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Iran's Idea of Europe (1501-2015):

Identity, Concepts,

and International Society

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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). I declare that this is 81,539 words.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

Abstract

This thesis offers a historically informed and theoretically driven account of how Iran has understood, debated and shaped its own identity in relation to Europe since the 16th century. These representations defined the contours of Iran's relation with the international society. They offered a new empirical catalogue to understand the impact of identity-constructions on the expansion of international society.

Drawing on a wide range of Iranian sources, I argue that key memories of religion and bygone polities influenced constructing a constellation of concepts makes specific actions possible. These concepts and ensuing possibilities trigger different processes that structure social relations between the Iranian state, the domestic polity, Europe and international society. The contribution of the thesis lies within the debates on the historical origins of modern international relations and international society, often overlooking the role of civilisational and suzerain entities, and the revival of global international thought within the discipline.

After introducing the theoretical underpinnings of the research, I chronologically trace shifts and continuities in Iran's representation of Europe and ensuing concepts. These social constructions highlight the uses of the concept of Europe not just as a geographical idea but a geopolitical and social imaginary that establishes differences, produces knowledge, draws boundaries, and defines politics and social on the elite and everyday level.

The first two chapters are the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of this study. First, I review the extant literature on identity construction and evolution of international society. I argue for the necessity of a macro exploration of non-European societies to expand the scope of International Relations. The second chapter lays out the key concepts enabling the analysis and highlights a model to analyse concepts emerging throughout the thesis. The remaining chapters investigate Iran's idea of Europe throughout imperial, anti-colonial, and civilisational episodes of its history. The concluding chapter assesses the implications of this study for the discipline and highlights the necessity of conceptual studies and bridging the gap between Area Studies and International Relations.

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That was the same night I gave my mother the hardest night of her life as I was ploughing through the submission. I owe a lot in my life to her beyond the PhD. This thesis is dedicated to her, and it is just a fraction of what I owe her in life. I can never thank her enough for teaching me everything I have.

Notes on Transliteration

This manuscript uses a simplified transliteration that privileges oral recognisability over written reversibility. Except for names that have conventional spelling in English.

I

Introduction to Studying Iran's Europe:

Identity, History, and International Society

'Why am I me?'

- Stendhal, *Le rouge et le noir*

At the time of this writing, an Internet search[1] or maybe a perusal of news archives over the last year shows the extent of Iran's relationship with Europe.[2] It also demonstrates issues, challenges, and potential crises. If you ask someone, far from the jargons of the discipline of International Relations, about Iran and Europe, they would probably talk about trade, nuclear programme, politics, and maybe culture. *Iran's Europe* could have been just about that: to focus on Iran's relationship

[1] This could hold in almost any language. I tried this search in English and the first entry amongst 857,000,000 results was 'The Coming Clash: Why Iran Will Divide Europe from the United States' (The European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017), https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/pr/why_iran_will_divide_europe_from_the_united_states_7230.

[2] You may also find series of pictures from Iran's historical attractions.

with Europe and discuss it through different themes and policies. It does not. This dissertation is a story how representations of Europe became a key part of the Iranian socio-political life, shaped its encounter with the international society, and how would affect international relations and studying it.

May main argument is that Iran's idea[3] of Europe constitutes a significant Other in shaping Iranian identity and its understanding of the international society. This constitution is primarily characterised by changing degrees of sameness and otherness: sometimes sharing identity with Europe, and sometimes feeling wholly strange. Identity and Iran's representation or conception of Europe varies in its content and contestation but has been continually omnipresent. It is not only relevant to understand Iran's sense of self, but given the history and evolution of the (European) international society, the conceptions will assist in understanding Iran's relationship with the society.

This chapter introduces the research question leading to the above argument and gives an overview of the theoretical framework. It discusses the relevance of history in International Relations and to this study. It also elaborates on how identities are pertinent, specifically when it comes to an understanding of the evolution of the international society as we know it within the English School of International Relations. Then, the chapter defines the scope and domain of this study. The last section offers a tour of the thesis and ensuing sections.

[3] Words matter. I am aware that for some, using the phrase 'idea' might connote a different meaning than when we use 'representations' or 'conceptions'. I use them interchangeably throughout.

I. What is at stake?

There is a long tradition of thinking about international society or international politics through the lens of identity. Who we are, who they are, who others are or were, or aspire to be, across different times and spaces are the typical questions that gets asked. The efforts to (dis)claim and (un)make those utterances and thinins have shaped politics. Even those who dismissed it now accept they were not correct in doing so.[4] Self/Other emerged as a useful binary to analyse and discuss differences constituted through othering.

This thesis joins the chorus of Self/Other studies in International Relations through the perspective of English School, and by taking up the calls for a Global International Relations to ground our studies in non-European histories, integrate regions, and find multiple forms of agencies.[5] The assumption and rationale of this project come about from two disciplinary planes. First, the English School's prolific discussion of the *International Society*, which is now prominently concerned with the non-West. It asserts that what starts as a European social and political form expands to global scale. It does so mainly through processes of (de)colonisation, socialisation, competition, encounter, and reform. The second strand is concerning Iranian politics, mostly belonging to Iranian area studies. Although a range of literature exists that have analysed the intellectual, political, social and economic influences of Europe during various discrete and discontinuities of Iranian history, and a number of publications have engaged with identity politics of Iran, mostly

[4] See Francis Fukuyama, *Identity : Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition* (London: Profile Books, 2018).

[5] Amitav Acharya, 'Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds', *International Studies Quarterly*, 2014, https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12171.

the state identity, there is no *longue durée* study of a genealogy of Europe as a concept in Iranian political sphere.

It is a propitious time to understand how exactly Europe is conceptualised in Iran, and what are its ramification for the English School, International Society, and International Relations. The thesis undertakes a diachronic and synchronic analysis of Iran's representation of Europe: one that engages in historical discussion that proceeds into contemporary era. In the social sciences, we are concerned with actions broadly defined as what actors have done, said, believed, desired.[6]

I keep referring to sameness and difference, Self/Other, and international society. What does all of this mean? Before going further, let me take off my jargon hat and bring in two quotes from senior Iranian officials to set up my argument:

1) We have not survived since 1979; we have survived for seven millennia. I am in Italy, so I can say Italians and Iranians have had empires that lasted more than the entire life of some countries. So, we are not easily impressed with that….[7]

2) The US administration's policies of unilateralism, racial discrimination, Islamophobia, and the undermining of important international treaties, including the Paris Climate Accord, are fundamentally

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[6] Friedrich V. Kratochwil, *Praxis: On Acting and Knowing* (Cambridge ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

[7] PADDolat, 'Asle Sokhanane Zarif Dar Goft-o-Goohaye Meditaraneyi Rom Darbare Ma Davam Miavarim: Ma Iranian 7000 Saal Ast Ke Davam Avardim', Twitter, 2018, https://twitter.com/PadDolat/status/1066611910471294976.

> incompatible with multilateralism and other socio-political norms valued by Europe … cooperation between Iran and Europe will secure the long-term interests of both parties, and ensure international peace and stability.[8]

Both statements draw on similarities between Iran and Europe. The first one highlights historical and ancient memory, to argue for sameness. It notes the durability of the polity and their relevance within the international order. By polity, I am referring to a group of humans with self-reflect identity (a sense of "we-ness"), with capacity to mobilise resources, and a degree of institutionalisation and hierarchy. [9] By international order, I mean pattern of relations creating expectations over the process and nature of future interactions.[10] The second statement highlights the same pattern of sameness between Iran and Europe, through differentiating each with the United States, and makes a normative stance on their role within the international order. These are the sort of utterances that this study scrutinises.

I also mentioned the role of memory. By memory, I am not alluding to how an individual could memorise texts or digits, but I am referring to collective

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[8] Hassan Rouhani, 'Europe Should Work with Iran to Counter US Unilateralism', *Financial Times*, November 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/3ecaed5e-dcfc-11e8-b173-ebef6ab1374a.

[9] Yale H Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, *Polities: Authority, Identities, and Change* (1996: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), 34.

[10] There is a caveat here: the concept of 'international order', or similar ones such as 'global order' or 'world order' appear throughout this manuscript. In instances, these are translated from the text. I do not define them. It should be read as the author(s) intended or how it proliferated throughout the discourse. Then there are analyses of my own or discussions that rely on the above definition.

memory. In simple terms, it is about how societies remember.[11] It refers to the widely shared perception of the past:[12] things societies tell about themselves, to simplify narratives or analogies to link past with present. At a basic level, it is about "general level memory refers to the process or faculty whereby events or impressions from the past are recollected and preserved."[13] Often memories are positive but there are ones that narrate a sense of feeling that " society been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways."[14] They could create impression of stability, forge new identities, or suggest new meanings.

Within the discipline of International Relations, the study of such statements usually belongs to a specific corner of the discipline: the use of history and highlighting sameness and difference in foreign policy writing and rhetoric.[15] It means that foreign policy is essentially the relationship between the Self and the Other. It drives what a foreign policy should be. Campbell explores how Otherness

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[11] Jeffrey C Alexander, *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), http://site.ebrary.com/id/10676173; Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics*, 2011, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511840470.

[12] Roland Barthes and Annette Lavers, *Mythologies*, 47. [print.] (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2006).

[13] Duncan Bell, *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between Past and Present* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 2.

[14] Alexander, *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, 12.

[15] See Richard K Ashley, 'Foreign Policy as Political Performance', *International Studies Notes* 13, no. 2 (1987): 51–54, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44235807%0A; D Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1992); Ole Wæver, 'Identity, Community and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Analysis', in *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*, ed. Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (London: Routledge, 2002), 20–49.

enables a process of nation-building and argues that talking about 'danger' is vital to legitimise state power and to establish or secure state identity.[16] An extension of this argument is how identity, shaped by Self/Other, explains foreign policy decision and are a priori to state's interests.[17] It argues for understanding how the Othering reveals potential policy choices, and highlights understanding of the Self.[18]

Let us rephrase the above statement through the discussed disciplinary tradition. The utterances by the Iranian President and the Foreign Minister, conveys a specific understanding of the Iranian Self and shows a particular representation of the European Other. It captures the nexus between the two. These utterances are what animates this research to understand how Iran sees the Europe. I have mentioned Foreign Policy few times but have not address what I actually mean. Foreign Policy usually means specific actions or stances on particular issues or with certain countries. This study moves away from a research on agential interactions that focuses on specific outcomes and causal perspectives.[19] Doing so would limit the scope of understanding how Othering could work. It might enable us to understand a specific action but would not provide us with a deeper assessment of how Iran sees Europe or what are the consequences of it.

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[16] Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*.

[17] See Erik Ringmar, *Identity, Interest and Action A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War* (Cambridge, GBR: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[18] V. Kubálková, ed., *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World*, International Relations in a Constructed World (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2001).

[19] For examples of such studies, see Gregorio Bettiza, 'Civilizational Analysis in International Relations: Mapping the Field and Advancing a "Civilizational Politics" Line of Research', *International Studies Review*, 2014, https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12100; Kuniko Ashizawa, 'When Identity Matters: State Identity, Regional Institution-Building, and Japanese Foreign Policy', *International Studies Review*, 2008, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2008.00805.x.

Thus, I study the broader social and historical context that shapes constant conceptual and representational clashes and struggles. It is not about one particular action or policy but to grapple with macro changes or continuities.[20]

If the desire is to capture long-term shifts and stabilities, then there is a need for a slightly bigger lens. This project charts how socio-political episodes of Iran's history since the 16th century have been intrinsically linked to the relationship between Iran and the Europe, creating a debate on the Europe and its influence in Iran. How the Europe has been represented in Iran involves essentially an exposé of Iran's self and the particular projects or policies Iran has attempted to pursue. It is not about specific policies or one action, but a bigger history. This macro focus does not mean they will not have policy manifestations. The relationship and its representations are not limited to intellectual concerns or debates but defines the scope of policies that are possible. Such debates determine and provide the bandwidth of options which then, if, combined with other factors could explain policy. This is not about establishing a causal link[21] between a specific idea and a policy but only highlighting conditions of possibility. For example, what does the above statements tell about the Iranian identity, what makes these utterances possible and what would be the potential ramifications of such positions?

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[20] For a discussion of different scales of historical studies, see Jan de Vries, 'Playing with Scales: The Global and the Micro, the Macro and the Nano*', *Past & Present* 242, no. Supplement_14 (21 November 2019): 23–36, https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gtz043.

[21] See Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 'Causal Claims and Causal Explanation in International Studies Oa', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 20, no. 4 (2017): 689–716, https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2016.13.

The underlying assumption of this question is that there is a permanence to the 'self' that is involved with debating or conceptualising the other, which has the effect of inadvertently delineating an identity of this self. Thus, I do not limit understanding of Europe to a particular geography or set of thoughts but reflect on how it has been conceived in Iranian discourse. Multifaceted and constantly mutating, the concept of Europe (in Iranian debate) has been principally a product of the evolution of political thought from sixteenth century Iran and a fermentation of modern encounters with Europe from the eighteenth century. How the concept of the Europe animates Iranian discourse, despite ongoing complexities of content and change, is a result of an intricate dialectic between existing historically conditioned patterns of thought in Iran and new concepts arising within international society, as navigated by Iran.

This chapter contextualize this study through an overview of the extant literature that informs the theoretical framework and methodology. After a discussion of the function of history within International Relations, it discusses international society and the English School of International Relations. It includes outlining its history, criticisms, and how it influences this research. The second section evaluates how change, specifically change in identities, is historicised within the international society. Then the chapter justifies the methodological choice of studying the discourse, broadly understood as a system for the formulation of statements. [22] This framework also includes a discussion of the relevance of Occidentalism and memory to the subject of this study.

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[22] See Kevin C. Dunn and Iver B. Neumann, *Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016).

However, a justification and an explanation are in order. My choice of the sixteenth century, the Safavid dynasty (1501-1722), as the starting point is an outlier amongst the wealth of literature that idealises the long 19th century as a starting point of global transformation and *relevant* studies[23] and ones revering or demystifying "benchmark dates of IR".[24] Buzan and Lawson come up with five such dates that, according to them, shape the narrative of International Relations: 1500, 1648, 1919, 1945, 1989.[25] Yet, almost none of these dates correspond to specificity of Iranian history. They are mostly based on European history that claims to be global but they are just European. That is why I attempt to identify specific dates within the Iranian history that could correspond as benchmark dates but for the purpose of understanding the agency and local history.

The offset of the Safavid periods is chosen for its convenience and relevance. It introduced religion into the Iranian discourse that is still pervasive today. It is the mythical start of the Iranian self. It is also one of early examples of transition of ideas, capital and individuals between Iran and Siam, Ottoman empire and Europe. By moving the clock back to the sixteenth century, I am purposefully highlighting the different temporality of understanding the international and how Iran's idea of Europe(ans) manifest it. It also enables us to

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[23] Barry Buzan and George Lawson, *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations*, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139565073.

[24] Barry Buzan and George Lawson, 'Rethinking Benchmark Dates in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 2 (June 2014): 437–62, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066112454553; Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hobson, 'The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 39, no. 3 (May 2011): 735–58, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829811401459.

[25] Buzan and Lawson, 'Rethinking Benchmark Dates in International Relations', 438.

have a broader grasp of ruptures and continuities that are the heart of the discipline.

The ongoing renaissance of historically informed research in International Relations is indebted to a constructivist research agenda dealing with change, oriented towards time and place specificity. Constructivist International Relations at its core is historical and sociological.[26] Highlighting the contribution of constructivism is not to undermine the relevance of history in International Relations or the study of history within International Relations. As Hobson and Lawson demonstrate,[27] "the apparently archetypal version of *ahistoricist* International Relations – Waltzian neorealism – has been historically "filled-in" by various scholars and the neo-neo nexus has also been subject to historical analysis.[28] However, the manner in which history has been used or treated raises the question of what history means and how it should be applied as the neo-neo debate by ritualising small differences.

History has served as 'a tool for testing the validity of theoretical positions' but only to depict historicist (and asociological) images of international relations. The seminal literature of International Relations by Kenneth Waltz proves the point. Despite Waltz's acknowledgement of history and the occurrence of discontinuities,[29] these aspects are only used to explain the power calculus or

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[26] John M. Hobson and George Lawson, 'What Is History in International Relations?', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2008): 415–35, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829808097648.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid., 417.

[29] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Waveland Pl., 1979), 66,71.

changes within the political realm and not to provide a methodological view of history. International Relations discourse has been challenged by two tendencies regarding its approach to history. Hobson has identified these tendencies as chronofetishism and tempocentrism. Chronofetishists ignore the contingency of spatial and temporal dimensions to eternalise, naturalise, or reify the present, whereas tempocentrists extend the features of the present to past historical periods.[30]

The decision to adopt a longue durée approach for this project is primarily driven by the necessity of assessing shifts and continuities in Iran's representation and conceptions of Europe. The historical span reveals the following: a) whether or not and how Iranian identity evolved throughout various political systems, structures and significant events; and b) how Europe (or the Iranian notion of it) has unfolded both as a state-constructed entity and as a concept.

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[30] There are various studies on polities over long timescales. For examples of idiographic history, see David Christian, *Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History*, vol. The California world history library (Berkeley: University of California Press), https://eu.alma.exlibrisgroup.com/view/action/uresolver.do;jsessionid=2820D2BCA75667D32C61679CF8117D58.app01.eu00.prod.alma.dc03.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com:1801?operation=resolveService&package_service_id=4635558200002021&institutionId=2021&customerId=2020; Patricia Crone, *Pre-Industrial Societies*, vol. New perspectives on the past (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Marshall Goodwin Simms Hodgson and Edmund Burke, *Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam, and World History*, vol. Studies in comparative world history (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1993), https://gate3.library.lse.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511626104; Arnold J. Toynbee, Edward D. Myers, and Royal Institute of International Affairs, *A Study of History, 12 Vols.* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934). For nomothetic studies, see John Levi Martin, *Social Structures* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press); Peter Turchin, *Historical Dynamics: Why States Rise and Fall*, vol. Princeton studies in complexity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press). For historical sociology, see Philip Abrams, *Historical Sociology* (Shepton Mallet, Somerset: Open Books, 1982); S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New Brunswick (U.S.A.): Transaction Publishers); Ernest Gellner, *Plough, Sword, and Book: The Structure of Human History*, Pbk. ed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). Finally, see Julia Adams, Elisabeth Stephanie Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff, *Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology*, vol. Politics, history, and culture (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Patrick O'Brien, 'Historiographical Traditions and Modern Imperatives for the Restoration of Global History', *Journal of Global History* 1, no. 01 (13 March 2006): 3, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1740022806000027.

Analysing the idea of Europe over approximately five centuries raises particular issues over which there is likely to be some degree of controversy. Rather than examining in depth, for example, certain events (such as a war) or a specific period (a decade), my research forgoes the concentrated view in favour of the broader view. There are excellent works of intellectual history on how, within a certain period, Iran has evolved intellectually to conceive of Europe, but these works fail to capture the ideational effect, and also the totality of the Iran's Europe. Narrowing the focus onto a certain period may be akin to just reading a page of a multi-volume book. That approach only gives insight to the immediate rather than to the before and after of the period under study. In contrast, running through this project as a continuous theme is a representation of the shifting contours of the idea of Europe.

A preference for an overarching view of history does not entail a comprehensive coverage of history in strict chronological order. This project does unfold chronologically, to grasp shifting contours, but it also acknowledges that a date 'that has a meaning in political or military or diplomatic history may have very little significance in social or economic or cultural history'.[31] The focus is not on *histoire événementielle* (the evental history) but on what the *Annales School* group of historians, in particular Fernand Braudel, emphasised: that is, history as 'concrete observation and comparative history alone. Comparative both through time, using

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Richard J. Evans, *The Pursuit of Power: Europe 1815-1914*, The Penguin History of Europe, general editor: David Cannadine ; 7 (London: Penguin Books, 2017).

the language … of the long term and the dialectic of past/present; and comparative through as wide a space as possible.'[32]

Braudel's choice to provide a history of the world, expanding across time and space, focuses on the plurality of social time anchored in the longue durée as a structure. This is the fundamental underpinning for historical decisions made in this project. Conceptualising time and history as a duration, as recurring (or cyclical) periods, helps to capture occurrences, cyclical phases, and ruptures. It showcases the shifting contours or the constant ones. Events are influential in shaping debates but are only 'surface disturbances'[33] or of limited real significance. The cycle and phases approach to historical understanding can show a turning point in time, a moment when something which did not exist before manifestly exists afterwards. Similar to the French Annales School, and inspired by Émile Durkheim, this historical view also emphasises the need to have a granular view of social and political order alongside the broad historical view: it manifests itself in everyday practices, architecture, administrations, and rituals.

Embarking on a longue durée study might be considered as impractical or likely to lead to a theoretical impasse. The matter of practicality, of being achievable, is dealt with by ensuring that the project combines synthetic work and archival research. It builds on existing scholarly efforts wherever possible and explores archives in pursuit of new materials.

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[32] Richard E Lee, 'Introduction', in *The Longue Duree and World-Systems Analysis*, 2012, 1–8.

[33] Fernand Braudel and Sian Reynolds, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II: Vol.1* (London: Collins, 1972), 20–21.

The broad overview approach goes beyond one event to capture a long chain of events, to identify a cascading effect on how the historical chain or concepts break or reproduce existing social entities, or clash with one another through sequences of occurrences that result in the transformation of structures'.[34] The constant clash and deconstruction (the shifting contours) are the processes that reveal how this history and this debate influence Iranian identity.

I. International Society

The focus on Iran might give the impression that this study is state-centric. That is partially true. The subject of analysis here is Iran but there are other ones too. The aim is to broaden up understanding of social and state interactions. Historical studies are well established, spatially and methodologically, to the confines of the nation-states and polities. In recent years, we have witness bourgeoning literatures[35] on world, global, transnational, international, and (trans)regional histories focusing on 'international society' as a historical object.[36]

International Society is one of the central components of the English School of International Relations.[37] In simple terms, it means that a society

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[34] William Sewell, *Logics of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226749198.001.0001.

[35] For example, S. Conrad, 'Enlightenment in Global History: A Historiographical Critique', *The American Historical Review* 117, no. 4 (1 October 2012): 999–1027, https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/117.4.999; Sebastian Conrad, *What Is Global History?* (Princeton University Press, 2016), https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvc779r7; Akira Iriye, 'The Internationalization of History', *The American Historical Review*, February 1989, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/94.1.1; Kenneth Pomeranz, 'Histories for a Less National Age', *The American Historical Review* 119, no. 1 (1 February 2014): 1–22, https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/119.1.1.

[36] For a recent discussion, see Erez Manela, 'International Society as a Historical Subject', *Diplomatic History* 44, no. 2 (17 February 2020): 184–209, https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhz071.

[37] Chris Brown highlights it as the School's 'master concept': Chris Brown, 'World Society and the English School:: An `International Society' Perspective on World Society', *European Journal of*

composted of states takes shape over time. Then, it transforms regionally and then leads to a more global (i.e. international) one that was historically made possible by Europeans through empire, expansion, and then processes of decolonisation. By focusing on modern collectives, it contrasts the classical International Relations account of the international as 'system' of states.[38] How can we recognise an international society? According to Hedley Bull,[39] it "exists when a group of states, conscious of their common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share the work of common institutions."[40] The key here is the relational nature of the society and interactions between states, forming the basis of sharing commonalities. It conceives the international as a social arena.

The operation of this international society hinges on state's "dialogue and consent" that informs "common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations" to "recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements."[41] Successive generations of scholars working on English School emphasise[42] that such dialogical and consensual arrangement is based on having a

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International Relations 7, no. 4 (December 2001): 423–41, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066101007004002.

[38] This is more relevant when we consider that the development of the English School emerges out of discussions on having the discipline of International Relations: Timothy Dunne, *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School* (Houndmills: Macmillan in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1998), http://site.ebrary.com/id/10612820.

[39] For an earlier attempt to map the contours of international society, see Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966).

[40] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: London : Macmillan, 1977), 13.

[41] Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 3.

[42] See Andrew Linklater, *Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316650950.

common culture.[43] This common culture creates sets of habits and practices, broadly defined as institutions, that shape the social relation between states to achieve common goals.[44]

Comparing these characteristics to the earlier discussion on International Relations theory and the neo-neo nexus, the English School emboldens the historicity and social nature of the international relations. Before going further, we must note two caveats. Firstly, international society is also a concept also used to by International legal studies, historical sociologists, and regime theorists to discuss norms and rules based international order.[45] Secondly, 'society' should not be taken as a value free term. For example, Patricia Owens argues that using society cannot escape "the fundamental problem of sociolatry" and misidentifying "the ontology and politics of the modern social realm."[46] Jens Bartelson builds on that to argue that society is an inherently modern term, emerging in the nineteenth century and within sociology, and might not be useful concept to understand some human associations.[47] He advocates for considering insights from postcolonial sociology to sharpen up the concept.

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[43] Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (Leicester: Leicester : Leicester U.P. in association with the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1977), 46.

[44] Bull, *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics*, 71.

[45] See Katarzyna Kaczmarska, 'International Society', in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies* (Oxford University Press, 20 November 2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.98; N. Onuf, 'The Constitution of International Society', *European Journal of International Law* 5, no. 1 (1 January 1994): 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.ejil.a035857.

[46] Patricia Owens, 'Introduction: Historicising the Social in International Thought', *Review of International Studies* 41, no. 4 (2015): 651–53, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210515000248.

[47] Jens Bartelson, 'Towards a Genealogy of "society" in International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210515000194.

A Bounded Society?

The English School's emphasis on such social common culture, and noting the relevance of consent, sit uncomfortably with hierarchical understanding of the international relations, the story of the expansion of the international society, and international changes. That is why we have witnessed a revival and revision of the concept within the discipline.

Firstly, the assumption of common culture and values lead to a specific conception of the society. It conveys a bounded unit with clear distinctions. Yaqing Qin's assessment of China's rise argues that the international society is not as "well-demarcated" as the classical definition wants it to be.[48] According to him, such conception manifests Western-centric "taxonomical thinking" that sees the society with essential properties and a discreet unit without any context, as the international society is regarded:

> as an independent ego-entity, by which I mean an ontologically self-organizing and self-evolving ego born in a particularly socio-cultural locale that develops its own organs and institutions and expands as it grows.[49]

Let us expand on this. The specific conception of the international society that presupposes it on a common culture, fails to define culture. It exists, without

[48] Q. Yaqing, 'International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities, and China's Peaceful Rise', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3, no. 2 (1 June 2010): 129–53, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poq007.

[49] Ibid., 132.

sufficient context, but the School is "decidedly unclear about what this meant."[50] It treats culture as a timeless entity with unchanging characteristics that are specific.[51] It fails to provide a space to understand potential changes to the culture. It also fails to address the tautology of it: a society emerges when there is a common culture, and we have a common culture when there is a society. How does this common culture emerge? According to Bull, international societies were "founded upon a common culture or civilisation, or at least on some of the elements of such a civilisation: a common language, a common epistemology and understanding of the universe, a common religion, a common ethical code, a common aesthetic or artistic tradition."[52]

For example, Andrew Linklater's recent process-sociological investigation of civilizing processes and the analysis of international society manifests how a particular conception of the society limits understanding of the agency of the non-Europeans within the international politics. His assessment of the development of the 'Western civilisation' centres all the processes within the West and fails to also appreciate potential influence of the broader international society. One might ask what is wrong with that? The problem is assuming too much homogeneity. The international is capable of imposing a certain cultural bounding to its entities but at the same time, it also takes a degree of influence from its members. In fact, "cultural heterogeneity is not the mark of an *unsuccessful* international order, but a *requirement* of international order."[53] Linklater also fails to note potential relations between the

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[50] Christian Reus-Smit, 'Cultural Diversity and International Order', *International Organization*, 2017, 865, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818317000261.

[51] This is somewhat reminiscent of Huntington's clash of civilisation. More on that in next chapter.

[52] Bull, *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics*, 15.

[53] George Lawson, 'The Untimely Historical Sociologist', *Review of International Studies* 43, no. 4 (October 2017): 671–85, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210517000304.

Western societies, and likes of Japan, China, and Ottomans. Such neglect gives an incomplete account: it does not grasp "possible relations or cross-fertilisations" between different societies, cultures and civilisations.[54]

This leads us to discussing how the international society gets states to be bounded by it. Is it even possible to have cross-fertilisations and relations? Hedley Bull and Adam Watson extend the English School's reach by arguing about *the expansion of the international society*.[55] Starting from the European centre, the European international society 'expanded' into the rest of the world.[56] These outward expansions is the basis of the English School.[57] A classic account of the English School narrates the expansion as an expansion of the rules and institutions, such as international law, shaping the social interactions between states.[58] This historical narrative is heavily contested because if its Eurocentric grand narrative,[59] and historical erasures or inaccuracies. The international society was not a dough to just expand on its own. The process, that is seemingly about consent and

[54] Julian Go, '"Civilization" and Its Subalterns', *Review of International Studies* 43, no. 4 (October 2017): 616, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210517000249.

[55] Bull and Watson, *The Expansion of International Society*.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Edward Keene, 'The Standard of " Civilisation ", the Expansion Thesis and the 19th-Century International Social Space', 2014, 657, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829814541319.

[58] Bull, *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics*; Bull and Watson, *The Expansion of International Society*.

[59] Katarzyna Kaczmarska, 'Reification in IR: The Process and Consequences of Reifying the Idea of International Society', *International Studies Review*, no. April (2018): 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy016.

dialogue, involved "exploitative and conflictual relationships" that enabled the expansion.[60] However, some labelled[61] it as a 'rational' way to do so.

This problematise assumptions of 'entry' into the international society. There was more at stake and perhaps, encounters are better phrase to describe the events and processes surrounding the expansion of the international society. The classic account of the English School focuses on Russia,[62] Spain and the Indies,[63] and Africa[64] to argue for global expansion of the society. Yet, studies on non-European entities problematise *entry* and manifest the different nature of the interaction. It was not a directional attempt by the society but rather a two-way interaction between Europe and other regions.[65] It underestimates the asymmetry of power relations and agency of the non-Western polities, and "blind to the complex processes of communicative actions ... through which common norms, values, interests and institutions have been negotiated, diffused, interpreted and accepted in different social embeddings."[66]

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[60] Keene, 'The Standard of " Civilisation ", the Expansion Thesis and the 19th-Century International Social Space', 658.

[61] Hidemi Suganami, 'The English School, History, and Theory', *Ritsumeikan International Affairs*, 2011, 27–50.

[62] Adam Watson, 'Russia and the European States System', in *The Expansion of International Society*, by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).

[63] M Donelan, 'Spain and the Indies', in *The Expansion of International Society*, by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).

[64] Hedley Bull, 'European States and African Political Communities', in *The Expansion of International Society*, by Adam Watson and Hedley Bull (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).

[65] Shogo Suzuki, Yongjin Zhang, and Joel Quirk, eds., *International Orders in the Early Modern World: Before the Rise of the West* (Routledge, 2016).

[66] Yongjin Zhang, 'The Standard of "Civilisation" Redux: Towards the Expansion of International Society 3.0?', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 42, no. 3 (June 2014): 694, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829814539574.

That is why Edward Keene advocates for using the term 'stratification' to ask about the positionality and status of states rather than who was a member.[67] I refrain from using stratification because of additional theoretical and methodological complications that it might bring but reaffirm the need to be careful about assessing how the society expanded, and highlight the experience. This is one of the tasks of this manuscript: to change the narrative from the expansion of the society to how Iran experienced it. Why Iran?

Classic and recent English School literature include rich but insufficient empirical repertoire. We have witnessed studies on third worldism,[68] racial inequality, non-European polities such as China,[69] Japan,[70] Russia,[71] the Ottoman empire,[72] Greece,[73] Egypt, South-eastern Europe,[74] Thailand,[75] Turkey,[76] and

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[67] Keene, 'The Standard of " Civilisation ", the Expansion Thesis and the 19th-Century International Social Space'.

[68] Bull and Watson, *The Expansion of International Society*.

[69] Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Zhongli Zhang, *The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society*, vol. no. 3 (Seattle: University of Washington press, 1955).

[70] Shogo Suzuki, 'Japan's Socialization into Janus-Faced European International Society', *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 1 (2005): 137–64, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105050139.

[71] Iver B. Neumann, 'Entry into International Society Reconceptualised: The Case of Russia', *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2011): 463–84, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000756.

[72] Thomas Naff, 'The Ottoman Empire and the European States System', in *The Expansion of International Society*, by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).

[73] Yannis A Stivachtis, *The Enlargement of International Society: Culture versus Anarchy and Greece's Entry into International Society*, 2016.

[74] F Edjus, ed., *Memories of Empire and Entry into International Society* (London: Routledge, n.d.).

[75] Ayse Zarakol, *After Defeat How the East Learned to Live with the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511921421.

[76] Einar Wigen, *State of Translation : Turkey in Interlingual Relations* (Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2018); Zarakol, *After Defeat How the East Learned to Live with the West.*

West and Central Africa.[77] Yet, apart from a passim mention in Gong's study of Standard of Civilisations[78] and few introductory remarks in Barry Buzan's increasing publications,[79] Iran have not been studied within the framework of the English School and its expansion story.

Iran, as a Middle Eastern country, would offer insights into the definition of international society and the degree of cultural homogeneity. The latter was Martin Wight's necessary component for existence of system and society,[80] which in recent was revised in by accounting for legitimacy[81] or reconsidering the assumptions. Such reconsideration is evident in Buzan's various attempts to revitalise the English School. Cognisant of the limits of the framework, instead of cultural homogeneity, he reconceptualises the international society to "institutionalization of shared interest and identity among states, and puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of the International Relations theory."[82] This is where the identity focus of this study matters, which will be discussed further below.

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[77] John Anthony Pella, *Africa and the Expansion of International Society: Surrendering the Savannah*, New International Relations (London ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2014).

[78] Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society*.

[79] Barry Buzan, 'The "Standard of Civilisation" as an English School Concept', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 42, no. 3 (June 2014): 576–94, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829814528265; Barry Buzan and Laust Schouenborg, *Global International Society: A New Framework for Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

[80] Kaczmarska, 'International Society'.

[81] Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford University Press, 2007), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219193.001.0001.

[82] Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 7, http://www.dawsonera.com/depp/reader/protected/external/AbstractView/S9780511313776.

Before moving onto identity and international society, I must address the relevance of regional particularities in formation of the international society. Earlier, this manuscript highlighted the pertinence of Area Studies in producing knowledge relevant to International Relations. But what is the implication of international society for Area Studies in terms of Iranian Studies and Middle East Studies? For the former, it will offer a new historical subject, the international society, to assess Iran's relationship with and to evaluate current sources and empirics with a new lens. There is a broader ramification for Middle East Studies, given the English School's increasing attention to regions.

In response to criticism of the English School's Eurocentrism, we have witnessed accounts of regional dynamics for the international society.[83] Though Martin Wight's classic 'comparative sociology of state systems' considers various regions, we are only just seeing sustained studies of sub-global scale. This study is not about the Middle Eastern International Society, but some of the insights and findings, specifically those on early historical eras pertaining the international society between Safavids, Mughals and Ottomans, would pave the way for a more robust and focused analysis of the history of the Middle Eastern International Society.

[83] Tim Dunne, 'System, State and Society: How Does It All Hang Together?1', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 34, no. 1 (August 2005): 159, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298050340011601.

II. Historicising Change: Identity and International Society

The issue of history, difference, and assessing changes and continuities are also vital part of the IR. Broadly, the literature's theoretical insights engaging with (macro)history is based on comparison either between periods of history or between systems/units. The shift between medieval and modern systems were discussed through transformation,[84] individual rights,[85] and stipulating theoretical challenges of converging one units.[86] The question of sovereignty was traced back to Europe,[87] while the history of colonialism in shaping national identity[88] and divisible sovereignty[89] was brought to the fore to underscore the importance of the colonial encounter.

Identity is how one understands oneself in relationship to another. However, identity is not singular. Any individual, group or state has multiple identities that are only meaningful in differing interactions with others. For

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[84] Andrew Phillips, 'The Global Transformation, Multiple Early Modernities, and International Systems Change', *International Theory* 8, no. 3 (2016): 481–91, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971916000166.

[85] Christian Reus-Smit, *Individual Rights and the Making of the International System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[86] Andrew Phillips and J. C. Sharman, *International Order in Diversity: War, Trade and Rule in the Indian Ocean*, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316027011.

[87] Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 2001); Janice E. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe*, vol. Princeton studies in international history and politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press).

[88] Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations*, Borderlines, v. 5 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

[89] Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics*, LSE Monographs in International Studies (Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

example, my individual identity as a PhD candidate is different when I am interacting with my supervisor, my upgrade panel, and different to when I am communicating with the school or with the Home Office as a Tier 4 student. Similarly, a (state's) national identity changes, based on the level and degree of its interactions with others. What this means in practice is that Iran presents itself differently when interacting with the United States, with Turkey, with Saudi Arabia, and with Central Asia. In itself, national identity is composed of various constellations of (sub-)identities that are discussed across the discourse, not limited to state officials or ruling elites but a blend of elites, intellectuals, and popular discourses.

How International Relations engages with identity also varies widely. The unravelling of assumptions and the fracturing of the previously hegemonic rationalist/positivist approach, including the ontologies of neo-neo theories, has provided a new perspective, in which identity has been insightfully discussed and developed. Identity has been transformed into a new concept to re-interpret the state, various political systems, and the world. Alex Wendt's seminal work provided a new systematic theory by re-reading the constitution of states and the international system. He argued that identities structure relations and vice-versa, thus creating a dynamic international society. Subsequently, to move away from Westphalian-oriented fixed entities, the deconstruction of spatiality and borders evolved into discussions of national and collective identities. The social construction of borders and sovereignty was justified by noting their contingent nature, with them being subject to shifting collective identities and social conventions. Building on the relevance of identity and social construction in relation to international borders, Walker provided a spatiotemporal re-articulation

of International Relations theories and political thought by problematising the political construction of 'inside/outside'. The concept of 'cognitive regions' was introduced to elaborate on imagined (security) communities that transcended Westphalian borders.

The proliferation of studies on identity and extensive use of the concept have generated issues regarding the meaning of identity in so many contexts and how best to use the concept. According to Rogers Brubaker and Fredrick Cooper, using the term identity without proper conceptual clarity has overly nuanced its meaning, as:

> it tends to mean too much (when used in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity).[90]

Evidently, across the discipline of IR, there is no consensus on how to define identity. However, there is a consensus on its application and benefits. David Campbell notes that 'identity is an inescapable dimension of being. Nobody could be without it'. Ted Hopf suggests that a world without identities would be a "world of chaos, a world of pervasive and irremediable uncertainty, a world much more dangerous than anarchy".[91] Anthony Burke claims that 'there is [...] no world politics without identity, no people, no states, no international system'. Ideational

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[90] Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. "Beyond "Identity"." *Theory and Society* 29, no. 1 (2000): 1-47. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3108478.

[91] Ted Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–171, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539267.

perspectives offer a way to categorise using the terms Self and Other, as identity provides a clear-cut distinction between inside/outside and Self/Other.

The influence of this dichotomy and its impact on the concept of identity in relation to norms, interests, power and 'outcomes' have already been empirically validated by International Relations scholars on multiple fronts. For example, focusing on collective identity, Adler and Barnet identified the construction of security communities, particularly in Europe over the past 60 years. Russia and the Soviet Union, similar to the Ottoman empire and Turkey, faced similar experiences regarding an inadequate European comprehension and analysis, paving the way for ongoing tumultuous relations. In the case of joining the European Union, the political and economic trajectories of 15 post-soviet Republics have been intrinsically linked by the relevance or prevalence of European identities. Relatedly, the degree of difference with the European identity is pivotal to accepting certain norms.

Amongst the diverse literature on identity formation, there is a constant understanding of the flexible and unstable nature of identity, which has resulted in a multiplicity of discourse emerging from relations with multiple others. This study models itself on similar investigations of national identity, specifically on Neumann's research on Russia's idea of Europe, and takes inspiration from studies on Japan's national identity based on 'othering' Russia, Turkish concepts and counter-concepts of Europe, and a genealogy of Chinese Occidentalism.

In surveying 200 year of Russian history after the Napoleonic wars, in strict chronological order, Neumann identifies 'constitutive elements' of the Russian discourse on Europe and how differing positions and representations have clashed,

struggled, and displaced each other. In detailing a multitude of 'vessels' across the discourse, he signifies the interplay between self and other by how the Russian state has chosen to juxtapose itself concerning Europe from a range of available positions across the discourse. This dense engagement with Russian intellectual history via discourse analyses also involves signifying how each position adopted has entailed variants: for example, a Russian nationalist position had varied expressions among romantics, spirituals and conservatives. The key features involve identifying how Russia is expressed as a state, and that Neumann does not attempt to define Europe, but that the meaning of Europe is dependent on how Russians define it, leading to an interchangeable use of 'Europe' and 'the West'. Neumann's work on Russia's idea of Europe [92] rigidly focuses on collective positions and avoids the personal/individual. I diverge from this approach by occasionally focusing on individuals as a symptom of the intellectual tradition of Iranian society, and how it is often the case that one's individual ascent within the political order is dependent on what is said or not said, or how a constant theme emerges. Despite the stress on intellectual history, Neumann emphasises the emergence of a 'boundary-producing identity practice'.

Bukh's monograph on Japan's national identity formation also takes Russia as the other.[93] Considering Japan's frequent interactions and conflicts with Russia, Bukh pursues a twofold task of exploring Japanese discourse on the Russian other, and then exploring the relationship between the identity discourse and Japan's

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[92] Iver B. Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations, Second Edition*, 2016, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315646336.

[93] Alexander Bukh, *Japan's National Identity and Foreign Policy Russia as Japan's 'Other'* (London: Routledge, 2011), http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9781134058358.

foreign policy. In contrast to Neumann, Bukh does not engage with intellectual history but explicitly labels his study as one involving an explication of the foreign policy implications of the national identity discourse on Japan's policy vis-a-vis Russia in the context of economic relations, and military and territorial disputes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The key argument concerns the function of identity across all three sub-fields of bilateral relations, and the ensuing two-way impact: how identity shapes interactions and how interactions shape identity. Bukh's argument underlines the irrelevance of security discourse in cases where the self conceives the other as inferior (Japan vs Russia), and how particular conceptions create a cognitive framework that defines policies.

Wang Mingming's study of Chinese Occidentalism also start on the basic premise of self vs other in identity formation.[94] Through a cosmological historiography, and through genealogy of the West in China, Mingming argues for the necessity of breaking the Eurocentric studies of Othering. Referring to how Edward Said's Orientalism imposed a taboo on studying how non-Europeans engage in othering, the study starts from 922 B.C..[95] It highlights how the self-representations of suzerain entities with rich history of engagement with the West, despite its indigenous characteristics, similar to Western process of Othering. Mingming's research shares similar premises on understanding identity formation and configuration of social relations but utilises a different methodology with an agenda in anthropology. This opens up a discussion on how I would continue this

[94] M Wang, *The West as the Other* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2014).

[95] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, Reprinted with a new preface, Penguin Modern Classics (London: Penguin Books, 2003).

research, and raises the possibility of also talking about what is Occidentalism. The latter is discussed in section four of this chapter.

This study distances itself from a foreign policy investigation but emphasises how Iranian discourse paves the way or makes it possible for certain foreign policy actions: how foreign policy is bounded.[96] It provides (partial) insights into foreign policy but does not analyse it. Explaining how intellectual, political, and social thought makes sense in Iran makes it easier for an outsider to *understand* Iran. The key to understanding is to gain access to Iranian discourse, which is a source for taking stock of the unstable nature of identity. The most viable methodological approach is discourse analysis to assess how knowledge on how Europe is conceptualized in Iran is produced, as it enables the research to focus on where different representations clash, namely in and through language.

III. Discourse Analysis

The brief review of the existing literature on identity in IR, specifically investigations into the existence of the Other and related discussions, highlights the relevance of an intersubjective understanding of relations and the unfixed nature of identities. Building on this literature, this project attempts to evaluate statements and utterances in Iranian discourse to uncover patterns of conceptions of Europe that delineate the Iranian self. It is vital to understand what discourse is, and how this project analyses it.

[96] Ashley, 'Foreign Policy as Political Performance'; Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*.

Discourse, broadly defined as 'the representational practices through which meanings are generated'[97] to talk about and understand the world, is a subject of analysis in a multitude of disciplines, leading to various approaches in analysing discourse in different disciplines. In addition to reaffirming social constructionism, all discourse analytical approaches coverage on the importance of language.

Structures of meaning can explain and elucidate actions. Finding and presenting in a systematic way the patterns of thought within a specific country will always be helpful in making the debates and actions of that country more intelligible to other observers. Discourse analysis shares this ambition with many writers from the humanities or from traditional(ist) International Relations.

In this project, discourse analysis is a method to investigate the way in which political discourse represents not just the credibility and extent of ideas and concepts but is also a signifier of material interests. The central assumption is that there are competing ideas of Europe across Iranian discourse and understanding how different conceptions are contested and proliferate gives insight into their persuasive power. Furthermore, the multitude of contrasting or overlapping concepts of Europe over the historical period will not shed light on what Europe is in any fixed sense. Rather, this project will reveal an imprecise and unstable concept of Europe with semi-fixed contours.

In defining discourse and framing this study, the works of Michel Foucault, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and Jacques Derrida have been drawn on. The study might be labelled post-structuralist, given its association with these authors

[97] Dunn and Neumann, *Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research*, 1.

but, at this point, is operating on basic structuralist tradition.[98] Discourse is not just what is uttered, but determines what can be said. It limits thought, speech, and writing. Discourse defines the normal and the abnormal and defines the conditions in which thought can be expressed. For Foucault, discourse is not a simple individual phenomenon but involves a controlled, selected, and organised (yet diffused) social production. Discourses are ruled by limits that are often created by another discourse, giving rise to conditions and social rules on what is acceptable, valid, 'rational', debatable, or even wrong. Discourse not only defines what can be said, but it also acts as a lens for defining, seeing, and conceiving the world/other. When shaping and defining social rules, discourse also constantly and actively shapes acts, which only highlights the interplay between discursive and non-discursive elements of discourse.

The analytical focus of this study is on the discursive element of discourse (explained in greater detail below), but incompleteness within the discourse approach and its own instability provide room for further reflection. Discourse is everywhere and there are multiple discourses. They interact with each other. Iranian discourse is not comprehensible in a vacuum. It is shaped by 'foreign' or 'unrecognised' discourses. This is the point where language and dominant discourses beyond Iran have shaped theoretical engagement of the project.

First, Iran's 'learning of Europe' occurred in multiple stages. The incremental process of becoming familiar with Europe included a violent episode. This violence was not merely limited to bloodshed and grotesque acts, but was also

[98] Jutta Weldes, 'Constructing National Interests', *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 3 (1996): 275–318, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066196002003001.

about how a safe and familiar *ontological space* for Iran — surrounded by Ottomans and Arabs who shared somewhat similar discursive and non-discursive practices (from the alphabet, to religion, traditions, and food) — was ruptured when learning about Europe, encountering it, and becoming aware of the magnitude of its construction occurred.

Second, the new ontological space meant an encounter or influence between discourses. The clash of discourses led to a borrowing of new words, concepts and language. The european repertoire provided alluring concepts, some of which in terms of their content or meaning had already existed in Iranian discourse but now were newly charged within Iranian discourse: new utterances were neither, in their form, familiar to the audience, nor in their content did they resemble Western discourse. A process occurred of borrowing from Western options, stripping them of their *Western meaning* and reconceptualising them in the language of Iran. The form was maintained but the content was changed, or vice versa. For example, nationalism is an inherently Western construct born out of the emergence of nation-states in Europe, but for Iran, a similar concept of belonging to one nation, land and group had already existed. Nevertheless, the concept of nationalism was borrowed/imposed from Europe. This resembles Carl Schmitt's notion of impregnated concepts, and what Einar Wigen defines as a feature of International Relations in creating 'inter-lingual' relations and 'conceptual entanglement' between discourses/communities. [99] How and why these entanglements occur, and which options are borrowed that then enter Iranian discourse, are important questions to address in understanding the triangular

[99] Wigen, *State of Translation : Turkey in Interlingual Relations*.

relation between the Iranian state, Iranian society and international society. The borrowed repertoire and the impregnated concepts came into existence not just because of a clash of discourses, but also through the rupture of becoming familiar with Europe, which led to treating terms and concepts as types of legitimising devices or 'passports' for access into international society.

I provide two examples from the findings of this project. The Iranian State changed its name from Persia to the Sublime State of Iran, *dowlat-e eliiye Iran.* This change of name by the state was implemented to appear part of international society at that particular time. The change also led to a change in discourse. It provided grounds for arguing what Iran was: whether it was a state on European model. The second example concerns the title of Islamic Republic in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The emphasis on the term 'republic' was an act of conformation to legitimate being a state in the international setting. The counterargument to being just another state was expressed through the proclaimed *Islamic* nature of the republic.

'Where there is power', Foucault says, 'there is resistance'. International society does have power and how Iran labels its state is a reflection of that power within Iranian discourse. The prevalence of religious discourse in Iran, and agnostic positions towards Europe and the global order from 1979, has been inherently acts of resistance. The discursive war within Iranian discourse has been, in a sense, directed by Iran's struggle with international society. When the state attempts to fit into or resist an international web of meaning or framework, there is a reaction within discourse. What ensues and is reproduced in the discourse then provides grounds for analysing the power relations between the state, Iranian

society, and international society. Changes in how Europe is conceptualised in this discursive struggle work as my signifier in this analysis.

The importance of choosing Europe as a focus is relevant within the inherent prevalence of language in discourse. Identity can be defined as an engagement with a series of differences and conditions of possibility, and language defines how difference is uttered and manifested.

Identity is not just about being recognized by the other but also about the creation of constitutive exclusions and being organised around a series of differences and paradoxes from its own subject-position:

An identity is established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized. These differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist as differences, it would not exist in its distinctness and solidity. Entrenched in this indispensable relation is a second set of tendencies, themselves in need of exploration, to conceal established identities into fixed forms, thought and lived as if their structure expressed the true order of things. When these pressures prevail, the maintenance of one identity (or field of identities) involves the conversion of some differences into otherness, into evil, or one of its numerous surrogates. Identity requires differences in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.[100]

In discourse, language carries the substantial burden of establishing, recognising, and understanding differences vital to identity. It forms identity. This

[100] William E. Connolly, *Identity, Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*, Expanded ed (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 64.

explains the analytical focus on discursive elements of the discourse. The task is not to catalogue all concepts and terms that establish differences, but to find a small constellation of concepts that to help understand Iran's conception of Europe. The analysis will shed some light on 'who' Iranians are, but it is more concerned with how Iran conceives itself through an articulation of different layers of identity in a complex constellation of concepts within an unceasing discourse contestation, in a struggle between the state, Iranian society and international society. All these elements are involved in an Iranian construction of Iran in respect of Europe.

The importance of language, and my focus, does not just involve a concentration on meanings given to particular words or concepts. That is relevant but the aim here is to learn how such meanings came about and what influences their conditions of possibility. The basic idea is to allow discourse analysis to illuminate various conditions of (im)possibility. The relevant discourse is vast and the period here under study is long. Therefore, I focus on discursive practices that formulate a layered framework that creates a constellation of concepts relevant to Iran-Europe relations.

To order the mapping of the debate and the constellation of concepts, I am being inspired by Wæver and Hansen's chosen framework for studying European integration and national identity, but not following it literally. That framework assumes three layers for discursive structures.[101] The inter-related layers of the discourse are not distinct components within the overall discourse. At each level, I investigate how a specific concept is defined vis-a-vis European Other. The first

[101] Wæver, 'Identity, Community and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Analysis'.

layer comprises the basic conceptual constellation of the state and the nation and explores how the state and the nation are conceived in Iranian discourse. The second layer outlines how the first level constructs the state and the nation's relations with Europe. Here, Europe is defined very generally through what is discussed as being Europe. While I could limit the concept politically or geographically (i.e. only Europe or only liberal states), I have used the meta-concept of Europe to capture the entirety of possible viewpoints on this concept. The third layer considers how certain collective interests pursue specific policies or acts. This layered framework facilitates an apprehension of change and continuity, and also the link of interpellation. To capture the underlying socio-political, and religious context, I also follow Tzvetan Todorov's inquiry[102] on utterances: What is the framework within which the other is seen/uttered? What are the moral judgements? What relationship is proposed between each?

As stated, the thesis focus is on discursive elements, but if certain concepts uttered in a text or speech can be traced to a non-discursive element, such as a movie, they will be highlighted. Intertextuality and the endurance of master signifiers are critical in reading texts. The historical scope of the study provides a challenge for a consistent selection and reading of texts. I start from secondary sources to identify and catalogue relevant concepts, and then map the debate, including speeches and texts by the highest-ranking member of the state over time, whether a king, president, or supreme leader. In convening and analysing the national discursive space, there will be a bias in taking into account official sources

[102] Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999).

and how the concepts are constructed. In the case of Iran, there will be additional challenge and layer of bias given the distribution of discourses, its availability and censorship.

Across 500 years of history, millions of texts were produced. It is not possible to examine all of them, but for the sake of consistency and validity, I endeavour, where possible, to include texts where a specific concept of Europe first emerged, to trace intertextuality. It is a herculean task to include them all and naturally, myself and my reader are bound to be frustrated if there are samples left out,or deemed biased and/or too narrow. Texts are also included involving moments of social upheaval such as war, riots, and revolutions to capture the political relevance to find conditions within which 'one' has to argue about Europe.

It is also vital to address the complexity that I have not addressed yet: what we refer to as today's Iran, was host to a broader Persianate world, Indo-European cultures, diverse ethnicities with different languages and religion. An ideal study into the Iranian identity should capture this multi-ethnic background and avoid potential essentialising of the identity.[103] Assuming a unitary Self that does not stagnate based on ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or racial grounds is rather a modern phenomenon. Why am I not capturing say Arabic texts or stocking Azeri positions? Part of this was addressed through the uniformity of historical consciousness and memory across time. The other is the practicality of doing such discourse analysis: it would not be possible to create a discursive catalogue covering different languages and ensure a level of consistency in analysis texts. This links to the issue

[103] Reza Zia-Ebrahimi, *The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the Politics of Dislocation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 11.

of access and circulation of texts too: despite the diverse communities, access to historical texts and also assessing the nationwide circulation and their relevance was impossible during the timeframe of this project.[104]

IV. Where is the Occident? Where/What is Europe?

So far, this framework reviewed the literature on the English School, identity, and history within International Relations. Almost across all three sections, orient or occident or Europe were mentioned in passim without any further elaboration. While I am adamant to not define Europe and see how it emerges in the discourse, it is a must to have some sort of a rubric to understand what Europe is and where is it located. At last, if we take Europe simply as a geographical location then the task of this study is rather easy: map and locate wherever Europe is mentioned as a geographical space. But what if there is more to Europe? Then, there also the case that when the orient is subject of the identity formation, we have orientalism. What about when we engage with the occident? This section provides an overview on these questions.

If I look for the definition of Europe in Iran's equivalent of the Oxford English Dictionary, which is the *Dehkhoda* dictionary, then I can find these:[105]

1) One of the three spaces of prosperity amongst ancient people,

[104] However, see Rasmus Christian Elling, *Minorities in Iran Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013) for an account of ethnic minorities and nationalism.

[105] Ali Asghar Dehkhoda, 'Europe', n.d.

2) European States,[106] such as ones after the Second World War: Albania, Eastern and Western Germany, Austria, Spain, England, Italy, Ireland, Belgium, Bulgaria, Turkey (Europe), Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Russia (Europe), Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Poland, Norway, Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Greece, and few small independent zones.

3) The reasons of Europe's progress: progress and development of Europe are due to its good location. This piece of land in the northern hemisphere occupies one of the best parts of the earth (the mild zone) between Asia, Africa, and America. Having seas and lack of high mountains or harsh desserts, makes Europe's weather an ideal one with good rains that reduces the hurdles of people's connectivity, circulation of civilisation, and other diminishes other challenges.

This does not give me much to start assessing the discourse. Despite being a definition, locating them within the discourse is rather difficult. Moreover, it will also narrow the scope and findings of this manuscript. In broad terms, I approach Europe (and subsequently the West) not just as a geographical location, but a temporal, spatial, political, social, and cultural idea.[107] It is broad and multifaceted.

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[106] This translation reflects the alphabetic order of the Persian language.

[107] Pim den Boer et al., *The History of the Idea of Europe*, Rev. ed, What Is Europe? (London: Routledge, 1995).

Same goes for the West. Both are "ubiquitous" in academia and policy discourses.[108] It seems when we utilise Europe or the West, the meaning is just accepted without any further probation. Yet, again, there is a history and effect:

> What is more, the idea of "the West," once produced, became productive in its turn. It had real effects: it enabled people to know or speak of certain things in certain ways. It produced knowledge. It became *both* the organizing factor in a system of global power relations *and* the organizing concept or term in a whole way of thinking and speaking.[109]

As it becomes more evident throughout this study, Europe, just like the West, is not just a location. In addition to signifying a potential geographical space, it connotes intellectual space. In addition to a particular history, it provides a sense of direction and temporality: being backward or forward. It also enabled the Iranian self to talk about certain things in certain ways or produce knowledge. There might be a problem here.

Is there a difference between Europe and the West? According to the Iranian discourse, it depends on time, issue, and context. If we contextualise this within a broader disciplinary gaze, there might be an answer. Buruma and Margālît defines Occidentalism as the way that enemies of the West perceive it, connoting it

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[108] Gunther Hellmann and Benjamin Herborth, *Uses of the West: Security and the Politics of Order*, ed. Benjamin Herborth and Gunther Hellmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316717448.

[109] Stuart Hall, 'The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power', in *Formations of Modernity*, ed. Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 278.

combative and animus relation.[110] They also argue that the West, the Occident, is "exemplified" by the United States.[111] Coker's study of the Western world (alliances), through assessing Hegel and Goethe's thought, shows how America is "the master builder" of the Western world.[112] However, there is an obvious shift. While America could be the master builder of the West, a lot of the foundations are European. I elaborate more on this in the conceptual chapter and the rise of civilisation. However, this shift is also evident in Iranian discourse circa 1908 when America starts to get idealised and receive the accolades for being progressive.[113] Yet, distinguished form Europe.

Is that the occident? While Edward Said's monumental work on Orientalism paved the way for understanding particular power relations and knowledge production schemes that could subjugate the orient, we also have Occidentalism that could be identified in same vein as orientalism. It is not just the West that has used 'the Orient' as its Other for identity purposes but also the reverse.[114] In fact, without Occidentalism, there is also no Orientalism.[115] These all define the conditions of Occidentalism, but what does it actually mean?

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[110] Ian Buruma and Avîšay Margālît, *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies*, 4. printing (New York: Penguin Books, 2004).

[111] Ibid., 5.

[112] Christopher Coker, *Twilight of the West* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1998).

[113] 'Meghiase Tarraghi', July 1909, University of Tehran.

[114] Alastair Bonnett, *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics, and History* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

[115] Walter Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000), 57–58.

At the core of it, it signifies the co-constitutive nature of the relational world. It is one way that sameness and difference is uttered between the Orient and the Occident. However, it takes different shapes. Drawing on Coronil,[116] I identify three paritcular types of Occidentalism that is purported by different positions. First one, reminiscent of Buruma and Margālît's argument,[117] is the dehumanising narrative of the Occidental Other. Second one is the radical opposition of the East to the West, that sees the Occident as source of the problem. It is on the Other and not the Self. The third way is an attempt to incorporate Self into the Other by privileging Occidentalism as a mode of knowledge production and valuable assets. It should be noted that this could be done for ideational, ideological, security, or symbolic reasons through different political and theoretical perspectives that might lead to specific representations of Europe in this manuscript.

V. Structure and Implications

A meaningful and salient analysis of whatever happens in the history studied here is hinged on an in-depth understanding how things came about, permeated, sustained, evolved, or disappeared. Contingencies of history matter.[118] For English School, this will provide an alternative understanding of history on how the International Society was accepted or discarded, viewed and discussed,

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[116] Fernando Coronil, 'Beyond Occidentalism: Toward Nonimperial Geohistorical Categories', *Cultural Anthropology* 11, no. 1 (February 1996): 51–87, https://doi.org/10.1525/can.1996.11.1.02a00030.

[117] Buruma and Margālît, *Occidentalism*, 5–6.

[118] Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', in *The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought*, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 1986), 76–99.

rather than providing a generalised world history.[119] It also manifests 'discursive fault lines'[120] both in Iran and International Society.

What follows, aims to add to the consciousness within International Relations that much of its culture and theory is abstracted from a history that neglects co-constitutiveness. The expansion story of English School[121] and its historical analysis needs to incorporate spatio-temporal modalities of othering that connote status and function of International Society. The differentiations provide taxonomical tools for Iranian Studies to assess the internal composition of society and politics of Iran within an international terrain. The historical memory much discussed in area studies enriches IR. Beyond the theoretical interventions, the conceptual catalogues and empirical story offered in this thesis provide ample material to reflect on status, knowledge production, and global entanglements. It also enables me to provide a broader explanation of how International Society operates as a society and a culture.

Master Concept	**Modality of Otherness**	**Temporality**
Irrelevant Christendom	An inferior entity with religious	Parallel civilizations, cyclical time

[119] In contrast to Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[120] Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, The New International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2006), 48.

[121] Bull and Watson, *The Expansion of International Society*.

	overlap that is worthy of consideration just because of religion	
Allied Empires	A barbaric Other that could help defeat other barbaric entities	Dynastic
Advanced Europe/Farang	A new Other	To be followed/progressive
Ideal Europe/Civilisation	Overlapping features, with desired differences	Futuristic
Failed Europe	An Other that fails itself in a broader world	To be ignored and go beyond

	order, mostly in comparison to U.S.A	
Useful Europe	Politically inept, technologically advanced	Parallel

The focus is on socio-political worlds. These worldings and otherings enable me to discuss how International Society imposes certain conceptual imperatives on its members, and how the international relations should be understood through the culture it promotes. Iran and International Society have global imaginaries that are interlinked and advance in contempt or complement. The expansion of International Society, to frame it in socio-cultural analytics, is a "process of cultural extension".[122]

This thesis proceeds chronologically, except for chapter 2. It is whatever the text tells me and delineates the meaning. It also sets out how discourse is analysed. Chapter 3 engages in a conceptual analysis provides a quick diachronic analysis of existing concepts and history. Chapter 4 starts with the rise of the Safavid empire and early representations of Europe and ends with the demise of the Safavids. Europe emerges as Christendom that is mostly understood in

[122] Alexander, *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, 534; Jeffrey C. Alexander, 'Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between Ritual and Strategy', *Sociological Theory* 22, no. 4 (December 2004): 527–73, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0735-2751.2004.00233.x.

religious terms until the uptick in rivalry with the Ottoman empire. The European other gains valour and prominence throughout while polity-specific conceptions are more prevalent than talking about Europe as a whole. It is in this era that Shi'ism, mysticism and monarchy emerges as discourse legitimisers that are also part of performance for or against Europe. Chapter deals with the pivotal period that witness an epistemic change through rise of nationalism, constitutionalism, and encounters of defeats. These concepts vis-a-vis the European other changes the society into a more fused one that lasted only until 1940s. Chapter 7, starting from 1963, captures the revolutionary representations of the Europe that last until 2015.

These chapters can enrich International Relation's theoretical and empirical repertoire beyond the nexus of identity and the English School. As briefly alluded, the agenda of Global International Relations by Amitav Acharya, [123] recognises the necessity of expanding the disciplinary horizons. According to Acharya, Global IR should depart from Greco-Roman and European histories. [124] Despite the direct relevance of Europe to this study, it is founded on the Iranian history. The earlier discussions on utilising this study to gain a more granular and regional understanding of the English School within the Middle East also reaffirms his call. Moreover, this research aims to recognise and study "multiple forms of agency

[123] Amitav Acharya, 'Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories beyond the West', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 2011, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829811406574; Acharya, 'Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds'; Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at Its Centenary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108647670.

[124] Acharya, 'Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds'.

beyond the state" and capture "resistance, normative action and local constructions of the global order."[125] This could be a first step regarding Iran and the English School.

[125] Ibid.

II

The Initial Dictionary:

Analysing Concepts

It is never a waste of time to study the history of a word.

- Lucien Febvre, *A New Kind of History*

This study revolves around International Relations, Iran, Europe, and Identity. These are all four highly contested concepts,[1] meaning their "proper use"[2] creates endless debate, and are capable of triggering disciplinary discussions and, some, can fuel socio-political debates. Yet, this is a manuscript written about all of them. The preceding chapter laid out the overarching framework, answering the 'how' question and 'where' this thesis came about. It argued for a research

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[1] In addition to "essentially contested" concepts (as advanced by W.B. Gallie and William Connolly), we also have "impossible" ones (Ernesto Laclau).

[2] For a more elaborate and refined discussion, see W. B. Gallie, *Philosophy and the Historical Understanding*, 2nd edition. (New York: Schocken Books, 1968). An overview of the broader debate is offered by David Collier, Fernando Daniel Hidalgo, and Andra Olivia Maciuceanu, 'Essentially Contested Concepts: Debates and Applications', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 11, no. 3 (1 October 2006): 211–46, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569310600923782.

agenda that embraces micro history and macro history, and to revise the English School through more global studies that expands its empirical catalogue. The following chapters goes through those histories to capture Iran's changing and continuing representations of Europe and analysing its impact on relationship with the international society. These representations engage (with) multitudes of concepts. The chapter is set out to understand how it studies concepts and ask the question of what "is"?[3]

The preceding chapter laid out this thesis' assumptions about language. A consequence of highlighting how the world is shaped by language(s) is to delineate the conceptual language and how concepts work. The key function of this chapter is to set out how it analyses concepts. In doing so, it will provide a brief review of how International Relations' studies concepts. Doing so hinges on a summarising earlier review on nature of International Relations and how *scientific* it could be.[4] Then the chapter continues by discussing ways in which concepts are used and studied. Subsequently it will recap three distinct approaches to conceptual analysis and history, that follows by outlining *central concepts* relevant to this study.

The emphasis is on central concepts[5]: not all concepts and conceptual constellations would be outlined here. Some are reserved for the ensuing

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[3] For an example of the latter, see Bull, *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics*.

[4] See earlier discussion in chapter 2.

[5] This bears resemblance to the notion of "basic concepts" (Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe), advanced by Reinhart Koselleck, that he treats as "indispensable" to social and political vocabulary. I am saving that to assign concepts emerging in empirical chapters, as they are indispensable to the Iranian socio-political lexicon. Central concepts are vital to grasp contours of my analysis. See Reinhart Koselleck, 'Introduction and Prefaces to the Geschichtliche

chapters because they are "conceptual results of the empirical analysis."[6] The central concepts[7] here refer to those of more general understanding that deals with the greater issues than this thesis: they inform the analysis.[8] The basis of this distinction and their function lies in understanding the role of concepts within language. We know a concept not through what it refers to, but through how it is differentiated with other concepts.[9] The concepts that inform the analysis distinguish themselves with concepts (and conceptual constellations) that emerge, through their context, specific history, and different linguistic modes. This is a classic English School take where focusing on central concepts are vital to grasp broader issues: it deals with specific set of concepts through various approaches.[10] It is how Hedley Bull's study of order keep questioning what is order:[11] What is

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Grundbegriffe', trans. Michaela Richter, *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 6, no. 1 (2011): 1–37, https://doi.org/10.3167/choc.2011.060102.

[6] Stefano Guzzini, 'The Ends of International Relations Theory: Stages of Reflexivity and Modes of Theorizing', ed. Colin Wight, Lene Hansen, and Tim Dunne, *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 534, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113494327.

[7] See Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', *History and Theory* 8, no. 1 (1969): 3–53, https://doi.org/10.2307/2504188. Skinner notes how any text contains "fundamental concepts" or "'fairly stable vocabulary' of characteristic concepts".

[8] Anna Leander's analogy, discovered via Guzzini (2013), is a useful simplifier: I am reviewing and adding to "*unfinished dictionaries,* inside which a growing number of terms are in need of being continuously updated, in themselves and in their relation to each other." See ibid.

[9] Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* (LaSalle, Illinois : Open Court, 1986).

[10] Mark Bevir and Ian Hall, 'Interpreting the English School: History, Science and Philosophy', *Journal of International Political Theory*, 13 January 2020, 2, https://doi.org/10.1177/1755088219898884.

[11] Bull, *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3.

the conception of the balance of power?[12] What is international law?[13] What is diplomacy?[14] What is war?[15]

In this manuscript, a conceptual constellation emerges with an unceasing discourse contestation, in a struggle between the state, Iranian society and international society. These concepts often refer back to a series of *central concepts*[16] and attempt to gain meaning by differentiating them. The differentiations and specific historical contexts are contiguous to one of the ancillary aims of this study: to contribute towards the move to Global IR. While this developing research agenda mostly focuses on agency, I highlight the need to engage with more conceptual analysis as source of theorising and understanding agency. One of the current pitfalls of IR is its failure "to develop concepts and approaches from non-Western contexts on their own terms and to apply them not only locally, but also to other contexts, including the larger global canvas."[17]

Such attention to context, grasping the local (history), and diversifying sources of theorising are all also pertinent and vital for studying concepts. They are the underpinnings of conceptual history: going beyond understanding concepts as

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[12] Ibid., 101.

[13] Ibid., 128.

[14] Ibid., 163.

[15] Ibid., 184.

[16] The reader might be reminded of how Max Weber's *Economy and Society* commences with 'fundamental sociological concepts' that the enables the analysis in subsequent chapter.

[17] Acharya, 'Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds', 650.

an "assembly of contemporary experiences and [past] meanings" [18] to underscore "several temporal and semantic layers of varying duration."[19] The current meanings draw on historical transformations of not just the language but broader socio-political context. Epistemologically, (socially produced) concepts, alongside theories and methods describing or analysing the social world are themselves entangled with each other.[20]

Conceptual changes cannot be taken for granted. Then there is another layer when we consider linguistic differences. Different languages have various ways of defining concepts. The temporal semantic changes also vary through spatial settings. Different linguistic interlocutors and contexts across diverse geographies influence the concepts in their own way. The geographical reach and transformations of concepts is more relevant when researching Iran, using Persian sources, adapting theoretical and methodological frameworks in English or French, and writing in English.

These differences highlight the vitality of grasping how to analyse concepts not just as an element of the discourse but meaningful ways to make sense of social worlds. International Relations' study of concept exists but is marked with similar trends of convergence between different camps. The discipline is mostly structured around theories, themes, and issues. Majority of the textbooks cover

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[18] Helge Jordheim and Erling Sandmo, eds., *Conceptualizing the World: An Exploration across Disciplines*, Time and the World: Interdisciplinary Studies in Cultural Transformations, volume 4 (New York: Berghahn, 2019), 5.

[19] Ibid.

[20] For the general point, and the relationship between history-concept-theory, see Ethan Kleinberg, Joan Wallach Scott, and Gary Wilder, 'Theses on Theory and History', *History of the Present: A Journal of Critical History* 10, no. 1 (1 April 2020): 157–65, https://doi.org/10.1215/21599785-8221515.

theories in sequence, with specific takes, while neglecting concepts.[21] With IR's embrace of history and language, concepts gained more prominent status.[22] On one hand, we have a conceptual take that considers concepts as "static variables"[23] that have fixed meanings. This neutral treatment, taking concepts as add-ons, is more so prevalent in quantitative research.[24] On the other end of spectrum, concepts are treated as vehicles carrying multiple meanings and values across different time and space.[25] The divide on how to study concepts, inevitably, ends up with a more foundational discussion of what we study and how we do it. It touches on broader and different approaches on what social scientists are supposed to do. That deals with epistemological debates, and specifically on the role of language. What is the difference between mere words and concepts? As elaborated in the previous chapter, the way we conceive of the reality and the social, and how we use language as a referral point. The crux of it is how knowledge gets produced.

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[21] Cf. Iver B. Neumann, *Concepts of International Relations, for Students and Other Smarties* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2019).

[22] For a different take, focusing on "the reception of an author rather than of a concept", see Claire Vergerio, 'Context, Reception, and the Study of Great Thinkers in International Relations', *International Theory* 11, no. 1 (2019): 110–37, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971918000192.

[24] A notable advocate of this critique is Sartori with his reflection on concepts: Giovanni Sartori, 'Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics', *The American Political Science Review* 64, no. 4 (1970): 1033–53, https://doi.org/10.2307/1958356.

[25] See William E Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse.*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford : Blackwell, 1993).

The positivist and non-positivist mode of knowledge production,[26] both, highlight the relevance of concepts. The ultimate aim is to offer some sort of categorisation and simplifying what we study. Yet, it is not that simple. Positivism posits the necessity of categorising and conceptualising through objective understanding of the reality. For example, Gary Goertz demonstrates how concepts are at the core of social science theory and methodology.[27] The way he, and positivism, approach concepts is through terminologies such as having 'necessary and sufficient conditions' approach to concept building, valid concept constructions, measuring concepts, and increasing their consistency.[28] The non-positivists reaffirm the unfixed and inherently socio-political nature of concepts, and their historical origins. As evident from the framework for this research, the latter bears more affinity to the purpose of this project. Nonetheless, the next section details major approaches in studying, researching, and analysing concepts.

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[26] A whole cottage industry revolves around these debates. In addition to the literature cited in the framework chapter, two influential scholarly work

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations*, 2010, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203843321; Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[27] Gary Goertz, *Social Science Concepts : A User's Guide.* (Princeton: Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2011).

[28] See generally Collier, Daniel Hidalgo, and Olivia Maciuceanu, 'Essentially Contested Concepts: Debates and Applications'; Jason Seawright and David Collier, 'Rival Strategies of Validation: Tools for Evaluating Measures of Democracy', *Comparative Political Studies* 47, no. 1 (January 2014): 111–38, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414013489098; David Collier, Jody LaPorte, and Jason Seawright, 'Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor', *Political Research Quarterly* 65, no. 1 (March 2012): 217–32, https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912912437162.

VI. Framing Concepts

All of the above elaborations fail to define concepts. Etymologically, the Medieval Latin version is *conceptum* meaning "draft" or "abstract". A classical Latin notion of it meant "conceived". The obligatory citation of an Oxford English Dictionary[29] reveals part of it is borrowing from *conceive* and partly an alteration of *conceit*, with an emerging definition, circa 1550, as "a general notion, the immediate object of a thought"[30]. This resembles the day to day usage of concept.[31] It is about forming a certain idea or an image that assists us to navigate knowledge and make sense of it. Having different concepts enables categorisation and providing meaning of different realities and worlds. Then what is the difference between concepts and words? They are used differently.

A Weberian account of science, though for wholly different reasons, elaborates on this distinction:

> The taking of practical-political positions and the scientific analysis of political structures and party positions are two very different things. If you are speaking about democracy in a popular meeting, you do not need to make a mystery of your personal

[29] Why the Oxford English Dictionary (OED)? The experience of my undergraduate studies, coupled with the fact that English is my second language, made the OED my starting point to find meaning and etymologies. There are habits that stick, and this is an example. Access to the online edition of the OED (www.OED.com) is only available to subscribers, which LSE is one of them. Alternative platform could be Merriam-Webster (www.merriam-webster.com) that provides a similar definition but with less elaborate note on etymologies.

[30] Oxford University Press, 'Concept', in *Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/38130?rskey=cWBLlZ&result=1#eid.

[31] Compare Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, 'Beyond "Identity"', *Theory and Society* 29, no. 1 (2000): 4–6, www.jstor.org/stable/3108478.

> position; instead, clearly taking a recognizable position is your damned duty and responsibility. The words you use are not tools of scientific analysis, but political advertisements against the positions of others. They are not ploughshares for the loosening of the soil of contemplative thought, but swords for use against your opponents: weapons.[32]

Words and concepts are used differently. For the purpose of scientific analysis, the key advantage of concepts is their ability to systematise observations to produce a "thoughtful ordering of empirical actuality".[33] The ordering occurs because of concepts acting as heuristic devices. It is often vague, yet holistic.[34] It covers a lot, but it does not offer a fixated meaning. The ambiguity hinges on the fact that concepts, unlike words, are not pointing to one specific thing or (social) reality. A concept is a "set of statements"[35] that evokes sensations,[36] unravels a series of relations with other concepts as they are situated with each other. The capturing of these relations is where we require a layered understanding of their functions. According to Reinhart Koselleck, who alongside Michel Foucault and Quentin Skinner is associated with conceptual analysis in IR,[37] concepts are "not

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[32] Max Weber, *Wissenschaft Als Beruf—Politik Als Beruf*, ed. W.J. Mommsen and W. Schluchter (Tübingen, 1917), 14–15; Cited In Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations*, 20.

[33] Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations*, 21.

[34] Thomas Bürger, *Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation: History, Laws, and Ideal Types*, Expanded ed. (Durham, N.C.: Durham, N.C. : Duke University Press, 1976), 26.

[35] Ibid., 27.

[36] Ibid.; also see Felix Berenskoetter, *Concepts in World Politics* (California: Sage, 2016), 4.

[37] Halvard Leira, 'A Conceptual History of Diplomacy', in *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy*, n.d., 29, https://www.academia.edu/29409894/A_Conceptual_History_of_Diplomacy?email_work_card=title.

simply indicative[s] of the relations which it covers, it is also a factor within them".[38]

Being a factor within the relations that concepts themselves ought to reveal, connotes the entangled nature of understanding concepts and their difference with words. Words are unambiguous. Concepts engage with various socio-political contexts and histories. Take the word 'state'. There is a difference between word state and the concept of state in International Relations. The latter is marked with historical evolution, and tangent on various other concepts (such as sovereignty). The concept itself plays a key role in those relations by limiting it to a certain history or theory.[39] That is what makes a concept different from a word.

The entanglement also makes it more difficult to define concepts and fix their meanings. Any text on conceptual analysis,[40] or genealogy,[41] hangs onto Nietzsche to convey our inability to define concepts: "only that which has no history can be defined".[42] The difficulty intensifies when we take into account how all concepts have histories, and then assess what type of history are we looking at. This is closely related to an aim of this manuscript to contribute to

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[38] Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past : On the Semantics of Historical Time*, New ed. (New York, Chichester: New York, Chichester : Columbia University Press, 2004), 86.

[39] Koselleck, *Futures Past : On the Semantics of Historical Time*.

[40] Neumann, *Concepts of International Relations, for Students and Other Smarties*; Bürger, *Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation: History, Laws, and Ideal Types*; Berenskoetter, *Concepts in World Politics*.

[41] Philippe Bourbeau, 'A Genealogy of Resilience', *International Political Sociology* 12, no. 1 (2018): 19–35, https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/olx026; Srdjan Vucetic, 'Genealogy as a Research Tool in International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 3 (July 2011): 1295–1312, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000938.

[42] Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic* (London: London : T. Fisher Unwin, 1899), 14.

the Global IR agenda: engaging with non-European histories enables expanding historical horizons of our conceptual repertoires. Such different historical experiences and various contexts add to the challenges of coming up with universal definition and application. The counterargument would be pointing out the extant definitions of state,[43] power,[44] sovereignty,[45] war, terrorism, and human rights within IR and other disciplines. Yet, various disciplinary, theoretical, and methodological views take each concept differently.

Multiplicity of views on each concept just manifests how a universal definition is improbable. Various takes have overlapping constitutive elements that only enable us to provide murky sketches of what they mean. We can only have a delineation of their meanings, elements, and relations. That is to encircle them and limit the possible horizons. That would be somewhat acceptable if the subject of our study is limited to a particular time or space. These meanings, elements, and relations change across time and space. A concept emerging in the 16th century England could be very different to its contemporary usage, just as

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[43] For an overview, see Robert Schuett and Peter M. R. Stirk, eds., *The Concept of the State in International Relations* (Edinburgh University Press, 2015), www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt14brxt7; Also see Lake, David A., 'The State and International Relations', ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford University Press, 2009), https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219322.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199219322-e-2; Cf. Jens Bartelson, *The Critique of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[44] See Janice Bially Mattern, 'The Concept of Power and the (Un)Discipline of International Relations', ed. Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford University Press, 2009), https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219322.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199219322-e-40; Also compare Stefano Guzzini, 'Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis', *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (1993): 443–78, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028022; Stefano Guzzini, 'The Concept of Power: A Constructivist Analysis', *Millennium* 33, no. 3 (1 June 2005): 495–521, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298050330031301.

[45] Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511586385.

the same concept would be different when used in French, Dutch or Russian. For example, the concept of Foreign Policy used today is very different to when it emerged in the 18th century.[46] Halvard Leira's attempt to denaturalise the concept of Foreign Policy shows how from its emergence circa 1730, it changed through "radical transformation of the political language" and the need to separate the domestic and foreign realm.[47] Such changes reify the need to take into stock the evolution of concepts across time and space.

The temporal and spatial range of each concept, as opposed to a word, enmeshes it into "abundances of meanings" that draw on social, political, and historical experiences.[48] We cannot fix one meaning or define it. They can only be interpreted.[49] Until now, this section kept referring to historical horizons, entanglements, or delineating meanings, elements, and relations. All of those provide an interpretive space[50] to explore history and language to understand potential interpretations of a concept. The interpretative space does not mean it can be filled with any objective or subjective takes.[51] The interpretation hinges on series of parameters such as the semantics of the concept, context, configurations, and related properties. These characteristics enable a concise

[46] See Halvard Leira, 'The Emergence of Foreign Policy', *International Studies Quarterly* 63, no. 1 (5 February 2019): 187–98, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy049.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Reinhart Koselleck, 'Introduction and Prefaces to the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe', 20.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Another phrase is "room for interpretation" mentioned in ibid., 30.

[51] Ibid., 32.

analysis rooted in tracing the transformation of concepts across different historical era and various geographies.

The interpretive space is supposed to make it easier to analyse concepts. Nonetheless, the above-mentioned characteristics lead us into another dilemma. Where do these characteristics and properties come from? How do we assign them? Are they contingent on our takes or they have a nature-given essence? If the latter, then it undermines the earlier discussion on how concepts have multiple meanings. It is about the function of concepts. The introduction alluded how this chapter focuses on central concepts and distinguished it with other concepts ensuing in the rest of the thesis. That is a characteristic of the concepts. They are central to this study. They are vital and "indispensable" to the analytic language of this thesis, deriving from International Relations' vocabulary to make sense of the international. That is very different to the basic concepts emerging in the study of Iran's conception of Europe: they are the basic concepts of Iran's socio-political vocabulary. It is distinct from IR's vocabulary, but there are some overlaps.

These are concepts that "combine manifold experiences and expectations in such a way that they become indispensable to any formulation of the most urgent issues of a given time."[52] Without having central concepts outlined below in this chapter, communicating the rest of the study would be ambiguous. Then there are basic concepts that emerge as result of study, that without them relaying

[52] Ibid., 3; Melvin Richter and Michaela W. Richter, 'Introduction: Translation of Reinhart Koselleck's "Krise," in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67, no. 2 (2006): 343–56, www.jstor.org/stable/30141881.

Iran's discourse[53] on Europe and international society would not be possible. The latter is the empirics of this manuscript, the former being the analytical lens of it. The characteristics of these central concepts (or categorising concepts known as *Leitbegriffe*)[54] are their function in our socio-political system, and play a vital role to understand pivotal processes, key events, and grand arcs. They are also prevalent in various theoretical and ideological promulgations.

The preceding chapter, briefly, discussed the prevalent culture of International Relations as a discipline. Within that lexicon, the central concepts in this chapter are "fundamental codes of … culture"[55] of IR, shaping discipline's language, theories, and debates. Concepts such as civilisations, religion, race, international order, modernity, (great) powers. All of these concepts also connote a certain temporal view and move as they could be backward or progressive. They carry a content that is closely linked to temporal dimensions of our social relations, connoting normative stances. Take civilisations and modernity. They connote either a certain backwardness in their meanings, glorifying specific status or convey a sense of superiority and advancement.

The temporal dimension and the socio-political function of basic concepts are only meaningful within a certain context as they lack meaning in vacuum. Take International Relations: the concepts are meaningful within the specific context of the discipline's history, related concepts, and the literature. For example, the

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[53] See Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse.* Specifically, for the distinction between normative and descriptive concepts.

[54] Reinhart Koselleck, 'Introduction and Prefaces to the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe', 7–9.

[55] Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things : An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (London: London : Tavistock, 1970), 11.

use of (primary and secondary) institutions in the English School is somewhat different to the use of institutions in neo-liberalism.

The first layer of the context is language, or how a concept is juxtaposed in a semantic field.[56] The field means a series of interconnected signs, symbols, terms, and languages. This linguistic focus means having an expansive understanding of where to look for concepts,[57] and to take stock of its linguistic elements. That is to probe relations and etymologies: do these concepts support each other? are they derived from the same roots? do they convey the same meaning? are they only meaningful if we consider their dialectic opposition to each other? This amalgamation provides a conceptual constellation: in order to have a meaning of a concept, then we have series of other concepts that either support it or oppose it. The full extent of a concept only gains meaning within this constellation.

The second layer concerns tracing the historicity of the concepts. The temporality of a concept is not just about its normative function but capturing the change of its meaning across time. For example, Civilisation or Foreign Policy might mean one thing in the 18th century and another in contemporary era. The third layer is about encircling a theoretical or ideological context. A concept might mean something within a specific ideational framework while convey a different meaning through a framework with different foundations. Think of Jihad: a security understanding of it links it to terror groups. A religious

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[56] Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*.

[57] On sources, see Reinhart Koselleck, 'Introduction and Prefaces to the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe', 22.

context of it conveys any sort of effort towards piety. The fourth layer is how concepts shape our understanding of materiality and space. The last layer concerns the practical and performative consequences of concepts in socio-political terms by key positions (actors), and if they are associated with any particular practices. It also delves into how each concept make certain actions or conditions possible within a society, or trigger contestations. This is also why, as discussed in preceding chapter, my understanding of Discourse Analysis encompasses not just texts and utterances but highlights the relevance of practices in grasping socio-political life, and the international, as a whole.[58]



Figure 1 – Layers of Contexts

Having all these contexts and layers to understand meaning(s) of a concept, all convoluted in through theoretical frameworks, might make putting pieces together rather complex. If we treat conceptual analysis as a cake, which should

[58] For an overview of philosophical and sociological underpinnings of this move, see Iver B. Neumann, 'Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 31, no. 3 (2002): 627–51, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298020310031201.

be a chocolate cake with icing and jam and sponge to be an acceptable one, then it might simplify the task. Not everyone is interested in cakes, nor interested in chocolate cakes. Same goes with conceptual analysis. Each layer of the cake is a context for understanding concepts to get to the core: icing, sponge, chocolate layer, and jam. Some are interested in particular layer and some in the cake as a whole. But the cake makes sense as a whole with all its layers. A layer of icing is not a cake. The way individuals eat cakes, might reveal something about their preferences and interests. The way researchers engage with conceptual analysis, here the layers and contexts, and what layers they focus on signifies their approach. Detailing the approaches to conceptual analysis is the task of the following section.

VII. How to Eat A Cake: Doing Conceptual Analysis

Deciding on how to analyse concepts is also like deciding on what type of cake to have. It is conditioned on the occasion, dietary requirements, and seasonality amongst other factors. The preliminary assessment of the appropriateness of a method is to focus on the contestations, why conceptual analysis is pursued, and what is at stake through the analysis.[59] International Relation's method of conceptual analysis could be categorised as historical, critical, and scientific.[60]

[59] W. B. Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56 (1955): 167.

[60] A discussion with Stefano Guzzini, on 12 March 2019, led me to this categorisation.

The Scientific Way of Minimalism

This approach is mostly associated with a positivist stance that takes concepts as a way to prove theory in empirical science to "develop analytical schemes of the empirical world" within which the science is concerned.[61] Concepts are regarded as means "to establishing connections."[62] However, there is a qualifier. The concepts that this approach relies on are mostly used to measure, explain and predict results.[63] Thus, "vague concepts", those without precise specifications, are deemed as insufficient to "develop a fixed and specific procedure designed to isolate a stable and definitive empirical content".[64] In another word, vague concepts regarded as a defect.[65] Relying on an ambiguous concepts amounts to a "basic deficiency"[66]

The key function of concepts in such approach is to be "tools for fact-gathering and data containers".[67] While Andrew Sartori, one of the key proponents of this camp, points how a universal application of data containers without grasping particular histories leads to confusion on the empirics and the level of analysis.[68]

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[61] Herbert Blumer, 'What Is Wrong with Social Theory?', *American Sociological Review* 19, no. 1 (1954): 1, https://doi.org/10.2307/2088165.

[62] Ibid., 4.

[63] Felix Berenskoetter, 'Unpacking Concepts', in *Concepts in World Politics* (California: Sage, 2017), 11.

[64] Blumer, 'What Is Wrong with Social Theory?', 5.

[65] Giovanni Sartori, *Social Science Concepts : A Systematic Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Beverly Hills, Calif. : Sage Publications, 1984).

[66] Blumer, 'What Is Wrong with Social Theory?', 5.

[67] Sartori, 'Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics', 1052.

[68] Ibid.

That confusion, obfuscates meanings and destructs "the sharpness of our concepts". [69] Here, sharpness means avoiding going up on a ladder of abstraction.[70] The scientific approach attempts to sharpen the concept through adjusting applications and operationalise them within different data sets. These methods are geared towards clearing up concepts,[71] but only minimally. The minimalistic research design fixates the meaning within a basic structure that ignores broader contexts and come up with a universal application.[72]

The Temporal Way

This historical approach is perhaps the most prevalent one in historical International Relations. It is associated with Quentin Skinner and the Cambridge School[73], when mostly focusing on the international political thought and history of ideas, and Reinhart Koselleck. It emphasises a concept's transformation throughout history, highlighting key historical turning points and events in shaping dissemination and understanding of concepts. Instead of transfixing a concept, it privileges the contingency, change and continuity of meanings. By drawing on linguistics, it traces the concept within specific historical conditions.

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[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid., 1040–41.

[71] Gerald F Gaus, *Political Concepts and Political Theories* (Boulder, CO: Boulder, CO : Westview Press, 2000).

[72] Sartori, *Social Science Concepts : A Systematic Analysis*.

[73] I am aware of the disagreements within this school of thought. Here, I am referring to group of historians of political thought studying historical texts with different sensibilities and priorities. See: Vergerio, 'Context, Reception, and the Study of Great Thinkers in International Relations'.

The tracing compartmentalises the analysis into understanding when a new concept emerges and establish itself, how the meaning become de rigueur, then assesses if there any change to meanings, and lastly if the concept ceases to exist. As opposed to regarding concepts as data containers, temporal way encapsulates a conceptual life that is linked to broader political, social and economic conditions. The prominence on conceptual life and their applicability elevates concepts into an enabler that actually makes actions and thoughts possible. That means concepts are indicators and factors in shaping the socio-political contexts, as much as they get shaped by them. This historical approach hinges ordering of the society, whether domestic or international, on understanding conceptual history.

An important criticism levelled against this approach is how it is asking for too much. Historical research is an arduous task in itself: getting the details right and then getting the story right. For a conceptual analysis based on historical approach, the historical study needs to embed tracing the evolution of concepts and provide a detailed account of socio-political transformations while ensuring spatio-temporal consistency is challenging. It necessitates a synchronic and diachronic analysis of a concept.[74] The difficulty of doing both creates divergence within this approach. The former way of analysis, focuses on a specific concept within a particular time and space: that is the Cambridge School scholars looking at concepts and their meanings discursively, and highlighting

[74] See Chapter IV: it elaborates on the difference between the two and offer a historical background to this research.

specific ideational structures emerging out of them.[75] That is to focus on studying what a philosopher intended to do and did when the text was written.

The Critical Way

This approach, just like International Relation's' critical theories, privileges critical understanding of the structures creating the knowledge-power nexus. Thus, pursuing a praxeological theory to pursue change and make it possible.[76] The distinct feature of this approach to the preceding ones is acknowledging both. It complements the historical and temporal approach by focusing on the evolution of concepts across discourses in different times and space, engaging with synchronic and diachronic analysis, while the scientific approach is deemed as an object of analysis the reproduced power structures.

This approach, in line with its post-modern foundations, considers how the reality is shaped by constructs and concepts that inly reified or implicated in power structures. That is to assess how a particular concept produces and what performance it undertakes in the society. While the temporal way heralded how concepts do things in societies and shape them, the critical approach argues the performative nature of concepts actually make things through systematic formation of the objects of which they speak for.[77] In doing so, they focus on how

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[75] Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas'; J. G. A. Pocock, 'On the Unglobality of Contexts: Cambridge Methods and the History of Political Thought', *Global Intellectual History* 0, no. 0 (2019): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1080/23801883.2018.1523997.

[76] See Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (June 1981): 126–55, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298810100020501.

[77] Foucault, *The Order of Things : An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, 49.

these concepts constitutes actions, subjectivities, and identities. These are broadly aligned with the overall aims of this project. The concepts, uttered on any level of society,[78] are important in understanding how a foundation of knowledge, episteme, gets created. That is not only a singular concept but how a concept meshes with other concepts, creating conceptual constellations or discourses that not only interact with each other but creates institutions that shape material reality.[79] This approach engages with all layers depicted in figure 1.

The outlines of three approaches to conceptual analysis offers *broad contours* of how one might explore concepts through different methods and based on various ontological and epistemological choices. My emphasis here is how these approaches all provide blueprints to explore concepts. They are not gospels but offer practical solutions to understand meanings of concepts, their relevance to International Relations, and grasp their functions. Building on these, the next part of the chapter outlines central concepts needed in studying Iran's idea of Europe.

VIII. Defining Central Concepts

Having an understanding of how conceptual analysis could work enables delineating central concept in studying Iran's representation of Europe. As

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[78] That is the key here. While, for example, the Cambridge School privileges elites and political philosophers, the critical approach notes the relevance and importance of the elite and subaltern.

[79] Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse.*, 14. Connolly also elucidate how, for example, concept of politics can only be made intelligible if a broader conceptual system within which it operates is highlighted.

discussed, these are the concepts that inform the analysis. A few of them, such as identity and international society, were already explored as part of the theoretical framework and their integral role in conveying the intended theories. The below concepts are chosen due to how they inform the analysis. A series of concepts outline the conditions of the international society and Iranian discourse:[80] for example, civilisation and religion. Both are indispensable in understanding of the evolution of the international society, specifically the suzerain period, and emergence of specific positions within the Iranian discourse.

The missing concepts here are Iran and Europe. Chapter 2 elaborated on the spatio-temporal and linguistic characteristics that enables me to find Iran. The chapter also discussed how the concept of Europe emerged in circa 15th century,[81] but this study actively avoids defining itself other than relying on what the sources reveal. It is about how Iran (various positions) define and conceptualise Europe. It is on me to find that. Yet, I include a broad overview of the concept of Europe, within International Relations and Political Thought, to familiarise the reader with the scope and relevance of the concept in differing concepts. Fixing the concept of Europe and then finding for its examples is counterproductive and reductive. This move is somewhat influenced by the poststructuralist (linguistic take) treating language as a "relational sign system

[80] There are alternative ways of grouping these concepts or justifying providing an overview: 1) In a chronological manner that starts with the concept emerging first and ending with the latest concepts, but that might distort broader historical baggage of the said concept. Practically, it also would have required additional explanations that lengthens this manuscript; 2) Alphabetically: the most neutral one but prevented me from providing a rather systematic explanation why I am focusing on these concepts.

[81] For a comprehensive overview, see Boer et al., *The History of the Idea of Europe*.

whose instability is only partially fixed through oppositional signs".[82] Moreover, the study is also concerned with what 'Europe' (and related constellations) *do* and *how* is it being used in the Iranian discourse. These concerns ascertain the scope of context and layers in defining concepts: applicable to a synchronic and diachronic analysis spanning five centuries, over differing spaces, through dynamic socio-political environments.

Religion: Mode, Condition, Identity

If we take Martin Wight's[83] original notion of the international society, it developed with "units shared significant elements of culture, especially religion and language".[84] Bull also noted "common religion" as one of the basis of international societies alongside ethics, language and epistemology.[85] The religion was highlighted as one of the key elements of culture. That is the broad theoretical context that inform how I would approach this concept. Yet, some of

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[82] Lene Hansen, 'Conclusion', in *Uses of the West: Security and the Politics of Order*, ed. Gunther Hellmann and Benjamin Herborth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[83] On the role of Christianity within English School, and specifically Martin Wight, see Scott M. Thomas, 'Faith, History and Martin Wight: The Role of Religion in the Historical Sociology of the English School of International Relations', *International Affairs* 77, no. 4 (1 October 2001): 905–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00225; Ian Hall, 'Martin Wight, Western Values, and the Whig Tradition of International Thought', *The International History Review* 36, no. 5 (20 October 2014): 961–81, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2014.900815.

[84] Barry Buzan, 'From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School', *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (1993): 333, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027983; Also see Jacinta O'Hagan, 'The Question of Culture', in *International Society and Its Critics*, ed. Alex J. Bellamy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), https://doi.org/10.1093/0199265208.003.0013; and Barry Buzan, 'Culture and International Society', *International Affairs* 86, no. 1 (1 January 2010): 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00866.x.

[85] Bull, *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics*, 15; Also see William Bain, 'The Anarchical Society as Christian Political Theology', in *The Anarchical Society at 40*, ed. Hidemi Suganami, Madeline Carr, and Adam Humphreys (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779605.003.0004.

the later appraisals of the link between culture and international society only hinted to religion with regards to violence in international politics.[86] The shift in attention is somewhat due to the changing landscape: decline of religion as part of the international society is linked to the rise of legal language[87] rationality perceptions[88] and progressive thought[89] embedded within the standard of civilisation[90] and modernity.

The transformation occurred through the rise of modern politics that deemed secularism as a normative necessity of a modern society.[91] Such view ignored religion based on a "presumption that religion has been privatized and is no longer operative in modern politics or that its influence can be neatly encapsulated in anthropological studies of a particular religious tradition and its

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[86] Buzan, 'Culture and International Society', 7.

[87] From Carl Schmitt to Hersch Lauterpacht, we see a move towards a secular and territorial authority replacing a religiously based order. For an account of transformation of international law, see Martti Koskenniemi, ed., '"The Legal Conscience of the Civilized World"', in *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960*, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 11–97, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511494222.003.

[88] See Barry Buzan and George Lawson, *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations*, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139565073 as they identify industrialization, rational state building and ideologies of progress as part of interlinked processes transforming international order.

[89] Georgios Varouxakis, '"Great" versus "Small" Nations: Size and National Greatness in Victorian Political Thought', in *Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought*, ed. Duncan Bell, Ideas in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 136–58, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490439.007.

[90] Paul Keal, *European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness of International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

[91] José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Maria Birnbaum, 'Religion', in *Concepts in World Politics*, ed. Felix Berenskoetter (California: Sage, 2016), 233–50.

external influence on politics…".[92] Yet, it seems studying the international without scrutinising religion could be incomplete. As stipulated by Clifford Geertz, "to leave religion out is not so much to stage the play without the prince as without the plot."[93] It means exploring religion beyond the sporadic studies on religion and global conflicts.[94] This differing contexts, on whether religion in IR gains meaning through conflict and/or violence[95] or through promoting good[96], is a manifestation on how theoretical, temporal, and socio-political contexts influence delineating concepts.

The differing contexts matter. If we take religion as impertinent and private, then the meaning would be different. However, if both temporally and theoretically, we acknowledge religion "at the root of modern international relations"[97] and

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[92] Elizabeth S Hurd, 'A Suspension of (Dis)Belief: The Secular-Religious Binary and the Study of International Relations', in *Rethinking Secularism*, ed. Craig J. Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 167.

[93] Clifford Geertz, *Available Light* (Princeton University Press, 2000), 174, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt7rkn7.

[94] Jack L. Snyder, ed., *Religion and International Relations Theory*, Religion, Culture, and Public Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Friedrich Kratochwil, 'Religion and (Inter-)National Politics: On the Heuristics of Identities, Structures, and Agents', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 30, no. 2 (April 2005): 113–40, https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540503000201; Mark Juergensmeyer, Margo Kitts, and Michael K. Jerryson, eds., *Violence and the World's Religious Traditions: An Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[95] For example, Daniel H. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), XI links the renewed interest in the nexus between religion and international relations to the aftermath of the September 11, 2001. Same assertion is made in Robert M Bosco, 'Persistent Orientalisms: The Concept of Religion in International Relations', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 12, no. 1 (March 2009): 90–111, https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2008.27.

[96] Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion*, 2017.

[97] Daniel Philpott, 'The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations', *World Politics* 52, no. 2 (January 2000): 206, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100002604.

"as part of any post-Westphalian international order"[98] then the conceptual scope encompasses IR. These variations offer us distinct understanding: one, religion as a descriptor and justifier of actions; second, religion as an explanatory concept; third, religion from a broader scale as conditioning action and explanation.

I refer to religion either as part of the assessment of the international society and international relations. I also rely on it, specifically through its Persian translations of *dîn* or *mazhab* or *Shari'ah* that are rooted in Islamic traditions that also denote tradition, law or custom.[99] The linguistic[100] and etymological roots of these concepts are older than how we rely on religion within International Relations. This study's scrutiny of the role of religion starts from 1500 but International Relations' usual[101] benchmark date for the discipline's engagement with religion is the heavily criticised[102] date for the Peace of Westphalia.[103] One

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[98] Thomas, 'Faith, History and Martin Wight: The Role of Religion in the Historical Sociology of the English School of International Relations', 816.

[99] For an overview, see John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*, 1st ed. (Oxford University Press, 2013), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195395891.001.0001; Anver M. Emon, *Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: 'Dhimmīs' and Others in the Empire of Law*, First Edition, Oxford Islamic Legal Studies (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[100] I am aware this might expose me to the charge of linguistic anachronism.

[101] For an exception, see William Bain, *Political Theology of International Order*, New product (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020). Bain traces modern theories of international order to medieval theology.

[102] On Westphalia as a myth, see Andreas Osiander, *The States System of Europe, 1640-1990 Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability* (Oxford: Oxford : Clarendon, 1994); For a criticism of its historical accuracy, see Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1996).

[103] Also see Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change* on mobilization of transnational religious movements in 16th and 17th centuries.

reading of this peace advocates how ending the conflict enabled privatisation of religion, hitherto through spread of the Westphalian state system that secularised the international.[104] In such reading, religion is conceptualised as conflictual if exist in public and source of stability as a private matter.

According to Scott Thomas, 16th-century Europe was still deeply infused with religious authority. It drew the lines between communities, shaped the form and content of its practices and gave legitimacy to social and political hierarchies. As the sovereign state emerged, it needed to transfer the ultimate loyalty of its population from religion to the state in order to consolidate the state's power. The "previous [intellectual and social] discipline of religion was taken over by the state, which was given the legitimate monopoly on the use of power and coercion in society".[105]

The initial reading treats the concept of religion as receding in the face of sovereign state. It meant as secularisation of Europe. Yet, this concept of religion actually interprets as the Catholic Church and only applicable to Europe.[106] Aside from obvious Euro-centric obfuscations,[107] this approach also regulates meaning of life through detaching religion from the public realm, moving it to

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[104] Philpott, 'The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations'.

[105] Scott M. Thomas, 'Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Society', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 3 (December 2000): 822, https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290030401.

[106] Ibid., 54.

[107] For example, 'the main constitutive elements of the practices of international relations were purposely established in early modern Europe to end the Wars of Religion': Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, eds., *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*, 1st ed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 1.

the private sphere, and transforming sources of morality.[108] The centrality of religion in this context the emphasis put on its reach, conceives of it as set of ideas, norms, doctrine, and beliefs.[109] According to this conception, this set only belongs to the private. The consequence of this is to label any religious affair in the public realm as an outlier. This enables deeming societies where religion is not so private as a dangerous to the Western order.[110] It also undermines the possibility of studying practices as part of the religion as they also constitute religion.[111]

Throughout the rest of this study, where I refer religion, I mean series of discursive and meaning-making practices that signifies belief and produce observable (political or social) effect.[112] The concept and meaning of religion constitute social and political life and offers the potential of conceptualising the international too. The latter is mainly through observing emergence of identities across different spaces. The emphasis on effect is in tangent to this study's aim to elucidate conditions of possibilities: religion, "create[s] the possibility of the very behaviour that they regulate".[113] They constitute the social life.

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[108] William E. Connolly, *Why I Am Not a Secularist* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 19–25.

[109] Birnbaum, 'Religion'.

[110] Buzan, 'Culture and International Society'.

[111] Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

[112] This formulation is inspired by Lisa Wedeen, 'Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science', *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 4 (December 2002): 713–28, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055402000400.

[113] John R. Searle, 'The Purpose of This Book', in *Making the Social World* (Oxford University Press, 2010), 10, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195396171.003.0001.

Such constitution is vital to grasp the relevance of the concept of religion, and to also assess how we study it within International Relations. That means going beyond just having it as an add-on variable.[114] It requires to be treated as a fundamental category alongside concepts such as class, and to be understood through various temporal contexts. That is not the only context. This is evident from how religion is used and analysed in ensuing chapters across different historical epochs. As we are focusing on representations of Europe, comparing those chapters show how, for example, Christian Europe or Christendom defines geopolitics more religiously. It is not just about social life but a significant marker through contradiction, or as mentioned above, as opposing concepts. The reverse is also valid. Europe often defines[115] itself through contrasting its difference within the "Islamic world".[116]

Thus far, the concept lurks multiple meanings and makes social life possible. It also creates a register of difference. This goes back to the earlier discussion of the framework of this thesis, outlining how identity requires a series of differences. Concept of religion, within IR and in everyday, is capable of being such register. There are other concepts, beyond opposing concepts, that often provide additional meaning or layer to our conceptual vocabulary. The earlier review of how concepts work and influence each other, paves the way to also understand

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[114] Jonathan Fox and Shemu'el Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations*, Culture and Religion in International Relations (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 1.

[115] For a comprehensive examination of the emergence of 'world religions' in modern European thought, see Tomoko Masuzawa, *The Invention of World Religions, or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

[116] Timothy A Byrnes, 'Transnational Religion and Europeanization', in *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, ed. Timothy A Byrnes and Peter J Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 2006), 284.

the nexus between religion and a cognate concept: civilisation. In fact, some argue that religion was "'the principal source of the religion' because of its softening manner."

Civilisation: Concept, Standard, Project

The framework chapter referred to 'Standard of Civilisation'[117] as one of the foundational concepts of the English School.[118] In general terms, it emerged as a way to address unequal relationship between the extant members of the international society and 'new' polities or members.[119] As demonstrated by Holsti, the concept itself evolved from a strict legal term in the 19th century to a more expansive one after 1945.[120] Notwithstanding such change, 'Standard of Civilisation'[121] itself relies on the basic concept of civilisation that is the focus of

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[117] In my writing, I use inverted commas for this, to signify its construction and subjective nature. When quoting, I rely on the original text's use of quotation marks or inverted commas.

[118] Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society*.

[119] For an analysis of emergence and relevance of this, see Buzan, 'The "Standard of Civilisation" as an English School Concept'.

[120] K. J Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 128–30.

[121] In addition to the English School, International Law and other theoretical orientations also rely on the 'Standard of Civlisation'. For example, see David P. Fidler, 'The Return of the Standard of Civilization', *Chicago Journal of International Law* 2, no. 1 (4 January 2001): 137–57, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1123&context=cjil; David P. Fidler, 'A Kinder, Gentler System or Capitulations? International Law, Structural Adjustment Policies, and the Standard of Liberal, Globalized Civilization', *Texas International Law Journal* 35, no. 3 (2000); Brett Bowden and Leonard Seabrooke, eds., *Global Standards of Market Civilization*, Routledge/RIPE Studies in Global Political Economy (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006); John M Hobson, 'The Twin Self-Delusions of IR: Why "Hierarchy" and Not "Anarchy" Is the Core Concept of IR', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 42, no. 3 (June 2014): 557–75, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829814537364; Jack Donnelly, 'Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?', *International Affairs* 74, no. 1 (January 1998): 1–23, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00001; Dimitrios Stroikos, 'Introduction: Rethinking the Standard(s) of Civilisation(s) in International Relations', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 42, no. 3 (June 2014): 546–56, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829814546585; Ann Towns, 'The

this section. The shift in 'Standard of Civilisation', and its ramifications within the Iranian discourse, will be the subject of other parts of this study.[122]

The Oxford English Dictionary traces the etymology of civilisation to the French[123] words *civil* and *civilité* (thirteenth and fourteenth century), derived from the Latin *civitas*.[124] But neither of them, nor the related family of words such as *poli* (polite), *policé* (organised), *polite* (all broadly relevant to law, order, administration), had a corresponding noun. It was invented for the sake of linguistic convenience.[125] The current concept of *civilisation* emerged in the eighteenth century.[126] The term was rather new as the previous ones were "no longer sufficient", so the new one "had to be called *civilization* in order to define together both its direction and continuity".[127] It emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century.[128]

Status of Women as a Standard of "Civilization"', *European Journal of International Relations* 15, no. 4 (2009): 681–706, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066109345053.

[122] The shift is evident by comparing chapters 5 and 6.

[123] For origins of civilisation in other languages, see Brett Bowden, 'The Ideal of Civilization: Its Origins, Meanings, and Implications', in *The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea* (University of Chicago Press, 2009), https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226068169.001.0001.

[124] Oxford University Press, 'Civilization', in *Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/33584?redirectedFrom=civilisation#eid.

[125] Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations* (New York: A. Lane, 1994), 4.

[126] Oxford University Press, 'Civilization'.

[127] Emile Benveniste, *Problems in General Linguistics*, Miami Linguistics Series, no. 8 (Coral Gables, Fla: University of Miami Press, 1971), 292.

[128] See Bruce Mazlish, *Civilization and Its Contents* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2004); Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, 2014, 57–60; Bowden, 'The Ideal of Civilization: Its Origins, Meanings, and Implications'; Braudel, *A History of Civilizations*.

The initial meaning of *civilisation*, as elaborated in the Trévoux *Dictionnaire universel* of 1743, was "term of jurisprudence. An act of justice or judgement that renders a criminal trial civil. *Civilization* is accomplished by converting informations (*informations*) into inquests (*enquêtes*) or by other means." Similar meanings mainly revolving around legalistic takes and jurisprudential gain more traction in 1750s, with early examples found in Victor de Riqueti, marquis de Mirabeau's Treatise on Population in 1756. Then the concept travelled across Europe, such as Britain through one of the key texts of the Scottish Enlightenment in 1767.[129] Lucien Febvre's attempt to find the word *civilization* in published French text led him to the below passage published in 1766:

> When a savage people has become civilized, we must not put an end to the act of *civilization* by giving it rigid and irrevocable laws; we must make it look upon the legislation given to it as a form of *continuous civilization*.[130]

In addition to the legal meanings involved, it signifies the 'savage people' as the other. 'Savages' and 'barbarians' were Europe's generic pejorative concepts applicable to the non-European others.[131] The othering aspect of a concept was

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[129] Adam Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511806599; Also see Krishan Kumar, 'The Return of Civilization—and of Arnold Toynbee?', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, no. 4 (October 2014): 825 and 834, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417514000413.

[130] Lucien Febvre, *A New Kind of History: From the Writings of Febvre*, ed. Peter Burke (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), 220–222.

[131] See Paul Cartledge, *Greeks, The: A Portrait of Self and Others.* (Oxford, UNITED KINGDOM: Oxford University Press, 2002), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/londonschoolecons/detail.action?docID=4963387.

not a novel phenomenon.[132] What makes civilisation and its othering worthy of a separate discussion is the transformation of the concept throughout the history, its global scale, temporal and spatial consequences, and it's use in international relations (and its study). The concept of civilisation, in its early iterations as above, connotes advancement and a stadial process that should be regarded as an important achievement.

If you ask yourself what civilisation means today,[133] it probably resembles the basic meanings found in the European texts of the nineteenth century with some added contemporary elements an example. That is what the concept is supposed to do. It unifies the themes and give a generalised label to human achievement. In the nineteenth century, made Europe feel distinct about where it as and legitimates its actions and relations with what they called 'non-civilised'. A concept ranks the whole of the globe. It shaped the imperial relationships through creating set of practices and emancipating a hierarchical order. How a concept is capable of doing so?

In addition to how civilisation enables othering, it is an evaluative and descriptive concept. It describes the others and the historical processes, while ordering them based on what is deemed more civilised or better. It also creates a sequence between the degree of being civilised and having opposing concepts such as

[132] See the framework chapter.

[133] See the preface to Christopher Coker, *The Rise of the Civilizational State* (Cambridge: Polity, 2019).

savages and barbarians. It creates a global register of difference, that makes sense of the non-Europe, and a single timescale that is intrinsically linked to progress.

At the same time, despite the othering features, it also attempts to turn the Other into the Self: by civilising them and creating boundaries[134] of identity. That aspect merits a more substantive discussion on the links between colonialism, empires and the concept of civilisation but this thesis and this chapter are not meant to do so. However, I must note the Eurocentric nature and scope of the concept of civilisation.[135] The concept emerged in Europe, privileges Europe at the epistemological level, and attempt make it universal through various philosophies of history. These political, temporal, and theoretical contexts matter in knowing the concept we are dealing with. At the same time, its circulation to the other parts of world makes it vital to explore its reception beyond Europe, and if it was transformed. That transformation within the Iranian discourse is touched upon in upcoming chapters, though the focus of this study is not the concept of civilisation. It will be assessed as a component of Iran's conception of Europe. Later in this chapter, I will also provide a brief overview of translations of the concept in Iran circa the nineteenth century and if any similar concept existed prior to that.[136]

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[134] Mark B. Salter, *Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 15–18.

[135] See John M. Hobson, *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004); John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics : Western International Theory, 1760-2010* (New York: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[136] For an argument on linking civilisation to the concept of society, see Bruce Mazlish, 'Civilization in a Historical and Global Perspective', *International Sociology* 16, no. 3 (September 2001): 294, https://doi.org/10.1177/026858001016003003.

The pluralisation, circulation, and articulation of the nineteenth century idea of civilisation is an important part of the history of this concept. That is not the full picture. The concept evolved through changing semantic, theoretical, material and socio-political contexts.[137] Since its emergence, we had wars, decolonisation, revolutions, and depressions. Such material and socio-political contexts influenced the concept and fuelled the plurality of meanings. Felipe Fernandez-Armesto highlighted three existing meanings for the concept, rejected all of them, and came up with a new one.[138] The extant meanings were alluding to 1) delineating difference with barbarians and savages, 2) a fragment of history, 3) notable stability in thought or ideology.[139] Fernandez-Armesto defined it as a relationship "to the natural environment".[140]

All of these definitions emerge out of generations of studies within social sciences that their views of civilisation depend on whether they essentialise the concept or not.[141] The first phase studies offered a rather narrow understanding of civilisation. For example, Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss constituted a civilisation as "a kind of moral milieu encompassing a certain number of nations,

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[137] In addition to the above on layers and contexts in analysing concepts, see Johann P. Arnason, 'Civilizational Patterns and Civilizing Processes', *International Sociology* 16, no. 3 (September 2001): 387–405, https://doi.org/10.1177/026858001016003009.

[138] Martin Hall and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 'Introduction: Civilizations and International Relations Theory', in *Civilizational Identity: The Production and Reproduction of "Civilizations" in International Relations* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 2–3.

[139] Ibid., 3.

[140] Ibid.

[141] On different generations or phases of civilisation studies, see Edward A. Tiryakian, 'Introduction: The Civilization of Modernity and the Modernity of Civilizations', *International Sociology* 16, no. 3 (September 2001): 277–92, https://doi.org/10.1177/026858001016003002.

each national culture being only a particular form of the whole."[142] It is a pluralist conception that highlights distinct groupings or what they call "families of peoples."[143] The second phase of civilisational studies expanded it by understanding it "as a dynamic entity, really as a process of actualisation rather than as a finished project."[144] For example, the work Norbert Elias gives a relational[145] and processual understanding of "the making of the modern individual as distinctly disciplined (or regulated), reflexive creature of civilisation."[146] His interpretivist account builds on shortcomings of classic sociological approach to civilisations, to come up with a universal and long term understanding of the civilising process.[147] Contrary to Durkheim and Mauss' assertion on plurality of civilisations which grants the possibility of having smaller units within a broader framework, Elias analysed civilisation as an unitary concept[148] that, simply put, hinges on self-restraint, specifically when it comes to violence.[149] The caveat here is Elias assumes the society would impose this in

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[142] 'Note on the Notion of Civlisation', *Social Research* 38, no. 4 (1971): 811, www.jstor.org/stable/40970769.

[143] Ibid., 809 and 811.

[144] Tiryakian, 'Introduction', 286; Hall and Jackson, 'Introduction: Civilizations and International Relations Theory'.

[145] At the same time, there have been attempts to incorporate such relation view into Martin Wight's substantialist account of the international society. See Linklater, *Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems*.

[146] From Hall and Jackson, 'Introduction: Civilizations and International Relations Theory'.

[147] Arnason, 'Civilizational Patterns and Civilizing Processes', 389.

[148] At the same time, Elias embraces the possibility of thinking "from the standpoint of the multiplicity of people": Norbert Elias, *Reflections on a life* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 140.

[149] Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process* (Oxford [England] ; Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1994).

order to achieve it, yet it is an underestimation of how there is some degree of regulation done by the international society.

Within the same generation of civilisational analysts, Benjamin Nelson focuses on "intercivilisational encounters" between "civilisation complex".[150] The latter, replacing 'civilisations', defines as fragment of cultural patterns and spheres that enables complex societies. For Nelson, complex societies are inherently political but internally diffused (with different nations, institutions, classes, and cultural experiences).[151] Such conceptualisation of civilisation privileges symbolic aspects and cultural relevance.[152]

The third generation of civilisational analysis is marked with understanding cultural conflicts as the factor setting the path in defining civilisation. Einstadt extrapolates history within civilisations and pursuit of modernisation, that leads to multiple modernities.[153] Then we have Huntington's thesis on the clash of civilisation, that despite focusing on history, it is more of predictive account of civlisation: that they will clash. He defines civilisation through shared "blood, language, religion, way of life" that acts as the "broadest" level of identity and "highest" societal grouping.[154]

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[150] Benjamin Nelson, 'Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters', *Sociological Analysis* 34, no. 2 (1973): 79, https://doi.org/10.2307/3709717.

[151] Ibid., 82.

[152] On an English School take that ascribes cultural zones between system of states, see Wight, *Systems of States*, 33–35.

[153] Shmuel N Eisenstadt, *Multiple Modernities.*, 2017.

[154] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 43.

Lets go back to figure 1 and how various layers and contexts shape our understanding of concepts. Each of these generations of civilizational analysis engage with different temporal, material, theoretical, and socio-political contexts. It matters if the Cold War or post-Cold War context, or the interwar period shaped studying civilisation. For example, Robert Cox defines civilisation through an interplay of material conditions and intersubjective meanings which reveals the theoretical context of his conceptualisation.[155] Such concept of civilisation is rapidly changing, and constantly influenced by "an amalgam of social forces."[156] Or take R.G. Collingwood's notion of having three dimensional civilisation: economic, social and legal. In all three, defined "[c]ivilisation is *something which happens to a community* … Civilisation is a *process of approximation to an ideal state*."[157]

How does this manuscript understand civilisation? It is a loaded and complex term with different meanings across various times and spaces.[158] In analytical terms, civilisation should be understood as not rigid and not in essentialist terms but dynamic. It should take into account the entanglements between society, economy, and intellectual history. Such view draws on Braudel's account for the

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[155] Robert W. Cox and Michael G. Schechter, *The Political Economy of a Plural World: Critical Reflections on Power, Morals and Civilization*, Routledge/RIPE Series in Global Political Economy (London ; New York: Routledge, 2002).

[156] Ibid., 143.

[157] R. G. (Robin George) Collingwood, *The New Leviathan : Or, Man, Society, Civilization and Barbarism* (Oxford: Oxford, 1942), 283.

[158] See Jacinta O'Hagan, 'Discourses of Civilizational Identity', in *Civilizational Identity: The Production and Reproduction of "Civilizations" in International Relations* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Mazlish, 'Civilization in a Historical and Global Perspective'.

necessity of locating civilisation in distinct geographies and scrutinising the entanglements.[159]

Then what is the conception of civilisation in the Iranian discourse? As expected, it takes a while for the circulation of the concept, in its European form or translation, to appear. There are various engagements with English and French terms, and notably figures such as Arnold Toynbee's account of civilisation that I outline in later in this study. At the same time, the discourse is influenced by broader historical entanglements with the Persianate world and exchanges with, for example, the Ottoman empire.[160] If we take civilisation on an individual level, to practice civility, cognate concepts emerging in early eighteenth century and populated in mid-nineteenth century are *tarbiyat* (culture or education) or *tazhib* (gilding) that deals with being refined.

At the core of it, the concept of civility connoted moral substance that is also susceptible to change through attaining certain behaviours. It also encapsulates paradoxes: one can be civilised and uncivilised at the same time. You can have proper behaviour and also improper behaviour. [161] The substantive understanding of civility and morality also made it sacrosanct: something ingraine in own's practice and identity that shall not be obtained or learnt from

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[159] Fernand Braudel, *On History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Braudel, *A History of Civilizations*, 9–23.

[160] See preceding chapter.

[161] Mana Kia, 'Moral Refinement and Manhood in Persian', in *Civilizing Emotions: Concepts in Nineteenth Century Asia and Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198745532.001.0001.

the Other. Thus, the resistance to 'civility' emanating from non-Muslim polities and peoples.

Getting back to the semantic context of our conceptual analysis, certain words gets paired through one of their meanings and attached to civlity. For example, civility, broadly meaning as *adab*, is comes with cognate concepts such as custome or rite, *a'in*, custom or manner, *rasm*, or habits as *adat* share meanings with morality and *adab*. As illustrated by Kia, the cognate concepts changes the meanings by having "the conceptual indivisibility of moral substance and behavioural manifestation" being equated to civlity.[162] Yet, it raises civlity as an individual trait and a collective virtue.

While some attributes the moral perfection to moderation as a modern concept, it could be traces to a much more ancient concept of *Peyman* and *etedal.* The latter date back to the fifth century BCE, enshrining moderation and being measured.[163] The historical context created a tension at an idea of civlity that was only possible in urbanity (*madaniyat* or *tamaddun*). It lead to have new cognate concepts dealing with equity, *insaf*, and justice, *edalat*. So the concept of civilisation gets translated into myriad of concepts. As discussed earlier, often an investigation into opposing concepts would be useful to understand the original one. Savagery and ignorance are often associated as the opposites to civlisation,

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[162] Ibid.

[163] Daryaee, Touraj. 'Herodotus on Drinking Wine in the Achaemenid World: Greek and Persian Perceptions'. In *Iranian Languages and Culture: Essays in Honor of Gernot Ludwig Windfuhr*, edited by Behrad Aghaei and Mohammad Reza Ghanoonparvar. Costa Mesa, Calif: Mazda Publ, 2012.

that gets translated as wild or *vahshi*. It was the attributed to those beyond the urban space lacking in education. The relevant caveat is when we realise often Europe or the West were and are regarded as *vahshi* or violent.[164]

By the mid-twentieth century, the *Lughatnamah*, Ali Akbar Dehkhuda (1879–1956) important dictionary, that is the Iranian version of the OED, defined *madaniyat* as urbanity and city. Here is when the entangled nature of languages kicks in. *Madaniyat*, linked with *tamaddun* as civilisation, is also attributed to the city of Medina in Saudi Arabia which was where the Prophet Muhammad ruled. It is regarded as the model of justice, equity, and morality. At the same time, as Kia notes, *madaniyat* is defined as 'the manner of the character (*akhlaq*) of the inhabitants of a city: the transformation from roughness, uncouthness and ignorance to states of refinement, sociability, and learning".

Let us now step back for a moment. All of this, ranging from the emergence of civilisation and *tamaddun*, to religious versus secular divide discussed earlier, as concepts with various contexts, provide us with a matrix of difference that orders the socio-political space through a hierarchical timescale. This understanding is shaped by the three approaches to conceptual analysis that I outlined in the first part of this chapter. These are distinct but not exclusive approaches. That is what I do. I rely on the historical approach to sharpen the critical conceptual analysis. That is why in addition to being cognisant of the temporal context of how central concepts emerge, I noted potential directionality and ramifications of each concept. A more critical appraisal of how these concepts shape the analysis and

[164] The translation would be the wild west.

are embedded within the findings, specifically how Iran's representation of Europe shapes that, is part of the what comes next in this study.

III

History:

Introduction to Europe

To study the imagination of a society is to go to the heart of its consciousness and historical evolution.

- Jacques Le Goff, *The Medieval Imagination*

The previous chapters laid out the theoretical and conceptual frameworks enabling the study of Iran's representation of Europe. The theoretical discussion noted the English School's historical orientation and assessed the relevance of suzerainty to the School's foundations and this project. Chapter two outlined the emergence of concept and their transformation. Both elaborated on the necessity of historical contexts and grasping the emergence or fusion of memories into registers of difference that leads to creating identity. Yet, the Safavid period is not the starting point of Iranian history or its relationships with others. The index of meanings that this study is supposed to analyse, did not emerge out of nowhere. They require context.[165] Moreover, international societies do not emerge out of nowhere either. They are predicated on the existence of a system of states (or international system). Such system, within the

[165] On contexts, see earlier discussions on concepts and framework.

English School, mirrors power politics. It is "formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause them to behave - at least in some measure - as parts of a whole."[166] This take is further inspired by the English School's attention to the suzerain entities, specifically Persia as an empire and the Persian-Greek relations.[167] Moreover, the traditions and relations between the Roman Empire and the Persian empire are regarded as a "test-case" for assessing system of states in the suzerain era.[168]

This chapter offers a historical background on Iran and Europe's encounters to illuminate the origins of the representations of Europe, and if Iran was part of a society or a system. It underlines how the present is deeply connected with critical junctures and pathways of the past. Engaging in depth with studying identity, discourse, and concepts would always require a substantial effort to analyse the roots of discourses, and how these have developed alongside the Iranian polity itself. This also links back to understanding the temporal, historical, and socio-political contexts of the concepts that make them contextual and particular.

The context and particularity open possibility of interpretation but not to an extent that everything is always possible. The ensuing background does not embrace historical linearity and determinism[169] but, as pointed in chapter 2,

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[166] Bull, *The Anarchical Society : A Study of Order in World Politics*, 9.
[167] See Wight, *Systems of States*.

[168] Ibid., 24.

[169] For an example, see Richard M. Price, *The Chemical Weapons Taboo* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1997). In showing how the chemical weapons taboo was a product of identity constructions and order throughout various historical junctures, Price's genealogical analysis produces a methodologically sane piece that also touches on alternatives.

actively notes historical contingencies, and discontinued continuities. What follows, enable understanding non-linear paths in formation, evolution, and usage of concepts throughout multiple conjunctures. The question for this study, again, is not 'what happened and why?' but 'how did certain concepts[170] get here' or 'how certain representations become possible?'.[171]

This overview is vital to understand how Iran's discourses of Europe[172] have evolved alongside the changes of the Iranian polity, Europe and ensuing conceptual constellations that emerged as nodal points in the Iranian discourse. Conforming to Foucault's view, a meaningful and salient analysis of the current day concepts should be rooted in an in-depth understanding on how these concepts, and their position in the relevant discourses first came into being, and their development through the contingencies of history.[173] As Lene Hansen has formulated it as a key methodological move for a good discourse analysis:

> Current representations might not repeat historical articulations slavishly, but they would have to relate themselves thereto. (…) A structured reading of conceptual history provides, where applicable, important knowledge on how constructions of identity

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[170] This also opens up a pandora box entailing stability of concepts and utterances. One cannot claim that *all* meaning is unstable. Moreover, chronological, geographical, or grammatical criteria are imposed to ensure stabilisation of language or historical interpretations. These are analytical shortcuts. See Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 19. For more, consult Kevin C. Dunn and Iver B. Neumann, *Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016), 59, 119. For a contrasting view on discursive stability, see Laura Shepherd, 'A User's Guide: Analyzing Security as Discourse', *International Studies Review* 8, no. 4 (6 December 2006): 656–57, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2006.00635.x.

[171] For an overarching theoretical and methodological discussion, see Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History'.

[172] For a conceptual history of Europe, see Boer et al., *The History of the Idea of Europe*.

[173] Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', 76–99.

have been argued in the past and thus a good indication of where 'discursive fault lines' might be located in the present.[174]

The role Europe played for Iran's Self changed immensely, over the course of a few centuries, as the concept of Europe took on a variety of radically new meanings and got enmeshed into a complex interplay of internal and external socio-economic and political developments. In mapping these representations, I have identified a number of foundational conceptualisations that shape the discourse, defines a role and function for Europe, and highlights the relevance of Europe. The study captures these conceptualisations and utterances.

While meaning-making practices have changed throughout this history, the particular act of creating meaning stays the same despite changing context.[175] To gloss it with philosophy of science terms, there is not a radical epistemological break between traditional and modern[176] societies.[177] This is important to avoid treating history as an 'idealised place-holder' to reify myths of modernity,[178] but to ascertain their relevance in studying various meaning-making practices that highlights historical situatedness of concepts, theories, ideas, and debates.[179]

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[174] Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 46–48.

[175] For an opposing view on historical context making and generation, see Kratochwil, *Praxis*.

[176] On how the modern world was not an entirely new construction, but based on pre-existing origins see Michael Allen Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity* (Chicago, Ill.: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2008).

[177] Jeffrey C. Alexander, *Performance and Power* (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).

[178] Julia Costa Lopez, 'Bringing the Middle Ages Back In', *International Studies Review* 20, no. 1 (2018): 161–63, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix062.

[179] However, when discussing certain aspects of history such as the Middle Ages, Martin Wight argued it is 'impossible to use the word "international" in speaking of medieval politics without serious anachronism and distortion'. See Wight, *Systems of States*, 26–27.

I have already detailed challenges of capturing these practices and utterances in the framework chapter. For the purpose of this background, lack of extant conceptual histories and scarcity of resources are the hurdles in providing an overview. Despite range of illustrious histories of Iran,[180] and encounter(s) with Europe, that often deals with modernity, and few texts on identity construction in contemporary Iran, there is no comprehensive conceptual history that I can rely to find the historical and present discursive fault lines. At the same time, specifically when venturing into earlier histories, we are faced with either lack of sources or existence of problematic ones.[181]

For example, there are no Iranian annals of Persia's relationship with Greeks,[182] or no books have survived from Seleucid (323–64 B.C.), Parthian (247 B.C.–224 A.D.) or Sasanian (224–651 A.D.) Iran.[183] There are few translated versions with doubtful provenance,[184] and trove of archaeological findings that only came to light in early 20th century dealing.[185] We have accounts from

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[180] Homa Katouzian, *The Persians: Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern Iran* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009); Abbas Amanat, *Iran: A Modern History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017); Ali M. Ansari, *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139020978. There are also eminent encyclopaedic or handbook series such as various volumes of the Cambridge History of Iran (see bibliography) or Touraj Daryaee, *The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History* (Oxford University Press, 2012), https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199732159.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199732159.

[181] See G. Widengren, 'SOURCES OF PARTHIAN AND SASANIAN HISTORY', in *The Cambridge History of Iran: Seleucid Parthian: Volume 3: The Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanid Periods*, ed. E. Yarshater, vol. 3, The Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1259–83, https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521246934.026.

[182] E. Badian, 'ALEXANDER IN IRAN', in *The Cambridge History of Iran: Volume 2: The Median and Achaemenian Periods*, ed. I. Gershevitch, vol. 2, The Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 420–501, https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521200912.009.

[183] Ehsan Yarshater, 'Iranian National History', in *The Cambridge History of Iran: Volume 3: The Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanid Periods*, ed. E. Yarshater, vol. 3, The Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 359–478, https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521200929.014.

[184] Ibid.

[185] Khodadad Rezakhani, *Reorienting the Sasanians: Eastern Iran in Late Antiquity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017).

Roman or Greek biographers, historians, or officials that narrate the histories involving Persians or convey a reading of inscriptions. Such sources could inform this background, but they would not be able to add much to the discourse as they fall out of the methodological choice outlined in chapter 1: translating another language into Persian would undermine the consistency of source selection.

This chapter closely follows how a particular narrative on Europe, that proliferated and embodied in certain concepts, were already extant in Iranian discourse when talking about Rome and foreigners. They hinged on stipulating differences. They did not appear abruptly. Akin to Russia and Turkey,[186] Iran's vicinity to European land, continent and culture made it a recognised entity. Europe was not so much of a *terra incognita*. This is not discarding the relational processes that took place to further discover and debate Europe later on. Europe's existence on the periphery was acknowledged, and coming centuries led to more knowledge about it. Given the vast political, cultural and linguistic boundaries of the *Persianate world*,[187] entities such as Siam[188] or India were more recognisable with established entanglements.[189]

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[186] Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations, Second Edition*.Wigen, *State of Translation : Turkey in Interlingual Relations*.

[187] While there are historical sources attesting how habitants of regional entities and empires in Iran, Central Asia, India (and the subcontinent), Ottoman, Anatolia, Shaybanids, and Mughals often utilised the same term, academia embraced the term after the publication of Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam : Conscience and History in a World Civilization. Volume One, The Classical Age of Islam*, Paperback ed. (Chicago, Ill. : University of Chicago Press, 1977), vol. 2. 293-4.

[188] On this, I have benefited from few discussions with Anahita Arian in September 2017. Her forthcoming project is Anahita Arian, 'Encountering the Siamese: Safavid Practices of Knowledge Production' (Panel Presentation, 13th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Sofia, 14 September 2019), https://www.czech-in.org/cmPortalv15/Searchable/PEC19/config/normal#!sessiondetails/0000124080_0; Alire Bohranipour, 'Negahi be monasebat-e Iran va Siam (Thailand) dar roozegar-e Shah Soleiman Safavi (11006-1077/1666-94) ba tekiyeh bar naghshe diasporaye Iranian dar Siam', *Tarikhe Ravabate Khareji* 1383, no. 20 (2004), http://ensani.ir/fa/article/75459.

[189] The overlaps of area studies (Eurasian studies, Iranian studies, Persianate studies) and further scrutiny of these spaces, historical or contemporary, could make valuable inroads

These knowledges are essential in a *longue durée* of discursive developments and related identity formation and history of the international. As noted earlier, attention to historical constructions of Europe (and its variations) has critical importance for showing the concept in question and related identities are production and reproduction of particular identities (selves) that manifest themselves in older materials and in some cases, change later on. The rest of this chapter offers a historical reading of meaning-making practices that shaped the discourse. and discuss in more detail how these discourses articulate specific spatial, temporal, and moral consequences. As much as revealing how Europe was represented, it reveals the self's perception of status and self. This historical overview also provides us with foundational understanding of space, time, ethics, and moral judgements of the Iranian self.

I. The Ancient Past

The histories of Herodotus validate prominence and relevance of Iran (more accurately, 'Persia') in foundational narratives of Europe and the West. In addition to providing a historical gaze to the conflicts between the Persians and the Greeks,[190] it is one of the earliest sustained explorations of difference and

into International Relations. A longer discussion of this belongs to the final chapter. Few examples that I am aware of: Joseph MacKay, 'Rethinking Hierarchies in East Asian Historical IR', *Journal of Global Security Studies* 0, no. 0 (2018): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogy028; Iver B Neumann and Einar Wigen, *The Steppe Tradition in International Relations: Russians, Turks and European State Building 4000 BCE-2018 CE*, 2018; Filippo Costa Buranelli, 'Knockin' on Heaven's Door: Russia, Central Asia and the Mediated Expansion of International Society', *Millennium* 42, no. 3 (1 June 2014): 817–36, https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829814540356; Kamran Matin, 'Uneven and Combined Development in World History: The International Relations of State-Formation in Premodern Iran', *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3 (1 September 2007): 419–47, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107080132.

[190] A. R. Burn, 'PERSIA AND THE GREEKS', in *The Cambridge History of Iran: Volume 2: The Median and Achaemenian Periods*, ed. I. Gershevitch, vol. 2, The Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 292–391, https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521200912.007.

conceiving the Other.[191] But how did Iranians perceive them? As mentioned earlier, there is no Iranian *chef-d'œuvre* that could be relied on, but we have series of sporadic texts and monuments that will assist elucidating the context.

One of the earliest examples is the Zoroastrian sources that labelled Alexander III of Macedon, who brought an end to the Achaemenid empire (330 BC),[192] as "evil Alexander".[193] This is clearly a mnemonic manifestation of a military confrontation. Despite emerging diplomatic encounters[194] and trade contacts,[195] numerous battles underpin representing the Other. State of war between Rome and Persia was "endemic" from the third to the seventh century.[196] That is why most of representations, specifically underscoring Otherness, were embedded within military contexts. The Other, the different, was subjugated, or dead, or defeated. These memorialisation and inscription were acts of celebration. A famous instance is *naqsh-i Rostam*'s monumental relief near Persepolis (see figure 1).[197]

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[191] François Hartog and Janet Lloyd, *The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History* (Berkeley, Calif; London: University of California Press, 2009).

[192] In addition to earlier cited volumes (such as Amanat, *Iran: A Modern History*; Daryaee, *The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History*; Katouzian, *The Persians: Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern Iran*.

[193] Amanat, *Iran: A Modern History*, 16.

[194] Here, I am using 'diplomacy' and 'diplomatic' loosely aligned with James Der Derian's definition as mediation of estrangements. See James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford, OX, UK ; New York, NY, USA: B. Blackwell, 1987). For more, below could be consulted: Costas M. Constantinou, *On the Way to Diplomacy*, Borderlines, v. 7 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Ragnar Numelin, *The Beginnings of Diplomacy : A Sociological Study of Inter-Tribal and International Relations* (London: London : Oxford University Press, 1950).

[195] Cf. Gary K. Young, *Rome's Eastern Trade: International Commerce and Imperial Policy, 31 BC-AD 305*, 1. issued in paperback (London New York: Routledge, 2011).

[196] Beate Dignas and Engelbert Winter, *Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity: Neighbours and Rivals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), l. 657 (Kindle).

[197] Persepolis was the ceremonial capital of the Achaemenid empire (550-330 BC). It is located in South West Iran.

Figure 1 – Naghsh-i Rostam, depicting

The monument depicts the Sasanian ruler Shapur I (r. 240-272). In figure 1, Valerian the Roman emperor is kneeling to respect the Iranian King. There are two other monumental reliefs that also shows Gordian and Philip. It copies Roman style of carving[198] in telling the story of how Shapur I defeated Romans. In this, the violence is quite subdued. The Iranian side is powerful, victorious, and riding the horse. The Roman, the Other, are depicted respectfully but kneeling, captured, and defeated. However, the monument should not be analysed on its own.

Few meters away, there is a trilingual inscription.[199] As the translation below shows, it provides conceptual glimpse into the Iranian self and the kingdom. Read alongside the monument, it offers a rich understanding of how spaces beyond Iran, including those to its west, were conceived of:

> I, the Mazda[200]-worshipping 'god' Shapur, King of Kings of the Aryans and non-Aryans, scion of the gods, son of the Mazda-worshipping 'god' Ard[e]shir, King of Kings of the Aryans, scion

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[198] Dorothy Shepherd, 'SASANIAN ART', in *The Cambridge History of Iran: Seleucid Parthian: Volume 3: The Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanid Periods*, ed. E. Yarshater, vol. 3, The Cambridge History of Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1100, https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521246934.015.

[199] There were some disagreements between archaeologists whether the inscription and monument were depicting Shahpur I. I rely on authority of Ibid., 11000–1.

[200] Mazda or Ahura Mazda is the highest diety and creator of Zoroastrianism.

> of the gods, grandson of the 'god' Pabag, the King, am ruler of the Empire of the Aryans.[201]

Alongside the monument of capturing Valerian, this inscription is one of the earliest reliefs on Others, that become a regular feature and source on discussing the Iranian Self.[202] The text refers to the universal sphere under the Iranian realm. The title 'King of Iran and non-Iran' hints the kingdom expands beyond where the Iranian collective inhabits, and even regions that non-Iranian lived.[203] The rest of the script lists[204] regions such as Syria, Cappadocia, Cilicia[205], Ashorestan (Mesopotamia), Armenia, Georgia, (gates of) Albania, Balasagan[206]. While this specific genre of text lacks further explicit representations, it highlights emergence of a discourse that engages with religious sources of authority, sense of superiority, claims of universality, and a hierarchical understanding of the order and world. The label used and location of the inscription alludes to continuities from the Achaemenid empire,[207] which reifies the *raison d'etre* of this chapter on historical layers of discourse and broader objective of the thesis for long history.

The regions listed above give an idea of how geographical and political entities were perceived and organised. In terms of how these regions were administered, they were known as *satrap* (provincial governance) and *satrapy*

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[201] Translation taken from Dignas and Winter, *Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity*, l. 654 (Kindle).

[202] See Gherardo Gnoli, *The Idea of Iran : An Essay on Its Origin* (Roma: Istituto italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1989).

[203] Ibid.

[204] Josef Wiesehöfer, *Ancient Persia: From 550 BC to 650 AD*, New ed., repr (London: Tauris, 2006), 287.

[205] South of Turkey.

[206] Currently between Azerbaijan, Russia, and Iran.

[207] Dignas and Winter, *Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity*, l. 667 (Kindle).

(provincial administration) that operated under the King of Kings, and guarded the centre against Others.[208] They were early forms of socio-political community that were mostly nomadic and tribal within a broader space known as *Iranshahr*.[209] It confined the direct rule of the king through lax institutional arrangement of *divan*. These terms are not important just because how they offer insight into range of forces involved, but highlights roots of future arrangements that will be mentioned in next chapters. All together, these define boundaries of Self and Other.

Another example is the below letter from Khosrow II to the Roman emperor Maurice:

> God effected that the whole world should be illumined from the very beginning by two eyes, namely by the most powerful kingdom of the Romans and by the most prudent sceptre of the Persian State. For by these greatest powers the disobedient and bellicose tribes are winnowed, and man's course is continually regulated and guided.[210]

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[208] Amanat, *Iran: A Modern History*, 9.

[209] *Shahr* means city, reminiscent of the Greek concept polis.

[210] Taken from Matthew P. Canepa, *The Two Eyes of the Earth: Art and Ritual of Kingship between Rome and Sasanian Iran*, The Transformation of the Classical Heritage 45 (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2009).

II. Diplomacy Between Equals

The persistent military conflicts intensified utterances that depicted the Other as inferior and/or defeated. Yet, perusal of peace treaties [211] and diplomatic exchanges that survived history reveals a fault line that emphasises Sameness between Iran and Rome. [212] It was an acknowledgement of hierarchical order and equal ranks between the monarchs. However, an intriguing aspect is how the peace treaty itself concluded and then how it was reflected in historical records. For example, Roman payments to Shapur I for fortresses in Caucasus was promoted as Rome turning into Sasanid's 'tributary'. [213] Despite the diplomatic treatments in mutual texts, what was circulated within the court and outside of it was different. These contradictions made it possible to have a discourse on Other as inferior, willing to submit.

The letters were a different story. A undated communication between Shapur II (r. 309-79) and Constantius II (r.337-61), reveals how the Sasanian king regarded his counterpart as his 'brother' while labelling himself as 'comrade of the stars, brother of the Sun and the Moon.'[214] This is particularly telling if we note how the Sasanids regarded their legitimacy as God given. In turn, it was a recognition of religious credentials and equality of Romans.

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[211] Study of these treaties could be a separate endeavour to reduce the existing gap in historical International Relations, to have a better understanding of treaty-making in general and to understand functions of previous societies.

[212] Examples of peace treaties are: treaty of 244 between Philip the Arab and Shapur I, peace treaty of 298 between Dicoletian and Narseh, treaty of 363 between Jovian and Shapur II, peace treaty of 422 between Theodosius II and Bahram V Goor, treaty of 562 between Justinian and Xusro I Anoushiravan, and peace treaty of 628 between Heraclius and Kavad II.

[213] Dignas and Winter, *Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity*, l. 1293 (Kindle).

[214] Ronald Syme, *Ammianus and the 'Historia Augusta'.* (Clarendon P, 1968), 41.

Signifying the Other

The view held by the Kings, information circulated through the divan, or exchanges conducted by traders and diplomats were the key sources of knowledge about the Other. A more far reaching, and perhaps widely disseminated, texts discussing the Other or depicting them were poetries and chronicles. Earlier in this chapter, I briefly touched on the issue of availability of sources. While epic poems,[215] court chronicles, or traders' diaries are of different genres, they provide an adequate understanding of knowledge pertaining to identity construction for the purpose of this chapter. This (cultural) history articulates the boundaries of how the Other was conceptualised or perceived.

Ferdowsi's epic poem is perhaps one of the most cited sources of Iranian studies, to highlight the mythologies and historical anchoring of identity.[216] This thesis will not be an exception. It is an essential knowledge that conceptualises an Other, that turns to be European (Roman, Armenian, etc.), in own language, that goes on to be a central source upon which Iranian discursive fault lines were based or turned to be utilised as a resource later on. While the narrative is marked with few inaccuracies, it portrays Roman victories as result of trickery. It matches the extant fault line of Rome as different, where the difference lies in using deception.[217] It is an ethical judgement of the Other: they win through deceit while the Iranian self is moral.[218] There also examples of how

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[215] Unless stated otherwise, I use already translated versions that are cross-checked with a version in Farsi.

[216] For example, see John Malcolm, *The History of Persia From the Most Early Period to the Present Time* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511983177.

[217] Abolqasem Ferdowsi, *Shahnameh: The Persian Book of Kings*, trans. Dick Davis, Expanded edition, Penguin Classics (New York, New York: Penguin Books, 2016), 574–76.

[218] Ferdowsi, *Shahnameh*.

Shahnameh depicts the Other as 'malevolent'.[219] It represents Armenians and Romans as individuals with red hair, crooked nose, short and ugly who fails to understand the Iranian mastery and lies.[220] Here, the Other and the aesthetic differences were source of amusement. Thus, another representation that would increasingly find traction, would be based on differing looks that are un-Iranian.

III. Conclusion

This brief historical background on diachronic understanding of discourse, provided few examples of how the Other has been depicted. It offers two basic discursive fault line of Sameness and Otherness that revolves around signifiers such as moral superiority, deceit, aesthetics, advancement, or power.

[219] David Bagot and Margaux Whiskin, eds., *Iran and the West: Cultural Perceptions from the Sasanian Empire to the Islamic Republic* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2018), 45.

[220] Ibid., 46.

IV

The Safavids (1501-1797)

The 222 years rule of Safavid[221] on Iran coincided with the late Middle Ages, forging of a new narrative of Europe, [222] and rapid re-ordering of the international alongside reconfiguration of mode of knowledge. This era, which did not necessarily feature modern statehood, is the building block of many local, national, and international debates, ideas, and societies[223].

As evident from the preceding chapter, Iran was somewhat familiar with the space on its west and discursive fault lines concerning Sameness and Otherness already existed. From the early sixteenth century, we witness proliferation of concepts concerning farang and Europe. The significant difference is merging between two discursive traditions: the elites were engaged

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[221] A detailed history of this period within the context of Iranian history could be found in any of encyclopaedic volumes cited earlier. A recent example is Amanat, *Iran: A Modern History*, chap. 1. Within the context of Islamic history, see Stephen F. Dale, *The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals*, vol. New approaches to Asian history (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), https://gate3.library.lse.ac.uk/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818646.

[222] Boer et al., *The History of the Idea of Europe*.

[223] Scrutiny of the emerging regional international society in this era

in meaning-making on popular level while the commoners were absent in elite's practices.[224]

However, complex interplay of internal and external political, social, religious, and economic developments coupled with territorial changes have all influenced the discourse. First section of this chapter provides a background on these issues. Then, the chapter proceeds to surveying the available positions.

With the decline of the Timurid Empire, descending from a Turco-Mongol lineage, and Aq Qoyunlu, the Sunni Oghuz Turkic tribal confederation ruling the spaces today known as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Eastern Turkey, and Iraq, the Safavids ruled 'the Protected Kingdoms of Iran'. They were Turkmans of Kurdish descent, speaking Turkic at court and at home. However, the literary and administrative language of the land remained Persian. They also have a particular religious and theological background.

They are descendants of Sheikh Safi-ad-din Is'haq Ardabili, who replaced Sheikh Zahed Gilani of Lahijan, as a spiritual figurehead leading a mystical *Sufi* order that despite association with Shafi branch of Sunni Islam, shifted and heralded the Twelver Shiism in Iran. They claimed to be direct descendants of the Seventh Twelver Shia Imam, hence, being a descendant of the Prophet. The Sufi order and the leaders of it were perceived as divine, holding the ultimate truth, *hagigah*. Prior to the establishment of the dynasty, they

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[224] Compare Peter Burke, *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe* (London: Temple Smith, 1978), https://eu.alma.exlibrisgroup.com/view/action/uresolver.do?operation=resolveService&package_service_id=4664929070002021&institutionId=2021&customerId=2020; Boaz Shoshan, 'High Culture and Popular Culture in Medieval Islam', *Studia Islamica*, no. 73 (1991): 67–107, https://doi.org/10.2307/1595956.

also waged holy wars, *jihad*, to the north of Iran in Georgia. Given the religious background, the utterances by the King and/or its envoys were holly sacrosanct.

Figure 1 The Safavid Empire, AD 1501 – 1722

Institutionally, the King appointed *Vakil-e Nafs-e Nafis-e Homayun* (Deputy to His Majesty's Exquisite Person) (Katouzian 2009) as one of the highest ranking officials. It started off as a post occupied solely by Turkamans but then Persians were also appointed. Alongside military ranks, another important office of the realm was the office of *sadr*, managing and overseeing the religious affairs such as endowment and else. The rank was also a religious legitimizer of the king. However, the status of it was in flux. At the beginning of this period, they had more authority. At the end, it was more of an administrative position.

While the religious and non-religious distinction is important here, the differing genres should be taken into account too. There are court writings, official letters, travelogues, memoirs, religious texts, Friday Prayer sermons, and

then a significant body of poems passing as sources of political, social and cultural narration. Specifically, *elm-ol ensha* was a new genre that court secretaries and travellers used to narrate events and produce knowledge. In addition to various genres, there is a linguistic diversity: Persian, Arabic, and instances of Turkish/Ottoman Turkish language. Here, I am relying on Persian texts (originals or edited) and then the limited knowledge of important Arabic texts. I define important as those making appearances in other Persian texts, introduction of new concepts, or being a source for political thought of the Safavids.

The period was an eventful one too. It begun with the establishment of the Safavid dynasty, and continued with series of internal strives, prolonged conflict with Uzbeks, a tumultuous relation with the Ottomans that led to various wars and treaties, occupation by Russians (beginning with Tsar Peter's invasion of Talesh and Gilan in Northern Iran in 1721), and interactions with Venetians, British, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, Germans, Hungarians and Poles.

The Iranian debate about Europe/Christendom in the sixteenth and the seventeenth century was dominated by ontological rupture in understanding the nature of the Europe and status of Iran. It witnessed multiple clashes with the Ottoman Empire, civil strife, conflict with Russia, changing bureaucratic/court structure, and fomenting of religious positions.

There are few limitations in assessing shifts and continuities. Firstly, the availability of texts is inherently influenced by the historical duree, limited circulation and lack of print. Secondly, there are conflicting stories. I am using

those to depict clashing narratives of reality. Thirdly, there are conceptual dilemmas. IR theorists have interpreted their empirics to account for the emergence of modernity and the modern state formation. It offers a neat portrait of (western) foundations of the international relations. The linguistic difference also is another layer of limits in conveying the concepts (Bain 2017; Armitage 2012).[225] This was also more prevalent in the period studied here, and how the inter-lingual relations influenced the discourse and also evolution of the concepts.

I have already highlighted how starting with this period is a departure from the 'benchmark dates' of IR. On Iranian history, this era is the first of Iran's interaction as a distinct geographical entity, polity, and realm rather than as part of a larger Muslim world. It is also one that lacks a dominant constructs of the Europe.

There is a big gap in understanding Iran's construct of Europe prior to the Safavids. This is partially due to the availability of texts. However, a key volume, *History of the Franks* (*Tarikh-i Afranj)*, written by Rashid aldin Fazl Allah. Here, *Afranj* is driven from arabic word *al-afranjie* which denotes French. Amongst Muslim historiographies, it distinguishes itself by acknowledging the existence of Europe, specifically depicting them as 'nearby' and not 'in darkness' (*zolomat*), as opposed to figure 2, and the outer edge of civilisation.[226]

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[225] William Bain, ed., *Medieval Foundations of International Relations* (London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017); David Armitage, *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[226] Rudi Matthee, 'Was Safavid Iran an Empire?', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 53, no. 1–2 (2010): 233–65, https://doi.org/10.1163/002249910X12573963244449.

The civilizational discourse was prevalent and very much marked with religious signifiers. There were diplomatic and trade interactions, but the encounter between European merchants and missionaries visiting and residing Iran were significant. The local and day to day misfortunes were attributed to the presence of those missionaries who resided in cities/neighbourhoods (Ha'iri, 1990). The 'learned folk' were the wealthy merchants, not the poor Capuchins, Carmelites, Jesuits, and Augustinians (N5324). They were hold in low esteem. The proper and respected westerners were of particular class. This is partly a reflection on religious minorities in Iran: they were usually merchants and of wealth.

Figure 2 Islamic Cartography, 14th century

[Islamic & Iranian History Specialised Library – Copyright needed for public use]

There was a shift when the Court started to offer hospitality to the missionaries, notably the French and Dutch one. One of the Sadr's of Shah Abbas II, Mirza Muhammad Taqi, was curious about the Dutch convictions and his successors started series of debates between clergies. The court position gave an official endorsement to these missions: they were let into the holly court, thus there

might be learned folks. There debates about cosmology and some of the members of the delegates got involved in teaching the elite. There was an incremental expansion of the debate beyond the court by including ranks of Sadr office and other clergies in on the outskirts of the Royal Square, *maydan*, in Isfahan. A series of treaties emerged out of these debates, written by Safavid Sadr's office, that attempted to capture superiority over Europeans by refuting the central tenets of the Christian faith.[227]

The discourse gets more layered with increased level of diplomatic encounters and day to day interactions. Europeans were generically labelled as *Farangiyan*, but then there were more specific constructions: the Spaniards were noble, Italians were sagacious, English were political, Dutch were mercantile, Poles as bellicose, French as troubling, and Russians as uncultured.

The sporadic interactions intensified after 1604, when Shah Abbas I (1587-1629) settled a large number of Armenians from the Aras river (now between Iran, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) to the capital, Isfahan, and granted them rights. He became mesmerized in Muscovy as a rising power, specifically after learning about Time of Troubles that ended with the accession of the Romanov Dynasty in 1613. Between 1598 and 1618, more than at least 25 missions were exchanged between the two capitals. Confronting the Ottomans was a pivotal concern. Contacts waned under Shah Abbas's successors, who gave up on his efforts to build an anti-Ottoman coalition and retreated from the activist foreign policy animated by these efforts. Within a decade they had

[227] Rasoul Jafarian, *Din va Siyasat Dar Dowreh Safavie* (Qom: Ansarian, 1991).

made peace with Iran's most redoubtable enemy, the Ottoman Empire, thus obviating the urgency to seek a military alliance with Christian powers. When peace was afoot with Ottomans, the official contacts decreased but the *Julfan* Armenians continued extensive commercial exchanges that only fitted the construct of wealthy Christians as beneficiary.

An example of diplomatic representations and specific conceptualisation of the European Other is Shah Abbas' letter to Charles I.[228] The objective of the letter is basic balance of power discussions on how to create an alliance against the Ottomans. The interesting, and relevant, aspects are its aesthetics and prose. Charles I is titled as the ruler of the whole of farang. This, either connotes deploying farang for any foreign land, or bestowing respect on Charles I. The most interesting aspect is how international hierarchy is manifesting itself in the writing. Phrases such as farang, ruler, Christianity and Islam are written in Golden ink. The rest in black.

Then there is the practice and societal level constructs. There are established utterances on how the Russia, to the north of the Caspian see, is the 'foggy' land of 'brutish', 'dim-witted', and 'bibulous' Russians that are separated from civilizations. Not only that, they are also the Gog and Magog, Ya'juj and Ma'juz that are warned about in Bible and Quran.[229] Ya'juj and

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[228] 'Shah Abbas to Charles I', Letter, n.d., AGK00234, Aga Khan Trust for Culture.

[229] Abbas Amanat and Assef Ashraf, eds., *The Persianate World: Rethinking a Shared Sphere*, vol. volume 18 (Leiden: Brill, 2019), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/londonschoolecons/detail.action?docID=5740161; Rudi Matthee, 'Iran's Relations with Europe in the Safavid Period: Diplomats,

Ma'juz (the latter transformed into Ma'juj) are still used to describe deformed and other derogatory notions.[230] The diplomatic protocol was often shaped by these. There are evidences on how Russian envoys sometimes were forced to dismount and tolerate long walks across the royal square to meet the king.[231] They were deemed inferior and had to walk to meet the Shah. While there is a symbolic notion in walking all across cultures, the Islamic culture also walking long distances to holy shrines and pilgrimage is a ritual to pay respect and showcase inferiority to the other-worldly subjects. In one instance in 1664, the Russians were drunk and also forced to carry their presents. In a court chronicle from the same year, the secretary describes Russians as "rude and barbarous" as Europeans, and "filthy, uncultured, and obtuse" as the Uzbeks of Europe.[232]

The phrase of Russia as an ominous space, *Rus-e manhous*, emerges in another court chronicle, interestingly titled *Khold-e Barin (*the best heaven).[233] They are called a tribe (taefe), and a sinister one. However, there are some contradictory writings on how Cossacks were treated as Russians, or 'rude seamen's and pirates' controlled by Russians that often used in interchangeable manner. This became more prevalent as the Caspian littoral and the areas of

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Missionaries, Merchants and Travel', *The Fascination of Persia Persian-European Dialogue in Seventeenth-Century Art & Contemporary Art of Teheran*, 2013, 6–37.

[230] See Matthee, Facing a rude and barbarous neighbour.

[231] Jafarian, *Din va Siyasat Dar Dowreh Safavie*.

[232] 'Mansha'at-e Soleimani' (1694 1661), IR31517.

[233] Rudi Matthee, 'Rudeness and Revilement: Russian–Iranian Relations in the Mid-Seventeenth Century', *Iranian Studies* 46, no. 3 (May 2013): 333–57, https://doi.org/10.1080/00210862.2012.758500.

Gilan and Mazandaran witnessed recurring raids. Highlighting the influence of Russians was coupled by the Russian engagement in extending their control over the northern Caucasus.

Then there are romantic constructs, mostly purported by the poems close to the court. While describes Europeans as infidel, it also depicts them as alluring creatures:

> When you've drunk from the ruddy-colored wine
>
> You appear as an unbeliever from the West
>
> There is not a whit of mercy in your heart
>
> You kill until you are in distress (Hasan Beg, 1690)

The drunkenness and red face made its way into art, as a source of understanding Iran's idea of Europe. The Europeans and/or Iranians in Western fabrics were painted in company of dogs, with wine, and amourous. The European was an infidel, to be avoided. You cannot touch or eat from the same plate. Yet, exotic and tantalizing that is only equated to pleasure. The constructions got more gendered as the artistic exchanges exacerbated through introduction of European paintings.

Back in the court, the reception of Europeans became more formalized and shifted away from religious credentials. From 1600, the extent of splendid gifts were signifiers of how they were received. The interesting distinction is between the English and the Dutch, notably the role of their merchants. England was well regarded as savy, while Dutch only had wealth. In 1690, the situation of the Dutch was worsened simply because a court secretary learnt a

new fact. Shaykh Ali Khan was given a book by a French envoy, which revealed the French invasion of the Netherlands. The Dutch were further relegated.

The court still gave more credence to Muslims. They were one of self. They were part of one society, bonded by language and blood and religion. They were welcomed. On the other hand, Russians were the lowest of the pecking order. While there was a Muslim self, and a European Other that is somewhat respectable, the Russians were outside of all categories. They were never even labeled as Farang. In 1664, a Sadrist describes how European infidels were sometimes 'not pure' but the Russians 'were infamously filthy and nasty in how they look and what they eat' (cited in Jafarian, 1983).

` All of these underline the sense of superiority in Iranian self. The extant chronicle highlights how the universe was depicted as Iran-centric and how all the inter-polity relations were revolving Iran and a God that was its grand king. The vicinity of Iran was only habitable, and the rest was not. The Shahs title was *padasha-e rub-i maskun*: the king of the habitable quarter. An anthology from the 17th century descibres the Iranian self as "learned men and scholars maintain that the land of Iran is situated in the habitable quarter of the world and that it is a country of extreme breadth and surface and endowed with various divine blessings" (Bushehri, 1690). The celebration of the Self is built on how the Other is defining Iran.

How Iranian envoys reacted in Europe also reflects the discourse. The Safavid envoys to Europe such as Husayn Ali Beg, who represented envoy to Portugal in 1601, Musa Beg, who went to Holland in 1625, Naqdi Beg who

was sent to England in 1626, and Muhammad Reza Beg, who visited France in 1714-15 were inconspicuous about Europe. What mattered was European woman.

V

Qajar

The extant International Relations scholarship has looked back to the long 19th century as a critical moment for development of the existing international order, and also Iran's transformation.[1] The period coincided with the Qajar rule in Iran (r. 1796 – 1925). If the preceding period was the onset of violent rupture in Iran's ontological space, this chapter explicates how familiarity and dissonance resonated in discourse. Despite shrinking territory, the discourse and repertoire rapidly expanded. The religious and traditional positions maintained their presence but faced transformation in content and positionality. A new set of ideas and positions emerged. Constitutionalist and nationalist positions, often with unclear boundaries with religious and traditional positions, emerged. With the mystic legitimizer waning off, the monarchy and religion remained as the main nodes of the debate. The increased interactions with Europe and the West, created the idea of it into a constant presence in discourse. It transformed that nature of political thought, life and debate, which turned into constitution of the idea of the self and delineating the Other.

It manifested itself in various interactions and practices between diplomatic envoys, trade delegations, and the Monarch's visits to the Europe.

[1] See Buzan and Lawson, 205; Mitzen, 2013; Branch, 2011. On Iran, see Tavakoli-Taraghi, 2001; Ansari, 2007; Axworthy, 2010.

The language and practice reflected these transformations, which changed not just positions within the discourse but more foundational épistémè, basic foundations of knowledge, grappling with the Europe and modernity.

A new politics was afoot. Some of the concepts discussed in previous chapter, such as decadence, infidels, morality, and progress remained in the discourse. New ones such as constitution, constitutionalism, and nationalism emerged. It shaped the socio-political struggle beyond texts and manifested itself in variety of social unrests, wars, revolutionary movement and civil resistance alongside creation of educational institutions, (attempts to) professionalize the army and expansion of the courts. A notable emergence is the more explicit discussion of women in public and private spaces and gendered bodies. Highlighting the changing stature of the religious position, secular texts and concepts emerged and discussed.

Globally, at the same time of the discursive and social struggles in Iran's political space, the international society experienced global transformation/industrial revolution,[2] 1848 revolutions, reorganization of the Ottoman empire (*tanzimat*) and its decline, the United States Civil War. The new politics was marked by new relations between the European powers, which in turn transformed the Iranian discourse: the new era required a new understanding. Thus, new repertoires and concepts emerged. Each position sought new ways of establishing or solidifying their presence.

The ebbs and flows in Iran's foreign relation with the Ottoman empire continued to challenge the territoriality, while the growing presence of the

[2] See Buzan & Lawson.

Russian state in the north and empowerment of the Europe posed existential threats to the territory and institutions.[3] On the other hand, the increased economic, intellectual and cultural exchange with Others led to proliferation of publishing houses, travelogues, dictionaries and rise of intellectual discourse incorporating Western philosophy. New genres emerged and some of the existing genres went through changes. The travelogues were not just by official envoys anymore but by students, intellectuals and even businessmen.[4] Letters of Jihad, *resale-ye Jahadiye*, written by religious scholars or clergies were not social anymore but included discussions of infidels, wars, practices of negotiations . It was political. Newspapers became a medium of dissent and dissemination. In addition to the prominence of travelogues in narrating the Iranian conception of the West, translation of foreign text heralded a new era of conceptual entanglement: from René Descartes' *Discourse* in 1862 to Isaac Newton's works.[5] Modern historians frame these as the onset of 'rationalising Iranian discourse' through understanding scientific texts.[6] Such framing highlight the relevance of Western thought in Iranian discourse but neglects or undermines the longuee

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[3] Katouzian's chapter 6 for historical overview of the period;

[4] It should be noted that the ability to travel and also write, signifies certain privileges and belonging to a class.

[5] For a broader discussion on cosmological concepts arising from Western science, see Allan, Bentley. *Scientific Cosmology and International Orders*. Forthcoming. Cambridge University Press.

[6] Elie Kedourie, *Afghani and Abduh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam* (London: Cass, 1966), 44–5; Nikki Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal al-Din "al-Afghani": A Political Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 197–9; Jamshid Bihnam, *Iraniyan va Andishah-i Tajaddud* (Tehran: Farzan Ruz, 1375/1996), 32–4; Alireza Manafzadeh, Notes 147 "Nukhustin Matn-i Falsafah-'i Jadid-i Gharbi bah Zaban-i Farsi," *Iran Nameh*, 9: 1 (Winter 1991), 98–108; Faraydun Adamiyat, *Andishah-i Tarraqi va Hukumat-i Qanun*: *Asr-i Sipahsalar* (Tehran: Khwarazmi, 1351/1972), 17 and 18.

duree of Persian repertoires and traditional texts that embodies same concepts. Moreover, there is a shifting conceptualisation of the *international* from one where empire and societies (the Ottoman empire, the Islamic Ummah, the khalafat) were predominant to where vocabulary of state and order appeared. The expanding discourse also faced restrictions. Authors and activists were often sent to exile, most of the times to the Ottoman empire.

The period is marked by intermittent Russo-Persian Wars that influenced the State's position and public discourse on the self, and heralded new concepts and positions with the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 that in Iranian historiography is commonly seen as the birth of Iranian modernity. A new power relation between classes and positions manifested itself in texts. For example, new thesis was promoted by the religious positions to create a new status for the clergies to create a balance between the King (*Shah*) and the grand clergies (marāji‘)[7]. It was called *Vilayat-e Faqih*, the guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, which became a central thesis during the 1979 revolutions. Creating new balances and making sense of the new eras and concepts made this era of confusion into a struggle between *sunat*, tradition, and politics, *siasat*, and modernity, *tajadod*. It manifested itself in conduct of politics, every day practices and the entirety of the discourse. Iran was between two épistémè to define itself and delineate the conditions of possibility of knowledge and its foreign policy.

This chapter shows how myriad of encounters, violent or not, transformed the discourse entailing the state institutions too. The three

[7] marāji‘, plural of marja‘ (from Arabic) are the highest religious authority of Shii Islam after the Quran, prophets and imams to provide guidance and interpret religious texts. Marja‘ means reference/source.

legitimizing pillars of religion, monarchy and mysticism clashed more with European thoughts, leading to increasing institutionalization of the state and heralding *modern* kingdoms. The essence of this transformation captures the paradox of Iranian identity. The monarchs titled themselves *Shah-in-Shah*, the King of Kings; *Pannah-e Alam*, the Asylum/Shelter/Refuge of the Universe; the Protector of the Unfortunate; the Shadow of God on Earth; the Conqueror of Lands; and the Guardian of Flocks.[8] Yet, sought to emulate dressing practices in Germany; lost lands in battles; faced uprising for failing to protect people; and sought refuge at foreign embassies. Conceptually, the discourse witnessed a clash between backward Iranians and progressive ones. On one hand, the self was seen as backward due to lagging behind Europeans but depicted as 'potentially being forward' rooted in ancient history. This chapter shows how in addition to emergence of new concepts and positions, a temporal dimension emerged: a recognition of the conditions governing the international society and desire to being one was labelled as backwardness against forwardness, yet clashing as whether the self is backward or forward.

The backwardness/forwardness struggle led to wide ranging discussions of political and economic development in Qajar's socio-political space. Broadly, the State position was constantly in flux as the court was not unified nor homogenous. The religious position that at the end of Safavid period was still marked by mystic concepts and *sunnat*, faced a bifurcation throughout the long Qajar period: a more conservative one and one that embraced modernity into religion and tradition. The prominence of pro-western discourse amongst

[8] Abrahamian, Despotism, p. 8.

liberals and merchants also focused on concepts such as democracy, rule of law and technical progress. On the other hand, the traditional thoughts were focused on sunat, authority, family, private space, and boundaries. The bafflement by Western progress was not the exclusive domain of pro-western positions but a commonality amongst all positions. How to face or emulate it was source of contestation. One, necessitates 'being the West'. The other, urged 'facing the West.' There is a challenge between freedom from traditions with progress, rule of law against authority, legitimate governing against weak governance.

Previously, the West was an other that could have been source of good or benefit. During Qajar period, the West became an Other as a model that self should be become one. The differences were *aghab-mandegi*, backwardness, and a disease that should've been cured. The West was the cure. Such position was widely disseminated through new publication mediums, and catalyzed by increased socio political exchanges across various spaces. Increased institutional presences of these forces both across social and political layers is another stark contrast to the previous epoch. The institutional presence provided a new dimension to the debate: it was not just about the philosophical inquiries or questions of knowledge, but considered practical, economic and industrial aspects that bounded debate in coming eras: both the Pahlavi and post-1979 pictured a dark era of Qajar, as weak, unstable, un-Iranian and 'shifteheye gharb', in love with the West.

All of these also revolved around a debate on *tammadon* (civilization) and *madaniyat* (being civilized). Various positions debated what are the criterias and how the Other plays a role in conceptualising it. Beyond the concepts and the debate, lies different assumtpions and teleology underlying State's practices and

what the society deemed appropriate. It resembles the English School framework and the Standard of Civilization debate on the expansion of the international society.[9] The Qajar period explicate the expansion story how the European attempt was also matched by variety of Iranian practices within and beyond the State. The spread of the international society and desire to be part of it was not just about set of practices, norms or legal standard but it manifested itself in changing language and interpellation of concepts.

Focusing on the discursive elements of the discourse, the language faced multitude of transformations from being limited in the persianate world, Persian recognised as the official language and how the discourse became more violent in depicting (anti-)West. The discursive transformation between the two épistémè paved the way for a discussion of nationalism and national identity.[10]

This was evident from the emergent historiography and commentary of the day. The traditionalist position, in this instance emerging from the Persianate world (India), relied on a particular rhetorical trope that was used earlier on by earlier poets to depict right versus wrong. *Darvish Fani Manekji Limji Hatara*, a Parsi Indian, the Islamic conquest of Iran was *zemestan-i zulm va setam- Arab*, 'the winter of Arab oppression and repression'[11] and the Qajar was deemed as a new beginning for justice, *adl*, and fairness, *insaf va payah*, fairness. The same troeps

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[9] See Chapter 1 (section 3) on the relevance of the English School framework, and various debates on nature and implication of the expansion story: Bull and Watson, 1984; Gong, 1984; Buzan, 2014; Keene, 2014.

[10] See introduction [ch1] on conceptual constellations, identity and the specific reference to nationalism.

[11] Cf. Tavakoli Targhi, *Ain-i Hushang*, 192 and 191–2.

were evident in previous chapter on Safavid period.[12] The Muslim conquest was deemed as an emplotment of Iran that has not been remedied. This renewed the quest and conceptualization of a new memory that in shape created a mnemonic politics and identity: what was the 'lost glory' of the past? Was it limited to a territory or a social space? How did it shape the struggle for a new social order?

While the chapter proceeds chronologically in exploring the discourse during Qajars, it will highlight few particular socio-political episodes to capture the pivotal moments of the discourse. For example, Iran's defeat from Britain and the subsequent loss of territory coupled with bureaucratic dysfunction reflected in the discourse exposes views on the Europe and also what the self needs to do reeling in from the defeat and dealing with them.

After Persia lapsing into a series of civil war, the Qajar tribe rallied around Agha Mohammad Khan (b. 1742–1797). The initial period doest not revolve around a certain text or position but structured through various practices and incidents. During the coronation in 1796, he wore two specific jwelery: *darya-e* Nur, sea of light, and *Taj-e* Mah, crown of the Moon. Both were taken from India after the Persian conquest. Symbolic assertion of the relevance of India to the new Persian king was not a limited incidence. Prior to that, he marched into Georgia and reasserted Persian sovereignty. The territory delineate the discursive reach and where the encounters might happen. Letters exchanged between city/town lords, *Khans*, on setting up checkpoints against looting and preserving the territory are one of the most notable examples of discussing self

[12] Note 104 from National archive

and protecting against an ambiguous *Other* who wants 'to rip us apart by alluring us.'[13] One of the letters, belonging to the religious position due to the background of authors and their seminary education, mentions *izzat-i nafs,* dignity and self respect, as a must for succeeding in ruling people and maintaining society's *nazm* (order). Incorporation of notions of ruling and order, notably by the religious position, coincided with expansion of the territorial foothold that lead to expanding the audience for the already religious discourse that was going through discursive reformation and institutional resurrection.

While the Shi'a theology and its ensuing discourse was shaped during the Safavid era and leigitimised the rule, it was only until the early periods of Qajar that became a structured force. Embodying the debate between tradition and reason, two separate schools emerged: Akhbari and Usuli. The Akhbaris gave discretion to individual Muslims to read and interpret the holy texts for themselves. On the other hand, the Usulis promoted a doctrine that there is a need for authorative interpretation (ijtihad) on the basis of reason and could only be achieved by specific scholars.

Halfway through the reign of Aqa Mohammad Khan, *mojtaheds* and *ijtihad* became institutionalized. It provided a new hierarchy to the religious discourse: certain text from individuals with higher official rankings were more important in shaping the discourse. This turned to be vital when facing the foreign enemy, when the clergies declared the need for *jihad* (battle), or when played a role in shaping the forthcoming constitutional revolution.

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[13] N/L 18732, National Archive.

ne of the instances of religious rulings and debates that influenced the society was dealing with medical issues and society's health. A debate emerged from 1810 and lasted until about 1838 on avoiding contagious disease like cholera. The state initiated process of collecting garbages, paving the roads and building laundry rooms, inspired by travelogues from Paris, and at the same time the religious position was conflicted on how to fight bodily impurities (nijasat-e badan) with spiritual infidelity of emulating others. The self could've not been protected or maintained through other's practices. This is another example of how everyday occurrences reified conceptual constellations associated with the Europe that also influenced the broader discourse. It turned into a debate about merits of learning and science:

> Due to dissection and compelling proofs, the medical sciences in Europe have now changed . . . but you are still hanging onto the principles of the age of Socrates and Hippocrates. . . . You do not know. Go learn.[14]

The clash between juridical explication with microbiological incidents, coupled with increased awareness of the European status quo meant that the traditionalist position, mostly composed of merchants visiting foreign lands found the incompatibility as lack of 'fortune' for people of Iran. It was called *millat-e badbakht-i* Iran. The nation was in bad shape not just because of diseases but lack of narrowing differences with European practices. This is in stark contrast to traditionalist texts mentioned in previous chapters on healing powers

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[14] *Abd al-Rahim ibn Abi Talib Najjar Talibuf, Masayil al-Hayat ya kitab-i Ahmad (Tiflis: Ghayrat, 1906), 34-37*

of the Iranian climate, ancient medicine, and mysticism.[15] The explicit reference to nation, as opposed to society and/or ummah, is one of the first instances of traditionalists embracing the concept.

Many of the writings of traditionalists and later on the nationalist positions rallied around this concepts and scientific differences. Expertise, knowledge and science was contrasted with the myscitism. When mystic of Safavid era was seen as sign of being 'higher on the ladder of luck,' it was disregarded during the Qajar era. The civility of the Europe was owed to its science, in this instance:

> In an era when scholars of civilized nations are discovering s'floating planets' in the infinite atmosphere, your scholars are negotiating the purity and impurity of scant water [*ab-i qalil*]. At a time when in political and diplomatic circles . . . thousands of major problems of the state, nation, and trade are being discussed and political scientists of the world are striving to resolve them, your jurists [fuqaha] are perplexed and in disagreement as to how to distinguish between 'menstrual' and 'non-menstrual vaginal' bleeding.[16]

[15] See previous chapter on geographical and ecological characteristics of the land and how it was regarded as the advantage of Persia.

[16] Mirza Agha Khan Kermani Abvabi, 1820, p 3.

One of the criticism of the religious position was the colonial influence on thoughts that discredit religious teachings. In fact, some of the emerging texts throughout the persianate world on science is interlinked to British colonial scholars and dialogical interaction between two languages. The Solar Encyclopedia, *Majmu(ah-)i Shamsi,* published in 1807 relied on English sources that were translated by a medical officer of the British army and how he also relied on Persian texts to compile a memoranda on astronomical labours in India.[17]

The British-Persian nexus is more prominent in coming years. In addition to the colonial effect across the Persianate and British presence in Iran, London was one of the prominent destinations to understand Europe or gaze at it. France was the cultural locus while Britan was looked at as an example of an acceptable political space that is prgresi.ve During the first decade of the nineteenth century, two Persians envoys to the court of King George have elaborated on their experience. Mirza Abu-Talib Khan (1752–1806) and Mirza Abu al-Hasan Ilchi (1780–1860) wrote how religious characteristics of growing a beard and Iranian clothing helps them:

> Now, when the ladies had once ascertained, by actual experiment, the length of a Persian's beard, and the texture of his skin and clothing; when their minds were pretty well made up what to think of their formidable

[17] Hunter, William, *"Some Account of the Astronomical Labours of Jaya Sinha, Rajah of Ambhere, or Jayanagar," Asiatic Researches or Transactions of the Society Instituted in Bengal,* 5 (1799), 177–211.

> guest, it was surely no unnatural desire to know that guest's opinion of them.[18]

These traditionalists narrated an exotic *farang* that was juxtaposed against the unfortunate nation of Iran. Narrating travels and being subject of the foreign gaze or being the one being mesmerised populated the discourse but then comes examples of educational exchanges. From 1811 to 1815, the State, on the orders of the Crown Prince (Abbas Mirza) , dispatched five students to England to study medience and sciences in Cambridge and Oxford. Whole they were close to the State, they did not embody State position. Given their backgrounds, they were closely associated with traditionalists but both within ht Edison rose and the institutions, that position changed after their graduation. Instituationly, they came back to become influential courtiers. The medical students were appointed as royal doctors. They were not just discussing Iran self or the European other but turned into intermediaries between two disctinct social spaces and also mode of knowledge.

They went to obtain *ma'lumat-e jadid* or new sciences. It connotes Iranian already knew science but the 'new' mode of it is attainable through England. Despite fragmentary evidenaces of their encounters in London and other cities, conventionally, the student party is dubbed as modernisers with distant religious affiliations. However, there are some evidences of their close liaison with

[18] NL/64128-9-IB

Evangelical projects at the university of Cambridge and how that changed their views on ulema.[19]

Few of them were appointed to diplomatic posts. For example, the Court assessed Mirza Jamar Mushir al-Dawlah Husayni's study of mathematics and engineering as merits of becoming the Ambassador to Constantinople and then England. In the edict, the King highlights that 'he knows the Europe that we do not know.'[20] Another student established *Kaghazi Akhbari*, literally translated from newspaper, to favour more active involvement of religious position in politics and also to engage with 'new sciences' to add divine blessings.

Often the historiography of Iran depicts narratives and diaries of these returning student as a pure story of modernisation and westernisation. In fact, the religious position back then was concerned how the purity of Iranian minds became muddy (*gel-alood*).[21] Constitution of Europe as a different site of analysis was as much about Europe as much as the Iranian self. The difference in this site was per curbed as a threat by some. However, the gaze at this different analytical site always carried a double consciousness between the self and the other: a hibridity solely due to the context of being written about Europe. While the religious position and to some extent, the traditionalists were concerned how knowledge about Europe, from History to politics, culture to science, might be

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[19] Algar, 1969; Amanat, 1993; Mostashari, 2006. For an overview of travelogues reflecting this, see Green, 2009. For summaries of their later careers in Iran, see Bamdad, 1984-5.

[20] Green, 2009; British Archive, Note 561.

[21] See Jihaddie Akbari, 1819.

unfit for Iranian audience or just bad copies, sometimes they carried a dynamic interaction between these multiple identities. The case of student is an example.

The religious position also had its own takes on this different analytical site. Mirza Salih Shirazi, writing in 1817-19, argued that people of England used to be backward when Iranians were principled. He call them *sharir-e mofsed va khunriz*. They were wicked reprobates and blood-shedders.[22] One position assumed utmost civility to the Europeans and the other counted them as thugs. Riza Quli Mirza believed that Europeans, "particularly the English, were like wild beasts and animals lacked industry".[23] He considered the predatory behaviour as cause for leaving "their own island for the New Word and other islands." Moreover, the religious position considered the European society as oppressed and lacking in tranquility due to lac of 'proper spirit'.[24] Conquering and colonialism was due to internal opression and lack of spirituality that deprived the Europe from tranquility. Order existed but it was not tranquil. The emerging *new* world was result of religious failures. Writing in the 1830, he linked the lack of spirituality to wealth. This is a classic religious opinion on how wealth corrupts. Then he prescribed to avoid the *farangi* way of seeing commerce and industrial inventions as wealth but as way to progress self. The traditionalists and the newcomers narrated their perceptions of the Europe, suggesting certain actions based on their perceptions of change (not continuity) in Europe. The religous position also had its own perceptions of the European transformations

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[22] N/L 135-B76

[23] cited in Tavakoli, 1982, p 75.

[24] N/L 135-B76

and suggested ways forward based on that. All positions accepted that there is a 'new' world but the reasons behind that and status of it were all contested along the same boundaries that delianted each position.

An interesting example is *zikr-i fazayil va razayil-i Inglish* by Mirza Abu Talib written in 1802. Describing the virtues and vices of the English, he provided an ethnographic account of how English behaved in *asr-e jadid*, the new age. He categorised them into classes: the elite were called *akabir (*the greats), *mutavvasitin* were intermediaries (middle class), the subalterns were named *kaminah-ha*, and then peasants who "ate potatoes". He argued this class system is not moral, right or religious. He warned of its coming *boghz va idavat*. Revenge and animosity was imminent because the extravagant life of some could have not been maintaned at cost of others 'tolerating hardship.' He defined the others as Iranians, other parts of the world and lower class of the European society. He warned of a great global uprising like the French Revolution but on global scale.

Despite being critical of the Europe as a whole, it acknowledged the virtues. Their *izzat-i nags*, self respect, was admired. The childhood education/nurturing was something he was keen to emulate in Iran. It attributed the national presitge across Europe, specifically England, to individual excellence (*kamal*) that composed national honor and credence. He discerned the acknowledgement of individuality as cause of national cohesion. This is one of the first instances of religious position focusing on individuality and acknowledging greater role to elevate the society as one of the first additions to the repertoire on modernity and Persian modernity forward. However, he criticised the Europe for different attitudes at home and abroad. The colonialism was seen as opposite to how their society were conducted. The 'same English

who produce honor and respect for himself and countrymen, fails to acknowledge individuality of Indians, disrespect to foreigners and make them feel inferior.[25]

Mirza Abu Talib's manuscript became widely circulated, within the standards of 19th century, across the seminaries and the court. Long before constitionalists, he wrote about foreign laws and rule of law. The virtue of the Europe was 'the fear of law-breaking and the abiding of self limits.' It promoted *ittifaq a jama'at*, social consensus and *paydari-e Dolat va qovvate mellat*, the stability of the state and power of collective. He argued that a national crash (*nazil*) could be avoided by imposing laws and being hesitant to transgress those. It would leaved to individual tranquility and societal justice. The concept of tranquility keeps coming back during this period but only within the religious position as a way to link it to theological teachings.

It connoted satisfying majority of people with "the imminently fulfillable desires and enjoyments" instead of "harboring distant wishes" as reason of progress.[26] This notion plays with the recurring ideas of the past and future. The Iranian discourse constantly depicts itself in moving forward by going to the past. The distant past was progressive. In this instance, the tranquil past of Iran was the present of Europe that the community should aim fore. In more broad sense, Mirza Abu Talib's narrative of the Europe heralded new concepts of political theory in talking about civility, stability of state and national cohesion. Despite his background, he attribute the new era of England to departure from religion

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[25] virtues and vices, p 43 (e-version).

[26] Taraghi, 1989, p. 276.

yet highlightin role of tranquility and spiritually in moving Iranian society forward. On the other hand, he refrains from using 'soul' to describe foreigners. Often, the religious position depicted the Western Other one with corrupt or infidel soul. Something rotten in the spirit and thinking. He conceptualised the other as an individual or a subject. It highlights one of the many shifts within the discourse and also the religious position that was also acknowledged theologically. The corpus of religious texts and commentaries focused on the linkage between communal welfare, *refah*, and individuality.

In one of his treaties, he also linked the new era of England as Europe's world for *tarz-e jadid,* a new mode [of life]. The invididaulty, the social cohesion and the progressive Europe is not just about the national stability or state power but producing a new everyday practices on law to treating others. Within intellectual circles and publishing houses, the phrase *tarz-e jadid* also referredto poetic innovations in mid 18th century Indo-Persian poetry. The linkage made here is an act of highlighting difference, yet making it familiar: the new mode was Iranian, and now Europe is using it for social innovation. The familiarity made the ontological and political distance less tangible.[27] The greater debate occurred how this new mode inspired British colonialism by replacing old styles that fuelled consumption: "The renovation of forms of dress, furniture and other necessities have reached such an extent in London that the used articles of the previous year and season are abandoned and their possession and use is degraded".[28] The new mode meant an aggregate affect to have new commodities

[27] Kia, 2011.

[28] Tavakoli, 1989; Amanat, 2011.

which fuelled constant production. Thus, according to this position, the Europe created a new class of *ahl-e hirfah* who were rationalists, constantly produced an innovated. This meant the European household became more efficient through simplifying tasks and constant innovations. the society is always on the move, in contrast to the Iranian society that was stuck in the distant past. The distant past, according to this position, was 'perfection' but needs to be 'kept perfect.'

Perfection, *kamal*, is an Islamic concept that was used to describe spiritual believes and faith but this position used it to describe social mobility. On the other hand, the religious position asserted this is a confusion between perfection and beauty (*jamal*). European perfection lies in their brutal and not necessarily in their civlisational perfection. This gap in conceptioalisting the Europe, deepened the ontological rupture. The perfection of Europe, its social mobility, was the possibility of constant advancement.

These utterances were occurring when the State/court was going through changes. After creating a stable country-wide authority, the Shah inadvertently created a second court by appointing a successor. Fath-Ali, created a *Dar al-Saltanah* in Tabriz that later on was governed by Abbas Mirza. The creation of a second centre of power has been rarely discussed within the context of formation and endurance of the Iranian discourse.

The Prince's household in Tabriz aimed to devise a *tarhi no* (new plan) to energise *bassate-kohneye Tehran* (the old stall in Tehran).[29] The youngesters in the Tabriz court were sent to England to 'learn about new things of the world… the

[29] Amanat, Pivot of the Universe, 57-75.

logics of their success.' The Tabriz court created one of the first translations offices in Iran. The translation bureau firstly started with Ottoman language. It was given due to the Azeri heritage and the proximity to Istanbul. Increased exchanges betwen the Tehran-Tabriz-Istanbul's axis have shaped the discourse through a focus on shared language and concepts that manifested itself later on throughout the constitutional revolution that followed the Tanzimat reforms in Ottoman Empire (1839-78). Establishing first permanent missions to Paris and London and subsequent military reforms and productions were all originating from Tabriz. That was the *tarhe no*.

This new plan was driven by the surprise of various positions of how the West operated. While the glorification of identity and the past was prominent, even the traditionliast positions expressed their *heyrat*, surprise, on progress of the West. This led to naming travelouges to *heyratnameh*, diary of surprises. In one, Syed Abdul Latif Shushtari was surprised how hard it was for the European kings to order killings. Shushtari, was an Arab Iranian who travelled across the world and resided in Heyderabad, India and became a businessmen. In this traditional position, he conveyed

> The [English] King made gave away his powers – *masloob al-ekhtiar* – unless it comes to preserving humans or embracing them… killing or punishment, even one of his own servants is not allowed, unless there is a juridical verdict. There is no politics without it [the judicial verdict].

While the use of politics, *siasat*, connotes it literal meaning as in 'ways of to do things' but it also hints to broader understanding of political affairs and

need of a judicial check. The commentaries started comparing how sheriffs and king envoys to how their Western counterparts behave. However, they avoided using the phrase 'hamtaraz' (counterpart), and specifically mentioned how the status of a Western official is never as grand as a 'petty Iranian official'[30]:

> When the sheriff passes by with his convoy, even for sightseeing, all must bow to him. Otherwise, they'll face *farrashan* (footman) and stick-holders … no where else is like this. Even the sheriff of London with 7 million people passes by, no one notices his status but in our Iran, someone in charge of a little county wants to have all the glory and status.

The West and European leaders were depicted as 'equal' to their subjects and citizens while the Iranian discourse was still conceptualized as 'holy'. The King was *zell-o-allah,* the shadow of the god. The people were to benefit from his grace. At the same time, a new utterance emerged: Shah should not govern, but should rule. These are first instances of notions of state and government emerging in the Iranian discourse.

The authority and relevance of both were debated. The religious position, reiterating the rhetorical resources of Islam, rejected notions of new goverment relation. On the other hand, the promoters of *asr-i munavvar*, 'enlightened age', equated to departing from religion and following Europe. The grandeur of Iran was in Europe:

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[30] Ebrahim-beig, no 4, p. 298.

> When What a shame for you, Iran: Where is your grandeur? Where is that power, that prosperity that you once enjoyed? It has been 1,280 years now that the naked and starving Arabs have descended upon you and made your life miserable. Your land is in ruins, your people ignorant and innocent of civilization, deprived of prosperity and freedom, and your King is a despot.[31]

The *enlightened* position identified itself with the European culture. The situation was described was *taraghi-e maakus* (reverse progress) where the Europe immitated Iran and prospered. Iran 'trapped with Islam' and reversed. The identification with Europe by this position continues their historical disassociation from religion and assuming various etymologies with the West. For example, they argued for history as the main foundation of a national (*Millat/mellat)* that was sole feature of the Iran and not the others in the region nor the world. Reiterating the pattern of appropriating the glory of the past, some speculated French grabbed Persian concepts that the french term for history, 'histoire' was derived from 'ostovar', which means solid, consistent and stable. It alludes the constant of the world, the Europe, and the civilisation was taken from Iran.

Furthermore, a notable figure of this position claimed 'two nations [France and Iran, were] born from the same father and mother.' While there are similar examples in future to highlight the close link between Iran and Europe, specifically France, this stands in a stark contrast to the Safavid era.Then Persian

[31] Mirza Aqa Khan, BL, note 73

ambassador to the Europe (circa 1599) avoided France as a destination as they need to 'earn their status'.[32] Now, France and Iran were made equivalent and sharing same understanding of the world. The State also reiterated that even the practices and how state arms dress are similar. Muhammad Shah (r. 1834-48), while calling for adaptation of European military styles, reiterated they were taken from ancient Iranian uniforms depicted in Persepolis. The difference was depicted as a similarity that could be rekindled.

Moreover, both the traditionalist and Europhil positions assumed the Western language is taken from Persian. Itizad-al Saltanah's book on *nizam-e jadid* discussed how the world order from military to language was shaped by Persian culture. The immittants were Europeans. At the same time, the traditionalist and religious positions criticised Europhils for copying the West. An example of believe appropriate of Persian was mentioned by Mirza Abdollahi Lari Shushtari investigated how the Europeans describe their daily lives during his travels. He claimed the term dinner table is taken from *mizban* (host) which is composed of the term *miz* (table) and *ban* (keeper). At the same time, the discourse was going through profund changes by introduction of new concepts such as liberty and equality (*Azadi va mosavat*).

The introduction of these concepts from Western thought initiated a debate about their origins. Surprisingly, all came to consensus the West was a thief that looted Persian culture to progress: 'while the Mughal looting destroyed our cities, the neuveu progressives looted our culture to improve themselves.'[33]

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[32] Note 32, National Archive

[33] Note 48, National Archive — also Tarraghi/Zia

At the same time, Arabic was the language of teaching and thought by religious positions (in seminaries) while the Europhils were striving from inclusion of Western languages. The State (court) spoke Azeri/Turkish while the Tabriz court was promoting new ways of teaching Persian. The important context in noting discurssive and institutional struggle is the developments in India. The British government introduced a new policy to replace Persian as the official language. The ramification of this was rapid spread of Persian texts published in India. They were used to compose a basic lexical resources for compilation of first examples of dictionary or encyclopaedias in 1871 or later one by Dihkhuda in 1958.

The incremental introduction and institutionalisation of language was the gradual govermentalisation of the everyday life. The state shaping the broader discourse was in itself was being influenced by the international society. The trickle down effect becomes more contentious when the language was treated as the 'symbol' of the civilisation and contextualised within the broader *farhang-e ghaani* (rich culture), the Persian language was the language of civilised. The traditional and religious discourse, through relying on Ibn-e Khaldun, highlighted the need to maintain the Arabic concepts in Persian language. The Europhils rooted against it. The Tabriz court urged for a 'delegation and publication to create new concepts ... because in Iran of today, there is nothing more *vajeb* nor more useful than this.' Utilising the concept of *vajeb*, cumpolsry/must, is reminiscent of the religious discourse where the basics of religion are *vajeb* to condocut/follow. Saying prayer, for example, is a vajeb. Conveying the intensity of the struggle, Jalal al-din Mirza labelled the moves

around language as a 'jihad' to 'maintain country, religion, dignity, and independence.'[34]

The changes in language become more important when we note one of the very first examples the the Shah used the new homogenous language was annnouncing adversity against British. Muhammad Shah in 1839 made a rare public statement, explaining the military retreat from Herat. This was the first statement he started with 'the people of Iran' (*mardom-e Iran*) that was disenminetaed across the country. It highlighted the necessities of 'honourable and virtuous life' facing the Western adversity, whether against the language or territory.

In grabbing concepts and changing the language, there was a debate on how to safeguard a lanaugage that has words such as virtue, honour, gratitude, patriotism, public spirit and martyrdom were evident against the 'western rape that sees our language as dark, because it does not describe their lavish decadent life.'[35] because 'we cannot find any synonym for them in any other language.'[36]

On the other hand, some embraced translation of European (scientific) texts to inform and progress Iran. Notably, the position was heralded by journals in Calcutta. Tha language was deemed as a way to limit the differences with

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[34] Abd al-Karim Iravani's *Qava(id-i Sarf vaNahv-i Farsi* (1262/1848), Hajj Muhammad Karim Khan Kirmani's *Sarf va Nahv-i Farsi* (1275/1858), Muhammad Husayn Ansari's *Tanbiyah al-Sibyan* (1296/1878), Mirza Habib Isfahani's *Dastur-i Sukhan* (1289/1872) and *Dabistan-i Parsi* (1308/1890), Mirza Hasan Taliqani's *Kitab-i Lisan al-(Ajam* (1305/1887), Ghulam Husayn Kashif's *Dastur-i Kashif* (1316/1898), and Mirza (Ali Akbar Khan Nafisi's *Zaban Amuz-i Farsi* (1316/1898).

[35] Sayyah, p. 67

[36] Tabatabi, p. 211.

Europe to 'force them accept our civility and be part of their society.'[37] The concern with language and identity became mostly visible throughout the constitutional revolution and nehzat-e tajadod. The viability and authenticity of a discourse/position was dependent on the fact of it was a translation (*tarjomeh*), prophecy (*estekhareh*), adaptation (*ta'alif*), rational thinking (*taaghol*) or divinity (*tavakol*).

The constitutionalist discourse, specially its Europhil and pro-western position, was heavily reliant on *tarjomeh* while producing itself on rationality. On the other hand the traditionalist and religious positions insisted it is only the divinity and prophecy that can protect the motherland against 'the encroachment and flirtation of the distant aggressive nations'. The use of gendered discourse here again demonstrates the inability of the western/Europhil discourse to protect the country. It is also crystallised through uttering statements such as 'Zaban-e madari' that could protec the country.[38]

The gendered discourse becomes more prevalent with increased exchanges/travels with the West, specifically facing the Other Women. Many of the diary of surprises described the West as the heaven that Iran must turn into, simply because of the Western women. The western women were described as angel-like, 'that are the reward of honourable men in heaven', and 'kind as a fairy'.[39]

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[37] Miftah al-Zafar, *Qawmiyat va Lughat*,

[38] Mahdi Quli Hidayat, 42. See *Sur-i Israfil.*

[39] Mirza Etesam's diary on visiting St James park, BL, note 4

On Sunday, men, women, and youths, poor and rich, travelers and natives, resort here. This park enlivens the heart, and people overcome with sorrow, repairing

thither, are entertained in a heavenly manner; and grieved hearts, from seeing that place of amusement, are gladdened against their will. On every side females with

silver forms, resembling peacocks, walk about, and at every corner fairy-faced ravishers of hearts move with a thousand blandishments and coquetries; the plain of the earth become a paradise from the resplendent foreheads, and heaven (itself)

hangs down its head for shame at seeing the beauty of the lovers. There lovers meet their fairy-resembling sweethearts: they attain their end without fear of the police or of rivals, and gallants obtain a sight of rosy cheeks without restraint. When I viewed

this heavenly place, I involuntarily exclaimed:

If there is a paradise on earth,[40]

It is this, oh! It is this.

The presence of females in the public, turned the West into a paradise for some. That turned into a discursive discussion between tradioanlist, Europhils and religious on how exactly to prosper. Prosperity was the presence of female. The presence of female was like paradise, while the religious position also promises heaven full of angels. A prominent pro-western author describes

[40] This verse (if there is a paradise on earth) appears in four other diaries that I came across, exactly describing Persian voy(ag)eurs experience in European parks.

the Europe as 'the land of heavenly ordinances' that was promised by the religion. On the other hand, the religious position expressly disavowed it as moral and social disorder. Masterful use of rhetorical resources available in religious scriptures, the Europhils urged copying the West, because of its woman, that is the promise of the religion. For example, Reza Quli Mirza claims 'the promised heaven of our backward society exist on this earth.' Here, the discourse is tainted. The idea of progress and political though, the social imaginaton of cilivisaiton, is dislocated with sexual fantasies that is natural home to reward men.

By relying on a Hadith that 'the world could a prison for a believer' because the freedom is promised in heaven, the interaction with women turned into a debate on what is Azadi (freedom). Observing Western spaces and introducing those into the Iranian discourse, firstly, temporalised the existing present to the desired future of the homeland. It also suggested new norms for life. Furthermore, it suggested the court to embrace the European tradition of dealing with women. This was further intensified when Nasser-e-Odin Shah travelled to Germany and as a king, witnessed it first hand. When his takeaway from the trip was advising the females of the court to wear skirts over their trousers, the religious discourse firmly opposed him:

> Progress cannot be legitimised tending to your desires, but healing the ailments of the society... we comprehend the enjoyment of eating and intercourse more than progress and education.

The issue of women's presence turned into a debate about *azadi va istibdad (freedom versus tyranny)*. It was a way to describe the mode of governance

in Qajar Iran. It became more prevalent and fuelled the constitutionalist movement when women turned into a symbol of freedom. It was juxtaposed against the concept of fairness, *javanmardi*, and not justice. *Javanmardi* is compounded from *Javan* (youth) and *mard* (man, male). The question turned into the quest for fairness or freedom. These started to shape the contours of the debate. The European norm was described as *rams-e azadi*, the convention of freedom, and the Iranian norm was described as *rasme javanmardi*, the convention of fairness.

One of the rare anti-colonial religious utterances was to describe how Europeans treat women with how they treat the colonised. Mirza Fattah Garmarudi described the European manner with women as *nabikari* (wickedness). It draw comparisons how Europeans were also wicked in colonising other nations and expanding their empire that 'damaged those socieites', and it will 'damage the religion, state, and tradition'.[41] It is notable how becoming European is perceived as a threat to the state (Shah), religion, and the tradition (mysticism). Foreign land, *farangistan*, was described as *Kufristan* (land of infidels) that causes 'emotional depression and immensity of regret' that could only be described as 'no more than a seed from a donkey's burden and a drop in a sea about the obscene acts and indecent behaviors of this malevolent people [*in qaum-i bad sigal*][42].'

[41] David Motadel, 'The German Other: Nasir al-Din Shah's Perceptions of Difference and Gender during His Visits to Germany, 1873–89', *Iranian Studies* 44, no. 4 (July 2011): 563–79, https://doi.org/10.1080/00210862.2011.569332.

[42] refer back to how Safvid described Ottoman as 'qualm-i bad sigal'.

The Europhobic narrative by the religious discourse also alarmed he State about becoming weak through feminisation. Inclusion of women in public, like Europe, would open Iran and its female population to European domination through *lizzat al-nisa,* the joy of women. The preservation of state power was portrayed through the locus of sexual fantasies and arousals. Another example of encountering the Western women is the experience of the visiting London to pass King's message to Queen Victoria.

This delegation, arriving in London in April 1839, faced a most discourteous reception. Queen Victoria declined to see them. The British government refused to receive them as governmental guests. Lord Palmerston pointed out that 'the Persian Ambassador must be Europeanized' by making him pay for all of his expenses.[43] This was a reversal of the earlier protocol according to which the British government, like its Iranian counterpart, paid all the expenses of diplomatic guests for the duration of their stay. Adding to the insult, the Iranian delegate was asked to revise Muhammad Shah's (r. 1834–48) letter to Queen Victoria, changing her title from *Malikah* to *Padshah*, for, according to Palmerston, 'we have no sexual distinction for our sovereign,' a distinction which was implied in the concept *malikah* but not in *padshah*.[44] This hostility, instead of the expected hospitality, shaped the Iranian delegates' image of *Farangistan* and perception of *Farangis*.[45]

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[43] Tavakoli Taraghi, p 182.

[44] ibid

[45] Tabatabi, p. 426.

The protocol was ascribed to Queen's *lust,* because women and girls are 'generally pantless and without a veil [*chadur*] and have a constant desire for able pummelers .... not covered ... addicted to pleasure and pleasure.' It was iterated they are free, but from suffering and toil. This was the particular notion of freedom that was heralded by some. They are free but incompetent and frail. On the other hand, the Europhil discourse portrayed the State as frail and incompeten because it failed to protect Iran's territoriality.

The emergent of Iran as a territory that also lost it's soil either through war or treaties such as Gulistan (1813), Turkmanchay (1828), Erzurum (1823 and 1847), and Paris (1857) created new notions of what is to be protected, what men needs to protec and how to protect. The above gendered discourse in relying on motherland, and shifting concepts of the land from territories (*mamalik*) to a cohesive entity (*mamlikat-i Iran* or *kishvar-i Iran*) all contoured to a broader depiction and transition of Iran talked about as an empire, land, nation and then a modern nation-state in close link with language and gender. The shifts in describing Iran coupled with multiple layers. From something to be expanded and conquer other lands, to a site that needs to be subject of matrionic love and to be protected. On the other hand, some of the Europhil positions described it as a grave that only buries progress and ideas.

VI

Until The Islamic Revolution

On 16 September 1941, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–1980) replaced his father, Reza Pahlavi (1878 – 1944), amidst rumours that the new Shah of Iran was selected[46] by Allied Forces when British and Russians forces occupied Iran on the morning of 25 August.[47] The influence of *ajnabi-ha*, the aliens,[48] in Iran remained a constant feature in intellectual, political and cultural debates. The West, *Gharb* (derived from Arabic and defined as the geographical location of the West)[49], was often the alien to talk about.

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[46] Sir Richard Bullard, the British envoy to Tehran, denied such event (Bullard, 1961) and Golsha'yian (1978), a cabinet member, also claims a denial by the Russian ambassador. Katouzian (2009), citing Golsha'yian, argues that Iran's Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Foroughi, informed Reza Shah of the need for abdication and portrayed it as the wish of allied forces. Foroughi was a constitutionalist.

[47] Despite Iran's formal announcement of neutrality during the Second World War, the occupation occurred due to a perception of Iran succumbing its geo-strategic location to German forces.

[48] It could also be translated as foreigners.

[49] On bakhtar/west

Understanding how the West has been represented and perceived during the Pahlavi era is a story of how interpretations emerged, replaced by another, or being reproduced (see Neumann, 1999; Ashley, 1987 and Der Derian, 1987). In very simple terms, it is about the meaning of the West (and sub-concepts) in Iran and to understand how representations are constructed, changed or stayed the same. *Ajnabi-ha* (plural form of Ajnabi), *Mostakberin* (oppressors), *Mostazafin* (the oppressed), and *Mofsedin* (the deviants) were not given throughout the Iranian history but rather brought to the social realm and formulated in discourses. Thus, enabling or hindering actors to pursue particular acts. From 1941 to 1979, anti-Western representations were not just an indictment of the West but a political act of opposition against the Pahlavi State.

The Iranian debate about the West during the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi witnessed the persistence of constitutionalist thoughts, modelling itself on Europe, official rise of historicists emphasising on the past glory of the nation of Iran (mostly lauded by the State), and notable rise of traditionalists and religious strands sourcing the wrongs on the West and urging vehemently to return to roots of being an Iranian and a Muslim. An emergent group near the end of the this era is graduates, those who have returned from Western education with rejection of modernity or the West and are in affection with the civilisation of the West. Despite multitude of ideological and theological difference amongst these viewpoints, wether belonging to State or being a force of opposition, they shared few similar ideas of the West and digressed on how to confront the West.

The idea of the West, during this period, was shadowed by the legacy of Iran's constitutional revolution (1906-11), *Mashruteh* (which conditionalised and

limited the reign of the monarch by establishing a parliament and judiciary), and policies of the founder of the Pahlavi dynast Reza Shah. The Mashruteh is often dubbed as *Asr-e-Bidari* (the age of awakening) when Iran's political landscape was restructured by introducing new political institutions, and the intellectual scene was flooded by Iranians who encountered 'the new civilisation of the West.' Though promoted, the Western civilisation was not regarded as ancient but a forbearer of modernity. The concept of modernity was known as *tajadud* (revival), suggesting that the Western notion of modernity revives Iranian traditions. This period was one of the high watermarks of constitutionalists who favoured adopting European political and economic models to Iran's conditions.[50] Mashruteh was also led by clergies like Jamal al-Din Asad-abadi, Mohammad-Husain Na'ini, and Malek al-Mutakalemin who did not offer an Islamic clash against tajadud but argued that modernity is a struggle against oppression and dictatorship (Ravandi, 1975). For example, in *Tanbih al Ommah and Tanzih Al Mellah* (the admonition of clergies and the refinement of people), Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Na'ayini, a leading Shia theologian of the time, insisted on constitutionalism as a byproduct of *feqh*[51] (Islamic jurisprudence).[52] The consensus on the need for development and tajadud was surprisingly overarching when even the last few Kings of Qajar

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[50] A similar position emerged in Russia in the first third of the nineteenth century (See Chapter 2 of Neumann, 1996).

[51] Alternative dictation based on different pronunciation is *fiqh*.

[52] It was during this time that an active political role by theologians led to establishment of modern centres of Islamic teachings and jurisprudence (hawzah) in Iran that led organisational coherence to the religious class and students and created a public space devoted to Islamic teachings.

dynasty (1796-1925), who embodied the State position, promoted emulating Western practices to have a developed society. The State, intellectuals and the society looked to the West as an inspiration for development. The ideal-type of development was depicted alongside an Iranian utopia that was pre-Islamic Iran. Qajar nationalists such as Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani (1853-96), an influential literary critic, disassociated Iranian identity from Islam and expressed hatred towards 'vile, hungry, savage' Arabs (Kermani, 2005; Zia-Ebrahimi, 2012). Towards the end of Qajar dynasty, Arabs were the imperialist of the time who hindered the development of talented Aryans (See Girgor, 2009 and Zia-Ebrahimi, 2012)[53], while the West was the saviour of the earth.[54] Iranians regarded themselves as culturally superior (Ringer, 2001) that could be strengthened by nearing itself to the West and learning from it.

Such wide spread conceptualisations guided the polity of Pahlavi and policy of Reza Khan, later known as Reza Shah[55], to pursue modernisation

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[53] The concept of cultural trauma, discussed as part of the theoretical framework of this project in the introductory chapter, is useful to analyse such antagonistic representations. Extreme strands of nationalists, pan-Persians and Aryans often regard the Islamic Iran as an 'Arab invasion', a cultural trauma that was a blow to social fabrics of Iranian society, changing the path of 'talented Aryans' in irrevocable way. In another word, for nationalists Islamisation of Iran meant "important part of self has disappeared" (Erikson, 1976). It should be noted that some of the representations are based on imagined events. On cultural trauma, see Alexander, 2004 and Eyerman, 2004. An interesting conceptualisation of spread of Islam across Iran is how a differentiation between Arabs and Islam emerged, especially by religious viewpoints, emerged after the 1979 revolution which turns into a contest of portraying the 'true Islam'.

[54] The racist language, attitude and racial issues in Iran's history and politics have rarely been discussed. Katouzian (1991) notes the racial attitude in his historiography of Iranian writer Sadeq Hedayat. Maraashi (2008) is also another example with a broader long-term view of race, culture and nationalism in Iran.

[55] Reza Pahlavi, known as Reza Khan or Reza Shah, joined the Persian Cossack brigade in his teenage years. The brigade was modelled on Caucasian Cossack regiments of the Imperial Regiment. The brigade, financed by Russia and commanded by Russian officers, was formed after Naser al-Din Shah of Qajara's request to the Tsar in 1878 (Katouzian,2010). Reza Khan was from north of Iran which shared a border with Russia and had a tumultuous

and centralisation programme that banned wearing hijab for women, established secular education institutes, founded a unified army and promoted the Persian language across the geography of Iran in hope of turning Iran into a Western society. The aspiration was modernity but the Iranian society obtained pseudo-modernism. These modernisation programmes were inspired by Mustapha Kamal Ataturk of Turkey, which signifies how Iran at the time regarded Turkey as Western entity (Marashi, 2004 and Banani, 1961).[56] Despite the emulation, Reza Shah was insistent on a nationalist paradigm of reviving the Aryan race,[57] which in his eyes was equivalent to being part of the Western society. The nationalists[58] thinking and modernisation programmes though repressed religious practices that were "impurity" clouding "the Aryan genius" (Siassi, 1931 cited in Zia-Ebrahimi, 2012) did not diminish the role of religion in its entirety. For example, to signify the strength and prowess of Reza

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experience of Russian presence. In April 1921, guided by a British commander in Tehran (Major General Sir Edmund Ironside of the War Office), the Cossacks were brought to Tehran to save Iran from chaos and bolshevism. The command of the Cossack brigade was given to Reza Khan. Within few weeks, the Cossack installed a new Prime Minister who within a year was replaced by Reza Khan (who was the minister of war and chief of army at the same time). In 1925, he was made head of state ending the Qajar dynasty and then established the Pahlavi Monarchy. See Wilber, 1975.

[56] In *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernisation under Ataturk and Reza Shah,* Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher (2003) compare and contrast rise of both individuals and their promotion of European social models, and the ensuing reformed yet authoritarian society.

[57] Perhaps, Reza Shah's affection for Germany could be attributed to the widely held belief that Germans are of Aryan race. Throughout the reign of Reza Shah, notable numbers of German technicians and engineers played a significant role in construction of Iran's infrastructure. For example, Iran's oldest university, University of Tehran, is built by German architectures. Presence of Germans in Iran and the extent of control (i.e. on Iranian railway) unnerved Russians and British during the Second World War, leading to insurmountable pressure on Reza Shah to expel Germans from Iran.

[58] The emergence of Iranian nationalism will be discussed in two previous chapters.

Shah, a popular poem mourning the death of Shia's third Imam[59] claimed that if Cossacks (a trope for Reza Shah) were present on the day of Ashura, Imam Hussein would have not been alone and slaughtered.

These debates were (re)produced amidst societal and structural changes alongside various policies that the Shah pursued. Notably, political freedom varied from 1941 to 1979 leading to a rigid state or self-censorship.[60] Therefore, to avoid imprisonment or other punishments, some representations and conceptions were not raised or not circulated, which shapes the availability of sources and comprises the discourse. For example, a critique of Pahlavi's education policy as promotion of Western *imperial* culture by 'trite bourgeois' (Hanson, 1983) was not published as a scholarly article but disguised in a children fiction with political innuendos and metaphors; or when a university lecturer, a Marxist, was reproducing the history of Shi'ism and the battle of Oppressed and Oppressors within the context of the global anti-imperialist

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[59] Understanding the reverence and role of Imam Hossein is essential to grasp the history of Iran and history of Shiism. A grandson of the Prophet (and a member of his family, called *Ahl-e-Beit* which means from the household) is Shia's third Imam and Sunni's fifth caliphate. When as decedent of the Prophet (described as his rightful heir), Imam Hossein was charging the caliphate with tyranny and subverting Islam, he was martyred during a bloody battle in Karbala, Iraq, in AD 680. Imam Hossein is known to be an oppressed individual and symbols of martyrdom, known as the Lord of Martyrs (Seyyed ol-Shohada). His story, especially his martyrdom, has been mythologised and used as a political metaphor throughout the Iranian history. His day of martyrdom, the 10th day of the Islamic month of Muharram (which means being deprived) is known as Ashura and commemorated throughout Iran and the Shia world. A popular slogan, 'Every day is Asura, every land is Karbala', signifies the importance of the role of this Shia Imam and how his life is regarded as the way for salvation in a world of injustice and oppression. The martyrdom of Imam has been used to also depict contemporary events: Pahlavi and the West, Islamic Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, and even the recent nuclear negotiations; with the West or Shah or Iraq being the tyrant (those who oppressed and martyred the Imam) and the battle being one to continue the path of Imam Hossein.

[60] There is no overarching study of censorship by the Pahlavi apparatus. For a brief discussion, see Banani, 1971.

movement to criticise the Shah. These were instances of how (self-)censorship affected the discourse.

I Darling or Devil?

Freedom, at the initial phase of the reign of the *Shah* was set as the standard for civilisation. Three weeks after Mohammad Reza Pahlavi came to power, Mohammad Ali Forughi, a leading intellectual and the Shah's first Prime Minister[61] underscored the need to move 'towards a civilised society.' After years of occupation, 'pain and suffering', according to Forughi, it was time to 'cherish the blessings of liberty' by avoiding to act in an 'arbitrary fashion' but be free with affairs 'based in law' (Katouzian, 2009). Because 'the essence of civilisation is that the people are mature, and the clearest sign of their maturity is that they observe the law' (Makki, 1994).

To Foroughi, an ardent constitutionalist, the essence of civilisation was observing the law but not 'railways and modern industries' (Katouzian, 2009). To traditionalists and religious (forming a notable portion of the opposition), 'being civilised' was seen as *taghlid*[62] *az Gharb* (emulating [from] the West). In 1944, early years of the reign of the young Shah, Ayatollah Khomenei[63]

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[61] Mohammad Ali Foroughi Zoka-ol-Molk (1877-1942) was also a diplomat who attended the Versailles Conference, and a prolific author of books such as the history of philosophy in Europe, the history of Iran, and the history of the Ancient Peoples of the East.

[62] *Taghlid*, emulation, is also used to refer to the act of following advices and decisions provided by the highest level Shia authority, i.e. a Grand Ayatollah, during the occultation of last Shia Imam, the hidden Imam.

[63] Later, he led the 1979 Islamic revolution against Pahlavi, founding the Islamic Republic with anti-Western and anti-Imperialist discourses at its heart.

published his first monograph, *Kashf-e-Asrar,*[64] outlining his world view and reflecting on the event of prior years:

> "It's a pity that we're afraid of Europeans and have lost our self-confidence in relation to them, viewing as weak our own mastery and expertise in the sciences which the Europeans cannot attain in a thousand years" (Khomeini, 1944).

He emphasised Iran's 'past', not just Islamic one, writing that a society with *Mantiq ul-Shafa* [Avicenna's *Book of Healing*], *Hikmat al-Ishraq* [*Philosophy of Illumination*, by Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi], and *Hikmat Muta'aliyyah* [*Transcendent Philosophy*] of Mulla Sadra should not need the 'logic and philosophy of the Europeans' (Khomeini, 1944) or those like Forughi, to prescribe Western philosophy to 'dictate how the Muslim society' should behave, and doing so 'is one of the biggest disservices that Muslim writers have done to their own societies' (Khomeini, 1944). The differentiation between Muslim society, Iran's history and following European logic is giving prevalence to the combination of *Iranniayt*, being Iranian, and *Islammiat*, being Islamic, against the *West* and also a sense of otherness vis-à-vis a state that pursued European logics and policies. This idea of the West conforms to the air of superiority conveyed during the Qajar period and embedded within the discourse of Pahlavi but the problematic is not being distant from the West, it is attempting to be inferior to them. Consequently, Western civilisation is regarded as one that is diminishing Iranian's self-confidence.[65]

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[64] Discovering Secrets

[65] Self-confidence could be regarded as one of the key discourses of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. Self-confidence became synonymous with

Following such a path would lead to Iran becoming a 'powerless captive' to the Western civilisation. In *Taskhir-e tammadon-e farangi*[66] (the conquest of Western/Foreign civilisation), Seyyed Fakhruddin Shadman, an alumni of LSE, argued that Iran should attempt to appropriate the Western civilisation by relying on the common denominators of Iranians: the Persian language. As a historian, he feared that surrendering to Western civilisation would put an end to 'Iranians' independence of thought and self-esteem' (Shadman, 1964 and Broujerdi, 1997). By using a militaristic language[67] to depict the Western civilisation as a violent aggressor, he compared it to 'an army made up of one hundred million soldiers' which could only be captured and turned into 'our own [Iran's] servant' if the Western civilisation is 'absorbed confidently and reflectively' (Broujerdi, 1997) in Russia and Japan, and does not take over like in Algeria.

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independence and self-sufficiency. The chapter on Iran's nuclear programme discusses the relation of these concept with the nuclear policy, and the idea of the West. The nuclear programme (and also the result of 2015 nuclear talks) could be analysed in pure security and strategic terms but should also be discussed how it became an ideational component embedded in Iran's idea of the West.

[66] *Farang*'s literal meaning is foreign. Here, in this instance is deemed as the 'West' as the content explicitly outlines Western civilisation. Shadman, himself, elaborates on the concept of Farang by including Europe, Australia, and North America as part of the Farang but not Haiti. For Shadman, countries with 'an entirely or majority Christian population that are descendants of a European race, speak one of the European languages, and have reached the highest stages of civilisation' are Farangis.

[67] When juxtaposed alongside the reign of first Pahlavi monarch and the global context, it could be argued that for a time the representation of the West was implicitly and explicitly militaristic (and a militaristic westernisation/modernisation). However, towards the end of the Pahlavi dynasty we would be witnessing prevalence of cultural aspect.

II Vocal Opposition to State and the West: From imitation to intoxication

In his book, Shadman portrays two fictions character: one a clergyman and the other a Western-educated intellectual. The clergy is criticised as a blockhead who is ignorant of 'the modern world' and nostalgic for 'the bygone era' (Broujerdi, 1997). At the same time, he labels the intellectual as *fokoli* and Iran's 'most treacherous enemy' (Broujerdi, 1997) due to blind copying of the Western culture and embodying the *farangi* (from foreign) lifestyle. Fokoli is originated from the French term *faux-col*, as someone wearing a tie. The term refers to someone who dresses like Westerners. Nowadays, it is also referred to men who style their hair 'in a Western manner' (more to be written about it in chapter 8). *Fokoli* and its associated words such as *gherti* (effete) — when used to label males — undermines the perception of masculinity. Shadman regards them pseudo-intellectuals, recently returned from *farang*, who advocate replacement of Persian alphabet with a Latin one (Broujerdi, 1997). The ignorant *fokoli* thinks if the alphabet is replaced, 'all Iranians will suddenly be able to read and write'. Hence, Shadman's argument that strengthening Persian alphabet by the accurate translation of Western literature (and not letting it take over the country) would lead to the surrender of the aggressor, the *Western* civilisation which is foreign to Iran.

Shadman's argument is one of nuance. In *Darkness and light*, he depicts West as an aggressor that Iran could learn from, not by abandoning Islam but by relying on Islamic 'moral and ethics' and learning from Western techniques. He loathes Europe-travellers and Europe-educated Iranians, 'indecent and narrow-minded' *fokoli*, who think the West is all about decadence of gambling,

dancing cheek to cheek, and going to smoke-filled pubs, but neglect the deeper foundation of *farang* which is rooted in 'reading, deliberation, and argumentation' (Shadman, 1948). With his admiration of the West and its history, he could be categorised as a constitutionalists[68] that urges adopting Europe based on Iran's local experience. His critique of the deceitful West is similar to one raised by traditionalists. He insisted on Iran's past and Iranian ethics but noted that there is a logic to learn from the West. On the other hand, criticise Iranians (especially *Fokoli)* as ones attracted to the allure of the 'deceptive West' (Broujerdi, 1997) but ignorant of the East such as Russia, India and China. He is amongst an array of intellectuals who are fond of East's rich history of scholastic achievements and institutions (such as theological centers) but have disdain for Western education system. He mocked Western trained and educated *fokoli*:

> "Since becoming a *fokoli* does not require much [intellectual] capital, whoever reads a few chapters of an economics book by Charles Gide [1847-1932] or Marshall [1842-1924] becomes an economic expert; whoever tightens up the screws on his aunt's sewing machine becomes an engineer' whoever writes the account of his cousin's wedding in poor Persian becomes a creative writer; whoever writes or talks about politics, party, Metternich, Lord Curzon, and Bolsheviks and Mensheviks becomes an expert on politics. So much so, that compared to our overall population we have more economists that United

[68] The same representation also exists in Russia, see Neumann, 1996.

States, and more political experts and commentators thanEngland." (Shadman, 1948)

For many, *Fokoli-ha* (plural form of Fokoli) were emblematic of phenomena that were destroying Iranian identity through the process of Westernisation. Becoming Western, or what Ahamad Fardid[69] called *gharbzadegi*, becoming Western (Westoxified, Weststurcked, Westaminated), by intoxicating the indigenous culture. In philosophical terms, Westoxification the 'interlude between the self and the being' between the dichotomy of the Orient, 'the kingdom of benevolence and compassion' (Brojouerdi, 1997), and the Occident, the terrain of domination (Broujerdi, 1997).[70] While Fardid regarded *gharbzadegi* as natural course of history that each society would get past imitating the West, a significant corpus of literature blamed Westernisation on Pahlavi's policy.

Jalal Al-e Ahmad, an essayist, compared *gharbzadegi* to a disease which kills wheat from within with two players: the West and the *gharbzadeh*. He believes that with heralding the Western culture and depicting the East as a backward servant to the superior West, the possibility of cultural exchange between the West and the East is over. Al-e Ahmad cites Pahlavi's urban policy as a plan designed by *gharbzadeha* to imitate West's industrial superiority, yet the local is grappling with dying agricultural sector and poverty.

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[69] Ahamd Fardid (1912-1994) introduced Iranians to German philosophy and himself is influenced by Heidegger.

[70] Throughout the project, terms East/West and Occident/Orient are used interchangeably to denote historical, ideational and philosophical traditions.

He regards the cycle of migration from Iranian villages to the cities not just a *gharbzadeh* imitating the West but acting upon the West's desire to 'recycle petrodollars for tractors' (Al-e Ahmad, 1977), which serves Western interest and solidifies the Pahlavi state. Mentioning [71] signified the capitalist nature of the West that buys Iran's oil, yet get it back through selling tractors (or other products) to Iran by disabling Iran's domestic economy and production. Jalal also regards high unemployment rate and inequality as outcome of 'bigots blindly copying west… [destructing] local handicrafts by industrialisation' and 'serving' the West'. Following likes of Shadman, he also lambasts Western education system 'infiltrating Iran with diploma disease' which gives prevalence to certificate and credentials rather than wisdom and ethics which is praised in Iranian culture and poetry. In specifics, scholars and students of literature, law and theology are criticised for 'aping of Western orientalists' (Hanson, 1983) without any social relevance, only paving the way for 'greater submersion' into intoxication by the West (Al-e Ahmad, 1977 and 1969).

While those educated in the West enjoyed social prestige amongst Iranians, were regarded as more superior not due to mere education but because of returning from *farang* or *kharej*[72], Al-e Ahmad confronts them as aliens to Iranian culture and "agents of the West" because "they are perfect examples of something severed from its roots, this [is] the result of *gharbzadegi*. They are perfect specimens of individuals with their feet in the air. These are

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[71] After 1979, petrodollar was used to mainly describe countries of the Persian Gulf to allude that their oil-based economy is serving the West.

[72] Another translation would be out or the outer sphere.

the ones who execute the notions and views of foreign advisors and experts" (Hansen, 1983).

Al-e Ahmad believes the 'government's deadwood' creates a position for Iranian graduates returning from Europe by simple virtue of their Western education, and proposes preventing Iranian students from studying in Europe (and the United States). Complying with earlier texts on the need for re-establishing exchange with the East, he suggests dispatching students to Japan and India, which have best embraced technology (Al-e Ahmad, 1977). By opening governmental jobs to Oriental graduates, Al-e Ahmad favoured an equilibrium between 'east stricken' individuals and 'westoxified'.

Al-e Ahmad regarded the spread of machinery and Western technology leading to loss of political sovereignty, cultural authenticity (what he referred to as *nativism* and *indigenousness*), and economic prosperity. He described use of machines in carpet weaving and textile industry as an example of frightening, exploiting and controlling Iranian working class that in turn, transformed the indigenous culture by changing relations and sturcutres. The transformation was symptom of passive submission to machines, symbol of the West and modernity, that enslaved Iranians. To regain cultural authenticity which, for Al-e Ahmad and his traditionalist followers, was independence, Iran had to 'exorcise the spell cast by the machine.'[73]

He conceived Europe and graduates of European education systems in the same way as Shadman earlier did. Al-e Ahmad referred to *fokoli* few times

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[73] It should be noted that there were some rebuttal on Al-e Ahmad arguments on machinery. For example, Rahimi (1968) discarded Al-e Ahmad's opposition to machines: "… machine in the hand of the Western bourgeoise has caused the subjugation of the Orient, is surely means of defence in the hand of the Orientals."

and depicted the *gharbzadeh* as a devious comfort-seeking effete who lacks ethics or convictions (Al-e Ahamd, 1984). In a way, Europe and the Western culture is portrayed as feminine. Rhetorical tropes of Al-e Ahmad might apply to himself too. For example, he was known for admiring Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) as an idol who stood up against *solte*, domination[74] (Al-e Ahmad, 1966). Nevertheless, Al-e Ahmad's writings were amalgamation of many of global debates ongoing in 1950s and 1960s.

'Westernisation: A Welcome Ordeal'[75]

The opposition to Pahlavi not only vehemently criticised Westernisation (and westoxification) but regarded the state as the embodiment of the pandemic that Iran is grappling with. The Shah, educated in Switzerland, was reining over governmental institutions that were modelled on German and American counterparts, embracing returnees from Europe and pursuing policies imitating and serving the West. However, unsurprisingly, the Shah thought different.

While he regarded himself as the true father of the nation uniting all sects and classes, he was *Shanshaah* — the King of the Kings — and the *aryamehr* — the light of Aryans — who is carrying the torch of an old empire from Cyrus the Great (576 BC-530 BC) of the Achaemenid Empire (550-330 BC; Ansari, 2012). For such proud history, it is not appropriate to imitate the West. In this sense, the Shah was in agreement with traditionalists and religious, i.e. Al-e Ahmad, Shadman and Khomeini (and others), on Iran's glorious past and

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[74] Solte could also be translated as reigning and ruling.

[75] The heading is taken from a chapter of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's memoir (1966).

Western inferiority. The Shah believed that the West owed much to Iran's civilisation with an 'older' and 'more mature' culture (Pahlavi, 1961) as the 'oldest continuous one racially and linguistically to that of the West' (Pahlavi, 1961). According to the Shah, Iranians are "Easterners, but we are Aryans. This Middle East, what is it? One can no longer find us there. But Asia, yes. We are an Asian Aryan power whose mentality and philosophy are close to those of the European states, above all France." (Kayhan International,1973; also cited in Zia-Ebrahimi, 2011). Shah's insistence on highlighting the Aryan race is reproduction of his father's thoughts and policies but singling out France hints a different understanding of the West and modernity. The initial interaction of the Pahlavi dynasty, as an authoritarian rulers, was with Germany and German technicians who had same roots with the Aryan race (see above) and heralded modernity in an industrial sense. As Mohammad Reza Shah matures in his reign, he closely associates the West and the Iranian civilisation with France, known for its cultural opulence. This change suggests a shift from an industrial modernity to a cultural one.

The Shah did not believe in submersion of Iran's 'imperial culture'[76] into Western civilisation, but heralded 'civilising exchange' that maybe Iran 'can civilise' the West. In such world view, policies of his governments were not westernisation but 'modernisation to reinvent Iran' (Pahlavi, 1961; Alam, 1992) not just by expanding its infrastructures, building universities and hospitals, and becoming an international transport hub but by buying dozens artworks and

[76] Both Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and his father, Reza Pahlavi, boasted Iran's imperial credentials by reminding it as world's 'first true empire'.

establishing magnanimous exhibitions.[77] It is not becoming Western but to strengthen the 'great civilisation.' Furthermore, the Shah believed the 'values' embodied by Iranian civilisation and empire were 'something of the spirit of the United Nations of nearly 2,500 years later' (Pahlavi, 1961). This statement layers the concept of modernising Iran.

Aligned with his opposition, the Shah regarded the native culture as more superior and more progressive that heralded United Nations values centuries earlier. This representation of Iran's past also hint the Shah's attempt of entry into international society.[78] It was in a broader international context that the modernisation policy was to reinvent and improve Iran's past to gain greater International standing.[79]

Gaining acknowledgement for Iran's past and appreciation for its current was at the heart of Pahlavi's state. The Shah's celebration and appropriation of the imperial past, specifically Cyrus the Great, reached its

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[77] Pahlavi's cultural policy and in specific, artworks bought by Shah and his wife, Farrah Diba, were also subject to revolutionary debates in the aftermath of the Islamic revolution. Naturally, paintings of Pablo Picasso, Andy Warhol, Pierre-Auguste Renoir or Paul Gauguin's paintings were symbols of the morally corrupt and subvert culture of the West, promoted by Pahlavi. However, despite attempts to destroy such artworks, they were preserved in the vault of Tehran's Museum of Contemporary Art. See Bloomberg's (2015) report on current status of the museum that was founded by Pahlavi.

[78] In this project, international society is defined as "when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions" (Bull, 1977). How Iran perceives itself as part of this society, or attempts recognition within it, and how defines common interests and values are amongst issues that is raised throughout the project. In specifics, chapters 9 and 10 discusses how Iran contests the definition of international society, its membership and common values. In some of official texts and speeches, international community is synonymous with international society

[79] A forthcoming writing by Iver Neumann on Entry into international society discusses how polities with long history often discuss recognition within international society and aspiring great power status.

height by organising one of the world's 'greatest party in history' (Life, 1972) to commemorate 2,500 years of the Persian monarchy. Numerous international dignitaries were invited to the celebration but no Iranian citizen (apart from officials and staff) were present during the days of events held in ancient capital of Iran, Shiraz.

The opposition perceived the party as an outlandish waste while the society was experiencing significant inequality. Furthermore, the logistics of the celebration strengthened the anti-Western narrative. Non-Seclusion of women attendees from men, serving (imported) alcoholic beverages, hiring foreign waiting staff and chef, amongst others, were all perceived as Iran becoming a playground for 'decadence of Westerners by throwing parties like them' (Adib-Moghadam, 2013) and 'hosting drunk degenerates' (Behrangi, 1973), and undermining its authentic past by commentating Parisian fashion (Shariati, 1974).

On the other hand, based on accounts published by the lead organiser of the celebration, Foreign Ministry officials and Shah's interviews, Pahlavi state regarded the celebration as an opportunity to magnify 'Iran's past'. Ardeshir Zahedi, a long-time member of Pahlavi's inner circle, remembers the party as a moment 'when I felt proud as an Iranian because all these *ajnabi*[80] witnessed where we came from … they were thinking of us as a backward society but we showed how progressive we are.'

[80] By referring to ajnabi (the aliens, foreigners), the speaker alludes to dignitaries attending the celebrations and also the global audience.

What united opposition and the state was the 'inferiority' of the West in comparison to Iran's civilisation and the need to regain the glory of the past. The Shah, the state, was open to learning from the West and bridging differences while traditionalists sought cure of wrongs simply in going back to roots of being Iranians. The religious reaffirmed the importance of Islam alongside the Iranian identity. One regarded the West as one that should be convinced of it by modernising Iran and 'reinventing the civilisation' while the other represented the way to superiority and glory through rejecting Western values and embracing the 'authentic Iranian self'. The emphasis on sense of being Iranian, against the Western other and their values, also embodies religious and Islamic elements. Ayatollah Khomeini, who at the time was actively leading the opposition force (at least amongst the religious class), used Quranic verses to liken the Shah to the 'Pharaoh' of the time, who by westernising Iran and his 'decadence that satisfies Western taste', is a 'stain on Iran's history' (Khomeini, 1971).

The Religion

Comparing the Shah to the Pharaoh was a recurrent theme in religious opposition to the State. The representation is inspired by Quranic verses. The Quran symbolises the Pharaoh of Egypt as a lavish waster, rebel [against the God and the people], idolatrous, and a savage tyrant. These traits were also often labeled as outcomes of a capitalist Western civilisation. In fact, 'Pharaoh' was a metaphor to name Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to evade censorship and punishment my security services. For example, Ali Shariati (1933-1977), a Marxist yet religious preacher who was educated at Sorbonne University in

Paris, resorted to religious concepts and naming Shah a Pharaoh to tacitly criticise Pahlavi's policies. His preachings at a religious institution, named *Hosseinie Ershad*,[81] seemed apolitical but the religious history was inclusive of a myriad concepts and representations that alluded to the Shah.

Writing in opposition to celebration of 2,500 years of Persian monarchs, he wrote:

> "As a nation entangled in a storm uplifting our roots and changing us, in a century that our enemy's attack is alienating us from ourselves, making us into tamed individuals ready to be looted; we are at the presence of continuum of history of our nation and our ideologues, to vow to treasure the true love, never die, and sustain our true selves in the name of a nation that has its strong roots in this grand desert of humanism, in a cultural depth enriched with glory and divineness. [We are] standing on our authenticity in a historical turn to [mark our legacy] in this world."

Amidst rhetorical tone, Shariati's reference to 'enemy' and its 'attack' to alienate Iranians from their true identity, is based on earlier representation of the West in Pahlavi era. He regards such cultural domination affecting the society and the individuality of Iranians. Like Pahlavi state and other forces of opposition, he notes the glorious past of Iran but, in line with Islamic teachings, promises a glorious future to come. A rather oblique reference in this instance

[81] Hosseinieh is a place where usually the martyrdom of the third Shia Imam is commemorated. Ershad means guidance.

of writing is his utilisation of 'looting' (*gharat*) which is often used to describe the Mongol invasion of Persia (1219-1221), perceived as a period where Iran was burnt down and 'its culture was in ashes' but emerged victorious when defied the Mongol invasion. Shariati is using an implicit militaristic language comparing the ramification of Western culture in Iran to be as devastating as the Mongol invasion.

Shariati's critique of the Pahlavi state was inspired by the struggle of Shia's third Imam, and the clash between *Mustazaafin* and *Mostakberin*: Quranic concepts for the oppressed and the oppressor. Shariati regarded the salvation of Iranian society, and return to self,[82] through heralding a revolutionary Shiism that trains individuals to be 'warriors and intellectuals' (Broujerdi, 1997). He also saw Che Guevara as a contemporary embodiment of Imam Hossein. He juxtaposed other civilisations, including the West, against the Islamic civilisation and regarded Iran's authentic culture not as the one rooted in pre-Islamic period but an Islamic Iran (Shariati, 1974). His critique of the Pahlavi state utilised Islamic narrative, creating a blend of 'sense of Iranian-ness' and 'Islamic identity.'

Shariati's representation of the West was more of a philosophical one, and not often explicit. His thesis of revitalised Shi'ism, which in essence was to be able 'to think by our true self' and fight rather than emulating others, was based on an ideology of 'divine integration' which rejected the infidelity of the West, and embraced social justice and equality. Nevertheless, he believed

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[82] *Bazgasht be Khishtan.* Which is also the title of his 1961 monograph.

imitating the model of Western development had failed because 'civilisation and culture are not like radios, televisions and refrigerators that could be imported, powered, and allowed to operate' (Shariati, 1981).

Indeed, he continued representing those copying European values and intellects as 'alienated and uprooted' individuals. It should be noted that Shariati's speeches and written work had broader contexts by referring to the intellectuals of the Third World and fight against cultural imperialism. Shariati's conception of the West was not limited to Iran, but a global phenomenon that needed to be rejected. In Iran, he believed, the way to overthrow Western domination was to be devoted warriors.

Devotion and fight was also prevalent in the position taken by Ayatollah Khomeini in opposing the Pahlavi state. In fact, Ayatollah Khomeini's statements on *gharb*, in its totality, were not much different to what other opposition forces have produced. However, his reliance on religious monuments and analogies was far more extensive.

As pointed out earlier, Ayatollah Khomeini who experienced fighting foreign presence in his teenage years, held the West responsible for miseries of Iranians. Such belief, shared amongst traditionalists and religious, positioned the West against independence and freedom of Iranians (Dahbashi, 1993). However, his anti-imperialism witnessed a shift as he shared the blame: Iranians, the oppressed, had been wronged in a plot of domestic and foreign *mostakbers*, oppressors.

Tormented by a series of the Shah's reforms, including land reform and universal suffrage of women, which was dubbed as the White Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini regarded Shah's embrace of Western values as instigator

of a 'process bringing misery and suffering to Iranian farmers and peasants.' In line with his thinking of European civilisation as inferior, only suffering is Western values which is similar to Al-e Ahmad's disdain for machinery and its consequences for working class.

Ayatollah Khomeini regards presence of the West as a cultural coloniser, eroding the cultural independence at the hands of the West in ways that had 'robbed Iranians of their humanity and true self' (Khomeini, 1999). In this robbery of Iranian identity, he invokes the familiar dichotomy that infidelity lead to Western oppression:

> "Selfishness and abandonment of rebellion toward God's path has led us to our present predicament, one in which the West has oppressed us and has placed Islamic countries under the control of others." (Cited in Boroujerdi, 1998).

Reproducing 'return to self' and 'authenticity', Ayatollah Khomeini urged Iranians and Muslims to 'take pride in their own accomplishment, stop grappling whatever comes out of the West, and – most importantly – rise against regimes that act as lackeys of the decadent West' (Khomeini, 1970 and 1984). A significant feature of the founder of the Islamic Republic's stance against the West is its inclusion of the collective identity of Muslims.[83] His representations emphasise the Islamic identity more than ever.

However, there are instances (such as his 1941 writing) where he emphasises the Iranian identity vis-a-vis the West. When the Pahlavi, as part of

[83] Known in religious text as the *Islamic nation*.

greater cooperation alliance with the United States, granted immunity to American servicemen, Ayatollah Khomeini gave a fiery speech:

> "Our pride has been pummelled. Iran's glory has been destroyed. They ruined the glory of Iran's army. Through a law in the parliament, they made us part of the Vienna Convention.This means that all American military advisors and their families, their technical experts or office workers, even their servants, are immune from whatever crimes they commit in Iran. ... They can kill your Shah, the head of state and be immune …Gentlemen, I warn of danger! Oh, army of Iran, I warn of danger. Oh Iranian politicians, I warn of danger" (Khomeini, 1960).

One notable aspect of the above speech is how Khomeini's conception of the Shah changes in instances. In one writing or speech, he regards the Shah as a 'treacherous infidel' who is not different from the West by colluding with the West. In the above, he signals the importance of the (office and institution) Shah in Iranian society and structure, but also noting that even the Shah is an Iranian which the West regards as inferior. He continues by saying "The only thing the West has to offer is betrayal". In addition to deception and oppression[84], Ayatollah Khomeini adds 'untrustworthy' to what he believes are the West's inherent features. He continues the tradition of violent depiction of the West by labelling the interest of Western imperialism as 'the rape and

[84] Cataloguing and mapping this concepts are vital, especially to analyse the ensuing Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic. For example, throughout 2015's nuclear negotiations, the West been portrayed as 'untrustworthy'.

oppression of the destitute masses.' His mentioning of the Vienna Convention is also an extension of a legal Islamic notion, *nafye-e-sabil* (negating the [corrupt] way)[85] that a Muslim society shall not be governed or dominated by infidels as it may undermine the dignity, independence and honour of Muslims.[86] It is closely associated with concepts of self-confidence and self-sufficiency that dominated religious representations and was evident in traditionalists discourses. Thus, highlighting an instrument of international law was not just a speech act of opposition but a disavowal of a world order that is dominated by the West that is inferior to Iran, and morally wrong compared to Islam.

In a book titled *Estezaaf va Estekbar*, Oppression and Arrogance[87], Ayatollah Khomeini depicted the West as architect of the world order, the dominator imposing a 'collective malaise in thought and intellectual production had overcome the people of the Third World' (Khomeini, 2002). In particular, in one of the first instances that the United States is pointed out, Ayatollah Khomeini blames Americans for 'difficulties that Iran and the Muslim people' were having: "Muslims despise Westerners in general and Americans in particular" (Khomeini, 1969). Such differentiation between the United States and the rest of the West would explain later representation of U.S. as the Great Satan.

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[85] After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, rejecting the rule (or way) of infidels was a central contention point on deciding the Islamic Republic's foreign policy. It resembled itself in honouring international treaties and legal commitments, membership of the United Nations and bilateral amity treaties.

[86] The notion is taken from verse 124 of sura Nessa in Quran, which says "the God never [paves the way] for infidels to dominate believers."

[87] The Arrognace, *Estekbar*, is derived from *Mostakber*, which means the oppressor.

Graduates: Regretful or insightful?

In 1960s and 1970s, Iran witnessed the return of graduates from their Western education, who were diagnosed as Westoxified. Based on Broujerdi's assessment (1997), by the 1975-76 academic year, about 55.9 percent of the 5,430 faculty members at various Iranian universities and institutes of higher education had received at least a degree from a foreign university. Surprisingly, the graduates were not fully submissive to the Western civilisation. Instead, an encompassing view was offered. One that was not prescribing exclusive return to Iranian roots but also embracing the broader civilisation of the West.

In a critique similar to religious view on international principles[88] and traditionalists and Marxist view on colonial injustices, Mohammad Ali Eslami Nadushan (b. 1925), a literature academic, wrote the Modern Man and the Underdeveloped Man (1967). The paper, presented in a conference led by Henry Kissinger (Broujerdi, 1997), defined the modern man as one influenced with carnivores and capitalist nature of the Western civilisation: an aficionado of luxury with nervous mind, subtitling wisdom with intelligence and deliver in technochracy.

On the other hand, the underdeveloped man is savage, bitter, mystical, angry, subject to prejudice but faithful. The typology, depicting a dichotomy between sexual and greedy behavior (i.e. modern, developed, western) against a faithful and resolute individual (unnerved by modernity), blames the industrial colonial world for all injustices and inequalities. In his idealist mindset,

[88] See above on international law, international society and common values.

Nadushan suggest abolishment of United Nations and replacing it with an entity representing people and not State. The material aspect of the Western civilisation was one of the main feature of the graduates idea of the West, similar to traditionalists and religious group. This ethical critique blamed the state system on submitting itself to "European civilisations, Roman statecraft, and Christian ecclesiasticism" (Behnam 1970). In a sense, christianity was not an Abrahamic religion (as Quran or religious group might argue) but a Western artefact.

Ehsan Naraghi (1926-2012), a Sorbonne educated sociologist and adviser to the Queen of Iran, blamed the Judeo-Christian tradition as the enabler of Western civilisation that its power lies in "its submergence reality" (Naraghi, 1976). He argues that *truth* is the source of the glory of the Eastern history which may be able to "temper industrialism" to eradicate machine-led poverty in the West. The truth that he is referring to is similar to righteousness that religious texts convey. Naraghi suggested a unity between Western reality and Eastern truth (Naraghi, 1976). On the other hand, he was a sceptical of scientific approaches as they were incompatible with "inner excitement" and the "unique characteristics" of Iran. Nevertheless, he established a sociological centre the train dozen of influential Iranian sociologists and suggested an indigenous Iranian social sciences.

Despite being vociferous on their opposition to the West, most of graduates argument was not targeted against the state (the Shah). This stark difference with traditionalists and religious group, perhaps, is rooted in graduates' knowledge of the West: they did not regard the problems of Iran a fault of Pahlavi but a byproduct of modernity and Western civilisation leading

to the alienation of the West. Naraghi adopted a somewhat constitutionalist position with hint of traditionalism: Western practices should not be applied but adapted (Naraghi, 1994) and rather than imitating the West, Iran should follow Japan by let the West in and reject westernisation (Naraghi, 1995). When he wanted to criticise States policy, he did not target it against the state but agents of the state, the technocratic elite (in Al-e Ahmad's word, westoxified) who misuse economy and desire for growth as an excuse for mindless, relentless and forced imitation of the West (Naraghi, 1994).

Another proponent of unity between Eastern and Western civilisation was a Henry Corbin (1903-1978) student, Daryush Shayegan (b. 1935), who accepted West as a "mesmerising, rich, and dynamic" civilisations (Shayegan, 1977). Yet, he criticises the West for undermining the faith and spiritual heritage of Asian civilisations. For a better world, Shayegan suggested Dialogue among civilisation to discuss ontological differences.[89] For example, he emphasised that Western mode of philosophy of history and science is irrelevant in the East, especially in Iran, as it is the Human's task to only provide answer and not to ask (Shayegan, 1977). Shayegan expected the logical outcome of Western civilisation to be Nihilism and a failed experiment.

Like other graduates, Shayegan also criticised those who blindly follow the West without being aware of vital elements of the "most dominant and aggressive world view on earth" (Shayegan, 1977). He also emphasised on Islam as primeval source of the Iranian identity (Broujerdi, 1997) that shaped

[89] It should be note that in 1998, Mohammad Khatami (President of the Islamic Republic of Iran) suggested to the United Nations to name a year as year for Dialogue among civilisation. In chapter 9, it would be discussed who the suggestion was perceived

Iran for fourteen years. Like Ayatollah Khomeini, Shayegan believed in wisdom of Avicenna that represented the orient, and Iran, as world of "light, ideas and purity" (Cobin, 1980) in contrast to the decadent, unrighteous and confused civilisation design of modernity. He also criticised likes of Shariati who were not grasping the essence of the West but only attacking the effects of Western civilisation and not its basic assumptions. Shayegan believed that the West is having a terminable disease.

One of the most prolific graduates was Hamid Enayat (1932-1982), an alumni of LSE, was also one of the key individuals in shaping Iran's idea of the West. He did not criticise the Western civilisation but blamed what traditionalist and religious regarded as wrongs of the society, on western governments, their orientalist perceptions and interests. Enayat also viewed *gharbzadegi* as Iran's natural romanticism with the West because "contrary to most Asian and African countries, Iran never suffered colonisation at the hands of Western power" (Enayat, 1973). Thus, an open arm to being westernised. He viewed a *gharbzadeh* not an intellectual but at best, a superficial researcher who is only aware of shades of Western philosphy. Enayat, in a similar line to traditionalists, blamed westoxified individuals for "plagarism and mimicry of the West" (Broujerdi, 1997) who only read a second rate translation of Voltaire, Heidegger and Rousseau (Enayat, 1990). Aligned with religious groups, he treated Iranian identity in direct relation with Shiism social history; a history that fits Iran and is as dynamic as the West.

III Conclusion

To sum this chapter, it is possible to claim that the constitutionalist position that was pertinent at the early stage of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's reign have

been diminished and transformed into a segment of graduates that were aware of the pitfalls of the West but were willing to adopt. The two other dominant position, traditionalists and religious, had siginifacnt commonalities in their viewpoints. Both did not regard the problem of Iranian society being backward and in need of modelling it on west but thought being under the influence of the West and *gharbzadeh* is the terminable disease of the Iranian society. Traditionalist insisted on more national and indigenous self-finding mission. The religious representation was also keen of such truth discovery but also found cure in Islamic thoughts and principles.

This period witnessed shift in compositions of positions and participants of the discourse. It also exemplified a profound change in representation and conceptions. In 1941, the West still had its perceived superiority and regarded as a model of development. As the opposition to Shah grew, the debate on the West turned more antagonistic. The West was the source of the problem that could have only been cut off the Iranian society through disempowering 'puppets of the West', the Pahlavi dynasty. In 1979, the Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini did exactly that.

VII

The Islamic Republic (1979-2015)

The enigmatic Islamic Revolution of 1979, with its (initial) multi-class character and religious complexion, defied the euro-centric analysis of Iran. It proliferated a challenging idea of the West and modernity, and revived Islamic language to govern a State. The revolutionary protagonists, mainly embedded within the religious revolutionary position, perceived themselves and the revolutionary discourse with a transnational appeal and on an international plane, challenging the international society.

In the lead up to the revolution, as the presiding chapter demonstrated,[90] the idea of the West in Iran conveyed distinct set of notions, concepts and values, that were also matched as oppositional act against the Pahlavi state. A natural role reversal occurred with the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty. Until 1979, the Iranian State idealised the West despite occasional

[90] The preceding chapter (submitted for my first year panel in June 2016) analysed the debate from 1920 until 1979, detailing how the idea of the West turned into a key oppositional act against the Pahlavi state, with rapid proliferation of concepts such as westoxification that not only criticized the West — depicting it as a toxic set of entities and values — but the state.

jabs but the Iranian opposition resisted it. From 11 February 1979, the Iranian state deemed itself as transcendental and the West as unworthy. However, Iran's idea of the West continued to be highly ubiquitous in intellectual debates, everyday life and political language. It was used to establish differences, draw boundaries and explicate what it means for the Islamic Revolution to move forward. Talking about how to govern, how to conduct diplomacy, what social rules to enforce, were all related to an idea of the West.

The dominant political, social and ideological language became the one purported by religious and revolutionary positions that led the protest toppling the monarchy. However, as the official State discourse, it had to reconcile or juxtapose itself vis-a-vis the international society. The struggle was to continue heralding the revolutionary concepts of having a just world order, while being part of the international society. The struggle was coupled with internal and international challenges of governing, fighting a war, and establishing itself. This chapter focuses on how these struggles shaped the discourse on the West, what constellation of concept emerged, and how the triangulation between state, society and international society interpolated the discourse. It relies on key focal points of change in the discourse and/or social upheaval, by underlining intertextuality, interdiscursivity and major signifiers outlined in previous chapters.

The first section presents a background and a note on context of analysis. The second section provides a historical reading of developments validating Revolutionary position on its status in the world and what type of state it should be. The second section analyses how the aftermath of the Iraq-Iran war provided new space for renewed relations with the West but failed to

create a new constellation of concepts to, radically, change the state or nation. The focus of the debate was on how to have a relation with the West, but it did not much affect how the State should behave and how the nation should change. The third section details one of the most radical conceptual shifts: when the authentic form of state and nation was under threat by common utterances of a new strand of revolutionaries marrying liberal nationalist after 1996. The fourth section outlines the counter-act of having a revolutionary state resisting the international society. The fifth, and final, section examines the development of the debate leading to the Iran nuclear deal and *passa-barjam* (post-JCPOA) until today.[91]

I Context

The prevalent theme of the state position was informed by religious teachings and philosophy, and mostly framed as a struggle between *mazlum*[92] (the oppressed) and *zālem* (the oppressor), mostazaāf (poor, weak, those who were weakened by oppression) and *mostakber* (the powerful arrogance). As noted in the previous chapter, these dichotomies are the production of 'traditional Islamic political imagination',[93] inspired by the narratives of the ten-day battle of *Karbala*, and reified throughout the Iranian discourse.[94] All of the ensuing

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[91] Finding empirics for the last section is still ongoing, and the offered

[92] For the transliteration of Persian words, I am following the Iranian studies scheme. For the transliteration of Arabic and Ottoman words, the scheme developed by the International Journal of Middle East Studies is utilised. If a transliterated phrase is different to its established anglicised form, the latter is chosen to maintain harmony with existing literature.

[93] Matin, K. (2008). The Islamic Republic and the World: Global Dimensions of the Iranian Revolution. *Capital & Class*, *32*(3), 159-161. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/030981680809600111 and Matin, Kamran (2010) Decoding political Islam: uneven and combined development and Ali Shariati's political thought. In: Shilliam, R. (2010). International relations and non-Western thought : imperialism, colonialism and investigations of global modernity : Interventions (pp. 108-124). London: Routledge.

[94] Karbala, now a city in central Iraq, was the battleground between Hussain ibn Ali, the third grandson of Prophet Muhammad (regarded as the third Imam by Shia Islam), and Yazīd ibn

concepts, allegiances, positions and utterances were inadvertently brought to meaning within the realm of Karbala.

In the early days of the revolution, what the state should be and how the nation should carry on was very much inspired by the Revolutionary position. The state institutions and apparatus were in flux. The idea of having a *nezame-akhlaghi* (a moral state) and *ummat moslaman* (the Islamic Ummah/nation)[95] motivated cleansing institutions from elements of the Pahlavi dynasty so it can 'advance the interests of the Iranian people, not the Western masters.'[96] The Pahlavi position gradually marginalised, if not abolished.[97] With the start of the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) and the takeover of the American embassy by *students following the Imam's path*, the public political space became radically limited. The Iranian debate about the West witnessed overt militaristic and combative language regarding the West.

Any opposition, especially from liberals and communists, was Western interference or plot. The nationalist (traditionalist) positions were portrayed as liberal, preserving Western interests. The Communist position, an initial a companion in anti-imperialist stance, was annihilated because of its perceived

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Mu'āwiya, the sixth Islamic caliph. Invited by the people of the Kufa to lead their rebellion against Yazid, Hussain alongside his family and entourage travelled to the Kufa but his path was blocked and surrounded by Yazid's army. After a ten day battle, Hussain, his 72 compatriots and his family were massacred. The tragic death on 10 Muharram 61/10 October 680 became the pivotal moment of Shiite communal identity, with continued resonance especially in Iran. For more information on the battle of Karbala and its importance in shaping the Shi'i communal identity, see Ayoub, M. (1978). *Redemptive Suffering in Islam* (1st ed.). New York: Walter de Gruyter; Nakash, Y. (1993). An Attempt to Trace the Origin of the Rituals of Ashura. *Die Welt Des Islams*, *33*(2), 161. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1570949.

[95] It is an Arabic term, meaning muslim community/nation, 'a fundamental concept in Islam, expressing the essential unity and theoretical equality of Muslims from diverse cultural and geographical settings. In the Quran, designates people to whom God has sent a prophet or people who are objects of a divine plan of salvation.' See

[96] Khomeini, 1979e

[97] Pahlavi's discourse was not uttered on any official public space. It became non-existent in first few years of the revolution, and was only reproduced on foreign radios. At a later stage, it became more active underground which attest to the status of censorship.

anti-Iranian identity and opposition to the state. The first decade of the Islamic Republic, under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, was not just about a war-torn country but a battleground to combat Western influence and Western ideas. Thus, the idea of liberty or freedom was not concerned with individual rights but collective freedom from dependence and freedom from Western influence.[98]

The death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 led to a divergence in Revolutionary position with evident institutional manifestation. The state institutions witnessed a bifurcation between *dowlat* (the government) and the state (*nezam*).[99] Each of them representing a variant of the Revolutionary position. One of the fundamental differences between the two was the level of understanding the degree of difference between Iran, the West and the international society: the point of contention was the level of integration with the West and international community.[100] One fragment of the position insisted on adhering to Ayatollah Khomeini's will, *vasiyat-e-Imam*, to preserve country in the 'righteous god-given path, and not to be dependent on the infidel East [USSR] nor on the oppressive West' (Khomeini, 1989b). The diluted revolutionary one, advocated integration with the West as speedily as possible to construct the country after the after war. Thus, the period of 1989 to 1997 is known as *Sazandegi* (construction, building). The uneasy status between the

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[98] A similar argument is evident in Chris Hughes' study of China, but with a different approach and emphasis on socialisation. See Hughes, C. (1995). China and Liberalism Globalised. *Millennium*, *24*(3), 425-445. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/03058298950240030901.

[99] See Abdolamohammadi (2014) on how the government represents the republic and the state represents the Islam.

[100] I am using international community and international society interchangeably, cognisant of the fact the latter is the correct analytical term. The reason is how the two are used in Iranian discourse interchangeably.

dowlat and nezam, lasted throughout the 1990s with traditionalist and liberal nationals on the sideline.

The election of Seyed Mohammad Khatami as the President in 1997 introduced the concept of *eslahat* (reforms) into the discourse. All positions contested it. The *Nezam* (i.e. a fraction of the Revolutionary position) and traditionalists argued for Iranian and Islamic reform, opposing reforms that could take a westernising direction. This was the first time after the 1979 revolution that liberal and Western-leaning positions were not underground anymore but argued publicly though not loudly or officially. It was first time after the revolution, ignoring the first three months, an alternative type of state and nation was conceived. The debate was whether the reforms would lead to a different kind of state with a different kind of nation, with how to participate and recognised by the international society. The liberal national and certain variances of revolutionary movements, heralded dialogue among civilisations,[101] supporting further integration with the international community. Civil society, democracy and western thoughts became integrated into state position. Because they were talked about, the state had embraced them though critically or tweaking it. It soon became clear that Iran's relation with the West could not simply be one of integrating and rejoining. Dialogues and cooperation did not change the framework within which the revolutionaries saw the West and the moral judgement they passed on it did not change.

This stand-off intensified when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became the President in 2004 by taking the mantle of reviving the revolution. The

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[101] See chapter 2 on civilizational identity.

institutional presence of revolutionaries grew as dowlat and nezam echoed views similar to early days of the revolution. The key concept re-emerged was justice, both internally and internationally. Western ideas were treated as causes of economic and social injustices inside Iran — thus, a just state was needed — , and Western influence was regarded as the hindrance to Iran's righteous status in the world order. The revolutionary position in Iran's debate on the West found a global audience. The content of this position was not new, but was a hyped version of its predecessors. Iran's nuclear program became a defining point in this debate, both internally and externally. Centrifuges and power plants were technicalities and policies, but the idea of a homegrown nuclear program was one aligned with concepts of *esteghlal* (independence) and *khodkafaee* (self-sufficiency). It was the international diplomatic negotiations on the nuclear program that rewinded the debate on the West.

With the election of Hassan Rouhani as the President in 2013, the debate on influence of the West inside Iran was reinvigorated. Rather than discussing how to oppose the West, the debate shifted to how to negotiate and cooperate with the West, notably the United States. These negotiations and the ensuing Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and five Permanent members of United Nations Security Council plus Germany (the P5+1) brought back the debate of Westernisation and western influence in Iran. Solving the stalemate caused by desires of esteghlal and khodkafaee, now turned into how 'not to bow to globalization and becoming them'.[102] It could be argued the make up of the positions in the public space and the

[102] Khamenei, S. (2016). *Ø¨ÛŒØ§Ù†Ø§Øª Ø¯Ø± Ø¯ÛŒØ¯Ø§Ø± Ù†Ø®Ø¨Ú¯Ø§Ù† Ø¹Ù„Ù…ÛŒ Ø¬ÙˆØ§Ù†*. *Farsi.khamenei.ir*. Retrieved 28 September 2016, from http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=34703.

(re)distribution of ideas are in direct response/reflection of shifts within the international order. Iran's idea of the West is what Iran makes of the international order, including progress and changes in political, legal, economic, and social thoughts.

The availability of texts since 1979 is inherently affected by the unremitting change in vehemence of censorship. A contracted public space meant more self-censorship. A meaningful turn is evident from the late 1990s when blogs and websites emerged. Digitisation of the public space led to more diverse publications and access. However, the recent trend (especially from 2013 onwards) and sudden shift in using mobile applications to produce texts without any traceable links or citation undermines conduct of discourse analysis.

II After the Revolution: 1979-1989

The fact that a revolution happened did not harmonise the chaotic state of Iran's debate about the West. The only consensus was to marginalize , if not eradicate, Pahlavi's conception of the West. Varying ideologies, agendas and views between revolutionaries merits to differ positions on how they viewed the West. The West and how to deal with it was not a priority but became the topic of the debate when deciding on how to govern after February 1979, and based on what values. The eight-year war with Iraq, inter-revolutionary assassinations, urban insurgencies, coup attempts and political in-fighting accelerated the contraction of public space in the decade after the Islamic Revolution. The Revolutionary position, from now on was the Revolutionary position and the dominant one, and later on the State's.

The Revolutionary position highlighted the uniting effect of the revolution: it created a new ethos for the nation. In one of his first messages after the victory of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini called the aftermath as an example of *vahdat-e-kalame*, a Quranic phrase. The unity he was referring to was not to be understood as ordinary meaning of unity but the one that 'the Prophet pursued to have all the world … following monotheism [*towhid*][103].'[104] In the same message, Ayatollah Khomeini also emphasized on the exceptional nature of the revolution due to its Islamic and human nature, that toppled a 'two thousand and five hundred years old oppressive regime with big fist and [huge] effort, and firm belief and [sic] did not pay attention to supports for them'.

In view of this position, the chaos of the country and its problems were the legacy of Pahlavi and Western support. The state and the nation had to be rebuilt. Religion and God was the way to reconstruct Iran from being an 'earthquake stricken country, a foreign stricken country, and an enemy stricken country.' The emphasis on destruction, *kharabi and viranegy*, is reminiscent of how both traditionalists and liberal nationalist named the country as *Iran-e viran*, the destructed Iran, in 1908-1925.[105] In this instance, the destruction was

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[103] See previous chapter on how *towhid* was discussed as the lacking feature of the Pahlavi state but evident across the nation. The Pahlavi state was casted as infidel because it did not follow monotheism, just as like the West.

[104] Khomeini R, 'Ù^ØØ¯Øª Ú©Ù„Ù…Ù‡ Ø±Ù…Ø² Ù¾ÛŒØ±Ù^Ø²Ûœ' (*Imam-khomeini.ir*, 1979) <http://www.imam-khomeini.ir/fa/n116203/Ù^Ø-Ø¯Øª_Ú©Ù„Ù…Ù‡_Ø±Ù…Ø²_Ù¾ÛŒØ±Ù^Ø²Ûœ> accessed 5 July 2016

[105] At the end of chapter 4 and beginning of chapter 5, I noted how Iran's encounter with the international society through various bilateral and international negotiations (such as Anglo-Iranian agreement of 1919 and Versailles Peace Conference) coupled with domestic conditions have led to the introduction of the concept of the destructed Iran. In Iran-e viran, the articulated problem was not being Western and/or modern enough. The West was the model.

because of modernity and treating West as the model. Constructions, building and modernisation programs that facilitated the rise of Revolutionary position (and their criticism of the Shah) was treated as mere destructions. It was on *enghelabioun*, the revolutionaries, and the nation to 'hang to the strong straw of the Islam, Quran, the Great Hidden Imam, to solve all problems with their great effort.'[106] This message emphasised the need for unity to 'build a new nation, a new government, a new infrastructure that all are Islamic and Humane.' In this new schema, the nation is not to be dominated by Colonialism, Oppressors, and decadence but 'for yourself [Iranians]. Yesterday, it was in the hand of foreigners; today, is a land that is Islamic [sic], a country that belongs to the Prophet, belongs to the Hidden Imam, it is owned by his holy presence and all of us are *pasdaran* (guards)[107] and must save it.' It was the Islam that gave meaning to the nation. Nationalism without religion was perceived as Western and means to subvert Islam.

These are manifestations of how Pahlavi and Iran under Pahlavi was regarded not as Iranian and not belonging to Iranians but foreign to Iranian culture and belonging to others that were symbols of oppression and colonialism. By underlining the relation between the nation and Islamic symbols, it was conveyed that the Islamic Revolution liberated Iran and took it back from Others. The reliance on Islamic discourse is, naturally, in line with

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On the other hand, the State renamed Persia as the Sublime State of Iran, hinting to its desired status.

[106] Khomeini, R. (1979). *Ø§Ù^Ù„ÛŒÙ† Ù¾ÛŒØ§Ù… Ø§Ù…Ø§Ù… Ù¾Ø³ Ø§Ø± Ù¾ÛŒØ±Ù^Ø²ÛŒ Ø§Ù†Ù„Ø§Ø¨ Ø§Ø³Ù„Ø§Ù…ÛŒ*. *Imam-khomeini.ir*. Retrieved 1 September 2016, from http://www.imam-khomeini.ir/fa/n14604/Ø³Ø±Ù^ÛŒØ³_Ù‡Ø§ÛŒ_Ø§Ø ·Ù„Ø§Ø¹_Ø±Ø³Ø§Ù†ÛŒ/Ù†Ú¯Ø§Ø_Ø±Ù^Ø²/Ø§Ù^Ù„ÛŒÙ†_Ù¾ÛŒØ§Ù…_Ø§Ù…Ø…_Ø§Ù…Ø³_Ù¾Ø³_Ø§Ø±_Ù¾ÛŒØ±Ù^Ø²ÛŒ_Ø§Ù†Ù‚Ù„Ø§Ø¨_Ø§Ø³Ù„Ø§Ù…ÛŒ

[107] *Pasdaran* is now associated with Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps (IRGC). The term *pasdar* is the identifier for IRGC members.

the religious background of this position[108] but is more significant when analysed as a way of modernising and reconstructing Shiism by saying the revolution's moto is 'serving Islam through Iran' because 'Iranian nation gave blood for Islam.' These attempts to interlink Iranian identity with the Islamic one, countering the West, was a broader attempt to portray Iran (and the Islamic revolution) as one saving the Islam from the West. The idea of saving Islam led to the creation of new concepts such as *American Islam* or *Islam of Humiliation* (Islam-e- Zelat). These concepts alluded to two version of Islam: a fake one and an authentic one. The fake Islam is the one acceptable to Western values and policies, especially to Americans. An American Islam meant giving up on defending oppressed people of the world and fighting injustice. The true Islam is the one which prevents being humiliated by the West and 'proactively stands on principles'.[109] The dichotomy emerged in early days of the revolution to distinguish between Iran, and Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, but also was utilised to differentiate between domestic political forces. This reaffirms the earlier argument on how Iranian debate was structured around mysticism, monarchy and shiism from the 16th century. The emphasis on shiism and saving the Islam seemed natural as the last standing pillar.

On relations with the world, revolutionaries were distrustful of the existing diplomatic corps. Embassies and consulates were now in control of Iranian students abroad who were member of the *Islamic Society of Students Outside Iran*. The ministerial staff were still employed but recruiting new ones

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[108] See prior chapter on rise of Revolutionary position.

[109] Khomeini, 1979d, 1982b, 1984a, and 1988f,

was put on hold. The existing staff in Tehran were also subject to stringer investigations or questions. Iranian embassies abroad were advised to 'navigate in straight path of humanity'[110] which is not about praying to God but 'to come out of domination of else [others], not being under possession of anyone other than the government itself and the ministry of foreign affairs itself. Move in one direction, not that it being pulled to one side and then from the other side [sic].'

The objective of diplomacy was to ensure the 'step taken is not towards dependency; that the evils are making us dependent or it is taken because of free will and we want to do it ourselves? Embassies must pay attention to the action, whether it is nearing us to dependency or is towards liberation and freedom?'[111]The liberation was essential to the Islamic nature. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 'the only ministry that with its Islamisation, can showcase our Islamic nature more than other ministries.' The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iran embassies abroad or foreign embassies in Iran were regarded as the path for 'inflicting harms' on Iran. These were signifiers of foreign policy and international relations. Relations were to be with those who do not want to 'swallow' Iran, and relations with 'those who wants to make us dependent is not necessary at all.' A non-Islamic FP, and the non-Islamic foreign, was an abomination to taking the control of the country by Iranians.

It was with the perception that 'embassies as source of harm' that a group of Iranian students proclaiming to be *Muslim Students followers of the path of Imam* [Khomeini] occupied the United States embassy in Tehran and called it

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[110] Khomeini, R. (2017). *ØµØÚŒÙÙ‡ ØŞÙ…ØŞÙ…. Imam-khomeini.ir*. Retrieved 28 August 2016, from http://www.imam-khomeini.ir/fa/books/BooksahifeBody.aspx?id=3100

[111] Khomeini, R. (1979). *Ù˜ØØ¯Øª Ú©Ù„Ù…Ù‡ Ø±Ù…Ø² Ù¾ÚŒØ±Ù˜Ø²Ú. Imam-khomeini.ir*. Retrieved 5 July 2016, from http://www.imam-khomeini.ir/fa/n116203/Ù˜Ø-Ø¯Øª_Ú©Ù„Ù…Ù‡_Ø±Ù…Ø²_Ù¾ÚŒØ±Ù˜Ø²Ú

'den of spies' as it was 'the place where all plots and conspiracies, before and after the revolution, against the oppressed *people [khalgh]*[112] of Iran is started.' Before discussing the ramifications of this act, it should be noted that two attempts at occupying embassies were thwarted beforehand. The first one was when two days after the fall of Pahlavi, an armed leftist group (Fadaei, devoted or self-sacrificing)[113] attacked the American embassy only to be ousted by governmental forces. The second attempt was when Ayatollah Khomeini, in reaction to a call for protest and conquest of the Soviet embassy, called it 'an American attempt to deviate global public opinion from the stance of the fighting nation… occupying any embassy in Iran is treason against the righteous anti-American fights of our people… anyone doing so would be an American agent, with no doubt'.[114]

The incident of November 1979 was planned to 'protest American crimes and giving refuge to the dislodged Shah.' The 444 days hostage taking, however, revealed the inherent conflictual nature of the revolution and different characteristics of various positions and factions. Few days before the incident, Head of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan (b. 1907-1995) met with Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to President Carter of the United States. The meeting was a point of contention in Iran because of Bazargan and his party's

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[112] The first announcement by the students used the word *khalgh* [خلق] that could be translated as people. However, the term khalgh is often associated with marxist-leninist vocabulary in Iran.

[113] See Behrouz, 2011; Sadeghi-Broujerdi, 2014; Ranjbar, 2009; Jazani, 1983.

[114] Kayhan, 1979e

backgrounds, the Liberation Movement of Iran. Bazargan was a graduate of engineering from École Centrale Paris, and part of the first group of students sent as part of Pahlavi's education abroad program. Thus, he could have been a gharbzadeh (Westoxified). His tie-wearing and western attire fitted the bill. Nevertheless, Ayatollah Khomeini appointed him as the first head of the government after the Islamic Revolution because of Bazargan's 'devoted faith to holy school of Islam' and Khomeini's awareness of his 'Islamic and Nationalist battles.'

PRG firmly believed in compatibility of science and religion, and supported Darwinian notion of evolution. Bazargan also promoted 'learning from the Western civilization in order to be able to be self-sufficient.' This position is akin to nationalists in post-mashrouteh and nationalist during early days of Pahlavi.[115] While his party was called the Liberation Movement and he was an ally of Mossadegh during the 1953 coup (who led the National Front), the position he represented was known as Nationalist (traditionalist). The Nationalist (traditionalist) also was not in favour of putting Islamic Republic to referendum but Democratic Republic. When criticised by revolutionaries, the suggestion was replaced by Democratic Islamic Republic. This was when Ayatollah Khomeini insisted it should be 'Islamic Republic, nothing more or less.' As the tension rose over how to govern the State, their position was depicted more as Liberals.

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[115] See background section of the chapter on Pahlavi.

The revolutionary and even Communist position treated Liberals as 'bunch of [people] who sold themselves [to the West].'[116] The selling of self to the foreigner rather than devoting self to the nation was sign of lack of honor. The terminology of selling self is also somewhat sexual and demeaning. It connotes selling self's body. Despite these conceptions, Nationalist (traditionalist) believed 'because [Iranian society] came together, hand of God was with us and then the world was in our favour too.' Contrary to revolutionary view of worldwide opposition to the Islamic Revolution, PRG (liberal nationals position) purported gradual global legitimacy and acceptance of the revolution because of its intrinsic values such as freedom and independence.

The Revolutionary position regarded the revolution as an act against imperialism and a Western-supported regime that captured Iran. On the other hand, the traditionalist and liberal nationalists insisted the revolution was a historical contingent and against 'two thousand and five hundred year of tyranny',[117] that infiltrated Iranian culture. To cleanse the culture from tyranny, according to them, Iran relied on a western import: revolution. Nationalist (traditionalist) regarded revolutions as alien to Iranian culture and traditions. This is when they legitimise their notion of 'learning from West to advance Iran.' They also believed anti-Imperialism and opposition to the West was only 'a defensive tactic to protest Shah's subordination.'[118] On the other hand, the revolutionary position insisted the Islamic nature of revolution and its

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[116] Taghavi, 1973
[117] Bazargan, M. (1984). *Iran's Revolution: Pain and Motion*. (انقلاب ایران درد و حرکت) Tehran: Mazaheri.
[118] Sanjabi, 1979

roots in 'rebelling against infidels and those rebelling against God' to eradicate all decadence and oppression around the World.

Revolutionaries were not alone in criticising Nationalist (traditionalist). The *Tudeh* (masses) position, being a Persianised Marxist-Leninist party, promoted itself by lambasting PRG and Nationalist (traditionalist). They criticised PRG for not being 'revolutionary enough' and following 'their Western masters' in being 'angry toward the masses and conciliatory toward the rich.'[119] Being liberal in eyes of Tudeh was 'upholding imperialist rule through upholding a monarchy minus the Shah.' Bazargan meeting with representative of the Carter administration only fuelled Tudeh's criticism further, alongside revolutionaries opposition. The meeting though occurred to discuss extradition of the Shah and repatriation of existing contracts.

The appearance of comforting in American officials triggered the 444 day hostage crisis. The incident, which was called 'a revolution greater than the first one', not only tumulted Iran's foreign relations but introduced two key phrases in describing United States, as leader of the West and symbol of imperialism. By relying on religious narratives, United States was introduced as the Great Satan:

> I think there is a story for when the God's Prophet became the messenger, that great Satan [devil] shouted and gathered all other devils around him and then created problems. In this [Islamic] revolution, the Great Satan that America is [sic], is gathering other devils by shouting. It is gathering the kid devils

[119] Mardom, 11 May 1979

that are in Iran, and devils that are abroad, and is creating a ruckus.[120]

The Constitution

The dominance of the Revolutionary position and marginalization of other positions is evident in the process of drafting and adopting the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The adopted constitution officialised the dominant anti-imperial and anti-western position, marginalised Nationalist (traditionalist) and to an extent, the Tudeh. The constitution created a meta-discourse, encapsulating earlier debates and inspiring future actions. The meta-discourse revolved around concepts of independence, justice and resistance. All are remeosicint of the

The constitution starts with a Quranic verse on need to uphold justice, and then proceeds in outlining principles of monotheism (see above re *towhid*), the foundational role of God's order in rule of law, justice and the role of clergy in politics. The constitution is not just a text for governing Iran but aims for 'rule of oppressed in the planet' and 'eradication of all examples of oppression, imperialism, and colonialism.'

The Cultural Revolution

The constitution also insists on Islamic culture and education to be institutionalised across the country. According to revolutionaries, the political institutions collapsed on 11 February 1979 but the overall culture of the Iranian society remained unchanged. Ayatollah Khomeini believed in necessity of

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[120] Khomeini, R. (2016). *ÙØµÙ„ ØŞÙˆÙ„: ØŞÙ…Ø±ÛŒÚ©ØŞØŒ Ø´ÛŒØ·ØŞÙ† Ø¨Ø²Ø±Ú¯*. *Imam-khomeini.ir*. Retrieved 4 September 2016, from http://www.imam-khomeini.ir/fa/c78_87393/Ú©Ø³Ø§Ø¨/ØŞØ³Ø³Ú©Ø¨Ø§ØŞØ±_Ø¬Ù‡ØŞÙ†ÛŒ_Ù‹_Ø´ÛŒØ·ØŞÙ†_Ø¨Ø²Ø±Ú¯_ØŞØ²_Ø¯ÛŒØ¯Ú¯ØŞÙ‡_ØŞÙ……ØŞÙ……_Ø®Ù…ÛŒÙ†ÛŒ_Ø³_/ÙØµÙ„_ØŞÙˆÙ„_ØŞÙ…Ø±ÛŒÚ©ØŞ_Ø´ÛŒØ·ØŞÙ†_Ø¨Ø²Ø±Ú¯

'correction' and 'reformation' of schools and universities for Islamic revolution to take shape (Khomeini, 1979e). The Iranian education system, just like the diplomatic corps, was regarded as an engine of dependency on foreigners and in hand of devils.

In fact, one of religious leading criticism of the Pahlavi regime was its secularisation of Iran's education system. It was series of Pahlavi era legislations and policies from 1921 until 1936 which restricted role of *ulama*, Shia clergy, in education and schools. These actions secularised the entire educational system. At the time, the opposition criticised it and lambasted it as a change in Iranian identity and a 'pathetic attempt to let the West penetrate us by flooding our society with *fokoli-ha*[121]'.[122] The sexual depiction of Western influence is very much aligned with representing it as a sexual and decadent entity. Therefore, a Western education would inject deviance in Iranian identity.

Such view led to the seven-year closure of universities (1980–1987) and few months of closure for schools in Iran. This time is known as period of cultural revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini formed a High Council for Cultural Revolution with an objective to answer the call of 'the Muslim nation to do something, because they are worried of plots that would leave the culture as it was during

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[121] The term *fokoli* is often associated with dandyism. It is originated from the French term *faux-col*, as someone wearing a tie. The term refers to someone who dresses like Westerners. Nowadays, it is also referred to men who style their hair 'in a Western manner'. *Fokoli* and its associated words such as *gherti* (effete) — when used to label males — undermine the perception of masculinity. The term first emerged in 1964.

[122] Davari, 1973

the *domination*[123] of the decadent regime in the service of colonialists'.[124] He added that 'continuation of this catastrophe, which is the desire of dependent of foreigners, is a deadly strike to Islamic Revolution and Islamic Republic.' Ayatollah Khomeini equaled compromising on cultural reform as 'great treason against Islam and Islamic country'.[125] Conceiving foreign influenced education as treacherous is taken from writings in 1950s[126] which treated graduates of foreign education system as *fokoli* and Iran's 'most treacherous enemy'[127] for their blind copying of the Western culture and embodying the *farangi* (from foreign) lifestyle.

Ayatollah Khomeini echoed Leon Trotsky's concept of 'permanent revolution' by urging a 'permanent and foundational revolution' across the country to 'transform university to a healthy environment fit to work on Islamic science [and education].' Highlighting the need for healthy environment is further elaboration of revolutionary (and religious) views of the existing education system as decadent and filthy. Furthermore, 'teachers dependant on West or East' were to *tasfieh* from universities. Tasfieh means purifying and filtering which connotes purifying water from dirt and toxics. The cultural revolution also sought 'unity between universities and [religious] seminaries' to make Islamic science. The suggestion for further cooperation between

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[123] The phrase used to describe the governance of Pahlavi's dynasty was *solteh*, which is derivative of *salatanat* (monarchy) but means domination, known as foreign domination and oppression.

[124] Khomeini, 1980e
[125] Khomeini, 1979r and 1980
[126] For example, see Shadman, 1964 in previous chapter.
[127] Boroujerdi, 1997, p.57

universities which were perched as secular and seminaries (the symbol of religious education) was, on its surface, aimed to make universities more Islamic. A closer link between seminaries and universities is also reminiscent of Khomeini's pre-revolution writings on glories of Islamic philosophy. Those writings rejected the need for 'logic and philosophy of the Europeans'.[128]

During Pahlavi era, revolutionaries and traditionalist believed Iran should not need the 'logic and philosophy of the Europeans'[129] or those like liberals, to prescribe Western philosophy to 'dictate how the Muslim society' should behave, and doing so 'is one of the biggest disservices that Muslim writers have done to their own societies' (ibid). The differentiation between Muslim society, Iran's history and following European logic is giving prevalence to the combination of *Iranniyat*, being Iranian, and *Islammiyat*, being Islamic, against the West and also a sense of otherness vis-à-vis a state that pursued European logics and policies that could be remedied through cooperation between symbol of islamic philosophy (seminary, *howzeh*) and western institution (university) to combat secularism.

Iraq-Iran War

It might be assumed being at war with a muslim neighbouring country might change the theme of the debate from defiance of the West. The Iraq-Iran

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[128] According to Khomeini, 'it's a pity that we're afraid of Europeans and have lost our self-confidence in relation to them, viewing as weak our own mastery and expertise in the sciences which the Europeans cannot attain in a thousand years' (Khomeini, 1944). He cited *Mantiq ul-Shafa* [Avicenna's *Book of Healing*], *Hikmat al-Ishraq* [*Philosophy of Illumination*, by Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi], and *Hikmat Muta'aliyyah* [*Transcendent Philosophy*] of Mulla Sadra as examples of authentic thinking independent of the West.

[129] Khomeini, 1944, p.56

war (September 1980–August 1988) have only reified the existing discourse by introducing new discursive themes of sacrifice and martyrdom. The war was talked as *defa-e moghadass* (the holy defense) or *jang-e tahmili* (imposed war), underlining the victimhood and loneliness of Iran in the struggle between 'believers' (Iranians) and 'non-believers' (Iraqis and others). In this war, Iraq was given a 'garrison state identity'[130] as a facade for West's opposition to Islamic Republic. Devoiding Iraq of its own Islamic (Sunni) and Arab identity ran against Saddam's depiction of himself as the leader of the Arab world, but was aligned with existing Iranian discourse on *Islam-e Zelat* and how the West perverse other states. The state, positioned Iraq and Iraqi leaders as *nokar-e gharb* (lackeys of the West) and anti-Islam. In the Iranian discourse, the war was not between Iran and Iraq but Iran and the international. Thus, the official statement juxtaposed the war alongside 'the other two wars that Iran endured,' being the two world wars.[131]

The war, and participation in holy defense, became an identifier of true patriots. Intellectuals and liberals were accused of being bystanders and those defending the 'dignity and honour of Iranian women from *tajavoz-e gharb* (western aggression, western rape)[132].'[133]According to Seyyed Hossein Hosseini (1958-2010), a poet close to Revolutionary position,

> during days which the intellectual was sipping brandy,

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[130] KhosraviNik, 2016
[131] Khomeini, 1980c
[132] *Tajavoz* connotes rape and aggression. Throughout the readings conducted for this research up to now, the phrase tajavoz was mostly used when describing attacks. Whenever tajavoz was utilised in describing the situation, traces of the clash between femininity and masculinity, and decadence and dignity was visible.
[133] Barahani, 1983

far away from [the] ruckus,

in cafes of the tumultuous city,

the history of this nation was created,

by sacrifices of *hezbollah* (party of god).[134]

The war became a catalyst in moving forward representations of intellectuals and liberals as treacherous and reify Revolutionary position as one of patriots. Patriotism was deemed the right form of nationalism, one that liberal nationals or traditionalists were unable to represent. The death will of martyrs of the war also became a vessel to convey these representations and a medium to utter anti-imperial and anti-western thoughts, with many of them grappling on the narrative of Karbala:

> '…these global *tofaleha* (scums)[135] are unaware of our love for truth and readiness to die for righteousness…'[136]

> '…the arrogant and blood-drinker world should know that we will rise till last drop of our blood to destroy your shiny constructions and propaganda…'[137]

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[134] Hosseini, 1984
[135] The literal meaning of the phrase is dirty spit. Also connotes grape's kernel.
[136] Yadegari, 1984
[137] Alizade, 1981

'Eastern aggressors and world-eaters! Western *gharatgarha* (looters)[138]! Observe how the fighters of Islam are destroying your interests to dry out your roots, and end your shameful lives'[139]

'Our bloods would lead to a flood to drown you… the great satan, the colonial America; the devious and satanic dirt, Russia; this [sic] cunning and treacherous England; and other satanic puppets…'[140]

'We will fight the contemporary Yazids and uphold the name of Hussain'[141]

Amidst willingness to continue the war, the question on how and when to end the war also turned into topics differentiating between true believers and non-believers. From the second year of the war, liberals (and some fraction of traditionalists) suggested ending the war and reaching a compromise with Iraq. The state, echoing the story of Karbala, insisted on value of not giving up and 'fighting till the last drop, because it is a war of honour and dignity.' These two concept were mostly rhetorical devices against the Shah or generic descriptions but throughout the war, they were entrenched as tenets of foreign policy. The liberal way of ending the war was trampling Iranian dignity as it caved up to zealous world.'[142]

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[138] *Gharat* or *gharatgar* or *gharatgari* were often used to describe the Mongol invasion of Persia (1219-1221), perceived as a period where Iran was burnt down and 'its culture was in ashes' but emerged victorious when defied the Mongol invasion. The phrase was extremely used in the lead up to the Islamic Revolution, namely by Ali Shariati.
[139] Kendry, 1986
[140] Motevalli, 1986
[141] Qomi, 1984
[142] Dehqani, 1984

In 1984, a few members of Iranian Parliament created a forum to discuss and analyse the war. The group, led by Hassan Rouhani (who became President in 2013), called itself *majma-e oghala* (the forum of rational individuals). Oghala were in favour of political end to the war. However, the state cornered them by rejecting 'talks of peace, because we will fight till last person standing'.[143] At the end, and on 18 July 1988, to the surprise of the international community and many experts, the Islamic Republic of Iran accepted UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 598 that ended the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran. In a letter to the UN Secretary General, Iran's President, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, wrote that saving people's lives, maintaining justice, peace, and regional and international security were rationales for accepting the mandated cease-fire. These reasons did not reflect the state's earlier position but represented what Oghala were pursuing. The self-called rationalists were the new voice of the revolutionary position, who sought engagement with the international society.

Ayatollah Khomeini, in the statement on ending the war, called the decision as 'bitter as a poisoned chalice'[144]. He depicted the Iraq-Iran war as a battle within a greater war between right and wrong, which is never-ending. Reasons for accepting the end of the war through UNSC resolution introduced a new term: expediency. In contrast with the discourse of poisoned chalice, the

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[143] Rezaee, 1986

[144] Khomeini, R. (1988). *Ø§Ù…Ø§Ù… Ø®Ù…ÛŒÙ†ÛŒ:Ù‚Ø¨ÙˆÙ„ Ù‚Ø·Ø¹Ù†Ø§Ù…Ù‡ Ø§Ø² Ù†ÙˆØ´ÛŒØ¯Ù† Ø¬Ø§Ù… Ø²Ù‡Ø± Ø¨Ø±Ø§ÛŒ Ù…Ù† Ú©Ø´Ù†Ø¯Ù‡ ØªØ± Ø§Ø³Øª. Ù¾Ø§ÛŒÚ¯Ø§Ù‡ Ø®Ø¨Ø±ÛŒ Ø¬Ù…Ø§Ø±Ø§Ù† - Ø§Ù…Ø§Ù… Ø®Ù…ÛŒÙ†ÛŒ - Ø§Ù†Ù‚Ù„Ø§Ø¨ Ø§Ø³Ù„Ø§Ù…ÛŒ*. Retrieved 28 April 2014, from http://www.jamaran.ir/Ø¨Ø®Ø´-Ø§Ø®Ø¨Ø§Ø±-12/15095-Ø§Ù…Ø§Ù…-Ø®Ù…ÛŒÙ†ÛŒ-Ù‚Ø¨ÙˆÙ„-Ù‚Ø·Ø¹Ù†Ø§Ù…Ù‡-Ø§Ø²-Ù†ÙˆØ´ÛŒØ¯Ù†-Ø¬Ø§Ù…-Ø²Ù‡Ø±-Ø¨Ø±Ø§ÛŒ-Ù…Ù†-Ú©Ø´Ù†Ø¯Ù‡-ØªØ±-Ø§Ø³Øª

end of the war was portrayed 'our righteous glory, because the West bowed and accepted our demands.' Thus, the international society was conceived as one respecting Iran and acknowledging its status. This was used to justify how the state and nation persisting on *arzesh-ha* (values) and resisting the evil (*moqavemat dar barabar-e sheytan)* would achieve the rightful status.

III Sazandegi: 1989-1996

The slight intellectual calamity in the aftermath of the end of the War significantly changed with the death of the founder of the revolution and the further contraction of the public space. The end of the war heralded an era of post-war construction that was overshadowed by Ayatollah Khomeini's death wishes. His will[145] reproduced the existing discourse and language on values, Iranian identity and the incredulity of the West while broadening it by reflecting on the journey of the revolution and the lessons learnt. The text is known as *vasiat-naameye Emam*[146] and is now taught as part of a nationwide University syllabus. The text, over twenty-nine pages, acts as the nodal point in creating and distinguishing positions: one position depict itself as following Imam's vasiat and blaming the other for derogating from it. The other represent itself as realising Imam's wishes and ideals. Both are situated within

[145] It should be noted that he wrote his will on 15 February 1983. It was revised once on 10 December 1987. It is not clear which parts were amended.

[146] All quotes are from Khomeini, R. (1989). Ù…ØªÙ† Ú©Ø§Ù…Ù„ ÙˆØµÛŒØªâ€ŒÙ†Ø§Ù…Ù‡ Ø§Ù„Ù‡ÛŒ Ø³ÛŒØ§Ø³ÛŒ ØØ¶Ø±Øª Ø§Ù…Ø§Ù… Ø®Ù…ÛŒÙ†ÛŒ Ø±ØÙ…Ù‡â€ŒØ§Ù„Ù„Ù‡. Farsi.khamenei.ir. Retrieved 28 April 2017, from http://farsi.khamenei.ir/imam-content?id=9447.

the revolutionary position, and the other three positions are juxtaposed as opposition.

The will outlines the revolution's goal as one to 'cut off the hand of world-eater superpowers and history's criminals from above the head oppressed of the world forever' and put an end to 'wrongful's way of interfering with justice and rule of law' by incorporating religion into politics. In contrast to American Islam, the true Islam is a political one which 'destruction of Islamic nations and opening the way for blood-drinker colonialists.'

The will, *vasiat-naameye Emam*, started with a brief history of Islam and reciting few teachings, which all reaffirmed 'the resolve of not just our nation but the pride of all Muslim nations and oppressed of the worlds that their enemies are enemies of the great God, the benevolent Quran, and dear Islam.' The will cites a global superstructures, inspired by Western 'decadent values' and headed by the 'terrorist United States,' that are against 'us and all oppressed of the world' that are now awakened. Though the will blames the West, its ideas and values as 'destructive to the world,' it also scolds the Soviet Union for its share of decadence in the global order.

He underscores 'dear Iran's straight divine path is not dependent on the heretic East or the infidel and oppressor West… that only shall be achieved through the Hidden Imam's divine mercy and kindness.' Ayatollah Khomeini scolds nationalism and nationalist who 'were led by imposed foreign embassies,' which highlights the inherent anti-Iranian character of nationalism in his eyes. According to his positions, Iranian nationalism was Western imposition to strip of Iran's religious identity. Yet, throughout years of opposition or governance, the nationalism, glory and history of Iran were utilised.

Before dealing with the issue of being Westoxified, the will vows cutting off 'the hand of the world-eater superpowers, who are criminals of this history, from above the head of the oppressed [mass] of [this] world forever.' It continues by highlighting the satanic nature of secular science, as 'wrongful's way of interfering with justice and rule of law.' A segment of the will goes in depth to describe the *khoonkhar*, blood-drinker, nature of the West and excluding Iran from such global order: 'We do not belong to the wild West.' This position disregards the industrial achievements and modernity as 'face of [western civilisation] which Islam is not and would not be against it' but problematising 'what intellectuals believe as in freedom: freedom for all sins and prostitution and decadence, even homosexuality, that all rational people are against it. Westoxified and even those stricken by the East are blindly following it'. This was the first time that Ayatollah Khomeini explicitly mentioned homosexuality in criticising the West but also differentiating with Western liberal values and its industrial development. Yet, previously, these advancements were treated as sign of decadence.

The will acknowledges Iran does 'not have everything … they [the West] are more progressive than us because they have oppressed us, preventing us from development.' It also warns of 'politicians dependent on the West and the East do not pull you towards international marauders with their satanic desires.'

The economic, social and political conditions of Iran after the war with Iraq (1980-88) coupled with the death of the founder of the revolution, created a new (yet, contracted) space for debate. The debate witnessed bifurcation of revolutionary position based on their institutional presence. The government (*dowlat*) and the state (*nezam*) clashed on level of integration. The debate did not

include Communists and liberal nationalists. The traditionalists had a limited and marginal visibility, often to side with a fraction of revolutionary position that insisted on normalisation with the international society rather than co-optation.

It could be argued the debate of the idea of the West was not between (the not-existent) opposition but a nuanced debate within the State: one side being the government and the other the Nezam. Thus, a debate within the revolutionary position. Dowlat was more engaging with the global order and the idea of the West, and the Nezam was known to be follower of the true ideal of Imam and custodian of the revolution. The problem of the society was post-war economy but the debate on the West was (still) about cultures and values.

The presence of Western companies and reconstructing the country after the Iran-Iraq war raised a question of what are the differences between these policies to those of Pahlavi era? The governmental answer was one of highlighting the prowess of the revolution in submitting the Others to now reconstruct Iran after the war 'they imposed.'[147] The Nezam was encouraging economic advancement but warned about Western culture which 'promoted capitalist wealth and decadence.'[148]

The excessive inflow of wealth and presence of foreigners were 'excuses to distract us from paying attention to true values… how can we think of moral purity? Is it possible? This [luxury and wealth] is the invisible and very dangerous lasso of the Western culture… which should be avoided.'[149] Foreign investment and quasi-imitation of Western practices and policies brought back the Pahlavi

[147] Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1993
[148] Kachouian, 2002
[149] Safavi, 1992

era debate on modernisation and westoxification. The Nezam, pursuing the true spirit of the revolution, rejected 'material life, in which we roam like an animal' (Khamenei, 1991b). The contrast between the acts and speeches of the President and the Supreme Leader, subsequently highlighting the positions of dowlat and nezam, signifies different frameworks within which the West is analysed. Hashemi Rafsanjani (1934-2017), the President[150], saw the West within an economic and pragmatic framework, proposing 'constructive engagement'[151] to benefit both Iran and Europe. The leader regarded the West and relationship with it within a spiritual and religion framework, finds fault with its moral status, and suggests saving the West from itself rather than integrating with it.

Pursuing Western policies and European styles were regarded only as 'beneficial to a certain class',[152] creating a new class of Western-oriented elite 'non-apathetic to pan-human values which the Revolution needs to promote, to save the world from doomsday.'[153] Pursuit of economic development and the debate on the West have also led to creation of new institutions and quite reactivation of intellectual discussions on modernity and indigenous policies. The debate went beyond rhetorics and engaged in serious philosophical questions and concepts. A quite conversation emerged on shifting away from revolutionary state and becoming an established republic. At heart of this conversation, the

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[150] Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was a one of the most prominent post-revolution politician and statesman. He was Member of the Revolution's Council, Speaker of the Parliament, Commander of the Iraq-Iran War, President for two terms, head of Iran's expediency council and for a while, led Iran's Assembly of Experts, a body tasked with selecting the next Supreme Leader. He died on 8 January 2017.

[151] Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1989 and 1990a. Also see Mousavian, 2013.

[152] Rajaee-Moghaddam, 1992

[153] Ghasemi, 1996

question of relations with the West was vital. Numerous contributions to the study of Iran have called post-1990 era as period of 'thermidor.'[154]

Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS) was established under the auspices of the Presidential office to conduct 'studies and researches … to develop national strategies and models'.[155] A monthly meetings of intellectuals, political scientists and philosophers was held to discuss 'issues facing the nation.'[156] The meeting was dubbed *halgheye Kian* (Kian circle). The agenda was to 'understand what is the West and how should be dealt with' (Shariatmadari, 2002). This was the question facing the Islamic Republic after the war.

Reza Davari Ardakani, a philosopher aligned with both revolutionaries and traditionalists, called the West and modernity 'a tree which now covers all the world, and for years we have been sitting, idly, under one of its withered branches… we took refuge in Islam but the shadow is till hanging over us… in reality, we are not leaving the branch alone either' (cited in Ahmadi, 2003: 140). He treated modernity as product of 'western rationality.' According to Ardakani and some of his revolutionary associates, Iran needs to grasp a 'new Islamic rationality' in order to be able to escape from the imposed modernity. The position on forced modernity is akin to one heralded by liberals in 1910 in Iran and subsequent generations of intellectuals in 1940s. It shows some common belief amongst early liberals and contemporary revolutionaries.

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[154] For range of studies, see Ehteshami, 1998, 2004 and 2009; Piscatori, 1993; Ansari, 2004; Axworthy, 2013.
[155] CSS, 2014
[156] ibid

This position regarded modernity as 'the destiny of history which should be embraced because failure to accept it would lead to backwardness.[157] This is was a novel statement. It was one of the first instances, after the 1979 revolution, that such statement attributed to official bodies was published. This position insisted that Iran either 'accepts the totality of the West or none of it. We cannot cherrypick'.[158] However, the dominant position within the Kian circle was to reject the West as a monolithic and uniform entity. According to Souroush, who started in Revolutionary position and the end shifted to a liberal one, 'belief in Western unity is a Hegelian construct which is dangerous and destructive'[159] because failure to 'disassemble Western puzzle into pieces blocks the path to dialogue.'

According to the Ali Akbar Velayati,[160] Iran needed to pursue dialogue and 'be present within the international society.'[161] Thus, Iran chose to engage in 'criticial dialogue' with the European Union. This motion reaffirms Iranian belief on possibility of only dealing with Europe and avoiding contact with United States. Thus, defined the West as Europe. Moreover, it underlined policy shift to participate in dialogues that were to be 'critical' of internal and international policies of Iran and the EU.

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[157] Kayhan, 1993e
[158] cited in Ahmadi, 2003, p.145.
[159] Soroush, 1992

[160] A medical doctor and graduate of Johns Hopkins University (1974), Velayati was the Minister the Minister of Foreign Affairs for more than sixteen years from 1981 to 1997, which included the years of Iraq-Iran War. He was tasked with negotiating the cease-fire deal. As a historian, he emphasises on historical roots of Islamic Republic and likening it to the Safavid empire.

[161] Velayati, 1995a

Naturally, these negotiations faced backlashes. A prominent critic was Seyed Morteza Avini, a filmmaker, journalist and poet from the Revolutionary position. Avini's writings and documentaries embellished the urgency of struggle against the West and called engagement with Europe, the West (both as political entity and cultural structure) as 'lust for materialism' and a 'petty need to be up to date with the world.' According to Avini, 'intellectuals and politicians are high on a drug called West,'[162] which gives them pleasure at first but then destroys them from inside. The Revolutionary position elevated Avini to its ideologue and speaker. His writings reiterated the unjust and oppressive nature of the world order that is painted by the West to make it alluring:

> They are having a delusion that dialogue and engagement with European minions would lead to a *bagh-e sabz* (green garden). It is an earthly paradise for them but we led a revolution with a holy book to lead us to a divine paradise; we did not embrace stupid analysis of 'third word' or 'urge for globalisation' because they prevent us from progressing towards God. They are talking about an international society which is global and cosmopolitan and connected … degenerate liars! If the world is getting smaller through connectivity, it does not make their oppression smaller … the Western oppression now spreads globally.

[162] Avini, 1993

The revolutionary position treated Iran's stigmatisation by the international society, being labeled theocracy/autocracy and an oppressed nation by the West[163] as a sign of the Western oppression. The connectivity, shared norms and making the world smaller were treated as cultural wars, imposing different values. Accepting standards of democracy and acknowledging shared belief of globalisation meant becoming Westerner.

IV Eslahat: 1996-2004

The debate intensified when the political campaigns leading to the 1996 Presidential election introduced concepts such as freedom, democracy and civil society. For the first time since the election, the gulf between the State and the Nation was discussed as 'failure of the State' to catch up with the nation. Policies were discussed by citing a proviso: *dar donya-ye emrooz*.[164] It means 'in today's world.' The state's record and capabilities were not discussed in comparison to the Pahlavi era or ideals of the Islamic period, but compared to what happened within the international society. Qualifying the acceptable conduct on what goes on in the West (and internationally), was an attempt to reduce the differences. It signified the necessity of becoming the same. The lead voices were few elements within the revolutionary positions but the forcefulness of it was due to its attraction to liberal nationals and traditionalists. They all shared the need to transform the state *dar donya-ye emrooz*. It was dubbed *eslahat*, the reform.

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[163] Mousavian (2009) elucidates how every statement by the European Union highlighted irreconcilable philosophical differences between Iran and Europe on human rights, democracy, free will and rights.
[164] See Sadri, 2003; Soroush, 1995 and 1996; Jameh, 1997.

The reformist revolutionaries argued the current state of the nation is 'far from what Imam perceived' and the State policies are far from 'what Islam teaches on how to rule.' In this discourse, it was not the mass or *ummah* that formed the nation but the *jame-eh* (the society) formed the nation. For that, the society was meant to be *jame-eh madani* (civil society). The feeling of a common attachment to the state was not represented as one surrounding God, Islam and Leader but one bound by rules, morality and values. The prevalent value discussed in the discourse was freedom. The central thesis of this idea is how the civil society formed the essential core of *the people* rather than what the revolution and the state deemed as to be the *mahroomin/mazlumin.*

The revolutionary position (institutionally represented by Nezam) treated these notions as attempts to secularise and westernise Iran.[165] In an attempt to avoid delegitimisation, then President Mohammad Khatami elaborated on concept of civil society as one from what Western social scientists theorise about:

> In the civil society that we espouse, which is centered around the axis of Islamic thinking and culture, however, personal or group dictatorship or even dictatorship of the majority and elimination of the minority has no place. In such a society, man, due to the very attribute of being human, is venerated and revered and his rights respected. Citizens of the Islamic civil society enjoy the right to determine their own destiny, supervise the administration of affairs and hold the government accountable. The government in such a society is the servant of the people and not their master,

[165] Messbah Yazdi, 1998; Azghadi, 1998; Tahmasebi, 1997.

> and in every eventuality, is accountable to the people whom God has entitled to determine their own destiny. Our civil society is not a society where only Muslims are entitled to rights and are considered citizens. Rather, all individuals are entitled to rights, within the framework of the law.[166]

He continued by arguing against Western civil society, as derived from Roman political system, but claimed to discover the origins of civil society in Islam, and 'madinat ul-nabi,' the city which Muslim prophet resided in. 'Madinat ul-nabi' was a utopia organised around Islamic virtues and duties. This conception was welcomed by revolutionaries as a 'slap in the face of the enemy, who are now disappointed from infecting us.'[167] They argued if a Western style civil society is imposed, it would lead to *velengari*, indifference, to authentic way of leaving. It would lead to contagious diseases of *ebtezal* (vulgarity), *fahsha* (prostitution), and *bala*[168] (disaster/crisis).[169]

For the revolutionary position, these were the consequences of being submerged by the West and the international society. However, the liberal nationalists (and some limited utterances from traditionalists) argued that the spread of religion in public domain, by itself, creates crisis through proliferating political and religious dogma rather than having apolitical virtues. One of the main proponents was Abdolkarim Soroush[170] who discredited revolutionaries and clergies because they did not have any authority to be the vessel between

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[166] Khatami, M, 1998.
[167] Azghadi, 1998.
[168] The origins of the phrase *bala* is important here as evident in utterance in section five. Bala, in its Islamic sense, is often conceived as acts of god to punish the immoral society.
[169] See Kanani, 2004; Rajaee, 2002; Khatami, 1999e and 2000.
[170] Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam, 1998 (pp. 88–104).

man and God. According to him and the liberal position, spread of religion across Iranian society and discourse have led to social disenchantment and international isolation.

IV. From 2012

The Presidential election of 2013 created a significant space in discussing the question of diplomat and how to deal with the world. The third debate between the nominees shifted the focus of elections from economy to foreign policy, in specific international sanctions, negotiations with five permanent members of United Nations Security Council. The debate, highlighted difference in positions (even intra-group positions) and set the tone not just for the politics of upcoming years but conduct of international negotiations leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran, United States, Russia, China, Germany, France and United Kingdom. The nuclear deal also had nuclear ramifications in broadening the debate on what it means to be revolutionary and Islamic.

The basis of this debate was set by a showdown, a back and forth, between Ali Akbar Velayati, the Supreme Leader's adviser on international affairs, and Saeed Jalili, the nuclear negotiator and secretary of Iran's National Security Council (NSC) during televised debate.[171] Both were representing the

[171] Saeed Jalili is currently Supreme Leader's Representative at National Security Council. Former secretary of the council and nuclear negotiator, he was the deputy of American affairs at Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was graduated from Imam Sadeq University, which is known as 'Iranian Harvard' for two reasons: 1) range of its graduates being recruited within government, 2) being situated on a campus that was the branch of Harvard Business School in Tehran. The graduates are socially called 'Imam Sadeqi.' His thesis was on Prophet's diplomacy of letter-writing.

revolutionary position but with two different notions of dealing with the international society. Velayati criticised Jalili's negotiation with world powers over Iran's nuclear programme. In response, Jalili portrayed his performance as rational: 'they [P5+1] did not have an answer to our logic, yet a person like you [with your calibre] is saying like this when even they [negotiating parties] were unable to provide a response and needed time.' Velayati's zinger was: 'Diplomacy is not a philosophy class so you [can] say our logic was superior and they were condemned. Those people [the West] are not intimated by our logic. What people are witnessing is that you have been in charge of the nuclear issue for few years, did not take a step forward and sanctions increased every day and its pressure is on the people.'

This was a significant digression in official debate in Iran as often it was purported it is the enemy's, United States greedy nature (being *estekbar*) that led to pressure on Iranian people, gridlock in international negotiations and preventing Iran from obtaining its righteous right. The above exchange shifted focus on skills and beliefs of negotiator, hinting to a shortcoming back at home in understanding international relations. Reminder of the earlier debate on technocrats versus revolutionaries, and the idealist-realist debate on foreign policy and revolutionary ideology.

With the election of Hassan Rouhani to presidency, the State position shifted from a revolutionary one and anti-world order to a more technocratic position similar to early 1990s. Diplomacy became the keyword while the pride of nation was to being revolutionary. The shift became official when in a speech, Ayatollah Khamenei defined diplomacy based on an Islamic narrative of and exercising *heroic flexibility*:

> World of diplomacy, is world of smiling; they smile [at each other], negotiate, request negotiation, they even tell it themselves. Few days ago, one of these Western politicians was asked about negotiating Iran, while Iran is an enemy; he said we negotiate with enemy! This is testifying to enmity with Iran; they say it explicitly. The reason of enmity is not individuals, the reason of the enmity is the truth and this identity. Whatever they say, should be analysed in this framework. We are not against correct and logical diplomatic movements; in diplomatic world or even internal policies. I believe in *heroic flexibility*; flexibility and softening is much needed in places, it is very good; it is not a problem. This wrestler who is wrestling with its opponent and in places, for technical reasons, makes his body flexible, should not forget who is the opponent; should not forget what he is doing; this is the main condition. Must understand what they are doing, must know who they are confronting, who they are facing; where is the target of attacks. They should pay attention to these.[172]

Though the above seems like an obvious observation on diplomatic skills and tactics, it is in line with religious analogies of the Revolutionary position. It is taken from the 'most glorious example of [apropos use of flexibility and authority] in the peace of Imam Hassan Mujtaba.' The concerned peace deal is the Hasan-Mu'āwiya treaty, signed between Hasan ibn Ali (the second Imam) and Mu'āwiya ibn Abu Sufyan (the fourth caliphate) in

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[172] Khamenei, 2014c

661 CE. When the second Imam replaced the second Imam following his assassination, Muawiya who was the governor of the Levant at the time, refused giving allegiance. The disobedience led to a civil war that finally came to an end with a treaty between the Third Imam and the Second Caliphate, leading the third Imam to hand over power to the caliphate. The handover was conditioned on Muawiya abiding the Quran and Prophet's tradition, Imam Hasan becoming the caliphate after Muawiya and Muawiya not to insult the first Imam. The peace deal, though broken by assassination of Imam Hasan, is regarded as a novel act with a great interest in mind rather than short-term goals.

The process of nuclear negotiations and conduct of diplomacy initiated a parallel debate on what it means to be Islamic and Revolutionary, and how being so is key in negotiations. The position that is akin to technocratic position of 1990s, now self-called moderate, insisted on 'win-win game' in foreign policy that both Iran and the West can win. The Revolutionary position, labeled as extremists, believed there is no way of winning if the other side wins. The language of win-win game became more contentious as win-win game in Farsi is *bazi-e bord-bord*. In Farsi, *bord* also means taken. Thus, the win-win game could be conveyed as a game during which the other side took everything. This meant the other side (with an emphasis on Western side, and not surprisingly Russia or China) took everything during the negotiations: nuclear materials, pride, honour, independence, and Islam.

One of the prevalent discussions in the period was one of accepting the international order, and the role of United States. In an interview, the President justified direct negotiations with United States rather than Europeans

because U.S. is their *kadkhoda*, that could be translated as village's alderman or chief. The phrase is composed of the term *Khoda*, the God, which sparked a debate on Western foundation of the government's thinking: rather than believing in *Khoda* as the superior power of the world, the government is begging their *Kadkhoda*. The dichotomy is reminiscing of how the Shah was also portrayed as godless with the West as the master. The debate witnessed return of similar phrases and languages of early period after the revolution and the period before revolution in calling proponents of diplomacy with the West as Liberal, Godless, naive and incompetent who sell themselves and country.

One of the interesting concepts that emerged was the *seller*, *forooshandeh.* The concept gained prevalence just after when Iranian director Asghar Farhadi won his second Oscars for best foreign film, titled *forooshandeh*. The award and its timing after the post-JCPOA was linked to how the negotiators, i.e. the liberals, sold the country, the nation and the state. The plot of film assisted with the sexual and amoral conception of the negotiations. The movie is concerned with a couple, which the wife was raped by an elderly man. The husband forgives the rapist. To add more fuel to the conceptual fire, the movie was sponsored and produced by a Qatari foundation. Thus, the discursive representation was how a movie funded by outsiders on rape in Iran and being comfortable with letting your wife being raped was equivalent to how the deal was raping of Iran, assisted by outsiders, and how the negotiators were content with it. The Revolutionary position gained a discursive advantage by debating how having a normalised relation with the international society and giving up rights was a rape of the nation and delegitimising the state.

V Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter, I outlined four distinct positions: revolutionary, traditionalists, liberal nationalists and communists that were broadly involved in a discursive (and often non-discursvie) battle to define the West in order to establish selves, either by total rejection, total embrace or a cherry-picking of concepts. The revolutionary position, despite variances, remains the most dominant position since 1979 with significant leverage over defining the state and the nation. The most significant opposition came from within the revolutionary position itself by introduction new factions. The communists went extinct when they were eliminated both intellectually and physically. The liberal nationalist and traditionalist were rarely visible across the discourse, except for the period from 1996 until 2004. The traditionalists always had marginal input in line with revolutionaries, but the liberal nationalist only became prominent after the contraction of public space. The attempts to introduce new concepts or ways of conceiving state and nation only led to gradual embrace of some of the concepts by the state and revolutionaries.

It could be argued the core contestations on concepts of state, nation and the international society were directly linked to main slogans and concepts of the revolution: freedom and independence. The Revolutionaries institutionalised across the discourse and political institutions neglected the concept of independence for freedom. The freedom, according to their positions, was the individual right-based freedom. The tension between the two and mutual neglect provided two different path of relations with the international society. However, the triangulation between the state, society and the international society, offered contentious discursive struggles to reject some concepts and discursive battles to

navigate defining some concept to seek status and recognition within the international society.

Coda

This was an inquiry into different Iranian ideas about Europe. It aimed to seek an answer to how Iran conceives of Europe over the *longuee duree*. In doing so, it attempted to provide a history of present. The emerging ideas were historically specific and emergent. As much as a history of the past, it highlights how today became logically possible. This undertaking viewed history as moments of continuity and change that is not necessarily objective, that includes silences and utterances. This chapter reviews previous discussions, highlights potential challenges, outlines lessons learn, and lays out potential future studies related to the topic and themes. If anything, I hope this manuscript show us that we should think twice before discarding area expertise and its relevance to understanding 'the international'. In this case, both Iran and Europe enrich IR's historical grasp.

Throughout, I was hesitant to impose 'the' definition on Europe and/or Iran. I introduced some linguistic, spatial, and temporal limits to make the project manageable and accessible. That is where the poststructuralist (linguists) influenced my analysis: 'language is a relational sign system whose instability is only partially fixed through oppositional.' The concern has been how it was used and what it did. On concepts, this thesis affirms that they do much more than providing frameworks for research. Take identity or Europe. They are deployed as justifications for projects, and conditions of possibilities.[173]

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[173] Richard Ned Lebow, 'Identity', 2018.

It is *de rigueur* for conclusions to expand on the research while tightening the loose ends. I believe the subject of Iranian identity and how conceives the International, and the topic of Europe and its others, are both worthy of closer scrutiny. The concern for this thesis has been to map out representations, catalogue concepts, discuss their usage, and debate their influence on the story of the expansion of international society. This could be expanded further into realms of security studies, knowledge production, and regional studies.

Despite the depth and breadth of the research, the thesis has not been intended as a total history of Iran's relations with Europe, nor as exhaustive of Iranian foreign policy and socio-political debate. When I embarked on this research, the challenge was how to distil[174] all the representations available. I laid out these challenges in the framework chapter. As this manuscript showed, with all changes and continuities, only five numbers of positions existed. They were, and still are, confined to a certain set of ideas, utilizing similar conceptual constellations, delineating desired temporalities,[175] specific othering practices and meaning. The explorations in these representations have sought to highlight varying influence of European ideas. Does this mean there would be no new

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[174] Hansen, *Security as Practice*.

[175] I have been very explicit about temporal implications and debates, whether of this thesis or debates it has been analysing. However, the spatial element has been very muted or implicit. At the core of identity debate, there is a spatial construction and belongings. Even the instances that I discuss 'dislocation', it is being dislocated from a certain space and belonging. An apt discussion of identity as ways to manage patio-temporal relations is Anderson, B (1983). *Imagined Communities*. Verso. The space-time (or time-space) nexus and ensuing tension is inescapable, and the a priori assumption of it is problematic. See Peter Merriman, 'Human Geography without Time-Space', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 37, no. 1 (2012): 13–27, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41427925.

positions? It is always possible that an entirely new idea emerges, and replaces the existing ones. However, it is unlikely that they do not engage with European ideas at all as the European thinking proves the most prominent intellectual counter-act.

VI How Iran sees Europe

In addition to focusing on Iranian debates, it also captured its global links, influential international thoughts, and broader entanglements. Specifically, how Europe was and is represented manifests Iran's position vis-à-vis the international society. However, the thesis has not been intended as a total history of Iran's relations with Europe, nor as exhaustive of Iranian foreign policy and socio-political debate. It argued that Iran's debate on Europe were not just pre-given facts but led to variety of processes of forging 'spatial, political, and cultural boundaries to demarcate the domestic space from the threatening other'.[176] As discussed in chapter 2, these demarcations ensue due to a series of socially recognisable differences. The thesis looked for how these differences, vital to identity, were established, recognised, understood, and clashed.

I traced these representations, which emerged out of a specific historical trajectory, diachronically and synchronically. In doing so, I tried to highlight how the influences across national and temporal boundaries shaped the discourse and impacted concepts and language. As highlighted throughout, translation and knowledge exchanges were pivotal in shaping some of the

[176] Simon Dalby, 'American Security Discourse: The Persistence of Geopolitics', *Political Geography Quarterly* 9, no. 2 (1 April 1990): 171–88, https://doi.org/10.1016/0260-9827(90)90017-5.

representations. My emphasis on translation as a practice of difference and in difference is not just due to an interest in linguistic turn of IR but, as Dipesh Chakrabarty has noted, how it is a practice to understand own's predicament and thereby grasp where the Iranians stand in relation to Europe, 'European enlighten' and 'modernity'.[177] Often, the translations were mistranslations. Then those informed concepts and bounded the discourse based on confusions and compulsions.

The collection of chapters, and episodes showcased in each, provided at least five centuries of talking about Europe. It articulated an intellectual project, and a socio-political one, involving Sadrists, Ulema, Religious, Nationalists, Socialists. The latter two are the most modern and recent iteration of identity, notably emerging in late 19th century and intrinsically shaped through a range of exchanges and interactions. The first three, mostly revolving around native discourses, have more historical groundings. Yet, they also had fair share of entanglement with spaces beyond Iran.

All of these positions had been engaged with modern global ideologies, debating the nation, revolution, the people, imperialism, class, and gender. In all of these engagements, Europe was somewhat present. The absence of or silence about Europe is rare. In addition to explicit articulations, there are implicit ones and some through secondary signs that come through a discourse of shared values, collective concepts, and practices. These were also grounds for differences

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[177] Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'Radical Histories and Question of Enlightenment Rationalism: Some Recent Critique of Subaltern Studies' in Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial, ed. Vinayak Chaturvedi

and othering. One of the most notable ways of establishing the difference was retorting to the discourse of Karbala. Until late 18th century, it was used in mostly symbolic and ritual manner. Then it became part and parcel of politics. It turned into a perpetually present node of the discourse, more so when talking about the international order or internal oppression. At one point, Europeans were Yazid. During the constitutional movement, England was specified as Yazid and nationalist as belonging to the camp of Husseini. It repeated itself throughout, until 1953 coup. Then, the State (and monarchy) were Yazid and upon the people, the nation, to be Husseini. The Yazid trope stuck to the Shah until 1979, when all positions (including socialists and nationalist) also resorted to religious discourse to talk about the State that is European and back by the oppressors.

The aftermath of the 1979 revolution was deemed as continuation of Karbala. It was time to correct the wrong. The Iraq-Iran war impacted that, and the debate on Europe. It was a validation of Europe as criminal, and the international order as unjust. This fragment of history introduces a more visible relevance of bodies beyond everyday practices and gendered notions. Martyred or injured, whole or dismembered, recovered or lost, returned or captive, were new aspects of the discourse. There was a physical and tangible manifestation of Karbala. They turned into a resource to know, value, and count identity, also to delineate the difference between a faithful selfless Iranian vis-à-vis the other. It fuelled the geographically and temporally unbounded discourse.

While historians and area specialists might generally concur with some of the above observations, the present endeavour arrived at them via the amalgamation of IR and social theories to highlight an empirical catalogue for

our international accounts and understanding the international. Chapters 1 and 2 discussed the necessity, relevance, and the frameworks of this task.

Chapter 3 dealt exclusively with the diachronic analysis. It was also a background on the history of Iran's idea of Europe. As pointed out, the purpose of it was to offer an in-depth understanding how utterancs first came into being. It showed how the basic concepts such as *farang* emerged mostly in cultural texts, while the space to the west of Iran was represented as mostly defeated but powerful in practices such as rituals and monuments. There were sharp boundaries and distinctions between the self and the Other.

There are harmony and antimony between that history and what we witnessed in chapter 4. The continuity was at the beginning, when the Europe was deemed inferior. The shift was in developing polity-specific representations of European, alongside embracing practices on an international level. These practices carried out themselves into the era covered by chapter 5, where a newly formed Shi'i Islamism discourse gains more grounding while treats Europe as equal. At the same time, a salvific millenarianism emerged that envisaged atemporal polity that needs to conquer Europe. By noting the impact of Ottoman, Russian, and Indian thought, chapter 6 highlighted travels to Europe and by Europeans in proliferation of ideas about Europe.

Getting into predicting future[178] is quite a perilous task.[179] Usually, it involves anticipatory statements in "relatively gross and general terms" [180] regarding societies, discourses, positions, practices, and individuals we study. It is not divorced from understanding current and the past, including "prior occurrences or conditions"[181] but are "often only thinly disguised commentaries on current affairs."[182] Nevertheless, here is my attempt: any new or differing representation of Europe is also contingent on how Europe changes or carry on. Just as we witnessed a bifurcation of relationships and conceptions into different cultural, political, and economic realm, I expect a more divergence. Intellectually and culturally, the state tries to reconcile differing ideas. Politics and security will continue to be an upheaval battle that also could affect economy. It will lead towards further divergence from Europe towards Eurasia as a distinct sphere. If fruitful, this could Russianise Iranian discourse and create an entangled space

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[178] See Chris Brown's passim call for 'better predictions' as part of IR's research agenda: Brown, Chris. "The Poverty of Grand Theory." European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (September 2013): 483–97. doi:10.1177/1354066113494321. On predictive powers, see

Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. 1st ed. Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill, 1979, 8.

[179] Philip E Tetlock, *Expert political judgment: how good is it? How can we know?*, 2017, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=1519721.

[180] Singer, J. David. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations." *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (1961): 77-92. doi:10.2307/2009557.

[181] Viotti, PR. and Kauppi, MV. (1987). *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond*. New York: Macmillan. 3. Cited in Dunne, T., Hansen, L., & Wight, C. (2013). The end of International Relations theory? *European Journal of International Relations*, 19(3), 405–425. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113495485.

[182] Christopher Coker, *The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror*, LSE International Studies Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 2007), 12.

between Eastern Europe, Turkey, Russia, Iran, and its neighbouring countries that counters European ideas on prosperity and progress.

VII International Society

The framework chapter outlined how the representations and concepts are vital to understanding Iran's view of the international society and its expansion story. Contrary to providing a systemic account, the specific history was the core of the thesis. This was inspired by the English School's rethinking of the "anarchical society",[183] as an expansion of the European society to the rest of the world. They rooted the European society circa 1500, and then the traditional account of how it expanded to the rest of the world. This conventional story has been criticised for its failure to address relational process(es) influencing the European dominated society. Neumann and Wlesh, as mentioned earlier in chapter two, spearheaded this criticism that was followed later on by, again, Neumann pointing out the Eurocentric nature of ES and International Society that strips off agency from non-Europeans. It is particular set of memories, experiences, narratives, and identities of each polity that make entrance possible rather than expansion. Based on these debates, the thesis asked Bull and Watson's central question from the vantage point of Iran's history from 1500 until 2015.

This attempt goes beyond the conventional understanding that Iran's relationship was just an encounter and reform. The birds-eye view allowed me to look for how past and memories of the past have been used for the purpose of

[183] Bull and Watson, *The Expansion of International Society*.

present. Theoretically, similar undertakings have been done in one way or another. Empirically, this investigation on Iran was new. Iran's status within the society is ambiguous. Itself is also unsure where it stands. The process has been long, not linear, filled with limitations and tensions. The 16th century interactions outlined in chapter 4, diplomatic attempts discussed in chapters 6 and 7 — notably membership of the League of Nations[184] — and even instances of early 1990s in chapter 8, all showcases this upheaval.

The traditional ES account is very legalistic. Taking cue from above criticism, and building on recent studies,zan [185] a more socio-historic understanding of membership is taken. One, that is not singular but a constant renegotiation. However, the two are in interplay and reinforcing or weakening each other. It has been a complex affair that was not fully convinced by legal justifications: memberships of clubs and International Organisation did not change the collective identity scripts, but always fuelled the internal debate whether they want to be part of this society or not. It also had an element of wether 'they' — Europeans in charge of the society — would only accept Iran as one if the Self becomes truly European. For critics, it was a one way and directional membership: to be subservient and emulate. Thus, the constant struggle to catch up with Europe while bashing it.

In all of these, memories of the past are key. These past could be national or religious, myths or not. This reverses the English School's gaze on Europe,

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[184] Which in itself could be subject of another study.

[185] Edjus, *Memories of Empire and Entry into International Society*; Buzan and Schouenborg, *Global International Society*.

and shines the limelight on the non-European other to understand the process of entry.

VIII What else?

Episodes highlighted in each chapter alongside the conceptual constellations are intended as key illustrations of this overall argument. This leaves open the possibility of further research investigating other episodes, or delving into each in more depth.

There is an irony in this manuscript. It constantly reminds the reader about global entanglements and international influences. The core is Iran's representations of Europe. However, in this research, Europe fails to get the chance to speak back. Acknowledging this is not an attempt to subscribe to disciplinary Eurocentrism[186] but a theoretical and methodological point to make that would stand if we replace Europe with any other entity. Monological constitution of an identity is neither logical nor possible. It is dialogical, and in dialogue.[187] As Bakhtin puts it apptly

> the expression of an utterance can never be fully understood or explained if its thematic content is all that is taken into account. The expression of an utterance always responds to a greater or

[186] Zeynep Gulsah Capan, 'Decolonising International Relations?', *Third World Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (2 January 2017): 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1245100.

[187] This view is inspired by my reading of Bakhtin, 1986 via: Neumann, 1999's engagement with him; Todorov, 1984's being fuelled by him; Shapiro, 1988's glance at him. I must acknowledge two sets of conversations that I had, leading me to think more about this: conversations with Einar Wigen (Barcelona, September 2017 and London, November 2018), and Andy Li, June 2019.

> lesser degree, that is, it expresses the speaker's attitude toward others' utterances and not just his attitude toward the object of his utterance . . . . However monological the utterance may be . . . , however much it may concentrate on its own object, it cannot but be, in some measure, a response to what has already been said about the given topic, on the given issue, even though this responsiveness may not have assumed a clear-cut external expression . . . . The utterance is filled with dialogic overtones, and they must be taken into account in order to understand fully the style of the utterance . . . . The interrelations between inserted others' speech and the rest of the speech (one's own) . . . are analogous (but, of course, not identical) to relations among rejoinders in dialogue.

This falls within the remit of further and much needed research.

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