The Rise of the Egyptian Nationalist Movement:
The Case of the 1919 Revolution

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Declaration

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This thesis aims to explore the rise of anti-colonial nationalism in Egypt on both mass and elite opinion before, during and after the First World War, with a particular focus on the 1919 Revolution.

The research work covers the evolution of Egypt’s nationalist movement – from the quelling of the ‘Urabi Revolt by British troops in the late nineteenth century, which resulted in the invasion and Occupation of Egypt in 1882, until the wartime formulation of the right to self-determination for all colonised peoples and the post-War settlement by victorious world leaders at the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919.

The ‘Urabi Revolt initially began as an effort to restore the rights and standing of native Egyptian servicemen in the Army, but this developed into a wider campaign across the country that increasingly tackled broader national grievances, including political independence from both the British and Ottoman Empires. ‘Urabi presented these issues against the background of his country’s Islamic identity, suggesting it was a vital part of Egypt’s status as a strong and prosperous nation-state and therefore pledged to protect it. The religious scholars engaged in the struggle provided the intellectual thinking that underpinned and justified Egypt’s nationalist movement. The ‘Urabi Revolt of 1879-1882 – during which the phrase “Egypt for the Egyptians” was coined – ultimately involved ordinary men and women who believed themselves to be part of a single nation: their aspirations were always framed within both a nationalistic and an Islamic context.

The Occupation, and the particularly reactionary conduct of British soldiers during the Taba Crisis and the Dinshawai Incident in the same year of 1906, led to the expression of anti-Imperialist ire and the rapid politicisation of the country. Egypt’s intellectual elite disseminated radical ideas among the entire population, triggering a dynamic that would propel the people towards the 1919 Revolution.

Anti-British resentment intensified under the Protectorate as there was widespread consensus in Egypt that the country had been plundered by a colonising power during the First World War. This galvanised the nationalist consciousness as never before as the British presence had evolved from a “Veiled Protectorate” to direct “Wartime Imperialism”.

Thesis Abstract
The wartime and post-War period saw the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson internationalise the rhetoric of self-determination as attempts were made at moulding a new world order. Wilson’s words had a great appeal to Egyptian nationalists who viewed these promises as an opportunity to break away from British colonial rule. It was in fact Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the Russian Bolshevik leader, who had spent fourteen years between 1903 and 1917 theorising the concept of “self-determination”, before Wilson globalised it as a “legitimising” ideal. The ideological rivalry between the two politicians during the war era certainly helped to create an “international self-determination moment” – one that would have resounding repercussions for the Egyptian nationalist movement.

A wide range of disaffected groups coalesced around the call for independence by the nationalist leader Sa’ad Zaghlul during the March 1919 Revolution. Wilson’s Fourteen Points – the American President’s heady principles – infused unprecedented expectations into downtrodden Egyptian activist circles. But Zaghlul underlined the paradox between discourse at the Paris Conference and British actions in the real world. There was a deep irony in the sight of a brutal British Army subduing nationalist hopes in Egypt, while these same hopes were being put forward in Paris as the very basis of reformed international arrangements.

The feminist element to this movement was particularly powerful, as women rallied under the “Egypt for the Egyptians” slogan. But as always, they were used as convenient and efficient expedient personnel to attain political goals and not gender equality. Bitterness and disillusionment were nonetheless a drive for Egyptian women determined to pursue their cause for emancipation.

Intense turmoil generated panic among those upholding British rule, and showed how ill-prepared they were to deal with the situation. This culminated in the transformation of Anglo-Egyptian colonial relations, as Egypt achieved nominal independence in 1922.
Acknowledgements

This thesis would not have been possible without the incredible support of staff at the London School of Economics, and particularly my supervisor, Dr Kirsten Schulze. I had just left my position as a Lectrice at Oxford University, and knew very little about London, let alone the city’s universities, when I approached Kirsten about joining the LSE’s International History programme. I have never looked back, enjoying one of the most fulfilling periods of my academic career. I am indebted to the International History Department as a whole, and indeed to the Middle East Centre. The LSE is a School of excellence in every way, and I am immensely proud of my time here.

Special thanks must also go to Professor David Stevenson, the previous Head of Department of International History at the LSE. David specialises in the First World War – a crucial subject as far as my own thesis is concerned. His lectures were unmissable, as were his acclaimed books.

Dr Antony Best has also helped me enormously, especially in the organisation of overseas research trips. Professor Nigel Ashton reviewed my upgrade material and was always available to offer advice. It was Nigel who contacted the Egyptian National Archives to make sure that I could gain entry at seemingly impossible hours! I ended up spending so much time with the archivists in Cairo that many became friends, and this happened in other archives across the world, including London and Washington D.C.: many thanks to all of them.

I am also grateful to the scholars, politicians, and other influential thinkers who agreed to meet me and share their ideas. Last, but by no means least, I would like to acknowledge my family and closest friends for bearing with me during a period of intense study. All know who they are, and how important they were. Due to my massive enthusiasm for this thesis, and the amount of time I have spent discussing it with them, some know my work almost as well as I do!
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Introduction:
The Arguments of the Thesis and Historiographical Review

Using a few words to encapsulate the importance of a subject which came to dominate his distinguished career, the British journalist, diplomat and historian Sir Valentine Chirol (1852 – 1929) wrote towards the end of his life: “The Egyptian question is bound up with a large part of the world’s history for the last hundred years.”¹

That this view was held by a passionate Imperialist committed to the protection and indeed expansion of the British Empire in no way undermines its strength. Anyone looking to understand and explain world affairs – and particularly Middle Eastern affairs – over the past two centuries would certainly do well to centre their studies on Egypt. Factors which have prevailed over the country’s history throughout this period have included the fight between foreign powers for strategic and economic interests within its borders, and the rise of militant Islam. Such issues are crucial in the modern world, with an analysis of their effect on Egypt’s recent history providing universal lessons.

While numerous academic titles have been an inspiration for this research, professional and personal contact with Khaled Saʿad Zaghlul, the grandson of the national hero of the 1919 Revolution and former reporter for the French edition of the newspaper Al-Ahram, has also been a source of motivation. Saʿad Zaghlul was the key figure of the anti-British Revolution. Although much has been written about Saʿad Zaghlul this thesis proposes different theoretical, diplomatic and political insights.

A fruitful collaboration with Khaled Saʿad Zaghlul has facilitated access to invaluable, original documents held in Egypt on the topic. This allowed for a new perspective on the development of the Egyptian nationalist movement and on the colonial relations between the British and the Egyptians in an immediate post-war era vastly influenced by America.

The book grew out of a series of articles he contributed to The Times from Egypt between October 1919 and April 1920.
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This thesis traces the modern origins of nationalism in Egypt to the ‘Urabi Revolt in the late nineteenth century. Specifically, it presents a novel historiographical framework that challenges the view held by most scholars of Egyptian nationalism that regards the revolt to have been a mere “proto-nationalist” expression of an Egyptian national consciousness in its infancy. Not only do we highlight the profoundly nationalistic nature of ‘Urabi’s movement – one determined to gain political freedom from both the British and Ottoman Empires – but we also demonstrate its distinctly Islamic character. This is done by examining the significant contribution of the religious scholars to the intellectual articulation of nationalistic thought. Both aspects – nationalistic and Islamic – have been greatly underplayed by wider academic theories pertaining to the advancement of particular nationalisms in the Muslim world.

Crucially, this thesis aims at bridging a gap between Western and Oriental history by adding an Egyptian dimension to a field which has largely been covered through an Anglo-Saxon or purely Egyptian lens. This work is therefore an attempt to provide a thorough and fresh multi-lateral approach to this question by uniting and comparing disparate literature from five countries – the United Kingdom, Egypt, the United States of America, Russia, and France, where the Paris Peace Conference took place after the First World War in 1919. A paramount angle of this examination – and a considerable strength – is that it relies on the domestic and diplomatic archives of most of these countries.

Another major theoretical argument of this thesis discusses at length the political application of nationalism, which is the principle of self-determination – a concept that seeks to base politics on the nation-state as a sovereign entity. During the war, diplomatic language came to encompass Wilson’s notion of “self-determination”. The U.S. President imbued this rhetoric with his very personal comprehension of morality and what was right for a new world order. Wilson’s legitimising utterances had, in fact, appropriated Lenin’s views of “self-determination” and had given them a new orientation. Indeed, the idea of “self-determination” that had such an abiding influence on the 1919 Egyptian Revolution has its roots in Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s political discourse during the period 1903 to 1917. The difference was that the Russian had championed self-determination as liberty and equality for all, including freedom from colonisation and the right to an independent state. Lenin conceded that violent revolution could be justified if the ultimate goal was freedom as equal rights. In turn, Wilson’s reaction to Lenin’s uncompromising ideology was to project “self-determination” as a stabilising standard that would ensure peace globally. Lenin’s
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terminology thus provided the trigger to Wilson internationalising the phrase in 1918, as the world considered the First World War and its aftermath. In this sense, Wilson developed the philosophy of “self-determination” from a radical doctrine into a liberal-conservative one.

Thus it was the pronouncements of both leaders, made in the context of wartime competing stances, which contributed to the emergence of an “international self-determination moment”. The much-vaunted, rhetorical idealism of mainly western statesmen at the post-war Paris Peace Conference in 1919 certainly stirred a nationalist consciousness in Egypt. However, Egyptians were only too well aware that lofty beliefs about self-determination had done nothing to prevent the British from using maximum force to crush a popular uprising in their own country. The pragmatic, and far from utopian, reality was that the Egyptian Revolution grew directly out of the Peace Conference which took place in the French capital in January 1919.

The immediate post-First World War period was a watershed in the transformation of colonial relations vis-à-vis countries like Egypt. Not only was it a time when Egyptian nationalism gathered an unstoppable momentum, but it culminated in a genuinely grass-roots insurgency perceived as the first modern revolution. This is to say that it saw religious, economic, political, class and even gender determinants all converging. In equally contemporary fashion, it also demonstrated the power of both elitist and populist opinion. This was manifested in the views of the highbrow, intellectual individual Egyptians who eventually made their way to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, to the comments of the journalists who produced Egypt’s burgeoning popular press at the time. Mass wartime mobilisation in the countryside led to nationalist resentment spreading out of the cities and towns, across the whole country, as an entire people began to focus their ire on the British Empire.

For the first time in history, upper-class Egyptian women participated in rioting: they openly demonstrated for a political purpose and thus showed their solidarity with the nationalist cause. Nationalism was an obvious vehicle for feminist demands too. So it was that two dynamic and overlapping groups – nationalists and feminists – merged to create a formidable campaigning force which would have a compelling effect on the progress of Egyptian society. Radical calls for change being made by a pioneering women’s movement strengthened the agenda for self-rule. In turn, feminists benefitted from their close association with the nationalists, using their connections to build up their own power base. However, we argue that after Egypt won nominal independence
1922, many of the male nationalists who had assisted those fighting for female equality became less enthusiastic about the women’s crusade. Feminists learned a crucial lesson from this development – they could only really succeed if they established their own independent political organisation.

In this section we review a number of frameworks to attempt to explain this sense of disillusionment experienced by Egyptian feminists in the wake of the 1919 Revolution. We put forward varied theories to analyse the changes in the roles and status of women, from the Arab world and beyond, following their contribution to revolutionary moments in their own societies. It is through this scholarly prism that we assess the Revolution of 1919 as a turning point in the history of Egyptian feminism. We conclude that the Egyptian feminist movement was a derivative of western feminism; a by-product of the nationalist struggle; and that it only came into being after the nationalist gains were achieved.

All of the above mentioned actors played a decisive part in obtaining Egypt’s nominal independence, and forging a spirit of citizenship that would ultimately allow all sections of society to engage in the democratic running of their country.

This thesis adopts both a thematic and chronological approach and we will now, in turn, focus on the salient historiographical themes under study in order to provide theoretical and methodological guidelines to our research.

The Theoretical Tension between Islam and Nationalism in the specific context of the ‘Urabi Revolt of 1879-1882 in Egypt

The theory and historiography of Islam’s place in the rise of nationalism in the Muslim world has developed considerably over recent decades, but there is a marked absence of specific case studies related to this field. Our first chapter is therefore an attempt to redress the balance, by focusing on empirical evidence displaying the impact the Muslim faith had on nationalist aspirations in Egypt.

We specifically draw on new theoretical perspectives of nation and nationalism while offering key experiences in the history of the country between the years 1879-1882 as an example of how important Islam was to the progress of nationalism. Events such as the ‘Urabi Revolt illustrate how Egyptians became the first large Muslim group to fight for their own nation within the Ottoman Empire.
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There was of course opposition to the Ottoman Sultan throughout the nineteenth century, in all parts of the Empire. But the Egyptian nationalistic revolt came at a time when the Ottoman Empire was by no means facing collapse, as it was at the end of the First World War in 1918, when nationalism turned into a commanding tool for change.\(^2\)

Most of those exploring Egyptian nationalism have analysed Colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi’s dissenting movement as one composed of indigenous revolutionaries who took on the local elite in Egypt, and also European colonial forces who were backing those in power, between 1879 and 1882. But scholars have stopped short of acknowledging such a course of action as out-and-out, advanced nationalism. Instead, they have portrayed the revolt as being one inspired by a partially formed sense of nationalist consciousness that was far removed from the kind which would gain real ground in the decades ahead. It was contended that ‘Urabi and his followers were political players merely involved in a formative stage of Egyptian nationalism. However, we suggest in Chapter One a more comprehensive interpretation of the ‘Urabi Revolt of 1879-1882.

There have, over the past half a century, been numerous theories about nationalism put forward. These can be broken down into the modernist theory, ethno-symbolist theory, primordialist theory, and perennialist theory. Modernists view nationalism as beginning predominantly in an industrialised Europe. Primordialism focuses on primordial – or fundamental – factors such as speaking a specific language, or living in a community based on specific rituals. Ethno-symbolism concentrates on the distinctive symbols, values and traditions that bond modern nations. Perennialists, meanwhile, argue that nations have existed for as long as people have lived together in communities. In spite of an expanding body of theoretical studies about nationalism, there is a restricted number of research works covering the link between Islam and nationalism, and particularly the influence religion has had on the emergence of nations across the Muslim world. This amounts to a notable insufficiency in close probes about nations and nationalism. Chapter One will therefore contribute towards explaining the way Islam has played a part in the development of a nationalist consciousness.

As far as definitions of nation and nationalism are concerned, we will use those of sociologist and historian Anthony Smith, who acknowledges the significance of history to the nation and views it as

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being focused on a pre-existing group sharing common elements, including a culture and economy. Smith describes a nation as:

… a named human population occupying a historic territory or homeland and sharing common myths and memories; a mass, public culture; a single economy; and common rights and duties for all members.³

We will also employ Smith’s definition of nationalism as:

... an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential “nation”.⁴

Apart from Anthony Smith, Ernest Gellner and John Armstrong, historians have largely neglected historiographical works on specific nationalisms as they apply to the Muslim Middle East.⁵ It has indeed been argued that nationalism is in fact incompatible with Islam because both concepts are seemingly defined by contrasting characteristics.

In the case of nationalism, theories overwhelmingly highlight how communities harness shared ground features and prevalent components of identity, while being set within manifest geographical boundaries. It is maintained that such boundaries are far less relevant as it pertains to Islam. Instead, Islam is based on the Umma (the international community of Muslims) which transcends nationhood. The Umma is an historic and universal idea, one that links citizens from potentially very different backgrounds according to religious faith: the principles and teachings behind the Umma are the principal bonds of unity between them.⁶


⁵The historian Paul Lalor highlights this academic deficit in ‘Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East’, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 5, no. 2, 1999, p.303.

⁶Erwin I.J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern National State, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1965, p.3. The Umma is described by Rosenthal and others as the “universal Islamic community of believers”. This community traces its roots back to the era of the Prophet Muhammad and the “original Umma of Medina”. Following the Prophet’s death, the Umma was headed by Caliphs who were viewed as “spiritual as well as temporal rulers”. See also pp.ix-xx and pp.3-11.
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As the first chapter of our thesis will demonstrate, however, this notion of *Umma* does not exclude the possibility of Muslims supporting nationalism. Since the birth of Islam, the *Umma* has covered a huge part of the world. It has encompassed varied groups of people from disparate ethnic, cultural, and linguistic communities, within separate geographical areas. Islam creates overarching ties based on religious belief and practice, and expressed in terms such as “brotherhood”.

Thus the objective of Chapter One is to offer a theoretical analysis of Islam’s impact on nationalism, using Egypt as a case study. Through investigating the ascendency of nationalism in Egypt in the late nineteenth century, we will demonstrate the effect the ‘ulama – or religious scholars – had on defining the foundations of the nation. The widely held scholarly thesis that the power and influence of the ‘ulama were stifled by modernisation during the reign of Muhammad ‘Ali and rulers that came after him in Egypt is also challenged.

During the nineteenth century, the ‘ulama experienced huge blows to their prestige, and indeed to their estates. Reforms led to them losing land and wealth. New educational policies in Egypt, combined with a move towards the centralisation of power all counted against the religious scholars. Many ‘ulama were extremely conservative, and opposed to any type of reform, and thus not obviously approving of such rapid change. Academics noted that the ‘ulama struggled to retain positions of authority within an increasingly centralised form of government and bureaucracy. Instead they were relegated to the edges of political and administrative processes.

There are three Egyptian nationalist Muslim scholars of the nineteenth century whose careers and works will be considered in Chapter One, as we examine how Islam influenced nationalism in Egypt in the nineteenth century. The views of Rifa’a Badawi Rafi’ al-Tahtawi, Muhammad ‘Abduh, and Sheikh Husayn al-Marsafi are particularly important to theoretical discussions on Islam’s place in the transmission of nationalistic thoughts. Analysis shows that many of the distinct attributes of the nation state are in fact inherent within the *Umma* too. Elements such as language, history, geography and culture can be as much of a bond within the *Umma* as they are within a nation. These three popular thinkers have also played a crucial part in expanding the debate about nationalism in Egypt into a wider one, so emphasizing all-encompassing properties that can be applied to other nationalism case studies. They were among the first group of Islamic scholars to underscore how the *Umma* and the nation were not just compatible, but indeed that religious belief and practice were

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necessary to those trying to forge a nationalist spirit. They stressed how Egyptians gradually acquired a powerful sense of nationhood while they were not just part of the *Umma*, but also subjects of the Ottoman Empire. When these three scholars tackled the issue of nationalism they were only too aware that they had to appraise it within the context of the *Umma* and the Ottoman Empire, because Egyptians were emotionally and culturally attached to both. These intellectuals saw few contradictions between religious faith and practice and national pride. In fact, they were convinced that a greater consciousness of Egyptian nationalism would make the *Umma* stronger.

In Chapter One we focus on the standing of the Egyptian ‘ulama in the years 1879–1882 and in particular the above three Islamic writers as we apply their work to the four principal political areas of thought at the time as they related to Islam. They are: firstly, the ascent of nationalist reasoning and action during the ‘Urabi Revolt; secondly, dissent aimed at Egypt’s governing Khedive; thirdly, Egypt’s relationship with the Ottoman Empire; and finally the invasion and subsequent occupation of Egypt by the British in September 1882. As they considered such critical matters, the ‘ulama offered ideas that were far from conventional. Contrary to common misconception, there was no single, uniform ‘ulama view of any of these subjects. Instead, the arguments in Chapter One show that there were nuanced religious scholars who were not only in favour of nationalism, but indeed played important roles in the Egyptian nationalist movement. They helped to analyse their country’s changing status within the Ottoman Empire and the *Umma*, while also providing new perspectives about the nature of communities and reform in a modernising Egypt.

We suggest in Chapter One that the religious scholars were not as negatively affected by the transformation of Egypt as has been made out. Rather, the ‘ulama managed to keep hold of a significant portion of their power. Our analysis also points to reforms specifically directed at undermining the ‘ulama not being carried out in full, or even in part. The impression that the ‘ulama were deeply traditional and had a wholly conservative outlook on society that held back progress through rigidly implementing teachings laid out centuries before is certainly one that historians are moving away from. Historiographical research reveals that there were both reformist and conservative ‘ulama who were prepared to endorse modernisation, and the popular movement calling for Egypt to be independent. The scholars deemed that such a state of affairs would be entirely befitting the country’s Islamic heritage.
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As far as methodology is concerned, records of the productions of religious scholars are of course key to understanding their relationship with power politics, and particularly Egyptian nationalism. The ‘ulama were heavily involved in political affairs in Egypt. The rise of an Egyptian nationalist movement at the end of the nineteenth century, and its clashes with the British and Ottoman Empires, as well as – locally – with the Khedive and privileged Turco-Circassian Army officers, were the primary historical events of the era, and the ‘ulama were engaged in all of them.

It must be emphasised that the ‘ulama stretched across the Islamic world, and indeed across Egypt during the nineteenth century. They had positions within religious institutions, but also in schools and universities, as well as in the Egyptian legal and bureaucratic systems, and trade groups and numerous other organisations. Thus we decided to concentrate on ‘ulama who, because of their intellectual output and reputation, would be regarded as an elite.

The higher ranking ‘ulama were assisted by juniors who would not generally challenge the views of their seniors. Our approach is to consider discourse among these senior and highly respected religious scholars as largely reflecting the arguments taking place among all ‘ulama. Scholars who were not part of the elite took on the role of spreading messages including the rulings of their seniors to Muslim worshippers across Egypt. This system did not tend to depend on the written word but instead on devout people committing information to memory, just as they were encouraged to memorise the Quran, so as to preserve its purity. The belief is that writing extracts of texts down might lead to mistakes, and thus becomes a corruption of what is meant to be communicated.

However, the elite ‘ulama we focus on also promoted their ideas in books and in newspaper articles, often collecting all of their fatawa – the Arabic word for opinions – in volumes of literature. Accounts of material elite ‘ulama may have registered in spoken debates is of course limited, and much of it is likely to be undiscovered. In these circumstances, particular reliance is placed on the known published works of the scholars reviewed here. Our analysis of the ‘ulama’s standpoints on Egyptian nationalism as it specifically related to the ‘Urabi Revolt is thus positioned in a far more wide-ranging academic conversation about the influence of Islam on nationalism.
“War Imperialism” & its Impact on Political Awareness in Egypt

A nationalist movement cannot operate within a vacuum so, naturally, must be investigated within the social, political and economic developments of the country in which it took form and thrived. It is, therefore, the purpose of the thesis to examine and discuss the immediate pre- and post-First World War contexts which boosted the nationalist campaign in Egypt so significantly, stimulating it to success. In particular, the thesis is preoccupied by two major and correlated themes: the impact of a global conflict on the political awareness of a colonised people.

As so often, the War was a huge catalyst of change. The Wafd’s novel brand of nationalism, which so surprised the British, was based upon the legacy of Egypt’s extensive participation in the First World War – a conflict which exposed the country to a range of previously unheard of hardships, and indeed, altered the entire social face of the country. It notably transformed the nationalist movement from one mainly involving an educated urban elite into one supported by an extremely broad cross-section of socio-economic groups.

Crucially, British military rule during the War had huge implications on the life of the Egyptians. Their country had been a highly strategic operational station for the Empire, with the garrisons administering local populations with as much ruthlessness as they fought. Martial law was implemented on 2 November 1914, meaning censorship was imposed and public assemblies banned.

The Mediterranean Expeditionary Force had, by the early months of 1915, adopted Egypt as a base. Later on in the same year, an Egyptian Expeditionary Force had been raised to fight in the Palestinian theatre of war, leading to a vast increase in military logistical demands. Accordingly, civilians were called upon to supply “labour, transport and animals and fodder”. Conscription was effectively instated under the pretext of recruiting volunteers, with entire villages seeing their male labour forces disappearing, often almost overnight. Light railways in the Sinai were built by an Egyptian Labour Corps and a Camel Transport Corps which had drafted no less than 500,000 people in total. Animals and crops had to be handed over by peasant communities to the British soldiers they were working for. Local cotton and fodder were forcibly purchased at well below market price, as British and Commonwealth troops flooded major cities and towns.

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Such mandatory collections, combined with other levies, led to growing discontent, not least of all in the countryside.

Egypt was by no means a belligerent country at the time, but it could not escape the social and economic repercussions of the War. National morale was acutely negatively affected by the presence of British forces on Egyptian soil, with feelings of anger and frustration becoming harder and harder to placate. This overwhelming sense of dissatisfaction built up as if in a pressure cooker, with nationalists constantly looking for a time and place to vent their emotions.

An evolution of far-reaching significance following the establishment of the Protectorate was the end of *de jure* suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. Egypt’s new legal status ushered in a considerably novel phase in its political life, with pan-Islamism no longer an objective. Nationalists could concentrate on winning freedom for Egypt rather than championing religious affinities with fellow believers in other countries. In summary, what happened was that Egypt’s nationalists won numerous supporters from the country’s non-Muslim communities, thus acquiring the necessary secular basis to gain power. The new nationalist movement was an explicitly secular one, uniting all indigenous Egyptians including the Coptic Christian minority, alongside the Muslim majority.

There is little doubt that the leaders of the 1919 Revolution perceived no direct connection between what they were trying to do and what nationalists in other Arab countries were attempting to achieve. This lack of parallel nationalism was evident in both the ideology and the action of the Wafdist. As far as their programmatic agenda was concerned, the manifestos and other public pronouncements of the Wafdist, Watanist, and other political parties in this revolutionary period simply ignored all links with other Arab nationalist movements in Western Asia. An inspection of Sa’ad Zaghlul’s speeches makes plain that, other than passing references to Egyptians as “the sons of Pharaonic civilisation and of Arabic civilisation” or to the involvement of Egyptian Bedouin Arabs in the nationalist movement, the pre-eminent leader of the Egyptian Revolution paid no attention whatsoever, either to the Arab dimension of Egypt or to a possible tie between Egyptian and Arab nationalism.\(^\text{10}\)

Another important situation which emerged out of the austere war conditions was a growing interest in politics. The *effendiya* (aspirational, middle-class people originally from a modest background) in particular began to involve themselves in political matters. The ground was prepared for them by the

\(^{10}\text{Ibid., p.107.}\)
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fastest advancement in education since Muhammad Ali’s reign. Suffering under the British Occupation gave the activists ideas about how to galvanise and organise people. Repression by the military authorities further enhanced their consciousness. As a result, the politicisation of the masses had also become inevitable.\(^{11}\) This widespread phenomenon allowed the *Wafd* to interact with the great part of society, and indeed to mobilise them towards action.

Awareness of the British stranglehold on the wartime economy had greatly increased as the war effort intensified. People could see Imperial influence on almost every sphere of day-to-day life as society, and especially the economy, was geared towards victory. In this sense British rule became an obvious focus for popular dissent.\(^{12}\) Professionals who were dissatisfied, chiefly lawyers and civil servants, were able to transmit Wafdist ideals to towns and villages, as well as to isolated rural communities. Workers belonging to social clubs and unions like the Manual Trade Workers Union were particularly targeted by these well-informed elites who were trying to get their message to as wide an audience as possible.\(^{13}\) Vatikiotis emphasises the importance of the committed educated elite as they formed a network between both the privileged aristocratic leadership in Cairo (who had always had problems with communicating with often illiterate countryside dwellers) and other members of the population.\(^{14}\)

After the War, most relinquished the *Watani* Party (which had concentrated on traditional nationalism, but was blighted by outmoded methods of political action and poor command) to join the *Wafd* Party under the dynamic leadership of Sa’ad Zaghlul. There was no possibility of the Egyptians being left untouched by the effects of the War. Almost all elements of society came to view the British Protectorate as an alien body interfering with, and indeed exploiting, their social, economic and cultural life. As the tension built up, the need for a radical response became cardinal, with wholesale independence as the number one demand.

\(^{11}\) Chirol, *op. cit.*, pp.151-52.
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Additionally, the post-war conditions of the world were distinguished by features which had an impact on the nationalist movement in Egypt – notably the American attempt to impose its own version of peace internationally.15

So it was that the grassroots base for a popular revolution was laid down by the strain caused by martial law, censorship, and the First World War. When combined with President Wilson’s Fourteen Points, this pressure became unassailable.16 It was now all a matter of coordination between those political circles and the masses.

An “International Self-Determination Moment”

Diplomacy in the early twentieth century became focused on “self-determination” as a concept that could be used to justify policy and, in particular, the creation of independent nation-states. Accordingly, the fourteen years during which Lenin theorised “self-determination” between 1903 and 1917 were hugely significant to getting the principle on to the global agenda and to comprehending its future international references. While mentions on the subject would not generally be framed around Lenin’s radical socialist ideology,17 the Russian’s work was still vital as regards equating the implementation of self-determination with independent nationhood. The notion of self-determination thus sanctioned the formation of these new states.

Lenin’s “negative” interpretation of liberty was also crucial. His definition of self-determination meant freedom from a variety of negatives, ranging from colonial domination and inequality to exploitation. The need to break free from oppression was, for example, part of a legitimising standard that permitted violence to be used. Thus negatives had positive moral associations. This iconoclastic approach to self-determination – one tied up in Lenin’s Marxist view of freedom – was to go head-to-head with Wilson’s more liberal-conservative outlook.

Worldwide debates about “self-determination” were increasingly dominated by Wilson’s liberal-conservative vision, but Lenin’s more revolutionary stance by no means disappeared. On the

15Salama Musa, Tarbiyat Salama Musa (The Raising of Salama Musa), Cairo, Dar al-Katib al-Misri, 1958, p.123.
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contrary, the Russian’s discourse on “self-determination” had prompted Wilson to internationalise the term in the first place. By 1917, Lenin had been grappling with it for fourteen years, and its conceptual and political insertion into wartime rivalries on the world stage was down to him. If it had not been for Lenin’s work in this respect, Wilson may not have reacted to it altogether, as the U.S. president popularised the expression at the end of the War in 1918.

Wilson’s very personal appreciation of “self-determination” had such influence internationally in terms of desirable values such as peace, stability and equality that it was difficult to oppose. Although loosely defined, the Wilsonian interpretation of “self-determination” was so closely affiliated with positives that it stood out as a moral norm in itself. Wilson had kept it out of the League of Nations Covenant, but it would soon be enshrined in literature relating to the League’s Aaland Islands case of 1920-21. Later still, “self-determination” would be integrated in international law when it featured in the 1945 UN Charter. With the tenet gaining more traction, it was presented as Wilson’s own. It was. Wilson’s views were paramount.

As Wilson came to personify “self-determination” across the world, elements of his statements and policies that had not even cited it were attached to it. Vague and contentious quotations linked to “self-determination” also meant it was construed in varying ways – not all of them ones which Wilson would have approved of. Order and peace were the priority after the rhetoric of “self-determination” was dropped from the League Covenant, only for the terminology to actually be applied via the mandate system. Wilson was mainly in favour of stability and mature political agency, and he managed to put this set of recommendations into the international debate about “self-determination”. Interchanging “self-determination” and “consent of the governed”, as Wilson did, allowed him to employ the formula without it translating into the necessity to form new, independent states. This opened the way for the academic theory of “internal self-determination”, which implied that “self-determination” could be implemented within existing states, including colonial ones, for the sake of a safe world.

Wilson’s legitimising discourse had, in fact, appropriated Lenin’s views of “self-determination” and had given them a new orientation. The difference was that the Russian had championed self-determination as liberty and equality for all, including freedom from colonisation and the right to an independent state. Lenin wanted ordinary people to work out their own destinies in specific cases, rather than leaving their fate to their leaders. Lenin conceded that violent revolution could be justified if the ultimate goal was freedom as equal rights.

In turn, Wilson’s reaction to Lenin’s theories was to project “self-determination” as a stabilising standard that would ensure peace in the world. Peace was always a prime consideration, and it therefore warranted self-determination. Besides, unlike Lenin, Wilson’s perspective on equality was solely interested in advanced states, within which his controversial conception of self-determination could flourish. Wilson’s appraisal of “self-determination as consent of the governed” allowed rulers to act without the consent of those ruled, and indeed in direct opposition to their popular will, as long as non-interference was the result. Thus Wilson had outlined self-determination as a device that abled those in charge to clamp down on forces that threatened their power. In this manner, Wilson had diminished the idea of liberty inherent in “self-determination”.

Beyond the contrasting natures of the Lenin and Wilson stances on “self-determination”, both evaluations had a built in “let-out clause” which fitted in with both men’s backgrounds and ideological positions. Lenin ultimately wanted to establish international socialism, putting the emphasis on socialists – and his own leadership, in particular – as to when and where his conceptualisation might be enacted. President Wilson, in turn, saw international stability as the primary issue, and everything else had to be focused on that aim. In the meantime, the argument was that it would be up to moral leaders like Wilson to agree that the right pre-requisites had been fulfilled before self-determination was granted.

Nowadays President Wilson is considered as the “father” of “self-determination” and there is no doubt that it was him who ensured that the creed was spread around the world. This internationalisation led to his ideas becoming more established and authoritative in the post-First World War era and beyond. It is likely that the ultimate victory of liberal-conservative values during this period meant Wilson’s posture was more widely embraced than Lenin’s in international affairs.

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20 It is historian John Breuilly who coined this expression.
Both world leaders had instilled their own views into their rhetoric about “self-determination”, leaving it to the international community and peoples worldwide to work out which they would take up. While Wilson’s manifestos were more internationally influential, both notions of self-determination informed future struggles for liberty.

There were marked differences between the direct environment in which Wilson and Lenin formulated their convictions concerning “self-determination”. Wilson’s were focused on self-determination petitions during a particularly tumultuous two decades of world history, and they were made when Wilson was President of the USA. Thus his declarations were expressed in relation to international diplomacy and realpolitik when he was at the height of his power. America itself was enjoying increased global prestige, yet Wilson was not constrained by the need to win elections, or ensure the approval of his colleagues.

In contrast, Lenin articulated his thoughts far more theoretically, setting them within the wider subject of Marxist revolution. He concentrated on the doctrinal “correctness” of self-determination as it might apply to reality. At the time, Lenin was fighting for power within his party, and all of his views were advanced within the framework of Marxist ideology, and the passionate in-house debates that characterised socialist party politics. Both Lenin and Wilson wanted to succeed in the propaganda battle during the war, and in the post-war period, so as to enhance their moral ascendancy and, subsequently, increase their appeal to audiences worldwide. Numerous diplomatic historians have analysed President Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech in great detail, and it is by no means our intention to do so in this work, but rather to give prominence to its significance. It is particularly noteworthy that Wilson spoke a week after being given an English language edition of a document in which the Bolsheviks asked the Allies to explain their ambitions for the First World War, in the context of “self-determination”. The Fourteen Points suggested specific cases of land arrangement agreements for Europe and indeed the Ottoman Empire, including for its Arab subjects, that would be linked to Wilson’s understanding on self-determination. Such practical plans certainly emboldened Egyptian nationalists and convinced them that they should strive for complete self-determination for themselves.
“On Revolution”

It would be easy to rely on a solely rational, scientific approach in an enquiry into nationalism in Egypt in the build up to the country’s 1919 Revolution. Verifiable evidence is readily available to back up theories about a concerted move towards independence – one supported by Egyptians of all backgrounds. However, there is no reason why more subjective accounts of this dynamic movement should be discarded. National history is often written in proud, triumphalist language, and in Egypt, records of nationalist leader Sa’ad Zaghlul’s life are, for example, often given a reverential treatment which might be considered inappropriate.

In fact, the generally florid and overblown language of the patriotic historian can provide an interpretation of reality which greatly adds to the history of a defined period. The Revolution of 1919 was first and foremost a nationalistic one, and expressions of nationalist pride provide very useful experiences about the mood of the time, and indeed the thought processes and circumstances which brought about such radical change.

Many of the men and women behind the development of Egyptian nationalism in the immediate pre-and post-First World War period admired western philosophy and culture, but still had to struggle against its colonial manifestation. Having rejected the West through their revolution, many historians in countries such as Egypt concentrated on producing narratives which have been written off as propaganda and polemic.

While politicians invariably use their country’s history as a tool to influence public opinion, and indeed to win them over to supporting both policy and strategy, scientific methods are expected of the historian. But this does not preclude considering the patriotic, idealised, and sometimes politically motivated bias in writing history in tandem with the more thorough, sober inclination.

As an example, our descriptions of the events of the 1919 Revolution in Chapter Five are by no means over-reliant on a Report drawn up by the Egyptian Delegation which offers a detailed chronicle of the clashes between demonstrators and Empire troops. In fact, we deliberately quote extensively from it to give the Egyptians “a say”. That does not suggest a lack of critical distance or indeed naivety, especially so as the brutal repressions they recount through eye-witness testimonies are something that the British authorities have also kept archives of.
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What is crucial, however, is that reflection on the more subjective expositions of Egypt’s recent history should be viewed against the background of decolonisation and nation-building in the pre- and post-revolutionary period, and the degree to which Egyptian historians have responded to official guidelines. Rather than dismissing certain versions, all should be welcomed as contributing to the historiography of the time.

Following the above discussion about the writing of the national history, this historiographical review will focus on the varied perspectives on the independence struggle of 1919 held by different writers. In this respect, the thesis is principally concerned with three aspects which illustrate the wide range of interpretations on specific developments. A fundamental facet of the thesis is that it highlights the historiographical division between “Western” and Egyptian sources, as the terminology used is crucial to placing the actions into a certain historical context. The thesis is also set to engage in a debate within Arabic literature itself on the Revolution, and on the part played by Saʿad Zaghlul in particular. Another major dimension of the revolution is that it brought to the fore a new brand of Egyptian nationalism – that is to say a true combination of the aspirations of an educated elite and the wishes of the popular classes. In order to understand how the two spheres came to coalesce, the thesis embarks on a thorough study of both the press and religion and their role in the dissemination of nationalist ideas.

There is a clear distinction between the Egyptian and Western lexicon pertaining to the radical events of 1919. Egyptian literature unanimously refers to the forceful protests as a “Revolution”. Western historiography, however, tends to resort to a whole array of qualifications relating to the scale of the dissent. Thus, alternative words are often used in Anglo-Saxon writings to describe the bloody confrontation between British soldiers and the Egyptian population in the spring of 1919. These include terms such as “unrest”, “trouble”, “crisis”, “events”, “protests”, “riots”, “uprising”, “insurrection”, “rebellion” or – at the most extreme – “revolt”. Sometimes the clashes do not even get a mention. The chasm in the usage of vocabulary is far from being just superficial. Instead it reflects a profound divergence of perceptions. For the Egyptian historiography, what happened in March 1919 was a key historical moment – hence the widespread reference to “Thawra” – Revolution – in Egyptian sources. Descriptions of the Revolution in Egyptian history books insist on the sudden and powerful way the Egyptian population as a whole rose up against British rule. In

contrast, the terminology adopted in British history in general depreciates the nature and indeed the extent of this watershed in modern Egyptian history. The revolution is thus at times reduced to a mere “agitation”, “disturbance” or “disorder”. At other times, it is perceived as a significant occurrence, a critical and unstable time, or a localised act of popular defiance to attempt to overthrow the established authority.

Interestingly enough, John Darwin makes a contradictory analysis of the revolution as he first tries to minimise it and then recognises its singularity. Darwin begins by depicting the Revolution as a “classic” colonial revolt. He praises Lord Milner for his efforts in attempting to find a peaceful co-existence (“modus vivendi”) with the nationalists. In this sense, Darwin harks back to the Cromerian period. But Darwin also concedes that the Wafād represented a genuine and sweeping form of mass mobilisation, rather than a straightforward form of routine “Pasha politics”. Darwin plays down the importance of the Revolution, instead concentrating on the impact the First World War had on the day-to-day running of the British Empire. More generally he looks at the war’s effect on Britain’s entire Imperial position in the world. Darwin poses the theory that the war may well have been the catalyst of a worldwide nationalist spirit which ultimately heralded the end of Empire. Inevitably, Darwin contends, the war did not have such cataclysmic repercussions. He minutely reviews the policy statements and policy execution of British leaders including Lloyd George, Curzon, Milner, Churchill and Montagu. Darwin also analyses the domestic and international policies of the Coalition government. Darwin’s conclusion is that there was “no absolute reduction in British power and influence” at this time. Instead Darwin suggests that the British retreated from what he calls “War Imperialism”, returning “to the methods and constraints which had characterised policy before 1914”. Darwin explains that:

> It was the gradual and selective casting off of temporary additions to Imperial power in a world which had grown less dangerous and more parsimonious, not a nerveless collapse in the face of insurgent nationalism, which best describes the spirit of the Lloyd George coalition's Imperial policy after 1918.  

Although there is a consensus in Egyptian historiography on the phrasing of the popular mobilisation of 1919, perspectives on the revolution and the part played by its leader Sa‘ad Zaghlul

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in particular can differ. These differences are clearly revealed if one considers the most prominent works in Egyptian history. For instance, Lahsin focuses on the figure of Saʿad Zaghlul and his role in Egyptian politics. He makes a number of understatements, most notably in denying Zaghlul his leadership of the nationalist movement. As for Mohammed Ghorbal, in his book entitled *Tarikh al-Mufawadat al-Misriyya al-Britaniyya,* he looks at the bilateral relations between Egypt and Britain. He reproduces the texts of the proposals set out before negotiations and presents them in a literal fashion. Unfortunately, his book does not explain the documents and the conditions under which they were put forward in terms of the political developments in Egypt at the time.

The prolific historian ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i witnessed the Revolution of 1919 as a young man of thirty and then chronicled it in his *Thawrat 1919,* in two volumes. His *Thawrat 1919* serves as one of the most detailed accounts of the revolution and draws on archival material, newspaper articles as well as his personal memories and links with political figures. Together with *Fi Aʿqab al-Thawra al-Misriyya,* vol.1, which deals with the aftermath of the revolution, they constitute a compilation of events arranged in a chronological sequence. Before the War, al-Rafi’i was a member of the *Watani* Party and afterwards served as a member of the lower and upper houses of Parliament. In spite of his political views, al-Rafi’i emphasises Zaghlul’s leadership in the Egyptian revolution. He also expresses his own nationalist feeling in his books when assessing the revolution and the nationalist movement.

As for ‘Abd al-ʿAzim Ramadan, in *Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wataniyya Fi Misr Sanat 1918 ila Sanat 1936,* he overstates the role of Zaghlul, and believes the 1919 Revolution to have been an essential part of his character. This amplification of Zaghlul’s position lessens the importance of the people throughout these events. The study is written in a journalistic style, and the author only uses secondary sources. What appears to be certain is that such works do give a strong idea of the disparity of views in Egyptian literature about this chaotic period.

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27 Al-Rafi’i, *op. cit.*
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At the end of the War, the transformation of nationalism from a dynamic but limited movement driven by an educated elite to a full-scale popular movement was quite incredible. Indeed, the ill-conceived arrest and deportation of the *Wafd* leaders to Malta prompted strikes and mass demonstrations by students, government officials, doctors, lawyers and other professionals, transport workers and women. The truism that economic power invariably lay behind political power and social advancement was also realised by a majority of the population. There is no doubt that the *Wafd* membership had been dominated by senior professionals including lawyers, landowners, bankers, civil servants and medics. They formed the nucleus of a burgeoning middle-class who had an economic stake in the desire for political independence. It was this group which was able to undermine rival Egyptian groups which traditionally supported the British administration, because they had gained so much from it. This politicisation of society meant that the *Wafd* could communicate with the great mass of people, and indeed to galvanise them to action. Chirol reaches the same conclusion when he writes that during the War:

> We had done nothing to gain the confidence of the educated classes, whose impatience at the maintenance of even a veiled Protectorate had been steadily increasing even before the war, and we had for the first time profoundly estranged the agricultural masses that form the vast majority of the population.

As a result, he notes that the politicisation of the masses had become inevitable:

> To the Egyptian masses political theories and arguments had meant nothing before the war. But in Egypt, as in every other country, all the conditions of life, and especially the enormous rise in prices, had produced a wave of social unrest which took many different forms.

Professionals who were dissatisfied with British rule, especially lawyers and civil servants, were able to transmit Wafdist ideals to towns and villages, as well as to isolated rural communities. Workers belonging to social clubs and unions like the Manual Trade Workers Union were particularly targeted by these well-informed elites who were trying to get their message to as wide an audience as possible. Vatikiotis emphasises the importance of the committed educated elite as they formed links with both the privileged aristocratic leadership in Cairo (who had always had

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31 Ibid., p.209.
33 Chirol, *op. cit.*, pp.151-152.
problems interacting with often illiterate countryside dwellers) and other members of the population.\textsuperscript{35}

One fascinating development of the revolution was the appearance of Egyptian women on the barricades. In correspondence with General Sir Edmund Allenby, the newly appointed High Commissioner of Egypt, Saʿad Zaghlul comments upon the extraordinary social change, noting how “the most distinguished women in Egyptian society were not able, on their side, to see their fellow-country-men treated in this way and keep silent about it”.\textsuperscript{36} He adds that:

\begin{quote}
[T]he curtain that ordinarily separates our women of the upper classes from the outside world did not prevent them from expressing their sentiments. In fact, nearly three hundred women of the most important families of Cairo organised on March 20th a simple and dignified manifestation, after they had read in the morning newspapers that permission had been granted them.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

With the deportation of the \textit{Wafd}’s figureheads, Egyptian women took over on the political playground. Thus, Safiyya Zaghlul and Huda Sha’arawi – the wives of the imprisoned \textit{Wafd} leaders – led upper-class veiled women and staged a demonstration against British Occupation. In the countryside, even the \textit{fellahat} (women farmers) disrupted railway and telegraph lines and damaged infrastructure.\textsuperscript{38} It is also important to note that Saʿad Zaghlul’s observations illustrate the relationship between nationalism, Islam and feminist commitments among Egyptian women from the upper-classes.

Margot Badran’s \textit{Feminists, Islam and Nation},\textsuperscript{39} also reflects the intricate link between gender issues, politics and religion in the making of modern Egypt. She has a broader understanding of the nature of feminism in Egypt at that stage as she points out that it involved not only women from different classes (essentially upper- and middle-class), but also male intellectuals, nationalists and Islamic modernists. The writings of Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyid also give particular importance to the growing connection between these different groups whose nationalist-feminist activism was best illustrated during the struggle for independence of 1919-1922. Hourani comments on Lutfi al-Sayyid’s thoughts in these terms:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{35}Vatikiotis, \textit{op. cit.}, p.23.
\textsuperscript{36}Egyptian Delegation Report, \textit{Egyptian Delegation to the Peace Conference: Collection of Official Correspondence from November 11, 1918 to July 14, 1919}, Paris, Published by the Delegation, 1919.
\textsuperscript{37}\textit{Ibid.}, p.38.
\end{quote}
For Lutfi al-Sayyid and his generation, feminism was an essential part of true nationalism, and it was no coincidence that when, a decade later, Egyptian women began to throw off the veil and claim the right to take part in the common life of society, it was as a by-product of the struggle for independence in the early days of the *Wafd*.\(^{40}\)

Although Beth Baron recognises the significance of the 1919 Revolution in relation to the rise of Egyptian feminism, she stresses emphatically women’s involvement in political and feminist affairs in the 19th century, in the context of the birth of the modern state under Mohammed ‘Ali. She thus writes:

> In the case of modern Egypt, historians have highlighted the role of women in the 1919 revolution. Prior to that, women are generally seen as uninvolved in the national struggle. [...] The 1919 revolution is also seen as the pivotal point in the shift from nationalist to feminist activities. Yet this stress has caused scholars to overlook antecedents for women’s nationalist and feminist endeavours as well as bypass non-feminist women and groups in the preceding decades.\(^{41}\)

This quick overview of the association between feminism, nationalism, politics and Islam provides a template for these themes to be discussed in a section of our dissertation.

The educated urban intelligentsia and nationalist elite were not the only ones to have a decisive role in the mobilisation of the masses. The part played by the popular press is often underestimated. Chirol insists that with the revival of Egyptian nationalism, it was the more extreme school of journalism that came to have the strongest influence on popular opinion. Thus he provides the following comment:

> Journalism was not regarded at first as a profession of much account. It attracted chiefly the failures of the Europeanised schools and colleges, whose hopes of employment in the public services had been disappointed, and who were proportionately embittered. The ordinary Egyptian who has a small difference of opinion with his neighbour at once shrieks at the top of his voice, cursing his antagonist’s forebears to the third or fourth generation, whilst the other neighbours gather round to enjoy the ferocious repartees that are bandied about. The newspapers caught that unfortunate habit, and it

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\(^{40}\) Hourani, *op. cit.*, p.182.

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It is widely accepted among scholars that the Wafd’s new type of nationalism cast the pan-Islamic and pro-Ottoman beliefs of its pre-war predecessors as it displayed an ideology rooted in the philosophy of liberal democracy. Chirol, however, argues that there was a close link between Islamic extremism and nationalism, writing at the time:

Nationalism is deeply tinged with Mahomedan fanaticism. There had always been reason to suspect, and for months past it had been very noticeable that almost all the turbulent demonstrations, usually ending in violence, originated in popular gatherings held inside the mosques, where the most fiery speeches could be made with impunity.

Chirol uses the Introduction of his book to describe Egyptian Nationalism as a blend of enlightened political philosophy and extreme religious zeal:

As elsewhere it [British Occupation and intervention] has set in motion forces, in part progressive and in part reactionary, which in Egypt, under the particular impulse given to them by the war, have found expression in a skilfully organised political campaign against the maintenance of the British Protectorate as well as in an explosive outburst of emotional patriotism, never entirely free, in an Oriental and Mahomedan people, from racial and religious passion.

He makes the same point in his conclusion when he asks:

Should we really promote the evolution of the Egyptian people towards nationhood by handing them over to a party which is appealing more and more openly to the reactionary forces of the Islamic world?

These are thus three main angles to the 1919 Revolution which will be covered in the thesis. They are firstly, the importance of phraseology in Western and Egyptian literature in the way it invariably reveals a different political agenda in both cases; secondly, the widely disparate interpretations within Egyptian literature itself. And, thirdly, the essential involvement of the elites, the popular

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42Chirol, op. cit., p.92.
44Chirol, op. cit., p.266.
46Ibid., p.300.
press and religion to gather anti-British support at the grassroots. All three dimensions are crucial as regards grasping an all-encompassing view of mass mobilisation at the time.

**Theories on Egyptian Feminism**

Many theories have been published about the feminist movement in Egypt. One popular way of looking at these ideas is to consider Arab feminist movements as by-products of Western ones.

**Feminism as a by-product of the Western model:**

Western influence could be found in all fields of Egyptian life: economic, political, and social change brought about by exposure to European powers had led to a new manner of thinking. Novel thought processes and perspectives being imported from the West resulted in the role of women changing significantly. These theories are based on the view that female status in any community is centred on both local outlooks and foreign ones.

As part of the primary phase of feminism in Egypt, educated groups of women were exposed to intellectual concepts from abroad, and acted on them. This discourse would have gradually attracted women from other tiers of society. This was the first stage in the development of feminism in Egypt. A hindrance to feminist ideals filtering down from the upper-classes to lower ones was the conservative nature of some sections of society. In certain circles there was a strong suspicion of western values because people were convinced that they threatened their traditional lifestyles, and indeed their beliefs.

**Feminism as a by-product of nationalism:**

Beyond the penetration of Western propositions stimulating feminism in areas such as the Middle East, political action by women could also be a direct result of nationalism. In the case of Egypt, women wanted to liberate their country from British rule, and considered their contribution as women to be essential to the struggle.

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This idea stems from the view that nationalism should be to the advantage of all sections of society, and not just men. Women who were politically active in Egypt between 1919 and 1924 not only displayed their nationalist credentials, but showed how they could be just as effective as men.

While women from the upper-classes dominated the early Egyptian women’s movement, some came from other backgrounds. Some of those joining in street demonstrations were killed by British soldiers, and were thus elevated to the status of national heroes, and indeed martyrs.

The *Wafd* political party accepted women members, and allowed them to take part in these popular demonstrations. They were also involved in other activities against the British Empire, including boycotting British goods. In terms of nationalist success, women certainly contributed to Egypt nominally achieving independence from Britain in 1922.

However, the fact was that this political activism had no immediate influence on attaining emancipation for women. Instead, after the revolution, those who had joined the *Wafd* and campaigned so effectively were expected to return to their traditional roles in life. There was no attempt at introducing women’s suffrage in the 1923 Egyptian Constitution. The kind of exclusion that women had experienced following other monumental revolutions around the world was replicated. Thus we can highlight the contrast between revolutionary activity among women and their lack of progress in the post-revolution period, just as we can in places such as Algeria, the Soviet Union, China, Cuba and America.

**Feminism as a derivative of the post-revolutionary period:**

It can also be argued that feminist movements become effective in the post-revolutionary period. Once nationalist movements have gained what they set out to achieve, there is a moment of settlement when women think about what they have been involved in, and what is possible in the future.

Women have experienced the limited freedom to participate in political action over a specific time span, and want this freedom to be permanent. In this sense, even bitterness, resentment, and the sense of betrayal that directly follows a revolution can be a significant impetus for change, and especially towards creating a more enduring feminist movement.
Egypt’s feminists worked to undermine British rule, but were not formalised as the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) until 1923. Even then, the Union did not start up properly until women realised they had been excluded from the electoral rules laid out in the new 1923 Constitution. From 1923 onwards, members of the EFU lobbied furiously to be introduced to the electoral process, and called for numerous other rights. They wanted to see the Personal Status Law changed, and encouraged all women in society to fight for the right to have a definite political role in their country.

Riots and other displays of public anger have always been commonplace in Egyptian society. When there is a widespread perception of injustice, or corruption, or a general need for change, then people take to the streets. Those who have chronicled such demonstrations over the centuries have reported that women from all kinds of backgrounds partook.

The years when Muhammad ‘Ali was in power, between 1805 and 1848, were renowned for such popular protest. As Egypt got into grave economic problems, women were among those who attacked the forces of law and order to oppose rising prices and taxes. Many were from the rural and city lower classes. The women may technically have been demanding better conditions and a fairer economic deal for men at this time, but they were still engaged in political action for their country, and for all of its citizens.49

The 1919 Revolution in Egypt saw a particularly marked movement towards women dissenting, and not just those from the working classes who had traditionally campaigned for improved socio-economic standings. The uprising of 1919 was the first time that women from the upper ranges of Egyptian society joined in the marches demanding independence from the British.

Such women could be seen in Cairo, following up on at least two decades of discourse about freedom by participating in direct political action. The women were often in black abayas and were invariably veiled, and their determination to take a public stance in what they viewed as reactionary, unjust British rule was extremely efficient. Even when the rioting stopped, and crowds moved off the streets, such women kept up their opposition for another five years.

There was no question of these women solely taking passive, peaceful roles during their country’s struggle. They instead wanted to emulate male activists – to present themselves as heroic and well

organised figures who could stand up to British rule in a manner that was not just symbolic. What is striking, however, is the manner in which these women were inclined to dispose of traditional stereotypes during the protests, and then revert to them after the revolutionary moment had passed.

Frantz Fanon recounts in *A Dying Colonisation* (1967), how women in Algeria took to the streets during their country’s War of Independence from France between 1954 and 1962. They had a hand in violent operations in a way that would revolutionise their position within society. It was through popular dissent, and indeed the use of weapons against a common enemy, that they brought about emancipation. Fanon describes how men supported the liberation of women in greater numbers, to the extent that the conflict against the French not only freed the country, but also its female citizens.

In fact, Fanon’s view had several problems. He underestimated how Algerian women were given minor functions in the resistance movement against the French. They were never allowed to take the initiative during attacks, for example, and never issued orders.

Instead, as the French became more combative and ruthless, and men started to go into hiding, or were killed, or invalided, or put in prison, women had to take on male duties. A shortage of males was the main reason they fought. Women were able to use their veils as a disguise, and their femininity to get through French check points, and to evade military patrols. Algeria’s National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale*, FLN) were able to send the women to place bombs in barracks and other targets using these overtly feminine disguises.

Women who were killed or imprisoned and tortured were viewed as national heroes, and indeed as martyrs, but ultimately they were replacements for men’s roles as a matter of military expediency. While groups of women were used on the frontline, many others remained in their traditional positions as wives and mothers, providing for children and other family members, including menfolk. Their employment as soldiers masqueraded as ordinary women was a temporary, emergency measure deemed necessary for the FLN to win the war.

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Similarly, Fanon did not acknowledge that the FLN’s primary and overriding aim was victory, and not female emancipation. Their plans for the post-war period were unspecified, and they certainly had no stated objective concerning women’s rights. On the contrary, the FLN was largely interested in reverting to the customary Islamic way of life that colonisation by the French had challenged. The kind of liberal approach to feminism from Europe was something the FLN wanted to resist. In short, ideas about the liberation of women were being imported from France and the FLN was fighting the French so as to eject them from Algeria.53

In such circumstances, the future for Algerian women, including those taking part in field operations, was a life in a free country, but also a traditional one. When the war ended, and independence was gained, all women were expected to go back to the conventional roles that Algerian society expected of them. There is a great difference between the heroic perception of women’s actions in revolutions undertaken during the period of conflict, and the reality of post-revolutionary life for women.

Women were also heavily involved in the French Revolution of 1789. However, as in Algeria, female participants did not achieve the kind of progress for women that many would have envisaged. There was no emancipation for women afterwards, with the Napoleonic era instead mainly concentrating on advancing the stations and professional careers of men from the upper echelons of society. There is in fact plenty of evidence that women’s rights suffered a setback within a France regulated by the Napoleonic Code: “old wines were presented in new bottles”.54

The situation was very similar after the American Revolution of 1765 to 1783. After the war, white women returned to patriarchal lifestyles focused on the kitchen and the nursery.55 There is very little proof that conditions in the lot of women in the Soviet Union, Cuba and China were improved by their revolutions either.

Radical events leading to sudden changes in the balance of power do not necessarily cause revolutions in every sphere. In the three latter nations, the gap between revolutionary beliefs and

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actually putting such beliefs into practice narrowed during the revolution itself, but widened considerably afterwards.\(^{56}\)

All of the five revolutions mentioned above had different objectives, but beyond this there were many similarities. They were fought against a single reactionary enemy; they aimed at reorganising society along nationalistic and egalitarian lines; and they all involved women joining mass revolutionary movements.\(^{57}\)

The revolutions also all tell a story of politically active women being denied emancipation in their post-revolutionary communities. Instead, their efforts ended up mainly helping the male revolutionaries they had fought alongside. These men were happy to see patriarchal values suspended during a time of struggle, but were equally content to see them re-imposed once the ideology behind their revolution could be applied to their respective societies.

Thus women’s involvement in extraordinary historical developments such as revolutions can be viewed as exceptional measures.\(^{58}\) They are by no means intended to redefine women’s places in the societies that emerge after revolution.

Women’s engagement in revolution is also different to men’s because women are supposed to participate in line with their roles as providers: as wives and mothers whose job it is to look after their menfolk.\(^{59}\) Essential provisions such as food are in short supply, but women are required to cope. Then men are in short supply (because of death, and wounding, and imprisonment) and women have to fill in. Women thus inevitably become politicised, but at the volition of men, who guide them on the battlefield and in other crisis zones. Women do not lead the revolution, and still have to continue with their traditional status.

After the crisis has gone, patriarchal roles within society are resumed, but – at the very least – attitudes have changed, especially among women. They have had an experience of freedom, and see no reason why they should not have others. Women have learnt how to deal with a struggle, and in peacetime consider themselves capable of sharing participation in electoral processes with men.


\(^{57}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p.79.

\(^{58}\) Rowbotham, \emph{op. cit.}, p.162.

\(^{59}\) Berkin and Lovett (eds.), \emph{op. cit.}, p.82.
All of this illustrates the manner in which the fiercely nationalistic women who took part in the Egyptian Revolution of 1919 to 1924 operated. At a critical time, they responded to the emergency within their country, taking on a repressive foe. This historiographical review thus shows how such women shared a sense of common purpose with all other members of society. Traditional female tasks, as well as factors such as segregation and enforced seclusion, were ignored along with social norms that relegated women to secondary posts within society. The national good was the primary motivation for all political action, and overrode any sense of injustice based on sex.

In light of post-revolutionary developments in Egypt, women felt disillusioned. Chapter Six evokes this sense of resentment, but concludes that it was galvanised and used to create a nationalistic female consciousness that was later channelled towards creating Egypt’s first feminist movement.

All the significant themes highlighted above are examined in our thesis. The methodology proposed here supports the key events and experiences discussed in our core work.
Structure of the Thesis

The Rise of the Egyptian Nationalist Movement:
The Case of the 1919 Revolution

Chapter One:
The Emergence of an Islamic Nationalist Movement in Egypt in the Nineteenth Century

This chapter explores the theoretical tension between Islam and nationalism in the specific context of the ‘Urabi Revolt of 1879-1882. We argue that ‘Urabi’s movement was not only the first manifestation of modern Egyptian nationalism, but that it was also imbued with a distinct Islamic character. What started as a protest against an elite class of Turco-Circassian officers within the Army, expanded to take on far greater nationalistic objectives, while preserving the country’s Islamic identity. The role of the religious scholars – or ‘ulama – is studied at length as they assisted greatly in that process.

Chapter Two:
Anti-Imperialist Ire & the Politicisation of Egypt in the Twentieth Century

The turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century saw British Imperial repression on full display during events that came to be known as the Taba Dispute and the Denshawai Incident of 1906. One was a border dispute which pitted the British and Ottoman Empires in a strategic regional power game, while the other saw Britain’s harshest form of summary justice used to maintain its grip on Egypt. Both outrages consolidated nationalist ambitions and led to the setting up of formal political parties providing means of expression for the population at large.

Chapter Three:
Prelude to the 1919 Revolution: How Britain’s “Informal Imperialism” was replaced by the “War Imperialism” of the 1914-18 Conflict

The focus of this chapter is the consensus among all strands of indigenous Egyptians that their country had been plundered by a colonising power during the First World War. Wartime mobilisation of Egypt’s resources led to wide-scale resentment of the British occupiers, with many Egyptian peasants coming into contact with direct British rule for the first time ever. This realisation galvanised the nationalist consciousness as never before.
**Structure of the Thesis**

**Chapter Four:**
**A New World Order: The Emergence of an “International Self-Determination Moment” and its Impact on Egyptian Nationalists**

The political implementation of nationalism evokes “self-determination”. It was the American President Woodrow Wilson who internationalised the language of self-determination as attempts were made at setting up a new world order after the First World War. This emboldened the Egyptian nationalists to strive for complete independence for themselves. But as will be made clear, it instead led to a “tragedy of disappointment”.

**Chapter Five:**
**The Egyptian Nationalist Revolution of 1919 and the British Response to the “Egyptian Problem”**

Chapter Five assesses the nature of the Egyptian nationalist movement and its radical shift from an elitist protest to a popular revolution in which all social classes participated. It considers the methods deployed by Britain to contain the Revolution. It also highlights the serious miscalculation by Empire troops as they underestimated the extent of the revolutionary movement, and failed to put an end to the agitation.

**Chapter Six:**
**Women in the 1919 Egyptian Revolution: From Political Awakening to Nationalist Feminism**

Chapter Six retraces the evolution of Egyptian feminism, from the formation of a political consciousness at the start of the 19th century, which ran in parallel with the country’s rapid development as a modern state, to the powerful role women played in the nationalist Revolution as they rallied under the “Egypt for the Egyptians” slogan. This chapter also analyses the intricate connection between feminism, nationalism, and Islam.

**Transliteration**

For the transliteration of Arabic terms, the author referred to the guidelines suggested by the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES). Most of the Arabic terms have been transliterated including most of the names of persons. Terms that have become of common use have been proposed in their more common form as accepted in English.
Chapter One

The Emergence of an Islamic Nationalist Movement in Egypt in the Nineteenth Century
Chapter One: The Emergence of an Islamic Nationalist Movement in Egypt in the Nineteenth Century

The profound influence of nationalism on the development of the modern world is covered in a vast body of historiographical literature dealing with peoples’ aspirations to create “nation-states”. The formation of distinct geographical entities over time has produced increased numbers of historical and sociological enquiries focusing on dynamic movements forcing change. This empirical evidence on the emergence of nations and nationalism supports four major theoretical approaches that can be listed as “ethno-symbolist”, “modernist”, “perennialist” and “primordialist”.

Such theoretical examinations have, however, been noticeably dismissed as regards the rise of nationalism in the Arab and Muslim World. Paul Lalor points the limited number of empirical case studies of regional nationalisms in theoretical works, saying “the new writing on nationalism has largely ignored the Arab Middle East” and that “scholars working on Arab nationalism have been slow to make use of the new [theoretical] material”.

Furthermore, nineteenth century Egypt stands out in scholarly perspectives which predominantly investigate the progression of nationalism in the Middle East in the context of the Ottoman Empire defeat at the end of the First World War. The ‘Urabi Revolt of 1879-1882 thus puts Egypt in a unique position as far as the timing of the expression of nationalism in the Muslim world is concerned. Indeed, Egypt was still nominally governed by the Ottoman Sultan, while seeking to break away from him as the de facto head of the Islamic Umma (the worldwide community of Muslims) during his rule and not in the aftermath of the fall of his Empire.

This chapter addresses this situation in Egypt, which is the principle subject of this thesis. In particular, scholars of Egyptian nationalism have neglected building historiographical and empirical work on the ‘Urabi Revolt of 1879 to 1882 that goes beyond the “proto-nationalistic” approach, instead considering it as a mere localised rebellion against the contending political forces of the Khedive, Turco-Circassian elites, European control, and indeed British Occupation. Not only have the core nationalistic ambitions of the movement been considerably overlooked by most academics, but they have mainly regarded it as an embryonic precursor to the “full-blown” nationalism of the early twentieth century in Egypt.

1 Lalor, op. cit., p.303.
2 Ibid., p.303.
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Similarly, although Egypt scholars have highlighted – to varying degrees – the importance of the Muslim faith, including the influence of Islamic thinkers, to Egyptian nationalism in the nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth century, wider theories of nationalism have not integrated this work. Instead they have suggested that Islam is at odds with traditional nationalism.

Nationalism as a force for social change emphasises the diverse cultural, ethnic, historical, and linguistic traditions that bond people to a particular territory, they argue, but Islam seems to override such distinctions, as common faith and the *Umma*, become the most prevalent features in the identity of the entire Muslim community. There are many scholars who agree that Islam and nationalism cannot be reconciled and they thus set forth divergent conceptions of community. In this regard, Sami Zubaida notes that to “some western commentators, including Ernest Gellner, the Islamic idea of the community as the political unit is incompatible with the territorial nation-state”. In this chapter, we will present an opposing argument by examining the sense of shared interests that underpin both Islam and the concept of the nation-state.

Thus, we will primarily draw attention to the gaps in the growing theoretical analysis and empirical findings on Egyptian nationalism, especially as they relate to the dynamic between Islam and the desire for nationhood. While there have been attempts by Arab Middle East scholars to set the ‘Urabi Revolt within the context of the emergence of nationalism in both the entire Arab and Muslim world, and Egypt more specifically, the amount of such historiographical enquiries is remarkably restricted. Against such a deficient theoretical background, the nationalistic expression of the ‘Urabi Revolt – albeit a failed one – remains largely disregarded.

Historiographical literature has included the role of Islam on the development of nationalism in Egypt, but studies tend to begin at the start of the twentieth century, and not with the ‘Urabi Revolt two decades earlier. The contribution of the Islamic religious scholars – the ‘*ulama* – to the ‘Urabi Revolt has been underplayed due to the widely held view amongst academics that the influence of the ‘*ulama* in Egypt declined in the nineteenth century because of state reforms. However, we will argue that in the emerging nationalism of the years 1879 to 1882 – which culminated in the quashing

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5Zubaida, op. cit., p.407.
of the ‘Urabi Revolt and the British invasion and subsequent Occupation of Egypt – the ‘ulama in fact retained much of their social status and played a significant part in the intellectual formulation of nationalistic thought. Accordingly, they imbued Egyptian nationalism with a distinct Islamic character.

This chapter therefore aims at challenging the prevailing scholarly consensus by exploring the theoretical tension between Islam and nationalism in the context of the ‘Urabi Revolt. To this effect, we will first of all analyse the historiographical literature covering the rise of nationalism in nineteenth century Egypt and stress its limitations. This chapter will also take into account new research asserting the nationalism of the ‘Urabi Revolt, as well as establishing its specific Islamic nature. We will then concentrate on the traditional role of the ‘ulama and consider their status in an increasingly modernised Egyptian society, while showing that they played a crucial part as agents embracing change supported by a sense of nationalistic pride. Eventually, we will focus on the theoretical study of the intellectual contribution of reformist Islamic clerics and thinkers in defining Egypt as a modern Nation during that time. All of those major protagonists provided convincing arguments about the way in which Islam was indeed compatible with the clamour for nationalism.

How Nationalism Developed in Egypt during the Nineteenth Century

Academic studies of the Constitutional movement and the ‘Urabi Revolt fall into a number of categories. These can be summarised as one involving a considerable amount of literature that concentrates on broad Egyptian history of the nineteenth century, and a narrow one made up of an output of writings that looks notably at the three year uprising using documents in Arabic, English, French and Turkish. Finally, there are commentaries and memoirs produced by those who witnessed or contributed to the build up as well as the ‘Urabi revolt itself. Egyptians in this group include the religious scholar Sheikh Muhammad ‘Abduh and Colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi himself, the Egyptian Army officer and nationalist at the head of the uprising. British officials living in Egypt and others visiting from other parts of Europe at the time of the revolt, and leading up to it, have

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also provided records, among them a seminal one by W. S. Blunt. Research for this chapter has used material from many of these texts as well as drawn on Egyptian archival sources. The assessment and limitations of such accounts will be underlined during our examination.

During the 1870s, the reign of Khedive Ismail (r.1863–1879) saw Turco-Circassian statesman Muhammad Sharif Pasha (1826–1887) lead calls for greater constitutional protection against Ottoman rule. His movement wanted a written Constitution and elected parliament of Egyptians to curtail Khedival power, and to allow Egyptians more self-rule. This movement emerged at a time of great economic instability, when Khedive Ismail was imposing ever higher taxes. The Dual Control set up by Britain and France in 1876 was meant to manage Egypt’s bankrupt economy and pay off the country’s debts amassed during a period of modernisation and redevelopment. Muhammad Sharif Pasha’s movement was dominated by Turco-Circassians. They were seen as nobility who was foreign and out of touch, so they were never able to appeal to the Egyptian masses. The Constitutionalists also largely failed to deal adequately with the country’s dire economic problems, nor to overcome the feeling that the majority of ordinary Egyptians were alienated from the political process. They did enjoy limited success, however, and – crucially – showed that it was possible to pursue a system of checks and balances between the ruler and Parliament. In this sense the Constitutionalists provided an essential step for those seeking an alternative power base to the Khedive.

In contrast, the movement led by Egyptian army officer Ahmed ‘Urabi was far more successful. ‘Urabi was first of all opposing the manner in which the Khedive granted privileges to Turco-Circassian army officers in comparison with their Egyptian counterparts. As the protest intensified, other more nationalistic objectives were introduced by the ‘Urabi movement. Meanwhile, the Dual Control and increasing European penetration continued to cause economic and social problems. Egyptians felt put-upon and humiliated, all the while blaming Khedive Isma’il for their subjugation

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7 Wilfred Seawen Blunt, *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt: Being a Personal Narrative of Events*, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1907. The accuracy and therefore usefulness of this record is reliant on how close the author was to power brokers of the period. Blunt was certainly well-connected to senior politicians including British premier William Gladstone and his Foreign Secretary Lord Granville. Blunt was also close to ‘Urabi, and supported the Nationalists and their calls for independence.

8 Landau, *op. cit.*

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by foreign powers. After his forced abdication, his successor and son Khedive Tawfiq was quickly viewed as a puppet of the British and French.\footnote{Ziad Fahmy, \textit{Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture, 1870–1919}, Cairo, American University Press, 2011, pp.20–25.}

‘Urabi established himself as a powerful leader between 1879 and 1881, as he was involved in a series of confrontations with Khedive Tawfiq. ‘Urabi’s movement became wider in scope and more influential, as it made more social, economic and political demands. The concerns of ordinary people from different walks of life were articulated. These included workers in the countryside, city trades people, and others such as “medium and lower-level clerks, middle management in state and provincial bureaucracies, the graduates of the modern civil schools, the officer corps and cadets, journalists, and the Muslim and Coptic clergy”.\footnote{Cole, \textit{op. cit.}, p.22.}

Whatever people’s background, there was a unified front against the Turco-Circassian elite, as well as expansionist European powers such as Britain and France. Nationalists believed that Egypt “was under Turkish and European domination and not ruled by Egyptians themselves and the country’s wealth was being disposed in debt payments to Europe”.\footnote{Schölch, \textit{op. cit.}, p.172.} A newly educated class had emerged out of the heightened modernisation of Egypt. There were burgeoning bureaucracies centrally and locally, and an equally expanding printed press. People had greater opportunities to interact and take part in political debates. Social mobility was on the increase thanks to improvements in the education system, while the Turco-Circassians and Europeans became more unpopular. They were seen as holding the nation and Egyptians back, and indeed threatening their futures.

There were other groups attracted to ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement who had lost out because of Egypt’s modernisation. Islamic scholars had, for example, seen much of their wealth taken away, and their influence was also in decline. Over the course of the nineteenth century, they gradually saw their land and property confiscated, as well as their role managing the \textit{Awqaf} (charitable endowments). Meanwhile, Egyptians in the countryside were heftily taxed so as to pay back debt to European governments. By the years 1880-81, all of these segments of society were “unified by a sense of ethnic solidarity involving an (Arabic) linguistic revivalism, Egyptian regional patriotism and Islamic nationalism”.\footnote{Cole, \textit{op. cit.}, p.271.}
Nationalist demands for greater sovereignty and against the Khedive, the British, and ultimately the Ottoman Empire, intensified. The Khedive used British support to try and appease ‘Urabi, initially granting concessions. The ‘Urabists were allowed their own government in September 1881, for example, but such measures only made ‘Urabi and his followers more popular, while undermining the Khedive’s authority further. Thus the Ottoman Sultan strengthened his power in Egypt by bolstering both the Khedive and ‘Urabi, without publicly backing one over the other. The Ottoman Sultan then disowned ‘Urabi at the behest of the British. When ‘Urabi refused to resign, the British launched a seaborne invasion, sailing the Royal Navy to Alexandria. The British military then prepared to invade, so upholding Khedive power, and also protecting the financial debt it was owed, as well as vital interests around the Suez Canal.14

Beyond the 1860s, an intelligentsia flourished in Egypt thanks to educational reforms. It was particularly drawn to nationalist thought and action, especially as the Egyptian economy came under greater strain. Debt was mounting, and there was growing concern about both the European and Ottoman influence in Egypt. Between 1879 and 1882 the native nationalist movement in Egypt knew such issues had to be dealt with, along with the increased influence of the Turco-Circassian nobility. The nationalists wanted to call a halt to British Imperialism, while also ending the supremacy of the Khedive and curbing the de facto Ottoman control over Egypt.

During this intense period of nationalist expression, local dissent flourished in the movement led by Colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi. It challenged local rulers, as well as European powers. Regardless of this, scholars have not recorded this as a period of “full-blown” nationalism. Instead they class it as being in its infancy.

Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski are among scholars who in fact see Egyptian nationalism as dating from the start of the twentieth century, underplaying the effect of the ‘Urabi Revolt. Despite this, both writers concede that “the first significant speculation over the issue of national identity in modern Egypt occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”15 Gershoni and Jankowski acknowledge the importance of the new intelligentsia, the development of Egypt’s printing press, and the country’s involvement in the developing world economy as being pivotal.

14Schölch, op. cit. These events are covered extensively in Schölch’s book and it serves as one of the most authoritative accounts of the ‘Urabi Revolt and its antecedents. See also Cole, op. cit. and account by Al-Rafi’i, op. cit., al-Thawra al-‘Urabi.
15Hourani, op. cit., p.4.
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Changes in the 1860s and 1870s led to far more public discourse on the country’s political affiliation and religious identity among all segments of society as well.

Nevertheless, Gershoni and Jankowski argue that ‘Urabi’s political movement that developed between 1879 and 1882 was never able to disassociate itself from the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan, and was accordingly weakened because of this. They contend that Egypt’s religious ties with the Ottoman Sultan as part of the *Umma*, is the reason why the ‘Urabists failed to seek full independence from the Caliph. They describe how the movement’s leaders “repeatedly expressed their loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan… and declared their struggle as being one of maintaining Islamic unity in the face of the threat of European domination.”

Thus, crucially, Gershoni and Jankowski view the ‘Urabi Revolt as increasing a sense of national consciousness and generating debates about Egypt’s national identity, but not as “full-blown” nationalism in pursuit of independence. Instead, they consider that there was always an underlying expectation for the ‘Urabists that Egypt would retain political and religious links with the Ottoman Empire, and indeed the Islamic *Umma*.

Albert Hourani highlights the same perceived conundrum between Islam and nationalism. For Hourani, Islam did indeed play a role in Egyptian nationalism as it progressed in the nineteenth century, but, according to him “the idea of the Egyptian nation, entitled to a separate political existence, involved not only the denial of a single Islamic political community, but also the assertion that there could be a virtuous community based on something other than a common religion and a revealed law.”

Many Muslims undoubtedly saw the very notion of an independent nation state as being a danger to Egypt’s more important role within the worldwide Muslim community. In spite of the greater power being granted to Egyptians within the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century, Egyptians supported the Ottoman Sultan for the primary reason that he was the head of the *Umma*.

However, we will use in this chapter new theoretical studies to show that nationalists succeeded in keeping Islamic loyalty to the *Umma* and the Sultan compatible with their desire for political independence. Specifically, we will emphasise that nationalist Islamic scholars (the *‘ulama*) assisted

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18 Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, p.3. Jankowski and Gershoni also state on this topic that Ottoman rule over the course of the nineteenth century led “educated Egyptians to reconsider the subject of Egyptian political allegiance and affiliation”.

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in this process. Nationalists wanted to remove themselves from Ottoman control, and establish their own political system. While doing this they also sought to maintain, and indeed solidify religious ties with the *Umma*, and with the Ottoman Sultan as its head. The nationalists deemed that this would ensure that the Sultan back them in their struggle against Khedive Tawfiq (1879-1892), and remove the popular misconception that religious connections with the *Umma* would be undermined by nationalism. The nationalists also considered that close links with the Ottoman Sultan were vital if the threat of a British invasion was to be overcome.

As Gershoni and Jankowski, another Egypt scholar who overlooked the influence of the ‘Urabi Revolt of 1879-1882 was P.J. Vatikiotis. In his historical book on Egypt from Muhammad ‘Ali to Sadat,19 Vatikiotis instead concentrates on other periods such as Muhammad ‘Ali’s political ascension. In his observations on the social, economic and political changes at the time, Vatikiotis writes that:

> political developments in the period 1866–82 cannot [...] be fully appreciated outside the context of the educational and cultural advances of the same period, or outside the context of the financial difficulties which brought European control over the Khedival government.20

Vatikiotis is thus primarily interested in the sudden and profound reforms in Egypt that started when Muhammad ‘Ali came to power (r.1805–1848). The Ottoman commander was not just the self-declared Khedive of Egypt and Sudan, but he also ruled Levantine regions outside Egypt’s borders. The Ottoman Empire’s control over Egypt lessened during the nineteenth century, as the country was transforming considerably. During the 1860s, Arabic replaced Turkish as the official language of Egypt, for example.21 This was also a time when Egypt began to gravitate towards European countries, developing trade and fiscal associations with these countries. The Egyptian state modernised across numerous other spheres, including education. Characteristically, a civil school system coordinated from Cairo introduced non-religious subjects. Although Ernest Gellner argues in his work that industrialisation22 and its consequences on nationalism did not happen in Egypt until

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well into the mid-20th century, the substantial socio-economic mutations of the nineteenth century did have a significant effect politically. Vatikiotis describes how these changes “for the first time produced a local opposition to the Khedive” and indeed directly led to the formation of the ‘Urabi movement between 1879 and 1882.

The account of events during the reign of Khedive Isma’il (r.1863–1879) is virtually the same contained in various scholarly works. Vatikiotis, in fact outlines, as many historians do, how the political turbulence was generated by numerous strains, including the European penetration of Egypt and its fiscal grip over the country, as well as a feeling of anger aimed at the local elitist Turco-Circassian class. Protesters joined the Constitutional movement, which expressed dissent against the Khedive via the new Consultative Assembly, the Majlis al-Shura al-Nuwwab in 1866.

The economic pressures brought about by the debt crisis in Egypt had a deep impact on the people – fellahin (peasants) and modest city dwellers alike – as they were heftily taxed to pay off the country’s debts to European nations who had financed Egyptian renewal projects throughout the 1860s and afterwards. By the turn of the nineteenth century, such social groups had been through decades of financial hardship, as they slowly won back autonomy from the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, as the eighteenth century drew to a close, the taxes they had to pay to the Sublime Porte to retain Egypt’s degree of independence and as a mark of respect to the Ottoman Sultan, had risen significantly. Vatikiotis claims that the Constitutional movement was mainly made up of the Turco-Circassian elites, who held the highest positions in Egyptian society. He contends that these constitutional concessions – namely the new Constitution and Parliament – meant Khedive Isma’il “opened a Pandora’s Box from which emerged the first Egyptian rebels.”

Notwithstanding, Egypt’s new Constitutional movement was not particularly successful. Ahmad Shafiq suggests in his diaries that the Majlis al-Shura al-Nuwwab was in fact a token body created so Khedive Isma’il might persuade supporters in Europe that he was a “constitutional monarch, permitting some public participation in power, to avoid the charge of absolutism”. Many historians

27Vatikiotis, op. cit., The History of Modern Egypt, p.129.
28Ahmed Shafiq, Mudhakkirati fi nisf qarn (My memoirs over half a century), 2 vols., Cairo, Matba’at Misr, 1–36, vol. II, p.29. This same quote is also mentioned in Vatikiotis, op. cit., The History of Modern Egypt, p.130. For a more minute study of Egyptian constitutional politics in the second half of the nineteenth century see Landau, op. cit.

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specialising in Egypt’s history have indeed cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Constitutional activists, with some placing a large question mark over the allegedly overwhelming Turco-Circassian nature of their movement. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod argues that the Constitutional movement was buoyed by its initial accomplishments, but soon faced up to the reality of where real power lay:

by 1879 they [the constitutionalists] appeared to have achieved a good measure of success in their endeavour, but the emptiness of their victory became apparent immediately after their triumph when they were confronted with the nascent power of the alien European elite.  

An assessment of the Constitutional movement’s record in government also shows its blatant shortcomings. As Prime Minister, Constitutionalists’ leader Muhammad Sharif Pasha, who was a Turco-Circassian nobleman, could only hold two administrations together for less than five months each, prior to Britain’s invading of Egypt in 1882.  

The intrinsic inadequacies of the Constitutionalists were two-fold. One that was noted by most scholars was the privileged nature of the Turco-Circassian nobility who dominated the movement. They succeeded in obtaining a range of constitutional changes before Isma’il was forced to abdicate in 1879, and indeed became the main check on Khedival governance. But when Isma’il’s son, Tawfiq, took the throne, ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement became far more influential than the Constitutionalists. By the time of Tawfiq’s ascension to power, they were viewed as an elite Turco-Circassian group solely concerned with strengthening their political power so as to, in turn, bolster their own economic stake in the country, rather than work for the greater interests of the Egyptian people. The second inadequacy was the ethnic identity of the Turco-Circassians, who were seen as having little in common with native Egyptians. Khedive Isma’il’s favouritism towards the Turco-Circassian class was tacitly supported by Ottoman Empire officials, who agreed to them being promoted over autochthonous Egyptians within institutions including the civil service and the Army. Thus the elitism and ethnicity of the Turco-Circassians helped to perpetuate the view that they were part of the Ottoman and Khedival power nexus. Such an impression prevented the Constitutionalists from winning mass popular support from the majority of the Egyptian people.

\[30\] Muhammad Sharif Pasha’s first term as Prime Minister was from April to August 1879. His second, prompted by Ahmad ‘Urabi after the ‘Abdin Palace incident, and following ‘Urabi’s demands, was from September 1881 to February 1882. His third lasted from August 1882 to January 1884.  
\[31\] Landau, op. cit., pp.16–27.
This common perception of Turco-Circassian ethnic elitism is, however, disputed by Abu-Lughod’s work on the changes in the makeup of Egypt’s power brokers during the nineteenth century. Abu-Lughod maintains that the fundamental nature of the Turco-Circassians, including their ethnic character, had changed considerably over the course of the nineteenth century, and that they were in fact “identical with the indigenous population except in prestige”. According to Abu-Lughod, the key to Muhammad ‘Ali’s desire to use his power to lessen the clout of specific social groups, and particularly the elite Turco-Circassians who exercised control over social, economic and political life, was Muhammad ‘Ali’s desire to weaken any group that challenged his own grip on power, and accordingly wanted the Turco-Circassians to move away from Cairo. He encouraged them to go back to their estates in the countryside, so as to “renounce their old occupations and begin to build a new pattern of life”. This movement of the Turco-Circassian noblemen led to them assimilating within rural communities, and indeed having an influence on them. Religious ties overcame ethnic differences, especially as there were marriages with native Egyptians. As a result of these family bonds, Turco-Circassians dispensed characteristics unique to their identity. They stopped speaking Turkish, for example, and communicated in Arabic. This caused, argues Abu-Lughod, the Turco-Circassian ethnic identity becoming so diluted that, by the 1870s, it “had lost its meaning”. While the idea of Turco-Circassian identity disappearing might be considered hyperbole, it certainly changed over the course of the nineteenth century. The native Egyptian view of the Turco-Circassians also altered during that time, to the extent that their noble status as the landed elite was no longer acceptable by the rest of society.

While there is a consensus among most scholars that ‘Urabi’s nationalists surpassed the Constitutional movement in popularity from 1879, they have made no suggestion that the mainly secular nature of the movement was to blame for its weakness. Indeed, Muhammad Sharif Pasha’s Constitutional organisation had no religious affiliation and although it was “nationalist”, it never sought to use Islam or other aspects of its Egyptian identity to advance its patriotic rhetoric. Vatikiotis wrote that he doubted “whether Sharif could have attracted the ‘ulama, landowners and other elements in the Assembly […] to his camp away from the Orabists”. In fact, he did not attract them and, crucially, there was almost no undertaking to secure such support. The...

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33 Ibid., p.327.
34 Ibid., p.332.
36 Vatikiotis, op. cit., The History of Modern Egypt, p.148.
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Constitutional movement not only never tried to incorporate religious groups, but its extremely limited “nationalist” ambitions centred in priority on increasing the power of the new Assembly at the expense of the Khedive’s, and working to repay debts to European lenders.  

Such objectives resonated with the elites, but not Egypt’s masses. Instead, it was the ‘Urabi movement – one for Egyptians and led by Egyptians – that captured the imagination of the public at large.

The ‘Urabi movement started as a group protesting against Turco-Circassian army officers receiving privileges over their Egyptian counterparts. While the dissent has been analysed as being caused by ethnic tensions between Turco-Circassians and Egyptians this view does not acknowledge that ‘Urabi himself wanted Muhammad Sharif Pasha – a Turco-Circassian – to become Prime Minister and lead a new government following the first confrontation between the ‘Urabi nationalist movement and Khedive Tawfiq in September 1881. ‘Urabi and his fellow officers were in fact from modest rural backgrounds which many Egyptians could identify with. ‘Urabi’s populist appeal involved not just grass roots national pride, but also a pledge that he wanted a return to Egypt asserting its Islamic identity and legacy. A long period of interference by European powers had caused huge economic difficulties for the Egyptian people, along with a feeling that their religious belief, and indeed entire culture, was being challenged. ‘Urabi, who was a native Egyptian acutely sensitive to his country’s Islamic identity, undertook to deal with such injustices.

There has been a tendency to underplay, or indeed bypass completely, the part the religious scholars played in the ‘Urabi Revolt and in the emergence of nationalism in Egypt in general. It is this analytical deficiency that this chapter will seek to cover. The Egyptian ‘ulama were the acknowledged protectors of their faith and the most important authorities in Islam. By paying little attention to their role in the ‘Urabi Revolt, historians of the uprising have thus overlooked its hugely significant Islamic character.

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37 Schöll, op. cit.
38 Berque, op. cit., p.113; see also Schöll, op. cit., pp.136-37 and p.153.
39 Berque, op. cit.
41 Ibid., p.295.
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The ‘Urabi revolt initially began as an effort to restore the rights and standing of native Egyptian servicemen in the Army, but this developed into a wider campaign across the country that tackled broader national grievances. ‘Urabi presented these issues in the context of his country’s Islamic identity, suggesting it was a vital part of Egypt’s status as a strong and prosperous nation-state and therefore pledged to protect it.

‘Urabi’s most natural and valuable allies in the promotion and indeed preservation of this Islamic identity were the religious scholars in Egypt, although at the time there was some disagreement among the ‘ulama. While some gave their backing to the Khedive, so opposing ‘Urabi and the increasing challenge he posed to the rule of both the Khedive and the Ottoman Sultan, others did in fact support his nationalist rebellion and calls for independence. There are scholars who concur with this account of a split among the ‘ulama, but to date no research into the ‘Urabi Revolt examines the ‘ulama as a group and their intricate positions in relation to the emerging nationalist movement, and indeed their role in the ‘Urabi Revolt. Islam was a central component of Egyptian national identity in the nineteenth century, and so were the ‘ulama who provided religious and moral guidance to society at large. Thus the lack of analysis of the part Islam and the ‘ulama played in radical politics can be viewed as a major academic flaw.

The Nationalist and Islamic Character of the ‘Urabi Revolt, 1879-1882

We will here incorporate new theoretical works demonstrating that Egyptians imbued with a sense of being part of a nation led the overwhelming nationalist ‘Urabi Revolt between 1879 and 1882. Their objectives were varied, and included retaining loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan, while achieving independence from his Empire. Beyond this principal aim, the nationalists sought to reduce the power of the Khedive. As the revolt intensified, they wanted the Khedive removed from power altogether, arguing that he was too close to the British. A third purpose of the nationalists was to attempt to secure the help of the British in reducing Khedival authority. While they tried to achieve this, the nationalists guaranteed all European powers, and the Dual Control, that they would pay...
back all their debts. When such complicated diplomacy became unstuck, and the British moved to maintain Khedive Tawfiq’s position, the nationalists chose to resist growing British influence.

We will endeavour to use fresh references to show that all of these three objectives were offered as ones that would amalgamate Islam and nationalism. We will also demonstrate the limitations of the existing scholarly literature in that respect. Egyptian nationalism played on a desire to defend the country from foreign meddling, and from a ruler who was being used by overseas invaders. The Khedive had abandoned his own people, and Egyptians with a legacy stretching back to ancient history needed to stand up to him. Egypt was a distinct geographical entity, with its own tongue – Egyptian Arabic – and a successful past. Beyond the greatness of the Pharaohs, Egypt had played a key role in Islamic civilisation. As far as Islam was concerned, the nationalists saw the need to safeguard Egypt’s religious identity, especially when it was coming under the hold of non-Muslim countries, such as Britain.46 When the Khedive forged an alliance with “infidel” Britain just before the British invasion in 1882, then the urge to preserve Islamic Egypt became particularly important and was indeed considered as an Islamic imperative.

Beyond the treatment of the ‘Urabi Revolt in the broad historical literature which covers nineteenth century Egypt, two highly authoritative books by Juan Cole47 and Alexander Schöch,48 have long been appraised the most notable published works about the ‘Urabi Revolt. Both investigate the uprising in more detail, focusing on its nature and principal causes. But there are marked differences in approach: Schöch’s is a thorough political analysis of the sequence of events between the specific years 1879 and 1882, while Cole concentrates more on the social and cultural history of the period and the conditions which gave rise to the rebellion. Cole’s angle is an effort to provide a sociological enquiry, which also incorporates a more theoretical examination of revolution and actual circumstances – the kind prevalent in Theda Skocpol’s valuable writings on the French, Chinese, Russian and Iranian Revolutions.49

47Cole, op. cit.
48Schöch, op. cit.
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Other publications on *al-Thawra al-‘Urabi* (Arabic for the ‘Urabi Revolt) are by writers such as Latifa Salim\(^{50}\) and the prolific ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi‘i.\(^{51}\) These Arabic language contributions are regarded by some to be overly descriptive, and too concerned with class struggle,\(^{52}\) but they still offer researchers considerable background on the subject of the ‘Urabi Revolt prior to negotiating the Egyptian archives that are notoriously difficult to access and utilise.\(^{53}\)

Alexander Schölch’s study is mainly interested in elites. For example, he describes how the pro-Khedival military and government hierarchy in Egypt were associated with new elites, both within the revolutionary ‘Urabi movement, and the Constitutionalist camp of Muhammad Sharif Pasha, which took a more long term view of change. Cole in fact writes that “the social dimensions of the Revolution escape Schölch”.\(^{54}\) Cole goes on to discard analysis based on elites, looking instead at the influence of wider social forces, such as peasants, organisations and societies centred on trade, and thinkers. Cole explores the social make-ups of these groups as they relate to class, and looks at how they fitted into a rapidly transforming Egyptian society. Cole suggests that “economic and demographic change and the growth of state power created new interests among the three strata that most participated later in the Revolution”.\(^{55}\)

Although the texts under discussion are examples of greatly different methods of scrutiny, the authors draw similar conclusions. Cole and Schölch both acknowledge that the ‘Urabi Revolt saw separate forces with very definite points of contention uniting against the Khedive and his government. Schölch refers to them as “autochthonous social groups,”\(^{56}\) which included military personnel, as well as ‘ulama and local journalists who “stood in the forefront of this struggle”.\(^{57}\) Cole concurred on the influence of the groups cited all taking part in the uprising, but he also highlights the involvement of “the rural population, the urban guilds and the intelligentsia … [who] were united by reference to a common enemy”.\(^{58}\) Both historians considered that the main fight was

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\(^{51}\)Al-Rafi‘i, *op. cit.*, *al-Thawra al-‘Urabi*.


\(^{54}\)Cole, *op. cit.*, p.17.

\(^{55}\)Ibid., p.21.


\(^{57}\)Ibid., p.314.

\(^{58}\)Cole, *op. cit.*, pp.21-22.
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against the Khedive Isma’il and then, after Isma’il’s abdication in 1879, his successor, Khedive Tawfiq. Triggers for political action included excessive taxation of the peasantry and guild workers. Disquiet about the treatment of Egyptian soldiers as second class servicemen in comparison to Turco-Circassians also caused grievances.

As regards the standing of Islamic religious scholars in Egypt, Schölch suggests that “as a social group, the ‘ulama had not recovered from Muhammad ‘Ali’s blows economically and politically”. In turn, Cole evokes the influence of “economic and social change in the 1860s and 1870s on the peasants, guilds and intellectuals”. The two academics stick to the familiar pattern of argument of the ‘ulama becoming far less influential while not investigating the validity of such a view. Consequently, both authors largely fail to grasp the full scope of and the intricacies underlying the ‘ulama’s part in the ‘Urabi Revolt as well as the Islamic nature of the uprising.

Cole and Schölch accept that Islam was a dynamic for social change, but only in a very limited manner. Schölch sees the ‘ulama as representing the obvious Islamic aspect to the uprising. The historian said that in the period just before the Revolution, authoritative ‘ulama such as “Sheikh al-Bakri and Sheikh al-Idwi were won over” to the nationalist cause. He points out that Sheikh al-Idwi used his sermons to rally against Riyadh Pasha, the ethnic Circassian politician who served as Egypt’s Prime Minister three times between 1879 and 1894, and colonial European powers. The La‘iha Wataniyya, or National Declaration by the National Party on 2 April 1879 – which laid out a set of nationalist demands – is emphasised by both Cole and Schölch. The latter argues this was supported by religious scholars such as Sheikh al-Bakri, Sheikh al-Idwi and Sheikh Khalfawi.

Cole takes a different view, however, and contends that the “religious and military branches of the intelligentsia supplied nearly half of the signatures”. Cole adds that “many of the Muslim high clergy or ‘ulama, though ‘ulama did form one branch of the revolutionary intelligentsia”. Cole and Schölch are united in the opinion that the burgeoning nationalist ‘Urabi revolt meant members of the

60Cole, op. cit., p.53.
62Schölch, op. cit., p.88.
63Ismail had called for the Assembly of Delegates to dissolve, but its members refused, saying they represented Egypt. They would not give up their governing mandate, especially since the Khedive was being pressured by foreign powers.
64Schölch, Ibid.
65Cole, op. cit., p.108.
66Ibid., p.17.
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‘ulama were forced to reflect on their relationship with the Khedive, the Ottoman Sultan and indeed Egypt itself, as it pertained to its place within the Umma. But there is no deep analysis of the ‘ulama’s exact position within this nationalist movement, and indeed among those who opposed it. Instead, the ‘ulama are merely treated as one of many groups caught up in revolutionary developments. Cole and Schölch place these Islamic scholars and thinkers in an oversimplified posture that only depends on the extent of their loyalties to the Ottoman Sultan, through his representative, the Khedive.

In fact, as they reacted to the rise of ‘Urabi, and the growing nationalistic spirit in the country between 1879 and 1882, the ‘ulama had a far more significant and indeed nuanced attitude towards the unfolding events. Important new research by more contemporary scholars such as Indira Falk Gesink and Meir Hatina that examines the work of the ‘ulama in Egypt during the nineteenth century, illustrates that the more conservative Islamic scholars were – in contrast to the established and predominant theories in ‘ulama studies – pro-nationalist, and indeed were very close and vocal supporters of ‘Urabi and the revolutionary movement he led.

The ‘Urabi uprising, Egypt’s first manifestation of nationalism, took place at a time when Egypt remained part of the Ottoman Empire – a period when the Sultan himself was head of the Islamic Umma. Despite this, there are no specific investigations on the influence of Islam and the ‘ulama on the ‘Urabi revolution. While Cole and Schölch’s books provide broad and beneficial material on the relationship between the ‘ulama and the nationalists, they by no means cover it in detail. By contrast, Meir Hatina offers a clear examination of the ‘Urabi uprising, and the role of the ‘ulama, but the precise links between Islam and Egyptian nationalism are not the primary subjects of his work and are similarly played down.

Gesink’s study of the corps of religious scholars is a valuable addition to the existing literature. She argues that most of the scholarly production on the ‘ulama has put too much emphasis on modernist Islamic scholars, such as Muhammad ‘Abduh, meaning that the more conservative ‘ulama have

67 Ibid., p.183. See also Schölch, op. cit., p.313.
68 Schölch, op. cit., p.313. Schölch’s contention here is that “not all ‘ulama supported ‘Urabi because they still believed in supporting Tawfiq who, after all, had been placed there by the Sultan who was God’s Caliph”.
70 Cole, op. cit., p.27.
been viewed as “opponents of reform and enemies of progress”. Gesink covers al-Azhar’s reforms in Egypt and, how the ‘ulama played an essential role in debates about education reform in the nineteenth century. Gesink also describes how, even on the political front, both traditional and more reformist ‘ulama remained engaged and expressed complex ideas, relating to the most important political issues of the day.

Indeed, the influence of Islamic scholars has been ignored in much of the historiography of the ‘Urabi Revolt. Academic literature has failed to acknowledge that the ‘ulama led discourse on nationalism, and discussed its implications for Egypt’s place within the Umma, and indeed its allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan. Many ‘ulama supported nationalism between 1879 and 1882. They recognised that nationalism and Egypt’s vital position in the Umma could be reconciled. There were also powerful religious scholars who were vehemently opposed to such views. The ‘ulama had a key role in the political fray, having an impact on all sides in the struggle. The confrontation extended to a battle over control of al-Azhar itself: Egypt’s most renowned mosque-seminary.

There were two particularly important confrontations involving al-Azhar, which came to symbolise Islamic legitimacy. One saw ‘Urabi’s movement attempt to get rid of the allegedly anti-nationalist Sheikh al-Azhar, and then replace him with a supporter. The second incident saw ‘Urabi, endorsed by pro-nationalist ‘ulama, secure a religious legal ruling, or fatwa, questioning the integrity of the Khedive in relation to his status as a Muslim. The fatwa portrayed Khedive Tawfiq as a British pawn, determined to advance the interests of the non-Muslim British Empire in Egypt. ‘Urabi’s nationalists accused Tawfiq of apostasy, as the fatwa called for his rule to end. Both incidents clearly highlight the involvement of the ‘ulama in the nationalist struggle.

While concurring with this opinion, Hatina re-analyses the ‘ulama’s stance. In line with this, our argument challenges the prevailing view of the ‘ulama losing their historic power during the nineteenth century and re-evaluates their authority during that time. Hatina acknowledges that the early to mid-decades of the 19th century saw the ‘ulama’s political and economic leverage receding, but he argues that “Muhammad ‘Ali’s reformist program […] failed to weaken [the ‘ulama’s] status as the country’s intellectual elite and the attractiveness of al-Azhar as an institution of religious

71 Gesink, op. cit., Islamic Reform, p.6.
72 Ibid., pp.59–89; see also Chapter 4 of that book (Progress, Nationalism and the Negative Construction of Al-Azhar ‘ulama, 1870–1882).
Hatina’s latter observation is a valid one, but we intend to rely on the writings and contributions of some of the most prominent religious scholars at the time to later demonstrate that the ‘ulama not only kept hold of much of their social standing, along with their authority in religious and moral matters, but they also retained intellectual dominance as well as political clout. This all enabled the ‘ulama to participate in expressions of Egyptian nationalism. In this sense, the ‘ulama not only provided spiritual, intellectual and moral legitimacy to the movement, but were a central political force in its ultimate popularity.

Thus both Hatina and Gesink have put forward an important re-appraisal of the principal and generally accepted body of work on the ‘ulama, and the way they dealt with state reforms and modernisation in nineteenth century Egypt. Such works include those by the scholars ‘Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot and Daniel Crecelius produced in the 1960s and 1970s and in which they stick to modernisation theory, and do not fully explore secularisation processes, and their repercussions on Islam and the Muslim world. Hatina remarks that secularisation per se did not take place in Egypt:

in the sense of the separation of religion and state. Rather, it took the form of the penetration of the state into areas that traditionally had been under the control of the religious establishment such as the Waqf (charitable endowment), the educational system and the judiciary.

As far as such questions are concerned, more research work is certainly required to establish how far the state did in fact spread its control on spheres of life including education and the judiciary. In line with Hatina and Gesink’s argument, we will proceed to show how the ‘ulama grappled with Egypt’s swift modernisation process in the nineteenth century. To that effect, we will offer an alternative theoretical approach about the manner in which the ‘ulama responded to reforms, while analysing how such reforms did not in fact present a significant challenge to their traditional roles. The way the ‘ulama were able to remain popular among huge segments of society, while resisting state influence will also be considered. It was through preserving their political and moral standing during the nineteenth century that the ‘ulama were able to have a huge impact on the emergence of Egyptian nationalism.

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74 Hatina, op. cit., p.31.
75 Ibid., p.29.
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Islam & Modernisation: The Status of the ‘Ulama in Nineteenth Century Egypt

The modernisation of Egypt during the nineteenth century was inextricably linked to a sense of national pride and the emergence of nationalism. It was an era when the country modernised in all areas of public life. The way the economy was organised was altered, along with the political system, and civil service. More specifically, the military and the education system were subject to change, as were Egyptian relations with the Ottoman Empire, and indeed other regional and international partners. This period of reform in Egypt was presided over by Muhammad ‘Ali, the Ottoman General in Egypt. After the French left in 1801, ‘Ali became Egyptian Vali (Governor) thanks in part to political demands by the country’s religious scholars.

Much of the modernisation process in Egypt can be traced back to burgeoning links with Europe which started with the invasion of Napoleon Bonaparte at the end of the 18th century. Muhammad ‘Ali’s reign, and those that came afterwards, saw Egypt moving away from the Ottoman Empire, as Europeans exerted greater influence. The creation of the Suez Canal strengthened bonds with Europe, as did increased visits by Egyptian students to countries such as Britain and France. Beyond these educational ties, European professionals arrived to work on prestige projects such as the Suez Canal, and also in aiding to renew other elements of Egyptian infrastructure. Architects and technocrats helped improve Egyptian cities, and they were supported by medics, lawyers and a host of other professionals from Europe. Egypt became increasingly reliant on Europe. Financially, much of Egypt’s modernisation derived from the sale of cotton to Britain.

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78 Fritz Steppat, ‘National Education Projects in Egypt Before British Occupation’ in Peter M. Holt (ed.), Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt: Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp.283–84. See Steppat for figures on the number of foreigners in Egypt: “From 1857 to 1861, an average of 30,000 foreigners came into the country each year; in 1862 they numbered 33,000; in 1863, 43,000; in 1864, 56,500; in 1865, 80,000.” Steppat’s statistics are drawn from David S. Landes, Bankers and Pashas, International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt, London, np, 1958, pp.87–88; and Al-Waqa‘i’ al-Misriyyah, Egypt, No. 781, 13 October 1878.

79 Egypt’s economic development during the nineteenth century is well-documented, including in Richmond, op. cit.
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Change from the start of the Muhammad ‘Ali’s era continued up until the reign of Isma’il’s (r.1863–1879). To begin with, the Egyptian military was strengthened, in the hope that it could resist greater encroachment from Britain or France, or indeed from the Ottoman Empire. Land in Egypt was handed over to the state to support the growth of all these transformations. In the meantime, educational reforms saw a technical school system set up. The missions of Egyptian students to Europe were meant to assist recruitment to the army and the civil service, producing a better quality of candidates. Reform and modernisation affected every sphere.

The reign of Khedive Isma’il was also a period of modernisation, following a break under Abbas I (r.1848–1854) and Said I (r.1854–1863). The latter wanted to slow down reform, or else reject it altogether. Education improved considerably under Isma’il. Efforts were made to assist trade links, and cities were rebuilt to resemble those in Europe. Meanwhile, political institutions were reformed. Parliamentary government grew out of Isma’il’s reign, with the foundation of the Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab in 1866.

Thus advancements aimed at centralising and modernising key institutions inhibited the influence of the ‘ulama in the political field, and also curtailed their economic privileges, and indeed increasingly challenged their overall traditional standing. These specialists in fiqh – Islamic jurisprudence – were sidelined as they were forced to retreat and exert their knowledge and authority in areas that were left relatively untouched by the encroaching new state. ‘Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot and Daniel Crecelius outline the declining power of the ‘ulama in the nineteenth century. They follow a popular view among historians that sees the start of Muhammad ‘Ali reign, and especially the period after 1809, as being detrimental to the fortunes of the religious scholars.

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82Landau, op. cit., p.8.
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Al-Sayyid emphasises how the ‘ulama were stripped of economic strength and other forms of power, saying all of this was due to “the introduction of westernising influences”, that, it is argued, were personified by advisors who rearranged “his administration on Western lines, introduce[d] a Western-style system of education, [and developed] an efficient army modelled on European lines”. Al-Sayyid contends that these brought about so much progress that “the traditional social pattern of groups having a cohesive force and an internal organisation of their own that was independent of a central authority” was broken down, and new social elites took over.

Crecelius, in contrast, focuses on the manner in which ‘ulama dealt with rapid transformations in society. He said that the way in which they reacted to modernisation was at first “instinctively defensive, [and] characterised by a strong desire for self-preservation”. Taking an opposing stance to al-Sayyid, Crecelius said the ‘ulama actively opposed change, and were “able to obstruct, delay or undermine new programs”. It was only later, when such obstructions failed and the state reforms grew stronger, that the ‘ulama altered their position, effectively withdrawing from the wider world, and concentrating on the areas where they still had authority. As Crecelius puts it, they retreated “in an effort to preserve them from contamination through contact with the modernising elements in society”.

Crecelius and al-Sayyid accordingly concur on how advances in Egypt undermined the ‘ulama: modernisation led to them losing economic and political clout. But, in contrast to Crecelius, al-Sayyid blames a new elite imbued with European values “that was eventually to displace the ‘ulama as the intellectual elite of the land”. Crecelius was more inclined to attribute the self-imposed marginalisation of the religious scholars for their decline. Crecelius argued that modernisation was not meant “to destroy the institutions of the old order but rather to create a new order alongside the old”. The ‘ulama were unable to prevent reform, let alone influence it, and so grew increasingly isolated.

85 Ibid., pp.277-78.
86 Ibid., p.278.
87 Crecelius, op. cit., ‘Non ideological Responses’, p.185.
88 Ibid., p.185.
89 Ibid., p.186.
Crecelius suggests that the ‘ulama’s traditional areas of leverage were able to avoid forced change because Muhammad ‘Ali was “unwilling to offend the religious prejudices of the ‘ulama and the overwhelming majority of tradition-bound Egyptians or to tamper with a sacred revealed law”. 92 Al-Sayyid maintains that a burgeoning modern civil service had replaced the religious scholars as the “men of the pen”. This altered the nature of Islamic Egypt, but, Al-Sayyid claims that, Muhammad ‘Ali “could not totally ignore tradition, for after all he was a Muslim ruler”.93

Despite the reforms carried out by Muhammad ‘Ali, and those who ruled after him during the nineteenth century, Islam remained hugely important to the lives of ordinary Egyptians. Rather than destroying the power of the ‘ulama, reform actually strengthened their connection to the lives of devout Muslims. Modernisation increased the authority of the ‘ulama among huge groups of people seeking moral guidance.94 Fast social change within a society with a long Islamic history meant that people looked for stability and certainty in religion. It is in this sense that the traditional approach of a diminished class of ‘ulama has been questioned and there is a view that “the loss of its monopoly over educational and intellectual life did not result in marginality.”95

Much of Muhammad ‘Ali’s reform led to the ‘ulama’s close relationship with the centre of power in Egypt being challenged. In the words of Crecelius: “having eliminated the interference of the ‘ulama in his government, Muhammad ‘Ali left them virtually alone, to teach, think, write, or practice whatever they wanted so long as they did not undermine his programs within the sphere of government”.96 Even if the influence of the ‘ulama was indeed limited to basic interaction with the political realm, there can be no question of the religious scholars losing all standing. On the contrary, an important role of the ‘ulama had, for centuries, been to offer ethical guidance to people, and there was no sense of this role disappearing. The religious scholars acted among other things as teachers, and legal experts, and such positions were as relevant to the mass of the population as ever, as new research indicates. Muhammad ‘Ali’s reforms ejected the conservative ‘ulama from government because they were sceptical of change, but this did not prevent the religious scholars from carrying out their wider work in society. Egyptians revered Islamic practice, and relied upon the ‘ulama to advise them.

92Ibid., p.185.
93Ibid., p.186.
95Ibid., p.52.
By looking at the key effect Islam had on Egypt, and the way religious scholars provided legitimacy to government, novel theoretical studies suggest that ‘Urabi and his movement had solid ground to bring the ‘ulama back into the centre of political life. In more recent scholarly work, Hatina notes that “bending to the authority of the state did not mean the total submission of the religious establishment”. Similar new interpretations to the work of the ‘ulama in the nineteenth century include that of Indira Falk Gesink who notes that both reactionary religious scholars, as well as “modernist” ones, backed ‘Urabi. Such work illustrates how important it is to further discuss the contribution of the religious scholars to Egyptian nationalism in the nineteenth century.

Over time, the state reforms gradually pressed the religious scholars to engage with issues linked to modernisation and wholesale societal changes in Egypt. This, in turn, left the ‘ulama working out how they might in fact adapt their work in a variety of spheres to new ideas being imported from other parts of the world, and especially Europe. Thus, the ‘ulama became increasingly involved in a wide-ranging debate about the relevance of these new ideas and how they should relate to their country.

Here, we will therefore examine the impact the religious scholars had on reform, and on the kind of thinking that underpinned Egypt’s nationalist movement. Islamic reform became a priority for an initially restricted group of ‘ulama as sectors of the state including education and scientific research were modernised. These more progressive ‘ulama believed that the development of knowledge was compatible with their faith. Other more conservative ‘ulama were more inclined to reject the new ideas, and called for continued emphasis on the core values of Islam they viewed as sacred. We will specifically concentrate on three highly influential religious scholars from the nineteenth century: Rifa’a Badawi Rafi’ al-Tahtawi, Muhammad ‘Abduh, and Sheikh Husayn al-Marsafi. We will thus demonstrate how all three men promoted reform, but also provided an intellectual justification for Egyptian nationalism.

Before we consider the writings and roles of those three distinct Islamic thinkers, however, it is important to first of all define the historical functions of the ‘ulama in Muslim countries and, in particular, look at their spheres of authority in Egyptian society in the nineteenth century. The word ‘ulama comes from the Arabic verbal root (ain laam meem). This root is the three-letter verb “to

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know”. As a noun, ‘ulama means “the ones possessed with knowledge” or those possessed with knowledge. Such “possessors of knowledge” have played hugely important parts in Islamic societies since the 8th century. Beyond teaching, preaching and interpreting texts, they acted as moral guides. Their ‘ilm (Islamic knowledge) was crucial, to the extent that political leaders in Egypt tried to use the work of the ‘ulama for political purposes. This was the reason so many leaders traditionally kept the ‘ulama at the centre of power.

Egypt’s education system, in turn, was kept separate from the political arena, but the ‘ulama were by definition able to continue with their educative function. Their principal scholarly, legal and moral duties ensured that the ‘ulama remained extremely well respected. There was a top-to-bottom feel to this: in the countryside, ‘ulama took on key positions in villages, while in the cities senior ‘ulama were part of the inner circle of power brokers. They were part of the Caliph’s imperial Court, and attached to those leading tribes.

Beyond their obvious religious and teaching responsibilities, the ‘ulama’s close links with political players meant they were relied upon to sanction policy. They offered legal justification for decisions concerning every sphere of life, from taxation and law to war. This power brokering was weighed in favour of the rulers, with the ‘ulama by no means remaining independent. However, by “1500 the religious scholars had already turned into a highly respected group which could with considerable sources of personal and corporate wealth and a large influence in the shaping of Muslim societies”.

Meir Hatina portrays the traditional ‘ulama as scholars “who acquired their formal religious training and credentials in established madrasas [schools: sing. madrassa; pl. madaaris] and religious colleges [and act as] teachers, preachers, judges and administrators in the state religious system”. Meir Hatina said some ‘ulama were affiliated to the state but others “were unaffiliated scholars who adopted a more critical and activist stance and often clashed with official ‘ulama and the political authorities over religious and socio-political issues”.

100 Ibid., p.2.
102 Ibid., p.2.
Meir Hatina’s sketch of the ‘ulama needs expanding. To begin with, it needs to be pointed out that the religious scholars worked across a variety of professions, and indeed many of them mixed with the intellectual elite across society. Many ‘ulama, including Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi, whose careers are both considered in this chapter, became influential journalists and writers, as they took advantage of the power of the new printing presses in Egypt. As we shall reference later, ‘Abduh and Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi spent time as part of the “formal” ‘ulama corps. Tahtawi, was a brilliant religious scholar who was close to Muhammad ‘Ali, while ‘Abduh became Grand Mufti, the highest Islamic legal position in the country.

It should also be noted that Meir Hatina stresses the way the ‘ulama were an integral component of the state religious system. They did not just legitimise political decisions, but actually took part in making them. Meir Hatina also discusses how all ‘ulama were respected, whether affiliated to the state or not. This was because of their numerous roles across all sections of society. Thus the ‘ulama sanctioned decisions taken by rulers, and also acted as informal guides to the masses, thanks to their diverse and highly influential capacity in society.

The Role of the Reformist ‘Ulama in Defining Egypt as a Modern Islamic Nation

Rifa’a Badawi Rafi’ al-Tahtawi (1801–1873)\textsuperscript{103} started his academic career at the al-Azhar Mosque-University in Cairo in 1817. Sheikh Hasan al-Attar (d. 1834),\textsuperscript{104} the leading Islamic scholar who was to become the Grand Imam of al-Azhar for four years up until 1834, taught al-Tahtawi. The son of an apothecary originally from North Africa, al-Attar was first influenced by the conquering French during the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt but he was forced to leave when they started persecuting the shuyukh (pl. of sheikh) and ‘ulama. A long period of exiles saw the polymath Hasan al-Attar travel and teach extensively in Albania, Syria and Turkey between 1803 and 1813, all the while honing his knowledge of subjects such as medicine and history. When he returned home to Cairo he made it clear that he was a supporter of Muhammad ‘Ali’s radical education policies, earning himself the position of Rector of al-Azhar University, the then principal global centre of Islamic learning. Al-Attar lectured at al-Azhar at a time when Egypt’s education system was becoming

\textsuperscript{103} Details of al-Tahtawi’s life are in Jamal al-Din Amal-Shayyal, \textit{Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi}, Cairo, np, 1958.

increasingly archaic and limited in scope, and so recommended its transformation. Writing about the classical work *Jam’al-Jawami’*,105 a book on the fundamentals of Islamic theology and legal theory, Hasan al-Attar critiqued what he considered to be the paucity of education at *al-Azhar*:

> We have limited ourselves to the study of narrow, derivative books composed by recent authors, which we repeat throughout life, and we do not permit ourselves to study anything else, as if true knowledge is contained within them. When we receive a question on theology that is not found within them, we dispose of it [by saying] that it is of the philosophers’ debate [...] or a literary point from among the topics that have been disproved.106

Hasan al-Attar’s reforming spirit was condoned by Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha, the Khedive of Egypt, but al-Attar still became unpopular with the more reactionary *al-Azhar* ‘ulama who dominated the religious corps at the time.107 His close links with Muhammad ‘Ali ensured al-Tahtawi was sent to France to further his education in 1826. Al-Tahtawi stayed in France between 1826 and 1831. As well as continuing with his religious duties as an imam as part of the educational mission, he spent a great deal of time learning about the “French language and reading books on ancient history, Greek philosophy and most importantly eighteenth century French Enlightenment thought, especially the works of Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu”.108 Al-Tahtawi’s period of study of the Enlightenment in France came just nearly four decades after the French Revolution of 1789, meaning France was awash with new radical ideas. Thus France was, according to Albert Hourani, of great importance to the young Egyptian’s intellectual development. In turn, as far as nationalism was concerned, this period of study “left a permanent mark on the Egyptian mind”.109

Beyond the ideas of writers such as Voltaire, al-Tahtawi realised that the implementation of these philosophical thoughts could have a profound effect on society as a whole. While remaining sceptical about some aspects of French life, the way France had evolved and was organised following Revolution and other momentous changes impressed al-Tahtawi greatly: he was taken by

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105 Imam Ibn As-Subki, *Jam’al-Jawami’ fi Usul al-Fiqh*, published by Dar Al-Kutub Al-‘Ilmiyyah. It is a collection of seven law books finished in 760 A.H. at Nairab near Damascus. It is the most well-known of Ibn As-Subki’s books, and remains one of the most important authorities on Shafi’ite law.
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the emphasis on the “prolonged education of children”, and by the French “intellectual curiosity and above all their social morality”. It was through adopting the philosophy and values of the Enlightenment that France had succeeded in so many spheres, al-Tahtawi believed. What particularly appealed to al-Tahtawi was Montesquieu’s description of the state as a geographical entity bound by “national spirit”, with love of country guaranteeing political virtue. It was this view of France as a nation that al-Tahtawi wanted to extend to Egypt, so he spent increasing amounts of time studying his own country’s distinctive ancient history and considering the way its geographical boundaries had practically not altered over time. When al-Tahtawi got back to Egypt, he held a number of positions, including school inspector and head of the new School of Languages, and as editor of the state-sponsored newspaper, al-Waqa’i’ al-Misriyya (Egyptian Events). The paper was an overtly pro-establishment one at the time, but working there gave al-Tahtawi great experience in articulating his views to a wider audience.

Al-Tahtawi’s considerable contribution to the field of education was primarily aimed at getting young people into the growing number of professional schools necessary to provide staff for the Khedive’s expanding bureaucracy. Also, as a means of stepping up the on-going process of modernisation of Egyptian industry, and of the country’s military, Muhammad ‘Ali encouraged subjects which were mainly being taught according to French texts on topics ranging from sociology and history to military technology. Al-Tahtawi’s most remarkable achievement was his hugely significant role in translating such French works into Arabic, including the writings of his favoured French philosophers, while also commissioning and supervising colleagues towards the completion of the translations of other writers, so allowing Egyptians to read them, and indeed to discuss them. Al-Tahtawi and his pupils translated some two thousand works into Arabic in all. This translation work opened up overseas literature to Egyptians in a manner which was to have a lasting

110Ibid., p.71.
111Ibid.
112Ibid., p.70.
113Charles Wendell, The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1972, p.123. Wendell notes that Egypt’s territorial boundaries are “determinable with unusual ease and little or no dispute”.
114Hourani, op. cit., p.71. Al-Tahtawi’s biography and political thought is also outlined in Wendell, op. cit.
115Al-Waqa’i’ al-Misriyya newspaper initially published in both Arabic and Turkish, first appeared in Egypt in 1828. Ordered by Muhammad ‘Ali, it was the first newspaper of its kind in the Middle East.
116These works are listed in Hourani, op. cit., p.71.
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effect as far as the creation of a new generation of Egyptian intellectuals was concerned.\textsuperscript{118} It was al-Tahtawi’s view that Egyptian education had been held back by the orthodoxy of the ‘ulama. Rather than taking up Enlightenment ideas, and indeed embracing the new technology that was transforming Europe, Egypt’s outdated education system was failing to cope. Al-Tahtawi thus counselled that the conservative Islamic institutions should incorporate the “sciences created by human reason”,\textsuperscript{119} adding that “if the ‘ulama are to interpret the Shari’a [Islamic Law] in the light of modern needs, they must know what the modern world is”.\textsuperscript{120}

Al-Tahtawi’s French-Arabic translations were of great historical importance to the development of Egypt’s nationalist spirit, and so too were his own original writings and political pamphlets which were widely distributed. Al-Tahtawi was, in Hourani’s opinion, the first Egyptian scholar to “articulate the idea of the Egyptian nation… [and to] justify it in terms of Islamic thought”.\textsuperscript{121} Hourani further describes al-Tahtawi’s work as follows:

[His] ideas about society and the state are neither a mere restatement of a traditional view nor a simple reflection of the ideas he had learnt in Paris. The way in which his ideas are formulated is on the whole traditional: at every point he makes appeal to the example of the Prophet and his Companions, and his conceptions of political authority are within the tradition of Islamic thought. But at points he gives them a new and significant development.\textsuperscript{122}

Al-Tahtawi published his first significant piece of writing when he got back to Egypt from France – an account of his time in Paris full of day-to-day anecdotes and considerations.\textsuperscript{123} It provided insights into what it was like to be an Egyptian in the French capital in the mid-nineteenth century, but also highlighted al-Tahtawi’s developing political thinking. The influence of the Enlightenment ran throughout his work: al-Tahtawi saw Enlightenment thought as being the dynamic of France’s successful domestic reform, and indeed its strength and effect on the world stage. Muhammad ‘Ali himself commissioned a special edition of the diary al-Tahtawi kept in Paris and ordered it to be

\textsuperscript{118}Hourani, \textit{op. cit.}, p.71. In 1841 Tahtawi took control of a new School of Languages, writes Hourani. Al-Tahtawi personally translated “twenty works including histories of the ancient world, the Middle Ages, Voltaire’s \textit{Lives of Peter the Great and Charles XII of Sweden}, a book on Greek philosophers and Montesquieu’s \textit{Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence}”.

\textsuperscript{119}Ibid., p.75.

\textsuperscript{120}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{121}Ibid., pp.68-69.

\textsuperscript{122}Ibid., p.73.

\textsuperscript{123}Rifa’a Rafi’ Al-Tahtawi, \textit{Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Baris (Paris Diary)}, Cairo, Bulaq Press, 1834.
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distributed to key civil servants in Egypt as part of their compulsory education. A subsequent text concentrated on Egypt, and saw al-Tahtawi showing great appreciation about the record of his countrymen’s forebears, the ancient Egyptians. Accordingly, and in contrast to fellow ‘ulama of the time, al-Tahtawi advocated in his book that the modern Egyptians should work to emulate the colossal achievements of their ancestors.

So it was that beyond calls to take up the rational values of the Enlightenment, al-Tahtawi combined this with the expression of greater pride in Egypt’s distinguished history and Islamic traditions in the country’s modern political life. Montesquieu’s separation of powers was a principle that al-Tahtawi wanted to adapt to Egypt’s culture of governance. Al-Tahtawi contended that his country was organised around four separate “estates”. These were the ruler, the ‘ulama, the military, and those involved in trade and other industries. If each of these “estates” were functioning properly, all would improve the circumstances of everyone in society, he argued. Al-Tahtawi discarded France’s model of nationalism based on a secular civil society, which promoted the idea of the people governing themselves, rather than allowing an autocratic leader to be in charge. This was mainly because al-Tahtawi was always conscious of the debt he owed to the Khedive. The success of al-Tahtawi’s ongoing career certainly relied on favours from the Ottoman representative. Consequently, al-Tahtawi did not advocate the scrapping of the Khedive’s position altogether. Instead, al-Tahtawi supported the more conventional Islamic form of government, which placed the ‘ulama within a hierarchy of power headed by the Khedive, with the ‘ulama serving the best interests of Egyptian Muslims. Thus al-Tahtawi did not consider that such a conventional type of Islamic authority should be changed, but argued that Montesquieu’s separation of “estates” would in fact act as an effective check on a ruler’s absolute power, while not creating the need to get rid of such a corrupt ruler.

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124 It was in 1822 that the Bulaq Printing Press had first been created allowing a wide range of books to be published in Arabic and Turkish and distributed among the kind of numbers which in the past would have been impossible. The establishment of new prints was to have a huge impact on the spread of ideas, and the number of people formulating them, and indeed acting upon them.

125 Rifa’a Rafi’ Al-Tahtawi, Manahij al-Albab al-Misriyya fi Mabahij al-Adab al-‘Asriyya (The Roads of Egyptian Hearts in the Joys of the Contemporary Arts), Cairo, Bulaq Press, 1869.

126 Ibid., p.348.

127 Hourani, op. cit., p.75.
Despite backing rule that involved Islamic traditionalists, al-Tahtawi was nonetheless critical of both the ‘ulama, and indeed the manner in which students were being taught at al-Azhar in Cairo. Al-Tahtawi (a Shafi‘i by legal rite)\textsuperscript{128} was well schooled in Islamic law but considered that Egypt’s failure to advance as quickly as many European countries was partly due to the ‘ulama and al-Azhar’s rejection of an education system that focused on non-Islamic subjects, and accepted modern, enlightened theories about the rapidly changing world.\textsuperscript{129} A reluctance to teach the rationality of science, for example, held back Egypt’s progress, al-Tahtawi argued. Progress was essential for al-Tahtawi, and especially moves towards two main objectives: the modernisation and prosperity of Egypt as a nation.

Indeed, al-Tahtawi firstly believed that modern Egyptians needed to emulate the achievements of their illustrious ancestors. This romantic view of ancient Egypt evoked the distinctive nature of modern Egyptians, who followed in their esteemed line. Al-Tahtawi argued that “the physical constitution of the people of these times is exactly that of the peoples of times past, and their disposition is one and the same”.\textsuperscript{130} By underlining the unique and highly impressive qualities of the Egyptian people in this manner, al-Tahtawi was setting the tone for a nationalistic argument.

Al-Tahtawi also saw less romantic, and more pragmatic, social reasons for Egypt’s progress as a nation. The advancement of Egypt would improve economic conditions for the vast majority of the Egyptian people, he contended, and engaging with Europe was an essential part of this process. Modernisation would ensure they understood “European laws of trade, commerce and credit”.\textsuperscript{131} Moral rulers were responsible for creating an efficient economic system and social welfare for all Egyptians, was al-Tahtawi’s position. He saw checks and balances to any government as being fundamental – a scrutinising role that was most commonly taken on by the ‘ulama. Influential, upright religious scholars were indeed considered as being paramount to the just and fair functioning of government – one that would result in a just and fair society that would increase prosperity for the community as a whole.

\textsuperscript{128}The Shafi‘i madhhab was founded in the 9\textsuperscript{th} century by the Arab scholar Abu ‘Abdullah Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi‘i (767 — 820 CE) and is one of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence in Sunni Islam. The others are Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali. Further discussion on Sunni Islamic law can be found in Hallaq, Wael B. (2009), \textit{An Introduction to Islamic Law}, Cambridge University Press.


\textsuperscript{130}Quoted in Hourani, \textit{op. cit.}, p.79. See also Al-Tahtawi, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{Manahij al-Albab}, p.187.

In spite of this reasoning, al-Tahtawi was concerned at the ‘ulama’s inability to embrace non-Islamic education. He said that “teaching must be linked with the nature and problems of society”, but the ‘ulama’s traditional teaching, and their rigorous focus on religion, held Egypt back. The religious scholars’ own influence on Egypt’s rulers was also disadvantaged by their conservatism, especially in the field of education. Al-Tahtawi appreciated that “the ruler should respect and honour the ‘ulama [and] treat them as his helpers in the task of government”, but he nevertheless conceded that the ‘ulama’s leverage had declined as their failure to modernise created differences with the Khedive. Muhammad ‘Ali was among Egyptian rulers who reduced the ‘ulama’s role as crucial cogs in the process of governance. It was the ‘ulama’s stagnating teaching practices that were seen as preventing Egypt’s chance to modernise and prosper as a nation.

Al-Tahtawi’s disposition towards European political thought, and especially that of the Enlightenment, was a principal reason for his criticisms of traditional Islamic education. Al-Tahtawi invariably championed a specific type of Egyptian patriotism in all his work, which saw him call for a reformed education system – one that promoted the notion of a community based on Egyptian identity. Specifically, a main and recurrent topic in al-Tahtawi’s work was the distinction between communities centred on religious and nationalistic values. The ‘ulama’s emphasis was on nurturing a community underpinned by religious faith and practice, but al-Tahtawi’s understanding was “a national brotherhood over and above the brotherhood in religion”. The concept of the Egyptian nation was also crucial to al-Tahtawi’s work. For al-Tahtawi, the love of country (hubb al-watan) was the “main motive, which leads men to try to build up a civilised community”. Such distinctive qualities were separate from the sense of unity which came from the Islamic Umma, and religion in general. Such an expression of the bond of nationhood (wataniyya) – and Egyptian nationhood in particular – was unique. Thus a glorious past, the continuing history of the Egyptian people, and clear geographical boundaries were all factors that gave Egypt the potential to stand alone as a successful nation.

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132 Hourani, op. cit., p.77.
133 Ibid., p.75.
135 Hourani, op. cit., p.78.
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Though the nation was all-important to al-Tahtawi, he saw how vital different types of ties, including religion, were to the progress of any distinct community. Al-Tahtawi believed modern Egyptians were part of a legacy stretching back to the heyday of ancient Egypt, but for him the Revelation and other key dates in the history of Islam from its foundation in the seventh century were more significant.  

Modernity pervades al-Tahtawi’s writings and was a key component of his political thought, along with the reform of education, so as to become part of the modern world. All of this, however, was ultimately grounded in and legitimised by the Islamic tradition, and the deeds of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. With his emphasis on such religious antecedents, al-Tahtawi was one of the first Islamic scholars to show how Islam could be reconciled with the new nationalist spirit pervading Egypt, but also modernising trends being popularised in the West, and increasingly penetrating countries such as Egypt.

Al-Tahtawi’s central role in the development of Egyptian nationalism came at a time when the influence of the ‘ulama was in relative decline. Al-Tahtawi died in 1873, before the nationalist ‘Urabi Revolt started in 1879, but his life achievements, as an authoritative translator and as a scholar, signified the start of the emergence of Enlightenment thought in nineteenth century Egypt, as it transformed the country. His work was greatly assisted by his close links to both the ‘ulama and to Muhammad ‘Ali and his descendants, thus making al-Tahtawi an intellectual lynchpin in the historic changes which took place in his country. Ultimately, al-Tahtawi wanted to create a modern, advanced, European-style Egypt, but one that also still held on to a sense of Egypt’s past, and to Islam.

A study of Muhammad ‘Abduh’s (1849 – 1905) work and his calls for the reform of Islam are crucial to understanding the developments towards modernisation that went on in Egypt during the nineteenth century. The future scholar was born in 1849 in the Nile Delta village of Mahallat Nasr, Lower Egypt, to ‘Abduh ibn Hasan Khayrallah, his Turkish father who was part of the devout Umad land owning elite. ‘Abduh was born in the year of the death of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha, also known by his Albanian name Mehmet ‘Ali. Mehmet ‘Ali was the Albanian soldier who rebelled against the Ottoman Empire, and caused great harm to Egyptian farmers during the period when he appointed himself ruler of the Ottoman province of Egypt between 1805 and 1848. ‘Abduh ibn Hasan

136Ibid., p.80.
137Al-Tahtawi was initially close to Muhammad ‘Ali, but became less popular with the Khedive. When al-Tahtawi was despatched to Khartoum, he compared the experience to being exiled (Hourani, op. cit., p.73).
Khayrallah, benefitted from newly introduced irrigation systems and an improvement in rural security under Mehmet ‘Ali, but he, like many other farmers of the time, fled their villages to avoid conscription. The situation was much quieter after Mehmet ‘Ali’s death, and ‘Abduh had a relatively secure upbringing in Mahallat Nasr. ‘Abduh ibn Hasan Khayrallah could not be classed as particularly wealthy, but he was well connected enough to hire a private Quran teacher for his son. Early lessons, up to the age of 12, involved learning religious texts by heart.138

‘Abduh went to a private school in the city of Tanta, north of Cairo, where he showed exceptional academic abilities from an early age. Then – as a young teenager – ‘Abduh was sent to be educated at the Ahmadi Mosque. He subsequently joined al-Azhar in 1869 and finished studying there in 1877, when he was twenty-eight.139 Muhammad ‘Abduh’s early career was not entirely spent within the formal ‘ulama corps, and involved lecturing at al-Azhar and Dar al-Ulum, the institution founded in 1871 to give students both an Islamic and a more modern secondary education.140 ‘Abduh also had a great deal of experience beyond the ivory towers of educational institutions as he started working as a journalist and writer soon after he graduated. His time at school and then at al-Azhar University had already convinced him that the scope of the Egyptian education system was too limited and traditional, with its insistence on religious instruction. ‘Abduh was particularly unimpressed by the “pre-modern” ideas and practices of Islamic scholars emphasising committing religious texts to memory. ‘Abduh was thus constantly seeking to expand his academic horizon outside such rigid systems, to the extent that Sheikh Muhammad ‘Illaish, the eminent conservative cleric and one of his tutors, once admonished him.141

139Rida, op. cit., vol. 1, part 1, pp.1-24 for background. See also Adams, op. cit.; Kerr, op. cit.; Kedourie, op. cit.; J.M. Ahmed, op. cit.; Hourani, op. cit. ‘Abduh became a ‘alim on graduation in 1877, but rather than join the ‘ulama immediately, worked as a writer and lecturer at al-Azhar. He was regarded as an esteemed and high-ranking Islamic scholar.
140For an account of the foundation and influence of Dar al-Ulum, see Lois A. Aroian, The Nationalization of Arabic and Islamic Education in Egypt: Dar al-Ulum and al-Azhar, Cairo Papers in Social Science, vol. 6, monograph 4, Cairo, American University in Cairo Press, 1983; see also Chris A. Eccel, Egypt, Islam and Social Change: al-Azhar in Conflict and Accommodation, Berlin, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1984.
Later on, ‘Abduh became part of the inner circle of modernising Afghan philosopher, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. It was to be the prominent Islamic scholar who had the greatest influence on ‘Abduh’s political thought. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was one of the fiercest detractors of the European powers’ domination and interference in the Muslim world. Arriving in Egypt in 1871, he first of all taught at *al-Azhar*, but then there were arguments with notable ‘ulama, which resulted in al-Afghani being barred from teaching there. So instead, he tutored informal classes in coffee shops and at his home in the Khan al-Khalili district of Cairo, neighbouring the *al-Azhar* mosque. After leaving his lecturing position at *al-Azhar*, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani remained on good terms with Khedive Ismail and continued to draw a salary. Al-Afghani used his privileged status to shape many of those who would play such a leading role in the Egyptian nationalist movement between 1879 and 1882. Others who attended al-Afghani’s discussion groups included Khedive Ismail’s son, Tawfiq, who would himself later become Khedive. Tawfiq was also persuaded by al-Afghani’s urging for internal Islamic reform.

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was careful to suggest that reform indeed needed to come from within Muslim communities, and that it should not be forced from outside. He particularly objected to the uncritical mimicry of western values, arguing that it would have a devastating effect on all walks of life – from economic to social – and indeed on Egyptians’ sense of moral worth. Al-Afghani advised that the way to protect Islam as an ethical force was for Muslims to themselves adapt to a changing world, abandoning their narrow and highly traditional view of education – one that mainly concentrated on a rote learning approach to religion which had constrained rational scrutiny and diligence. A far broader education, which included new subjects, would give Muslims the chance to not only advance in the modern world, but also to build a new role for their religion within it.

Islam’s inability to modernise and its failure to keep up with western countries were at the heart of al-Afghani’s teaching. This, he believed, had resulted in European powers, and particularly Britain and France, controlling vast swathes of Muslim countries, either directly or indirectly. Thus, as far

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143 Rida, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, part 1, pp.73, 79, 82.

144 Jamal al-Din’s teaching methods saw him being forced out of *al-Azhar*. He failed to follow the traditional, conservative curriculum, instead choosing more enlightened topics and scholars for study; see Hourani, *op. cit.*, in particular the chapter on al-Afghani.

145 See Schölch, *op. cit.*, and Hourani, *op. cit*.

as al-Afghani’s political activism was concerned, he was committed to curbing and indeed eventually terminating European hegemony over the Muslim world, and Egypt in particular. The scholar contended that greater authority by European powers would mean a further erosion of rights to sovereignty, and humiliation for Egyptians. As injustices against ordinary Muslims continued, al-Afghani argued that, as well as a more comprehensive education reform and a willingness to embrace changes in the world, direct expressions of political dissent against dominating European countries were justified. In particular, he advocated the use of Egypt’s new printing press as a political tool that could be used to bring about change. It would distribute literature about reform, the need to end occupation, and create the conditions for the liberation of the Egyptian people. Al-Afghani urged intellectuals, ‘ulama and political groups to all play a part in this nationalist movement against European control.

‘Abduh and al-Afghani both rehearsed their theories about the way Muslim countries such as Egypt were no longer progressing and tried to pinpoint particular causes in their writings. However, Hourani notes that ‘Abduh “was to become a more systematic thinker than his master and have a more lasting influence on the Muslim mind, not only in Egypt but far beyond”. Similarly, although both men travelled widely, and were to have great clout throughout the Muslim world, ‘Abduh’s more prestigious yet entirely grounded family background suggested he had a stronger link with traditional Egyptians. This was perhaps also due to his role as both a writer and an educator. ‘Abduh was indeed very well connected to leading publications, and was affiliated to al-Azhar and Dar al-‘Ulum. ‘Abduh’s teaching and activities outside the academic sphere – first offering political and juridical advice (he had served as a judge) within the nationalist movement and later as Egypt’s Grand Mufti, the country’s highest legal authority – were all initiatives to help him bring about change in society, and to reverse years of decline in the Muslim world, while firmly associating Islam with modernity in all his work.

‘Abduh and al-Afghani shared the view that, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Muslim world’s subordinate position to the West was complete in every field, from the economy to the military and technology. As he examined the reasons for this waning, ‘Abduh was convinced Egyptian Muslims could embrace modernity, and achieve their own success in the world. ‘Abduh believed there had been a move away from “true” Islam, and that Egyptians had lapsed into a

147 Hourani, op. cit., p.130.
148 After the failure of ‘Urabi’s revolt in 1882, ‘Abduh was exiled by the British to Beirut for having backed the “rebels”.

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situation not dissimilar to the pre-Islamic jahiliyya, or backwardness/ignorance.\textsuperscript{149} Writing in \textit{al-Ahram} newspaper,\textsuperscript{150} ‘Abduh suggested that the position was even worse than jahiliyya, and that “hopes for our people’s development diminish”.\textsuperscript{151} Significantly, ‘Abduh defined the pre-Islamic era as one when “intellectual enquiry into faith or indeed into the details of the universe was vetoed [and when] the principle that reason and religion had nothing in common, but rather religion was the inveterate enemy of science was promulgated”.\textsuperscript{152} ‘Abduh considered that the late nineteenth century Egyptian society in which he lived had also seen Islam pulled away from rationality and was equally characterised by scholars displaying a distinct lack of intellectual rigour when it came to both religious matters and knowledge, in general.\textsuperscript{153}

‘Abduh even indicated that Muslim populations, including Muslims in Egypt, had neglected the reality that rationality and logic were, in fact, essential to the practice of Islam. He asserted the view that God had given them the ability to speak and think not only to better comprehend the divine order of things, but also so as to progress through history, and advance the world beyond a primitive state.\textsuperscript{154} God’s world was not designed to remain in a fixed state, and could indeed be modernised.

‘Abduh believed that, in contrast to any other religion, Islam in fact freed people from confined views and opened them up to a wider, more dynamic perspective on the world based on critical enquiry and deduction, and one that would encourage development.\textsuperscript{155} The link between Islam and forward-thinking rationality had been undermined, leading to Muslims withdrawing from “true”

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\textsuperscript{149} Muhammad ‘Abduh, \textit{Risalat al-Tawhid (The Theology of Unity)}, Cairo, Mutba’at Nahdat al Misr, 1956, p.133, is used by ‘Abduh to consider the pre-Islamic period of jahiliyya and assert that, while pre-Islamic religions had “laid down for men sacred laws of asceticism and turn[ed] them towards the higher life, men lapsed from its provisions and precepts with concord, cooperation and peace ousted and schism, contention and strife reign[ing] in their place”.

\textsuperscript{150} The publication was started in 1875 by two Lebanese brothers, Bashara Taqla and Salim Taqla. See also Latifa Salim, \textit{Sahafat al-Thawra al-’Uрабiyya (The Press of the ’Uрабi Revolt)}, Chapter 7 in Nabil ‘Abd al-Hamid and Sayyid Ahmed (eds.), \textit{Misr lil Misriyyin: Mi’at ‘Am ‘ala al-Thawra al-’Uрабiyya (Egypt for the Egyptians: Hundred Years on the Uрабi Revolt)}, Cairo, Markaz al-Dirasat al-Siyasiyah wa-al-Istiratijiyah bi al-Ahram (Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies), 1981.


\textsuperscript{152} ‘Abduh, op. cit., \textit{Risalat al-Tawhid}, p.133.


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Islam, ‘Abduh argued. The first historical manifestation of this was a schism and other power struggles within Islamic civilisation after the era of the first four Rashidun Caliphs, ‘Abduh explained. In particular, ‘Abduh suggested there was disunity amongst Muslims during the Abbarasid dynasty, which saw Caliphs “became content to possess the title of ‘Caliph’ and ceased to be scholars and trained in religious matters, rejecting the exercise of ijtihad (independent reason).”\(^{156}\)

The taqlid (imitation) method of learning gained precedence, as pupils simply committed rules and principles to memory.

‘Abduh identified the Turkish Ottoman’s taking over of the Caliphate from the Arabs as a second pivotal historical stage that brought the period of ijtihad to an end. ‘Abduh contended that this transition of power also had profoundly negative repercussions. The Turks encouraged Muslims to give up striving towards rational truths, and instead instructed them to concentrate on Islamic orthodoxy and the mere imitation and memorisation of Islam’s teachings. Critical analysis was deterred, as the Ottoman Islamic Caliphate became less credible than the Caliphate had been when in Arab hands. According to ‘Abduh, this crisis of legitimacy was exemplified as the core relationship between Arabs and Islam faded, along with a broader understanding of the Arabic Quran and the Prophet’s message, despite the fact that the Prophet was an Arab.\(^{157}\) The Ottomans’ position as head of the Umma was also disputed in the process. The Turks alleged inability to grasp the fundamentals of Islam led to them dissuading free-thinking, because they saw it as a challenge to their own rule. It was through weakening, and indeed corrupting the ‘ulama, and their authority over education and society as a whole, that the Turks could strengthen their own power.\(^{158}\)

All of ‘Abduh’s work continued to stress how the ‘ulama’s vital function in Islamic communities had been morally compromised.\(^{159}\) The scholar argued that all components of Muslim society – from the law and politics to education – were intrinsically linked. Central to ‘Abduh’s thinking was faith, and particularly the belief that the Prophet Muhammad’s role had been to spread God’s message, but also to create a moral society centred on the teachings of the Quran and the correct interpretation of divine law. ‘Abduh’s emphasis was on an Islamic legal system that protected all members of

\(^{157}\)Hourani, op. cit. p.150.
\(^{159}\)Muhammad ‘Abduh, Al-Islam al-Youm wa’l Ihtijaj bi’l Muslimeen ‘ala ‘l Islam (Islam Today and the Remonstrance of Muslims Against Islam) in ‘Ammara, op. cit., vol. 3, pp.330-33. Here, ‘Abduh says that “nobody can deny how scholars and religious scientists have become too loyal to the opinions of their masters”. In this sense, “masters” refer to both politicians and teachers.
society. The rapid modernisation of the world meant religious jurisprudence had to adapt to new demands, rather than simply relying on legal precedents encompassing outdated work by earlier Muslim scholars. Instead, rational methods inspired by Enlightenment thinking needed to form the foundation of Islamic laws that would govern the lives of Muslims in a changing era.

The preponderance of *taqlid*, which required students to rehearse and indeed memorise early Islamic texts, showed that Muslims had moved away from authentic interpretations of Islam, ‘Abduh argued, and the situation needed to be rectified. ‘Abduh considered the ‘ulama to be entirely to blame for this. Discussions as to whether *taqlid* was an appropriate manner to implement Islamic teachings, especially in a modern age where many legal issues and newfound problems had no historical antecedents to compare them to, necessitated serious thought. In this respect, ‘Abduh believed that the application of *ijtihad* would ensure that reason and deduction were used in making sure that the teaching of the Quran and Hadith was relevant to new laws, and the general adjudication of ethical problems. Until this was the case, society as a whole would continue to regress.

*Taqlid* had not only provided a pedagogical method and Quranic exegesis in Egypt but, in ‘Abduh’s view, it also affected the development of Egyptian society. Europe’s power over Muslim countries, and particularly Egypt, was spearheaded by European willingness to reform according to Enlightenment principles, and to apply rationality, and new technology.¹⁶⁰ ‘Abduh insisted that a retreat into a state of *jahiliyya* in nineteenth century Egypt was due to the rejection of science and progress by *al-Azhar* University and other educational, state-run institutions. A journalistic article written by ‘Abduh focused on students who wanted to study rational subjects beyond Islamic sciences, thus provoking the concern and wrath of more traditional family members. ‘Abduh commented that they were instructed by their relatives to “stop reading these misleading texts in order that you do not fall into sin and to follow the footsteps and beliefs of [your] fathers and grandfathers”.¹⁶¹ ‘Abduh said traditional Islamic methods of study, including memorising texts, all contributed to a backward society which could not hope to compete in the world, least of all with advancing western societies.

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‘Abduh’s thinking and his positions on Egypt and the wider Muslim world are essential to comprehend his ties with ‘Urabi and the broad nationalist movement. Before the 1882 revolution, his opinions about Egypt’s stagnation and the need for modernisation and reform were discussed in refined academic circles along with al-Afghani and his peers while he was a student at al-Azhar and during his early career. ‘Abduh and al-Afghani called for change in Egypt, and across the rest of the Islamic world so as to raise their standing internationally. ‘Abduh used the burgeoning Egyptian press to put his reformist views across to as vast an audience as possible, even though there was often fierce opposition to his ideas from more conservative ‘ulama who, at the time, constituted the overwhelming majority of the corps of Islamic scholars. They were the traditionalists who relied on taqlid style methods of education that ‘Abduh felt were at the heart of Egypt’s decline and poverty.162 This did not dissuade ‘Abduh from writing copiously, and in great details, as he expressed his opinions about the blockage in society that they represented.

It is crucial to note, however, that ‘Abduh did not want to see new western culture imposed on Egyptians, but instead believed a return to true Islam was necessary – this meant an Islam that accepted scientific progress and rational thought as a means of improving society. Thus, according to ‘Abduh, Islam, and the scholars who interpret it, play a fundamental part “in revitalising Egyptian society”. This reversion to “true” Islam – which included the need for a modernised education system and the practice of the methods of ijtihad to explain the meaning of sacred texts – would ensure that society was well managed as a righteous community that adhered to the Prophet Muhammad’s teachings.163

Nineteenth century Egypt opened up to rapid progress emanating from abroad, so welcoming fresh political thinking. The Age of the Enlightenment and the spread of popular nationalism after the 1789 French Revolution saw radical new beliefs arriving in Egypt via Europe. The fall of monarchies, and the championing of the right of the peoples to govern themselves within nation-states had huge appeal in Europe, as local populations strove towards the most ethical form of representative government. In turn, such nationalist political thought was seized upon in Egypt,164 where these new political ideas were embraced because of the country’s constitutional change, combined with its greater connection to Europe.

This was particularly so through the popular press under Khedive Isma’il, when commentary and debate about political events affecting the lives of ordinary Egyptians became increasingly prevalent in the proliferating newspapers and journals. This was a time when the vocabulary of popular nationalism was becoming more and more common. The definition of words such as “nation” and “fatherland” were to be refined by scholars including Sheikh Husayn al-Marsafi. Sheikh Husayn al-Marsafi (d.1890) of al-Azhar University, published his Risalat al-Kalem al-Thaman (Treatise on the Eight Words) in 1882 – the very year of the ‘Urabi Revolt. This was an attempt to explain the terms of reference of nationalism to Egyptians.

There are two significant elements to al-Marsafi’s book that encapsulate his thinking on its subject matter but which also provide a crucial context to his overall contribution to the development of nationalism in Egypt. Firstly, al-Marsafi’s Risalat was published at a key moment in the ‘Urabi Revolt – 1882 was the year when the uprising reached its culmination. It was also when the revolt failed: a British attack on Alexandria, and the invasion of Egypt saw Urabi’s forces defeated at the Battle of Tel el-Kebir, thus ending ‘Urabi’s nationalist uprising and ensuring that Khedive Tawfiq remained in control. Khedive Tawfiq became a constitutional ruler agreeing to reform based on the orders of the British. The Khedive was regarded as a British puppet, so any hopes of a successful nationalist resurgence appeared doomed.

The book was released at the height of a number of events in Egypt that saw the country’s nationalist consciousness growing, and which al-Marsafi sets to cover in his work. These included the creation of an Egyptian constitution and a move towards parliamentary politics. Neither of these significant concessions to popular government posed much of an immediate threat to the Khedive’s authority, but they at least led to debate about the legitimacy of Khedival power, against the calls for self-rule by the Egyptian people. Thus al-Marsafi’s writing was at an essential crossroads in Egyptian history: it was a key period of time when Egyptian nationalism and the desire for political freedom combined to forge a sense of national unity which was articulated across the whole society.


Wendell, op. cit. For al-Marsafi’s date of death see Meir Hatina, op. cit., ‘Ulama’, Politics and the Public Sphere, p.66. His date of birth is thought to be around 1815, but this has not been verified.

Mahafiz al-Thawrah al-’Urabiyyah, Mahfazah No. 41, Dusiah 6,3; and Mahfazah No. 8, Dusiah 53/D, file 220; and Mahfazah No. 8, Dusiah 53/D/6, file 220.

Landau, op. cit.
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The *Risalat* was also important because it was the first time that an eminent 'alim from *al-Azhar* had defined key political terms that had come into common usage in Egypt. ‘Ulama had been kept on the margins of political institutions, and indeed political debate, for much of the nineteenth century. In this sense, the *Risalat* was considered a landmark as a widely respected and influential Islamic scholar had become a huge asset to the nationalist movement at a time when the ‘ulama were being sidelined from the nationalist debate. Al-Marsafi’s work thus made it clear that the ‘ulama could be relevant in terms of real world politics, and could indeed inspire thought and action related to popular nationalism. Similarly, the sphere of education had been under the control of the ‘ulama but a large number of non-religious schools were founded in the nineteenth century, so challenging their authority. In this context, the *Risalat* proposed clarifications of what education should offer Egyptians, and helped to restore the credibility of the ‘ulama as far as their effect on modern society was concerned.

Of great significance, is the interpretation of the two types of community with which al-Marsafi begins his book – *al-Umma* (the nation) and *al-watan* (the homeland). His explanations went against the idea that Islam cannot be reconciled with popular nationalism. On the contrary, al-Marsafi advanced the view that Islam can in fact embrace pride in the nation. That a senior and esteemed member of the *al-Azhar* ‘ulama was putting this opinion forward, highlights the value of al-Marsafi’s *Risalat*. Al-Marsafi actually identified eight key popular words at the time, that he proceeded to describe explicitly in the *Risalat: al-Umma* (the nation), *al-watan* (the homeland), *al-hukuma* (the government), *al-‘adl* (justice), *al-zulm* (injustice), *al-siyasa* (politics), *al-hurriya* (liberty/freedom) and *al-tarbiya* (upbringing/education). Here, we will concentrate on *al-Umma* and *al-watan* as a means of showing how a religious scholar conceptualised fundamental terms in the language of nationalism.

To al-Marsafi, “a nation [al-Umma] is a group of people bound by a certain tie”.

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169 Husayn al-Marsafi, *Risalat al-Kalem al-Thaman (Treatise on the Eight Words)*, Cairo, al-Nahda, 1984. Accepted translations of the eight Arabic terms are used, with the exception of *al-Umma* and *al-watan*, both of which have prompted widespread arguments about which translation is correct. The words are translated here as, we believe, al-Marsafi would have intended. *Al-Umma* is widely considered to mean the “worldwide community of Muslims” and *al-watan* to be “nation”.

170 Ibid., p.1.

171 Ibid.
Islamic doctrine, had essential defining traits: it bonded a community of Muslims sharing religious ideals contained in a unique holy text, accepting the Holy Prophet and indeed his teachings. Belief in Islam was of course central to this view, and other tribal or ethnic links were not considered to be as important as a common faith and adherence to its traditions. The religious connection was thus essential in al-Marsafi’s theory of the nation as he defined it as a religious entity in which “people follow a Prophet and commit themselves to his laws”. In this sense, al-Marsafi’s terminology evokes the traditional religious interpretation of al-’Umma. Al-Marsafi’s insistence on religious affiliations was not just aimed at asserting the great importance of the ‘ulama to Egypt’s historical development, but was also intended to firmly back the indigenous nationalist movement, and more specifically ‘Urabi’s action to protect “Muslim” Egypt against an impending “non-Muslim” invader, in the form of British Imperial forces.

Yet for al-Marsafi the overriding national bond in nationhood is common language. He writes that the “nation that is bound by language is the most proper one because language comes from within the people.” Thus al-Marsafi’s line of reasoning is that the linguistic nation is also the authentic nation. Here, the scholar also produces a comparison between the language of a nation and the growth of a tree, saying that both have solid roots allowing healthy and powerful development. Even if the tree dies, other trees would grow up around it. Such organic analogies illustrate the idea of a linguistic nationalism that runs throughout al-Marsafi’s work. He insists on the importance of the popular written press to the formation of the nation. Al-Marsafi conjures up the proto-Andersonian view of the nation being “imagined” as a result of the expansion of capitalist publishing. Al-Marsafi is adamant that the language in print publications should be intelligible to the public in order to educate and stimulate debate, so allowing people to engage because “when a group of people share the same language, they live in harmony”.

Al-Marsafi’s emphasis on language as the foundation of the nation is in fact evocative of the traditional Islamic conception of the Umma: the Arabic language was considered a fundamental bond for the religious community of the Umma. This is exemplified by the significance of the Quran – a holy text in Arabic recited in Arabic by all Muslims around the world, whether they are Arabic speaking or not. Thus, while there are non-Arabic speaking Muslims in the Umma, the need to study the Quran, and indeed to render it out loud

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172Ibid., p.2.
173Ibid., p.3.
174Ibid., p.6.
176Ibid., p.6.
in the authentic language, means Arabic is an essential common factor in the lives of all Muslims within the Islamic Umma, regardless of their mother tongues.

Al-Marsafi’s third factor that helped define a nation was geographical. In al-Marsafi’s opinion, “a nation bound by territory means a group of people possessing a piece of land that distinguishes them from other territorial nations like the Egyptian nation or the Hijazi nation”. 177 Thus al-Marsafi’s championing of the “Egyptian nation” does not seem to tally with the universal characteristic of the Umma. Through resorting to “Egyptian” or ethnic and national delineations to categorise the concept of the nation, al-Marsafi’s specific interpretation seemed to be at variance with the Umma’s elementary principle that it not only transcends tribal, ethnic or national bonds, but wider territorial boundaries too. Egypt’s place within the Ottoman Empire also appeared at odds with al-Marsafi’s idea of a single Egyptian nation organised along the lines of territory, language and religion. The Ottoman Empire offered the unifying tie of religion, but by introducing the limitations of geography and language al-Marsafi seemingly questioned and indeed challenged the legitimacy of the Ottoman Islamic Umma. This implicit argument was all the more important when made at a time when the Ottoman Empire was declining and in the context of the growing influence of a determined nationalist movement in Egypt.

Despite this apparent conflict between al-Marsafi’s insistence on the geographical boundaries of a nation and the universalism of the Umma, there was in fact a territorial aspect to traditional Islamic religious communities. The dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) was a key concept in the classical definition of the Umma. So too was its antithesis dar al-Harb (abode of war). 178 Whether for reasons of defence or expansion, this divide was manifestly connected to the notion of territory as it opposed the realm of Muslims (living on Muslim lands) to the realm of non-Muslims. Parallels between al-Marsafi’s idea of the geographical nation-state and the Umma were strengthened when we consider that, according to al-Marsafi, “the nation must believe that their land is like one’s home [and] they should defend it with their lives”. 179 Al-Marsafi saw holy war as being justified so as to defend the virtue of dar al-Islam. Defending Muslim territory was morally right, as would be the case when Egypt was threatened by a non-Muslim British invading force. In the words of al-Marsafi

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177 Al-Marsafi, op. cit., p.7.
179 Al-Marsafi, op. cit., p.9.
“nobody should be allowed in one’s home unless for service, visiting or living but even for these purposes there are certain limits”.

Thus the three ties of nationhood advanced by al-Marsafi can be reconciled with the *Umma*. There were two other consequential aspects of al-Marsafi’s work that displayed an *Umma*-style moral dimension to the conceptualisation of the nation-state. The morality of the nation as a community was of utmost importance to al-Marsafi. He also put great emphasis on the moral imperative behind the people’s actions that were paramount to the progress and indeed success of the nation. Accordingly, for al-Marsafi, tolerance and justice underpinned the strength of a nation, while intolerance generated its decline, for example. Al-Marsafi also believed there should be constant debate between members of society, with young and old working out the best manner in which to resolve differences, with the nation-state more generally recognising peoples’ rights as well as their duties towards it.

It is in al-Marsafi’s chapter on *al-watan* that he dealt with the subject of rights and duties more comprehensively. He employed the term *watan* in a broad sense to mean “homeland,” while explaining that there were many different types of homeland, all created for differing circumstances. He clarified that a public homeland, for example, was a “piece of land that a community would consider as their place where they would live and work for their land”. He also identified a “private *watan*” and described it as an individual’s home and indeed the place where an individual’s soul resides. Thus *al-watan* was distinctly linked by al-Marsafi to residency: “the house, the district, the village, the country, the world and globe are *watan* because they are places of residency”.

The meaning of *al-watan* proposed by al-Marsafi exceeded the mere boundaries of the nation. However, he insisted that the rights of the *watan* should adhere perfectly to those he saw fit to be granted to the nation. He emphasised rights and duties that should be enjoyed by all members of the *watan*, in all spheres. Anyone, whether operating in private or public life, had a moral imperative to uphold these principles. As an example of this imperative, al-Marsafi drew a parallel between urban

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180Ibid., p.6. This refers to European colonialists entering Egypt and growing prosperous through the country’s modernisation.
181Ibid., p.12.
182Ibid.
183Ibid.
185Ibid., p.15.
and rural life, stating that the areas symbolised two kinds of *watan*. He argued that the populations of cities had a civic duty to maintain thoroughfares in good order, while the government has a similar duty to keep citizens and their livestock safe by curbing traffic to manageable limits and providing walkways for pedestrians.\(^{186}\) Thus a nation’s rights are ultimately drawn from its citizens’ own sense of civic duty and responsibility to the nation, where “everybody should believe that his country needs his time and effort and when people have this feeling, it will benefit their own security and they would never hesitate in helping their own country”.\(^{187}\) It was in this way that al-Marsafi brought to the fore the moral dimensions of the nation (or *watan*): he encouraged members of communities to act along ethical principles, while stressing the concept of the nation as a moral community, preserving the rights of these people.

In his depiction of the nation as an ethical entity, al-Marsafi made Islam, and the religious scholars who uphold its laws, its focal point. The *Risalat* lists episodes from the life and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad to illustrate right conduct and relate them to the characteristics and requirements of both the *Umma* and *watan*. These two types of community clearly had common features, but for al-Marsafi, the morality of the nation was centred on Islam, and the ‘*ulama*’s ability to “call people to do good deeds and dismiss them from doing the wrong ones”.\(^{188}\) The ‘*ulama*’s role within the nation was deemed crucial by al-Marsafi, who placed them in a historical continuity: they represented a direct link between the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions, through to the first Imams and their methods of legal interpretation, and ultimately the modern ‘*ulama*’ whose primary duty was to explain the Quran and Hadith, and thus provide a moral guide to upright behaviour for the community as a whole.

Al-Marsafi’s definition of the *Umma* gave prominence to the function of common faith in society. He emphasised that the nation’s bonds became stronger through “holding fast to the rope of God”.\(^{189}\) Religion was, for al-Marsafi, not only a unifying factor, but it also ensured that the nation remained just and equitable. However, al-Marsafi also warned against people steering of the ethical, moral path as laid out in the original teachings and sacred texts of Islam, writing that “people tend to forget and get distracted by other things”.\(^{190}\) Thus, al-Marsafi believed that when religion was undermined,
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society as a whole was made more vulnerable: it diminished its sense of common purpose, led to its gradual decay, and opened it up to foreign menace. ‘Ulama of all kind, reactionary and reformist, concurred with this view at the time, seeing correctly applied moral lessons as being vital as a barrier against the influence and intrusions from non-Muslim forces. Al-Marsafi was pointing to European penetration and the very specific threat of British invasion at the end of the nineteenth century. He called on “a group of people for the sake of reforming an entire nation”.\(^\text{191}\) Although al-Marsafi did not say exactly who he was referring to, there is no doubt from his writing that the ‘ulama would have been involved.

However, al-Marsafi avoids viewing the entire ‘ulama corps as a single, cohesive unit. Instead, he concedes that, while the “orators of the pulpit [are] more skilled than the public”\(^\text{192}\) at interpreting the holy texts of Islam, some simply tend to “memorising words whose meanings they don’t understand”.\(^\text{193}\) Examining the role of the ‘ulama from a historical perspective, al-Marsafi notes how the early ‘ulama “established the discipline of the fundamentals of religion [and] purified the authentic pillars of Islam”.\(^\text{194}\) In time, the religious scholars adopted intellectual and legal methods to analyse the holy Islamic texts and guarantee that their implementation in everyday life remained appropriate and relevant to the community. But there were splits between different schools of interpretation, and some of these divisions descended into confrontations between these groups. It was in this way that the ‘ulama became politicised, as rulers got involved in their battles and, in turn, ‘ulama formed alliances with those power brokers. This was how the ‘ulama were corrupted, al-Marsafi claimed.\(^\text{195}\)

Al-Marsafi thus saw an era of intense internal dissension within the corps of religious scholars as being the time when these ‘ulama took to politics. As a result, Egyptians started to mistrust the ‘ulama, who instead of acting for the benefit of the community, appeared to be more interested in currying favour with rulers who had an undue amount of influence over them.\(^\text{196}\) Religious affiliations weakened because of this politicisation, and this had a highly negative impact on the

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\(^{191}\)Ibid., p.20.
\(^{192}\)Ibid., p.21. Al-Marsafi alludes to both the ‘ulama and the minbar, the place in a mosque from which ‘ulama deliver sermons.
\(^{193}\)Ibid., Al-Marsafi is describing the way Muslims committed the Quran to memory, believing that such a practice kept the holy book in the way God intended, and made sure it would not be altered in any way.
\(^{194}\)Ibid., p.23, Al-Marsafi here refers to the foundation of the ‘ulama as a corps following the death of the Prophet Muhammad and the four Rashidun Caliphs.
\(^{195}\)Ibid., pp.14-16.
\(^{196}\)Ibid.
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unity of the nation, said al-Marsafi. In effect, the religious ties which held Egypt together were threatened by the ‘ulama’s politicking. The moral and intellectual vacuum diminished the strength of the nation, al-Marsafi argued. Such a view presents a disunited ‘ulama as harming the nation, while a united corps, and the religion they represent, benefit the cohesion of the nation. In this sense, al-Marsafi placed Islam as the moral cornerstone of the Egyptian nation, with the ‘ulama’s duty to protect it. Al-Marsafi’s summed the idea up, by writing that the ‘ulama were “like Prophets but without Revelation [and] are the guardians of the Revelation who explain its content to the people and educate them through this Revelation”.

Again, the Risalat needs to be understood in the context of the year in which it was published, 1882. It was the time when a forceful political movement galvanised vast popular appeal and took part in the revolt by Egyptian nationalists led by Ahmad ‘Urabi. Al-Marsafi’s work was by no means available to a majority of Egyptians, and cannot directly claim responsibility for the mass appeal of ‘Urabi’s nationalist movement. However, the Risalat certainly did play an essential part in the uprising by influencing Egypt’s intellectuals, and especially religious scholars. For the ‘ulama, the author of the Risalat who came from a family of esteemed scholars, was an eminent ‘alim in his own right. Al-Marsafi was considered an accomplished writer who had wide experience teaching at Egypt’s greatest seats of learning – al-Azhar and Dar al-‘Ulum. His peers saw him as an elite scholar who could be described as one of the most respected and influential ‘ulama of the day.

Al-Marsafi’s standing as a high-ranking ‘alim and a pro-nationalist was made clear when he joined other senior ‘ulama in the signing of the fatwa that dethroned Khedive Tawfiq as Egypt’s ruler in July 1882. Not only was al-Marsafi’s Risalat of great interest to the ‘ulama, but so was his significant discourse on nationalism, as it applied to Egypt. This inspired extensive discussions on this issue amidst a large number of them. It did not matter whether other religious scholars agreed with al-Marsafi’s interpretation of the concepts of nationhood and “fatherland” (the popularity of his views among the ‘ulama was not accurately recorded). What is certain, however, is that al-Marsafi’s work shows how elite religious scholars were drawn into contributing to the domestic political arena, and particularly towards the nationalist movement. It was this political consciousness – one that was to oppose both Ottoman and British rule – that was to spread across Egypt, with the ‘ulama playing a key role in this anti-imperialist development.

197Ibid., p.22.
Chapter Two

Anti-Imperialist Ire

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The Politicisation of Egypt in the Twentieth Century
Egyptian nationalism was often confused with Arab nationalism *per se* in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Nationalism across the Arab World was not an all-encompassing movement, however. In fact, the kind of nationalism to be found in Egypt at the time was a result of the country’s unique history and geographical position. The invasion by French forces under Napoleon Bonaparte in 1789 was to start a wholly different type of nationalist movement for Egypt, as it related to others in the Arab world. Napoleon and his military ensured that Egypt was effectively separated from all the other countries in the Ottoman Empire. After the French left in 1801, Muhammad ‘Ali was nominally an Ottoman governor when he came to power in 1805, but in reality he took charge of an autonomous state which the Ottomans struggled to influence, let alone control.¹

By the time Muhammad ‘Ali died in 1849, however, Egyptian sovereignty had been eroded by the growing economic might of adventurist colonial powers. The ‘Urabi Revolt, an uprising which started in 1879 against the Khedive and increasing European influence in Egypt, was crushed in 1882,² heralding a new period of Egyptian history which got underway following the invasion and Occupation by British forces in the same year.³ The turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century once again saw Egypt being used as a place for the Ottoman and British Empires to pursue their power games; specifically in episodes such as the Taba Crisis in which a border dispute turned into a battle of wills backed up by military power – one which involved a pan-Islamic front made up of Egyptians and Ottomans against a Britain determined to ensure the security of strategic assets like the Suez Canal. Britain’s unwavering reliance on the harshest form of summary justice to maintain its power was illustrated by the Dinshawai Incident. It cast a dark cloud over the end of colonial administrator Lord Cromer’s period in Egypt.

It was against this tumultuous background that Egypt was in a singular position to foster a brand of feeling and behaviour which became arguably the best known (and indeed most effective) of the differing nationalist movements which swept across the Arab world.⁴

What was clear was that Egypt at the beginning of the 20th century was very different to neighbouring countries in the Ottoman Empire. As a nation, Egypt was not only seeking independence from its British imperial masters, but also from the Ottomans. Egypt was the first overwhelmingly Muslim territory to express a desire to be politically independent from the Ottoman Empire. What also distinguished Egypt’s hallmark nationalism was that the country was seeking to break away from an Islamic ruler – the Ottoman Caliph – at a time when the Ottoman Empire had not collapsed. Thus Egypt developed unique nationalistic policies and strategies. These became viewed as a benchmark by which to measure the success of nationalist movements in the Arab and Muslim worlds.

Egyptian nationalism during this period was noted for being underpinned by a strong unity in views, purpose and action. Throughout the 19th century, Egypt was developing into a country set aside from so many other surrounding Arab states. As it struggled to replace institutions embedded in the infrastructure of the Ottoman Empire with more modern ones, it had a state education system which deliberately championed an Egyptian form of “exceptionalism”.

The distinct nature of Egyptian society and history was advanced at every opportunity, especially following Occupation by British forces in 1882. The arrival of troops and administrators from the United Kingdom highlighted, rather than diminished, this sense of a special Egyptian identity. This period coincided with increased intervention by Ottoman rulers in their territories around Egypt. The British presence not only stirred up a strong sense of Egyptian nationalism, but also succeeded in strengthening loyalties among some Egyptians for the Ottoman Empire.

This chapter will analyse the manifestation of anti-Imperialist ire fostered against Britain, focusing on key moments and incidents which acted as the catalyst for massive social change. As discussed in our first chapter, the ‘Urabi Revolt, which took place in the build up to the First World War was arguably the first true revolution in modern Egyptian history, and rallied thousands against western colonisers. The irregular Egyptian army involved found support from numerous members of Egyptian society in what turned out to be an indisputably patriotic conflict against invading British forces. This first expression of Egyptian nationalism assisted greatly in a revolt which was doomed in the short term, but which ultimately united huge numbers of Egyptians in a manner which would later carry them forward towards limited independence. Crucially, the Taba Crisis, which almost started a regional war involving the two dominant Empires operating in Egypt, and the Dinshawai
Incident, which revealed the reactionary spirit of the British Empire at its harshest, also ultimately inspired a strong anti-colonial position in Egyptian society. This chapter will first of all concentrate on these two spectacular displays of British Imperial might and repression. It will then demonstrate how the loosening of British control caused by the departure of Lord Cromer in 1907 consolidated nationalist ambitions. It will eventually be argued that all these elements would lead to a pivotal moment in the articulation and spread of nationalist ideals, with the setting up of formal political parties providing mouthpieces for the population at large. As such, all the below aspects will be taken into account.

Indeed, the experience of being linked to the industrial democracies of Europe, albeit through Empire, had a huge influence on nationalist aspirations. Ties with Britain not only reduced the strength of Egypt’s economic relationship with neighbours, but also produced an educated, articulate and aspirational class who had worked closely with a growing number of European colonists. Egyptian bureaucrats, land owners/managers and politicians were among the new elite who were able to rally the rest of the population towards political action.

This “modern” and increasingly secular class of Egyptians gradually replaced the traditional “Arab” and indeed “Muslim” class who had previously generated public support through regional and local clubs and societies. Radical ideas articulated by the new classes were combined with nostalgia for Egyptian ancient history, evoking the glories of the Pharaohs, and a culture which was revered all over the world. That modern-ancient identity came to lessen the attraction of a traditional religious identity centred on Islam and what it meant to be an Arab.

Thus, this chapter will emphasise the over-riding European cultural and political forces which moulded Egyptian nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century. This preponderance of European doctrines applied as much to the “new intellectuals” as it did to Egyptian scholars influenced by their state-sponsored trips to countries like Britain and France, where they used the very ideas learned from their colonial masters to push for their own independence.

Towards the start of the twentieth century, however, the dynamic of modernisation within Egypt started to come from private organisations and individuals operating within the state, rather than from the state itself. Private money began to fund a variety of groups, whether in the professional or social fields. Such innovation promoted the circulation of ideas, not least of all those associated with political change. In simple terms, nationalism was becoming sponsored privately, rather than by the
government – a crucial but often overlooked aspect. People were drawn away from the concept of a single leader and his administration directing society, towards private individuals spearheading progress. Change within the “public sphere” in Egyptian society was generated by a class of “new intellectuals” who were to disseminate ideas about identity and nationalism.

A secular agenda was, in the meantime, expressed by a different group of reformers. All paid great attention to what was being suggested by Muslim modernisers, but their views were slanted towards a less religious age. As the great debates of the day concentrated on crucial subjects, such as national identity, Islamic reform and social issues including gender equality, a form of nationalism uniquely geared towards Egyptian society began to emerge. The two men who perhaps proved most influential in shaping this early consensus were Mustafa Kamil and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid. So it was that the thinking of Egypt’s intellectual elites came to be propagated among the population as a whole – a development which would have a huge impact on society in the build up to the 1919 Revolution.

The Taba Crisis of 1906

British Imperial might was, once again, to be the deciding factor in the diplomatic row of early 1906 which became known as the Taba Dispute. It saw Britain and the Ottoman Empire arguing over a previously undefined line of demarcation in the Sinai Peninsula, west of ʿAqaba. What appeared at first to be a minor incident in which two sets of military personnel met – one British, one Ottoman – escalated to such an extent that the Royal Navy steamed towards Istanbul, threatening war.

While the row, and the resulting settlement, serves as a classic case study of how military-backed diplomacy between Empires worked in the pre-First World War period, it is what the Taba Dispute said about Egyptian nationalism during this period which is of particular interest. As an Ottoman Province, Egypt’s relationship with its British occupiers became increasingly strained after the 1882 invasion. The Ottomans had been allies of the British for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but as Egypt became of crucial strategic and commercial importance to the British, tensions mounted. Britain’s new ability to send shipping through the Suez Canal rather than around the Horn of Africa greatly simplified travel from Britain to India, which – as Egypt – was considered a Jewel in the Crown of Empire. The British viewed a secure Egypt as being essential to maintaining access to the Canal, and this was one of the main reasons for the Taba Dispute.
The Ottoman Empire claimed control of the Sinai region, which had traditionally always belonged to the Egyptians, but the British feared that if the Turks gained a foothold in the Sinai desert they would be able to push for control of the Suez Canal. To add to the complications, the Ottomans wanted to build a railway connecting 'Aqaba to the Suez Canal – a project which would put the Turks in a position to move from the centre of their Empire to one of the most important logistical assets in the British Empire in a very short amount of time.

Lord Cromer, who was the principal British official in Egypt from 1883 until 1907 in his capacity as Consul-General, dominated negotiations over the Taba Dispute, mainly using the calculated bluster which had turned him into such a great Imperialist. While efforts were made to modernise Egypt during the Occupation, Lord Cromer’s overriding position was to view the Egyptian people with suspicion. British interests always remained paramount. Following a mixture of diplomacy and military brinkmanship, the British neutralised the threat from the Ottomans during the Taba Dispute, and reaffirmed their command over the region. However, the episode awakened the danger to Britain coming from the East, and increased British attention for Syria and Palestine as potential buffers between the deeper Middle East and Egypt.

The capitulation of the Ottoman Sultan 'Abdul Hamid II and the granting of what the British wanted was the end result of the Taba Dispute. The increasingly ineffective Ottoman leader, who had never wanted to see Britain occupy Egypt, handed over thousands of square miles of territory to Egypt, and so to the British, who got their formal border in the Sinai Peninsula.

The Taba Dispute started in January 1906 when British Camel Corps officer Wilfrid Jennings-Bramly was ordered by British Military Intelligence, which was under the auspices of Sir Reginald Wingate, Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, to go to the ‘Aqaba area to build a guard post for the Egyptian border police. Bramly and four Egyptian policemen arrived at Naqb al-‘Aqaba on 5 January to set up a fort. ‘Abdul Hamid had been warned by the Ottoman governor of Syria in December about the possibility of a fort being erected. Seeing the fort as a direct menace to Ottoman sovereignty over ‘Aqaba itself, the Sultan constructed two guard posts of his own in the

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5 *The Times*, 9 May 1906. The idea never materialised because of the conditions of the terrain.
7 Ibid., p.275
8 See Private Papers of W.E. Jennings-Bramly, Frontier Administration Officer in the Sinai Peninsula, 1902-1947, at the Royal Geographic Society in London.
area – land he believed was Ottoman territory, as set out in letters between Cevad Pas, then Grand Vizier, and Cairo in 1892.

There had always been vagueness about where the line between Ottoman and Egyptian territory in the Sinai Peninsula lay, and Cromer was determined to clarify the border. He chose to highlight his preference in a statement in the *Egyptian Official Gazette* of 13 April 1892. It pointed to the town of Tor Sinai, bordered by a line from immediately east of al-Arish, on the Mediterranean, to the head of the Gulf of ‘Aqaba. This border would ensure Egypt, and thus Britain, assumed control of the whole of the Sinai Peninsula. The Ottoman response to Cromer’s statement was to say nothing about it and then, on 9 January 1906, to order Bramly to withdraw to Nakhl in central Sinai. The Ottomans then set both diplomatic and military initiatives in motion aimed at showing the British how unhappy they were to have Cromer’s forces so close to ‘Aqaba.

Egyptian intellectuals argued that the Ottomans’ desire to build a railway towards British interests was the main cause of the dispute. Muhammad Rashid Ridha supported such a view in his Cairo-based newspaper, *al-Manar*. Ridha, whose general ideas centred on establishing Egypt as a united Islamic state, was a hugely important scholar, influenced as he was by the Salafi movement founded in Cairo by Muhammad ‘Abduh. As will be discussed at length later, the use of the burgeoning Egyptian press to disseminate opinions was typical of how nationalist ideals were being developed and spread at the time.

While the dispute was being resolved, British propaganda was regularly offered as a means of bolstering the country’s position. Cromer was particularly focused on foreign powers being behind the dispute, and Germany in particular. The theory was that the Germans wanted the Ottomans to oppose British expansion in the area – a belief given credibility when a large number of Arabic language anti-English and anti-French pamphlets were distributed around Cairo. They all pointed out that Germany alone was the friend of the Sultan and of all Muslims.

The long period of diplomatic negotiations also saw the Sultan supported by Mustafa Kamil’s *al-Liwa* newspaper (The Standard). An editorial on 22 April endorsed the Ottoman claim to the Sinai Peninsula over Egypt, while an 8 May editorial called for all Egyptians to back the Ottomans in the dispute. Kamil also ordered a strike at the Cairo Law School, which Cromer had to intervene

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10Ibid., p.278.
11Muhammad Rashid Rida, ‘Mas’alat al-‘Aqaba’ in *al-Manar*, vol. 9, April 1906, pp.231–33.
in personally. Local opposition encouraged Cromer to try to persuade the Foreign Office that the dispute had wider international implications, but the Ottomans ignored British demands to leave Taba.  

It was Cromer who said that if talks failed they should “send a British fleet steaming towards Constantinople”. Cromer’s belligerence was that “the result was a stiff ultimatum to the Sultan in early May demanding the withdrawal of his troops from Taba within 10 days, backed up by orders to British warships to persuade in the general direction of the Dardanelles, seizing ‘island after island’ on the way”. This Gunboat Diplomacy worked, as so often in the past. The Ottoman force in Taba capitulated, leaving the Ottoman authorities to take part in a joint delimitation of the frontier, which was signed on 1 October. If the Turks had acted more diplomatically it would have been difficult to justify such bellicose action over such a small incident.

Cromer had received warnings that the Ottomans intended to strengthen their garrison around ‘Aqaba, including one from the future Times reporter, Philip Graves, who visited Ma’an, north-east of ‘Aqaba, in May 1905. The Sinai Peninsula took on huge strategic importance following the building of the Suez Canal, as it was effectively the buffer against Ottoman expansion towards the waterway. Following days of wrangling between the parties involved, the Khedive sent the following telegram to the Porte on 15 January 1906. Written under Cromer’s instruction, it read:

The frontier between Egypt and the Ghaza region has never been clearly determined so, following representations made to me by His Excellency the Imperial Commissioner, I invite Your Highness to nominate a special administrator to head to the area and make contact with an ad hoc commission formed by the Egyptian Government to delimit the border in this area.

Meanwhile, a Royal Navy cruiser, HMS Diana, was sent to the Gulf of ‘Aqaba, prompting the Sultan to complain about an escalation. By February, the dispute had turned into an aggressive stand-off. The undoubted instigator was Cromer, who pushed constantly for the border to be defined and for Ottoman expansion to be contained so as to preserve the security of the Suez Canal. Cromer’s strategic achievement was confirmed in the early months of the First World War, in 1915,

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when Ottoman forces took a full 10 days to cross the Sinai Peninsula in an unsuccessful bid to seize the Suez Canal.

Cromer and the British Agency in Cairo fought tirelessly against the Ottomans for British interests, while nominally using Egypt as their pawn – a fact which did not impress indigenous Egyptians who felt they were being used in an imperial power game. The sense of powerless Egyptian outrage intensified a few months later when, in June 1906, a summary court trial saw ordinary Egyptian villagers executed after being accused of murdering a British officer.

The radical nationalist Mustafa Kamil, for example, made it clear that he was supporting the Ottoman Empire against the British rulers of Egypt. Indeed, the Taba Crisis was demonstrating sharply British control over Egyptian territory – something which provoked the ire of the nationalists in Egypt.\footnote{G. Haddad, \textit{op. cit.}, p.137.} It was to lead to Cromer acting with typical belligerence, asking for an increase in British garrisons in Egypt. Cromer kept requesting more troops, calling for “public confidence” in British security to be maintained.\footnote{Cromer to Grey, 21 May 1906, PRO, FO 141/397 quoted in Owen, \textit{op. cit.}, p.335.} Troops were regularly marching through the “native quarter” of Cairo, and the Egyptian police were disarmed in Buhaira.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}}

Cromer’s special talent was to continually demand British resources to be pumped into Egypt to bolster his country’s own Empire. He successfully argued that strategic assets including the Suez Canal made an essential Imperial bastion, and regional issues, such as British commerce in neighbouring countries in the Ottoman Empire, should be of secondary concern. Cromer’s status as a robust and highly respected statesman with vast experience across the jewels of Britain’s international domain meant Egypt remained at the forefront of British foreign policy decisions.

\textbf{The Dinshawai Incident of 1906}

A pivotal point in the historical relationship between Egyptians and their colonial British masters came in June 1906 with the Dinshawai Incident. In comparison to the mass worldwide violence which was to characterise the second decade of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, and the casualties they caused, it was a small event – one centred more on repressive colonial arrogance than widespread killing. But the British response to what George Bernard Shaw would go on to call the “The Dinshawai
Horror\textsuperscript{18} was to have far-reaching repercussions, and indeed grave ones as far as the country’s hold on a prestigious Imperial asset was concerned.

It was on 13 June 1906 that five British officers (three Englishmen and two Irishmen led by Major John Edward Pine-Coffin, a Boer War veteran who had been used to wielding brutal colonial power in South Africa) went pigeon shooting in the Egyptian Delta village of Dinshawai, in the Menufiyya Governorate. With the soldiers were an Egyptian interpreter and a local police official. Locals in Dinshawai raised pigeons in conical pigeon-cotes, primarily for food. The year before, in 1905, other British military personnel had enquired about shooting pigeons there but, following protestations, the British Army banned further hunting in the area. The exact details of what happened during the 1906 Incident are often muddled, but the gist as outlined in the summary court case, which ensued the Dinshawai Incident is as follows:

The soldiers had first of all split into two groups, and insisted that permission for the hunting had come from the \textit{ʿumdeh}, the effective chief of Dinshawai.\textsuperscript{19} All of the officers later stated that they had been “guests” of the villagers, and had agreed to shoot a good 100 yards away from the residential centre of the village, but as they started their hunt, a threshing floor in Dinshawai caught fire. The Dinshawai residents were furious at losing the pigeons, and, as the fire spread, were in increasingly angry mood. There was no sign of the \textit{ʿumdeh} who had allegedly allowed the British to kill the birds. Some of the villagers started to throw stones at the British, who responded with gun fire. An already tense situation was exacerbated when the wife of Muhammad ʿAbd al-Nebi the prayer leader at the local mosque, was shot dead. This led to the Egyptian mob growing in size, as the attack on the British continued. As the officers’ live fire intensified, five Egyptians were wounded. The fire in ʿAbd al-Nebi’s grain store raged, meanwhile, and he hit one of the British officers with a stick. Al-Nebi was then joined in his attack on the British by Hassan Mahfouz, the man whose pigeons had been killed.

The fight then turned against the British soldiers. Major Pine-Coffin ordered his officers to surrender their weapons, along with their watches and money, but this failed to appease the enraged villagers. Three were held captive but then let go. Two managed to escape, with one, a Captain Bull, dying

\textsuperscript{18}Bernard Shaw, \textit{John Bull's Other Island and Major Barbara}, New York, NY, Brentano’s, 1907.
\textsuperscript{19}Foreign Office, \textit{Correspondence Respecting the Attack on British Officers at Denshawai}, London, Printed for HMSO by Harrison and Sons, 1906, pp.703-5.
from a combination of a blow to the head and sunstroke a few miles from the village.20 The second British soldier who managed to escape was able to return to his garrison and raise the alarm.21 An Egyptian who tried to help the dying soldier was mistaken as a murderer and killed by the British. Some 50 to 70 Dinshawai villagers were then arrested by the British (the exact number has varied).

Before considering details of the summary trial which followed the Dinshawai Incident, and its effect on British rule in Egypt, it is worth outlining how autocratic Britain’s administration of Egypt had been since Sir Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer,22 was made Consul-General. The background to his appointment to this hugely powerful position goes back to 1876 when the British and French agreed on the Dual Control of Egypt to assist it in its grave financial difficulties. British rule had also been strengthened immeasurably by military force after the London government agreed to occupy Egypt following the ʿUrabi Revolt. Thus the reform of Egypt’s administration and fiscal system was used by the British as an excuse to remain in Egypt following the ʿUrabi Revolt.

Imperial stability was offered to the indigenous population of Egypt as a means of sorting out their considerable structural problems. Although Egypt’s Khedives were nominally running the country under the supervision of the Ottoman Sultan, their actual ability to implement decisions was feeble. Khedive Tawfiq officially reigned from 1879 to 1892, and Khedive ʿAbbas II from 1892 until 1914, but the British were very much in charge throughout this period. The economy was in the hands of British advisors, who made sure their Egyptian colleagues rubber-stamped their resolutions.

These colonialist controllers clamped down on any attempts by the Egyptians to carry out policy unilaterally. For example, any possibility by the Egyptians to raise money to re-invade Sudan was nullified because it showed fiscal irresponsibility while Egypt was trying to pay off its massive debts. Lord Cromer personally intervened in such matters, using his status as the ultimate power broker in Egypt, which was established at the beginning of the Occupation, from September 1882 until November 1883. Cromer sought backing for this position from London, and, agreeing to assist, British Foreign Secretary George Granville issued the Grandville Doctrine.23 It stated:

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20Captain Bull was hit over the head repeatedly, and knocked out. Concussion and heatstroke were confirmed as the cause of death by British medics. Sessional Papers, 1906, Egypt No. 3, Vol. 87, British Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, pp.10,16.
21Ibid., p.16.
22Baring was made a Baron in 1892 and given the title Lord Cromer. He was made a Viscount in 1898 and an Earl in 1901. ʿAfaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations, London, John Murray, 1968, p.82. To avoid any confusion, he will be referred to as Lord Cromer or Cromer throughout.
23Ibid., p.57.
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It should be made clear to the Egyptian Ministers and Governors of Provinces that the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges Her Majesty’s Government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those Ministers and Governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices.\textsuperscript{24}

In other words, Cromer, who had next to no respect for the indigenous Egyptians as far as running their own affairs was concerned, would guarantee that any of them who disagreed with British recommendations would be removed. Cromer’s firm belief that essential Egyptian reforms needed to be implemented as part of Britain’s Occupation,\textsuperscript{25} but not by the allegedly poorly educated and inefficient Egyptians, was explained as follows:

It is absurd to suppose that a nation which has for centuries been exposed to the worst form of misgovernment at the hands of a succession of rulers, from Pharaohs to Pashas, can suddenly, on the strength of a superficial education imparted to a few youths at the Government schools, acquire all the qualities necessary to the exercise of full rights of autonomy with advantage to itself or to those interested in its welfare.\textsuperscript{26}

Cromer not only had the last say in any proposed action in the Sudan, but in any other policies pursued by the Egyptians. In a memorandum issued on 8 September 1906, Cromer further stated that “the system under which the country is governed, and which has grown up under the force of circumstances, is opposed to every sound political and administrative principle”.\textsuperscript{27} Such reasoning saw Cromer offer a form of control of Egypt which always made certain that the interests of the British Empire take precedent over local views.\textsuperscript{28} The Consul-General and his staff were perfectly satisfied to make policy decisions without paying any attention whatsoever to what the Egyptians themselves wanted.

As far as the Dinshawai Incident was concerned, Cromer used his immense authority to set up the legal machinery for emergency tribunals to deal “swiftly and summarily” with violence against his occupying soldiers.\textsuperscript{29} Cromer was not altogether unhappy with processes organised by the Egyptians, but crimes against the British Army carried out by locals were always a special case, and

Cromer believed that special measures enshrined by Khedival Decree were an absolute necessity. A draft copy of the specific Khedival Decree concerning emergency courts was submitted by Cromer to the Egyptian government, and ratified on 25 February 1895.\textsuperscript{30}

Its aim was as much to do with deterrence as punishment,\textsuperscript{31} as Cromer looked to see any efforts at violent dissent by the Egyptians against the British crushed at the earliest opportunity. No appeals against sentences would be permitted and summary punishments would also be carried out as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{32} Special tribunals would be adjudicated by both British and Egyptian officials,\textsuperscript{33} and would follow an order by the Consul-General himself, along with the Commanding General of the British Army of Occupation, in line with the consent of the Foreign Secretary in London. Rather than abiding by the accepted penal code for Egypt, the special tribunal could hand down any punishment it considered appropriate, depending on the severity of the crime.

Dinshawai was just the kind of incident which Cromer had always envisaged the Khedival Decree dealing with. Agreement to invoke it over Dinshawai was taken with British commander, Major-General G. M. Bullock.\textsuperscript{34} Among the figures defending the villagers was the prominent lawyer and politician Lutfi al-Sayyid. The President of the court was an Egyptian, a senior Cabinet member, Boutros Ghali (grandfather of the later United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali), who sat with another Egyptian, Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul (lawyer and brother of the future nationalist leader Sa‘ad Zaghlul). But the judge who mattered most was the British Vice-President, Sir Walter Bond. Bond, like other British officials at the time, barely spoke a word of Arabic. Cromer’s Chargé d’Affaires, Mansfeld Findlay, sat at the trial in the Consul-General’s absence. This was simply for logistical reasons – Cromer was in England at the time.\textsuperscript{35} Findlay expressed concerns that the Dinshawai Incident would have widespread political implications. Accordingly he advised that a swift trial with a verdict that could not be appealed would enable everybody to move on as quickly as possible, with controversy kept to a minimum.\textsuperscript{36} Lord Cromer later claimed to have been shocked by the harsh sentences which were handed down, and told Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, but both men agreed that overruling the verdicts would be a sign of weakness.

\textsuperscript{30}Sessional Papers, Egypt No. 3, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.1-2.
\textsuperscript{31}\textit{Ibid.}, p.1.
\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Ibid.}, p.4.
\textsuperscript{33}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, p.6.
\textsuperscript{35}Owen, \textit{op. cit.}, p.336.
\textsuperscript{36}Sessional Papers, Egypt No. 3, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.13–14.
So it was that Lord Cromer and his military and administrative colleagues decided to invoke the Khedival Decree of 25 February 1895, initiating a summary trial involving the villagers of Dinshawai who had been implicated in the attack on the British. The first day of the court case, in which both British and Egyptian judges sat, was 24 June 1906, and, three days later, on 27 June 1906, verdicts were handed down following an extremely fast rehearsal of the often muddled evidence. The view was that Captain Bull had been murdered, and so four of Dinshawai’s residents – Hassan ‘Ali Mahfouz, Youssef Hussein Seleem, Sa’id Issa Salin, and Mohammad Darweesh Zahran – were sentenced to death by hanging. Hassan was actually hanged in front of his own home in the village – something which was considered particularly inflammatory by other villagers. Muhammad ‘Abd-el-Nebi and another villager, Ahmed ‘Abd al-Mahfouz, were given a life sentence of penal servitude, and 26 residents of Dinshawai were given various terms of hard labour and ordered to be flogged.

The Egyptian policeman who had been with the soldiers would not confirm their claim that they were “guests” and had effectively been given permission to act as they did. He testified in court that after ‘Abd-el-Nebi’s wife had been shot, the officers he was accompanying all fired on the mob. The policeman was severely punished for his testimony, with two years in prison and 50 whip lashes. There was no authorisation of flogging, or indeed of hanging, in the penal code, yet Cromer believed it was necessary as part of his policy of deterrence. The Consul-General argued that court sentences should be “prompt and severe” as Egypt adjusted to a transitional period in which reforms could be implemented by his British collaborators.

A crowd of around 100 people were permitted to watch the horrific punishments carried out in Dinshawai, surrounded by an enclosure and guarded by 137 British soldiers and Egyptian police.
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The nationalist press in Egypt was to make much of this cruelty, describing it as a humiliation designed to highlight Egyptian subservience to their heavily armed British masters. Under the Decree which established the special tribunal, none of the sentences could be appealed – a manifestly unjust state of affairs which furthered the impression of reactionary British rulers refusing to show any leniency to the Egyptians.

After the punishments were administered, Dinshawai itself lost its ʿumdeh and numerous local officials were dismissed.45 They were replaced by those approved of by the British, who said that the person in charge would come from a neighbouring village. While the actual Dinshawai Incident and the trial relating to it were soon over, its repercussions were enormous: opinion formers including politicians and scholars all quickly saw it as a hugely significant turning point in the history of Britain’s control over Egypt.

Egyptian academics and their students spoke openly about the possibility of independence.46 All stressed the need of all types of Egyptian people to unite towards a common goal, whether their nationalistic motivations were based on religion, through the Pan-Arabic movement, or through secular ideas. A speech by Sheikh ʿAli-al-Gerbi in the mosque of Bishri Fakhrion on 12 August 1906 read: “Oh Moslems! Weep over these calamities. Unite yourselves together. Cease following your desires. Obey not the enemies of Islam, for whom God has prepared fire.”47 After the Sheikh’s speech, a spy working for the British listened to people in the crowd and heard an Egyptian say: “If the preachers continue thus, the English will go. ‘No, they must be overthrown’.”48

Pan-Islamism appealed to many Egyptians because of the combination of religion and politics which they had grown used to during the modernisation of their country during the nineteenth century. Just as the Ottoman Sultan and Caliph was a consolidated position working within the British Empire, so Muslims believed they had to fulfil their duties to both their own country, Egypt, and their God, through their religious devotion.

This was a period of pan-Islamic agitation, however, and Cromer wanted to make sure that any disturbances were dealt with in the harshest possible way.49 The Taba Crisis revealed the growing
unpopularity of the British Occupation, and indeed how determined the British were to defend their strategic and economic interests in Egypt at all costs. The brutality associated with such a committed mindset was brought into sharp focus during the Dinshawai Incident.\textsuperscript{50} It was because of his experiences negotiating Britain’s position in the Taba Dispute, and especially the resolve of the Ottomans to secure a base close to the Suez Canal, that Cromer was particularly wary of pan-Islamism.

Cromer warned of a growing Pan-Islamic movement aimed at creating a single region, made up of different countries including Egypt, for all Muslims. Such a movement appealed to many Egyptian Muslims, including potential agitators, who rallied against Western, Christian interference. These increasingly politicised Muslims believed that unification around their religious belief would return their country to the glory days of the Islamic dynasties of the seventh to the tenth centuries. Cromer said that “Pan-Islamism [had] quickened into activity all those elements of discord, which close observers well knew to exist, but which [had] heretofore remained comparatively dormant”.\textsuperscript{51} The British Consul-General also argued that Pan-Islam in Egypt would make Egyptians subservient to the Ottoman Sultan, rather than to the British. In general, Cromer was convinced that a return to the earliest tenets of Islam would lead to a period of intense racial and religious hatred.\textsuperscript{52}

Cromer had seen the radical forces of Pan-Islam in both Taba and Dinshawai. The Consul-General considered that, as far as a threat to the British Empire was concerned, Pan-Islamic-based Egyptian nationalism was a great menace to Britain. Cromer was indeed confident that Pan-Islamism used the cover of nationalism to gain legitimacy. His means of combating it were, he hoped, ones which would be persuasive for the British and the Egyptians who aspired to reform gradually under British rule. Cromer argued that British Imperialism, whether manifested in Egypt or countries like India, offered an example of how difficult it was to allow democratic government for indigenous people, while maintaining an Empire at the same time.

Viewing the matter in what he regarded as a paternalistic fashion, Cromer thought that Pan-Islamic tendencies were best fought by ensuring the Khedive’s support for the Egyptian government.

\textsuperscript{51}British Documents on Foreign Affairs, \textit{op. cit.}, p.402.
\textsuperscript{52}\textit{Ibid.}, pp.403-4.
Cromer knew that ‘Abbas II was essentially hostile to the British remaining in Egypt, and indeed partially viewed Pan-Islamism as a means of getting rid of them from his country. So it was that Cromer looked at the Dinshawai as a chance to counter such sentiments, and show off Britain’s ruthless determination to crush resistance. British colonial administrators believed they had been fairer and more just rulers than the Ottomans, giving Egyptians a better opportunity of improving their society, and indeed their day-to-day lives.

The use of the Khedival Decree to deal with the Dinshawai Incident had a devastating effect on the international opinion of British rule in Egypt, not least of all from Britain itself. The writer and social reformer George Bernard Shaw expressed his outrage in particularly strong terms in the “Preface to Politicians” that introduces his 1911 *John Bull’s Other Island*. After defending Home Rule for the Irish, Bernard Shaw wrote about “The Dinshawai Horror” thus:

Denshawai is a little Egyptian village in the Nile delta. Besides the dilapidated huts among the reeds by the roadside, and the palm trees, there are towers of unbaked brick, as unaccountable to an English villager as a Kentish coast-house to an Egyptian. These towers are pigeon houses; for the villagers keep pigeons just as an English farmer keeps poultry. Try to imagine the feelings of an English village if a party of Chinese officers suddenly appeared and began shooting the ducks, the geese, the hens and the turkeys, and carried them off, asserting that they were wild birds, as everybody in China knew, and that the pretended indignation of the farmers was a cloak for hatred of the Chinese, and perhaps for a plot to overthrow the religion of Confucius and establish the Church of England in its place! Well, that is the British equivalent of what happened at Denshawai.

Shaw further pointed out:

Ages of the four hanged men respectively, 60, 50, 22 and 20. Hanging, however, is the least sensational form of public execution: it lacks those elements of blood and torture for which the military and bureaucratic imagination lusts. So, as they had room for only one man on the gallows, and had to leave him hanging half an hour to make sure work and give his family plenty of time to watch him swinging (“slowly turning round and round on himself”, as the local paper described it), thus having two hours to kill as well four men, they kept the entertainment going by flogging eight men with

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53 On his first meeting with Khedive ‘Abbas II, who succeeded Khedive Tawfiq after his death on 7 January 1892, Lord Cromer noted that: “I see that the young Khedive is going to be very Egyptian”. See *Mudhakkirat Muhammad Farid*, Part. 1, Tarikh Misr Ibtidain min ‘Am 1891.

54 Shaw, *op. cit.*, p.11.
Shaw was in no doubt that the British reaction to the Egyptian villagers was wholly disproportionate, adding: “Instead of showing understanding for the peasants self-defence against the officer’s tactless blundering, the colonial administrators viewed the natives’ actions as a dangerous popular insurgency that had to be dealt with harshly.” Shaw also suggested that Dinshawai was “more dangerous to the Empire than the loss of ten pitched battles”.

John Marlowe said of Dinshawai: “It was the biggest blunder and the worst crime which Great Britain has ever committed in Egypt.” The radical anti-Imperialist Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, a long-time British advocate of Egyptian nationalism, thus commented on Dinshawai on June 29, 1906: “I have worried myself all day about the Egyptian villagers, and I see now that they were hanged yesterday under circumstances of revolting barbarity. All day I have been writing, and the thing is weighing on me like a nightmare still.” It was to be Blunt who spearheaded dissent against what was by now widely acknowledged as a British atrocity at Dinshawai. Blunt also coordinated the House of Commons opposition to what happened at Dinshawai, with his associate, the Liberal MP John Mackinnon Robertson. The latter was also introduced to the Egyptian journalist and politician Mustafa Kamil by Blunt, when Kamil was visiting London to lobby for the cause of Egyptian nationalism. On December 31 1906, Blunt recorded in his diary:

We have smitten Cromer hip and thigh from Tabah to Dinshawai, and from a lost force at Cairo I have become a power again; never since Tel-el-Kebir have the fortunes of Egyptian Nationalism seemed so smiling. Such have been my consolations.

There was every sign that a violent reaction to defiance had succeeded in the Taba Crisis, but scholars such as Marlowe explain how the development of Egyptian nationalism clearly benefitted from the murderous scandal of Dinshawai.

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55Ibid.
57Shaw, op. cit.
60Marlowe, op. cit., Cromer in Egypt, pp.266-7.
Chapter Two: Anti-Imperialist Ire & The Politicisation of Egypt in the Twentieth Century

John Marlowe discussed how a revived nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kamil became ever more popular towards the start of the twentieth century. Marlowe also pointed out how Cromer’s view of radical nationalism, with its perceived strong links to the militant Pan-Islamic movement, could be traced to the nationalist paper *al-Muʿayyad* (lit. the supported) which, throughout the 1890s, espoused virulent Pan-Islamic ideas.

Sir Ronald Storrs, a British Foreign Official who in 1906 was at the beginning of his distinguished career in North Africa and the Middle East, was to write later in his memoirs that the sentences handed down at Dinshawai were “excessive and mediaeval” and that “a mistake had been committed”. With such opposition to British policy mounting, not least of all from within the British establishment, Sir Edward Grey, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, at least conceded that what happened at Dinshawai was “open to question”. However, Grey chose to defend the implementation of British rule in Egypt in the most severe possible terms, admitting that his government struggled with the problem of whether “to uphold the authority on the spot at the cost of making British rule open to reproach, or to override it at the risk of undermining it altogether”.

Thus Grey’s ultimate position was that general stability in Egypt was more important than the spending of too much time dwelling on the possibility that the response to the Dinshawai Incident may well have been wrong. The confidence with which Grey offered such an opinion shows how rigid British rule was in 1906: the Empire’s administrators were in fact in control of the nominal Egyptian government through Lord Cromer. After Dinshawai, Grey agreed that the defeat of resistance to the Empire should remain a priority, and that it should be destroyed at every opportunity. Such a view was, however, to prove a great error. The violent behaviour displayed at Dinshawai, and the reactionary delivery of British justice which followed, made the nationalists even more determined to take control of their own destiny. By clamping down on those who had suffered most from the horror of Dinshawai, the British had united the opponents of their rule, and indeed reduced their support among opinion-formers within Britain.

Following Dinshawai, Egyptian nationalists certainly found themselves with more backing in both their own country, as well as in Britain itself. Within Egypt, the nationalists were very careful not to

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take too strong a stance politically or religiously, so as not to lose the prop of the two leading figures in the life of most Egyptian Muslims: the Khedive and the Ottoman Sultan. The fellah, who had previously been Cromer’s most influential supporter, was to become a staunch nationalist after Dinshawai.

The needs of ordinary Egyptian people became paramount after Dinshawai, as nationalist, rather than Pan-Islamic arguments, prevailed:

Dinshawai brought the ordinary Egyptian much nearer to the opinions of Mustafa Kamil and ‘Ali Yusuf, and also brought the nationalist leaders nearer to the real grievances of the people. Newspapers began to drop their pan-Islamic tone and dwell on the miseries of the fellah; Copts joined in the general abuse and criticism of the British rule, and Mustafa Kamil achieved the Muslim-Coptic unity which he had always worked for.68

Khedive ‘Abbas II expressed his anger after Dinshawai with the words:

I admit that this was for me a bitter and real agony. My nights were troubled by it for a long time. English haste and the weakness of the Egyptian Government gave me no time to intervene at the time of the trial. I will not go on. The English press and history have since lambasted the murderers of Dinshawai, not the unfortunate peasants guilty of a mere gesture of violence of which their ignorance excuses them, but those who sent out the executioners, flouting law, equity and justice.69

Qasim Amin echoes the Khedive’s words, saying:

Everyone I met had a broken heart and a lump in his throat. There was nervousness in every gesture – in their hands and their voices. Sadness was on every face, but it was a peculiar sort of sadness. It was confused, distracted and visibly subdued by superior force [...] The spirits of the hanged men seemed to hover over every place in the city.70

The influence of Dinshawai was to last long in time, with Anwar el-Sadat, the future President of Egypt, who lived close to the blighted village, in the neighbouring hamlet of Mit ‘Abu ‘Kom, writing:

But the ballad which affected me most deeply was probably that of Zahran, the hero of Dinshawai. I recall my mother reciting it to me as I lay stretched out on top of our huge rustic oven, half-asleep while my younger brothers

70Quoted in J.M. Ahmed, op. cit., p.63.
(and our rabbits) had all fallen asleep. It appealed to me afresh every time I listened to it. Dinshawai was only three miles away and the ballad dealt with a real incident... Zahran was the hero of the battle against the British and the first to be hanged. The ballad dwells on Zahran’s courage and doggedness in the battle, how he walked with his head held high to the scaffold, feeling proud that he had stood up to the aggressors and killed one of them. I listened to that ballad night after night, half-awake, half-asleep, which perhaps made the story sink into my subconscious. My imagination roamed free. I often saw Zahran and lived his heroism in dream and reverie – I wished I were Zahran.  

The dark, violent streak within British Imperialism had been shown up by the Dinshawai Incident, as everyone from militant nationalists in Egypt to enlightened reformers in Britain itself realised that urgent action was needed – not just to curb such reactionary excesses, but to allow nationalist aspirations in Egypt to flourish. There was a distinctly racist element to what had happened in the devastated community, with the British viewing their self-styled superiority as a pretext to wreak havoc among the indigenous community.

**Lord Cromer’s Departure in 1907**

Cromer unexpectedly resigned in April 1907, citing health reasons, but there is no doubt he felt it was time to go. The departure was variously described as “a bolt out of a clear sky” and a “national calamity”. As the British Controller-General and Consul-General, Cromer’s greatest achievement in Egypt was serving British interests – but his often ruthless treatment of native Egyptians also had the effect of inspiring nationalist thought and action.

Egypt’s controllers had *de facto* authority over Egypt’s finances, meaning they wielded enormous power in both the Egyptian and British governments. When Isma’il refused to declare bankruptcy, it was Cromer who pressured the government in London to dispose of him in 1879. This was greeted with relief in Egypt itself, not because there was widespread approval of the British choosing leaders, but because Isma’il was considered a lackey of men like Cromer. This sense of puppet Egyptians doing exactly what the British wanted was to intensify with the accession of Isma’il’s son, Tawfiq.  

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72 Marlowe, *op. cit.*, *A History of Modern Egypt*, p.113
Historian Roger Owen thus assessed Cromer’s legacy in Egypt:

That Cromer really believed that one man could persuade the different groups in Egypt to fuse themselves together into a single cosmopolitan society with common interest is testimony to a system of personal rule that had become significantly divorced from major local developments.73

The starting point of all Cromer’s dealings with the Egyptians was that he deemed that they could govern themselves. Such prejudice caused immense resentment, as did his conviction that Egypt was not a proper nation, and never would be one. Cromer’s day-to-day interactions with ordinary Egyptian people saw him misread the undercurrent of nationalist fever. One of Cromer’s biggest mistakes was to write off the burgeoning Egyptian nationalist movement as inconsequential. Soon after returning to Cairo in October 1906, Cromer wrote that “Dinshawai is forgotten”74 and all but discarded the popularity of Mustafa Kamil as a matter of concern for those trying to maintain domestic security in Egypt.

In this sense, he was a typical Victorian Imperialist – one who believed in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race and its duty to act as a parental figure to the less advanced peoples of the world. Viewing the Eastern mind as weak and “slipshod”, he was never happier than as a colonial administrator. Known to co-workers and friends as “Over-Baring”, he could be condescending to both his peers and to the “subject races” he governed. Cromer constantly fought to persuade opinion formers in London – and particularly cabinet ministers and journalists – that there should be no possibility of Britain abandoning Egypt. Alfred Milner’s England in Egypt,75 defended the Occupation, and was of huge use to Cromer. Constant changes between Salisbury’s Conservative governments and Gladstone’s Liberals made Cromer’s task a difficult one, but he slowly came to realise that the Conservatives were a more determined Imperial party than the Liberals. Cromer thought that Muslim fanaticism had pushed Europeans towards supporting the British, believing that moderates were disturbed by pan-Islamic ideas, and that reactionary policing was the only way to deal with it. In fact, the heavy-handed reliance on police and military force provoked Egyptian into just the kind of nationalistic designs that Cromer and his fellow officials feared. Cromer always estimated that a long period of Egyptian administrative and political incompetence meant a long occupation was necessary for any type of reform.

73Owen, op. cit., Lord Cromer, p.332.
74CP/2, FO 633/13 quoted in Ibid.
75Alfred Milner, England in Egypt, London, Edward Arnold, 1892.
When Cromer first became Consul-General, he approved the Dufferin Report, which effectively sanctioned a compliant parliament for Egypt with no power. It stressed that the security of the Suez Canal zone should be maintained at all times. More crucially, the report approved of men like Cromer firing any Egyptian officials who refused to accept British directives. This guiding principle, named after British Foreign Secretary Lord Granville, was known as the Granville Doctrine.

Cromer ensured that British officials were positioned in all key ministries during the so-called Veiled Protectorate. Any show of Egyptian governance was essentially a façade, with the always weak Tawfiq Pasha more than happy to abdicate any governmental responsibility. The Egyptian army, which Cromer considered untrustworthy because of a history of mutinies against the Khedive, was disbanded and a new army organised along British lines, as had happened in India. With Egyptian finances stabilised by 1887, Cromer also made sure that the Egyptians abandoned any aspirations towards reconquering the Sudan, which Egypt had lost control of following the Mahdist Rebellion.

From 1885 to 1887 Baring ran a “race against bankruptcy” \(^76\) – struggling to find the money to keep up payments on Egypt’s debt, pay for the occupying army, finance the administration, and fend off French and British domestic objections to the Occupation. Cromer decided against evacuating Egypt in the foreseeable future. Perhaps without fully realising it, Cromer “had helped to place Egypt on a path along which the only logical destination was not self-government but annexation … the country would now be subject to the familiar colonial process by which the more reforms were implemented, the more further reform was seen as absolutely necessary”. \(^77\)

There were sometimes more consolatory measures employed by Cromer. The Dufferin Report had asserted the need for British supervision of reforms deemed necessary for the country. Cromer upgraded the Egyptian Department of Education to a ministry, and appointed the perceived “moderate” Sa’ad Zaghlul as its new head in November 1907. Cromer wanted to work with Egyptians in high positions, as a way of reforming from within.

However, Cromer misjudged the effect of his education policy on nationalist thinking. Cromer’s background in India always made him think that underemployed graduates from European-style schools and universities were likely to turn their attentions to nationalist considerations and action. Thus he removed vital resources from higher professional schools, as well as the secondary and

\(^{76}\) Owen, *op. cit.*, p.215.

primary schools that provided them with students. In an article entitled “Lord Cromer Before History” in the newly-created *al-Jarida* newspaper, the nationalist Lutfi al-Sayyid commented on Cromer’s mixed legacy: on the one hand he virulently criticised Cromer’s failure “to establish the foundation of a productive and serviceable system of public education” but also lauded Cromer’s “magnificent results” for his successful economic policies.\(^7\)

Irrigation projects brought considerable economic prosperity to Egypt under Cromer. The projects were underpinned by British expertise gained in India, and were often supervised by Anglo-Indian engineers. The profits they made benefited every worker, from prosperous landowners to peasants alike. One of the main aims of the irrigation schemes was to win support for the Occupation. Under Cromer, the barrage north of Cairo was repaired, and – most famously – the British built the Aswan Low Dam across the Nile between 1898 and 1902. As Egypt exported raw cotton to industrial Britain, Cromer refused tariff protection to fledgling textile factories. The ability to control floods and provide irrigation for Egyptian crops was, according to Owen, an example of Cromer presiding:

> Over one of the world’s first modern green revolutions, in which a temporary surge in yields and outputs based on a combination of extra water and more prolific strains of cotton was bought at a longer-term cost in terms of waterlogging and an intensification of pest attacks beginning in the early 1900s.\(^7\)

Despite his reputation as an uncompromising Imperialist, Cromer always believed that British control of Egypt would one day end, and that full independence would be restored, but only once the Egyptian people had learned how to govern themselves properly.

Cromer’s policies directly led to profiteering by colonialists – something which inflamed passions among Egyptians, especially those living in rural areas. Cromer circumvented French and other European interest on the Caisse de la Dette Publique by raising loans through private interests, and particularly Ernest Cassel and his local banking partners in Egypt. Cassel set up the National Bank of Egypt, which obtained a monopoly on issuing Egyptian banknotes. Cassel also made a fortune at the expense of the Egyptian government when he was allowed to sell off the state lands of the Daira Saniya. Cromer appreciated how dangerous it was to give permission to profiteers to make so much money out of Egypt, but, once schemes were in motion, he had trouble reining them in.

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\(^7\) *Al-Jarida*, 13 April, 1907.
\(^7\) Owen, *op. cit.*, p.397.
ʿAfaf Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot suggested that under Cromer Egyptian nationalists were inert and that many Egyptians had trust in Britain’s policy of gradually retiring, while carrying out reforms in the meantime. But, Marsot argued, Cromer had no intention of seeing the British actually leaving one day. Marsot writes:

Baring believed that “subject races” were totally incapable of self-government, that they did not really need or want self-government, and that what they really needed was a “full belly” policy which kept it quiescent and allowed the elite to make money and so cooperate with the occupying power.80

Cromer’s sense of bullishness was increased by the way he had to continually deal with the French, who had always opposed the Occupation. Attempts to sabotage British policy were frequently manifested through the Mixed Tribunals or the Caisse de la Dette Publique, with the French delaying or blocking any reforms which were necessary. It was only after the 1904 Anglo-French Entente that Britain could enjoy the upper-hand in Egypt, in return for the French having the upper-hand in Morocco.

Various factors combined to make Cromer seem even more authoritarian, as he moved towards the end of his time in power. Very little information about what Egyptians were really thinking was passed on to Cromer, who remained as assured of his ability to understand everything as ever before. A Liberal government in Britain was becoming more in tune with nationalist aspirations across the world, yet the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 convinced Cromer that he could do even more to impose his country’s will on a foreign power. He wanted to abolish the Capitulations and Mixed Tribunals and set up a European legislative council alongside the Egyptian one. With the British in charge, Cromer dreamed of “fusing together all the races of the Valley of the Nile”. Owen adds: “it is difficult to exaggerate the extraordinary, and misguided ambition behind this exercise in what would now be called “nation-building”. Even more striking than the unreality of the whole project is the megalomania involved.”81

Severe punishments meted out to Egyptian peasants following the 1906 Dinshawai Incident were a huge black mark on Cromer’s period in power, even though he was out of the country at the time and had no direct involvement in Dinshawai. Straight afterwards, the new British Liberal

81Owen, op. cit., p.332.
government under Prime Minister Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman adopted a more lenient policy towards Egypt, and this was soon followed by Cromer handing in his resignation. He was awarded £50,000 by the British government for his “eminent services” to Egypt.

In 1908, Cromer published, in two volumes, *Modern Egypt* and a narrative of events in Egypt and the Sudan since 1876. In 1910, he also published *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, an influential comparison of the British and Roman Empires. After Khedive ʿAbbas II was deposed by the British for supporting the Ottomans during the First World War, Cromer was free to publish his impressions of the Khedive, ʿAbbas II, in 1915.

So it was that pre-First World War Egypt was characterised by key episodes of traditional British colonialism belligerence. Incidents such as Taba and Dinshawai, and indeed the use of overwhelming military firepower in the suppression of the ʿUrabi Revolt, showed single-minded, self-interested and often brutal British administrators acting with uncompromising ruthlessness to protect their interests. Sensitivity to a changing world, and the views of an increasingly politicised and internationally-aware indigenous population was always discarded in favour of the pursuit of objectives which bolstered Britain’s position.

All of this was to have the effect of rallying Egyptian nationalists who found growing sympathy for their cause among a more educated and better organised population. Indeed, political parties, private clubs, and other groups became the platform from which people from every strata of society would make a concerted attempt to dislodge foreign rulers who were increasingly being viewed as colonial despots.

**How Private Initiative and the Emergence of a Class of “New Intellectuals” helped spread Radical Nationalist Ideas**

Throughout the early part of the nineteenth century, it was the Egyptian state itself which was widely considered as the main moderniser. The view that *al-Azhar*, the country’s most important religious institution and its associated organisations, dominated society began to change. A need to advance, and alter people’s perceptions of the world, saw the younger generation being sent to European countries like France and Britain to study on government-funded scholarships. Schools and other educational establishments at home also moved away from the rigidity of the *al-Azhar*
system. Reforming governments introduced theatres, and opera houses, and other forms of entertainment aimed at a new type of culturally aware, cosmopolitan Egyptian. There were artistic and literary movements which challenged traditional ways of looking at the world. The workplace was also transformed, with people moving into factories and other communal places of work, rather than remaining in agricultural jobs.

Colonial rule by the British had a great deal to do with these modernising trends in the nineteenth century, enabling new concepts from abroad to circulate, and inspire change. However, the idea of imposed development by an outside ruler which dictated how society was to evolve was not one which could be maintained. By the turn of the century, and throughout the period 1900 to around 1920, the notion of the government and other state institutions playing the role of moderniser began to be replicated through private initiatives. This meant educated, enlightened, and wealthy private individuals and independent organisations investing in society to bring about progress.

These private individuals and organisations worked with modernising architects, artists and business people, as well as politicians and civil servants. All had a loose societal mission to improve and expand, with the ultimate aim being a better, contemporary society for all. This experiment in changing every department of society has been compared to other countries’ “bourgeois cultural revolution” 82, especially the kind which took place in Europe from the three centuries starting in 1600. Similarly, Egypt, and indeed other parts of the Middle East, went through an intense period of “modernisation” at the beginning of the twentieth century. 83

Replacing absolute power based on religious beliefs with a more secular view of the world was the definite objective of the “bourgeois cultural revolution”. Modern theories such as improving the lot of women became paramount, and began to dominate all forms of cultural expression, including literature. This new era of radical thinking was credited for creating the climate for Egypt’s nationalist movement leading up to the 1919 Revolution.

Chapter Two: Anti-Imperialist Ire & The Politicisation of Egypt in the Twentieth Century

From the outset, the intensely frustrating aspect of all this change was that it was still underpinned by the British Empire, and its forces of control. Egyptians knew they had to work out their own economic and political institutions, as well as sociocultural, ahlī autochtonous ones. This meant “private” institutions beyond the state. The ownership of private land by Egyptians played a big part in the feeling of an indigenous people taking charge of their own country, and indeed their own destiny. Egyptians owned 31 per cent of all privately-owned land in their country by 1900, and 300,000 to 450,000 feddans (an Egyptian unit of land measurement) were added between 1900 and 1906. Thus people could start to speak about “provincial capitalism” as it applied to people living in the Nile Delta in the quarter of a century starting in 1895. Notable among such landed gentry were grandees living in al-Gharbiyya province: their farming and trade generated substantial surplus of produce. Small and medium-sized factories such as cotton-ginning plants were also owned in Upper Egypt, while others worked as merchants and government contractors.

It is through such success that wealthy individuals were able to finance public projects. A large rise in the incomes associated with the agricultural sector allowed landowners to support ahlī institutions, and privately sponsor individuals who ran them. Many of these landowners were part of the newly intellectualised class. Expatriates from other countries also belonged to this new entrepreneurial class, promoting modernisation in every aspect of life, and bolstering it financially too. An organisation directly funded by this diaspora from other countries, and through local benefactors, was the Société Égyptienne d’Économie Politique et Législation (The Egyptian Society of Political Economy and Legislation), which was set up in 1907. It offered Egyptians training in a range of diverse fields, from banking to the cinematic arts. More generally, it provided practical advice on how ordinary people could found working-class clubs and societies. More privileged members of society also benefited from what the organisation had to propose, learning how to form themselves into influential groups.

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84 For example, the British Consul-General Lord Cromer implemented economic policies which led to the expansion of private landownership among native Egyptians. Yet, while some of his measures in the field of public works and infrastructure favoured big landowners, his policies as a whole did not help the emerging class of indigenous industrial entrepreneurs.

85 The term ahlī describes those initiatives in the private sphere organised by Egyptians in the public arena, be it in the political, economic and cultural field. Anything to do with members of the royal family is not included in this definition.


87 Eric Davis, *Challenging Colonialism: Bank Misr and Egyptian Industrialization, 1920-1941*, Princeton, N.J, Princeton University Press, 1983, p.94. The father of Sa’ād Zaghlul was ‘umdeh of the villages of al-Gharbiyya, meaning that most of Zaghlul’s lucrative agricultural land was concentrated in the province.

88 Davis, *op. cit.*, p.94.
Thus the nationalist flame was fanned by a range of modernising influences. Increased property ownership, and especially the development of sizeable landowner estates, contributed to enrich and educate people from all levels of society. Colonial rulers from Britain also unwittingly stimulated nationalist thought by allowing this modernisation to develop within the public sphere. Community life became hugely important to a new class of Egyptians, who wanted to share their wealth and their ideas. This all created a dynamic around the turn of the century, when the era of the new, assured, populist thinker was in full swing. The “modern intellectual” grew principally out of two elements: this novel period of idea-sharing, and the expansion of national and international journalism. Intellectuals and ordinary people were all able to take part in the circulation of ideas, as the new language of democracy began to thrive out of this exchange. At this point it is important to note the spread of non-Azharite thinking, which is to say the kind of belief which is not related to the Mosque and the Islamic university of al-Azhar. Secular schools produced a whole new generation of effendiya – those of high education and social standing in Arab society. These, in turn, were part of a new literate class which provided the bulk of readers for the burgeoning press, and the similarly revitalised publishing industry.

Intellectuals and influential journalists were at the forefront of the diffusion of new ideas. Rich “upper-class” thinkers who offered to solve the nation’s problems were at the top of this pyramid. Many spoke a foreign language, usually from one of the allegedly great civilising nations, and especially France. The new Egyptian philosophers were frequently wedded to the cultural convictions of this foreign country too. Their thinking filtered down through society, through large networks of new social groups.

The exchange of opinions, and high powered debates, took place in coffee shops between effendiya, but such places of refreshment and discussion were also open to those without a significant education. The semi-literate and wholly illiterate were given the opportunity to have newspapers and books read out to them at these coffee shops by mutanawwirīn (enlightened people) – a term associating education with “light”, in contrast to “dark” ignorance. This enabled ordinary people to take part in arguments and talks of their own, with the mutanawwirīn – this vast new class of intellectuals – contributing to the unfurling of civilising ideas imported from Europe.

These “new intellectuals” soon stepped into roles once fulfilled by Muslim scholars trained in Islamic law, or ‘ulama. In contrast to the ‘ulama, who were easily recognisable thanks to their traditional Islamic garb, the new thinkers dressed in European clothes, and often made themselves noticeable through cosmopolitan accessories, perhaps marking their adhesion to French culture by wearing a beret or carrying a work of Gallic literature around with them at all times, for example. These determinedly worldly Egyptian thinkers saw themselves as essential members of a radical, challenging new society, and indeed representatives of the modern age.\textsuperscript{90}

New writings focusing on liberal ideas flourished. These included Qasim Amin’s feminist tomes on the liberation of women: \textit{Tahrir al-mar’a} (The Liberation of Women) (1899) and \textit{Al- mar’a al-jadida} [The New Woman] (1901). Books by scholars like Amin called for fresh, profound theories about how society should be organised, so improving the condition of every social group, especially perennially disadvantaged ones such as women. The thousands of articles and other literature written in similar vein all provided the prelude to nationalist arguments which were to dominate intellectual thought in the run up to the 1919 Revolution in Egypt. The need to move on from an era characterised by regression, into an enlightened one inevitably underpinned all this new reflections.

The overwhelming desire to see the British retreat from Egypt was naturally a primary component of any Egyptian nationalist consideration, but the need to work out exactly what to replace it with was also very important. In short, that new class of intellectuals wanted to define the new Egypt. A consensus was to emerge around the belief that western modernisation could be reconciled with indigenous Egyptians finally taking hold of their own lives. Much of those new thinkers’ effort was centred on how new technology, revived political and social institutions, and other factors could all be directed towards the establishment of a new nation.

There were a number of national newspapers founded during the two decades leading up to 1919: \textit{al-Mu’ayyad} (lit. the supported one) was set up by Sheikh ‘Ali Yusuf in 1889 and it was later adopted by \textit{Hizb al-Islah’ala al-Mabadi’ al-Dusturiyya}, the Party of Constitutional Reform, and \textit{al-Liwa’}, (The Standard), which was established by Mustafa Kamil in 1900. The latter became the organ of the \textit{Watani} Party. Similarly\textsuperscript{91} \textit{al-Jarida}\textsuperscript{92} (lit. the newspaper) was first published in 1907,

just before the creation of the *Umma* Party, for which it was the mouthpiece. All of these newspapers were examples of the dynamic success of *ahlī* associations, and activities which involved huge numbers of Egyptians in the period preceding the 1919 uprisings. Many of these groups concentrated on the production of newspapers and privately-funded magazines.

Classical Arabic was the main language of these new newspapers, along with colloquial Egyptian dialects. Muhammad ʿUmar, the author, counted some sixteen new magazines in 1900 alone.93 Over the last 25 years of the nineteenth century, more than 160 Arabic-language newspapers and journals were founded in Egypt.94 In *The Arabs*, Eugene Rogan notes how one the most famous newspapers in the Arab world today, *Al-Ahram* (lit. the pyramids) came into being at this time. *Al-Ahram* was launched by the brothers Salim and Bishara Taqla, who moved from Beirut to Alexandria in the early 1870s. It was also during this period that the cities of Cairo and Beirut earned their contemporary reputation as the main publishing cities in the Arab World.95

The *Khedival Agricultural Society* was initiated by the landowner Prince Husayn Kamal in 1898. Kamal was one of the new enlightened thinkers who saw the need to address and then find an answer to Egypt’s challenges through science. Specifically, Kamal wanted to create a body which could use new technology to improve agricultural methods in his country’s rural areas.96 In 1919 there was another major development which saw powerful Egyptian landowners working in tandem towards the collective good: it was in this year that an appeal was made towards the formation of a club for important figures in the agricultural sector (*Nadi al-ʿyān*). The main purpose of this call was to foster a sense of camaraderie among an agricultural elite. The solidarity of this “notables club” never materialised for political reasons, but it was a perfect example of how members of society wanted to come together for the benefit of Egyptian society.

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92The creation of *al-Jarida* illustrates the close links between publishing and the press as vehicles for the spread of ideas throughout society, along with the development of private property. The privately-owned newspaper was well funded by landowners. Later, private contributions to the running of the newspaper were welcomed.
95Ibid., pp.171-2.
The *Watani* party sponsored high-school students’ Clubs (*Nadi Talabat al-Madāris al-ʿUlya*), which were founded in 1906. The party also helped set up the Manual Labourers’ Syndicate (*Niqābat Ummāl al-Sanaʾi al-Yadawiyya*) and the Cairo Tramway Workers Syndicate three years later.  

They were typical of a score of similar groups, some of which had strong links with European countries, while others were more parochial in nature, concentrating more on building up membership within Egypt itself. There was a civil servants’ Club formed in 1911, and, a year later, a workers’ Club. All of these new associations were further proof of the increasing communal character of Egyptian society.

All the while, public affairs were being discussed in private salons of the rich and influential. Princess Nazli Fadil welcomed numerous people to hers, up until her death in 1913. Other prominent figures who took part in talks in such forums were the religious scholar Muhammad ʿAbduh, the writer Muhammad al-Muwailihi, and Ahmad Fathi Zaghlul, the lawyer, politician, translator and alienated brother of the future nationalist leader Saʿad Zaghlul. The esteemed newspaper editor Sheikh ʿAli Yusuf was also a regular visitor to Princess Nazli’s salon. Syrian author May Ziyada (daughter of Ilyas Ziyada, the owner of the journal *al-Mahrusa* [lit. the protected one]) also hosted writers and debaters in her salon. Those who called in up until the late 1920s included thinkers such as Khalil Mutran, Salama Musa, Shibli Shmayyil, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Ahmad Zaki Pasha, and ‘Abbas al-ʿAqqad.

The growth of *ahlī* activities reached an important point in 1907. That year saw an infamous financial crash, with the New York Stock Exchange falling 50 per cent on its 1906 peak. It became known as the “Year of Panic” in international financial circles. At that time, any frailty in the international system was viewed as something which could be turned to the advantage of nationalists. Crucially, the exit of Egypt’s British Consul-General Lord Cromer the same year preceded by the Taba Crisis and the Dinshawai Incident in 1906 also had a profound effect on Egyptians, with the creation of political parties. These included ‘Ali Yusuf’s *Hizb al- Islah ʿala al-Mabadiʾ* (the Party of Constitutional Reform) associated with the Khedive; *Hizb al-Umma* was backed by liberal landowners and senior civil servants; and *al-Hizb al-Watani*, which was founded

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by Mustafa Kamil. *Ahlī* activities rapidly increased as an Egyptian School of Fine Arts, funded by Prince Yusuf Kamal, was opened. A movement of agricultural cooperatives was also led by ʿUmar Lutfi, a wealthy landowner and a teacher at the Khedival Law School.100

Mustafa Kamil was a leading proponent of the *ahlī* initiatives, and was to become synonymous with their success. He rallied supporters through the new associations, and started a new newspaper to promote his political party. Kamil was also one of the first people to offer private financial help to education.101 In 1880, Yaʿqub Sarruf102 had translated Samuel Smile’s well-known book *Self-help, with Illustrations of Conduct and Perseverance*. The book immediately had a profound impact on intellectual thinking in Egypt. Kamil was among those who were to champion “self-help” as a political dynamic. He frequently used the expression, including at the opening of a school he founded in 1898, stressing the need for pupils to work towards taking control of their own lives. Kamil also ensured that “self-help” was turned into a motto which was inscribed prominently around the school, along with other inspiring phrases extracted from Smile’s book.103 This belief in private initiatives in education also led, in 1908, to the establishment of an *ahlī* Egyptian university following Kamil’s recommendation.

**Secular Nationalists: Mustafa Kamil and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid**

Opinions about the substance and future direction of Egypt as an independent state differed enormously in Egypt before the First World War, with newfound political parties putting forward numerous policies and strategies to take the country forward into a prosperous future. Among the most high-profile parties were the pro-Ottoman *al-Hizb al-Watani* (The Nationalist Party) which, despite its loyalties to the Ottomans, was indisputably Egyptian in outlook and aspiration. The figurehead of the party was Mustafa Kamil (and later Muhammad Farid). Less disposed to the Ottoman Empire was the *Hizb al-Umma* (The Party of the Nation), whose main spokesman and ideological inspiration was Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid. There were widespread divergences between the Nationalist Party and the Party of the Nation in regards to the Ottoman Empire, but their views on the future of Egypt itself were far more uniform.


101 Baraka, *op. cit.*, p.70.

102 Sarruf was a Syrian émigré to Egypt and editor of the pro-British magazine *al-Muqtatatf*.

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Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908) was to use his legal training to formulate and articulate his vision of an independent Egypt, setting his ideas within the context of ties with an Ottoman Empire which he and his followers still found attractive. Religious ties to the Sultan/Caliph were emphasised, as the Nationalist Party strived to impress a huge constituency of ordinary Egyptian people. As he made speeches around the country, Kamil highlighted a position which was only partially traditionalist, combining hatred and rejection of the British Empire with an appeal to those who harked back to the glories of Egypt’s ancient history. Kamil’s flowing rhetoric was enshrined in numerous publications including the newspaper *al-Liwa*’, which he edited from 1900 to 1907. It was in 1907 that the paper’s editorial staff and other writers helped found *al-Hizb al-Watani* itself. In fact, most political parties in Egypt at the time were established around a newspaper or an editor. In 1910, owing to a discord between the new leader of the party, Muhammad Farid, and the heirs of Mustafa Kamil, the party approved *al-‘Alam* newspaper (The World) as it new mouthpiece, although several other newspapers supported the National Party too.

Mustafa Kamil’s priorities were to stir up a strong nationalist spirit at home, while attempting to make an overwhelming case internationally for Egypt’s right to be free from British rule. Kamil tried to divide France and Britain by inviting François Deloncle, a journalist and member of the French National Party, to see the political situation for himself as part of the process of “Internationalising” Egypt’s struggle. Deloncle arrived in Cairo on 21 March 1895, and was introduced by Kamil to Juliette Adam, the staunch pro-British publisher of *La Nouvelle Revue*. Adam connected Kamil to French literary and political circles and personalities. Kamil thus established the contacts to spread details of the Egyptian nationalist cause abroad, not least of all by writing about it in *La Nouvelle Revue*.

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105 *Al-Jaridah*, 23 October 1907. Egypt’s national movement had antecedents in a secret military group set up by Ahmad ‘Urabi in 1876. Known simply as the Military Party it evolved into a “National Front” called *al-Hizb al-Watani* led by ‘Urabi. When the ‘Urabi Revolt got underway, this party in turn achieved mass support as it rallied against foreigners interfering in Egyptian affairs. The failure of the ‘Urabi Revolt, however, brought about the fall of the party before it achieved the unity of its supporters.


108 *Mudhakkirat Muhammad Farid*, Box No. 1, Khatab min Mustafa Kamil ila Muhammad Farid, 10 August 1898.
Al-Liwa advocated the party’s views and there was also a supplementary magazine entitled Majallat al-Liwa that came out every two weeks. In the wake of the Dinshawai Incident of June 1906, Kamil also launched two daily newspapers called L’Étendard Égyptien and The Egyptian Standard. They first came out in March 1907, and specifically targeted European readers in order to explain the Egyptian standpoint on those events. Both newspapers were to last until 1909, when a lack of funds forced closure. The nationalist movement led by Kamil was indeed revived following the Dinshawai Incident, which caused Egyptians to become extremely antagonistic towards the British Imperialists. Kamil thus used all these platforms, as well as his public speaking, to advance his nationalist ambitions, while at the same time lobbying for greater educational opportunities for Egyptians. He accused Britain of having neglected this field on purpose. Kamil also promoted the National Party’s programme that included the independence and just governance for Egypt and the Sudan based on a written Constitution. Kamil also wanted rulers to be regulated by an authoritative representative Assembly. Education was to become a priority for Kamil’s political demands, along with support for international treaties and financial arrangements. Health, social policy, agriculture, and industry were also part of the nationalists’ objectives.

Mustafa Kamil died in February 1908, and it was then that Muhammad Farid was elected president of the Party. He re-iterated the requirements of the national movement, calling for the British to leave Egypt so that his countrymen could get on with setting up their own Constitutional, parliamentary government, an effective system of primary education for all classes, as well as providing protection for workers through a variety of measures including trade unions. Just such a union came into being in Bulaq in 1909, leading to increased friction between the Khedive and Farid through the press.

During Muhammad Sa‘id’s time as Prime Minister (1910-1914 and again in 1919) – which succeeded that of Boutros Ghali’s (1908-1910) – a number of laws were passed aimed at keeping the power of the Nationalist Party in check. For example, criminal charges involving print
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journalists were to be heard by the Criminal Court, where no appeal against conviction was possible, instead of the Court of Justice, where appeals were allowed. Students were not permitted to take part in protests. The law was changed so that any accomplice or accessory to an offence could be punished, even if there was no direct involvement.

When Muhammad Farid wrote an introduction to *Wataniyyati* by Sheikh ‘Ali al-Ghayati, he was prosecuted under the new laws, and put in prison. The literary introduction had urged poets to evoke Egypt’s nationalistic consciousness. Undercover police harassed National Party members while the newspapers *al-Liwa* and *al-‘Alam* were both suspended: *al-Liwa* on 31 August 1912 and *al-‘Alam* on 7 November 1913.\(^{115}\)

The National Party became much less influential during the First World War because of martial law, under which numerous activities, including much journalism and political activity were put on hold.\(^{116}\) The National Party’s work was mainly reduced to propagating literature in Europe calling for a free Egypt.\(^ {117}\) At the end of the war, the party resumed its protests against the British government and reasserted its nationalist demands.

As far as Kamil’s views about Egypt’s relationship with the Ottoman Empire were concerned, he was a secular politician whose position was always profoundly pro-Ottoman.\(^ {118}\) He wrote reams about the subject in his book *The Eastern Question* (*al-Mas’ala al-sharqiyya*), published in 1898. It deconstructed claims that Egyptians were trying to set up an Arab caliphate in their country, blaming them as a British-backed conspiracy theory aimed at scaring people away from the Egyptian nationalist movement. He was convinced the British were trying to break up the Ottoman Empire and occupy its territories themselves, and so remained solidly pro-Ottoman right up to his death in 1908.\(^ {119}\)

\(^{115}\) *Al-‘Alam*, 21 August 1912 and 27 October 1912.

\(^{116}\) The Press Laws of 1881 had already been re-issued under the Premiership of Boutros Ghali, which allowed the Government to censor newspapers. See *Al-Liwa*, 1 February 1909, “Madha Yurid bil Sahafa”; and FO 407/174 No. 33, Sir G. Lowther to Sir E. Grey, Constantinople, 15 March 1909; and FO 407/174 No. 40, Ronald Graham to Sir E. Grey, Cairo, 4 April 1909.


\(^{118}\) At the young age of thirty-four years-old, Kamil was honoured by the Ottoman Sultan with the title of Pasha in 1904. In 1899, he had been made Bey.

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Indeed, Kamil provided the connecting link between Egypt and Ottoman Turkey as he protested against the continuation of the British Occupation. Kamil thus showed support for the Ottoman Khalifa as a tool against the British, all the while trying to make Britain more unpopular with other powers in Europe. Kamil thus relentlessly used the press to defend the Ottoman Government and the concept of Pan-Islamism. Mustafa Kamil was made al-Mutamaiz (lit. the distinguished) and given the al-Majidi medal by the Sultan in 1899, and in 1904 Kamil attained the title of Pasha.

The pro-British Syrian community in Egypt was one which caused Kamil particular anger as they did so many other Egyptian nationalists. The privileged Syrians were known as intruders (dukhala’). Muhammad Farid himself was particularly sympathetic to Kamil’s position towards the Syrian Arabs in Egypt. Followers of Kamil became more determinedly pro-Ottoman Empire from 1907 onwards. There were repeated attempts by the Watani Party hierarchy to work with the Ottoman leaders who took over following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, but these had little impact. Instead, the years after the insurrection were characterised by increasing cracks in the Ottoman Empire – ones which had started to open during the Young Turk revolt. It was brought about by an unlikely alliance of discounted groups including Turkish nationalists and secularists influenced mainly by western ideas and governments. The common bond was the widespread view that the Ottoman Sultan was failing to run the Empire properly. The nationwide organisation which brought disparate groups of nationalists together was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Its development led to the Ottomans trying to bolster their position in North Africa and the Balkans, where they were continually being challenged by European Imperial powers. Measures to try to stop expansionist Italy moving into Libya, for example, included a ban on Italians buying or running factories in Tripoli and other major Libyan cities and towns. Similar restrictions were also applied in Ottoman assets in the Balkan Peninsula.

Watani spokesman Muhammad Farid and Sheikh ‘Abd al-ʿAziz Jawish left Egypt in 1911-1912 to support the Ottomans from Constantinople in their conflicts in Libya and the Balkans.\(^{123}\) By the outbreak of the Turkish-Italian war in Tripoli, many Egyptians were backing the Ottomans, and Egyptians also sided with the Ottomans in the Balkan Wars of 1912 to 1913, when the aim was to stop secession. Similarly, during the Taba Dispute in 1906 when British and Ottoman forces came close to engaging, it was to the latter that Egyptians had shown loyalty. Kamil also backed the Ottomans unreservedly, considering that losing territory to them was preferable to having the British negotiate on their behalf.

By the time Arab discontent was brewing up against Ottoman rule during the period 1908 until 1914, the pro-Ottoman Watani leaders expressed their prevalent allegiance to the Ottoman Empire and were singularly unsympathetic to Arabs seeking to break away from its domination. Instead, specific Egyptian problems were concentrated upon at party meetings, including the annual Congresses.\(^{124}\) Syrians like Rashid Ridha were attacked in journalistic articles for trying to diminish the centralised power of the Ottoman Empire. Watanists believed that breaking down the power base of the Ottomans would simply play into the hands of the British. The principal fear was that the British would use Ottoman weakness to extend their own empire throughout the Muslim world.\(^{125}\)

As far as ideology was concerned, there were a number of reasons why Egyptians should be drawn to Ottomanism. A lot of Muslims were impressed by the idea of pan-Islam which the empire encouraged. The anti-western nature of the Ottoman Empire had similar appeal to the masses (although more affluent, middle-class Egyptians were less inclined to support it). Upper-classes – and especially those of Turco-Circassian origin – were meanwhile very pleased about the association with Turkey which came with strong ties with the Ottoman Empire.

Up until the First World War, there was, as far as their relations with Ottoman rulers were concerned, a notable divergence between Watani Party power-brokers and Arab nationalists. A revealing example was the Party’s explicit rejection of the idea suggested by Arab nationalist ‘Aziz‘ Ali al-Misri that the Party support Arab aspirations for greater autonomy. The Administrative Council of the Party opposed such a move because it did not want to encourage conflict between


Arabs and Turks at a time when the Ottoman Empire was already under great threat, argued Muhammad Farid. It was just before the start of the War that Farid and Jawish took part in heated debates with Arab nationalists in Constantinople accusing the Arabs of treason to an Empire which deserved their fidelity. In summary, there were vast numbers of Egyptians who maintained their loyalty to the Ottoman Empire right up until its defeat in World War I.

Despite widespread approval of the Ottoman Turks, there were thousands of others who believed that the noticeable disintegration of the Ottoman Empire would lessen the chances of it helping Egypt in its struggle towards independence. Instead, Hizb al-Umma, which was founded in 1907 around the newspaper al-Jarida (1907-1915) as a direct reaction to the Dinshawai Incident, championed a form of secular nationalism which distanced itself from the profound Islamic nature of the Ottomans. Hizb al-Umma’s leader was Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (1872-1963), also editor of the Party’s newspaper. As a profoundly liberal nationalist who viewed organised religion as an anachronism, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid encouraged his supporters to reject continuing defence of the Ottoman Empire, suggesting that cooperation with the British was justified as Egypt strived towards reform in every aspect of public life.

Al-Sayyid always appreciated the efficient administration and relative financial stability which came with Egypt’s links to the British Empire, but his overriding view was that the colonialists and the Khedives would always be a barrier to his people expressing themselves democratically. Al-Sayyid considered it wholly unrealistic that Britain’s military strength, and their often ferocious devotion to maintaining their Empire, could be overcome by Egyptian nationalists. Ever a pragmatist, it was al-Sayyid’s view that Egyptians should work within the British colonial system to lobby for a Constitution on the Khedive, and indeed to strengthen the Legislative Council and the Provincial Councils – the bodies of native rule.

Al-Sayyid’s overall repudiation of Arab-centred nationalism was made very clear in 1911 when two Syrian dignitaries visited Egypt and made the suggestion that Syria should be annexed to Egypt if the Ottoman Empire were, as feared, to collapse. Al-Sayyid later said his reply was: “I did not agree with this idea, not only because of the impossibility of the request, but because I did not see it as

127As’ad Daghir, Mudhakkirati ’ala Hamish al-Qadiyya al-‘Arabiyya (My Memoirs on the Margins of the Arab Cause), Cairo, Dar al-Qahirali Tiba’a, 1959, pp.47-48.
128Rogan, op. cit., p.179.
being in the interest of Egypt.”\footnote{Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyid, \textit{Qissat Hayati (The Story of My Life)}, Cairo, Dar al-Hilal, 1962, p.137.} The interests of Egypt and Egyptians were paramount to \textit{Hizb al-Umma}, which appealed to an almost mythical sentiment of Egypt as a giant fusion of like-minded people sharing a heritage and love of nationhood. Al-Sayyid called on his countrymen to “absolutely reject any attachment to any other homeland but Egypt, whatever our origin – Hijazi, Nubian, Turkish, Circassian, Syrian, or Greek”\footnote{Quoted in Wendell, \textit{op. cit.}, p.259.}.\footnote{Quoted in Sayigh, \textit{op. cit.}, p.55.}

Such a profoundly Egyptian nationalistic stance left al-Sayyid little scope to show sympathy towards a more generalised Arab nationalism. Discussing discontent by Arabs at their under-representation in the Ottoman Parliament, al-Sayyid appreciated the complaints of Arab activists, and sympathised with their position, but was convinced they could be resolved through negotiations between Arabs and Ottomans.\footnote{See Abu Zayd, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.155-57; Al-Sayyid, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.129-30; and Ahmad Zakariyya al-Shaliq, \textit{Hizb al-Umma wa Dawruhu fil-Siyasa al-Misriyya (The Umma Party and its Role in Egyptian Politics)}, Cairo, Dar al-Ma’arif, 1979, pp.229-30.} As far as the fight against the Italian empire in Libya by Ottoman-Arabs between 1911 and 1912 was concerned, al-Sayyid made his opinion clear in a number of strongly argued editorials in \textit{al-Jarida}. His main argument was that Egypt had no national interest in the conflict, and should remain out of it.\footnote{Quoted in Sayigh, \textit{op. cit.}, p.55.} So it was that nationalists like Lutfi al-Sayyid and the \textit{Umma Party} viewed Egypt as a national unit which was completely separate from its neighbours, while others – and notably the \textit{Watanists} – considered it was one of a number of indigenous units represented by the all-encompassing Ottoman Empire. Like the National Party, the role of \textit{Hizb al-Umma} declined during the First World War, however, and after the conflict the majority of its members joined \textit{al-Wafd} party, which played a central role in the 1919 Revolution and on which we shall concentrate fully later on.

It was this new belief in political groups and associations which was to create a wave of popular support for the Revolution of 1919. People no longer regarded nationalism as an intellectual ideal, but as a basic right. They had learned much through communal debate, and then communal action. Association was deemed essential for people who wanted to fight against injustices, and rise up against the British occupying forces.
Chapter Two: Anti-Imperialist Ire & The Politicisation of Egypt in the Twentieth Century

There is no doubt that the basis of an Egyptian nationalist movement was well in place by the turn of the twentieth century. The conduct of British soldiers during the Dinshawai Incident of 1906, and the subsequent trial, was unquestionably reactionary and many showed their opposition. Dinshawai was followed eight years later by the outbreak of a global war which, as far as Egypt was concerned, brought ordinary people into contact with their colonial masters, often for the first time.

The sense of an expansionist coloniser pillaging one of its prestige overseas assets became very real to the ordinary man and woman. The fact that many of these indigenous citizens actively had to help the British exploit Egyptian resources for their use in the war became intolerable. Mass mobilisation in the countryside saw nationalist resentment spread out of the cities and towns, across the whole country, as an entire people began to focus their ire on the British Empire.
Chapter Three

Prelude to the 1919 Revolution:
How Britain’s “Informal Imperialism” was replaced by the
“War Imperialism” of the 1914-18 Conflict
Chapter Three: Prelude to the 1919 Revolution: How Britain’s “Informal Imperialism” was replaced by the “War Imperialism” of the 1914-18 Conflict

The widespread view that Egypt had been plundered by an invading, colonial power during the First World War inflamed passions across the country during the post-war period. People considered that the mobilisation of an armed, foreign force stripped the indigenous population of precious resources. So it was that, in the Spring of 1919, the arrest and deportation of nationalist leader Sa’ad Zaghlul became the spark which turned all these grievances into a fiery explosion of outrage. There were strikes accompanied by riots in major cities including Cairo and Alexandria, as industrial unrest brought transport links and other vital infrastructure to a standstill, causing panic across the ranks of those upholding British rule in Egypt.

Darwin has depicted the Egyptian countryside in 1919 as being akin to “an economic and social battleground where competing groups struggled to gain most and lose least from the changes of the preceding decade”.¹ Brown in his Peasant Politics notes how rural mobilisation led to wide-scale resentment of the British occupiers. He points out that many Egyptian peasants were coming into contact with direct British rule for the first time ever. Darwin argues that the “war imperialism” of the 1914-18 conflict replaced the “informal imperialism” which had previously characterised Britain’s presence in the Middle East. This form of “war imperialism” had three principal features which Darwin qualifies succinctly. He describes them as “temporary additions to Imperial power” – which is to say the introduction and extension of British administrative control; the mass mobilisation of labourers and animals to form whole military units; and the organisation and collection of agricultural resources for the war effort.²

Egypt’s agricultural cycle was detrimentally affected by this massive logistical undertaking, which involved huge amounts of food and fodder for the soldiers and animals. All of this produce had been originally intended for civilian use, but was instead turned over to the military. This caused major changes in the nature of the Egyptian economy: it meant that everyone from senior Egyptian civil servants and industrialists to ordinary agricultural and city workers became far more aware of the control the British Empire had on their lives. The main argument of this chapter is that this galvanised the nationalist consciousness as never before.

²Ibid., p.275.
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the “War Imperialism” of the 1914-18 Conflict

Certainly, the Wafd nationalist literature has made efforts to propagate this argument too.³ Officials
at the Foreign Office in London also admitted – albeit rather bluntly – that: “There is no doubt that
we squeezed the country very hard.”⁴ A logical corollary was great sympathy for nationalistic
messages.⁵ The system of reconciling civilian and military demand in the midst of a total war came
close to destruction in 1918. Rioters in Egypt in 1919 were in many ways similar to those in India
who attacked vital communications, including railway and telegraph lines, in order to try to break
down the British administration of their respective countries.⁶ The ultimate aim was to safeguard
local resources, and to stop them being taken away for the war effort.

The chapter will thus successively analyse the devastating consequences of the British “war
imperialism” on the Egyptian people. As the conflict grew in its intensity, an all but inevitable result
was Egypt been turned from a “Veiled Protectorate” of the British into a country which was directly
ruled from London. The main reason for this downward penetration was the need to step up the war
effort. The chapter will then highlight how the mass mobilisation of a traditional, agrarian economy
necessary for a modern, industrialised war had far-reaching repercussions on Egyptian society.
Finally, the chapter will examine how the war disrupted, and eventually destroyed an Anglo-
Egyptian system which had existed in the pre-war years – something which led to a politicisation of
the Egyptian people which was as swift and powerful as the progress of the war itself. Those
concerned were only too ready to react equally strongly when nationalist leader Saʿad Zaghlul called
for independence from Britain during the March 1919 uprising.

From “Veiled Protectorate” to Direct British Rule

Egypt’s pre-war economic system was based on very limited military spending, low taxes, free trade
and what was always described as a “temporary occupation”. After Royal Navy ships were sent to
put down the nationalist ʿUrabi Revolt in 1882, the economy evolved into a distinctive one right up
until the years preceding the First World War.⁷ British bureaucrats assisted by a formal Army of
Occupation were then given permission to modernise what Alfred Milner called the “frightful

³See for example the Egyptian Delegation Report, Egyptian Delegation to the Peace Conference: Collection of Official
Correspondence from November 11, 1918 to July 14, 1919, Paris, published by the Delegation, 1919.
misgovernment” of Khedival rule. After 1892, the London Foreign Office conceded that withdrawal from Egypt was not likely to happen, despite politicians protesting against a supposedly “temporary” occupation. British influence across Egypt spread in the years leading up to the turn of the century. British civil servants flooded the higher reaches of the Egyptian government by 1914, with Milner coining the description of Egypt as a “Veiled Protectorate”. These highly influential British civil servants became known as “advisers in name, controllers in fact”, but they operated behind the façade of the Egyptian Government. The British bureaucrats were ostensibly accountable to Egyptian Ministers in a separation of powers. British policy between 1882 and 1914 was to maintain British economic and strategic interests, ensuring enough political co-operation so as to avoid direct British rule. This led to a “constant balancing act” in British foreign policy – work centred on improving Egypt’s political and economic status certainly led to stability within Egypt, and actually strengthened Britain’s position, resulting in more British officials arriving in Egypt to join the country’s bureaucracy.

Lower, peasant levels of Egyptian society were not, however, influenced by this influx of British administrators. The vast majority of the Egyptian population was instead unaffected by a British presence made up of only 300 to 400 civil servants, and 4000 to 5000 soldiers. Their direct involvement did not extend to rural Egypt. In the countryside, 68 per cent of Egyptians remained employed in agriculture. Rural policies continued the Khedives’ pre-1882 measures, which saw Egypt integrated into the international economy through the development of cotton as an export-based cash crop. This course of action led to work on huge capital projects including the creation of the Aswan Dam, as well as a comprehensive railway network.

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12 Darwin, op. cit., p.59.
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The edicts of British officials were sent through the local village hierarchies, meaning most ordinary people had very little to do with the British. This form of indirect rule led to many believing that some kind of Egyptian government was in fact making decisions, rather than the British themselves. After the First World War broke out in 1914, this separation of powers broke down. Military demands during the war saw martial law introduced, resulting in centralised British control over every aspect of Egyptian life. So it was that intense resource extraction engendered a fundamental change in the relationship between the Egyptians and their British colonial masters.

At the outset of the war in 1914 Egypt was nominally still part of the Ottoman Empire, something which was illogical considering Turkey’s position as an enemy of the British. Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, first proposed that Egypt be annexed, but Sir Milne Cheetham, acting Consul-General in Cairo, was against this, defending the collaborative tradition of the “temporary” occupation of Egypt. Cheetham said that annexation would contradict the Government’s declared aim of upholding the rights of small nations. Britain’s connection with the Caliph, the spiritual head of the Sunni Muslim inhabitants of Egypt and India, also needed to be considered, argued Cheetham. The Residency called for a careful approach in 1914, regarding Egyptians as “potential if latent enemies whose neutrality and quiescence it was advisable to purchase at a price”. In October 1914, the Residency adjourned before suspending the Legislative Assembly. On 2 November 1914, the British military authorities in Cairo proclaimed that Britain would take on primary responsibility for the defence of Egypt. No Egyptian would be asked to engage in the fighting, it was alleged. Press censorship and counter-intelligence expedients were also brought in, adding an undertaking which defied those Egyptians who had declared an Islamic holy war on 14 November.

Egyptian sovereignty was settled on 19 December 1914 when Britain declared Egypt a Protectorate and replaced the pro-Ottoman Khedive, ’Abbas Hilmi II, with his nephew, the pro-British Hussein, a man described as a collaborator “of unmistakeable loyalty and sincerity”. Sir Henry McMahon was made Egypt’s High Commissioner, while martial law was put in place to bypass the system of

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Capitulations. Britain became the main legislative and executive authority in Egypt, despite Foreign Office claims that martial law would supplement rather than supersede the Civil Administration. This development was one of the first signs of the newly aggressive British involvement in Egyptian sovereignty.

This interference in the country’s most vital affairs transformed the political relationship between Egyptians and British, directly creating the bitterness which led to unrest in the post-war years. The terms of the Protectorate were ambiguous and easily manipulated. They were at first welcomed by the British, while the Egyptians viewed them as a transitional plan aimed at prosecuting the war successfully before Egypt’s status was finally settled. Percival Elgood, who served in the Ministries of War, Interior and Finance and as wartime General Staff Officer at Port Said during his career in Egypt, said later – in 1924 – that the Protectorate “inferred much and promised little” and should not have been implemented since “no human intelligence in November 1914 could foretell the development of the War, or whether Egyptian assistance would not become necessary to the success of military operations”. There was, to begin with at least, little impact on the daily life of Egyptians made by the new measures.

However, an indication of the gradual manner in which the war ended up having a dramatic consequence on Egyptian society is clear. As Britain extended its military commitments across Europe and the Middle East it increasingly relied on logistical support from its Empire, and especially the colossal human resources. The London government was fully aware that a global war necessarily required a strategy designed to “embrace the active mobilisation provisional of the nation’s entire economic resources as well”. Also, with Britain expanding its Imperial ambitions,

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21 A capitulation is a formal, signed joint-agreement or unilateral undertaking by which a country relinquishes jurisdiction within its borders over those living within a foreign state. As a result, those who have taken charge are immune from actions by courts and other governmental institutions in the state they have invaded.
22 General Sir Archibald Murray, ‘Memorandum on Martial Law in Egypt’, 26 November 1916, FO 371/2930, TNA.
23 John E. Marshall, The Egyptian Enigma, London, John Murray, 1928, p.141; Marshall was a Judge in the Egyptian Court of Appeal throughout the war years.
24 Elgood, op. cit., p.85.
25 See Kristian Coates-Ulrichsen, The Logistics and Politics of the British Campaigns in the Middle East, 1914-22, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, for a comprehensive coverage of how the British Empire made enormous logistical and human demands on Egypt and India to conduct large scale campaigns in Mesopotamia and Palestine during the First World War.
cities such as Cairo, as well as the larger towns, became full of uniformed soldiers from Britain and the Commonwealth preparing for action in nearby theatres of war, including the Dardanelles and Palestine. The flood of units of men with their equipment, all involved in training for war, had a profound effect on the psyche of Egyptians. This kind of military presence was an extensive physical manifestation of colonisation – one which raised tensions in local communities, convincing people that the vast increase in troop number corresponded with a vast decrease in independence.27

Sir John Maxwell, the military Commander of Britain in Egypt in 1914-15, worked closely and effectively with the civil administration.28 Egypt was the main base for the Dardanelles campaign in 1915 and, in January 1916, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) returned to Egypt. By 9 January General Archibald Murray had replaced General Charles Monro as Commander-in-Chief. The MEF initially operated alongside the Force in Egypt, but by March 1916 the complexity of maintaining two military formations persuaded Maxwell to suggest that his position be abolished. Maxwell found the system “extravagant and wasteful”.29 Murray then assumed sole charge of the amalgamated troops which were renamed the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF).

An advance across the Canal Zone across the Sinai Peninsula to el-Arish was ordered by Murray in February 1916, near the border with Ottoman Palestine. This aimed to stop the Sinai falling into enemy hands by securing British control over the only town capable of defeating an attacking force thanks to access to water supplies. Victory would also enable the EEF to take rapid offensive action against any Ottoman build-up in southern Palestine.30 The War Office in London approved the policy, and the EEF crossed the Sinai to occupy el-Arish on 22 December. The progress was accompanied by the construction of a desert railway from the Canal port of Qantara, and a water pipeline, and by 5 February 1917 both reached el-Arish.31 The campaign, which began as a defensive one designed to protect Egypt, then became an offensive one, with the EEF making headway into Palestine. The capture of Gaza and Beersheba, the two main sources of water for the

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region, denied this water being made available for the enemy. It also ensured that the EEF had a healthier HQ, away from the malaria-infested coastal plain of southern Palestine. The operation also provided cover for the extension of the military railway into Palestine.\textsuperscript{32}

There was very little resistance from the Ottoman Turks in the Sinai so, under mounting pressure from the War Office in London to deliver a spectacular, morale-inspiring victory at the time of the Russian Revolution, Murray carried on advancing. An attack on Gaza on 26 March was planned too quickly, however, and without adequate logistical support. Despite a troubled campaign, the War Office ordered that the manoeuvre continue leading to the Second Battle of Gaza on 18 April, when a frontal assault on the reinforced Ottoman garrison was beaten back with heavy casualties to both infantry and cavalry.\textsuperscript{33} On 11 June, Murray was relieved of his command and replaced by General Sir Edmund Allenby.

With increased artillery, and two new infantry divisions put at his disposal, Allenby spent the summer of 1917 extending the rail and pipeline networks up to and along the battle-front. This detailed preparation was repaid during the Third Battle of Gaza between 31 October and 2 November – one which included the heaviest non-European artillery bombardment of the war.\textsuperscript{34} The EEF launched an assault on Gaza and Beersheba in a combined offensive and penetrated the Ottoman lines.\textsuperscript{35} Allenby’s XX Corps was confronted with stiff Ottoman resistance in the Judean Hills but broke through to capture Jerusalem on 9 December.

While all this was happening, British armies were involved in all-out fighting on the western front in Europe. Offensives in France meant few additional troops were made available to the EEF from Europe. Instead, battalions from British India were sent to Egypt, many of them initially badly trained and poorly equipped before they were transferred to the front line of the conflict.\textsuperscript{36} Faced with the want for extra training and fast supply lines, Allenby did not resume his offensive until September. A joint-infantry-cavalry attack at Megiddo vanquished the Ottoman Seventh and Eighth

\textsuperscript{32}Sir Philip Chetwode, ‘Notes on the Palestine Operations’, 21 June 1917, Papers of Sir William Bartholomew, 1/2, LHCMA.


\textsuperscript{34}Matthew Hughes, ‘General Allenby and the Palestine Campaign, 1917-1918’ in \textit{Journal of Strategic Studies}, vol. 19, no. 4, 1996, p.70.

\textsuperscript{35}Sir Philip Chetwode, ‘Report on XX Corps Operations – October 20\textsuperscript{th} 1917 to November 7\textsuperscript{th} 1917’, Papers of Field Marshal Lord Chetwode, P 183, Folder 5, Imperial War Museum, London (hereafter IWM).

\textsuperscript{36}Memorandum on India’s Contribution to the War in Men, Materials and Money: August 1914 to November 1918’, L/MIL/17/5/2381, British Library, London, Asia, Pacific and Africa Collection (hereafter APAC).
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Armies on 26 September 1918. The use of the air force and substantial mechanised transport led to the retreating Ottoman columns being cut off and defeated, in what became a text-book model for a modern, “deep” battle. This paved the way for the advance to Damascus on 30 September and Aleppo on 6 October. It was at Aleppo that the momentum was halted, because the cavalry and other mechanised forces had far outstripped their supply lines.

Such swift, dynamic, modernised warfare across a fluid frontline entailed that local resources continually had to be commandeered to meet military needs. A lack of roads and railway lines at the beginning of the war necessitated that supplies be carried by beasts of burden across countryside. This was made particularly difficult because of the rough and uneven state of this rural environment in the Sinai and Palestine, and involved basic logistical military units made up of thousands of labourers and animals including camels and donkeys. By the time of the capture of Aleppo in October 1918, lines of communication were stretched to 650 miles, with these animals and their human guides having to negotiate the hundreds of miles of hugely difficult terrain. By this time, the demands on the country of Egypt had increased inexorably. In November 1918 the Egyptian Expeditionary Force comprised more than 460,000 combatants and non-combatants, with up to 500,000 Egyptians serving in the Egyptian Labour, and a further 170,000 in the Camel Transport Corps.

Wartime Mobilisation of Egyptian Resources

The provision of man and animal power, and food and fodder was the main strain of this massive wartime mobilisation. The agricultural cycle and the delicate balance between civil and military requirements were all affected in Egypt. While the enormous EEF mobilisation was met, there was great disruption to the political economy of rural Egypt and its fragile equilibrium between subsistence farming and the growth of cash crops for export. Units like the Egyptian Labour Corps

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and Camel Transport Corps called for huge numbers of peasant workers to be recruited. This was a voluntary movement to begin with, but it turned into a division of forced labour. Egyptians noted that it started to resemble the corvée – a system of unpaid toil which had been abolished in 1892 but which Cromer described as one of the primary “civilising” achievements of British rule. During the war, the reappearance of state requests for labour caused great hardship and resentment in rural regions which contributed to the revolt in 1919.  

Towards the end of the war, Britain was no longer the main supplier for the military forces in Palestine and Mesopotamia. Instead, bulky comestible items had to be produced locally, so as to economise on the use of shipping which was needed in other theatres of the war. In both Egypt and India the British authorities increased their downward demand on agrarian society. They organised the mobilisation and collection of local resources to supply the various military campaigns, so intensifying the trend towards greater British exploitation of rural affairs in Egypt that had begun during the consulships of Cromer and Kitchener. Above all, however, this development represented a significant departure from pre-war policy as the civil-military state intervened directly in economic affairs in order to requisition local produce on a far more substantial scale. The High Commission in Cairo initially had to take measures to stimulate the production of foodstuffs and reverse the pre-war emphasis on cotton which had restricted the amount of cereal yielded and created a dependence on imported food. By 1914, there were shortfalls in grain and meat and a reliance on imports to meet domestic consumption. Around one-third of Egyptian wheat requirements, amounting to 260,000 tons, were imported from Russia and India in 1913, while cattle came from Sudan.

The outbreak of war in 1914 and the immediate diversion of shipping to military use meant Egypt either had to decrease food consumption or increase the production of foodstuffs. Reducing consumption would make a mechanism of rationing and a literate population necessary. Accordingly, the Egyptian Government passed a decree on 20 September 1914 forbidding the cultivation of cotton in Upper Egypt and restricting it to one-quarter of total holdings elsewhere.

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This limitation was subsequently relaxed to one-third of holdings following protests from large landowners. Its results were mixed as the proportion of cultivated land producing cotton fell from 44% in 1914 to 28% in 1915, before rising to 40% in 1916 when many large landowners came to regard the fine levied on excess cotton production as a minor tax on profits as world prices soared to record levels. Consequently the constraint had to be re-imposed with tighter regulation in 1917. Early attempts to change commercial agricultural patterns is what these curtailments on cotton cultivation represented. But they failed to significantly increase grain production, or achieve self-sufficiency in food output. Farmers switching production to the growth of cereals were hampered by the absence of nitrate fertiliser, because it was needed by the military. This led to a disappointing wheat harvest in 1915, and many peasants switched to growing animal fodder instead.

The Egyptian Government’s failure to keep under control the export of foodstuffs in 1914 exacerbated the situation. It led to a huge increase in exports in 1915, making wheat scarce, and leading to maize being used as a substitute in 1916. Egypt remained dependent on shipments of wheat, and flour from India throughout the war, despite the various measures taken to stimulate cereal production. The return of the MEF from Gallipoli in March 1916 overwhelmed existing reserves of food and fodder and caused a food crisis which had to be dealt with by emergency shipments of bread and hay from India. Prosecuting a major desert campaign with peasant labour, animal transport, food, fodder and railways between mid-1916 and November 1918 had a huge impact on Egyptian society. Established patterns of agricultural production and distribution were distorted, and Egyptian agriculture regressed from an export-based cash economy to a food-producing one in which any surplus was claimed for military consumption and thus withheld from commercial sale. Egyptian agricultural schemes were disrupted because of three factors in particular: the recruitment of peasant labourers for military unit; the diversion of the Egyptian railways for use by the military; and the extraction of agricultural resources to feed and maintain the troops in the Sinai and Palestine.

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47Ibid., p.264.
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The decision to use Egyptian manpower was part of a long history of state mobilisation of peasant labour in Egypt. This had been standard practice during the Ottoman period (1517-1882) and Mehmet ʿAli introduced conscription for the peasantry in 1823. Under the corvée system, vast numbers of forced labourers worked on the construction of irrigation and infrastructural state-building projects during his reign (1805-1848). During the reign of Khedive Ismaʿil (1863-1879) railway development and the construction of the Suez Canal intensified and politicised the contacts between state institutions and peasants and set in motion a dialectical process of negotiation and occasional confrontation with the bureaucratising state. Government demands for labour declined after 1882, and by 1914 only the Nile Bank Lists, which provided labourers for essential flood-defence works, remained.

The need for peasant labour during the war asked for a hierarchical bureaucratic structure that projected state power downward to provincial and rural levels. This was how this mobilisation was achieved. There were improvements in irrigation, however, and this ensured that British calls for military labour differed greatly from what was the case under the Ottoman Empire. The agricultural “off-season” in which labourers had temporarily offered their services under the corvée ceased to exist, with agriculture becoming a year-round activity. Between 1917 and 1918 the agricultural and military cycles clashed as wants for military labour peaked each spring and coincided with the wheat harvest.

The Egyptian Labour Corps and the Camel Transport Corps were the units in which most Egyptian labourers served. They made up the complex logistical system which allowed the advance into Palestine to take place. Before the railway had been built across the Sinai, and mechanised transport emerged in great numbers after 1917, all items of consumption had to be shifted into place by man and animal power. This included all of the water requirements of the force, which were moved across the Sinai by camel until the water pipeline was ready in February 1917.

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It was in January 1915 that the Camel Transport Corps (CTC) was founded to use animals in the Canal Zone. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Whittingham took charge, combining his military experience in the Grenadier Guards with camel management skills picked up in the Anti-Slavery Department in Sudan. The Corps strength stood at 1310 camels and 864 men by February 1915, and was split into 24 sections and four divisions. The camels took rations and water along the Suez Canal during the early stages of construction of the Canal Zone defence works. An Ottoman attack on the Canal Zone occurred on 3 February 1915 but was largely unsuccessful. The CTC was therefore reduced to 500 camels – a move which signified that the immediate military threat to Egypt had got smaller. Methods of loading camels were perfected during these earlier years of the Corps, as well as means by which the animals could be protected against mange, colic and cold.

In December 1915 the London War Office authorised the Force in Egypt to be increased to 20,000 camels. This was in part due to Maxwell’s decision to defend the Canal in depth, and the need for a defensive line 11,000 yards to the east. The sandy soil of the Sinai Desert made wheeled transport unsuitable, so camels were brought in to ferry water, ammunition and other essential military supplies. There was a rise in military demands on the CTC as the advance across the Sinai took place in 1916. This was in particular because the water pipeline always lagged behind the railway. Throughout 1916 the troops and labourers were dependent on the CTC on water which was conveyed by rail from the Sweet Water Canal to the railhead and then loaded on to special fantasses (camel tanks) and then divided up among advanced groups.

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55 Lt-Col. C Whittingham, ‘Note on Organisation etc. of CTC’, February 1915, WO 95/4360, TNA.
57 General A. Wilson, ‘Major-General A Wilson to General Staff, Cairo’, 24 February 1915, WO 95/4360, TNA.
58 Whittingham, ‘Note on Organisation’, WO 95/4360, TNA.
59 ‘Levant Base in Egypt to War Office’, 23 December 1915, WO 33/760, TNA.
61 Elliot & Kinross, *op. cit.*, p.119.
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The CTC peaked in size in June 1917 when it was made up of 33,594 camels and 19,886 Egyptian personnel. Then its ration strength was reduced to 29,000 camels in March 1918 and 25,700 in September. The change in ground in Palestine allowed greater use of mechanised transport.\(^{62}\) Around 170,000 camel drivers and 72,500 camels served in the CTC between December 1915 and February 1919.\(^{63}\) The men and camels enduring terrible conditions, especially during the winter progression to Jerusalem through the Judean Hills in 1917 and the two Trans-Jordan raids in March and April 1918. In 1924, Elgood recorded how the “fellahin drafted into it gave themselves up as lost men” who could “hardly have been worse off in Turkish captivity”.\(^{64}\)

As well as the problems suffered by camels and drivers, there were other effects caused by the strengthened CTC, especially in regards to impacts on Egyptian society. Around 30,000 camels imported to Egypt from Arabia were all lost. The lack of camels on the open market naturally pushed the price of the animals up.\(^{65}\) The Ministry of Interior started to buy lots of camels in December 1915. The Heavy Delta camel proved the most suited to the work required, out of the eight classes of camel tested.\(^{66}\)

Camels were used by peasants to carry their produce to local markets for sale. They also resorted to railway connections to take their produce to national markets. The effective requisitioning, through “indirect pressure”, of their camels caused considerable hardship and unrest in the countryside, as an estimated 20,000 were gathered in this way in 1916 and 35,000 in 1917.\(^{67}\) This in turn placed enormous demands on agricultural Egypt to supply the fodder to feed the camels as well as the 46,000 horses, 15,000 mules and several thousand donkeys in service with the EEF by 1917.\(^{68}\) As with the supply of camels, the open market could not provide the required quantities, which were obtained instead by means of requisitioning and forced purchasing at below market prices.\(^{69}\)

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\(^{62}\) Allenby, op. cit., p.99.
\(^{63}\) Badcock, op. cit., p.154.
\(^{64}\) Percival G. Elgood, *Egypt and the Army*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1924, p.244 gives figures of 220 camel-drivers killed in action with a further 4,000 deaths in field hospitals during the war.
\(^{66}\) Murray, op. cit., p.219.
\(^{67}\) Elgood, op. cit., p.320.
\(^{68}\) Gullett, op. cit., p.364.
\(^{69}\) Brown, op. cit., *Peasant Politics in Modern Egypt*, p.201.
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The reality of Egypt being a country in dire straits became more apparent as people were recruited to the Egyptian Labour Corps (ELC). Some 500,000 Egyptians served in the unit between 1915 and 1919. Even then, these figures were disputed by some Egyptian historians with some saying the actual number was more like 1 million. Although enlistment initially represented a financially-attractive proposition to many peasants affected by agricultural unemployment and low wage-rates in 1915-16, the opportunity cost of engagement went up at a great rate in 1917-18 as agricultural salaries readjusted to reflect the growing scarcity of rural labour. The resulting slump in recruitment at a time of rapidly increasing military needs for labour led to the introduction of more coercive methods of enrolment which caused great discontentment in rural areas.

The first mobilisation of Egyptian labour occurred in March 1915 with the dispatch of a 650-strong Egyptian Works Battalion to the Dardanelles. The Battalion was stationed on the advanced base at Lemnos and was involved in the construction of piers, jetties and a light railway. It performed extremely valuable service in difficult conditions during the summer of 1915 and was often exposed to shell-fire. However, an “unfortunate incident” early in September left nine Egyptian workers dead and another seven injured after British officers fired on them to quell a disturbance. The unrest arose when the labourers claimed that they had only agreed to serve for three months and that their agreement stipulated that they would not be employed under fire. Their British officers disputed both allegations, and tensions escalated further after one officer flogged several of the men.

The civil and military authorities in Egypt condemned the “deplorable lack of tact and self-control” of the officer involved, and the Commander-in-Chief of the MEF, Sir Ian Hamilton had little option but to withdraw the Battalion to Egypt. This he did with regret, for “the abused and troubled Works Battalion also did magnificent work as long as it was here, and I wish very much I had another”. In Egypt, the British civil authorities fretted that the incident would awaken memories of the 1906 killings at Dinshawai and spark a nationalist backlash. This was averted through a policy of rigorous censorship which succeeded in keeping the incident quiet.

70 Ibid., p.198.
71 Sir Henry McMahon to Sir Ian Hamilton’, 2 October 1915, Papers of Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, PRO 30/57/47.
72 Wingate to John Herbert, ‘Works Battalion Incident’, 14 September 1915, Hamilton Papers, 7/1/26, LHCMA.
73 Ibid.
74 Hamilton to Wingate, 2 October 1915, Hamilton Papers, 7/1/26, LHCMA.
75 Wingate to Herbert, 29 September 1915, Hamilton Papers, 7/1/26, LHCMA.
In July 1915 the Egyptian labour force at the Dardanelles was augmented by an Egyptian Labour Corps. This numbered 1,152 labourers, recruited from the villages of Upper Egypt, and 10 British officers, described as “private gentlemen specially qualified by their occupation in Egypt to understand and handle Egyptian labourers”. Its commander, Major Hicks Paul, had long experience of administering agricultural estates in Egypt and earlier in 1915 had served as Inspector of a Section of the CTC. He thus combined practice of handling Egyptians in both a civilian and quasi-military context. The ELC returned to Egypt after the evacuation of the Gallipoli beachheads in January 1916. It then expanded rapidly as manual labourers constructed the railway and water pipeline which accompanied Murray’s advance through Sinai. By the end of April 1916 its strength had grown to 42 officers and 9000 men. A formal structure of recruitment replaced the hitherto “ad hoc” system that had relied on the collaboration of specialists such as Hicks and other members of the British commercial community.

Demands for labour continued to increase as the logistical network became more complex and the lines of communication lengthened. In July 1916, 3,800 labourers dug trenches and generally buttressed the fortifications at Romani against the anticipated Ottoman charge which came on 4 August. This figure represented the maximum number who could be supplied with water, to the chagrin of Murray who had ordered the dispatch of 5,000 and ordered a report as to why the remaining 1,200 had been held back. Nevertheless, Murray was satisfied with their prowess, remarking that “I feel it would have been perfectly impossible for Territorial troops in this area to have accomplished one-twentieth of the work these Egyptians have done”.

The exact strength of the ELC has been a matter of dispute between the official British sources and Egyptian historians: Nathan Brown quotes a British estimate of half a million alongside an Egyptian estimate “two or three times that number”. All labourers were recruited on three-month contracts, except those serving overseas in France and Mesopotamia, who enlisted for six months. This meant that one-third of the force had to be replaced each month. This high turnover has made it very

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76 Note, General Staff, Army Headquarters, Cairo, 23 July 1915 – The Egyptian Labour Corps’, FO 141/97, TNA.
77 An example of the use of the British commercial community to enlist labour is contained in the First World War letters of Lieutenant J.W. McPherson at IWM 80/25/1.
78 General Staff to General Officer Commanding No. 3 Section, Canal Defences, 14 July 1916, WO 95/4364, TNA.
79 Extract from notes made by C-in-C during recent visit to Romani and Mohamdiya’ in Dispatch from Captain A.C. Dawney to Deputy Quartermaster-General, G.H.Q., 7 July 1916, WO 95/4364, TNA.
81 Murray, op. cit., p.208.
difficult to calculate the overall statistic of men who served, as an unknown number re-enlisted, and the precise figure may never be known. Official Foreign Office data show that the levels of Egyptians working for the ELC rose steadily: these correspond roughly to the official sum of 100,002 labourers in November 1918, which included all ELC men performing duties overseas as well as 6,406 skilled men assisting in the units. The British authorities were careful not to publicise the extent of Egyptian involvement in the war effort, in light of the 1914 Proclamation and nationalist unease at the scale of their participation. In September 1918, Cheetham informed Balfour that “the figures have, for obvious military reasons, never been published, and are quite unknown to the public”. Cheetham added that “it has recently been thought advisable to contradict exaggerated rumours to the effect that several hundred thousand Egyptians had been sent across the Canal”.

Enlistment in the ELC was nominally voluntary, and overall responsibility for raising the amount of men rested with a network of British District Recruiting Officers. At this level, direct British supervision of the system of recruitment ended as control shifted to a class of intermediate collaborating groups. These utilised existing methods of state penetration of rural society as Egyptian agents in each sub-district worked with the village headmen (‘umdeh) to enrol the labourers. Initially, the rates of pay – 5 Piastres per day for service within Egypt and 8 for service overseas – compared favourably with the prevailing agricultural wage rate, which was lower in 1916. It was in the villages of rural Egypt, far from official gaze, that the abuses and compulsion which engendered so much indignation occurred. British officials blamed the “natural venality” of Egyptian ones for practices such as the acceptance by agents of bribes for exemption from service from those willing and able to pay, while imposing effective conscription on all others. Significantly, the village headmen succeeded in deflecting the rural backlash against these abuses of authority by ascribing them to “tyrannical” British demands for men. As a result, one British administrator in Cairo acknowledged that “while we were winning the war, we were losing the fellahin”, long considered the bedrock of British rule in Egypt, as in India.

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82 Allenby, op. cit., p.108.
83 Sir Milne Cheetham to Sir Arthur Balfour, 15 September 1918, FO 407/183, TNA.
85 Wingate to Balfour, 15 September 1918, FO 141/797, TNA.
86 Grafftey-Smith, op. cit., p.56.
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After mid-1917, the intensification of recruitment, increasing exposure of labourers to shell-fire and deployment in an offensive campaign in Ottoman Palestine multiplied the plethora of rural grievances. Although the measures taken in May 1917 temporarily boosted enlistment, the inexorable rise in military requirements for labour resulted in another crisis in May 1918. This happened as contracting fell from 6,000 per week in February to 4,000 per week in March and 1,800 per week in April when the start of the wheat harvest increased the opportunity cost of servicing. The general reluctance to enlist was compounded by stories of sickness and hardship from returning labourers and an outbreak of cholera in southern Palestine in January 1918. Meanwhile, news of the great German offensive on the Western Front on 21 March reached Egypt alongside rumours that hundreds of Egyptian labourers had been killed when the German assault broke through Fifth Army’s front-lines at Saint-Quentin.

These declining returns led to the final collapse of the system of voluntary work. On 1 May, Allenby informed Wingate that “recruiting has… now become so unsatisfactory and shows every inclination to remain so that it is of the utmost importance to reconsider the question of compulsion”. With Wingate and both the Sultan and Prime Minister adamantly opposed to the introduction of conscription, the High Commission adopted a scheme of “administrative pressure”. This involved the requisitioning of labour from the villages, working through the hierarchical structure of the provincial governors (mudīr) and village headmen (ʿumdeh). Within the High Commission itself it was rather euphemistically referred to as “compulsory volunteering”. The new policies led to “various regrettable incidents” taking place, almost daily in late-May, June and July in rural provinces, as opposition to them mounted. They included attacks on village officials and policemen attempting to round up “volunteers” for the labour units. The British blamed the disturbances on the ʿumdeh, whom they suspected of resorting to corrupt methods to collect men. In particular, they believed that the new measures “brought to a head long standing differences between village factions”. One Political Officer reported how “Junior Officials, ʿOmdehs and Sheikhs used it as a weapon against their personal enemies, as well as for the purposes of extortion”.

87Sir Edmund Allenby to Wingate, 1 May 1918, FO 141/797, TNA.
88Wingate to Allenby, 8 May 1917, FO 141/797, TNA.
89Grafftey-Smith, op. cit., p.55.
90Wingate to Allenby, 24 May 1917, FO 141/797, TNA.
91Minute from Keon Boyd to Wingate, 26 May 1918, FO 141/797, TNA.
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In this manner, the system of “compulsory volunteering” became a haven of “favouritism and baksheesh” that was “allowed to drift into a means of oppression of the poor and helpless”.

The second action to destabilise rural Egypt was, between May 1917 and November 1918, Egyptian railway being expropriated for military purposes. Thus the civilian lines were used to provide minimum subsistence to the civilian population. This created a massive overstraining on the connection between agricultural production and the railway network, as it was strained to its limit. Before 1914, the virtual absence of wheeled traffic, added to restricted routes of inland waterways, meant that the Egyptian State Railway (ESR) system was employed extensively for moving cash crops (such as cotton) to the ports for export, and collecting sugar, cereal, forage and other foodstuffs from agricultural districts and distributing them to the various centres of consumption around the country.

The exploitation of Egyptian railway resources was first raised in July 1916 when the Foreign Office ordered the civilian authorities in Egypt to render all possible assistance to the construction of the desert railway across the Sinai. The diversion of railways to military usage accelerated sharply in May 1917 after Murray identified them – along with manpower – as the two areas where Egypt could intensify its general contribution to the war effort. This led to the transfer of a dangerously high proportion of Egyptian railway resources to satiate the voracious demands of the military railway track as it extended further into Palestine.

By October 1917, 5400 wagons were in permanent military use. Only 3600 remained for supplying food and goods to the civil population and Wingate warned the military authorities that the system had been reduced to its minimum subsistence. The Director of ESR, Sir George Macauley, replied that the country could still be nourished, but a considerable dislocation of traffic in goods would occur in 1918 and continue into any post-war period. The Foreign Office advised Wingate that

92 ‘Political Conditions in Provinces – Expressions of opinion extracted mainly from the Reports of British Political Officers’, forwarded by Allenby to Lord Curzon, 24 May 1919, FO 608/213, TNA; Memorandum by Sir William Willcocks, 4 March 1921, FO 407/183, TNA.
93 Murray to Robertson, 24 May 1917, FO 371/2932, TNA.
94 Foreign Office to McMahon, 29 July 1916, FO 141/478, TNA.
95 Murray to Wingate, 22 May 1917, FO 371/2932, TNA.
96 Sir George Macauley to the Quarter-master General of the EEF, 26 October 1917, FO 141/478, TNA.
97 Wingate to Balfour, 22 September 1917, FO 371/2932, TNA.
98 Memorandum by Sir George Macauley, ‘Egyptian State Railways and Telegraphs: Report on Rolling Stock and Transport’, no date (but late October 1917), FO 371/2932, TNA.
military requirements justified “such sacrifices as would be entailed upon the Egyptian commercial population”, unaware that their policies were creating food shortages in the cities and conditions of severe deprivation in the countryside.\textsuperscript{99} The effects of this were made clear in March 1919, when railway lines became one of the targets of the rural violence as peasants sought to evade state orders for their meagre stocks of food and fodder.

The third element of dislocation was the large-scale extraction of agricultural resources to provide for the EEF in the Sinai and Palestine. Vast quantities of food and fodder were called for to feed the men and animals over and above the civilian population of Egypt. Fodder was initially brought over from India, but it was a bulky item which took up scarce shipping space. From 1916 the shipping shortage made it desirable to obtain sources locally in Egypt, and in 1917-18 Egyptian fodder was used to meet needs in Palestine and Mesopotamia as well.\textsuperscript{100} Insufficient amounts were forthcoming on the open market so fodder was secured by means of appropriation and forced purchasing from rural producers.\textsuperscript{101}

The extraction of foodstuffs was according to a similar pattern as initial acquisitions on the open market were followed by the imposition of a formal commandeering apparatus. This new method of distributing food and other local resources between civilian and military requirements altered traditional farming convention. The Resources Board which formed in 1915 to equip the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force with provisions evolved into the Supplies Commission in 1916 before being replaced by a Controller of Supplies late in 1917. However this only lasted until March 1918 when a Supplies Control Board was established.\textsuperscript{102} The Supplies Control Board represented a comprehensive attempt to channel all agricultural activity towards the prosecution of the war. It fixed maximum prices for cereals, meat and other commodities, was responsible for maintaining stocks in the larger cities, and for collecting Army supplies direct from the cultivators. In practice, this amounted to requisitioning in all but name, as local officials regularly seized crops as “contributions” and all farmers were forced to sell their produce to the government at prices fixed below market rates.\textsuperscript{103} Once again, Elgood retrospectively acknowledged that “of all forms of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{99}{Maurice de Bunsen to the Secretary of Army Council, 4 September 1917, FO 371/2932, TNA.}
\footnotetext{100}{Goldberg, op. cit., p.268.}
\footnotetext{101}{Brown, op. cit., Peasant Politics, p.201.}
\footnotetext{102}{Wingate to Curzon, 20 January 1919, FO 371/3713, TNA.}
\footnotetext{103}{Brown, op. cit., p.200.}
\end{footnotes}
control… few were guilty of more profound or more costly mistakes than those which dealt with food.\(^{104}\)

These agricultural policies failed to make Egypt self-sufficient in food. Shipments of grain from India continued to make up for shortfalls in local availability, and Cairo and Alexandria suffered from acute food shortages in 1917-18. Prices of foodstuffs soared as the military competed with civilians for sparse commodities, and wheat consumption fell dramatically from an average of 95.9 kg/capita in 1913 to 61.7 kg/capita in 1918.\(^{105}\) Usage of other crops also dropped by between 3 and 10%, and late in 1918 the food deficiencies extended to the countryside as peasants refused to sell to the Supplies Control Board and began to hoard grain for their own consumption.\(^{106}\) By November 1918, every facet of the agricultural system in Egypt had been penetrated by the British authorities. Military demands for food, fodder, man and animal power and rolling stock led to the disruption of pre-1914 agricultural patterns. The artificial restriction of prices denied cultivators the opportunity to share in the soaring wartime prices, while the constraints on the cultivation of cotton marked the regression of Egyptian agriculture from a highly-developed commercial economy to that of a planned economy.

The Breakdown of the Anglo-Egyptian Economic System

The paucity of gearing a peasant economy to modern, industrialised warfare was continually exposed. India, the main supply base for the campaign in Mesopotamia, had similar problems: military demands for man and animal power, food and fodder made the civil authorities to question the very foundations of their rule by Britain. In Egypt, as in India before it, the British were initially reluctant to penetrate downwards to satisfy their war needs through relying on rural society.\(^{107}\) Bitter memories of previous social backlashes against the imposition of heavy taxation on the peasantry in India in 1857 and Egypt in 1882 reinforced this view. So it was that military demands for Egyptian resources were not burdensome in the early days.

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\(^{104}\) Elgood, *op. cit.*, p.327.

\(^{105}\) Goldberg, *op. cit.*, p.262.

\(^{106}\) Ibid., p.263.

In 1915, the main supply base for the Dardanelles was constructed at Alexandria and stocks were drawn from the pre-1914 Army of Occupation peacetime depots at Cairo and Alexandria. In October 1914, Egypt’s role as a centre for operations in the eastern Mediterranean expanded as it took on responsibility for equipping the four infantry divisions dispatched to Salonika. The supply base at Alexandria was re-organised into the Levant Base under direct War Office control. The Egyptian Government established a local Resources Board that entered into contracts for all district supply purchasing. This eased tensions in relations between the military and civilian communities which had blighted society earlier in 1915 when the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force and the Force in Egypt had contended on the open market for the same resources.

It was Murray’s advance across the Sinai and his army’s offensive campaigns in Palestine which led to a radical and long-lasting increase in military demands on the civilian population of Egypt. This was exacerbated by a growing shipping crisis as losses from German and Austro-Hungarian U-boats mounted during 1916. Losses were particularly critical in the Mediterranean and seriously interfered with the transport of provisions from the United Kingdom. In June, Sir John Cowans, the Quartermaster-General at the War Office, insisted that local resources be used as much as possible. By December, the position had worsened still. The General Staff in London admitted that in the case of Egypt “we are faced with a situation which amounts practically to a break-down in our shipping arrangements…We have, in fact, reached a stage where the available shipping is inadequate to meet requirements”.

A wider intensification of the Imperial war effort in 1916 had much to do with the decision to use local resources that year. The flagging Egyptian and Indian wartime contributions had been harshly criticised by officials in London, with many considering that Cairo and Delhi were not doing enough to help win the war. In June 1916 the very influential Middle East diplomatic adviser Sir Mark Sykes put forward a memorandum to the War Committee saying that “civil policy in Egypt since the beginning of the war has been business as usual. There has been a steady effort to carry on the

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110Marlowe, op. cit., *Anglo-Egyptian Relations*, p.222.
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administration as though very little was afoot…this has produced a deadening of energy and a defensive or passive atmosphere…” The Proclamation of November 1914 is often described as something which limited the ability of the British to alter their foreign policy to adapt to changed circumstances, but this theory has been downplayed by Sykes. Sir Reginald Wingate, who took over from McMahon as commissioner on 1 January admitted in May 1917 that other countries had in fact contributed more than Egypt to the war effort. However, Wingate said the Egypt input was “by no means negligible…within the limits of His Majesty’s Government’s assurance…and by the requirements of the local political situation”. It was on 21 May 1917 that the issue of Egypt’s participation in the war effort came to a head. William Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in London, sent a telegraph to Murray to ask “whether in your opinion, Egypt is contributing to the fullest extent possible”. Robertson told Murray that: “It is essential that all parts of the Empire should share the strain as far as local conditions admit.” This was proof that the November 1914 Proclamation prohibited a more dynamic involvement in the war effort, but Robertson said: “As regards Egypt, I am not satisfied that this is the case.” Murray’s repeated failures to break through into Gaza by May 1917 showed how important it was to devise a complex logistical network of advanced bases and light railway lines so as to maintain a force of three infantry divisions, initially, and then seven infantry and three cavalry divisions in southern Palestine. Robertson raised concerns which were shared by all the military authorities in Egypt at the widening gap between the increasing military requirements for labour and the decreasing numbers of men enlisting voluntarily for the various labour units and auxiliary corps and services became evident.

A discussion of the general use of manpower and the scale of Egypt’s proper part in the war effort was also brought up by Robertson’s telegraph. On 22 May, Murray warned Wingate that: “There can be no doubt that Egypt is not feeling the strain of the war.” The High Commissioner responded to this by reaffirming the principle of the November 1914 Proclamation. Wingate reminded Murray that the need to maintain a compliant and stable Egypt represented a “strong argument against conscription and the mobilisation, in a European sense, of the country’s resources”. Talks between the civil and military authorities in Egypt were similar to those taking

113 Note by Sir Mark Sykes, ‘The Problem of the Near East’, prepared for the War Committee on 20 June 1916, CAB 17/175, TNA.
114 Robertson to Murray, 21 May 1917, FO 141/797, TNA.
115 Murray to Wingate, 22 May 1917, FO 371/2932, TNA.
116 Wingate to Murray, 23 May 1917, FO 371/2932, TNA.
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place between the Foreign Office and War Office in London. On 18 June 1917, Sir Ronald Graham, Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office and the former Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior in Cairo, told the Army Council that the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, considered that any change in the November 1914 Proclamation would be a mistake as it would justify the negative effect it would have on public opinion in Egypt. But the London War Office held a very different view – on 2 July, Lord Derby, the Secretary of State for War, informed Graham that the Proclamation represented “the chief stumbling block to the fuller development of the resources for the purposes of the war”.118

Allenby, the dynamic new Commander-in-Chief arrived with a mandate from the Prime Minister ordering “such reinforcements and supplies as he found necessary” to take Jerusalem by Christmas.119 Allenby’s successful breakthrough in November 1917 and extension of expeditions into Palestine placed enormous strains on Egyptian resources to furnish the EEF and build the networks of roads and railways which connected the troops in Palestine to their supply bases in Egypt. The extraction of the resources necessarily involved the British in unprecedented downward mobilisation. The agricultural cycle and the delicate balance between civil and military requisites were all drastically altered, so ensuring that the war led to the rapid politicisation of all levels and sectors of society in Egypt.120

Wartime demands for logistical supplies involved a deeper infiltration by the British into Egyptian society and an intensification of the exploitation of local resources. Similar processes occurred in the territories which came under British control in Mesopotamia, and in India which remained the supply base for that campaign. In each region, the mobilisation of local resources led to a situation of acute penury that affected rural and urban socio-economic groups. These included conditions of near-famine121 brought about by the forced purchasing of crops in 1918, inflationary pressures that resulted from the scarcity of food and other commodities such as coal and cotton seed, and service in the military labour units. In Egypt, these measures gradually evolved into “a means of oppression

117Sir Ronald Graham to the Secretary of the Army Council, 18 June 1917, FO 371/2932, TNA.
118Lord Derby to Graham, 2 July 1917, FO 371/2932, TNA.
of the poor and helpless” which contributed greatly to the alienation of the peasantry hitherto considered the “keystone of the British occupation”.\(^\text{122}\)

In summary, in 1919 the peasantry identified the principal reason for their grievances as “covert” British rule.\(^\text{123}\) Even Chirol, a passionate imperialist, highlights the hardship felt not only by the peasantry but also by the urban working-classes:

> [I]n Egypt, as in every other country, all the conditions of life, and especially the enormous rise in prices, had produced a wave of social unrest which took many different forms. [...] For the rise in wages, considerable as it had been, had often not kept pace with the inordinate rise in prices for the very necessities of life. This was the case amongst the landless labourers in the rural districts, and still more in the urban centres, where the lower classes – workmen, carters, cab-drivers, shopkeepers, and a host of minor employees – were hard put to it to make both ends meet.\(^\text{124}\)

Chirol even goes as far as showing some understanding for the use of violence by the peasantry to express their suffering:

> The British Occupation has taught them for the first time in their history that the fellah too has rights, and Nationalism has recently taught them that violence is at least excusable in the assertion of grievances. An agrarian movement, if once started under the pressure of economic distress, might easily assume against the landlords the same disorderly character of violence as the anti-British rising last year.\(^\text{125}\)

In the same vein, Safran explains how railway lines and telegraph poles were listed among legitimate symbols of British rule which could be attacked.\(^\text{126}\) This is also emphasised in Carman’s article, “England and the Egyptian Problem”:

> Before the war was two years old martial law had completely overshadowed civil authority; requisitioning of supplies and forced recruiting of labour alienated the agricultural masses which had hitherto been loyal.\(^\text{127}\)

\(^{122}\)Memorandum by Sir William Willcocks’, 4 March 1919, FO 407/184, TNA.  
\(^{123}\)Brown, op. cit., Peasant Politics, p.203.  
\(^{124}\)Chirol, op. cit., p.153.  
\(^{125}\)Ibid., p.163.  
\(^{127}\)Harry J. Carman, ‘England and the Egyptian Problem’ in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 36, no. 1, 1921, p.68.
The radicalisation of these disparate groups was matched by a second significant development in 1919. This was the British authorities’ attempt to legitimise their wartime powers and extend them into the immediate post-war period. On 7 November 1918, the Anglo-French Declaration promised to assist in “the establishment of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia”.

Although Wingate informed the Sultan that Egypt was “in an entirely different situation” and not covered by the Declaration, it nevertheless gave impetus to Egyptian demands that they be allowed to place their case for self-government before the international community at the post-war peace conference. So too did news that a delegation from the Hedjaz, led by Prince Faisal bin Hussein, would travel to Paris.

These two strands came together between November 1918 and March 1919 to form the prelude to the outbreak of the revolt. In November 1918, the Brunyate Commission proposed to replace the 1911 legislative machinery with a bicameral legislature which would, for the first time, bring Egypt’s foreign communities into the legislative process. This discontented native civil servants and lawyers, so far two of the most important collaborative props on which British rule rested and whose continued cooperation was essential to the daily administration of Egypt.

Also in November, the Foreign Office refused two requests, from Prime Minister Hussein Rushdi and nationalist politician Sa’ad Zaghlul, to travel to London and place their case for Egyptian autonomy before ministers in advance of the Peace Conference. Balfour ruled that “no useful purpose would be served by allowing Nationalist leaders to come to London and advance immoderate demands which cannot be entertained”.

Beyond “Drawing Room” Nationalism

Egyptian politicians felt that their loyal participation in the war effort entitled them to be involved in the negotiations on the future of the Ottoman Empire. Rushdi resigned on 5 December in protest

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129 Wingate to Balfour, 5 December 1917, FO 371/3204, TNA.
130 As the Wafdist made their bid for power, the reaction of the Egyptian workers was largely according to ethnic lines. Greeks, for example, remained extremely loyal to the British. The French were detached, if sympathetic to nationalist aspirations, while Italians were broadly active supporters of the Wafd.
132 ‘Summary of Events in Egypt from November 1918 to April 1919’, 17 April 1919, FO 608/213, TNA.
133 Harding Papers, Vol. 4, 28 December 1918, Wingate to Harding, CUL.
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at London’s “interpretation of the meaning of the protectorate with which he could not agree”. Meanwhile, Zaghlul’s delegation (the Wafd) drew up a constitution declaring their intention to seek the “absolute independence of Egypt” through “peaceful and lawful means”.

Consequently it was the Wafd’s ability to broaden its appeal beyond the educated urban elite which marked the real break with the past and shook British policy to its core. The politicisation of Egyptian society enabled them to tap into and mobilise popular support. This was a reaction to the more visible and penetrative nature of British interference in Egyptian affairs during the war. The wartime political economy served to heighten public awareness of the effects of British decisions on their lives. It provided disaffected elements and local elites with an external scapegoat on which they could rightly blame their hardships. Furthermore, the active participation of native lawyers and civil servants stripped the British of their two most important local allies and created the power vacuum which temporarily paralysed the working of the state after the first strike wave erupted on 9 March.

In rural Egypt, disgruntled civil servants and lawyers played an important role in transmitting Wafdist ideals to provincial towns. Labour social clubs and organisations such as the newly-reconstituted Manual Trade Workers Union spread the activist message beyond the realms of the educated elite. A broad range of socio-economic groups mobilised in an uneasy alliance between the aristocratic leadership in Cairo who struggled to control and channel the inarticulate fervour of the urban and rural masses which followed them. For the peasants who targeted symbols of British authority such as railway lines and telegraph poles, their action was primarily motivated by dissatisfaction with the wartime sufferings imposed by the military demands for their resources, labour and animals as well as a desire to protect scarce supplies from further degradation.

The Wafd’s achievement was to combine the nationalism of ideals espoused by the educated urban elite with the social and economic effects of Egyptian implication in the war effort. This was a significant new development which, in the words of one contemporary British official, meant that:

134 Summary of Events in Egypt from November 1918 to April 1919, 17 April 1919, FO 608/213, TNA.
135 Yap, op. cit., p.297.
137 Vatikiotis, op. cit., The Egyptian Army in Politics, p.23.
138 Safran, op. cit., p.103.
“For the first time these two naturally antagonistic classes are united in having grievances.” Zaghlul fused the backlash of the educated urban intelligentsia and nationalist elite at British attempts to extend their temporary wartime powers into the post-war world with the wide range of hardships that faced almost every social and economic grouping in Egypt.

The mobilisation of Egyptian man and animal power made possible the conduct of modern warfare in a pre-industrial setting. It made a formidable contribution toward the creation of a logistical network that maintained the EEF over a line of communication which eventually linked the Suez Canal to Aleppo on 31 October 1918. Nevertheless, the demand for military labour involved the British authorities in unprecedented downward mobilisation into rural Egypt. It both built upon and utilised the existing Ottoman pattern, but interfered with agricultural schemes in a fundamentally different manner as agriculture had become a year-round activity by 1914. The impact of wartime agricultural policies fell variously on large landowners, who resented the restrictions on cotton cultivation that prevented them from sharing in record prices after 1916, and on small peasants, who suffered from the requisitioning of their animals and fodder. Wingate defended these policies and stated that the British authorities had been preoccupied with doing “all in their power to help in winning the war”.

The negative legacy of rural mobilisation was one of considerable hardships that hardened into resentment against the British presence as countryside Egyptians came into contact with direct British control for the first time. Their politicisation mirrored that of many other strata within Egyptian society as a result of the war, and ensured that they were no longer immune to the “drawing room” nationalism of the urban and educated intelligentsia.

The mass slaughter and devastation of infrastructure caused by the First World War had created an urge for global change. The old order of Imperial powers was in crisis, and nationalists acknowledged this as an opportunity to challenge it. Their masters’ claim to represent superior societies appeared particularly weak. European nations with expansive empires had used up masses of resources to prosecute the war, and the veneer of martial invincibility that once surrounded them

139 Memorandum by Mr Mallaby Firth, Department of Antiquities’, 7 April 1919, FO 407/184, TNA.
140 Rough Notes by Sir R. Wingate on Sir W. Willcocks’s proposals’, no date but March 1919, FO 371/3714, TNA.
141 Brown, op. cit., p.203.
142 Enclosure by William Willcocks – Memorandum, giving the opinion of a very friendly and reliable Egyptian on the situation today’, 4 March 1919, FO 371/3714, TNA.
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had vanished. Moreover, those who had assisted the colonialists in their conflicts as subjects – including risking their own lives and losing fellow countrymen – felt they should be repaid with a greater stake in running their own affairs domestically as well as on the international stage.

Failing economies contributed to the bleakness of the immediate post-war period, as, between 1918 and early 1919, those in countries such as Egypt saw rays of light in Wilson’s idealistic rhetoric about self-determination and a new world order. This is the reason why his “Wilsonian Moment” was such an important international phenomenon, and why it should be duly investigated.
Chapter Four

A New World Order:
The Emergence of an “International Self-Determination Moment” and its Impact on Egyptian Nationalists
Chapter Four: A New World Order: The Emergence of an “International Self-Determination Moment” and its Impact on Egyptian Nationalists

The concept of “self-determination” that had such an abiding influence on the 1919 Egyptian Revolution has its roots in Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s political discourse during the period 1903 to 1917. A liberal, conservative version of the Russian leader’s radical, Marxist ideas was then placed in the international arena by American President Woodrow Wilson, at the end of the First World War, and during the post-war era when attempts were made at moulding a new world order.

Since 1917, the debate about self-determination mainly took place using the language of law and international diplomacy.¹ In this chapter, we will also examine it as social history, demonstrating how it legitimised a dynamic force for hugely significant changes around the world.² Both Lenin and Wilson effectively combined to promote the term “self-determination” internationally as it was projected into routine political discourse, especially with regard to the creation of new states, and the re-organisation of former empires.³ The League of Nations was to evoke “self-determination” during the Åland Crisis of the early 1920s, for example, when the population of the Åland Islands demanded an end to Finnish rule. Rather than self-determination per se, Finland allowed measures securing political and cultural autonomy ⁴ and the League of Nations ruled that these were enough to protect the Swedish language and culture which those living in the islands wanted. By June 1945 delegates of 50 nations had met in San Francisco to incorporate the “equal rights and self-determination of peoples” in the new UN Charter, the founding document of the United Nations.


²This chapter follows the intellectual and social history methodology of the “Cambridge School” historian Quentin Skinner, as outlined in his seminal article ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’ in History and Theory, Vol. 8, no. 1, 1969, pp.3-53. We will, in particular, be applying Skinner’s framework to demonstrate how specific ideas and terms of expressions are used in international discussions to legitimise concepts. Skinner argues that references of political thinking require legitimisation. In turn, they are “inhibited” by the need for this legitimisation. On all this see Skinner’s History and Theory as well as Skinner’s highly influential publications on theoretical principles, which are compiled in Visions of Politics.


Wilson and Lenin had both always had very different views as to what self-determination actually meant, and each played a crucial role in triggering a global argument on the subject. Woodrow Wilson’s general idea about “self-determination” was, in summary, a liberal conservative one, while Lenin’s was a radical socialist one. Diplomacy in the early Twentieth Century became focused on “self-determination” as a concept that could be used to justify policy. Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the Russian Bolshevik leader, spent fourteen years between 1903 and 1917 theorising it, and then it was American President Woodrow Wilson who globalised it as a “legitimising” ideal. There is no doubt that Wilson was on many occasions responding to Lenin’s work. In this chapter, we will analyse the pronouncements of both men, and how they both helped to create an “international self-determination moment” – one that would have resounding repercussions for the Egyptian nationalist movement.

Accordingly, this chapter will start by exploring the ideological and theoretical chasm between Lenin and Wilson’s respective interpretations of “self-determination”. What both leaders thought of freedom was central to their discourse on self-determination: each wanted to justify and legitimise their own definitions in relation to liberty. Lenin stressed how “self-determination” was a radical idea: one that projected freedom as equality. If pursued, it would lead to complete political freedom, and the creation of new, independent states equal in status with other states and systems. Lenin was arguing for “self-determination” in the context of socialist internationalism – one that included the possibility of violent revolution. This made for a more restricted definition of the term, based on factors that were not to become internationally prevalent. Wilson also wanted to legitimise “self-determination” in the context of freedom. Although his reference to “self-determination” was ambiguous and potentially difficult to implement, it was markedly different to that envisaged by Lenin. While the Russian’s “radical” stance has given prominence to equality in international debate, Wilson’s “liberal-conservative” idea of freedom has instead insisted on the values of peace and stability. The American President seldom evoked the term “self-determination” specifically, but implied it as a conditional form of political freedom – a notion that guaranteed non-interference with existing borders and orders. The political results of framing “self-determination” in such a way have been advantageous to those upholding the status quo. As Lenin’s work, Wilson’s discourse set terms of reference that would be used repeatedly at key historical junctures in the future. But, as will be demonstrated, even though Wilson had used the terminology of “self-determination” far less than
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Lenin and in a far more elusive manner, it was his liberal-conservative interpretation that was to have great impact and long-lasting influence on the world.

This chapter will also, in turn, focus on Lenin’s and then Wilson’s use of the rhetoric of “self-determination”, and place it in its historical perspective. Ideas popularly associated with “self-determination” – such as sovereignty, freedom and legitimacy – had been debated for centuries, but it was Lenin and Wilson who brought the term *per se* to international prominence, resorting to precise language that took on immense significance for the future of the world. In short, “self-determination” became a crucial reference point in global diplomacy thanks to both Lenin and Wilson. This was at a time of turbulence, involving cataclysmic world events including the First World War and Revolutions in Russia. Conflict resolution, and indeed conflict prevention, underpinned the idea of “self-determination”, and the most destructive war in human history (to date) gave the need to get the concept right added urgency. The perception was also that the pre-War era had been wracked by corrupt, unjust systems that did nothing to alleviate the condition of subjugated peoples.

Lenin and Wilson both endeavoured to alter the overwhelming negativity of the war into a catalyst for change, following which a new, enlightened world would emerge. The notion of “self-determination” was, for both men, integral to this, even though their versions of self-determination differed as much as their overall political ideologies. Both men were determined to use this rhetoric along with their own frameworks to win over international audiences. However, this chapter will conclude by demonstrating that it was Wilson’s “self-determination” vocabulary which had the more direct effect in practice. In particular, it will show how the Egyptian nationalists had studied Wilson’s parlance in detail and consequently saw the promises of the post-war era as an opportunity to break away from British colonial rule.

The “Leninist Moment”: Lenin’s Radical Socialist Interpretation of Self-Determination

Lenin produced numerous publications between 1903 and 1917 about the “right of nations to self-determination”. Marxists Internet Archive (MIA): www.marxists.org. The website has digitalised the version of Lenin’s collected works originally printed by Progress Publishers, Moscow.

5The principal reference to Lenin and other Marxists is the *Marxists Internet Archive* (MIA): www.marxists.org. The website has digitalised the version of Lenin’s collected works originally printed by Progress Publishers, Moscow.
at this time mainly occurring in debates about the “National Question” that raged between Lenin and his fellow socialists. Soon, the First World War would have a far greater influence on Lenin’s stances on “self-determination”.

At the start of the 1903-1917 period, Lenin’s party was relatively obscure and thus he and his comrades were not constrained by the pressure of having to formulate views for a wider audience (as Wilson would be). Lenin and the Bolsheviks were then not in a position to implement any policies either, meaning they could push theoretical arguments without worrying about any real world consequences. This was a time when there was no “standard” socialist view of the national question. Karl Marx and the first Socialist International (1866) had instead left the problem of reconciling Marxism with nationalism unresolved. A major problem for both Marx and the Socialist International had been dealing with socialism’s focus on class being the main dynamic of political behaviour and the notion of national solidarity. This made the entire subject of self-determination a controversial one. Marxist thinkers were not intent on defining the nation precisely – they only referred loosely to “nations” – but they saw these units as being bound up in the concept of self-determination.

Lenin viewed the “national question” and “self-determination” as components of the same problem. When Lenin first began making pronouncements about “self-determination”, the exact link between national liberation and socialist liberation was not established. Later, the First World War provided the reason for internal socialist discussions and works about “self-determination” to be elevated to political theories about pressing world affairs. Thus Lenin’s original writings on “self-determination” made reference to specific issues including the position of different nationalities within the Russian Empire, and he subsequently applied his views on “self-determination” to the

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first publication dates of his discourses are cited below, along with where they can be found online. Russian language mentions follow the website’s standard referencing.


7Stalin did, however, analyse the concepts that make up a “nation” in ‘Marxism and the National Question’, see below, Prosveshchenie, nos. 3-5, March–May 1913. www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm.

First World War, and related subjects such as Imperialism. So it was that terminology of “self-determination” began to appear in the literature of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP or “the party”), including the Marxist group’s resolutions dating from 1903. This was the year that polemics on national groups within Russia became particularly focused in socialist circles. However, “self-determination” was still more to do with highly competitive theoretical exchanges about ideology within the party, rather than being about tangible political action.

The necessity of establishing a new political order in Russia was naturally one that motivated the discussions of revolutionary socialists imbued in Marxist thinking. Their debates on “self-determination” became more intense as the promise of power beckoned. As Lenin jostled for influence within his party, and indeed leadership of the RSDLP, he was intent on offering a rigorous definition of “self-determination” that would legitimise his arguments. Lenin was not in Russia for much of the early 1900s (he mainly remained in Munich, London and Geneva) but he followed his country’s progress intently from abroad, writing all the time about its politics, and applying his doctrine to the situation there.

The Bloody Sunday massacre of protestors in St Petersburg in January 1905 triggered Revolution in Russia – one which the Tsar would survive. As Lenin encouraged the Bolsheviks to take part in violent attacks on those in authority, he adopted slogans such as “armed insurrection”, “mass terror”, and “the expropriation of gentry land”. This led to accusations from the Mensheviks, the non-Bolshevik wing of the party, that Lenin was deviating from orthodox Marxism. By the time of the

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For sources on political action by minorities in Russia during this period, see e.g. Rex A. Wade, The Bolshevik Revolution and Russian Civil War, Westwood, CT, Greenwood Press, 2001, p.87; David R. Marples, Lenin’s Revolution: Russia, 1917–1921, Essex, Pearson Education, 2000, p.5; Edward Acton, Rethinking the Russian Revolution, New York, Routledge, 1990, p.145.

9The terminology of “self-determination” also appeared in RSDLP resolutions of 1913 and 1917. In this chapter, “the party” will refer to Lenin’s socialist party, regardless of its actual name at any point in time. The RSDLP was also known as the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party or the Russian Social Democratic Party; it was later on called the “Bolshevik” party, and then, following the birth of the USSR, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

10James Mayall, ‘Nationalism and Imperialism’ in Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (eds.), The Cambridge History of Twentieth Century Political Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.115 – also implying that efforts to advance “self-determination” had more to with pragmatic political calculations, rather than doctrinal beliefs.


the February 1917 Revolution, which prompted Lenin’s return to Russia, and the subsequent October Revolution when the Bolsheviks took complete power, Lenin’s position within the party was by no means certain, even though he had sided fully with the Bolshevik majority of the party, rather than the Mensheviks in 1912.

It was during the fourteen years after 1903 that Lenin came to view “the right of nations to self-determination” as being of “utmost” and “specific importance”. Self-determination was a key part of the socialists’ organised discussions, when the party’s debating programme became inextricably intertwined with Lenin’s ascension to power. Lenin’s determinedly combative approach to politics was initially aimed at winning over colleagues, rather than stamping his mark on the world stage. His long-term view was to apply his political vision in Russia, and indeed the wider world, but he first needed to convince his party to support his ideas. Lenin always spoke publicly about “self-determination” when he was fighting for control of his party, his country or – later – international domination. When, in 1917, Leon Trotsky became the Bolshevik Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, he said that Lenin “possessed the tenseness of striving towards his goal”. Lenin was always obsessed with any issue in hand, and immersed all of his being in the struggle to achieve his objectives, according to Trotsky.

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19Trotsky, op. cit., pp.161-162, original emphasis.
20Ibid. See also Carr, op. cit., p.23.
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As with all his political arguments, Lenin tried to underpin his theory of “self-determination” with ideological correctness.\(^{21}\) He produced as much legitimising literature as possible to back up his cause that “self-determination” was an answer to the “national question”, including Karl Marx’s writings on nationality and nationalism\(^{22}\) and a report from the 1896 London Congress of the Second International.\(^{23}\) In 1914 Lenin wrote: “No one can seriously question the London resolution”.\(^{24}\) Lenin used extracts from the German version of the Political Action Commission’s report from the London Congress to highlight how the Second International was in favour of “the full right of all nations to self-determination”.\(^{25}\) Through citing texts from organisations such as the Second International, Lenin was always trying to bolster his own standing, by making his ideas more appealing amongst his fellow party members.\(^{26}\)

Lenin believed that “self-determination” legitimised the freedom to secede and become a state, so as to be equal with other states.\(^{27}\) In essence, people could not be free unless they had the opportunity to choose full independence from a dominant nation. Without being granted that choice, countries would not be able to realise self-determination, nor indeed freedom.\(^{28}\) In 1913, an RSDLP resolution defined “self-determination” as “the right to secede and form independent states”. This was a testament to the party’s endorsement of Lenin’s stance.\(^{29}\) In practice, a party resolution stated that

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\(^{21}\)See e.g. Lenin, *op. cit.*, ‘The National Question’, 1903. Such issues are only briefly touched upon in works about Lenin’s political thought on self-determination, e.g. in Carr, *op. cit.*, p.68; a relative exception is the following paper by Uriel Abulof, ‘We the Peoples? The Birth and Death of Self-determination’, Tel Aviv University and Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School, 2010.


\(^{28}\)Terms such as “independence”, “freedom” and “self-determination” are used interchangeably in e.g. Lenin, *op. cit.*, *The National Question* and Lenin, *op. cit.*, *The Socialist Revolution*.

“self-determination” meant “the constitutional guarantee of an absolutely free and democratic method of deciding the question of secession”.30 Due to Lenin’s work on the concept, whenever “self-determination” was mentioned in future international contexts, the “default” way of implementing it would be equated with the creation of a new state, and as the position that had to be either approved or disapproved of. By declaring that “all nations” had the right to “self-determination”, Lenin was also introducing equality as a key component.

Lenin defined self-determination as an overwhelmingly “negative” concept in 1913, saying: “Combat all national oppression? Yes, of course! Fight for any kind of national development, for ‘national culture’ in general? – Of course not”.31 Here, Lenin was introducing the wider theoretical context in which questions about nationality and self-determination would have to be solved.32 Lenin’s interpretation of self-determination concentrated on the economic and political role the “nation” played as it developed into a socialist state. ‘The Right of Nations to Self-determination’, Lenin’s main discussion on the subject in 1914, stressed the marked contrast between the specific practice of self-determination in a particular case, and the unopposed right to self-determination as secession.33 There would always need to be a great deal of groundwork involved in considering whether an area should be granted independence based on self-determination. Lenin had, as early as 1903, made an emphatic distinction between promoting a right to self-determination, and actual situations when peoples were demanding for the principle to be applied.34 So it was that Lenin decided that sometimes secessionist claims could be ignored, even if there was theoretical support for secession itself.

Definite geopolitical, economic and historical conditions for a conceptual right to self-determination were laid out by Lenin between 1913 and 1916 in the context of a Marxist view of freedom – the same Marxist ideology around which he had expressed his general self-determination discourse. The requirements for self-determination and the “nation” were also rehearsed by Lenin as he suggested historical determinism played an important part in these contingencies. Sticking to the Marxist view,

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30Ibid., Article 5.
Lenin argued that both nationalism and national identity were the results of a fixed phase of bourgeois capitalism.\(^{35}\)

Self-determination was part of capitalism’s historical dynamic and part of the national question, Lenin contended in ‘The Right of Nations to Self-Determination’ in 1914. This would concentrate on how self-determination needed to be examined as part of a capitalist period of history.\(^{36}\) More specifically, the point of history in which self-determination was being considered was crucial in deciding whether it would assist progress towards socialism. This 1914 work pinpointed two stages of capitalist development: the first was the collapse of feudalism and absolutism; the second was the creation of bourgeois-democratic societies, and the mass movements focused on nationalist concerns which followed.

As it set out to “capture the home market”, capitalism needed the bourgeois class, while it organised itself into “politically united territories whose population speak a single language”. It was through these units that capitalism won over feudalism.\(^{37}\) It was this period of capitalism that saw all classes joining together to fight for “the rights of the nation”,\(^{38}\) Lenin argued. As this all inevitably progressed towards the socialist society, self-determination should be supported during this period. His 1914 writings also stipulate that the second stage of development of society towards socialism – the “eve of capitalism’s downfall” – would not have any room for self-determination, however. This, as mature capitalist states would be characterised by clear rivalries between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.\(^{39}\) The confrontation between the working-class movement and the capitalist one would become a global one. Lenin’s view was that Socialist revolution and, ultimately, the defeat of capitalism, would ensure that internationalism was triumphant over national self-determination.\(^{40}\)

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\(^{37}\) Ibid.

\(^{38}\) Ibid.

\(^{39}\) Ibid.

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Economics began to play a part in Lenin’s explanations of self-determination in 1915 as he wrote that the “division of nations into oppressor and oppressed” was one which needed to be analysed in line with Marxist ideology on the national question. This meant the proletariat in oppressor nations assisting those in oppressed states towards self-determination. Meanwhile, the workers of oppressed nations should push for “unity and the merging of the workers of the oppressed nations with those of the oppressor nations”. If not, they would “involuntarily become the allies of their own national bourgeoisie, which always betrays the interests of the people and of democracy, and is always ready, in its turn, to annex territory and oppress other nations”. Secession could be sanctioned only when liberation movements were combating capitalist oppressors in a progressive fashion, Lenin had asserted in 1913. If a nation supported its “own bourgeois nationalism” then Lenin could not endorse it. As Lenin stated again, in 1914: “We fight against the privileges and violence of the oppressor nation, and do not in any way condone strivings for privileges on the part of the oppressed nation.”

A geopolitically determined categorisation was also part of Lenin’s criteria for the right to self-determination. In 1916, Lenin pinpointed three different classes of nations, all of which had varied obligations as far as self-determination was concerned. The first involved the advanced capitalist countries, such as America, Britain, and other major western powers. By 1916, such nations had seen bourgeois national movements disappear, and they were now subjugating colonised nations, as well as people within their own borders. The proletariat in oppressor countries needed to lend their support to the self-determination of people living in the areas they were oppressing, so hastening the establishment of socialism there, and by consequence benefitting their own interests. Lenin quoted Marx saying: “no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations.”

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42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
Austria, the Balkans and Russia made up the second geopolitical area that interested Lenin, because they contained recently formed bourgeois-democratic nationalist movements. The proletariat should view self-determination as a way of uniting workers living in both oppressed and oppressing nations, as part of the class struggle. The “semi-colonial” classification of China, Persia and Turkey was Lenin’s third category, along with the colonies. Lenin’s views were based on his particular interest in various developments in such areas. Self-determination – that is to say immediate freedom – should be an unconditional demand of revolutionaries in bourgeois democracies.

Lenin believed, in line with Marxist theory, that larger states had intrinsic advantages for everyone living in them, so long as full equality was granted. But the incentive to formally withdraw from a union might recede if they had the right to self-determination. Lenin contended that if nations were granted the right to self-determination as independent entities, then it would “attract” them “to union with great socialist states”. Lenin expanded on his support for this idea in 1915 thus:

[N]ot because we [the social democrats] have dreamt of splitting up the country economically, or of the ideal of small states, but, on the contrary, because we want large states and the closer unity and even fusion of nations, only on a truly democratic, truly internationalist basis, which is inconceivable without the freedom to secede.

There would be no desire to secede if people had equal rights that included the full right to self-determination within a larger political unit. The reality would be that the equality made available by the right to self-determination would have rendered the application of the concept irrelevant. It is also likely that even if states did choose secession when given the right of self-determination, there

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49Ibid.
would be extremely close unifying ties between the states involved. According to self-determination would not be a divide between working-class communities. On the contrary, the concept of self-determination would reinforce links between equal entities across national boundaries.

Thus, Lenin’s views on “self-determination” encompassed an ideal of equality as a legitimising standard. In 1914, Lenin laid out his vision as to how this legitimising mechanism could be achieved: “By political equality [we] Social-Democrats mean equal rights, and by economic equality [...] the abolition of classes.” This stance was later compared by Lenin to the deceptive, bourgeois “abstract or formal posing of the problem”, and explained how: “Freedom and equality” would “in practice [only signify] wage-slavery for the workers”. Lenin believed that his own approach to the notion of equality deemed necessary to ensure “self-determination”, was the right one however. His emphasis on such a standard of equality showed that his arguments were based on his broader thinking, and not just on debates with fellow Socialists about specific issues, such as nationalism.

Lenin was therefore in favour of self-determination if it led to liberty as equality without division into nationalities, and within a classless society progressing towards becoming a socialist one. Once socialism was established, the national question, including questions of “self-determination”, would be replaced by internationalist equality. Internationalism, rather than nationalism, was a perennial theme in Lenin’s work. As Leon Trotsky put it: for Lenin, internationalism was “a guide to revolutionary action embracing all nations”, with the world “considered as one single battlefield”.

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63 See e.g. Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Right of Nations’, 1914.
64 Trotsky, op. cit., p.143.
The notion of “self-determination” as a concept encompassing freedom as equality was consequently a “negative” legitimising principle, according to Lenin. That is to say that Lenin believed self-determination was a right because it offered people freedom against and from negatives such as, tyranny, absolutism, monarchy, annexations, and capitalist oppression. Self-determination could be used to guard against all such factors.\(^{65}\) All of these restrictions on freedom created circumstances of inequality, dependence, and interference. As such, they legitimised “self-determination”.\(^{66}\) Thus it was self-determination as protection against threats to freedom that Lenin praised, even if he believed that, as a right, self-determination would seldom be implemented. The idea of “self-determination” as freedom from domination and dependence had been put forward by republican theories for centuries, and Lenin’s thoughts were partially in line with theirs.\(^{67}\) Where Lenin’s vision differed, however, was that he was a radical socialist with a global view, rather than a republican focusing on a single state. Liberty for Lenin was an international ideal, one that would allow oppressed peoples worldwide to take charge of independent states. In this context, violence and instability were permitted, if they contributed to the advancement of freedom as equality within the framework of socialist beliefs across the planet. In this sense, Lenin would support a revolutionary approach to self-determination, so long as it championed his political thinking.\(^{68}\)


\(^{68}\)See e.g. Chapter 1 in Lenin’s The State and Revolution: The Marxist Theory of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution, written 1917, published 1918, [www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev](http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev).
Lenin’s view of self-determination helped resolve the tension between Marxism and nationalism. He effectively won the in-party socialist arguments centred on the national question, as his theory was included into key party resolutions in 1913 and 1917. Nations in Russia, the resolutions stipulated, should be allowed “self-determination” as the right “to secede and form independent states”. They also advocated “complete equality for all nations”, promoting self-determination as a means to get rid of “national oppression” by “ensur[ing] complete solidarity among the workers of the various nations”. Thus, the resolutions highlighted – as Lenin did – the difference between being in favour of self-determination, and “the expediency of a given nation’s secession”. The latter expediency needed to be worked out in “the interests of the proletarian class struggle for socialism” at all times, and rule out joining up with the bourgeoisie, Lenin argued.

The Bolsheviks triumphed in Russia with the October 1917 Revolution, just after Lenin’s views of “self-determination” had also triumphed with the official formulation of these resolutions. Lenin was then encouraged to transfer this ideology to real life by pressing for independence for such groups such as the Ukrainians, Finns and those living in the Baltic. It is not the purpose of this chapter to analyse the demands made of Lenin. Such matters are covered by others. However, while there were often stark differences between Lenin’s arguments in favour of self-determination and his ability to reject certain claims to independence, his political ideology always informed his policy decisions. Socialist development was paramount to Lenin, and underpinned his support for

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69See Wade, op. cit., The Russian Revolution, p.151 and Carr, op. cit., pp.261–263, on how Lenin inserted the rhetoric of “self-determination” in the party programme, despite being initially unsuccessful. See Carr, Ibid., p.269, who writes on how this also occurred in 1919. See also Read, op. cit., p.226.


73Ibid.


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self-determination at all times. Some may have questioned whether it was fair to consider “self-determination” between such a rigid doctrinal framework, but Lenin did not waiver from his clearly stated rationale.

Lenin’s Discourse on “self-determination”: From Intra-Socialist Party Debate to Wartime International Revolutionary Rhetoric

Lenin’s ideas about self-determination were considerably affected, and indeed changed, by the First World War, and these adaptations in turn influenced how President Wilson responded, as he ended up internationalising the concept. Like most politicians of his era, Lenin spent a great deal of time considering what had led to the war starting, what kind of war it was, and what possibilities it created for the future once the fighting was over. These reflections shaped Lenin’s political thoughts on self-determination. Lenin’s views, contained in speeches and writings, saw the First World War as primarily being the result of capitalism, and “imperialism” at its highest stage, and specifically the fight for control by dominating countries, as outlined in his famous 1917 pamphlet Imperialism. He demonstrated how traditional capitalist competition had been replaced by monopolies, with leading powers vying for economic and political hegemony. The First World War was “imperialistic – both annexationist and plunderous” and, given Lenin’s theories about Imperialism, unavoidable. Control was the ultimate aim of imperialism so its corollary would be violence. This violence came from the intense antagonism between respective capitalist powers, and also from the imperialistic repressive nature of colonisation. Thus the capitalist dynamic was the main reason for the war, Lenin believed.

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78For the war’s impact on Lenin’s political thought, see also Harding, op. cit., Lenin’s Political Thought, pp.20-26; Read, op. cit., pp.116-126; Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Empire and Emancipation: Power and Liberation on a World Scale, New York, Praeger, 1989, pp.4-13.
81Ibid., pp.89, 77.
82Ibid., (1920 preface to the French and German editions), pp.3-4.
83Ibid., p.83.
84Ibid., pp.97 and 125. See also Lenin, op. cit., ‘Resolution on the National Question’, 1917.
Aggressive imperialistic rivalry manifested itself in many ways, including the scramble to gain and then govern colonies. This resulted in a globe “completely divided up” \(^{85}\) with colonialist power primarily growing out of the determination of avaricious nations to interfere with the populations of new areas, and the natural resources that came with them. \(^{86}\) Lenin was “obviously not” opposed to using force in broad terms, \(^{87}\) but he was against colonial annexations because they contradicted the right of self-determination for all nations. \(^{88}\) Lenin wrote in 1916 that annexations “establish[ed] state frontiers contrary to the will of the population”. \(^{89}\) Lenin explained:

National self-determination means political independence. Imperialism seeks to violate such independence because political annexation often makes economic annexation easier, cheaper (easier to bribe officials, secure concessions, put through advantageous legislation. etc.), more convenient, less troublesome. \(^{90}\)

Being against imperialist annexations and standing up for the right of nations to self-determination went together, Lenin argued. \(^{91}\)

There was considerable liberating potential in the unrest, dissent and subsequent violence that colonial expansionism and the denial of self-determination would inevitably cause, Lenin contented. Imperialist oppression would stir the consciousness of those being exploited and provoke them to unite socially towards the cause of expelling those who were dominating them. In short, maintaining an economic grip through reactionary Imperialism and the forces of law and order which upheld it would trigger social awareness and effective armed opposition. \(^{92}\) Lenin’s 1917 pamphlet *Imperialism* explained how this united action was a reaction to capitalist provocation, leading to violent revolution and liberation. \(^{93}\) So it was that there was no emphasis on peace in Lenin’s wartime interpretation of self-determination. Lenin’s belief in the possibility of violence in the context of self-determination and freedom was thus very different to Woodrow Wilson’s, who championed peace and stability at all times.

\(^{86}\) Ibid., p.83.
\(^{87}\) Lenin, *op. cit.*, ‘The Discussion’, 1916.
\(^{89}\) Lenin, *op. cit.*, ‘The Discussion’, 1916.
\(^{91}\) See also Harding, *op. cit.*, Lenin’s Political Thought, p.66; Young, *op. cit.*, pp.107-134.
\(^{93}\) Ibid., pp.125, 97.
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In 1916, Lenin wrote that “Liberation of the colonies means self-determination of nations. Europeans often forget that colonial peoples too are nations, but to tolerate this ‘forgetfulness’ is to tolerate chauvinism.”

Other socialists had put forward the same kind of thinking about Imperialism and their view that colonised countries should be allowed to stand alone. For example, Karl Kautsky in 1910 stated that imperialism “deceived and disposed of foreign peoples as if they were cattle”. Kautsky then elaborated:

[Imperialism] rest[ed] on the assumption that only the peoples of European civilization are capable of independent development. The men of other races are regarded as children, idiots or beasts of burden, to be treated with more or less mercy – at any rate they are beings of a lower kind, which can be controlled according to our whim.

Lenin did not believe in unconditional self-determination, that is to say principled self-determination without any exceptions at all. Instead he pushed for all colonised peoples to be given the right to oppose those dominating them within the struggle to establish socialism within their areas of the world. Lenin aimed to assess individual cases with this long-term objective prevalent in all discussions. Thus this case assessment model contradicted the widespread belief among historians that Lenin “first and foremost” viewed self-determination as “a postulate of anti-colonialism”. This traditional presumption was not only misguided but Lenin proposed “self-determination” as a much more generalised answer to the “national question” which had been debated among socialists. Lenin was not in favour of any independence from colonialist oppression where liberation stopped development towards socialism.

Lenin’s early calls to oppose the nationalistic “defend the fatherland” rallying cries prevalent in Russia and Europe during the First World War seemed to be at odds with his support for an anti-

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95See e.g. Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, London, Routledge, 2003 (first published in 1913);
96Kautsky, op. cit., Der Weg zur Macht, pp.75–76.
99See also Bowring, op. cit., p.125.
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colonial version of self-determination. Flag and country patriotism was a unifying and galvanising force among all belligerents during the war, with people across the political and class spectrums gathering around their national symbols, but Lenin had objected to this “fatherland” war effort. He considered such emotional nationalism to be a “despicable betrayal of socialism”. In contrast to the stances of the Marxist theorist and revolutionary socialist Rosa Luxemburg who was against “defence of the fatherland” and “self-determination” whatever happened, Lenin had no problems with it as long as it was aimed at imperialistic oppressors. In fact, Lenin argued, people were perfectly entitled to consider their violent struggle a “defence of the fatherland” if it resulted in the demise of an Imperial power. Thus Lenin’s backing of independence from a colonial power and more general opposition to “defending the fatherland” could be reconciled. Both were legitimised in the context of Marxist ideology and the global war against capitalist imperialism.

Lenin used the language of “self-determination” to undermine imperialism. In this sense he was applying “self-determination” as a “negative idea of freedom” – defining it against a set of negative concepts. The colonial drive for “domination” subdued “liberty”, Lenin outlined in his Imperialism, and he advocated “self-determination” as the best liberating tool to get rid of it. Land theft, oppression, exploitation, and other forms of interference were to be opposed at all times, but Lenin had not condemned all forms of interference before the war. It was only once the First World War had started that Lenin suggested that interference per se was generally a crucial way by which freedom as equality was taken away, and proposed self-determination as a means of winning it back. Thus the war altered Lenin’s theoretical opinion on “self-determination” and Imperialism, as he addressed his revised position to a different kind of public. It was in this manner that Lenin was able to increase the scope of his ambitions.


\[\text{Source:} \text{Lenin, op. cit., ‘Draft Resolution’, 1920. See also Carr, op. cit., p.66.}\]


\[\text{Source:} \text{Lenin, op. cit., ‘The Discussion’, 1916.}\]

\[\text{Source:} \text{Lenin, op. cit., Imperialism, p.83.}\]
Before the outbreak of the war, Lenin was largely directing his comments about “self-determination” at fellow socialists, as he asserted himself within his party, but his comments were aimed at a far wider audience as the global conflict progressed. During the war, Lenin’s use of the rhetoric of “self-determination” was primarily motivated by the Marxist imperative to push peoples all over the world to unite as an international working-class and so bring about revolution in the colonies. Lenin’s ultimate objective was to halt the control of capitalist powers and to trigger an international revolutionary wave. Furthermore, this dynamic applied in Europe would, Lenin contended, “sharpen the revolutionary crisis” within major capitalist countries – the imperialists’ home arena. If the working-class united in these countries, they would not only spark revolution at home, but bring the war to an end, as well as advance socialism. Thus, Lenin’s soundings on self-determination were now focused on the international struggle to not only stop the war, but to bring about the demise of capitalism. This contrasted with Lenin’s far more limited debates on “self-determination” which took place among Socialist rivals before the war.

Through attempting to influence the world with his increasingly radical wartime ideas on self-determination, Lenin showed how ideological propaganda was crucial to the First World War effort. A burgeoning mass media made sure that the standpoints of international politicians engaged in the war reached as wide an audience as possible. People everywhere began to become aware of messages about everything from generalised political thought to specific information about the


progress of the war, and indeed leaders’ plans for the peace that would come next.\footnote{As far as the Press was concerned, Winston Churchill (\textit{op. cit.}, p.137) pointed out that the Paris Peace Conference had 500 “special correspondents” covering it. See also Laurence W. Martin, \textit{Peace without Victory: Woodrow Wilson and the British Liberals}, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1958; A.J. Mayer, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.54, 372.} Both Lenin and Wilson were at the heart of this propaganda war as they pushed forward their beliefs about “self-determination”. However, it would be wrong to say that the two men’s public statements were solely strategic – both had broad ideological convictions and these were certainly reflected in the ideas they articulated about “self-determination”.\footnote{In spite of allegations to the contrary, e.g. Muriel Evelyn Chamberlain, \textit{Decolonization}, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999, p.10.}

Two revolutions in Russia and America’s entry into the war ensured that the ideological battle became more protracted in 1917.\footnote{America formally joined the First World War as an “Entente” or “Associated” force, and not as an “Allied” one, but for ease the USA will hereafter be referred to as a member of the “Allies”.} President Wilson was interested in projecting America’s war effort as being one about morality and virtue, and indeed about legitimising his country’s contribution to the world conflict in glowing terms, with regular references to liberty and, crucially, peace. Wilson’s approach to “self-determination” in this context will be examined in the next section of this chapter.\footnote{Former U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt’s 1914 idea of a ‘World League for the Peace of Righteousness’, \textit{Outlook}, 23 September 1914, pp.169–178, at p.178 also shows how morally charged some American discourse could be.} The February 1917 Revolution in Russia led to the end of the Tsar and the establishing of the Provisional Government, which ostensibly shared power with the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies in Petrograd.\footnote{See e.g. Harding, \textit{op. cit.}, ‘The Russian Revolution’, p.240. The “Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies” is what the name became. Until September 1917, the Mensheviks were very much in charge of this particular Soviet: Wade, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{The Russian Revolution}, pp.64, 70. In contrast, Bolsheviks controlled the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets by October 1917: Marples, \textit{op cit.}, p.87; also Sheila Fitzpatrick, \textit{The Russian Revolution}, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp.43, 49; Carr, \textit{op. cit.}, 1978, pp.70–71; Peter Holquist, \textit{Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, 1914–1921}, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2002, p.50; Peter Gatrell, \textit{Russia’s First World War: A Social and Economic History}, Harlow, Pearson Education Limited, 2005, p.197; A.J. Mayer, \textit{op. cit.}, p.72.} Later in 1917, the Bolsheviks prevailed during the October 1917 Revolution, seizing power. Against this background, Lenin had pushed self-determination as a weapon of global revolution to oppose all forces resisting socialism, and particularly capitalist imperialism. Russia and America were united in the war effort until March 1918,\footnote{At the time that Russia and Germany agreed to the Brest–Litovsk treaty, as below.} but, following the Russian revolutions, they naturally had great ideological rivalry. The post-war destruction of empires, and the need to replace them with new territorial lines, was still unclear then, but it was already certain that traditional diplomacy and the accepted standards of an Imperialist world were
under threat. These changing circumstances and values saw the possibility of a new world being acknowledged by both the Americans and the Bolsheviks. There was a distinct gulf between their respective, competing principles, but they were personified by Vladimir Lenin and Woodrow Wilson. The pair became locked in debate aimed at persuading global audiences that their own causes were the right ones.

For the Americans and their allies, the newfound influence and doctrinal fever of Lenin and the Bolsheviks, and especially their calls for international revolution, were deeply troubling. As a small, relatively unknown wing of an obscure party, the Bolsheviks had little appeal before the war, and certainly not outside Russia. The war gave them a chance to propagate their ideals to Europeans, and indeed to others living in other parts of the world and their push for radical change, and especially freedom from oppression, resounded worldwide in areas exhausted by conflict. The Bolsheviks developed a particular interest in altering western public opinion, with the European Left becoming the key target for these theories about the war. The U.S.A and those who had fought alongside them were, in the short term, most concerned that the Bolsheviks would actually withdraw

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118 On Wilson, see e.g. William Carleton, ‘A New Look at Woodrow Wilson’, *Virginia Quarterly Review*, vol. 38, no. 4, 1962, p.566.
120 Wilson’s propaganda chief George Creel responded by advocating for an American Bureau of Public Information in Europe; see ‘A Memorandum by George Creel’, 31 January 1918, pp.200–203 in PWW 1984, vol. 46. The U.S.A.’s worries about the popularity of the Bolsheviks were discussed in the *New York Times*: ‘Prey of Agitators’, 23 August 1919. This article reported that “a campaign for self-determination for the negroes of all corners of the earth” lauded Lenin and Trotsky. To learn about the then Bolsheviks’ increasing appeal in Russia, see Gatrell, *op. cit.*, p.221.
from the war effort, so potentially damaging their own contributions considerably.\textsuperscript{122} Their fears proved grounded when, in March 1918, the Bolsheviks now running Russia, signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with the Central Powers, who no longer had to combat on the Eastern front.\textsuperscript{123} America and affiliated nations had in fact suspected that Germany had been undermining Russia all along, supporting the Bolshevik rise to power as a means of improving its own chances of winning the war.\textsuperscript{124}

Wilson’s prestigious, “liberal” image and the substantial propaganda machinery he had at his disposal made him a formidable enemy to Lenin as the two leaders competed to promote their respective thinking.\textsuperscript{125} Despite the challenge from the American, Lenin was determined to champion his radical Marxist ideas as much as possible.\textsuperscript{126} Yes, the men’s ultimate goals were very different, but both employed the same kind of Old World Versus New World rhetoric – one that opposed imperial annexations. The difference was Wilson wanted change according to liberal-conservative principles, while Lenin was a revolutionary who used self-determination to strongly advocate for socialism. When the war ended, Lenin attacked the allegedly hypocritical liberals in Europe who had supported Wilson, saying they “call[ed] themselves pacifists and socialists, who sang praises to ‘Wilsonianism’, and who insisted that peace and reform were possible under imperialism”.\textsuperscript{127}

Wilson’s increasing popularity as the war progressed – and the widespread support that his ideas received – is likely to have prompted Lenin to emphasise his own version of self-determination.\textsuperscript{128}

While the phrase “self-determination” was barely employed by Wilson, the broader thinking connected with it, and the expression itself as used by Wilson in 1918, were viewed as being an


\textsuperscript{123}For a discussion of the Russian treaties from that time, see e.g. Charles G. Fenwick, ‘The Russian Peace Treaties’, \textit{American Political Science Review}, vol. 12, no. 4, 1918a, pp.706-711.

\textsuperscript{124}See e.g. the secret ‘Memorandum on the Formula of “the Self-Determination of Peoples” and the Moslem World’, British Intelligence Bureau, TNA: FO 608/203, Department of Information, Section E, 30 January 1918, no. 6289/1, pp.2–3; and memoranda received by Wilson on 20 and 22 November 1918, in PWW 1986, vol. 53, pp.136–137, 169–180.


\textsuperscript{126}Baker, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. I, suggests that Wilson readily attracted support from “the liberal and labour groups”, p.45; see also Carr, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{The Bolshevik Revolution}, p.13. For details on the US information infrastructure, see Creel, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{How we Advertised America}, and Creel, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{The War, the World, and Wilson}.

\textsuperscript{127}Lenin, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{Imperialism}, p.5, from his preface written in 1920.

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integral part of what the U.S. president represented. Despite this, Lenin set out to undermine Wilson’s message.\textsuperscript{129} Lenin wanted to try to take control of the “self-determination” narrative by highlighting the hypocrisy of the USA and its colonialist, capitalist Allies as they interfered in the affairs of foreign countries while allegedly championing self-determination.\textsuperscript{130}

After the “self-determination” debate levitated from one between rival socialists to a global issue, party members placed it at the centre of their international ideological war with the USA and its western Allies. This aspect tends to be underplayed in scholarly literature on the subject.\textsuperscript{131} Lenin’s opinions and similar pressure from the Soviet in Petrograd\textsuperscript{132} originally led to the Provisional Government which came to power early in 1917 introducing its “Declaration of War Aims” in March 1917. They read: “[T]he objective of free Russia is not the domination of other nations, nor the expropriation of their… property, nor the forcible seizure of foreign territories, but the ratification of a stable peace on the basis of national self-determination”.\textsuperscript{133} Following the October Revolution later in 1917, self-determination was backed by the Bolsheviks as being a desirable concept for all Russian people. The Bolsheviks advocated peace and democracy based on “no annexations or indemnities and the self-determination of nations”.\textsuperscript{134} They wanted to stake their claim to being more moral than their ideological enemies in America and in line with this they disclosed previously confidential treaties from the Tsar’s regime into the public domain.\textsuperscript{135}

It was Leon Trotsky, the Bolsheviks’ Foreign Commissioner, who, on December 31 1917, released the most important international address as regards Lenin’s and the Bolsheviks’ pronouncements on

\begin{itemize}
  \item Manela, \textit{op. cit.}, 2007, p.7. As an example, the idea that Lenin’s view of self-determination was only influential internationally after spring 1919.
  \item See e.g. Wade, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{The Russian Revolution}, p.84; Fitzpatrick, \textit{op. cit.}, p.46.
  \item Bolshevik decree of 2 November 1917, ‘Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia’, signed by Lenin and Stalin. \url{www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/1917/11/02.htm}.
\end{itemize}
self-determination: “To Peoples and Governments of Allied Countries”. It highlighted the posturing of the Allies and called on them to be open with their war aims. It asked if the Allies were “willing on their part to give the right of self-determination to the peoples of Ireland, Egypt, India, Madagascar, Indochina, et cetera”, just as the Revolution in Russia had presented this right to those living in Finland and Ukraine.136

[It] is clear that to demand self-determination for the peoples that are comprised within the borders of enemy states and refuse self-determination to the peoples of their own state and their own colonies would mean the defence of the most naked, the most cynical imperialism.137

The literature emphatically stated Lenin’s attitude towards “self-determination”, all the while forcefully opposing the Imperialistic status of the colonial, western nations. Such public wartime statements confronting the western Allies made sure that Lenin’s interpretation of “self-determination” became part and parcel of the global moral debate about the world’s future. Lenin’s rhetoric had led to the language of “self-determination” becoming more important to the extent that, by December 1917, Wilson was apparently using it in his State of the Union Speech. The President said “the principle” should be “brought under the patronage of its real friends”.138 It was also in December 1917 that the Austria-Hungarian Foreign Minister Ottokar Czernin made a very clear mention of “self-determination” in his Christmas address, arguing that the Central Powers provided “validity to this principle everywhere in so far as it is practically realisable” and only if other war participants followed suit.139

British Prime Minister David Lloyd George stated on 5 January 1918 that “we are fighting for a just and lasting peace”, and “a territorial settlement must be secured, based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed”.140 It has been said that Lloyd George thus “coined

137 Ibid., pp.412–413.
138 Wilson, ‘Fifth Annual Message’, 4 December 1917, Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. millercenter.org/scrrips/archive/speeches/detail/3799.
139 Statement of Count Czernin at Brest–Litovsk of the Terms on which the Central Powers were willing to Conclude a General Peace’, 25 December 1917, pp.221-222 in Scott, op. cit.
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...the phrase *self-determination*”, but this was in fact after Lenin had spent at least fourteen years discussing the subject in numerous speeches and written works, and also in the wake of First World War international declarations by the Bolsheviks. Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” speech was made just three days after Lloyd George’s reference to self-determination. Wilson would firmly propagate the language of self-determination worldwide the following month.

The fourteen years during which Lenin theorised “self-determination” between 1903 and 1917 were hugely significant to getting the concept on to the global agenda and to comprehending its future international references. While international mentions on the subject would not generally be framed around Lenin’s radical socialist ideology, the Russian’s work was still vital as regards equating the implementation of self-determination with independent nationhood. Self-determination thus became the legitimising concept for the creation of these new states. Lenin’s “negative” interpretation of liberty was also crucial. His definition of self-determination meant freedom from a variety of negatives, ranging from colonial domination and inequality to exploitation. The need to break free from oppression was, for example, part of a legitimising standard that permitted violence to be used. Thus negatives had positive moral associations. This radical idea of self-determination – one tied up in Lenin’s Marxist theory of freedom – was to go head-to-head with Wilson’s more liberal-conservative approach to the concept.

Universal references about “self-determination” became increasingly dominated by Wilson’s liberal-conservative convictions. But it was the Russian’s more revolutionary discourse on “self-determination” that had prompted Wilson to globalise the term in the first place. By 1917, Lenin had been grappling with it for fourteen years, and its conceptual and political insertion into wartime rivalries on the world stage was down to him. If it had not been for Lenin’s work in this respect, Wilson may not have reacted to it altogether. Lenin’s radical language thus provided the trigger to Wilson internationalising the phrase in 1918, as the world considered the First World War and its aftermath.

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The “Wilsonian Moment”: Wilson’s Internationalist and Liberal-Conservative Interpretation of Self-Determination

As the First World War raced to a close, President Woodrow Wilson committed America to “self-determination” in a manner that was high profile and internationalist, while liable to misinterpretation. Russia supported the right of all nations, especially colonised ones, to self-determination, but Wilson’s intentions were far more limited in scope. So it was that the year before the 1919 Egyptian revolution saw the U.S. President introduce “self-determination” on to the global stage. The President imbued it with a sense of moral worth for an extensive audience, so as to try to legitimise his vision of a secure, peaceful world order over and beyond the nationalist aspirations of subjugated peoples. This was a time when Wilson was enjoying a great deal of prestige internationally, and he was accordingly intent on pushing forward his liberal-conservative agenda around the world. The result was that self-determination as a dynamic for change became hugely influential – it gained traction across numerous countries, and would eventually be codified as international law in the 1945 United Nations (UN) Charter.

Wilson was to personify this movement towards self-determination as a justification for political action. He was so firmly linked with the concept that, remarkably, even his work that did not specifically quoted “self-determination” was associated with the notion in the global imagination. A prime example was that Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points speech did not mention the term, but became nonetheless a key international reference for the idea. In this sense, Wilson’s principle of self-determination also represented his wider political beliefs, and especially his conservative-liberal ones about how the world should be organised.


Wilson’s rhetoric of “self-determination” needs to be considered, like Lenin’s, in the historical period it was articulated. The First World War was raging when Wilson made his most significant points about self-determination. Lenin’s contribution to the subject was also an influence on the American at the time. This section will therefore examine Wilson’s language of “self-determination” and its standards of legitimation, in the context in which they were formulated. It will then present Wilson’s more pragmatic “self-determination” discourse set within a worldwide movement upholding the notion as a means of solving territorial disputes in the wake of the Great War. While Wilson’s overall thought processes dictated his reasoning on self-determination, our focus will be on the internationalisation of the concept, rather than the specifics of Wilson’s broader political philosophy.146

Wartime doctrinal antagonism was culminating when, in 1918, Wilson first spoke formally about “self-determination”.147 There were numerous official opposing views as to what the ideals of peace should actually entail after the war148, so the conflicting nations enhanced their own contributions to the war effort, all the while criticising their adversaries’ positions on the subject. Their objective at all time was to appeal to a worldwide public, in order to convince them that they were best placed to win the war, and indeed win the peace. All the warring parties were aware that Lenin had dominated the “self-determination” debate before 1917. This ideological rivalry thus continued alongside the actual combat. It was in this highly strifeful global environment that America tried to exploit

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148 References to such exchanges in relation to competing visions for peace have been traced back to the resolution of the German Reichstag 19 July 1917 by Mamatey, op. cit., pp.136–137. The previous section, however, highlighted how the concept of “self-determination” had already been included in the Russian Provisional Government’s statement on war aims 27 March 1917. It was in that context that Wilson’s adviser “Colonel” House (discussed later on) urged the President to formulate a strategy on war aims on 17 August, 1917, E.M. House, *op. cit.*, vol. III, 1928, p.161.
Wilson’s discourse as propaganda, projecting American values as universal ones. The significance of self-determination arguments as a propaganda tool was illustrated after the war in 1920 when the head of the American Committee on Public Information said Wilson’s wartime pronouncements had been the USA’s “most effective weapons” in conveying to the world “the motives, purposes, and ideals of America so that friend, foe and neutral alike might come to see us as a people without selfishness and in love with justice”. The USA’s image on the international stage, as well as his own reputation, were uppermost in Wilson’s mind as he put forward his ideals on “self-determination”. It ensured “unprecedented enthusiasm” – as regards competition with other world leaders, Wilson was certainly in the strongest position when he attended the Peace Conference at the end of the war. In 1919, when he arrived in Paris, Wilson became the first president to leave the U.S. territory while in office.

There were marked differences between the direct environment in which Wilson and Lenin formulated their ideas concerning “self-determination”. Wilson’s were focused on self-determination petitions during a particularly tumultuous period of world history, and they were made when Wilson was President of the USA. Thus his pronouncements were expressed in the context of international diplomacy and realpolitik when he was at the height of his power. America itself was enjoying increased international standing, yet Wilson was not constrained by the need to win elections, or ensure the approval of his colleagues. In contrast, Lenin articulated his thoughts far more theoretically, setting them within the wider subject of Marxist revolution. He concentrated on the doctrinal “correctness” of self-determination as it might apply to reality. At the time, Lenin was fighting for power within his party, and all of his arguments were advanced within the framework of Marxist ideology, and the passionate in-house debates that characterised socialist party politics. Both Lenin and Wilson wanted to succeed in the propaganda battle during the war, and in the post-war period, so as to enhance their moral authority and, in turn, increase their appeal to audiences worldwide.

149Creel, op. cit., How We Advertised America, pp.288, 237.
Personality was key to the two men’s presentation skills, and the way their respective opinions on self-determination were greeted. While Lenin engaged with his opponents, Wilson was more single minded, and there is no evidence of Wilson having to persuade critics that his stance on self-determination was the right one.152 Instead, Wilson was overwhelmingly dismissive and even “intolerant of the views of others”, and as “intensely prejudiced in his likes and dislikes”.153 Wilson did not take kindly to guidance,154 and “shunned the sight or study of unpleasant truths that diverted him from his foregone conclusions”.155 He had a “one-track mind”,156 and was “dogmatic and yet [without] a very clear idea of what was really needed”.157

Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, was naturally keen to offer as much advice as possible to the President but – as so many other advisors – was routinely bypassed. The Bolsheviks called on the U.S., and the country’s allies to explain their war aims in the context of self-determination in December 1917.158 When Wilson used his January 1918 Fourteen Points speech to reply, Lansing said the Bolsheviks represented “the proletariat [,] the ignorant and mentally deficient”,159 and not the Russian people as a whole. Lansing argued that the Bolshevik

152It was a highly unusual occurrence when Wilson took questions on “self-determination” at the San Francisco Labour Council, on 17 September 1919. Rather than arguing in favour of his views in a positive fashion, he was trying to reassure people as to the practical implications of his arguments. Records from the meeting, WWPL: wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=29523.

153Quoted in Louis Siebold, ‘The Extraordinary Career of Woodrow Wilson who left the Quiet of University Life for the Turmoil of Politics and became the Leader of the World’s greatest Nation during the World’s most Stirring Times’, Post-Dispatch, 18 June 1920, WWPL: wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=32168. Cf. also E.M. House’s diary from 22 November, 1915, E.M. House, op. cit., Vol. I, 1926, p.128. Cecil, a British diplomat, claims that Wilson would accept the opinions of other people “as soon as he realised what they were”. However, Cecil suggests that Wilson did not really have much interest in finding out what those views were, Cecil, op. cit., pp.68-69.


157Cecil, op. cit., p.68.


idea of “self-determination” would cause “international anarchy” and so, Lansing suggested, it should not be addressed. It is also likely that Wilson was not as antipathetic towards the Bolsheviks and, accordingly, ignored Lansing’s recommendation.

The changes brought about through revolutions in Russia were not something which Wilson felt able to easily cope with, however, and, in 1918, he admitted: “I have been sweating blood over the question that is right and feasible to do in Russia. It goes to pieces like quicksilver under my touch”. President Wilson was not averse to the way Russia developed after the February 1917 Revolution, but this was not the case during and after the Bolshevik Revolution in October, when Wilson was a lot more engaged with how matters were unfolding. Wilson objected to the Bolsheviks’ covert diplomacy in the pre-war years and calls for radical change, even though he welcomed some of their opposition to colonial annexations. This was entirely in line with Wilson’s strong disapproval of disorder.

Wilson’s reply to the Bolsheviks in his Fourteen Points appeared to be to try to get them remain in the war fighting with the Allies. At that time, Wilson was concerned that the Bolsheviks were actively negotiating with the Central Powers from December 1917. More generally, he wanted to persuade a Europe exhausted by the war – and left-wingers in the West, in particular – that his own political ideology on the future of the post-war world order was far more attractive than the Bolsheviks’ popular socialism. However, the Fourteen Points did not directly include the phrase “self-determination”.

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160Ibid., p.427.
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It was a month after the Fourteen Points speech that Wilson internationalised the concept of “self-determination”, despite the opposition of political colleagues including his Secretary of State, Lansing. The latter was a qualified lawyer and consistently argued that the absence of any specific recipient of the concept of “self-determination” meant it did not have validity, to the extent that it might be devoid of any significance at all. Lansing also claimed that pursuing self-determination could be perilous and was “utterly destructive of the political fabric of society and resulted in constant turmoil and change”. Lansing put across his opinion in 1918, emphasising arguments he had also made to Wilson:

The more I think about the President’s declaration as to the right of ‘self-determination’, the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Congress and create trouble in many lands. What effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, and the nationalists among the Boers? Will it not breed discontent, disorder, and rebellion? [...] The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it is bound to be discredited, to be called the dream of an idealist who failed to realize the danger until too late to check those who attempt to put the principle in force. What a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!

Lansing was much chagrined when Wilson rejected his assessment. Despite such difficulties with Wilson, Lansing’s work still provides important scholarly reference points and is consulted at key moments in history.

During the First World War, “self-determination” underpinned discussion by all parties, including Lenin, about likely territorial settlements at the end of the conflict. While Wilson appeared to ignore advice on other matters, he accepted the knowledge of “experts” on that subject during that

166 Lansing, op. cit., notes from 20 December 1918, p.86.
period,\textsuperscript{171} seeking “general principles of justice”, “not by diplomats and politicians each eager to serve his own interests, but by dispassionate scientists – geographers, ethnologists, economists – who had made studies of the problems involved”,\textsuperscript{172} said one of Wilson’s aids. On his way to Paris for the Peace Conference at the end of 1918, Wilson said to the experts with him: “Tell me what is right and I will fight for it. Give me a guaranteed position.”\textsuperscript{173} In September 1917, Wilson had already set up a U.S. “Commission of the Inquiry”\textsuperscript{174} made up of specialist counsels and other presidential advisors tasked with recommending territorial arrangements aimed at ensuring future peace and stability. The Commission sent the President a memorandum just before Wilson delivered his Fourteen Points speech.\textsuperscript{175} Findings outlined in the Memorandum were included.\textsuperscript{176}

Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech made no direct reference to “self-determination” yet it became eternally associated with the President’s view of the notion.\textsuperscript{177} Beyond that, the speech came to illustrate Wilson’s close personal link with “self-determination”, especially in the context of the peace that would follow World War I. In many ways, Wilson was the personification of “self-determination” at the time. Thus the speech was not just a chance for him to outline his vision on the war’s territorial divisions in detail, but it was the most well-known pronouncement anyone made during the entire conflict. The meaning of “self-determination” and its use to the international community all came to be inextricably connected to Wilson’s wider political thoughts and utterances.

Numerous diplomatic historians have analysed President Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech in great detail, and it is by no means our intention to do so here, but rather to focus on its significance.\textsuperscript{178} It is

\textsuperscript{171}Cf. the Fourteen Points below. For manifestation of Wilson’s conduct towards experts, see DHM 1928, Vol. II, Document 18: ‘The Council of Ten, January 30, 1919: Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held at M. Pinchon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, January 20, 1919, at 11 AM’, p.198. See also Seymour, op. cit. p.575.
\textsuperscript{172}Baker, op. cit., Vol. I, p.112.
\textsuperscript{173}Ibid., p.113.
\textsuperscript{174}It was sixteen weeks prior to the Fourteen Points Speech that the ‘Commission of the Inquiry’ gathered, and twenty before Wilson projected the term “self-determination” globally. See Liliana Riga and James Kennedy, ’Mitteleuropa as Middle America? “The Inquiry” and the Mapping of East Central Europe in 1919’, Ab Imperio, vol. 4, 2006, pp.271-300.
\textsuperscript{176}Baker is on the record (op. cit., Vol. I, p.110) saying that six of Wilson’s Fourteen Points were directly drawn from the Memorandum. See also Throntveit, op. cit., ‘The Fable of the Fourteen Points’, p.463.
\textsuperscript{177}See also Throntveit, op. cit., ‘What was Wilson Thinking?’, especially p.450.
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particularly noteworthy that Wilson spoke a week after being given an English language edition of a document in which the Bolsheviks asked the Allies to explain their ambitions for the First World War, in the context of “self-determination”. The Fourteen Points suggested specific cases of land arrangement agreements for Europe that would be linked to his considerations on self-determination. They included:

Independence for Poland so as to create a country “inhabited by indisputably Polish populations” (XIII). Italy’s frontiers were to be changed “along clearly recognisable lines of nationality” (IX). Those living in Austria-Hungary (X) would be permitted the “opportunity of autonomous development”. Similarly, it was pledged that Arabs, like all the other subjects of the Ottoman Empire, would be granted “an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development” (XII).179 Balkan alliances would be organised “along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality”. It was also stated that the “political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states” should be officially fixed (XI).180

Wilson also called for colonial arrangements to be “based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined” (V). Wilson wanted “evacuation of all Russian territory” (VI), the re-establishment of the state of Belgium (VII), and the righting of the “wrong done to France by Prussia” in Alsace-Lorraine (VIII). Wilson was opposed to further secret treaties (I). He forcefully asked for guarantees of freedom of the seas and free trade (II and III), and significant arms reduction (IV); as well as a “general association of nations” to ensure “political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike”.

Bearing in mind his own link with “self-determination”, Wilson took advantage of the speech to inspire international debate on the subject, without resorting to the phrase directly. An example of this was the way Wilson highlighted nationally defined characteristics for working out state boundaries: his contribution in this field provided reference points for politicians and academics to

discuss self-determination in nationalistic terms in future years. More specifically, Wilson’s discourse on the restoration of Belgium and France independence would later be seen as case studies in self-determination being used to re-establish sovereignty after occupation and annexation, as in the 1990s instances of Baltic independence. Wilson’s talk of “colonial claims” in relation to Russia seemed to be prompted by the Bolsheviks’ anti-imperialist rhetoric of “self-determination”. Wilson primarily intended the Fourteen Points to be legitimised through creating peace, stability, liberty and protection from the kind of disorderly involvement that Lenin had advocated. The main targets of Lenin’s version of “self-determination” were domination, dependence and inequality. But Lenin also aimed to prevent the sort of interference manifested in colonial oppression and exploitation by capitalist forces.

In turn, Wilson linked the liberty of “free nations” – or “states” as they are referred to today – with their stability and ability to trade freely. Thus Wilson outlined disruptive influence and sudden change as the main threats to freedom. The U.S. President did not mention “self-determination” or even “freedom” directly in his wartime speeches. Instead, peace and states being able to act unimpeded were the main themes in Wilson’s communications. Freedom as peace is what Wilson emphasised – he saw it as the legitimising norm. This was to be expected considering his stance was being delivered in the context of the First World War. It was an idea of “freedom” not shared by the far more radical Lenin, who continued to see violence as an acceptable tool to be used towards political change in the context of “self-determination”.

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182 Cf. for example, points II and III, as well as point VI (on Russia) and VII (on Belgium).


Economics was crucial to Wilson’s argument during the war. As regards interference, free trade was particularly important to him.\footnote{Economics was crucial to Wilson’s argument during the war. As regards interference, free trade was particularly important to him.} The American President cautioned that curbing trade between states would be a “non-interference” peril to their freedom.\footnote{The American President cautioned that curbing trade between states would be a “non-interference” peril to their freedom.} The ideology of economic liberalism, expressed as free trade, was essential to peace, stability and overall freedom. Wilson warned in April 1918 that a German victory in the war would end up with “trade […] following the flag”, with no maritime liberty.\footnote{Wilson warned in April 1918 that a German victory in the war would end up with “trade […] following the flag”, with no maritime liberty.} Protectionism blighted free trade, so jeopardising a nation’s freedom and a peaceful world order, Wilson argued.\footnote{Protectionism blighted free trade, so jeopardising a nation’s freedom and a peaceful world order, Wilson argued.} To limit this danger, Wilson used post-war settlements to press for free trade for some countries by emphasising their open passage to international waters.\footnote{To limit this danger, Wilson used post-war settlements to press for free trade for some countries by emphasising their open passage to international waters.}

Prior to America entering the First World War, Wilson mentioned “self-determination” in 1915 when he asked Congress to improve the country’s military measures so as to make independent seaborne trade safer,\footnote{Prior to America entering the First World War, Wilson mentioned “self-determination” in 1915 when he asked Congress to improve the country’s military measures so as to make independent seaborne trade safer.} but at this stage the term was not yet a global one. President Wilson’s first significant statement on “self-determination” came with his “Four Principles” address to Congress on 11 February 1918.\footnote{President Wilson’s first significant statement on “self-determination” came with his “Four Principles” address to Congress on 11 February 1918.} He expanded on his Fourteen Points speech. The Four Principles aimed to address international reaction to the Fourteen Points, and to clarify America’s peace settlement proposals. By this time, the USA had been fighting in the war for close to an entire year, and still viewed Russia as an ally. This was despite the latter being actively engaged in talks with the Central Powers – the Quadruple Alliance that was at war with the Allied Powers. As difficulties mounted, and the world searched for a new way forward, Wilson’s usage of “self-determination” in his Four Principles pronouncement was the most valuable international expression of the notion of the unfolding century.

\footnote{See, for example, Wilson, Address to the Senate of the United States: ‘A World League for Peace’ (‘Peace without Victory’), January 22 1917, APP: \url{www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65396}; Wilson 1915: ‘State of the Union’. See also Stevenson, \textit{op. cit.}, p.66.}

\footnote{In Woodrow Wilson, \textit{The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics}, London, D. C. Heath, 1919 (original 1889), p.309, he suggested that interference should only be permissible “where common action (and) uniform law are indispensable”.

\footnote{Wilson, \textit{op. cit.}, ‘Force to the Utmost’, 1918.}

\footnote{Wilson, \textit{op. cit.}, ‘Peace without Victory’, 1917. Wilson included such access to the territorial arrangements for Poland and Serbia in the ‘Fourteen Points’, PWW, 1984, Vol. 45, p.478.}

\footnote{Wilson, \textit{op. cit.}, ‘State of the Union’, 1915.}

\footnote{Wilson, \textit{op. cit.}, ‘Four Principles’, 1918.}
Wilson’s Four Principles immersed the language of “self-determination” into an enquiry into the causes of the war, and indeed the entire nature of the war. This was at a time when Lenin was also still exploring the concept of self-determination in his works as it related to the conflict. Wilson wrote: “This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political life.” Wilson scorned the “forever discredited…balance of power” game, saying that, to guarantee peace, “every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned”.

A peaceful world, and an end to instability, was the ultimate object of Wilson’s form of “self-determination”:

National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. ‘Self-determination’ is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.

So it was that Wilson legitimised “self-determination” as a way of ending domination and interference. Wilson had no truck with revolutionary violence. Peace and freedom were the result of stability, and entirely the right state of affairs. This contrasted sharply with Lenin’s ideological definition of “self-determination” that relied on self-determination as being a step on the road to equality within the framework of internationalist socialism. Lenin’s ultimate objective was violent revolution to end capitalism, and he advocated the unlawful use of force, if necessary, to attain this. There is no doubt that, like Lenin, Wilson saw “self-determination” as a means to an end, but of course the end Wilson aspired to was distinct from Lenin’s.

Wilson always differentiated between “peoples” and “statesmen” in his Four Principles address. He suggested it was politicians, and not their constituents, who were responsible for the First World War. Wilson insisted that his country was at war with Germany per se but “had no quarrel with the German people”.

Wilson aimed to make sure that everyone was free of “autocratic rulers”,

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192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 See, for example, Notter, op. cit., pp.20, 80, 228; Manela, op. cit., The Wilsonian Moment, p.43.
195 For instance, in the Washington Post interview, 5 November 1916, cited in Notter, op. cit., p.568, see also p.480.
and condemned such autocracy in Germany as an illegitimate bar to freedom. Yet rather than supporting the “bottom-up” idea that ordinary people should decide on policy, Wilson concentrated on the ideal of rulers understanding what those they were in charge of desired, and delivering their wishes through the established political system. Wilson thus viewed a flaw in the general will, in that people en masse could make the wrong decisions and put society in peril. Wilson was said to be a self-styled “democrat like Jefferson, with aristocratic tastes” in 1917. He was not altogether content to be considered as a democrat because “his mind led him where his taste rebelled”. Wilson was prone to think of his backing for democracy as being in “bad taste”. The Four Principles speech was, therefore, in many ways a warning to politicians that bypassing “self-determination” would put their own futures in jeopardy. Allowing self-determination to flourish would defuse popular dissent and prevent it from threatening political power. Wilson thus considered that self-determination should be an “imperative principle of action”: ignoring it would endanger peace and stability, and put the position of rulers at risk. Wilson’s crucial point was that, in contrast to Lenin’s thinking, self-determination should not manifest itself in demands for equality or separate statehood.


The way Wilson considered “self-determination” as a means of empowering heads of state over ordinary people has been underplayed by historians. Wilson’s view of the phrase as integral part of democracy was noticeably dissimilar to many modern interpretations of the principle.


199 See, for example, E.M. House, op. cit., Vol. IV, 1928, p.28, note 1.


203 Cf. also Throntveit, op. cit., ‘What was Wilson Thinking?’, p.446; and the Bowman Memorandum, DHM 1928, Vol. I. p.43.

204 In particular, see Wilson, op. cit., The State; also Wertheim, op. cit., ‘The Wilsonian Chimera’, p.349.
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The U.S. President’s ideas about democracy were thus very different to the kind that are popular today, when voters in liberal democracies technically govern through elections, institutions, and relations with their representatives. Simply describing Wilson’s “self-determination” as encompassing values such as “popular sovereigny” and “self-government” can be wide off the mark and certainly needs to be challenged. Wilson was prone to engage with particular grassroots groups, for instance left-wingers who had to be persuaded away from Bolshevism, or Germans whom he wanted to convince to rebel against the Central Powers’ unjust war. However, this limited approach to “self-determination” clashed with Wilson’s universal discourse on the matter, and seemed more like pragmatic manoeuvring prompted by the progress of the First World War.

The following ideas about Wilson’s concept of “self-determination” in fact appeared in his rhetoric using a different form: that is to say the “consent of the governed”. Although Wilson often employed the expressions “self-determination” and “consent of the governed” interchangeably, “consent of the governed” was given precedence. In particular, Wilson had articulated the proposition in 1917 that peace and stability were reliant on “the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed”. The way Wilson resorted to the two notions as implying much the same thing created difficulties as to their exact meaning, and indeed made it possible for peoples to apply differing definitions to the concept of “self-determination”. Repeated references to “self-determination” and “consent of the governed” did, however, point to clear agreement on the legitimising requirements of stability, peace and freedom from interference.

Wilson’s “consent of the governed” was accordingly a diluted type of “self-determination”, as the term “determination” indicates a far stronger link between the ruled and their rulers. The phrase

205 Manela, op. cit., p.42.
207 See, for example, Carleton, op. cit., p.563.
209 See also Throntveit, op. cit., ‘What was Wilson Thinking?’, p.478.
“consent of the governed” suggests peoples meekly accepting the whims of a political establishment, while not assisting in the formation of the political framework which affects their lives or opting out to set up a new political system. In the absence of any definition of equality, “consent of the governed” could merely signify that people were governed rather than playing any active part in the process of government. Thus this phrasing points to a form of representation, rather than political ownership: it does not imbue people with a sense of political legitimacy, involving them directly in governance and indeed law-making.

Lenin had presented “self-determination” as freedom, as it related to equality and the creation of new states. Wilson thus reacted to what he perceived as Lenin’s radical creeds by questioning the distinction between “self-determination” and “consent of the governed”. In short: Wilson moved “self-determination” down a far less extreme route. This happened during the propaganda war which was taking place between Russia and the USA, as both countries tried to champion their visions about how to create a new post-war world order. More specifically, Wilson wanted to turn “self-determination” into his own conception in order to use the socialists’ international discourse on “self-determination”, while discarding its Bolshevik radical idea of freedom, and transforming it into a globally influential notion impregnated with his own liberal-conservative outlook.

Wilson’s internationalisation of the language of “self-determination” led to millions calling for political liberty, in numerous different countries. As we shall see, Wilson’s rhetoric had a great appeal to Egyptian nationalists as they struggled against colonial rule. In this sense, Wilson’s statements had a profound influence on the progress of the war, and the way in which democracy would develop, and in particular on how the peoples’ political demands would be met. Wilson’s global pronouncements during the war were thus made with great sensitivity to the kind of impact they would have. Fear about the popularity of the Bolsheviks, and indeed the preoccupation that Russia could actually pull out of the war, and the need to establish a new world order on American terms, all bolstered the concept of self-determination.

Against this background, using the term “consent of the governed” was also a sign of Wilson wanting to keep Allies such as Britain and France content during the war. Both had colonies and were intend on strengthening their respective empires, instead of liberating their “subject peoples”.

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In the context of these colonial possessions, Wilson’s principles and proposals were examined with a lot of scepticism, so the U.S. President toned down his arguments. This pragmatic approach saw self-determination fitting into a definition that could encompass imperialism. In 1918, while Wilson was publicly articulating on the subject, Lenin had already purposefully conflated “self-determination” with freedom from colonialism on the world stage. Worried that US-style “self-determination” was not being promoted adequately, a Wilson-sanctioned official offered a perspective of the Fourteen Points in the Autumn of 1918 – one that encouraged Britain and France not to be concerned about self-determination threatening their colonies. While there was a consensus on a peace centred on Wilson’s Fourteen Points “and the principles of settlement enunciated in [Wilson’s] subsequent address”, with concepts such as self-determination, there was by no means a green light for a self-determination that included de-colonisation.

So it was that Wilson’s own usage of “self-determination” had, by the opening of the Paris Peace Conference, become acceptable to colonialist nations such as Britain. Woodrow Wilson had reconciled the desirables of peace, stability and non-interference with states which retained colonial empires. So long as these standards were respected, then colonialism was sanctioned, Wilson argued. Negotiators in Paris had also, in fact, sealed colonial arrangements, as they were in accord on boundary agreements that adhered to the wishes of major powers. Only a handful of new states

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214In 1929, Churchill stated that the Allies were largely unsupportive of Wilson’s plan “except in general sympathy”, p.105; an irritated Georges Clemenceau (in Grandeur and Misery of Victory, London, Harrap, 1930) went further and diminished the Fourteen Points to a “purely American idea”, p.156. The same view is expressed in Franz Ansprenger, The Dissolution of the Colonial Empires, New York, Routledge, 1989, p.31.

215House’s analysis was prepared in time for the Peace Conference, and used during negotiations. Drafted in the main by Walter Lippman, who had been Secretary of the Inquiry, it was completed on 29th October 1918, E.M. House, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp.156–158 and Churchill, op. cit., p.106. Cf. also Riga & Kennedy, op. cit.


217However, there were qualifications in relation to the “freedom of the seas”, and refraining from requesting German compensation clauses, André Tardieu, The Truth about the Treaty, Indianapolis, IN, Bobbs-Merrill, 1921, p.71. The Allies’ declaration was in response to ‘President Wilson’s consent to propose an armistice to the Allies’, Department of State, Washington, DC, 23 October 1918, in Scott, op. cit., pp.434-436.

218Indeed, France did mention “self-determination” in its “plan of procedure” ahead of the Paris Peace Conference, Tardieu, op. cit., p.88.

219Clemenceau would later refute that the Allies ever wished to implement any “liberation program”: A.J. Mayer, op. cit., p.184; also De Groot, op. cit., pp.197, 193. For a sceptical British approach to Wilson’s principles, see TNA: FO 608/41/503, Peace Conference (British Delegation) Files 97/1/22 to 98/1/2 (to P.P.18113), 1919, from Herron on 30 April 1919, Geneva.

220See the exchanges compiled in DHM 1928, Vol. I-II.
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were brought into being by the Paris Peace Conference. Instead, subjugated minority groups were left outside their “mother” countries. Concessions such as minority rights were awarded to some of those living in existing states, but they were not granted their own state.

By the time he actually got to Paris, Wilson was not as supportive of “self-determination” as peoples around the world had imagined. He was mistrustful of altering frontiers, and did not act like the self-styled champion of self-determination, or the “icon of their aspirations”. Oppressed people had presented letters and petitions to Wilson, and organised visits to see him. Despite this, Wilson did not offer much help. Wilson had presented the theory of self-determination as the key to peace, international order and non-interference in the affairs of states but he had no interest in new cases. Wilson by no means saw the concept as a dynamic for action. In Paris, the American President showed far more enthusiasm towards creating a League of Nations to ensure peace and stability.

It is likely that Wilson was by then disgruntled that the language of “self-determination” he had employed during the war was being used to justify the need for absolute freedom for millions of disaffected people around the world. Just before the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson is said to have told the aid who spread his speeches globally:


225 See, for example, Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study in Frontier making, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1963, p.25.

226 Manela, op. cit., p.4.


228 See also Manela, op. cit., in relation to the plight of the Egyptian nationalists, p.153; the Koreans, pp.123-127; the Indians, p.166.

I am wondering if you have not unconsciously spun a net for me from which there is no escape. It is to America that the whole world turns to-day, not only with its wrongs, but with its hopes and grievances. The hungry expects us to feed them, the roofless look to us for shelter, the sick of heart and body depend upon us for cure. [...] What I seem to see – with all my heart I hope that I am wrong – is a tragedy of disappointment.  

The most telling example of Wilson’s unease at raising the concept of “self-determination” is often incorrectly linked to a speech at the US Senate on 19 August 1919, or a “written statement” he is meant to have sent to Congress “in late 1919”. In fact, the actual statement referred to was made while Wilson was with an Irish delegation in Paris on 11 June 1919, and it was sent to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 30 August 1919. According to the proceedings of the gathering, the group from Ireland said President Wilson had summed up the views of thousands around the world when he “uttered those words declaring that all nations had a right to self-determination”. President Wilson was in turn perturbed by the unpredictable impact of what he said, explaining: “When I gave utterance to those words, I said them without the knowledge that nationalities existed, which are coming to us day after day.”

In light of Wilson’s more practical, and indeed sceptical behaviour in Paris, it is worth reconsidering his reputation as a bone fide champion of “self-determination”. If he really had been the personification of the concept, then he would have wanted to propagate it around the world, using it to help liberate oppressed peoples. In fact, Wilson often made vague references to the idea, and his muted commitment to “real life” self-determination (in contrast to the academic principle) has tentatively been explained by his misgivings about actually coming up with the concept in the first place. That said, Wilson never publicly declared that his discourse on “self-determination” had been misinterpreted, or that he should not have uttered it in the first place.

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234 Ibid.
There was in fact a great deal of pragmatism in relation to Wilson’s language of self-determination, especially in comparison to Lenin’s views on the subject. In this respect, it is likely that Wilson felt his own ideas on self-determination were misunderstood by the international audience he spent so much time cultivating. Lenin’s radical version of freedom as equality for everyone – including colonised peoples – was what Wilson had responded to. Wilson’s main aim had been to see fellow statesmen applying the principles of self-determination to create order, stability, and peace. He had by no means envisaged using the notion to justify or indeed spur popular revolutions. It is possible that it was not the rhetoric of “self-determination” that disappointed Wilson, but instead the fact that ordinary people were acting in accordance with what they thought it meant, rather than allowing world leaders to put it into practice. The irony was that subjugated peoples in many different countries interpreted Wilson’s self-determination in the radical manner that Lenin had advocated. So, nationalist movements around the world were in effect looking to put into practice Lenin’s revolutionary principles through the proxy of Wilson’s words. Rather than strengthening the values he believed in, Wilson’s globalisation of the term “self-determination” inspired numerous drives towards liberation that the President had not foretold, or indeed desired.

There were other statements, private ones, used by Wilson to highlight his intricate evaluation of “self-determination”. It was the French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau who defined Wilson’s ambition to create a League of Nations as the U.S. President’s “motor”.\footnote{Clemenceau, op. cit., p.161. See also Ambrosius, op. cit., ‘Democracy’, p.229, and Stevenson, op. cit., p.245.} Wilson’s initial draft of a League Covenant, of 7 September 1918, referred to “self-determination”, but it was dependent on international peace and stability, illustrating how idealised Wilson’s vision could be.

The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may in the judgement of three fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected, if agreeable to those peoples; and that territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. The Contracting Powers accept without reservation the

\footnote{Clemenceau, op. cit., p.161. See also Ambrosius, op. cit., ‘Democracy’, p.229, and Stevenson, op. cit., p.245.}
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Faced with such opposition, Wilson agreed to temper the Covenant’s reference to “self-determination”. He put forward the idea of letting countries to veto territorial changes.\footnote{In his draft of 20 January 1919, \textit{Ibid.}, Document 9, p.99. See also Riga & Kennedy, \textit{op. cit.}, ‘Mitteleuropa’ and ‘Tolerant Majorities’; Throntveit, \textit{op. cit.}, ‘What was Wilson Thinking?’; pp.445-446.} There is nothing to suggest that Wilson’s scepticism towards “self-determination” was being erased from later versions of the Covenant\footnote{E.g. the records in DHM 1928, Vol. II, in particular Document 7, with Hunter Miller’s comments to the article, p.70; as well as Document 8, p.94; Document 12: ‘Cecil-Miller Draft, January 27, 1919’, p.134; and Document 14: ‘Wilson’s Fourth Draft or Third Paris Draft, February 2, 1919’, p.146. The “elasticity” of the initial wording was bemoaned by House, E.M. House, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{The Intimate Papers}, Vol. IV, 1928, p.35.} – a document which he knew was crucial as a means for striving for order in the post-war world.\footnote{According to the Bowman Memorandum of December 1918, Wilson did not refer to the concept either when elaborating on the article above to contemporaries: E.M. House, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{The Intimate Papers}, Vol. IV, 1928, p.292.} “Self-determination” was originally changed to “consent of the
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governed” in the drafting process, but this too was eventually taken out. Article (X) of the final Covenant ended up reading as follows:

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

Wilson could have incorporated “self-determination” into the League Covenant, but did not. It thus remained a principle without any legal underpinning and indeed without any official means of applying it. Wilson had succeeded in bolstering the rhetoric of “self-determination”, and its power to make a difference in the world, but it did not become a part of international law.

Wilson’s language of “self-determination” in the Four Principles speech was by no means as emphatic as it might have appeared at the time. Wilson had used the speech to attack Germany, and specifically Chancellor Georg von Hertling, asking:

Is Count von Hertling not aware that he is speaking in the court of mankind, that all the awakened nations of the world now sit in judgment on what every public man, of whatever nation, may say on the issues of a conflict which has spread to every region of the world?

Wilson described a “court” that was opposed to annexations and other threats and lauded “self-determination” as being “an imperative principle of action”, rather than a vague rhetorical device, which statesmen would from now on “ignore at their peril”. Accordingly the notion of “self-determination” was put forward as something approved of by an external actor, the “court of mankind”, while Wilson himself actually appeared less engaged with the concept of “self-determination” in what was yet his most powerful argument for it. Wilson wanted to illustrate that men like von Hertling were dismissive of “self-determination”. What Wilson was not doing, however, was offering the proposition positively as a desirable that should be supported at all costs. Wilson’s speech was delivered just over a week after American diplomat William Bullit suggested

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245 This was recommended by Hunter Miller, DHM 1928, Vol. II, p.87. See also Document 11, p.119, with Lord Eustace Percy making the same proposal.
247 See League of Nations: Covenant (Including Amendments adopted to December, 1924), Avalon Project: avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.
248 See also Throntveit, op. cit., ‘What was Wilson Thinking?’, pp.445-446.
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to the President that he should use “self-determination” against the Central Powers. The speech was also four days after striking workers in Germany had sent Wilson a petition asking for “self-determination”. Thus, Wilson’s Four Principles version of “self-determination” was reacting to specific situations, and not imbued with the idea that it should be employed come what may.

Another reference to “self-determination” appeared in Wilson’s “Force to the Utmost” speech. This second key public mention came two months after the “Four Principles” one. It was made in Baltimore to a military audience, and was very much like the one in his Four Principles. This was a time when Wilson’s “self-determination” rhetoric was growing in popularity amongst peoples worldwide. The “Force to the Utmost” saw Wilson opposing Germany’s so-called “programme”: a programme that “our ideals, the ideals of justice and humanity and liberty, the principle of the free self-determination of nations, upon which all the modern world insists, can play no part”. As with the Four Principles speech, however, President Wilson did not actively champion the language of “self-determination” as playing an important role in his own agenda for world change. Instead, the term was used to undermine a wartime enemy. Thus, it is clear with hindsight that there were restrictions to Wilson’s support for “self-determination”, even when he spoke about it with such apparent passion in the Four Principles and “Force to the Utmost” speeches.

An element of Wilson’s interpretation of “self-determination” which illustrates particular divergences with Lenin was the manner in which he tied it to equality. Wilson invariably mentioned equality in the context of discussions about self-determination, just as Lenin did. Where Wilson differed from Lenin, however, was in the way he valued equality only as part of an orderly world, in which peace was guaranteed. An example of this was how Wilson used his Fourteen Points to call for a peace centred on the “right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety”. Wilson resorted to the same speech to advocate “equality of trade conditions” for peaceful countries, and he re-iterated

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this proposition in the Four Principles. Wilson’s “Force to the Utmost” speech also laid out the terms for a “peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike.”

Wilson’s definition of “self-determination” took into account a version of “equality” that was far more limited in scope than Lenin’s. Wilson outlined the equality of nations – or states as they would be referred to today – while Lenin applied equality to nations and their populations, including those who had no political power. More specifically, Wilson viewed equality as a concept aimed at ensuring peace. He considered equality as the right of any country to be free from interference in their political and business affairs.

Thanks to his generalised references to “peoples” and “nations”, Wilson was able to exclude particular groups from his definitions of equal self-determination. He was said to have “a passionate faith […] in the higher nature of the people!”, but this confidence was qualified to favour those who provided stability and peace. Thus Wilsonian self-determination supported peoples that guaranteed order. There was no question of simply granting self-determination as an ideal – it was instead a tool towards the establishment of international stability.

It was also clear that there was an American bias in all Wilson’s views on self-determination, with the President convinced that his own country led the field in “serving humanity.” Wilson also

255Wilson, op. cit., ‘Four principles’, 1918.
257Also, Wilson appeared to be uncommitted to equality in his domestic politics: see e.g. Wilson ‘An Address at New Rochelle, New York’, 27 February 1905, when he disapproved of the push from labour unions for equality, stating that “they drag the highest man to the level of the lowest”, in PWW 1974, Vol. 16, p.15. Wilson also objected to equal rights for non-whites, Manela, The Wilsonian Moment, pp.26-29. Scholars have shown some interest in the influence of racial thinking on Wilson’s policy and overall political thought, with one study published recently unequivocally calling him “racist”, Gary Gerstle, ‘Race and Nation in the Thought and Politics of Woodrow Wilson’ in Cooper (ed.), op. cit., Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson, pp.93-124, at p.115. See also Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-determination in International Law, Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, 1996, pp.120-121. Distrust towards certain “races” as well as towards democracy (as representative of the masses) was commonplace at the time; for an overview see Richard Bellamy, ‘The advent of the Masses and the Making of the Modern Theory of Democracy’ in Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (eds.), The Cambridge History, op. cit., pp.70-103.
259See e.g. Wilson, op. cit., ‘Address’, 1917.
261Wilson laid out these points of his political thought in his 1919 (originally 1889) The State, as well as in ‘The Modern Democratic State’, an 1885 piece of writing, reproduced in PWW 1968, Vol. 5, see pp.90 and 92 specifically.
believed that he had a special role in this duty.\textsuperscript{263} He stated that the USA “spr\{ang\} out of freedom and \{was\} for the service of freedom”,\textsuperscript{264} and that only America could “redeem the world”.\textsuperscript{265} Wilson argued that America was the only “disinterested” combatant in the war,\textsuperscript{266} and integral in asserting the war aim he enunciated in his 1917 “Peace without Victory”.\textsuperscript{267} In this sense, America’s unique morality informed the country’s war efforts to clamp down on the secret treaties and diplomacy, and the annexing of territory associated with the old order.\textsuperscript{268} Thus, in theory, Wilson articulated the formal ideal of equality between \textit{states}, but there was always ambiguity in his words. In fact, Wilson’s new world order promoted American exceptionalism, rather than genuine equality between nations.

American values were fundamental to Wilson’s statements made during the war: he wanted to spread them across the world, rather than let other populations define their own standards. In the Four Principles, Wilson declared that he did “not mean that the peace of the world depends upon the acceptance of any particular set of suggestions”;\textsuperscript{269} but a year earlier, a set of ideals \textit{was} put forward. President Wilson had stated the necessity for a re-shaped world centred on “consent of the governed”, a reduction in armaments and freedom of the seas. Wilson wrote:

\begin{quote}
These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.\textsuperscript{270}
\end{quote}

Beyond his grand missionary rhetoric, Wilson knew that his domestic audience required him to concentrate on U.S. national interest as it related to the war effort.\textsuperscript{271} Wilson insisted throughout the war that non-interference, especially as regards the flourishing of free trade, was essential to the long term advantage of the country.\textsuperscript{272} If the war did not end in Victory, Wilson said in 1918, his “own great Nation’s place and mission in the world would be lost with it”.\textsuperscript{273} The wishes of the

\textsuperscript{263}For psychological analysis, see Freud & Bullit, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.197, 226.
\textsuperscript{264}Wilson, \textit{op. cit.}, ‘Four Principles’, 1918.
\textsuperscript{265}Wilson, \textit{op. cit.}, ‘Force to the Utmost’, 1918.
\textsuperscript{266}See Bowman’s notes, cited in DHM 1928, Vol. I, p.41.
\textsuperscript{267}Wilson, \textit{op. cit.}, ‘Peace without Victory’, 1917.
\textsuperscript{269}Wilson, \textit{op. cit.}, ‘Four Principles’, 1918.
\textsuperscript{270}Wilson, \textit{op. cit.}, ‘Peace without Victory’, 1917.
\textsuperscript{271}See Ambrosius, \textit{op. cit.}, Wilsonianism, p.122.
\textsuperscript{272}Prior to America entering the war, in Wilson’s 1915: ‘State of the Union’; after, in 1917: ‘Peace without Victory’.
\textsuperscript{273}Wilson, \textit{op. cit.}, ‘Force to the Utmost’, 1918.
Republicans who controlled the American Congress were a huge influence on Wilson as he formulated a place for the U.S. in the world. The Republicans were opposed to becoming too wrapped up in world affairs, and Wilson had to make sure this did not happen.274

Beyond offering a confusing and at times muddled definition of “equality” in relation to “self-determination”, Wilson’s actual implementation of the concept was also far from convincing. Due to the term’s close association with its perceived originator, these ambiguous policies, too, would become part of the international image of “self-determination”.275 The Wilsonian approach could thus be as much about proposing universal values of equality to the peoples of the world as about exclusion. Wilson dismissed Africans living within Germany’s Empire as “barbarians” unqualified for self-determination, for example.276 Similar prejudice was aimed at the Irish and Albanians too. When an Irish group petitioned Wilson at the White House in 1918, he was uninterested.277 Wilson was later to admit that the Irish made him “very angry”, and “that he had wanted to tell them to go to hell”.278 Britain was an important ally of the USA, and Wilson saw no reason to grant Irish nationalists support against Britain.279

The terminology used by Wilson as he discussed equality was therefore restrained by his paradoxical belief that only progressive, liberal thinkers could have a say in politics.280 Wilson deemed equality to be a basic standard necessary within “free states” which demonstrated their advancement by abiding by the law.281 Those who broke the law, on the other hand, were a threat to

274See e.g. Republican criticism in Creel, op. cit., The War; Manela, op. cit., p.56.
279See also Ambrosius, op. cit., Wilsonianism, p.119-122.
280For an insight into Wilson’s political thinking on these matters, see op. cit., The State; as well as Throntveit, op. cit., “What was Wilson Thinking?”, in particular p.470; Notter, op. cit., pp.69–71; Steigerwald, op. cit., p.473.
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peace and stability, and were thus not entitled to equality.\textsuperscript{282} Wilson said in 1917 that true equality
had to be “gained” in an incremental, non-violent way.\textsuperscript{283} This conditional attitude towards equality
was the basis for peace, Wilson argued. This position was prevalent following the end of the First
World War when newly liberated countries could only be recognised diplomatically if they adopted
treaties guaranteeing the rights of minorities.\textsuperscript{284}

Moral and orderly governance worked within the mandate system, Woodrow Wilson suggested at
the end of 1918.\textsuperscript{285} He saw this as a pragmatic means of ensuring peaceful and stable societies while
avoiding the need to offer policies of equality without any pre-requisites and an independent
homeland for those who were “unqualified”. The mandate system would therefore become the most
decisive way to practically implement his concept of self-determination. The mandate system
would, when incorporated in the League of Nations Covenant, guarantee sovereignty for the League.
More specifically, it would be responsible for the “right of ultimate disposal” over populations
formerly under the rule of Russia, or the Hapsburg or Ottoman empires. A designated member of the
League would be mandated to each set area.\textsuperscript{286} According to the Covenant, mandate rule was
necessary for those “not (being) able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the
modern world”.\textsuperscript{287}

It was South Africa’s Prime Minister Jan Smuts who helped to develop Wilson’s faith in the
mandate system in “Practical Suggestion” for a League of Nations.\textsuperscript{288} Smuts organised people into

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{282}See Link, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{The Higher Realism}, especially ‘Woodrow Wilson and his Presbyterian Inheritance’, pp.3-20. Drawing on the same logic, Wilson recommended that “self-determination” should not be granted immediately to German-speaking Austria, in Grayson’s notes of 8 December, 1918, \textit{op. cit.}, and PWW 1986, Vol. 53, pp.336-340, especially p.339. For the same motives, Shipway 2008 suggests that Germany was discredited as a colonial power.

\textsuperscript{283}Wilson, \textit{op. cit.}, ‘Peace without Victory’, 1917. The British held the same view in relation to prospects for Egyptian self-rule in Minute High Commissioner, Egypt, 11 May 1922, TNA: FO 141/790, No. 14549/1. See also Ambrosius, \textit{op. cit.}, Wilsonianism, p.127.


\textsuperscript{286}Smuts, \textit{op. cit.}, p.12. The formal U.S. commentary to the Fourteen Points had advocated a similar system, namely that colonial powers should be “trustee(s) for the natives and for the interests of the society of nations”, E.M. House, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{The Intimate Papers}, Vol. III, 1928, p.202.

\textsuperscript{287}The same expression had been used in Wilson’s various drafts of the Covenant; See e.g. DHM 1928, Vol. II, Document 14, p.151 – 152.

\textsuperscript{288}The Allies were seriously contemplating the establishment of a mandate system towards the end of 1918: see Smuts, \textit{op. cit.;} Curry, \textit{op. cit.}, specifically p.975; Norman Gordon Levin, \textit{Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s response to War and Revolution}, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1968, p.186; Thomas J. Knock, \textit{To End All Wars:}
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their ability to govern themselves (or not), insisting some needed, “much nursing” to attain self-rule. Smuts believed that the “genius of Western civilization” had a crucial role to play in the post-war world, and such views meant that Wilson was “deeply impressed with the idea that it was the moral duty of the great and enlightened nations to aid the less fortunate and especially to guard the nationalities freed from autocratic rule until they were capable of self-government and self-protection”. It was after reading the work of Smuts – a supporter of the apartheid system that ensured separate territories for blacks and whites – that Wilson included the mandate system into his own drafts of the League of Nations Covenant. Wilson’s confidence in Smuts suggests the U.S. President was by no means the open-minded liberal that some have made out.

The mandate system and the Covenant were meant to guarantee guardianship by “advanced nations” so that the world as a whole would be kept safe from the potential chaos brought about by “uncivilised” peoples. The President’s advisors agreed to the mandate system being part of the Covenant. The major criticism of the mandate system was that it effectively legitimised inequality, rather than its stated aim of peace for all states. The completed, agreed Covenant left very little power to those who were mandated, while League members could take advantage of the assets of those oppressed peoples through the “open door” system. Lansing would then suggest that the approval of the mandate system by the Allied powers was primarily motivated by their desire to carve up Germany’s colonies.


Lansing, op. cit., The Peace Negotiations, pp.142–143.

A principle that concerned the former German colonies in the first place, DHM 1928, Vol. II, p.40. Churchill, op. cit., commented: “This was carrying a sound principle too far”, p.150.

League of Nations Covenant, Article XXII.


Smuts, op. cit., p.19, points that out: it was only certain peoples previously living within the Ottoman Empire who, in accordance with the Covenant’s Article XXII, could have a say in affairs – ones that were in line with “their” mandatory power.

In December 1918, when Wilson spoke to Bowman, he indicated to him that he endorsed this proposal, E.M. House, op. cit., The Intimate Papers, Vol. IV, 1928, p.293. This position was supported by the U.S commentary to the Fourteen Points, which had suggested that mandates would benefit from this state of affairs. E.M. House, op. cit., The Intimate Papers, Vol. IV, 1928, p.201.

Lansing, op. cit., The Peace Negotiations, p.140.
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The mandate system became linked across the globe with President Wilson’s notion of “self-determination”. Subjugated peoples who were set to be part of the mandate system asked the U.S. President about its effects at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, and they particularly wanted to know how it differed from “self-determination”. Wilson replied, rather mysteriously: “In every instance the mandate should fit the case as the glove fits the hand”. At a later date Wilson suggested to peoples living under a mandate that, over time, the system would assist them in gaining “full membership in the family of nations”, as this was essential for the sake of peace. All the while, Wilson focused the system’s prerogatives on how he saw his and the USA’s role in the world. That is to say, he wanted a prime example of universal rights and stability to administer people, regardless of the views they particularly formulated. Peace would be guaranteed by the mandate system, and this would in turn ensure proper freedom, was Wilson’s belief.

Wilson’s overriding argument that mandated populations were not developed enough to establish themselves as political players meant that many would remain excluded from their own political, economic and legal affairs. The League of Nations and the mandatory powers in authority would make the final decision on self-rule once mandates had matured during a period of oppression. Mandated peoples could agree to a system passively, but this system did not involve them directly in the political process. The kind of plebiscites employed in select post-war settlements was not applied for mandates. The ultimate aim of the system was to guarantee a peaceful international system, within which mandatories’ freedoms to operate appear to have been the leading tenets. This state of affairs was influenced by Wilson’s more reactionary views about “self-determination”. It was thus formalised, even though Wilson’s explicit phrasing was not used.

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300 Ibid., p.198.
301 See the second principle in Wilson, op. cit., ‘Four Principles’, 1918. In a similar vein as regards pressing domestic issues, Wilson suggested that segregation would suit American “Negroes” too, Gerstle, op. cit., p.109.
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The differences between the Wilsonian and Leninist interpretations of self-determination are far clearer now than they were when the two men were both articulating them at the beginning of the 20th century. Colonial subjects in particular perceived that the two leaders had very similar ideas about the concept. They both questioned the validity of Empires, they were both in favour of a new style of transparent diplomacy, and they were both seeking a peaceful world that allowed self-determination to flourish.

What was certain, however, was that by 1918 Wilson had far more power to influence world opinion than Lenin. Wilson could inform and direct the imminent peace negotiations, and indeed adopt Bolshevik language to do so. Such radical discourse reflected an appetite for a complete overhaul of society. Subjugated peoples around the world were desperate for a transformation of the international order, and Wilson used the Bolshevik rhetoric of self-determination to promote his own programme to significantly reshape the world. In turn, anti-colonial nationalists operating within established Empires would appropriate Wilson’s language as they took on the foreign oppressors governing their lives.

Wilson’s Self-Determination in Practice: “A Tragedy of Disappointment” for Egyptian Nationalists?

Woodrow Wilson’s determined work towards creating a new world order was reported extensively by newspapers and journals across Egypt. The leading Arabic language newspaper, Al-Ahram, carried minute coverage and analysis of the American President’s April 1917 Speech to the U.S. Congress declaring war. Wilson pledged to support small countries in their calls and rights for freedom and – more generally – solemnly promised to make the world a place where democracy could flourish.

There were numerous similar articles in the press concentrating on what America had to offer the Allies. Al-Ahram editorials stressed the country’s “immense” potential in the conflict, saying it could raise a conscript army of three million men. The overall conclusion was that the USA’s entry to the war could be decisive towards a successful outcome for the Allies.304

304 Al-duktur Wilsun yatlabu min al-majlis i’lan al-harb ʿala Almania’ (Dr. Wilson asks Congress to Declare War on Germany), Al-Ahram, 4 April 1917; ‘Amrika wa-Almania fi harb’ (The U.S. and Germany at War), and ‘Khitab al-raʾis Wilsun’ (President Wilson’s Address), Al-Ahram, 5 April 1917; ‘Majlis al-Shuyukh al-Amriki yuqarriru i’lan al-harb’
Wilson’s Fourteen Points Speech of January 8th 1918 received as much media attention as the Congress Address: the entire Speech was translated into Arabic by the Reuters news agency, and the joint commentary highlighted the enthusiastic responses to the Speech from around the world. Egyptians across the country were thus fully informed not only about Wilson’s set of actions on how to win the war, but also on his vision for a post-war settlement. This had far more to do with the role of the press than any propaganda efforts deployed by the Commission on Public Information, which did not have a base in Egypt.

Censors operating in Egypt during the war directed their efforts towards stamping down on dissent shown against the domestic government, but there was little opposition to reports and analysis on what was happening in America and the rest of the world. Well-educated Egyptians could also read European newspapers from countries such as Britain and France that were imported and distributed widely in major cities, as well as those printed in the country for the vast communities of expatriates. News about other international events, including the demands for Home Rule by the Indian National Congress was also carried by the newspapers. Egyptians could certainly get a very good idea about the number of people who believed that the war could change their position in the world, and ideally for the better.

Journalism promoting the Allied cause became even more prevalent in 1918, as the Allied powers looked increasingly likely to win. By the summer, as American troops contributed to more battlefield triumphs, the Egyptian press reported on the Fourth of July Independence Day celebrations in the U.S. for the first time. The fact that the USA chose the peaceful signing of the Declaration of Independence – and not a military victory or violent upheaval – as a specific day to mark its freedom from Britain was considered novel. Thus, high ideals were seen as being crucial to the American victory, rather than simply armed conflict.

(‘Majhud Amrika’ (The U.S. Effort), Al-Ahram, 6 January 1918; ‘Khuthat al-ra’is Wilson’ (President Wilson’s Speech), Al-Ahram, 11 January 1918.)


307Al-Ahram, 8 April 1917 and 6 January 1918.
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Less than 150 years since achieving liberty from Britain, America was leading the world in numerous fields of human activity, from teaching and the arts, while also becoming a beacon of freedom and economic success. A substantial citation from the Declaration of Independence stirred Egyptian imaginations following its Arabic translation in *Al-Ahram*. Other events covered at length included President Wilson’s Fourth of July Address at Mount Vernon, when he again outlined his country’s war motivations, and there were also reports on the Independence Day festivities in capital cities in Europe.\(^{309}\) The notion of American exceptionalism was being celebrated in print newspapers in countries such as India and China, and Egypt followed suit. High moral stances, rather than selfish self-interest, were seen as the guiding light of world leaders such as Wilson, especially as America was evidently less reliant on Imperialism than the British or the French and thus more favourable to the principle of self-determination.

Like nationalists in other parts of the world, those who longed for an independent Egypt were increasingly impressed by Wilson, and everything that his country represented in the new world order. Many of the Egyptian nationalists felt that America and its leader would therefore have to conform to the values promoted in their Declaration of Independence, the American war effort rhetoric, and indeed the country’s plans for a post-war peace, if they were to achieve their own ambitions.\(^{310}\) Such ideas were reinforced when other Allied powers supported Wilson’s statements, as the Egyptians were pleased to see. Just before the Armistice in 1918, there was an Anglo-French declaration about the Middle East: it pledged to “ensure the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and to establish national governments and administrations which shall derive their authority from the initiative and free will of the people themselves”. Only Syria and Mesopotamia were specifically referred to, but Egyptian nationalists were emboldened by the idea, and were convinced the same measures could apply to them.\(^{311}\) Nationalists in Egypt who had originally been demanding a greater say in the running of the Egyptian government, were so impressed by Wilson’s and the Allied views that they saw no reason why they should not strive for complete self-determination for themselves. Sa‘ad Zaghlul, the vice

\(^{309}\) ‘4 yuniyu 1776, ‘id istiqlal Amrika’ (Fourth of July 1776, America’s Independence Day), *Al-Ahram*, 5 July 1918; ‘Al-`id al-watani al-Amriki: Khitab al-ra’is Wilsun’ (America’s National Holiday: President Wilson’s Address), *Al-Ahram*, 6 July 1918.


president of the Legislative Assembly, was among the nationalists who rallied around such ideas. He was to become the leader of the 1919 Revolution, while colleagues who supported him included Muhammad Mahmud, who was from Egypt’s landowning elite. Other prominent figures involved in the movement were the liberal politician ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmi, and the lawyer and author Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid. All of these men considered that the First World War was part of a period of history that was theirs to exploit. The “fight for Egyptian independence”, as Lutfi al-Sayyid would describe it, was a challenge which numerous Egyptians wanted to take part in. Prince ‘Umar Tusun, of the Egyptian Royal Family, spent the weeks leading up to the Armistice meeting Zaghlul to discuss sending an Egyptian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. 312 Prince ‘Umar Tusun said that the idea of Egypt dispatching a delegation had “occurred to him after the publication of President Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points”. 313 Even Egypt’s Sultan Fu’ad himself told the British High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, Britain’s principal authority figure in Egypt, that he aspired to “Home Rule for Egypt along the lines of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points”. 314 This affirmation in October 1918 showed that Egypt was utterly committed to exerting what power it could muster in the new world order.

President Wilson’s pronouncements continued to drive this move towards Egypt’s independence. Egyptian leaders were convinced that Wilson would offer his backing to them, because their ambitions were so closely based on the president’s own beliefs in post-war peace negotiations. Hampson Gary, America’s Consul General in Cairo, sent a report back to Washington on the day of the 1918 Armistice saying: “I have been made aware of a tendency in all classes of Egyptians to believe that President Wilson favours self-government throughout all the world and that he will champion the right of the people of this country to govern themselves.” Mr. Gary said “prominent officials” in Egypt had already asked him if Wilson’s vision for the world intended to extend his ideals to countries outside of Europe, and specifically to Egypt itself. Mr. Gary said he had heard a “persistent rumour” that members of the Egyptian National Assembly were circulating a petition calling for their own “self-determination”. Gary wrote that “All signs seem to me to point to a

313 Ibid.
definite movement to elicit the support of the American Government on behalf of their claims in the
great international clearing house that is now in process of formation either by a general public
appeal or before the peace Congress soon to meet”, thus confirming the Egyptian politicians’ faith
that President Wilson would be on their side. Publications produced and distributed widely by the
nationalists stated that independence had been recognised by Wilson as “a natural right of nations”
and the subjugation of people completely contradicted Wilson’s principle of self-determination. In
such circumstances, Britain’s belief that it could govern Egypt against the will of Egyptians was no
longer acceptable.

When Wilson became the first U.S. President to leave America while in office, the Egyptian press in
Arabic ran many reports about his arrival in France. The President personified the newfound
economic and military strength of the USA, and he appeared to be the first international statesman to
be working for everyone in the world, and not just the major powers. He wanted to back humanity
“without distinction between white, black, yellow, etc”. There were references to the Prime Minister
of Italy and how he saw Wilson as producing a new bible for humanity, but there was no sign of the
American president being arrogant. It was reported that Wilson made much of displaying his
passport to European border officials when he travelled between countries, for example. Speculation
about Wilson’s thought processes were rife, but commentators had nonetheless full trust that his past
“great addresses” would influence the future of the world in Paris positively.

It was also noted in news reports that, beyond Paris, Wilson’s whirlwind tour of Europe included
trips to London, and Rome. There was a visit to the village in the north of England where his
mother’s family came from, and receptions with French President Raymond Poincaré; King George
V of England; and Pope Benedict XV, for instance. It was thanks to these published news reports
that literate Egyptians – and those who spoke to them – knew exactly where Wilson was, and what
he was saying. As he built up his international profile and influence, Egyptian nationalists
increasingly viewed Wilson as an ally, and cultivated his representatives at every opportunity. There
were a great number of petitions received at the American legation office in Cairo demanding that a

315 Gary to Lansing, 11 November 1918, U.S. NARA RG 256, SD 883.00/2. Gary’s report to DOS, 29 January 1919, RG
256, SD 883.00/12.
316 Terry, op. cit., The Wafd, pp.19-20, 84-100; Gershoni & Jankowski, op. cit., p.44; Kedourie, op. cit., ‘Sa’ad Zaghlul
and the British’, pp.97-98.
317 ‘Dr. Wilson in Europe’, Al-Ahram, 15 December 1918.
318 Reported in Al-Ahram, 16, 17, 23, 24, and 30 December 1918.
ban on the Egyptian delegation (Wafd, in Arabic) travelling to Paris should be reversed. The British did not want Zaghlul to travel, and the Americans were asked to oppose this, by adhering to the ideas of the “illustrious president, who stands today in the eyes of the world for full justice for all nations, large or small”.319

All kinds of influential Egyptians signed the petition calling for the delegation to be able to go to Paris, including civil servants and legislators, those working in local government, tradesmen, members of the judiciary, doctors and those in the armed services.320 Hampson Gary wrote in his account that all were “basing their claims to independence on the president’s self-determination clause”, and that they would “endeavour to obtain an expression of opinion from him during his visit in Europe”.321 Egyptian Christians were, said Gary, the only group who opposed the proposed trip to Paris by the delegation, the Wafd. These Christians did not recognise Zaghlul as their leader, and wanted Britain to remain in charge in Egypt. They feared Muslim majority government, thinking that their own safety could be compromised. The petition received by the Americans from the Christians was not signed, however, and Gary admitted that it might be a forgery.322

Zaghlul meanwhile sent a note to Gary saying that the Americans had entered the war with the aim “of safeguarding the rights of the small nations”. Zaghlul said the Egyptian people had to take control of their own future, and would be prepared to make a deal with America, to have their self-determination supervised by a League of Nations envisioned by President Wilson.323 Zaghlul dispatched a telegram to Wilson himself in December 1918, stressing that Egyptians endorsed his view of the world. Zaghlul wrote: “No people more than the Egyptian people has felt strongly the joyous emotion of the birth of a new era which, thanks to your virile action, is soon going to impose itself upon the universe.” Wilson’s leadership would “spread everywhere all the benefits of a peace” no longer “troubled by the ambitions of hypocrisy or the old-fashioned policy of hegemony and furthering selfish national interests”, Zaghlul added.324 Egyptians were entitled to be in Paris,
Zaghlul argued, because it was their “natural and sacred right”— the overwhelming desire was for Wilson to get the British to accept all of this. 325

Nationalists in the Egyptian legislature expressed similarly ardent feelings in a letter welcoming President Wilson to Europe. It read:

To the great and venerated President who led the people of the United States in their disinterested participation in the European conflict to save humanity and to preserve the world in the future from the horrors of war, we send our affectionate greetings.

To the eminent philosopher and statesman who occupies today a preponderant place among the leaders of peoples, and whose high ideals are imposing themselves upon statesmen of all nations, we offer our homage and admiration.

To the chief of the great American democracy, who left his country in order to bring about a durable peace based upon equal justice for all and guaranteed by the Society of Nations, we submit the cause of Egypt, which is subjugated to a foreign domination that Egypt unanimously rejects.

Long live the United States! Long live President Wilson! 326

While the note was clearly aimed at appealing to Wilson’s vanity, it reflected the American President’s portrayal in the Egyptian press at that time, and there is every likelihood that those views were completely sincere.

Zaghlul continued to write to President Wilson, calling on him to apply his ideals to Egypt. Zaghlul also wrote to Georges Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister who was president of the Paris Peace Conference, to complain about the British bar on Egyptians attending. 327 Zaghlul produced a detailed memorandum about ‘The Egyptian National Claims’ on January 25, 1919, making the case for his 15-man delegation to travel from Cairo. This thirty-three page document was disseminated to all foreign diplomats in the city. 328 All aspects of its culture and economic and historical developments, including its rich ancient history, meant Egypt was a perfect candidate to govern itself, the memo argued. Egypt’s “racial homogeneity, the high culture of her ‘elite,’ her sense of

325Ibid., p.50; Zaghlul to Wilson, 3 January 1919, in Ibid., p.51; Gary to Secretary of State, 16 December 1918, U.S. NARA, RG 256, SD 883.00/5.
327Gary to Secretary of State, 4 February 1919, U.S. NARA, RG 256, SD 883.00/19; Gary to Secretary of State, 17 February 1919, U.S. NARA, RG 256, SD 883.00/29.
328Gary to Secretary of State, 3 February 1919, U.S. NARA, RG 256, SD 883.00/16.
order, love of liberty and generous tolerance” should all be considered, the memo emphasised. Meanwhile, it said that violent British rule was “at utter variance with justice, not to mention civilisation”. If, as Wilson had pledged, the world needed to be reorganised according to democratic principles of justice and equality, then Egypt would have to become a self-governing state.329

Thus it was in the context of a rapidly changing world that the prospect of a democratic and free Egypt was promoted. The nationalists were no longer pushing for limited liberalising reforms, as they had been before the war. Instead they wanted full-blown self-determination. Those taking up the Wilsonian clamour for self-government included the National Party, whose priority had been a German and Ottoman victory in the war, so as to topple the British Empire administration in Egypt.330 In exile in Geneva, the National Party president, Muhammad Farid, wrote to Wilson about British oppression, and suggested that the American president’s “noble principles” would see him pushing for Egypt’s presence at the Paris Peace Conference. Egyptians sought “the dawn of a new era”, one that would see Egypt stand alone as a free nation, under the auspices of the League of Nations, Farid wrote, and countries without “imperialistic designs” were best placed to deliver it.331 Farid went on to portray Wilson as “that great man whose name is venerated by all Egypt as that of the champion of the liberation of nations”.332

Members of the U.S. peace commission were staying at the Hotel Crillon in central Paris, and they received a stream of correspondence there from Egyptian groups from around the world, all of it calling for independence for Egypt. The interest groups said they met Wilson’s visit to Europe “with emotional joy” at “one of the most solemn hours of the world’s history” in order to serve “the cause of justice, right and liberty”.

Commentators in the Egyptian press kept emphasising that Wilson’s words about freedom from subjugation had inspired hope that the American president would deliver on his powerful

329Zaghlul to Gary, 4 March 1919, U.S. NARA, RG 256, SD 883.00/36.
331Kent to Wilson, 10 December 1918, LOC, WWP, series 5b, reel 385.
pronouncements and help Egyptians achieve their goal.333 One of the pamphlets prepared by activists and sent to the U.S. commission was called Egypt and the Peace Congress. It set Egypt’s new demands in the context of its history, opening with a section “Egypt and the Wilsonian Principle”. It said: “The principle of the rights of nations which, only yesterday, was in the eyes of many a chimera, has to-day become a reality”, thus making it clear that Wilson had galvanised nationalist thought and action, ensuring that it would play a hugely important part in world affairs. Those who wrote the pamphlet noted that Egypt was effectively free prior to the British occupation. It disputed the claim that Britain had brought economic prosperity to their country. The hefty document used numerous quotes from Wilson’s statements throughout the War as evidence of his apparent support for Egyptian independence. As so many other documents prepared at the time, the pamphlet contained sweeteners aimed at encouraging the support of the western powers for their cause: it suggested, for example, that Suez Canal control would be decided by the League of Nations.334

Despite the lobbying of Wilson and his representatives in the French capital, Britain’s officials in Paris did everything possible to counter the Egyptians’ calls for self-determination. The French-run conference secretariat was easily manipulated by the British who made sure that petitions from Egyptians were stored, rather than distributed to delegates.335 Even petitions sent directly to the Americans did not do much better. Joseph C. Grew, Secretary of the American delegation said they should be forwarded to the “persons in the Commission”, who were unsympathetic to Egyptian demands for self-determination.336 Robert Lansing, the American Secretary of State, was a particularly strong supporter of the British, and their powerful position in Egypt. Many American diplomats were equally pro-British.337 Allen Dulles, who at the time was working in the State Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs said that correspondence from the Egyptians “should not even be acknowledged”. The request for Egyptian representation at the Paris Conference was of primary interest to George Louis Beer, the designated expert on African affairs, who said: “Such a
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step would serve no good purpose”, as it would lead to “similar appeals from factions in all parts of the world”. Despite all their hard work, short and very formal acknowledgment of receipt slips from Gilbert Close, Wilson’s private secretary, were all that the Egyptian nationalists ever got back after delivering their extensive literature.\footnote{Dulles to Beer, 7 February 1919, and Beer to Dulles, 8 February 1919, U.S. NARA, RG 256, SD 883.00/21; Close to Grew, 4 February 1919, U.S. NARA, RG 256, SD 883.00/17.}

Back in Cairo, Hampson Gary would not meet Zaghlul or other representatives of the Egyptian nationalist lobby, and his advice to colleagues in both Washington and Paris was for them to dismiss Zaghlul’s appeals to the Americans to help him against the British.\footnote{Gary to Zaghlul, 6 December 1918, U.S. NARA, RG 256, SD 883.00/5.} Gary made out that those seeking to influence western powers in Europe were by no means representative of the majority of Egyptian people. They were instead a “native autocracy as foreign to the autonomous peasantry as the British”, and not in any way “conversant with American and European ideals”. Furthermore they were “incapable as yet of efficient government”, said Gary.

In turn, ordinary Egyptians were described as “politically undeveloped”, uneducated, and sceptical about Egyptian authority figures. They “really prefer British protection to native autocracy”, was the line of argument. Accordingly, self-determination was “manifestly impracticable” in Egypt because its people were “as yet not fitted for self-government”. Gary suggested his country should back “the continued political education of the Egyptian people under British protection”, so safeguarding the majority of Egyptian citizens, and indeed foreigners. Rather than supporting nationalism, the USA should recognise and support the British Protectorate over Egypt, Gary argued.\footnote{Gary to Secretary of State, 16 December 1918, U.S. NARA, RG 256, SD 883.00/5 and FW 883.00/24, Gary to DOS, 19 December 1918, RG 256, SD 883.00/3; Gary to Secretary of State, 30 December 1918, RG 256, SD 883.00/4; Gary to Secretary of State, 3 February 1919, RG 256, SD 883.00/16; Gary to Secretary of State, 15 February 1919, RG 256, SD 883.00/28, pp.3-4, 6-7.} Despite all this, Wilson had by no means written off the demands of the Egyptian nationalists as the Peace Conference progressed, and the Americans had not yet recognised the British Protectorate. As Egyptians continued to insist that they should be able to run their own lives, one nationalist pamphlet concluded: “Are we to believe, that such a plain and natural aspiration can be deliberately put aside?”\footnote{Petition from the Egyptian Committee in Geneva, 31 January 1919, U.S. NARA, RG 256, SD 883.00/14.}

Towards the end of the war, those following Wilson’s announcements in colonies around the world became increasingly optimistic that they could benefit from the new global order he contemplated.
Chapter Four: A New World Order: The Emergence of an “International Self-Determination Moment” and its Impact on Egyptian Nationalists

They initially trusted that change could be fast and far-reaching. However, details of the envisaged peace treaty were to cause profound disappointment: they suggested beyond any doubt that traditional imperialistic ideas were still dominating international diplomacy. Those living outside Europe would continue to be denied anything approaching sovereignty – a fact that contributed to the evaporation of the “Wilsonian Moment”. In Egypt, anger and bitterness led to demonstrations against the old world order. It is this nationwide wave of discontent that will now be examined.
Chapter Five

The Egyptian Nationalist Revolution of 1919 and the British Response to the “Egyptian Problem”
Chapter Five: The Egyptian Nationalist Revolution of 1919 and the British Response to the “Egyptian Problem”

On 8 March 1919, a heavily armed platoon of British soldiers carried out a dawn raid on the Cairo homes of the prominent Egyptian nationalists Sa’ad Zaghlul, Isma’il Sidqi, Muhammad Mahmud and Hamad al-Basil. The four were bundled into military vehicles and – still under the cover of darkness – briefly taken to the city’s Qasr-al-Nil barracks before being placed on a warship heading for Malta.¹ The brutally unexpected deportations ultimately caused the Egyptian Revolution.

At the time of their arrests the men had been preparing to travel to France as their country’s representatives at the post-World War One Paris Peace Conference.² They were the most well-known members of the Wafd (lit. “delegation”) who had effectively been designated to thrash out their nation’s very future in the reorganised world. Egyptians were smarting at not having been granted independence from Britain after the conflict, and these four men were meant to carry their grievances to the major powers. The political, economic and social conditions under which Egyptians had been living since the start of the British Occupation were crucial factors in the social turmoil. The dramatic arrests exacerbated these factors to breaking point.

The myth of charismatic leadership is often applied to Sa’ad Zaghlul, the fierce Egyptian nationalist who did so much to forge his country’s recent history. His hero status has never been in dispute, but just how much of it derived from his place within a mass movement is less easy to define. While some view Zaghlul as a classic “man-of-the-people” who ultimately led his country to independence, others position him within an authoritarian, highly-organised elite who were able to impose their will on their country’s development. Indeed, in spite of his impressive legacy, Egyptian historiography is still divided on Zaghlul’s actual contribution to the Revolution. His standing as a compelling chief is discussed by some historians and social commentators who, instead of focusing exclusively upon the individual leader, are primarily concerned with the hugely important role of the masses at grass-root level.

It is therefore legitimate to consider to what extent the nationalist struggle in Egypt was a popular movement from below, or indeed an elitist protest from above. Did Sa’ad Zaghlul – an eloquent, erudite and extremely intelligent politician, despite his humble origins – play a unique part in the first truly modern revolution in Egypt; a revolution which involved all regions, age groups, classes,

²Cheetham to Curzon, Cairo, 6 March 1919, FO 407/184 No. 64, & Cheetham to Curzon, Cairo, 9 March 1919, FO 407/184 No. 69, The National Archives of the United Kingdom in London (hereafter TNA).
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and religious communities? Or was he merely a vehicle for the expression of nationalist hopes and expectations?

A major argument in this chapter is that the events of 1919, as they are related by Western writers, often overlook the Egyptian dimension of the story. An emphasis will therefore be put on Egyptian sources to describe the circumstances surrounding the Revolution in an attempt to add a valuable indigenous perspective which is largely absent from Western literature that tends to downplay the scale of the protest as well as the brutality of its repression. Particular and extensive usage will be made of a previously only carefully and selectively quoted Report drawn up by the Egyptian Delegation which offers a detailed narrative of the Revolution. Furthermore, the document also contains verbatim transcriptions of official Egyptian reports, correspondence, depositions of victims and eye-witnesses, and photographs of atrocities committed by British troops in Egypt. This will be treated as very useful information as we are focusing our attention on the Egyptian records of the events, while being fully aware of their potential slant.

The recently-founded Wafd had been determined to receive authorisation – up to and including passports from the British authorities – to allow them to travel to Paris so as to take up their places at the negotiating table in Versailles. Their intention was to seek the “absolute independence of Egypt” through “peaceful and lawful means”. In a letter addressed by the Wafd Delegation to High Commissioner Wingate on 3 December 1918, Zaghlul wrote:

Forbidding our departure makes illusory and inoperative the mission that we have accepted by the will of the country. It is difficult to conciliate this situation with the principles of liberty and justice which the victory of Great Britain and her Allies is supposed to have caused to triumph.

The Wafd’s growing and more vociferous activism prompted Cheetham (acting as High Commissioner in Egypt during Wingate’s absence in London) to address a note to the British Government to request authority to arrest Sa’ad Zaghlul and his principal confederates and to banish them immediately.

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3 Mudhakkirat Sa’ad Zaghlul, Kurras No. 33, p.1862.
4 “Summary of Events in Egypt from November 1918 to April 1919”, 17 April 1919, FO 608/213, TNA.
6 Cheetham to Curzon, Cairo, 6 March 1919, FO 407/184 No. 64, TNA.
Did Cheetham’s decision unintentionally spark the unrest? The repercussions of what he did certainly placed question marks against the British authorities’ anticipation of the ill-feeling which inevitably led to Revolution. Cheetham’s resolution similarly cast some doubt about the extent to which the British were prepared to tackle the uprising. The chapter will contend that the British were indeed taken by surprise by what happened.

As the Revolution escalated, the British government appointed General Allenby as Special High Commissioner for Egypt as evidence of a change of approach towards the nationalist movement. What was Britain’s strategy behind the alteration of its policy in Egypt? And what was its outcome? It will be demonstrated that, despite Allenby’s claims of controlling the situation, British power had diminished under the increasing force of nationalist spirit.

This chapter will conclude that Zaghlul’s charismatic leadership was an important element in the process of both individual and collective resistance against British rule. It will also highlight the fact that there was no clear-cut dichotomy between “above and below” as far as the Revolution was concerned. Instead, what emerges is a much more complex picture of interdependence between the elitist and progressive direction of the nationalist Wafd Party and the popular and revolutionary nature of the movement at the grassroots. This complementary relationship helped define “a new age in Egyptian history – the age of Egyptian nationalism” – and, more specifically, a brand of “revolutionary nationalism”. This period of upheaval created panic among those upholding British rule, and showed how ill-prepared they were to deal with this state of affairs.

“Nationalism of the Elite” or Legitimacy Gained at Grass-Root Level?

Zaghlul’s popular myth was reinforced by the title Za’im al-Umma, the Arabic for “Leader of the Nation”, and he is also often referred to as “Father of the Egyptians”. Obituaries published in the year of his death, 1927, evoked – variously – the “Death of an uncrowned King” and the demise of the “Colossus of the Nile Valley”. The legendary singer Oum Kalthoum dedicated a song to him, while Zaghlul’s home in Cairo was turned into the “House of the Nation” – Beit al-Umma. These early tributes were followed up by Zaghlul’s name becoming imprinted in Egyptian national history,

7Mudhakkirat ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, Mahfaza h No. 1, Malaf No. 2, p.111.
8Ramadan, op. cit., Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wataniyya, p.5.
and indeed the collective consciousness. New schools, city and town squares, and streets were named after him, while monuments and statues were erected to him.

Movies portraying Zaghlul leading the country to glory are still shown across Egypt to this day, while radio programmes and plays also perpetuate the legend. Sa‘ad Zaghlul’s character was also explored in *Bayna al-Qasrayn*, the first volume of Naguib Mahfouz’s trilogy of historical novels, along with details of the anti-British uprising of 1919. There is an emphasis on Zaghlul’s life in school history curricula. In general terms, all manifestations of Egyptian culture are pervaded by a glorious episode of Egyptian history in which Zaghlul headed and ultimately won the struggle against the country’s colonial masters. What is certain is that Zaghlul, who proudly called himself the “son of the rabble”, because of his *fellah* (peasant) background, developed the ideas behind the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, championing the anti-British nationalism which resulted in nominal independence in 1922.

On 13 November 1918, just two days after the Armistice brought the First World War to an end, members of Egypt’s burgeoning nationalist movement began to assert their presence forcefully. This was one of the reasons why Sa‘ad Zaghlul, already self-styled representative of the people of Egypt, presented himself at the official Cairo Residency of Reginald Wingate, the British High Commissioner for Egypt. The general subject of discussion was the Egyptian question, but Sa‘ad Zaghlul, ‘Abd al-Aziz Fahmi and ‘Ali Sha‘arawi – all members of the Legislative Assembly – were specifically asking for the abolition of martial law and censorship, two oppressive measures which had both been implemented at the outbreak of the War, and on the establishment of the British Protectorate over Egypt on 18 December 1914.  

The Egyptians also demanded “complete independence” for Egypt although Sa‘ad Zaghlul assured Wingate that there would be sufficient guarantees aimed at guaranteeing British interests. This would mean that the routes down to India, the “Jewel in the Crown” of the British Empire, would be protected, and British forces would be allowed to occupy Egyptian soil in times of emergency. Sha‘arawi further explained that their claim meant “friendly relations between freemen rather than between a slave and his owner”. Zaghlul said that their requests were being put to Wingate

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10FO 371/3204 No. 1710 Sir R. Wingate to FO (It was dispatched to the King and War Cabinet), Cairo, 17 November 1918.


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because he was acting for the British Government, but made it clear that his Delegation was more than ready to travel to London to negotiate with the government directly if necessary.\footnote{Al-Rafi’i, op. cit., Thawrat Sanat 1919, Vol. 1, pp.138-139.}

Wingate, for his part, wanted an off-the-record conversation – stating that he could make no official promises because he did not know what his government’s views about the demands actually were.\footnote{Mudhakkirat ‘Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, op. cit.; ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Fahmi, Hadhihi Hayati (This is my Life), Cairo, Dar al-Hilal, 1963, pp.76-89.} Instead he offered assurances that, following the Peace Conference due after the War, Britain would give full attention to the Egyptian question, which was presented as “an imperial and not an international question”. Wingate is even believed to have quoted a line from the Qur’an to make his point: “Allah ma’a al-sābīrīn, idha sabirū” (God is with the patient, if they are patient).\footnote{Ronald Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan: The Life and Times of Sir Reginald Wingate, Maker of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, London, John Murray, 1955, p.229.} Most importantly, Wingate urged caution, insisting that the Delegation did not represent Egyptian public opinion, saying they had come to his Residency to discuss the affairs of a whole nation without having a mandate to do so.

It was, in fact, this crucial question of legitimacy which had galvanised the Delegation. A few hours after the meeting with Wingate, Sa‘ad Zaghlul and his colleagues met to consider the methods which would empower them to speak on behalf of the nation. They decided to form a board which was called al-Wafd al-Misri (the Egyptian delegation),\footnote{Mudhakkirat Sa‘ad Zaghlul, Kurras No. 32, pp.1844-1846.} and which would obtain the mandatory authorisation that would give the board the right to demand complete independence for the Egyptian people.\footnote{Ibid., pp.1845-1846.}

Sinyut Hanna, Hamad al-Basil, George Khayyat, Mahmud Abu al-Nasr, Mustafa al-Nahhas, and Dr. Hafiz ʿAfifi.

They immediately set about drafting a declaration that would allow the Delegation to officially become the representative of the nation and press for its rights. On 23 November 1918, the fourteen members laid down the regulations of the Wafd, which were made up of twenty-six Articles in all. The attainment of complete independence by legitimate and peaceful means was the intended objective of the Delegation (Article 2). The will of the Egyptian people was announced to be the source of the authority of the Delegation (Article 3). The final Article stipulated the formation of a central committee for the Egyptian Delegation, whose members were to be chosen from prominent personalities in the country. Its main purpose was to collect donations and ensure correspondence within the Delegation.

The new national organisation was meant to act on behalf of the Egyptian people, but there is little doubt that its membership was initially biased towards the professional classes. Financiers, administrators, lawyers, civil servants and other urban professionals were selected, along with a small religious class (the Copts), but the grand land and property owning class dominated. Cumulatively they provided the nucleus of a landed and commercial bourgeoisie which had an obvious economic interest in political independence.

Saʿad Zaghlul emerged as the Delegation’s leader because of his dynamic personality but also, it was noted, because of his cultured outlook, and religious belief tempered with an enlightened approach to new ideas. The highly experienced reformer soon established himself as the favourite leader of the Wafd Party and the Egyptian people. Zaghlul was certainly different from other politicians of his generation. Rather than coming from a metropolitan household, he was born in Abyana, a country town, in 1856. He was brought up in this rural environment as the son of a fellah (peasant), studying at his village school before going on to al-Azhar University, in the days of

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20This led Zaghlul to comment: “he was the first Copt to think of joining the Wafd” in his Memoirs, Mudhakkirat Saʿad Zaghlul, op. cit., Kurras No. 32, pp.1853.
21Ibid., p.1853.
22Mudhakkirat ʿAbd al-Rahman Fahmi, op. cit., Mahfazah No. 1, Malaf No. 1, p.11.
24Mudhakkirat ʿAbd al-Rahman Fahmi, Mahfazah No. 1, Malaf No. 3, p.272.
Al-Afghani and then Mohammed ʿAbduh. Zaghlul made his political debut as a follower of ʿUrabi. He later learnt French, the foremost diplomatic language of the time, at the Sorbonne University in Paris, as well as taking a law degree. He married the daughter of Premier Mustafa Fahmi – something which increased his social standing enormously.

A cosmopolitan, aspirational background combined with a grounding in Egypt’s rural heartland made Zaghlul admired by all classes. Zaghlul was the only Egyptian whom Cromer was particularly impressed by. In his farewell speech on leaving Egypt, Cromer in fact singled out Zaghlul as “one of its future rulers. He possesses all the qualities necessary to save this country. He is honest; he is capable; he has the courage of his convictions... he should go far.”

A distinguished legal career saw him appointed a Judge at the High Court in 1892. He was then designated as Minister of Education and, later on, Minister of Law. He was moderate in his views, something which again was appealing to observers, from whichever side of the political spectrum they came from. Zaghlul had a ruthless, uncompromising side too. He was an important figure behind the establishment of the pre-war Hizb al-Umma (People’s Party) in 1907 before being elected to the Legislative Assembly, and then selected for the post of Secretary of the Assembly.

Zaghlul was thus a reformer with a commanding, traditional education behind him, and someone with experience in a variety of political roles. His modest origins endeared him to the masses but he could evidently mix with people from all classes. It was the former aspect of his character which was to prove most useful as he moulded the Wafd into a political force which could represent the Egyptian population at large.

So it was that the grassroots base for a popular revolution was laid down by the pressure caused by martial law, censorship, and the First World War. When combined with President Wilson’s Fourteen Points, this pressure became unassailable, as the American president’s heady principles infused unprecedented hope into downtrodden Egyptian political circles. It was now all a matter of coordination between those political circles and the masses. That is precisely where the relation of interdependence between these two spheres comes into play.

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Interdependence between the Elite and the Masses

The Delegation was, at the start, little more than a small group of idealistic, high-minded individuals who viewed themselves as nothing less than the leaders of a newly emerging, independent nation. In terms of democratic organisation, the group had few institutional ties with the majority of Egypt’s population.

Soon, however, the group developed into the Wafd Party, which took its place at the head of a mass, broad-based movement including almost every section of Egyptian society. The traditional dynamic of youth – so important to such movements wherever they are formed – was provided by students from the Nadi al-Madaris al-ʿUlya, a strong coalition of Higher Schools’ Club. These bright, hugely energetic youngsters were tasked with the collection of signatures, or Tawkīlat (also mandates), which were to provide written legitimacy to the political grouping. The Tawkīl had only been a hurriedly prepared document drawn up after the delegation’s meeting with Wingate at his Cairo residency, but its subsequent impact was profound. It had provided permission to the Delegation to work towards Egyptian independence through peaceful means, thus ensuring that the organisation was lawful in the eyes of all those involved in the process, and to the watching world.

Beyond this limited aim of the Tawkīl, it had the effect of inspiring political awareness in the mass of people. The Delegation had not envisaged the influence it would have on the people they sought to represent and neither had the British authorities who initially tried to suppress the signatures campaign – such was its immense power on the consciousness of the Egyptian people. As students travelled the length and breadth of the country amassing signatures, they instilled great hope, bringing thousands of Egyptians into their party. Certainly, there is little doubt that the Delegation made far more effective use of their mandate enshrined in the Tawkīl than they did at the Paris Peace conference.

29Al-Ahram, 2-3 August 1920.
30Ramadan, op. cit., Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wataniyya, p.156.
The Delegation had, of course, made representations to the British Government, asking if they could travel to London to negotiate directly, but such requests were constantly turned down. British politicians said they were too busy, but it remains unclear as to whether the British anticipated spokespersons of the Wafd Party travelling to Paris. The Egyptians viewed this as a slight – for obvious reasons – they saw their peremptory claims as being of paramount importance.

Things moved rapidly and, on 4 March 1919, the Wafd sent letters to the agents of foreign countries in Egypt protesting against British policy as it contradicted the wishes of the Egyptian people. On 6 March, General Watson – the Commander of the British forces – threatened “to take strong action” against the Delegation if it carried on with “the discussion of the existence of the Protectorate”. The Delegation’s reply was short and to the point – they published a letter of protest addressed to Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, reiterating their call for complete independence.

This had a serious consequence on the British government, whose wholly negative reaction was to arrest Sa’ad Zaghlul, Muhammad Mahmud, Isma’il Sidqi and Hamad al-Basil and to deport them to Malta on 9 March. ‘Ali Sha’arawi took over the leadership of the Wafd in the meantime.

This section had sought to address the following question: did the Revolution of 1919 start from above – under the auspices of the intensely charismatic leader Sa’ad Zaghlul – or was it a genuinely popular movement which emanated from the grassroots? The dynamic of the Egyptian Revolution came from a combination of two compelling forces: the first was Zaghlul, and the second was his vast power base among the masses. So it was that the Wafd succeeded in becoming a recognised mouthpiece for the millions who had undergone unprecedented social turmoil and bitter hardship during the First World War. This experience of the chaos caused by worldwide conflict, when merged with Wilson’s rhetoric of self-determination, ensured they were determined to get rid of their colonialists from Britain. But while the Wafd leaders and those operating at the grass roots had the same overall purpose, they diverged on the means of achieving that result. In 1918 Egypt’s first truly modern revolution began with peaceful negotiations aimed at terminating the newly declared British Protectorate on the country. By 1919, it had escalated into widespread protest and physical

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33 A. Fahmi, op. cit., p.88.
36 Ahmed Shafiq, Hawliyat Misr al-Siyasiyyah (The Egyptian Political Annals), al-Tamhid, Vol. 1, Cairo, Matba’at Shafiq Pasha, 1926, p.244.
attacks firmly directed against the British administrative and military presence on its soil. As far as political action was concerned, violence was replacing the gradual, piecemeal approach of the Wafd, as a new brand of radical, “revolutionary nationalism” started to emerge.

“Revolutionary Nationalism” Crushed by the “Barbarism” of Empire Troops

The sudden deportation of Sa’ad Zaghlul and his three colleagues was, as far as the stability of the British Empire was concerned, a fatal move. As previously mentioned, it sparked a popular uprising and strikes right across Egypt, precipitating a period of violent confrontations between the Egyptian people and British troops known in Egyptian historiography as the 1919 Revolution. Over several months, Egyptians of all classes and religions participated in the upheaval. The novel nature of the clashes was highlighted by the fact that, for the first time in history, upper-class Egyptian women openly took to the streets for a political cause and thus showed their solidarity with the nationalist movement. The chronology of what happened was minutely recorded by the Egyptian Delegation in a Report which was later addressed to the newly-appointed British High Commissioner, Allenby, on 30 March 1919. The Report recounts that the protests began with peaceful student demonstrations on 9 March – the very day that the Wafd leaders were deported to Malta. In order to paint a comprehensive picture of the dramatic events, we will also be relying on the records of other observers, whether local historians and participants or British officials whose despatches were mainly based on eye-witness accounts.

In Cairo, agitation first flared among students of law, engineering, agriculture, medicine and commerce. All were joined by students from Dar al-’Ulum (an institution which combined modern secondary teaching with Islamic studies) and the School of Jurisprudence. “Nearly three hundred were arrested.”38 On 10 March, students of al-Azhar and secondary school pupils also got involved. The marches were deliberately organised to pass the houses of political agents, with those taking part chanting their concern for the very future of Egypt, for their own freedom to be reinstated, and for the end of the Protectorate.39 Later in the 10 March rally, there were numerous heavy-handed

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38Report presented by the Egyptian Delegation in Arabic, with a French translation, to the British High Commissioner on 30 March 1919. The members of the Delegation were invited to the Residency on 31 March to discuss its contents with the High Commissioner. See Egyptian Delegation Report, op. cit., p.30 & p.37.
39Cheetham to Curzon, Cairo, 22 March 1919, FO 371/3715, TNA; Chirol, op. cit., The Egyptian Problem, pp.177-178; John D. McIntyre, The Boycott of the Milner Mission: A Study in Egyptian Nationalism, New York, P. Lang, 1985, p.27.
attacks on everything from trams to shops, especially those owned by foreign nationals.\textsuperscript{40} The Report points out that, on 11 March, “another peaceful manifestation of students was received by a volley of shots which killed a certain number of them”.\textsuperscript{41} And, on 12 March, “similar peaceful manifestations were suppressed by machine-gun fire which caused the death of more young people”.\textsuperscript{42} Also on 12 March, dissent reached Tanta. British troops responded with more definitive expressions of violence, killing and wounding Egyptian demonstrators with their firepower.\textsuperscript{43} There were similar scenes of repression on the 13 and 14 March in Cairo, with the British Army intervening against public displays of opposition all over the city in an attempt to disrupt further peaceful processions organised by students “without arms”.\textsuperscript{44} Such action inevitably exacerbated the problems.

The revolutionary spirit spread, as anti-British activity fanned out across the whole country.\textsuperscript{45} The next day, 15 March, transport workers succeeded in severely disrupting communications all over Egypt. On that day alone there were more than 4,000 railway workers on strike. Strategically crucial areas which experienced sabotage included Imbaba, the gateway to Upper Egypt, where railway lines were destroyed, thus preventing engines from moving.\textsuperscript{46} On 16 March, the craftsmen also engaged in the dissent.\textsuperscript{47} Two days later, on 18 March, protests moved from Bulaq to al-Azhar. It was in al-Azhar that there was even more resistance from British troops, and serious fighting broke out. Again, demonstrators were killed and wounded by Empire troops.\textsuperscript{48} The violence prompted the inhabitants of districts including al-Azhar, al-Sayyida Zaynab, al-Husseiniyya and Bab al-Sha’ariyya to erect barricades. They also dug long, deep ditches to prevent the easy movement of military vehicles. By this time, shops and financial institutions had all been closed since 11 March.\textsuperscript{49}

It had been on the same day that the legal profession had also organised meetings and agreed to go

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\textsuperscript{41} Egyptian Delegation Report, op. cit., p.37.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Ramadan, \textit{op. cit.}, Tatawwur, p.135; Young, \textit{op. cit.}, p.239.
\textsuperscript{48} Al-Raffi’i, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{Thawrat Sanat 1919}, pp.136, 137, 154.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p.129.
\end{flushright}
on strike as an objection against the deportation of the four nationalist leaders.\textsuperscript{50} By 12 March, the agitation extended to major cities including Alexandria, Tanta and al-Mansura. In the latter city students had attacked police stations, also setting fire to railway stations and damaging telegraph and telephone lines. Again, a number of demonstrators were shot dead or seriously wounded by British troops. A key example was the slaughter in Tanta, where a British unit fired at them near a railway station, killing 16 and wounding 49.\textsuperscript{51}

Following these cataclysmic events, disturbances propagated to Mudiriyyat al-Buhaiyra, al-Gharbiyya, al-Minufiyya, al-Daqahliyya, Assiut and al-Fayyum.\textsuperscript{52} Rioters in these regions followed the revolutionary example, once again destroying railway lines, and cutting telegraph and telephone poles. The first railway line was cut on 13 March, between Tanta and Tala. Damage was done to numerous other parts of the rail network, to the extent that Cairo was separated from other regions. The British military authorities had to put out a declaration on 17 March instructing people living in communities near demolished or impaired railway lines and stations to pay for the cost of repairs themselves.\textsuperscript{53} This did not prevent agitators at Dayrut and Dir-Muwasa to assail the train from Luxor to Cairo on 18 March, mortally wounding three British officers and five soldiers.\textsuperscript{54} As a result, on 20 March, British army officials ordered that the settlement closest to the attacks be raised to the ground.\textsuperscript{55}

Bedouins also took part in the Revolution, with numerous engagements between them and the British, especially at al-Fayyum, where there was solid support for the nationalist Hamad al-Basil. On 19 March, a group of Bedouins from West Fayyum were involved in a conflict with British Guardsmen. Around 400 demonstrators were killed or wounded. Bedouins also besieged the Diwan of Itsa, demanding that the police gave up their weapons and horses. The isolated forces of authority refused and heavy fighting ensued, with the Bedouins eventually defeated.\textsuperscript{56} Bedouins in Mudiriyyat al-Buhaiyra made an assault on the Kum Hamada district and British troops were sent by the military administration to subjugate them.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{51}\textit{Ramadan}, op. cit., pp.136-137.
\textsuperscript{52}\textit{Cheetham to Curzon, Cairo, 22 March 1919, FO 371/3715, TNA & Ramadan, op. cit.}, p.137.
\textsuperscript{53}\textit{Ramadan, op. cit.}, p.137.
\textsuperscript{54}\textit{Egypt, 1919, Being a Narrative of certain Incidents of the Rising in Upper Egypt’, J.W.A. Young Papers, The Middle East Centre at St Antony’s College, Oxford.}
\textsuperscript{55}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Ibid.}, pp.168-169; Lloyd, op. cit., p.298.
\textsuperscript{57}\textit{Al-Rafi’i, op. cit., Thawrat Sanat 1919}, p.160.
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To illustrate the unity and tolerance of the whole of Egyptian society in revolt, many authors have emphasised the participation of women and religious minorities in the nationalist movement. There is no doubt that the appearance of women on the barricades was a fascinating development. Many of these women indeed went so far as to assist with the demolition of railways lines and telegraph poles. In correspondence with General Sir Edmund Allenby, the newly-appointed High Commissioner of Egypt, Sa’ad Zaghlul commented upon the extraordinary social change, noting how “the most distinguished women in Egyptian society were not able [...] to see their fellow countrymen treated in this way and keep silent about it”.58

On 16 March, nearly three hundred upper-class women had demonstrated under the leadership of his wife, Safiyya Sa’ad Zaghlul, Huda Sha’arawi, wife of one of the original members of the Wafd and organiser of the Egyptian Feminist Union, and Muna Fahmi Wissa. Zaghlul also testified that: “[T]he British soldiers surrounded them on all sides, with fixed bayonets pointed towards them, and compelled them to remain two hours under a broiling sun.”59

The involvement of women in the movement was certainly unprecedented. Middle-class women played important roles in the struggle, taking part in the political process along with upper-class women and fellahat (female peasants). These women organised all kinds of strikes, protests, and boycotts of British goods and wrote petitions, circulating them to foreign embassies. Zaghlul himself commented that, “[T]he curtain that ordinarily separates our women [...] from the outside world did not prevent them from expressing their sentiments.”60 Historians have often remarked how the 1919 Revolution effected a huge transformation in relation to women’s place in Egyptian society. It took women – as the historian Ramadan put it – from the harem to the public arena and the labour market.61

Another significant moment as far as potentially disparate groups were concerned saw the Wafd choose both the cross and the crescent as an emblem, signifying national as well as religious concord. Leading Egyptian Copts sent correspondence expressing their empathy with the nationalists, with the Egyptian Association, a group formed soon after Wilson’s arrival in Paris to

59Ibid.
60Ibid.
61Ramadan, op. cit., Thawrat 1919, pp.5-6.
advocate independence, adopting a flag showing the symbols of Egypt’s three principal religious communities – a crescent, a cross, and a star of David. This badge was displayed on a scarlet background to signify the union of Egyptians of all faiths in the national struggle.\(^{62}\)

In a letter to Georges Clemenceau, the President of the Paris Peace Conference, dated 28 June 1919, Sa’ad Zaghlul presented a brief statement about the different kinds of atrocities which had been committed in Egypt. All stressed the increasing “barbarism” of Empire troops. Hoping that Clemenceau would raise Egypt’s grievances at the Conference, he wrote forcefully:

> The British authorities in Egypt were as much disturbed as provoked by the extent of the movement, and astonished at their powerlessness to stop it. It was then that the spirit of vengeance got the better of them, and that they allowed themselves to indulge in the most disgraceful excesses. No longer content to stop the demonstrations by means of rifles and machine guns, they were guilty in several places of rape, of the assassination of peaceful villagers, of pillage, of arson – all with the most trifling pretext or even without pretext. No longer was it a question of individual crimes committed by stray soldiers. [...] No longer was it a question of blows and thefts in the streets of Cairo and Alexandria. Attacks began to be made by strong military detachments, under the command of their officers, in villages as well as cities.\(^{63}\)

Thus Zaghlul underlined the paradox between discourse at the Paris Conference and British actions in the real world. There was a deep irony in the sight of a reactionary British Army subduing nationalist hopes in Egypt, while these same hopes were being put forward in Paris as the very basis of a new world order.\(^{64}\)

Elements of those involved in the Egyptian uprising had, of course, been violent, but their actions were nothing as aggressive as the British. “Peace keeping” measures included the beheading of revolutionaries. There were numerous incidents of serial rape, arson, pillage and flogging, all carried out by ordinary “Tommies”, many already battle-hardened during First World War campaigns. The detailed description of British atrocities provided by Zaghlul to Clemenceau was based on literal translation of complaints and sworn testimony. He had gleaned facts from the memorials of the

\(^{63}\)Ibid., p.90.
\(^{64}\)This contradiction is forcefully highlighted in Dr Andrew Arsan’s essay ‘The Patriarch, the Amir and the Patriots: Civilisation and Self-Determination at the Paris Peace Conference’ in T.G. Fraser (ed.), *The First World War and its Aftermath: The Shaping of the Middle East*, London, Haus, 2015, pp.127-45.
complainants, police registers, the correspondence of the Ministry of the Interior and telegrams the Waft was able to get copies of.\footnote{Egyptian Delegation Report, op. cit., p.91.}

For example, a police record was established in the district of Bulaq, in the Egyptian capital, on 14 March 1919, reporting a rape case as follows:

The victim [...] was a girl named Zeinab Mohammed Aly. [...] She was only ten years old. She had been violated and death had ensued. The medical report qualifies this crime as one of “abominable barbarism”.\footnote{Ibid., p.169.}

Other instances of rapes are abundant. Mohammed Ahmed Goma, a 35-year-old teacher at the girls’ school at Manial al-Rodia, thus described what happened in his village at Giza on 30 March 1919:

The whole night, the soldiers mixed with the women [...]. They shamefully attacked their chastity, and violated many of them. The reason why I do not mention particular cases is that our peasant women would never confess such shame that would leave ineffaceable marks of disgrace upon themselves and their husbands.\footnote{Ibid., p.133.}

A merchant called Hussein Sayyid al-Mohr, aged 46, who lived in Nazlet al-Shobak, reported what his wife as well as other women underwent:

I, with my very eyes, had to see my own wife, Aisha, being raped. I think no woman escaped that disgrace, as the soldiers remained in the village from the afternoon until the next morning.\footnote{Ibid., p.150.}

In the same village, Mahmud Ibrahim ‘Abdel Hadi, aged 32, stated that two soldiers caught his sister ‘Aziza, aged 30, and “took her to a room where both of them committed rape on her”. He added:

I myself saw the raping with my very eyes while I was unable to do anything. One of the soldiers shot her, and one of them looted all the money and jewellery which they found. Then they set fire to the house by pouring some fluid from bottles which they had with them. They also poured some of that liquid over my murdered sister and burnt her. I went up to the roof and jumped to an unburnt house and continued jumping from one roof to another until the morning.\footnote{Ibid., p.151.}
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The situation worsened, with the number of punitive campaigns increasing. Examples of the rising intensity of British repression included a statement by Mahmud Mansour al-Dali, ‘Omdeh (Mayor) of Badrashin, in the Province of Giza, which related to events that occurred on 25 March 1919:

[A]t 4.30 a.m. my house was attacked by 40 British soldiers. [They] entered my bedroom, where they found my wife, my daughters and daughters-in-law. From the room in which I was held, I could hear their cries and sounds of struggling. Their distress was heart-breaking. I wanted to fly to succour them, but was immobilized by a stroke from the butt of a rifle. […] Having obtained permission to dress, I entered my room where I found the women, trembling with fear and indignation at the ignominious treatment which they had received from the soldiers. […] Other troops pillaged the village [and] soldiers divided the spoil between them.70

He added that he “saw the flames mount from homesteads and heard the cries of distress, interrupted by the noise of a fusillade”.71 He later found out that, “Ibrahim ‘Atwa al-Dali, my cousin, was killed by a bullet in his home, after having been divested of his money”. Among other casualties was also ‘Abd al-Gawad Sayyid Marsouf who “was shot in his house, his head cut off, and the soldiers amused themselves with it as if with a ball”.72

Similarly, on 30 March 1919, hundreds of soldiers arrived in the village of Shobak near Cairo, raping local women and killing their men folk if they resisted. More than 140 houses were destroyed by fire, leaving only 56. The Mayor and four members of his family “underwent a refined martyrdom” as they were buried up to their waists before being cut to pieces by bayonets.

There were further examples of gratuitous acts of retaliation. For instance, Ibrahim Rashdan, Mayor of Aziziyya, wrote on 25 March:

The British were going to burn the village, and ordered the inhabitants to leave their homes as soon as possible. Men, women and children hurried away, carrying what they could. […] They subjected the women to the most shameful treatment, but the fellaheen hide these details for the sake of their women’s reputation. […] A sacred banner embroidered with the Moslem formula of faith was also desecrated.73
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A particularly fierce punitive campaign was recounted by Ragheb Effendi Biachi who reported, on behalf of the inhabitants of al-Chabannatt, the following episode:

On 25 March 1919, at half-past ten a.m. a group of British soldiers surrounded the house of the Mayor of our village. […] On my arrival there I was immediately surrounded by armed soldiers. The Colonel then informed me that at 2 o’clock on 24 March, one of the Indian soldiers (Gourkas), who was guarding the railway line, had been killed. He informed me that our village would be burnt if the criminal was not denounced and handed over at once.\(^74\)

Continuing his narrative Ragheb wrote:

In the meantime the village had been encircled and the inhabitants, old and young, ordered out of their homes. They were pushed along at the point of the bayonet without pity for woman or child.\(^75\)

Ragheb then cited one significantly cruel spectacle:

A poor woman, bearing child, was expelled violently. She was in terrible pain, but every time she tried to sit down […], the soldiers prodded her on with the points of their bayonets. […] [S]he died a few hours later.\(^76\)

The officer then executed fifty of the inhabitants and the whole village was burnt and abandoned. “This is a true story of what British soldiers did to our village and to our people. Even this did not satisfy them, for they declared their intention to burn three more villages to avenge the death of one Indian soldier.”\(^77\)

A similar carnage occurred in the village of al-Shobak on 30 March 1919. One vivid scene of atrocities describes how the “Sheikhs and other notabilities of the village […] were strangled and buried upright and their heads covered over by grass”.\(^78\) The massacre was followed by burning which “continued from Sunday at 3 o’clock p.m. until Monday morning at 10 a.m.”.\(^79\) During these events, twenty-one people were killed and twelve wounded. On top of that, one hundred and forty-four houses were burnt, fifty-five animals were killed and a large number were stolen.\(^80\)

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\(^74\)Ibid.
\(^75\)Ibid.
\(^76\)Ibid.
\(^77\)Ibid., pp.170-172.
\(^78\)Ibid., p.120.
\(^79\)Ibid.
\(^80\)Ibid.
On 9 April 1919, two days after the atrocities committed in the villages of Imbaba, Aziziyya, Badrashin and Nazlet al-Shobak:

[T]he inhabitants were still able to point to the bodies of the victims in the cornfields and canals. No estimation can be made of all the animals destroyed. The maize which was on the roofs of the houses has been sprinkled with benzene and burned. Thus, the entire harvest of the peasantry had been destroyed.81

The brutality of British rule was also illustrated by the way troops resorted to flogging as a means of retaliation. Zaghlul noted in his correspondence to Clemenceau, that:

Under pretext that a shot had been fired at a British patrol which was passing at a certain distance from the village of Kafr Moussaed, the soldiers entered the said village, and also in the villages of Choubra-al-Charkieh and Kafr-al-Hagga, as well as in the hamlets that depend upon them. They compelled the whole masculine population to appear and condemned them to be flogged on the stomach and on the back. [...] In the district of Kafr-al-Charkieh, the British authorities made use of the whip a regular thing, and forced the mayors to furnish men to be flogged.82

Egyptian men were depicted in graphic photographs with their bare torsos covered in whip marks. The nationalists who took the images placed the name and social position of each man under each photograph: pictures of peasants, students and religious scholars were all included so as to provide evidence of the broad social support for the revolutionary nationalist movement. British soldiers also forced the Mayors and businessmen of the villages to sign their names to a document acknowledging the British Protectorate over Egypt.83

There were detailed reports of violent incidents at Saft-al-Melouk on 12-13 April 1919. Egyptian men were severely tortured in an attempt to get them to admit the name of one alleged criminal, or to show the British authorities where arms were concealed. Each man

… was seized by soldiers who undressed him, took all his money away, and, as soon as he was naked, placed him with his head through a hole. Four soldiers held him outside this hole while four groups of soldiers, each composed of three soldiers held his feet and hands in lifting up his body. Two other soldiers then flogged him mercilessly without taking any care as to where the blows might fall. This over, the victim was thrown out of the

81Ibid., p.107.
82Ibid., pp.93-94.
83Ibid., p.182.
kiosk and beaten and kicked by other soldiers outside the kiosk. Some of these men fainted from the pain inflicted. Others vomited blood. There was no doctor there to take care of those wounded or to prevent those who were ill or feeble already from being thus tortured.\textsuperscript{84}

The Delegation’s report notes that no exceptions were made by the British according to the social status or age of the victims.\textsuperscript{85} Approximately five hundred men were brutalised in this fashion and lodged a complaint in Cairo. However, the report states that those who could not come to Cairo were “more numerous”.\textsuperscript{86}

In view of the deaths and abuse perpetrated by British soldiers, Zaghlul felt entitled to put the following questions to Georges Clemenceau:

\begin{quote}
Can we Egyptians remain with folded arms and keep absolute silence in the presence of the different forms of martyrdom the British military authorities are inflicting upon us, especially when our conscience is free from having committed the slightest crime? [...] Can we hold our peace and not complain when it is decided that every Egyptian, of whatever rank, must stand up and salute passing British officers? Can we preserve our serenity when our women are violated, our villages burned, the innocent assassinated en masse?\textsuperscript{87}
\end{quote}

Thus, Sa’ad Zaghlul summed up his own country’s tragedy with typical eloquence.

Despite the barbarity with which the British went about quelling the revolt, more railway lines were cut at Meit al-Qirsh, Tafahna al-Ashraf and Dandit. Again, the British authorities responded with more repressive violence.\textsuperscript{88} When the inhabitants of al-’Aziziyya and al-Badrashin villages burnt the railway stations at al-Hawamdiyya and al-Badrashin, troops responded by, on 25 March, burning these villages in addition to the village of al-Shabanat near al-Zaqaziq.\textsuperscript{89} On 30 March, villagers from Nazlet al-Shobak in al-‘Ayyat district, attacked a train, and the British burnt this village as well.\textsuperscript{90}

In Assiut, demonstrators seized local ammunition dumps as well as police arms. They also set private and public buildings on fire while shops were looted. Revolutionaries also targeted the

\textsuperscript{84}\textit{Ibid.}, p.177.
\textsuperscript{85}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{86}\textit{Ibid.}, p.178.
\textsuperscript{87}\textit{Ibid.}, p.85.
\textsuperscript{89}Shaﬁq, \textit{op. cit.}, Hawliyat Misr al-Siyasiyya, pp.278-280.
\textsuperscript{90}Al-Rafi’i, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.178-179.
British forces in the city, but following the arrival of military supplies, the insurrection was suppressed and law and order restored.\textsuperscript{91} At al-Minya, a nationalist committee was formed which took responsibility for protecting foreigners and their property and tried to maintain peace generally. The committee also upheld a basic form of local government, to the extent that consuls and foreigners observed that conditions for foreigners remained remarkably safe.\textsuperscript{92}

On 30 March, a British force commanded by Brigadier General Huddleston settled at the Diwan al-Mudiriyaa and sent for the thirty or so committee members. Six of them – namely Muhammad Tawfiq Isma’il, Dr Mahmud Bey ‘Abd al-Razaq, Muhammad Effendi Rahmi, Hassan Effendi ‘Ali Tarraf, Riyadh al-Jammal and Sheikh Ahmad Hatata – were arrested and accused of usurping the authority of the Government.\textsuperscript{93}

It was at Zifta that a revolutionary committee formally declared independence as they raised a national flag and distributed literature announcing that they were now the main authority in the town. Wafd Party member Yusuf al-Jundi gave clear instructions for the committee to be convened at Cafe Mustawkli. The committee was made up of some A’yan (wealthy landlords), the educated, and minor merchants, such as ‘Awad al-Kafrawi, Sheikh Mustafa ‘Amayim, Ibrahim Khayr al-Din, Admun Burda, Muhammad al-Sayyyid and Mahmud Hassas. Yusuf al-Jundi also led a large demonstration, with many of those carrying guns and clubs. But Isma’il Hamad, the Ma’mūr (local chief) of the area, was hugely proud of his country. In order to avoid fighting and further bloodshed he capitulated, surrendering the town, and weapons to the British. However, insurgents were still in control of the railway and telegraph stations.

The principal committee established smaller groups to preserve order and to collect dues, and also set up groups of students and other learned people in the towns. These conducted patrols in the streets, while others made sure that provisions were not stolen, and indeed worked to prevent British spies from entering. It was one such faction which published and distributed a newspaper called \textit{Al-Jumhur} (The Public) containing its decisions, as well as directions and news.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{91}Ibid., pp.170-171.
\textsuperscript{92}Ibid., p.169.
\textsuperscript{93}Ibid., pp.169-170.
\textsuperscript{94}Ramadan, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{Tattawwur}, pp.142-143.
Following the release of Saʿad Zaghlul and the granting of permission to the Wafd to travel to Paris on 7 April 1919, a revolutionary committee continued to exist in Zifta. This situation was sustained until the British Military Authority finally sent a unit of Australian troops to put down the revolt. The approach of the soldiers led to the inhabitants digging trenches in main roads, but the invaders began shelling before seizing Mahlaj Rinhart and Kishk School on the outskirts of the town. It was left to Ismaʿil Bey Hamad to intervene, and he acted as mediator between the soldiers and the committee. It was only at this point that the soldiers went into the town and finally restored government authority.95

The 1919 Revolution was a major watershed in the progress of the Egyptian national struggle. It formed, according to the prominent Egyptian historian ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Rafiʿi, “the basis for all the developments that followed”.96 It was the first truly popular revolution in Egypt, which included all regions, age groups, classes, and religious communities. In the words of Saʿad Zaghlul, it brought “all the Egyptians, from highest to lowest” together.97 Another Egyptian historian has written that the 1919 Revolution augured, “a new age in Egyptian history the age of Egyptian nationalism – which replaced the idea of the Islamic community that made Egypt part of the Ottoman state”.98 It is apparent that Western history books make little mention of the brutality which characterised British rule in Egypt. Some 800 Egyptians and 60 British soldiers and civilians died in the clashes that Spring, and thousands more were wounded.99 In March 2009, however, an article published in the Egyptian newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm (The Egyptian Today) on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the Revolution, stated that the ruthless subduing had made “1,000 Martyrs” in total.100 The violent disturbances of the period naturally worsened connections between the British and the Egyptians. This deterioration in relations was to hamper all future attempts at negotiation.

95Al-Rafiʿi, op. cit., p.162.
96Ibid., p.5.
98Ramadan, op. cit., Thawrat 1919, p.5.
100Maher Hassan, ‘The 1,000 Martyrs’ Revolution: The People’s Strike Topples the Government and Brings Back Saʿad Zaghlul and his Comrades’ in Al-Masry Al-Youm, 13 March 2009.
A New Brand of Egyptian Nationalism which took the British by Surprise

The *Wafd*’s novel brand of nationalism, which so surprised the British, was very different to pre-war versions. It was based upon the legacy of Egypt’s extensive participation in World War One – a conflict which exposed the country to a range of previously unheard of sufferings, thus altering its social face. In particular it transformed the nationalist movement from one mainly involving an educated urban elite into one supported by an extremely broad cross-section of socio-economic groups.101 This new kind of nationalism discarded the pan-Islamic and pro-Ottoman beliefs of pre-1914 nationalism, instead putting forward positivist ideas rooted in the framework of a liberal political philosophy.102

The realisation that economic power played an important role in political advancement was another post-war development. Landowners, financiers, administrators, lawyers, civil servants and other urban professionals dominated the *Wafd* membership. Together they made up a concentrated group of aspirational citizens in both metropolitan centres and the countryside who were invested in Egyptian independence. The *Wafd* thus ensured that the influence of the collaborative groups which had propped up the British administration was now eroded.103

The *Wafd* also distinguished itself by its efforts to build a solid political and economic alternative to British rule. This differentiated the party from the older Turco-Albanian aristocracy, of which Prime Minister Rushdi was a prominent member.104 The British civil and military authorities failed to foresee this turn of events. During the few crucial months between Rushdi’s resignation in December 1918 and the outbreak of the revolt on 9 March 1919, Egyptians affairs were run by British advisers. They had nonetheless been unable to comprehend the extent to which the *Wafd* managed to mobilise the endorsement of groups representing every strata of society.

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The Residency turned to the Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior to ensure that they were able to follow public opinion around the country, but during that period Haines had made little effort to do so. Moreover, the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff was under strain because many officers had been demobilised after the war, or else were on long leave. Accordingly, the Residency received “totally insufficient and misleading information as to the true nature and character of the Nationalist political movement”.

It was these observations which led Cheetham to report to the Foreign Office on 24 February 1919 that Zaghlul was widely distrusted and that the trouble which he had been creating was dying out. The British government thus seemed to view the nationalist movement as a minority group made up of a few disgruntled politicians, and with little real power, let alone influence on the mass of the population.

Consequently, when the Wafdist agitation became more of a concern in March 1919, the British authorities’ reaction was a traditionally brutal one. It was entirely conditioned on British experiences pre-1914 when outbreaks of nationalist activity were violently crushed. Then, the arrest and deportation of nationalist leaders had always succeeded in quelling putative uprisings. By 1919, however, the decision to deport Zaghlul and his three fellow nationalists to Malta could only have been described as a disastrous miscalculation. It severely underestimated the amount of popular support enjoyed by Zaghlul’s group. The British government thus realised in March 1919 that their initial obstinacy first shown towards Zaghlul’s demands had been ill-advised in the extreme, and was more than partly to blame for the subsequent rebellion. It was only when wide-scale upheavals erupted that officials in London finally began to appreciate the seriousness of the situation.

Thus, the “temporary reaction in our favour” which had been anticipated by Wingate in London did not materialise. Instead the incarceration and then deportation of the Wafid leaders was met by student demonstrations in Cairo and Alexandria on 9 March. These were followed by a wave of strikes involving transport workers, judges and lawyers. In a highly significant display of inter-communal unity against the British enemy, the al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo was opened up to Coptic

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105 ‘Minute by Sir R. Graham to Lord Curzon’, 6 May 1919, FO 407/184, TNA.
106 Allenby to Curzon, 26 February 1920, L/P&S/10/576, APAC.
107 Curzon to Allenby, 12 April 1919, FO 407/184, TNA.
108 Cheetham to Curzon, 24 February 1919, FO 407/184, TNA.
110 ‘Note by Wingate on deportation of Egyptian Nationalists’, 9 March 1919, FO 371/3714, TNA.
111 Curzon to Balfour, 16 March 1919, FO 608/213, TNA.
preachers. Upper- and middle-class women took to the streets for the first time in Egyptian history. By 15 March, the unrest had spread to large parts of the countryside, ensuring a temporary loss of British control in numerous districts as logistical networks were targeted and destroyed, or at least momentarily put out of action.\footnote{Goldberg, op. cit., ‘Peasants in Revolt – Egypt 1919’, p.261.}

British rulers, finally acknowledging that the disturbances were not solely isolated incidents which could be put down by intimidation and deportation, but a far-reaching national revolt, rushed General Allenby, “the strong man of the East”, to Egypt on 22 March.\footnote{British Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 1919, 5\textsuperscript{th} series, Vol. 114, p.16.} Allenby reached Cairo on 25 March and, as Special High Commissioner, was ordered “to exercise supreme authority in all matters military and civil, to take all such measures as he considers necessary and expedient to restore law and order, and to administrate in all matters as required by the necessity of maintaining the King’s Protectorate over Egypt on a secure and equitable basis”.\footnote{Ibid., Vol. 34, p.675.} In order to carry out these instructions, Allenby resorted to an apparently contradictory combination of military repression in the provinces and limited but effective concessions to nationalist opinion. These compromises included the release of Zaghlul and his associates and permission for them to travel to London and on to Paris.\footnote{Allenby to Curzon, 6 April 1919, FO 407/184, TNA.} By 29 April, Allenby reported that the situation was “much improved”.\footnote{Allenby to Curzon, 29 April 1919, FO 608/213, TNA.} Yet as will be shown, Allenby’s cruel legacy has not been particularly successful. In effect, the broadening of the \textit{Wafd}’s attractiveness beyond the educated urban elite constituted the real rupture with the past and altered British policy dramatically.

The much-vaunted, rhetorical utopianism of mainly western statesmen at the post-war Paris Peace Conference in 1919 certainly stirred a nationalist consciousness in Egypt. However, Egyptians were only too well aware that lofty ideas about self-determination had done nothing to stop the British using maximum force to stamp out a popular uprising in their own country. The pragmatic, and far from idealistic, reality was that the Egyptian Revolution grew directly out of the Peace Conference which took place in the French capital in January 1919.
Allenby’s *modus vivendi*: Britain’s New Policy towards Egypt

As has been demonstrated throughout this chapter, the events of the Egyptian Revolution had an effect across the country. Cheetham, the British *Chargé d'affaires* in Egypt, had this in mind when he wrote to the British government:

> Latest reports are that preaching in favour of cessation of work has taken place in some mosques in Cairo. Were it not for this feature it would probably be our best policy to deport or intern here the rest of Saad’s deputation, and to treat similarly others who might openly replace them. Alternative is to discover some ground for reconciliation, and I may wish to recommend a concession to native feeling.\(^{117}\)

It was Cheetham who put forward the idea that Egyptian nationalists should not be prevented from travelling to Europe to air their grievances. He also believed that an investigatory commission should travel to the country to provide recommendations about how the situation could be ameliorated. All of this would happen once the Paris Peace Conference had formally recognised the British Protectorate over Egypt, and indeed accepted the mandate.\(^{118}\)

Cheetham sought the help of the United States in convincing the British Government to adopt a more conciliatory policy. So it was that on 18 March he summoned the American Consul General, telling him that “at no time since the Arab rebellion in 1882 has the state of affairs been so critical”. Cheetham made it clear that he had not received orders from London. As the American Consul General reported in a telegram:

> [H]e desired me to report the serious conditions to my government in the hope that it would exert promptly some influence over his own government and thus make them appreciate the gravity of the situation.\(^{119}\)

The Consul General also recounted that Cheetham had called him to his official Residency “to tell me that the situation is getting beyond control and to ask if I will be prepared to help in the matter if the worst comes”.\(^{120}\) Yet despite such a seemingly pacifying turn of events, the Foreign Office instructed Cheetham to take further repressive measures so as to ensure that order was

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\(^{117}\)Cheetham to Curzon, Cairo, 15 March 1919, FO 407/194 No. 93, TNA & Memorandum by Patterson, Director General of State Accounts, FO 407/184 No. 339, TNA.


\(^{120}\)Ibid.
Consequently, the General Commander-in-Chief sent for a number of selected Wafd members on 16 March. At a meeting, he held them personally responsible for outbreaks of trouble. The next day, the Wafd produced a letter protesting against what the British Commander had said, sending a copy to the consuls of all foreign countries represented in Cairo.

With the Revolution escalating, the Government ministers forming the British delegation in Paris soon became aware of the immense power of the nationalist movement that they were up against. Attempts to control it by deporting its leaders would be doomed to failure, they realised. Egypt was faced with a *bona fide* nationalist uprising throughout the country. Accordingly, these British ministers sent a telegram to London on 18 March reversing Curzon's policy:

> [O]rder must be restored immediately and without bargaining, and then a competent government carrying the requisite authority formed. When this had been done, HMG were prepared to discuss in London any grievances with Egyptian Ministers, and these Ministers could be accompanied by persons qualified to represent the Nationalist cause, even if they were extremists.

It was at this point that General Allenby was appointed by the British Government as High Commissioner for Egypt. He set about implementing a policy which had been broadly delineated by the British delegation in Paris in its message to the Foreign Secretary on 18 March. Allenby arrived in Cairo on 25 March. As quickly as the next day he summoned a group of Notables and A’yan, including members of the Wafd, and firmly told them that his mission in Egypt involved: the restoration of law and order in the country; a thorough investigation of the root causes of the Revolution; and the use of the law to try and eliminate these grievances.

Allenby called on all of them to work with him closely towards a fair and equitable settlement of the issues which had led to the Revolution. It appeared that, within days of arriving in Cairo, Allenby had already made his mind up about a solution to the Egyptian problem. It might even have been that he had worked out a solution before arriving. His policies were to be as follows: a just, transparent training policy ultimately designed towards getting Egyptians administrating their own

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124 Balfour to Curzon, Paris, 18 March 1919, FO 407/184 No. 85, TNA.
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country; a firm ban on bargaining in political affairs; some reduction in the strength of British Forces in Egypt.\textsuperscript{128}

Yet despite these measures which were clearly aimed at expunging the deeper origins of the Revolution, Allenby did not call a halt to the military action undertaken by General Bulfin, Brigadier General Huddleston and Major John Shea. On 29 March, it was reported that the punitive campaign led by Brigadier General Huddleston in Assiut was ongoing, as the military commander attempted to restore order in neighbouring districts. It was also the case that Major John Shea was moving south to the Middle Egypt region, leading a full-strength army unit for the same purpose. The 1 April official account included intelligence about 16 mobile platoons working in Upper Egypt. It was recorded on 4 April that their repressive activities were intensifying.\textsuperscript{129} Lord Lloyd criticised General Allenby, saying it was imperative to complete the work initiated by General Bulfin as he tried to re-establish British authority in the country, and put an end to the unrest. It was only after he had eradicated the trouble that he would discuss the removal of the sources of Egyptian grievances.\textsuperscript{130}

Despite the violence taking place across the country, Lord Allenby’s policies were certainly tempered with a more benevolent spirit. He allowed military force to be used in quelling the March Revolution, but at the same time he negotiated with \textit{Wafd} members and Egyptian leaders to try and deal with the causes of the Revolution. General Allenby understood clearly that “force could never solve the problem of Anglo-Egyptian Relations”.\textsuperscript{131} As will be explained, however, this policy – directed as it was towards the immediate suppression of the Egyptian Revolution and the continuation of the British Protectorate – did not achieve its desired objectives.\textsuperscript{132}

On 30 March, the members of the Egyptian delegation submitted a report on Egypt’s complaints, and what they considered as the genesis of the Revolution. The \textit{Wafd} argued that Egyptians viewed the British protectorate over Egypt as something which had been made necessary by the war. They said all had been forced to endure a military regime during the war, while maintaining the hope that the Egyptian question would be settled in favour of the aspirations of the Egyptian people. This hope

\textsuperscript{128}Archibald Percival Wavell (Viscount), \textit{Allenby in Egypt}, London, Harrap and Co., 1943, p.53.
\textsuperscript{129}Chirol, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.187-188.
\textsuperscript{130}Lloyd, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.302-303.
\textsuperscript{131}Wavell, \textit{op. cit.}, p.53.
\textsuperscript{132}Mudhakkirat \textquotesingle Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, \textit{op. cit.}, Maḥfazah No. 1, Maḥaf No. 1, p.106; \textit{Mudhakkirat Sa\’ad Zaghlul}, Kurras No. 35, p.1928.
had all but disappeared after the end of the war, with the British refusing to authorise the Egyptian delegation to travel to England and indeed France in order to test Egyptian claims for independence before world public opinion. The Wafdist were concerned that representatives of British Wilâyât (dependent provinces) had been allowed participation at the Peace Conference in Paris, while Egypt – generally regarded as a more civilised nation which had actually helped to conquer these countries – was banned from the Conference.¹³³

Not only had Britain put down Egyptian nationalist ambitions, but it had also arrested the head of the Egyptian delegation and his three colleagues. As discussed, this had directly led to bloodshed, with students and then other groups taking part in peaceful demonstrations against the British. Violence was met with violence, as the Egyptian people fought back against British troops who had been firing at them. The Delegation’s report thus repeated the advice which it had first offered the military in a letter dated 24 March. In order to put an end to the agitation and general confusion, it suggested the formation of a new popular ministry – an advice which had been promoted by the notables, scientists, ministers, representatives and A’yan of Egypt. This view had indeed been expressed in the aforementioned letter which they had sent to the General Commander-in-Chief.¹³⁴

On the following day (31 March), General Allenby summoned the members of the delegation and the members of Rushdi’s ministry who had resigned¹³⁵ so as to review the report presented by the Wafd. Allenby made it clear that he saw the report as an extremely positive development, and suggested that the two parties had come closer to one another, so ensuring that an agreement was possible.¹³⁶ On the same day, Allenby wrote to the British Government recommending that the Egyptian nationalists should be allowed to travel to Europe regardless of the nature of their demands. Allenby stated that he had been influenced not only by the Wafd members, but also the ex-ministers. These senior politicians had stated that “this concession would restore tranquillity and guarantee the formation of a ministry”.¹³⁷ The British Foreign Office, which viewed this proposal “with grave misgiving”, passed it on to the British delegation in Paris.¹³⁸ In turn, the delegation concluded that Allenby’s advice “cannot be disregarded”, and accepted his considerations. They

¹³³Egyptian Delegation Report, op. cit., p.95.
¹³⁷Memorandum by Sir R. Graham on the unrest in Egypt, FO 407/184 No. 152, TNA; Allenby to Curzon, Cairo, 13 March 1919, FO 407/184 No. 123, TNA; Wavell, op. cit., p.44.
¹³⁸Memorandum by Sir R. Graham on the unrest in Egypt, FO 407/184 No. 152, TNA.
also requested Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary in London, to “avoid any appearance of mistrusting” Allenby’s present policy.\textsuperscript{139}

Before the reply from the British Government had arrived, Allenby had written, on 4 April, to re-emphasise his proposition, and to issue a warning to his own Government about the seriousness of the situation, indicating that “there is evidence that movement is influencing Palestine and Syria, besides Egypt, and danger is a very real one”. Simultaneously, Allenby reiterated to his government “the importance of obtaining an early announcement that our protectorate is recognised by powers”.\textsuperscript{140} On 5 April, Allenby was told that his policy had been agreed to. He was guaranteed all support in implementing it. An alternative plan was, however, also put to him. This was that a commission of the highest importance, headed by Lord Milner, should immediately be sent to Egypt to conduct a probe into the current situation and produce an account about the future make-up of the Protectorate. Adopting this substitute measure would have changed the centre of the political dynamic concerning Egypt’s future from Europe back to Cairo, and it might also have made it simpler to fulfil Egyptian requests without making out that violence had led to previously unsatisfied demands being met. The decision as to which action to pursue was left to General Allenby.\textsuperscript{141} On 6 April, Allenby telegraphed his government, outlining the steps to be followed to carry out his strategy. In terms of the scheme of sending out Milner’s Commission to Egypt, Allenby stated that “the proposed commission might be desirable later, but would be useless now”. There was always the possibility that it might be sent when the ministerial deputation left Egypt for London.\textsuperscript{142}

Allenby’s priority was to implement his guidelines as soon as possible. On 7 April, he gave permission to the Egyptians to travel to Europe following their release from prison in Malta. On 9 April, Hussein Rushdi formed the Ministry. Even so, Allenby’s decision was severely criticised. As one British national in Egypt wrote:

\begin{quote}
The proclamation of April 7th came as a bombshell to us. As affecting British Prestige and security in Egypt, General Allenby’s action is regarded as
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{139}Balfour to Curzon, Paris, 2 April 1919, FO 407/184 No. 152, TNA. 
\textsuperscript{140}Allenby to Curzon, Cairo, 4 April 1919, FO 407/184 No. 144, TNA. 
\textsuperscript{141}Curzon to Allenby, FO, 5 April 1919, FO 407/184 No. 148, TNA & Memorandum by Sir R. Graham on the unrest in Egypt, FO 407/184 No. 152, TNA. 
\textsuperscript{142}Memorandum by Sir R. Graham on the unrest in Egypt, FO 407/184 No. 152, TNA.
nothing short of calamitous. Men who were previously prepared to stand by us simply had to go over to the other side for protection.\footnote{Wavell, \emph{op. cit.}, p.44.}

Lord Lloyd made it clear that he considered this “reversal” of policy would make it appear that violence as a tool of political action had succeeded. He accordingly described Allenby’s action as unjustifiable.\footnote{Lloyd, \emph{op. cit.}, pp.303-304.} What alarmed Sir R. Graham, he said, was that two weeks of violence might lead to Britain surrendering what it had failed to yield during four months of negotiations.\footnote{Sir Milne Cheetham Papers, ‘Letter from Sir R. Graham to Sir M. Cheetham’, 16 April 1919, FO.} What was immediately apparent, however, was that the news had a sudden effect right across Egypt and the Sudan. It was hailed as great national triumph, with political agitation giving way to popular celebrations.

It certainly seemed that the change in British policy in Egypt took place after Britain had reached guarantees about the recognition of the Protectorate by the major powers which had convened at the Peace Conference, and by the United States in particular. The U.S. President informally recognised the Protectorate on 19 April, just as Zaghlul and his delegation, which had left Malta a few days earlier, landed in Marseilles on their way to the Paris Peace Conference. The official recognition which came on 21 April delighted British officials. Curzon was among those who were convinced that a “severe rebuff” in Paris – and most definitely one which had come from the U.S. President – had to be seen as a vital step in diminishing the danger from Zaghlul’s damaging extremism. He believed that Wilson’s formal acknowledgement was “a very important step in the right direction”.\footnote{Curzon to Balfour, 23 April 1919, FO 608/213, TNA.} George Lloyd, who in the 1920s would serve as the British High Commissioner in Egypt, said later (without trying to disguise his happiness) that the U.S. validation of the Protectorate assured that “Zaghlul’s last hope of effective action in Paris disappeared”. The statement showed how concerned the British had been about the possibility of President Wilson giving Zaghlul a hearing in Paris.\footnote{Lloyd, \emph{op. cit.}, p.342.} The \emph{Wafd} delegation was, in turn, “shocked” at news of the recognition, and “despair began to steep into their hearts” about the prospects of what they had set out to achieve. The nationalists had seen Wilson as the personification of their hopes. Accordingly, the final U.S. decision left them with a sense of betrayal. In his memoirs, Muhammad Haykal said that this resolution by the Americans fell upon the nationalists “like a bolt of lightning”: 

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\footnote{Wavell, \emph{op. cit.}, p.44.}
\footnote{Lloyd, \emph{op. cit.}, pp.303-304.}
\footnote{Sir Milne Cheetham Papers, ‘Letter from Sir R. Graham to Sir M. Cheetham’, 16 April 1919, FO.}
\footnote{Curzon to Balfour, 23 April 1919, FO 608/213, TNA.}
\footnote{Lloyd, \emph{op. cit.}, p.342.}
Here was the man of the Fourteen Points, among them the right to self-determination, denying the Egyptian people its right to self-determination and recognising the British protectorate over Egypt. And doing all that before the delegation on behalf of the Egyptian people had arrived in Paris to defend its claim, and before President Wilson had heard one word from them! Is this not the ugliest of treacheries?! Is it not the most profound repudiation of principles?!

Notwithstanding this harsh reverse, the Wafd representatives got to the French capital in April and began pressing for Egypt’s independence from Britain. While there were Wafd members who viewed the American stance as a mortal wound as far as Egyptian aspirations were concerned, others, including Zaghlul himself, decided to keep reiterating their stated aims. The entire population of Egypt, Zaghlul was to record in his diary, had become a “revolutionary people determined to achieve independence and willing to pay a price for it”, and they would not accept failure.

Through the execution of its new policy in Egypt, Britain was seeking to guarantee the containment of the Egyptian Revolution as well as the alleviation of its current impact on the British position in the country. Was Allenby’s modus vivendi a success? What was the direct outcome of his via media which combined the restoration of law and order with negotiations with the nationalists? Allenby’s balance sheet turned out to be quite unimpressive.

The celebrations which followed the release of the Wafd delegation from Malta were only temporary. Within a couple of days strikes and riots once more blighted the whole country, and especially Cairo. There is no doubt that the government had been fully reshuffled, but as soon as the Prime Minister, Rushdi Pasha, returned to office on April 9, he was warned with an ultimatum by government officials who had been on strike. They called for the Cabinet to officially recognise the Egyptian delegation as the principal legal power in the country, but also demanded that it should refuse to recognise the British Protectorate. They also requested the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt, stating that they should be replaced by Egyptian troops. After numerous and vain negotiations, Rushdi Pasha resigned on 21 April.

The next day, General Allenby issued a proclamation ordering that the striking officials, under threat of being fired, should go back to their posts. They grudgingly obeyed. Other strikes were outwardly crushed by the repressive
measures of martial law, but nationalist spirit remained at the grassroots level. Ordinary Egyptians were, perhaps more than ever before, resolved to abolish the Protectorate and liberate Egypt from foreign “usurpers”.

By forcefully ensuring the resignation of the Rushdi Pasha ministry, the *Wafd* had dismissed the theory that British control was crucial to Egypt’s future. Over a period of more than 30 years, the Egyptians had only nominally governed Egypt with the assistance of English advisers, but the country had actually been administered by a British bureaucracy headed by a Consul-General or a High Commissioner. As far back as Lord Cromer’s time, this administration had worsened to such an extent that it was almost entirely alienated from the population it was designed to be serving. Under such a system, where there was little if no mechanism for public opinion to be heard, Egyptians were naturally disinclined to accept that British plans to train an Egyptian governmental class had worked. They considered that the number of Egyptians in the public service was in fact decreasing and they “were treated more and more as inferiors and not as collaborators”. They also complained that “the British official world had steadily cut itself off from any intimate contact with Egyptians save with those who were prepared to have no opinions of their own”.152

It was clear to all that an out-of-touch, largely irresponsible civil service had to go. After the stepping down of the Rushdi Pasha Cabinet, it took General Allenby a month to convince Mohammed Sa’id Pasha to form a new government.153 This government went on to survive for eight months, but it was inevitably unable to prevent the swelling tide of nationalism which was sweeping the country. British control was close to breaking point.

The British authorities in London conceded this when on 15 May 1919, it informed the Westminster Parliament that “a strong mission”, led by Lord Milner, would soon arrive in Cairo to investigate the causes of the revolution and to make recommendations about what it saw as the necessary measures to protect foreign interests in the country and in “shaping for the protectorate a system of prudent and ever-enlarging enfranchisement” as well as addressing the “claims of the Egyptian people to a due and increasing share in the management of the affairs of Egypt”.154

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What was particularly noticeable about these developments was how many women took part in the Egyptian social movement calling for change. For the first time in history, upper- and middle-class female members of the population were rallying on the streets, and indeed providing the intellectual ideas which underpinned their country’s commitment to independence. This will be discussed in detail next.
Chapter Six

Women in the 1919 Egyptian Revolution:
From Political Awakening to Nationalist Feminism
The formation of a feminist consciousness in Egypt ran in parallel with the country’s rapid development as a modern state at the start of the 19th century. Technological advancements within Muhammad ʿAli’s increasingly capitalist, secular country were accompanied by burgeoning intellectual thought among all sections of society, including women. The whole nation was united in criticising the way the occupying British had used their country for their own ends, demeaning the interests of the indigenous population, from the peasant masses up to the educated elites. This gave rise to numerous variations of Egyptian nationalism, all of which were eventually to play a part in seeing at least nominal native rule introduced.

The feminist element to this movement was both vocal and powerful, as women rallied under the “Egypt for the Egyptians” slogan. Nationalism was certainly an obvious vehicle for feminist demands. So it was that two dynamic and overlapping groups – nationalists and feminists – merged to create a formidable campaigning force which would have a compelling effect on the progress of Egyptian society. Radical calls for change being made by a pioneering women’s movement strengthened the nationalist cause. In turn, feminists gained from their close association with the nationalists, using their connections to build up their own power base.

Before 1919, there was a widespread perception that women were not involved in Egypt’s nationalist struggle. Middle East historian Thomas Philipp noted the “total lack of political involvement and the almost complete absence of patriotic nationalist expression” before 1919.¹ In fact, historians have largely drawn attention to the role women played in the revolution of 1919 per se. That year was actually viewed as a turning point as far as Egyptian feminism was concerned.² The overlap between an emboldened nationalist consciousness and a new feminist one has meant feminist progress often being blurred by nationalistic promotion. It manifestly appears that feminist endeavours in the decades leading up to the war may well have been overlooked by academics. The need to put this historical inaccuracy right is the main objective of this chapter, and it will also examine the roles played by male intellectuals in the movement for change, including their own contribution to a feminist awakening in Egypt.

However, it will be argued that after Egypt won nominal independence in 1922, many of the male nationalists who had assisted those striving for female equality became less enthusiastic about the women’s crusade. Feminists learned a crucial lesson from this disappointment – they could only really succeed if they established their own independent political movement.

The following chapter will examine how such an organisation took shape in Egypt at the end of the 19th century, with the appearance of women’s journals expressing the feminist cause. It will trace its evolution up until the early 1920s when the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) was formed. The focus will be on the female, middle-class literary culture which was indelibly associated with a nationwide feminist awakening. The activities of women’s groups in Egypt in the decades leading up to the Revolution will be analysed. The convergence of feminist and nationalistic aspirations is hugely significant, as both were major contributing factors in moves towards revolution. An irony in the study of the development of a feminist consciousness in Egypt is that it has almost always been considered by men, with historians likely to underplay the significance of women’s action. The role of middle and upper-class women in recording their feminist battle will therefore be underlined in this chapter, particularly the split between Muslim middle-class reformist women writers and upper-class women activists with a western influence. Finally, the chapter will explore the way in which women of all classes became vital political actors in the country’s fight for independence from the British as they participated in nationalist demonstrations for the first time in March 1919. It will, however, observe that the activism of the elite women, which started out playing such an important part in the nationalist cause, was gradually separated from it so that it could plough its own furrow through history. What is apparent is that the early modern feminist thinkers in Egypt did not necessarily come to the same conclusions about the main issues at stake or, indeed, the means to achieve their goals.3

“The Women’s Awakening in Egypt”

Feminist consciousness and the chiefly male-dominated nationalist movement were developing at a different pace in late 19th century and early 20th century Egypt. Men were beginning to study abroad, for example, while women were only just emerging from upper-class harems into the state sector. Women in such close-knit traditional domestic situations were becoming increasingly disillusioned.
with their plight, and they found new outlets to display their frustration namely a burgeoning publishing industry. This period is referred to as “the women’s awakening” by Egypt scholars such as Beth Baron who point to the manner in which women were able to make their demands aired. While the better educated found their voice through the written word, others took part in public political action. Among the early female activists who inspired these developments were ’Aisha al-Taymuriyya and Huda Sha’arawi.

Those researching early Egyptian feminism have conventionally regarded it as an upper-class phenomenon. The trajectory of the aristocratic Huda Sha’arawi (1879-1947), who became the first president of the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) in 1923, helps perpetuate this view as she was the woman who led the actual struggle for independence. Yet more recent inquiries have challenged this belief, in particular works by Baron, and by Margot Badran, the women’s studies and Middle East historian. They show that it was middle-class women who were at the forefront of the feminist cause, using articles in magazines and newspapers, as well as more classical literature like poems and novels, to convey the need for improved rights for women.\(^4\) Arabic was the language of the middle-class at the time, and the women’s press – its founders, its editors, its contributors, and its readers – mostly came from that class.

The new women’s literary culture gave rise to a powerful female Arabic printing business – one which articulated the consciousness of a previously home-bound section of society. As an increase in female literacy became a reality,\(^5\) middle-class women were able to put across their feminist agenda through their writings. This feeling that everybody could not only have a say, but make a positive contribution to change, was encapsulated in a phrase which came up time and time again in Egyptian literature of the period: *al-nahda al-nisa’iyya* (the women’s awakening). This expression was regularly used by female intellectuals to describe their growing literary movement. It also took on a more general meaning – referring to greater social mobility for women, a vast expansion in popular education, and an explosion in the number of clubs and associations being formed by newly-empowered women. The words *al-nahda al-nisa’iyya* became more a rallying cry than a straightforward description of a literary genre. They were certainly ones which captured the *Zeitgeist* of a nascent women’s movement in Egypt.

\(^5\)Ibid., pp.80-84, for data on the increase in female literacy in 19\(^{th}\) and 20\(^{th}\) centuries Egypt. For details about the expansion of education for middle and upper-class urban women in 19\(^{th}\) and 20\(^{th}\) centuries Egypt, see Margot Badran, ‘Dual Liberation: Feminism and Nationalism in Egypt, 1870s-1925’ in *Feminist Issues*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1988, p.20
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There were also technical reasons for Egypt’s popular publishing trade flourishing from the late 1870s onwards. By the time of the British Occupation in 1882, the Cairo governments had relinquished their control of the press across the country, which meant that censorship had become far less rigorous. The number of presses increased because members of the middle and upper-classes had the financial means to invest in literature. Far more expenditure on the production of such material saw profits for the sector rise, with the number of books, magazines, and newspapers multiplying. As people grew more interested in political ideas, and the possibility of united action, the press evolved into the key medium of communicating and indeed mobilising.

The specific development of the women’s press can be dated to the early 1890s. It corresponded with the emergence of private publications which allowed publishers to respond to an expanding female readership, and its heed of women’s affairs. Opposition to women reading and writing had been prevalent among the middle and upper-classes, but this was no longer the case. Female literacy shed its subversive image and filled those women who were able to read and write with pride, if not a degree of conceit, as they opened up an entirely new literary culture. Principally female problems, including ones about veiling and seclusion, were vented, along with popular ones about relationships, marriage and divorce. Women’s journals also tackled matters such as education and work, which were debated at length. The journals contained numerous articles about the world of entertainment, and domestic life, ensuring balanced, readable issues. Baron summarises the three elements of the early feminist popular press in Egypt: secularist, modernist, and Islamic.

Publications which were more secular in content appeared to last the longest. The tradition of the women’s press in Egypt began in 1892, when Hind Nawfal (c.1860 - 1920), a Syrian Christian author, started the monthly journal al-Fatah (The Young Woman), which is deemed the first wholly feminist outlet in a sizeable list of Arabic periodicals which were written for, by and about women and their concerns. They came to be known as al-majallāt al-nisaʾiyya (women’s journals). Despite the wide variety of literary and scientific journals available at the time, Nawfal said she had set up al-Fatah because none of those platforms dealt expressly with the rights of women, nor articulated their predicaments in a satisfactory manner. It was for this reason that Nawfal invited

6Baron, op. cit., pp.90-92, for data and details about the circulation of the press in 19th and 20th centuries Egypt.
7Ibid., pp.82-84.
8Ibid., p.189.
women to send her their contributions for print. Almost thirty of these women-centred periodicals had been produced for distribution around Egypt, and indeed in the outside world, before the start of the 1919 revolution.

However, as early as the 1870s and 1880s, women’s achievements had been featured in the then male-dominated press, offering hope of moving beyond customary gender roles. The first biographical dictionaries of women were published by Maryam al-Nahhas (1856-1888), Nawfal’s mother, and Zaynab Fawwaz (1860-1914) – two women who had emigrated from Lebanon to Egypt and then settled in Alexandria. The pair were part of a dynamic generation of female writers who described the condition of women in Egypt through their dictionaries. Al-Nahhas was very much at the vanguard of the history of the Egyptian feminist awakening. Her biographical dictionaries, based on a genre stretching back hundreds of years to the medieval period, became channels to document women’s lives. Some of the earlier biographical dictionaries included references to women, and there were even one or two volumes solely dedicated to women, but generally they were largely ignored in favour of men. Redressing the balance, al-Nahhas completed *Mar’id al-Hasna’ fi Tarajim Mashahir al-Nisa’* (The beautiful woman’s exhibition for the biographies of female celebrities). The latter was a biographical dictionary which concentrated on Eastern and Western women, and which al-Nahhas researched and wrote while living in Alexandria.

Zaynab Fawwaz, the Shiite Lebanese writer, followed in al-Nahhas’s legacy fifteen years later when, in 1894, she published a weighty biographical tome called *Al-Durr al-Manthur fi Tabaqat Rabbat al-Khudur* (The Scattered pearls amongst the classes of secluded women). This highly detailed work chronicled the lives of historical female icons, especially from Greek mythology. These included Atlanta the Huntress, while biblical characters such as Abraham’s wife, Sarah, were also written about. The life stories of Isabella II, the Queen of Spain, were among those of more contemporary women accounted for, together with the 19th century American astronomer, Maria Mitchell. As far as Islamic role models were concerned, Fawwaz recounted the tales of Khadeeja, the Prophet Mohammed’s first wife; the Prophet’s daughter, Fatima; the Prophet’s youngest wife ‘Aisha; and Zaynab, the granddaughter of the Prophet. Fawwaz is considered a hugely prominent

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11Ibid., p.16.  
12Ibid., p.1.  
13Ibid., p.51.  
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Arab feminist – not because there was anything overtly radical, let alone militant, about her writings, but because she was a pioneer in her field. The very fact that she gave women an identity by highlighting their social contributions made her biographical work adventurous.\textsuperscript{15}

Women’s historical domestic seclusion in Egypt was well covered by the 19th century poet ’Aisha al-Taymuriyya (1840-1902), whose volumes were to influence numerous generations. Al-Taymuriyya mainly composed long passionate \textit{divans} about the equality of the sexes in Turkish, Arabic, and Persian (her lineage included a Circassian mother and a Kurdish father). ’Aisha al-Taymuriyya’s determination to one day be treated equally to her male counterparts derived directly from her lack of formal education due to what she believed to be the constraining practices of men. Al-Taymuriyya’s oeuvre was seen as a powerful argument for equality by thousands of Egyptian women. Just before al-Taymuriyya’s death in 1902, her prose was circulated widely across the country, while most of her poetry was published posthumously. Al-Taymuriyya was a leading light of the early Egyptian feminist movement. Her production concentrated on what was logically viewed as the biggest single impediment to women being treated equally in society – the denial of access to education. Hind Nawfal and Zaynab Fawwaz followed al-Taymuriyya’s example in calling for enhancement in the place of women in society. Both were, in particular, committed to bettering educational standards for women, arguing that this was entirely in keeping with religious teaching, including that of Islam and Christianity.

So it was that the number of journals available in Egypt grew rapidly from the 1900s onwards. There was also a considerable increase in the number of Egyptian editors and writers (Syrians and Lebanese had once dominated the industry).\textsuperscript{16} As previously discussed, Egypt scholar Beth Baron provides a great deal of evidence that these early women authors – who were mainly drawn from the middle-classes of society – were an extremely dedicated and dominant force as far as the initiation of the women’s movement in Egypt was concerned.

There is little doubt that the output of female writers changed markedly as the feminist movement evolved, with women finding the nationalist campaign a perfect agency for their endeavours. The reasoning of people like al-Taymuriyah’s was not just a call for education for women for its own sake, but a case to make Egyptian society a greater, more efficient one in the face of foreign invaders. Women insisted that education and a feminist awareness would make them better citizens.

\textsuperscript{15}Badran, \textit{op. cit.}, \textit{Feminists, Islam, and Nation}, p.14.  
\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, p.37.
As a nationalistic consciousness developed alongside a feminist one, women’s journalism began to play a role in affecting people’s perceptions. Malaka Sa’ad, founded *al-Jins al-latif* (The Fair Sex) in 1908, and her editing aimed “to raise the status of Egyptian women in particular and Eastern women in general”. Flently asserted nationalist and patriotic opinions were advanced by women writers, so making the entry of women into the literary arena an extremely significant one. Despite this, women writers would regularly dispute suggestions that they had political aspirations, or were in any way trying to transform society by becoming political players. They regularly dissociated themselves from the suffragette movement in Europe, for example, making clear that their purpose was not to win the vote, as many women were doing in countries like Britain in the early 1900s. Sarah al-Mihiyya, editor of *Fatat al-Nil* (Young Woman of the Nile, 1913-1915) wrote that European women “are in a worse situation now… having striven to attain political rights alone”.

Women undoubtedly wanted a revitalised, new relationship with society, but greater clout in the home was their priority. They sought more leverage among their own families and others in their immediate circles, so swaying society in general. This was more important to them than outright political power.

Fatima Rashid, the wife of Muhammad Farid Wajdi, owner of the nationalist newspaper *al-Dustur* (The Constitution), expressed her ideas about a woman’s devotion for her country in an article called “Nationalism and Woman”, in which she supported the view that those living in an occupied land like Egypt had a moral duty to develop a nationalist consciousness. Rashid contended that there were plenty of enlightened women who shared this belief with men, and that they had an obligation to spread it around all levels of society. It was therefore imperative that “every educated woman who senses the critical situation of her country […] to inspire all she meets with the essence of this honourable sentiment”. She was confident that better mothers could pass on their cultural and moral instruction to their children. Baron describes this process thus:

17Malaka Sa’ad, ‘Fatihat al-‘aam al-sadis’ (An Introduction for the Sixth Year) in *Al-Jins al-latif* (The Fair Sex), vol. 6, no. 1, May 1913, p.2.
20Sarah Al-Mihiyya, ‘Tahrir al-mar’ah fi Urubba’ (Women’s Liberation in Europe) in *Fatat al-nil* (Young Woman of the Nile), vol. 1, no. 6, April 1914, p.239.
21Fatima Rashid, ‘Al-Wataniyya wa al-mar’ah’ (Women and Nationalism) in *Tarqiyat al-mar’ah* (Women’s Progress), vol. 1, no. 2, 1908, p.28.
In their unique capacity as “mothers of the world and child-raisers”, women were given the imperative of imbuing their children with love for the nation, teaching them national songs and stories. “It is upon you, tender hearted mother, to impart to your son respect for his beloved nation, which has no dignity without him. The glory of this nation and its misery are in your hands.” Mothers were seen as particularly well-suited to be inculcators of moral values and patriotic values.22

Those advocating the aspirations of women in society tended to emphasise their wishes for more authority within the home, rather than for enhanced political rights per se. In this sense, women’s status as highly moral wives and mothers, was always stressed. Taking up the cause of nationalism was also used to legitimise calls for improved women’s rights. Yet limits were also set by the focus on domestic roles – by highlighting their dependence on bread-winning men they lessened their own functions as autonomous human beings who were capable of acting politically. Similarly, women made it clear that they were relying on men to bring about change through the political system, rather than seeing beliefs of their own implemented. There was frequent criticism aimed at unwanted western influences introduced by colonialists, but not against men who routinely subordinated women and kept them in often highly restricted positions within society. Men legitimised their control of women with ideals of morality, many of them based on religion. Despite this, there were a number of concessions which women were able to gain, and these increased knowledge of women’s rights in general.

The purpose of women demonstrating their nationalistic stances was not solely an academic one – they wanted their work to have practical consequences. Thus nationalism became the obvious means by which Egyptian women could make their voices heard in society. It effectively allowed them to deal with numerous vexed questions including education, seclusion, veiling, and not least of all political action. The “mother of the nation” role which women held for themselves meant venturing out of their homes and into key institutions such as schools and hospitals. They also held meetings, developing nationalistic ideas and rhetoric which they shared with their male counterparts. These activities are what we will consider next.

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The Cultural and Social Dimensions of Nationalist Feminism

_Hizb al-Umma_ (the Umma Party), _al-Hizb al-Watani_ (the Nationalist Party), and _Hizb al-Islah al-Dusturi_ (the Party of Constitutional Reform) were the three main nationalist parties which developed around newspapers in Egypt in 1907. _Jamʿiyyat Tarqiyat al-Marʿah_ (the Society for Woman’s Progress) was founded by a group of Muslim women a year later, along with a journal of the same name. In common with all other women’s groups at the time, _Jamʿiyyat Tarqiyat al-Marʿah_ was not described as a party (_ḥizb_), and there were no public meetings in civic halls. Instead the group was called a Society (_jamʿiya_) and assemblies were always held in private homes.

Some members of _Jamʿiyyat Tarqiyat al-Marʿah_ had Turkish backgrounds and they, along with other associates, remained allegiant to the Ottoman Empire. These loyalists called for a constitution similar to the Ottoman Constitution. “We do not have a remedy for our present situation except through work and reform, and this will never be accomplished as long as the nation is not granted a constitution like that of the Ottoman Empire”, wrote Munira ʿAbd al-Ghaffar, an affiliate of the _Jamʿiyyat_. “What does that constitution mean? That our men will formulate their own policy, and foreigners will not prevent reform.”23 The obligation for male relatives to fight for a new Egyptian constitution was stressed by ʿAbd al-Ghaffar, along with the need for economic sanctions against foreigners who challenged the autonomy of Egyptians. ʿAbd al-Ghaffar encouraged Egyptians to ignore overseas-made, imported products, saying they should manufacture and buy indigenous ones instead.24

As women tried to persuade, rather than force people to come round their way of thinking, the middle and upper-classes established their own network of charities. This often meant that activities usually carried out in the home and for the family – like cooking and sewing and caring for the sick – were performed in society at large. There were also other types of compassionate institutions set up. One, founded in 1908, looked after orphans, and one of its mission statements was to contribute to the “vitality of the nation”.25 This kind of altruism added a voluntary, well-intentioned dimension to their undertaking, which won them far more supporters than would have been the case if they

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23Munira ʿAbd al-Ghaffar, ‘La taqulu al-nisa’ (Do not Say Women) in _Tarqiyat al-marʿah_ (Woman’s Progress), vol. 1, no. 6, 1908, p.127.
24Ibid., pp.126-128.
were simply working for proceeds. The rallying cry for these disinterested deeds was the need for national renewal, and not the selfish welfare of individuals. Part of this bringing the nation together entailed removing benevolent national agencies away from foreign control. A medicine dispensary initiated by Lady Cromer, wife of the British Consul General Lord Cromer, and largely run by British women was boycotted by Egyptian women including Huda Sha’arawi. A royal Egyptian project, the Mabarrat Muhammad ‘Ali, was later launched by Sha’arawi and a number of Egyptian women. Middle and upper-class women invested a huge amount of time, energy and money into new charitable structures such as clinics and orphanages. Many became limited power bases for women, allowing them to influence society from outside their homes, while providing important social services for an increasingly unified nation.26

Egyptian women were, by the turn of the 19th century, also using private talks as a forum for their new feminist awareness. The lectures, which were coordinated by upper-class women and chiefly delivered to women-only audiences by middle-class women, were held on Friday – the national day off. The new Egyptian University, which was opened in 1908 thanks to a number of generous endowments, including an exceptionally large one from Princess Fatma, was where many of these educational addresses were given. The offices of the liberal, pro-feminist newspaper *al-Jarida* (lit. The newspaper) were inaugurated in 1907, and were also used as a place for instruction. Among the influential speakers was Malak Hifni Nasif (1886-1918), a former teacher, who used her skills as a poet and writer to encourage women to lift themselves academically, and to involve themselves in professions from which they had previously been excluded. Using the pseudonym Bahithat al-Badiyya (Seeker in the Desert), Nasif always ensured packed gatherings as she became the first woman in Egyptian history to publicly call for the liberation of women. The first time she did this was at a meeting of male nationalists held at the Egyptian Congress in Heliopolis in 1911, with Bahithat al-Badiyya advocating a gradual breakdown of segregation, so as not to compromise women. Other cultural lessons were later arranged by the Intellectual Association of Egyptian Women, which was set up in 1914.

The matter of a woman’s place in Egypt’s society in the early 20th century has often been considered in the context of the nationalist debate. In turn, female activity towards change has mainly been studied by male writers. There was also no doubt that the country’s growing feminist press kept up with the budding Egyptian nationalist movement. The parallel emergence of the two has been

26Sha’arawi, *op. cit.*, *Harem Years*, p.94.
underplayed by history books, with many of the female intellectuals of the period – whose writings triggered the women’s awakening – often ignored at the expense of more high-profile men.

**The Contribution of Male Intellectuals to the Feminist Debate**

One of the great ironies of the early feminist debate which took place in Egypt’s books, newspapers, and magazines in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was that it was predominantly conducted by authoritative men. The Muslim lawyer Judge Qasim Amin (1863-1908) and Tala’at Harb27 (1867-1941), the Cairo-based economist who founded Banque Misr, were two fiercely competitive male intellectuals who carried out a very overt contest on the vexed issue of women’s emancipation. The Amin/Harb rivalry has led to a misconception that women were not actively engaged in the discussion on women’s role in society, or, that women only joined in some time later when the Egyptian Muslim Malak Hifni Nasif began to write. Because of this erroneous view, many scholars attribute the foundation and early leadership of the women’s movement in Egypt – and indeed in the rest of the Arab world – to men.28 Yvonne Haddad, for instance, states that the Arab feminist campaign’s “most prominent advocates have been men who took up the cause of women”.29

No male individual is more inextricably linked to the awakening of the feminist struggle in Egypt than Judge Qasim Amin. Feminist scholar Kader even dubs Amin “the first Egyptian and Arab feminist”, arguing that Amin’s books transformed the widespread national polemic about women into a full-fledged feminist crusade.30 But this claim seems to underplay earlier Egyptian and Arab feminist history, and major societal developments during and after the strive for independence. A French volume published in 1894 by Qasim Amin and entitled *Les Égyptiens: Réponse à M. Le Duc d’Harcourt* (The Egyptians: Response to The Duke of Harcourt) was said to have laid the basis for an argumentation about the situation of women in society. This work was a response to a French intellectual’s criticism of the treatment of women in Egypt and in Islam. In his own book, Amin denies that women are overwhelmingly secluded in Egypt and goes so far as to say that there is no

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fundamental difference between the conditions of European and Muslim women. However, Amin reverted from his original defence of Islam to arrive at a more secular position in Tahrir al-Marʾah (The Liberation of Women, 1899) and al-Marʾah al-Jadida (The New Woman, 1900). The latter publication lambasted Islam, mainly using quotes from French authors who were sceptical, to say the least, of classical Islamic culture. Both of Amin’s latter works critiqued the place of women in society far more forcefully than earlier literature. Both also created a huge stir, drawing numerous plaudits, as well as many detractors who found his opinions repellent. Amin went to great efforts to highlight the positive contribution of Western women towards their societies’ civilisation. Amin thus summed up his view of Egyptian feminism as a tension between “modern” Western values and “ancient” Islamic ones.

Amin’s key premise was that the liberation of Egyptian society from foreign control required female emancipation. Amin also used arguments based on the teachings of Islam to call for a sovereign Egypt free from external domination. In his two pro-enfranchisement tomes, Amin concentrates on the contentious topics of women’s education, the seclusion of women because of the way many covered their faces in public, reforms of marriage and divorce, and the subject of polygamy. Many of these issues involved laws and customs that are directly relevant to Islam or the Arab world. Others, such as the female veil, preceded the emergence of Islam as a religion. It has to be pointed out, however, that not all of these subjects were particularly pertinent to all classes of women in Egypt at the time. Veiling and seclusion, for example, were not practiced by working-class and peasant women. While arranged marriages (often followed by divorces) were relatively common, polygamy was in fact fairly rare in Egypt. Regardless of class, numerous women found themselves denied all property rights.

Education remained the fundamental dilemma of women’s subjugation. Amin contended, for example, that men were to be blamed for women’s state of ignorance. But while Amin was in favour of women being educated, he did not advocate for women to be tutored on equal terms with men. The questions of polygamy and veiling were, of course, closely linked to that of education. In

33 Ibid., p.73.
35 Ibid., p.28.
order to defend his stances on both matters, Amin used references from Islam and Shari’a law. These opposed polygamy, asserting that the Islamic legal system itself had “stipulated the equality of women and men before any other legal system”.\(^{36}\) Amin equally maintained that the covering of the face using a veil was not even mentioned in Islamic law.\(^{37}\) He said that the veil itself was in fact more likely to increase interest in potential suitors, and that it was a barrier to women taking part in any dealings.\(^{38}\) Shari’a law did not require the seclusion of women in society, insisted Amin, even affirming that exclusions were in fact harmful to society. Despite this, Amin did not push for a complete and immediate ban on seclusion. Instead, Amin explained that: “…such a sudden revolution could lead to an increase in the behaviour that we consider corrupt”.\(^{39}\)

Amin’s contentions for the emancipation of women – albeit limited in scope – certainly had roots in the Egyptian society in which he was writing. The values of the English ruling class in Egypt also had a strong influence on his claims. For instance, Amin suggested in his works that the burgeoning feminist movement in Britain had a considerable impact on Egyptian women. As the Europeans tightened their control over Egypt, the principles of the old Turco-Circassian elite – the power structure which dominated the main administrative and military posts in society – became less relevant to Egypt’s upper middle-classes. There is little doubt that Amin presented a very positive picture of women from Europe and America during the period, declaring that many were leading fulfilled lives. Amin pointed to the fact that many were working alongside male counterparts in all kinds of fields, from the arts through to trade. He said he was saddened that Egypt was depriving women of the opportunities so readily enjoyed in Europe and America.\(^{40}\) Amin also described European women as being well-socialised, in the sense that they were modest and restrained in their behaviour. A surprising statement made by Amin was that European and American women continued to lower their eyes when they came into contact with an unfamiliar man publicly. He reckoned that not even the chastest Egyptian women would have been expected to do this.\(^{41}\)

Leila Ahmed, a prominent scholar specialising in women’s studies and religion, is among the authors who have examined Amin’s writings at length and come to the conclusion that he was not, as many allege, “the father of Arab feminism”. Instead she proposes that Amin was “the son of

\(^{36}\)Ibid., p.7.
\(^{37}\)Ibid., p.43.
\(^{38}\)Ibid., p.40.
\(^{39}\)Ibid., p.60.
\(^{41}\)Qasim Amin, op. cit., The Liberation of Women, p.145.
Cromer” – the Victorian British Consul General in Egypt - and “colonialism”. These figurative criticisms are certainly worthy of being taken seriously. Many of Amin’s theories about women were in fact being shared by men of the period in colonial societies like British Egypt. Ahmed makes the accusations that Amin’s book Tahrir al-mar’ah “merely called for the substitution of Islamic-style male dominance by Western-style male dominance”.42

Muhammad Tala’at Harb was, however, the fiercest opponent of Amin’s views on women’s emancipation. Harb, a nationalist historian and economist who came from a lower middle-class Cairo family, wrote two books in 1899 and 1901,43 with the second of these, Fasl al-khitab fi al-mar’ah wa al-hijab (The Decisive Decree on Women and the Veil), containing long excerpts from Amin’s reply to the Duc d’Harcourt. In it, Harb takes up a particularly authoritarian, conservative position on the theme of women. He collaborated on this subject with Mustafa Kamil, the lawyer and journalist who was a founder of the Nationalist Party, who also used his writing to campaign against women’s freedoms at the turn of the century. The common factor between Harb, Kamil and many other male intellectuals of the period was that they all had a French legal education.

Harb did not oppose increased education for women, as Amin did. However, he vigorously objected to removing restrictions on the social mobility of women. Harb’s book starts with a quote from Amin’s Les Égyptiens, asserting that Muslims will never subject women to the same treatment as Europeans. Harb launches a vitriolic attack on him for changing his position.44 Harb is in fact in general agreement with the necessity for improved educational standards for Muslim women, but he prescribes two conditions: the first is that education does not preclude the type of modesty involved in seclusion and veiling; the second is that women’s education should have a significant Islamic dimension, and indeed be limited to the study of keeping a household in order and bringing up children properly. The veil and seclusion do not need to be abolished as part of a policy of educating women, states Harb. In practical terms, he recommends that a girl’s tutor could be a relative or a close family friend. The most important thing argues Harb, is that al-hijab (the veil) can be observed – that is to say that the head and body of a woman should be covered when she is with anybody with whom she is not on intimate terms. Harb supports the view that a woman should remain at home,

44Ibid., p.402.
except in extreme circumstances when she is forced to go out. Harb also suggests that women teachers and administrators should staff Islamic girls’ schools. Harb is hostile to the importing of instructors from non-Muslim countries, even though – at the time – there were not enough trained Egyptian women to take up schooling and bureaucratic posts in all the educational institutions. Accordingly, Harb recommends that learned Muslim women should arrive from India and other Islamic countries to educate Muslim girls.

Harb is sceptical of the high regard in which Amin holds European civilisation, and he also castigates Amin’s dismissal of the glories of ancient Islamic legacy. Harb points out that the reforms in society which Amin has endorsed might have earned him praise as a reformer, but that the reforms have been far from effective. Harb considers that too many societal dangers were creeping in from the West: manners were not what they were; incidents of prostitution were on the increase; people were drinking wine and other alcohol; a lot of people were in debt and wasting money; and educational standards were declining. Harb even blamed Europeans for a deterioration in the moral codes of Islam. European colonialism and commerce had – alongside European “civilisation” – succeeded in corrupting Muslim society, and, indeed, threatening its very existence. Salvation, Harb insisted, did not lie in living up to European lifestyles.

Amin and Harb’s ideas should also be placed in the context of a conflict between the classes of Egyptian society. The Europeans, who were undeniably the governing class in Egypt, were seen differently by the upper middle-class reformers like Amin and lower middle-class intellectuals like Harb. In his younger days, Amin rejected European culture, but then began to admire the continent’s achievements as he grew older. This change of mind coincided with a widespread belief that British rule would, in the long run, be more beneficial to his class than the Khedives had been. But, as far as Harb was concerned, the colonialism and industry of Europe was a genuine threat to Egyptian institutions and ethics. This consideration almost certainly summed up the insecurities of his class.

Internal tensions between men and women combined with these fundamental disparities in attitude towards European mores at the turn of the century were to produce a protracted divergence in the convictions of those from the new upper middle-classes, and the petite bourgeoisie as they related to the rights of women in Egyptian society. Juan Cole, the American historian specialising in the
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Middle East speculates that Egyptian men from a petite bourgeoisie background felt threatened by women. In summary, the men feared that their traditional roles as guardians of the family honour were being endangered by European supremacy and by the standards of the British occupiers, in particular. They also thought they were being undermined by women who were increasingly questioning their own standing within society. In contrast, men belonging to the new upper-middle class were more inspired by Western customs and advocated women’s moves towards emancipation.48

The advancement of women in society was of course a shared goal of women of all classes, but there was a distinct split about how to achieve it: mainly between middle-class Islamic reformist women and upper-class women activists who were more galvanised by ideas from the West. This cleavage became one between traditional, conservative women and more liberal ones. It was made clear in the differences of opinion between Malak Hifni Nasif and Huda Sha’arawi – both of whom were high profile adversaries in the debate on women’s issues at the end of the 19th century and early 20th century.

The Islamic/Western Split among Egyptian Feminists

The early 20th century not only saw the activation and participation of upper-class women such as Sha’arawi but also an intensification of feminist arguments within the press and amongst middle-class women writers. While the pioneering works on feminism were produced by men or by non-Muslim women, middle-class Muslim women soon joined the conversation on the side of reform. The most prominent of these was Malak Hifni Nasif who, as mentioned earlier, wrote under the pen name of Bahithat al-Badiyah. An example of this is seen in her various journal articles and letters. She also spoke publicly about the situation and advancement of women, and was tirelessly involved with other women such as the prolific Christian Lebanese-Palestinian writer Mayy Ziyadah (1886-1941) in various literary groups exchanging on feminism,49 nationalism and giving lectures to female audiences comprised of both upper and middle-class women.50 Her work inspired more upper middle-class women to be instrumental in the dialogue on women and society in the following decade.

48Ibid., pp.387-407.
49Baron, op. cit., The Women’s Awakening, p.176.
50Sha’arawi, op. cit., p.126.
Ziyadah, the poet, essayist and translator, was an essential figure in the Nahda – or “renaissance” – of Arab literature in the early 20th century. Ziyadah and her family emigrated to Egypt in 1908, with her father founding al-Mahrusah (lit. the protected one) newspaper. Ziyadah became a regular contributor to the paper, and went on to run a literary salon in Cairo during the 1920s and 1930s which turned one of the most famous in the world. Her letters to Nasif provide a very clear illustration of their ideas with respect to women’s rights. In one letter to Nasif, written in 1902, Ziyadah asks for direction and leadership in the woman’s struggle:

We have hearts that are burning, but we do not know what fire is burning them… so teach us how and where to direct it… Help in the emancipation of the woman by teaching her responsibilities and duties… We do not mind if you hide your delicate hands behind walls or if you hide your eastern features behind your veil, as long as we continue to hear the sound of your pen at work, so that we may know from you what the higher self is.\(^{51}\)

Nasif’s response to this letter was equally charged and thought-provoking. In 1912, she wrote: “My heart is breaking because of the corruption in our society”,\(^{52}\) and argued that men had for too long determined the fate of women: “If the man commanded us to veil, we veiled, and if he asked us to unveil, we unveiled, and if he asked us to learn, we learned, but were there always good intentions behind his demands for us?”\(^{53}\) Ziyadah replied to this letter, making her feelings about men’s historical domination over women unambiguous: “Man wants the woman to feel his tyranny, because tyranny is control… the more she rebelled, the more his authoritarianism increased”.\(^{54}\)

Malak Hifni Nasif had already rehearsed her own views about the status of women in her feminist tract which was published in 1910, prior to her correspondence with Ziyadah. The book, Al-Nisa’iyat (Women’s Affairs) was, and still is considered an extremely important ground-breaking feminist publication, which looked at several issues from marriage, to polygamy, to education and work. Nasif objected to arranged marriages saying: “if love is not the foundation for two people coming together, then there is no meaning to their union”,\(^{55}\) and wrote that the marriage age for girls had to be raised to at least sixteen years-old.\(^{56}\) She was vehemently opposed to polygamy asserting

\(^{51}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.14.}\)
\(^{52}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.18.}\)
\(^{53}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.20.}\)
\(^{54}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.25.}\)
\(^{55}\text{Malak Hifni Nasif, al-Nisa’iyat (Women’s Affairs), Cairo, Multaqa al-Mar’ah wa al-Dhakira, 1998, p.57.}\)
\(^{56}\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.82.}\)
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that: “Polygamy corrupts men… and corrupts the hearts of women.”\(^{57}\) Her stance on veiling was more equivocal – on the one hand she argued that “our religion does not restrict us in this matter”,\(^{58}\) and on the other hand stated: “My opinion is that it is not yet time for the removal of the veil, for women must first be given a true education, and taught proper behaviour… then leave her to choose what is most beneficial to her and her nation.”\(^{59}\)

What is very evident in Nasif’s work is a genuine attempt to advance any changes within an Islamic modernist context. There were other conservative women in society who, as Nasif, had a traditional attitude towards their role in the community – one which had been cultivated during their restricted experiences under Ottoman rule. These women were concerned about what they perceived as the spread of liberal immorality. Fatima Rashid, editor of Tarqiyat al-mar’ah (Woman’s Progress; 1908-1909), for example, was critical of the way Egyptian women mimicked their European counterparts in everything from progressive point-of-views to fashion. Rashid contended that a return to Islamic law would be the only way of moving back from this blind copying of a foreign social group. Rashid wrote that Egyptian women “did not understand the full scope of religious law which has given them all the rights that they need”.\(^{60}\) Ideas about how women should behave within Egypt under the Ottomans also found support in the journals al-’Afaf (The Virtue; 1910-1922) and Fatat al-Nil (Young Woman of the Nile).

The vision of conservative women nurtured under Ottoman sovereignty was based on a harking back to an ancient Islamic past. It centred on the manner in which the wives of the Prophet were said to have conducted their lives, along with other prominent religious women. So it was that customs which gave women a subordinate place in society were highlighted. These included, for example, wearing a veil, and generally keeping a subdued profile, or secluding themselves away completely from society. Conflicting cultural and sexual identities put forward by women on different sides of the feminist polemic created a conundrum. Leila Ahmed suggested that Middle Eastern feminists were “caught between those two opposing loyalties, forced almost to choose between betrayal and betrayal”.\(^{61}\) By attempting to reconcile different aspects of their identity – including class, culture,

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\(^{57}\)Ibid., p.78.  
^{58}Ibid., p.61.  
^{59}Ibid., p.64.  
^{60}Fatima Rashid, ‘Al-Mar’ah wa huququha fi al-Islam’ (A Woman’s Rights in Islam) in Tarqiyat al-mar’ah (Woman’s Progress), vol. 1, no. 10, 1908, p.150.  
and political outlook – conservative women were particularly prone to solely calling for improved women’s rights within strictly prescribed parameters. In this sense, they had no interest in challenging the boundaries which had already been set for them by their backgrounds, and were thus content with accepting male views of nationalism, and what it meant for their society.

This Islamic approach to feminism contrasted noticeably with the statements made by the more upper-class feminists like Huda Sha’arawi, which appear to show a greater western orientation. Accounts of harems in the latter part of the 19th century and early decades of the 20th century testify to how upper-class women’s perceptions of themselves were evolving within the harem walls, and how the shifts taking place outside these walls and the writings of middle-class women were seeping in and influencing them. One of Sha’arawi’s childhood memories is of a travelling poet coming to her house – she writes how this woman of lower status impressed her with her level of knowledge: “Observing Sayyida Khadija convinced me that, with learning, women could be the equals of men if not surpass them.”62 Moreover, upper-class women’s philanthropic activities were also pushing them into the public sphere, making them more aware of the political forces around them. One of the most successful charitable organisations, the Mabarrat Muhammad ‘Ali, founded in 1909 by Huda Sha’arawi and other Egyptian women, is mentioned in the *Egyptian Gazette* in 1910 in an article about high infant mortality in Egypt:

In order to remedy this deplorable state of affairs a society has been started called “L’Œuvre Mohamed Aly”, which by means of pamphlets, tracts and the distribution of medical necessities is trying to spread some elementary notions of health among the native populace. The Khedive, the Khedivah and the Khedival mother have given their patronage to this work.63

One conspicuous distinction between middle and upper-class Egyptian women was the level and type of contact they had with Western women which can endeavour to explain this Islamic/Western split amongst Egyptian feminists. Many upper-class families during this period employed Western governesses and teachers to educate their children. The memoirs of Sha’arawi and Mary “Ellen” Chennells, the English governess, (c. 1814–1896) demonstrate that often very genuine friendships developed between these women. Chennells was, following a long career as a governess, appointed governor to Princess Zeynab Khanum Effendi, daughter of Ismail Pasha, Khedive of Egypt and his second wife, Princess Jananyar Berinici Khanum Effendimiz. Chennells wrote *Recollections of an

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62Sha’arawi, op. cit., p.42.
63*Egyptian Gazette*, Wednesday April 6 1910, p.5, British Library newspapers.
Egyptian Princess by her English Governess, a book which has become a classic source about day-
to-day life in the Khedival court, setting in the context of Anglo-Egyptian history. Sha’arawi thus
commenced on her close association with Eugenie Le Brun, the French wife of Hussain Rushdi
Pasha (Prime Minister of Egypt between 1914-1919): “Mme Rushdi not only guarded my
reputation, but also nourished my mind and spirit… Soon, at her request, I began to attend her
Saturday salon.” While women of the middle-classes such as Ziyadah were holding meetings
for intellectual reflections, women of the upper-classes were also engaging in socio-political
considerations within the harems and at the high society gatherings of women such as Eugenie le
Brun: “Mme Rushdi adroitly guided the discourse from issue to issue. There were debates about
social practices, especially veiling.” Upper-class women such as Sha’arawi also began organising
lectures for women, initially inviting European female speakers, and later welcoming well-known
Egyptian writers. It was through these talks that a more direct link was made between feminists of
the middle-class and those from upper-class harems:

Marguerite Clement arrived from France … she asked if Egyptian women
were in the habit of giving and attending lectures. We were not, I had to
admit, but I invited her to give one…The lecture drew a good audience…
Soon Egyptian women began to speak. The best known was Malak Hifni
Nasif.

On the other hand, under British colonial rule, middle-class women in Egypt would have come into
contact with western women working as teachers or for ministries, positions that were limited if not
closed to them. A level of estrangement was always maintained, and often a strong resentment grew
out of the situation. This is seen in the case of the educator, Nabawiyaa Musa (1886-1951). She
grew up in a modest Muslim family and entered herself into the girls section of the ‘Abbas Primary
School. She was subsequently admitted at the Saniyah Teacher’s Training School and later
appealed to the Ministry of Education to sit the state baccalaureate exam and receive equal pay to
male teachers. She describes this experience in her memoirs:

Mr. Dunlope surprised me when he came in holding my application in his
hand… He said: you are a dreamer so listen to my advice and remove this

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64Sha’arawi, op. cit., p.78.
65Ibid., p.80.
66Ibid., pp.93-94.
68Nabawiyaa Musa, Tarikhi bi-Qalami (My History by My Pen), Cairo, Multaqa al-Mar’ah wa al-Dhakira, 1999,
request... unless you promise me you will be successful. I said: And have any of the other candidates promised you success before sitting the exam? [...] he said: then know that if you fail, my opinion of you will fall. I said: I am, thank God, above the serving classes, and neither you nor anyone else can make me a servant... for my work carries no deficiency. 60

As Badran explains, the British authorities made Musa the exception to the rule by making her the first female teacher to receive an equal salary to male teachers. 70 Musa herself writes of her success:

The results came out and I passed coming out forty-third among two-hundred candidates. This was in the year 1907... no other Egyptian woman would pass the baccalaureate exam until 1928. For this reason my success was big news, and newspapers carried titles such as “the first female Egyptian to pass the baccalaureate”. 71

Musa was strongly opposed to marriage arguing: “I hate marriage and see it as dirt, and I decided never to soil myself with this dirt” 72 and justifies her decision to remove her veil as being partly motivated by a desire to set an example in order to alter established practices: “I wanted to unveil, although I did not write about it but read Qasim Amin’s book and liked it, though I believe traditions cannot be changed with words.” 73 Musa was a highly controversial character, who clashed with the colonial powers and also with the men of her time. She records: “They called me the wrecker of men’s homes and the severer of their livelihoods”, 74 and describes an incident which exemplifies the resentment the other male teachers and the British principal had for her:

At that time I used to write for a daily journal called “the young woman’s Egypt”... The other Arabic teachers went to the principal and brought her various clips from the journal and said I was criticizing English politics in these articles... and by doing that they managed to turn her against me. 75

Musa went on to become the first Egyptian woman principal at a girls’ school in Fayyum, in Middle Egypt. 76 She was made principal of the Mansurah teaching school and in 1924 became inspector of girls’ schools. 77 As Badran argues, the achievements in her career as an educator threatened both the

69 Ibid., p.83.
70 Badran, op. cit., p.44.
71 Musa, op. cit., p.85.
72 Ibid., p.87.
73 Ibid., p.78.
74 Ibid., p.93.
75 Ibid., p.94.
76 Ibid., p.114.
77 Ibid., p.142.
social patriarchy as well as the British administration. The relatively positive interaction of upper-class Egyptian women with Europeans compared to the more negative one of middle-class Egyptian women can help clarify the spilt in Egypt’s feminist awakening from the very start between a western-oriented feminism promoted more amongst women of the upper-classes such as Shaʿarawi, and a more Islamic feminism bolstered by middle-class women like Nasif and Musa. Nationalist arguments were exploited by both liberal and conservative feminists, agreeing on the need for girls to be educated, to attain domestic competence, and to maintain a patriotic posture within their nation.

It was through the increased intellectual contentions between female and male thinkers and writers, and the interplay between middle and upper-class feminists, that Egyptian feminism moved into its second phase during the fight for independence in 1919-1922, which tied it directly to Egyptian nationalism and provided the background needed to turn ideas into actions. Thus, the nationalist and feminist voices of the early part of the 20th century had collided. In some arenas women were involved by the nationalists, while in others they were marginalised and had their claims turned against them. However, the events of the 1919 revolution would give women a reason to hope that their work had not been in vain. Women’s militant participation in the protests against the British was greeted with open arms by many nationalists, and for a brief period the men and women of Egyptian society were united in their quest for independence. A joint struggle towards freedom from Britain suited both men, and women who had been driven to political action.

Nationalist Feminist Political Activism

During the 1919 revolution, Huda Shaʿarawi led veiled women demonstrators in the strife against the British. Female solidarity with the Egyptian nationalists was embodied by Shaʿarawi’s strong partnership with Saʿad Zaghlul (1859-1927), leader of the Wafd (“delegation”) – the Egyptian nationalist movement which was formed in 1918 at the end of the First World War. It was at the forefront of the push for independence from Britain, with both men and women lending their support to the “party of the nation”. What women also stressed, however, was that they were equally

78 Badran, *op. cit.*, p.60.
campaigning for equality of the sexes – so engaging in a “dual struggle”. Egyptian women first took part in nationalist public actions in 1919, but they were to become central to the limited withdrawal of the British from Egypt in 1922.

It is at this point that the chapter focuses on the role of Huda Sha’arawi and Safiyya Zaghlul, two women from the aristocratic class who were integral to the nationalist feminist movement – helping to organise the rallies of March 1919 against the British, but also mobilising the Egyptian feminist movement as the revolution gathered steam. Both women were the wives of Wafd activists: Huda Sha’arawi was married to ‘Ali Sha’arawi Pasha, a senior member of the Wafd party and of the adjourned legislative assembly. Safiyya Zaghlul (1878-1946), in turn, was the wife of Sa’ad Zaghlul, the Wafd leader himself. Following the favourable outcome of the 1919 revolution, Safiyya Zaghlul was to become known as the “Mother of the Egyptians”. There had been numerous manners in which upper-class Egyptian women resisted British rule, including through economic boycotts, pickets, and the distribution of anti-colonial literature. This chapter, however, intends to concentrate on the particularly symbolic marches in March 1919 and the way they created a seminal moment in the relationship between the nationalists and the feminists. It was the first public interaction between the two groups, and one which was in many respects an immediate accomplishment. So it was that women were able to resort to popular political activity to voice their concerns to as large an audience as possible, utilising their solidarity with men to advance their cause.

Egypt scholars such as ‘Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, and especially feminist ones, highlight the fact that women from all kinds of backgrounds were involved in the battle for change. This cooperation across different social and economic classes has been discussed at length. However, while the effort of upper-class, aristocratic women to the revolution was often described in great detail, and indeed celebrated, the help of poorer, unentitled women has frequently been forgotten. Masses of economically disadvantaged women actually lost their lives in the process, while the sacrifice of more privileged women was nothing like as extreme.

The arrests and deportations of Sa’ad Zaghlul and three colleagues was the spark which ignited major protests all over Egypt in March 1919. It was also at this time that women took to the streets to dissent for the first time in the country’s history. This hugely significant development has been examined by historians writing in various languages, including English, Arabic and French. Thus a

80 For more on women’s dual struggle see the Egyptian historian ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ramadan’s account of the Egyptian nationalist movement, op. cit., Tatawwur al-Harak al-Wataniyya.
mythology has emerged around the women’s very public gatherings, with recollections of the “Revolutionary Gentlewomen” written about, along with references to the “ladies’ demonstration” of March 1919.\(^1\)

Middle-class and upper-class women in Egypt were, before the First World War, associated with a number of professional sectors, including educational and journalistic. Women also gained some type of political action by forming social groups, but the outbreak of the war in 1914 brought a lot of these activities to an abrupt halt. Schools, for example, were effectively shut down as learning institutions as they were used to house refugees. Journalists lost their jobs as journals had to close because of high production costs in wartime. Many associations, including those founded by women, were dissolved. Rising prices, shortages of basic foodstuffs and other necessities were inconveniences which all hampered women’s pursuits in public life.

The war also led to increased interest in colonial politics, drawing attention to oppressive British rulers and their methods. As women joined men in their hostility to the British authorities, they became more familiar with the language of national determination.\(^2\) Wartime hardships amplified a sense of injustice, and made women more inclined to protest. The basic narrative of the 1919 revolution is allegedly well established, having been pieced together considering diverse sources (both indigenous and foreign) – from eye-witness accounts, and newspapers articles through to contemporaneous historical chronicles.\(^3\) Yet there were a number of contradictions in these records impeding the construction of a definitive minute-by-minute version of exactly what happened.\(^4\) Indeed, descriptions of the March rallies are often blurred. Demonstrations first broke out on Sunday, 16 March, with the daily newspaper *Al-Ahram* reporting a “ladies’ demonstration” starting.

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\(^2\) *Al-Ahram*, 17 March 1919, p.2; 21 March 1919, p.2.

\(^3\) For comprehensive information about women’s experiences during the war, see Beth Baron, ‘The Politics of Female Notables in Post-War Egypt’ in Billie Melman (ed.), *Borderlines: Genders and Identities in War and Peace, 1870-1930*, New York, Routledge, 1998, pp.330-34.

\(^4\) The Egyptian historian Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi’i, who was thirty years old at the time of the Revolution, recorded a remarkably detailed account of the events as they unfolded in his *Thawrat 1919*, which was first published in 1946.

\(^5\) For example, while the Egyptian daily *Al-Ahram* reported a demonstration of 250 women on 16 March 1919, the London *Times* newspaper wrote about 400 women marching on 19 March 1919. The historian Beth Baron has suggested that: “It is quite possible that the events often associated with 16 March actually occurred on 19 or 20 March.” See Beth Baron, *Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics*, London, University of California Press, 2005, p.109.
This was followed by a similar march on Wednesday, 19 March, and/or Thursday, 20 March. These distinct protests have frequently been erroneously joined together as one.

Although the processions of March 1919 by elite Egyptian women were planned in advance, and meticulously coordinated by Huda Sha’arawi, they have often been characterised as being spontaneous ones. Sha’arawi’s entourage sent a delegation to the British authorities to ensure there was official permission for the first mass meeting. No approval was offered to begin with, but it was later reported in *al-Muqattam* (lit. the name of a hill range in Southeast Cairo) that sanction had been granted by the colonial administration. Pre-demonstration work was then carried out, mainly involving upper-class women telephoning each other to arrange assembly points. These women also employed their literary skills to produce slogans on banners, and to circulate petitions promoting their aims. Even though her husband was a prominent personage in the progress towards independence from Britain, there was no question of Safiyya Zaghlul remaining in his shadow. On the contrary, she became a formidable political actor in her own right, showing immense support for the March 1919 revolution. Safiyya Zaghlul’s very home in Cairo was known as *Bayt al-Umma* (the House of the Nation), with nationalists from far and wide rallying within it. Safiyya Zaghlul invited activists while her husband was away – first in exile following his arrest and later travelling to London and Paris to press for independence for Egypt. Through this period, Safiyya Zaghlul took a pride in playing a pivotal role in their struggle. By organising meetings at their house, and styling herself as a national “mother” figure, she achieved results which have often been overlooked by those studying nationalist movements. During the house assemblies, Safiyya Zaghlul would sign petitions, deliver speeches, and generally make the men and women who visited this focal point of revolution feel welcome. Safiyya Zaghlul had until then lived a largely secluded life in her own upper-class enclave, so especially took pleasure in becoming a public individual. Sultan (later King) Fu’ad summed up the power which Safiyya Zaghlul yielded within the Wafdist nationalist movement when he noted the “extraordinary influence of the women and particularly of Madame Sa’ad Zaghlul in exciting native hostility to the British”.

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86 *Al-Ahram*, op. cit.
87 *Al-Muqattam*, Cairo, March 1919.
88 For more on Safiyya Zaghlul, see her biography written in French by her close friend, Fina Gued Vidal, shortly after Safiyya’s death. Fina Gued Vidal, *Safia Zaghloul*, Cairo, R. Schindler, 1946.
89 Allenby to Curzon, 20 April 1919, enclosure: ‘Colonel Symes’ Note on Interview with the Sultan, April 17, 1919’, FO 407/184/286, TNA.
The home of the distinguished protestor ʿAtiyya Abu Isbaa was used as a convergence location for demonstrators on the first day of their march. The house was in Garden City, near the central square of Maydan Ismaʿiliyya (later renamed Midan al-Tahrir or Liberation Square), and also close to government offices, as well as the headquarters of foreign diplomatic missions. Petitions were signed by all women who came together, and then an itinerary was explained to all marchers, with all those taking part encouraged to walk in an orderly manner, to maintain the image of a well-organised and peaceful demonstration. Those participating mainly wore dress favoured by women from the highest strands of Cairo society, namely black abayas, and white face veils. Most of them arrived by car, keeping them parked nearby as they set out on the protest route. Estimates of the number of women who turned up ranged from 150 to 530.

Banners at the front of the demonstration projected slogans such as: “We protest the shedding of the blood of the innocent and the unarmed” and “We demand complete independence”. Those shouted out verbally included: “Long live freedom and independence!” and “Down with the protectorate!”

The march progressed along Qasr al-ʿAini Street, now one of the oldest streets in central Cairo, towards the foreign missions and other administrative offices, where organisers aimed to distribute tracts stating their claims. However, it was then diverted to the home of Saʿad Zaghlul which was a prime place for the undertaking of the Wafdist movement – a symbol of the idea that all those involved in the protest were part of a “national family”.

As the dissenting crowds approached the house of Saʿad Zaghlul, it soon became evident that the occupying forces were uneasy about what was going on. “When we had arrived at the end of Saʿad Zaghlul Pasha Street we were surrounded by British troops who levelled their weapons at us”, women wrote in a later petition. Huda Shaʿarawi then challenged the soldiers with the words: “Let me die so Egypt shall have an Edith Cavell.” Cavell was the English nurse who became a female martyr when she was killed by German soldiers in Belgium in 1915 after helping Allied prisoners of war to escape. The allusion to Cavell showed that Huda Shaʿarawi knew how to cite emotional British references to her own advantage. Other marchers had to physically restrain Shaʿarawi from overly intimidating the British. They feared that violence might ensue if this were to happen. The
officers then “kept us standing thus for two hours under a burning sun”. Sir Thomas Russell Pasha, British commander of the Cairo City Police, later admitted that it was his decision to keep the women standing around under a hot sun as a way of sapping their energy and morale. The tense situation came to an end when Russell called for the women’s cars to be summoned so that all the demonstrators could depart in a restrained, easily monitored fashion.

The American Consul-General was among foreign missions which received petitions from the women, which were to become central prescribed acts of notable women’s disobedience. Many included complaints about the way they had been treated by the British. Records confirm that the women engaged in the resistance came from the highest echelons of Cairo society. Those joining in the dissidence movement included Safiyya Zaghlul, Sharifa Riyad, Labiba Ahmad, Esther Fahmi Wissa, and the wife of the late revolutionary feminist activist Qasim Amin. Many were the wives and daughters of pashas and beys, and they signed their names accordingly. The register also reveals that many of the women who protested together came from the same august families.

Opposition to the methods of the British military to suppress public demonstrations was expressed in the appeals to the authorities, as well as the principal call for Egyptian independence from Britain. Signatories specifically resented the practice of force against people, “who have done nothing more than claim the liberty and independence of their country, in conformity with the principles proclaimed by Dr. [President Woodrow] Wilson and accepted by all belligerent and neutral nations”. At the time Egyptians were hugely influenced by Wilson’s principles of self-determination, as outlined in his Fourteen Points speech delivered to Congress at a joint session on January 1, 1918. Pleas presented by the select group of women condemned the British for using machine gun fire against unarmed women and children, especially as many of the women protestors marched peacefully. A petition signed by 118 women urged the international community: “We beg you to send our message to America and to President Wilson personally. Let them hear our call. We believe they will not suffer Liberty to be crushed in Egypt, that human Liberty for which you[r]
brave and noble sons have died.” The hint at the U.S. War of Independence from Britain was seen as a particularly poignant one by those who endorsed the solicitation.

Analysing the early March 1919 events, Middle East specialist Beth Baron is categorical that gentry women spent next to no time demonstrating with women from other classes. In this sense the revolt was not a consolidated social one, Baron argues. Instead, the main aim of the non-violent rallies was, at first, to convince the British that the upper Egyptian classes objected to their presence in their country. Coptic and Muslim women thus joined forces. The women’s choice of black clothing with white veils was that of entitled women who lived in relative seclusion, albeit a highly privileged one. They set themselves apart from women working in menial jobs in the countryside, or in factories, or solely in their husband’s homes. The women used the telephone to plan their marches, and turned up in chauffeur driven cars. The evidence of this elitism, Baron contends, contradicts the idea that the “lady demonstrators” displayed collective solidarity and unity across class boundaries. On the contrary, their attitude contributed to maintain a very stiff hierarchical view of society based on class distinctions.

The primary outcome of the aristocratic women’s activity was to create a female Egyptian voice which would impress a wider, international audience. Petitions written by the high society women used expressions such as: “In the name of the women of Egypt” and many were signed as “The Ladies of Egypt” and “The Egyptian Women”. The Egyptian family unit also became a rallying cry for the women demonstrating in 1919. They dubbed themselves “the mothers, sisters and wives of the victims massacred for the satisfaction of British ambitions”. Through presenting themselves as “Mothers of the Nation”, women played on their moral high ground as such, so dramatising their campaign for freedom. Some commentators, such as the wealthy Socialist and prolific Coptic writer and journalist Salama Musa (1887-1958), have described the March 1919 popular gatherings as a feminist act. A staunch defender of women’s rights, Musa writes in his Memoirs published only a year after al-Rafi’i’s authoritative Thawrat 1919: “That even women went out to stage demonstrations was not only a revolt against the English, but even more so against a thousand years

99Enclosure ‘To the U.S. Diplomatic Agent in Egypt, Cairo’, 24 March 1919, SD 883.00/135, USNA.
100Badran, op. cit., Feminists, Islam, and Nation, pp.76-77.
101SD 883.00/130, op. cit., 18 March 1919; SD 883.00/135, op. cit., 20 March 1919; SD 883.00/135, op. cit., 24 March 1919.
102SD 883.00/130, op. cit.
Chapter Six: Women in the 1919 Egyptian Revolution: From Political Awakening to Nationalist Feminism

of veiled obscurity.”¹⁰³ Baron, however, denies that feminist demands were rehearsed during the protests. Establishment women stayed away from working-class ones, and insisted on remaining cut off from other social groups, and indeed from men, so reinforcing gender barriers.¹⁰⁴

The historian Ijlal Khalifa wrote:

> It is said that the daughter of the wealthy or aristocratic class is the one who participated in the revolution and the adept political work after it, and that the daughter of the middle and lower classes is the one who died as a martyr by the hand of colonialism, who felt its humiliation and oppression.¹⁰⁵

Peasant women from the countryside also supported revolutionary action. Among their exertion were acts of sabotage, including the destruction of railway lines. Khalifa honours the “female martyrs” who died carrying out this kind of operation, and lists their names, the places they came from, and the dates of their deaths. The Egyptian feminist Nawal al-Sa’adawi (1931-), suggests that “little has been said about the masses of poor women who rushed into the national struggle without counting the cost, and who lost their lives, whereas the lesser contributions of aristocratic women leaders have been noisily acclaimed and brought to the forefront”.¹⁰⁶

Demonstrations against the British became increasingly populist throughout 1919, with working-class women who had marched in different sections to the bourgeois women gradually merging with them. So it was that class separations were crossed. Female historians, in particular, have underplayed the gender segregation that has been associated with elite women’s activity. There are also indications that women “agitated side by side with their men”.¹⁰⁷ Husbands and wives were thus brought together in protest. Sha’arawi’s memoirs make this manifest.

Following the achievements of the revolution, upper-class women tried to establish a political role for themselves through the foundation on 12 January 1920 of the Wafdist Women’s Central Committee (WWCC), a subsidiary branch of the main Wafd. These female activists wanted to share the nationalist stage with their male counterparts so as to advance women’s political culture in new

¹⁰³Salam Musa, Tarbiyat Salama Musa (The Raising of Salama Musa), Cairo, Dar al-Katib al-Misri, 1958, pp.150-151.
¹⁰⁴Badran, op. cit., Feminists, Islam, and Nation, pp.76-77.
¹⁰⁷Al-Sayyid-Marsot, op. cit., p.269.
directions. However, once nominal independence from the British had been granted in 1922, nationalist men who had worked with women in the liberation struggle disowned them. Women were thus prompted to create formal institutions to follow their own path towards female emancipation. Foremost among these was the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU), which was set up and presided over by Huda Sha’arawi in 1923. The EFU was to become the first in a number of influential women’s political organisations which would work towards equality and reform.

The Aftermath of the 1919 Revolution: How Male Nationalists Disowned Feminist Nationalists

Strains between men and women campaigning for Egyptian independence came to a head towards the close of 1920, when male Wafdists returned from London following talks with the British authorities. Emboldened by their negotiations with imperial leaders, the men presented new terms for self-government to their own countrymen. But they ignored women’s groups, and specifically the Wafdist Women’s Central Committee which had been working so hard towards self-determination. Angered by the Committee’s snub, the women sent a stiff letter to Sa’ad Zaghlul, in charge of the Wafd. The correspondence of 12 December 1920 was signed by Huda Sha’arawi and read:

We are surprised and shocked by the way we have been treated recently, in contrast to previous treatment and certainly contrary to what we expect from you. You supported us when we created our Committee. Your congratulatory telegrams expressed the finest hopes and most noble sentiments. What makes us all the more indignant is that by disregarding us the Wafd has caused foreigners to disparage the renaissance of women. They claim that our participation in the nationalist movement was merely a ploy to dupe our civilized nations into believing in the advancement of Egypt and its ability to govern itself. Our women’s renaissance is above that as you know. At this moment when the future of Egypt is about to be decided, it is unjust that the Wafd, which stands for the rights of Egypt and struggles for its liberation, should deny half the nation its role in that liberation.\footnote{Sha’arawi, \textit{op. cit.}, p.122.}

The relative success of the Egyptian Revolution which saw Britain grant the country nominal independence in 1922 was not the accomplishment envisaged by feminists. Instead, male liberal nationalists effectively abandoned their women supporters. Badran summarises what happened:

Following independence, women’s liberation slipped in order of priority for male liberals, who became engaged in their own political power struggles. It was then that feminists proclaimed the start of the public, political movement for their own liberation and national liberation within the framework of their feminist movement and began the move to desegregate society by the removal of the veil.\(^\text{110}\)

These developments laid the foundations for the establishment of a genuinely feminist movement – one which could act beyond the original calls for independence. Free of its nationalist ideology, the grouping brought about what was, arguably, the most momentous period in the history of the Egyptian women’s movement. Faced with increasing marginalisation as they campaigned alongside male nationalists, women were determined not to be disregarded, as they were in 1924 when they were left out of the inaugural ceremonies of the new Egyptian Parliament. A year later, in 1925, women were also prevented from contributing to the third convocation of Parliament. Saiza Nabarawi, the young editor of *L’Égyptienne* (The Egyptian Woman), the journal of the Feminist Union, made much of what was clearly a “double standard” in one of her articles for the publication:

> In stating my complaint I by no means resent the presence of my distinguished colleagues but simply wish to raise a voice against unequal treatment. I should point out that representatives of the local press are often less favoured than certain foreign women… A double standard! This will always exist as long as men rule…Is it just that in this Egyptian land… our women should be the last to enjoy rights and prerogatives accorded others.?\(^\text{111}\)

The distinct biased principles of male nationalist advocates very much set the tone for the years to come. Women were quick to grasp the change in approach by the men, and set up groups aimed at combating it. The pioneering EFU was the original all-women faction that led the way in championing female rights.\(^\text{112}\)


\(^\text{112}\) Badran, *op. cit.*, *Feminists, Islam, and Nation*, p.86.
Women’s chronic setbacks at not attaining equal citizenship with men following the formulation of the 1924 Constitution were soon transformed into renewed demands for universal suffrage. Members of the EFU, as well as women working within other structures, concentrated once more on the goal of political equality. While this was happening, however, they were met with fierce religious criticism. Male Muslim conservatives were not wholly opposed to women fighting for their prerogatives when they were united with liberal nationalists in the common, formal request for self-rule, but this enlightened view did not extend to allowing enfranchisement. The idea of having women voting and acting in the political sphere for any other reason beyond lobbying for independence was considered beyond the pale:

Now focusing mainly on suffrage, the feminist movement evoked a hostile reaction, mainly from popular religious quarters, of the sort that the EFU had not attracted earlier. The problem was not simply that women’s intensified drive for political rights was threatening but that a segment of the patriarchal culture, anchoring its ideology and politics in a conservative reading of Islam, had been gaining momentum in the 1930s and 1940s… Feminist activism in its most symbolically threatening form, a suffrage movement, and patriarchy at its most conservative, were on a collision course.\textsuperscript{113}

Despite the inevitable reproval from the conservative elements of a profoundly religious society, however, women did make some gains during the period. These included a rise in the number of jobs made available to women. In 1923, the government granted equal secondary education for girls too, and in 1924 the minimum marriage age for both sexes was raised (it was set at 16 for girls and 18 for boys). 1929 was also the first year that women were allowed to go to university. By the time World War II started, there was a marked curtailment in all political activity, and this had a profound effect on the fortunes of women in society. Saiza Nabarawi’s journal \textit{L’Égyptienne} was forced out of business, for example. By the end of the war, however, women had established the Arab Feminist Union in Cairo, with Huda Sha’arawi as the federation’s president.\textsuperscript{114}

The growth and dissemination of a literary culture among middle-class Egyptian women at the turn of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century was tied up in a feminist awakening in the country. Nationalist aspirations were part and parcel of this movement, with women using pride in country and their fellow citizens as means of expressing themselves as feminists. An irony is that this

\textsuperscript{113}\textit{Ibid.}, p.218.
\textsuperscript{114}\textit{Ibid.}, p.244.
feminist advancement was largely overlooked by Egypt scholars while the writings of male intellectuals on feminism at the time were given more historical prominence.

Charities and other associations combined with women’s literature and other forms of argumentation to promote a nationalist strife linked to feminist action. The participation of middle and upper-class women in a wide range of activities in the years leading up to 1919 suggests that women’s involvement in the 1919 revolution was more the result of a historical trend, rather than a radical new phenomenon. As they increased their undertaking, many felt as they were an integral part of a national endeavour against British control. What is less clear is exactly how much impact these women’s groups had on the nationalist entreprise. There is little doubt, however, that influential nationalist literature was propagated by fronts managed by women, along with ideas by word of mouth. So it was that women created a place for themselves in the fight for independence, albeit more of a guiding, moral role than an overtly political one.

Privileged women also saw taking up a public duty as a means of voicing their concerns while displaying loyalty towards men engaged in the strive towards independence. The 1919 revolution, led by the Wafdist Sa’ad Zaghlul, was a flagship opportunity for women to show that their aspirations lay beyond their own societal rights as women. Instead they wanted to demonstrate that they were just as capable of working towards Egyptian sovereignty as their fellow male patriots. Veiled female agitators led by Huda Sha’arawi confronted the British, exhibiting their solidarity with all Egyptian nationalists, and particularly the Wafd party. These early female mobilisations – the first of their kind – certainly helped precipitate the qualified withdrawal of the British from Egypt in 1922.

However, following nominal independence the same year, many male Egyptian nationalists effectively discarded women activists who had offered them so much allegiance. Feminists were in turn forced to face up to an unavoidable reality – to succeed they needed to form their own independent political movement.
Conclusion

A struggle motivated by an “Egypt for Egyptians” spirit finally achieved nominal independence for the country in the first half of the 20th century. Through focusing on this sense of “oneness” this thesis has shown how the rise of nationalism on both mass and elite opinion before, during and after the First World War, was channeled towards success.

This study has demonstrated that the Egyptian nationalist movement developed through and beyond the quelling of the ‘Urabi Revolt by the British army in 1882. The mutiny had begun as an effort to restore the rights of native Egyptian military officers, but turned into a full-blown protest against far broader injustices. Colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi, who led the revolt, highlighted his country’s unique cultural identity. Beyond this, elite Muslim scholars took part in the uprising. These ‘ulama provided the religious and intellectual rationales for the growing Egyptian nationalism.

Despite the short term failure of the ‘Urabi Revolt, this thesis discussed the immediate pre- and post-First World War contexts that bolstered calls for self-government in Egypt so significantly. The British Occupation, and the particularly violent behavior of British soldiers during the Taba Crisis and the Dinshawai Incident in 1906, had caused widespread anger and the increased politicization of Egyptians. The country’s educated classes propagated radical thoughts, creating a vigorous militantism that would eventually spur society towards the 1919 Revolution.

The activists were also to become preoccupied by the impact the Great War had on the political awareness of a colonized people. As so often throughout human history, war was a huge catalyst of change. The Wafd Party’s novel brand of nationalism – one which caught the British by surprise – was based on the legacy of Egypt’s extensive contribution to the global war. The hostilities exposed the country to a range of previously unheard of hardships, and indeed altered its entire social make-up. Anti-British sentiment escalated under the Protectorate because of the widely held belief that the land had been pillaged by a colonising power. This stirred the nationalist consciousness as the British presence had expanded from a “Veiled Protectorate” to direct “Wartime Imperialism”.

Conclusion

The effendiya – in essence the aspirational middle-classes – continuously participated in politics during the war. The ground was prepared for them by the fastest growth of mass education since Muhammad ‘Ali’s reign. Oppression under the British Occupation also gave them ideas about how to win over and organise people. Both men and women reacted to changes in Egypt’s social, economic and political landscape, uniting around a common language, and a shared culture as they expressed dissent.

The thesis argues, in particular, that conflict transformed the nationalist movement from one mainly involving a small elite based in Cairo into one supported by an extremely broad cross-section of socio-economic groups, including many from the countryside. An overwhelming feeling of dissatisfaction built up, with radicals constantly looking for a time and place to act. Crucially, those advocating a powerful Egyptian identity received backing from the country’s non-Muslim communities. This new sense of nationalism was an explicitly secular one, bringing together all indigenous Egyptians including the Coptic Christian minority.

Meanwhile, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson had internationalised the rhetoric of self-determination in pursuit of a new world order – a factor that was a huge boost to the Egyptian nationalists. The words of the American head of state were an inspiration to them as they perceived the idealism of the post-war era as a chance to advance their opposition to rule by British Empire forces. It was in fact Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the Russian Bolshevik chief, who had theorised the concept of “self-determination”, before Wilson globalised it as a “legitimising” ambition. The two men certainly generated an “international self-determination moment” that would benefit the anti-colonial movement in Egypt.

Beyond the principles contained in Wilson’s Fourteen Points, Egyptian nationalist leader Sa’ad Zaghlul had emphasised the deep contradiction between discourse in Paris at the 1919 Peace Conference and British oppression on the ground. The United Kingdom’s Foreign Office had sent the Special High Commissioner General Sir Edmund Allenby to Egypt. Allenby was tasked with maintaining security across the country. He set about this by combining military brutality to safeguard peace in the countryside, while displaying apparent tolerance towards urban demonstrations of nationalism. Specifically, he allowed Sa’ad Zaghlul and other senior Wafid Party members to be released after they were detained and then deported to Malta, so that they could attend the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.
Conclusion

The thesis has illustrated how civic nationalism resulted in people championing the common good of all Egyptians. However, those who led the 1919 Revolution perceived no direct connection between what they were striving to do at home and what nationalists in other Arab countries were trying to achieve. This lack of parallel nationalism was evident in both the ideology and the action of the revolutionaries. The revolt did, nonetheless, include a forceful feminist element. It did not bring about emancipation, but women’s anger at this need of progress helped to drive the establishment of a formal women’s movement.¹ Rebellion culminated in the transformation of Anglo-Egyptian colonial relations, as Egypt was granted nominal independence in 1922.

The reaction of the British to the wide-scale turmoil of March and April 1919 was to send Alfred Milner, the Colonies Secretary, to conduct an enquiry. His commission focused on the future of Egypt, but was met with overwhelming antagonism by nationalists. With cooperation refused, and the prevailing order rejected, Milner had concluded by February 1921 that the Protectorate could no longer operate effectively. He instead advised Lord Curzon, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, that nominal independence should be regarded as a viable option for Egypt.

Despite Milner’s recommendation, there was still a strong desire in London to retain control of the Suez Canal, and other key assets – a position that conflicted with what the Egyptian people wanted. This huge discrepancy between the two views was reflected in the manner in which Britain was prepared to concede nominal independence. Securing strategic interests remained the priority of the British, who guaranteed they were still responsible for defence and foreign policy, especially as they continued to occupy the crucial Suez Canal Zone. Sa’ad Zaghlul meanwhile kept on coordinating resistance across Egypt.

It was on February 28th 1922 that Field Marshal Edmund Allenby ensured that the London government issued a unilateral declaration of Egyptian independence. The subsequent Anglo-Egyptian Treaty deemed Egypt ‘a sovereign independent state’ with four notable exceptions: ‘the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt’, ‘the defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect’, ‘the protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities’ and ‘the Sudan’.²

²Vatikiotis, *op. cit.*, *The History of Modern Egypt*, p.263.
Conclusion

Research in this thesis deliberately analysed events mainly from the point of view of indigenous Egyptians, rather than solely through outsiders who have written original histories of this period. In equally contemporary fashion, it has contended that the revolution exemplified the strength of both elitist and populist circles working together. This was manifested in the grievances of the highbrow Egyptians who eventually made their way to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, as well as in the columns of the journalists who fuelled Egypt’s burgeoning popular press. All played a crucial part in obtaining Egypt’s nominal independence, attempting a largely peaceful approach to political change in a campaign of civil disobedience that was to influence, among others, Mahatma Gandhi in India.

This work forms a pertinent case study of all types of nationalism throughout the 20th century and beyond, and particularly Arab nationalism. It concludes that a nationalist movement cannot operate in a vacuum so, naturally, must be investigated within the social, political and economic developments of the country in which it took shape and thrived. Egyptian nationalism gained an unstoppable momentum, leading to a genuinely popular uprising considered as the first modern revolution.
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