s historical appeals can be seen as akin to selling a political and performance record covering both the pre-independence and post-liberation era. Viewed this way, historical appeals are not only legitimate, but also legitimacy seeking. This is validated by Zamchiya (2013:958), who after being imbedded in Tsvangirai’s campaign in 2013, remarked that Tsvangirai “…misread Mugabe’s claim to the liberation struggle mantle and his ability to invoke memories of the war as a sign of
weakness.” Tsvangirai, Zamchiya reports, thought “…Zimbabweans were more concerned with day-to-day bread-and-butter issues”, yet “…in many people’s eyes, invoking memories of the liberation war validated Mugabe’s candidature and invalidated Tsvangirai” (Zamchiya, 2013: 958). The opposition had no effective counterweight to the liberation narrative, leaving Mugabe as the custodian of the revolutionary past and a fit candidate for leadership, while depicting Tsvangirai as ‘without history’ and lacking the credibility to embody and lead Zimbabwe.

This study’s evidence suggests that beyond comparing histories, as Zamchiya (2013) states, or giving ‘lectures’ on history, as Tendi (2013) characterises it, the use of historical and ideological appeals had additional persuasive effects that contributed to ZANU-PF winning voters hearts and minds through invoking pride, sorrow, fear and foreboding in Mount Darwin, which was heavily involved with the liberation struggle. As Tendi (2010) acknowledges, patriotic history was not just a fabrication or a polemic with limited resonance. Rather, it incorporated real grievances that resonated with people’s interests, and, as the study’s engagement in Mount Darwin shows, translated to some positive identification with ZANU-PF and some form of popular support for Mugabe at elections, which I demonstrate in the next section on ZANU-PF’s ground game in 2008 and 2013 in ZACs.

6.1.7 The Blame Game: The Opposition as a hinderance to people centred government and policies

In 2013 ZANU-PF continued its attacks on the opposition and on Mugabe’s main competitor, Morgan Tsvangirai, at both personal and political levels. Attacking Tsvangirai personally, Mugabe derided Tsvangirai as a “philanderer” and “sell-out” who had impeded government business in the inclusive government (Zimbabwe Independent, 12 July, 2013). Politically, outside just the name calling, ZANU-PF also offered a disciplined attack on the opposition as corrupt, power hungry, and the reason for the ‘failures’ of the GNU. The political attacks were also sharpened, specific and targeted. Speaking in Muzarabani North constituency on the border with Mount Darwin on 11th July 2013, Mujuru blamed the MDCs for the plight of farmers, and singled out the then Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti, who was also the MDC-T Secretary General for special blame. Mujuru argued that Biti had brought “darkness” by failing to fund new farmers and had blocked “a number of projects that were meant to benefit the masses”
including two projects that were meant for the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) in Muzarabani (Herald, 12 July, 2013). The nature of the attack on the opposition was decidedly different from those of 2008, when ZANU-PF had mostly ridiculed and demonised the opposition as western puppets. In 2013, ZANU-PF attacked the opposition not just in regard to their perceived intent and associations, but also for their performance record. Whether true or not, Mujuru had specific examples for her target audience, and argued that the opposition’s actions in government had led to limited support for farmers, a crime worthy of voting out the MDC.

Most of you here are cotton farmers and you lost a lot of household goods and cattle as a result of this type of farming [Contract Farming]. The best time to vote out puppets is now so that a ZANU-PF Government, that started the land reform, supports you to the maximum (Herald, 12 July, 2013)

Mujuru’s pitch and attacks on the opposition were effective and well targeted because they centred on issues and problems that her audience could relate to as farmers and beneficiaries of the land reform. The opposition was provided as a scapegoat and voting Mugabe as the solution. These attacks were meshed together with ZANU-PF’s traditional attacks on the west and sanctions. During a whirlwind four rally tour in Mount Darwin during the first week of July 2013, Mujuru reminded the people of Mount Darwin of how they had “…bought this land and farms with blood” for which the opposition “…invited the illegal sanctions” (Herald, 8 July, 2013).

Mujuru often followed through on the targeted and locally relevant attacks by talking up the right of communities to benefit from the natural resources in their communities. She also made pledges around electrification, employment, and local mining. For instance, on 26th July 2013, while speaking at Chimhanda Primary school in Rushinga where coal had been discovered at Semwa dam, she expressed her expectation for “Mount Darwin residents to benefit from the coal project”. Mujuru pledged that the 15 megawatts of electricity that the dam’s plant would produce would be used to ensure that “all schools in Rushinga without electricity would be electrified” as part of the people of Rushinga and Mount Darwin benefitting from their resources (Ruwende, 2013). The electricity pledge was a fairly credible promise and, as mentioned in section 6.1.2 Mugabe had

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15 Mujuru conducted rallies at Nembire Primary school, Chakoma Primary School, Mudzengerere Secondary School, and Dotito Township.
made similar pledges to Mashonaland Central in 2008, and by 2013, ZANU-PF appeared to have delivered this promise. According to a Rural Electrification Agency (REA) report to Parliament in 2013, 49% of key target areas like schools, hospitals, small businesses, farms, chiefs homesteads, and small-scale mines in Mashonaland Central province had been electrified, making it the most electrified rural province in Zimbabwe (REA, 2013:3). This achievement made Mujuru’s 2013 commitments to electrification fairly credible.

Despite the Mount Darwin constituencies being rural, Mujuru’s campaign messages also focused on job creation for young people. In Dotito Township on 6th July 2013, Mujuru argued that ZANU-PF was embracing young people in all of its structures, including as parliamentarians. Mujuru emphasised job creation for young people and ZANU-PF’s commitment through its manifesto to addressing youths’ concerns regarding employment and rural livelihood transformation (Mugabe, 2013). Mujuru’s special focus on young people and promises of job creation, as I will show in Chapter 5, were a critical component of ZANU-PF’s 2013 strategy, and signalled a shift from its general neglect of the youth vote in the past.

6.1.8 “Respected” and “Respectable” Traditional Leaders in the 2013 Presidential Election campaign

The four Mount Darwin constituencies fall under five chiefdoms: Matope, Dotito, Kandeya, Nembire, and Chiswiti, presided over by chiefs of the same names. These Chiefs share similar powers to the village headmen but over more expansive territory. They have the veto over the headmen who preside over wards and villages in the chiefdoms. The Traditional Leaders Act of 1998 (section 46.1) states that traditional leaders are supposed to be neutral and apolitical and must rule without being “influenced by any considerations of race, tribe, place of origin, creed, gender or political affiliation”. This message is reinforced in the 2013 Zimbabwean Constitution, which recognises Traditional leaders in Chapter 15. Section 281 (2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe is clear that traditional leaders must not:

1. be members of any political party,
2. must not participate in partisan politics, or act in a partisan manner, or further the interests of any political party or cause, and
3. must not violate the fundamental rights and freedoms of any person.
The above legal requirements stopped neither ZANU-PF from using chiefs in political affairs nor some traditional leaders from willingly engaging in electoral affairs, with most headman automatically treated as branch chairpersons and cell leaders in their villages, although they were excluded from higher level ZANU-PF party structures from the district stage upwards. Speaking at Chimhanda three days before the 2013 election, Mujuru lauded these chiefs and traditional leaders as “the custodians of the country’s heritage” whom “…political leaders should consult on national issues” and respect “No matter how learned” one was (Herald, 27 July, 2013). This call to respect the traditional leaders was taken seriously by their subjects, and ZANU-PF leaders at a local level instrumentalised chiefs and traditional leaders as partisan instruments in a similar way to 2008. I argue that constituents in Mount Darwin and the surrounding areas interpreted this and similar calls as meaning that respecting traditional leaders meant following their instructions, especially regarding voting for ZANU-PF.

Mujuru’s call on the campaign trail in Dotito was an example of how ZANU-PF used social norms and customs to enforce partisan agendas and interests. ZANU-PF agents saw the chiefs as an instrument to access and manage prospective voters. In this respect, a respectable traditional leader was one who followed “gwara remusangano” (the ways of the party). Mujuru’s lauding of the traditional leaders, and her call for their respect was loaded with political meanings and intentions, calling chiefs to respectable action and their subjects to obedience. Despite it being illegal, Mujuru had, in the past, defended the right of traditional leaders to engage in ZANU-PF politics because they were “pioneers of the struggle for freedom” (Herald, 1 October, 2010)

Mujuru’s exaltation of the traditional leaders is at odds with the historical record, which makes it clear that while some traditional leaders assisted guerrillas during the liberation struggle, most collaborated with the settler regime as its local state agents to counter the influence of either elected councils or liberation fighters (Bratton, 1978; Kriger, 1985; Lan 1985 Weinrich,1971). As Kriger (1985: 64) notes, to survive, some chiefdoms, village heads and tribal leaders had to be responsive to the colonial authorities rather than their subjects because the “…chiefship and other positions depended not only on the application of inheritance laws but also on government approval”, with those who rebelled being removed and loyalists rewarded. Lan (1985:136) shows how chiefs’ collaboration with the colonial state discredited them with the guerrillas, leading
the guerrillas to establish an alliance with the *Mhondoros* (spirits of past chiefs) as the legitimate traditional rulers, with that legitimacy passing on to the guerrillas. Because of this dynamic, the liberation fighters usurped the authority of the chiefs, and either assumed it themselves or handed it over to local ZANU-PF village committees (Alexander, 2014). Nonetheless, as shown in Chapter 4, this revisionist attitude towards the historical role of traditional leaders was in step with the general revision of history as part of the patriotic history trope and was increasingly at play in the run-up to the 2013 election.

While Mujuru stroked the traditional chiefs’ egos on the 2013 campaign trail, the army had a more direct message and added threats. On several occasions from 2010 onwards, the army is reported to have summoned traditional leaders to military barracks to discuss ZANU-PF’s campaign strategies ahead of the 2013 election. At one of the meetings, Army Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Douglas Nyikayaramba, who is also a former Zimbabwe Election Commission Chief Elections Officer, continued to falsify the historical record, asserting that gone were the Rhodesian days when chiefs were apolitical. Instead he told the chiefs:

> From today no one will come into your communities to hold political meetings or rallies without your blessings. Those who defy such an order will be dealt with. Only war veterans and chiefs have the right and powers to hold rallies and meetings because they fought for this country. I want to make it clear to all chiefs gathered here today that if President Mugabe loses in next year’s elections, they will have a case to answer (Nyikayaramba cited in *Muckraker*, 2010).

Most of the traditional leaders in Mount Darwin took Mujuru and Nyikayaramba’s exhortations seriously, and non-compliance, as in 2008, had grievous consequences for both the traditional leaders and their subjects. Although death was not on the menu in 2013, ostracization and victimisation were. The call for the traditional leaders to watch their own people through various processes was quite similar to the Rhodesian establishment’s use of traditional leaders and the regime’s attempts to block access to villages for the liberation movement. At that time, the protected villages as well as a network of informers were used to inform on any strange visits to the villages, leading to quick mobilisation of the armed settler forces to disrupt any engagement between villagers and guerrilla forces or their commissars. This history of the role of traditional leaders, and ZANU-PF’s use and abuse of them during elections is
instructive, as they played a critical role in relation to ZANU-PF’s local politics in ZACs during elections.

6.2 The Ground Game In Mount Darwin Constituencies

This section unpacks how ZANU-PF managed its electoral politics and campaigned at the sub-national level in Mount Darwin constituencies. It will show that ZANU-PF structures, with the aid of the local state (traditional leaders and rural councils) and coercive arms of the state (the intelligence, police and military services), engaged in a dual process of persuasive and coercive politics. These structures constituted an intractable, complex and localised ZANU-PF political machinery aimed at capturing and retaining ZANU-PF support at elections by fair means or foul. The section will show how, generally, ZANU-PF initially went about hyperbolising Mugabe’s and ZANU-PF's virtues, and enticing people to support the party through inducements, preferential treatment and access to a wide variety of public goods that came with membership. Given that Mount Darwin was generally perceived to be strong ZANU-PF territory, this message was well received by many, but there were also islands of opposition, which ZANU-PF sought to remove in the spirit of Mashonaland Central, which they considered a “one party province”. These islands of opposition were engaged with the hope of converting them into ZANU-PF supporters, but where this failed, ZANU-PF associates subjected them to unrelenting coercive politics that left many of them with a Hobson's choice of voting for the party or suffering punishment.

This section looks briefly at how the persuasive and coercive appeals sat uncomfortably side by side in ZANU-PF’s local campaign efforts for the 2008 and 2013 elections, and how the bigwig rally appeals were received in Mount Darwin. It highlights the salience of history and ideology, as persuasive tools that ZANU-PF used to campaign by day, while by night it unleashed violence and intimidation on real and suspected opponents with the intent of punishing dissent, compelling support, and dissuading opposition organisation and support ahead of the 2008 polls.
6.2.1 The local appeal of history and power of ideology

In section 3 above I showed that at the national level, during the bigwig visits to ZACs in 2008 and 2013, ZANU-PF deployed historical, ideological and populist appeals augmented by programmatic appeals and a clientelist distribution of both targeted and general goods. These ideological and historical appeals found traction on the African continent, for whom they had been initially deployed as a counter narrative to a pervasive liberal discourse around a human rights crisis in Zimbabwe. However, these messages also resonated with some members of the local electorate in places like Mount Darwin, where the wounds of the liberation war festered, and memories were still reasonably fresh. In Chiweshe, Mugabe’s historical and ideological appeals yielded dividends and the corrections he called for were made as his political stoke rose in the Mazowe constituency, in which the opposition had outpolled him in 2008. Voter turnout increased from 42.8% to 62% and in turn his votes increased to 10,534, about 39 percentage points higher than Tsvangirai’s reduced vote haul of 4,385.

Outside the numbers, which I will highlight later for the Mount Darwin constituencies, conversations with a cross section of society in Mount Darwin showed that historical and ideological appeals were resonant amongst people with lived experiences of colonisation and the war, as would be expected under the movement legacy (Hyden, 2006). ZM2301, a resident of Bveke village in Mount Darwin East, who participated in the 2008 and 2013 elections as a local observer, told me that the historical and ideological appeals resonated for three reasons. First, the people of Mount Darwin, he argued, were uneducated. Secondly, these narratives were the only ones in the Mount Darwin public sphere given the limited opposition campaigning. Thirdly, because people remember the brutality of the white men and the hardships of war. Telling them that someone wants to take them back to war and white rule, whether correct or not will make them both afraid and angry (ZM2301-Interview, 2018).

Surprisingly, the messages were also well received by younger people born after Independence, who were fairly educated and literate, but, by their own admission, had grown up on a healthy diet of oral tradition in regard to the war and the ‘evils’ of the ‘white man’. These younger people, some of whom were members of ZANU-PF, corroborated ZM2301’s observations, but stressed that supporting ZANU-PF and taking to heart its messages were not functions of ignorance or illiteracy. To them these were the products of the rationalisation and
reconciliation of their history and lived experiences, and to them it was those who
did not find this message attractive who were ignorant. MC2201, from Chitsato
village in Mount Darwin’s Ward 12, was persuaded by ZANU-PF’s ideological
and historical appeals. He sincerely believed that the “whites never accepted that
we defeated them in 1980, and when we took back the land they kept coming
back and supporting the MDC so that they could come back” (MC2201-
Interview, 2018).

MaiZ2201, a 32 year old Bveke district and ZANU-PF member, stated that in the
15 years she had been involved with ZANU-PF, she had grown to understand the
hazards of losing power to sell-out parties like Tsvangirai’s MDC because of their
motives to bring back the whites and be at the beck and call of the west
(MaiZ2201-Interview, 2018). TP2501, a 26-year-old from Mavhuradonha
Village, shared MaiZ2201’s perspective and stated that the issues that Mugabe
raised around whites and imperialists were not new. He stated that his parents had
always told him about these issues, to such an extent that “It was clear to me that
not supporting ZANU-PF would bring back the whites, and was war, or would
take us back to war” (TP2501, 2018). He argued that “while I did not live through
the war, I have seen war on television and know that it is a bad thing that no one
would wish for. (TP2501, 2018).

At the very least, ZANU-PF’s message had permeated to lower structures of the
party and ordinary card-carrying members, and the historical and ideological
appeals had been drilled down from the top candidate, Mugabe, and transmitted
to the rest of the party structures through the party’s organs and commissariat.
These local party structures also took this case to members of their communities,
including members and non-members. For instance, an aspiring Member of
Parliament, Wonder Mashange, declared that victory at parliamentary level was
a given in Rushinga and Mount Darwin, and that what mattered was increasing
the tally in aid of the Presidential battle. He promised Mujuru that he would
contribute no less than 20,000 votes and argued that the main challenge in the
elections was not the opposition, but apathy. Mashange, addressing a local rally,
told his captive audience that voting was part of the process, not just to secure a
Mugabe victory, but also to defend the sovereignty of the country (Ruwende,
2013). Mashange’s pitch on sovereignty mimicked Mugabe’s continued message
on the liberation war and the need to safeguard the country from falling back into
the hands of colonialists and their proxies, which was central in both the 2008 and 2013 elections.

Mashange delivered on his promise to Mujuru, with the constituency casting 24,032 votes for Mugabe, compared to 1175 for Tsvangirai, with a voter turnout of 71.31%. These figures were improvements on the 2008 performance of 13988 votes for Mugabe, 4240 votes for Tsvangirai and a turnout of 60%. Anecdotal evidence from Mount Darwin suggests that this result is also plausible due to Mujuru’s encouragement for those who were illiterate to be assisted being taken to heart. The “beneficiaries” of the assistance were not just illiterate people, but also suspected opposition supporters who were forced to fain illiteracy.

A former rural district councillor from Ward 14 stated that, “suspected opposition supporters are warned in advance during meetings ‘that we shall see you when elections come’ so to be safe they and a lot of old people would say they are disabled and seek help voting” (LCM2701-Interview, 2018). The electoral statistics for ZANU-PF in 2013 showed improvement across the board in Mount Darwin Constituencies. For instance, as shown in Table 6-5, voter turnout in Mount Darwin constituencies, which consistently surpassed the national average as well as the average for ZACs, increased to an average of 74.7% against a national average of 59.24% and 61.2% for ZANU-PF aligned constituencies in 2013.

Table 6-5: Voter Turnout rates- Mount Darwin Constituencies compared to ZACs and National Average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Average Voter Turnout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mount Darwin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>69%</td>
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Source: Author’s data & ZEC 2002, 2008 & 2013 Presidential Election Reports

The 2013 Mount Darwin electoral outcomes based on official data showed marked improvements in all four constituencies. For instance, during the 2008 presidential election, the winning margins across the four constituencies averaged 49%, but in 2013, ZANU-PF’s winning margin in Mount Darwin almost doubled to an average of 85%.
The data showing improved turnout figures, increased winning margins, and increased votes for Mugabe across Mount Darwin suggests that Mashange was correct about the low turnout “mistake” and apathy being ZANU-PF’s main challenges in Mashonaland Central. Based on the election results, he was also correct that the opposition posed little contest. The data suggests that the “mistake” Mugabe lamented was duly corrected in 2013, but not just by fair means of politics and campaigning but also through foul and violent means.
6.2.2 Clientelist appeals, selective distribution of petty patronage, and selective access to programmes and projects

While Mugabe and other members of his praesidium made grand announcements of programmes at Star and Bigwig rallies, the implementation of the stated programmes was always at a subnational level. Such initiatives made ZANU-PF’s promises believable and assisted in strengthening the resolve and loyalty of party supporters, while demoralising non-members through restricting their access to campaign goods. A group of women associated with the opposition in Nyamazizi, Mount Darwin East reported that in 2008 ZANU-PF politicised farming implements, farm products, and welfare products. They excluded us from accessing them because we were opposition. It was hard for us because 2008 was a time of hunger and poverty (GI-OWAN2101, 2018).
Their “saving grace was that at some point in 2008 the MDC distributed seed and groceries to its members here, which really assisted because at the time we were in dire poverty and desperate for survival” (GI-OWAN210, 2008). Although this was a one-off thing, the women continued their defiance of ZANU-PF but bore continued costs to their welfare. Traditional leaders also played a key role in limiting the distribution of various resources to community members based on political affiliation. A village headman, 74-year-old CS2501, stated that he was restricted in terms of the people from my community that I can deal with. My community is diverse with ZANU-PF but also non-ZANU-PF people and Aliens [Zimbabweans of foreign decent]. I am usually told by ZANU-PF district leaders that I should not mix with or cater to aliens and non-ZANU-PF people, and that they should not get anything (CS2501-Interview, 2018).

Headman CS2501 also stated that he had tried to resist the selective distribution of resources like seed, fertiliser and food based on political affiliation, but he was labelled a *Mupanduki* (sell-out) and threatened with beatings and death. He stated that the ZANU-PF district structures had reported him to Chris Kuruneri, an MP in Mount Darwin, seeking a “kill order”, but the MP had said, “why should we kill him, leave him alone, we’ve won already” (CS2501-Interview, 2018).

As shown earlier, during both the 2008 and 2013 electoral campaigns, ZANU-PF’s programmatic appeals, especially Mujuru’s, were skilfully tailored to the people of Mount Darwin and the surrounding areas. These appeals, around electrification, and the locals benefiting from natural resources, jobs and other social amenities were well received and utilised in local jurisdiction campaign efforts. As a persuasive tool, they were made potent by ZANU-PF’s demonstrated ability to deliver on its commitments, as it had done at the national level with the land issue, farming implement schemes, and other initiatives highlighted above. At a local level in Mount Darwin, NTAD2001 attested that it was difficult for the opposition to campaign in Mount Darwin meaningfully in part because of violence, but also because they could not compete with ZANU-PF programmatically in terms of providing socio-economic opportunities to the constituents (NTAD2001, 2018). He also added that ZANU-PF had used its access and control of the local state to selectively distribute bicycles, ox-drawn carts, land (farming plots) and jobs meant for the entire community to its card carrying and known members. In a country where unemployment was high,
ZANU-PF’s pledges around indigenisation and empowerment as well as employment resonated with youths in Mount Darwin, who knew that it could deliver because of its past fulfilment of its pledges. In the run-up to the 2013 elections, ZANU-PF made efforts to place young people in Mount Darwin district in local companies, especially cotton companies, and this became part of their persuasive appeal and legitimacy through performance. As MM2201, a former ZANU-PF secretary for indigenisation and local district executive member, stated,

People in Mount Darwin know that ZANU-PF’s campaign promises are not empty promises. Maybe in town they are empty but here in [Mount] Darwin the rhetoric is often followed by action, even when the action is unfair to opposition. People here take ZANU-PF’s commitments and threats seriously…. In 2008 and 2013, they gave us bicycles for transportation, we had land, we got T-shirts, seed, and food. But it also went beyond these handouts and made sure that our youths had jobs. ZANU-PF recruited youth officers for each district, who were paid by the government, and placed other youths at Graffax, COTTCO Zimbabwe, INSING and SINO-Zim (MM2201-Interview, 2018).

The companies that MM2201 referred to were cotton companies and ginneries that operated in the Mount Darwin area. Despite being private companies, ZANU-PF appeared to control them and could determine recruitment. Like other interventions in 2008, this kind of delivery by ZANU-PF, which endeared it to some people, exemplified the way in which ZANU-PF conflated pragmatic and programmatic interventions with patronage-based access to economic opportunities. This was neither new nor restricted to Mount Darwin, as Alexander & Chitofiri (2010) noted for Norton. Interestingly, the fact that where possible both the opposition and ruling parties engaged in the selective distribution of goods to their supporters in 2008 shows the extent to which the distribution of goods to supporters had been established as a custom in Zimbabwe’s electoral processes. Although normatively, clientelist politics are largely considered illicit or socially undesirable (Zovighian, 2018), empirically, as shown above, they may be grudgingly acceptable to constituents as part of the rules of the game, and socially desirable and acceptable as a “fair” exchange for their support. For most candidates and parties in Zimbabwe, clientelist bargains were reluctantly accepted not as fair but as part of the game in the electioneering process.

16 The Zimbabwe Labour Force Survey for 2014 showed that 94.5% of those employment in Zimbabwe is informal, up from around 85% for 2012. Over 86% of those in informal employment are unskilled young people, mostly female.
especially in relation to vote buying. Recall MDC-Alliance president Nelson Chamisa’s sentiments on the material dimensions of campaigning that I reported on in chapter 2. Chamisa had also remarked that:

> We have reduced the standards of our politics in campaigning to the extent that even giving a cup of rice or a small tin of beans or a cup of maize seed from a 25kg bag, solar power torches, will make a difference and meaning (Chamisa-Interview, 2017).

It is because of this acceptance that clientelism (including patronage and vote buying) occupies a shaky middle ground on the persuasive-non-persuasive continuum. However, as argued above, the fact that the focus of the distribution of access to economic opportunities as well as the distribution of goods was on party loyalists rather than “swing” or independent voters shows that ZANU-PF was mobilising its base, and the goods were rewards rather than enticements. ZANU-PF was already dominant in ZACs, so the inducements served to ensure the turnout of its members rather than the vote itself, especially in 2008, but also in 2013. For ZANU-PF, the elections were censuses of its membership, and its membership structures constituted an important part of ZANU-PF’s strategy because it is through them that they could coordinate, gather and spring their members into electoral action, as I will show in the next section.

### 6.2.3 Party organisational structure as strategy

While historical and ideological appeals, as well as programmatic and practical clientelist interventions were integral to ZANU-PF’s campaigns, for the mobilising strategy to work, ZANU-PF leaned heavily on effective organisation and party structures. The mobilising strategy entailed combining ZANU-PF’s hierarchical presence at the local level with the use of persuasion, coercion, and intimidation. At the local level, ZANU-PF party organisational structures comprised Cells, Branches, and District Structures, which operated in sync with traditional leadership roles. Multiple respondents stated that everyone in ZANU-PF belonged to a Cell, and that Cells were typically made up of 50 people and were the lowest organising structures of the party. At least five Cells formed a Branch (250 people) and Branches were often led by a village headman (Sabhuku). At least five Branches formed a District (1250 people) and Districts were led by war veterans and youths who collaborated with the headmen (Sadunhu). The number of district party structures depended on the size of the constituency and were coordinated at the top of the local party hierarchy, by the District
Coordinating Committee (DCC), or District coordinators, who liaised with the Chiefs (*Madzimambo*). These connections gave ZANU-PF’s structures the ability to manipulate the influence of traditional leaders and coordinate party activities through the traditional leaders, who led community processes like village meetings. It also meant that ZANU-PF’s definition of a District differed from the Administrative District, which was bigger than a constituency, often encompassing more than one and as many as four constituencies, as well as the opposition’s definition of a district, which was often the same as a constituency.

According to MM2201, ZANU-PF’s organisational structures were a strategy in themselves, and the most potent of all of the strategies that ZANU-PF used at the local level to triumph in elections. MM2201 stated that:

> ZANU-PF formed structures in such a way that in every district and cell structure they expected a certain number of people. Based on those figures they would know how many members they had, votes to expect, and people to intimidate, and on polling day the village head would lead people to the polling stations based on the party registers (MM2201-Interview, 2018)

NM0202, who had served as ZANU-PF district chair for eight years and held several other positions in the party in Mount Darwin, explained that all of the other strategies were predicated on the ZANU-PF Cell and Branch structures being intact (NM0202-Interview, 2018). According to MT2301, these party organisational structures facilitated a three-pronged approach, which included staging regular village level and district meetings, campaigning for ZANU-PF through selling the party agenda and presiding over inducements and the selective distribution of farming inputs and food and turning out the vote on election day (MT2301-Interview, 2018). These three processes were part of a mobilising strategy in Mount Darwin, which several respondents referred to as the *Dambawasara*. The *Dambawasara* was both a mandatory village meeting and process where everyone in the village was marshalled to engage with the political process, usually under the pretext of politically innocuous village engagements led by traditional leaders but sanctioned by war veterans in the ZANU-PF district structure (MM2201, 2018).

In Mount Darwin, a lot of the public political work at the local level was coordinated through these regular meetings and processes where roll calls were made. The *Dambawasara* subnational politics in aid of the national presidential campaign races in both 2008 and 2013 straddled the line between what may be
normatively considered legitimacy-seeking and non-legitimacy seeking methods. It combined the use of persuasive appeals, manipulation, and coercive methods, some of which had a discursive, yet compulsory, character. The roll call element of the Dambawasara also served an additional purpose of surveillance, because through presence or absence at the Dambawasara and allied voting process, ZANU-PF could also identify “errant” people in each village and punish them accordingly during the campaign and post-election period, in particular by excluding them from the benefits of membership. During the 2008 election run-off and ahead of the 2013 elections, ZANU-PF made serious attempts to make sure that those in the villages were not only under surveillance but would also not be subjected to undue external influences from the opposition. As such, besides regular meetings and roll calls, the village was also turned into a fortress, with village headman and ZANU-PF district organisational structures as the key watchmen, in a way that refashioned some colonial methods for post-colonial authoritarianism.

6.2.4 The “Ten by Ten” Strategy: Return of the cordon sanitaire

The strategy of the cordon sanitaires, no-go areas, and the surveillance that came with “Protected Villages” during the liberation struggle, were methods that were also alive and well in Mount Darwin ahead of, during and post the 2008 election. ZANU-PF’s organisational structures and agents instituted cordon sanitaires ostensibly to “protect” voters from “outside influences” in a similar way to the Rhodesian use of the strategy to stop ZANU-PF and other liberation movements from entering and influencing rural folk in the 1970s. ZANU-PF adopted this strategy and used it in Mount Darwin to shut out the opposition and other external influences. To a large extent, especially ahead of the 2013 elections, this could be seen as the application of Brigadier General Douglas Nyikayaramba’s call not to allow anyone, apart from traditional leaders and war veterans, to conduct meetings and hold rallies in villages. ZANU-PF implemented this with strategic precision in the Mount Darwin villages. NM0202 revealed that ZANU-PF, including its formal party structures and the local traditional leadership, instituted a surveillance programme that would detect and deter external people from entering their villages and politicising villagers.

We had the ten-by-ten strategy where blocks of ten households in any direction were constituted into a physical matrix to thwart the opposition penetration into Mount Darwin. This was before we even reached formal
ZANU-PF party structures like the cell or the branch. If a visitor reached any one of these houses, the name of the visitor was supposed to be reported to the village head, who most of the time was also a ZANU-PF Branch Chairman, to report to the district (NM0202, 2018).

The ten-by-ten structure was primarily an intelligence network with physical barring instituted by the ZANU-PF district party organisational structures when they received reports from village heads. The village heads oversaw an area just a bit smaller than a typical administrative ward. For instance, the village headman VHKS2401’s village had about 86 households in 2008 before being cut in half ahead of the 2013 elections, partly due to suspicion that part of his area had opposition members (VHKS2401-Interview, 2018). Based on this estimation, there was a network of 4x4 to 8x8 ten-by-ten columns in each village. The village heads were under instruction to report to the ZANU-PF District structure “whenever there is a new opposition party or person visiting from outside the village” (VHKS2401-Interview, 2018). If a traditional leader was informed of the presence of “intruders” and failed to act on or transmit the information for action, the consequences were theirs to bear for “spoiling their children”. If the visit was “not innocent”, measures would be taken at night through the zvipoko strategy to hound out the visitors. Sometimes this was not necessary, as ZANU-PF could quickly mobilise and attend to the affected household, or intercept and disrupt an intrusive political process or place where the “intruders” were located. An MDC youth ward chairperson from Mount Darwin East marvelled at how “ZANU-PF is ever so watchful” and recounted that whenever they travelled as MDC supporters, they would hear through rumours that ZANU PF was aware of their activities. He shared one experience where MDC activists were assaulted at the Chipfunyanguwo shops where they found ZANU-PF waiting for them and were surprised by “how ZANU-PF had caught wind of the fact that we would be passing through the area.” (CWY2601-Interview, 2018).

The ten-by-ten strategy was effective, and the fact that it was based on households not individuals meant that it had an inbuilt fail-safe mechanism where members of the same household also had each other under surveillance, and if one failed to report an incident, another could. BZ2202, a suspended former district chairperson for ZANU-PF, stated that the system was so effective, “to the point that even your wife can be like the biblical Peter or Judas, who can deny you or betray you. If I don’t tell them there is no guarantee that my wife won’t tell them to protect the family” (BZ2202-Interview, 2018). Outside the reporting functions,
members of the ten-by-ten structure could also be called upon to implement the disruption of activities that were not aligned to ZANU-PF. As BZ2202 recalled, “the behaviour in this area is that before elections, we hang around and get along, but towards elections it becomes a dog eat dog relationship, and ZANU-PF and the opposition become like oil and water, despite other relationships” (BZ2202-Interview, 2018)

6.2.5 “Ghosts” and “Goblins”: Violence and intimidation under the cover of darkness

It is largely accepted in the literature that the March 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections were held under conditions that were free, if not entirely fair, and produced a plausible result (Alexander & Tendi, 2008; Masunungure, 2009; Matysak, 2017). These elections did not produce a decisive winner in the presidential poll, necessitating a presidential election run-off in June 2008. As Alexander & Tendi (2008) argue, 2008 was a tale of two elections in which there was a relative lack of state-led violence in March, while in June there was extreme violence orchestrated by the ruling party, leading to unacceptability of the results. There are a few places in Zimbabwe where the violence and intimidation in 2008 were worse than in Mount Darwin. Here, the violence had multiple purposes, including to punish opposition supporters, as well as the traditional chiefs who sought to protect them and uphold their freedom of choice and association. The violence was also aimed at “convincing” reluctant converts, who otherwise would have proved resistant to ZANU-PF’s persuasion.

VHKS2401 stated that while in most of the country, violence became a feature of the run-up to the run-off election, in Mount Darwin, it was also a feature of the “free and fair” March 2008 elections. He stated that:

In the March 2008 election, and after that election in which the opposition party won, ZANU-PF sent representatives to the Village Headmen to identify and weed out opposition supporters. Their main strategy was to target opposition party supporters and intimidate them through the use of violence. For example, they would send what they termed ‘zvidhoma’ [goblins] or ‘zvipoko’ [ghosts] to beat up opposition party members and supporters at night. Some people even lost their lives. Most people known to be opposition party supporters would seek refuge in the mountains at night, as staying in their own homes became unsafe (VHKS2401-Interview, 2018).
In the above instance, the violence acted not only as a punishment for belonging to the opposition, but also as a destabilising strategy that forced the opposition to scatter, and go into hiding, which resulted in them failing to organise themselves openly and meaningfully in the area. MM2201, added that in the first instance ZANU-PF made sure that people could see that it could deliver, but “…those who do not believe from seeing action are visited by what we call Zvipoko (ghosts) at night and convinced through other means” (MM2201-Interview, 2018). These “non-believers” were the ones that the traditional leaders were supposed to identify, and non-compliance bore consequences. For instance, in Mount Darwin, village headman, Sabhuku Chaparira, was reportedly assassinated in 2008 for “supporting the opposition” (VHKS2401-Interview, 2018). VHKS2401 recounted how he had also feared for his life after being labelled a Mupanduki (sell-out) because he had allowed the MDC to have organisational structures in his village.

I had been asked that whenever there was a new opposition party, I must advise ZANU-PF through district party chairpersons. But how could I report my own children to be beaten, raped and killed? Not reporting opposition members in 2008 got me into trouble. It got to a point where I had to leave my homestead and seek shelter in the mountains for my own security (VHKS2401, 2018).

Besides the traditional leaders and opposition supporters in general, the violence was targeted in particular at opposition officials and candidates for election who acted as the key connecting cogs between the national presidential election and the constituencies. NTAD2001, a 2008 MDC-T parliamentary candidate and chief presidential campaigner in one of the Mount Darwin constituencies, was assaulted in 2008, his home was burnt, and his wife raped (NTAD2001-Interview, 2018). NTAD2001 explained that his ordeal and the opposition’s inability to assist impacted his and other constituents’ ability to champion the opposition’s cause in Mount Darwin post-2008.

Given what I went through, I would not attempt to run or lead opposition campaigns here in Mount Darwin again. During that time in 2008, I could. Even after the elections, after my house had been burnt. But from the party’s side no-one even bothered to call or visit to check on me. So you know people would ask me if the party would rebuild my house and buy property that I lost in the unfortunate incidents, and as a member, the polite thing to say would be that they are looking into the matter, but nothing came up. So, when you then try to approach people to say let’s campaign or bring people into the party, they say my house will be burnt and I will
lose my property, what help would I get? You did not receive any help after your ordeal, so why do you want me to get involved. (NTAD2001-Interview, 2018)

NTAD2001’s story had a huge impact on the communities in Mount Darwin because of his status in the community. NTAD2001 was a former police Senior Assistant Commissioner, who had commanded several provinces during his 29 years of service before resigning in 1985. In addition, he had two sons, one a soldier, and the other an ex-combatant, NTDA, who was a senior director in Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and responsible for President Mugabe’s security. This circumstance unnerved a lot of people amidst speculation that if NTDA could “do” or allow to be done what was done to his father and stepmother, Vimbai, by “Zvipoko” to protect Mugabe, what more could happen to those he did not share blood ties with? NTAD2001’s son was reported by members of the MDC-T District structures for Mount Darwin, for having discharged his gun on several occasions and dispersed MDC rallies or meetings during his weekend visits to Mount Darwin. The reports suggested that NTDA was usually aided by a member of the Presidential Guard from the area identified as Martin Kwainona, and a Youth leader, Mavhura Nyamaruka (GI-MDCdistrict2601-Interview, 2018). The overnight acts of violence and intimidation in 2008 were mainly conducted by members of ZANU-PF, (mostly Youths and War Veterans), but were aided by members of the national security services who were from the area and who, because of their profiles, could not hide under the cover of darkness.

The above evidence shows that the violence and intimidation did not just target and affect known MDC candidates and members, but also suspected ones, including traditional leaders suspected of accommodating opposition members in their villages. Based on this evidence, I argue that the violence had various uses, and was not happenstance. Rather, it was signalled by senior party officials at both the local and national level. At the local level, the task of surveillance given to the traditional leaders, with the ZANU-PF district structures receiving and processing information and directing action, show that the violence at the local level was sanctioned. At the national level, the instructions to purge the opposition were implicit in the framing of the electoral contest as a war to safeguard Zimbabwe’s sovereignty from enemies of the revolution. I concur with Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012) that these labels signalled how those identified deserved to be treated. During the liberation struggle, ZANU-PF often created “hit lists”
of people who had “sold out” and needed to be liquidated. The labels were more than just derogatory, they pointed to those who needed to be dealt with and “…deserved to die if the Zimbabwean nation was to live” (Ndlovhu-Gathseni, 2012:10).

However, the rampant use of violence and coercion in 2008 had consequences for ZANUPF’s legitimacy at home and abroad. In 2013, ZANU-PF dumped overt violence with Mugabe calling for unity and peace during the elections. He clearly had the 2008 elections in mind and encouraged ZANU-PF members to exercise restraint:

Right now, the MDC is poking you so that you poke back. Resist the temptation to poke back, refuse to be incited, and you also must not poke them. They want there to be violence so that they can say the elections were fraudulent because people were intimidated and beaten like they were in the 2008 elections (Herald, 11 July, 2013)

This was a telling message in part because of the departure from violent politics by a ZANU-PF candidate who, in 1998, had claimed to have “degrees” in violence (Blair, 2002). The message was also a veiled acknowledgement of the 2008 violence, which ZANU-PF had frequently denied and or blamed on the opposition.

The relative peacefulness of the 2013 Presidential election suggests that Mugabe’s message was headed across the country, at least as it related to overt physical violence. MT2301, a ZANU-PF youth league member in Mount Darwin, stated that in 2013 they resorted less to physical violence and relied more on intimidation and invoking memories of past episodes of electoral and political violence: “In 2013 the emphasis was more on intimidation, when we intimidated people, we would just say ‘Chegore riya vabereki !’[remember that year people/parents!] and they would know what we meant” (MT2301-Interview, 2018). This invocation of memories of the June 2008 violent run off period reminded people of the past and the consequences of not supporting ZANU-PF. It played on people’s fears and was effective because “…in the past, for sure, people were killed and maimed, the ‘long sleeved’ and ‘short sleeve’ stories were real, so if we just said, "Che gore riya vabereki !" people know” (MT2301-Interview, 2018). The “long sleeved” and “short sleeved” refer to practices reported in 2008 where suspected opposition supporters had their arms cut off at the elbow (short sleeve) or closer to the wrist (long sleeve).
Violence and intimidation were ZANU-PF’s tools of disenfranchisement in 2008, and compulsion in 2013. In both elections, where the campaign targets refused to accept hagiographic accounts of ZANU-PF and Mugabe, ZANU-PF subjected them to unrelenting coercive politics that showed them that they had a Hobson's choice of voting for the party or suffering punishment. In these instances, choosing whether or not to support ZANU-PF became the difference between hunger and starvation; access, or no access, to seed, grain and land; or being celebrated and welcomed in the village versus being treated like a pariah, if not rendered homeless. It was a choice between rape and pillage versus "peaceful" and harmonious settlement, and in the worst cases, it was, quite literally, the difference between life and death. ZANU-PF district secretary for lands, JJ2601, who was an opposition supporter until 2009, explained why and how he had changed political sides:

The main reason that I left MDC was because I feared for my life. My father was murdered for political reasons, and the party did not assist us in any way, and the police reports that we made did not bear any results. ZANU-PF asked me to convert, and I did because ZANU-PF seemed a safer option (JJ2601-Interview, 2018).

After 2008, ZANU-PF was not content with letting opposition members be. As LeBas (2006:420) pointed out, in rural areas societies were very polarised along political lines, and opposition sympathisers experienced violence and intimidation in ways that ensured that party affiliation was seldom chosen but imposed.

The fact that in the run-up to the 2008 presidential run-off election ZANU-PF was content to intimidate opposition members into fleeing their homesteads suggests that the violence was not meant to convert them. Instead, it was meant to take them out of the electoral equation and ensure that they did not turn out, making the 2008 run-off race a one-horse race. In 2013 overt violence was limited, but intimidation and coercion were rife. This time intimidation was used not to block the participation of suspected opposition members in the electoral process, but to compel them to vote for ZANU-PF. During this period, patronage distribution was meant to cover both vote buying (convincing people to vote through inducements) as well as turnout buying (ensuring that beneficiaries of ZANU-PF’s patronage turned out to vote). ZANU-PF also monitored constituents vote choices through traditional leaders and forced suspected
opposition members to feign illiteracy or disability so that they could be assisted to vote.

6.3 Conclusion

The politics of campaigning and elections in Mount Darwin bring out the multiple layers and shades of operation for ZANU-PF including the good, the bad and the very ugly. The empirical facts presented in the chapter show that ZANU-PF pursued a coercive mobilising campaign strategy in 2008 in ZACs where it catered for most to its members and core-constituencies. In 2013, ZANU-PF maintained a muted version of the mobilising campaign in ZACs, vigorously pursuing OACs at the national level and suspected opposition supporters at the subnational level in ZACs. In both elections, rather than just attaining victory, the campaign objective was to mobilise (2008) and increase (2013) turnout to boost its presidential candidate’s votes. Also, ZANU-PF’s campaign strategy between the elections changed regarding the tenor of the bigwig campaign speeches, as well as the nature of the inducements and sanctions offered for supporting (or not supporting) ZANU-PF. In the run-up to the March 2008 election, ZANU-PF distributed patronage goods with no discernible follow-up, suggesting that these clientelist distributions were to thank and reward its membership. When ZANU-PF did not win the March 2008 presidential election nationally, it resorted to violence.

Nevertheless, the chapter also provided evidence that showed that ZANU-PF’s efforts to increase the voter turnout and their winning tallies were also made through legitimacy-seeking historical, ideological and programmatic appeals. This was ZANU-PF’s daylight strategy to win hearts and minds, which proved useful in Mount Darwin. This was based on the strength of ZANU-PF’s ability to establish historical connections, evoke memories and emotions, appease and reward loyalty through practical and material inducements, inspire members through programmatic visions, and establish performance legitimacy through delivery on past programmatic promises, as well as running interventions in the run-up to and during the elections. These attempts by ZANU-PF to seek legitimacy through persuasive politics have not been examined much in the existing literature on ZANU-PF politics.
The findings partly lend traction to Southall’s (2013: 137) argument that ZANU-PF secured its 2013 victory in part because it presented a programmatic message around empowerment, indigenisation, and jobs at rallies and in the press, as opposed to the MDC-T’s lacklustre campaign. Southall (2013) argues that this messaging struck a chord with voters and that it is not inconceivable that ZANU-PF could have won in 2013 without rigging. However, the chapter complicates this by showing that these persuasive elements were also part of ZANU-PF’s campaign in 2008; yet it lost the first round of the Presidential election and only secured a hollow victory in the June 2008 run-off election on the back of unmitigated violence and intimidation.

In sum, the chapter shows that in ZACs, ZANU-PF campaigned to increase voter turnout and their winning tallies using a multi-level political game aimed at achieving legitimacy and delivering large winning margins. By “day”, ZANU-PF bigwigs campaigned to win voters’ hearts and minds through legitimacy-seeking historical, charismatic, programmatic and ideological appeals. The chapter showed that when the inquiry is limited to this aspect of electioneering, ZANU-PF appears to have campaigned to win the hearts and minds of voters and to enhance its legitimacy. The chapter used evidence from interviews and conversations with a cross-section of ZANU-PF members, traditional leaders, opposition members, liberation war veterans, and ordinary villagers to highlight how and why ideological, historical and programmatic appeals had some resonance in the Mount Darwin constituencies. At the local levels, ZANU-PF and its appendages initially went about hyperbolising Mugabe’s and ZANU-PF’s virtues. These actions represented the levelling down of persuasive appeals from the bigwigs. However, while emphasising the persuasive elements of ZANU-PF’s campaigns because of their neglect in the literature and analysis, the chapter still found that by “night” ZANU-PF organisational structures, with the aid of the local state and coercive arms of the state, engaged in a process of compelling support. The chapter thus also validates, in part, existing arguments on ZANU-PF’s use of coercion and patriotic history discourses.

Nonetheless, the type of subnational politics in aid of the national presidential campaigns that were present in ZACs straddled the line between what may be normatively considered legitimacy-seeking and non-legitimacy seeking methods. It combined the use of persuasive appeals, manipulation, and coercive methods, some of which had a discursive, yet compulsory, character. The chapter
concludes that ZANU-PF campaigned in ZACs to reinforce its liberation war legacy as a credential for governing, to promote the party’s programme, and to mobilise and compel members and ordinary voters to turn out on election day through a range of positive and negative local sanctions. ZANU-PF flattered to deceive as it publicly sought legitimacy, but privately compelled support in wicked ways that are inimical to legitimacy-seeking modes of electioneering. In ZACs, therefore, ZANU-PF did not campaign to just win; it did so to win big. How it went about this in 2008- mainly coercive mobilising in its core constituents and hounding the opposition out of the electoral process - differed from 2013- when it sought to mobilise its base, and convert suspected opposition supporters into at best ZANU-PF members, and at worst, just votes for ZANU-PF.

In the final analysis ZANU-PF, by invoking its liberation war credentials and anti-imperialist rhetoric, it signalled that although it was participating in a process which could land it with procedural legitimacy, it emphasised more its identity-based claims to legitimacy. Also, rather than touting its own performance during the GNU, ZANU-PF chose instead to shoot down the opposition, and using them as a reason for the bucolic to keep supporting their needs. The next chapter investigates ZANU-PF’s campaigns in opposition-aligned constitutions whose political DNA was fundamentally different from the ZACs covered in this chapter.
This chapter discusses ZANU-PF’s campaigning in the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections in opposition-aligned constituencies (OACs). The OACs category includes opposition strongholds (where the opposition’s winning margins against ZANU-PF were over 52.75%), consolidating-opposition constituencies (where the winning margins for the opposition against ZANU-PF were between 31.3% and 52.75%), and constituencies where the opposition scored narrow victories (between 15.1% and 31.3%). While the primary presidential competition in 2008 and 2013 was between Robert Mugabe of ZANU-PF and Morgan Tsvangirai of the MDC, the opposition’s winning margins, which inform the OAC category in this chapter, are calculated based on combined opposition votes (MDC-T and other parties) against the incumbent, ZANU-PF. The calculation follows a simple formula of subtracting the second placed candidate’s votes from the winning candidate’s votes and dividing this by the total number of votes cast. The chapter analyses the presidential election campaigns in OACs at the national and sub-national levels in 2008 and 2013, when ZANU-PF appeared resurgent.

This chapter uses overview data from the study’s dataset as the basis on which to conduct a national level analysis. It augments this with an analysis of the bigwig visits for the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections by members of the ZANU-PF praesidium, acting in their national leadership capacities to OACs. In addition to this, the chapter also leverages other descriptive outputs from the study’s dataset (overviewed in chapter 5), the public record (newspapers and other secondary evidence), and interviews conducted in Bulawayo ‘s Makokoba and Pumula constituencies, as well as Lupane West constituency to analyse ZANU-PF’s campaign strategy in OACs. As shown in chapter 3, circa 2008, Bulawayo province in particular, and the Matebeleland provinces in general, were perceived to be opposition stronghold provinces. Ahead of the 2008 elections, Makokoba and Pumula constituencies were opposition strongholds because the opposition had registered winning margins of around 62% in the previous elections in 2002. This was over the stronghold threshold of a winning margin, which was 52.75%. Lupane West constituency was a marginal-opposition constituency after the opposition carried the constituency in 2002 with a winning margin 28.27%, placing it in the marginal (i.e. narrowly won) constituency category. After the
2013 election, Makokoba and Pumula turned into consolidating-opposition constituencies (with winning margins of 47.2% and 46.7% falling into the consolidating-constituency category, with winning margins between 31.33% and 52.75%) while Lupane West became a battleground constituency with the opposition only mastering a winning margin of 10%. This selection of constituencies is representative of OACs, especially from the Southern region of Zimbabwe.

The chapter picks up the change and continuity discussion started in chapter 5 and will show how that a change in strategy occurred and that it had its genesis in the March 2008 presidential election. It attributes the shift in campaign strategy to several factors, including the March election results and the negative consequences of ZANU-PF’s resort to violence in the run-up to the June 2008 presidential election run-off on its legitimacy. These circumstances caused dissonance in ZANU-PF, requiring practical political action at a strategic level to stem ZANU-PF’s embarrassment. In contrast to some of the popular scholarship on ZANU-PF and Zimbabwe’s electoral processes, the chapters argues that ZANU-PF was forced to learn “new” ways of capturing power, and unlearn old habits of power retention in 2013 to meet its ambition of risk mitigation against loss power as nearly happened in March 2008, and loss of legitimacy as had happened after the June 2008 presidential election run-off.

In advancing these arguments, the chapter departs from some of the more popular analysis on Zimbabwean elections, which focuses on ZANU-PF manipulation and violence. It argues that ZANU-PF’s campaigning in licit and persuasive ways also had an impact on the electoral outcomes in 2013. The chasing strategy that ZANU-PF adopted in 2013 comes across as compelling evidence that ZANU-PF went out and mobilised more voters through strategic shifts in how their campaigns targeted people and places. My main conclusion is that ZANU-PF shifted its campaign strategy in OACs in 2013, desisting from overt violence, and relying on the utilisation of persuasion and patronage. There was a shift in strategy from just mobilising its partisan core (ZACs) to attempting a persuasive clientelist chasing strategy targeting non-members (found mainly in OACs). The data supports the study’s the notion that in 2013, ZANU-PF, a clear example of a competitive authoritarian regime, campaigned to win the hearts and minds of more independent voters to enhance its legitimacy.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.1 presents an overview of OACs as a category, outlining the main features of constituencies and how they fit into it over time. It also covers how ZANU-PF executed its election campaigns in OACs in 2008 using bigwig rallies and particular appeals. It will show how, at bigwig rallies, ZANU-PF utilised programmatic and clientelist appeals, and also attempted to leverage history and Joshua Nkomo’s legacy in Matebeleland. As in ZACs, ZANU-PF savaged the opposition. Section 7.2 looks at the local politics of the 2008 ZANU-PF campaign in OACs, showing how ZANU-PF used its party structures at the cell, branch and district levels to mobilise support. I argue that in the absence of positive and negative sanctions to entice or force people to be part of ZANU-PF, the party structures, as a mobilising and organising strategy in elections, became of limited utility. Section 7.3 outlines the outcomes of the 2008 elections and the implications that they had for ZANU-PF’s campaign strategy going forward. Section 7.4 covers ZANU-PF’s “forays into enemy territory” in the 2013 election. It engages the literature on the 2013 Presidential election and outlines how this study argues ZANU-PF’s switched its campaign strategy. Section 7.5 analyses 2013 bigwig rallies and the kinds of appeals that ZANU-PF made. It then looks at how ZANU-PF’s local party structures and members conducted ZANU-PF’s ground game in OACs in 2013. It will outline several approaches that ZANU-PF adopted with decent electoral returns. The conclusion summarises the chapter, its main findings, arguments, and analysis.

### 7.1 Overview Of OACs 2002 To 2013

Between 2002 and 2018, a total of 108 electoral districts of the 210 that are contested were at one point or another opposition-leaning constituency, as either opposition strongholds, or consolidating, or marginal constituencies. Although the general impression is that the opposition is dominant in urban areas and ZANU-PF is dominant in rural areas, the data compiled for this study based on official election returns from the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) shows that across time (2002 to 2018) this was not completely the case. The OAC category was constituted of an almost equal number of rural (48 constituencies) and urban areas (49 constituencies), with peri-urban areas taking up the remaining 11 slots. Also contrary to the view that ZANU-PF controlled all constituencies where land reform had occurred, almost 78% of the rural constituencies (34 out of 48) in the OAC category had experienced some form of land reform.
Absent the legitimate criticism around the integrity of official election returns in Zimbabwe as covered in chapter 5, the data suggests that the opposition was generally weakening across time. For instance, the average winning margins for the opposition across OACs were generally declining. In 2002 the average winning margin for OACs was about 40%; it went down to 35% in 2008, further declining to an average of 24% in 2013. However, the picture is more volatile when one looks at concrete numbers of OACs and voter turnout in OACs across time. As Figure 7-1 shows, although there was an increase in the number of OACs in 2008 to 105 out of 210 from the 2002 levels of 69 out of 210, the number of OACs decreased from this 2008 high watermark of 105 OACs to only 47 out of 210 in 2013. In 2008 OACs constituted about a third, 33% of the 210 constituencies, that ZEC’s delimitation exercise had introduced for the 2008 election. Out of the 69 OACs, 29 were opposition strongholds, 21 were consolidating, and 19 were marginal opposition constituencies.

Table 7-1: Opposition Aligned Constituencies (2002 to 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPPOSITION LEANING CONSTITUENCIES</th>
<th>Opposition Strongholds</th>
<th>Marginal opposition</th>
<th>Consolidating Opposition</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1-2002</td>
<td>13.80%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>32.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29/210</td>
<td>19/210</td>
<td>20/210</td>
<td>68/210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2-2008</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>14.30%</td>
<td>13.80%</td>
<td>50.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46/210</td>
<td>30/210</td>
<td>29/210</td>
<td>105/210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3-2013</td>
<td>5.20%</td>
<td>7.61%</td>
<td>9.52%</td>
<td>22.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11/210</td>
<td>16/210</td>
<td>20/210</td>
<td>47/210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T4-2018</td>
<td>9.00%</td>
<td>8.57%</td>
<td>16.66%</td>
<td>34.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19/210</td>
<td>18/210</td>
<td>35/210</td>
<td>72/210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 In this chapter and the rest of the thesis, marginal constituencies refer to constituencies narrowly won by either the opposition or the incumbent. This classification is a departure from the general usage where marginal is used interchangeably with constituencies considered battlegrounds, swings or close contests. I further clarify the difference between these three (marginals, swings and battlegrounds) as used in this thesis in chapter 6, which is on battleground constituencies.
Although the data shows that, over time, rural and urban constituencies constituted roughly equal shares of OACs, in 2008, the vast majority (46 out 69) were urban areas, while 17 were rural, with only six constituencies being peri urban. Official election returns, if taken as correct, also show that voter turnout in OACs averaged around 50.7 % in 2002, going down to 42% in 2008, before increasing again to 55% in 2013. This official data suggests that ZANU-PF, rather than the opposition, benefited from the increased voter turnout. Generally, when the turnout was low in 2008, the opposition benefited from the apathy, while when it was higher in 2013, ZANU-PF benefitted from the increased turnout figures. This could have been the result of voter education and mobilisation saturation in rural areas in 2013, given the commonly held understanding that this is where civic education was needed the most.

As Figure 7-1 shows, the presidential election for 2008 led to increases across all three types of OACs, with strongholds increasing to 46, up from 29, consolidating-opposition constituencies increasing to 29, up from 21, and
marginal-opposition constituencies increasing to 30 from 19. In aggregate terms, the opposition mastered pluralities in 105 constituencies, exactly half of the 210 single member districts, although they also had some very narrow winning margins in some of the 57 battleground constituencies.

7.1.1 2008 Political Calculus: Neglecting OACs, Shoring Up The ZANU-PF Heartland.

Figure 7-2, below, shows the number of bigwig visits that ZANU-PF made to the different types of constituencies. It shows that in 2008, ZANU-PF deployed the most bigwig visits to marginal ZANU-PF constituencies (12 visits), followed by ZANU-PF Strongholds (7 visits). Marginal-opposition constituencies and battleground constituencies enjoyed the same level of attention (6 visits). Figure 7-2 also shows that ZANU-PF paid the least attention in 2008 to consolidating-ZANU-PF constituencies, opposition stronghold and consolidating constituencies. In other words, in 2008, ZANU-PF concentrated its attention on its own partisan strongholds.

Figure 7-2: 2008 ZANU-PF Bigwig visits By Constituency Type.

Source: Author’s data

Table 7-2 shows how many bigwig visits ZANU-PF deployed to the different constituency types in 2008. The table presents this data on two levels and in two forms. It shows the absolute number of recorded visits and the
proportion/percentage they constituted of all visits in 2008, as well as the aggregate proportions of visits to OACs, ZACs, and battleground constituencies. The percentages in Table 2 are rounded to the nearest whole number.

Table 7-2 shows that ZANU-PF concentrated its bigwig efforts in ZACs (53%), with battlegrounds receiving 14% of visits, while OACs received 34%. About 54% of visits to ZACs were to marginal constituencies, i.e. where its margins of victory were narrow, although a sizable proportion, 32%, were to its strongholds. Regarding OACs, ZANU-PF devoted 43% of its visits to marginal-opposition constituencies with the remaining visits being equally split between opposition-consolidating and opposition-stronghold constituencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency Type</th>
<th>2008 Bigwig Visits</th>
<th>2008 Aggregate proportions per Major Constituency type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Strongholds</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidating Opposition</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal Opposition</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Data based on cataloguing campaign stops of the ZANU-PF Praesidium during the 2008 (March and June) and 2013 elections.

The 2008 pattern of bigwig visits shows that ZANU-PF largely neglected OACs and sought to shore up support in its core constituencies. This was a strategy to mobilise its base, as explained in chapter 6. It was aimed at maximising the turnout in its strongholds and allied constituencies (ZACs). The ZANU-PF base had also benefitted from the land reform programme and other populist intervention programmes that supported both commercial and communal agriculture. As Raftopoulos (2013:983) notes, this effort to win rural support through populist programmatic interventions, and ZANU-PF’s support to the informal and formal mining sectors and informal traders in the cities, were part of reconstructing its social base for elections and future developmental visions. If Raftopoulos (2013) and scholars like Dube & Makaye (2013), who argue that ZANU-PF’s past success was due to the strength of a captive rural electorate, are correct, then the mobilising strategy that ZANU-PF employed in 2008 made political sense. The data suggest that ZANU-PF intended to shore up shaky
elements of its base (marginal ZANU-PF constituencies) and maximise support from its strongholds. That ZANU-PF paid the least attention to areas that they were unlikely to win (opposition strongholds) is in line with a mobilising strategy, elaborated in chapter 6, in regard to ZANU-PF’s campaigns in ZACs. However, ZANU-PF did pay some limited attention to OACs in 2008. The next section focuses on how it did so through bigwig rallies and the appeals that Mugabe made during rallies in Matebeleland and Bulawayo provinces.

7.1.2 Programmatic and Clientelist appeals & Leveraging the Nkomo Legacy

On the few occasions that Mugabe and other ZANU-PF bigwigs made forays into OACs in 2008, their appeals were similar to those made in ZACs (chapter 4). The campaign speeches featured spirited attacks on the opposition, historical and ideological appeals, and the partisan distribution of basic essential commodities through people’s shops, the BACOSI initiative and price controls. There were also programmatic appeals around transport and the resuscitation of industries. These were important issues nationally but had particular resonance in Bulawayo and Matebeleland (Bulawayo Bureau, 2008). Several news stories from the campaign period show that while mentioning issues regarding social service delivery, health (including donating 400 cars to senior doctors), transport (including the donation of thirty-five minibuses each to the three Matebeleland provinces), and sharing his grain import scheme through Zambia, Mugabe’s main focus was on addressing the issues of runaway inflation and basic food prices.

Speaking at Hwange Colliery mine just outside Lupane on 24 March 2008, Mugabe made populist threats to companies that refused to lower their basic commodity prices. He accused them of a deliberate attempt to push a regime-change agenda by frustrating people so that they turned against the government in the 29 March elections. Mugabe threatened a political response:

We are going to read them the riot act. If they refuse [to lower prices], we too will reject them. That is no play. We are going to use the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act which stipulates that all companies, be they mines or manufacturing companies with foreign ownership, without black shareholders, or with black shareholders without a majority, should have at least 51% shares reserved for indigenous people (Gagare & Mpofu, 2008).

Mugabe also attempted to leverage the memory and popularity of late veteran nationalist and Vice President of Zimbabwe, ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo. This
was in a bid to calm Matabeleland’s historical regional hostility against ZANU-PF on account of the Gukurahundi massacres. The Fifth Brigade is reported to have killed between 8000 (CCJP & LRF, 1997) and 20,000 people (International Association of Genocide Scholars, 2005), mostly consisting of people of Ndebele descent and ZAPU supporters. Nkomo, dubbed “Father Zimbabwe”, enjoyed his greatest support in the Matebeleland provinces. As Alexander, McGregor, & Ranger (2000) note, Zimbabwe’s two liberation guerrilla armies, ZANLA for ZANU and ZIPRA for ZAPU, followed regional patterns of recruitment and operation during the war. While considered allies, there was also a history of animosity and distrust between them and their political leaders, in part stemming from the ZANU’s split from ZAPU in 1963 (see chapter 4). Alexander, McGregor and Ranger (2000:181) also note that the patterns of recruitment and operation left ZIPRA forces dominated by Ndebele speakers from Matebeleland, while ZANLA was predominantly Shona-speaking. These composition dynamics and operational areas impacted political loyalties both pre- and post-independence, mostly following ethnic and regional divisions.

Mugabe was aware of this history, including the complication added by the Gukurahundi massacres. He sought to salvage some support, claiming that he wanted to uphold and fulfil Dr Joshua Nkomo’s legacy of empowering the people of Zimbabwe, and excluding the British from taking over the land (Sibanda, 2008).

In Mugabe’s eyes, the opposition was standing in the way of Nkomo’s legacy and, by extension, the ideals of the liberation struggle. Mugabe made scathing rhetorical attacks on the opposition, which hitherto had been quite dominant in Matebeleland. In the 2002 presidential race, Morgan Tsvangirai had bested Mugabe in the three provinces, securing 63% of the vote while Mugabe only received 32.5%. Tsvangirai’s dominance was pronounced in Bulawayo, where he massively dominated in every constituency with an average winning margin of 62%. In Matebeleland South and North, Tsvangirai still led but with lower winning margins averaging 31% and 24% respectively, with Mugabe leading in five of the 26 constituencies with small winning margins, averaging 12%. Since the 2002 presidential election the opposition had split, with the bulk of its leaders from Matebeleland (like the then Deputy President Gibson Sibanda, Secretary-General Welshman Ncube, and Spokesperson Paul Themba Nyathi) leading the faction opposed to Tsvangirai. With the opposition seemingly weakened by the
split, 2008 seemed like an opportunity to cut down Tsvangirai’s support in the region (BBC, 2005).

### 7.1.3 Savaging the opposition: “Puppets”, “Sell-Outs”, “Political Adventurers” and “Prostitutes”

Speaking at Stanley Square in Makokoba a few days before the March 2008 presidential election, Mugabe was more combative than persuasive, perhaps because he knew his chances in Bulawayo were limited. The Herald newspaper reported that Mugabe had chided the people of Bulawayo in particular, and Matebeleland in general, for voting for “puppets of the west” since 2000. In Hwange, Mugabe had dismissed the MDC challenge, stating that losing to Tsvangirai would be a curse of biblical proportions. Nonetheless, he was confident that although “they may win some seats”, it would be impossible for them to win across the country (Gagare & Mpofu, 2008:1). In Bulawayo, at the Stanley Square rally, Mugabe did not equivocate, declaring that constituents would be wasting their votes if they voted for the opposition because,

> You can vote for them, but that will be a wasted vote. You will be cheating yourself as there is no way we can allow them to rule this country. We have a job to do, and that is to protect our heritage. The MDC will not rule this country. It will never ever happen. Asisoze sivume [we will not accept it] (Sibanda & Mavhumashava, 2008:1).

It appears that Mugabe meant what he said, as he later refused to acknowledge being defeated in the 2008 election by Tsvangirai. This attitude is true to the nature of elections in competitive authoritarian regimes, where, despite having politically valid results, the elections seldom offer a “real” opportunity to change ruling regimes (Blaydes, 2006; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2002). I also argue that given the place, Bulawayo, and the time, a week ahead of the election, Mugabe was engaging in intimidation at scale, sowing the seeds of the futility of voting in OACs to dissuade opposition supporters from participating in the election. This kind of intimidation, as Collier & Vicente (2012) note, is useful in attacking the resolve to participate of the opposition’s soft-core supporters, who can be easily dissuaded from voting by intimidation and violence.

Part of the logic in Mugabe’s declarations around protecting Zimbabwe’s heritage stemmed from the blame he placed on the MDC for the sanctions and economic challenges that Zimbabwe had faced ahead of the 2008 election. Mugabe accused MDC leaders of being empty vessels with no solutions and being puppets on
Western strings. He derided Morgan Tsvangirai as being uneducated and having no *locus standi* for solutions to Zimbabwe’s economic challenges. He accused Tsvangirai of not being able to “think for himself” and relying instead on white people and former white farmers to think for him (Sibanda & Mavhumashava, 2008). Even then, Mugabe claimed that the MDC’s campaign message, while catchy, was vacuous and should not entice Zimbabweans:


While Mugabe sought to take advantage of the MDC split, ZANU-PF was also in disarray and in danger of disintegrating. ZANU-PF politburo member and former finance minister Simba Makoni declared his intention to run as an alternative ZANU-PF candidate a month ahead of the 2008 election. Makoni’s bid for the presidency followed a failed palace coup at ZANU-PF’s December 2007 Congress to have a candidate other than Mugabe for the 2008 election (DD, 2017). Coming into the 2008 race, Mugabe was aware that ZANU-PF too was fraught with elite dissensus over his leadership. Party influentials ultimately advanced the “*Bhora Musango*” [kick the ball into the bush] strategy, where some senior ZANU-PF insiders urged constituents in 2008 to vote for ZANU-PF MPs but not Mugabe in the presidential ballot (Ncube, 2016; Tendi, 2013).

In Matebeleland, these fractions within ZANU-PF were more pronounced. One of the most senior ex-ZAPU members in ZANU-PF after the death of Nkomo, former ZIPRA intelligence chief Dumiso Dabengwa, quit ZANU-PF at its December congress. Dabengwa became Makoni’s chief campaigner in Matebeleland and the surrounding regions, where ZAPU’s name and heritage carried much more weight than ZANU-PF. As a result Mugabe also made scathing attacks on Dabengwa, whom he accused of “straying into the darkness” for following Makoni, whom he called a political prostitute without a party, a sell-out, and a political adventurer driven by personal ambition (Bulawayo Bureau, 2008; Staff Reporter, 2008). The opposition also accused Makoni and Dabengwa rhetorically of being ZANU-PF plants. Despite these attacks, Dabengwa and Makoni’s history as ZANU-PF members, and Makoni’s insistence, despite being expelled from ZANU-PF, that he was loyal to ZANU-PF, are thought to have assisted him to get 8% of the vote share in 2008. Some in
ZANU-PF believed that his candidature reduced their support base. In an interview with me, one ZANU-PF Member of Parliament and Central Committee member from Matebeleland Province, M.P-KM1212, shared his belief that ZANU-PF could have performed better in 2008 had it not been divided. As far as he was concerned the three-way split of votes between Mugabe, Tsvangirai and Makoni was an artificial result that did not adequately show ZANU-PF’s strength. He argued that in Matebeleland, Makoni and Dabengwa were rogue ZANU-PF members who took votes away from ZANU-PF (M.P-KM1212, 2017).

The above issues, appeals, and attacks were assimilated, acted on, and appreciated differently by different constituencies and voters on the ground in Matebeleland. The next section looks at how ZANU-PF went about localising the national presidential race in OACs. However, given the limited campaign effort in OACs in general, and in urban areas in particular, the section covers experiences from rural Lupane more than Makokoba and Pumula, which are urban areas in Bulawayo.

### 7.2 The Local Politics Of The 2008 Presidential Election Campaigns

Mugabe’s attempt to appropriate Nkomo’s legacy did not work, putting a dent in his historical and ideological appeals. In this region, ZANU-PF had a chequered history, and could not make the monopoly claims to liberating the country that Mugabe could make anywhere outside Matebeleland. As explained above, during the liberation struggle, ZAPU was the party, and ZIPRA the army, that most people in the Matebeleland region supported and interacted with during the war. The fact that this movement was targeted for extermination by Mugabe post-1980 through the Gukurahundi Massacres, and then absorbed as a junior partner into ZANU-PF through the 1987 Unity Accord, did not sit well with ZAPU purists in the region (Masunungure, 2008). Although this fact is neglected in most broad sweeping analyses, Mugabe, if the official results are to be believed, still enjoyed a sizable amount of support in the Matebeleland province. In 2002 Mugabe’s vote share stood at 32%. However, it is correct that the historical regional disdain for ZANU-PF left the region fairly open to opposition. In 2008, opposition forces provided two options other than Mugabe: Makoni and Tsvangirai.
In 2008 Tsvangirai seemed to prevail in Matebeleland and was considered by some the best candidate with national credentials strong enough to defeat Mugabe. TS1612, a Matebeleland North provincial opposition leader, explained in an interview that some in the province saw Tsvangirai as Nkomo’s successor. This was plausible because Nkomo had not anointed a successor in the region, and, throughout his life, had styled himself as a Zimbabwean nationalist and “father of the nation”, despite being from Matebeleland. This gave Tsvangirai an advantage. Other leaders from the region, like Dumiso Dabengwa, Welshman Ncube, and others that Ncube had left the MDC with during the 2005 split, were seen, and sometimes portrayed themselves as regional leaders. Importantly, none of these other leaders were on the 2008 Presidential election ballot. Tsvangirai was, by contrast, perceived, and portrayed himself as a national leader, who, like Mugabe, also claimed, during a tour of all of the districts in the region in 2008, that he wanted to finish what Nkomo had started (TS1612, 2017). TS noted that people actually believed in Morgan [Tsvangirai] so much more than they would believe in their Ndebele brothers in the Presidential election. They felt that their struggle and challenges had local manifestation but were nationally driven, and the only person who could tackle those national issues, who could remove Mugabe was Morgan. So, at all costs, Morgan was their messiah, their Joshua Nkomo (TS1612, 2017).

Tsvangirai’s retail politics of moving from district to district doing rallies, the region’s historical disdain for ZANU-PF, and ZANU-PF’s poor economic stewardship, which had left Bulawayo, formerly Zimbabwe’s industrial hub, deindustrialised, damaged Mugabe’s candidature in the Matebeleland provinces. These factors made Mugabe’s appeals during the bigwig rallies largely ineffectual. The opposition made good on this opportunity through “a well-polished campaign strategy, supported by Command Centres at provincial offices in Bulawayo, Lupane and Gwanda, which the business community supported and funded together with an astute technical team” (TS1612, 2017).

Mugabe’s ideological and historical appeals, as well as his vilification of the opposition, especially around their ties with whites and the West, also seemed to have a limited impact in OACs if the electoral results are used as a measure of success. In part, this limited impact was because the message was too broad. It was tailored to appeal to the rural folk who had direct interest in the land, and who were more concerned about this than ideological concerns around land reclamation and righting past wrongs. It must be remembered that, in 2008, the
The vast majority of OACs were urban areas (46 out of 69). These constituencies had been hardest hit by the country’s serious economic challenges and did not readily accept the *third chimurenga* discourse as an explanation for the economic decline. Different types of appeals outside land and land-related inducements would have been needed. ZANU-PF also had limited capacity to transmit its messages from the presidency downwards to the local level, given the poor shape that the party was in, the present infighting, and the *Bhoro musango* phenomenon.

Away from the urban areas, for some in the predominantly rural constituency of Lupane, the connections with white people that ZANU-PF chastised the opposition for were precisely why the opposition was worth supporting. In an interview, Counc-CM1112, a former Local Authority counsellor in Lupane, stated how this demonization worked against Mugabe.

People thought if they voted for Tsvangirai in 2008, the white settlers could come back and spearhead developmental projects that could revive the economy. It is and was useless to vote for Mugabe. For example, we have an ARDA [Agricultural and Rural Development Authority] Estate in Lupane East in Jotsholo which is being run by white men. It has proved to be a shining beacon in terms of agricultural production. This proves beyond reasonable doubt that the white man is a hard worker and can provide for the community (Counc-CM1112, 2017).

In Lupane and Bulawayo, evidence from the interviews suggests that ethnicity as an organising principle was salient. It mattered who introduced and who campaigned for the presidential candidates outside of the settings of the bigwig rallies. While this was the case throughout the country, in Bulawayo and Lupane particularly, ethnicity and the local patron's position in what was understood to be the Ndebele tribal hierarchy were important. Several Lupane respondents stated that the politics of representation and campaigning had to be what they called “a well-balanced tribal act”. MXS1612, a local business owner at Lupane Center, contextualised this sentiment during an interview:

...Lupane is dynamic in the sense that this is where you find the core *Ndebele*, the *Mguni* and *Khumalo* people who believe in the ideology of *Ubuntu ubuNdebele* [Ndebele fundamentalism]. These people are a small clique, but they swing the vote. I will give you an example in Lupane West. It has been contested, but it is a Khumalo constituency if you bring in a Sibanda, the Khumalo wins. The Presidential candidate fronted by the pure Ndebele, the Mguni and Khumalo also does well. If you go down to Dandanda you find and see these cliques there who believe in and support
Khumalo, but maybe some of them don’t even know him but because he is a Khumalo, he is the right person to elect and whose call on the Presidency is also followed (MXS1612-Interview, 2017).

TS1612, the opposition provincial executive member who was part of the province-wide leadership for the campaigns in 2008 and 2013, validated the efficacy of the above sentiment for political practice in Lupane. Despite the homogeneity that most assume for Matebeleland, the provinces are a dynamic constellation of various ethnicities and self-identifying tribes. Pushing a Ndebele candidate and point-person forward can be inadequate to deal with the political dynamics, which vary from district to district. To illustrate, TS1612 stated that while the Ndebele leadership question was salient in Lupane and Tsholotsho, in multi-cultural Umguza (another constituency in Matebeleland North), it was not an issue. The representation and leadership matrix in Binga district, which is Tonga dominated, and in Hwange, where the Nambya are the major group, also changed the dynamics of the campaign leadership and representation. TS1612 credited the opposition’s good performance in Matebeleland North to getting these dynamics right.

However, the MP and ZANU-PF Central Committee member whom I interviewed in Lupane watered down the above perspective. He saw his and Mugabe’s success in Lupane as a function of his record of working with the community at different levels. He argued that it was also a sign of being a good candidate and campaign lead selection at ward and constituency level beyond the position of the person in the ethnic hierarchy (M.P-KM1212-Interview, 2017). According to him, his record and relations in the community, rather than his perceived position in the ethnic hierarchy, allowed him to mobilise support beyond ZANU-PF members to include people who were “development driven” (M.P-KM1212-Interview, 2017). The MP’s input and argumentation could have been rationalization and revisionist reflection on the politics on the ground. Tribalism and ethnic mobilisation are generally frowned upon in Zimbabwe, which since independence has been trying to foist a unitary national identity on a state with ethnic diversity.

Ethnic considerations and mobilisation appeared to play an important part in campaigns at the local level, at least in Lupane. Those in public office could deny it for purposes of painting a picture of meritocratic and performance-based politics for fear of being labeled tribalists and ethnic political merchants. Despite
this, ethnicity seemed to impact voters’ choices. However, the nature of the presidential race, the absence of a Ndebele on the presidential ballot, and the almost perfect three-way split between Mugabe, Makoni and Tsvangirai in Lupane, suggest that while the local level campaigners and representatives had to fit a certain ‘ethnic’ mould, they had no co-ethnic to elect as President. This muted the nature and possible prevalence of ethnicity in the political field because it could not be identified from the top and did not appear to be a major mobilisation tool in mainstream national political mobilisation.

7.2.1 The limitations of party structure in the absence of positive and negative sanctions

My data suggests that while ZANU-PF did very little to appeal to general constituents in OACs, it did, however, concentrate on mobilising its own party members. A ZANU-PF Provincial Executive member for Bulawayo Province, DF0212, who was closely involved in the ZANU-PF campaigns in Bulawayo Province in 2008 and 2013, said that ZANU-PF's approach in 2008 in the province mostly depended on mobilising its party structures and members (DF0212, 2017). This entailed ensuring that, in the first instance, it mobilised members of its party cell structures to vote. In this way, ZANU-PF could anticipate the minimum number of expected votes based on the number of cells it had. DF0212 explained this as follows:

If in Bulawayo Mugabe had 30000 votes, it is highly probable that that is the same membership we have in the party. These are the people who you will see at the rally. Those are the people, because you are using a guaranteed system, because you are using the party structure. What we got outside the membership was good luck. But we relied on our membership (DF0212-Interview, 2017).

The approach, as MPKM explained, was similar in Lupane.

It all starts with the structures. We have very strong party structures which start from the Cell, Branch, Districts up to the Province. If all those structures are managed properly, we keep our numbers in check. The African National Congress, ANC, in South Africa uses the same strategy. So, in elections, we just add on new numbers (M.P-KM1212-Interview, 2017).

The reliance on party cells that DF and MPKM mentioned is evidence that ZANU-PF was following a mobilisation-centred campaign strategy, focusing on turning out its base and its supporters. As argued in earlier chapters, after 232
achieving a two-thirds majority in parliament in the 2005 general election, ZANU-PF had no reason to doubt that it had sufficient numbers to carry the day in 2008 if those numbers turned out.

The opposition attempted to use similar stated that in Lupane West, they had tried to mobilise their party structures. However, the poor organisation, lack of transport, and limited campaign resources curtailed the effectiveness of this strategy (Counc-CM1112, 2017). In contrast, ZANU-PF were well resourced. They had 4x4 trucks to cover all the areas they needed to reach. It used the Border Gezi national youth service to campaign through night Pungwes, and they were also incentivised with allowances. In the MDC, it was hard to even get transport to go into constituencies as the party was under-resourced (Counc-CM1112-Interview, 2017).

The opposition’s resource challenges and ZANU-PF’s use of night vigils and youth officers and/or militias were similar to the campaign dynamics in in ZACs. CM1112 mentioned ZANU-PF’s use of the “Border Gezi” youth militia in its ground campaign in Lupane West. It is notable, however, that even in 2008, opposition officials noted that, “If they know that you are opposition like me, they do not bother you. They sort you out by not giving you food parcels and other benefits associated with being ZANU-PF” (Counc-CM1112, 2017). In this respect, even in rural OACs, the March 2008 elections were generally peaceful with limited violence and coercion. This changed somewhat towards the presidential election run-off, but not at scale. One interviewee, MXS1612, stated that there were some incidents in Lupane West where liberation war veterans took over the leadership of the ZANU-PF campaign and harassed civil servants. During this process, the war veterans took over the policing services, randomly asking people to positively identify themselves with photo ID and declaring some areas "No-Go zones" for the opposition (MXS1612-Interview, 2017). During the period of the Inclusive Government, this situation was serious enough to warrant the attention of the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC). The JOMIC staged a musical concert in Gomoza in Lupane West. This brought together all three parties represented in parliament “to try and bring closure to the communities that had been affected by the 2008 political violence” (MXS1612-Interview, 2017)

The limited ZANU-PF violence and intimidation in the OACs did not gain much traction or lead to many ZANU-PF converts. A former legislator for Pumula
constituency and key opposition organiser, M.P-MA1212, suggested that this was because

…the people of Bulawayo and Matabeleland have been fighting the military and politically motivated violence since the days of Joshua Nkomo and the ZIPRA. They have been resisting Mugabe and army deployments in Matabeleland since Gukurahundi and have developed a thick skin unlike our colleagues in Mashonaland who only knew ZANU-PF's violence in 2008 (M.P-MA1212-Interview, 2017).

MP-MA1212 added that “whatever threats from the war vets, militia or the army, ZANU-PF will never win anything. Matabeleland people know that the Shona majority has targeted and segregated them as a tribe. They have developed a thick skin because of that seclusion” (M.P-MA1212-Interview, 2017). Unlike in ZACs where ZANU-PF’s use of cell mobilisation and organisation was married with negative sanctions and coercive measures, in OACs, these aids were only there to a limited extent in 2008. However, in 2013, as will be discussed later, the structure was augmented and assisted by positive measures that could accrue to recruits as part of ZANU-PF’s patronage networks.

7.3 2008 Election Outcome And Aftermath

We are not used to boxing matches where we go from round one to round two. We just knock each other out…. It is a constitutional requirement that there may be a re-run, but it will not be necessary (Sunday Mail, 30 March, 2008:1).

These were the words of a buoyant Mugabe to a waiting press on 29 March 2008, after casting his ballot at Mhofu Primary School in Harare's high-density suburb of Highfield. Yet the outcome of the 2008 March presidential elections showed that ZANU-PF had failed to achieve the results Mugabe had hoped for. The 2008 results across the three Matebeleland provinces bear this out, but also show that sweeping declarations around Tsvangirai carrying the provinces and Mugabe being very unpopular obscure the reality that these were highly contested areas. Tsvangirai prevailed, but failed to get more than half of the vote share. Tsvangirai obtained about 42% of the vote share across Matebeleland in the March 2008 election, down from 63% in 2002. Makoni had the second largest vote share, with about 29%, and Mugabe was narrowly behind with about 27%, down from his 32.5% in 2002. The vote split was tighter outside Bulawayo province. For
instance, in Lupane West, Mugabe narrowly led with 34% of the vote, followed by Makoni with about 33%, with Tsvangirai polling third with about 32% of the vote, down from 61% in 2002. In Makokoba, the inverse was true, with Tsvangirai leading with 48% of the vote followed by Makoni with about 39%, and Mugabe with about 14%. Phumula followed a similar pattern to Makokoba, with Tsvangirai getting around 50% of the votes, Makoni 29%, and Mugabe maintaining 14%.

The data shows that the opposition was dominant, but mostly so in its combined form rather than as separate parties. ZANU-PF was very competitive in Lupane West and maintained a steady vote share of only 14% in the city, where it was most unpopular. It also suggests that Mugabe was right to go after both Tsvangirai and Makoni, as they both enjoyed more support than he did across the provinces and the constituencies that are the focus of this chapter. The data suggests that MP-KM1212’s assessment that Makoni took away votes from ZANU-PF was wrong. It seems that Tsvangirai took the hardest hit from Makoni’s entry into the presidential race. As shown above, Tsvangirai’s support fell proportionally by half in Lupane West, from 80% to 50% in Pumula, and from about 81% to 48% in Makokoba.

Table 7-3: 2008 Vote Share Across Constituency Types + Matebeleland and National

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2008 Vote Share</th>
<th>Constituency Type</th>
<th>Matebeleland</th>
<th>Battlegrounds</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OACs</td>
<td>ZACs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.G. Mugabe</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.R. Tsvangirai</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Makoni</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beyond Matebeleland and the constituencies on which this chapter focuses, as table 7-3 shows, the national picture showed that Matebeleland was much more competitive than any other area in the country. Overall, Tsvangirai led the national vote share tally with about 47.85%, followed by Mugabe with 42.99%, and Makoni trailing at a distant third, with 8.31% of the vote. In opposition-aligned constituencies only, Tsvangirai led the vote share tally with about 60%, followed by Mugabe with about 27%, and Makoni with 12%. Using the 2008 election results as a measure, it is apparent that ZANU-PF’s mobilising strategy
and attempts to benefit from the opposition splits did not work. Figure 7-4 presents the national picture regarding constituency types before and after the March 2008 presidential elections. It shows that ZANU-PF suffered declines in the number of constituencies in the ZACs column, which accrued as gains in the opposition (OACs), and battleground columns, as shown in Figure 7-4.

**Figure 7-3: Numbers of Constituencies per type before and after the March 2008 Presidential Election**

![Bar chart showing numbers of constituencies per type before and after the March 2008 Presidential Election.]

Source: Author’s Data from Official Election Results.

Some read the 2008 results as ZANU-PF’s Waterloo, following decades of dominance and an incipient decline that had started in late 1990s (Sithole & Makumbe, 1997). What remained of the party, according to Mandaza (2011), was surviving only through its conflation with the securocrat state and according to Bratton & Masunungure (2008:45) the conflation of all organisational and public administration structures with the party. Given the challenges that Zimbabwe faced and ZANU-PF’s role in creating those challenges, it was easy to see ZANU-PF as being on its political deathbed. Yet contrary to this thinking, I argue that
the post-2000 socio-political and economic challenges that contributed to ZANU-PF’s near defeat at the 2008 elections did not sound the death knell for ZANU-PF as a political force. Rather, the empirical reality of the fusion of the ruling party with public administration structures which saw the party married to the state, as well as its militarisation through a civilian-military compact did not weaken but strengthened it. Despite the conflation, the near defeat also prompted a reawakening, reorganization and redefinition of ZANU-PF as a political party proper. This redefinition included ZANU-PF re-emphasising its radical ideological redistribution agenda beyond land, adjusting itself to the increased political and electoral competition, and responding to protest in ways that ensured that it survived the confounding challenges and assault from the “strong” opposition. While the perspective of Mandaza (2011) and others is dominant, its analysis is limited to ZANU-PF’s response to, and continuing fight with, the opposition. I argue that the extant analysis does not capture ZANU-PF’s post-2008 responses to the political market’s verdict on its poor political and economic stewardship, outside coercion and violence. These often-neglected ZANU-PF responses are what drove ZANU-PF’s transformation ahead of the 2013 election. These responses were born out of the 2008 near loss and contributed immensely to its 2013 victory. The general implication is that competitive authoritarian regimes may learn from and adapt to circumstances to enhance their electoral appeal, as ZANU-PF appears to have done after 2008.

7.4 The Switch: From “Mobilising” Core Constituencies In 2008 To “Chasing” Non-Members In 2013

Although most manifest in 2013, ZANU-PF's change in strategy was instituted before the establishment of the GNU and went beyond the strategic reduction in the number of Mugabe's rallies that Tendi (2013) notes. ZANU-PF realised soon after the March 2008 presidential election that, whatever support it had, and whatever manipulation it could master, it could no longer carry it beyond the finish line at the run-off and in subsequent elections. It instituted other immediate changes to its strategy, including overt violence (in June 2008) and excluding overt violence in 2013. ZANU-PF National Political Commissar, Eliot Manyika, affirmed this in early June 2008, when he stressed that ZANU-PF was reaching out, and canvassing at the family level, to ordinary people who were not party members so as to ensure that it got an emphatic victory (Chronicle, 3 June, 2008).
Reaching out to non-members was part of a resort to “grassroots campaigning”, which the then ZANU-PF Chairman for Information and Publicity, Patrick Chinamasa, admitted to (Chronicle, 3 June, 2008). In an interview, a well-known leader of the liberation war veterans, SJ1212, who played an active part in ZANU-PF’s 2013 presidential election campaign, confirmed that they had operationalised this change in strategy. He argued that while the intention was to win the presidency,

…our strategy was to start by working hard from ward to ward so that people do not walk to you, you go to them. This takes time. That is why I spent all five years in the bush (SJ1212-Interview, 2017).

The strategy of reaching out to and canvassing non-ZANU-PF members was instituted alongside its campaign of violence in 2008. There were, clearly, two contending centres of power with different strategies in ZANU-PF. One was the civilian element of ZANU-PF, led by former nationalists and politicians. This centre of power was aware that the politics had to change, and more voters needed to be gained through persuasive means. It was this group that led thought around ZANU-PF’s switch from a mobilising strategy in 2008, as outlined in section 7.2, to a chasing strategy in 2013, whereby it would direct its campaign efforts beyond its base to include non-partisans. The other was the military, whose involvement in ZANU-PF politics is well-documented on account of the politicised role of militants in the liberation struggle who were then later grafted into the national army during the demobilisation efforts in 1980 (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006; Noyes, 2013). The military had maintained an interest in ZANU-PF and civilian politics covertly since 1980, but this interest became increasingly overt post-2000, and outright plain to see during the 2017 ousting of Mugabe. The former liberation war combatants within the Zimbabwe National Army considered themselves “stockholders” (Chiwenga, 2017), and were considered the moral owners (Vene vechinhut) of ZANU-PF (Manheru, 2017). In 2008, these stockholders saw their political wardens in ZANU-PF as having failed, and were intent on securing power for their party at any and all costs, including through the violence of operation mavhotera papi (Operation Who Did You Vote For) towards the June 2008 presidential election run-off (Noyes, 2019)

The data gathered for this thesis shows that the chasing strategy took two main forms that are not mutually exclusive. First ZANU-PF targeted opposition-aligned constituencies the most with its bigwig rallies. The ground campaign prioritised constituencies led by opposition frontbenchers. It also made increasing
use of members of its praesidium other than Mugabe to campaign. Second, ZANU-PF chased the youth and urban vote. It used creative campaign strategies to entice the youth, promising and providing inducements to both the youth and urban dwellers in exchange for support.

The first element of the chasing strategy that ZANU-PF adopted for the 2013 election relates to the types of constituencies that it targeted with bigwig rallies. In aggregate terms, ZANU-PF paid less attention to ZACs, which constituted about 53% of visits in 2008 and only about 26% in 2013. A decline in visits is also evident in battleground constituencies, from 14% in 2008 to 8% in 2013 (See chapter 8). Bigwig visits to OACs dramatically increased from the 2008 levels of about 34%. The proportion of visits almost doubled to about 64% in 2013. As table 7-4 shows, the top two types of particular constituencies visited in 2013 are marginal-opposition (28%) and opposition stronghold (23%) constituencies. Marginal-ZANU-PF and consolidating-opposition constituencies both ranked third in priority, at 12% of visits each.

Table 7-4: Proportions of ZANU-PF Bigwig visits across constituency types for 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency Type</th>
<th>2013 Bigwig Visits</th>
<th>2013 Aggregate Bigwig visit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ZANU-PF Strongholds</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidating ZANU-PF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal ZANU-PF</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battlegrounds</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition Strongholds</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidating Opposition</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal Opposition</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s data based on cataloguing campaign stops of ZANU-PF Praesidium in the run-up to the 2013 elections

Figure 7-4 shows the number of visits to different types of constituencies in 2008 and 2013 from a comparative perspective. It shows that ZANU-PF made deep forays into “enemy territory” through its shift from a mobilising to a chasing
strategy. As shown in Figure 7-4, these constituencies received the second highest number of bigwig visits in 2013. While we cannot affirmatively argue that this increase in ZANU-PF’s attention to OACs was the cause of its 2013 election victory, the data shows that there was a correlation between the increased ZANU-PF bigwig rallies in OACs and the increased ZANU-PF support in these areas. This contributed to ZANU-PF’s eventual triumph in the 2013 election. As I will show below, these targets had been softened during the Government of National Unity period. In addition, ZANU-PF also pivoted from the preponderance of Star Rallies that Mugabe addressed to bigwig rallies that other members of the ZANU-PF praesidium addressed, especially in regions that they came from and OACs.

Figure 7-4: Number of ZANU-PF Bigwig visits 2008 and 2013 per constituency type

7.4.1 Chasing Opposition Leaders’ Constituencies During The Interregnum

Several scholars provide a window into the impact of the shared incumbency of the GNU on Zimbabwe’s 2013 electoral processes and politics (Alexander and Chitofiri, 2011; Chan & Gallagher, 2017; Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010; LeBas, 2014). This scholarship invariably argues that the Government of National Unity led to the weakening of the opposition through (1.) The MDC’s deployment of critical human assets and attention to government rather than the party (LeBas, 2014; Chan & Gallagher, 2017), (2.) the MDC’s failure to meet the patronage
demands of their supporters, some of whom expected access to resources in return for past suffering (Alexander and Chitofiri, 2011:685), and (3.) the GNU’s undermining of the MDC’s claim to be different from ZANU-PF and to offer more responsible governors (Chan & Gallagher, 2017: 57). These implications, together with the widely covered scandalisation of Morgan Tsvangirai’s sex life and allegations of MDC corruption and profligacy in government are of critical importance in understanding why the opposition fared poorly in the 2013 presidential election (BBC News, 29 July, 2013; Bulawayo 24, 1 December, 2011; Mail and Guardian, 2 December, 2011; Sunday Times, 2 February , 2014).

I argue that ZANU-PF took advantage of these circumstances and used them to inform the 2013 chasing campaign strategy. The MDC's deployment of crucial officials to government and its failure to distribute patronage created an opportunity for ZANU-PF to gain support, and to loosen the MDC's perceived stranglehold on the cities and other OACs. Heightened patronage expectations from MDC members stemmed from its presence in government and hurt those appointed to positions in government the most. These were senior opposition leaders who were naturally vulnerable to both dissatisfaction among their members and attacks from ZANU-PF because they were engaged in government business. As the Mail and Guardian reported, it appears that ZANU-PF specifically, targeted seats held by senior officials of the MDC-T, calculating that this would destabilise Tsvangirai's party elsewhere. The party targeted and won Harare North, previously held by Theresa Makone, a close ally and family friend of Tsvangirai, and Mt Pleasant, previously held by Jameson Timba, Tsvangirai's chief of international relations. ZANU-PF also won in Mbare, the city's biggest township, and in Epworth (Mail and Guardian, 8 August, 2013).

There were also suggestions that ZANU-PF had deliberately targeted Harare East, where MDC-T Secretary-General Tendai Biti was the Member of the House of Assembly. ZANU-PF failed to prevail, losing Harare East to the MDC by about 500 votes in 2013, effectively turning this once consolidating-opposition constituency into a battleground constituency. In these targeted constituencies, ZANU-PF utilised programmatic and ideological appeals, and added to this partisan distribution of resources. The latter included setting up housing cooperatives, bringing in thousands of home seekers, drilling boreholes, and making makeshift toilets. ZANU-PF did all this while ignoring the legal restrictions and health hazards posed by these new settlements in Harare's leafy
suburbs (Mail and Guardian, 8 August, 2013). According to officials, ZANU-PF devised its “new” strategy as early as 2010 when it began registering its supporters in targeted opposition constituencies and making plans to ensure that those registered would turn out on election day (Mail and Guardian, 8 August, 2013; Tendi, 2013).

However, on election day in 2013, I witnessed people being bussed to Mount Pleasant constituency where the MDC-T Minister for State in The Prime Minister’s Office lost. This was also captured in a sensational video where the MDC-T Secretary-General alleged that the people being bussed were not residents of the constituency (News24, 1 August, 2013). ZANU-PF's chasing of opposition bigwigs’ constituencies was limited to neither Harare nor government ministers. It also claimed the scalp of the then-MDC-T Chairperson Lovemore Moyo who was the Speaker of Parliament during the Government of National Unity (Muponda, 2013) and MDC-T Spokesperson, Douglas Mwonzora, the Co-Chairperson of the parliamentary select committee on constitutional reform (COPAC).

Bulawayo was not spared, as affirmed by two leading opposition members who were also Ministers in the Government of National Unity, David Coltart and Min-MG1412. David Coltart, the then Minister of Education, Sports and Culture who represented Bulawayo East, was a leading member of the smaller MDC faction. He argued that ZANU-PF had targeted him, Tendai Biti (Harare East) and Jameson Timba (Mount Pleasant) for special attention (Coltart, 2013). Min-MG1420 explained that in 2013 ZANU-PF appeared determined to chase voters beyond its traditional electoral hunting grounds,

ZANU-PF was determined to do well in Bulawayo and other Matebeleland provinces. They invested serious resources stolen from parastatals and deployed bigwigs like Obert Mpofu. In Makokoba they deployed Colonel Tshinga Dube, a diamond magnate, who ran Zimbabwe Defence Industries and was Chairperson of the board of Mbada diamonds, to campaign for them (Min-MG1412-Interview, 2017).18

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18 Mbada Diamonds is a mining company believed to be a front for senior military officials, while Highlanders Football Club is a major team that is invariably called the second largest in the country and is the most popular team in Bulawayo and Matebeleland provinces. Obert Mpofu is a former government Minister for Home Affairs and Mines who is suspected of being amongst the richest in the country and is alleged to own a significant amount of the real estate in Zimbabwe's tourist resort town of Victoria Falls.
While instances where opposition officials lost House of Assembly seats were quite dramatic and grabbed media attention, the story of the presidential election in these elections is less often told, yet it was the primary concern for ZANU-PF. This is because, as highlighted in chapters 5 and 7, in Zimbabwe, the president is elected by simple majority (50% plus1 votes) of the vote in a single national constituency. Besides this institutional arrangement, for ZANU-PF, it was also because of the 2008 Bhora Musango phenomena wherein some MPs had fared better than Robert Mugabe in some constituencies. Former Liberation War Veteran’s leader SJ1212 confirmed this in an interview, saying that the 2013 strategy was to focus on ensuring that Mugabe won the presidency with the constituencies as secondary, because the presidency is where the executive power in Zimbabwe is located, not the parliament (SJ1212-Interview, 2017). The logic expressed in SJ1212’s sentiments partially explains how and why ZANU-PF pursued voters outside of its traditional political hunting grounds, and chased Harare, for instance, which was generally perceived to be an opposition stronghold. SJ1212 noted that their data showed that Harare was the biggest province in the country in terms of voter population, followed by Masvingo, and that the numbers dictated that ZANU-PF target them, in addition to eliminating and destabilising the opposition’s frontbench in Parliament (SJ1212-Interview, 2017). SJ1212 explained the political maths and logic through the example of Masvingo, where he spent a few months canvassing for ZANU-PF ahead of the 2013 election.

By 2013 Masvingo had about 500,000 voters, Bulawayo, Mat North and or Mat South …all three of them had less than 300,000 voters or a maximum of 380,000 voters. So, we went for Masvingo, if we win those 500,000 voters and lose Bulawayo and the Matebeleland provinces, still my candidate goes to the statehouse. …These were the calculations; Masvingo would take care of Bulawayo and other cities, which were hostile to ZANU-PF (SJ1212-Interview, 2017).

However, while the voter populations were smaller in Matebeleland, other organs in ZANU-PF did target them. There were, predictably, mixed results at the parliamentary level, but huge successes in terms of the presidential race. As the state-owned newspaper, The Herald noted, although …the revolutionary party [ZANU-PF] did not win a single seat in Bulawayo; it made significant strides as it recorded increased figures from the 2008 harmonised elections. In most of the twelve constituencies, the
revolutionary party recorded a 100 per cent increase from the 2008 figures (Herald, 8 August, 2013).

7.4.2 Pivoting: From Mugabe’s Star Rallies to the preponderance of bigwig rallies

By the time of the 2013 election, Mugabe, at 89 years of age, was in bad physical shape. He routinely went to Singapore for medical check-ups. The media reported that Mugabe, who had addressed dozens of rallies in 2008, was only scheduled to address 10 in 2013. Also, provincial Chairpersons were asked to send their briefings in advance, and reduce their introductions at rallies to 10 minutes, to minimise the time that Mugabe was on the trail and at rallies (Mail and Guardian, 19 July, 2013). Although political analysts and the opposition ventured that the changes were health induced (Daily News, 11 July, 2013), ZANU-PF provided political cover, arguing that they wanted to ensure that Mugabe only addressed massive crowds at the provincial level (Tendi, 2013: 966). As one ZANU-PF campaign manager explained,

Colossal gatherings strike fear in the competition and showcase our ability to mobilise a whole province to a single venue. We will win this [election], but we know there are people who will want to question our victory. After seeing big crowds like this, no one, not even the [election] observers, can dispute that Mugabe is indeed the winner (ZANU-PF Campaign Manager quoted in Tendi, 2013: 966).

ZANU-PF's reduction in the number of Mugabe's Star Rallies is an empirical fact, which was strategically justified to stem the murmurs around his health. The assertion that the party wanted to concentrate on maximising numbers at rallies where Mugabe appeared incorrectly suggests that this may not have been the case in the past. In 2008, Mugabe’s many appearances had large turnouts, even when he carried multiple events in the same Province, including in opposition-aligned constituencies. This was the case, for instance, on 22 March 2008, when Mugabe staged three massively attended Star Rallies in Chitungiwa at Chibuku Stadium, and in Harare – at Mbare’s Shawasha grounds - and in Dzivarasekwa constituency (Sunday Mail Reporters, 2008). Nonetheless, the 2013 reduction in Mugabe's appearances did not leave a gaping hole. Instead, party Vice President Joyce Teurayi Ropa (JTR) Mujuru took up greater responsibility, campaigning outside her constituency and Province (as shown in chapter 6 and acknowledged by Tendi, 2013: 966). In addition to Mujuru, ZANU-PF also saddled its party Chairperson Simon Khaya (SK) Moyo with more campaign responsibilities in 2013 than his predecessor John Nkomo had had in 2008. These two members of
the praesidium campaigned in various provinces, but especially amongst their co-ethnics, Mujuru in the Mashonaland provinces, and Moyo in the Matebeleland provinces, as shown in Table 7-5 below.

SK Moyo’s task, according to ZANU-PF Matebeleland South Secretary for Administration, Christopher Masuku, was to canvass for Mugabe and ZANU-PF to recover all of the seats it had lost to the MDC in 2008 and address 19 rallies in Bulilima district (Dube, 2013). Moyo was assisted by ZANU-PF politburo member, Dr Obert Mpofu, who, while SK Moyo zigzagged between Matebeleland North and South, assisted in Matebeleland North (Chronicle, 16 July, 2013). While we cannot directly attribute cause, it is a fact that ZANU-PF was successful in recovering all of the seats and increasing Mugabe’s vote share in Matebeleland South, but not in Matebeleland North. It did improve its showing by retaining its four seats and recovering three to have a plurality of seven out of 13 House of Assembly seats in the Province and a larger vote share for Mugabe in the presidential election.

Table 7-5: ZANU-PF Bigwig rallies in OACs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSTITUENCY</th>
<th>PROVINCE</th>
<th>BIGWIG</th>
<th>DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Makokoba, Davis Hall</td>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
<td>SK Moyo</td>
<td>9 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magwegwe, White City stadium</td>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
<td>RG Mugabe +</td>
<td>27 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chitungwiza South, Chibuku Stadium</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>RG Mugabe +</td>
<td>16 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highfield East, Zimbabwe Grounds</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>RG Mugabe +</td>
<td>5 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harare Central, City Sports Center</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>RG Mugabe +</td>
<td>17 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warren Park, National Sports Stadium</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>RG Mugabe +</td>
<td>28 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutare Urban, Aerodrome</td>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>RG Mugabe +</td>
<td>23 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbare, Number 5 Grounds</td>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>JT Mujuru</td>
<td>13 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo Urban, Mucheke Stadium</td>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>RG Mugabe +</td>
<td>25 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norton</td>
<td>Mash West</td>
<td>RG Mugabe +</td>
<td>24 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadoma Central, Rimuka Stadium</td>
<td>Mash West</td>
<td>JT Mujuru</td>
<td>25 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chegutu west</td>
<td>Mash West</td>
<td>JT Mujuru</td>
<td>25 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinhoyi, Chinhoyi University</td>
<td>Mash West</td>
<td>RG Mugabe</td>
<td>18 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marondera Central, Rudhaka Stadium</td>
<td>Mash East</td>
<td>RG Mugabe</td>
<td>15 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mkoba</td>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>RG Mugabe</td>
<td>26 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lupane East, Somhlolo Stadium</td>
<td>Mat North</td>
<td>RG Mugabe</td>
<td>19 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chikomba Central</td>
<td>Mash East</td>
<td>G. Mugabe</td>
<td>16 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangwe, (Multiple venues)</td>
<td>Mat South</td>
<td>SK Moyo</td>
<td>17 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insiža, Avoca</td>
<td>Mat South</td>
<td>SK Moyo</td>
<td>25 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matobo, Kezi, Maphisa</td>
<td>Mat South</td>
<td>SK Moyo</td>
<td>26 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulilima, (Multiple venues)</td>
<td>Mat South</td>
<td>SK Moyo</td>
<td>14-24 July</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s data compiled from multiple newspaper reports
The descriptive statistical data for this study suggests that ZANU-PF’s campaign efforts in OACs correlate positively with ZANU-PF’s gains in 2013, as shown in Figure 7-6. There is a positive correlation between ZANU-PF’s increased bigwig activity in OACs and its increased margins and constituencies in the ZACs columns. While it may not be the only reason, ZANU-PF’s strategic campaign activity must be included in any explanation of ZANU-PF’s good electoral fortunes in 2013.

Figure 7-5: Change in Number of Constituencies per type from 2008 to 2013 based on election outcomes at Presidential level

Source: Author’s Data

The 2013 election saw the opposition’s vote share fall nationally from 56.70% (i.e. 1,419,318 out of a total of 2,501,202 votes cast) in 2008 to 37.25% (1,294,846 out of a total of 3,475,406 votes cast) in 2013. While ZANU-PF’s vote share jumped from about 43% (1,075,189) in 2008 to 60.50% (2,102,422 out of a total of 3,475,406 votes cast) in 2013, in OACs, the opposition’s vote share fell from about 77% (577,047 out of 746,247 votes cast) in 2008 to about 54% (865,356 out of a total of 1,597,039 votes cast) in 2013. ZANU-PF’s fortunes in OACs improved from a 22% vote share (163,811 out of 746,247 votes cast) in 2008 to 58% (584,453 out of a total of 1,031,833 votes cast) in 2013.
cast) to a vote share of about 44% (697,161 votes out of a total of 1,597,039). Voter turnout also increased from the 2008 level of 44.5% nationally, and about 40% in OACs, to 59% nationally, and 55% in OACs. Of critical importance to this study is that the findings provide prima facie evidence that ZANU-PF targeted its bigwig visits at constituencies where "more independent" voters were likely to be found, which has serious implications for the study's hypotheses. It suggests that (1.) ZANU-PF targeted constituencies outside its zones of electoral comfort, and (2.) it sought the support of “more independent voters” and invested less effort in campaigning targeted at its captive supporters in ZACs.

While the national level data clearly shows that ZANU-PF targeted its campaigns at more independent voters, part of determining whether or not it campaigned to win voters’ hearts and minds lies in how it campaigned. The next section looks at how ZANU-PF campaigned in OACs in 2013. I examine bigwig rallies and analyse how appeals made at these significant national events translated into electioneering on the ground in Lupane West, Pumula and Makokoba constituencies.

7.5 ZANU-PF Bigwig Rallies In OACs In 2013

As in 2008, Mugabe continued to leverage the legacy of Joshua Nkomo when campaigning in Matebeleland, claiming that Nkomo had told him on his deathbed to ensure unity through the continuity of the Unity Accord and to take care of the land question. For Mugabe, unity meant supporting ZANU-PF, and getting rid of the MDC, who he called “drunkards and ignoramuses” while addressing a Star rally at Somhlolo Stadium in Lupane West (Herald, 19 July 2013). This approach had its challenges, and in Bulawayo, Mugabe tried to mitigate these, including by spending over 30 minutes greeting and chatting with late liberation fighters’ widows. Part of the challenge was that these widows included some whose husbands had died at the hands of Mugabe’s regime post-1980 during Gukurahundi. One was Look-out Masuku, Zimbabwe’s first deputy Commander of the defence forces, who Mugabe tried for treason. He died in custody in 1986 (Zimbabwe Independent, 9 August, 2013).

As he did in ZACs, Mugabe and other ZANU-PF bigwigs placed the Government of National Unity and the MDC's role in it front and centre of the campaign pitch. Speaking in Lupane, Mugabe made his case against the opposition as follows: 247
We have moved together with the MDCs and people are now able to judge their performance and personality. You now know *ukuthi ngabantu abanjani* [what kind of people they are]. Things have been going down and down, especially in Bulawayo. People have suffered enough, and we want to give them a Government that will correct the wrongs done in the last five years (*Herald*, 19 July, 2013).

Mugabe blamed the MDCs for the failure to resuscitate industries in Bulawayo, blaming the then Finance Minister Tendai Biti for holding on to resources that could have assisted that effort. He accused Finance Minister Tendai Biti of abusing US$500 million that Zimbabwe had received from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Mugabe alleged that the GNU had earmarked part of the money to resuscitate companies in Bulawayo, “but Biti said he would give only US$20 million, which was not enough. The rest of the $500 million, we do not know where it went” (*Herald*, 19 July, 2013).

The above accusation was tailored to anger the people of Bulawayo and the Matebeleland provinces. It added to other allegations around the GNU’s failure to support farmers and civil servants. While ZANU-PF could not wrestle Bulawayo from the opposition, the message did not necessarily fall flat. It appears to have resonated with a significant proportion of the voting population in the more peripheral Matebeleland North and South provinces. As Figure 7-6 shows, Mugabe’s vote share in 2013 increased from the 2008 levels across all three Matebeleland provinces, including in all three constituencies of Lupane West, Pumula and Makokoba, which are the focus of this chapter.
It is possible that the gains shown in Figure 7-6 could have been the result of ZANU-PF’s electoral manipulation, and other political dynamics during the GNU. It is also possible that in 2008, the opposition benefited from a protest vote, and the dire economic situation militated against a ZANU-PF victory. However, evidence of fraud was hard to come by in the stated constituencies, although the allegation of fraud was often repeated by several respondents together with the lack of opposition unity. ZANU-PF, nonetheless, spun the increase in its vote share and support as a condemnation of the Government of National Unity and the MDC, and a vote of confidence for Mugabe and his indigenisation and empowerment rhetoric (Bulawayo 24, 3 August, 2013). As DBN1412, a House of Assembly candidate for one of the MDCs in 2013, explained in an interview, on the campaign trail Mugabe proved adept at the politics of claiming credit for all that was good during the Government of National Unity years, and blaming Tsvangirai and Biti for all that was terrible (DBN1412-Interview, 2017)). Mugabe followed up his attacks on his GNU partners by pledging that alone, ZANU-PF would assist existing factories and open new ones in Bulawayo (Herald, 27 July, 2013).
While the kinds of appeals made at bigwig rallies in OACs bore some resemblance to those made at bigwig rallies in ZACs, there were differences in some of the content, and in how similar content was accentuated, according to where the rally took place. The data set developed for this study shows that in 2013, rural and urban OACs constituted roughly the same number (48 and 49 respectively) while there were 11 peri-urban areas. Perhaps because of this, it made sense for issues related to jobs, industrialisation, and social service delivery to enter Mugabe’s and other bigwigs’ speeches at rallies in OACs, more than they did in ZACs, which were predominantly rural. In my assessment, these issues were fairly substantive and programmatic. The reason I am pointing this out here is to show that there was more to ZANU-PF appeals than what the existing “headline” analysis often reveals. The headlines often centre on the vitriol against the opposition or the West, and demagogic rhetoric based on the liberation war history and ZANU-PF's role in that history. While these were part of ZANU-PF’s rally pitches, focusing on just them is an oversimplification.

At bigwig rallies, Mugabe and his colleagues also continued to laud their ability to perform and deliver for the people based on their past performance on the land issue. They used this to persuade people that their commitments to indigenous ownership and control of multimillion-dollar industries, companies, and mines were legitimate, credible commitments on which they could deliver, as they had done in the past. ZANU-PF was changing the empowerment metanarrative from what it focused on in 2008, i.e. land, (which it had sold as “the economy is the land and the land is the economy”), to broad-based economic empowerment and indigenisation. This further shifted the popular political discourse from past policies to huge historical choices between “jobs” and employment, as promised by the opposition, or becoming an employer or entrepreneur, as promised by ZANU-PF. These huge questions were tied to significant ongoing ideological battles in which ZANU-PF fronted a radical, Pan-Africanist anti-colonial, anti-imperialist critique of 'the West' against the opposition's 'Universalist' embrace of certain aspects of neoliberalism and globalisation (Hammar, Raftopoulos, & Jensen, 2003). In this sense, ZANU-PF’s 2013 election campaign strategy represented a continuation of the radical discourse of the Third Chimurenga, which some scholars have labelled nativist (Muzondidya, 2010; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).
As such, part of the change from 2008 to 2013 in ZANU-PF’s populist discourse around empowerment was a shift from the 'historicised and racialised monopoly claims around land restitution' (Hammer et al., 2003) to extending the scope of patronage in 2013 through its indigenisation and empowerment policies (Southall, 2013). Whereas ZANU-PF had targeted the land issue to appeal to predominantly rural Zimbabweans between 2000 and 2008, as a response to the “revolt” in the cities and an attempt to shore-up its base, the new thrust in 2013, which promised access to and control of companies, mining concessions, and other economic activities, appealed to city dwellers and the youth.

7.6 ZANU-PF’s “Hands-on” Approach: Building Support through basic messaging and patronage networks

While the anatomy of the bigwig rallies was reasonably consistent across constituency types, the bigwigs tailored their messages in an attempt to placate the issues and concerns of the constituents they were addressing. This is exemplified by Mugabe's attempts in Matebeleland to leverage Nkomo's legacy and the issues related to the deindustrialisation of Bulawayo. By contrast, ZANU PF’s campaigning at the local level in OACs became grounded in “knowing” the problems of the target audience and addressing them. PG1412, a civil society leader interviewed for this study, stated that, in 2013, ZANU-PF had benefitted from the GNU-based economic recovery, and had successfully sold urbanites and the youth in OACs a dream that resonated with messages of this economic success (PG1412-Interview, 2017). He believed that Mugabe’s charge that the MDC stood in the way of industrial resuscitation was believable in Bulawayo where the MDC had been in-charge of the local council since 2000 and there had been no substantial improvements. PG also suggested that the MDC in 2008 had benefitted from a general groundswell of discontent, but when this context had changed in 2013, ZANU-PF was smart and began to offer people economic empowerment as a narrative, as opposed to the opposition’s “esoteric and distant message and promises” (PG1412-Interview, 2017).

DF0212, the ZANU-PF Provincial Executive member for Bulawayo, whom I also interviewed, emphasised this approach to messaging by ZANU-PF. DF0212 argued that “even when we [ZANU-PF] did big stadium events like Mugabe used to do, he would say the most basic things – no GDP figures or scientific things”, 251
like the speeches that MDC-T Secretary general Tendai Biti was famous for making (DF0212, 2017). It appeared that ZANU-PF calculated that the majority of the masses were in poor urban areas and rural Zimbabwe and surmised that what they wanted and what “elite urbanites” wanted were different things. As DF0212 put it, “As ZANU-PF, we know that the strength is with the so-called poor and marginalised rather than their so-called enlightened and developed urban counterparts” (DF0212, 2017).

In Bulawayo, NE1612, another ZANU-PF provincial official, explained that the engagement strategy does not fundamentally differ from how ZANU-PF operates elsewhere. “It is all the same thing”, he said, “You go out there, you tell people what the party is, and you have a hands-on approach” (NE1612, 2017). Several interlocutors involved in ZANU-PF campaigns at constituency and district level across the three constituencies covered in this chapter, argued that ZANU-PF adopted a hands-on approach through a “delivery” based strategy married to simple and basic messaging. First, ZANU-PF desisted from speaking above people's heads about issues like the GDP, democracy, human rights and other complex sounding concepts, as the opposition did. It instead focused on issues proximate to their target constituents. NE1612 intimated that while these issues are important [the economy, democracy and human rights], but we all know that most people do not know how they link to their table. When we went out, we focused on basic issues. Everyone knows that if you are hungry, you need food, so fifty Kgs and seed to grow your own food and so on. That is what people wanted to see and hear (NE1612-Interview, 2017).

Second, the so called “hands-on approach” was characterised by ZANU-PF’s attempts to build elaborate patronage networks incumbent on clients’ willingness to jump onto the ZANU-PF bandwagon and pledge their electoral support. The other ZANU-PF provincial member for Bulawayo, DF0212, illustrated this process as follows:

If it is an issue of vendors in the city, you go out there and you ask what the problem is. They tell you, and you share with them what the solutions can be. But you also ask them to form cells, hey, because we cannot help them if they are not in the party. If they do, you then take their issues up, because if you solve their immediate problems, then they can understand you better. If it is an issue, like in 2013, there was an issue of council bills. That was something that came from the grassroots, not from the top. People were complaining about bills and their inability to pay them at the
grassroots level, and the Minister acted, and it was a problem that everyone had (DF0212-Interview, 2017).

DF0212’s illustration around council bills was, in all likelihood, revisionist and an attempt to order historical events post-facto, but the solution did shock its opponents. Some scholars mention this particular initiative, cancelling local government rates arrears, as something that endeared ZANU-PF to some urban voters. This and other actions possibly constituted vote buying. Assistance in dealing with proximate issues in OACs, just like in ZACs, was contingent on being a member of ZANU-PF, with exceptions. The example that DF0212 highlighted, the cancellation of council bills for urban dwellers, where everyone, whether they were ZANU-PF or not, benefited, is an example of that. It is clear that ZANU-PF’s hands-on practical assistance approach was based on it leveraging its access to the state and other resource, purveying institutions to sponsor patronage and build its support base in OACs in several ways.

In poor areas, ZANU-PF distributed food and other largesse that the MDC heavyweights could not distribute. For instance, a former opposition Minister and MP shared in an interview that in Makokoba constituency,

Tshinga Dube responded directly to Makokoba’s urban poverty through distributing food to constituents continuously for three months ahead of the 31 July elections and used his position as Board chairperson of Highlanders football club to campaign for himself and Mugabe. He also distributed copious amounts of ZANU-PF party regalia (Min-MG1412-Interview, 2017)).

Dube also staged concerts, contributed to the purchase of a bus for the local football team, and engaged in philanthropic acts, especially with the elderly in Makokoba, even after losing the elections in 2008 and 2013. Dube’s was a long game, which saw ZANU-PF’s vote share increase from 13% of the vote in 2008 to 26% o the vote in 2013 . He eventually won a by-election in 2015 which the MDC had boycotted. Despite Min-MG1412’s observation reported above, Dube claimed that his support for Makokoba constituency was non-partisan philanthropic giving (Bulawayo 24, 18 June, 2018). Nonetheless, like other “respected” ZANU-PF politicians in Matebeleland, for example Dabengwa (before his 2008 resignation), both in 2008 and 2013, Dube did not get much electoral support for himself and Mugabe. According to a Bulawayo residents’ leader, FR3011, this was not because Dube was “bad” as an individual, but
because he was part of ZANU-PF, and therefore guilty by association of past historical wrongs or abating perpetrators of tribal cleansing (FR3011-Interview, 2017).

In 2013, as in previous elections, vote-buying as part of building its patronage network for electoral support was something that ZANU-PF utilised in Pumula, Makokoba and Lupane West. First, ZANU-PF made a concerted effort to attract the youth vote. It hogged the administration and access to the Ukondla/Kurera [taking care or raising (as in raising children)] 10-Million-dollar Youth Fund. Insurance giant Old Mutual had set up the fund in 2011 as part of its indigenisation agreement with the Government of Zimbabwe (Old Mutual, 2012). Despite being part of the GNU, the MDCs neither claimed credit nor staked a claim in the administration of the fund. The Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment took government responsibility. In Bulawayo and other places, they allowed selective access to the fund based on party membership. In Bulawayo, the MDCs attacked the fund as a gimmick and accused ZANU-PF of using it for vote-buying. ZANU-PF MP for Pumula offered a tongue in cheek response:

   At least we buy votes using money, unlike other parties who use vulgar language in attacking us as their campaign strategy to win votes. Giving money to the youths is something that is there. If young people want us to give them money for their projects, we give them, and then you say we are wrong (News Day, 1 February, 2013).

In addition to this youth fund, which was not ZANU-PF's to begin with, ZANU-PF also made use of a controversial church organisation led by Reverend Dr. Obadiah Msindo, called the Destiny for Africa Network. This organisation promised young people housing stands (small plots of land for residential purposes) in exchange for supporting ZANU-PF. In Bulawayo, Msindo pledged 5000 housing stands, and empowerment projects to woo at least 50,000 votes for Robert Mugabe in Bulawayo and 2 million votes nationally (News Day, 7 March, 2013). This may have worked as ZANU-PF’s vote share in Bulawayo increased from 14% of the vote in 2008 to 23% of the vote in 2013.

For non-urban constituents, ZANU-PF also deployed and took advantage of another GNU initiative, Community Share Ownership Trust Schemes (CSOTS). At least 50 such CSOTS had been set up with average funding of 10 million American dollars each. Mugabe inaugurated most of them ahead of the 2013
elections and made it difficult for the then Prime Minister Tsvangirai to officiate at their launches. Leadership on the CSOTS was calculated to show that ZANU-PF could deliver on local economic empowerment, and that this was a ZANU-PF baby in the GNU (Herald, 29 June, 2012). Yet the CSOTS were a government initiative to spearhead the development and empowerment of rural communities by giving them a 10 per cent stake in all businesses that exploited natural resources in their areas (Herald, 29 June, 2012). In rural OACs and ZACs alike, this initiative was well-received and seen as beneficial. As Chief Masuku of Mathetsheni in Matebeleland South stated, “The majority of people here say they are benefiting from the programme and have embarked on several projects such as the rehabilitation of irrigation schemes, construction of clinics and refurbishment of schools” (VOA, 1 March, 2013).

7.6.1 Chasing The Youth Vote: Becoming “cool” and “fashionable”

ZANU-PF’s bigwig visits and campaigning in general in 2008 focused on traditional ZANU-PF supporters, rural folk and older generations that had witnessed the liberation struggle. In 2013, by contrast, ZANU-PF aggressively competed for the urban and youth votes (Hodzi, 2013; Southall, 2013). As Hodzi notes, the results of the assault are difficult to ascertain. However, ZANU-PF did attempt to master “cool politics” through the use of cool iconography, celebrity, socialites and fashion. As DF0212 explained,

In 2013 the party became fashionable. From 2011 to 2013 the party had the youths coming in the forefront. If you notice, the posters we had in 2008 and 2013 were different. The branding was different. The songs were different, and the party was attractive. We all agreed that the world was changing, and we needed to rebrand and attract the youth vote beyond our traditional support. Before 2013 the party rebranded, we had the youth fund and so many other activities that attracted the youth and attracted even youths from the suburbs, who were the trend and pacesetters. Through that, all youths wanted to be part of us. We had beautiful campaign material. I remember in 2013 everyone wanted to have that regalia in their car, even here in Bulawayo. It was now fashionable, and people forgot about the economy (DF0212-Interview, 2017).

DF0212’s assertions speak to how, in 2013, ZANU-PF rebranded by turning the soccer allegory Bhora Musango, which was credited in part with ZANU-PF’s struggles in 2008, on its head. The party adopted “Bhora Mughedhi” (Ball into the net/goal) as an official slogan for 2013. They assertions also referred to the dubious emergence of Robert Mugabe as a fashion icon through clothing apparel
under the "House of Gushungo" clothing line, which trademarked Mugabe's signature. The designers of this relatively fashionable apparel saw it as some form of rebellion, and a push back against the opposition’s dominance in the city where “everyone” was supposed to be against Mugabe, yet “many” urban young professionals supported him (Zimbabwe Independent, 15 March, 2013).

ZANU-PF’s assault on the youth vote in 2013 went beyond regalia to include branding vehicles (fancy SUVs, 4x4 trucks, haulage trucks, mini-buses and sedans), and hip-hop themed jingles. These vehicles were used to conduct roadshows in cities like Bulawayo, where a large haulage truck with Mugabe's image and other branded vehicles led processions from constituency to constituency over a two-week period in July ahead of the elections (Chronicle, 27 July, 2013). ZANU-PF, amongst many of their jingles, produced a video jingle that was a spoof cell phone network jingle, about “getting connected on Mugabe's network”, in which Mugabe featured answering a call from a young lady by saying, “what’s up?”. As Reuters reported:

However desperate it may look - Mugabe is an 89-year-old social conservative who prefers choral arias to hip-hop - the video is a sign of the importance given to the generation of Zimbabweans born after the liberation struggle (Reuters 13 March, 2013).

This attempt to appeal to the youth vote was driven by young Zimbabwean professionals and entrepreneurs who had been swayed by Mugabe’s rhetoric, as well as young people who had benefited in some way from ZANU-PF’s patronage, or had been socialised into ZANU-PF’s ideology. As Justin Matenda, the Chief Executive officer for the company that made the Mugabe apparel, attested:

We all came from families that went through the liberation struggle. Our upbringing has been mentored by the concept and principles of empowerment and upholding the ideals of black Zimbabweans (Zimbabwe Independent, 15 March, 2013).

In addition, the appeal for the youth vote was also led by a large crop of ZANU-PF officials' children who had been radicalised through victimisation on account of the targeted sanctions and measures from the West, where their parents had been targeted, and they were caught up, as collateral damage. For instance, Australia cancelled study VISAs and deported children of a dozen or so ZANU-

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19 Gushungo is Robert Mugabe's totem. It is part of the Shumba (lion) cluster of totems.
PF ministers and officials as part of the stronger implementation of the targeted sanctions and measures against leading members of ZANU-PF. These deported ZANU-PF children would not have taken it lightly that they were bundled onto the same flights home as Morgan Tsvangirai, whom their parents blamed for calling for the sanctions that had led to their deportation (Zimbabwean, 24 October, 2007; VOA, 3 September, 2007). In addition, the United States of America was reported to have compiled a list of 400 children and close relatives of ZANU-PF leaders for deportation, with the UK and other European countries following suit ready for more embarrassing deportations (Zimbabwean, 24 October, 2007). By 2013, a significant number of these “ZANU-PF children” had settled back home, and became media (radio and television) personalities, music stars, beauty queens, celebrities (online celebrities, especially Facebook), revered socialites, entrepreneurs, and social media influencers. In the spirit of ZANU-PF’s “all hands to the plough” approach, which I touch on below, these highly influential young people assisted in making ZANU-PF appear cool, and helped the party reach the youth demographic.

7.6.2 ZANU-PF the “Church” and collegial politics in OACs in 2013

By most accounts, campaigning in OACs was a peaceful and politically collegial affair amongst the contesting parties. In OACs, the name-calling was treated as banter, especially amongst the contesting House of Assembly candidates, who served as the principal agents of presidential candidates at a local level. MP-MA1212 referred to his ZANU-PF opposite number, MP-MG1512, as a friend, who he still cordially engaged on national and local political issues (M.P-MA1212-Interview, 2017). MP-MG1512 affirmed this and stated that the cordiality of their relationship with MP-MA1212 allowed for competitive but friendly electioneering, which was always smooth and non-violent in both 2008 and 2013, when they contested, and acted as campaign leads for their presidential principals in Pumula constituency (MP-MG1512-Interview, 2017). MP-MG1512 also added that electoral competition was non-violent because of ethnic homogeneity in the province and a largely shared ZAPU background. He argued that people socialised in ZAPU ideology were also socialised in human rights respect, respect of other people's views and democratic contestation (MP-MG1512-Interview, 2017).

The competitive politics in Lupane, Pumula and Makokoba constituencies took diverse forms. Yet in all of them, NGOs and community radio stations provided
platforms for the different political parties to debate each other and engage potential voters through fairly impartial platforms. MP-MG1512 stated that he would use these kinds of platforms to explain the liberation war heritage and the importance of the land question (MP-MG1512-Interview, 2017), while MP-MA1212 stated that the opposition had to do very little from a messaging perspective because

tribalism and the Gukurahundi trump card easily garnered us enough votes. Reminding the people that the purveyors of Gukurahundi are segregating you and stating the need to replace them with Tsvangirai was enough (M.P-MA1212-Interview, 2017).

Beyond the platforms organised by NGOs, in Bulawayo and Lupane, ZANU-PF also created its own platforms around its members, and made effective use of its party structures to mobilise. MP-MG1512 shared that in Pumula, during the 2013 elections, ZANU-PF had 17 campaign coordination points, one for each of the 16 ZANU-PF districts in the constituency, plus the constituency coordinating campaign team. These teams were responsible for pushing Mugabe’s candidature and other ZANU-PF candidates concurrently at the constituency, district and ward levels through rallies and meetings that candidates addressed, as well as door-to-door canvassing (MP-MG1512-Interview, 2017). This campaign structure in Pumula did not supplant but supplemented the regular ZANU-PF party structures in the constituency such as the party cells. MPMG added that at election time the whole party machinery moves, “no one sits on their laurels, everyone who is a member of the party is busy” (MP-MG1512-Interview, 2017). DF0212 confirmed this “all hands to the plough” approach, explaining that while the commissariat takes the lead during elections, “everyone in ZANU-PF is a commissar”. He explained the commissariat system as follows:

It is like a Church system. The pastor is not the only one solely charged with converting people or souls to the fold. It is everybody's responsibility, but there will be that one person who will preach who is the “Commissar”, but everyone can convert souls. It lies on all of us, for the party to win, it is our collective effort and responsibility. Then obviously there are strategic partners, I’d say, like these days there are churches, you have many institutions in addition to formal affiliates like War Vets who are part of the commissariat and the National Youth Service who are affiliated to the Youth League. (DF0212, 2017)
7.7 Conclusion

This chapter covered ZANU-PF's campaigns through bigwig visits in opposition-aligned constituencies. It showed that the campaign strategy changed over time. In 2008 ZANU-PF ventured little into these types of constituencies, choosing to employ a mobilising strategy that focused on its core-voters and constituencies (ZACs). In 2013, it made a significant strategic shift to a chasing strategy where it focused its campaigns (through bigwig visits) on OACs. Its intent was to recover ground lost in the 2008 election where it had lost the first round of the presidential election to Morgan Tsvangirai of the opposition MDC. Support for Mugabe had plummeted from 56.2% in 2002 to 43.2% in 2008. This dip in popularity was even more apparent at the parliamentary level. ZANU-PF moved from a position of having a two-thirds majority in parliament to just under fifty percent of the seats.

The chapter argued that, contrary to the argument in the literature that ZANU-PF does not change its modus operandi, the findings highlighted in the chapter show that ZANU-PF is a learning institution. It adapted its strategy across time and space. In doing this, ZANU-PF dealt with the practical challenge of not having enough support on the ground, the possible shortcomings of any manipulation, as well as the normative challenge around its legitimacy. ZANU-PF’s legitimacy had been eroded by its resort to violent and coercive politics after the March 2008 election, with severe domestic and international ramifications, including having to share power with the opposition and sustained international scrutiny over its politics.

The chapter attempted to show the causal pathway that led to the change in strategy from mobilising to chasing, eventually contributing to the dramatic change in political fortunes that was the 2013 election result. It highlighted how ZANU-PF started changing its strategy early in 2008, and how it used the Government of National Unity period as an opportunity to attack the opposition's frontbench and their constituencies in general through sustained smear campaigns in the media, while building its membership and voter base.

The chapter highlighted how, at the subnational level, ZANU-PF used what it termed a "hands-on approach" to engage and recruit members to its party in return for favours and dealing with practical local problems. It also showed how ZANU-
PF bigwigs and their proxies at the constituency level used inducements like housing stands, food, party regalia, and empowerment grants and loans to recruit members and potential voters. These strategies were a mixture. On the one hand, they were persuasive and centred on growing party loyalty through delivering solutions and incentives. On the other hand, they were also illicit. ZANU-PF's "performance" in dealing with grievances and incentivizing support was condemnable as vote-buying, patronage politics, and petty clientelism. Nonetheless, the chapter also showed that the relative deprivation of perceived opposition supporters, selective access to services and goods, and the offering of support contingent on ZANU-PF membership were used as recruitment and mobilisation tactics.

The chapter’s empirical terrain of Bulawayo and Lupane constituencies also showed that while ethnicity was not significant as an organizing and mobilizing principle in Zimbabwe's politics in general, at the subnational level, this assertion was subject to a lot of qualification. The salience of ethnicity is dependent on place and history. In areas that have long been seen as opposition bastions of largely Ndebele ethnicity, ethnicity was more salient as a talking point, a matter for discussion, a political organisation and mobilisation tool, and an influencer of political preferences. In Lupane, it was evident that ethnicity matters at the local level when it came to who led and who organized. But for the presidential race, it was subservient to a more practical political calculus around who could take on ZANU-PF successfully.

The chapter shed light on the politics of coercion and violence in both the 2008 and 2013 elections. While spoken of in broad analysis by Zimbabwean interviewees and prominent literature, coercion and violence were not preeminent characteristics of the ground campaign at the subnational level in OACs in general, or in Lupane and Bulawayo in particular. For Lupane and Bulawayo, some of the reasons behind the absence of politically motivated violence during the two elections were historical, but as former ZIPRA combatants and Former ZAPU members interviewed for this study also highlighted, they were also strategic and ideological.

The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that, in these kinds of constituencies, ZANU-PF engages in its presidential election campaigns in a well-organised fashion and, like in ZACs, utilises its organisational structures for
legitimacy seeking purposes. Violence and electoral manipulation are difficult to find in OACs. When there, violence yielded limited results on aggregate election outcomes. During election campaigns, members of the opposition and ZANU-PF interviewed for this study agreed that the competition was nonviolent and even democratic. While the opposition was dominant in these constituencies, this was only the case when the opposition’s votes were collated together. Regardless, in these types of constituencies, perhaps because it was the weaker party, ZANU-PF campaigned using persuasive-clientelist means. It appeared content to win and lose within the accepted procedural framework. The kinds of claims to legitimacy made in these kinds of constituencies revolved around a muted version of identity-based claims and an accented clientelist and programmatic frame.

The next chapter looks at ZANU-PF campaigns in battleground constituencies. Like opposition constituencies, battleground constituencies are not ZANU-PF bulwark constituencies, but they were not as lost a cause regarding victory and capture as the ones covered in this chapter. Nonetheless, despite being difficult campaign terrain with limited chances of prevailing, ZANU-PF in 2013 still campaigned in OACs, but as the next chapter shows, in battleground constituencies where their chances were supposed to be better, oddly, they hardly campaigned there using bigwig rallies. The next chapter will explain why.
This chapter describes and analyses ZANU-PF’s campaigns in battleground constituencies in 2008 and 2013. It will show the forms of political engagement that took place in these types of constituencies through an outline of subnational election campaign activity for presidential elections in Goromonzi North and Tsholotsho North constituencies. “Battleground”, as a characterization of constituencies, is seldom used in African politics and Zimbabwean election literature. The preference is often for the term swing constituencies, but even this is scarce in the literature. One of the few studies that attempt to address swing constituencies in Zimbabwe defines a swing “as a constituency where the difference in vote tallies between the MDC-T and ZANU PF in the above-mentioned elections was 10% or less.” (Freedom House, 2011:4) This definition is in line with generally accepted definitions of swing constituencies, equated to Battleground constituencies in other jurisdictions. For instance, in the United Kingdom (UK), “battleground” is used to denote “marginal” constituencies in which the gap between the first and second-placed candidates is less than 10%, thus matching the Freedom House definition in terms of magnitude (Barnes, 2017). In the United States of America (USA), “battleground” states are the same as “swing” states, in line with the Freedom House (2011) definition. However, in the USA, the terminology is used to denote states that have regularly seen close contests between parties in previous elections and could reasonably be won by any one of the leading contenders. Additionally, these states are considered key to the overall outcome of the election.

While there is no formally accepted definition of Battleground constituencies, I find the Freedom House (2011) definition inadequate to characterize battleground and/or swing constituencies in Zimbabwe. In this chapter I attempt to go beyond cutting and pasting the standard battleground and swing definitions onto the Zimbabwean political terrain. I do this to incorporate the context and the volatility, as well as the magnitudes of election victories that have turned some constituencies into swings over time. While all of the 36 constituencies identified by Freedom House (2011) qualify as battlegrounds for this study, I believe that pegging the threshold at 10% does not reliably capture the full universe of constituencies whose outcomes in elections can be “too close to call” in the
Zimbabwean context. I, therefore, move away from both the UK understanding, as defined by Barnes (2017), and the Freedom House conception. I define battleground constituencies as constituencies in which the winner’s margin of victory is less than 15.01%, a margin I consider too narrow for any candidate or political party to claim the constituency before an election. Battleground constituencies generally possess the common characteristic of not being discernibly dominated by one party or candidate regarding electoral outcomes. Different political parties and interests can battle it out electorally in battleground constituencies, knowing that they stand a 50-50 chance of winning, and that a significant portion of constituents will give them the time of day and listen to their appeals. Table 8-1 illustrates this point using the constituencies in the districts of Tsholotsho and Goromonzi, that have been battleground constituencies over time. They include the two constituencies in which I conducted in-depth fieldwork to explore the subnational politics of presidential election campaigns in battlegrounds, Goromonzi North and Tsholotsho North.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Winner 2002</th>
<th>Constituency Type-2002</th>
<th>Winner 2008</th>
<th>Constituency Type 2008</th>
<th>Winner 2013</th>
<th>Constituency Type 2013</th>
<th>Winner 2018</th>
<th>Constituency Type 2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tsholotsho South</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Battleground</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Marginal Opposition</td>
<td>ZANU-PF Battleground</td>
<td>ZANU-PF Battleground</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsholotsho North</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Battleground</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Marginal Opposition</td>
<td>Opposition Consolidating</td>
<td>Opposition Consolidating</td>
<td>ZANU-PF Battleground</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goromonzi West</td>
<td>ZANU-PF Consolidating</td>
<td>ZANU-PF Battleground</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Battleground ZANU-PF Battleground</td>
<td>Opposition Consolidating</td>
<td>Opposition Consolidating</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goromonzi North</td>
<td>ZANU-PF Consolidating</td>
<td>ZANU-PF Battleground</td>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Consolidating</td>
<td>ZANU-PF Battleground</td>
<td>Opposition Consolidating</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwanda South</td>
<td>ZANU-PF Battleground</td>
<td>ZANU-PF Battleground</td>
<td>ZANU-PF Battleground</td>
<td>ZANU-PF Battleground</td>
<td>ZANU-PF Battleground</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s data, also Extracted from Annexure 1: List of Battleground Constituencies 2002 to 2013.
Table 8-1 shows that Tsholotsho South, while being a battleground ahead of the 2008 election and again in 2013 and 2018, turned into a marginal opposition constituency after the 2008 election. In this constituency, both ZANU-PF and the opposition have carried it twice each over four elections. Tsholotsho North progressed from being a battleground in 2002 to a marginal in 2008 and a consolidating opposition constituency in 2013. At this point, it should have been more difficult for it to swing from opposition to ZANU-PF, but in 2018 it did, reverting to battleground status but with ZANU-PF carrying it. The two Goromonzi constituencies in Table 8-1 have swung from being consolidating ZANU-PF constituencies in 2002 to being battlegrounds and consolidating ZANU-PF in 2008 and 2013, and eventually consolidating opposition in 2018.

Battleground constituencies are very prone to swings from incumbent to opposition and vice versa, as well as between constituency types. To keep the analytical field simple, in this thesis I do not differentiate between battleground and swing constituencies, although, as shown above, while battleground constituencies have a high likelihood of swinging over time, they may only be close contests with no swings. It is perceptible that one party or candidate may, in such a constituency, perennially occupy the place of “nearly man”, always coming close and fighting hard, but never winning to turn the constituency into a swing, as exemplified by Gwanda South constituency in Table 8-1. ZANU-PF has carried it with small winning margins, 14% in 2008, about 12% in 2013, and 4% in 2018.

Fridy (2012:108) defines swing voters as voters not beholden to a particular political party, who sometimes self-identify as independents who are willing to listen to multiple appeals, although they can also be party members who, under certain circumstances, are willing to vote across party lines. To get to a swing constituency, we can aggregate individual constituents and say such a constituency is one where voters, despite party affiliations, have a tendency to hear out cross party appeals and under certain circumstances vote across party lines. These constituencies also carry most of the hallmarks of a battleground, with one important distinction, i.e. alternation of winning candidates and or vote leaders in previous elections between the opposition parties and incumbent party.
This rest chapter is organized as follows: Section 8.1 provides an overview of battleground constituencies from 2002 to 2018, i.e. one election before and after this study’s elections of interest, 2008 and 2013. Section 8.2 outlines and analyses ZANU-PF bigwig visits to battleground constituencies in 2008 and 2013 as well as the kinds of appeals that Mugabe and other members of the ZANU-PF praeidium made during these visits. In contrast to the preceding two chapters, chapter 8 will, in section 8.3, describe ZANU-PF’s efforts to engage with the economic and social crisis that was part of the 2008 election context, and explain why there was this difference in approach. Section 8.4 will also cover developments and extant analysis on the 2008 run-off election and describe and analyse ZANU-PF’s ground game in battleground constituencies. It will argue that despite the general approach of analysing ZANU-PF as a monolith, some of the ways in which it conducted its presidential election campaigns in the battlegrounds show an interesting amount of variation in strategies and tactics, not just across constituency types and time, but also within constituency types as shown in battleground constituencies. It will attempt to bring out these different strategies and tactics within battleground constituencies in four respects: party organizational structures and the game of numbers; patronage politics; traditional leaders and their mediating role; and lastly coercion (physical violence and intimidation).

8.1 Battleground Constituencies Over Time (2002 To 2018)

This thesis considers battleground constituencies as a useful analytical category that provides the possibility of illuminating variations regarding the campaign tactics and strategies of political parties in Zimbabwe. This is even more the case because, as Table 8-2 and Table 8-3 show, battleground constituencies have, across time, occupied a significant proportion of the types of constituencies at each election, and between the 2002 and 2018 elections 109 of the 210 constituencies were battleground constituencies at one election or another. In the rebased constituency types from the 2002 electoral outcome, they constituted no less than 17% of the 210 constituencies. This figure increased in the most competitive election in Zimbabwe’s history, the March 2008 presidential election, where the number of battleground constituencies rose from 35 to 57 constituencies out of 210, or 27% (nearly a third) of all constituencies. At 27%, battleground constituencies were the largest single constituency type when ZACs
and OACs are disaggregated into strongholds, consolidating and marginal constituencies. In 2013, these figures dropped in absolute number terms from 57 in 2008 to 43 in 2013 before increasing again to 52 out of 210 in 2018.

Table 8-2: Battleground Constituencies Dashboard (2002-2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number Of Battleground Constituencies Per Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Number out of 210</td>
<td>35/210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion/Percentage</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s data from official presidential election returns (2002 to 2018)

Table 8-3: Constituency types composition (in absolute numbers out of 210) 2002-2018, with Battleground Constituencies highlighted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Opposition Constituencies</th>
<th>Aligned Constituencies</th>
<th>Battleground Constituencies</th>
<th>ZANU-PF Leaning Constituencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongholds</td>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>Consolidating</td>
<td>Strongholds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8-1 shows the proportions of battleground constituencies across time. It shows that the proportions fluctuated, but never by more than 10 percentage points, which suggests some stability, especially after 2008, where the category contributed an average of 24% across three elections. However, although the category seems to have been stable in absolute number terms and proportions, its composition regarding actual constituencies was very volatile. For instance, only four constituencies, Seke, Buhera West, Chimanimani West, and Gwanda South retained battleground status across all presidential elections from 2002 to 2018. This means that at one point or another the remaining 105 constituencies swung from battleground status to either ZACs or OACs. Of these, the majority, 55 constituencies, occupied battleground status for only one election, while 38 constituencies occupied this space twice in the four elections and 12 constituencies occupied battleground status at all but one of the elections. It is also this dynamic change in status for most constituencies marked as
battlegrounds ahead of the 2008 election that makes this category a worthy subject to study, understand and explain.

**Figure 8-1: Share of Battleground Constituencies across time (2002-2018)**

![Percentage of Battleground Constituencies 2002-2018](image)

Source: Author’s data, calculated from official presidential election results (2002-2018)

Figure 8-2 shows that when the constituencies are disaggregated, they do not fall into two neat groups of incumbent and opposition territories as there is a significant 20-27% of constituencies that do not fit that mould. Although not as volatile, as can be seen from Figure 8-2, the trend in battleground constituency composition has followed that of opposition aligned constituencies, increasing and dipping with them across time.
The data compiled for this study shows that 72% of all 18 peri-urban constituencies in Zimbabwe occupied battleground status at some point between 2002 and 2018. It also shows that 61% of all 143 rural constituencies were also battleground constituencies, while only 21% of urban areas were, at some point between 2002 and 2018, battleground constituencies. Close to half, 48.60%, of all of the constituencies that were battleground constituencies benefitted from the post-2000 fast track land reform process. This data suggests that rural constituencies are much more contested than anecdotal evidence on ZANU-PF’s control of the bucolic suggests. It also suggests that the opposition has a firmer hold of the urban areas and has been able to stop a significant proportion from slipping into battleground status.

8.2 Bigwigs In Battleground Constituencies In 2008 And 2013

Despite the significant space that battleground constituencies occupy as a constituency type, ZANU-PF paid scant attention to them in the 2008 and 2013 elections. In the run up to the March 2008 election, ZANU-PF bigwigs visited
battleground constituencies four times, with an additional two visits ahead of the June 2008 presidential election run off. In 2013, ZANU-PF only visited battleground constituencies four times. As Table 8-4 shows, these visits constituted just 14% and 6% of all visits catalogued for this study in 2008 and 2013 respectively.

**Table 8-4: Number of ZANU-PF Bigwig visits to battleground Constituencies in 2008 and 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Number of Bigwig visits to Battleground Constituencies</th>
<th>Proportion of bigwig visits to Battleground constituencies (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s data from press archives

Table 8-5 lists the bigwig visits to battleground constituencies in 2008 and 2013. It shows that consistent with the finding in the other two constituency types, in 2008, Mugabe did most of the campaign’s heavy lifting, and was the main attraction at five of the six bigwig visits, while in 2013, all of the visits noted were presided over by Joyce Mujuru. Half of the constituencies that ZANU-PF targeted with bigwig visits in 2008 (Marondera central, Masvingo urban, and Insiza) were revisited in 2013, but do not show up on the table for 2013 because their constituency type had changed to opposition aligned constituencies. Goromonzi, which Mujuru visited in 2013, had, in 2008, benefitted from the unusual luxury of two Mugabe visits on 3rd March. Except for Insiza, which as stated in Chapter 7 received a tremendous amount of campaign attention from the ZANU-PF Chairman, Simon Khaya Moyo in 2013, and Goromonzi, the visits to Marondera and Masvingo were probably because these two constituencies are also provincial capitals for Masvingo and Mashonaland East provinces respectively.
Table 8-5: Locations, dates of ZANU-PF Bigwig visits to Battleground constituencies in 2008 and 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Bigwig</th>
<th>Date of Visit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March-June 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insiza South Avoca Business Center</td>
<td>Matebeleland North</td>
<td>V.P. Mujuru</td>
<td>5 March (Herald March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bubi</td>
<td>Matebeleland North</td>
<td>R.G. Mugabe</td>
<td>11 March (Chronicle March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marondera Central Rudhaka Stadium</td>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>R.G. Mugabe</td>
<td>20 March (Herald March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo Urban Mucheke Stadium</td>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>R.G. Mugabe</td>
<td>25 March (Herald March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chegutu East Pfulajena Stadium</td>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>R.G. Mugabe</td>
<td>14 June (Herald June)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsholotsho South Tsholotsho Business Center</td>
<td>Matebeleland North</td>
<td>R.G. Mugabe</td>
<td>19 June (Chronicle June)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goromonzzi west (Mungate GP, Domboshava)</td>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>V.P. Mujuru</td>
<td>22 July 2013 (Herald 24 July)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mhondoro Ngezi Mamina Business Center</td>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>V.P. Mujuru</td>
<td>23 July 2013 (Herald 26 July)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mhondoro Mubaira Nyamweda Business Center</td>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>V.P. Mujuru</td>
<td>23 July 2013 (Herald 26 July)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s data from press archives

The overall pattern of bigwig visits to battleground constituencies suggests neglect. This neglect was present in both political practice and popular as well as academic analysis. This was despite the fact that, post-March 2008, there were more battleground constituencies (27% of the 210 constituencies) than ZANU-PF aligned constituencies (23% of the 210 constituencies), and after the July 2013 elections, the proportion of battleground constituencies was roughly the same as that of opposition aligned constituencies (20% and 22% respectively). The pattern of visits is a bit counterintuitive, as one would think that because of their prevalence, and the possibility of being swung, battleground constituencies should have had more currency in polities where the first past the post electoral system exists. One way of understanding the little attention that ZANU-PF paid to battleground constituencies for the March 2008 election is on account of the
mobilizing strategy that ZANU-PF adopted, whereby it targeted its core constituents and members, as argued in Chapters 5 and 6. However, ZANU-PF’s continued neglect of battleground constituencies in the 2013 election begs the question, why, if, as I have argued in Chapter 5, it was pursuing a chasing strategy?

I argue that political agents in the Zimbabwean context adopt a dyadic perspective when viewing campaign targets and constituencies. They hardly use the term battleground, and do not see it as viable organizing principle for their campaigns, preferring the binary mapping of the national constituencies into incumbent and opposition territories, or in Zimbabwe’s case, ZANU-PF and Opposition (mostly MDC) territories. A viable explanation for this is the deep polarization between the major political actors that LeBas (2006) highlighted when she argued that electoral competition in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s required elites to build parties able to mobilize their constituencies and maintain cohesion through polarizing tactics that established sharp boundaries between opponents (LeBas, 2006:435). This polarization and the resultant dyadic logic extend to campaign strategy, with the net result being the absence of grey zones in the political imagination of campaign strategists, who prefer either black (ruling party) or white (opposition) categorizations. The dyadic approach in practice also extends to analysis and is part of the reason why there is a scarcity of battleground and swing constituency analysis in African politics in general, and in the Zimbabwean politics scholarship in particular.

The limited interest in battleground constituencies in both practice and theory in Zimbabwean politics can also be understood in terms of the winner takes all types of politics that result from the perils of Zimbabwe’s presidentialism. While parliament exists and winning constituencies matter in Zimbabwe, part of the reason why battleground constituency analysis and campaign practice is limited is precisely because, ultimately, in the presidential contest, it matters less whether candidates win these battleground constituencies where support for incumbents and opposition is almost an even split. It matters more for parties and presidential candidates to strategize around a vote maximizing logic that forces them to invest their efforts more where they are strong and either have a chance of getting more votes or reducing those of their opponent. This argument explains both why limited attention was paid to battleground constituencies in both the 2008 and 2013 elections, and also why ZANU-PF elected to mobilize its base in ZACs in
2008, and why it resorted to chasing opposition constituencies in 2013. As Linz (1990:56) argues, institutional arrangements directly and indirectly shape entire political processes. This influence is inclusive of both ways of ruling as well as ways of campaigning to attain the right to rule. Zimbabwe’s institutional setup entails a bicameral parliament, but one which does not have executive authority and power. This parliament is pitted against an Executive Presidency in whom executive power and authority reside. The president, as stated in Chapter 4, is directly elected by a national constituency in a zero-sum electoral contest. This is part of the “ineluctably problematic” nature of presidentialism and its "winner-take-all” rule that leads to democratic politics and elections being a zero-sum game (Linz, 1990:56).

8.2.1 Mugabe’s Handling Of The 2008 Socio-Economic Crisis And The Politics Of Giveaways

Despite the limited allocation of bigwig visits to battleground constituencies, when they took place, there were some features of the rallies that were different from ZANU-PF’s approach to other types of constituencies. The broad messages and themes remained the same in both 2008 and 2013 across constituency types, with Mugabe insisting that people should vote for him and ZANU-PF because they were “the custodians of the legacy of the people” (Herald, 21 March, 2008). Shaming the West was a consistent theme, and speaking in Bubi constituency, at the border with Tsholotsho North and South constituencies, Mugabe pleaded for votes on the strength of his and ZANU-PF’s passion for the interests of the people. He urged the people of Bubi and the surrounding areas to unite behind the party of liberation and show Britain and America, who wanted Zimbabwe’s resources, that Zimbabwe would never be a colony gain. For Mugabe, unity of the country meant unity behind his candidature and ZANU-PF.

This is the time to demonstrate our unity. This is the time to show that we were united by the war of independence, that we are united in defence of our country. Let us not sell out those who died for this country. Let us not sell out our heroes (Chronicle, 12 March 2008).

However, in 2008, Zimbabwe was reeling under a serious socio-economic crisis. It had a grain deficit on account of a drought, leaving the country in need of emergency grain imports to meet maize meal and wheat requirements (Financial Gazette, 6-12 March, 2008). Shortages were also evident in the electricity and fuel supply, basic commodities, and clean water. The year on year inflation rate set and broke records, reaching 66,212.30% in December 2007 and just over 273
100,000% at the beginning of 2008. The economy had entered firm hyperinflation territory, and by the third quarter of 2008 the hyperinflation rate reached the ridiculous rate of 79.6 billion percent, with prices doubling every hour (Hanke & Kwok, 2009). The Zimbabwe dollar lost virtually all of its value, 99%, in 2008 alone, despite the ZANU-PF government’s attempts to stem the tide by cutting off zeros and introducing a 10-million-dollar bill in January 2008 (Financial Gazette, 21-27 February, 2008; Hanke & Kwok, 2009).

Over the course of ten years (between 1998 and 2008), the Zimbabwean economy had shrunk by more than 50%, and 18% in 2008 alone, eroding “billion dollar” incomes and pensions, especially for civil servants (Bond & Sharife, 2012). The economic crisis was so deep that those who could migrate did, leaving the health sector operating with only 20% of the doctors needed, while half of the skilled personnel in the mining sector also left for South Africa, the United Kingdom, Australia and other destinations (Chikanda, 2006; Keller, Stewart, & Eppel, 2008). On the campaign trail, Mugabe stated that he saw this brain drain not as a result of the socio-economic and political challenges, but as being due to the “the massive investments made in the education sector”, which had led to Zimbabweans being attracted by Australia, the United Kingdom and South Africa, which offered better packages to trained professionals (Herald, 6 March(A), 2008) Of those who were left, an estimated 80% of the population were living below the poverty datum line, and over 80% were working on their own account in the informal sector (BBC, 20 February, 2008; Kanyenze, 2009).

The above-mentioned issues spawned serious disquiet in the country, leading to several civil service strikes. These included the worst teachers’ strike since independence, which started in the school term in January 2008 and continued until the 2008 election. The teachers demanded a salary increase to Zim$ 1.7 billion dollars per month, and access to benefits from the AIDS levy; although they contributed to this levy monthly, many of them had no access to antiretroviral drugs (Zimbabwe Independent, 7-13 March, 2008:2). Medical doctors and nurses had also been on strike from December 2007 to March 2008 over poor earnings (estimated at less than the equivalent of US$170 per month) and their tenuous working conditions, whereby they were without basic anaesthetics, sutures, and drugs (Meldrum, 2008). As Meldrum (2008) noted, “Mugabe used to be able to campaign on the excellent health care his government offered” but in 2008 as Zimbabweans voted, many had “to go to the polls by
stepping over pools of raw sewage” and Mugabe, in the main, could “…only pledge to distribute more antiretroviral drugs, which weary Zimbabweans dismiss[ed] as empty promises” (Meldrum, 2008:1059).

The 2008 crisis was too pervasive for Mugabe to ignore. In ZANU-PF’s core constituencies Mugabe could get away with blaming the “illegal sanctions” imposed by the West at the urging of an “unpatriotic” and “sell-out” opposition, for the economic downturn. But the newspaper record suggests that in OACs and battleground constituencies Mugabe could not end at the rhetorical anti-imperialist excuse. He went further and spoke of what he and the ZANU-PF government were doing about the situation. This approach at a national level was similar to a hands-on approach and ZANU-PF’s attempts at stemming the dissent and building support through patronage networks, covered in Chapter 7. Mugabe’s pre-March 2008 rallies in battleground constituencies indicated a focus on the manifestations of the socio-economic crisis. This meant limited reliance on the historical and ideological appeals that he often used in ZACs, and the programmatic ones that took centre stage in OACs.

For instance, at the beginning of his official campaign Star Rally schedule in Chipinge on the 4th of March 2008, Mugabe dwelt on the issue of food shortages and assured voters that the government was looking into resolving the problem through importing 500,000 tons of maize from Malawi, Zambia and South Africa to alleviate the effects of the crop failure due to drought (Herald, 5 March, 2008). The issue did not go away on the strength of Mugabe’s assurances, and would continue to be a talking point at his rallies in the battleground constituencies of Marondera on March 20, and Masvingo on March 25, 2008. Mugabe had to repeat his commitment to dealing with hunger, doubling down on his import solution, and arguing that the food had arrived in the country, but relief efforts were being hampered by bad roads (Herald, 21 March, 2008 and Herald, 26 March, 2008). In Masvingo Mugabe added that his government had released funds to the District Development Fund (DDF) to create and maintain feeder roads to improve distribution, and ensure equitable distribution of the food aid (Herald, 26 March, 2008; Chronicle, 12 March, 2008).

The food aid was a temporary stop-gap solution. Mugabe presented the effective use of the land as the long term solution to Zimbabwe’s food woes and promised to transform people’s lives through this form of empowerment. He pledged his
government’s continued support with equipment and related implements like hoes and tractors, and argued that these were the “weapons that we use to empower you so that your lives may be transformed” (*Herald*, 5 March, 2008). In Bubi, Mugabe emphasised his party’s understanding of the differentiated agricultural needs of different areas and pledged to support Matebeleland beyond cropping with animal breeding through a donation of 500 cattle to each of the Matebeleland provinces, and just over 300 each to other provinces (*Chronicle*, 12 March, 2008). In a similar spirit, Mujuru made similar commitments at the rallies she addressed, and in Insiza she donated two billion Zimbabwean dollars to the establishment of pigsties and the renovation of a dam in ward 12, as well as Jatropha seed (the plant extracts could be used to produce biodiesiel and lamp oil), enough to cover 50 hectares of land (*Herald*, 6 March(B), 2008). In addition, as was the case in other provinces, Mugabe distributed computers to schools in Masvingo province and buses as part of the “National Transport Enhancement Program”. He also promised gasoline powered electricity generators to provide for the electricity needs of towns in light of the incessant power cuts.

For the civil servants, Mugabe announced at his rally in Bubi that he had signed off on a new salary schedule for teachers and other civil servants. Mugabe, a former teacher himself, praised the profession, proclaiming it to be the “first of all professions” because everyone, regardless of their eventual profession, passes through the hands of a teacher (*Herald*, 6 March(A), 2008). He sympathised with the plight of teachers and declared that they must not be allowed to become destitute and that his government would act on their grievances. In Murewa, Mugabe promised to deal with businesses to stop them raising prices in ways that eroded civil servants’ incomes. Mugabe urged teachers to engage the government with their grievances instead of striking and stated that his government “wants teachers to be well remunerated. Their issues are legitimate, but I only heard the day before yesterday that teachers have gone on strike, and was surprised since I am teacher number 1. No one wanted to whisper in my ear before striking” (*Herald*, 6 March(A), 2008). A week later, the teachers’ strike was still ongoing and Mugabe was still pleading.

Teachers, please please, we do not want strikes. These kids are yours. Why go on strike when you have a good case? I have told them [the teachers] that I am teacher number one. It is undignified (*Chronicle*, 12 March , 2008).
In regard to the health sector, Mugabe admitted the dire state of affairs and presented what he thought would be a popular solution.

In our hospitals, there was now a disaster because we didn’t have medicines, equipment and other supplies. Our doctors and nurses were complaining that their salaries were too low. This Thursday, I am going to meet the doctors at Harare Central Hospital to discuss these issues. But at the same time, we will also be giving Senior and Junior doctors 400 vehicles. They will also be told about housing and accommodation, and where we have built houses for them in various places, although in some places the houses are yet to be built. We will also be distributing ambulances to several hospitals (Herald, 26 March, 2008).

The scheme for medical doctors that Mugabe announced was on top of a US$1 million donation that he had made to buy high-tech scanning equipment for distribution to all hospitals (Herald, 26 March, 2008). However, like many other things during the 2008 election, this scheme for doctors was financed by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to the tune of US$ 4 million. Although Mugabe argued at rallies that this intervention was not election related, the Minister of Health and Child Welfare, Dr David Parirenyatwa, admitted that the move was also meant to prevent junior doctors from “downing tools ahead of the March 29 harmonised elections”, which he saw as a plot to decampaign government (Herald, 11 March, 2008). Parirenyatwa argued that the “purchasing of vehicles bears evidence that we have taken their grievances as genuine and we are working towards addressing conditions of service for all health personnel” (Herald, 11 March, 2008).

Mugabe’s approach to some of the issues that constituted the socio-economic crisis in 2008 was a showcase at the national level of the hands-on approach mentioned in Chapter 7, and shows how Mugabe instrumentalised dissent and attempted to fashion solutions as part of ZANU-PF’s attempts to win votes, or at least not lose them. Outside blaming the West and sanctions, the evidence suggests that at some of the rallies Mugabe took some responsibility for the challenges engulfing Zimbabwe at that time, blaming poor monitoring and supervision in some ministries. He argued that some ministers were only visible during election time, and once appointed to the Cabinet, they left all of the work to their permanent secretaries (Herald, 26 March, 2008). He pledged closer monitoring in the future and stated that he would “whip” ministers into working, and was thus asking the electorate to give him the whip (Herald, 26 March, 2008).
8.2.2 Opposition Vilification And Attacks In The 2008 Presidential Election

Mugabe appeared aware that in battleground constituencies the opposition could inflict a lot of harm on his bid for re-election. This was especially so because, on the one hand, Makoni was running as a technocrat, scholar (with a Ph.D. in Medicinal Chemistry), former Executive Secretary for the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and former liberal Finance Minister, who Mugabe had allegedly side-lined because he refused to engage in populist financial management. Tsvangirai, on the other hand, claimed to have answers to the economic challenges the country was facing. Although the MDC had split in 2005, Tsvangirai had experience of running against Mugabe from 2002, and, unlike Makoni, he was backed by an experienced and formidable movement that after close to ten years of existence was no longer fumbling in the dark as far as challenging ZANU-PF was concerned.

Given the above, it was no surprise that in battleground constituencies, Mugabe reiterated his disdain for Makoni, and contempt for Tsvangirai. At the beginning of his 2008 campaign, at Checheche growth point in the battleground constituency of Chipinge central, Mugabe accused Makoni of being “a ploy by the British to divide Zimbabweans” (Herald, 5 March, 2008). Mugabe’s argument, made at several rallies including in the battleground constituency of Marondera nine days ahead of the elections, was that the British, Australians and Americans were funding the opposition’s regime change agenda (Herald, 21 March, 2008). His evidence was a fundraising lunch that the Citi Group had held for Simba Makoni in London, which ZANU-PF had discovered through a leaked email as well as the arrest of a British pilot who had flown in opposition material from South Africa and was supposed to ferry Morgan Tsvangirai to rallies. ZANU-PF publicized these developments as proof of foreign funding and “promises” by opposition leaders to give back land to the whites. These fabrications were made at rallies and distributed on pamphlets, which were also published as attack advertisements in various editions of the state-controlled media (see Figures 8-3 and 8- 4 for examples).
Mugabe expressed his disappointment that while he was launching his campaign in Manicaland province because it had lost the highest number of people during the liberation struggle, the province was also home to the most prominent
opposition leaders and sell-outs. These included Simba Makoni and Morgan Tsvangirai, as well as former ZANU-PF Secretary General turned opposition leader in the 1990s, Edgar Tekere (Herald, 5 March, 2008). ZANU-PF rubbished both Makoni’s and Tsvangirai’s credentials at bigwig rallies and replayed the attack scripts in the daily press that circulated in urban and peri-urban areas where some of the battleground constituencies were located (See Figure 8-5). In Insiza South constituency, Mugabe’s Vice President, Joyce Mujuru, followed a similar lament, calling Simba Makoni and Dumiso Dabengwa’s defections from ZANU-PF distractions. Mujuru argued that the defections were a ‘black hole’ that ZANU-PF members needed to cover, and encouraged them, instead, to focus on the election at hand (Herald, 6 March(B), 2008).

The attacks on the integrity of the two main opposition candidates were juxtaposed against Mugabe’s record and sacrifice, which ZANU-PF argued, needed to be rewarded. The pamphlets in Figure 8.6 show how ZANU-PF captured these messages, emphasizing the benefits of land reform, Mugabe’s education, and his 11 years in prison.²⁰

²⁰ Between 1944 and 1974 Mugabe attained an assortment of seven Undergraduate and master’s Degrees in English and History, Education, Administration, Economics, and Law from the University of Fort Hare, the University of South Africa, and the University of London.
Figure 8-5: ZANU-PF Tsvangirai attack pamphlets and advertisements
Figure 8-6: Mugabe Campaign pamphlet on the “self-sacrificing” hero

HE HAD A FAMILY...

ZIMBABWE IS ALREADY WORKING

SEVEN DEGREES,
NOT GRADE SEVEN!

R.G. has given your children ELEVEN years of education.
R.G. has built schools throughout the country.
R.G. has achieved 96% literacy rate, making Zimbabwe the second best on the continent.
R.G. has given your children twelve Universities.
R.G. has given you a technical college in every province.
R.G. is giving your children computers to modernise education.

But someone who knows himself only too well, thinks you deserve LESS...

He's ignored Adult Literacy availed by R.G.

He uses Timba to fight access to education.

NOW HE WANTS TO TURN ZIMBABWE INTO A NATION OF GRADE SEVENS!

VOTE ZANU PF FOR EMPOWERMENT THROUGH MECHANISATION

VOTE ZANU PF
In Chapter 6, I outlined how the results of the March 2008 election were not constitutionally conclusive as no presidential candidate met the victory threshold of 50% plus 1 vote, but with Tsvangirai leading and Mugabe in second position, the result led to a presidential run-off election in June 2008. In constituencies that were coded as battleground constituencies for this study, the number of registered voters was just over a million (1,007,053) but less than half of these (463,041) turned out to vote (just about 46%). It took five weeks for the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission to release the presidential election results. According to ZECs official numbers, the vote share distribution in battleground constituencies between the three main candidates almost mirrored the national presidential election results. Tsvangirai mastered about 47% of the vote, Mugabe got about 41%, while Makoni’s vote share was above his national average at 11%. The combined opposition vote share was close to 59%, which shows how, had the opposition not been split, it could have comfortably won the presidential election without the need for a run-off election.

At this point, the March 2008 election was the least violent of all post-2000 elections and had succeeded in “redeemed[ing] a popular faith in the electoral process that had waned” between 2000 and 2008 elections, which were characterized by opposition defeats (Alexander & Tendi, 2008:5). But this was one end of a spectrum, with the June presidential election run-off marking the other end, undermining the power of the vote and exposing the deeply problematic nature of the militarized means and liberation struggle logic that had hitherto sustained ZANU-PF’s power (Alexander & Tendi, 2008).

The period between the March 2008 election and the June presidential election run-off revealed ZANU-PF’s militarized authoritarian underbelly. Mugabe’s challenger, Morgan Tsvangirai, speaking at a rally in Bulawayo on 3 June 2008 before being detained on his way from a another rally in Lupane, claimed that Mugabe was “…determined to turn the whole country into a war zone” to “subvert the will of the people and steal the June 27th election by any means possible” (Reuters, 4 June, 2008). Tsvangirai was not wrong and would be detained at least four more times during the run-up to the June run-off election. As Masunungure (2009) pointed out, the 2008 run-off election demonstrated the “brazenly intrusive and expansive role of the military/security complex”, leading
to an omnipresent fear enveloping the whole country (Masunungure, 2009:79). This military incursion into civilian politics was not a new thing. As many writers have established, even before assuming power in 1980, ZANU-PF as a movement was militarized, in the sense of having the ‘military’ involved politically in civilian institutions as well as processes. If the Gukurahundi massacres of the early 1980s provided the clearest manifestation of this involvement, as the military went out to quash opposition against Mugabe in Matebeleland and the Midlands regions of the country, 2008 presented the second major manifestation. These events served to portray how indirect militarization had long been a factor in Zimbabwe’s politics, starting in the mid-1970s when ZANU’s military wing, ZANLA, installed Mugabe as the civilian face and leader of the movement after his 11-year stint in jail.

Nevertheless, in 2008, after multiple disruptions to his efforts to campaign, more than 100 supporters being killed, more than 200 being abducted, hundreds being jailed on spurious charges, thousands being beaten, and tens of thousands being forced from their homes, the sheer intensity and systematic nature of the violence and intimidation forced Tsvangirai to pull out of the run-off election (The Guardian, 22 June, 2008; Masunungure, 2009). Having fled to Botswana in April 2008 after receiving intelligence regarding threats to his life, he had to flee again, taking sanctuary at the Dutch Embassy in Harare soon after withdrawing from the race, fearing for his life (Government of the Netherlands, 2008).

It is irrefutable that the 2008 presidential election run-off was a farce, which, instead of being a democratic contest and conclusion to the inconclusive presidential election, ZANU-PF turned into a battle between the ballot and the bullet. Speaking at Tsholotsho Business Center on 19th June 2008, Mugabe made this abundantly clear. He repeated the message he had shared earlier in Nkayi, Beitbridge and Gwanda South, that the run-off was an opportunity to stop sell-outs from mortgaging the country to colonizers. For Mugabe, June 27 was an opportunity for patriotic Zimbabweans to reject recolonization through rejecting Tsvangirai. Specifically, in regard to the validity of the vote, Mugabe stated that war veterans had approached him and stated their intention to safeguard the land, sovereignty and independence from foreign threats. He told his audience:

The war veterans came to me and said, President we can never accept that our country, which we won through the barrel of the gun, be taken merely by an X made by a ball point pen. *Zvino ballpoint pen ichirwiswa neAK?* [now, can a ballpoint pen fight against an AK (47 rifle)?] Is there going to
be a struggle between the two? But if the X is following the path of the
gun, then that is fine. We can meet and win squarely. (*Chronicle*, 20 June, 2008).

It was clear that Mugabe was only interested in a contest on his terms, and as he
and ZANU-PF had already demonstrated, any result that was not a ZANU-PF
victory would not be acceptable and would be resisted by members of the former
liberation movement. Mugabe made this abundantly clear at Pfungajena stadium
in Chegutu, where he surmised that in March 2008 the electorate had engaged in
economic voting (both pocketbook and sociotropic), which he thought was
misplaced when compared to the fundamental legacy issues that he thought the
votes betrayed. He told his audience:

*You should consider carefully. Did you consider carefully (in the last
election) or you were moved by prices? This is voting against yourselves.
We have come a long way with ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF fought for you, for
our rights, land and for a bright future. This legacy should not simply be
vanquished by the stroke of a pen at the ballot simply because ‘I am not
getting any basic goods. This is not the way to do it. (*Sunday Mail*, 15-21
June, 2008)*

Mugabe insisted that the British and Americans were using Tsvangirai and the
MDC to reverse the gains of independence. He argued that he was prepared to
pass on the leadership baton but only to people known to be committed to
Zimbabwe’s ideals, who would continue to safeguard the legacy if “sell-outs”
continued to abide in the country. In Mugabe’s mind Zimbabwe’s ideals were
ZANU-PF ideals. He proclaimed that:

*We are the custodians of Zimbabwe’s legacy. We will only pass this on to
those we know are fully aware of the party’s ideology; those who value the
country’s legacy. We will pass on leadership to them, telling them to go
forward. But as long as the British still want to come back here, I will not
grow old, until we know we no longer have sell-outs amongst us (*Sunday
Mail*, 15-21 June, 2008).*

The statement above was a clear indication of the direction that ZANU-PF was
taking which presidential spokesperson George Charamba had outlined on 3 May
2008 in his column in the Herald under the pseudonym of Nathaniel Manheru.
Charamba argued that the British and the Americans had interfered with and
rigged the March 2008 election through influencing the SADC mediation process
that was a precursor to the election (*Manheru, 2008*). The SADC mediation
process had begun after several opposition leaders were beaten and tortured on 11 March 2007 when they attempted to stage a prayer rally in Highfields constituency.

The ZANU-PF campaign rallies in the run-up to the run-off were not exercises in persuasion like the ones prior to March 2008 had been. They served as platforms where Mugabe made statements of intention and declarations that ZANU-PF would not go easily, and especially not through or because of an electoral defeat. They also served as exercises in mass intimidation. They were verbalization of physical violence against, and the intimidation of key opposition organizers, leaders and civic activists, which had become endemic in the country at this point. The premise was grounded on the two ideological issues that had been central to the March 2008 election campaign, anti-imperialism and economic emancipation through the land. Mugabe, at the post-March 2008 rallies in the run up to the run-off presidential election, paid lip service to being prepared to concede defeat, through declaring that he would do so to but not to parties that were being used by the British and the Americans. This, as the above quotation from Chegutu showed, meant a power transfer in ZANU-PF. The second element was related to the first, with Mugabe declaring that he needed to safeguard the legacy of the country through staying until the land reform process was completed. This was not a plea, but a statement, and to him, the root of his dispute with the British and the Americans and by extension their proxies in the opposition. Mugabe eloquently, albeit aggressively, tied the two issues together in Tsholotsho as follows:

I walk on this land; I farm on this land. I sleep on it. My house is built on it. Our children play on it. Our schools are built on it, that is truly our number one legacy. Ndiyo nhaka yedu. Haitengeswi [it is our inheritance. We cannot sell it] (Chronicle, 20 June, 2008)

In the “election” that would follow Morgan Tsvangirai’s withdrawal, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission announced Mugabe as the winner with 90.2% of the vote, with the remaining 9.8% going to the non-competing Tsvangirai (Herald, 30 June, 2008:5). This ZANU-PF “triumph” was indeed a triumph for militarized authoritarianism. I, however, concur with Alexander & Tendi (2008) that the way in which the 2008 elections panned out was not “simply the triumph of crude authoritarianism rooted in coercion, over a revived democratic idealism” (Alexander & Tendi, 2008). As I have shown in previous chapters, the ZANU-PF election story was indeed too complex, and its house was too divided to fit
this simple analysis. The 2008 election, more than any other election in Zimbabwe, provided glimpses of the underlying architecture and settlement in ZANU-PF, as I will expand on below.

While the bulk of the evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates the unitary and command nature of ZANU-PF as an establishment, the party was also a political settlement of groups that, during ZANU’s formative years, were disparate and geographically separated, and shared varied experiences (Chung, 2006). Although Chung (2006) demonstrates how, post 1976, Mugabe tried to meld this revolutionary mish-mash into a coherent organization, it remained true that contrary to claims of having one centre of power, ZANU-PF, on account of the diversity it melded, had multiple groupings with contesting claims to legitimacy and moral ownership of the party ZANU-PF. Added to this ZANU history is the infusion of ZAPU into ZANU-PF through the 1987 Unity Accord, as an additional stakeholder in the contemporary ZANU-PF. ZAPU had been part collaborator, part foe during the liberation struggle, as well as the organization from which ZANU emerged or split from in 1963. Nonetheless it is fair to say that in the main ZANU-PF was a settlement between civilians and militants, generally. Norma Kriger (2006:1151) identified the primary components and contestations in the ZANU-PF political settlement as being liberation war fighters and veteran nationalist politicians. Using parliamentary debates in assemblies that were almost entirely constituted of ZANU-PF, Kriger shows how these two groups were united by the national myth of the liberation struggle but diverged on whose contribution was greater between the fighters and the nationalists. With the emergence of a strong opposition in 1999, these different interests in ZANU-PF closed ranks, but the fissures made intermittent appearances, especially around ZANU-PF succession politics post 2000, and eventually came to a head in the 2017 military coup that forced Robert Mugabe to resign as state president and deposed him as ZANU-PF leader.

During the post-March 2008 election processes towards the run-off election, both the civilian nationalist/political centre, which emerged from its ZANU structures during the liberation struggle, and the militaristic, violent arm of the party, which had its roots in the fighting ranks of its military wing ZANLA, were at work. Although, as Tendi (2013) argues, senior members of the military had a staunch ideological commitment to ZANU-PF, the fact that this group stepped-in to secure Mugabe’s power violently was a testament to this commitment, but also a
betrayal of this faction’s disappointment and lack of faith in the civilian arm to safeguard the party’s reign. What this military faction did is well-captured in the literature by Alexander & Tendi (2008), Masunungure (2009) and Tendi (2013), amongst others. The efforts of the civilian/nationalist political arm during the run-off period are less well captured, although Mugabe made at least ten more campaign stops in the run-up to the run-off election, two of which were in battleground constituencies, as covered above.

The review of the two rallies in battleground constituencies shows that the civilian element of ZANU-PF maintained the pretence of campaigning. The material that was distributed in and around the run-off election campaign, despite Mugabe’s tenor, also changed, becoming more issue focused and appealing especially to young people in an attempt to yield more votes. This was in concert with coercive actions that subverted voters’ free choice, which were led by the military and militant wing of the ZANU-PF political settlement. This persuasive approach was secondary because to all intents and purposes, the consensus in ZANU-PF was that the fair political campaigning route had failed, and that people needed to be forced into submission, albeit through voting for Mugabe. Mugabe’s tone on the campaign trail is a testament to this, and the actions of both factions in ZANU-PF are what led most people to dismiss the 2008 run-off election as a democratic non-event and see it instead as a critical authoritarian showcase on clinging on to power.

I argue that ZANU-PF knew that the game was up when Mugabe trailed Tsvangirai in March 2008. Given the state of the economy and the fact that the opposition had tasted victory in both the presidential lead and the narrow victory in the parliamentary race, the momentum was with them. It is not inconceivable that it was to slow down this momentum that the ZEC delayed the announcement of the presidential election results, whilst assuaging tensions by releasing the parliamentary ones. However, in that moment of anxiety, ZANU-PF, instead of conceding defeat and negotiating an amicable exit, engineered a stalemate and a political crisis to weaken the opposition, and to bring them to the negotiating table kicking and screaming rather than in triumphant jubilation. In my view, while the focus of most of the scholarship is on the violence that led Tsvangirai to withdraw from the June 2008 presidential election run-off, ZANU-PF’s strategy was always to have that election, defeat Tsvangirai by fair means or foul and create a
stalemate that would force a settlement that would allow them to regroup but with at least one foot in the state.

8.2.4 Bigwigs Rallies In Battleground Constituencies In 2013

As highlighted in previous chapters, Mugabe’s deputy Mujuru took on more rally work in 2013 than she did in 2008. The few bigwig visits (three visits to battleground constituencies but multiple rallies) that ZANU-PF staged in battleground constituencies and that are captured as part of this study were all presided over by Mujuru. The themes were similar to her campaign pitches in other constituency types, and followed on from the major themes from 2008, i.e. land reform, sanctions and shaming imperialists, as well as empowerment. The 2013 specific issues revolved around her blaming of the opposition for the limited progress of the GNU, as well as the mobilisation of chiefs through pleading for their respect and encouraging their involvement in ZANU-PF’s political activities. In addition, she mirrored Mugabe’s calls for peace, which appeared to be quite central to ZANU-PF given the costs of violence to its legitimacy, as seen in 2008. She asked voters in Goromonzi to be peaceful and urged co-existence across party lines. She encouraged ZANU-PF supporters to conduct non-coercive campaigns and urged them to “Tell those who support other parties what is good about ZANU-PF, its policies and its leadership and convince them to join our party without being violent” (Herald, 24 July, 2013)

In Goromonzi, where Mujuru staged three campaign rallies (Mungate Growth Point, Nyaure Clinic and Munyawiri secondary school) in one day on 23 July 2013, she continued her GNU bashing and blaming of the MDC Secretary general Tendai Biti for refusing to release funds for projects (Herald, 24 July, 2013). She urged voters to vote ZANU-PF from president to councillor, arguing that some of the challenges in Goromonzi had not been dealt with because of poor coordination and a communication breakdown between MDC-T councillors and their ZANU-PF members of parliament. In Mhondoro, she doubled down on this message, arguing that it had been difficult to achieve people’s goal during the GNU because, of different ideologies of political parties [ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations] in the inclusive Government. Instead of raising motions that help people in Parliament, it was all about disagreement and sometimes the House would adjourn after a few minutes (Herald, 26 July, 2013).
The blame game continued with Mujuru blaming the opposition’s “call” for sanctions for the collapse of the textile industry, which for many years had been the centre of production and productivity in Chegutu and Kadoma, the two towns closest to Mhondoro (Herald, 26 July, 2013). She pledged that Mugabe would resuscitate manufacturing industries and urged Mhondoro voters to reward Mugabe for his sacrifice.

He [Mugabe] has been called all sorts of names while defending you and me from the imperialists. His stance to defend the land and empower people through the indigenisation and economic empowerment programmes has angered some quarters, with some putting economic measures against us. Our leader remained steadfast and today we have prevailed over sanctions and doing things on our now (Herald, 26 July, 2013).

She buttressed this message by proclaiming the irreversibility of the land reform programme, not just because ZANU-PF said so, but also because

This is enshrined in the new Constitution and *pawakagara ndipapo hapana anokubvisa mumunda wako* [where you are now settled is fixed and yours. No one can come and remove you from the land]. The supreme law that we now have recognises what our war veterans fought for, and it also respects the custodians of that land, who are our traditional leaders. (Herald, 26 July, 2013)

The statement above points out key constituencies that Mujuru was mobilising and appealing to as part of her campaign efforts across the constituencies she visited, i.e. chiefs and war veterans. She argued that Tsvangirai and the opposition had no respect for either. “Instead of appreciating and honouring them for the work they do in various provinces, we have someone purporting to be a leader threatening the chiefs. This is unacceptable and our chiefs should not be moved by these empty threats”, Mujuru declared (Herald, 26 July, 2013).

At all of the rallies in question Mujuru also tried to deal with local challenges like water shortages. In Mashonaland West, at her rallies in Chegutu and Mhondoro, she blamed MDC local councils for failing to provide services and asked the voters to reclaim Chegutu West from the opposition. In Goromonzi, she placed the blame for the water shortages on the opposition, and suggested that Mugabe was committed to clean water provision but that some of the money that had initially been earmarked for this had been reallocated to food aid efforts (Herald, 24 July, 2013). She also pleaded for time on the longer term promises that ZANU-PF had made like empowerment, and asked voters to understand that
empowerment was not a one-off programme but a sustained effort at shifting the economic balance of power \((Herald, 24 July, 2013)\).

### 8.3 Ground Game: Strategies, Tactics And Opposition Competition In Goromonzi And Tsholotsho

The two constituencies covered in this section, Goromonzi North and Tsholotsho North, are both battleground constituencies in different parts of the country. Goromonzi West is located in the heart of Mashonaland, in Mashonaland East province, which has been largely characterised as a ZANU-PF stronghold province, while Tsholotsho North, about 400 miles away, is located in Matebeleland North province, which is perceived as an opposition stronghold province. While both are rural constituencies that enjoy a tremendous amount of influence from the major cities of Harare and Bulawayo and, in Tsholotsho’s case, even further afield, they are also different in various respects.

Goromonzi is located about 30 miles from Harare and is dominated by inhabitants of one form of Shona ethnicity or another. This proximity to Harare made it a commercial farming hub prior to the land reform process. Circa 2000, Goromonzi had an estimated 257 small- and large-scale commercial farms specialising in mainly livestock rearing, horticulture for the export market (Paprika, Soya, and flowers) as well as tobacco and maize. Prior to 2000, no land resettlement had taken place in Goromonzi, whose commercial value was protected and highly valued by the government \((Marongwe, 2009)\). However, post-2000, 243 of the 257 farms were gazetted for fast track land reform allocation. Suffice to say, a fair amount of land redistribution took place in the district during the Fast Track Land Reform Process (FTLRP). Marongwe (2011) points out that the vast majority of the beneficiaries in Goromonzi, especially on A2 farms, were people connected to ZANU-PF and the state, i.e. war veterans, party officials and civil servants – including those from the army, police and intelligence services - while peasants from the Goromonzi area, and some urban dwellers benefited from the allocation of at least 1,800 A1 farms \((Marongwe, 2011)\).\(^{21}\)

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\(^{21}\) As Marongwe (2011:1070) explains, under the Fast Track programme land was redistributed in terms of two main planning models: the A1 model involved small plots for household-based production, and the beneficiaries were to be the generality of the ‘landless’ population of Zimbabwe, while the A2 model involved the sub-division of large scale commercial farms into medium-sized farms, and was intended for would-be black or ‘indigenous’ commercial farmers.
redistribution exercise was presided over by the state in its various hues as part of the national land reform process, but Goromonzi was still left with large tracts of communal land under the province of chiefs and municipal land under the rural district council. The traditional leaders and the council, over time, saw the value of allocating land for housing purposes to desperate city dwellers looking for cheap accommodation and housing close enough to the city. As a former soldier and lifelong resident of Goromonzi who uncharacteristically supported the opposition shared during an interview, chiefs and councillors were selling land for residential purposes in Goromonzi for around USD 5,000 for 1000 square meters (T0403-Interview, 2018).

That land redistribution occurred in Goromonzi, and also that the community of Harare-Goromonzi commuters was increasing made for an interesting mix of residents in Goromonzi district in general, and Goromonzi North and West in particular. The proximity to the capital made it easy for some Goromonzi residents to work in the city, formally, or through informal trade, especially, in fresh vegetables, since the area is good for horticulture and market gardening activities to stem poverty. The poverty prevalence rate is estimated at about 62.4% for the rural part of the constituency, and about 41% for the urban Ruwa local board, which is also part of the Goromonzi North constituency (ZimStat, 2015). According to HMG0704, a traditional leader in Goromonzi, its proximity to the city means that Harare influences Goromonzi on a daily basis through people who work in the city, leading to city dynamics more than rural ones affecting the residents of Goromonzi, and partly informing their politics (HMG0704-Interview, 2018). However, as can be noted, the Goromonzi residents who commuted to Harare and or Marondera (another town close by) came in different political shades. They included high numbers of civil servants, security sector employees and war veterans who got farms and housing plots alongside other Goromonzi residents who plied their trades in the private and informal sectors, as well as civil servants who did not benefit from the land reform process but got housing plots from either chiefs or the local council.

Tsholotsho, on the other hand, is a bit further (about 72 miles) away from Zimbabwe’s second largest city, Bulawayo. It is home to predominantly Ndebele
ethnic groups (generally, but Kalanga, San, and Ndebele specifically). Poverty is rife and is estimated at about 89.3% (ZimStat, 2015). Most of its water is from underground sources/boreholes, with the prevalence of Kalahari sands (over 70% of the land area) making farming difficult but enhancing the possibility of animal rearing. Given the limited economic opportunities, livelihoods in Tsholotsho are sustained by a strong remittance economy from the diaspora, mainly South Africa. As one respondent, a shop owner at Efusini Business centre in Tsholotsho, explained during the field work for this study,

There are no young people here. Everyone has gone to Egoli [Johannesburg in South Africa]. If you go to South Africa, you pick a stone and throw it in a restaurant, you are bound to get a waitress or a waiter from Tsholotsho. The bulk of the youth of Tsholotsho they are there in South Africa. The moment children reach the age of seven here, they are taken by the Malaicha to join their parents in Joburg [Johannesburg], and the few who stay go to Bulawayo by the time they are 18 (SOE2112-Interview, 2017).

TS1612, a former opposition Matebeleland North province chairperson, added to SOE2112’s explanation, stating that because of the migration and the cultural and economic exchange between Tsholotsho and Johanessburg, the district in general is not influenced by Bulawayo or Harare, but by Johanessburg (TS1612-Interview, 2017). He explained further that, of all the districts in Matebeleland, the district with the highest levels of immigration to South Africa is Tsholotsho. It means Tsholotsho is influenced by South Africa, and when those guys come back for holidays, which they always do in large numbers to see their relatives, Tsholotsho turns into a South African township, and they talk politics. They sow the seeds, and they influence their communities on how they are supposed to vote (TS1612-Interview, 2017).

Tsholotsho is also widely reported to have suffered severely during the Gukurahundi massacres of the early 1980s. This, according to TS1612, also explains why “most of the vote from Tsholotsho is anti-ZANU PF. There are so many mass graves of the victims in there” (TS1612-Interview, 2017).

However, despite the general sentiment that Tsholotsho North is opposition territory, and Goromonzi North (located as it is in Mashonaland East) is ZANU-PF territory, their designation in this study, as battleground constituencies, shows

22 Malaicha are informal couriers who travel between Zimbabwe and South Africa. Besides smuggling goods between the two countries, they also engage in human trafficking. It is the latter that the statement refers to.
how dynamic and competitive both constituencies have been. According to the official election results, during the 2002 presidential election ZANU-PF actually carried Tsholotsho (Then one constituency) with a narrow margin of victory of about 3.36%, with only 749 votes separating Mugabe from Tsvangirai. In 2008, Simba Makoni led the vote in Tsholotsho North with 42% of the vote, while Tsvangirai trailed with about 29% and Mugabe had about 26% of the vote. In 2013, Tsvangirai carried Tsholotsho North with about 47% of the vote, while Mugabe trailed with about 38% of the vote, leading to a narrow margin of victory for Tsvangirai of about 9%. In all of the elections (2002, 2008 and 2013) the voter turnout in Tsholotsho North was very low (about 47% in 2002, about 33% in 2008, and 41% in 2013). In Goromonzi North, a similar tale unfolds. In 2002, Mugabe carried the consolidated Goromonzi constituency with a winning margin of 33%, but in 2008 Tsvangirai carried the new Goromonzi North constituency with a winning margin of 18.9%. Mugabe regained pole position in the constituency in 2013, winning it by a margin of about 11%, while the opposition regained pole position in 2018. The voter turnout in Goromonzi contrasted with that in Tsholotsho. It was about 54% in 2002, then 49% in 2008 before rising dramatically to 82% in 2013.

Clearly, based on the official election results, the two constituencies were much more competitive than the general perceptions imply. The next section looks into the kind of politics that played out at the local level in the presidential races, which could have assisted in making the political competition in the two constituencies as intense as it was in both similar and dissimilar ways.

8.3.1 Party Organisational Structures And The “Game Of Numbers” In Battleground Constituencies.

A recurring theme throughout all constituency types was ZANU-PF’s adept use of organisational structures as a way of mobilizing support for its candidates during elections. The battleground constituencies were no exceptions with minor variations to the rule. In Goromonzi North, CdeM0503, a member of ZANU-PF’s Chinyika district party structure in Goromonzi, confirmed that the organizational structures were a critical pipeline in the communication and execution of the campaign strategy in the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections, as directed by the Politburo –ZANU-PF’s Highest Decision-Making body. CdeM0503 stated that strategy was the domain of the national leadership but was handed down to provincial executives, district structures, branches and eventually cell structures.
The communication of strategy followed a strict command and obey process through these organizational structures, which, CdeM0503 stated, seldom changed in between or during elections, but were constantly audited with any gaps being filled ahead of elections (CdeM0503-Interview, 2018).

According to CdeM0503, the auditing and gap-filling processes usually occurred after the official intensive voter registration to ensure that cells were intact and determine the number of party supporters. Because Zimbabwe’s electoral legislation (Zimbabwe Electoral Act of 2008 Section 17A, Chapter 2:13 amended in 2013 to move registration responsibilities from the Registrar General to the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, ZEC) allowed for continuous voluntary voter registration through the Registrar of Voters or Registrar General in both 2008 and 2013, CdeM0503 presumably meant that the restructuring occurred before the proclamation of the election dates. While the registration process was a continuous or rolling process at law, voters who registered after the proclamation of the election day could not vote in the impending election but would be registered for future ones. In both 2008 and 2013, Mugabe proclaimed the election dates, prior to which the dates were a closely guarded ZANU-PF secret (Lewanika, 2012; 2013). Anyhow, the point that CdeM0503 was driving at was that during elections ZANU-PF plays the game of Numbers. Registration of prospective voters is a strategy, including assisting with the process for party members or supporters to avoid the hustles of queuing at registration centres through registering in the village with the cell chairperson. The cell chair, who is usually a traditional leader, chief or sabhuku, can take up the names to the district for easy registration (CdeM0503-Interview, 2018).

CdeM0503’s assertions regarding the numbers game bring out three critical things related to ZANU-PF’s election campaign efforts and the electoral process in general. First, they assist us to understand a bit more the arguments around urban voter suppression made on the strength of more people being registered in rural than urban areas in terms of the proportion of eligible voters. Some of the reasons for this discrepancy obviously have to do with deployment of resources and registration centres across the country, which is usually skewed towards rural areas, as well as possibly voter inflation. But CdeM0503’s statement also shows that part of this mismatch in voter proportions between rural and urban areas is because in rural areas, voter registration is facilitated with very few hustles as
long as the potential voter is a registered cell member of ZANU-PF. Registration takes place from the convenience of the home or village, whereas in urban centres, where ZANU-PF’s structures are few and generally weaker, and there are no traditional leaders, people have to go to registration centres, and endure queues and bureaucracy, in addition to registration requirements like proof of residency, which are more stringent on urban dwellers who do not own property than rural folk whose proof of residency can be a note or nod from the traditional leader.

Second, CdeM0503’s statement shows how, in the 2008 and 2013 elections, the district committees and district coordinating committees (DCCs) were the most critical organ of the party regarding campaign coordination at the constituency level starting from the registration process. In Goromonzi North, ZANU-PF ensured that each village had a cell of no less than 50 people; some villages had more than one cell and up to five cells and thus constituted branches. These cells, led by a seven-member executive or leadership (Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer, Security plus two Committee members), were responsible for collating data on both ZANU-PF members and potential voters and transmitting this to the authorities responsible for voter registration. They were also responsible for transmitting the same information to ZANU-PF as part of both informing the party about its potential vote haul, and presumably where the numbers were insufficient, informing the party’s strategy on attracting more support. In rural Zimbabwe, including Goromonzi North, the latter was seldom required because registering as a cell member, besides facilitating registration and affirming support for ZANU-PF, had other perks associated with it, as shown in Chapter 5, like access to food aid, farming implements, land, and ZANU-PF facilitated employment. This access was often moderated by ZANU-PF local leadership, including traditional leaders. This is the third thing that CdeM0503’s statement points out, and it will be dealt with in more detail below.

CdeS0503, a colleague of CdeM0503 in the ZANU-PF leadership in Goromonzi, Chinyika district, stated that regarding campaign strategy implementation and communication, the district and its leadership structure were the nerve centre and hardest working arm of the party because of their horizontal connecting role between the “top leadership”, i.e. provincial and national levels (central

23 This structure was replicated at branch and district level where a District Coordinator, an employee of the party, was responsible for inter district coordination after the banning in ZANU-PF of District Coordinating Committees.
Committee and Politburo), and downwards to branches and cells (CdeS0305-Interview, 2018). The district structures, according to CdeS0503, were the “real implementation centre of what the party would have decided on and sometimes morphed into inter-district platforms to ensure uniform sharing of information and strategy to avoid information asymmetries because the idea is to have one broad strategy across the province, and where possible across the country” (CdeS0305-Interview, 2018).

CdeS0503’s assertions about uniformity of strategy, and his articulation of the communication pipeline, show how ZANU-PF, during the elections in question, attempted to have a unitary party that marched to the same beat. Specifically, for battleground constituencies, these assertions assist in making this chapter’s argument that battleground constituencies were neither seen nor treated as a special type of campaign target requiring a bespoke strategy. Rather, the battleground constituency campaign strategy was largely dependent on impressions of whether they were ZANU-PF or opposition constituencies, and also determined by their specific geographic location. In this case, Goromonzi North, while being a battleground constituency in terms of this thesis’ characterization, was largely subjected to the strategy that applied to Mashonaland East as a ZANU-PF stronghold province, a province that ZANU-PF considered theirs and thus subjected to the kind of organization and strategies shown in Chapter 5. The foregoing also makes clear that although a general line of march was declared by the ZANU-PF politburo, provincial, and sometimes constituency, peculiarities and idiosyncrasies determined the nature and form of organization and mobilization for presidential election campaigns on the ground. The fact that in Tsholotsho, another battleground constituency, ZANU-PF operated differently, lends traction to this argument, as I will now outline.

In Tsholotsho, the talk of ZANU-PF structures and their use as part of the central ways in which ZANU-PF ‘campaigned’ or went after votes is much more muted. By most accounts from interviews conducted in Tsholotsho with ZANU-PF, MDC, and ordinary community members, ZANU-PF’s structures in Tsholotsho had always been very weak. A survey of parliamentary election results shows that after the advent of the MDC in 1999, Tsholotsho did not have a ZANU-PF Member of Parliament until 2013 for Tsholotsho South and 2014 in Tsholotsho North. Prior to this, in Tsholotsho North, the MDC had represented the constituency in 2000, and had then lost it to Professor Jonathan Moyo, who ran
as an independent candidate. Jonathan Moyo retained the seat again as an independent in 2008 but the MDC-T’s Roseline Sipepa Nkomo won it in 2013. Nkomo, while not originally from Tsholotsho, had strong connections in the constituency as she was married to the MDC-T Minister of Water Resources during the GNU, Samuel Sipepa Nkomo, who in turn was brother to ZANU-PF National Chairperson during the 2008 elections, John Landa Nkomo. Nonetheless, the pendulum in the electoral outcomes in Tsholotsho’s parliamentary contests is mirrored in the presidential election results, as shown in above.

The perceptions and reality of the ‘weaknesses of ZANU-PF’s organizational structures in Tsholotsho did not stem only from the electoral reality, as outlined above, but also from the weakness of ZANU-PF as a brand in Tsholotsho on account of Gukurahundi. According to a former proportional representation female Member of the House of Assembly for Matebeleland North province, who came from Tsholotsho, MP-SL1312:

People in Tsholotsho North generally do not support ZANU-PF. Jonathan Moyo did well when he did because he stood alone. This is because of the history of Gukurahundi in Tsholotsho. There are many mass graves and histories of displacements from that era which makes the constituency tough for ZANU-PF even when they intimidate people. People are not afraid as they have gone through the worst of politically motivated violence, intimidation and persecution. That is why the MDC has always won (MP-SL1312-Interview, 2017).

As already shown above the MDC had not always won in Tsholotsho, but more importantly, the perceptions and reality of ZANU-PF’s weak formal party organizational structures, as well as its battered image in Tsholotsho, spurred ZANU-PF to employ other organizational strategies and tactics as part of its campaign effort in the constituency. It employed two primary strategies, i.e. creating alternative organizational structures, and using famous “sons” of the district to campaign in a lower form of the bigwig visits. The creation of alternative organizational structures took two forms, i.e. the creation of parallel organizing structures at ward level, and the use of an existing network of highly mobile couriers, the Malaicha. Regarding the first, creating alternative ward structures, a former ZANU-PF District Coordinating Committee Chairperson, who also served as a Senator for Tsholotsho, Sen-GA1312, accepted that the structures in Tsholotsho were generally weak, such that ZANU-PF, through the
leadership and coordination of Jonathan Moyo in Tsholotsho North, had to develop an alternative structure for campaign purposes. Sen-GA1312 stated that:

To improve our chances of winning in 2013, Jonathan and I had to establish what we called the Groups of 40 (G40) which operated at every ward campaigning for Councillor, MP, senator and President. The G40s would go from door to door distributing campaign materials. These G40s were coordinated constituency wide by another team also of 40, which coordinated the campaign activity in the constituency (Sen-GA1312-Interview, 2017).  

Regarding the second element, ZANU-PF also made extensive use of the illegal traffickers, *Malaicha*, who had an extensive network throughout Tsholotsho and were quiet mobile spreading information and mobilizing for ZANU-PF even as they made deliveries of remittances and groceries from South Africa and collected people and goods for transport to South Africa. According to one of the MDC-T’s campaign managers in Tsholotsho for 2008 and 2013, CMT2112, the *Malaicha* were coordinated from the Efusini business centre by a local businessman identified as Esau. According to CMT2112:

> Esau’s *Malaicha* network could reach everywhere, while the MDC only had two vehicles. Jonathan Moyo, while charismatic in English and on matters of national importance, did not have as much impact on the ground in Tsholotsho, and was not as charismatic in the vernacular language. But him and Mugabe’s efforts in Tsholotsho were well served by a well-coordinated team on the ground, especially the *Malaicha* network (CMT2112-Interview, 2017)

Nonetheless, this great organization on the ground in Tsholotsho was not enough in 2008 and 2013 to deliver vote leads for ZANU-PF in Tsholotsho, although Jonathan Moyo himself had been a two-time Member of the House of Assembly for the constituency, in 2005 and 2008. In both of these elections he had run as an independent candidate, and in 2008 he had the explicit support of the MDC-T, which did not field a candidate against him, after being expelled from ZANU-PF in 2004. Moyo was one of the senior party leaders who had plotted, at a prize giving ceremony at Dinyane school in Tsholotsho, to sponsor Emmerson Mnangagwa as a vice presidential candidate in ZANU-PF’s 2004 congress and

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24 Coincidently, Jonathan Moyo would, in 2017, be expelled from ZANU-PF again and forced into exile for being part of a “cabal” called G40 (Generation 40), a faction of ZANU-PF that promoted itself as younger, politically savvy, and well-educated, which pitted itself against the Lacoste faction led by eventual president Emmerson Mnangagwa. Jonathan Moyo and his colleagues however insisted that the G40 as a faction was a media creation that was non-existent in real life (see Tendi, 2019 on the motivations and dynamics of the coup that toppled Robert Mugabe in 2017)
an eventual successor to Mugabe, against Mugabe’s wishes, in what became popularly known as the Tsholotsho declaration.\textsuperscript{25} After winning in 2008 as an independent, Moyo made his lot with ZANU-PF, successfully negotiating readmission into the party, and leading its national campaign and writing its Manifesto for the 2013 election.

According to some in Tsholotsho, the national responsibilities that Moyo carried out astutely, as can be seen from the national election results in 2013 and his appointment as a non-constituency Member of Parliament and Minister by Mugabe in 2013, contributed to ZANU-PF’s weakness in Tsholotsho, since the person who was supposed to lead the charge, Moyo, was “complacent as the sitting MP, and spent his time doing ZANU-PF national duties in Harare” (CMT2112-Interview, 2017). This view is interesting when it is juxtaposed with other assertions from Tsholotsho that credit Jonathan Moyo’s success as an independent to the “development” that he had been able to bring to Tsholotsho between 2000 and 2004, when Mugabe first appointed him as a non-constituency member of parliament and Minister of Information. During this period, Moyo led the assault on fundamental civil liberties and is credited with penning draconian pieces of legislation in 2001, including the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). These pieces of legislation were the lament of the opposition and civil society ahead of both the 2008 and 2013 elections because of their restrictions on assembly through allowing the police to ban meetings including rallies as well as their partisan control of the information market through AIPPA. Nonetheless, even though Moyo carried out these national duties between 2000 and 2004, in Tsholotscho he was hailed as a hero. According to TS1612, the MDC-T provincial leader in Matebeleland North cited earlier,

> People of Tsholotsho had faith in Jonathan, that he was the most educated man coming from their district, that he was dynamic, independent, and because he had managed to put a GMB [Grain Marketing Board] in Tsholotsho and to tar some 20km of road. So, they expected that if they put him again as MP, they were going to have more development in Tsholotsho (TS1612-Interview, 2017).

If TS1612’s assessment is correct, it could account for why Mugabe did slightly better than Tsvangirai in the 2002 presidential election, why ZANU struggled in

\textsuperscript{25} Both Tsholotsho North constituency and Jonathan Moyo are prominent in contemporary Zimbabwean political history because of this so-called Tsholotsho debacle, which was the first brave attempt at dealing with the succession question in ZANU-PF.
2008 when there were no new developments, and why Tsvangirai did better in 2013, when, as I will show below, his champions facilitated some “development” in the constituency. In TS1612’s assessment, a lot of people in Tsholotsho were disappointed because no further development came to Tsholotsho, perhaps in part because Moyo no longer had a ministerial position and could not leverage resources well as an independent and later as a ZANU-PF strategist with no formal foothold in the inclusive government between 2009 and 2013. This foothold in government was something that the opposition had, to the benefit of Tsholotsho, as I will show in the next section.

The second strategy that ZANU-PF used in Tsholotsho to mitigate the perceived and real organizational structural weaknesses of the party was the deployment of successful sons of the district, local bigwigs, back to Tsholotsho to aid its campaign efforts through visits. MP-SL1312 noted that:

In Tsholotsho ZANU-PF has tried to drum up support through using regional bigwigs or heavyweights to mobilize support. In the past those who have conducted rallies have included Cain Mathema [Tsholotsho MP between 1990 and 2000 and Governor of Matebeleland North], John Landa Nkomo [Tsholotsho’s first post-independence MP and ZANU-PF National Chairperson], Jacob Mudenda [Former Matebeleland North resident Minister (1984) and governor] and Jonathan Moyo (MP-SL1312-Interview, 2017).

MP-SL1312 also added that Mugabe’s visit had been for nothing” because ZANU-PF did not get a lot of support at either the presidential or parliamentary level, was probably on the strength of the persuasion of the heavyweights. This approach made sense given the tremendous amount of influence that “sons and daughters” of Tsholotsho who were no longer staying there have on the constituency when they do come to visit, as noted earlier (TS1612-Interview, 2017). While this appeared to be a good strategy, part of the challenge of deploying these regional bigwigs was that for some in Tsholotsho they were not in touch with issues of local relevance, and as such came carrying a national message, especially around land and indigenization (SOE2112-Interview, 2017). However, even as the former senator for the area, Sen-GA1312 noted, these messages were not resonant because

Tsholotsho is largely a communal area, formerly part of Umguza district. There was no land reform in Tsholotsho, no farms in Tsholotsho, and any beneficiaries of the land reform process in Tsholotsho had mainly relocated
to Umguza and Nyama Ndlovhu where they had been allocated land (Sen-GA1312-Interview, 2017).

The above reality also meant that Mugabe’s message, when he visited Tsholotsho in 2008 and preached about not leaving until the land question was resolved and legacy issues around safeguarding land, sovereignty and independence, would have been dissonant in Tsholotsho (Chronicle, 20 June, 2008). This was different from Goromonzi North, which had benefitted from the land reform as a constituency, and where a significant number of beneficiaries were domiciled in the constituency. Yet still in Tsholotsho, while acknowledging the deficiencies of the message and avoiding overemphasizing the land issue, campaigns at a local level were still informed by and revolved “around the national message notched on 100% total empowerment and indigenization” (Sen-GA1312-Interview, 2017).

According to SOE2112, a Tsholotsho based shop owner, “ZANU-PF didn’t know how to talk to people nicely, and instead tried to use intimidation & partisan distribution of resources, which backfired” (CdeS0305-Interview, 2018). Sen-GA1312 informed me that he had advised that food relief should be given to all people and then votes should be asked for later, but this was not followed, leading to the erosion of ZANU-PF’s support in Tsholotsho North (Sen-GA1312-Interview, 2017). It is this element around patronage distribution and its differential application in Goromonzi and Tsholotsho as part of the presidential election campaigns in 2008 and 2013 that this chapter now turns to.

8.3.2 Turn Out Buying And Vote-Buying Across The Partisan Political Divide.

The subnational politics of the 2008 and 2013 elections in Tsholotsho and Goromonzi followed familiar terrain regarding partisan/patronage distribution of goodies in exchange for electoral support. In 2008 this phenomenon was fairly similar for both constituencies with reports of ZANU-PF using grain, fertilizers, farming inputs, livestock and secondhand clothes, torches, and party regalia as gifts to the electorate in both constituencies. This was in addition to the establishment in both constituencies of Basic Commodity Supply Intervention Facility (BACOSI) shops through which residents were supposed to access basic commodities at subsidized prices.

In both constituencies the distribution of these various goods took a clear partisan turn. A traditional leader, headman HMG0704, shared that ZANU-PF distributed
food and inputs in Goromonzi, but this was usually done in a way that was not fair because “there are a number of former soldiers who have settled in Goromonzi, especially in the resettlement areas where support and command bases were set up ahead of elections in 2008, and these tend[ed] to benefit more than anyone else” (HMG0704-Interview, 2018). In Tsholotsho in 2008, Mugabe opened a BACOSI store, but this was viewed as tokenistic. Other food distribution efforts were steeped in scandal as members of ZANU-PF structures and campaign team were accused of corruption and theft. The situation caused some serious rifts within the party structures, and “eventually ZANU-PF meetings had to be held at Ward Centres to avoid theft, and establish neutrality in distributing campaign materials, food stuffs and grain as well as inputs” (Sen-GA1312-Interview, 2017).

Outside of the general distribution of the above-mentioned products, which took place in a partisan fashion, according to MP-SL1312, in Tsholotsho “Jonathan Moyo upped the stakes. He would have community gigs where he would slaughter even 5 cows and bring in a tanker from Ingwebu [this was some type of local opaque beer from a Bulawayo based brewery] for inter-ward and ZANU-PF inter Districts meetings, stating that these were gifts from ZANU-PF’s president and himself” (MP-SL1312-Interview, 2017). This was especially the case in June and July 2013, when Jonathan Moyo allegedly became “pretty much stationed in Tsholotscho and slaughtered over 25 cows - one every two days - which were used to feed people at meetings and campaign events” (CMT2112-Interview, 2017). All of this largesse, according to Sen-GA1312, was facilitated by Jonathan Moyo’s access to state resources and financial contributions from his allies in the military and other ZANU-PF officials (Sen-GA1312-Interview, 2017). This additional element, which was meant to win over voters in ZANU-PF’s favour, did not yield the desired results. Part of the reason why possibly lies in the fact that ZANU-PF faced a formidable opposition challenge in conducting this kind of politics in Tsholotsho, because the opposition was also engaging in similar politics. As CMT2112, the MDC-T campaign manager in Tsholotsho, explained,

Our campaign to win over Tsholotsho started quite early in 2011 because by this time it was clear that Jonathan Moyo had betrayed us and was heading back to ZANU-PF even though we had campaigned for him. We identified members at ward level and built teams of women, youths and men to identify projects they wanted to do. 20 women wanted to do chicken feeding, Youths wanted soccer teams, and most villages had serious clean
water challenges because as you know Tsholotsho is semidry. So we went around building and repairing boreholes, sponsored the chicken projects, provided proper breakfast and lunches for school kids, bought soccer kits and balls, and sponsored some goat rearing projects under the Common Danga [kraal] project in most villages (CMT2112-Interview, 2017).

According to CMT2112, the opposition continued to sponsor most of these projects up until the elections in 2013 and used meetings to discuss the progress of the projects as part of their mobilization and organisation building exercises. The difference between what the opposition and ZANU-PF did was, first, that the opposition did not discriminate politically. Anyone who wanted and asked for support would get it, and some of the efforts were party blind like the bore holes, the common kraals and the children’s feeding schemes. Second, these efforts, while clearly politically calculated, were more sustainable and people felt that they owned the projects. CMT2112 explained that “we would encourage people to go and drink Jonathan’s beer and eat his meat but remember their future and how a meal for a day would not guarantee meals in the future”. The opposition appeared to match and even outdo ZANU-PF in their efforts to instrumentalize community needs for political expedience. In addition, the borehole repair process was aided, not in the least by the fact that the spouse of the MDC-T parliamentary candidate in Tsholotsho was a cabinet minister responsible for water resources, and, by CMT2112’s admission, some resources from the ministry as well as the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) were used to assist some of their efforts (CMT2112-Interview, 2017). The use and abuse of state resources in Tsholotsho was therefore not the preserve of ZANU-PF because the shared incumbency in the state allowed the MDC-T to manipulate resources in aid of their political objectives.

In both Goromonzi North and Tsholotsho North vote buying appeared to be an accepted part of the electoral process. While the opposition was not implicated in this practice in Goromonzi, in Tsholotsho, ZANU-PF and the opposition appeared to be in a bidding war for constituents’ votes on the strength of what they could offer. From the evidence gathered in the two constituencies, it appears that in Goromonzi and Tsholotsho ZANU-PF distributed campaign material along the same lines that it did in ZANU-PF aligned constituencies, mainly to its

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26 During the GNU a fleet of all-terrain vehicles (4x4s), estimated to number about 200, was bought and given to JOMIC, which was constituted of all three parties in Parliament. The vehicles were used by JOMIC coordinators from across the political divide. These are amongst some of the resources that the parties took advantage of and used “illegally” to support their campaigns.
party faithful. The opposition appeared to have a more catholic approach to the distribution of its largesse. In this respect, the data suggests that more than buying votes, ZANU-PF’s efforts were aimed at rewarding party loyalty on the assumption that by virtue of being members of the party their votes were guaranteed. The opposition appears not to have had such illusions, and its distribution of resources and sponsorship of “projects” was aimed at “buying” votes. I argue that this was not out of profound strategic wisdom on the part of the opposition, but rather on account of the reality that the opposition did not have a stringent and well-established membership framework as ZANU-PF did. Ordinarily this could be perceived as a weakness because parties need members, but in this unusual case, working beyond and being oblivious to known members could have assisted the opposition to gain more support.

8.3.3 Traditional Leaders As (Willing) Accomplices To ZANU-PF’s Campaign Efforts In Battleground Constituencies.

In chapter 6, this thesis highlighted Mujuru’s courting of traditional leaders and how this acted as some kind of activation for their heavy involvement in ZANU-PF campaign activities in ZANU-PF aligned constituencies. This elevation and mobilization of traditional leaders was a theme that ran across constituency types during Mujuru’s visits, as shown above. However, these calls for respect for and activation of traditional leaders to act on behalf of ZANU-PF in electoral campaigns at the local level were received differently in different types of battleground constituencies.

In Goromonzi North, respondents from ZANU-PF and the MDC, as well as traditional leaders themselves, confirmed that chiefs, headman and kraal heads had huge roles to play in ZANU-PF’s campaign efforts on the ground. In fact, traditional authorities were part of ZANU-PF’s organizational structures and kraal heads invariably chaired all of ZANU-PF’s cell party structures in Goromonzi North, and “in instances where the village had more than one cell or was a branch these were chaired by the Sabhuku/Headman” (CdeS0305-Interview, 2018). However, although chiefs coordinated with ZANU-PF’s district structures, traditional leaders were not permitted to be part of the party structure above the cell and the branch level (CdeS0305-Interview, 2018). For anyone looking at ZANU-PF’s campaign infrastructure at a national or even provincial level, it would have been easy to miss the traditional leaders as part of the ZANU-PF formal machine because they would not have been there, and ZANU-PF’s
provincial leadership made sure through strict communications that this was the case (CdeS0305-Interview, 2018).

Most electoral stakeholders in Goromonzi North almost accepted the involvement of the traditional leaders in ZANU-PF’s structures as given, traditional and normal (GI-Majuru1004, 2018; HMG0704-Interview, 2018). Group discussions with opposition committees in Ward 16 and 17 of Goromonzi North revealed that while the opposition was not happy about this, they had learnt to live with this situation and looked forward to the day when the traditional leaders would service their party once it attained power. One of the participants, himself a brother of a local chief and high up in the line of succession, stated that:

I often argue with brother, chief X, because he uses our chieftaincy only to support the ruling party. He calls meetings under the guise of dealing with community issues, but once there, people are made to do ZANU-PF slogans. I often remind him that ushe madzoro [power is temporary and flirting] and that when ZANU-PF gets out of power he will have to serve a different master, or if he dies and I take over, I will serve a different master (GI1-Chinyika0904, 2018).

Headman HMG0704 affirmed this attitude and stated that while he tried to serve everyone across party lines because of the nature of the constituents in his village, ultimately, he was expected to serve ZANU-PF more and coordinate ZANU-PF activities in his village. He stated that what happened in his village regarding his role was the norm across Goromonzi (HMG0704-Interview, 2018). Headman HMG0704 also said that since becoming a headman he had not been side tracked from what was required of him, in part because his own brother was a former member of parliament and diplomat, and also because the consequences were too ghastly to contemplate (HMG0704-Interview, 2018). In addition to convening local village and ZANU-PF meetings, traditional leaders were also expected to deliver the votes of their subjects. In Goromonzi North, this role was codenamed “Operation bereka mwana iyeve” [Operation carry that child (on your back)] (CdeM0503-Interview, 2018). This operation was similar to the Dambawasara processes in Mount Darwin, covered in chapter 4. Operation bereka mwana iyeve conceptualized traditional leaders as local patriarchs or fathers of the village, who were responsible for their children (subjects) and had to ensure that they participated in ZANU-PF activities and went to the polls to vote for ZANU-PF, even if that meant carrying them on their backs. The accountability trail did not end with “carrying one’s subjects” to the polling booth; it extended to accounting
for voting preferences. For instance, in 2008, the opposition vote at one polling station at Goromonzzi high school was so high that the village head was summoned by the “president’s office” [members of the central intelligence organization] and asked to explain. The village headman recounted this incident as follows:

In 2008 Goromonzzi high school polling station was problematic because it voted opposition. I was asked by the president’s office to explain, and I told them that I was sure that my villagers had voted ZANU-PF but could not account for the teachers who fell outside my jurisdiction. Luckily my explanation was accepted, and in 2013 teachers were not allowed to vote at Goromonzzi high school; they were taken to other polling stations [as election officials] and the district administrator (DA) was fired and a new DA was brought to the area (HMG0704-Interview, 2018).

Opposition supporters in Goromonzzi testified that during the 2013 elections, village headmen had walked around the queues on polling day at various polling stations reminding people to vote for ZANU-PF (GI1-Chinyika0904, 2018). Any suspicions that one would not follow the suggestion to vote for ZANU-PF were met with sanctions from the traditional leaders. The power of the traditional leaders in rural Zimbabwe, as previously noted, was complete.

Some of the accounts noted in chapter 4 on ZANU-PF’s campaigns in ZACs demonstrated the violent aspects of the power of the traditional leaders who could leverage their association with ZANU-PF to mete out physical punishment to dissenters. Given the changing times, the traditional leaders themselves were not immune to physical violence if they turned out to be dissenters. Besides this physical violence, there were other forms of sanctions that the traditional leaders could mete out as part of their all-encompassing power, as Mamdani (2001) describes. If physical violence constituted traditional leaders’ hard power, in Goromonzzi, their soft power was characterized by one participant in a focus group discussion at Majuru growth point through the following illustration:

For you to survive in the area you have to be written in the small and big book [village registers kept by traditional leaders]. Non-compliance with the instructions of traditional leaders could lead to one being removed from the bhuku rasabhuku [the village headman’s register]. Being removed from the bhuku rasabhuku could lead to one losing their land, which was under the purview of the traditional leaders if you stayed in the village, and being automatically removed from accessing food, seed and other government
The constitutional roles and powers of the traditional leaders across the country are defined in Zimbabwe’s constitution. However, the conduct of the traditional leaders in Goromonzi North and Tsholotsho North brings out some interesting parallels and differences in how the traditional leaders carried out their formal and informal roles, the motivating factors for their conduct, and the way they used their formal and informal power during the 2008 and 2013 elections. In Tsholotsho, while there were press reports around chiefs being partisan, a number of election stakeholders across party lines believed that the local chiefs were, as expressed by an opposition member of parliament, “not involved in politics, not captured by ZANU PF or the opposition, not separatist in their approach, and fairly independent” (MP-SL1312-Interview, 2017). The chiefs themselves declared this relative impartiality “within limits” and one of the three chiefs interviewed for this study lambasted accusations from some in the opposition that they were partial to ZANU-PF. Chief12012 stated that,

The opposition press often attacks us first, for things that are outside of our control and second, from a preconceived and uninformed position. For instance, sometime in 2013 the Daily News and News Day reported that the chiefs in Tsholotsho summoned traditional leaders from the district and threatened them and bribed them with bicycles to support ZANU-PF’s campaign efforts. But this never happened. The truth is that Jonathan Moyo asked for a meeting with the traditional leaders to explain his party’s plans and share their vision for Tsholotsho. We obliged and brought in headmen for one-on-one encounters to share their problems and hear ZANU-PF’s plans. (Chief12012-Interview, 2017)

The above clarification was repeated by Chief22012, who added that they engaged equally with all parties but were not “in the business of chasing after parties”, and that the problem was that sometimes the opposition assumed that they were partisan and just did not approach or engage them (Chief22012-Interview, 2017). Chief22012 explained that ahead of elections falsehoods are unavoidable but the truth was that in the run-up to the 2013 election, the opposition appeared to have an anti-traditional chief position and made no effort to meet and or share their policies (Chief22012-Interview, 2017). The good reputation that the traditional leaders have in Tsholotsho appears to support the defence given by the two chiefs. In addition, the fact that I was given an audience by half of the chiefs in the area (three out of six and all of those presiding over
Tsholotsho North) and yet was relegated to interviewing the headman and kraal heads in other research sites speaks volumes about their accommodation. The MDC campaign manager for Tsholotsho, CMT2112, testified that at least during the 2013 election, there were little to no challenges engaging with traditional leaders. Chiefs were fairly impartial and allowed parties to do what they wanted to do. Maybe this was because Matebeleland chiefs are generally sceptical about ZANU-PF and different from chiefs elsewhere. They are not afraid of ZANU-PF and as you can see from the actions of Chief Matema, Chief Kayisa and Chief Ndiweni, they can stand up to ZANU-PF (CMT2112-Interview, 2017).

CMT2112 further stated that the MDC-T had a particularly good interlocutor in Mrs Nkomo, the parliamentary candidate, when it came to engage traditional leaders.

Mrs Nkomo excelled with traditional leaders and was a good ambassador for Tsvangirai and the party. She took advantage of her Malukazana status [Daughter in law], and used it to fit in, humbly and with the humility befitting of a daughter-in-law. She consulted the local headman and visited them with gifts. She went to see Chief Matuphula, who despite being young, she treated with deference and respect. She also used the issue of a homestead as an advantage, Jonathan Moyo did not have a homestead in Tsholotsho (CMT2112-Interview, 2017).

Despite the positive report card for the traditional leaders in Tsholotsho regarding non-interference with their subjects’ voting preferences, Chief12012 admitted that they were under tremendous pressure to toe the ZANU-PF line, and sometimes they had no choice but to do so. This is what he meant when he mentioned impartiality within limits. He stated in an interview that:

You have to understand our position as chiefs and traditional leaders. Those who represent us in senate have perks and benefits, other jurisdictions like civil and criminal courts, magistrates and so on have resources, yet the District Administrators’ office which supports chiefs doesn’t even have budgets for chiefs’ administrative purposes, and we are not salaried, but get a small allowance that traditional leaders generally do not. To achieve results, we end up having to rely on elected officials, and central government, who do not help out of benevolence but expect favours in return. So, when elections come, you are forced to work with and support those who have supported you. (Chief12012-Interview, 2017).
Chief12012, Chief22012, and Chief32112 were highly trained in various professions, and prior to assuming their chieftaincies on the deaths of their fathers had all been working professionally, either abroad or in other parts of Zimbabwe. They all explained the challenges of catering for a family at a particular standard, which their previous lives had entailed, on a chief’s allowance, and how this often forced them to compromise politically to facilitate scholarships for their children and other comforts for their families. Despite these social pressures, the traditional leaders at the highest level in Tsholotsho maintained the optics of non-partisanship and not being unjustly involved in the local politics of the presidential election races. There is little doubt that the traditional leaders in Goromonzi North were under similar social pressures, as well as political pressure, given the location of the constituency in a ZANU-PF “stronghold” province. Nonetheless, the ways in which the traditional leaders used their positions, power and privileges in relation to ZANU-PF’s local politics and electoral campaigns were different. In Tsholotsho the chiefs also had the additional burden of the history of Gukurahundi and how their subjects and their own families were seriously affected during the 1980s.

8.3.4 Coercion, Violence And Intimidation.

The coercive politics in battleground constituencies, as with other modes of “political” engagement highlighted above as part of ZANU-PF’s campaign efforts, mirrored what this thesis has already covered in previous chapters. Goromonzi North, typical of ZANU-PF operations in ZACs, had a fair amount of coercive politics at play, and was reminiscent of Mount Darwin. In Tsholotsho, the coercive politics were toned down for similar reasons to Bulawayo province’s Makokoba, Luveve and Lupane constituencies.

Various respondents from Goromonzi North provided accounts of a team and operation from the 2008 run-off period called “Capricorn”. Despite the pervasive references to it, respondents had different understandings of what it was. For instance, T0403 described Capricorn as a team of what he referred to as “bad people”, who, in 2008, moved around Goromonzi with guns intimidating people. T0403 recounted that in his area the Capricorn was led by a retired army major who would fire shots in the air to intimidate people (T0403-Interview, 2018). ZANU-PF insiders conceded that there had been coercion in Goromonzi during the 2008 run-off election period, and that the exercise was called “Operation Capricorn”. According to Cdes0305, the Zimbabwe National Army deployed
captains in the top districts, who in Chinyika were assisted by a ZANU-PF leader referred to as Mai Mudhara and war veterans. The captains and war veterans were reported as instructing, commandeering and forcing ordinary ZANU-PF party members to perpetrate acts of violence as part of operation capricon. (CdeS0305-Interview, 2018; CdeM0503-Interview, 2018).

These assertions from members of ZANU-PF could have been perpetrators covering their own backs on the strength of “following instructions”. In regard to opposition members in Goromonzi North, ZANU-PF members were responsible for carrying out egregious acts of violence in 2008, and intimidation in 2013 (GI-Majuru1004, 2018). While opposition members suspected some involvement of formal security sector members in violence, they squarely pointed the finger of blame at ZANU-PF members. This was despite that ZANU-PF members, in the main, tried to carry out some of the local acts of violence discreetly and in neighbouring rather than their own villages. Opposition supporters identified ZANU-PF supporters and war veterans like “Malaba, Marunguzhiike and Mrs Mudhara” as giving the directives for violence (GI-Majuru1004, 2018 and GI-Chinyika0904, 2018). The patterns of violence and intimidation, and their consequences in 2008 and 2013, mirrored those shown to have taken place in Mount Darwin. As T0403 recounted, remember that people were still affected by the 2008 violence, long-sleeved and short-sleeved, and where some houses were burnt, and businesses were closed. I remember many people like Joshua Marihwa who had to desert their homes and literally run to Ruwa [a small satellite town about mid-way, 20km between Harare and Goromonzi] on foot in the middle of the night because ZANU-PF was unleashing violence in Goromonzi. In 2013 people were told that if you don’t vote ZANU-PF the days of Capricorn will return. (T0403-Interview, 2018)

The implementation of violent politics in 2008 and intimidation in 2013 severely affected the ability of the opposition to campaign openly and of its members to be open in Goromonzi, due to fear. As headman HMG0704 stated, the net impact was that a few brave opposition members were left to campaign at growth points but not in the villages, and invariably ZANU-PF had more meetings and rallies than the opposition in different localities in the constituency (HMG0704-Interview, 2018). Although there was virtually no physical violence in 2013, and the intimidation was “not as bad as 2008. Most opposition activists did not want
to come out in the open for fear of reprisals and victimization, limiting their ability to campaign for their party.” (HMG0704-Interview, 2018)

In Tsholotsho North, some respondents reported that ZANU-PF did deploy some war veterans to the constituency in 2008, but the violence was “limited to a few incidents and virtually non-existent in 2013 (TS1612-Interview, 2017; MP-SL1312-Interview, 2017). Despite this limited violence, the impression was that ZANU-PF did not fare well in Tsholotsho because “People in Tsholotsho North generally do not support ZANU-PF, because of the history of Gukurahundi” with many mass graves and stories of displacements as a constant reminder of this period. On account of this history, like in other parts of Matebeleland, the people of Tsholotsho did not easily succumb to intimidation because they had already “gone through the worst of politically motivated violence, intimidation and persecution” (MP-SL1312-Interview, 2017).

8.4 Conclusion

This chapter outlined how ZANU-PF campaigned in battleground constituencies in 2008 and 2013. It showed that battleground constituencies were relatively deprived of bigwig campaign attention in both elections and explained that this was on account of battlegrounds not being a concept that was factored into ZANU-PF’s election campaign calculus. It argued that the ZANU-PF appeared to look at constituencies using a binary lens and, as a result, saw them as either ZANU-PF or opposition. As a result, although constituencies that meet the criteria for battleground constituencies exist, the concept is seldom applied in analysis and election campaign strategy formulation on the ground. While political agents across the political divide accepted that the politics in Goromonzi North and Tsholotsho North were extremely competitive, they seldom saw the constituencies as battleground constituencies. The overwhelming impression was that although the opposition had support, Goromonzi North was a ZANU-PF constituency, and that despite the close contests in Tsholotsho, it was an opposition constituency. For Tsholotsho, while it is true that the constituency was largely opposition leaning, the results of the electoral contests in 2008 and 2013 show that the allegiances to the opposition did not automatically flow to the MDC-T, with other opposition candidates also getting sizable proportions of support.
However, on the few occasions that bigwig visits took place in battleground constituencies, the campaign messages seemed to drift away from the hard hitting historical and ideological appeals, like those made in ZACs, as well as the sound programmatic appeals made in OACs, to a more sober attempt to address the immediate problems. This suggests that at a subliminal level, the ZANU-PF knew that in battleground constituencies rhetoric alone would not carry the day and it attempted to buttress it with the introduction of practical issues and solutions to people’s everyday problems.

The chapter also showed that while the kinds of politics at the subnational level in ZACs and OACs were fairly distinct, this distinction was less clear in battleground constituencies, which tended to mimic the modes of political activity of either their neighbours or the partisan constituency type that actors believed the constituency to be. In this respect, Goromonzi constituency tended to mimic the politics of Mashonaland East and central because of its geographic location as well as perceptions of it being a ZANU-PF constituency. Tsholotsho’s subnational politics mirrored the politics of the rest of Matebeleland, and campaigning was also informed by perceptions of it being an opposition constituency.

The two constituencies thus diverged on critical subnational campaign patterns, buttressing the first point that it appears that ZANU-PF did not have a specific election campaign strategy for battleground constituencies. ZANU-PF’s campaigning in Goromonzi North was certainly more oriented towards mobilizing its base, and opposition support was fairly suppressed and given limited room to manifest. Its campaigns in Tsholotsho North appeared to be more legitimacy seeking and entailed the adoption of fairly novel forms of organizing and chasing the vote on account of perceptions of a weaker ZANU-PF presence on the ground. In both constituencies patronage-based distribution of resources and campaign “gifts” was present, and accepted as critical element of the electioneering process, leading to some form of outbidding contest between ZANU-PF and the opposition. In Goromonzi North, ZANU-PF almost had a monopoly on this type of politics and used goodies as rewards for its members and enticements for further support. In Tsholotsho both ZANU-PF and the opposition deployed a patronage distribution of resources and attempted to buy people’s votes with consumables such as food and drink, as well as long term projects such as animal rearing. Another critical point of divergence relates to the
role of traditional leaders. In Goromonzi, the traditional elders were by and large captured and in the service of ZANU-PF both formally (through leadership at cell and branch level) and informally, while in Tsholotsho they appeared to keep a healthy distance from partisan politics. The use of violence also diverged, with it being used quite a lot and effectively in Goromonzi North, but not much and ineffectively in Tsholotsho South.
9 CONCLUSION

This dissertation presented a unique descriptive analysis of competitive authoritarian regimes by focusing on Zimbabwe’s ruling party, ZANU-PF as a case. It assessed ZANU-PF’s national and subnational campaign strategy during the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections and provided a detailed descriptive analysis of the campaign strategies. The dissertation used the detailed descriptive analysis to draw inferences on why ZANU-PF campaigned during the 2008 and 2013 presidential elections. Inferences, that can hopefully be used to study and compare with other competitive authoritarian regimes. The analysis presented in this thesis was based on the classification of constituencies into three broad types: ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies (ZACs), opposition-aligned constituencies (OACs), and battleground constituencies (BCs).

The study revealed a spatially and temporally variegated strategic logic to ZANU-PF’s campaigns centred around its need to preserve power and enhance its legitimacy. The thesis found that ZANU-PF pursued these goals by deploying a vote and turnout maximisation logic for itself. It also employed a vote and turnout minimisation strategy for its opponents. The thesis showed how ZANU-PF deployed combinations of seemingly competing strategies that included persuasion, intimidation, and clientelist inducements in varied proportions across space (constituency types) and time. It argued that ZANU-PF proved adept at learning and adjusting its campaign strategy-based election results from previous elections and geographic and political location and categorisation of constituencies. In this respect, contrary to popular analysis which suggests the unchanging nature of ZANU-PF and its reliance, as a competitive authoritarian regime, on force and fraud, this thesis built on an analysis showing that ZANU-PF changes its strategies across time and space. It specifically argued that ZANU-PF switched its campaign strategy from a predominantly persuasive mobilising strategy in March 2008 which focused on its core-constituents to a coercive strategy in June 2008. In 2013 it adopted predominantly persuasive and clientelist chasing strategy that focused more on unaligned and soft-core opposition voters, but without neglecting its base in ZACs. The thesis argued that the predominantly persuasive mobilisation strategy of March 2008 and the persuasive chasing strategy for the 2013 presidential election campaign showed that ZANU-PF cared about its legitimacy. In both elections it made identity-based legitimation appeals which were ideological, historical and programmatic. This showed that ZANU-
PF cared less about procedural legitimacy and more about traditional and identity-based legitimacy. Generally, the literature suggests that competitive authoritarian regimes rely on performance legitimacy to establish authoritarian bargains that sustain them in power. ZANU-PF in 2008, as in 2013 bucked this trend and insisted on identity-based claims to legitimacy more than any other. This finding has implications for theorising on legitimacy and legitimation along the lines of work by, for instance, von Soest & Grauvogel (2017). During the 2008 June presidential run-off “election” ZANU-PF’s interests on legitimacy were severely watered down as it used coercion to prolong its stay in power through force. However, during the 2013 elections, it added issues related to performance during the GNU and accented Mugabe’s history and achievements into its appeals while reiterating the identity-based appeals. This showed that ZANU-PF while still claiming legitimacy based on tradition was moving more towards performance-based claims to legitimacy as well as procedural legitimacy.

It undergirded this temporal change of national campaign strategy with spatially variegated subnational campaigns strategies based on constituency types. This predominantly involved coercive-clientelist mobilisation in ZANU-PF aligned constituencies across time, persuasive-clientelist chasing in opposition-aligned constituencies in 2013 after neglecting them in 2008 where it focused on clientelist mobilisation of its core-supporters there. The study found that ZANU-PF largely ignored battleground constituencies in terms of the national level campaign strategy, as well as allocation of bigwig visits. However, at subnational campaign level, ZANU-PF allowed battleground constituencies to follow territorial logics where strategy was determined by geographic location and the politics and strategies employed in the province or district in general. It also allowed battleground constituencies involved to deploy strategies incumbent on whether the constituency was perceived to be opposition or ruling party, making for a dynamic, sophisticated and often creative campaign strategy. However, ZANU-PF broadly employed persuasive-clientelist mobilisation strategies battleground constituencies.

9.1 Recap: Main Findings And Arguments

The thesis found that in 2008, the ruling party concentrated its campaign resources in ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies, where it held the highest proportion of bigwig rallies. At these rallies, members of the Praesidium touted
their performance legitimacy based on their land redistribution efforts. They made ideological and historical appeals designed to mobilise existing ZANU-PF supporters and to persuade them to turn out to vote in defence of the gains of the land redistribution efforts. To ensure support and obedience, ZANU-PF distributed clientelist emoluments to its supporters. It conducted violence and intimidation campaigns, often at night, designed to ensure that its supporters and any “converted” suspected opposition people kept their commitment to vote for ZANU-PF. In this regard, the thesis found that most violence and intimidation during the 2008 and 2013 elections was in ZANU-PF-aligned constituencies. The thesis argued that this betrayed a territorial logic of control. It reflected the party's wish to minimise the risk of low supporter turnout through a mobilising campaign strategy that focused, geographically, on ZANU-PF’s core-constituents. This strategy also reflected the party’s concern with identity-based claims to legitimacy based upon the party’s ‘foundational myths’ and perceived ‘traditional’ legitimacy as Zimbabwe’s liberation party. However, as is typical of legitimacy as defined by Weber’s (1978) traditional ideal type, minimal to no dissent was allowed. In ZACs, obedience and support were 'owed' to ZANU-PF.

In contrast with the intensive campaigning in ZACs in 2008, ZANU-PF limited its attention to opposition-aligned constituencies and battlegrounds. Historical and ideological appeals, as well as clientelist and coercive strategies by the ruling party, were initially conspicuous by their absence in opposition constituencies ahead of the March 2008 presidential election. ZANU-PF appeared to focus on maximising turnout among its members, who were a minority in these constituencies. They sought to create the impression for opposition supporters that the election was a fait accompli because ZANU-PF's triumph was obvious. It rewarded its supporters in these constituencies for their loyalty and made limited attempts to persuade new and swing voters or to convert opposition supporters into ZANU-PF supporters. In the main, this was consistent with the logic that ZANU-PF could clinch electoral success through targeting its core-constituents in ZACs, and through mobilising its supporters in other types of constituencies while discouraging opposition supporters from turning out on election day.

The thesis found that bigwig did not focus on battleground constituencies (BCs) in the March 2008 election. However, during the few visits made, Mugabe largely adopted the posture of a responsive performer, speaking to contemporary
economic and social challenges and how his government was addressing them. This approach spoke to a different type of legitimacy, one based on performance and an almost subliminal acceptance of the electoral procedure. This suggested a subordination to legal-rational process in pursuit of the express consent of the people, procedural, as well as political legitimacy.

However, the ruling party’s strategy spectacularly failed in March 2008, since Mugabe trailed Tsvangirai in the first-round presidential election and compelled a presidential run-off election in June 2008. Towards the June 2008 election, ZANU-PF minimised the risk of defeat by conducting a campaign of intense violence across all constituency types. Faced with the prospect of losing power in 2008, ZANU-PF decided to focus more on securing its foothold in the state and not on seeking legitimacy in the presidential run-off election.

Ahead of the presidential run-off election, at the few rallies it conducted, ZANU-PF resorted to historical and ideological appeals and the identity-based claims to legitimacy that had won it support in ZACs. However, this time, this strategy was spread across all constituency types and with a twist. Whereas in the run-up to the March 2008 presidential elections, these identity-based claims were made as appeals and meant to credential Mugabe and his party as the best candidates to lead, in June 2008, ZANU-PF did not make these as appeals. Instead, it recast them as claims to legitimacy in their own right and as the basis on which ZANU-PF would not accept anyone with a different history and alternative ideology to take over the state. History and ideology became the fuel behind ZANU-PF’s refusal to vacate power, even in the face of defeat. The party claimed legitimacy from "the barrel of the gun" foundational myth, and from legitimacy steeped not in procedure or performance but history, identity, and ideology.

Analysis of ZANU-PF campaign strategy over time revealed that despite the success of its coercion-based campaign in June 2008, ZANU-PF changed its campaign strategy in 2013. It relied on a persuasion-based campaign in 2013. It learned from its mistakes in 2008, and this time it concentrated its bigwig rallies in opposition-aligned constituencies where it made programmatic appeals and relied more heavily on clientelist inducements. The observed aspects of the 2013 strategy are consistent with a chasing campaign strategy. ZANU-PF sought to increase turnout for itself in opposition constituencies by winning the hearts and minds of unaligned and swing voters, as well as through an increase in turnout in
its core-constituencies. Overt physical violence was minimal, although intimidation was still rife in ZACs. I argued that this reflects the party’s continued concern with its legitimacy, but now also in opposition areas. Moreover, the party seemed to move beyond traditional legitimacy-seeking to embrace a more rational-legal and procedural legitimacy, in line with the modern-day prerequisites of political legitimacy.

Just like in 2008, in 2013 there was no evidence of a specific, tailored strategy pursued by ZANU-PF pursued in battleground constituencies. I argued that this reflects the polarised nature of Zimbabwe's political landscape: the party employs a binary classification of constituencies into either pro-ZANU-PF or pro-opposition types. As such, the campaign strategy in battleground constituencies followed from the geographic location. For instance, Goromonzi mimicked broader strategies employed in Mashonaland East province, which is perceived to be a ZANU-PF aligned province, while Tsholotsho followed trends in Matebeleland generally perceived to be anti-ZANU-PF and pro-opposition. Campaign strategy as such also followed the party's perceptions and categorisation of that location as either ZANU-PF or opposition. ZANU-PF applied the logic of territorial control to battleground constituencies which it perceived as ZANU-PF territory, like Goromonzi, complete with attendant clientelist inducements and intimidation. The political space was reasonably open, and the politics more persuasive, in battleground constituencies considered more opposition-aligned, like Tsholotsho. Here we saw signs of outbidding between the opposition and the ruling party, even in terms of the distribution of clientelist inducements. I argued that while this nuance is neglected in the literature on African politics and in election campaign discourse of ZANU-PF political agents, battleground constituencies represent a rich political canvas that can expose considerable variation in how presidential campaigns play out at subnational level.

Based upon the analysis presented in the chapters of this thesis, I challenged and qualified explanations of ZANU-PF's longevity that emphasise a part of the party’s history (i.e., the war of liberation), its authoritarian character, and its reliance on force and fraud to win elections. I argued for an approach to history that acknowledges ZANU-PF’s roots as a mass-based, popular party, existing in the emergent nationalist movement of the mid-1950s, complete with its democratic aspirations as well as its emergent, violent sub-culture. Such an
approach does not take away or negate extant historical explanations of ZANU-PF's coercive politics and its demonisation-of-all-opponents discourses. It does however make such analysis more complete and more accurate, nuanced and situated within in a proper periodisation of ZANU-PF's becoming the hardened ruling party that it was by the 2000s.

For a historical explanation to offer insights into ZANU-PF's post-independence existence as a competitive authoritarian party, the analysis must embrace the party's diversity, complexity, and change over time. That is, the analysis must take into account the diversity of characters, experiences, ideologies, and generations that made up the nationalist party and its metamorphosis into a liberation movement with a guerrilla army. It must also address ZANU-PF's status as a merger between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU, with their own armed wings, ZANLA and ZIPRA. This is in addition to their vast "armies" of citizen diplomats and support systems that looked out for their own material well-being, as well as lobbied internationally on their own and the party's (and the country's) behalf. This approach allows for a better understanding of ZANU-PF's apparent inherent contradiction between violence-dispensing and legitimacy-seeking, and the tensions within the party that lent it its hybrid character. The empirical strategy I employed in the thesis chapters offered a genetic explanation of why ZANU-PF campaigns varied over time and across space.

The analysis also suggested that understanding ZANU-PF requires that we see it as more than its violent past and its militant and authoritarian components even in the present. It was also a marriage of Sino-Russian ideological influences with liberal notions of freedom, an aspirational social-democratic front, a radical nationalist movement in constant conflict with a modernising ethos that had been part of the leadership's grooming and development process.

Regarding ZANU-PF's reliance on force and fraud, the thesis acknowledges the existence of force and provided evidence of this, and also acknowledged the possibilities of fraud in elections. I took electoral manipulation as given but argued that focusing on these elements is a narrow lens through which to understand ZANU-PF’s campaign strategies. I argued that ZANU-PF not only genuinely campaigned, but that it did so sometimes using persuasive, legitimacy-seeking methods. This means that regardless of the emphasis on force and fraud, election campaigns do matter in Zimbabwe. I demonstrate the latter point by
providing evidence showing that suggested ZANU-PF's campaign efforts and electoral outcomes in 2008 and 2013 are correlated. I argued that such a correlation was not fallacious - that is, there is a good reason to believe that campaigning to win the votes of citizens may have succeeded in some places.

9.2 Contributions: Theoretical And Empirical

This thesis contributes to several empirical and theoretical conversations in the African and comparative politics literature around election campaigns, political parties, and competitive authoritarian regime legitimation. It moves the conversation on authoritarian legitimation strategies forward. I do so through an analysis of campaign appeals, and the ruling party's claims to legitimacy. This gives the concept of "authoritarian legitimation" an empirical foundation, helping to move analysis beyond its philosophical and normative applications.

That ZANU-PF insisted on identity-based claims to legitimacy; i.e. history, foundational myths, ideology, and personalism, has implications for extant theorisation and systematic analysis of how authoritarian and competitive authoritarian regimes substantiate their claims to rule and or govern. Extant expectations are that out and out authoritarian regimes are the ones that bank on identity based and performance claims to legitimacy, while competitive authoritarian regimes bank on procedural, and performance claims to legitimacy (von Soest & Grauvogel, 2017; Schedler 2013).

This thesis, however, finds that obviously, not all competitive authoritarian regimes are the same, and refinement is required on the expectations of the legitimacy claims that regimes make. This entails being cognisant of the origins of political parties making the claims. This is because even democratic regimes which value procedure if they have strong foundational myths part of their claims should move from just procedure and performance to include identity-based claims. An example is the ANC in South Africa, which by most accounts is democratic although hegemonic, and has a rich liberation movement history. The ANC can campaign on performance and procedure but can and often does make claims steeped in its identity as the liberation movement that ended apartheid in South Africa. The same applies to several other regimes and parties highlighted in this study’s scope conditions.
Therefore, the hypotheses and descriptive inferences that the thesis puts forward have possible applications in other competitive authoritarian settings in sub-Saharan Africa. They are also open to further testing at a subnational level within Zimbabwe itself. The subnational comparison that is the centrepiece of this analysis of variation of campaign strategy showed different extents of aperture and closure across space. This part of the analysis contributes to conversations around subnational authoritarianism, which have not yet found much traction in Zimbabwe. Such conversations have also been muted in broader political science analysis of elections in Africa, given the enduring primacy of the country as the primary unit of analysis and the search for unit uniformity and country-level, cross-national comparisons.

The thesis also contributes to a growing literature that has begun to take electoral campaigns seriously in Africa. Existing literature acknowledges that for most of Sub-Saharan Africa, traditional rally intensive campaigns are still the order of the day (like Brierley & Kramon, 2018; Cheeseman & Lamar, 2015; Harowitz, 2016; Paget, 2019). This literature, while focusing on diverse campaign elements (e.g. ethnic mobilisation, campaign targeting, ground politics, clientelism, canvassing, messaging, rallies and opposition campaigns), is paving the way for much-needed analyses of electoral campaigning in sub-Saharan Africa. This study’s findings put it in direct conversation with general elections literature on campaign targeting (e.g. Potter & Olivella, 2015; Harowitz, 2016) and literature on incumbent parties’ electoral targeting based on spatial logics (e.g. Boone & Wahman, 2018, Koter, 2013b). It contributes a study of ZANU-PF’s spatial and temporal campaign logics into this theoretical discussion, focusing on the importance of rallies, itinerant leadership (bigwig visits to localities), campaign messaging, and appeals for legitimacy. These are topics that figure prominently in the global literature on parties and elections, but most remain underdeveloped in respect of their application to sub-Saharan Africa. These contributions and inputs into extant theoretical and empirical conversations are elaborated briefly below.

9.2.1 Electoral campaigns, rallies, & the increasing importance of bigwig rally analysis

Part of the challenge with studying electoral campaign strategy in Africa is the scarcity of literature. In part, this reflects the assumption in much of the scholarly literature that campaigns do not matter in Africa. The preference, in the main, is
to focus on how elections are shams, on parties' silence around programmatic and policy issues, and on incumbents' use of coercion and fraud. I agree with Paget (2019), who argues that most of the existing campaign literature is too focused on electoral campaigns in the West, and as such, speaks with a distinct Western accent. I endorse and operationalise Paget's classification of the "rally intensive campaign" as a distinctive type of campaign more suited to new democracies. While Paget measures campaign intensity in terms of numbers of rallies and rally attendees, in this thesis I focused on a different type of indicator of rally intensity. I coin the concept of "the bigwig rally," define it and, sketched out its dynamics, and use this as a proxy measure/indicator for campaign intensity. Developing and using bigwig rallies as a critical variable has, until now, not been used in studies of Zimbabwean politics and sub-Saharan Africa. As such its categorisation, characterisation, and profiling as a proxy for campaign intensity is an academic end in itself.

Where most analysis of Zimbabwean elections focuses either on national level processes and outcomes or on local level politics, bigwig rallies offer a layer of analysis that brings the two together. It explores this middle layer between the star and ordinary rallies, national and local campaigning, and the presidential candidate and the grassroots. As Paget (2019) argues, the rally in particular and in sub-Saharan African election campaigns (which are "rally intensive"), have been trivialised in the literature and made peripheral in the Western-centred approach to and categorisation of campaigns mentioned above. This thesis demonstrated that bigwig visits were an excellent indicator of the constituencies that ZANU-PF prioritised for vote maximisation and were (possibly) integral to ZANU-PF electoral fortunes and signalled which kinds of voters ZANU-PF targeted in its legitimacy-seeking appeals.

The study inferred intensity from bigwig rallies because bigwig visits to constituencies and districts naturally lead to heightened political and organisational activity in the locale visited. This stems from the effort that goes into the making of such rallies, which is complex and demands extraordinary effort to ensure that bigwig rallies are well attended by favourable audiences. Bigwig rally production is both a test of the popularity of the party and of the ability of the local leadership to mobilise participants and create a good impression of themselves to national leaders. Besides the increased investment in organising on the ground, bigwig visits also signal an increased investment in
clientelist handouts from both local notables and the visiting bigwigs. Bigwigs ordinarily do not travel empty-handed, and they are better placed to leverage the incumbency advantage to distribute campaign largesse.

The use of bigwig visits as a critical variable in this thesis also allowed the study to escape the dangers of over-generalisation and the "mean spirited-ness" usually associated with national unit analyses. It also allowed me to escape the parochialism of purely local (subnational) unit analysis. Local unit analysis is often disconnected and separated from broader developments at regional and national levels. My analytic strategy also allowed me to escape the usual, (although at times warranted) conflations of the party leader with the party, and the party with the state. By going beyond 'the' party leader to the party leadership, the study treated ZANU-PF as an organisation. It avoided treating the party leader as the personification of and a replacement for the party. It also treated ZANU-PF as more than its occupation of and conflation with the state or the regime and analysed it as a political party (without forgetting that it was a party which controlled the state and enjoyed attendant incumbency advantages).

Bigwig visits analysis can be replicated in other similar settings, and the casual mechanisms attributed to it are traceable. This approach may be able to shed light on other campaigns under competitive authoritarian regimes in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Comparable cases may include countries presided over by former liberation movements like Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, as well as Uganda and Rwanda, although their liberation movements were different in character and political moment to those of the aforementioned countries. Bigwig visit analysis can also be applied to other competitive authoritarian regimes which operate with the presidential system. In Southern Africa, this could include Malawi and Zambia. Further East, they could include Kenya, who’s ethnic and coalition politics would lend themselves to the study of visits beyond those of the presidential candidate, given that different coalition leaders would constitute discernible sets of bigwigs.

Bigwig visits should become a critical node for meaningful analysis of future presidential elections in Zimbabwe. Already, political developments in 2017 led to the establishment of a government where the president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, to all intents and purposes was appointed by his deputy, General Constantino Chiwenga, who as commander of the defence forces, led a coup to
depose Mugabe. During the 2018 elections both Mnangagwa and Chiwenga hit the campaign trail, and even in governing, it is more a partnership of equals making the deputy’s actions, pronouncements and claims to legitimacy critical to understand. However, outside this speculative importance of bigwigs, in the year 2023, Zimbabwe is constitutionally set to transition to a presidential election system which requires presidential candidates to pick a running mate. This American-style setup will mean that meaningful analysis of campaigning will need to follow the presidential candidates and their running mates, as well as small but critical sets of their surrogates. The slow rates of internet penetration, and the fact that despite the “hype”, social media continues to be an urban phenomenon, means that rallies will continue to be a critical feature of ground campaigning in Zimbabwe and other parts of Africa, at least for the next few electoral cycles.

9.2.2 Election campaign targeting

The study contributes to thinking around the power of itinerant (i.e. travelling around the country) leadership in competitive authoritarian settings and merges this with analyses of the targeting of campaign efforts. Zimbabwe is a multi-ethnic country, and the study of campaigning in Zimbabwe adds to the body of knowledge that seeks to go beyond ethnicity in understanding campaign targeting in sub-Saharan Africa. Ethnic targeting is the primary mode of campaign targeting that is explored in the literature on African countries. One often encounters exaggerated assumptions about the ethnic logic of campaigning in Africa (e.g. Harowitz, 2016 and Cheeseman & Lamar, 2015). While this may be close to the truth in some countries, in nations such as Zimbabwe where ethnicity is not a salient political organising principle, a different logic applies.

This thesis has described a logic to campaign targeting that is spatial. It is based on politically salient features of constituencies. These are defined here as incumbent strongholds, consolidating and marginal constituencies, i.e. incumbent-aligned constituencies; and opposition-strongholds, consolidating and marginal constituencies, i.e. opposition-aligned constituencies; as well battleground constituencies. Analysing campaign targeting logics in terms of constituency types moves the conversation beyond ethnicity and ties the analysis of election campaigning in Zimbabwe to analyses of campaigns elsewhere on the continent and beyond. For instance, Brierley & Kramon (2018) use a similar categorisation to study campaigning in Ghana's 2014 election. While their
findings differ from this studies (for instance they argue that incumbents do not campaign in their bulwarks because they would have invested in them enough during their tenure to warrant safety and allowing the incumbent party to focus on swing constituencies), the two studies of election campaigning become a bit more easier to compare. This kind of comparison through a targeting logic of campaigns based on politically salient features beyond ethnicity has the possibilities of pushing forward theorisation on campaigning in Africa or at least sharpen thinking around what accounts for the differences beyond location. This kind of analysis also recognises that ethnic targeting is not universal, while variation across constituency types based on electoral outcomes is arguably more universal. This approach allows for more significant comparative analysis in the future because these basic constituency types can be ascertained for any country. In future work, there is room for debates and refinement of the definitions and standardisation of what constitutes a stronghold, incumbent or opposition-aligned constituency, as well as swing or battleground constituency. This remains an open empirical and conceptual question. There is certainly scope in the future to incorporate socio-demographic variables in the definition of constituency types.

9.2.3 Some cause for pause on political parties in Africa

This thesis presents evidence on how ZANU-PF is structured, operates, and campaigns. As such, it pushes back on and calls for a recalibration of a significant tendency in African politics and third wave of democracy literature on political parties. Carothers (2006:4) christened this tendency “the standard lament of the parties in new and emerging democracies.” Carothers lamented that parties in emerging democracies were invariably corrupt, only active around elections, do not stand for anything, and party leaders were selfish and preoccupied with squabbling instead of governing the country (Carothers, 2006: 4). Van de Walle and Butler’s (1999:15) early work explicitly voiced this lament in the African context. They worried that African political parties were plagued by "weak organisations, low levels of institutionalisation, and weak links to the societies they are supposed to represent." The net effect of such analyses was to portray incumbent regimes in Africa as mainly patronage and clientelist electoral machines that were almost without agency outside the state, and that had little regard for distinguishable policy platforms. When they did have some semblance of policy platforms, these were judged to have little relevance to what politicians did once in office (Randall and Svasand, 2002: 10; Van de Walle and Butler 1999).
This thesis showed that this canonical lament is an ill-fitting description of ZANU-PF for three primary reasons. These are associated with time context, political party institutionalisation, and opposition bias in the analysis. First, as shown in Chapter 2, ZANU-PF's existence as a political party predated Huntington's (1991) third wave of democratisation, which acted as the fulcrum of analysis for most of the political parties' analysis referenced above. Huntington (1991) placed the start of the third wave of democratisation around 1974 with the Portuguese revolution and its demonstration effects on Spain and South America and traced the consequences for its colonies like Mozambique and Angola in Sub-Saharan Africa. The third wave of democratisation was supposed to have peaked shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 when a significant number of Eastern European countries were born as breakaway states from the Soviet Union and 'democratised.' ZANU-PF's formation in 1963 predates this "wave." ZANU-PF is not among the political parties that emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Second, ZANU-PF was not a “weak” organisation with poor ties to the communities it serviced. Neither was it poorly institutionalised, as Van de Walle and his colleague lamented. ZANU-PF's long history and its control of the state allowed it to establish itself as a strong political party (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001:461). By 2000, Zimbabwe's party system was relatively well institutionalised. It scored quite high on Kuenzi and Lambright's institutionalisation index, falling just short of full institutionalisation because of ZANU-PF's dominance in electoral contests (as the thesis showed in Chapter 3). Kuenzi & Lambright explained their surprising scoring as follows:

Although some might be surprised at this outcome, given the hegemonic nature of its party system, it is, in fact, the hegemonic nature of the leading party (ZANU-PF) which caused it to score so highly on our criteria. Not only has the ZANU-PF been in existence for a long time, but its role in the independence movement elicited the long-term loyalty of many (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001:462).

Outside ZANU-PF itself, Zimbabwe has enjoyed a long history of parties that have proved reasonably sustainable. The UANC existed at least from 1972 to circa 1985, ZAPU from 1961 to 1987 when it merged with ZANU-PF, ZANU (Ndonga) from about 1973 to the 2000s, ZUM, lasted long enough to contest in all the elections in the 1990s, while the MDC, in various formations, has stuck
around from 1999 to date. This state in which parties are stable, have roots in society, and possess strong organisations with the status and value of their own, is what (Mainwaring, 1999: 26) defined as party institutionalisation. It is a study in contrast to the "musical chairs" of political parties in many other African countries, including Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, and Ethiopia amongst others. However, in the African context, party institutionalisation is not unique to Zimbabwe. Tanzania's party system is reasonably institutionalised, as are party systems in South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana.

According to Mainwaring (1999), party institutionalisation is associated with low electoral volatility, and limited personalistic and neo-populist leadership. It is also associated with policy stability and better representation of popular sectoral interests. The case of ZANU-PF suggests that while Mainwaring's (1999) argument may apply to his empirical cases in South America, in Africa, the inverse may be true. In ZANU-PF's case, institutionalisation did not stem electoral volatility, and it still produced a personalistic neo-populist leader. ZANU-PF's governance was often characterised by policy inconsistency, and it suffered (post-2000) severe legitimacy deficits on account of its failure to acquire unquestioned popular consent. This raises again the question of whether all concepts developed for the study of political parties elsewhere can travel well to Africa.

Third, ZANU-PF was corrupt, and for some time in the 1990s, it appeared disconnected from the people (despite its political dominance), as could be seen in sliding voter turnout rates during this period. When placed in this temporal context, Carothers' lament makes sense. However, post-2000, ZANU-PF demonstrated that it was a master of the permanent campaign and attempted to stay in programmatic action and connected to rural peoples' social, economic, and political existence in between elections. This thesis also demonstrated that ZANU-PF stood for something. It was comfortable in its ideological straitjacket and revelled in its anti-imperialist and chimurenga ideologies. It used them as the basis on which it claimed patriotic citizenship and rights, including the right to govern the country.

Most accounts of African political parties consider them as ideologically vacuous and intent on collecting support on any grounds (catch-all parties) or through the manipulation of ethnic cleavages. ZANU-PF calls for a rethink of this stereotype
of African parties as ethnic parties. ZANU-PF is not the only party to break this mould, and exciting literature on politics in Ghana, Senegal, Namibia and other places is beginning to dispel the exaggerated view of ethnicity as an organising principle for all parties on the continent (Brierley & Kramon, 2018; Elischer, 2013; Koter, 2013a; 2013b). Even so, ethnicity remains a geographically circumscribed yet salient feature of politics in some parts of East Africa (e.g. Kenya and Ethiopia), and other places (e.g. Zambia). Also, although factional fights in ZANU-PF were present from inception (and came to ahead in 2017 as discussed in the prelude and chapters 2, and 5), and while ZANU-PF party leaders were indeed selfish, they cannot be accused of having been preoccupied with squabbling instead of governing. They governed, although poorly in the 1990s and 2000s.

Fourth, the thesis demonstrated that while ZANU-PF has been a governing party since 1980, its organisation and the imbrication of its organs and officials in almost all aspects of social, political and economic life demonstrates that it was more than just its conflation with the state. ZANU-PF was also a strong political party with the ability to organise outside the state. It demonstrated in 2013 that it could resort to organising outside the remit of the state. The conflation of party and state often leads political scientists to restrict their analysis to what ruling parties achieve on account of a genuine incumbency advantage, but often leaves out the agency that they demonstrate as political parties. This thesis deliberately deemphasised this "state" element to get into the "black box" of ZANU-PF as a party. It sought to understand its organisation, formal and informal structures, and how these were used in service to ZANU-PF’s interests of retaining power and enhancing its legitimacy through the vote and turnout maximisation.

For a long time the Africanists neglected political parties and when it covered them, it slanted towards opposition parties. This was a outcome of the time as civil society and opposition politics were fairly new phenomenon post the fall of the Berlin wall and the rise of the third wave of democracy. Van de Walle (2015:232) admits as much, when he states that the weaknesses of political parties that he and Buttler outlined in 1999 related mainly to opposition parties contesting authoritarian regimes. Van De Walle’s privileging of opposition political parties in the study of African political was not an exception and left a gap around the study of ruling parties, understood as political parties outside of their conflation with the state. The literature correctly suggested that incumbent
regimes survive in part on the strength of the incumbency advantage and the weakness of the opposition. However, the almost exclusive focus on these two elements inadvertently underplayed incumbent victories that are based on incumbent party strengths distinct from the powers they gain from how they carry and manipulate the state. This thesis follows a new track of scholarship on African political parties in filling the attendant gaps in our understanding of these political parties and their theorisation. This literature exemplified by Bogaards (2004;2009); Bogaards & Elisher (2016); Elischer (2013), LeBas (2019); Riedl (2013), and Morse (2012), amongst others have began to take dominant parties seriously and expanded our understanding of politics and political parties in Africa. This thesis speaks to and contributes to this new found understanding through showing that besides just chicanery, strong ruling parties can be flexible in terms of the instruments they use to shape, manipulate and affect election results through legitimacy-seeking in addition to nonlegitimacy seeking methods.
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