(POST)COLONIAL EGYPT &

ITS SIMULACRA OF LIBERATION

A Capture of Revolutionary Desire

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ABSTRACT

What is the revolutionary event and what tongue does its desire speak? Can we really understand and analyse revolutionary events through a logic of representation that works through processes of Identification and Signification? This thesis challenges assumptions that the revolutionary event/experience can be thought through the logic of Representation/Signification/Identification. It does so by highlighting the continuities between the colonial and post-colonial moments in Egypt. In this, it critiques both modern thought and modern political thought and their assumption that the regime of Representation and its Symbolic Simulations of experience remains an unescapable subjective panopticon. Indeed, the thesis proposes to look at revolutionary events as moments that challenge the Simulation and its production of experiences as simulacra. To his end the research asks the following question: *Is (post)-Colonial revolutionary thought thinking revolutionary events/experiences as their colonial simulacra?* To explore this problematic of liberation, the research looks at three series of times that all share a similar temporal sequencing of space: the Modern Fold. The thesis starts its analysis of the mode of subjectivations that keep thought prisoner of its Simulation by looking at the modern colonisation of Egypt. It then moves into postcolonialism and explores the continuities between the Nasserist and Colonial Symbolics by highlighting how they both function by Oedipalizing desire. Its third moment looks at the thought of Sayyid Qutb as an illustration of a thought that challenges postcolonial reality and beyond it, modern reality as a Simulation. However, as the research highlights, Qutb's moment of escape turns into a line of death. So, can revolutionary desire free itself from the Symbolics of Simulation and their

capture of desire? Perhaps, the thesis concludes, if we move from a paranoid to a Schizoid semiotic assemblage.

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INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER PART I
KHALED SAEED AND THE SUFFOCATION OF REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE/EVENT

INTRODUCTION

In 2011, Khaled Saeed was smashed to death; but the Egyptian security forces covered up this fact.[1] They came up with an alternative version for his death; they replaced the real moments with a simulation. The initial post-mortem examination concluded he had swallowed a packet of hash he had been carrying. A police investigation co-signed the verdict: he had died by self-inflicted suffocation.[2] Despite the Simulation, Egyptians hung on to this fact: that Khaled Saeed had been killed. The State's attempts to cover-up his actual death were failing. A simulation cannot determine the real; it can only simulate its real as the real.

Fast-forward to 2014, and two policemen were convicted of Saeed's death. His murder could now be signified as a fact in/of law.[3] The 2011 Egyptian revolution had dislocated the Signified/Image that the State had chosen to represent Saeed's death– he had suffocated on hash- and exposed it as a cover-up, a distorted copy, a simulacrum. In denouncing the

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1 Khaled Saeed was a young whistle-blower. He was in Alexandria when on June 6, 2011 he caught the police in an act of corruption and filmed them. He then went to an internet café to upload his video on the internet, but the police had been on his track. They found him in the café, took him to a police station where they beat him to death. he was just 28 years old. Ahram online, "Khaled Said the Face that Launched the Revolution", June 6, 2012, *Ahram online*, accessible from: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/43995/Egypt/Politics-/Khaled-Said-The-face-that-launched-a-revolution.aspx

2 Aswat Masriya, "Allegations of police torture spark outrage", December 02, 2015, Aswatmasriya *online,* accessible from: http://www.aswatmasriya.com/en/news/details/3323

3 This thesis does not support the disciplinary function of law and as we will see in the conclusion, problematises the very notion of responsibility. However, it also highlights how an organic revolutionary event was able to produce a semiotic dislocation by using law as a determinant of the Real: Khaled Saeed had been murdered, tortured to death.

simulacrum that had been made of Khaled Saeed's last moments, millions of Egyptians denounced the simulacrum that the official reality - the reality advocated by the State, its laws, its officials - had become. Through their gatherings, their slogans, their screams, their bodies, their arts, their blogs, their social media posts, their videos, they denounced, outlined, explained, exposed a simulation that silenced the real of their experience, that suppressed it from its discourse on reality. The Simulation was losing its power of affection; the revolutionary event/experience was dislocating it.

The Egyptian revolution opened up a tear that exposed how the Simulation masked the real and substituted itself for the real. Liberation had never really happened. This tear was somehow allowing people to breathe again because beyond the veneer of neo-liberalism, they had been gasping for air. By suffocating the reality of Saeed's death, the Egyptian State had exposed one of its vilest articulatory practice: it silenced experience by suffocating it with its simulacrum. [4] Through this practice, the state totalizes individual experience: it subjectivizes/subjectifies people into its Simulation through repression. Repression traumatizes; Repression crushes the real; it silences it. The police had smashed Khaled Saeed because he was exposing reality as a simulacrum. Postcolonialism, Justice, Modernity, Independence, they were all still colonial simulacra. Although in appearances, things looked different, in-itself, not much had changed.

In his written works, Frantz Fanon denounced how repression crushes individual subjectivities and bodies and through this crushing, imprints them.[5] This imprint can be so profound, it pathologizes. *Black Skin White Masks* denounces colonialism as a Simulation.[6] It coequally attests of its maddening imprinting. It is as dangerous to be subjectivized/subjected into it as it is to come out of it: in both cases, one's sense of reality is vacillating. There is,

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4 The thesis draws from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in its use of the concept of 'articulatory practice' In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, Laclau and Mouffe critique the ways in traditional political thought, including Marxism, assumes that the concept of 'society' exists as a totality that determines the meaning and identity of each elements that constitute it. In contrast, they argue that the totalisation of the social is impossible since the social itself does not have an essence (HSS, p.95, p96). They thus use the concept of articulation to mean 'any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice', (HSS, p.105). See Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, (London: Verso, 2013).
5 See for example, Khalfa, Jean, Young, Robert, (Ed.), Corcoran, Steve (Trans.) , *Alienation and Freedom*, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing 2018); Frantz, Fanon, Charles, Lam Markmann (Trans.), *Black Skin, White Masks*, (London: Pluto Press, 2008); Frantz Fanon, *Les Damnes de la Terre*, Paris: La decourvete, 2002) and in English, *The Wretched of the Earth*, (London:Penguin Classice, 2001), Frantz *Fanon A Dying Colonialism*, (New York: Grove Press, 1994) , Frantz Fanon, Haakon Chevalier (Trans.) *Toward the African Revolution,* (New York: Grove Press, 1988); Fanon, Frantz, Nigel C. Gibson (Ed.), *Decolonizing Madness: The Psychiatric Writings of Frantz Fanon* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015),
6Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, see for example p.42, p.92, p.101, p.173, p.210,

however, an essential difference between these two states of being. One's subjectivation/subjectification into the colonial Simulation dislocates the individual's sense of being-in-the-world and being-in-themselves. In contrast, attempts to come out of the Simulation implies a vital momentum: a struggle against the colonial Symbolic and its suffocation of reality. Indeed, for Fanon, on more levels than one, suffocation is a colonial articulatory practice and the anti-colonial struggle a resistance against this suffocation:

"Ce n'est pas parce que l'Indochinois a découvert une culture propre qu'il s'est révolté. C'est parce que « tout simplement » il lui devenait, à plus d'un titre, impossible de respirer"[7]

Alternatively:

"It is not because the Indo-Chinese has discovered a culture of his own that he is in revolt. It is because "quite simply" it was, in more than one way, becoming impossible for him to breathe."[8]

Things were not fine; things had not been fine. The persistence of suffocation as a statist articulatory practice could only mean one thing: the postcolonial era had remained pathologically colonial. Khaled Saeed's last moments were now a percept of the transhistorical experience of millions of people: they could not breathe anymore. How could the colonial Simulation continue to reproduce itself after Egypt's independence? In both *Black Skin White Masks* and *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon's works emphasize how topologically, colonial space expands long past its geographical boundaries. Colonial space even colonizes affects: its discourse subjectivizes individuals by affecting how they experience themselves and the world. Colonial space; thus, coextensively articulates itself as a social time or a Symbolic order that enframes subjectivity. Colonial space expands into thinking:

"Je me découvre un jour dans un monde où les choses font mal; un monde où l'on me réclame de me battre; un monde où il est toujours question d'anéantissement ou de victoire."[9]
Alternatively:

"I find myself – I, a man – in a world where words wrap themselves in silence; in a world where the other endlessly hardens himself." [10]

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7 Fanon, *Peau Noire, Masques Blancs*, p.182
8 Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, p.176
9 Fanon, *Peau noire masques blancs,* p.185
10 Ibid., p.178

As a social time that delineates the frontiers of subjectivity and thus of its thought and its speech, colonial space structures both the conscious and unconscious:

"Nous espérons avoir montré qu'il n'en est rien et qu'en fait cet inconscient collectif est culturel, c'est-à-dire acquis. De même qu'un jeune campagnard des Carpathes, dans les conditions physico-chimiques de la région, verra apparaître chez lui un myxcedème, de même un nègre comme René Maran, ayant vécu en France, respiré, ingéré les mythes et préjugés de l'Europe raciste, assimilé l'inconscient collectif de cette Europe, ne pourra, s'il se dédouble, que constater sa haine du nègre."

Alternatively:

"I have shown […] that in fact, the collective unconscious is cultural, which means acquired. Just as a young mountaineer of the Carpathians, under the physico-chemical conditions of his country, is likely to develop a myxedema, so a Negro like René Maran, who has lived in France and breathed and eaten the myths and prejudices of racist Europe, and assimilated the collective unconscious of that Europe, will be able, if he stands outside himself, to express only his hatred of the Negro."[11]

With Fanon, colonial space and colonial time form a continuum, this is why the colonial Simulation can pass as the real. Colonialism simulates itself as the real by articulating itself as a continuum of discourse, thought, and reality. Conjointly, as Fanon explains, this colonial continuum permeates the conscious and unconscious of the body politics that it subjectivizes. It becomes a regime of truth.

"Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.

In societies like ours, the 'political economy' of truth is characterized by five important

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11 Ibid., p.145

traits. 'Truth' is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement (the demand for truth, as much for economic production as for political power); it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, notwithstanding certain strict limitations); it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); lastly, it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation ('ideological' struggles) ."[12]

The colonial regime of truth takes up a spectrum that starts with a white race as its most progressive and a black race as its most digressive. It is by acting as a regime of truth that mediates our sense of reality, that colonialism subjectivizes its historicity into our becoming. The becoming of colonialism is contingent on a mystification of the real; colonization unfolds by mythologizing experience. Colonial representations/concepts/myths mediate experience. In Egypt, for example, Lord Cromer described Egyptian peasants as ignorant and stupid. This ignorant, stupid peasant is the Fellahin of the colonial discourse:

"The Egyptian Oriental is quite one of the most stupid… in the world…stupidity, not cunning is his chief characteristic."[13] The fellah is blinded by "a thick mist of ignorance and misrepresentation."[14]

Picking up from Cromer's logic, it must have been because:

"[T]here can be no doubt that it is in the hand of England which first raised him from the abject moral and material condition in which he had for centuries wallowed"[15]
that:

"In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the people of Egypt were made inmates in their own villages … The village was to be run like a barracks, its inhabitants placed under

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12 Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power, interview with Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino", In Michel Foucault, Colin Gordon (ed), *Power/Knowledge, Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-77, Michel Foucault*, (New York: Pantheon Books, c1980), p.131
13 Lufti al-Sayyid, Afaf, *Egypt and Cromer, a Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations*, (London: John Murray, 1968), p.77
14 Ibid.
15 Lord Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Rpt. New Edition, 1 vol_, (London: Macmillan & Co limited, 1911), p.613

the surveillance of guards night and day, and under the supervision of inspectors as they cultivated the land – and surrendered to the government warehouse its produce."[16]

The colonial Symbolic mythologizes reality, and coloniality concretizes this mythologization. It gives the reality to the Colonial Symbolic order. The colonized were becoming a pre-condition of colonial historicity: their future could only actualize itself as anteriority. They were being turned into the *Totems and Taboos* of the European collective unconscious.[17] Fanon explains that while all the colonial subjects are mystified, the white colonizer has a power of mystification over the colonized. The white colonizer is mystified by colonial thought and its discourse. By embracing it and enacting it as a reality, they mystify the colonized into a Signified of colonial symbolic. By embracing the colonial Simulation, the white colonizer helps simulate colonialism as the only (real) possible. They help make the absurd pass for the real. For the white colonizer, the reality of the Simulation is ego-boosting since it reifies their whiteness as a power of superiority, as a deserving better, as a being freer, more affluent, more likeable, more beautiful, more modern, kinder, more intelligent, more developed, more civilized…more. The ideal-Is or specular images that the colonial Symbolic produces for the colonizer are narcissistically boosting. They project a colonizer who is thriving, who is enjoying, who is powerful. The white subjects have an incentive: colonial reality offers them the possibility of becoming the concrete representation of the good of the system, of the truth of its goodness.

Nevertheless, there is a steep price to pay. In failing to problematizes the Simulation and in asserting its reality, white colonizers induce their mystification. Colonization subjectivizes people into colonial concepts; it petrifies them. In doing so, colonial thought covers reality; it superimposes discourse as an experience over the real. The White Masks colonize Black Skin:

"Vous arrivez trop tard, beaucoup trop tard. Il y aura toujours un monde — blanc — entre vous et nous... Cette impossibilité pour l'autre de liquider une fois pour toutes le passé. On comprend que, devant cette ankylose affective du Blanc, j'ai pu décider de pousser mon cri nègre. Petit à petit, lançant çà et là des pseudopodes, je sécrétai une race."[18]

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16 Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, (University of California Press, c1988), p.32
17 Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo: some points of agreement between the mental lives of savages and neurotics,* (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1975)
18 Fanon, *Peau noire, masques blancs*, p.178-9

Alternatively:

"There will always be a world- a white world- between you and us. The other's total inability to liquidate the past once and for all. In the face of this affective ankylosis of the white man, it is understandable that I could have made up my mind to utter my Negro cry. Little by little, putting out pseudopodia here and there, I secreted a race."[19]

This race that the colonized secreted was nothing but a white phantasm:

"But the English man is a Western albeit an Anglo-Saxon Western, and from the point of view of all process of reasoning, the gulf which separates any one member of the European family from another is infinitely less wide than that which divides all Westerns from all Orientals."[20]

For Fanon, the anti-colonial struggle is an élan vital against colonial phantasmatic petrification. It emerges at a very advanced stage of colonial pathologizing: after its cultural myxedema, affective ankylosis, after its pseudopodia, its phobogenesis, and its epidermisation.[21] It comes when the colonized cannot breathe anymore.

How had we gotten there? How could colonial concepts act as the ideals against which we measure(d), apprehend(ed) and sense(d) existence? How was the colonial Symbolic able to *en*fold subjectivity in its Simulation? Cromer's discourse unveils it all: thought processed the Simulation as reality. Thought had determined that "from the point of view of all process of reasoning" races were real, they were a 'fact'. Thought had produced social Signifiers that hierarchically re-organized human beings according to a racial spectrum. Thought simulated a white race as its most progressive form of experience and a black race as its most digressive.

A colonial System had colonized thought, in both its conscious and unconscious state. But this had supposedly all ended with the postcolonial turn. What happened to postcolonialism? In our collective history/memory, postcolonialism represents a movement out of colonialism and its coloniality. In Egypt, the Nasserist Revolution represents the

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19 Fanon, Black Skin, *White Masks,* p. 92; see original in Frantz fanon, *Peau noire masques blancs,* (Paris: Edition du Seuil, c1952), p.98
20 The Earl of Cromer, "The government of subject races", in *Political and literary essays*, 1908-1913 (London: MacMillan, and Co Limited, 1913,), p.40
21 Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, p.145, p.92, p117

concretization of this moving away from colonialism. Nasser had opened up the horizon of existence beyond colonial capture. Beyond the borders of Egypt, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and parts of Asia would reverse colonial reality. The coming into being of postcolonialism could, would, and was putting an end to the suffocation. Or had it all been just another fold of the Simulation? The thesis asks the following question in further exploring this problematic: Is (post)-Colonial revolutionary thought thinking revolutionary events/experiences as their colonial simulacra?

1 POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AS A SIMULACRUM: PRESENTATION OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE THESIS

This thesis postulates that postcolonial thought thinks revolutionary events/experiences as their colonial simulacra. Its starting point of reflection is the 2011 Egyptian revolutionary event, which challenged a Simulation to which we all are participants. It exposed our shared experience: we are simulacra. Although it did denounce the official reality as a simulacrum, by calling for the army's return against Morsi, this revolutionary subjectivity/desire also ended up calling for the return of the Simulation. It was *en*folded back into the spoken of the State. Is (post)-Colonial revolutionary thought thinking revolutionary events/experiences as their colonial simulacra? This thesis explores the *en*folding of Egyptian reality into the Modern Simulation through three moments. The first moment looks at the penetration and formalization of the colonial Simulation. The second moment examines Nasserism as a machine of capture of revolutionary subjectivity. Finally, its third moment explores how Sayyid Qutb's solution to free thought from the modern Simulation ended up becoming a line of death rather than a line of flight.[22]

As we will see throughout this thesis, the research argues that a thought that thinks revolutionary events/experiences as either the copies or the degraded reproductions of an Idea thinks simulacra for the event/experience. This thinking exposes a Symbolic totalization of

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22 "A line of flight' is a path of mutation precipitated through the actualisation of connections among bodies that were previously only implicit (or 'virtual') that releases new powers in the capacities of those bodies to act and respond.", also "In the texts written with Guattari, this concept of freedom appears only in the guise of other concepts such as 'line of flight', 'deterritorialisation' or 'smooth space'." Adrian Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze Dictionary*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), p.63 and p.145, p.

experience since it can only think the field of experience/immanence by mediating it through the field of Ideality/transcendence. This semiotic logic means that the Symbolic simulates itself as equivalent *in meaning* and *in given* to experience. Per definition, such a Simulation cannot think organic experience; it can only think experience Symbolically. As we will see in part two of this introductory chapter, the research develops its understanding of modern semiosis from a series of thinkers, including Plato, Jacques Lacan, Charles S. Peirce, Jean Baudrillard and especially Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. In drawing from them, the research argues that modern semiosis operates through a logic that mimics a paranoid structure: it thinks knowledge as phantasms. The thesis further argues that this thought is caught up in an obsessive Symbolic, a Symbolic that stalks its preys, always ready to recapture/re-*en*fold them them into its fold.

In his Film *El*, Luis Buñuel gives us a Face for this obsessive Symbolic with Francisco Galvone de Montemayor's character.[23] Francisco, who is deeply pious encounters an attractive young woman in a church, Gloria. Francisco cannot get Gloria out of his head and soon his feelings for her turn into an obsession. Gloria refuses his advances, but he stops at nothing to seduce her into his Simulation of love. Gloria eventually falls for him, and to her horror encounters the Real of Francisco's desire: he is a paranoiac who desires a desire for repression. He sees imaginaries 'others' everywhere, others who want to steal his object of affection/phantasm, Gloria, from him. He blames Gloria for his spiralling into the worlds of phantasms; he is convinced she is guilty. As he feels she escapes his power of subjectivisation, he tries to kill her. Gloria had rapidly unmasked the Simulation: Francisco only saw her as an object of phantasm; he had never really seen her.

In 2011 in Egypt, it was the State that stalked its preys. Everywhere, the secret police, waiting to hear the wrong Signified ,the wrong signifier, the wrong look, the wrong movement, the wrong act. The State was on the lookout for the guiltiness of its Subjects. People spoke of it in Tahrir Square. They spoke of this Face that haunts them, that terrifies them, that traumatizes them. This speech is a speech that is being spoken across the MENA streets. In 2011 in Tunisia, Syria, Libya, Bahrain, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, it became impossible not to hear it. In 2019 Algeria re-joined the revolutionary experience as the Hirak, (the Movement), emerged. But these are only a few of the instances where this speech has been/is being spoken. The MENA streets are always full of speeches that challenge the Simulation. But as it was the case with Gloria in Francisco's Simulation, the speech of the revolutionary event/experience, this thesis argues, is haunted by the Symbolic speech it wants to escape. In the *Wretched of the*

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23 Luis, Bunúel, *El,* 1953

Earth, Frantz Fanon had already warned Algerian revolutionaries who spoke that free speech, that their revolution was being suffocated by the State's speech, the speech spoken by elites and vanguards. The leaders of the Revolution/War of Liberation were now also speaking this speech.[24] They were speaking the Faces of power and their exercising of repressive desire. They were drawing blood. The nation was attempting to kill its revolutionary self by suffocating its revolutionary becoming.[25] This becoming that the Wretched spoke, and that any revolutionary event speaks, has never been able to take the 'form' of a movement of liberation. Indeed, the thesis argues that this revolutionary speech is continuously recaptured by the multiple Faces of civilization and their image of thought.

This speech of the revolutionary event, the thesis further argues, speaks a free tongue/speech; it speaks a speech 'liberated' from the Symbolics of Simulation. This speech does not speak an Outside; it speaks an un-*en*folding of the Symbolic, not its Symbolic infoldings.[26] This form of speech has been a speech of the streets for millenniums. Nevertheless, it has always been suffocated by a Symbolic Order of language that speaks a tongue of hierarchy, purity and totality. Throughout, this thesis thinks and conceptualizes the State as a subjective machine-of-capture that speaks this tongue. As we will see in Chapter One, The Symbolic Order - the Order of Language and Subjectivity -, projects reality as a distorted mirrored image. Chapter Two explores the parallax quality of this Image/Idea that the Symbolic produces. Colonial reality pretends to be open to all the series of time, yet it only operates through one particular temporal sequencing of space. Drawing from Deleuze, this logic or law of semiosis, the Chapter argues, is a logic of the absurd. This absurd is a reality where the Real is deprived of the possibility of Signification.[27] In Chapter Two, this absurd-real takes the Face of Plunderland. Chapter Three of the thesis looks deeper int to the Symbolics of Simulation. It illustrates its argument by looking at the Nasserist State as a Face of Oedipal desire. Its Symbolic proceeds through Facialization and subjectivizes subjectivities into the Ideal surface of its Simulation.

Moreover, the Chapter problematizes Nasserism by conceptualizing it as a Simulation of liberation. Indeed, just as in the Colonial fold, the Nasserist fold produces a two-sensed reality. On the one hand, it appears as a world open to all the series of times, yet, on the other,

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24 Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre*, see for example, " Spontaneity, its strengths and weaknesses", pp.85-118 and "On the pitfalls of National Consciousness", p.119-165
25 Ibid.
26 More on this in the Conclusion of the thesis.
27 The thesis defines The Real as an un-*en*folded Symbolic. More on this in the Conclusion of the thesis.

it forecloses the series of time that do not fit its Symbolic temporal sequencing of Space. Chapter Four of the thesis further looks into the mechanisms of capture of the Nasserist state. It highlights how the Nasserist State is able to trick/seduce Egyptian subjectivity into its fold by producing sensations and perceptions of reality. It thus *en*folds Subjectivity, the Chapter argues. Chapter Five then turns its attention to the thought of Sayyid Qutb, which it argues, challenged the Simulation but ended up spiralling further and further into it's a world of simulacra. In the thesis's Conclusion, we will see that to think liberation Sayyid Qutb thinks free desire as pure desire. This vision of desire as total and totalizing exposes the fascist latency of the concept. In line with Deleuze and Guattari, the thesis argues that there is a fascist latency to all the forms of thought that think the Symbolic order as the origin of the Real/immediacy. The thesis argues that these forms of thought totalize experience with their Symbolic, they suffocate it.

All in all, the thesis thus argues that Colonial, Nasserist and Qutubist thoughts are three models of thought that reproduce a paranoid semiotic process, which thinks knowledge as simulacrum. Although these three thoughts take up different forms - Colonial Liberalism, Arab Socialism and Qutubism -, they share a similarity. They all think the revolution as the concrete reproduction of an Idea/simulacra. Beyond their external differences, these thoughts share an internal similarity; they think a same difference/ a different Simulation. Before moving to Part Two of this Introductory Chapter, which theoretically grounds the thesis's argument, the next moment provides theoretical definitions of three critical Faces of the desire for repression that capture desiring-machines into the Subjects of their Simulation.

2 THEORETICAL DEFINITIONS OF THE FACES

DESIRE AND ITS OEDIPAL CAPTURE

Desire is a concept central to Deleuze's chaosophy. Desire is an expression of the vitality of being, of its push to be, to exist. One could say that with Deleuze, desire works in the same ways as light. In physics, light is both energy and momentum: it can penetrate objects thereby allowing us to distinguish their colours and/or forms, it can be refracted from them, and it can also cause an object with mass to change its velocity. Deleuzean desire like light is a force of flux and movements that "is productive, and that is able to make connections and

enhance the power of bodies in their connections."[28] It is not a psychic existence; it does not lack as psychoanalytical theory argues; instead, it is a vital reality. In drawing from Spinoza and Bergson, Deleuze developed a definition of desire as an élan vital, a vital force with neither object nor fixed subject.[29] He also borrowed from the Freudian concept of Libido to conceptualize desire as an agencement (assemblage, layout) of flux and movements and thus as a productive force.[30] Unlike Freud, Deleuze did not limit libidinal desire to sexual investment. Desire expresses a desire to be social, to act on the real. For example, drawing on the thesis's analysis, one can say that the desire expressed by all revolutionary event/experience is a desire to challenge the 'real' of the Simulation and bring about the differentials it carries.

From a Deleuzean perspective, power cannot be taken as an analytical lens because power only exists in-itself as the becoming of a desire to dominate, to totalize: "There isn't a desire for power; it is power itself that is desire. Not a desire-lack, but desire as a plenitude, exercise, and functioning, even in the most subaltern of workers. Being an assemblage [agencement], desire is precisely one with the gears and the components of the machine, one with the power of the machine. And the desire that someone has for power is only his fascination with these gears, his desire to make certain of these gears go into operation, to be himself one of these gears—or, for want of anything better, to be the material treated by these gears, a material that is a gear in its way."[31]

With Deleuze and Guattari, the social emerges from our desire to be-in-the-world, not out of our desire for power. Deleuzean desire is thus similar to the Nietzschean will to power. Accordingly, semiosis is not stimulated by a desire for the real but by a desire to become. Before being co-opted by the symbolic, desire is immanent to the real and thus to becoming. For Deleuze and Guattari, beyond their social phenomena, economic and political institutions are first the expression of a Symbolic desire. In their chaosophy, a desire that takes its root in the Symbolic is an Oedipal desire. This desire maps or codes reality according to the Symbolic Order. Both the State and capitalism have an Oedipal function; they capture our desire to be and *en*fold it into their Symbolic Simulations. Oedipus, they write "is this displaced of internalized limits where desire lets itself be caught. The Oedipal triangle is the personal and

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28 Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze Dictionary*, p.63
29 Ibid., p.64
30 The term agencement is part of the Deleuzean repertoire. The French term of agencement is preferred as neither assemblage nor apparatuses convey the original meaning. Indeed, in contrast with the French term, both terms emphasise the visual/structural form rather than the idea of difference and multiplicity that the French term emphasises.
31 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature*, Dana Polan (trans.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p.63

private territoriality that corresponds to all of capitalism's efforts of social reterritorialization."[32] Thus, Oedipalisation is "a contemporary form of social repression that reduces the form desire takes – and thus the connections desire makes – to those that sustain the social formation of capitalism".[33] They use of the concept of Oedipalisation "to analyse the specific nature of the libidinal investments in the economic and political spheres, and thereby to show how, in the subject who desires, desire can be made to desire its own repression".[34]

THE STATE

Deleuze and Guattari think the emergence *of* the State through its correlation with the emergence of a desire *for* the State. They take as an example the despotic State in the Marxian "Asiatic mode of production".[35] They argue this model does not conceptualize the State as a machine of capture at the service of a dominant class. Instead, it thinks the State as the maker of a class, which it then uses to exercise its domination over the entire socius it governs. This domination, they further explain, is primarily exercised through a bureaucratic apparatus.[36] The State is thus the expression of a Symbolic desire that creates its conditions for domination.[37] From this angle, all states are the expression of a despotic desire. Thus, despite the differences in the apparitions or forms they take, that is, whether we talk about the archaic State or the modern State, all states express a similar desire. This convergence finds its expression in the concept of the Urstaat (ur [proto] + staat [State]): "Asiatic production, with the State that expresses or constitute its objective movement, is not an objective formation.; it is the basic formation, on the horizon throughout history. There comes back to us from all quarters the discovery of imperial machines that preceded the traditional historical forms, machine characterized by State ownership of property with communal possessions bricked into it, and collective dependence. Every form that is more "evolved" is like a palimpsest: it covers a despotic inscription, a Mycenaean manuscript. Under every Black and every Jew, there is an Egyptian, and a Mycenaean under the Greeks, an Etruscan under the Romans. And yet their origin sinks into oblivion, a latency that takes hold of the State itself, and where the writing

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32 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus,* p.266
33 Parr, *The Deleuze Dictionary*, p.190
34 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus,* p.105
35 Ibid.,p.194
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., pp.194-5

system sometimes disappears."[38]

The Idea of the Urstaat refers to the State as a machine of capture. The State captures flows (flows correspond to the real, to experience) and as its Idea, the Urstaat is "the eternal model of everything the State wants to be and desires".[39] The State and its desiring economy unfold as a seizing of individual and collective desire. By expressing itself as a "contemporary form of social repression that reduces the form desire takes – and thus the connections desire makes – to those that sustain the social formation of capitalism" the modern state proceeds through Oedipalisation.[40]

For Deleuze and Guattari, as forces of productions of the Symbolic, the State and the economy act as the symbolic laws of the social and subjectivizes us into their Simulation: "In this way, different totalitarian systems produced different formulas for a collective seizing of desire, depending on the transformation of the productive forces and the relationships of production. […] The historical transversality of the machines of desire on which totalitarian system depends, is in fact, inseparable from their social transversality. Therefore, the analysis of fascism is not simply a historian's speciality. I repeat: what fascism set in motion yesterday continues to proliferate in other forms, within the complex of contemporary social space. A whole totalitarian chemistry manipulates the structures of the state political and union structures, institutional and family structures, and even individual structures inasmuch as one can speak of a sort of fascism of the superego in situations of guilt and neurosis."[41]

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, they exposed the archaic despotism through which the modern state articulate itself.[42] They argued that the main difference between the two lies in their relationship to the real or what they call flows. The archaic State coded flows while through capitalism, the modern State both codes and decodes flows. As mentioned earlier, this shift into the decoding of flows is at the core of Deleuze' analysis of the shift from disciplinary society to control society.[43] Deleuze and Guattari see the State as a transhistorical machine that produces the social as a concrete copy of the dominant Symbolic. The State thus transversally

38 Ibid., p.218
39 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p.217
40 Parr, *The Deleuze Dictionary,* p.190
41 Felix Guattari, Sylvere Loringer Francois Dosse (eds.), *Chaosophy, Textes and Interviews 1972-77*, (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009), p.163
42 Gilles, Deleuze, Felix, Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p.574
43 Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control", pp.3-7

delineates the frontiers of social subjectivity.[44] It is a "fantastic machine for repression" whose desire "passes from the head of the despot to the hearts of his subjects, and from the intellectual law to the entire physical system".[45] From a Deleuzean perspective, the Urstaat thus not only haunts the State in its concrete forms, but it also haunts us, by shaping our desire to its desire for domination and repression. The desire of the Urstaat metastasizes itself across the social field. Overall, they define the State as a "cerebral ideality that is added to, superimposed, on the material evolution of societies, a regulating idea or principle of reflection (terror) that organizes the parts and the flows into a whole."[46]

CAPITALISM

Deleuze and Guattari coequally envision capitalism as both a machine of capture of desire and Symbolic production. Capitalism exists as an economy of Symbolic domination. Its origins are as murky as the origins of the State.[47] In *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, they argue that features of the capitalist market already existed in feudal times and even much earlier. So did David Graeber in his book 5000 years of debt.[48] The function of capitalism is to produce economic forms of domination through which it can continue to expand and capture flows. In "*Le Capital en fin de compte*", Felix Guattari and Eric Alliez defined capitalism as a 'semioticoperator' that in correlation with its topological relation to both the economic and social orders, is able to permeate and affect both material and subjective productions.[49]

As mentioned earlier, in relationship to the modern State, capitalism both codes and decode flows. Capitalism unfolds through two semiotic register: a signifying semiosis- the register of representation- and an a-signifying semiotics-the register of transvaluation. Control societies capitalist semiotics increasingly operate through a-signifying semiotics. Maurizio Lazzarato successfully resumes Deleuze and Guattari's complex vision of capitalism as a systemic libidinal reality:

44 Deleuze, Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p.221
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., p.219
47 Deleuze, Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p.219
48 David Graeber, *Debt: the First 5000 Years*, (New York: Melville House), 2011
49 Felix Guattari, Eric Alliez, "Le Capital en fin de Compte: systems, structures et processus capitalistiques", *Change International,* Vol.1 (Autumn 1983), pp.101-6

"According to Deleuze and Guattari, the semiotic components in control societies always operate in a dual register. The first is the register of "representation" and "signification" organized by signifying semiotics (the most important of which are "natural languages") for the purpose of producing the "subject", the "individual", the "I". Signifying semiotics fulfil the functions of social subjection and subjective alienation since, through representation and Signification, they create and allocate roles and places, they provide us with a subjectivity and they assign us to an identity, a gender, a profession, a nationality, etc. so that everyone is implicated in a semiotic trap that is both signifying and representative."[50]

"The second semiotic register is organized by a-signifying semiotics (such as money, analogue or digital machines that produce images, sounds and information, the equations, functions, diagrams of science, music, etc.). Like Félix Guattari, we can call these "a-signifying" semiotics for, while they bring into play signs with a potentially symbolic or signifying effect, they have a machinic rather than a symbolic or signifying effect in the way they actually function. Signifying semiotics speak, interpret, narrate, perform, while a-signifying semiotics fulfil the functions of machinic enslavement since this second register is not aimed at subject constitution, but at capturing and activating pre-individual and trans-individual elements (affects, emotions, perceptions)" Lazzarato illustrates this by examples: "Stock-exchange indices, economic statistics, scientific diagrams and computer languages do not generate discourse; they operate, rather, by keeping the socio-economic machine running. Let the European Central Bank raise its bank rate by 1% and tens of thousands of "projects" go up in smoke for lack of credit. Let the French national health service accounts show a deficit and decisions on ways to cut spending are going to follow."[51]

Overall, then,

"signs and semiotics can operate according to these two heterogeneous and yet complementary logics; they can fulfil two functions at the same time. On the one hand, through a-signifying semiotics, they have a direct impact on the real, they produce processes, trigger actions, work, constitute the input and output elements of a social or technological machine

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50 Maurizio Lazzarato, "Semiotic capitalism: social subjection and machinic enslavement"; accessible from: http://automatist.net/deptofreading/wiki/pmwiki.php/SemioticCapitalism
51 Lazzarato, "Semiotic capitalism"

while on the other, they produce meaning, representations, discourses in which the subject recognizes himself/herself and is alienated from himself/herself. On the other hand, through signifying semiotics, signs are no longer linked to processes but to representations, to meanings. The same semiotic devices can be devices for both machinic enslavement and social subjection simultaneously. Television, for instance, can constitute us as subjects, as users, or it can even use us as simple relays for transmitting information, emotions, affects or signs, which trigger an action-reaction sequence. We have the privilege of being subjected simultaneously to the effects of both."[52]

As a semiotic force, capitalism subjectivizes us into its desire and makes us desire capitalist forms of domination. For example, capitalism produces individuals as producer-consumer, hence the transvaluation of our desire into capitalist desire. Deleuze and Guattari call this the capitalist molecularisation of the process of repression. This molecularisation articulates itself through the pain and pleasure principle. Capitalism, like the State, does not just coercively objectify us, it also produces gentle forms of subjugations that produce a "collective drowsiness". Capitalism is "genius" in the Latin sense of the word: it is present from one's birth and consciously and unconsciously enframes our subjectivity. Besides, capitalism is also genius because of its capacity to neutralize anti-capitalist desire by capturing revolutionary movements into its fold. In doing so, it draws these movements away from the revolutionary event/experience and re-codes them into its Simulation.[53]

The repressive and totalitarian desire of capitalism thus reproduces itself by activating the micro-fascist desire of the masses, and in doing so, creates the conditions for its reproduction. (post)Modern societies are hosts for the metastasizing of capitalist forms of fascism, forming a new form of molecular fascism: "Alongside the fascism of concentration camps, which continues to exist today in several countries, new forms of molecular fascism are developing, a slow burning fascism in familialism, in schools, in racism, in every kind of ghetto, which advantageously makes up for the crematory ovens. Everywhere the totalitarian machine is in search of proper structures capable of adapting desire to the profit economy."[54] By creating micro-fascism as forms of its social domination, capitalism proceeds through Oedipalisation. The Oedipal essence of the State and Capitalism haunts their historicity by

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52 Ibid.
53 Deleuze, Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p.76
54 Guattari, *Chaosophy,* p.171

totalizing their becoming. Through them, this haunting becomes ours and subjectivizes us into desiring our own repression. In this way, we become active consumers and passive producers of the Simulation.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER PART II
OLD AND NEWER REFLECTIONS ON THE SIMULATIONS OF OUR TIMES

1 POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AS A SIMULACRUM: REPRESENTATION AND ITS DEADLY CAPTURE OF BECOMING

Postcolonial thought has been inquiring into the postcolonial reproduction of coloniality for some time.[1] Colonialism, it argues, has continued to multiply by diversifying the forms it takes up. Colonialism continues to exist as territorial occupation and as the continuation of metropole-periphery economic relations that reproduce forms of colonial exploitation.[2] International institutions such as the World Bank or the IMF, transnational corporations and states, all participate in the continuation of colonial reality. However, colonialism also refers to a force of/in language: it produces colonial concepts for /as realities. Its Symbolic laws structure discourse and thus thought. Thus, postcolonial thought questions the continued presence of colonialism both in thought and in concrete existence. It questions

1 Amy Allen, *The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*, (Columbia University Press, 2016); Kwame Anthony Appiah, , *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers.* Reprint Edition, (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007); James. Baldwin, *Conversations with James Baldwin*, (Univ. Press of Mississippi, 1989); Gurminder Bhambra, "Cosmopolitanism and the Postcolonial Critique." In *The Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism*, edited by Maria Rovisco and Magdalena Nowicka, (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2011); Ronit Lentin (Ed.), *Thinking Palestine,* (London and New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2013); Dipesh, Chakrabarty, Homi K. Bhabha, Sheldon Pollock, and Carol A. Breckenridge, *Cosmopolitanism*, (Duke University Press, 2002), Angela Y. Davis, *Abolition Democracy : Beyond Empire, Prisons, and Torture*, 1st ed.New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005); Mahmoud Darwish, Munir Akash and Daniel Abdal Ayy Moore, *State of Siege*, (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, c2010)
2 See for examples: Onur Ulas. Ince, Colonial Capitalism and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, (Oxford University Press, 2018); Sandro Mezzadra, , "How Many Histories of Labour? Towards a Theory of Postcolonial Capitalism." Postcolonial Studies 14, no. 2 (June 1, 2011): 151–70; https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2011.563458 ; Chris Chen, "The Limit Point of Capitalist Equality", *Endnotes 3,* accessed from: https://endnotes.org.uk/issues/3/en/chris-chen-the-limit-point-of-capitalistequality ;

the continued use of its representations as Signifiers of our reality as well as the hierarchical spectrum of being on which these are founded.

Up to now, to understand the shifting forms of colonialism and explain its continuation, the bulk of the post/decolonial literature has primarily explored the ways in which the colonialism of/in language affects our relationship to social/political reality. For example, in *Orientalism, Culture and Imperialism and, Dans l'ombre de l'occident, et autres propos*, Edward Said argued that colonial thought/discourse gave rise to a particular form of aesthetics known as Orientalism.[3] He explained this form has continued to permeate and structure thought/discourse throughout the postcolonial era. It continues to apprehend 'Orientals' as Signifieds of the Orientalist discourse and in doing so, reproduces the colonial Symbolic. Said equally argued that this way of existing as an Other's representation has now been internalized and invested by Orientals.[19] In doing so, Said unveiled how colonialism had *en*folded or subjectivized the Arabs into its system of significations, which meant they now narcissistically invested the Colonial Symbolic. To use Fanon's word, they secreted a race. From this, we take that an Idea is a concept that thinks experience through an imagined representation. It is a Simulation that produces experience as its simulacra.

Since Said, the colonial process of subjective alienation and its impact on how reality actualizes itself has been referred to as one of coloniality. Aníbal Quijano coined the expression "coloniality of power", which refers to the structures of power, control, and hegemony that have emerged during the modern colonial era, which stretches from the Americas' conquest to the present.[4] According to Nelson Maldonado-Torres, it applies to "the logic, culture, and structure of the modern world-system."[5] This concept takes as a point of departure the ways in which colonial relations of power affect our relationship to authority, sexuality, knowledge and the economy. Therefore, fundamentally the concept of coloniality showcases how colonialism goes far beyond just taking up the form of a political arrangement. In contrast, it highlights how it also articulates itself as epistemology. Nelson Maldonado-Torres further explained the conceptual difference between colonialism and coloniality:

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3 Edward W.,Said, *Orientalism*, (London, Penguin Books, 1995) and Edward W.,Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, (London: Vintage, 1993), Edward W.,Said, Seloua Luste Boulbina, Dans l'ombre de l'occident, et autres propos, (Paris: Les Presses du reel, 2011)

4 Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "On the coloniality of human rights", *Revisista Critica de Ciensias Sociais*, n.115 (2017), pp.117-36, p.117

5 Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "On the coloniality of being", *Cultural Studies*, Vol.21, n.2 (2007), pp.240-40, p.242

"Coloniality is different from colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such nation an empire. Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, labour, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breath coloniality all the time and everyday."[6]

As Walter Mignolo also wrote, "Modernity, capitalism and coloniality are aspects of the same package of control of economy and authority, of gender and sexuality, of knowledge and subjectivity."[7] Both Mignolo and Maldonado-Torres thus imply that coloniality is an epistemic form of knowledge inherited from colonialism and that it constitutes the current epistemic space through which being articulates itself.[8] Furthermore, Mignolo coined the term coloniality of being, which he developed in correlation to the nexus coloniality-power-knowledge:

"'Science' (knowledge and wisdom) cannot be detached from language; languages are not just 'cultural' phenomena in which people find their 'identity'; they are also the location where knowledge is inscribed. And, since languages are not something human beings have but rather something of what human beings are, coloniality of power and of knowledge engendered the coloniality of being [colonialidad del ser]".[9]

Accordingly, colonialism still epistemically structures thought and through it being. Today, he adds, the concrete form of this epistemological structure takes is Globalization:

"What is termed Globalisation is the culmination of a process that began with the

6 Maldonado-Torres, "On the coloniality of being", p.243
7 Walter D. Mignolo, "Coloniality of power and decolonial thinking", *Cultural Studies*,Vol.21, Issue 2-3 (2007), p.1
8 Maldonado-Torres, "On the coloniality of being", p.242
9 Walter D. Mignolo, "Coloniality of power and decolonial thinking", p.242

constitution of America and colonial/modern Eurocentered capitalism as a new global power. One of the fundamental axes of this model of power is the social classification of the world's population around the idea of race, a mental construction that expresses the basic experience of colonial domination and pervades the more important dimensions of global power, including its specific rationality: Eurocentrism. The racial axis has a colonial origin and character, but it has proven to be more durable and stable than the colonialism in whose matrix it was established. Therefore, the model of power that is globally hegemonic today presupposes an element of coloniality."[10]

The concept of coloniality of being examines how the coloniality-knowledge-power nexus enframes our rationality and shapes our reality. It thus examines coloniality through the lenses of its apparitions. It takes notes of its presence and examines how it imprints existence symbolically and at its concrete level. To this end, it draws on the Foucauldian theory of knowledge/power. For Foucault, power objectifies things but cannot be possessed. Power is spread along with various social practices; it is not possessed by those who exercises it; it transversally passes through them. Power exercises itself through us; it permeates our social organization. With Foucault, power is at the root of the social link; it is what makes the social possible:

"What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it transverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression."[11]

The essence of power escapes symbolization; power runs is the surplus that comes out of the convergence of Symbolic reality and concrete reality. The convergence of the Real and the Symbolic produces a desire to be representation, a desire to identify the real with a regime of Representation. For Foucault, our desire to be social stems from this desire to be representation, this desire to make sense of our being-in-the-world through language.

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10 Quijano, Anibal, "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America", *International Sociology*, Vol.15, Issue 2, pp.215-32, p.215.
11 Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge,* p.119.

Ultimately then, the power of representation is ineluctable. Besides, representation is not all negative. Foucault closely associates pleasure, knowledge, and discourse as positive inductions/productions of power in the above definition. Power expresses itself as a desire to be social, to form a socius.

Nonetheless, for Foucault, power is also a prisoner to representation; representation subjectivizes power. The modalities of power, the forms that it takes-up are regulated by the regimes of truth of historical formations. Historical formations exercise power by producing particular forms of knowledge and discourse that act as their regimes of truth. With Foucault, regimes of truth produce power before power is subjectivized by discourse; before it can even be exercised. Since regimes of truth produce power, the locus of power is language. Power is the Signified of a Signifier before becoming a sign. Power is, just like us, the subject of the Symbolic and its laws. From a Foucauldian perspective, our historicity imprints our concrete becoming: we are the subjects of language and language is the subject of the historicity of the Symbolic order. Foucault did not see a way out this capture. He maintained that ultimately, it remains impossible for us to express a knowledge of the world, of ourselves and thus of reality beyond language and since language is first subjectivized by the Symbolic, we are locked in a position of being subjects of the regime of representation:

"I would suggest rather (but these are hypotheses which will need exploring): (i) that power is co-extensive with the social body; there are no spaces of primal liberty between the meshes of its network; (ii) that relations of power are interwoven with other kinds of relations (production, kinship, family, sexuality) for which they play at once a conditioning and a conditioned role; (iii) that these relations don't take the sole form of prohibition and punishment, but are of multiple forms; (iv) that their interconnections delineate general conditions of domination, and this domination is organized into a more-or-less coherent and unitary strategic form; that dispersed, heteromorphous localized procedures of power are adapted, reinforced and transformed by these global strategies, all this being accompanied by numerous phenomena of inertia, displacement and resistance; hence one should not assume a massive and primal condition of domination, a binary structure with 'dominators' on one side and 'dominated' on the other, but rather a multiform production of relations of domination which are partially susceptible of integration into overall strategies".[12]

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12 Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p.142

All in all, with Foucault, power is ineluctable because it expresses itself as our desire to be, to invest the social through language. This power of representation masks a lack: we cannot think existence as an object of knowledge beyond the logic of representation. Overall, this conception of power helps us think about the phenomena the Simulation produces but tells us little about the semiotic process that produces these simulacra. The next section theoretically explores in more depth the concepts of Simulation and simulacrum.

2 THE SEMIOTICS OF SIMULATION OR WHEN SIMULACRA PASS AS THE REAL

In *Simulacra and Simulation*, Jean Baudrillard argued that the shift from Modernity to postmodernity inaugurated the Symbolic order's totalization of the Real order.[13] He explained this totalization results from a shift in our semiosis of being, which has affected our experience of, and relationship with, the Real. Semiotics is a vast academic field, so as an introduction to its basics, this section provides a brief overview of the approaches developed by Ferdinand de Saussure, Jacques Lacan and Charles S. Peirce.

Ferdinand de Saussure developed a structural model of semiosis in which the sign is constituted through the dyadic interaction of a signified and a signifier. In Saussurean linguistics, a signified is the concept or representation of a word, a signifier is an acoustic image or word (the phonological element of the sign), and the sign is what results from the association of the signifier with the signified.[14] In the Saussurean system, the signified and the signifier are mutually interdependent, and 'signification' emerges from this interdependence.[15] Saussure's dyadic model has been reworked in linguistics and beyond. For example, in psychoanalytical theory, Jacques Lacan rethought the relationship between signifier and signified through the psychic process of Identification rather than through the linguistic process of Signification. He introduced a third element to the dyadic structure: the Real as the Object

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13 Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacres et Simulation,* (Paris: Editions Galillee, 1981), p.11
14 Marianne Jorgensen, Louise J. Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, (London: Sage Publications, 2002), pp.9-10
15 Jorgensen, Phillips, *Discourse Analysis,* pp.9-10

of Identification production.[16] With Lacan, the hegemonizing of the Real by the Symbolic order produces the Real as an *Object a* of experience; it produces the Real as an object of desire or phantasm of thought.[17] Yet, even as an Object a, the Symbolic-Real has a parallax quality: it can never be totalized by representation. The subject's sense of the Real as its Symbolic Other is thus founded on a Simulation. As we will in Chapter One, the Ideal-I (an image of concrete experience seen in a mirror or an image of concrete experience thought as a concept), which the subject identifies with to enter the Symbolic/social order is a distorted image of the real. With Lacan subjective reality is a simulacrum of the Real, it misrepresents it.[18] For Lacan in-itself, subjectivity can experience itself in three different orders of being. The Real is the order of immediate experience and eludes representation. The Symbolic is the order of symbolic experience in both its conceptual and concrete forms and the Imaginary is the order of fundamental narcissism through which the subject creates phantasms of both themselves and their ideal objects of desire (Objects a).[19] The imaginary is a vital force out of which the Symbolic emerges. The Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary are linked like a Borromean knot.[20]

With Lacan, the subject's Identification with an Ideal-I produces a displacement in the subject's experience, which concomitantly dislocates the subject's relationship to experience.[21] The Real becomes experienced as an *Object a*. The parallax nature of the real as an *Object a* projects the Symbolic Order as the order in which being can take up different perspectives/dimensions. This, in turn, produces a stimuli/desire to cognize unmediated experience as its Symbolic equivalent/specular. Drawing from Lacan, one could say that the Simulation's phantasmatic quality allows it to pass as the real. The totalizing nature of the Symbolic order also expresses itself through language. For Lacan, signs are not the unit of language, signifiers are. In the Lacanian model of Identification, the signifier is primary and thereby produces the signified. The signified inevitably 'slips beneath' the signifier, and in

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16 Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits*, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), p.25: "C'est qu'on ne peut dire à la lettre que ceci manque à sa place, que de ce qui peut en changer, c'est-à-dire du symbolique. Car pour le réel, quelque bouleversement qu'on puisse y apporter, il y est toujours et en tout cas, à sa place, il l'emporte collée à sa semelle, sans rien connaître qui puisse l'en exiler."
17 Lacan, *Ecrits,* p.549, p.553
18 Ibid., p.553
19 Ibid., p.807, see for example: "Mais il est clair que la Parole ne commence qu'avec le passage de la feinte à l'ordre du signifiant, et que le signifiant exige un autre lieu, - le lieu de l'Autre, l'Autre témoin, le témoin Autre qu'aucun des partenaires, - pour que la Parole qu'il supporte puisse mentir, c'est-à-dire se poser comme Vérité."
20 Tom Eyers, *Lacan and the Concept of the 'Real*, (Hampshire: Plagrave Macmillan, 2012), p.17, see also
21 Jacques Lacan, Jacques-Alain Miller (Ed.), *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X Anxiety,* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014) p.26

doing so, it resists our attempts to delimit it. [22] Lacan defined the signifier as "that which represents a subject for another signifier," in opposition to the sign, which "represents something for somebody". [23] A signifier is first a sign without a fixed referent, rather its identity/meaning emerges out of its relationship with other signifiers, which means that language/thought functions metonymically. The signified can never totally represent the Real of its *Object* - the real a thing, person, or property- because it can only think it from the Symbolic order's perspective. The signifier's primacy lies in its power of subjectivation: it re-constitutes or represents its *Object* (the real of a thing, property, person) as a subject of its symbolic. Overall, Lacan highlights how processes of Identification think/ apprehend the real through representation. Thus representation masks a parallax gap: it can only simulate its Self as a quality of the real.[24]

The theory of Charles S. Peirce also conceives a triadic process of semiosis. The sign is thought in relation to its function, not structure. Semiosis emerges out of the relationship between the *Representamen*, its *Object,* and its *Interpretant*.[25] The *Representamen* is the form that the sign takes. The *Representamen* can refer to the conceptual representation of a sign or refer to the sign, in its concrete existence (for example, a prison as both a concept and an institution is a *Representamen)*.[26] The function of the *Representamen* is to represent another thing: its *Object*. The *Representamen's function* is then to represent/produce the Symbolic as a copy of the Real. For example, in Peircean terms, one can say that the Object of prison is disciplinary power. Its function is to represent/produce disciplinary power as both a form of knowledge and a concrete experience.

Moreover, for Peirce, *Representamen* pre-exist their representation as pure potentialities. Initially, the *Representamen* comes first in the semiotic process, while the *Object* is <u>second</u> because it is thought of in relation to something else, whether the individual, experience, fact, existence, and action-reaction.[27] Thought then thinks its *Object* as the object of knowledge of a historicity. The *Interpretant* thinks the relationship between the *Representamen* and its *Object*. Thought can thus only think the Object and the Representamen

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22 Jacques Lacan, Alan Sheridan (Trans.), *Écrits*, (London: Routledge, 1977), p.149, p.154.
23 Lacan, J. (2006). "The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire in the Freudian unconscious" (Trans. B. Fink), in *Écrits the First Complete Edition in English* (New York; London: W.W. Norton), 671–702
24 Ibid, pp.90-1
25 Charles C. Peirce, Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Eds.), *1931-58 The Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce*, Vol. 2, (Cambridge: Harvard. University Press, 1931-1935), paragraph 228
26 Ibid., paragraph 228.
27 Ibid., Vol. 5, paragraph 484

from the Symbolic of the *Interpretant*.[28] The *Interpretant* echoes the Foucauldian regime of truth. Our current regime of truth, for example, still likes to think of a prison as having rehabilitation as its primary function or Object.[29]

In a way, by attributing semiotic referents to the real, the *Interpretant* can easily mask the real Object of the Representamen (in the case of a prison, the production of disciplinary power). As such, the *Interpretant* does not tell us about the being-in-itself of the *Object*. For Peirce, since initially the *Interpretant* is the mediator that brings a <u>first</u> and a <u>second</u> into a relation, it comes as a <u>third.</u> Peircean semiotics, therefore, follow an initial order of distribution: *Representamen*, *Object* and *Interpretant*. However, for Peirce semiosis is dynamic: its distributive order can change because its production is dynamic: it produces the real as an *Object* of thought and experience. When thought thinks the sign *a priori,* the *Representamen* is <u>first,</u> the *Interpretant* is <u>second,</u> and the *Object* is <u>third</u>. A semiotic process that simulates disciplinary power as justice would follow this order. It would think disciplining as a *Representamen*, justice as the *Object* and would *Interpret* the function of disciplinary power as the production of justice. When a sign is determined a posteriori, the *Object* can come <u>first</u>, the *Representamen* <u>second</u> *and* the *Interpretant* <u>third</u>. In this case, experiences produce concepts, so overall, this process is less totalizing. However, the *Interpretant* still mediates its Identification/Signification, meaning that representation still hegemonizes the semiotic process. Ultimately then, experience is still apprehended as representation. The distributive order of semiosis depends on the Object's position, but regardless of its position, the *Object* is dynamic, it escapes total representation.[30] Thought can only apprehend it as a sign of semiosis, as an object of its Simulation of knowledge/phantasm. With Peirce, in line with Lacan, the Real overflows from the immediate, it is a dynamical object, it cannot be totalized by semiosis although it lies at the root of its production.

Saussure's, Lacan's and Peirce's semiotics theories are much more complicated, but the above overviews are enough to help us understand Baudrillard's argument. While Saussure used semiotics to investigate the inner workings of Signification, Lacan examined the coming onto itself of subjectivity through Identification processes while Peirce gave an account of Signification as representation. Baudrillard, drew from semiology to look at how changes in semiosis impact the social production of reality. Baudrillard's analysis of postmodern semiosis

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28 Ibid, Vol.2, paragraphs 203, 228, Vol. 1, paragraph 339
29 Ibid., Vol. 2 paragraph 249
30 Peirce, 1931-58 *The Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce,* Vol. 2, paragraph 299

postulates that in postmodernity, the semiotic process of thought has moved from a triadic to a dyadic process.

This semiotic process is locked in a dyad between the signifier or *Representamen* and the *Interpretant* or signified. In the semiotic process of Simulation, for Baudrillard, the real is not an *Object* of semiotic production anymore, not even as an Object a. With Baudrillard, the phantasm becomes a quality of the real and as such it loses its phantasmatic quality. [31] Baudrillard's critique of postmodernity is in line with Lacan's Mirror Stage, which lays out how our entrance into the Symbolic order dislocates the Real from its immediately, which means thought thinks the Real as phantasms/simulacra. However, with Baudrillard, the Simulation articulates itself as the totalization of representation: subjects totally identify with its Ideal-Is. They do not just strive to identify with them; they experience the Ideal-Is as a Real:

"If once we were able to view the Borges fable in which the cartographers of the Empire draw up a map so detailed that it ends up covering the territory exactly (the decline of the Empire witnesses the fraying of this map, little by little, and its fall into ruins, though some shreds are still discernible in the deserts - the metaphysical beauty of this ruined abstraction testifying to a pride equal to the Empire and rotting like a carcass, returning to the substance of the soil, a bit as the double ends by being confused with the real through aging) - as the most beautiful allegory of simulation, this fable has now come full circle for us, and possesses nothing but the discrete charm of second-order simulacra."[32]

The Simulation operates through a process of "museification" that mystifies the real.[33] Furthermore, as the Real is excluded from the semiotic process, it slips beneath Signification. This hypermania of the Symbolic, Baudrillard called it the hyperreal:

"Today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory - *precession of simulacra* - that engenders the territory, and if one must return to the fable, today it is the

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31 Ibid., paragraph p.304
32 Jean Baudrillard, Sheila Faria Glaser, *Simulacra and Simulations*, (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2010), p.1
33 Ibid., pp.8-10

territory whose shreds slowly rot across the extent of the map. It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges persist here and there in the deserts that are no longer those of the Empire, but ours. *The desert of the real itself.*"[34]

In the fable of Borges, the real is left to rot; the map totally recovers it. Eventually, people forget that, beyond the map, there is a real. In the end, the map simulates itself as the real. This analogy illustrates how the postmodern semiotic process does not 'make' the difference between the Real and its concepts and between the Idea and its copies. There is no Imaginary Order, no Real Order, just a metastasis of the Symbolic:

"This imaginary of representation, which simultaneously culminates in and is engulfed by the cartographer's mad project of the ideal coextensivity of map and territory, disappears in the Simulation whose operation is nuclear and genetic, no longer at all specular or discursive. It is all of metaphysics that is lost. No more mirror of being and appearances, of the real and its concept. No more imaginary coextensivity: it is genetic miniaturization that is the dimension of Simulation. The real is produced from miniaturized cells, matrices, and memory banks, models of control - and it can be reproduced an indefinite number of times from these. It no longer needs to be rational, because it no longer measures itself against either an ideal or negative instance. It is no longer anything but operational. In fact, it is no longer really the real, because no imaginary envelops it anymore. It is a hyperreal, produced from a radiating synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace without atmosphere."[35]

There are "No more mirror of being and appearances, of the real and its concept".[36] Postmodern semiosis precludes a Symbolic-Real dialectics because thought does not think being/essence anymore. In Baudrillard's view, this totalization of representation produces a new order: the Simulation. In this order, the sign has lost its semiotic referents. Indeed, Baudrillard differentiates between Representation and Simulation.

"Such is Simulation, insofar as it is opposed to representation. Representation stems from the principle of the equivalence of the sign and of the real (even if this equivalence is

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34 Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, p.1
35 Ibid., p.2
36 Ibid.

Utopian, it is a fundamental axiom). Simulation, on the contrary, stems from the Utopia of the principle of equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as value, from the sign as the reversion and death sentence of every reference. Whereas representation attempts to absorb Simulation by interpreting it as a false representation, Simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation itself as a simulacrum. Such would be the successive phases of the image: it is the reflection of a profound reality; it masks and denatures a profound reality; it masks the absence of a profound reality; it has no relation to any reality whatsoever; it is its own pure simulacrum. In the first case, the image is a good appearance - representation is of the sacramental order. In the second, it is an evil appearance - it is of the order of maleficence. In the third, it plays at being an appearance - it is of the order of sorcery. In the fourth, it is no longer of the order of appearances, but of Simulation."[37]

Baudrillard highlights the dissimilitude between the Symbolic-Real of Representation and the Symbolic-Real of Simulation. The Symbolic-Real of the Simulation is emptied of the potentialities of the Real, of its becomings. It is a 'museified real', a Real that exists as a ghostly figure, a Real that is already dead. While Representation simulates a resemblance to the Real, the Simulation simulates a self-identicality to it.

The difference between Representation and Simulation is that with Simulation, Representation totalizes experience.[38] The Symbolic-Real of the Simulation is not a bearer of potentials but of their hypertrophy; it suffocates them. The real of the Simulation is a mummified real: a Symbolic representation. In Peircean term, the Simulation is the result of a <u>third</u> produced without a <u>second</u>. The results of this inter-symbolic operation are bounds to produce concrete reality as an absurd. Hyperreality is a reality where the real is valueless, its sign has no value, and its only quality is transvaluation. Furthermore, this transvaluation mirrors capitalist semiotics.[39] With capitalism, the screen acts as a surface that mediates the Real (reality tv, livestreaming,….). [40] The screen/surface mediates immediacy, but this immediacy is simulated. This simulated real, this Symbolic-Real, has no depths of its own, no dimensions. It is a one-dimensional Simulation.

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37 Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulations,* p.6
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p.21, p.106
40 Ibid., pp.27-8

3 DELEUZE AND THE OVERTURNING OF PLATONISM: REALITY IS A SIMULATION

FOUCAULT AND DELEUZE: POSTMODERNITY AS CONTROL SOCIETIES

The ability of capitalism to flatten experience into its Symbolic and in doing so, to produce a one-dimensional world, is also an argument made by Herbert Marcuse in the book, *One-dimensional man*. [41] Before Baudrillard, the Frankfurt School had argued that in Modernity, commodities, bureaucratic institutions, media and technology act as signifiers that redefine individual identity/values/desire.[42] Baudrillard saw postmodernity as a historical stage that reifies the social forms of domination already denounced by the Frankfurt School. Accordingly, in postmodernity, human subjectivity is totalized by the object world (Symbolic/Capitalist order.) Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari also critiqued this objectification of human subjectivity.[43] Deleuze, in particular, argued that disciplinary societies were shifting to control societies.[44] He also postulated that changes in semiotic processes, which include signs losing their referents, produce shifts in the structures of social domination.[45] Previously, disciplinary societies had primarily rooted power in fixed and thus identifiable institutions/places such as prisons, schools, military forces, police forces, the State, etc. However, in control societies, power permeates the social without taking up concrete institutional forms. Disciplinary power has metastasized into every stage of our life:

"In the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of control one is never finished with anything–the corporation, the educational system, the armed services being metastable states

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41 Herbert Marcuse, *One-dimensional man: studies in ideology of advanced industrial society*, (London: Routledge, 2002)

42 See for example Marx Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Gunzelin Noeri, *Dialectics of the Enlightenment* (London: Verso Books, 2016), Benjamin, Walter, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction", in *Illuminations*, (New York: Schocken Books, 1969)

43 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books , 1977); Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control", October, Vol. 59, (Winter 1992), pp.3-7

44 Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control", pp.3-7; see also Chantal Mouffe, "Space, hegemony and radical critique", in D. Featherstone, and J. Painter, (Eds.), *Spatial Politics: Essays for Doreen Massey*, (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), pp. 19–31

45 Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control", p.7

coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal system of deformation."[46]

This shift in the production of the real coequally implies a shift in the process of capitalist production:

"It no-longer buys raw materials and no longer sells the finished products: it buys the finished products or assembles parts. What it wants to sell is services but what it wants to buy is stocks. This is no longer a capitalism for production but for the product, which is to say, for being sold or marketed. Thus, it is essentially dispersive, and the factory has given way to the corporation. The family, the school, the army, the factory are no longer the distinct analogical spaces that converge towards an owner--State or private power-- but coded figures--deformable and transformable--of a single corporation that now has only stockholders. Even art has left the spaces of enclosure in order to enter into the open circuits of the bank. The conquests of the market are made by grabbing control and no longer by disciplinary training, by fixing the exchange rate much more than by lowering costs, by transformation of the product more than by specialization of production."[47]

Overall, for Deleuze, the shift from disciplinary to control societies means the emergence of new forms of domination and subjectivation, which are far less identifiable, although as totalizing as the old ones.[48] Control societies simulate freedom but produce totalizing forms of control that are difficulty discernible. The panopticon has lost its walls and exercises its control over the social transversally. While in disciplinary societies, capitalism subjectivized the social by multiplying itself through analogical forms of power, in control societies, it multiplies itself by taking up only one form: corporate power. This produces a reality where the individual and social reality become organized by the market's principle: capitalist deregulation. This deregulation of the diffusion of power allows it to permeate the social which maximizes its disciplinary capacities. In the Symbolic order, signs have lost their semiotic referents, and chains of significations are replaced by a system that both codes and decodes empty signifiers. Lacan emphasized the initial lack of signifiers, but for Deleuze, it is capitalist semiosis that produces empty signs and allows the market to process them into its

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46 Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control", p.5
47 Ibid., p.6
48 Ibid., p.7

system of values.

For Deleuze, the Simulation is not a modern or postmodern moment; it is the logic of thought through which civilization has emerged and has unfolded from antiquity up to now. From this perspective, Representation is an order of Simulation.[49] For Deleuze, history illustrates the totalizing affect of regimes of Representation on experience. Indeed, the process of museification that Baudrillard refers to in *Simulacra and Simulations* echoes the colonial petrification of *Black Skin White Masks* and Nietzsche's critique of the 'Egyptianism' of thought and its production of a history that has lost its dynamic sense/vitality.[50]

Deleuze explains that Simulation and Identification are metonymic.[51] For Deleuze Representation is always based on a simulacrum, because thought thinks the Real as an Object of Symbolic/phantasm.[52] In *Anti-Oedipus Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* Deleuze and Guattari critique the Platonic Idea.

Plato's theory of Ideas aims at accounting for the difference between the real of a thing-in-itself and its apparition as a concrete form of/in experience. It differentiates between the two by deducing the degree of realness or falsity of an experience. To account for this differential, Plato proceeded through division.[53] He divided/differentiated existence into two spaces, two rival spaces or orders of being.[54] The first order is a conceptual space, a space where being exists in self-identicality. Conceptually, the image of an experience (its sign) and its representation (concept) can be self-identical. The thing (sign) can be identical to its concept (i.e., justice is just). Plato thinks Ideas (eidos) as concepts that can represent an experience in its unmediated form.[55] In doing so, Platonic thought posits Representation as the original presentation of being, as the first order of being. Being can be the same with itself in-itself only as Representation. Justice can only be entirely just in thought, that is to say, justice can only be entirely just in/as Representation.

As a concrete institution, however, justice can only strive to reproduce this perfect Ideal. Concrete existence is marked by a dissonance between the Idea and its concrete forms.

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49 Gilles Deleuze , Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (Minneapolis, University of Minesto Press, 2000), p.87
50 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, in Friedrich Nietzsche , R. J. Hollingdale (Trans.), *Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 35
51 Deleuze , Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus,* p.87
52 Ibid.
53 Gilles Deleuze, Rosalind Krauss (Trans.), 'Plato and the Simulacrum', *October,* Vol.27 (Winter 1983), pp.45-56, p. 45
54 Deleuze, "Plato and the Simulacrum", p.46
55 Daniel W. Smith, 'The concept of simulacrum, Deleuze and the overturning of Platonism' *Continental Philosophy Review*, (2006), pp.1-35 , p.11

The representation and its concrete form are not self-identical. Existence is a distorted experience or image (*eidolon)* of Ideas.[56] Thus, the theory of Ideas thinks concrete experience as the *eidolon* of an eidos, an image or copy of the Idea. This consequently means that concrete existence can only be a copy of its Ideality.

Furthermore, thought thinks experience as the distorted reproduction of an Image/Idea, hence the thesis' argument that thought thinks experience as a phantasm (phantasma) or simulacrum. Indeed, thought thinks experience as either similar, analogous or opposed to concepts but never as self-identical to them. For example, in its concrete form, justice can never be totally/entirely just. It can be similar, analogous or opposed to the concept of justice-in-itself. In this regime of Representation, as a concrete experience, justice can never be justice-in-itself; it can only be a similar, analogous or opposed representation. Deleuze and Guattari's critique challenges Platonic Idealism and the spectrum according to which it judges the relationship between the Real or concrete experiences/events, and the representations or concepts thought uses to 'make' sense of them. When thought 'judges' whether a court's decision is similar, analogous or opposed to justice-in-itself, it relies on the thinker's *a priori* interpretation of justice-in-itself.

Therefore, in this regime of representation, whether it is thought as in-itself or as a concrete experience, the meaning/Signification of justice is 'made' contingent on the interpretation that the Interpretant/thinker 'makes' of it. This exposes how Platonic Idealism Symbolically totalizes experience: it can only think experience through processes of Identification.

It can only think experience by *en*folding it in an Identity. For Deleuze and Guattari, Identification and Simulation function through Representation and thus both take their origin in the Symbolic. Representation simulates its relation to the Real: it claims they both share the same sense of self, a similar interiority. It pretends that the 'I' of the thinker can think the interiority of justice. It claims that a Subject of knowledge/language can think/'judge' the inner being of a concrete thing/experience by 'measuring' its relations to its Idea. The processes of Signification that thought uses think the relation between concrete experience and the Symbolic order in terms of Identity.

In contrast, for Deleuze and Guattari, the relation between the Symbolic and the Real cannot be thought in terms/relations of Identity. The Symbolic takes up Identity as its central system of being while the Real takes up difference. When the thinker thinks the Real through

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56 Ibid., p.6

the principle of Identity, the Symbolic totalizes the semiotic process. With Deleuze and Guattari, the method of 'division' through which Platonic Idealism proceeds to 'make' sense of immediate experience means it thinks a mirrored image or Symbolic copy of Real experience. It thinks a Simulation of Identity; it misrecognizes the Symbolic as a Real, it misrepresents it.

"But Simulation must be understood in the same way as we spoke of Identification. It expresses those non-decomposable distances always enveloped in the intensities that divide into one another while changing their form. If Identification is a nomination, a designation, then Simulation is the writing corresponding to it, a writing that is strangely polyvocal, flush with the real. It carries the real beyond its principle to the point where it is effectively produced by the desiring-machine. The point where the copy ceases to be a copy in order to become the Real and its artifice. To seize an intensive real as produced in the coextension of nature and history, to ransack the Roman Empire, the Mexican cities, the Greek gods, and the discovered continents so as to extract from them this always-surplus reality, and to form the treasure of the paranoiac tortures and the celibate glories—all the pogroms of history, that's what I am, and all the triumphs, too, as if a few simple univocal events could be extricated from this extreme polyvocity: such is the "histrionism" of the schizophrenic, according to Klossowski's formula, the true program for a theatre of cruelty, the mise-en-scene of a machine to produce the real."[57]

In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari, therefore dismiss the distinction that Baudrillard makes between Representation and Simulation by thinking Representation as an order of Simulations. Thought has never had a dialectical relationship with the Real because it has never been able to think the Real through its own plane of immanence. In *Difference and Repetition,* Deleuze critiques the quadruple root of the regime of Representation and the limitations it imposes of thought. To think difference, Representation equivalences it to one of its quadruple roots: the identical, the similar, the analogous, the opposed.[58] Representation rethinks difference as an object of its Symbolic regime. Thus, thought has always thought the Real as an *Object a,* and consequently, as a phantasmatic quality of the Symbolic. With Deleuze even when it is thought as an Idea, the Real is thought as an eidolon or Symbolic copy, which illustrates the totalizing quality of the order of Representation. This is very important as it

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57 Deleuze , Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus,* p.87
58 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition,* (London: Athlone, 2011 edition), p.138

means that thought can be affected by the real of experience/existence, but the regime of Representations from which it thinks cannot.

DELEUZE AND THE PLATONIC REVERSAL OF THE SIMULACRUM

Deleuze developed his own concept of simulacrum in *Difference and Repetition* and The *Logic of Sense*.[59] To rethink the simulacrum, he drew from Plato's conception of the simulacrum in three works, *The Statesman, The Phaedrus and The Sophist*.[60] As mentioned earlier, Plato wanted to know how to differentiate essence from appearance. To this end, he developed a theory of Ideas. For Plato, at the conceptual level (Symbolic order), the Idea's image can be self-identical to its form. With Plato, the cosmos or physical world is modelled on the world of forms/representations (Ideality).

This means that thought can think a thing, a property, a person, in its unmediated existence and thus as a pure re-presentation, but only conceptually. With Plato, Ideality is the only space of being where a representation of being (a concept) is self-identical to its form (existence): "it is what objectively possesses a pure quality, or what is nothing other than what it is."[61]

In contrast, concrete existence does not articulate itself through the principle of Identity. A thing, person, property can only lay claim to an Ideal identity, to the Idea in its pure form. For example, in its concrete existence, justice is not (always) just, but it lays claims to being just. So, how do we discern the degrees of falsity and truthfulness of an experience? How do we differentiate the true from the illusion?

Plato thinks this differential through an ascending spectrum of being that goes from a perfect form to all its possible degraded forms. In this spectrum, being is first a perfect/total Idea and is followed by all its concrete existences, which ranges from the best copy to the worst. The Platonic unity of measure of the Real is one of the degrees of similitude between

59 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition,* Gilles Deleuze, The *Logic of Sense*, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004)
60 Deleuze, 'Plato and the Simulacrum', p.47
61 Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Hugh Tomlinson, and Graham Burchell (Trans.), *What is Philosphy*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) pp.29-30

Ideas and their copies. The best copy resembles the original the most, and the worst is so dissimilar to it, it cannot be said to resemble it. In *The Statesman,* for example, Plato defines the Statesman as the "shepherd of men", as he who takes care of men.[62] Throughout the book, different persons come forward to lay claim to being the shepherd of men.[63] The problematic is then to make the difference between the true shepherd, who is the true claimant to the idea and its rivals. The true shepherd is the man who is the best concrete representation or reproduction of the Idea of the shepherd.[64] In addition to explaining how thought thinks being through a gradient of good and bad, the Platonic selection process of thought exposes how the Idea acts as a foundation, an initial image against which we measure the real. The Idea is a pure model. [65] In being the same with itself, in-itself it pretends to self-identicality, to totality.

In *The Sophist*, Plato further investigates the differences between the copy and the simulacrum.[66] A copy is marked by its internal resemblance or similitude to an *a priori* original while the simulacrum is marked by its internal dissemblance to this original.[67] For Plato then, in its concrete form, being can either be a copy (eikons) or a simulacrum (phantasma). This logic of thinking concrete experience as the reproduction of an Ideal illustrates how

"difference becomes an object of representation always in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition or a perceived similitude. Under these four coincident figures, difference acquires a sufficient reason in the form of a principium comparationis."[68]

Representation can thus only think difference represented as Identity, analogy, opposition or similitude. In doing so, Representation reduces difference to a difference between two elements.   Furthermore, to be compared, two things have to be equivalenced. Representation thus thinks difference as a repetition of the same or as the non-repetition of the same (opposition). Therefore, with the theory of Ideas, Platonic thought thinks being through a field of immanence, but this immanence is only thought from the field of transcendence. It thinks concrete experience through its resemblance or lack, therefore with a total Ideal

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62 Deleuze, 'Plato and the Simulacrum', p.46
63 Ibid.
64 Deleuze, 'Plato and the Simulacrum', p.46
65 Ibid., p.50
66 Ibid., p.47
67 Deleuze, Deleuze, 'Plato and the Simulacrum', p.46
68 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, (London: Athlone Press, 2001), p138

experience:

"The poisoned gift of Platonism is to have introduced transcendence into philosophy, to have given transcendence a plausible philosophical meaning. Modern philosophy will continue to follow Plato in this regard, encountering a transcendence at the heart of immanence as such."[69]

Thought can think things in their concrete being but only by mediating /measuring them against a pre-set Idea. In other words, the Idea is the unity of measure against which thought thinks the real. We think the real through its representations. Plato's 'poisoned gift' is nonetheless a gift, Deleuze tells us because, in *The Sophist*, he offers us an inroad into the potential overturning of this spectral logic of thinking being. Although Deleuze notes that the overturning of Platonism is a Nietzschean project, he also highlights that the double objection to essences and appearance goes back to Hegel, and further still, to Kant."[70] In *The Sophist,* Deleuze tells us, is illustrated by the Platonic reversal of the function of the simulacrum.[71] In *The Stateman* and *Republic,* the simulacrum was a bad copy of an Idea: it is a simulacrum because of its dissimilitude to the original. In contrast, *The Sophist* offers us a different conception of the simulacrum and gives it a different function.[72] At the end of the dialogues, Deleuze notes that:

"The final definition of the Sophist leads us to the point where we can no longer distinguish him from Socrates himself: the ironist operating in private by elliptical arguments. Was it not inevitable that irony be pushed this far? And that Plato be the first to indicate this direction for the overthrow of Platonism?"[73]

This time, it is impossible to make the difference between the model (the original) and the copy:

"By simulacrum we should not understand a simple imitation but rather the act by which

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69 Gilles Deleuze, Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco Trans.) "Plato, the Greeks," in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 137
70 Deleuze, 'Plato and the Simulacrum', p. 45
71 Ibid., p.47
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.

the very idea of a model or privileged position is challenged and overturned".[74]

In *The Sophist,* the simulacrum's function is then to challenge, to problematize the idea of an original foundation by contesting the distinction between original and copy. Knowledge has been reached to its point of limit, and its Simulation collapses: How can two different Ideas share the same experience?

"Resemblance is always on the exterior, and difference – small or large – occupies the centre of the system."[75]

Thus, the simulacrum is constituted by an internal difference, a disparity that is not derived from an a priori identity. Its only unit of measurement is the 'disparate'. As Deleuze explains in *Difference and Repetition,* simulacra are differential systems of being in which "the different is related to the different through difference itself."[76] Ideality and materiality are motored by the disparate. For Deleuze, in *The Sophist*, Plato tells us that beyond the Simulation, the simulacrum is its own singularity. Per its Identity as a simulacrum, it can expose reality as a simulation. The uncovering of the real as a simulation reveals a real founded on the unfounded, a real with no myth or origins, no originals or copies. In its concrete existence, experience is bound to be dissimilar to Ideas; they occupy two different orders. The Idea has an ideal existence while concrete existence has a plastic existence. The Simulation simulates an equivalence that cannot be made. This is what Nietzsche called the 'power of the false':

"Simulation is the phantasm itself, that is, the effect of the functioning of the simulacrum as machinery—a Dionysian machine. It involves the false as power, Pseudos, in the sense in which Nietzsche speaks of the highest power of the false."[77]

This power of the false simulates depths and dimensions, but hides a flat surface, a surface that has lost all its potentials:

"the simulacrum implies huge dimensions, depths, and distances that the observer

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74 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.69
75 Ibid., p.171
76 Ibid., p.299
77 Deleuze, "Plato and the Simulacrum", p.53

cannot master. It is precisely because he cannot master them than he experiences an impression of resemblance."[78]

There can be no equivalence made between the Real and the Symbolic they have different systems of being. They operate in different orders. The Symbolic operates within the regime of Representation, which is based on Identification/Signification while the Real functions through a regime of difference based on the disparate. With Deleuze, the system central to the being-in-itself of a thing is difference. When the simulacrum stops thinking in terms/relations of Identity and accepts their singularity and all the potentials that it bears, they stop being the Subject of a Simulation. The simulacrum is neither original nor copy; it follows the Law of excluded middle: that which is neither, nor. This means that in-itself experience has no a priori identity outside of being in becoming:

"Simulacra are those systems in which the different relates to the different by means of difference itself. What is essential is that we find in these systems no prior identity and internal resemblance: it is all a matter of difference."[79]

Deleuze's overturning of the function of the simulacrum is a poignant critique of Representation as an order/regime of Simulation. Drawing on him this thesis defines representational thought as a thought that thinks the concrete being of a thing/person by measuring it to an a priori Idea, whose meaning/existence is structured by symbolic laws.

"Representation has only a single centre, a unique and receding perspective, and consequently a false depth. Movement for its part implies a plurality of centres, a superposition of perspectives, a tangle of points of view, a coexistence of moments which essentially distort representation: paintings or sculptures are already such 'distorters,' forcing us to create movement."[80]

With Deleuze, it is in accepting ourselves as simulacra that we can challenge the

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78 Ibid., p.49
79 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.299
80 Ibid., p.56

Simulation's reality and expose the unfounded quality of what we call reality. The 'reality' of the Simulation is the product of a Symbolic totalization of the Real and as such, is marked by its dissimilitude to the Real. However, in contrast with Baudrillard, Deleuze argues that the totalization of the real is a simulation. Indeed, by definition, the real cannot be totalized. Accordingly, while Baudrillard foresaw no potential ending to postmodern semiosis, Deleuze and Guattari insist that new forms of dominations, however totalizing, always gave rise to new forms of resistance.

With Deleuze, the real has no foundational law or image, no myth of origins. Accordingly, thought cannot think being-in-itself through a spectrum of good and evil, of true and false. Thinking the quality of being quantitatively is bound to produce reality as an absurd. We cannot 'measure' the internal quality of being by comparing the degrees of similitude or lack thereof between its exteriority (concrete apparition) and an Ideal representation. In doing so, Deleuze highlights the qualitative quality of being: being is in becoming. Being is always in becoming, in both its conceptual and concrete levels. It is then morality that assumes that the world of forms is fixed. For Deleuze, the real is always a dynamical object that resists totalization. Thus Ideality ought not to be thought of as an order of being where experience is total. All in all, Representation thinks Simulations; it produces us as simulacra because thought cannot think things in their immediacy. We are all simulacra because we do think beyond representation, but yet, as simulacra, we have the power to expose the Simulation, to denounce it:

"Things are simulacra themselves, simulacra are the superior forms, and the difficulty facing everything is to become its own simulacrum."[81]

The Simulation does not replace the real; it creates a phantasmatic duplicate, a copy. This duplicate, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is born out of incest. The unmediated copulation between Signifiers and Signifieds produce the Simulation:

"Simulation does not replace reality, it is not an equivalent that stands for reality, but rather it appropriates reality in the operation of despotic overcoding, it produces reality on the new full body that replaces the earth. It expresses the appropriation and production of the real by a quasi-cause. In incest it is the signifier that makes love with its Signifieds. System of

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81 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition,* p.67

Simulation is the other name for Signification and subordination."[82]

Signification/identification/r/simulation all pertain to the order of Representation because they all pervert a dynamic experience by producing it as a simulacrum. The stronger the Simulation grows, the more it equivalences itself for the real. This growing sense of equivalence between the simulation and the real offsets the subject's sensing of the real, it colonises it.

All in all, Deleuze argues that the simulacrum's function is to challenge the Simulation, to challenge the foundations of its reality. Platonic thought, Kantian thought and dialectical thought all pretend they can think the real as an object of knowledge, but this is a simulation. To move forward and liberate ourselves from the simulations of the regime of Representation, Deleuze and Guattari argue that we need to rethink the Idea. With *Anti-Oedipus* and through much of their works, they developed their own approach of the concept by thinking the Idea as a multiplicity founded on the disparate. In-itself, an Idea does not refer to a total or perfect state of being (experience) but to the different qualities of a common experience. In this, each experience of this common is marked by its own singularity. Their Idea is founded on multiplicity, disparity, just like being. For Deleuze, the concept of simulacrum ultimately proved to be too tainted by Platonism. As he developed his rethinking of the Idea as a communal experience that refers to multiple experiences, Deleuze left the concept of simulacrum for the concept of agencement, which refers to an assemblage of disparities, of differentials. In saying that we are simulacra, it is our constitutive disparity that we are affirming. We are agencements, assemblages of desiring-productions. In a way, Deleuze came up with a simulacrum of the Platonic Idea: a concept constituted on an internal dissimilitude to the Idea. If the Platonic Idea thought the cosmos as a copy of the world of forms, the Deleuzean Idea thinks concrete experience through Chaos, a becoming founded on the unfounded. It is then the cosmos becomes a Chaosmos that Deleuze and Guattari think through their Chaosophy.[83]

In drawing from these theoretical perspectives, the thesis argues that postcolonial thought thinks revolutionary events/experiences as their colonial simulacra, that is, as colonial phantasms of knowledge. It does so by thinking experience through a Symbolic Order of

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82 Deleuze, Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p.210
83 Felix Guattari, *Chaosophy, Textes and Interviews*, 1977-77, (Los Angeles: Semiot(e), c2009)

language that operates through Identification processes that totalize experience.[84] Processes of Identification as Signification think the Symbolic as the foundation or origin against which the concreteness of an event/experience can be measured. The Idea acts as the unit of measure against which the 'realness' of event/experience is judged. This logic follows the logic/laws of Platonic Idealism, which, as we have seen, thinks concrete existence as the degraded apparition of an Idea. In thinking the Symbolic Order as the origin of temporality, it postulates that subjectivity emerges out its encounter with a Symbolic Ideal-I or Gestalt. This thesis proposes to examine how in reproducing the logic of Representation, postcolonial thought is still stuck in the colonial Simulation. It problematises the ways in which political and revolutionary thought thinks the event/experience as Representation by drawing on the thoughts of Frantz Fanon and Gilles Deleuze. It argues that postcolonial semiosis also thinks experience (the Real) real as an Object a, that is as an Object of phantasms of the symbolic. The thesis further postulates that as Representation, the continued phantasmatic quality of knowledge means that thought thinks becoming as an event/experience that has already passed. This coequally helps explain the continued museification or petrification of experience. This thesis then challenges the thoughts of Simulation. In line with Deleuzean thought, this thesis argues that Representation only allows us to think the Real through an invented/simulated equivalence with the Symbolic Order. Representation thinks the Real as a world of copies, but it does not sense the affect that this production has on the immediate experience (The Real) and thus on subjective experience. In doing so, the thesis concludes it reduces concrete existence to the world of simulacra.

OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS

Chapter 1 highlights the processes through which the colonial system folded Egypt in its Simulation. It proposes to look at the colonial symbolic as a fold of Modernity that gradually *en*folded Egyptian subjectivity in its Simulation. In doing so, it argues that Egyptians were subjectivized into taking up the colonial symbolic as their new Big Other and consequently

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84 This approach stands in contrast to Jean-Paul Sartre's argument that a 'liberated' thought is a thought that the Subject totally identifies with it, so as to move from its position of simulacrum to a position of perfect representation. See for example, Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique de la raison dialectique, ,précédé de Question de méthode,* (Paris: Gallimard, 1985) or *L'être et le néant, essai d'ontologie phenomenologique,* (Paris: Gallimard, 2019, c1943)

espoused the colonial regime of Representation, which thinks concrete experience as a copy or reproduction of Bourgeois capitalist modernity. The argument of this Chapter unfolds in two moments. The first outlines how both subjectivity and thought are tricked/seduced into thinking a simulation. The second examines how the colonial Simulation subjectivized Egyptian reality into its fold. It argues that by reshaping public spaces according to capitalist desire, the Colonial Symbolic projected colonialism as the concrete production of the Idea/reality of Modernity.

Chapter 2 draws from Deleuze's critique of the modern Kantian understanding of LAW. It argues that in Egypt, colonial reality articulated itself in two senses. On the one hand, it projected itself as open to all series of time. On the other, it foreclosed the series of time that did not fit its temporal sequencing of space. The Chapter contends that the ways in which colonial reality deprives the Real of the possibility of Signification expose its semiotics of the absurd. This Chapter is divided into two moments. The first moment focuses on how the capitalist reality of the Simulation worked at foreclosing non-colonial possibles. The second moment continues to empirically highlight how colonial law further concretized Egypt's colonial becoming by foreclosing the possibles that did not fit the requirements of capitalist desire.

Chapter 3 looks at the processes of subjectivation and alienation of desire that set the scene for the postcolonial State's Oedipalisation of social relations. Its first moment examines the rise of fascist tendencies in the 1930s before moving to the Free Officers' coup and Gamal Abdel Nasser's rise. The Free Officers and Nasser assigned roles and places that help redefined the citizens' Identity in correlations with the State's desire, the Chapter argues. The second moment of the Chapter sets the scene for Chapter Four by illustrating how the State came to dominate the means of production of national subjectivity, thereby acting as the primary signifier or LAW of reality.

Chapter 4 draws from the concept of faciality, to argue that as a Face of the fold of the colonial Simulation, Nasserism thought Liberation as a copy of its colonial simulacrum. Nasserism's spiralling into the world of phantasms further illustrates its pathologisation of the politics of Liberation, the Chapter contends. The Chapter thus examines how Nasserist thought produced multiple Signifiers/simulacra of liberation. It highlights how this surface Nasserism presents itself as both an affect and percept of liberation. The Chapter then challenges the liberated affects of Nasserism by looking at how its facialization reduced the social to the Objects of phantasm/knowledge of its Symbolic. Finally, the Chapter exposes the repressive function of the Nasserist Simulation. It examines how Nasserism simulated itself as a revolutionary affect, an affect of 'liberated time'.

Chapter 5 looks at Sayyid Qutb's thought by drawing from Deleuze's concept of the image of thought. It proposes to see how Qutb's thought moved from challenging the Simulation to falling back into its capture. To this end, it is divided into two moments. The first illustrates Qutb's writings from the late 1920s until the mid-1940s. The second from the mid-1940s up to the mid-1960s. The Chapter argues that while Qutb did challenge the modern Simulation, the model of thought that he developed to liberate thought only captured it further into the world of phantasms. Qutb acknowledged the need to rethink the semiosis of Liberation, but, the Chapter further argues, he inversed not reversed the colonial regime of Representation. In doing so, he also thought Liberation as the copy of a simulacrum. Qutb, the Chapter contends, remained a prisoner of the image of thought. Besides, in his increasingly orthodox/dogmatic vision Qutb reproduced the logic of alienation he tried to escape and reproduced the pathologisation of the politics of Liberation, the Chapter concludes.

Finally, the Conclusion summarises the argument and contributions of the thesis. It also provides concluding remarks on the research and the outcome of its analysis. Finally, the thesis argues that Deleuze and Guattari's schizoid semiotic assemblage, its free speech and free desire, seems to be a liberating departure from the paranoid semiosis of Representation. Through this argument, the visions of Deleuze and Guattari, Lacan, Fanon and Albert Cossery encounter each other.

CHAPTER 1
THE COLONIAL FOLD AND ITS LOGIC OF THE UN-SENSE

"The important thing in representation is that the prefix: re -presentation implies an active taking up of that which is presented; hence an activity and a unity distinct from the passivity and diversity which characterize sensibility as such. From this standpoint we no longer need to define knowledge as a synthesis of representations. It is the representation itself, which is defined as knowledge, that is to say as the synthesis of that which is presented.[1]

INTRODUCTION

This chapter highlights the processes through which the colonial system folded Egypt in its Simulation. The concept of the fold is taken from a vocabulary that Deleuze uses in his books on Foucault and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, although it was foregrounded in *Difference and Repetition*.[1] It acts as a critique of the typical accounts of subjectivity, which presume an initial division between the interiority and exteriority of being by dividing between essence and appearances or between surface and depth.[2] It challenges this division by exposing

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1 See Gilles Deleuze, Tom Conley (Trans.), *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, (Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press, 2012, c1993);Gilles Deleuze, Sean Hand (Trans.), *Michel Foucault*, (Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press, 2016).

2 "Fold over folds: such is the status of the two modes of perception, or of microscopic and macroscopic processes. That is why the unfolded surface is never the opposite of the fold. but rather the movement that goes from some to the others. Unfolding sometimes means that I am developing – that I am the undoing - infinite tiny folds that are forever agitating background. with the goal of drawing a great fold on the side whence forms appear; it is the operation of a vigil: I project world "on the surface of a folding At other times, I on the contrary, undo the folds of consciousness that pass through every one of my thresholds, the "twenty-two folds" that surround me and separate me from the deep, in order to unveil in a single movement this

interiority as a fold of the outside.[3] Through the fold, Deleuze problematises and questions the affect of the Self on the self and the ways in which the Self subjectivizes the self, into its fold. For him, the Self is always *en*folded by the Big Other and the outside, while thought is *un*folded by difference in the forms of repetitions.[4] Thus thought can challenge the fold; it can *un-en*fold it because its modes of questioning and problematising cannot be represented by pre-determined criteria.[5] Thus, although thought tricks itself into thinking the Simulation as the true, it can also problematise the Simulation and challenge it. Overall, the folding of subjectivity into the enfolding of the Simulation gives the illusion that being is initially divided between two claimants: the Self and the self. It then simulates the Symbolic of Simulations as the only language/speech that can 'make' sense of our exteriority or Self and our interiority or self. This illusion masks a Simulation: the central system of the fold is founded on the disparate, not on a rivalry between two claimants and an identity.

This chapter proposes to look at the colonial symbolic as a fold of modernity that gradually *en*folded Egyptian subjectivity in its Simulation. In doing so, it argues that Egyptians were subjectivized into taking up the colonial symbolic as their new Big Other and consequently espoused the colonial logic of representation that thinks concrete experience as a copy or reproduction of Bourgeois capitalist modernity. As we have seen in the introduction, drawing on Deleuze and Baudrillard, modern semiosis results from a Symbolic totalisation of the semiotic process. This totalisation of semiosis by the regime of Representation unfolds itself as an experience totalised by the Object/Sign world. Indeed, drawing on Fanon, we have

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unfathomable depth of the tiny and moving folds that waft me along at excessive speeds in the operation of vertigo, like the "enraged charioteer's whiplash", I am forever unfolding, between two folds, and if to perceive means to unfold. Then am forever perceiving within the folds.", Deleuze, *Leibniz,* p.93.

[3] "The One specifically has a power of envelopment and development. while the multiple is inseparable from the folds that it makes when it is enveloped. and of unfoldings when it is developed", Deleuze, *The Fold,* p.23

[4] "Why would something be folded, if it were not to be enveloped, wrapped, or put into something else?
It appears that here the envelope acquires its ultimate or perhaps final meaning: it is longer an envelope of coherence or cohesion, like an egg, in the "reciprocal envelopment" of organic parts. Nor even mathematical envelope of adherence or adhesion. where a fold still envelops other folds, as in the enveloping envelope that touches an infinity of curves in infinity of points. It is an envelope of inherence or of unilateral "inhesion": inclusion or inherence is the final cause of the fold, such that we move indiscernibly from the latter to the former. Between the two, a gap is opened which makes the envelope the reason for the fold: what is folded is the included, the inherent. It can be stated that what is folded is only virtual and currently exists only in envelope, in something that envelops it." Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, p.22; See also Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*

[5] " We cannot say in advance whether a problem is well posed, whether a solution fits, is really the case, or whether a persona is viable. This is because the criteria for each philosophical activity are found only in the other two, which is why philosophy develops in paradox. Philosophy does not consist in knowing and is not inspired by truth. Rather, it is categories like Interesting, Remarkable, or Important that determine success or failure.", Deleuze, Guattari, *What is Philosophy*?, p.82

seen how colonial modernity totalised experience by producing it as a concrete representation of its Symbolic. Overall, the unfolding of colonialism as a fold of modernity coextensively points to colonial thought being a fold of modern thought.

Firstly, colonial thought reproduces the Kantian postulate that there are objects that can be true objects of knowledge, namely phenomena, and there are objects that cannot be true/total objects of knowledge, namely noumena. Secondly, colonial thought reproduces the internal division trough which modern thought resolves this disjunction by thinking phenomena through the non-disjunctive axiom apparitions/conditions.[6] Modern thought thinks things through their apparitions or phenomena by measuring concrete events against the Idea its Symbolic produces for them. Furthermore, to measure or judge the degree of similarity between the event and the Idea, colonial thought reproduces the modern spectrum of thought, which posits white experience as the true claimant of modernity and black experience as its simulacrum. This logic thinks experience as internally constituted by an antagonism or rivalry that can be resolved by being synthesised into representation reproduces the Platonic method of division that Plato articulated in his theory of Ideas. Colonial thought thus thinks the Idea as the original of the phenomenon and the phenomenon as a copy or simulacrum of its original (the Idea).

As the concrete expression of a semiosis totalised by the Symbolic, modernity produces an experience totalised by reason. The totalising subjectivation of modern reason is based on the Enlightenment postulate, which asserts that it is by thinking the apparition of a thing/event/person that thought can think this it as an objective form of knowledge. Such logic is exemplified by the 18th-century shift in the conception of the event of History as a scientific object of knowledge.[7] Indeed, thinkers of the enlightenment including Giambattista Vico, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Gibbon, Herder, Turgor or Condorcet, thought history through a scientific analysis of the relationship between cause and effect by drawing from a rule of physics, which states that for every action there is an equivalent reaction.[8] In historical terms, this implies that every event has a cause, and is itself the cause of subsequent events, which may be considered its effect(s), or consequences. In this logic, the Self causes the Other.

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6 In Modern European thought, the couple apparitions/conditions was introduced by Kant. See Immanuel Kant, Paul Guyer, Allen W. Wood (Trans.), *Critique of Pure Reason,* (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp.338-353; see also Gilles Deleuze, "Lecture on Kant: Syntheses et temps", 14/03/1978, Vincennes. Accessed from: https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/seminars/kant-synthesis-and-time/lecture-01

7 Francois Dosse, *Renaissance de l'evenement: Un Defi pour l'historien, entre sphinx et phenix*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires De France, 2010), pp.13-4

8 Ibid.

Besides, the causal lens presupposes that it can think events in real-time by thinking their successive series of time: it can think the apparition, think the cause of the apparition, and think the effect of the apparition as the cause of another event. This logic of signification pretends that thought can think the movement of history as the apparition of successive series of times. This line of thought follows the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which, according to Kant thinks the possible grounds of experience, "namely the objective cognition of appearances with regards to their relation in the successive series of time."[9] In following this principle as a ground for thinking experience, modern thought presumes that it thinks the true and that this truth can be cognised as an object of knowledge by measuring the degrees of Identification between a phenomenon and the Idea to which it corresponds.[10] Ironically, in this logic of signification, the Idea acts as a 'noumenon' of the phenomenon.

As both a concrete and symbolic signified and Signifier of the modern Big Other, colonial thought is *en*folded by a racial partitioning of being that compares individuals to an Ideal spectrum of being that divides them into good copies and bad copies. In this spectrum, 'White people' are a good copy of being; they are the concrete representations of its intelligence and reason 'Black people' on the other hand, are the concrete representations of a defect in being, of a Symbolic lack-in-being. In this logic, the principle of comparison organises the objective cognition of appearances in analogy to an Ideal successive series of time. As we have seen in the introduction, colonial thought can re-organise existence through the unfolding of its Symbolic as a concrete reality, thereby forming a time-space continuum. Indeed, in Black Skin White Masks, Frantz Fanon highlights how the colonial Self increasingly subjectivized his sense of self. This subjectivation was so strong, Fanon tells us, that it disrupted his sense of selfhood, and of the sense he had of reality. To his horror, he was interiorly being colonised by one concept: the Negro. The Self affected the self, so much so that the self, became the Self. Fanon outlines through *Black Skin White Masks* the affective impact of colonial thought/subjectivity on how individuals experience their sense of Self and self.[11] This subjective force of affectation produces a displacement of the individual's Big Other, and its gradual replacement with the Colonial Symbolic as the new Real of the Subject.

As a signifier or attribute of modernity, the colonial system also expresses the

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9 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p.311
10 It is important to reminisce the words of Deleuze already quoted in the Introductory chapter: "difference becomes an object of representation always in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition or a perceived similitude. Under these four coincident figures, difference acquires a sufficient reason in the form of a principium comparationis", in Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.138.
11 Fanon, Black Skins White Masks

repressive quality of the socius as civilization. As already noted in the introduction, in line with Deleuze, this thesis argues that as the concrete expression of a successive series of not time but simulations of time, civilisation is the transhistorical concrete experience of a multiplicity of repressive desires through which the Symbolic thinks repression. Modern thought thinks its Simulation and thus repression of the Real through three main agencements or assemblages: the individual as a Subject, the State as the Symbolic Law, and Capitalism as a desiring economy. From a Deleuzean perspective or counterpoint, the totalising quality of the Symbolic means its paramount quality of being is a desire for repression. This desire for repression takes up concrete forms by colonising individual desire, capturing it and folding it. Again, as a modern form of repression, Oedipalisation, is "a contemporary form of social repression that reduces the form desire takes – and thus the connections desire makes – to those that sustain the social formation of capitalism"[12]. It is thus contingent on the capture of individual desire. Capitalism *en*folds individual desire with its fundamental/internal laws, which postulates that capitalism is immanent to both experience and desire. These laws assume a prohibitive function because the capitalist Simulation prohibits any other Real of experience. Instead, it expands as The Real of experience. The state is also an agent of repression by organising, partitioning social and concrete spaces into the representations of its Symbolic. In line with post-Marxist thought, the Frankfurt School, the Situationists, and Deleuze and Guattari, this chapter also conceptualises of the modern fold as a Symbolic totalised by capitalism. As a sub-set of the modern fold, so is the colonial fold. The state is also an agent of capitalist totalisation as both share a similar quality: they both think the Real as an *Object a*.

The modern theories of the social contract reflect the parallax quality of knowledge by thinking an Imaginary origin. Accordingly, in modernity, capitalism 'fills' this parallax gap by Simulating itself as a total economy of both knowledge and desire. In the *Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon exposed the capitalist structure of colonial desire and its partitioning of space between native-backwards-poor and coloniser-moderns-rich.[13] As we will see in this chapter, in Egypt, colonial desire reshaped public and cultural spaces by recoding them as the concrete representation of capitalist desire. Additionally, in Egypt, modernity increasingly came to be thought of as the concrete representation of progress, technology, responsibility, and productivity. Coalescent to this, Egyptians increasingly 'realised' that Egypt needed to get out of idleness, backwardness, and primitivity to become modern. Egypt needed to copy what

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12 Deleuze, Guattari, *Anti Oedipus,* p.35
13 Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, pp.35-6, p.40-1

Europe had done and become modern. This image of thought of the colonised, the chapter argues, is a colonial simulacrum or phantasm that thinks the colonised as the lost Real and thus past of Europe. In this image, the chapter further discusses, the colonised is a castrated subject, a Symbolic lack-in-being.

The argument of this chapter unfolds in two moments. The first outlines how both subjectivity and thought are tricked/seduced into thinking a simulation. Its first section is a theoretical section that draws from Jacques Lacan's model of the Mirror Stage. It lays out how Identification works as representation and outlines the processes through which both thought, and subjectivity get tricked into thinking the Simulation as the real. Its second section empirically looks at the ways in which while European powers established themselves as centres of knowledge in Egypt, colonial reason thought Egyptians as the castrated subjects of its phantasm of a lost Real/past. The second moment of this chapter examines how the colonial Simulation subjectivized Egyptian reality into its fold. It argues that by reshaping public spaces as the concrete representations of capitalist desire, it projected colonialism as the concrete production of the Idea/reality of Modernity. Its first section looks at how European powers modernised institutions. It especially highlights how the colonial exterior or Symbolic *en*folded modern Egyptian national institutions. Its second section looks at capitalism as an agent of both colonial castration and recoding of public spaces. It also argues that capitalism projected itself as an agent of liberation from the colonial system by producing a native Bourgeoisie that would open up Egyptians to a becoming modern. In doing so, the laws of capitalism postulate that capitalism can select or 'make the difference' between the 'backward' and the 'modern', it can make the 'backward' 'modern'.

1 THE UNFOLDING OF A COLONIAL LOGIC OF THOUGHT: REPRESENTATION AND ITS VIRTUALISATION OF EXPERIENCE AS A SIGNIFIED

THE SYMBOLIC-MIRROR AS A SITE OF IDENTIFICATION PROCESSES: WHEN THE PRESENT IS APPREHENDED AS REPRESENTATION

As already stated above, the symbolic totalisation of modern experience thinks its Simulation and thus its repression through three main agencements or assemblages: the individual, the state, and capitalism. This section proposes to look at how the Colonial

Symbolic of Simulation progressively *en*folded individual subjectivity. To this end, it takes as its model of thought the Lacanian model of a process of Identification called the Mirror Stage. With the *Mirror Stage*, Jacques Lacan examines the shift of human subjectivity from unmediated experience to social experience.[14]

"We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image - whose predestination to this phase-effect is sufficiently indicated by the use, in analytic theory, of the ancient term imago."[15]

It postulates that infants pass through a development stage between the age of six and eighteen months that marks the start of social Identification processes.[16] These processes are instigated when an external image of the body produces a psychic response that gives rise to the mental representation of an "I". [17] This image can be the infant's reflection in an actual mirror, or it can be the symbolic image a primary caregiver projects of the infant through language.[18] In any case, the mirror stage marks when infants start to identify with a social representation of themselves, which then acts as a gestalt of their emerging sense of "I" or selfhood.[19] This gestalt or imago of the Self presents itself as a unified body image while infants still experience their body as a disparate.[20] Lacan notes that there is a fundamental difference between these two experiences. Pre-Mirror Stage, subjectivity experiences itself in the immediacy of the Real, its experience of its self is not mediated by language and thus by the Symbolic order. Lacan also calls the Symbolic order the Big Other.[21] With the Mirror Stage, subjectivity leaves this unmediated modality of experience and is enfolded by the Symbolic and its regime of representation. It learns to think and experience itself as a Self. In the Mirror Stage Lacan tells us that Identification follows a logic of representation, that it belongs to the order of representation. As we have seen in the introductory chapter, Deleuze follows a similar

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14 "The diagram on the blackboard is designed to ground the function of the ideal ego and the Ego Ideal, and to show you how the subject's relation to the Other functions when the specular relation is dominant there, a relation that on this occasion is being called the mirror of the big Other.", in Lacan, *Anxiety,* p.253
15 Jacques Lacan, Alan Sheridan (Trans.), *Ecrits*, (London: Routledge, 2005), p.2
16 Ibid, p.1, see also Tome Eyre, *Lacan and the Concept of the 'Real'*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp.109-10
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Lacan, *Ecrits,* p.2
20 Ibid.
21 Lacan, *Anxiety,* p.253

line of thought by explaining that Identification and representation both work in the same way.

Indeed, subjectivity (self) strives to experience itself as the Ideal-I (Self) projected by the Symbolic. The Self then acts as a Platonic Idea that the subject seeks to represent by becoming its concrete reality. In the Mirror Stage, the processes of social Identification also reproduce the Platonic division of being. They divide between being as conceptuality and being as a concrete experience. In representation, the Self is the same with itself in-itself, but as its concrete experience, the Subject or self can only be a copy of this Ideal-I. Subjectivity thus divides being into two rival orders: originals and copies, the true and the false, the real and its Simulation. With Lacan, our constitution as Subjects of the Symbolic or "Is", illustrates how subjectivity folds itself into the Symbolic Simulation.[22]

Identification simulates an original similarity between the Ideal-I and its concrete experience. This simulation masks a difference in-itself between the original modality of subjective experience and its adopted modality of representation. Ultimately then, Identification produces a simulation because its logic of representation cannot think difference in itself. It 'thinks' difference as the internal central of being by presupposing an original division of being. In doing so, it does not 'make' or think the difference between the two orders of being: the Real and the Symbolic. Instead, it simulates an original equivalence or similarity between the two. Identification does not think the difference constitutive of the relationship between unmediated and mediated experience. Instead, it simulates an original similarity between them or lack thereof. With Lacan, the Mirror Stage thus marks a shift in our semiosis of being. Initially, we experience ourselves and the world as unmediated signs. As the Symbolic Simulation enfolds us, we start to experience ourselves and the world as signs of representations.[23] In this semiotic process, the Idea becomes the object of semiosis production. The Real slips beneath signification and the Symbolic totalises the semiotic process. [24]

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22 "I have myself shown in the social dialectic that structures human knowledge as paranoiac why human knowledge has greater autonomy than animal knowledge in relation to the field of force of desire, but also why human knowledge is determined in that 'little reality' (ce peu de réalité), which the Surrealists, in their restless way, saw as its limitation.", Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits,* p.3

23 "This development is experienced as a temporal dialectic that decisively projects the formation of the individual into history. The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation – and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic – and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development.", Lacan, *Ecrits,* p.3

24 "Pour ce faire, la relation polaire par où l'image spéculaire (de la relation narcissique) est liée comme unifiante à l'ensemble d'éléments imaginaires dit du corps morcelé, fournit un couple qui n'est pas seulement préparé par une convenance naturelle de développement et de structure à servir d'homologue à la relation

The Lacanian model illustrates how Identification necessarily implies the alienation of the real by representation. The Self emerges as a social subject by positing a Symbolic Ideal-I as its myth/law of origin. Like representation, Identification thinks the Symbolic order as the original or first space of being, as an Ideality where forms can be self-identical to their images. In contrast, concrete experience can never achieve this internal sameness. It is marked by an internal difference that cannot be resolved but that the subject attempts to repress by striving to become the perfect representation of an Image or Ideal-I.

Furthermore, by thinking being through an initial division between the Real and its Simulation, Identification further illustrates the Symbolic's sovereignty as a Signifier of the subject's reality. Semiotically, Identification is totalised by the Symbolic; it excludes both the Real and the Imaginary orders from its semiotic process.[25] As we have seen in the Introduction, Baudrillard also came to the same conclusion in *Simulacra* and *Simulations.* The semiotic division between the real and its Simulation is essential because it reduces both the real and the imaginary to qualities/attributes of the Symbolic.

The Lacanian model of the processes of Identification also connects desire and language. It stipulates that our desire to invest the social is triggered by our entrance into representation, by our constitution as subjects/signs of representation. However, this subjectivation also entails the loss of pre-symbolic subjectivity. From a Lacanian point of view, desire is contingent on lack because it is triggered by a loss of the Real; the Real is from then on lack(ing). It becomes a gap-in-meaning; it still exists but cannot be made sense of again; it can only be signified/represented as an *Object a*. Moreover, as the title of the stage indicates through its reference to a mirror, the image projected by the social is distorted. As a Symbolic representation of the Real, the Ideal-I is made-up of an aggregate of historical perceptions whose concrete sensorial experiences are deprived of the possibility of signification. The mirrored image does not and cannot represent the internal subjective shifts that the subject experience: "the myth of the unity of the personality, the myth of synthesis…. All these types

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symbolique Mère-Enfant. Le couple imaginaire du stade du miroir, par ce qu'il manifeste de contre-nature, s'il faut le rapporter à une prématuration spécifique de la naissance chez l'homme, se trouve approprié à donner au triangle imaginaire la base que la relation symbolique puisse en quelque sorte recouvrir. (Voir le schéma R.)", Lacan, *Les Ecrits*, p.552.

25 "This development is experienced as a temporal dialectic that decisively projects the formation of the individual into history. The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation – and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic – and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development.", Lacan, *les Ecrits*, p.69

of organisation of the objective field constantly reveal cracks, tears and rents, negation of the facts and misrecognition of the most immediate experience"[26].

Still though for Lacan, representation thinks the real as its simulacrum, yet it allows us to access experience as an *Object a* - as an object of knowledge of thought-, even if just as a phantasma (image). Our enfolding as subjects of knowledge is contingent on our enfoldment by the Symbolic and of its laws of Simulation. In this model, representation produces knowledge, meaning the latter takes its origin in the Symbolic. Knowledge is then an aggregate of historical postulates or perceptions. Accordingly, knowledge is contingent on the historicity of the subjects who produce it. This historicity subjectivizes the Symbolic into its laws of signification and their sequencing of time. Since the regime of representation cannot represent immediate experience, thought can only think subjectivity as a fold of social time. In line with Kantian thought, time-in-itself becomes an internal limit of subjectivity because it cannot be represented.[27] It is replaced by its simulacrum: Historical time.[28] The Mirror Stage illustrates how subjectivity is tricked into thinking a Simulation by thinking the present of the social as Historical time. It misrecognises the mirrored image/Ideal-I as a virtual representation of the subject's concrete becoming. This process of thinking time as a causal succession of images or series of times reduces the Real and the Imaginary to being qualities of the Symbolic. In simulating itself as the actual (Real) of time, the Symbolic tricks thought into misrecognising the Real as its Symbolic copy.

Ultimately, the Lacanian model of subjectivity as Identification reveals how thought thinks experience as the copy of an Idea. It can think immanence but only by mediating it by a transcendent plane. Although the Ideal-I of the mirror stage represents a unified body/Sign, as a Subject of language, the Self is constituted by a multiplicity of Signifieds that act as signifiers. Indeed for Lacan, the Self is the sum of its selves. In conceptualising the human mind as an assemblage of Symbolic multiplicities, the Mirror Stage proposes a critique of the Cartesian Cogito.[29] The mind leaves its Cartesian canvas: the "I" is not a unified whole, but a multiplicity totalised signs. Moreover, the subject of the Mirror Stage is an I-language and as such its

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26 Jacques Lacan, R. Grigg (Trans.), *The Seminar, Book III, The Psychoses*, (W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), p.8

27 Joly K. Poncet-Montange, "Clinique Psychanalytique, L'angoisse ICP 2013", *Association Lacanienne internationale Rhoines-Alpes*. Accessed from: https://www.ali-rhonealpes.org/archives/clinique-psychanalytique/210-l-angoisse-icp-2013

28 Lacan, *Les Ecrits,* p.278

29 For more on Kant and time as a frontier of subjectivity see Gilles Deleuze, "Third, Lecture on Kant: Synthesis and Time", 28/03/1978, Vincennes. Accessed from: https://deleuze.cla.purdue.edu/seminars/kant-synthesis-and-time/lecture-03

interiority is determined by its exteriority: its interiority is a fold of the Symbolic. Thus, the Mirror Stage marks a subjective shift in the subject's apprehension of the experience of its interiority, which changes both their being-in-the-world and their being in-themselves. The Lacanian subject shifts from a being-in-nomos to a being-in-logos. This being-in-logos operates through what Lacan calls the name-of-the-father. The name-of-the-father can be interpreted on two levels.

From a clinical psychology perspective, the initial 'real' of the infant is its mother. As the infant enters the Symbolic order, it moves to the father, and gradually, the social establishes itself as the primary Big Other. A displacement in the mother-infant relationship marks the entrance in the Symbolic. When the infant loses the mother as a Big Other, it also loses the unmediated symbiotic relationship it has with her. This shift is experienced as a castration, a loss and the infant produces fantasies of re-experiencing this relationship.[30] The mother thus becomes an *Object a*. The infant takes-up the Symbolic as its new Signifier and strives to identify with its Ideal-Is/Signifiers.

Lacan highlights the jubilatory reaction of the infant when they perceive their reflection in the mirror.[31] In his view, this jubilation exposes how the Symbolic comes to fill an original "manque à être" or lack-in-being; desire is the desire for the Other (Mother and then Big Other).[32] As an *Object a,* the mother represents the image of complete pleasure and unmediated experience; as a signifier of experience, the Symbolic represents the image of castration and mediated experience.[33] This Signifier is the name-of-the-father. Unlike the mother, as a Big Other, the symbolic operates through prohibition and the name-of-the-father is the name Lacan gave to its prohibitive function.[34] For Lacan, there are two laws, two bans that structure the Symbolic. The first prohibits the Subject from going back to a pre-Symbolic unmediated state, hence the necessary separation from the mother. The second prohibition, which follows from the first, is that pleasure cannot be this complete pleasure that the infant

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30 For a child to successfully enter the symbolic order, the fantasies the infant produces of the mother have to be castrated, through another development stage, the Oedipus complex. "At the oral stage there is a certain relationship between demand and the mother's veiled desire. At the anal stage, the mother's demand comes into the picture for desire. At the stage of phallic castration, there is the minus-phallus, the entry of negativity with regard to the instrument of desire when sexual desire as such emerges in the field of the Other. But the process doesn't stop with these three stages, because at its limit we have to meet up with the structure of the a as something separated off.", Lacan, *Anxiety,* p.228

31 Lacan, *Ecrits,* p.2

32 Lacan, Les *Ecrits,* p.522

33 Poncet-Montange, "Clinique Psychanalytique, L'angoisse, accessed from: https://www.ali-rhonealpes.org/archives/clinique-psychanalytique/210-l-angoisse-icp-2013

34 "C'est dans le nom du père qu'il nous faut reconnaître le support de la function symbolique qui, depuis l'orée des temps historiques, identifie sa personne à la figure de la loi.", Lacan, *Les Ecrits*, p.278

experienced pre-symbolic. It has to be mediated by the Symbolic.

From a psychoanalytical theory perspective, it is the Real that acts as the initial Big Other of the subject and the Mirror Stage marks the displacement of this function to the Symbolic. This displacement is experienced as a loss, a castration, and the subject produces fantasies of returning to their previous sense of the Real. It also means that the Real is from then on experienced as an *Object a.* As the subject takes-up the symbolic as its new Signifier, it will strive to reproduce the similar feeling of self-identicality it had with the Real, with its social Self. Notably, the Mirror Stage illustrates the phantasmatic quality of what we call knowledge.[35] This vision of knowledge is in line with Foucault's critique of knowledge in the *order of things.* Furthermore, while as an *Object a* the Real represents the image of complete pleasure and lawlessness, as a signifier of experience, the Symbolic represents the image of castration and mediated experience: Its subjects must operate through its laws. The first prohibition of the Symbolic is that one cannot go back to the pre-symbolic state. The second prohibition is that one must not question/challenge the authority/legitimacy of its function of representation and thus of Simulation. From both a Lacanian and Deleuzean perspective, the Symbolic has an Oedipal function; it is structured by prohibitions.

Moving away from subjectivity and looking at the laws that structure thought, Deleuze developed the concept of the image of thought.[36] If the Symbolic operates through prohibition and thus takes-up a prohibitive function, what of thought? What are the pre-suppositions through which thought operates? How does thought think of itself? How is the Self of thought affecting its self? According to Deleuze, like the Symbolic, thought is *en*folded by prohibitions because the postulates through which it operates produce laws that impose limitations on thought. As we will see in more depth in Chapter Five, such postulates think the good nature of thought, the thinker and representation, and assert the authority/legitimacy of representation and reason. Eight postulates altogether form the image of thought: a dogmatic image of what thinking is. As illustrated by the above postulates, this image presupposes that thought wants to get at the true. For Deleuze and in line with Nietzschean thought, morality presents thought as 'upright', good-natured and truth-seeking. It is morality that presupposes that the function of thought is to think the true and that its representation of truth is true. These are the two laws that structure the image of thought.

In concluding, this section has explained how the Simulation enfolds both subjectivities

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35 Lacan, *Ecrits,* p.3
36 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.167

and thoughts. It has argued that as a theoretical model, the Mirror Stage outlines the processes of the folding of subjectivity into the Symbolic Simulation. In doing so, it helps us better understand how modern semiosis produces experience as Simulation. It has shown that ultimately, it is by taking up a prohibitive function of repression of the real and desire, that the Symbolic order subjectivizes us into its Simulation. And it is by thinking of itself as thinking The True and The Good, that thought gets tricked into thinking the Simulation. The next section looks into how the colonial Simulation thinks the colonised as a representation of the absence or lack of/in modernity.

THE BECOMING PHANTASM OF EGYPT: EGYPT AS AN OBJECT A OF MODERNITY

This section illustrates how the colonised was thought as a phantasm or Object a of Europe's lost Real. In doing so, this section argues, colonial thought constructed/folded the colonised as a castrated subject. From this perspective, the colonial system is an agent that concretised this castration: it thinks the colonised as its simulacrum or mirrored image. This section coequally highlights how colonial thought reconceptualised Ancient Egypt as a lost European Real by recoding ancient Egypt as the origin of the immanence of European modernity in history. This symbolic dislocation also castrated Egyptian agency in History. Indeed, colonial thought thinks the colonised as lacking-in-modernity and thus as lacking-in-historicity. Accordingly, the colonised is a subject that suffers from a lack-of-selfhood.

In contrast, the colonial recoding of ancient Egyptian civilisation as an analogous copy of European civilisation, reified the modern quality of European experience, its modern sense of selfhood. This signification process conceives modernity as a precept of both time and selfhood/Identity. As a concrete expression of modern thought, European modernity thus required the recoding of the epistemological space as a space of production of modern perceptions and sensations. This recoding proceeds by producing historicisms. Historicism is the idea of linking a society's values and its movements of thought to their greater historical context. This rearrangement included the re-invention of European identity along two poles of being *(Other)*, each having a different temporality. The first pole included a new image, a new Ideal-I of European past, which included the invention of a continuous link of filiation between Europe, Greek and Roman antiquity. Europe was reconceptualised as the successor of the Western Roman Empire, which was itself reconceptualised as Greece's successor. The growing

focus of the political writings on the models of the Greek polis and the Roman Republic as inspiration for the rethinking of the European political horizon illustrates such process. European identity was rethought as an essence that stretched across the space-time continuum; it had existed in a form or another. It was a constant in the successive series of time as the advent (not event) of progress:

The Greek Polis→The Roman Republic→The Modern European State.

Modern colonisation produces a new signifier or simulacra:

Ancient Egypt →The Greek Polis→The Roman Republic→The Modern European State

How is a symbolic perception or specular image tuned into a perceived concrete reality? Thought thinks that some of its Ideal-Is/ Signifiers are the representations of scientific facts or truths. It represses the phantasmatic quality of knowledge. Through this process, the simulacra/Signifiers of the modern Simulation are thought and experienced as a Real, a True. The Simulation produces a 'reality': a real thought and experienced as a phantasmatic quality of the Symbolic. Thus, when we refer to the Real as an Object *a,* we think of experience as an infolding of a sign; experience becomes an object of misrecognised knowledge. The Object *a* thus masks the real, which in-itself, remains beneath the surface of the fold.[37] In rethinking ancient Egypt as the origin of European modernity, colonial thought produced Egypt as an object of misrecognised knowledge, an alternative fact.

This phantasm of Egypt as an Object *a* of European subjectivity gained momentum in the arts, diplomacy, and spread to other sectors of the political economy. Before the 18th century, interest in Egypt had already emerged as illustrated, for example, by Shakespeare's *Anthony and Cleopatra.* The play is partly set in Egypt, although it does not focus much on local colour. Following the revival of curiosity about Antiquity that Historicism provoked, a

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37 This is why Deleuze and Guattari preferred to talk of desire as flow rather that as object. According to Deleuze the Lacanian object a is more of an illusion, a specular that ticks us into focusing on it rather as on the landscape that hides behind it. For him, desire is a force that invests space, A desire is always about a landscape, about how we feel in a particular landscape. See letter D in *L'Abecedaire de Gilles Deleuze*, directed by par Pierre-André Boutang with Gilles Deleuze, Claire Parnet, (DVD format, editor: Montparnasse, Collection Regards).

series of fiction books that presented a detailed yet imagined Egypt emerged. In the 18th century, the European fixation on Ancient Egypt as its object of phantasm illustrated this point. Indeed, Egypt, as rediscovered through Greek writings birthed a new filiation in the history of Europe. Before Greece, there had been Egypt that had been a centre of knowledge and magic. Egypt had also been present in Hebrew and Christian religious writings. This Egypt could only be mostly fantasised -misrepresented-because at the time hieroglyphics had not yet been deciphered. Interest in ancient Egypt was promoted by Jean Terrasson, a French priest and man of letters fluent in Greek and Latin, who wrote the *Life of Sethos* in 1731.[38] The book was a work of fiction inspired by an antique Greek writer who depicted ancient Egypt as a centre of knowledge and mysticism. It became popular and was translated in English and published in London in 1732, launching the notion of Egyptian mysteries that a century later would captivate the European imaginary.

Laying between England and India- the crown's prized possession, in the course of the 18th century Egypt also became of significant geostrategic importance for European imperial powers and the inter-imperial economy (both in economic and epistemic terms.) From 1798 until 1882, the 19th century's two most powerful imperial forces - France and Britain – led a veritable fight over the country.[39] Talks of a French intervention were initiated during the French revolution following the end of King Louis XV's reign but did not materialise until the Napoleonian expedition (1778-1801). [40] Beyond the taking of control of Egypt, the expedition had three aims. The first objective was to destroy British commerce with India, thereby illustrating the link between the country's geostrategic and geo-economic importance. The second was to literally bring the enlightenment to Egypt with the Commission, a group of 167 specialists from France. Napoleon also used the expedition to draw a parallel with Alexander of Macedon (ca. 330 BC) and his supposed liberation of Egypt. Egypt had been a centre of knowledge for the Greeks; it had fascinated Rome and had been colonised by both. By freeing Egypt from the oppression of the Mamluks, Napoleon had found his universal telos. If

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38 Jean terrasson, The life of Sethos. Taken from private memoirs of the ancient Egyptians. Tr. from a Greek manuscript into French, (London, Printed for J. Walthoe, 1732)

39 David G. Jeffreys, *Views of Ancient Egypt Since Napoleon Bonaparte: Imperialism, Colonialization, and Modern Appropriations* (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2003), p.58. The signature in 1797 of the treaty of Campo between France and Austria meant that France only had one rival left: Britain. The fight over the Rosetta Stone is also telling. The precious artefact had been discovered by Napoleon's officers but the British rapidly seized it after Napoleon's defeat. While British authors had tended to lead discussions over ancient Egypt, the Napoleonic expedition changed that.

40 Ibid., p.58.

successful, the expedition would have helped legitimise Napoleon and assure him of a place in the pantheon of modernity.[41] The third objective was to use the scientists and scholars to collect as much information as possible to integrate Egypt as a French colony.

To this end, the fields that mattered the most were: geography, topography, agriculture, hydrography, commerce, manufacture, and the study of the ethnic population and translation.[42] Although the expedition failed in its objective of colonising Egypt, it allowed France to establish itself as a centre of knowledge production by founding several institutions. These included the creation of l'Institut d'Egypte, modelled on the famous Institute de France, a printing house, two periodicals, and a public library. In 1809, an encyclopaedic work, *La Description de l'Egypte*, was published. Finally, Jean-François Champollion's deciphering of hieroglyphs in 1822 provided a crucial contribution to the study of Egyptology. It also helped consolidate the idea that ancient Egypt seen through Europeans' eyes would from then on be empirically objective. French was also the nobility's preferred foreign language, and by the 1820s, the popularity of the French language in Egypt had only grown.

Napoleon's invasion of Egypt represents the perfect model of a scientific appropriation of a culture by another.[43] It also helped instigate a shift in European identification processes that would progressively conceptualise Ancient Egypt as a past Gestalt of Europe. Indeed, From the late 18th century (1798) and until the early 19th century, Egypt became much more than just a territory. It became the bearer of a lost essence whose rightful inheritor was the West. The colonial simulacrum for Ancient Egypt was used as a measuring stick for European modernity. The Napoleonian expedition instigated a competition over culture and knowledge accumulation and a fascination for ancient Egypt that lasted throughout the 19th century. Under Mohammed Ali, artefacts gained economic and Symbolic value, even becoming a currency in a competition between art collectors and diplomats.[44] The Egyptian government even used the promise of objects to playoff diplomats against one another.

Interestingly, the obelisks are a case in point. Before the Napoleonic expedition, Egyptian obelisks adorned the city of Rome, the capital of the Empire that Western Europe had adopted as one of its cultural birthplaces.[45] In 1814, it was Louis XVIII who asked Mohammed Ali for an obelisk. The move was part of the celebration of the re-establishment

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41 Jeffreys, *Views of Ancient Egypt,* p. 15.
42 Ibid., p.15
43 Said, *Orientalism,* p.50
44 Jeffreys, *Views of Ancient Egypt Since Napoleon Bonaparte*, p.3
45 Ibid., p.23

of kingship in France.[46] As the obelisk made its way to Paris, the British pressured Mohammed Ali to give them two obelisks from Luxor's temple.

Similarly, after the British defeated the French navy in the battle of Abu Qir, they put the statue of a triumphant Colonel Nelson in Trafalgar Square. Then, in 1819, to commemorate Lord Nelson and Sir Ralph Abercromby's victories, Mohammed Ali presented them with one of the fallen Thutmose III obelisks - an obelisk from the King "who conquers all the lands".[47] To the British, the obelisk represented a symbol of world power's inheritance and marked a new era: London would now be the new Rome.[48] Soon after, in 1879, the Egyptian Palace announced the gift of an obelisk to America. Egyptomania had crossed the Atlantic and despite the engineering challenges posed by the transportation of the monument the obelisk was erected in New York's Central Park in 1881. A crowd of 10,000 people had come to watch the event. A reporter from the *New York Herald* wrote at the time:

"It would be absurd for the people of any great city to hope to be happy without an Egyptian obelisk. Rome has had them this great while, and so has Constantinople. Paris has one. London has one. If New York was without one, all those great cities might point the finger of scorn at us and intimate that we could never rise to any real moral grandeur until we had our obelisk."[49]

The insertion of fantasised or fictional Egypt into the European present went far beyond the political realms. Fictional Egypt came to populate the European imaginary. In Britain, romantic poets Percy Bysshe Shelley and Horace Smith released competing versions of Ozymandias (1818), a Greek name for Ramses II and in 1894 Oscar Wilde wrote *The Sphinx*. Meanwhile, Georg Ebers, a German Egyptologist and novelist who discovered the Egyptian medical papyrus wrote in his two-volume *Egypt: Descriptive, Historical and Picturesque* (1878): "Everyone, high and low, has heard of Egypt and its primeval wonders. The child knows the names of the good and the wicked pharaohs before it has learned those of the princes of his own country"[50] *The Times of London* published numerous excited letters from

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46 Ibid., p.61.

47 Cleopatra's needle is still on the Victoria Embankment. It is worth noting that the obelisk only made its way to London in 1878.

48 Ibid., p.64; See also Labib Habachi, *The Obelisks of Egypt: Skyscrapers of the past*, (Cairo: American University of Cairo, 1985 Edition), pp.165-170

49 Jeffreys, *Views of Ancient Egypt*, p.64

50 Georg Ebers, *Egypt: Descriptive, Historical, and Picturesque,* vol. 1, translated from the German by Clara Bell (London: Cassell, 1885), p.IIV

archaeologists who recounted their discoveries of chamber tombs and description of temples. One of those asserted that ancient Egyptian art uncovered a culture of such an extraordinary calibre that its acquisition would help raise the British cultural standing. [51] Egyptian influences could be found in women's mourning jewellery, while ancient Egyptian trinkets were quite popular. Members of the British nobility became avid collectors of jewellery, figurines, ornamental boxes, and scarabs. Ancient Egyptian symbolism was also present on tombs, mausolea, cemetery gates and even entire graveyards, which had an Egyptian architecture style or decorative features. Most prominent of these is London's Highgate Cemetery, with the Egyptian Avenue and the sunken Circle of Lebanon added by James Bunstone Bunning between 1839 and 1842. The Egyptian avenue became a tourist attraction instantly.

Symbolisms of ancient Egypt did not stop at cemeteries. Built in an over-the-top "Egyptian style" in 1812, the Egyptian Hall was originally a museum designed to house curiosities from Captain Cook's adventures the South Seas. However, by the late 1800s, it was associated with séances, theatre and magic shows with tricks involving sudden disappearances. The most popular was the trick, known as The Vanishing lady.[52]Public events where people could watch mummies being unwrapped also grew in fashion. Such events were more coated in entertainment than scientific technics. The idea was to play on people's desire to be both scared and entertained. Influential circles of oculists who performed ancient Egyptian rituals and who believed in Egyptian curses and magic also emerged in England, Germany, or even Russia. From the late 18th century, Freemasons also started to use ancient Egyptian imagery and rituals. In literature, ancient Egypt had appeared in European plays and novels corpus in the 17th century. However, tales focusing on mummies, maledictions and revenge started to emerge in 1869 and peaked in the aftermath of British occupation. The mummy-mania even crossed the pond following newspaper reports that several people connected to the British archaeologist Howard Carter had died untimely. In 1922, he led an expedition in the Valley of the Kings where he discovered the tomb of Tutankhamun. A media frenzy followed the excavation and later on peaked as reports of a series of "related" deaths multiplied. In America, this interest in Egypt fed into the development of the architectural style, Art Deco. American movie houses of the 1920s were typically adorned with extravagant Egyptian décor that

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51 Kenna Hawes, 'Oscar Wilde's "The Sphinx" and Victorian Egyptomania', Accessible from: http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/wilde/hawes2.html
52 The Vanishing Lady was originally a trick by Robert Houdini and many illusionists then drew from him and reproduced the trick. In England the illusionist the most known for those sudden disappearances in the late 1880s was David Devant.

mimicked Ancient Egypt's imagined opulence. Capitalising on this eruption of Egyptomania, Universal Studios unleashed *The Mummy* in 1932.[53]

From the late 18th century (1798) and until the early 19th century, uncovered from the depth of time, Egypt and been modern before modernity. This was of course done through the incorporation of ancient Egyptians into the White Race. The growth of the field of Egyptology was concomitant with the development of transatlantic slave trade. The categorization of the 'negro' as uncivilized prohibited the possibility that ancient Egyptians were blacks. The 'whitification' of ancient Egypt has led to many debates. The re-insertion of the blackness of ancient Egypt became essential to both Afrocentric and Pan-African movements. In the US, W.E. B. Du Bois, one of the forefathers of pan-Africanism trained in Berlin to become an Egyptologist but had to cut short his studies after the American government stopped his funding. Over half a century later Cheikh Anta Diop made attempted to reverse the colonial simulacrum of Africanness by re-defining it through the modernity of its history. Through this, Diop joins the Negritude movement in its redefinition of blackness as the affirmation of African history's modernity.[54] The epistemological re-shuffling of ancient Egyptian identity that allowed it to become a marker of modern European identity is quite troubling. By constructing Egypt as an *Object a* of European modernity, colonial thought invented the colonised Egyptian as a castrated subject, a subject lacking-in-modernity and thus in experience. Ancient Egypt was rethought as a myth of origin of European modernity and through it as another element in the myth of European Identity as a precept of time. The power of the West lied in its ability to turn a virtual construction of the Oriental - a phantasm or simulacra- into a real production: the colonised and its heir, the post-colonised.

2 SUBJECTIVITY AS REPRESENTATION: THE IDEAL OF THE BOURGEOIS AS CAPITALIST HORIZON OF THE MODERN SIMULATION

The second moment of this chapter examines how the colonial Simulation subjectivized/enfolded Egyptian reality into its fold. It argues that by reshaping colonial public spaces as the concrete representations of capitalist desire, capitalism acted as an agent of

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53 Ailise Bulfin, 'Fiction of Gothic Egypt and British Imperial Paranoia: The Curse of the Suez Canal,' in *English Literature in Transition 1880-1920*, 54(4):411-443 · January 2011
54 Fanon seems to hint at this throughout *Black Skin White Masks*.

production of colonial reality. It did so by projecting itself as immanent to both desire and experience. In the colonial Simulation, this chapter argues that one of the functions of capitalism is to 'make' the difference between the 'backwards' and the 'moderns' while claiming to 'make' the 'backwards' 'modern'.

THE ACTUALISATION OF VIRTUAL EGYPT: THE BAROQUE FOLDING OF MODERN EGYPTIANNESS

This section illustrates the progressive penetration of Modern Imperial subjectivity in Egyptian subjectivity. It does not claim to provide an empirical study of Egyptian subjectivity and simply seeks to explain how colonial subjectivity managed to fold Egyptian reality into its Symbolic order. It will also highlight how colonial modernization produced national institutions enfolded in the colonial symbolic. As machines of capture and production of national subjectivity, these institutions 'invented' an Egyptian national subjectivity whose sense of selfhood is determined by colonial subjectivity, the section further argues.

In Egypt, the Napoleonic expedition had brought Muhammad Ali to power. Ali had taken advantage of the vacuum or a gap-in-meaning of power in the aftermath of the French departure to gain control of the Palace. The situation was precarious: he needed to consolidate his position and gain more agency from the Ottoman Sultan who was in alliance with the British. To consolidate his position, Ali needed to modernise Egypt. He turned to France for assistance in the modernization processes he instigated through military, administrative and economic reforms. He used the skills of the French technocrats who had remained after the Napoleonic fleet had left as well as those who had flocked to Egypt in the lookout for a job after the collapse of the Empire. He also imported military and naval advisers from France. Ali had a mix of French, Britons, Italians, Germans and Spaniards in charge of the military corps.[55]

Amongst the growing number of French ex-pats, from the mid-1820s, a French doctor named Antoine Barthélemy Clot led reforms in the health sector. Clot became Surgeon-in-chief of the Armies, he instituted French army regulations in Egyptian army camps and made

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55 Laverne, Kuhnke, L*ives at risk: public health in nineteenth-century Egypt*, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990), p.32.

smallpox vaccination mandatory for civilians. [56] He also founded the Egyptian School of Medicine in 1827 under the Department of War's supervision, which curriculum included training in anatomy, pathology, physiology, surgery, internal medicine, hygiene, toxicology, and forensic medicine.[57]The school was affiliated with a new military hospital that included a lecture hall and a pharmacy.[58] In 1827, a Veterinary School was opened, and in 1829, it was a Pharmacy School. Clot Bey also formed a Health Council to supervise and coordinate health efforts and keep records of doctors, pharmacists, midwives, and barbers practising in the country.[59] In the schools, most of the courses were taught in French by Europeans, which led to three developments. First, schools needed translators to communicate the lessons to the students. Secondly, new tertiary and primary schools where teaching was in French were opened so that future Medicine students could understand the courses.

Thirdly, in the nineteenth century, there were also several Egyptian medical student missions to Europe. Some of Bey's educational practices such as post-mortem dissection of human cadavers and the study of anatomy were seen suspiciously by both the' Ulemas and the population. The 'Ulemas suspicions grew as they were pitted against modern doctors. They also were entangled in the growing rivalry between the Institute of Egypt and al-Azhar. Besides, previously, most of the hospitals were run by religious organisations. The implantation of modern medicine modelled on French rules also impacted the Egyptian market for drugs.[60] Indeed, before the emergence of pharmaceuticals, herbalists and home remedies had previously dominated the domestic market. Gradually, over the nineteenth century, modern pharmacists replaced herbalists as the primary purveyors of medicines. Ali also hired many French mercenaries to remodel the army, and several military schools were opened.

After his death, Ali was replaced by his son Said, who under growing European pressure for money closed most of the schools his father had opened. Said's successor Isma'il was intent on modelling Egypt to the image of a European state to achieve sovereignty-independence from European powers and Istanbul. Following his father's footsteps, he launched a series of infrastructure projects and restructuration of the army. This meant he

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56 Gerard n. Burrow, 'Clot-Bey: Founder of Western Medical Practice in Egypt', *The Yale journal of biology and medicine*, 48, (1975),pp.251-257, p.251; see also Clot, Antoine Barthélémy, *Mémoires de A.-B. Clot Bey*, (ed.) Jacques Tagher, (Cairo: Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1949).
57 LaVerne Kuhnke, *Lives at Risk*, pp.34-38
58 Ibid.
59 LaVerne Kuhnke, *Lives at Risk*, p.33.
60 Ibid.

required investors to help fund his projects. Said's ambitions coincided with new financial developments in Europe. Indeed, between1850-1876, bankers in London, Paris and other financial centres expanded their investments beyond the sphere of Europe, and aware of Isma'il plans, they had their eyes set on Egypt.[61]

As we will see in the next chapter, these developments in the international economy had important repercussions on the Egyptian economy. The country soon became reliant on loans and ultimately found itself in indebtedness. Amid all this chaos, a new player inserted itself in the epistemic inter-imperial rivalry between France and Great Britain: the to-be-new-empire, America. Indeed, America had made its inroads in Egypt before the Obelisk gift. From 1869 to 1883, fifty American Army officers, ex-confederate and union officers were voluntarily dispatched to Egypt to help model the military on the West Point model. They also designed coastal fortification, lighthouses, and cartographic surveys in Uganda, the Congo and Sudan.[62] They also participated in the Egyptian-Ethiopian war.

The project called "Americans on the Nile", was launched by Isma'il. Thaddeus Mott, an ex-union artillery officer who served in the Sultan's court in 1868, had been initially introduced him to the idea.[63] Although the mission started as an unofficial project, President Ulysses S. Grant's Army Chief of Staff, Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman eventually authorised it. Mott travelled in 1869 to Egypt, accompanied by Gen. Charles Pomeroy Stone and Gen. Henry H. Sibley. In 1872, Gen. Sherman paid a visit to the Americans in Egypt. In 1878, former President Grant, as part of a world tour, also visited the Americans serving the Khedive. Stone remained in Egypt until 1883 and became the Chief of Staff of Isma'il. At the time American soldiers were considered superior to French and English soldiers. Indeed, the American civil war was seen as the most technologically advanced war. Besides, unlike the French and the British, the Americans did not have a vested interest in the Suez Canal.[64]

Most importantly, the American soldiers, led by General Stone, remodelled the army. Following a request from Stone, Isma'il ordered that no men be promoted within the Egyptian

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61 J. M. Blaut, 'Colonialism and the Rise of Capitalism', Science & Society
Vol. 53, No. 3 (Fall, 1989), pp. 260-296, p.281; See also P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism*: *1688-2000* (Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited, 2002)
62 Cassandra Vivian, *Americans in Egypt, 1770-1915: Explorers, Consuls, Travelers, Soldiers, Missionaries, Writers, and Scientists* (Jefferson: McFarland & Co., 2012), p. 171
63 Ibid., p. 171-72
64 Karl R. de Rouen (ed.), *Defence and Security: A Compendium of National Armed Forces and Security Policies* (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2005), Vol.1, p.215.

military unless they could read and write well.[65]A second order called on establishing schools for each battalion so that officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers could receive the required training.[66] A third order announced the establishment of a good staff college.[67] A school that specialised in courses that taught the use of the latest sub- marine equipment was opened in Rosetta.[68] Another special school for non-commissioned officers was opened.[69] Finally, in 1974, a school for the children of non-commissioned officers was opened in 1974.[70] Fellahin who achieved the battalion school could then also attend this school.[71] Some of the Egyptians who participated in the Urabi revolt attended these schools.[72] Additionally, some of the leaders of the 1919 and 1922 revolution had gone to these schools or had parents who went there.[73] Urabi himself had encountered the Americans during the Egyptian-Ethiopian war.

All did not welcome the American presence. First, tensions arose within American ranks as some officers were unhappy and did not get on well with Egyptian officers, with racial and religious tensions high on the list. Several incidents that turned violent between American officers and their American superiors were reported. Secondly, the Turco-Circassian elite also did not see the American-led reforms from a good eye as they threatened their superiority. Indeed, opening schools to fellahin and other Egyptian conscripts menaced the authority of the Turco- Circassian class. Finally, the French and the British were angry at the American presence. The spiralling debt crises meant that France and Britain had increased their control over the Egyptian government. In 1878, the two imperial forces imposed the abdication of Tawfik, and British and French officials were installed as heads of the Finance Ministry and other key posts. The first demand of the French-Anglo debt holders was the dismantling of the American-built Egyptian Army and Navy. Soon, 80 per cent of the armed forces were shut down, and most American officers were sent home.[74]

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65 William Wing Loring, *A Confederate Soldier in Egypt*, (New York: Dood, Mead and Company,1884), p.351.
66 Ibid., p.352
67 Ibid., p.352
68 Charles, P Stone, 'Military Affairs in Egypt', *Military Service Institution of the United States Journal*, (5; 1884), pp.168-169.
69 Ibid., p.173.
70 Heyworth-Dunne, *An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt,* (London: Luzac & Co, 1938), p.350.
71 Ibid., p.350.
72 Chapter Two examines the 'Urabi revolt into more details.
73 Chapter Two also reviews the 1922 revolution in more details.
74 Jeffrey Steinberg, 'Grant and Sherman On the Nile', *Executive Intelligence Review,* Volume 42, Number 32, August 14, 2015, Accessible from https://larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2015/eirv42n32-20150814/37_4232.pdf

Looking at the foundations of the institutional and legal apparatuses that form the basis of Egypt's modern state, it is difficult to see what is "Egyptian" about it. The modern Egyptian state is an infolding of the colonial Symbolic. These foundations look like a mosaic of different European and American assemblages that invented a kind of Baroque hybrid supposed to produce Egypt as a passable copy of European modernity. By embracing the modern Egyptian sovereign state as the defining Signifier of Egyptian modernity, Egyptian anti-colonial nationalist thought remained bound to reproduce colonial semiotics. Amidst this growing desire to recode the Egyptian state as a copy of its colonial sign, the seeds of the Egyptian anti/post-colonial national subjectivity were birthed. Egyptian nationalism thus emerged as Egypt was taking up a different Big Other.

COLONIAL MODERNITY HAS A NEW SIGNIFIER: BEING MODERN AS BEING BOURGEOIS

This section argues that in colonial Egypt, capitalism had a double function. It acts as both an agent of colonial castration and an agent of production of the bourgeoisie. Indeed, as we have seen in the previous section, capitalism acted as an agent of castration by dislocating the Historical presence of colonised people. The integration of ancient Egyptian culture in the capitalist economy in the 19th century and diplomacy illustrates this. The capitalist transvaluations of culture as an economic marker of modernity acted as a reifier of the validity of the modern Identity of Europe. As we will see in this section, the re-shifting of public spaces was also experienced as a castrating experience, although it did trigger a desire for Bourgeois modernity. Furthermore, by projecting itself as an Ideal-I with which the castrated subjected can self-identify, capitalism also projected itself as an agent of liberation. Indeed, by producing a native Egyptian bourgeoisie, capitalism projected itself as an agent of liberation that could 'make' all Egyptians into subjects of modernity.

In the course of the 19th century, European subjectivity continued to insert itself in the horizon of Egyptian subjectivity. While previously, the Idea of Egyptianness had been dominated by the image of the peasant, the image of the Bourgeois offered up a new possible representation of Egyptians as being-in-modernity. This process of dislocation highlights how capitalists signifying semiotics operate through dislocation and recoding. This displacement

posited the peasant as a connecting point between Egypt's ancient past and its more recent past. In contrast, the image of the Bourgeois represented the possibility of economic emancipation and through it, of individual emancipation. One of the ways through which the Bourgeois Ideal was projected involved the restructuration of the Egyptian public space.

Although Napoleon and his army had already started to remodel Cairo architecturally during the attempted French expedition, similar efforts were continued by the Ali dynasty.[75] In Cairo, Egyptian public spaces were remodelled to turn the city into an Imperial capital.[76] To this end, new public gardens were a must-have. They are an interesting example because they represent both an actual and a virtual point of convergence between Empire, modern national state and capitalism. Connecting entertainment to public health, they were closely associated with the idea of an independent and sovereign state, making them a symbol of state modernity. They had become a craze in the Ottoman Tanzimat, the Habsburg, British and French empires, and the USA.[77] Egypt, under Ali's sons, was no different. In his continuous efforts to aesthetically modernise Cairo, Ismail Pasha established what is now called Horeyya Garden in Tahrir street, the Aquarium Grotto Garden in Zamalek, the Zoo and the Orman Gardens in Giza and restructured the Azbakiyya garden. A closer look at the impact of public parks highlights the link between aesthetics and existence, in that aesthetics participate to actualising a particular form of reality, a specific subjectivity. The Azbakiyya garden can be used as a case in point to illustrate the growing enfolding power of Imperial subjectivity. The garden had fences and an entrance fee.[78] It was thus not accessible to most Egyptians. Enjoyment of the park and its facilities, including kiosks, a restaurant, a garden theatre, a Comedie, a Circus, an Opera House and a Hippodrome, was exclusively reserved to those who could afford it.[79] Additionally, the Palace freely distributed parcels of land to the Ottoman-Egyptian elite and Europeans on the condition that they build houses. [80]As a result, a new upper-class quarter developed in the vicinity of the Garden.

In the official imaginary, public gardens and their leisure function were parts and parcel of creating a new Egyptian civilisation similar to European society. In the 19th century Europe, music and musical theatre were the symbols, if not the standard of cultured sociability: here

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75 Adam Mestyan, 'Power and Music in Cairo, Azbakiyya', *Urban History,* Vol. 40, Special Issue 04, (November 2013), pp.681-704, p. 682
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., p. 682
79 Ibid., p.106
80 Ibid., p.46

civilisation and bourgeois etiquette are co-constitutive.[81] In 1871, Draneht Bey, the superintendent of the new Opera, claimed in a conversation with an Arab journalist that musical theatre was 'the relaxing side of civilization'. Azbakiyya thus embodied the production of new social hierarchy.[82] The development of public gardens is also interesting because these new buildings and gardens initially did not correspond to the needs of an existing audience.[83] Although their creation has often been interpreted as an illustration of colonial transfer, this chapter argues they are the illustration not just of a transfer, but instead of the penetration of imperial subjectivity and through it of capitalist signifying semiotics.

The emergence of the notion of enjoyment as the public through public spaces whose access is contingent on money effectively entails a new process of signification of what public signifies. It also creates enjoyment as a capitalist pleasure and posits it a marker of an individual's ability to be in modernity and enjoy it. The emergence of this new agencement (assemblage) did not take place linearly or without ambivalence. The next few paragraphs highlight attempts made by the Khedive to use capitalist signifying semiotics to his advantage. The reshaping of Egyptian public spaces took place as tensions increased between Egypt and its European creditors, engineering a shift from Egypt's image as a possible identical image of being European to an image analogous with it. This shift also implied a displacement of the role of Ottoman identity and a turn towards a more Arab one. Indeed, Arabism opened the possibility for a new and more 'national' Tanzimat. This new vision is illustrated by Isma'il increasing portrayal of himself as a benevolent Arab ruler by, for example, inciting migrations from Syrians to Egypt. Furthermore, Isma'il advocated the use of the Arabic language to increase popular interests in some of the leisure attractions. In 1869, for example, more Egyptians visited Rancy's circus in Cairo because it advertised its events programme in Arabic.[84]

Following the opera House construction, Isma'il offered free seats to Arab journalists hoping they would help popularise the place amongst the nascent Egyptian upper-class.[85] Amongst them were Muhammad Unsi and his father, Abu'l- Su'ud Effendi, the *Wadi al-Nil* journal editors who began to engage extensively in theatre and opera.[86]*Wadi al-Nil was* the first privately owned Arabic Newspaper in Egypt. It covered political and literary issues but steered

81 Mestyan, 'Power and Music in Cairo, Azbakiyya', p.114
82 Ibid., p.694
83 Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, p.114
84 Mestyan, 'Power and Music in Cairo, Azbakiyya', p.697.
85 Ibid., p.701
86 Mestyan, 'Arabic theatre in early khedivial culture', p.701

clear of religion and was a mouthpiece of the Khedive. Muhammad Unsi also edited the Egyptian armed forces' official paper, *Rawdhat al-Akhbar*, which specialised in political, scientific, literary, agricultural and commercial journalism.[87] Throughout this period, Isma'il became increasingly involved in press matters. He used the press as a tool to try and compete with the rising power of imperial subjectivity. Despite the attempt to Egyptianize and Arabise the public spaces by advertising them to the Effendis, ordinary Egyptians turned their interests to popular Egyptian traditions, including street entertainments, folk songs and the Arab art music. These were characteristic of mid-nineteenth century Azbakiyya and were used to try and reclaim the modernised garden.[88] In 1871, James Sanua, now seen in Egypt as the father of modern Egyptian theatre, staged his 'operettas' in colloquial Egyptian Arabic and used popular tunes to bring ordinary Egyptians to the Azbakiyya Garden Theatre.[89] However, he soon found himself out of the Khedive's favours because his theatre was deemed too vulgar. Clearly, the popular style did not match the Bourgeois etiquette that Egypt needed to make itself analogous to Europe. The same year, Muhammad Unsi asked the Khedive's support to set up an Arab state theatre to no avail. For some time, the only ordinary Egyptians welcomed in the garden were the guards. The 'Urabi revolt in 1882 allowed for a temporary breaking of those codes as the Egyptian singer Salama Hijazi first performed in the spring of 1882 in the Opera House for Colonel' Urabi Pasha.[90]

After the 'Urabi revolt in 1882, which was followed by the British occupation, the Khedive shifted his position and increasingly used popular arts as a popular tool against the British. "Abduh al-Hamuli, an Egyptian musician who together with his wife, formed one of the most successful musical duets and who had served the Khedive privately returned to performing publicly with regular concerts at the Opera House. Attending his performances became increasingly associated with a patriotic act of opposition to colonialism with attendees including ordinary Egyptians, Syrians and a Turco-Circassian elite which was in the process of self- nationalizing as more Egyptian than Ottoman. The increase of autocracy with Isma'il's successor Tawfik led to an alliance between Syrians and Egyptian singers, which launched an intraregional musical-theatre genre in Egypt. By the 1890s, the British excluded Arabic from use in the Opera. Entertainment in Arabic, be it colloquial or classical, was confined to

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87 Ibid., p.703
88 Ziad Fahmy, *Ordinary Egyptians, creating the Modern Nation Through Popular Culture*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press), p.40-43
89 Mestyan, 'Arabic theatre in early khedivial culture' pp.117–137
90 Ibid., p.702.

private/semi-private theatres or coffeehouses in Cairo, Alexandria, Tanta, Port Said. Those coffee houses defied the newly emerging social hierarchy by becoming a space where individuals who would today be considered middle class (writers, lawyers, doctors, bureaucrats, soldiers) and the urban poor could mix.

Besides, Isma'il's developments had opened a new economic market: the arts. Capitalist signifying semiotics thus also unfold through what we call culture. Amongst the arts that developed rapidly in the first half of the 20th century was music. From 1900 to 1910, the gramophone Corporation marketed 1,192 different records in Egypt and 1912, Germany exported 65,000 records to Egypt.[91]By 1929, the estimated number of records imported by Egypt from the US, UK, Germany and France was 728,000. Concomitantly, there was also a growing shift from classical to colloquial language in the arts and the press: writers who could write Ajzal (colloquial poems and songs) were more in demand. Moreover, they were increasingly being paid to write theatre plays and comedic sketches.[92]Odeon started recording Egyptian artists from 1905 and made its reputation by signing the most well-known Egyptian artists including Salama Hijazi, Asma al-Kumsariyya or Bahiyya al-Mahalawiyya. These singers were paid very well. Reports from 1906 claim that there was such a demand for Arab records in Egypt that artists were paid the unprecedented sum of 10,000 Francs.[93]

Less than three decades after Ismail's restructuration of public gardens, Musical theatre had become increasingly popular in Egypt. Beyond the plot, most people came to see a rising singing star. Amongst them was Munira al-Mahadiyya, a female singer who became very famous in the 1910s. She was one of the very few female singers at the time. She founded a coffee shop in the Azbakiyya area of Cairo called Nuzhat al-Nufus, which became a meeting place for politicians and intellectuals from Egypt, Sudan and the Levant who would meet to discuss their ideas.[94] After the British closed Nuzhat al-Nufus, she went into theatre. In 1915, she joined a troop headed by Salama Hijazi, and as he became fatally ill, she performed the male roles originally written for him to great acclaim.[95] She sang nationalist and anti-colonial songs, which made her so famous that a slogan emerged: 'Hawa' al-hurriyya fi Masrah Minira

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91 Ziad Fahmy, 'Media-Capitalism: Colloquial Mass Culture and Nationalism in Egypt', 1908–18, *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* Vol. 42, No. 1 (Feb. 2010), pp. 83-103, p.86
92 Ibid., p.87
93 Ibid.
94 Naguib Mahfouz, The *mirage: A Modern Arabic Novel*, Translated by Nancy Roberts, (New York: Anchor Books, 2012), p 385
95 Nikki R. Keddie and Beth Baron (eds.), *Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), p.296.

al-Mahdiyya" (there is a love of freedom in the theatre of Munira al- Mahdiyya).[96] She founded her own theatre company after the British tried to ban her from the stage. She assumed management responsibilities for her troop, negotiating with theatre owners, composers, lyricists and singers, she dealt with payroll and planning schedules.[97] She was closer to the Wafd than Mustafa Kamil's party, and she sang at Saad Zaghloul's funeral. Tauhida, a Syrian immigrant was another famous singer. She began her career as a dancer in the Azbakiyya area.[98] Her husband has opened a club, Alf Laila wa Laila especially for her to perform from 1887. After his death, she continued to own and manage the business until her passing in 1932. Na'ima al-Masriyya, raised in a lower-middle-class neighbourhood of Cairo, became a singer after a divorce. By 1927 she had bought a casino the Alhambra, which she managed and where she performed.

All in all, with the public gardens, the restructuration of public spaces promoted the Bourgeois as a new possible becoming of Egyptians. This process also marked the growing penetration of capitalist signifying semiotics, as illustrated by the rise of the press and a class of entertainers. This helps demonstrate how, similarly to the state, capitalism also works like a cerebral-ideality. Furthermore, Bourgeois Identity was used to delineate both the possibilities and limits of public enjoyment. As such, the Ideal of being Bourgeois was projected as an image of both individual economic emancipation. This identity was both embraced and rebuked by Egyptians, leading to an ambivalence towards what it meant to be modern. Still, in being the concrete representation of new possibilities that colonial capitalism offered, the Bourgeois Ideal seduced Egyptian subjectivity into its fold. This *en*folding helps explain how most Egyptians saw themselves in the Liberal Bourgeois party called the Wafd.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined how Egyptian subjectivity became *en*folded by the colonial Simulation. It has first argued that the Mirror Stage can be used as a conceptual model that

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96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.

thinks how subjectivity comes onto itself as the simulacrum of a simulation. It drew from Jacques Lacan, who argued that the Symbolic order acts as a Big Other of the Subject. This Big Other produces images of reality, what Lacan calls Ideal-Is, which the subject identifies with throughout their life. In effect, the Big Other produces virtual images that act as sites of Identification through which Subjects mediate their sense of selfhood and of being-in-the-world. The Symbolic order effectively codifies the subject's sense of reality; it acts as the map through which the subject experience their sense of self in reality.[99] As in Borges' fable and lining with Baudrillard's argument, the map becomes the real and the Real is left to rot beneath the map. It has slipped beneath signification.

The chapter has also highlighted the dynamic dimension of the mirror stage. Indeed, it outlines the processes through which the subject shifts from one sense of self to another. This shift into a new sense of reality, it argues, is gained by an entrance into a new modality of being and therefore a new sense of Self. It is also experienced as a castration because it implies losing a previous sense of real. This sense of castration is further exacerbated by the laws through which the real of the new colonial Simulation articulates itself. Indeed, as we have seen, the Symbolic has a prohibitive function: the real has to be mediated by language. It cannot be unmediated anymore. As a result, the 'first real' can only be re-experienced as an *Object a* or phantasm that needs to be castrated to affirm the power of subjectivation of the new Big Other. Drawing from this the chapter has argued that eighteenth-century Europe fantasised a lost Real. This phantasm or simulacrum divided Egypt between a True claimant of modernity, namely ancient Egypt, and a fake claimant, modern Egypt. This displacement of the Egyptian historical agency illustrates how colonial thought thought the Egyptian colonised as a castrated subject. It thought the relationship between ancient and modern Egypt through their non-relationship and fantasised a Historical link of filiation between ancient Egypt and Modern European identity. Thus, while colonial reason thought the colonised as a subject that lacks historicity, a subject that lacks a sense of selfhood, In contrast, the modern European Subject is thought as a surplus of affectation: it is a precept of time. The invented link of filiation thus plays an affective role; it reifies European identity's temporal immanence. This affective construction went so far, European and the American governments rivalled over their acquisitions of ancient

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[99] Drawing from Foucault and Deleuze's take on societies of control, one can say that modernity increasingly articulates itself as through codes that a a-signifying: codes that do not signify but de-signify. They do so by thinking being not through the process of identity but opposition: either/or.

Egyptian artefacts and knowledge. As the American newspaper article pointed, true claimants of modernity had to have an obelisk.

The chapter also highlighted how this Symbolic and concrete penetration was coalescent with the emergence of the Capitalist-Bourgeois Ideal as having a double function of '*liberation*' and castration of desire. Capitalism recoded public gardens as private spaces of Bourgeois enjoyment by setting entrance fees and a dress code. Moreover, to fully be a participant in the enjoyment, one had to have money to partake in the gardens' activities. However, it also acted as an agent of 'liberation' of desire by 'making' enjoyment a public business. The return of folk songs and colloquial Arabic in songs and theatre as the signs of popular enjoyment illustrates this. Furthermore, by offering the colonised a concrete way out of their economic poverty and into the bourgeoisie, capitalism reified its function of 'liberation'. This process also highlights how capitalism works through transvaluation. In Egypt, we have seen how capitalism acted as an agent of 'liberation' of women in several ways. It 'made' dancing more of a professional and thus respectable profession, it allowed women to become not just performers but also owners, managers, and writers…

Furthermore, in the music industry, it produced both men and women millionaires who gained international recognition. By articulating itself through the pleasure principle, capitalism can seduce subjectivity into its Simulation. According to Freud, the Id is driven by a force that desires the experience of pleasure while seeking to avoid or minimise displeasure.[100] The pleasure principle thus acts as a subjective regulator of the economy of desire that assesses the gains and losses of satisfaction that the outcomes of various courses of actions produce.[101] This regulative function of the subjective economy of desire is not the function through which the Id proceeds but the strategy through which the ego negotiates the demands/exigencies of reality on behalf of the Id. In mimicking the pleasure principle and thus acting as a drive that regulates subjective affects, capitalism can capture the interiority of individual desire and project itself as immanent to both experience and desire.

Thus, the 'liberation' of capitalism offers the colonised active participation into the modern Simulation since a subject with capital is a subject with agency. As we will see throughout the thesis, this transvaluation of values through which capitalism functions also produced a desire to disidentify with the Simulation, a desire for de-subjectivation from it.

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100 See for example, Sigmund Freud, James Strachey (Trans.), *The Ego and the id,* (New York: Norton, 1962)
101 Ibid.

Besides, as we will see in the next chapter, this economic 'liberation' of capitalism was the experience limited to a nascent class. For the majority of the population, capitalism was experienced as an economic and legal castration. Thus, in fine, capitalism did open up of the social to more enjoyable becomings, but it 'made' this difference possible, by castrating the becomings of the majority of the population. This sense of liberation, the thesis argues, is one of capture.

CHAPTER 2
ALICE IN PLUNDERLAND

Central Premise: Modernity is an object (the whole that is greater than the sum of its parts) that the subject can acquire through a particular set of processes. The production of a specific set of processes is called a procedure.

Second Premise: Modernity is acquired through a procedure. A procedure is the production of a particular mode of production (production of a set of processes);

Conclusion: Modernity is acquired through the production of a particular mode of production. (*Think Capitalism*!). The only Law (of production) is thus that of Capitalist desire.

INTRODUCTION

On November 5, 1896, the first Egyptian cinema projection took place in Alexandria. On November 12, the journal *El Mou'ayed* published an anonymous letter written by an Egyptian who had attended the screening:

"I will not go into all those things people wonder about regarding the affairs of foreigners, for endless tomes are needed to explain that. There are all sorts of evidence for us to see and almost touch with our fingers, to admit that we are as far behind them as a tortoise is from a hare. But what has made me use this title is not a futile matter which can be comprehended by anybody who has a heart or heard and was witness. What has happened is that a few days ago some foreigners came to Alexandria with a camera capable of capturing motion pictures, which they call "cinematograph". They presented it in a spacious hall in the

Toussoun Pasha Bourse. An incredible number of people gathered round to watch it, and I among them. I left intoxicated by the wonders I had seen.

This marvellous invention which has aroused such amazement has also made me aware of a multitude of things, the most important of which is that I apprehended the secret of the progress of the foreigners. I found out that we would be no less than them if we had the same material, and if, like them, we related work to science and linked the tangible with the intangible.

[…..]

If we know all this, and also that trade, industry and agriculture are resources in the lands of the foreigners, … which make life easier for them and eliminate the fear of hunger and poverty that is so firmly fixed in our country. If we know all this we will no longer hesitate to confess that to compare us Orientals to the West is to compare the dead to the living or earth to sky. All we can do is lament our luck, wail at our destiny, and grieve that our government is in the iron grip of the foreigners. The souls of its people are rising to their throats from harsh pressure and murderous oppression. Then there is no harm in blaming our rich, who have made of their safes a graveyard of piles of money at which termites are gnawing. …

This is all that came to my mind when I saw that wonderful machine I have referred to. I left thinking that as long as we were proceeding down that road, we were heading for an inevitable abyss that has been dug for us by the progress and civilization of the foreigners. If we do not do as our ancestors have done, and shake off the dust of apathy, we will be overwhelmed by their flood. Oh, people, our only salvation lies in following in their footsteps and making the progress of our country our only aim, so that we can catch up with them. I showed in today's letter, that described the progress of the West, the beauty of the cinematograph (motion pictures)."[1]

As this letter highlights, the projection of a film on a screen can be intoxicating to those watching it can arouse amazement. This effectively means that a screen can mediate affect and that the mediation of a Symbolic reality through a screen has the power to subjectivize us affectively. We can thus be affectively subjectivized into a symbolic/virtual reflection of reality. In the introductory and first chapters, we have seen how the symbolic order acts as a screen that projects images of a symbolic/fictive reality that the subjects of the social strive to

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1 Letter accessed from the website of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina website, Alex cinema, section "Historical background", accessed from: https://www.bibalex.org/alexcinema/historical/beginnings.html

identify with, by becoming their concrete representations. When a subject is assigned an image that castrates their internal experience of their selves and their being-in-the-world, the subject experiences identification as a totalising external force of colonisation. We have also seen how by opening up the social to a becoming Bourgeois, capitalism produced images that 'liberated' the colonised experience of modernity. It did so by delivering experience as enjoyment, thereby providing the subject with some sense of 'agency' in their history and through this in History. In the letter, it is because the foreigners produced a machine that provides enjoyment - the cinematograph- that the colonised envies their Modernity. The letter, however, does not tell the whole story. During the first projection, the images also triggered fear and panic. When images of a speeding train appeared on the screen, many ran out of the room.[2] They were frightened that the train would come out of the screen. Their instinctive reaction was that another real could come out of the screen and colonise their reality. Surely, a virtual Symbolic reality could not act on our reality; it could not affect our reality? If a train came out of a screen, the screen would have the power to displace our sense of reality, to 'make' it different. So much so in fact that in this case, the real would be deprived of the possibility of signification. And surely, if reality articulates itself as a real deprived of the possibility of signification, then reality would be absurd. A train coming out of a screen is absurd, and so is the a-signifying real it produces.

Gilles Deleuze defines the absurd as a signifier deprived of the very possibility of signification.[3] Such a signifier has no referent in semiotics; it is a concept/sign that does not refer to a fixed object /image and has no agreed-upon meaning. In this case, this signifier can be called an empty or floating signifier.[4] In the introduction, we have seen how for Baudrillard, in postmodern semiotics, the real had lost its referents.[5] This loss of reference of the real, Baudrillard argued, means that as a concrete historical formation, postmodernity articulates itself as a post-truth era. Baudrillard called it a hyperreal that produces an empty real, hence its deathly quality.[6] We have also seen that for Deleuze what Baudrillard calls postmodernity is, yet another simulation produced by the regime of representation. Indeed for Deleuze, it is the regime of representation that 'causes' subjectivity and thought to cognize experience as an

2 As explained by Alaa al-Aswani Conference at the Mediatheque de Vaise, Assises Internationales du Roman, 2019, Lyon, May 21st, 2019

3 Deleuze, The *Logic of Sense*, p.69

4 Howarth, Stavrakakis, "Introducing discourse theory and political analysis", in D. Howarth, A.J. Norval, J. Aletta and Y. Stavrakakis (Eds.), *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp.1-23; See also Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.*

5 See Introductory Chapter, p.19.

6 Ibid.

object of knowledge/phantasm.[7] This simulation marks a shift from disciplinary to control societies, and according to Deleuze, disciplinary societies produced the a priori conditions for their becoming as societies of control.[8] Indeed, from a Deleuzean perspective, a simulation 'makes' the conditions for its possible shift into another simulation and through semiotic folding.

In *Masochism, Coldness and Cruelty*, Deleuze argued that modernity expresses itself as a semiosis that thinks THE LAW - and through it the reality that is underpinned by THIS LAW - as an empty signifier. He outlined how the emergence of modern thought converged with a shift in how thought thinks the Idea of law. Up to Kant, he argued, classical thought took up THE GOOD as a referent for the Idea of law. Accordingly, it thought law in itself as a regulation that ought to produce a better experience of being-in-the-world, a better society. Things changed when in his second *Critique,* Kant argued that the Idea of law does not have a referent in semiotics since the Idea of law is founded on similarity. He thus asserted that the concept/representation of Law is not mediated by another Idea; it is the same in-itself- with-itself.

"In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant gave a rigorous formulation of a radically new conception, in which the law is no longer regarded as dependent on the Good, but on the contrary, the Good itself is made dependent on the law. This means that the law no longer has its foundation in some higher principle from which it would derive its authority, but that it is self-grounded and valid solely by virtue of its own form. For the first time we can now speak of THE LAW, regarded as an absolute, without further specification or reference to an object. [….] Clearly, THE LAW, as defined by its pure form, without substance or object or any determination whatsoever, is such that no one knows or can know what it is. It operates without making itself known. It defines a realm of transgression where one is already guilty, and where one oversteps the bounds without knowing what they are, as in the case of Oedipus. Even guilt and punishment do not tell us what the law is but leave it in a state of indeterminacy equalled only by the extreme specificity of the punishment. This is the world described by Kafka."[9]

Thus, for Kant, as a noumenon, or Idea, the image/concept of law cannot be

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7 Ibid., p.25

8 Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control", pp.3-7

9 Gilles Deleuze, Masochism, Coldness and Cruelty,(New York: Zone Books, 1991) p .82-84

apprehended as an object of knowledge because its form is identical to its image. In other words, in-itself, The law is THE LAW. Followingly, the image or concept of law can only be apprehended as an object of knowledge through the concrete forms that THE LAW takes up. In thinking THE LAW as having no semiotic referents, Kant rethought law as an empty signifier. An example of a thought that thinks law through this semiotic process is financial thought. Financial law is primarily determined by the financial sector's requirements, not by the degree of Good that it produces as an experience. This shift in semiotics that Kantian thought operates in its thinking of the concept of law as an Idea of THE LAW opens up the door to what Deleuze calls a Kafkian reality. Kantian thought cognizes the Identity of the image/concept of law through its function. It does not mediate the *Representamen*/signifier it produces for the image/concept of law by its affect/sense on the social. Drawing from Peirce, one could say that the Representamen/signifier is not interpreted through its relationship with an *Object,* but through its relationship with its concrete Self. Kantian thought thus thinks the meaning of the image/concept of law through its tangible Symbolic representations. This is problematic since, as we have seen in the introduction, the Representamen's function is to represent/produce the real of the sign (the *Object*) as being equivalent to its symbolic representation.[10] Thus in thinking of itself through a dyadic semiotic process between the Representamen/signifier as a concept and the Representamen/signifier as a concrete Representation, semiosis is totalised by the Symbolic order. The semiotic production is the result of "a signifier that makes love with its signifieds."[11]

Besides, if the concrete representation determines the concept's meaning, then the concrete representation acts as the *Interpretant* of its own symbolic. To go back to our example of financial law, this means that ultimately, financiers act as the Interpretant of the concept/image of financial law. As a consequence, the Idea is tailored to the requirements of the financial sector its capitalist desire. As we will see in this chapter, in Egypt, colonial financial law was determined by the needs of European financiers. In the colonial semiotic process, the function of the concept/image of law is not to represent a Symbolic that is the equivalent of a Real nor to judge/think the Symbolic by looking at its affect on the production of social reality. Instead, the function of THE LAW is determined by the requirements of European financiers and through them, of capitalist desire. Thus, further drawing from Peirce,

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10 For example, in Peircean terms, the function of a prison is to exercise disciplinary power. The Object of a prison is to produce discipline, to discipline us. Or again, to think the function of a prison as the exercise of disciplinary power thought thinks prison as a panopticon

11 Deleuze, Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p.210

one could say that in modern thought, the meaning of the concept of law is determined by the requirements set by its symbolic function: the totalisation of experience by the Modern Symbolic.

In fine, Kantian thought thinks the function of repression of the image/concept of law as the affect (Object) that law ought to produce on the real: its foreclosure. In foreclosing the affective reality that laws produce from its image/concept, Kantian thought opens up law and the reality that it structures to the absurd: it thinks law as a force of foreclosure of the reals or possibles that do not fit The Law of its Symbolic. In itself, the function of Symbolic LAW is then to discipline us into its simulation. Semiotic deregulation had produced a new regulation: repression as the only object of production of the law.

In thinking law as a supreme or total authority, a pan of modern thought has stopped questioning the legitimacy of law in-itself. Instead, it thinks THE LAW as a set of regulations that produce a reality partitioned to fit capitalism's requirements/desire. As law lost its sense of THE GOOD and found its sense of Capitalist Plasticity, so did its simulation. In modernity, the real takes up plasticity as an experience totalised by the object world and the laws of its capitalist desire. This means that the real can only be thought through its capitalist referents, which remain forever external to it. In itself then, the real is apprehended as de facto lacking-in-experience because it cannot be made into an object of pure/total knowledge and thus of phantasm. Overall, then, Deleuze tells us that by embracing the Kantian semiotic slip, modern thought thinks THE GOOD as the repressive function of the law: the law is good because it is a necessary form of repression. In this modern semiotic process, THE GOOD is produced out of the subject's acceptance of repression: a lawful subject is a subject that satisfies the requirements of capitalist desire.

This chapter draws on Deleuze's critique of modern thought to argue that in thinking THE LAW as an empty signifier, colonial thought also thinks the reality that structures it as an empty signifier. This chapter's title refers to Deleuze's book *The Logic of Sense* and Lewis Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*. In Carroll's book, Alice 'falls' into Wonderland, a territory totalised by the object world and its rules. There, to make sense of reality, Alice cannot refer to her previous sense of the real and its laws. In Wonderland, the real is an empty signifier; it can go all in all senses, widths, dimensions. It is a world that appears open to all potentialities. However, Alice soon discovers that Wonderland functions by foreclosing the possibles that do not fit its laws. The reality of Wonderland thus articulates itself in two senses:

It appears as a pure becoming <<<----->>> It actualises/concretises itself as a limited becoming

Or:

It appears as the potential becoming of all possibles <<<----->>> It concretises itself as one possible becoming

In Egypt, the chapter argues, colonial reality articulates itself through a similar paradox. It appears as the potential becoming of all possibles and yet concretises itself as a capitalist becoming. As we have seen, this paradox is produced by a semiotic slip that 'makes' the absurd as THE LAW that structures the production of modern thought and modern subjectivity. This chapter thus argues that in Egypt, modern colonial reality is as an example of this semiotic law of the absurd. In doing so, it highlights how colonial reality produces the absurd by foreclosing the possibility of signification of the reals that are not compossible with its Symbolic. This chapter is divided into two moments. The first moment includes three sections and highlights how the simulation's capitalist reality articulates itself through the foreclosing of non-colonial possibles. The moment argues that it does so by problematising the possible becomings of Egypt with the debt problem. The first section highlights how colonial powers used the debt problem to create a dependency system between European capitalists and the Egyptian Palace.

Although colonial reason argued that this dependency was for Egypt's betterment, its primary function was to 'make' European financiers and through them, European governments, richer. The second section argues that the debt problem was then used for the gradual domination of the government by colonial powers. While colonial reason argued that its restructuring of the legal system would act as the foundation of a social contract between the state and its citizens, its function was to legally assert the superiority of European financial and political interests in Egypt. The third section looks at the Egyptian struggle for the legal negotiation of national independence through the example of the National Programme. It highlights how the foreclosure of this possible by colonial powers, led to the 'Urabi revolt. The second moment of the chapter also empirically highlights how colonial law further concretised Egypt's colonial becoming by foreclosing the possibles that did not fit the requirements of capitalist desire. Its first section looks at the consolidation and reproduction of colonial hierarchies through the establishment of Mixed Courts. It argues that the courts' function was to protect the interests of the capitalist Bourgeois and participated in the concretisation of their socio-economic supremacy. This second section outlines how colonial laws foreclosed the peasants' previous sense of real as it disciplined them into the reality of the

simulation. It does so by looking at how widespread foreclosures of peasants' lands made the majority of the Egyptian peasantry landless. The foreclosure of their previous sense of real by capitalism, this section argues, meant that for the peasants, modernity expressed itself as the affirmation of two senses: one the one hand it appeared to open the door to all the possible yet on the other it concretises itself as the a priori guilt of the colonised. The section further argues this paradox illustrates the absurd logic of colonial semiotics and their production of a reality where the real deprived of the possibility of signification. The third and final section looks at the absurd of colonial reality through the illiberalism of what is thought of as the 'Liberal era' of Egypt. Colonial political laws, it argues, can be taken as another example of the ways in which colonial rule was used to totalise the political experience into the colonial Simulation.

1 WHEN COLONIAL REASON MASQUERADES AS GOOD SENSE

WELCOME TO PLUNDERLAND: THE DEBT AS THE IMAGE/HOLE INTO COLONIAL MODERNITY

This section highlights how the debt problem was used as an instrument for the gradual economic penetration of colonial powers by creating a dependency system between European capitalists and the Egyptian Palace. Although colonial reason argued that this dependency was for Egypt's betterment, its primary function was to 'make' European financiers and through them European governments richer. In doing so, the section argues, its function is to comply with THE LAW of capitalist desire. As we have seen in the previous chapter, in the 18th-century Modernity meant business and from Mohammed Ali onwards, the Khedivial system became intent on turning Egypt into the copy of a Modern European country. As advertised and disseminated by the agent of colonial reason, it was believed that modernity could be acquired through a set of processes known as modernisation processes. What we will see in this section is analogous to Alice falling in the hole that leads her to Wonderland. It illustrates how the Egyptian Palace's constant borrowing, coupled with bankers and financiers' total financial irresponsibility, literally manufactured Egypt's indebtedness. These developments ultimately created a relationship of dependency that became anchored in law and later formalised through a system: the colonial system. The situation, however, was presented in a different light by colonial powers. From their perspective, the debt was exclusively Egypt's

and its government, a government that lacked a raison d'état.

From the early 1800s, Mohammed Ali's efforts to modernise the state affected several fields. In agriculture, he expanded the cultivation and plantation of crops for exportation and reinvested public works' revenues.[12] He restructured the army and promoted industrialisation by opening factories for weaving cotton, jute, silk, and wool.[13] Ali also recruited European advisers to help him open sugar, indigo, glass and tanning factories and import the required types of machinery.[14] Factories came to employ about 4 per cent of the population – between 180 000 and 200 000 people aged 15 or over.

Meanwhile, commercial activity was geared towards establishing foreign trade monopolies to achieve a favourable commercial balance.[15] This angered Britain and France, although both engaged in similar practices.[16] In a bid to remove Ali, on March 17, 1807, the British sent 5,300 troops to Egypt.[17] Ultimately, their military excursion failed, and on September 14, they evacuated the country.[18] The British also entered a proxy war with Egypt and the Ottoman Empire by supporting the Wahhabi movement's expansionist ambitions against the Khedive's initiatives.[19] Ali came out victorious, which only heightened his aspirations. In return for helping the Sultan in the Greek war for independence in the late 1820s, Ali asked for Syria and Morea. When Istanbul refused, he invaded Syria (1831) with his son Ibrahim who came out victorious from the battle of Konia. Britain, France, Austria, Russia and Prussia allied with the Ottoman Empire to fight off the Egyptian forces and drove Ibrahim out.[20] At that point, the relationship between Egypt, France and Britain was a fraught one.

Said Ali, Muhammad Ali's son, took over after his father passed away in 1849. He wanted to follow in his father's footsteps, but this required vast sums of money, which could only be obtained through borrowing. At the time Egypt's law on these matters remained

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12 These included irrigation, canals, dams and barrages.

13 Mohammad A. Chaichian, 'The Effects of World Capitalist Economy on Urbanization in Egypt, 1800–1970', International Journal of Middle East Studies, Volume 20 Issue 1, (February 1988), pp.23-43, p.27

14 Osama LTC Shams el-Din, *A Military History of Modern Egypt from the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War,* (CreateSpace Independent Pub, 2012), p.19

15 Afaf Lufti Al-Sayyid Marsot, *A Short History of Modern Egypt*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.45

16 Ibid., p.45

17Andrew McGregor, *A Military History of Modern Egypt,* (London: Praeger Security Press, 2006), pp.54-56.

18Ibid., , pp.54-56

19Ibid., , pp.54-56

20 Osama LTC Shams el-Din, *A Military History of Modern Egypt from the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War,* p.25

blurred. While no decrees from the Porte granted the Khedive the privileges of issuing state-loans, no regulations prevented him from doing so either. Thus, in 1858, to finance the Suez Canal construction, Said circumvented the legal fog by issuing treasury bonds, a method on which he became increasingly reliant. However, this was not enough to finance the Canal. By 1860 he turned to a French banking house that loaned him 28 million francs on his personal account.[21] In 1862, still short of money Said was able, with the Sultan's accord, to negotiate the first Egyptian state-loan worth 3.3 million. But there was a trick. The loan conditions meant that after the deduction of interests and charges, Egypt only received 2.5 million pounds. Besides, the 30-year repayments plan meant Egypt had to repay a total amount of 8 million pounds.[22]

In 1863, Said was succeeded by his brother Isma'il, who tried to relaunch industrialisation processes. He instigated a series of infrastructure projects and worked on the restructuration of the army. This required even more financial capital, which the Palace lacked. Isma'il opted to follow in Said's tactic of finding investors. Coetaneous to this, and as seen in Chapter One, between 1850-1876, bankers in European financial centres expanded their investments beyond Europe, especially after the 1873 financial crisis that affected Vienna, Berlin, Frankfort, New York and London.[23] Thence, special banks tasked with organising financial flows between European financial centres and Egypt were created.[24] By 1873, Egypt had accumulated a debt of 60,000,000 million pounds, mainly owed to French and English bankers.[25]

British bankers focused on long-term loans (20-30 years), and French bankers on short-term loans. In addition to loans, the Egyptian government continued to issue bonds. Between 1862-1867, with the support of several British and French banking houses including Frühling & Goschen and Anglo-Egyptian Bank, five bonds totalling 18 million pounds were issued.[26] These loans were secured on the revenues of the Delta, Dekahlieh, Charkieh and Behera

21 Ali Coşkun Tunçer, *Sovereign Debt and International Financial Control The Middle East and the Balkans, 1870–1914*, (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2015), p.31

22 Ibid., p.32

23 David S. Landes, *Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt,* (London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1958), p.214, p.235

24 These included the Anglo-Egyptian Bank (founded in 1864), the Franco-Egyptian Bank (founded in 1870 and directed by the brother of Jules Ferry, a significant official of the French government) and the Austro-Egyptian Bank (founded in 1869). The major London banks were also particularly active.

25 Richard Atkins, 'The Origins of the Anglo-French Condominium in Egypt, 1875-76', *The Historian*, Vol.36, n.2, (February 1974), pp.264-282, p.266

26 Tunçer, *Sovereign Debt and International Financial Control,* p.31

provinces, and the general revenues of the Egyptian state.[27] More bonds that were secured on the private agricultural lands of the Khedive and his family or *Dairas* followed.[28] In less than a decade, Isma'il had mortgaged Egyptian provinces, private estates, and state revenues, but more was needed to finance modernisation. In 1868 to meet interest payments the Khedive took on yet another loan of 11.9 million issued by the syndicate of IOB, Société Générale and Oppenheim.[29] This time the consortium imposed a condition: Egypt could not contract another loan for five years.[30] By 1896 the Sultan echoed those sentiments by issuing a decree that restricted the Egyptian governor's rights to acquire a new loan without seeking his permission.[31] By then, Istanbul had realised the debt would allow European powers to gain more and more influence in Egyptian affairs.[32]

Still, in 1870 the Palace managed to contract a new loan through the Franco-Egyptian Bank and secured it with the revenues of the Dairas. The Sultan declared it illegal prompting a series of discussions over the necessity of borrowing between Istanbul and Cairo.[33] The Palace argued that "restrictions [on issuing foreign loans] were creating serious obstacles to the complete development of the prosperity of Egypt".[34] By 1872 the Sultan relinquished and gave full decisional powers to the Khedive on loan so that Egypt could 'modernise'. This marked the introduction of a law known as "Moukabala" which gave landowners the option of paying six years' land tax in advance at a fifty per cent discount.[35] Landowners who could pay this in one time beneficiated from an immediate return on their tax. Those who could only afford instalments had an 8 per cent discount on their advance, with the amount only reduced upon completion of their contribution. This created yet another form of dependency. In effect, this meant contracting a domestic loan with landowners at about 9 per cent interest rate. At the time of the law, the land tax amounted to about £4.8 million per year. Therefore, the law implied a sacrifice of half of this amount to address the government's short-term liquidity needs. During

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27 Ibid., p.31.
28 Ibid., p.31.; See also William H. Wynne, *State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders: Selected Case Histories of Governmental Foreign Bond Defaults and Debt Readjustments*, (New Haven: Yale University Press 1951), p.593.
29 Ibid., p.31.
30 Ibid., p.31
31 Ibid., p.31
32 Ibid., p.31
33 Eric Toussaint, 'La dette comme instrument de la conquête coloniale de l'Égypte', May 20, 2016, Centre de recherche sur la mondialisation, Mondialilisation.ca, Accessible from:
https://www.mondialisation.ca/la-dette-comme-instrument-de-la-conquete-coloniale-de-legypte/5526551
34 Tunçer, *Sovereign Debt and International Financial Cont*rol p.47
35 J.C. McCoan, *Egypt under Ismail, a romance of history*, (London: Chapman and Hall, 1889), p.122; see also William H. Wynne, *State Insolvency and Foreign Bondhol*der, pp.581-82.

the first three years of its operation, the Moukabala yielded in total £9.9 million, but this was not enough to cover the deficits.[36] The loan mania continued, and in 1873, Egypt contracted its largest loan to date - £32 million- with a bank consortium that included the Imperial Ottoman Bank, Bischoffsheim, Société Générale and banking houses in Alexandria, Istanbul and Amsterdam. This loan was secured through all the revenues of the railways of Lower Egypt, the proceeds of the personal and indirect taxes, the proceeds of the salt tax and annual receipts taken from the proceeds of the Moukabala.[37] By then "taken together with the previous ones, the overall guarantees corresponded to almost all the Egyptian government's general revenues. Although acquiring this loan was seen as a success for the government, the crises in the international markets had an immediate effect on Egyptian credit, as it was impossible to borrow further."[38] Once again, this loan did not favour Egypt. After all the charges and interests, Egypt only received 20 million pounds. Repayments set over 30 years, meant Egypt had to repay 77 million pounds.

Concomitant International developments such as the American civil war (1861-65) further affected the Egyptian economy. As the conflict raged, Southern states stopped their cotton production and continued demand allowed Egypt to boost its production. To do so, it relied on loans and in the process, it became dependent on the cotton revenues to make its repayments. When the war ended, and Southern states resumed their cotton production, prices plunged, leaving Egypt in an even greater financial precarity. The outset of the Long Depression in 1873 also marked the slowing down of European capital export to Egypt.

Consequently, the Palace stopped making some of its loans repayments and turned to short-term loans, which had greater interest rates. In 1875 unable to pay the creditors, Ism'ail suspended payments of interests on the loans. Desperate for money he turned to the Rothschilds. With their intermediary, he sold 45 per cent of the Suez Canal shares to the British government for around 4 million. That same year, the Ottoman Empire ended up in bankruptcy which meant Egypt could no longer contract international markets loans.[39] By 1876, The Egyptian debt totalled 68,5 million pounds against just 3 million in 1863. In this context of growing tensions, with Isma'il's agreement, the British Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli and his government sent two advisors to reassess the state's finances. A few weeks before the

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36 Tunçer, *Sovereign Debt and International Financial Control*, p.34.
37 William H. Wynne, *State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders: Selected Case Histories of Governmental Foreign Bond Defaults and Debt Readjustments*, pp.582-83
38 Tunçer, *Sovereign Debt and International Financial Control*, p.34.
39 The same year, Peru and Uruguay also became bankrupt.

British government bought the Khedive's actions in the Suez Canal, a first investigation commission, led by a British Lawyer named Stephen Cave was launched in Cairo. All in all, this section has illustrated how the dependency of the Egyptian Palace on European capitalists *un*folded as the greater penetration of colonial powers in Egypt's internal affairs. As the next section explains, a parallel was drawn between European capitalists' interests and their governments. Here, capitalist and colonial interests/desires are thus placed in a signifying chain of equivalence. Welcome to PlunderLand.

THE MIS-SIGNIFICATION OF THE LAW AND ITS PRODUCTION OF THE COLONIAL SYSTEM

This section further details how the colonial powers used the debt problem to dominate the government. Firstly, the colonial Symbolic equivalenced the interests of European capitalists and the interests of their governments. In a second step, while colonial reason argued that its restructuration of the legal system would act as the foundation of a social contract between the state and its citizens, its function was to legally assert the superiority of European financial and political interests in Egypt. Empirically, this section outlines how the two legal investigations launched by European powers to look into the debt problem helped consolidate the legal institutionalisation of colonialism.

As mentioned in the previous section, in the late 1870s, the British launched the Cave investigation. Bitter from the agreement between Isma'il and Disraeli, France decided to send its mission in Alexandria. In addition to their political and strategic rivalry, Britain and France's diverging interests meant they had different views on how to solve the debt. Besides the debt also involved a complex network of actors that included financial groups and diplomats, which resulted in the creation of many concurring plans for its restructuration and repayment. The Egyptian debt crisis arrived on the heels of two other similar crises in Tunisia and the Ottoman Empire. In 1866-67, following its failure to make debt repayments, Tunisia had been put under France's financial tutelage. France led the negotiations, which established an international

economic commission in 1868.[40] In contrast, the Ottoman case entailed several sporadic attempts to develop mechanisms of financial control, but these repeatedly failed.[41] Thus, the Tunisian and Ottoman cases were taken as a reference point for the Egyptian situation. France, for example, heavily drew from the Tunisian case to rethink the Egyptian position.

The Cave's Report was written in March 1876 and explained the financial state of Egypt as follow: "[Egypt] suffers from the ignorance, dishonesty, waste and extravagance of the East, such as have brought her suzerain to the verge of ruin, and at the same time from the vast expense caused by hasty and inconsiderate endeavours to adopt the civilization of the West."[42] Colonial powers thus thought that Egypt lacked the business of governing, which echoes the words of Balfour.[43] The report recommended that Egypt pay-off its short-term loans and consolidate all its other debts into a stock of £75 million. French banking houses, which owned most of the floating debt, objected to Cave's solution. Negotiations between the different creditors started but ended in deadlock. At the same time, the Ottoman bankruptcy increasingly weighted on Egypt debt's and on April 6, 1876, the payment of Egypt's treasury bonds was suspended. The Khedive then issued two decrees. On May 2, 1876, at the instigation of a consortium of French banks, legislation established the Caisse de la Dette Publique, which was set up to represent the interest of Europeans creditors. It was directed by foreign commissioners nominated by their respective governments. To service the debt, they had the authority to take the revenues directly from local authorities.[44] These included, amongst others, the provinces of Cairo and Alexandria and the salt and tobacco taxes. While the French, Italians and Austrian creditors agreed to the Caisse, British creditors and the British government refused to commit to it. On May 7, 1876, the second decree called for the unification of Egypt's total indebtedness, which amounted to £91 million. This further angered some creditors, and within weeks the enterprise failed.

New negotiations then took place in London and Paris. These resulted in a new

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40 Jean Ganiage, *Les origines du protectorat français en Tunisie 1861-1881*, (Paris, PUF, 1959), p. 338-368.

41 See Donald Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929); Christopher Clay, *Gold for The Sultan. Western Bankers and Ottoman Finance 1856-1881* (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000); Edhem Eldem, 'Ottoman Financial Integration with Europe: Foreign Loans, the Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman Public Debt', *European Review* (2005/13), p. 431-445.

42 Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, p. 4.

43 Said, *Orientalism,*p.46

44 Coşkun Tunçer, *Sovereign Debt and International Financial Control*, p.36; see also F. Robert Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives, 1805–1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1984), p.183.

investigative commission in summer 1876 led by G.J. Goschen and M. Joubert. Goschen was selected to represent the bondholders' interests in Egypt. [45] Joubert represented French interests. [46] Together they developed a plan known as the "Dual Control". This time it was accepted by the Khedive and embodied in a decree dated November 18, 1876. [47] This decree also maintained the Caisse de la Dette Publique. This time the Caisse's Commission comprised a French, a British, an Italian and an Austrian representative. It had to assess the resources and the total debt of the Palace, evaluate the totality of the state's revenues and draw a budget.

To this end, a system known as General control was set up. [48] Two general-controllers, one British and the other French, supervised the entire fiscal administration of the country. One was mostly responsible for expenditure and the other for the revenues. The State railways, Telegraphs, Alexandria Harbour, the port commission, and the Khedive's private lands were brought under international boards' control to provide guaranteed revenues for service of the debt. [49] The post-office was also placed under the superintendence of an English official. [50] In facts, revenues from the most productive provinces ended straight in the hands of the Commission. By 1877 more than 60 per cent of all Egyptian revenues went to service the national debt. [51] Despite the unification of the debt's capital, the total outstanding amount remained the same because of the floating debt. The Caisse also oversaw any changes in taxes and new loans. In fine, to compensate the creditors for their losses, the 1876 decrees hypothecated the revenues of the Egyptian state and the personal wealth of the Khedive. This meant a complete loss of fiscal sovereignty, which was the first step towards the Palace losing political authority. The creditors' control established in Egypt in 1876 marked the beginning of direct international control of Egypt's finances. Colonisation had arrived, albeit informally.

Furthermore, the Caisse could sue the Egyptian government before the Mixed Court if it breached its repayment plan and any single member could personally sue the government in

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45Ibid., p36.
46 Ibid., p.36.
47 F. Martin, (ed.), *The Statesman's Yearbook 1878*, (London: MacMillan & Co, 1878), p.633-634
48 Malak Labib, 'Crise de la dette oublique et missions financieres europeenes en Egypte, 1878-1879', *Mondes*, 2013/2 (N.4), pp.23-43. Accessible from: https://www.cairn.info/revue-mondes1-2013-2-page-23.htm
49 Hershlag, Zvi Yehuda, Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1964), pp.103-104
50 C Tunçer, *Sovereign Debt and International Financial Control*, p.39
51 Helen Chapin Metz, (ed.), "From Intervention to Occupation, 1876-82, in Egypt: A Country Study," (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1990). Accessible from: http://countrystudies.us/egypt/25.htm

the Mixed Courts. These had been established in September 1875 due to an agreement between the Khedive and the Great Powers. Under this scheme, foreigners were empowered to bring cases against the government, the administration and the estates of the Khedive as well as members of his family. The Commission agreed with Cave's findings that the root of indebtedness stemmed from a lack of reasonable administration of the country's money. It pointed as culprits the arbitrary tax system, the lack of a proper budget system, the unequal distribution of lands and water for irrigation, as well as the forced labour used for the Khedive's private estates. The Commission's findings implicitly established a causal link between fiscal reform and state reform. Its report thus called for establishing a constitutional government that included a British-headed Ministry of Finance and a French-headed Ministry of Public Works. This was an extension of the Controller System set up in 1876. Unbelievably, soon after its formation, the new cabinet attempted to raise a new loan. Under European supervision, in 1878, Egypt was allowed to borrow £8.5 million, which were secured with the Khedive's personal properties. As per the agreement, these became state property and were administered by an international commission comprised of a French, an English and an Egyptian national. These new regulations *de facto* excluded the Khedive from the administration of Egyptian finances. They also engineered a complete shift by putting at its head a European-led executive council.

European creditors and their governments could now be sure that their interests would prevail since they had become the de facto yet informal Egypt rulers. The move fostered discontent across the country and strikes and petitions made the rounds. Within months, the Caisse and the Controle Général proved ineffective. Internal divisions between the actors meant that most of the measures passed were never applied. Besides, disagreements over the scope of the investigation remained. For the creditors, the failure of the investigation was caused by two factors. First, the commissioners disagreed on the investigation's scope, some claiming it was too brief and too superficial, others called for a longer one. Second, the investigators had to rely on local sources deemed unreliable because of their conflicting interests. Nonetheless, the commissioners now pointed to the despotism and absolutism of the Khedive as the source of Egypt's debt problem. They argued that the Dairas had been acquired illegally and should be returned to the state.[52] The Khedive contested the Commission's findings and argued that Egypt's continued indebtedness was rooted in the miscalculation of the country's financial resources. He also denounced that the investigative reports had never mentioned the contestable nature of much of the loans, the high-interest rates or the pressure

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52 Malak Labib, 'Crise de la dette publique'

exercised to have repayments met.[53]

In 1877, calls for yet another investigation first emerged in British financial and diplomatic circles. Amongst them was Evelyn Baring who was then Caisse commissioner. Eventually, both France and Egypt agreed on starting negotiations. This time talks took place in Paris, London and Cairo and involved a network of actors even more complex than the previous ones. These included the initial negotiators, their agents, the Egyptian government and its intermediaries in Europe, the Europeans governments and their consuls. The heterogeneity of the participants meant that divergences once again rapidly surfaced. The Caisse de la Dette requested to be actively involved in the investigation to represent European creditors' interests. The Khedive objected and considered it an attack on the last remnants of his sovereignty. [54] The Caisse won and its four commissioners, who had little knowledge about Egypt's internal affairs, were tasked with the new investigation.[55] Charles Rivers Wilson from the British National Debt Office and Ferdinand de Lesseps, one of the leading promoters of the Suez Canal joined in.[56] The Khedive had a consolation prize in Mustafâ Riyâd, the minister for commerce and agriculture and a close friend, who was included as a representative of Egypt.[57]

The investigation went through two phases. Throughout the first one - April 1 until August 1878 - the Commission asked ministries to provide information about the organisation and attribution of their budget and list of the people in charge. It also requested Egyptian officials and government deputies to testify before it and to subpoena all records.[58] Egyptian officials were offended as the requests openly confirmed their complete loss of sovereignty. The Commission also organised personal meetings with ministers and administration chiefs; some were conducted in French and required translators.[59] The domination of the Commission by Europeans meant that highly ranked Egyptian officials did not want to share information with them.[60] The Khedive's royal proprieties were also investigated, but officials were equally

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53 Labib, 'Crise de la dette publique'; See also Charles Rivers Wilson, Chapters from My Official Life (London: Edward Arnold, 1916)
54 Labib, 'Crise de la dette publique', pp.23-4
55 Ibid., pp.23-43
56 Roger Owen, Lord Cromer. Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.106-07
57 Ibid., pp.23-43
58 Ibid., pp.23-43
59 Labib, 'Crise de la dette publique', pp.23-43
60 Ibid., pp.23-43

reluctant to help. This time the report known as the August report mentioned administrative disorder and confusion as a significant obstacle to understanding the roots of Egypt's debt problem.[61] From Winter 1878 until Avril 1879, the Commission entered its investigation phase. Throughout, European officials insisted they could not understand the Egyptian system of accountancy and therefore requested that France and Britain lead radical reforms. Lord Baring even proposed putting Wilson as the minister for Finance. In the end, the investigative Commission recommended a new accountancy budget, a new fiscal system as well as recommendations for a new judiciary system that would guarantee the protection of individual rights and individual property rights.[62]

Most importantly, the report established a causal link between the financial system and the political system by arguing for a limitation of the Khedive and Egyptian officials' power as a pre-condition to resolving the debt crisis. It still blamed the source of Egypt's indebtedness on the unreason and arbitrariness of its despot.[63] In any case, the report failed to mention that the proposed reforms consolidated the expansion of the Commission's powers. Indeed, in European high-finance milieu, it was an open secret that creditors ask governments to pass political reforms in their favour as a form of guarantee against their investments.[64] At the same time, colonial powers used the emphasis that the report's recommendations put on individual and property rights to misrepresent their presence as helping set the foundations of a social contract between the state and its citizens.

In the end, the Khedive accepted the Commission's conditions, including a cabinet containing Europeans. He appointed Nubar Pasha as prime minister and asked him to form a government. Europeans cabinet members were paid high salaries, and they were many of them. Thirty British officers were appointed to the Land Survey Department alone. The Commission insisted on respecting the ministerial responsibility principle, so Isma'il delegated governmental responsibility to his cabinet. Disagreement over the root of Egypt indebtedness remained. The Khedive insisted that the Goschen-Joubert mission had vastly overestimated the state's revenues while European advisors still played the despot card. In 1878 Isma'il formed a new government that rejected the Commission's arrangement. Negotiations started in 1879 after the new government submitted a counterproposal known as the National Programme.[65]

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61 Ibid., pp.23-43
62 Ibid., pp.23-43
63 Ibid., pp.23-43
64 Ibid., pp.23-43
65Jacob M. Landau, *Parliaments and Parties in Egypt*, (New York: Hyperion Press 1979), p.90-91

The talks stopped after European advisers rebuked the proposal. European powers then pressed the Porte to oust Isma'il who Prince Tewfik replaced on June 26, 1879. With little legitimacy, Tawfik agreed to re-establish the General Control system first set-up in 1876. Following a decree issued on November 10, 1879, England and France were put back in charge of the administration. This time, they had the authority to investigate the public services of the state. Meanwhile, Baring and De Blignières were appointed controller-generals. They represented the foreign bondholders, their respective governments and could investigate all the public services. They reinstated some of the reforms that had been suspended, adopted new fiscal reforms and repealed the law of Moukabala. By January 1880, the Controller-Generals complained that Egypt could not meet its engagements and suggested the appointment of yet another Commission.

The Commission of Liquidation was set up on May 31, 1880. It had one Commissioner named by France, one by Great Britain and one designated by Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. Only one delegate represented the Egyptian government. On July 17, the Law of Liquidation was established. It reinstated the previous dual system of administration. The members of the Commission were recognised as legal representatives of the foreign bondholders and still had the right to sue the government. Finally, the Porte, which was itself in default and was at war with Russia, still managed to weave itself into the situation. When it appointed Tewfik, the Sultan issued a decree that limited the right to contract loans without the Porte's approval and prohibited the Khedive from ceding territory. Egypt was now marginalised from both Europe and the Porte. The Law of Liquidation, combined with the dual control, the establishment of new tribunals (Mixed Courts) and the Porte's repeated decrees transformed Egypt into "the assignee in bankruptcy of Europe, with Great Britain and France as official trustee, and the Sultan as bailiff of the Court."[66] The Liquidation Law was the last straw for many in the Egyptian army. The controllers-general recommendation to dismiss large numbers of officers and further curtail state activities when so many European cabinet members were paid so highly provoked a wave of anger that took as form what would be known as the 'Urabi movement.

All in all, this section has argued that European powers used the debt problem to gradually dominate the Egyptian government. Indeed, the reports of the investigations repeatedly insisted there was a deficit in the Egyptian government's ability to reason its debt problem and blamed Egypt's financial crisis on the Khedive's despotism. This, it was argued

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66 Coşkun Tunçer, *Sovereign Debt,* pp.41-43

helped misrepresent their intentions by pretending they wanted to protect the rights and interests of the Egyptian population. In other words, European powers portrayed their greater involvement as being motivated by their willingness to seek a greater good. Ultimately though, THE GOOD was 'made' dependent on the legal affirmation of the supremacy of their interests over the Egyptian population. Eventually, throughout this period, the law was turned from an emancipatory tool into a tool that foreclosed the possibilities of Egyptians being given the right to negotiate national sovereignty within a legal framework.

THE NATIONAL PROGRAMME, THE 'URABI REVOLT AND THE EGYPTIAN STRUGGLE OF THE LAW

This section looks at the Egyptian struggle to legally negotiate national independence through the National Programme. It highlights how the foreclosure of its possible by colonial powers, led to the 'Urabi revolt. The increase presence, control and rights of European advisers and ex-pats in Egypt fermented anger across the country. This came as constitutional changes emerged across the region. 1861 had seen the birth of the first Tunisian constitution, and between 1876 and 1878 the Ottoman Empire had experimented with constitutional reforms.[67] In 1879, in Egypt, the Consultative Chamber became the primary centre of a constitutional and nationalist revindication that mostly focused on the links between the country's financial management and political representation.[68] Between January and July 1879, the Assembly of delegates repeatedly met. Demands included more control over financial matters and the accountability of European ministers in front of the Assembly. This took place as a group of Egyptian army officers who opposed the mixed cabinet protested a measure that had just placed 2,500 officers on half-pay. A group even marched and occupied the Ministry of Finance. European advisers accused the Khedive of orchestrating the protest. Whether he did or not, at that point, Isma'il had realised he could use anti-European feelings to his advantage to rid him of foreign control.[69] This was not an easy bet given the fraught relationship that the Palace had with the army. Indeed, from 1823, a large number of peasants had been forcibly conscripted in

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67 Labib, 'Crise de la dette oublique et missions financieres europeenes en Egypte, 1878-1879', *Mondes*, 2013/2 (N.4), pp.23-43

68 Ibid.

69 Helen Chapin Metz, (ed.), Egypt: *A Country Study*, (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1990). Accessible from: http://countrystudies.us/egypt/25.htm

the military. Besides, Egyptians had only been allowed in the military as officers since an 1854 decree that ordered the sons of village notables to join in. It allowed them to be trained and rise to the rank of colonel, but the top posts continued to be held by members of the Turco-Circassian elite.[70]Ultimately, continued European pressure for more reforms and more control helped push Egyptian nationalists towards the Khedive.

From March 1879, the announcement of the upcoming Liquidation plan furthered mobilisation. On March 2, members of the majlis shûrâ-al-nuwwâb organised a protest against the European cabinet. They were equally upset by Isma'il's dissolution of the Assembly of Delegates, which they contested. They told the Khedive that they represented the nation and would not relinquish their mandate at his order, regardless of how influenced and pressured he was.[71] About a hundred persons from various influential Egyptian groups formed and gathered regularly to discuss the situation between March and April. They included prominent figures from the state bureaucracy, indigenous notables known as dhawâts, large landowners known as a'yâns, merchants, and 'Ulemas, army officers, state officials and religious dignitaries.[72] The leaders of the movement were the Dhawâts and the A'yâns. It is interesting that these two groups came together because non-Egyptian Dhawâts dominated senior government positions while provincial A'yâns dominated the majlis shûrâ-al-nuwwâb.[73] The liquidation plan was especially threatening to the latter.

A convention later known as the National Assembly (Jam'iyya Watanniyya), was held on April 2, 1879.[74] A programme called al-La'iha al-Watanniyya' was adopted, signed and deposed to the Khedive.[75] The document's preamble stresses the viability of the proposed counter plan[76] The Programme rejected the Liquidation plan and insisted Egypt had covered its debt obligations. It also asserted the signatories' continued willingness to apply the stipulations they recommended, both in their personal capacity and as national representatives.[77] By April 5, the Khedive welcomed the move and rejected the Liquidation Plan. He confirmed his repudiation of absolute rule, embodied in an 1878 decree (the August rescript). This was

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70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 EzzelArab, Abdelaziz, 'The Fiscal and Constitutional Program of Egypt's Traditional Elites in 1879: A Documentary and Contextual Analysis of 'al-La'iha al-Wataniyya' ('The National Program'),' *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* ,52, (2009), pp. 301–24, p.302
73 Ibid., p.302
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., p.303
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.

important because the National Programme demanded parliamentary reforms.[78]These include demands for a parliament based upon the European model and dotted with full legislative powers and authority over all internal and financial matters. This condition was at the centre of the counterplan but required intensive changes in the law. Thus, the Programme demanded the election of a new Majlis based on the existing Electoral law, followed by the revision of that law and other pertinent regulations by the Council of Ministers. It also asked the Council of Ministers to submit the new Majlis for ratification.[79]In a shrewd political move, Isma'il summoned the European consuls and informed them he would act per the Programme. Furthermore, he pointed to the increased general dissatisfaction with European control. He also invited one of the National Programme leaders to form a government, and this new cabinet dismissed European ministers.[80] It is in this context that in 1879, European powers requested the abdication of Isma'il who Tawfik replaced. The Assembly of the delegates was swiftly dissolved. The National Programme was depicted as a Khedivial plot despite the soundness of the proposal.

The overthrow of Ism'ail did not stop the rise of the national movement, which culminated in the 'Urabi revolt. Following British informal annexation, protests against the Viceroy Tawfik were organised but suppressed. The push for independence picked up after Tawfik's son, Abaas Hilmi II ascended to the throne. Months later, the National Assembly merged with an underground military organisation. A secret society of Egyptian army officers had come into existence in 1876. It included Colonel Ahmad 'Urabi, and colonels Ali Fahmi and Abd al Al-Hilmi. In the aftermath of the merger, the 'Urabi-led group took Al Hizb al Watani al Ahli - the National Popular Party - as a name. Although it has been referred to as a political party, Urabi's formation was more a nationalist faction than a party per se. The title mostly represented the members' opposition to the foreign control of Egypt.[81] One of the co-founders was Jamal al-Afghani, and the group was made of heterogeneous elements, including a mix of Muslims, Christians, and Jewish civilians. A British poet Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, a friend of Mohammed Abduh, also helped draft the Hizb political Programme. The rise of a national subjectivity geared towards Egyptianizing the state is illustrated by the Urabi revolt's slogan: Miṣr li'l Miṣriyyīn (Egypt to the Egyptians).

In 1881, the nomination of an anti-Urabist minister of War prompted a mutiny which

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78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., p.303
80 Chapin Metz, 'From Intervention to Occupation'
81 Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, p.137-138.

led to the appointment of a more sympathetic minister. In 1882, after continued pressure, Urabi joined the government as undersecretary for War. Amidst all the chaos, a law was passed, which reinforced the delegates' representative and legislative roles. These developments alarmed France and Britain who sent a joint note declaring their support for Tawfik. After all diplomatic attempts had failed, the Egyptian group's leadership shifted tactics. [82] A new Cabinet was formed with a dual goal: getting rid of European influence and overthrowing the Khedive. To break Urabi's power, the British and French demonstrated a joint show of naval strength. They issued a series of demands, including the government's resignation, the temporary exile of Urabi, and the internal exile of his two closest associates, Ali Fahmi and Abd al Al-Hilmi. As a result, violent riots broke out in Alexandria with considerable loss of life on both sides. During the summer, an international conference of European countries met in Istanbul, but no agreement was reached. The Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid boycotted the meeting and refused to send troops to Egypt. Eventually, Britain decided to act alone. The French withdrew their naval squadron from Alexandria, and in July 1882, the British fleet began bombarding Alexandria. This marked the beginning of the formal colonisation of Egypt by the British. One of their first act was to abolish most of the laws passed by the 'Urabists, including measures that increased the legislative powers of assembly members and those that increased ministers' accountability. [83] This section has illustrated how colonial powers repressed Egyptian attempts to negotiate the sovereignty of Egypt. The blocking off of Egyptian desire for independence eventually led to an armed revolt known as the 'Urabi revolt, as the section has further argued. The revolt was met with totalising repression, which culminated in the British's illegitimate colonisation. The colonial simulation had moved from repression of the non-colonial possibles to their foreclosure: colonisation was now a formal business.

2 ALICE FALLS IN THE HOLE: PLUNDERLAND AND THE ABSURD OF MODERNITY

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82 Chapin Metz, 'From Intervention to Occupation'
83 Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron , 'Les constitutions égyptiennes (1923-2000) : Ruptures et continuités', Égypte/Monde arabe, 2001/1-2 (n° 4-5),pp.103-33. Accessible from: https://journals.openedition.org/ema/868?lang=en

THE MIXED COURTS AND ITS REPRODUCTION OF COLONIAL HIERARCHIES

This section looks at the consolidation and reproduction of colonial hierarchies through the establishment of Mixed Courts. It argues that these courts' function was to protect the interests of capitalist Bourgeois and participated in the concretisation of their socio-economic supremacy. While the Mixed Courts were initially created to curb Europeans' capitulatory rights, they became a de facto tool of the landed bourgeoisie, whether European or Turco-Circassians. The expanding totalisation of the colonial Symbolic on the peasants' sense of reality further illustrates the repressive affect colonial laws produced on experience. Mixed Courts thus also explain the Oedipal enframing of THE LAW since they define a realm of transgression where the peasant is already guilty.[84]

As pointed out, legal issues involving the Egyptian government and foreign nationals had increased with Egypt's turn to modernisation. Some even used their national courts to try and sue the Egyptian government, but most foreign national courts acknowledged they lacked jurisdiction over such cases. The Solon C. Egyptian government case is one such illustration. On April 6, 1847, a person brought an individual claim for damages against the Egyptian government to the Seine Civil Tribunal. The ruling stated that the tribunal was "incompetent to take cognizance of that suit; that the garnishes attachment orders on certain articles in the hands of Mr. Mehemet Ali, belonging either to the Egyptian government or to Mr. Mehemet Ali, were null and void; and that according to the principles of international law French courts have no jurisdiction over foreign governments except, when the action involved real property possessed by them in France, to assume jurisdiction in the present case would involve an examination of administrative and government act, between a foreign government and an individual granted with a mission as an official of that government, for which the French court was without competence."[85] The incompetence of municipal courts to review actions brought against foreign states was an established principle of international law. By corollary, it stipulated that the properties of foreign states were not liable for seizure.[86]

Nonetheless, European nationals continued to use the law to uphold and protect their interests. These developments fed Isma'il's calls for judicial reforms which helped him gain

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84 Here drawing on the quote previously cited from Gilles Deleuze, *Masochism, Coldness and Cruelty*
85 Gustavo Adolfo Olivares Marcos, *The Legal practice of the recovery of external debt*, (PhD Thesis, University of Geneva, 2005), p.49
86 Ibid., p. 307

popular favour. In 1866 he adopted the Organic law, *(lâ'iha asâsiyya)* that instituted the Consultative Chamber of the Delegate (*majlis shûrâ-al-nuwwâb*). From 1865, villages and professional organisations elected leaders to represent them in the Consultative Chamber. Communal Councils were also set-up.[87] The Khedive presented the Chamber as integral to the modernisation processes.[88] However, the Chamber was used as a tool against the second international investigative Commission. It was thus used as the tool for mobilisation against European governments' growing power in the cabinet.

As the power struggle continued to rage, Isma'il fought to lead a judiciary reform to change capitulatory rights.[89] France, Greece and Italy were vehemently opposed to the change while the USA and Great Britain supported the move. Most foreign residents from the Capitulatory Powers were against the move as it lessened their rights.[90] In the 19th century, they enjoyed jurisdictional immunity from all courts but that of their country. They also had legislative immunity.[91]This had literally put foreigners beyond the reach of Egyptian law.[92] It also gave them additional advantages over Egyptians. Like the artisans, Egyptian merchants had to pay a series of large and oppressive taxes from which foreign merchants were exempt. The capitulatory system allowed foreigners to become a powerful pressure group committed to defend and increase its interests[93]. Between 1867 and 1873, Isma'il 's push to lessen the rights of foreigners led to negotiations.[94] In 1871 he explained: 'By introducing judicial reform in Egypt, I give an example and render a very great service, to all those interested in the well-being of the population.'[95] The proposed reform cost a lot of money - over 2.5 million Gold Francs, but it was eventually embodied in the Mixed tribunal Charter.[96]

These were inaugurated in 1875 with courts in Cairo, Alexandria, where the Court of Appeals was located, and Mansura. In 1876, the first cases were heard. Their jurisdiction covered all legal suits between Egyptians and foreigners except those related to personal status

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87 For the village councils and see also Hamied Ansari, *Egypt's stalled society*, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), p.24-26

88 Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, p.75

89 Mark S. W. Hoyle, The origins of Mixed Courts, *Arab Law Quarterly*, Vol.1, N.2 (1986), pp, 220-230, p.225

90 Hoyle, The origins of Mixed Courts, pp.220-230

91Gabriel M. Wilner, 'The Mixed Courts of Egypt: A Study on the Use of Natural Law and Equity', *Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 5 (1975): pp.407–30, p. 409

92 El-Din, *A Military History of Modern Egypt*, p.28

93 Ibid., p.34

94 The negotiations involved Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Holland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden and the USA

95 Hoyle, The origins of Mixed Courts, pp.220-230, p.203

96 Wilner, 'The Mixed Courts of Egypt: A Study on the Use of Natural Law and Equity', pp.409-10

and family disputes. The courts also adjudicated cases involving land.[97] Their legal code drew heavily from French law. In fact, the first penal code in Egypt was drafted for the Mixed Courts and was modelled on French law.[98] The penal code was enacted in 1883 after British occupation and was modelled on the Mixed Court Penal Code. Additionally, new national courts that handled litigation between citizens who did not fall under the Mixed Courts' jurisdiction were also set up.[99] Their penal codes equally drew from French Law. The two systems of courts applied different sets of civil, criminal, commercial and procedural codes.[100]To complicate matters, these codes did not adhere to Shari'a Law, which had been prevalent under the Ottoman Empire.[101] By the end of the 19th century, the judicial system was composed of mixed codes applied by the Mixed Courts; national laws applied by the national courts, Islamic Shari'a Law applied by Shari'a courts and religious rules based on the litigants' religion applied by the different religious courts.[102] This plethora of courts, laws and regulations led to many conflicts of jurisdiction and legalised inequalities and hierarchies based on nationalities and religions.

Although in theory, only foreigners from Capitulatory powers should have been able to access the courts, the Mixed tribunals opened them to all foreigners.[103] The mixed courts were also used by Egyptians, mostly the Turco-Circassian Bourgeoisie who had some knowledge of European languages. The courts used European languages and applied European laws to land disputes involving Europeans, meaning peasants could not understand the proceedings. The creditors could now quickly foreclose on loans by taking the peasants' lands, even if slightly in arrears.[104] The courts thus primarily served the interests of foreigners.[105] The unfairness of these tribunals made the peasants feel like strangers in their own country.[106] The Mixed Courts were set to have a 5-year lifespan but remained opened until 1949.[107] By 1930 there were 70

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97 Ibid, , pp.409-10

98 Esmeir, Samera, 'On the Coloniality of Modern Law,' *Critical Analysis of Law*, 2 (2015), PP.19-41, p.34.

99Adel Omar Sherif, 'An Overview of the Egyptian Judicial System and Its History', *Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law*, 5, (1998/99), pp.3-28, p.13

100 Ibid., p.13

101 Ibid., p.13

102 Ibid., p.13

103 Ibid., p.13

104 Juan Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's 'Urabi Movement,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.65

105 Ibid., p.65.

106 Ibid., p.66

107 Wilner, 'The Mixed Courts of Egypt', pp.407–30

judges, two-thirds being drawn from foreign powers.[108] At that point, the baroque patchwork of laws meant that traditional rules and regulations had been pushed to the margins. The Mixed Courts further illustrate how the law was used as a colonial instrument. In so doing, it participated in the expansion of colonial capitalism. The Courts also helped consolidate and reproduce the superiority of the foreign landed bourgeoisie while expropriating the peasants. Within a century, most of them had become landless. Additionally, the Oedipal enfaming of the law can be seen in the Mixed Courts ascription of the peasants as a priori guilty subjects, who were punished into giving their land to the bourgeoisie. Thus, the Mixed Court illustrates the disciplinary power of modern law: a good subject is a subject that meets the requirements of capitalist desire.

THE LANDLESS PEASANT: MODERNITY AND ITS PRODUCTION OF THE ABSURD

This second section outlines how colonial laws foreclosed the peasants' sense of reality as it disciplined them into the reality of the Simulation. It does so by looking at how widespread foreclosure of peasant lands made the majority of the Egyptian peasantry landless. This section argues that the foreclosure of their previous sense of real by capitalism meant that modernity expressed itself as the affirmation of two senses. On the one hand, it appeared to open the door to all the possible yet, on the other, it concretises itself a series of time where the colonised is always guilty. This paradox, the section further argues, is the paradox of the absurd: a reality totalised by the colonial symbolic and where the real is deprived of the possibility of signification. In the 19th century, Egypt's socio-economic situation wholly transformed. The country's entrance in the capitalist economy was concomitant with its structural placement as a periphery economy. It exported raw materials to Europe but became dependent on the importation of European manufactured goods. [109] These developments added a class of medium-sized landowners of Egyptian origin to the Turco-Circassian landed elite. Meanwhile, due to the debt problem, many peasants became landless and left for the cities where they mostly remained unemployed.[110] Modernisation had also been coalescent with imperialist, expansionist ambitions and to conquer the Sudan Mohammed Ali had relied on mass

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108 Ibid, p. 407
109 El-Din, *A Military History of Modern Egypt*, p.27-8
110 Ibid., p.27-8

conscriptions. To some, resisting meant leaving their villages or even maiming themselves, but others chose to revolt. [111]Another source of popular discontent was the rigidification of social hierarchies. For example, Mohammed Ali pressured the village Shaykhs to tighten their hold on peasants who owned taxes.[112] While peasants became poorer, village Sheikhs grew stronger, expanding their properties and thus revenues. They promised that lands from runaway peasants would be redistributed amongst the remaining villagers, but redistribution rarely happened.[113]As their financial influence grew, Shaykhs became more and more coercive. They forced peasants into corvee labour, took their cattle and machines without paying rent for them, hired seasonal labourers without paying them, and employed camel drivers to transport crops without paying them.[114]

In 1858, Mohammed Ali's son, Sa'id, had passed a series of laws that changed the peasants' holdings into private properties. The shift to proprietor favoured Europeans and the Turco-Circassian elite who had the money to buy the peasants' lands. The law meant peasants could now buy their lands, but most lacked the money to do so, meaning they either sold or mortgaged it.[115] More reforms targeting rural areas came under Isma'il including abolishing forced labour for peasants who worked for the nobility. These policies were designed to end the feudal system by transforming farmers into landowners or workers. Still, unfortunately, they were only sporadically applied, and wages were rarely paid. Ironically, it is a law aimed at increasing the peasant's rights that facilitated the greater penetration and domination of foreign capital in the agriculture sector.[116]

Those measures also had unintended effects that would play an essential part in shaping the country's future. By anchoring the peasants' status in law, they increased both their political involvement, demands and expectations. For a very long time, their grievances had only seldomly been acknowledged by the state. They had hoped that their inscription as autonomous agents in law would be game-changing. Unfortunately, Egypt's debt crisis only heightened the dichotomy between their new legal status and the reality of their lived experience. The American civil war and the resulting cotton boom had been incredibly beneficial to the

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111 Benjamin Geer, *The Priesthood of Nationalism in Egypt: Duty, Authority, Autonomy,* Thesis, (SOAS 2011), p.102

112 Zeinab Abul-Magd, *Imagined Empires: A History of Revolt in Egypt,* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013), p.80.

[113] Ibid., p.89, p.120

[114] Ibid., p.134

115 Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East*, p.7

116 Issawi, Charles. (1961), 'Egypt since 1800: A study in lop-sided development', *The Journal of Economic History*, 21(1), (1961), pp1-25, p.9

Egyptian-Ottoman nobility and the village notables.[117] It made land more valuable, but because Europeans and Turco-Circassians paid lower taxes than Egyptian peasants, they could buy larger estates. By the early 1870s, the nobility acquired large amounts of arable land from small peasants, often under questionable circumstances.[118] As a result, a new agricultural middle class emerged, which did not seem dependent on its own labour for livelihood.[119] Moreover, state policies meant that the boost benefitted certain areas more than others. Cotton production was primarily increased in the Nile Delta while Upper Egypt was neglected. The area was already suffering from a slump in wheat demands following the industrial revolution in the West.[120] Besides, the end of the American civil war was also followed by a contraction of the Egyptian economy. This only furthered the peasant crisis and Egypt had to face its most serious peasant indebtedness problem with all the consequences it implied: mortgages, foreclosure, and usurious loans.[121]

Between 1860 and 1870, taxes were repeatedly increased.[122] Many small peasants resorted to selling their crops to usurers who advanced them money for equipment and seeds. Unfortunately, the mix of high taxes and prices inflation meant most struggled to make their repayments. Instead, they sold their lands to the large landholders.[123] Spiralling economic hardships bred discontent and waves of revolts and acts of civil disobedience emerged in several provinces, prompting a special decree by the Supreme Court.[124] Peasants felt slighted by their new dealings. Many who were forced to sell their lands refused to vacate them; others refused to pay their rent.[125] Some fellahin also blocked irrigation water from large landowners' estates and attacked state-owned factories. Armed falatiyya gangs (armed bandits) resorted to raiding the houses of village Shaykhs. They also attacked government bureaucrats.[126] The cabinet responded by shooting them. Rural workers in the sulphur and coal mines were also angry at their working conditions which caused high mortality rates.[127] Discontent rapidly

117 Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East*, p.59.
118 Ibid., p.59
119 Nathan J. Brown, *Peasant Politics in Modern Egypt: The Struggle Against the Stat*e, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p.29.
119 Kenneth M. Cuno, The Pasha's Peasants: Land, Society, and Economy in Lower Egypt, 1740–1858, Cambridge Middle East Library, no. 27 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.144.
120 Abdul Magd, *Imagined Empires*, p.109
121 El-Din, *A Military History of Modern Egypt*, p.33
122 Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East,* p.59
123 Ibid., p.23
124 Abul-Magd, *Imagined Empires,* p. 109
125 Ibid., p.109
126 Ibid., p.93
127 Ibid., p. 109

spread and in 1864, for example, a peasant revolt erupted in Qina province, Upper Egypt.[128] Peasant demands focused on calls for equal land division, leading an English woman who witnessed it to compare it to a Bolshevik rebellion.[129] In an attempt to bridge the growing social hierarchisation peasants also harnessed the petitions system.

Meanwhile, in urban areas, a small working-class had emerged.[130] Only a small number was employed in building and transport jobs or in the few factories that remained open. Those who worked complained about their treatment and low wages. Besides, they faced stiff competition from the Mutamassirun and Europeans who were then still protected by the capitulatory system.[131] The 19th century saw an essential growth in the influx of European ex-pats. In 1838 they were 10,000, but by 1881 they numbered 90,000.[132] Clashes between Egyptians and foreign workers recurrently took place. Egyptian workers felt abused and denigrated by the state.[133] Peasants and workers were not the only one affected by the influx of ex-pats. Other such groups included merchants, artisans and intellectuals.[134] A growth of more radical leftist ideas soon surfaced across various strata of the population. Calls for an equal and classless society multiplied.

Following repeated clashes in rural and urban areas, Isma'il launched reforms in the police and army forces, increasing the number of high-ranked officers.[135] The police concomitantly increasingly targeted ordinary Egyptians workers, often at the demand of Europeans employers.[136] As the policing expanded so did the violence of its methods and punishments never seemed to stop. Egyptian farmers were significantly affected by the steady and substantial tax increases. In 1878-9 several protests were organised to denounce over-taxation even during drought.[137] For ordinary Egyptians, the benefits of modernity had hardly materialised. The substantial inflow of capital and the cotton boom, coupled with the growth of the bureaucracy and the army had created inflation.[138] Rapid population fed the price

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128 For a full account of the revolt see Ibid., p.95
129 Ibid., p.95
130 El-Din, *A Military History of Modern Egypt,* p.28.
131 The word Moutamassirun is used to refer to Syrian Christians, Greeks, Italian, Jews and Armenians
132 Ibid., , p.28
133 Abul-Magd, *Imagined Empires,* p.95
134 Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East*, pp. 66-69.
135 Ibid., p.66
136 Ibid., p.66
137 Ibid., p.66
138 Ibid., p.66

increase of urban housing, services, and food[139]. The army proved a powerful tool in crushing protests, but by the late 1870s, the government was slowly losing its grip.[140] As we will see in the next section, things continued to worsen with the country's formal colonisation.

The Dinshaway incident, which happened less than ten years after the British took control, is a telling illustration of the violent repression that peasants suffered. In 1906 a group of British officers hunted for sport pigeons that were the collective source of livelihood of a village. Villagers complained, a scuffle broke out and officially, an officer's gun 'was fired'. The bullet wounded the wife of a religious leader which further escalated the confrontation. A British soldier who escaped the scene ran back to his camp but collapsed outside, ultimately dying of heatstroke. A villager who saw him collapse came to assist him as other soldiers arrived at the scene. They saw an Egyptian by the body of their dead colleague and immediately assumed the villager was guilty. They killed him on the spot, beating him up to death. Another Khaled Saeed….The British authorities then accused the villagers of premeditated murder and set up a special tribunal to try them for the British officer's death. Ahmad Lufti al-Sayyid, an Egyptian lawyer and national political figure was part of the defence team, but it was in vain; fifty-two villagers were found guilty. They were either flogged and executed publicly in the village or imprisoned for years. This incident traumatised Egyptians and helped galvanise the anti-colonial struggle. In the colonial simulation, their punishment was the concretisation of the Good of colonial law. It is then this new sense of reality that the colonial struggle rejected. The trauma of Dinshaway activated a collective encounter with the paradoxical reality of the simulation. The symbolic colonial was suffocating the peasants' sensing of a real and replacing it with a totalising simulation where their possible became reduced to a capitalist Oedipalisation. Modernity presented itself as the potential becoming of all possibles but in-itself, it actualised itself as the becoming guilty by default of Egyptians. The colonial totalisation of experience as an absurd, as a real that is deprived of signification, exposed modernity as a simulacrum/Simulation.

THE ILLIBERALISM OF THE LIBERAL ERA: THE NON-SENSE OF THE COLONIAL LOGIC

139 Ibid., p.66
140 Ibid., p.67

This section looks at the absurd of colonial reality through the illiberalism of what is thought of as the 'Liberal era' of Egypt. Colonial political laws, it argues, can be taken as another example of the ways in which the function of colonial law is to produce a political experience totalised by the colonial Symbolic. This experience is marked by the foreclosure of the possibilities of giving the peasantry a role that would affect the modern regime of political representation. By excluding most Egyptians from this process, the repressive affect of colonial law continued to dominate the political, the section concludes.

Generalised discontent, harsh repression, mass dispossession, and under-representations of most of society's sectors in the government and legislative chambers ultimately led to the 1919-22 revolution. Trade unions, peasants, workers and women all played a role in the uprising.[141] Between March and April 1919, following the arrest of four Wafdist leaders, including Saad Zaghloul, one of the most significant peasant revolts in the country took place.[142] While the arrest of Zaghloul certainly played a role in the revolt, the uprising cannot be reduced to this. By 1918, the regular consumption of cereals and pulses had fallen to 80 per cent of the pre-WWI average.[143] During the war, the Supplies Control Board meant the British requisitioned food and animal which they bought at fixed prices to export them to the Allies. Besides, the Cotton commission purchased all the cotton crops and closed the Alexandria bourse.[144]. By 1918, food and oil were scarce in cities and the countryside.[145] The British had offered wage employments in the Labour Corps but resorted to forcibly recruiting farmers when they ran out volunteers [146]. Besides, as already explained, peasants were increasingly marginalised from having rights. The state also had increased repression against them, and they had no institutions to turn to. This was happening as European powers continued to insist on their goodwill. In other words, reality had become so alienating it was untenable.

When the revolt erupted, peasants cut communications and rail lines, isolating the capital for several weeks. By doing so, they prevented goods and men from leaving. The British propaganda once again called it a Bolshevik insurrection.[147] Trade unions also played an important role. By the mid-1900, they mobilized large numbers of urban workers. For example, in 1908 and 1911, the Cairo Tramway Company workers went on strike, complaining about

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141 Women also played an important role in the revolt

142 Ellis Goldberg, 'Peasants in Revolt – Egypt 1919', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 24 (1992), pp.261-280, p.260.

143 Ibid., p.262

144 Ibid., p.263

145 Ibid., p.261

146 Ibid., p.261

147 Ibid., p.275

constant abuse by foreign managers and inspectors.[148] The Wafd supported the strike and realising the mobilising potency of unions shifted its focus to urban workers and artisans.[149] Soon workers made-up a critical part of the party's urban social base. Once in power, the Wafd engineered a further rapprochement with the unions, in a bid to sustain its urban support.[150] The party had tried to strengthen its patronage of unions, but it severely repressed their actions once in power. In 1923, tramway workers attempted to organise a strike, but were arrested and charged with violating public order and insulting the prime Minister, Saa'd Zaghloul.

Despite great hopes, the granting of conditional independence in 1922 did little to improve the lower classes' political participation. In 1923, a new constitution was proclaimed, the principle of popular sovereignty was adopted; a two-tier parliament was created, and elections were held.[151] The introduction of political pluralism meant that political parties were formed while a growing press was relatively free.[152] Despite all these structural changes, the monarchy retained disproportionate powers, which ultimately curtailed democratic developments[153]. While landless peasants and urban workers had been a prominent feature of the Wafd populist-nationalist rhetoric before it acceded to power, they remained excluded from the political process after the revolution. The 1930 constitution is a case point: it worked against the enfranchisement of the people. To be eligible, voters were required to own a specific amount of money (Art.81).[154] The peasants were economically invisible in the Imperial rhetoric, and now the (semi)-Liberal political system had inscribed their political invisibility constitutionally. Moreover, by ensuring that the monarchy retained control over the country's political apparatus, the British were able to continue their proxy-governing. The liberalisation of the political sphere remained a simulacrum, and the Palace retained its right to ban political parties. Once in government, the Wafd worked with the British and the Palace. Their alliance meant they were able to prevent other popular political parties from gaining power.[155] For

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148 Joel Beinin, 'Egypt: society and economy, 1923-1952', in M. W. Daly, (ed.), The Cambridge History of Egypt, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 5

149 Ibid., p.5

150 Ibid., p.10. In 1924, for example, one of Zaghloul lieutenants became president of the General Union of Workers.

151 Ibid., p.5.

152 Selma Botman, *Egypt From Independence To Revolution, 1919-1952*, (Syracuse N.Y. Syracuse University Press, 1991, p. 5

153 Ibid., p. 5

154 At the time, the system was clearly not portrayed as semi-liberal but as fully Liberal

155 Tareq Y. Ismael, and Rifʿat Saʿīd, *The Communist Movement in Egypt, 1920-1988*, (Syracuse N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1990), p.22

example, in the 1920s, the Wafd annihilated the Communist Party of Egypt. Although communist parties did not have many members, their ideals and calls for greater equality echoed popular demands. In 1921, the Communist-led Confédération Générale du Travail was formed in Alexandria, and in 1924 it led a series of strike and sit-ins that the government heavily repressed.

Meanwhile, religious authorities supported the Wafdist government and also worked with the British. Thus in 1919 following British prompts, the Grand Mufti of Egypt issued a fatwa against Bolshevism. It declared communism haram because it instigated 'the lower classes against all systems founded upon reasons, moral, and virtue." [156] By the 1930s, communist parties in Egypt had been decimated. This curtailed for a while their influence on the labour movement and the unions. Other banned groups included the Muslim Brotherhood and Young Egypt. Ironically, the 'liberalisation' of the political sphere did little to increase popular representation. While much of the nationalist rhetoric highlighted women, peasants and workers, their rights remained nominal. The 'Liberal era' as it is often called in the literature remained patriarchal and dominated by the middle-class. Indeed, no land or industrial minimum wage reforms were passed, and women were still barred from voting. Moreover, while landowners dominated the Wafd, the Liberal Constitutionalists and the Sa'adist party, the peasantry was not organised in political parties or social movements. The Socialist Peasant Party was established in 1938 but had a marginal political following. The Wafd had robust rural support but never articulated in praxis its pro-peasant narrative.

This section has argued that throughout the 'Liberal' era, the Oedipal function of colonial law reified the conditions for the continued reproduction of the colonial social structure. It did so by partitioning the political sphere into a spectrum that reproduces the capitalist production of modern socio-political classes. Indeed, this experience is marked by the foreclosure of the possibilities of giving the peasantry a role that would affect the modern regime of political representation. In contrast, it affirmed the economic and political supremacy of the landed bourgeoisie and co-coaptated the rising nascent Egyptian bourgeoisie. It also co-opted the nascent petty bourgeoisie by providing employment opportunities within the state and its instructions. The alliance of these three social layers and their active participation in the state's affairs gave the illusion that independence was around the corner. Modernity promised the becoming modern of Egypt, but this becoming modern started to sense every day more and more like a distorted image or mirage for most of the population. Nonetheless, the legal

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156 Ibid., p. 23

underpinning of the absurd as the modus operendi of the modern Simulation announced the continued becoming of the colonial Symbolic in the 'postcolonial' era.

CONCLUSION

The first moment of this chapter has highlighted the paradoxical nature of colonial knowledge. It produces an absurd reality where the real is deprived of the possibility of signification. In Plunderland, reality is what capitalism makes of it; it obeys capitalist laws and totalises individuals' sense of self and reality. As we have seen, European colonial powers imputed Egypt's indebtedness on the sole responsibility of the Palace and the inability of the Khedive and his government to come up with a model of labour production and taxes collection that would ensure a stable and continued flow of capital to the state. They refused to acknowledge the effect and affect that the laws of deregulated liberalism had on reality. Instead, they used the debt problem to gain more significant political sway and continued to foreclose the possibilities of Egyptians being given the right to negotiate national sovereignty. Their refusal of the National Programme illustrated this. As we have seen, this blocking off of Egyptian desire for independence/liberation eventually led to the 'Urabi revolt. Once again, colonial powers foreclosed the possibility of independence by bombarding Egypt and formally occupying the country.

The second moment of the chapter has highlighted how colonial law further concretised Egypt's colonial becoming by foreclosing the possibles that did not fit the requirements of capitalist desire. We can now say that the colonial simulation fixes its series of times but forecloses the series of times that do not fit its temporal sequencing of space. The first section outlined how, with the Mixed Courts, laws were used as a colonial instrument to expand colonial capitalism. The Courts helped consolidate and reproduce the superiority of the foreign landed bourgeoisie while dispossessing the peasants. The Oedipalisation of peasants coequally helps illustrate modern law's disciplinary power: a good subject is a subject that meets the requirements of capitalist desire.

Moreover, we have seen how the trauma of Dinshaway activated a collective encounter with the paradoxical logic of the reality of the simulation. The Symbolic colonial was

suffocating the peasants' sense of real and replacing it with a totalising simulation where their possible became reduced to a capitalist Oedipalisation. They were guilty even when they were trying to save a life. The colonial totalisation of experience as an absurd, as a 'real' deprived of signification, exposed modernity as a Simulation, this section has argued. Finally, we have seen how despite Egyptian pushes against the suffocation of the colonial simulation, the 'Liberal' era of Egypt solidified the conditions for the continued reproduction of the colonial social structure by partitioning the political sphere into a spectrum that reproduces the capitalist production of modern socio-political classes. It affirmed the economic and political supremacy of the landed bourgeoisie, the co-coaptation of the rising nascent Egyptian bourgeoisie and the nascent petty bourgeoisie. In doing so, it had produced a social bloc that had internalised the absurd of modernity as the given of reality. As we will see in the next chapter, Nasser's Arab Socialism reproduces the semiotic slip that characterises colonial semiosis and its world of simulacra. Nasserism appears as a world of all possibles yet concretised itself by foreclosing the reals that did not fit its laws, it will be argued.

This chapter concludes from its analysis that the laws that structure the process of modern semiosis can be described as following a paranoid logic of *enf*olding. In *Les Ecrits*, Lacan wrote:

"I have myself shown in the social dialectic that structures human knowledge as paranoiac why human knowledge has greater autonomy than animal knowledge in relation to the field of force of desire, but also why human knowledge is determined in that 'little reality' (ce peu de réalité), which the Surrealists, in their restless way, saw as its limitation."[157]

In Chapter One, the model of the Mirror Stage exposed the phantasmatic quality of knowledge. The subjective production of knowledge as an Object a of thought reveals the simulation: thought cognises Symbolic *Objects a* (Ideal-Is) produced by the Symbolic as the 'Real'. In this structure, the only Real is the 'real' produced by the Symbolic, the simulation. In *Simulacra and Simulation*, Baudrillard described postmodernity as a 'real' where images precede reality.[158] Reality is turned into a procession of images in which the real is deprived of the possibility of signification; it slips beneath the images. This phantasmatic production of a

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157 Lacan, *Ecrit,* p.3, also cited in chapter 1.
158 Baudrillard, *Simulacra and Simulations*, p.1

Symbolic 'real' also *unfolds* as an affective relationship. It fetishizes its 'real': the simulation *unf*olds as a successive series of 'phantasms' or 'times' that foreclose the series of times that are not compossible with its series. This oscillation between processes of fixation and foreclosure exposes a paranoid structure. In the words of Lacan:

"The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation – and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic – and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development. Thus, to break out of the circle of the Innenwelt into the Umwelt generates the inexhaustible quadrature of the ego's verifications."[159]

Here, we can draw a parallel between the "quadrature of the ego's verifications" and the quadruple roots of representation: the identical, the similar, the analogous, the opposed.[160] The Subject of representation is a paranoid Subject who forecloses the Real and takes up the Symbolic as its Object of desire. The paranoid structure is uncovered by the Symbolic metonymy that *en*folds the Subject: thought can only think the Real by bringing it to the principle of Identity. It thinks it through the dimensions of the identical, the same, the analogous or the opposed. The Real falls beneath signification, but its affect still haunts the Simulation, hence its foreclosure of the series of times that do not fit its temporal sequencing of space. As Jacques-Alain Miller notes:

"As for Lacanian epistemology, it marks, in our opinion, the position of psychoanalysis in the epistemological break, insofar as through the Freudian field the foreclosed subject of science returns to the impossible of its discourse. There is therefore only one ideology of which Lacan theorizes: that of the "modern self", that is to say of the paranoid subject of scientific civilization, of which misguided psychology theorizes the imaginary, in the service of free enterprise. " [161]

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159 Lacan, *Ecrits,* p.3
160 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p.138; see also Introductory chapter, p.28 and Chapter 5, p.200
161 The translation in the body of the text is is translation of the author. For the original quaote see: "Quant
à l'épistémologie lacanienne, elle marque, à notre sens, la position de la psychanalyse dans la coupure

This chapter has highlighted how as a fold of Modernity, the colonial simulation foreclosed the series of time - or possibles - that were not compossible with its Symbolic. Drawing from Lacan, it concludes that its laws of fixation – it fixes its series of time as the 'real' and of foreclosure – it forecloses the series or times that are not included in its simulation- highlight the paranoid structure of modern semiosis. As in a paranoid structure, the possibility of the real is foreclosed and replaced with a Symbolic Simulation and its successions of simulacra or phantasms. This uncovers that the social dialectic that produces human knowledge, that is, its foreclosure of the Real as a non-Symbolic is not the result of a dialectics between the Real and the Symbolic, but rather as Deleuze and Guattari have explained, a copulation between the Signifier and its Signifieds.[162] The simulation simulates that Real as an Other, it thinks it as its opposition: it excludes it from its Symbolic. This antagonistic construction of a Real-Symbolic dialectics is an artifice of the simulation. Thought has never been able to think the Real because The Real is not in-itself external to thought. Thus, while Baudrillard saw the foreclosure of the Real as a postmodern phenomenon, in line with Deleuze and Guattari, this thesis conceives it as a phenomenon of civilisational semiosis. Fanon and Deleuze and Guattari, along with many others, have already denounced the pathological character of modernity. Deleuze and Guattari have especially emphasised the pathological quality of civilisational semiosis/subjectivity as its historical unfolding and *en*folding. This thesis's remaining chapters will further outline how postcolonial semiosis reproduces a similar pathologisation of our relationship to the Real. This paranoid structure, it will be argued, produced what Fanon called pathologies of freedom. This pathologisation of liberation as a desiring-production continues to suffocate modern and postcolonial experience. In fact, as reality becomes every day more Kafkian, the words of Gilles Deleuze echo with greater intensity:

"There is not the slightest operation, the slightest industrial or financial mechanism which does not reveal the insanity of the capitalist machine and the pathological character of its rationality {not at all a false rationality, but a real rationality of this pathology, of this

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épistémologique, pour autant qu'a travers le champ freudien le sujet forclos de la science fait retour dans l'impossible de son discours. Il n'y a donc qu'une seule idéologie dont Lacan fasse la théorie : celle du « moi moderne », c'est-à-dire du sujet paranoïaque de la civilisation scientifique, dont la psychologie dévoyée théorise 1'imaginaire, au service de la libre-entreprise.", Jacques-Alain Miller in Lacan, *Les Ecrits*, p. 694.
162 Deleuze, Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus,* p.210

madness, because the machine really works, stay certain of that}. There is no danger that this machine will go mad, it has been mad from the start and it is from this madness that its rationality comes."[163]

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163 Deleuze in Guattari, *Chaosophy*, p.35

CHAPTER 3
OEDIPUS RAIS

INTRODUCTION

Colonial reality produces a pathologising of the real. It fetishizes our relationship with the Real by misrepresenting the Symbolic and its world of Objects as the origin of concrete reality. By misrepresenting the Real through the Symbolic Order's phantasmatic quality, the colonial Symbolic connects to our intrinsic desire to invest the social and perverts it into misrecognizing experience as a virtual Symbolic that mirrors concrete reality. It is then by acting as a drive that the Symbolic takes up an affective modality. It misrepresents affects as qualities of the Symbolic. Consequently, as we have seen, subjects can experience a sense of freedom or agency by identifying with the signifiers or Ideal-Is that the symbolic projects. In this case, Identification boosts the Subject's sense of selfhood; it acts as a narcissist affect. On the other hand, subjects can also experience Identification with these Ideal-Is as a castration of their sense of freedom or agency. Frantz Fanon has shown how Identification with the colonial Symbolic can be experienced as a dissolving of the sense of selfhood in the Subject. In this case, the process of Identification is marked by repression: the Subject represses the violence/castration experienced during Identification processes so as to continue to strive to identify with the colonial symbolic. In *Black Skin White Masks,* Fanon exposes how the colonized who identify with colonial Ideal-Is compensate their own repression by acting/projecting their power of repression on other colonized.[1] This implies an affective detachment/disassociation from the experience of colonization so as to rationalize its violence. Fanon vividly recounts being nauseated in instances when, in Paris, he met black people who thought of black people as the concrete representation of their colonial signifieds.[2] Nausea became more potent as he realized, he had also been tricked into this same Simulation when

1 Fanon, *Black Skin White Masks*, p.144, p.59,
2 Ibid., p.72, p.114, p.115

he lived in Martinique.

In fact, colonial reality can be so violent; it can take the Subject beyond representation. It can cause foreclosure. As we have seen in the previous chapter, foreclosure produces a slip in the semiotic process. The meaning of the Signifier is not fixed by the signified that the Symbolic has produced for it. Instead, it is replaced by a Signified that the Subject produces as a phantasm of the 'original' simulacrum. The Subject thus mediates the 'reality' of the Simulation through their own Symbolic assemblages or phantasms. It is in doing so that the Subject can re-experience a sense of selfhood, freedom and agency. In other words, when what is symbolically given or represented as 'the real' of a Signifier is thought as its simulacra, the semiotic process produces a pathologizing of our relationship to reality: the 'real' produced by the Symbolic is re-interpreted as its simulacra. Fanon called this the production of pathologies of freedom. He drew the concept from Ey who had drawn from the works of Günther Anders.[3] Colonial reality, he argued, produces mental illness as a pathology of freedom.[4] The colonized could lose themselves in the worlds of phantasms of the Simulation. The precessions of simulacra produced reality as a series of phantasms that did not operate by the laws of the Simulation. In this case, the Subject loses its agency because it cannot use the colonial Symbolic to 'make' sense of the 'real' of the colonial Simulation. In his resignation letter Fanon writes:

"La folie est l'un des moyen qu'a l'homme de perdre sa liberte",
which translates as
" Madness is one of the ways that humans have of losing their freedom"[5]

The colonial Simulation can produce a loss of agency so deep that the Subject speaks it as an experience of madness. Later, Fanon expanded his vision of mental illness in general as a pathology of freedom:

"In any phenomenology in which the major alterations of consciousness are left aside, mental illness is presented as a veritable pathology of freedom. Illness situates the patient in a

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3 Fanon, Khalfa, *Alienation and Freedom*, p.16
4 Ibid. P. 1010 (Epub)
5 Ibid., p.880

world in which his or her freedom, will and desires are constantly broken by obsessions, inhibitions, countermands, anxieties."[6]

From Fanon, we can draw that the colonial Simulation *en*folds its Subject, thereby capturing their desire in the "obsessions, inhibitions, countermands and anxieties" of its Symbolic. This chapter argues that as a fold of the colonial Simulation, postcolonial thought is coequally captured in "the obsessions, inhibitions, countermands and anxieties" of the colonial Symbolic. This, it argues, is illustrated by the ways in which the paranoid structure of modern semiosis produces a pathologisation of the politics of liberation. The Nasserist state will be used as an agent of this pathologisation. Indeed, the present chapter, along with the two chapters that follow, argue that the postcolonial Symbolic as articulated by Nasserist and Qutbist thoughts, both reproduce colonial semiosis and their Symbolic totalization of experience. In particular, the present chapter focuses on Nasserism's attempt to recode the postcolonial as a new sense of reality by using the state as an agent of recoding of national subjectivity. In doing so, the chapter argues, Nasser, reproduced the colonial Oedipalisation and its production of a two-sense reality. On the one hand, Nasserism presented itself as a world/Symbolic of liberation that opened up reality to all the series of time yet on the other; it used the state to foreclose all the series of time that did not fit its sequencing of space**.** Finally, given the state's Oedipal function, this chapter asks: how can the state be conceived as an agent of the Revolution? As the chapter argues, the Nasserist state is best conceptualized as a machine-of-capture of revolutionary desire. It reproduces the colonial pathologisation of the politics of liberation and its paranoid semiotic structure.

The chapter is divided into two moments. The Fist moment looks at the processes of subjectivation and alienation of desire that set the scene for the postcolonial state's Oedipalisation of social relations. Its first section examines the rise of political organizations that took up fascist tendencies in the 1930s. It argues their rise resulted from the totalitarian latency of the colonial state and its suppression of the masses' desire to invest the socio-political space in the 'liberal era.' The second section argues that in the 1950s, the Free Officers' dissolution of the political scene illustrates their reproduction of the colonial state's Oedipal desire. The Oedipalisation of relations through which the state articulated itself is further exemplified by subjectivization processes that assigned roles and places that redefined the citizens' identity in correlations with the state's desire. The second moment of the chapter sets

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6 Fanon, Khalfa, *Alienation and Freedom*, p.1010.

the scene for Chapter Four by illustrating how the state came to dominate the production of national subjectivity, thereby acting as the nodal Signifier or LAW of reality. To this end, its first section illustrates how social subjectivation was fed by the state's domination of the press. The second section examines the state's increasing grip on the religious sphere, and the final section turns its attention to the judicial sphere.

1 CONTINUITIES IN DISCONTINUITIES: THE COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL SUPPRESSION OF DESIRE

This moment of the chapter illustrates the processes of subjectivation and alienation of desire that set the scene for the postcolonial state's Oedipalisation of social relations. As already stated in the introduction, "Oedipalisation" can be defined as a contemporary form of social repression/ that reduces the forms desire takes... to those that sustain the social formation of capitalism".[7] For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is not constructed around a lack but is instead apprehended as a productive, assembling force that flows in the socius. Desire is best understood as a desiring-production, which itself can be seen as Deleuze and Guattari's materialist re-conception of the Freudian id or libido: "Drives are simply the desiring-machines themselves".[8] Accordingly, desire cannot be reduced to being an expression of the libido; it is first and foremost the creation of new possibilities of/in becoming. In their conception, desire establishes points of contact with immediate experience since it naturally flows in the socius. Oedipalisation occurs when desiring-production is "blocked off", and either suppressed or re-engineered into a capitalist and/or state desire, thereby curtailing our very desiring-production by turning it into the Object of a Big Other.

POSTCOLONIALISM AND ITS PRODUCTION OF EMANCIPATION AS OEDIPALISATION

This section looks at the two decades preceding the rise of the Free officers and Gamal

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7 Tamsin Lorraine, 'Oedipalisation', in Adrian Parr, (ed.), *The Deleuze Dictionary,* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), pp. 189–191.
8 Deleuze, Guattari, *Anti Oedipus,* p.35

Abdel Nasser. It looks at processes of subjectivation and alienation of desire that set the scene for the postcolonial state's Oedipalisation of social relations. To this end, it presents the gradual fragmentation of national subjectivity illustrated by the growth of unofficial political parties. It argues that the rise of political organizations that took up fascist tendencies resulted from the totalitarian latency of the colonial state and its suppression of the masses' desire to invest the socio-political space in the 'liberal era'. To this end, it draws from Deleuze and Guattari's definition of fascism as different from the classical definition of the term.

These two philosophers did not reduce the concept of fascism to the phenomena it took in the 20th century. Rather as argued in *One Thousand Plateaus,* fascism emerges when an attempt to move beyond the position of subjugation to different power structures is hindered by the internalization of the micro-forms that this power takes up in these structures. Fascism is first the expression of a "blocking off" of desire in its productive process. Desire becomes fascist when it expresses itself as an obsession for power but not in its productive capacity. It is a fixation on power inherited from the structures of the state through its signifying semiotics. As such, fascism arises out of an attempt to invest the social beyond the Symbolic of the state, which in its impossibility to be released, turns into a love for the form of power that the state produces. [9] Fascism thus emerges following a collapse of desiring-production into death. It is a mass revolutionary libidinal investment of the social that is potentially emancipatory but that when blocked off by mechanisms of suppression turns into a desire for the other's death. This perversion of desire can go as far as leading one to desire his own death.[10]

Thus, this section argues that in the 1930s, the latent totalitarianism of the state- Egypt had gained its conditional independence but was still very much governed as a colony- was concomitant with a mass revolutionary desire to invest the social. Eventually, the blocking off of emancipatory desire turned into a desire inherited from the state's structures: a desire for totalitarianism. The desire for repression is illustrated by the rise of paramilitary organizations and the calls for the death of imperialism and the 'agents of imperialism' whether foreigners or Egyptians. In theory, the function of the *Al-Mamlaka al-Misreyya-* the Kingdom of Egypt- and its constitutional monarchy was to represent the Egyptian population's interests. In praxis, the triangulation of power between the British, the Palace and the political factions led by the Wafd meant that all these actors were involved in a struggle to represent their own interests. In other

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9 Deleuze, Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 214
10 Deleuze in Guattari, *Chaosophy,* p.35

words, the system of representation had failed to actualize its primary function, which, in theory, was to represent the Egyptian masses. Indeed, despite clear calls for their inclusion, most Egyptians were excluded from the system of political representation. This repression of their desiring-production, this section argues, fed the rise of non-official parties and groups that were not represented in the parliament but that were supported either by the peasantry and/or the educated lower and middle strata of the urban class.

Top of the list was the Muslim Brotherhood. Following the collapse of the international cotton price in 1929, the group expanded its influence in the villages and the Nile Delta's provincial towns by establishing a moral Islamic economy that opposed colonial capitalism's 'immoralism'.[11] Then in 1933, Young Egypt, a popular nationalist movement modelled on fascist parties in Europe, was formally founded. Its base of support was mainly urban, and it called for Egypt's industrialization and the Egyptianisation of the economy. To this end, it led a series of high-profile projects such as the "Piastre Plan" which started in 1931. The plan asked students to donate one piastre to support an independent national industrial plant - the tarbush (fez) factory.[12] The objective was to replace imported goods with locally manufactured ones and in this case to replace Tarabeesh (Arabic plural for Tarboosh) that were imported from Austria. The group's youth movement drew inspiration from Mussolini's Black Shirts, which had inspired the German SS' Brown Shirts. Young Egypt thus created its Green Shirts who became famous for holding mass nationalist rallies. Participants were divided into "members" and "fighters" (mujahidin) with the later wearing dark green shirts. They fought for the unification of the Nile Valley and Sudan's incorporation in the new "Egyptian Empire." They denounced foreigners' privileged position in Egypt and campaigned for improved "public morality" by banning alcohol and prostitution. They could not run for parliament because the leadership was under 30 years of age (the constitution stipulated limitations on age). However, they still saw the Wafd as their greatest political enemy. This resulted in their support for the King, who was embattled in an embittered rivalry with the Wafd. In 1935 to counter the influence of the Green Shirts, the Wafd established the Blue Shirts. From the mid to the end of the 1930s, the Green and Blue Shirts recurrently engaged in violent clashes. In 1937, the Green Shirts attempted to murder the Wafdist prime minister. The Wafd also used the Blue Shirts to prove it still had some popular support. In a show of force in December 1937, the Blue Shirts participated in a mass demonstration in front of the King's Palace which led to the dismissal of

11 Eric Hobsbawm, *History and Politics,* (London: Pluto Press, 2010), p.143
12 Ilan Pappé, The Modern Middle East: A Social and Cultural History, (New York: Routledge, 2004), p.150

the Wafdist Prime Minister. In 1938 the government banned all "shirt" organizations. By that point, most Young Egypt members started to incorporate the more successful Muslim Brotherhood or Ikhwan.[13]

The Muslim Brotherhood had eventually also set up its youth organization modelled on the shirts, known as the "*Jawalla.*"[14] This model drew from the Boy Scout organizations set up by the Greek communities in Egypt. These were also tainted with fascism and supported Ioannis Metaxas' dictatorship between 1936 and 1940. Like the Shirts, the Jawalla demonstrated in the streets in military uniforms and were allegedly receiving military training in camps.[15] They managed to avoid the 1939 ban on the Shirts. They continued to exist after the second world war, although they later shifted their focus on providing social services in the countryside.[16] By the mid-1930s, the Ikhwan had also started to co-operate with the Jam'iyyat al-Shuban al-Muslimin (Young Men's Muslim Association YMMA) on the Palestine issue.[17] By the late 40s, the Ikhwan had grown to 500,000 members. It also had a secret wing, al-Jihaz al-Sirri, whose multiple operations culminated in Nuqrashi Pasha's assassination in 1948 following his attempt to ban the Brethren. In response to this act, the state secret services retaliated with the murder of Hasan al-Banna, the Brethren's Supreme Guide (al-Murshid al-Amm).

In addition to these paramilitary organizations, the Egyptian communists were also trying to gain influence. It helped that they were loathed by the King and the British and were persecuted by the state. The communist movement was organized in a loosely held coalition of extra-Parliamentary organizations that included The Egyptian Movement for National Liberation (EMNL), The Democratic Movement for National Liberation (DMNL), The New Dawn and Iskra.[18] Most of these groups were established during the 1940s and were active in labour organizations and university campuses.[19] Repeated efforts to unify the movement failed. By the late 1940s, it had further splintered into a plethora of groups that all advocated similar goals and strategies but worked independently and sometimes even in competition with each

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13 Throughout the thesis the terms Muslim Brotherhood and Ikhwan are used interchangeably.
14 Brynjar Lia, *The society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, 1928-1942*, (Reading: Ithaca press, 1998). p.101
15 Ibid. p.102
16 Youssef M. Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism,* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), p.49
17 Israel Gershoni, 'The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine 1936-39', *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 22, No. 3 (1986), pp. 367-397, pp, p.379-382
18 Selma Botman, 'The Liberal age', in in M. W. Daly, (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.302
19 Ibid, p.302

other. Nonetheless, despite its fragmentation, the Communist Movement in Egypt influenced political and intellectual thought, including journalism, political writings, poetry and even fiction.[20]

By the late 40s, the student body had grown very political and demonstrations against the British refusal to abrogate the British-Egyptian treaty were staged. Repression was harsh. On February 9, 1946, for example, at least 50 students and 30 policemen were injured in Cairo. Up to 150 students were arrested.[21] Students slogans included "Down with Britain", "To the Revolt," Down with Imperialism," and "Get out of the Nile Valley."[22] Up until the 1950s, university and secondary students also joined workers and labour unions in street demonstrations to oppose continued British control over their country. [23] The Egyptian workers' movement had also increased in volume and militancy. It came to constitute an essential component of the social and political upheaval against both the British and the monarchy.[24] Workers' strikes, and demonstrations were also often directed against foreign enterprises, and as noted by Beinin, the labour movement was commonly considered a component of the nationalist movement.[25]

In January 1950 the Wafd had returned to power with Mustapha al-Nahhas as prime minister. He was a doyen figure of the party and was intent on re-legitimizing the Wafd. He released many political prisoners from the prisons and camps in which they had been held.[26] In October 1951, he introduced decrees unilaterally abrogating the British-Egyptian Treaty, which were passed by parliament and proclaimed by King Faruk. The British refused to accept the move and by 1951 tensions were so high that Egyptians stormed the Army's Naafi storehouses. A British soldier was stabbed, and two Egyptians were killed.[27] Civilians formed Liberation battalions as the Ikhwan, and auxiliary police armed themselves. People blocked

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20 Ibid. p.302

21 Yoav Di Capua, "Liberal era politics, Extra-Parliamentary Political Movements, 1919-1952', Department of History, University of Austin, Texas, accessible from : http://laits.utexas.edu/modern_me/egypt/3/movements

22 Yoav Di Capua, 'Liberal era politics, Extra-Parliamentary Political Movements'

23 Ahmed Abdalla, *The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt, 1923-1973*, (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2008), pp.39-68.

24 Joel Beinin, 'Labor, Capital, and the State in Nasserist Egypt, 1952-1961', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1, (1989), pp. 71-90, p.71

25 Ibid., p.71

26 Selma Botman, 'Egyptian communists and the Free Officers"1950-54', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3, (1986), pp. 350-366, p.350.

27 Pamela Parkes, 'The Suez Emergency: The forgotten war of the conscript soldier', BBC, October 24, 2016. Accessible from
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-36985325

food supplies to the Suez Canal, workers were withdrawn from the base and the students and the Ikhwan allied to conduct a guerrilla war against the British in the Suez Canal Zone.

In December, British bulldozers and Centurion tanks demolished fifty Egyptian mud houses to open a road to a water supply for the British army. On January 25, 1952, the British attacked an Egyptian police barracks in Ismailiyah, leading to 50 Egyptians killed and 100 wounded. These events culminated in "Black Saturday" which took place on January 26, 1952. It started with a police mutiny to protest their colleagues' death, but people spontaneously joined in, attacking British property and some foreigners. Ultimately, 750 establishments were burnt or destroyed, thirty persons were killed, and hundreds were injured. The Wafdist interior minister was dismissed by the British and the King dismissed al-Nahhas. This led to significant instability as six prime ministers held office in six months. It is amidst this chaos that on July 23, a military organization known as the Free Officers seized the state.

Overall, the continued suppression of the masses' desire to invest the socio-political space meant that anti-colonial emancipatory movements increasingly came to articulate themselves through either a manifest or latent fascism. This fascism results from the 'blocking off' of a desiring-production that attempted to move beyond the colonial Symbolic's totalitarianism. In turn, this castration of the masses' social, libidinal investment turned into a love for the form of power that the colonial state produced. The stage was then set for the postcolonial reproduction of totalitarianism as a form of state power/desire.

THE BIRTH OF THE REVOLUTION, THE END OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE MILITARY-STATE

This section argues that the Free Officers' dissolution of the political scene by banning political parties illustrates their reproduction of the colonial state's Oedipal desire. This desire takes up a totalitarian form of power, exemplified by subjectivization processes that assigned roles and places, which redefined the citizens' identity in correlations with the state's desire. Furthermore, the postcolonial state legitimized its totalitarianism by invoking the Revolution. Thus, this section asks the following question: Can Revolutionary politics be articulated through a totalitarian desire for power?

Before and in the immediate aftermath of their seizing of the state, the Free Officers were in regular contacts with various political forces in the country. These included the Ikhwan,

the Marxist groups HADETO and the DMNL. The DMNL was the communist group with the closest ties to the military and included Free officers such as Abd al-Halim Amr and Yusuf Siddiq. Ahmad Fuad or Khalid Muhi al-Din.[28] Fuad and al-Din reportedly regularly met with Nasser to discuss a wide range of subjects that included the policies of the Wafd, the situation in the Middle East, the role of the United States, the King, the British occupation, land reform, nationalization and Palestine.[29] They provided Nasser with a leftist analysis of Egypt's national situation and the international scene.[30] In praxis, however, the role of the Communists remained limited. For example, they were tasked with writing and distributing leaflets that set forth the Officers' movement's goals but had no real decisional power over actualising the democratic Revolution promised by the junta. In addition, the Officers also had contacts in the Palace, in some of the security apparatuses and the press. However, these relationships rapidly soured in the months that followed the Revolution.

Less than two months after their coup, the Officers who had established themselves as a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) made their will clear: a purge was needed before any talk of a democratic system could even be brought up as a possibility. On September 8, 1952, the RCC passed the law on the "reorganization of the parties", which marked a turn in its relationship with political parties' leaders.[31] The law required parties to follow a strict application procedure. They had to comply with a list of demands requiring them to declare and detail their funding, programmes, and internal hierarchical organization.[32] By October 7, they also had to proceed to a 'voluntary' purge of members who had participated in the previous regimes and of individuals who the new revolutionary command had detained.[33] The Officers' swift turn against political parties illustrates their inability to compete with other political subjectivities.

Most parties complied with the RCC's demands, aware they had little chance to win a challenge against the Officers due to their small size. Under the leadership of al-Nahhas, who was supported by his deputy Fuad Sirag el-Din, the Wafd took a different approach and decided

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28 Selma Botman, 'Egyptian communists and the Free Officers', p.351
29 Ibid., p.351
30 Ibid., p.351
31 Steven A. Cook, *The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.48
32 Michael T. Thornhill, 'Britain, the United States and the Rise of an Egyptian Leader: The Politics and Diplomacy of Nasser's Consolidation of Power, 1952-4', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 119, No. 483, (2004), pp. 892-92, p.902. See also Peter Mansfield, 'Nasser and Nasserism', *International Journal*, 28.4 (1973), pp.670-688, p.672.
33 Thornhill, 'Britain, the United States and the Rise of an Egyptian Leader', p.898.

to stand up to the junta.[34] Al-Nahhas was reportedly so outraged by the move that he declared "no power on earth can force me to give up the presidency of the Wafd except God and the Egyptian people."[35] The RCC retorted by leading a propaganda campaign against Al-Nahhas. It claimed to have a dossier that showed that in 1951 when Al-Nahhas was Prime Minister, he had consented to the secret withdrawal of $300,000 from the Ministry of Interior to finance an investment for King Farouk in America.[36] The dossier allegedly also proved he had used state funds to construct a quay for his wife's yacht and build a private road for her estate.[37] The RCC also accused Al-Nahhas of being a "British tool and a faithful servant of imperialism" who had enriched himself at the expense of the poor."[38] The RCC's rhetorical emphasis on al-Nahhas' 'faith' in imperialism unfolded in the context of a national political subjectivity articulated around its fight against imperialism. This helps highlight subjectivization processes that the RCC used to consolidate itself as an ascendant political force. They also castigated al-Nahhas' failure to supply arms to guerrilla fighters in the Suez Canal Zone and his inaction when in 1948 Palestinians had been provided with faulty arms.[39] To help convince the population and spread the news, General Nagib went on a propaganda tour against Nahhas and visited the Delta region, including Samannud, the birthplace of Nahhas and a Wafd stronghold.[40] The RRC's constant belittling and castigating of Nahhas also illustrates the growing totalitarian desire of the Free Officers' state which set the scene for its authoritarian redefinition of national identity.

The decision to defy the junta had heightened tensions within the Wafd and the party fragmented in several nucleoli that soon denounced and attacked each other.[41] The younger elements feared a showdown with the Free Officers and convinced the other factions to abide by the law.[42] Things went from bad to worse when on September 15, the RCC announced that a revolutionary court would try members from the previous regime.[43] King Farouk's entourage and some Wafdist ministers were arrested and arraigned. Their sentences included four

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34 Cook, The Struggle for Egypt, p.48.

35 Don Peretz, 'Democracy and the Revolution in Egypt', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter, 1959), pp. 26-40, p.28.

36 Ibid., p.28-29

37 Peretz, 'Democracy and the Revolution in Egypt', p.28-29

38Ibid., p.28-29

39 Ibid., p.28-29

40 Ibid., p.28-29

41 Peter Mansfield, '*Nasser and Nasserism*', p.673

42 Ibid., p.673

43 Ibid.,p.673

executions orders and long-term imprisonment.[44] Following a legal challenge, executions were transmuted to house arrest or detention. The RCC also tried to prevent Nahhas from remaining the party leader, but after the party mounted a legal challenge, the Officers accepted to let him have an honorary title. [45] On October 2, the RCC froze all parties' funds.[46]

Eventually, in October, fifteen parties registered under the decree, among them, eight had existed under previous governments. These included the Wafd, Liberal-Constitutionalists, the Kutlah, Sa'dists, Nationalists, Socialists, Labour and Fallahin. The Muslim Brothers and two feminist groups, the National Feminist Party and the Daughters of the Nile, which previously existed, but not as political parties, also registered.[47] Three new political parties also emerged: the Nile Democrats, Fallah Socialist, New Socialist and Democratic Parties. In August 1952, they were openly attacked by 'Ali Mahir, the new RCC approved Prime Minister who warned "They must either be reshaped and reformed or disintegrate and disappear. [….] They belong to the nation and not to individuals. They must have definite and specific programs. They must differentiate from one and another, otherwise, there is no need for the existence of different names for one idea.... We have had enough of differences and bad feelings, enough of mutual accusations and political murders, enough of imprisonment and of restrictions on liberty."[48] Mahir further warned that from then on, parties should no longer obey their leaders "which is dictatorship, but the leaders have to obey the members, which is democracy."[49] He denounced the pre-existing system for having kept Egypt in a "state of backwardness and retarded progress" because political parties had "remained preoccupied with a struggle for their own power".[50] Beyond the parties it was also the constitution itself that was a "source of weakness and confusion."[51] Here again, Maher's rhetoric legitimized state repression in the name of the production of the Revolution. It portrays the very possibility of difference as a threat to the state and through this, a danger to the unfolding of revolutionary national subjectivity.

Thus, on October 21, strict censorship was imposed to 'protect' the Revolution. On December 10, the constitution was abolished, and finally, on January 17, 1953, all parties were

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44 Ibid., p.673
45 Cook, *The Struggle for Egypt*, p.48
46 Peretz, 'Democracy and the Revolution in Egypt', p.28.
47 Ibid., p.28.
48 Ibid., p.28-29
49 Ibid., p.28-29
50 Ibid., p.28-29
51 Ibid., p.28-29

banned for the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood and their funds were confiscated.[52] It was a humiliation for the fifteen parties that had complied with the September 8 demands.[53] They now felt the RCC never had any intention of including them in the political process. The RCC swiftly confiscated their assets, including their press organs and printing press, and issued arrests orders for 144 parliamentarians and 44 leftist activists. A three-year transition period was announced during which constitutional government would be restricted. During the transition period, which was to end in January 1956, Naguib then the leader of the RCC, of the Revolution, and the Chief of State, was granted full powers in order to 'guard' the Revolution and national security. All his decrees and those of the army would from then on be exempted from the jurisdiction of the courts. Just a month later, Naguib abolished the 1923 constitution and announced the drafting of a constitution that would realize the Egyptian people's aspirations. A new constitution for a new revolution! The government formed a committee representing political groups, various professions, religious communities, and leading jurists to draft the document. Naguib had promised the constitution would be put to the test through a referendum. [54] He had also mentioned a second referendum on the end of the monarchy.[55]Things turned out in quite a different way. The newly drafted constitution was abandoned, and the original committee was swiftly replaced by a hand-picked group of close associates of Nasser. The final document was proclaimed in January 1956. There had been no popular input; just the Regime's will to power…

Within a week of the announcement of the ban on all parties, the RRC set up the Liberation Rally, and Nasser was appointed secretary-general. It aimed to fill the vacuum created by the waves of ban and arrests, contain political dissidence and spread the military junta's vision.[56] Nasser announced the organization in front of a Cairene crowd of 250,000 people. Nasser derided political parties for having divided the people in their struggle against imperialism, their corruption which had created a "limited company for theft and robbery in which the people had no shares."[57] He then went on to say: "We have decided to put an end to it all and to start again from the very beginning. [. . .] We have already removed the hand of dishonour and torn out the root of corruption in government", Nasser insisted before explaining that what was now needed was "a body to organize the people and to foster their unity, and to

52 Botman, 'Egyptian communists and the Free Officers'1950-54, p.359
53 Abdel-Malek, Egypt: *Military Society,* p.92
54 Peretz, 'Democracy and the Revolution in Egypt', p.29.
55 Ibid. p.29.
56 Botman, 'Egyptian communists and the Free Officers', p.359
57 Peretz, 'Democracy and the Revolution in Egypt', p.30

coordinate the efforts of the workers. In the name of the Egyptian people . . . I announce the birth of the organization which will build our unity." [58] The motto of the Liberation Rally was "unity, discipline, and work." Nasser thus represented the Rally as the objective embodiment of the people. In reality, his close associates controlled the organization. The Rally's motto further illustrates how the state assigned particular roles to its people. It redefines work and workers through a relationship of obedience and loyalty to the military regime. This also highlights how the subjectivization and thus subjectivation of the people's identity into the state's desired representations/objects were essential to the regime's reproduction. In this, the reconversion of national subjectivity constituted the capital of power of the regime.

The Rally published an 11-point programme laying out its goals. These included "a new constitution expressing the aspirations of all Egyptian people" and a "political system within which all citizens are equal before the law and in which freedom of speech, of assembly, the press and religion will be guaranteed within the limits of the law."[59] How this ideal could be actualized through a centralized political organization whose members were all part of the junta remains a mystery. The programme also called for the British's unconditional withdrawal from the Suez Canal, self-determination for Sudan, and establishing a socialist welfare state. In September 1953 the RCC announced the formation of a Revolutionary Court that would 'protect' the people and through them the Revolution from political machinations.[60]Here again, the law was used as a tool in the state's production of a totalitarian mode of governance. In the name of the Egyptian Revolution, the RCC arbitrarily imprisoned thousands of people. Anybody who threatened the subjective reconversion that the state engineered was put in jail. Here again, the political system of representation acted as an agent of castration of difference. The RCC's fixation on suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood only further exemplified its inability to think the social in its heterogeneity.

Indeed, just a year later, in January 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood, which the RCC had relatively spared was banned and 540 of its members detained. Many of the remaining leftist magazines were also banned in the process. Repression against the Ikhwan became even harsher after one of their members attempted to shoot Nasser. The retort was immediate: the military and the secret police arrested 7000 people, the Military Court sentenced 287 people

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58 Ibid., p.30
59 Abdel-Malek, *Egypt: Military Society,* p.92
60 Elie Kedouri, 'Revolutionary justice in Egypt the trials of 1953', *The Political Quarterly*, Vol.29, Issue 4, (1958), p.389.

and the People's Court, which replaced the Military Tribunals sentenced another 867. [61] Through 1955, as many of 20,000 Egyptians including liberals, leftists and Ikhwan members were jailed.[62] Many were sent in concentration camps, which had been built to accommodate the ever-expanding prison population.[63] There, their everyday was rhythmed by episodes of torture, humiliation and terror. By the time Nasser became president, the political space had been decimated by mass repression, which created a subjective vacuum that the regime would fill. This section has argued that the Officers and then Nasserist Revolutionary state de facto reproduced the authoritarian form of power through which the colonial state had articulated itself. Their belittling of politicians and repeated attacks on political movements and their harsh repression of all forms of dissidence exemplified the argument. Nasser's authoritarianism was fed by a desire to make 'sense' of the colonial Symbolic, to recode it to produce modern reality as a reality that differed from the colonial Simulation. Ultimately though, the event it primarily birthed consolidated and the military corporatist post-independence state. To this day, this form both haunts and castrates the becoming revolutionary of Egypt.

2 THE NASSERIST STATE'S DOMINATION OVER THE MEANS OF SUBJECTIVIZATION

THE CLEANSING OF THE PRESS

The next chapter will further investigate the processes of subjectivization that allowed the Nasserist state to establish itself as the Signifier of the Idea of Revolution. This moment of the present chapter sets the scene for the next by illustrating how the state came to dominate the means of production of national subjectivity in its quest to assert itself as the nodal Signifier

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61 Ahmad Hashim, 'The Egyptian Military, Part Two: From Mubarak Onward' *Middle East Policy -Vol. 18, Issue* 4, (2011). Accessed from: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00514.x

62 Michele Dunn, Scott, 'Williamson, Egypt's unprecedented instability by the numbers', March 24, 2014, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Accessible from: https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/24/egypt-s-unprecedented-instability-by-numbers-pub-55078

63 Michele Dunn, Scott, 'Williamson, Egypt's unprecedented instability by the numbers'

of reality. This section describes its domination of the press as a process of social subjectivization and subjective alienation. As this section highlights, the state used the press to disseminate its Ideal-Is and present them as the only acceptable ones.

Soon after abolishing the monarchy, the Officers established the Publishing House of the Revolution called Dar al-Tahrir (Liberation House).[64] This would allow the regime to operate its subjective reconversion of the masses. Indeed, despite seizing power, the junta was relatively unknown by the Egyptian public, and the officers needed a medium to increase their visibility and introduce their vision. The regime believed that to be born as a Self, the Revolution needed a Mirror Stage: national consciousness ought to identify with the regime's Ideal-Is, and the press would project/reflect these.

By September 1952 *al-Tahrir* began to publish its bi-monthly magazine *al-Tahrir*. Anti-Imperialist and leftist in tone, it mostly acted as the voice that praised the regime's vision and policies.[65] Its first editor was Ahmad Hamrush, a leftist Officer who was let go because of his communist tone.[66] In 1954 he was replaced by Anwar al-Sadat with the magazine then running weekly until 1959.[67]

On January 18, 1953, some eight magazines with a fairly wide circulation were banned, including *al-Katib*. The Peace Partisans Movement (PPM) founded Al-Katib in 1950. The PPM was a communist group that regrouped members from the Socialist Party, the National Party, the Ikhwan and the left-wing of the Wafd.[68] Al-Malayin, the organ of HADITU and al-Mu'arada, a communist journal edited by the writer Fathi al-Ramli, suffered the same fate.[69] It critiqued the Egyptian system and denounced the socio-economic conditions of 'progress'. It also published socio-economic proposals and laws, which the RCC saw as a threat to its regime. Beyond press censorship, communist were harassed, arrested and harshly sentenced by military tribunals.[70] Al-Risala, a journal founded and co-edited by the political writer Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, was also closed. The journal was very well known and regarded. Under the British, it

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64 William A. Rugh, *The Arab Press: News Media and Political Process in the Arab World* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979), p. 61
65 , Ibid., p.61
66 George N. Atiyeh, Ibrahim M. Oweiss (eds.), *Arab Civilization: Challenges and Responses: Studies in Honor of Dr. Constantine Zurayk*, (New York: Suny Press, 1988), p.327
67 Ibid., p.327
68 Rami Ginat, 'The Egyptian Left and the Roots of Neutralism in the Pre-Nasserite Era', British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.30, 1, (2003), p.18
69 Roel Meijer, The Quest for Modernity: Secular Liberal and Left-Wing Political Thought in Egypt, 1945–1958 (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), p.159
70 Botman, 'Egyptian communists and the Free Officers, p.359-60.

had become a real anti-colonial forum with Arab, Islamic and democratic writings and the journal had denounced fascism in the 1930s and 1940s.[71] Even journals such as *al-Thaqafa* that were more generalist were closed. In 1954, forty-two newspapers and magazines were abruptly forced to cease publishing.[72]

On December 7, 1953, the Rally created its magazine, *al-Gumhuriyya*, whose first editor was also Anwar al-Sadat. At first, the magazine hosted eminent writers: Tawfiq al-Hakim, Louis Awad, Taha Husayn and Naguib Mahfouz who wrote editorials and articles on a wide range of topics.[73] They indirectly helped legitimize the Regime's vision for a New Egypt. As the Nasser/Naguib struggle raged, the press censorship was imposed, lifted and re-imposed in the name of national security, with Nasser arguing that freedom of the press meant freedom of the country's enemies.[74] After Nasser asserted his supremacy over Naguib, the RCC ordered the dissolution of the Press Syndicate. It replaced it with a ministerial committee ran by Major Salim, who was close to Nasser.[75] The government legitimized the move by explaining that when press censorship had been lifted "elements affected by corruption in the past era had betrayed themselves by spreading suspicion and doubts against the revolution."[76] Here the official discourse emphasises the theme of betrayal and by default defines the 'wanted elements' as loyal and docile subjects of the state. The government primarily targeted newspapers that had supported Naguib. It accused twenty-three Press Syndicate members of having received bribes of up to LE 48,000.[77] The list included some of the country's leading journalists who had at times criticized the government. Amongst these were M. Husayn Abu al-Fath, editor of the Wafdist journal *Al-Misri* who was also President of the Syndicate; its Secretary-General, M.' Abd al-Qaddus, editor of the left-wing *Rose al-Yusuf*; and M. Edgard Gallad, editor of the *Journal d'Egypte* and the *Sa'dist Party paper Al-Asas*. The Revolutionary Tribunal sentenced several of the journalists, and al-Misri was banned.[78] Besides, The Société Orientale de Publicité, the Egyptian Gazette, La Bourse Egyptienne, and Le Progrès Egyptien was turned over to a government trustee.

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71 For more on al-Risala see Israel Gershoni, James Jankowski, *Confronting Fascism in Egypt: Dictatorship versus Democracy in the 1930s,* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p.115; p.154
72 Oweiss, *Arab Civilization*, p.327.
73 Ibid., p.237
74 Ibid., p.237
75 Peretz, 'Democracy and the Revolution in Egypt', p.37
76 Ibid., p.37
77 Ibid., p.37
78 Ibid., p.37

On April 16, 1955, the executive branch of the Union of Journalists was dissolved following accusations of corruption within elements of the old regime.[79] Consequently, and under the guise of similar reasons, fourteen magazines were closed, and twenty-three journalists were forced to leave their positions. In early May of the same year, two owners of *al-Misri* were condemned to ten and fifteen years of imprisonment, and the magazine was revoked.[80] On May 26, the government banned the Party Press and the closed down 42 non-partisans magazines. By the end of 1955, the opposition press had been reduced to the shell of itself. The new revolutionary subjectivity ought to be purged from old elements. Here again, the possibility of heterogeneity was castrated in the name of the Revolution.

The press was used as an agent of state semiotisation. In June 1956 the Martial Law and the censorship were lifted in preparation for the upcoming elections. Nasser was the only candidate and won with an unsurprisingly vast majority. A new constitution, which ended censorship, was promulgated. Paragraph 45 guaranteed the freedom of the press and publication "within the limits of the law". Here the term "within the limits of the law" meant that freedom would be defined within the limits of acceptability set by the state. A week after the promulgation of the new constitution Nasser also reportedly personally requested that all the paragraphs that exempted the president from journalist and writers' criticisms be removed. [81] This move was especially well-received as it was a first in the history of the country. However, a press-law that defined exception cases as including national defence, the sanctity of private life and the 'administration of justice' was also issued.[82] The law also demanded that journalists abide by the moral codes of the Union of Journalists. Nasser thus continued to expand his hold over the press. For a short period, it seemed that the ideals of democracy and freedom from alienation projected by the regime were in the process of being actualized. But this was all carefully orchestrated spectacle.

Nasser ignored the constitutional guarantee of a free press since ultimately the government remained in charge of issuing licenses to press organs. In July 1956, for example, it refused to licence 60 publications.[83] Besides, in October 1956, amid the

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79 Oweiss, *Arab Civilization*, p.327
80 Ibid., pp.328-329
81 Oweiss, *Arab Civilization,* pp.328-329
82 Ibid., pp.328-329
83Ibid., pp.328-329

tripartite aggression, censorship was reinstated. In 1957, another three magazines were closed, including *Majallat Bint al-Nil* founded by Duriyya Shafiq in 1945. The government issued a decree stipulating that all publications needed to seek the Censorship Department's approval before publication.[84] Meanwhile, the regime awarded licenses to new journals, like Sabah al-Khayr, al-Sha'ab, and al-Masa, which acted as its mouthpieces and had Officers as editors.[85] AL-Masa nonetheless rose to prominence under Khalid Muhiy al-Din's direction. He gave critical writers and intellectuals a chance to expose their views. But this would not last.

Following Nasser's electoral win, the Liberation rally was replaced by the National Union. In 1958 the regime's ever-increasing hold on the press continued to unfold with the passing of yet another measure. From then on, all private owners and editor–in-chiefs were required to attend bi-monthly meetings to discuss co-operation with the National Union. Additionally, a National Union committee was created in each private publishing houses.[86] In the same year, another women-focused magazine was closed, *al-Sayyidat al-Mulsimat*.[87] In 1959, a new wave of repression against the left saw hundreds of Marxist and Socialist writers disappear in prison and camps for years. By this point, the private publishing sphere was reduced to four houses: Akhbar al-Yawm owned by 'Ali and Mustafa Amin, al-Ahram owned by the Taqla family, Dar al-Hilal, owned by two brothers Amil and Shukri Zaydan and Ruz al-Yusuf, owned by Ihsan' Abd al-Quddus[88].

In May 1960, the leadership passed Law Number 56 that effectively nationalized the press, bringing it under the Arab Socialist Union's control, now the only political organization. However, the leadership insisted this was not a nationalization because technically the ASU was not part of the state.[89] Instead, it portrayed the move as a reorganization of the press to create "a media of mobilization."[90] The leadership insisted yet again it acted to protect the interest of the Revolution and allow the actualization of the now openly assumed Socialist vision. Officially there was only one goal: to "prevent the domination of capital in the political

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84 Ibid., p.330
85 Ibid., pp.328-329.
86 Ibid., pp.330-31
87 Ibid., 330-31
88 Marina Stagh, *The limits of freedom of speech: prose literature and prose writers in Egypt under Nasser and Sadat*, (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell International, 1993), p.21
89 Barry Rubin, 'The Egyptian Media', in Barry Rubin (Ed.), The politics of governing in the middle East. The middle East: A guide to politics, economics, society, and culture (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc, 2012), p. 240
90 Abdalla F. Hassan, *Changing News, Changing Realities, Media Censorship's evolution in Egypt*, (Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, Oxford University, 2013), p.44

and social media."[91] A government explanatory note explained the press was being taken from the "capitalist owners and placed in the hands of the people to ensure press freedom."[92]It further explained that the public ownership of the means of social and political guidance inevitable lied in a democratic, socialist, cooperative society.[93] It presented the National Union as an organ whose primary function was to guide the "positive national action" towards constructing a society based on the principle of popular sovereignty.[94]The national leadership was disappointed that its mouthpieces had not been able to match or surpass the success of the few remaining private publishing houses.[95] Nasser also blamed the press for being out of touch: they focused on Cairene gossip and nightlife rather than ordinary Egyptians' everyday struggles. "The real picture of our country lies in the Nile Delta", he said. There, people worked hard to earn a living.[96] *An orientalised orientalism?*

Nasser was reportedly convinced that the capitalist owners of the press would not support the socialist turn. [97] What was needed then was a Socialist Press. "Journalism is more of a calling than a commodity."[98]And a Socialist Press, Nasser insisted, ought to be a critical one. In a meeting, he reportedly told the new board members and editors of the nationalized press: "Criticism is not a threat or a revenge. If there is anything that is in ruins, say that this is in ruins."[99] According to Nasser, foreign embassies were engaged in a competition to use advertising to control Egyptian magazines and newspapers. [100] Nationalization meant that the last four publishing houses were transferred to the National Union. *Al-Akhbar* had primarily been targeted by the left for being an organ of capitalist propaganda.[101] In 1963, the National Union gained further power as the official mouthpieces of the leadership including *al-*

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91 Oweiss *Arab Civilization*, p.331
92 Ibid. p.331
93 Ibid., p.331
94 Ibid., p.331
95 William A. Rugh, *The Arab Press: News Media and Political Process in the Arab World*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979), p. 66
96 Oweiss, *Arab Civilization*, p.331
97 Indeed, in France for example, the Socialist press had done little to support the Algerian Revolution or the Nasserist regime .
98 Oweiss, *Arab Civilization*, p.332.
99 Abdalla F. Hassan, "Changing News, Changing Realities, Media Censorship's evolution in Egypt;" See also Marina Stagh: *The limits of freedom of speech*, p.22.
100 Oweiss, *Arab Civilization,* pp.332-33
101 Marina Stagh: *The limits of freedom of speech,* p.22.

Gumhuriyya, *Watani,* and Journal d'Egypte, which had been exempted from Law Number 56, now fell under its hold.

It was the Union that oversaw the appointment of editors and board members of the press. It also gave the licences to both newspapers and journalists. According to the law, no one could publish or work in the media without authorization from the National Union.[102] Nonetheless, the law also offered exciting points. For example, it opened the companies' boards to journalists and employees, offering them a minority right of participation in decision-making and a fifty-fifty share in profits. This mode of organization was praised, although freedom of participation was conditioned and limited. Journalists and editors had to avoid issues, and subjects deemed anti-revolutionary and had to stand behind the National Union's goal of being "a positive force behind the revolution".[103] Moreover, gradually Officers and close associates of Nasser were once again placed in the boards' chairmanship. For example, Muhammad Husanayn Heikal was appointed chairman of *al-Ahram, Dar al-Hilal, and Akhbar al-Yaoum*.[104] Meanwhile, others found themselves in trouble. This was the case for example of Mustafa Amin, the co-owner of *Akhbar al-Yaoum*. In 1961 he was appointed chairman of the board of directors of *Dar al-Hilal* and named general inspector of the newspaper's editorial board.[105] However, On July 21, 1965, Amin was arrested following accusations he had given the Americans sensitive information behind the regime's back.[106] On August 21, he was judged and sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour. He was tortured during his interrogation, and the attorney general demanded he confessed to something he denied ever doing.[107]It is worth noting that these developments were not particular to Egypt; the same unfolding took place in Algeria, Syria or Iraq where similar waves of nationalizations took place.[108]

The government's anger then turned to leftist activists, who had tried to form a National Democratic Front and 253 of them were arrested on May 31, on accusations of being "communists". In July, they were tried in military courts, with no due process, before being

102 Ibid., p.22

103 Adnan Almaney, 'Government Control of the Press in the United Arab Republic, 1952-70', Journalism Quaterly, (Vol. 49:2 1972), p. 340-48

104 Abdalla Hassan, 'Front Row Seat to History: Mohammed Hassanein Heikal', Arab media Society, April 14, 2016. Accessible from: https://www.arabmediasociety.com/mohamed-hassanein-heikal/

105 Emmanuel Kwaku Akyeampong, Henry Louis Gates, Mr. Steven J. Niven (eds.), *Dictionary of African Biography, Volumes 1 à 6,* (OUP, USA, 2012), p.215

106 Ibid., p.215

107 Ibid., p.215

108. Rugh, *The Arab Press,* pp. 57-70

sent to forced labour camps.[109] In September, it was the university professors' turn to feel the wrath of the regime's revenge. The University of Cairo, a stronghold of the Democratic Movement, was targeted with 45 professors expelled for being either members of the Democratic movement or leftist elements.[110]On the other hand, there was an increase in the printing and publishing of books, followed by a renaissance in the theatre, cinema, and arts in general. In other words, the regime took upon itself the task of carrying out a disciplined and controlled process of enlightenment – governed by comprehensive and strict control from above. Was this the event that permeated the Egyptian streets and bodies when people were denouncing the authoritarian mode of governance of colonial modernity? By dominating the press and continuing its repression of political actors, the state could posit itself as the nodal Signifier of reality. It recoded it in correlation with its own desire.

THERE IS A NEW GOD IN TOWN: WHEN THE STATE PRODUCES NEW SIGNIFIEDS FOR RELIGION

The Nasserist State started to literally occupy every space it could to recode them to its own representation. This, of course, included the religious sphere, a space which the state increasingly came to see as a threat to the subjective reconversion it operated. Indeed, Islam was a signifier of reality for most of the population. By appropriating it, the state could recode subjectivity to the requirements of its own Ideality. This took place through two different stages of *Islah* or reforms. The first set of reforms took place between 1952 and 1961 and targeted the Islamic establishment's foundations. The second reform occurred from 1961 until Nasser's death and targeted its institutions. In 1952, only fifteen days after the 180 Law on the land reform was passed, the RCC decided to nationalize the *Waqfs ahli* (religious endowments), which a Waqf ministry would administer. The move made al-Azhar dependent on the state for subventions and thus for its existence and subsistence. The 'Ulema were caught so off

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109 Ibid., pp. 57-70
110 Stagh, The limits of freedom of speech, p.18

guard they did not have the time to organize protests.[111] In 1955, a new reform abolished the *Mahakim shar'iyya* or religious courts, thereby depriving the 'Ulemas of their administrative functions and their access to the magistracy. Moreover, the move put an end to the Sharia as the only source of law, which helped homogenize the Egyptian civil court system. This time, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, Sheikh Khidr Husayn and the Vice Sheikh, Abd al-Latif Draz resigned from their position in protest.[112] This had little impact on the regime as new and pro-RCC Sheikhs swiftly replaced them.[113] This was the beginning of a long chess game where pro-Officers and then pro-Nasserist were gradually put in charge. In 1953, Sheikh al-Baquri was named the new head of the Waqfs ministry. He was an Ikhwan member who had worked with the Free Officers before the 1952 coup and who took up the post against the organisation's wishes.[114] Al-Baquri then established himself as one of the most prominent spokespersons of the Officers' Revolution and then of the Nasserist regime. Nasser banked on his popularity in Africa and Asia to emphasize the international aspect of the Nasserist Revolution and the regime's desire to support other 'liberation' movements. This helped the state expand its sphere of influence and power well beyond the frontier of Egypt.

Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat was named the new editor of al-Azhar's journal, *Majallat al-Azhar* and used his position to help domestically disseminate the regime's ideology by outlining the main goals and phase of the Nasserist Revolution.[115] In a laudatory editorial published in October 1960, he set forth the Nasserist vision of the Revolution, which would articulate itself through three sub-set revolutions: a socio-cultural revolution, a political revolution and a soon-to-come economic revolution. The editorial unofficially announced the soon-to-come-Ishtirakiyya or socialist turn.[116] In the article, he also told of a fourth revolution-to-come: a religious revolution. He described this Revolution as a liberation of reason from "powerless and subservient imitation", a purification of the Sunna from "deceitful hadiths" and an evolution of fiqh "in the limits allowed by the Shari'yya."[117] Sheikh Zayyat insisted this Islah was first an intellectual reform, necessary to bring Islam into modernity. This editorial is

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111 Alain Roussillon, (dir.), 'Le nassérisme à travers les âges : recompositions de la formule du pouvoir et de la légitimité', *Nasser, 25 ans, Peuples Mediterraneens*, n.74-75, (Janvier-Juin, 1996), pp.13-48
112 Ibid., pp.13-48
113 For example , Sheikh Khidr Husayn was replaced by Sheikh Abd al-Rahman, who was close to the RCC.
114 Gerges, *Making the Arab World*, p.96.
115 Roussillon, (dir.), "Le nassérisme à travers les âges, p.13-48.
116 P.J. Vatikiotis, *Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2016, 3rd edition) p.43
117 Ibid., p.43

critical because it semi-implicitly targeted a potent critic of Nasser's growing enemy in the Arab world: Saudi Arabia. Al-Zayyat's voice as a representant of the religious establishment and beyond it of Islam was thus used to introduce the regime's new policies. It also highlights the continued theme of the need to purify national subjectivity as a component of the state's semiotics.

The 'religious revolution' took place as the 'socialist revolution' was unfolding, marking the beginning of the second waves of religious reforms. These changed the 'Ulemas to civil servants' status, thereby sealing their co-dependence to the state. They now had it as a duty to obey it. This co-dependence also became economic as the institution would from then on be financed by the state. It also helped the state further exclude the 'Ulemas from the reforms process, this as a restructuration of al-Azhar was taking place. In the 1950s, following the Free Officers' seizing of the state, a debate centred on the need for unification and homogenization of Egypt's school system had re-emerged. In many of their writings, the 'Ulemas had criticized the secularisation that the Egyptian school system's modernisation entailed. In 1955 the question was debated by Taha Husseyn, who proposed to end traditional education at the primary and secondary levels, in Kuttabs and al-Azhar. He also wanted to create faculties of theology in universities that did not specialise in Islamic teachings. Religion would be studied beyond the boundaries of religious knowledge. While this model inspired reforms in Tunisia, it was not applied by the Officers. [118] Nasser had been able to assert his grip over the institution, which he used as a symbol of his legitimacy and authority. To act as an agent of Nasserist semiotics, al-Azhar needed to remain a national institution.

The regime-endorsed reform, which the Grand Sheikh `Bahi, the director of the university then supported, fragmented Al-Azhar in five parts: the Superior Council of al-Azhar, the Academic Centre for Islamic research (majma al buhuth al-Islamiyya), which was the former administrative and judicial centre of power of the 'Ulemas, the Culture Directory, the University of al-Azhar and the Primary, Preparatory and Secondary institutes of Education. This truncation of Al-Azhar set different centres of powers that mutually competed with one another. *Divide and Conquer!* The president was now in charge of nominating the Grand Sheikh and the Imam. A semblance of

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118 Malika Zeghal, "Les reformistes de l'Universite al-Azhar", in Pierre Jean Luizard (Dir.*) Le Choc Colonial et l'Islam* (Paris: La Decouverte, 2006). Accessible from: https://www.cairn.info/le-choc-colonial-et-l-islam--9782707146960-page-533.htm

representation was still maintained as the Imam was elevated to minister in the ministry of Waqf, which still meant he had little power. The ministry was tightly controlled by Major Ahmad' Abdallah Tu'ayma, the former General Secretary of the Liberation Rally. Additionally, the reforms established a Superior Committee of Islamic Affairs attached to the Waqfs' ministry. It published the regime's official vision of Islam- a Socialist Islam- in books that were affordable so as to maximize the outreach. Azharis were now just the pawns of/in the regime propaganda. They did not have much choice. Anwar Sadat was sent to al-Azhar to relay a stern warning, telling an assembly of 'Ulemas; "On July 23, 1952, a revolution took place. Those who tried to oppose it were trampled. A new revolution is taking place now. Those who will oppose it will meet the same fate."[119] The Hurriyya (Freedom) of the people had been eaten up alive by freedom as represented by the regime. The state used its gradual redefinition of the religious space and Islamic identity to establish a signifying chain that equated its political vision to an emancipatory desire. This also helped it masks its desire for the repression of subjective difference.

The state also changed the curriculum in the primary and secondary institutes of education and introduced a dual programme composed of both a secular and religious curriculum. At the university level, similar changes took place as the three schools – theology, Arabic language and Shari'a – all included new programmes that taught modern disciplines including biology, engineering, pharmacy, medicine, languages, etc…[120] These reforms drew their inspiration from the previously proposed reforms of Mohammed Abduh, which had not been accepted. These ideas had also been carried forward by the Ikhwan. In the preamble of the Law n° 103 de 1961, the government referred to a vision shared by the Ikhwan when it described Islam as *Din wa dunya* (religion and world).[121] This vision entailed the grouping of Religion, the domain of the spiritual and thus of the non-material world, with the materialism of earthly living -here meaning more statist socialization. Through this vision religion coated in socialism, what the regime called a Socialist Islam, gained a social utility that matched the Socialist reformist agenda launched by Nasser:

« Al-Azhar has failed to find the path that would help it participate in the movement of renewal that would put it in harmony with this century [...]. Its graduates are still [...] today

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119 Sayyid Ahmad Rif'at, (1993) Thawrat al jiniral, Qissat Jamal 'abd al-nasirkamila, min al-milad ila al-mawt 1918, 1970 (Cairo, Dar al Huda,1993) p.686
120 Zeghal, 'Les reformistes de l'Universite al-Azhar'
121 Ibid.

men of religion (rigal din), who do not demonstrate a marked interest for the sciences of this world (dunya). Islam, in its first reality, makes no difference between the science of religion (din) and the science of this world (dunya). Islam is indeed a social religion [...]. Every Muslim must be both a man of religion and a man of the world "(Law N.103, 1961).[122]

In this vision, al-Azhar was often represented in official discourses as the citadel of Islam (Hisn) while at the same time denying that Islam could be a profession (Hirfa).[123] This further helped the state delegitimize the 'Ulemas as a counter-subjective force. Nasser's grip on al-Azhar was also beneficial in counter-balancing the influence of the Ikhwan and then legitimizing the brutal repression by the regime against them. Simultaneously, the regime recuperated and appropriated the Ikhwan's critique of al-Azhar. The organization had criticized the institution for its collaboration with the British and the Palace. [124] For example, Al-Banna had critiqued the torpor in which its 'Ulemas had befallen and decried their lack of action against the growing influence of foreigners on the symbolic and material reality of/in Egypt.[125] Al-Ghazali, who was an Ikhwan member and an al-Azhar scholar, had denounced the passivity of his colleagues in a similar vein:

"I know men among the shaykhs of the Azhar who live on Islam, as do the germs of bilharzia and ankylostomiasis on the blood of the wretched peasants." [126]

The Nasserist regime made good use of these critiques by forcing the 'Ulemas' hand and having them proclaim Fatwas against Islamist organizations. The official Azhari discourse then described them as 'corrupt', 'Sufis devoted', and as a class allied to the 'feudalists'. In brief, they were 'charlatans' whose main function was to trick the population. This highlights how the regime used religious institutions to portray elements that resisted its subjectivation, which it saw as threatening the production of the Revolution by corrupting the people with their vision. The leadership's use of Islam

122 Ibid.
123 Jeffrey T. Kenney, Ebrahim Moosa (Eds.), *Islam in the Modern World,* (Oxon: Routledge, 2014) p.136
124 Zeghal, 'Les reformistes de l'Universite al-Azhar'
125 Richard P. Mitchel, *The society of the Muslim Brothers*, (New York: Oxford University Press. 1969.), pp 212-213.
126 Ibid., p.213.

did not just touch al-Azhar; it also interfered with primary schools' curricula. In 1952, the RCC reinstated two hours of religious instruction in the first two years of primary schools, although no textbook had been written for them until 1958-59.[127] This instruction moved away from the previous focus on manners, time management and good behaviour to emphasize social values that the regime deemed necessary to a popular reformation of society.[128] This meant an increase of discussion on jihad as a personal struggle against temptation, injustice, or wrongdoing with analogies being made to the fight against the regime's external enemies.[129] The state socialized its presentation of religion by presenting a 'faith that reward and punishment are founded on social justice."[130]

The regime also used religious ceremonies and celebrations as public events where it could distil its ideology. Beyond religion, schools were used to produce a Nasserist cult with schools in the Nile Valley, making pupils chant "Nasser! Nasser! Nasser!", followed by revolutionary slogans.[131] In parallel, Nasser's use of Islamic symbols and images in his speeches also increased, a move that soon extended to other members of his government.[132] The Nasserist use of Islam as a tool for disseminating the regime's signifying semiotics produced quite a paradox: by asserting a statist vision of Islam the regime was able to penetrate the private sphere up to its most intimate. It used this intimacy to recode individual subjectivity and desire.

GAMAL ABDEL NASSER: 'THE LAW IS ON HOLIDAY', OR WHEN JUSTICE IS NOT JUST

The Officers and then Nasser did not stop with ensuring their control of the religious sphere. Modernity had brought a new god. The Nasserist state was establishing itself as The LAW of/on reality. This section showcases how the state used the law to suppress the elements

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127 Gregory Starrett, *Putting Islam to Work, education, politics and religious transformation in Egypt*, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998), p.78.
128 Ibid., p.78
129 Ibid., p.78
130 Ibid., p79
131 Ibid., p.79
132 Anouar Abdel Malek, *Egypte societe militaire*, (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1962), p.256

of the population that resisted its subjectivation. When the Free Officers seized the state in 1952, the Majlis al-Dawla, an apparatus modelled on the French Conseil d'Etat, initially assisted them, albeit pressure and intimidation might have been at the root of its acquiescence.[133] For example, when the Officers formed a Regency Council to replace King Farouk, the Majlis al-Dawla provided a ruling that obviated the requirement to submit the measure constitutionally required to the disbanded parliament.[134] The assumption was that the Officers' authoritarianism was both a necessary and sufficient condition to the production of the Revolution, but that it would progressively transition to a more democratic mode of government.[135]

As it turned out, this assumption never materialized. Besides, not one member of the body of legal experts appointed by the officers to draft a new constitution protested the banning of political parties or resigned over the move.[136] Many of its members also argued against the submission of the to-be-constitution to popular vote or a review by an elected assembly.[137] It is also worth noting that the domestic attitude also mirrored the lack of international pressure for Liberal Constitutionalism. For example, in the view of the United States, the most important was to prevent the ascension of a communist regime. Thus, the US ambassador stated that Egypt was not yet ready for democracy.[138]

The president of the Majlis al-Dawla, Abd al-Raziq al-Sanhuri, drafted a constitution that would have granted women the right to vote and would have established a supreme constitutional court to protect the constitution.[139] However, in 1954, the drafting of this constitution stalled and eventually came to a halt. The relationship between the Majlis al-Dawla and the Officers broke down following the junta's splinting into a pro-Naguib and a pro-Nasser camp. The Majlis supported Naguib, who suggested a return to parliamentary life, which opposed what Nasser wanted. As things heated up, the president of the Majlis al-Dawla Abd al-Raziq al-Sanhuri was physically beaten up by supporters of Nasser for attempting to restore a

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133 Nathan J. Brown, *The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.232
134 Ibid., p.232
135 Ibid., p.235
136 Moustafa, *The struggle for Constitutional Power*, pp.180-188
137 Ibid., pp.180-188
138 Ibid., 180-188
139 Brown, T*he Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf,* p.236

constitutional government.[140] Al-Sanhuri was convinced that his assault had been ordered and planned by RCC members, which the group denied. Two weeks later, the law that prevented partisans of the old regime from occupying state positions was passed, and he was forced to resign. In 1955 the repression continued as twenty Majlis members, most being prominent judges, were either forced to retire or transfer to nonjudicial positions.[141] In 1959 a new law that restricted the Majlis' power to review and cancel administrative acts was issued.[142]

Five months after the Officers had seized the state, they had also consolidated their control by creating exceptional courts which allowed them to circumvent the regular court system. The first exceptional court was the Mahkmat al-Ghadr (Court of the Treason), and it established an important precedent for the other exceptional courts that were to come. The court was "bound only by the loosest procedural guidelines; the majority of its members were political appointments with no judicial background; its mandate was extremely broad; and it seemed aimed not simply at punishing but also at embarrassing and discrediting its targets."[143] The court was composed of three senior judges appointed by the minister of (in)justice and four military officers appointed by the armed forces' commander-in-chief.[144] It had the authority to investigate former political officials suspected of corruption, abuse of influence, corrupting the political order, or interfering with the judiciary.[145] In 1953 the RCC had also set up special military courts to try the communists, a barely covered attempt to try communism itself. The prosecution called on the Grand Mufti to testify against communism although, against their expectation, he called for establishing an Islamic State.[146] The defence lawyers put up a good fight, but ultimately, most defendants were served the sentences that the prosecution had required.

In 1953, the Mahkarnat al-Thawra (The courts of the Revolution) were established. These courts were exclusively made up of military men. They did not allow appeals, although the RCC had the authority to either approve or commute sentences.[147] Again, these courts had a broad mandate. They could try crimes against the political order, against the Revolution or those accused of supporting imperialism.[148] The arbitrariness of the courts is exemplified by

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140 Moustafa, *The struggle for Constitutional Power,* p.4
141 Ibid., p.4
142 Ibid., p.4
143 Brown, *The Rule of Law in the Arab World*, p.243
144 Ibid., p.243
145 Ibid., p.243
146 Ibid., p.244
147 Ibid., p.246
148 Ibid., p.246

the trial of former Prime Minister Ibrahim' Abd al-Hadi. Only one charge was caught on camera, but when his lawyer asked to see the charge's documentation, he was refused access. He resigned in protest, but his client was then tried without counsel and sentenced to death by the court.[149]The trials pitted politicians against one another and most rushed to testify against each other, which the RCC said illustrated their corruption and obsession with self-interest. The trials had been for show, literally. In May 1954 a second chamber was opened to try "all acts of sedition which took place on April 28", this as the court was about to be closed.[150] On this day some supporters of Naguib had attempted to rebel against the regime but were swiftly overpowered. Their trial served to embarrass Naguib, who had started to lose serious ground against Nasser.

In November, the Mahakim al-Sha'ab (the People's courts) were established. They dealt with the trials of the Ikhwan members accused of attempting to assassinate Nasser. They included Ab'Abd al-Qadir 'Awda, a member of the Ikhwan who had occupied key positions within the judiciary and arrested and jailed for siding with Naguib in his struggle against Nasser.[151] He was accused of participation in the plot against Nasser, was sentenced to death and hanged on December 7, 1954.[152] The mandate of the court was again a broad one. Officially it would put to trial individuals whose "actions considered as treason against the Motherland or against its safety internally and externally as well as acts considered as directed against the present regime or against the bases of the Revolution."[153] Yet, these trials were another tragic illustration of the illiberalism of the regime. The Law of the Revolution was the law of resentment more than a Just law. The defendants were accused of being members of the Secret Organisation and directing the Ikhwan policy of violent terrorism. Still, the prosecution did not attempt to present facts to back up its claims.[154] The trial moved from showing the defendants' participation in the attempt against Nasser's life to proving that being a member of the Ikhwan was in itself a crime. Eventually, hundreds of Ikhwan were tried.[155] The People's court was finally closed in 1955 although it was

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149 Brown, *The Rule of Law in the Arab World*, p.247
150 Ibid. p.248
151 Khaled Fahmy, 'Law, medicine and society in nineteenth-century Egypt', *Droits d'Égypte: histoire et sociologie*, 34, (1998), p.29
152 Ibid., p.29
153 Brown, *The Rule of Law in the Arab World*, p.248
154 Ibid., p.252
155Ibid., p.253

revived in 1967 and in 1971 to try Sadat's rivals. In the following years, the Nasserist leadership refrained from setting up new courts, but it did not have to.

Instead, it regularly transferred cases from the regular court system to both military and security courts, which again afforded few procedural protections."[156] Once a military court tried a case, all appeals to a civilian court were banned, thereby ensuring in most cases the verdict desired by the leadership. The law was also amended to permit trial in absentia in these courts. Torture and forced confessions were routine, only further discrediting the courts.[157] In facts, these were used to harass, embarrass and torture political opponents. The Revolution thus openly entailed the killing of the Other as a necessity to produce the social goals it sought to reach. The state's representation as an emancipatory agent was now in total contradiction with its unleashing of killings and torture. Dissidents from various political landscapes were now rotting away in jails, although Ikhwan members and communists were the most targeted as the next chapter explains. Journalists and judges were also not spared. For the regime, the Revolution meant to *Discipline and Punish* anyone who refused to be moulded into the regime's representation. Unsurprisingly, this was of course done in the name of the elusive Revolution in-the-making. The morbid underbelly of the Officers and then of the Nasserist Revolution seems to contradict the very idea of their event as one of liberation. Looking back on the state's Oedipalisation of desire and national subjectivity coupled with its castration of difference, Nasserism disciplined revolutionary politics into its fold. Its production of the Revolution as a dialectical struggle against all other forms of national political subjectivity points to its pathologisation of the politics of liberation.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has highlighted how the postcolonial state acts as an agent of the symbolic totalization of experience that reproduces the colonial Oedipalisation of social relations. It did so by thinking and articulating the concept of law as an empty signifier, whose main task is to concretely foreclose the possibles or series of time that threatened the Nasserist totalization of Egyptian reality. In doing so, the chapter argues, the Nasserist state reproduced colonial semiosis and their production of a reality that articulates itself as two senses. On the one hand,

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156 Moustafa , The struggle for Constitutional Power, p.60
157 Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World, p.253

Nasserism presented itself as an agent of the anti-colonial Revolution that would liberate Egypt from colonial reality and finally, open up the social to all possibles or series of time. Yet, on the other, as we have seen throughout the chapter, Nasserism actively foreclosed the possibles or series of time, that did not fit its temporal sequencing of space. To illustrate its argument, the chapter first examined the processes of subjectivation and alienation of desire that set the scene for the state's Oedipalisation of social relations. Ultimately the constant repression of desire by the state and its apparatuses meant that desire as an *élan vital* (vital impetus) turned into a desire for repression, a desire for the form of power that the state produced.[158] This recoding of desire into Signs (Signifiers and Signifieds) of state desire set the scene for the Free officers and then Nasser. As soon as they seized the state, the Free Officers dissolved the political scene by banning most parties and delegitimizing the political actors that had dominated the political game before their coup. This was but the beginning of a long process of appropriation of reality and its possibles. Under the Officers and Nasser, the state established itself as the nodal Signifier of reality and used the press, the legal system and the religious sphere to disseminate its symbolic. In this way, the state could subjectivize the population into its Simulation of liberation, the chapter has argued. In emphasizing the state as a force of Oedipal subjectivation, this chapter illustrates the role of the state as a cerebral-ideality that produces sets of Ideal-Is with which the people must strive to conform. Indeed, the Nasserist state gradually dominated the means of production of national subjectivity. As a machinist assemblage of subjectivation processes, the state is first an Oedipal machine: to say that the state Oedipalizes means that it castrates our desire's immanence, thereby constraining being to being alienated by an *O*ther.[159]

"To be anti-Oedipal is to be anti-ego, as well as anti-homo, wilfully attacking all reductive psychoanalytic and political analyses that remain caught within the sphere of totality and unity, in order to free the multiplicity of desire from the deadly neurotic and Oedipal yoke."[160] For Deleuze and Guattari, Oedipus is not a mere psychoanalytic

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158 Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Tr. Arthur Mitchell, (New York: Dover, 1998 edition), p.57-58, p.62, p.65; see also Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, Tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, (New York: Zone Books, 1991), pp.94-95

159 Mark Seem in the Introduction of *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze, Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. XX-XXII

160 Ibid., p.XXII

construct. Instead, Oedipus is the figurehead of imperialism, "Oedipus is always colonization pursued by other means it is the interior colony, and we shall see that even here at home….it is our intimate colonial education.."[161]

With Deleuze and Guattari the state is colonial machine in-itself: it colonizes individual desire and reduces it to its Object of phantasm. All in all, then, the state and capitalism share a similar mode of production: private ownership of the means of (subjective)production. From a subjective point of view then, as citizens of a state, we are all in a form or another the state. Yet at the same time, as a fold of the state, we can only exist as its Object of knowledge/phantasms. Indeed, the Nasserist state portrayed the social as a homogenous bloc from which undesired elements- namely anyone that resisted its subjectivation- needed to literally be eliminated. They saw the social as a pure Identity. In concluding, the chapter has argued that in setting up the seeds of the corporatist-military state that to this day still haunts the possible revolutionary becoming of Egypt, set the stage for the continuation of the colonial castration of experience and its pathologisation of the politics of liberation. The corporatist-military state can here be seen as a Face of the paranoid production of modern semiosis. Beyond its surface of liberation, Nasserism had captured the anti-colonial struggle. It had become a force of suffocation, a force that fixed its series of time while foreclosing all other possibles.

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161 Ibid. p. XX-XXII

CHAPTER 4

THE HAUNTOLOGY OF THE ONTOLOGY OF THE REVOLUTION: NASSERISM AND ITS LOST SENSE OF LIBERATION

INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapter has argued that Nasserism reproduced the colonial semiotics by producing a reality in which the real was deprived of the possibility of signification. This reality articulates itself through two senses: in appearance or surface, Nasserism opened up the social to all possibles (or series of time), yet on the other, it foreclosed the possibles that were not compossible with its Symbolic. A reality from which the real is deprived of the possibility of signification is as we have seen, per definition an absurd. The interesting thing, however, is that Egyptians experienced this absurd as the production of a postcolonial reality. Nasser did pass a series of laws and reforms that greatly benefited the population and increased the socio-economic standard and citizens' rights. These included two waves of nationalisation, the construction of infrastructures and social housing as well as reforms in land ownership, education, health or labour. Yet, this was done at the cost of increasingly harsh repression and expanding of the state's power of subjectivation. Just like colonialism, Nasserism disciplined its subjects into exclusively identifying with its Symbolic. Anyone who failed to do so, was, as we will see in this chapter, a deviant case, a bad copy that needed to be punished, humiliated and recoded.

Furthermore, the Nasserist Revolution followed a top-down process, not a popular one. Firstly, although Nasser was elected president, it is the 1952 coup that led him to the presidency. Besides, when the Free Officers seized the state on July 23, there was no popular effusion of joy or support. By then, the people had lost trust in the political system, and at first, they mistrusted the new military regime. Yet, in the lapse

of fifteen years, things had taken up a very different turn.[1] When Nasser offered to resign following the 1967 Egyptian defeat in the war against Israel, millions of people poured into the streets to ask him to remain president. When he died of a heart attack in 1970, five million people attended his funeral. Nasser's symbiotic relationship with his people reached such heights; even his death was mythologised. Legend has it that he really died of a broken heart because after Egypt lost the 1967 war, he felt like he had let down the nation. Still, despite Egypt's humiliating defeat, for millions of Egyptians, with his death, the Revolution had lost its' name of the father'.

It is as if Nasserism was able to subjectivise Egyptians into the experience of its Ideality or Symbolic (sur)face rather than into the full experience of the concrete reality it was producing. In *Memories from a Revolution*, Khaled Mohi el-Din, a member of the Free Officers who was close to Nasser, illustrated this paradox:

"However, getting closer to the masses called for action geared to their interests, at least in part. Hence the agrarian reform and social development, to which were allocated the funds gathered from the Muhammad' Ali dynasty, and whereby a school, a clinic, and a social centre were built in every village. Egypt, at the time, was building a school a day throughout the whole of the Egyptian countryside. It was then also that the slogan "Socialist Cooperative Democracy" emerged. All this made Nasser extremely popular with the masses and enabled him to deal with such issues as democracy and liberty in his own way. His popularity increased even more when he rejected the Baghdad Pact and led a wide-scale campaign against it. *Peasants felt that they had been really freed from the injustices of feudalism and the 'umda (village Mayor) and could never believe that the Revolution encroached on their freedom. That, perhaps, was the core of the idea that Nasser entertained for a long time and which permeated the Charter for National Action- the idea of a socialist democracy."[2]*

In this passage, Mohi el-Din highlights the paradoxical nature of the Nasserist experience. Peasants experienced Nasserism as a liberation, this, as more and more Egyptians were being arbitrarily arrested, tried, imprisoned and tortured in Nasserist jails. This affective subjectivation of experience was so strong that even after Nasser's death, Nasserism continued

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[1] Robert Pascoe, 'Nasser and the Modernization of Egypt', *Arena Journal* (44), (2015), pp. 156 – 177, pp.158-165

[2] Khaled Mohi el-Din, *Memories of a Revolution*, (Cairo: The American University of Cairo Press1995), p.238. Emphasis added by the author of the research.

to act as a Signifier of the experience of postcolonial liberation. As an affect, Nasserism survived Nasser's death. It had become a percept of liberation.[3] The re-activation of Nasserist images and symbols during the 2011 Egyptian revolution exposed the haunting affect of Nasserism on Egyptian politics. The spontaneous emergence of Tahrir square and Talaat Harb street as a nucleus of the revolutionary event, for example, reflect this affective sense that Nasserism is still able to act/have on reality. In 1954, Nasser renamed what had been 'Soliman Pasha Street' after Talaat Harb, a leading Egyptian economist of the early 1900s. He did so to erase the reminders of the Ali dynasty and British occupation. Then in 1960, he changed the name of Ismailia Square to Tahrir (Liberation) square to commemorate the end of British occupation. As a popular Ideal or simulacrum, Nasserism is still perceived as a moment of production of postcolonial reality, moment which was cut short by the unforeseen death of Nasser. In 2011, it was around spaces that were supposed to represent the end of colonialism and the beginning of a liberated reality that Egyptians gathered to challenge the postcolonial as another fold of the colonial Simulation. Forty years after its end, Nasserism was still able to simulate itself as revolutionary desire. How was this possible?

In a moment of *A Thousand Plateaus*, entitled, Year Zero: Faciality, Deleuze and Guattari take up the concept of the Face to illustrate the subjective and affective alienation of the system or Big Other on individuals.[4] Their concept acts as a subtle attack of Levinas and his concept of "face of the other". For Levinas, in-itself, this "face of the other" relates to the subjective experience of encountering the other as the living presence of another person.[5] The face here offers the possibility of experiencing the encounter with the other as both a social and ethical experience. In this encounter, it is the face that gives us access to the real of the other as a living being. For Levinas then, the "face of the other" highlights the other's foundational role in constructing an ethical relationship to existence. Taking things at counterpoint, Deleuze and Guattari develop a concept of The Face as a Symbolic that overcodes subjectivity by totalising the individual's sense of Selfhood.[6] The Face subjectivises individuals into identifying

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3 A percept is an assemblage of perceptions and sensations that survive those experiences them.
4 Deleuze , Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* p. 594-673
5 Emamnuel Levinas, "Emanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity", *Crosscurrents,* Vol.34, n.2 (Summer 1984), pp.191-203
6 Deleuze, Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* p.595, p.598

with the faces of its Symbolic.[7] Here the function of the Face is to subjectivise individual into the laws of the Symbolic. Per definition then, it cannot give us access to the other since it castrates the possibilities of otherness.

"[T]he Face is part of a surface-holes, holey surface, system. This system should under no circumstances, be confused with the volume-cavity system proper to the (proprioceptive) body. The head is included in the body, but the face is not. The face is a surface: facial traits, lines, wrinkles; long face, square face, triangular face; the face is a map, even when it is applied to and wraps a volume, even when it surrounds and borders cavities that are now no more than holes. The head, even the human head, is not necessarily a face. The face is produced only when the head ceases to be a part of the body, when it ceases to be coded by the body, when it ceases to have a multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code — when the body, head included, has been decoded and has to be overcoded by something we shall call the Face. This amounts to saying that the head, all the volume-cavity elements of the head, have to be facialised. What accomplishes this is the screen with holes, the white wall/black hole, the abstract machine producing faciality."[8]

Deleuze and Guattari note that historically, some subjects, have been able to escape the universality of the face. In fact, they tie the origin of the process of facialization to a specific western European historical experience that starts with the Face of Christ[9]. Indeed, the Face of Christ can be seen as the Image of all European empires, from the Holy Roman Empire to The French and British modern empires. In modernity, the Face of Christ is also the image of thought of Modern imperialism whether, through its openly fascist forms such as with Hitler or Mussolini or its neoliberal forms such as with the U.S. Overall, the Face of Christ marks the emergence and spreading of a socio-political disciplining of individual subjectivity as the mode of governance of the state. The Face of Christ thus exposes a semiotic dislocation in the history of the subject. This dislocation attributes a new function to the subject: the subject must be a concrete representation of the faces of the state and its Symbolic. This shift in function also produced a new meaning for the subject: the subject moved from being a socio-political animal

7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p.603-604
9 Ibid., p.626-7

(Man as a subject of History as Fortuna) to a socio-political individual (Man as a subject of History as reason).

All in all, for Deleuze and Guattari, the Face of Christ marks a historical juncture whereby the state ascendingly establishes its symbolic as THE Signifier of the subjects' experience. It makes us into its faces, and in this process reduces our experience to be a distorted mirror image of the Big Other. As an agent of the facialization of the Big Other, the state overcodes the subject with Symbolic Ideal-Is and in doing so simulates the existence of the subject as a successive series of Identifications. For Deleuze and Guattari, the birth of the Face of Christ coalesces with the influence of Neo-Platonism in Christian thought, which eventually led to the emergence of nominalism.[10] In fine, for them, both the Face of Christ and the Face of Modernity takes up the individual as the basis of their conception of man. From a Deleuzean perspective, modernity is yet another fold of the Face of Christ, a fold of a semiosis that thinks being, but only after it has been totalised by the Idea. Modern thought reproduces Christian semiosis by thinking experience as the degraded copy of an original. Christian thought thinks the Idea of Man as a degraded copy of Christ/God and modern thought thinks of practical reason as a degraded copy of pure reason.

Their critique echoes the critique of modernity and modern reason made by Luis Bunuel in his film *The Milky Way*.[11] In the movie, there is a scene in which a priest and a brigadier have a conversation about religion and modernity. The brigadier affirms that since modern science can explain everything, it challenges religious miracles as simulacra. For the brigadier, modern reason challenges religion as a simulation. To this, the priest answers:

"Well, personally, I think that science has never more agreed with the Scriptures. That's why everybody is catholic now." Their conversation continues:

"- How so, catholic?

- Yes, the whole world.[…….]"[12]

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10 Michael Gillespie, *The Theological origins of modernity*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), pp.101-28.

11 Luis Bunuel, *The Milky Way,* 1969. This film is part of a trilogy that includes the *Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie*, 1972, and *The Phantom of Liberty*, 1974.

12 Luis Bunuel, *The Milky Way,* 1969

This face of Christ as the face of modernity, Deleuze and Guattari also see it as the face of the White Man, and as the spreading of its facialised form of subjectivity:

"Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance to the White man's face, which endeavours to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating them at a given place under given conditions, in a ghetto, or sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides alterity."[13]

With Fanon, the black skins become white masks, and with Deleuze and Guattari, it is modernity that takes up a white surface and black holes.[14] The modern Big Other overcodes the social with its racial spectrum of Ideality. The critiques of Fanon, Deleuze and Guattari expose the processes through which individual subjectivity is subjectivised by the surface of the Simulation's reality. This surface produces a head that is no longer coded by the body[15]; instead, the face overcodes the body as in the Hobbesian image of the Leviathan. On this surface of the Simulation, individual experience is subjectivised into the Ideal side of the Simulation. Experience is totalised by the concepts/Ideas or faces of the Symbolic, but the subject experiences the facialised social as a field of possibles. Thus, the Face's function is to produce an affective desire for the Symbolic's desire and the possibles its laws authorise. Beyond this surface of the face, experience is not totalised by the concepts/Ideas or faces of the symbolic; the subject struggles against this totalisation. The subject rejects this totalisation because it experiences the facialised social as a field that forecloses possibles. In this case, the Simulation loses its affective power. As we will see in this chapter, when a subject desire possibles that the Nasserist Symbolic prohibits, the Face violates the integrity of their bodies. In this case, the Face assumes its repressive function by traumatising the subject's bodily experience into desiring the possibles included in the series of time of the Nasserist Symbolic.

This chapter draws from the concept of faciality, to argue that as a Face of enfoldment of the colonial Simulation, Nasserism thought liberation as a copy of its colonial simulacrum. Nasserism's spiralling into the world of phantasms further illustrates its pathologisation of the politics of liberation. The chapter argues that its 'liberated' Face masks a beneath that exposes

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13 Deleuze, Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* p.631
14 Ibid., p.595
15 Ibid.

the totalising violence of its repressive function. To this end, this chapter unfolds in just one moment that examines the Nasserist Facialization of the social as a mechanism-of-capture of liberated possibles/desires rather than as their liberation. The first section looks into the Nasserist productions of multiple Signifiers/simulacra of liberation. In particular, it focuses on how it thought liberation within both the international and domestic contexts. It will highlight how this surface Nasserism presents itself as both an affect and percept of liberation. The second section challenges the liberating affect of Nasserism by looking at how its facialization reduced the social to the Objects of phantasm/knowledge of its Symbolic. In doing so, the section argues, Nasserism became a totalising vision of subjective capture that actualised itself through a totalising state. Finally, its third section exposes the repressive function of the Nasserist Simulation by looking into the ways in which Nasserism simulated itself as a revolutionary affect, an affect of 'liberated time'. The section argues this Simulation reproduces colonial semiosis whereby the semiotic process is totalised by the Symbolic and its world of phantasms. As the face or distorted mirror image of the social, Nasserism mediated its subjects' sense of experience. This Ideal-reality or Simulation that the Symbolic of the regime projected is particularly problematic, the section further argues, because it forecloses the reality/intensity of its violence from its surface. The totalising repression and repeated dehumanisation exemplify this violence that the state unleashed on dissidents.

MIRRORED FACES OF A REVOLUTIONARY EGO: NASSERISM AS A NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTION

This section examines the multiple Signifiers/simulacra of liberation used by Nasserism to talk about both its international and domestic contexts. At the international level, Nasser did so by supporting liberation movements and calling on the union of Arab Nations. The Nasserist vision also established a filiation between the domestic Egyptian Revolution and the need to move beyond the politics of Imperialism. In his speeches, he often used humour to draw his audience into his vision of political developments. At the domestic level, Nasser projected the vision of Nasserism as the continuation of the anti-colonial fight. Accordingly, in Nasserist terms, the Egyptian push against colonialism could not be reduced to a push for territorial independence. In

contrast, it ought to be conceived as a push against the subjective, epistemic and material alienation of Imperialist-Capitalist reality. In his speeches, Nasser often acknowledged that the struggle for change would be long, although he also always pointed out that things had already started to change. If he pushed one point across, it was that a revolution was in the making. In the *Philosophy of the Revolution* and his speeches, Nasser portrayed the Revolution as multiplicity.[16] At the international level, this multiplicity involved three circles. The first circle is the Arab circle, which Nasser saw as the most important. Nasser's pan-Arabist vision conceptualised all Arab nations as forming one unified face:

"Is it still possible for us to ignore that there exists, around us, an Arab circle, and that this circle is part of us and we of it, our history mixed with his, our interests linked to his, in fact and in truth, and not just in words?"[17]

In 1958, during the UAR establishment, Nasser further explained: "The Arab homeland is an indissoluble political and economic unit; no Arab territory can complete the very conditions of its existence if it remains isolated from other territories. The nation, the Arab umma, constitutes a spiritual and cultural unity; all the differences between its members are superficial and false and will disappear entirely with the awakening of the Arab conscience."[18]

Nasser's goal was to unify Arab countries into one nation. To this end, Egypt attempted to unite with several Arab countries. In February 1958, Egypt and Syria merged to form the United Arab Republic, and in 1958 Yemen joined the union.[19] However, the UAR collapsed in September 1961 following the Syrian army's seizing of power and the proclamation of Syria's independence.[20] In March 1963, negotiations to form a new union between Egypt, Syria and Iraq started in Cairo but eventually failed. Nasser's Pan-Arabism meant he also actively supported anti-colonial and nationalist movements in several countries. In Tunisia, he helped Salah Benyoussef who opposed Bourguiba before the latter became president. In Algeria, he supported financially, militarily and politically the FLN, with many members finding refuge in

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16 Gamal Abdel Nasser , *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, [Publisher: S.I., 196-?], LSE Library Archives Special

17 Excerpt from *The Philosophy of the Revolution* in. Anouar Abdel-Malek Egypt Military Society, (New York: Random House, 1968), op. cit., p.244

18 Abdel-Malek, *Egypt Military Society*, p.248

19 Robert McNamara, *Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952, 1957*, (Portland: Taylor and Francis, 2003), p.163, pp.175-171

20 Ibid., pp.175-171

Cairo.[21] In the Arab peninsula, Nasser supported nationalist forces that opposed Britain, and in the Mashreq, he endorsed the MNA (Mouvement des Nationalistes Arabes). Nasser's support for Arab liberation movement did make a difference. His support for the Algerian FLN, for example, played a significant role in helping Algeria's National Revolution, also known as the War of Independence.[22] Nonetheless, Nasser's rhetoric and policies also posited Egypt at the centre of the Arab circle. In this way, Nasser set Egypt and thus Nasserism as the ultimate model of Arab Revolution. Accordingly, in the Nasserist vision, this model ought to be reproduced by the rest of the Arab nation.

The second circle was the Islamic circle. As seen in the previous chapter, Nasser increasingly used Islamic imagery and used Islam to promote his Pan-Arab socialism. His push for Egypt's growing role in re-defining Islam at the international level mirrors his domestic level tactics. It also entailed a fight for influence that opposed Egypt and Saudi Arabia, whose regime legitimacy is in part built around its role as custodian of Mecca as well as on its Salafi ideology. Saudi Arabia used Nasser's turn to socialism to discredit his piousness. Nasser's harsh repression of the Ikhwan provided further ammunitions in the rhetorical battle. In retort, Nasser denied Saudi Arabia's legitimacy by denouncing its ties with Western forces, insisting that "the valet of imperialism cannot be Muslim"[23] or that "Islam is by its nature opposed to imperialism, feudalism and capitalist exploitation".[24]This took place the two countries were involved in a bitter rivalry for influence in the region, as exemplified by their support for warring factions in Yemen.[25] At the beginning of the Saudi-Egyptian proxy confrontation in Yemen, Nasser made a speech in which he openly insulted Saudi Arabia and Jordan - who acted as its ally-, saying: "Since the first day until yesterday, we have had a total loss of 136 officers and soldiers, twenty-one officers and hundred and fifteen soldiers. Each of their shoes has more honour than the crowns of Saudi Arabia and Jordan."[26] Nasser's attack was met by loud applause from his audience.

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21 For more on Nasser's support for the Algerian FLN and his relationship with the Algerian people see Mohamed Fathi Al Dib, *Abdel Nasser et la révolution algérienne*, (Paris: L'Harmattan, c1985.)
22 Ibid., pp.167-71
23 Port-Saïd, speech on 23 décembre 1964 in Balta Paul, Rulleau Claudine, *La vision Nassérienne*, (Paris: Ed. Sindbad, 1982), p.217
24 Speech in a banquet in the honour of the Mauritanien President on March 27, 1967, in Ibid., p.136
25 Gerges, *Making the Arab World*, p.192, p.290
26 Speech from Nasser on December 23, 1962, Filmed archive, 'Egypt President Nasser: Shoe More Honorable Than Crown of Saudi Arabia', YouTube. Accessible from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3YA96PG9Opc

Another example of the rivalry is the diplomatic chess game they both played during the American-Syrian crisis of 1957 but that Nasser eventually won. As the crisis unfolded, the Eisenhower administration plotted to overthrow the Syrian regime, following reports of rapprochement between Syria and the Soviet leadership.[27] In October 1957, the Syrian government became aware of the plot and retorted by firing three American diplomats.[28] The American administration responded by declaring the Syrian ambassador to Washington and his second secretary persona non-grata.[29] In an effort to de-escalate the crisis, the Americans asked Saudi Arabia to mediate between them and Syria. Saudi and America both agreed on the need to isolate Nasser and America insisted on Saudi support for regime change in Syria would help it consolidate its role in the Arab world.[30] Due to Nasser's rise as a defender of pan-Arab interests, Saudi refused to officially align itself with America. Consequently, it engaged in diplomatic negotiations with Syria, America and a series of other Arab actors. America then turned to another contender, Turkey. Indeed, the country was equally concerned about Soviet influence and ultimately threatened intervention by amassing troops along the border with Syria.[31] While Saudi attempted to bolster the ongoing negotiations, Nasser sent troops to the Syrian coastal city of Latakia. Saudi was taken by surprise and found itself marginalised from the rest of the talks.[32] A few months later, Nasser and Syria merged into the UAR.

Finally, the third circle was the African circle. A year after Nasser's ascension to the presidency, Egypt opened its first African Affairs Bureau. From 1959 it opened bureaus for the representatives of African Liberation Movements including for the Combatant de la Liberte of Rwanda and Burundi, the National Democratic Party of South Rhodesia, the ALC and the ANC from South Africa as well as the MPLA and the UNITA in Angola, the PAIGC from Guinea Bissau and the ZAPU from Zimbabwe. Nasser supported all of those movements, both militarily and financially. In 1961 Egypt was also part of the Casablanca Group which comprised Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, and Morocco for a short period.

Egypt also played an essential role in the formative moment of the Non-Aligned Movement. Nasser summarised the goals of the bloc before its first formal summit. In a speech on November 27, 1958, he explained: "As for our international policy, it is one of work for

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27 David W. Lesch, 'Gamal Abd al-Nasser and an Example of Diplomatic Acumen', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Apr. 1995), pp. 362-374, p.362
28 Ibid., p.363
29 Ibid., p.363
30 Ibid., p.363
31 Ibid., p.365-366
32 Ibid., p.367

easing tension now that humanity has reached a stage where it has become a necessity to end the Cold War and lay the foundation of peace. We support the right to self-determination; we stand by all the nations that are struggling for their independence and work towards ending the power policies pursued by the big powers. We work for the liquidation of the spheres of influence bearing in mind that the independence gained real so that the smaller nations would not be toys in the hands of the big ones. We are struggling to prevent atomic weapons and support disarmament so that all efforts can be directed towards development. ... This is why we are determined that our policy be one of neutrality and non-alignment, a policy that works for peace, prevention of war and disarmament for the sake of humanity at large."[33]

For Nasser, international and national were inherently linked. Accordingly, national independence could not be reduced to just nominal territorial independence. This was made explicitly clear in a speech in which he criticised the principle of aid conditionality:

"When we communicate with international states, we communicate to prevent interference in our work. However, if the United States give us aid to exercise their influence on us and our politics, we will tell them that we cannot accept. We will tell them that we are ready to drop our consumption of tea, of coffee, or other goods but that we will keep our independence and that we refuse to lose the gains we made in 1956."[34]

The speech then broke into a joke:

"Let's talk seriously; We receive wheat, meat and chicken from America, but trust me, we will never receive factories from them", Nasser told the audience as it burst into laughter. "[….] Yesterday the US ambassador met with the vice president's first secretary to discuss matters related to consumption. The ambassador was upset and vexed. [more laughter in the audience]. They were supposed to discuss the food aid

33 Nasser's Speech to the General Co-Operatives' Conference, 27 November 1958, in Khalid I. Babaa, "The "Third Force" and the United Nations", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 362, Nonalignment in Foreign Affairs (NNov.1965), pp. 81-91, p.88.
34 Filmed archive of Nasser's speech on refusing international aid, "Gamal Abdel Nasser discourt de refus de l'aide internationale", *YouTube*. Accessible from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GoK3IDuwDgA

given to us by the US. I can't really tell you what he said because they do not appreciate our mode of functioning. I personally tell those who do not like our way of doing things…as we say in Egypt, if you are unhappy you can go and drink….what? The water from the sea", the audience replied, again bursting in laughter…[35] "Should the Mediterranean not be enough, I can advise the red sea. [Even greater laughter]. What I want to say is that we will never lose our independence for 30 or 40 million pounds. We are not ready to allow them to say the wrong thing. We will cut the tongue of whoever says the wrong thing…"[36]

In this speech, Nasser highlighted the continued attempts by the US to interfere in Egypt's affair. He also positioned himself as the guarantor and custodian of Egyptian independence and through this of the Revolution. With him, Egypt had not only asserted its independence on the international scene; it also had regained its pride and dignity. These ideals are some of the signifiers that Nasser repeatedly used to describe the Nasserist Revolution. Another speech made in the aftermath of the 1956 tripartite aggression of the country is equally telling. Nasser spoke of the British propaganda against his involvement in Yemen which he linked to the British defeat in 1956. He insisted that his presidency had literally changed how other countries looked at Egypt and how Egyptians could look at themselves and act. He also implicitly drew an analogy between his victory against the tripartite aggression and a message that ordinary Egyptians had scribbled on the walls of Port Said in response to the attack:

"Last Friday, four days ago, the British broadcast station made a show about Yemen, the BBC. And then, they went and insulted Gamal Abdel Nasser; with bad names. But we….they used to bring one vessel here, and it would shake the government. Today, if they insult us, we can beat them with shoes and insult them from the biggest one to the smallest one. [laughter and applause] They brought a fleet and what happened? [More applause] They brought a fleet here to Port said, we defeated them. Did the fleet work for them when they brought them over in 1956? Or the parachutes they sent? Spent 100 million pounds and they came out demoralised. They came out embarrassed. And now all they can do is insult us. When they call us names, we feel that we are important. In the past, when Times magazine wrote something, the head of the Egyptian government fell. And now they want to insult us? Well, we can insult them. Aren't our papers able to insult their Queen and Prime Minister? Of course,

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35 Filmed archive of Nasser's speech on refusing international aid, *YouTube*
36 Ibid.

we can. Remember the insult written on the wall in Port said. [Applause] Remember those word? Should we let them know what you wrote on those walls? You said your Queen is what?? [The audience screams the word "bitch" as Nasser hid his laughing face by facing the floor.] Well, if the subject is about insult…I mean.. the world is changing…The world has changed…We feel that we are strong. We feel that the world has changed. When the British came out and said Gamal Abdel Nasser is a dog, [boos in the crowds], we can come back and call them the sons of sixty dogs. [Applause and laughter]…."[37]

As we can see from the audience's reaction, Nasser's speeches produced an affective sense of liberation. Egyptians could laugh at British imperialism because they had been freed of the yoke of colonialism. Nasserism produced political humour as a sense of liberation, of agency. Nasserism represented liberated desire.

THE DOMESTIC LEVEL

At the domestic level, the production of the Revolution took up a particular face: Arab Socialism. The Nasserist state repeatedly affirmed that its function was to produce a postcolonial socialist reality. Nasser described his vision of socialism as follow:

"The goal that we seek is to abolish colonisation and to abolish exploitation. The Islamists say that socialism is blasphemy. Okay then, why is socialism blasphemy? Socialism gives the workers who shed their blood their rights. It gives the peasants their rights. Socialism gives opportunities to everyone. Socialism provides better access to healthcare; it abolishes feudalism; it changes society from a society of slave owners to a free society. What is Socialism? It gives back their humanity to the people. […]"[38]

At the domestic level, the Socialist Revolution was also conceived as a multiplicity that involved a succession of events that each would help produce a new and commonly-shared reality. Nasser argued: "Every nation on earth undergoes two

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37 Filmed Archive of Nasser's speech, 'Jamal Abdel Nasser defines Socialism in his own words', YouTube. Accessible from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ExaonayiLQs
38 Ibid.

revolutions: One is political, in which it recovers its rights for self-government from an imposed despot, or an aggressive army occupying its army without its consent. The second Revolution is social, in which the classes of society would struggle against each other until justice for all countrymen has been gained, and conditions have become stable. [..] Other nations have preceded us along the path of human progress and passed through the two revolutions but not simultaneously. Hundreds of years separated the one from the other. In the case of our nation, it is going through the two revolutions together."[39] As this excerpt shows, Nasser conceived the Revolution as a natural phenomenon; perhaps even a natural law of nation-states' development.

According to Nasserism, Egypt's exceptionality lied in its accomplishment of two simultaneous revolutions: one political, the other social. These revolutions were conceived as popular because beyond the question of interests, Nasser also saw the people and the state as one: a nation-state. The symbiotic relationship is highlighted in the ways Nasser himself talked of the relationship:

"It is the people who lead, and not Gamal Abdel Nasser or any other groups. Gamal Abdel Nasser is only the tool that carries out the will of the people."[40]

"No leader can create the people, but the people can create the leader…"[41]

"My fellow citizens, every time I meet you, I feel stronger because my strength is derived from yours."[42]

"On no accounts can there be leaders feeling strong unless the people themselves are strong. […] This strong leadership must inevitably be the real reflection of this strong and heroic people."[43]

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39 Sami Ayad Hanna, George H. Gardner (eds.) *Arab Socialism. [al-Ishtirakīyah Al-'Arabīyah]: A Documentary Survey*, (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1969), p.101
40 Gamal Abdel Nasser, "The People is Supreme", Alleppo speech 18 Feb, cited in Yitzhak Oron, *Middle East Record Volume 1, 1960,(* The Moshe Dayan Center, 1960), p.469
41 Ibid., p.469
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.

In Nasser's times, socialist thought still upheld socialism as a political doctrine that could change state economy from a market to a labour economy. The political Revolution was to be followed by a socio-economic revolution. In *Arab Socialism* Sami A Hanna and George, H. Gardner explains that:

"The social Revolution, originally made possible by a political revolution of somewhat limited horizons, soon sets the stage for a higher phase of political Revolution. A coup d'état paves the way for social changes, which culminate in socialism; and socialism, in turn, paves the way for true democracy, socialist democracy, which is the political counterpart, the climax and the objective of socialism."[44]

In theory, Arab Socialism implied a shift from a market to a labour economy. This was set as the first step towards replacing the capitalist-colonial system with a new reality: a socialist reality. Nasser viewed colonialism as a system in which the state represented the interests of a particular class: the capitalist class. This class had created its native twin through colonialism: an Egyptian bourgeois capitalist class with which it formed an international class alliance. Nasserism thus saw capitalism as a force that took up the form of an international class alliance that used the state as a vehicle to multiply their interests. In this way, the interests of the capitalists could continue to be represented, this even in the event of independence. In this image, state and capitalism are two Faces of the same coin: capitalist colonialism.[45] Nasserism thus posited a contingency between capitalism as an economic form and a political mode of governance. In the Nasserist vision, this contingency produced a modern form of coloniality. Nasser argued that in such conditions, a capitalist democratic system could only create a factitious democracy. "He who monopolises and controls the fortunes of farmers and workers can, in consequence, monopolise and control their votes as well as impose his will upon them. The freedom of the loaf of bread is an indispensable guarantee of the freedom of the vote."[46]

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44 Gardner, *Arab Socialism*, p.107

45 In this sense, Egypt's liberal era was one of Liberal economics and where the political was articulated as just a transliteration of the economic field: parties could only represent the economic interests of the class they represented.

46 Gardner, *Arab Socialism*, p.114

Nasser opposed the identity of Nasserism to the colonial-capitalist state. The Nasserist state would produce dignity and social justice. In the Nasserist image of social justice, the social field is organised around an equal share of the nation's wealth, equal access to the state's services and an equal opportunity for self-realisation and dignity for all citizens. Nasserism however, also emphasised that equality amongst all citizens is in itself impossible since it would aim at equalising human beings who are essentially unequal in their abilities.[47] In this image, social justice takes up the face of social liberty, with social liberty defined as the absence of social alienation. Socialism is thus conceptualised not as an ideology but rather as a productive process through which social liberation can be achieved.[48] Furthermore, the Nasserist vision insisted that democracy would emerge from the new societal it was producing: "Democracy is political liberty; socialism is social liberty; the two cannot be separated. They are the two wings of true freedom, without which, or without either of which, freedom cannot soar up to the horizons of the anticipated tomorrow."[49] Or again "political democracy cannot exist under the domination of any one class."[50]

Nasserism thus appeared to be producing a new form of democracy, a socialist democracy where no class would have hegemony over the other. Only this would ensure the necessary social liberty through which political liberty could be exercised. But even in theory, things got complicated. The Nasserist repertoire of Revolution is an aggregate of concepts that are contingent on others. Thus, social liberty is contingent on social justice, and social justice is contingent on yet another Idea: equality. In this vision, social justice, therefore, takes up the form of equality. This equality was to articulate itself as a freedom of choice with each citizen having the possibility to "determine his place in society by his own work and his own effort."[51] Social justice is thus seen as a continuation at the individual level of the principle of national self-determination. The Nasserist vision implicitly established a contingency between national independence as the sovereignty to determine its mode of government and the citizens' individual liberty to determine their place in the societal economy.

Domestically, at the individual level, independence was also contingent on equal access to opportunity: "The son of a Pasha became a Pasha at birth; he was born with a golden spoon in his mouth and grew up to find the countrywide open to him. The son of the overseer became

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47 Ibid., p.112
48 Ibid., p.252
49 Ibid., p.108
50 Ibid. p.114
51 Nasser speech on December 23, 1961, cited in Gardner *Arab Socialism*, p.112

a hired farmer on the land. Under socialism, every individual shall have a chance and an opportunity. This is what I mean when I talk about dissolving class barriers: there shall be no Pashas, no beys, no masters…Indeed, there shall be equality and freedom for each individual in this nation."[52]

This equal access needed to be produced in various sectors:

"Neither the law of justice, nor divine law allows that wealth should be hereditary and that poverty should be hereditary; that health should be hereditary, and that illness should be hereditary; that learning should be hereditary and that illiteracy should be hereditary; that human dignity should be hereditary and that human degradation should be hereditary."[53]

Nasser saw Socialism as a method that would ultimately foster a society where class hierarchy would stop being the primary sociological mode of organisation:

"I want a society in which class distinctions are dissolved through equality of opportunities to all citizens. I want a society in which the free individual can determine his own position by himself, on the basis of his efficiency, capacity and character."[54] This was not a classless society. Instead as Sami A. Hanna and George H. Gardner explained, it is "a society with diverse classes, each performing a valid social function, and all free from domination and exploitation […] It is a vertical stratification of classes, so to speak, in accordance with which some are subordinate and exploited while others are dominant and exploitative that Nasser's socialism rejects."[55]

If capitalism had been synonymous with a class hegemony, then socialism could not reproduce this schema. From a Nasserist point of view, capitalism was considered a class dictatorship. Socialism would be its positive opposite: it would produce a society without a class hegemony: "We are pledged to the establishment of a new socialist experience in our country, based on love and brotherhood and not on the domination of

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52 Nasser speech on December 23, 1961, cited in Gardner, *Arab Socialism*, p.112
53 Ibid., p.113
54 Nasser speech October 16, 1961, cited in, in Gardner , *Arab Socialism*, p.113
55 Ibid., p.113

any one class, whatever name it may take….If we declare that we will not allow capitalism or feudalism to return, because they represent the rule of a minority, the rule of one class, we also declare that we will not allow the dictatorship of the proletariat, as envisaged by communism, because that too means the domination of a particular group over all….Our socialism, which rejects the rule of one class, shall not fall under the domination of any class…A small group of people cannot be allowed to monopolise the political scene, whether in the present or in the future: political action belongs to all the people."[56]

Nasser summarised his Arab socialism as the pursuit of sufficiency, justice and freedom. Sufficiency is the expansion of the nation's wealth through the increase of production and the development of state services: "the true object of production is to provide the greatest amount of services."[57] The national charter lists those services: medical care, education, employment and insurance against old age and sickness[58]. Sufficiency is in this sense the prelude to prosperity, which is itself what allows for the coming into being of a just and equal society: "In proportion to the expansion of the base of production….new scopes are opened, affording equal opportunities to all citizens."[59]"

Overall, the ideal societal form that Nasserism thought was never fully actualised. Although Nasserism did lead to a bettering of most Egyptians' socio-economic conditions, it never actualised the socialist essence it dreamt of. As seen in Chapter Three, Nasser did nationalise the most critical sectors of the economy, but it never deferred decisional power to the workers. Instead, Nasser placed his close associates in command, thereby consolidating the centralisation of state power that had started with Mohammed Ali and further developed by the colonial state. Besides, Nasserism presented a totalising vision of the social that ultimately posited the Nasserist regime as a necessary a priori to the production of the Revolution. This process of facialization of revolutionary subjectivity/desire produces individuals as the consumers of the Ideal-Is produced by the Nasserist Symbolic.

The process of facialization echoes the processes through which *Society of the Spectacle* subjectivises individuals into becoming receptacles of the Simulation. The more the spectator "contemplates, the less he lives; the more he identifies with the dominant images of

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56 Nasser speech on December 18, 1961 cited in, in Hanna, Gardner, *Arab Socialism*, p.114
57 Ibid., p.114
58 Gardner *Arab Socialism*, p.343
59Ibid, p.109

the need, the less he understands his own life and his own desires."[60] Debord's spectator resembles Deleuze and Guattari's Face made of a white surface and black holes through which the system's faces colonise the individual's sense of self.

FROM MISRECOGNITION TO MIS-REPRESENTATIONS: HOW CAN THE SOCIAL BE REPRESENTED WHEN IT IS MISRECOGNISED?

This section examines how Nasserist facialization reduced the social to the Objects of phantasm/knowledge of its Symbolic. In doing so, it argues that Nasserism became a totalising vision of subjective capture that actualised itself through a totalising state. Much has been written on the causes of the failure behind the actualisation of the Nasserist socialist framework. Overall most of the analyses acknowledge that the Nasserist regime chose to favour capital-intensive development patterns that fitted a capitalist model rather than labour-intensive patterns. Anouar Abdel Malek argued that while Nasserism successfully uprooted the "controlling position of imperialism", the main issue was that "private ownership was still the dominant mode of production in the Egyptian economy as a whole."[61] Besides, he noted that while

"the state-controlled the objectives, the priorities, and the methods of growth of the national economy", economic planning ultimately remained "based on private enterprise and [...] loosely regulated market."[62]

Consequently, he argued that the new economic model mostly benefitted what he called the new power elite, which consisted of the "medium and large landowners "that had replaced the old, landed aristocracy.[63] Ultimately then, during Nasserism, the Egyptian economy remained driven by capitalism.[64] Others have argued that the socialism of Nasserism was more political than economic. As such, the Nasserist state

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60 Guy Debord, *The Society of the Spectacle*, p.16
61Abdel-Malek, *Egypt: Military Society,* p.xvi-xvii

62Ibid, p.xvi
63Ibid., p.xvii
64 Ibid., p.xix

focused more on developing social welfare to ameliorate the conditions of the working classes than on economic development.[65] For Mahmoud Hussein, the Nasserist regime embraced watered-down socialism mainly due to the increasing popularity of communists in the Arab World.[66] Indeed, it is interesting that Nasser proclaimed his attachment to Socialism while at the same persecuting the Egyptian left. As Peter Johnson explained in his article 'Egypt *under Nasser'*, 'the conspiring officers did not insert themselves into the masses to build a popular revolutionary organisation. Rather they erected themselves as a vanguard."[67]

Overall, the literature acknowledges an aporia between the Ideal vision of the reality that Nasserism claimed it was producing and the concrete reality it produced. As seen earlier, Nasser insisted he aimed to actualise a cooperative democracy, but in reality, Nasser implemented a corporatist arrangement that selectively strengthened and co-opted working-class organisations.[68] As Schmitter and Lehmbruch explain a corporatist model can be defined as: "A system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singularly, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and support."[69]

This corporatism was already premised in the Free officers' vicious crackdown on striking workers in Kafr al-Dawar. Only months after the Free Officers took power, strikes broke out in unionised textile factories in the Delta. Workers demanded the right to form their unions and remove managers from the now-ousted King's circle.[70] The government agreed to the first demand but refused to cave to the second. Instead, four workers were summarily arrested.[71] Then, during a strike at the Misr Spinning Company in Mahallah, police shot four

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65 Ibid., p.xix

66 Mahmood Hussein, *La Lutte des Classes en Egypte*, (Paris: Librarie Francois Maspero, 2nd edition) p.163-69

67 Peter Johnson, "*Egypt under Nasser"*, *MERIP Reports*, No. 10 (Jul. 1972), pp. 3-14, p.3.

68 Robert Bianchi, *Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth Century Egypt*, (New York: Oxford University Press,1989), p.126.

69 Philip C. Schmitter, Gerhard Lehmbruch, *Trends toward Corporatist Intermediation,* (London: Sage, 1979), p.13.

70 Maha Abdelrahman, *Egypt's long revolution: protest movements and uprisings*, (New York: Routledge, 2014), p.53

71 Ibid., p.53

workers.[72] Hundreds of demonstrators were wounded, and hundreds were arrested.[73] As this took place, the RCC set up a series of military tribunals to try strikers across the country. [74] Two workers Mustapha Kamis and Mohammed Hassan el-Bakri were condemned to death. To sentence them, the judge recited a quote Arab quote from the Iraqi Omayyad governor al-Hajjaj bin Youssuf:" I see those ripen heads, it is time to harvest them."[75] A few weeks later, tanks intervened to stop elections organised by General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions and arrested his general secretary Mohammed Ali Amer who was imprisoned and tortured.[76]

As Maha Abdelrahman explained "Nasser wasted no time in showing his unbending opposition to workers' strike irrespective of the nature of their demands. His actions demonstrated clearly to all workers that he had no qualm about using the violence necessary to quash any form of strike."[77] Moreover, as Beinin explained "the government's concern for productivity and economic development limited workers' freedom to express their own vision of their role in the new industrial Egypt."[78]Nasser followed the same model to reorganise associations. By restructuring them along corporatist lines, he ensured their interests would coalesce with those of the state. In this context, Nasserism misrepresented itself by insisting it was producing a revolution that would create a free society. In this way, Nasserism misrepresented the social relations it established between the state and its people. Rather than building a cooperative democracy, Nasserism planted the seed of state corporatism. The creation of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) in 1957 only further illustrate such developments. As Gilbert Achcar noted, ETUF leaders were drawn from the ruling party, and their task was to control the working-class rather than defend its interests.[79] By 1956 communists had become increasingly critical of Nasser's crackdown on the labour movement, which only intensified state repression against them.

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72 Ibid, p.53
73 J.M. Domenach, *Tribunaux et bagnes d'Egypte*, Esprit Nouvelle série, No. 237 (4) (AVRIL 1956), pp. 610-623, p.611
74 Abdelrahman, *Egypt's Long Revolution*, p.53
75 Domenach, Tribunaux et bagnes d'Egypte, p.611
76 Ibid., p.611
77 Abdelrahman, *Egypt's Long Revolution*, p.53
78 Joel Beinin, 'Labor, Capital, and the State,' p.86
79 Abdelrahman, *Egypt's Long Revolution,* p.53; See also Gilber Achar, *Marxism, Orientalism, Cosmopolitanism,* (London: Sadi Books, 2013), Kindle version, p.54.

It is then paradoxical, if not absurd that socialism under Nasser entailed the imprisonment of socialist thinkers and political figures. In doing so, Nasserism aimed at foreclosing the socialist possibles that did not match its temporal sequencing of space from its production of reality. Thus, while on the surface, Nasserism appeared to open up the social to a socialist reality, it foreclosed the possibility of a socialist mode of governance. Indeed, Nasser drew his process of socialist planification from the theory developed by Charles Bettelheim, who was a friend of Louis Althusser. Bettelheim's theory of planification was put into praxis by several governments, including Algeria, Egypt and Cuba. Bettelheim opposed market economy, which he saw as the most developed form of capitalist economy, to planification. In a market economy, 'the ultimate and real economic decisions are made by individual economic agents themselves driven by their economic interests."[80] In contrast, planification is the form of a socialist economy in which "workers are the collective proprietors of their means of production".[81] In this vision, the workers' ownership of their means of production ought to provide the foundation for the withering away of market economy.[82]

In Bettelheim's view, planification could never be fully actualised in advanced capitalist economies because capitalist refused to relinquish their control over the means of production. In such conditions, ex-colonies that wanted to depart from their colonial-capitalist framework presented a better possibility for the theory's actualisation. For Bettelheim, socialism's concretisation is contingent on the form that its social structure takes up and the nature of the classes that take an active part in leading this change.[83] In theory, planification is thus in-itself contingent on the workers owning their means of productions, since, without this, they cannot be in charge of the fundamental economic decisions. This, however, is also contingent on an a priori set of conditions. Firstly, planification can only unfold in a social structure emptied of its capitalist imprint: everyone ought to be workers. In the words of Bettelheim, society first ought to be purged of" non-workers, exploiters and other social parasites who enjoy the power of money.'[84] Secondly, this is in-itself contingent on another a priori condition: it is the society as a whole, not a minority of individuals that ought to own the

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80 Charles Bettelheim, *Planification et croissance accélérée*, (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1971), translated by the author of the thesis, p.5
81 Ibid., p.8
82 Ibid., p.6
83 Charles Bettelheim, *Planification et croissance accélérée*, p.172
84 Ibid., p.9

means of production. [85] This fact then also requires another a priori condition: nationalisation of the principal modes of production and exchange. [86] The theory's actualisation was itself to be supervised by technical and political managers, in other words, experts.

Throughout Nasser's time in power, the majority of the workers never owned their means of production. Indeed, as seen in Chapter Three, although Nasser nationalised the economy and set up cooperatives, decisional power always remained in his hands. Indeed, when Nasser was not directly in command, he delegated to close associates of his. Besides as Bier noted, "over the course of the 1950s, members of the effendiyya came to provide the bulk of the middle and upper ranks within the public sector which by the early 1960s included not only agencies dealing with social service provision, but also the press, the cinema and publishing.[…] They belonged to an emergent and increasingly powerful state elite who, as Roel Meijer has argued derived their authority and influence from their claims to be agent of modernisation."[87] Meanwhile, as Bier also pointed out, it was rare to find in the press the voices of those towards which state policies were engineered, namely the peasants and the urban poor.[88]

In theory, the Nasserist vision presented an equivalence between state interests and the collective interests of individuals. In this model, centralised power is re-thought as a transversal collective desire that ethicises the laws of the political and the reality they produce. In praxis, however, the Nasserist process of planification consolidated the centralisation of state power by foreclosing the possibilities of workers owning their means of production. Nasser, it must be noted, defended his non-formal approach to the actualisation of socialist theory. Revolutionary Socialism, he insisted, was guided by practical reason. In his address to the opening session of the Preparatory Committee of the National Congress of Popular Forces on November 25, 1961he explained:

"Many people say we have no theory; they would like you to give us a theory. What is the theory we are following? We answer a socialist democratic cooperative society. But they

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85Ibid., p.167
86 Ibid., p.9
87 Bier, *Revolutionary Womanhood*, p.10
88 Ibid., p.20

persist in asking for a clearly defined theory. I ask them, what is the object of a theory? I say that I was not asked on July 23 to stage the Revolution with a printed book, including my theory. This is impossible. If we had stopped to write such a book before July 23, we would never have succeeded in carrying out two operations at the same time. Those who ask for a theory are greatly complicating matters. This is torture."[89]

Overall, by affirming the primacy of practical reason, Nasserism did not reverse the colonial logic, it inversed it, it produced a copy of it. This inversion masks an antagonism between the transversal model of power and collective desire included in the concept of a socialist democratic cooperative society and the Nasserist state's corporatist reality. As this section argues, by foreclosing the possibilities for workers to own the means of their production, Nasserism exposes the repressive function of its Symbolic. The section has argued that the Nasserist Symbolic prohibits the production of a reality underpinned by a transversal collective desire out of which ethics of political liberation could emerge. This Oedipalisation of individual desire produces the political as a parallax object, an object of Nasserist phantasms. As subjects of the political Egyptians are then subjectivised into the political Simulation of Nasserism and its production of the political as a simulacrum of liberation. This simulacrum, this chapter has further argued, is a copy of the colonial simulacrum because it affects individual subjectivity to the extent of colonising the individual's sense of Selfhood and sense of being-in-the-world. It is the more of a machine of capture than a machine of liberation.

BENEATH THE SURFACE: NASSERISM AND ITS AFFECT AS REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

This section further exposes the repressive function of Nasserist liberation by looking at the Nasserism simulation of itself as a revolutionary affect. The section argues this Simulation reproduces colonial semiosis whereby the semiotic process is totalised by the symbolic and its world of phantasms. As the Face of the social, Nasserism was able to act as a site/surface of Identification that affected its subjects' sense of experience and this desire. The

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89 Nasser speech cited in Shahrough Akhavi, "Egypt socialism and Marxist thought", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Apr. 1975), pp. 190-211, p.198.

Nasserist state used various mediums to capture national subjectivity and subjectivise Egyptian into its facialization of individual subjectivity. As seen in chapter three, it used the laws and the justice system, policies, strategies and disciplining techniques, Islam and the press. Other means of subjectivation that the state used included songs, the radio, and as we have seen in an earlier section, Nasser's speeches were often broadcast on Egyptian radio and television. Many Egyptians gathered in cafes as well as in each other's' homes to watch him. [90] Indeed, radio and television relentlessly reported on his activities.[91] His portraits were also present in public space and private spaces, renown Egyptian singers glorified him in songs, and school children were taught nationalist songs that honoured him. [92] National star Oum Khaltoum, for example, helped disseminate the regime's signifying semiotics through her songs. She chanted the Suez Canal nationalisation, the land redistribution or the construction of the Aswan Damn, thereby relaying the ideal vision of the Revolution in the making as advanced by the regime. In this way, national subjectivity and regime subjectivity coalesced into the same image, the same being.

Sawt al-Arab, The Voice of the Arabs, is another important medium that the Nasserist state used to mediate the audience's experience/sense of reality. It captivated national subjectivity throughout the Nasserist period. Its radio service began on July 4, 1953, and by 1956 it had a twenty-four-hour service. [93] The radio could reach the illiterate part of the population and the remote rural regions, which allowed it to reach out to the fellahin well beyond urban centres. Its subjective pulling power meant it received an average of 3000 letters every day from its listeners. [94] Programming included news, commentary, press reviews, speeches as well as interviews with various Arab politicians. It also broadcasted an entertainment program that incorporated music and politics. Ahmed Said was the director of the Voice of the Arabs radio program and

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90 Anne Claire De Gayffier Bonneville, 'Du Roi Farouk au président Nasser, l'héroïsation du dirigeant Égyptien', in Catherine Mayeur Jaouen, *Saint et héros du Moyen-Orient contemporain,* (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2002), p.98.
91 Ibid., p.98-99,
92 Hind Soufi Assaf, 'Umm Kultum: A Legend or a Story of Will!', al-*Raida,* Issue 122-23, (2008), pp.42-8
93 Douglas A Boyd, Development of Egypt's Radio, 'Voice of the Arabs under Nasser', *Journalism Quarterly*, 52, 4, 645-53, (1975), p.645
94 Osgood Caruthers, "Cairo Radio Stirs Restive Peoples" *The New York Times*, Jul 6, 1958, Sec. E, p.5

is believed to be the author of the radio's famous tagline "Calling on the Arab nation from the heart of Cairo." He hosted two favourite programs "Truth and Lies" and "Do Not Forget" and rapidly gained notoriety for his acerbic political commentaries. Of course, his sharp words were always directed towards the enemies of Nasserism. The radio itself was a powerful tool of propaganda for the regime but of interest to this section is its subjective pulling power of interpellation, which the programme 'Truth and Lies' illustrates perfectly. In the programme, an announcer would read newspaper articles critical of Nasser. Said would then step in to report and explain "the truth". The program "Do Not Forget" was used to foster mobilisation and resentment against all the designated enemies of Nasserism, including imperialist powers, Israel, and domestic dissidents. The radio also broadcasted songs that praised Nasser and his accomplishments. While the radio disseminated a perfect image of the Nasserist leadership, it had a comedy show that parodied other Arab leaders.

Sawt al-Arab also focused on articulating the reality of pan-Arabism by promoting Arab Unity and encouraged anti-imperialist revolutions across the region. It thus supported the political struggles in North Africa and was a potent tool in fostering Egyptian support for the Algerian Revolution. It also allowed the FLN access to its facilities. The radio was very critical of the Bagdad Pact, even calling on Jordanians to launch a campaign against their country's involvement in the accord and target political figures including the prime Minister. The radio's propaganda went so far that during the 1967 war, Said was claiming victory as Egypt was losing the war. Millions of Egyptians and beyond them Arabs religiously tuned in to hear about the developments and firmly believed Sawt al-Arab's reports of victory. When the news that Egypt had lost surfaced, people were in shock. The cerebral-Ideality of Nasserism was crumbling in front of them.

By using so many means of subjectivation, the state was able to establish its representation of reality as the primary signifier/surface through which experience was mediated. This Ideal-reality or Simulation that the Symbolic of the regime projected is particularly problematic because it forecloses the reality/intensity of its violence from its surface. The totalising repression and repeated dehumanisation exemplify this violence that the state unleashed on dissidents. The reality of Nasserist prisons is a tragic illustration of the violence inherent in producing the political as an object of phantasms of the state. Subjects that resisted the Nasserist processes of facialization were repressed in the harshest ways. When the Face of the state fails to overcode the head of its subjects, it attacks the integrity of their bodies. It violates it by traumatising bodies into submission. The state's laws testify of its sadomasochist desire and its imposition of this sadomasochism as the only acceptable form of

individual desire. The Nasserist laws reproduce the laws of colonial reality, whereby the subject needs to admit its foundational guilt. Indeed, Nasserism reifies the necessity of subjective castration as an a priori to its reality: a good subject is a subject that meets the requirements of the Nasserist state and its desire. Only then, can the subject experience their sense of Selfhood as a sense of agency.

In his speeches, Nasser linked dignity, humanity, and independence to post-colonialism, but its treatment of dissidents highlights how Nasserism thought of liberation as a copy of the colonial simulacra. Indeed, as the years went by, the regime's prisons had become the cesspool of Egyptian problems.[95] All dissidents were thrown in them: communists, Jews, Brothers, members of the pre-52 elite, former Officers and even members of their families, even a former Algerian deputy.[96] In the Nasserist prisons, prisoners were everyday plunged deeper and deeper into a hole called dehumanisation. The first thing taken away from them was their speech (parole): it was forbidden to speak even with signs. The only sounds allowed were the screams prisoners let out as they were being tortured, followed by the sounds of their bones breaking.[97] The second thing taken from them was their senses: how does one sense life when one's body is traumatised into being so numb it does not feel anything anymore? In those prisons, bodies would get punched anywhere really: the face, the guts, the feet, the back, the arms.[98] Any little piece of skin was the territoriality of the correctional officers. Some beatings were so bad they could wound prisoners to the point where they could not walk for months. Some beatings were so harsh prisoners died. They were all already Khaled Saeed. At times, guards would launch a beating offensive on a group of prisoners that would last the whole day. Other prisoners in their cells would have to hear the sounds of beatings and the chains put on prisoners.[99] Some prisoners' physical torture was used to torture others psychologically. They were hitting two birds with one stone.

Another routine included guards pumping air in the intestines of detainees. Abdel Kader Oda a former judge; Ibrahim el Tayeb, a lawyer; Youssef Talaat, a merchant and Cheikh Farghali, a theologian from Al-Azhar, who were Ikhwan

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95 Ibrahim Berto Farhi, *Les Juifs de Nasser*, L'Express, Paris, 25-31 December 1967. Translated document accessible from: https://www.farhi.org/Documents/Nasser's_Jews.htm
96 Domenach, "Tribunaux et bagnes d'Égypte »{, p.610
97 Ibid., p.610
98 Domenach, "Tribunaux et bagnes d'Égypte", p.615
99 Ibid., p.615

members all testified to having suffered such ordeal. [100] The guards' savagery often targeted members of the Ikhwan and communists. Some of them who had been arrested but not yet charged were tied upside-down with ropes and made to hang from the ceiling.[101] Others were stripped of their clothes and beaten for hours, with a team of guards mercilessly relaying each other.[102] In one instance, guards filled the cells of Ikhwan detainees who were awaiting trial with water, forcing them to remain there for days with water up to their bellies.[103] By the time they attended their trials, those prisoners had been reduced to mere skeletons.[104]

In prisons, confinement is both material and subjective, but in Nasserist prisons, everything was done to make prisoner lose touch with reality. The modalities of experience were articulated around one axiom: the repetition of dehumanisation. Living in prisons is about repetition: the repetition of violence, of confinement, of trauma. Trauma is one of those things that can only be experienced in a modality of repetition; each repetition producing a greater surplus of violence… torture, screams, silence. Perhaps silence was the worst because it could announce the death of the prisoner who was being tortured. Prisoners found themselves subjectively alienated by the fear and paranoia of the present to come. Death was everywhere, so present it hegemonised life. Anyone could be killed in just one moment. The example of Farid Haddad, a young Egyptian doctor who was tortured to death in prison because he was a communist, is one such tragic case. Haddad, a friend of Edward Said, was summoned by State Security and never returned from his interrogation.[105] Said later discovered what had happened to his friend:

"He was taken directly to prison—I heard this—and stripped of his clothing, as were we all. Surrounded by a circle of guards, we were then beaten with clubs and canes. Everyone called this the welcoming ceremony. Farid was directly taken off for interrogation, though he had already been severely hurt and seemed stunned and very shaky; he was asked whether he was a Russian doctor—we were all leftists and members of various Communist groups; his and mine was Workers and Peasants—and he replied, 'No, I am an Arab doctor.' The officer cursed

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100 Ibid., p.616
101 Ibid., p.616
102 Ibid., p.616
103 Ibid., p.616
104 Ibid., p.616
105 Edward Said, *Out of place,* (New York: Vintage Books, Epub, 1999), p.270

him and flailed at Farid's head for about ten seconds, then it was over. Farid rolled over dead."[106]

As another former prisoner called it, the best way to explain Egyptian prisons was through the absurd: Ionesco meets Kafka! In December 1967, Ibrahim Berto Farhi, a friend of Nasser who was thrown in jail because he was Jewish, anonymously wrote about his experience in the French newspaper L'Express.[107] In the article, Fahri explained how as soon as prisoners entered the prison, a real war of subjectivity started:

"[…] Another officer cornered me against the bars and asked my name. I told him. He took me by the throat. No, here no one was called by his name. Here there were no watches, no names, no shoes. There was not even a register: there were only women's names. And he said that he knew the drill, that he had been there in 1956 when the Israelis had hit the camp by mistake. "What else are you?" "A pervert." "And you?" he said to me. I didn't know. He landed me one straight in the plexus. You are a pervert, too. Your name will be Khaduga." Another woman's pet name. Then he searched me, found my tobacco and slowly spilt it over my head. A little old man got up on a stool and shaved our heads. Then came the disguise. With our bare feet, our shaven heads, our baggy trousers and our fatigues which came down to our knees, we looked like Mexican walk-ons who had got the wrong set. I parted ceremoniously from Zanuba outside his cell. The Moslem Brother who led me to mine said without turning his head, or moving his lips: "Don't worry, you're not the pervert. We all know here who the pervert is. Can't you guess who is the pervert?"[108]

Screams, fear, humiliation, guilt, this is the chimes Nasserist prisons sang. Insults after insults, beatings after beatings, humiliations after humiliations. This happened every day to thousands of Egyptians throughout Nasser's times in power. It has not stopped since then. How can Nasserism be the Signifier of a popular liberation

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106 Ibid., p.273
107 Fahri later on withdrew his anonymity
108 Ibrahim Berto Farhi, *Les Juifs de Nasser*

when the people were by thousands being objectified and turned into shells of human beings? All clues point to its pathologisation of the politics of liberation.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued that as a Face of the fold of the colonial Simulation, Nasserism thought liberation as a copy of its colonial simulacrum. The first section of the chapter has examined the multiple Signifiers/simulacra of liberation produced by the Nasserist Symbolic. By giving liberation both an external (international) and internal (domestic) dimension, Nasserism was able to present itself as both an affect and percept of liberation. Furthermore, in fantasising itself as the motor for an international revolution, Nasserism projected its Identity as a precept of time. The second section has challenged the liberating affect of Nasserism by looking at how Nasserist liberation reduced the social to the objects of phantasm/knowledge of its Symbolic. In doing so, the section argued that Nasserism became a totalising vision that actualised itself as a totalising state. It subjectivised Egyptians into the surface of the Simulation by inserting itself as a Symbolic field/surface that mediated the experience and the being in the world of its Subjects. It did so by producing a complex system of signification for liberation. In this Symbolic, liberation is thought of as the production of the people into the faces of the state. Finally, its third section exposed the repressive function of the Nasserist liberation by looking into the ways in which Nasserism simulated itself as a revolutionary affect/desire. This Simulation, it argued, reproduces colonial semiosis because its semiotic process is totalised by the symbolic and its world of phantasms. This Ideal-reality or Simulation that the Symbolic of the regime projected is particularly problematic because it forecloses the reality/intensity of its violence from its surface. The totalising repression and repeated dehumanisation exemplify this violence that the state unleashed on dissidents.

All in all, the analysis of this chapter has uncovered a hole, a parallax gap between the 'liberated' and 'liberating' surface of Nasserism and its Oedipal function. The symbiotic relationship between Nasser and his people masks an aporetic tension between law and liberation. In becoming the 'name of the father' or The original Face of the Revolution, Nasserism foreclosed the revolutionary event from the reality of the Simulation. It suffocated it to keep it repressed from its surface. As we have seen, the Nasserist state used various means of subjectivation to keep Egyptians on the surface of its Simulation, where the absurd can be experienced as a given. But its totalising power of subjectivation could not foreclose the

coming to the surface of a desire to exist beyond its regime of representations. As this desire grew and expanded, so did the number of prisoners. This, the chapter has further argued, further illustrates Nasserist pathologisation of the politics of liberation. The 'liberated' Face of Nasserism thus masks a beneath that exposes a terrifying underbelly of violence and trauma. Rather than moving away from the colonial logic, the postcolonial can thus be seen as a further spiralling into the Simulation and its worlds of phantasms.

All in all, the chapter has tried to show that in becoming the Ideal-Is of the state, we become participants to the subjective de-individuation through which facialization operates. We become participants in the Simulation. In making us the participants of its subjective Oedipal *en*foldment, modernity prevents us from acknowledging that we share pure differences as our common ground. Instead, modern semiosis postulates that our role as state subjects is to erase the differences that separate us from its faces. They propose that we open ourselves up to possibles by becoming a concrete representation of the Objects of phantasms of the state: I am a good citizen, a good parent, a good worker, a good Nasserist; I am the good that produces postcolonial reality. All in all, the laws of Nasserist speech/Symbolic say that it is by literally becoming the goods or possessions of the system that we can produce liberation as a concrete (capitalist) reality. Nasserism thus simulated itself as a liberated desire/'time' the chapter has argued. Its continued expropriation of the subject's sense of self in profit of a capitalist transvaluation of both desire and subjectivity points to our continued spiralling into the semiosis of Simulation. This continued spiralling of postcolonial thought into the Simulation's void will be examined in the next chapter through the writings of Sayyed Qutb.

CHAPTER 5
SAYYED QUTB AND THE REALITY OF ALL REALITIES AS A SIMULACRUM

INTRODUCTION

Gamal Abdel Nasser is not the only spectral affect that haunts the revolutionary becoming of Egypt. Fifty-four years after his execution, Sayyed Qutb still lives as an affect and percept of the revolution. First, there is his birth in 1906 in Musha, a village in the Assiut governorate.[1] Musha provided the background for a folkloric childhood rocked by the financial decline of Qutb's family.[2] Still, Qutb reminisced fondly of his rural youth. He loved school and developed a thirst for learning. Yet, this relationship was early on mystified by colonial reality. In his autobiographical recollections, Qutb describes how his experience of a dual education system triggered an ambivalence towards both traditions and modernity. Qutb was first sent to a madrasah, a school that taught a modern curriculum.[3] There, he excelled, and according to him, was thriving. This stopped when he, along with other children of the village, was sent to a kuttab, a Qur'anic school.[4] Qutb did not have fond memories of the kuttab and its rejection of modern scientific knowledge and modern reason. Still, when he returned to the madrasah, he organised a Qur'an recitation competition against students from the kuttab.[5] As a young teenager, Qutb became increasingly interested in nationalist politics and the anti-colonial struggle against Britain.

Could modernity and traditions be reconciled? Qutb did think so, at least for a while. He left Musha at fourteen years old to live with his uncle, a Cairo journalist. There Qutb trained to be a teacher and became more directly involved in politics when he joined the Wafd. He also became friends with Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqad and published poems, critiques and debated against the

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1 Fawaz A. Gerges, *Making the Arab World,* p.175
2 Ibid, p.176-7
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.

literary movements that rivalled al-Aqqad's Diwan group. Throughout, Qutb's ambivalent relationship with modernity and traditions remained unchanged. Qutb could move from writing a conservative Islamic piece to defending rationalism and scientific reason.

In fact, the more time passed, the more Qutb grew ambivalent towards the reality produced by colonial modernity. He started to lose faith in the Faces of modernity. The Faces of Europe, of the British, of the Wafd, of the Egyptian literary scene, the Face of the Free Officers' revolution…all those faces started to feel like simulacra. Qutb was now questioning the foundations of modern reality and its Symbolic. He found its concepts to be treacherous; they tricked thought into a simulation. Modern Egyptian intellectuals had been tricked into the Simulation of modern European thought. Qutb himself had believed in progress, in liberal ideas and their humanism, in modern reason and modern science. Yet despite all this more of the good, despite this surplus-production of goodness, modern capitalist modernity suffocated experience. The constant transvaluation through which it operated produced a surplus of anxiety, Qutb noted. Nasserism claimed it could decolonise Egyptian subjectivity, yet it still thought of Islam as a deviant copy. It used colonial Signifieds to think of it. For Qutb, this exposed the Nasserist revolution as a simulacrum.

When he joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1953, the group was going through an ideological vacuum.[6] Its founder, Hassan al-Banna, was murdered in 1949 and Hassan al-Hudaybi had replaced him as Murshid or general guide of the organisation. Al-Hudaybi was a judge who advocated prudence and rationality over impulsion and action.[7] Given the repressive and disciplinary nature of the Nasserist regime, al-Hudaybi advised the organisation should focus on tending to its grassroots level development rather than entering into a formal struggle against the state. Nasser's repeated digs at the organisation, its guide and members, angered the organisation's younger members, who decried the lack of ideological and strategical vision of the Murshid. It is in this context that Qutb, who was an experienced writer with internal knowledge of the Free Officers' junta, turned to Islam to develop a new theory of modernity. Qutb had become convinced that the modern history of Islam was/is marked by degradation. As a historical formation, Islam moved from being a passable copy, a concrete representation of the spoken of the Qur'an, to a simulacrum: an Islam colonised in both its Symbolic and concrete reality by the European Judaeo-

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6 Gerges, *Making the Arab World,* p.231-2
7 Ibid.

Christian Symbolic. Qutb's answer to the modern Simulation is to return to an original modernity, a divine modernity and where reason is totally objective. For Qutb, Islam is modern in that it gives us access to the reality of all realities, to a reality of all possibles. As we will see in this chapter, by positing the birth of Islam as the original of modernity, Qutb did not reverse but only inversed the colonial logic of identities. In Qutb's Symbolic, modern western capitalist reality is backward. By espousing 'Islam' as a pure reason and fighting for its revival and continued expansion, Muslims can save the whole of humanity from backwardness. This logic is an inversed copy of the British colonial logic.

Qutb had thought of liberation as an inversed copy of the colonial simulacra. It is interesting that as Qutb's thought moved deeper into the worlds of phantasms, he became more and more convinced he had found a solution to the existential doubt/void that had been with him since his childhood. Qutb had lost trust in thought, but somehow Islam had made it a safe space again. It could clean subjectivity of the colonial trauma; it could get to a truth, to the truth. It could 'make' sense of modern reality by exposing it as a simulacrum. Islam presented itself as The Original truth, the reality of all realities. With Islam, thought had become naturally good-natured and truth-seeking again. In his prison writings, Qutb's thought asserts the authority of the regime of representation. With him, the Islamic subject takes on a new function of representation: Muslims must strive to copy and forever reproduce the first decades of Islam's birth. He describes the first forty years of Islam as an original modernity, an Ideal that modern Muslims have to copy and re-enact. In doing so, he also asserts the authority of Islamic Salafi reason over all other forms of reason. In *Milestones,* Qutb wrote the template of what he thought ought to constitute the basis of Islamic common sense. In doing so, his thought also subordinated knowledge to learning and culture to method.

It is as if despite his attempt to escape capture by challenging the Simulation, Qutb's thought remained a prisoner of its image of thought. This chapter argues that Qutb's writings illustrate a thought that remains a prisoner of the image of thought that produces a Symbolic of simulations. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze explains that the image of thought is made of eight postulates which "crush thought under an image which is that of the Same and the Similar in

representation, but profoundly betrays what it means to think and alienates the two powers of difference and repetition, of philosophical commencement and recommencement."[8]

These eight postulates, Deleuze lists them as:

1-   "The postulate of Cogitatio natural universalis: the goodwill of the thinker and the good nature of thought;

2-   The postulate of the ideal or common sense: Common sense as a Concordia facultatum with good sense underpinning this distribution;

3-   The postulate of the model or of recognition: the model or recognition as the means of thought and the possibility of misrecognition it implies;

4-   The Postulate of the element or representation: the primacy of representation over supposed elements in nature and thought, which implies that difference is subordinated to the dimensions of the Same, the Similar, the Analogous and the Opposed

5-   The postulate of the Negative according to which error expresses everything that can go wrong in thought, but only as a product of external mechanisms;

6-   The Postulate of the Logical Function: Designation is taken to be the locus of truth, sense being no more than a neutralized double or the infinite doubling of the proposition;

7-   The Postulate of the Modality, or Solutions: Problems being materially traced from propositions, or indeed formally defined by the possibility of their being solved

8-   The Postulate of the End or the Result, or the Postulate of Knowledge: The subordination of learning to knowledge and of culture to method."[9]

 It is this image of thought, Deleuze argues in *Difference and Repetition* and in *What is Philosophy?* that keeps thought prisoner to the regime of representation and its dictatorship of the same and the similar. This image of thought reflects thought as a pure Ideal, a Self or Identity that

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8 Deleuze, *Difference and* Repetition p.167
9 Ibid., p.167

is in-itself the same with itself. But how can this be? Thought, Deleuze explains, works through the process of recognition: thought recognises objects as concepts,/Signifiers which implies that it senses, remembers, imagines and understand an object as being equivalent to a concept/Signifier. Deleuze defines the process of recognition as "the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object".[10] Referencing Descartes, he further illustrates: "*wax remains wax, even as I put it by the fire*".[11] The object is then recognized when the faculties commonly relate it to an Identity. The objectivity of thought thus masks the role of *Interpretant* of the 'I' of the thinker. In the process, of recognition, it is the thinking subject who organizes the various properties into a coherent object of symbolic knowledge. Deleuze emphasizes that we judge the Identity of things when the sense impressions accord. Thus overall, when the sense impressions of a subject accord, then thought recognizes an object as a concept/Signifier.

The process of recognition is problematic on this basis: the accord of sense impressions can also trick thought into misrecognizing the Identity of things. In Plato's allegory of the cavern, for example, this process of recognition kept the prisoners, prisoners of the Simulation.[12] Besides, recognition implies a limitation of thought: thought can only recognize. A second problem with the process of recognition then means that we compare the new to what we already know. As a result, the new can only be represented through the quadruple root of representation which brings difference to the level of Identity by thinking it through the dimensions of the identical, same, the analogous or the opposed. As Deleuze puts it:

"The form of recognition has never sanctioned anything but the recognizable and the recognized; form will never inspire anything but conformities".[13]

Thirdly, Deleuze problematizes the addition of social values in the process of recognition. Thought does recognize not only the object but also the values attached to it. In this way, the historical context in which thought thinks taints the objectivity of thought. All in all with Deleuze, thought is affected by the historicity of the thinker and the historicity of its regime of

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10 Ibid., p.133
11 Ibid., p.169
12 Plato, Benjamin Jowett, *The allegory of the cave*, (Los Angeles: Enhanced Media Publishing, 2017)
13 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* p.170

representation. As a consequence, thought constantly "rediscovers" the State, the Church, and "all the current values that it subtly presented in the pure form of an eternally blessed unspecified eternal object".[14]

The image of thought constitutes a dogmatic image of what thinking is that keeps thought prisoner of the Symbolic of Simulations. It acts as a Signifier/simulacra for the Identity of thought. This Signifier thinks thought as an Ideal-I. Thought simulates an Ideal Self to mask that its central system of being is founded on the disparate. This Ideal-I that thought uses as an image of its Self is a mirror image. Its surface hides the dimensions, volumes, and intensity that thought can take up. This surface masks the extensive differences or qualities of thought. Thought can be a tear, a jump, a scream. This chapter argues that despite his attempt to free thought of its image of thought, Sayyid Qutb's prison writings produced a Signifier/simulacra for Islam's identity that thinks the concept as an Ideal-I or Idea. In doing so, his thought remained a prisoner of the historical a priori that *en*folds thought in the Symbolics of Simulation.

Although Qutb did challenge the modern Simulation, the model of thought that he developed to liberate thought only captured it further into the world of phantasms. Qutb acknowledged the need to rethink the semiosis of liberation but inversed not reversed the colonial regime of representation. In doing so, he thought of liberation as the copy of a simulacrum. This simulacrum is analogous to the colonial simulacrum for liberation because its model reproduces colonial identities and their disjunction backwards/modernity and ignorance/progress, albeit in an inversed logic (Islamic thought is modern and modern western thought is backward; Islamic thought is progress and modern European thought is ignorant). Thus, this chapter proposes to see how Qutb's thought moved from challenging the Simulation to falling back into its capture. To this end, it is divided into two big moments. The first illustrates Qutb's writings from the late 1920s until the mid-1940s. The second from the mid-1940s up to the mid-1960s. This chapter does not claim to provide an exhaustive review of his writings but has tried to include a variety of them. The first moment examines how Qutb's thought was affected by his growing ambivalence towards the modern progress/tradition disjunction. However, throughout this timeframe, Qutb still believed that this disjunction could be resolved, although he located the conditions for its resolutions in several areas. The second moment of the chapter further examines the shifts in Qutb's thought. It

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14 Ibid., p.172

highlights how he gradually moved from challenging the modern Simulation to thinking of Islam as total reason and a totalising reality. This was bolstered by a growing conviction that western modernity was nothing but a simulacrum of the Real of Islam. In his increasingly orthodox/dogmatic vision, Qutb reproduced the very logic of alienation he tried to escape and their pathologisation of the politics of liberation.

1 QUTB AND THE DIALECTICS OF MODERNITY: A CONTRADICTION THAT CAN BE RESOLVED?

This moment of the chapter examines how Qutb's thought was affected by his growing ambivalence towards the modernity as progress and traditions. This will be illustrated by a phase in which his writings highlight a paradox between progress thought as a linear of successive development towards the better and progress experienced by the colonised as moving backwards into dispossession. This percept of progress as moving in two senses that both pull reality in two experiences/directions reflects Qutb's growing perception of a disjunction between the actual reality of modernity and the appearance of this reality. As we will see, this emerging percept constitutes the crust of Qutb's problematisation of modernity as a simulation in his later writings. A second theme that emerges is the violence and force or speed through which materialism totalises existence by decoding spiritual values and recoding them into a modern capitalist system of values. However, between the late 1920s and mid-1940s, Qutb still believed that modernity opened up the social to progress and the individual to a greater sense of agency.

QUTB'S WRITINGS BETWEEN THE LATE 1930S UNTIL THE MID-1940S: ISLAM AS POETIC JUSTICE?

From the late 1920s, Qutb used Islam as a tool for his social critique. In most of those writings, he decried Egypt's social conditions as much as what he saw as the Egyptian youth's

apathetic attitude. At this point, Qutb's use of Islamic rhetoric remained in sync with mainstream Egyptian Islamic and anti-colonial thought. As it had been during the 'Urabi revolt, and despite the emergence of the Wafd as the leader of the 1919-22 revolution, Islam remained a nodal element of the anti-colonial discourse. Between 1928-29, Qutb wrote a lot of poetry or critiques/commentaries on poetry.[15] While his poems varied in topics and styles, a poem written in 1928 already illustrates Qutb's questioning of his era's consciousness. In it, he used the Idea of conscience (damir) to differentiate between justice and injustice.[16] The strength of consciousness could be evaluated in relations to the good and/or evil in human conduct.[17] Besides, the poem highlights the strengths and weaknesses of individual consciousness impact relationship with society.[18] Qutb already posited an inter-dependence between individuals' moral character and the morality of society as a whole. This link would become more apparent in his later writings. Another topic that would later surface is that of Jihad, which Qutb mentions in a poem published in 1929, in which he wrote: "From the Jihad I do flee not – I was never weakhearted."[19] This as it turned out, proved prophetic. Qutb's reference to jihad seems to be bolstered by the rise of anti-colonial forces. In a poem published in 1931, he commemorated Alī' Abd al-Laṭīf as a hero. Al-Latif was the leader of a nationalist movement in the Sudan whose aim was to dislodge the British army.[20] He was imprisoned for seven years, and upon the end of his sentence was transferred to a psychiatric hospital in Cairo where he died in 1948. In the poem, Qutb derided the Egyptian youth's lack of care for nationalist fighters and martyrs. He also already expressed his desire to "execute the responsibility of the youth"[21] This vision is precursory to his later writings.

In some of the early 1930s' writings, a dichotomy East/West started to emerge.[22] Soon after graduating from Dar-al-'Ulum in 1933, Qutb wrote an article in *al-Risalah* in which he warned the Egyptian youth against the blind limitations (taqlid) of Western civilisation.[23] He critiqued the rise of materialism, which, he argued compounded by a capitalist system of mass consumption,

15 Sayed Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb, The theory of jahiliyy*a, (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), p.52.
16 Ibid., p.121
17 Ibid. p.121
18 Ibid., p.121
19 Ibid., p163
20 Ibid., p.62
21 Sayed Khatab, The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb, p.62
22 Adnan Ayyub Musallam *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career and his emergence as an Islamic da'iyah1966-1952*, PhD Thesis, (The University of Michigan, 1983), p.97
23 Ibid., p.97

emptied life of its spirituality. [24] He also called for jihad to liberate his country.[25]In another article, in 1934, Qutb critiqued the Orientalists' failure to appreciate Islam's spiritual strength.[26] In a poem, he linked what he perceived as a state of confusion regarding the different rules and laws of the Egyptian legal system.[27] He then opposed this hybrid legal system to Islam as a total system. In the same year, he wrote a considerable number of poems that were published in 1935.[28] In them, he discussed matter, reason and spirit, Einstein's Theory of Relativity and the relationships between matter, space, time and unity.[29]Through these theoretical linkages, he tried to develop a theory that focused on the great universal Unity (al-wahdah kawniyyyah al-Kubra).[30]

Another theme that appeared is that of a quest for the unity of both knowledge and experience. This is particularly visible in his writings on the Qur'an and its aesthetics. In his writings on Islamic Aesthetics, especially in *Muhimmat al-Sha'ir fi al-Haya wa Shi'r al-Jil al-Hadir*, published in 1932 and *al-Shati al-Majul in* 1935, Qutb began to oppose the power of spirituality to that of reason.[31] In these, the imprint of the Sufi teachings of his childhood became more apparent. He found solace in the quest for infinitude that spirituality offered, and which sharply contrasted with the crushing weight of Materialism's emphasis on the finitude of existence.[32] He argued that Qur'anic teachings reconciled the finitude/infinitude dichotomy by postulating, on the one hand, the need for man to accept the finitude of earthly life but on the other to seek everlasting life in the abode of reckoning.[33] He argued that man's access to the equilibrium offered by Islamic teachings relied on man's ability to live a balanced life.[34] In *Muhimat al-Sha'ir*, the Sufi inspiration can also be seen in Qutb's espousing of *Wahdat al-kawn*- cosmic unity, through which man can reach a state of being in a perpetual state of presence with Allah.[35] In his early Islamic writings, Qutb also referenced what he defined as the 'highest Ideal', although his

24 For an excerpt see Sayed Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb,* p.63
25 Ibid.,p.64.
26 Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career and his emergence as an Islamic da'iyah, 1966-1952,* p.99
27 For an excerpt see Sayed Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb, The theory of jahiliyya,* p 66
28 Ibid., p.60
29Ibid. , p.61
30 Sayed Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb, The theory of jahiliyya*, p.61
31 Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career*, p.111
32 Ibid., p.111
33Ibid., p.112
34Ibid., p.112
35 Murshid F.A. Ali ElSenossi, 'The language of the future: Sufi terminology', *AlmirajSufi centre,org,* Accessible from http://www.almirajsuficentre.org.au/qamus/app/single/748

definition of this term remained vague. He hinted it referred to man's quest for the good (*al-kahyr*) in his struggle between good and evil. It is in the future that Qutb located this highest Ideal:

"We believe that the highest ideal of poetry and non-poetry lies in the future because the ideal (al-kalam) and what comes closer to it lie ahead, and it could be that we are closer today to this ideal than in previous era."[36]

Qutb's use of Islam also reflected a larger shift in the literature. The famous Egyptian writer Abbas Mahmoud Al-Aqqad, for example, was then also writing about the early Islamic period, albeit from a historical perspective.[37] As disillusion with the Wafd and the promises of the liberal effendi class grew, Islam, emerged as a new potential point of departure for the re-imaging of both the state and the nation. The question of the becoming of Islam was also propounded by a growing widespread dissatisfaction with the Islamic religious establishment's cooperation with both the British and the Palace. Beyond the direct impact of colonialism, Islamic circles were also affected by the nationalist turn and the penetration of modern modes of diffusion.[38] The practice of listening to sermons, which in Sufism, had been identified as central to the cultivation of the sensibilities of the heart and through it of the mind, can be taken as a case in point.[39] This practice was both affected by a socio-political context increasingly shaped by the penetration of secular thought and the rise of capitalism, the mass consumer market and mass media that are coterminous with it.[40] In particular, new modern styles of political oratory and popular media entertainment impacted the styles of sermon-making, their discursive structures and their reception.[41] According to Charles Hirsckind, Qutb's works on aesthetics and his discussion of the aesthetic images in the Quran, also impacted contemporary da'wa preaching.[42]

Meanwhile, Qutb also critiqued Taha Husseyn, one of the most influential Egyptian writers of the 20th century in nationalist thought and literature. Qutb's critique was published in a lengthy

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36 Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career*, p.112
37 Gerges, *Making the Arab World,* p. 137
38 For more on Colonial governmentality see Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt, c1988*
39 Charles Hirschkind, *The ethical soundscape, Casette sermons and Islamic Counterpublics*, (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2006), p.25
40 Ibid., p.25.
41 Ibid., p.25
42 Ibid., p.153

article in 1939 in *Sahifat Dar al-'Ulum*. He discussed the pro and cons of the views that Husseyn had expressed in his work, *Mutaqbal al-thaqafa fi Misr* (The future of Culture in Egypt).[43] Again, Qutb's ambivalence reflected a growing sense of disillusion with Europe and the promises of Liberal capitalism. Europe had been hit by an economic crisis that had fed the rise of fascism, which included the governments of Franco, Mussolini and Hitler. By 1939 the breaches within Europe had morphed into a war that now involved people long beyond its frontiers. By buying into the Western Ideal, Egypt ran the risk of suffering the same fate, Qutb argued. This further highlights Qutb's growing suspicion of a disjunction between Modernity as an Ideal through which the West had exported itself and its reality as a Signifier/simulacra.

In some of his writings, Qutb attributed the world's socio-economic and political problems to a phenomenon: the modern addiction to speed.[44] This phenomenon of speed addiction, he explained, blinded man by reducing his field of perception to an exclusively frontal one.[45] Consequently, he argued, man had become obsessed with always moving beyond himself, without any regards for where that would take him.[46] Subsequently, man kept repeating the same errors, until he inevitably reached a point of breaking down, he pointed out.[47] Moreover, Qutb decried the ways in which the speed through which times moved had swept away the very creative force of literature. Consequently, he contended, literature increasingly neglected in-depth studies and precise analyses to the benefit of quick observations.[48] In this text, Qutb opposed the addictive speed of materialism to the very progress of/in thought. Thus, Qutb's view pointed to a disjunction between appearance and reality: modernity appeared to be a representation that did not match its reality. Furthermore, drawing from Ibn Qaldun, he also continued to attack Western mimicry, which he attributed to the conquered propensity to imitate their conquerors.[49] He proposed the notion of vitality (Nashat) to fight back against the speed of modernity. He conceptualised vitality as more beneficial to both the individual and the community than haste.[50] Perhaps the writings of Henry Bergson, which he had accessed through al-Aqqad's library influenced him.[51]

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[43] Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career,* p101-108
44 Musallam, The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career, p.97
45 Ibid., p.97
46 Ibid., p.97
47 Ibid., p.98
48 Ibid., p.98
49 Ibid., p.98
50Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career*, p.99
51 Ibid., p.99

In his early 1940s journal writings, Qutb's nationalist stance is very present. His article « Hal nahnu mutahaddirûn? Al-fawâriq al-sahîqa bayna mazâhirina wa haqâ'iqina » [Are we civilised? The crushing differences between appearances and realities], took two questions as points of departure: Are we a nation? And Are we civilised?[52] Again, Qutb highlighted a disjunction between reality and appearances and used modernity to illustrate this disjunction. While colonial modernity represented itself as the vector of progress, it had produced declining social conditions. "How can we treat the mind when diseases so ravage the body?", he asked, further referencing biology throughout the article.[53] The first cause of Egypt's social crisis was its lack of development., he argued. Using the health system crisis in an Egypt that epidemics had repeatedly hit, he wrote a scathing critique of 'modern' Egyptian conditions by highlighting the Egyptian health system's quasi-non existing state. The moral perversions, the rise of criminality and prostitution, and the gradual erasure of morality result from poverty, diseases and a lack of education. These three elements had been left aside by the various reforms of governments, he argued.[54] Qutb's take on prostitution is particularly interesting as he refused to blame prostitutes and instead placed responsibility on Egyptians' failure to tackle the social conditions that led girls to prostitution.[55]Qutb also discussed marriage and dowry, topics that would also be essential elements of his later Islamist writings.[56] In this critique, Qutb's approach envisioned modernity as an objectivity that required Egyptians to take clear material steps towards it. This totalising vision would also be reproduced in his later writings, albeit with a totally different coating. Nonetheless, the positivist imprints on Qutb can be seen in the biological terminology that runs through the article as well as in his causal approach to the problems of Egypt, which he posited as material rather than epistemic. It was then first through action, not thought that Egypt could enter modernity. This further exposes Qutb's growing mistrust for a modern epistemology that paradoxically still enframed his thinking.

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52 Ibid. p.99
53 Alain Roussilon, 'Trajectoires réformistes: Sayyid Qutb et Sayyid 'Uways : figures modernes de l'intellectuel en Égypte', Égypte/Monde Arabe,1ere série, 6 (1991). Accessible from: https://journals.openedition.org/ema/451
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, (Trans.) Ahmad Zaki Hammad , (Indianapolis, American Trust Publications,1990)

Throughout the 1930s and 40s, Qutb became entangled in the literary battles of his then mentor Al-Aqqad. For example, he opposed himself to the Apollo group, a romantic literary movement, whose rivals were Aqqad's Diwan group. The Apollo collective had a periodical and a society that bore the same name.[57] They aimed to promote literature and collaboration between Arab writers from both in and out of Egypt. His opposition to the group reflected his doubts about the viability of Arabism's political-cultural doctrine, which had started to gain traction in Egypt.[58] Throughout this same period, Qutb continued to compose poems. Some of them were published in 1935 in a collection titled *The Unknown Shore*, while others written in different periodicals were never collected in the form of a book.[59] Many of his poems, took up a lyrical style, which illustrated the romantic mood of the 1930s, but sharply contrasted with his journal writings in which he used Islam as a tool for social critique [60] Here is an example of such poem:

"Come, our days are about to end,
 Come, our breaths are about to cool,
 Without hope, no meeting and no date.

 So return, here is the nest calling us;
 Let us not O, sister destroy it with our hands;
 Come, let us spend the rest of our lifetime,

 Two comrades in good and evil
 Two allies in wealth and poverty."[61]

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57 Julie Scott Meisami, Paul Starkey (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Arabic Literature, Volume 1 (London : Routledge, 1998), p.96

58 Gerges, Making the Arab World, p13; Other clashes included Qutb also engaged in clashes with the partisans of Mustafa Sadeq al-Rafi'I, Mohammad Mandour, a close friend of Taha Husayn

59 Muhammad A. Abubakar, 'Sayyid Quṭb's interpretation of the Islamic view of literature', *Islamic Studies,* Vol. 23, No. 2 (Summer 1984), pp. 57-65, p.58

60 Ibid., p.58

61 Adnan A. Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism* (Westport CT: Praeger, 2006), p.68

All in all, this section has argued that Qutb's writings up to the early 1940s denote a growing ambivalence towards modernity. Qutb especially became suspicious of modern epistemology and its Big Other/Symbolic. Qutb's writings expose an ever-increasing perception that the disjunction between the appearance and the real of modern reality is rooted in the tradition of knowledge through which modern European thought articulates itself. In contrast, Islam emerges as a more transparent tradition of knowledge, as a tradition that can produce a reality that is the same with itself in itself. Despite this problematisation, however, Qutb's thought remained tainted by the positivism he increasingly rejected. Indeed, he effectively postulated that if reason had gone wrong, it had been due to external mechanisms: it was anchored in a perverted morality, in a wrong tradition of thought.

IN BETWEEN THE REAL AND THE PHANTASM: CAN COLONIAL MODERNITY REALLY OPEN THE WORLD TO UNIVERSAL LIBERATION?

This section continues to highlight Qutb's growing perception that the reality produced by modernity articulated itself as a parallax object. At the same time, it also illustrates Qutb's constant desire to find a way to salvage the concept of modernity and the worlds of possibles it could open Egypt to. In 1941, despite his growing critique of Modernity Qutb saw in WWII the opening of a breach that could lead to a new order. He wrote :

"One might fear that the present war, which is much more violent and radical than the previous one, will have even more terrible and irremediable consequences than the previous one had it not opened our eyes to mistakes [which followed] it and that some of the principles on whose behalf it is conducted are born in reaction to these errors."[62]

Qutb drew three lessons from this war. Firstly, he drew a social lesson. Individualism which weakened collective values had made it impossible for France to come together to resist the

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62 Roussilon, 'Trajectoires réformistes: Sayyid Qutb et Sayyid 'Uways'

invader.[63] Secondly, he drew a moral lesson. In England, Empire-building had required a common modality of being marked by virtues of simplicity and temperance, and it is by drawing from these that the British had managed to put up a front against Germany. Finally, he drew a political lesson. Germany's position has brought to the light the need for a more universal being-in-the-world.[64] This new being-in-the-world could be actualised through the nuclear family, he argued.[65] He insisted that the family nucleus still formed an objective social entity in Egypt, which put the country in a favourable situation.[66] In this vision, we can also see Qutb's attempt to bypass the coldness of reason, which he thought could be mediated by the realm of the sensible. In the same vein, he described traditional rural organisation as the space that allowed the preservation of traditions that, in turn, maintained national cohesion (al-qawmî).[67]

By 1945 Qutb's hope for Western modernity's movement towards a more universal and thus more peaceful being-in-the-world seemed to have disappeared under the weight of continued colonialism and repression. In an article published *in al-Risalah* in September, he denounced France's policies in the region, citing Napoleon's invasion, Cairo's bloody occupation, the 1925 bombardment of Damascus, the suppression of nationalist revolts in Syria, Morocco and Algeria. For example, despite French attempt to suppress it, news of the May 1945 French army's massacres in Setif, Guelma and Kherrata had spread throughout the region like wildfire. Qutb castigated the history of France's presence in the East as 'savage barbarism' and 'pools of blood' and decried the Egyptians' glorification of France. [68] He equally condemned British policies and presence, their continued colonialism and support for Zionism, for which he also denounced America.[69] Qutb it seems had lost faith in the world.

However, his semi-autographical novels, *A Child from the Village* and *Thorns*, denote a man still hanging on to modernity's potential. To be actualised within the Egyptian context, it would require the dialectical resolution of conflicts between past and present, which was illustrated by the tension tradition/modernity. His social critique also took up a different coating by espousing

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63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career,* p.163
69 Ibid. p.163-65

Wafdist nationalist ideals. He thought of social reform through the prism of 'liberal' nationalism, which articulated itself by taking as a nodal point the nation as a re-imagined community.

Qutb dedicated *A Child from the village*, first published in 1946 to Taha Hussayn, whom he had earlier critiqued. In it, a young teacher goes on a venture against the superstitious beliefs of a village who believes that Jiins haunt a house. With his students' help, the teacher scientifically proves the jinns are nothing but mere rabbits. Throughout the novel, the teacher's scientism is characterised as the source of his creative potential, which ultimately allows him to realise his vocation to the fullest.[70] This again highlights the imprint of scientism and positivism on Qutb's perspective. It equally reflected nationalist efforts to reconcile the cultural differences between perceptions of the West as modern and of Egypt as non-modern.

Qutb thus used fiction as a space that allowed him to re-imagine the entrance of Egyptian culture in modernity as a possible. This, however, did not entail mimesis of Western culture but required the affirmation of Egyptian differences, differences that formed the basis of the re-imagination of a national modern Egyptian community.[71] As such, the novel still represented epistemic modernity as a space of potential while also emphasising the central place of Egyptian rural folklore and culture in the new-national Ideal in-becoming.[72] In this way, the village was re-moulded into the site of expression of Egyptian national exceptionalism.[73] Expressing cultural differences as not antithetical to modernisation was also a way for Qutb to distance himself from Taha Husseyn's three-volume book, *al-Ayam*, in which he had expressed the need to emulate Europe culturally.[74] Moreover, as Musallam notes, Qutb also used the book to critique the duality of the colonial system of education divided between a secular and traditional Islamic education and its affect as producing an Egyptian cultural identity split into two antagonistic poles.[75] Qutb thus also used fiction to try and recontextualise Egypt in its historicity. Here the imprint of historicism is also visible. This re-contextualisation epistemologically entailed a more holistic

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70 Alain Roussilon, 'Trajectoires réformistes, Sayyid Qutb et Sayyid 'Uways'
71 John Calvert, 'The Individual and the Nation, Sayyid Qutb's Tifl min al-Qayra (Child from the village)' , *The Muslim World*, Vol.90 (2000), p.110
72 Ibid., p.110
73Ibid., p.110
74 Qutb had already taken up this position in previous writings, including in a 51-page review of Husseyn's book the future of culture in Egypt; See Ibid, p.114
75 Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career*, p.109.

approach of communal modes of being-Egyptian. Another important theme that runs through the book is the ambivalence towards the state and the penetration of foreigners, both seen as hegemonical forces in the Gramscian sense.[76] Depicted as forces of coercion but also of seduction, the state and foreigners are nonetheless associated as outsider forces that *en*folded the village. Modernity is thought of as a time that is foreign to Egyptian subjectivity yet, also as a time enfoldment of Egyptian subjectivity.

In *Ashwak* (*Thorns*), first published in 1947, Qutb's hero makes the difficult decision to leave his childhood sweetheart to accomplish himself as a literary figure.[77] In the book, Alain Roussillon saw a recurrent theme of the novelistic literature of the times, which touched on then-actual Egyptian problematics.[78] These included the social dissolution of sociological and emotional ties as well as the social determinations that curtailed the moral, political and scientific development of the hero.[79] In this, it illustrated the uncanniness of the Egyptian epistemological space: modernity had split space-time by articulating itself as a contradiction between a future-as-progress and a present still dominated by past traditions. In the novel, this contradiction required the hero to leave behind a past that could never be fully recovered. In doing so, the hero also left a bit of his self. Thus, the concept of change through movement became a central fixture of Qutb's narrative and was expressed through a dramatized form. It is also interesting to note that in Sufism the term Ashwak is used to reference an ideational state of being of love and of one's desire to see their loved one, which allows one to access the enlightening visions of the Soul.[80]

In these two novels, Qutb's Ideal of a reformed society finds its strength in a past that disappears in the present, but that paradoxically becomes its vector for change towards the actualisation of a future-to-be. The actualisation of this becoming is made contingent on the formulation of an enunciative differentiation between a current state of the situation and a new normative framework where things would fall into a more natural order of things.[81] Qutb argued that the confusion engendered by colonisation and the coterminous entry of capitalism required a new re-ordering of Egyptian epistemology. This quest for a new and more ordered epistemology

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76 Calvert, 'The Individual and the Nation, p.110

[77] Adnan A. *Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad*, p.67.

[78] Roussillon, 'Trajectoires réformistes, Sayyid Qutb et Sayyid 'Uways'; See also Calvert, 'The Individual and the Nation, p.110

[79] Roussillon, 'Trajectoires réformistes. Sayyid Qutb et Sayyid 'Uways'

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid. see also Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt,(c1988)*

can thus also be seen as an attempt to fill the gaps-in-meaning produced by colonisation. Overall, this section has argued that despite his critiques, Qutb still hanged on to the concept of modernity and saw the re-ordering of the Symbolic order as a way to salvage modern epistemology and reality. Modern semiosis had challenged the Egyptian Symbolic, but it could be recoded into a modern Symbolic able to produce a new order of things, a modern reality.

SUFISM AND THE REALM OF THE SENSIBLE: THE FIRST SIGNS OF QUTB'S BREAK-UP WITH MODERN REASON?

At the time of publication of these novels, Qutb was looking for a new way of thinking modernity. In his 1940s writings on the theme of artistic representation in the Quran, which include *Al-taswir al-fannî fî al-Qur'an*, published in 1945, and *Machâhid al-qiyâma fi al-Qur'ân*, published in 1947, Qutb examined the aesthetic uniqueness of the Qur'an. In these, he developed an interest in a doctrine that previous scholars had called the immutability of the Qur'an - I'jaz al-Qur'an.[82] He criticised classical grammarians and rhetoricians' debates, which, he argued, centred on questioning whether the text's beauty lied in its wording or meaning.[83] He also noted their tendency to focus their analysis on small segments of verses, which he contended, made them lose sight of the more extensive aesthetics that gave the text its Oneness.[84] Qutb argues that the I'jaz al-Quran results from a unique compositional principle he termed *al-Taswir* – an artistic representation.[85] While *Taswir* had been employed in Muslim traditions of aesthetic appreciation, Qutb changed its use by applying it to the I'jaz.[86] He defined the concept in the following terms:

"Taswir is the preferred tool in the style of the Qur'an. By palpable fancied images, it designates intellectual meanings, psychological states, perceptible events, visual scenes, human types, and human nature. It then elevates these images it draws and grants them living presence or regenerating movement: whereupon intellectual meanings become forms or motions,

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82 Hirschkind, *The ethical soundscape*, p.154
83 Ibid., p.154.
84Ibid., p.154
85 Ibid., p.155
86 Ibid., p.155

psychological states become tableaux or spectacles, human types become vivid and, at hand and human nature becomes visible and embodied. A for events, scenes, stories and sights, it renders them actual and immediate, pulsating with life and movement. When it adds dialogues to them, it brings into play all of the elements of imaginative representation into them."[87]

With this concept, Qutb turned the Qur'an's words into material reality. In this vision, the Qur'an works like a cinematographic image that represents objective reality.[88] He argued that it provides us with a real picture of the past, and through it, it can serve as the foundation of a new future to-be. Qutb also referred to the Quranic rhythm and musicality as included in this *Taswir*, which, he argued the appeal to the realm of the sensible by engaging the senses of hearing.[89] Qutb thus articulated the uniqueness of the Qur'an through the sensory couple visual/ audio in which visual sensory perception retained a primacy over the audio.[90] "One effect of this Qutbian vision on the narrative structure of a sermon is a tendency to disarticulate and alternate between segments with highly visual languages and those with strong phonic associations".[91] Despite englobing them in a movement that together gives reality to the text, Qutb maintained a disjunction between the two senses, albeit a complementary one.

For Qutb, the Qur'an is transformed into the noumenon of reason, its being-in-itself. His emphasis on the sensible as an a priori through which the Revelation can be experienced draws from Sufism. Indeed, Sufism locates knowledge as first emerging from the sensible rather than the material.[92] This mirrors the very experience of the Prophet's Revelation, prior to which he did not know how to read or write. By denying the Qur'an's ability to give life to reason, Muslims had given up on their most important tool of knowledge; they had given up on their own epistemology. Implied in Qutb's view is an attempt to move beyond representation, or what he calls the realm of appearances. This takes place by giving back the sensible its rightful place as that which should constitute the a priori through which the symbolic system emerges. A kind of spoken beyond language that would come to determine language itself. Qutb calls it imaginative representation

87 Hirschkind, *The ethical soundscape*, p155
88 Ibid., p.154
89 Ibid., p.154-55
90 Ibid., p.154-55
91 Ibid.,p.154-55
92 In Sufism the first brain is the heart.

Qutb saw the Qur'an as a medium that gives us access to the real of thought, which constitutes the condition for the actualisation of reality as its perfect presentation, not representation. With Qutb, the Qur'an is lunately what allows us to bridge the truth/appearances antagonism that he saw as inherent to modernity. He also already used the term Jahiliyyah to draw an analogy between past and present. In this analogy, he referred to 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab, a strong opponent of the Prophet who had converted to Islam and had acknowledged that prior to his conversation, he lived in Jahiliyyah (state of ignorance).[93]

The 1940s were a precursor to Qutb's gradual shift towards a vision of Islam as a total system of both being and knowledge. However, they equally attested to the multiple ideational positions that Qutb occupied. The multiplicity of his positions seems to reflect the state of confusion of the world that he mentioned in his writings. His Sufi inspiration also attests to his desire to produce a logic of thought and of being that would move us beyond representation. In Qutb's writings, there is an emerging sense that the parallax gap constitutive of modern reality could be bridged by using the sensible to mediate reason. In doing so, Islam again appears as the learning method that opens the individual to objective knowledge of reality. The Qur'an has a power of affect on the individual's sense of reality by positing the sensible as the first order of being and knowledge. With Qutb, the Islamic Revelation shows that Islam is the original form of thought because its Symbolic can speak the pre-symbolic. It can speak itself as a sensible experience. In this emerging vision of Islam, Qutb postulates that as a form of thought, Islam is the form of truth. His thought, therefore, remains within the confines of the image of thought. The emergence of Islamic reason as the percept of truth seems to be vectorised by three questions: how can the colonised move beyond his own conditions? How to move beyond materialism' objectification of life? How to access the Reality of all Realities to move beyond the disjunction between the Signifier and its signified?

2 QUTB AND THE ABSURD OF MODERNITY: ISLAM AS THE TOTAL SIGNIFIER OF THE REAL

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93 Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb*, p.85

Between the mid-1940s and until he died in the mid-1960s, Qutb's thinking shifted to understanding Islam as total reason and a totalising reality. This was bolstered by a growing conviction that western modernity was nothing but a simulacrum of the Real of Islam. This also marked an increasing resolve to produce a method that would actualise Islam as an all-encompassing reality. Qutb's thought increasingly subjugated learning to method and knowledge to culture. His growing dogmatism coalesced with his ever-expanding conviction that Islam was the only form of thought that could birth an unalienated reality. His model, however, only inverses the colonial logic of identities and repeats its semiosis. It postulates that Islam is a form of reason that thinks the true. In this process, reason remains absolute, and the semiotic process continues to be totalised by the Symbolic. Islam is thought of as an Ideal-I that gives the individual access to a pure reason. When Qutb appeals to practical reason as a sensible of Islamic experience, he thinks of practical reason as a concrete reproduction of the sensible of pure reason. With Qutb, the sensible remains a prisoner of the worlds of simulacra: it remains caught up in symbolism. This period is also a time where Qutb's activism took up a more practical turn. He made it his mission to revive the Secret Apparatus (al-Nizam al-Khass), a paramilitary branch of the Muslim Brotherhood created by Hassan al-Banna.[94] He became the leader of an offshoot known as al-Tanzim al-Sirri (The Secret Organisation), condemned for its implication in the 1954 attempt on Nasser's life. Qutb was imprisoned in 1954, let out in 1964, re-arrested, re-imprisoned and executed in 1966. Qutb's reproduction of colonial semiotics is further exemplified by the presence of the Face of the vanguard as the Ideal-I that Muslims have to emulate. Again, experience is reduced to being the concrete representation of an Ideal-I. The real is deprived of the possibility of signification and is replaced by a semiosis totalised by the Symbolic/Big other.

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94 Gerges, *Making the Arab world*, p.243

QUTB: MODERNITY NEEDS A NEW IDENTITY

By 1946, in between the publication of his two semi-autobiographic novels, some of Qutb's writings took up more rigid positions. If he previously defended prostitutes, he was now criticising the immorality of women who wore swimming suits on the beaches of Alexandria, equating their behaviour to anarchism. [95] Beyond women, Qutb also grew more critical of the younger generations, decrying its lack of ethics.[96] He blamed mass media, including print mediums, films and the radio for having influenced their ways of living.[97] This evil, he contended, stemmed from European civilisation: "How I hate and despise this European civilisation and eulogize humanity which was tricked by it and its lustre, noise, and sensual enjoyment in which the soul suffocates, and the conscience dies down (yakhfut), while instincts and senses become intoxicated, quarrelsome and excited by the red lights."[98]He also pursued his critique of the Egyptian upper classes, which he called aristocrats, especially targeting writers, journalists and politicians. They hang on to the facticity of modernity while remaining indifferent to the exploitation of their people.[99] In the article *Madaris lil-sakth*, Qutb used the Qur'an to attack the apathetic and passive relationship that Egyptians had with Islam.[100] At this point he was already working on his next opus: *Mashahid al-Qiyamah fi al-Quran, Scenes of the resurrection in the Qur'an*, which he published in 1947.

In 1947 Qutb briefly flirted with the pan-Arabism he had previously rejected, as is attested by his editorship of the Cairene pan-Arab monthly journal *al-'alam al-'arabi* (the Arab World) between April and July.[101] Throughout his tenure he used the journal to deliver a vision in which Arabism ought to be combined with Islam, the latter being the only force that could produce a universalism. This year also marked a turn towards Islamic imagery and symbols. This time, Qutb did not focus on aesthetics but on Islam's strength as a political tool against colonial subjectivation.

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95 Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career* p.159
96 Ibid., p.160
97 Ibid., p.160
98 Ibid., p.161
99 Ibid., p.167-171
100 Ibid., p181-2
101 Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career*, p.184-85.

He pointed to leaders such as Jamal al-Afghani who, he argued, revived Islam's spiritual power and helped give rise to the 'Urabi revolt.

Along with seven Egyptian intellectuals, including his brother, Nagib Mahfouz, Mohammed al-Ghazali and four others, he also set up a journal titled *The New Thought*.[102] The journal was registered under the name of an Ikhwan member, Muhammad Hilmi al-Minyawi because as public employees, the co-founders were prohibited by law from being publishers.[103] Qutb and his colleagues refused repeated requests from the Ikhwan to turn the journal into their official mouthpiece.[104] They aimed to use it as an independent revolutionary journal that would illustrate how Islam offered the model for a society free of corruption, tyranny, and foreign domination.[105] They nonetheless also criticised Islamic groups. In fact, so much so that the Ikhwan officially boycotted the journal.[106] The views advanced in the journal also emphasised concerns about how to actualise Islam as a material socio-political reality. It advocated a return to the Islam of the Prophet and Abu Bakr. It also insisted that Islam ought to be both correctly understood and applied. The gradual emergence of a rigidity already highlighted in Qutb's previous writings seemed to have morphed into a nascent orthodoxy by the end of the 1940s. Within three months, the journal was closed, and an arrest order against Qutb was issued.[107] The then Prime Minister Mahmoud Nuqrashi Pasha intervened and offered Qutb a study leave in America for which Qutb departed on November 3, 1948. [108]

Qutb's al-'Adâla al-Ijtimâ'iyya fî al-Islâm (Social justice in Islam), was published in 1949 although he had completed it before going to America. Qutb dedicated the book to "the youngsters whom I see in my fantasy coming to restore this religion anew when it first began…fighting for the cause of Allah by killing and by getting killed, believing in the bottom of their hearts that the glory belongs to Allah, to his Prophet and the believers…To those youngsters whom I do not doubt

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102 James Toth, *Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p.305
103 Musallam *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career*, p.188
104 Toth, *Sayyid Qutb,* p.305;
105 Ibid.,
106 Musallam *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career,* p185
107 Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb*, p.57
108 Officially, the trip was to "investigate the American system of education, its methods and curricula." See, Ibid., p.57

for a moment will be revived by the strong spirit of Islam from past generations to future generations in the very near future." [109]

The book was only allowed for sale after the deletion of the dedication.[110] As Mussallem notes, at this point, Qutb did not specifically dedicate the book to the Ikhwan, although later re-edition reflected the close association between Qutb and the group.[111]Throughout the book, Qutb emphasised the need to reconstruct an Egyptian identity cohesive with its historicity. He also further developed the practical approach to resolving Egypt's identitarian problem, which he had already taken in New Thought. To this end, he discussed the agrarian reform, whose importance had been compounded by landless peasants' question. Although the law had regularly discussed in the parliament, no reforms had been passed. He also tackled socialism and discussed labour rights through the prism of Islam. The discourse of rights that positivism had appropriated was already present in Islam, he contended.[112] Islam, Qutb argued, provided an alternative frame to positivism because it had always articulated itself as social justice.[113] Qutb used at least 284 verses from the Qur'an to support his ideas, making it the primary source of the book.[114] From his perspective, Islam provided direct access to modernity and ought to be the point of departure of the legal, and socio-political system. Qutb thus again highlighted the need to move beyond a modernity of appearances. To this end, rather than looking at European laws or Communist ideals, Muslims ought to first turn to the Islamic theory of the universe, life and humankind.[115] He criticized several important Sunni figures, including Othman bin Affan, Abu Sufyan bin Harb and his son Muawiya and Amr ibn al-Aas. In contrast, he praised the Qaramita movement, one of the underground Shiite movements that had revolted against the Abbasid Caliphate in the fourth century after the Hijrah. He also posited Islamic philosophy as the main epistemological point of departure for understanding the world and cited philosophers such as Ibn Rushd and Ibn Sina. He insisted it could awaken people to the reality that Islamic social justice is "essentially all-embracing

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109 Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career,* p.191-192
110 Ibid., p.191-192
111 It was changed to: To the youngsters whom I see in my fantasy coming but have found them in real life existing", Ibid., p192.
 112 Roussilon, 'Trajectoires réformistes. Sayyid Qutb et Sayyid 'Uways',
113 See for example Sayyid Qutb; (Trans.) John B. Hardie, *Social justice in Islam, Near Eastern Translation Program* (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953), pp.19, 20, 29.
114 Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career*, p.193
115 Qutb, *Social justice in Islam,* p.30

justice."[116] He argued that Islam, as an omnipotent reality, was constituted by particulars. This included individuals as mutually responsible for its actualisation and inter-dependence.[117] This exposes a nominalist tendency in Qutb's vision.

Furthermore, he argued that the total aspect of Islam was exemplified by its regulations on "individual possession; on the poor-tax, on the law of inheritance, on the rules for estates, on politics, on commercial transactions, in a word, it will explain all the regulations prescribed by Islam for individuals, societies, nations and races."[118] Besides, Qutb discussed Islamic history. He highlighted the strength of early Muslim generations and located it in their use of the Qur'an as the primary source for their mode of governance.[119] Social justice in Islam, includes freedom of conscience, complete equality and social solidarity, he wrote.[120] At this point, Qutb did not call for a complete disassociation from the Western world or western knowledge. While he urged Muslims against borrowing from western socio-economic and cultural-political ideas, he equally acknowledged the benefits of science, albeit ambivalently. [121] Regarding constitutional arrangements, Qutb stipulated that Muslims should use "all the discoveries which man had made in the way of social legislation and systems", as long as these fit with Islamic principles and Islamic theories on the birth of humanity and the universe.[122] When applied in such a way, Islam could lessen the divide created by the capitalist mass appropriation of wealth, eliminate extreme poverty, increase global equality, increase the social security of disable people, and provide medical and educational care to all people.[123]

By the late 1940s, Qutb had moved from being a critique to a dissident. By then he was a vivid critic of France and Great Britain for their imperialistic policies across the Arab world. The Palestine question, the Arab defeat and the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 must-have equally impacted his shift. Besides, Egypt had been severely affected by the Second World War, which had led to an increased presence of foreign troops. National independence, it seemed, was more of a myth than a reality.[124] At that point beyond its Islamic coating, Qutb's emphasis on the

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116 Musallam *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career,* p.196
117 Musallam *Ibid.,* p.196
118 Qutb, *Social justice in Islam*, p.30
119 Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career,* pp. 199-1994
120 Qutb, *Social justice in Islam,* p.74-75
121 Ibid., p.44-48
122 Ibid., p.44-48
123 Ibid., p.44-48
124 See Chapter Two and Three

need for action paralleled a larger shift in intellectual circles. Taha Husayn, Muhammad Hussayn Haykal, the economist Rashid al-Barawi and the philosopher 'Abd al-Rahman Badawi all asserted the need to actualise a social reform that would guarantee that social justice is put in practice through direct action.

ISLAM AS THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE PRESENT

As many writers have pointed out, Qutb's trip to America greatly influenced him. Although he had been critical of the country before being sent there, his sojourn had only asserted his feeling that modernity was a simulacrum. He had never been to a Western country before.[125] There, he witnessed the extent of America's fascism towards African Americans, which he wrote, extended to anyone with non-white skin colour, including Arabs.[126] Beyond the racial hierarchies, Qutb said he was shocked by the extent of American ignorance and fear of Islam. He also decried what he saw as sexual deviance. The speed through which capitalism hijacked reality was again a point of critique. It turned existence into an empty shell: a material form without substance, a bare subsistence. In the mists of such feelings, Qutb's trip to the Hajj in Mecca in the autumn of 1950 also affected him, especially as he networked with Muslims from all around the world.[127] In the city of Ta'if, he met the Hijazi writer 'Abd al-Ghafur 'Attar, whose writings he was well acquainted with. He separately also met with the Indian scholar Sayyid Abu Hasan Nadwi, a student of Sayyid Abu al-A'la Mawdudi. Qutb gave Nadwi a copy of his book *Social Justice in Islam*.[128] Impressed by Qutb, Nadwi later invited him to write the preface of his book *Madha Khasira al-'Alam bi al-Inhitat al-Muslimin? (What Has the World Lost with the Decline of the Muslims?)*.[129] In the book, Nadwi expanded on Mawdudi's use of the term Jahiliya- age of ignorance, which Mawdudi had used to discuss the then present conditions of Muslim Indians. As

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125 Calvert, 'The Individual and the Nation', p 392.
126 Ibid., p.407
127 Ibid., p426
128Ibid., p.343
129 Sayyed Hasan Nadwi , *Islam and the World , the rise and decline of muslims and its effect on mankind*, (Leicester: UK Islamic Academy), Qutb's introduction is on pp. x-xi

such, his critique focused mostly on the Muslim bourgeois ruling elites in India.[130] He referred to India's condition as the "new Jahiliyyah."[131] Subsequently, Nadwi used the term to refer to the condition of the Muslim world at large. He argued that the path out of Jahiliyyah required the re-affirmation of Islamic Identity and Islamic leadership.[132] Qutb would later use it to refer to the conditions of the whole world.

There is, however, some controversy over the influence of Mawdudi and Nadwi's thoughts on Qutb's thinking and his development of the concepts of Jahiliyyah and Hakimiyyah. As we have seen, Qutb had previously already used the term Jahiliyyah. Moreover, in pre-Islamic literature and to a certain degree in the Qur'an, the term was used to refer to forms of barbarism or attitudes of hostility and aggressiveness against the monotheistic belief.[133] In Islamic thought, the term Jahiliyyah was gradually used to refer to the pre-Islamic period as "the Age of ignorance" of monotheism and divine law.[134] In one of their commentary on the Qur'an, Muhammad' Abduh and Rashid Rida had also used it to draw analogies between some of the tendencies of their society and those of pre-Islamic societies.[135] The term was used similarly by Abdullah Yusuf Ali in "Do they then seek after a hukm al-Jahiliyyah?"[136] Thus, as Shepherd notes, the term Jahiliyyah had been in usage in Egypt long before Qutb, Mawdudi or Nadwi.[137] Besides, As Khattab points out, Al-Aqqad had himself used the terms in some of his writings to describe the condition of social injustice. Egyptians found themselves and distinguished between the truth and the deviation from it.[138]

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130 Asyraf Hj. A.B. Rahman and Nooraihan Ali, 'The Influence of Al-Mawdudi and The Jama'at Al Islami Movement On Sayyid Qutb Writings', *World Journal of Islamic History and Civilization*, 2 (4): 232-236, 2012, pp. 232-36, p.234

131 Ali, 'The Influence of Al-Mawdudi' p.234

132 Sayyid Qutb, Fi Zilal al Quran, see for example Surah 23, (al-Muminun), English translation of the full book accessible from: https://tafsirzilal.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/al-mukminun-eng.pdf

133 William E. Shepard, 'Sayyid Qutb's doctrine of jahiliyya', I*nternational Journal of Middle East Studies,* Vol. 35, No. 4 (Nov. 2003), pp. 521-545, p.522

134 Indeed, throughout this time the Arabian Peninsula had been pagan. As Calvert notes, 'In pre-Islamic times and in the Qur'an the Arabic trilateral root j.h.l. carried the basic meaning of "barbarism"; its antonym was h.l.m., "conveying the meaning"', in Calvert, The Individual and the Nation'; see also Shepard, 'Sayyid Qutb's doctrine of jahiliyya', pp. 521-545.

135 Shepard, 'Sayyid Qutb's doctrine of jahiliyya', p.522

136 Ibid., p.522

137Ibid., p.522

138 Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb,* p 61

In 1951 Qutb published Ma'raka al-Islâm wa al-Ra'smâliyya (The Battle between Islam and Capitalism), which delineated in more Manichean terms reality as an opposition of two systems. He opposed the positivity of Islam to the negativity of Western modernity. Qutb built on the critique of capitalism and communism he had written in the last pages of *Islam and Social Justice*.[139] He warned that Egypt's deteriorating conditions could not continue, especially as they stood in opposition to the very promises of modernity.[140] They constituted the root of Egypt's social, economic, and human development impediment and denied Egyptians human rights and dignity. Modern reality was based on a contradiction, he insisted. It represented itself as the exporter and custodian of rights but actualised itself as a state of non-rights that made 'equality of opportunity" and "justice between effort and its rewards" appear as a myth. This dichotomy, Qutb argued, led to anxiety and restlessness among individuals and groups.[141] Qutb's emphasis on the angst that modern condition produced further illustrates colonial reality's uncanniness and its continuation in the postcolonial era.

He also continued to denounce the exploiting tyrants, a term in which he gathered men of religion as well as hired writers and journalists. He called for them to be thrown in jail and for their newspapers to be closed.[142]As seen in Chapter Three, a few years later, the RCC would sing to a similar tune. Qutb's critique of representation had now also openly moved to the system of representative democracy. He saw the state as representing the needs of capitalism rather than the needs of the masses. Egypt's declining conditions made a mockery of the parliamentary system's claim that the nation was at the root of its power. Excessive wealth had created a class of people obsessed with bodily enjoyment and hedonism, this in the total indifference of the religious establishment, Qutb argued.[143] Here again, there is a resemblance with the RCC's critique of the effendis. In the face of this reality, capitalism and communism - the two blocs around which the world was in the process of being divided - ought to be rejected in favour of Islam, Qutb further contended. He asserted Islam's viability as an alternative model but insisted that to be actualised, it required a faithful adhesion to Islamic Idea. At that point, Qutb's emphasis on the concepts of social justice, dignity and universalism are beyond their Islamic colouring, very reminiscent of

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139 Roussilon, 'Trajectoires réformistes. Sayyid Qutb et Sayyid 'Uways'
140 Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career*, p.213
141 Ibid., p.215
142 Ibid, p.215
143 Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career* p. .215

both the colonial and the Nasserist rhetoric and the ideational visions they expressed. So did Qutb's repeated calls for action. From that perspective, it becomes less puzzling to understand how Qutb and with him, many Ikhwan members had grown so close to the Free Officers.[144]

In 1951 Qutb also published *Islam and Universal Peace*, a book whose vision was compounded by the domestic political context. The early 1950s were a period of intense frustrations in Egypt. The ruling and upper classes had become increasingly involved in corruption, and King Farouk has been rocked by financial and sexual scandals that had turned him into a staple of the Cairene gossip. News of faulty armed supplied to the army in Palestine under contracts that had been profitable to the King and his clients, and which Nasser discussed in the *Philosophy of the Revolution*, had added to the frustrations.[145] So were stories of the rigging of the Alexandria cotton market to the profit of Wafdist ministers. Against the backdrop of a rising cost of living and a shortage of basic foodstuffs, these developments almost brought down the Palace. Besides, behind the scenes, a military junta was preparing its takeover.

Beyond Egypt, international politics were not more cohesive. The Cold War had emerged in 1946, followed by the Berlin blockade crisis of 1948, the victory of the Mao Tse Toung forces in China in 1949, the outbreak of the war in Korea in 1950 and continued colonialism in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Qutb explicitly referenced some of those developments in the book. In a chapter that was censored and reappeared under an anonymous editor in 1967, Qutb allegedly developed a vision of capitalism as a system in which war was used as a tool to protect capitalist interests, this at the costs of the lives of the masses. America had gone to war in Korea, he contended, to reverse the stagnant post-war economic conditions in America and Europe.[146] Qutb once again opposed Islam to capitalism: "As humanity at present is deeply concerned about the problem of world peace, one should ask whether Islam has a constructive opinion on this matter, and what are the solutions it provides. This book is meant to answer this question in detail."[147] In Islam, he wrote, peace means "harmony in the universe, the laws of life, and the origin of man, while war is the result of such violations of harmony as injustice, despotism and corruption."[148] It was becoming increasingly hard for him to make sense of the gaps-in-meaning

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144 See Chapter Four
145 Gamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution,* p.9
146 Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual career,* p.220
147 Ibid. p.217
148 Ibid., p. 217

between modernity as Signifier and modernity as a signified. While for a time, he had believed in its concepts of law, peace, human rights, dignity or democracy, these had failed to materialise as objective realities in Egypt and beyond. In Qutb's eyes, they had lost their meaning. In this, Islam is thus used to fill the gaps-in-meaning of colonial modernity by recovering them with its totality. This shift set the scene for Qutb's vision in *Milestones*.

In the meantime, Qutb had continued to write in leading Cairene journals, including *al-Risalah*. By then, he had engineered a rapprochement with the Ikhwan as attested by his writings in publications in al-Da'wah. The journal was published by Salih al-'Ashmawi, a prominent member of the Ikhwan's Executive Council (maktab al-Irshad) who had also been the first head of Hassan al-Banna's Secret Apparatus. He had also been a contender for his replacement as Murshid after his assignation in 1949. Meanwhile, Qutb's calls for direct actions continued. To actualise postcolonialism as a reality, he was now willing to work with groups he had repeatedly criticised. For example, he called for creating a single front that would gather nationalists, communists and Ikhwan members.[149] Qutb's writings between the late 1940s and early 1950s led him to reportedly be nicknamed the Mirabeau of the Egyptian revolution of 1952".[150] He had apparently been the only civilian to be aware of the 1952 coup in advance.[151] He was close to Nasser and was also the only civilian to attend the post-coup meetings of the RCC, having been appointed adviser to the Committee. His nickname was put to good usage when talking to the Officers, he reportedly called for the suspension of the constitution and advocated rule by the bayonet. He was also adamant that the old regime and the effendis should pay, allegedly saying: "Oppressing ten or twenty innocents is better than endangering the Revolution".[152] Qutb only officially joined the Ikhwan in March 1953. The same year he invited a young Iranian Islamist Mojtaba Mirlohi, better known as Navvab Safavi to Cairo where Safavi delivered a speech to Muslim Brotherhood members. Qutb's praises of some Shiite movements in *Islam and Social Justice* had helped him gain traction in Iran. He saw in the country the presence of an Islamic revolutionary vitality that lacked in Egypt. In 1946, Safavi had founded the Fada'iyan-el-Islam, an Islamist armed group. He was also close to the man

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[149] Ibid., p 223.
[150] Musallam, *The formative stages of Sayyid Qutb's Intellectual*, p.213
[151] Gerges, *Making the Arab World,* p.224
[152] Ibid., p.226

who would become one of the figures of the revolution, Ruhollah Khomeini.[153] It is through Safavi that Khomeini first heard of Qutb and later translated one of his books. Qutb's revolutionary activities would soon be severely constrained by the very people whose rise to power he had supported. As seen in chapter three, in January 1953, the junta banned all political parties and a rivalry between the Officers, and the Ikhwan had now emerged for all to see. The Ikhwan had provided legitimacy to the Junta, but they were now being driven away from power and into the prisons.[154]

Qutb joined the Ikhwan at a time of discord and rifts between some of its younger members and their new Murshid, Hassan al-Hudaybi. A decade earlier, Hassan al-Banna had created al-Nizam al-Khass or the Secret Apparatus as a military branch. In reaction to their harsh repression by the Nasserist state, members of the apparatus, which had mainly been dormant, expressed their desire to lead a coup against the Officers. Hudaybi disagreed. A growing rivalry between the two camps fragmented the organisation with Hudaybi losing its grip on the younger members.[155] When Hudaybi, wanted by the state, went into hiding, the Secret Apparatus found itself in charge. Meanwhile, Qutb's role – he had been the principal chief of the anti-Nasserist propaganda- continued to grow, further strengthening his influence within the organisation.[156] In July 1954 Qutb was named editor of the Ikhwan's newspaper *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun,* but things would come crashing down in September. The attempt on Nasser's life meant the government dissolved the group. In October, 450 members were arrested, including Qutb and Hudaybi.[157] Qutb was released in 1964 at the behest of the Abdul Salam Arif, the Iraqi prime minister.[158] In prison and helped Ikhwan members who were still on the outside keep al-Tanzim al-Sirri alive.[159] He was put back in prison just eight months after his release and sentenced to death. This did little to qualm Qutb's

153 Enki Baptiste, L'Iran des intellectuels : une brève histoire de l'émergence d'une société civile au xxe siècle (1/2), Les clefs du Moyen Orient, December 12, 2007.
Accessible from: https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/L-Iran-des-intellectuels-une-breve-histoire-de-l-emergence-d-une-societe-civile.html
[154] In *Why they executed me,* Qutb explained his rupture with the Officers and joining with the Ikhwan. For more on this see Gerges, *Making the Arab World,* p.229
155 Gerges, *Making the Arab World,* p.100-110
156 Ibid., p.109
157 Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb*, p.57 and Gerges, *Making the Arab World,* pp.250-51
158 Gerges, *Making the Arab World,* p.251
159 Gerges, Ibid., p.242

resolve. From prison, he focused on developing a method that would actualise his vision of Islam as a total system that would replace the facticity of modernity with the Reality of all Realities.

In 1957, Qutb wrote a poem, Bawakir al-Kifah (Firstling of Struggle) first published in al-Kifah *al-Islami,* an Ikhwan journal in Jordan.[160] Its editor, Abdallah Youssouf Moustafa Azzam, would become Bin Laden's mentor and an essential source of inspiration for both al-Qaeda and ISIS.[161] Here are excerpts of the poem:

"Brother I am not fed up with this struggle

And I have not given up my weapon

If the army of darkness encircle me

I believe that the sunlight will be rising

[….]

I will avenge but for My Lord and my Religion

I will continue to stand firmly on my way to victory

Or to the Paradise of Allah, I shall return"[162]

The poems created a controversy with other Islamic writers responding to Qutb with their own poems, including al-Azzam.[163] Qutb's prison experience imprints the poem, especially the murdering of 21 Ikhwan members in their cells by prison guards.[164] Qutb was also very aware that the repeated assaults of violence and torture that imprisoned Ikhwan were incessantly subjected to weakened both their resolve and commitment.[165] The postcolonial state reproduced a form of totalitarian power that is similar to that of the colonial state. The freedom and dignity that Modernity had claimed to bear had never fully been actualised. It had all been simulacra. The repressive function of Nasserism only confirmed postcolonial reality as a simulation.

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160 Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb,* p.162.
161 Fawaz A. Gerges, *Isis, A History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017) p.53
162 Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb,* pp.162-163
163 Ibid., p.162
164 Ibid. , p.162
165 Ibid., p.164

THE PRISON WRITINGS: QUTB AND ISLAM AS AN IDEA THAT NEEDS A NEW PHENOMENOLOGY

Prison changed Qutb: 'The prison years transformed Qutb's thinking and writing. He turned his pen into a deadly weapon against the tawagheet [tyrants] and aimed at awakening the Umma from its prolonged slumber."[166] Prison changes anyone that enters it, but as we have seen in chapter four, the constant unleashing of violence and humiliation against the detainees must have been as traumatic as transforming. From there, Qutb gradually developed a method that his disciples called *Fiqh al-Harakah* – The operational and actionable approach.[167]

In 1961, *Religion of the Future* was published and drew from a book, *This Religion,* which was first published in 1955. In *Religion of the Future*, Qutb continued to develop the Idea of Islam as a total system. He discussed the split between the Church and science in the Western world. It had created a "hideous schizophrenia" that had severed Man from the "truth", a truth that could only be accessed through the acknowledgement of God's objective truth".[168] He quoted several Western thinkers who shared his view to strengthen his arguments.[169] He also located the Nasserist State within Jahiliyyah.[170] By accepting and relying on non-Islamic sources of law, Arab nationalism had taken up Jahili concepts that were incompossible with Islam, he argued. Beyond Egypt, he extended that the Islamic Ummah was forced to live according to human-made laws that tyrants had designed.[171] From his perspective, Islam was the only path towards the future.

In 1962, the first part of his book, *Characteristics of the Islamic Conceptions and its Foundations* was published.[172] The Idea of the Oneness/Unity of God, as well as his views on the relationship between the Creator and Creation, life, and humankind, are discussed. These ideas were as we have seen already present in his earlier writings.[173] However, this time Qutb decried the influence of Greek Philosophy, which had drawn Islamic thinkers away from the Qur'an.[174] In

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166 Gerges, *Making the Arab World*, p.244
167 Ibid., p.244
168 Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb,* p. 164
169 Ibid., p.164
170 Ibid., p.164
171Ibid., p.164
172 The parts on the foundations were published at a later time.
173 Ibid., p.61
174 Ibid., p.166

the same year, *Islam and the problems of civilisation* was published. In it, he exposed Western civilisation as a simulacrum that produced antithetic conditions to those it ideationally projected. In it, he announced a future book which, he explained, would deal with the practicalities of how the Islamic society should deal with its present problems.[175] The book titled *Towards an Islamic Society* disappeared after it reached its publisher.[176]

Milestones can be then viewed as an attempt to fill the void left by this book's disappearance. In addition to Qutb's activities with al-Sirri, *Milestones* is considered an important reason for Qutb's death sentence. However, it was also used by Qutb's lawyers as part of his defence.[177] Qutb dedicated the book to a vanguard, which he had seen coming onto itself by reviving the Secret apparatus.[178] As such, he described it as being first a "programme for the Islamic movement".[179]

Throughout *Milestones*, Qutb pursued his critique of Imperialism, Capitalism and Communism which are seen as repeats of the Roman Empire.[180] *Same difference.* Similarly, he continued to deride the bankruptcy of positivism to which he again opposed the Real of Islam.[181] Secular-leaning Arab cultural and political movements such as Arab socialism, are described as 'the form of a society in which belief in Allah Almighty is denied, and human history is explained in terms of intellectual materialism, and '*scientific socialism*' becomes the system."[182] Islamic socialism receives a similar treatment.[183] The theme of a disjunction between truth and appearances also persists. Firstly, modernity goes at countersense of itself since it produces ignorance as knowledge and progress:

175 Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb*, pp.166-68.
176 Ibid., pp.166-68
177 Ibid., p.166
178 Ibid., p.169
179 Qutb, *Milestones,* p.60
180 Ibid., p.60; See also p. 177: "The truth of the matter is that the latter-day imperialism is but a mask for the crusading spirit, since it is not possible for it to appear in its true form, as it was possible in the Middle Ages.". On the bankruptcy of Democracy, socialism and communism, see p.23., p.14, p.155; for imperialism see p.60.
181 Ibid., p.54; See also p.68
182 Ibid., p.109
183 Ibid., p.150

"If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that the whole world is steeped in Jahiliyyah and all the material comforts and high-level inventions do not diminish this ignorance."[184]

Western modernity is thus presented as an inversion of its representation: it actualises progress as ignorance. This opposition implies another: modern reason is a simulacrum. The facticity of modernity and its assault on reason is described in apocalyptic terms:

"Mankind today is on the brink of a destruction, not because of the danger of complete annihilation, this hanging over its head being just a symptom and not the real decease but because humanity is derived of those vital values which are necessary not only for its vital development but also for its real progress.[…..] The period of the Western system has come to an end primarily because it is deprived of those live giving values, which enabled it to be the leader of mankind."[185]

Secondly, Jahiliya's Simulation had contaminated Islamic reality. [186] It had folded the Islamic Symbolic into its Simulation and split Islam into two orders: an original and its simulacra. This split mirrors the division of Islam into two main branches: Sunnism and Shiism. Islam, he warned "is not 'a theory' based on 'assumptions', instead it is a way of life working with 'reality'.[187] It is a total system that governs all aspects of life.[188] It is a universal message because its laws are the laws of God whose laws regulate the universe. [189] With Qutb, there are two contenders to the Idea of Islam, a true claimant and a deviant copy. True Islam provides a "universal declaration of the freedom of man on the earth from every authority except that of Allah."[190] The Qur'an is defined as an instruction for action, which ought to be read "as a soldier on the battlefield reads today's bulletin."[191] Its message is a transhistorical method of liberation, Qutb argued [192] The Muslim community must comprehend that "There is no deity worthy of

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184 Qutb, *Milestones*, p.31
185 Ibid., p.23, p.27
186 Ibid., p.27
187 Ibid., p.32
188 Ibid., p. 46.
189 Ibid., p.66, pp.99-100
190 Ibid., p. 68
191 Ibid., p.31
192 Qutb, Milestones, p.31

worship except Allah," and "commit itself to obey none but Allah, denying all other authority, and which challenges the legality of any law which is not based on this belief".[193] For Qutb, Islam offers spirituality as a concrete experience, whose emergence as a collective reality requires each member's actions and commitment. [194] This is reminiscent of his insistence on responsibility and inter-dependence in *Islam and Social Justice.*

In *Milestones*, it is a reconfiguration of the reality of being-Muslim that Qutb proposed.[195] To this end, he put forward a method that, he argued, would produce Islam as a perfect presentation of its Idea. However, he warned the path ahead would be difficult.[196] The first step would be the most arduous since it requires a total split from the epistemological *O*ther (Big Other) of Jahili society:[197] To actualise this split, Muslims ought to return to the only pure source of knowledge, the Qur'an and derive from it all their existential concepts.[198] To this end, they ought to mimic the first generations of Muslims. [199] For a writer who had spent decades attacking Muslims for their mimicry of the West, it is ironic that he used the concept to actualise a future to-come. Qutb put the responsibility for this shift into a new Real in the hands of a vanguard which he described as an organised and active group, probably referring to al-Sirri[200] The history of Islam, he contended is paved with Jihads. Jihad is not a war of conquest, Qutb postulated, but a war for humanity's liberation. In this way, Islam is seen as the ultimate decolonial tool. This liberation was made contingent on achieving Hakimiyyah. [201]

Just like Jahiliyyah, the term Hakimiyyah has a long historicity of usages. However, drawing on the term's etymology, most of those meanings establish an intrinsic filiation between Allah and juridical power. As Sayed Khatab notes, Ibn Duryad, the famous Iraqi philologist, lexicographer and poet defined it followingly: "the hakim is the one who exercises judicial authority; a ruler or governor…and there is none but Allah is the Highest Governor, the Ruler and the Supreme legal authority".[202] Meanwhile, Ibn Mansur, a Persian Sufi writer and poet defined

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193 Ibid., p.46. For Islam not being a theory see p.53, p.57
194 Ibid., p. 59
195 Ibid., p.35
196 Ibid., p.35
197 Ibid., p.34-35
198 Ibid., p.66
199 Ibid., p.44
200 Ibid., p p.28
201 Qutb, *Milestones,* p.75, pp.81-6; For examples of verses see p.132, p.134, p.143
202 Khatab, *The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb*, p.2

it as "Allah is the Sovereign (Ahkam) of sovereigns (hakimin) and His Qur'an is the Hakim for and among you." [203] While much of the literature has approached Qutb's use of the term hakimiyyah as meaning sovereignty, this section argues that another reading is possible: that of Hakimiyyah as Reason/Absolute Reality.

Qutb's use of Hakimiyyah can be seen as a synthesis of his previous development of a theory of God's Oneness, in which he drew from Sufism. Despite the breadth of Sufi movements and doctrines, in most cases, the Oneness of God, known as *Wahdat al-wajud,* is often compared to a drop entirely losing itself in the ocean of divine unity.[204] This draws from the Qur'anic concept of *Tawhid*: there is only one God- Allah. With Sufism, however, the concept takes a deeper meaning. *Tawhid* is seen as "only Absolute Reality is absolutely real' meaning that there is nothing Real but God. Accessing this reality is first a metaphysical experience whose evental materiality can be attested to by the Prophet Muhammad's experience of the Revelation. In this event, the soul of the Prophet merged with God. As previously pointed, Mohammed did not know how to read nor write, this until the Revelation where through this union, he could write the language/words of God. In Sufism, the Word of God is thus understood as Logos. This Logos, or the Reality of all Realities, is first accessed through the heart rather than the brain.[205] This is very reminiscent of some of Qutb's positions taken in his works on the Aesthetics of Islam, which emphasised the realm of the sensible as a path to access the all-encompassing Reality of Allah. Hakimiyyah thus appears to be a re-working of Qutb's I'jaz, albeit emptied of its Sufi imprints. Hakimiyyah is first a material objectivity, not a metaphysical experience. It, however, does not just express the sovereignty of God but rather through it, it promises the actualisation of the Reality of all Realities: God's logos on earth. In this way, Hakimiyyah presents itself as the concrete presentation of God's immanence and omnipotence. Hakimiyyah can then only produce a pure and total reality. There is no disjunction between the essence of things and their appearances because the two are self-identical. By developing a concept of Islam as a pure-practical reason, Qutb thinks of a liberation totalised by the Symbolic world. Islam is rethought as a total system of Ideas that enframes sensible experience and in doing so can 'make' the difference between illusion and reality. Qutb presents

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[203]Ibid. p.2

[204] Ibid, p.2; See also John Renard, *The A to Z of Sufism,* N.44, (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2009) p.245

[205] William Stoddart, *Outline of Sufism: The Essentials of Islamic Spirituality,* (Bloomington, Indiana: World Wisdom Inc, 2012), p.29

his vision of Islam as offering an objective knowledge of reality and beyond it of time. Logos, for Qutb, is the spoken of Allah.

All in all, colonial reason, Nasserist thought and Qutbist thought, all think time as the spoken of a utopia in the making. Colonial reason thought of time as progress, which posits time as a linear succession of a series of events unfolding towards a better. Time is then thought of as an internal limit of subjectivity. Indeed, progress implies a subjectivity that repeatedly moves beyond its limits. Nasserist thought thinks of time as Arab socialism, which posits time as a dialectical movement of history. The dialectics also think of time as an internal limit of subjectivity. This vision implies the presence of a historical subject able to move beyond its subjective limits. Besides, socialism also thinks of time as a succession of a series of time, albeit a dialectical one. Finally, Qutb thought of time as Hakimiyyah. Time starts with the words of God and is the objective reality that these words produce. Time is thought of as an inversed dialectics: it is by foreclosing its present history that the subject can enter a higher level of consciousness. Time is then also thought of as an internal limit of subjectivity. Its vision implies a historical subject able to move beyond its subjective limits. In these three models of thought, the objectivity of knowledge is tainted by the "I" of the thinker. This narcissistic reflection of the image of thought keeps thought prisoner of the Symbolic order.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued that despite his attempt to free thought of its image of thought, Sayyid Qutb's prison writings produced Signifiers/simulacra that identify Islam's identity as an Ideal-I or total Idea. In doing so, his thought remained a prisoner of the historical a priori that folds thought in the Symbolics of Simulation. This chapter has proposed to see how Qutb's thought moved from challenging the Simulation to falling back into its capture. Its first moment highlighted the emergence of a percept of modernity as a simulacrum, a parallax object. Nonetheless, Qutb still believed that the constitutive disjunction between the appearance and the real of modernity could be resolved. Qutb gradually grew convinced that modern reason operated within the wrong tradition of knowledge and that Islam could open man up to objective knowledge. Qutb started to contrast the coldness and emotionless faces of modern reason and science with the warmth of

Islam's affect on sensible experience. This also marks the emergence of Islam as a precept of truth. The second moment of the chapter further examined the shifts in Qutb's thought. Qutb moved from challenging modernity as a Simulation to thinking of Islam as a total reason and a totalising reality. In his increasingly orthodox/dogmatic vision, Qutb reproduced the very logic of alienation he tried to escape.

Although he did challenge the modern Simulation, the model of thought that he developed to liberate thought from the Simulation only captured it further into the world of phantasms. Qutb acknowledged the need to rethink the semiosis of liberation but inversed not reversed the colonial regime of representation. This inversion of the regime of identities of the colonial Simulation meant that Qutb's thought eventually gave rise to an image of Islam as a copy of the colonial absurd. ISIS, for example, can be seen as the concrete representation of the Qutbist absurd. It also illustrates its pathologisation of the politics of liberation. In this Simulation, experience is so totalised by the symbolic that the real is deprived of the possibility of signification. It is foreclosed from reality. In this semiotic process, the real is replaced by the true, the Ideal-I. In thinking of time as an internal limit of subjectivity, Qutb thought of time as an empty signifier, whose reality is determined by the reality of the Idea of Islam. Thus, modern European progress can be thought of as a simulacrum of Islamic progress. In this semiotic assemblage, the real is deprived of the possibility of signification and replaced with its symbolic representation. This semiotic process produces a reality that has two senses. On the one hand, it appears to open the social to all possibles; on the other, it forecloses the possibles that do not fit its laws. It functions differently from what it appears. Qutb uses the dogmatic image of Islam as a total Idea to rationalise the fascism with which its model forecloses exteriority. With Qutb, Muslims have been colonised by so many faces that they have forgotten the real Face of Islam, the Qur'an. Just like in the colonial and Nasserist models, the individual is conceptualised as a Self who ought to strive and identify with the Ideal-Is, in this case, presented by an Islamic Symbolic. All in all, Qutb rethinks Islam as a precept of time and the Islamic Symbolic – Allah's Logos- as the origin of socio-political individual and collective reality. Qutb's thought thus remains a prisoner of the image of thought and its postulates. It thinks Islamic thought as a pure reason that is good-natured and truth-seeking. In concluding, Qutb's postcolonial thought is an infolding of the colonial Simulation, a fold where the panopticon has lost its walls but where control has never been more total. Qutb's line of flight had been captured into a becoming death.

CONCLUSION
FREE DESIRE AS A SCHIZOID BECOMING REVOLUTIONARY

« Il faut une révolution dans la révolution. » [206]

« - J'entends rien….Qu'est-ce qu'elle dit ?

- Elle dit que les pauvres sauveront ce monde. » [207]

« The only thing that survives an era is the form of art it has created as a percept. » [208]

Overall, this thesis has argued that postcolonial thought thinks of the revolutionary event/experience as its colonial simulacra. Modern thought, including postcolonial thinking, the thesis has argued, still reproduces Platonic Idealism by positing the Symbolic as the origin of experience. This, the thesis has argued, is a Simulation of thought. Indeed, as explained in the Introductory Chapter, the thesis conceptualises civilisational time as a time of Symbolic

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206 "There needs to be a revolution in the revolution". Sentence pronounced in the film *Le Livre d'Image*. Jean-Luc Goddard, *Le Livre d'Image*, 2018

207 "I am not hearing it…..What is she saying? - She is saying that the poor will save the world". Dialogue in the film *Le Livre d'Image*. Ibid.

208 Ibid.

Simulations. Consequently, it understands the colonial Simulation as a fold of the modern Simulation and the postcolonial Simulation as a fold of the colonial Simulation. Historical time is then seen as a successive series of simulations, with each Simulation producing a particular temporal sequencing of space. Modern semiosis, the thesis has argued, thinks the space of the Real as a lost past. This is exemplified by the ways in which modern thought thinks of time-in-itself and thus of the Real/immediate experience- as an internal limit of subjectivity.

The ways in which Liberalism, Marxism, Socialism and as we have seen with Qutb, Modern Salafism, think of time as a successive series of Ideas or simulacra whose movement is either defined as a linear progression or as a dialectics, illustrate how the Real is thought as a limit of representation. In the Symbolics of Simulation, images precede the real and form a procession of simulacra. Furthermore, the affect or sense that this perception of time produces, the thesis has argued, is an absurd 'real', a real whose foundation is purely Symbolic. Indeed, the thesis has highlighted how modern semiosis produces a reality totalised by the Symbolic and its worlds of Objects. It has also outlined how, as folds of the modern fold, colonial and postcolonial semiotics reproduce this absurd.

Finally, the thesis has also argued that the structure of modern semiosis mimics a paranoid structure by articulating itself through two fundamental laws. The first law is that its Symbolic temporal sequencing of space is the only possible series of time. The second law is that all the series of time that are not included in this sequencing must be foreclosed. Here again, the thesis illustrates how the Symbolic totalisation of time/experience produces a reality that appears to be split between an Ideal surface and a beneath whose reality is suppressed by the Faces of the 'surface'. As we have seen, those Faces include the modern state, which includes both the colonial and the Nasserist states, capitalism but also modern thought. Indeed, Colonial Liberalism, Nasserist Socialism and Qutb's Salafism all speak the speech of the surface, this speech that projects the Symbolic as the 'origin' of experience. This has had significant implications on how thought thinks liberation, the thesis postulates. Indeed, the paranoid structure of modern semiosis produces a pathologisation of the politics of liberation, the thesis argues. Fanon has already exposed that the colonial Symbolic produced mental illness as a spoken of its castration. Madness becomes a form of 'liberated' speech because it speaks what the Colonial Symbolic suppresses from its surface or discourse; it speaks the foreclosed. Colonialism, Fanon thus argued, produced pathologies of freedom. This pathologisation implies a Symbolic whose speech spirals further into

the worlds of phantasms. The thesis has outlined how Colonial, Nasserist and Qutbist can be used as illustrations of thoughts that pathologise the politics of liberation by thinking liberation, that is, revolutionary events/experiences, as simulacra.

Chapter 1 has examined how Egyptian subjectivity became *en*folded by the colonial Simulation. As in Borges' fable, this chapter has shown how the Symbolic of space that constitutes the colonial map, recover the Real and exclude it from its system of signification/simulation. The chapter used the Lacanian Mirror Stage as a model of thought that explains the processes of Identification. From a Deleuzean perspective, Identification/Representation/Signification are all orders of Simulation. The Mirror Stage can thus be used as a model that explains the colonial Simulation's semiotic processes, the chapter has argued. It also shows how the entrance into a Symbolic Simulation is experienced as castration because it implies losing a previous sense of 'real'. This sense of castration is further exacerbated by the semiotic laws that structure the Colonial simulation. The first law postulates that the previous 'real'/simulation can never be experienced again. The second law postulates that the Real, can only be experienced as an *Object a*, or phantasm of its Symbolic. This was exemplified by the ways in which colonial thought thinks of Egypt as a phantasm of its lost real. This phantasm or simulacrum divided Egypt between a True claimant of modernity, namely ancient Egypt, and a fake claimant, modern Egypt. This displacement of Egyptian historical agency illustrates how colonial thought thinks the Egyptian colonised as a castrated subject. In contrast, the chapter has further advanced that colonial thought thinks of the modern European Subject as a precept of time, a surplus/transhistorical production. Additionally, the has chapter also highlighted how the colonial Simulation was coalescent with the emergence of the Capitalist-Bourgeois Ideal and its double function of '*liberation*' and castration of desire. The 'liberation' of capitalism offers the colonised the possibility of being an active participant in the modern Simulation, a subject with capital and thus agency, the chapter has contended. It is by articulating itself through the logic of the pleasure principle, the chapter then argued, that capitalism seduces subjectivity into its Simulation. Furthermore, the process of transvaluation acts as a regulator of the economy of Capitalist desire.

Drawing conclusions from the first chapter, we can now say that both colonial thought and capitalist semiotics produce the Real as an empty signifier. In this, they can both be taken as forms of thought or semiosis that Nietzsche called Egyptianism. Egyptianism can be used to describe a form of thinking that produces a Real deprived of the possibility of signification, and instead

simulates it as its Symbolic Simulation. For Nietzsche, the history of thought/philosophy is marked by its Egyptianism:

"There is ... their hatred of even the idea of becoming, their Egyptianism. They think they are doing a thing honour when they dehistoricise it, sub specie aeterni—when they make a mummy of it. All that philosophers have handled for millennia has been conceptual mummies; nothing actual has escaped their hands alive. They kill, they stuff, when they worship, these conceptual idolaters—they become a mortal danger to everything when they worship. Death, change, age, as well as procreation and growth, are for them objections—refutations even. What is, does not become; what becomes is not … Now they all believe, even to the point of despair, in that which is."[209]

Chapter 2 has further outlined how modern thought thinks of The Law and the 'real' as empty signifiers. This also echoes' Nietzsche's warning that thought produces mummified concepts or as the chapter proposes drawing from Deleuze's critique of the Kantian turn, Ideas/concepts as empty signifiers. This chapter's first moment has highlighted the paradoxical nature of colonial knowledge and the absurd that it produces. While Plunderland presents itself as a world where all the series of times are possible, it forecloses the series of time that do not fit its temporal sequencing of space. In Plunderland, reality is what capitalism makes of it; it obeys the laws of capital and individuals' sense of self and reality are totalised by the colonial Symbolic's capitalist economy. The Mixed courts and the 'Liberal' era have illustrated how the colonial Simulation partitions space according to Capitalist desire and time. While capitalist desire/time reproduced the superiority of the foreign landed Bourgeoisie, it expropriated the peasants from their lands. This helps highlight capitalism as the desire or drive that 'makes' 'organises' the modern temporal sequencing of space. Moreover, the Oedipalisation of peasants has illustrated the disciplinary power of modern law: a good subject is a subject that meets the requirements of capitalist desire. The repressive quality of Modern colonial rule also activated collective encounters with the paradoxical logic of the Simulation's reality. The Dinshaway incident can be taken as one of these encounters, the chapter has argued. In its concluding remarks, the chapter has contended that its

209 Friedrich Nietzsche, R.J. Hollingdale (Trans.), *Twilight of the Idols* , (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1968), p. 35

analysis of the modern semiotic process means it can be described as a paranoid logic of *enfo*lding. Indeed, its laws 'fix' subjectivity in a fixed time– they set the series of time of the Simulation as the 'real' and foreclose the series or times that are not included in the Simulation. This logic of fixing and foreclosing mimic a paranoid structure. This paranoid structure, it further argued, means we have a paranoiac relationship not only to knowledge but also to the 'reality' produced by the Simulation. This could help explain the subjective fetish for the Objects produced by capitalism, already described, for example, by Marcuse in *One-dimensional man*.[210]

Finally, we can now say that in thinking of The Law/Idea as an empty signifier, modern thought thinks of the Real as a form/image with no particular experience, an empty form/surface. If modern thought thinks of the Real as a lost origin, then it is bound to think of the three syntheses of time past/present/future as their posteriority. If thought thinks of time in its posteriority/Symbolic virtual past, then it cannot include the affect that time has on experience in its cognition. *The Spirit of the Law*s then is a hauntological Real: a Real that can only appear through the presence of its absence. This hauntology of the Real echoes the plastics of the Simulation's surface, which the thesis has highlighted.

Chapter 3 moved to the First Face of postcolonial thought that the thesis explores: Nasserism. It has argued that Nasserism can be conceptualised as a postcolonial Face of the colonial fold. To this end, it has outlined how the Nasserist state reproduced the colonial semiosis of the absurd and their production of a reality that articulates itself as two senses. On the one hand, Nasserism presented itself as an agent of the anti-colonial revolution that would liberate Egypt from colonial reality and finally, open up the social to all possibles or series of time. Yet, on the other, it actively foreclosed the possibles that did not fit its Symbolic laws. Furthermore, the chapter also highlighted how the state and capitalism share a similar mode of production: private ownership of the means of (subjective)production. Thus, the state and capitalism can be seen as nodal Signifiers of modern semiosis, hence their role as machines-of-capture, rather than as machines-of-liberation of desire. Indeed, the thesis contends that both the state and capitalism speak the speech/Symbolics of Simulation. The Nasserist state's obsession with eliminating the elements who/that did not fit its temporal sequencing of space further illustrated both the absurd of postcolonial semiosis and their production of an experience totalised by the Symbolic. Besides

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210 Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man*

the paranoid structure of the semiotic process can help explain the fascist latency of the Nasserist state and beyond it of the state in its historical dimension. In concluding, the chapter has argued that in setting up the seeds of the corporatist-military state that to this day still haunts the possible revolutionary becoming of Egypt, Nasserism set the stage for the continuation of the colonial castration of experience and its pathologisation of the politics of liberation. Beyond its surface of liberation, Nasserism acted as a force of suffocation: it captured not liberated revolutionary desires.

Chapter 4 has argued that as a Face of the fold of the colonial Simulation, Nasserism thought of liberation as a copy of its colonial simulacrum. The chapter first examined the multiple Signifiers/simulacra of liberation produced by the Nasserist Symbolic to highlight how Nasserism simulated itself as both an affect and percept of 'liberated' time. Beyond this Ideal surface, the chapter highlighted the function of Facialization of the Nasserist state. In line with Deleuze and Guattari's concept of Faciality, the chapter has argued that the Nasserist state subjectivised Egyptians into the Ideal face of the Simulation by inserting itself as The Signifier/surface that mediated the experience and the being-in-the-world of its Subjects. It did so by producing a complex system of signification for liberation. Nasserism thus presented itself as a liberated Symbolic. It claimed it thought the production of an equal and just reality, in which Arab Socialism would re-code individual subjectivity to a collective modality of consciousness. The chapter challenged this vision of the Nasserist Symbolic by arguing that it thought of liberation as the production of the people as copies of its Ideal-Is, the chapter has argued. In becoming the state's ideal-Is, we become participants in the subjective de-individuation through which facialization operates, the chapter has emphasised. We become participants in a Simulation that simulates 'liberated' desire, the thesis contends. Finally, the chapter exposed the repressive function of the Nasserist liberation by looking into how Nasserism simulated itself as a revolutionary affect/desire. This Simulation, it argued, reproduces colonial semiosis because its semiotic process is totalised by the Symbolic and its world of phantasms. This Ideal-reality or Simulation that the regime's Symbolic projected is particularly problematic because it forecloses the reality/intensity of its violence from its surface, the chapter has contended.

All in all, the analysis of this chapter has uncovered a hole, a parallax gap between the 'liberated and 'liberating' surface of Nasserism and its Oedipal function. We can now say that this parallax gap is the mark of an *en*folding. The thesis postulates that this *en*folding is the trace/imprint of a mechanism of subjective capture rather than of subjective liberation. This 'gap'

uncovers the *en*folding of thought into a Simulation: thought thinks the Real as an empty Signifier. In this logic/law of semiotics, signs are first thought from a Symbolic perspective: their Real is represented by a Symbolic copy. The sign becomes the Sign in the same way that the self becomes the Self. The parallax quality of the Nasserist Simulation thus uncovers how the Nasserist Symbolic thinks 'liberation' as a Sign of the colonial Symbolic. In doing so, the chapter has argued, Nasserism thinks 'liberation' as the simulacrum of a simulacrum. As the chapter has shown, the Nasserist Symbolic can think and produce effects of liberation, that is sensations and perceptions of liberation. However, ultimately, the chapter concluded, Nasserism does not unfold as an affect of liberation but as an affect of alienation of desire and subjectivity: it *en*folds them.

Finally, Chapter 5 looked at the second Face of colonial thought that the thesis explores. The chapter has argued that this Face is the Face of a desire for liberation that turned into a desire for repression. Indeed, the chapter looked at Qutb's thought as a thought that moved from challenging the Simulation to falling back into its capture. Despite his attempt to free thought from its image of thought, Sayyid Qutb's prison writings produced Signifiers/simulacra that identify Islam's identity as an Ideal-I or total Idea. In this, just like Nasserism, it thinks of liberation as the simulacra of a simulacra and remains a prisoner of the panoptical historical a priori that enframes modern thought. This panoptical *a priori* was approached through Deleuze's concept of the image of thought. To make this argument, the chapter first highlighted how Qutb's thought increasingly questioned Modernity as both a concrete historical formation and as an epistemic space.

In particular, a disjunction between the appearance of modernity and its true Self emerged in Qutb's thought. As his writings show, Qutb looked for ways to explain the parallax quality of modernity. Eventually, he grew convinced that modern thought operated within the wrong tradition of thought. The modernity thought by modern European thought, Qutb argued, produced modernity as a simulacrum. To this, he opposed Islam as the only tradition of thought that can think of modernity as the Reality of all reality, that is as a reality open to all the series of times. With Qutb, the chapter has argued, Islam is rethought as a precept of truth. The chapter has also highlighted how, with his increasingly orthodox/dogmatic vision, Qutb reproduced the very logic of alienation he tried to escape. Qutb acknowledged the need to rethink the semiosis of liberation but inversed not reversed

the colonial regime of representation. In the Qutubist Symbolic, Modern European thought is ignorant, while Islam thinks the true. Qutb thinks of the Islamic Subject as an inversion of its colonial simulacra. With Islam, the castrated subject becomes a 'liberated' Subject, who, Qutb contends, can access the Reality of all realities.

This inversion of the colonial Simulation's regime of identities, the chapter explained, means that Qutb's thought eventually gave rise to Islam's image as a copy of the colonial absurd. ISIS, for example, can be seen as the concrete representation of the Qutbist absurd. Finally, the chapter argued that Qutubism illustrates the postcolonial reproduction of the colonial pathologisation of the politics of liberation. In this Simulation, experience is so totalised by the Symbolic that the Real is deprived of the possibility of signification. It is foreclosed from reality and replaced with its Symbolic copy. All in all, Qutb rethinks Islam as a precept of time and the Islamic Symbolic – Allah's Logos- as the origin of socio-political individual and collective reality. Qutb's thought thus remains a prisoner of the image of thought and its postulates. It thinks Islamic thought as a pure reason that is good-natured and truth-seeking. In concluding, the chapter has explained that Qutb's postcolonial thought is a fold of the colonial Simulation, a fold where the panopticon has lost its walls but where control has never been more total. Qutb's line of flight had been captured into a deathly becoming.

We can now say that Qutb's thought can be used to illustrate what Lacan called a thought of the in-between-two-deaths: a line of flight that turns into a line of death. Lacan used the concept in reference to the Greek tragedy *Antigone*.[211] In the Sophocles play, Antigone is the oldest daughter of Oedipus and Jocasta. In Greek, her name defines as 'one who is of the opposite opinion' (anti = opposite, gnomi = opinion). Creon, the new King of Thebes, represents THE LAW as a total and totalising Symbolic. Creon thinks of 'reality' through the Reason/LAWS of the Simulation. He knows or thinks no Outside of the Simulation. Creon's fortune meets its limit in the form of Polyneices, Antigone's Brother.[212] He prohibits the burial of Polyneices, thereby condemning him to die again after his death. In doing so, Creon has unwillingly transgressed the limits of the Symbolic. He went against its 'name-of-the-father: he presupposes that the Symbolic acts on an 'Outside'; that the Symbolic can act on series of laws that do not fit its temporal

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211 Jacques Lacan, Jacques-Alain Miller (Ed.), *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-60, - The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p.219
212 Ibid., p.254

sequencing of space. At first, drawing from Sophocles, Creon's 'mistake' can be seen as a misjudgement Lacan tells us.[213] Yet, as Lacan notes, Creon's desire is a pleasure without affect: it is a rational desire. Lacan contrasts Creon's desire to Sadean desire, as a pleasure whose affect is perverse.[214] It is because Creon wanted to honour his responsibility towards the polis to 'make' good that he Identified so strictly with THE LAW.[215] With Lacan Creon speaks the Kantian language of the good, the language of practical Reason:

"one cannot at the same time honour those who have defended their country and those who have attacked it. From a Kantian point of view, it is a maxim that can be given as a rule of reason with a universal value".[216]

For Lacan, tragedy is the first objection to the aesthetics of the good, because it implies that:

"the good cannot reign over all without an excess emerging whose fatal consequences are revealed to us in tragedy."[217]

With Lacan, it is then Antigone, not Creon who is the victim of hubris – excessive pride or confidence. Antigone refused to obey Creon and buried her brother. She took-up a different Law, the Law of the Outside that Creon had overstepped. Creon had warned Antigone that should she fail to abide by The Law of the state, she would be immured alive, yet Antigone forged ahead and took her life in the aftermath. For Lacan, this exposes Antigone's real desire as a "pure and simple desire of death as such". [218]

Between the moment she acted out her real desire and the moment of her acting out, Antigone had found herself in the space of the In-between-two-deaths: she was not dead yet, but her desire to free herself of THE LAW of the State eventually takes her to her death. Antigone, Lacan tells us, connect her "desire for the Other" or as the thesis postulates, THE LAW as THE

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213 Ibid., p.258
214 Ibid, p.260
215 Ibid., p.259
216 Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 1959-60, p.259
217 Ibid.
218 Ibid., p.282

REAL, to what Lacan says is her "desire for the mother", that is for "the origin of everything". With Lacan, Antigone desires desire in its pure form, and in doing so, braves the laws of Signification/Identification, she desires a desire 'liberated' from Symbolic of her Historical Simulation. Lacan connects Antigone's pure desire to the Signifier of a Crime: Incest.[219] Her family had been born into Crime, not Power:

"The fruit of the incestuous union has split into two brothers, one of whom represents power and the other crime. There is no one to assume the crime and the validity of crime apart from Antigone [...]. Antigone perpetuates, eternalises, immortalises this *Até*."[220]

With Lacan Antigone wants to move beyond this *Até* :

"What does it mean to us if Antigone goes beyond the limits of the human? What does it mean if not that her desire aims at the following - the beyond of Ate?"[221]

Antigone wants to re-write the 'name of the father' and free her family from its original crime. She sees herself as a de-*en*folded space: as being beyond the laws of the Symbolic of her Historical Simulation. According to Lacan, there is something quite beautiful about Antigone's desire for this beyond:

"The violent illumination, the glow of beauty, coincides with the moment of crossing, of achievement of the *Até* of Antigone."[222]

Antigone's beauty glows so brightly it blinds. She becomes sublime when her Self breaks-down when her Self de-Identifies wi

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219 Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis,* 1959-60, p.282
220 Ibid., p.283
221 Ibid., p.263
222 Ibid, p.281

th the Symbolic of her Historical Simulation. Still, to speak this *Até*, Antigone needs to assume the Crime and move beyond the Symbolic. She says herself that she dead: "I am dead, and I desire Death".[223] She is in the in-between-two-death.[224]

Overall, for Lacan, a Self cannot exist without an image, an eidos, that precedes it. Indeed Antigone aimed at thinking her *Até* as a 'liberated speech', a 'speech' where signs are not preceded by images, a speech that thinks from beyond the Symbolics of Simulation. This is the speech of free desire. As mentioned, for Lacan, a subject who desires pure desire can only think and desire death. Antigone's process of de-Identification with her Self is a process of Identification with Death. This marks her entrance into the zone of the in-between-two-death. This Identification with Death is even more powerful that the Simulation it draws her into the Outside. Lacan establishes an equivalence between de-Identification and the in-between-two-death. What was originally a line of flight, a desire that challenged the Simulation, became *en*folded by death.

The image of Antigone seems to precedes the image of Sayyid Qutb. In his desire to move beyond the laws of his Historical Simulation, he too, aimed at speaking an *Até* of free speech. Yet, like Antigone, he became *en*folded by death. Antigone and Qutb had unwillingly both become heroes of the tragic. Their Faces are included in the series of times of the colonial Simulation, of the Nasserist Simulation and all the Faces of civilisation. Civilisational thought is just a Simulation of knowledge. Their desire for free speech/desire turned into a desire for repression. It thought and acted a desire for repression. Their thought still spoke of the state and its Oedipal prohibition. The economy of their desire still mimicked the logic of the pleasure principle, in line with Capitalist desire. This desire thinks total pleasure or in Lacanian term, *Jouissance*, as a foreclosure of the Real, but its Symbolic is an in-between-two-death. With Lacan, the laws of the Outside are laws that transgress the Simulation. These laws of transgression expose a movement from pleasure into a petite mort (a little death). With Lacan, *Jouissance* cannot be unlimited; it cannot be total otherwise, it would take us to the Outside of Life, and into death. The film *La Grande Bouffe*, for example, illustrates this going-towards-death of *Jouissance*.[225] With Lacan, it is because it violates the laws of the Symbolic that *Jouissance* takes the body into its death. It is then of *Jouissance* as

223 Lacan, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, 1959-60, p.281
224 Ibid., p.270-283
225 Marco Ferreri, *La Grande Bouffe*, 1973

an Empty Signifier that Lacan thinks of; Jouissance as a pure desire for repression. This desire desires an experience that has no form, no limits. This experience for Lacan is Death/Madness.

So, is a desire for free speech bound to Identify with death and take its subject into a movement of death? In there an Inside/Outline limit that cannot be overstepped? From a Deleuzean perception, no. For Deleuze, free desire is not pure desire. For Deleuze, the 'inside' is enfolded by the 'outside'. *Jouissance* is not a petite mort or little death but a bodily sur-production of vitality. Jouissance is then not the symptom of a lack-in-being, symptom that becomes death when it reaches its limits.[226] Instead, it is the event of a being-in-becoming. It is not the copulation of a Signifier with its Signifieds but of a sign that senses itself in experience. With Deleuze, *Jouissance* is not a law of transgression; it is a law that follows the principle of the excluded middle: that which is neither, nor, the research argues. With Deleuze, the Real cannot be on the Outside of the Simulation because it is *en*folded by it. The Simulation's surface projects itself as a white wall with black holes, but in subjectivising us into its Simulation, it 'makes' us forget that the Real permeates the air. It 'makes' us forget to breathe; it suffocates us. While it suffocates us, it colonises us. As Fanon has shown, it produces pathologies of freedom.

The surface enfolds us back into its Simulation and continuously re-captures subjectivity into a paranoid semiotic structure and its analytics of the Self. Deleuze challenges the necessity of the Self on the self that Lacan presupposes with his concept of "agencement" or assemblages. In doing so, he reverses the Platonic Idealism of Lacanian thought. In his analysis of the laws of transgression through his analysis of Antigone, Lacan is tricked/seduced by his Platonic Idealism. He only thinks of free desire as pure desire. From a Deleuzean counterpoint, free desire does not have to be pure; it can be flow.[227] It is not Oedipal but Dionysian. This flow is not the desire of a Subject who Identifies with Death in its quest to De-Identify from the laws of the Simulation, as Lacan necessarily thinks it. It is not a de--*en*folded subject, a subject who does not have a Self. Desire as flow is the desire of a subject who un-*en*folds their folds. This subject, the conclusion of the thesis postulates, is an assemblage of folds that thinks and acts as an *un*-enfolded form of thought. Its assemblages are not heroes of the tragic as in Oedipus and his cursed family. They are the heroes of a different genre/affect: irony. The thought of this assemblage, the thesis argues

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226 Deleuze, Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p.553
227 Ibid, p.75-76

can be best approached as a thought that rethinks the Platonic Idea as a simulacrum of the Idea of Antigone. In this simulacrum, Antigone does not assume a crime but instead assumes a 'liberation'. She is not in an in-between two-deaths but in an in-between-two-folds. This Antigone thinks in schizo-analytical terms, not parano-analytical terms.

Overall, the research has analysed the paranoid semiosis of modernity through a Deleuzean un-*en*folding of its folds. This un-*en*folding of the folds of thought is what Deleuze and Guattari called a Schizoanalysis. In *Anti Oedipus*, they explain that Schizoanalysis asks the following questions: "What are your desiring-machines, do you put into these machines, what is the output, how does it work, what are your nonhuman sexes?"[228] To let desire speak its free speech then is to allow it to un-*en*fold the infoldings of thought. In *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, they gave us a conceptual cartography of the Ideas as assemblages that a schizoanalytical thought thinks. These include as we have seen throughout the thesis the Urstaat as the Original Face of the State which they rethink as a fold of civilisational Oedipal desire. It also includes Capitalism as the economy of Oedipal desire, which regulates the Symbolic economy through its own articulatory regulator: the pleasure principle. Then, there is the Body Without Organs (BwO) as a vital force which they rethink by de-facialising thought. The BwO then is a thought that operates without an image of thought, without a Self. This thought is an assemblage of folds whose function is not to repress its extensive quality by expressing itself as a purely intensive quality. THE BwO is a thought that uses its extensive quality to un-*en*fold its folds. It has no form because it is not preceded by an Image.

Deleuze and Guattari have been heavily criticised for rethinking Schizophrenia as the semiotic structure of their free subject or in their schizo-bulary the 'self' as an assemblage of desiring-machines. This conclusion highlights that Schizoanalysis is a thought that rethinks the paranoid semiotic structure of the Symbolic as a schizophrenic structure. From this perspective, there is then nothing 'irrational' to Deleuze and Guattari's rethinking of the Real as a simulacrum/assemblage of the Symbolic. The schizophrenic structure, Deleuze and Guattari tell us, is 'healthier' because it has two dimensions, not one. Earlier on, the Conclusion noted that with Deleuze and Guattari semiosis is not the result of the copulation of a Signifier with its Signifieds, but of a sign with experience. This semiosis, the Conclusion argues, has two Symbolics. The first

228 Deleuze, Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p.536-9

is a Symbolic *en*folded by language. This Symbolic is a Symbolic of Signification/Identification/Representation. It simulates itself as the representation of an 'original' Real that the Subject had lost. This non -'Original-Real', the Symbolic thinks it as a time that includes all the series of time. This Simulation produces subjective and bodily stimuli. As we have seen in Chapter One, Lacan emphasises the jubilatory affect of the subjective encounter with Identification. When the child first encounters their image in the mirror, they sense jubilation. Thus, the Simulation stimulates a desire to re-experience a lost-past, a pure past of total power, a time of pure Identity. The second trick of the Simulation is that while it projects its time as a time that includes all the series of time, its Real/internal time is a lost past. It is a time that operates with one temporal sequencing of space. It is a time of One dimension, the time of the Symbolic as an *en*folding of language. The second Symbolic of Schizoanalytical thought is a logic of Sense. It stimulates, not simulates, itself as the unmediated experience of a sign. It is the experience of the un-*en*folding of a sign. In this Symbolic, the sign is experienced as an extensive quality of thought. The sign is not experienced in degrees of Identification with a Same. It is experienced as a variation of sensorial intensities. It can emerge out of the encounter with an *en*folded sign; it can come out as a tear, a jump, a scream. This sign does not have an image that precedes it because it produces an experience. This experience is an experience where *en*folded thought becomes affected by the affect it produces on its Other, its un-*en*folded self. The *en*folded Symbolic affects its self; it senses it as a real experience. There is no 'original' and no copies in this semiotic process, no first, second or third Orders. In the schizoid semiotic process, the *en*folded Symbolic becomes aware of its affective production by encountering its Other Quality not its Objectivity as Ideality.

In the Schizoid semiotic process, the Representamen is not mediated by an *en*folded sign and interpreted by the 'I' of the thinker and the image of thought that thinks it. With Deleuze and Guattari, the event does not start with a *Representamen*; it begins with the affect that the *Representamen* produces. It is then an act of recovering of the sense/affect that an experience has on the self as an 'assemblage' that this thought thinks. In line with Deleuzean thought, the thesis argues that 'Individuality' as an assemblage of Symbolic folds is then best cognised not through the Idea of the Self but as a machine of production and repression of memories. A machine that experiences its self/interiority and the world as an assemblage of sensations and perceptions that speaks to its present. Indeed, if the Logic of Sense un-*en*folds, it speaks the effects/symptoms of paranoid repression. The thesis has shown these symptoms are the symptoms of

systematic/structural violence: desire is a desire for repression. It is then by analysing how the *en*folded Symbolic affects the affective state of individuals that Schizoanalytical thought works.

Of course, the extensive quality of the Schizoanalytical Symbolic can be dangerous. Jumps can be fascist jumps; tears can be tears of a blocking off of desire and screams can be screams of power. This conclusion postulates that scattered in Deleuze and Guattari's works are the two-fundamental laws of the Logic of Sense. Their Logic of Sense is one particular Face of the Fold of Symbolic Senses.

Its First Law, the Conclusion postulates, is that its signs are not preceded by images. Its Second Law is that its signs cannot be Faces; they cannot be *en*folded because they are un-*en*folding. This has significant ramifications. `Deleuze and Guattari effectively propose a thought that is not tricked into the Simulation of Oedipal desire, it can learn to recognise its screams of fascism or jumps of power and its tears of the tragic. It exposes them; it denounces them. This thought un-*en*folds faces; it does not speak them. It is then not of a Newspeak, the Newspeak of the colonial, Nasserist, Qutbist, thought, this Newspeak of Antigone that Deleuze and Guattari speak. Deleuze proceeds by thinking simulacra of Ideas. His thought proceeds through de-Facialization or what this thesis calls un-*en*folding. In their works, Deleuze and Guattari have left us keys to retrace their thought process. Deleuze exposed one of these in a chapter of *Difference and Repetition* also published as an article, "Plato and the Simulacrum". In it, he exposes that he proceeds by thinking of the Idea as a simulacrum. Overall, the thesis argues that Deleuze and Guattari have Outdone the Simulation, not by inventing a Law of the Outside, but by coming up with an even greater joke: they propose we shift from a paranoid to a schizophrenic semiotic structure. In this Real, the Imaginary re-acquires its own multi-dimensional dimensions; it is open to all the series of time. The Symbolic stops being an agent of castration of the Real and the Imaginary but instead acts as the agent of their de-coding; it frees them from the Symbolic's interiority. It reverses the laws of the Simulation:

'Images precedes signs'

Becomes

Some signs are not preceded by images.

And,

'There are pure images that cannot be represented in life.'

Becomes

Life thinks/speaks all images.

Beyond Deleuze's rethinking of the being-in-itself of the Platonic Idea, this research has identified a series of Ideas that Deleuze has rethought for us. In particular. It proposes looking at how he has revisited Kant's three transcendental Ideas: The Self, Time and God. Kant thinks of the Idea of Self as a transcendental Subject – the "I' of the thinking Subject. Deleuze rethinks it as an assemblage. Here the metonymy between the Self and the Idea is exposed. Kant thinks of the Idea of God as the being of all beings but this God, Deleuze and Guattari have unmasked it as the Face of Oedipus and his Sadean desire. They rethink the Idea of God as a god who takes the Face of Dionysus and has a masochist desire.[229] Their God does not regulate its economy through a variation that ranges from an intensive quality of pleasure to pain. It regulates its economy through variations of degrees of care.[230] In this economy, images do not precede experience. There are no original and no copies, no good nor bad, no Real/Symbolic dialectics. Finally, Kant thinks of the Idea of time as the whole of social history. This time is the time of Chronos. It operates by sequencing or 'organising' space into a space that fits its economy of desire. It re-codes 'social space' - in both its Symbolic and concrete forms- into the spaces/signs that reflect the demands/desires that regulates the Symbolic and its desiring economy. As we have seen in this thesis, in modernity, this regulator is Capitalist. Moreover, as equally illustrated, this vision of time implies the subject's necessary/primordial alienation. Deleuze swaps Chronos for Aion, a time that fits all series of time.[231] It does not invent a code for social space; it let the 'social space' – or its community of thinkers – imagine/create series of times that fit *their* desiring-economy. This Face of the Logic of the Sense is its Ironic Face.

This Face thinks *Une pensée qui panse*, that is, a thought that heals its wounds, a thought that cares for itself, not a thought that punishes itself for its self-inflicted wounds.[232] Deleuze and

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229 " The masochist body : it is poorly understood in terms of pain; it is fundamentally a question of BwO" in, Deleuze, Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, p.539

230 Ibid., 1291 p. 1285. Deleuze and Guattari drew from Bergson, Hume and Spinosa

231 Aion can be defined as "the past-future, which in an infinite subdivision of the abstract moment endlessly decomposes itself in both directions and forever sidesteps the present", Deleuze, The *Logic of Sense*, p.190

232 Bernard Steigler, *Qu'appel t-on panser? L'Immense regression* (Paris: Les Liens qui Libèrent, 2018) p.22-3

Guattari tell us that these' self-inflicted wounds' are not really self-inflicted; they are Self-inflected, one could say. If the interiority of the self is a fold of its outside Self, then who assumes responsibility for the crime/wounds? In Egypt, in 2011, the question of responsibility emerged as one of the nodal element of the revolutionary Symbolic. The state had manufactured a cover-up by claiming that Khaled Saeed had died of self-inflicted suffocation. The State and its faces were guilty of a Simulation. The faces of the state paid for the state's guilt, and two policemen were condemned to ten years in jail. But are they really the only participants in the crime? Should they really assume the total responsibility for Khaled Saeed's murder? If they are folds of the State and if in some ways, as we have seen with the thesis, we are all faces of the state, beyond it of Civilisation, then who should assume responsibility?

The aporetic of responsibility is a theme mastered by the writer Albert Cossery as attested by his works *La Violence et la Derision*, *Proud Beggars*, or the *Jokers,* for example.[233] Suppose responsibility is an a priori image of citizenship. In that case, the citizen is thought of as either a docile subject who assumes the responsibilities that the Symbolic attributes to it, or as guilty of a crime: it fails its responsibilities. Cossery's mastery lies in his overturning of the Tragic into an Ironic. In his universe, tyrants and revolutionaries are participants to the same joke: they are the simulacra of a Simulation. The Real revolutionaries then are those who take the Simulation for what it is: a Joke. With Cossery, the revolutionary face of free desire is the face of the thinker who laughs at the joke, not the thinker who 'makes' the joke. With Cossery, as with Deleuze and Guattari, the revolutionary becoming starts with breath as a laugh.

This vision of the revolution as a breath coalesces with Frantz Fanon's vision. In Algeria, as in the phantasmatic worlds of despots of Cossery, the leaders of the revolution are heroes of the tragic while the revolutionary desires of their people/movement speak irony. In the chapter, "Spontaneity, its strengths and weaknesses" of the *Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon exposes the double suffocation of colonial reality in the colonies: the outside of the Fold experience - the Colonial Symbolic and its inside, the (Anti)-colonial Nationalist Colonial Symbolic-, are suffocating the revolutionary event. The inside of the outside stifles the event. As Fanon explains, his consideration on violence

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233 Albert Cossery, *La Violence et la Derision*, (Paris: Editions Joelle, 2013), Albert Cossery, Thomas W. Cushing (Trans.), *Proud Beggars* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2011), Albert Cossery, Anna Moschovakis (Trans.) *The Jokers,* (New York: New York Review of Books, c2010)

"has led us to take account of the frequent existence of a time-lag, or a difference of rhythm, between the leaders of a nationalist party and the mass of the people."[234]

Indeed,

"The *élite* will attach a fundamental importance to organisation, so much so that the <u>fetish</u> of organisation will often take precedence over a reasoned study of colonial society." [235]

The notion of political party for Fanon is enfolded *by* Oedipal desire:

"The notion of political party is a notion imported from the mother country. This instrument of modern political warfare is thrown down just as it is, without the slightest modification, upon real life with its infinite variations and lack of balance, where slavery, serfdom, barter, a skilled working class and high finance exist side by side."[236]

Yet Fanon also shows empathy for these leaders:

"For them, the <u>fact</u> of militating in a national party is not simply taking part in politics; it is choosing the only means whereby they can pass from the status of an <u>animal</u> to that of a <u>human</u> being."[237]

Still, though, it is not in the humanity of political reason that Fanon locates the vitality of the revolutionary event/experience, but in the people "who are rebels by instinct", the peasants who remain on the margins of the Folds and can sense the trace of their *en*folding.[238]

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234 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, p.85 or *Les Damnés de la Terre,* p. 44
235 Ibid.,Italics by the author and underline by the author of the thesis.
236 Ibid.
237 Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, p. 99 or Fanon, *Les Damnés de la Terre,* p.122
238 Ibid.

It is the moment of the encounter between the nationalist leaders and a revolutionary people that marks both an opportunity for the un-*en*folding of the revolutionary speech as a free speech and the moment of its capture:

"These men get used to talking to the peasants. They discover that the mass of the country people have never ceased to think the problem of their liberation except in terms of violence, in terms of taking back the land of the foreigners, in terms of national struggle, and of armed insurrection. It is all very simple. These men discover a coherent people who go on living, as it were statically, but who keep their moral values and their devotion to the nation intact. They discover a people that is generous, ready to sacrifice themselves completely, an impatient people, with a stony pride. It is understandable that the meeting between these militants with the police on their track and these mettlesome masses of people, who are rebels by instinct, can produce an explosive mixture on unusual potentiality. The men coming from the towns learn their lessons in the hard school of the people; and at the same time these men open classes for the people in military and political education. The people furbish up their weapons; but in fact the classes do not last long, for the people come to know once again the strength of their own muscles and push the leaders on to prompt action. The armed struggle has begun."[239]

For this research, the moment of liberation turns into a moment of capture when the movement of liberation takes up the arms of the Coloniser's Symbolic. Rather, in line with the vision of Deleuze, Guattari and Cossery, there is not a war of liberation but a movement of liberation. Indeed, this encounter that Fanon talks about is the exchange and a mutual process of Identification between the political men or political educators and the 'rebels by instincts". [240] The mistake here is a misrepresentation of the revolutionary speech, this conclusion contends. Free speech is not a dialectics between the reason and instinctiveness of man. Egypt and Algeria both share the same lack of/in postcolonialism. They are haunted by a war of 'origin' against the Other who has now taken the form of an internal and international elite that hides in people as much as it does in Signs. The panopticon has lost its wall. However, from the Signs of the Colonial Symbolic that still haunts us, as it was in the process of becoming re-captured, revolutionary

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239 Ibid., p.101
240 Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth,* p.115 "political educators".

speech produced an *enf*olded Sign: Decolonisation, this conclusion contends. For Fanon Decolonisation is:

"Decolonisation, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a program of complete disorder. But it cannot come as a result of magical practices, nor of a natural shock, nor of a friendly understanding. Decolonisation, as we know, is a historical process: that is to say that it cannot be understood, it cannot become intelligible nor clear to itself except in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give it historical form and content. Decolonisation is the meeting of two forces, opposed to each other by their very nature, which in fact owe their originality to that sort of substantiation which results from and is nourished by the situation in the colonies. Their first encounter was marked by violence and their existence together—that is to say the exploitation of the native by the settler—was carried on by dint of a great array of bayonets and cannons. The settler and the native are old acquaintances. In fact, the settler is right when he speaks of knowing "them" well. For it is the settler who has brought the native into existence and who perpetuates his existence. The settler owes the fact of his very existence, that is to say, his property, to the colonial system.

Decolonisation never takes place unnoticed, for it influences individuals and modifies them fundamentally. It transforms spectators crushed with their inessentiality into privileged actors, with the grandiose glare of history's floodlights upon them. It brings a natural rhythm into existence, introduced by new men, and with it a new language and a new humanity. Decolonisation is the veritable creation of new men. But this creation owes nothing of its legitimacy to any supernatural power; the "thing" which has been colonised becomes man during the same process by which it frees itself.

In decolonisation, there is therefore the need of a complete calling in question of the colonial situation. If we wish to describe it precisely, we might find it in the well-known words: "The last shall be first and the first last." Decolonisation is the putting into practice of this sentence. That is why, if we try to describe it, all decolonisation is successful."[241]

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241 Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth,* p.28

"Decolonisation is quite simply the replacing of a certain 'species' of men by another 'species of men'."[242]

Yet, Fanon also says, "Decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon."[243]

So how do we un-*en*fold *decolonisation*? This thesis proposes that we take up free speech as a Schizo-tongue. Indeed, if decolonisation speaks liberation as a movement of reversal rather than a dialectics, then Deleuze's reversal of Platonism appears like a GOOD/CARING coordinate to take up. In their revolutionary tongue, Deleuze and Guattari, speak a becoming revolutionary in which the revolutionaries have dropped their arms to become the Analysts of their own desiring-productions. Indeed, *Concerning violence*, Deleuze proposes an alternative to the armed struggle, the freedom of the schizoid semiotic assemblage against the absolute reign of its paranoid dimension. The movement of liberation acts as a mechanism of defence against the movement of petrification. In this universe, The Symbolic is a percept of its Real, and the Imaginary is the order/precept of space/thought. Acts are guided by the affect/ethics of care rather than the politics of power. There is no dialectical movement of man from a savage to a domesticated animal, this rebel whose instincts have been rationalised. There is no political educator and no masses in need of education because, in this universe, knowledge is not prejudiced; it is not organised by Adjudication. In this over there of 'us', 'liberated' thought is a remedy against the lack-in-being of a Symbolic world that thinks the present as a lost Real. Bodies and thoughts have not been smoothed into the representations of a Symbolic surface. The Other is not gazed at because it doesn't exist. People are not walls with black holes; they are bodies with a Body without Organ, BwO. They apprehend the traces that the affects of experience leave son their bodies as the reflections of the affects of experience on their BwO. They process, rather than assume these traces; they learn to look at them, they learn to coexist with them, to digest them, to heal. In a way, this tongue's logic is similar to the logic of the 'unconscious'. It has the power to liberate Signs from the speech of language. This universal speech sees beauty in Irony; it is not subjectivised into the Sublime of tragedy.

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242 Ibid, p.2 7 or p.39 (French version)
243 Ibid.

In concluding, if, after this research, *i* have to un-*en*fold my own image of thought, then my 'I' thinks a world where all the streets speak:

> *"Asseguas Amegaz, el Hirak rahou labass."*
> *"Happy New Year, the Hirak/Movement is in GOOD health."*

Postscript: As these signs are written, the movement is fighting to keep breathing, it is being hunted down. So, the irony is not lost. Although this one does not repress, it throws its light on the event/experience that continues to un-*en*fold in ɜur becoming.*

*Cette ironie ne m'en [me] tue pas, elle jette sa lumière sur l'événement/expérience qui continue de se dés*en*velopper en ñðtre [notre] devenir.

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