THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Politics of Population Change:

Three Papers Examining How Attitudes Towards Immigrants Influence Support for Restrictionist Policies & The Impact of Political Messages

Melissa Shannon

A thesis submitted to the Department of Social Policy of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London February 2019.

Declaration of Authorship

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work.

I declare that my thesis consists of 71,581 words

Table of Contents

List of Tables

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

I. Background: Growing Anxiety over Immigration

Globalization increased the ease of which individuals can move from one place to another, significantly impacting migration patterns and the national economies of sending and receiving countries. While new technological advances drastically improved the flow of trade for goods and services, these developments also allowed for a more fluid interchange of people and their cultural foundations. Over the last twenty-five years, the relative volume and changing composition of new immigrants has intensified the public focus on immigration as a major domestic policy concern in many industrialized nations (e.g. Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013; Joppke, 1999; McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Sides and Citrin, 2007). Despite contextual differences in the experiences with immigration native-born citizens across developed countries have expressed fears that immigrants dilute nation-state sovereignty and control over borders (Castles and Miller, 1998; Luedtke, 2005), challenge national identity (Smith, 2001), and pose a substantial economic threat (Hanson et al, 2007; Lau et al, 1997).

Within many industrialized democracies, policies are formed when groups identify social problems and pressure policy makers into action (Manning, 1985; Kingdon, 1995; May et al 2001; Stone, 2002). These problems are defined in terms such as symbols, numbers, causes, interests, and decisions, which are subjective and framed ambiguously to maximize support (Stone, 2002). The threat posed by inward migration has been constructed through each of these angles with the aim of triggering anxiety: that there are too many immigrants consuming too many public resources that they should never have had access to (Cohen, 2002; Citrin et al, 1997). Some researchers content that such frames help to cement support for restrictionist policies, in this case prohibiting access to social welfare provisions, by attributing blame to an 'undeserving' population; allowing policy makers to ignore the structural causes of poverty, historical factors, and

policy failures that perpetuate social exclusion (Gilens, 1999; Ryan, 1976; Sniderman and Carmines, 1997).

Alesina and Glaeser (2004) suggest that political entrepreneurs that have an interest in maintaining a lean welfare state can undermine social movements that call for stronger welfare provisions by exploiting racial and ethnic divisions on the issues of costs and scarcity of resources to block the formation of a common identity based on class concerns. The authors provide several U.S. based historical examples to strengthen their claim, highlighting the defeat of the Populists in the late 19th Century and the role of elite segregationist senators from southern states who attempted to thwart the New Deal provisions during the Great Depression.

Social rights, or access to the social safety net, embody one of the key principles of modern democratic governance: that citizens make personal financial sacrifices to ensure that all residents have access to basic necessities like food, education, housing and health care to bring all individuals in line with the standards of the society (Marshall, [1950] 1992). Yet, the perceived impact of immigration on social services has ignited a fierce debate and served as the impetus for a slew of policy initiatives aimed at prohibiting noncitizens from accessing public services in many democracies. In the wake of the Great Recession much of the political messaging related to the fiscal burden of immigration has been presented in tandem with, or as a distraction from large scale cuts to public services and government expenditures.

These calls to reduce the welfare state come as public programs struggle to keep pace with the demands of the native born population (Abraham, 2014; Collett, 2011). The added burden of budget constraints allows for migrant groups, who lack full access to political rights, to be singled out for social exclusion without the ability to raise politically viable opposition. This combination of circumstances raises concerns that further policies that erode welfare provisions or exclude other populations that previously had access are more likely to be passed. However, within a democracy

whether and the extent to which immigration impacts policy outcomes will depend on the immigration attitudes of the native-born population. The aim of this doctoral research is to narrow the gaps in our understanding of how public opinion about the foreign-born shapes preferences for punitive[1] policies directed at migrants. This chapter introduces the setting of the research, highlights the current gaps in this area, and provides a historical overview of restrictionist[2] policies linked to social welfare provisions.

II. The Setting

The number of foreign-born (both legal and unauthorized immigrants) living in the U.S. has doubled, from 20 million in 1990, to its current figure of nearly 45 million (United States Census Bureau, 2012; Lopez, Passel, and Rohal, 2015). The decision to immigrate to the U.S. is a complex and varied process with many factors, including labor market conditions, family reunification, and the perception of better opportunities (Massey, 1993). While there is an extensive body of literature that provides a rich field of theory aimed at explaining this phenomenon[3], the purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the trends of both the number and background of the foreign born population residing within the U.S.

---

[1] The term punitive is regularly used (see Wilson, 2001; Ybarra, et al, 2011) in the political science literature to refer to policies that limit the numbers of immigrants in the country, restrict access to services, limit access to the country itself, and other areas that may create different outcomes for immigrant communities. Further, an analysis by Filindra, Blanding and Call (2011) shows the detrimental effects of restrictionist policies on the health, well-being, and overall outcomes of immigrant populations and the communities in which they reside. They argue that this equates to a type of punishment, and define these policies as punitive. The terms punitive, anti-immigrant, hostile, and restrictionist will be used interchangeably throughout this work.

[2] Daniel Tichenor (2002) defines a restrictionist policy as one that seeks to exclude immigrant populations from entry, access to public services, or private markets. The terms restrictionist, anti-immigrant, hostile, and punitive will be used interchangeably throughout this work.

[3] For more detailed explanations on the push and pull factors and cumulative causes that spark unauthorised migration to the U.S. see: Durand and Massey, 1992; Espenshade, 1995; Massey, 1990, 1993.

Demographic Trends in the Foreign Born Population

The national origin for migrants has changed a great deal since the passage of the enactment of the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act. This piece of federal legislation, which is commonly referred to as the Hart-Celler Act, eliminated the traditional immigration preference system that accepted specific numbers of new migrants based on national origin; the new law prioritized admittances based primarily on family reunification and attracting skilled labor to the United States. Prior to 1960, more than 80 percent of the foreign born living in the U.S. were from Canada or Europe. Data from the Pew Research Center (2016) revealed that the remaining share hailed from Mexico (6 percent), South and East Asia (3.8 percent), other Latin American countries (3.5 percent) and other areas (2.7 percent). Fifty years later the sending countries for the U.S. immigrant population had completely transformed with Canadian and European migrants making up 13.6 percent, Mexicans having the largest share at 27.7 percent, but with Asian immigrants rapidly settling to account for 26.4 percent of all immigrants. Migrants from other Latin Americans countries represent at 23.9 percent of the total foreign born, and 8.3 percent settled to the U.S. from in another region.

Most migrants enter the U.S. legally, however, the proportion of unauthorized migrants has grown faster (61 percent) than the rest of the foreign born population (55 percent). The vast majority of unauthorized immigrants living within the United States were either granted admission legally and have overstayed the visa, or have entered into the country without legal documents (Passel, 2006). The number of unauthorized immigrant population living within the United States, roughly tripled from three million in 1980 to nearly 12 million at its peak in 2007 (Passel 2006; Passel and Cohn, 2011). This substantial growth began during the 1990s with 4.6 million arriving, and occurred in tandem with a net increase of 21 million jobs over this decade (Camarota, 2010).

Table 1.1: Estimated Changes in Foreign Born Populations: 1990-2017

	1990	2000	2010	2017
Total Population	249 million	281 million	308.7 million	324.8 million
Total Foreign Born Population	20 million	31 million	38.4 million	44.5 million
Percent of Foreign Born to Total Population	8.0%	11.0%	12.4%	13.7%
Estimated Unauthorized Migrant Population	3.5 million	8.4 million	11.2 million	10.7 million
Percent of Unauthorized Migrants to Total Population	1.4%	2.9%	3.6%	3.3%
Percent of Unauthorized Migrants to Foreign Born	18.7%	27.1%	29.2%	24.1%

Source: Estimates provided for the unauthorized population were calculated by the Pew Hispanic Center (2006, 2011, 2012, 2019). All figures are derived from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Surveys (CPS) from the US Census Bureau 1991, 2001, 2011, and 2017.

Note: Individuals living in group quarters (e.g. university dorms, nursing homes, or prisons) are excluded from all counts.

This growth in migration is likely to be felt by citizens in ways that differ from other realms of policy and therefore this might set help explain why the issue of immigration has become more salient in recent years (Arajano and Hajnal, 2017). Evidence suggests that individuals residing in communities that have experienced upward migration over the last two decades are more likely to support local ordinances that seek to make life difficult e.g. obtaining a rental lease, enrolling in schools, sending remittances outside the U.S. (Hopkins, 2010).

III. Framing the Message: Making Immigration a Priority Issue

In recent years, the public discourse and policy debates on immigrants have mainly centered on unauthorized immigrants (Massey and Pren, 2012). Scholars have provided evidence suggesting that an immigrant's legal status (or lack thereof) plays an

important role in shaping Americans' preferences for punitive policies (Brader et al, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012). The size of the foreign-born population, their dispersion into new localities across the U.S., the changes in the ethnic composition of the country, and this shift in the ethnic balance are thought to contribute to the formation of anti-immigrant views (Hopkins, 2010).

Immigration is hardly a new political concern within the U.S., but what is novel about this fresh wave of nativist sentiment is that elected officials, acting within all levels of government, are employing new tactics to address the perceived consequences of these demographic changes. Some politicians suggest that these new demographic shifts warrant re-examining the U.S. Constitution to prohibit birthright citizenship for the children of unauthorized migrants (Immigration Reform Law Institute, 2006) and implementing English-only ordinances in towns throughout the country (Preston, 2011) – they say these proposals directly reflect the will of their constituents. Survey data depict a clear trend that views about immigrants over the last twenty years are hardening, tracking well with the growth in the foreign born population. For example, a Roper poll from 1990 revealed that 48 percent of U.S. citizens wanted to reduce the number of new immigrants admitted, while data from the 1996 wave of the General Social Survey found that 67 percent of citizens favored tighter restrictions (Simon & Alexander, 1993; Wilson, 2001). A *Washington Post* poll from March 2013 illustrates natives' concerns, with more than 80 percent of respondents supporting tougher border controls.

More recently, those interested in the electoral success of candidates like Donald Trump in the U.S., Matteo Salvini in Italy, Viktor Orban in Hungary, Mariene La Pen in France, have started to examine long-term trends that link negative views about migrants to the high salience of immigration as a political issue. Certainly the rise of Donald Trump to the presidency, and the subsequent policies targeting immigrant – both legal and unauthorized populations – and large segments' of the electorate's ambivalence or

support of these shifts in policy – despite trends depicting a down-turn highlights the symbolic nature of immigration as a political issue (Gimpel, 2016; Citrin et al, 1997).

POLICY BACKGROUND

Analysis from several disciplines shows that restrictionist responses (hostile views and policy options) are a product of challenging circumstances, reflecting changes in economic and social conditions (Sniderman et al., 2004; Tichenor, 2002) as well as demographic change (Hopkins, 2010; Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017). Anti-immigration attitudes are strongly associated with national economic downturns (Lapinski et al., 1997). Scholars have not reached a consensus about the 'true' impact of immigration on the social safety net, nor do they agree on the perceived economic threat. Yet, Americans' knowledge of immigrant populations (Citrin and Sides, 2008; Wong, 2007) and the intracacies of the policies that regulate their numbers and access to the country and government funded programs (Delli Carpini et al, 1996; Gilens, 2001; Zaller, 2004) remain remarkably low.

Public Charge Exclusion & the Development of the Welfare State

Although immigration represents a fundamental element of the founding of the United States, from the country's inception policy makers have sought to control the public costs associated with immigration by implementing laws to limit entry to individuals deemed unable to maintain a household without additional support (e.g. parishes or local charities). These restrictions were and are still known as public charge exclusions, and early versions of these provisions pre-date the signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1776. For instance, the British colonies of Massachusetts and New York applied statutes as early as the 1640s that prohibited migrants who were thought to be "paupers or the infirm" from settling, unless it could be proven that the passenger

would not eventually become a burden on society (Baseler, 1998). By 1728 the colony of Pennsylvania established its own legislation, which excluded "any such infant, lunatick [sic], aged, maimed, impotent or vagrant person" from settlement (Bilder, 1996).

The ratification of the U.S. Constitution shifted the responsibility of immigration policy from the states to the federal government. The newly formed Congress formalized the process that would enable the foreign born to become citizens, however, the public charge laws implemented during the colonial era were left largely unchanged and continued to be enforced at the state level (Basler, 1998). Borrowing language from state laws, the Immigration Act of 1882 federalized the public charge exclusion, prohibiting the entry of any immigrant deemed "unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge" to the United States for settlement. As a consequence, any individual identified as a potential ward of the state would be returned to their country of origin at the ship-owner's expense (Tichenor, 2002). The law also attempted to divert immigrant related expenses away from native taxpayers by establishing a 'head tax' for the new comers at the port of arrival. Within a decade Congress passed the 1891 Immigration Act to strengthen the public charge law so that individual who had not paid their own fare would be barred from entering the U.S. and immigrants that were deemed a public charge within a year of arrival would be deported.

Tighter restrictions for immigrants emerged with the development of social welfare programs during the Progressive Era. Passage of the 1917 Immigration Act extended the public charge rule to allow the government to deport immigrants that became destitute within five years of their arrival. By the 1930s new immigrants were required to demonstrate that they had sufficient funds to support themselves, were gainfully employed by a U.S. based business, or had secured an affidavit of support where one or more legal residents signs an official document pledging to sponsor and support the immigrant if the individual faced financial hardship (United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2013).[i] Soon the affidavit of support became the

most common means of entry, however, a series of court decisions[4] in during the 1950s held that the documents were not legally binding to the sponsor of the migrant because the laws for federal assistance failed to spell out residency restrictions for lawful immigrants (Wasem, 2012). Since the affidavit of support was generally unenforceable, it was rarely used to prevent legal immigrants from enrolling in public programs.

The welfare system within the U.S. expanded during the 1960s, and many of the newly established programs were funded through required matched contributions from the states (Skocpol, 1991). Concerned about the potential burden on state coffers, many state officials implemented residency requirements for legal immigrants (unauthorized immigrants were prohibited) in the programs that received federal-state match funding (Tichenor, 2002). However, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the 1971 case *Graham v. Richardson* (403 U.S. 365) that such restrictions by the state were unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause. The federal government responded by updating the eligibility criteria to ensure that non-citizen applicants for Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, or food stamps were lawfully admitted for permanent residence or were otherwise "permanently residing in the United States under color of law", also known as PRUCOL, a legal designation which enabled access to certain public benefits (Reischauer, 1995). By the early 1980s the perceived abuse of the welfare system brought about calls for new legislation to curb the enrollment of new permanent residents (Wasem, 2012). The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 required status verification of applicants and used the affidavit of support to ensure that a portion of their immigration sponsors' income and resources would be included in the application to limit eligibility for food stamps, SSI, and AFDC for up to three years.

[4] Two key decisions that diluted the ability of program administrators to apply the affidavit of support as a condition for eligibility include *Department of Mental Hygiene v. Renal*, 6 N.Y. 2d 791 (1959) and *State v. Binder*, 356 Mich. 73 (1959).

The Case for Welfare Reform & Restricting Immigrant Eligibility

By the mid-1990s calls to overhaul the nation's welfare system were becoming more prominent and universal. The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) established time limits on public benefit programs for all recipients, but the law also dramatically altered legal immigrants' access to welfare provisions. Limiting access to social services is a policy position is often associated with fiscally conservative Republicans, however, political interest in curbing immigrants' eligibility for social welfare provisions gained bipartisan support in the early-1990s (Fix and Passel, 2002; Tichenor, 2002).

A decade earlier, much of the research investigating the public cost of immigrants showed that immigrants were less likely to be enrolled in public benefits programs than native born citizens (Blau, 1984; Borjas and Trejo, 1993; Tienda and Jensen, 1986). However, as the discussions for overhauling the social safety net became as a top policy priority, some researchers enhanced the case for restrictionist policies by suggesting that migrants were choosing to settle within the U.S. due to the availability of social programs (Borjas and Hilton 1996). Particular emphasis was placed on a specific statistic that immigrant households had surpassed native families' rates of public assistance, it was argued the consequences of which increased the fiscal burden for native taxpayers and reduced the quality of the immigrant population (Borjas, 1999; Hanson, 2005). Although these findings on benefit usage were technically accurate, other scholars delved deeper, presenting a more nuanced picture of benefit usage among the foreign born and demonstrated that the political anxiety surrounding immigrant enrollment and corresponding fiscal burden was not possible given actual take up rates (Duleep and Regets, 1994; Fix and Passel, 1994; Van Hook et al, 1999).

Table 1.2: Estimated Benefit Usage by Citizenship Categories 1995-2006

	Native-born				Naturalized Citizens				Noncitizens			
	1995	1998	2001	2006	1995	1998	2001	2006	1995	1998	2001	2006
Estimated number of recipients (in millions)												
AFDC/ TANF	4.3	2.5	1.7	1.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.2
SSI	4.2	4.2	4.3	4.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3
Medicaid	28.5	25.1	28.3	34.1	0.6	0.8	1.1	1.6	2.5	1.8	2.0	2.6
Food Stamps	25.1	21.9	16.0	19.9	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	2.5	1.5	1.2	1.4
Total Population	239.2	244.6	249.1	259.5	7.9	9.9	12.0	14.5	16.6	16.6	16.6	22.7
Percent of total recipients by citizenship category												
AFDC/ TANF	86.0	84.4	83.3	88.2	2.3	3.9	3.7	2.8	11.8	11.8	12.4	9.0
SSI	86.2	85.5	86.6	85.3	3.9	6.5	8.1	8.6	9.9	7.8	5.3	6.0
Medicaid	90.2	90.6	90.2	89.0	1.7	2.8	3.5	4.1	8.0	6.5	6.3	6.9
Food Stamps	89.6	90.2	90.2	91.0	1.6	2.2	3.1	2.6	8.9	7.2	6.7	6.4
Percent of benefit usage within citizenship category												
AFDC/ TANF	2.3	1.3	0.9	0.6	1.5	1.2	0.7	0.3	3.9	2.3	1.4	0.7
SSI	2.3	2.3	2.3	1.6	2.4	3.3	3.5	3.0	3.2	2.5	1.4	1.3
Medicaid	11.9	10.2	11.4	13.1	6.9	8.0	9.1	10.8	15.3	10.9	9.7	11.6
Food Stamps	10.5	7.6	6.4	7.7	5.6	4.5	4.6	3.9	14.9	8.9	5.8	6.2

Source: CPS March Supplements – 1996, 1999, 2002, 2007
Note: Non-citizen refers to a foreign-born immigrant that has not become a naturalized citizen.

Table 1.2 compares the number and rate of participation within federally funded entitlement programs by citizenship status from 1995-2006. While immigrant households, who are on average poorer and less educated, were more likely to meet the income threshold for eligibility (Capps et al, 2004; Duncan and Brooks-Gunn, 2000), the actual number of noncitizens and naturalized citizens enrolled in public benefits programs during this period was substantially lower than native born citizens, thus the projections for savings were considered by many fiscal experts as short-sighted and

misleading. Despite the evidence and potential impact on minority groups, several high profile Democrats associated with minority rights including the Chairperson of the U.S. Immigration Reform Commission, Barbara Jordan, Housing and Urban Development Secretary, Henry Cisneros, and President Bill Clinton all spoke on the record of the need to reduce the number of low-skilled migrants and bar access to social welfare programs (Tichenor, 2002).

Preliminary versions of the bill were drafted in the Democratically-controlled House of Representatives and key administrators of the Clinton Administration revealed that the President supported these efforts because the issue polled well and had the potential to attract centrist voters (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000). Visible support from these prominent figures within the Democratic party established a bipartisan consensus that tougher immigration control were necessary, and later even stronger restrictions were outlined in policy blueprint The Contract With America (Gingrich et al, 1994), which was later credited with helping Republicans secure their Congressional victory in 1994. The bill was signed into law on August 22, 1996 by President Clinton who, despite his initial commitment to "ending welfare as we know it," later expressed ambivalence about the bill's tougher immigrant provisions (Tichenor, 2002).

The restrictionist measures were framed as a necessary step to promote self-sufficiency and to improve the 'quality' of the immigrants admitted by deterring individuals who were perceived to be a higher risk of becoming a public charge from settling within the U.S. (Fix and Passel, 2002). Officials also projected that the immigrant provisions from welfare reform would equate to nearly $40 billion in programmatic savings in the first six years (Congressional Budget Office 1996). Ultimately, the savings estimate never materialized, which was perhaps unsurprising as the share of foreign born

enrolled in federal entitlements programs made up only 15 percent of the total case-load in 1996 (Fix, Capps, and Kaushal, 2009).

An Overview of The Immigrant Provisions of Welfare Reform

Weeks after PRWORA was signed into law, Congress fortified the immigration eligibility provisions through the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Together the two complementary bills expanded the use of sponsor-to-alien deeming requirements to reduce new immigrant participation in means-tested programs. Immigrants were now to be sponsored by a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident whose income exceeded 125 percent of the federal poverty threshold (Vialet, 1997). Additionally, the sponsors' affidavit of support became a binding pledge to support the applicant until the immigrant completed 40 quarters of employment (roughly ten years of full-time employment) or became a naturalized citizen. The new law also stipulated that the Attorney General would need to collect "appropriate information" regarding affidavits of support in the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system. Although Congress did not explicitly state what information was necessary to store in the SAVE system, the law required the Attorney General to generate an automated record of the sponsors' social security numbers (Wasem, 2012).

Policy makers contended that these provisions were intended to assist program administrators in the enforcement of public charge exclusions (Vialet and Eig, 1998). In practice the new deeming rules established made it increasingly difficult for sponsored immigrants to meet the income threshold for eligibility, even if the individual fit within one of the noncitizen eligibility criteria; the sponsor (and the sponsor's spouse) would also be liable for reimbursing federal, state, or local agency if services were used before

the 40 quarters (Fix and Zimmerman, 1999). Advocacy organizations and some scholars argued that these new laws represented a 'back door' reform of legal immigration that sought to keep the poorest migrants from settling within the U.S. (Espenshade et al, 1997).

PRWORA also created a new classification system for immigrant eligibility, based on the immigrant's arrival date, legal status, the state of settlement, and the length of time the immigrant had been present in their state of residence (Fix and Tumlin, 1997). Table 1.3 outlines the changes in the criteria for immigrant eligibility before and after PRWORA. Before enactment, legal immigrants living within the U.S. could access social welfare programs much in the same way as a U.S. citizen. After enactment immigrants were sorted into two broad categories "qualified" and "unqualified" migrants. Qualified immigrants included refugees (admitted under the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980) and asylees, non-citizens who served on active duty in the armed services (and their dependents), or veterans who were honorably discharged from the military (Holcomb et al, 2003). The unqualified immigrant category included all other foreign-born residents without citizenship: unlawful immigrants, temporary residence (students, tourists, temporary foreign employees, etc.), and applicants for political asylum or refugee status.

But the immigrant provisions of these two bills created a more complicated classification. Because the unqualified immigrant class was also defined by arrival date, lawful permanent residents (LPRs) and other legal immigrants who had arrived after August 22, 1996 were prohibited from receiving benefits for at least five years or until U.S. citizenship was attained (Health and Human Services, 1996). LPRs who work in jobs in which Social Security taxes are collected could potentially enroll after completing 40 quarters of work if the applicant also met the other eligibility criteria (Center for

Medicaid and Medicare Services, 2004; Fremstad, 2002). In practice the policy change transferred 'post-enactment' legal immigrants into the same eligibility category as unlawful immigrants, which effectively downgraded the significance of their legal status (Fix and Passel, 2002). The new law also banned unqualified immigrants from federal health insurance programs, nutrition benefits, welfare and related work supports, and aid to the aged and disabled. These new measures represented an important policy shift that made attaining U.S. citizenship a central component of eligibility for public entitlement programs.

Table 1.3: Benefit Eligibility Criteria for Non-Citizens Before & After PRWORA

	SSI	Food Stamps	Medicaid	TANF	Other Federal Programmes	State/ Local Benefits
Qualified Immigrants Arriving Prior to August 23, 1996						
Legal Permanent Residents	Eligible	Not Eligible	State Option	State Option	State Option	State Option
Asylees/ Refugees	Eligible for the first 7 years	Eligible for the first 5 years	Eligible for the first 7 years	Eligible for the first 5 years	Eligible for the first 5 years	Eligible for the first 5 years
Qualified Immigrants Arriving After to August 23, 1996						
Legal Permanent Residents	Not Eligible	Not Eligible	Barred for the first 5 years – State option afterward	Barred for the first 5 years – State option afterward	Barred for the first 5 years – State option afterward	State Option
Asylees/ Refugees	Eligible for the first 7 years	Eligible for the first 5 years	Eligible for the first 7 years	Eligible for the first 5 years	Eligible for the first 5 years	Eligible for the first 5 years
Unqualified Immigrants						
Unauthorized Immigrants	Not Eligible	Not Eligible	Emergency Services Only	Not Eligible	Not Eligible	Not Eligible
Nonimmigrants[5]	Not Eligible	Not Eligible	Emergency Services Only	Not Eligible	Not Eligible	Not Eligible

Source: Urban Institute 1997/ Congressional Research Service 2012

Note: States had the option to provide supplemental nutrition through the Women, Infants and Children program (WIC) to unqualified immigrants. Some provisions have been amended to lift the bar on Food Stamps for Legal Permanent Resident (LPR) children, and allow LPR children to access some federal health care programmes before five years. Unauthorized immigrants may also be eligible for other health programs (e.g. immunizations or testing and treatment for communicable diseases).

5 Nonimmigrants are those admitted temporarily for a limited purpose (e.g., students, visitors, or temporary workers). The PRUCOL doctrine permitted access to public means-tested programs for some immigrants with ambiguous status. Under this provision, introduced through the Health Care Financing Administration in 1990, undocumented immigrants are ineligible to receive aid because their lack of status is clearly defined.

Loosening Restrictions To Reduce the Fiscal Burden

Access to health care poses a particular concern for most state and local governments; this is because this is often the second largest expenditure on the budget, only behind education (Fix and Passel, 2002). Upon entry, unauthorized immigrants to the U.S. are typically younger and healthier than the average the native born population (Goldman et al., 2006). Recent studies have shown that both legal and undocumented immigrants consume health care at significantly lower levels than the native born population (Goldman et al., 2006). This is due in part because unauthorized immigrants are more likely to work in low-wage jobs that do not offer health insurance or other benefits, and thus disproportionately lack health coverage making it difficult to access a primary care physician (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2003). However, without coverage, an unauthorized immigrant may delay treatment until a condition becomes critical, and/or seek care in an urgent care facility at considerably higher costs (Carrasquillo et al, 2000).

The lack of coverage combined with the rising costs of treatment has made it more difficult for these individuals to pay for their own care. This means that the costs for treatment are then passed on to local communities and the hospital districts, which are paid though local taxes. The uneven distribution of the costs triggers a great deal of anxiety for many state and local governments, particularly in areas with higher concentration of unauthorized immigrants because they will not receive state or federal funding to reduce the fiscal impact of uncompensated care (Fix and Passel, 2002). After revisions were made to PROWRA the federal government granted states the ability to extending Medicaid benefits (the public health care program for individuals with very low-income) to specific unauthorized immigrant populations (e.g. children and pregnant

women) to absorb some of the financial challenges by providing access to primary care (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2003).

Certain policies were never incorporated into the welfare reform effort, the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women Infants and Children (referred to as WIC) and child tax credits; specific unauthorized immigrants (e.g. pregnant women and children) who meet the income requirements were not prohibited from enrolling. A detailed analysis by the Urban Institute found that the largest growth in WIC participation between 1997 and 2006 was among native-born children with unauthorized immigrant parents. Participation among mixed status families jumped from 6.8 to 11.7 percent of all recipients (Vericker, 2010). Although higher enrollment rates may increase costs for the program, research shows that food insecurity dramatically increases the costs for health care programs, schools, and other important budgetary items (Abrams, 1993). These costs savings helped to make the case for states to take their own initiative to expand access to other programs aimed at reducing poverty and inequality.

V. Research Aims

This doctoral research builds upon prior work examining the links between individuals' views about immigrants and preferences for restrictionist policies, but makes several very important contributions to this realm of public opinion research. First, examines how U.S. citizens respond to real-world political communication regarding immigration related policies by presenting respondents with vignettes that mimic or (as in the case of Chapter IV, draw from the actual language used in these debates. Vignette survey experiments give respondents short and clear illustrations of hypothetical people or situations, but vary specific attributes at randomly. Researchers can then isolate the

effect of each attribute put forward by comparing the differences across groups (Atzmüeller and Steiner, 2010; Auspurg, 2015).

An Overview of How Attitudes and Preferences Are Formed

The three empirical papers each take a novel approach to directly test how Americans' evaluate immigrant populations, draw upon existing attitudes towards these populations and form policy preferences related to these populations. A first step in achieving this objective is defining what is meant by attitudes and preferences.

O'Keefe (1990:18) argues that an attitude is "a person's general evaluation of an object (where 'object' is understood in a broad sense, as encompassing persons, events, products, policies, institutions, and so on)." Druckman and Lupia (2000) expand upon this definition of attitude to capture the multidimensionality of an individual's evaluation of an object, citing public opinion towards a popular leader like Bill Clinton. They note that while many Americans express a closeness or a positive attitude towards the former President's politics, their attitude towards his moral disposition is more complex, or in spatial terms, a bit farther away.

Other scholars contend that an individual's preference is based on their attitude of each attribute of an object under consideration (Fishbein 1963; Krosnick, 1988). Thus these two (and likely more) attributes of the object – Bill Clinton - interact and are weighted in an individual's mind to generate a preference. Each attitude regarding a particular attribute is formed in part from prior beliefs (Zaller, 1992). These beliefs about an object's attributes are dependent various bits of information which can come from an infinite number of sources and interact between an individual's brain and body, and are often influenced by a particular environment. Individuals can adapt their beliefs, attitudes or preferences upon exposure to new information. (Churchland and Sejnowski, 2016).

Within the realm of political science there is a shared assumption that preferences form through a memory-based process (Lodge et al, 1990). That is that individuals base their evaluations on all relevant information that they retrieve from their memory. Going back to the Bill Clinton example, when an individual gets new information about an accusation regarding the president's extra-marital affair, it is filed away in their long-term memory. At another point in during the run for re-election, the voter may receive more information on issue positions. On Election Day, this voter will rely on their memories of information on the various attributes they associate with the incumbent and use what information is retrieved, make an evaluation on each attribute, weight each attribute and form their preferences in favor or against (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Enelow and Hinich 1984).

This memory model is well used among social scientists, but one major down-side is that it assumes that individuals engage with political information, and reflect on this information thoughtfully before forming a preference. However, a wealth of evidence contradicts this assumption, demonstrating that most American voters have very little information retained regarding the majority of political issues (Bartles, 1996; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Zaller, 1992). Individuals' engagement with information on policy issues, particularly on those related to immigrants is similar (Citrin and Sides, 2008; Wong, 2007).

This lack of engagement presents an opportunity for politicians to sway voters with a more visceral tactic, drawing upon an assumption that attitudes towards immigrants are negative. If political actors can introduce new negative information through messages about immigrant groups, this act will trigger an intense gut reaction among voters (Carmines and Stimson, 1980; 1986; 1989), and influence candidate and party preferences (Hajnal and Rivera, 2014, Messina, 1989). Party leaders distribute these messages, and if framed strategically, can increase the likelihood of an individual

engaging with the message and easily retrieving the information contained in the message (Taylor et al, 1979).

A Tool to Isolate the Effects of Political Messages on Immigration

Measuring the extent to which political messages on immigration can stir up underlying attitudes and influence the political preferences of the recipient is tricky business. For example, consider an attempt to determine how presidential phrasings affect voters' preferences regarding levels of immigration (the subject of the third empirical paper). Understanding this impact requires researchers to identify and separate as many environmental factors that could influence beliefs or preference changes, a seemingly impossible task using traditional observational methods. However, some political scientists have established novel ways to reveal message effects on the formation of preferences through the use of experiments. The experimental approach introduces new opportunities to get at the causal mechanisms that drive political phenomena. This section provides an overview of definitions, concepts, and the contributions of experimental research, and introduces some important methodological issues.

An experiment involves a direct intervention of the social phenomenon under investigation, but requires random assignment to at least two conditions. Researchers design experiments to investigate the causal impacts of explanatory variables in line with the prevailing theory of the phenomenon under investigation. Although scientists have used experiments for hundreds of years, experimentation in the social sciences emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, with scholars randomly allocating subjects to treatment and control groups to unpick causal mechanisms that drive such social phenomenon.

Early examples of experiments in political science can be found as early as the 1950s, the first experimental study published in the *American Political Science Review* (*APSR*) appeared in 1956 (Eldersveld 1956), where potential voters were randomly

assigned to a control group that received no messages (25 percent), or one of three treatment groups - two that received messages encouraging them to vote via personal contact (25 percent included phone calls or 25 percent receiving personal visits), and one via a mailing (25 percent). Participants who received the personal contact treatment were much more likely to turn out to vote than those in either the control group or the mailing group; the author concluded that through the process of random assignment of participants that personal contact caused a relative increase in turnout. Within a generation of Eldersveld's seminal work, scholars began using experiments to bolster international conflict resolution (e.g., Mahoney and Druckman 1975), which eventually sparked the short-lived journal *The Experimental Study of Politics*.

The use of experiments in political sciences has skyrocketed over the last two decades as researchers have become more applied – reaching out to candidates (Gerber et al, 2007), political advocacy groups (Broockman and Kalla, 2016), and as online platforms have made conducting experiments with larger samples easier (Mutz, 2011). Evidence of the change is clear when considering that more than half of the 71 experimental articles that appeared in the *American Political Science Review* were published after 1992 (Druckman et al, 2011). Other signals of the prominence of experiments in political science include the proliferation of courses offered in graduate programs, the investment by the National Science Foundation to establish an experimental infrastructure, and the great expansion of survey experiments in both private and publicly supported studies like this doctoral research.

Where an experiment takes place is of vital importance to political scientists and the context to which they have been applied and questions tackled with this approach is varied. Over the last two decades, most experiments have been carried out in one of three contexts: laboratories, surveys, and the field. The environment where participants are exposed to stimuli (e.g. targeted voting ads) could be introduced in a controlled setting such as a university campus (McKelvey et al, 1992) or in a more natural

environment like within a person's home via the postal service (Eldersveld, 1956), on the radio (Panagopoulos et al, 2008), through a face-to-face interaction (Broockman and Kalla, 2016) or in a web-based survey (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012).

Methodological challenges emerge under each of these experimental settings. For example, many of the early experiments conducted in political science took place in the artificial settings of university labs using of student-aged subjects. While studies in other disciplines have discussed the limitations of conducting experiments on a younger, wealthier, whiter and generally homogenous population, these issues are often not discussed at length in the political science literature (Druckman et al, 2011).

Some political scientists have attempted to overcome the problems of campus-based experiments by conducting experiments on more representative samples. Field experiments present a solution to this concern of an artificial setting. However, in the field the researcher often has less control over what experimental stimuli the participants actually observe. Further, logistical challenges such as recruiting a sufficient number of participants or similar issues of diversity in sampling may materialize.

Survey experiments offer a resolution to this issue, as web-based platforms such as Amazon's Mechanical Turk[6] one of the sampling arms used for the analysis conducted in Chapter IV. The web service offers a much larger and more diverse pool (Buhrmester et al, 2010; Chandler and Kapelner, 2010) of respondents. However, this drawing from this pool of subjects also introduces important questions about external validity, namely that subjects may be exposed to phenomena they might have also encountered prior to participating in the experiment, thus complicating the inferences that can be made (Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk 2007).

[6]Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is an online platform that allows researchers to upload surveys, which can be taken up by 'workers', or research participants as paid tasks. The MTurk 'workers' can then opt into and complete the survey. Although the pool of 'workers' on MTurk is unlikely to produce a nationally representative sample, the samples drawn from the platform are typically more diverse than a laboratory sample of university students. A more thorough discussion on the process of sampling via Mechanical Turk and its limitations is offered in Chapter IV.

The methodological advancements made on experimental approaches within political science have been bolstered by critical investment, namely the large-scale infrastructure project Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS), which is supported by the National Science Foundation. TESS provides free access to NORC's, the sampling arm for the General Social Survey, AmeriSpeak Panel[7] to successful proposals that employ experimental designs; the data from Chapter III is drawn from the AmeriSpeak Panel. This means that the stimuli that are being manipulated as a part of the experiment is put to a large and nationally representative population sample of online respondents. Also commonly referred to as a survey experiment, the population-based survey experiment is not defined by the setting or mode of delivery, but rather by its use of survey sampling methods to harvest a sample of experimental subjects that is representative of the target population for the phenomenon under examination (Mutz, 2011). For a population-based survey experiment to be credible, the population captured in the sample should be statistically similar to the population in which the inferences of the research findings are being made.

Similar to other experiments carried out in in the social sciences, research participants are randomly assigned to conditions, and treatments are administered as in any other experiment. A cost-effective feature of the population-based survey experiment is that participants can take part in a study without having to go to a laboratory or other venue. This means that the samples are sufficiently large to detect effects, often those that are more difficult to parse out in smaller experimental studies, and are applied in a more natural environment on a more diverse pool of respondents.

[7] TESS contracts with NORC the entity that conducts the experiments via its AmeriSpeak Panel. AmeriSpeak is a nationally representative, probability-based panel based on NORC's National Sample Frame, an area probability sample funded and managed by NORC and used for several NORC studies, including: the General Social Survey funded by the National Science Foundation and the Survey of Consumer Finances sponsored by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board in cooperation with the U.S. Treasury Department. More information on the TESS peer-review process, the sampling strategy of NORC's AmeriSpeak Panel as well as the response rates can be found in Chapter III.

Questions about representativeness are valid; however, as with large-scale observational studies weights can be applied to ensure that the sample is similar to the target population.

Many national surveys like the General Social Survey (N=1,500-4,600) and polls like Gallup (N=500-2,000) collect data from some reasonably large, round number of respondents for expediency. However, these surveys are intended to provide a snapshot into society rather than being devised to test a small number of specific hypotheses. As a consequence, it is not uncommon to have more respondents than is necessary – taking up the time or respondents and resources that could be spent to investigate other interesting areas, or too few, thus limiting the inferences that can be made (Druckman et al, 2011; Mutz, 2011). The data from Chapters III (via access to the AmeriSpeak Panel) and IV (via funding for the MTurk sample) come from the National Science Foundation's TESS project. These studies require the sample size that is appropriate to the main hypotheses being tested and are justified by the power analyses included in Annexes 3.E and 4.C, which were submitted as part of the proposals.

Considering Experimental Norms and Ethics

Besides the way an experiment is conducted, the extent to which the researcher follows experimental norms in neighboring disciplines, such as psychology and economics has emerged as an important debate in political science research. One case in point, deception in psychological experiments is commonplace, whereas economists generally forbid the practice. Similarly, psychologists typically prohibit any form of payment for research subjects, while economists typically require some form of compensation for a subject's time (Smith 1976). The issue of compensation for research subjects is one of such importance that the first issue of *Experimental Economics* implemented a rule that automatically rejected submissions that used deception or failed

to pay participants for their actions (Druckman et al, 2011). These debates are critical to ensure that no harm is done to any potential participant who has been asked to take part.

While the potential risk of harm to any participants is minimal, I have carefully considered strategies aimed at protecting all respondents. All individuals interested in taking part through MTurk or sampled through the AmeriSpeak panel was provided with my name, school affiliation, and contact information to direct questions and concerns about the research project, and a link to the research ethics policies at the London School of Economics was included. All potential respondents were told that participation was voluntary and informed consent was required before taking part.[8]

The issue of recompensing participants was also carefully considered. Researchers have debated the risks of providing financial rewards citing fears of coercing respondents to participate or skewed samples (Grady, 2006). However, findings from several papers on the quality of the MTurk sample suggest that financial incentive are not the sole motivation for taking part, additionally the pool of participants better reflects the samples from published research using convenience sampling (Buhrmester et al, 2010; Chandler and Kapelner, 2010). The level of compensation alleviates concerns about participant exploitation, but is more importantly an appropriate acknowledgement of their time.

This project also incorporates many features to ensure the protection of participants' privacy and anonymity. All data submitted by participants will be fully anonymized. The responses collected through MTurk pool cannot be linked to the participants, as each individual is identified only with their worker code. Data from the AmeriSpeak panel were scrubbed thoroughly prior to dissemination by NORC to ensure the privacy of the panelists is protected. All data from this project will remain in electronic format and stored (or when necessary transmitted) on LSE secure servers. The

[8] See page one of Annex 4.D for a copy of the informed consent.

London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Research Ethics Committee (Appendices A-C) and the National Science Foundation's Time Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS) peer-review panel (Appendices D & E) reviewed and approved this research.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The primary goal of this research is to determine how individuals' attitudes towards immigrants shape their policy preference regarding these populations and to examine the impact of political messages surrounding immigration influence different segments of the electorate. This section includes an overview of why each topic is important, an overview of the methods employed and a summary of the findings.

Chapter II (Paper 1) documents the pre-testing phase of a vignette survey instrument that seeks to measure two distinct phenomena: how individuals' attitudes towards immigrants and the party sponsor influences support for government funded health care initiatives, and whether providing respondents with a concrete economic benefit induces more positive enrollment preferences when immigrant groups benefit from a public entitlement program. To date, not study has used cognitive interviews to unpack Americans views on real-world political communication on immigration policy. Developing and evaluating survey questions presents a major challenge to researchers in the social sciences. During the 1980s researchers in psychology, market research and government agencies developed techniques and other quality assurance tool to systematically draft and evaluate survey questions to identify sources of response error and improve the validity of survey questions (Forsyth & Lessler, 1991; Pressler, et al, 2004; Tourangeau, 1984).

One important strategy was the adoption of cognitive interviews, which refine survey instruments by asking potential respondents - individuals who meet the criteria for participation in the survey if randomly sampled - about how they interpret the

wording of the questions (Willis, 2005). This process helps to ensure that the questions are generating the intended information that the researcher seeks to measure (Groves et al, 2004). Following the guidelines of best practice, two rounds of cognitive interviews were conducted (Collins, 2015; Pressler et al, 2004; Willis, 2005), thirty-three in total, between August and September 2015. The goal of the evaluation process was threefold (1) identify any complicated language in the survey that could affect comprehension, memory retrieval, and decision processes; (2) investigate the ways in which participants mentally process information as they respond to questionnaires; (3) evaluate how online survey respondents engage with the survey in its electronic form.

This exercise not only improves the quality of the survey instrument, but also yields some important insights into how individuals residing within the U.S. – the target population – engage with and comprehend political communication related to immigration policies. The cognitive interview subjects revealed interesting insights about U.S. voters' views regarding immigrant participation in various public entitlement programs. It was consistently noticed when an immigrant cue was embedded in one of the vignettes, and the definitions provided for both immigrants and illegal immigrants were overwhelmingly uniform across the sample. Many subjects automatically linked the issue of immigration to politics, especially among individuals who identified with a particular political party. Politically oriented subjects identified immigration as a 'hot-button' political issue and consistently expressed concern that the vignettes mentioned an immigrant group in relation to the public entitlement programs and were overwhelmingly anxious about the partisan cue because they feared that members of the opposite party would respond more negatively when it was employed. Yet, when subjects received the concrete savings estimates, at least in some instances, that it was possible to neutralize the negative effect of the illegal immigrant cue. However, some subjects expressed skepticism about the savings estimates.

Chapter III (Paper 2) examines whether native citizens are prepared to turn down a fiscal benefit in order to exclude immigrants from specific public services. This study builds upon the vast literature examining the links between individuals' anxieties about immigrants and preferences for restrictionist policies (e.g. Alesina et al, 1999; Borjas, 1996; Citrin et al, 1997; Espenshade and Hampstead, 1996; Hanson, 2005; Hanson et al, 2007; Faschini and Mayada, 2009; Luttmer 2001; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). The experiment is also specifically designed to examine the issues that spark exclusionary policies – concerns about immigrant participation in government funded programs, animosity towards unauthorized immigrants, and the perceived tax burden. However, the project deviates from prior scholarly work in this area by flipping the perspective to focus on the economic savings rather than fiscal burdens with the aim of minimizing the anxiety related higher taxes.

The pioneering studies examining the relationship between citizens' attitudes about immigrants and the potential fiscal burden as an explanation for restrictionist policies established a strong theoretical foundation (e.g. Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Borjas and Trejo, 1991; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Hanson, 2005; Hanson et al, 2007; Faschini and Mayada, 2009), however, we have scant evidence based on experimental manipulation (but see Ford's 2015 analysis in the British context). This study emerges from these important works and expands our knowledge by explicitly testing three hypotheses: that individuals' concerns about immigrants trigger exclusionary preferences; that unauthorized immigrants intensify these preferences; and that information stressing a social and economic benefit of the social policies will help to reduce opposition to immigrant participation. Data from an original survey experiment put to a nationally representative sample (N= 1,931) of Americans show that across the all items immigrant participation triggered more exclusionary responses, regardless of the respondents' educational attainment and income levels, suggesting that pocketbook concerns are not driving these preferences. I observed vast differences in the responses of Republicans

and Democrats, however, the immigrant cues consistently induced more negative responses irrespective of party identification. Finally, the savings estimates failed to neutralize punitive policy preferences, suggesting that Americans will reject a fiscal benefit to block immigrant access to government funded programs.

Chapter IV (Paper 3) seeks to assess the extent to which the language referring to immigrants influences native citizens' preferences on immigration-related policies. It builds upon the vast literature examining political parties' use of cues (symbols) and frames (arguments) to establish policy reputations with the electorate (e.g. Bartels, 2002; Chong and Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001; Druckman et al, 2010; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Krosnick and Brannon, 1993; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004; Zaller, 1992). The vignettes draw from prior work mimicking the real-world political debates referencing immigrants (Brader et al, 2008; Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins 2014). This study provides new insights on how partisans evaluate the parties' current welcoming/restrictive messaging strategies on immigration, but includes frames from credible political elites (Druckman, 2001) - former Presidents Ronald Reagan (welcoming) and Bill Clinton (restrictive) – and counter their respective parties' current positioning on the issue. The second level of this study exposes respondents to two experimental vignettes to test whether a (bi)partisan sponsor cue (neutralizes) strengthens the partisan response (Goren et al, 2009) on immigration policies across the various segments of the American electorate.

The unique 4 by 3 experimental design was put to a pilot sample of 2,053 respondents on the crowdsourcing platform Mechanical Turk. The study provides a simultaneous and direct test of the effects of the positive and negative issue frames, partisan cues, and their effects across items. Investigating the impact and limits of the partisan cue effects within the context of these complex political frames on immigration within the U.S. is vital in this current political climate because as politically polarization has gripped the country (Abramowitz, 2010), the messaging strategies crafted on

immigration seek to draw sharper distinctions between the parties, but this has fueled some harsh rhetoric on the issue (Jeong, Miller, Schofield and Sened, 2011; McCaffrey, 2000). Scholars have demonstrated that strategies to demonize immigrants as can increase apathy (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1996) and hostility (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015) within the electorate, but also increase punitive policies directed at immigrant populations (Hopkins, 2010). The results demonstrate that the welcoming frames trigger more positive responses while the restrictionist frames induce more negative responses. Again, I find large differences based on an individuals' partisan identity, but cues by the parties or their political elites fail to shift public opinion on the issue.

Chapter V provides a conclusion summarizing the major findings of the thesis and discussing future areas of research.

CHAPTER II (PAPER 1)

HOW DO AMERICANS ENGAGE WITH EXPERIMENTAL VIGNETTES ABOUT IMMIGRANTS & SUPPORT FOR RESTRICTIONIST POLICIES?

INSIGHTS FROM COGNITIVE INTERVIEWS

Abstract

Policy makers regularly cite voters' perceptions of immigrants, their participation in government funded programs, and regulating their numbers as a key influencer of political parties' current positions on immigration policies. But political parties' regularly use issue frames as a fundamental means of influencing public opinion. Our knowledge on how individuals actually engage with these issues is currently limited because we have little information about how Americans comprehend political messages that communicate partisan positions on immigration, how they perceive immigrant populations, or how other factors may feed into their decision-making process as they reflect upon these political messages. Connecting theory on individual attitudes about immigrants with the research on framing and political partisanship is vital because it best reflects how individuals engage with this type of communication in the real world. Drawing from the 33 cognitive interviews to test experimental vignettes related to immigrant participation and support for public funded initiatives, I provide novel recommendations for researchers interested in using real-world political communication.

I. Introduction

When Americans receive information about immigrants, what they are presented with is a message that has been molded and kneaded and sculpted by a whole host of political actors (e.g. political elites, strategist, and interest groups) who seek to define and interpret what will resonate with the electorate (Stone, 2002). The initial goal of these political efforts is to respond to public opinion and direct it, and in turn win elections (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000). We know from a growing body of research that political frames can influence attitudes on a multitude of issues (e.g. Goren 2002; Krosnick and Brannon, 1993; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004; Zaller, 1992). Hayes (2008) illustrates the point with examples commonly found in the media – those seeking to increase support for border security might focus on illegal immigration posing a threat to national security as a negative frame – similarly, a welcoming frame may emphasize that stricter immigration laws limit the potential of the U.S. economy.

Scholars have also demonstrated that these frames can be successful because a large segment of the electorate has low policy and political knowledge, and are thus more susceptible to the influence of political frames (Bartels, 1996; Gaines et al, 2007; Gilens, 2001; Lauderdale, 2012; Zaller, 2004). Other studies have shown similar low levels of knowledge by individuals regarding immigrants (Blinder, 2013; Citrin and Sides, 2008; McLaren and Johnson, 2008; Wong, 2007) and the specifics of social welfare provisions (Delli Carpini et al, 1996; Gilens, 2001; Kuklinski, 2001; Zaller, 2004). Given these findings, we are faced with some fairly substantive questions on how Americans understand the policies emphasized in frames, and in our quest to assess their impact we must develop a credible strategy to measure their attitudes.

Determining how a target population comprehends and interprets these types of frames is critically important because while scholars have examined the links between individuals' attitudes about immigrants and negative policy preferences there is little evidence demonstrating how attitudes about immigrants influence support and

enrolment preferences for programs aimed at reducing poverty and inequality. To disentangle these complex relationships a more complicated research design is required. It is possible to examine how U.S. citizens respond to real-world political communication regarding immigrant participation in public entitlement programs by presenting respondents with vignettes that mimic the language used in these debates that manipulate specific aspects as treatments, and putting these before a large sample of the populations (Mutz, 2011). Vignette survey experiments provide brief and clear illustrations of hypothetical people or situations and specific attributes are randomly varied; researchers are then able to isolate the impact of each attribute under consideration by comparing the differences across groups (Atzmüeller and Steiner, 2010; Auspurg, 2015). Over the last two decades, vignette survey experiments have played a crucial role in revealing new insights into a variety of social phenomenon including those analyzing the mix of competing messages found in political communication regarding social welfare provisions (e.g. Sniderman and Theriault, 2004; Chong and Druckman, 2007). These experiments actively measure the concept under consideration and offer high internal validity by providing an experimental intervention and a control group (McDermot, 2011). Some survey experiments are also able to achieve high external validity by recruiting large representative samples and collecting additional individual-level information that enables analyses beyond the core experiment (Druckman et al, 2011; Mutz, 2011; Sniderman and Grob, 1996).

This paper details the pre-testing phase of the study, a vital step in developing a credible survey tool. The vignette survey experiment being tested seeks to measure two distinct phenomena: how individuals' attitudes towards immigrants and the party sponsor influences support for government funded health care initiatives, and whether providing respondents with a concrete economic benefit induces a more positive enrollment preference when immigrant groups benefit from a public entitlement program. This evaluation process had three goals (1) identify any problems with comprehension,

memory retrieval, and decision processes that stem from the wording of the survey; (2) examine how individuals mentally process information as they respond to questionnaires; (3) assess how survey respondents engage with the online survey. A two-pronged strategy was taken, incorporating a series of cognitive interviews and the electronic feedback from respondents who participated in a testing phase of the web-based survey.

Based on the existing literature on political issue frames, individual attitudes towards immigrants and survey response strategies, there are four main areas to understanding responses to experimental vignettes on political issue frames on immigration because they may introduce measurement error because responses put forward by research subjects may not reflect what is being measured. The first area under consideration seeks to identify any problems with comprehension, memory retrieval, and decision processes that stem from the wording of the survey. It is possible that respondents may read a question interpret the language presented in a way that is different from what the survey seeks to measure, make a judgment and provide a response that does not reflect their true attitude on the topic (Tourangeau, 1984; Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1988; Tourangeau et al., 2009). Second, revolves around how subjects understand and interpret the policies or the populations under consideration. This is because while Americans may have low levels of knowledge on a policy or inaccurate information about a population (Citrin and Sides, 2007; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Lauderdale, 2012; Zaller, 1992), they may still give a response to the question, employing satisficing strategies, which means giving a response that is good enough instead of one that actually represents their attitudes or preferences on the topic at hand (Krosnick, 1991). Third, centers on how Americans interpret the information under consideration and to gain better insights into the motivation behind the responses – individuals' perceptions are gleaned by asking respondents to 'think-aloud' whilst answering and probing for deeper information (Groves et al., 2004). Finally, the forth seeks to gain deeper insights into the prior experiences that influence individuals' views

on these topics (Gaines, Kuklinski and Quirk, 2007; Sniderman, 2011) to theoretically test and incorporate in later versions of the instrument.

II. Strategy

ASSESSING COMPREHENSION THE VIGNETTES & QUESTIONS

The first goal of the cognitive interviews is to ensure that respondents understand the words used in the vignettes and questions in the same way that is intended by the researcher and across respondents (Willis, 2005). The language used in surveys, and indeed in political frames seek to get individuals to tap into and retrieve memories on a particular issue, make a judgment or decision, and provide a response (Groves, et al, 2004). But this cognitive process will be hindered if respondents are unable to comprehend the issue or language before them, or express different interpretations of the words used (Pressler, et al, 2004; Tourangeau, 1984). For instance, Blinder (2013) contracted the polling firm IPSOS Mori to assess individuals' attitudes about 'immigrants' in the UK. His research demonstrated marked differences in how British people perceive immigrants relative to how the state defines and measures immigration. This study highlights the potential policy implications of this mismatch in definition of these words, but differences in personal definitions across subjects could introduce measurement error, and is therefore necessary to investigate, and parse out as distinct treatment groups to unpack true differences in opinion rather than in definition.

UNDERSTANDING COGNITIVE PROCESSING OF THE POLICIES & POPULATION

The policies under consideration in the experiment includes five vignettes that are all positively framed, each focusing on a distinct policy aimed at improving economic and societal outcomes. The memory model does not require individuals to have pre-existing attitudes about the policies at hand, but they need to have enough information to

draw upon to express this. Therefore, the first priority in this exercise requires determining whether subjects comprehend what the policies under consideration are and have a working understanding of the fundamental goals of the initiatives. A secondary goal of this exercise is to gain insights into individuals' levels of knowledge of the policies and populations under consideration. Scholars have argued that most Americans have scant knowledge about the majority of political issues (Bartles, 1996; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Zaller, 1992). Studies examining citizens' knowledge of immigrants and immigration related policies mirror these findings (Citrin and Sides, 2008; Wong, 2007). It has been argued that this lack of knowledge presents an opportunity for politicians to manipulate voters. Following the guidelines of best practice (Pressler et al, 2004; Willis and Lessler, 1999) each interview used both the think-aloud and verbal probing strategies to gain deeper insights into how individuals comprehend and process the information on the policies and the population in front of them.

PROBING FOR PRIOR EXPERIENCES

Sniderman and Piazza (2002) observe that individuals bring prior experience into their decision making process when answering survey questions and understanding as these aspects of the target population in advance of the survey will help to improve the research design and measure outcomes. Employing a unique vignette experiment, the researchers displayed the hypothetical college applications of white and black candidates with identical characteristics with three exceptions – race (varying between white and black) and college exam entrance scores, with the white student's set at 80 and the black student's randomly varied at 55, 60, 65, 70 and 75 – the experiment also varied father's occupation, but this was secondary. The researchers anticipated that African American respondents' personal negative experiences with racism would factor in racial discrimination in their assessment of the two hypothetical candidates and select the black

applicant as a 'nod' to the obstacles that had to be overcome. Their null hypothesis was that there would be no difference in the acceptance rates of the black and white applicant among African American respondents. The researchers were surprised to observe that even when the exam scores of the black candidate were the closest to the white candidate, African American respondents consistently selected the white candidate. Their conclusion suggests that African Americans prioritize the higher exam score over all other factors. In a later discussion of this paper, Sniderman (2011) notes that having an additional on the motivations of this decision would have been helpful in understanding motivation for the choices of African Americans decisions. Another study by Gaines, Kuklinski and Quirk (2007) used panel data to determine whether and how partisans change their beliefs and interpretation of facts about the government's handling of the Iraq war overtime. Although most subjects expressed similar and accurate beliefs about facts, partisans tended to interpret the facts in ways that fit their party-preferences, those with higher policy knowledge were more adepts at using the interpretations to support their existing partisan lean. Here too the use of think-aloud and verbal probing strategies are necessary to better understand other factors that may influence individuals' reactions to the vignettes presented.

III. Method

Developing and evaluating survey questions has long challenged researchers in the social sciences. Researchers in psychology, market research and government agencies developed techniques and other quality assurance tool in response to these challenges, creating a systematic process to draft and evaluate survey questions (Forsyth & Lessler, 1991; Pressler, et al, 2004; Tourangeau, 1984). One important strategy was the adoption of cognitive interviews, which refine survey instruments by asking potential respondents - individuals who meet the criteria for participation in the survey if randomly sampled -

about how they interpret the wording of the questions (Willis, 2005). This process helps to ensure that the questions are generating the intended information that the researcher seeks to measure (Groves et al, 2004).

In-line with best practice, each subject was asked to think-aloud whilst providing their response and additional verbal probing strategies were employed (Pressler et al, 2004; Willis and Lessler, 1999). The think-aloud technique provides subjects with the opportunity to explain their thinking or what is motivating their response as they respond to the tested question (Davis and DeMaio, 1993; Bickart and Felcher, 1996; Bolton and Bronkhorst, 1996). This technique has been useful in providing deeper insights into the process of how individuals retrieve information from their memory, but also illuminates the external factors that influence their decision making process (Willis, 2004).

We know from prior work that this type of political communication is often difficult for individuals to process (Druckman et al, 2010; Martin and Polivka, 1995). To minimize the risk of measurement error it therefore necessary to rigorously and systematically test the survey instrument to ensure that respondents interpret the vignettes and concepts uniformly and in line with the theoretical foundations (Groves et al., 2004). Following the guidelines of best practice, I conducted two rounds of cognitive interviews (Collins, 2015; Pressler et al, 2004; Willis, 2005), thirty-three in total, between August and September 2015. The purpose of these interviews was to elicit feedback from a similar population of individuals who could be sampled to take part in the quantitative survey – U.S. citizens above the age of 18 and to ensure that potential respondents properly understand the concepts measured in survey instrument. Additional feedback on the content and interface of the web-based survey was solicited from 50 respondents using the crowd-sourcing platform Mechanical Turk in October 2015.[9]

[9] Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is an online crowdsourcing platform that allows researchers to recruit research participants. The samples drawn from the platform are typically more diverse than a laboratory sample of

THE COGNITIVE INTERVIEW SUBJECTS

Table 2.1 outlines the characteristics of the subjects that participated in the cognitive interviews. Individuals were recruited from three areas of the state of Texas – central (21 were located in Austin/San Antonio) and west (5 were located in Midland/Odessa) as well as the Gulf Coast (7 were located in Houston/Corpus Christi) regions - to enhance diversity within the sample. A purposive sampling strategy was employed, targeting specific groups based on characteristics of interest that may help to reveal problems with phrasing and concepts included in the survey (e.g. younger people who are less familiar with complex policies or economic arguments, individuals with very low incomes and educational attainment, ethnic and racial minorities, politically active and inactive, etc.). The subjects were recruited from two campuses of a community college within the Austin/San Antonio area, a non-profit organization based in Houston that serves low-income populations, and two conservative leaning social organizations – one in the Gulf Coast and the other in west Texas.

university students. A more thorough discussion on the process of sampling via Mechanical Turk and its limitations is offered in Chapter IV.

Table 2.1: Characteristics of Cognitive Interview Subjects (N=33)

Covariates		
	N	%
Men	15	45.5%
Women	18	54.5%
Whites	22	64.6%
African Americans	5	14.7%
Latinos	4	11.7%
Asian	3	9.1%
Completed High School	2	6.1%
Some College	14	42.5%
Undergraduate Degree (B.A.)	9	27.2%
Graduate Degree (M.A., PhD.)	8	24.2%
Below $20,000	13	39.4%
$20,000 - $39,999	7	21.2%
$40,000 - $69,999	5	15.1%
$70,000 - $89,999	3	9.1%
$90,000 or more	5	15.1%
Central Texas	21	63.6%
Gulf Coast	7	21.2%
West Texas	5	15.2%
Age (Mean / Median)	42	40

To ensure greater diversity across the pool of subjects and advert was also posted on the classified adverts website Craigslist, which was put out to residents in each region visited. Similar to MTurk, Craigslist serves as an online local noticeboard that expands the potential reach of adverts outside of the limited number of venues that one individual would be able to recruit from alone. All subjects received a $10 token to recompense

their time, which is recommended by practitioners (Willis, 2005). Of the 33 respondents 15 were men and 18 were women. The average age across the sample was 42. The oldest subject was aged 71 (24 percent were over the age of 45), and the youngest was 19 years old (with 57 percent of those interviewed were under the age of 24). Nearly half interviewed had not completed any post-secondary education, with the other half having completed an undergraduate or graduate degree. Roughly 60 percent of the subjects had earnings under $40,000 annually. Information on political affiliation was collected from 26 individuals of which 16 self-identified as Democrats, eight as Republicans, and two as Independents (one leaning Democrat and one leaning Republican).

THE COGNITIVE INTERVIEW STRUCTURE

The cognitive interviews focused primarily on the content of the survey questions, rather than on the online administration. In line with best practice each interview lasted no longer than an hour because participants become tired and their attention flags (Hess, Rothgeb, and Nichols, 1998). To maximize the time and impact of each interview careful planning was done in advance. Unlike the respondents in the online testing phase, where the respondents would be locked into a treatment group, every face-to-face subjects who took part in a cognitive interview was exposed to a variety of treatments that were pre-selected at random. This meant that a subject could have received a vignette that provided both a savings estimate and the illegal immigrant prime for one question, a true control vignette for the second, and a bipartisan cue with no immigrant prime for the third, and so on.

Following the guidelines of best practice (Pressler et al, 2004; Willis and Lessler, 1999) each interview used both the think-aloud and verbal probing strategies. The think-aloud technique was developed by psychologists and was first systemized by Ericsson and Simon (1980), and involves minimal interruption on the part of the interviewer, except to say something like "tell me what you are thinking" when the subject pauses.

This technique helps to minimize the influence or bias that the interviewer may have over the subject (Willis, 2005). Individuals were first provided an overview of the project, asked to read each of the five vignettes aloud from a computer screen to mimic the conditions of the computer administered survey, and instructed to explain their thought process as they answered each survey question. After describing their decision making process, a series of unscripted, but consistently applied probes were put to each interviewee to ensure that specific terms and concepts held a similar meaning across subjects.[10] Notes on any potentially problematic areas of the processes that subject uses in arriving at an answer to the question was documented in the Question Appraisal System (QAS) developed by Willis and Lessler (1999) in accordance of best practice.[11]

THE RESPONDENTS OF THE ONLINE PRE-TESTING PHASE

Additional feedback on the general structure, wording, and user interface of the survey was collected from 50 respondents through the web-based crowdsourcing service MTurk in October 2015. Established in 2005 by the online marketplace Amazon.com, MTurk connects employers (referred to as *requesters*) and employees (referred to as *workers*) to complete tasks that cannot be automated (called human intelligence tasks or HITs). Researchers can limit access to their project to respondents in a specific country, and set a worker approval rating (similar to a star rating on the website EBAY) to improve the quality of the data. Given the subject matter, I restricted the sample to U.S. workers with a 95 percent approval rating. Workers are typically paid a small amount for each HIT completed. Amazon.com pays cash to workers that have provided bank details, and provides Amazon.com gift vouchers for workers without bank accounts or those unwilling to link their bank details to the company. Online respondents received a small

[10] A list of the probes that were used in each interview is provided in Annex 2.A

[11] An example of the QAS form is provided in Annex 2.B

payment of $1.00 for the completion of the survey, which was completed, on average, in about seven minutes. As with the payment provided to the cognitive interview subjects, the rate is high enough to alleviate concerns about exploitation, but the incentive is not greater than the payment offered through the LSE Behavioral Research Lab.[12]

The online system, anonymity, and financial incentives have raised concerns about the quality of the data (e.g. respondents engage in random clicking of response options or create multiple accounts to take surveys more than once). Researchers in several disciplines within the social sciences have helped to alleviate these fears by replicating the results of several experimental studies (Berinsky et al, 2012). Although the virtual setting is far less controlled than a typical laboratory setting, it does reflect a similar structure to the nationally representative AmeriSpeak panel, which the final version of the survey will be presented to. Additionally, MTurk has created safeguards to limit multiple submissions by a single participant by linking accounts to bank accounts and address, checking the information against the IP address. Concerns about respondents randomly clicking responses for payment was addressed at the front end through by including a 'weed-out' question that test whether a respondent is paying attention before they start. Additionally, in an experiment conducted by Prior and Lupia (2008) survey respondents who were offered a small financial inducement for their participation took more time to complete a survey and provided more accurate responses than those who participated without compensation. The findings suggest that offering a small monetary reward for participation can enhance the quality of the responses and reduce the level of noise in dataset.

[12] The LSE's Behavioral Research Lab pays respondents £10 for studies that last up to an hour. More information can be found at: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/management/research/behavioural-research-lab/faq.aspx

Table 2.2: Characteristics of Respondents for Online Pre-test Phase (N=57)

Covariates		
	N	%
Men	37	64.9%
Women	20	35.1%
Whites	47	82.5%
African Americans	2	3.5%
Latinos	2	3.5%
Asian	6	10.5%
Completed High School	10	17.5%
Some College	17	29.8%
Undergraduate Degree (B.A.)	24	42.2%
Graduate Degree (M.A., PhD.)	6	10.5%
Below $20,000	13	22.8%
$20,000 - $39,999	22	38.6%
$40,000 - $69,999	18	31.6%
$70,000 - $89,999	2	3.5%
$90,000 or more	2	3.5%
Democrat	40	70.2%
Republican	11	19.3%
Other / No Preference	6	10.5%
Age (Mean / Median)	34	33

Table 2.2 shows the characteristics of the respondents of the pretesting phase who were recruited from the crowdsourcing platform Mechanical Turk. Of the sample of 57 respondents, 37 were men and 20 were women. The average age across the sample

was 34. The oldest subject was aged 58 (8.7 percent were over the age of 45), and the youngest was 20 years old (with 14 percent of those interviewed were under the age of 24). Nearly 30 percent of respondents had not obtained a university degree, but only ten percent of respondents had a graduate degree. Similar to the subjects from the cognitive interviews, about 60 percent of the respondents had earnings under $40,000 annually. As with the sample of subjects, the online survey respondents were considerably more likely to identify with the Democratic Party.

The cognitive interviews and responses from the online pre-test provide invaluable feedback on the types of problems that respondents are likely to experience in a large scale survey and insights into how individuals engage with political frames on immigration policies. However, the subjects from this study were recruited rather than sampled. As a consequence, we cannot make any conclusions regarding the distribution of the responses, and we should use caution in how we interpret the findings. Namely, they are useful in identifying the types of issues that respondents may encounter, but not how often.

IV. Results

SURVEY ITEMS IDENTIFIED FOR IMPROVEMENTS

Some subjects recommended that certain terms be rephrased to make the scenarios clearer, less technical, and more easily interpreted.

Only one subject selected a 'Don't Know' response for one of the vignettes, however, she was able to articulate her ambivalence about the issue at hand. While no other subject was unable to form or express an opinion on any of the five survey questions, some had difficulty defining who the policies were directed at or reading specific terms (e.g. 'preventative' or 'return on investment'). Additionally, some subjects expressed skepticism over the strength of the statements. The revisions to each of the survey questions are included in the italicized text with changes underlined. Subjects' comments to demonstrate why these changes were advisable are also provided below:

CHILD TAX CREDITS

Original Phrasing - *"Tax credits for low-income parents encourage work and help lift thousands of families out of poverty. Also, when families spend these tax refunds it helps to boost our economy. [It is estimated that every $1000 credited to working parents generates $1,380 in local economic activity.] We must encourage every eligible tax payer [, including immigrants / illegal immigrants,] to file for child tax credits."*

A majority of subjects stated that the logic of the argument presented in this vignette was generally clear. However, a minority felt that an extra emphasis could be made that the tax credits would be targeted at families with children. Additionally, several subjects expressed dissatisfaction with the notion that tax credits encouraged work or lifted families out of poverty.

> *"I don't know if it encourages work – people who are not working are benefitting from other sources, they don't care if they can get a tax credit or not."*
>
> *"It [tax credits] will help you, it will help poverty stricken people, but it's not going to take them out of poverty and it's not going to encourage them to work. Now if you gave them $10,000 everybody would go to work. But it's not enough, they work at McDonald for $12,000, or what is it $15,000, what's $1,000 going to do?"*
>
> *"No tax credit is going to encourage people to work, they work because they've got to eat and pay their bills…I agree with the statement and the premise of the program, just not the part about encouraging work."*
>
> *"I wouldn't say it [tax credits] helps to lift them out of poverty cause if you in poverty, a tax credit is not going to lift you out…If you're making $10,000 a year and you get a tax credit, say it's $1,000, it helps, but you're still poor."*

The language on these points were adapted to signal that parents must be working to receive the credit and specify that the provision it was one of many strategies to fight poverty. The word child was also added to emphasize the program was targeted at families with children.

Revised Phrasing - *"The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working parents with low-incomes and is an important tool in the fight against poverty. Also, when families spend these tax refunds it provides a boost to our economy. [It is estimated that every $1,000 credited to working parents*

generates $1,380 in local economic activity.] We must encourage every qualifying tax payer [, including immigrants / illegal immigrants,] to file for child tax credits."

FOOD NUTRITION

Original Phrasing - *"Programs that provide low-income children and new mothers with access to nutritious food improve the health of infants, prevent developmental delays, and increase rates of childhood immunization. This generates enormous savings for schools and the health care system. [For example, every $1.00 spent on food nutrition programs results in $3.10 in health care savings alone.] We must get every eligible woman and child[, including immigrants / illegal immigrants,] to participate in the food nutrition program."*

Generally, subjects had a clear understanding of what the message on food nutrition was trying to convey. However, some felt that the vignette included information that was irrelevant to the rest of the argument and was therefore confusing. One subject in central Texas expressed concern about the immunizations stating:

> *"Stats on this one don't quite add up because there are savings for schools and health care system, how do kids get immunizations?"*

Some subjects expressed concern that the vignette was stating that low-income people meeting the eligibility criteria should be required to participate.

> *"I think we should be helping people, but this 'we must get' sounds like the government would be forcing people to do this, and I don't agree with that."*

> *"This 'get every eligible woman' that's a good thing to say, but in reality is hard to achieve, so that's maybe unrealistic."*

> *"Would we be forcing people to participate? I'm not comfortable with that."*

To simplify and distill the argument, careful emphasis was placed on the direct health benefits and economic savings, and the point about immunizations was omitted. Additionally, the language on boosting enrollment was modified to avoid confusion about requiring participation of low-income people.

Revised Phrasing - *"Programs that provide access to nutritious food to low-income children and new mothers improve the health of infants and prevent developmental delays. This generates enormous savings for schools and the health care system. [For example, every $1.00 spent on food nutrition programs*

results in $3.10 in health care savings alone.] We must make it easier for every eligible woman and child [, including immigrants / illegal immigrants,] to access the food nutrition program."

IN-STATE TUITION

Original Phrasing - *"In-state tuition rates make college an affordable option for millions of students and prepare the next generation of workers for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. Individuals who receive a college education earn more money over their lifetime and contribute more in taxes. For every $1.00 invested in getting students through college provides a $4.50 return on investment. We must maximize our benefit by increasing [~~increasing~~ including immigrants / illegal immigrants in] the number of students that qualify for in-state tuition."*

Several subjects commented that the 'return on investment' phrase listed in the in-state tuition question was potentially too technical and slowed down the cognitive process. Individuals also expressed confusion regarding where the savings could be applied. While others, particularly those who either had children in university or were paying tuition rates felt that the strength of the statement detracted from the statement's credibility. One younger subject in the Gulf Coast region stated:

> *"I understand this return on investment – I mean I get that this is 4.50 return, but I don't know what that means."*

Another older subject based in central Texas with limited education explained:

> *"It's long – I'm still trying to process this [return on investment] and I got to ask myself what is this asking and think about it. I guess it's saying when you complete this program you should be making more money."*

Three separate subjects located in Austin and Houston (one in the first round and two in the second), who each had children in university expressed skepticism that in-state tuition rates made college more affordable and prepares the next generation for better jobs.

> *"I gotta daughter at the University of Houston – she gets in-state tuition, but let me tell you something, it ain't cheap! She may not get a job when she's done, either. I know it's going to be ok in the long run- and I like that you included the phrase 'on average' and 'over the life-time' because I can see that this makes sense, but it's not affordable!"*

"My daughter is about to start school next week. We've been saving for years, and I'm in a higher income bracket that most people, but right now college kids aren't getting jobs and it's not affordable."

"I can tell you right now that even with in-state tuition, and I know it's cheaper, but University of Texas is not as affordable as it used to be. I moved in from out of state in the 1970's and I think I paid something like $18 per class – something ridiculous like that – it was nothing! Now, it's more than $15,000 with room and bored, and my kid was born and raised here in Austin."

While these sentiments did not seem to alter their opinion on the question itself, their comments illustrate that the language employed conjured up thoughts that could potentially detract attention away from the concepts being measured – whether immigrant participation in the in-state tuition program could alter enrollment preferences and economic benefit could neutralize the position. To minimize the risk of this distraction the language was softened.

Revised Phrasing - *"In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable and help to prepare students for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. On average, individuals who receive a college education earn more money over their lifetime and contribute more in taxes. [Estimates show every $1.00 spent in getting students through college provides a $4.50 return in higher tax revenue and reduced social services costs.] We must maximize our economic benefit by increasing [~~increasing~~ including immigrants / illegal immigrants in] the number of students that qualify for in-state tuition."*

HEALTH INSURANCE SUBSIDIES

Original Phrasing - *"New health insurance credits reduce monthly insurance payments and out-of-pocket costs for people with low and modest incomes. Elected officials / [Democrats] have worked to pass these subsidies to save taxpayers billions of dollars and provide millions of new patients with access to preventive health services. We should support health insurance credits to make sure that every qualifying person[, including immigrants / illegal immigrants] can purchase private health insurance."*

Some subjects expressed a lack of clarity over the terms subsidy and preventative health services. Additionally while many subjects intuitively linked this provision to 'Obamacare' some highlighted confusion about whether this meant the credits would be used to purchase private health insurance. Several subjects had difficulties reading or providing a quick definition for the term subsidy, and with this in mind, the term was removed.

"Sub…what is this…ok, subsidies - I know what it means, it's just hard to pronounce."

"Is a subsidy like a discount?"

"Subsidies – credits it's synonymous with that. You could use either one, but some people aren't going to know what you're talking about."

While most subjects never flagged any concerns about the term preventative health services and all were able to define the term, a few suggested that the phrasing could lead survey respondents to believe that health insurance credit may only cover preventative care instead of comprehensive care. These individuals recommended changes to broaden the scope to better reflect what the subsidy covers.

"[Preventative care is] just health services to prevent stuff from happening, not anything they do have, but this might be limited to what people can get from the doctor. People go to the doctor because something's wrong not because it hasn't gone wrong yet. It [the term preventative care] could be confusing it seems it limits what people get."

"Pre – [Struggles with reading the term preventative care] how do you say this?... I do preventative maintenance, so I know what it means, but maybe say monthly or annually check-ups."

The following edits were applied to the text of the vignette to reflect subjects' recommendations.

Revised Phrasing - *"Newly issued credits to purchase private health insurance provide a discount to reduce monthly payments and out-of-pocket costs for people with low and modest incomes. Elected officials / [Democrats] have worked to pass these credits to provide millions of new patients with access to health services, which saves the health care system and taxpayers billions of dollars. We should support health insurance credits to make sure that every qualifying person[, including immigrants / illegal immigrants] can purchase health insurance."*

PRENATAL CARE

Original Phrasing - *"Prenatal care is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. Elected officials / [Republicans and Democrats] have worked to expand prenatal care for women who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings to lower the risks of birth defects and reduce the high costs associated with premature births. We should support programs that cover all qualifying mothers[, including immigrants / illegal immigrants,] with prenatal care."*

Some subjects misread the term prenatal care, instead substituting the word parental. Each individual who made this error managed to catch the misinterpretation, and could easily provide an accurate description of the types of services provided for prenatal care. The language within the survey was slightly altered to simplify the wording of the vignette.

> *"Parental care is…wait that says prenatal care – it's ok though, I guess, I associate this with parents [laughs]. That's ok, right?"*

> *"I just said parental care, ha! I mean prenatal care. I've had babies, I should be able to say it!"*

Subjects' feedback motivated the following modifications to the prenatal care vignette:

Revised Phrasing - *"Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and premature births, and is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. Elected officials / [Republicans and Democrats] have worked to expand prenatal care for women who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should support programs that cover all qualifying mothers[, including immigrants / illegal immigrants,] with prenatal care."*

PRIOR KNOWLEDGE ABOUT ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA

All subjects were asked to describe what they understood the terms eligibility or qualify to mean. Every person interviewed was able to provide a clear response to this probe, which mainly centered around the income criteria, although the responses were sometimes varied.

> *"People who live in poverty. Earn under $40,000 a year and have five kids, expecting mothers who work, people on disability, people in the military, but mostly people in poverty."*

> *"Specific groups of people who meet certain criteria. There's some kind of formula that the government has that says people can apply."*

> *"People who are poor."*

> *"Poor kids that I went to school with. Poor Mexican and black kids, they live in housing developments and end up on a more problematic track and don't finish school."*

One self-identified Republican provided this explanation for who might qualify for some of the programs described in the vignettes:

"Your income has to be at a certain level, you have to pass a drug test, no debt, receive assistance from the Church. There's a hard cut-off, it's not fair for some people."

During the discussion several subjects raised questions about the eligibility rules of some of the provisions. This was not a common occurrence across the first twenty interviews, fewer than six subjects made any mention of the term.

> *"I don't know what the eligibility criteria is. Who is actually eligible, I don't know."*
>
> *"In terms of qualifying, what does qualifying mean?"*
>
> *"I'm not sure about the child tax credits. I would think you need to have kids and make a certain income. I agree with everything else, but I don't know enough about the rest like how close to the poverty line do people need to be?"*

Out of the 33 interviews one person selected the 'Don't Know' option for the in-state tuition question. However, given this feedback it became apparent that it was necessary to address this issue within the survey.

> *"Well, just don't know enough about who qualifies. I don't know enough about this program and I'm not sure if I can answer. [pause] No, I don't think I can give an answer."*

To avoid increasing the length of each vignette and to minimize the risk of priming respondents towards a particular response by drawing attention to the eligibility rules, it was necessary draft a general statement placed at the start the survey. The text below addresses the fact that each program has certain eligibility rules and that specific knowledge of these criteria is not necessary to form an opinion. The statement below was presented to the final ten subjects who participated in the cognitive interviews and 50 survey pre-test respondents immediately before the vignettes.[13]

Inserted Text - *"The purpose of this study is to better understand people's attitudes about government programs and politics more generally. Each program has specific rules that determine whether individuals*

[13] A copy of the text and layout of the survey is included in Annex 2.C.

can qualify for participation which may include things like income, residency, having children, or some other criteria.

Knowledge of the eligibility rules for each program is not necessary to answer any of the questions. Just read each scenario carefully and provide the response that best reflects your views."

REACTIONS TO THE IMMIGRANT CUES

The survey contains a treatment that primes U.S. citizens to think about 'illegal immigrants' and another for 'immigrants' participating in each program. These treatment primes are included to distinguish whether and the extent to which Americans respond to these different immigrant populations given the current political climate and the language used by political officials to polarize the electorate. Prior research suggests that citizens' knowledge of immigrant populations and immigration policy issues is low even when other areas of political knowledge are high. For instance, native-born citizens in Europe and the United States are known to over-estimate the number of immigrants residing in their respective country (Citrin and Sides, 2008; McLaren and Johnson 2007). Another study within the UK context shows that to the term 'immigrants' conjures up perceptions of people who are poorer, less educated, and in greater need of financial supports than the demographic snapshot of immigrants that is presented by the Office of National Statistics (Blinder, 2013). Although no study has identified the how attitudes towards various social services change when immigrant participation and legal status has been introduced, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2012) found that native citizens within the U.S. were universally much less likely to support hypothetical visa applicants if they were low-skilled migrants with limited English language skills, and even less supportive of hypothetical migrants when there was information indicating that the migrant had not entered the country legally.

The terms 'immigrant' and 'illegal immigrant' are used to reflect the language regularly employed by political officials of both political parties and a majority of media outlets (Hayes, 2008; Tenore, 2011). Although the use of the term illegal immigrant has

sparked its own debate, with several interest groups launching highly publicized campaigns challenging the use of the label, studies that have examined the effects of labeling unauthorized immigrants as 'illegal' have yet to produce evidence confirming these concerns. For instance one study by Knoll, Redlawsk and Sanborn (2011) tested a similar hypothesis, using the 'undocumented'/'Mexican' immigrant and 'undocumented'/'illegal' immigrant labels on two different samples of likely attendees of the Iowa Caucuses in 2007/2008, and produced no evidence of a direct framing effect by label or ethnicity cue. A second study by Merolla, Ramakrishnan and Haynes (2013), used a nationally represented sample through the Cooperative Congressional Election Study in November 2007, and tested whether the terms 'illegal'/'undocumented'/'unauthorized' altered respondent's preferences of national level policy options that had been considered in Congress that year. This project also yielded null results on the equivalency frames. Similarly, as a part of this doctoral research, I had run two separate pilot projects using a non-representative sample from the crowd sourcing platform Mechanical Turk and presented respondents with a series of similarly framed vignettes to those used in this survey instrument changing the labels from 'illegal' and 'unauthorized' and consistently found no difference across the treatment groups. In light of all of these findings it seems appropriate to mirror the language adopted in the current political debates.

DEFINITIONS OF IMMIGRANT AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT

Most subjects made some reference to the issue of legal status when defining the term 'immigrant.'

> *"Immigrants are people who are documented, but I guess it could also captures illegal immigrants."*
>
> *"Someone with a green card or paperwork that says they can be here."*
>
> *"Immigrants, well I think illegal. We don't talk about legal immigrants [laughs]. The word immigrant has an emotional point, [pause] it's funny because it's bad."*

The definitions for the term 'illegal immigrant' touched largely on the issue of visas, but some subjects expressed concern about the 'illegal' label.

> *"Somebody who is in this country unlawfully."*
>
> *"People who came here without a visa."*
>
> *"Someone who does not have the appropriate visas."*
>
> *"I hate the word illegal immigrant, it says that somebody is wrong."*
>
> *"It's interesting that you use the term 'illegal' rather than 'undocumented'."*

The vignette for prenatal care prompted an interesting discussion with many subjects, particularly among those with Republican leanings, regarding the distinction between the mothers without legal status and their unborn children who would receive U.S. citizenship at birth. Some subjects stated that this designation lead to their support for the prenatal care questions when they received the 'illegal immigrants' cue.

> One younger subject from central Texas who had expressed Libertarian leanings stated:
>
> *"Um, well I'm pretty sure the law is that if the baby is going to be born on U.S. soil that it's going to be a citizen. So, no matter what your stance is on illegal immigrants, you're going to be helping an American baby, so you know, help them [the mothers] too."*

Another self-identified Republican subject from the Gulf-coast provided the following comments regarding legal status:

> *"This is important... it ensures the mom and baby will be taken care of. Even illegal immigrants shouldn't hide in a closet because of a pregnancy. Babies before they are born need care, and they will be an American citizen. So I strongly agree."*

Political Interpretations of Immigration Cues

Recent research has suggested that partisanship may be a major contributing factor in shaping U.S. citizens' attitudes about immigrants and the uptick in punitive policy preferences. For instance, polling data from the Pew Research Center's 2014 study on immigration attitudes demonstrated that a majority of Americans (57 percent versus 35 percent) agree that immigrants strengthen the country rather than create burden.

However, when analyzed by party affiliation, only 17 percent of self-identified conservatives agree that immigrants strengthen the country as opposed to 93 of self-identified liberals. Additionally, two separate studies using nationally representative samples showed that U.S. citizens' brief exposure to both written and spoken Spanish or heavily accented English by Latino speakers, prompted a more punitive response regarding immigration related policies, but only among non-Hispanic white Republican voters (Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins 2014).

Several self-identified Democrats expressed concern that the term 'illegal immigrant' was politically loaded and would likely trigger a negative response from individuals with Conservative leanings. These concerns were not expressed by those who self-identified as Republicans.

> *"Illegal immigrant is a little loaded – just like Obamacare, it's loaded."*
>
> *"There's a lot of political weight, um I don't know how to put it, around this. It's like oh, 'I agreed with this until I see the illegal immigrants' – I can see a lot of people say yeah, I totally agree with this except not…not with this illegal immigrants. I could see where that would take this question and make it very political. 'Nope I don't believe in doing anything for illegal immigrants, and while I agree with 99% of this, I'm going to say no because of the illegal immigrants thing here.' If you left that out people would say, yeah I agree…I guess."*
>
> *"If you leave it [the term illegal immigrant], it's like 'this is what we're trying to do – save billions of dollars and get as many people covered on the private health insurance.' Right now, if illegal immigrants are in this eligible person thing, I don't even need to include that!...Fox-news wouldn't like this! They'd pick this thing apart."*
>
> *"You see, anytime you say illegal, now it could be including immigrants, but including illegals - for some people that's going to be a disagree not matter what else you have in there. This is going to be a 'no-go'… I'm bypassing it because of what I do, but I have to look at it and they're persons too, but the illegal it's like they're not persons too. So you've already put into someone's mind that these people are not people."*
>
> *"I would think that some would still disagree because of the immigrant. Now I would say that people who are anti-illegal immigrant benefits are the same people who are anti-health benefits people too."*

Several subjects from the cognitive interviews and respondents from the online testing-phase expressed ambivalence regarding the 'illegal immigrant' cue in influencing their policy preferences.

A respondent from the online testing phase provided the following comment about their conflict with the idea of illegal immigrants benefitting from public services:

> *"I must admit that I have mixed feelings about giving full services to people who come here illegally. I do not think that they are entitled to them. We are generous if we give them. We would not get services at all if we went to their country illegally... / Yet there are good things about educating children providing prenatal care and feeding children... I do not know how any feeling human being can deny food education and medical care to any child. I also believe that health care is a good thing for all people to get as it prevents the spread of diseases that will affect everyone in the community."*

One younger subject based in central Texas explained his ambivalence about the illegal immigrant prime:

> *"I would say that I strongly agree, but then I see the illegal immigrant. That has a nasty connotation is there another way to say this? Right now I'd say I agree because even with the immigrant it still makes them healthy, and that's important."*

A second online respondent shared similar sentiments:

> *"Some of these I strongly agreed with except including illegal immigrants - that reduced my answers down to agree with. I just don't know that if someone is here illegally the government has any responsibility towards them at all."*

Another respondent from the online testing phase offered a clearer perspective on how the prime changed their preference:

> *"I fully support societal (government paid) services for the poor. I DO NOT support AT ALL programs meant to help people who ARE ILLEGALLY PRESENT. Go home and get here legally. THEN I will show my support for you."*

EMERGING THEMES: SOCIAL COMPARISON & FAIRNESS

Several subjects expressed concerns about the fairness of immigrant participation in the public entitlement programs. While this is not a hypothesis that is being directly tested using the current survey instrument, the frequency with which it came up in subjects' think aloud exercise warranted some acknowledgement. Behavioral economists may offer some useful insights into this phenomenon with a growing body of empirical

evidence from experimental research demonstrating that individuals prioritize reciprocity in social and financial exchanges. Gächter and Thöni (2010) conducted laboratory gift exchanges in several countries, including 56 subjects within the U.S., to test the 'fair-wage effort' hypothesis and found that workers' that experienced lower wages reduced their efforts when workers had information that colleagues earned substantially more. More recently, an experiment conducted on seasonal contract workers in Germany provided evidence supporting the social comparison hypothesis showing that wage reductions lowered worker productivity and satisfaction only when colleagues in the same team had not experienced a similar wage cut. The researchers note that individuals with identical characteristics whose colleagues experienced the similar wage cut to their colleagues did not report lower satisfaction or reduced productivity (Cohn, Fehr, Herrmann, and Schneider, 2014). These scholars' findings provide an interesting framework to help explain the views expressed by the interviewees.

Concerns about the issue of fairness regarding immigrant participation, specifically illegal immigrant participation, in public benefits were raised by some subjects with less education and others with Republican leaning. These concerns were not raised among self-identified Democrats with more education.

A construction worker in central Texas who did not express any partisan leanings raised the issue of fairness in this way:

> *"I'm not sure about the immigrants – I'm not real high on it. Us as American people who are paying taxes and we should get stuff first, but there are a lot of things that we can't get even though we pay taxes, so it's about fairness…That would cause me to disagree with it, but without it [illegal immigrants] then I question who is included. Not to say that illegal immigrants bother me, but I don't want them there to get what I can't get."*

A younger subject from central Texas who attended community college in central Texas expressed concerns when he compared his situation to the illegal immigrants:

> *"Illegal immigrants don't lose out on anything. So I say no, but eventually I'm going to lose 'cause I can't put myself in their shoe when they benefit from this."*

A self-identified Republican in the Gulf Coast region articulated financial concerns but stressed the issue of responsibility:

> *"I strongly disagree with this one. We should not be paying anything to illegal immigrants, legal ones yes. The reason why? It's bankrupting our country. We should be taking care of our own, not those. The government, well their [emphasis] government should be taking care of their own people."*

A subject from west Texas who self-identifies as a Republican expressed her reservation regarding immigrant participation in programs and the issue of fairness linking it to homeless citizens:

> *"All mothers need care for their safety, but it does make me mad that we have all of these homeless VA vets and immigrants get more than them. It's not fair people are forced to pick and choose what they can get because of their income – if you need it, no matter what. We need to look at our own back yard first to see who gets benefits. But they [immigrants] can get more than the VA gets, you know. Why work? They qualify for more than our good old Americans. I think we should be fair on immigrants, but look after our own first."*

REACTIONS TO THE SAVINGS ESTIMATES

Americans' attitudes on taxes are known to be complex. On one hand, most individuals want high quality services accessible to many, but their expressed willingness to pay remains low (Meltsner, 1974). Political scientists contend that some political actors capitalize on individuals' concerns about immigration as a means of mobilizing voters in an effort to reduce the size and scope of the welfare state (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Messina, 1989). A wealth of empirical evidence demonstrates that individuals are more opposed to taxes that are more visible (Cabral and Hoxby, 2012; Citrin, 1978; Finkelstein, 2007; Meltsner 1974) and in recent years political strategists have emphasized the government costs associated with immigrants (Hanson et al, 2007). This survey is specifically designed to address the issues raised by the sponsors of exclusionary policies – immigrant participation, concerns about unauthorized immigrants and the perceived tax burden. However, I deviate from prior work by presenting native citizens with positively framed information about the return on investment for means-tested

programs. By altering the perspective to focus on the fiscal benefits rather than fiscal burdens I seek to neutralize some of the negative effects about immigrant participation and simulating a social and economic reward for maximizing enrollment. We currently have little knowledge on the impact of concrete savings estimates in relation to immigrant participation on views about social welfare programs, however, the subjects from the cognitive interviews provided many interesting insights into how this may affect citizens' support.

Many subjects stated that the savings estimates presented influenced their support for the programs put in front of them.

One subject from central Texas who self-identified as a Democrat provided these comments about the savings estimates presented for the food nutrition program:

> *"I would agree with that. I feel like it's a cycle if you give them the habits and the resources and the knowledge it equips them to tackle this themselves so they cycle out…At first I was thrown because we got the health benefits here, then it went into the saving for schools, but then the statement resolves itself here with the 'for every dollar we spend here, we get x back.' [Pause] Yeah it's helpful, because if it just said it creates enormous savings, I'd be like, why? But this makes it clear – we get something back."*

One subject from the Gulf Coast with strongly expressed Republican leanings stated:

> *"I agree with this because it makes sense. You're saving money…if you lay a dollar out and you get $3.10 back that's a no-brainer. Plus, most of those kids don't have it anyway. So yeah, you're netting $2.10 back."*

Another subject in central Texas with no stated political affiliation provided the following explanation about how the numbers influenced her opinion on some of the vignettes presented: "

> *It was really interesting reading some of the statistics, like the $3.10 for every dollar, and the $1,380 for every $1,000 – I felt like I was learning. And having those statistics made me more inclined to agree, maybe because anyone can say [funny voice], 'this will improve the economy.' But actually having the numbers to back it up it gave me something to get behind."*

Once exposed to the concrete savings estimate some subjects expressed a desire for more numeric information, sometimes because they were curious and found the information helpful, but others expressed skepticism about the source of this information.

One younger subject with no stated political affiliation requested numeric information that had no relation to the fiscal arguments presented:

> *"I wanted to see a statistic like I did with the other questions – maybe something about the life expectancy when they get these credits that would be helpful."*

A subject based in west Texas who is a self-identified Republican provided this reaction to the savings estimate:

> *"I'm one of those that I don't always believe what I read. I'm going with the premise that these numbers are true, that they're correct, but normally I would want to do some extensive research to find out exactly what that means…I'm skeptical because the government spends my money like I have a lot of it [laughs], and I don't!"*

Another subject in central Texas who is a self-identified Democrat also wanted more information regarding the savings estimates provided:

> *"Some of the things that I see, like this $3.10 savings on health care alone – the first thing I think about is over what period? These are things that I've read a bit about, and I strongly agree. Probably because I've heard other people say that. Um, yeah that seems definitely plausible. I've heard other people have done these kinds of studies, and their results are positive. So, yeah - this sounds like one of those things I've heard about – and I've never heard anything where they say we've spent money on low-income women and children and it wasn't very useful, so we're not going to do that anymore [laughs]!"*

Partisans tended to be more skeptical about the numerical estimates provided as compared to those without strong political affiliation.

REACTIONS TO THE (NON)PARTISAN CUES

An individual's allegiance to a political party is believed to be one of the most important predictors of policy preferences. Well-cited work by Campbell et al. (1960) suggests that individuals with stronger bonds to a political party exhibit greater perceptual distortion towards the party's platform. A generation of scholars have

supported this line of reasoning, consistently demonstrating that the politically engaged interpret new political messages with a bias toward their existing preferences and express their opinions to align with or justify their party's position (Bartles, 2002; Druckman et al, 2010; Gaines et al, 2007; Gilens, 2001; Goren, 2002; Goren et al, 2009; Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1988; Zaller, 1992). When partisan voters are presented with a political message from their chosen (opposing) party they tend to support (reject) the message and accept (reject) the political consequences articulated in the statement (Abramowitz 2010; Zaller, 2004).

One subject in central Texas, a Democrat, provided insights into how his political leanings impact his level of trust in the information within the vignettes for the food nutrition program, which lacks a partisan prime, stating:

> *"I'm in this camp. I can't educate myself on all the issues because I come from that side of things. The people I vote for tell me these things are good, so I would probably believe this."*

Citizens are more prone to engage in partisan reasoning when reminded of the origins a political message, but Zaller (1992) suggests that their response should be more positive when they receive a message that signals political consensus because this elevates the issue into the mainstream. Later research supports this finding demonstrating that citizens with higher levels of political knowledge and participation were more likely to be persuaded by political messages and lend their support to political issues when they receive information that indicates partisan consensus (Druckman et al, 2010; Goren et al, 2009). The comments from some interview subjects in relation to the bipartisan prime starkly contrast the findings from prior work and raise important questions into the pervasiveness of polarization in American politics.

Many subjects, even those without a stated partisan leaning, associated the vignette for the health insurance subsidy with 'Obamacare' even though the term 'Obamacare' was never included in the vignette.

Nonpartisan ('Elected official') cue to Nonpartisan - *"That's the new Obamacare – that's the key word – is it seen as derogatory? You could see if that turns people off, but that's the danger of using it."*

Partisan cue on Nonpartisan - *"Is this Obamacare?... Oh yeah, I didn't pick up on the Democrats, but I know I've heard about this. Yeah, you can't call it Obamacare."*

Partisan cue to Nonpartisan - *"This issue [health insurance subsidies] is divided along party lines, so it makes it worse. We can't find middle ground, it's difficult [Pause] So, don't mention Democrats, it's a hot button word. They will start making assumptions."*

Subjects who expressed a partisan leaning, but received the party sponsor cue expressed strong emotions when asked to discuss their views about the vignette for the health insurance subsidy.

A subject in west Texas who is a self-identified Republican wanted to omit partisan information because she felt it would reduce support among other Republicans:

Partisan cue to Partisan (Republican) - *"I know that this was done by the Dems, so I don't care if it says this, but for some it may change how they see it. You don't even have to make it a person – policy or the new law. The law was written to pass these credits. Even though I blame them personally, if it read another way I'd still say, 'Well, who passed the damn law?' I can pick that a part [laughs]. I saw that it said Democrats, and I know those S.O.B.'s did that [laughs]…I truly believe that when this law passed, well I don't believe it was passed, it was shoved (emphasis) either down my throat or up my back-side! [laughs]. Either way um…I believe initially it started with good intentions, but later down the line I think they started to say, 'How dare you question what I've put together. I've worked hard on this.' Then it just got to, 'Screw you, it's just going to happen.' And so it's not the law of the land, it's the forced of the government. And I think when they did this they took away individual rights."*

A Gulf-Coast Democrat echoed the concerns expressed by the Republican woman from West-Texas, emphasizing the his perceptions of what the 'typical' Republican would say:

Partisan cue to Partisan (Democrat) - *"I think a lot of people would strongly disagree with this because 'they haven't saved the system billions of dollars – I've been told that's not true and it's a big waste of money'…people more on the Republican or conservative side of things, anyone who watches Fox news on semi-regular basis is probably going to disagree with that. I think there are a couple of things they'd disagree with, both that there is savings with, uh Obamacare, I mean we're talking about Obamacare here – um and, so people would disagree with the premise."*

A Gulf-Coast Republican responded to the Democratic cue with a partisan-centered argument:

Partisan cue to Partisan (Republican) - *"I disagree. Number one, I think what they're doing is, well a lot of people are going to lose their health care because they can't afford it because they're paying for everyone else's. So I strongly disagree. What I think is that they should have left it alone and taken all the money they wasted and given everybody health insurance. They need to improve on it, don't get me wrong, but it's going to cost everybody! They're taking $1-3 trillion out of Medicaid and Medicare to pay for this deal. So it's going to hurt the people who need it the most, to pay for this. So I think they should have left it alone and funded health insurance for everybody else. I'm not sure how it works, but they're spending money like it's not theirs."*

Subjects who expressed a partisan leaning, but received the elected official prime still provided emotional responses about the vignette for the health insurance subsidy.

Nonpartisan (Elected officials) cue to Partisan (Democrat) - *"So the country seems to be fairly polarized, especially in terms of immigration and health care. I think the past eight years, with Obama, it's pushed the country to be more polarized um, which sucks. I wish we could all just get a long, and we're probably a lot closer to things than we realize. But you've got people who are - well the whole Republican Party is trying to separate itself out from the Democratic Party as much as possible, and the Democratic Party probably does the same thing. Me, being someone identifying more as a Democrat, I see the party as trying to be more inclusive and [different voice] 'we'd like you guys to agree with us'. I see Republicans as very adversarial [different voice] 'we don't care what you think, this is the right way! Whether you agree with us or not, this is the right way!' But you know, I'm biased because I identify with this crowd and not that crowd."*

Nonpartisan (Elected officials) cue to Partisan (Democrat) - *"Oh, I got one more thing to say on this one, you say elected officials have worked to pass. Well not necessarily. I mean, some [emphasis] elected officials have worked to pass these credits [laughs], but a whole lot [emphasis] have not worked to pass this. It's not like the whole government is working on this – we got maybe half and half because the Congress and Senate are split and, uh, is pretty much weighing on the not-doing-it. I mean the Obamacare was pushed through, and the Supreme Court said, 'yeah we could do this stuff'. But there's a time coming in where this may not look the same…But don't put Democrats in there either, to me this has to be as generic as possible because you're going to interview people who, I mean, I'm looking at this from a biased perspective, if you're going to have a multitude of people doing this survey, you don't want stuff in it that's going to turn people off. So telling a Republican, I see Democratic officials – we're already going to be in the 'disagree' category."*

Some subjects thought the bipartisan cue did send a positive message that prenatal care was a universal issue. However, most partisans were skeptical of the idea that Republicans and Democrats would be willing to work together. Many Republicans cited Democrats' strong support and unilateral passage of the Affordable Care Act, and Democrats often cited recent efforts made by Republican officials to reduce funding for the women's health care program Planned Parenthood.

Bipartisan cue to Nonpartisans - *"I love that it says both Republicans and Democrats, because if it was just like, 'Republicans did this' then my first thing would be like, 'damn those Democrats! They hate babies!' So, good call on that [laughs]! I think it's compelling that they both did it because then it can be clear that this is something that everyone universally agrees on, and it's not just something that one political party wants everyone to believe in."*

Bipartisan cue to Partisans (Republican) - *"If they're working together, it's an issue that crosses the aisle. It's not right to expect very vulnerable section of the population to not get help with this [prenatal care]. If you can plan ahead to help the child there are some basic fixes and the health concerns are important."*

Bipartisan cue to Partisans (Republican) - *"Well that's what's happening right? Well number one if it weren't bipartisan I don't think it'd pass. Oh but wait, I can't say that because the Democrats were able to push through the health care without even one Republican vote, so maybe I don't believe it. It really doesn't matter who passes it I'm good with it, but I guess it could make a difference."*

Bipartisan cue to Partisan (Democrat) - *"I notice that you use Republicans and Democrats in this one instead of just politicians [pause] uh women's health has been a really big issue in Texas, namely on the matter of abortion. But if they're closing down clinics, it doesn't seem as if they're expanding care. I would be interested in learning more."*

Bipartisan cue to Partisan (Democrat) - *"No, don't you know they cut Medicaid and they cut CHIP, I mean here in Texas. So I strongly disagree with this. I mean we used to do a lot more – we used to have WIC and now they're refusing to let us join Obamacare and expand Medicaid, which would help poor mothers. I do know that the county does stuff – I work for Travis County. Even then, they don't advertise the county clinics where you can get free prenatal care and vaccines and stuff, but they don't want people to know about it. Why not? Because then the costs would go up. So I disagree… I don't think we're working to expand. Yeah this is what I disagree with – 'the Republicans and Democrats'. I just read in the paper, maybe Sunday's paper that the Republicans are screwing with Medicaid and Planned Parenthood. It makes me angry…they're making it more difficult, making mothers take on more costs – they're working to reduce as much as possible – reduce Medicaid, reduce free health for women, you know they can't even afford birth control. So I disagree with that sentence enough that I disagree with the whole statement – take that middle sentence out!"*

V. Conclusions

Policy makers and political entrepreneurs regularly employ messaging strategies on immigration with the aim of influencing public opinion to secure electoral victory (Hayes, 20008; Abrajano and Hajinal, 2017; Tichenor, 2002). A large and vibrant body of research has demonstrated that political issue frames can play a major role in shaping preferences on a variety of topics (e.g. Druckman et al, 2010; Goren 2002; Iyengar and

Kinder, 1987; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Krosnick and Brannon, 1993; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004; Zaller, 1992). But our understanding of how Americans actually interpret these frames is limited because political communication is often difficult for individuals to process (Druckman et al, 2010; Martin and Polivka, 1995) and prior experiences (Gaines, et al, 2007; Sniderman and Piazza, 2002) also influence decisions. These factors require a more complex study design, and vignette survey experiments have helped to innovate the approach to analyzing the complicated mix of competing messages found in political communication (e.g. Sniderman and Theriault, 2004; Chong and Druckman, 2007).

The cognitive interview subjects offered a glimpse into U.S. citizens' opinions about how immigrant participation can influence preferences about various public entitlement programs. The findings revealed that most subjects comprehended the language and policies as intended and across the group. Subjects consistently noticed when an immigrant cue was embedded in one of the vignettes, and the definitions they came up with for both immigrants and illegal immigrants were overwhelmingly uniform across the sample. Most subjects' reactions to the concrete savings estimates demonstrated, at least in some instances, that it was possible to neutralize the negative effect of the illegal immigrant cue. However, some subjects expressed skepticism about the savings estimates.

Many subjects seemed to link the issue of immigration to politics, often noting the issue of immigration more generally as a 'hot-button' political issue. This seemed to be a particularly prominent concern among those who expressed some sort of political leaning.

> *"Does politics drive the response to the questions? I mean whatever end of the spectrum, whatever source of news they get their information from – we've kind of been told which way we're going to go. I'm a left-leaning Democrat and the group of people I agree with support this, and I agreed with everything...This is good because it presents evidence based arguments, but these aren't always effective because the topics we're discussing here are in the political sphere."*

It was not uncommon for individuals of both political parties to express concern that the vignettes set immigrant group in relation to the public entitlement programs because they felt it would negatively influence Republican respondents, not Democrats. On this point Democrats stated the political ramifications of an immigrant prime would decrease support for the provision, and Republicans seemed to be concerned on some level about how they as a party might be perceived. This is an important take-away as the subjects in this study did not enter as a blank canvas. Their previous experience helped shape their attitudes regarding immigrant cues and the policies under consideration.

Through the cognitive interviews I gained rich insights into some of the factors that influence Americans' preferences about public entitlement programs, immigrant participation in these programs, and the political dynamics at play. For some subjects, their ethnic background - being Mexican American - played a role in their how they perceived the immigrant cues. Others highlighted their vocation – a Methodist preacher – meant they could not exclude a person from any public program regardless of where they were born. Although these were important considerations for a handful of subjects, across the entire group, partisanship emerged as the most substantive factor swaying their preferences on the topic at hand.

This outcome falls in line with prior research in the field of understanding framing effects in which partisans' identity altered their interpretation of the facts (Gaines, et al, 2007). Subjects with strong party attachment crafted arguments that helped support their respective party's position on the policy at hand. This expression of partisan interpretation was most evident when they observed the partisan cues embedded in the frames, and this seems to be a necessary addition to vignette survey experiments aimed at examining individuals' attitudes about immigrants in the U.S. and their policy preferences for this population.

Annex 2.A – Verbal Probes Presented to Each Subject (without script)

- Can you talk though why you picked this answer?
- What were you thinking of when you picked this answer?
- Can you tell me what you were thinking when you answered this way?
- Can you give me some examples?
- What came to mind when you read _____?
- "I noticed you pausing - what were you thinking about answering that question?"

Meaning of words/phrases and questions

- What does the word _____ mean to you?
- What does the phrase _____ mean to you?
- The scenario asked you _____. What did you think of _____ in this context?

Low-income Moderate income Prenatal care Premature births
Preventative care
Return on investment Cost-effective Child tax credits Democrats
Republicans and Democrats
Immigrant Illegal Immigrant

Sensitivity

- Do you think others would have difficulty answering a question or would answer the question honestly?

Comprehension

- Do you feel this is a question that people would or would not have difficulty understanding?

Annex 2.B – Example of QAS Form

OL – August 18, 2015
Male - African American – 1955 - Single
Custodial Staff –$50-59K
Political Views: N/A

Evaluate Reading – Does the participant have difficulty reading the any part of the question? Underline words and phrases where readers experience difficulty or extended pauses.		
Conflicting or Inaccurate Instructions: Introductions or Explanations	Y	N
Complicated Instructions: Introductions or Explanations	Y	N
Wording: Lengthy, ungrammatical, or awkward phrasing, complicated syntax	Y	N
Technical Terms: Undefined, unclear, or complex terms	Y	N
Notes:		
Interpretation of the Questions		
Clarity: Problems related to communicating the intent or meaning of the question	Y	N
Vague: Multiple ways to interpret the question or to decide what is to be included or excluded.	Y	N
Notes:		
Knowledge/Logic – Problems with the underlying logic of any portion of the question		
Knowledge: Unable to understand specific terms within the question	Y	N
Attitude: Is the respondent unable to formulate an attitude being asked about?	Y	N
Recall: Does the respondent have problems remembering the information asked for?	Y	N
Computation: Does the question require any difficult mental calculation?	Y	N
Notes: Does not like 'return on investment' and in-state tuition to a lesser extent. Prenatal care said 'parental care' but then defined prenatal care.		
Sensitivity Bias		
Sensitive Content: Does the respondent feel that there is any content that is embarrassing, private, or of a sensitive topic that may prevent them or any individual from answering the question honestly?	Y	N
Sensitive Wording: Are there any suggested improvements to the wording to minimize sensitivity?	Y	N
Socially Acceptable: Does the respondent not respond	Y	N
Notes: Commented that illegal immigrant may cause trouble but then defined what he thought was an illegal immigrant, and did not think that it would prevent respondents from avoiding the question.		

CHAPTER III (PAPER 2)

ARE AMERICANS WILLING TO REJECT A FISCAL BENEFIT TO EXCLUDE IMMIGRANTS FROM PUBLIC ENTITLEMENTS?

Abstract

The study explicitly tests three major theories believed to spark exclusionary policies directed at the foreign-born – concerns about immigrant participation in government funded programs, animosity towards unauthorized immigrants, and the perceived tax burden. Economists, psychologists, and political scientists have all demonstrated that individuals are less willing to fund public services when the costs are explicitly stated and when an emphasis is on unpopular beneficiaries. The vast evidence showing the impact of political frames suggests that political messages centered on the immigrant tax burden would negatively influence Americans' enrollment preferences for government funded programs, but would a similar pattern emerge if individuals were exposed to a positive frame emphasizing the general benefits of such policies? Also, could providing Americans with a concrete savings estimate associated with the policies weaken opposition to immigrant participation, or would citizens reject these savings to block immigrant access? Data from a unique survey experiment put to a nationally representative sample (N= 1,931) of U.S. citizens reveal that immigrant participation consistently induced more exclusionary responses, irrespective of educational attainment and income levels, indicating that pocketbook concerns are not driving these preferences. Although there are significant differences the responses of Republicans and Democrats, the findings reveal that immigrant cues consistently trigger more negative responses irrespective of party identification. Finally, across all groups there was little evidence indicating the savings estimates reduce punitive policy preferences, suggesting that Americans will reject a fiscal benefit to block immigrant access to government funded programs.

I. Introduction

Over the last 25 years elected officials and other political actors regularly emphasize the negative effects of immigration, often putting costs squarely at the center of this debate. Recent efforts have included a slew of efforts proposed at all levels of government including re-examining the U.S. Constitution to prohibit birthright citizenship for the children of unauthorized migrants (Immigration Reform Law Institute, 2006) and implementing English-only ordinances in towns throughout the country (Preston, 2011).

More recently, prominent pollsters in the realm of the U.S. political system have spent months trying to explain how they could have so badly miscalculated the controversial entrepreneur Donald Trump's elevation to become the President of the United States. A candidate's favorability rating is measured using the following survey question – "Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of businessman, Donald Trump?" Public opinion researchers heavily rely upon this measure as a strong predictor of candidate success (Shaw, 1999). Although he had not officially announced his candidacy, Trump's favorability ratings were significantly less popular than previous contenders who had secured their party's nomination, and significantly less popular than the other candidates expected to be in the race to lead the Republican Party (Enten and Silver, 2016).

However, after giving a speech in which he stated: "*I would build a great wall. And nobody builds walls better than me, believe me. I will build a great, great wall on our southern border. And I will have Mexico pay for that wall. Mark my words.*" Trump's favorability ratings immediately leaped from 35 to 52 percent (Chase et al, 2016; Lind, 2016). Although many of his most ardent supporters live in communities where there are relatively few immigrants (Rothwell and Diego-Roswell, 2016), a growing number of scholars and pollsters have reached a consensus that the issue of immigration has fueled Donald

Trump's success, and that he is bringing new voters into the political process (Gimpel, 2016).

Historical analysis shows that political actors from across the political spectrum regularly invoke hostile frames directed at immigrants either for the purpose of shoring up support or to implement restrictionist policies (Tichenor, 2002). For instance, consider a 1993 news report in The Los Angeles Times quoting Henry Cisneros, the Secretary for Housing and Urban Development under President Clinton: *"there are some benefits [that illegal aliens] clearly ought not have... health benefits and welfare benefits and others that serve as a magnet attracting people here from other countries."*

Although there was little evidence to support this claim,[14] the argument that immigrants enter the U.S. to benefit from the social safety net and subsequently drive up the costs for taxpayers, was used as an impetus for the passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). Commonly referred to as welfare reform, the legislation effectively made citizenship a central component of eligibility, and was framed as a necessary step to improve the 'quality' of the immigrants by deterring individuals who were perceived to be a higher risk of enrolling in public services from ever settling within the U.S. (Fix and Passel, 2002). Politicians placed particular emphasis on a specific fiscal projection that estimated the immigrant provisions of the law would save nearly 40 percent within six years of implementation (Congressional Budget Office, 1996).

Ten years after welfare reform, households that had at least one non-citizen family member were significantly less likely to be enrolled in entitlement programs, as compared to households totally comprised of citizens (Capps, Fix, and Henderson, 2009; Ellwood and Ku, 1998). The projected savings also never materialized, which was

[14] More detailed explanations on the push / pull factors and cumulative causes that spark migration to the United States see: Durand and Massey, 1992; Espenshade, 1995; Massey, 1990, 1993. Research investigating enrollment levels and the public cost of immigrants showed that immigrants were less likely to be enrolled in public benefits programs than native born citizens including: Blau, 1984; Borjas and Trejo, 1993; Tienda and Jensen, 1986.

perhaps unsurprising as the share of foreign born enrolled in federal entitlements programs made up only 15 percent of the total case-load in 1996 (Fix, Capps, and Kaushal, 2009). Nevertheless, these facts failed to dampen the political rhetoric on this issue. Text from the influential political strategist Dr. Frank Luntz's (2005) messaging manual on immigration policy captures the sentiment well: *"Fix the immigration problem and we begin to fix the economy. Fix the immigration problem and we reduce the cost of government. Fix the immigration problem and taxpayers get the break they deserve."*

The aim of this study is to narrow the gaps in our understanding of how public opinion about the foreign-born influences American citizens' willingness to restrict access to government funded initiatives. To disentangle the impact of these attitudes on policy preferences aimed at immigrant populations I provide evidence from an original nationally representative dataset of 1,931 respondents.[15] These participants were exposed to three experimental vignettes to determine whether concerns about specific immigrant groups influence their willingness to exclude for programs that reduce poverty and inequality and whether providing a concrete savings estimate could help to weaken opposition to immigrant participation. Additional tests were also conducted to determine whether education and income levels as well as political partisanship affect support restrictionists policies.

CURRENT GAPS IN THE LITERATURE & EVIDENCE

Some academics have argued that candidates and other political actors can recalibrate partisan alignments by exploiting citizens' concerns about immigrants (Messina, 1989). The theory suggests that political actors can promote policies that penalize immigrant populations in order to obtain an electoral advantage (Simon and Alexander, 1993; Wilson, 2001) with the aim of reducing the size of the welfare state (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). But can a messaging strategy that emphasizes immigrant

[15] Using the power analysis (See Annex 3.C) to estimate the appropriate size of the sample to detect any differences across treatment groups. This approach is recommended as best-practice in population-based survey experiments and is a requirement of the TESS submissions process.

participation in government-funded programs really alter the way Americans view these initiatives?

Scholars have examined the links between individuals' attitudes about immigrants and preferences for restricting access to public programs (e.g. Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Clark, Passel, Zimmermand, and Fix, 1994; Fachinni and Mayda, 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter, 2007; Hopkins, 2010; Olzak, 1992), but there is little agreement as to what is driving the hostility. We know from prior research that states with a higher concentration of ethnic minorities, particularly immigrant populations, tend to have lower expenditures (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999; Hopkins, 2009) and more stringent eligibility criteria for means-tested programs (Graefe, De Jong, Hall, Sturgeon, and Van Eerden, 2008; Hero and Tolbert, 1996). We also know that citizens tend to be less supportive of spending on public goods and redistributive policies when they live in more ethnically diverse communities (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Luttmer 2001; Vigdor, 2004). However, we have limited knowledge about citizens' predisposition for blocking different immigrant groups from social welfare provisions.

There is a wealth of evidence demonstrating that individuals' attitudes regarding redistributive policies can be shaped by the tone and content of the information presented, or how a political message is framed (e.g. Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1996; Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2003 and 2006; Druckman, 2001; Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade, 1999; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004). For instance, political frames generate greater levels of support for social welfare provisions when they spell out the connections between the governmental policy and the target population (Jacoby, 2000). Still, Americans' reactions to these frames are, at least to some extent, affected by their attitudes about the potential beneficiaries (Schneider and Ingram 1993; Nelson and Kinder 1996). While Americans are generally sympathetic towards 'the poor' some segments of society (e.g. immigrants) are perceived as less deserving, and this underlying bias could have an adverse effect on enrolment preferences (Gilens, 1999).

Scholarly work has also shown that individuals harbor greater opposition to taxes or funding of public services when the costs are explicitly stated (Cabral and Hoxby, 2012; Finkelstein, 2007; Green et al, 1994; Meltsner 1974; Povich, 2014). Citrin (1979) argued that this tax burden tunnel vision often leads voters to support policies (tax cuts) that can harm individual and societal interests. The large and growing body of research adds credence to the claim that political messages centered on the immigrant tax burden would negatively influence U.S. citizens' willingness to allow immigrant participation in government funded initiatives. But would a similar pattern emerge if individuals were exposed to a positive frame emphasizing the general benefits of such policies? Also, could this opposition to immigrant participation be weakened if Americans received a concrete savings estimate associated with the policies, or would citizens reject these savings to block immigrant access?

Examining Citizens' Opposition to Immigrant Participation

The early studies investigating the links between hostility towards immigrants and punitive policy preferences offer evidence to establish a strong theoretical foundation, but unfortunately, the research designs and datasets employed by these studies introduce serious limitations and multiple forms of bias. Namely, the attitudinal data used in these studies were not collected for the specific purpose of examining immigration attitudes in the context of exclusionary policies, which makes it difficult to parse out the particular strands that weave together of voters' view in this realm (Schildkraut, 2013). Large-scale surveys like the General Social Survey (GSS) or the National Elections Survey (NES) do provide high quality attitudinal data with a nationally representative sample, all of which yield some useful insights into citizens' perceptions of the foreign-born. However, the survey questions from these data sources often use general wording referring to 'immigrants' and 'welfare' and are presented completely separate questions, ruling out any potential for causal claims (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010).

Second, the language used in the questions does not allow researchers to distinguish citizens' attitudes about immigrants based on their legal status. Schildkraut (2013) notes the serious implications this lack of specificity has on research findings, as she identified substantial differences in respondents' attitudes for immigration policies depending the wording of questions related to immigrant populations, and the policy proposals presented. In recent years, concerns related to unauthorized immigrants have dominated the public discourse of the immigration debate (Massey and Pren, 2012). The inability to disentangle these differences in citizens' attitudes is also problematic because a growing body of research has shown that citizens in the U.S. (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012; Hartman, Newman and Bell, 2013; Iyengar et al; 2013) and across Europe (Ford, 2011; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013) hold different attitudes towards immigrants depending on various background characteristics, including legal status.

While evidence from peer-reviewed studies examining the citizens' exclusionary preferences across policies is limited, it is also plausible that attitudes may change under the context of different spending entitlement programs. Currently 20 states, including those with Republican controlled legislatures and above average immigrant populations, have allowed unauthorized immigrants to attend public universities at in-state tuition rates (Leber, 2013, National Conference of State Legislatures, 2015). If the people's will is reflected in policy outcomes, then it stands to reason that citizens may be more supportive of specific immigrant groups benefiting from university education. However, polling data referenced (2005) to justify Dr. Frank Luntz's framing on exclusionary policies indicates growing support for more restrictive policies for in-state tuition rates and 'welfare' provisions, but less restrictive positions for primary and secondary education and emergency health care access.[16]

16 Although Luntz's messaging manual fails to include any information methodology or sampling strategy for the data provided - raising doubts about the representativeness of the polling data, his prominent role in the drafting of Newt Gingrich's 'Contract with America" has provided him as an influential strategist particularly among Republican policy makers (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000). This level of influence warrants an examination the differences citizens' willingness to exclude immigrants/illegal immigrants on this issue.

Ultimately, the absence of a baseline (a control) measure of American's preferences for specific provisions limit our insights into how voters' attitudes change as additional factors (i.e. concrete fiscal benefit, immigrant participation, and legal status) are introduced. Consequently, the measures used to examine the impact of immigration-related attitudes generate incomplete, imprecise, and often yield conflicting results for social scientists interested in understanding how citizens' enrollment preferences are affected by their about immigrant participation. To date no study has explicitly tested whether it is possible to neutralize the effects of underlying hostilities by introducing a concrete fiscal benefit to maximizing enrollment. An experimental approach, using a fresh survey instrument with a control to establish baseline enrollment preferences, is the only way to achieve this credibly.

II: Prior Research & Hypotheses

Research Linking Policy Outcomes & Ethnic Diversity

Scholarly work on policy formation cites racial and ethnic diversity as a critical motivator for proposals that penalize minority populations and budget reductions for public programs aimed at reducing poverty and inequality (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Hero and Tolbert, 1996; Key, 1949). Researchers examining the role of ethnic diversity in shaping punitive policies find that states with larger shares of ethnic minorities were more likely to introduce measures seeking to limit access to government services or making English the official language than states with larger white/non-Hispanic populations (Hero and Tolbert, 1996; Hood and Morris, 1997). Restrictionist policies, at all levels of government, are also strongly correlated with demographic shifts in minority and immigrant populations (Citrin et al. 1990; Hopkins, 2010). Hopkins suggests that

growth in ethnic minorities (2009) and the foreign born (2010) within communities can reduce individuals' willingness to raise taxes and trigger punitive policies targeted at immigrants. The author notes this particularly prevalent when an event (e.g. security threat or economic down turn) sparks national level attention and an anti-immigrant message is crafted. In light of the economic shocks (stagnating wages or prolonged unemployment) faced by many Americans during the Great Recession, these findings may help to support the main hypothesis tested in this study - that U.S. citizens will be less willing to maximize enrollment in public entitlement programs if they are think immigrant populations are also participating.

Economic Concerns about Immigration: Individual Vs. Group Level

The Risk of Personal Material Loss

Economic factors are thought to influence attitudes about immigrants because individuals develop hostile attitudes toward those who they perceive pose a threat to their material well-being (Bobo, 1988; King and Wheelock, 2007). Early theories on the formation of anti-immigrant policies builds off of research on racial threat to explain Americans' resistance to policies aimed at improving the conditions for African Americans in the wake of the civil rights movement (Bobo, 1983; Fosset and Kiecolt, 1989). The theory posits that political hostility directed at immigrants stems from anxiety that individuals within a dominant group will lose social, political or economic standing to the competing interests of an out-group (Olzak, 1992; Brown, 2013). At a fundamental level, citizens are thought to perceive a zero-sum contest in which foreigners threaten access to jobs (Mayda, 2006), public resources (Borjas and Hilton, 1996), or general economic prosperity (Citrin et al, 1997). Under this construct, an individual's level of discontent is rooted in resource competition with immigrants (e.g. the supply of jobs or access to public resources), and this animosity towards foreigners

may increase even when the proportion of and gains made by the foreign-born are imagined rather than actual advancements (Blinder, 2013).

Scholars focusing on individual level concerns about immigrants regularly cite voters' 'pocketbook' concerns: that immigrants, who are on average poorer and less educated, may require more government services, and therefore place a burden on taxpayers (Clark et al, 1994; Hanson, 2005). A much-cited study by Hanson et al. (2007) expanded on this theory suggesting that wealthier individuals residing in states with a high fiscal exposure – those states with a high proportion of immigrants and allowing greater access to programs – hold greater hostility towards immigrants because their financial burden is believed to be higher. Facchini and Mayda (2009) flesh out the theoretical assumptions by citizens' socioeconomic status, offering evidence that suggests that high income individuals are more opposed to immigration because they fear higher taxes, while low-income individuals are worried that their benefit levels may be reduced because the pool of applicants would expand. From this perspective, it would seem a reasonable assumption that individuals reflect upon their own interests before considering the needs of the 'other' when forming positions on specific policies. Studies on voting behavior support this hypothesis, finding that individuals make choices at the ballot box that enhance their personal position (Downs, 1957; Plotnick and Winters, 1985).

The Economic Threat to Society

A growing number of studies have offered evidence at odds with the framework that individuals' concerns about personal financial losses are driving hostile attitudes towards immigrants. For instance, Espenshade and Hempstead's (1996) study utilizing polling data collected by *CBS News* and *The New York Times* found that the strength of citizens' restrictionist preferences were highly correlated with concerns about the health of the U.S. economy. Citrin et al. (1997) provided a similar result the following year using

two waves (1992 and 1994) of the American National Elections survey. The researchers showed that personal financial considerations played very little role in American's support for immigration levels and receipt of government funded benefits, but concerns about the national economy were closely associated with individuals' desire to restrict immigration. Other studies using similar methods and observational data support the group threat framework as a predictor of resentment towards immigrants, identifying concerns about the demographic changes, cultural norms, national identity in addition to concerns public resources and the national economy (Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Castles and Miller, 1998; McLaren, 2003).

Experimental studies on this topic offer a more nuanced perspective on the drivers of hostile attitudes towards immigrants, directly testing the various attributes of immigrants and context specific scenarios that may influence support for restrictionist policies. For instance, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) examine American's preferences of admitting low skilled versus high skilled immigrants via a bespoke survey instrument using a nationally representative online panel. The authors present evidence demonstrating that both high and low skilled citizens are more positive about high skilled migrants and oppose low skilled migrants in roughly equal measure. Another key finding was that wealthier Americans who reside in states with high-fiscal exposure are no more opposed to low-skilled immigrants than wealthy Americans who live in states with low fiscal exposure, contradicting the findings of earlier studies in this realm. The authors conclude that sociotropic, or group-level concerns about the economy, rather than individual level concerns about taxes provide a better explanation for their results. Another pair of studies that also employ an experimental design on a nationally representative sample present Americans with negative frames that mimic the arguments lately adopted by some politicians, and were able to elicit feelings of anxiety about Latino immigrants with noticeable accents when they speak English (Gadarian and Albertson, 2013) and those without legal status (Brader et al, 2009). A further paper by Hainmueller

and Hopkins (2012) attempts to determine if Americans had specific preferences on the type of immigrants granted a visa. By randomizing a variety of immigrant attributes including nationality, education, language, legal status, and other factors they found that Americans were no less likely to select potential applicants based on nationality. However, the participants nearly universally favored attributes mirroring the portrait of a highly skilled (e.g. highly educated, good language skills, and had legally secured a visa) migrant. The findings of each of these experimental studies provide support for the assumptions tested in this paper - that immigrants who would conceivably participate in public entitlement programs would conjure the image of low skilled migrants (as observed in Blinder, 2013), and would decrease U.S. citizens' willingness to enroll into the programs presented.

Concerns about Legal Status

Prejudice and stereotypes about racial and ethnic groups are also known to influence individual attitudes towards the foreign born (Burns and Gimpel, 2000). Experimental approaches to this topic revealed that Americans' support for immigrants can differ depending on an immigrant's national or ethnic background (Brader et al, 2008; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013; Sniderman et al, 2004), but that legal status seems to trigger higher levels of exclusionary preferences among citizens (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012).

It is certainly possible that the overlapping biases towards immigrants, Americans ethnic minorities, and the rapid growth in the Latino population (Humes, Jones and Ramirez, 2011) may also be fueling some of the current anxieties about the long-term impact of inward migration (Chavez and Provine, 2009). Ethnic minorities within the U.S. tend to experience poorer outcomes relative to the non-Hispanic White population (Gandara, 2008). However, differences in earnings and other indicators of social and economic wellbeing between Latinos and Black Americans may highlight the burden of

foreignness experienced by Latinos residing in the U.S. (Dovidio, Gluszek, and John, 2010), and therefore the legal status of immigrant beneficiaries is a required indicator.

The Convergence of Populist Attitudes & Restrictionist Policies

In the realm of immigration policy there had often been a sizeable disconnect between public opinion and the legislative behavior of political elites. Tichenor (2002) argues that this phenomenon was particularly noticeable within the U.S. context, largely due to the lobbying efforts on the part of business leaders and a conglomeration of interest groups (e.g. religious organizations or ethnic advocacy groups) who are able to wield their influence to prevent more restrictive immigration policies. But as the politics of immigration have become more polarized in recent years there seems to be a convergence in the populist support for anti-immigrant policies and the actions taken by elected officials.

Traditionally, political action is assumed to be a product of the preferences of the electorate (Page and Shapiro 1983; Radcliff and Saiz, 1995; Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1987), as elected officials craft policies aimed at attracting support for the largest share of the vote, which typically requires a centrist approach (Downs, 1957). However, at least over the last decade, individuals who are more engaged in politics have secured greater influence over the political discourse than centrists because elected officials are seeking approval from their party's activists (Abramowitz, 2010). This may help to explain the rapid revival of nativist sentiments and sharp party distinctions in who supports such provisions, with Republicans shunning the more tolerant approach to immigration adopted by former president George W. Bush and Arizona senator John McCain in the early 2000s.

Abramowitz (2010) argues that demographic changes within the U.S. are at least partially responsible for the partisan shift in politics. The rapid growth in the Latino population, which is more pronounced in different states, is known to increase anxiety

about immigrants (Hopkins, 2010). This population shift has led some elected officials, particularly right-leaning candidates, to prioritize the views of constituents who will turn out to the polls over the pull of interest groups, and is thought to be a major trigger for the state-level restrictionist proposals put forward since 2005 (Goodwyn, 2011). Some academics argue that for such a strategy to be successful, minority groups must be small or socially segregated, and must be tied to one side of the political aisle (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). Noncitizens meet the criteria, as they have few outlets to exercise their civil rights and low voter turnout rates among ethnic minorities, who also tend to vote for Democratic candidates help to strengthen this argument.

Over the last two decades, states with conservative governments were more likely to implement reduced benefit packages for low-income families and create further barriers to limit access to entitlement programs (Graefe et al., 2008). Additionally, the negative immigrant-related messages introduced in recent years were significantly more likely to come from Republicans (Hayes, 2008) – these frames have become even more salient with the election of President Trump (Mutz, 2018). Experimental studies that exposed respondents to vignettes with similar language used by politicians in recent debates found that negative frames (Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins, 2014) about immigration control policies only seemed to resonate among Republican voters. Given the current state of politics on the issue of immigration, it is critically important to investigate the differences in how individuals' preferences on immigration policies differ depending on their partisan alignment.

HYPOTHESES

We currently have limited knowledge about the extent to which Americans are willing to exclude immigrant populations from specific programs, what external factors motivate these preferences, and whether it is possible to soften opposition to immigrant participation by providing individuals with information that mimics a

fiscal benefit. Building off the prior work in this area, but directly asking a nationally representative sample of 1,931 Americans, I will test the following assumptions:

HYPOTHESIS 1: Participants who are primed to think about immigrants benefitting from publicly funded initiatives will be more willing to exclude than those who receive the control vignette that lacks any reference to the foreign-born. Those who receive the 'illegal immigrant' prime will provide the most punitive response, followed by those who receive the vignettes that remind participants that 'immigrant' also benefit.

HYPOTHESIS 2: Participants who are in 'immigrant' or 'illegal immigrant' treatment groups, but are also provided with a concrete savings estimate will be less opposed to excluding immigrants than those in the 'immigrant' or 'illegal immigrant' groups that omit the savings estimates.

HYPOTHESIS 3: Participants who have lower income and education levels will be more willing to exclude immigrant groups than the participants with higher incomes or education levels.

HYPOTHESIS 4: Participants who self-identify as Republican will be the most willing to exclude immigrants, even when offered the costs savings, as compared to Democrats or Independents who do not lean towards either of the two parties.

III. Research Design & Methodology

THE SURVEY EXPERIMENT

Interest-based concerns regarding the economic impact of immigrants are thought to be a major driver of spending preferences on programs aimed at reducing poverty and inequality, particularly in areas with a higher concentration of ethnic minorities (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Hanson et al, 2007). I directly test this assumption by embedding the three experimental vignettes listed in Table 3.1. These vignettes are positively framed and focus on the general savings to draw out greater support for specific means-tested programs: child tax credits for the working poor, the supplemental nutrition program (WIC), and providing in-state tuition rates to non-state residents. The survey includes a second treatment level that presents respondents with a concrete fiscal benefit stated in numbers to test whether it is possible to neutralize the effects of hostility towards immigrants. The unique 2 by 3 survey design and large sample size

provides the opportunity to distinguish whether immigrant participation, their legal status, and explicitly stated monetary benefits alter Americans' enrollment preferences across a broad range of programs aimed at reducing poverty and inequality.

The AmeriSpeak panelists provide key demographic information when they sign up to participate, it is therefore possible to block respondents into treatment groups based on a specific attribute to improve the power of the study (Bowers, 2011, Mutz, 2011). A growing body of research has shown key differences in immigrant attitudes based on partisanship (Hopkins, 2014; Gadarian and Albertson, 2013), and to limit the risk of biased results participants were blocked into their treatment groups based on their party identification at rates proportionate to the general population – Republicans 42 percent, Democrats 42 percent, Independents 16 percent who expressed no political lean towards either the Democrats or Republicans. Participants were then randomly assigned to a question order for the experimental vignettes, with equal probability among all possible orders across the three vignettes.



Once the participant received their first vignette they were randomly assigned to one of six treatment groups, which are also of equal proportion and remain in that treatment across the three vignettes. The control group (1/6 of respondents), which did not contain an immigrant cue or a savings estimate establishes a baseline enrollment

preference for each of the programs of interest. The first treatment group (1/6 of respondents) differs from the control in only one aspect – the introduction of a numeric value for programmatic savings. The four remaining treatment groups follow an identical design, but introduced an immigrant cue - using 'immigrant' without savings (1/6), 'immigrant' with savings (1/6), 'illegal immigrant' without savings (1/6), and 'illegal immigrant' with savings (1/6). For each vignette the savings estimates presented to the three treatment groups receiving the fiscal benefit are identical.

Table 3.1: The Vignettes

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
CHILD TAX CREDITS: "The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working parents with low incomes and is an important tool to keep [**people / immigrants / illegal immigrants]** out of poverty. Also, when these families spend these tax refunds it provides a boost to our economy. **[It is estimated that every $1,000 credited to working parents generates $1,380 in local economic activity.]** We must encourage every qualifying tax payer to file for child tax credits."
SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION: "The food nutrition program helps low income **[immigrant / illegal immigrant**] children and new mothers get access to healthy food. This improves outcomes for their babies, prevents developmental delays, and generates enormous savings for schools and the health care system. **[For example, every $1.00 spent on food nutrition programs results in $3.10 in health care savings alone.]** We must make it easier for every eligible woman and child to access the food nutrition program."
IN-STATE TUITION: "In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable **[for immigrants / illegal immigrants]** and help to prepare these students for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. On average, individuals who receive a college education earn more money over their lifetime and contribute more in taxes. **[Estimates show every $1.00 spent in getting students through college provides a $4.50 return in higher tax revenue and reduced social services costs.]** We must maximize our economic benefit by increasing the number of students that qualify for in-state tuition."
Response Options (all versions):
1 = Strongly Disagree 2 = Disagree 3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4 = Agree 5= Strongly Agree

The entitlement programs have been selected because specific unauthorized immigrants (e.g. pregnant women and children) who meet the income requirements are

eligible for child tax credits and WIC. Additionally, 20 states provided unauthorized students who met certain criteria to claim in-state residency status, which reduced the costs of attending higher education. The services are generally referenced rather than using the program names (e.g. WIC, or even 'welfare') to reduce the risk of bias or confusion (Pew Research Center, 2011). Each vignette includes three treatment groups that reference numeric estimates for programmatic savings. These figures are pulled from analyses conducted by universities and government reports, and therefore are not uniform. The savings estimates are explicitly stated in order to determine whether the numeric (and fact-based) information influences citizens' preferences about who should benefit from government-funded programs. If such a change is observed it would provide a useful empirical strategy of anchoring[17] not commonly used in research related to immigration attitudes and generate new evidence to advance the theory in this area.

By including the 'immigrant' group I am able to test whether Americans' concerns about immigrant participation in means-tested benefits reduces enrollment preferences. Blinder (2013) documents that UK citizens perceive the most disadvantaged migrant when exposed to the term 'immigrant'. Unauthorized immigrants are selected as a treatment prime because they are known to have the most polarizing effect given the current political climate. Hainmueller and Hopkins (2012) found that Americans were much less likely to support hypothetical visa applicants to the U.S. if they had not entered the country legally. Additionally, over the last decade, much of the negative opinions espoused about the foreign-born are directed at the growing number of unauthorized immigrants.

[17] The fields of experimental psychologists and behavioral economists have long used anchoring heuristic, or numeric information to influence participants' knowledge, attitudes and behaviors. A useful sample of the literature includes: Airely et al. 2005; Chapman and Johnson, 1999; Epely and Gilovich, 2005; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974.

The Advantages of Employing an Experimental Design

Incorporating the randomized survey experiments in the research design provides several advantages over using standard survey data. First, an online survey allows the participant to complete the questionnaires privately, which is important, given the sensitive nature of the topic. Participants are more likely to respond honestly about their perceptions of different immigrant groups if they are not worrying about how a researcher may perceive or judge their preferences, therefore administering the survey online should help to reduce the social desirability bias (Groves, Fowler, Couper, Lepkowski, Singer, and Tourangeau, 2004; Robson, 2011). Second, unlike traditional attitudinal datasets, this study's use of the survey experiment reduces the risk of biased estimates for willingness to exclude immigrant populations because the random assignment ensures that participants have an equal chance of being allocated to any of the six treatment groups, and therefore it can be assumed that the distributions of the responses are similar and comparable. The control group establishes a baseline for enrollment preferences and the treatment groups measure willingness to exclude in relation to the participation and legal status of immigrant groups. In principal, any statistically significant difference in enrolment preferences between the treatments and control can be attributed to the difference in preferences about the particular immigrant groups and the concrete fiscal benefit presented to respondents (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Mutz 2011). I also varied the order of the questions and locked respondents into the same treatment group from the start as a further step to lower the risk of bias.

DATA COLLECTION

With an increasing proportion of the U.S. public spending greater amounts of time online, web-based survey methods are quickly gaining popularity among researchers. Market researchers were the pioneers of online surveys, but the opportunity to reduce field-costs and rapid turnaround for response and data processing times has made this an attractive option for researchers in recent years. The early days of web-based surveys

often yielded sketchy results because there was little thought that went into a sampling strategy (Groves et al., 2004; Horton and Zeckhauser, 2010). However, this is increasingly improving as research firms prioritize quality and find new ways to expand coverage to include segments of the population that are more difficult to reach, such as the elderly, individuals in rural communities, and low-income households (Loftis and Lupia, 2008). To determine the extent to which immigrant participation changes Americans' preferences about who should benefit from government funded initiatives, I examine the data from 1,931 U.S. citizens aged 18 and older who completed interviews using the AmeriSpeak Panel via the University of Chicago's research firm NORC. Data were collected at two time points from April 18th to May 26th 2017 and again from January 5th to February 22nd 2018.[18] For the study, 4,989 AmeriSpeak panelists were invited to participate via email, providing a completion rate of 38.7 percent. Respondents completed the interview on their own computer, privately, and thus are more likely to respond honestly about their perceptions about public programs and immigrants. Completing this sensitive survey online reduces the risk of social desirability bias present in face-to-face or telephone interviews, as participants are known to alter responses to ensure the researcher may perceive or judge their preferences more favorably (Groves et al., 2004; Robson, 2011).

The following section provides a detailed discussion on the sampling procedures for this project via NORC's AmeriSpeak Panel. Access to this nationally representative sample was obtained through a successful application to Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (TESS), a project funded by the Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences Directorate of the National Science Foundation. From 2001, TESS has

[18] An initial balance check revealed a problem with the blocking conditions on partisan identification, where participants were recruited without having any prior information on partisan preference. The study re-fielded in January 2018 to ensure that the treatment groups do not differ on this variable that is believed to be closely associated with Americans' current views about immigrants. A summary table of the differences in the Non-Partisan Sample and Final Sample can be found in Annex B – these two samples are statistically similar on all other covariates of interest.

supported a wide range of scholars within the social sciences to conduct general population experiments. Through a comprehensive peer review process the Principle Investigators screen proposals for their importance of their contribution to science and society. These proposals are then passed to a diverse team of leading scholars in the applicant's field, in administering the review process. Successful applicants to TESS have the standard data collection and data dissemination costs paid by the program.

The NORC AmeriSpeak Panel

The NORC AmeriSpeak Panel has garnered a reputation among scholars as providing high quality data because it has gone to great lengths to establish and maintain a nationally representative panel. Initially designed by a research team in 2010 at the University of Chicago, the NORC National Frame employs a two –stage probability sample design, which covers more than 97 percent of households within the U.S. and is the same frame used to draw the General Social Survey (GSS).

The first stage, a National Frame Area (NFA), is comprised of entire metropolitan areas or counties with a population of at least 10,000, and based on the 2010 Census tracts. The NFAs are densely populated and dominated by tracts with street-style addresses; these areas contain 56 percent of the population and cover 8 percent of the U.S. geographic area. The remaining areas of the U.S. was stratified into two strata: 'rural' areas defined as less likely to have street-style addresses – making up 81 percent of the geographic area and 14 percent of the U.S. population; and a stratum containing 30 percent of the population and 11 percent of the geographic area where street-style addresses are predominate.

The second-stage sampling unit is a 'segment' from within selected NFAs, and is defined according to the 2010 Census, based on Census tracts or block groups of at least 300 housing units. A stratified probability sample of 1,514 'segments' was drawn with probability proportional to size; the majority of these segments provided more than 90

percent coverage of the geo-codable city-style addresses according to the United States Postal Service Delivery Sequence Files (DSF - a computerized listing all addresses served by the agency that is updated every two months). NORC observed that there were 123 segments within the NFA stratum for which the DSF provided insufficient coverage. To remedy this, NORC conducted an in-person listing exercise.

NORC's National Sampling Frame includes nearly 3 million households, with more than 80,000 households identified through the in-person listing. Still, in 2016 NORC made further improvements to ensure representation of all U.S. states, by supplementing the frame with addresses from the U.S. Postal Service's DSF. From October of 2016, more than 99 percent of the AmeriSpeak Panel recruited adults were drawn from the National Frame and .9 percent were sourced from the addressed-based sampling from the DSF.

The sample for this study was selected from the AmeriSpeak Panel drawing on a 48 strata sample based on age, race/ethnicity, education, and gender. The size of the selected sample per stratum is proportional to the population for each category. Further, NORC's sample selection factors in expected differential survey completion rates by demographic groups to ensure the set of panel members with a completed interview for a study is a representative sample of the target population. NORC restricts eligibility for selection of panelists to one member per household, and panelists are only eligible for selection on a study once per week. Upon completion of the fieldwork, study-specific sample weights are applied to ensure that the demographic characteristics of the final sample are statistically similar to the characteristics of the U.S. population using the U.S. Census's Current Population Survey (Montgomery, Dennis, and Ganesh, 2016).

The Sample

The average age of the respondent was 49 years old, 53 percent were female and 36 percent had completed a bachelor's degree or higher. Seventy-two percent of the sample reported their ethnic or racial background as white, 9 percent as African American, 13 percent as Latino, and 6 percent as "another" race or ethnic identity. Additionally, 42 percent of respondents identified as Democrats, 42 percent as Republicans and 16 percent as Independents without any particular political lean towards the two dominant parties. A balance check on the individuals' characteristics (e.g. age, race, gender, educational attainment, political preferences, etc.) was carried out and confirms that participants are evenly distributed across the treatment and control groups, indicating the that analysis can be conducted without any additional adjustments (Mutz, 2011). [19]

Measures

OUTCOME VARIABLES

Respondents will be asked to consider enrolment preferences in three areas of government spending on social services: supplemental nutrition 'WIC; in-state tuition 'TUITION; and child tax credits 'TAXCREDIT. The willingness to exclude is measured using a Likert scale ordered from negative to positive responses (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).

EXPERIMENTAL ITEMS

To test the difference in respondents' willingness to exclude across the three policy areas presented to respondents. I created six binary indicator variables:

[19] A summary table of the demographic characteristics by treatment group can be found in Annex 3.A.

'CONTROL' (1 = no immigrant, no savings, 0 = assigned to a treatment); 'ONLYSAVE' (1= no immigrant numeric savings, 0 = all other respondents); 'IMMONLY' (1 = 'immigrant' prime, no savings, 0 = all other respondents); 'IMMSAVE' (1 = 'immigrant' prime, numerical savings, 0 = all other respondents); 'ILLEGALONLY' (1 = 'illegal immigrant' prime, no savings, 0 = all other respondents); and 'ILLEAGALSAVE' (1 = 'illegal immigrant' prime, numeric savings, 0 = all other respondents).

IV. Results

Immigrant Participation & Exclusionary Preferences

The effect of the immigrant and fiscal benefit treatments was estimated by comparing the mean response of the treatment groups to the control. Although there is some difference in U.S. citizens' preferences on enrollment depending on the initiative put forward, a convincing majority of respondents allocated to the control group agreed or strongly agreed with maximizing enrollment - 63 percent for tax credits, 73 percent for WIC, and 65 percent for in-state tuition. Table 3.2 shows that a substantial drop in support for maximizing enrollment as the immigrant primes are introduced. For instance on the issue of in-state tuition, the proportion of respondents who agree or strongly agree to maximize enrollment steadily sinks from 65 percent in the control group, to 48 percent in the 'immigrant' prime group to 38 percent in the 'illegal' prime group – a drop of roughly 40 percent.

Figure 3.2:
Distribution of Exclusionary Preferences by Initiative & Immigrant Prime



The results of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression outlined in Table 3.3 indicate that the immigrant treatment groups did negatively influence respondents' willingness to maximize enrollment across each of the policy initiatives. In-line with existing evidence (e.g. Brader et al, 2008; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012), those who

were allocated to the 'illegal immigrant' treatment groups were significantly more negative (p<.01) across all vignettes, even for those respondents who received the savings estimate prime. This result holds even when compared to those allocated to the two 'immigrant' treatment groups. Participants who received the 'immigrant' prime were also consistently less willing to maximize enrollment for each of the vignettes as compared to those allocated to the control group and 'savings only' groups. However, this outcome was only significant at the traditional .05 threshold on the issue of in-state tuition rates.

Table 3.3: Willingness to Exclude by Initiative & Treatment Group (N=1931)

	taxcredit	**wic**	**tuition**
	coef/se	**coef/se**	**coef/se**
Savings Only	0.139	0.066	0.028
	(0.090)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Immigrant' - No Savings	-0.123	-0.170*	-0.346***
	(0.090)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Immigrant' & Savings	-0.072	-0.167*	-0.265***
	(0.090)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Illegal' - No Savings	-0.478***	-0.466***	-0.691***
	(0.090)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Illegal' & Savings	-0.418***	-0.429***	-0.614***
	(0.090)	(0.093)	(0.093)
A	3.672	3.878	3.700
Adjusted R^2	0.036	0.026	0.047

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

DOES A FISCAL BENEFIT WEAKEN OPPOSITION TO IMMIGRANT PARTICIPATION?

The results from Table 3.3 also demonstrate that participants who were allocated the savings estimate treatments were consistently less negative than their pair group that lacked the fiscal benefit (control vs savings only, 'immigrant' only vs 'immigrant' & savings, and 'illegal' only vs 'illegal' & savings). Figures 3.3-3.5 illustrate the results of

each experimental item with the three pairs of treatment groups. For each pair, the top line signifies the treatment for immigrant prime (or lack thereof), and its match immediately below, depicts the average for the corresponding immigrant prime plus savings estimate.

For each of the vignettes, none of the three fiscal benefit groups (the bottom pair) provided an average response that indicated that the information would soften the opposition to enrollment across all the government-funded initiatives. While the uniformity in the results suggest that the possibility of a fiscal benefit could help reduce the opposition that comes from immigrant participation – this additional information fails to shift the savings groups into territory that offsets the effects of the immigrant primes.

Figure 3.3
Willingness to Exclude on Tax Credit Vignette by Treatment Group



Figure 3.4 - Willingness to Exclude on WIC Vignette by Treatment Group



Figure 3.5 - Willingness to Exclude on In-State Tuition Vignette by Treatment Group



DO AMERICANS' PREFERENCES DIFFER BY INCOME & EDUCATION?

To test the assumption that individuals' personal financial circumstances are major factor in shaping their exclusionary preferences, I grouped individuals with household incomes above and below the median income, $59,000 annually (U.S. Census, 2016), against whether or not they had a bachelor's degree or higher. If the American citizens sampled follow the fiscal burden construct (e.g. Hanson, 2005), we would anticipate that respondents with lower incomes who were exposed to an immigrant prime to have significantly more negative preferences after being asked about maximizing enrollment.

On the issue of educational attainment, previous studies have found that a university education is positively associated with more tolerant views towards ethnic minorities. College graduates are believed to be more pluralistic because they are exposure to cultural diversity, receive information and critical thinking skills about the impacts of migration, and are arguably more insulated against the threat of unemployment related to competition from immigrants than those without a degree (Harwood, 1986; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007).

Figure 3.6 Exclusionary Preferences on Tax Credit Vignette Comparing Total Sample by Education & Income



Figure 3.7 – Exclusionary Preferences on WIC Vignette Comparing Total Sample by Education & Income



Figure 3.8 – Exclusionary Preferences on In-State Tuition Vignette Comparing Total Sample by Education & Income



The results presented in Table 3.4 show that degree holders that received an immigrant prime were on average less punitive in their responses than those without a university education. Figures 3.6-3.8 provide a more holistic perspective, comparing the results of the six treatment groups with the total sample (level 1, N= 1931) to the six treatment groups for each of the four income and education segments: under median income/no degree (level 2, N=1006); under median income/with degree (level 3, N=275); over median income/no degree (level 4, N=737); and over median income/with degree (level 5, N=648).

This panoramic view shows that education fails to dampen the negative effects of the immigrant primes – especially for those allocated to one of the two 'illegal' treatment groups. The remarkable consistency in this rejection of unauthorized immigrants across all subgroups and all items provide strong evidence against the theory that individuals' willingness to enroll is predicated on their own personal financial considerations.

Table 3.4: Willingness to Exclude by Income & Education Level (N=1931)

	taxcredit (1) coef/se	taxcredit (2) coef/se	wic (1) coef/se	wic (2) coef/se	tuition (1) coef/se	tuition (2) coef/se
Savings Only	0.139	0.145	0.066	0.073	0.028	0.036
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Immigrant' - No Savings	-0.123	-0.108	-0.170*	-0.149	-0.346***	-0.321***
	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Immigrant' & Savings	-0.072	-0.061	-0.167*	-0.149	-0.265***	-0.244***
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Illegal' - No Savings	-0.478***	-0.461***	-0.466***	-0.441***	-0.691***	-0.663***
	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Illegal' & Savings	-0.418***	-0.419***	-0.429***	-0.431***	-0.614***	-0.617***
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.092)
Under Median - With Degree		0.086		0.188**		0.198**
		(0.087)		(0.090)		(0.090)
Over Median - No Degree		-0.096		-0.093		-0.104
		(0.067)		(0.069)		(0.069)
Over Median - With Degree		0.067		0.115*		0.146**
		(0.067)		(0.069)		(0.069)
α	3.672	3.661	3.878	3.839	3.700	3.653
Adjusted R^2	0.036	0.039	0.026	0.034	0.047	0.059

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

DOES PARTISANSHIP SHAPE PREFERENCES ON IMMIGRANT PARTICIPATION?

Although elected officials across the political spectrum have a long history of framing immigration as an important policy problem (Tichenor, 2002) much of the negative immigrant-related messages introduced in recent years were significantly more likely to come from Republicans (Hayes, 2008) – these frames have become even more salient with the election of President Trump. Experimental studies that exposed respondents to vignettes with similar language used by politicians in recent debates found that negative frames (Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins, 2014) about immigration control policies only seemed to resonate among Republican voters. Given the findings from prior research we would expect to see very different responses based on partisan preferences, more restrictive attitudes for Republicans receiving immigrant primes and less restrictive attitudes among Democrats, and more ambivalence for Independents that do not lean towards either of the two main parties.

Figures 3.9-3.11 also segments the results, this time by partisanship, comparing the results of the six treatment groups with the total sample (level 1, N= 1931) to the six treatment groups for each of the partisan identifications: broadly Democrat (level 2, N=812); broadly Republican (level 3, N=819); and Independent (level 4, N=300).

The results outlined in Table 3.5 and illustrated in Figures 3.9-3.11 clearly and convincingly demonstrate that although immigrant participation negatively influence all respondents support for maximizing enrolment, Republicans had a much stronger aversion to both the 'immigrant' and 'illegal' immigrant prime. Interestingly, the information on savings estimates did have a more demonstrable influence on Republicans as compared to Democrats and Independents, particularly for those who received the 'illegal' immigrant primes.

Figure 3.9 – Exclusionary Preferences on Tax Credit Vignette Comparing Total Sample by Party Identification



Figure 3.10 – Exclusionary Preferences on WIC Vignette Comparing Total Sample by Party Identification



Figure 3.11 – Exclusionary Preferences on In-State Tuition Vignette Comparing Total Sample by Party Identification



Table 3.5: Willingness to Exclude by Partisanship (N=1931)

	taxcredit (1) coef/se	taxcredit (2) coef/se	wic (1) coef/se	wic (2) coef/se	tuition (1) coef/se	tuition (2) coef/se
Savings Only	0.139	0.142	0.066	0.070	0.028	0.031
	(0.090)	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.093)	(0.088)
Immigrant' - No Savings	-0.123	-0.142	-0.170*	-0.191**	-0.346***	-0.369***
	(0.090)	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.093)	(0.088)
Immigrant' & Savings	-0.072	-0.085	-0.167*	-0.181**	-0.265***	-0.280***
	(0.090)	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.093)	(0.088)
Illegal' - No Savings	-0.478***	-0.492***	-0.466***	-0.481***	-0.691***	-0.707***
	(0.090)	(0.087)	(0.093)	(0.089)	(0.093)	(0.088)
Illegal' & Savings	-0.418***	-0.417***	-0.429***	-0.427***	-0.614***	-0.613***
	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.093)	(0.087)
Leans Democrat		0.448***		0.514***		0.583***
		(0.074)		(0.076)		(0.075)
Leans Republican		-0.227***		-0.268***		-0.266***
		(0.074)		(0.076)		(0.075)
α	3.672	3.587	3.878	3.783	3.700	3.576
Adjusted R^2	0.036	0.109	0.026	0.120	0.047	0.158

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

V. Conclusion

As policy makers square off on how best to manage unprecedented budget deficits and growing demands on public services, this study seeks to elucidate these political decisions by examining how Americans' preferences about who should get access to government-funded assistance are influenced by their attitudes towards specific immigrant populations. Prior work in this area relies primarily on observational data to demonstrate these links, but the inferences made are limited because they lack a counterfactual, that is no direct comparison to an identical situation that obscures the possibility of immigrant participation. This study broadens our understanding of these links by explicitly asking a large and nationally representative sample of Americans about their willingness to provide access to people that plausibly meet the criteria for enrolment for each program put forward, but parses out the difference in enrolment preferences when Americans are reminded that 'immigrants' or 'illegal immigrants' can also benefit.

Ultimately partisanship (Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins, 2014) appears to

have the largest influencer over an individuals' willingness to exclude immigrants from participation. Yet, the results confirm that immigrant participation negatively affects Americans' willingness to enroll universally. Similar to Hainmueller and Hopkins (2012), the respondents who received the 'immigrant' prime were less punitive than those 'illegal immigrants' prime, signaling that legal status is a significant driver of exclusionary preferences; nevertheless the respondents expressed strong opposition for each group for each program presented. Consistently, individuals with lower levels of income and education provided statistically similar responses to their counterparts with higher incomes and education, indicating that concerns about higher taxes found in earlier observational work (e.g. Clark et al, 1994; Fachini and Mayada, 2009; Hanson, 2005) are not the a substantial factor dictating these preferences. Instead, the findings of this study do advance several theories a growing body of work, which suggests that spending and policy preferences targeted at immigrants are motivated by sociotropic or group-level concerns about how immigrants impact society (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Citrin et al. 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000; McLaren, 2003; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012; Mutz, 2018).

The partisan differences displayed by the respondents suggest that the debate over immigration policy within the United States will remain just as contentious, limiting the possibility of any major overhaul of the system in the near future. However, the consistency of these negative reactions to immigrant participation certainly signals to elected officials that Americans' are at least tolerant to further restrictions on the types of government funded services that non-citizens may access, irrespective of legal status. This is a critical point to consider as the Trump administration has put forward additional hurdles to block legal immigrants from obtaining permanent residency or citizenship if they or household members received in certain services like supplemental nutrition, tax credits and other entitlement programs (National Immigration Law Center, 2018).

The results reveal another important finding worthy of further investigation – the initiative the generated the most support for exclusion, even among Democrats, was the offer of in-state tuition. The willingness to exclude was highest for both the 'immigrant' and 'illegal immigrant' primes. Much of the research that has sought to unpack the attributes that make a more 'desirable' immigrant, point to skill level as the most

important factor used to weigh up their decision (e.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012; Helbling and Kriesi, 2014). The results presented in this paper indicate that Americans across all segments of the electorate are quite prepared to prevent immigrants from accessing a crucial credential necessary to obtain a high-skilled job, even when presented with a fiscal reward for doing so.

The steady lack of impact observed for the fiscal benefit prime for each of the immigrant treatment groups hints at the presence of some reasonably entrenched norms in which Americans feel that it is appropriate to block access to government-funded services to the foreign-born, even when this decision equates to an economic loss. However, the fact that the fiscal benefit rarely resonated with those that did not receive the immigrant prime, also suggests that the numerical and fact-based argument is not compelling, at least not in the manner presented here.

Future research seeking to dampen the effects of hostile attitudes towards immigrants should build upon the findings from studies that use emotional (e.g. Brader, Marcus, and Miller, 2011; Gadarian and Albertson, 2013) or moral (Igartua, Moral-Toranzo, and Fernández, 2012; Lecheler, Bos, and Vliegenthart, 2015) frames to provoke positive feelings and policy preferences. Further, flipping the perspective on how policies impact individuals (e.g. Mutz, 2002; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012) rather than groups of people may yield greater generosity directed at immigrants than those observed in this study.

Annex 3.A: Summary Statistics by Treatment Group

	Control (N=320)		Savings Only (N=323)		Immigrant No Savings (N=319)		Immigrant & Savings (N=322)		Illegal No Savings (N=320)		Illegal & Savings (N=327)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Male	0.49	0.50	0.43	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.45	0.50	0.46	0.50	0.50	0.50
Female	0.51	0.50	0.57	0.50	0.52	0.50	0.55	0.50	0.54	0.50	0.50	0.50
Age 18-24	0.05	0.22	0.06	0.23	0.08	0.28	0.08	0.28	0.06	0.24	0.04	0.19
Age 25-34	0.20	0.40	0.20	0.40	0.14	0.35	0.17	0.38	0.20	0.40	0.17	0.37
Age 35-44	0.17	0.38	0.18	0.38	0.13	0.34	0.15	0.35	0.15	0.36	0.17	0.37
Age 45-54	0.16	0.37	0.16	0.37	0.19	0.39	0.17	0.38	0.18	0.39	0.20	0.40
Age 55-64	0.15	0.35	0.18	0.38	0.20	0.40	0.18	0.38	0.22	0.41	0.19	0.39
Age 65-74	0.20	0.40	0.19	0.39	0.18	0.39	0.19	0.39	0.12	0.33	0.18	0.39
Age 75+	0.08	0.26	0.04	0.19	0.07	0.25	0.06	0.24	0.07	0.25	0.06	0.23
White	0.72	0.45	0.72	0.45	0.71	0.46	0.76	0.43	0.70	0.46	0.69	0.46
Black	0.07	0.26	0.10	0.30	0.11	0.31	0.07	0.26	0.07	0.26	0.10	0.30
Latino	0.14	0.35	0.11	0.31	0.12	0.33	0.11	0.31	0.17	0.38	0.15	0.36
Other Ethnicity	0.07	0.26	0.07	0.26	0.07	0.26	0.06	0.24	0.06	0.24	0.06	0.24
No H/S Diploma	0.03	0.17	0.03	0.17	0.04	0.19	0.03	0.17	0.03	0.17	0.02	0.13
H/S Diploma	0.13	0.33	0.17	0.38	0.15	0.35	0.20	0.40	0.18	0.39	0.16	0.37
Some College	0.43	0.50	0.42	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.45	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.39	0.49
Bachelors or Above	0.42	0.49	0.38	0.49	0.31	0.46	0.32	0.47	0.31	0.46	0.44	0.50
Under $35k	0.25	0.43	0.30	0.46	0.29	0.46	0.29	0.45	0.28	0.45	0.24	0.42
$35k-$59k	0.27	0.44	0.23	0.42	0.23	0.42	0.26	0.44	0.22	0.41	0.26	0.44
$60k-$99k	0.27	0.44	0.28	0.45	0.25	0.43	0.25	0.43	0.26	0.44	0.24	0.43
Over $100k	0.22	0.42	0.20	0.40	0.24	0.42	0.20	0.40	0.25	0.43	0.27	0.44
Broad Democrat	0.41	0.49	0.41	0.49	0.44	0.50	0.43	0.50	0.43	0.50	0.41	0.49
Broad Republican	0.44	0.50	0.44	0.50	0.41	0.49	0.41	0.49	0.41	0.49	0.44	0.50
Independent - No Lean	0.15	0.36	0.15	0.36	0.15	0.36	0.16	0.37	0.16	0.37	0.15	0.36

Annex 3.B: Summary Statistics by Original Sample without Partisan Identification Compared to Final Sample

	Non-Political ID (N=1982)		Final Sample (N=1931)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Male	0.47	0.50	0.47	0.50
Female	0.53	0.50	0.53	0.50
Age 18-24	0.07	0.26	0.06	0.24
Age 25-34	0.20	0.40	0.18	0.38
Age 35-44	0.16	0.37	0.16	0.37
Age 45-54	0.18	0.38	0.18	0.38
Age 55-64	0.17	0.38	0.18	0.39
Age 65-74	0.16	0.37	0.18	0.38
Age 75+	0.05	0.22	0.06	0.24
White	0.67	0.47	0.72	0.45
Black	0.10	0.31	0.09	0.28
Latino	0.15	0.36	0.13	0.34
Other Ethnicity	0.07	0.23	0.06	0.22
No H/S Diploma	0.03	0.17	0.03	0.17
H/S Diploma	0.17	0.38	0.16	0.37
Some College	0.47	0.50	0.44	0.50
Bachelors or Above	0.33	0.47	0.36	0.48
Under $35k	0.30	0.46	0.27	0.45
$35k-$59k	0.24	0.43	0.24	0.43
$60k-$99k	0.24	0.43	0.26	0.44
Over $100k	0.22	0.42	0.23	0.42
Broad Democrat	0.36	0.48	0.42	0.49
Broad Republican	0.29	0.45	0.42	0.49
Independent - No Lean	0.10	0.29	0.16	0.36

Annex 3.C: Experimental Instrument

[RANDOMIZE QUESTION ORDER]
[RANDOMIZE TREATMENT GROUP]

Display if Control

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

1. "The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working parents with low incomes and is an important tool to keep people out of poverty. Also, when families spend these tax refunds it provides a boost to our economy. We must encourage every qualifying tax payer to file for child tax credits."

    1 = Strongly Disagree
    2 = Disagree
    3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
    4 = Agree
    5= Strongly Agree
    6 = Don't Know

Display if Savings Only

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

1. "The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working parents with low incomes and is an important tool to keep people out of poverty. Also, when families spend these tax refunds it provides a boost to our economy. It is estimated that every $1,000 credited to working parents generates $1,380 in local economic activity. We must encourage every qualifying tax payer to file for child tax credits."

    1 = Strongly Disagree
    2 = Disagree
    3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
    4 = Agree
    5= Strongly Agree
    6 = Don't Know

Display if 'Immigrant' Only

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

1. "The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working parents with low incomes and is an important tool to keep immigrants out of poverty. Also, when

families spend these tax refunds it provides a boost to our economy. We must encourage every qualifying tax payer to file for child tax credits."

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5= Strongly Agree
6 = Don't Know

Display if 'Immigrant' & Savings

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

1. "The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working parents with low incomes and is an important tool to keep immigrants out of poverty. Also, when families spend these tax refunds it provides a boost to our economy. It is estimated that every $1,000 credited to working parents generates $1,380 in local economic activity. We must encourage every qualifying tax payer to file for child tax credits."

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5= Strongly Agree
6 = Don't Know

Display if 'Illegal' Only

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

1. "The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working parents with low incomes and is an important tool to keep illegal immigrants out of poverty. Also, when families spend these tax refunds it provides a boost to our economy. We must encourage every qualifying tax payer to file for child tax credits."

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5= Strongly Agree
6 = Don't Know

Display if 'Illegal' & Savings

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

1. "The child tax credit provides an annual refund to working parents with low incomes and is an important tool to keep illegal immigrants out of poverty. Also, when families spend these tax refunds it provides a boost to our economy. It is estimated that every $1,000 credited to working parents generates $1,380 in local economic activity. We must encourage every qualifying tax payer to file for child tax credits."

    1 = Strongly Disagree
    2 = Disagree
    3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
    4 = Agree
    5= Strongly Agree
    6 = Don't Know

Display if Control

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

2. "The food nutrition program helps low income children and new mothers get access to healthy food. This improves outcomes for babies, prevents developmental delays, and generates enormous savings for schools and the health care system. We must make it easier for every eligible woman and child to access the food nutrition program."

    1 = Strongly Disagree
    2 = Disagree
    3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
    4 = Agree
    5= Strongly Agree
    6 = Don't Know

Display if Savings Only

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

2. "The food nutrition program helps low income children and new mothers get access to healthy food. This improves outcomes for babies, prevents developmental delays, and generates enormous savings for schools and the health care system. For example, every $1.00 spent on food nutrition programs results in $3.10 in health care savings alone. We must make it easier for every eligible woman and child to access the food nutrition program."

    1 = Strongly Disagree
    2 = Disagree

3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5= Strongly Agree
6 = Don't Know

Display if 'Immigrant' Only

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

2. "The food nutrition program helps low income immigrant children and new mothers get access to healthy food. This improves outcomes for babies, prevents developmental delays, and generates enormous savings for schools and the health care system. We must make it easier for every eligible woman and child to access the food nutrition program."

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5= Strongly Agree
6 = Don't Know

Display if 'Immigrant' & Savings

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

2. "The food nutrition program helps low income immigrant children and new mothers get access to healthy food. This improves outcomes for babies, prevents developmental delays, and generates enormous savings for schools and the health care system. For example, every $1.00 spent on food nutrition programs results in $3.10 in health care savings alone. We must make it easier for every eligible woman and child to access the food nutrition program."

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5= Strongly Agree
6 = Don't Know

Display if 'Illegal' Only

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

2. "The food nutrition program helps low income illegal immigrant children and new mothers get access to healthy food. This improves outcomes for babies, prevents

developmental delays, and generates enormous savings for schools and the health care system. We must make it easier for every eligible woman and child to access the food nutrition program."

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5= Strongly Agree
6 = Don't Know

Display if 'Illegal' & Savings

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

2. "The food nutrition program helps low income illegal immigrant children and new mothers get access to healthy food. This improves outcomes for babies, prevents developmental delays, and generates enormous savings for schools and the health care system. For example, every $1.00 spent on food nutrition programs results in $3.10 in health care savings alone. We must make it easier for every eligible woman and child to access the food nutrition program."

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5= Strongly Agree
6 = Don't Know

Display if Control

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

3. "In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable and help to prepare students for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. On average, individuals who receive a college education earn more money over their lifetime and contribute more in taxes. We must maximize our economic benefit by increasing the number of students that qualify for in-state tuition."

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5= Strongly Agree
6 = Don't Know

Display if Savings Only

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

3. "In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable and help to prepare students for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. On average, individuals who receive a college education earn more money over their lifetime and contribute more in taxes. Estimates show every $1.00 spent in getting students through college provides a $4.50 return in higher tax revenue and reduced social services costs. We must maximize our economic benefit by increasing the number of students that qualify for in-state tuition."

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5= Strongly Agree
6 = Don't Know

Display if 'Immigrant' Only

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

3. "In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable for immigrants and help to prepare these students for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. On average, individuals who receive a college education earn more money over their lifetime and contribute more in taxes. We must maximize our economic benefit by increasing the number of students that qualify for in-state tuition."

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5= Strongly Agree
6 = Don't Know

Display if 'Immigrants' & Savings

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

3. "In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable for immigrants and help to prepare these students for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. On average, individuals who receive a college education earn more money over their lifetime and contribute more in taxes. Estimates show every $1.00 spent in getting students through college provides a $4.50 return in higher tax revenue and

reduced social services costs. We must maximize our economic benefit by increasing the number of students that qualify for in-state tuition."

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5= Strongly Agree
6 = Don't Know

Display if 'Illegal' Only

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

3. "In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable for illegal immigrants and help to prepare these students for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. On average, individuals who receive a college education earn more money over their lifetime and contribute more in taxes. We must maximize our economic benefit by increasing the number of students that qualify for in-state tuition."

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5= Strongly Agree
6 = Don't Know

Display if 'Illegal' & Savings

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think.

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

3. "In-state tuition rates can make college more affordable for illegal immigrants and help to prepare these students for higher-wage and higher-skilled jobs. On average, individuals who receive a college education earn more money over their lifetime and contribute more in taxes. Estimates show every $1.00 spent in getting students through college provides a $4.50 return in higher tax revenue and reduced social services costs. We must maximize our economic benefit by increasing the number of students that qualify for in-state tuition."

1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4 = Agree
5= Strongly Agree
6 = Don't Know

Annex 3.D: Power Analysis for Study Sample Size

	Base Experiment		
Input:	Effect size f	=	0.1
	□ err prob	=	0.05
	Total sample size	=	2000
	Numerator df	=	5
	Number of groups	=	6
	Number of covariates	=	0
Output:	Noncentrality parameter □	=	20.0000000
	Critical F	=	2.2185848
	Denominator df	=	1994
	Power (1-□ err prob)	=	0.9517586
	Moderate Estimate – 5 Covariates		
Input:	Effect size f	=	0.1
	□ err prob	=	0.05
	Total sample size	=	2000
	Numerator df	=	10
	Number of groups	=	6
	Number of covariates	=	5
Output:	Noncentrality parameter □	=	20.0000000
	Critical F	=	1.8354512
	Denominator df	=	1989
	Power (1-□ err prob)	=	0.8887952
	Conservative Estimate – 10 covariates		
Input:	Effect size f	=	0.1
	□ err prob	=	0.05
	Total sample size	=	2000
	Numerator df	=	15
	Number of groups	=	6
	Number of covariates	=	10
Output:	Noncentrality parameter □	=	20.0000000
	Critical F	=	1.6714265
	Denominator df	=	1984
	Power (1-□ err prob)	=	0.8271863

CHAPTER IV (PAPER 3)

DOES HARSH LANGUAGE REFERRING TO IMMMIGRANTS TRANSLATE INTO HARSHER PREFERENCES FOR IMMIGRATION POLICIES – OR IS IT ALL POLITICS?

Abstract

This study explicitly tests the extent to which language referring to immigrants influences Americans' preferences on immigration policies and whether a partisan cue induces a more polarized response. The novel 4 by 3 experimental design is put to a pilot sample of 2,053 respondents, allowing for a simultaneous and direct test of the effects of the positive and negative issue frames, partisan cues, and their effects across items. The study provides new insights on how partisans evaluate political messaging on immigration by drawing on frames in speeches by former Presidents Ronald Reagan (welcoming) and Bill Clinton (restrictive), each of which counters their respective parties' current positioning on the issue. Understanding the impact and limits of the partisan cue effects within the context of these complicated political frames on immigration is critically important within the U.S. because as the country has become more politically polarized, the messaging strategies employed, particularly on immigration have become more extreme. Prior research suggests such strategies can increase apathy and animosity within the electorate, but also increase punitive policies directed at immigrant populations. The results on a non-representative MTurk sample demonstrate that the welcoming/restrictionist frames do influence support for limiting migration levels, but that partisans' responses are mostly motivated by the parties' current position on immigration.

I. Introduction

Over the last decade, the debate over immigration in the United States (U.S.) has become more prominent and contentious (Hayes, 2008a; Hopkins, 2010; Skocpol and Williamson, 2011; Valentino, Brader and Jardina, 2012; Mutz, 2018). Some scholars argue that politicians can exploit natives' concerns about immigration to attract new voters and destabilize existing partisan alignments (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018; Hajnal and Rivera, 2014, Messina, 1989)

Crafting a winning messaging strategy requires political leaders (e.g. policy advocates, interest groups, politicians, and pundits) to identify the cues (symbols) and frames (arguments) that may appeal to potential voters and sway them into their camp (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Zaller, 1992). Cues and frames are types of rhetorical structures that define a policy problem to emphasize specific considerations with the aim of shifting public opinion and advancing the policy goals of the political actors who employ them (Kinder, 1998; Riker, Calvert, Mueller and Wilson, 1996). Both serve to simplify the evaluation process within an individual's memory, and are known to influence public opinion. However, a cue serves as a form of short-hand, requiring less new information or details for the decision making process (Druckman, Hennessy, St. Charles, and Webber, 2010). In addition to cues and frames, we know from prior research that individuals' political decisions are influenced by a variety of factors including the tone (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995) and strength (Druckman et al, 2010) of the message, the importance of the policy issue (Lecheler, de Vreese, and Slothuus, 2009), the competitiveness of the environment (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004), and the party sponsor (Downs, 1957).

Political parties use cues and frames to establish policy reputations with the electorate over time (Druckman et al, 2010). The cues and frames disseminated by party leaders - often referred to as political elites - provide citizens, who may otherwise lack direct experience or knowledge of political issues (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996), with

crucial guidance regarding the political implications of a persuasive message (Zaller, 1992). Empirical evidence from prior scholarly work demonstrates that cues embedded in political issue frames can have a powerful effect on individuals' preferences across a variety of policy areas.

Carmines and Stimson (1980, 1986 1989) contend that when politicians use ethnic minority cues they can transform complicated policy proposals into an 'easy' issue because it evokes an intense gut-level reaction that transcends party allegiance. If framed appropriately, racial and ethnic cues have great potential to increase the salience, or importance, of issue (Lecheler, et al, 2009) and also undermine existing party loyalties within the American electorate. This visceral reaction against minorities is believed to provoke a redistribution of voters, and has the potential to uncap a stream of new voters (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017; Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018). Once an issue becomes salient, or reaches has a high level of prominence in the political discourse, the issue sits at the surface of the minds of potential voters, and thus is easily retrievable (Taylor, Crocker, Fiske, Sprinzen, and Winkler, 1979). For more than two decades, immigration has ebbed and flowed to the forefront of the American conscience, surpassing issues like health care and the economy, that may have a greater impact on their day-to-day experience (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017).

Political messages are also believed to be more persuasive when citizens can identify a political source like an elected official or a party sponsor (Brewer, 2001; Chong and Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001; Zaller, 1992). Other scholars add to this body, demonstrating that prolonged exposure to issue frames can improve issue salience, but also help to cement party allegiances (Druckman and Leeper, 2012; Lecheler, Keer, Schuck, and Hanggli, 2015). Historical analysis shows that within the U.S., politicians of all political stripes have long used immigration as a reliable trigger to generate electoral support (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017; Masuoka and Junn, 2013; Tichenor, 2002). However, analysis of the rhetoric on immigration reveals that over the past twenty years

political elites in both parties are more inclined to use restrictionist frames than welcoming frames (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017; Hayes, 2008). However of late, the harshest rhetoric has come from the Republican Party (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2018; Knoll, Redlawsk, and Sandborn, 2011; Hajnal and Rivera, 2014; Zingher, 2014).

Carmines and Stimson (1986) content that when politicians adopt a messaging strategy that employs cues and frames about minority populations, that it can have lasting effects on how the electorate defines the party, and therefore can be risky. That is, if a political party is perceived as opposing (or favoring) particular societal groups, then voters weigh the possible policy outcomes directed at this group when they are presented with a party cue (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Nicholson and Segura 2012; Stubager and Slothuus 2013). For instance, a party that is perceived to promote policies that negatively and disproportionately impact Latinos (with or without citizenship) may lose the support of this sub-group for several generations (Barreto, Fraga, Manzano, Martinez-Ebers, and Segura, 2008; Hawley, 2013; Wong, 2018).

In light of these findings and under the current political landscape, in which the electorate is more politically polarized and one party has launched a prolonged campaign linking immigrants to various negative policy consequences, several important questions emerge. First, how much influence does negative frames have on shaping individuals' preferences on immigration policy if there is no political information tied to the message? Second, if individuals are affected by the prolonged exposure to their party's current immigration frames – restrictionist for Republicans and welcoming for Democrats – then how would partisans react to a contrasting frame from a credible in-party elite? Third, do party sponsor cues induce more polarized responses among partisans for the policies displayed or will the party faithful stick to their party's current position on immigration? And finally, how do partisans respond to information that shows both parties have supported a particular immigration policy that runs counter to the current party rhetoric on the topic?

There is a sizeable gap in our knowledge about how citizens' opposition to immigrants is altered by political parties' complex messaging strategies, especially when you compare them to a contrasting position from the past. Measurement problems have hindered our ability to examine the links between individuals' attitudes towards immigrants and their partisan ties. The pioneering studies that examined the correlates of attitudes towards immigrants and support public policies affecting immigrant populations relied primarily on observational data from large-scale surveys like the General Social Survey (GSS) or the National Elections Survey (NES). While these datasets provided richer perspectives into the relationship between voters' opinions about acceptable immigration levels, citizens' general level of support for immigrant participation in government-funded programs, or other policies directed at immigrant populations, there are substantial limitations in what inferences can be made. Namely, the data from large-scale surveys were not collected for the purpose of examining attitudes regarding specific immigrant populations – legal versus unauthorized immigrants – a critical component in this political debate (Schildkraut, 2009). Nor do these surveys provide the partisan context that surrounds the discourse.

To disentangle the multidimensional factors that influence punitive policy preferences requires a direct test that enables researchers to tease out changes in support. But a credible test must reflect the competitive real-world arguments put forward in the current debates, and contrasted with partisan positions of the past. To understand the partisan influence also demands varying partisan cues that expose respondents to positive and negative policy initiatives to activate underlying partisan biases across the electorate. Isolating the impact and limits of the partisan cue effects within the context of these complicated political issue frames (Druckman et al, 2013) on immigration is critically important within the U.S. because as the country has become more politically polarized (Abramowitz, 2010), the messaging strategies employed have become more extreme (Hopkins, 2013; McCaffrey, 2000). Studies have shown that such strategies can increase

apathy (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1996) and animosity (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015) within the electorate, but also increase the likelihood of punitive policies directed at immigrant populations (Hopkins, 2010) or even attacks on ethnic minorities (Müller and Schwarz, 2018).

This study builds upon the vast literature examining parties' use of issue frames to establish policy reputations with the electorate (e.g. Bartels, 2002; Chong and Druckman, 2007; Druckman et al, 2010; Goren 2002; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Krosnick and Brannon, 1993; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004; Zaller, 1992) to assess the extent to which the language referring to immigrants influences Americans' preferences on immigration-related policies. The vignettes used in the original survey experiment draw from prior work mimicking the real-world political debates referencing immigrants (Brader et al, 2008; Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins 2014). This study provides new insights on how partisans evaluate the parties' current welcoming/restrictive messaging strategies on immigration, but the 4 by 3 experimental design includes frames from credible political elites (Druckman, 2001) - former Presidents Ronald Reagan (welcoming) and Bill Clinton (restrictive) – and counter their respective parties' current positioning on the issue.

The second level of this study exposes respondents to two experimental vignettes to test whether a (bi)partisan sponsor cue (neutralizes) strengthens the partisan response (Goren et al, 2009) on immigration policies across the various segments of the American electorate. Specifically, I examine the effects of party sponsor cues on a state level provision that offer prenatal care for expectant mothers with low incomes (National Immigrant Law Center, 2015) and the executive decision made under the Obama administration and expanded during the Trump presidency to denaturalize citizens who used an alternative name to apply for a visa (Taxin, 2018).

Overall, I find that welcoming frames induce more positive responses across the electorate, while the participants who received the restrictionist frames tend to respond

more negatively. Although an individual's partisan identification is the greatest predictor of support for restrictionist policies, the cues by party elites and those that signal bipartisan support make little difference. This suggests that Americans preferences on immigration are anchored in the parties' current position on immigration, and are difficult to shift, even when trusted political leaders provide them with a credible partisan alternative.

II. The Influence of Frames & Why Parties Single-Out Immigrants

HARSH FRAMES ATTRACT NEW VOTERS & KEEP PARTY LOYALISTS

Voter turnout in the United States has steadily declined since 1960. It hit its lowest rate since World War II in the 2014 midterm election, with only 36.4 percent of the voting-eligible population casting a ballot (McDonald, 2014). As a growing proportion of individuals disengage in the political process (Putnam, 1995), political parties have employed more negative and extreme political messages to court the 'swing votes' of weak partisans and non-voters (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1996; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000). This segment of the electorate is believed to have lower policy and political knowledge, and thus is potentially more easily influenced than their strong partisan counterparts (Zaller, 2004). However, during this period, party attachment has also strengthened, and as a consequence, a growing share of voters who are more likely to show up at the polls are going to be less likely to change their position (Abramowitz, 2010; Ayenger and Westwood, 2015; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2004).

In order to entice these irregular voters, whilst simultaneously maintaining high levels of loyalty among partisans, political parties have to work hard to construct a compelling and consistent messaging strategies. They supply the electorate with a set of frames and cues with the aim of influencing potential voters into adopting the position communicated through the frame (Hayes, 2008a; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Jacobs and

Shapiro, 2000). Political parties use these rhetorical devices because they want to ensure that the electorate receives clear signals that can be drawn upon rapidly and without much information or much critical thought (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). Through these vehicles, their messages are easily disseminated, seeping into the public discourse as efficiently as possible (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Skocpol and Williamson, 2011). Political issue frames make for ideal news segments because they provide low-cost and high impact stories, complete with attention-grabbing sound bites, compelling visuals. Further, the sensational attacks conveniently slot into the two-minute format of television news, the easily digested layout of *USA Today* or similar newspapers (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1996), and digital sources like Twitter or Facebook (Weeks, Ardèvol-Abreu, and Gil de Zúñiga, 2017).

Tone Matters

Political issue frames provide vital clues into the direction of the author's support by employing a specific tone and emphasizing relative importance to specific considerations (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Nelson and Oxley 1999). For example, a restrictive frame on immigration may focus on the costs of border security as an impetus to reduce numbers, whereas a welcoming frame may emphasize that stricter immigration controls will increase labor costs, and thus limit the potential of the U.S. economy (Hayes, 2008). Negative frames can often yield short-term gains at the ballot box; however, the impact of this strategy in over the long-term is believed to contribute to reduced voter turnout and higher levels of political apathy (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1996). Under the current electoral landscape politicians are more likely to deploy negative frames and cues to court the "swing votes" of weak partisans, independents and irregular voters (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1996; Riker, Calvert, Mueller and Wilson, 1996). This messaging strategy could pave the way for strategic politicians to make political gains and achieve policy goals.

The Influence of the Messenger

Sniderman and Bullock (2004) argue that in a representative democracy, citizens' options for policy alternatives are limited to the 'menu of choice' that is presented to them by political parties, and that this menu is set through the hard fought process of electoral competition. Converse (1964) suggests that party elites play a crucial role in communicating this menu, referring to them as 'ideological packages'. This communication system allows Americans to see 'what goes with what', or match their values to a political identity (Goren, 2005). The parties are perceived to embody a set of values that are in synch with the citizens' ideological identity (Petersen, Slothuus, and Togeby 2010). A consequence of this pairing is that overtime the parties are perceived to 'own' certain issues, and this transition can alter how partisans interpret the messages (see Carmines and Stimson, 1986; Cohen 2003; Iyengar and Valentino 2000; Kuklinski and Hurley 1994). Ultimately, when an individual commits themself to a political party, the party itself serves as a cue on a variety of issues, which requires very little information regarding the details of a particular issue for the partisan to make up their mind (Leeper and Slothuus, 2014).

THE ISSUE AS CUE: DOES A PARTICULAR PARTY 'OWN' IMMIGRATION?

Scholars contend that over the last four decades Republicans secured electoral victory in national elections in part because the negative messaging strategies about minorities were effective in changing perceptions among white Americans (Gilens, 1999; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Sniderman and Carmines, 1996). They note that from the late 1960s a substantial proportion of whites swapped party allegiance away from the Democratic Party in response to its support for the Civil Rights movement and the party's diversification (Giles and Hertz, 1994). Sniderman and Piazza (1993) explicitly tested the impact of political predisposition and the associated concerns by examining variation in U.S. citizens' willingness to support redundant workers when specific cues -

the race and work ethic of subject of the vignette – were introduced across treatment groups. Respondents were presented with specific attributes of hypothetical recipients, allowing the authors to identify with greater precision how certain populations (e.g. black versus white recipients) reduce support for government programs; they found that self-identified conservatives were more likely to block access. Studies with similar approaches also find greater support for blocking access to government programs for minority populations for (Kuklinski, Sniderman, Knight, Piazza, Tetlock, Lawrence, and Mellers, 1997; Sniderman and Carmines, 1997).

Much of the pioneering work on the formation of anti-immigrant policies and attitude formation is derived from theories on racial threat developed within the U.S. to explain whites' opposition to affirmative action and welfare initiatives (e.g. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999; Bobo, 1983; Fosset and Kiecolt, 1989; Gilens, 1999; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Sniderman and Carmines, 1997; Taylor, 1998). Nearly thirty years of research related to individual attitudes towards immigrants demonstrate that Americans of all political persuasions, or none at all, can harbor restrictionist preferences (e.g. Brader et al, 2008; Clark et al, 1994; Facchini and Mayda 2009; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2013; Hanson et al, 2007; Lau, Sears and Jessor 1990). In light of these findings, this may be a useful messaging strategy for Republicans to employ in order to pick up new voters (Hajnal and Rivera, 2014).

Although Republicans have circulated the negative immigration messages more often in recent years (Hayes, 20008; Jeong, Miller, Schofield and Sened, 2011; Knoll, et al, 2011; Hajnal and Rivera, 2014; Zingher, 2014), historical records show that this was not always the case. For instance, Democratic lawmakers in the mid-1960s felt heavy pressure from labor organizations like the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) to curb the number of migrant workers along the U.S. / Mexico border (Tichenor, 2002). Congressional Democrats began sponsoring the

legislation for such restrictions, with Democratic Senator Walter Mondale stating (Congressional Printing Office, 1970):

"There is still a hemorrhaging of desperately poor Mexican labor that can come across the border any time they want for commuting purposes…it easy for illegal entrants to obtain employment both on the farms and increasingly in the cities, contributes substantially to the presence in the United States of perhaps as many as 400,000 aliens who entered illegally, have no right to be here, but who deprive low-income domestic workers of jobs…The use of wetbacks coincides with high unemployment and low wages. At the current rate of unemployment perhaps as many as one out of every six unemployed American workers could be out of work because of the use of illegal entrants."

To stop this 'hemorrhaging of people', which he argued placed South Texas in a perpetual economic depression, Mondale drafted a bill limiting the numbers of migrant workers (Reimers, 1992). His proposal came after the end of the Bracero Program in 1964. The Bracero Program, which translates to manual laborer, permitted predominantly Mexican migrants hundreds of thousands temporary work visas and was viewed positively by employers and migrants alike. The Democratic Senator's use of the term 'wetback' in 1970 indicated a substantial key change in how the workers were referred and the policies that would regulate their numbers. The end of the program shifted the migrant workers' status from legal manual laborer to unauthorized migrant (Tichenor, 2002).

Contrast the language used by Senator Mondale against the following exchange, made a decade later by presidential candidates Reagan and Bush during the 1980 Republican primary debates:

George H. W. Bush – *"If they're [unauthorized immigrants] living here, I don't want to see…six and eight year-old kids being made, one – totally uneducated, and made to feel like they're living outside the law. Let's address ourselves to the fundamentals. These are good people, strong people"* (C– SPAN 1980).

Ronald Reagan - *"Rather than talking about putting up a fence, why don't we work out some recognition of our mutual problems, take it possible for them to come here legally with a work permit and then while they're working and turning here, they pay taxes here and then when they want to go back, they can go back and the cross. And open the border both ways."*

In this exchange, Bush's emphasis that unauthorized immigrants were 'good people' was not challenged by his Republican colleague Reagan. It is perhaps because this positive frame was outranked in the party's position that immigration, particularly unauthorized migrants, was a means of promoting labor competition, and a critical component to the success of the U.S. economy (Gonzalez O'Brian, 2018).

The language used by all three of these policy makers signals their policy position, but also to some extent identifies their allies and the interests they represent. For the Democrat Mondale, the shift in tone was a nod to labor leaders to alleviate their concerns about migrant labor undercutting the wages of low-skilled workers. Whereas the comments made by the Republican candidates affirm the laissez faire position on migration to business leaders and free market conservatives. Although both of the major political parties have adopted a tougher tone on immigration in recent years (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017; Hayes, 2008), it is necessary to investigate the effects of how partisans engage with party issue frames from in-party elites in a way that counter the current position. Adopting this approach will help to clarify the conditions under which partisans' support for a party's policies can be shifted, and the extent to which voters' support for tough immigration policies are a reflection of their adherence to the current party line.

Party Attachment, Polarization & the Limits of Frames & Cues

The Importance of Party: Partisans' Response to Partisan Frames

Campbell et al., (1960, 133) suggest that deep party attachment "raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation. The stronger the party bond, the more exaggerated the process of selection and perceptual distortion will be." Survey data over the last fifteen years support this argument, as partisans' reactions to the political issue frames tend to be remarkably stable and fall squarely in line with parties' doctrinal position. The scholars

investigating this phenomenon have found that party attachment is the strongest predictor of an individual's judgments on a full range of political issues, including the economy, candidate evaluations, or approval and policy preferences (Abromovich, 2010; Bartels 2002; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960; Green and Palmquist 1990; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Lauderdale, 2012).

Political theorists contend that this political reasoning is rooted in how the individual perceives this connection to their party. They note that party attachment is a type of social group identification similar religious denomination or an ethnic group, and their political activism provides a sense of belonging because the parties are able to connect to their core values (Brewer, 2001; Goren, 2004, 2013; Tomz and van Houweling 2008). In addition to this important form of social identity (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015), the political information disseminated by the parties is perceived as more valid than other sources and thus more easily absorbed (Green et al, 2002; Zaller, 2004). The strong social connection and sense of belonging derived through partisan identity has led to a gradual bleed of party preferences into nonpolitical spheres (Willems, 2019), like taking a stand against the alt-right by following the comic Tina Fey's call to purchase sheet cakes in protest of the President's response to Charlotsville riots, and the elementary school teachers who dressed as 'Mexican migrants' and the border wall for their Halloween costumes in support of the President's boarder policies. Iyenger and Westwood (2015) argue that this partisan bleed is different from the political protests of the past, and contribute to an alienation of partisan foes. Leeper and Slothuus (2014) expand upon this view and provide evidence showing that these actions exacerbate partisan divides and help to fuel polarization. Ultimately this mix of factors is believed to contribute to the difficulty in shifting partisans' positions on a variety of political issues.

Partisans' Responses to Bipartisan Cues in Era of Polarization

In this period of deep polarization (Abramowitz, 2010), the electorate has expressed frustration and dismay over petty party rancor and its dysfunctional effect on governing (Binder, 2015). Some scholars have argued that partisan skirmishes may not solely be attributed to policy disagreements, but rather is the result of long-term strategy to prevent the opposition from legislative success. Gutmann and Thompson (2012) illustrate the point, noting that during the 2009 health reform debate, Republicans' refused to contribute to bipartisan legislation in order to deny the Democrats a political win. They reference Senator Jim DeMint's comments to colleagues, *"If we're able to stop Obama on this, it will be his Waterloo. It will break him."*

Researchers have demonstrated that excessive partisanship reduces institutional approval (Ramirez, 2009; Riffkin, 2014) and can lead to losses at the ballot box (Carson et al., 2010). The results from public opinion surveys consistently demonstrate that a majority of the American electorate wants political officials to work together and compromise, which suggests that if politicians signal bipartisan agreement in action, they might elicit greater support for an initiative. Zaller (1992) notes that elite political consensus can send a powerful message to the electorate that a particular issue is universally supported thereby bringing it into the 'mainstream'. Two studies examining the effects of political issue frames with partisan consensus both demonstrated that bipartisan frames could generate greater support for policies as compared to the frames with single party support (Druckman et al, 2010; Goren et al, 2009). But a growing body of literature has identified a potential paradox - that even through Americans might want Congress to be more bipartisan, partisans are more supportive of elected officials when they engage in partisan behavior (Harbridge and Malhotra, 2011; Nicholson, 2012). In one experimental study Harbridge, Malhotra, and Harrison (2014) present respondents with altered versions of the political context, portraying bipartisanship in Congress as an equal compromise or a capitulation by one side. The researchers also manipulated the

partisan distribution of roll call votes legislation for tax cuts for small business and budget cuts to NASA in order to determine how Americans respond to parties (not) reaching consensus on broadly supported policies. They found that participants could identify bipartisan processes, but their support for bipartisan solutions fails to match their partisan support on both policies.

HYPOTHESES

We currently know very little about how complex frames that link immigrants to political parties alter Americans' support for policies that help or punish immigrant populations or how partisans evaluate the messages from in-party elites of the past. Under the theoretical framework of prior research in this area, I will test the following assumptions:

HYPOTHESIS 1 – Respondents exposed to the welcoming frames will be more favorable to increasing the level of immigration as compared to those who receive the restrictionist frames – this effect should hold within partisan groups.

HYPOTHESIS 2 – Partisans who receive issue frames that attribute authorship to a credible party leader will respond in-line with their own party. In other words, Republicans (Democrats) allocated to the frames attributing authorship to Reagan will respond more (less) favorably to increasing levels of immigration as compared to their Republican (Democratic) counterparts that have no party leader cue.

HYPOTHESIS 3 – Party sponsor cues will induce more polarized responses - with Republicans and Democrats providing more agreeable responses to the policies when they receive a party sponsor cue that matches their own allegiance and repel against the out-party.

HYPOTHESIS 4 – Bipartisan cues should elicit the most agreeable responses across the entire sample and within partisan groups.

III. Research Design & Methodology

THE SURVEY EXPERIMENT

Party identification is believed to be a major determinant of where Americans align themselves on immigration policies (e.g. Brader et al, 2008; Gadarian and

Albertson, 2013; Hopkins 2013; Knoll, et al, 2011). I explicitly test how partisans evaluate the parties' past welcoming/restrictive messaging strategies on immigration, and include frames from credible political elites (Druckman, 2001) - former Presidents Ronald Reagan (welcoming) and Bill Clinton (restrictive). These frames were deliberately selected to counter the Democrats and Republicans' current positioning on the issue. The second level of this study exposes respondents to two experimental vignettes to test whether a (bi)partisan sponsor cue (neutralizes) strengthens the partisan response (Goren et al, 2009) on immigration policies across the various segments of the American electorate.

Table 4.1: Summary of Treatment Conditions

	Vignette 1 Levels of Immigration	**Vignette 2 Prenatal Care**	**Vignette 3 Denaturalize Citizens**
Group 1	Negative Immigration Frame (No Attribution)	*Republican Cue*	*Republican Cue*
Group 2		*Democrat Cue*	*Democrat Cue*
Group 3		*Bipartisan Cue*	*Bipartisan Cue*
Group 4	Negative Immigration Frame (Attributed to Bill Clinton)	*Republican Cue*	*Republican Cue*
Group 5		*Democrat Cue*	*Democrat Cue*
Group 6		*Bipartisan Cue*	*Bipartisan Cue*
Group 7	Positive Immigration Frame (No Attribution)	*Republican Cue*	*Republican Cue*
Group 8		*Democrat Cue*	*Democrat Cue*
Group 9		*Bipartisan Cue*	*Bipartisan Cue*
Group 10	Positive Immigration Frame (Attributed to Ronald Reagan)	*Republican Cue*	*Republican Cue*
Group 11		*Democrat Cue*	*Democrat Cue*
Group 12		*Bipartisan Cue*	*Bipartisan Cue*

The original 4 by 3 experimental design (summarized in Table 4.1) allows for a simultaneous and direct test of the effects of the positive and negative issue frames, partisan cues, and their effects across items. For ease of programming across the three experimental questions, participants were randomly assigned to one of 12 treatment groups of equal proportion and locked in the groups for the duration of the study. To determine the extent to which harsh language on immigration negatively influences policy preferences, ¼ of respondents were presented with a restrictive frame and a ¼ of respondents presented with a welcoming frame - neither group received any information regarding the origins of the statement. To test how partisans react to a frame that contrasts the current parties' position on immigration the remaining half of the sample received the same welcoming (¼) and restrictive (¼) frames which also included the name and party of the political elite who made the statement – Presidents Bill Clinton and Ronald Reagan. Then respondents were then asked their views on the current levels of immigration.

Table 4.2: The Welcoming & Restrictive Frames

WELCOMING FRAME: "Through this 'Golden Door' have come millions of men and women, who first stepped foot on American soil right there, on Ellis Island. These families came here to work. They came to build. Others came in different ways, from other lands, under different, often harrowing conditions. They didn't ask what this country could do for them but what they could do to make this refuge the greatest home of freedom in history. They brought with them courage, ambition and the values of family, neighborhood, work, peace and freedom. They came from different lands but they shared the same values, the same dream." **[President Ronald Reagan, Republican]** **RESTRICTIVE FRAME:** "All Americans, not only in the states most heavily affected but in every place in this country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens entering our country. The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants. The public services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. We are a nation of immigrants. But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our immigration laws we have seen in recent years, and we must do more to stop it."

[President Bill Clinton, Democrat]

IMMIGRATION LEVELS DISPLAYED TO ALL:

Do you think the number of immigrants to America should be....

Response Options:

1 = Increased a lot 2 = Increased a little 3 = Remain the same as it is

4 = Reduced a little 5= Reduced a lot

The second level of this proposed study made use of the initial programming of 12 treatment groups by exposing one third of each of the four frame groups to vignettes that reveal party sponsor cues. For vignette 2: Democrat / Republican / Republican and Democrat. For vignette 3: President Obama / President Trump / Presidents Obama and Trump. Exposure to these two vignettes allowed for a robust examination of whether the sole party sponsor cue induces more polarized responses among partisans and also determine the impact of a bipartisan cue in both a positive and negative context.

Table 4.3: The Vignettes on Immigration Related Policies

How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

VIGNETTE 2 – PRENATAL CARE: "Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states **[Republicans / Democrats / Republicans and Democrats]** have worked to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care."

VIGNETTE 3 – DENATURALIZATION: "Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and then get citizenship. The **[Obama / Trump / Obama and Trump]** administration**[s]** began checking old records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa"

Response Options (all versions):

1 = Strongly Disagree 2 = Disagree 3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree

4 = Agree 5= Strongly Agree

Vignette 2 focused on unauthorized immigrant participation in prenatal care for low-income expectant mothers through the State Children's Health Insurance Program. This policy was included because the issue often flies below the political radar - several states even expanded access to unauthorized immigrants, often with bi-partisan sponsorship (see Heberlein, Brooks, Alker, Artiga, and Stephens, 2013). The beneficiaries of this program are vulnerable (low-income mothers and their infants), and the program addresses expansion of government funded health care (often deemed a Democratic issue) and the protection of unborn children (often considered a Republican issue), making the addition of the party sponsor cues believable for the partisans that receive an in-party cue. The bipartisan cue at least in theory, should signal that this is a universally supported provision (Harbridge, 2015; Zaller, 2004), thereby inducing the most positive response. Yet, given the tribalization of politics in recent years (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015) it is also possible that respondents would be unconvinced that the parties can work together. Those who receive an out-party cue are perhaps more likely mirror their party's current position on the issue (Goren et al, 2009) – a more positive response among Democrats (perhaps more so when exposed to the Republican cue) and a more negative response among Republicans who may wish to retreat from easily identifiable Democratic positions (Bechtel et al, 2015; Druckman et al, 2013).

Vignette 3 centers on the denaturalization of citizens who used an alternative identity to successfully apply for a visa, but previously had deportation orders out under another name. This policy began under the Obama administration, when fingerprint records were used to identify from individuals with criminal backgrounds that had used a false identity to obtain a visa that later had their citizenship revoked. Fewer than 150 cases were brought forward (Lind, 2018). The Trump administration continued with the practice, but adopted a more aggressive interpretation. To accelerate the process and bring more cases forward the Trump administration established a task force aimed at coordinating the effort and have investigated naturalized citizens that did not have a

previous criminal record (Taxin, 2018). This vignette is negatively framed and emphasizes a fraudulent act, which should in theory at least, spark more punitive policy preferences among all respondents, irrespective of party identification. Given what we know about the role of partisans' preferences (Goren et al, 2009), one might expect Republicans to strongly support denaturalization and deportation when they receive the Trump cue, and similarly punitive responses for the bipartisan cues, but it is unclear whether a cue signaling support from Obama would make Republicans more negative because it signals that the policy is justified or less negative to rebel against the former President. Under this construct one might expect Democrats to repel from support when provided the Trump cue and be more supportive of the policy when shown the Obama cue. However, the intensely divided positions taken in the debate on the legitimacy and need for the Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) recently may suggest that the issue of denaturalization will induce a response that reflect the parties' current stance on this issue rather than supporting an earlier position – i.e. Republicans would be no less supportive with the Obama cue because it would validate the need for such action taken by the Trump administration, and that Democrats would strongly oppose this policy even when presented with the Obama or bipartisan cue. On the other hand, individuals may link this controversial issue to denaturalize foreign-born citizens with the largely unpopular family separation policy, and may oppose the policy because it does not align with their personal values (Schwartz et al, 2010).

DATA COLLECTION

Over the last decade web-based surveys methods have become a vital data collection tool for researchers. Market research firms were early adopters of online surveys in large part because of the lower data collection and processing times equated to lower operating costs than face-to-face interviews and telesurveys (Mutz, 2011). However, in those early days Internet access was low in certain areas (e.g. rural or low

income communities) prohibiting a general lack of reach by firms. These gaps in coverage rightly introduced many questions of validity (Groves et al., 2004). Nevertheless, the ever-growing population that has gained access to the web through smartphones and better broadband connectivity make online surveys an appropriate alternative to student panels, which are often drawn upon for bespoke projects on sensitive topics (Loftis and Lupia, 2008; Mutz, 2011).

The data for this study, a pilot for a narrower project funded by the National Science Foundation's Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Science, was conducted using data collected through the web-based crowdsourcing service Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Although the platform enables researchers to collect relatively large samples in a short period of time, there are several trade-offs that need to be considered. The following section provides a detailed discussion on the subject pools selected for this project via Mechanical Turk, and compares the samples used in published studies from alternative sources or participants.

An Overview of Mechanical Turk

Established in 2005 by the online marketplace Amazon.com, MTurk connects employers (referred to as *requesters*) and employees (referred to as *workers*) to complete tasks that cannot be automated (called human intelligence tasks or HITs). Researchers can limit access to their project to respondents in a specific country and set a worker approval rating (similar to a star rating on the website EBAY) to improve the quality of the data. Given the subject matter is focused on issues related to American politics and policies, I restricted the sample to U.S. workers with a 95 percent approval rating.

Workers are typically paid a small amount for each HIT completed. Amazon.com pays cash to workers that have provided bank details, and provides Amazon.com gift vouchers for workers without bank accounts or those unwilling to link their bank details

to the company. Paolaci, Chandler and Iperirotis (2010) recruited 1000 respondents within three weeks, paying just $.10 for participating in a three-minute survey. Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012) found similar results in their recruitment efforts, receiving more than 200 respondents in a day for a 2-4 minute survey for $.25 per completion.

The grant application to the National Science Foundation's TESS project was to gain access to a nationally representative sample of 2,000 respondents living within the U.S. A power calculation was carried out and indicated that the sample size of 2,000 should be sufficiently large to detect a difference in means of 0.15 approximately 97 percent of the time, if one actually exists within the U.S. general population.[20] To yield the closest possible results of the sharper TESS study, the MTurk sample sought was also for 2,000 respondents.

Table 4.4: Submitted Surveys (per hour) by Compensation Rate & Length of Task

Rate of Compensation	Short Survey (5 min)	Medium Survey (10 min)	Long Survey (30 min)
$.02	5.6	5.6	5.3
$.10	25.0	14.3	6.3
$.50	40.5	31.6	16.7
Source: Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling (2011)			

The low rate of pay has raised ethical flags about the exploitation of workers, and these concerns have given rise to new research examining why individuals agree to take part in the marketplace. Respondents often reported that earning extra money was an important consideration for their participation, however, many workers also cited non-monetary reasons, such as entertainment and 'killing time', considering it a productive alternative to television (Chandler and Kapelner, 2010). Another study by Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling (2011) sampled 187 MTurk workers to understand why they

[20] The results of the power analysis can be found in Annex 4.C.

completed tasks, financial incentives ranked below the mean, with many reporting they found the HITs 'enjoyable'. Yet, as Table 4.4 illustrates, participation is sensitive to the rate of compensation and the time to complete the HIT, with higher paying and shorter tasks generating more interest than those that take longer and pay less. For this project, participants received a small payment of $.50 for the completion of each survey for the five-minute questionnaire. The rate is high enough to alleviate concerns about exploitation, but the incentive is not greater than the payment offered through the LSE Behavioural Research Lab.[21]

The online system, anonymity, and financial incentives have raised concerns about the quality of the data (e.g. respondents engage in random clicking of response options or create multiple accounts to take surveys more than once). Researchers in several disciplines within the social sciences have helped to alleviate these fears by replicating the results of several experimental studies (Berinsky et al, 2012). Other studies comparing the results of cognitive tasks found that the quality of the data obtained through the MTurk pool to be as good as, or better for cognitive tasks than traditional sampling pools from universities, and online panels created by research firms (Chandler and Kapelner, 2010; Horton et al, 2010; Paolaci et al, 2010). Although the virtual setting is far less controlled than a typical laboratory setting, MTurk has created safeguards to limit multiple submissions by a single participant by linking accounts to bank accounts and address, checking the information against the IP address. Concerns about random clicking were addressed at the front end through the design of the instrument and careful testing before the survey is distributed, and included a 'weed-out' question that tested whether a respondent is paying attention before entering the survey (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko, 2009).

[21] Based on the average survey completion time of five minutes, the amount paid to respondents would equate to $6 per hour, whereas the LSE's Behavioral Research Lab pays respondents £10 for studies that last up to an hour. More information can be found at:
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/management/research/behavioural-research-lab/faq.aspx

Table 4.5: MTurk Sample as Compared to High Quality Internet Panel & Face-to-Face Samples 2008

	Internet Sample		Face-to-face Sample	
	MTurk	**ANESP (GfK)**	**CPS**	**ANES**
Female	60.1% (2.1)	57.6% (0.9)	51.7% (0.2)	55.0% (1.3)
Education (mean years)	14.9 (0.1)	16.2 (0.1)	13.2 (0.0)	13.5 (0.1)
Age (mean years)	32.3 (0.5)	49.7 (0.3)	46.0 (0.1)	46.6 (0.5)
Mean income	$55,332 ($1,659)	$69,043 ($794)	$62,256 ($130)	$62,501 ($1,467)
Median income	$45,000	$67,500	$55,000	$55,000
Race				
White	83.5 (1.6)	83.0 (0.7)	81.2 (0.1)	79.1 (0.9)
Black	4.4 (0.9)	8.9 (0.5)	11.8 (0.1)	12.0 (0.6)
Hispanic	6.7 (1.1)	5.0 (0.4)	13.7 (0.1)	9.1 (0.5)
Marital status				
Married	39.0 (2.1)	56.8 (0.9)	55.7 (0.2)	50.1 (1.3)
Divorced	7.1 (1.1)	12.1 (0.6)	10.2 (0.1)	12.9 (0.8)
Separated	2.5 (0.7)	1.3 (0.2)	2.1 (0.1)	2.9 (0.4)
Never married	50.6 (2.1)	14.2 (0.6)	25.7 (0.2)	26.2 (1.1)
Widowed	0.7 (0.4)	4.9 (0.4)	6.3 (0.1)	7.8 (0.6)
Housing status				
Rent	52.7 (2.3)	14.3(0.1)		32 (1.2)
Own home	47.3 (2.3)	80.8 (0.8)		66.1 (1.2)
Religion				
None	41.8 (2.1)	13.1 (0.8)		26.9 (1.2)
Protestant	20.7 (1.7)	38.7 (1.4)		28.2 (1.2)
Catholic	16.5 (1.6)	22.9 (1.0)		17.5 (1.0)
Jewish	4.4 (0.9)	3.0 (0.4)		1.2 (0.3)
Region of the U.S.				
Northeast	22.1 (1.8)	16.9 (0.7)	18.4 (0.1)	14.6 (0.9)
Midwest	26.6 (1.9)	28.3 (0.9)	21.9 (0.1)	21.2 (1.1)
South	30.9 (2.0)	31.4 (0.9)	36.5 (0.2)	42.8 (1.2)
West	20.4 (1.7)	23.4 (0.8)	23.1 (0.2)	21.4 (0.9)

Source: Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012)
Note. Percentages except for education, age, and income with SEs in parentheses.

The respondents from MTurk look more demographically diverse than a typical web survey sample, and much more representative than a traditional sample of American college students (Buhrmester et al, 2010; Paolaci et al, 2010). In another study, an MTurk

sample compared reasonably well to a Knowledge Networks panel (which is now the research firm GfK) for the National Election 2008-09 Panel Study (Berinsky et al, 2012). As summarized in Table 4.5, the MTurk participants are not representative of the U.S. population. Many of the studies analyzing the use of MTurk for research have highlighted respondents are, on average, more likely to be female, unmarried, renters, more educated, and less conservative than the typical American (Berinsky et al, 2012; Buhrmester et al, 2010; Paolaci et al, 2010).

The Sample

To determine the extent to which partisan attachment, the language used to refer to immigrants, and the party sponsor alters Americans' preferences about immigration related policies, I examine the data from 2,053 U.S. citizens aged 18 and older who completed interviews using the online software tool Qualtrics. The web-based survey service allows users to generate survey instruments, collect and store data, and create reports. The platform is user-friendly, supports advanced survey logic (e.g. piping), and is able to handle complex designs including projects that require random assignment and embedding in external websites. Qualtrics offers many important quality control features that allow researchers to completely anonymize responses, track the Internet Protocol (IP) address to exclude participants from outside the sampling area, and limit multiple submissions from a single respondent. Further Qualtrics meets strict data security requirements to ensure participants' data are protected.

Data were collected from August 28th to August 29th 2018. Participants used their own private computer, tablet or mobile device to complete the survey, and this element of privacy is associated with a lower risk of social desirability bias because participants are not interacting with an interviewer and do not need to monitor their responses to fit what they believe society expects an 'appropriate' answer to be (Groves et al., 2004;

Robson, 2011). The average age of the respondent was 38 years old, 50 percent were male, and nearly 60 percent had completed a bachelor's degree or higher. Seventy-five percent of the sample reported their ethnic or racial background as white, eight percent as African American, six percent as Latino, and seven percent Asian, and two percent as "another" race or ethnic identity. Additionally, 43 percent of respondents identified as Democrats, a quarter of the sample identified as Republicans and 32 percent as Independents. Upon examining the 657 Independents, 85 percent expressed a particular lean towards one of the two main parties – lean Republican (N=223) and lean Democrat (N=337). A balance check across the twelve treatment groups on the participants' characteristics (e.g. age, race, gender, educational attainment, political preferences, etc.) was executed and confirmed that, despite the large number of treatment groups, participants are evenly distributed, indicating that no additional adjustments are necessary to include in the analysis (Mutz, 2011). [22]

Measures

OUTCOME VARIABLES

Participants were asked about their preferences regarding the current levels of immigration, measured by the variable LETIN, which uses a reverse coded Likert scale (1 = 'Reduced a lot' to 5 'Increased a lot') to ensure that a positive response is captured as a higher value. The government policies directed at immigrants include are also measured using a five point Likert scale ordered from negative to positive - prenatal care for unauthorized immigrant mothers PRENATAL (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) and the reverse coded variable for denaturalization DENAT (1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree).

[22] A summary table of the demographic characteristics by treatment group can be found in Annex 4.A.

EXPERIMENTAL ITEMS

To test the difference in Americans' reactions to harsh (welcoming) language regarding immigrants, I created four binary indicator variables: RESTNO (1 = restrictionist frame, no party leader attribution, 0 = all other respondents); RESTCLINTON (1= restrictionist frame with attribution to former President Bill Clinton, 0 = all other respondents); WELCOMENO (1 = welcoming frame, no party leader attribution, 0 = all other respondents); WELCOMEREAGAN (1 = welcoming frame with attribution to former President Ronald Reagan, 0 = all other respondents).

The (bi)partisan cues on immigration policies are examined with six binary indicator variables. For vignette 2: REPCUE (1 = Republican cue, 0 = all other treatments); DEMCUE (1= Democrat cue, 0 = all other treatments); BIPCUE (1 = Republican and Democrat cue, 0 = all other treatments). For vignette 3 OBAMACUE (1 = President Obama cue, 0 = all other treatments); TRUMPCUE (1= President Trump cue, 0 = all other treatments); TWOPRESCUE (1 = Obama and Trump administration cue, 0 = all other treatments).

PARTISANSHIP

The survey asked participants which political party they identified. Dummy variables were created to isolate the differences in preferences between Republicans – REPID (N=514); Democrats – DEMID (N=882); and Independents – INDID (N=566). A second question was put to respondents who identified themselves as political independents, which asked whether they more closely identified as a Republican or Democrat, which revealed that an overwhelming majority align themselves with one of the two major parties. A second set of partisan variables were created, collapsing these 'leaner' respondents into the two main parties: BROADREP (N=737) and BROADDEM (N=1219).

IV. Results

Does Harsh Language Affect Preference on Immigration Levels?

The effect of the restrictionist and welcoming frames was estimated by comparing the difference in mean response of Americans' preferences for immigration levels within the U.S. to those who received President Ronald Reagan's welcoming speech that was positively framed about immigrants, to those who received President Bill Clinton's negatively framed speech calling for tougher immigration controls. The difference in means was also calculated for those who received information about the source of the speech. The results of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression in Table 4.6 demonstrate a significant difference ($p<.01$) in preferred immigration levels for those allocated to the welcoming versus the restrictive frame. Figure 4.1 depicts the results from the four treatment groups across the entire sample of 2,053 respondents. The top pair of plots represent the participants allocated to the restrictionist Clinton frame – ½ receive a cue attributing credit to the former president, while the other half did not. The bottom pair illustrate the results of the participants who received the welcoming Reagan frame – ½ identifying former President Reagan as the speaker and ½ omitting this information. This holistic view clearly shows that participants who received President Reagan's welcoming speech were, on average, more favorable to increases in immigration levels, irrespective of whether or not they knew that the text came from a credible party leader, whereas the respondents who read President Clinton's negative speech favored curbing immigration levels, even when they did not receive information on the origins of the speech.

Figure 4.1 –Effects of Restrictionist & Welcoming Frames Total Sample



Table 4.6: Support for Increasing Immigration Levels by Political Frame

	letin (N=2053) **coef/se**	**letin** (N=2053) **coef/se**	**letin** (N=1956) **coef/se**
Restrictionist – Clinton	-0.076	-0.074	-0.086
	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.068)
Welcoming – No Attribution	0.278***	0.253***	0.260***
	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.067)
Welcoming – Reagan	0.326***	0.313***	0.326***
	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.067)
Republican ID		-0.415***	
		(0.064)	
Democrat ID		0.549***	
		(0.056)	
Broad Republican			-0.897***
			(0.050)
α	2.869	2.746	3.198
Adjusted R^2	0.022	0.139	0.156

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

PARTISANS' REACTIONS TO CONTRASTING FRAMES FROM IN-PARTY ELITES

Figures 4.2 and 4.3 provide the four treatment groups with the effects broken down within each partisan group (Republican – level 2; Democrat – level 3; and in Figure 4.3 Independents are listed in level 4) compared to the entire sample laid out in level 1. These forest plots show vast differences from the participants who were allocated to the welcoming and restrictionist frame, but no discernable differences among the respondents who received the cues of attribution to Presidents Reagan and Clinton. At first glance this outcome is surprising, as evidence from a large literature shows that individuals tend to follow the lead of trusted party leaders (e.g. Zaller, 1992; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Gilens and Murakawa, 2002; Chong and Druckman, 2007) and that these voters are more likely to remain consistently on side with the leader (Levendusky, 2010), but the fact that speeches from these former presidents directly contradict the messages disseminated from the current party leaders, and the large gap in immigration preferences between Republicans and Democrats suggest that partisans are relying the results fit the context.

Figure 4.2: Effects of Welcoming & Restrictive Frames – Total Sample Compared to Republicans / Democrats / Independents



Figure 4.3: Effects of Welcoming & Restrictive Frames – Total Sample Compared to Republicans / Democrats Only



DO PARTY SPONSOR CUES EXACERBATE POLARIZATION?

The results from Table 4.7 show no effect on the partisan cues on the question of support for prenatal care for 'illegal immigrant' mothers. What becomes apparent from models two and three is that again, preferences on this issue are almost entirely driven by the individual's partisan affiliation. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 break down the effects of the party cues by the respondent's party identification. Figure 4.5 isolates the effects within for Republicans only, whereas Figure 4.6 only includes the results of each cue on the respondents who identify as Democrat. For each graph, level 1 represents the segment of Republicans/Democrats allocated to the Republican cue, level 2 shows the segment of Republicans/Democrats exposed to the Democrat cue, and level 3 depicts the results of the respondents allocated to the bipartisan cue. Each of the four lines within the levels breaks down the sample to factor in the spill-over impact of the welcoming and restrictive frame. These graphs illustrate that predictably, Republicans are, on average, more likely to strongly oppose providing prenatal care to unauthorized immigrants and Democrats are on average, more likely to support the initiative.

Table 4.7: Support for Prenatal Care for Illegal Immigrants by Partisan Cue

	prenatal (N=2053) **coef/se**	**prenatal** (N=2053) **coef/se**	**prenatal** (N=1956) **coef/se**
Republican Cue	0.022	0.042	0.037
	(0.076)	(0.071)	(0.069)
Democrat Cue	-0.097	-0.081	-0.104
	(0.076)	(0.070)	(0.069)
Republican ID		-0.625***	
		(0.077)	
Democrat ID		0.701***	
		(0.067)	
Broad Republican			-1.222***
			(0.059)
α	3.449	3.292	3.885
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.146	0.174

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figures 4.5 & 4.6 – Republican & Democratic Responses to Partisan Cues on Prenatal Vignette by Treatment





On the issue of denaturalizing citizens who may have used an alternative name to apply for a visa, it is important to flag a routing error in the survey, which allocated the 177 respondents from treatment group nine – who would have initially received the welcoming frame without attribution and subsequently a bi-partisan cue, were instead allocated to the Republican cue question for the Denaturalization vignette and do not show up in the results for this question. The results from Table 4.8 indicate a larger difference between the Trump and Obama cue. Interestingly, those who received the Obama cue were, on average, more likely to support the denaturalization policy, but the results are only marginally significant.

Figures 4.8 and 4.9 also break down the effects of the party cues by the respondent's party identification. Figure 4.8 isolates the effects within for Republicans only, whereas Figure 4.9 only includes the results of each cue on the respondents who identify as Democrat. Again, level 1 represents the segment of Republicans/Democrats allocated to the Republican cue, level 2 displays the segment of Republicans/Democrats exposed to the Democrat cue, and level 3 portrays the results of the respondents allocated to the bipartisan cue. As with the earlier graphs, each of the four lines within the levels breaks down the sample to factor in the spill-over impact of the welcoming and restrictive frame. Again, Figures 4.8 and 4.9 reveal the substantial gulf between parties, demonstrating that an individual's partisan affiliation is best predictor of where participants align themselves on this issue.

Table 4.8: Support for Denaturalization by Partisan Cue

	denaturalize (N=1876) **coef/se**	**denaturalize** (N=1876) **coef/se**	**denaturalize** (N=1794) **coef/se**
Trump Cue	0.073	0.112	0.120*
	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.071)
Obama Cue	-0.123*	-0.090	-0.099
	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.070)
Republican ID		-0.457***	
		(0.076)	
Democrat ID		0.509***	
		(0.066)	
Broad Republican			-0.949***
			(0.058)
α	3.449	3.292	3.885
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.146	0.174

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figures 4.8 & 4.9 – Republican & Democratic Responses to Partisan Cues on Denaturalization Vignette by Treatment





How Do Partisans Respond to Bipartisan Cues

Figures 4.5-4.9 reveal that the bipartisan cues make little difference in the policy preferences of Democrats or Republicans. Despite a glut of polling data suggesting many Americans prefer political compromise to move policy, the results indicate that bipartisan support fails to disrupt the deep rooted partisan pattern observed across items. These patterns persist for policies that could positive and negatively impact immigrant populations. This finding supports the research demonstrating that Americans' pleas for bipartisan solutions are a better reflection of self-serving partisan desires, and this leaves policy makers with little incentive to work with their colleagues on the other side to craft substantive policy solutions on the issue of immigration (Harbridge, Malhotra, & Harrison, 2014; Nicholson, 2012).

V. Conclusion

In this paper, I bridge together two of the major theories believed to trigger hostile attitudes towards immigrants political frames and partisanship in order to test how public opinion is affected by the competing frames the in current immigration debate. Political parties work hard to define and craft a credible messaging strategy on the issue, and a large literature demonstrates that how an issue is framed can have a powerful impact on public opinion (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; Chong and Druckman 2007; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Nelson and Oxley 1997). We also have a wealth of evidence showing that political parties are a major predictor in shaping public opinion (e.g. Bartels 2002; Campbell et al. 1960; Green and Palmquist 1990; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). However, to date no study has provided evidence demonstrating how Americans' opinions on immigration are influenced by issue frames that are explicitly sponsored by political parties, and also provides a contrasting frame /policy issues from the same party.

I find that Americans of all political stripes are more supportive of immigrants when they receive a welcoming frame that emphasizes the positive contributions and seek to reduce immigration when they receive a restrictive immigration frame where the focus is on negative consequences. Still, there are vast differences in the attitudes across all policy initiatives depending on the respondents' partisan identity. Republicans were consistently more likely to respond negatively (Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins, 2014) whereas Democrats took a softer approach in their responses on all items. This

consistency is not surprising, given the remarkable polarization experienced within the United States in recent years (Abramowitz, 2010; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Jacobson, 2014; Mutz, 2018) and that the messaging strategies adopted by political actors are more extreme (Hopkin, 2013; McCaffrey, 2000).

The cues that reveal attribution of the frames did not the sway preferences for the entire sample or within the partisan groups, countering the findings from a wide range of research demonstrating that important role played by party elites (e.g. Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Goren, 2005; Peterson, et al, 2010). Similarly, the party sponsor and bipartisan cues embedded in the vignettes on prenatal care and denaturalization failed to influence respondent's preferences, despite a large literature showing demonstrating the effectiveness of party sponsor cues (Brewer, 2001; Chong and Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001; Zaller, 1992). It is possible that the observed differences between partisan groups make it difficult to widen the gulf between the groups, irrespective of the party signals received. The results potentially point at a much deeper problem that has important implications for those interested in both the study of, but also the practice of good governance (Guttman and Thompson, 2012) – that is if elected officials are taking their cues from public opinion, and the electorate is signaling they do not want politicians to reach across the aisle, then it becomes increasingly difficult to govern. Both parties can 'own' the issue of immigration, but under very different narratives. To simplify - Republicans own immigration control (e.g. Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins 2013; Knoll, et al, 2011) and Democrats own immigrants' rights (Jeong, et al, 2011; Mayada, et al 2016).

The vignette survey experimental design yields a rich set of data, allowing us to test a much larger number of hypotheses simultaneously. However, there are some important limitations of the study design and sample that may also hamper the results. Namely, the sample drawn from a pool of workers on Mechanical Turk was on average younger, more educated and more likely to identify as Democrats. Additionally, the sample size of 2,000 respondents across 12 treatment groups (and two parties) introduced some challenges in testing alternative hypotheses (e.g. low versus high knowledge citizens, voters versus non-voters).

The results of this study serve as a pilot and inform the research design for a larger

study that will be put to a nationally representative sample in some important ways. First, although the power analysis (see Annex 4.C) indicates sufficient power to detect a difference on the partisan and bipartisan cues, should one exist in the general population, it is possible that the skew of the sample combined with the many treatment groups limited the ability to detect of any effects. The revised design will reduce the number of treatment groups from 12 to six – collapsing the four treatment groups for the welcoming and restrictive frame into two and omit the test of attribution. This means that all respondents will receive information revealing attribution to either Clinton or the Reagan and the null result from the MTurk sample will be incorporated into the findings of any final paper that is published. The sample will remain at 2,000 respondents, but with a more focused design and nationally representative sample, the effects may be stronger from the outset, and allow for an analysis of any spill-over effects from the welcoming and restrictive frames into the second and third vignettes.

Annex 4.A: Summary Statistics by Treatment (Groups 1-6)

	Group 1		Group 2		Group 3		Group 4		Group 5		Group 6	
	Mean	StdDev	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev
Republican	0.27	0.44	0.26	0.44	0.24	0.43	0.26	0.44	0.21	0.41	0.30	0.46
Democrat	0.41	0.49	0.40	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.41	0.49	0.46	0.50	0.43	0.50
Independent	0.32	0.47	0.35	0.48	0.28	0.45	0.33	0.47	0.33	0.47	0.27	0.45
Broadly Rep	0.35	0.48	0.33	0.47	0.34	0.47	0.42	0.49	0.32	0.47	0.39	0.49
Broadly Dem	0.60	0.49	0.62	0.49	0.59	0.49	0.53	0.50	0.64	0.48	0.58	0.50
Male	0.55	0.50	0.47	0.50	0.53	0.50	0.46	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.52	0.50
Female	0.45	0.50	0.53	0.50	0.47	0.50	0.54	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.48	0.50
Age 18-24	0.08	0.27	0.07	0.26	0.11	0.31	0.08	0.27	0.11	0.31	0.07	0.26
Age 25-34	0.42	0.50	0.36	0.48	0.32	0.47	0.42	0.49	0.38	0.49	0.44	0.50
Age 35-44	0.31	0.46	0.25	0.43	0.32	0.47	0.23	0.42	0.23	0.42	0.27	0.45
Age 45-54	0.10	0.30	0.15	0.35	0.13	0.34	0.16	0.36	0.14	0.34	0.10	0.30
Age 55-64	0.07	0.26	0.11	0.32	0.10	0.30	0.08	0.27	0.13	0.34	0.07	0.26
Age 65+	0.01	0.11	0.07	0.26	0.03	0.18	0.04	0.20	0.02	0.15	0.04	0.20
White	0.76	0.43	0.74	0.44	0.75	0.43	0.75	0.43	0.78	0.42	0.75	0.44
Black	0.07	0.26	0.10	0.30	0.07	0.25	0.09	0.29	0.07	0.26	0.07	0.26
Latino	0.05	0.23	0.05	0.22	0.06	0.23	0.03	0.17	0.07	0.26	0.08	0.27
Other Ethnicity	0.12	0.32	0.11	0.31	0.12	0.33	0.13	0.33	0.08	0.28	0.10	0.30
H/S Diploma	0.08	0.28	0.08	0.27	0.08	0.27	0.08	0.27	0.11	0.31	0.07	0.26
Some College	0.32	0.47	0.33	0.47	0.32	0.47	0.30	0.46	0.32	0.47	0.33	0.47
Bachelors	0.42	0.49	0.39	0.49	0.41	0.49	0.41	0.49	0.39	0.49	0.42	0.50
Graduate Degree	0.17	0.38	0.20	0.40	0.18	0.38	0.19	0.39	0.17	0.38	0.18	0.39
Under $40k	0.42	0.50	0.43	0.50	0.42	0.49	0.40	0.49	0.44	0.50	0.40	0.49
$40k-$70k	0.38	0.49	0.32	0.47	0.33	0.47	0.39	0.49	0.33	0.47	0.39	0.49
Over $70k	0.20	0.40	0.25	0.44	0.25	0.43	0.22	0.41	0.24	0.43	0.21	0.41

Annex 4.A: Summary Statistics by Treatment (Groups 7-12)

	Group 7		Group 8		Group 9		Group 10		Group 11		Group 12	
	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev
Republican	0.22	0.42	0.29	0.45	0.30	0.46	0.23	0.42	0.26	0.44	0.18	0.39
Democrat	0.42	0.50	0.40	0.49	0.39	0.49	0.41	0.49	0.45	0.50	0.49	0.50
Independent	0.36	0.48	0.31	0.46	0.31	0.47	0.36	0.48	0.29	0.46	0.33	0.47
Broadly Rep	0.36	0.48	0.41	0.49	0.42	0.50	0.35	0.48	0.34	0.47	0.27	0.45
Broadly Dem	0.59	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.53	0.50	0.60	0.49	0.62	0.49	0.67	0.47
Male	0.51	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.47	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.53	0.50	0.50	0.50
Female	0.49	0.50	0.51	0.50	0.53	0.50	0.52	0.50	0.47	0.50	0.50	0.50
Age 18-24	0.08	0.27	0.08	0.27	0.05	0.22	0.09	0.29	0.04	0.20	0.08	0.27
Age 25-34	0.38	0.49	0.41	0.49	0.42	0.49	0.34	0.48	0.47	0.50	0.40	0.49
Age 35-44	0.31	0.46	0.22	0.42	0.22	0.42	0.30	0.46	0.28	0.45	0.22	0.41
Age 45-54	0.13	0.33	0.14	0.35	0.16	0.37	0.11	0.32	0.13	0.34	0.11	0.32
Age 55-64	0.07	0.26	0.08	0.27	0.09	0.28	0.08	0.28	0.06	0.24	0.13	0.34
Age 65+	0.03	0.17	0.07	0.25	0.06	0.23	0.07	0.26	0.01	0.11	0.06	0.24
White	0.76	0.43	0.73	0.44	0.78	0.42	0.79	0.41	0.72	0.45	0.70	0.46
Black	0.06	0.23	0.09	0.29	0.10	0.31	0.08	0.28	0.11	0.31	0.08	0.27
Latino	0.07	0.26	0.05	0.21	0.02	0.13	0.05	0.21	0.06	0.23	0.10	0.30
Other Ethnicity	0.11	0.32	0.13	0.33	0.10	0.30	0.08	0.27	0.11	0.31	0.12	0.33
H/S Diploma	0.10	0.30	0.09	0.29	0.10	0.30	0.11	0.31	0.07	0.25	0.11	0.32
Some College	0.32	0.47	0.29	0.45	0.31	0.47	0.32	0.47	0.28	0.45	0.34	0.48
Bachelors	0.43	0.50	0.45	0.50	0.41	0.49	0.40	0.49	0.40	0.49	0.38	0.49
Graduate Degree	0.14	0.34	0.16	0.36	0.16	0.37	0.17	0.37	0.24	0.43	0.15	0.36
Under $40k	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50	0.46	0.50	0.44	0.50	0.42	0.50	0.47	0.50
$40k-$70k	0.30	0.46	0.38	0.49	0.34	0.47	0.34	0.47	0.36	0.48	0.30	0.46
Over $70k	0.19	0.40	0.19	0.39	0.20	0.40	0.22	0.42	0.21	0.41	0.24	0.43

Annex 4.B: Figures

Figure 4.4 – Effects of Partisan Cues on Prenatal Vignette Total Sample by Treatment



Figure 4.7 – Effects of Partisan Cues on Prenatal Vignette Total Sample by Treatment



Annex 4.C: Power Analysis for Study Sample Size

Conservative Estimate: Treating Partisan ID as Blocking Condition

Input parameters:

Effect size f	= 0.15
□ err prob	= 0.05
Total sample size	= 2000
Numerator df	= 35
Number of groups	= 36

Output parameters:

Noncentrality parameter □	= 45.00000
Critical F	= 1.4289903
Denominator df	= 1964
Actual power	= 0.9812613

Moderate Estimate: Treating Partisan ID as a Covariate

Input parameters:

Effect size f	= 0.15
□ err prob	= 0.05
Total sample size	= 2000
Numerator df	= 18
Number of groups	= 12
Number of covariates	= 7

Output parameters:

Noncentrality parameter □	= 45.00000
Critical F	= 1.6090431
Denominator df	= 1988
Actual power	= 0.9968603

Annex 4.D: Experimental Instrument

Qualtrics Harsh TESS Pilot Study 2018

Start of Block: BLOCK 1 - CONSENT

consent1 **STUDY: What's your take on important social issues?**

OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT This survey is for a research study about important social issues in the United States. You will be asked to report your views about different issues discussed in government and on the news. This survey requires you to pay careful attention. Please make sure that there are no distractions. **Only participants who answer carefully will be credited.**

PARTICIPATION & CONFIDENTIALITY The survey will take approximately 5 minutes, and you will receive $.50 for your participation.

• All information from this project is confidential. Personal information such as your name will not be used in any work that results from this research, and will be treated as strictly confidential.

• Results of this project will be written up as part of a PhD dissertation at the London School of Economics. Results may also be published in an academic journal and discussed at conferences.

• You have the right to withdraw your participation at any time, and for any reason.

• If you have any questions about this research please contact the researcher Melissa Shannon (m.shannon@lse.ac.uk).

• It is important that you respond honestly to all questionnaire items.

CONSENT

I understand the purpose of this research project and all my questions have been answered. I understand that my answers will be kept confidential and will be fully anonymized. I understand that I have the right to stop participating at any time. I have read and understand the information provided above. I give my consent to participate.

○ Yes, I AGREE to participate (1)

○ No, I DO NOT give my consent and will EXIT the survey (2)

End of Block: BLOCK 1 - CONSENT

Start of Block: BLOCK 2 - WEED-OUT QUESTION

attention1 **STUDY: ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOCIAL ISSUES**

In this study you will be asked to think about different social issues and report your attitudes.

Before you start, we want to know whether you actually take the time to read the directions. We will screen out and refuse to pay people who do random clicking. In order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please answer whether the following statement is true.

This survey contains questions about social issues

- ○ Definitely True (1)
- ○ Probably True (2)
- ○ Neither True nor False (3)
- ○ Probably False (4)
- ○ Definitely False (5)

End of Block: BLOCK 2 - WEED-OUT QUESTION

Start of Block: BLOCK 3 -Presidential Frames

G1_restnone

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first question.

"All Americans, not only in the states most heavily affected but in every place in this country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens entering our country. The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants. The public services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. We are a nation of immigrants. But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our immigration laws we have seen in recent years, and we must do more to stop it."

G2_restcling

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first question.

"All Americans, not only in the states most heavily affected but in every place in this country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens entering our country. The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants. The public services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. We are a nation of immigrants. But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our immigration laws we have seen in recent years, and we must do more to stop it."

President Bill Clinton - Democrat

G3_welnone

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first question.

"Through this 'Golden Door' have come millions of men and women, who first stepped foot on American soil right there, on Ellis Island. These families came here to work. They came to build. Others came in different ways, from other lands, under different, often harrowing conditions. They didn't ask what this country could do for them but what they could do to make this refuge the greatest home of freedom in history. They brought with them courage, ambition and the values of family, neighborhood, work, peace and freedom. They came from different lands but they shared the same values, the same dream."

G4_welreg

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first question.

"Through this 'Golden Door' have come millions of men and women, who first stepped foot on American soil right there, on Ellis Island. These families came here to work. They came to build. Others came in different ways, from other lands, under different, often harrowing conditions. They didn't ask what this country could do for them but what they could do to make this refuge the greatest home of freedom in history. They brought with them courage, ambition and the values of family, neighborhood, work,

peace and freedom. They came from different lands but they shared the same values, the same dream." President Ronald Reagan - Republican

G5_restnone

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first question.

"All Americans, not only in the states most heavily affected but in every place in this country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens entering our country. The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants. The public services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. We are a nation of immigrants. But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our immigration laws we have seen in recent years, and we must do more to stop it."

G6_restclint

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first question.

"All Americans, not only in the states most heavily affected but in every place in this country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens entering our country. The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants. The public services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. We are a nation of immigrants. But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our immigration laws we have seen in recent years, and we must do more to stop it."

President Bill Clinton - Democrat

G7_welnone

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first question.

"Through this 'Golden Door' have come millions of men and women, who first stepped foot on American soil right there, on Ellis Island. These families came here to work. They came to build. Others came in different ways, from other lands, under different, often harrowing conditions. They didn't ask what this country could do for them but what they could do to make this refuge the greatest home of freedom in history. They

brought with them courage, ambition and the values of family, neighborhood, work, peace and freedom. They came from different lands but they shared the same values, the same dream."

G8_welreg

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first question.

"Through this 'Golden Door' have come millions of men and women, who first stepped foot on American soil right there, on Ellis Island. These families came here to work. They came to build. Others came in different ways, from other lands, under different, often harrowing conditions. They didn't ask what this country could do for them but what they could do to make this refuge the greatest home of freedom in history. They brought with them courage, ambition and the values of family, neighborhood, work, peace and freedom. They came from different lands but they shared the same values, the same dream."

President Ronald Reagan - Republican

G9_restnone

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first question.

"All Americans, not only in the states most heavily affected but in every place in this country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens entering our country. The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants. The public services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. We are a nation of immigrants. But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our immigration laws we have seen in recent years, and we must do more to stop it."

G10_restclint

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first question.

"All Americans, not only in the states most heavily affected but in every place in this country, are rightly disturbed by the large numbers of illegal aliens entering our country. The jobs they hold might otherwise be held by citizens or legal immigrants. The public services they use impose burdens on our taxpayers. We are a nation of immigrants.

But we are also a nation of laws. It is wrong and ultimately self-defeating for a nation of immigrants to permit the kind of abuse of our immigration laws we have seen in recent years, and we must do more to stop it."

President Bill Clinton - Democrat

G11_welnone

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first question.

"Through this 'Golden Door' have come millions of men and women, who first stepped foot on American soil right there, on Ellis Island. These families came here to work. They came to build. Others came in different ways, from other lands, under different, often harrowing conditions. They didn't ask what this country could do for them but what they could do to make this refuge the greatest home of freedom in history. They brought with them courage, ambition and the values of family, neighborhood, work, peace and freedom. They came from different lands but they shared the same values, the same dream."

G12_welreg

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first question.

"Through this 'Golden Door' have come millions of men and women, who first stepped foot on American soil right there, on Ellis Island. These families came here to work. They came to build. Others came in different ways, from other lands, under different, often harrowing conditions. They didn't ask what this country could do for them but what they could do to make this refuge the greatest home of freedom in history. They brought with them courage, ambition and the values of family, neighborhood, work, peace and freedom. They came from different lands but they shared the same values, the same dream."

President Ronald Reagan - Republican

End of Block: BLOCK 3 -Presidential Frames

Start of Block: BLOCK 4 - Immigration level

letin

Do you think the number of immigrants to America should be....

- Increased a lot (1)
- Increased a little (2)
- Remain the same as it is (3)
- Reduced a little (4)
- Reduced a lot (5)

End of Block: BLOCK 4 - Immigration level

Start of Block: BLOCK 5 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 1-3

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

Prenatal - Rep 1

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans have worked to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care."

- Strongly disagree (1)
- Somewhat disagree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat agree (4)
- Strongly agree (5)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

Prenatal - Dem 2

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Democrats have worked to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care."

- Strongly disagree (1)
- Somewhat disagree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat agree (4)
- Strongly agree (5)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

Prenatal - Bipart 3

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans and Democrats have worked together to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care."

- Strongly disagree (1)
- Somewhat disagree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat agree (4)
- Strongly agree (5)

End of Block: BLOCK 5 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 1-3

Start of Block: BLOCK 6 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 4-6

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

Prenatal - Rep 4

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans have worked to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care."

- ○ Strongly disagree (1)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (2)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (4)
- ○ Strongly agree (5)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

Prenatal - Dem 5

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Democrats have worked to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care."

- ○ Strongly disagree (1)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (2)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (4)
- ○ Strongly agree (5)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

X→

Prenatal - Bipart 6

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans and Democrats have worked together to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care."

- ○ Strongly disagree (1)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (2)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (4)
- ○ Strongly agree (5)

End of Block: BLOCK 6 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 4-6

Start of Block: BLOCK 7 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 7-9

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

Prenatal - Rep 7

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans have worked to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care."

- ○ Strongly disagree (1)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (2)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (4)
- ○ Strongly agree (5)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

Prenatal - Dem 8

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Democrats have worked to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care."

- ○ Strongly disagree (1)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (2)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (4)
- ○ Strongly agree (5)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

Prenatal - Bipart 9

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans and Democrats have worked together to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care."

- Strongly disagree (1)
- Somewhat disagree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat agree (4)
- Strongly agree (5)

End of Block: BLOCK 7 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 7-9

Start of Block: BLOCK 8 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 10-12

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

Prenatal - Rep 10

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans have worked to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care."

- Strongly disagree (1)
- Somewhat disagree (2)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat agree (4)
- Strongly agree (5)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

Prenatal - Dem 11

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Democrats have worked to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care."

- ○ Strongly disagree (1)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (2)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (4)
- ○ Strongly agree (5)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

Prenatal - Bipart 12

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Prenatal care lowers the risks of birth defects and is the most cost-effective way to improve the health of mothers and their infants. In some states Republicans and Democrats have worked together to expand prenatal care for unauthorized immigrants who cannot afford health insurance to make sure they can get important health screenings. We should cover low-income unauthorized immigrant mothers for prenatal care."

- ○ Strongly disagree (1)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (2)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (4)
- ○ Strongly agree (5)

End of Block: BLOCK 8 - Political Cues - Prenatal Groups 10-12

Start of Block: BLOCK 9 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 1-3

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

X→

G1_DenatRCue

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and then get citizenship. The Trump administration began checking old records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa"

- ○ Strongly disagree (5)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (4)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (2)
- ○ Strongly agree (1)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

X→

G2_DenatDCue

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and then get citizenship. The Obama administration began checking old records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa"

- ○ Strongly disagree (5)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (4)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (2)
- ○ Strongly agree (1)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

X→

G3_DnatBiCue

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and then get citizenship. Both the Obama and Trump administrations began checking old records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa"

- ○ Strongly disagree (5)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (4)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (2)
- ○ Strongly agree (1)

End of Block: BLOCK 9 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 1-3

Start of Block: BLOCK 10 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 4-6

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

G4_DenatRCue

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
"Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and then get citizenship. The Trump administration began checking old records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa"

- ○ Strongly disagree (5)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (4)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (2)
- ○ Strongly agree (1)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

X→

G5_DenatDCue

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and then get citizenship. The Obama administration began checking old records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa"

- ○ Strongly disagree (5)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (4)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (2)
- ○ Strongly agree (1)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

G6_DenatBiCue

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and then get citizenship. Both the Obama and Trump administrations began checking old records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa"

- ○ Strongly disagree (5)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (4)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (2)
- ○ Strongly agree (1)

End of Block: BLOCK 10 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 4-6

Start of Block: BLOCK 11 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 7-9

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

X→

G7_DenatRCue

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and then get citizenship. The Trump administration began checking old records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa"

- ○ Strongly disagree (5)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (4)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (2)
- ○ Strongly agree (1)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

X→

G8_DenatDCue

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and then get citizenship. The Obama administration began checking old records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa"

- ○ Strongly disagree (5)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (4)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (2)
- ○ Strongly agree (1)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

X→

G9_DenatBiCue

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and then get citizenship. Both the Obama and Trump administrations began checking old records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa"

- ○ Strongly disagree (5)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (4)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (2)
- ○ Strongly agree (1)

End of Block: BLOCK 11 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 7-9

Start of Block: BLOCK 12 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 10-12

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

X→

G10_DenatRCue

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and then get citizenship. The Trump administration began checking old records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa"

- ○ Strongly disagree (5)
- ○ Somewhat disagree (4)
- ○ Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- ○ Somewhat agree (2)
- ○ Strongly agree (1)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

G11_DenatDCue

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

"Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and then get citizenship. The Obama administration began checking old records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa"

- Strongly disagree (5)
- Somewhat disagree (4)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Strongly agree (1)

Display This Question:

If Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and advance to the next page for your first q... Is Displayed

G12_DenatBiCue

Please take a moment to read the argument carefully and then tell us what you think. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement

"Old fingerprint records can be used to identify immigrants who had mislead the government by using a different name on their visa application to stay in the country and then get citizenship. Both the Obama and Trump administrations began checking old records to identify immigrants who may have fraudulently obtained citizenship. We should revoke the citizenship and deport any immigrant who used a different name to get a visa"

- Strongly disagree (5)
- Somewhat disagree (4)
- Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat agree (2)
- Strongly agree (1)

End of Block: BLOCK 12 - Political Cues - Denaturalization Groups 10-12

Start of Block: BLOCK 13 - Voting Behavior

votereg **Are you currently registered to vote?**

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

vote2012 **Did you vote in the 2016 presidential election?**

- ○ Yes (1)
- ○ No (2)

JS

likvote **There are many local, state, and national elections. Furthermore, many people intend to vote in a given election, but sometimes personal and professional circumstances keep them from the polls. Thinking back over the past two or three years, would you say that you voted in all elections, almost all, about half, one or two, or none at all?**

- ○ All Elections (1)
- ○ Almost All (2)
- ○ About Half (3)
- ○ One or Two (4)
- ○ None At All (5)
- ○ Don't Know (6)

Page Break

X→

partyid **Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a...**

- ○ Republican (1)
- ○ Democrat (2)
- ○ Independent (3)
- ○ Another Party, Please Specify: (4) _____
- ○ No Preference (5)

Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a... = Republican

repub **Would you call yourself a...**

- ○ Strong Republican (1)
- ○ Not Very Strong Republican (2)

Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a... = Democrat

dem **Would you call yourself a...**

- ○ Strong Democrat (1)
- ○ Not Very Strong Democrat (2)

Display This Question:

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a... = Independent

indepaff **Do you think of yourself as closer to the...**

- ○ Republican Party (1)
- ○ Democratic Party (2)

X→

polid **In general, do you think of yourself as…**

- ○ Extremely Liberal (1)
- ○ Liberal (2)
- ○ Slightly Liberal (3)
- ○ Moderate, Middle of the Road (4)
- ○ Slightly Conservative (5)
- ○ Conservative (6)
- ○ Extremely Conservative (7)

Page Break

polknow **Who is the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives?**

- ○ John Boehner (1)
- ○ Harry Reid (2)
- ○ Paul Ryan (3)
- ○ Nancy Pelosi (4)
- ○ Don't Know (5)

End of Block: BLOCK 13 - Voting Behavior

Start of Block: BLOCK 14 - Respondent's Place of Residence

state **Please select the state and county in which you currently reside.**
State: (1)
County: (2)

□ State (1) ... Wyoming ~ Weston County (3152)

End of Block: BLOCK 14 - Respondent's Place of Residence

Start of Block: BLOCK 15 - Demographics

gender **What is your gender?**

- ○ Male (1)
- ○ Female (0)

born **What year were you born?**

 2006 (7) ... 1900 (113)

edu **What is the highest level of education you have completed?**

- Less than High School (1)
- High School / GED (2)
- Some College (3)
- 2-year College Degree (4)
- 4-year College Degree (5)
- Master's Degree (6)
- Doctoral Degree (7)
- Professional Degree (JD, MD) (8)
- Prefer Not to Answer (9)

Page Break

JS

income **What is your annual income range?**

- ○ Below $20,000 (1)
- ○ $20,000 - $29,999 (2)
- ○ $30,000 - $39,999 (3)
- ○ $40,000 - $49,999 (4)
- ○ $50,000 - $59,999 (5)
- ○ $60,000 - $69,999 (6)
- ○ $70,000 - $79,999 (9)
- ○ $80,000 - $89,999 (7)
- ○ $90,000 or more (8)

Page Break

marstat **Please indicate your marital status:**

□ Single (1) ... Prefer Not to Answer (7)

race **What is your race?**

- ○ White/Caucasian (1)
- ○ African American (2)
- ○ Hispanic (3)
- ○ Asian (4)
- ○ Native American (5)
- ○ Pacific Islander (6)
- ○ Other (7) _____

Page Break

relig **What is your religion?**

- ○ Baptist—Any Denomination (1)
- ○ Protestant (e.g., Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Episcopal) (2)
- ○ Catholic (3)
- ○ Mormon (4)
- ○ Jewish (5)
- ○ Muslim (6)
- ○ Hindu (7)
- ○ Buddhist (8)
- ○ Pentecostal (9)
- ○ Eastern Orthodox (10)
- ○ Other Christian (11) _____
- ○ Other non-Christian (12) _____
- ○ None (13)

church **How often do you attend religious services?**

- ○ More than Once a Week (1)
- ○ Once a Week (2)
- ○ Once or Twice a Month (3)
- ○ A Few Times a Year (4)
- ○ Once a Year or Less (5)
- ○ Never (6)

Page Break

End of Block: BLOCK 15 - Demographics

Start of Block: BLOCK 16 - Citizenship

bornUS **Were you born in the United States, Puerto Rico or some other country?**

- ○ The United States (1)
- ○ Puerto Rico (2)
- ○ Some other country (3)

Display This Question:

If Were you born in the United States, Puerto Rico or some other country? = Some other country

citizen **Are you a naturalized American citizen?**

- ○ Yes (1)
- ○ No (2)

Page Break

intparent **Where were your parents born?**

- ○ One parent born in the U.S. (1)
- ○ Both parents born in the U.S. (2)
- ○ Neither parent born in the U.S. (3)
- ○ Don't Know (4)

End of Block: BLOCK 16 - Citizenship

Start of Block: BLOCK 17 - end page for testers

end Thank you for taking part. If you have any comments about the topics covered in the survey that you think might be useful for the study, please include them below.

Be sure to click next so that you can receive your worker code and get paid for completing the survey

Again, we really appreciate your input!

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

End of Block: BLOCK 17 - end page for testers

CHAPTER V CONCLUSION

This doctoral thesis builds upon prior research to examine whether and the extent to which attitudes towards immigrants induce support for punitive policies directed at immigrant populations. Hajinal and Rivera (2014) argue that the heavily rotated threat narrative on immigration has successfully fed fears about immigrants. They content that these messages also play an important role in shaping non-minority voters' attitudes towards minority populations and but trigger party selection.

Research on this topic that employs the lingua-franca of the current political discourse is critical to understanding how individuals engage with these messages, how successful these frames are at tapping into latent views about immigrant populations, and piecing together how these factors sway policy preferences in this realm. Recent examinations on the effects of Donald Trump's immigration rhetoric within online discussion forums show that the volume and content of phrasing increases dramatically after his speeches, copycatting the phrasing laid-out in his speeches and giving full credit. By December 2015, Demata (2017) observed a sizable shift in the most prominent phrases linked to overall discussions of immigration from "reform," "amnesty," and "uslatino" to "illegal", "alien", "Muslim", "terrorism", "ban" tied to hashtags for "trump" and "realdonaldtrump". Observational analysis of this kind is informative, but the viewpoint is restrained and potentially misleading. For example, partisan identification is assumed because of the post on the web forum and only includes messages from those who are active on these forums rather than from the wider electorate. Further, the scope of much of the literature on how individuals engage with the issue of immigration is centered on negative political communication (Brader et al, 2008; Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins 2014), limiting our perspective to one aspect of this important issue. In short these types of analyses give us little insights into how people across the entire electorate respond to the same political message on

immigration, an important addition given the increasingly fragmented media and partisan environment.

I make several important contributions to public opinion research by investigating whether additional factors may neutralize (i.e. positive frames and concrete savings estimates in Chapters II and III, welcoming frames by trusted party elites in Chapter IV, and bi-partisan cues Chapters II and IV) these policy preferences. Further, by presenting respondents with vignettes that mimic or use the actual language from the debates on immigration, I am able to investigate how Americans respond to real-world political communication on this highly partisan and polarized issue.

Careful attention has gone into drafting these political messages to ensure they come across as credible and research participants understand what is being asked in the same way. In Chapter II (Paper 1) I present the results of pre-testing phase of a vignette survey experiment. The tested instrument seeks to measure how individuals' attitudes towards immigrants and party sponsor influences support for government funded health care initiatives, and whether providing respondents with a concrete economic benefit induces a more positive enrollment preference when immigrant groups benefit from a public entitlement program. This methodology has not been used in this area and presents a vital contribution to the research in this vein.

To identify sources of response error and improve the validity of survey questions in surveys, I conducted two rounds of cognitive interviews with participants in Texas between August and September 2015. Through the cognitive interviews I hoped to (1) identify any complicated language in the survey that could affect comprehension, memory retrieval, and decision processes; (2) investigate the ways in which participants mentally process information as they respond to questionnaires; (3) evaluate how online survey participants engage with the survey in its electronic form. The cognitive interviews provide vital feedback to improve the quality of the survey instrument, however, the

study also bears out some important qualitative insights into how individuals residing within the U.S. engage with and comprehend political issue frames on immigration.

Across all interview participants, the consensus was largely positive to the positive frames employed. Regularly participants would make suggestions on how to improve the wording to increase agreement with the statements rather than to pull out an objective evaluation or policy preference. These discussions suggest that the positive frames do induce more positive preferences, findings that are also supported in the larger quantitative studies carried out in Chapters III and IV.

Although participants were largely positive in their assessment of the vignettes put before them, once the immigrant primes were present, the participants consistently linked the issue of immigration to politics, referring to it as a 'hot-button' issue. This theme was especially common among individuals who strongly identified with a political party, many of which expressed anxiety that the vignettes mentioned an immigrant group in relation to the public entitlement programs. Their reactions were amplified when they received the party cue. They feared that members of the opposite party would respond more negatively when it was employed providing qualitative evidence that touches on Iyengar and Westwood's (2015) main thesis that partisan hostility across the American electorate now exceeds racial disdain. But through the interviews the participants offered a more nuanced perspective of their concerns about what the immigrant cues meant, but always under the lens of how they believed these would influence the 'other' party's preferences on the policy under consideration. The feedback received from this project was critical in informing the theoretical approach and hypotheses tested on partisan cues in Chapter IV.

As participants of the cognitive interviews received the concrete savings estimates, some moderated their response from a negative position, commenting 'it's a no-brainer', however, other subjects expressed skepticism about the figures embedded in the vignette. The feedback related to this concern centered on a mistrust of where the

numbers came from. The suspicion expressed was particularly prominent among those with stronger party affiliation, but expressed relatively evenly across committed Republican and Democratic participants. This mistrust of apolitical information introduces some interesting questions worthy of further investigation. The ability for citizens absorb and objectively evaluate new information in the political world is a fundamental standard for democratic decision-making. For example, if the economy is performing poorly or the number of mass shooting increase, there is a traditional assumption that the entire electorate, regardless of party preference – would update their beliefs in light of the new information and reassess their political preferences. Yet, this assumption is challenged by research demonstrating that partisans interpret the same, seemingly neutral, information through a partisan lens and discount the information before them (e.g., Gaines et al., 2007). Experimental work has deepened the cracks in this assumption, showing that once partisans form an attitude about an issue or candidate, they fail to process new information about these objects impartially (e.g. Bartles, 2002; Druckman et al, 2013; Zaller, 1992). Rather, these individuals question and disregard information that contests their existing opinions. Despite the growth of research in this area, to date there has been scant evidence presented of how this mistrust of apolitical information transpires in real-world settings. Consequently, we know almost nothing about the depths or motivations behind these types of the bias. The persistent theme of mistrust of neutral information invites further investigation to this important topic.

In Chapter III, I employ an original survey experiment to directly tests three fundamental theories believed to be at the heart of exclusionary policies targeted at the foreign-born – anxiety about immigrant participation in government funded initiatives, hostility towards unauthorized immigrants, and the concerns about taxes. Social welfare programs were created to improve outcomes for disadvantaged populations, but they also provide a tangible economic benefit to society (Heckman, 2006). However, the

American electorate's complex and somewhat contradictory vision of a social safety net, which calls for a system of minimal taxes while aiming to provide high quality public services, presents the opportunity for exclusionary attitudes to emerge.

As policy makers debate how best to resolve record budget deficits and burgeoning demands on the social infrastructure, this research seeks to disentangle the political decisions made by Americans' regarding who should get access to government-funded assistance. Pioneering studies examining the links between attitudes towards immigrants and their exclusionary preferences relied on observational data, but the inferences made are restricted because they lack a counterfactual, that is no direct comparison that removes the explicit reminder of immigrant participation. This study broadens our understanding of these links by introducing immigrant primes to a large and nationally representative sample of Americans, and asks about their willingness to block access to these controversial populations.

Scholars in a range of disciplines have all provided evidence indicating that individuals are less willing to fund government services when the costs are presented to them (Cabral and Hoxby, 2012; Finkelstein, 2007; Green et al, 1994; Meltsner 1974; Povich, 2014) and when an beneficiary is deemed to be undeserving (Gilens, 1999). A large literature has also shown that political frames centered on the immigrant tax burden would negatively influence Americans' enrollment preferences for government funded programs (Clark et al, 1994; Hanson et al., 2007), but the original contribution examined in this study determines whether a similar pattern emerge if individuals were exposed to a positive frame emphasizing the general benefits of such policies.

To date few studies have explicitly examined Americans' reactions to messages using the term illegal immigrant in a comparative context. Knoll et al (2011) get closer to the impact of the 'illegal immigrant' cue by testing whether Iowa voters change their preferences for federal immigration reform options when primed to think about 'undocumented immigrants' versus 'illegal immigrants', and 'undocumented immigrants'

against 'Mexican immigrants' – but these frames related to citizenship not public benefits policies. Carried out between March 2007 and January 2008, their results provided limited evidence for decreased support for conditional citizenship under the 'Mexican immigrant frame', however, the effects were stronger for Republicans who believed immigration was an important policy problem. The experiment conducted in Chapter III expanded upon the findings of Knoll et al (2011) by testing changes in preferences on a much larger and nationally representative sample to examine differences by education and income level, in line with the prevailing theory. Additionally, the experiment provides respondents with a greater range of social policy options that were recently floated in state legislatures and the U.S. Congress, and the data were collected at a point when citizens have experienced greater exposure to the immigration debate.

The results clearly demonstrate that immigrant participation consistently triggered more exclusionary responses. The respondents who were exposed to the 'illegal immigrant' prime expressed more punitive preferences relative to those who received the 'immigrant' prime. Similar to Hainmueller and Hopkins (2012) and Knoll (2013), these findings suggest that legal status is a significant driver of exclusionary preferences. Still across the sample, respondents expressed strong opposition for 'immigrant' and 'illegal immigrant', indicating that Americans would support greater restrictions on immigrant participation in public programs even when they have gone through the proper channels to obtain a visa.

Across all three vignettes, respondents with lower levels of income and education provided statistically similar preferences to respondents with more education and higher incomes. This result stands in stark contrast to earlier observational work (e.g. Clark et al, 1994; Fachini and Mayada, 2009; Hanson, 2005) that suggest that hostile preferences towards immigrants are linked to concerns about higher taxes. Instead, the findings from Chapter III advance several theories a growing body of work, which suggests that spending and policy preferences related immigration are motivated by group-level

concerns about how immigrants impact society (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Citrin et al. 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000; McLaren, 2003; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012; Mutz, 2018).

The test to examine whether a concrete savings estimates can neutralize the negative effects associated with negative immigrant attitudes also addressed a substantive gap in the literature that has become much more prominent in the age of questioning fact-based information. Across the three vignettes there was a steady lack of impact on the immigrant primes. This finding hints at the presence of some reasonably entrenched norms in which Americans feel that it is appropriate to block access to government-funded services to the foreign-born, even when this decision equates to a group-level economic loss. However, it is worth noting that similar to the qualitative feedback from Chapter II, the fiscal benefit also rarely resonated with those allocated to the control group. This would suggested that the numerical and fact-based argument is not compelling, at least not in the manner presented here.

Similar to the qualitative feedback presented in Chapter II and the evidence presented by Gadarian and Albertson (2013) and Hopkins (2014), I find that vast and significant differences in the responses of Republicans and Democrats on policy preferences on immigration. These partisan differences suggest that reforms to the immigration system within the United States will remain just as contentious. However, for those interested in learning ways to dampen the effects of the negative political rhetoric, the pattern and consistency of the negative reactions to the immigrant primes suggests that all Americans' irrespective of party affiliation are potentially tolerant to further restrictions on the types of government funded services that non-citizens may access. These finding held as firmly for the 'immigrant' as they did for the 'illegal immigrant' groups. As the Trump administration has put forward additional hurdles to block legal immigrants from obtaining permanent residency or citizenship if they or household members received in certain services (National Immigration Law Center,

2018) this result seems particularly pertinent in determining what kind of opposition can be mobilized to halt such actions.

The results from Chapter III expose another important finding that warrants further investigation. Much of the previous literature in this realm has focused on Americans' opposition to low-skilled migrants. Within this study, the initiative the generated the lowest support among respondents, even Democrats, was the offer of in-state tuition to either immigrant prime group. Much of the research that has sought to unpack the attributes that make a more desirable immigrant point to skill level as the most important factor used to weigh up their decision (e.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012; Helbling and Kriesi, 2014), but this outcome provides clear evidence that Americans, across all segments of the electorate, are prepared to limit access to a means of obtaining the credentials necessary to secure a high-skilled job. From a policy perspective, the pattern of results seems striking, as only group has generated sympathy - young people who were brought to the U.S. as children, who are commonly referred to as DREAMERS – to garner enough bi-partisan support to try for a policy solution.

Chapter IV builds off the findings from Chapters II and III. For this paper I explicitly test whether the language referring to immigrants sways Americans' preferences for immigration policies and whether a partisan cue triggers a more polarized response. The experimental design consists of a 4 by 3 block, drawing upon the large and timely literature investigating parties' use frames (arguments) and cues (symbols) to establish policy reputations with the electorate (e.g. Bartels, 2002; Chong and Druckman, 2007; Druckman et al, 2010; Goren 2002; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Krosnick and Brannon, 1993; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004; Zaller, 1992). The vignettes pull from the actual welcoming and restrictive frames implanted in speeches by former Presidents Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, extending the important research conducted by those attempting to mimic the real-world political debates on immigration

(e.g. Brader et al, 2008; Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins 2014). The careful selection of the immigrant frames allows for a unique analysis of respondents reactions to partisan frames that counter each parties' current positioning on the issue. This is critical for a robust examination of the impact and limits of the partisan cue effects within the highly polarized context.

Within this chapter two of the major theories believed to trigger hostile preferences towards immigrants are investigated: the tone of the political frames and the role partisanship. By taking this approach, I am able to test how public opinion is affected by the competing frames the in current immigration debate. There is a wealth of evidence showing that political parties are a major predictor in shaping public opinion (e.g. Bartels 2002; Campbell et al. 1960; Green and Palmquist 1990; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). However, to date no study has provided evidence demonstrating how Americans' opinions on immigration are influenced by issue frames that are explicitly sponsored by political parties, and also provides a contrasting frame /policy issues from the same party.

Similar to Chapter III, I find that all Americans are more supportive of immigrants when they receive a welcoming frame that emphasizes the positive contributions made by immigrants and are more punitive of reducing immigration when they receive a restrictive immigration frame where the focus is on negative consequences to costs and competition for resources. Still as with the findings in Chapters II and III, there are vast differences in the preferences expressed across all policy initiatives depending on the respondents' partisan identity. Republicans were steadily more negative (Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins, 2014) and Democrats were more positive. The stability across items is not surprising, given the remarkable polarization experienced within the United States in recent years (Abramowitz, 2010; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Jacobson, 2014; Mutz, 2018) and that the messaging frames are more extreme (Hopkin, 2013; McCaffrey, 2000). The very large differences between partisan groups make the null result of the partisan cue less surprising, as it might not be possible to intensify the polarization when the gulf is so wide.

The cues that give credit to the president and their respective party also did not influence preferences - across the entire sample or within the partisan groups. Similarly, the bipartisan cues within the vignettes on prenatal care and denaturalization did not sway respondent's preferences. These results counter the findings from a wide range of research demonstrating that important role played by party elites that suggests when high level and trusted political elites agree on policy position, it signals that the issue is worthy of political support (e.g. Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Druckman et al, 2010 Goren, 2005; Goren et al, 2009 Peterson, et al, 2010; Zaller, 1992). Public opinion surveys suggest that most Americans want elected officials to cooperate and govern well. However, the findings from this direct test of bipartisan support failed to generate greater support for either the positive or punitive policy options laid out.

Perhaps this points to the paradox that is beginning to be explored in this prolonged period of polarization - that even through Americans say they want Congress to be more bipartisan, partisans are actually more supportive of elected officials when they engage in partisan behavior (Harbridge and Malhotra, 2011; Nicholson, 2012). The results presented in Chapter IV hint at a much larger issue that has important implications on how to make government work (Guttman and Thompson, 2012). If politicians are crafting their policy positions in response to public opinion, and the electorate appears to reject bipartisan consensus, then how can any policy decisions of substance emerge? Both parties can 'own' the issue of immigration, but under very different narratives. More specifically, Republicans own immigration control (e.g. Gadarian and Albertson, 2013; Hopkins 2013; Knoll, et al, 2011) and Democrats own immigrants' rights (Jeong, et al, 2011; Mayada, et al 2016).

IMPLICATIONS OF THIS BODY OF RESEARCH

The findings from the first two studies, which draw from a rich source of qualitative insights and robust data from a population-based survey experiment that generally, that Americans respond more negatively to the mention of immigrants. Across the board, support to restrict access to public services is higher, and at least qualitatively there is evidence to suggest that support for health care initiatives is lower.

Across all three studies I find that partisan identification is the largest driver of individuals' views on any topic put in front of them, mirroring the findings of a large body of research (Abromovich, 2010; Bartels 2002; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960; Green and Palmquist 1990; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Lauderdale, 2012). For both quantitative studies, and across all items, Republicans respond more negatively and Democrats respond more positively. Research on partisanship suggest that persistent exposure to party frames increase the salience of an issue (Taylor, et al, 1979), it can also make that issue more polarizing as positions become entrenched. Others demonstrate that as this process hardens in the political discourse, that partisans then strongly associate the issue with the party (see Carmines and Stimson, 1986; Cohen 2003; Iyengar and Valentino 2000; Kuklinski and Hurley 1994). Because the parties are viewed by partisans to match their ideological identity (Petersen, Slothuus, and Togeby 2010) and the parties' frames are becoming more extreme (Hopkins, 2013; McCaffey, 2000) it ultimately makes shifting views very difficult (Leeper and Slothuus, 2014). This raises some troubling questions for individuals interested in governance (on all issues), immigration policy, and the safety and welfare of immigrant, or indeed minority populations more generally. If a large portion of the population is taking cues from a party that advocates sending military troops to secure the border (Stengling and Hudak, 2018) or detaining children indefinitely (Hampton and Venters, 2018) – while a similarly sized contingent call for shutting down Immigration and Customs enforcement – it leaves little room for making good public policy, and poses serious threats to a population that lacks full political, social, and civil rights.

LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Notwithstanding this thesis' contributions to the field of public opinion research, there are several limitations that should be addressed by future research and data collection. The vignette survey experimental design allows for direct tests of theoretical

concerns on a sufficiently large sample, permitting simultaneous hypotheses simultaneously. However, there are some important limitations of the study design and sample that should be addressed when discussing the results. In Chapter IV, the sample was drawn from a pool of workers on Amazon's Mechanical Turk. These respondents were on average, younger, more educated and more likely to identify as Democrats. Additionally, within the same study the sample size of 2,000 respondents was distributed across 12 treatment groups. The analysis was broken down further to examine the effects of partisanship across two parties. Effectively this introduced some challenges in testing alternative hypotheses (e.g. low versus high knowledge citizens, voters versus non-voters) because the sample sizes within each groups was too small. A future project will reduce the number of treatments from 12 groups to six. This will be achieved by collapsing the four treatment groups for the welcoming and restrictive frame into two and removing the test of attribution. Instead, all respondents will receive information revealing the party elite who delivered the message - Clinton or Reagan. With a reduced study design the effects on a sample size of 2,000 respondents may be more detectible, allowing for an analysis of any potential spill-over effects of the welcoming and restrictive frames into the second and third vignettes.

For instance, we know from prior research that unengaged citizens typically have lower levels of political and policy knowledge; they also make fundamentally different and less stable political decisions than well-informed voters (Bartles, 1996; Delli et al, 1996; Lauderdale, 2013; Zaller, 2004). A growing body of empirical evidence demonstrates that these unengaged citizens are not political centrists, but rather it is believed that they receive more new information from political frames on which they rely on more heavily than their partisan counterparts (Bechtel, 2015; Cam, 2005; Drukman et al, 2010; Zaller, 1992). When the ethnic minority cues are embedded into issue specific policy frames they have the potential to influence a large share of voters because these messages induce a 'gut-level' reaction that triggers anxiety and sense of urgency to

motivate low knowledge voters (Carmines and Stimpson, 1980; 1989). However, the findings from Hopkins (2013) and Gadarian and Albertson's (2013) respective studies revealed that frames and cues related to immigrant populations failed to influence low knowledge voters. These findings raise important questions about the limits of anti-immigrant messaging strategies, which remain untested in this work.

Popkin (1994) offers a perspective that may aid in unpacking the nuances of this complex puzzle. While he also suggests that disengaged citizens use 'gut-level reasoning' relying on information acquired from a variety of sources in their daily lives (e.g. media, personal interactions), he notes that these irregular voters seek out mental shortcuts such as a party identifier to aid in their political decision making. Lupia (1994) demonstrates this empirically in his comparison of high and low knowledge Californian voters' decisions regarding a complex insurance reform initiative. In the study, subjects were asked how they voted on the initiative, their knowledge on the issue, and whether they could identify the positions of interest groups involved in the debate. The political decisions of voters who only knew of interests groups positions ('shortcut voters') were indistinguishable from those made by voters with high policy knowledge ('encyclopedic voters'). Although the less politically aware may spontaneously process political information along party lines, many scholars have shown these voters rely on signals that underscore the partisan terms of the debate rather than the substance of the issues (Zaller, 1992; Kam 2005). Lauderdale (2013) demonstrates this phenomenon using the nationally representative GfK sample of U.S. voters, showing that citizens with low-knowledge make more consistent and partisan decisions across a range of six policies if they received a party cue to help them connect the issue to their ideological leanings. In future work, I would like to test whether citizens with lower levels of political knowledge and engagement would be less changeable in their immigration preferences and examine how they respond to the partisan cues.

Another major concern with the research presented is one of potential reverse causation – that is does partisanship drive views about immigration or do views about immigrants influence party support? Although a vast body of evidence suggests that party attachment is a major driver of where an individual may align themselves on a whole host of issues (e.g. Bartels 2002; Green and Palmquist 1990; Zaller, 2004) the party sponsor and elite cues that countered the current position that were presented in Chapter IV failed to shift views across the entire sample and within partisan groups. Although the population based survey experiment offers a robust set of data fit for examining this issue in the current context of this highly polarized debate, this question of reverse causality can only be resolved with an ongoing with data that repeats the measures over time. Such an approach could not be carried out on the same respondents because it would introduce bias with priming, but there may be alternative approaches that should be considered. In the future, I will seek out data from similarly framed population based survey experiments, carried out in the past, when immigration was not such a polarizing issue. The TESS archive offers some hope in pursuing this, as the data from prior studies (including two data sets from this research) provide access to these data at no charge.

Also, although the studies present respondents with rigorously tested vignettes or political speeches provided by party elites, the mode in which these frames were presented – via text on a computer screen - do not reflect the way most individuals take in political information - via video or audio clips (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). We know from research on communication studies that political information, particularly those containing factual content is more compelling when packaged in a way that is more familiar, appealing and engaging (Buckingham and Scanlon, 2005). Future work in this area will draw upon primary sources of media content to determine if there is a stronger impact.

Finally, one novel feature of this research is that Americans of all political stripes are exposed to an identical message, and careful work went into balancing the exposure

of each of the experiments' manipulations. This allows for an even comparison of how Americans respond to these highly political messages, and is vital to understanding the policy debates of the day. However, the technological revolution that has taken place over the past two decades has completely transformed the transmission of information with remarkable consequences for the news media in general. Today's more diversified and fragmented media landscape looks vastly different to the national network marketplace of twenty years ago and local media outlets are closing or merging across the country (Iyengar and Kinder, 2016). In the year 2000, most Americans got their political information via one of the three major television networks – ABC, CBS, or NBC. They received roughly the same news stories, in a similar format, and the presenters of the programming adhered to the same journalistic norms – fact-based and balanced reporting. As digital converter boxes replaced the traditional analog set-up, an exceptional leap in the number of channels an American household could access. By the end of 2010 the average American gained access to 130 channels versus 19 just twenty-five years before. Fox News signed on in 1996 and quickly gained a healthy share of the market by emphasizing a conservative perspective in their coverage. Other networks like CNN and MSNBC followed the traditional journalistic norms, but altered their formats in the hopes of picking up a similar share of liberal viewers Iyengar and Kinder, 2016). Although political elites had already adopted a more polarized tone, some scholars argue that these shifts in markets accelerated this pattern across the electorate. The growth of cable news outlets like CNBC, Fox News the proliferation of formal online sources like *Huffington Post*, *Politico*, and *Buzzfeed*; and the dominance of social media sources like Facebook and Twitter have all made it very difficult and very unlikely for Americans to receive the same information (Weeks, Ardèvol-Abreu, and Gil de Zúñiga, 2017). This research does not address the extent to which Americans are exposing themselves to partisan news media. Measures to separate mainstream and partisan news were not included. If we believe that the source of the news is a major contributor to political

preferences, and there is a large body of research to support this (e.g. Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998), then it is necessary to include stimuli that enables a disentangling of the effects of partisan and mainstream news among citizens who prefer partisan and mainstream news sources.

REFERENCES

1891 Immigration Act (*An Act in amendment to the various acts relative to immigration and the importation of aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor*), Sess. II Chap. 551; 26 Stat. 1084. 51st Congress; March 3, 1891.

1917 Immigration Act (*An Act to regulate the immigration of aliens to, and the residence of aliens in, the United States*), H.R. 10384; Pub.L. 301; 39 Stat. 874. 64th Congress; February 5, 1917.

Aaroe, L. (2012). "When Citizens Go Against Elite Directions: Partisan Cues and Contrast Effects on Citizens' Attitudes." *Party Politics*, 18(2): 215–233.

Abraham, D. (2014). "Immigrant Integration and Social Solidarity in a Time of Crisis: Europe and the United States in a Postwelfare State." *Critical Historical Studies.* 1(2): 215-253.

Abramowitz, A. (1994). "Issue Evolution Reconsidered: Racial Attitudes and Partisanship in the U.S. Electorate". *American Journal of Political Science*, 38(1): 1.

Abramowitz, A. (2010). *The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Abramowitz, A. and Saunders, K. (2008). "Is Polarization a Myth?" *Journal of Politics*, 70(02): 542-555.

Abrams, B. (1993). "Preventing Low Birth Weight: Does WIC Work? A Review of Evaluations of the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children." *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*. 678(1): 306-315.

Alesina, A and Glaeser, E. (2004). *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Alesina, A., Baqir, R., and Easterly, W. (1999). "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 114(4): 1243-1284.

Angrist, J. and Pischke, J. (2009). *Mostly Harmless Econometrics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ansolabehere, S., and Iyengar, S. (1996). *Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Shrink and Polarize the Electorate*. New York, NY: Free Press.

Ariely, D., Loewenstein, G., and Prelec, D. (2006) "Tom Sawyer and the Construction of Value." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 60(1): 1-10.

Ariely, D., Loewenstein, G., and Prelec, D., (2003). "Coherent Arbitrariness: Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 118: 73–105.

Atzmüller, C., and Steiner, P. (2010). "Experimental Vignette Studies in Survey Research." *Methodology: European Journal of Research Methods For The Behavioral And Social Sciences*, 6(3): 128-138.

Auspurg, K. (2015). "The Vagaries of the Vignette World Revisited: Method Effects in Factorial Surveys." Accessed online Oct 23, 2015

http://www.gesis.org/fileadmin/upload/events/Vortragsreihe/Gesis_Auspurg_2015.pdf.

Barreto, M., Fraga, L., Manzano, S., Martinez-Ebers, V., and Segura, G. (2008). "Should They Dance with the One Who Brung'Em? Latinos and the 2008 Presidential Election." *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 41(4): 753-760.

Bartels, L. (2002). "Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions." *Political Behavior*, 24(2): 117–50.

Baseler, M. (1998). "Asylum for Mankind": *America, 1607-1800*. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, N.Y.

Bechtel, M., Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D. and Helbling, M. (2015). "Reality Bites: The Limits of Framing Effects for Salient and Contested Policy Issues." *Political Science Research and Methods*, 3(03): 683-695.

Berinski, A., Huber, G., and Lenz, G. (2012). "Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk." *Political Analysis*, 20:351-368.

Bilder, M. (1995). "The Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of Commerce. *Immigration & Nationality Law Review*. 61(4): 743-824.

Binder, S. (2015). "The Dysfunctional Congress." *Annual Review of Political Science*, *18*: 85-101.

Blank, R. (1997). "Policy Watch: The 1996 Welfare Reform." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 11(1): 169-177.

Blau, F. (1984). "The Use of Transfer Payments by Immigrants." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*. 37(2): 222-39.

Blinder, S. (2013). "Imagined Immigration: The Impact of Different Meanings of 'Immigrants' in Public Opinion and Policy Debates in Britain." *Political Studies*, 63(1): 80-10.

Bobo, L. (1983). "Whites' Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group Conflict?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 45: 1196–1210.

Bobo, L. (1988). "Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the Paradox of Contemporary Racial Attitudes." *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy*. New York: Plenum Press. Pg. 85–114.

Borjas, G. (1999). "Immigration and Welfare Magnets." *Journal of Labor Economics*. 17(4): 607-637.

Borjas, G. and Hilton, L. (1996). "Immigration and the Welfare State: Immigrant Participation in Means-Tested Entitlement Programs," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. Boston: MIT Press. 111(2): 575-604.

Borjas, G. and Trejo, S. (1993). "National Origin and Immigrant Welfare Recipiency." *Journal of Public Economics*, 50(3): 325-44.

Brader, T, Marcus, G. and Miller, K. (2011). "Emotion and Public Opinion" Shapiro, R. Y., & Jacobs, L. R. (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Brader, T, Valentino, N, and Suhay, E. (2008). "Is It Immigration or the Immigrants? The Emotional Influence of Groups on Public Opinion and Political Action." *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(4): 959-978.

Brader, T. Valentino, N. and Suhay, E. (2008). "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat." *American Journal of Political Science*. 52: 959-978.

Brader, T. Valentino, Nicholas A., and Jardina, Ashley E. (2009). "Immigration Opinion in a Time of Economic Crisis: Material Interests versus Group Attitudes." American Political Science Association 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1449415.

Brady, H., and Sniderman, P. (1985). "Attitude Attribution: A Group Basis for Political Reasoning." *American Political Science Review*, 79(4): 1061–78.

Brewer, P. (2001). "Value Words and Lizard Brains: Do Citizens Deliberate About Appeals to Their Core Values?" *Political Psychology*, 22(1): 45-64.

Brown, H. (2013). "Racialized Conflict and Policy Spillover Effects: The Role of Race in the Contemporary U.S. Welfare State." *American Journal of Sociology*, 119(2): 394-443.

Broockman, D., and Kalla, J. (2016). "Durably Reducing Transphobia: A Field Experiment on Door-to-Door Canvassing." *Science*, *352*(6282): 220-224.

Buckingham, D., and Scanlon, M. (2005). "Selling Learning: Towards a Political Economy of Edutainment Media." *Media, Culture & Society*, 27(1): 41-58.

Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., and Gosling, S. (2011) "Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High Quality Data?" *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 6(1): 3-5.

Burn-Murdoch, J. Ehrenberg-Shannon, B., Wisniewska, A. and Rininsland, A. (2017). "French election results: Macron's victory in charts." *The Financial Times*. May 9. Accessed online January 3, 2019. <https://www.ft.com/content/62d782d6-31a7-11e7-9555-23ef563ecf9a>.

Burns, P. and Gimpel. J. (2000). "Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy." *Political Science Quarterly*, 115(2): 201-25.

Cabral, M., and Hoxby, C. (2012). "The Hated Property Tax: Salience, Tax Rates, and Tax Revolts." (No.w18514). *National Bureau of Economic Research*.

Camotara, S. (2010). " Immigration and Economic Stagnation: An Examination of Trends 2000 to 2010." *Center for Immigration Studies*.

Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W., and Stokes, D. (1960). *The American Voter*. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Capps, R., Fix, M. Ost, J. Reardon-Anderson, J., & Passel, J.S. (2004) "The Health and Well-being of Young Children of Immigrants." Urban Institute : Washington D.C.

Capps, R., Fix, M., and Henderson, E. (2009). "Trends in Immigrants' Use of Public Assistance after Welfare Reform." *Immigrants and Welfare: The Impact of Welfare Reform on America's Newcomers*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.

Carmines, E. and Stimson, J. (1980). "The Two Faces of Issue Voting." *American Political Science Review*, 74(1): 78–91.

Carmines, E. and Stimson, J. (1986). "On the Structure and Sequence of Issue Evolution." *The American Political Science Review*, 80(3): 901-920.

Carmines, E., and Stimson, J. (1989). *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Carrasquillo, O, Carrasquillo, A, Shea S. 2000. "Health Insurance Coverage of Immigrants Living in the United States: Differences by Citizenship Status and Country of Origin." *American Journal of Public Health*. 90: 917-23.

Castles, S. and Miller, M. (1998). *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. 2nd edition. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.

Center Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2004). "Questions and Answers on the Five-Year Bar." Department of Health and Human Services: Washington D.C. <http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidEligibility/Downloads/alien2.pdf>.

Chandler, D., and Kapelner, A. (2010) "Breaking Monotony with Meaning: Motivation in Crowdsourcing Markets." Available at www.sciencedirect.com. Accessed online March 23, 2013.

Chandler, C. and Tsai, Y. (2001). "Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes: an Analysis of Data from the General Social Survey." *The Social Science Journal*, 38(2): 177-188.

Chapman, G. and Johnson, E. (1999). "Anchoring, Activation, and the Construction of Values." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 79(2): 115-153.

Chase, Z., Enten, H. and Glass, I. (2016). "Poll Dance". This American Life. <http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/590/choosing-wrong?act=2> Accessed online September 7, 2016.

Chavez, J. and Provine, D. (2009). "Race and the Response of State Legislatures to Unauthorized Immigrants." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 623(1): 78–92.

Chong, D., and Druckman, J. (2007) "Framing Public Opinion in Competitive Democracies." *American Political Science Review*, 101(4): 637-655.

Churchland, P., and Sejnowski, T. (2016). *The Computational Brain*. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.

Citrin, J. (1979). "Do People Want Something for Nothing: Public Opinion on Taxes and Government Spending." *The National Tax Journal*, 32(2): 113-129.

Citrin, J, Green, D, Muste, C, and Wong, C. (1997). "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations." *The Journal of Politics*, 59(3): 858-881.

Citrin, J, Reingold, B, and Green, D. (1990). "American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change." *The Journal of Politics*, 52(4): 1124-1153.

Citrin, J. and Sides, J. (2008). "Immigration and the Imagined Community in Europe and the United States." *Political Studies*, 56(1): 33-56.

Citrin, J., Green, D., Muste, C., and Wong, C. (1997). "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations." *The Journal of Politics*, 59(3): 858-881.

Clark, R., Passel, J., Zimmermand, W., and Fix, M. (1994). "Fiscal Impact of Undocumented Aliens: Selected Estimates for Seven States." Urban Institute. Washington D.C.

Cohen, J. (2003). "Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 85 (5): 808–22.

Cohen, S (2002) *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers*. 3rd edition. Oxford, UK: Routledge.

Cohn, A., Fehr, E., Herrmann, B., and Schneider, F. (2014). "Social Comparison and Effort Provision: Evidence from a Field Experiment." *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 12(4): 877-898.

Collett, E. (2011). "Immigrant Integration in Europe in a Time of Austerity." Migration Policy Institute: Washington, D.C.

Collins, D. (2015). *Cognitive Interviewing Practice*. London, UK: SAGE Publications.

Congressional Budget Office. (1996). "Federal Budgetary Implications of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996." Congressional Budget Office: Washington D.C.

Converse, P. (1964). "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." *In Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter. New York, NY: Free Press.

Dearman, E. (2016). "Rick Perry Claims Donald Trump's Wall on the Southwest Border Will Take Years to Complete." Politifact Texas. <http://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/2016/feb/27/rick-perry/rick-perry-claims-donald-trumps-wall-southwest-bor/> Accessed online September 10, 2016.

Delli Carpini, X., and Keeter, S. (1996). *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Demata, M. (2017). "A Great and Beautiful Wall": Donald Trump's Populist Discourse on Immigration. *Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict*, *5*(2): 274-294.

Doherty, C. (2016). "5 Facts about Trump Supporters' Views of Immigration." Pew Research Center. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/25/5-facts-about-trump-supporters-views-of-immigration/> Accessed online September 10, 2016.

Dovidio, J., Gluszek, A. and John, M. (2010). "Understanding Bias toward Latinos: Discrimination, Dimensions of Difference, and Experience of Exclusion." *Journal of Social Issues*, 66(1): 59-78.

Downs, A. (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York, NY: Harper & Row.

Druckman, J. (2001). "On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?" *Journal of Politics*, 63(04): 1041–66.

Druckman, J., Green, D., Kuklinski, J., and Lupia, A. (2006). "The Growth and Development of Experimental Research in Political Science." *American Political Science Review*, 100(04): 627-635.

Druckman, J., Green, D., Kuklinski, J., and Lupia, A. (2011). "An Introduction to Core Concepts." In Druckman, J., Green, D., Kuklinski, J., & Lupia, A. (Eds.). (2011). *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*, (19-41). Cambridge University Press.

Druckman, J., Hennessy, C., St. Charles, K., and Webber, J. (2010). "Competing Rhetoric Over Time: Frames Versus Cues." *Journal of Politics*, 72: 136–148.

Druckman, J., and Leeper, T. (2012). "Learning More from Political Communication Experiments: Pretreatment and its Effects." American Journal of Political Science, 56(4): 875-896.

Druckman, J. N., and Lupia, A. (2000). "Preference Formation." *Annual Review of Political Science*, *3*(1): 1-24.

Duleep, H. and Regets, M. (1994). "The Elusive Concept of Immigrant Quality." Discussion Paper PRIP-UI-28, Program for Research on Immigration Policy. The Urban Institute: Washington, D.C.

Duncan, G. and Brooks-Gunn, J. (2000). "Family Poverty, Welfare Reform, and Child Development." *Child Development*, 71: 188-196.

Durand, J., and Massey, D. (1992). "Mexican Migration to the United States: A Critical Review." *Latin American Research Review*, 27(2): 3-42.

Dustmann C., and Preston I. (2007). "Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration." *The B. E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy*, 7(62): 1-39.

Eldersveld, S. (1956). "Experimental Propaganda Techniques and Voting Behavior." *American Political Science Review*, *50*(1): 154-165.

Ellwood, M.and Ku, L. (1998). "Welfare and Immigration Reforms: Unintended Side Effects for Medicaid." *Health Affairs*, 17(3): 137-151.

Enelow, J., and Hinich, M. (1984). *The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.

Enten, H. and Silver, N. (2016). "What In The Hell Is Trump Doing On Immigration?." FiveThirtyEight. <http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trump-immigration-chat/> Accessed online September 8, 2016.

Ericsson, K., and Simon, H. (1980). "Verbal Reports as Data." *Psychological Review*, 87(3): 215-251.

Espenshade T. and Calhoun C. (1993). "An Analysis of Public Opinion Toward Undocumented Immigration." *Population Research & Policy Review*. 12(3): 189– 224.

Espenshade, T, Baraka, J, and Huber, G. (1997). "Implications of the 1996 Welfare and Immigration Reform Acts for U.S. Immigration." *Population and Development Review*, 23(4): 769-801.

Espenshade, T. (1995). "Unauthorized Immigration to the United States." *Annual Review of Sociology*, 195-216.

Espenshade, T. and Hempstead, K. (1996). "Contemporary American Attitudes Toward U.S. Immigration." *International Migration Review*, 30: 535-570.

Facchini, G. and Mayda, A. (2009). "Does the Welfare State Affect Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants? Evidence across Countries." *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 91 (2): 295–314.

Filindra, A., Blanding, D., and Coll, C. (2011). "The Power of Context: State-level Policies and Politics and the Educational Performance of the Children of Immigrants in the United States." *Harvard Educational Review*, 81(3): 407-438.

Finkelstein, A. (2007). "E-Z Tax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates." (No. w12924). *National Bureau of Economic Research*.

Finkelstein, A. (2009). "E-Z Tax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124: 969-1010.

Fishbein, M. (1963). "An Investigation of the Relationships Between Beliefs About an Object and the Attitude Toward that Object." *Human Relations*, 16(3): 233-239.

Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I. (1975). *Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research*, 181-202.

Fix, M and Zimmerman, W. (1999). "All Under One Roof: Mixed-Status Families in an Era of Reform." The Urban Institute: Washington D.C. < http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/409100.pdf>.

Fix, M, and Tumlin, K. (1997). "Welfare Reform and the Devolution of Immigration Policy." Urban Institute: Washington D.C.

Fix, M, Capps, R, and Kaushal, N. (2009). "Immigrants and Welfare: Overview." *Immigrants and Welfare: The Impact of Welfare Reform on America's Newcomers*. Russell Sage Foundation: New York, N.Y.

Fix, M. and Passel, J. (1994). "Immigration and Immigrants: Setting the Record Straight." The Urban Institute: Washington, D.C.

Fix, M. and Passel, J. (2002). "The Scope and Impact of Welfare Reform's Immigrant Provisions. Assessing the New Federalism." Discussion Paper 02-03. Washington, DC. The Urban Institute.

Ford R. (2011). "Acceptable and Unacceptable Immigrants: How Opposition to Immigration in Britain is Affected by Migrants' Region of Origin." *Journal of Ethnic Migration Studies*, 37: 1017–37.

Ford, R. (2015). "Who Should We Help? An Experimental Test of Discrimination in the British Welfare State." *Political Studies*, 64(3): 630-650.

Forsyth, B. and Lessler, J. (1991). "Cognitive Laboratory Methods: A Taxonomy." In P. Biermer, R. Groves, L. Lyberg, N. Mathiowetz, and Sudman (Eds.), *Measurement Errors in Surveys*, (393-418). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.

Fosset, M. and Kiecolt, J. (1989). "The Relative Size of Minority Populations and White Racial Attitudes." *Social Science Quarterly*, 70: 820–35.

Fremstad, S. (2002). "Immigrants and Welfare Reauthorization." The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities: Washington D.C. < http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-22-02tanf4.pdf >

Gächter, S. and Thöni, C. (2010). "Social Comparison and Performance: Experimental Evidence on the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis." *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 76: 531–543.

Gadarian, S., and Albertson, B. (2013). "Anxiety, Immigration and the Search for Information." *Political Psychology*, 35 (2): 133-164.

Gaines, B., Kuklinski, J., Quirk, P., Peyton, B. and Verkuilen, J. (2007). "Same Facts, Different Interpretations: Partisan Motivation and Opinion on Iraq." *The Journal of Politics*, 69(4): 957-974.

Gandara, P. (2018). "The Latino Education Crisis." [online] Eric.ed.gov. Available at: https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ896430 [Accessed 11 Dec. 2018].

Gerber, A., Gimpel, J., Green, D., and Shaw, D. (2007). "The Influence of Television and Radio Advertising on Candidate Evaluations: Results from a Large Scale Randomized Experiment. *Unpublished paper, Yale University.* <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d8dd/4577fc9ab9892ce5ef58cc390ecb0415426a.pdf> [Accessed 11 Dec. 2018].

Gilens, M. (1999). *Why Americans Hate Welfare*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Gilens, M. (2001). "Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences." *American Political Science Review*, 95(02): 379-396.

Giles, M. and Hertz, K. (1994). "Racial Threat and Partisan Identification." *The American Political Science Review*, 88(2): 317-326.

Gimpel, J. (2016) "Immigration Opinion and the Rise of Donald Trump." Center for Immigration Studies: Washington D.C.

Gimpel, J. and Edwards, J. (1999). *The Congressional Politics of Immigration Reform*. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.

Gingrich, N., Armey, R., Gillespie, E. and Schellhas, B. (1994). *Contract with America*. New York, NY: Times Books.

Goldman, D., Smith, J and Sood, N. (2006). "Immigrants and the Cost of Medical Care." *Health Affairs*. 25(6): 1700-11.

Good, C. (2010). "Congressional Hispanic Caucus: No Deal On Health Care, Immigration." *The Atlantic*. January 5, 2010.

Goodwyn, W. (2011). "Texas Republicans Take a Harder Line on Immigration." *All Things Considered*. National Public Radio [online]. March 29.

<http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=134956690> Accessed online February 17, 2013.

Goren, P. (2005). "Party Identification and Core Political Values." *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(4): 882– 97.

Goren, P. (2013). *On Voter Competence.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Goren, P., Federico, C., and Kittilson, M. (2009). "Source Cues, Partisan Identities, and Political Value Expression." *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(4): 805-820.

Graefe, D., De Jong, D., Hall, M., Sturgeon, S., and Van Eerden, J. (2008). "Immigrants' TANF Eligibility, 1996-2003: What Explains the New Across-State Inequalities?" *International Migration Review*, 42: 89-133.

Green, D., and Palmquist, B. (1990). "Of Artifacts and Partisan Instability." *American Journal of Political Science*, 34(3): 872–902.

Green, D., Palmquist, B., and Schickler, E. (2004). *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Groves, R., Fowler, F., Couper, M., Lepkowski, J., Singer, E., and Tourangeau, R. (2004). *Survey Methodology.* Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley and Sons.

Gutmann, A., and Thompson, D. (2012). *The Spirit of Compromise: Why Governing Demands It and Campaigning Undermines It.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hainmueller , J. and Hangartner, D. (2013). "Who Gets a Swiss Passport? A Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimination." *American Political Science Review,* 107(01): 159-187.

Hainmueller, J. and Hiscox, M. (2010). "Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment." *American Political Science Review*, 104(01): 61-84.

Hainmueller, J. and Hopkins, D. (2012). "The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes toward Immigrants." MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2012-22. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2106116 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2106116> Accessed online November 23, 2012.

Hajnal, Z. and Rivera, M. (2014). "Immigration, Latinos, and White Partisan Politics: The New Democratic Defection." *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4): 773-789.

Hanson, G. (2005). "Why Does Immigration Divide America: Public Finance and Political Opposition to Open Borders." Institute for International Economics U.S. Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute.

Hanson, G., Scheve, K. and Slaughter, M. (2007). "Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies." *Economics and Politics*, 19 (1): 1–33.

Hartman, T., Newman, B., and Bell, S. (2013). "Decoding Prejudice toward Hispanics: Group Cues and Public Reactions to Threatening Immigrant Behavior." *Political Behavior*, 36(1): 143-163.

Harwood, E. (1986). "American Public Opinion and U.S. Immigration Policy." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 487: 201–12.

Hawley, G. (2013). "Pro-Immigration Congressional Republicans Do Not Perform Better Among Latino Voters." Center for Immigration Studies. Accessed online October 17, 1017. <https://cis.org/sites/default/files/hawley-latino-voters.pdf>

Hayes, D. (2008). "Does the Messenger Matter? Candidate-Media Agenda Convergence and Its Effects on Voter Issue Salience." *Political Research Quarterly*, 61(1): 134-146.

Hayes, D. (2011). "Media Frames and the Immigration Debate." Washington DC: American University Press. Accessed online September 9, 2013. http://home.gwu.edu/~dwh/immigration.pdf.

Health and Human Services. (1996). "The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996." Health and Human Services: Washington D.C.

Heberlein, M., Brooks, T., Alker, J., Artiga, S., and Stephens, J. (2013). "Getting Into Gear for 2014: Findings From a 50-State Survey of Eligibility, Enrollment, Renewal, and Cost-Sharing Policies in Medicaid and CHIP, 2012–2013". Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured.

Heckman, J. (2006). "Skill Formation and the Economics of Investing in Disadvantaged Children." *Science*, 312(5782): 1900-1902.

Helbling, M., and Kriesi, H. (2014). "Why Citizens Prefer High-Over Low-Skilled Immigrants: Labor Market Competition, Welfare State, and Deservingness." *European Sociological Review*, 30(5): 595-614.

Hero, R. and Tolbert, C. (1996). "A Racial/Ethnic Diversity Interpretation of Politics and Policy in the States of the U.S." *American Journal of Political Science*, 40: 851-71.

Hess, J., Rothgeb, J., and Nichols, E. (1998). "Report on Cognitive Interviewing Results for the 1999 Survey of Program Dynamics." Washington D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, Center for Survey Research Methods. Accessed online October 27, 2015. < https://www.census.gov/spd/workpaper/99cogrpt.htm>

Hoefer, M, Rytina, N. and Baker, B. 2012. "Estimates of the Unauthorised Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2011." Population Estimates. Office of Immigration Statistics. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Washington D. C.

Holcomb, P., Tumlin, K., Koralek, R., Capps, R., and Zuberi, A. (2003). "The Application Process For TANF, Food Stamps, Medicaid, and SCHIP." The Urban Institute: Washington D.C.

Hood, M. and Morris, I. (1997). "Amigo o Enemigo? Context, Attitudes, and Anglo Public Opinion toward Immigration." *Social Science Quarterly*, 78: 309–23.

Hopkins, D. (2009). "The Diversity Discount: When Increasing Ethnic and Racial Diversity Prevents Tax Increases." *The Journal of Politics*, 71(1): 160-177.

Hopkins, D. (2010). "Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition." *American Political Science Review*, 104(1): 40-60.

Hopkins, D. (2011). "The Limited Local Impacts of Ethnic and Racial Diversity." *American Politics Research*, 39(2): 344-379.

Hopkins, D. (2012). "The Upside of Accents: Language, Inter-group Difference, and Attitudes toward Immigration." Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1879965 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1879965> Accessed online March 24, 2015.

Hopkins, D. (2013). "The Exaggerated Life of Death Panels: The Limits of Framing Effects in the 2009-2012 Health Care Debate." SSRN Journal 2163769.

Hopkins, D. (2014). "One Language, Two Meanings: Partisanship and Responses to Spanish." *Political Communication*, 31(3): 421-445.

Horton, J. and Zeckhauser, R. (2010). "The Online Laboratory: Conducting Experiments in a Real Labor Market." Available at SSRN: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w15961.pdf?new_window=1 > Accessed online February 26, 2013.

Humes, K., Jones, N., and Ramirez, R. (2011). "The Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin 2010." 2010 Census Briefs. The U.S. Census Bureau: Washington D.C. Available online at: www.census.gov.

Hutchinson, E. (1981). *Legislative History of American Immigration Policy, 1798-1965*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Igartua, J., Moral-Toranzo, F., and Fernández, I. (2012). "Cognitive, Attitudinal, and Emotional Effects of News Frame and Group Cues, on Processing News about Immigration." *Journal of Media Psychology*.

Immigration Law Reform Institute. (2006). "Pro-English, Official English Ordinance." Available at ILRI: <http://irli.org/node/14 or http://irli.org/system/files/Pro-English%20Model%20OEO.pdf> Accessed online August 30, 2016.

Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (*An Act to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to revise and reform the immigration laws, and for other purposes*), Pub.L. 99–603, 100 Stat. 3445, enacted November 6, 1986.

Iyengar, S., and Kinder, D. (1987). *News that Matters: Television and American Opinion*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Iyengar, S., and Valentino, N. (2000). "Who Says What?" *In Elements of Reason*, eds. Lupia, A., McCubbins, M. and Popkin, S. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Iyengar, S., and Westwood, S. J. (2015). "Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New evidence on Group Polarization." *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(3): 690-707.

Iyengar, S., Jackman, S., Messing, S., Valentino, N., Aalberg, T., Duch, R., Hahn, K., Soroka, S., Harell, A. and Kobayashi, T. (2013). "Do Attitudes about Immigration Predict Willingness to Admit Individual Immigrants? : A Cross-National Test of the Person-Positivity Bias." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 77(3): 641-665.

Iyengar, S., Peters, M. and Kinder, D. (1982). "Experimental Demonstrations of the 'Not-So-Minimal' Consequences of Television News Programs." *The American Political Science Review*, 76(4): 848.

Jacobs, L. and Shapiro, R. (2000). *Politicians Don't Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Jacobs, L., and Skocpol, T. (2015). *Health Care Reform and American Politics: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Jacobson, G. (2014). "The Electoral Connection, Then and Now," *Governing in a Polarized Age: Elections, Parties, and Political Representation*, ed. Alan Gerber and Erik Schickler. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Jacoby, W. (2000). "Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending." *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(4): 750-767.

Jeong, G., Miller, G., Schofield, C. and Sened, I. (2011). "Cracks in the Opposition: Immigration as a Wedge Issue for the Reagan Coalition". *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(3): 511-525.

Joppke, C. (1999). *Immigration and the Nation-State*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Inc.

Kahneman, D., Ritov, I., and Schkade, D., (1999). "Economic Preferences or Attitude Expressions? An Analysis of Dollar Responses to Public Issues." *Journal of Risk Uncertainty*, 19 (3): 203–235.

Kaiser Family Foundation. (2003). "Immigrants Health Care Coverage and Access." http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/Immigrants-Health-Care-Coverage-and-Access-fact-sheet.pdf

Key, V and Heard, A.(1949). *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: Vintage Books.

Kinder, D. (1998) "Communication and Opinion." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1:167–197.

Kinder, D. and Sanders, L. (1996). *Divided by Color*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

King, R. and Wheelock, D. (2007). "Group Threat and Social Control: Race, Perceptions of Minorities and the Desire to Punish." *Social Forces*, 85(3): 1255-80.

Kingdon, J. (1995). *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. 2nd edition. New York, NY: Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Company.

Knoll, B., Redlawsk, D. and Sanborn, H. (2011). "Framing Labels and Immigration Policy Attitudes in the Iowa Caucuses: 'Trying to Out-Tancredo Tancredo'". *Political Behavior*, 33(3): 433-454.

Kochhar, R. (2005). Latino Labor Report, 2004: More Jobs for New Immigrants but at Lower Wages. Pew Hispanic Center: Washington, DC. http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=45 Accessed online July 23, 2016.

Krosnick, J. A. (1988). The Role of Attitude Importance in Social Evaluation: A study of Policy Preferences, Presidential Candidate Evaluations, and Voting Behavior." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *55*(2): 196-210.

Krosnick, J. (1999). "Survey Research." *Annual Review of Psychology*, 50(1): 537-567.

Krosnick, J., and Brannon, L. (1993). "The Impact of the Gulf War on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations: Multidimensional Effects of Political Involvement." *American Political Science Review*, 87(04): 963-975.

Kuklinski, J. and Hurley, N. (1994). "On Hearing and Interpreting Political Messages: A Cautionary Tale of Citizen Cue-Taking." *Journal of Politics*, 56 (3): 729-751.

Kuklinski, J., Sniderman, P., Knight, K., Piazza, T., Tetlock, P., Lawrence, G., and Mellers, B. (1997). "Racial Prejudice and Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action." *American Journal of Political Science*, 402-419.

Lapinski, J., Peltola, P., Shaw, G., and Yang, A. (1997). "Trends: Immigrants and Immigration." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 61 (2): 356–83.

Lau, R., and Redlawsk, D. (1997). "Voting Correctly." *American Political Science Review*, 91(3): 585–98.

Lau, R., Sears, D., and Jessor, T. (1990) "Fact or Artifact Revisited: Survey Instrument Effects and Pocketbook Politics." *Political Behavior*, (12): 217–242.

Lauderdale, B. (2012). "How to Generate Partisan Disagreement about Political Facts Without Misinformation." SSRN Journal.

Leber, R. (2013). "Colorado Approves In-State Tuition For Undocumented Immigrants." Thinkprogress. Center for American Progress. <http://thinkprogress.org/immigration/2013/03/08/1693461/colorado-approves-in-state-tuition-for-undocumented-immigrants/> Accessed online March 26, 2015.

Lecheler, S., Bos, L., and Vliegenthart, R. (2015). "The Mediating Role of Emotions: News Framing Effects on Opinions About Immigration." *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 92(4): 812-838.

Lecheler, S., de Vreese, C., and Slothuus, R. (2009). "Issue Importance as a Moderator of Framing Effects." *Communication Research*, 36(3): 400-425.

Lecheler, S., Keer, M., Schuck, A., and Hänggli, R. (2015). "The Effects of Repetitive News Framing on Political Opinions Over Time." *Communication Monographs*, 82(3): 339-358.

Leeper, T., and Slothuus, R. (2014). "Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Public Opinion Formation." *Political Psychology*, 35(1): 129-156.

Lind, D. (2016). "One Chart Shows Why the Republican Party was Ready for Donald Trump." *Vox*. < http://www.vox.com/2016/5/3/11571444/republican-democrat-anti-immigrant> Accessed online July 17, 2016.

Lodge, M., Stroh, P., and Wahlke, J. (1990). "Black-box Models of Candidate Evaluation." *Political Behavior*, *12*(1): 5-18.

Loftis, K., and Lupia, A. (2008). "Using the Internet to Create Research Opportunities: The New Virtual Communities of TESS and the American National Election Studies." *Political Science Online*. July. <http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FPSC%2FPSC41_03%2FS1049096508080736a.pdf&code=a6d153112af20cc4b1a15cd526574854> Accessed online May 15, 2013.

Lopez, M., Passel, J., and Rohal, M. (2015). "Modern Immigration Wave Brings 59 Million to US, Driving Population Growth and Change Through 2065." Pew Research Center, Washington, DC Available: http://www. pewhispanic. org/files/2015/09/2015-09-28_modern-immigration-wave_REPORT. pdf.

Los Angeles Times, (1993). "Nation In Brief: Washington, D.C. : Cisneros Backs Limit on Who Gets Aid." *The Los Angeles Times* [online]. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1993-08-23/news/mn-27075_1_illegal-immigrants [Accessed 7 Jul. 2015].

Lu, K., and Coughlin, T. (1997). "How the New Welfare Reform Law Affects Medicaid." The Urban Institute: Washington D.C.

Lu, K., and Kessler, B. (1997). "The Number and Cost of Immigrants on Medicaid: National and State Estimates." The Urban Institute: Washington D.C.

Luedtke, A (2005) "European Integration, Public Opinion and Immigration Policy: Testing the Impact of National Identity." European Union Politics 6(1): 83-112.

Luntz, F. (2005). "Respect for the Law and Economic Fairness: Illegal Immigration Prevention." <http://bit.ly/cH62eg> [Accessed May 5, 2015].

Lupia, A. (1994). "Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections." *The American Political Science Review*, 88(1): 63-76.

Lupia, A., and McCubbins, M. (1998). *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Luttmer, E. (2001). "Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution." *Journal of Political Economy*, 109(3), 500-528.

Mahoney, R., and Druckman, D. (1975). "Simulation, Experimentation, and Context: Dimensions of Design and Inference." *Simulation and Games*, *6*(3): 235-270.

Manning, N. (1985). *Social Problems and Welfare Ideology*. Aldershot, UK Gower Publishing Co.

Maraniss, D., and Weisskopf, M. (1996). *Tell Newt to Shut Up!* New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.

Markon, J. (2016). "Trump says building a U.S.-Mexico wall is 'easy.' But is it really?." *Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-on-the-us-mexico-border-building-a-wall-is-easy/2015/07/16/9a619668-2b0c-11e5-bd33-395c05608059_story.html Accessed online September 10, 2016.

Marshall, T. ([1950] 1992). "Citizenship and Social Class". Reproduced in T. H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore, *Citizenship and Social Class*. 2nd edition.London, UK: Pluto Press.

Martin, E., and Polivka, A. (1995). "Diagnostics for Redesigning Survey Questionnaires Measuring Work in the Current Population Survey." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 59(4): 547-567.

Massey D., and Pren K. (2012). "Origins of the New Latino Underclass." *Race and Social Problems*, 4(1): 5-17.

Massey, D. and Pren, K. (2012). "Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Policy: Explaining the Post-1965 Surge from Latin America." *Population and Development Review*, 38(1): 1-29.

Massey, D., Arango, J. Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A. and Taylor, J. (1993). "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal." *Population and Development Review*, 19(3): 431-466.

Mataconis, D. (2016). "Even Trump's Supporters Don't Believe Mexico Would Pay For Trump's Border Wall." *Outside the Beltway*. Accessed online October 27, 2016. <http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/even-trumps-supporters-dont-believe-mexico-would-pay-for-trumps-border-wall/> Accessed online September 15, 2016.

May, M., Page, R., and Brunsdon, E. (2001). *Understanding Social Problems*. Oxford, England: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Mayda, A., Peri, G., and Steingress, W. (2016). Immigration to the US: A Problem for the Republicans or the Democrats? (No. w21941). National Bureau of Economic Research.

McCaffrey, D. (2000). "Competitive Framing Processes in the Abortion Debate: Polarization-vilification, Frame Saving, and Frame Debunking." *The Sociological Quarterly*, 41(1): 41-61.

McDermott, R. (2011). "Internal and External Validity." In Druckman, J., Green, D., Kuklinski, J., and Lupia, A. (Eds.). (2011). *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*, (27-40). Cambridge University Press.

McDonald, M. (2014). "2014 November General Election Turnout Rates." *United States Election Project*. George Mason University. Accessed online September 14, 2015. Available at: http://www.electproject.org/2014g

McKelvey, Richard D., and Thomas R. Palfrey. (1992). "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game." *Econometrica,* 4: 803-36.

McLaren, L. (2003). "Anti-immigration Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants." *Social Forces*, 81 (3): 909–36.

McLaren, L. and Johnson, M. (2007). "Resources, Group Conflict and Symbols: Explaining Anti-Immigration Hostility in Britain." *Political Studies*, 55(4): 709-732.

Meier, K. and Stewart, J. (1991). *The Politics of Hispanic Education*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Meltsner, A. (1974). *The Politics of City Revenue*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Merolla, J., Ramakrishnan, S. and Haynes, C. (2013). "'Illegal,' 'Undocumented,' or 'Unauthorized': Equivalency Frames, Issue Frames, and Public Opinion on Immigration." *Perspectives on Politics*, 11(03): 789-807.

Messina A. (1989). *Race and Party Competition in Britain*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

Montgomery, R., Dennis, J. M., and Ganesh, N. (2016). "Response Rate Calculation Methodology for Tecruitment of a Two-Phase Probability-Based Panel: The Case

of AmeriSpeak." University of Chicago National Opinion Research Center White Paper. Accessed online January 14, 2019. http://amerispeak.norc.org/Documents/Research/WhitePaper_ResponseRateCalculation_AmeriSpeak_2016.pdf

Murdoch, S. (2011) "The Changing Demographics of Texas." Presented at New Day Rising: Changing Demographics and Changing Politics and Policy in Texas Symposium on February 28. < https://www.texastribune.org/2011/03/07/steve-murdock-on-the-coming-hispanic-majority/comments/> Accessed online on April 29, 2013.

Mutz, D. (2002). "Cross-cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice." *American Political Science Review*, 96(1): 111-126.

Mutz, D. (2011). *Population-Based Survey Experiments*. Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Mutz, D. (2018). "Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 201718155.

National Conference of State Legislatures. (2012). "2012 Immigration Laws, Bills and Resolutions." <http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/2012-immigration-laws-bills-and-resolutions.aspx> Accessed online March 23, 2015.

National Immigration Law Center. (2018). "FAQ: Proposed Changes to the Public Charge Rule - National Immigration Law Center." Available online at: <https://www.nilc.org/issues/economic-support/pubcharge/proposed-changes-to-public-charge-rule-faq/> Accessed December 12, 2018.

Nelson, T. and Kinder, D. (1996). "Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in American Public Opinion." *Journal of Politics*, 58 (4): 1055-1078.

Nicholson, S. (2012). "Polarizing Cues." *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(1): 52-66.

Nicholson, S. and Segura, G. (2012). "Who's the Party of the People? Economic Populism and the U.S. Public's Beliefs About Political Parties." *Political Behavior*, 34(2): 369-389.

O'Keefe DJ. 1990. *Persuasion: Theory and Research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Olzak, S. (1992). *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition & Conflict*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Page, B., and Shapiro, R. (1983). "The Effects of Public Opinion on Policy." *American Political Science Review*, 77(1): 175-90.

Panagopoulos, Costas, and Donald P. Green. (2008). "Field Experiments Testing the Impact of Radio Advertisements on Electoral Competition." *American Journal of Political Science*, 52: 156-68.

Paolaci, G., Chandler, J. and Iperirotis, P. (2010). "Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk." *Judgment and Decision Making*, 5(5): 411-419.

Passel, J. (2006). "The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S." The Pew Hispanic Center: Washington, D.C.

Passel, J. and Cohn, D. (2011). "Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends." Pew Hispanic Center: Washington D.C.

Petersen, M., Slothuus, R. and Togeby, L. (2010). "Political Parties and Value Consistency in Public Opinion Formation." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 74(3): 530-550.

Peterson, P. and Rom, M. (1989). "American Federalism, Welfare Policy, and Residential Choices." *American Political Science Review*, 83(3): 711–728.

Pew Research Center (2011). "Public Wants Changes in Entitlements, Not Changes in Benefits." Pew Research Center: Washington D.C. Available online at www.peoplepress.org. Accessed April 27, 2013.

Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. (2014). Section 4: Views on Immigration and Race. [online] Available at: http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/26/section-4-views-on-immigration-and-race/ [Accessed 8 May 2015].

Plotnick, R. and Winters, R. (1985). "A Politico-Economic Theory of Income Redistribution." *American Political Science Review*, 79: 458-73.

Popkin, S. (1994). *The Reasoning Voter*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Povich, E. (2014). "States Grapple with Unpopular Property Taxes." Stateline. The Pew Charitable Trust. Available online at < http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/05/14/states-grapple-with-unpopular-property-taxes>.

Presser, S, Rothgerb, J., Couper, M., Lessler, J. Martin, E. Martin, J. Singer, E. (2004). *Methods for Testing and Evaluating Survey Questionnaires*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.

Presser, S., and Blair, J. (1994). "Survey Pretesting: Do Different Methods Produce Different Results." *Sociological Methodology*, 24(5), 73-104.

Preston, J. (2011). "State Lawmakers Outline Plans to End Birthright Citizenship, Drawing Outcry." *The New York Times*. [online] January 5, 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/06/us/06immig.html?_r=1&> Accessed online April 23, 2013.

Prior, M. and Lupia, A. (2008). "Money, Time, and Political Knowledge: Distinguishing Quick Recall and Political Learning Skills." American Journal of Political Science, 52(1): 169-183.

Radcliff, B. and Saiz, M. (1995). "Race, Turnout, and Public Policy in the American States." *Political Research Quarterly*, 48(4): 775-794.

Reischauer, R. (1995). "Immigration and Welfare Reform." Congressional Budget Office: Washington D.C.

Rendall, M., Brownell, P. and Kups, S. 2011. "Declining Return Migration From the United States to Mexico in the Late-2000s Recession: A Research Note." *Demography*, 48(3): 1049-1058.

Reyna, C., Henry, P., Korfmacher, W. and Tucker, A. (2006). "Examining the Principles in Principled Conservatism: The Role of Responsibility Stereotypes as Cues for Deservingness in Racial Policy Decisions." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90(1): 109-128.

Rhuzkan, A. (2015). "An Engineer Explains Why Trump's Wall Is So Implausible." *The National Memo*. <http://www.nationalmemo.com/an-engineer-explains-why-trumps-wall-is-so-implausible/> Accessed online September 10, 2016.

Riker, W., Calvert, R., Mueller, J. and Wilson, R. (1996). *The Strategy of Rhetoric*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Rothwell, J. (2016). "Explaining Nationalist Political Views: The Case of Donald Trump." Available at SSRN 2822059. <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2822059> Accessed online September 9, 2016.

Rothwell, J., and Diego-Rosell, P. (2016). "Explaining Nationalist Political Views: The Case of Donald Trump" Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2822059> Accessed online March 27, 2018.

Rugh, J. and Trounstine, J. (2011). "The Provision of Local Public Goods in Diverse Communities: Analyzing Municipal Bond Elections." *The Journal of Politics*, 73 (04): 1038-1050.

Ryan, W. (1976). *Blaming the Victim*. 2nd edition. New York, NY: Vintage Books.

Samuelson, W., and Zeckhauser, R. (1988). "Status Quo Bias in Decision Making.: *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, *1*(1): 7-59.

Saunders, G. (2016). "Who Are All These Trump Supporters?" *The New Yorker*. <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/07/11/george-saunders-goes-to-trump-rallies> Accessed online September 10, 2016.

Scheve, K. and Slaughter, M. (2001). "Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy." *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 83(1): 133–45.

Schildkraut, D. (2005). "The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination." *Political Behavior*, 27(3): 285-312.

Schildkraut, D. (2013). "Amnesty, Guest Workers, Fences! Oh My! Public Opinion about "Comprehensive Immigration Reform." In Freeman, G. P. *Immigration and Public Opinion in Liberal Democracies*, (Vol. 52). New York, NY: Routledge.

Schneider, A., and Ingram, H. (1993). "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy." American Political Science Review, 87(02): 334-347.

Schwartz, S. H., Caprara, G. V. and Vecchione, M. (2010), "Basic Personal Values, Core Political Values, and Voting: A Longitudinal Analysis." *Political Psychology*, 31(3): 421-452.

Segovia, F. and Defever, R. (2010). "The Polls--Trends: American Public Opinion on Immigrants and Immigration Policy." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 74(2): 375-394.

Shaw, D. (1999). "The Impact of News Media Favorability and Candidate Events in Presidential Campaigns." *Political Communication*, 16(2): 183-202.

Sides, J. and Citrin, J. (2007). "European Opinion About Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information." *British Journal of Political Science*, 37(03): 477-504.

Sides, J., and Vavreck, L. (2013). *The Gamble : Choice and Chance in the 2012 Presidential Election*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Simon, R. and Alexander, S. (1993). *The Ambivalent Welcome: Print Media, Public Opinion and Immigration*. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Skocpol, T. (1991). "Targeting within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to Combat Poverty in the United States." Jencks, C., and Peterson, P. *The Urban Underclass*. Pg. 437-59. Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C.

Skocpol, T., and Williamson, V. (2011). *The Tea Party and the Remaking of American Conservatism*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Smith, A. (2001). *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*. Polity Press: Cambridge, England.

Sniderman, P. (2000). "Taking Sides: A Fixed Choice Theory of Political Reasoning." *In Elements of Reason*, eds. Lupia, A., McCubbins, M. and Popkin, S. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Sniderman, P. and Carmines, E. (1997). "Reaching Beyond Race." *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 30(3): 466-471.

Sniderman, P. and Grob, D. (1996). "Innovations in Experimental Design in Attitude Surveys." *Annual Review of Sociology*, 22(1): 377-399.

Sniderman, P. and Piazza, T. (1993). *The Scar of Race*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Sniderman, P. M. (2011). "The Logic and Design of the Survey Experiment." In Druckman, J., Green, D., Kuklinski, J., & Lupia, A. (Eds.). (2011). *Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science*, (103-114). Cambridge University Press.

Sniderman, P., and Bullock, J. (2004). "A Consistency Theory of Public Opinion and Political Choice: The Hypothesis of Menu Dependence." *In Studies in Public Opinion*, eds. Saris, W. and Sniderman, P. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 337-57.

Sniderman, P., and Stiglitz, E. (2012). *The Reputational Premium: A Theory of Party Identification and Spatial Reasoning*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sniderman, P., and Theriault, S. (2004). "The Structure of Political Argument and the Logic of Issue Framing." In W. Saris and P. Sniderman (Eds.) *Studies in Public Opinion*, (pp. 133–165). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sniderman, P., Hagendoorn, L., and Prior M. (2004). "Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities'" *American Political Science Review*, 98(1): 35-49.

Social Security Administration. "§416.1618 When you are considered permanently residing in the United States under color of law." Office of Management and Budget. December 2, 1991. <http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/cfr20/416/416-1618.htm> Last updated January 26, 2010.

Stolte, J. F. (1994). "The Context of Satisficing in Vignette Research." *Journal of Social Psychology*, 134(6): 727-733.

Stone, D. (2002). *Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.

Stothard, M. (2017). "Economic Frustration Drives Young French Voters Towards Le Pen." *The Financial Times*. March 18. Accessed online January 3, 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/5119f9ac-08cb-11e7-97d1-5e720a26771b

Strack, F., and Mussweiler, T. (1997) "Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect: Mechanisms of selective accessibility." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 73(3): 437.

Stubager, R. and Slothuus, R. (2013). "What are the Sources of Political Parties' Issue Ownership? Testing Four Explanations at the Individual Level." *Political Behavior*, 35(3): 567-588.

Taxin, A. (2018). "APNewsBreak: US Launches Bid to Find Citizenship Cheaters." *AP News*. Accessed online August 9, 2018. <https://apnews.com/1da389a535684a5f9d0da74081c242f3>

Taylor, M. (1998). "How White Attitudes Vary with the Racial Composition of Local Populations: Numbers Count." *American Sociological Review*, 63(4): 512–535.

Taylor, S., Crocker, J., Fiske, S., Sprinzen, M., and Winkler, J. (1979). "The Generalizability of Salience Effects." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37(3): 357.

Tenore, M. (2011) "Despite Criticism, AP Stylebook Dictates that Journalists Use 'Illegal Immigrant'." Accessed online September 10, 2013. <www.Poynter.org>.

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, enacted as Division C of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, and signed into law on September 30, 1996 (P.L. 104-208)

Theriault, S. (2013). *The Gingrich Senators: The Roots of Partisan Warfare in Congress*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Tichenor, D. (2002) *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Tienda, M. and Jensen, L. (1986). "Immigration and Public Assistance Participation: Dispelling the Myth of Dependency." *Social Science Research*. 15(4): 372-400.

Tomz, M., and van Houweling, R. (2008). "Candidate Positioning and Voter Choice." *American Political Science Review*, 102 (3): 303–18.

Tourangeau, R. (1984). "Cognitive Sciences and Survey Methods." In T. Jabine, M. Straf, J. Tanur, and R. Tourangeau (Eds.), *Cognitive Aspects of Survey Methodology: Building a Bridge Between Disciplines*, (73-100). Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

Tourangeau, R. and Rasinski, K. (1988). "Cognitive Processes Underlying Context effects in Attitude Measurement." *Psychological Bulletin*, 103(3): 299-314.

Transue, J. (2007). "Identity Salience, Identity Acceptance, and Racial Policy Attitudes: American National Identity as a Uniting Force." *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1): 78-91.

Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1974) "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases." *Science*, 185(4157): 1124-1131.

United States Census Bureau. (2012). "The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2010," Available online at: www.census.gov.

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. (2013). Affidavit of Support. U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Washington D.C. [online] Available at: https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/green-card-processes-and-procedures/affidavit-support [Accessed 11 Aug. 2016].

Valentino, N., Brader, T. and Jardina, A. (2012). "Immigration Opposition Among U.S. Whites: General Ethnocentrism or Media Priming of Attitudes About Latinos?" *Political Psychology*, 34(2): 149-166.

Valentino, N., Hutchings, V., and White, I. (2002). "Cues That Matter: How Political Ads Prime Racial Attitudes During Campaigns." *American Political Science Review*, 96(01): 75-90.

Van Hook, J., Glick, J. and Bean, F. (1999). "Public Assistance Receipt Among Immigrants and Natives: How the Unit of Analysis Affects Research Findings." *Demography*, 36 (1): 111-20.

Vericker, T., Fortuny, K., Finegold, K., and Ozdemir, S. (2010). "Effects of Immigration on WIC and NSLP Caseloads." Urban Institute: Washington D.C.

Vialet, J, and Eig, L. (1998). "Alien Eligibility for Public Assistance." Congressional Research Service: Washington D.C.

Vialet, J. (1997). "Immigration: The New Affidavit of Support—Questions, Answers, and Issues." Congressional Research Service: Washington D.C.

Vigdor, J. (2004). "Community Composition and Collective Action: Analyzing Initial Mail Response to the 2000 Census." *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 86(1): 303-312.

Wagnerman, K. (2017). "Medicaid: How Does it Provide Economic Security for Families?" Georgetown University Center for Children and Families. [online] <https://ccf.georgetown.edu/2017/03/09/medicaid-how-does-it-provide-economic-security-for-families/> Accessed online October 23, 2018.

Wasem, R. (2012). "Noncitizen Eligibility for Federal Public Assistance: Policy Overview and Trends." Congressional Research Service. Washington D.C.

Weeks, B., Ardèvol-Abreu, A., and Gil de Zúñiga, H. (2017). "Online Influence? Social Media Use, Opinion Leadership, and Political Persuasion." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 29(2): 214-239.

Willis, G. (2005). Cognitive Interviewing. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Willis, G., and Lessler, J. (1999). "Question Appraisal System QAS-99." Rockville, MD: Research Triangle Institute.

Wilson, T. (2001). "Americans' Views on Immigration Policy: Testing the Role of Threatened Group Interests." *Sociological Perspectives*, 44(4): 485-501.

Wong, C. (2007). "'Little" and "Big" Pictures in Our Heads: Race, Local Context, and Innumeracy About Racial Groups in the United States." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 71(3): 392–412.

Wong, J. (2007). "Two Steps Forward, One Step Back…The Slow and Steady March of Immigrant Political Incorporation." *DuBois Review*, 4: 457-467.

Wong, J. (2018). *Immigrants, Evangelicals, and Politics in an Era of Demographic Change*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.

Wright, G., Erikson,R., and McIver, J. (1987). "Public Opinion and Policy Liberalism in the American States." *American Journal of Political Science*, 31(4): 980-1001.

Ybarra, V. D., Sanchez, L. M., & Sanchez, G. R. (2016). "Anti-immigrant anxieties in state policy: The great recession and punitive immigration policy in the American states, 2005–2012." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*, 16(3): 313-339.

Zaller, J. (1992). *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Zaller, J. (2004). "Floating Voters in U.S. Elections." In W. Saris and P. Sniderman (Eds.) *Studies in Public Opinion*, (pp. 166–212). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Zeskind, L. (2005). "The New Nativism." *The American Prospect*. [online] October 23. <http://prospect.org/article/new-nativism> Accessed online May 7, 2013.

Zimmerman, W, and Tumlin, K. (1999). "Patchwork Policies: State Assistance for Immigrants under Welfare Reform." Washington DC: The Urban Institute.

Zingher, J. (2014). "The Ideological and Electoral Determinants of Laws Targeting Undocumented Migrants in the U.S. States." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*, 14(1): 90–117.

Appendix A: Ethics Review Questionnaire

Researchers should consider the following questions when devising research proposals involving human participants, personal, medical or otherwise sensitive data or methodologically controversial approaches. N.B. not all of these questions will be relevant to every study. These questions provide pointers to direct researchers' thinking about the ethical dimensions of their research. It is expected that researchers will already have addressed the academic justification for the project in their proposal; the guidance questions set out below aim to help researchers address specific ethical issues in so far as they relate to participants or data.

In particular, consideration of risks to the research participants versus benefits need to be weighed up by researchers. It is important to think through carefully the likely impact on participants or vulnerable groups of any data collection methods. Certain groups are particularly vulnerable, or will be placed in a vulnerable position in relation to research, and may succumb to pressure; for example children or people with learning disability, or students when they are participating in research as students. Some participants will have diminished capacity to give consent and are therefore less able to protect themselves and require specific consideration (see further guidance given on the RPDD web pages regarding informed consent). The Research Ethics Committee (REC) recognizes that it is not only research with human participants that raises relevant ethical concerns. Researchers may be assessing sensitive information, the publication or analysis of which may have direct impact on agencies, communities or individuals. For example, collection and use of archive, historical, legal, online or visual materials may raise ethical issues (e.g for families and friends of people deceased), and research on provision of social or human services may impact user provision. Similarly, use of other people's primary data may need clearance or raise concerns about its interpretation. The Research Ethics Committee will assess whether the relevant questions have been adequately addressed when it scrutinises proposals. Please ensure that each answer provides the Committee with enough information to make an informed decision on the ethical dimensions of the proposal.

The LSE Research Ethics Policy and guidance will be reviewed annually and may be subject to further development.

The completed questionnaire should only be returned to Michael Nelson in the Research Division where specific issues have been identified *and* the supervisor/researcher would like the Research Ethics Committee to consider the application. Where you have considered questions to be irrelevant please indicate this on the form.

I. Project Details

Project Title: **The Politics of Population Change: How Do Attitudes towards Immigrants Influence Public Spending Preferences & Support for Restrictionist Policies?**

II. Applicant Details

Name:	Melissa Shannon
Status (delete as applicable)	PhD
Email address:	m.shannon@lse.ac.uk
Room number/contact address:	OLD 1.20

III. Research Aims

Please provide *brief* details of the research aims and the scientific background of the research. A full copy of the proposal should be attached to this document.

The aim of this research is to narrow the gaps in our understanding of how public opinion about the foreign-born shapes public spending preferences and support for policies directed at immigrant populations. To disentangle these preferences I will collect an original dataset, which asks participants questions about recent state policy initiatives. I will also employ survey experiments, often regarded as one of the most credible research designs because of the use of random assignment and a treatment and control, to determine whether concerns about specific immigrant groups influence spending preferences for programmes that reduce poverty and inequality. Additionally, I will include a direct test to determine the extent to which individuals are willing to exclude particular immigrants from specific services, and whether or not they will reject public savings to prohibit access. State level indicators will also be applied to assess whether certain demographic (e.g. the level and change of foreign born or ethnic minorities), economic (e.g. unemployment, benefit take-up, and tax rates), and political (e.g. the ideological composition of legislative bodies) characteristics are fuelling anti-immigrant proposals at the state level and affect public spending preferences.

ONLY COMPLETE THE RELEVANT PARTS OF THIS DOCUMENT. THESE WILL HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AFTER COMPLETION OF THE RESEARCH ETHICS CHECKLIST.

4. Ethical questions arising from financial support/the provision of incentives

4.1 Are there any real or perceived conflicts of interest which could compromise the integrity and/or independence of the research due to the nature of the funding body?

No

4.2 Have any incentives to the investigator been declared?

No

4.3 Are there any restrictions on the freedom of the investigator(s) to publish the results of the research?

No

4.4 Are any incentives being offered to participants?

I plan to collect data from two web-based samples, the crowdsourcing platform Mechanical Turk and the market research firm GfK. For Mechanical Turk sample, participants will receive a small payment for the completion of each survey (e.g. $3.00 for the initial 20 minute survey and $2.00 for the second, which could be completed in less than 10 minutes). Participants who complete the survey will be recompensed at just over the minimum wage ($9.19 per hour) for the state of Washington, which has the highest hourly rate in the country. The rate is high enough to alleviate concerns about exploitation, but the incentive is not greater than the payment offered through the LSE Behavioural Research Lab (£10 for studies that last up to an hour). **Participants from the GfK sample, even those without computers, are provided with free internet access and hardware (through the service WebTV) for as long as they remain in the panel. The participants also receive some small compensation (between $10-$25 for each month in the panel).**

Appendix B: Research Ethics Review Checklist

This checklist should be completed for every research project that involves human participants, personal, medical or otherwise sensitive data or methodologically controversial approaches. It is used to identify whether a full application for ethics approval needs to be submitted. The research ethics review process is not designed to assess the merits of the research in question, but is merely a device to ensure that external risks have been fully considered and that an acceptable research methodology has been applied. This checklist applies to research undertaken by *both* staff and students, but it should be noted that the way the checklist is processed differs between these two groups.

For staff: if a full application is required please ensure that you complete the Ethics Review Questionnaire for Researchers and send the completed form to Michael Nelson in the Research Division (RD).

Please accompany the questionnaire with a copy of this checklist and a copy of the research proposal.

For MSc/PhD students: if a full application is required please ensure that you complete the Ethics Review Questionnaire for Researchers and discuss the issues raised with your student supervisor in the first instance. You should ensure that the completed forms are accompanied with a copy of the research proposal to ensure that your supervisor can make a fully informed decision on the ethical implications of the research. Where the supervisor is satisfied that all ethical concerns have been addressed s/he must sign the checklist and ensure that a copy is retained within the department as a record of the decision reached. It is appreciated that in certain cases the student supervisor may not be able to reach a decision on the ethical concerns raised. In such instances the matter should be referred to the Research Ethics Committee (please send all relevant forms and a copy of the proposal to Michael Nelson in RD). *Only where an informed decision cannot be reached by the supervisor should paperwork be submitted to the Research Ethics Committee.*

For undergraduate students: After completing the checklist, undergraduate students should discuss any issues raised with their supervisor in the first instance. If fully satisfied with the research proposal, the supervisor can sign the checklist on behalf of the department. A copy of the signed form should be retained by the department as a record of the decision reached. It is appreciated that in certain instances the student supervisor may not be able to reach a decision on the ethical concerns raised. In such instances the application for ethics approval should be referred to the Research Ethics Committee (please send all relevant forms and a copy of the proposal to Michael Nelson in RD). *Only where an informed decision cannot be reached by the supervisor should paperwork be submitted to the Research Ethics Committee.*

Before completing this form, please refer to the LSE Research Ethics Policy. The principal investigator or, where the principal investigator is a student, the supervisor, is responsible for exercising appropriate professional judgement in this review. For students, your supervisor should be able to provide you with guidance on the ethical

implications of the research project. If members of staff have any queries regarding the completion of the checklist they should address these to Michael Nelson (RD) in the first instance.

This checklist must be completed before potential participants are approached to take part in any research.

Section I: Applicant Details

Name of researcher:	Melissa Shannon
Status(delete as appropriate):	PhD Student
Email address:	m.shannon@lse.ac.uk
Contact address:	50 Crispin St – Lilian Knowles House Flat D6B1 London E1 6HQ
Telephone number:	07530-078-376

Section II: Project Details

Title of the proposal and brief abstract:
The Politics of Population Change: How Do Attitudes towards Immigrants Influence Public Spending Preferences & Support for Restrictionist Policies?

The aim of this research is to narrow the gaps in our understanding of how public opinion about the foreign-born shapes public spending preferences and support for policies directed at immigrant populations. To disentangle these preferences I will collect an original dataset, which asks participants questions about recent state policy initiatives. I will also employ survey experiments, often regarded as one of the most credible research designs because of the use of random assignment and a treatment and control, to determine whether concerns about specific immigrant groups influence spending preferences for programmes that reduce poverty and inequality. Additionally, I will include a direct test to determine the extent to which individuals are willing to exclude particular immigrants from specific services, and whether or not they will reject public savings to prohibit access. State level indicators will also be applied to assess whether certain demographic (e.g. the level and change of foreign born or ethnic minorities), economic (e.g. unemployment, benefit take-up, and tax rates), and political (e.g. the ideological composition of legislative bodies) characteristics are fuelling anti-immigrant proposals at the state level and affect public spending preferences.

Section III: Student Details:

Details of study:	Three papers examining how attitudes towards immigrants

	shape policy preferences directed at immigrant population. Involves primary data collection using online surveys.
Supervisors' names:	Arjan Gjonca & Dominik Hangartner
Email address:	a.gjonca@lse.ac.uk; d.hangartner@lse.ac.uk
Contact address:	

Section IV: Research Checklist

Consent

	Yes	**No**	**Not certain**
Does the study involve participants who are in any way vulnerable or may have any difficulty giving consent? *If you have answered yes or are not certain about this please complete Section 1 of the Research Questionnaire.* *As general guidance, the Research Ethics Committee feels that research participants under the age of 18 may be vulnerable.*		**X**	
Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study without their knowledge and consent at the time? (e.g. covert observation of people in public places) *If you have answered yes or are not certain about this please complete Section 1 of the Research Questionnaire.*		**X**	

Research Design/Methodology

Does the research methodology use deception? *If you have answered yes or are not certain about this please complete Section 2 of the Research Questionnaire.*		**X**	
Are there any significant concerns regarding the design of the research project? a) If the proposed research relates to the provision of social or human services is it feasible and/or appropriate that service users or service user representatives should be in some way involved in or consulted upon the development of the project? b) Does the project involve the handling of any sensitive information?		**X**	

If you have answered yes or not certain to these questions please complete Section 3 of the Research Questionnaire.			

Financial Incentives/Sponsorship

Will the independence of the research be affected by the source of the funding? *If you have answered yes or not certain about this please complete Section 4 of the Research Questionnaire.*			**X**
Are there payments to researchers/participants that may have an impact on the objectivity of the research? *If you have answered yes or not certain about this please complete Section 4 of the Research Questionnaire.*			**X**
Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and compensation for time) be offered to participants? *If you have answered yes or not certain about this please complete Section 4 of the Research Questionnaire.*		**X**	

Research Subjects

Is pain or more than mild discomfort likely to result from the study? *If you have answered yes or not certain about this please complete Section 5 of the Research Questionnaire.*		**X**	
Could the study induce unacceptable psychological stress or anxiety or cause harm or negative consequences beyond the risks encountered in normal life? Will the study involve prolonged or repetitive testing? *If you have answered yes or not certain about this please complete Section 5 of the Research Questionnaire.*		**X**	
Are drugs, placebos or other substances to be administered to the study participants or will the study involve invasive, intrusive or potentially harmful procedures of any kind? *If you have answered yes or not certain about this please complete Section 5 of the Research Questionnaire.*		**X**	

Risk to Researchers

Do you have any doubts or concerns regarding your (or your colleagues) physical or psychological wellbeing during the research period? *If you have answered yes or not certain about this please complete*		**X**	

Section 6 of the Research Questionnaire.			

Confidentiality

Do you or your supervisor have any concerns regarding confidentiality, privacy or data protection? *If you have answered yes or not certain about this please complete Section 7 of the Research Questionnaire.*		**X**	

Dissemination

Are there any particular groups who are likely to be harmed by dissemination of the results of this project? *If you have answered yes or not certain about this please complete Section 8 of the Research Questionnaire.*		**X**	

If you have answered **no** to all the questions, staff members should file the completed form for their records. Students should retain a copy of the form and submit it with their research report or dissertation.

If you have answered **yes** or **not certain** to any of the questions you will need to describe more fully how you plan to deal with the ethical issues raised by your research. You will need to answer the **relevant** questions in the Ethics Review Questionnaire for Researchers form addressing the ethical issues raised by your proposal. Staff should ensure that the completed questionnaire is sent to Michael Nelson in RD. Students should submit their completed questionnaire to their supervisor in the first instance. It will be at the discretion of the supervisor whether they feel that the research should be considered by the Research Ethics Committee.

Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the School's Research Ethics Policy and any relevant academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study. This includes providing details of your proposal and completed questionnaire, and ensuring confidentiality in the storage and use of data.

Any significant change in the question, design or conduct over the course of the research should be notified to Michael Nelson in RD.

I have read and understood the LSE Research Ethics Policy and the questions contained in the Research Checklist above.

Academic Research Staff

Principal Investigator Signature:
Date:

PhD Student

Student Signature:
Student Name (Please print): Melissa Shannon
Department: Social Policy
Date: 30/6/13
Date of Research Ethics Seminar attended:29/11/12

Summary of any ethical issues identified:
Supervisor Signature*:
Supervisor Name (Please print):
Department:
Date: 30/6/13

* By signing this document the student supervisor attests to the fact that any ethical issues raised have been dealt with adequately.

yes or not certain about this please complete Section 8 of the Research Questionnaire.			

If you have answered **no** to all the questions, staff members should file the completed form for their records. Students should retain a copy of the form and submit it with their research report or dissertation.

If you have answered **yes** or **not certain** to any of the questions you will need to describe more fully how you plan to deal with the ethical issues raised by your research. You will need to answer the **relevant** questions in the Ethics Review Questionnaire for Researchers form addressing the ethical issues raised by your proposal. Staff should ensure that the completed questionnaire is sent to Michael Nelson in RD. Students should submit their completed questionnaire to their supervisor in the first instance. It will be at the discretion of the supervisor whether they feel that the research should be considered by the Research Ethics Committee.

Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the School's Research Ethics Policy and any relevant academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study. This includes providing details of your proposal and completed questionnaire, and ensuring confidentiality in the storage and use of data.

Any significant change in the question, design or conduct over the course of the research should be notified to Michael Nelson in RD.

I have read and understood the LSE Research Ethics Policy and the questions contained in the Research Checklist above.

Academic Research Staff

Principal Investigator Signature:
Date:

PhD Student

Student Signature:
Student Name (Please print): Melissa Shannon
Department: Social Policy
Date: 30/6/13
Date of Research Ethics Seminar attended:29/11/12

Summary of any ethical issues identified: The only issue that has been adressed and dealt with is the use of financial insentives. We strongly believe that it will not affect the quality of research conducted.
Supervisor Signature*:
Supervisor Name (Please print): ARJAN GJONCA
Department: SOCIAL POLICY
Date: 30/6/13

Appendix C: Ethics Approval Letter

THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
tel: +44 (0)20 7955 7113
fax: +44 (0)20 7955 6187
email: rescon@lse.ac.uk
www.lse.ac.uk

Research Division

Ms Melissa Shannon
Department of Social Policy

29 August 2013

Dear Melissa,

Re: The Politics of Population Change: How do Attitudes Towards Immigrants Influence Public Spending Preferences & Support for Restrictionist Policies.

I am writing with reference to the above research proposal and can confirm that I have reviewed the application in my capacity as Chair of the School's Research Ethics Committee. I have concluded that the appropriate ethical safeguards with regard to informed consent, confidentiality and data protection are in place for this project.

I would like to take this opportunity to wish you well with your research project. If you have any further queries, please feel free to contact Michael Nelson, Research Division.

Yours sincerely,

Professor Hartley Dean
Chair of the Research Ethics Committee

cc. Michael Nelson, Research Division
Dr Arjan Gjonca, Department of Social Policy