

***Kemalism as a Language for Turkish Politics: Cultivation, Reproduction,
Negotiation***

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For my grandparents, in loving memory

Abstract

Every political system has a shared language of symbols, narratives and priorities through which legitimation is sought. This language is basic and schematic, yet it generates 'legitimate' priorities and objectives. My interest is two-fold: firstly, how is this language reproduced, disseminated and upheld? Secondly, how is it used, interpreted and adapted to legitimise a wide array of actions, policies or ideas? I seek to answer these questions in light of Turkey's EU ambitions.

I sketch the prescriptions of what I call the normative core of Turkish politics, as expressed through national socialisation, the Constitution and the *raison d'être* of key institutions. I show how institutions such as the military, judiciary and Presidency legitimise their actions through appeals to this normative core, thus reproducing it with little variation, while simultaneously reproducing a shared language of politics. I also highlight the wide dissemination this language enjoys through education and early learning as well as its symbolic reproduction through spatial narratives such as national sites, museums and monuments.

Having demonstrated how this language is institutionally entrenched, widely disseminated and extensively used for the legitimation of public activities, I turn to the question of whether its constraints also create opportunities. I argue that Turkey's EU ambitions have actually led to the proliferation of such opportunities by introducing an alternative value benchmark in the pursuit of political legitimacy. Although the language is not abandoned, it is being actively enriched.

After decades of tension and reform, the notions of 'secularism' and 'westernisation', cornerstones of the normative core of Turkish politics, are now open to debate. This could lead to a process of radical re-negotiation of political values. Alternatively, the constraints that the language imposes might actually outweigh the opportunities. For now, a delicate but fascinating process of negotiation is unfolding in the heart of the Turkish political system. My PhD seeks to explain and analyse it.

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| | |
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| AKP | Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party |
| ANAP | Anavatan Partisi, the Motherland Party |
| CHP | Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People's Party |
| DEHAP | Demokratik Halk Partisi, Democratic People's Party |
| DİB | Diyanet İşleri Bakanlığı, Directorate of Religious Affairs |
| ECHR | European Court of Human Rights |
| İTA | İnkilâp Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük, Reforms' History and Atatürkism (high school textbook) |
| KKTC | Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus |
| MHP | Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Nationalist Movement Party |
| NSC | National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) |
| RTÜK | Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu, the broadcasting regulatory authority |
| SSCs | State Security Courts (Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri) |
| TAF | Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri) |
| TİS | Türk-İslam Sentezi, Turkish Islamic Synthesis |
| TRT | Türkiye Radyo Televizyon |
| TTT | Türk Tarih Tesi, Turkish History Thesis |
| YÖK | Yükseköğretim Kurulu, Higher Education Council |

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Introduction

The Republic of Turkey is Mustafa Kemal's (later Atatürk) creation. This thesis sets out to examine the place Atatürk's legacy occupies in Turkey today and the role it still plays in Turkish politics. I intend to show that Kemalism, an idiosyncratic blend of legacies, ideas and prescriptions, constitutes Turkey's language for legitimate politics, moulding political debate and processes. I propose that Kemalism is neither redundant nor a hegemonic ideology, as much of the literature suggests. Rather, after eight decades of being appealed to, institutionalised and celebrated, Kemalism has become a language used by law, educators, politicians and journalists, regardless of whether they understand Atatürk's legacy the same way or, indeed, embrace it entirely. This way of analysing Kemalism has not, to my knowledge, been documented and explored before. Yet it is vital to do so as Kemalism's ability to articulate Turkey's future is being revisited as Kemalism, as a language, is being renegotiated.

Because many embrace Kemalism as an ideology or creed and reject the very notion of re-interpretation and negotiation, using Kemalism as a language and, even more controversially, negotiating its specifics are sensitive issues in Turkey. Certain groups oppose this flexibility and seek to reverse it. The ensuing battle of wills between opposing groups is fought in Kemalist terms. Claims are made and opposed, effectively, in the same language. This does not mean that Kemalism is the only language for politics in Turkey; others do exist. Some, for instance, Islamic political idioms, antagonise Kemalist assumptions. Others, such as languages premised on Western universality and democratic popularity, represent alternatives without rejecting Kemalism, for Europe as an abstraction and universal values as a measure of civilisation are Kemalist legacies, as is the Republic within which a popular mandate can be claimed. Kemalism frames political debate in Turkey.

Research for this thesis started practically as Turkey's current government came to power. My initial purpose was to understand Turkey's erratic relationship with the EU, explain why EU membership is simultaneously feared and coveted and why domestic political actors simultaneously accuse each other of wanting EU membership too much and not wanting it enough. What I found is that Atatürk's legacy on the issue of westernisation is mixed and that a fierce negotiation on what it actually entailed and whether joining the EU will realise Atatürk's dream or

undermine his legacy is currently under way. This negotiation is effectively debating both Turkey's path towards the future and the nature of this future.

Chapter 1 will discuss the nature of Atatürk's legacy and its function and seek to explain 'Kemalism' by looking at Atatürk's statements and speeches, analyses and opinions offered by partisan intellectuals, politicians and journalists as well as academic accounts. Looking at Atatürk's perception of his bequest, I will assess the form its preservation takes: is it an ideology? A tradition? A movement? This will help me analyse both this legacy's corresponding role within Turkish politics and the nature of its influence. Here I will propose that, although Atatürkism is an ideology for some and is understood as a movement by many, it has also become – through time, institutionalisation and extensive use – a language. Kemalism, I argue, is a language for the construction and negotiation of legitimacy in Turkey.

Kemalism as a language is useful because it is universally intelligible. In Chapters 2 and 3, I will show how every Turk is socialised into recognising Kemalist narratives, themes and priorities. Chapter 2 will look at schoolbooks, language books and leisure reading materials for children, while Chapter 3 will look at republican monuments, museums and national sites. I will show how a nexus of meaning is introduced at a young age and then constantly elaborated on and reproduced through a saturation of public space with Kemalist symbols and narratives.

Chapter 4 will show that this language is used not only to articulate national identity, but is actually the language of the law; its priorities are also the priorities of Turkey's legal system. Here I will demonstrate that the constitution derives its legitimacy from Atatürk and, in turn, bases all its provisions on Atatürk's principles. This means that the legal system remains anchored on certain principles, reforms notwithstanding.

As I will show in Chapter 5, this means that, despite recent reform, the law is interpreted in ways that uphold Kemalist principles as the judiciary understand them. This effectively means that Turkey's EU ambitions may be frustrated at home because of an intense debate over the essence of Kemalism and the goals of Turkish politics. Here I will show how self-professed Kemalists (the Turkish Armed Forces, TAF, or the President of the Republic) reproduce this language while simultaneously seeking to protect it from being used independently of what they perceive as its true content.

This is what some Kemalists believe the current government seeks to do: use Kemalist language and priorities, namely westernisation, in order to renegotiate Kemalist practices, institutions and principles. Chapters 6 and 7 will highlight how this renegotiation possible in the first place and how it is being attempted.

Chapter 6 will demonstrate that Kemalist secularist legacies are mixed and contradictory. For early Kemalists, secularism was both a stepping-stone for modernisation and its proof. Hence, secular policies until the 1990s should be seen in the light of specific conditions and in conjunction with the general direction of the modernising project at any one time. During the 1990s, secularism was elevated to a value in itself. In this context, the AKP¹ seeks to redefine the meaning of secularism and alter the way secularism is understood and approached in Turkey. Erdoğan seeks to transform Atatürk's freedom from religion to European-style religious freedom. In the context of Turkey's EU aspirations, Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seeks to use Kemalist westernisation to challenge Kemalist secularism. This debate, I will show, simultaneously revisits the nature of modernity and the best path for its achievement.

Chapter 7 deals with westernisation. Although, on the surface, Atatürk's westernising drive is clear, his legacy towards the West is mixed. Kemalist modernising urges are closely linked to a defensive nationalism that makes Turks extremely sensitive to perceived slights, insults and what is often seen as unwarranted meddling from European quarters. As Turkey is battling against European doubts regarding its Europeanness, a domestic debate about whether EU membership should be pursued at all cost is gaining momentum. Many Kemalists accept an update of the system, but see no reason to replace the existing legitimising paradigm. Others, including such disparate groups as the government and much of the independent intelligentsia, support reform and believe that democracy should permit diverging perceptions of the 'good life'. This debate is influenced and often hijacked by domestic and international developments and corresponding fears and anxieties. As incidents threatening to derail Turkey's EU bid are carefully negotiated at home, the question that needs answering is whether accession can occur without the Kemalist republic ceding its

¹ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, the Justice and Development Party. The acronym AK means white, pure, unblemished – in keeping with the AKP's self-professed integrity.

place to a second republic. Is such a transition desirable? And will Kemalism's defenders permit the articulation of this option in the first place?

Studying events as they unfold *a priori* guarantees originality for one's project. This thesis occupies a vantage point that has not been explored adequately elsewhere and draws on material that – although analysed by others – has not been simultaneously studied in the same volume before. Moreover, this thesis benefits from the analysis of varied textual material and extensive personal observation.

I spent several months in Turkey, collecting books and documents as well as engaging in participant observation, informal interviews and visiting all the museums, monuments and national sites discussed in Chapter 3. All observations and descriptions not referenced to others are derived from my own research and all photographic material in the appendix is my own. A considerable amount of my original material was available online, hence legal and official documents, speeches, interviews, newspapers and certain scholarly articles were accessed electronically unless otherwise stated. References from electronic sources do not contain page numbers. All electronic references were valid and 'live' at the time of submission. When quoting ministers, state officials and military officers, I cite their title at the time the statement was made.

Newspapers are listed in the bibliography alongside a set of initials. In the text, newspaper articles are referenced citing these initials and publication date. Finally, schoolbooks and early childhood books are often penned by many authors or do not offer the author's name. In the text they are referred to by their title, for coherence and clarity. Full bibliographical details are offered in the bibliography.

Quotes, especially from speeches and documents available in English, often have mistakes in them that I have not corrected. For word-count purposes I refrained from adding (sic) next to them. All translations from Turkish, French, Greek and Italian sources are my own unless otherwise stated. In the bibliography, all documents are cited in the original with translations provided only for Greek titles.

As I only started learning Turkish when I started my PhD, I am aware of the limitations this places on my ability to use the language for some of my research. For

instance, I was unable to read the Constitution in Turkish. As all such documents are available in English, however, this was not a handicap. I read the Turkish press daily and my language skills were adequate to tackle all the original material needed for Chapter 2 and elsewhere. Where secondary sources are concerned – and noting that Turkish scholars invariably seek to publish in English – I made a conscious decision to use only English-language secondary sources in the name of speed. I, nevertheless, used numerous Turkish sources in English and French and believe the coverage of secondary material to be balanced, although not exhaustive.

Chapter 1, Kemalism

Although it is easy to identify specific ideas and priorities as part of Atatürk's legacy, charting this legacy and defining its form and functions is complex. In this chapter, I will outline Atatürk's bequest, his political priorities and other legacies. I will demonstrate the difficulties involved in seeking to define Kemalism as an ideology, a political movement or a historical phenomenon and argue that, although Kemalism is an ideology many espouse, above all it is a language everyone uses.

1. Atatürk's Legacy

During his lifetime, Atatürk actively encouraged his people's admiration of his achievements as war hero and republican father. Moreover, he always stressed the fusion of his personal trajectory with the national one, claiming that the nation is both an extension and a reflection of his person. The people should not only admire him but, in order to be true to themselves, remain loyal to him. Atatürk claimed complete ownership over the people he liberated. He was their natural leader and they were *his* people, *his* children, forged in *his* image. This is his bequest, left to the Turks in the form of *Nutuk*¹, the famous 36-and-a-half-hour speech.

In this speech, Atatürk presents his leadership as essential to independence and freedom. He presents himself as the sole author of national salvation – not even the nation shares his glory – but also its only *possible* author. Without him, the Turks would simply not exist and, Atatürk stresses, he was the only person who could have achieved this. There were no alternatives as his comrades-in-arms and republican companions were inadequate, self-serving, power-hungry hypocrites and liars (Atatürk, 2003:16, 25, 409, 422, 443, 522, 581, 588, 592, 740). He on the other hand, Atatürk claims, only cared for the good of his people, who responded by giving him their uncompromising affection (p.31-33, 622). His leadership, Atatürk implies,

¹ Great Speech

cannot be imitated or repeated: therefore, the nation needs to remain loyal to this legacy and vigilant against threats and reversals.

Given the magnitude of his achievements and the natural bond he enjoys with his people, opposition to Atatürk's legacy would be not only foolish, but actually a character flaw (p.11) amounting to national betrayal. Such treason, he notes in *Nutuk*, took many forms during the national struggle. Some even sought to restore the imperial state even though the nation's manifest desires had made it impossible to continue serving the Ottoman cabinet (p.165). Only Atatürk responded to these desires because, he notes, he alone possessed the vision for saving his people (p.8). 'In this situation there was only one resolution to be taken, that of creating a new Turkish state, based on national sovereignty... [so] that the Turkish nation could lead an existence of dignity and glory' (p.9).

Having saved the nation, to ensure that its restored dignity and new-found glory would not lapse, Atatürk launched a modernisation campaign. Turkey was to achieve the standards of contemporary civilisation and join the civilised nations of the world (p.303, 523, 598). Thus Atatürk offered his people military triumph, national deliverance, happiness and 'the avoidance of misery' (p.318), as well as a promise to work for the 'health of this *patria* and nation' (p.348). What he did not promise was democracy. Atatürk proclaims: '[s]overeignty belongs without reserve or condition to the nation. The administrative system rests on the principle that the people rule effectively and personally its destiny' (p.492). Nevertheless, he also notes: 'What I expect from the entire people, without exceptions, is complete submission to the orders of the government' (p.134); but not just any government. While Atatürk was alive, the Turkish Republic was his domain. Atatürk notes: 'The entire nation accepted the principles I published and it was clear that those who opposed the principles or even *my person* had no chance of being elected deputies by the nation' (p.624 – emphasis added). And thus, he believes, it should remain after his death.

Evidently, Atatürk's legacy is one of nationalism and modernisation, not one of democracy and individualism. This legacy rested on three pillars: collectivism, essentialism and teleology. *Nutuk* closes with the famous *Address to Youth*, through which Atatürk entrusts the Republic to the hands of unborn Turks:

‘Your first duty is to safeguard and eternally defend national independence, the Turkish Republic. It is the only foundation of your existence and future... In the future, there will be those wishing the country harm, both inside and outside it, who will want to grab this treasure away from you... By force or ruse, all citadels and arsenals of the *patria* may have been taken; all of its armies may have been dispersed and the country entirely occupied.

Envisage an even more sinister eventuality, suppose that those who hold power within the country have fallen into error, ignorance or even treason and confuse their personal interests with the invaders’ political ambitions. The nation itself may have fallen into adversity, ruin and exhaustion.

Even in those conditions, Turkish child of centuries to come, your duty is to save Turkish independence and the Republic. The strength necessary for this exists, in full potential, in the noble blood that flows in your veins’ (Atatürk, 2003:746-7 or 2002:279-280)².

Atatürk blends the primordial appeal to blood with the civic tie of republican citizenship, thus turning citizenship into an essential bond. Atatürk claims both the Turks and the Republic as his creations and then presents the two as naturally linked. The Turks’ blood dictates protection of the Republic because ‘the blood shed’ (p.487) for Anatolia’s deliverance ensured the Republic’s creation and should not go to waste. Blood binds unborn Turks to the republican *patria*. It is natural, Atatürk implies, that individual Turks should seek to protect what their ancestors died establishing. If one does not feel allegiance to the Republican Fatherland, then one is not really a Turk.

Through the *Address to Youth* – carved on the walls of public buildings, universities and Anıtkabir (Atatürk’s mausoleum) and memorised by all schoolchildren – Atatürk binds national consciousness with the Republic’s protection. National consciousness entails vigilance against external and internal enemies. Although guarded, this national consciousness ‘is not selfish and arrogant’ (1920 speech, see Atatürk, 1920-1937); rather, it is good both for Turkey and the world. Speaking in 1921 (ibid), he stressed that ‘Anatolia... is not only fulfilling a survival duty for itself, but... erecting a barrier against all attacks directed to the East’. For, although Atatürk (ibid) stressed

² For alternative translations, see bibliography.

in 1937 that '[a]ll nations have become... members of one family', dangers to national independence persisted. Consequently, the nation must remain vigilant.

Actually, for Atatürk, this is the main task of national education, as vigilance holds the key to both national survival and greatness. Addressing a group of teachers in 1922, Atatürk (1920-1937) noted: 'A military victory is insufficient for true liberation'. Lasting national survival and progress rest on the cultivation of national consciousness through education. 'It is only education, science and teachers that can save the nation' (1925 speech, *ibid*).

Liberation was only the first step in Atatürk's plan, the realisation of which relied on retaining national consciousness. Speaking in 1923 (*ibid*), and reflecting popular concerns of the time, Atatürk noted: 'No matter how great may be the victories won by a nation at the battlefield, those victories may only yield lasting results through the efforts of an army of educators'. Such statements undoubtedly offered teachers, working under hard conditions, a sense of purpose. Simultaneously, however, they reveal Atatürk's conviction that the national struggle did not end with independence. National deliverance led to the Republic, which, in turn, opened the road for modernisation. Modernisation was liberation's final aim.

National pride was an invaluable resource on this path, so Atatürk sought to cultivate a strong sense of pride in national belonging. Speaking on the tenth anniversary of the Republic's foundation, Atatürk identified himself as a member of the great Turkish nation, alongside 'his' citizens and the nation's 'valuable army' with great pride because, he noted, '[t]he Turkish nation is of excellent character... intelligent... capable of overcoming difficulties of national unity, and because it holds the torch of positive sciences' (Atatürk, 1933). Turkishness is associated with intelligence, progress and bravery. Simultaneously, unity – vital during the tumultuous war years – is deemed vital in peacetime as well, ensuring progress and greatness. Conversely, disunity is presented as an affliction and a sign of stupidity.

The speech concludes with the words '*ne mutlu Türküm diyene*', 'How happy he who says I'm a Turk', presenting happiness as a concomitant of Turkishness. This phrase is now an ever-present national mantra. Although this repetition could be interpreted as a sign of national insecurity, rather it seems to indicate the success of Atatürk's

narratives in forging national pride and inspiring a sense of ownership over the republican, national, westernising project, as described in *Nutuk*.

Yet, there is one conspicuous omission from Atatürk's account in *Nutuk*: there is little mention of secularism. Does 'contemporary civilisation' *ipso facto* suggest secularism? For Andrew Mango, Turkey's most famous western student and one of Atatürk's most fervent admirers, it does. Speaking in 2000, Mango argued that 'secularism followed *naturally* from Atatürk's rationalist philosophy'. Atatürk did not need to stress the importance of secularism; in fact, secularism only becomes a contentious issue when modernisation proceeds *without* the corresponding secularisation. Yet this does not fully explain the omission.

Nutuk is hardly the place for secularist bravado. The speech was delivered soon after the end of the Independence War, during which the Kemalists had made extensive appeals to religion and the Caliph in order to gain the support of pious soldiers. Memories were fresh. Although Atatürk dismisses the Caliphate as 'nothing but an object of derision in the eyes of the civilised and cultivated world' (p.10), he still appeals to God frequently (e.g. p.371, 373) and does not advocate uncompromising secularism. He does, however, stress that the Turks' greatness predated their conversion to Islam (p.598) and urges them to purify sentiments and knowledge 'through the light of true science' (p.608), thus preventing tradition, history and the fanciful notions of Islamic unity from jeopardising national survival.

Atatürk praises enlightened religion whereby 'humanity shall abandon Christianity, Islamism, Buddhism [and] there shall exist a religion pure and devoid of tarnish, simplified and comprehensible for all and having a universal character' (p.612). This, he notes, is in line with a higher level of civilisation and universal standards. Secularism thus emerges as a means for showing the world that Turkey is not a primitive nation sunk in prejudice and superstition (p.745). Hence, Atatürk opposes the Caliphate, not because of its religious identity, but because of its desire to block progress in order to hold onto an order of things made redundant by the passage of time. The Caliphate is guilty of seeking to 'sacrifice the Turkish people in the name of a simple caprice, a fantasy, a mirage' (p.610).

A nation has to move with the times or perish. The Republic, celebrated by Atatürk as the Turks' 'natural' political habitat, is the vehicle for progress. Hence, Atatürk identifies republicanism and a thirst for progress as *natural* concomitants of Turkishness. Secularism is in turn depicted as a *natural* republican trait and, hence, necessary for both national survival and progress: 'Our greatest strength, our prestige in the eyes of the world rests in the new form, the new character of our regime' (p.602). The regime that Atatürk has bound with national identity is Turkey's ticket for acceptance by the world, or the part of it that matters: the civilised West.

2. *The Six Arrows*

Atatürk's legacy is emotionally potent, albeit often muddled in terms of its derivation and internal logic. Kemalism's prescriptions are simple and stark, yet no concrete instructions are offered for the pursuit of its goals. Kemalism offers vision, but not method. That was the case even before Atatürk's passing, even though he died in office. In the 1930s, rather than actively formulating policy, he busied himself with grand research projects in Turkish history and language. Nevertheless, he retained control over the direction, boundaries and priorities of political activity through the introduction of a simple set of principles known as the 'Six Arrows' (*Altı Ok*) initially presented as the manifesto of Atatürk's *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP, Republican People's Party). With the exception of two short-lived experiments at controlled opposition that proved unexpectedly popular and thus came to an abrupt end, the CHP was, until the mid-1940s, Turkey's only political party. This effectively gave the Six Arrows universal validity, enhanced by their incorporation into the constitution (Weiker, 1981:222), where they have remained, despite constitutional reform³.

The Arrows (nationalism, republicanism, secularism, populism, statism and reformism) offer neither socio-political insight on a grand analytical scale nor short-term party-specific goals. Rather, they propose avenues and methods for ensuring that the Turkish nation leads a life of dignity, security and glory. Their ultimate aim is modernisation, which, for Atatürk, held the key to survival and progress. The Arrows

³ In 1937, 1961 1983 and 2001.

were pragmatic context-specific recommendations. Economic statism, for instance, was necessary for survival given the post-war, crisis-ridden international economy and was eventually abandoned. The remaining Arrows, however, survive and are still continuously appealed to, with some having become values in themselves.

As Atatürk was the leader of a state-seeking nationalist liberation movement, it is hardly surprising that nationalism remains strong in Turkey. In fact, nationalism is a powerful tool for any state, partly because, Herb (1999:9) notes, state power is territorially defined and partly because national identity itself is partially spatial. States, therefore, invariably seek to control, define and use territory in order to engender support or loyalty, claim legitimacy or foster a desirable collective identity. This is exactly what Atatürk's nationalism achieved, welding ethnic and civic appeals into a coherent narrative anchored on Anatolia. This account, essentialising both the Turks' homeland and their relationship to it, was subsequently embraced and widely disseminated by the Turkish state (see Chapters 2 and 3).

Fusing nationality and republicanism, Atatürk legitimised the polity by presenting it as a product of Anatolian soil and the Turks' natural political habitat. Yet this did not constitute a declaration of democratic intent. As the Ottoman Empire became associated with defeat and humiliation, Ottoman/Islamic identity became a symbol of vulnerability and potential degradation. The secular Republic was thus hailed as the institutional expression of a collectivist and decidedly anti-Ottoman Turkish nationalism and a guarantee of security and dignity. Having identified backwardness as the reason for Ottoman vulnerability, Atatürk saw the Republic as both the first stepping-stone towards modernisation and the best vehicle for its achievement. Consequently, he was more concerned with modernisation than democratic structures, while national sovereignty referred to a collective sense of destiny rather than civic empowerment. In this context, populism proved a useful tool.

Atatürk saw the nation as his creation and himself as the natural representative of national volition. As the purpose of politics was given (modernisation) and as the people lacked the political maturity to make (correct) decisions, Atatürk's populism was, for Mango (1999a:6), a salutary sign of reason and realism. Effectively, however, what Atatürk described as politics for the people, if not by the people, was pure paternalism and gave rise to the *devlet-baba* (father-state) that is only now being

challenged through reform and the electorate's increasing sophistication and cynicism. Still the paternal(istic) rhetoric persists.

The vaguest yet possibly most influential 'Arrow' is 'reformism' or 'revolutionism', referring to the continuation of the *İnkilâp*, the non-violent revolution that was the political and social transformation Turkey experienced in early republican years. The secular republic was established as part of Atatürk's modernisation drive. Reformism expresses his intention to persevere until modernisation is complete. Reformism also proves that Kemalism is not reducible to the Six Arrows; its vision goes beyond the methods employed at any one time, hence negotiation on how best to achieve Atatürk's vision is possible, if not necessary.

Atatürk wanted Turkey to be modern as much as he wanted to be the leader of a modern country: personal ambition supported political intent. In Atatürk's mind, secularism, a republican nation-state and economic growth *were* the essence of modernity. Although his grasp of economic processes lacked sophistication, Atatürk visualised 'modernity' and tried to make Turkey look the part, hence his republicanism, secularism and nationalism were often exaggerated in form and possibly lacking in essence: they were means to an end.

Atatürk's (1933) legacy is clear: '[w]e shall raise our country to the level of the most prosperous and civilised nations of the world... We shall raise our national culture above the contemporary level of civilisation'. Turkey was a project and the nation was the vehicle for its achievement; national need was what Atatürk deemed it to be and the nation's destiny what Atatürk commanded. In time, Atatürk and his people would come to be seen as essentially linked as he becomes the executor of national volition, accepted by national mythology and academic commentators alike. When political scientist Henry Allen (1968:69) claims that, via Atatürk, Turkey exhibited national volition – 'deciding' to make herself a nation – he effectively embraces the essentialism of national rhetoric conferring *a priori* popular legitimacy on all Atatürk's acts, including the creation of the secular Republic. Some identify this mystical bond as Atatürk's most precious gift; others celebrate the Arrows as an ideological bequest, while others still perceive the movement towards progress, rather than its methods, as Atatürk's true legacy.

3. *From Atatürk's Legacies to Kemalism*

3.a. *Kemalist Mysticism*

The mystical bond between Atatürk, the nation and the Republic is accepted and reproduced not only by Turkish schoolbooks (see Chapter 2), but also by academic apologists inside and outside Turkey. Jevakhoff (1989:442) calls Turkey the most beautiful homage to Atatürk, turning the nation into a monument in the father's honour. This is a recurring theme. Most discussions on republican Turkey are premised on the belief that, although without Atatürk a Turkish national state would probably still have been created, it would have been smaller and state-building would not have been as peaceful (Mango, 1999a:4). Atatürk, having shown Turkey 'the way out of an oriental ghetto' (ibid, p.8), is venerated as the man without whom Turkey would not exist; he 'brought new life and hope to the Turkish people, restored their energies and self-respect, and set them firmly on the road not only to independence, but to that rarer and more precious thing that is freedom' (Lewis, 2002:293). Journalists and academics, both Turkish and foreign, revere Atatürk and accept Turkey as his handiwork. The legitimacy with which this vests his legacy cannot be underestimated. Stressing that Atatürk brought light and hope (Camcıgil⁴, ND), 'salvag[ing] his country from being reduced to... a client-state of British imperialism' (DT, 22 November 2005) makes gratitude a quasi-compulsory feeling.

Baki İlkin, Deputy undersecretary of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, in a 2003 address, noted that 'the Turkish nation founds its national identity with Atatürk' on 19 May 1919, when Atatürk landed in Samsun and the War of Independence begun. On that date, 'the birth date of Turkish democracy' (ibid), the Republic, the *patria* and the nation were born simultaneously. Although, İlkin claims, the nation had 'high values', Atatürk vested it with his own traits, thus catalysing the Turks' destiny through an inversion of historical and political agency. Although the Republic is based on national sovereignty, the nation is derivative. İlkin even states that '[t]he Turkish nation did not leave [Atatürk] alone in this quest for democracy and modernisation. With total conviction they adopted his reforms and embraced democracy'. Atatürk is the actual repository of national agency: the nation follows.

⁴ President of the Atatürk Society of America.

Initially, however, the nation did not follow all that readily. As ‘the masses for the most part were oblivious to the fact that they needed to be saved’, notes apologist Suna Kili (1969:53), Atatürk ‘had to be ruthless in order to modernize a backward nation at a time when its illiterate people considered any reform the work of the infidel’ (Kaylan⁵, 2005:64). Thus, in Kemalist narratives, the Turks retain no agency over their liberation and later republicanism. Yet Kemalist priorities remain ‘natural’ to nationhood as they appear expedient in light of a narrative of historical determinism. Hence, these narratives can claim simultaneously that Atatürk forged a nation out of disparate and unwilling elements *and* that the nation is natural, its character and aspirations directly inherited from Atatürk. ‘The Turkish nation will keep marching along the path of civilization that Atatürk laid before it. Because the legacy left by Atatürk is still cherished by the Turkish people as the strongest guarantee for its survival and progress’ (İlkin, 2003).

For Kili (1969:82), ‘one’s Turkishness [is] not necessarily determined by one’s race or religion, but by the degree a person associated himself with the ideas, ideals, and goals of the Turkish nation and by determination to protect all that had been won as a result of great hardships; and also by commitment to Turkish modernization’. As Atatürk forged the Republic and its citizens simultaneously and concurrently, loving Atatürk and cherishing the Republic is not a matter of choice. Essentialising the bond Atatürk shares with his people effectively ‘naturalises’ the entire republican project and ‘locks’ the Turks into following the path that Atatürk laid down for them because to stray from it would violate nature, providence and common sense.

Although this infusion of national narratives with ideological subtexts? is hardly limited to Turkey, its effects go beyond simply unifying the population. This essentialist narrative replaces Atatürk’s undeniable charisma with a quasi-mystical aura (see Volkan & Itzkowitz, 1984:344-345). Atatürk comes to ‘personif[y] the Turkish Revolution’ making it impossible to ‘be for the Turkish Revolution and against Atatürk’ (Akşin, 1999:14-15). This goes beyond acknowledging an ideological debt to Atatürk and a sense of gratitude for the modern, secular Republic. Atatürk becomes the anthropomorphic instantiation of both state and idealised nation, Turkey’s patron saint, the source and guarantor of national pride and safety.

⁵ Journalist and self-professed Kemalist, see below.

This is particularly evident during the commemoration of his death. On 10 November each year, schoolchildren write him letters asking for peace, health and prosperity. Some even register complaints about other children at school (*H*, 10 November 2005). The letters resemble prayers. On 10 November 2005, *Hürriyet* carried a text-box reading *Yol aynı yol, ruh aynı ruh*: the road is the same road, the spirit is the same spirit. The vision is alive and at 9:05 am, the time of Atatürk's death, the fatherland stands still and silent to the sound of sirens and the national anthem.

10 November is a national day of mourning with ceremonies reminiscent of the country's monarchical past. In Istanbul, top military and municipal officers visit the room Atatürk died in, before it opens to the public. In Ankara, the President leads a ceremony at Anıtkabir, attended by Turkey's political and military leadership before this site is also opened to mourners.

Honouring Atatürk entails a transcendence of his mortality. The rituals claim his continued presence among his people. The appeals are not to his ideological legacy, but to the mystical bond, the guiding hand that, as President Ahmet Necdet Sezer wrote in the Anıtkabir visitors' book on 10 November 2005, led 'our country out of the darkness with your enlightenment' (*S*, 10 November 2005). The Dolmabahçe visitors' book is filled with similar entries, evoking Atatürk's presence: a beloved and saintly father watching over his people. The Independence War and reforms era are mentioned as if still in living memory. Atatürk's immortal spirit is celebrated as the guarantor of republicanism and the essence of Turkish national pride. For Parla and Davison (2004:165, 167), this quasi-religious way of remembering Atatürk supplants choice and reflection with a public discourse of love and kinship. Regardless of whether love is felt by all, this public narrative frames public discussions on Atatürk and underlies appeals to and discussions of his legacy. It is in this context that the question of whether Atatürk bequeathed an ideology should be raised. Many embrace Kemalism as an ideology while others malign it as one, resenting its symbolic prevalence. Yet 'ideology' does not fully describe Kemalism.

3.b. What is Kemalism?

Kemalism is often referred to in the press as well as in academic and political literature as an ideology. In a study by Giannakopoulos and Maras (2005:13) on European Parliamentary groups' attitudes towards Turkey, all respondents speak of Kemalism as a doctrine. Although they disagree on Kemalism's specifics (p.7, 16-7, 22), both the respondents and the authors treat Kemalism as Turkey's state ideology. Undeniably, Kemalism occupies a privileged discursive position within Turkish politics (see Chapters 4 and 5) and although Atatürk claimed that Kemalism was not an ideology but a guide to action, some embrace it as a value-system, while others oppose it as a hegemonic and repressive ideology.

For Parla and Davison (2004:35), Kemalism represents 'the sole, most determinative, all-encompassing public philosophy, embedded and enforced in the governing and socializing institutions of the Turkish Republic'. Kemalism *is* heavily institutionalised in Turkey, but Parla and Davison assume a degree of coherence and determination that may be exhibited by self-professed Kemalist actors, but is not actually offered by Kemal's legacy. Moreover, although Kemalism enjoys a predominant discursive position, Bozdoğan (2001:12) finds that Turkey enjoys an intense, if polarised debate between the defenders and critics of Kemalism's republican modernism. If anything, in the five years since Bozdoğan's publication, debate has intensified and points of view have proliferated and fragmented. Turkey's public domain is polyphonic; Kemalism is prominent, but open to contestation and appropriation by political agents from the far Left to the extreme Right (e.g. *TP*, 14 December 2004).

For Parla and Davison (2004:36-7), this in itself is proof of hegemony as Kemalism's presence in non-state institutional spaces both ensures and proves the marginalisation or elimination of alternative beliefs. To them, Kemalism is hegemonic, monopolistic and exclusionary, 'secur[ing] and reserv[ing] public space solely for itself by rejecting *prima facie* the legitimacy of existing alternative ideologies'. It seems, nevertheless, that Parla and Davison's (2004:48-50) quarrel is with Atatürk, not Atatürkism. They do not seek to analyse what they dismissively call the 'congratulatory politics of national enthusiasm' (*ibid*, 2004:73). They do not seek to prove Kemalism is a hegemonic ideology; that is their starting point. They choose to speak of hegemony as Kemalism is neither coercive nor totalitarian yet, they believe, it still vanquishes

alternatives. Kemalism is undeniably discursively dominant yet describing it as hegemonic clouds over the intensity of public debate in Turkey. This debate leads to alternatives to Kemalism prevailing on occasion and it often leads to the negotiation of what exactly a Kemalist point of view ought to be in the first place. Such flexibility, or even uncertainty, does not bode well for hegemony.

Although attempts to systematise Kemalism into an ideology have been made, they never succeeded. Some, such as Camcıgil (ND), believe that '[t]here ought to be an Atatürk chair and Atatürk library in every Turkish University, and Atatürk courses in all middle and high schools. The public has to meet, embrace, and learn Atatürk anew' and they should do so in a standardised and monitored fashion. Yet standardisation would need to make a series of unsubstantiated assumptions and manufacture a conceptual rigidity that Kemalism otherwise lacks (Sahinler, 1995:239-240). '[D]efining Kemalism as an ideology is a problematic issue. There is little agreement among Kemalists themselves about what Kemalism exactly means as a contemporary political project... Kemalism has become a secularist and nationalist reflex, rather than a coherent ideology' (Taşpınar, 2005:87-88).

Kemalism is prevalent, but it is appealed to by different agencies within and outside the state apparatus. The Association to Promote Contemporary Life (*Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği*) for instance – a women's group founded in the 1990s to counter the perceived rise of Islamism – is not forced to include Atatürk in its charter. It does so because Kemalism is successful and hence appealing and because Atatürk's name carries immense emotional resonance. This is possibly his strongest legacy and, contrary to Parla and Davison's claims, those who embrace Atatürk's ideas mostly maintain that his bequest is not an ideology, but a course of action.

Kemalism lacks both internal coherence and a real theoretical basis for the analysis of society, politics or history. It started life not as an ideology, but as an action-focused movement created by generals and politicians – not theoreticians – in the heart of battle. Kemalism was thus defined in terms of its goals, since its strategies were strictly context-specific, moulded according to particular exigencies and conditions. Although named after its undeniable leader, the Kemalist movement was historically characterised by both conflict and disagreement. For Sahinler (1995:242), Kemalism

constitutes a movement of permanent revolution. Evolution and change is inherent in such a movement, as is criticism, even if Atatürk often resented its existence.

Atatürk himself always stressed the non-ideological nature of his legacy and his followers claim to remain true to his goals and values while following no ideological guidance. This legacy, they believe, is essentially democratic and humanistic (see Sezer, 1992:3; Akşin, 1999:16, 19; Kaylan, 2005:67-8). Although Atatürk may not have always observed the letter of democracy in his lifetime, he ‘left behind him the structure of a democracy, not of a dictatorship’ (Mango, 1999b:534, 536). This structure is a vital part of his legacy, as is the purpose with which it was vested. ‘Kemalism means a continual effort towards modernism and progress’ (Giritli⁶, 1984:252-3); Kemalism ‘means continuous pursuit of progress for catching up with, keeping up with and even surpassing the advanced level of civilization, not falling behind, not being humiliated or dominated’ (Camcıgil, ND).

Kemalism, for its adherents, is a movement towards progress, modernisation and the preservation of national dignity. The secular Republic is a Kemalist achievement, in line with modernisation. Nationalism is a Kemalist instinct, in line with preserving national dignity and freedom. But the essence of Kemalism is a constant movement towards progress, helped along the way by democracy and scientific rationality. The fact that Kemalism is *not* an ideology, note his supporters, ensures its continued survival. ‘As Kemalism is based on rationalism, it will continue to be contemporary and progressive’ (Giritli, 1984:252-3).

Analytically, approaching Kemalism as a movement rather than an ideology is helpful and illuminating. However, Kemalism as a movement still does not convey the complete story about Kemalism’s function in Turkish political life. Although not actually hegemonic, Kemalism remains semiotically prevalent, seeking to establish a monopoly over certain discursive terrains and the definition of certain terms. Hence, I believe, it is better to approach Kemalism as a universally intelligible language through which political legitimacy is negotiated and legitimation sought.

⁶ Dean, School of Journalism, Marmara University.

4. *Kemalism as a Language of Legitimation*

4.a. *Legitimacy and Legitimation*

It is a well-known truism that if a term can mean anything, eventually it does. 'Legitimacy' is one such term. It has been used to express a trait governments have, a blessing people convey or a process of political negotiation. It has been equated to authority, legality, democracy, efficiency and stability.

For Rothschild (1977:488, 498), legitimacy is a trait possessed, amplified or squandered by political organisations or states. It is linked to authority, procedural legality, good governance and efficiency. Although Rothschild does not equate legitimacy with public acceptance, he concedes that it may exist to varying degrees *vis-à-vis* different groups within society as legitimacy partly relies on a 'show' of good governance, sustained in the face of various relevant publics.

For Lipset (1983:64), legitimacy is the measure of this show's success. 'Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.' Legitimacy, therefore, can exist in every society, regardless of its political organisation or social structures, provided the system of government can maintain the dominant social groups' confidence in its 'appropriateness'. But how is appropriateness measured? Is it effective governance, as Rothschild suggests, a normative fit with society's values or neither?

For Schaar (1984:111, 127), in order to be legitimate, power needs to be situated in something outside itself, be it God or a transcendental ideology. Schaar rightly notes that, although belief is a manifestation of legitimacy, legitimacy cannot be reduced to belief. His demand for a transcendental justification for power, however, leads him to the conclusion that the modern, bureaucratic, non-transcendental state exists in a perpetual state of legitimacy crisis. This may indeed be the case, but the lack of divine justification of power is hardly the reason.

Schaar accurately notes that legitimacy needs to be negotiated in terms of a set of values or principles. These principles, however, do not need to be external to the political system. In fact, most political systems generate their own narratives of

political legitimacy as they set rules according to their own principles. Currently in the West, political narratives locate sovereignty firmly with ‘the people’ and legitimacy is negotiated in terms of a popular mandate. Although legitimacy can be, and often has been, negotiated in terms of a transcendental ideology, e.g. Communism (see Di Palma, 1991), most frequently it is sought in terms of non-transcendental values, such as democracy. Consequently, democratic governments are often considered *ipso facto* legitimate, thus reducing legitimacy to a trait conveyed through democratic election.

This fit means that even authors who vehemently deny equating democracy with legitimacy make democratic endorsement a prerequisite for legitimacy. Beetham (1991) is a case in point: he accepts that power is legitimate when justified in terms of principles that satisfy a politically relevant audience; rational defensibility may convince intellectuals, while priests may be swayed by appeals to God. Yet legitimacy should not be equated to the act of believing. For Beetham, legitimacy is not simply a public relations feat, rather it indicates the degree of congruence between the system of power and the values providing its justification. This means that legitimacy is historically specific and changeable as values change and governments lose their legitimacy when this congruence lapses or weakens. This definition could be universally applicable were it not for the tripod analogy.

Legitimacy, Beetham notes, relies on rule-derived validity and moral congruence with society’s beliefs and values, regardless of their content or derivation, *as well as* expressed consent; what he calls the declaratory power of confirmation. Beetham introduces expressed consent in order to avoid the murky waters of inaction and passivity being mistaken for acceptance. As a result, however, systems that do not offer institutionalised avenues for the meaningful expression of consent (which for Beetham entails the provision of real choice and the absence of coercion) cannot ever be legitimate, although Beetham denies this is the case.

As Beetham, like Rothschild before him, notes that ineffective governance, rising inflation or corruption can de-legitimise a government, he effectively reduces legitimacy to shorthand for democratic electability. Moreover, Beetham (1991:216) seems to conflate the legitimacy and stability of a regime and its incumbent government when he notes that ‘[d]e-legitimation is the dramatic loss of prestige

incurred by a regime when large numbers of its subjects refuse to do as they are told in a public and collective way'. By making civil disobedience the measure of a legitimacy crisis, Beetham fails to distinguish between the various on-going legitimation negotiations within a political system, fails to register the subtler signs of legitimacy deficits and fails to achieve what he actually set out to do, namely improve on Weber's understanding of legitimacy.

For Weber (1978:226), legitimacy is claimed and believed in. It is not a trait that governments possess, but a process of negotiation within a specific reference framework. Legitimacy describes the degree of congruence between a policy, system, action or institution and the values or principles that underpin activity in a relevant political context, be it dominant social values, religion or democracy. Weber (1978:266-7) concedes that 'it is readily possible that, instead of recognition being treated as a consequence of legitimacy, it is treated as the basis of legitimacy; democratic legitimacy'. But this is one of many kinds.

This distinction is vital in the context of modern Turkey. Here legitimacy is claimed within a republican setting, where national sovereignty and representative democracy allow for popular legitimacy to be conferred through elections. Simultaneously, however, legitimacy is also claimed in terms of Atatürk's legacy, including republicanism, but not derived from it. Pursuing congruence with Kemalist values generates boundaries and obligations, benchmarks and expectations that political actors comply with in order to remain legitimate in the eyes of other politicians, judges, the Press, the army and the citizenry. The image is not static. Kemalism, after its extensive use in the public domain, its institutional entrenchment and reproduction, now represents both the set of values through which legitimacy is claimed and the language through which this is being done. As a result, Kemalism is the medium through which political actors negotiate the boundaries of acceptable political activity. Kemalism frames political debate, but does not determine courses of action, so different and divergent policies seek to legitimise themselves in terms of Kemalism's core themes and priorities.

In subsequent chapters, I will demonstrate that Kemalism is not only part of the public culture, but also the normative bedrock of the Republic's legal and institutional superstructure, generating a frame of reference, explanations and expectations for

citizens and officers of the state alike. I propose that Kemalism, far from being a hegemonic ideology, actually is a language, dominant and widely used, yet separate and distinct from Atatürk's specific political intentions. This language generates constraints and opportunities (see Barker, 1990:139) as the process of legitimation involves the creative re-appropriation of legitimacy's sources.

'[I]t is a notable feature of power relations that they are themselves capable of generating the evidence needed for their own legitimation' (Beetham, 1991:60). Rothschild (1977:491) agrees: 'Discussions of legitimacy and legitimation risk irrelevancy if they overlook this crucial dimension of a ruling elite's sense of its legitimacy' and its public appeals to that effect. These appeals constitute the activity of legitimation. Legitimation is the active pursuit of congruence with the political system's core normative values and the public claiming of said congruence. This constitutes, for Barker (2001:2), a generic trait of government. Elected, appointed and hereditary power-holders always actively claim to be legitimate, be it through the fabrication of sumptuous palaces, the observance of religious rituals or declared allegiance to social values and constitutional principles – themselves possibly moulded by the ruler in question.

Legitimation can be carried out in a variety of ways: verbal, visual or ritualistic. Although Barker's (2001:20, 24) connections between legitimation and legitimacy do not directly map onto what I described above, the stress he places on legitimation is vital for this analysis. As a political process, legitimation has specific aims that do not necessarily comply with society's normative core of political legitimacy. Legitimation is the process through which politicians seek to cover or explain potential disparities. In this process, the political system's normative core is appealed to, re-appropriated, negotiated and redefined with reference to emerging domestic or international realities, social change and each politicians' specific agenda. Motives and intentions are unknown and irrelevant to the analysis of legitimation, enabling us to assess the government's conduct *vis-à-vis* citizens and state agencies (Barker, 1990:2).

Regardless of whether 'acceptance' is part of legitimacy, governments seek acceptance, particularly in a republic such as Turkey. As Barker (1990:98) notes, if legitimacy is a relationship between the rulers and the ruled, between normative assumptions and practical politics, then legitimation is the (public) effort to ensure

that this relationship continues to exist. As legitimacy is not constant throughout a political system, legitimation attempts enjoy varying degrees of success at different times, in different contexts and in the eyes of different audiences. Hence the legitimation process is never-ending and legitimacy never a foregone conclusion.

4.b. Kemalism as Language

Kemalism as a language is taught in schools, reproduced through media and spatial narratives and extensively used by politicians, academics and members of the TAF and the judiciary. The language has been in continuous use for decades and thus enjoys a position of undeniable discursive dominance. While for Parla and Davison this constitutes hegemony, for Volkan and Itzkowitz (1984:354) it represents a civic cult resulting from Atatürk's immortalisation. Constant appeals to Atatürk undoubtedly forge a ritualistic legitimation avenue for Turkish politics. Yet, his legacy is most effective in the form it acquired, possibly despite Kemalist intentions: namely as a language all Turks speak.

Kemalism constitutes the unquestionable normative framework for the negotiation of political legitimacy in Turkey. Kemalism is the republican project's lynchpin; a national fact rather than a matter of individual political choice, as appeals to Atatürk and his legacy are constant. In fact, the sheer volume of celebratory material and reverential references is telling in itself. This is not hollow politicking. Atatürk's plan worked and the narrative of national awakening and liberation, as we will see, has an element of defying fate in it. Appeals to Atatürk and his legacy, therefore, represent appeals for hope, resolve and pride in what the Turks are capable of. Appeals to Atatürk effectively constitute claims to be doing the right thing.

Mehmet Dülger, Chairman of the Turkish Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission, (2005:24) opens an article by quoting Atatürk's 'peace at home, peace in the world' motto. He stresses that Turkish foreign policy is genuinely committed to Atatürk's agenda, namely modernisation and the preservation of territorial integrity and unity (p.29). Similarly, OECD⁷ Manager Mehmet Ögütçü (2005:96) argues in favour of

⁷ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Turkey's ability to deliver the quick and radical transformation the EU demands in terms of Atatürk's legacy. 'One should recall that the founding father of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk, had accomplished the bulk of his revolutionary modernizing vision for the country only in a period of 15 years... between the two destructive world wars and in great deprivation. Consider what more can be achieved over the next two decades in the era of rapid globalisation.' Atatürk is proof of what Turkey is capable of; he is Prince Charming in Turkey's Cinderella story.

Yet the prince comes with heavy baggage. The founding of the secular republic was both a crowning achievement for Atatürk's vision and an avenue for its continued pursuit. Kemalist modernisation went beyond politics and economics, encompassing individual relations and lifestyles. Social change, that elsewhere would be the side-effect of modernisation, here was part of a sustained campaign, (Eisenstadt, 1984:3). Atatürk taught Turkish peasants to use beds, chairs and lavatories; he coached men and women to embrace Western, mixed-gender entertainment. This was as important to Atatürk as acquiring a thriving industrial infrastructure, as he would thus achieve 'a shift in the bases of political legitimation and the symbols of the political community, together with a redefinition of the boundaries of the collectivity' (ibid, p.9).

This redefinition was total and extremely potent as the Kemalist conceptualisation of modernity established a long-term discursive monopoly. 'Modernity' meant what Atatürk wanted it to. Such radical change was possible in the first place because of the volatile post-First World War situation. Social and geographic dislocation, successive defeats and exhaustion left the population disillusioned and receptive to radical social transformation (McCarthy, 2001:92, 94). War broke social habits; the predictability of social life and individual experience vanished. Successive defeats destabilised and discredited administrative structures, facilitating political reform. Allen (1968:40), seeking to vest even secularism with popular legitimacy, notes that disillusionment with the Ottomans translated into widespread popular dissatisfaction with Islam. Religion was not actually discredited, yet dissatisfaction with the imperial order was widespread even among Ottoman elites (McCarthy, 1983:139-140).

Short-term expediency and Atatürk's *de facto* legitimacy as liberator and war hero enabled him to introduce a series of radical modernising reforms without, at first, disclosing the specifics and eventual extent of his wider project. Moreover, as Atatürk

started constructing a national legitimization narrative as early as 1920, with the first National Assemblies (see Sezer, 1992:2), the radical transition to republicanism appeared gradual. Once the Republic was a foregone conclusion, it became the avenue for the introduction of a new politics of modernisation, conducted in the nation's name. This new politics – its goals, assumptions and language – now constitute Turkey's political reality. Although the new politics used the discourses of democracy and national sovereignty extensively, they were actually welded into the amalgamation of ideas that is Turkish republicanism, meaning more and yet at the same time less than they would elsewhere. After all, the republic's *raison d'être* was to achieve modernisation, not popular democracy.

Although the new political vocabulary marked a radical shift in Turkish politics, Kemalism was more concerned with modernisation than with republicanism. The Republic was a modernising tool. Its purpose, Karpas (2004:201) notes, was not to allow the articulation of 'society's basic culture, philosophy, and aspirations', but to enable a revolution from above. As a result, national sovereignty referred to an abstract and idealised nation, not Turkey's actual citizens, and Kemalism, for Karpas (2004:221), became a mechanism for the perpetuation of political control. Control was necessary for securing a monopoly over the definition of progress and modernity and ensuring the country did not stray from the path of its achievement.

Undoubtedly, a tendency for the establishment of ideological hegemony is evident, as are the means for its potential achievement. Nationalism, republicanism and secularism *became* the essence of progress, making Kemalist prescriptions absolute conditions for modernisation, while also making 'the attainment of modern European civilization a new faith' (Karpas, 2004:228-229). Nevertheless, this faith, although discursively dominant, did not become hegemonic as, with the advent of multi-party democracy, the rigidity of the Kemalist agenda was compromised. Although lifestyle choices were heavily limited under both Atatürk and his successor, İsmet İnönü, the advent of multi-party politics made it evident that much of Kemalist legislation had not penetrated Turkish society beyond the surface.

'The political struggle which began in Turkey after 1945 as a struggle for democracy was in fact the struggle for cultural and spiritual freedom as people understood them' (Karpas, 2004:231). This struggle lasted for several bloody decades and, for Karpas,

represented an attempt to widen available lifestyle and belief options limited under strict Kemalist modernisation that not only decreed that the pursuit of progress was the purpose of politics, but also limited the ways in which that was to be understood and achieved. Atatürk's vision of modernity was absolute. Legislation sought to ensure that Turkey would comply with his vision, from the development of industrial infrastructure to regulating his citizens' private lives. As secularism was deemed necessary for modernity, spiritual freedom became a political issue. As modernity came with specific cultural manifestations, individual tastes and leisure were measured against state-endorsed modernity benchmarks. For Atatürk, appearances mattered.

The 1925 Hat Law is a case in point. The fez disappeared from Turkish streets, yet the law did not have the corresponding effect on mentalities that the reformers expected. Similarly, banning arabesque music from the airwaves actually had mixed results as the genre became, briefly, strangely subversive. The state's relentless modernisation drive turned appeals to tradition into potent political statements. Because Kemalists perceived tradition as the opposite of modernity, tradition in all its manifestations, including arabesque, became a language for the expression of political dissatisfactions. This gave arabesque music subversive connotations by default, permitting politicians, such as Turgut Özal, who played this genre during his pre-election rallies, access to pockets of electoral support outside the CHP's reach (Özbek, 1997:219-220).

This politicisation lasted until the 1990s. The advent of private broadcasting brought arabesque back into the mainstream, as the market incentive was strong. Now it is neither contentious nor, for that matter, particularly popular. Yet the incident captures in miniature Kemalist attitudes towards folkloric, traditional or 'backward' images, practices and sounds. Interestingly, once the elimination campaign was suspended, the music lost its edge. The Kemalists' willingness, however, to simply eliminate practices deemed undesirable from the public domain explains why Kemalism has been described as authoritarian, despite the open and vocal debate over its specifics.

Kemalism can be questioned and disputed. Nevertheless, it enjoys unrivalled institutional and legal protection and access to socialisation channels. It can easily maintain a conceptual quasi-monopoly over certain analytical categories such as

modernity, secularism and republicanism. Nevertheless, although authoritarianism has often donned a Kemalist cloak, Kemalism is too incoherent to be authoritarian *per se*.

‘Ideologies seek both to make sense out of the world and to offer a rationale for living and acting in it. As such, they offer visions of legitimate thought and practice in the public world... All ideologies offer, in this sense, some prescription for legitimate and illegitimate action’ (Parla and Davison, 2004:23-24). In Turkey, these prescriptions have forged a language through which legitimation is sought. Even those departing from Kemalism negotiate their position in its terms. This is possible because ‘Kemalist terms’ (from modernisation to popular sovereignty) are flexible since Atatürk furnished no concrete definitions. Consequently, alternative and, often, competing definitions are sustainable, as Kemalism is in the strange position of having repressed several ideas almost in their own name. Freedom of religious expression was stifled in pursuit of secularism; democracy often suffered in the Republic’s name; freedom of expression was limited in the name of a modernising drive that today brings Turkey on the EU’s doorstep; and Turks are still prosecuted for insulting ‘being a Turk and the Republic of Turkey’ (Article 301/1, Turkish Penal Code).

Undoubtedly, Kemalist agencies retain considerable power yet Kemalism is not their exclusive property. As political agents use and re-appropriate Kemalist language, an intense debate is occurring in Turkey. Although attempts are often made to stem the creative uses of Kemalist language, alternative interpretations of terms (such as secularism) and priorities abound. This, for many, is a deplorable event. ‘Gone [is] the enlightenment programme of the Revolution... The Kemalist movement [is] frozen. To conceal this fact, great emphasis [is] placed on “ceremonial Kemalism”’ (Akşin, 1999:26). Jevakhoff (1989:457, 467-8) agrees: ‘[T]he mention of Atatürk often becomes a simple rite or caution used with the same ease by those on the Right and Left.’

The ambiguity of Atatürk’s legacy and the creative interpretation entailed in its application to the 21st century make this debate possible. For Kemalist purists, however, the debate is an aberration. To them, Atatürk created a nation in his image and, unless true to that image, people are laying false claims on national belonging. For them (e.g. Kaylan, 2005:441; Mango’s 2000 speech) there is more to ‘Kemalism’

than ritualistic references to Atatürk and modernisation. Yet, looking at Turkey's political exchanges, it seems that Kemalism is most relevant as a set of ritual practices; as a language for talking about republicanism, secularism and modernisation; and a language for talking about Turkey's past, present and future. Kemalism is an ideology to some – hated or espoused – but a language for all.

This was partly achieved through conscious institutionalisation and partly by default. Although republican institutions reflect Atatürk's agenda, as they are his handiwork, attempts to turn Atatürk's project of thorough societal transformation (e.g. see Bozdoğan, 2001:172, 174) into a coherent set of prescriptions fit for the 21st century were frustrated. Particularly, since the advent of multi-party democracy, attempts to standardise and safeguard Kemalism have been more successful in opening Kemalism up for re-interpretation and negotiation than in protecting its purity.

'[I]nserting [Atatürk's] principles in the Constitution subsequently also made it possible for anyone adhering to the principles, often rather loosely interpreted, to qualify as loyal to the revolution' (Weiker, 1981:5). Kemalism, Weiker (1981:7) continues, 'established general principles which provided the outer limits of permissible dissent, but many of the principles were also flexible enough in their operational interpretation so that they could be legitimately debated'. It thus became a language for the negotiation of politics. Kemalism delineates the boundaries of the political arena and seeks to tame dissent, but does not set the political agenda. Kemalist principles are schematic and offer guidance for political activity rather than strict prescriptions, thus they frame political debate without actually determining it.

Hence, although the desirability of modernisation is not debated, its shape and the best route for its achievement are. Atatürk's legacies are revisited and redefined in a changing world, while competing political positions seek to justify themselves in Atatürkist terms. This is hardly surprising. Atatürk is Turkey's civic patron saint. His plan worked and his ideas have been incorporated into law and institutional practice, hence legitimisation appeals phrased in Kemalist terms carry immense weight. What may be surprising is the flexibility and adaptability of which Kemalism is capable. As I will demonstrate in this thesis, the AKP is currently using Kemalist language and the Kemalist westernisation drive to renegotiate political priorities and bring about reform that would be hard to legitimise if it were not for the EU mantle. The AKP embodies a

challenge to Kemalism, in the form of its Islamist credentials, yet it simultaneously represents the promise of Kemalism's vindication, as the AKP became the champion of EU accession.

The ensuing process of contestation and negotiation entails the reinterpretation of terms and notions, which, in turn, creates tensions. There is, for instance, the potential for intense conflict between Kemalists and the champions of a different kind of democracy, using Kemalist language in a way that challenges Kemalist authority. This conflict could either express itself as a confrontation between 'Kemalism' – defended by jurists, academics and soldiers – and the 'people'. Alternatively it could take the form of an internal semantic breakdown. Simultaneously, however, this tension is creating opportunities not yet fully explored. Although momentous change may be afoot, legitimacy remains a Kemalist domain. The AKP still seeks to legitimise its leader through references to Atatürk, noting that Turkey is living proof 'that having a just and visionary leader is key to achieving quick and effective results' (Dülger, 2005:30). By appealing to constitutionally enshrined principles (such as territorial integrity and national unity) and national mantras, the AKP is widening the scope of political debate without challenging its terms and Kemalism's basic premises.

It has been argued that Kemalism is an irrelevant term – having changed too much to be analytically useful (Millas, 2001:30). It has been argued that Kemalism is a knee-jerk reaction attributable to socialisation and political culture. Yet current political tensions and negotiations prove that Kemalism has changed enough to represent a language everyone in Turkey can use creatively. Rather than stifling debate, this Kemalist language seems to be furnishing the terms for the revision of Kemalist principles, assumptions and institutions. This flexibility is currently being tested. Post-9/11, EU membership-seeking Turkey is facing domestic and international challenges that require drastic action. The fluidity surrounding many of Kemalism's guiding principles makes taking the action needed difficult, as rival interpretations clash in the public domain. Some wish Kemalism were more prescriptive, offering firm guidance in a changing world. But it is not. And the debate over the true meaning of secularism and westernisation is raging.

Chapter 2, 'Learning' Kemalism

State-sponsored national-identity narratives in Turkey are conceptualised and articulated in Kemalist terms. National identity, notes Gillis (1994:5), is a useful tool to think *with* and a handy communication medium. As such, it is, by definition, shared and standardised in order to ensure intelligibility among users. The school is pivotal in the process of standardising and disseminating this cognitive tool, but not alone, as any communication medium is reaffirmed and reproduced through everyday usage.

Turks learn Kemalism from a young age, inside and outside the classroom. Standardisation and centralisation in national education means that core textbooks – with the exception of language books and supplementary materials – are not selected by individual schools. Former Minister for National Education, Metin Bostancıoğlu (2001), prided himself on the textbooks his ministry produced, commissioned and disseminated to all Turkish children. National education, stressed Bostancıoğlu (2000 & 2001), is the bedrock of national growth, progress and development. Inevitably, centrally-produced textbooks and a centrally-managed single-textbook national curriculum promote a Ministry-sponsored vision of the past and future thus forging and sustaining 'vocabulary and syntax of national identity' (Heathorn, 2000:viii). Hence every Turkish student receives the same presentation of Kemalist narratives, concerns, priorities and vision at school as centralisation ensures coherence. Moreover, a high degree of convergence also exists between state-produced books and commercially produced titles. This creates a tight nexus of meaning, permitting Kemalist 'vocabulary and syntax' to pervade a child's work and leisure time.

The very existence of commercial 'patriotic' titles testifies to the publishers' and purchasers' active role in the cultivation and reproduction of a Kemalist arsenal of intelligible and accessible signifiers. Kemalism, sanctioned and cultivated by the school, is also actively promoted by the writers', publishers' and illustrators' willingness to produce patriotic literature, only a fraction of which is surveyed here, indicating an acceptance of the significance and emotional resonance of their subject matter. This literature may not be consciously cultivating a language of legitimate politics, but it is reproducing a nexus of national reference. The wide dissemination of

this nexus makes legitimisation appeals in its terms both immediately understandable – as all Turkish children grow up ‘speaking’ this symbolic language – and potentially very successful, given its emotional resonance. ‘Fluency’ may not *ipso facto* guarantee endorsement of Kemalism’s standardised interpretations or acceptance of Kemalist priorities, but it does guarantee intelligibility.

The role national education plays in this process is not unique to Turkey. Every nation-state carries out or supervises national socialisation. Through ‘national’ education, the nation-state manufactures what Gellner (1983:38) calls ‘viable and usable human being[s]’. A ‘viable’ individual is capable of decoding the complex symbols underwriting social life in a modern nation-state. This ability, in turn, makes the individual ‘usable’ in the context of the nation-state. Yet no code is value-free. A ‘viable’ individual recognises both symbols and the narratives of justice and greatness associated with them. Ideally this recognition, Gellner notes, inspires desirable emotions and courses of action, and national education seeks to forge both recognition of relevant symbols and familiarity with the appropriate emotional responses to them. The school cannot engender pride. It can, however, teach the connection between certain symbols or events and a narrative of pride.

Heroism is inspiring and success stories are easy to tell. Ranging from early readers to poetry anthologies, privately produced volumes dealing with Atatürk abound. Artists deem the subject worthy of their time. More significantly, however, the sheer bulk of such material – only a fraction of which is discussed here – commissioned and produced by commercial publishers indicates huge market demand. The sheer number of such titles, on top of a considerable body of state-produced literature, obviously suggests that parents or children purchase these books, finding them interesting, appropriate or instructive. As a result, children ‘learn’ Kemalism through both state and private channels. Thus Kemalism becomes a *natural* component of everyday life.

Yet it remains inaccurate to describe Kemalism as a hegemonic language. Kemalism is propagated by the state, but alternatives are not silenced. Stories that have nothing to do with Atatürk, written by Turkish or foreign authors, are plentiful, as are religiously inclined storybooks. Yet even religious stories do not denounce modernity, nationality and secularism (Saktanber, 1991:174-5), rather they often seek to construct

a specific kind of morality, not incompatible with Kemalism in its specifics (ibid, p.180), but which attempts to balance religion with the dictates of modernity.

Although literature providing different readings of nationality exists for adult audiences, for children it does not. Alternatives to patriotic literature constitute a separate genre, but do not challenge Kemalist national narratives. Whether the state would block attempts to provide an iconoclastic reading of national history aimed at young readers is a rhetorical question. Yet it is important to stress that the predominance of Kemalist narratives is ensured by agencies outside the state acting on the basis of market incentive and *not* state pressure. Books analysed here, although produced by various authors and publishers, share a coherent narrative structure. In introducing Kemalism as a language, the books also introduce Turkish history from a Kemalist vantage point, which effectively legitimises Kemalism in Kemalist terms.

This legitimisation narrative consists of three layers. Firstly, Turkishness – nationality, national history and the national homeland – is presented as *natural* and essential. Secondly, republicanism is presented as *natural* to Turkishness. Although civic on the surface, republicanism is presented as a quasi-ethnic trait; an ‘organic’ component of a ‘natural’ identity. According to national narratives, the Turkish nation is both the force behind and the natural outcome of Atatürk’s republican reforms, thus the two become *essentially* linked. What starts as a civic narrative becomes an essentialist discourse. Finally, a quasi-metaphysical appeal accompanies the account, celebrating Atatürk as the nation’s natural leader *and* its timeless instantiation.

This narrative is linear and progressive, structured around Atatürk’s career, achievements and aims. Modernisation and the preservation of national independence and dignity are presented as the ultimate goals of national history and national greatness is measured in their terms. Consequently, Atatürk’s republican/secular legacy is celebrated as the sole medium for the achievement of the desired future. In doing so, national narratives give Atatürk’s legacy a talismanic quality, while he emerges as, simultaneously, accessibly human *and* super-human.

This storyline is powerful. But is it effective? Unlike spatial narratives (see Chapter 3), books can be ignored. Yet they remain significant for three reasons. Firstly, the books analysed here are designed for young readers. The accounts are schematic,

unsophisticated and, thus, accessible across cultural-capital-induced barriers acquired with age. Although scientific treatises on Kemalism abound, familiarisation with the Republic's early history is not allowed to become the exclusive domain of the 'educated'. In fact, it starts before the child can actually read. By definition, it accesses a much wider audience than any specialised volume could.

Secondly, the proliferation of styles in which Atatürk and other national(ist) stories are available further expands potential readership, as different tastes are catered for without varying the message. Thirdly, repetition ensures 'naturalisation', as narratives introduced by early childhood books constantly reappear in novels, comics and poems. Moreover, this narrative features in schoolbooks. Given their *de facto* institutional legitimacy, schoolbooks are invariably treated as objective and true. Hence the concert between schoolbooks and leisure books enhances the authority of their common message. The fact that pre-school books, leisure reading material and textbooks sustain the same narrative allows for its cumulative and gradual enrichment with one goal in mind: the education of republican citizens responsive to Atatürk's reforms, who also relish a sense of ownership of said reforms.

Kazamias (1966:220-221) notes that, in the 1960s, educators equated 'Turkishness' with allegiance to Atatürk, the TAF and secular Republic and a sense of ownership of Kemalist reform principles. In this chapter I will demonstrate that this largely remains the case and analyse the corresponding narratives in three bodies of literature: textbooks (state-commissioned or endorsed as part of a single-textbook national curriculum); language-learning books; and state-sponsored and privately published leisure books.

1. Kemalist Essentials: Claiming Anatolia

1.a. The TTT

Anatolia plays a central part in Kemalist national narratives (see also Chapter 3), as it is vested with the power to naturalise and unify its inhabitants. So, although the Turks originated in Central Asia, the narrative claims Anatolia as their *natural* homeland

and its history as their history. This *mélange* of conjecture and elective affinities for a while constituted a powerful political and academic current, supported by Atatürk himself, in the form of the Turkish History Thesis (*Türk Tarih Tesi*, TTT), the appeal of which, although diminished in scholarly circles, has not altogether lapsed.

Millas (2001:77) believes that the Balkan national uprisings in Ottoman times taught the Turks the usefulness of propagating the myth of an ancient and superior people with a 'timeless' claim on the national land. The TTT forges this myth for the Turks, presenting the people as 'native' and national geography as 'natural'. The TTT, intended for both domestic and international consumption, represented an extraordinary attempt to prove that Turkish history is not reducible to the Ottoman period. Actually, while claiming that Turkish history predates and outshines Ottoman history, the TTT ended claiming most world civilisations as Turkish¹.

Through what Millas (2001:62) calls 'expressed anti-orientalism', the TTT sought to reaffirm the Turks' worth vis-à-vis the West by claiming both the origins of Western civilisation and the West's genetic ancestry as Turkish. As Atatürk (2003:388) put it: 'It is a truth known by all that... long before the advent of Islamism, the Turks had penetrated to the heart of Europe'. Historical appropriation and reductionism enabled the Thesis to claim that, as Turkish people were the Europeans' ancestors and Anatolia, the Turks' home, was the cradle of all Western civilisations, Turkey was, by extension, European. Hence Atatürk's westernisation drive would enable Turkey to 'return' to an assumed original position, alongside the West. Presenting a bid at momentous transformation as a homecoming naturalised the process, thus both legitimising it and fostering public confidence in its success.

Atatürk's policies, advocating the return of Turkey to the Western fold and of Western civilisation to its birthplace, presupposed that the Turks' ownership of Anatolia was 'natural' and total. The nature and significance of this ownership represent the TTT's most lasting influence on Turkish national narratives. Anatolia remains shrouded in a mystical aura, perceived as both conveying and expressing

¹ Vryonis (1991:37, 70-2, 74) quotes Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti Secretary-General Reşit Galıp claiming the Hellenic, Chinese, Indian, Etruscan and Roman Civilisations as 'Turkish'. Turgut Özal concurs (1991:6, 11, 346-7).

national character. This makes its protection from violation and the maintenance of sole Turkish ownership a Turk's foremost national duty. Anatolia's territorial fragmentation would also maim national character; this is the message that the books surveyed here convey.

This is hardly surprising. Internal inconsistencies aside, the TTT provided an overview of world history that enabled Anatolians to be, for the first time, proud of their Turkishness. Although with time, and through Republican commemoration, sources of national pride proliferated, the appeal to an Anatolian identity was initially necessary and has since remained strong. Even the Independence War, now commemorated as a Turkish national war, was at the time, fought by Anatolians, for Anatolia. Anatolia thus became the conceptual bridge, thanks to the TTT's retrospective articulation, that took the people from their Ottoman/Islamic past to a Turkish future. The Independence War thus represented both the Turks' glorious national awakening and the deliverance of Anatolia's holy land. Similarly, the Republic was inserted into this essentialist discourse by being claimed as the natural offspring of Anatolia's historical development, the structural manifestation of Anatolian character *and* the institutional expression of nationality. This fusion offered a powerful legitimising discourse for the Republic's early years.

Millas's overview of early Republican schoolbooks, history books and novels shows that, as the Kemalists gained confidence, outlandish TTT appeals ceased. The thesis faded into the background, surviving in fragments, nuances and assumptions that, according to Parla and Davison (2004:221), lead to 'praise for anything Turkish' and the assumption that 'anything praiseworthy is Turkish'. Although naïve patriotism hardly needs recourse to a pseudo-scientific basis, TTT influences survive. In the literature surveyed here, they are most evident in the presentation of Turkey's 'rightful place in the world' and the glorification of Anatolia.

1.b. Republican Anatolia

Anatolia features heavily in the material surveyed here. Early and pre-school readers celebrate the fatherland through the national flag and map. Turkey's shape becomes a

powerful Republican symbol. Children memorise its borders and visualise their home as an international entity. The history they learn (national awakening, Independence War, modernisation and current events) takes place in and around Anatolia and is mostly concerned with Anatolia's protection, defence and advancement.

Early childhood books such as *Atatürk ve Cumhuriyet* abound. The mere existence of 'Atatürk and the Republic' in a pre-school series including titles on animals, family life and traffic awareness is telling in itself. The book starts with counting exercises: one apple, two pears, three Turkish flags (p.8-9). The existence of national(ist) symbols at this level naturalises them, while repetition makes them familiar and almost personal without, however, allowing them to become banal and mundane. The seemingly omnipresent flag is always presented in a respectful setting. It gradually becomes a potent symbol. National narratives will later assist in turning it into a sacred object. For now, the book teaches children how to draw a Turkish flag (p. 25). Interestingly, this exercise follows a section on growing potatoes. The even and random mix of ordinary information (such as naming the seasons) and nationalistic narratives 'neutralises' them, making both sets of information appear factual.

On the book's back cover, a picture of Atatürk is superimposed onto a map of Turkey drawn to resemble the flag: red with a white crescent and star. Underneath this, on a heart-shaped wreath held up by children we read '*ne mutlu Türküm diyene*'. National references become a natural part of everyday discourses and encounters. It is a small step towards accepting, or even expecting, nationalism to form the backbone of public political discourses later in life.

A rival publisher offers a similar book entitled *Atatürk*. National symbols are, again, introduced in a seemingly innocuous yet potent fashion: a Turkish flag at the end of a maze (p.15); exercises in drawing the flag, singing the national anthem or counting Turkish soldiers. Repetition is vital because it engenders familiarity. Introducing very young children to this pervasive national discourse naturalises it, as the omnipresence of national symbols in diverse settings becomes habitual and, by extension, 'normal'. This is vital as this omnipresence persists beyond childhood (see Chapter 3).

The familiarity of such symbols facilitates the presentation of Anatolia in the desired (Republican) light, which is what a famous children's series under the general title

Küçük Gezgin does. This 'Little Traveller' series boasts over 100 titles seeking to familiarise young Turks with their country, integrating different cities and regions into official Republican history. Unity is of the essence. The series, aimed at schoolchildren, uses photographs and drawings; the text is dense and the colours dark. In *Kütahya'da*, the series' hero, Ömer, expresses the desire to travel and get to know his country. This is a commendable desire, readers are told. Reading books about his destination on the train, little Ömer offers *his* readers a short history of Kütahya (p.4), complete with visual aids and pictures of republican statues and monuments (p.2).

This city, and Anatolia in general, is the home of great civilisations, we are told. Ömer speaks of Kütahya's Hittite, Frygian, Roman, Byzantine, Selçuk and Ottoman heritage (p.9) gradually progressing to the Independence War and Kütahya's part in it. Although information about architecture and local cuisine is offered, the book is actually an ode to Anatolian republicanism. The patriotic narrative is accompanied by pictures: the *Dumplupınar* monument (p.12), statues of Atatürk flanked by Fevzi Çakmak and İsmet İnönü and of *Mehmetçik*² (p.11). The book praises Turkish soldiers for inspiring trust in their friends and fear in their enemies. Ömer speaks of national heroes as martyrs, recounting the events of 1922 as the Greek offensive started to crumble. His narrative is illustrated in eerie black, white and green drawings of battles, graves and an outstretched arm holding a flag, emerging from a marble slab.

Children are highly unlikely to read the entire *Küçük Gezgin* series. Yet exposure to one title suffices to learn that Anatolian cities, with their specific culture and history, contributed in a unique and vital way to the Independence War, confirming and celebrating the unity of Anatolian domains. The cities' differences are played down and their shared Republican legacy stressed. Although the series fulfils a Sunday-school role, promoting a wholesome, patriotic, articulate and exceedingly polite little Ömer, its main message is the celebration of Anatolian unity. The Independence War and Republic are celebrated as means that ensured and continue to protect this unity.

National unity and unity between the nation and the land across space and time are also the themes of Yeşilyurt's *Çanakkale Benim Adım* (p.8). Most books of this kind

² *Mehmetçik*, little Mehmet, is the average Turkish soldier, often celebrated as the nation's most authentic representative.

celebrate Anatolia as the cradle of civilisation, home of the Turks and birthplace of the Republic. Waxing lyrical about Anatolia's natural beauty is either entirely absent or used as an introductory gimmick before delving into its political history. Yeşilyurt, true to the TTT, starts his account with Troy, skips the Eastern Roman Empire and Byzantium, reaching the battle of Çanakkale (p.17) in a few pages. According to the title, this battle should be central to the book, yet its discussion is brief. The account swiftly moves on to the Independence War and the Republic (p.24). For Yeşilyurt, the country's glorious past makes its defence an ever-pressing duty. His historical analysis is peppered with poems and warnings about how close Turkey came to not existing (p.56-60) and stresses that, given the circumstances, the Turks' success and survival is little short of a miracle. The Republic is part of that miracle (p.65ff).

Although Anatolia was delivered by divine or superhuman fiat, its protection is now everyone's duty. Anatolia – the Turks' national home *and* the Republic's birthplace – is celebrated in this dual role in novels and schoolbooks alike. The preservation of national geography is vital. Anatolia needs to remain whole, hence vigilance against invasion or secession is important. But Anatolia must also remain the Turks' undisputed home, hence internal contenders for 'indigenous status' are as dangerous as invaders. Consequently, Anatolia's ancient peoples are 'claimed' as Turks and their history appropriated (see Chapter 3) through the land, believed to carry its own history. Thus Anatolia itself ensures the desirable time-space continuity. Sole ownership of Anatolia meant that the Turks' national existence and chosen civilisational identity were secure. Turkey's map under the national flag came to symbolise all this.

Such historical revisionism is hardly unique. National identities the world over rely on the constant revision of collective memories (Gillis, 1994:3). Nation-building is primarily a process of revision aimed at ensuring a fit between collective memories and certain prescriptions, that, in Turkey's case, entail allegiance to the nation, the Republic and Atatürk's modernisation. Hence, celebrating the Turks as Anatolia's sole legitimate heirs assisted both nation-building and modernisation – by elevating the Turks' collective self-image *vis-à-vis* the West.

There was only one problem: other Anatolians. Although war, displacement and population exchanges altered Anatolia's demographic make-up in the Turks' favour,

nation-building required replacing the memory of coexistence with a narrative claiming the Ottoman Empire as a Turkish state. Turkish schoolbooks thus integrate the Ottoman period into a Turkish-history narrative starting with the 1071 battle of Manzikert (*Malazgirt*), after which, it is claimed, Anatolia became Turkish. All states that existed in Anatolia since then are integrated into a geo-politically continuous narrative (Koullapis, 2002:280-281). By presenting Anatolia's history as Turkish, the Turks emerge as indigenous; Anatolia's rightful owners. As other communities are rarely mentioned, textbooks sustain the impression that Anatolia was scarcely inhabited before the Turks' arrival in the 11th century. Moreover, if the Turks are native, non-Turkish populations resident in Anatolia are, by extension, non-native. Thus the Turks manage to be 'from elsewhere' *and* indigenous to their new homeland.

This narrative is complicated but necessary for nation-building, hence national education was harnessed early on to disseminate it. In fact, a Ministry of Education was created before Turkey was, so to speak – it was established in 1920, while the Independence War was still raging. This, Winter (1984:185) rightly notes, indicates both the importance of education for Kemalist modernisation and the republican elite's readiness to use it as a nation-building tool. A year after the Republic's proclamation, this determination to control national socialisation led to the unification of education, bringing all secular and religious institutions under direct state control.

Although the Turkish nationalist elite was following foreign models, this initial establishment of the national schooling system in the midst of war had a lasting effect on education. The martial tone persisted, viewing teachers as an 'army of educators' and education as a campaign for national survival. Undoubtedly, given the deprivation and widespread illiteracy of early republican years, this militaristic approach bolstered teacher morale. Yet the maxim *her Türk asker doğar*, every Turk is born a soldier, seems to have affected education long after the end of the war.

Kazamias (1966:143), in his now-classic study, found that the education system's stated aim was to inspire a sense of national duty and pride in 'being the son of a great nation with an honourable history'. The TAF, he notes, was a useful model, representing an idealised version of the republican Turk, forever vigilant against threats. As the Republic and *patria* are fused in Turkish national discourses and as Turkey's historical claims on Anatolia are an indispensable part of national identity,

patriotism is effectively synonymous with a duty to protect both the nation and the land against incursions, divisions and threats. Anatolia's integrity, national unity and the survival of the Republic thus become indistinguishable.

The high school history book *İnkilâp Tarihi ve Atatürkçülük* (İTA, ND), celebrates the TAF as the purest representative of the nation's spirit and strength. The TAF, it notes, ensured Anatolia's deliverance in 1923 and its continued protection since (p.75). Soldiering is celebrated as the Turkish nation's highest profession and art (also see *T*, 13 January 2002). Discipline, strength and order suit the Turkish character, consequently the TAF is one of the world's oldest and most prestigious³ military establishments (İTA, ND:238). The bilingual reader *Özgürlük Uğruna/To Set Them Free*⁴ also calls soldiering 'a man's route' (p.6/7), celebrating 'a soldier's qualities' (p.62/63) and stressing every Turk's duty to protect Turkey as Atatürk did (p.186/187).

It could be argued that, as a conquering people, the Turks inevitably resort to a militaristic identity alongside the appropriated histories of the peoples they conquered. Yet the TAF is also a useful conceptual bridge in a narrative seeking to distance the Republic from its Ottoman past yet retain continuity in Anatolia's history. The TAF, celebrated as the only segment of the Ottoman apparatus that did not betray the people and embraced the national cause, republicanism and modernity, offer the Turks a sense of continuity. The TAF, *İTA* claims, inherited a tradition of valour and forward thinking which now represents the Turkish nation's distilled spirit. In Atatürk's words (*İTA*, ND:239), the army represents and protects national unity, freedom and strength. Thus it remains organically linked to the people and land – an argument often appealed to by the TAF – and responsible for their protection.

The subsequent glorification of the land is found in both books. *İTA* hails Anatolia as the Turks' cradle and their grave, soaked in ancestral blood and, for that reason, *Turkish* in a most elemental way (anonymous quote, p.80). Sacrifice binds the people

³ *Köklü*, literally 'with roots'.

⁴ The book is used as an English language-learning tool in Turkey, Turkish language-learning tool in America and, the authors proudly note, as part of Kemalist education.

to their land. Citizenship, the administrative manifestation of this essential bond between the Turks and their homeland, is derivative and secondary.

Unity within and with the national domain is a natural state of being. ‘The nation inside the boundaries of the fatherland is one whole’ (p.84). Hence, both the Allies’ desire to share the Empire’s lands during the First World War *and* the Ottoman government’s failure to resist betray both morality and nature (p.115). The Allies pursued narrow self-interest – using the Empire’s Greek and Armenian populations as pawns for their designs (p.115, 126) – with a disregard for justice. Using a David-and-Goliath narrative, *ITA* notes that the Allied forces were stronger, richer and more numerous than the TAF. Yet Turkey had nature and justice on its side so it won the Independence War and established the Republic. National deliverance and the Republic’s establishment are presented as indistinguishable.

Thus, believes Altınay, emerged the myth of the ‘military nation’. Studying the teaching of National Security Knowledge in Turkish schools, Altınay claims that socialisation into the ‘military nation’ is surprisingly successful. Unless personal experience directly contradicts what they learn, students internalise national security wisdom imparted at school. Although critics exist, Altınay found that the course helped sustain a reverential attitude towards the TAF. National Security Knowledge (compulsory for boys and girls in all high schools and usually taught by a serving or retired officer) is openly aimed at raising citizens committed to Atatürk, his reforms and principles; conscious of the privilege of being a Turk; and willing to sacrifice personal interest for the common good (Altınay, 2004:120-1). The course accepts most TTT assumptions about national history, depicts nationalism as a natural instinct, not an ideology, and celebrates the TAF as the nation’s embodiment (p.125).

Altınay offers a minute and superbly annotated analysis of National Security Knowledge textbooks (hence I shall not focus on them here). The course’s preoccupation with the unity of nation, territory and language, and glorification of the TAF and national service, Altınay notes, works. Students generally accepted military

service as ‘the most sacred service to the homeland’⁵ (p.131), while teachers equated a good education with inculcation in Atatürk’s principles (p.135).

Altınay found that teachers often implicitly referred to the proverb *Türkün Türkten başka dostu yoktur*⁶, heightening the perceived need to protect and preserve the motherland from numerous enemies. Students were told that no country or organisation – and certainly not the EU – wants Turkey to be strong and independent, as Atatürk warned in *Nutuk*. The course takes it as read that Greeks, Syrians and Armenians have expansionist designs on Anatolia, while Iran wishes to turn Turkey into a theocracy (Altınay, 2004:136-7) and its proposed solutions are invariably military. Altınay found students mostly agreed with their books.

As noted above, all textbooks celebrate the TAF as the nation’s purest representative and best guarantor of national greatness, freedom and safety. Here the military’s de facto authority when discussing national security – they are, after all, experts – enhances the gravity of the message. Classroom experiences reproduce the discourse of threat and protection. It is extremely significant that none of Altınay’s interviewees questioned this course’s existence (p.143) or the military’s unlimited access to all high school students in the country (p.139) and actually commented⁷ that officers were the best people to teach the course (p.147). As a result of this arrangement, all Turkish students are told, by a figure of authority, that Turkey is surrounded by enemies, hence the military needs to stay strong; a ‘fact’, Altınay (2004:145) found, accepted even by those who questioned the course’s specifics. As the sacrality of protecting the motherland’s unity and integrity is stressed, a powerful national narrative emerges, lending legitimacy to all actions justified in its terms. Repetition ensures familiarity, as this national mantra appears in history, geography and language books.

⁵ National Service is compulsory for all Turkish males. Exemptions do occur on medical grounds or for the highly educated – for a fee. Although conscientious objectors exist (see <http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/>) their numbers are small as evading military service creates a myriad of day-to-day problems.

⁶ A Turk’s only friend is a Turk.

⁷ Students in Southeastern Turkey, having had direct experience of conflict, had different views of the TAF (e.g. see p.152, 163).

Modernisation is justified in terms of protecting the motherland from ever suffering indignity and fear again. In order to navigate around republican nationalism's biggest caveat – namely how, after fighting the Europeans, Turkey could be persuaded to emulate them – national narratives separate European civilisation from the Europeans.

The Allies are the undisputed villains of early Republican history. The West is depicted as evil – for fighting against the Turks and refusing to acknowledge their superior nature – and inferior: hypocritical, self-interested and of dubious moral fibre (Millas, 2001:75, 79, 84, 98, 133). The Allies' baseness, combined with their strength and wealth, makes them a constant source of worry. For Kemalists, Turkey had to put itself in a position where the Allies could threaten it no more. Hence, although defeated after the Independence War, the Europeans were not 'neutralised'. The only way for Turkey to be truly safe was to become as powerful as its enemies.

This initial conceptualisation of survival soon became a civilisational aim in its own right and modernisation became the lynchpin of Republican nationalism. 'Every single aspect of reform was justified on nationalistic grounds and as a concerted effort to indicate that the Turks were, or had the potential to be, as cultured as any other nation of the world' (Kazamias, 1966:187). This appeal entailed a precarious balance between embracing Western civilisation and not forgiving the Westerners. Kazamias's survey of early Republican textbooks shows that Western civilisation is promoted with heavy provisos, cautioning against the equation of Civilisation with Western European countries. The fact that modernity happened to flourish in Western Europe does not make it *Western European*. The Turkish modernisation drive was thus reconciled with an intense pride for all things Turkish.

ITA celebrates this balance. Speaking of injustice, brutality, sacrifice and disaster, the book accuses Europe and America of causing destruction and bloodshed in Anatolia (p.80-1) while betraying their own principles (p.86-7)⁸. Turkey, conversely, remained true to its principles even after military victory, never maximising her demands during negotiations at Lausanne (p.174). Retaining the moral high ground is important to the narrative. Turkey's struggle for Anatolia becomes a pursuit of justice and fairness that the Allies seek to violate in their pursuit of selfish gain (p.174-5). This rhetoric is now

⁸ Wilson's Fourteen Points.

often used against the EU by those who find that reform demands compromise Atatürk's legacy: Turkey should westernise without the West.

This theme is stressed in the Education Ministry-produced comic *İmparatorluğa Veda*. The enemies are depicted as numerous and treacherous (p.13). Their only desire was to carve up and share out Ottoman lands (p.42) and turn the Sultan into a puppet (p.53), so that what little was left to the Empire would also fall under their control. Moreover, the Allies' ethnic or religious connections to minorities residing within the Empire meant that Allied victories led to violence and intimidation against 'the people' (p.47, 51). The comic's exclusion of Christians from the Ottoman *demos* gives (anachronistic) legitimacy to nationalist narratives. 'The people' are Turkish and Anatolia is their rightful home. Although Turkey as a country may not yet exist, the Allies are the people's enemies as they violate their country's integrity.

This theme is taken up by many a war novel or memoir, such as Seyfettin's⁹ (2004:4-46) *Primo, Türk Çocuk*, following the spiritual journey of a westernised Turk who, having rejected his nationality in the name of Western civilisation, discovered that Westerners were not that civilised after all. Through an agonising night of self-criticism, the hero exposes Western hypocrisy, cultural arrogance, imperial aggression and insatiable greed. Young readers recognise these themes; national concerns are confirmed. Seyfettin's hero re-embraces his nationality and finds freedom, truth and happiness in an identity he had previously rejected. This identity, the hero exclaims, is a source of happiness *because* it is culturally authentic while offering a purer and more honest approach to Western civilisation than found among many westerners. As Atatürk debunks the myth that Turkishness is a backward identity, he enables his compatriots to feel proud to be Turkish and, through that identity, embrace modernity.

2. Atatürk: From Essentialism to Metaphysics

2.a. Delivering and Protecting Anatolia

⁹ This particular story is not taken from a schoolbook but during the course of my fieldwork I asked a number of people whether they had studied Ömer Seyfettin's stories at school. They all answered in the affirmative.

The fusion of national independence, republicanism and, later, modernisation allows national narratives to celebrate the Independence War as the founding moment of all three. Atatürk was the founding father of all three, hence presenting his career as the unfolding of a preconceived plan towards national liberation, a seamless narrative of military achievement and political accomplishment, is *ipso facto* celebrating the republic that will soon emerge. Given the symbolic nature of the moment and the genuine appeal of a heroic story with a happy ending, a vast body of literature exists focusing exclusively on Atatürk's defence of Anatolia. This material confirms and reproduces narratives discussed above, forming part of a self-perpetuating narrative chain. Familiarity is part of its socialising function and, possibly, part of its appeal, for this genre is particularly popular. Although circulation statistics are hard to locate, staff in several Ankara bookshops confirmed that 'anything with "Atatürk" in the title' sells. Everyone I asked during the course of my fieldwork whether they had, in their childhood, read Atatürk-related stories, poems and comics answered affirmatively. Reading about Atatürk is a national pastime and the habit starts at a young age. In *Dost*, possibly Turkey's largest bookstore chain, Atatürk and the Independence War warrant a separate section, distinct from Turkish history and politics and larger than both. *Nutuk* is invariably in the bestsellers' corner and the sheer volume of secondary titles suggests one thing: publishers stand to gain from printing them and do so with great flare and imagination.

Neverland Çocuk Kitabevi, a tiny children's bookstore behind Ankara's *Kocatepe* mosque, offered 16 different Atatürk-related poetry anthologies for very young readers. Similar poetry anthologies for teenagers crammed several shelves, while assorted biographies covered entire walls. Copies of *Nutuk*, in various abridged editions, books on Kemalism, the history of the Independence War and/or the reforms and books of Atatürk's quotations took up most of the youth section. Non Atatürk-related novels took up less than a third of the shelf space.

Atatürk's story is explored from many different angles. Some authors focus on his childhood and youth (e.g. Araz, 1999; Savci, ND; or Atatürk's classmate Ali Fuat Cebesoy, ND), while others relate Atatürk's story through parables and anecdotes. For instance, Hengirmen's (2004:8-9) *Atatürk Çiftlikte* and Yavaşlı's (2004:23) *Ben Mustafa Kemal* discuss vigilance against the enemy in terms of the famous 'crow

incident'. Little Mustafa, the story goes, living on a farm in Rapla, is asked to drive marauding crows from the fields. The crows, readers are told, represent the enemies and the field the motherland, 'little Mustafa would one future day scare the enemies out of the country as he succeeded in scaring the crows off the plain' (Hengirmen, *ibid*).

Other books, such as Palazoğlu's (2004) history of the Independence War for young readers, prefer a didactic tone, reflecting a belief that Atatürk's war feats represent vital knowledge in themselves. This belief is often taken to extremes. Arıkan (2003), for instance, offers a day-to-day calendar of the critical period 1918-1923, while Köklügiller (2000) offers an effective inventory of key events and reforms. Atatürk's principles are catalogued (p.59ff), as are his thoughts on issues ranging from law to flowers (p.65-66) and from sport (p.81) to patriotism (p.83). One chapter offers segments of famous speeches (p.86ff), while another is devoted to poems inspired by Atatürk's life (p.111ff). The last chapter consists of a meticulous list of foreign dignitaries' statements on Atatürk, alphabetised by country name (p.147ff).

As the story offers pitched battles, political intrigue, treason, heroism *and* a happy ending, it most commonly appears in the form of emotional patriotic novels and comics. The Ministry of Education publishes an entire series on Atatürk's career often focusing on periods shorter accounts ignore: for instance, *İmparatorluğa Veda* (Volume 9 of this series) deals with pre-1919 events. Still, this account stresses that Atatürk already had a specific plan for national salvation. In the fullness of time, Atatürk's level-headed brilliance enabled him to single-handedly deliver the nation to freedom.

Atatürk is presented as perceptive, resourceful, brave and capable of always making the correct decision (p.22, 24, 36-7). Although not actually wielding power, Atatürk shows great leadership and serves the Empire commendably (p.6, 12), thus earning the respect and admiration of both his men and superiors, including the Sultan and the German Kaiser (p.16-17, 20, 33-34, 48). Although Atatürk's rank and age make the lavishing of such praise unlikely, hindsight makes admiring Atatürk seem natural.

Atatürk's brilliance, the story claims, enabled him to remain untainted by the Empire's failures and abstain from Enver's activities, realising the CUP¹⁰ was bad for the country (p.11). Only Atatürk managed to lead his army to victory even in the grimmest of times (p.38). He alone maintained his resolve when the Ottoman government resigned itself to humiliation and nationalist commanders despaired (p.43, 53). The war was not over, he said, the Turks' war was about to start (p.44); the occupying forces would not stay long: 'As they came, they shall go' (p.46).

In order to achieve this, Atatürk travelled to Anatolia to organise resistance (p.54). Interestingly, although the Sultan is aware of Atatürk's nationalism (p.27) and his active involvement in and leadership of nationalist groups (p.53-55, 60), he still dispatches Atatürk to Anatolia (p.58) with the mission of 'rescuing the state' (p.61). Atatürk preferred to rescue the nation realising that, to remain true to his conscience, he had to oppose the Sultan (p.28). The volume ends as Atatürk departs for Samsun. His parting words are that the Allies 'cannot appreciate the love of freedom and a nation's determined struggle for it, the only thing they trust in is physical force' (p.62). Everyone knows what follows: Atatürk matches their force with his – and wins.

Knowing the outcome hardly compromises the thrill of reading about Atatürk's successes, however, as the immense popularity of the *Küçük Gezin* series proves. The series' hero, Ömer, visits famous battle sites, such as Sakarya, or places where important innovations were announced, such as Kastamonu: the series 'follows' Atatürk's military and political career, although the books are not actually *about* him. Yet a book about Anatolia is essentially about Atatürk as he is the land's champion and its redeemer. Anatolia is the coveted prize the Independence War secured. As Atatürk's life and the nation's destiny are fused and he is the War's undeniable hero, as the Republic's *raison d'être* is Anatolia's protection and Atatürk is the Republican father, the national narrative further fuses Anatolia with Atatürk, for without him Anatolia would have been ravaged.

In *Ben Mustafa Kemal*, Yavaşlı drives this point home. Before Atatürk, invaders were robbing the Turks of their freedom and the Sultan of his powers. But the Sultan only

¹⁰ Committee of Union and Progress.

cared about his enjoyment (p. 34, 37, 78) and did nothing to prevent the Allies from grabbing ‘our lands from our hands’ (p.51, 94). Even ‘the government takes the weapons from our hands’ (p.88). ‘[O]ur country lacked a firm hand’ (p.81). The Turkish people and the cause of freedom needed a champion.

‘Our patria’s independence, our nation’s future is in danger’ (p.89), Atatürk told the Erzurum Congress, but ‘[t]he sublime Turkish nation, will show its heroism once more, and will win the first national independence war in human history’ (p.83). Atatürk’s success, notes Yavaşlı, was vital for humanity, as the Turkish victory against all odds ‘gave the whole world the first example of a national awakening’ (p.10). Historical inaccuracy hardly undermines the potency of this first-person narrative whereby Atatürk tells his young readers that ‘the most important thing for humanity nowadays is freedom and independence’ (p.45). Which was exactly what he gave the Turks. For ‘[w]ithin two days [of the Erzurum speech] there were no enemies East of Sakarya’ (p.99). ‘By 18 September 1922 no enemy soldiers were left in Western Anatolia’ (p.109). Atatürk had achieved the impossible (p.127).

This is where the education system comes into its own. Atatürk is the symbol of Turkish patriotism, hence protecting his legacy and safeguarding Anatolia and the Republic – his gifts to his people – become, not simply national duties, but duties *to* Atatürk. He single-handedly delivered the land and its people; all he expects in return is that his gift be preserved. Thus the *Address to Youth* becomes a national prayer. It appears, superimposed on Atatürk’s portrait, in the first-grade reader *Birinci Kitap, Okuma-Yazma* (1990), although it is beyond the students’ reading abilities. It appears on the last page of *Özgürlük Uğruna* (1981:250/251), printed in the shape of Atatürk’s profile, like an icon. In *İTA*, the high school history textbook, the *Address* is printed alongside the national anthem, the flag and a portrait of young, western-clad Atatürk.

As *İTA* addresses teenagers, the introduction (p.15-16) explains why Atatürk’s reforms and thoughts are worth studying. The state, we are told, is naturally strong, rich and beautiful, but remains a work in progress. For that work to be completed, the Turks need to face and resolve contemporary problems and, to achieve this, understanding Atatürk’s principles is essential. Although, the nation is freedom-loving by nature, it was Atatürk who established its freedom. Studying Atatürk’s reforms, the book notes, is necessary for future happiness. *İTA* claims to teach the

history of Turkey's critical years in order to offer students a reference point and benchmark for the future. As Atatürk's reforms constitute an essential part of citizenship, learning about his activities – and by extension his life – becomes an essential avenue for moulding future citizens.

Hayat Bilgisi, an elementary schoolbook blending basic physics (unit 8) with civic education (an introduction to electoral politics), farming (unit 7), giving directions (p.73-4), shopping (p.33) and recycling (p.43), also offers lengthy patriotic interludes.

The book opens with the words of the national anthem, the flag – a visualisation of nationality – and the words *ne mutlu Türküm diyene*. Repeating this mantra constitutes a national ritual, all the more potent for being familiar. Then comes a simplified version of the already well-known history of the Independence War and early republican reforms. The account is focused on Atatürk's life and actions, ensuring accessibility for its young readers, while also retaining narrative structure. The choice to anchor the entire story on Atatürk, however, is both practical and tactical as it perpetuates and reproduces the myth that Anatolia's deliverance was the work of one man.

'Before the Republic, our state used to be called Ottoman', the book relates, upholding the 'Turkification' of the Ottoman state discussed above. That state lost a war and, as a result, part of the country was occupied. The occupiers disarmed the soldiers (p.49), but Atatürk went to Anatolia to fight nonetheless. The tone is set. Atatürk is the key historical agent: he started the Independence War (p.50) – seemingly, single-handedly and proclaimed the Republic. The book presents the War and the Republic's proclamation as stages of the same event. Discussion of the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses facilitates this, stressing the existence of republican practice even in the midst of war.

Interestingly, although the war is discussed, the enemies are barely mentioned. Germany, the Ottomans' ally, is not mentioned either. Other nations are mere extras in this discourse of inevitability leading from national liberation to political republicanism. Nowhere is this equation more evident than in *İTA*. The truth after the Great War was simple, we are told; the Turks' motherland was to be occupied and shared out among the enemies. The Sultan did not resist, but the nation would. As the

army was being demobilised, patriotic officers joined the nationalist forces that spontaneously formed (p.74). Building on the established understanding of the Ottoman state as a Turkish state, the book speaks of the nation and patriotic national officers anachronistically, but convincingly. The sections on the Balkan and First World Wars open with Atatürk quotes – creating a false sense of continuity – and a ‘growing sense of national consciousness among the people’ is stressed (p.75).

The people rallied around the national cause (p.78-81). The book quotes from rousing speeches and offers maps marking the changing political and military situation¹¹. For students long-exposed to a rhetoric of unity and indivisibility, taught to identify Turkey’s map with independence and freedom, the lines criss-crossing the motherland carry a potent emotional message. So the book proceeds, noting that ‘we will not endure any nation becoming... our master in our own homeland’ (p.79). Atatürk ensured such a fate would not befall the Turkish people. Emerging as a *deus ex machina*, Atatürk is praised for his superior political understanding and ability to give the people what they needed. He brought them hope by going to Anatolia with the specific aim of establishing a new state based on national sovereignty (p.75). His plan of action predated his posting; in fact, we are told, he only accepted the official commission to facilitate this work, for he recognised, in the military struggle against the Allies, a simultaneous struggle towards a new polity. Atatürk was the dawn after a long dark night (p.79), bringing justice to two million Turks who risked being sacrificed to two hundred thousand Greeks (p.80).

Atatürk delivers justice while also naturally representing the people – both through superior understanding and through the democratic legitimation conveyed by the Sivas and Erzurum Congresses. ‘The patriotic people of Eastern Anatolia were firmly gathered and united around the Paşa’ (p.84). The people wanted freedom and needed Atatürk in order to get it: his was a strong guiding hand to lead them towards the future of national independence they had autonomously envisaged. Popular legitimacy and procedural transparency is vital for Atatürk’s own legitimation as a true national

¹¹ E.g. Balkan Wars (p.25); First World War (p.33); Mudros Armistice – map marking location of occupying forces (p.41); Greek offensive and Independence War (p.128); the Republic of Turkey (p.335); the ‘Turkish World’ – countries considered ethnic kin (p.336).

leader and genuine republican father: he was popular; his agenda was popular; his power was acquired through proto-democratic structures.

This clarification is important as some small-minded, jealous people failed to see the magnitude of his achievements and felt Atatürk was exceeding the limits of his authority for personal gain. But his contributions were selfless; a fact proved by his resignation from the Ottoman Army – his childhood dream and only ambition – in the national struggle's name (p.83 & *Özgürlük Uğruna* p.212/3). Besides, *İTA* stresses, Atatürk's authority could not be measured against conventional benchmarks as new conditions forged a new legitimacy derived from the nationalist movement (p.85).

Presenting both Atatürk himself and his power as legitimate automatically legitimises subsequent political reforms. Claiming legitimisation in terms of both democratic popularity and natural authority creates tensions, as procedural democratic legitimacy effectively qualifies claims to 'natural leadership'. Nevertheless, the books pursue both avenues in an attempt to pre-empt potential counter-narratives: Atatürk's power was procedurally legitimate, democratically and *essentially* representative and his goals were both popular and just. Although the discourse of republican nationality presents the transition to a republic as natural and inevitable, authors are aware that a republic needs to be popular with its citizens. Hence no legitimisation appeal is left untapped in an attempt to present the Republic as both natural and popular, simultaneously giving the nation ownership of the republican reforms.

Moreover, Atatürk's legitimacy *ipso facto* proves the Sultan's illegitimacy as he opposes Atatürk's – aka the people's – desires. As Atatürk is the people's representative in both procedural and essential terms, the Sultan's slights against him represent a collective insult and violation of national volition. The Sultan forfeited his legitimacy, *İTA* continues, when he conceded to the country's break-up (p.89), thus failing the nation. This was the 'biggest blot in Ottoman history' (p.117), as it ignored national volition and was only erased by the treaty of Lausanne (p.173).

Discussing national will as something that predated the Independence War lends both the nationalists and their state *de facto* legitimacy: on 'April 23, 1920 a new state was created in Anatolia based on unconditional national sovereignty' (p.120).

Republicanism was thus inserted into the national imaginary as a natural concomitant of independence. The connecting thread is Atatürk himself.

2.b. Atatürk: Real Man, Real Hero

Atatürk is war hero, statesman and national champion wrapped into one. His every endeavour seems to have been crowned with glory and everything Turkey *is* today emanates from his vision and willpower. Atatürk is the strapping young prince in Turkey's Cinderella story and, as such, he is a potent symbol in his own right. Arithmetic books, for instance, often sport Atatürk's picture, looking fondly at a child on his knee, encouraging learning with the promise of his affection. His omnipresence may represent a homage, a habit or an attempt to invest an endeavour with some of Atatürk's charisma. What it achieves is familiarisation with Atatürk's figure which, in turn, helps sustain national narratives, as he is both the symbol of national victory, republicanism and freedom and the connecting theme in all national narratives.

In these narratives, Atatürk often emerges as a super-human, mythical figure. Photographs help remind readers he was real. This 'reality' works on two levels. Pictures of his parents, the home he was born in or Anıtkabir (*İTA*, p. 62; *Hayat Bilgisi*, p.59) serve as reminders of his humanity and mortality. Such pictures, and the anecdotes that accompany them, enable students to develop a sense of proximity to the leader. Simultaneously, however, Atatürk's pictures on the battlefield (e.g. *İTA*, p.164) or a photograph of the *Bandırma* (*İTA*, p.77), the vessel that carried Atatürk to Samsun on May 19, 1919, thus enabling him to start the Independence War, remind the reader that Atatürk's heroic feats, mythical as they may appear, are actually true. Familiarity is not always trivialised. *Hayat Bilgisi* (p.60) seeks to cultivate respect, even awe, when noting that Atatürk devoted his life to the Turkish nation: defeating its enemies, ensuring its progress and, eventually, breaking his health for 'our sake'. *Okuma-Yazma* concurs, linking his death to hard work while *Özgürlük Uğruna* (1981: 248/249) identifies 'the burdens that a perpetually active life' as the cause for Atatürk's death. Cirrhosis of the liver is, unsurprisingly, not mentioned.

The Atatürk mythology is assisted by the proliferation of audiovisual material often used in schools: documentaries, dramatisations – available on video and DVD – and CDs of narrative, poems and patriotic songs. One such CD¹² even claims to include Atatürk's favourite song. Meanwhile, at home children can do jigsaw puzzles¹³ commemorating key moments in Atatürk's career. Adults hang his portrait in their homes, shops and cars. The fusion of Atatürk's life trajectory with national salvation creates immense interest in the man himself; his life, not just his career; his thoughts and desires, not just his actions. Interest gives rise to a fascination that commercial publishers are eager to feed and capitalise on with commemorative albums such as *Renkli Fotoğraflarla: Atatürk, Özel Albüm* (ND).

Publisher *Milliyet* claims that this album was designed as a resource for students and schools. With that in mind, it opens with Atatürk's *Address to Youth* (p.5). The photographs, arranged in chronological order, are digitally coloured, offering the nation the opportunity to see 'Atatürk's blue eyes' (back cover). The captions offer quotes from politicians, public personae, academics and Atatürk himself. Nuggets of nationally salient information are also offered, including a summary of the *Milli Misak* (p.10), Atatürkism's core principles (p.49) and the significance of national unity in ensuring freedom and territorial integrity (e.g. p.13, 26). Territorial integrity protects the Republic, which in turn protects freedom (p.32). As the Republic is Atatürk's gift, by extension, Atatürk offered Turks both freedom and progress. Pictures of children (e.g. p.16-8, 20-1, 27, 29 and, p.44ff pictures of Atatürk's youngest adopted daughter, Ülkü), Western-clad crowds (p.32-3, 39 etc) and quotes on women's liberation (p.22, 34) enhance the message of republican well-being.

The album supports the one-man-struggle narrative with all the reverential admiration such a feat deserves. In most pictures Atatürk stands alone – even if that has, at times, required some airbrushing¹⁴. Simultaneously, this narrative is supported by a series of pictures in which Atatürk is *not* alone. Certain comrades-in-arms, particularly İsmet –

¹² 'Mustafa Kemal Devrimcinin Güncesi: Söz, Müzik, Sözlük'. Text and Narration: Fikret Kızılok (Kalan Müzik Yapım ltd Şti).

¹³ *Heidi* offers 20 different puzzles. Other brands abound.

¹⁴ For instance, Refet (Bele) has been removed from p.14. See Mango (1999, fig.21, p.298-299) for a copy of the original.

having survived both early Republican ‘purgings’ and digital *retouchage* – respectfully accompany Atatürk, stressing the subtext of great leadership among great men. Similarly, quotes of admiration penned by famous individuals and the respectful presence of military personnel (p.33, 40, 52) and foreign dignitaries (p.30, 67, 88) underline Atatürk’s personal authority. This recognition confirms Atatürk’s glory in a public and ceremonial fashion. Yet the image of the statesman does not outweigh that of the caring national father. Atatürk is shown touring the country, eager to stay close to his people (although his biographers mention no such interest), as a father should. One picture shows Atatürk listening intently to a soldier, the proverbial *mehmetçik* (p.60).

Such albums do not simply glorify Atatürk, they also provide ‘proof’ of the republican fairytale’s reality. A story of such achievement can easily slip into the realm of myth. People need reminding that it is true. Pictures of Atatürk delivering *Nutuk* (p.69, 79) and other images associated with specific reforms accompanied with explanatory captions (p.62, 84 the Hat Law, p.87 on script) provide hard proof. The album does not need to relate stories, it simply hints at them. Everybody recognises Sabiha Gökçen, Atatürk’s adopted daughter and Turkey’s first, and for a long time only, female military pilot. Her picture is a *story* in its own right (p.72, 89). Similarly, pictures prove Atatürk *actually* existed and one day in Kastamomu he *did* shock his audience by introducing the Western brimmed hat. Simultaneously, recognition of key moments forges a narrative for the reader, regardless of whether one is provided.

Readers will have read an abridged version of *Nutuk* at school (Atatürk, 2002), hence a picture of Atatürk delivering the speech, the finale of which (*Address to Youth*) everyone knows by heart, triggers immediate recognition. Readers are aware of Atatürk’s modernisation drive, but while their lives are shaped by eight decades of republican modernisation, beholding snapshots of the reform effort as it unfolded enhances the story’s reality and resonance: the first Turkish universities (p.48, 50); ceremonies celebrating Republican anniversaries (p.55, 57, 65); new factories (p.66). The pictures extol progress, education, industrialisation. Atatürk’s presence in every frame stresses that it was all achieved under his guidance. The album finishes with a picture of Anıtkabir: Atatürk is dead, but his legacy lives on.

Nothing about this album is unique. ‘From the moment persons are born into Turkish society, they are taught to view Mustafa Kemal as the unparalleled chief and savior of the Turkish nation and to devote themselves to preserving his accomplishments and legacy’ (Parla and Davison, 2004:41).

Pre-school ‘Atatürk packs’ are common. *Atatürk Çok Seviyorum* (ND) offers four books of stories, pictures and exercises. Single volumes on Atatürk and the Republic also exist. Publishers seem to consider such titles necessary for early socialisation as they always include them in ‘educational series’ such as the *Benim Biricik Dergim* books, which are aimed at children aged 5-7. Here, *Atatürk ve Cumhuriyet* (ND) introduces basic facts about Atatürk’s life and career and offers pictures of Atatürk’s Salonica house and Anıtkabir (pages 4-5). As the book is an example of ‘learning through doing’, national symbols are integrated into games and exercises. For instance, joining the dots ‘gives’ the *Bandırma* (p.7), while mazes lead to the little pink house and Atatürk’s mausoleum (p.12). Similarly, in *Atatürk* (ND) – a similar volume by a rival publisher – joining the dots also gives the *Bandırma* (p.8) and Anıtkabir (p.36), which is also the final destination of a maze (p.37). Repeated exposure to these images in childhood enhances familiarity while also ensuring that a visit to relevant national sites, later in life, will feel like a return.

These books do not limit themselves to promoting national imagery. They also offer a basic yet powerful republican narrative, always hinged on Atatürk. *Atatürk ve Cumhuriyet* (p.14-5) suggests that Atatürk brought fairness, peace and prosperity to his people through reforms, depicted through scales and a courthouse, a dove and olive branch as well as factories. A clock, some bottles and a calendar complying with the republican metric system link objects the child recognises to Atatürk. The message is clear and partly true: nothing would be as you know it without him. Atatürk thus emerges as the maker of the child’s reality. Actually, Atatürk emerges as the maker of all good things surrounding the child, as his reforms are further associated with enlightenment, freedom and happiness. Drawings show old and stooping Ottoman Turks wearing veils and peasant garb in shades of grey and brown. Next to them a young, straight-backed couple in colourful Western suits represents ‘new Turkey’.

Visual narratives are easily accepted as factual. Lists of major national holidays and their significance (p.16-7) and the seasons (p.18) enhance this aura of objectivity. Either the publishers believe in the factual nature of their narrative or they wish the children to do so. Either way, the presentation of nationally salient information as objective and real moulds the child's experience accordingly. In some cases, to ensure that children have committed these facts to memory, the books offer tests. In *Atatürk* (ND), a quiz asks the reader to name Atatürk's birthplace and his parents, as well as identify the Anıtkabir and the *İstiklâl Marşı*¹⁵. *Atatürk Çiflikte* offers the names of Atatürk's family members in a Turkey-shaped bubble and the child is asked to match them to their pictures. This information enhances familiarity and accessibility, which helps turn Atatürk into a manageable role-model. Like his reader, Atatürk had parents and went to school – and he was exceptionally hard-working, setting an example for all Turks (*Atatürk*, ND:6).

Rather than discussing Atatürk's later accomplishments, these books discuss his tastes, his habits and what is known of his childhood. *Atatürk* asks the child to discuss novels, noting that Atatürk loved to read (p.21), or to discuss the sea, noting that Atatürk loved to swim (p.23). Rather than discussing the sources of Atatürk's greatness, the books forge familiarity and accessibility. Offering a photograph of Atatürk with his friend İnönü (p.30), the book urges the young reader to draw the picture of a friend; a picture of a smiling Atatürk (p.33) begs the question of what makes the reader smile. Atatürk is real, accessible, lovable. On the last page the child is told that this glorious man is dead and is asked to draw him some flowers (p.35).

Drawing parallels between a child's experiences and Atatürk's life seeks to forge a personal bond between young readers and the Republican father, stressing that every great man was once a child. *Atatürk Çiflikte* belongs to a 32-title series dealing with Atatürk's life, from cradle to grave. This series devotes several titles to Atatürk's boyhood, his antics and achievements, even his first love.

Enabling a child to feel close to Atatürk facilitates embracing the republican project and its faith in an accelerated and controlled modernisation. Hence the books stress traits that children may identify with. In *Atatürk Çiflikte*, Atatürk is a poor, orphaned

¹⁵ The Independence March, Turkey's national anthem.

farmer, enabling millions of Turks to identify with him. Similarly, in *Ben Mustafa Kemal*, a first-person narrative rich in photographic material (p.48, 64, 66, 74, 84) and anecdotal information (p.23, 86-88) adding immediacy to the story, the author constructs a sense of proximity. Although Atatürk's leadership is celebrated (p.69, 82), the book stresses his kind and caring nature (p.41, 49, 55), seeking to instil in young Turks the knowledge that Atatürk was one of them. But was he?

2.c. Atatürk: Beyond Humanity?

Ata'ya Armağan – available in bookshops and costing twice as much as most children's books – is a small polygonal contraption of folded cardboard that eventually unfolds into a flower made of pictures of Atatürk from different stages in his life. On the reverse side of each 'petal' one reads: I believed, I trusted, I worked, I captured success, I used the strength that was in the blood in my veins – a reference to the *Address to Youth* – I am so happy, thanks to you. The belief that Atatürk brought his people success and happiness by enabling them to achieve both forms part of a parallel narrative that children encounter as they grow older. Atatürk may be a familiar figure, but, with time, he also becomes a superhuman hero.

The belief that heroes are the nation's true representatives and the best examples according to which 'moral men and women' should be moulded (Kazamias, 1966:133) means that such imagery is extensively used in education. Hero-worship helped construct the new national narratives, as the Kemalist state sought to fuse disparate ethnic elements into a coherent national culture through education (ibid, p.109-111). Although smaller heroes are celebrated, Atatürk represents the backbone of this narrative. In fact 'the War of Independence seems to be integrated into *his* life or to be just an episode of his life' (Koullapis, 2002:298).

Rather than fading, this phenomenon has intensified with time. The 1980s military government enhanced Atatürk-worship and ensured Kemalist principles were taught in schools in a clear and comprehensive fashion. Although educational reform has occurred since, this Kemalist drive has not been abandoned and Atatürk's omnipresence has actually increased. Since the 1990s, history books average one

Atatürk picture every fourth page. This both capitalises on and increases the emotional resonance of Atatürk's story.

This story constitutes the topic of choice for many language-learning books because, according to a group of English Literature university students in Ankara, familiarity facilitates language-learning. Hence books such as Kirk's (ND) *Kemal Atatürk* or Ardanancı's (2004) *Atatürk: Leader of Turkish People* – also available in German and French – abound. Their format is standard: the story opens with a picture of the little pink house (also in *Özgürlük Uğruna*, p.10) and recounts Atatürk's childhood in light of his thirst for *modern* education. The double stress on modern education *and* Atatürk's exceptional intelligence, diligence and indefatigable inquisitiveness (see *Atatürk: Leader of Turkish People*, p.6, 9, 13; *Atatürk Çiftlikte*, p.3, 5, 13; *Özgürlük Uğruna*, p.46, 56/57, 68/69, 154/5, 170/1, 174/5, 186/7; and *Ben Mustafa Kemal*, p.19, 29, 33), simultaneously propagates the Kemalist modernising plan *and* encourages children to be hard-working at school.

These books present little Mustafa as a miniature of the man he later became, with all his convictions already in place and his plan formulated. In *Atatürk: Leader of Turkish People* (p.15, 17, 20), Atatürk is depicted as patriotically aware by the age of seven, while *Özgürlük Uğruna* (p.182/3, 184/5) suggests that Atatürk was consciously educating himself for his future role, learning how to manage political change and bring freedom and democracy to his people. His leadership is presented as natural (p.14/15, 168/9, 190/1), both in terms of his personality and in his relationship with the nation. Atatürk, it is claimed, was *destined* to lead his people to freedom and a plan to that effect predated the circumstances that enabled its realisation. By 1919, '[h]e is ready to serve his country. He will go to Anatolia and create a new country. He has the necessary talent to do it... So democracy [begins] in Turkey' (*Atatürk: Leader of Turkish People*, p.27, 30).

In these simplified accounts, Atatürk is both accessible and out of reach. He is a normal boy, attending school as his readers do, facing his share of difficulties, yet unlike 'normal boys' he has a mission, an inner calling that common mortals do not share. The dissemination of this message, important in its own right, becomes more significant when inscribed in language-learning material, compounded by the awareness that the material will be automatically accessible to foreign audiences –

and foreign audiences matter. Every book helping a Turkish child practice French also enables a French child to learn about Turkey and Atatürk or even learn Turkish. In this spirit, *Atatürk* comic books are available in a variety of languages. Children on buses and ferries often clutch the Turkish version; according to booksellers, the French, English and German versions are used for educational purposes, while Dutch or Swedish versions are mainly targeted at tourists. Whatever the root of their appeal, Turkish, French and English translations were sold out everywhere I searched. Finally, I procured a battered Italian copy from a dusty bookshop in Selçuk.

Once again, the narrative starts with the pink house in Salonica and ends with Anıtkabir. This is a story of landmarks, symbols and emotional appeals. The aim is not the provision of facts, but their ordering. According to this sequence of events, Atatürk's national leadership was a plan long in the making and his faith in his impending success unwavering (p.19). The book stresses his genius and foresight (p.13-4, 17) and his intuitive ability to know his people's desires (p.43). This quasi-organic link with his people meant that Atatürk's power was *essentially* representative, even if not always structurally so. It also meant that opposition to Atatürk's actions *ipso facto* opposed the nation's wishes. Only deranged, self-serving individuals and reactionaries – such as Rauf (Bele), who advocated the Sultanate's return (p.33) – opposed Atatürk and the Republic. *Özgürlük Uğruna* (p.230/1, 236/7-238) concurs, stressing that Atatürk *always* enjoyed *everyone's* support. Those who opposed him were jealous or ignorant men. Yet, we are told, Atatürk actually favoured the existence of opposition for the sake of democracy. According to *Atatürk: La Nascita di Una Nazione*, he wanted political activity to become independent of him, yet deputies kept seeking his advice (p.35) and opposition leaders, feeling used by subversive elements, withdrew from the political arena.

All figures, apart from Atatürk, seem secondary and subservient to him. Even Kazım Karabekir, without whom there would have been no nationalist forces for Atatürk to command, is mentioned merely as one of Atatürk's men. No other war comrade is mentioned by name and, although the narrative does not lapse into falsity, omissions create the impression of a superhuman leader taking Turkey by the hand, doing what was necessary for the good of the people (e.g. executing dissidents p.36, 39, 45), as it was 'too soon to realise a completely democratic regime'. In *Ben Mustafa Kemal*

(p.119) the same theme is stressed: Atatürk wanted to give his people multi-party democracy, but they were not ready. So he did what he had to.

Undoubtedly, Atatürk was ‘one of the most important statesmen of our century’ (p.54), yet many authors approach him with reverence, vesting him with almost superhuman qualities. In *Özgürlük Uğruna*, Atatürk is presented as beyond human constraints. This is a narrative of his childhood, for which sources are rare, but for the authors the biggest challenge was not research. ‘Atatürk’s achievements have made it seem almost unthinkable that he could ever have been a child at all; to imagine this great hero engaged in childlike activities seems almost an impertinence’ (p.xiv/xv).

The book claims that Atatürk, a born leader, did not *develop* the desire to lead his people towards freedom and progress. Rather this desire was an integral part of his personality, evident since childhood. His nature, we are told, was noble, kind-hearted and caring: he cared for puppies and younger children (p.70-75) and once bought two goldfinches just to set them free (p.26/7). ‘Someday he could lead the people of his country to freedom, the same way that in childhood he had set free those two goldfinches in the market at Salonica’ (p.180/1). National freedom, however, was not Atatürk’s only gift to his people. He also brought them individual freedom by teaching them to embrace modernity the way he had always done. Even at the age of seven, Atatürk refused to kneel at school, choosing instead to sit. He rejected tradition and religion, preferring modern education, art and science (p.42/43, 60/61, 74/5). Undoubtedly such thoughts are uncommon among seven-year-olds, but this is no common seven-year-old.

Authors looking for the man in the boy have no trouble finding or constructing him. In *Ben Mustafa Kemal*, Atatürk is also depicted as a moderniser since early childhood, rejecting corporal punishments, rote-learning and uncritical memorising at the age of seven (p.16-8, 25, 28). His opposition to traditional methods and endorsement of a new civilisational paradigm is not accidental. Atatürk knew, it is suggested, since childhood, that modernisation held the key to progress.

So Atatürk saved his people, freeing them from the Sultan’s grasp and making them a ‘proud democratic nation’ (*Özgürlük Uğruna*, p.188/189, 198/199). Everything he

promised, he delivered. In fact, the words ‘*verdiği sözü tuttu*’¹⁶ (p.23, 119) constitute a common rejoinder in Atatürk stories and anecdotes. He kept his word, against the odds, making personal sacrifices as ‘the interests of Turkey and its possibilities for survival lay with the Nationalists under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal... undefeated in pitched battle, a master of warfare and tactics’ (p.218/219). Atatürk liberated his people becoming ‘[s]choolteacher (*başöğretmen*) of the whole nation’, leading his people to progress through his reforms. Thus, he was named Atatürk:

‘His was an appropriate name indeed, because as father, he had given the Turk reason to be proud of his home and his heritage, and made him ready to play a role in the twentieth-century... In truth, just as the child Mustafa had set those two goldfinches free, the man Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had set his own people free, free from the past, free from the dictates of other political powers, free to walk tall among the nations of the world, free to live under their own laws, free to sing their own songs’ (p.244/245).

This leader, exceptional by any standards, has been further glorified since his death. For the authors, however, the divine aura surrounding Atatürk is not the product of a sustained glorification campaign. Rather, they believe that young Mustafa was on a mission and a divine hand protected him ensuring he survived to fulfil it. This narrative is not uncommon. In *Ben Mustafa Kemal* (p.76), we hear of a pocket watch taking a bullet that would have pierced Atatürk’s heart and sparing his life. In *Özgürlük Uğruna* we are told that a door fell off its hinges onto his cot (p.50/51) yet he was spared; a gun he was cleaning as a young boy fired by accident yet ‘for a wonder, no harm had been done to anybody’ (p.64/65) and Atatürk grew up having learnt not to clean a loaded gun. Even when his brothers died of diphtheria, he survived. ‘How had Mustafa escaped the dreadful disease?’ (p.20). The implication that he was spared in order to fulfil his mission is clear in this narrative. His mother, a republican Mary, knew her son was destined for greatness and although she deplored the burden he was to carry for his people, she accepted it as his mission (p.126/127). Atatürk himself also believed he had survived for a reason (p.152/153 & Yavaşlı, 2004:24, 32).

¹⁶ ‘He kept his word’.

Atatürk's ascent to prominence appears linear; career frustrations are not mentioned and his plan for national salvation is given a timeless quality. As God or providence seemingly conspire for his success, it is no wonder that Atatürk often features in books as a quasi-divine figure. The bilingual reader *Atatürk Olmak/Becoming Atatürk* is a case in point. A child is wondering what to be when he grows up. As the book teaches basic vocabulary – family members and the professions – the child learns about 'how [Atatürk] had saved Türkiye from the invaders and established the Republic' at school (p.10). Interestingly, in the English text the country retains its Turkish name while in the Turkish text it is simply referred to as 'our country'.

The child, fascinated, decides to become Atatürk when he grows up. His family, however, mock this decision: Atatürk was extraordinary, no one can resemble him; the very suggestion is a sin (p.16). 'Not only did Atatürk lead a revolution that freed a (captive) nation, but he also paved Türkiye's future by introducing reforms' (p.13). His brother laughs at him for wanting to be like Atatürk without his 'burning blue eyes and hair, which shone like the sun' (p.14). Everything about Atatürk, from his physique to his abilities, is unique and immune to replication by mere mortals.

Nevertheless, the child is told, by understanding Atatürk's thoughts and protecting his principles everyone can preserve a part of him in his heart (p.18): 'If you understand Atatürk, then he will always be within you' (p.19). The child then 'knew that Atatürk would live within his heart throughout his life and guide him. As he would, all the other children on the path to peace and brotherhood' (p.20) like a patron saint or a guardian angel. Thus, the *Address to Youth* becomes not a political bequest, but the articulation of a moral duty for Turkish youth.

This is undeniably the stuff of poetry and, indeed, poetry it has inspired. Anthologies such as Atak's (ND) child and youth poems or Günes's (ND) Atatürk poetry anthology pay patriotic homage to Atatürk and the Independence War. Some, such as Özyürekli's (2002) *Mustafa Kemal'in Süvarileri*, complement dramatic verse with graphic battle drawings and photographic material from the Independence War. Çakmakçioğlu's (1997) best-selling *Atatürk Destanı* – the Atatürk epic, placed alongside the Gilgamesh epic and the Odyssey in bookshops – celebrates Atatürk's quasi-divinity.

Atatürk, the poem starts, was thinking of the people that had been forgotten for many years and were thirsting for freedom (p.8-9). No one else thought of them while the enemies were ravaging the country. But Atatürk came to the people in answer to their prayers. In the book, a picture shows trees in bloom and an angel hovering over a dancing crowd. Atatürk came to his people, with whom he belonged (p.12), and took up their cause. With his arrival the first rose blossom tore through the darkness (p.13). Atatürk's intervention restored his people's pride, progress and prosperity (p.24); his arrival enabled the water to flow, the trees to bear fruit and the sun to rise (p.14, 27).

Figurative language emphatically stressing how 'Atatürk's light' changed his country's destiny is expected in a patriotic poem. Its effects, however, should not be underestimated. Atatürk is vested with the power to defeat fate and affect nature. Not only did he re-draw the motherland's map, he also made all his people – whom he had known for centuries – be 'of the same blood' (p.15). Although the nation is claimed as having always existed, Atatürk awakened and united it. In fact, it was through Atatürk that the nation acquired the unifying tie of shared blood. The poem dramatises national awakening: rolling drums follow Atatürk's wake-up call as villagers take up arms and join him (p.17-18) to reclaim their land. During all this, Atatürk remains outside and above the nation which is symbolised by Mehmet, the soldier (p.18).

After liberating the nation, Atatürk 'founded the Republic' (p.19). Once again, establishing the Republic is presented as an integral part of the national Independence War. Once again, historical agency is vested in Atatürk. The nation followed: when he laughed, they laughed and when he called, they went (p.20). The nation accepted Atatürk's Republic and the youth accepted the duty of protecting it and defending national unity, knowing that the strength necessary flows in their noble blood (p.21).

The organic tie Atatürk and his people share is extended to include the Republic. Ankara is the nation's heart, where love beats and the Assembly works (p.22). As the Republic is organic, it is natural and essential. Atatürk's reforms, then, were necessary. Republicanism was not a choice, but a natural imperative as Atatürk was creating civilisation (p.23). And he succeeded. Everything the Turks enjoy today, from apples and waves to literacy and international respect is Atatürk's gift. So whenever problems occur, whenever there is confusion or uncertainty, the Turks turn

to him for answers as he is the flag that never disappears from the skies (p.26): Atatürk has not left his people and they have not left him.

Atatürk Destanı stresses that Turks still eagerly answer his call to arms (p.28) and shows drawings of schoolchildren – wholesome boys and uncovered girls – solemnly filing past an Atatürk bust while mourners hold flags and copies of *Nutuk* and Atatürk's head hovers above them (p.29). Atatürk has not left his people, he still reaches down to wipe our tears, the poem continues, stroke our hair and say 'now that the Mustafa Kemals have grown, no one can make our fatherland disappear'. On the last page, the *Address to Youth* spells out the Turks' mission in their Father's words.

Can such a leader's bequest be ignored? Atatürk changed history, defeated enemies against all odds and modernised Turkey. His call on Turkey's youth to defend his legacy is hard to disregard; his assurance, that their blood vests them with the power to do so, is hard to disbelieve. As Atatürk's people, the Turks inherit his deterministic momentum towards success, survival and glory, as long as they remain loyal to Atatürk's legacy. The Republic thus emerges as both the repository of national essence and the only path towards success and progress.

3. Essential(ist) Civics

A republican narrative, hinged on Atatürk, accompanies the story of national liberation discussed above. In *Atatürk ve Cumhuriyet*, pages 14-15 juxtapose everyday life before and after Atatürk. The dichotomy of old/new is simultaneously one of good/bad: Arabic is written on a piece of grey scroll, Latin ABCs on a bright red book. The Ottoman student sits on the floor reading the Quran while the modern (blond) child is seated at a desk in a sunnier room, wearing colourful clothing. 'New' things – associated with Atatürk's reforms and, hence, the Republic – are brighter.

In *Ben Mustafa Kemal* the Republic is equated with modernity and 'contemporary' is equated with 'good' as early as page 10. By default, religion is equated with backwardness, which is inherently bad. The Republic, we are told, brought modern national schools, free from foreign oppression or religious superstition (p.122-3), as

well as modern clothes (p.124) and surnames (p.126), thus enabling the Turks to enter the contemporary world. Secularism, therefore, does not need to be discussed as policy. Religion is dismissed as the reactionaries' domain: men with no interest in national survival (p.61, 95). Yet national survival is the most important task and the Republic is discussed as a natural part of Atatürk's struggle for national salvation.

The Republic is depicted as born and subsequently named, as a child would be (p.115). Interestingly, the schoolbook *Hayat Bilgisi* uses exactly the same imagery. Atatürk does not proclaim a republic in 1923, he simply names a structure that grew organically as national sovereignty and representation took root (p.51).

According to *Ben Mustafa Kemal*, secularism is an inherent part of the republican order, in fact, one cannot exist without the other. The issue of whether the country was ready for secularism does not arise. Secularism is a given for contemporary civilisation and when Atatürk offered the Turks freedom and independence, he did so through a secular republic. Today's Turks ought to defend the entire package as part of their national legacy. The book concludes with Atatürk's famous words, 'my mortal body will one day turn to dust, but Turkey's Republic will live forever', and the appeal 'remember me' (p.132). The appeal is hardly necessary. For anyone educated in Turkey, Atatürk is impossible to forget.

Birinci Kitap, designed for use in schools both at home and among Turkish migrants abroad, starts with a patriotic poem dedicated 'to our heroic soldiers' guarding the homeland without ever sleeping. Although this poem is, undoubtedly, beyond the children's reading abilities, its presence is significant. Read out by the teacher in class, the poem is visually enhanced by a flag, map and Atatürk's portrait and reaffirmed by a civics section, planted in the middle of the ABCs, discussing the significance of Republican holidays through simple narrative and photographs.

Every year on 29 October, the book narrates, the nation pays its respects to Atatürk's mausoleum and Assembly buildings. Pictures of young scouts carrying flags give children an active role in Republic Day ceremonies, enhancing the desired sense of ownership of Atatürk's republican legacy. The sacred duty to protect this legacy is stressed in the discussion of the Atatürk Commemoration Ceremony, which takes place on the anniversary of his death, 10 November 1938. The picture of a clock,

showing 9:05, teaches the child the exact time of Atatürk's death. This is not simply patriotic trivia; students learn that the clock on Atatürk's bedside stopped when he passed away. No mystical interpretation is offered, but none is needed.

Through this account, children learn to identify national landmarks, such as Anıtkabir, and are introduced to the dual image of Atatürk as familiar father and divine leader. A picture of Atatürk in a garden with a child and the caption 'Atatürk loved children' seeks to establish accessibility, while a picture of Atatürk seated at his desk, under the caption 'Atatürk worked hard for our country', establishes reverential admiration. The knowledge that this extraordinary individual loved 'us' and dedicated his life to 'us', creates an overpowering sense of gratitude and makes the map of Turkey, at the end of the book, seem like Atatürk's gift to its young readers.

Maps appear in every schoolbook, stressing the significance of Anatolia – delivered by Atatürk's victorious Independence War and administered by his Republic – in the students' own lives. This visual representation of national geography and administrative sovereignty effectively celebrates Atatürk's legacy and achievements, while also reminding young Turks of their duty to protect the motherland. The *Address to Youth* features both in the actual books and at the forefront of their authors' minds.

Hayat Bilgisi's readers are urged to be true, to work and to love their country and nation, paraphrasing the mantra *Türk öğün çalış güven*¹⁷, often inscribed under Atatürk's busts. The opening pages hail the great Atatürk for giving Turkey worthy goals. The first chapter discusses the beginning of the school year, showing classrooms, schoolyards and assembly halls sporting Atatürk busts, banners and portraits. Students, who stood by Atatürk's bust in their own schoolyard and sang the national anthem, thus learn that their experience is shared by all Turkish schoolchildren (p.10), forging national awareness and a feeling of unity.

This feeling is part of the desired national consciousness and a wider Republican project. Part of this project is 'being modern', hence 'modern' traits are celebrated and promoted alongside patriotism in *Hayat Bilgisi*: fitness, cleanliness, personal

¹⁷ 'Turk be proud, work and trust'.

hygiene, a healthy diet and proper sleeping patterns (unit 6), as well as decency and good manners (p.20). Politics is discussed in terms of administering the beautiful homeland (p.82-4). Although the country's physical beauty is celebrated, with pictures and references to its numerous tourist attractions, it does not divert attention away from the true source of national pride: republicanism. Through references to school and national elections (p.23 & p.57 respectively), the book seeks to make civics relevant to students. Similarly, the discussion of the Republic's significance is framed in a narrative of rights and freedoms, which the students themselves enjoy within it (p.98-99). Such rights can only exist in a republic, the book notes. Hence the children ought to love the Republic, honour Atatürk – whose gift it is – and the ancestors who died in its defence, and do their duty: vote, work and do military service (p.107) in order to protect the Republic just as Atatürk did.

Hayat Bilgisi dedicates an entire section to the national awakening that began with Atatürk's landing at Samsun (p.47ff). Although republican reforms are not discussed at length and their radical nature is underplayed, they are presented as an integral and necessary stage of the war effort. It is interesting that, although treaties and ceasefires are named and dated, the book focuses less on the war and more on its achievements, namely the national modernising republic presented here as inherently *popular*, a true national endeavour (see unit 9). Simultaneously, however, it is abundantly clear that family law, gender equality and modernity itself are Atatürk's gifts. Every Turk owes Atatürk a debt of gratitude for having 'loved the homeland and the nation very much' and for having 'worked for the homeland and the nation all his life long' (p.64). The emotional appeal is compounded by patriotic poems (e.g. p.67).

Turkishness is premised on republicanism, which is Atatürk's gift. Yet this civic narrative is not free from purely ethnic references. *Özgürlük Uğruna* claims that Turkey was Atatürk's creation, but the nation was not. Atatürk awoke a nation that existed since time immemorial. This national awakening was not separable from the Republic's birth, as Atatürk identified republicanism as the only way to save the country (p.208/209). His people would learn to accept democracy so they could eventually be ruled by representatives and not one person, 'no matter how talented' (p.232/233). The Republic is thus incorporated into nationhood as, without it, the nation would have slept on or perished. Protecting the Republic is now a national

duty. The ability to do so, as the famous *Address* goes, is in the Turks' blood. Republicanism thus, peculiarly, becomes an ethnic trait.

ITA promotes a similarly essentialised civics account. The book celebrates the Amasya Declaration as the turning point in Turkish history, after which territorial unity and national independence became the core principles of politics. Nevertheless, *ITA* suggests, the voice speaking through the declaration is Atatürk's (p.82). Although *ITA* celebrates popular sovereignty, this does not translate to a discussion of national agency. In *ITA* the sole historical agent is Atatürk. Independence and freedom are Atatürk's gift. This inherently contradictory postulation is viable because the nation is fashioned in Atatürk's image, hence his will encompasses national volition. The nation does not exist independently from Atatürk. Hence, his statement that '[f]reedom and independence are of my character. The most important legacy for my nation ... is that I am a man full of love for independence' (p.73) *ipso facto* makes freedom and independence traits of a Turkish national character.

Yet the Turk, by this definition, craves national, not individual freedom. Hence when Atatürk states that '[t]he Republic is the most appropriate type of government given the creation and character of the Turkish nation' (p.181) he is referring to a vehicle for the expression of a collectivist nationalism and his own modernising plan, *not* to a political arrangement that would bind and limit him in his endeavours. Moreover, this statement renders alternative political arrangements 'inappropriate'. Consequently, the Sultanate had to be banned, especially as it defied national volition by bowing to foreign interests. Besides, the Turkish nation needed progress and a return to past systems or practices was not going to help. Rather, the nation selected a new president to redeem past deficiencies (p.183). Atatürk was elected unanimously on 29 October 1923, as the Republic was proclaimed. That day the regime, already *essentially* a Republic, was given its true name (p.184).

Reform is presented as the restoration of Turkish politics back to a natural state of affairs. The Caliphate is discussed in terms of an issue needing resolution (p.185). Its abolition was Atatürk's answer to a problem. A technical discussion of the Caliphate's origins presents it as a political institution. The tensions that accompanied decisions and reforms are downplayed and the Caliphate's abolition is presented as natural (p.185-6). Reform is once again depicted as less controversial than it actually

was, thus dispensing with the need to discuss opposition to Atatürk's policies. If something is 'natural' then its alternatives are, by implication, not.

The Caliphate's abolition is depicted as structurally expedient and historically apt. As a symbol of the old regime, we are told, the Caliphate could become a dangerous focal point for regressive political elements. Now that the road for open-mindedness and enlightenment was open, should Turkey risk returning to an artificial order (p.188)? The recalibration of power-politics resulting from this reform is not discussed. The book simply notes that it strengthened national sovereignty, allowing the Republic to move into a *laik düzen* (secular order), wherein the state had no religious foundations and used no religious symbols; religion was now the citizens' domain. Secularism is celebrated as an essential part of republicanism.

As the Republic is a natural political arrangement for the Turks, *İTA* does not elaborate on secularism's inherent value. Secularism is not relativised by being discussed as a reform. Rather, alongside nationalism, it is promoted as the foundation of both reforms and, by extension, the Republic. Secularism is presented as a paradigm-shift marking the transition to a new and distinct historical and civilisational period. With secularism, a new era of law and justice was inaugurated: 'Secularism, national sovereignty, democracy, freedom ... are the contemporary order of life' (p.290); they are natural so they are not debatable.

'National narratives are constructed out of romantic ideas about the past and desires, both conscious and unconscious, about what the present and the future should look like' (Heathorn, 2000:197). For Kemalists, the past held horrors and frustrated opportunities. The only thing worth keeping about the Turks' past was the Turks themselves, now led into a glorious future by Atatürk. Turkey's national strength – economic, socio-cultural and military (*İTA*, p.253) – was to be harnessed in the name of this civilisational transition. The Turks had to focus on achievements natural to the era they lived in. Modernisation means 'conforming with what is necessary' (p.181). This principle, we are told, is the basis of Turkish society's values and institutions as, for Atatürk, modernisation was a question of life and death for Turkey. All sacrifices were to be endured in its name. That was Atatürk's decision, the nation followed suit.

Growing up in this Kemalist-saturated context means that Turks become 'fluent' in the language that is Kemalism. They may choose not to speak it, but they understand it. It also means that, for some, the language evokes feelings of duty, gratitude and determination, while it neatly corresponds with categories of value for everyone educated into this system. The propagation of this language and its corresponding priorities and value-system continues through spatial narratives.

Chapter 3, Continuing ‘National Education’: Spatial Narratives

A language needs to be constantly used in order to survive and not be superseded. Kemalism, used so extensively in children’s patriotic literature and schoolbooks, remains present in everyday adult experiences, its symbols pervading daily life. Atatürk’s face can be seen on coins and notes – including the AKP-introduced New Turkish Lira – above store counters, in schoolyards, courtrooms, police stations, squares and on street corners, accompanied by engravings and banners of his sayings. No other hero or statesman is honoured thus. Spatial narratives endorse national history’s message: Atatürk is celebrated as an extraordinary hero, achieving Turkey’s ‘awakening’ and liberation alone; all other leaders were his assistants and apprentices.

Atatürk emerges as a symbol of dangers overcome and greatness achieved. Monuments and statues celebrate his super-human, quasi-divine attributes, thus lending his legacy added weight. Simultaneously, and confirming narratives encountered in childhood, museums cultivate a secondary narrative reminding Turks that Atatürk was real. He slept, ate, wrote letters, had baths and needed socks. This trivialisation helps bring a quasi-mythical figure within reach and permits identification; Atatürk was, after all, a Turk, the nation’s finest specimen. Turks are invited to revel in pride for his achievements, but never to believe that they can be emulated or repeated. The proliferation of Atatürk’s images also warns the people against straying from his modernising republican path. In order to achieve this, spatial narratives build on the fusion of republican, national and secular symbols and utilise Atatürk’s face as a symbol of the specific Kemalist identity, already discussed. Thus, imagery and assumptions learnt at a young age are constantly re-affirmed and re-launched, turning national socialisation into a lifelong process and nation-building an ongoing state activity.

Spatial narratives, constituting the most effective method of continuous national education, are hinged on four core themes: the nation’s founding moment – constantly rekindling gratitude towards Atatürk; national and territorial unity and the need for its protection; a glorification of the nation’s ‘true’ representatives: soldiers, teachers and peasants; and a celebration of modernisation, through symbols associated with

progress and the West¹. Although living in this symbolic universe does not necessarily make one a Kemalist, it perpetuates national socialisation in adulthood. Categories of meaning are reproduced and associations, such as the link between republicanism and secularism, or patriotism and loyalty to Atatürk, are sustained. Again, as was the case in Chapter 2, this reproduction is partly state-sponsored and partly the outcome of individual and group initiatives sustaining a common currency of symbols and narratives through which political legitimisation is articulated.

With that in mind, in this chapter I will look at public monuments – inescapably part of everyday life – and museums, as they are well-attended and their message enjoys a large audience. As such national sites are entirely state-managed, their reproduction of Kemalist language, priorities, symbols and narratives is ‘unadulterated’. Moreover, their sheer number gives Kemalism an undeniable symbolic advantage over other ‘languages’. Simultaneously, the propagation of Kemalist language through museums and galleries is equally important as curated sites carry the stamp of the expert and thus enjoy respect and acceptance as ‘objective’ and ‘true’. This is particularly important as adults, notes Riegel (1996:89), tend to learn about history and ethnography through museums rather than books. Naturally, the potential effect of this ‘education’ relies wholly on attendance. While at school the national curriculum has a captive audience, here individuals need to choose to attend. And they do.

Although archaeological and ethnographic museums are the domain of tourists and schoolchildren (becoming, by default, part of early learning), commemorative spaces and exhibitions related to the Independence War and Atatürk are filled with Turks, defying Fyfe and Ross’s (1996:127) disclaimer that museum attendance is linked to class. During my numerous visits to all museums, monuments and sites discussed in this chapter (between 2002 and 2005) I was surrounded by people from diverse economic and socio-religious backgrounds. As the subject matter of national museums is familiar to all, those lacking extensive cultural capital are not intimidated. For museums openly dedicated to nation-building, such accessibility, notes Wittlin (1949:186, 202, 205), is a sign of success as their purpose is to help familiarise people with the requirements and traits of their collective identity and the demands of

¹ Interestingly, modernisation was never celebrated through the glorification of bureaucrats, entrepreneurs or scientific elites. This was a populist message.

national citizenship. Hence the museum seeks to integrate the past with the present and the local with the international in the context of a specific national narrative.

Museums turn the past into an invaluable resource for a modernising state's pursuit of progress (Walsh, 1992:37-8). Unsurprisingly, the Kemalist state has used museums since its inception in order to propagate a specific national narrative and the corresponding modernising project. Museums have been used to forge a link between nationhood and allegiance to the secular Republic and to promote the assumption that westernisation does not constitute policy, but a historical necessity.

When choosing to use museums as part of their modernising project, the Kemalists drew inspiration from a century's worth of experimentation in the guided production of knowledge. Museums had been used for the political socialisation of citizens since the French revolution when '[t]he museum was a crucial instrument that enabled the construction of a new set of values that at once discredited the *ancien regime* and celebrated the Republic' (Hooper-Greenhill, 1992:190). This is what Kemalists sought to achieve. They were not alone. In Nigeria museums helped people visualise national unity (Kaplan, 1994:75-77). In Greece the founding of the new national state practically coincided with the founding of the first national museum (Avgouli, 1994:261), while in Mexico, between 1825 and 1925, the National Museum was not only dedicated to discovering Mexico's 'patriotic identity', but also an accepted symbol of that identity (Morales-Moreno, 1994:183-4).

This open dedication to national socialisation is particularly significant. Museums are, by definition, the habitat of the expert. Some people consciously visit museums in order to learn, true to the schoolbook's enthusiastic endorsement of museums as the perfect place to learn about the nation's glorious past (*Hayat Bilgisi*, p.200). Invariably, museum visitors accept that exhibitions offer 'facts' and knowledge rather than artefacts and opinions. Objects in a museum are deemed valuable and important and museum narratives automatically true. As Macdonald (1998:2) notes: 'Exhibitions tend to be presented to the public rather as do scientific facts: as unequivocal statements rather than as the outcome of particular processes and contexts.' In a Foucauldian Power/Knowledge nexus, Bennett (1995:59, 63) finds, the museum possesses knowledge and the visitor does not. Although the visitors are empowered through the opportunity to learn what the institution of power already

knows, the ‘truth’ they are given access to is tainted and specific as the museum offers what Hooper-Greenhill (1992:193) calls ‘society[’s] “general politics” of “truth”.’

Nevertheless, the belief that the museum bestows objective knowledge is what makes it useful as a political socialisation tool. The actual message, as Hooper-Greenhill (1992:195) succinctly puts it, is in the narrative, not the object displayed. The curator turns maps, medals and fragments of objects into a story, leaving alternative stories untold. Can the visitors see through the narrative? Some can, most choose not to. Firstly, the museum’s *de facto* ‘objectivity’ makes it unlikely for credibility questions to be raised. Secondly, narrative is what makes museums ‘good to think with’ (Fyfe and Ross, 1996:148). Without narrative, the museums’ appeal is heavily diluted if not altogether lost. Bennett (1995:131) agrees: the display context within which artefacts are placed makes them relevant, evoking memories and creating expectations. Museums thus come to not simply represent, but embody the national past. If nations are ‘never-ending stories’ (Bennett, 1995:148), museums represent the state’s attempt to stitch together what is known of these stories into a coherent national narrative.

In Turkey, this narrative is simultaneously physically inscribed onto urban spaces. Although architecture is not part of my analysis, it is important to stress that ‘the planning of the capital city of Ankara is an unsurpassed example of the monumental narrative of modern Turkey’ (Nalbantoğlu, 1997:193). Architecture ‘assumed a larger-than-life mission in Turkish nation-building’ (Bozdoğan, 2001:6, 298), as modernity lacked both a material base and a coherent social agent. Thus, the state took charge, manipulating public space in order to give Turkey a modern aspect. Reinforced concrete became a symbol of modernity, itself a constitutive part of Turkish nationalism. Having changed the script and replaced the calendar, and in order to achieve a visual representation of national imperatives and state ideology, Atatürk decreed the construction of buildings *à la* Corbusier and Soviet-style statues celebrating progress (Akman, 2004:103-111) and symbolising the modernisation drive. Since Atatürk’s death, the most potent such symbol has been Atatürk himself.

1. Atatürk

Ahmad (2003:87) notes that Atatürk felt confident enough to have his statue unveiled in Istanbul as early as 1926. This was a bold move. The Republic was still young, and, traditionally, Islam frowns upon the representation of living form. Since then, however, statues and busts have proliferated to the extent that '[t]here is not one city in Turkey that does not have at least one square with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's statue at its centre' (Çınar, 2005:99-100). Atatürk's likeness expresses allegiance to the nation and its principles, even abstract ones such as secularism. In fact, Atatürk's face has become a signifier of republican legitimacy, national greatness and progress.

In Istanbul's noisy Taksim Square, near Beyoğlu's crowded cafés and bookstores, stands the Republic Monument (fig.1). Here Atatürk is simultaneously honoured as a soldier and statesman, on one side depicted in full military regalia and on the other wearing a Western-style suit, celebrating both military prowess and modernisation. This monument is a rare specimen, depicting Atatürk in the company of others – historical personalities, war heroes and deputies. Nevertheless, he remains prominent, in a pose of quiet determination, undoubtedly leading those around him. Part of this group consists of flag-wielding *Mehmetçik* figures. The national flag, a quasi-totemic object, in the hands of a figure celebrated as the nation's most authentic representative enhances the message of national urgency and pride with Atatürk emerging as the link between national liberation and the Republic, and a symbol for both.

The Republic Monument is a reminder of the gratitude owed to all soldiers, whatever their rank, for their role in establishing and protecting national independence and the Republic. Naturally, gratitude is, above all, owed to Atatürk, who delivered the homeland and established the Republic. Here, the celebration of his reforms is subtle – implied in his Western clothes but, above all, the choice of location for the monument. Taksim stresses Istanbul's modern, secular aspect with its bustling nightlife and European pedigree. In fact, Taksim was specifically chosen as the site for this monument in 1928 exactly because it lacked a mosque. As the foreigners' quarter in Ottoman times, Beyoğlu is full of churches and synagogues, but the Ottoman-Islamist heritage is weaker. With no minarets in sight, Taksim became a symbol of republican Istanbul. Arguably the Islamist municipality had this symbolic narrative in mind when, in 1994, it contemplated building a mosque off Taksim.

Although the project was justified in terms of the area's need for a mosque in light of other faiths' over-representation, Islamists are aware of Beyoğlu's Republican character and its symbolic significance for the nation-state. Trying to build a mosque in Taksim was a heavily charged move that, if successful, would have broken the Kemalist symbolic monopoly. For some, this constituted a provocative attempt to undermine what this monument and whole area stand for: national unity within the secular republic. Çınar (2005:116-7), however, believes that the Islamists' choice of Taksim over a more traditional area, such as Sultanahmet, for their mosque project is not subversive. Rather it shows that the Islamists do not wish to create an alternative centre, but embrace the nation-state and desire a voice within it. Kemalism, implies Çınar, has won. Either way, this controversy – stressing the extent to which the negotiation of public space in Turkey occurs in Kemalist terms – highlights the state's commitment to the preservation of Kemalist space. It is significant that the state blocked the building of the Taksim mosque when hundreds of mosques are being built all over Turkey every year. It is as significant, however, that Islamist politicians seek to share Kemalist space without affecting a breach by moving to an alternative centre. Regardless of whether they ultimately desire to coexist with Kemalism or defeat it, the struggle for symbolic supremacy is taking place on Kemalist terrain.

Not that non-Kemalist terrain really exists in Turkey. Things have changed since 1928. Now Istanbul's every corner bears Kemalism's mark: from fashionable Bebek to dusty Fatih, Istanbul is dotted with Atatürk's statues and busts. Some Turks enjoy being reminded of Atatürk's exploits. Others resent the perceived personality cult, even though they appreciate Atatürk's legacy. And there are those who resent both the man and the statues so much that they are willing to pour green paint – Islam's colour – over them. Such incidents are rare but not unheard of.

When Atatürk's statue in Sincan's Lale Meydani was vandalised, the city's Kaymakam, Ertan Yüksel spoke of 'desecration' and called the attack 'disgusting and provocative... an attempt to sully Sincan's honour' (9-10 July 2005 *TNA*). The local CHP head, Kemal Baştımur, accused the perpetrators of seeking to remind everyone of Sincan's 'dark past'², while crowds denounced the vandal in their midst.

² Sincan was the site of intense religious tension on the eve of the 1997 soft coup, see Chapter 5.

This struggle for symbolic control is unequal. Vandals, armed with tins of green paint, have an endless task ahead given the sheer number of secular republican symbols. Moreover, this is not simply a struggle against the state, police and judiciary; many, if not most, citizens espouse Kemalism and resent such acts. Throwing paint over Atatürk does not merely constitute antisocial behaviour, it mocks the Republic, the nation and the Turkish state's modernising secular identity. Punishments reflect that. Murat Vural, found guilty of five separate instances of vandalism including the Sincan incident, was sentenced to 22 years in prison – four-and-a-half years per vandalised statue. Although penalties are usually softer, the court explained, Vural was a repeat offender who showed no remorse. He therefore had to be made an example of as the desecration of Atatürk's statues was an open challenge to the secular order (*H*, 3 November 2005; *E*, 4 November 2005).

The connection between respecting Atatürk's statues and respecting the Republic can be taken to extremes as Veysel Dalcı, AKP leader for Fatsa, discovered. Dalcı was arrested following accusations of 'disrespectfully chewing gum during an April 23 ceremony' while laying a wreath in front of Atatürk's statue (*H*, 27 April 2006). Dalcı is lodging an official complaint with the TAF General Staff, yet the incident is telling of the diligence with which secular Republican symbols are protected against potential disrespect by suspected anti-secular actors, such as the AKP.

The symbolic representation of secularism is important for Turkey's national project. Although Atatürk's face encapsulates secularism, alternative symbols are also used, such as women who have dispensed of the veil and are embracing modernity. Variations on this theme abound. Outside Istanbul University, Atatürk's statue is accompanied by two stern, athletic youths: a man in a loincloth shouldering a flag and a woman holding a torch, steadied by the Father's hand on her back (fig.2). The complex represents virility, strength, progress and freedom. Such statues, Bozdoğan (2001:75) notes, expose a Kemalist fascination with youth and health comparable to that of Fascist Italy, only here the immortal leader is guiding the nation to a better future through education, not martial virtue. The torch of knowledge burns bright, symbolically held by a woman, whom Atatürk liberated from the veil.

This basic semiotic recipe of torches, books, doves and flags is used frequently. In Çeşme's central square, Atatürk stands taller than adoring, flag-bearing youths. On

Kuşadası's seaside promenade, Atatürk – again taller than other figures – holds hands with two athletes: a man bearing a torch and a woman holding a dove. The structure, surrounded by Turkish flags, stands on a plaque reading *yurtta sulh cihanda sulh*³. On the outskirts of Foça a composite sculpture of Atatürk and two small children, a boy and a girl, holding a book stands next to an engraving urging young Turks to aim high in the Republic's name.

This national narrative is glorious in its simplicity, representing peace and progress through easy-to-decode symbols and depicting the nation through young and wholesome, yet 'nameless' figures, eagerly following Atatürk. The nation – men and women, side by side – is young, strong and healthy, eager to strive for education and progress under Atatürk's watchful gaze. Education holds the key; hence the image of a young teacher or student, holding a book – modern script clearly visible on the cover – becomes an important modernisation symbol. Atatürk remains the nation's mentor and guardian, the *büyük öğretmen* (great teacher) leading his people to progress. Outside İzmir's Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, Atatürk is seated in a huge armchair next to a lengthy quote urging students to embrace modern art and science and labour towards national greatness and security. Such quotes, seemingly engraved on every available surface and the numerous statues adorning every Turkish town, create a tight nexus of meaning, consisting of images, admonitions and a general feeling that Atatürk's teachings can help ordinary Turks navigate through the challenges of everyday life.

Atatürk's face thus becomes an icon, a promise of 'protection'. In the quiet park behind Istanbul's Topkapı palace (fig.3) or on an imposing pedestal (fig.4), Atatürk is forever watching over his land and people. Near İzmir's NATO headquarters, a majestic statue gives this protection an edge: Mustafa Kemal, uniformed and on horseback, is pointing towards where the Greeks came from and retreated back to, forever guarding Anatolia's coast and reminding his people of how close Turkey came to not existing. On the marble pedestal, a Delacroix-esque battle scene – complete with flag-carrying woman – dramatises the sense of danger.

³ 'Peace at home, peace in the world', a famous Atatürk quote, also the motto of the Foreign Ministry and the daily *Milliyet*.

Atatürk saved Turkey from imminent danger and his legacy will protect it from future perils. Hence his face becomes a lucky charm on crests and logos, while roads, buildings, schools and airports are named after him regardless of any link to his life or person. The Kredi ve Yurtlar Kurumu⁴ logo, outside a girls' hall of residence in downtown Istanbul, consists of two girls' faces superimposed onto Atatürk's. In Istanbul's Kuştepe neighbourhood, a primary school sports a reproduction of one of the leader's most famous wartime photographs on its outside wall. In Sıhhiye, a run-down Ankara neighbourhood, a school founded in 1886, when Atatürk was a baby⁵, is called *Atatürk Lisesi*. The school was neither attended nor founded by Atatürk, it was simply (re)named after him, as if Atatürk's name was itself a talisman.

The omnipresence of Atatürk's name and face serves as a constant reminder of his achievements and legacy. Atatürk is among his people, guiding them, but also assessing their progress down the path he chose for them. The proliferation of such symbols in schools is particularly apt for reminding students – especially girls – that modern education is a gift that they have a duty to protect. Through education, Atatürk gives his children the opportunity to remain free, become strong and work towards actualising his modernising project. This message is inscribed in every schoolyard next to Atatürk's bust (fig.5), yet is not limited to schools.

Atatürk's ubiquity both bolsters his legacy and serves to turn every activity into a patriotic endeavour of utmost national significance, from the quote in İzmir's tiny ethnographic museum extolling culture and civilisation (fig.6) to the signs in Çeşme's small but busy harbour admonishing the locals: '*vatandaş: her turist büyükelçidir*'⁶. Banners, Atatürk's profile in one corner, warn against littering or parking illegally. Creating a modern, civilised country is everyone's **duty** and public spaces are dotted with 'reminders' of what is expected of people. Thus, notes Herb (1999:23), a national landscape – cleansed of all visible traces of previous occupancy through expulsion, annihilation or symbolic effacing – can be claimed. For Herb, Atatürk's face, carved on wood and erected on a mountainside outside Urla, marks the symbolic appropriation of space and its inundation with appropriate (Kemalist) symbols.

⁴ Credit and Dormitory Foundation.

⁵ Atatürk was born in the winter of 1880-1.

⁶ 'Patriot, every tourist is an ambassador'.

This process becomes particularly significant moving East. Öktem (2004:569) notes that in Kurdish-populated regions, hills are often inscribed with the crescent and star and slogans such as *baş öğretmen Atatürk* or *ne mutlu Türküm diyene*. Such inscriptions, Öktem finds, proliferated during the height of the PKK's insurgency in the late 1980s. This 'Kemalisation' of space, notes Öktem (2004:564), followed the elimination of the area's alternative heritage, through neglect, migration or systematic destruction. As, until recently, part of the Southeast was under martial law, the process of cultural 'neutralisation' and re-appropriation was greatly facilitated – even though, simultaneously, the boundaries of the region under martial law 'traced a Kurdish map and put it before the international public'⁷.

The Southeast is a riddle for Turkey. Politically complicated and morally charged, the 'Southeastern issue' is the subject of intense and bitter debate, coloured by different perceptions of justice and personal loss on all sides. For McDowall (2000:210), 'Turkey had unmistakably intended genocide of the Kurdish people. In practice its intentions were defeated by the sheer size of the task'. But intentions are hard to ascertain. What is known is that Kurds joined Mustafa Kemal in his rejection of the treaty of Sèvres, even though it offered them national independence. Through the co-optation of urban notables and tribal chiefs and by playing the religious card, Atatürk then claimed the Kurds as the Turks' ethnic kin⁸. Yet the Turkish embrace was vice-like. As early as 1922 the Kemalists spoke of 'bringing the Kurds to a higher level of civilization through the building of schools, roads and (more ominously) gendarmerie posts and military service [...] explicit within only a few months was the idea of turning Kurds into good Turks' (McDowall, 2000:191). This fits in well with the Kemalist penchant for state-sponsored social reform, as well as the association of tribalism and peasantry with backwardness. But modernisation in the Kurdish areas required a more intense symbolic campaign than elsewhere.

The Kemalisation of space was meticulous. References to Kurdistan disappeared from official materials, Kurdish provinces were renamed and their boundaries redrawn. Hence, Le Ray (2005:4) relates, Dersim became Tunceli, failing to include much of

⁷ Former chief of parliamentary commission of unresolved political murders, Sadık Avundukluoğlu (Z, 19 August 2005).

⁸ Although, McDowall (2000:189-190) notes, the Kurds are of Iranian not Turanic origin.

historic Dersim. Turkish became the only acceptable language. Attempts at reaction and revolt led to brutal reprisals and, according to McDowall (2000:199), often unrelated arrests, executions and large-scale deportations. In Atatürk's lifetime, war was raging and Turkification was far from subtle. The state's unitary national vision and the goal of westernisation meant that the Kurds, referred to as 'mountain Turks', were a national hurdle to be overcome. Their resistance to the Republic was regarded as reaction against progress that had to be crushed for their own good.

Today, Turkification campaigns differ. There is a flag-raising ceremony in Tunceli's central square twice a week (Le Ray, 2005:7), while inscriptions on surrounding mountainsides read *ne mutlu Türküm diyene* and *önce vatan*⁹. The removal of Kurdish symbols from urban landscapes, notes Le Ray (2005:7), went as far as replacing all green bulbs in traffic lights with blue ones to prevent the Kurdish colours (red-yellow-green) from flashing up on a daily basis.

The campaign has had mixed results. Among the Southeast's Alevi population¹⁰, the state has abandoned its confrontational attitude in favour of co-optation. The 1980s synthesis-inspired mosque-building spree ceded its place to toleration, if not support, for the construction of *cem evleri*, the Alevi place of worship. With the Kurds, however, the situation is more volatile. The existence of the PKK, whose history of violence clouds the fact that it does not have a clear position on the issue of separatism, complicates matters. Simultaneously, certain public figures, such as Diyarbakır Mayor Osman Baydemir, stress their commitment to the unitary state, noting that Kurds and Turks 'founded the Republic together and will keep it alive by being supportive of one another' (TDN, 12 August 2005).

Nevertheless, achieving an atmosphere of cooperation is difficult because of the Kemalist state's Jacobin approach to citizenship, effectively proclaiming 'to the Kurd as individual, everything; to the (politically conscious and culturally assertive) Kurd, nothing'. Many, including PKK sympathisers, resent having to choose. Yet for others, including many Kurds in Tunceli, the distinction presents no problem as people pride themselves on the purity of their Turkish and their attachment to Atatürk.

⁹ 'First of all, the motherland'.

¹⁰ The Sunni-Alevi divide cuts across the Turkish-Kurdish divide.

This attachment, as noted before, is so closely linked to national identity and political republicanism that land inhabited by people loyal to Atatürk is *ipso facto* considered 'safe'. As Kemalist nationalism is premised on citizenship and territoriality on the one hand, and blood and ethnicity on the other, loyalty to Atatürk as an external manifestation of national belonging means that the populations in question 'fit' the nation and deserve the land they live on. This 'desert' is vital as Anatolia, as discussed above, bestows metaphysical continuity and belonging to the people that inhabit it, effectively merging civic and ethnic national narratives. For this reason, it is vital that no non-Turk be allowed to claim Anatolia as his natural home.

The request to reopen Ayasofya as a mosque in the 1950s to mark the 500th anniversary of the 1453 fall of Constantinople is a manifestation of this need to celebrate Anatolia's ownership. Similarly, the reaction against the commemoration of Istanbul's Greek history by the Orthodox Patriarchate and the reluctance to return 'minority' properties (e.g. see *E*, 6 & 7 September, 11 November 2005) is premised on this elemental need to claim Anatolia as Turkish: administratively, historically and organically. As Anatolia is a constitutive part of Turkishness, it needs to always have been Turkish, hence its history is edited, rearranged and re-written accordingly.

This ownership is celebrated by inscribing public spaces with Atatürk's face, symbolising both the nation and its struggle for Anatolia as the instigator and hero of the Independence War. Atatürk's face expresses a very rich, albeit narrow, national cosmos, enjoying immense emotional resonance as the hand-made banner fluttering outside a petrol station near the coastal city of Seferhisar proves. On the banner Atatürk's face is accompanied by the words *seni seviyoruz*¹¹.

In the outskirts of Ankara many houses sport hand-carved crescent and stars on their walls and portraits of Atatürk inserted in the tile work¹²: Atatürk symbolises the nation, the Republic, national freedom and progress. His face symbolises everything that is good about the past, present and future. Thus a self-sustaining cult emerges around Atatürk wherein two narrative strands are pursued concurrently. Atatürk is

¹¹ 'We love you'.

¹² In the 30s, notes Bozdoğan (2001:87), it was common to inscribe dwellings, not only public buildings, with Atatürk's sayings.

simultaneously celebrated as the example every Turk should follow and a divine figure people should simply bow to. Preserving fragments of Atatürk's mortal life stresses his humanity and accessibility, presenting him as the father everyone can love. Simultaneously, appeals to the metaphysical, especially through stories and sites related to his death, elevate him above humanity, a force to be obeyed and followed. Republican mythology had to compete with the supernatural and metaphysical folk traditions of a people neither prepared for nor, initially, convinced as to the benefits of secularism and modernisation. So it created a rich and wonderful mythology of its own, complete with a saintly figure and holy relics.

1.a. Atatürk's Personal objects

Objects associated with Atatürk are preserved and carefully displayed in national museums. This, on occasion, goes to extremes. In Istanbul's naval museum, a silver toothpick is displayed alongside other paraphernalia from his yacht, the *Savarona*. Yet the trend feeds on and enhances the general tendency for national symbols to constitute popular currency in Turkey, independent of specific political meaning.

The exhibition of Atatürk's personal objects further enhances their significance as the act of display vests any item with value (Crane, 2000:2). As the objects in question are mundane, such as combs and teacups, this institutional acknowledgment is bestowed, not on the object, but on its former user. The individual whose personal effects are deemed worthy of public display *has to be* objectively great, or the museum – by definition the locus of unbiased truth – would not be displaying their nightshirt. In Atatürk's case, already famous before his personal artefacts went on display, the museum becomes part of a multi-faceted commemoration machine, constantly augmenting the mythology surrounding him. The museum both creates familiarity and increases awe. By proving that the great Atatürk was real, drank coffee and wore slippers, the museum makes his achievements seem even more admirable for, although an ordinary man, his deeds were extraordinary.

Objects become stage props in the reconstruction of Atatürk's extraordinary story. This is necessary, as the past, Fowler (2003:81) notes, 'does not just exist. What we

see of its presence, and the uses that we make of our ideas about it, are to a considerable extent contrived'. Thus information about the past needs to be 'staged' with the help of banal, everyday objects, in order to be accessible. In Atatürk's story, such objects abound. On the top floor of the house he was born in, on a busy street in Greece's second largest city, Thessaloniki (Salonica) there is a small display of Atatürk's clothes: undergarments, collars, slippers, shoes, worry beads and a dinner jacket. Atatürk's report cards from the Manastır and Harbiye military schools are displayed, offering objective proof that he was as intelligent and studious as legend suggests. The museum also displays Atatürk's Ottoman and Republican identity cards. This is not only irrefutable evidence that Atatürk was real, but also a visually powerful way of introducing the script reform through contrasting the two documents. Visual aids are invaluable in summarising complex policy.

Objects associated with Atatürk also allow a museum to 'claim' him. In Istanbul's Şişli district, in a house where Atatürk spent a brief 18 months as a little-known Ottoman officer, a small display of his personal effects, including clothes and underwear, marks the space's authenticity. Similarly, down the road, the military museum boasts a wide collection of Atatürk's personal objects, mostly donated by his youngest adopted daughter Ülkü. Clothes, undergarments, pyjamas, towels, cutlery and cups used by Atatürk, together with headed notepaper – some sheets signed in his own hand – pens and ink bottles from his office, all serve a triple function: they add objectivity to the narrative, they perpetuate the Atatürk cult by rendering the subject both accessible and magical and, finally – given the significance of this 'cult' – they lend significance to the museum itself. A museum that has access to Atatürk's personal paraphernalia is a true Republican institution, a badge of honour the military would not pass by. Hence the military-managed museum attached to Anıtkabir 'claims' Atatürk as 'one of ours' and the TAF as 'his'.

Here too, objects associated with Atatürk's public life (swords, guns and gifts presented by foreign dignitaries¹³) are presented alongside slippers, socks, shoes, shaving kits, canes and walking sticks (displayed alongside pictures of Atatürk using them). The collection even includes a stuffed animal (according to a plaque, Atatürk's dog) and the rowing machine he used to keep fit.

¹³ Cigarette holders, teacups and glasses, luxury toiletry sets and ornate cigar boxes among other things.

Do people care to see underwear, towels and spoons? Judging from the crowds in front of the cabinets, they do. The museum shop attached to Anıtkabir does a roaring trade selling just this kind of everyday object. Apart from guidebooks and postcards, this shop stocks academic works on Atatürk, CDs and DVDs with music, text and dramatic re-enactments of the Independence War and the widest selection of Atatürk paraphernalia I have seen in one place. Although the streets of Ankara or Istanbul are filled with peddlers selling Atatürk lapel pins and framed pictures, here one can obtain medallions, wallets, ties, tie-clips, clocks, pocket mirrors, lighters, cigarette cases, pill boxes, sewing kits, key-rings, spoons, pen-holders, fridge-magnets and earrings with Atatürk on them. Each item is available with Atatürk in various poses.

Visitors can purchase engravings of famous speeches, jigsaws of famous battle scenes and Atatürk engravings on stone or small metal plaques bearing an uncanny resemblance to Christian icons. Portraits are also on sale: pictures and paintings, including a popular frame fitted with slanted panels. Looking at the frame from the left, front or right, one sees Atatürk in youth, maturity and old age. This portrait can be purchased in the back-street stalls of conservative Ulus and in the exclusive Karum shopping centre in Ankara's most modern neighbourhood. Shops selling Atatürk portraits abound as the goods are in demand. From barbers in run-down Sıhhiye to banks in upper-class Kavaklıdere, from the ticket office on Büyük Ada's jetty, in the Bosphorus, to grocery stores in the coastal village of Alaçatı, Atatürk's portraits watch the Turks as they go about their daily business. The Atatürk cult, for lack of a better word, enjoys a genuine popular following and, although Atatürk's image means different things to different people, the act of hanging his portrait constitutes a patriotic ritual performed independently from the state that effectively unites Turks.

1.b. Atatürk's Houses

Given Atatürk's centrality in Turkish national narratives and the narratives' centrality in daily life, it is hardly surprising that Atatürk's houses are now well-frequented museums. Houses recreate a sense of space, which, Walsh (1992:160) finds, facilitates learning about the past, as visual narratives are more accessible to people of all ages and educational backgrounds. Recreating a room forges the feeling of 'having

been there', stressing objectivity. Although what visitors see is not 'what it was like', but the product of a highly selective process of interpretation and recreation, the experience nevertheless feels authentic, especially if the sites in question are as well-known as the 'little pink house' in Salonica (fig.7). Constant exposure to pictures (see Chapter 2) or scale models (such as the ones displayed in Istanbul's military museum and Anıtkabir) of this house means that visitors recognise it and appreciate its significance as the place where Turkey's national awakening began.

The house, now a museum in the garden of the Turkish Consulate in Salonica, offers a photograph collection and small reference library¹⁴ on the ground floor, re-creating the 'house' on the top two floors. The curator accepts the fusion of Atatürk and Turkey. The Independence War and the Republic's proclamation are depicted as facts in his life while his pictures alongside European leaders are proof of Turkey's international prestige. Keeping with established narratives, Atatürk stands alone in photographs. There are no pictures of his war comrades; there is only one picture of Atatürk with his, later divorced, wife Latife and one with Ülkü. There is one group photograph taken outside the Assembly building and not a single picture of his sister, Makbule. Solitude enhances Atatürk's myth while also giving the Republic a monarch-style figurehead.

The museum mixes well-known pictures, objects and symbols with new ones. Familiarity with the narrative structure enhances the potency of its message. The house, immediately classed as 'typical' of its time – with assorted *kilims*, *divans* and a traditional bathroom – is actually unlike any other as, on the first landing, in an ordinary room (marked with a commemorative plaque) Atatürk was born. Next door, in Atatürk's mother's room, a copy of the Quran reminds visitors of well-known stories regarding Zübeyde's piety. Atatürk's mother, the story goes, wanted him to become a *hoca*, but he defied her wishes – just as the country broke with its Ottoman past – and opted for a secular, modern education and military career.

¹⁴ The books offered are exclusively about Atatürk. Being 'written about' makes an act, by definition, important. As this is not a lending library and there is no reading room, it is doubtful that it may be consulted often, yet its presence puts a scientific stamp on national narratives.

This fusion between Atatürk's story and national awakening is also sustained in the museum booklet. Entitled *Atatürk's House: The place where the future of a Nation was born*, it offers a short biography and photographs (Atatürk's parents, Atatürk as a child, a coffee cup he once used). The booklet's main message, however, is that, Atatürk's mortality notwithstanding, his legacy is immortal. On the opening page, a 1923 Time magazine cover is reproduced. It shows Atatürk – itself a tribute and international acknowledgment – and the famous words 'my mortal body will turn to soil some day; however, the Turkish Republic will last forever'. The Republic, Atatürk's brainchild, the booklet suggests, has not simply outlived its founder, but survived *as his spiritual legacy*, educating young Turks to follow in Atatürk's footsteps and inspiring the desire to visit the site where it all began.

Although a Turkish-run museum, the little pink house is in a foreign country and thus difficult for Turks to visit. Therefore, an exact replica (fig.8) was constructed on Atatürk's model farm, in Ankara's Gazi neighbourhood to mark the centenary of his birth. Although visitors know this is a replica, they also know it is a very good one as the house is a familiar sight. Thus the sense of 'having been there' is forged even though the visitors know they actually have not. Besides, a visit to such a site is rarely inspired by scientific curiosity, rather it represents a national pilgrimage.

The pilgrim need only travel across town to visit, on the rare occasions that it is open to the public, Atatürk's residence inside the Çankaya presidential complex – also, peculiarly, pink. In this house, the Presidency's website notes, momentous decisions were made and defining moments for the country's destiny were lived through. Hence 'today, it is preserved with utmost care as part of Atatürk's indelible memory'¹⁵. Once again, the country and its leader are fused. The authenticity of this space – where '[t]he bedroom... is furnished humbly, yet with an appropriate taste. Atatürk's own cushion and quilt together with the original coverlet have been kept on the bed'¹⁶ – legitimises the Turkish Presidency. Inside the Presidential palace, untouched by subsequent presidents, is Atatürk's home, thus placing him, not only symbolically, but also spatially *inside* the Turkish presidency.

¹⁵ http://www.cankaya.gov.tr/eng_html/muze.htm

¹⁶ http://www.cankaya.gov.tr/eng_html/yatoda.htm

Similarly, preserving Atatürk's other homes has the effect of situating him among his people. This omnipresence is achieved by turning even houses he spent little time in into museums. The pink house in Şişli is a case in point. Practically unfurnished, the house offers a small photographic collection and some interesting posters from the Independence War. References are made to the well-known national narrative with no real attempt to recreate it. Although the means for recreating a sense of space are lacking, the curator knows that the visitor is familiar with the narrative and satisfied with the authenticity of the space that once housed Atatürk. The curator also knows that visitors are only interested in seeing one exhibit: a wine-stained tablecloth on which Atatürk scribbled the new Turkish alphabet during a picnic. The reality and immediacy of this fragment of the script reform is incredibly potent.

In fact, the very existence of this tablecloth, unwashed and treasured, betrays the fact that soon after the Independence War, the Atatürk cult was gathering momentum and objects were being preserved for later display. The house Atatürk stayed in briefly while in İzmir is a perfect example of this. When he was here, Atatürk already was a celebrated national hero. So, after his departure, everything was preserved as it was at that moment – down to the coffee cups he used. Photographs, personal effects and clothes clutter the displays, while Atatürk's famous frock coat, immortalised in countless pictures, is exhibited on a mannequin. Furniture stands exactly as it did when he conducted state affairs from these rooms.

The claim of having preserved everything as it was when he was there is also made of the place where Atatürk died. Although the Dolmabahçe Palace is normally filled with foreign tourists, numerous Turks also join the mandatory guided-tour, starting with the Red Audience Room where, the guide claims, the Ottoman Sultan summoned Atatürk and charged him with starting the Independence War – a popular urban legend making the civil strife that followed the war easier to forget¹⁷.

Either way, Atatürk set off for Samsun from this palace and also ended his days here, in a section painted, by curious coincidence, vivid pink. The room Atatürk died in,

¹⁷ This is not an irrelevant debate for Turkey. Historical research and intense public deliberation surround the question of whether Sultan Vahdettin was more interested in saving the country or his throne in 1919, e.g. see Z, 19 July 2005.

approached through bathrooms, medical chambers and sitting rooms, is plain. Above the bed hangs a huge tapestry, depicting Atatürk during the war fought, ironically, partly against what the palace, in which it hangs, stood for. The bed he died in is covered with an enormous Turkish flag. On the bedside table, the legendary clock shows five minutes past nine. Visitors have read about this clock at school and have heard the sirens at 9:05 on the morning of 10 November. They have heard that, when Atatürk died, time stood still and so do his people every year, to commemorate a man who defied mortal constraints. Actually seeing the clock lends credibility to such metaphysical and often outlandish claims.

I.c. Atatürk's Resting Place

Atatürk is dead, but 'death [does] not release a man from national service' (Gillis, 2004:11), especially when he is a nation's foremost hero. Atatürk remains the focal point of national narratives and his majestic mausoleum – now Ankara's most famous landmark – is the locus of patriotic pilgrimages. This, however, was not Atatürk's first resting place, as he died in 1938 and Anıtkabir was only completed in 1953. For 15 years Atatürk was interred in Ankara's Ethnographic Museum (fig.9).

The museum's few rooms embrace the burial chamber in a loop, so one's visit starts and ends in front of Atatürk's cenotaph: white marble adorned with bronze palm leaves under a gilded Ottoman-style dome. The marble hall is cool, silent and church-like. On a vertical slab, Atatürk's face, cast in bronze, is mounted next to the famous phrase: even if he turns to dust, the Republic will live on¹⁸. The hall is lined with photographs from the funerary procession showing old, young, male, female, traditional and modern mourners laying wreaths. Pictures show people lining the streets or perched on top of mosques' domes and roofs in order to catch a glimpse of the funeral procession as Atatürk's body travelled by boat, train, armoured car (preserved in Anıtkabir) and on soldiers' shoulders. On the wall, the *Anadolu Ajansı* announcement of his death is sombrely framed.

¹⁸ *Benim naçiz vücudum elbet bir gün toprak olacaktır, lakin Türkiye Cymhuriyeti ilelebet pavidar kalacaktır.*

This feeling of collective loss is reversed in Anıtkabir where Atatürk's immortal spirit is celebrated and his omnipresence reasserted. Bozdoğan (2001:282) describes Anıtkabir as the 'holiest' site in modern Turkey, expressly designed as a national(ist) temple. According to the 1942 architectural competition brief, Anıtkabir should be where Atatürk would be celebrated as a symbol of the Turkish nation and where the people could pay their respects. The intention, Bozdoğan continues, was to commemorate Atatürk as a soldier, president, statesman, scientist, intellectual and great creative genius. The building was meant to evoke feelings of respect, dignity and immortality (Bozdoğan, 2001:186). The result – achieved by architects Emin Onat and Orhan Arda and sculptor Hüseyin Özkan – is, for Bozdoğan, the secular substitute for a space of religious ritual and prayer. And pray is what many visitors do in front of Atatürk's cenotaph. His body is buried directly underneath the chamber open to the public, held under lock and key by the Chief of General Staff, who rarely grants permission to visit.

That does not discourage visitors, however. Anıtkabir is a quintessentially 'national' space constructed around a national narrative rather than the tomb itself. Even the location, now known as Anıt Tepe, is charged with national significance. This hill marks the spot where the city's two axes – the heroic 'old' Ankara of the Independence War and the modern city – meet, (Bozdoğan, 2001:289). The site was meant to represent the fusion of old and new while dominating the skyline, as Anıtkabir 'was part of the effort of Turkish nationalists to define, and thereby control, the symbolism of public life' (Meeker, 1997:169). Anıtkabir, wrought with intricate symbolism, was to become one more national symbol.

Ironically a mosque challenged this dominance. The Kocatepe mosque¹⁹ (fig.10) boasts Turkey's tallest minarets which, given Ankara's hilly terrain, make it visible from almost anywhere, including from Anıtkabir. Although only a short distance apart, Anıtkabir is not visible from the mosque's esplanade or, indeed, from many other elevated spots. Ankara's skyline has risen since Anıtkabir's construction and

¹⁹ Although the building of the Kocatepe mosque was agreed in the mid-1930s, construction only started in 1967 and lasted 20 years. The complex boasts a huge mosque, conference halls, Western-style shopping centre and car park. Interestingly, no outrage followed this commercialisation of religious space.

pollution hinders visibility. Still, for Meeker (1997:177,182-3), Anıtkabir has not lost its battle for symbolic supremacy. Kocatepe, he claims, is respectful of Anıtkabir and proudly advertises itself as a *national* place of worship. Nevertheless, Meeker concedes, competition over dominating the skyline does exist. However nationalised, a minaret was the last thing Atatürk would have wanted defining Ankara, the modern Republican capital. And yet, minarets are the city's new municipal symbol (fig.11). Given the mounting tensions between secular and (perceived or real) religious agencies (see Chapter 6), this contest for symbolic supremacy is as intense as ever.

Meeker believes the contest is over: Kocatepe may be more visible, but Anıtkabir has won, as its concerns and priorities have re-shaped the way religion is approached. However, after eight decades of secularism, this may hardly be enough. Although many individuals 'worship' at both sites, Anıtkabir was meant to fulfil the need for Kocatepe. Anıtkabir is a place of worship, commemorating Atatürk's life and rule as well as his intellectual remains, manifest through republicanism and national unity (Vale, 1992:102). As Atatürk's legacy is Turkey, Anıtkabir is the shrine where society worships itself. Meanwhile, the Head Teacher delivers his last lesson.

The entire site, notes Wilson (2004:1) represents a conscious bypassing of Ottoman legacies and the deliberate claiming of an alternative historical evolution for the Turks: central Asian, Hittite and Greco-Roman. The promenade leading to the mausoleum is flanked by 24 Hittite lions 'representing the strength and power of the Turkish nation' (plaque inside the Independence Tower at the foot of the promenade). The Hittite theme is hardly surprising. Wilson (2004:3) notes that early Republican elites 'actively supported and funded archaeological excavations, the establishment of "ancient civilisation" museums, and printing of publications in support of this imaginary pre-Islamic or pre-Ottoman ancestry of the Turks'. Motifs thus discovered (deer, lions, double-headed eagles or the Hittite sun) were integrated into Turkish architecture and are also celebrated here, in Ankara's national 'temple'.

On the main plateau, however, Hittite references vanish. The main building and the colonnades surrounding the esplanade have a distinct Greco-Roman feel to them (fig.12). Patriotically named²⁰ towers mark the site's every corner. These towers'

²⁰ National Pact, Republic, Defence of Rights, Independence, Freedom, *Mehmetiçik* and Victory.

roofs resemble traditional nomadic tents²¹, a reference to the Turks' central Asian past. Similarly, the ceilings of the colonnaded corridors flanking the esplanade are decorated in abstract carpet motifs, seeking to assert national unity across time.

Anıtkabir also asserts the spatial unity of national domains. The mausoleum is constructed with materials brought from all over the country (Meeker, 1997:170). Moreover, soldiers constantly patrol the site in complex step formations. As they frequently stop to identify themselves and their names and home provinces echo around the ceremonial plateau, it is clear that *Anıtkabir* was meant to unite, represent and express the entire nation. Hence the nation's 'authentic representatives' stand guard by the mouth of the promenade: a soldier, a peasant and a teacher/student faced by three women (fig.13). These are the people the nation needs for its material, spiritual and emotional sustenance. The rest, Atatürk has taken care of.

Half-way up the 26 risers leading to the mausoleum, symbolising 26 August 1922, when the nationalists achieved full control of the country (Wilson, 2004:6), a sign reads: *hakimiyet kayıtsız, şartsız milletindir*²², Atatürk's Republican legacy.

Inside the cool, dark hall, speeches by Atatürk and İnönü are engraved on opposite walls – just as İnönü's modest grave faces Atatürk's across the ceremonial plateau. Inside Atatürk's burial chamber there is no flag, statue or bust. This is the only public room in Turkey not to bear Atatürk's image. There is no need. His presence is intensely felt. The room is Spartan but for a gilded, elaborate carpet motif above the black granite sarcophagus. Before it, people stand to attention, pray or leave flowers. Some kiss the steps. A tearful old man wrote in the visitors' book 'great father, thank you'. Leafing through the entries, one finds the ledger is full of messages of love and gratitude. As people of all ages, 'covered' and *açık*²³, file solemnly past the tomb, it is impossible to link the 'Atatürk cult' to one socio-economic or cultural group. Atatürk's message – engraved on his mausoleum's outside wall in the form of the *Address to Youth* and his speech on the Republic's 10th anniversary – was intended for all Turks and people from all backgrounds have responded to it.

²¹ 'Yurt', the nomadic tent, also means 'homeland'.

²² Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation.

²³ 'Open', uncovered.

The TAF, however, pride themselves on being Atatürk's first and truest disciples and, as Anıtkabir is the military's domain²⁴, this connection is evident in the site's well-curated museum. Pictures celebrate Anıtkabir as the capital's foremost ceremonial site, while also firmly establishing the TAF's position – represented by Chief of the General Staff, General Hilmi Özkök – among the country's elites as military leaders, foreign dignitaries, the Premier and President pay their respects to Atatürk. Moreover, the museum attempts a detailed reconstruction of the Independence War and republican reforms and a celebration of the TAF's role in them.

This starts with a re-enactment of the battle of Çanakkale, complete with cannon sounds and eerie music. A map of Turkey is juxtaposed with a map of what would have been Turkey had the treaty of Sèvres not been reversed – a reminder that the country would not exist had it not been for Atatürk and the TAF.

Although other military leaders are present in this narrative and their portraits displayed, Atatürk remains prominent. Paintings depict Atatürk alone or surrounded by the 'salt of the earth' – peasants, whose selfless contribution to the war and Atatürk's direct, unmediated relationship with them are central to national narratives. Focusing on the anonymous heroic masses makes national greatness the outcome of a collective national endeavour of which all Turks can be proud, while simultaneously reserving the hero's pedestal for Atatürk alone. The presence of women in such paintings is particularly significant as a potent reminder of his policies towards gender equality. Images of massacres, bayonet-bearing Greeks and cross-wielding priests ('clerics played a provoking role' in such massacres, the caption reads) remind visitors of the horrors endured to ensure freedom, while preaching vigilance against both foreign invasion and religious fanaticism. Down the hall, the battle of Sakarya is reproduced. The music is triumphant and the claim that national independence has one sole author is symbolically upheld by Atatürk's omnipresence on the battlefield as all famous wartime pictures are reproduced on the tableau.

The next cavernous hall is dedicated to republican reforms: a bronze engraving of a fierce, uniformed Atatürk, surrounded by people holding rifles, flags and pitchforks guards the door. The war was won, but not over; the battle for modernisation was only

²⁴ <http://www.tsk.mil.tr/anitkabir/index.html#>

beginning. Successive alcoves present republican reforms in great detail. The TAF seem more interested in hard proof than easily digestible narrative offering 3,000 photographs and 600 pages of information (museum leaflet): everything from the script reform to Turkey's electrification is minutely documented.

The TAF are making a powerful claim regarding how Republican history should be read. Controversial or contentious issues are not avoided; rather they are treated as opportunities to offer clarifications. For instance, under the rubric 'multi-party politics' the TAF stress that Atatürk 'saved the country'. 'He gained the confidence of the nation as a hero' and used it to establish a functioning republic, even if that meant occasionally interrupting multi-party politics. Besides, the caption continues, interruptions were objectively necessary. The Progressive Republican Party was disbanded in the wake of the murderous 1925 Şeyk Sait Rebellion while the Free Republican Party actually dissolved itself. Needless to say, suggesting that Atatürk would tolerate no opposition is hardly the stuff of nationalist museum exhibits.

Besides, this presentation of republican reforms suggests the project matters more than the process. The Republic as a timeless abstraction matters more than republican procedure, especially if the latter endangers a perceived republican 'essence'. Although seemingly contradictory, this thesis defines the Republic as what Atatürk established. Its purpose was his project and the method through which that was to be fulfilled was secondary to its aims. 'Republicanism' hence becomes an idiosyncratic term as, no matter what Atatürk does, it is, by definition, republican.

The TAF are *this* Republic's appointed guardians. Atatürk's 'Last Message to the Army' – exhibited in the *Milli Güvenlik* (national security) alcove – delivered on 29 October 1938, makes this abundantly clear:

'If you saved your country from oppression, tragedy and enemy invasion in the most critical and hard times, I have no doubt that in the fruitful era of the Republic... you will conduct your duty with the same loyalty... As I express the feelings of gratefulness today, I am also the voice of the feelings and pride of our great nation... Our great nation and I believe and fully trust that you are always prepared and ready to carry out your duty of defending the Turkish

land and the honour of the Turkish people against any internal or external threats.'

Framed for all to see, are the military's clear instructions.

2. Inscribing 'Republican Nationality' onto National Space

In the summer of 2004, Turkey was full of Republican paraphernalia. Some 75-year anniversary banners remained alongside 80-year anniversary streamers, while 85-year commemorative signs and hangings were already appearing. By Dolmabahçe Palace, letters mounted on an archway over a busy road read 'we love democracy and the Republic' (fig.14). Eight decades after the Republic's proclamation, loyalty to it is still actively and publicly celebrated, while its protection remains an urgent matter. Such commemorations afford the opportunity to assert national dignity and celebrate national sovereignty and Atatürk's project. Moreover, they allow national narratives to renew the urgency of their message. This urgency is central to the message, as Ankara's War of Independence Museum proves.

The museum, initially a school and home of Turkey's first Assembly, preserves the classroom that served as the assembly hall, thus wordlessly stressing the precariousness of the nationalist struggle when it started and, by extension, the magnitude of its success. In the hall, Atatürk's bust on the podium is forever addressing the nation (fig.15). Adjoining rooms display the flag raised above the building on 23 April 1920 alongside the weapons, phones and pigeonholes used by nationalist deputies.

The walls are lined with patriotic paintings representative of the populist/nationalist art which republican elites used in order to forge a new collective identity (Altan, 2004:6, 11). Paintings depict Atatürk as a statesman, not a soldier, featuring landscapes of Ankara, the new republican city, and book covers in the new script. Thus paintings exalt Atatürk and his reforms, merging the Independence War and the Republic's declaration and presenting them as a genuinely popular insurgence against darkness and anachronism, à la French revolution (Bozdoğan, 2001:57). This imagery

is central to Atatürk's self-legitimation, premised on the claim that he changed his people's reality, just like his French revolutionary counterparts.

The museum presents the script reform by exhibiting documents in Arabic and the calendar reform through double-dating in explanatory plaques – e.g. 1335 (1919) – thus stressing how Atatürk moulded the visitors' reality. The reform effort is celebrated as momentous and necessary, almost inevitable. Decisions are discussed in the passive voice, as if no agency was needed, and the curator constantly stresses the revolution's popularity. Finally, the display of the rebellious MPs' identity cards and personal belongings adds immediacy to the narrative. These men – whose faces visitors inspect – were involved in a historic event and, as the caption notes, they showed extraordinary heroism and determination, following Atatürk and working against all odds until 'our country was saved from the enemies'.

Although the MPs are named, none is singled out and their ordinariness is repeatedly stressed. The plaque quotes contemporaries' testimonials: the MPs' selfless patriotism and self-sacrifice is a fact. Despite poverty and hard conditions, the valiant Turkish deputies managed to create the Republic under Atatürk's leadership. Again, the Republic is celebrated as Atatürk's work, accomplished with the assistance of anonymous yet worthy Turks. The First Assembly, notes the plaque, was an 'example of the determination the deputies... showed in realising their common aims towards the salvation of the country' and an example for subsequent generations.

This message is captured by a 1994 TRT-produced 'mockumentary' DVD, on sale in the museum shop. According to the production leaflet, the reconstruction *Kurtuluş – Push to Freedom*, involving 5,000 participants, sought to capture the feeling of self-sacrifice that inspired men and women during the war. This production combines grand epic scale with intimate narrative, extolling Atatürk's virtues (refusing to desecrate a Greek flag after his resounding victory over the Greeks) and the love and devotion he inspired in his people (bringing veterans and deserters back to the front merely by making his wish known). Atatürk, we are told, was capable of fighting the battle for progress alongside the Independence War. Even before the armistice at Mudanya, Atatürk is addressing a group of teachers, the narrative goes, stressing that the true victory is theirs to win as the nation's true enemy is backwardness and teachers are the Republic's peacetime soldiers.

Nevertheless soldiers are never forgotten. Mehmetçik, the peasant-soldier, the son of the soil – a universally familiar picture – represents the common Turk who ploughs the land and guards the borders. Sometimes the soldier has a name. Near İzmir's famous clock tower is the statue of Kubilay, famous for his unfortunate involvement in the 1930 Menemen incidents. Kubilay is a model Kemalist officer: young, secular – literally to the death – dedicated to Atatürk and, when not serving his country, a teacher. Kubilay's image reminds everyone that the TAF's willingness to defend the modernising, secular Republic is matched by the common Turk's.

This is a recurring theme. Two soldiers and a peasant woman carrying ammunition accompany Atatürk's equestrian statue in Ankara's *Ulus Square* (fig.16). Mehmetçik and the Turkish mother are potent symbols in this narrative. Although Turkish feminist scholarship has long-deplored women's auxiliary role in national semiotics, it is nevertheless important that women are present in such monuments given female exclusion from the public domain in pre-republican times. It is true, however, that few women are commemorated as individuals²⁵ and those who are, are closely linked to Atatürk. Such sculptures are rare and, usually, tucked away. Zübeyde Hanım's busts, for instance, found in one of İzmir's quiet pedestrian streets or near Istanbul's Yedikule, are dedicated to *en büyük Türk annesi*²⁶. A Republican Mary, Zübeyde is commemorated for having given birth to the national messiah.

The only other female figure present in this spatial narrative has mixed credentials. Halide Edip (Adıvar) was Atatürk's friend and collaborator, but fell from grace, although this is often conveniently forgotten. Now she is a national symbol and her bust, 'with the love of the Turkish woman', adorns Sultanahmet square, where she gave her most fiery speech, in 1919, mobilising Istanbul's women against the Greek occupation of İzmir. Abstractions such as 'the Turkish mother' or 'the Turkish woman' are part of a highly pervasive national narrative reminiscing about the glories of old and simultaneously pursuing a very specific, albeit idiosyncratically conceived, future. Symbols of past achievement sustain well-known national imperatives.

²⁵ Tributes to individual women are, largely, context-specific: the statue of a famous soprano is outside the National Opera House in Ankara and Sabiha Gökçen's outside the Aviation Society.

²⁶ The greatest Turkish mother.

Kemalism is progress-driven and forward-looking. These spatial narratives act as reminders that each Turk is personally responsible for the country's future.

Each Turk's duty is to realise Atatürk's plan by remaining secular and republican and by working hard towards modernisation. True to the motto *Türk öğün, çalış, güven*, the structure in Ankara's Güven Parkı – the aptly named 'pride' park (fig.17) – depicts peasants, soldiers and artisans. The image of craftsmen at work is often used to symbolise progress. Together with soldiers and peasants, artisans are vital in achieving and sustaining the nation's progress. Repetition is vital in maintaining this narrative's momentum. Further up Atatürk Bulvarı, a similar structure (fig.18) emphasises the nation's need for craftsmen. A Delacroix-esque representation of civilian figures brandishing flags and holding books accompanies an engraving extolling the nation's need for artisans, scientists and craftsmen. Praise for leadership qualities is conspicuously absent from this narrative: the nation needs workers. No leaders are needed – Turkey has an immortal leader: all Turks need to follow him.

Reminders to that effect abound. Every Turkish city boasts an Atatürk Bulvarı, usually the main commercial road. Ankara has both a Gazi Mustafa Kemal Avenue and an Atatürk Avenue. Excessive? Possibly. But Ankara is a special case and Kemalists want that remembered. Bozdoğan (2001:68) calls Ankara a 'utopian city', the republican dream emerging out of barren land. The Kemalists, she notes, saw it as a *tabula rasa* for the implementation of their vision, from which mosques were expressly absent, although they have mushroomed since.

Atatürk's statues symbolise this modernising republican identity. He represents the nation, the state and even abstract notions such as progress and justice (fig.19). His presence inscribes nationhood and is thus employed to 'caution' traditional neighbourhoods or 'expunge' alternative national memories, as in the case of the İzmir Kültür Parkı. Built specifically for the 1936 international fair, the park is an ode to modernisation. But it is not set on 'neutral' ground; the park mostly occupies what used to be the Greek quarter, ravaged by the 1922 fire, and now inscribes nationhood on a previously non-national space. The park obliterates the memory of a past now made irrelevant and a disaster that scarred the city offering instead an assertively modern Turkish space. The park is dotted with Atatürk's statues and plaques inscribed with his aphorisms. Here, there is even a statue of Atatürk with İsmet; but, İnönü is

not a challenger for parity in the pantheon of national heroes and does not undermine the glory of Atatürk's one-man-show.

Near this statue is the İzmir Sanat (Art) Gallerisi that, in the summer of 2003, hosted an exhibition marking the Lausanne Treaty's 80th anniversary. Pictures, documents and caricatures were on display. In one, İsmet and Venizelos²⁷ are depicted as boxing contestants – İsmet sitting bolt upright in one corner while Venizelos is being revived in another. The match ended in victory for İsmet and this park is his trophy.

Commemorating nationhood in parks is common in Turkey, as parks represent Western refinement while also symbolising health and youth. Moreover, parks are popular and accessible to all, hence permitting national narratives to extend their symbolic eminence by penetrating leisure spaces. Examples abound. In Ankara's Gençlik Parkı, there is a likeness of Atatürk constructed of white metal and what looks like spent light bulbs. In Doğa Parkı inside Ankara's Atatürk Orman Çiftliği nationality is literally inscribed on the soil in the form of a flag carved in the middle of the grass-covered picnic area (fig.20). Such symbols constantly remind Turks to enjoy their surroundings *as* Turkish space, liberated by Atatürk.

Inscribing nationality in public spaces is not a state monopoly. In Kavaklıdere's Kuşulu Parkı, a small free-standing arch covered with clay handiwork made by local children commemorates 23 April, Republic and Children's Day. The children have used clay to make Turkish flags and models of Anıtkabir and the Bandırma (fig.21). Neither the children's familiarity with these symbols nor their readiness to focus on the Republican rather than 'children's' aspect of the holiday is surprising. Students instinctively gravitate towards activities that beg rewards within any education system and children often are invariably susceptible to hero-worship. Nevertheless, this small shrine is not simply the children's work. Teachers and local councillors were involved, thus directly participating in the symbolic appropriation of national space.

'National space', as a bounded and protected entity, is a popular and emotionally resonant image and fear of division or fragmentation is widespread – as Türk

²⁷ Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos – largely responsible for the Asia Minor Campaign and subsequent population exchange, although not for the events in-between.

Telekom's anti-privatisation campaign proves (fig.22). The most common antidote against the spectre of a divided or preyed-upon country is Mehmetçik.

3. *Defending the Land*

The TAF are dedicated to the country's protection out of both duty and profound patriotism, as a streamer outside the Florya army barracks advertises: *Türkiyemi ve bayrağımı seviyorum*²⁸. This duty to protect, however, is heavily tinted by the TAF's perception of what the country needs protecting from. As, for the TAF, republicanism is a Turkish national trait not a political or administrative choice and Turkey is, by definition, a Republican space, their protection of national geography spills into upholding and defending specific national signifiers and political structures.

The TAF are committed to Atatürk's Republic. This Republic welcomes public acceptance, but is neither reducible nor dependent on it. For the TAF, the Republic is measured in terms of its modernising aims and character. To retain those, it may need to be protected even from the people. Although this creates the potential for immense tension between narratives seeking to legitimise Kemalist reforms in terms of their popularity and those seeking to do so in terms of their inevitability and inherent value, it also offers an insight into the TAF's *esprit de corps*, as their idiosyncratic republicanism is reflected in all military-controlled public spaces (see Jones, 1996:152). The TAF seek to advertise their role in the Independence War and reform effort, as well as their 'ownership' of Atatürk.

Istanbul's military museum achieves both. Occupying the elegant 19th-century building that once housed the Harbiye military academy, the museum boasts a rich collection of weapons, uniforms, paintings and artefacts from several wars. Here, three inter-related narratives are pursued: national greatness is evoked; the precariousness of national safety is stressed; and Turkey's rightful position alongside the West is advertised. Throughout these narratives the TAF are celebrated as the nation's most authentic representatives. Moreover, as Atatürk is reclaimed as a soldier, the TAF emerge as the key agent of national history. The museum's booklet

²⁸ 'I love my Turkey and my flag'.

stresses (p.32) that Atatürk, ‘the founder of the Turkish Republic and major statesman’, was educated in this very building. His Harbiye classroom is ‘preserved’ in the middle of the museum’s collection of Ottoman and Islamic artefacts. This ‘interruption’ provides a subtle, but symbolically potent link between the museum’s Ottoman and Republican wings. The transition from empire to republic entailed a momentous breach for most of the nation, but for the TAF it was smooth as, through claiming Atatürk, they claim authorship of the change. His classroom proves that Atatürk’ was ‘one of ours’.

Moreover, true to the maxim ‘every Turk is born a soldier’, this ‘ownership’ is extended to every Turk – brave Mehmetçik – whose valour is celebrated in the museum’s numerous paintings from the Balkan Wars, the First World War and the Independence War. Paintings show a soldier who keeps fighting even though his arms are bandaged and bleeding; soldiers helping each other out of harm’s way; women carrying ammunition. The museum dedicates its ‘Martyrs’ Gallery’ ‘to all those, throughout history, who have lost their lives in action in the cause of liberty’. The TAF are not a war machine, the message goes. As Atatürk’s ‘peace at home, peace in the world’ motto is inscribed on the wall in several languages, the museum stresses that the TAF fight for just causes only and, consequently, always bring progress and assist growth. The TAF are not an agent of destruction. In the Enver Salonu, bequeathed to the museum by former Chief of Staff Kenan Evren, leader of the 1980 coup and subsequently President of Turkey, a Turkish flag that was taken to the moon is displayed, stressing the TAF’s progress-oriented culture.

Although the Army’s main task is to fight or prevent wars, the curator is anxious to claim that Turkey has never fought an expansionistic or aggressive war: the TAF have always fought for freedom or survival and will do so again, whenever required. But in order to avoid that eventuality, the TAF believe it is their duty to ensure the Turkish nation does not grow complacent. Hence, the curator stresses all the dangers that the country has faced in the past and may yet face, giving the Greeks pride of place, as theirs was the only invasion that republican Turkey has suffered and it kick-started the Independence War. In fact, although not the only enemy, it was the Greek defeat that marked the Nationalists’ final victory. Hence, paintings of massacre abound, in which the urgency of guarding the fatherland is underlined.

There is no hall dedicated to the First World War. For perspective's sake, it should be mentioned that the Korean War is commemorated in a huge hall, while the First World War is glossed over in a small room marking the Ottoman victory at Gallipoli, exhibiting petty 'booty': Allied equipment, soldiers' personal objects, even parts of a human skull. The Ottoman alliance with Germany is never mentioned.

This lack of information is concealed, albeit not compensated for, by presenting the Independence War as having started in 1918. The well-known images of greedy Allies and bloodthirsty Greeks (in 18th-century costume) are re-used, while those who died in the name of the Republic and national independence are celebrated as martyrs of God and their artefacts displayed for dramatic effect, from the car Reşid Paşa was assassinated in, complete with bullet holes, to Mehmetçik's bloody clothes. Nothing makes danger seem more imminent than the sight of blood.

Although grievances against the Allies are subsumed by a desire for Western integration, there is still unfinished business with the Greeks. The rooms dedicated to Cyprus are dramatic and poignant as paintings cede their place to photographic evidence, hard proof of the atrocities committed against the island's Turkish population. The exhibition fuses Greek Cyprus with Greece and presents the Cyprus events as a continuation or rekindling of the 1920s. The message is caution for the Turks and a plea to the 'West' as, 30 years on, the island of Cyprus remains divided and the Turkish presence in the North remains condemned by the international community. Here is where the TAF state their case, claiming theirs was a peace operation, rescuing civilians who were being slaughtered. A photograph of Lieutenant General Nurettin Erkin embracing Rauf Denктаş in 1974 stresses the TAF's continuing commitment to Cyprus. Next to the picture lies a blood-red pouch filled with Cyprus soil. The dramatic representation of land and blood is complete.

Although concert between public moods and official narratives is hard to ascertain, there is considerable popular sympathy for this narrative. On the eve of the 2004 Cyprus referendum, all political parties, with the notable exception of the AKP, filled Istanbul with banners reminding people of the conflict. A CHP poster read *dayan Denктаş yanındayız*²⁹, whereas the ultra-nationalist MHP³⁰ – whose leader, Devlet

²⁹ 'We stand by Denктаş in his resistance'.

Bahçeli never misses an opportunity to declare his support for KKTC³¹ – raised banners sporting the grey wolf, the Turkish flag and the words: *Istanbul Kahraman Denктаşı karşılıyor*³². The TAF's support for such declarations was tacit. Yet what they perceived as 'national betrayal' actually helped Turkey, for the first time since the Cyprus saga began, to occupy the moral high ground in Western eyes.

Western acknowledgment of Turkey's 'worth' is vital for the TAF as it would constitute proof that Atatürk's westernisation is, finally, successful. Hence the Museum devotes a surprisingly large section to displaying ceremonial gifts presented to Turkish military and civilian officers by their foreign counterparts. Although this preoccupation can be read as a sign of national or institutional insecurity, for the TAF, these gifts represent a ritual recognition of Turkey as an equal in the international arena. Hence they carry immense weight in Turkey's struggle to secure its 'rightful place in the world', alongside Europe. In fact, stressing that Turkey has always been part of Europe even if it failed to start off there is a constant theme in these exhibitions. Ottoman protective armour is discussed as the fusion of Islamic and European influences. Similarly, when displaying uniforms, attention is drawn to Selim III and the Tanzimat reforms that 'Europeanised' outfits. In the accompanying leaflet, all 16 pictures show European-style liveries.

Stressing Turkey's European credentials often relies on downplaying the significance of its Ottoman pedigree, usually by reducing Ottoman history to a period in Turkish history. Hence, the *Military Museum and Cultural Centre* booklet speaks of Turkish bows and arrows of Ottoman times (p.8), 19th-century Turkish cavalry (p.10) and the 16th-century Turkish Sultan Selim I (p.14). Under the rubric of 'Islamic cutting weapons', the leaflet mentions 'Turkish swords'. Once again republican historiography claims that the Turks predated and outlived the Ottoman Empire. Although they originated in Central Asia, the Turks are so entwined with the history of Anatolia that its history becomes theirs. Anatolia has not always been Muslim, nor indeed Ottoman; neither have the Turks. 'Islamic' and 'European' practices and

³⁰ Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Nationalist Movement Party

³¹ E.g. see Z, 4 August 2005 or www.mhp.org.tr/gene/bsk/gbskkonusma/2005/02/02005.php

³² 'Istanbul welcomes the hero Denктаş'.

civilisations may remain distinct analytical categories, but the Turks do not belong to one at the expense of the other.

4. Constructing Continuity in Space and Time

The Turkish Presidential insignia is a Turkish flag bearing, in its top left corner, a golden Hittite-style sun, representing the Republic, surrounded by 16 stars, representing the 16 Turkish states that have existed throughout the nation's history³³. True to the TTT, the insignia claims continuity between the history of different Turkic tribes across time. The Turks, originally from the steppes of central Asia, migrated to a land rich in history and converted to Islam. The Turks today, claims the TTT, represent the fusion of a pre-Islamic past, Islamic traditions and the culture of all Anatolian civilisations. Association is more important than proof in this narrative³⁴. The Hittites were Anatolian, so are the Turks, *ergo* the land's Hittite past is now the Turks'. The use of Hittite symbols seals the Turks' long and glorious history (fig.23).

Anatolia's Hittites or Greeks are not claimed as Turks. They are Anatolians. So are the Turks. Hence they share an *Anatolian* legacy as the land nurtures civilisations and passes legacies on (Özal, 1991:21-22, 26). Thus Özal (1991:346-7) claims Homer and Paul of Tarsus as 'our countrymen'. Similarly, as philosophy, geometry and the world's religions flourished in Anatolia, the land must have had something to do with it. This land is now the Turks', hence they own both the birthplace of European civilisation and the setting within which it grew. This narrative grounded the nation in a remote and mythical past rooted in Anatolia enabling it to 'claim' an antiquity comparable to the Europeans'. Unsurprisingly, Bozdoğan (2001:118) notes, it was extremely popular with modernising elites, who named banks and industries after the mythical past that Turkey claimed as its own (e.g. *Sümerbank* and *Etibank*). Surely a nation with such a glorious past could not fail to succeed in its future endeavours?

³³ http://www.cankaya.gov.tr/eng_flash/gunes.htm

³⁴ For instance, the Hittites were the first civilisation to have archives; the Turks are fond of archives, *ergo* there is a connection (Özal, 1991:6).

This insecurity is now less pronounced, yet TTT influences remain strong in Turkey's ethnographic museums. Ankara's Museum of Anatolian Civilisations, for instance, offers the story of Anatolia's Turkish people and discusses Ottoman, Memluk and Selçuk periods. 'The Turkish art of embroidery is unquestionably as old as the history of the Turks themselves', it notes, which stretches back for millennia. Similarly, İzmir's Ethnographic Museum embraces a narrative accepting the Turks as Anatolia's only indigenous people. Although Levantine populations are mentioned, the very word implies that Anatolia's non-Turkish populations were imported and transient.

The absence of any mention of, or artefact related to İzmir's Jewish and Christian (Armenian, Greek and Syriac) communities is staggering, but unsurprising. A 2003 picture exhibition on İzmir's seaside promenade, marking 80 years since the Lausanne Treaty, included no picture taken before 1928. This is a part of Anatolian history that the TTT is not eager to appropriate, as it would entail accepting shared ownership of the land which Turkish national narratives have bestowed with so much meaning. Accepting that the Turks are not Anatolia's sole owners could have potentially explosive results in the Southeast and would throw the entire national identity narrative off balance.

As it stands now, the TTT-inspired identity does not claim substantive linguistic, religious or indeed racial links with Anatolia's populations. The TTT claims a continuum, not continuity. As Anatolia remains constant, its owners benefit from the land and bestow it with their civilisation. Thus the Turks have inherited Anatolia's history and, through it, became *essentially* Anatolian. The Selçuks, for instance, came from Central Asia but *were* Anatolian anyway, according to İzmir's Ethnographic Museum, as if it were an elective rather than descriptive term. Perplexing captions help: 'the Anatolians brought Central Asiatic carpet-weaving patterns to Anatolia'. Dating is non-sequential and Muslim and Christian dating is used interchangeably, causing confusion as to what the Turkic tribes did before emigrating to Anatolia and what had been done in Anatolia before the Turks arrived. Although we are told that the Selçuks came from central Asia, it seems that there never had been a time when they were not Anatolian. For instance, next to a set of carpets, one caption claims that these motifs were brought to Anatolia in the 13th century, while another notes that

they were first found in Anatolia in the 3rd century. Confusion must be the desired effect. And yet this narrative is neither uncommon nor limited to Turkish nationalists.

Stierlin (2002), in his popular coffee-table book on Selçuk and Ottoman architecture, speaks of Selçuk and Ottoman periods rather than tribes. Stierlin (2002:15) describes the ‘Ottoman period’ as the time when ‘Turkish power had given rise to one of the greatest empires in history’ and stresses Anatolia’s influence on its inhabitants. Before settling in Anatolia, the Turks had only the most rudimentary notions of architecture and art, but once there, they produced true masterpieces, which for Stierlin (2002:9, 100, 132-3) is the result of a direct creative dialogue with the civilisations that flourished in Anatolia before the Turks arrived. For Stierlin (2002:23) there is no conundrum: ‘[t]he Turks settled permanently in Anatolia [in the 11th century] and since then it has been Turkish.’ For the TTT, however, this is not enough. Anatolia needs to have always been Turkish, hence it is reclaimed through, for instance, translating place names. The Mikroyalos shrine in the coastal city of Foça, becomes Küçük Deniz, an exact translation. Even when the information plaque at the site of the shrine quotes Herodotus, Küçük Deniz replaces all references to Mikroyalos. The nationalising effect is as imperceptible as it is potent.

No attempt is made to conceal the linguistic or cultural diversity of Anatolian civilisations. Museum curators simply stress that Anatolia was central in enabling diverse civilisations to flourish: this is where the Romans were at their greatest and Greek city-states truly thrived. This narrative, supported by the Istanbul, Selçuk and Ankara Archaeological Museums, enables national narratives to embrace Anatolia’s history without denying unity of space. Simply by translating place names, the feeling of distance is overcome and an intense sense of pride is instilled in people even though they do not claim direct ownership of those civilisations, simply of the land that inspired them. A schoolteacher, guiding a group of first-graders around Istanbul’s archaeological museum in the spring of 2004, told them they should be proud that their country had been the home of many glorious civilisations. How glorious must a land be, she asked, if so many glorious people choose it as their home?

This message, although instilling national pride, is also directed at European audiences, as many of these sites are packed with tourists. The Kemalist project was one of westernisation and, as national identity was moulded to assist this project,

simultaneous narratives were generated claiming that the Turks – because of droughts in prehistoric times (Bozdoğan, 2001:243) – migrated to India, China, Mesopotamia, Anatolia *and* Europe, carrying and disseminating their civilisation. So although the Hittites – or, indeed, the Europeans – are not the Turks’ ancestors, they might actually be their offspring. Stierlin (2002:23) also identifies the Fins and Hungarians as descendants of migrant Turkish tribes.

‘The republican need for self-affirmation through Western eyes appears... central to the cultural and political consciousness’ of this elite (Bozdoğan, 2001:67) and explains many of the theories they generated that otherwise seem untenable. As Republican elites needed to simultaneously facilitate relations with the West and legitimise westernisation as a return, a series of theories was generated that now potentially seems naïve. It succeeded, however, in claiming that there was no shame in Turkey seeking to learn from Europe, for Europe had once learnt from Turkey. Moreover, by separating the civilisation Europe stood for from the conduct of individual European countries, Turkey managed to retain a sense of pride, while being able to challenge the Europeans at their own game. As Özal (1991:304 & 356), among others, claims, to accept Turkey, Europe has to rise above ethnocentrism, become truly secular and, in short, be true to its own civilisation.

The pursuit of this civilisation has bequeathed Turkey with a confused and confusing relationship with the West. As I will show in Chapter 7, this westernisation drive both stems from Kemalism and undermines it, as Kemalism has given rise to specific institutional arrangements, legal practices and codes of conduct that are often incompatible with westernisation in the form of EU accession. Yet Kemalism has also, as I have shown, given Turks a language and rich symbolic arsenal for thinking about the future and carving their path towards progress, modernity and national dignity. This language, reproduced through education and spatial narratives, is also the language of the law, protected and reproduced through the constitution and judicial activity. This effectively means that making some use of the Kemalist language in Turkey’s public life is hardly a matter of choice.

Chapter 4, Kemalism as the Language of the Law

Having demonstrated that Kemalism pervades the Turks' everyday life, from childhood to adulthood, in this chapter I will demonstrate that Kemalism also represents the normative basis of the Republic's legal system.

1. The Constitution

The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey¹ is a heavily amended version of the document that came into effect in 1983 under military tutelage. Although substantially revised in line with EU stipulations, the current constitution remains true to most of the original version's concerns. Articles quoted here (unless otherwise stated) were untouched by constitutional reform. This is particularly significant as the 1983 constitution was, after all, the work of a military government, which ensured that, under considerable pressure, the document was endorsed by more than 90 percent of the population in a referendum. This constitution made former coup leader Kenan Evren the most powerful president in Turkish history, while offering all coup leaders immunity from criminal indictment or judicial review (Provisional Article 15). This is considered Turkey's most restrictive constitution. It promotes a unitary, collectivist national vision and, in its original form, enhanced the power of the Presidency and the National Security Council (NSC) at the expense of Parliament.

This imbalance has been partly restored, the NSC's power has been diluted and its composition altered², much to the dismay of those fearing the AKP's 'hidden agenda' (*E*, 30 November 2003). They had good reason to fear. The AKP was the first party under the current constitution to have a parliamentary majority enabling it to pass

¹ <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/english/constitution.htm>, see bibliography for details.

² According to (amended) Article 118, the NSC now meets under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic and consists of the Prime Minister; Chief of General Staff; Deputy Prime Minister; Ministers of Justice, National Defence, Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs; the Commanders of the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Gendarmerie.

constitutional reform without the collaboration of another party³. Given the AKP's mixed credentials, this was potentially worrying. Reform, however, has remained sedate, satisfying but not exceeding EU demands. Hence, although clauses identified by the EU as problematic were changed, reform did not touch the clauses setting out the state's character and mission. In fact, there is little proof that the AKP wished to replace them in the first place. This, however, means that, despite the reforms, the Turkish Republic's core normative concerns and the state's identity and mission as reflected in the Constitution, remain true to the 1983 military government's intentions.

Preamble paragraphs 1 & 2 read:

'In line with the concept of nationalism and the reforms and principles introduced by the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk, the immortal leader and the unrivalled hero, this Constitution, which affirms the eternal existence of the Turkish nation and motherland and the indivisible unity of the Turkish state, embodies;

The determination to safeguard the everlasting existence, prosperity and material and spiritual well-being of the Republic of Turkey, and to attain the standards of contemporary civilization as an honourable member with equal rights in the family of world nations;'

The Republic's legal cornerstone explicitly draws legitimacy from Atatürk: the constitution is *legitimate* because it is in line with Atatürk's reforms. That established, the constitution then declares allegiance to (primordialist) nationalism and the indivisibility of the state, identified as a republic, and its domains. Then it stresses its commitment to the Republic's protection and the pursuit of progress and alignment

³ According to Article 175, Section 7 (amended 17/05/1987), constitutional amendments have to be proposed in writing by at least one-third of MPs. Proposals then ought to be debated twice in Plenary Session. The adoption of a proposal requires a three-fifths majority in the Assembly. The consideration and adoptions of such proposals should take place in line with the law. The President may refer laws related to constitutional amendment back to Parliament for further consideration or, if the Assembly adopts a draft law by a two-thirds majority, the President can submit it to referendum. A referendum can also be resorted to if the required majority is not met in the Assembly.

with the universal standards of contemporary civilisation. Before outlining the Turkish state's organisational and functional traits, the constitution specifies that the preservation and furthering of Atatürk's plan represents the core objective towards which political power ought to be used (see Glyptis, 2005a:411). The constitution demands that Turkey should both espouse the standards of contemporary civilisation, and strive for the acknowledgment of its status by nations deemed to possess the requisite civilisational standards.

Also before delving into technicalities (preamble paragraph 5), the constitution further stresses the 'principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values of the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk (sic)' and secularism. Again, Turkey's constitution draws legitimacy from Atatürk. Modernism, nationalism and the indivisibility of state and territory are reiterated as not only the state's organisational principles, but part of its mission and purpose. This mission, however, is not the state's alone. Preamble paragraph 6 stresses that 'all Turkish citizens are united in national honour and pride, in national joy and grief, in their rights and duties regarding national existence, in blessings and in burdens, and in every manifestation of national life'. The indivisible unity of the state and land also includes the people, thus completing the trident of state-territory-nation. National identity is both celebrated as the source of individual joy and pride, setting the document's collectivist tone, and established as the basis on which citizenship-related rights and duties are hinged.

This collectivism, expressed through the conceptualisation of a shared national destiny, translates into an elaborate set of state responsibilities. The state is bound to the people almost organically, as the existence of common national interests and a shared destiny translates easily into the assumption that the 'common good' also exists and it is the state's job to pursue it. In Turkey, the state is responsible for the cultivation of national pride and accomplishment – for instance, promoting successful athletes – and for protecting the families of those who sacrificed their lives for the nation's freedom and glory (Articles 59 & 61). Moreover, the state is responsible for ensuring that the economy – from land cultivation (Article 44) to private enterprise (Article 48) – serves 'national economic requirements and social objectives'. Upholding national interest is a key state responsibility as the constitutional document

'recognises' national unity. It does not demand or legislate it, it simply states its natural and unmediated existence. This legitimises related legislation that, premised on the assumption that national unity and solidarity *exist*, seeks to protect them from perceived challenges, such as ethnic or linguistic plurality.

Article 2 defines the Turkish state as a democratic, secular and social republic, premised on national solidarity and loyalty to Atatürk's nationalism. Article 3, paragraph 1 reiterates that '[t]he Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish'. Identifying Turkish as the language of this 'indivisible entity', the lawmaker indicates that this language is derived from and belongs to the unit that is the nation. As such, no other language can belong to or express this unit. Linguistic unity thus becomes both a practical manifestation and an inherent part of national unity. This is extremely significant as many EU-stipulated reforms were targeted at reversing the exclusion of other languages, namely Kurdish.

In line with EU demands, Article 26 on freedom of expression and the dissemination of thought, that in 1983 read '[n]o language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought' has been scrapped. However, Article 42, paragraph 9 still proclaims that '[n]o language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education'. The article permits the teaching of foreign languages and, in fact, Turkey sports a number of established foreign-language schools and universities. The issue here is the potential status of a language other than Turkish *as* a mother tongue for Turkish citizens, an acknowledgment that would heavily compromise national unity. Now, although the direct ban on Kurdish has been lifted and it enjoys (limited) access to education and broadcasting (*AFP*, 17 March 2006), Turkish remains the constitutionally protected language of the indivisible entity that is the nation.

This indivisible entity has to be at the forefront of the judges' minds when interpreting the law (see also Chapter 5). Article 5 is unequivocal:

'The fundamental aims and duties of the state are: to safeguard the independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic and democracy; to ensure the welfare, peace, and happiness of the individual and society; to strive for the removal of political,

social and economic obstacles which restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in a manner incompatible with the principles of justice and of the social state governed by the rule of law; and to provide the conditions required for the development of the individual's material and spiritual existence.'

In line with EU concerns, the constitution stresses its commitment to the individual. Nevertheless, it also commits itself to the active promotion of society's happiness. Moreover, the document upholds the integrity and indivisibility of the nation and its republic as the state's first and foremost duty. Although since 2001 the constitution's tone is 'softer' than it was in 1983 when exalting the state and society's supremacy over the individual, such provisions remain similar in content. This gives the question of interpretation and implementation added urgency, especially as the list of duties includes potentially incompatible fundamental aims without according any one of them priority. Although this confirms the (bounded) conceptual flexibility of the Kemalist language, it also leaves immense power in the hands of those interpreting the law and the perambulatory clauses discussed above become, in this light, important pointers. These clauses' priorities and concerns are reiterated as part of every political actor's duties. Article 68, paragraph 4 states:

'The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties shall not... conflict [with] the independence of the state, its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular republic; they shall not aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime.'

Banning parties whose programme undermines the constitution seems perfectly reasonable. However, a closer reading reveals that a wide array of political programmes constitute, under this clause, threats to national indivisibility, integrity and secularism. As the preservation of these principles emerges as a key political duty in Turkey, a framework for the legal suspension of rights and freedoms survives, even after extensive EU-championed reform. Interpretation is of the essence. For instance, Article 17, paragraph 2 permits the use of violence in quelling riots or insurrections. As International Women's Day 2005 events proved, however, defining 'riot' is not a

straightforward matter⁴. Provisos on rights and freedoms exist in all legal systems, the difference lies in the manner and frequency with which they are appealed to and the mechanisms for checking the authorities that wield the power to limit said freedoms.

Article 27, paragraph 2, for instance, bans using art, broadly defined, to challenge Articles 1-3 of the constitution; in other words art cannot challenge the Republic, nationalism or the indivisible unity of state-territory-nation and its language. Freedom of artistic expression is secondary to the protection of state integrity and national unity. Regardless of how often Article 27 is appealed to, the unconditional supremacy of national integrity cannot be lost on the judges, especially as it is not simply art that should respect national integrity. Article 28, paragraph 4 prevents the publication or printing of news or articles that threaten the state's internal or external security, the indivisible integrity of state-territory-nation, or that may incite offence, riot or insurrection. For Rebecca Tinsley⁵ (2005), such legal provisions enable the state to limit individual freedom of expression in the name of an abstract collective national good – in whose name, secularism is also upheld.

Secularism is part of Republican character and the Republic is part of the indivisible trident of state-territory-nation that the Constitution protects and upholds. The protection of secularism takes many forms. Article 24, paragraph 3 bans proselytising; Article 24, paragraph 4 brings all education and instruction in religion and ethics under state supervision and control, while Article 24, paragraph 5 states:

‘No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the state on religious tenets.’

⁴ During the Q&A session following a speech (see Gül, 2005e), Abdullah Gül was challenged by audience member Ayşe Gül on why the police used violence against what she claimed was a peaceful demonstration on Women's Day. The minister noted the matter was under investigation, but stressed that implementation of Turkey's new legal framework needed work still.

⁵ Director, Waging Peace.

Religion is firmly excluded from the public domain. Yet the line separating the public expression of religious beliefs from their exploitation for political purposes is blurred. The distinction is left up to the courts, whose secularism is unyielding (see Chapter 5).

Having established the core principles that should underpin law and political activity, the constitution seeks to ensure their protection and perpetuation, declaring that all educational institutions have a duty to protect Atatürk's principles and the constitution. Nationalism, secular republicanism and westernisation are to be communicated through education:

‘Training and education shall be conducted along the lines of the principles and reforms of Atatürk, on the basis of contemporary science and educational methods, under the supervision and control of the state. Institutions of training and education contravening these provisions shall not be established. The freedom of training and education does not relieve the individual from loyalty to the Constitution.’ (Article 42, paragraphs 3 & 4)

‘The state shall take measures to ensure the training and development of youth into whose keeping our state, independence, and our Republic are entrusted, in the light of contemporary science, in line with the principles and reforms of Atatürk, and in opposition to ideas aiming at the destruction of the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation’. (Article 58, paragraph 1)

The constitution's command, that it is the future generations' duty 'to safeguard and eternally defend national independence', effectively reproduces Atatürk's *Address to Youth*. Although the famous rejoinder celebrating the Turks' blood is not reiterated here, the constitution embraces primordial nationalism elsewhere and the law remains true to Kemalism. The problem is that Kemalism is, as mentioned before, internally incoherent. Hence a court would have to untangle the constitution's potentially incompatible principles before upholding them (see Chapter 5).

Still, having entrusted its protection to the nation, the constitution also binds key political figures to the same set of principles by oath.

‘I swear upon my honour and integrity, before the great Turkish Nation, to safeguard the existence and independence of the state, the indivisible integrity of the Country and the Nation, and the absolute sovereignty of the Nation; to remain loyal to the supremacy of law, to the democratic and secular Republic, and to Atatürk’s principles and reforms; not to deviate from the ideal according to which everyone is entitled to enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms under peace and prosperity in society, national solidarity and justice, and loyalty to the Constitution.’ (Article 81, MPs oath).

‘In my capacity as President of the Republic I swear upon my honour and integrity before the Turkish Grand National Assembly and before history to safeguard the existence and independence of the state, the indivisible integrity of the Country and the Nation and the absolute sovereignty of the Nation, to abide by the Constitution, the rule of law, democracy, the principles of the secular Republic, not to deviate from the ideal according to which everyone is entitled to enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms under conditions of national peace and prosperity and in a spirit of national solidarity and justice, and to do my utmost to preserve and exalt the glory and honour of the Republic of Turkey and perform without bias the functions that I have assumed.’ (Article 103).

The Republic’s elected officials are, under oath, responsible for the protection of the state and nation’s indivisible unity and integrity. Although only the President is specifically responsible for the protection of secularism, everyone is responsible for protecting the Republic, which is secular in nature.

Finally, Article 174 seals the constitution’s Atatürkist nature:

‘No provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the Reform Laws⁶... which aim to raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilisation and to safeguard the secular character of the Republic, and which were in force on the date of the adoption by referendum of the Constitution of Turkey.’

⁶ Atatürk’s fundamental republican reforms.

The constitution itself draws legitimacy from the Reform Laws, passed under Atatürk. As the constitution, and by extension the Republic, is premised on Atatürk's vision and reforms, the laws in question need to remain unchangeable. Thus Atatürk's legacy is 'essentialised' by constitutional fiat, placing it outside political debate.

2. The Penal Code

The Turkish Penal Code is a good example of how – almost despite the provisions of individual articles – the law is both premised on Atatürk's principles and dependent on the judiciary to implement it on said principles' terms. In 2005, the Penal Code was amended in line with EU demands. The new code protects women's rights and aligns Turkish family law and inheritance provisions with EU legislation; it establishes a Court of Appeals and enhances freedom of thought. Prison sentences for members of the Press are abolished in favour of fines, and Article 216 replaced Article 312, so that now 'opinion statements which do not exceed the limits of providing news and which are made to provide criticisms, cannot be considered crimes' (Z, 27 May 2005).

Although the EU commended Turkey's accession efforts, the government denied that reform took place with the EU in mind. The Directorate General of Press and Information of the Prime Minister's Office⁷ describes this reform as a 'silent civil revolution', responding to public desires, not external pressure. The AKP seeks to create a sense of ownership for the reform effort among the Turkish people while also trying to advertise the party's popular mandate. AKP politicians know only too well that their popularity is their hardest currency (see Glyptis, 2005c).

The directorate, however, further seeks to legitimise the new code in Kemalist terms, describing it as 'new and modern', seeking to capitalise on the positive connotations the words carry. A modern penal code, surely, takes Turkey a step closer to achieving the desired standards of contemporary civilisation. The amendments to Atatürk's 1926 Code, the Directorate explains in a most reverential fashion, should not be perceived as a rejection. The 1926 Code, we are told, was aimed at 'bringing Turkey

⁷ [http. www.byegm.gov.tr](http://www.byegm.gov.tr) . see bibliography for details.

into line with the standards of modern civilization. Taking into account the era of its origins, the Code must certainly be considered a revolutionary step forward’.

Yet reform was necessary as Turkey was struggling to establish a ‘fully legal system’. Atatürk’s code did not fail, continues the semi-apologetic document, but external obstacles hindered implementation. ‘[L]aws are fated to always fall behind the times; they must be periodically amended and renewed’ if only to facilitate implementation. Aware that a rejection of Atatürk’s handiwork would cause public outrage *and* could be deemed unconstitutional, the AKP claims continuity with Kemalism, presenting reform as ‘updating’ Atatürk’s legacy. Yet an ‘update’ is hardly what the EU had in mind and organisations such as Women for Women’s Human Rights⁸ and Amnesty International⁹ expressed concern about some of the new code’s restrictive articles. Amnesty International, as well as the Turkish Journalists’ Union noted that provisions for freedom of expression were inadequate, while Union President Nazmi Bilgin called said provisions superficial and the year-long effort to amend the old code an abject failure (*TDN*, 2 June 2005).

Despite amendments, journalists can still be fined and even jailed for what they write. The code does not secure the journalists’ right to report on public-interest issues; restrictions remain on access and disclosure of information, while defamation and insult remain criminal rather than civil offences (*TDN*, 8 July 2005). Combined with the New Press Law, passed a year previously, the code undoubtedly improves the Turkish journalists’ lot, but limitations persist. Reports violating the needs of a democratic society; the rights or freedoms of others; moral values; national security, stability, public security; and the nation’s territorial integrity can still be banned. Bans can also be used to protect national secrets, prevent crimes or ensure the authority and independence of the judiciary (*TDN*, 11 June 2004). Although under the new code journalists in violation of the law face a fine rather than a prison sentence, it has not brought the qualitative change in preoccupations and priorities that many had hoped for.

⁸ http://www.wwhr.org/homepage_en?id=881

⁹ <http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR440112005?open&of=ENG-TUR>

But how could the new penal code *not* reflect concerns with unity, integrity and the protection of national interest when these concerns represent the constitution's core principles and, as such, inform all legislation? These principles automatically shape both laws and their interpretation. In fact, Tinsley (2005) notes, a cursory look at freedom of expression court cases in Turkey shows that, although the state prosecutor is highly erratic in bringing cases to justice, their treatment is standard. Trespasses, she notes, may lead to a trial in one case but not another, while a piece of writing may land its author in court a decade after its publication. The prosecutor's willingness to prosecute, Tinsley found, depended on a variety of factors that were not always directly related to the case, but were invariably linked to the values being upheld. Consequently, when the prosecutor did act, the approach to authors accused of undermining the nation, state or their indivisible unity, was coherent and predictable.

In 1986, notes Vryonis (1991:120), publisher Hulya Potuoğlu was brought to court under the old penal code because of a footnote in the Encyclopaedia Britannica's Turkish Edition mentioning a 12th-century Armenian Kingdom in Cilicia. Potuoğlu was charged with trying to undermine Turkish National Identity. Almost 20 years later, under the new penal code, publisher Fatih Taş was sentenced to six months in prison for printing the translation of an American book detailing the activities of Turkish paramilitary forces during the struggle against the PKK, and an academic conference debating the 'Armenian Question' was, briefly, banned by the courts (*TE*, 11 November 2004). Although the saga of the twice-cancelled Armenian Conference ended in victory for those who saw it as a litmus test for Turkey's democracy and human rights (*TDN*, 26 & 27 September 2005), the story itself is telling.

The conference was cancelled when it transpired that genocide allegations might be openly discussed. Justice Minister Cemil Çiçek, speaking in May, described holding the conference as 'stabbing Turkey in the back'. The minister called the organising universities 'irresponsible' and deplored his inability to single-handedly take them to court. Although Çiçek eventually retracted these statements and supported the conference, the Press were not going to let him forget them in a hurry (e.g. *TNA*, 23 August 2005; *TDN*, 27 September 2005), especially as five prominent Istanbul journalists were indicted for having criticised the courts' initial decision. This, notes Kınıklıoğlu, proves that EU-stipulated reform has hardly touched the judiciary (*EAN*,

17 December 2005). For Etyen Mahcupyan, domestic policy director of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, the explanation is even more sinister, as he believes the judiciary belongs to a conservative camp seeking to sabotage the AKP's EU vocation (ibid). Although Kınıklıoğlu agrees with Mahcupyan about the necessity of reform, his interpretation of the Armenian conference saga is actually triumphant. It was vital for Turkey's reform effort, he notes, for the conference to take place despite the reactions surrounding it (*TDN*, 27 September 2005), even though, in the end, most speakers expressly avoided discussing the question of whether the Armenian question constitutes genocide, potentially respecting 'public sensibilities' and possibly intimidated by the controversy that predated the conference and the clamouring crowds outside the venue on its opening day (*TDN*, 26 September 2005).

Everybody was a winner. Kemalist values had not been compromised, academic freedom had scored a minor victory without injuring national pride and EU spokesmen congratulated Turkey on successfully passing this 'litmus test'. Yet before long, another such test emerged. Once more, a public contradiction of official national narratives before an international audience – relativising national orthodoxy, giving voice to alternatives and simultaneously harming Turkey's image abroad – triggered the new penal code's provisions on freedom of expression into action. This time the case was even more controversial, concerning Europe's favourite Turkish writer.

Orhan Pamuk, during an interview in Switzerland, claimed he is the only person who dares mention the deaths of a million Armenians and thousands of Kurds. The statement was not particularly provocative and, as far as his solitary campaign for justice goes, exaggerated. Yet the prosecutor, ironically the same man who, four years previously, investigated Erdoğan for 'insulting the state' (*NYT*, 25 September 2005), found that Pamuk's statements had violated Article 301 of the new penal code. Articles 299-301 deal with 'crimes against symbols of state sovereignty and the honour of its organs'. Pamuk's public contradiction of official Republican history narratives was interpreted as an insult to Turkishness and therefore qualified as a violation of Article 301. If found guilty, Pamuk would have faced a longer prison sentence for having made the statements abroad and having, thus, compromised Turkey's international image¹⁰. Punishing Pamuk would damage Turkey's EU

¹⁰ See Writer's Association <http://www.internationalpen.org.uk/>

chances more than his statements ever could. Nevertheless this trial upheld the legal system's priorities and concerns.

'Legalists say the problem with [Article 301] is not the law itself but its implementation' (*Z*, 19 December 2005). European journalists claimed the Pamuk trial was a sign of Turkey's failure to face up to 'this blood-sodden chapter of its history' (*FT*, 5 September 2005). The European Parliament's co-chairman, noting that the prosecutor was misusing Article 301, warned that, unless the trial was suspended, the EU would consider interrupting membership negotiations with Turkey (*Z*, 18 December 2005). EU Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn also demanded the amendment of Article 301 in a tense meeting with Turkey's chief EU negotiator Ali Babacan. Babacan's answer failed to satisfy the commissioner, yet it illuminates the controversy perfectly. He simply said that Turkish courts are independent (*H*, 24 November 2005). This is what they chose to do with their independence.

Erdoğan, when asked to comment on the case, echoed Babacan. 'Correct or incorrect', he stated, 'the case is under [the] judiciary's authority' (*Z*, 18 December 2005) and that authority, his government would not meddle with. Meddle, however, is exactly what his government was asked to do, as the case stumbled on a technicality: was Pamuk to be tried according to the old or new penal code? The decision was referred to the Justice Ministry and the AKP was thus faced with a stark choice between siding with the prosecutor and upholding the national project or facilitating the EU-oriented modernising project by dismissing the case. Eventually, the Ministry chose the path of least resistance while effectively siding with Europe: it refused to issue a ruling (*BBC*, 23 January 2006). The Europeans 'described the case as a litmus test of Turkey's eligibility to join, warning that it is Ankara – rather than Mr Pamuk – that is going on trial' (*BBC*, 16 December 2005). As a result, they were delighted by this development, but stressed the urgent need to revise Article 301 in order to prevent similar incidents from recurring. Prevention is hardly the issue, however, with more than 60 writers and publishers currently facing similar charges. Which raises the question of why the Ministry chose to allow this case to fall without actually articulating opposition to it.

The Ministry, on this occasion, protected Turkey's EU ambitions by removing the obstacle that such a well-publicised case would represent without actually touching the law or prosecution mechanisms that created this obstacle in the first place. The EU

was placated, but the Turkish court system remains unchanged. Unless extensive retraining for judges and prosecutors goes hand in hand with a revision of articles such as 301, it is not likely to change soon. Meanwhile, ironically, Pamuk offered the best explanation of this controversy (*NY*, 19 December 2005). Although lamenting his books' public burnings and calls that he should be 'silenced for good', Pamuk is calm. 'I do not think I will end up in jail', he writes. 'This makes it somewhat embarrassing to see my trial over-dramatized.' Yet he understands:

'The hardest thing was to explain why a country officially committed to entry in the European Union would wish to imprison an author whose books were well known in Europe, and why it felt compelled to play out this drama ... "under Western eyes"... [T]he Westernizing elites in my own country, feel compelled to follow two separate and seemingly incompatible lines of action.'

Both modernisation and nationalism are lines of action contained within Kemalism, protected by law and celebrated through national narratives. Yet, as I mentioned before and as Pamuk's case proves, they are potentially contradictory. Although Pamuk's article ends on a semi-accusatory note, telling the Europeans that neither they nor their legal systems are as perfect as they often think, his assessment of his native country is insightful. Turkey's reasons for pursuing EU accession are often muted. For many, the desirability of EU membership stems from Atatürk's westernising imperative (see Chapter 7). If, however, membership is approached as a Kemalist goal then it is, automatically, secondary to Kemalism itself. Hence achieving this goal should not be allowed to compromise Kemalist values or imperatives. Thus, for many, protecting the nation's indivisible unity and the supremacy of established national narratives – the significance of which has already been discussed – is actually as important as maintaining EU accession momentum.

Moreover, in Kemalist terms, projecting 'the right' image is vital. As I have already shown, the republican project entailed the creation and dissemination of desirable historical narratives for European consumption. Controlling Turkey's image abroad has always been an important state function and a significant component of the attempt to attain the universal standards of contemporary civilisation. Speaking of massacres, as Pamuk did, does not enhance Turkey's 'Western' image and thus contradicts said narratives. On this occasion, the attempt to punish him for tarnishing

Turkey's desired image may in fact damage the image more than Pamuk's statements, yet it demonstrates the state mechanisms' basic impetus to prosecute those who endanger the Kemalist project.

While trying to negotiate a difficult public relations situation, Justice Minister Çiçek stated that '[s]ome people make statements that push the limits of freedom of speech to the extreme' (*TNA*, 7 November 2005). For European commentators, used to individualistic legal traditions, the statement was yet another blunder. And yet Çiçek was being insightful for, as we have seen, in Turkey the individual is not the non-negotiable core of legal thought. The state, Atatürk's project and the national collectivity vie for protection on an equal footing with the individual. The statist component of Turkish nationalism should not be underestimated. As Atatürk's chosen medium of revolutionary reform, the state is often perceived as constituting the institutional expression of national volition and, as such, deserving both obedience and protection. Atatürk (2003:314) was unequivocal: 'What I expect from the entire people, without exceptions, is complete submission to the orders of the government'.

Although freedom of expression is respected in Turkey, albeit in a qualified fashion, as is the case everywhere, collectivism often overrides individualism and the nation-state emerges as an agency with interests and priorities beyond merely protecting its citizens. This is of vital significance. Basic freedoms *are* observed in Turkey, contrary to European accusations. For instance, because of the new code's controversial provisions, the Press Council has set up a special assistance service for journalists facing jail sentences, offering an information hotline as well as free access to a lawyer (*TDN*, 6 June 2005). Limitations to freedom of the Press are known and openly discussed. These limitations are not imposed by an authoritarian regime, but result from the collectivist premises of Turkish law and state model wherein the nation comes before the individual and the common good amounts to more than the sum of individual 'goods'. Hence limitations to individual freedoms differ from those accepted in European liberal democracies. This does not make Turkey essentially repressive, but it does make it substantially different from the Union it seeks to join.

For Çakmak (2003:71), Turkey's unitary nation-state model is a historical throwback, globally superseded by a plural, multi-layered type of polity. Rather than arguing, however, that this state model is premised on Kemalist collectivist nationalism,

Çakmak (2003:70) presents it as derived from the need to ‘eliminate the negative effects of [ethnic and religious] diversity’ during early Republican years. Çakmak (2003:71) links human rights violations directly to the PKK insurgency and, turning his initial argument on its head, notes that Turkey’s unitary state model actually reflects the people’s common identity. Although human rights violations intensified during the 1980s, Çakmak’s claim that the unitary state model was a response to specific terrorist threats is ahistorical and inaccurate. Atatürk claimed Anatolia for the Turks and the Turks only. The protection of national and territorial indivisibility is, as I have demonstrated, every citizen’s duty. And citizens stand warned that threats assume many guises, from the PKK to a newscast undermining national cohesion.

Atatürk’s (2003:487) legacy was clear: ▶

‘The efforts exerted by the nation with the exclusive goal of safeguarding its sovereign rights; the blood [the nation] shed without counting; the resistance, the resolve it exhibited in all sorts of difficulties, internal or external, have created the new favorable situation in front of which we are found today.’

According to Kemalist lore, it is everyone’s obligation to maintain this favorable situation by safeguarding national unity, territorial integrity and secularism. Kemalist agencies such as the courts, the TAF and the presidency never fail to do what they feel is their national, civic and professional duty.

Chapter 5,

Political Actors: Using Kemalism, Protecting Kemalism

Kemalism is the language of political socialisation and the cornerstone of Turkey's legal system, despite its internal tensions. In this chapter, I demonstrate how this language, despite its contradictions, is upheld by core political agencies (the judiciary, TAF and presidency). For them, Kemalism is the language of choice when seeking to legitimise decisions or actions. These institutions are central to the conceptualisation and evolution of the Kemalist project and their recruitment processes, training and professional duties reflect that fact. For them, Kemalism is not simply a language. Rather the language is derived from and corresponds to a specific set of values and priorities that they wholeheartedly embrace. Here I will show how the presidency, judiciary and particularly the TAF seek to uphold Kemalist values as they understand them and prevent others from acting in ways that are incompatible with them.

Nevertheless, Kemalism's inherent flexibility and potentially contradictory prescriptions forces its defenders to use it selectively, upholding what they identify as its essence, while other agencies, increasingly, also capitalise on this flexibility. These agencies use the Kemalist language in order to attack the interpretative monopoly Kemalism's defenders reserve for themselves. Thus they seek to re-conceptualise Turkey's identity and future orientations. The problem is that for Kemalists, 'Kemalism' is more than a language and it was never intended to become a loose framework within which politics was negotiated. Yet that is what it has become.

The Kemalist language is all-pervasive, its narratives and symbols, as shown previously, dominate public life. As these narratives and symbols are both reproduced by agencies vested with great authority (e.g. the school or courthouse) *and* inherently popular – as they are associated with the nation's founding moment and a story of great heroism and glory – Kemalism as a language is now used by various agencies. Public usage enhances the language's currency, it reproduces it and enhances its intelligibility. This intelligibility, cutting across status or educational divides, renders

this legitimating language common property, not the elites' exclusive domain, and opens the debate over the country's future to all.

It is hardly surprising, then, that the AKP government is using this language extensively in its legitimating appeals. Capitalising on the language's inherent legitimacy, however, the AKP is gradually shifting its meaning and boundaries. The courts, the TAF and the President resist this effort, as to them the Kemalist language corresponds to specific values and priorities that are compromised by this new-found linguistic flexibility. Moreover, as I will further discuss in Chapter 6, AKP politicians are intensely mistrusted given their association with Islamist politics and frequent *faux pas* in the discussion of religion's place in public life. Hence the linguistic tension between the AKP and the Kemalists is symptomatic of a deeper conflict regarding unarticulated, competing visions for Turkey's future. This debate is the most public fashion in which these tensions are played out. Yet tensions have practical manifestations as the courts, president, generals and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan clash.

1. The President

The President of the Republic of Turkey is elected for a single term of seven years by a two-thirds majority of the total number of MPs (Article 102 of Turkey's Constitution) in the Turkish Grand National Assembly from among its own members *or* from among Turkish citizens who fulfil the age and education requirements and are eligible to be deputies (Article 110). Nominating presidential candidates from outside parliament, such as the current president, former Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, requires a written proposal by at least one-fifth of MPs.

The President is the head of state and represents the Republic, hence the president-elect is committed to impartiality: he ought to sever any relations with a political party and his status as an MP should cease. Upon assumption of office, the President swears to protect national unity, national glory and secularism. The President can promulgate laws; summon the Assembly; return laws to the Assembly to be reconsidered; submit constitutional amendment proposals to referendum; and appeal to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of provisions or laws (Article 104). For instance, President

Sezer sent parts of a new Anti-terror Bill to the Supreme Court for revision (Z, 18 July 2006). The President has many duties in common with most heads of state (appointing the Prime Minister, calling elections, giving the Parliamentary opening address or ratifying international treaties). Yet he remains more powerful than most, especially in Parliamentary systems.

The President appoints the members of the Higher Education Council (*Yükseköğretim Kurulu*¹, YÖK – previously appointed by the NSC) and the rectors of public universities. Article 130 of the constitution brings education under state control and gives the President (indirect but significant) power over it. The President appoints YÖK's members who are, in turn, partly responsible for the appointment of rectors and faculty deans (Article 131). Technically, state universities provide a list of candidates, from which YÖK chooses three names, irrespective of who got the most votes, and submits them to the President who then selects one. Foundation (private) universities do not conform to this rule. Although attempts were made to change this, a wave of protests resulted in the proposal being shelved. Boards of trustees choose foundation universities' rectors.

Nevertheless the President – and until recently, the TAF – enjoys immense power over state higher education, having the final word over rectors' appointments and having selected the selectors (i.e. YÖK). Thus it is likely that rectors will fit a certain profile and it is common for academics, from both types of universities, to rally in Kemalism's defence. Although such guardianship pretensions may not be representative of Turkey's intellectual establishment, they remain part of its mainstream. This is even more significant given the respect and unrestricted access to public platforms that educators enjoy.

The President's power over university appointments is matched by his control over judicial appointments. He appoints the members of the Constitutional Court, Military High Court of Appeals, Supreme Military Administrative Court, Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors as well as a quarter of the members of the Council of State. Finally, he appoints the Chief Public Prosecutor and Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals (Article 104c). Hence, the President appoints

¹ See www.yok.gov.tr

senior judges and determines promotions (by controlling top appointments, including appointments to the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors that determines promotions to lower posts), thus effectively controlling the judiciary's demographic make-up. Thus the President's understanding of Kemalist priorities has a powerful and lasting effect on politics, as most of his appointments will outlast his tenure. The judiciary's Kemalist *esprit de corps* becomes almost self-sustaining.

The inter-connectedness of Kemalist institutions is completed with the bond that the President enjoys with the TAF. The President appoints the General Chief of Staff and presides over the NSC. As the TAF's Commander-in-Chief, the President commands military mobilisation and represents the TAF's Supreme Military Command on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. '[T]he Office of the Commander-in-Chief' notes Article 117 of the constitution, essentialising the bond between the Army, presidency and the Republic, 'is inseparable from the spiritual existence of the Turkish Grand National Assembly'. The current General Chief of Staff concurs, noting that '[t]he office of the Commander in Chief is represented in the spiritual entity of Turkish Grand National Assembly' (Özkök, 2004b).

It is hardly surprising that the judiciary, presidency and TAF share a political agenda, orientation and understanding of key Kemalist terms. For some, this concert is a sign of military manipulation. Güney (2002:192) believes that the presidency often does 'the military's work for them'. Although the President often shares the TAF's assumptions and priorities, especially as the occasional appointment of retired military officers to the presidency made such agreement a foregone conclusion, this is not forced. The TAF enjoy a considerable degree of influence over political proceedings, yet they actually have no direct control over or access to the President's appointment. Although the presidency's agenda and professional ethos coincides with the TAF's, this is hardly surprising given Turkey's constitutional framework.

President Sezer is independently as Kemalist as the TAF. Sezer (2000a) embraces republicanism, stressing that democracy is 'the single most important value to be upheld' and that the Turkish Republic is the outcome of 'my nation's struggle for progress and prosperity'. He embraces modernisation, noting that '[o]ur country, which cannot remain inward-looking, has to become integrated with the values of civilisation embraced by the European Union. Our success in the areas of the

supremacy of the law and democracy will enhance our respectability in the community of modern nations' (Sezer, 2000b). He defends secularism and favours EU accession without ever losing sight of national dignity and security (see Chapters 6 and 7). His interpretation of what national unity entails, as I will demonstrate below, invariably coincides with the TAF's and diverges from the AKP's. Yet, when Sezer acts in ways that meet the Army's approval thus potentially, eliminating the need for intervention, he is not compromising the independence of his office. Rather, such incidents prove that the TAF's agenda has a powerful, prestigious and vocal supporter. Currently this agenda converges on intense suspicion regarding the AKP's actions and intentions and a perceived need to protect national unity and the secular Republic.

2. The Courts

Having demonstrated the ways in which the letter of the law and its implementation incorporate, reproduce and uphold Kemalist priorities and concerns, here I will briefly demonstrate that Kemalism is the backbone of Turkey's judges' corporate identity

The Constitutional Court², according to Article 148 of the constitution, examines the constitutionality, in form and substance, of laws, decrees having the force of law, the Rules of Procedure of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and constitutional amendments (*only* with regard to form). The court can be called upon by the President to verify the constitutionality of laws and decrees. The court also has the power to decree the closure of political parties. No action can be brought before the court alleging the unconstitutionality, either in form or substance, of laws or decrees having the force of law issued during a state of emergency, martial law or in time of war. The constitution protects the TAF *a priori*.

According to Article 146 of the constitution, the Constitutional Court consists of 11 regular and four substitute members appointed by the President, according to specific quotas, from the High Court of Appeals, the Council of State, the Military High Court

² The Constitutional Court also acts as the Supreme Court and the Republic's Chief Public Prosecutor acts as the Supreme Court's Prosecutor.

of Appeals, the High Military Administrative Court and the Audit Court, after candidates for each vacant office are nominated by the Plenary Assemblies of each court from their respective members. One further member is selected from among senior administrative officers and lawyers and one from a list provided by YÖK, whose make-up and likely commitment to Kemalism was discussed above.

Recently, Prime Minister Erdoğan accused YÖK of ‘displaying an ideological attitude’ (Z, 4 November 2005). Yet it seems that YÖK’s very purpose is to uphold certain values as, according to the constitution, Republican education as a whole should be in line with Kemalist principles. As the constitution establishes and undertakes to protect the *Atatürk High Institution of Culture, Language and History* (Article 134), it would be surprising if YÖK *did not* display an ideological attitude. YÖK’s make-up, structural position and *esprit de corps* point it towards a specific direction. Almost by definition, academics have, for most of Turkey’s history, been at the heart of Kemalist modernisation, as they were both necessary for the enlightenment project and more likely to embrace the westernising rhetoric, secular outlook and Republican discourse. Although this tradition, while not rejected, was superseded with the advent of an era of subtler meanings and proliferating options, and the pool from which YÖK selects its nominees is now varied, YÖK’s own composition and the continued existence of die-hard Kemalist elements in intellectual circles makes it easy to maintain a coherent pool of Kemalist candidates when selecting nominees for the Constitutional Court.

Moreover, although the President can exercise discretion, the TAF are necessarily represented in the country’s highest court, further cementing its Kemalist outlook. Finally, choice is further limited by the judiciary’s professional ethos that remains, by and large, secular, republican and in support of a unitary, Kemalist national awareness. Reproducing and maintaining this professional ethos is easy as judges’ promotions are internally regulated. For instance, appointments to the High Court of Appeals are made by the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors from among first category judges and public prosecutors (Article 154). Thus Turkey’s top judges can ensure their corporate identity is upheld and reproduced. This identity is, unsurprisingly, secular, republican and nationalist, which has led to accusations that the judiciary is the TAF’s proxy. As the Constitutional Court is particularly active in

rejecting legislation, its independence from the government of the day cannot be doubted. Yet, for Cizre & Çınar (2003:316), that does not make the court independent. They believe that during the 1997 ‘velvet coup’ the TAF relied on the courts extensively in order to wrestle political power away from the Islamists, thus forcing their agenda onto the courts, ending judicial independence.

Shankland (1999:129-130) disagrees, noting that when the state prosecutor brings individuals or parties to court he is acting independently, upholding the letter and spirit of the constitution without consulting other civilian or military authorities. This proves both the judiciary’s independence and the supremacy of Kemalist priorities and their corresponding language. Although the judiciary’s agenda often coincides with the TAF’s, this is the result of agreement, not coercion (Shankland, 1999:111). Besides, the TAF ‘prefer to rely on the state prosecutor where they can’ (ibid, p.85) because they are fond of upholding Republican procedure when it functions according to their understanding of Kemalist propriety. Simultaneously, this reliance is telling of the TAF’s trust in the judiciary’s Kemalist credentials, a well-founded trust, as a *Vakit* columnist insulting the generals discovered to his cost (*TDN*, 11 June 2004).

Against all evidence, the British journalist and sometime adviser to the Turkish government David Barchard denies that there is any concert between the judiciary’s and the TAF’s political agendas and believes that the judiciary is independent and opposed to the military. He claims that the TAF held onto the state security courts (SSCs) as long as they could exactly because the civilian judiciary does not share their preoccupation with territorial integrity and national unity. Now that the military is isolated, notes Barchard (2005:89, 98), the judiciary’s true ‘centre-Left leanings’ become apparent. This, combined with the fact that ‘Turkey’s mainstream press [...] undoubtedly subscribes to the common values of the modern world’ (ibid, p.103) deals the TAF’s defensive nationalism a *coup de grace*.

Barchard is striving to persuade his readers that Turkey is ready for EU membership but he seems to be conflating the undoubted independence of Turkey’s judiciary – itself a ‘Western’ trait – with an idealised Western-style individualistic, liberal conception of the state and law. This equation does not stand up to close scrutiny. The Constitutional Court’s task is to uphold constitutional principles. These coincide with the TAF’s principles as the TAF forged the constitutional document in the first place.

This concert does not mean judges are less independent. Rather, judges are an integral part of the country's nationalist, modernist, secular – aka Kemalist – establishment. Hence, when the Prosecutor's Office launched an investigation into *DEHAP*³ for having called former PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan 'esteemed' in a statement (*Z*, 19 August 2005), the investigation sprung from 'Kemalist' concerns with national unity, but was unprompted by any bodies outside the judiciary.

This may, in fact, be the reason why the judiciary now seems to be under attack. Could Erdoğan be using the EU-prompted judicial overhaul (*H*, 30 November 2004) as a veil under which he seeks to compromise judicial independence and thus weaken an established Kemalist bastion? The AKP's defence is unequivocal: 'The Government, led by a Prime Minister who has been hurt several times due to a politicised judiciary, is struggling to prevent the politicisation of the judiciary' (*TNA*, 9-10 July 2005). Yet many remain unconvinced, noting that 'Erdoğan's disdain for the independent judiciary has become the rule rather than the exception' (*NRO*, 12 December 2005), as his government has reportedly ignored several Supreme Court rulings declaring their seizure and sale of political opponents' assets illegal.

This confrontation with the courts goes beyond disrespect, as it is feared that, before long, Erdoğan will have 'influenced' the appointment of up to 4,000 judges and prosecutors in lower courts, thus seriously compromising the judiciary's independence (*ibid*). Those who suspect the AKP of harbouring a hidden agenda speak of a concerted effort to undermine the judiciary's Kemalist credentials, while former Constitutional Court Chief Judge Mustafa Bumin publicly accused the AKP of violating judicial independence. Parliament Speaker Bülent Arınç dismissed Bumin's concerns, speaking, rather, of unwarranted political meddling by 'unaccountable bodies' (*TDN*, 8 July 2005) and threatening the Constitutional Court with closure if it continues 'hampering' AKP legislation (*AEI & NRO*, 2 August 2005). EU observers worry. Meanwhile Erdoğan's opponents speak of a personal vendetta against the judiciary and a perceived impatience with the compromises inherent in democracy.

³ *Demokratik Halk Partisi* (DEHAP, Democratic People's Party), (Kurdish) party founded in 1997 as an alternative to HADEP.

Yet democracy is the AKP's bulwark as their reform initiative is carefully packaged as EU-stipulated judicial restructuring. The need for change in Turkey's court system is impossible to deny: 112,000 lower court decisions were overturned by the Court of Appeals in one year only, while a staggering 43 percent of criminal cases were found judged in a manner that contravened the law (Z, 19 May 2005). The EU average is one in 10 such cases. Reform is necessary, but since its instigators are mistrusted, reform itself is feared. The opening of the judicial year in September 2005 was greeted with demonstrations: thousands of attorneys attended rallies in Ankara, some marching to *Anıtkabir*, protesting a perceived undermining of judicial independence through political meddling (TNA, 6 September 2005). The symbolic significance of taking a complaint directly to Atatürk is immense. Although visiting *Anıtkabir* is customary at the beginning of the legislative and judicial year, as well as upon assumption of office, the act of carrying a protest to the Father lends the issue at hand great national urgency. Attempts to compromise the courts' independence amount to an affront to Atatürk's legacy. The lawyers are effectively accusing the government of thwarting Atatürk's plan. The implication is that the courts' duty to protect national unity and territorial integrity is now more urgent than ever, especially since the abolition of SSCs (see TDN, 11 June 2004).

The SSCs, established with Article 143 of the 1983 Constitution, dealt with offences against the state's indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, the Republic or any of its core elements. They were abolished in accordance with EU demands. Such demands are effecting piecemeal change to Turkey's legal system – eliminating 'moral reductions' for 'honour' killings⁴ or countering the General Chief of Staff's control over RTÜK (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu, the broadcasting regulatory authority) and YÖK appointments. The judiciary, largely Western-oriented, extends its collaboration on certain matters. For instance, the Supreme Court of Appeals ruled *against* the closure of Eğitim-Sen (the Education Personnel Labour Union), overturning a lower court's decision demanding closure on the basis of Eğitim-Sen's support for education in local dialects (Z, 26 May 2005).

EU pressure even succeeded in overturning one of the SSCs' most famous rulings, achieving the release of Leyla Zana, Orhan Doğan, Hatip Dicle and Selim Sadak (M,

⁴ The EU condemned the lenient treatment of honour killings by Turkish courts as tacit compliance.

9 March 2004). Zana and her fellow former-DEP parliamentarians had been in custody for 11 years. While still in existence, the SSCs resisted demands for their release. Although her supporters claim her only crime was speaking Kurdish inside the Parliament building (*TP*, 2 April 2004), in April 2004, during her 13th trial (having served 10 years of a 15-year sentence), Zana was yet again convicted of staging separatist activities. Then, a few months later she was released (*TDN*, 11 June 2004).

The EU had succeeded. As Zana's release coincided with the first Kurdish language broadcasts, those worried about Turkey's human rights record breathed a sigh of relief. But what about the small print? Zana's conviction was never overturned and the deputies' release is pending ongoing investigations. Although the SSCs' critics greet her release as conclusive proof that banning these courts was a momentous step for Turkey, Zana is not yet acquitted. Her release proves that the system is flexible and amenable to change. Nevertheless, perceptions of what constitutes a threat to territorial and national integrity have not yet changed. Zana's release does not represent a retraction of the courts' commitment to the protection of national integrity. In fact, it may have been a tactical move to appease the EU, although Court of Appeals Chief Judge Erarslan Özkaya denied this. For CHP leader Deniz Baykal, long-term Sèvres Syndrome sufferer, her release was a concession to inappropriate external pressures and EU meddling (*TDN*, 11 June 2004).

Zana's case magnifies fears regarding national survival, unity and territorial integrity, which are heightened by a perceived Kurdish threat. The very existence of a Kurdish identity poses a symbolic challenge to Turkish national narratives, undermining the Turks' sole ownership of Anatolia. Claims to cultural distinctiveness within Turkey's borders are experienced as subversive and threatening even if they are not accompanied by demands for political independence, because cultural distinctiveness *could* inspire political nationalism. Cultural pluralism within Anatolia constitutes symbolic transgression. As Zana's release coincided with a spate of renewed attacks on soldiers and gendarmes (Barchard, 2005:93), her repeated calls for a ceasefire (Z, 19 August 2005) failed to dispel public mistrust. When Zana publicly kissed Abdullah Öcalan's sister's hand, fears that she is a PKK supporter soared (*WSJ*, 7-9 October 2005).

The EU's support for Zana is interpreted in the light of memories of European intervention in Ottoman domestic affairs and a traditional mistrust of the meddling West: seemingly protecting, yet again, the interests of potentially hostile minorities within, thus undermining national unity and jeopardising territorial integrity. This narrative is often resorted to by the Press, while a more sophisticated version appears to have shaped the courts' rationale when dealing with Zana, disproving Barchard's claim that concerns with unity and integrity are the TAF's monopoly. Such concerns remain at the heart of the judicial process regardless of EU-stipulated reforms (see Chapter 7). SSCs no longer exist; Zana is free; the EU is partially satisfied, but the judiciary's agenda is not radically changed.

Until the AKP's attempt to remodel the judiciary succeeds – if they are truly trying – Turkey's courts will remain independent and genuinely committed to the constitution's Kemalist principles. Consequently, the courts use the Kemalist language to articulate their priorities and perceptions of what national interest constitutes, while simultaneously seeking to prevent the violation of said perceptions. Increasingly, the courts are faced with agencies, such as the AKP, who use this language without embracing all Kemalist values, an eventuality they were not necessarily prepared for. This enables the AKP to utilise the language to broaden the political debate and explore new avenues towards the future. Certain agencies, including the judiciary, are resisting, but the confrontation is not over. Meanwhile, individual legal reforms often fail to affect all relevant pieces of legislation. As implementation invariably depends on interpretation, and taking the judges' professional ethos into account, reform often merely dents the surface of judicial practice. For Former Supreme Court of Appeals Chief Justice Sami Selçuk, freedom of expression and true democracy now depend on a radical change of mentality in Turkey's judiciary (*TDN*, 14 June 2006).

This is not necessarily forthcoming. The anti-terror law, for instance, was reformed in line with EU demands. The clause making propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state a terror crime was scrapped and the length and severity of resulting punishments were decreased (*Z*, 12 August 2005). Territorial unity, however, remains an overriding concern in both the constitution and other bodies of law and, as a result, a core concern for the judges. Kemalist concerns coincide with core constitutional

principles; the judges' professional ethos and their professional 'bible', Turkey's Constitution, point in the same direction. Protecting national interest and the indivisibility of the state-nation-territory nexus is their primary concern, even if that entails limiting some individual freedoms. The TAF agree.

3. *The TAF*

Atatürk's (2003:314, 571) legacy is clear: '[T]he affairs of the nation and the state do not work by supplications or recourse to equity and pity; neither do we ensure dignity and independence by... begging for equality'; rather, they are won and maintained 'by the force of our bayonets'. Hence the TAF's mission is to protect the country from internal and external enemies; maintain peace at home, peace in the world and stability in the region; and preserve the Republic's independence and integrity⁵.

The military are oath-bound to the *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland) and the Republican regime, according to article 277 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Law, which for Turfan (2000:438) is not, strictly speaking, a military task. Birand (1987:2-3) agrees, drawing attention to Article 35 of the Armed Forces Statutes stating that '[t]he duty of the Armed Forces is to safeguard (*kollamak*) and defend (*korumak*) Turkish territory and the Republic of Turkey as designated by the constitution'. This is neither unique nor surprising, as most armies are oath-bound to a regime. What is potentially different here is that the TAF's understanding of republicanism is rigid and they are willing to intervene when they feel it is being compromised.

Moreover, for the TAF, republicanism is fused with nationhood, hence preserving the Republic becomes the *essence* of national interest. This means that Atatürk's (2003:37) aphorism, '[i]t is the national volition that is sovereign in the conduct of the state's and nation's destiny. The army is the docile servant of this national volition', makes the TAF the servant of an absent master. How is national volition determined or the country's destiny ascertained? The TAF are unequivocal: Atatürk's legacy holds both answers. As the nation was created in Atatürk's image, the TAF interpret

⁵ The TAF's website, www.tsk.mil.tr

national volition in terms of Atatürk's plan, before humbly serving it. Thus the TAF construct a national narrative similar to that studied in Chapters 2 and 3. The nation, awakened by Atatürk, fought for independence *and* the Republic. Turkishness is fused with republicanism and the nation emerges as part of Atatürk's plan; a rhetorical abstraction, rather than a demographic reality: an ideal type towards which the Turkish people should strive, with the military as their guide.

Simultaneously, the TAF establish themselves as the nation's most authentic symbolic and institutional expression (Parla and Davison, 2004:236, 240) as 'the Turks are an Army nation' and '[t]he God-given military mission... was accepted by the Turks as an ideal for all times'⁶. National history is seen as a succession of military victories, elevating Gallipoli to a victorious campaign and depicting the end of the First World War as a unilateral decision taken by the Allies at the Ottomans' expense. Yet the defeat and demise of the Ottoman Empire is not to be deplored:

'The demise of this deep-rooted empire gave way to the rise of a new sun, laying the foundations of the Turkish Republic that would last forever. Breaking through the dark clouds, this sun was Mustafa Kemal ATATÜRK, the great soldier and statesman of the 20th century'⁷.

Atatürk is the TAF's starting point. Their sole concern is protecting his legacy: the Republic and the nation's integrity, freedom and dignity (*H*, 24 November 2005). According to Military Academy Commander General Aydoğan Babaoğlu, '[t]he reason for our existence is to wholly serve the Turkish nation'. In serving the nation, Babaoğlu notes, the TAF serve Atatürk as '[o]ur never-ending enthusiasm for our jobs and patriotism... is directed by his principles and ideals' (*TNA*, 4 October 2005).

The TAF's patriotism makes the protection of Anatolia, the Turks' essential homeland, a vital task. In a 30-year-old polemic published jointly by the Chief of General Staff and the Tourism Ministry⁸ in the immediate aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the TAF stress Anatolia's significance for the Turkish nation. Discussing the blood-ritual entailed in the Independence War, the pamphlet stresses

⁶ www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/genel_konular/tarihce_p.htm

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ 'Türk-Yunan İlişkileri ve *Megalo Idea*' see bibliography.

that threats to Republican territorial integrity actually represent threats to the national essence (p.10, 22, 60, 62, 64) as Anatolia is saturated with the blood Turks shed in its defence. Vigilance is essential. The Ottoman Empire suffered at the hands of both treacherous minorities within (p.44, 46, 51, 54) and greedy external enemies (p.41, 49, 57, 68, 70). Turkey has learnt its lesson and the TAF are determined to protect its unity and integrity at all cost. The nation is inconceivable without its territory, which cannot be divided or shared without compromising the national essence.

So the TAF oversee the nation and its politics without actively partaking in it, as Atatürk decreed that no serving officer should hold political office. This, notes Turfan (2000:xviii), was aimed at protecting the military from factionalism, not politics from the military. The TAF feel they are above, rather than outside politics. Institutional channels, such as the NSC that enable the TAF to oversee the republican process mean that politics is not so much shielded from the military as shielded *by* it. '[A]lthough Kemal rejected direct rule by generals during his time, he made such rule possible by entrusting to the army the high duty of guarding the state from all "internal and external" threats' (Parla and Davison, 2004: 231). Consequently, the TAF see it as their right and duty to publicly comment on Republican affairs. Such public commentary is hardly aimed at influencing policy. Military top brass is well represented in the NSC and the Chief of Staff is so highly placed in the state hierarchy – appointed by the President and answering directly to the Prime Minister in peacetime – that institutionalised channels for communicating TAF feelings to the government abound. The TAF feel duty-bound to respond 'to the view of our people that [the] TAF should always assume a definite attitude towards every important issue' (Özkök, 2004a). Hence, officers hold press conferences and issue statements on civilian political issues – cashing in on their reputation as a trustworthy and solidly republican institution. The TAF claim they are not meddling, rather they are yet another pressure group in a functioning democracy, provided democracy functions to their satisfaction.

Through their public platform, the TAF seek to promote Kemalist orthodoxy and, concurrently, a legitimising narrative upholding the TAF's self-image. This platform becomes particularly significant when the TAF's conduct is called into question. When the 2005 explosions in the Southeastern town of Şemdinli were followed by

speculation that rogue military elements were involved, General Yaşar Büyükanıt was indignant: ‘The Turkish Armed Forces overall, and specifically the Land Forces within them, act within the law. Those who say differently have their own aims’ (*H*, 24 November 2005). The TAF’s code of conduct rests on respecting the law as long as the law respects Atatürk’s legacy and they want the nation to know that and never doubt that the TAF’s behaviour could be motivated by anything other than selfless patriotism and a genuine commitment to the Republic.

This commitment should not be interpreted as declared allegiance to democracy, however. For the TAF, Atatürk’s project matters more than democratic process. In the name of the Republic’s protection and sustenance – conceived as separate and distinct from the democratic process – the army has, several times since Atatürk’s death, suspended democratic politics in order, they claimed, to protect the Republic, public order and Atatürk’s legacy⁹, always restoring civilian rule at the earliest opportunity.

The first military intervention came on 27 May 1961, toppling Adnan Menderes’ government. Menderes introduced a new political formula in the 1950s still employed by Turkish politicians today (Shankland, 1999:39), fusing Right-wing economics with overt sympathy for Islam *within* the republican/secular framework. Within a decade of his election and the advent of multi-party politics, however, Menderes’ economic programme was failing. As his popularity waned, he resorted to repression. An attempt to close down the CHP together with Menderes’ suspected involvement in a failed attempt on İsmet İnönü’s life, also fuelled speculation that Menderes was flirting with a return to one-party rule (Hale, 1994:106).

Moreover, Menderes built on the relaxation of secularism initiated under İnönü, ‘regress[ing] from the reforms and principles of Atatürk’ (Kili, 1969:180). Under Menderes religious education became virtually compulsory (parents now had to ask for exemption) and certain compromises were made. Although these were more symbolic than real, and substantive legislation was not actually relaxed, the message was potent both for the pious masses and the secular elites. Ahmad (1977:365) dismisses theories suggesting that Menderes harboured an anti-secular agenda,

⁹ Although, lofty ideals aside, Hale (1994) argues that every military intervention has coincided with TAF professional grievances.

stressing that the decision to switch the *ezan* (the call to prayer) back to Arabic was taken over cocktails. The new religious discourse was epidermic and symptomatic of the frustrations of 27 years of one-party rule. Religion had become a symbolic playing field exactly because it mattered so much to the Kemalists. It was not, or not yet, a force in itself. Interestingly, Menderes' defence at the time was that the nation, which had voted for him, was Kemalism's true guardian, hence his decisions were compatible with Atatürkism (Ahmad, 1977:366, 376). Evidently, Kemalism was a legitimising language as early as the late 1950s and Menderes made extensive use of it, passing legislation upholding Atatürk's reforms (1951 Atatürk Bill), alongside religious reform.

Menderes was not staging a revolution, rather he was trying to carve a niche for his party in a political system designed and dominated by Atatürk and his disciples. For Ahmad (1977:370-1), religion simply represented an easy way of diverting attention away from the financial crises plaguing Turkey in the late 1950s. These crises and the resulting repression, threatening unity and order, inspired the coup of 27 May 1961. The TAF assumed power with no real plan for 28 May. Despite the confusion, abortive counter-coups and the ensuing purges of the military and academic establishments, the TAF remained confident that intervention was both necessary for the Republic and popular with the people. Although popular support is not essential, the fact that the 'majority of educated opinion', including academic jurists, embraced the 1961 intervention (Mango, 2005:20) offered the TAF popular legitimation. Support from the country's urban population and students, Atatürk's proverbial Turkish Youth (Kili, 1969:181), offered the TAF supplementary sources of (Kemalist) legitimation. For Kili (1969:111, 181), this support legitimised both the intervention and the agenda in the name of which the TAF intervened, proving Atatürk's reliance on 'the Turkish military and Youth to protect his reforms and principles' right.

Although the military relished this sense of mission, their legitimation appeals *also* included an appeal to legality. Menderes was accused of both straying from Atatürk's path *and* defying the rule of law. 400 Democrat Party (DP) members were tried, on charges of misgovernment and violating the constitution. These trials were vital in sustaining the TAF's desired legitimation narrative, although Hale (1994:144-5)

believes they eventually backfired. Several DP members were imprisoned and 15 were sentenced to death, although only three (including Menderes) were executed.

Then, the TAF embarked on constitutional reform in order to eliminate the possibility of similar power abuses from occurring again, creating the most liberal constitution Turkey has ever had, enabling associational life and offering religion institutionalised breathing space. Rustow (1994:362) calls the 1961 coup the price Turkey had to pay for its first democratic regime having been the work and gift of a dictator. Similarly, Turkey's most liberal constitution was the work and gift of a military administration and, as such, it came at a price. The NSC was created, institutionalising military involvement in civilian affairs. It was hoped that the NSC would enable the military to safeguard the Republic, as Atatürk intended, without needing to intervene again.

This was not to be. By 1968-9 disorder had returned and bloody clashes were a daily occurrence. In 1971 the Army intervened with a *pronunciamento* forcing Premier Süleyman Demirel to resign, hoping to pre-empt the need for a more radical intervention. Order was restored through martial law, sweeping arrests, the execution of three student leaders and closures of newspapers and organisations. When the TAF sought to return the Republic to the 'right' path, a government of technocrats and representatives of various parties was put in place under the Army's watchful gaze. In the name of national interest, this government affected constitutional reform strengthening collectivism at the expense of individual freedoms. Once reforms were in place, the TAF withdrew from politics. Nevertheless, neither stability nor order returned as militancy, violence and Right-Left polarisation intensified while the government remained weak and ineffectual¹⁰. According to Pope and Pope (1997:127), political 'street fighting' between 1973 and 1980 claimed 5,240 lives. Meanwhile, the economy suffered from rampant inflation, growing foreign debt, intense labour disputes and a slumping GNP. In 1979 power cuts and basic goods shortages added to what became known as the 'winter of discontent'.

By mid-1979, the breakdown of order was complete. Street violence was indiscriminate, causing an average of 20 deaths each day, even though the TAF had

¹⁰ Between 1973 and 1980 there were two general elections, but several weak coalition governments – 10 according to Hale (1994:215) and 13 according to Pope & Pope (1997:127).

partially imposed martial law and had set up military tribunals. Politicians seemed chiefly interested in keeping each other out of power, thus confirming the TAF's low opinion of them, and the police were incapacitated by political fragmentation, gradually also threatening the TAF's lower ranks (Birand, 1987:80-1, 228). The spectre of full-scale civil war was real, yet military intervention was delayed.

Legitimation was of the essence. The TAF have never intervened with the intention of holding onto power. Interventions are perceived as corrective and withdrawal is always part of the plan. This role is ongoing, hence appearing legitimate – firstly to themselves, secondarily to other state agencies and the people – is vital for the TAF. Although interventions may be legitimate in Kemalist terms, popularity offers a separate source of legitimacy, hence the TAF waited. When they intervened, on 12 September 1980, Birand (1987:195, 232), Shankland (1999:43) and Mango (2005:22) believe, the people heaved a sigh of relief.

Before that day, a concise and public explanatory narrative had been sustained, stressing the civilian authorities' inability to control the situation. Coup leader General Kenan Evren launched this narrative well before the coup, flagging up civilian failures vis-à-vis both the preservation of order and Atatürk's project. Evren established a legitimising paper-trail, writing letters to politicians and repeatedly stressing to President Korutürk the need to find solutions 'within an Atatürkist national perspective and within the current parliamentary democratic regime' (quoted in Birand, 1987:100). These warnings were even broadcast on the radio on 2 January 1980. When the Army finally stepped in to salvage Atatürk's Republic, proceeding with sweeping arrests and summary justice, Evren sought to retain the legitimation momentum initially forged by despair:

'Exalted Turkish Nation... the Republic of Turkey which was entrusted to us by the Great Atatürk, and which is an indivisible entity with its state and territory, is the target of traitorous assaults – both physical and intellectual – on its very existence, regime and independence, prompted by enemies within and without' (quoted in Birand, 1987:186).

'The TAF intervened on 12 September 1980 ... *in accordance with its Internal Service Act which assigns to [it] the responsibility of "safeguarding and*

protecting the Turkish Republic". Whenever the TAF have been faced with [this] necessity... they have undertaken this task unhesitatingly and for the sole purpose of preserving the... integrity of the country' (quoted in Turfan, 2000:439 – emphasis added).

Evren claims continuity with Atatürk, stressing that the coup was aimed at upholding unity and integrity. Extra-institutional, military intervention is defended in terms of its intention to protect the constitution. The TAF's guardianship role means that, when all other avenues fail, it is their role to protect the Republic. Evren thus claims that the coup was in accordance with constitutional principles *and* that the intervention was actually prescribed by legal provisions setting out the Army's duties. As the TAF, he claims, is morally and legally responsible for the Republic's protection, the coup is morally and legally legitimate, especially as it protected Atatürk's legacy by safeguarding national unity and integrity and ensuring the peace necessary for progress. This legitimisation campaign worked. Some only accepted Evren because he stopped bloodshed and violence, while others actually compared him with Atatürk. More than two decades after the return to civilian rule, Evren's memory remains untarnished, his pictures hanging alongside those of other statesmen in Anıtkabir, while the Istanbul Military Museum sports an *Evren Salonu*.

During his leadership of the junta administration, Evren sought to stay true to Kemalist principles in a vocal fashion. Revoking the freedoms of the 1960s constitution was justified in terms of Kemalist collectivism as '[w]e have to sacrifice some personal rights for the security of the Community' (Evren quoted in Pope & Pope, 1997:148). Under Evren, individual rights were qualified by the government's power to override them in the name of national security, while national unity and territorial integrity were paramount policy objectives. Order was restored, fostering economic stability. Yet staying true to Atatürk's principles meant restoring civilian rule. Especially as, although the US did not mind Turkey's military regime – as, after the Iranian revolution, supporting Turkey became a default position – Europe did. As the TAF wanted Atatürk's westernisation to resume in the form of rapprochement with Europe (see Chapter 7), a return to civilian rule was necessary.

In the name of Kemalist westernisation, civilian rule was restored in 1983 under Evren's presidency. The coup bequeathed the Republic a new constitution and

restrictive legal provisions, partly still in effect (Z, 27 August 2005), seeking to bolster collectivism and national solidarity in the face of a perceived Communist threat. Forging this solidarity entailed appeals to religion as a constitutive element of identity (see Chapter 6) that eventually, albeit unwittingly, opened the road for a new phenomenon and, ultimately, a new challenge: political Islam. In the next military intervention, the TAF were pitted against an enemy partly of their own making.

Before the 1997 velvet coup, the TAF, once again, engaged in a series of public appeals – verbal and ritualistic – stressing the government’s failures. Although, this time the people’s backing was neither unqualified nor unanimous, public support was not actually necessary, it was, however, desirable and useful in ensuring popularity and respect for the TAF. In 1997, the TAF’s concerns resonated with certain groups who both sided with the Army and assisted in the ritual dissemination of the legitimisation appeals that were, to a very large extent, addressed to the TAF themselves. In the run-up to the 1997 coup, the TAF were not waiting, as Güney (2002:168-9) believes, for civil society to make the decision to resist political Islam on its own, rather they wished to establish then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan’s failures vis-à-vis Kemalist secularism in a public manner before intervening on 28 February 1997.

‘A major characteristic of the 1997 coup was that judges and journalists rather than bullets and tanks, supported and implemented it’ (Yavuz, 2003:244). The people’s reluctance to support the TAF was interpreted as divergence from Kemalism, thus making the need for intervention seem more urgent as the people, erring away from Kemalism, had to be guided back to the right path¹¹. This interpretation was not limited to the TAF. Journalists, such as Kaylan (2005:382), sympathised with this sense of urgency, noting that ‘[t]he Turkey I had known [had] disappeared; some of the reforms I had gone through as a boy [had] vanished. The secularity of the state [was] constantly under aggression... The legacy of Kemal Atatürk has been so dogmatised and is such a victim of neglect that millions are no longer touched by it’.

¹¹ Similar justifications were employed in Eastern Europe by leaders equating lack of support with ignorance and error (see Di Palma, 1991).

The TAF, for Kaylan, are the last remaining bulwark. ‘The Turkish army is a beloved... institution. Most people, fed up with extremism and governments diseased with corruption, look up to the armed forces and see a guardian institution for their security’ (Kaylan, 2005:346-7). Politicians betrayed Atatürk’s legacy in their pursuit of selfish ends in the past and may do so again (*ibid*, p.24-5), hence the TAF should remain involved in politics as a counter-weight to civilian ineffectiveness and greed. A 2003 opinion poll suggests that the people share this pessimism, as 83.3 percent of respondents agreed that ‘democracy is not fully functioning in Turkey’ (*TDN*, 16 November 2003). Although these figures may have changed during the AKP era, this lack of faith in the democratic process means that people are more likely to tolerate the military’s guardianship role even though they hardly welcome it, as 53.3 percent of respondents wished to see TAF's involvement in politics curbed.

Although the TAF have not staged a full-scale intervention since 1980, interference in the form of memorandums persists. Hale (1994:295) attributes this partly to a realisation that coups are no longer internationally acceptable and would damage Turkey’s modern aspect and westernising aspirations and partly to politicians treading more carefully, having learnt their lesson. Besides, the TAF abandoned intervention in the name of interference, not passivity, as Erdoğan’s government discovered through tensions, public relation face-offs and ‘leaks’ to the Press (e.g. *M*, 8 January 2004). The TAF can antagonise the government. The repository of their loyalty is the Republican regime: not procedural democracy nor the state. Commitment to the country and people is derived from commitment to Atatürk’s Republic.

Cadets are trained to see themselves as the heirs and protectors of Atatürk’s legacy: ‘Your flag will be the great Atatürk. Your ideology will be his principles; your aim will be the direction he showed us. You will follow unswervingly in Atatürk’s footsteps’ (officer quoted in Birand, 1991:3). Training discourages a critical engagement with Atatürk’s legacy and ideas as, for all junior officers, faith is an invaluable resource on the battlefield. Besides, the TAF’s faith is genuine; drawn from the knowledge that Atatürk saved his country, setting it on the path of progress. Cadets are taught that Atatürk’s plan worked and his principles now constitute a tried and tested benchmark. In time, Birand (1991:22-23, 52-53) finds, Kemalism gets ‘under their skin’. During Birand’s interviews, cadets claimed democracy was the best

form of government, but understood democracy to be coterminous with Atatürk's Republic. Therefore, they were prepared to stage 'rescue operations' as and when necessary, suspending democratic process in democracy's (aka the Republic's) name. This involvement was emphatically distinguished from 'doing politics'.

The TAF's *esprit de corps* requires that they remain outside and above politics, non-aligned and untarnished by association with any political party, group or class (Güney, 2002:164). Politically 'meddlesome' armies elsewhere often provide a reflection of political realities on the ground. The TAF do not. The TAF also escape the factionalism and corruption often afflicting political armies. As the TAF's role is corrective, it is vital for their legitimation *not* to hold onto power longer than necessary. These factors enable the TAF to claim – for internal *and* popular consumption – that they are apolitical and their interventions are always based on genuine Republican patriotism rather than power-hunger and self-interest.

The perceived need for the continued existence of a Republican guardian is justified in terms of a conviction that Kemalism holds all the answers that Turkey will ever need. This denial of relativism, combined with a deep-seated mistrust of politicians and a dismissive paternalism vis-à-vis the people – both inherited directly from Atatürk – makes it unlikely that the TAF will voluntarily admit that, after eight decades, the Republic has come of age and no longer needs a custodian. Such an admission would be incompatible with the TAF's corporate identity that enables the Army to feel it represents society while also being a quasi-sacrosanct institution that, for all its meddling, should not be meddled with (Turfan, 2000:136-7) as they believe they hold a *true* recipe for progress *and* embody national interest.

Thus they are ideally suited to protect the Republic. That may, on occasion, mean that 'democracy should be suspended only to restore and revitalise the democratic regime' (Karaosmanoğlu, 1993:28). Democracy is not allowed to run its course and overcome a crisis. As the TAF approach republicanism in terms of a Kemalist blueprint, not in terms of democratic process, they do not perceive experimentation, negotiation and recalibration as salutary signs. Secondly, the TAF believe that Turkey is constantly in grave peril, therefore, allowing democracy to run its course would leave the country at the mercy of Islamists, terrorists and (ethnic) separatists who, according to General

Büyükanıt (2005), constantly prey on Turkey's 'inseparable integrity' and its Republic.

Yet these enemies should never forget that Turkey's dynamic Armed Forces are sworn to protect the Republic to the last, true to their mission (*ibid*). The TAF's ownership of the Republic is central to their sense of mission. Not only are they Atatürk's appointed Republican guardians but, actually, the TAF claim authorship of the Republic, alongside Atatürk, simultaneously ritually claiming him as 'one of us'. On the anniversary of Atatürk's enrolment in the Military Academy (13 March 1899), the roll call includes his name. As the cadets sound 'present' in unison, they are effectively celebrating the TAF's role in the achievement of national independence as Atatürk – and many other Republican leaders, including İnönü – were soldiers, moulded by the Army before they were in a position to reorganise it, as Atatürk did¹². Before he was a national hero, Atatürk was a soldier and the TAF remain the only Republican institution that may bear Atatürk's mark but was not created by him. The TAF is proud to be both a means for the achievement of independence and its symbol.

Ottoman leaders were rejected: the Sultans were corrupt and the *ulema* manipulative, but the Turkish people were told that 'their soldiers had always been brave and had upheld the noble ideals of their nation' (Hale, 1994:2). Since independence, the TAF perceived themselves as a school for national and revolutionary principles (Hale, 1994:81), largely responsible for ensuring that Atatürk's sixth Arrow, Revolutionism, was not forgotten and the Republic was preserved as Atatürk bequeathed it. Today, public confidence in the TAF's impeccable national credentials and unwavering commitment to the national good persists, partly flowing from the TAF's commitment to the funding of development projects in Southeastern Anatolia, even when the government turns a blind eye (*TNA*, 9-10 July 2005).

Although the age of full-scale interventions is behind us, the Army retains influence over the political process and a willingness to use it. Güney (2002:170-1) accepts the TAF's claim that they now simply constitute a pressure group. Yet the TAF's institutional representation – not least in the NSC, described by Kili (2003:405) as 'an institution having constitutional authority, in support of Atatürk, Atatürkism and

¹² Atatürk reorganised the TAF into territorial units to 'break' resistance clusters (Hale, 1994:71)

modernity' – their influence and kudos combined with access to weapons means that they wield much more power than any pressure group. The TAF hardly need to intervene, given the channels for political involvement at their disposal.

This remains true even after the EU-championed reform of the NSC. Although the Council now includes more civilians, what is reduced is the TAF's voting leverage, not their influence. As their agenda resonates with constitutional prescriptions and concerns, it is unlikely this NSC reform will alter decision-making dramatically. Nevertheless, the reform is significant as a sign of military willingness to cooperate on the road to EU accession. The TAF are willing to change. The extent and speed of that change remains, for now, a moot point but, realistically, the TAF's corporate identity and constitutionally prescribed mission begs the question of whether abandoning their guardianship role in the name of EU-sponsored democratisation is, in fact, possible.

Erdoğan's administration is probing this question. Although the NSC acquiesced to reform, tensions between the AKP and the generals remain unresolved. Following a barrage of accusations over a security breach, some wonder whether the AKP has launched a covert but sustained campaign to discredit the NSC and, through it, the TAF. When a document outlining primary security issues was leaked to the Press, the AKP chose to emphatically blame the NSC's administrative personnel rather than its officers (*TDN*, 3 November 2005). Yet Erdoğan hardly seeks to hide his impatience with the TAF's self-appointed guardianship role, frequently stressing that '[t]he nation does not need custodians or supervisors' (*TDN*, 3 November 2004). The Turkish people are capable of making their own decisions through the democratic process. Erdoğan knows the TAF mistrust him, doubt his genuine democratic commitment and suspect him of harbouring an Islamist agenda, so he stresses that '[n]o power that legitimises itself by the support it received from the people can limit democracy' (*ibid*). Is Erdoğan right? Has the Turkish nation outgrown its guardians? And will Erdoğan be allowed to demonstrate that this is the case?

Having sought to remove him from politics twice before, the TAF are now biding their time. Erdoğan is resilient and, mostly, careful. Past performance undermines the TAF's faith in Erdoğan's professed democratic and secular credentials, but while he pays lip service to Kemalism and respects the secular westernising republic, the

generals know that an intervention would incur accusations of self-interested manipulation, thinly veiled under the defence of a frayed ideology.

4. The AKP Government

AKP spokesmen frequently embrace Atatürk's republican legacy, advertising their national(ist) credentials and dedication. They are aware of the powerful legitimising effect of referring decisions and policies to Atatürk, and make full use of that fact. For instance, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül (2005b), speaking on the anniversary of his Ministry's foundation, noted:

‘[O]ur ministry has not only secured and exalted the founding principles of the Republic's foreign policy, but also performed successfully in adapting to the rapidly changing circumstances of our age... The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has always played a pioneering and effective role in the modernisation process for Turkey in terms of both ideas and approaches... my Ministry will continue to function with a high level of patriotism’.

Gül advertises his ministry's loyalty to Atatürk's legacy and interprets its successes in terms of this legacy. Praising Atatürk's principles, his pragmatic outlook, modernisation and patriotism, Gül speaks of political orientations and duties, almost repeating Atatürk's (2003:9) words: ‘The essential thing is that the Turkish nation could lead an existence of dignity and glory.’ Gül notes that his ministry is committed to pursuing modernisation and contemporary civilisational standards in order to ensure this glory. As for dignity, Gül shares the preoccupation with upholding desirable national narratives in the international public domain that led to Pamuk's abortive trial and reactions to the Armenian conference. Hence, when a civic-minded Turk informed the minister of an Australian museum exhibit showing an Allied soldier trampling the Turkish flag underfoot, Gül sprung to action. In a bitter letter, Gül denounced this terrible insult and false representation of the battle of Çanakkale, demanding the restoration of historic truth (*M*, 23 August 2005).

AKP politicians may share the self-professed Kemalists' concerns with national unity, dignity and pride. In fact, the AKP makes extensive use of the Kemalist language and

embrace its priorities, yet it does so in a slightly subversive fashion. For instance, Erdoğan and Gül speak of democracy where Kemalists would extol republicanism. Without ever denying the significance of Atatürk's republican legacy, their discourse shifts. Rather than seeking legitimacy in the Kemalist origins of republicanism, nationalism or secularism, Erdoğan and Gül build on the *de facto* legitimacy of Kemalist concerns using terms in a more general and open fashion, thus expressing ideas (potentially) outside Kemalist ideology through the Kemalist language.

Every language is a system of signs. Abiding by the system's conventions is the only guarantee against unintelligibility. A signifier, the linguistic vessel, corresponds to a signified. Linearity ensures that language is an effective medium of communication. Kemalism, as a language, has a basic vocabulary built around notions of westernisation, republicanism, secularism and nationalism. Erdoğan is using this vocabulary, yet shifting the terms' exact meanings, capitalising on the realisation that Kemalism is both the language of legitimacy and the main normative reference point of all legitimisation narratives in Turkish politics. This exercise, however, is complicated by the fact that Kemalism *also* corresponds to values and ideas that certain well-placed agencies and individuals seek to protect. In effect, the TAF's or the President's defence of Kemalism is a simultaneous defence of ideas associated with it and an attempt to resist its utilisation as a language independently from the ideas that inspired it. The ensuing debate over terms' boundaries and meaning is actually one over fundamental differences about Turkey's desired future.

Erdoğan's usage of the Kemalist language and symbolic arsenal allows increased flexibility to the terms through which legitimacy is negotiated. The process is delicate but simple. Democracy is legitimised in terms of Kemalist modernist republicanism. Democracy, in Kemalist terms, is a concomitant of modernisation and part of the republican system, although secondary to it. The Republic is not legitimised in terms of a democratic essence, but rather it uses democracy as a means of political organisation. This means that, in accordance with the TAF's narratives, the Republic was alive even when democracy was suspended. Erdoğan's conflation of republicanism with democracy builds on the Kemalist habit of using the terms interchangeably to denote republicanism. Erdoğan uses them both to mean democracy. For example, Erdoğan (2004b) describes his party's politics as a

'Conservative Democracy': the marriage of conservative social values, democracy and market-oriented economics. The AKP's commitment to democracy is in line with EU demands; it does not contradict republicanism, if anything it reinforces the Republic by confirming faith in both its structures and procedures. The AKP borrows from traditional Kemalism in its rejection of 'interest' politics and claims to be representing the whole nation. Nevertheless, it does not indulge in a Kemalist veneration of the Republic. In AKP discourses, the republic is spelt in lower case as the focus shifts from Atatürk's legacy to democratic process.

Simultaneously, the AKP keeps appealing to Kemalist progress and civilisation. Gül (2004c), for instance, calls democracy a necessary ingredient for progress. While Kemalist republicanism is a collectivist project honouring the group before its individual members, however, Gül celebrates 'democracy [as] a way of thinking' going beyond free and fair elections: 'it is about freedom of thought and expression [and the] ability to freely associate for the common good'. Gül's definition of democracy retains the Kemalist preoccupation with the common good and yet it introduces the individual as an equally significant parameter. Rights and freedoms are thus inserted into the discussion of democracy on an equal footing with the common good. The AKP widens the debate without, at any point, abandoning Kemalist appeals or denying Kemalist definitions. Gül (2004c, 2005a) is careful to stress that the democracy he speaks of is republican in form and universal in nature, celebrating Atatürk's legacy and his commitment to universal civilisational standards. In line with this legacy, Gül celebrates Turkey's acceptance of universal values. In this vein, Gül (2004c) stresses that Turkey's history, culture and religion do not obstruct its progress. Although the preoccupation with modernity is maintained, Gül's emphasis on Islam diverges sharply from Atatürk's vision.

Having anchored their revised understanding of democracy in Kemalist modernisation, Erdoğan (2004a) and Gül (2004c, 2005a) link democracy to individual rights and freedoms, good governance and accountability. Abandoning Kemalist collectivism, the AKP does *not* depict democracy as the vehicle for the achievement of national greatness and progress, but as the individual's domain. This radical shift is possible because it is necessary in order to placate EU observers.

This new focus, however, offers the AKP an unexpected platform from which to tell many Kemalist agencies to mind their own business. Constantly appealing to its popular mandate, the AKP reminds President Sezer – elected by Parliament – that the party has more democratic clout than him. AKP parliamentary group deputy leader Sadullah Ergin told Sezer that it is not his place to offer more than recommendations and warnings regarding political issues (*TDN*, 14 June 2005). Cemil Çiçek stressed that the presidency lacks the direct popular legitimation that the AKP enjoys (*H*, 30 November 2004). Parliament Speaker Arınç, always at the heart of controversy, accused ‘people with no political responsibilities’ (aka Sezer) of trying to undermine parliamentary decision-making without themselves being accountable (*TNA*, 8 July 2005) and warned the TAF not to ‘imagine themselves above parliament’ (*Z*, 24 April 2006). Even Erdoğan joined in, telling all ‘unaccountable bodies’ lacking a mandate to remain silent. ‘If you are the one who will give account, no one has the right to make decisions but you.’ (*Z*, 5 June 2005). These bodies, it was recently made clear, include the TAF which were reminded that they, too, are unaccountable (*E*, 22 May 2006). Erdoğan was unequivocal: ‘the Army answers to me’ (*E*, 24 May 2006).

Such bold statements, indicative of the AKP’s antagonistic relationship with core Kemalist institutions, combined with the AKP’s idiosyncratic Kemalist legitimation and the suspicion this causes in Kemalist circles, mean that the AKP cannot rely on its Kemalist legitimation: other lines of legitimation have to be pursued simultaneously. Constant appeals to its popularity provide a straightforward legitimation appeal in a Republic: the people want us. If this argument worked for the TAF, it is bound to work for a democratically elected government.

Having premised its discourse of democracy and individualism on Kemalist republicanism and progress, the AKP blends familiar and new references. This blend is subsequently used to legitimise the AKP as both the people’s choice and the vehicle through which the final stages of republican Westernisation are achieved. Retaining popular legitimacy is vital for the AKP, hence the President is reminded he lacks it, even though he has not exceeded his role’s constitutionally prescribed boundaries. Moreover, appeals to popular democratic legitimacy assert democratic process as a parameter of republicanism, continuing the linguistic negotiation.

Alongside this, or possibly as part of it, the controversial issue of religion's public role (see Chapter 6) is debated while Erdoğan is introducing sweeping political reforms in the name of EU accession (see Chapter 7) and raising questions about the sustainability of Turkey's unitary nationalism. Erdoğan (2005a) was the first Turkish premier to openly speak of the Kurdish issue without resorting to euphemisms (such as speaking of 'mountain Turks'), without describing Turkey's Kurdish population as either backward or a 'fifth column' and without equating identity with terrorism. Erdoğan (2005a) actually uttered the words 'Kurdish problem' and 'citizens of Kurdish origin'. Responses were mixed. Zana found the AKP's gesture courageous, while opposition leader Deniz Baykal called it naïve politicking (*M & TDN*, 12 August 2005). Unsurprisingly, the break with tradition incurred the NSC's wrath (*TNA*, 23 August 2005), yet at a Siirt rally, the Premier still spoke of 'Kurdish citizens' having problems just as everyone else (*Z*, 9 October 2005). Nevertheless, even though breaking with tradition, Erdoğan's (2005a) speech was anchored in *de facto* legitimate notions: democracy and Kemalist pragmatism.

Atatürk prided himself on his pragmatism and ability to adapt to real situations in order to achieve his goals. Erdoğan, similarly, claims that it is impossible for him to ignore realities and obvious problems. 'Ignoring the political and administrative mistakes made against our citizens of Kurdish [origin]... is as inappropriate as resorting [to] violence or creating "an atmosphere of terrorism".' Although Erdoğan soon returned to familiar territory – reiterating the AKP's zero tolerance approach to terrorism – he did not dismiss all Kurds along with the PKK, thus automatically closing the matter of Kurdish rights, as was often done before him. Rather, he stated that 'terrorist organisation[s] can in no way be accepted as the representative for any group of citizens'. Republican national unity was upheld, yet redefined:

'Whether you name it social demands of our citizens of Kurdish origin, the southeast issue or the Kurdish issue, those who try to relate this issue to terrorism will be met by the opposition of Turkish citizens of every ethnicity, or in other words, the Turkish nation as a whole. When it comes to this, our nation is one and whole.' (Erdoğan, 2005a)

Unity remains vital. Simultaneously, however, variable ethnicity emerges as an acceptable phenomenon within the Turkish nation, much to the generals' and

President's horror. Erdoğan's determination to widen the scope for debate, broaden terms and shift the boundaries of political activity is inspiring intense suspicion and speculation regarding his ulterior motives.

Undoubtedly, Erdoğan wishes to mollify EU observers. Actually, his gestures towards the Kurds may mean more to European than Kurdish audiences. DEHAP's Osman Baydemir, commenting on Erdoğan's (2005a) speech, finds that the AKP remains out of touch with Kurdish realities (*M*, 22 March 2004). Baydemir notes that modernisation has damaged the Southeast and dismisses Erdoğan's 'reformist' agenda as thinly veiled electioneering. Experience in dealing with the state makes it hard for Kurds to believe that traditional definitions of 'unity' and 'integrity' have been abandoned. This could be residual bitterness. Or the AKP could be playing the European card while actually remaining closer to the Kemalist agenda than may at first appear to be the case. Undoubtedly, the AKP's understanding of national interest has often differed from the Kemalists', but its preoccupation with Kemalist concerns has never wavered. Whether this is an opportunistic legitimation avenue or a genuine policy concern is hard to ascertain. Yet there are reasons to suspect that the AKP's attachment to certain Kemalist principles, although heavily qualified, is genuine.

As Kurdish groups are quick to note, Erdoğan's administration, rhetoric aside, rarely diverges from established paths. The ban on Hakkari Turkish Human Rights Association posters reading 'peace will prevail' in Kurdish is a case in point. Claiming that the posters were harmful to the constitution, the police confiscated and banned them (*TDN*, 13 December 2003), proving to many that the AKP differs little from previous governments. On the other hand, General Özkök hinted that the TAF are under 'restricted authorisation' in deciding whether a state of emergency is needed in the Southeast (*Z*, 1 September 2005). The AKP evidently seeks to strike a balance, precarious as it may be, on the road towards EU accession. Simultaneously, however, a legitimation narrative at home has to be sustained. Patriotic and Kemalist appeals are emotionally resonant with the people while also establishing affinity with national discourses and the country's legal framework. It is unsurprising that the AKP indulges in such appeals. And it would be misleading to dismiss the AKP's 'Kemalism' as mere lip service. AKP members have occasionally had 'Kemalist' outbursts that undermined the party's European orientation. These outbursts used the established

Kemalist language, with no appeals to Erdoğan's new-found individualism, as Çiçek was doing when he described the infamous 'Armenian Conference' as a stab in the Turkish people's back (see Chapter 4).

5. Negotiating the Boundaries of Legitimate Political Activity: Concert and Conflict between the AKP and Kemalist Agencies

Kemalist unity (fusing the nation and state) is the common core of almost all public legitimisation appeals. After a spate of PKK attacks, for example, Hakkari governor Erdoğan Gürbüz declared that terrorists would not be allowed to undermine the state's unity and integrity, while Sırnak Governor, Osman Güneş stated: "What is important is the continuation of the state... This big state is a whole with its people and there is no power [which can] destroy this" (Z, 20 May 2005). Governors of towns and cities affected by the attacks did not promise their constituents protection for their families, but rather lectured them on the significance of safeguarding national unity. Similarly, CHP member Mesut Değer, speaking after the Şemdinli attack, declared himself 'willing to sacrifice his life for the preservation of Turkey's unitary integrity' and the fight against terrorism (Z, 9 January 2006). Even Interior Minister Abkulkadir Aksu described terrorism, not in terms of the terror it wreaks, but as 'seeds of discord... sown among our citizens that [are] strongly united' (Z, 18 September 2005). The threat to national unity seems greater than that to lives and livelihoods.

The TAF agree. Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff General İlker Başbuğ noted that the PKK is particularly dangerous because its aim is 'ethnic nationalism' (H, 19 July 2005). Although, Başbuğ admits, ethnic and cultural differences exist in every country, when domination is sought, ethnic nationalism appears in the form of terror organisations seeking to undermine national unity. In a series of simple connections, Başbuğ equates all challenges to Turkey's unitary nationalism with terrorism. Although the PKK does wreak terror, Başbuğ is not simply referring to PKK violence here. Rather he also links terrorism to symbolic challenges to the Turkish nation's sole ownership of Anatolia's historic land. 'Turkey's unitary structure is not open to debate', he noted on a different occasion, 'questioning it could lead to disintegration... The TAF cannot accept a debate over the unitary structure of the Turkish state, an untouchable provision of the Constitution' (TDN, 3 November

2004). Such a debate would sully Atatürk's memory as well as the memory of those who fell in its defence, fighting against terrorism.

General Özkök (2005b) also stressed the huge number of TAF members and regular Turks who sacrificed themselves in order to shield the Republic and nation from PKK violence. Reminding his audience of Atatürk's 'Peace at Home, Peace in the World' maxim, Özkök equated peace with security and security with the preservation of Turkey's territorial integrity. Yet, as mentioned above, preserving integrity goes beyond avoiding territorial fragmentation, as it encompasses national unity and the unbreakable bond between the nation and its territory. Protecting *this* integrity, the TAF often consider symbolic threats to be as significant as physical ones. Unfaithful minorities were central to the Ottoman Empire's downfall and the TAF have learnt their lesson. So, when two Kurds burnt a Turkish flag in İzmir during the *Nevruz* celebration (marking the beginning of spring) Özkök spoke of 'so-called citizens' (*TP*, 23 March 2005) since, to Özkök, the ritual rejection of the state's flag was tantamount to renouncing Turkish citizenship.

Article 66 of the constitution states that '[e]veryone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk'. Although this depicts 'Turkishness' as a civic identity, constant references to blood, destiny and collective needs mean that Turkishness actually carries heavy and complicated essentialist baggage. As Article 66 declares that '[n]o Turk shall be deprived of citizenship, unless he commits an act incompatible with loyalty to the motherland', it is clear that Özkök believes the burning of the Turkish flag to constitute such an act. The general was not alone, as week-long countrywide demonstrations and the appearance of numerous flags on cars and buses, offices and homes proved (*BBC*, 28 March 2005). Even recently-released Zana and Doğan condemned the attack on 'our common flag of our common homeland' (*TP*, 23 March 2005). As the flag symbolises the indivisibility of state-territory-nation, an attack on it constitutes an open provocation to the state and nation, and an act of desecration (*TDN*, 9 August 2005). When this attack is perpetrated by members of a minority known for its erratic commitment to the nation, the sense of threat is immense. This is reflected in the Turkish General Staff's response:

'[The Army] has sworn to protect its country and flag at the cost of [its] blood... We recommend to those who attempted to question [our] loyalty to

[our] country and flag, to look at the pages of history... The Turkish nation has experienced many betrayals besides its countless triumphs throughout its history. However, it has never seen such vileness [perpetrated] by its so-called citizens in its own territories. [The] Turkish nation is known [for] its respect even [for the] flag of its enemies in the battlefield. Such a desecration [of the] Turkish flag... is nothing, but treason' (*TP*, 22 March 2005).

The narrative of betrayal is familiar to Özkök's audience (see Chapter 2). An appeal to the blood of those who died in the country's defence enhances an already emotionally charged debate. The burning of a flag, a ritualistic attack that does not, actually, physically harm anyone, is grouped together with the violence experienced in the Southeast. By protecting the flag or mounting operations against Kurdish insurgents, the TAF feel they are performing one and the same duty: defending the country's integrity and unity. When performing this duty, General Büyükanıt stresses, the TAF need no guidance or assistance: 'We don't need anyone's advice on how to fight terrorism. We are not going to the mountains on a picnic – we are going to defend the country's unity' and the unitary state (*TDN*, 10 July 2005).

General Özkök (2005a) agrees:

'[T]here is a single country, single sovereignty and a single nation in the unitary state. The goal of the terror organization against which we struggled for so many years is to change the unitary nature of the Turkish Republic, which means the disintegration of the country (sic).'

Without unity, Turkey as a country is dealt a blow challenging its very existence. The nation, Özkök (2005a) continues, is a body of citizens bound together through common 'language, culture and ideal(s)' true to Atatürk's definition of the nation as 'the people of Turkey, who founded the Turkish Republic'. Again the civic bond of citizenship is mixed in with the ethnic ties of language and culture. Yet essentialism goes further, defining the Turks as the people who founded and love Atatürk's Republic. Those who do not share this love do not, by extension, belong in or with the Turkish nation. Unity is not a matter of policy but a matter of fact, as rejecting republicanism *ipso facto* denies one's Turkishness in the TAF's eyes. For Özkök, an attack on the 'singularity of the concept of the nation' is tantamount to an attack on

the nation itself because the nation is a unit and it 'cannot be regarded as an entity consisting of parts' (ibid). Such analyses will only lead to the country's disintegration, as the nation's constituent parts will each seek to possess a segment of the country.

The Republic's unitary structure, continues Özkök (2005a), is set out in Article 3 of the Constitution. 'Opening this article to discussion has the potential of leading Turkey into conflict. Therefore... each mindful citizen should eagerly support the understanding of a unitary state structure and further strengthen this concept for the future of our country.' There can be no nation within the nation. Although, Özkök stresses, Turkey's rival states have often tried to weaken or breach its unity, the TAF and 'mindful citizens' have and will continue to frustrate such plans. 'It is our main objective to maintain the territorial integrity and the values of our country [and] to preserve [its] unity and integrity in the forthcoming period according to the principles of our great leader Atatürk' (Özkök, ibid). This was also Aegean Forces Commander General Hürsit Tolon's message during his retirement speech:

'I am handing over an Army which condemns with hatred the attempts of a group and its supporters... to destroy the Unitary structure of the Turkish Republic... An Army who will not make any bargaining ever on the sacred trusts it protects, who is loyal to the oath it made and... identifies with its people in terms of will and determination of struggle' (Z, 22 August 2005).

President Sezer agrees. During his New Year's address, Sezer quoted Atatürk and spoke of the 'indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic with its Land and people'. Accepting diversity, but denying it affects national unity, he noted:

'The Turkish Constitution has adopted a unifying and integrating nationalism... everyone who is connected to the Republic through citizenship is a Turk... naming all citizens as member[s] of the Turkish Nation, no matter what their ethnic roots and religions are, is to establish equality among the citizens and to prevent the citizens from various ethnic roots from being "minorities" within society. The rule "sovereignty belongs to the Turkish Nation unconditionally" also shows [... that] "Turkish Identity" includes all... citizens [irrespective of] ethnic root ... or religion' (Z, 1 January 2006).

The President can hardly deny differences within the nation exist. Eighty years of republican rule have not quite eliminated residual Ottoman traits – religious, tribal, linguistic or regional – dividing Turkish citizens. Speaking of these differences a few months earlier, Erdoğan (Z, 22 August 2005) had stated:

‘The Kurdish citizen is my citizen. They are all sub-identities... under the main identity of the Turkish Republic. There are not only Kurds in our country; we also have Laz, Bosnians, Albanians and Circassians. There are about 30 ethnic identities. Let’s not confuse this with citizenship of the Turkish Republic... A single nation, a single flag and a single country.’

Sezer’s address emphatically denounced this statement, because speaking of minorities *ipso facto* denies unity. The President stressed that the nation was defined by Atatürk as the people who established the Republic; Atatürk, the nation and the Republic are, since then, thought of concurrently, through Turkey’s ‘singular state structure’ (Z, *ibid*). In order for that structure – and by extension the Republic – to be maintained, Sezer noted, ‘national identity awareness’ has to be settled and not disrupted by provocative statements like the Prime Minister’s (TP, 3 January 2006).

Although Erdoğan is careful to stress unity of symbols, citizenship and administration, and although he is careful *not* to list Turkishness as a sub-identity among many, he effectively demotes cultural Turkishness to a sub-category by stressing the republican (civic) identity that binds all Turks, regardless of culture. Erdoğan accuses those who elevate sub-identities to political identities of promoting ethnic nationalism. Could the AKP’s zero tolerance to ethnic nationalism also be directed at Sezer? The ‘only primary link that connects us (is) Turkish Republic[an] citizenship’ (TP, *ibid*), noted Erdoğan, capitalising on the vulnerability of the Kemalist conception of Turkishness. By defining it as secular and republican, official national identity narratives render ‘Turkishness’ a civic identity, even though a (rhetorical) ethnic patina is often applied. Erdoğan has identified an internal tension in Kemalist narratives and is exploring how far it can be used in order to widen political debate without actually abandoning or contradicting the Kemalist language.

For Sezer, Erdoğan’s claim contradicts a perceived Kemalist essence, according to which Turkishness goes beyond citizenship and identities established by law (*ibid*).

The national bond is built on shared joys and sorrows, as well as on collective pride in being Turkish. For Sezer (*ibid*) *this* constitutes a primary identity. The President is unwilling to compromise on unity, a concern the TAF share.

Similar tensions emerged over the question of Northern Cyprus when, once again, the AKP defined national interest and modernisation differently to the TAF. Normally, Erdoğan handles the Cyprus question with caution, aware that, if handled poorly, it could end Turkey's EU ambitions. For the TAF, things are more straightforward. Land Forces Commander General Aytaç Yalman stressed that the TAF remain committed to defending Northern Cyprus (KKTC) and its people (*TDN*, 12 May 2004). For General Tolon, Northern Cyprus is part of the fatherland and those (i.e. Erdoğan) with no regard for its welfare are traitors (*M*, 21 January 2004).

Erdoğan responded to General Tolon's statements with a question. During a time so critical for Turkey's development and the realisation of its westernising aspirations, what does love of the motherland dictate? Erdoğan is adamant: the best proof of loving the country is to bestow the next generation with a stronger and more prosperous Turkey (*H*, 23 January 2004). As a line of legitimation, this is flawless. The problem is that, although Erdoğan's stated goals are fully compatible with Kemalism, some of the *étapes* on the way to realising them seem to stretch the notions of secularism (see Chapter 6), national unity, integrity and pride (see Chapter 7) to the limit.

Journalist Taha Akyol, in an article extolling the military's duty to strengthen the country's unity (*M*, 21 January 2004), unwittingly demonstrates how flexible Kemalism is for those who seek answers in its legacies. Stressing Atatürk's pragmatism, Akyol notes that the great leader knew when to fight (Alexandretta/Hatay) and when not to (Kirkuk). The Turks today, Akyol continues, should not refer back to an 'essential nation' or to what Atatürk did all those decades ago: rather they should ask what Atatürk would have done in their place. This attitude, shared by many, opens the scope for debate even further. The AKP claims that Atatürk would approach secularism and westernisation differently in the 21st century than he did in the 20th. Some Kemalists fear that such claims only intend to weaken Kemalism and allow religion to invade politics or Western interests to invade the

national domain. So the debate over the boundaries of the Kemalist universe continues.

Chapter 6, Negotiating Secularism

The Turkish Republic is a secular state. In this chapter I explore what this actually means to analysts trying to decipher eight decades' worth of secular policies and to actors seeking to protect, defend or redefine secularism. Such attempts, now championed by the AKP, create tensions and suspicions regarding the AKP's real intentions. These tensions are particularly evident when policies actually address the boundaries of secularism, such as the provision of religious education or, more controversially, the headscarf question. After stressing how Kemalists themselves unwittingly enabled the negotiation of secularism's boundaries and provisions, I will demonstrate how the AKP seeks to redefine it and how Kemalists seek to resist such efforts and uphold their understanding of secularism. I, finally, raise the question of whether this debate is actually one regarding the boundaries of modernity and the direction of modernisation, an essentially Kemalist concern.

1. Laiklik à la Turca: 'No-one was told not to pray' (Kaylan, 2005:69)

Kemalist secularism inevitably begs the question of feasibility: was what Atatürk set out to do possible? 'Islam is something more than a religious belief system', notes Toprak (1981:20), hence 'secularisation also becomes something more than a formal separation'. Therefore, it does not suffice to look at Atatürk's policies and intentions. Rather, to understand his secularism, one has to think about the nature of Islam and its relation to politics. For Berkes (1998:3, 7-8, 507-8), secularism is a Christian remedy, unfit for the Ottoman context that it was made to fit, through radical reform, because the Kemalists deemed religion-free politics necessary for modernisation. Nevertheless, essentialising the link between Ottoman politics and Islam, elevating it to an Islamic trait rather than an Ottoman choice, confounds analysis by effectively claiming that Atatürk carved the only possible path, given the socio-political realities on the ground.

Çaha (2003:108, 114-5) disagrees, stressing that the Kuran does *not* specify desirable political arrangements and the community-focused, often authoritarian, political

arrangements in many Muslim countries should be treated as social artefacts rather than religious inevitabilities. For Çaha (2003:117-120), Islam is fully compatible with liberalism, rationalism and individualism and, by extension, secularism – intellectual misgivings linked to the Muslim experience under French colonial rule notwithstanding. Islam, in fact, always accepts the separation between religious and state law, thus facilitating the separation of state and religion (Çaha, 2003:123). What Çaha implies is that Islam cannot be blamed for Turkey's incomplete secularisation; rather one should look at the policy-makers' intentions.

For Ahmad (2003:84), Atatürk consciously chose *laiklik* (state-controlled Islam) over secularism (the separation of religion from politics), containing and using religion while limiting freedom of conscience in order to protect people from false consciousness. Kili (2003:356) agrees: through *laiklik* Kemalism sought to de-emphasise Islam, not abolish it. The result was, for Özdemir & Frank (2000:195), 'state Islam', not secularism, whereby Atatürk exerted lay control over religion. This was not a new idea. Abdulhamid had made a concerted effort to 'monopolise official sacrality' (Deringil, 1999:53), thus creating a precedent for state control over religion. What there was no precedent for was disestablishment. Through a combination of disestablishment, separation and control (Davison, 1998:181-2), Atatürk forged Turkish *laiklik*, a system that is neither fully 'secular' nor 'laic'.

The Caliphate was disestablished, but other institutions of religious authority inherited by the Republic were kept and extensively used as the state continued to administer religion (Davison, 1998:140). Religion became a vital resource for the mobilisation of peasant masses during both the Independence War and early republicanism, before institutions were consolidated and this strategy could be abandoned in favour of producing an educated westernised elite that would control the periphery without recourse to religion (Toprak, 1981:63, 66-67). Atatürk (e.g. 2003:371, 373) made frequent appeals to religion and even assumed a religious military title (*Gazi*¹). Yet he deemed religion an explosive weapon in the wrong hands, so control over it was retained, not least in order to ensure that no unauthorised agency could use religion to subvert the state's purposes. For Kemalism, secularism was part of Atatürk's modernising plan. It was both a modernising *étape* in itself and a means for the

¹ Warrior of the Faith.

project's continuation, hence it was not pursued strictly for its own merits. Although secularism was always central in Kemalist thought, secularist policies were moulded with the wider project in mind. Thus they varied, responding to changing conditions on the ground and often using religion to assist other aspects of modernisation. Hence *Laiklik* equalled *new* religious policy, not *no* religious policy (Davison, 1998:153).

Still, the change, at least in theory, was immense, as the Ottoman state ostentatiously described itself as a theocracy, even though the actual application of Islamic law was often mitigated by political intrigue, *raisons d'état* and *realpolitik*. The Ottoman regime had a clear sense of a statist sphere not subordinate to Islam: not all state business and arbitration paid lip service to religion and legislation produced by the Sultan did not claim divine provenance. Nevertheless, the Sultan was also the Caliph, claiming personal legitimacy in terms of this dual position and submitting himself only to Islamic Law – not man-made laws – thus giving religious dignitaries a high position within Ottoman hierarchies. The Republic put an end to religious mandarin traditions, replacing them with republican structures and legitimising narratives. Although processes and preoccupations changed little, political priorities had changed radically as modernisation had become the overriding political goal.

Secularisation should be analysed through Atatürk's anxieties, peculiar to turn-of-the-century Ottoman officers. Through successive military defeats, real or perceived betrayals by allies and subjects and frustrated, ill-conceived or half-hearted reform experiments, the Ottoman Empire taught its officers a bitter lesson regarding protection. Atatürk was convinced that Turkey had to modernise and become as strong as any possible opponents in order to avoid future humiliations.

The Ottomans had sought to emulate Western technical accomplishments while remaining uninterested in the foundations of the civilisation that made such accomplishments possible (Berkes, 1998:29, 53). Although ideas, shreds of secular policy and radical experiments predated Atatürk, he was convinced that half-measures achieved nothing. Building on the frustrations of war and the increasing sophistication of Ottoman society (who, as individuals, travelled, read² and traded more), Atatürk

² Interestingly, for Deringil (1999:8) the Ottoman state's religious foundations and legitimacy were slowly being eroded since Sultan Mahmud permitted printing. Although repression was rife and

embraced the rose that is Western civilisation with its thorns. Many disapproved of this. Yet reform was necessary as the selective and random application of reforms (the co-existence of the Muslim lunar calendar and Western solar calendar for trading purposes or the coexistence of commercial courts outside the jurisdiction of the *Şeyhülislam* – Berkes, 1998:161-2) eroded the Empire's institutional coherence. Atatürk's secularism eliminated the overlapping institutions, practices and authorities that created confusion and slowed down the administrative apparatus.

In 1920, however, Atatürk's prevalence was no foregone conclusion as nationalist deputies remained pious and attached to the religious legitimacy of Ottoman politics. Although everyone agreed on the state's desperate need for reform in order to catch up with the West, there was no agreement on how to achieve that (Turan, 1991:33) and many retained the belief that Western technology could be effectively separated from Western 'civilisation'. In 1924, the Republican constitution actually mentioned Islam as the country's official religion.

The secularist movement was bolstered by default when it was discovered that religious dignitaries were lending support to anti-nationalist elements (Karpat, 2004:214). Atatürk prevailed and the new secular Republic was promoted as the perfect vehicle through which the Turks could dissociate themselves from Ottoman defeat and humiliation and turn a new page in their history. Still, legislative intervention was required in order to eliminate symbols and vested authority that could forge a rival legitimising discourse to republican modernisation. Islam was too closely associated with Ottoman authority and the pre-national past to be trusted.

Atatürk disposed of the dual system and eliminated confusion by embracing modernisation whole-heartedly and re-thinking the country's civilisational model. Secularism was part of the new civilisational paradigm and, for many, modernity's sharpest thorn. Its introduction was gradual but relentless. All mention of religion was removed from Turkey's Constitution in 1928 – in the midst of an uncompromising campaign eliminating symbols, structures and individuals associated with the fusion of religion and Ottoman politics. Thus Atatürk protected his modernising project,

publishers avoided politics, the simple act of reading for pleasure was subversive in itself. Printing and reading profane, if not anti-religious, material allowed people to bypass religion without forsaking it.

advertised his determination to see it through to its logical conclusion and, simultaneously, pursued a very specific power struggle. Following the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, all members of the House of Osman were banished from Turkey (Lewis, 2002:264), thus removing individuals around whom conservative political sentiments could be rallied.

Symbols of the old order were methodically eliminated and an attempt was made to look modern. The fez was banned in 1925, and the veil was widely criticised – although an outright ban was left up to local authorities (Lewis, 2002:269 & 271; Çınar, 2005:59); international numerals and the Latin script were adopted in 1928, followed by a Turkish language purification campaign; women were given full electoral rights in 1934; Western-style surnames were introduced and Sunday adopted as the day of rest, replacing the Muslim Friday, in 1935. Thus Atatürk ejected religious undercurrents from all non-religious activities. For Pamuk (2005:10), westernisation made little sense to the people: ‘Although everyone knew it as freedom from the laws of Islam, no one was quite sure what else westernisation was good for’. Yet the secularisation drive had an undeniable nationalising effect.

Secularising policies were actually simultaneously westernising *and* nationalising as they distanced Turkey from ‘Islamic’ practice. This was particularly true of language reform. Although it rendered Ottoman literary and historical sources unintelligible in the space of one generation, the new alphabet marked Turkey’s new orientation: due West. The new script expressly abandoned the universalism of Arabic, thus severing ties with the Arab Middle East, while also assisting literacy – itself necessary for modernisation and useful for nation-building – by offering the people an alphabet that was both easier to learn and better suited to the representation of Turkish phonetics. Such secularising measures equalised the population, creating a sense of national ownership of the new language and script.

Nationalism, secularism and modernisation were interlinked in Atatürk’s mind and remain so in his supporters’ hearts. Religion was harnessed, controlled and nationalised. The Kuran was translated into Turkish and, briefly, so was the *ezan*. This act of symbolic transgression confined the Prophet’s language to the Mosque and ensured that religion would be mediated through the national language. Secularism embodied this shift from empire to republic, from tradition to modernity, from *Ümmet*

to nation. This new religion – subordinate, national and attuned to the Republic – came to represent the essence of Turkish secularism that, since 1937, is protected by the constitution. Pre-ambulatory clause 1, paragraph 5; Articles 2, 13, 14, 137, 174; provisional Article 2; and the MPs and the President's oaths all describe Turkey as a secular Republic and Article 68 permits the closure of political parties challenging or undermining secularism. The constitution makes it clear that containing religious influences and safeguarding secularism is an ongoing task.

The protection of secularism entails the continued pursuit of nationalised religion and pure Islam and continuous vigilance against the appearance and growth of political Islam. The latter is a core concern for Kemalist actors such as the President or the TAF. The former is taken care of by an organisation forged by Article 136 of the constitution, the *Diyanet İşleri Bakanlığı* (Directorate of Religious Affairs, DİB). The DİB, a true bureaucratic army with 80,000 employees (Özdemir and Frank, 2000:201), enjoys a monopoly over employing and training *imams* (prayer-leaders) and *hatips* (preachers). As the DİB remains tethered to the state, it is often described as an *ideological state apparatus*, although its Head, Professor Ali Bardakoğlu (2004), defends its intellectual freedom. The DİB, he notes, is concerned with individual piety and seeks to promote a modern expression of Turkish culture and civilisation in a secular state with a (mostly) Muslim population. Religion has found its place within the Republic and 'secular and non-secular Muslims join in the varied practices of Islam' (Özdemir & Frank, 2000:63), under what Bardakoğlu identifies as state protection. Bardakoğlu praises the secular state for guaranteeing religious freedom while preventing religious demands from disrupting social order.

This, however, is not the whole picture. Although the state preached secularism, successive governments sought to compromise it for electoral gain. The advent of multi-party politics made religion an invaluable bargaining tool for politicians. Although what was offered by way of concessions was minimal, it constituted a powerful symbolic break with Atatürk's relentless secularism. Even İnönü joined in the new mood, granting permission for Turks to take the pilgrimage to Mecca, introducing elective religion courses in primary schools³ and permitting the re-

³ Religious education has been limited and expanded, but never eliminated from school curricula (Winter, 1984:187).

opening of *imam-hatip* schools in 1949. More such schools opened as soon as Menderes swept into power. Banning the *medreses* had been one of Atatürk's first acts in power. Was their reopening a betrayal of Atatürk's secularism? Arguably not, as the transition from the Ottoman polity was, by then, complete and, if Islam was to be harnessed by the state, as discussed above, preachers and prayer-leaders had to be trained in a standardised and monitored fashion.

Many of the concessions, however, were not part of a concerted policy, but either populist vote-seeking moves or acts of symbolic 'restoration' – such as the return to the Arabic *ezan* or the allowing of Kuran readings on state radio (Toprak, 1981:80). Even the military used Islam. Following the 1961 intervention, the TAF did not restore militant secularism and even exhibited a desire to transform Islam into a 'national instrument for the state' (Ahmad, 1977:374). Islam was not, at this stage, seen as a threat to democratic stability. And with good reason, as more imminent threats existed. With the 1971 intervention, some of the earlier legislation relaxing secular provisions was repealed. Still, religion was not Turkey's key problem at this time. With the start of the Cold War, the Communist threat from the north overshadowed the Islamic threat from the south. Harnessing all conservative forces against Communism became expedient and placating Muslims seemed a sensible way of combating the violent political polarisation tearing Turkey apart.

As a result, the next military intervention did not subdue Islam; it used it. In 1980, the generals seized power, determined to change Turkish politics so that the once-a-decade intervention would no longer be necessary. During three years of tight social control and radical transformation, the TAF sought to completely transform Turkish political life. Education was controlled (through YÖK) and society pacified, to the extent that the Left wing of the political spectrum, militant or not, was almost totally incapacitated. In their attempt to forge social cohesion and wholesome values (respect for authority and family-orientation), the TAF promoted what became known as the Turkish Islamic Synthesis (*Türk-İslam Sentezi*, TİS). Although secularism had been relaxed since 1946 it was, ironically, the TAF that compromised Atatürk's legacy.

The TİS was premised on the assumption 'that "Islamic" values would instil respect for tradition and society and function as a means of social control' (Tank, 2005:11). The TAF chose to weld Islamic ideas to national goals in order to preserve national

unity and integrity. This was achieved by merging pre-Islamic Turkic symbols and history with Islamic ones and forging a new national narrative that retained all the Kemalist traits discussed in previous chapters, but afforded Islam a greater role. This new narrative stressed a ‘Central Asian’ regard for family life and military virtue – institutions ensuring morality, truth and justice in social relations – love of country, fear of God, sanctity of custom and obedience to state authority. The initial TİS, it is claimed, was forged when this culture was fused with Islam. It collapsed because of an affliction of Turkish intellectuals: Western mimesis. The 1980s TİS sought to re-establish a balance between home, mosque and barracks⁴ and reassert respect, discipline and the sacredness of duty in social life.

For Toprak (1990:10-11), the TİS turned religion into a state ideology. Turan (1991:41-2) disagrees, noting that ‘the Turkish state, while not viewing religion as giving direction to its policies and actions, continues to treat it as a resource which may be mobilised for “purposes of state” whenever it is found useful or necessary’. The TAF had not suddenly become religious. They used religion, thinking they could contain it, in an attempt to forge a more socially homogeneous and less politically active community (Shankland, 1999:43). The use of Islamic symbols did forge a new source of social cohesion. Yet new Islamic communities were far from docile.

The fact that the TİS was introduced without abandoning Kemalism shows that scope for negotiation within the Kemalist language has always existed and has been used even by those who resist such negotiation, namely the TAF. The TİS itself was the product of negotiation between military and intellectual agents, making its paternity hard to ascertain. Toprak believes the TİS was the brainchild of the *Intellectuals’ Hearth* (*Aydımlar Ocağı*), Navarro-Yashin (2002:20) attributes it to Islamists, while Yavuz (2003:214) sees the TİS as a military-backed intellectual exercise seeking to placate and co-opt nationalists and Islamists alike.

In practice, the TİS renewed state legitimacy in the periphery, but it unwittingly re-politicised heterodox Kurds and Alevis. Alevis, traditionally supportive of Kemalist secularism, felt that the TİS’s celebration of Sunni Hanefi Islam disenfranchised

⁴ Interestingly, Sultan Abdulhamid had premised his legitimation on a mosque-school-barracks trident as well, see Deringil (1993).

them. They, naturally, raised the question of its compatibility with secularism and were not alone in deploring a perceived betrayal of Kemalist modernisation. The definition of 'modernisation' and 'modernity' was, thus, unwittingly thrown wide open. The TAF had only itself to blame for this relativisation of Kemalist legacy.

With the benefit of hindsight, Kemalist apologists, such as Kili (2003:415), criticise the TİS as threatening to draw Turkey into the dark ages. The Synthesis, she notes, writing after the religious revival of the 1990s, represented a violation of Atatürkist thought, a heretical error that gave political voice to religious extremists, enabling them to seek the undoing of Atatürk's reforms (ibid, p.420). The TAF's mistake, Kili (2003:423) believes, lay in the assumption that Atatürk's ideas can be selectively applied and combined with other principles. Atatürk's system of thought, however, is 'whole'. Atatürkism is *not*, for Kili, a language for the negotiation of politics, but a blueprint for political life, making negotiation redundant.

For Kili (2003:403-4), the coup of 12 September 1980 is an aberration, failing to represent the progressive tradition the military stands for – re-embraced, she feels, by 1997. For Kili, true Kemalists see modernity as consisting of positivist certainties and religion as nothing more than unsubstantiated assumptions, prejudice and superstition. Yet those Kemalists who supported the TİS did not dismiss religion so readily. Thus they blurred the line between acceptable and unacceptable uses of religion in public life. This has created a legitimating precedent for Islamists, while also enabling them to attempt a redefinition of secularism and its relationship with modernity without rejecting Kemalism. For, while the TİS enabled the military to use religion for its own purposes, it simultaneously opened opportunity-spaces wherein other actors could use religion as well. The TAF's error lay in their dismissal of 'Islamists' as a backward, reactionary and unitary 'camp', incapable of utilising such opportunities. Islam, however, offered a flexible and multi-faceted language of cultural politics and personal morality that soon translated into a new political idiom.

This idiom ensured Özal's electoral victory in 1983, offering him a new language of legitimation – used to justify repealing the law banning the use of religion for political purposes. This action was largely symbolic as the constitutional ban on political uses of Islam remained in place. Yet it marked the advent of a new era for Turkish politics. The Kemalist conviction that personal piety, if publicly expressed, necessarily went

hand in hand with narrow-minded backwardness was shattered by Özal, himself a perfect embodiment of 'modern' Islam. Özal embraced market economics and Western ways, including the consumption of alcohol. Meanwhile, his association with Islamic brotherhoods was no secret; nor was his habit of leaving his desk to pray on Fridays. Özal was an eventuality for which Kemalist westernisation was not prepared.

Atatürk's relentless secularism was history, yet what would replace it remained unclear. For two decades, politicians have been testing the limits of this enlarged space of legitimate discourses. Some seek to expand it further. The Turkish Press now speaks of 'two camps', the secularist and the Islamist, facing each other; yet things are not so simple. Firstly, both sides – to the extent that they exist at all – are heavily fragmented and diverse. Secondly, both sides use, to varying degrees, Kemalist legitimisation narratives in the public arena. Thirdly and most significantly, as Shankland (1999:2) remarks, the Islamic revival can only be understood through the malleability of hitherto rigid Kemalist institutions, acquired post-TİS. Also post-TİS, the electoral success of religious parties has increased which, combined with migration from the more religious periphery into Turkey's administrative centres (Yavuz, 2003:83), has inadvertently enhanced the state's readiness to embrace Islam. As a result, the state can now be used to serve both secular and Islamist aims, often simultaneously. This creates potential for confusion and conflict, but more importantly, it creates space for the pursuit of many conflicting agendas concurrently.

This is particularly significant as religion has forged several, and often contradictory, discursive niches. Islamic idioms and agendas have proliferated forging what many call an Islamist public sphere. Religious discourses are not uniformly incompatible with the present constitutional order, as feared. In fact, some kinds of Islamism offered alternative routes to and definitions of modernity within a republican setting. Distinguishing between strands of Islamist thought, however, is not the Kemalists' foremost concern. Religion's reappearance in the public sphere alarmed them as they believed they were faced with what Weisbrod (2002:499) calls 'political religion', namely the translation of religious sensitivities into secular practice.

Although, arguably, this 'translation' marks the end of religious fundamentalism, the TAF were taking no chances, especially in the late 90s, when the charismatic, albeit incoherent, Necmettin Erbakan became the face of Islamist politics. Erbakan's

provocative anti-secularism did not partake of the new debate; it simply tested the TAF's patience. His failure to castigate deputies making inflammatory statements against Atatürk, foreign affairs blunders and erratic policies soon also catalysed the public mood (Toprak, 2005:176). The TAF were not alone in thinking that Erbakan was using democratic institutions to undercut the Republic. The belief that the democratic process had to be suspended to save secularism was widespread (Toprak, 2005:177).

The TAF initially simply ignored the people's elected representatives, concluding an alliance with Israel despite Erbakan's opposition and staging large-scale military operations in northern Iraq without informing the Prime Minister (Yavuz, 2003:243). Then came verbal admonitions and a warning in the form of tanks rumbling through Sincan after an ill-advised attack on secularism at a rally resulting in the mayor of Sincan's arrest and the Iranian ambassador's expulsion. The NSC then issued clear demands, regarding the curbing of private schools funded by religious associations and the closing of certain *imam-hatip* schools and Kuranic seminaries. Erbakan resisted. On 28 February 1997, the TAF staged Turkey's first 'post-modern' coup, presenting Erbakan with a series of demands, also endorsed by bureaucrats and politicians.

The honeymoon period was over. Islamism – that is Islam in any form other than private faith – was once again regarded with suspicion, as a potential threat to the nation and Republic. Many Kemalists now greet Islamism with blanket disapproval, convinced that Islamists are hostile towards modernity and republicanism. Statements or proof to the contrary and conduct indicating that some Islamists have embraced modernity are dismissed as a carefully manufactured smokescreen. Religiosity and modernity are, once again, incompatible in Kemalist thought. Kemalists perceive Islamic political idioms as the *de facto* vernacular of 'backwardness'. Having retained, until recently, a monopoly over the definition of modernity, Kemalists do not perceive Islamism as an alternative perception of modernity but as opposition to it. Nevertheless, some Islamist movements use republican language in the articulation of their position. Many embrace the nation and modernity, although they seek to redefine, although not abandon, secularism. Kemalists resist such attempts, fearing a concealed plan to turn Turkey into an Iran-style theocracy. What they fail to

appreciate is that the Islamist movement is heavily fragmented and, within it, there are those who not only honestly embrace the Republic, but could not actually exist outside it. Secularism is expedient to keep Islamist radicals from silencing the moderates and the moderates know that, though many Kemalists do not.

For those who treat Kemalism as a creed whose legacies cannot be negotiated or selectively applied, 'being modern is a deeply cherished ideal that is held very much as a religion, with its own shrines, rituals, sacred spaces, and mantras' (Çınar, 2005:4). Kemalism cum religion has a secular temple (Anıtkabir), a holy book (*Nutuk* – Turan, 1991:50) and daily civic prayers in the form of Atatürk's mantras. Atatürk is the prophet of this civic creed, his face an icon symbolising national destiny that people flaunt – on car rear-view mirrors, lapels and shop windows – in times of anxiety. Even Atatürk's commemorations are quasi-religious. 'The secularist founder of state [is] not remembered in a secular fashion' (Navarro-Yashin, 2002:191) because, although Özal stopped the obligatory commemoration of 10 November, people still stand still at the time of Atatürk's death and engage in mystical practices of the kind Atatürk most despised. Turks practising 'domestic magic' call his spirit for advice, while semi-scientific treatises analyse the recurrence of 19, a 'magic number' for Islam, in Atatürk's life, claiming that he was on a divine mission. Even the Press seeks supernatural indications of Atatürk's continued presence (Navarro-Yashin, 2002:194-196). For those who approach Kemalism as a faith, Atatürk's bequest cannot be negotiated. Partly altering it undermines the whole, they believe, and secularism, as part of Kemalism, should be neither negotiated nor reinterpreted. But Atatürk's legacy is mixed and interpretation is necessary.

2. The AKP: Promoting 'True' Kemalist Secularism

Ahmad (1977:362) finds that '[i]t is paradoxical that in Turkey, where there have been no organized Islamic pressure groups since the establishment of the Republic, religion has played such an influential role in the politics of the country during the last quarter century', and was to play an even more significant role in the 20 years after this was written. This was the Kemalists' doing. By elevating secularism to a central pillar of modernisation, they turned religion into an arena of manipulation and

confrontation and, by extension, a banner for those seeking to oppose Kemalist real or symbolic monopolies. This tradition, exploiting discursive spaces established during the TİS, gave rise to Erdoğan, who is currently seeking to fuse Atatürk's 'pure Islam', EU-sponsored individual freedoms and Islamic spirituality.

Erdoğan does not argue against the secular state's legal provisions in the name of religion; rather he does so in the name of westernisation and republicanism. Drawing on the *de facto* legitimacy of EU accession – itself pursued in Atatürk's name – Erdoğan seeks to renegotiate secularism through its practical requirements. He appeals to European values and practice, where secularism is not static, but an ever-renewed concept (Theology professor Terrence Merrigan, Z, 16 May 2006).

Simultaneously, he stresses that his party not only enjoys a majority of seats in Parliament, but was voted for by 'nearly every sector of society... Consequently, our party's vote represents a Turkish consensus' (Erdoğan, 2002). Then he stresses his simultaneous commitment to European and spiritual ideals: pluralism, diversity, toleration *and* piety. Appealing to the great Atatürk and his legacy, Erdoğan speaks of universal civilisation and democracy. Turkey is a model, he notes. 'This model is the democratic, secular, legal and political order that views the world of faith at the level of the individual and treats all faiths equally at the level of the state' (ibid). The AKP, Erdoğan (2002) continues, is the same model in miniature, as its members are Muslim but the party is not Islamic and its agenda is democratic and modernising. Similarly, he notes, Turkey is Muslim, but democratic and secular. The EU should embrace Turkey because it 'should be based, not on any particular culture identified by the faith of individuals, but on commitment to democracy' (ibid). This appeal to the EU is actually a simultaneous appeal to secularists within his own country.

Such statements draw on the *de facto* legitimacy of well-known narratives penned by Ziya Gökalp (1959), one of the few identifiable influences on Atatürk's thought. Gökalp noted that each nation has its own culture, part of which is religion. The essence of progress lies in a nation's ability to move beyond its narrow cultural specificities, embracing the non-negotiable traits of universal 'civilisation' without abandoning its peculiar culture. Erdoğan hardly needs to quote Gökalp when he states that Turkey can be simultaneously Muslim and westernising. His audience recognise the reference immediately.

Erdoğan believes in democracy. He often reminds the Muslim world that their troubles would be resolved if they put more faith in human rights and reason (*TDN*, 6 September 2005; *WSJ*, 30 August 2005). Moreover, he accepts secularism as necessary for modernisation. Nevertheless, secularism for Erdoğan, means freedom of religion, not freedom from it. 'In a secular society, religion is under the guarantee of the secular administration... Secularism is at an equal distance from every kind of belief. And for this reason, secularism is a sort of insurance for all of us' (*TNA*, 9-10 July 2005). Although this resembles Kemalist secularist narratives, Erdoğan is adamant that secularism is 'an institutional attitude and method, which ensures the State remain[s] impartial and equidistant to all religions' (Erdoğan, 2004b). The purpose of secularism is to limit the state, not the individual.

Simultaneously, religion is to be kept out of politics. 'While attaching importance to religion as a societal value', Erdoğan (2004a) stated, 'we do not think it right to conduct politics through religion, to attempt to transform government ideologically by using religion, or to resort to organisational activities based on religious symbols.' Having thus ensured compliance with the constitution, Erdoğan outlines his party's democratic conservatism: '[A] political approach which accords importance to history, social culture and, in this context, religion [and] re-establishes itself on a democratic format.' Not even Gökalp could disagree with this. Religion belongs to the individual, Erdoğan (2004a) stresses, '[i]t should be left to the individual'.

Drawing heavily from aspects of Kemalist legacies that die-hard secularists would rather forget, Erdoğan claims that the time has come to reinterpret Atatürk's legacy, secularism included, 'according to the norms of modern democracy' (*Z*, 16 May 2006). In 1924, Atatürk's secularism was justified in terms of cleansing Islam and rescuing it from political manipulation. Atatürk's (2003:612) support for a pure, universal religion, moving men away from the prejudices and false notions that 'poison their bodies and intellects', explains his aggressive secularism as the Republic was making the transition away from the political and social structures of empire. In fact, Davison (1998:151-2) believes Atatürk was in favour of Islam 'in its plain trueness', as it did not hinder modernisation and Berkes (1998:484) believes '[t]he crux of all Mustafa Kemal's experiments was not to Turkify Islam for the sake of Turkish nationalism, but to Turkify Islam for the sake of religious enlightenment'.

Erdoğan capitalises on this narrative, hinting that secularism was necessary for modernisation, but should not be perceived as hostility towards religion per se.

Stringent secularism – distilling, controlling and protecting religion from re-contamination and mediating personal access to the sacred in terms of the state’s own modernising exigencies – could have been an interim policy. Atatürk’s biographers believe that, had he lived, he would have relaxed his relentless secularism after the transition to the new polity, for which secularism was a necessary stepping-stone. Actually, this relaxation occurred only after his death and invariably for the wrong reasons. Today, Kemalists treat secularism as an essential part of republican legacies. So Erdoğan celebrates secularism ‘as the fundamental and uniting feature of the republic and a guarantee for the freedom of religions and religious beliefs’ (Z, 16 May 2006) and Arınç stresses the AKP’s commitment to both democracy and secularism, noting that problems only arise because of different interpretations (Z, 24 April 2006).

Erdoğan pays lip-service to secularism while castigating secular practice in Turkey where, even when secular policies were relaxed, the individual was never trusted to make choices regarding religious practice without compromising the Republic or modernisation. Erdoğan’s focus on the individual represents a dramatic revision of secularist perceptions and policies. Marrying secularism with individualism, he is pleasing the EU and, while not retracting Kemalist principles, he is vesting them with new meaning. Secularism suddenly is not shorthand for the state’s right to control expressions of faith, but a description of individual rights vis-à-vis the state. Erdoğan is using the Kemalist signifier, but changes its meaning according to a European, modern and, hence, legitimate model. Some external observers are convinced by Erdoğan’s mix of personal piety and political secularism. US-based *Christian Science Monitor* describes the AKP as the Turkish equivalent of European Christian Democratic Parties and no more subversive than them (M, 10 June 2005).

In order to convince domestic audiences, Gül (2005c) speaks of Islam using Atatürk’s descriptions of enlightened religion, presenting its values as universal and hence an asset, not an impediment, for modernisation. ‘The perception on the part of certain policy-makers and public opinion in the West, of Islam, as a source of intolerance and extremism is totally unfounded... Islam is a profound source of wisdom, ethics, knowledge and values that complements and enriches the common heritage of human

civilisation... an asset and not a disadvantage' (Gül, 2005i). A country such as Turkey, notes Gül (2004c), 'with a predominantly Muslim population' can retain its 'spiritual-cultural identity' while 'achiev[ing] contemporary democratic standards. Justice, equality, consultation, law and respect for the individual are in fact inherent in our spiritual and cultural heritage'. Erdoğan (2005c) also uses the theme of a democratic state with predominantly Muslim citizens, describing himself as the 'Muslim Prime Minister of a democratic country'. Erdoğan notes that democracy is a system of universal values and hence accessible to Muslims, and stresses that '[t]he main philosophy of Islam... favours participation, freedom and pluralism'.

Erdoğan is seeking to simultaneously appease US allies, EU assessors and secularists at home: still he goes on the offensive. In the same speech he castigates those who 'carry out restrictive policies in the name of religion', either by politicising faith or otherwise limiting pluralism – a covert but clear reference to Turkey's secularists – for they harm both democracy and religion.

Gül (2005d) stresses Turkey's ability to demonstrate, in an unstable world, that a Muslim society can sustain institutions of democratic participation and political pluralism. Atatürk could not object to this. And yet the persistent focus on political pluralism worries secularists. The AKP may be more Kemalist than most Islamists, but it remains more Islamic than secularists are comfortable with. The AKP's redefinition of secularism, empowering the individual, and their description of Turkey as a Muslim society – demographically accurate, yet diverging from Kemalist identity prescriptions – cause fears regarding Erdoğan's 'true' intentions to resurface. These fears are rarely fully articulated. Nevertheless, Kaylan (2005:412) speaks for many when he writes: 'On November 3, 2002... Kemalism and the secular reforms of my childhood years suffered a humiliating defeat in Turkey's 172,143 polling stations. The winners, despite their denials of having an Islamist agenda, were aiming to undermine Kemal Atatürk's secular reforms.' Kaylan does not explain how he knows that, yet he feels the need to expose Erdoğan, because 'I was a child of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's revolution... We called ourselves Kemalists then and took solemn oaths to protect his secular legacy.' (p.25). This feeling is strong for many.

The result is suspicion and conflict that finds no institutionalised arena in which to resolve itself or play itself out. As former Chief Justice Selçuk put it: 'In a country

that lacks freedom of expression, there can be no tradition of debates. In a country that does not accept the fact that the number of opinions... is equal to the number of people who live in it, it is impossible to introduce a culture of debate' (*TDN*, 14 June 2006). As the TAF and courts remain vigilant, ready to detect signs of 'heresy', they force Erdoğan to tread carefully and refrain from articulating the full extent of his reform vision – even if unrelated to religion. Although the AKP has not used its parliamentary majority to affect radical constitutional reform, Baykal accuses them of trying to 'restructure the state based on religion' (*TDN*, 10 July 2005). But is it what Erdoğan does or who he is that inspires such fears? Erdoğan and Gül may have thrown the EU's gates open for Turkey, but they constantly refer to Turkey's Muslim identity (Gül, 2004a & b; Erdoğan, 2004b); their wives are covered; they were both Erbakan's associates; Erdoğan even attended an *imam-hatip* school⁵.

Erdoğan represents both the contradictions currently facing Turkey and potential solutions to them. Having dissociated himself from Erbakan (*M*, 10 October 2004), Erdoğan remains pious and proud of his humble roots – and for that, electorally popular. His government champions democracy, justice, human rights and economic growth. Undoubtedly, it is more than fear of the generals that binds Erdoğan to the Republic. His EU commitment appears genuine, not least to the EU, and political change is real and sweeping. Even some businessmen appreciate a party they once rejected as Islamic and *hence* backward, as Turkey is enjoying single-digit inflation for the first time since 1970. This may have happened during the AKP's watch rather than thanks to them and economic indices have deteriorated in 2006, but is that reason enough to mistrust Erdoğan's democratic credentials?

Secularists may actually mistrust the people's secularist credentials and their choice of Erdoğan as their leader. In Selçuk's words, '[o]ne of the biggest problems Turkey faces is the distrust felt by those who govern the country towards the people and vice versa' (*TDN*, 14 June 2006). Often this mistrust is expressed publicly. On one such occasion, when academics denounced a perceived AKP onslaught on secular education and Erdoğan dismissed their intervention as political (*H*, 25 September 2003), their reply was dramatic and unequivocal: defending Atatürk's reforms and Turkey's national unity is their responsibility; what Atatürk (2003:539) described as

⁵ See www.rterdogan.com

‘personally partaking of the battle’. If defending the reforms and pitting themselves against ‘darkness’, they stated, is to do politics, then politics they shall do.

Secularists remember Atatürk’s (2003:610) warning: Islamists ‘wanted to sacrifice the Turkish people in the name of a simple caprice’. With that in mind, CHP leader Deniz Baykal urges the people to remain vigilant as the AKP’s real ‘intention [is] to subvert the main principles of the state’ (*TDN*, 3 November 2004). Erdoğan, understandably, deplors this attitude: ‘Some talk like they are reading my mind. No other administration faced such treatment’ (*TDN*, 6 June 2005). Although this is not actually true – both Erbakan’s and his successor Recai Kutan’s intentions were constantly questioned – it is unclear whether this treatment is deserved.

AKP policies have, on occasion, cast doubt on the sincerity of the party’s secularism. The proposal to criminalise adultery (see *TP*, 14, 16 & 17 September 2004) was quickly dropped under EU pressure and domestic outrage, but not all controversial bills have shared its fate. Attempts to limit alcohol consumption are a case in point. When AKP-ran municipalities seek to move businesses that serve alcohol into red zones outside city centres and Erdoğan blames drunk driving for 80 percent of Turkey’s traffic accidents when police statistics set the figure at below 1 percent, secularists worry. Taxes on alcohol are steadily climbing. Although Erdoğan denies plans for an outright ban, observers wonder whether he is, once again, mixing religion with politics at secularism’s expense (*H*, 24 November 2005; *LAT*, 10 December 2005).

Similarly worrying is the AKP’s position on women’s rights. Although the champion of the covered girls’ right to education, Erdoğan (2005b) believes that rights are acquired, not granted: women have to work for their rights just as men did. No quotas or special dispensations will be offered to Turkish women and their entry into public life will be permitted but not facilitated (*ibid*). True democracy should need no quotas. But is Erdoğan hiding his disdain for women behind carefully selected ‘European’ vocabulary? There is no real evidence of that. Dağı (2003; 2005:30) notes that the AKP’s position on all social matters remains conservative, but neither radical nor Islamic, despite its leaders’ piety. In fact, Dağı believes, the fact that the AKP see Turkey’s EU membership as the natural outcome of modernisation marks the end of political Islam as it was in the 90s.

Although the AKP draws considerable electoral support from religious quarters, its electoral majority cannot possibly rely solely on Islamists. In fact, an intense pro-Islamic discourse could alienate many AKP supporters (Dağı, 2003). Conservative social and economic policies, internal democracy and a good record in office, combined with the presence of many Eastern Turks on AKP ballots, make the party popular, often despite its religiosity. This is a huge change from the 1980s and 1990s, when Erbakan's faction ensured popular support through voter radicalisation (Toprak, 2005:173). The AKP is careful not to antagonise the courts (too much) and is conscious that the credit its popularity lends it should not be spent on fighting religious issues alone. This, for Toprak (2005:183), entails little effort as the AKP is genuinely committed to the EU process and aware of the fact that accession and, eventually, membership will foster conditions favourable to the implementation of the party's social, political and economic agenda without the AKP needing to fight for them now. This is exactly what the secularists fear. Turkey, however, does not exist in a vacuum. Any move away from secularism would result in pressures, penalties and isolation. Besides, resistance would begin at home as, partly thanks to EU accession, Turkey now sports a thriving civil society that cherishes pluralism.

Debate is ongoing on whether the time has come for the Turkish state to become a value-free administrative apparatus that follows no blueprint for the good life, but allows and enables the community and individuals within it to follow their own. Many question the AKP's ability and, indeed, intention to carry out such a transformation. Some question the desirability of fixing what is not broken. What cannot be questioned is the AKP's contribution to exposing the flexibility of Kemalism as a language of legitimation. Without rejecting Kemalist principles, the AKP has widened the scope of legitimate political activity. Undeniably, Erdoğan's ability to do so is partly attributable to a breakthrough in Turkish-EU relations, which in turn is, to a considerable extent, his doing. As EU-stipulated reforms are changing the state dramatically, a simultaneous change to the language of legitimation is effectively altering the political model Turkey has long followed.

Erdoğan has fused his political future with the country's European vocation and has shown both willingness to cooperate with the establishment and amazing resilience in the face of opposition. During the tense few weeks before the Cyprus referendum,

Erdoğan's sangfroid and ability to hold his ground led to Birand's exclamation that Turkey had, for the first time in its history, a true elected government (*M*, 24 February 2004). This is assisted by Özkök's conciliatory attitude and preference for persuading rather than forcing the government's hand (Heper, 2005:217-220). Yet the AKP's reformism has won it the respect of even those who do not approve of Erdoğan's religiosity or the party's take on alcohol or adultery. Although secularists often try to present tensions with the AKP as an argument *over* secularism, it is evident by now that it is about more than that. It is about Turkey as a project, it is about republican legitimacy, it is about a model of politics that has worked well for decades.

Religion, especially its visible manifestations, such as the Islamic head-covering, challenges this project on many levels. In Turkey the headscarf is banned from public places in the name of modernisation. Yet when two girls take their country to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) defending the right to cover, the notion of modernity becomes elusive. Erdoğan could hardly conceal his support for Leyla Sahin and Zeynep Tekin, who claimed that the headscarf ban impinged on their human rights. In June 2004, much to the secularists' joy and the government's chagrin, the ECHR upheld the ban because of Turkey's 'special condition' (*Z*, 17 May 2005). The special condition had constituted the crux of the Turkish state's defence, claiming that the ban represented a necessary precaution. Far from limiting human rights, the lawyers noted, the ban actually protected them by shielding the public – particularly the uncovered girls – from a potentially repressive religious revival.

Gül confirmed that the state's defence lawyers represented the Republic's opinions, but not his government's. Although ministers rarely draw such a stark distinction between their government and the state, the AKP often feels it needs to. The AKP, seeking to placate its traditional voters while retaining its legitimacy with the Republican mainstream, nodded in agreement when Sahin's lawyers – during their appeal – accused the ECHR of supporting 'limited' democracy for Turkey because it is a Muslim society (*Z*, 19 May 2005). Erdoğan (2005b) took this even further, noting that banning the headscarf makes a mockery of democracy as 80 percent of society support it – a method of supporting the headscarf utilised since the 1980s (Sezer, 1992:22). Further, it makes a mockery of Atatürk's modernisation drive, Erdoğan

continued, noting that the right to cover will be granted when Turkey reaches the level of human rights that Western civilisation entails.

Although, given France's policy on headscarves, the ECHR's ruling was hardly surprising, some EU commentators criticised it heavily, dismissing post-9/11 fears that full democracy is unattainable in Muslim societies. Seeking to debunk this myth, Sahin's lawyers used the language of Western democracy, basing their case on freedom of religion and conscience in 2002, and a girl's right to education during the 18 May 2005 appeal. When, in autumn 2005, the ECHR announced its final decision, Turkey's secular establishment was jubilant and the AKP outraged. The ECHR found that *turban* laws in Turkey upheld both secularism and equality. In a democratic, secular constitution, notes secularist daily *Milliyet* (10 November 2005), equality is as important as freedom of religion, if not more so. For *Milliyet*, the ECHR's ruling was a triumph for women's rights. For secularists, the ruling was a triumph for Atatürk's definition of modernity and all corresponding policies: a validation and formal European acknowledgment. This recognition, valued in its own right in light of Turkey's westernising drive, is doubly significant as it boosted both the existence and exact nature of Kemalist secularism, making it harder for the AKP to verbalise its opposition to the headscarf ban in a (domestically) legitimate fashion.

Although the government had asked the ECHR to approve the headscarf ban in accordance with Turkish law and the opinions of the country's judicial, military and academic establishments, simultaneously AKP members had castigated the ban on several occasions. The government's ambivalent position meant that Munci Özmen, Turkey's lawyer, was expected to both defend the ban *and* concede the need to review it in view of protecting rights and freedoms (Z, 19 May 2005). This approach is based on Erdoğan's position that law should protect, not legislate human rights, of which wearing a headscarf is one. 'Rights are not given by law', notes Erdoğan (Z, 26 April 2005), rather 'laws are created to protect rights' that are, it is implied, natural.

This discourse of human rights and democracy allows the AKP to oppose the ban without abandoning its Kemalist legitimation. AKP members may stretch and, occasionally, stray from Kemalist language, but they always frame arguments in its terms. Hence, Erdoğan (2005b) stresses that Atatürk gave Turkish women rights their European counterparts could not even dream of. Now, it is every Turk's duty to

ensure *all* women can make full use of their rights by ensuring that legislation reflects changing social trends. By introducing the Atatürkist angle of universal standards of civilisation, Erdoğan speaks of the headscarf in terms of freedom of religion and expression. In Atatürk's time the headscarf may have represented backwardness but, after 80 years of Atatürkist modernisation, Turkey has changed and what the ban represents today is simply a failure to deliver the level of democracy and human rights that Western countries enjoy (*ibid*). Erdoğan seeks to turn the headscarf – for Kemalists, a symbol of superstition and oppression to be stamped out – into a challenge for the secularist establishment; he seeks to make the headscarf a symbol of true secularism as, he notes, accepting a woman's right to cover would further equality between the sexes and institute true freedom of religion.

This argument, part of the AKP's careful redefinition of secularism, draws heavily on Kemalism, although it strays from standard interpretations. This legitimisation narrative, however, could not stand alone. It is backed by constant references to the AKP's westernising credentials, a *Kemalist* trait, and their popular legitimacy, a democratic trait (e.g. see *M*, 30 November 2004). Presenting the right to cover as a popular demand, Erdoğan (2005b) castigates the secularist establishment for granting rights selectively. *Açık* (uncovered) and covered girls have an equal right to choose and they can only be protected concurrently, concluded the premier. In order to lift the headscarf ban and enable Turkey to further pursue its alignment with the West, Erdoğan notes, unanimity and democracy are essential (*Z*, 5 November 2005).

Sezer (1992:43) notes that 'competitive politics has made it almost a foregone conclusion that the philosophical-ideological bases on which the state was originally erected yield in varying degrees to demands and inputs from civil society'. That is what Erdoğan is banking on, possibly hoping that this yielding could be transformed into a fully fledged renegotiation of the state's philosophical bases, which, although not fully articulated as such, represent a momentous opportunity for change in Turkish politics; an opportunity that is, nevertheless, resisted by several agencies.

3. Protecting Secularism

3.a. The Courts

Early republican reformers believed that secularism, although introduced from above, would become self-sustainable. They never intended for a tolerant social pluralism to become the norm in Turkey, yet it has. Secularism's new, enlarged, boundaries are now zealously guarded by more than the TAF's guns. The judiciary is just as eager to protect the secular establishment from further erosion. The sheer number of Islamist agents, parties and organisations means that the courts are kept very busy.

Erbakan alone kept the courts working overtime for over 20 years (e.g. see *NYT*, 18 January & 30 April 1998; 11 March & 11 July 2000; *H*, 7 June 2006). Although a string of his parties⁶ were banned, Erbakan was back in the game within days, months or years. Yet the courts kept fighting him. By the 1990s, his entourage had become so accustomed to the process, that, in anticipation of a ban, Refah's successor party Fazilet was ready pre-emptively. Eventually, the courts won. Erbakan never led Fazilet. In 1998 the Constitutional Court under Chief Justice Sezer banned Erbakan from politics for five years on the grounds of anti-secularism. The ruling, White (2002:136) notes, was not based on specific unconstitutional activity, but on Erbakan's opposition to constitutional essence, that is how much Erbakan's vocal and unpredictable Islamism had worried the secularists.

In a world where the Communist threat subsided only to be replaced by an Islamic global challenge, the TİS legacy was heavy. The courts needed to remain vigilant against Islamism as it represented both a threat to national unity and territorial integrity and an obstacle to Kemalist modernisation and westernisation. Vigilance gave rise to hyper-sensitivity. In 1998 Erdoğan was tried over a 1997 campaign speech in which he recited a nationalistic poem of questionable artistic merit but undeniable religious overtones: 'Turkey's mosques will be our barracks, the minarets our bayonets, the domes our helmets, and the faithful our soldiers'. Although the

⁶ Banned in 1971, Erbakan was back in parliament within a year and Bülent Ecevit's deputy Prime Minister by 1974. Although he was successfully kept out of politics for most of the 1980s, he was back in parliament in 1990s, thanks to an electoral law amendment, and back in government after his unlikely alliance with Tansu Çiller.

religious element is undeniable, this is a militant nationalist poem, penned by Ziya Gökalp – a respected figure in Republican mythology. In the context of the TİS, these verses could have been a state-sponsored slogan. However, coming from a known Islamist, they sounded like a militant appeal to religious universalism.

Erdoğan received a 10-month prison sentence in accordance with Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code. He lost his mayoral seat and was banned from politics. When the AKP was created, this conviction and its founders' religiosity was not forgotten. The state prosecutor warned the AKP, whose founding members included covered women, that they were in violation of the law; so the AKP changed its constitution. On 19 April 2002 Turkey's constitutional court barred Erdoğan from leading his party and from standing in the impending national election because of his previous conviction, passed by a, now-defunct, SSC. Erdoğan stepped aside and Gül lead the party.

His conviction was meant to carry a lifelong political ban with no right of appeal. Elected with an adequate majority to make the necessary constitutional amendments in 2002, however, the AKP ensured that, before the year was out, Erdoğan ascended to power after a by-election, thus becoming Turkey's first Prime Minister to have served a prison sentence for inciting religious violence. Before this, however, he stood trial again in 2002, this time on charges of insulting the military and praising Islamic groups in Afghanistan 10 years previously (*TDN*, 25 April 2002). The trial, following a TAF petition to the Justice Ministry, was referring to a 1992 speech made in Rize, during which Erdoğan congratulated Afghanistan on forming an Islamic Republic and accused the TAF of sending inexperienced conscripts to fight Kurdish rebels. Erdoğan later admitted that these remarks were harsh and stressed he had no quarrel with the TAF. Nevertheless he rejected the charges, noting that 'the right to criticise is important in a democracy' (*TDN*, 25 April 2002).

Clearly the courts were more interested in containing Erdoğan than punishing a specific trespass and that is why many worry he is now seeking to avenge himself (see Chapter 5). Although Erdoğan emerged victorious on this occasion, the courts are watching closely. The courts' fear of Erdoğan's religiosity is no secret and, since his election, the government and courts have engaged in a constant low-intensity *bras-de-fer* over visible Islam, in other words, the question of the headscarf.

For Atatürk the veil was a metaphor of both male and societal oppression (Çınar, 2005:62, 71). When the Kemalist state ‘freed’ women, the veil ‘marked’ those not yet reached by reforms, or those who resisted them out of ignorance. Thus the veil became a sign of backwardness (Özdalga, 1998:35). By default, this made veiling a ‘class thing’. The veil, more prevalent among the poor or in the socially conservative periphery, became a symbol of their poverty and isolation in secular eyes. For them, however, veiling is not a political act but a constituent element of social identity and personal morality (Gülalp, 2003:386). Still, the headscarf remains a symbol of backwardness even when the individual wearing it is actively embracing modernity by, for instance, entering public life and becoming an MP.

In 1999, Fazilet MP Merve Kavakçı tried to take her oath in parliament wearing a headscarf (Yavuz, 2003:99, 249; White, 2002:145; Shankland, 1999:9, 129, 183). The resulting political mayhem and the subsequent, although partly unrelated, loss of her citizenship⁷ mark the significance the issue holds for Kemalist elites, expressed succinctly by Kazancıgil & Özbudun (1997:viii):

‘Turkish Islamism remains an extremist minority movement. The favourite strategy of Islamist parties and groups seems to be increasing infiltration of governmental machinery with the aim of strengthening the hold of Islam in the country’s social and political life, but without openly and directly challenging the secular state, at least for the time being.’

The fear surrounds the intentions of all Islamist politicians, Erdoğan included – although, according to Heper (2005:221, 228), as a Sufi, Erdoğan is by definition opposed to the political uses of religion – and all appearances of religious symbols in public life. Although it has been argued that taking the headscarf issue into parliament in the most dramatic fashion, namely by wearing it, is an appropriate course of action for a matter that has become essentially political, the headscarf saga is mostly played out in courtrooms and university campuses across the country.

The official line is that, in a secular state, religious symbols have no place in the public domain, hence headscarves are not allowed in universities, schools,

⁷ Kavakçı had failed to notify the authorities of her dual citizenship (Turkish and American).

courthouses and other public buildings. The state does not care why women veil, although arguably it should. The veil is seen as a throwback and even DİB director, Professor Bardakoğlu, a state employee, stressed that the headscarf is *not* a religious stipulation (*M*, 18 October 2003). In a muddled and contradictory statement claiming both that religion demands modesty in the form of a simple headscarf and that modesty does not mean wearing a headscarf, Bardakoğlu seeks to toe the official line: the advent of modernity has made such practices redundant as religious habits respond to the mores of the era one lives in, making the headscarf irrelevant in Turkey.

To mark this, the headscarf is often banned, as graduants' relatives discovered when they were denied entry into the Atatürk University campus in the eastern city of Erzurum. Although graduating girls had complied with regulations and were about to receive their diplomas uncovered, their female relatives had not anticipated that police would deny them entry for wearing headscarves (*WT*, 2 October 2005). Although this may be an isolated incident, it stresses both the significance the issue holds for secular authorities and the haphazard nature of attire regulations.

There is no actual law prohibiting certain garments. That, for Özdalga (1998:39), is part of the problem. Attire regulations are only applicable to certain groups, in some settings; they are often vague and complicated, as different types of headscarf are banned, discouraged or tacitly tolerated; and their implementation leaves a lot to individual judgment. In 1982, for instance, the *başörtü*⁸ was banned in schools and universities. The ban proved difficult to implement as girls resisted in various ways – wearing wigs or hats over their headscarves – while overzealous interpreters sought to ban hair-ribbons (*ibid*, p.59). In 1984, while the *başörtü* remained banned, the *türban* was allowed as a head-covering in line with modern living. A debate ensued about whether the scarf was most 'modern' – i.e. secular – tied under the chin or at the nape of the neck and the regulation was withdrawn two years later. By 1989, universities and faculties were largely left to their own devices. It was clear by then, however, that the issue at stake was modernity's semiotic prevalence.

Meanwhile, politicians remained divided on the issue, although it was generally agreed that regulations should be relaxed. But when then-premier Özal tried to

⁸ Literally 'head-covering'.

legislate accordingly, reinstating expelled ‘covered’ girls, President Evren blocked such efforts, referring legislation to the constitutional court. Now, according to Article 17 of Higher Education Law 2547 (in effect since 1990), *any* item of clothing can be worn in universities (Z, 27 April 2005). Attempts to get a universal ban on the headscarf failed at court level, with President Sezer, then a judge, voting in favour of a ban. Universities, however, regulate internally whether covered students are allowed to attend classes and graduation ceremonies or sit exams.

Most universities tend to uphold an unconditional ban on members of staff, while regulations on students vary between universities and faculties. Although covered girls can now attend most universities, they often endure pressure and intimidation in doing so. Reaching graduation covered necessitates a thorough knowledge of university regulations – calculating the number of ‘warnings’ and ‘cautionary notes’ a student is allowed before expulsion – that many girls find unbearable and quit. Others persist. After graduation, however, they find that civil servants, lawyers, MPs and other state employees are expected to keep their head bare. The rationale is simple: the secular state’s representatives should look secular (Özdalga, 1998:51, 52).

Moreover, teaching women to embrace modernity was part of the state’s modernising project. When educated and articulate – i.e. *modern* – women take on the headscarf, they represent a failure in terms of society’s modernisation and an aberration from Kemalist modernity narratives, wherein the headscarf was a trait of backwardness and oppression that should naturally disappear. That women should willingly cover is unthinkable, yet it happens. As shown above, Erdoğan celebrates this choice as a triumph for Kemalist secularism and modernisation.

This re-appropriation of Kemalist language does not, however, convince everyone. Former Chief Justice Mustafa Bumin, by-passing Erdoğan’s elaborate re-conceptualisations, issued an unequivocal proclamation in favour of the ban, resulting in Erdoğan’s abstention from the celebrations of the anniversary of the constitutional court’s foundation. YÖK spokesmen, criticising the AKP’s treatment of the headscarf issue, incurred Bülent Arınç’s wrath. Arınç accused unaccountable institutions of creating political tension and ‘some political parties’ of joining them as their instruments (TDN, 8 July 2005). Arınç defiantly asserted Parliament’s authority to deal with the headscarf issue in accordance with the people’s wishes (TNA, 8 July

2005), positioning himself opposite the secular establishment. Erdoğan, conversely, preferring reconciliation to confrontation, suggested that the ban should be lifted from private universities, leading to Koç's⁹ exclamation that 'the Prime Minister is seriously in need of legal counsel' if he thinks that Turkish law can be selectively applied (*TNA*, 9-10 July 2005).

Tensions are high, but debate is occurring over an issue that had hitherto remained 'above discussion' in the secularists' minds. Many have tried to benefit from this change. Even ANAP¹⁰, then outside Parliament, sought to champion the issue, demanding a constitutional amendment (*TDN*, 8 July 2005). Building on the party's traditional links to Islam, ANAP leader Erkan Mumcu went as far as accusing Erdoğan of ignoring the problem (*Z*, 19 July 2005).

The courts, university rectors, TAF and President watch these attempts to score points with the electorate with contempt and trepidation. While their commitment to Kemalism is unwavering, the constant widening of political debate and the corresponding proliferation of visions regarding modernity and secularism worries them. The government is the prime agent seeking to widen the scope for debate while the state – 'a structure with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily equivalent to, or fused with the interests of the dominant class in society or the full set of member groups in the polity' (Skocpol, 1993:27) – seeks to retain its monopoly over definitions of key terms such as nationality, modernity and secularism.

The struggle is largely symbolic, yet its effects (trials, imprisonment, party bans) are real for the people involved especially as, recently, the struggle ended in murder, making secularists feel their mistrust of Islamists was sadly vindicated. Following a February ruling against schoolteacher Aytaç Kiliç's right to wear a headscarf outside school, a lawyer, Alparslan Arslan, shouting 'I am a soldier of Allah', opened fire inside the Council of State, killing one and injuring four of the judges involved in the ruling. Kiliç, who was about to start work in a TAF-affiliated school, was covered in her private life, not at work. Nevertheless, this was considered 'a violation of the

⁹ CHP's parliamentary group deputy leader.

¹⁰ *Anavatan Partisi*, the Motherland Party.

principles of the legal order' and she was demoted and transferred to a village school¹¹.

The shooting occurred in a period of heightened insecurity, with attacks on secular newspapers¹² and AKP headquarters, as well as Kurdish-related violence both in major cities and in the Southeast increasing concerns about the Republic's security (*G*, 18 May 2006; *TDN*, 26 July 2006; *Z*, 10 August 2006; *TDN*, 14 August 2006). President Sezer described this as an attack on the secular Republic¹³. The judicial establishment accused the state, on the one hand, of failing to protect justice and the Press, on the other hand – in particular the daily *Vakit* – of radicalising public opinion and publishing the judges' pictures thus exposing them to danger (*E*, 18 May 2006). Adding insult to injury, Erdoğan failed to attend the murdered judge's funeral and, although he condemned the attack, he also condemned attempts to link it to his activities. Yet, in light of such events, the distinction between republican Islamists and fanatics becomes academic for the secular establishment, which is part of the problem in the first place.

3.b. The President

President Sezer (2004a, b) is proud of Turkey's Islamic past, which he sees as a fraction of a long history, surpassing Ottoman times in both duration and significance. The Republic respects Islam, he notes, but awards it no role in the public realm, hence he opposes all public expressions of religion, headscarves included. Consequently, when the President celebrated his son's wedding at the Çankaya presidential complex, Erdoğan, Gül and Arınç were invited without their wives. This was neither the first nor the last time AKP members were invited to presidential functions without their covered spouses (*M*, 28 October 2003; *TP*, 12 September 2004; *M*, 8 January 2004).

¹¹ See 17 May 2005. Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org) and 26 May 2006 <http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/spiegel/0,1518,417900,00.htm>

¹² Arslan and eight other suspects are accused of being involved in both the Council of State shooting and the *Cumhuriyet* bombings (*Z*, 10 August 2006). The trial began on 11 August 2006.

¹³ <http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/spiegel/0,1518,417900,00.htm>

Sezer is a staunch secularist. His record as both judge and President testifies to this. Erdoğan is suspected as an Islamist and as such is watched closely. This means that the President is not only watching out for religious trespasses, as the courts are, but monitors the government's every act. These suspicions compromise the government's ability to carry out the difficult reforms necessary for EU accession. In the midst of strenuous and momentous transformations, the country's top leaders are not talking to each other. Public opinion finds this ludicrous and counter-productive (*Z*, 31 October 2005), yet it does not stop.

The AKP's reaction to this disparaging attitude is to remind the President, the citizens and the TAF, whose interventions invariably rest on the existence of an effective power vacuum, that Sezer is neither directly elected by, nor answerable to the people. Bearing in mind that the AKP's is the first single-party government since 1987, Erdoğan often juxtaposes his government's popular legitimacy to the President's power without responsibility, advising Sezer not to raise his voice above that of the people's democratically elected, accountable representatives. The same accusation is levelled against YÖK functionaries or the CHP leadership who, in the AKP's mind, do the President's bidding (e.g. see *TDN*, 6 June 2005; *TNA & TDN*, 8 July 2005; *TNA*, 14 October 2005). This appeal to a public mandate enhances, as mentioned before, the AKP's often-shaky Kemalist legitimisation narrative. The AKP's electoral mandate is their only trump card against opponents inside and outside parliament.

Although secularists enjoy pointing out that the AKP's parliamentary majority does not correspond to a true mandate, as turnout was low and the electoral system favours the front-runner (e.g. Kili, 2003:408), the AKP enjoys the ability to claim superior democratic authority to any agency levelling anti-secular accusations against them. This authority is also practically expedient. The AKP emerged from the 2002 election with a strong and stable government and an adequate majority to shape the 2007 presidential election. The question of whether Turkey is about to have its first Islamist president is on everyone's mind. Erdoğan's responses are evasive, neither confirming nor denying speculation. So secularist circles worry.

Although the AKP constantly stresses it is *not* an Islamist party and does *not* have an Islamist programme, for many academics, observers and journalists the personal piety of AKP members and their past association with Erbakan are proof to the contrary

(TNA, 14 October 2004). The fact that this party can effectively appoint Turkey's next President causes intense trepidation: will Turkey find itself with an Islamist President, bent on compromising secularism? 'This election might result in the regime's secular nature being seriously challenged and fragmented' (TNA, 7 July 2005) as the President has traditionally applied secularist pressures on politicians.

Past experience is reassuring. Özal, pious and charitably inclined towards Islam, indulged in no anti-secularist hysterics when President. There is no reason to believe that the AKP will exact revenge on secularists through the next presidential appointment, yet many fear it. For now, speculation is rife. Unless Erdoğan calls early elections, he has the prerogative, as leader of the party with a majority in parliament, to nominate his presidential candidate. Who that candidate might be is the subject of heated debate. Meanwhile, Sezer's confrontation with Erdoğan over secularism rages on, focusing, in 2005, on the perennial question of religious education.

Imam-hatip schools have been the subject of a tug-of-war between secularism's guardians and populist governments since 1946. The opening of such schools represents one of the main demands voiced by Muslim groups and of the main concessions granted by centre-Right parties for electoral support (Yavuz, 2003:127). Secularists seek to 'contain' them, especially as, in the 1960s, they expanded beyond training *imam-hatips*. Graduates enjoyed free access to post-graduation options, thus *imam-hatip* schools became an alternative to the (secular) education system (Akşit, 1991:147). The 1971 military intervention ended this, making them a less attractive option – offering shorter tuition and limited post-graduation choices. In 1983, Özal allowed *imam-hatip* graduates to take university exams for any discipline, while in 1997 the velvet coup limited the schools' scope once again (Sezer, 1992:24).

The TAF oppose offering *imam-hatip* graduates non-religious career options; so does President Sezer. Erdoğan, an *imam-hatip* graduate himself, disagrees. While Professor Zeki Aslantürk¹⁴ accuses the secularists of politicising religious education, they, in turn, accuse the government of seeking to give such schools equal status with modern, non-vocational, secular schools in order to sabotage modernisation (M, 18 October 2003).

¹⁴ Divinity Faculty, Marmara University.

Similar tensions surround Kuranic courses and seminaries, as secularists deplore their continued existence, even though they are under state supervision. As early as 2003, the AKP legislated in favour of state control over religious education and Article 263 of the new penal code bans all unauthorised teaching of the Kuran in informal settings (Z, 17 May & 5 June 2005). Religious groups, especially Islamic orders and brotherhoods, running unofficial courses were furious. The resulting clash with the AKP highlights that there is no 'Islamic camp' in Turkey – opinions differ, beliefs vary and 'Islamist' responses do not exist. For secularists, that hardly matters, as two years previously the AKP confirmed their suspicions by establishing extensive optional night and summer Kuran classes (*TDN*, 8 December 2003).

This could be indicative of the AKP's willingness to placate competing concerns while pursuing its own agenda. The AKP stayed loyal to the Kemalist script when noting that religious education should be carried out under state supervision. It even limited the scope of religious education, making it impossible for children to attend Kuran schools before completing eight years of formal education. Yet, simultaneously, the extension of state control was presented as a salvage operation, preventing religious education, in Education Minister Hüseyin Çelik's words, from being 'pushed underground as a nefarious activity' (*TDN*, *ibid*) and thus vesting it with new significance. The Kemalist state provides religious and moral education in order to exert control; the AKP uses this power to protect, not isolate religious education.

In a rare moment of agreement with AKP policy, Sezer declared illegal Kuran courses to be in violation of Turkey's constitutionally protected secularism (*M*, 17 May 2005) and asked for severe punishments to prevent terrorist, sectarian and missionary organisations from opening such schools (Z, 4 June 2005). The state, noted Sezer, cannot allow for youth to be educated in ways that are separatist, outdated or contrary to the Republic's founding principles. Erdoğan was unhappy with Sezer's reading of his policies. It is a natural right, he stated, for every Turk to learn the Holy Book. 'It is a disrespect against Muslims to misinterpret studying the Kuran as an instrument of [terror]' and the nation will not forgive attempts to exploit this politically (Z, 29 May 2005). Although the AKP and Sezer actually agree on this particular law, they do so for different reasons and Erdoğan wants that stressed. Discussing religious rights as

part of a citizen's human rights is central to Erdoğan's redefinition of secularism. Erdoğan rejects the Kemalist equation of religion with backwardness and terror while *not* rejecting state control over religion. Thus he broadens the debate without openly undermining the secular state. President Sezer is waiting, ready to intervene as necessary, and the TAF are observing closely.

3.c. The TAF

For the TAF, protecting secularism begins at home. Between January 1995 and August 2000, Tank (2005:8) notes, the TAF expelled 745 serving officers for ideological reasons – in other words, excess religiosity. 'Turkey's military routinely dismisses officers suspected of sympathizing with Islamic groups or Kurdish terrorists' (*TDN*, 7 December 2003), as they fail to conform with the TAF's corporate identity and the Kemalist plan (Altınay, 2004:72). Although the military's ability to purge itself is currently under AKP scrutiny, its willingness to dismiss officers over 'disciplinary infractions' (*TDN*, 9 August 2005) is indicative of the TAF's *esprit de corps*. As General Evren noted during the 1980s coup:

'[T]hose who attempt to challenge the secular tradition of our republic by hiding behind the free democratic system are bound to be crushed. The [TAF] which, from the raw recruit to the senior commander, constitute the most resolute defenders of the reforms and principles of the Sublime Atatürk will tear out any tongue sullyng his name and break any hand touching him in malice' (quoted in Birand, 1987:139).

Secularism is defended as a precondition for progress, a universal civilisational trait and part of Atatürk's legacy. As Deputy Chief of Staff General Başbuğ (2005) stressed, although '98 percent of [Turkey's] population is Muslim... [the] Republic is a democratic and secular state'. Secularism, inherited from Atatürk, is a 'basic and indispensable principle' for the fulfilment of Atatürk's project as it is a constituent element of modernity. 'Atatürk's thought-system is mainly based on secularism. Secularism... is based on reason and positive science [and] presents an ideal lifestyle for all societies' (*ibid*). For Başbuğ, secularism is objectively beneficial, hence its opponents are not only sullyng Atatürk's legacy, but are also objectively misguided.

The TAF see secularism both as a precondition for westernisation and as one of Atatürk's legacies in its own right – on an equal footing with modernisation and republicanism and worthy of the same protection. Hence, although secularism and westernisation are distinct notions, they are not separable and the TAF are unwilling to compromise one for the other. Consequently, post-9/11 US references to Turkey as a friendly Muslim democracy and an example for the Muslim world, enraged the generals. Atatürk's westernisation entailed being accepted by the West as an equal (see Chapter 7) not as a useful oddity. Moreover, Turkey has spent eight decades dissociating itself from the Islamic world through secularism and modernisation. Hence, when Colin Powell described Turkey as an Islamic state, General Tolon frostily reminded him that Turkey has been a secular republic for eight decades (*TP*, 3 April 2004). Similarly, General Özkök stated that 'Turkey is neither an Islamic state, nor an Islamic country' (*TDN*, 28 April 2005), but a secular country wherein religion is respected but reactionary movements are not tolerated. 'Bear in mind that our great leader Atatürk placed secularism in the centre of [the] six principles he established while founding the Republic. He recognised... that all modern and civilised nations were strongly tied to secularism' (Özkök, 2005a).

The Republic 'has no official religion. All laws and regulations... are made... according to the scientific principles and forms provided by modern civilisation' (*ibid*). Turkey's population may be 99 percent Muslim, Özkök concedes, but that does not give 'some circles' the right to redefine Turkey's polity as an Islamic one. Turkey cannot be a model for Islamic countries. 'What is forgotten or neglected here is the fact that secularism is the main driving force in the development of Turkish democracy' (Özkök, *ibid*). Turkey should not be judged on the basis of its geographic position but in terms of its civilisational choices. Turkey chose secularism the day it chose westernisation. Secularism is not an 'aside' in Turkey's political development but 'the keystone of all values that constitute the Republic' (*ibid*). Secularism is central to Turkey's national existence, hence discussing republicanism or nationality as distinct from secularism is, for the TAF, misguided, if not openly provocative. For Başbuğ (2005a), 'secularism is the main driving force behind the development of democracy' and the TAF's duty is to protect them both. This commitment to secularism is both a well-known fact and, for many, a welcome security.

Protesting a draft law perceived as a threat to secularism and YÖK's independence, a group of senior academics marched to *Anıtkabir*, on Republic Day 2003 (*M*, 28 October 2003). Rather than protesting against the specifics of the proposal, however, the rectors' placards read '*ordu göreve*'¹⁵, urging the military to intervene with a coup against the AKP. Their entry in their visitors' book was '*Atam, vatan elden gidiyor*'¹⁶. Atatürk's Republic is upheld as a coherent whole and the TAF are called upon to defend it. By urging the TAF to ensure that secularism was not compromised, however, the academics were claiming part of the guardian's mantle for themselves, while also choosing Kemalist republicanism over popular democracy – by dismissing both the people's elected representatives and the citizens' ability to resist the erosion of secularism. Many within Turkish society share this unease. Some turn to the military; others, such as the President and judges, shoulder the responsibility to defend secularism against the AKP's perceived encroachments themselves.

'[E]xactly because the patriotism of the TAF cannot be doubted... Turkey is in constant danger of military intervention' (*E*, 9 December 2003). The era of armed interventions may be over, especially as technological innovation makes the control of public opinion virtually impossible. Yet the TAF can, and do, intervene without getting the armoured vehicles outside their depot. The debate over the boundaries and provisions of Turkey's secularism is unfolding under the shadow of this knowledge.

4. The Boundaries of Modernity

For Kemalists, modernity is good and secularism is part of both modernity and the path to it. Secularism is therefore good and aberrations are bad. Although simplistic, this stipulation captures many Kemalists' feelings, echoed in Mango's (1999a:8) words: '[D]etractors [from Atatürk's legacy]... are afraid of the modern world and want to retreat into a past that never was.' Positions denying, questioning or diverging from Atatürk are seen as reactionary, destructive and, by extension, inherently illegitimate.

¹⁵ Army, to your duty.

¹⁶ 'Father, the fatherland is leaving your hands'.

Although resistance to Atatürk's secularism was intense and bitter during the early Republic¹⁷, swift justice was delivered through the Independence Tribunals, sending people to the gallows after summary proceedings. What today seems like a prickly, but symbiotic, relationship between the secular state and controlled Islam, was not always so. Atatürk's secularising policies relied on the force of arms. This, strangely, enhances his supporters' passionate enthusiasm for Atatürk's achievements. The fact that the Turks – illiterate and superstitious (İlkin, 2003) – had to be forced to modernise makes Atatürk's achievement seem even more admirable. 'Perhaps his most outstanding quality was his ability to develop an ambitious yet achievable vision for the future of his country... Of all the revolutions of the past century, only the one in Turkey achieved its goals, and still maintains its dynamism and vigour... The reason for this longevity is simple: Atatürk's ideology... of humanity and civilization' (ibid). This, in turn, makes Atatürk appear more glorious, 'a man of unusual foresight, intellect, wisdom and charisma... enormous courage and stamina' (ibid).

Given this adulation, it is hardly surprising that Kemalists resist the use of Kemalism as a language and rather see it as a specific (and restrictive) ideology. Perceiving Kemalism as an organic whole makes selective interpretations unacceptable – besides, most Kemalists would trust no one's ability to 'interpret'. Kemalists enjoy repeating that without Atatürk neither the Turkish nation nor its modernisation would exist, which means that the Turks would never have realised their own ability to 'learn to use the tools of modern civilisation and live up to the exigencies of each new age' (Kili, 1969:49). As modernisation is unthinkable without secularism (Kili, 1969:221) and progress, survival and national dignity are unthinkable without modernisation, Islamists are national dangers and possibly deranged individuals to boot.

As Kili (ND) explains in *the Voice of Atatürk*, Islam is 'not interested in a reconciliation with the forces of modernity' and 'Islamic groups (have) an aversion to Kemal Atatürk'. Islam is an obstacle on the road towards completing Turkey's transformation. As Atatürk's plan represents 'the very essence of Turkish enlightenment' (ibid), Islam stands outside Turkey's national existence and in the way of progress. Even academics, who do not accept Kemalism uncritically, often accept

¹⁷ 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion; 1930 Menemen rebellion; 1930-1 Ağrı Dağ uprising (leading to the 1934 Resettlement Law); 1937-8 Dersim rebellion.

secularisation as a prerequisite for modernisation, thus dismissing Islamism as reactionary (e.g. see Güllalp, 1997:57-8).

It sometimes seems that self-proclaimed Kemalists inherit a mistrust of Islamists that is neither necessarily coherent nor always rational. Kaylan is a case in point. His book, an incoherent jumble of memories and personal opinions, lacks both academic and literary merit. Yet it remains significant as Kaylan – having served as *Reuters* correspondent, political news editor of *Akşam* and *Yeni Sabah* and editor-in-chief of *Hürriyet* – enjoyed access to respectable public platforms for decades and his views are loosely representative of one group of journalists and newspaper men. Finally, this book, dedicated to Atatürk’s memory and loyally reproducing official narratives, is an interesting specimen of unsolicited Kemalist propaganda.

His stated aim is to expose and castigate ‘Islamist bigots’ (p.23, 83, 369) and fundamentalists¹⁸ (p.133), because of whom ‘the secularity of the state is under an obsessive and hostile encroachment’ (p.430). Kaylan perceives Kemalism as both indivisible and natural, hence a denial of part – staunch secularism – equals a denial of the whole, which is, in itself, an unnatural frame of mind: bigoted, reactionary and dangerous. This makes it impossible for Kaylan to perceive the rise of Islamism as a social phenomenon. Rather, he attributes it to peasant ignorance, incomplete modernisation, Islamist financing from abroad or to the failure of Atatürk’s successors to follow the plan, rather than to a flaw in the plan itself. Had the Turks been vigilant against external interference, as Atatürk instructed them, all this could have been avoided (p.305-6). Islamism only exists today because Turkey strayed from Atatürk’s path. Its existence poses a clear danger to Turkey’s continued survival in its present form as, Kaylan (2005:323-4) notes, ‘[t]he harem is the ultimate objective of *tesettür*¹⁹... I believe that the election victory... of the [AKP] with its Islamic roots, finally caused *tesettur* to take over the Turkish secular state.’

¹⁸ For Kaylan, the act of building thousands of new mosques when secular schools are needed is fundamentalist.

¹⁹ *Tesettür* is a way of covering that differs from the traditional headscarf both stylistically (the scarf tightly covers the head, neck and shoulders but not the face. It is usually matched with a pastel-coloured floor-length coat, which hides the contours of the body without being bulky and billowing) and symbolically. *Tesettür* is invariably considered ‘political’.

Kaylan is representative of a group of secularists who are unable – or unwilling – to concede that there is no such thing as an Islamist movement. ‘Islamism’ is fragmented and plural, hence generalisations are misleading. Moreover, Turkish Islamism as a phenomenon grew within the republican tradition and does not automatically reject the Kemalist Republic. Yet accepting the reality of these statements presupposes a conceptualisation of both republicanism as separable from Kemalism and Islamism as compatible with republicanism; neither is easy. Atatürk’s nation-building project was focused and specific. Islamism, in most its manifestations, accepts the nation and embraces the republic, yet it re-conceptualises modernisation – if not its desirability, then its essence and the paths towards it. In principle, certain forms of Islamism are fully compatible with Kemalism, yet Kemalists are not willing to entertain that thought.

Kemalism’s ambiguous relationship with religion, rejecting it as a sign of backwardness but simultaneously harnessing it for nation-building purposes, is captured in Pamuk’s (2005:162) aphorism: ‘[W]e equated piety with poverty but never in too loud a voice.’ Although even secular Turks rarely fully reject religion, its public expression is generally equated with material and spiritual poverty, a feeling that, in recent years, has been combined with fear inspired by the violence that Islamist fundamentalists have shown themselves capable of elsewhere. Could that happen in Turkey? For Shankland (2004), there are enough aggressively religious people in Turkey to constitute a real danger for both secularism and *açık* girls, if the neutrality of public space is compromised. This view, echoed by Sezer and TAF commanders, rests on the assumption that Islamism represents both a challenge to modernity and a physical threat for secular individuals. Toprak (1981:122), however, notes that it is naïve to assume that religion’s interaction with modernisation has been static and consistently obstructive over eight decades of Republican history.

In fact, for Toprak, today’s religiosity is a measure of the ever-increasing cultural gap between ruling elites and the ‘masses’: not a threat, but a warning protesting the Republic’s treatment of its citizens. Birand (*M*, 12 January 2004) agrees. Islamism hardly constitutes an anti-modern social movement, he notes. Rather, it represents the articulation of frustrations that intellectual and political elites choose to interpret as potentially dangerous because they harbour a profound mistrust for the people, *à la*

Atatürk. Thus, Republican elites support continuous military involvement in politics because they fear that traitors within and enemies without seek to divide the country. Those who believe that the military should partake of the country's governance to prevent it from straying off the correct path, Birand continues, do not realise that the people will permit neither division nor a revision of the secular republic. Nor will the AKP. For Birand the secular republic is safer than ever (*M*, 8 January 2004).

White (2002) agrees. Her study shows that, although some Islamists contemplate the advantages of a *Şeriat* order, Islamist political idioms are mostly couched in republican terms and Islamist politicians seem committed to Turkey's democratic parameters (Yavuz, 2003:4). Erbakan, Çınar (2005:118) believes, is a dated phenomenon. Refah's successors (Fazilet and the AKP) vocally endorse Kemalist republicanism. Moreover, Islamist politicians, Erbakan included, are intensely nationalistic (White, 2002:53; Çınar, 2005:8). Although their Turkishness often contains a greater dose of Ottomanism than official historiography prescribes, they never place the *ümmet* above the nation. Political Islam, in all its manifestations, accepts the Republic's rules of engagement and constitutes a functional part of a plural democracy (Özdalga, 1998:3, 93; Çınar, 2005:83). Fanaticism is introduced into the equation more frequently by state anxiety than Islamist activities.

That said, the relationship between Islam and modernity is far from simple. Although '[t]he history of modern Turkey... is a complex, many-tiered encounter between "traditional" forces and modernity' (Mardin, 2005:160), Islam now straddles this divide, accommodating, challenging and reconceptualising modernity in ways to which state agencies seem oblivious. Thus the state lags behind (civil) society, failing to distinguish between Islamic movements seeking to dissolve Atatürk's modernity and those seeking to re-appropriate it. Fethullah Gülen is a case in point. His neo-Nur movement combines modernist and Islamist idioms; it is intensely nationalistic, pro-Atatürk and pro-Ottoman; it is Islamist yet highly individualistic²⁰ and forward-looking. Gülen subverts standard analytical categories and challenges the Kemalist discursive monopoly against which Erdoğan is also fighting.

²⁰ [http://en.fgulen.com/a.page/life/gulens thoughts/individual.and.individual.human.rights/c244.html](http://en.fgulen.com/a.page/life/gulens%20thoughts/individual.and.individual.human.rights/c244.html)

Imprisoned after 1971, Gülen was brought before the now-abolished SSCs under the Counter-Terrorism Act (Z, 27 April 2005) in 2000. He re-appeared in court in 2003 and 2006 under accusations of trying to Islamicise public life. Gülen embraces the secular republic vocally,²¹ yet he faces the secularist fear that Islamists' true intentions remain unfathomable. Moreover, in opposing Gülen, secularists defend Kemalism's monopolies over definitions of identity and modernity. Although nationalistic, Gülen introduces an element of spirituality in identity narratives that makes Kemalists uncomfortable. For Turan (1991:40), 'early Republican leadership, in their effort to build a nation, may have produced a national *ümmet* ' that Gülen is now educating in order to enable it to externalise Islamic consciousness in a modern world (Yavuz, 2003:185, 187, 193). Yet this Kemalist thread is lost on Kemalists, as Gülen recasts core Kemalist terms, such as secularism²², republicanism²³ and the nation²⁴, infusing their discussion – much as Erdoğan does – with piety and a religious subtext not originally there. Therein lies the tension with Kemalist modernity.

Gülen stages a sustained discursive assault on Kemalist modernity through a huge network of teachers, bursaries, dormitories and schools. He focuses on spirituality²⁵ and hardly considers the headscarf integral to faith. This is a linguistic struggle, as Gülen is introducing Turkish youth to a modernist political idiom *other* than that of secular Kemalism, breaking the monopoly hitherto enjoyed by Kemalist national discourses. Gülen's suggestion that the wholesale rejection of Turkey's Ottoman legacies in favour of Hittite symbols offers the Turks an *irrelevant* past may be accurate, but it challenges the entire national edifice. Similarly, his moralistic reading of national bonds and republicanism as well as his definition of secularism as freedom of religion rather than freedom from it mean that, although Gülen does not reject Atatürk, his narratives are incompatible with Kemalist orthodoxy.

Gülen re-appropriates the Turks' Ottoman past and readmits Islam into national narratives. In doing so, without rejecting existing narratives, he enriches the core of

²¹ <http://en.fgulen.com/a/page/life/gulens-thoughts/republic-politics-democracy-and-secularism/a1270.html>

²² <http://en.fgulen.com/a/page/life/gulens-thoughts/republic-politics-democracy-and-secularism/a1274.html>

²³ <http://en.fgulen.com/a/page/life/gulens-thoughts/republic-politics-democracy-and-secularism/a1268.html>

²⁴ <http://en.fgulen.com/a/page/life/as-a-teacher/a816.html>

²⁵ <http://en.fgulen.com/a/page/life/gulens-thoughts/religion-islam-and-relevant-matters/c242.html>

nationhood. This alternative focus remains *illegitimate* in Kemalist eyes, as national identity is first and foremost secular; Islam was never meant to penetrate to its core. Using the opportunities that the TAF created, Islamists started an unsolicited and unauthorised renegotiation of collective memory, challenging the state's discursive monopoly. If nationality can be redefined, however, so can modernity and secularism.

Islamists use the language of human rights, democracy and globalisation in order to counter-balance their poor secular credentials with public appeals to a recognisable modern idiom, further legitimised through Turkey's EU drive. Yet this renegotiation of prevailing political values is *not* the powerhouse behind the ever-increasing popularity of Islamist movements. Individuals, notes White (2002:5-6, 28, 79), are attracted to the movement's use of a socio-cultural idiom, religious in origin, accessible to people lacking sophisticated cultural capital; the state's refusal to acknowledge this turns Islamist activity into politics.

Although subversive political Islam exists, many Islamists embrace the Republic and remain national(istic), albeit in unconventional ways. Islamists are not uniformly 'backward'; in fact, Dağı (2005:21, 23) notes, they never were. Islamist antagonism towards the West was never *essential*; rather it was fuelled by Kemalist oppression of Islamist expressions in the name of westernisation and modernisation. This antagonism was never translated into an Islamist rejection of modernisation (Dağı, 2005:25) and anti-Western Islamist feeling has been declining since the 1970s (Toprak, 2005:171). Even Erbakan – whose infamous *Milli Görüş* (National Outlook) was suspicious of the West – embraced modernisation and Western capitalism, only advocating Turkey's withdrawal from the Customs Union when *not* in office (Yavuz, 2003:45; Navaro-Yashin, 2003:55-56). Now Turkish Islamists, including Kutan, often use the West as a reference point while employing the language of rights and democracy. Islamism's antagonism with the West is over, yet Islamists have not embraced existing modernist narratives. Rather they have re-conceptualised modernity through a discourse of democracy and human rights, enabling them to articulate their spiritual needs *as* such rights and to renegotiate secularism within a democratic framework. Meanwhile, Muslims are embracing modern lifestyles, disproving Kemalist fears.

A 2005 European Stability Initiative Report shows that the Anatolian Tigers, a group of socially conservative and commercially thriving Anatolian entrepreneurs, successfully embrace market capitalism while abandoning neither their piety nor public acts of Islamic charity. Their willingness to accept modernity readily and effectively – assisted by access to capital, skill, luck and the reforms that ‘profoundly changed the nature of the state and its relationship to society’ (p.22) – enabled some Anatolians to prosper more than others. In Kayiseri, the report notes, Islam has made its peace with modernity: there is a large mosque in the university campus and companies have prayer rooms on site. Conservative social habits do not preclude market orientations, pro-EU attitudes or mixed lifestyles. In Ankara’s Beğendik Kocatepe shopping centre, covered women buy foreign products while the *ezan* is heard overhead. Covered girls use mobile phones, smoke in public and walk hand-in-hand with their boyfriends, wearing modest yet fitted outfits. Although traditional lifestyles survive in Turkey, ‘reformed Islam’ is also a sociological reality – both the product of modernisation and a factor assisting its growth.

Among the Anatolian Tigers, education, healthcare and social activities are promoted through Islamic charity. The picture would be perfect, the report notes, but for the question of women, who remain marginally employed or kept at home. Employers admitted preferring to hire men (p.30) because they are the family breadwinners and women only work until they marry. The report remains hopeful that the Tigers’ entrepreneurial pragmatism – and the labour shortages this strategy is bound to cause in the long run – will change these attitudes. For secularists, however, modernisation is as much about economics as it is about lifestyles, hence the Tigers’ attitude towards women makes their modern aspirations seem like a sham.

Fears that Islamists will not only oppose but, given the chance, undermine the ‘Western way of life’ are never far from the secularists’ mind. In the run-up to the 27 March 1994 municipal elections, the Islamists were heading the polls and media anxiety over women’s mobility, Western entertainment and freedom to choose one’s preferred way of life reached a feverish peak (Navaro-Yashin, 2002:29). Although sensationalist reporting invariably boosts sales and ratings, the concern is genuine and reappeared during the 2004 municipal elections (*M*, 2 February 2004).

In 1994, the fears proved well-founded as certain Refah-run municipal restaurants and coffee houses stopped serving alcohol (Çınar, 2005:128-9). But women's attire was not regulated and gender-segregation not promoted. The Islamists have not forsaken their conservatism. However, having accepted its instrumental benefits, they have re-conceptualised their relationship with modernity. For Kemalists, the simple act of re-conceptualisation is an affront. So is the Islamist advocacy of mixed lifestyles within a democratic setting – especially as, for Kemalists, the path from accepting religious lifestyles as legitimate to finding oneself under Islamist rule is short and slippery. Naturally, Turkey should not have to choose between secularist or Islamist authoritarianism, but secularist fears and reactions make that difficult to realise.

Islamists have failed to convince the secularists that this new-found appreciation for modernity is sincere and their proposed alternative routes are valid. Yet they persist and their resilience astounds Kemalists, who have inherited the view that religion as a viable political idiom would never survive modernisation. Islamist idioms grew gradually – first filling the vacuum created by the relentless anti-Leftist witch-hunt of the 1970s, leaving economic and social reform without a champion. Generating a discourse based on justice and rule-governed conduct for all facets of life in a secular state, Islamist actors capitalised on the relaxed intellectual climate of the 1980s. The attempt in the 1990s to retract that relaxation cannot undo its effects. Islamist idioms carry weight and command an audience. They generate their own legitimacy that, often, appeals to Kemalism and modernisation as much as it does to faith. In fact, many Islamists wish for more secularism and more republicanism, and their main criticism of Kemalism is that it has not gone far enough.

Standard secularisation theses predicting that religion naturally withdraws into the private sphere in a modernising society were proven wrong in Turkey, as was the fear that Islamists would battle modernity to the bitter end. Islamists approach modernity differently from Kemalists; they appreciate it for different reasons and lifestyle options vary wildly. Yet, in economic, industrial and technological terms, they are in complete concert. This, however, does not resolve the tension. Even if Islamist versions of modernity were accepted as legitimate, their determination to recalibrate national identity and re-embrace its rejected past by definition antagonises Republican narratives and, by extension, the Republican project. Finally, although Islamists

accept economic and industrial modernisation, the question of lifestyle remains pertinent. Would they, given the chance, restrict options, force women to cover, censor art or ban alcohol? Or would a 'multicultural' era dawn?

The secularists are taking no chances. While seeking to protect their lifestyle choices from Islamic encroachment, they limit the Islamists' choices. Rival visions of modernity can only coexist when they do not threaten or oppress each other. In Turkey they do both, as the secularists have the power to oppress Islamism and the Islamists have the ability to make Kemalists feel cornered: the appearance of a headscarf in public usually suffices, even though for many women – especially those from traditional backgrounds – veiling is the only ticket to personal mobility and autonomy permitting them to join modernity (White, 2002:52, 219-220, 238).

The Islamist movement is fragmented, yet it is largely moderate and almost uniformly conservative. Many Islamist men believe women should stay at home, some even support polygyny. It is clear then that female Islamists need the secular Republican framework more than any other group. Yet the state refuses to differentiate between different kinds of Islamism, treating them all with the same unconcealed alarm. As a result, Islamists group together against the state's refusal to grant veiled girls access to education. Yet they are not united; for some, believing that women need no more education than suffices to make them better mothers, this is simply a banner. For others, it is a substantive issue of freedom of choice and religion that actually carries favour with many secularists, but not all. And while Kemalists resent the 'covered' girls as hitches to the modernisation project, these girls are modern enough to know their rights and take the state to court in their defence.

'In a democracy' notes Kaylan (2005:331), 'wearing a *türban* is... a matter of personal choice. In Turkey the *türban* is used as a form of protest by a reactionary movement, supported for years by Saudi Arabia and Iran.' For Kaylan, the headscarf is not simply a symbolic violation of secular public space, but an open expression of political support for theocracy. Yet religion, although feared, remains central to the Turks' national self-definition, even if it denotes shared cultural capital rather than piety (Turan, 1991:37-8). Even the Republic tacitly admits this, favouring Muslim asylum applicants over others in the name of cultural compatibility (Kirişçi, ND).

Religion remains relevant as Turkey remains conservative. A 2005 survey shows that 30.5 percent of Turks attribute the country's problems to lack of morality, while 40.3 percent are proud of Turkey 'because it is an Islamic country'. Only 12.3 percent were proud of Turkey's modernisation (*TDN*, 19 September 2005). Piety and conservatism do not necessarily imply support for Islamic politics or opposition to economic and technical modernisation; in fact, they rarely translate into religious politics²⁶. Nevertheless, religiosity affects the way people think about politics. Hence the secularist national self, with its disdain for piety, excludes many Turks. Similarly, Erbakan's attempt to turn the headscarf into an Islamic political banner alienated many girls who cover because of personal piety, paternal oppression, social timidity or personal politics, but still seek a slice of modern living despite their headscarf, not because of it.

Although veiling can be political, it is not *ipso facto* political²⁷. By assuming that it is, however, secularists alienate the veiled university student – a Republican citizen embracing modern living. A secular republic is the ideal structural habitat for a veiled student to practice her faith without forsaking her right to education or a job outside the home. And yet the secular Republic does not celebrate or even accept its veiled students, as modernising expectations prescribe that women raised and educated within it should not wish to veil. A veiled student, doctor or lawyer is a contradiction in terms. The headscarf ban, as all attire regulations, was meant to ensure Turkey's Western aspect while modernisation was taking root. The ban itself does not seek to cultivate modernity, it simply ensures its semiotic prevalence. A headscarf is assertively visible in a secular landscape. As the state forces its female students and professionals to 'embrace' modernity by looking the part, the question of what 'being modern' means begs an answer. Is a woman who seeks an education and career not modern? If this is not proof enough, the covered girls' readiness to fight for their right to cover proves they are hardly the docile Muslim women that modernisers fear.

²⁶ 46 percent of Turkey's population pray five times a day; 84 percent of men attend Mosque on Friday; 91 percent of Turks observe the *ramazan* fast. Yet three-fifths of those questioned, and despite their religiosity, believed that a religion-based party had no place in Turkish politics (White, 2002:56-7).

²⁷ Women in *çarşaf* are a rare sight in Turkey. Loose headscarves are most common. The assertively self-conscious *tesettür* is also modern and chic.

Özdalga (1998:60) finds ‘covered’ lawyers, PhD students and divorcées. Covered women are not subsisting in modernity’s margins. Although many are forced to cover by spouses or fathers, for most veiling constitutes a ‘sensible’ compromise between personal choices and her family’s conservative sensibilities. Some perceive the veil as an opportunity to re-appropriate Islam in a public and political fashion (Göle, 1996:1, 5), but for the vast majority of women, veiling is a matter of moral dignity, not a rallying cry for systemic change, (Özdalga, 1998:89).

Motivations vary and, if anything, the veil is neither a sign of backwardness nor an obstacle to progress. Regardless of her motivations, however, a veiled woman engaged in modern activities challenges Republican definitions of modernity by embodying an unthinkable combination: religiosity and modernity. Simultaneously, she challenges Islamic traditions wherein women occupy the role of invisible domestic carers. The covered/modern woman phenomenon makes conflict with traditional Islamic males inevitable (Göle, 1996:117) as the ‘veiled student’ is a secular product, not an Islamic one. She needs the secular setting more than the secularists themselves. ‘Paradoxically’, notes Göle (1996:139), ‘the more Islamic women enter the public sphere via political movements, the more influential they become in initiating an irreversible process within the Islamic movement, when they “question” the private sphere.’ Their demands vis-à-vis the secular state may be religious in content, but their methods and language would have done Atatürk proud.

Covered girls speak of liberal values and individual freedom, a language enjoying currency abroad and resonating with Turkey’s EU ambitions. Although the constitutional court deems using democratic principles in order to impose segregation (through the veil) and challenge secularism unacceptable, the covered girls have widened the secularism debate. Firstly, by actively claiming that it is not the veil that segregates them but the state, they undermine the authority of the courts’ protection rhetoric. Secondly, and most significantly, the covered girls, alongside the AKP, combine the European language of human rights with a redefinition of Kemalist secularism to forge a new legitimisation narrative.

The debate over whether men and women can be equal partners in a modernising society is not unique to Turkey and is not limited to the Islamists. Even Kemalist modernisers retained conservative gender notions for many decades. Eventually

women became a Kemalist symbol. Çınar (2005:65) actually accuses Kemalism of granting women political rights as a tactical move for European consumption. Göle (1996:73, 79) accuses Kemalism of granting women social visibility in order to facilitate the desired 'civilization shift' while actually retaining Islamist/conservative perceptions about what a woman 'ought to be like'. As women became a symbol for modernisation, the veil became the symbol of all that could hamper this effort. The covered student debunks this myth while also rejecting Kemalist monopolies over the definition of modernity. Defying Kemalist predictions, she embraces modernisation, but does so in her own terms, abandoning Kemalist universalism and Western mimesis for an assertively personalised road to modernity.

While Islamists are trying to assert legitimate lifestyle alternatives, they remain united vis-à-vis a hostile state, although, in an open environment, fragmentation would be inescapable. Meanwhile secularists claim the unique protection of Turkey's secular principles and fear the Islamic onslaught. The question is whether the 'Islamic revival' is embedded in the Republican nexus or seeking to transform it. Does praying during one's lunch-break on Friday cement secularism or subvert it?

The question is hardly asked yet, but the time when it will be is not far off. Meanwhile, Islamists feel obliged to address secular concerns regarding their presumed backwardness and irrationality as their self-image absorbs and responds to secularist fears and misapprehensions (Navaro-Yashin, 2002:42-3, 71; White, 2002:8). The debate is widening and, gradually, caricatures and stereotypes are being abandoned. The AKP is both the product and powerhouse of this transformation, having won precious breathing space by embracing a Kemalist westernising rhetoric and delivering results on the EU front. Yet, as not all modernisers favour EU accession, the AKP cannot escape suspicions of being not only a threat to secularism, but also a sell-out to foreign interests.

Chapter 7,

The EU: Westernising Opportunity or National Threat?

Atatürk's legacy regarding the West is mixed and ambivalent. The West represented the source of Ottoman problems and anxieties. It was threatening, duplicitous, treacherous. Simultaneously, Western science, art and technology inspired intense admiration. For Kemal, who fiercely rejected the Communist alternative, national survival depended on becoming as strong as the West in order to resist it. To move Turkey out of its precarious post-War position, progress was needed. This required modernisation, for which the West was a good model. With time, this urgency waned and Turkey was left with a national narrative that both admired the West, seeking to resemble it, and hated it, seeking to resist potential encroachment.

1. Threat and Admiration: Kemalist Visions of the West

The West is both a model and a predator in Turkish national narratives. As the place where civilisation and modernity flourished, it offers an excellent model for Turkey's modernisation. In its desire to share the West's scientific, artistic and technological accomplishments, however, Turkey looks up to an abstract, static and a-historical 'West' (Ahıska, 2003:352, 354), distinct from the Western countries Turkey never trusted. It was Turkey's mistrust of this real West that created the urgent need to modernise and 'catch up' in the first place, in order to avoid being at the westerners' mercy again. Westernisation, promised Atatürk (1929:723), would 'raise the nation onto its rightful place in the civilised world'. This was an invaluable tool for early Kemalists, as the strong republican state was legitimised as the only structural vehicle capable of pursuing progress and modernisation (Gökalp, 1959:81).

As modernisation held the key to national survival, everything done in its name was deemed expedient – including the creation of a brand new polity. Once on the road to modernisation, early Kemalists forged an elaborate rhetoric seeking to represent

westernisation as a return to the Turks' original roots – in order to make the task seem both manageable and legitimate to an exhausted, war-weary population. Historical appeals to the Turks' 'Europeanness' sought to represent the initial westernisation drive as a modernisation drive for a European country whose development had lapsed. The urgency of sustaining this message at home and disseminating it abroad – proving Turkey's Europeanness to Europeans – survives today.

An Ankara Business Centre (2005) publication, designed as a resource for foreign businessmen, spends several pages 'proving' Turkey is European by claiming three traits associated with Europe: a long and illustrious (national) history, binding Turkey to Europe's own Hellenic and Roman ancestors (p.44); a solid republican pedigree, the gift of 'Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, one of the greatest leaders in modern times, who catapulted Turkey into the 20th century' (p.1); and secularism (p.23, 49).

Similarly, a 2003 TRT (Türkiye Radyo Televizyon) leaflet advertising the radio service *La Voix de la Turquie* delves into a similar set of claims regarding Turkey's Europeanness. Firstly, Turkey is a European-style national republic, thanks to Atatürk. Secondly, it consciously pursues a policy of secularism, scientific inquiry and modernisation, which is rational *and* European. The leaflet notes that the 'eternal Republic... a source of pride and happiness' has enabled the Turks to achieve success in many fields while competing against *other* Europeans: awards at Cannes; literary prizes for Pamuk; Erenur Sertab's 2003 Eurovision song contest victory; a third place in the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Stressing the mortal peril the nation faced *because* of the Europeans during the Independence War, the leaflet underlines that such accomplishments are only possible thanks to the Republic, which ought to be protected at all cost.

This is indicative of Turkey's current position. Its 80-year westernisation drive has created an intense desire for recognition and vindication. It is felt that, unless the Europeans accept Turkey's westernisation as successful and Turkey as one of them, the effort will have come to nought. Westernisation has long been pursued despite the West – à la Atatürk – and Europe's unwillingness to accept Turkey's Europeanness was attributed to ill-will, jealousy and small-mindedness. Yet acceptance remains highly desirable. In fact, some favour EU membership mainly because it would convey this recognition in a most final and formal way. Simultaneously, EU

membership would offer Turkey the means and support to complete its modernisation project and reach the level of contemporary civilisation. To do so, however, Turkey has to cede to the westerners' demands – 80,000 pages of legislative reform; submit to their scrutiny and, potentially humiliating, assessments; and compromise national pride and sovereignty while putting the country's unity and integrity at risk. And then, even after having complied with all the demands and having ignored Atatürk's warnings against European duplicity, Turkey may still be rejected, facing the humiliation that Westernisation was meant to shield it from.

The EU is both a threat and an opportunity, the object of both admiration and profound mistrust. Does it represent the West that Atatürk warned his children against? Or does it represent progress; a force Atatürk believed could be neither resisted nor negotiated? Everything Turkey *is*, from the nation-state to the secular Republic, was embraced as part of a conscious effort to bring it in line with contemporary civilisation. Membership of international bodies, such as NATO and the Council of Europe, was sought in the name of westernisation; industrialisation was pursued and gender equality legislated in the name of progress. As progress and 'being European' became fused, Turkish foreign policy's 'primary aim was to see their country recognised as a respected European power' (Hale, 2002:57). Recognition was of the essence.

'Not long ago, a prominent Belgian politician argued that Turkey could not become a member of the European Union because Europe was a "civilisational project". But Atatürk's project, launched at a time when civilisation was coming under a threat in its European core territory, was a "civilisation project" above all else' (Mango, 1999a:9).

Turkey is the outcome of this project and seeks EU membership in its name. How Atatürk would feel about the EU is a complicated issue. Those who argue in favour of the EU do so in Atatürk's name: but so do those who oppose it. Atatürk's legacies are pitted against each other when trying to weigh nationalism versus westernisation. Some seek to revisit, update and redefine these legacies in light of a changing world. Others uphold certain arrangements as not only good, but also *necessary*. In Atatürk's time there were no formal channels for the conveyance of Western recognition. Recognition did not entail compromises on sovereignty or an extensive legal

harmonisation plan. Westernisation for the Kemalist regime, notes Hale (2002:71), entailed pro-Western republican, secular structures and policies, but did not involve any further contact or entanglement with the West unless national security required it. So is the EU an opportunity for recognition or a danger to national independence and integrity? The issue remains unresolved. Debate over whether EU accession would pursue Atatürk's dream to its logical conclusion or compromise his principles is now raging. When, however, Turkey applied to join the (much smaller and less demanding) EEC in July 1959, there were no doubts that membership was in line with progress and modernisation.

Turkey was deemed unfit to join, but in 1963 it was offered an association through the Ankara Agreement, securing financial assistance and a gradual customs union, completed in 1996. The customs union brought about 'the biggest budget deficits ever witnessed in world economic history' (Z, 27 July 2005), but was hailed as a political success, promoting modernisation. Additional protocols were signed and legal harmonisation started remarkably early, yet Turkey remains in the EU ante-chamber.

Decades of political instability and economic crises hampered Turkish-EU relations (Glyptis, 2005a:403-407). When Turkey reapplied for membership in 1987, the application was forwarded to the European Commission and not rejected outright. This meant that – unlike Morocco whose application was turned down by the Council of Europe because it is not European – Turkish membership was a matter of readiness not suitability. And although Turkey was not deemed ready, the Council and Commission did not question its suitability. Meanwhile, the EU changed dramatically and membership became a much more complicated affair. When Turkey's EU saga began there was no reason to believe that it might backfire and result in humiliation rather than recognition. Even if Turkey failed the formal criteria, its Europeanness should not be an issue as it was confirmed when the Association Council, Commission and Council of Europe discussed Turkish membership between 1997 and 2000, recognising Turkey as a candidate country at the 1999 Helsinki summit. This should have sealed the process. It definitely increased Turkey's commitment as, in 2001, EU accession became Turkey's overriding political priority.

EU acceptance is now more pertinent than ever, yet it seems that some academics, politicians and political advisers never stopped questioning Turkey's 'Europeanness'.

Sanguineti is a case in point. For Sanguineti (1999:18), Turkey is not European on any level; its geography, race, culture, religion, civilisation and politics prove Turkey is alien to Europe. Sanguineti dwells on politics in particular as, he believes, Turkey disregards core European values and norms of conduct. Yet, implicit in his argument, there seems to be a feeling that, as Kubicek (2004:25) aptly put it, ‘even if Turkey meets the political criteria, it will still be big and Muslim’.

Corrado Pirzio-Biroli (2005), Head of Cabinet for former EU Commissioner Franz Fischler, finds such witticisms unhelpful. ‘Accusing all those who object to the accession of Turkey of Islamophobia... is a very cheap shot’, he argued. Turkey is simply not European. The 1999 candidacy decision, he notes, took 60 seconds to make. Now EU leaders do not back down for fear of humiliating Erdoğan’s government, which has done an exceptional job. But granting candidacy was an irresponsible action. Defining Europe is hard, Pirzio-Biroli admits, but defining what Europe is *not* is easy. For Olli Rehn, the EU is defined by values not borders. Turkey, for Pirzio-Biroli fails to respect those values. Besides, he concludes, Rehn’s statement is irrelevant to strategy, as it gives no indication of where the EU could end. For Pirzio-Biroli, the answer is simple: west of the Bosphorus.

Such statements hurt national pride by dismissing both Turkey and its national aspirations. Since the EU started stalling, devising membership criteria for Turkey that other candidates did not face and prolonging the process, Turkish diplomatic circles started feeling that the quest for acceptance was gradually eroding its own premises. The pursuit of moral satisfaction was beginning to hurt national pride. Was the EU being malicious, inconsistent or irresponsible?

The EU has changed dramatically since Turkey’s Association Agreement. This change has not been fully thought-out and Turkey accentuates many unresolved issues regarding Europe’s future – identity matters; structural issues; boundary problems; and the dilemma of whether the EU should be a security area or a security actor (see Glyptis, 2005b). As Grillo, Milio and Talani (2005:3) note: ‘[t]he two referend[ums] that killed the constitutional treaty at the end of May represent the most dramatic crisis in the history of the European project. In fact, the Council of the 16th and 17th June shows that what makes the crisis even more acute is that nobody seems to be in charge or to have a plan.’ It is no wonder, then, that the EU is sending Turkey mixed

modernisation was to protect independence; without it, the entity that is to modernise exists no more. Mango (2000) agrees. Atatürk was inspired by Western civilisation's achievements, but knew that the fact that contemporary civilisation was achieved in the West did not make it Western. Atatürk's vision embraced some Western traits, but did not seek to emulate the West. For Mango, comparisons and external benchmarks are misguided and detrimental. Echoing Atatürk's famous aphorism '*biz bize benzeriz*'¹, Mango re-asserts the grounds for Turkish pride vis-à-vis Europe. Atatürk's Republic was unique in its time, even if it did not satisfy a stringent definition of democracy. Besides, '[i]f Italy, the home of the Renaissance, could not maintain democratic rule, how could one expect it of Turkey, which the Renaissance had bypassed?' (ibid).

Aggravation aside, withdrawal from the accession process is not a serious proposal yet. The AKP continues to champion EU membership, capitalising on both the westernising project's *de facto* legitimacy and the (waning) popularity the prospect of EU membership enjoys. Thus, under the mantle of EU-stipulated reform, the AKP has managed to effect sweeping reforms that no other government – especially if suspected of harbouring an Islamist agenda – could have passed. This, however, further complicates the EU supporters' already fragmented front.

The EU is an unyielding and meddlesome partner, often acting with complete disregard for both national sovereignty and pride. Before accession, Turkey needs to satisfy the EU on 35 key issues or 'chapters', ranging from science and education to politics and the Cyprus question. Some issues are already on the road to being satisfied, such as dismantling the SSCs, reforming the NSC, legalising Kurdish broadcasting and banning the death penalty, as well as reforming the constitution, penal code and anti-terror legislation. Others, such as minority rights, the Cyprus issue and relations with Greece, are harder to resolve, yet the AKP persists.

Even those who perceive membership as the apex of Atatürk's westernising dream often wonder whether the accession process actually undermines Kemalist nationalism by assaulting national sovereignty and integrity. Is the pursuit of EU membership forwarding westernisation at the expense of Kemalist nationalism? The

¹ 'We resemble ourselves'.

debate is intense. For Ahiska (2003:355), the entire Kemalist project was ‘a performance geared for the gaze of the West’, hence Turkey will not abandon its EU ambitions, whatever the sacrifices entailed. Yet Atatürk’s legacy of ‘westernisation despite the West’ meant that Turkey should ensure that while Western eyes were turned towards it in admiration, Western hands were kept off it at all cost.

The AKP’s presence at the helm of an already problematic reform effort, mistrusted as an instance of potential foreign meddling, complicates matters further. Is Erdoğan using EU accession and the language of democracy and westernisation to undermine secularism and emasculate Kemalism?

‘[Some] are not reassured by the argument that, just as approaching EU membership protects civilian rule against military interference, so it defends it against religious takeover. Ah yes, they say, but EU membership will never actually come about. Somewhere along the way it will be vetoed. And then Turkey will be left in the hands of the AK Party, and all the good works of Atatürk and his republican successors will be undone’ (*TE*, 17 March 2005).

Reform has been extensive; not enough to disestablish the existing state model, but far-reaching nonetheless, unsettling unitary national narratives by giving voice to minorities and weakening military involvement in civilian affairs. The AKP, fearing a disruption on the road to Europe, seeks to inspire public ownership of the reform effort – presenting it as popular, necessary and fully compatible with Kemalist principles (Glyptis, 2005c:105-106). Nevertheless, even those in favour of both reform and EU membership are not unanimously convinced of the AKP’s ability to pursue these goals (*TNA*, 7 July 2005). Meanwhile, Kemalists remain divided on whether the EU is a threat or an opportunity in Kemalist terms.

EU accession is not a negotiable process. The EU makes demands and expects candidate countries to change, adapt and comply. Legislation needs to be passed regulating everything from data collection to water purification, health and safety at work to the establishment of family businesses. Unsurprisingly, the more contentious part of the reform package involves the political provisions demanding, among other things, the complete withdrawal of the TAF from civilian affairs, legislative reform protecting the individual above the community, provisions for minority rights and

human rights and freedoms, as well as the resolution of the Cyprus question. All in all, satisfying the EU's political demands entails a radical rethink of Turkey's unitary, nationalist, defensive and collectivist state model.

Such a rethink, however, is not easy, as the issue of minority provisions proves. As unity presupposes 'one-ness', the Turkish state adopted a Jacobin approach to minorities – with the exception of Istanbul's *établis*, 'foreigners' protected by the Lausanne Treaty. The Kemalist state did not embrace ethnic diversity. Population movements, exchanges and an inclusive civic discourse enabled the Turkish Republic to move away from Ottoman ethnic diversity, although Mango (2000) is keen to stress that Atatürk 'cannot be blamed for the disappearance of the ethnic diversity of the Ottoman state... non-Turkish communities had become determined to lead separate lives in their own national states'. Hence the presence of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul (*E*, 11 November 2005; 31 October 2005; 7 September 2005; *H*, 7 June 2006) or the Armenian Hospital Foundation's right to own property in Turkey (*M*, 22 July 2005) are unwelcome reminders of past Ottoman mistakes and thorns in the side of national unity. Yet these populations present no real threat to the state-territory-nation trident as they are *foreign*, with national homelands elsewhere. Although actually indigenous, these populations represent Ottoman residue, staking no real claim on Anatolia. Conversely, populations with no alternative homeland are problematic and their potential claims on Anatolia need to be nipped in the bud. Anatolia belongs to the Turkish nation and all its residents are Turks; if they think otherwise, it is simply a case of false consciousness to be remedied through education.

As former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit put it: 'There is no Kurdish problem in Turkey, there is a feudalism problem' in the Southeast (*Z*, 7 September 2005). In other words, the problem is not one of unitary nationhood or territorial integrity, rather, it is one of insufficient modernisation. Violence in the Southeast is caused by tribal chiefs refusing to let go of power that has become irrelevant in a modern world. Such attitudes, naturally, de-legitimise the Kurdish struggle on several levels. Perceiving the 'Kurdish problem' not in ethnic, but in civilisational terms, makes it easier to 'handle' under the Kemalist modernisation scheme. Or, rather, it did until recently. Turkey's EU ambitions make such narratives untenable as the EU demands minority provisions to be integrated into law, irrespective of Turkey's unity concerns.

In line with these demands, Turkey established a committee to investigate Turkish citizenship provisions. Its report, published in November 2004, was damning. Criticising the state's approach to citizenship since its founding moment, the report suggested replacing the ethnonym 'Türk' with the more inclusive toponym 'Türkiyeli'. Outrage ensued. The state prosecutor investigated allegations of treason and an enraged committee member theatrically tore up the report before television cameras (*TE*, 11 November 2004). Although condemnation for the shredding was immediate and vocal, even human rights activists criticised the report for insulting the state (*TDN*, 3 November 2004). The report challenged unity: since safeguarding unity and territorial integrity is the state's duty, the report effectively threatened integrity by denying the one-ness of the Turkish nation with its Anatolian motherland.

This incident is representative of the tension between making concessions on the road to EU accession and actually compromising the Kemalist national, secular Republic. Ranking Atatürk's priorities in descending order is a difficult task that Kemalists did not expect to have to perform. While the decision on whether modernisation as westernisation is worth pursuing through EU membership is pending, the AKP is championing the cause of membership and effecting reform in Kemalism's name.

2. Kemalist Concerns and EU Ambitions: the AKP's Accession Effort

The sweeping 2002 electoral victory allowed the AKP to claim it represents the wishes of the Turkish public. This claim was simply strengthened with time. A 2003 poll showed support for the AKP increasing from 34.2 percent to 44.4 percent (*TDN*, 6 November 2003). By 2004, and with AKP's success at the impending local elections almost certain, secular journalists rightly anticipated a strengthening of the AKP's rhetoric of popular legitimation (*M*, 2 February 2004; *TDN*, 22 March 2004).

In order to retain this popularity, however, the AKP cannot afford to lose touch with the people. It needs to voice popular frustrations at a perceived Western lack of respect for Turkey. In the wake of the 2003 murderous attacks on Istanbul, when European countries issued travel warnings and UEFA moved two football matches away from Turkey, Gül told Europe it had failed Turkey, showing no solidarity and

isolating it in its time of need (*TDN*, 7 December 2003). For all its commitment to the accession process, the AKP is no stranger to Kemalist frustrations and fears.

Following a Turkish-Swiss showdown on and off the football pitch during a 2006 World Cup play-off, Fatih Terim, the national coach, accused the West of a conspiracy to keep Turkey out of the competition and praised his team for doing 'what was necessary for the Star and Crescent'. The matter was referred to FIFA and could have ended there had deputy premier and sports minister Mehmet Ali Sahin not jumped on the conspiracy bandwagon. Sahin spoke of injustice and accused FIFA president Sepp Blatter of acting 'as a Swiss fan instead of a president' (*World Soccer*, January 2006). Although marginal, this example is indicative of a national reflex at a time when national pride is bruised by a barrage of European slights against Turkey's Europeanness that the opening of accession negotiations failed to stem.

Similarly, the AKP needs to articulate the socially conservative voters' preoccupations with the EU's perceived Islamophobia. It is worth noting here that '[w]hile many AKP members are Islamist, most Turks are not' (*AEI*, 2 August 2005) and overt religiosity would undermine both Erdoğan's popularity and his credibility vis-à-vis the EU project. The AKP cannot afford that, as support for the EU and the reform effort is vital for the party's survival. Hence, although Erdoğan never bypasses an opportunity to deplore the West's propensity to equate Islam with terrorism, he does so within the context of the concert of civilisations of which Atatürk spoke. On rare occasions, he even accuses the West of a bigoted and racist attitude towards Islam that worries Turkey, a country with a Muslim population and a democratic regime (*M*, 17 May 2005). But Turkey can help. 'With its stability, success in development, status within the West, rich historical heritage and identity, Turkey will be a symbol of [the] harmony of civilizations for the 21st century... the EU should not and cannot be a Christian club' (Erdoğan in *TDN*, 9 July 2005).

In keeping with public opinion, AKP politicians occasionally condemn EU intervention in domestic affairs as an assault on sovereignty and independence, in true Kemalist style. Ironically, on one such occasion the 'meddling' was welcome to secularists, as it concerned the AKP's abortive attempt to criminalise adultery (*TP*, 10 September 2004). For journalist Ülkü Güney, the AKP's willingness to fall into line with public moods and its readiness to withdraw unpopular legislation is a sign of

weakness (*TDN*, 13 December 2003). However, the AKP's reluctance to press the system to breaking point and its eagerness to remain in tune with popular moods is a sign of wisdom, not cowardice. Public endorsement is vital both for the AKP's legitimation and the reform effort's sustenance, as there is a growing feeling in Turkey that the Europeans are backing out of the European project.

Could Turkey's continued loyalty to this project be misplaced (see *SFC*, 17 June 2005)? While the Europeans try to disentangle their priorities and agree on their common direction, Turkey is striving to meet criteria and stay positive. Yet this is hardly satisfying the nation's need for recognition. Growing frustrations could derail the reform effort. Erdoğan cannot afford this, so he tries to give his people a sense of ownership of the reform effort. Even if EU membership fails to materialise, Turkey, he notes, will 'go it alone', turning the Copenhagen criteria into the Ankara criteria (*TNA*, 6 September 2005). This was an AKP slogan even before the party's election (Erdoğan 2002, Gül 2002). The phrase was later used by Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn (2005a), who also claimed that Turkey's accession journey will be as rewarding as the final destination. A year previously, Erdoğan (2004a) had said the same thing: the road to membership is as significant as the destination because it enables Turkey to pursue much-needed reform and Atatürk's westernising dream concurrently.

Reform is not simply a means to an end (Gül, 2005e). Turkey's transformation goes beyond introducing and implementing new laws. The reform is aimed at changing habits and modes of thinking and acting that are incompatible with democracy and modernity (*ibid*). The AKP never concealed its support for reform in itself. Now Erdoğan's position is unequivocal: Turkey's 'democratisation' path will continue irrespective of the fate of its EU aspirations (*Z*, 3 October 2005). The path in question, however, remains easier to travel down as part of the EU accession effort.

The AKP's discursive position relies heavily on the combination of their popularity with the (waning, but still considerable) support for EU accession and the ability to attribute controversial legislation to EU accession demands. This means that the AKP seeks to retain the loyalty of conservative voters while gaining support elsewhere *because* of their reform agenda and EU aspirations. Those who favour reform would, potentially, still support the AKP even if the EU process foundered. For others,

however, reform was a necessary evil and the AKP an undesirable champion of a coveted goal. If that goal remains stubbornly out of reach or becomes undesirable, then Erdoğan's reform effort will lose several of its reluctant supporters.

Erdoğan's electoral success, combined with the popularity of his westernising reforms, has enabled him to stretch the definitions of nationhood and secularism while still legitimising his actions in the name of Kemalist goals. As Dağı (2005:31) put it: '[T]he AKP realized that they needed the West and modern/western values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in order to build a broader front against the Kemalist centre, and to acquire legitimacy through this new discourse in their confrontation with the secularist establishment.' This, however, means that if Turkey's EU membership was rejected – by either the Turks or the EU – Erdoğan's powerhouse of legitimation would fail, the reform effort would falter and so could his party. So Erdoğan is seeking to instil support for reform in itself by constantly stressing the need for and popularity of reform, regardless of EU demands.

This legitimising narrative was easy to construct, as the previous government handed the AKP a declaration of intent in the form of the *National Programme* (2001) making the pursuit of EU membership a national duty. The programme hailed EU accession as the culmination of Atatürk's dream and pledged to pursue it with respect for national unity and integrity. Had Erdoğan tried to initiate this process, discussions regarding 'hidden intentions' would have probably hampered him. In 2002, however, the AKP hardly needed to legitimise its agenda; the process was under way and legitimised before them, enabling the AKP to legitimise itself through it.

The AKP sought to legitimise its idiosyncratic version of secularism in terms of the EU project, making it a question of national pride 'to prove and confirm that a Muslim society can... be democratic, open, transparent, accountable, pluralistic and contemporary, that is "European", while preserving its identity' (Gül, 2004d). The AKP thus challenged both the EU and Turkey's secularists to prove themselves against Atatürk's universal standards. Turkey, Gül (2005a & e) noted, proves the universality of certain values and the feasibility of managing democratic politics in a Muslim society. Can secularists at home accept that Turkey's Muslim population does not challenge its democracy? Can the EU admit this Muslim population into its civilisational enclave? If Europe opens its doors to Turkey, continues Gül (2005a), it

will show the world that ‘Europe is defined not by a narrow understanding [of] geography or religion, but by common values’: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. These values, concurs Erdoğan (2004a), are ‘European’ in civilisational, not geographical terms. Although European in origin, they have transcended their place of birth, becoming the common property of the civilised world. ‘No single culture can claim that universal values belong to it alone’ (Gül, 2004e).

The reassertion of Turkey’s Muslim identity as a dare to Europe – to show itself worthy of the civilisation it gave birth to – turns EU membership into the acceptance of *Muslim* Turkey. Islam thus becomes a constituent element of an exercise in national pride. Staying loyal to Atatürk’s belief that civilisational standards are universal, Gül (2004c) exclaims that ‘democracy is a way of thinking’ untainted by cultural specificities. In fact, freedom of thought and expression – necessary for democracy – are evidently in action when democracy flourishes in new cultural environments, such as a Muslim setting. As always, the message is directed both at EU and domestic audiences. But domestic audiences are fragmented.

Trying to placate secularists, traditionalists, reformists and conservatives at home, Erdoğan (2004a) defines *Europeanness* as ‘politics commanded by values’. Secularists approve of politics adhering to a set of values – Kemalist in nature and European in origin – transcending social divisions. Meanwhile, socially conservative Anatolians receive such statements as declarations of the AKP’s intent to end a bias towards westernised Turks at the centres of power and possibly even end clientelism and patrimonialism. Obviously, Erdoğan’s popularity, as well as his practical capability to deliver reforms, rests on his continued ability to retain the support, however grudging, of both these groups. Given that both groups are heavily fragmented internally, the task is as sensitive as it is momentous. The fact that EU demands are non-negotiable makes uniting disparate agendas easier for now. ‘Europe is not only the engine of reform but the glue of political cohesion in Turkey. EU membership is a national project shared by the people, business and the army, and embraced by the AKP as a shield against the generals’ (*FT*, 22 May 2006).

People desire EU membership for different reasons, so some embrace reform while others merely tolerate it. The fact that the EU simply dictates its demands means that disparate forces can – and have been – harnessed towards the same goal. This is why

the AKP has managed to sail around debates over its 'true intentions' and doubts voiced by secular officers and academics; the Copenhagen Criteria became an unexpected ally in the pursuit of domestic reform. As a result, the AKP's EU commitment has been dismissed by some as 'more necessary than genuine' (*E*, 8 October 2005). Kaylan (2005:449) even argues that the AKP only seeks EU membership in order to pursue its fundamentalist agenda unchecked by domestic agents. Such accusations are extreme. In fact, even suggesting that the AKP needs the westernisation, rather it has incorporated the drive into its internal legitimating logic.

For Dağı (2005:32), the AKP's pro-EU stance is 'based on an observation that, the more Turkey was distanced from the West and the EU in particular, the stronger would be the tutelage of the army that treated the Islamic groups as an anomaly and threat... the Western demand for democratization and human rights overlapped with their search for protection against the Kemalist establishment, including the military and the judiciary'. The AKP is genuinely concerned for human and religious rights – 'in particular its own' (*P*, issue 105, December 2004, p. 49), as protecting human rights and democracy will ensure its own survival. Undoubtedly, this constitutes a parallel agenda, but it is neither concealed nor subversive. The AKP needs the reform effort for its political survival both at the polls and vis-à-vis the secular establishment.

In order to sustain this effort, the AKP has to counter Kemalist fears that the West is constantly 'plotting against Turkey' (*ibid*), as well as suspicions regarding its 'hidden agenda' (Tank, 2005:12). Although the former is hard to achieve, the AKP has followed the EU democratisation roadmap closely, not giving secularists cause for real concern too frequently. Meanwhile, however, the AKP is effectively testing the boundaries of Kemalist discourse. Can republicanism come to mean Western liberal democracy? Can secularism come to mean freedom of religious belief?

Despite momentous reform, the core of the Turkish state remains the same. Constitutional and legal concerns, as well as the corporate identity of judges, officers, academics and the President, all point towards the fact that Erdoğan has walked the tightrope well so far, but is not yet on solid ground. The reform effort needs to continue and, for that, either the accession process needs to carry on or the Turkish people need to feel complete ownership of reform, valuing it independently and

regardless of EU accession. Erdoğan, trying to forge this feeling, often stresses that the AKP's popular mandate is a mandate for radical reform; this is a 'reformist government' enjoying 'the strong support of all segments of Turkish society' (article by Gül, *TDN*, 13 December 2003). In order to retain this support and sustain the reform effort, Erdoğan seeks to present the accession process as very near completion, while simultaneously making textbook Kemalist legitimization appeals

Erdoğan (2004a) believes Turkey has 'reached the required threshold in both legislative terms and effective implementation', but many disagree. Hansjoerg Kretschmer, head of European Commission's Delegation to Turkey, (*TP*, 1 May 2005; *TNA*, 9 July 2005) stresses that 'the beginning of accession talks does not necessarily imply that Turkey will enter the EU'. Olli Rehn (2005a & b), on the other hand, possibly seeking to help stabilise the reform effort, often stresses that reforms in Turkey have reached an irreversible point; the debate now is not about whether Turkey will join, but about when. In fact, Rehn (2005b:54) spoke of Turkey's rightful place in the European project, practically quoting Atatürk.

Rehn is aware that Kemalist concerns are the main reason EU aspirations are deemed legitimate in Turkey and so is the AKP, wasting no opportunity to pay tribute to Atatürk and his legacy. Gül (2005b) proudly advertises his ministry's dedication to Atatürk and determination to 'function with a high level of patriotism'. Patriotism drives state business, loyal to Atatürk's (2003:9) legacy: 'The essential thing is that the Turkish nation can lead an existence of dignity and glory'. The AKP does not lose sight of this and seeks to present the tortuous path to EU accession as the road towards national glory that will take Turkey, in the words of chief EU negotiator Ali Babacan, into 'the contemporary world' (*H*, 4 October 2005), marking the final stage of Atatürk's modernisation effort with an endeavour that is comparable in magnitude and significance to Atatürk's accomplishments. 'Turkey is now experiencing the second largest wave of modernization after the reforms carried out by the founding father of the Republic' (Babacan, 2004:12).

Atatürk famously stated that Turkey should resemble no one but herself. Gül (2004f) repeats this theme: Turkey stands apart from the rest of its neighbourhood thanks to the Republic. Atatürk set Turkey on the path to a destiny the AKP is about to fulfil, true to his spirit. 'We dared to implement this reform programme in a very peculiar

atmosphere: a war was going on in our neighbourhood, international terrorism was on the rise, most liberal countries had to take some restrictive measure effecting certain freedoms', but Turkey, once again, proved stronger and more determined than others (Gül, 2004f). For Gül (2004d), AKP reforms hardly differ from Atatürk's mission as they share the goal to improve political, economic, cultural and social standards for the country and the people in an uncertain world. Moreover, AKP reforms are genuinely popular. 'We responded to the call from our grass roots asking for better governance, higher standard[s] of democracy and respect for rights of every sort' (Gül, 2004g).

National pride, republican structures and modernisation are immediately recognisable as Kemalist references. In a tight-knit nexus of meaning, Kemalism conveys legitimacy on undertakings *ex hypothesi*. Describing democracy as a 'process of perfection', Gül (2005e) effectively claims that he is elaborating on Atatürk's plan. A static democracy is no democracy at all, he notes. In order to retain Atatürk's legacy, the nation has to keep working, changing and evolving with the times.

The AKP presents EU accession as the vindication of Atatürk's vision, but with a twist. Accession will confirm Turkey's modern credentials and prove Ziya Gökalp right: attaining contemporary civilisation does not require abandoning specific cultural identities. 'Turkey is coming ever closer to its historical integration with the West while preserving its uniqueness' (Gül, 2005f). The 'uniqueness' in question may be more Islamist than Atatürk would have appreciated, but the marriage of culture and civilisation is fully in tune with his legacy. The question is how creatively can one adapt this legacy. For Kili, change is heresy: for others change is long overdue (Z, 25 May 2005), as eight decades is long enough to render the wisest legacy redundant. On that note, some even advocate a complete departure from Kemalism. Legitimation works in concentric circles of acceptable, negotiable, deviant and inconceivable ideas. The wholesale abandonment of Kemalism is currently in the outer circles, but its negotiation is legitimate and acceptable, although its boundaries remain fuzzy.

'Some see European culture and values as museum pieces restricted to certain geography', but for Gül (2004g), Atatürk was right; European civilisation defies spatial boundaries. Atatürk could not have foreseen, however, today's global world. He could not have known that joining Western civilisation was not merely a matter of

choice, but one of legal and institutional harmonisation and formal acceptance. Turkey remains loyal to Atatürk's path of integration with the West, namely alliances and treaties (Gül, 2004h). Turkey, however, keeps up with the times. Engagement with modernity now also entails membership of international organisations such as NATO and, of course, the EU. Drawing from the argument that EU membership is the logical culmination of Kemalist westernisation, the AKP managed to widen the meaning of 'democracy', 'human rights' and 'secularism' – by making their EU-endorsed meaning common currency in Turkey. Linguistic options proliferated and, as a result, political debate widened. Simultaneously, however, tensions emerge as newly embraced European definitions are not always compatible with accepted Kemalist definitions. Often terms such as secularism mean different things, have different aims and legitimise different sets of actions. Through this disparity, the dilemma faced by the Ottoman Empire during its decline re-emerges: can Western modernity be selectively embraced? Or do Western values need to be given precedence over local ones? As Turkey is neither crumbling nor ailing, the question it needs to answer is whether value-coexistence is possible and, if not, whether the alternative is desirable.

3. The Kemalists' Qualified Europhilia

3.a. The TAF

The TAF, as Kemalism's guardians, are committed to all facets of Atatürk's project, including modernisation. In this spirit, and true to Atatürk's 'peace at home, peace in the world' motto, General Özkök (2005a) stresses, Turkey joined NATO and always contributes to regional and global peace. In this spirit, Turkey also wishes to join the EU, as an equal partner. The wish to join, however, rests on the condition of equality. Nobody, not the US nor the EU, should hint that association with Turkey constitutes a favour. America's relationship with Turkey is based on a mutual-need/mutual-benefit assessment, and so will Turkey's association with the EU (Başbuğ, 2005a). Özkök (2005a) agrees: 'It is really inappropriate to consider [EU] membership as a favour.'

Despite this tone of defiance, however, Dağı (1996) found that the TAF's longstanding identificational engagement with the West makes military leaders highly

responsive to Western influence and pressures. As Republican national imperatives are essentially linked to westernisation/modernisation, TAF personnel never willingly disassociate themselves from Europe. Even during the 1980s military administration, Dağı continues, Turkey's EEC vocation was never abandoned. Turkey did not even withdraw from the Council of Europe – despite threats to do so – because such a withdrawal would be ‘a denial... of Turkish commitment, in symbolic terms, to Westernization that was the cornerstone of Kemalist state ideology’ (ibid).

For the TAF, pursuing EU membership is part of a sustained Western-oriented policy that has sought membership of international organisations when opportunities arose and allowed security doctrines to change with time. EU membership itself is neither an overriding nor distinct goal; rather, it remains important as part of this ideological positioning and *rapprochement* with the West. In this spirit, Hilmi Özkök noted that the time has come for Turkey to assume a more cooperative perception of security, focusing not on its neighbours any more, but on international terrorism. In order to do that, Özkök stressed, Turkey needs to be admitted into the EU. Then, and not before, it will be truly able to adapt its security doctrines to the needs of new security situations facing the world (*M*, 18 October 2003; *TDN*, 23 November 2004).

Responding to EU demands for the resolution of Turkey's longstanding disputes with Greece (the continental shelf, FIR and Aegean grey zones), the TAF, understandably, wish to be on an equal footing with their counterparts before relaxing policies. Consequently, the TAF are unwilling to grant the EU's request for signs of goodwill before parity is established as, they feel, this may jeopardise national security. This is further complicated by the fact that the TAF often perceive threats to national unity as security threats. Hence TAF suspicions are extended to several EU demands, including granting cultural and linguistic rights to the Kurds. As such demands proliferate, the TAF are hinting a policy re-orientation away from the EU and, strategically speaking, away from an exclusive focus on the West since relations with the US are as strained as those with the EU (*TDN*, 28 April 2005).

EU membership is sought in Atatürk's name, but there is more to his legacy than westernisation. And the EU's ever-increasing demands, articulated in terms of human rights concessions and increased democracy, create an unprecedented problem for Turkey, namely the need to rank Atatürk's priorities in descending order of

significance. EU-stipulated reforms are bound to change Turkey's existing state model and affect its collectivist, nationalist and secularist priorities. Is westernisation more important than unitary nationalism and the protection of national sovereignty against foreign meddling? For General Başbuğ (2005b), the nation-state is the ultimate repository of loyalty for citizens and officers alike. In fact, citizen attachment to it 'remains one of the reasons for [the] rejection of [the] EU constitution in... France' (ibid). But if the nation-state retains such overriding importance for EU member-states, why would an aspirant member be expected to compromise national pride in the name of accession? For Başbuğ, the nation-state is more important than EU membership. Although he clearly hopes one would not preclude the other, the preservation of unitary nationalism and corresponding state structures is the TAF's primary concern. EU membership should not require sacrifices in that respect.

This does not mean that the TAF do not desire EU accession. On the contrary, Özkök (2005a) exclaims: 'EU membership is the first topic on our national agenda.' However, negotiations are ongoing and it is not simply up to the EU to decide; 'Turkey can also say "yes" or "no" in the end' (ibid). The problem, notes Başbuğ (*TDN*, 3 November 2004), is that the EU makes demands and puts pressure on Turkey without taking its realities, needs and interests into account, thus jeopardising its unitary structure and territorial integrity. The EU, like other European powers before it, joins forces with Turkey's minorities seeking to divide and weaken the country. But the TAF, Başbuğ concludes, will protect the unitary Republic at all cost. Turkey should remember negotiations are open-ended and the option to refuse membership remains open. As Özkök (2005a) put it: 'If no agreement is reached and Turkey does not enter the EU, it would, of course, not be the end of the world.'

Yet there is little to agree on. As the EU's conditions are non-negotiable, Turkey has to decide how much it actually desires membership. Then the question is not whether Turkey can become what the EU wants it to be, but whether it wants to (Glyptis, 2005d). Does Turkey want to dilute Kemalist unitary nationalism; de-securitise public discourses; and abandon collectivist national narratives? So far, when necessary, '[i]ndividual rights and the autonomy of public institutions were restricted... for the sake of national unity' (Mango, 2005:31). This constitutional and military preoccupation with unity and integrity forges a collectivist framework in which EU-

style individual liberties cannot fully function. For those who believe time for change is upon us, the EU provides an excellent framework within which to do so. The TAF disagree, believing that the political model followed thus far works and does not need changing. Kemalism, together with all its priorities, the TAF note, survived intact into the 21st century because it is both popular and successful. Although true, Turkey's evolution has also been shaped by the fact that the West needed it to remain secular (after the Iranian revolution), stable and Western-oriented (during the Cold War), and did not much care if it was the TAF rather than civilian authorities ensuring that Turkey stayed on their side at those difficult times.

Now, however, the pressure is on. The EU demands the TAF's withdrawal from politics and the creation of new laws placing the individual above the community. Moreover, the EU demands that this new spirit be reflected in institutional practice, public culture and political priorities. It also demands that EU observers, analysts and assessors be allowed access to institutions and public documents. Unsurprisingly, the Sèvres Syndrome rears its head: is the EU trying to undo the Lausanne Treaty? Could EU accession, rather than being the vindication of Atatürk's modernisation, actually be its undoing? Could complying with EU demands open Turkey to Kurdish, Islamist and other threats that the emasculated TAF will no longer be able to control?

'Sufferers of the Sèvres Syndrome cling to a rigidly authoritarian system that uses Kemalism as the proverbial hammer that pounds flat any raised nails, be they ethnic or religious' (White, 2002:57). The Sèvres Syndrome is not limited to the TAF, but is shared by politicians, journalists and civilians. Although 'in the abstract, Turks approved of a number of basic democratic rights... [they] exhibited more lukewarm feelings on many of the specific political reforms that have actually been adopted' and many 'would refuse to endorse reforms, even if it would cost Turkey its EU membership' because they are 'reluctant to "follow orders" from Brussels', often equating EU demands with Kurdish separatism (Kubicek, 2005:371-2). Although Kubicek is quoting from a 2002 survey and things may differ following the AKP experience, the concert between public opinion and military concerns is important. Given the respect surrounding the TAF, when the military identifies an event as a threat, challenge or slight, the population and Press take notice.

The TAF's scepticism towards the EU (*NYT*, 25 September 2005; *TT*, 10 June 2005; *CSM*, 14 June 2004), combined with reform fatigue and the practical side-effects of convergence efforts hitting society, means that the question of whether pursuing EU membership costs more than it is worth is being raised. As the referendums in France and Holland were experienced as direct affronts in Turkey (*M*, *TDN* & *TP*, 2 June 2005), the popularity of accession started to wane. Nevertheless public opinion has not yet turned against the project, the AKP remains committed and even the TAF, reservations notwithstanding, have not withdrawn their support. In an unprecedented move, Hilmi Özkök even permitted the investigation of retired officers (including retired Admiral İlhami Erdil) for financial irregularities and abuse of power (*H*, 25 May 2005). The move was so unexpected that some wondered whether it had more to do with personal animosities rather than a willingness to comply with the government's reform effort (*TDN*, 28 December 2004). Stating that 'patriotism cannot be monopolized by men in uniforms' (*ibid*), Özkök, bowing to civilian authority, allowed the investigation of 39 officers, in line with EU demands. The TAF is no longer untouchable, yet the debate over the desirability of EU membership is not over.

'Many Turks believe the Kurds are using the country's EU bid to advance separatist ambitions under the cover of human rights reforms. Moreover, public support for EU membership, the driving force behind Turkey's democratic reform effort, has declined amid increasing European hostility to this Muslim nation's accession to the bloc' (*TDN*, 10 July 2005). The TAF's concerns with unity and their opposition to perceived concessions to a foreign power obviously linger in the Turks' minds. This unease is exacerbated by the insecurity caused by the new wave of attacks in the Southeast (*TDN*, 31 March 2006; *TP*, 29 March & 6 June 2006; *Z*, 27 April 2006).

Concerns, however, have been voiced that the TAF, rather than seeking to appease this insecurity, may have created it. In September 2005, a *Zaman* editorial lamented that 'whenever Turkey starts democratic reformations, turns its face to the Western world, and gets rid of its [political] problems', rogue security elements and ultra-nationalists seek to frustrate its ambitions for a better future (*Z*, 6 September 2005). A few months later, these concerns seemed potentially founded in fact. Land forces commander Yaşar Büyükanıt and two senior officers were investigated for attempts to thwart Turkey's EU bid through the artificial manipulation of the Kurdish conflict (*TT*

& *LAT*, 7 March 2006). Büyükanıt was earmarked as Özkök's successor (and indeed became TAF Commander-in-Chief on 30 August 2006) and expected to be less accommodating than the current Chief of Staff. Van prosecutor Ferhat Sarıkaya accused Büyükanıt of having assembled a rogue force to stoke unrest among the Kurds in hope of forcing the government's hand into restricting Kurdish freedoms and thus undermining Turkey's EU bid.

On 9 November 2005, a bomb exploded in a bookshop in Şemdinli, killing one and injuring five. Although the PKK was initially suspected, it transpired that two non-commissioned officers were implicated. When 'General Büyükanıt described one of them as "a good soldier" suspicions deepened' (*TDN*, 14 June 2006). The request to investigate Büyükanıt came after a parliamentary investigative committee had been set up and after several local officials had been transferred to other regions. The accusation was shaky, based on a single testimony, and the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges disbarred Sarıkaya (*TDN*, *ibid*). Some perceived this action as a Kemalist 'closing of ranks', while others spoke of a government plot to ensure a more pliable successor to Özkök than Büyükanıt.

Either way, although Büyükanıt remained unaffected, the TAF's authority was undermined by the speculation and the subsequent arrest of military personnel on charges of setting up organisations to destroy the unity of the country (*TP*, 5 June 2006). The General Staff's attitude – accusing the civilian prosecutor of overstepping the boundaries of his authority – and Sarıkaya's subsequent fate revived discussions regarding the 'deep state' – namely that real power lies with the military, police, gendarmerie and secret services. Meanwhile, the AKP sought to grant Sarıkaya an amnesty to work in the private sector, but the CHP opposed the move (*TDN*, 14 June 2006), describing Sarıkaya's indictment as an attempted coup against the TAF. ANAP sided with the CHP in its defence of the Kemalist establishment.

Exactly one year before these events, Gül declared EU accession 'the most important project in the history of the Republic', noting that it enjoyed the complete support of civilian and military forces (*TDN*, 27 April 2004). These events may well prove him wrong. Nevertheless, it is clear that the TAF support EU membership as the culmination of Atatürk's westernising plan only as long as its pursuit does not require a compromise on Atatürk's other principles. Many share this reservation.

3.b. Civilian Kemalists

Not all Turkish politicians think EU membership is a good idea. Opposition is voiced from all sides of the political spectrum in startlingly similar language. Workers' Party leader Doğu Perincek and ultra-nationalist Devlet Bahçeli, surprisingly in agreement, note that they respect Europe and Western civilisation, yet oppose EU membership as it threatens national autonomy and sovereignty (*TP*, 14 February 2004). Perincek refers to Atatürk's warnings against external interference and, describing European capitalism as 'latter-day colonialism', he denounces straying from the Kemalist path. Bahçeli makes a similar appeal, noting that Turkey's EU entry ought to be dignified, entailing no concessions on religious and ancestral values that would jeopardise unity. In the name of this unity, he opposed abolishing the death penalty (for separatists) and accused the AKP of betraying the nation and laying siege to its pride.

Erdoğan's reply was equally Kemalist: 'Those who cannot digest Turkey's membership are opposed to an alliance of civilizations' and the people's will. 'Nobody can divert the path of the public by filling public squares. The Turkish public can't be deceived like that. The day is the hour of truth' (*TNA*, 4 October 2005). Erdoğan is referring to a rally where Bahçeli (2005) urged the great Turkish nation to resist the compromises asked for by the AKP and the EU. Implicit was a reminder of the First World War, when the Europeans opposed Turkey's very existence. Turkey's contradictory feelings towards Europe complicate matters. Former Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, while warning that if Turkey is not offered membership, it will either slip into Islamic fanaticism or suffer another coup, also accused Europeans of having a crusader's mentality and called the EU a Christian club (*E*, 1 September 2004).

For many, each difficulty on Turkey's EU path is both a slight to national pride and a warning sign against European aggression. This complicates Turkey's desire to belong. Every EU directive or communication is received in an environment of mistrust towards both the Europeans' intentions vis-à-vis Turkey and their *a priori* unwillingness to accept her as an equal. These fears underlay Baykal's exclamation that Turkey should not be happy with whatever the EU offers, but hold its head high, negotiate as an equal (*TDN*, 26 May 2005) and under no circumstances accept a privileged partnership or other second-tier tie, which is what, Baykal claims, the AKP

is ready to do (*H*, 25 May 2005). Although Baykal does not advocate withdrawal from negotiations, he did request that the accession process be debated in parliament (*Z*, 3 October 2005). Although Erdoğan reacted to this proposal as he does to most anti-EU remarks, that is by treating them as personal political attacks (*Z*, 12 October 2005), it is important to ask what re-opening a parliamentary debate on the desirability of accession would achieve at this stage of the process. The only real purpose would be reaffirming Turkey's sense of agency and reminding everyone that Turkey can withdraw if it so wishes.

President Sezer agrees that Turkey should retain its sense of agency in the process. As head of state, however, Sezer approaches the issue with caution. He is in favour of westernisation and believes that, in ideological terms, there is no *a priori* discord between Turkey and the West (Tank, 2005:4). For Sezer, the EU is a civilisational project, pursued in the name of universal values. Countries sharing those values share a bond despite their historical and cultural differences (Sezer, 2000a & 2004b). This bond, stressed Sezer's Chief Foreign Affairs advisor, Sermet Atacanlı, was the reason why the President would not allow the French and Dutch 'No' votes to affect his European commitment (*TDN*, 6 June 2005). Nevertheless, his commitment is not unqualified and Sezer remains vigilant against challenges to national unity, integrity and pride. He knows that Atatürk's westernisation was not meant to entail the wholesale acceptance of European values.

Sezer uses a specific, often defensive, national narrative that embraces EU accession, but makes it abundantly clear that certain issues are non-negotiable. The first is national interest. Sezer often speaks of 'realities' that the EU has to take into account – such as the existence of 'equal and democratically separate states' in Cyprus (*TNA*, 7 July 2005). Secondly, the President is unwilling to sacrifice Turkey's national unity and territorial integrity and has often used his veto in order to block AKP legislation – justified in terms of EU demands – that he felt violated the constitution and put the country's unity and integrity in danger (*Z*, 6 November 2005). Thirdly, Sezer is suspicious of what he, too, perceives as unwarranted foreign meddling in Turkey's affairs. When the ECHR called for the re-trial of jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, the President advised that the request be rejected (*M*, 17 May 2005). Although the EU

retains the right to monitor candidate countries' legal proceedings, Sezer perceived this as a contrived excuse to stall Turkey's EU accession.

In the end, the ECHR decided a re-trial was unnecessary (Z, 16 May 2006), but Sezer's initial stance remains significant. Some felt this interjection actually compromised the impartiality of his office. Others, particularly those sharing his indignation at a perceived sustained EU campaign to injure Turkish pride, felt that, as President and a former judge, Sezer was well within his rights to express an opinion. Evidently, defending national pride has created unlikely bed-fellows; Perincek agreed with Bahçeli, and Sezer agreed with Arınç when the latter stated that Turkey wants EU membership but accession should 'be completed without giving up national interest and self-esteem'. Sezer concurred, noting that the Turks' biggest responsibility is not EU accession, but the Republic's preservation and protection (Z, 2 October 2005).

4. The Future of Turkey's European Vocation: The Advent of Relativity or the Dawn of the Second Republic?

Having identified the EEC as 'the political expression of "contemporary civilization" that Atatürk had set them the task of reaching', the Turks hailed accession talks as 'a decisive victory for the republic's ideals' (*IHT*, 16 December 2004). But if accession is 'the most important project in the history of the Republic' (*TDN*, 27 April 2004), is it worth reforming the Republic for? With SSCs abolished, the NSC limited, pluralism embraced (*TDN*, 12 August 2005) and the Prime Ministry publishing monthly human rights reports (*TDN*, 27 January 2004), is Erdoğan's reform effort slowly but surely paving the road towards the Second Republic?

Erdoğan proudly stated that 'no person has entered jail for expressing their thoughts during my term. Turkey is a country of freedoms' (*WSJ*, 18 March 2006), a statement that captures the reformists' jubilant mood, but is not fully accurate. Firstly, reform has slowed down noticeably in the past year. Secondly, Turkish prosecutors are currently investigating English artist Michael Dickinson for depicting Erdoğan as a dog in a collage. The accusation is 'insulting the dignity of the Prime Minister' and, if found guilty, Dickinson could spend up to three years in jail (*TDN*, 14 June 2006).

This is not the first time Erdoğan has been depicted as an animal nor, indeed, the first time he is taking legal action against his critics, as a cartoonist depicting him as a cat discovered last year (*BBC*, 3 March 2005). When, following this incident, a magazine depicted Erdoğan's head attached to a variety of animals, the premier sued again and – when the court ruled against him – appealed, noting that '[f]reedom of thought, freedom of the press never amount to freedom of insult; they should not. If you caricature the prime minister of this country, or anyone else, as an animal, this can never be called freedom' (*TDN*, 3 April 2006). Yet in the EU it can and it does, and Erdoğan's intolerant attitude caused raised eyebrows in Brussels.

The AKP's record is no longer unblemished. Although there is evidence that the AKP purges itself occasionally (*H*, 7 June 2006), the party's impeccable credentials while ruling the municipalities have been compromised while in government and accusations of tolerating corruption and appointing cronies to top jobs are rife (*TE*, 4 May 2006). Similarly, although the AKP initially followed the IMF financial plan to the letter, earning Western praise (see Glyptis 2006) and CHP accusations of taking orders from abroad (*Z*, 29 May 2006), things no longer look as rosy (*E*, 27 May 2006). With the 2007 parliamentary elections in mind, Erdoğan lowered taxes and raised spending (*TE*, 30 March 2006). ANAP leader Erkan Mumcu actually accused him of trying to influence the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey to conceal a financial crisis (*TDN*, 15 June 2006).

This situation is compounded by increasing violence in the Southeast. 'Kurdish politicians have blamed the riots on Ankara's failure to meet their demands for greater freedoms' (*TDN*, 31 March 2006), while Bahçeli described the violent riots as 'the price for Erdoğan's Diyarbakir adventure' (i.e. the 'meeting with intellectuals', *ibid*). In this context, popular anti-PKK sentiment grows and soldiers' funerals are inundated with placards demanding action in the form of tougher anti-terror laws (*TDN*, 11 April 2006) that could limit freedoms anew. Meanwhile, Özkök issued a statement confirming the TAF's guardianship role, even though it did not reveal specific intentions: 'We love the people of the region. We are the commanders of all regions. We serve the whole nation.' Yet how is the nation best served? By navigating through the difficulties of EU demands and arriving, finally, at the Second Republic, that may or may not include EU membership? Or by protecting national unity,

integrity and pride? The inherent contradictions in Atatürk's legacy are difficult to resolve, but Erdoğan's democratising westernisation seeks to sail around them.

Democratisation, however, is a tricky concept. For some in Turkey, 'more democracy generally means more Islam' (*NYT*, 25 September 2005), yet for others, more Islam automatically means less democracy. Hence the question of whether the Kemalist Republic can harmonise with the *acquis communautaire* and still be the same state is charged and pertinent. If the only vehicle that can take Turkey into the EU is the Second Republic, membership loses its appeal for many. Many agree with Mango's (2000) belief that the purpose of each state is good governance and EU demands may be compromising the Turkish state's ability to fulfil this purpose. '[H]uman rights lobbyists must ask themselves... whether the reforms they urge will enhance or diminish good governance, and law and order, without which freedom cannot flourish.' Here Mango raises the question of whether those demanding sacrifices from Turkey have the foresight and ability to navigate through difficult and unpredictable situations that Atatürk had. The conviction that Atatürk's genius cannot be replicated, therefore his legacy should not be interfered with, is common. The position is anachronistic, as the options and international realities facing Atatürk were hardly comparable with the ones facing Turkey today. Therefore, many believe that reform is long overdue. For them, the EU is a useful anchor and trigger for much-needed reform: for them, the advent of the Second Republic is good news.

For Kubicek (2005:366), Turkey's elites have long favoured drastic reform, even if they rarely choose the 'Second Republic' phraseology in its support. Hence reform occurs even though the people remain indifferent or hostile to it. Elites, however, are not uniformly in favour of reform. Turkey now resembles, according to Barlas (*S*, 18 October 2003), a car with two drivers – the elected and the appointed – each with their own agenda and steering wheel. Accidents are bound to occur. Although both drivers are headed for 'democracy', the term, as we have seen, means different things to different groups. Erdoğan seeks to amalgamate these trends by marrying eight decades' worth of Republican legacies. Erdoğan's (2004b) 'conservative democracy' borrows from traditional Kemalism, rejecting 'interest' politics and claiming to represent the whole nation; it emulates ANAP-style inclusiveness and avoids Erbakan's mistakes. Conservative democracy is not an ideology, it is a survival guide,

as the AKP is determined to carry out 'reforms of a revolutionary nature' (Gül, 2005b) *and* preserve the peace between the civilian and military establishments. Opting for the thoroughly Kemalist path of a 'revolution from above', while stressing its electoral mandate and continued popular support (Gül, 2005e), the AKP has limited the TAF's political leverage, enhanced rights and freedoms and declared zero tolerance to torture (*H*, 17 March 2004).

Yet during Gül's (2005e) London School of Economics speech, a small but vocal demonstration by the Haklar ve Özgürlükler Cephesi protesting police brutality and torture was raging outside the lecture hall. Gül's assurances notwithstanding, the AKP revolution still has some way to go. The AKP's balancing act does not always work. The AKP is in tune with the population's socially conservative elements, such as the potentially pious urban poor, rural masses and new capitalists. In fact, the European Stability Initiative Report (2005:6) finds that the AKP 'is in many respects a political reflection of the values and ambitions that have shaped the Anatolian Tigers'. Yet the party does not always retain the confidence of 'coastal' elites, secularists and Kemalists. But their confidence remains necessary as reform has not gone far enough to hail the advent of a Second Republic.

While the AKP is eager to stress that everything is under control and the EU path remains undisturbed, the only problems faced being difficulties inherent in the process (*TP*, 6 May & 5 June 2006; *Z*, 12 June 2006), the eventual extent of reform is still a moot point. Radical as change may have been, the existing system is so far being 'updated', not replaced. The advent of the Second Republic requires individualism – and corresponding rights and freedoms – to replace collectivism and EU-style liberal democracy to replace the secular Republic. Until then, structural reform will affect but not alter the normative core of political legitimacy. The Republic's agenda and priorities remain the same. Erdoğan is currently negotiating the meaning and practical translation of certain items on this agenda, but his position is yet to win the day.

As legitimacy is a language of constraints and opportunities for the articulation of power arrangements and political choices, the normative framework of legitimacy can change. In Turkey such change would entail radical legal reform, the re-training of judges and educators and the gradual replacement of spatial symbolic narratives and

socialisation discourses. In short, such change would require more reform and more time than it has been given thus far. But is there support for such change?

Elites and citizens remain divided. The actual aim of reform, EU accession aside, remains frustratingly unstated. *Because* reform was legitimised in terms of EU accession, no alternative justification for its desirability has been articulated. Although support for the reform process irrespective of the EU exists, it springs from a multitude of often-contradictory rationales. If EU hopes are frustrated, the reform effort will have to be assessed on its own merits, and discussing the Second Republic may become appropriate. Yet Turkey's ability to do this will depend on what brought its EU ambitions to an end: a conscious decision at home, EU rejection or a coup?

Following the Şemdinli case, speculation regarding civilian-military relations reached fever pitch. Following the 17 May 2006 attack on the State Council and a judge's death, tensions between the Islamists and secularists are rising. Erdoğan criticised those who linked this attack to the headscarf question. Phrasing his statement carefully, the premier spoke of organised crime and likened this attack to the Susurluk affair, unmistakably referring to the 'deep state' (Z, 24 & 31 May 2006). Deputy Prime Minister Sahin spoke of illegal individuals and organisations thinking they are protecting the state while actually harming it. Erdoğan concurred, claiming that these attacks were targeted at his government (Z, 24 May 2006; E, 25 & 27 May 2006).

Two issues are at hand here. Firstly, the TAF are complaining that after the attack, the government seemed more concerned to inform the media of developments than the TAF (TP & E, 5 June 2006). Given the security implications of this attack, this is more than a violation of protocol, but Sahin denies the accusations, stressing the government's commitment to helping security personnel at this juncture (Z, *ibid*). Secondly, speculation regarding an attempted or potential coup against the AKP is gaining momentum. As serving officers are currently under investigation by the TAF, as well as civilian authorities, conspiracy theories are rife. Istanbul-based Greek journalist Aris Abatzis is convinced that the AKP has won the animosity of both the TÜSİAD, over 'disrupted' channels of state patronage, and the TAF, mainly over the question of secularism, and current events are part of a concerted, albeit hitherto unsuccessful, effort to destabilise Erdoğan's government (E, 3 & 5 June 2006).

The secularists' lack of faith in the AKP's suitability to lead the accession process is no secret. The possibility that they may withdraw their support for the unqualified pursuit of EU membership cannot be ruled out. Events such as the 17 May or the Şemdinli attacks, regardless of who perpetrated them, prove one thing: that Turkey's EU harmonisation is far from over and that it is increasingly undesirable to more and more people. Abdullah Cevdet² famously stated in 1913: 'There is no second civilisation, civilisation means European civilisation, and it must be imported with both its roses and its thorns' (quoted in Rustow, 1997:59). Having followed this legacy to the letter, Turkey is actually wondering whether one universal civilisation actually exists. The answer to this puzzle could potentially derail both accession and the reform effort.

Turkey felt discriminated against from the outset as EU decision-makers made its accession conditional not only on normal criteria, but on a series of extra issues such as improving relations with Greece and resolving the Cyprus issue. The AKP government accepted the challenge of trying to deliver results on both these issues without compromising national pride. Having scored a moral victory with the Cyprus referendum, Erdoğan's government stumbled on the question of recognising the Republic of Cyprus, now an EU member state, and extending the Customs Union to include a country that hitherto did not exist for Ankara. Which he grudgingly did³.

Relations with Greece are equally sensitive, especially as a recent accident over the Aegean (inside FIR Athens but outside Greek national airspace) caused the ill feeling of previous decades to resurface. A mock battle between Greek and Turkish fighters in May 2006, a sad but frequent occurrence, resulted in the death of one pilot. Although Greece has not threatened to veto Turkey's EU ambitions as a result, the atmosphere is tense. Greek President Karolos Papoulias accused Turkey of disrespecting international legislation (*ibid*), while Greek politicians brought the recognition of Cyprus to bear on the resolution of this incident (*E*, 1 June 2006). Meanwhile, Turkey stressed that the aircraft were on a training mission that NATO was informed of. Turkey also made demands, later retracted, for concessions on Cyprus (*E*, 18, 24 May & 1 June 2006). Complicating matters further, Greece is

² Founding CUP member.

³ <http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,421168,00.html>

adamant the Turkish side is to blame (*E*, 24 May 2006), while the Turkish Foreign Ministry launched an inquiry warning it will eventually demand compensation from Greece (*TDN*, 15 June 2006), exacerbating an already tense atmosphere. It is exactly these tensions that the EU wants resolved before accession. Yet, ironically, it seems such problems can only be resolved after accession, when border control no longer is as overriding a national priority. That was Özkök's message after a similar incident in 2003 (*M*, 18 October 2003) and Greek Air Force pilots agree, embracing Turkey's EU membership as the only solution to this ongoing low-intensity war (*E*, 25 May 2006).

This aside, objective criteria seem to be applied more rigorously to Turkey. Nothing else can explain why former Communist states, with weaker governance structures and rickety economies, overtook Turkey on the accession ladder. Adding insult to injury, these countries were former foes, against whom Turkey stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the forever-ungrateful West⁴. As Turkey keeps urging the EU to be true to its signature and promise (*TNA*, 4 August 2005; *Z*, 8 August 2005; *S*, 27 August 2005; *H*, 13 June 2006), the fear of not being accepted is intense. This plays on anxieties regarding the projection of Turkey's European image abroad (*TDN*, 13 December 2003; *Z*, 14 June 2005), and also fuels intense introspection regarding Turkey's identity, the relative significance of Islam and the West in it and the possibility that the EU might simply be biased. In a post-9/11 world, this question is not easy to answer. Turkey has nationalised Islam and embraced the West, being neither Islamic nor Western, yet retaining characteristics from and partly identifying with both civilisational paradigms. Erdoğan, however, fears that the Europeans may subscribe to Huntington's clash of civilisations, making this position untenable.

Erdoğan increasingly speaks of 'civilisations' seeking to live in harmony rather than cultures co-existing within one civilisation (*WSJ*, 18 March 2006). This is not a simple semantic difference; it constitutes a potentially huge revision of Atatürk's legacy. When asking the EU to be a place where different civilisations meet and not an exclusive Western club; when he urges, after the cartoons of the Prophet incident early in 2006, an alliance of civilisations (*IHT*, 5 February 2006; *TP*, 26 September 2005; *TDN*, 22 June 2004), he is departing from Kemalist universalism. Erdoğan is implying that if the West denies the existence of universality *à la Atatürk* then, to all

⁴ Turkish Foreign Office, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adab/relations.htm](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adab/rerelations.htm)

intents and purposes, it does not exist. Hence it is not the AKP rejecting Atatürk's belief in civilisation as an umbrella covering all cultures, but rather the West itself.

What does national pride dictate in this case? Atatürk's westernisation was courageous in a country ravaged by war and bitter at the West's imperialist incursions on Ottoman soil. But Atatürk preached westernisation despite the West and, in a way, against it. Although recognition of Turkey's equal status would be the ultimate proof of success, modernisation's true aim was survival and national greatness. The West was a model. But if a model becomes irrelevant, then it simply gets replaced. Westernisation in the abstract can be pursued outside and irrespective of the EU. Atatürk's legacy, preaching pride in Turkey's uniqueness, may inspire an unwillingness to *become* what the EU demands. If the Republican 'hard-drive' is incompatible with EU-sponsored software, why was the assumption that the Republic should change so easily made – especially when Europe itself seems to be abandoning the European enlightenment project for a guarded, insular identity?

Turkey has westernised; it is secular, but culturally Muslim and is currently undergoing momentous reform that could stop at any point or continue until the Republic is fundamentally transformed and modernisation meets secularism once again, when neither is necessary as policy any longer as their aims have been achieved. For that to happen, the debate over whether the EU represents the logical conclusion of Atatürk's legacy needs to be resolved and reform needs to be decoupled from membership and discussed in its own right. With ever-decreasing support for Turkey's EU membership in Europe (*TNA*, October 4 & 19 July 2005; *CSM*, 14 June 2004), the best time to do that is now – before a potential EU rejection makes reforms seem like a concession to external intervention and before fears regarding US policies and the instability of Iraq inspire a more inward-looking stance in Turkey. Increasing national(ist) frustrations within Turkey with EU indecision and US estrangement could lead to reorientation away from the West.

The AKP's motto, that nobody is free unless everybody is free, exposes standard categories for analysing Turkish social and political development (modernisers vs traditionalists; elites vs the people) as redundant. It also exposes the over-reliance of Kemalist westernisation narratives on symbols – sometimes over substance (Cizre &

Çinar, 2003:310). In doing so, the question of whether the EU is resisting Turkey's accession not because it is Muslim, but because it is Kemalist, is raised.

Constant EU requests for human and minority rights protection⁵ are a case in point. Turkey is a democracy where the rule of law prevails. What to EU observers looks like a poor human rights' record may actually be the legal protection of collectivism at the expense of individualism. Although many EU demands, such as prison reform and the prevention of torture, have no bearing on Kemalist principles, the individualism and multiculturalism underlying EU legislation comes into conflict, not with Turkey's Muslim identity, but with its Kemalist legacies. Recent research by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (2005:63, 65) shows that incompatibility with the EU arises not because of Turkey's Muslims, but because of the nature of its state's secularism, which is also blamed for the existence of political Islam in Turkey in the first place. For the EU, the report concludes, the problem is not one of religion's influence on the state but 'the influence of the state on religion'. Once again, the problem seems to be Kemalism. In other words, EU accession *ipso facto* necessitates the advent of the Second Republic.

Turkey did not sign up for regime change, even though many Western observers keep losing sight of that fact, thinking that the Turkish state is as malleable as collapsed post-Soviet states. This discourse, even when employed in Turkey's favour, often smacks of latter-day colonialism (e.g. see *G*, 26 September 2005). The issue at hand is that if Kemalism is the reason why the EU does not want Turkey, Kemalism may well be the reason why Turkey will reject the EU in turn. While membership retains friends at home and supporters abroad (e.g. Jack Straw's article, *IHT*, 9 September 2005), Kemalism is being renegotiated – and alongside it, so is normative purpose of politics. This does not mark the advent of the Second Republic, yet it represents Turkey's 'third way'.

⁵ European Commission Information Database, www.fifoost.org/en/index.php

Conclusions, Turkey's 'Third Way'?

The first half of this thesis shows that nationality, history and political experience in Turkey are mediated through the language of Kemalism. I analyse the narratives, anxieties and priorities of this language, used extensively for socialisation and state-sponsored national narratives, and demonstrate that this language is embedded in and protected by constitutional and legal provisions and used, alongside its corresponding values, by judges, generals and the President when performing their duties. The distinction between Kemalism as a language and Kemalism as a set of values is vital because, although the language is accessible, extensively used and negotiated, not everyone subscribes to Kemalist values.

The second half of my thesis demonstrates, firstly, how those who subscribe to these values seek to uphold them and, secondly, how those who espouse the language but seek to revisit the values go about instigating debate. Meanwhile, I demonstrate that the 'debate' is not entirely verbal, as policies, court orders and violent incidents make powerful 'statements' that influence the direction of this negotiation.

This analysis begs the question of whether it is actually useful to describe the Turkish state as 'Kemalist'. According to Tostendahl (1992:12), a state is a network structure, changing according to circumstances and with 'no lasting content of [its] own'; it is a social reality shaped by contingency. Erdoğan disagrees: states should be value-free structures, yet often they are not, failing to realise that ideological states are a thing of the past (Erdoğan in *TP*, 3 April 2005). Although speaking about Communism in the Ukraine, Erdoğan's reference to Kemalism at home was thinly disguised.

Yet Kemalism, even for those who embrace it as a doctrine, remains imprecise and incoherent; a language for politics rather than a blueprint for action. Turkey is not an ideological state, even though Kemalist concerns are written into the Turkey's Constitution and reflected in the recruitment practices and code of conduct of most of the state's core bodies. However, Kemalism as a language *is* the medium through which Turkish politics is conducted. Even Öcalan expressed loyalty to Atatürk during his trial and Erbakan claimed that, were Atatürk alive, he would be a member of the Welfare Party (White, 2002:134), proving the almost automatic legitimising effect of such appeals.

Kemalist signifiers and nationalist narratives are unquestionably dominant in Turkey. But what are they? Kemalism is contradictory and can fuel conflicting policies as it blends civic and primordial appeals to nationality; it simultaneously urges Turks to resist the West and join it; and it is willing to marginalise religiosity while using religion. Nevertheless, until recently this potential for conflict did not complicate everyday political exchanges, as military officers, law-makers, educators and jurists all interpret Atatürk's legacy in a standard and coherent fashion. Increasingly, however, the language is being used creatively rather than deferentially. National symbols are popular currency, used independently of specific political meaning and, as a result, potentially used for different purposes and incompatible causes. The AKP is currently exploring its boundaries and applications and, in doing so, revisits Republican political imperatives and assumptions via legitimate channels. This depends on making sure that the AKP's legitimation rests on Kemalism but does not fully rely on it.

Hence the AKP constantly stresses its democratic legitimacy and popular mandate acquired in 2002 and enhanced after the 2004 local elections (*E*, 29 & 30 March 2004) as a reminder for officers, judges and political opponents¹. Secondly, the AKP utilises the *de facto* legitimacy of westernisation to pursue, more successfully than any previous government, Turkish-EU *rapprochement* earning them the admiration of foreign governments and businessmen (*Z*, 9 June 2005) as well as the EU². At home, Erdoğan's westernisation drive may be under fire for being too yielding (*M & TDN*, 19 June 2005; *TDN*, 6 June 2005), but the legitimacy of its final objective is not yet questioned. This gives Erdoğan some leeway to use Kemalist republican nationalism as a third strand of legitimation in ways that diverge from the language's established uses and, slowly but surely, open the debate over the meaning of nationalism, secularism, westernisation and republicanism. Erdoğan's reforms have changed Turkish politics. His linguistic acrobatics have initiated a process of negotiation over normative issues. The question now is how far-reaching and long-lasting this will be.

¹ Apart from constant verbal reminders, AKP opponents have occasionally felt the sting of its power. For instance, the AKP removed procedural concerns that had previously halted proceedings so that Yılmaz and Taner could face trial (see *TDN*, 9 July 2005).

² See bibliography for Commission Reports.

For *Turkish Daily News* (28 April 2004) reporters, the change is already revolutionary as public service veterans openly criticise Turkey's rigid state model. This openness, however, is not fully attributable to the AKP and is heavily conditioned by EU-membership ambitions. Hence, if Turkey fails to join the EU, the future of this reform effort is not assured; although the reasons behind such a failure will be of vital significance. If Turkey 'fails' the European test, as Wolf suggests it might³ (*FT*, 19 October 2004), then the AKP will be discredited and westernisation might be recast in a different mould, but Kemalism, as a set of priorities, will not have suffered too serious a blow. If, however, Turkey abandons the EU process because of a perceived European 'exclusionism' or if the EU terminates it because of exclusionism, then three scenarios emerge: the Kemalists may offer a re-vamped 'modern despite the West' narrative; Kemalism's universalist appeals may appear relativised, thus bringing the broadening of the linguistic terrain pioneered by the AKP to the fore, enabling alternative conceptualisations of the future and modernity to be explored; or a conservative backlash may turn Turkey away from the West and modernity.

It is too soon to speak of the AKP's triumph: the party has been flamboyant, but has it been successful? For Ercan Çitlioğlu (*TNA*, 7 July 2005), the AKP's legitimation is precarious and bound to falter. Its Kemalism has convinced no one, while 'borrowing' legitimacy from the EU drive has meant that policy success is often measured abroad, ignoring frustrations at home. In fact, Çitlioğlu believes, in order to deal with such frustrations, the AKP lied to the people regarding the success of the EU drive – lies that have propelled the AKP forward, but that are bound to be exposed sooner or later.

Meanwhile, reform proceeds slowly but surely, introducing legislation based on individualism and human rights under a constitutional umbrella premised on collectivism and national expediency. The tension between these principles, implicit in the way Erdoğan chooses to employ Kemalist terminology, cannot be ignored for much longer. Courts will need to implement legislation and instances comparable to the Pamuk trial, minus the publicity that saved the day on that particular occasion, are bound to occur. Yet the issue at hand is not new. The tension between Westernising

³ Wolf notes that although inflation has fallen, the country's growth performance does not allow for convergence with the EU average. If Turkey joins pre-convergence, its size and poverty will cause 'unmanageable stress' for the Union.

Republican traditions and Kemalism's dismissive populism, strict secularism and modernisation from above was present since the Republic's proclamation and is reflected in the constitution, national narratives and the TAF's agenda. The question is whether the time has come to resolve it.

Kemalist military and civilian elites have long harboured a distinct lack of trust towards the people's understanding, ability and readiness to defend the secular Republic and have taken it upon themselves to ensure the Republic's continued survival. The Kemalists underestimate their people. Yet they also underestimate the ability of their own socialising mechanisms to ensure the internalisation of national republican narratives – especially as some interpreted the failure of strict secularism to take root as a wholesale failure of the Kemalist project. Kemalism may be an indivisible whole for Kemalists, but for the Turkish people 'Kemalism' is a social reality and, as such, multi-faceted and flexible. This effectively means that the best defence against any threat is the republic; not the Republic as an abstraction distilled from Atatürk's legacy, but the citizens in their rich variety.

Many find this confidence difficult to sustain due to renewed violence in the Southeast, fears regarding the Islamists and a precarious international situation: the EU remains non-committal, relations with the US have not improved and a war has been simmering on Turkey's borders for three years. In theory, flexible Kemalist language in its current 'widened' status could be the best vehicle for restoring a balanced set of priorities. If, however, the current negotiation process is interrupted by violent incidents at home or a rejection abroad, this may not be an option.

So where does all this leave Turkey? While some Kemalists deny the existence of a Kemalist language in favour of an imagined infallible doctrine, they simultaneously fuel the language's continued utilisation in public life by accepting its currency regardless of who uses it. The resulting negotiation of terms, priorities and assumptions is the fate of any living language. This negotiation is slowly extending to issues of great normative importance, proving that the Kemalist language is flexible and popular, regardless of what the TAF think or fear. Public actors ensure Kemalism's reproduction and reaffirmation through constant use. Academics, jurists, judges and journalists ensure the reproduction of a perceived national truth by remaining loyal to it. As long as such narratives are open to renegotiation and re-

appropriation, Turkey's normative debates can proceed gradually and peacefully. This will necessitate two things: that laws, educational provisions, artistic output and political discourse are allowed to respond to social change; and that Kemalism's guardians accept that those who do not accept Kemalism wholesale do not necessarily reject it. Turkey's 'third way' starts with the acceptance that the republican experiment has worked. The revolution from above can now cease, regardless of the EU saga's final outcome.

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Appendix



Figure 1 - Republic Monument, Taksim Square



Figure 2 - Istanbul University



Figure 3 – Istanbul, Topkapı



Figure 4 - Istanbul, Yedikule



Figure 5 – ‘Turk Be Proud, Work, Trust’, School in Foça



Figure 6 - 'The Foundation of the Turkish Republic is Culture', İzmir Ethnographic Museum




Figure 7 - Atatürk's House in Salonica



Figure 8 - Replica of Atatürk's House, Ankara



Figure 9 - Ankara's Ethnographic Museum



Figure 10 - Kocatepe Mosque, Ankara



Figure 11 - Ankara Municipality Logo



Figure 12 – Anıtkabir




Figure 13 – ibid



Figure 14 – Istanbul, Dolmabahçe



Figure 15 - War of Independence Museum, Ankara




Figure 16 - Ulus Square, Ankara



Figure 17 - Ankara's Güven Parkı



Figure 18 – Ankara, Atatürk Bulvarı



Figure 19 – Ankara, Ministry of Justice



Figure 20 – Ankara, Doğa Parkı



Figure 21 – Ankara, Kuşulu Parkı



Figure 22 – Türk Telecom advert



Figure 23 – Ankara, Sıhhiye