The London School of Economics and Political Science

A CITY YET TO COME

A STORY OF ARAB JERUSALEM 1948–1967

Haneen Naamneh

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ABSTRACT

This thesis introduces a historical documentation of Arab Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967. Following the Nakba in 1948, mandate Jerusalem was partitioned into an Arab city and a Jewish city. The western neighbourhoods of Jerusalem were occupied by Israel, while the Old City and the eastern neighbourhoods outside the walls were annexed to Jordan. These parts became known as Arab Jerusalem, a polity that was shaped by the Palestinian residents, the municipality and other social institutions, as well as the Jordanian government.

The thesis documents the history of the (re)making of Arab Jerusalem after the Nakba, including its urban revival and development. This historical documentation sheds light on dimensions of communal dynamics and urban revival after 1948, which are not thoroughly documented in Palestinian narratives on the Nakba. The thesis illuminates the ways in which Arab Jerusalem represented a state of in-betweenness during the first two decades after the Nakba, as a partitioned city of refugees located at the border with its lost homeland, while it sought at the same time to revive and become a productive space for its residents.

The historical documentation introduced in the thesis particularly engages with the struggle and efforts of the municipality under Jordanian rule, in light of the municipality's loss of the town hall and resources in the Israeli occupied part of the city in 1948. The thesis considers the history of the Jerusalem municipality from the late mandate period (1945–1948) through Jordanian rule and ends with the first few weeks following the Israeli occupation in 1967, when the Arab municipal council was dissolved.

For this documentation, the thesis relies primarily on the records of the Arab municipality, which are located at the Jerusalem Municipality Archive. In addition, it deploys historical materials collected from archives and libraries in Palestine, Israel and the United Kingdom.

IN MEMORY OF

ASEEL ASLEH

Who was shot dead by the Israeli police under an olive tree in our village, 'Arrabeh al-Baṭouf, on 2 October 2000, during a protest in the second Intifada. He was only 17 years old, just about to go to university and fulfil many other dreams.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

asylum in Germany, his passion to know Baghdad has not faded. I thank Omar for urging me to listen to Jerusalem, to write about it, and to believe in the power of our imaginations despite and beyond the ruins. Omar's love and faith in me, always reminding me لا بأس لا يأس, made this challenging journey a rewarding adventure. Together, we made it.

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

BMC – British Municipal Commission

CM – [Municipal] Council Minutes

CZA – Central Zionist Archives

ISA – Israel State Archive

JMA – Jerusalem Municipality Archive

KA – Knesset Archive

MJM – Mandate Jerusalem Municipality

PASSIA – Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs

PLO – Palestinian Liberation Organization

TMC – Temporary Municipal Council (1948)

TNA – The National Archive of the UK

UNRWA – United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

YBZL – Yad Ben Zvi Library

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PART I: WRITING ARAB JERUSALEM

Chapter 1

Looking for Arab Jerusalem

Introduction

And here thou sees us – we, who were receded – running from cliff to cliff in order to stop the receding of the edges away from us; lest we see the edgeless present.

– Saleem Barakat, *Two Autobiographies*[1]

The city of Jerusalem is not merely a place, but a time as well.

– Jabra Ibrahim Jabra, *Jerusalem*[2]

On 15 March 1967, the Arab Town Organization was inaugurated in the city of Kuwait. Representatives of the Jerusalem municipality were invited, together with those from Amman to represent Jordan, along with 33 Arab cities (Municipality of Kuwait, list of invited municipalities, undated, JMA 952-25). The delegation of the Jerusalem municipality included mayor Ruhi al-Khatib, his assistant Anton Safieh, and the city engineer, Yusif Budeiri, the latter two of whom both served in the British mandate municipality of Jerusalem. The Organization was an initiative of the municipality of Kuwait to 'achieve effective cooperation at the level of Arab municipalities to study, research and address the problems facing these municipalities due to rapid urban development and the need to unify the urban and planning concepts of these cities and work to maintain their distinctive character' (Report of General Secretary on the inauguration conference, 15/3/1967, JMA 952-25 (hereafter, Report on the inauguration conference, 15/3/1967)).

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[1] Barakat, 1998.

[2] Jabra, 2004.

Over the four days of the conference, the delegations discussed various issues related to urban local administration and planning. This included discussion of a study by the renowned Palestinian urban planner Saba George Shiber,[3] who was a consultant in the planning council of Kuwait City, on the technical problems of planning in Arab villages and cities and ways to address them (Study of Saba Shiber, 20/1/1967, JMA 953-39).

In his study, Shiber reviewed the distinguishing features of the Arab City while referring to, among other cities, his hometown of Jerusalem, particularly the Old City, as a 'great example of the Arab City that is still in an excellent state of preservation and cleanness'. He called attention to its wall, which 'was excellently kept and constitutes yet another example of the Arab City's features' (ibid, p.10). Shiber further emphasized Jerusalem's unique location near the Old City in a 'beautiful and rolling land' (ibid, p.16).

Shiber had a vision for the future development of Jerusalem and so did the Jerusalem municipality delegation – particularly mayor Ruhi al-Khatib, who was a leading figure in the development of Arab Jerusalem. After the loss of the modern New City during the Nakba in 1948, two decades of struggle to rebuild the city and its image had followed. Projecting partitioned Arab Jerusalem as part of an Arab urban scene and contextualizing it within the national post-colonial Arab modernity of the 1960s was crucial for re-establishing the city.

The Jerusalem municipality delegation participated in the conference's subcommittees, which discussed common local governance affairs in Arab cities and exchanged knowledge and expertise with other municipalities (Report on the inauguration conference, 15/3/1967). This was particularly important for the representatives of Arab Jerusalem, as a team of Arab urban planners was supposed to

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[3] Shiber was born in Jerusalem in 1923. He graduated from the American University in Beirut in 1944 and received a master's degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a PhD in urban planning from Cornell University in 1956. Shiber was the leading figure in theorizing and conceptualizing the post-colonial Arab urban scene in the 1960s, especially the city of Kuwait. He published several books and essays in Arabic and English on urban development of the Arab City (al-Kanderi, 2018; al-Ragam, 2011).

visit the city at the end of June that year to begin working on the Greater Jerusalem master plan (Letter from the Jerusalem governor to the mayor, 3/6/1967, JMA 952-28).

Less than three months after the conference, on 7 June 1967, Israel occupied Arab Jerusalem. Three weeks later, it dissolved the city's elected municipal council. In March 1968, Israel deported mayor al-Khatib to Jordan. From his position in exile, al-Khatib symbolically represented the dissolved municipality in the second conference of the Arab Town Organization in 1968 (Jihad, 2011, p.9). Sadly, Shiber died that year at the age of 45. Jerusalem retains its membership in the Organization to this day.

This story and its timing represent the life of the city that developed between 1948 and 1967 in the eastern parts of Jerusalem and became known as 'Arab Jerusalem'. Despite being overshadowed by the Nakba, the history of Arab Jerusalem represents a unique case of struggle and survival. Even today, while the city and its Palestinian inhabitants struggle under Israeli colonial violence, the Arab City refuses to fade. The travails of this city constitute a lost and forgotten story. To recover parts of its history, this thesis has undertaken the uneasy task of telling a story of Arab Jerusalem.

Jerusalem after 1948: Inquiry and Context

'Arab Jerusalem'[4] refers to the parts of Jerusalem, including the Old City, that came under the control of Jordan in 1948 and were annexed to its territory in 1950. Arab Jerusalem is a polity that arose between 1948 and 1967 as a frontier city located on the armistice line with Israel. It was materially and conceptually shaped by the local social, political and economic dynamics of its Palestinian residents, the municipality and other social institutions, as well as by the Jordanian government. Through the particular case of Arab Jerusalem, this thesis pursues the overarching question of how Palestinians continued to reproduce their material worlds, discourses and meanings,

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[4] I refer to 'Arab Jerusalem' and 'the Arab City' interchangeably. This study will track the transformation of the adjective 'Arab' as it was transferred from the colonial era under the mandate rule between 1917 and May 1948, transformed into a local and regional frame between 1948 and 1967, and then violently replaced with the adjective 'East' under Israeli colonial rule in 1967.

as well as imagining their future, in the immediate aftermath of the Nakba and particularly during the first two decades after 1948.

In order to unpack the particularity of this polity and its making, the thesis addresses the following questions: How did the events of the Nakba in 1948 affect Jerusalem? How did the city cope with the loss of Palestine and the New City?[5] What social, legal, political and material infrastructure, institutions and systems did the city inherit from the mandate period? How did the city, its residents and local leadership engage with the Jordanian state? What challenges did they encounter? What forms of urban revival did the city witness? Answering these questions has helped me to address more theoretically the question of what Arab Jerusalem was conceptually, legally, socially, politically and economically between 1948 and 1967.

To address those questions, this thesis relies on the rich records of the municipality of Arab Jerusalem.[6] Through these records, the thesis was able to track the suffering of the city's residents following the loss of Palestine in 1948, as well as the process of (re)making the city after it was partitioned. As an essential institution in the city, the municipality's history occupies a central position in telling this story. Given the loss of its town hall and resources in the parts of the city occupied by Israel in 1948, the struggle of the municipality reflects in many ways the history of the city itself.

My main argument in the thesis is that the (re)making of Arab Jerusalem after the Nakba reflects a state of in-betweenness of the Palestinians who remained in the localities that were not destroyed in 1948, yet lived under the conditions of national loss. Arab Jerusalem is particularly representative of this in-betweenness, as the city was subjected to a physical and discursive partition between a lost past and an aspirational future. On the one hand, life in Arab Jerusalem became determined by political, material and conceptual loss. It was a city of refugees located at the border with its lost homeland under the rule of Jordan. On the other hand, after 1948, Jerusalem's Palestinian residents reclaimed their right to the city (or the parts that

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[5] The term 'New City' will be used in this thesis to refer to the parts of mandate Jerusalem that Israel occupied in 1948. The New City is known today as West Jerusalem. It was home for many Palestinian families until 1948 and it constituted the administrative centre of the British mandate in Palestine from 1917 to 1948.

[6] I refer to the 'Arab Jerusalem municipality' interchangeably as the 'Arab municipality'.

remained) – including their right to self-rule, which they were deprived of during the late mandate period.

The efforts of Palestinians to build and develop Arab Jerusalem after the Nakba, as reflected by the archives, show aspects of political practice, agency and identity that have been largely underappreciated. Arab Jerusalem, as a locality that was not depopulated in 1948, became a space of negotiations over the erasure and restoration of Palestine under conditions imposed by Jordanian rule and Israeli colonization in 1948. Negotiations with the Jordanian state over politics, identity and material resources, as well as negotiations within the city between various local institutions and the public, created Arab Jerusalem as a context and a frame to imagine the future while still immersed in the past.

The production of the city and the struggle to make it a productive locale for the residents and refugees was at the heart of Palestinian world-making and identity during the early aftermath of the Nakba. Thus, the significance of Arab Jerusalem then and now transcends mere material survival. The history of Arab Jerusalem demonstrates that Palestinian identity was neither suspended in 1948 nor halted until the Palestinian national movement was revived in the mid-1960s. Rather, imagining, thinking, producing and struggling for the future was a constitutive political element in the making of the city after the Nakba.

The main contribution of this thesis lies in its in-depth empirical, conceptual and methodological intervention in telling a story of Arab Jerusalem. The historical documentation presented in the thesis is mostly new; it illuminates wide-ranging aspects of living in Arab Jerusalem after the Nakba and tells the story of the municipality's archive. Conceptually, it introduces a nuanced analysis of the historical materials through aspects of agential politics and temporal experiences after the Nakba. Finally, the thesis deploys a methodological approach that captures the local vantage point through archives, tracing details and images that document the process of making the Arab City and the groups that were involved in this process.

Upon the UN announcement of the Partition Plan for Palestine in November 1947, the city of Jerusalem became a battlefield divided into security zones. Local administration was weakened throughout the following months, and the Arab residents and political leadership refused to cooperate with the British-appointed municipal commission that had ruled the city between 1945 and 1948. Following the announcement of the Partition Plan, local residents, along with the Arab Higher Committee (which constituted the political leadership of Palestinians), established committees to regulate essential aspects of life for the city's residents.

In mid-May 1948, the mandate government left Palestine, the western parts of the city were occupied by Israel, and the Old City and its surrounding areas were annexed to Jordan, together with the rest of the territories of central Palestine; these became known as the West Bank of the Jordan River. Jerusalem was partitioned into an Arab city and a Jewish city, the border between which was marked by an armistice line agreed by Israel and Jordan in April 1949.

Central Palestinian cities – including Jerusalem, Hebron and Nablus – and their residents were legally and politically defined as Jordanian and the title Palestine was dropped from maps and textbooks. Jordan's political attitude towards Palestine before, during and after 1948 had affected the lives of Palestinian inhabitants who became part of the West Bank polity. These inhabitants – including the middle-class and elite strata who were integrated into Jordan's civil service and political life – had to negotiate their location and manoeuvre between a Jordanian present and a Palestinian past, at a time when the Palestinian national movement of the 1960s was not yet on the horizon.

The location of Jerusalem in Jordan's politics affected its local authority, as the Jordanian government sought to empower Amman as the capital of its rising nation-state. As a result, Jerusalem was constantly negotiating its location within Jordanian politics and administration in relation to status, authority in municipal administration, identity, and – most pressingly – funding and development. Unlike other Palestinian cities in the West Bank, Jerusalem's partition and the occupation of the New City resulted in the Arab City's loss of essential urban institutions and infrastructure. This

urban destruction aggravated the situation of thousands of Palestinian refugees who sought shelter in the city.

Most prominent was the loss of the municipal town hall and resources, which remained in the New City. In November 1948, Jordan appointed the first municipal council in Jerusalem after a group of senior municipal workers took it upon themselves to organize the city's urgent urban affairs between May and November 1948. The appointment of a municipal council in November 1948 marked the renewal of self-rule in Arab Jerusalem, which had for several years been deprived of local authority under the British mandate administration.

Between 1948 and 1967, the Jerusalem municipality, which became a 'refugee-institution'[7] during the Nakba, was able to maintain itself as a social institution despite its political and financial deprivation. It actively contributed to building Arab Jerusalem alongside a network of residents, refugees and natives, village inhabitants, social institutions, professional unions, and local men of capital who engaged within the city. Given the large-scale destruction and loss of the Arab City in the 1948 war, including the lack of urban infrastructure and restrictive mandate colonial planning policies, most projects and activities that took place after the war – particularly in the first decade – were concerned with recovering the destroyed infrastructure and economy, as well as aiding the poor and the refugees.

Simultaneously, the city witnessed extensive urban revival that extended beyond its geopolitical position as a partitioned city under Jordanian rule. The most remarkable aspects of this revival included the development of tourism through hotel construction beginning in 1949 and the opening of the Jerusalem Airport in 1950, which positioned the city on a regional and international map of connectivity and transformed the city's local economy and social fabric. The flourishing tourism industry in Arab Jerusalem exemplifies the city's ability to deploy its symbolic and material resources after the Nakba, in order to rebuild its economy and render the city a liveable and productive space for its residents.

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[7] I introduce this concept in chapter 4 as an analytical category to examine the loss of the Jerusalem municipality as part of the overall experiences of refuge in 1948.

At the peak of the city's development, on 7 June 1967, Israel occupied Arab Jerusalem and imposed Israeli civic law on its residents, whom it defined as 'permanent residents'.[8] Israel also dissolved the Arab municipal council and deported much of the city's political leadership. This dissolution was exclusive to Jerusalem and did not extend to the municipalities of other cities of the West Bank. The municipal council's dissolution, along with other measures Israel has imposed in Jerusalem since 1967, was intended to dismantle Arab Jerusalem and deprive its Palestinian residents of their right to self-rule in the city, while exploiting Jerusalem's infrastructure and symbolic status to render the city an Israeli one.

Looking for an Arab City

This research was enriched not only by archives but also by Arabic, my native language, which has been the torch in my journey and the compass for its orientation. Arabic for me is the condition of imagination, the frame of reference, and the marker of time that has preserved the meanings, voices and shapes of a Palestine that I do not know. It is through Arabic that I think about and make sense of the world. It is what enables and shapes how I imagine and contemplate Arab Jerusalem.

In 2011, after spending almost a decade studying and practising law in Hebrew and embarking on master's studies in law at SOAS, I decided to return to Arabic. I began writing essays in Arab platforms that reached Arab cities such as Beirut and Baghdad, which are beyond physical reach for Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship. Reclaiming writing and thinking in Arabic opened a new horizon beyond the colonial Israeli landscaping of Palestine and the distorted space-time of the so-called 'Arab villages'[9] and 'mixed cities'.[10] Although I myself was not displaced, I share the

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[8] This has been Israel's legal definition of the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem since 1967. The revocable status treats Palestinian residents as newcomers and subjugates them to constant violent monitoring in order to prove their eligibility to reside in the city.

[9] The term 'Arab villages' is used by Israeli authorities to distinguish the Palestinian villages and towns that were not displaced in 1948 from Jewish-inhabited towns. Between 1948 and 1966, these localities and their residents were under Israeli military rule and grew into underdeveloped and suffocated spaces. Since 1948, no new Palestinian town has been established, except for several towns to 'relocate' the Bedouin residents from their villages in the Naqab.

[10] The term 'mixed cities' was used by the British mandate authorities in Palestine to describe towns that included Palestinian and Jewish inhabitants. Since 1948, the term has been used by Israeli authorities and in the literature to refer to the cities from which not all Palestinian residents were

collective experience of deprivation of a Palestinian city – a city with an Arab university and a national library, where the public space speaks our language and where a wider cultural Arab context is just a few stops away by train.

For me, the city occupies a productive site in my imagination. The exercise of imagining an uncolonized Palestine by asking what if the Nakba had never happened is not new. While living in Jerusalem for three years, I constantly wondered how such an astonishing city might be if it had not been colonized. The lines between imagining, idealizing and orientalising the city are fine ones. How can we imagine and read Arab Jerusalem, even today, between the lines of the colonial language and text, and apart from romanticism and the ideal images of the ruined past [al-aṭlal]?

This research began from two seemingly contradictory worlds in which I was involved: law and writing. I say 'seemingly' because, although both are different, law and writing create narratives of people, time and space. The present in Jerusalem is heavily burdened with the debris of lives, houses, hopes and histories. Lawyers know the best about (and often contribute to) the legal violence that has targeted the city's Palestinian residents since 1948, which has rendered them refugees and 'absentees'. Legal violence has persisted. Since 1967, when Israel rendered the rest of the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem refugees-in-suspension, Palestinians have become a native population whose right to reside in their own city is revocable. This story has become the most dominant – almost the singular – narrative of Jerusalem.

But whose story is this? Is it the story of Jerusalem's Palestinian residents, or of those who have the power to relegate a city and its residents to precarious legal categories? How do we break free from the colonial imagination and construct a different narrative, amid a world of violence that banishes you, in plural, from time, space, memory and the self?

One of the most persistent challenges in knowing Palestine today, and over the last half a century at least, is that much of our thinking about Palestine and Palestinians is

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displaced in 1948, including Haifa, Lydda and Ramleh. Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics defines 'mixed cities' as 'urban localities that have a large majority of Jews, but also have a considerable minority of Arabs' (Statistical Abstract of Israel, Population, 2018, Israel Central Bureau of Statistics website).

mediated through our legal subjectivities: refugees, absentees, permanent residents, Arab citizens, Palestinian citizens of Israel, 67/48/Jerusalem/blue/green ID, and residents in areas A, B, C, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, Arab villages, mixed cities and so on. These categories alienate us as we strive to think of a narrative that breaks through their persistence.

This thesis is partly a journey into the self – a journey taken to make sense of being a part of Palestine that was not displaced in 1948, yet whose history was overshadowed by the violence of the Nakba and the colonial destruction of the Palestinian world. The Nakba has also burdened my private time, as I was born on 15 May – the Nakba anniversary. This coincidence has, perhaps, constantly pushed me to search for a crack in the wall to see beyond the Nakba. Is that possible at all?

During the three years that I worked in the field of so-called legal aid in Jerusalem, I became more vigilant of the authority of law, among other dimensions of colonial rule, to narrate and to dominate through narration. In Jerusalem, it is 1967, not 1948, that became the signifier of Palestinian history. Yet again, this narrative was not that of the native residents nor of their city. The violence of the 1967 war and occupation overshadowed the stories of the Palestinian residents who lived through, shaped, resisted and negotiated it.

Thus, my initial departure point in this thesis was studying and documenting the events of 1967, through the perspectives and experiences of the Palestinian generation who lived the transformation imposed by the Israeli occupation in 1967. I hoped that such an examination would produce a Palestinian narrative that challenges the abstract narrative produced by Israeli law and politics and recover untold stories of the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem.

Accordingly, the first phase of my research focused on researching the events and memories of the 1967 war. I spent three months in summer 2016 mapping and collecting materials from Palestinian and Israeli archives and libraries related to post-1967 Jerusalem. The libraries of the Institute of Palestine Studies, the Is'af al-Nashashibi Centre, the Kenyon Institute and the Israel National Library constituted the main source for secondary literature.

This included extensive research in the Israel State Archive (online and physically), the Israel Defence Forces Archives and the Jerusalem Municipality Archive. I benefited from my previous experience in archival research for my legal work, as well as from consulting some secondary resources on archival strategies, methods and techniques (Reid and Paisley, 2017; Farge, 2013; Hill, 1993).

In the summer of 2017, I returned to Palestine for a second phase of fieldwork research. I conducted twenty-five interviews with Palestinian residents of Jerusalem concerning their memories of the 1967 occupation. The interviewees included lawyers, teachers and housewives who told me about the events of the war and life since then.

In the background of these conversations and documents, there was life before 1967 under Jordanian rule. Although I asked some of the interviewees about life during the Jordanian period, and at times people voluntarily referred to it, this nevertheless remained on the margins of these interviews. When I later listened to the interviews, read my notes, and skimmed through the archival materials, I became aware of the *absence* of what is known as 'Arab Jerusalem'.

Recognizing this absence marks the crucial shift in the intellectual and empirical basis of this thesis. I realized that writing a Palestinian history of 1967 would never be complete and would not do justice to the city without a history of Arab Jerusalem. What was it that was occupied in 1967? What was the experience of living in the partitioned city between 1948 and 1967? After 1967, what were the continuities and the interruptions in people's lives anchored in Arab Jerusalem?

These questions and more haunted me as I made my way back to the Jerusalem Municipality Archive. I also conducted further research in the Is'af al-Nashashibi Library and the Israel National Library in order to collect documents concerned with the period between 1948 and 1967. Finally, I examined the collections of the Yad Ben Zvi Library in relation to the first weeks following the 1967 occupation.

I was struck by the fact that, despite being in the Jerusalem Municipality Archive many times, I had not been attentive enough to the Arab municipality files. There were practical reasons for this, such as time limitations and being so invested in the events

of 1967. But this distraction was also due to the politics of the archive and its 'chaotic' order, as I explain in chapter 3.

In the Jerusalem Municipality Archive, random boxes of the Arab municipality records[11] were piled in front of me. I photocopied everything I could. Like all visitors to colonial archives, I did not know whether these were all the files that were held by the archive. One of the most 'organized' sets of files was the Arab municipal council minutes, which were in order and complete, except for two missing years. These minutes constituted a diary of the city as it emerged week by week and street by street, chronicling its existence while its residents encountered many challenges as they raced in different directions.

A whole world was unfolding in front of me. Excitement, disappointment, joy and sadness were all floating around and enshrouding me. Thus, this thesis came to life as an answer to the question of 'what was Arab Jerusalem like?'. It was a focus on the experience and events of Arab Jerusalem that replaced my initial question about what was occupied in 1967. The story to be told was no longer about the colonization of the city in 1967 or 1948, but rather about the city in its many dimensions and the Arab experience of it.

Upon returning to the UK in fall 2017, I examined files relevant to Arab Jerusalem at the UK National Archives, as well as the historical newspapers *al-Difa'* and *Falastin* at the British Library. I also conducted research at the SOAS library and at the British Library for relevant secondary materials in Arabic, Hebrew and English.

Overall, I spent five months of fieldwork research in Palestine and another three months in the UK. In this thesis, I rely mainly on the archival materials that were collected during the second phase of the fieldwork concerning the period 1948–1967, particularly the records of the Arab municipality. The interviews and the archival materials related to Jerusalem after 1967 will be deployed in a future study.

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[11] I interchangeably refer to these as the 'Arab files'.

Tracing History in Arab Jerusalem: Sources and Methodology

This section discusses the methodology deployed in reading and analysing the Arab municipality records and other resources. The primary consideration in deploying the Arab records, combining them with other resources, and reading them through discourse analysis is to recover local voices and memories. This approach seeks to escape reading the Palestinians in Jerusalem during 1948–1967, and at other times, as merely *objects* of governance. Instead, it seeks to engage with them as 'subjects who take an active role in the construction of their own history' (Doumani, 1995, p.9).

The Arab Municipality Records

Within the colonial world of the Jerusalem Municipality Archive lie the records of the Arab municipality. The records are 'locally generated sources' (Doumani, 2009, p.8) that document various aspects of life in Jerusalem after the Nakba. Beshara Doumani states in his introduction to *Rediscovering Palestine* that in local sources, unlike central-state records, 'the inhabitants come across as *subjects* who take an active role in the construction of their own history'. Other central archives and sources, however, are limited in this sense, as 'they portray the inhabitants of Palestine as *objects* to be ordered, organized, taxed, conscripted, counted, ruled, observed, and coopted' (1995, p.9).

In their introduction to *Ordinary Jerusalem*, Angelos Dalachanis and Vincent Lemire acknowledge particular characteristics of local archives, such as being 'repetitive' and 'requiring extra analytical efforts', but stress that 'these are the only sources that allow for a thorough re-examination of the historical stereotypes of the city' (2018, p.4).

The Arab municipality records span nineteen years of municipal work between 1948 and 1967. The General Administration records include records of the departments of engineering, finance, water, electricity, education, tourism and more. They also include a large number of media items concerned with local affairs, as well as leaflets, memorandums and vision documents concerned with the future of the city.

Most importantly, these records include the minutes of the municipal council's meetings (hereafter, the minutes), which this thesis relies on extensively. The minutes

can be found in chronological order from July 1948 to May 1967, with the exception of the years 1958 and 1959, which could be either lost or inaccessible.

Despite the institutional loss in the 1948 war, the minutes demonstrate a bureaucratic continuity with the mandate legacy of institutional governance as they followed the same style of minute-taking. Around 5,000 pages of municipal meetings reveal the areas, rhythms and players involved in the production of the city during that period. They detail a material and discursive production of locality, such as the construction of public spaces, the development of infrastructure, the enforcement of law and order, and the creation of urban norms for Jerusalem as a tourist destination. As such, they are a valuable source to track the emergence of the institution and the city in time and space after 1948.

They also convey different voices – particularly those of the council members, some of whom were more dominant than others. These include 'Arif al-'Arif and Ruhi al-Khatib, given their positions as mayors. Other voices arise from these minutes, including those of employees, politicians, merchants, lawyers, residents, vendors, school students and tourists.

Although the records provide the basis for an ethnographic account on the city's life, it was crucial to follow a guiding rule in order to ensure a critical engagement with them. As is usual in minute-taking, the final products do not reflect what actually took place. Therefore, 'something is always left out while something else is recorded' (Trouillot, 1995, p.49). This is particularly true given that the municipal council held closed meetings that were recorded in separate classified minutes, most of which were not available or accessible to me in the archive. One example on archival silence in the opened minutes is the absence of discussions on political affairs or events, which mostly were discussed in closed meetings. Therefore, the reader must be mindful of what happens behind the scenes of the minutes.

In fact, the minutes themselves are quite informative in this regard. They were taken by the city secretary or the city clerk (later retitled the mayor's assistant) in each meeting, and then typed into a particular format that showed the sequence of the

session, date, location,[12] attendees and absentees with reference to the reason for absence. These minutes were then reviewed and approved by the mayor before they were circulated among the council members for their approval in the following meeting, where corrections and additions were considered and made.

Some council members complained that the minutes did not reflect exactly what had been said in the meetings. In two different meetings, the mayor at the time, Ruhi al-Khatib, addressed the issue of minute-taking and approval. He explained the process and indicated that members had in the past notified him about mistakes and asked for corrections, stating that they were welcome to continue to do this as he was not 'infallible' (CM 6/3/1963, p.3, JMA 938-1).

In another meeting, al-Khatib responded to a similar complaint. He reiterated that it was impossible to register every single detail in the minutes, as that would require a recording machine and more staff to take notes, which the municipality did not have. Accordingly, he stated, they were only able to summarize what was said, unless a member asked for his comments to be transcribed verbatim to affirm his position (CM 31/3/1965, p.1, JMA 938-5).

These discussions emphasize the need for a critical reading of the minutes, mainly by seeking to construct a context for the events or activities being discussed, through other resources – most importantly, the other administrative files of the Arab municipality. These are divided into particular or general subjects, such as 'sewerage tax' or 'general instructions to the city residents'. Other files are related to particular events, such as 'the Nakba anniversary in 1966' or 'elections of the municipal committee in 1955'. Thus, whenever I sought to learn about an activity or event discussed in the minutes, I consulted these files.

The documents in these files vary in their type and authorship. While the majority were produced by the municipality staff, many other documents were collected from governmental authorities, the press, and other local and regional institutions. They also include correspondences and petitions from residents. Memorandums and reports on the municipality's history and work were extremely valuable in my research as they

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[12] Not all meetings took place at the municipality building.

produced a timeline, a framework, and a context for the overall work of the municipality and the city.

Petitions have been particularly important in local social history, as they represent 'a complex laboratory of different forms of *citadinité* coexisting sometimes in contradictory ways in the mixed city of Jerusalem' (Avci, Lemire and Ozdemir, 2018, p.162).[13] Petitions during the time of the Arab City functioned as a method of political participation, especially for those residents who were excluded from the suffrage. It should be noted, however, that not all petitions referred to in the thesis were reviewed in their original copies, as many were only mentioned or referred to in the council meetings when petitioners' concerns were discussed.

Other Archives and Sources

In the Jerusalem Municipality Archive, I also used the records of the mandate and the Israeli municipality to engage with the history of the municipality during the late mandate period (1945–1948) and the last weeks in the life of the Arab municipality after the Israeli occupation in 1967. The Israel State Archive and the British National Archives also constituted important resources on the mandate, the Arab City and the Israeli occupation.

During the three weeks following the Israeli occupation, the Arab municipality continued to function and to hold council meetings. However, those meetings are either not available or not accessible in the Arab municipality records in Jerusalem Municipality Archive, as they cannot be found in the minutes files of the Arab municipality records.

I retrieved some of these resources from the personal archive of Meron Benvenisti at the library of the Yad Ben-Zvi Institute in Jerusalem, although this was not without challenges. The main anxiety I encountered in handling these documents was the lack of the original Arabic documentation. Therefore, I had to rely on Hebrew translations, the accuracy of which remains in question given the colonial power relations and the

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[13] For more on the role of petitions in shaping urban citizenry, see Ben-Bassat, 2013; Lafi, 2011.

objectives behind their translation by the Israeli municipality employees or other officials.

In researching the early weeks after the occupation, I also relied on the personal notes of the mayor of Arab Jerusalem at the time, Ruhi al-Khatib. Beginning on 5 June 1967, in a small notebook holding the headings of the airline company *Alitalia*, al-Khatib embarked on writing short notes on the life of his municipality and city during the war and under the occupation. The last note is dated 5 January 1968, two months before Israel deported him to Jordan.

Figure 1: Notes of Ruhi al-Khatib during the first days of the Israeli occupation in 1967

(Source: al-Khatib, 2006, p.106)

The notes were published in 2006 in a volume marking the twelfth anniversary of al-Khatib's death, along with a collection of speeches and tributes from colleagues and other official figures (Abu-Jaber, 2006). They are an invaluable resource in learning about the events from a Palestinian perspective. Written during the weeks of occupation, the notes reveal the extent of anxiety and tension that Jerusalem's residents and leadership experienced under the occupation.

I supplemented the documents from the historical archives with important secondary academic resources and literary accounts – particularly Palestinian materials. The publications of the *Jerusalem Quarterly* in Arabic and English and the publications of the Institute of Palestine Studies on Jerusalem significantly enrich this research.

Given the dearth of secondary literature on the Jerusalem municipality and the Arab City, memoirs and personal reflections were particularly important in contextualizing the Arab records. Among these was the autobiography of Mahmoud Shqair, *A Different Shadow of the City* (2009), which is a timely account of Arab Jerusalem.

As Issam Nassar states in his introduction to the Ottoman memoirs of Wasif Jawhariyah, the importance of such memoirs is due to their authors being not only witnesses of an era but also active players in its events (Nassar and Tamari, 2003, p.4). Thus, the memoirs used in this thesis allowed an intimate examination of the active lives of citizens who made and wrote their city's story.

The thesis is extensively indebted to the rich historical local press in Jerusalem, particularly *al-Difa'* and *Falastin*. The historical press is crucial for social history since it is a 'valuable source for understanding issues of identity', providing a 'unique insight into an important segment of the population' (R. Khalidi, 2006, pp.90–91). As I will further explain in chapter 5, the local press played a very active role in the social and political life of the city. It covered activities of the municipality and became a space for public debates around urban affairs.

Furthermore, in cases of lost, inaccessible, disorganized or colonized local municipal archives, the municipal sections of the press help in 'reconstruct[ing] the inner workings of councils', as Jens Hanssen tells us in relation to his work on the municipal archive of Beirut, which was destroyed in a flood in 1983 (2018, p.270). I reviewed selective years of those sections, particularly focusing on the first years of the city's life after the Nakba, when these newspapers resumed their work in 1949. I also reviewed the Haifa-based *al-Itihad,* the Arabic newspaper of the Israeli communist party. The coverage in *al-Itihad* of local news in the West Bank after 1967 was crucial in order to grasp the viewpoints of the municipality and the Palestinian residents, given the suspension of the local Palestinian press by the Israeli military authorities following the occupation.

Finally, visual resources, including maps and photographs, have been deployed throughout the thesis. These were collected from various sources, including the Arab municipality records, secondary literature, photo collections of the Israel State Archive and the Library of Congress, and the maps collections of the Israeli National Library and the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs [PASSIA].

The presentation of press items and leaflets, mostly in Arabic, in the body of the thesis is not merely to confirm the text, but also to evoke the Arabic language as a generative element in the narration of the story. One particularly important aspect of this argument is related to the style and content of Arabic that was used in the Arab City, as opposed to the declining position and level of Arabic in the colonized Palestinian urban and public space since 1948 (Nashif, 2019). The presentation of Arabic texts thus urges the reader – especially Arabic-speakers – to imagine the linguistic space of the city, as well as imagining the Arabic language within the urban public space.

The use of photography in social history before 1948 'proves to be a powerful tool in rendering the past, for it gives specific glimpses, a timeless presence, and conjures up images of the wider social and cultural milieu of the time' (Sa'di, 2002, p.179). However, unlike the situation before 1948, photographic documentation of Palestine after the Nakba was poor. 'Arif al-'Arif's account *The Nakba in Photos* (1961) shows the importance of this documentation, while also emphasizing its absence. In Jerusalem in particular, the Palestinian photographers who actively documented the city before 1948 lost their shops upon the occupation of the New City in 1948, when most of these shops became part of No Man's Land (Nassar, 2006, p.91).

Producing the Archive as a Local Vantage Point

The beginnings of handling and making order in the archival records was overwhelming. I skimmed through all archival materials, including the council's minutes. Then I reread the minutes and created charts that summarized each meeting, while highlighting general themes, including past, future, Nakba, Palestine, development, space, law and infrastructure. Next, I read these analytical charts in conjunction with press items, memoirs and other archival materials.

When I had some familiarity with the major events, activities and sites of the Arab City, I started drawing a map with features and characters that emerged in the city space, including sketching people, animals, roads, pipes, wires and more. This imaginary map continued to expand and thicken as more details accumulated on the surface. At some point, I became lost. I did not know where to look and how to move in space and time. This is where a 'vantage point', to follow Arlette Farge, was needed to guide me throughout the map:

> [It] is not for the cleverest, most driven researcher to unearth some buried treasure, but for the historian to use the archives as a *vantage point* from which she can bring to light new forms of knowledge that would otherwise have remained shrouded in obscurity. (2013, p.54, emphasis added)

In reading and analysing the archival sources and writing a narrative based on them, I used the Arab municipality records to construct a local vantage point, through which a particular story could be told. Such a vantage point had to be reflected upon, tested, challenged and contested in order to come to life. What determines its contours? What story does it seek to tell?

In his introduction to the section 'Imperial Allegiances and Local Authorities' in *Ordinary Jerusalem*, Doumani raises the question of how a narrative on Jerusalem could transcend stories (over)determined by symbolism, the 'external impact of western hegemony', and the macro-narratives of traumatic events. He particularly wonders about the insertion of the Palestinian into such a narrative:

> How can Jerusalem's long-term inhabitants, inasmuch as they were a local demos (*ahāli*) under Ottoman and British imperial rule, be written into history *as agents* rather than as hapless observers or victims? (2018, p.139)

Further on in his essay, Doumani proposes an answer by framing Jerusalem's history 'in terms of a mutually constitutive relationship between *the ahali* and the state' (ibid). What is at stake in this proposed frame of narration is making space for the agency of the residents in order to reveal them in the city space, independently, and in relation to the institutions of governance that regulate their life. The agency of *al-ahali*[14] was

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[14] I use the Arabic term *al-ahali* interchangeably in this thesis to refer to the residents of Jerusalem. The meaning of al-ahali (or *al-ahlein*) includes citizens, inhabitants, nationals, natives, population, residents of a household, locality, country and so on (online dictionary of *al-Maany*).

not easy to recover from the municipality records, but a close examination of 'marginal' activities and groups sheds light on the constitutive relation between the different players in the city.

The activities that constituted a *process* of production of the city are dispersed over many spaces and times. By constructing and developing material and discursive social, economic and political infrastructure, *over* time, the city of Arab Jerusalem was produced. It is through this process that I became more aware of temporal orientation as a crucial agentic element (Emirbayer and Mische, 2002) for both the residents and their local institutions.

How can we create the archive as a local vantage point through the city's temporal orientation? Time in Arab Jerusalem was not a linear flow emerging from the past and leading into the future, given its partition and its state of in-betweenness; never completely in the past nor fully in the future. Therefore, in order to track the temporal constitution of these processes, I deployed a discourse analysis that particularly investigates notions of continuity and interruptions.

For this discourse analysis, it was important to carry out a 'negative work', according to Foucault, to 'rid ourselves of a whole mass of notions, each of which, in its own way, diversifies the theme of continuity' (2002, p.23). For instance, development, which is a dominant theme in the Arab records and in the production of the city, is one such notion that demands to be revisited as an exclusive and inherent signifier of continuity (ibid, p.24).

To understand the role of the municipality in the mutual relation with the residents and to grasp its temporal orientation, I considered it within the local social context and tracked how it experienced the Nakba. This led me to the story which gave birth to the concept of the refugee-institution. This was crucial for grasping the mutual relation between the residents and the institutions and to identify the shared frame within which they acted.

This approach helped in filtering out external vantage points, primarily that of Jordan's central state authorities. Furthermore, it allowed me to understand the position of the municipality beyond its role as an institution of local governance. Indeed, I addressed

the legal and bureaucratic tools that the municipality used to regulate the life of the residents. But, instead of examining them from above and from a distance, I tracked how these were 'folded into the life' of the city and its neighbourhoods (Das and Walton, 2015, p.44).

In conclusion, the thesis recovers parts of the story of Arab Jerusalem. It aims to contribute to the diverse Palestinian narratives on the experiences of 1948 by shedding light on different aspects of life in the shadow of the Nakba. It also seeks to contribute to thinking beyond the Nakba – an endless search that stretches the historical imagination beyond the colonial present.

This journey into the lost time of Arab Jerusalem is by no means a complete one. On the contrary, it is a beginning loaded with question marks and gaps. Now that I have completed reading the city's records and have written a story, I have more questions than answers. As such, this thesis only gives signposts for a much longer journey into the history of Arab Jerusalem.

Final Notes and Clarifications

There are five issues that this thesis is *not* about, although it touches upon and discusses some of their aspects. First, Jordan's political, social and economic history is not covered here, although I discuss relevant political events and their influence on Jerusalem's local history. Second, the thesis is not concerned with local governance per se, nor with the form of governance that the Arab municipality practised. It mainly approaches the municipality as a social institution and as a keeper of local memory, which its records – together with other historical resources, such as the local press – offers a story about the Arab City. Third, the thesis does not address infrastructure from a developmental point of view. Instead, it focuses on their historical making and their location within the city's social space. Fourth, the discourse of modernity and modernization is a dominant theme in the social history of Jerusalem. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to engage conceptually with the transformation of the meaning of modernity after the Nakba. Finally, the issue of holy places and the renovation plans that Jordan implemented during the period under study are not addressed in the thesis. This is primarily because the Arab municipal council minutes

rarely addressed these sites, as they were not directly under the authority of local governance.

Chapter Outline

This thesis is divided into four parts – Part I: Writing Arab Jerusalem; Part II: Colonial Times in Jerusalem; Part III: Making Arab Jerusalem; and Part IV: Dismantling Arab Jerusalem. The division is somewhat chronological, as the overall story unfolds and leads from the mandate era into the Jordanian era and ends with the Israeli occupation in 1967.

This chapter 1, Looking for Arab Jerusalem: Introduction, constitutes the opening of Part I. Chapter 2, Writing Jerusalem beyond the Nakba: Literature and Conceptual Review, discusses in its first section historiographical approaches to Jerusalem after the Nakba and the gaps in writing the history of Arab Jerusalem. The second section of the chapter discusses the contribution of the thesis to the history writing of the local history of Jerusalem during the first decades after the Nakba. In its last section, chapter 2 discusses the conceptual and thematic frames of the thesis, particularly in relation to the themes of space, time and agency.

Chapters 3 and 4 constitute Part II, which explains the background of the Jerusalem municipality both as an institution of governance and as an archive. Chapter 3, Occupying Local History: Contextualizing the Jerusalem Municipality Archive, introduces a historical documentation of the Jerusalem Municipality Archive and the Israeli seizure of the Arab municipality records in the 1967 war, after the municipality was dissolved.

Chapter 4, The Emergence of An Arab Municipality: Jerusalem's Local Governance in the Wake of the Nakba, constitutes the first substantive chapter in the thesis. In the first of its two sections, it discusses Jerusalem's local governance during the mandate era and describes the crisis in local administration that produced the division in local administration and led to the emergence of Arab Jerusalem. The second section of the chapter follows the fall of the New City, the loss of the town hall, and the municipal challenges that the city faced between mid-May and the end of November 1948. Most

importantly, it documents the story of the municipal employees' struggle to provide the city with elementary services in the immediate wake of the Nakba.

Part III is the heart of this thesis. As indicated by its title – Making Arab Jerusalem – it tells the story of the production of Arab Jerusalem after 1948. It brings together in three chapters (chapters 5 to 7) the *process of becoming* Arab Jerusalem from the official appointment of the municipal council by the Jordanian government in November 1948, until the last day of its rule in late May 1967. The three chapters are divided along the city's temporal orientation of present, past and future.

Chapter 5, The Present of Partitioned Jerusalem, introduces the making of Arab Jerusalem. The first section of this chapter discusses the city, its administration and its residents through their engagement with the Jordanian state, while focusing mainly on resuming local governance in Jerusalem. It also inquires into the ambivalent political relations that this created between local players and residents of the city and Jordan. The second section of the chapter examines the conceptual transformation of the Nakba and its 'commemorative practices' in Arab Jerusalem. It unpacks the meanings of the spatial partition of the city and its temporal representations.

Chapter 6, The Struggle with and for the Past, analyses how the city grasped the past, named it as a past, and came to terms with its conditions through two different frames. The first section of the chapter describes the social landscape of the Nakba in Jerusalem, with special focus on the refugee communities and the city's old and new institutional networks, particularly the role of the municipality. The second section examines the institutional loss of the municipality, particularly its legal infrastructure, through its perceptions of this particular infrastructure as a right of the past.

Chapter 7, Imagining and Making Futures in Arab Jerusalem, is a journey into the streets of the city, underneath its ground and along its borders. This long chapter introduces a micro-historical account of the city's development through which the future was imagined and projected. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first is an introduction on developing Arab Jerusalem. The second discusses the process of resuming water and electricity in Jerusalem after the Nakba. The third analyses the making of the commercial centre of Arab Jerusalem. The fourth engages with the issue of negotiating the use of the city's public space. The final section discusses the field

of tourism in Jerusalem while engaging with the precarious location of the city on the map of tourism between the Jerusalem Airport and the Mandelbaum Gate.

Part IV comprises chapters 8 and 9. Chapter 8, A Municipality under Occupation: The Colonization of Arab Jerusalem in 1967, tells the story of the municipality throughout the weeks leading to the Israeli decision to dissolve it at the end of June 1967. It contextualizes this dissolution within the colonial structure that Israel founded in Jerusalem in 1967 and locates the deprivation of the residents' self-rule as the first step towards the ongoing process of dismantling Jerusalem as an Arab City.

Chapter 9, A History of the Future: Conclusion, closes this thesis with a short discussion of the main themes with which it has engaged, particularly in relation to futurity and its importance for the discussion of agency and history-telling in the Palestinian context. It also suggests some further issues that should be addressed in future studies of Arab Jerusalem and Palestinian local history in general.

Chapter 2

Writing Jerusalem beyond the Nakba

Literature and Conceptual Review

> We are all amateur historians with various degrees of awareness about our production. We also learn history from similar amateurs. Universities and university presses are not the only loci of production of the historical narrative. (Trouillot, 1995, p.20)

The Historiography of Jerusalem after the Nakba

Writing Jerusalem after 1948

During a visit to South Africa in 1991, Edward Said, himself a refugee from Jerusalem in 1948, spotted a book in the office of Walter Sisulu, a leader of the African National Congress. The book was authored by Theodore 'Teddy' Kollek, then the mayor of the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem, and was about himself and Jerusalem. This encounter provoked Said to reflect on the distorted representation of Jerusalem and the absence of a Palestinian narrative:

> It is, however, no less a sign of Palestinian powerlessness and, it must be said, collective incompetence that to this day the story of Jerusalem's loss both in 1948 and 1967 has not been told by them, but – insofar as it has been told at all – partially reconstructed either by Israelis both sympathetic and unsympathetic to them, or by foreigners.
>
> In other words not only has there been no Palestinian narrative of 1948 and after, that can at least challenge the dominant Israeli narrative, there has also been no collective Palestinian projection for Jerusalem, since its all-too-definitive loss in 1948 and then again in 1967.
>
> So to get to the main point of my comments: I want to draw attention to this quite extraordinary act of historical and political neglect, whose effect had been to deprive us of Jerusalem well *before* the fact. (Said, 2011, p.61, emphasis in original)

A search of publications from the 1950s and 60s shows that, in fact, Palestinians produced accounts – in Arabic and in English – on the loss of the city in 1948. The most prominent early example is 'Arif al-'Arif's encyclopaedic account *The Nakba:*

The Nakba of Jerusalem and the Lost Paradise (1956). Furthermore, the rise of the Palestinian national movement, the establishment of Palestinian research centres, and the political transformations in the mid-1960s onwards produced a surge of knowledge production on the loss of the city.

Most writings on Jerusalem after 1967 focused on the war and the colonization of the city. These include the *Papers of 'Arif al-'Arif on the Israeli Occupation Violation and the Palestinian Popular Resistance between 1967–1973* (1973); the study of Ibrahim Dakkak, *Jerusalem in Ten Years, 1967–1977* (1977); and the publications of the Arab Jerusalem municipality, particularly by the mayor Ruhi al-Khatib, including *The Judaization of Jerusalem* (1970). Al-Khatib also established a monthly journal focused on Jerusalem, titled *al-Quds al-Sharif*, which was published between 1985 and 1993.

This sample of writings published between 1967 and the mid-1990s indicates that there was clearly Palestinian knowledge production on the loss of the city in 1948 and in 1967. Nevertheless, as Rashid Khalidi indicates in his introduction to Said's essay, Said was pointing to the lack of a 'humanistic and ecumenical' vision of the Palestinians on Jerusalem, and the absence of a channel for 'projecting it clearly to the world' to convey their 'aims, hopes, visions, and understanding of history' (2011, p.58).

The 1990s witnessed a growing interest in social and quotidian aspects of the city's Palestinian population. Among the most prominent marks of this shift was the establishment of the journal *Jerusalem Quarterly* in 1998. This became a specialist academic journal that focuses exclusively on Jerusalem from a Palestinian perspective. Its first editorial criticized the dominance of nationalist views in the Palestinian narrative on Jerusalem:

> The serialization of the 'short hand' has taken on a logic and life of its own, extending far beyond the popular print media. This is not to say that the national question can be or for that matter should be pried from a discourse of rights. Yet conceptualizing the texture of daily life in Jerusalem through the lens of nationalist narratives conceals as much as it reveals. (Rieker, 1998, p.3)

This constituted a call for shifting knowledge production on Jerusalem from generalization to specification and from the symbolic to the phenomenological, to

produce a locally generated narrative that reflects the life of the city's Palestinian residents. Since its establishment, *Jerusalem Quarterly* has become a primary resource on the city, as well as a reflection of the historiographical approaches and the dominant patterns of writing on Jerusalem.

In 2000, Rashid Khalidi delivered a lecture in Jerusalem titled 'A Research Agenda for Writing the History of Jerusalem', in which he mapped the gaps in writing the history of the city. Among these, Khalidi listed 'Jerusalem as an urban or municipal area', including the history of the *municipality itself*; research into 'the social economic history of different sectors of the population of the city', including 'the newer commercial districts of Salah al-Din street and elsewhere'; and, finally, 'questions related to the development of the Arab City and the demographic transformation after 1948'. Khalidi's questions included: 'What was the impact of the inflow of refugees to the city after 1948 war? *What factors determined the growth of the new Arab quarters of the city to the north-east and south-west* and how did the population of the older quarters of the city change?' (2005, p.16, emphasis added).

Although two decades have passed since this acknowledgment of the absence of studies on Arab Jerusalem, its municipality, and the infrastructure that developed during the period between 1948 and 1967, these remain neglected in the scholarship. This absence is evident from a review of *Jerusalem Quarterly* issues since its establishment until today. It shows a growing interest in the Ottoman and mandate eras, as well as the post-1967 period, especially since the 1980s, while disregarding Arab Jerusalem and the period between 1948 and 1967.

Generally, writings on post-1948 Jerusalem focused on documenting the depopulated New City that became part of Israel in 1948, particularly as a symbol of Palestinian modernity (Husseini-Shahid, 2000; Bisharat, 2007). However, the Old City and the areas outside the walls that survived the war, and their residents, are strikingly absent from the narratives on the city in 1948.

One of the most significant examples of the dominance of the New City's story in Palestinian historiography of Jerusalem after the Nakba is the edited volume *Jerusalem 1948: The Arab Neighbourhoods and Their Fate in the War* (Tamari, 2002). This is an extremely valuable resource for information on the war, the depopulated

neighbourhoods, the refugees, and estimations of the looted property. The volume describes some aspects of life before 1948 in the areas that later became Arab Jerusalem, but it does not detail the fate of those areas in a similar way to that of the neighbourhoods of the New City in 1948. Moreover, to this date, there has been no similar comprehensive volume that addresses the fate of the Old City and the northern, eastern and southern areas outside the walls during and after the Nakba.

Dominant Palestinian narratives were justifiably preoccupied with the trauma and memories of the loss of the New City in 1948 and the occupation of 1967. Within these narratives, the Arab City was neglected, despite the availability of historical records. However, this historiographical pattern is not exclusive to Arab Jerusalem, as there is a similar historiographical approach towards the Palestinian localities that were not displaced in 1948 and that became part of Israel.

These cities and villages, some of which became shelters for those Palestinians who were internally displaced, have been less present in the Palestinian narrative in comparison to those that were depopulated (Manna, 2016). This is despite the fact that they also witnessed village-writing trends similar to the 'village-notebooks' that refugee communities in exile produced on their lost localities (Davis, 2011).

In the last decade, more studies have been dedicated to documenting and analysing the local history of these villages and towns (Dajani, 2018; Reger, 2017; Dallasheh, 2016).[15] Nevertheless, these have not yet gained the same position on the research agenda of the Nakba compared to the levels of interest in the areas that were depopulated in 1948.

Palestinian Local History Writing

Before moving to discuss the historiography of Arab Jerusalem, it is worth reviewing key aspects of Palestinian local history writing, which has witnessed tension between local and national narratives at least since 1948. The rise of the Palestinian national

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[15] I distinguish here between the micro-local history and other important macro-analytical accounts that addressed Israel's colonial governance of the Palestinians who became its citizens in 1948, and the actions and reactions of this group of Palestinians to the events of the Nakba, including the works of Robinson (2013) and Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury (2015).

movement in the mid-1960s allowed national 'grand-narratives' (Taraki, 2004, p.89) or 'metanarratives' (Davis, 2011, p.46) to dominate Palestinian narration of the Nakba. This overshadowed the period that preceded it, namely the first two decades after the Nakba. These national narratives focused on political structures 'that have sidelined local Palestinian stories, histories and subjects' (Davis, 2011, p.47).

Instead of documenting the ordinary, the quotidian and the local, the conceptual frames of these metanarratives were preoccupied with 'commemorative themes' of nationalist narrative, including martyrdom, sacrifice, *sumud* (steadfastness), battles, massacres and heroism, as Laleh Khalili discussed in her study *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine* (2007, p.91).

This heroic narrative also organized national time as one moving linearly towards an ultimate goal of victory and liberation, as it:

> insists on interpreting all past events teleologically as the epic progress of revolutionary courage and envisions nationalist history hurtling towards an inevitable victory, the establishment of the nation-state in the statist narrative or the liberation of society in the liberationist one. (ibid, p.93)

This temporal ordering was reflected in the periodization of Palestinian historiography, which normally follows the major events of the 1936 Revolt, the Nakba in 1948; the Israeli occupation in 1967; the years 1969–1982 as a period of heroism, particularly in Lebanon (ibid, p.95); the Intifada in 1987; and the Oslo Accords in 1993 (Davis, 2011, p.47; Taraki, 2004, p.89).

Overall, the national narrative projected a homogeneous abstract image of the nation that overlooked class, gender, religion and other differences, creating 'an essentialist identity of "us" and "them" [which] reinforces the boundaries of the nation' (Khalili, 2007, p.94).

Although the thematic and temporal frames of the national narrative are still present, the failure of the Palestinian nationalist frameworks beginning in the mid-1980s pushed for more localized narratives to emerge (Davis, 2011, pp.50–51). This local history reflected the centrality of locality for the Palestinian rural and urban population alike (Tamari, 2009, p.57), which was in place before 1948 and sustained itself even more so afterward.

For the peasantry, the village unit was the 'first determining factor to be grasped in understanding their social organization and consciousness … for in identifying himself and his loyalties, the peasant would always refer to his village' (R. Sayigh, 2007a, p.5). The urban population is no less attached to its local identity and loyalties, such as in the case of Jerusalem's production of local self-identity, primarily through local popular culture (Tamari, 2004, p.31).

Local history writing was not a product of the post-1948 world, however, as documentation of localities began before 1948. In *Palestinian Historiography 1900–1948,* Tarif Khalidi listed some of the accounts of local history that were produced before the Nakba, including the work of Father A. S. Marmarji, the topographical historical dictionary of Arab Palestine *Buldaniyyat Filastin al-'Arabiyya,* the work of Reverend As'ad Mansur on the history of Nazareth, 'Arif al-'Arif's work on the history of Gaza and Jerusalem, and that of Ihsan al-Nimr on Nablus (1981, pp.64–68). In addition to these, there is the monumental 11-volume encyclopaedia of Mustafa Murad al-Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin* (Oudatallah, 2019).

After 1948, the loss of the majority of Palestinian localities impressed upon Palestinian refugees the importance of documenting memories of everyday life in their depopulated villages and cities before the Nakba. Thus, village history writing developed in response to the physical and political absence that implied a need to produce evidence of past existence for future memory (Davis, 2011, p.38).

The trend shifted Palestinian historiography from 'one of metanarratives to one of social and cultural histories of everyday life' (ibid, p.47). This shift also witnessed the rise of oral history and history-telling by 'ordinary' Palestinians, particularly in the refugee camps, which further enriched the local history of Palestine (R. Sayigh, 1998).

Writing urban local history in Palestine after 1948 has been an extensive and ongoing project. It has particularly focused on pre-Nakba life during the late Ottoman and mandate period, while the following decades, particularly the years 1948–1967, are remarkably undocumented in local history. Among the main examples of this history writing is the urban history series of the Institute of Palestine Studies that was published in 2011, including the work of Beshara Doumani on Nablus (1700–1900), May Seikaly on Haifa (1918–1939), Munayer Isbir on Lydda during the mandate and

the Israeli occupation, Zuhayr Ghanayim on Acre (1864–1918), Mustafa Abbasi on Safad (1917–1948), and Hasan Ibrahim Said on Jaffa (1799–1831). Other recent accounts include the works of Abaher al-Sakka on Gaza during the Mandate (2018) and Samih Hamouda on Ottoman Ramallah (2017), as well as the accounts of Johnny Mansour on Haifa (2016) and Mahmoud Yazbak on Jaffa (2018a).

One important feature of these accounts and others concerned with urban local history is their deployment of municipal records that survived the Nakba. Although most of these records were destroyed in 1948 (Yazbak, 2018b, p.242), the remaining records were used to uncover the rich social, political and economic aspects of Palestinian localities before 1948 (Hamouda, 2017; Doumani, 1995).

However, only a few studies used these records to produce a history of the municipalities themselves and their roles as social institutions (Al-Sakka, 2018; Naïli, 2018; Lemire, 2017; Yazbak, 1999). Furthermore, these studies were mostly concerned with governance and politics, mainly the contestation over local affairs between Arab and Jewish members in city councils in 'mixed cities' (Goren, 2006; Namoura, 1994; al-Jarbawi, 1991; 1992).

The studies of municipalities in the West Bank and Gaza after the Israeli occupation in 1967, especially during the pre-Oslo period, were concerned with the political struggle of municipalities under the occupation. They addressed the policies of the Israeli military administration against Palestinian municipalities and the extensive limitations on their planning and development authorities, as well as the political role of Palestinian mayors in the 1976 elections (al-Jarbawi, 1992, pp.42–43).

Local history writing on Jerusalem also benefited from the archives of various local institutions, including the municipality; Islamic, Christian and Jewish institutions and courts; family and public libraries; and others. These social histories mainly focused on the city before 1948, when Jerusalem occupied a central position in Palestinian politics and society, as well as being an administrative centre.

The main studies include the accounts of Auld and Hillenbrand (2000), Hintlian (2004), Nassar and Tamari (2005), Mazza (2009), Manna (2008), Ghosheh (2013), Najjar (2012), Lemire (2017), and Dalachanis and Lemire (2018). In addition, there

are several memoirs that enriched the city's local social history, including those of Wasif Jawhariyah (Tamari and Nassar, 2003; Nassar and Tamari, 2005), Khalil Sakakini (2003), Ihsan Turjman (Tamari, 2011) and John Melkon Rose (1993).

The Jerusalem municipality played a prominent role in the social life of the city and its records enriched its social history writing. Several accounts engaged, directly and indirectly, with municipal governance and affairs during the Ottoman period and the mandate rule. These include the works of Rubenstein (1980), Kark (1980), Abu 'Arafeh (1986), Levin (2006), Mazza (2009), Even (2015), Naser (2016), Lemire (2017) and Naïli (2018). The accounts that dealt with the mandate period, in particular, were preoccupied with the political conflicts between the Arab and the Jewish council members, as chapter 4 will discuss further.

Recently, the research project *Open Jerusalem: Opening Jerusalem Archives* (1840 – 1940) has produced important studies of the records themselves, in addition to studies based on them. In 2014, Yasemin Avci, Vincent Lemire and Falestin Naïli, who are part of the research team, described the Ottoman municipality records, including minutes of the city council meetings from the late Ottoman period (1892–1917), as invaluable for putting 'the urban and material facets of Jerusalem's history front and centre' (2014, p.112). In 2018, the research team published the volume *Ordinary Jerusalem* (Dalachanis and Lemire, 2018), which relies on extensive archival resources from the municipality and elsewhere. Furthermore, the project's website includes a catalogue of available archives related to the history of late Ottoman and mandate Jerusalem.

Arab Jerusalem in Local History Writing

The above review demonstrates how the Arab municipality and the city's history during the period between 1948 and 1967 more generally were sidelined as subjects of historical inquiry, consequently producing this polity as a historical lacuna over the years. Moreover, the records of the Arab municipality have been marginalized, although they constitute a primary historical source on the city. Following the Israeli occupation in 1967, the municipal records were moved from the building of the dissolved Arab municipality to the archive of the Israeli municipality. It should be

noted that, unlike many other governmental records associated with the Jordanian period (Budeiri, 2016), the Arab municipality records are accessible to the public – although not without challenges, as the next chapter will detail.

Based on a mapping of studies that were based on the Arab municipality records or were concerned with the Arab municipality and with Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967, it can be argued that, to my knowledge, the only study dedicated to the Arab Jerusalem municipality was authored by Palestinian lawyer Usama Halabi in 1993. However, Halabi's account was mainly a description of Palestinian and Israeli secondary sources, with very limited deployment of archival and historical press items (Halabi, 1993).

The main two sources that Halabi and others have used extensively in relation to the Arab municipality are by the Israeli authors Meron Benvenisti and Daniel Rubenstein. Benvenisti was appointed as the 'Advisor for East Jerusalem Affairs' in the Israeli Jerusalem municipality in 1967 and served as a deputy mayor in the 1970s. In his book *Jerusalem, The Torn City* (1976), Benvenisti relies on some of the Arab municipality records.

Rubinstein's essay, 'The Jerusalem Municipality under the Ottomans, British and Jordanians' (1980), appeared in an edited volume introduced by Teddy Kollek. For his essay, Rubenstein relies mostly on the Arab municipal council minutes and Jordanian files located in the Israel State Archive. Both accounts represented an Israeli perspective that focused on Jordanian policies towards Jerusalem and the Palestinian cause in general.

Urban and social historians who work on the city from a Palestinian perspective have been aware of the existence and accessibility of the Arab records in the Municipality Archive for over a decade at least. In 2005, Kimberly Katz published *Jordanian Jerusalem*, which remains the only academic account of Arab Jerusalem. However, its focus is rather limited for those interested in Jerusalem's social and urban history, as it focused mainly on the location of Jerusalem in Jordan's nation-state project and the domination of the country over the symbolic – mainly religious and touristic – resources of the city. For her research, Katz relied on the Arab municipality records,

among other resources, and mainly on minutes of the supervisory committee for the Dome of the Rock celebrations.

In 2011, the Arabic version of the *Jerusalem Quarterly* published an article titled 'The Palestinian File in the Zionist Archives', by Mahmoud Yazbak. Among other archives, the author lists municipal archives, including the Jerusalem Municipality Archive. Yazbak states in his introduction to the section on municipal archives that the Jerusalem Municipality Archive includes important Ottoman and mandate municipal collections. Although he briefly refers to the Arab records, those were not deemed to be as 'important' as the Ottoman and mandate records (2011, pp.89–90).

Although not published, two Palestinian students have written papers that were based on the records of the Arab municipality as part of their master's studies. A student at al-Quds University, Nour Edkidik, submitted her paper, titled *Jerusalem in the Time of Jordan, Revisited*, in 2009. The short paper deploys the municipal records to briefly describe important aspects of the city's urban development, including services and building, as well as political events and 'representations of state sovereignty in the city' (p.2).

Edkidik explains in her introduction that the 'existence of many overlapping political events during Jordanian rule' contributed to the creation of a 'bleak' picture in the collective memory of Jerusalemites about that period. This, she explains, has affected the way that this history has been approached and she therefore acknowledges the need for it to be documented and revisited (2009, pp.3–4).

The master's thesis of Jamil Mish'al from Hebron University, titled *Jerusalem Municipality in the Jordanian Era*, was submitted in 2015. Mish'al briefly refers to the absence of studies on the Arab municipality, despite the availability of historical resources. The dissertation is a detailed account of the institutional history, operation and development of the municipality, including the work of its various divisions, and a discussion of the municipal law and elections.

Although both accounts are mainly descriptive, summarizing different records without analysing their context or the context of the students' research in a colonial archive,

they are both important additions to the historical research on the city and its municipality from a Palestinian perspective.

This short review has revealed the (dis)location of Arab Jerusalem and its municipal records from Palestinian history writing on the city. Such dislocation is manifested not only in the marginalization of the records within Jerusalem studies, but also in the failure to consider their history and position as colonized records in the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality Archive, in line with the overall colonial practice of appropriating Palestinian history.

Consequently, a lacuna was created in the local history of Arab Jerusalem with several historiographical consequences. First, the dominant historiographical approach to the first two decades following the termination of the mandate and the establishment of Israel (1948 to 1967) underestimates the importance of this period for the study of the mandate era in Jerusalem. As Jacob Norris states, 'the mandate is not a closed chapter. People in the region are still living with the mandate. It is not as if this historical period is somehow confined to the past. I find the continuity of the mandate through Palestinians who live the realities of the structures that were put in place during the mandate' (Norris, 2019b, p.23).

If the mandate continues through the lived realities of Palestinians today, it was indeed heavily present during the two decades following its termination and the fall of Palestine in 1948. Termination of the mandate in 1948 was by no means the end of the story for the Palestinians or their leadership. Immediately after the Nakba, they had to negotiate, challenge, revive and interpret mandate regulations and bureaucracy under the authorities of other states.

A second consequence of Arab Jerusalem's absent history, as already mentioned, is the exemption of this case from narratives on the Nakba. The preoccupation with loss that characterizes dominant Palestinian narratives means that some forms of survival and revival have been unrecorded. Jerusalem constituted a noteworthy case of local self-rule, locality production and development that were all a direct result of the Nakba. The analysis of the social, political and economic transformations of Jerusalem that this thesis presents should contribute to a fuller collective conceptualization of the Nakba.

Finally, the lack of a story on Arab Jerusalem also affected the historiography of the 1967 war and occupation and allowed the domination of colonial epistemologies on the event, such as the depiction of Jerusalem as a 'troubled city' (Barakat, 2016, p.23). While most Palestinian scholarship is critical of the 'annexation' and perceives its coloniality and illegality on the basis of international law, it continues to deploy the language and discourses that this act imposed on the city and its narration. Epistemologically, the framing of 'East Jerusalem' since 1967 has been based mostly on the Israeli regulatory frameworks and flagship Israeli Supreme Court cases. Indeed, the heaviness of these legal frames in the lives of Palestinians in Jerusalem renders them dominant in the daily language of Palestinians, as well as in the scholarship that studies the Palestinian residents in Jerusalem.

Writing Arab Jerusalem beyond the Nakba

How do we then recover the story of Arab Jerusalem from its absence, from symbolism, and from the burden of national and colonial time? As much as this question could be addressed theoretically, it is essentially ethical and methodological. The departure point for reading and writing the local history of forgotten Arab Jerusalem is that this history is *not* a response, an alternative, a counter-narrative or an argument to the colonial discourse on Jerusalem. The local and social history of Arab Jerusalem is registered, restored and practised through the experience of Palestinians and their knowledge of place and time as *local* demos [al-ahali] of the city (Doumani, 2018, p.139). It is the production of the city and the residents' being in its time and space that dispenses with the need to prove the existence of the Arab City after 1948, or to refute Israeli colonial assumptions about it after 1967.

As I read the Arab municipality records, not one story but hundreds arose. The files cover a wide range of processes that were part of (re-)producing the city. The stories of the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem are endless, and it is this quality – rather than the narrative or its epistemologies – that constitutes the effective response to the colonial narration. In this sense, the story introduced in this thesis does not by any means claim to be a singular narrative.

As I embarked on reading the Arab municipality files, I had no idea what I was looking for. The council's minutes chart multiple stories and anecdotes related to refugees and native residents, and to vendors and tourists, as well as to municipal workers and inspectors and many others. There are also multilayered and entangled networks of streets, electricity wires, city walls and gates, markets, hotels, buses, donkeys, water reservoirs, borders, an airport, money and more. Endless assembled details delineate, seemingly randomly, the features of Arab Jerusalem. Living with these memories and the affections of their characters in the Arab municipality records gave birth to the narrative introduced in this thesis.

In writing the local history of Arab Jerusalem, this thesis engaged with two fundamental sets of events that shaped the city's local history between 1948 and 1967 and beyond. First are the events and consequences of the Nakba, which led to the loss of the possibility of a national state and the loss of most Palestinian territories – including the New City. The second set of events happened around the renewal of local self-rule in Jerusalem under Jordanian rule. These events and processes were contradictory: the return of local self-rule was an indirect result of the Nakba's political consequences, namely the destruction of the possibility of national self-determination. Despite their contradictory essence, they gave birth to Arab Jerusalem as a polity and locality after the Nakba.

Arab Jerusalem in the Shadow of the Nakba

One of the most challenging aspects in reading and extracting a narrative out of the Arab municipality records was the ability to conceive the events as they were experienced at the time of their occurrence,[16] as distinct from the current perceptions of the Nakba and the 1967 war. This requires an escape from the conventional framing of the Nakba as a 'clean break' with the past (Winder, 2014, p.409).

To overcome this challenge, the narrative in this thesis is structured through temporal frameworks that reveal continuities and interruptions in the city's life after the Nakba,

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[16] On the challenges of such an approach, see the discussion by David Lowenthal in *The Past Is a Foreign Country*: 'Just as we are products of the past, so is the known past an artifact of ours. No perceiver, however immersed in the past, can divest himself of his own knowledge and assumptions' (2003, p.216).

rather than through a chronological ordering of the events. Accordingly, the narrative engages with representations of time in the historical resources in order to grasp the temporal orientation of the city and its residents, such as their ability to imagine the future, retrieve the past, and locate themselves within the present-time of the city.

This temporal framing allowed a nuanced analysis of Palestinians as 'agents, actors and subjects of history and not just refugees, the only analytical category that has elicited global empathy and allowed them to enter the all-too dominant Arab–Israeli conflict literature' (Hanssen, 2018, pp.265–266). This transcends depictions of the actions of Palestinians as being determined solely by the structures that emerged after the Nakba, in which they sought to survive and adjust to their present conditions.

Unlike conventional analysis of Palestinians through their legal subjectivities (refugees, absentees or Jordanian/Israeli citizens), this thesis engages with Palestinian experiences after the Nakba through the analytical category of temporal orientation. It argues that within the temporal ordering of colonial law, the native is forced into a performance of particular narrow subjectivities: new/old, legal/illegal, present/absentee, citizen/refugee. However, these legal subjectivities and their temporalities remain artificial in the eyes and memories of native Palestinians, who persistently reject their disposition as new and incidental subjects, even when they engaged with and submitted to the colonial law. As such, Palestinians should be imagined as inhabiting a time that exists in *parallel* with the colonial temporal frames, to which these violent legal subjectivities confine them.

The narrative of Arab Jerusalem presented in this thesis renders the Nakba an active concept, one that evolves empirically and conceptually throughout the thesis, reflecting heterogenous experiences of the Palestinian community (or communities) after 1948. Conceptually, the history of Arab Jerusalem opens a window to witness how life was interrupted and continued in the *immediate* aftermath of the Nakba, before it was solidified into a national signifier. This allows for an examination of the experiences of the Nakba as it *happened* and grew to become a symbol and marker of Palestinian time. In other words, this allows us to 'historicise commemorative practices and examine their multiple sites of production and reproduction' (Khalili, 2007, p.4).

The rise of the Palestinian national movement, particularly the inauguration of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (hereafter, PLO) in Jerusalem in 1964, marked the transformation of the Nakba from the performative to the pedagogical (Bhabha, 1994, pp.211–212), from the event to the representational (Nashif, 2018, p.186). Indeed, reference to the Nakba was not uncommon in the Palestinian public sphere, since the conceptualization of the Nakba event was underway from 1948 and was extensively transformed within Arab thought and debates (Al-Hardan, 2015).

Yet, a local history of Arab Jerusalem allows an examination of the process of transformation of the Nakba within 'a social setting and in relation to a particular audience(s) and context(s)' (Khalili, 2007, p.4). This transformation can be traced through the residents' engagement with their city, its public space and its infrastructure. It is also evident through forms of the municipality's modes of remembrance, such as street naming and the 'organization of time and space', including through commemoration ceremonies and monuments.[17] History-telling and periodization of the events – which were reflected, for example, in the speeches of mayor Ruhi al-Khatib and reports of the municipality – also reveal a transformation in the perceptions and experiences of the Nakba over time.

Municipal Rule in Arab Jerusalem

One of the consequences of the Nakba in Jerusalem was the loss of the mandate municipal town hall and resources, which remained in the occupied New City. An indirect result of the Nakba events was that the Palestinian residents of the city *regained* the right for local self-rule, which they were deprived of during the last years of the mandate rule. In November 1948, Jordan appointed a municipal council, while consecutive councils were mostly elected in local elections. In 1967, Israel dissolved the Arab municipal council, three weeks after the occupation of the West Bank.

Contestation over self-rule, which entailed the authority and legitimacy of the Palestinian native population to govern their city, has been a constitutive element in the history of the city until this day. This thesis explores the political and social role

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[17] For a detailed discussion of these forms of commemoration in the Palestinian context, see Khalili, 2007, pp.65–89.

and the location of the municipality as a local institution of governance – especially during the first two decades after the Nakba, when the national political institutions collapsed. It argues that the history of local administration, although poorly studied in Palestine, is integral to the study of Palestinian urban and social history.

The examination in this thesis of the history of the municipality begins with the late mandate period, between 1944 and 1948. In 1944, the crisis between the Arab and the Jewish council members over the right to the mayoralty intensified, eventually leading to the dismissal of the municipal council and the appointment of a British municipal commission. This event and its consequences are discussed within the context of the mandate policies towards local administration in Palestine, which was another sphere of governance upon which the British and Zionist settler-colonial project was established.

The loss of the Jerusalem municipality town hall after 1948 locates the institution within the collective experience of loss and displacement. The documentation of the first six months after the fall of the New City describes an event in which the institution itself became a refugee. From this vantage point, we can see that the institution shared the fate of the war with the city and its residents. In chapter 4, I track the story through the narration of municipal workers, whose words gave birth to the conceptualization I suggest of the Arab municipality as a 'refugee-institution'.

This analytical category of 'refugee-institution' transcends conventional analysis of the mere material loss and captures its political and social meanings. This paves the way for a nuanced analysis of the positionality of its council members and workers and escapes the binary view of Palestinians as embodying either heroism or submission under Jordanian rule. Most studies on Jordan's governance and policies towards the Palestinian population of the West Bank between 1948 and 1967 examine the relationship of Jordan towards the Palestinians through national and regional frameworks. The only academic study dedicated in full to Arab Jerusalem, *Jordanian Jerusalem* (Katz, 2005), exemplifies this approach as it focuses on the attitudes and politics of Jordan towards Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967. The analysis I present here contributes to thinking about the political in Palestinian life beyond national frames and ideology (Seikaly, 2016, p.13).

Finally, a history of Palestinian self-rule in Jerusalem cannot be complete without examining the story of the dissolution of the Arab municipality after the Israeli occupation in 1967, which will be analysed in chapter 8. Different Israeli accounts have discussed the engagement of the Arab municipal council and workers with the Israeli municipality during the early weeks of the occupation, especially concerning the provision of urgent services to the Palestinian residents. These accounts, told primarily from a Zionist perspective, marginalize the role of the Arab municipality in the city's life and relegate its role to service provision, while dismissing its political and social position.

Local History and the Production of the City: A Conceptual Review

General Framing of the Local History of Arab Jerusalem

The period under study crosses through three different regimes of administration, beginning in the late mandate era, through the first Israeli colonization in 1948 and the period of Jordanian rule between 1948 and 1967, and ending with the first weeks of the second Israeli colonization in 1967. To explore these different regimes, I relied on some of the critical frameworks that have been debated in the field of Palestine studies.

The settler-colonial framework has been a prominent theoretical frame in Palestinian studies over the last two decades, although its early beginnings date back to the work of Fayez Sayegh (2012) in the mid-1960s and Maxine Rodinson (1973) in the 1970s. A myriad of accounts from different fields have deployed this framework over the last two decades (Tartir and Seidel, 2019; Joronen, 2017; Gordon and Ram, 2016; Hilal, 2015; Veracini, 2006). A review of the issues of the journal *Settler Colonial Studies* since it was established in 2011 reflects the extent of engagement with, and debates in relation to, Palestine and Israel through this framework (Jaber, 2019; Bhandar and Toscano, 2017; Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury, 2014; Salamanca et al., 2012).

This literature has analysed Zionism as a settler-colonial project that extends before and beyond the Nakba as a singular event, since its violence is structured within the material and discursive production of the Israeli colonial nation-state (Wolfe, 2006). This thesis deploys the critical work and discourses of settler-colonial studies to

analyse the city's history in relation to the Israeli colonization in 1948 and in 1967, as well as in relation to the study of the mandate.

In recent years, an increasing number of critical works on the historiography of the mandate are calling for a more explicit and nuanced framing of this era within settler-colonial studies. These works highlight the need to critically revisit the relational history framing that approached the relationship between the Palestinian population and the Jewish immigrants as a relationship between two asymmetrical communities rather than a relationship between natives and settlers (Barakat, 2019, pp.31–32; Seikaly, 2016).

Despite its prominence, the framework of settler-colonialism has been criticized for being preoccupied with the settler's narrative while marginalizing the native's narrative or simply framing it as part of the settler's narrative (Barakat, 2017; 2019). Therefore, there have been calls for conceptual and methodological comparative interventions in which Palestine studies engage with other indigenous experiences, such as those of Native Americans in the United States (Barakat, 2017; Bhandar and Ziadah, 2016; Al-Hardan, 2014).

Furthermore, there have been calls to search for and capture 'indigenous critique' in colonial archives, in order to grasp the 'richness and historical depth of Palestinian intellectual production, political creativity, and anti-colonial critique' (Allen, 2017, p.271). Such an approach to indigenous positionality perceives the native's narration 'as a political act that in its action is assertion of indigenous sovereignty, [and] challenges the confines of history' (Barakat, 2019, p.37).

This thesis builds upon these critical calls and argues that the deployment of the Arab municipality records as 'locally-generated resources' (Doumani, 2009) helps to recover the voices and experiences of Jerusalem's Palestinian residents. Therefore, the story it introduces contributes to the scholarship that aims to shift the focus away from colonial frameworks, narratives and epistemologies, and towards a narration of Palestinians as historical agents after the Nakba and beyond.

Contexts and Concepts

In writing the history of Arab Jerusalem as an absent historical entity, this thesis locates itself within historical projects that draw attention to forgotten spaces, times and subjects of history (Chakrabarty, 2000; Guha, 1999; Trouillot, 1995). This historiography challenges categories upon which colonial pasts have been made (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1992, p.15), as well as Western 'assumptions that history requires a linear and cumulative sense of time that allows the observer to isolate the past as a distinct entity' (Trouillot, 1995, p.6). These perceptions of history have prevented many native histories from being told.

The importance of local history in the case of Arab Jerusalem lies in allowing the city's particular story to emerge and contribute to diverse and heterogeneous narrations of the Nakba. In writing local history, however, there are two interrelated elements that should be critically taken into account to produce a meaningful narrative within the local and beyond: exceptionalism and context.

In *The Great War and the Remaking of Palestine*, Salim Tamari points out in his review of local historical accounts of Nablus that exceptionalism is a recurrent theme in urban history, which portrays local contexts isolated from national and global networks. He asks:

> to what extent are the particularistic social features of the urban scene – which are necessary for examining urban ethnography – rendered as exceptional and *sui generis*? (2017, p.136)

Tamari's question is particularly relevant in the case of Jerusalem, given the multiple forms of political and religious exceptionalism with which the city is burdened. Accordingly, this thesis is careful not to approach Jerusalem as an exception in the Palestinian landscape. Instead, it approaches the city as 'relational and contextual rather than scalar or spatial' (Appadurai, 1996, p.178). As such, the thesis considers some of the conditions that the city experienced as a result of its partition after 1948 – itself a distinctive feature of the city – such as the shortage of water and electricity.[18] These conditions are examined as being particular to the context of the Nakba events

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[18] For the importance of context for the history and study of technologies, see Meiton, 2019, p.17.

in Jerusalem, rather than exceptional features of the city that would render it an isolated case in the context of 1948.

Context is emphasized on different levels, including relations between cities and between central and local governments, as well as regional and international relations. In short, the thesis conceives of the city as 'an ensemble of differences between cities' (Lefebvre, 1996, p.109). Context is also temporal, as the city cannot be read solely within the particular segment of time under study. Rather, this segment of time invites comparisons with others in the city's past.

Thus, contextualization is important in history writing, since a lack of context renders historical narratives merely anecdotal – 'just stories'. In order 'to become something more, these partial, "hidden histories" have to be situated in the wider worlds of power and meaning that gave them life' (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1992, p.17). Contextuality is thus a balance between the local and the wider context, since the activities that produce locality are simultaneously 'context-driven' and 'context-generative' (Appadurai, 1996, p.186).

This balance is delicate, however, and might result in diminishing local particularity altogether. In the context of Arab Jerusalem, the Nakba constitutes this larger political, social, geographical and temporal context:

> The Nakba is often reckoned as the beginning of contemporary Palestinian history … The Nakba is the point of reference for other events, past and future … The Nakba has become a key event in the Palestinian calendar – the baseline for personal histories and the sorting of generations. Moreover, it is the creator of unsettled inner time. It deflects Palestinians from the flow of social time into their own specific history and often into a melancholic existence. (Sa'di and Abu-Lughod, 2007, p.5)

How could this balance be created between Jerusalem and the Nakba as a temporal and political context? How could the linear temporal framing of 'post-Nakba' life, which envelopes all other times and places, be challenged? How would it be possible to write against the 'appropriation' of the Nakba's temporality, which 'assumes that there is a moment when the differential temporalities of cultural histories coalesce in an immediately readable present' (Bhabha, 1994, p.218)?

Homi Bhabha criticizes what he calls the nationalist appropriation of people's time and emphasizes the need, following Fanon, for 'liberat[ing] a certain, uncertain time of people' (ibid). Such an approach assists in tracing the time of people in 'post-Nakba' Jerusalem. In his critique of the limited static prefix of 'post-' as an indication of sequentiality (after) or polarity (anti) – for example, in post-modernity or post-coloniality – Bhabha argues that the use of the concept *beyond* as an 'intervening space' (ibid, p.10) opens up other forms of time and experiences:

> 'Beyond' signifies spatial distance, marks progress, promises the future; but our intimations of exceeding the barrier or boundary – the very act of going *beyond* – are unknowable, unrepresentable, without a return to the 'present' which, in the process of repetition, becomes disjunct and displaced. … The present can no longer be simply envisaged as a break or bonding with the past and the future, no longer a synchronic presence: our proximate self-presence, our public image, comes to be revealed for its discontinuities, its inequalities, its minorities. … We are now confronted with what Walter Benjamin describes as the blasting of a monadic moment from the homogeneous course of history, 'establishing a conception of the present as the "time of the now"'. (ibid, pp.5–6)

'The act of going beyond' the Nakba in studying Arab Jerusalem is an attempt to see the particularities of the city as they were experienced during the 'time of the now' of the people, al-ahali, and *beyond* the hyphenated sequential or polar 'post-Nakba'. This is not by any means a dismissal of the Nakba's political meanings and consequences, but rather a call to open its locked time for a closer, micro-scale examination – especially during its *immediate* aftermath. This would allow a study of what Arjun Appadurai describes as the 'phenomenological quality of locality, which expresses itself in certain kinds of *agency, sociality and reproducibility*' (1996, p.178, emphasis added).

How was life experienced and practised, what forms of production gave birth to the Arab City, and what kind of agency enabled the making of Jerusalem beyond the Nakba? These are the main questions with which this conceptual review is concerned. A tri-dimensional *space-time-agency* correlation constitutes the main conceptual and analytical frame through which I see, contextualize and narrate the city. These concepts are not independent of each other but are, rather, interrelated as they shape and produce each other.

Agency and Temporal Orientation

My personal understanding of agency, as growing in the shadow of a settler-colonial structure that is contingent on the erasure of local time and history, is related to how one acts, thinks and imagines within, despite and beyond colonial temporal and spatial formations. What makes me now – sitting in the British Library and surrounded by layers of colonial histories – think, imagine and produce a historical account of Arab Jerusalem beyond current Israeli frames? What made the Palestinian residents of partitioned Jerusalem imagine and produce Arab Jerusalem, while their occupied city and their homes, schools, businesses and town hall were just metres away, occupied, at a time when the Nakba was not *yet* a past?

In *Beyond Settler Time*, Mark Rifkin discusses how colonial time frames can be challenged through an examination of a collective 'temporal orientation' of the native that is disparate from a 'shared' time, as well as from a story that is 'ultimately oriented around non-native transformation' (2017, p.7). Rifkin suggests that the concept of temporal orientation is a 'potentially divergent *process of becoming*' of the native, which means that:

> one's experience, sensations, and possibilities for action are shaped by the existing inclinations, itineraries, and networks in which one is immersed, turning towards some things and away from others. (ibid, p.2)

Rifkin's project acknowledges the inevitability of colonial time in the native's life. Thus, he does not try to 'search for an authentic indigenous conception of time as against degrading forms of settler influence' (ibid, p.3). Instead of 'juxtaposing the past and the present', he insists on:

> the importance of attending to Native conceptualizations, articulations, and impressions of time that do not easily fit within a framework explicitly or implicitly oriented around settler needs, claims, and norms – a pluralization of time that facilitates Indigenous people's expressions of self-determination. (ibid, p.2)

Rifkin thus suggests an alternative conceptual frame through which the impasses of native presence in a settler-colonial structure can be deployed to perceive and articulate native actions, world-views and futurity *differently*. I suggested earlier in this chapter, along these lines, imagining a parallel time to that imposed by the Israeli

legal subjectivities of refugees, 'absentees' and other colonial categories. This approach considers legal subjectivity to be a performance staged and forced by the settler, while the native is artificially produced as new and ahistorical. Thus, an imagined parallel time could offer a space to think and express native history differently.

Temporal orientation is integral to human action and determines a critical model of agency. In their essay 'What Is Agency*?*', Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische argue that sociological approaches that examine agency solely through the structures in which one acts produce an understanding of agency that 'remain[s] so tightly bound to structure that one loses sight of the different ways in which agency actually shapes social action' (2002, p.963). In other words, a sociological examination of agency should not be limited to the structures in which subjects act and think.

To open up this concept, theoretically and empirically, they argue instead that agency should be understood as a:

> temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the future (as a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment). (ibid)

Furthermore, Emirbayer and Mische suggest three different constitutive elements of human agency: iteration, projectivity, and practical evaluation. They unpack these elements as follows:

> *The iterational element* – the selective reactivation by actors of past patterns of thought and action, as routinely incorporated in practical activity, thereby giving stability and order to social universes and helping to sustain identities, interactions, and institutions over time.
>
> *The projective element* – … Projectivity encompasses the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action, in which received structures of thought and action may be creatively reconfigured in relation to actors' hopes, fears, and desires for the future.
>
> *The practical-evaluative element* – … It entails the capacity of actors to make practical and normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of presently evolving situations. (ibid, p.971)

These analytical elements of agency are clearly dominated by temporal orientation towards past, future or present. But the authors also ask us to think of 'empirical social action as constructed through ongoing temporal passage'. In this regard, temporal orientations of subjects are not isolated but rather simultaneous 'internal orientation toward past, future, and present, for all forms of agency are temporally embedded in the flow of time' (ibid, p.972).

This point is crucial for perceiving the frame and structure of the story of Arab Jerusalem introduced in this thesis, as a story narrated through simultaneous orientations towards the past and the future, rather than as a linear timeline that begins in the mandate era and ends in 1967.

To what extent can we really separate the subject and power structures and what are the terms of agency that emerge out of the dialectic of power-subject? Judith Butler discusses in *The Psychic Life of Power* the question of whether power is prior to the subject or is its instrumental effect. She deploys the concept of *ambivalence* to describe this relation:

> Agency exceeds the power by which it is enabled. One might say that the purposes of power are not always the purposes of agency. To the extent that the latter diverge from the former, agency is the assumption of a purpose *unintended* by power, one that could not have been derived logically or historically, that operates in a relation of contingency and reversal to the power that makes it possible, to which it nevertheless belongs. This is, as it were, the *ambivalent* scene of agency, constrained by no teleological necessity. (1997, p.15, emphasis in original)

The ambivalence of the relation between power structures to which one belongs allows, as Butler suggests, some space to think of agency as an 'unintended' outcome of power structures. This releases the concept from the dominance of the structure and illuminates the subject's position and action.

At the end of their essay, Emirbayer and Mische also acknowledge the challenge that power structures pose for perceptions of agency. Accordingly, they call to 'analyze the variable nature of the *interplay* between structure and agency' (2002, p.1002, emphasis in original), given a 'double constitution of agency and structure'. By that, they propose that 'temporal-relational contexts support particular agentic orientations,

which in turn constitute different structuring relationships of actors toward their environments' (ibid, p.1004).

In this thesis, I build on these interventions regarding the relationship between agency and structure as an 'interplay', 'ambivalence' and 'double constitution'. Specifically, I examine agency as it is determined by both temporal orientations and power structures. Through this, I seek to examine negotiations between Palestinian subjects and the structures that shaped their actions after 1948, through 'processes of becoming' in the shadow of the Nakba.

The Nakba is normally projected in the Palestinian experience as an elementary event in determining the temporal orientation of Palestinians. It constitutes what Rifkin describes as an 'indigenous duration' which 'operates less as a chronological sequence than as overlapping networks of affective connection (to persons, nonhuman entities, and place) that orients one's way of moving through space and time, with *story* as a crucial part of that process' (Rifkin, 2017, p.46, emphasis added).

In this sense, the Nakba as duration constitutes 'the very condition of subjectivity', as Veena Das argues in *Life and Words* while discussing the violent partition of India in 1947 (2006, p.98). The concept of 'duration' assists us in thinking about the 'relation between the subject and time and what counts as a past', as it shapes the subject's 'sense of pastness' (ibid, pp.99–100). In order to examine the position of Arab Jerusalem on the Palestinian historical map, capturing this 'sense of pastness' as it was experienced by the Palestinian residents between 1948 and 1967 is elementary because the Nakba was not yet fully a past for the partitioned city.

Duration is not only about the past, though. Rather, it determines the orientation and the 'process of becoming' of those who live within it. Telling a story of those, and by those, who inhabit a particular duration constitutes a 'crucial part of the process' of orienting 'one's way of moving through space and time' (Rifkin, 2017, p.46). Furthermore, Das invites us to think of 'stories not as completed but as in the process of being produced'. What is at stake in this process is 'the *work* of time, not its image or representation' (ibid, p.80, emphasis added). Stories thus are important for capturing the orientation of the subject, since:

> Time is not purely something represented but is an agent that 'works' on relationships – allowing them to be reinterpreted, rewritten, sometimes overwritten – as different social actors struggle to author stories in which collectivities are created or re-created. (ibid, p.87)

In writing the story of Arab Jerusalem, this thesis is particularly interested in the work of time and the process of becoming of the city and its residents following the Nakba. To do so, I trace marks of temporal orientation and future-making through the details, images and *stories* of the city as it was being produced as a locality. Following Arjun Appadurai, locality is 'a phenomenological property of social life, a structure of feeling that is produced by particular forms of intentional activity and that yields particular sorts of material effects' (1996, p.182). It is this production of the city as a space of social life and a structure of feeling that determined particular Palestinian temporal orientations after the Nakba, especially in relation to the future as it was imagined and produced in the case of Arab Jerusalem.

Producing Arab Jerusalem

What would a city do if it wakes up to a reality in which it has become a frontier, partitioned, deprived of a state, without substantive financial resources, with a destroyed infrastructure, cut from water and electricity, and with no city centre? What urges cities and their inhabitants to continue to produce a meaningful world in the aftermath of political and human catastrophe?

In his autobiography, *A Different Shadow of the City*, author Mahmoud Shqair opens for us a rare window to look into the life of Arab Jerusalem. Growing up in Jabal al-Mukabir, one of Jerusalem's rural suburbs, Shqair narrates memories from his childhood and adolescence in Arab Jerusalem:

> The city, however, continued its familiar life, vendors proclaiming their goods with their loud voices, the villagers returning home before evening, the city people walking in its streets until the late hours of the evening, and I am very eager to live looking in the city and in the village for new materials to write a story. (2009, p.66)

In Shqair's account, Arab Jerusalem is projected as a productive site for culture, politics and passion. It is a space for the imagination to produce and reproduce the city beyond its depiction as a frontier or a marginal and partitioned city. I read the

emergence of Arab Jerusalem by focusing on this production of space, time, meaning and discourses by the city's residents and administration. I am particularly interested in the *process* of production of the locality, which reflects notions of continuity that transcend conventional notions of mere survival in the aftermath of destruction.

The space of the city is a social product determined by social relations of production and their representations, according to Henri Lefebvre in *The Production of Space* (1991, p.26). In coming to understand this space, the '"object" of interest must be expected to shift from *things in space* to the actual *production of space*' (ibid, pp.36–37, emphasis in original). In this process of production, the element of time is particularly important, since society takes time to be able to generate 'an *appropriated* social space in which it can achieve a form by means of self-presentation and self-representation' (ibid, p.34, emphasis added).

This invokes an examination of the relation between time and space and whether these are separate domains of social life. In her essay 'Politics and Space/Time', Doreen Massey argues that 'space is not static, nor time spaceless. Of course, spatiality and temporality are different from each other, but neither can be conceptualized as the absence of the other' (1992, p.80). However, Mariana Valverde warns us in her critique of legal geography scholarship about the relegation of time to a 'theoretical notion of history'. This narrow understanding of time neglects the 'temporal dimension of human experience', as well as 'aboriginal and spiritual temporalities that ground many non-Western legalities' (2014, pp.55–56). These debates highlight the importance of both time and space in the production of the city.

As such, tracking the process of production is also crucial for capturing the temporal constitution of the city, which is itself essential for unpacking elements of Palestinian agency after the Nakba. The marks of time were spread all over the city's infrastructure and were embedded in its activities, such as in water and electricity flows, whenever an airplane landed in the Jerusalem Airport or a street was paved, or even when a donkey, finally, made its way through one of the Old City's narrow streets. These temporal marks contribute to a richer engagement with space-making, beyond its mere spatial materiality.

Moreover, Lefebvre distinguishes between the city as 'a present and immediate reality, a practico-material and architectural fact' and the urban as 'a social reality made up of relations which are to be conceived of, constructed or reconstructed by thought'. The 'practico-material', he further emphasizes, constitutes the base for the urban and its 'morphology' (1996, p.103).

The loss of essential infrastructure that was positioned in the New City in 1948 occupies a prominent role in the material making of the Arab City that followed the partition. As such, this thesis combines the history of the city as a morphology and that of the urban as a social reality. Scholarship on infrastructure is extensive and has illuminated different aspects of urban infrastructure, including its sociability (Amin, 2014). Examining interactions with infrastructure opens a window onto social worlds, since:

> These interactions are both intimate and affective, as people approach infrastructure with assumptions about how things should work, and leave it frustrated, disappointed or fulfilled. Individuals also develop time- and place-specific understandings of the world through these moments – such as perceptions of the city they inhabit, the nation of which they are a part – and normative expectations about good cities, functional communities or battles worth fighting. (Angelo and Hentschel, 2015, p.306)

The sociability of infrastructure is manifested also in its power and authority 'to forge and maintain the assemblage of practices, discourses, physical fixtures, laws and procedures necessary for the government of subjects and citizens, including their economies' (Khalili, 2018, p.914). Despite the seeming 'banality' and 'dullness' of infrastructure, the political effects that it generates remain significant artefacts of economic power and capital distribution (Anand, 2017, p.2). The effects of infrastructure also extend beyond its own time, as Anand states, 'while infrastructures are present, they also continue to reproduce the political relationships of the times in which they were constructed' (ibid, p.3). Therefore, it is crucial to explore infrastructure as a temporal marker that extends beyond the political moment of its making.

In studying the development of urban infrastructure, different elements should be examined. These include the process of their making ('being produced, altered, repaired, maintained and demolished'), the actors involved ('host of builders,

developers, architects, engineers, bulldozers and diggers'), and the thought behind them ('shaping, location, financing, use and repercussions'). Finally, there should be an examination of the resistance between competing players, such as capital owners and poor residents who seek to 'adapt to or respond to and resist dominant methods of governing infrastructures' (McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008, p.366).

Arab Jerusalem was not the global city of our times and neither does it fit within mega neo-liberal developmental models of these cities (Sassen, 1991), although it sought to integrate modestly within the regional and global economy of its time – mainly through the tourism industry. However, in this thesis, I focus mainly on the social and political meaning of infrastructure, particularly because Jerusalem was living in a state of crisis given the loss of essential urban infrastructure. Therefore, I address notions of urban development, including infrastructure, through this condition of crisis.

To explore this, I deploy a definition that extends the notion of infrastructure directly to people's activities in the city, as AbdouMaliq Simone suggests in his essay 'People as Infrastructure' (2004b, p.407). According to this, a 'conjunction of complex combinations of objects, spaces, persons, and practices … becomes an infrastructure – a platform providing for and reproducing life in the city' (ibid, p.408). Simone further explains that diverse activities, modes of production and institutional forms produce the very possibilities that allow people to 'live and make things', as well as 'use the urban environment and collaborate with one another'. The sum of these activities and collaborations is thus a:

> process of conjunctions capable of generating social compositions across a range of singular capacities and needs (both enacted and virtual) and which attempts to derive maximal outcomes from a minimal set of elements. (ibid, pp.410–411)

This process resonates with the state of Arab Jerusalem as a city that lived through adaption, adjustment and compensation for the loss of infrastructure, and had to create alternative collaborative economies in order to continue as a living city. This, however, did not prevent its residents and administration from developing a particular (historical) notion of development, as this thesis shows.

The destruction and revival of Arab Jerusalem after the Nakba as a somehow contradictory state of being is not unexpected, however, as Simone shows in his work

on post-colonial African urbanity. In his book *For the City Yet to Come*, the title of which is itself apposite to the case of Arab Jerusalem, Simone states that 'for many urban residents, life is reduced to a state of emergency'. In seeking to understand the 'possibilities of becoming' in these settings, Simone describes the emergency as being a '*double-edged* experience' as it 'describes a process of things in the making, of the emergence of new thinking and practice still unstable, still tentative in terms of the use of which such thinking and practice will be put' (2004a, pp.4–5).

In the case of Arab Jerusalem, one particularly distinguished example of 'double-edginess' at a time of crisis is the creation of a city centre in the Bab al-Sahira area and the development of Salah al-Din Street into the main commercial thoroughfare and the landmark of the Arab City, a status it retains until this day. Hotels, bookshops, a post office, courts and the Jerusalem Electricity Company were all built in the street or in its area. Salah al-Din Street, which was only a marginal road before the Nakba, grew in parallel to the lost Jaffa Street – the main commercial street of the New City, in which were located many Palestinian businesses, as well as the government headquarters and the town hall before 1948.

So, what is this city of Arab Jerusalem? What kind of urbanity did it create? How do we write the history of the city that is the sum of 'double-edged' experiences? These were the experiences of people living in the shadow of the Nakba in a city that was neighbouring its past, being a contemporaneous site of loss, while at the same time thinking about the future. The main starting point in writing such a history is to acknowledge its contradictory life, as well as its multilayered compositions. As Doreen Massey notes:

> Perhaps a really 'radical' history of a place would be one which did not try to present either simple temporal continuity or only spatial simultaneity with no sense of historical depth. A way of understanding which, in the end, did not try to seal a place up into one neat and tidy 'envelope of space-time' but which recognised that what has come together, in this place, now, is a conjunction of many histories and many spaces. (1995, p.191)

The life of Arab Jerusalem as it will be introduced in this thesis escapes this 'neat and tidy "envelope of space-time"' by imagining it as a 'landscape of recovery' (Arif, 2009) in which people live an 'everyday life [with] a quality of something recovered', inhabiting 'a temporality of second chances' (Das, 2006, p.101). In this landscape,

each of the spaces articulates 'a kind of reconstruction or recovery' and 'together they compose a stable landscape representing the practice of recovery' (Arif, 2009, p.282).

Nevertheless, Arab Jerusalem was not merely a post-war landscape of recovery that sought to overcome the past and move on, as it was waiting to connect to its other part – and so too were its refugee inhabitants. As it was recovering from the destruction of the past, it was also embedded in that past and demanding to reverse its consequences. The Nakba was always present in the city, even when it embarked on developmental projects, as Arab Jerusalem was, partly, a product of the Nakba.

The geographical and temporal proximity of Arab Jerusalem with its lost part positioned it in a state of in-betweenness. The city was neither totally lost nor fully claimed, neither completely living in the past nor immersed in imagining the future, and neither optimistic nor pessimistic.

In-betweenness was inscribed in the city's body: the Jerusalem airport stood in parallel to the Mandelbaum Gate; hotels stood across from the destroyed buildings in No Man's Land and the Jewish Quarter, where refugees sought shelter; streets were named after the lost cities of Jaffa, Haifa and Lydda; and the expanding Salah al-Din Street marked the new centre and future development of the city.

Temporal and spatial orientations of the city were both determined by this in-betweenness. Spatially, the city was now expanding towards the east, the south and the north, having lost its western parts – which had been its main areas of development before 1948. Temporally, while oriented towards the future, which promised development and a return home, it was equally living with the past, which was not yet completely a past – especially for the many refugees who waited, almost in certainty to return to their homes, which could be seen from the top of Arab Jerusalem's high buildings. 'So which am I, a pessimist or an optimist?' (Habiby, 1985) said undecided Sa'id, the pessoptimist,[19] who had to live in the shadow of the Nakba, *forever*.

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[19] *Pessoptimism* (a combination of pessimism and optimism) is the remarkable term Palestinian author Emile Habiby coined to describe the life of those who survived the Nakba and remained in their localities under the rule of Israel.

Conclusion

Writing the local history of Arab Jerusalem is a complex and uneasy task. Neither the period nor the polity under study have received recognition in the dominant Palestinian historiography. This was clearly reflected in the lack of use made of the Arab municipality records for local history writing. This thesis addresses this absence by engaging with the history of making Arab Jerusalem. By tracing the processes of producing the city, I seek to capture temporal and spatial formations, as well as the agentic element of the players involved in this production process. Writing about small details of locality-making in the shadow of the Nakba requires an understanding of its duration and presence in the city's space-time, beyond the physical partition.

PART II: COLONIAL TIMES IN JERUSALEM

Chapter 3

Occupying Local History

Contextualizing the Jerusalem Municipality Archive

This chapter traces the history of the Arab municipality records as they were subsumed by the history and the archives of colonial Jerusalem beginning in 1967. Contextualizing the Jerusalem Municipality Archive aims to contribute to critical accounts of Israel's colonization of Palestinian archives. At the same time, this case of archival violence has its own particular contours as an archive located at the frontier of a settler-colonial state.

A key argument of this thesis is that it was not inevitable that these records should have been kept, or that they were made accessible. Accordingly, this chapter seeks to explain, through the history of the Jerusalem Municipality Archive, how archives create epistemic violence even when they function as an open public resource (Stoler, 2002, p.87).

The history of Israel's colonization of Palestinian private and public collections and archives, and access to these, has been extensively documented and studied (Masalha, 2012; Amit, 2008). Archival records cannot be read outside the moment of their colonization, which is not limited to the actual seizure – normally accompanied by force – but rather extends into the present by acts of authorised confidentiality, limited accessibility, and acts of refusal to return looted documents to their owners (Azoulay, 2015; Budeiri, 2016).

Physical access to archives has been another challenge for Palestinians, especially over the last two decades, as freedom of movement within the West Bank and Gaza is restricted given the increase of checkpoints and the establishment of the separation wall (Banko, 2012).

Archival violence in relation to Jerusalem is a systematic and ongoing Israeli policy. Palestinian archives, libraries and private collections are continuously under threat from Israel – similarly to the life, home and residency status of any Palestinian in Jerusalem. The best-known case of archival violence in Jerusalem is the Orient House, which constituted the main Palestinian political institution in the city. The Orient House accommodated the Arab Studies Society, one of the largest collections of books, maps, photographs and manuscripts on Modern Jerusalem (*Jerusalem Quarterly* editorial, 1999). In 2001, the Israeli army raided the House and confiscated the library and the records. Since then, it has kept the place closed by issuing an administrative order every six months (*Jerusalem Quarterly* editorial, 2001).

Finally, this chapter examines the relation between local knowledge and archival violence by analysing the interaction between the Palestinians in Jerusalem and the Israeli municipality – a violent institution governing their everyday life, while simultaneously functioning as a local archive. In sum, the history of the Arab municipality records is introduced here to illuminate the systematic archival violence in Jerusalem and Palestine in general.

An Archive on the Frontier of the Colony

During the Jewish Passover holidays in March 1965, the Israeli Jerusalem municipality circulated a call in the local Israeli press for Jerusalem's residents to rescue the city's history from being burned. As part of the Passover cleaning ceremonies, Jewish 'housewives' threw away or burned old documents that they considered 'nuisances' and sources for 'accumulating dust'. Thus, the municipality called on citizens who were 'about to throw away letters, pictures, written records, books and other objects' to contact the municipal archives instead. It also offered to send one of its employees to pay house visits to search family papers for valuable items (unauthored and untitled, 21/3/1965; 'The Capital's Municipality is Rescuing Documents', *Haaretz*, undated; 'Passover Cleaning with Sense of History', *Jerusalem Post*, 30/3/1965; 'Removal of Leavened Bread for History', *Yedioth Ahronoth*, 30/3/1965, JMA 2702/09).

This call was preceded by earlier calls of the fledging Israeli Jerusalem Municipality Archive ('Jerusalem Municipality Call', *Davar,* 9/2/1964, JMA 2702/09), which sought to gain public and governmental status after years of struggling to establish itself. It was following the lead of Tel-Aviv and Haifa, which had established municipal archives in the mid-1950s. Jerusalem's attempts to establish a municipal archive dated back to 1959 but, due to bureaucratic delays, the final approval of the archive and its inclusion in the municipal budget was possible only in 1962 (unauthored report titled 'First Steps 1959–1962', undated, JMA 2730/05 (hereafter, 'First Steps 1959–1962')).[20]

In 1963, the archive began work. It was accommodated in the three-room armoured safe of the infamous Barclays Bank building, which the Israeli Jerusalem municipality occupied ('Foundations for the Historical Archive in the Capital', *Hirot*, 7/11/1963, JMA 2730/05). The archive's task was defined by the State Archivist at the time, Avraham Alsberg, as follows:

> the historical archive of the Jerusalem municipality should be considered as an institution that has administrative and cultural functions, which will keep *forever* the archival materials needed for the city's administration and residents for administrative and legal purposes, and which will keep for *generations* the documentation of the city's history and development. (Unauthored, 'The historical archive', undated, JMA 2730/05, emphasis added)

In order to begin working, the archive received collections of governmental records, including advertisements and photographs. A library was established, to which the *Jerusalem Post* donated copies, oral history recordings were considered, and private archives were collected, including the archive of Jerusalem's ex-mayor Daniel Auster (ibid).

Yet, as time passed, it became clear that the archive was not a priority for the local administration. It became overloaded and neglected in the basement of the municipality. When Teddy Kollek was elected to the mayoralty in 1965, the staff of the archive hoped to find a new home for the archive and to improve it. But, due to financial constraints and other priorities of the local administration, no major changes

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[20] This seems to be a draft of Menhaim Levin's book *A Brief History of Jerusalem City Archive* (2004).

transpired. Thus, the archive's mission became limited to collecting news items concerned with municipal work (First Steps 1959–1962).

This brief historical account of the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality Archive is intended to contextualize the archive within the Israeli national context, between its 'War of Independence' in 1948 and the occupation of the rest of mandate Palestine in 1967. Up until the 1967 war, the municipal archive was seeking to establish itself as a 'cultural urban institution for the service of the citizens as part of the city's development plans' (unauthored, draft titled 'Announcement to the public on the historical archive', undated, JMA 2730/05 (hereafter, 'Announcement to the public')).

At the time, the Israeli-occupied part of partitioned Jerusalem was described as a 'neglected frontier zone' (Jarzmik, 2016, p.100) and an 'isolated city' (Hercbergs, 2018), having the 'quality of an introverted provincial city' (Benvenisti, 1976, p.35), despite being the capital and a university city. This resulted in a gradual decline of the city's population between 1948 and 1967 – especially young people, who left for coastal cities such as Tel-Aviv given the 'difficulties in finding housing and livelihood' (ibid, pp.31–35).

'Israeli' Jerusalem also struggled on the symbolic level, despite being the Israeli capital and the residence of the Knesset, as it lacked the Old City, the heart of Zionist ideology and its claim over Palestine (Troen and Shalom, 1999, p.217; Haim Weizmann, Israel Provisional State Council meeting, 1/12/1948, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website). As such, the history of the city during this period was also marginalized. This was reflected in memorandums explaining the importance of a local archive for the production of historical accounts on Jerusalem, given the 'bitter fact … that there is not yet a monograph on Jerusalem and the attempts that started more than ten years ago to produce a monumental book on Jerusalem did not bear fruit' (unauthored, 'The historical archive' (in handwriting), 5/3/1964, JMA 2730/05).

Nevertheless, the Jerusalem Municipality Archive did not stand in a national vacuum, as it deployed a discourse of local heroism and sacrifice in line with the Zionist narrative of independence and liberating the land. As one archival document states, 'at the time other municipalities in the world dealt with collecting historical materials,

Jerusalem was deep into a constant struggle for its independence and its status' (unauthored, undated, untitled, JMA 2730/05).

Moreover, the past in the archive's narrative did not include the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, particularly those refugees from the colonized parts of 'Israeli' Jerusalem. The archive's erasure of Palestinians from the history of the city was made through typical colonial temporal ordering and claims of continuity, eternity and being there since time immemorial.

This erasure was further extended to the Arab part of partitioned Jerusalem, which was not occupied in 1948. The municipal archive reiterated the Zionist mourning over the loss of the Old City in 1948, an essential component of its colonial temporality and claims. The Archive considered the Israeli failure to occupy the Old City as a 'gap' in the history of the city:

> As is well known, an important organ of Jerusalem was dismembered during the 'independence war' and that is the Old City. The documents related to the history of the city until the establishment of Israel exist today in the hands of the municipality. In this regard, the city citizens can donate from their archival collections in order to bridge the *historical gap* that was created in our history. ('Announcement to the public', emphasis added)

The Israeli 'loss' of the Old City was depicted as a 'historical gap' that needed to be bridged materially and discursively, be it by the army, the residents or the archive. The archive thus appropriated the city's history and claimed it as exclusively Israeli since time immemorial – a history that was interrupted by the Palestinian presence in the city. Thus, although on the margin of the colony, the colonial effects of the Jerusalem Municipality Archive were in action. It is within these discourses of historical 'gap' and 'interruption' that this archive should be analysed as a colonial institution on the eve of the 1967 war.

Occupying Local History

One day after the Israeli military occupied Arab Jerusalem in 1967, the State Archivist at the time, Alex Bayn, wrote a letter to the Prime Minister's office to offer his services and those of the public archives – including the Israel State Archive, the Israel Defence Forces Archives and the Central Zionist Archives – for any task needed to secure a

safe preservation of archives in the occupied territories. Bayn retrieved the procedure for collecting records in occupied territories that the IDF had followed during the Suez War in 1956. He, however, was concerned that the occupation in 1967 was much more complex, thus requiring the interference of experts. In this sense, Bayn perceived the task of securing a safe collection of the archives of the occupied territories as being inseparable from the overall operations of the war (Letter from Bayn to Hirtsog, 'Archives in the Old City and the occupied territory', 8/6/1967, ISA G-37/7115).

Over the next few months following the occupation in 1967, archive employees roamed governmental buildings in different cities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip looking for records. In Jerusalem, these included the building of the governor, the post office department, the district health department, and the development and housing ministry (Unauthored, 'Supervision on Archival Material in the Occupied Territories, Report No. 1', 26/9/1967 (hereafter, Report No. 1); 'Report No. 2', 11/10/1967 (hereafter, Report No. 2), ISA G-37/7115).

In addition to collecting records belonging to the Jordanian government, the person in charge of the State Archive instructed the employees to collect records of the Ottoman and mandate eras (Report No. 1). On some occasions, the archivists approached local Palestinian officials in order to help them locate particular records. For instance, to locate mandate period records, one of the archive's employees visited Anwar al-Khatib, the last governor of Jerusalem under Jordan, and questioned him about the records (Letter from Mizrahi to Alsberg, 'A Visit to the Ex-Governor of Jerusalem – Anwar al-Khatib', 21/6/1967, ISA G-37/7115).

Despite the attempts of the State Archivist to have full supervision of the collection operation, chaos prevailed. Several Israeli governmental bodies collected records relevant to their function without referring to the State Archivist, leaving some collections unorganized and in chaos (Report No. 1). By October 1967, about 40 tons of archival material, packed in 3,243 boxes, were collected from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The majority of these archives were from Jerusalem, including 468 boxes from the governor's office, 194 boxes from the Jordanian intelligence service office, and 38 boxes from the office of the Ministry of Development (Unauthored,

'Supervision on Archival Materials in the Occupied Territories – Report No. 3', 1/1/1968, ISA G-37/7115).

Despite being a public institution, the Arab municipality building was not among the list of buildings included in the abovementioned reports. The Arab municipal council was dissolved on 29 June 1967. Following that, the Israeli municipality decided to move its sanitation department into the Arab municipality building (Levin, 2004, p.5). At the end of July 1967, the Arab municipality workers who were incorporated in the Israeli municipality, as chapter 8 will explain, were moved to the Israeli municipality building along with their files and documents (al-Khatib, 2006, p.138).

Menahem Levin was among the municipal archive employees during the 1967 war. He took part as a soldier in the military operation in the Old City, before resuming his work in the archive in July 1967. Levin documented the removal of the files in his short account *A Brief History of Jerusalem City Archive*:

> The occupation of the Old City and the dissolution of the Arab municipality in East Jerusalem imposed on the City Archive a big and unexpected challenge – handling the archives that were found in the [Arab] municipality building at St. Dimitri street. … Most of the archival materials were stored by the Arab municipality employees in the building's basement in wheat bags. Hundreds of bags were piled from the floor to the roof. There were no shelves or carton containers but only smelly bags. We hired Jewish workers of a delivery company and they cleaned the files with brushes and packed them in carton containers. Most of the files were kept in a good shape. (Levin, 2004, pp.5–6)

Since then, the Arab municipality records have become part of the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality Archive. There is no information available in relation to their treatment and accessibility over the years. But it is evident that they became accessible to researchers – although perhaps only to Israeli researchers – at least from the 1980s, as the Israeli scholar Daniel Rubinstein relied on them to write his essay in 1980. And yet, the relations of Palestinian scholars and Jerusalem residents with these records, and with the Jerusalem Municipality Archive in general, cannot be contextualized separately from the violent role that the Israeli Jerusalem municipality plays in their lives.

The Archive of the 'Municipality of the Occupation'

Anyone following Palestinian and Arab news on Jerusalem would notice that it is common to refer to the Israeli Jerusalem municipality as the 'municipality of the occupation' [baladiyat al-ihtilal]. Although I did not investigate the history of this term in detail, it can be argued that it emerged to distinguish this institution from the Arab municipality which Israel dissolved after the occupation in 1967 – especially since no other municipality in the West Bank or Gaza Strip was dissolved. The Israeli occupation in 1967 and the forced incorporation of Arab Jerusalem into the Israeli local administration and rule deprived the Palestinian residents of their right to self-rule in the city and subjugated them to violent practices of *baladiyat al-ihtilal.*

'Suspicion and enmity' characterized the way in which the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem responded to the Municipality Archive's actions of 'collecting' local records following the 1967 war. In the draft that seems to be of Levin's aforementioned account, which can be found in the Municipality Archive, he expresses the tension in the relation between the Archive and the Palestinians in Jerusalem during that time:

> The four years after the Six Days War were years of opening horizons. Connections were established with churches in the eastern part of the city, and with merchants and lay residents. Important materials of the Greek ethnic group and other ethnic groups were added to the archive, whether the original or a copy. *But not all doors had opened. Suspicion and enmity had their effect.* (First Steps 1959–1962, emphasis added)

However, this last line was omitted from Levin's published account. Instead, the author referred to 'collecting materials' from the Palestinian residents in terms of market exchange and historical materials as commodities:

> The four years after the Six Days War were years of opening horizons. Important archival materials were *purchased* in East Jerusalem. Old photos, maps, publications and books were *purchased.* (2004, p.6, emphasis added)

The material existence of the archive within the Jerusalem municipality building must have influenced the Palestinian community's knowledge of its existence and contributed to its image as an alien archive, not one that belongs to them and their city. Given the fierce colonial bureaucratic violence of the municipality against the Palestinian residents, they are forced to come to its door quite often to pay taxes and

fines and to attend municipal court hearings and more. At the secured entrance to the municipality's central building, people line up to be checked through a metal gate and their bags are searched by armed security personnel. This checkpoint-like scene is a location of racial profiling and surveillance; all are familiar rituals in the securitized Israeli public space in Jerusalem and in general.

To enter the Municipality Archive, which is located on floor -1 of the municipality's central building, one must go through this entrance. Accordingly, visiting the Jerusalem Municipality Archive involves a violent practice derived from the actual everyday role of the municipality as a colonial institution. This imposes further distance between the Palestinian residents and their city's history. Once inside the archive, alienation persists through the unfamiliarity of Palestinians with the Hebrew language and its hostile role in their everyday lives in Jerusalem.

Israeli archives, like other colonial archives, seek to produce effects of order, discipline, knowledge, coherence, authority and control of their resources. The Jerusalem Municipality Archive is an exception to this colonial archival logic, yet not to its epistemic violence and history. The archive is opened only three days a week for three hours and is staffed by university students.[21] The staff lack archives training and basic historical knowledge of the municipality, including names of key characters associated with the municipal history of the city. The reading room is a narrow space furnished with some old tables and chairs and connected to the reception desk. Staff and visitors normally chat and make jokes while researchers examine historical records.

There is no organized, digitized and coherent catalogue of the archive. The Jerusalem City Archive webpage hardly indicates anything beyond the general objectives of the archive and the length of the shelves of materials that it accommodates. The webpage provides a ten-page document that includes charts of the materials related to the four eras in the modern history of Jerusalem in chronological order: the Ottoman, mandate,

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[21] Levin stated that the archive has been short of staff and inexperienced students have worked there since it was established (Levin, 2004, p.3).

Jordanian rule and the Israeli Jerusalem municipality (List of Major Divisions and Collections, JMA website).

In the archive itself, there is a chest of drawers that operates as an index. Each drawer holds a sticker indicating a variety of themes, subjects and epochs, and each contains cards that index the archive's content. Yet not all of these files are available or accessible, as one discovers when ordering them. The archive staff members have access to a digital catalogue on the only computer that exists in the reception area, which is reserved for their use and not accessible to researchers.

The chaos and contingency of the municipal archive's records put it at odds with the Israeli colonial obsession with archiving and record keeping. This was particularly obvious during the fiftieth anniversary of the 1967 war in 2017, which signified the celebration of the 'unification' of Jerusalem across different Israeli national institutions. For instance, the Israel State Archive 'celebrated' the event by disclosing a wide range of documents, photographs, maps, broadcast recordings and videos and making them accessible online.

The Jerusalem Municipality Archive, which would be expected to take part in the national celebration of the city's unification – an event that constituted a turning point in its own history – did not make any move in the same direction. While working in the Municipality Archive in the summer of 2017, coinciding with the fiftieth anniversary, I ordered documents on Jerusalem in 1967. Most folders I received were not from 1967 but from years later. When I enquired, I was told that this is what exists [zh ma yish]. Randomly, I did find some files relevant to 1967 dispersed in other folders.

Contingency and luck determine the scholar's path in this archive. In one case, I asked for a file that appeared in the reference list of a journal article authored by an Israeli scholar. The staff consulted a supervisor, who initially said that the file – which was on 1967 policies towards Palestinian residents of Jerusalem – did not exist. Yet, after I insisted that the file did in fact exist, as documented in the journal article, it was given to me. In another encounter, I asked the archive's staff whether there were records on the history of the establishment of the archive. I received a negative answer. Yet, when I randomly examined some of the cards in the abovementioned drawers, I

found several files on this subject. I ordered those files and they became the basis for this chapter.

When the Israeli archivists collected the records from the Arab municipality building, Levin states, most of the files were in good shape. In fact, many of them are still held in the original files and still bear the headings of the Arab municipality. According to Benvenisti, Salah al-Din Jarallah, the former secretary of the Arab municipality, had 'personally packaged the papers with loving care, guarding them strictly, until they were deposited in his new office in West Jerusalem' (Benvenisti, 1976, pp.129–130).[22]

These files were catalogued by the Arab municipality in line with the British format and had a decimal key, similar to that of the mandate municipality (Levin, 2004, pp.5–6). In addition, the files were numbered by the Israeli municipality archive according to box/file sequence and were stamped 'registered in computer' (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Example of an Arab municipality file

(Source: JMA 952-24)

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[22] Many workers of the dissolved Arab municipality were incorporated in the Israeli municipality in July 1967. Jarallah and other senior employees did not feel comfortable in their positions and wanted to quit their jobs (al-Khatib, 2006, p.142). See chapter 8 for further discussion.

Nevertheless, no catalogue or index is provided to the researcher who comes to fetch these particular records – unlike, for instance, the mandate records, which are catalogued in an accessible red folder. Researchers of the Arab records are left with only basic information provided in the general list of collections available on the Archive's website.

This list includes only three categories of materials: general administration (including the municipal council); the city engineer division; and the finance division (1948–1967). For each division, the list states the length of the shelves of materials that it holds – for instance, there are 27 metres of shelves for materials related to general administration.

Such a detail sparks the imagination of the researcher who sits in the basement of the Municipality Archive, trying to imagine 27 metres of shelves and the number of folders they could accommodate. The attempts to imagine the space that these records occupy vertically and horizontally in the colonial archive come at the expense of imagining them in a different setting and context: on the shelves of the Arab municipality at a different time.

A catalogue of the Arab records could be produced and perhaps exists in the archive's system, but its absence aims to render these records passive in the present. To be activated, these files should be thought of as products of their locality, not products of the archive, and as 'active, generative substances with histories, [and] as documents with itineraries of their own' (Stoler, 2009, p.1).

If read independently of their context, the contingency and randomness of the Arab records as disorganized archival materials would contribute to their passiveness. That is where the 'labour of the scholar' (Doumani, 2009, p.6) is much needed – not only to activate the archive and to tell a story, but also to look for and find an 'indigenous critique in the archives' (Allen, 2017).

Conclusion

This brief chapter contextualized the Jerusalem Municipality Archive within its colonial disposition, past and present. The history of the Archive and of the Arab

records, together with the role of the Israeli Jerusalem municipality since 1967, has contributed to the creation of Arab Jerusalem as a historical lacuna over the years. This short review, however, aimed not only to show the coloniality of the archive, but also to create a space to recover the local resources and voices from their colonial positionality.

Chapter 4

The Emergence of an Arab Municipality

Jerusalem's Local Governance in the

Wake of the Nakba

> Our heritage from the Mandatory Government in this part of Jerusalem, was a distressed city of shaky buildings, paralyzed commerce and industry, devoid of any financial resources and without a Government, water and electricity. The city was suffering from poverty and bad destiny, the same as it was sustaining the calamities of war. (Ruhi al-Khatib, Lecture 'Developments in Jerusalem', 15/5/1963, p.3, JMA 944-24) (hereafter, 'Developments in Jerusalem' lecture, 15/5/1963)

With these words, mayor al-Khatib recalled Jerusalem's situation after the mandate ended in mid-May 1948. The role of the mandate, especially during the last period of its rule in Palestine, was decisive in determining the fate of the city and its administration after the Nakba. Thus, the first section of this chapter[23] narrates the story of the crisis of local governance in Jerusalem during the late mandate period, which led to Jerusalem's native residents being deprived of their right to rule the city. It begins with an analysis of local governance as a sphere of the mandate governmentality, in order to locate the crisis in Jerusalem within the overall context of the British and Zionist settler-colonization of Palestine.

The fall of the New City in mid-May 1948 and the war of the Nakba extended the crisis of Jerusalem's local administration afterwards, when the city came under Jordanian control. Therefore, the second section of this chapter documents the struggle of the municipality during the first six months after the fall of the New City, which captures its transformation into a 'refugee-municipality'. In November 1948, the first municipal council under Jordan was appointed in Jerusalem.

This window into the early months of the Nakba constitutes a crucial point of departure for the whole thesis, as it analyses the roots and particularities of the crisis of the city's

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[23] Parts of this chapter were published in the *Jerusalem Quarterly* journal, see Naamneh, 2019.

local administration and the loss of essential infrastructure after the fall of the New City. At the same time, this period constituted a 'bridge' that led to the re-emergence of self-rule in the city from late 1948 until the Israeli occupation in June 1967.

Colonizing Local Governance in Palestine under the British Mandate

Local Governance in Mandate Palestine

Over the three decades of its rule in Palestine, Britain established a colonial infrastructure to govern the country. The mandate governed all areas of life in Palestine through determining ethnic-national separation between the Arab Palestinian native residents and the Jewish population, constituted mainly by settler communities:

> First, was the partitioning of people into categories of Jewish and non-Jewish, *deserving and undeserving* of a national home. Second was the erasure of the Palestinian who appeared only as a non-Jewish inhabitant bearing religious and civil but not *political* rights. (Seikaly, 2016, p.5, emphasis added)

Since its early beginning, local governance under the mandate was not an exception to this rule. On the contrary, it was heavily shaped by the mandate policy of creating Jewish and non-Jewish categories, deserving and undeserving of political rights (al-Jarbawi, 1991, pp.51–58). It explicitly associated local governance with political potency, and as such it discursively and materially produced two categories of those who were able, and thus deserved, to be leading a local autonomy, and those who were *not.* This, ultimately, led to a weakening of the potential Palestinian 'forum of state' (R. Khalidi, 2006, p.43), including local governance. This vital branch of governance became a contentious site of politics, since it was among the very few areas during the mandate of actual joint political representation of the Palestinians and the Jews, mainly in 'mixed towns' (Goren, 2006, p.19).

This mandate policy was stipulated in the report of the Royal Commission for Palestine of 1937 (hereafter, the Peel report).[24] The report considered local governance to be a system that 'involves the conjunction of what are virtually two *civilizations* in one system, and thus reflects in miniature the paramount problem of the whole

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[24] The commission was appointed following the Great Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936–1939).

country' (1937, p.354, emphasis added). In its analysis of municipal corporations in Palestine, the report suggested to 'study in two allied respects, as a *milieu* for racial co-operation and as an experiment in self-government with national representation as its goal' (ibid, p.347, emphasis in original). As such, the report recommended that the mandate administration should encourage local autonomy in Palestine since its quality and extent would indicate 'the political capacity of its people' (ibid, p.345).

The association of local governance with political capacity set the ground to create a political hierarchy between Jewish communities and Palestinian Arab residents within local autonomy. This gave rise to a scale of local councils and municipalities according to notions of development and civilization, signifying some municipalities as 'backward' and others as 'progressive'. Following the same racial logic, it also coined the concept of 'mixed' towns or municipalities (ibid, pp.348, 350)[25] to distinguish between pure Arab towns and pure Jewish towns, but '*always* with the exception of Tel-Aviv' (ibid, p.350, emphasis added). On the higher scale were the local institutions of the Jewish communities, while on the lower scale were the Arab local institutions – especially in rural Palestine.

The Commission criticized the existing local governance system and considered it to be undeveloped and insufficient due to the rigid Municipal Corporations Law, which limited local authorities – especially those designated 'progressive' – from developing:

> The deficiencies of the present system are therefore two-fold; first, a lack of initiative on the part of the more backward Municipalities; and, secondly, the limitations set to initiative on the part of the more progressive Municipalities by the Government's centralized power and its monopoly of certain public services. (Peel report, p.351)

The report further argued that the failures in the local system were due to the lack of interest shown by townspeople. To support this argument, it referred to the rates of voting in elections – such as in Jerusalem, where only a little over 50 percent voted (ibid, p.350). This lack of social responsibility, argued the report, also characterized

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[25] The 'mixed' municipalities that existed under the mandate included Jerusalem, Haifa, Tiberias, Safad and Jaffa. Tamir Goren argues that the term '"Mixed Cities" first began to circulate in written documents of the Mandatory government and its use expanded throughout the period', but it was not official (2004, p.120).

the 'average municipality of Palestine', as it was only a service provider but 'not yet a corporate body expressing in its services the social sense of the community' (ibid, p.349). As such, the colonial administration dismissed native communal spirit and bonds that were formed within the historical and social context of Palestine.

The hierarchical approach of the administration was best represented in its attitude towards the municipality of Tel-Aviv, 'the only purely Jewish municipality', as the exception and the role model for local governance in Palestine.[26] Tel-Aviv was founded in 1909 as a small settlement. Between 1922 and 1944, its Jewish population increased from 15,065 to 166,300, rendering the percentage of the Jewish population more than 74.5 percent of the Jaffa–Tel Aviv region by 1944 (LeVine, 2005, p.84).

The commission described Tel-Aviv as a town – unlike all others – whose 'people' were democratic and highly educated and 'possess[ed] an intense *civic spirit* and a confident belief in the future of the town. The Municipal Council has *always* pursued an ambitious social policy' (Peel report, p.352, emphasis added). The demarcation of Tel-Aviv as *always* being a cohesive polity with a high social spirit resonates with Mahmood Mamdani's discussion of how theorists of an empire-in-crisis, such as Henry Maine, argued that while 'history defined the settler, geography defined the native' (Mamdani, 2012, p.6). Situating Tel-Aviv as a city defined by historical continuity in Palestine and defining its settler community as a *people* meant endowing them with a right to claim Palestine as a home (Said, 1979, p.62), thereby dismissing the native from that very history as lacking the social bond with the land.

At the same time, the Commission – as well as the mandate government in general – had relegated the political rights of the Palestinian native population in the country in general, and in local autonomy in particular. For the Commission, a politically advanced Palestinian municipality constituted a danger for the mandate governance:

> The more *advanced* and *politically-minded* an Arab Municipality becomes, the less ready will it be to acquiesce in control by the Mandatory Administration. The Jewish Municipalities accept the Mandate, but nevertheless, the bigger and *older* they grow, the harder it will be to adjust their relations with the Mandatory Administration. For it is not the normal relationship between central and local organs of the same national and constitutional character. On the one side are

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[26] The Peel report designated a separate section to discuss Tel-Aviv (pp.352–354).

> highly democratic Jewish bodies, on the other a British Government of the Crown
> Colony type. (Peel report, p.356, emphasis added)

These lines were the concluding remarks of the Peel Commission report on the issue of local governance. They reflected how the Palestinians were discussed as governable/non-governable subjects, with their political agency and interests conceived negatively, while the political agency of Jewish communities was perceived as legitimate and a virtue. These attitudes were further manifested in the political conflict in and over local representation, especially in the so-called 'mixed towns', which worsened as time passed and weakened the basis for Palestinian political representation in their localities.

The Jerusalem municipality, despite being the oldest local governance institution in Palestine, was not specifically addressed in the Peel report, unlike the Tel-Aviv municipality. The former was mentioned for constantly being in a crisis, in order to illustrate a failing experiment in local autonomy. Yet the reasons for the crisis, which only became more aggravated throughout the decade following the report (Naser, 2016; Levin, 2006; Rubinstein, 1980), were not addressed by the Commission. The case of the Jerusalem municipality represented the mandate's colonial policies, which deprived the Palestinian native population of their right to local autonomy and their right to self-determination in a national state.

The 'De-Municipalization' of Jerusalem under the Mandate Rule

The Jerusalem municipality was among the very first municipalities that were established in the Ottoman empire, which gradually gained status in local and national politics after its establishment in 1863 (al-'Arif, 1999, p.478).[27] Under its rule, the Ottoman municipality 'took over responsibility for most of the public services, education, health issues, water installation, and social welfare' (Hintlian, 2000, p.233), as well as the establishment of the first professional police force in Palestine (Mazza, 2009, p.24). It also actively engaged in urban planning (Lemire, 2017, pp.117–119),

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[27] Vincent Lemier argues that the 'first documentary clues' indicated that the municipality was established in 1866–67 (2017, p.105).

especially of the fledging New City, 'by conferring a civic aspect to this new city centre' (Naïli, 2018, p.9).

Lemire emphasizes that the creation of the Ottoman municipality was 'indeed the result of endogenous initiative, carried out by the local nobility, and characterized by *a pre-existing urban consciousness*' (2017, p.107, emphasis added). This 'urban consciousness' was not only to be ignored as 'civic spirit', it was also to be materially hindered under the British colonization of Palestine. The mandate government limited the authorities of the Jerusalem municipality, consequently leading to what historian Falestin Naïli described as the 'De-Municipalization of Urban Governance in Post-Ottoman Jerusalem' (2018). According to Naïli, the mandate authorities 'curtailed the power of the municipality, which was asked to provide public services, but no longer played any role in urban planning or even in collecting tax revenues' (2018, p.10). Since the early years of the mandate, the planning and enforcement of building regulations were displaced from the Jerusalem municipality to other institutions.[28]

De-municipalization in Jerusalem was not limited to planning authorities but was extended to the political representation within the municipality. This was primarily due to the constant interference of the mandate government in the composition of the municipal council, the political decision-making organ of the municipality. Since the establishment of the municipality, the city's council was composed of nine to twelve elected members (ibid, p.9). While the Muslim representatives constituted a majority, the council also included Christian and Jewish members. However, local representation was not based on religious, national, ethnic or racial division; rather, it was determined by the 'imperial' element of being an Ottoman citizen (Lemire, 2017, p.111).

The structure of the municipal council changed fundamentally under the mandate, becoming divided along national and racial categories. The Municipal Corporations Ordinance of 1934 divided the mandates between six Jewish members and six Arab members. The category of Arab included Muslims and Christians and the category of

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[28] The main one was the Pro-Jerusalem Society, which was established in 1918 by the military governor Ronald Storrs and his adviser, Charles Ashbee. In 1920, the Town Planning Commission took over from the Pro-Jerusalem Society (Naïli, 2018, p.11; see also Barakat, 2016). For further discussion on the Pro-Jerusalem Society, see Mazza, 2018.

Jewish included both Jewish settlers and Jews who were natives of Palestine. Furthermore, while the mayor remained exclusively Muslim, the Ordinance stipulated the addition of a Jewish deputy to join the Christian deputy. Lastly, the mandate administration excluded several Arab villages in the hinterland of Jerusalem, by changing the electoral districts to allow the incorporation of new Jewish neighbourhoods in order to manipulate election results (Naïli, 2018, pp.10–11).

Jerusalem and the Deprivation of Local Self-Rule under the Mandate

As the national struggle intensified in Palestine, the Jerusalem municipality became a heated site of contentious politics. The mandate authorities often intervened in the politics of representation, such as dismissing Musa Kazim al-Husseini, the first mayor under the mandate, for participating in an anti-Zionist demonstration during the Nabi Musa festival in 1920. Similarly, in 1937, mayor Hussein Fakhri al-Khalidi was dismissed and exiled with other Arab leaders to the Seychelles for his active role in the Great Arab Revolt between 1936 and 1939 (ibid).[29]

The right to stand for the mayoralty of the Jerusalem municipality, which was granted exclusively to a Muslim member, had been a contentious subject since the early days of the mandate. The Jewish community representatives constantly demanded a share in the mayoralty, given their increasing percentage of the city's population. The mandate governance's criminalization of Arab political claims, struggles, figures and institutions, together with the rapidly increasing Jewish immigration into Palestine, aggravated the crisis of the right to the mayoralty between the Arab and Jewish members in the mid-1940s.

The crisis reached its peak in August 1944 following the death of the Arab mayor, Mustafa al-Khalidi. Earlier that year, on 9 May 1944, during a meeting of the municipal council in its capacity as the Local Building and Town Planning Commission, the Jewish members decided to withdraw from the meeting. They protested against the participation of mayor al-Khalidi in the general meeting of Arab mayors that was organized in Jaffa on 8 May 1944 by Omar Bittar, the chairman of

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[29] Al-Khalidi served as mayor from 1934 to 1937. The mandate allowed him to return to Palestine in 1938 and he was part of the Palestinian delegation to London that preceded the White Paper.

the Jaffa Municipal Commission (Letter from Omar Bittar to Mustafa al-Khalidi, 29/4/1944, JMA 832/A-13-49).[30]

Daniel Auster, the Jewish deputy, spoke on behalf of the other Jewish members, condemning the participation of the mayor in what he described as a 'political meeting', which issued:

> resolutions which are contrary to the vital interests of the Jewish Nation in Palestine. The mayor of Jerusalem, as a mayor of a Town with a mixed population, two thirds of which are Jews, had no right to take part in such a political convention. (Minutes of the Local Building and Town Planning Commission meeting, 9/5/1944, p.1 (English version), JMA 832/A-13-49 (hereafter, Local Building Commission meeting))

Among the resolutions of the Arab mayors' meeting, according to Auster, were the demand to stop Jewish immigration and selling land, as well as the demand to enforce other restrictions of the White Paper. Furthermore, Auster stated that the 'convention named the Jews enemies of the Arab nation who are a danger to this country, which we [the Jewish residents] refuse as an absolute libel' (Local Building Commission meeting).

Following the withdrawal of the Jewish members, the Arab members stated that they were:

> surprised at the declaration made by Mr. Auster on behalf of all Jewish Councillors, and consider it an encroachment on the right of Mustafa Bay el Khalidi, and on his private opinion and freedom in regard to general affairs. In his capacity as an individual of this magnanimous Arab Nation, he is fully entitled to attend any conference or meeting which he may deem necessary. The Arab Councillors confirm the action taken by Mustafa Bey Khalidi and appreciate his dignified position in this respect. (Local Building Commission meeting, pp.1–2)

In the following meeting of the municipal council, on 23 May 1944, the acting district commissioner attended to speak about 'the recent misunderstanding'. He gave a speech to the council members, making 'a personal appeal to each one of you to resume and continue your co-operation in the interests of this sacred and historic city and of all its citizens' (Minutes of municipal council meeting, 23/5/1944 (English

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[30] According to the invitation of Bittar, the meeting agenda included discussing 'the draft amendment of the Municipal Corporations Ordinance, and matters of vital importance relating to the municipalities'.

version), JMA 832/A-13-49). Following this meeting, it seems that the committee resumed its meetings with the attendance of the Jewish members.

In August 1944, mayor Mustafa al-Khalidi passed away and the mandate government appointed the Jewish deputy Daniel Auster as his successor. The Palestinian members of the municipal council, as well as the political leadership across Palestine, protested the appointment. They perceived it to be a violation of the Ottoman precedent, which reserved the position of Jerusalem's mayor for a Muslim (A Survey of Palestine (II) pp.933–938 (hereafter, Survey); Anton and Hanna 'Atallah, Report on the Meeting of the Arab Municipal Council Members, 28/9/1944, ISA P/15/201).

The mandate government had been pressured by the Jewish municipal council members to overturn the Muslim mayor precedent. Therefore, the mandate government attempted to negotiate the terms of the mayoralty through a system of triple rotation between Christian, Muslim and Jewish residents. Eventually, both parties rejected these suggestions.

Starting in March 1945, the Palestinian members refrained from attending the municipal meetings. As a result, they were disqualified in July 1945 as council members, thus creating a lack of a quorum that prevented the Jewish members from being able to assemble legally in the council (Survey, pp.935–937). Consequently, the government dismissed the council and appointed a British Municipal Commission (hereafter, BMC) composed of five[31] British government officials (Va'ad Leumi, 1947, pp.28–29). The BMC functioned until the very last day of the mandate in mid-May 1948. It encountered enormous financial and political challenges and was disputed by the Palestinian residents.

In parallel to appointing the BMC, the mandate government appointed Chief Justice William Fitzgerald in July 1945 to inquire into and 'report on the local administration of Jerusalem and to make recommendations in relation thereto' (Fitzgerald report, 1946, p.1216). Several Arab citizens and political leaders testified before the Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry, including ex-mayor Hussein Fakhri al-Khalidi, ex-

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[31] The Survey states that six British officials were appointed (p.937).

deputy mayor Anton 'Atallah, and advocate 'Awni Abd al-Hadi. The Jewish representatives chose not to testify before the commission (ibid, p.1220).

The Palestinian members insisted on preserving the status quo of appointing a Muslim to the position of Jerusalem mayor. They rejected the notion of formal democracy based on population percentage as the basis for the franchise, and they distinguished between Jewish natives of Palestine and those affiliated with Zionist settlement in Palestine. The insistence on having a Muslim as mayor was thus on political and not religious grounds, as Hussein Fakhri al-Khalidi stated before the commission:

> There is no justification whatsoever for the appointment of a Jewish mayor based on the argument that the Jews are a numerical majority in Jerusalem. This fact was known at periods even during the Turkish regime. More than half of the Jews in Jerusalem, and everywhere in the country are not Palestinians, and are thus not entitled to the franchise. (The Arab Case – Evidence of al-Khalidi before Fitzgerald, CZA 525-5877)[32]

Adding to the historical approach of al-Khalidi, attorney Anton 'Atallah introduced a legal argument against the Zionist claim for franchise on the basis of demographic majority:

> the Zionist Jews who settled all around the neighbourhoods of the Old City, thus necessitating the extension of the City's boundary, should be deemed to have accepted the Muslim jurisdiction which existed when they first took up their abode, and they are now stopped from arguing to the contrary. (Fitzgerald report, 1946, p.1220)

The Arab political leadership across Palestine persistently protested the colonial foundation of the alleged democratic representation claim based on population percentage. They insisted on their historical rights as natives and rejected equating their rights with those of Zionist settlers based on mandate colonial legal categories.

The Fitzgerald commission was well aware of the roots of the problem as a colonial product. The commission argued that the imposition of British municipal law in the case of Jerusalem failed due to the Palestinians' refusal to apply the majority-base franchise principle. It stated that '*in the light of history*', the Arab point of view, although not fully accepted by the commission, 'was not without substance' (ibid,

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[32] I found a copy of this in the collection of Meron Benvenisti at the Yad Ben-Zvi Library (YBZL.0075.044/007).

p.1219). In addition, the commission emphasized that Jewish migration to Palestine was not seen by the Zionists as 'colonization as we understand the term, but a return to take up an inheritance. The distinction is important because it goes to the root of the problem' (ibid, p.1217).

In light of these two irreconcilable stands, the commission concluded that no cooperation would be possible under the same municipal entity. Accordingly, it recommended the declaration of Jerusalem as a county with several boroughs, similar to London, with two separate councils – one led by an Arab mayor in the boroughs populated by Arabs, and the other led by a Jewish mayor in the Jewish boroughs (ibid, p.1220).

On the ground, Fitzgerald's recommendations were never implemented in Jerusalem and the BCM continued to lead the municipality until the last days of the mandate. Despite this, a de facto administrative and bureaucratic division of Jerusalem's municipal work took place beginning in December 1947, splitting the local administration along ethnic lines that produced *Arab* and *Jewish* municipalities after the partition of Jerusalem and the colonization of Palestine.

The Rise of an 'Arab' Municipality

In late March 1948, Richard Massie Graves, the chairman of the BCM, addressed the Jerusalem District Commissioner suggesting that 'the present commission might be dissolved and the High Commissioner be asked to appoint two emergency committees from the Arab and Jewish Communities, with himself [Graves], the chairman as a neutral coordinator'. However, this suggestion 'broke down' as the Palestinian leadership rejected it (CM 6/4/1948, p.2, ISA MJM 1940–1948; Graves, 1949, p.170).

Earlier that month, on 6 March 1948, Graves addressed Hussein Fakhri al-Khalidi, who was then the Secretary General of the Arab Higher Committee, pleading with him to encourage the Palestinian residents to pay their dues to the municipality given its degraded financial situation. In his letter, Graves also invited the Arab Higher Committee to create an Arab committee to deal with municipal affairs:

> I do not for a moment anticipate cooperation between the communities [Arab and Jewish]. What I propose as far as the Arab population of Jerusalem is

concerned is that a small Committee should be formed under the auspice of the Arab Higher Executive to take some part in the responsibility for municipal affairs. I realise that such a committee would not wish to become coopted members of the Commission [BMC], (which, of course, is likely to disintegrate within a few weeks as most of the members are Government officers), and suggest that they should act as my advisers on all important matters connected with the Arab areas and Arab personnel (Letter from Graves to al-Khalidi, 6/3/1948, ISA P/61/990)

The following day, al-Khalidi, on behalf of the Arab Higher Committee, rejected the proposal, as the Arabs refused 'to participate or cooperate with an appointed municipal commission installed in the municipality against the will and the wishes of the Arab tax-payers in Jerusalem' (Letter from al-Khalidi to Graves, 7/3/1948, ISA P/61/990).[33] 'Arif al-'Arif indicated that, on 3 December 1947, Graves was stoned by Arab demonstrators, who were protesting the declaration of the Partition Plan and believed that he was an ally of Zionists (1956, p.32). These positions emphasized the intensity of the 1944 mayoralty crisis for the Palestinians in Jerusalem, as well as the symbolic value of the municipality in the national discourse over self-determination and political representation.

In the last meeting of the BMC on 6 April 1948, before it was dissolved, Graves reported on the breakdown of the government's attempts, given the rejection by the Palestinians, and stated that the commission 'felt that nothing further could be done in this regard' (CM 6/4/1948, p.3, ISA MJM 1940–1948).

However, an ad hoc municipal division had already been underway since December 1947, as Graves stated that there was an 'absenteeism problem' among the Jewish staff, and that:

the Jewish community are obviously doing everything in their power to force us to open a branch office in the Jewish part of the town. This would be most inconvenient, and would be interpreted by the Arabs as the first step towards 'partition' in the city. I shall certainly resist this pressure, unless it is demonstrated beyond a doubt that attendance of the Jews at the present office is definitely dangerous. (Graves, 1949, p.106)

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[33] Graves expected this rejection, as he stated in his memoir: 'the Jews will probably be prepared to co-operate, but I fear that the Arabs may think that co-operating with me and the Commission is equivalent to co-operating with the Jews' (1949, p.154).

On 29 December 1947, an attack targeted the Jewish staff members while they were passing through Jaffa Street to reach the town hall, which was located in the old post office building, opposite Barclays Bank (ibid, pp.115–116). As a result, the BMC decided to establish a Jewish branch of the municipality in a building located in Mahneh Yihuda.[34] For the next few months, 'the Arab employees, abandoned by their colleagues, anticipate[d] being blown up by the Jews' (ibid, p.124).

Municipal order and the workforce were severely affected by the violent events, even before the termination of the mandate in mid-May 1948. By the beginning of April, at least three municipal employees had been killed in violent events while on duty. The BMC allocated fifty Palestinian pounds as compensation for their dependants (CM 6/4/1948, p.2, ISA MJM 1940–1948). On the administrative level, some Arab Palestinian employees had to take over the tasks of their Jewish colleagues. For instance, Salah al-Din Jarallah, who was an assistant to the head of clerks in the municipality, stated that he had to cover the position of the Jewish head of clerks, Ibrahim Franko (Jarallah's testimony, p.2).

From mid-April 1948, the BMC members and all other British municipal employees began leaving Palestine. The municipal affairs of the Palestinians and the Jewish community had to be transferred to their respective leaderships. In light of the Arab Higher Committee's refusal to cooperate with the BMC, the deputy of the Commission, J. A. Hilton, appointed Anton Safieh to lead the Arab municipal affairs until a new municipal order arose. Similarly, Hilton asked Daniel Auster to lead the Jewish municipal affairs (*al-Difa'*, 26/12/1950).

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When the mandate government left Palestine in May 1948, it left Jerusalem 'distressed', as al-Khatib noted ('Developments in Jerusalem' lecture, 15/5/1963), without any substantive municipal infrastructure or plans for self-rule. The British did not have 'a clear cut policy' in Jerusalem in general towards the end of the mandate

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[34] Municipal employee Salah al-Din Jarallah stated that one of the Jewish staff members refrained from attending the town hall beginning in March 1948. Jarallah gave a detailed description of the municipal work during this period in his testimony on 11 January 1954, in the legal case 262/52, *Jerusalem Municipality v. Barclays Bank*, in the Jerusalem Magistrate's Court (Jarallah's testimony, 11/1/1954, p.2, JMA 965-7 (hereafter, Jarallah's testimony).

(Krystall, 2002, p.91). In late 1947, the authority of the municipality was reduced to the areas of cleaning, lighting, roads and enforcing building regulations (al-'Arif, 1999, pp.478–479). Its role only deteriorated during the months leading to the end of the mandate. Resentment grew among the city's Palestinian residents, who – as we will see – had taken some municipal responsibilities upon themselves, apart from the municipality.

A Municipality Seeking Refuge: The Jerusalem Municipality in 1948

> The municipality did not fare any better than the rest of Jerusalem's residents. After the departure of the British forces before noon on 14 May, we were surprised by the attack of the Jewish forces. We left the municipal offices and the bullets all over the city and entered the walls [of the city]. We found on the morning of 15 May that while being inside the walls, the enemy had surrounded us and bombs were falling everywhere. (Anton Safieh, *al-Difa'*, 26/12/1950)

On 26 December 1950, *al-Difa'* newspaper published extracts of a 'Detailed Report of Jerusalem Municipality's Work after the Termination of the Mandate'. This report was authored by Anton Safieh, who was appointed to lead the Arab municipal affairs after the termination of the mandate. *Al-Difa'* added the subheadings 'Facts and Figures Demonstrate the Difficulties It [the Municipality] Encountered and the Valuable Tasks It Undertook', 'The Difficult Period That Followed the Departure of the Mandate Government', 'The Remnants of the Municipality and Its Finances', and 'Gradual Restitution of Life to Normal'.

Between mid-May and late November 1948, a municipal council composed of senior Palestinian administrative employees, led by Safieh, literally transferred the municipality from pre- to 'post-Nakba' and undertook municipal tasks in Jerusalem after the city's administrative centre fell under the control of the Zionist forces. This municipal council functioned until 22 November 1948, when the military commander Abdallah al-Tal appointed the first official municipal council under Jordan in Jerusalem (Al-Tal, 1959, p.367). This council held its first meeting on 8 December 1948 (JMA 936-1).

Safieh's report published by *al-Difa'*, as well as other reports produced by municipal employees and mayors, narrated the loss and deprivation of the Jerusalem municipality in 1948 as part of the stories of refuge that the city's residents lived in the aftermath

of the Israeli occupation of the New City. This was to affirm that the municipality itself was rendered a refugee-institution in 1948. As time passed, this narrative became a constitutive part of its institutional discourse.

This story should be contextualized within the overall institutional loss in Jerusalem during the Nakba. Many institutions in Palestine under the mandate, including municipalities, functioned as part of the administrative apparatus that facilitated the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, which was contingent on the destruction of the Palestinian home. Yet, the extent to which Palestinian society was affected by the loss of these institutions in the aftermath of the Nakba cannot be underestimated.

As an acknowledgment of the essential role of institutions and the need to sustain them after the termination of the mandate, an agreement was reached in Jerusalem between the Arab and Jewish military authorities at the end of April 1948 to keep the main institutions out of the fighting. It was agreed that flags of the Red Crescent and the Red Cross be raised on Arab buildings and flags of the Red Star of David on Jewish buildings.

Among these were the 'YMCA, King David Hotel, the Government headquarters on Jabal al-Mukabir, the Arab College, Terra Sancta College, the Italian Hospital and the Daoud Building at King George street' (al-'Arif, 1956, p.125). Although the agreement eventually failed, it indicated the importance that the parties attached to different types of institutions in Jerusalem throughout the Nakba war. It is within this frame of institutional loss in 1948 that the story of the emergence of an Arab municipality in Jerusalem is located.

Jerusalem following the Announcement of the Partition Plan

Historical accounts on the partition of Jerusalem in 1948 refer to the declaration of the Partition Plan for Palestine on 29 November 1947, as the breaking point that gradually led to the occupation of the western neighbourhoods (that is, the New City) and the vast majority of the Jerusalem district's villages in 1948. The Plan divided Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state, and stipulated Jerusalem and Bethlehem as a *corpus separatum*, to be placed under international rule after the end of the mandate.

Similar to other cities in Palestine, violent – mainly spontaneous – protests broke out in Jerusalem against the Plan by the Arab residents, which were followed by more organized acts against Zionist targets. The Arab Palestinian military supply, training and organization were poor. In contrast, the Zionist militant groups *Haganah*, *Irgun* and *Lehi* held organized attacks against British and Arab targets (Krystall, 2002, pp.88–89). Moreover, in January 1948, these groups began to systematically attack and displace several villages in the hinterland of Jerusalem – including Deir Yasin in April 1948, which played a crucial role in determining the psychological warfare against the Palestinians during the Nakba war (ibid, pp.96–100).

Between January and May 1948, the Zionist militant groups attacked, terrorized and displaced the western neighbourhoods of Jerusalem. Many of their Arab residents escaped, fearing the Zionist attacks – especially after the Deir Yasin massacre. The *Haganah* radio repeated the warning 'Remember Deir Yasin' and vans with loudspeakers broadcast messages in Arabic, such as 'unless you leave your homes the fate of Deir Yasin will be your fate' (ibid, p.100). By March 1948, all Jerusalem's neighbourhoods, except for the Jewish Quarter in the Old City, were either exclusively Arab or exclusively Jewish (ibid, p.95).

The Palestinian residents in Jerusalem had lived throughout the violent months leading to May 1948 in chaos and fear, since there was no clear plan of protection or any political solution. At that time, most Arab leaders were still in exile after the mandate government had prosecuted them for their role in the 1936 revolt. According to the war memoir of Anwar Nusseibeh, only two members of the Arab Higher Committee were in Jerusalem at the time, Hussein Fakhri al-Khalidi and Ahmad Hilmi Abd al-Baqi (Budeiri, 2001, p.42).

Some efforts were made for social organization after the mandate's announcement to leave Palestine and the declaration of the Partition Plan, since major governmental and local institutions were dysfunctional. The Arab Higher Committee established the Emergency Committee in Jerusalem to take responsibility for the administration in the Arab areas, including health, security, borders, money and arms, as well as collecting taxes and fees and establishing an 'emergency court' (al-'Arif, 1956, p.94).

The Emergency Committee also established local committees in each of the Arab-populated neighbourhoods to take responsibility for defence, including purchasing arms with donations made by the residents and organizing first aid. Yet, a massive Zionist dynamite attack at Bab al-'Amoud (Damascus Gate) in December 1947, which killed 14 Palestinians, brought their leadership to the conclusion that they were insufficient by themselves to undertake defensive roles against the organized Zionist militias (ibid).

During the months leading to May 1948, the situation of Jerusalem's Arab population was miserable, especially given the increasing numbers of refugees escaping the massacres and fighting in the surrounding villages and western neighbourhoods. On 13 January 1948, Hussein al-Khalidi informed the Mufti of Jerusalem about the crisis in Jerusalem as follows:

> The position here is very difficult. There are no people, no discipline, no arms, and no ammunition. Over and above this, there is no tinned food and no foodstuffs. The black market is flourishing. The economy is destroyed … This is the real situation, there is no flour, no food … Jerusalem is emptying out. (Krystall, 2002, p.94)

In order to contain the crisis among civilians, the Emergency Committee was dissolved and replaced by the National Committee on 26 January 1948 (al-'Arif, 1956, p.94). This committee had wider responsibilities than the preceding one, mainly in relation to administering the Arab residents' civic affairs, including:

> Issuing identity cards, arms licences, and movement permits for the transfer of foodstuffs from one locality to another. It regulated trade and strove to eliminate profiteering. It oversaw the work of the local committees responsible for the equitable distribution of bread, kerosene and other essential commodities. (Budeiri, 2001, p.46)

The National Committee 'survived on a day-to-day basis and spent the majority of its collected fees on defense' (ibid, p.47), as well as feeding and sheltering the increasing numbers of refugees coming into the city – particularly after the massacre of Deir Yasin in April 1948 (al-'Arif, 1956, p.95). In any case, this committee 'saw its role as temporary; no plans were made beyond 15 May 1948, when it was hoped the Arab states would take over' (Budeiri, 2001, p.47). The committee's role reveals the extent to which the mandate authorities became redundant as they were busy organizing their

evacuation from Palestine, without any viable plan for the local residents who were left alone to face a disastrous fate during the war and its aftermath.

The Israeli Occupation of the New City and the Loss of the Municipality Town Hall

The town hall was located within the 'Bevingrad', the central British security zone to the west of the Old City, which included the Russian compound, the general post office and other strategic buildings. This area was central to Operation Kilshon (Pitchfork) of the *Haganah*, which meant to capture all of western Jerusalem up to the Old City wall and the area of Sheikh Jarrah (Krystall, 2002, p.105). Different accounts show that the occupation of this strategic area by the Zionist forces was easy – due, partly, to the collusion of the British forces with the Zionist militia upon the former's flight from the area on the very last day of the mandate (ibid; al-'Arif, 1956, p.334). On the night of 13 May 1948, just before the evacuation of the British troops, British officers permitted *Haganah* patrols to enter the area. 'Therefore, when the British troops departed from Bevingrad at noon on 14 May 1948, the occupation of this area took only ten minutes' (Krystall, 2002, p.105).

On 13 May 1948, J. A. Hilton, the deputy of the BMC, attended the town hall located in this area for the last time. The following day, Palestinian employees, including Safieh and Jarallah, encountered difficulties in reaching the town hall, given the heavy fighting in the area (Jarallah testimony; *al-Difa'*, 26/12/1950). They would never be able to resume their work in that building.

On 14 May 1948, the British troops left Palestine and David Ben-Gurion declared 'the establishment of the state of Israel'. On 18 May 1948, the Trans-Jordanian Arab Legion entered the city. The four days separating these events became known among the residents of Jerusalem as the 'red days', as the two fighting parties stood face to face without the British being involved (al-'Arif, 1956, p.333). The fighting continued between the Arab Legion forces and the Zionist forces, leading at the end of May to the Arab Legion's taking control over the Jewish Quarter inside the Old City. The fights, however, did not end until the armistice agreement in April 1949. The Trans-Jordan government sought to enforce both its political and military authorities in the

city. Thus, it dissolved the Arab Higher Committee and subordinated the National Committee to the military commander Abdallah al-Tal (Krystall, 2002, p.110).

Between May and July 1948, the division of the city became effective between the western Israeli-controlled areas and the eastern Jordanian-controlled areas, with No Man's Land between them. During these months, two truces were achieved between the Israeli and the Trans-Jordanian parties, with the mediation of the United Nations (ibid, p.112). During the first truce between 11 June and 10 July 1948, many residents and refugees took the opportunity to escape Jerusalem and look for what they perceived to be a safer place. Jerusalem was considered as being still under attack and without any plan for the future, as the Greek vice-consul in Jerusalem, CX Mavrides, describes in his diary:

> What really characterized the Old City during the four weeks of the truce was the exodus of the non-combatant population who took refuge in the countryside, the surrounding villages and towns such as Ramallah, Jericho and Bethlehem, or Trans-Jordan. From morning till evening the streets were full of porters and pack-animals, belonging to the Ta'amreh and 'Abed tribes, who were carrying furniture, household utensils, mattresses, clothing, etc., from different parts of the city and heading to Damascus Gate. The exodus was like an ongoing chain of animals, porters, women, aged people, children – all of them carrying something under the burning sun of July. As the end of the 'truce' neared, this chain of people and animals was getting denser and denser every day. (Cited in ibid, p.110)

As the truce ended on 10 July at 8 am, Jerusalem was 'emptied of residents'. Of the population of 60,000 residents, including 10,000 refugees, only about 5,000 to 7,000 remained. Most of those were very poor and had no means to escape, but Mavrides also indicates that some were obligated to stay due to their positions – including religious clerks, as well as civilian government and consular and municipal employees. The rest of this chapter discusses the attempts of the municipal employees who remained in Jerusalem to revive municipal services in the destroyed city.

A Municipality Seeking Refuge

Against ongoing fights, a shortage of food, a lack of national authority, crowds of refugees, and an uncertain future, a core of Palestinian employees of the municipality took responsibility for proceeding with municipal tasks, despite the loss of the town hall and many other essentials for municipal activities. Following the flight of the

British administration, Anton Safieh formed with other employees a temporary municipal council (hereafter, TMC).[35] The TMC included Safieh as a director, Saba Sa'id as the municipality's advocate, Yusif Budeiri as the head of the engineering department, Mufied Nashashibi as the head of the health department, Jamil Ahmad Nasir as the head of the water department, Mahmoud al-Shu'aibi as the head of the municipal inspectors department, Mohammad Totah as the head of the finance department, and Salah al-Din Jarallah as the head of clerks (*al-Difa'*, 26/12/1950).

These municipality employees worked to respond to urgent challenges, such as preventing epidemics and ensuring public order, while their work took place under conditions of continuous fighting, rendering the future ambiguous and uncertain (Report of the UN Truce Commission in Jerusalem, 'Jerusalem Fighting Resumed', 16/8/1948, UN website). The TMC described the situation as a 'crisis' and announced that 'the country is in a state of chaos' and that it was not possible to 'influence anyone or to achieve justice for anyone' (CM 16/8/1948, p.1, JMA 936-1). The TMC was unsure how to approach the situation from an administrative point of view and considered the situation to be 'a change of the administration in Palestine' (CM 5/7/1948, JMA 936-1).

Throughout the first weeks following the loss of the town hall, the TMC had to operate from different locations. Safieh described in an internal report in 1958 how 'we [the employees] sought *refuge* inside the walls together with the residents who remained' and then 'we took *refuge* in two rooms of The Islamic Orphans House' (Anton Safieh (transcription), speech 'comparing the situation of the municipality between 1948 and 1958', 23/6/1958, JMA 944-24 (hereafter, speech comparing between 1948 and 1958), emphasis added).

Jarallah's testimony further explains the journey as he detailed the several buildings in which the municipality sought refuge, 'first in al-Frier school for four or five days and then in the Islamic Orphans House for a month or two, from there we moved to Murkus estate, known as the Citadel Hotel, and we stayed there for about a month'.

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[35] The Jordanian military commander Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, who was appointed on 16 June 1948, approved Safieh's appointment as the director of the Arab municipal council (Statement of Ahmad Helmi Pasha, 11/8/1948, JMA 965-8).

Safieh reported that the municipality moved to the Citadel Hotel when the first Truce was announced, and before it ended they moved to the building of the Greek hospital (*al-Difa'*, 26/12/1950).

The displacement of the municipality and its workforce generated a shared fate between the institution and the public, given the desperate need for essential services. Similar to the public who sought to survive the crisis by turning to the city's material and social infrastructure, even if it was largely in ruins, the municipality sought the assistance of other local institutions that survived the war to establish temporary sites of authority.

Moreover, the municipality shared with other refugees the loss not only of homes and buildings but also of deeds and documents. In mid-May 1948, some employees managed to 'save' maps, documents including property tax registrations, vehicles and fuel just before the fall of the town hall (ibid; 'speech comparing between 1948 and 1958'). Yet, they were not able to get hold of one particular cheque, which was the most crucial for the functioning of the municipality.

Upon the termination of the mandate, about 60,000 Palestinian pounds remained as a surplus fund in the Jerusalem municipality's Barclays Bank account. The mandate government decided to divide the amount between the anticipated Palestinian and Jewish municipal councils in Jerusalem. Accordingly, two cheques were issued and handed to Safieh and Auster in their capacity as the leaders of the post-mandate municipal councils (Letter from the General Consul to the Foreign Office, 5/7/1953, JMA 965-8 (hereafter, Letter from the General Consul, 5/7/1953); Registry No. EE 1152/8, 13/12/1950 [confidential], TNA / FO 371/82216 (hereafter, Registry No. EE 1152/8); *al-Difa'*, 26/12/1950).

Safieh signed the cheque and kept it, as was normal procedure, in the metal safe of the municipality. On 30 June 1948, he crossed under the auspices of the Truce Commission to examine the town hall, hoping to retrieve the cheque (Letter from the General Consul, 5/7/1953), but the safe could not be found and the traces of the cheque were lost. Safieh believed that the Israelis took over the safe when they occupied the town hall, which included – in addition to the cheque – 'about 100 pounds and a

number of promissory notes from tenants of municipality property' (*al-Difa'*, 26/12/1950).[36]

In June 1948, Safieh contacted the British Colonial Office and the department of clearance of the British government in Cyprus, seeking their assistance to retain the cheque and release the money. In August 1948, he met with United Nations mediator in Palestine, Count Folk Bernadotte, just before the latter was assassinated by *Lehi,* the Zionist militant group. Bernadotte expressed his sympathy with Safieh but explained that his role was limited to political affairs (CM 11/8/1948, JMA 936-1). In the same month, Safieh travelled to Cyprus to meet with Barclays Bank officials, but he fell ill while he was there and could not resume his work at the municipality until December 1948 (Letter of Anton Safieh to Jerusalem mayor, 10/8/1949, JMA 965-8; *al-Difa',* 26/12/1950).[37]

During these months of hunting after the lost cheque, the TMC sought to overcome its empty treasury – it had only 15 pounds in August 1948 (CM 12/8/1948, JMA 936-1) – through other channels, including collecting taxes from monasteries and pleading with the Jordanian government for financial support. However, as time passed, the council members became hopeless, realizing that they were unlikely to obtain immediate support from the government despite the 'misery and destitution' that prevailed (ibid). Therefore, the cheque represented a deed for a future, without which neither the municipality nor the city could revive. This sentiment was repeatedly expressed during municipality meetings, referring to the cheque as the only thing that could save the municipality from its severe financial crisis.

For the next six years, Palestinian, Jordanian and British officials would attempt to obtain the cheque and release the money from Barclays Bank. The Israel Exchange Controller declared that it 'would not in any case release the funds in question' to the Arab municipality. In 1949, following instructions from the Israeli government, Barclays Bank released the money to the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem (Registry

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[36] Other accounts suggest that the safe was destroyed and buried under the rubble of the town hall (Letter from the General Consul, 5/7/1953).

[37] It is beyond the scope of this thesis to detail the relentless efforts of Safieh and other Palestinian and Jordanian officials to release the money. The Jerusalem municipality case should be read as part of the attempts of many other Palestinian individuals and institutions to release their money from the banks that Israel seized in 1948. For extensive discussion on this, see Mitter, 2014.

No. EE 1152/8). In 1952, the Arab municipality sued Barclays Bank in the Jerusalem Magistrate's Court (in Arab Jerusalem). It won the case in 1954 and finally received its share of the mandate municipality treasury, a total of 27,500 Palestinian pounds (JMA 965-7).

Unemployed Municipality

One of the direct consequences of the municipality's financial crisis was its inability to pay the salaries of its workforce. Municipality workers did not consider that their employment was officially terminated after the end of the mandate. Consequently, many of them continued to attend the municipality's provisional seats in order to prove their availability for employment, even when no work or money was available, since they worried that nonattendance would lead to their dismissal (CM 5/7/1948, JMA 936-1).

In August 1948, only 130 to 150 Palestinian technical and administrative employees – of the total number of 300 to 350 – were active (CM 22/8/1948, JMA 936-1). After months of working without being paid, some employees protested and performed disorderly acts [shaghab]. Therefore, the TMC met with their representative and pointed out that the employees, who had been paid until the end of May 1948,[38] were asked to refrain from coming to work since the municipality had no money to pay them (CM 5/7/1948, JMA 936-1). It further clarified that, given the 'change of administration' in Palestine, salaries would not be paid until the new government had determined a salary scale and secured the necessary financial resources (ibid).

Following the employees' threats of a strike, the TMC met in mid-August 1948 with the employees' representative and explained the hardship of the municipality and the challenges of health hazards that the city was facing (CM 12/8/1948, JMA 936-1). Although the employees initially expressed their understanding and agreed to cooperate with the municipality and to receive only a partial payment, they announced a strike on 20 August 1948. They suspended the strike on 25 August, when they learned about Safieh's travel arrangements to Cyprus to release the money from

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[38] Before the termination of the mandate, the government paid salaries in advance to a group of employees until May 1948 and to another group until June 1948 (CM 7/8/1956, JMA 936-8).

Barclays Bank. Upon Safieh's return from this unsuccessful mission, the desperate employees resumed their threats to strike (*al-Difa'*, 26/12/1950).

During this period, the TMC played the role of mediator between the central government and the employees. The TMC members demonstrated an understanding attitude towards the employees, which could be explained as deriving from a sense of bureaucratic solidarity and communal responsibility towards the destroyed city. Amid the workforce crisis, Safieh met with the Administrative Committee of the Trans-Jordan government, which 'paid no attention at all to the problem of the municipality and was not even willing to discuss it'. Nevertheless, Safieh insisted on speaking before the Administrative Committee and described the situation of the municipality while emphasizing the strike of the employees (CM 21/8/1948, JMA 936-1).

The zenith of the workforce crisis was when the Jerusalem military commander offered the municipality his only solution, which was to dismiss most of the employees. Safieh, who represented the TMC in the talks with the military commander, refused such a solution, and so did the TMC members once he reported back to them on 21 August 1948. The following day, the TMC convened after the military commander had met with Safieh again and ordered him to dismiss employees and prepare a brief budget proposal accordingly.

At that point, the TMC members agreed that any decision to dismiss employees depended on the 'acceptance of the employees who are the operating hand of the municipality and if they refuse then there is no need to prepare either a brief or a detailed budget'. The employees' representative was called at once and was briefed on the crisis, which the TMC members described as a quandary [wrṭa], yet noted that 'the public good which demands that we sacrifice everything, is on the top of all' (CM 22/8/1948, JMA 936/1).

The representative went back immediately to consult with the employees, who agreed to conditional dismissal of some of their number until the situation changed, 'so long as their salaries for June, July and August would be secure, that they would not be considered permanently dismissed, and their accumulated rights would be guaranteed'. Accordingly, the TMC prepared a brief budget to hand to the military commander (ibid). The negotiations over this issue did not stop there. After two

months of correspondence with the central government, it was agreed in October 1948 to grant the municipality a loan of 5,000 pounds to secure some basic salaries (*al-Difa'*, 26/12/1950).

The workforce crisis only emphasized to what extent the cheque was essential for the municipality during that crucial phase. Above all, its loss limited the capacity of the municipality to provide services and to develop the ruined city, but it also affected its political authority and status and made it fully dependent on the 'new administration', which was not yet aware of or attentive to its needs and priorities. Despite this, the TMC, which was equipped with local knowledge and bureaucratic experience, alternated between material and legal continuities and interruptions to negotiate its terms through the crisis.

Law, Order and the Public Good

Alongside its attempts to retain administrative order, the TMC was also busy leading the city throughout these chaotic months as it became crowded with deprived refugees, in addition to a large impoverished population of native residents following the war. In late May and early June 1948, the TMC was preoccupied with issues of public health and hygiene to prevent the spread of diseases and epidemics.

Among its first tasks was the preparation of some workers' groups to spread DDT all over the city, as a few cases of typhoid had been diagnosed in the houses of refugees, while other groups were prepared for the clearance of water wells by spreading lime in the city's alleys (ibid). Other health hazards were caused by the loss of crucial infrastructure and public spaces, such as the loss of the slaughterhouse in Shu'fat after it became a dangerous area, forcing butchers to slaughter their cattle in their shops inside the Old City. Consequently, the TMC established an alternative slaughterhouse in Wadi al-Joz. By 16 June 1948, at least eight butchers had been fined for failing to use the new slaughterhouse (ibid; Important announcement from Jerusalem municipality, 16/6/1948, JMA 945-8).

Improvised usage of the city's public spaces was common during that period, as we can learn from Safieh's call to his 'fellow citizens' on 9 June 1948 (JMA 945-8), in which he pleaded with the general public and with particular sectors to keep the city

clean and in order. In an earlier call that was broadcast on *al-Rawda* radio,[39] he addressed vegetable vendors to resume selling their goods in the Bazar market that the municipality opened on 7 June 1948 (ibid).

Disorder seemed to be common not only in public spaces among merchants and manual workers, but also among individuals in private places:

> As for the residents, I hope you keep your houses clean and do not throw garbage in the streets, but rather put it in tightly closed containers until it is gathered by the municipality workers and do not drop dirty water in the streets so that you prevent flies from spreading in front of your houses bringing with them different kinds of fatal bacteria. As for urination in the streets, it has very bad effects on all of us and therefore I ask you to avoid doing it and each one of you should help the municipality workers to do their job appropriately. (Ibid)

Lack of law enforcement and communal compliance with urban regulations constituted a challenge for the municipality, but to what extent did it have any executive force to implement the law? In its meeting on 2 July 1948, the TMC concluded that it would plead with the military commander to formally recognize the municipality as a national charity institution, 'in order to continue to meet its obligations and apply Municipality Ordinance and by-laws in Jerusalem' (CM 2/7/1948, JMA 936-1).

Beyond the importance of the rule of law, the municipality was also seeking to collect some revenue through taxes and municipal licences to overcome its financial crisis. As early as 13 June 1948, the municipality turned to merchants, manual workers and handicraft workshop owners and ordered them to renew their expired licences immediately and to start paying their taxes accordingly, stating that its employees had started collecting taxes and that lack of cooperation would be followed by legal steps (Call from the Jerusalem municipality to merchants, manual workers and handicraft workshop owners in Jerusalem, 13/6/1948, JMA 945-8).

On 31 July 1948, the TMC dedicated a meeting to discuss the question of urban licensing procedures. The meeting was attended by the TMC members, the head of inspectors, and representatives of the health division and the police. Safieh retrieved

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[39] This was a loudspeaker that was set on the roof of al-Rawda al-'Umarieh School, which used to deliver evening news broadcasting about the progress of the fights in Jerusalem and other places (Al-Hussaini, 2012, p.52).

the mandate municipality's procedures for issuing licences and collecting taxes, and the attendees assessed the situation on the ground concerning law enforcement (CM 31/7/1948, JMA 936-1).

New bars and cafés, including mixed (male and female) cafés, opened during the few months after the war; the police representative indicated that some of these had become targets for thieves. It was therefore decided to refrain from issuing licences to new bars or cafés, especially those located outside the walls, without first referring to the police. New shops, such as handicraft and manual workshops, also worked without licences during this period. Given the public's degraded economic situation, Safieh suggested that no strict policy would be enforced in issuing licences to these workshops, as long as health rules were followed. Yet the TMC and the police decided to cooperate to ensure that unlicensed workshops would be fined and closed (ibid). The municipality also decided not to intervene in the work of the female farmers [fellahat], as long as they were away from the main streets. Interestingly, these fellahat were distinguished from vendors (mainly male), with whom the municipality decided to hold a separate meeting to discuss their situation in detail (ibid).

To what extent did vendors, merchants, butchers, fellahat, and café and bar owners comply with the municipal regulation of health, safety, licensing and tax-payment? The dearth of sources available makes it difficult to understand, especially since the local press was temporarily suspended during these months (Schleifer, 1972, p.43; *Falastin,* 4/2/1949). Municipal disorder was not unusual in Jerusalem due to different political and administrative circumstances under the mandate (Letter from Graves to al-Khalidi, 6/3/1948, ISA P/61/990). Yet, given the drastic changes in the city's life after mid-May 1948, cooperation between citizens and the municipal council becomes a crucial entry point to learn about the city's local political and social dynamics, as this thesis will discuss further.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the role of Jerusalem's municipal system in the aftermath of the Nakba. Jens Hanssen argues that the emergence of municipal institutions was normally in response to a 'mixture of immediate urban crisis' and not due to

democratic impulses (2018, pp.267–268). The story of the struggle of the refugee-institution to create a continuity in the city's municipal work, when the Nakba interrupted and destroyed the Palestinian world, was part of this nature of municipal institutionalism. Beyond that, however, the political circumstances that produced this crisis generated a shared fate between the institution and its workforce and the city's residents. A form of communal responsibility towards the city urged those who remained in the city to protect it, equipped with their local knowledge and a long legacy of municipal establishment. Although at the time their acts were mainly driven by the humanitarian crisis, over the long term the political meanings of these acts became clearer and proved to be fundamental to the re-emergence of self-rule in Jerusalem after 1948.

PART III: MAKING ARAB JERUSALEM

Chapter 5

The Present of Partitioned Jerusalem

> The Nakba, left for us only the sacred shrines and the legacy of our ancestors, their remembrances and the landmarks, and with these, it retained for us the spirit of cooperation, faith in God, in humanity and in the homeland.
>
> In that atmosphere of destitution and weakness, and with that provision of moral courage, determination was revived in the remnants of the population, dwellers and refugees, to hold out in defence of the remaining quarters until the vanguards of the Arab Army arrived to assume the duty of defence and to retrieve what they could of the lost quarters.
>
> Thereafter, public security and stability were maintained, Government & Municipal systems were established thus enabling the inhabitants to resume normal life gradually and to realize what you have seen of the building projects, commercial and industrial enterprises, educational and charitable institutions, together with comprehensive and complete cooperation among the different classes of the population and mutual understanding with Government departments and denominational and foreign institutions. (Ruhi al-Khatib, *Amman al-Massa'* essay, JMA 944-21 (hereafter, *Amman al-Massa'* essay) – English version – 'Developments in Jerusalem' lecture, 15/5/1963, p.2))

In 1948, Jerusalem was partitioned, lost most of its territories, and became a frontier city located on the border with Israel. Jordan's annexation of Jerusalem and the rest of the cities and villages of central Palestine after the Nakba transformed the political, social and economic life of the residents and posed challenges for them, particularly in relation to fulfilling their right for self-determination. This chapter contextualizes the transformation of Jerusalem after 1948 through two frames: the incorporation of Palestinian territory and residents within the Jordanian state and the time-space of the Nakba.

The chapter's first section outlines the main features of Jerusalem's political position within Jordan, particularly the role of the local administration and its ambivalent relationship with central state authorities. The second section examines Jerusalem's temporal and spatial location as a partitioned city and traces the Nakba's conceptual transformation and inscription in the city's space.

Both frames open a window into the immediate present of the city in the aftermath of the Nakba in order to grasp Jerusalem's relationship with the 'new' state, on the one hand, and the discursive and material articulations and representations of the Nakba in Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967, on the other hand.

Jerusalem 'after' Palestine

Palestine under Jordanian Rule: Erasure and Restoration

On 24 April 1950, the Jordanian Parliament approved the government's 'Project of Unification Decision', which dictated the annexation of the territories of central Palestine to Jordan (Massad, 2001, p.224; 'Aayid, 1995, p.91). The Palestinian population was granted Jordanian nationality under the citizenship law of November 1949 (Y. Sayigh, 1997, p.41). This was in keeping with the aims of King Abdallah, who had expansionist ambitions in Syria and Iraq and had declared his acceptance of the first Partition Plan for Palestine in 1937, which suggested 'that the Arab state be merged with Trans-Jordan to form a United Arab Kingdom under Amir Abdallah' (Shlaim, 1988, p.62; Massad, 2001, pp.223, 226). In the Nakba war in 1948, he saw an opportunity for the newly independent state of Jordan to expand its territories and population (Y. Sayigh, 1997, p.41).

Prior to the official annexation, a postal ordinance, issued on 1 March 1950, dictated the erasure of the word 'Palestine' from official correspondence and documents: 'the word "Palestine" is hereby abolished as a reference to the West Bank of the Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom wherever it appears in the ordinances and decisions and instructions that are listed in the first article of this ordinance' (Massad, 2001, p.229). The political and geographical erasure of the name Palestine rendered it an 'adjective [that] served to describe historical events, localities, happenings, and to differentiate between the Arabs and the displaced Palestinians living among them' (Dakkak, 1983, p.66).

The Palestinians perceived these processes of erasure as 'De-Palestinianization' (ibid, p.66; see also Katz, 2005, p.49). Erasure was practised through Jordan's persistent opposition to the rise of a Palestinian nation-state before and after 1948 (R. Khalidi,

2006, p.129) – one early example being Abdallah's repression of the All Palestine Government established in Gaza in 1948 (Shbib, 1988; Y. Sayigh, 1997, p.15). Palestine's erasure was later weaved within all areas of governance and the public sphere, including in schools, the press, municipalities and the Parliament (Katz, 2005). As Mezna Qato has argued, Jordan's 'geography textbooks despatialize the imaginary through a discursive move against the familiar', and 'those Palestinians who were not displaced were called upon to read a natural topography so intimately tied to their social world as if they were alien from it' (2019, p.19).

The position of the Palestinians towards the Jordanian administration was complex given the circumstances that the Nakba produced, on both the humanitarian and political levels, as well as the collapse of the old Palestinian leadership (Y. Sayigh, 1997, p.35). Thus, Jordan was not perceived strictly as colonial at the time, as it was an Arab country that deployed discourses of Arab nationalism to legitimise its claims to authority – although the unity between the two banks was defined primarily by 'Trans-Jordanian nationalism' rather than Arab nationalism (Massad, 2001, p.226). Furthermore, Jordan was a Muslim country – unlike the mandate government – which presented itself as a guardian of Muslim (and Christian) holy places in Palestine to affirm its legitimacy in annexing the West Bank (Katz, 2005, pp.90–118).

The experiences of Palestinians and Jordanians in emerging from colonization were fundamentally at odds, as one gained a state out of the colonization while the other lost a homeland and subsequently a nation-state. The 'lack of effective power over the state' before 1948 rendered the Palestinian national leadership 'unable to use the resources of the state to centralize power in its hands and thereby develop into a cohesive stratum' (Khalaf, 1991, p.236, cited in R. Khalidi, 2006, p.44). Consequently, the fragmented Palestinian communities after 1948 'tended to preserve their pre-existing patterns of social solidarity and cultural expression, while at the same time evolving in response to the dominant political, legal, and administrative framework in which each found itself' (Y. Sayigh, 1997, p.36).

In the aftermath of the Nakba, Palestinian cities and villages became the centre of the Palestinian population in the West Bank, as they were 'less subject to convulsions in the social structure. They alone have retained a semblance of social order that is

contentious with the nation's history' (Tamari, 2009, p.18, emphasis added). The vast majority of these cities and villages retained their social structures within their urban and rural sites, utilizing existing administrative and social institutions, including municipalities. At the same time, these localities were fully incorporated into Jordan's state apparatus and Palestinians were allowed representation in the government and the Parliament, as well as in local administration.

Although this political participation was restricted and conditioned by the nation-state building objectives of Jordan, the question of the state or the 'forum of the state' (R. Khalidi, 2006, p.43) became a distinctive feature that characterized Palestinian society during the period of Jordanian rule, as opposed to the mandate regime. Unlike in other Arab states that were ruled by a mandate system in the twentieth century – such as Iraq, Syria and Lebanon – 'the British commitment to a Jewish national home, left the Palestinians bereft of any real or symbolic sites of sovereignty' (R. Khalidi, 2006, p.38; see also R. Khalidi, 1997, p.19; Y. Sayigh, 1997, p.7). Therefore, 'stateness' (Seikaly, 2016, p.42) was decisive in Jordan's relations with the Palestinian communities in the West Bank as a functional realm.

Kimberly Katz mentions an encounter that illustrates the role of the state as a forum for the Palestinians under Jordanian rule well into the 1960s. In February 1964, a meeting took place ahead of the PLO inauguration conference in May of that year between Ahmad al-Shuqayri, the King and members of the royal court. In the meeting, al-Shuqayri proposed the need to design a flag and an anthem for Palestine, to which the Jordanian royal court chief responded: 'why don't you mention anything about issuing banknotes and stamps in Palestine?'. Katz interprets the Jordanian response, besides the symbolic meaning of banknotes and stamps in nation-building, as a clear reminder of Jordan's substantial and functional state power (Katz, 2005, pp.138–140).

As this thesis is concerned with local administration in Jerusalem during the Jordanian regime, it is crucial to contextualize it within this 'forum of the state' and its challenges. The state played a crucial role in the formation of local governance through institutions, funding, legal reforms and political dynamics. Yet, underneath the relations between the local and the central governance, there was a struggle between

the old Palestinian localities and their political aspirations and the new Jordanian administration and its nation-state project.

Consequently, dialectics of 'erasure' (Qato, 2019, p.18; Katz, 2005, p.49) and 'restoration' (Aruri, 1972, p.39) of Palestine emerged between the Jordanian state and the Palestinians. A close examination of how these dialectics manifested themselves in Jerusalem will allow us to identify the 'ambiguity, uncertainty, and conflict' and the 'contingency and uncertainty of interactions' (Emirbayer and Mische, 2002, p.994) that the city, its administration and its residents faced under the 'new' state.

Jerusalem's Local Governance after 1948

On 22 November 1948, Abdallah al-Tal, the military commander of Jerusalem, appointed the first municipal council in Jerusalem under Jordanian rule (al-Tal, 1959, p.367). Prior to that, a temporary municipal committee had been led by Anton Safieh and his colleagues, as discussed in the previous chapter. Al-Tal's appointment marked the *return* of local self-rule in Jerusalem, albeit under limited conditions, after the Palestinian residents were deprived of political representation in the Jerusalem municipality from 1944 until the end of the mandate (Mayor's memorandum about the establishment of Jerusalem municipality (English version), 24/4/1965, p.19, JMA 935-14 (hereafter, Mayor's memorandum, 24/4/1965)).

The return of local self-rule transformed the meaning of the adjective *Arab*, which had been used by the mandate authorities before 1948 to define the population along ethno-national lines. After 1948, this depiction of Arab did not fully lose its national meaning, as it now distinguished the parts of Jerusalem under Jordanian control from those under Israeli occupation. In this sense, Arab was also associated with the rule of Jordan as an Arab country after three decades of non-Arab and non-Muslim rule of the city. Yet, as the city developed between 1948 and 1967, the adjective Arab also took a more substantive meaning related to local and regional networks and the production of urban space and agency after 1948, as it will become clear in the following chapters.

Like the residents, the Jerusalem municipality was integrated into the Jordanian civil jurisdiction following the annexation of central Palestine in 1950. In the first weeks after the war, the TMC led by Safieh perceived the transformation from the mandate

to Jordan as a 'change of administration in Palestine' (CM 5/7/1948, JMA 936-1). However, unlike the British-appointed municipal commission from 1945 to 1948, the legitimacy of the municipal council after 1948 in Jerusalem was not questioned by the local community since it was composed of Palestinian residents.

Nevertheless, the Jerusalem municipality's institutional loss in 1948 meant that, unlike other West Bank municipalities, it encountered challenges when reclaiming authority among its local community and beyond. Its condition as a refugee-institution relegated its financial capacities and areas of action and therefore influenced its authority. In addition, the religious and political symbolism of Jerusalem in the Arab and international imagination, even after its partition (as the Old City came under Jordanian rule), gave the city a precarious location in Jordan's politics and affected its local authority.

Jordan, which gained its independence just two years before the Nakba, sought to empower Amman as the capital of its fledging nation-state. Accordingly, Jerusalem was not treated equally in terms of status, local authorities and funding. Nevertheless, Amman still had to compete with Jerusalem for religious and political status, since Jordan depended on the symbolism of Jerusalem to gain regional and international legitimacy and status (Katz, 2005).

The municipality's state of refuge and the location of Jerusalem in the Jordanian political map persistently produced the municipality as an institution in crisis. Trapped between confronting objectives, Jerusalem was constantly negotiating its location within Jordanian politics and administration in relation to status, authority in municipal administration, identity, and – most pressingly – funding and development. However, what would become remarkably clear is that the municipality argued firmly for having a right for local authority and urban development. This right was derived from the political, social, legal, bureaucratic, economic and historical continuities, legacies and traditions that characterized Jerusalem as a central Palestinian city before the Nakba.

During the mandate, the claim of Palestinian residents to the right of self-rule in local governance[40] and for national political independence and social and economic development were based on being native and a majority in Palestine. After 1948, the grounds for such rights (and the essence of the rights themselves) changed. The dispossession of Palestinian people and institutions constituted one primary frame for claiming rights. The municipality's condition as a refugee-institution became a source for the city's political claim for equal treatment and development as natural rather than acquired rights endowed by the 'new administration'. The refugee-institution's claim was to some extent similar to the Palestinian refugees' claim for a right to receive aid after 1948 from humanitarian agencies, mainly the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The insistence on their rights was derived from the acknowledgment of Palestinian national claims in the first place (Feldman, 2018, p.137).

Throughout the period of Jordanian rule, the Jerusalem municipal council constantly compared the municipality with other municipalities in the West Bank, as it considered its own situation worse than theirs. This approach was articulated on different occasions but most explicitly in the Jerusalem municipality's repeated rejections of al-Bireh and Ramallah's requests to reduce the rates of the water they bought from reservoirs around Jerusalem (CM 12/8/1952, pp.1–2, JMA 936-4). In a discussion over the issue in August 1952, 'Arif al-'Arif, then a municipal council member, stated that when he was the mayor he had explained to al-Bireh and Ramallah Water Company that it was out of the question to reduce the rates because:

> the economic and financial situation of al-Bireh and Ramallah is much better than the situation of Jerusalem, which the enemy occupied most of its parts and its income resources decreased, unlike Ramallah and al-Bireh which revived as a result of the Nakba because of the immigration of refugees. (Ibid)

This comparison was not limited to the West Bank municipalities but was also articulated in relation to the Jordanian municipalities in the East Bank. For instance, the Jerusalem municipality complained about unequal governmental distribution of fuel dues between the two banks, as the East Bank received 70 percent and the West

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[40] See the discussion on the Palestinians' argument before the Fitzgerald Commission in the previous chapter.

Bank 30 percent. It claimed that 'the West Bank deserves a larger portion, especially Jerusalem, given the destruction and ruination of the city, [while] the cities of the East Bank are growing and developing' (CM 29/1/1952, pp.2–3, JMA 936-4).

Massad argues that 'Palestinian demands that the Jordanian government treat the West Bank like the East Bank as far as development policies were concerned were being voiced from the start'. At least since 1950, Palestinian merchants claimed that they were discriminated against in the issuance of import licences, as two-thirds of the import licences were granted to residents of the East Bank. Most development funds were channelled into the East Bank; its transportation systems, including railways, were expanded, and its agriculture and industry were developing (Massad, 2001, pp.235–236).

The articulations of discrepancy and unequal treatment between the East and the West Banks reflected deeper political, social and economic differences in the experiences of the Palestinian communities under Jordanian as compared to the mandate rule. Al-'Arif expressed this in the council's meeting that took place on 18 January 1955 as follows:

> (a) The governance changed, in terms of ways, methods, regulations and everything, (b) the relations of the employees with the current state changed, (c) living expenses changed and living level improved. (CM 18/1/1955, pp.3–4, JMA 936-7)

These differences determined the institutional experience of Jerusalem's local governance and its location within Jordan as a 'different' administration. The new situation, especially in the first years after the Nakba, produced a 'rupture in the organization of the present' (Simone, 2004a, p.4). Crisis, disruptions and 'changing hands' (Jacobson, 2011, p.117) were not, however, new to Jerusalem – although the consequences of the Nakba were incommensurable.

Having situated the municipality as an administrative institution within the Jordanian state, it is now essential to engage with the question of how the city, represented by the municipal council as the political body of the municipality, perceived its role under Jordanian rule. Yet, the question of whether this council was democratic and representative of all segments of the city's community must be considered before

continuing to examine the players and the dynamics within the municipality's political body.

Ali al-Jarbawi, in his study *The History of Palestinian Municipalities since Their Establishment until 1967*, argues that, due to the legal and political restrictions that the Jordanian central government imposed on them, especially in the West Bank, municipalities could not play an influential political role. As a result, municipalities became mainly a site of competition between local notable families, while failing to reflect a wide political representation of the public (1991, p.65).

Furthermore, the Jordanian Municipalities Law (1955)[41] limited suffrage to men who paid property taxes or a certain amount of municipal taxes each year (Smith, 1984, p.101; JMA 935-11). These limitations allowed only a minority of the city's residents to vote and hold office while excluding many poor residents (Young, 1984, p.68), along with the refugees who had lost their homes and businesses in the New City.

Such limitations on suffrage were not exclusive to the Jordanian regime in the city. Jens Hanssen notes in his analysis of the history of municipalities, particularly the Jerusalem municipality during the Ottoman era, that 'although municipal elections were public affairs, these new democratic practices hardly constituted universal suffrage, nor can we speak of mass participation before 1908. They were severely circumscribed by class, gender, and urban residence biases' (2018, p.269; see also Yazbak, 2018b, pp.257–258). The mandate Municipal Corporations Ordinance of 1934 was not any different, as it also included these property requirements (Hanssen, 2018, p.273; Young, 1984, p.61).

In the case of Arab Jerusalem, public participation in municipal elections, including by those eligible to vote, does not seem to have been popular. Evidence of this comes from a call distributed in the city ahead of the municipal elections in 1963, urging those who had the right to vote to register themselves in the election registrar. According to the call, a week before the registration, only around 4,000 voters were registered (Call of Issmat Hassan Sidqi al-Dajani to the honourable residents of

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[41] This law unified municipal regulations between the East Bank and the West Bank. For further discussion, see chapter 6.

Jerusalem, JMA 943-7). Nevertheless, many of those legally excluded members of the public were involved in shaping the public space and influenced decisions in other ways, including political protests, petitions, and debates in the press, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

Continuous and Interrupted Agency

The conditions produced by the Nakba brought about transformations within the Palestinian local political sphere, including the return of self-rule in Jerusalem. The latter constituted a major direct transformation in local politics after the Nakba, as it allowed Palestinian residents to claim local authority and represent al-ahali interests. Questions accordingly arise about those who did so. Who were these local players who were decisive in the making of Arab Jerusalem? What did they represent, normatively and politically? How do we read their individual and group continuities and interruptions after 1948? And to what extent do their roles reflect a form of Palestinian agency determined by the Nakba?

The aforementioned reference to 'Arif al-'Arif constitutes an illustrative starting point in this discussion. Al-'Arif, who was active in municipal governance throughout the Jordanian era, either as a council member or as mayor, represented the class of Palestinian bureaucrats who constituted a driving force in building Jordan *before* 1948. Born in 1892, al-'Arif occupied several administrative positions during the mandate, both in Palestine and in Trans-Jordan prior to its independence in 1946. He served as the general secretary of al-Amir Abdallah, then a deputy of the district governor of Beer al-Sabi', Gaza and Ramallah, before becoming an assistant of the British governor of Jerusalem's district towards the end of the mandate.[42]

Due to various social and political conditions in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, modernization processes under the mandate were much more established in Palestine than in Jordan, giving rise to a middle class and the 'development of an elaborate civil service under the British' (Aruri, 1972, p.34). Palestinians were more urban, educated and experienced in political participation than Trans-Jordanians, and 'they had more exposure to the mass media (newspapers and radio) … Palestinian merchants brought

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[42] For more on 'Arif al-'Arif, see Tamari, 2011, pp.63–88; Fares, 2013; R. Khalidi, 1997, pp.162–163.

with them their capital as educated Palestinians brought with them their expertise and skills. Palestinian workers also brought with them their organizational expertise and political experience' (Massad, 2001, p.234). 'Palestinian civil servants were often "borrowed" to staff the bureaucracy of Trans-Jordan … by contrast, Trans-Jordan had neither developed a middle class nor a sizable proletariat' (Aruri, 1972, p.34). After 1948, many of those professional bureaucrats occupied governmental and local governance positions, as 'Abdullah hoped to benefit from their experience of civil service and modern commerce under the British mandate in order to expand Jordanian public services and stimulate economic growth' (Y. Sayigh, 1997, pp.41–42).

The return of local self-rule in Jerusalem after 1948 allowed these Palestinian bureaucrats to take active roles in local politics and administration. They embarked on what Salim Tamari describes as 'the bridging career' in his study of late Ottoman Jerusalem. Tamari illustrates this bridging through another important point of rupture in the life of the Jerusalem municipality: when the British occupied Jerusalem in 1917, marking the end of four centuries of Ottoman rule. But, as Tamari and others have argued, regime transformations are not merely neat and clean breaks, as structural and normative continuities endure throughout these ruptures (Tamari, 2017, p.52).

Agents, who constitute the core of these structures, make these continuities possible, contribute to them, or push for changing them. Tamari illustrates this point through the example of the former mayor of Jerusalem, Raghib al-Nashashibi, who was the city and district engineer during Ottoman rule and was elected as mayor under the British, becoming the longest-serving mayor of the city (1920–1934). Al-Nashashibi exemplifies the 'local Palestinian notable whose political and professional career as an urban reformer and functionary *bridged* the late Ottoman period and the mandate era' (ibid, emphasis added).

The post-1948 municipal council in Jerusalem was no different, as it was composed of players who were previously part of the mandate bureaucratic system and other social institutions in the city before 1948. Many of those who were appointed, ran for election, or were elected to the Jerusalem municipal council were civil servants, lawyers, engineers, educators and doctors. Others were part of the pre-1948 network

of 'men of capital' (Seikaly, 2016), including merchants and businessmen who were also active in the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce.

In 1955, advocate Hanna 'Atallah, who served as a member in the municipal council in 1950, addressed the council members, describing them as 'administrators who moved between several high ranked public positions, businessmen who appreciated their rights as well as the right of others, and experienced lawyers' (CM 12/1/1955, p.2, JMA 936-7). This reflected the professional 'bridging' those brought to the municipal council beyond familial affiliations in Jerusalem. The council was also diverse in its Muslim and Christian representation, as well as its members' wide range of secular and religious world-views. Nevertheless, it was exclusively occupied by men, as women were not eligible to vote or run for local elections, according to the municipality regulations of both the mandate and Jordan.

This diversity of expertise had been reflected in the council's composition ever since it was first appointed by Abdallah al-Tal in November 1948. The first council was headed by Anwar al-Khatib and comprised 'the best of the city's young people', including advocates Yihya Hammoudeh[43] and Abdallah Na'was,[44] priest Ibrahim 'Ayad, and doctor Ra'fat Faris (Al-Tal, 1959, p.367). Not too long after this appointment, 'Arif al-'Arif and Ruhi al-Khatib also joined the council.

Manual and administrative employees of the Jerusalem municipality during the mandate, including Anton Safieh, Yusif Budeiri and Saba Sa'id, who organized the municipal work between mid-May and the end of November 1948, also demonstrated this bridging career. This was reflected in the continuity of 'bureaucratic habit' and 'bureaucratic competence' that combined technical competence, local knowledge and ethical considerations (Feldman, 2008, pp.92–93), which were fundamental for the institution's survival after 1948. This continued to be part of the institution's

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[43] Hammoudeh served as an employee in the Jerusalem governor's office during the mandate period and was active in local government elections. From his position, he criticized the selling of land to Zionist settlers. He was detained in the 1937 revolt, consequently losing his job (Nassar and Tamari, 2005, pp.480–481). After 1967, Hammoudeh served as the acting chairman of the PLO until 1969.

[44] Na'was was arrested and exiled in August 1949 by the Jordanian government while serving as a municipality member. A letter was issued by the municipal council pleading for his release. The letter does not show the reason for his arrest, but it was probably on political grounds (Letter from the mayor of Jerusalem to the General Administrative Governor of Palestine, 27/8/1949 [confidential], JMA 935-10).

performance even during the first weeks after the Israeli occupation, until it was eventually dissolved at the end of June 1967.

Legal knowledge was one form of this 'bureaucratic competence' and professional bridging. It was particularly present in the discussions and activities of the council members, some of whom were lawyers. Their legal thought was represented in the interpretation and legislation of municipal by-laws and national laws. They constantly demanded to restore some mandate regulations when they perceived them as being more progressive and modern than their Jordanian equivalents.

Modernization, development, organization and progress were the most recurrent themes in the discussions of the municipal administration and the council members – as well as in municipal election campaigns, which listed several developmental projects. Although many of these projects focused on building the infrastructure that was either destroyed or lost in the Nakba war – particularly water, electricity and roads – more substantive investment developmental projects were at stake. The most distinguished were projects for developing tourism and industry. These projects demonstrated the capacity of the city to continue despite the destruction (see the examples in Figures 3 and 4).

Figure 3: 'Announcement from the Popular Front of the Jerusalem Municipality'

(Source: JMA 943-7)

Figure 4: 'The Jerusalem Municipality Coalition'
(Source: JMA 943-7)

These developmental projects demonstrated continuity with the economic thought and knowledge that was shaped from the mid-1930s by a group of elites who defined themselves as 'men of capital'. Sherene Seikaly has insightfully studied how bankers, accountants, commercial businessmen and industrialists, along with some landowners, 'perceived economics as a body of knowledge and economy as a science of the self [as] central to their visions and projects' (2016, pp.23–24). Accordingly, 'they sought to shape economics as a neutral and scientific realm of nation building, to define class and status in new ways, and to safeguard their own power' (ibid, p.26). One primary aspect of this economic thinking was envisioning, securing and improving the future (ibid, p.49) and maintaining a forward-looking vision (ibid, p.46).

The incorporation of this group within the Jordanian state – albeit not their nation-state – allowed them some (restricted) space for action, as well as to maintain their social hegemony within available governance institutions, including municipalities. This demonstrates the importance they endowed to 'stateness' before 1948 as a condition for political independence and freedom.

Another aspect of this thinking was economic management (ibid, p.41), overcoming legal disorder (ibid, p.33), calculation, organization and scientific evidence (ibid, pp.108–109). An illustration of this organization and calculation was the election campaign of two candidates who promised that they would 'resolve issues on the basis of thoughtful consideration and in precise relation to Jerusalem's population and its budget' (Figure 5) (Zaki al-Ghoul and Musa al-Bitar, '2 = 1 + 1 – What does this title mean?', JMA 943-7).

Figure 5: '2 = 1 + 1 – What does this title mean?'
(Source: JMA 943-7)

Continuity was also material, as many of those who became the most important Palestinian entrepreneurs in the Arab world after 1948 had accumulated their wealth decades before (Seikaly, 2016, p.29). Many moved their capital and residencies outside of Palestine after 1948, and developed markets and economies within the Arab world (Norris, 2013, p.210; Smith, 1984, pp.129–137). Others remained in Palestine, as George Hintlian explains:

> The Arab Middle Class and rich businessman were concentrated around Jaffa Gate. However in the 1948 earthquake, the earth swallowed everything. This was the Jerusalem Arab entrepreneur class. Who were they? What happened to them? … Overnight, many resumed in the old city. Though they had lost everything, they had enough cash to start again. (Hintlian, 2004, p.32)

Those men of capital who remained in the West Bank, including Jerusalem, deployed economic thinking to revive the destroyed local economy and promote some economic independence within their urban centres. Furthermore, their aspiration to belong to a wider Arab economy and to be embedded in its 'economic Nahda' (Seikaly, 2016, pp.45–49) did not fade after 1948 and instead became entangled with the rising pan-Arab political aspirations that were on the rise in the 1950s and 60s in the West Bank (R. Khalidi, 1997, p.182).

The massive labour migration to Gulf states and the opening of these markets to Palestinian labour in the 1950s (Smith, 1984, pp.172–175), constituted one strand of economic engagement with the Arab world. As tourism was the main economy in the city, those in charge sought to attract Arab tourists, in addition to pilgrims, to regularly visit the city. The opening of the Jerusalem Airport in 1950 allowed daily connections with several Arab capitals.

Other forms of engagement involved the exchange of expertise as the city became a hub for professional Arab gatherings, such as by hosting the Second Arab Tourism Conference in 1955 (CM 6/9/1955, p.3, JMA 936-7). Ironically, the year 1967 was remarkable in this regard, as preparations were underway in January to relocate the headquarters of the International Arab Tourism Union from Cairo to Jerusalem (CM 4/1/1967, p.9, JMA 938-9). In March 1967, Jerusalem became a member of the Arab Town Organization, which was inaugurated in Kuwait City (JMA 952-25). Finally, a committee of the Arab Planners Union was expected to arrive in Jerusalem at the end of June 1967 to prepare an urban planning scheme for Greater Jerusalem (Letter from the Jerusalem governor to the mayor, 3/6/1967, JMA 952-28).

Several members of Jerusalem's municipal council were also active in resuming the work of the Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem after the Nakba. Among those were Ali al-Taziz, who served as the president of the Chamber after 1948, and Fayiq Barakat, who was his successor after 1967 (Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry

in Jerusalem website). They both ran for the municipal elections (as shown in Figures 3 and 4) and served as members in the municipal council.

It was Ruhi al-Khatib, however, whose name was most associated with the municipality in Jerusalem. He also became a successful entrepreneur after 1948. Al-Khatib was born in 1914 and worked as a teacher before he was appointed to the mandate department of travel and immigration in 1931 (al-Khatib, 2006, p.43). During his appointment, 'he provided services to figures affiliated with the Palestinian national movement who were pursued for arrest by the mandate authorities'. He also worked later in the department of work affairs for two years. Overall, al-Khatib served fifteen years in civil service during the mandate (Salih, 2010, pp.6–7).

Al-Khatib left his work in civil service under the mandate in 1946 and became the head of al-diwan of the Arab office of the re-established Arab Higher Committee until the fall of the city in 1948, when he joined the National Committee in Jerusalem. During the first year of Jordanian rule, he was appointed to the external communications office of the Arab Legion, before becoming the head of the travel permits department in Jerusalem until April 1949 (ibid), when the Jordanian administration replaced him with one of the former senior Palestinian employees during the mandate (al-Khatib, 2006, p.48).

In January 1949, al-Khatib joined the municipal council and soon after became unemployed and in desperate need of income, following his release from the Jordanian travel permits department in Jerusalem. He stated that this urged him to think of new sources of income under the catastrophic situation of the city. Al-Khatib and other former mandate employees who remained in Jerusalem had some small capital left from their salaries and compensation from the mandate government. In 1949, al-Khatib raised the idea of establishing a small hotel to serve the journalists and military correspondents who regularly visited the city during that time, as no hotels were located in the areas of Arab Jerusalem in 1948. Thus, in 1949, al-Khatib, along with some other former employees – both men and women – established the Arab Hotels Association, using capital of only six thousand dinars divided between 66 contributors, although none of them had any experience in the field (ibid, p.48).

Within a few months, the Association had built al-Zahra Hotel, the first economic project in Jerusalem after the Nakba, which opened in mid-1949 and employed in its beginning seventeen workers. Al-Khatib recalls that when they began renovating the building that was rented for the hotel, people thought of him and his colleagues as 'crazy, reckless towards their situation and the country's situation! Poor people!'. The hotel grew steadily – as did the Association, which built more hotels in Arab Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967, including the Ambassador Hotel in 1955. Al-Khatib became the general director and the chairman of the Association's board from the time of its establishment until Israel deported him from Jerusalem in March 1968 (ibid, pp.48–50; Salih, 2010, pp.8, 12).

In addition, these young entrepreneurs established in 1950 the Jerusalem Real-Estate Company, which was initially concerned with rebuilding houses damaged in the 1948 war. Later on, it invested in building commercial zones and stores outside the city's walls, as well as residential projects in the suburbs of Jerusalem. Al-Khatib served as the Secretary General from its establishment until his deportation (Salih, 2010, pp.13–14).[45]

Al-Khatib was involved in the municipal council from 1949 and throughout the whole Jordanian period. He was appointed as mayor three times, being the last mayor of Arab Jerusalem's municipality before Israel dissolved it in late June 1967.[46] The dual positionality between public service and private entrepreneurship informed his engagement with both realms, particularly in the tourism sector, as along with al-'Arif he also was a member of the advisory council of the Jordanian Tourism Authority (CM 22/6/1954, p.2, JMA 936-6).

The question of whether the line between public good and private benefit was (often) crossed for those involved simultaneously in the municipality and in business seems to be an issue, as we can learn from statements made by some candidates in the 1963

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[45] It should be noted that these forms of entrepreneurship and investment in local capital were not new to Jerusalem. As Jacob Norris states, the Ottoman Chamber of Commerce helped establish the Bank Filastin al-Tijari, which was 'designed to mobilize local capital for government public work concessions'. [..] Its activities aimed at "bringing to fruition indigenous capital which remains largely unproductive due to a lack of serious investment". Both the Chamber and the [Bank] were products of the new spirit of local participation in the development of infrastructure and municipal services' (Norris, 2013, p.39).

[46] Al-Khatib continued to hold this position symbolically after his deportation to Jordan in 1968.

local elections. These candidates promised in their campaigns to 'fight corruption, nepotism and routine in the municipality system' (Zaki al-Ghoul and Musa al-Bitar, flier titled 'Please Read This!', JMA 943-7 (hereafter, 'Please Read This!' flier)) and to 'work on issues that benefit the public good and fight against individual benefit at the expense of public benefit' (Zaki al-Ghoul and Musa al-Bitar, flier titled 'To our brothers, the honourable residents of Jerusalem', JMA 943-7).

Overall, in the light of the absence of a nation-state, Jerusalem's local governance represented a form of continuity with the Palestinian past. Such continuity was determined by local knowledge and citizenship, as well as by local capital, economic thought, and aspirations for development. Did these reflect some fulfilment of Palestinian developmental agency within the municipality (and outside it)? The answer is inherently intertwined with the question of political agency within the Jordanian state, which requires a closer examination of political performance and representation within local governance and its relation with the Jordanian state.

Political Ambivalence under Jordanian Rule

The involvement and support of al-Khatib and others in the Palestinian national movement against colonial British and Zionist plans in Palestine, positioned them during Jordanian rule in what Pamela Smith describes as a 'cruel dilemma' (Smith, 1984, p.103), as many had to act within their governmental posts as 'silent nationalists' (al-Khatib, 2006, p.51). This meant that they had an 'uneasy relationship with a country where they have formed a majority since 1949, but where political power is out of their control' (R. Khalidi, 1997, p.179).

Although subverted to the legal, economic and social frames of the 'new state', the Palestinian intelligentsia that emerged from its ranks was 'unable to assimilate itself politically into these new regimes and soon became a staunch proponent of Pan-Arab nationalism and later of Palestinian nationalism' (Tamari, 2009, p.12). In the absence of an alternative, especially in the 1950s, although these were 'compelled to acknowledge political allegiance to Abdallah's regime, [they] focused less on integration than on the creation of a political atmosphere conducive to the *restoration* of Palestine' (Aruri, 1972, p.39, emphasis added). Furthermore, their 'tradition of

involvement in political activities … proved to be the major source of trouble for [King] Abdallah when he extended his jurisdiction to the West Bank' (ibid, p.37).

Throughout the 1950s, Jerusalem and other localities in the West Bank witnessed rising support for Arab nationalism under the leadership of Nasser and against Western imperial powers. This support was reflected in the Jerusalem municipality's acts of solidarity and protests in line with events taking place in the Arab world. For instance, following the attack on Port Said in 1956, the municipality accepted a petition issued by residents to call a street in Jerusalem after the city of Port Said (CM 17/12/1956, p.3, JMA 936-9). Furthermore, a delegation representing the municipality travelled to Cairo to congratulate Nasser for the withdrawal of the attacking parties (CM 22/1/1957, p.1, JMA 936-10).

In another case that year, the municipality issued a letter to King Faisal protesting the unfair trials conducted by Nuri Said, the Iraqi Prime Minister, against Iraqi nationalist leaders and young men (CM 17/12/1956, p.8, JMA 936-9). The city's enthusiasm and solidarity with anti-colonial movements around the world, such as Algeria's struggle of independence, was prominent. This included donations from the municipality to Algeria (CM on 13/8/1957, p.10, JMA 936-11; CM 11/7/1961, p.6, JMA 937-4), issuing a condemnation letter to the General Consulate of France protesting its brutality in Algeria (CM 3/4/1956, p.2, JMA 936-8), and celebrating the Algerian female freedom fighters Djamila Bouhired and Zohra Drif upon their visit to the city in 1962 (CM 17/19/1962, p.1, JMA 937-6).

Being part of a state that sought to erase the possibility of their statehood and their aspirations to restore that state, even as a delayed possibility, many of those Palestinian bureaucrats accordingly developed an 'ambivalent relationship' with the Jordanian state. Ambivalence was not new, as we learn from the history of those who served in civil service posts under the mandate rule (Seikaly, 2016, pp.26, 45) while protesting its politics inside and outside their offices. As Ilana Feldman states in her study of Gaza during the mandate, 'civil servants distinguished between their work *in* government and government itself, drawing a line between British policy and Mandate service delivery' (2008, p.83).

In such positionality, civil servants utilized 'subterfuge' and 'disassociation' as two mechanisms to manoeuvre between their employment and their political stands and national sentiments (ibid). However, 'it was when one's work was directly implicated in the pursuit of objectional policies that it became difficult to disassociate' (ibid, p.84; see also the abovementioned example of Yahya Hammoudeh in Nassar and Tamari, 2005, pp.480–481). Furthermore, the system itself had also been ambivalent towards them as they were appointed, replaced, arrested, deported and reappointed during the mandate period.

The same pattern was repeated under Jordanian rule, though ambivalence was more complex now, given the political consequences of the Nakba and the stance of Jordan towards these consequences. Local administration in the West Bank was not an exception for Jordan's politics towards the Palestinians and the limitations it imposed on their political expression. As al-Jarbawi noted, the Municipalities Law of 1955, which replaced the previous municipal regulations of the mandate, was clear and direct about its objective to prevent the development of local governance institutions into political local sites that would 'compete with the government over power, or even share with it this power' (al-Jarbawi, 1991, p.61).

Although there is a difference between employment in civil service and membership in municipal councils, this sense of political ambivalence was part of both positions. An illustration of this ambivalence in local governance was reflected in one of the meetings of the Jerusalem municipal council in 1965. On 17 March 1965, the council[47] discussed a proposal of member Zaki al-Ghoul demanding that the municipality issue a statement condemning comments made by the Tunisian President Bourguiba in the Jericho Conference[48] and that it reverse its previous decision to name a street in Jerusalem after him (JMA 938-5 [confidential]).

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[47] The council was composed of Ruhi al-Khatib as the mayor, along with members Abd al-Mughni al-Natsheh, Nihad Abu Gharbieh, Musa al-Bitar, Fayiq Barakat, 'Arif al-'Arif, Ibrahim Tleel, Khader Abu-Swai, Rashid Nashashibi and Zaki al-Ghoul.

[48] In March 1965, Bourguiba delivered a speech in Jericho in which he called on the Palestinians to accept the partition as a tactic and suggested that their leadership should meet with Israel. The speech was widely condemned by Palestinians and others in the Arab world. For historical and analytical discussion on this, see Al-Hannashi, 2007.

The confidential discussion was intense, as some members insisted that the municipality should be pragmatic and refrain from such announcements in order to prevent tension in the streets. The following statement of mayor al-Khatib articulates the liminal and ambivalent positionality of the council:

> The fact is that each one of us has passion and feelings towards the Palestinian cause and for the Arab causes, similar to the passion and feelings of Mr. Fayiq [Barakat], and I would like to thank him for his initiative to articulate this passion. But I would like to say that it is well known about us in Jerusalem that we do not make emotional and rushed decisions and this has always made us avoid impulsiveness and carelessness. (ibid, p.1)

Al-Khatib noted that it would be better to wait and see how things develop before taking such decisions. He also referred to the extent to which the municipality should interfere in politics, saying:

> Issuing any statement to express feelings would create a reverse reaction and we, as a municipal council, have to follow the Municipalities Law and keep the municipality as a collective away from politics. However, that does not mean that we cannot issue statements in our personal capacity if there is a need for that. (ibid)

Other members complained against the restrictions imposed on the council to speak about politics, particularly the Palestinian cause. As al-'Arif stated:

> There is nothing that prevents us from expressing our national aspirations, as individuals or as a council of a community. I condemn and resent it being said that we as a municipal council should be restrained in expressing our national aspirations. We are the people and we have to express our will. (ibid, p.2)

In response, Zaki al-Ghoul insisted that the municipality, as a representative body, must not interfere in politics, as none of the members had said in his election campaign that he would do so if elected: 'Since we all approached [the municipality] on the grounds of civil service only … yet that does not mean that we as individuals must not feel the aspirations for our country and the dangers it is exposed to.' In response, the mayor said that 'we all respect brother hajj Zaki al-Ghoul as nationalist [watani]' and added that 'when the fight [or event] happens we all indeed will forget that we are municipality members or otherwise and will struggle whatever it costs us' (ibid, p.3).

The tense discussion ended with al-'Arif remarking that he did not mean to question the nationalist political stands of any of the council members: 'All my intentions were

that the council represented by the mayor always and at every occasion and ceremony involving foreigners and others, speak of politics and about the Palestinian cause and present its facts to gain supporters' (ibid).

Such a discussion, as well as its timing in 1965 – a year after the inauguration of the PLO – and the diverse stands concerning the right of individuals and the institution to express *political stands, feelings*, *aspirations* and *passion* towards Palestine, is indicative of the members' ambivalent positions towards their civil service roles under Jordanian rule. It also reflects the tradition of negotiations and negations, as well as the dialectics of erasure and restoration between the local and the central governance in Jerusalem.

These dialectics of negotiations and negations were not a product of the late 1960s. Nor were they limited to political issues, as tension with the central government took place on administrative and structural levels as well. For instance, in March 1950, the Jordanian Minister of Interior used his authority to dissolve the council that had been appointed by Abdallah al-Tal in November 1948, replacing it with an appointed municipal *committee*. Requests from the members to be recognized as a council were rejected (CM 15/3/1950, pp.1–2, JMA 936-2).

Furthermore, soon after this status relegation, the committee encountered a breaking point with the central government, when the Minister of Interior refused to confirm the proposed municipal budget for the financial year 1950/51 and instead proposed major cuts in the budget. Therefore, the members agreed on a collective resignation, since 'the committee feels that the government does not treat this holy city equally like other cities that did not suffer [in the Nakba] like Jerusalem did' (CM 8/7/1950, p.6, JMA 936-2).

To solve this crisis, the Minister of Interior appointed al-'Arif on 31 July 1950 as the head of the municipal committee (not council) (Falah al-Mdadahah decree appointing al-'Arif, 31/7/1950, JMA 935-10). Following this, al-'Arif issued a letter to the King expressing his allegiance and 'his desire to be instructed by his pertinent advices' (JMA 935-10) (Figures 6 and 7).

Figure 6: Letter from 'Arif al-'Arif to the King

(Source: JMA 935-10)

After some attempts by al-'Arif to recruit new members for the municipal committee, he was able to form a committee that began its work in November 1950 – four months after the resignation of the previous committee. In his opening remarks at the first meeting of the new committee on 8 November 1950, al-'Arif showed a pragmatic attitude towards the crisis:

> the fact that this is an appointed committee, not a council, does not prevent it from carrying out the tasks of a municipal council. Nor does this mean that it does not represent all residents of Jerusalem … until the time comes to hold a municipal election. (JMA 936-2)

In October 1951, the first municipal elections in Jerusalem took place. Al-'Arif was elected and then appointed by the government as mayor of the municipal *council*. These elections constituted a landmark in the city's local politics, as they retained some of the municipality's political weight and its role as a representative institution. This was reflected in the speech of the Jerusalem governor [Mutasrif al-Quds] in the inaugural meeting of the new elected municipal council: 'as it is well known, an elected council is stronger than an appointed one since it expresses the will of people and the nation which is the source of power'. From his side, al-'Arif perceived the elections as a move from an old to a new era, stating that 'today we open a new page in the life of our municipality' (CM 23/10/1951, pp.1–2, JMA 936-3).

Yet what looked like a promising democratic phase for the city and its people did not last long. On 5 December 1951, less than two months after al-'Arif was elected and appointed, the government removed him from his position as mayor, without previous notice to either him or the council members. The central government persistently refused to return al-'Arif to his position, or to explain the reasons for his removal,[49] and instead appointed Omar al-Wa'ri as mayor in March 1952 (Decree of Sa'id al-Mufti, Minister of Interior, 12/3/1952, JMA 935-10).

Al-'Arif, who remained a member of the municipal council, wished al-Wa'ri better luck than he had experienced in the first council meeting following his appointment. Al-'Arif also expressed his full commitment to supporting the council and working in order to revive the city. Furthermore, he drew the new mayor's attention to some

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[49] Relevant municipality records do not indicate the reasons but, according to al-'Arif's publisher, they concerned a dispute he had with Prime Minister Toufik Abu al-Huda (al-'Arif, 1999, pp.569–571).

matters that needed to be addressed urgently, including the 'status of Jerusalem'. Al-'Arif advised al-Wa'ri to work hard in order to 'remove whatever is stuck in the government's mind about Jerusalem and to work on upgrading its status and preventing a deprivation of its dignity' (CM 15/3/1952, pp.1–2, JMA 936-4).

This statement clearly shows the complex and ambivalent relation of the municipality and its representatives with the Jordanian state from the early 1950s. Ambivalence is further illustrated by the fact that three years after his dismissal, al-'Arif was re-elected and appointed by the government as mayor (CM 27/9/1955, JMA 936-7). He soon withdrew from this role after accepting the position of Minister of Employment in 1955, only to resign weeks later over his opposition to Jordan's role in the Baghdad Pact – which brought mass political protests to the streets of Jerusalem, as will be discussed next.

The Politics of al-Ahali

The ambivalence and pragmatism of the municipality leadership were also manifested in its relationship with the local community during public protests against Jordan's politics. Jerusalem's community articulated its political position through protests, which constituted a challenge to the local political leadership as a mediator between the state and the community. Jordan repressed political expression in the West Bank, including through emergency regulations against freedom of speech and political participation (Massad, 2001, pp.174–175; Aruri, 1972, pp.89–115). Consequently, Palestinian national political expression was banned in public spaces. Nevertheless, public protests were an integral part of the city's life throughout Jordanian rule.

Protests, petitions[50] and strikes reflected the political agency of Palestinians in the West Bank. Various social groups participated in these political events, including merchants, labourers and school students. The students were a distinguished group that at times led the protests.[51] Their prominence was reflected in the fact that the

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[50] For the role of the petitions as an 'institution' that allows political participation in Ottoman Jerusalem, see Avci, Lemire and Ozdemir, 2018, p.164.

[51] Protests by school-level students had been prominent in Jerusalem at least since the 1920s. See Davis, 2005, p.69.

political leadership addressed them specifically when it intervened to contain public anger.

Protests in the streets gave space, particularly for women to convey their political voice. Women were not excluded from political repression, as the women's movement 'had both an anticolonial nationalist agenda and a gender-equality agenda' (Massad, 2001, p.96). Thus, the Jordanian government dissolved women's groups, attacked their demonstrations, and 'did not hesitate to detain women and to dismiss them from jobs' (ibid). Although the Arab Women's Union[52] continued to have an active role in the West Bank's local politics after the Nakba,[53] women were not allowed to vote or run for municipal councils. This was despite the fact that the municipal council in Jerusalem demanded the amendment of the Municipalities Law to allow suffrage for women.

The protests against the Baghdad Pact in 1955[54] reflected public opinion across the West Bank in relation to the foreign policies of Jordan and its alliances with Western powers. Protesters took to the streets of Jerusalem to protest Jordan's intention to join the Pact, although political activities were banned and curfews, detentions and violence prevailed. Residents of Jerusalem, including many school students, organized demonstrations against the Pact. Among these was 17-year-old refugee student Raja' Abu 'Ammashah, who was a co-founder of the General Student Union in Jordan and was active in the women's movement in the West Bank (Palestinian Encyclopaedia website).

On 19 December 1955, Raja' and others raided the embassies of Britain and Turkey in Jerusalem to protest their membership in the Pact. Raja' was shot 'as she set fire to the British flag at the British consulate in Jerusalem'[55] (Massad, 2001, p.96). Her funeral was widely attended in Jericho, despite a curfew (Palestinian Encyclopaedia

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[52] The Arab Women's Union Society was established in Jerusalem in 1928.

[53] For a discussion on the Palestinian women's movement and its political participation in Jordan, as well as the demand for the right of women to vote in national elections, see Massad, 2001, pp.92–99.

[54] The Baghdad Pact was a defensive organization for promoting shared political, military and economic goals. It was founded in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, Britain, Pakistan and Iran as part of the Cold War alliances to block the communist presence in the Middle East.

[55] Other accounts suggest that Raja' was killed in the Turkish Embassy in Jerusalem.

website). Author Mahmoud Shqair, then a student in Jerusalem, remembered these protests and the killing of Raja':

> We halted our study for several days due to the escalation of tensions in the country. And among the martyrs was student Raja' Abu 'Ammashah, who was killed while trying to take down the British flag from the British Consulate building in Jerusalem. We were saddened by her death, and then the political forces began to distribute her image in large numbers, and she became a symbol of the sacrifices and struggle of students, and we looked at her brother, who was a students in the upper grades of al-Rashidiya school, with respect and pride, as a brother of the martyr. (2009, p.47)

Less than two weeks after the death of Raja', the Jerusalem municipality changed the name of the street in which she was killed from al-Jihad to her name to honour 'the struggle of the Jordanian woman' (CM 27/12/1955, p.6, JMA 936-4). The protests eventually brought about the resignation of the government and the withdrawal of Jordan from the Baghdad Pact (Aruri, 1972, pp.124–127).

The protests against the Baghdad Pact also reflected their influence on the city's formal political structures. Local leadership, represented primarily by the municipal council and the Chamber of Commerce, was urged by the protests of al-ahali to articulate clearer stands towards central government politics. The leadership had to restructure a public committee called the Jerusalem Committee to convey the 'opinion of the holy city frankly, honestly and reliably to the responsible parties concerning all political matters and public affairs that occupy the mind' (Jerusalem municipality and the Chamber of Commerce, announcement to the honourable residents of Jerusalem, 20/12/1955, JMA 952-21) (Figures 8 and 9). In this sense, it could be argued that these protests offered the local governance a space for political articulation beyond their restricted institutional frames.

Figure 8: 'Announcement to the honourable ahali of Jerusalem'

(Source: JMA 952-21)

Figure 9: 'Dear Citizens / Announcement from the Jerusalem Committee'

(Source: JMA 952-21)

Public protests endured throughout Jordanian rule, which witnessed persistent crises in its internal political structure. At the end of 1966, mass protests broke out across all large cities in the West Bank, following Israeli aggression in the frontier village of al-Samu' on 13 November (Massad, 2001, p.238). Al-Samu' protests took place against rising national activism among Palestinians, in the context of the establishment of the Palestinian national movement in the mid-1960s and increasing militant acts against Israel, as well as rising liberation and anti-colonial movements around the world.

Figure 10: 'A group of Jerusalem's leadership in a tour in the Old City during al-Samu' protests'

(Source: Al-Khatib al-Tamimi, 1989, p.64)

Figure 11: 'Lifting curfew in Jerusalem and Nablus'

(Source: *Al-Manar*, 28/11/1966; JMA 953-38)

The protests in the case of al-Samu' aggression brought different parties to the municipality offices for an urgent meeting, including members of the Parliament, the Chamber of Commerce, the municipal council, and others. Following the meeting, an announcement was issued to the public and to the King, supporting the public's quests to liberate Palestine and empower the PLO (Members of the Parliament, Chamber of Commerce, the municipal council and notables, Announcement to the honourable citizens, 22/11/1966, JMA 953-38) (Figure 12).

Figure 12: 'Announcement to the honourable citizens'
(Source: JMA 953-38)

On the one hand, these illustrations of political participation taking place on two different occasions during Jordanian rule reflect the pulse of the street and its relationship with both the state and the local administration. On the other hand, they reflect the local administration's 'uneasy' relationship with the central government. The brief discussion here cannot do justice to the public political struggle and heavy costs that Palestinians paid but has aimed nevertheless to emphasize an important aspect of al-ahali agency during the period of Jordanian rule.

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This section has charted the roots of the local agency of Jerusalem's residents, along with – primarily – that of the municipal administration in Jerusalem. It aimed to delineate the features of the ambivalent and uneasy position of the city and its administration within the new state on different levels. A closer examination of the perception of the Palestinians in Jerusalem in relation to the time and space of their ruined homeland is crucial to further grasp their positionality and agency after 1948.

The Space-Time of the Nakba

On the margins of 1948 (the event) and its representation (the Nakba) emerged Arab Jerusalem. The *present* of Jerusalem was trapped between the geography of a hopeful future and a destroyed past, between Jordan's national time and Israel's colonial time – as well as the Palestinian national time, as 1964 signified the establishment of the PLO.

In his study of the construction of Palestinian identity, Rashid Khalidi reveals how distorted narrations on Palestinian identity depicted the years between 1948 and 1964 as a time during which 'the Palestinians seemed to many to have disappeared from the political map as an independent actor, and indeed as a people' (1997, p.178). However, as Khalidi argues, these years witnessed 'the beginnings, the pre-history as it were, of a new generation of Palestinian nationalist groups … in the refugee camps, the workplaces, the schools, and the universities where Palestinians congregated in the years after 1948' (ibid, pp.179–180).

This thesis explores the representation of Palestinian identity through local manifestations during the two decades between the Nakba and the Israeli occupation in 1967. It suggests that these forms of local identity representations, independently and jointly with other national analytical categories, shed light on a form of Palestinian agency that developed after the Nakba. In other words, researching Palestine through national frames of pre-1948 and post-1964/1967 would not be enough to count world-(re)making experiences like that of Arab Jerusalem.

This section's discussion of the Nakba builds on the previous section's engagement with the city's relationship with Jordan, while more closely examining the city's perceptions of Palestine as both a lost past and a future for statehood. Such an

examination requires unpacking the meanings of the Nakba through 'people's time' in order to trace perceptions on the Nakba and its temporality before it became historicized (Bhabha, 1994, pp.218–219).

As Palestinians found themselves the subjects of new states and the occupants of new citizenship status, maintaining continuity with Palestine was the key element in reproducing their Palestinian identity. The temporal orientations of the scattered Palestinian communities after 1948, whether at home or in exile, constituted a pillar in restoring Palestine in the *future*. This was illustrated in the articulation of 'Arif al-'Arif, then a municipal council member, in a 1955 council meeting about Palestinian lives before and after May 1948:

> There is a difference like [that between] earth and sky in the state of mind of every individual among the people, in relation to his living and *his perspective on the future*. [This is] because of what happened to him and what happened to his homeland in terms of estrangement, loss and misery. (CM 18/1/1955, p.4, JMA 936-7, emphasis added)

The time of the Nakba, its duration and the temporal orientation it generated are at the core of this thesis, which traces time through the material and discursive making of the city. This section focuses exclusively on the history of representations of the Nakba space in Jerusalem, as an inseparable component of the history of space itself (Lefebvre, 1991, p.42). Furthermore, it traces the time of the Nakba through 'processes of remembering and commemorating' (Khalili, 2007, p.4) in the social setting of partitioned Jerusalem, and in relation to the context of Jordanian rule and the dialectic of erasure and restoration.

The Loss of the New City and Its Representation

Until May 1948, Jerusalem was a city of over 164,400 Christian, Muslim and Jewish (native and settler) communities. 'The majority of the Jewish population and half of the Christian and Muslim populations' lived in the western neighbourhoods outside of the walls – that is, the New City. During the fighting in 1948, most parts of the New City were occupied by the Zionist forces and approximately 30,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled from their homes and businesses located in those parts. Furthermore, '2,000 Jews were removed from the Old City Jewish Quarter' (Davis, 2002, pp.49–50).

After mid-May 1948, the Old City and some areas surrounding the walls came under Jordanian control. This area comprised no more of '2½ square miles out of 12½ square miles that was the total area of mandate Jerusalem, and it comprised remnants of inhabitants not exceeding 33,000 out of a total of 90,000 Arabs that were living in Jerusalem before 1948' ('Developments in Jerusalem' lecture, 15/5/1963). Many of the refugees of the New City found shelter in these areas, which became known as Arab Jerusalem, rendering it 'a city of refugees' (Tamari, 2004, p.34).

Figure 13: 'Jerusalem municipal boundaries between 1948 and 1967'
(Source: PASSIA)

The New City signified, in both the native and the colonial imagination, Palestinian modernity in general and that of Jerusalem in particular. It was the only space that was free to develop in Jerusalem according to the town planning ideology of the mandate. As such, it signified the renewal, opening and closing of avenues and possibilities that modernity endowed humanity with (Osborne, 2011, p.5). The first planning scheme of Jerusalem was developed under the mandate in 1918 and 'entailed a strict demarcation of urban space' so that there were two cities: 'The Ancient City' and an 'adjacent modern city' (Abu El-Haj, 2001, p.63).

The demarcation of the western parts of the city as modern and developed was conditioned on the depiction of the Old City and its surrounding areas to the east and north of the walls as a historical monument that needed to be protected and preserved. This mentality disregarded the Old City as a lived site of the native residents:

> The Old City *stood for* the historical, in the eyes of Europeans and outsiders, in relation to which the modern city would and could exist. The Old City, its living architectural fabric, was imagined and legislated to be a historical monument whose special character had to be conserved. It was, after all, only in the modern city that future development could take place. (Abu El-Haj, 2001, p.66; see also Tamari, 2017, pp.40–41; Barakat, 2016)

The fall of the New City in 1948 thus represented the fall of Palestinian modernity and the destruction of its material and discursive infrastructure, as the partition 'eliminated its pluralistic feature, but also put an end to its connectedness and openness to the culture of the coast' (Tamari, 2004, p.34). Furthermore, the domestic life and urban practices that the New City allowed constituted 'a way of life' that was also lost:

> The parts of Jerusalem that remained in Arab hands were in no way able to *compensate* for life in the New City, particularly given the poverty of the refugees from the suburban neighbourhoods of the city. These refugees were often without employment and no longer able to afford to send their children to private schools or to live in or rent large and spacious homes. Not only did people lose property, businesses, jobs and material possession in the division of Jerusalem in 1948 and the eviction of Arabs from the New City, but they also *lost a way of life*. (Davis, 2002, p.51, emphasis added)

In the shadow of the nostalgic past, Arab Jerusalem emerged as a contemporaneous site of loss. It 'withdrew into itself', became 'secluded' and lost its centrality after becoming a 'second city' in relation to Amman (Tamari, 2004, p.34). The physical proximity and the 'visual relations' (Dakkak, 1981, p.138) that the Old City maintained with the lost New City, and vice versa, contributed to such depictions.

Furthermore, the fact that much of the urban revival in the Old City and its area was responding to the loss of the New City and its essential infrastructure contributed to the creation of the New City as an idealized and nostalgic space after 1948. Accordingly, Arab Jerusalem was perceived as unable to *compensate* for the lost New City (Davis, 2002, p.51), or to compete with its modernity. It was perceived as being only an 'imitation' rather than a product of interaction (Dakkak, 1981, p.147).

Without refuting or approving these historical and historiographical distinctions between the New and the Old City before and after 1948, it is argued here that examining Arab Jerusalem's perceptions and memories of the New City from 1948 to 1967 can newly illuminate, test and challenge these distinctions.

Articulations of the Nakba in Arab Jerusalem

As the distance between the city and its past grew between 1948 and 1967, the meaning of the Nakba transformed from being a descriptive title of Palestinian loss to a discursive signifier of both colonization and liberation. During the early 1950s, the municipality was struggling with maintaining the city's infrastructure and resuming urban services, authority and capital. Yet the gradual revival of urban life extended the distance from the Nakba, albeit never recovering its loss. In the mid-1960s, with the establishment of the PLO, the Nakba would finally be conceptualized as a national signifier that extended beyond its local context.

During the early 1950s, the institutional memory of the municipality did not refer exclusively or regularly to the Nakba to speak about the collective loss of Palestine. The occupation of Palestine in general, and the New City in particular, was often referred to as 'the recent war in Palestine', 'the Palestinian war', 'the change of administration' and the 'termination of the mandate'. In a comment in 1953, al-'Arif referred to the Nakba in plural as opposed to the singularity of the concept 'the Nakba':

> … and here is our afflicted country adding every day another Nakba to its previous *Nakbas* due to the migration of its sons, this continuous migration which only almighty god knows its extent … (CM 31/3/1953, p.1, JMA 936-5, emphasis added)

However, over a decade later, the Nakba became the singular signifier of the destroyed past. In 1965, mayor Ruhi al-Khatib published an essay in a special edition of the newspaper *Amman al-Massa'* entitled 'In Our Beautiful Country'. The title of al-Khatib's essay, 'Jerusalem: How Did the Nakba Leave It … and How Is It Now?', reflected on the development of the city since mid-May 1948. The essay itself began with a sort of a disclaimer: 'I find myself obliged to go back to the middle of May 1948, summarizing the situations of the city *at the time*, and then *moving* to speak

about what happened in the years that followed until the *present time'* (*Amman al-Massa'* essay, emphasis added).

This disclaimer marked a distance from the Nakba that is constitutive in understanding the present as it was sensed and perceived in the city, and to capture the temporal formations and orientations that the city lived. From that point of the present of Arab Jerusalem, al-Khatib was able to turn back and speak of the Nakba as a past that left the city with only 'the sacred shrines and the legacy of our ancestors, their remembrances and the landmarks'. This articulates a process of becoming, as 'inhabitants were able to resume normal life gradually and to realize what you have seen of the building projects, commercial and industrial enterprises, educational and charitable institutions' (ibid).

These 'pessoptimistic' and mixed reflections on the past, present and future of the city are most indicative of the form of Palestinian agency after 1948. This form of agency was able to perceive the resumption of life in the Palestinian localities as a form of self-making and identity-preservation – despite the Nakba, which continued to be present and constitutive in this making. From 1948 to 1967, the time of the Nakba and the relation of the city to its past signified a process of transformation that was not only indicative of the history of the space and its representation, but also manifested how urban space was deployed to preserve identity and practice political actions.

Palestinian past and future were inscribed in the city's representational landscape (or space)[56] through municipal authority over street naming.[57] This authority was nevertheless contested by the central government and thus the municipality had to fight for it. In 1952, the central government demanded that the municipality appoint a representative in a commission of street naming set by the government in preparation of a population census. The municipal council refused, demanding that such a committee be part of local governance in accordance with the Street Naming by-law of 1938 (CM 16/12/1952, pp.9–10, JMA 936-4). The following week, the municipality

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[56] Lefebvre defines representational spaces as 'redolent with imaginary and symbolic elements, they have their source in history – in the history of a people as well as in the history of each individual belonging to that people' (1991, p.41).

[57] For the history of the transformation of street naming in Jerusalem since the mandate, see Khamaisi, 2013. On the politics of naming in Jerusalem, see R. Khalidi, 1997, pp.14–18.

appointed a street-naming subcommittee comprised of council members al-'Arif and Anton Lawrence (CM 23/12/1952, p.1, JMA 936-4).

Over the subsequent months, the committee embarked on naming streets inside and outside the walls. On 10 March 1953, al-'Arif briefed the council about the work of the committee inside the walls, stating that the 'task is not easy as [he] initially thought it would be, as there are many considerations for street naming, since there were old names that must be preserved because they are known among people since antiquity'. He added that when the committee changed street names, 'its considerations were the historical events that took place in the city, as well as attentiveness to the feelings of the residents [ahlin] and the institutions with accordance of their interests and beliefs' (pp.2–3, JMA 936-5).

The task of the committee in naming streets outside the walls was more complex, as al-'Arif reported back to the council on the committee's work a few months later. In finding names for new roads outside the walls, the committee was guided by the reality and events that 'hit the city in its old and newer days and was directed by the knowledge and the opinions of the city's mukhtars as well as the opinions of the residents' (CM 26/5/1953, p.3, JMA 936-5).[58]

The names given to the new streets represented the Nakba as the past and the aspired future. They included the Martyrs, the Return, the Arab Legion, the Salvation [Inqadh] and Abd al-Qader al-Husseini. In addition, several streets were named after occupied cities, including Jaffa, al-Karmel (in reference to Haifa), Lydda and al-Ramlah. In some cases, they represented occupied streets, such as Jaffa Street, the well-known hub of commerce and administration during the Ottoman and mandate rule (where the town hall was located), which was out of reach since it was located under the Israeli-occupied parts of the city.

While it had been common to call streets after their city-destination – such as Hebron, Nablus and Jaffa roads – in these cases the act of naming was purely representational. It was not dictated by geographical orientation but rather by the loss of such

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[58] On 14 July 1953, the municipal council approved the names of these streets (JMA 936-5). In 1965, the names were reviewed and approved with some changes (CM 5/4/1965, JMA 938-5).

geography. These new streets did not lead to the occupied cities, yet they 'maintained a world in the names' (Benjamin, cited in Massey, 1995, p.187). In this sense, they manifested a recovered world, a compensation of a space that was no longer reachable.

Street naming represented the temporal as well as the geographical orientation of the divided city. The name *al-'Awda* – the *return* – was given in 1953 to the street stretching from the Prophets road to Nablus road, adjacent to the armistice separation border between the Israeli occupied side and the Arab City (CM 14/7/1953, p.1, JMA 936-5). When the list of names was reviewed in 1965, the name was given to the road leading from Nablus road to the Mandelbaum Gate (CM 5/4/1965, p.2, JMA 938-5). In material and discursive terms, this modification mitigated the distance between the city and its past and drew it closer to the future, to the actual return. While in 1950 the distance from the Nakba was referring to an unrecoverable past, marked by ruins and destitution, the mid-1960s brought change in these perceptions. The opening of the national political horizon meant that the Nakba was experienced as a remote time, serving as a bridge between the past and the imminent return to a future state.

The Nakba as a National Signifier

The 1960s, thus, signified a remarkable transformation of the representation of the Nakba, in the context of the emergence of the 'Palestinian Entity' political project and the rise of the Palestinian national movement. On 28 May 1964, the Palestine National Council Congress convened for the first time in Jerusalem, under the leadership of Ahmad al-Shuqayri and the sponsorship of King Abdallah.[59] In the opening session, both the King and mayor Ruhi al-Khatib delivered speeches, in addition to the Arab League representatives and al-Shuqayri (Abd al-Hadi, 1992, p.232). The Congress

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[59] Katz states that despite the tension between Jordan and the Arab states, by the mid-1960s the Arab League had accepted Jordan's rule in Jerusalem – not as a stated policy but rather through an active participation of Arab League member states in meetings and conferences convened under Jordanian sponsorship in the city. The Congress was convened following the decision of the Arab League summit in Cairo in January 1964. The King was forced to accept that decision, as a rejection would had brought serious political consequences given the wide pan-Arab support of the establishment of a Palestinian national movement. At the same time, he was looking to preserve the incorporation of the Palestinian territories within Jordan. Therefore, he 'chose cooperation rather than confrontation' (2005, pp.137–139).

announced the establishment of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and the leader of its struggle to liberate its homeland.

Over four days, the Congress met in the Intercontinental Hotel in Jerusalem. Some of the municipal council members participated in the subcommittees of the Congress – such as Subhi Ghosheh and al-'Arif, who participated in the political subcommittee (Report of the political committee, 30/5/1964, JMA 953-28). Moreover, the municipality played an important role as the host by facilitating the local arrangement of the historical event (Letter from Ahmad Shuqayri to al-Khatib, 2/6/1964, JMA 953-28). Among other things, the municipality invited the 500 attendees to a celebratory dinner at the Ambassador Hotel and prepared signs welcoming the Congress members into Jerusalem. The signs were eventually banned by the government after they had already been printed (CM 3/6/1964, p.3 [confidential], JMA 938-3).

The municipality also financially supported Ismail Shammout, the pioneer of fine art in Palestine, in printing the invitations to his exhibition *The Pictures of the Nakba*, which took place during the time of the Congress (ibid). Shammout, a refugee from Jaffa, represented the era of the 'first dispersion' (1948–1967), in which the 'concept of a categorical Return to Palestine came into being and was linked to an abstract vision of liberating the land' – a dream/vision that Shammout 'personified' in his paintings (Tamari, 2003, p.174).

Figure 14: Ismail Shammout, *Beginning of the Tragedy* (1953)

(Source: Ismail Shammout website)

Figure 15: Shammout, Al-Khatib, al-Shuqayri and Tamam al-Akhal during the Congress in Jerusalem

(Source: Abu-Jaber, 2006, p.191)

The national transformation of Palestinian politics influenced local representations and meanings of the Nakba most explicitly after the Congress. These transformations were reflected in the increasing calls to remember and commemorate the Nakba as a national event in the city's public space. In 1965, Sami Hidawi,[60] then the head of the Arab League Information Centre in New York, wrote to Ruhi al-Khatib, urging the municipality to establish a monument to the victims of the Nakba 'if you think the King will agree' (Letter from Sami Hidawi to al-Khatib, 12/3/1965, JMA 953-7).

Proposals of this kind were not new to the city. In September 1964, *al-Manar* newspaper published a call to the municipality to set a monument to 'the unknown soldier' or to a 'distinguished martyr, like Abd al-Qader al-Husseini, or one of the good men of Jerusalem that exalted the city's name'. The call was provoked by the planned eviction of the bazaar from Bab al-'Amoud, which would leave it empty. Not only monuments but also streets names, continued *al-Manar* newspaper, should be called after 'our heroes in Palestine and the names of our deprived cities' (Excerpt from *al-Manar*, 10/9/1964, JMA 953-7).

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[60] Sami Hidawi (1904–2004) was a Palestinian scholar and a refugee from the New City.

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In 1963, al-Khatib was invited to deliver a speech on the development of the municipality before the Rotary Club during one of its meetings. Although the meeting was scheduled on 15 May, it was not depicted as the Nakba anniversary or as a commemoration. As al-Khatib stated in the opening of this speech:

> My talk about this development has come, *coincidentally* and without *previous* or *premediated* arrangement, on the anniversary of the inauspicious day, the anniversary of the partition of Palestine and the anniversary of the division of Jerusalem. ('Developments in Jerusalem' lecture, 15/5/1963, emphasis added)

However, in 1965, the municipality institutionalized the commemoration of the Nakba by organizing 'The Palestine Lecture' on 15 May. A series of public events was approved to take place across the cities of the West Bank, following a meeting between local parties and the Jordanian military and district governance. The government allowed public events while stressing that 'demonstrations, regardless of their organizers, would be repressed by force to prevent chaos' (CM 12/5/1965/, p.1, JMA 944-24).

The government also ordered the event in Jerusalem to be held in a remote location away from the city centre, preferably at the Intercontinental Hotel – which was located on the top of the Mountain of Olives and was the site of all important conferences, including the PLO inauguration (Figure 16). Several municipal council members objected to the location and suggested alternative spaces in the city centre, such as the Palestinian Museum, the Chamber of Commerce hall, or the 'Umarieh School hall (ibid). However, their requests were not fulfilled.

Figure 16: The Intercontinental Hotel on the top of the Mountain of Olives

(Source: JMA 944-21)

In the council's meeting following the event, council member Musa al-Bitar asked that the meeting's minutes register 'his amazement in relation to holding the event in the Intercontinental Hotel' and for 'remoting us from the city centre while the event in Amman took place in the city centre' (CM 17/5/1965, p.1, JMA 938-5).

Figure 17: Invitation for 15 May Anniversary

(Source: JMA 953-2)

Furthermore, although the lecture was public, it was on an invitation-only basis (Figure 17). The list of invitees included about 600 persons who represented 'all social groups of the people' (CM 12/5/1965, p.1, JMA 938-5), including representatives of labour unions, the Chamber of Commerce, banks, Muslim clerks, Arab Christian clerks, government employees in Jerusalem, judges and employees of the Justice Ministry, publishing houses, press and broadcasting, reporters, the Arab League Office, the PLO, lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, UNRWA, the Electricity Company, travel and tourism agencies, hotels and school headmasters. The largest group comprised notables and merchants. Although the Women's Union was among the speakers, only three women were on the list of invitees (List of invitees, JMA 953-2).

The commemoration became a tradition with the ceremonies taking place again in 1966, using the same list of invitees. Yet the event's remote location and the class and affiliations of the invitees, although claiming to be representative 'of all social groups', were exclusionary and reflected a remoteness from the social body. The refugees, in particular, were not explicitly represented in the programme's speakers and were only implicitly present through the invitation of UNRWA.

Al-Khatib's speech in the 1966 commemoration event summarizes perceptions of the Nakba and its duration on the eve of the 1967 occupation. Al-Khatib looked at the Nakba as both a past and a future, as if he was looking eastwards and westwards reflecting on Jerusalem:

> We thank god that the general Arab situation in 1966 is much better in many ways than it was in 1948. But in some other ways, it sadly remains at the same level, as everybody feels that the force of the enemy is increasing and their relations with the world's countries are improving and the *time element* has no mercy for those not learning the lesson.

> Dear audience, I learned from one of those coming from the other part of Jerusalem that the municipal council of the [Israeli] occupied part discussed in its recent sessions establishing a big building for the town hall that suits the religious, historical and international status of Jerusalem and as a centre for them … Some members suggested they begin establishing the building right away, but their mayor, with whom they eventually agreed, suggested *postponing* this until the two parts [of Jerusalem] are united under the Israeli flag.

> And I learned earlier that those in charge of schools and education in Israel have groups of their male and female students constantly walk to the edges of Jerusalem and stand on the borders and plant in their minds and hearts enthusiasm

to *look forward* to annexing the other part of Jerusalem, and the annexation of the whole of the West Bank. (Ruhi al-Khatib's 'speech in the anniversary of the partition', 15/5/1966, JMA 953-2, emphasis added)

<center>***</center>

Time was the most pressing element for a city that could cling only to time, amid uncertainty and an ambivalent statehood. Whereas the Nakba seemed from the podiums of the commemoration events to be in the remote past, the future of the city was a space of contradictions. On the one hand, there was a promising future of development and progress that contrasted the Nakba and its symbolism. On the other hand, the future was threatened as the 'enemy's force was increasing' and 'looking forward to annex the other part', rendering the future a space of loss and deprivation.

Conclusion

This chapter introduced a context to understand and imagine the location of Arab Jerusalem in space and time. The city's history is multilayered, as it lived surrounded by contradictions: erasure and restoration, ambivalence and resistance, destruction and development, past and future. It is within these contradictions, and while negotiating and negating them, that the Arab City was simultaneously able and unable to emerge. The next two chapters will address how this contradictory emergence was (im)possible and attempt to grasp the process of becoming as it unfolded through the time and space of the city.

Chapter 6

The Struggle with and for the Past

> You know, your honour, that the war that broke out in Palestine ended while leaving hundreds of young Arab fighters with their parts cut and their bodies distorted, and the municipality of Jerusalem saw the need to focus its attention on those youth and to contribute together with charities to prepare whatever is needed for the disabled of artificial parts to help them proceed with their daily tasks and live without the humiliation of begging and need. (Letter from Anwar al-Khatib, the mayor of Jerusalem, to the observer of export and import of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 11/4/1949, JMA 953-5)

The flight of refugees to Jerusalem in 1948 and the loss of essential infrastructure and homes rocketed poverty and destitution in the partitioned city. Class, kinship, social ranking and economic status were lost, sustained, re-created and tested in the new reality. Status was determined by loss, not gain: loss of houses, businesses, infrastructure, deeds, body organs and thus ability to work, as well as loss of breadwinners and loss of life altogether. Whoever was left with something to proceed with was lucky, or rather lived in a state of pessoptimism – that is, to be lucky in the shadow of the Nakba.

This chapter engages with a process of recovery that turns to the past and 'selective[ly] reactivate[s] … patterns of thought and action' (Emirbayer and Mische, 2002, p.971) that allowed the city to revive. Such a recovery entailed perceiving the past not merely as a dead end and a signifier of destruction but also as a source of survival and rights. The discussion in this chapter further extends the meanings of continuity and interruption and the 'process of becoming' (Rifkin, 2017, p.17) of Arab Jerusalem in the aftermath of the Nakba. It explores this through particular forms of loss and patterns and discourses of recovery that the city experienced, especially during the first years after the partition. Furthermore, it examines how at times Palestinians partially and selectively deployed the colonial past as a familiar system of knowledge, approaching it as a source of rights needed to preserve identity and authority beyond the national frames of Jordan.

The first section of this chapter introduces the social landscape in Jerusalem after the Nakba, particularly the role of institutions, including the municipality. It analyses the obstacles that refugees and disabled and poor people had to deal with and the responses of the city's public and social institutions. These social processes demonstrated how the city resorted to the remnants of its social infrastructure to contain the crisis and move on. In other words, the past was lost and recovered to some extent through networks of solidarity and social mobility.

The chapter's second section examines a different form of loss that was experienced by the municipality. As a refugee-institution, it lived its own loss of resources, town hall and workforce, as well as the loss of a familiar system of bureaucracy and law. This last aspect of loss was crucial for the functioning of the institution and affected all groups that came to its doors; nevertheless, its consequences are rarely discussed as part of the repercussions of 1948. The municipality's struggle for a right to the past was facilitated through and by law and legal debates.

The Social Landscape of the Nakba in Jerusalem

The Infrastructure of the City of Refuge

Arab Jerusalem became a shelter for about 7,500 refugees who were displaced from the Jerusalem district's localities in 1948 (Krystall, 2002, p.116). It is estimated that most of the 'urban refugees' sought shelter within Jerusalem, or in Ramallah or Bethlehem, since they were in a better economic situation and wanted to stay within eyesight of their property, while the 'rural refugees' sought shelter in Jordan and other Arab countries in UNRWA refugee camps (Tamari, 2002, p.7). In Jerusalem, 'refugees either lived in the open or were housed in mosques, convents, schools and Old City houses in ruinous conditions' (Krystall, 2002, p.116); the last site became a persistent reminder of the Nakba in Jerusalem.

In addition to 'official refugees' who were displaced from their homes during the war, the partition in Jerusalem also produced economic refugees of two types:

> The first included, in the case of West Jerusalem, those who owned property but resided elsewhere; those who worked for the Mandate in the city; and those who had set up small shops and trades, or were employed by the wealthy as servants,

chauffeurs and gardeners. Many such economic refugees had to start again from scratch. The second type of economic refugees were people in the Jerusalem area dependent upon the economic activity of those who earned their income in West Jerusalem. The fall of West Jerusalem led to a sharp decline in their standard of living and particularly, writes Perowne, their standard of education. (ibid, p.117)[61]

The Arab Jerusalem municipality was an economic refugee-institution due to its doubled loss of resources and property, as well as the loss of livelihood of its workforce. Many of its Palestinian workforce remained in their normal residences in the eastern parts. Despite chaos and destitution, they attempted to re-establish their municipality. From the viewpoint of the workers and the general public, the loss of the town hall constituted a loss of home to a certain extent, as the use of the word *dar* (literally meaning home) to signify town halls – dar al-balidiyya – endows municipalities with social standing and exemplifies the meanings of institutional loss.

Thus, the loss of the municipality in 1948 as a home for its workforce and attempts by the workforce to revive municipal services as a way of returning to work, constitute a part of the story of economic refugees who were among wage-labourers or manual workers who lost their livelihood in the war. Although the Arab municipality was able to absorb some of its former Palestinian workforce, many municipality workers remained unemployed well after the Nakba. These people depended on UNRWA for food rations and support, subject to providing loss-of-employment certificates issued by the municipality.

On 15 May 1956 – a whole eight years after the fall of the New City – the widow of a late municipality employee, Abdallah Wihbe, wrote a letter to the municipality asking for such a certificate on behalf of her late husband. The acting mayor at the time wrote:

> To whom it may concern,
>
> The municipality of Jerusalem hereby certifies that the late Mr. Abdallah Wihbe was one of its employees, and he worked as a driver of a garbage van which operated in the occupied territories of Jerusalem.
>
> Mr. Abdallah kept his job until the end of the mandate, when he was fired from his job because the territory he worked in was occupied by the Jews. As a result of the occupation, the municipal services were reduced and limited to a small part

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[61] This description was drawn from the account of Stuart Perowne, an ex-mandate employee who carried out relief work with Palestinian refugees in Jerusalem's area.

of the city and the municipality could not afford absorbing Abdallah, who died leaving a desperately poor family consisting of a wife and four children.

Therefore, we issue this request to whom it may concern to offer any possible help to the family who lost their only breadwinner. (Letter from the acting mayor to whom it may concern, 15/5/1956, JMA 950-40)

Other categories of refugees included former dwellers of the frontier neighbourhoods in the No Man's Land area and villages of Jerusalem near the armistice lines, including al-Thuri, al-Shama'a, Jurat al-'Inab and the Jaffa Gate area, as well as Beit Safafa. The last of these was divided by a separation fence, leaving the majority of the residents under Jordan and the rest under Israel – with many cut off from their lands and 'fellow villagers and relatives' (Krystall, 2002, p.117).

Figure 18: Map of partitioned Jerusalem

(Source: PASSIA website)

In 1951, a group of these refugees issued a letter to the general director of UNRWA in Amman, protesting the agency's decision to withdraw their right to food rations on the grounds of a lack of sufficient proof of refugee status – despite the fact that they had been granted ration cards in the past by the Red Cross. UNRWA refused to accept certificates from their neighbourhood mukhtars or from their landlords (in cases of tenants), which made it very difficult for them to prove their hardship as a result of the Nakba.

These refugees wondered in their letter whether the 'agency [UNRWA] in charge in the country, came to rescue or extinguish' them, and emphasized that 'we the Arabs of Palestine are inflicted with the Nakba that we are all part of', and 'there is no difference between us and the refugees that live in tents, and in fact live much better than we do as they do not lack what we lack' (Letter from refugees of al-Thuri, al-Shama'a, Jurat al-'Inab and Jaffa Gate area to the general director of UNRWA in Amman, 1/1951, JMA 953-26). The Jerusalem municipality repeatedly demanded that UNRWA support these refugees, with UNRWA agreeing at times to fully or partially resume their ration right (Letter to the municipality's head of Diwan, 11/1/1951, JMA 953-26).

Throughout the years, the municipality received requests for certificates of property ownership or tenancy from refugees from the Nabi Dawoud area, al-Shama'a, Jurat al-'Inab, Jaffa Gate and Musrara to prove their status in relation to their lost businesses and property. The municipality relied on mandate tax records – including property, sewerage and education tax records – to issue such certificates, and at times issued these based on the knowledge of its employees of particular cases (JMA 950-40). The act of issuing these certificates located the municipality on a map of refuge, not only as a refugee-institution but also as an authoritative memory-institution serving as a witness to the loss of others.

The Poor, the Disabled and the Networks of Charities

The poverty that hit Jerusalem following the Nakba became a distinguishing characteristic of life for the city's residents and institutions. Throughout the first few years after the Nakba, the municipality, although itself a poor institution, approved

requests from residents and institutions to be exempted from paying municipal taxes on properties in view of their poverty and lack of means to pay, based on article 118 of the mandate Municipality Ordinance (1943) [poverty] (CM 3/6/1952, pp.1–3, JMA 936-4). Some social institutions, including religious institutions, schools and charities – among them, Dar al-Tifil al-'Arabi – also pleaded with the municipality to receive free water supply (CM 23/9/1952, p.1, JMA 936-4). Moreover, the municipality allocated an annual budget for aiding charities (Mayor's memorandum, 24/4/1965, p.27).

Despite their poverty, new and old social institutions played a crucial role in moving Jerusalem forward, containing the refugee crisis and easing poverty. As a religious city, Jerusalem had a wide range of religious institutions, both Muslim and Christian, that continued to function after 1948 – including schools,[62] charities and *zawaya*. The refugee-municipality found shelter in these institutions after the loss of the town hall, and other refugees depended on their aid before and after the establishment of UNRWA.

Figure 19: 'The roles of makhatir in Palestine / The party upon which the development and organization of the country depends, by advocate Hanna al-Sa''

(Source: *Falastin*, 28/8/1949)

The role of neighbourhood mukhtars in Jerusalem after 1948 was fundamental, as they maintained their authority even when some of their neighbourhoods were destroyed or displaced. In August 1949, *Falastin* newspaper published a two-part essay by a lawyer named Hanna al-Sa',[63] who described in detail the mandate laws[64] that regulated the appointment and work of mukhtars, especially in villages, describing

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[62] The schools included al-Ma'monieh for girls, al-Rashidieh and al-'Umarieh.

[63] Al-Sa' had other publications in the legal field, including *The Directory of Jordanian Laws and Precedents*, which was published by the Orphan House Press in Jerusalem in 1953.

[64] Including the Appointment of Mukhtars Law (1942) and the Village Administration Law (1944).

them as the 'mobilizing force for the development of their localities' (*Falastin*, 28, 30/8/1949) (Figure 19).

After 1948, the mukhtars coordinated between the dispersed refugee communities and official organizations,[65] such as in the abovementioned case of UNRWA, in their capacity as being legally responsible for issuing and approving documentation related to the affairs of their communities. Other examples included their involvement in announcing curfews to the residents of their neighbourhoods.[66] They also actively conveyed residents' petitions to the municipality, demanding the provision of services and the improvement of infrastructure, especially of those villages surrounding Jerusalem that were gradually included in the municipal boundaries – such as 'Issawieh and Silwan (CM 3/1/1961, p.6, JMA 937-3). In addition, the municipality consulted with mukhtars on various issues, including street naming[67] and requests from residents for municipal property tax exemption (CM 8/2/1950, p.1, JMA 936-2).

Charities and organizations were particularly active in supporting poor, ill and disabled people. These included Dar al-Tifel al-'Arabi Organization, the Orthodox Shelter for Ill and Disabled People, the Organization for the Relief of the Destitute, the Missionary for the Service of the Blind, and the Society for the Wounded Fighter (CM 2/10/1956, pp.1–2, JMA 936-9).

In his book *The Nakba in Photos*, 'Arif al-'Arif documented some of the work of the Society for the Wounded Fighter (meaning those who had lost organs during the Nakba war). By the mid-1950s, there were 769 wounded fighters (al-'Arif, 1961, no page number). They organized themselves and many attended the meeting that took place on 25 February 1949 in Jerusalem to discuss the establishment of the organization (Figure 20). In May 1949, the Society elected an advisory council which included, among others, al-'Arif himself, Ruhi al-Khatib and al-Haj Ali al-Masri, an expert in manufacturing artificial organs (ibid).

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[65] Ilana Feldman describes the rise of a similar 'new responsibility and therefore new power' of mukhtars in Gaza after 1948 (2008, p.140).

[66] See the discussion in the next chapter.

[67] See the previous chapter.

Figure 20   calls for compassion and support'

(Source: *Falastin*, 25/2/1949)

Figure 21: 'The party of the Society for the Wounded Fighter'

(Source: *Falastin*, 17/7/1949)

In July 1949, the Society had a party in the newly opened al-Zahra Hotel to raise money. The orchestra of the Arab Army and the singers Saber al-Safh and Najah Salam performed at the highly attended party, which lasted for over three hours. The event, *Falastin* newspaper reported, 'proved the extent to which the public appreciated the wounded and disabled fighters and their sacrifice for the homeland' (*Falastin*, 17/7/49) (Figure 21).

Figure 22: Rehabilitation and providing employment for members of the Society for the Wounded Fighter

(Source: al-'Arif, 1961)

Dar al-Tifel al-'Arabi Organization (the House of the Arab Child) was another crucial organization generated by the Nakba. The organization was founded in April 1948 by Hind al-Husseini as a shelter for orphaned children who had lost their parents in the Deir Yasin massacre (Dar al-Tifel al-'Arabi Organization website). In August 1949, the organization produced a publication with photos of orphans, along with their stories and a brief history of the organization. It was written by Hind al-Husseini with a foreword by Anwar al-Khatib, then the mayor of Jerusalem. The organization called for support and care of the 'children of the nation', who represented the 'generation of tomorrow', so that they could 'extract from the hands of their enemy what their fathers lost and their nation committed' (*Falastin*, 9/8/1949) (Figure 23).

Figure 23: 'Dar al-Tifel al-'Arabi Organization in Jerusalem'

(Source: *Falastin,* 9/8/1949)

The establishment of this organization and other charities after 1948 – especially those established by women activists – was part of the long tradition of charities established by women in Palestine before and after 1929. That year marked the foundation of the Palestinian women's movement at the Palestine Arab Women's Congress. The objectives of this initial charitable work and the development of the women's movement in Palestine during the mandate era were to serve the goal of 'national survival' and contribute to the nationalist discourse in 'preserving a way of life, a culture and a society against the threat of Zionism' (Fleischmann, 2003, pp.95, 97).

After 1948, these objectives were maintained, given the destruction of the Palestinian world and, consequently, the urgent need to compensate for the loss – of homeland, family, property, livelihood, education and other social institutions – suffered by the Palestinian society. This was reflected, for example, in the call delivered in the abovementioned publication of Dar al-Tifel al-'Arabi Organization: 'Let us build a live generation … let us rescue the children from displacement and destitution' (Figure 23). The need to preserve and protect the possibility of a homeland in the future was, thus, a pressing goal after 1948 for these organizations and their society.

Economy, the Press and Reviving Jerusalem

During the mid-1950s, building the future, in parallel to recovering (from) the past, was also reflected in the rise of organizations that were concerned with developing Jerusalem by raising funds for vital projects and encouraging tourism (CM 9/2/1960, p.5, JMA 937-1). These organizations included the Revival of the City Organization (CM 16/9/1952, p.4, JMA 936-4) and the Friends of Jerusalem Society (CM 9/2/1960, p.5, JMA 937-1). Economic sector institutions – including labour unions representing professions such as doctors, lawyers and pharmacists – were also major players in the city's revival of past patterns of actions (CM 12/4/1960, p.8, JMA 937-1).

But it was the Arab Chamber of Commerce[68] that took the leading role in the economic and political affairs of the city, as in the case of the Baghdad Pact protests. In May 1948, the Chamber – like the municipality – lost its offices, which were located in the area of Mamilla in the New City. After 1948, the Chamber moved from one place to another, first to al-Musrara and then to al-Zahra Street, before building its headquarters on land of the Awqaf on Nur al-Din Street, opposite the Palestine Museum garden (Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Jerusalem website).

The Chamber's most prominent roles between 1948 and 1967 were its 'contribution to the Jordanian Chambers of Commerce Act, the establishment of trade fairs, and the formation of economic studies and seminars, all in addition to its core work in protecting the interests of traders, artisans, industrialists, including providing services to them in the field of commercial arbitration' (ibid).

These social and institutional networks were massively mobilized by the revival of the two main daily newspapers in Palestine before the Nakba, *al-Difa'* and *Falastin*,[69] which were published in Jaffa before the city's fall. For months before these two

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[68] Following the 1936 revolt, the Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem split from the joint Arab and Jewish Chamber of Commerce, which was established during the Ottoman era. The Arab Chamber played an important role in the organization of the economic and commercial life of the Arab community in the city during the mandate period (Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Jerusalem website). For further discussion on the role of this Chamber and others in Palestine during the mandate period, see Seikaly, 2016, pp.107–109.

[69] See R. Khalidi's discussion of *Falastin*'s role in 'shaping a sense of Palestinian identity' before 1948 (2006, pp.92–104; R. Khalidi, 1997, pp.119–144). For further discussion on the role of the press in Palestine, see Beska, 2014; Tadros-Kahlaf, 2011; Kabaha, 2004.

newspapers resumed their work in 1949,[70] Jerusalem relied upon a daily stencilled bulletin (Schleifer, 1972, p.43) and the evening news broadcasts from the loudspeaker on the roof of al-Rawda school (Al-Hussaini, 2012, p.52).

On 4 February 1949, the director of *Falastin* newspaper, Daoud al-'Issa, wrote the op-ed in the first issue after 1948, announcing the return of the newspaper in a 'new era'. The newspaper's new slogan was 'new homeland', 'new spirit' and 'new policy'. Building upon its journalistic legacy, the newspaper positioned itself as an agent in the production of this 'new homeland' by being a platform for public opinion exchange.

Accordingly, *Falastin* allocated a section for the public 'to say what they like'. This became one of the central sites for public opinion debates in Jerusalem. The newspaper also allocated a special section for refugee news, hiring a reporter who 'specialized in refugees' to tour the country's refugee camps to listen to their complaints and injustices. In addition, *Falastin* hired a special reporter to visit government offices, ministries and embassies to report on issues that interested the public (*Falastin*, 4/2/1949).

Both *Falastin* and *al-Difa'*, and later *al-Manar* and *al-Jihad*, played an important role in local politics and affairs in the city. They allocated full pages to local news stories focusing on the West Bank, particularly Jerusalem. They actively engaged in local politics and affairs, including serving as a platform for complaints from residents about the municipality (CM 26/5/1965, p.5 [confidential], JMA 938-5). Many times, they were also the source of information for the municipality about decisions taken by the central government, such as news about the government's preparations for the amendment of the Municipalities Law (CM 14/10/1952, p.9, JMA 936-4).

Local newspapers were invited to selected meetings of the municipality, which on several occasions urged them to write about particular matters in order to mobilize public opinion and pressure the central government to implement particular projects or change its policy in relation to Jerusalem. At times, the newspapers were so invested in mobilizing public opinion about a specific matter that they demanded that the

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[70] *Al-Difa'* was briefly published in Cairo before moving to Jerusalem in 1949 to be printed in the Orphan House Printing House (Palestinian Encyclopaedia website). *Falastin* also resumed its work in February 1949 from Amman (*Falastin*, 4/2/49).

municipality award them for their role in achieving its goals (CM 3/8/1961, p.9, JMA 937-4).

Poverty and prosperity existed in parallel and informed each other, as the city iterated past patterns that constituted a '*schematization* of social experience'. Past resources and networks were recalled, selected and applied in the present of the city to move forward (Emirbayer and Mische, 2002, p.975, emphasis in original). This explains how different interests and resources, and familial and political connections, were all deployed in order to generate financial support and solidarity, as well as maintain social and political authority and hegemony across different institutions. Most important was the municipality and its representatives.

The Municipality as a Social Institution

In February 1950, snow covered Jerusalem. Mayor Anwar al-Khatib toured the Jewish Quarter buildings inside the Old City, where refugees sought shelter, and visited those poor who lived in houses and caves in the area of Wadi al-Joz outside the walls. Al-Khatib decided to distribute coal to these families and reported back about their miserable conditions to the municipal council (CM 8/2/1950, p.2, JMA 936-2). As an act of appreciation, a delegation from the 'refugee camp'[71] in the Old City and a representative of the Red Cross visited the municipality, thanking the mayor for the municipality's support. According to *Falastin* newspaper, the mayor replied: 'There is no thanks for what is a duty' (*Falastin*, 9/2/1950) (Figure 24).

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[71] The phrase 'refugee camp' was used by the press to describe the houses occupied by refugees in the Old City.

Figure 24: 'There is no thanks for what is a duty'
(Source: *Falastin*, 9/2/1950)

In Arab Jerusalem after the Nakba, the attitudes of the city's administration, charities and the public towards the need to provide 'crisis services' – that is, 'when needs come to be thought of as services' – illustrated how the 'responsibility for their fulfilment shifts from personal to public, from family to society, from community to government' (Feldman, 2008, p.124). The municipality's support during the winter of 1950 showed the interaction between these players and emphasized the role of the municipality as a social institution.

In the same meeting that took place on 8 February 1950, the municipality also decided to issue a call for public support of refugees and poor people, which it launched with a contribution of 100 Palestinian pounds (CM 8/2/1950, p.2, JMA 936-2). A committee comprised of municipal representatives and employees and others – including Hind al-Husseini, Ruhi al-Khatib and Anton Safieh – was established to raise donations of 'money, food, coal, clothes, blankets or whatever generous souls give' (*al-Difa'*, 9/2/1950) (Figure 25).

Figure 25: 'Public organizations are interested in the distress of the refugees and call for their relief'

(Source: *al-Difa'*, 9/2/1950)

Among those who donated were mayor Anwar al-Khatib, al-Zahra Hotel, Safieh and Omar al-Wa'ri, who two years later served as acting mayor after al-'Arif was dismissed (ibid). These initiatives and those involved further illustrate the social networks that intersected between social and economic capital and the 'ethics of care' (Feldman, 2008, p.125), reflecting how local projects such as al-Zahra Hotel generated capital and were incorporated at the same time into a network of social mobility.

Newspapers also published demands from the public for social solidarity 'in the name of humanity'. These calls showed a class struggle and a stratification that was delineated by the condition of refuge. For instance, *Falastin* published, under the pseudonym 'Ghassan', a call for people – especially, 'a particular class that still lives a luxurious life and wastes its money on ephemeral luxuries that do not benefit the city they live in' – to take action to aid their brothers and share with them 'their pain, misery and even death' (*Falastin*, 6/2/1950) (Figure 26).

Figure 26 ... **manity'**

(Source: *Falastin*, 6/2/1950)

Calls to assist refugees and poor people during wintertime became a tradition in the city. In January 1952, a committee comprised of some of the city's prominent figures was established to help the poor in the freezing weather, while the municipality issued a call to institutions and individuals urging them to donate (CM 3/1/1952, p.3, JMA 936-4). In subsequent years, a campaign called Winter Aid was launched annually as a collaboration between the municipality and charities in the city.

The municipality did not define who was considered poor, which was not a self-evidentiary category. Instead, it consulted with mukhtars about requests from residents to be exempted from paying municipal taxes. Similarly, the definition of 'refugee' was not fixed, as those who lost houses in the No Man's Land area were not considered refugees by UNRWA. In both cases, the question of basic needs was crucial.[72] In 1952, the municipal council decided that the distribution of aid in the winter would be based

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[72] The concept 'basic needs' – similar to poverty – is not self-evident. See the discussion in Seikaly, 2016, pp.86–90; Feldman, 2008, pp.130–135.

on lists, provided by each council member, of the names of families in need, and in consultation with the department of legal and social affairs (CM 3/1/1952, p.3, JMA 936-4).

In mid-November 1962, *al-Quds* broadcast streamed Q&As between mayor Ruhi al-Khatib and residents around the upcoming Winter Aid campaign. The questions included 'What is the best way in the municipality's opinion to distribute gifts and donations?'. Al-Khatib replied that 'the charities working in the humanitarian filed in Jerusalem and the departments of social affairs keep lists of families in need and numbers of their members, and thus the best way to distribute gifts and donations comes through these' (CM 13/11/1962, p.1, JMA 937-6). Over a decade, the category of people in need became institutionalized, which exceeded the traditional ways of individual knowledge and became subject to public enquiry and debate.

These private and public traditions of aid, 'ethics of care', social solidarity and cooperation reflected social and political dynamics in the city after 1948 and their perceptions of 'humanism' and 'hospitality'. Expressions of appreciation from the public towards the municipality asserted the renewal of its authority as a social institution. Moreover, they reflected what mayor Ruhi al-Khatib described a decade later as 'the spirit of cooperation, the spirit of faith in God, in humanity and the homeland' (*Amman al-Massa'* essay).

Since the municipality acted within a network of charities and social institutions, its social involvement was not limited to financial aid. It was also involved in social and normative ordering, especially of marginalized social groups. Among these were beggars, 'delinquent girls' and the mentally ill. At the beginning of 1954, after a mentally ill resident harassed a foreign tourist near the Austrian Hospice in the Old City, the district governor discussed with the district's municipalities the need for a shelter for the mentally ill (CM 13/7/1954, pp.1–2, JMA 936-6).

In the same year, the municipality also proposed establishing a shelter for beggars (CM 5/1/1954, p.2, JMA 936-6), which was joined two years later by a shelter for the rehabilitation of homeless and 'delinquent' girls who were 'capable of rehabilitation' (CM 13/11/1956, p.2, JMA 936-9). These social ordering activities of the municipality reflected how it perceived itself as not only a service provider but also an active player

in normative restructuring, 'urban surveillance and control' (Tamari, 2017, p.45), and 'policing propriety' (Feldman, 2008, p.191) of Jerusalem society after the Nakba. Through social ordering, the municipality and other social institutions were 'shaping the future of civic life' and 'imagining a better society [and], a brighter future' (ibid, p.192).

The municipality also sought to achieve social reformation through education by supporting schools and poor students. In October 1951, a delegation of poor high-school students who were expelled from school after their parents failed to pay their tuition fees, came to the municipality to ask for its support. Following this, the municipality started a tradition of supporting poor students at the high-school level only, as Jordan declared that elementary school would be free. Support for the students was determined by a statement from the headmaster confirming the parents' poverty and inability to pay tuition (CM 9/10/1951, pp.3–4, JMA 936-3).

This support built on a long legacy of Jerusalemites endowing education with high importance before the Nakba. The aforementioned students' delegation, as well as the increase of students in Jerusalem after 1948, support this argument. In 1956, the municipality urged the government to open more schools as the available classrooms were overcrowded and children had to 'study in two shifts' during the day (CM 11/9/1956, pp.4–5, JMA 936-9).

The wide range of charitable activities helped in upscaling the municipality's social standing and authority, yet its persistent financial crises limited its ability to sustain such activities. Throughout the years, it was forced to cease or limit its support in some areas (CM 12/8/1952, p.5, JMA 936-4; CM 2/10/1956, p.2, JMA 936-9). In other cases, such as improving the conditions of refugees and the poor, it had only a limited capacity to act over the long-term future.

The case of the ruined endangered buildings inside the Old City, where some refugees sought shelter, demonstrates the municipality's persistent inability to achieve its goal of developing the city through finding durable solutions for groups in need. In several cases, where the municipality had no money to repair or reconstruct destroyed buildings that it owned, it reached agreements with residents who had the means to rebuild them at their own expenses. In return, they would not have to pay rent for

several years (CM 3/6/1950, p.2, JMA 936-2). However, most of these buildings remained in ruins for the whole period of Jordanian rule.

Refugees and other urban poor found shelter in the debris of buildings that were damaged in the war or were abandoned by their residents in the Jewish Quarter inside the Old City (CM 6/4/1966, pp.5–6, JMA 938-7). This was renamed as the 'Munadilein/Mujahidin neighbourhood' (Election flier of the 'Jerusalem Municipality Coalition', p.11, JMA 935-17) and became the city's 'landmark' of the Nakba. In August 1949, a representative of the Red Cross, who visited the neighbourhood accompanied by Anton Safieh, reported on the health hazards caused by the lack of toilets and other conditions. He sent photos to the Red Cross headquarters in Lebanon, urging the organization to take action (*Falastin,* 5/8/1949).

The debris – which remained unchanged, mainly because there was no means of rebuilding – represented a 'natural' monument to the Nakba and its temporality. Throughout the years, the municipality took visiting politicians, religious clerks and journalists to the debris to remind them of the Nakba, and also to attempt to find a solution. For instance, in 1964, a journalist and a senior bishop from Canada were taken by the municipality staff to witness the miserable life of the refugees living there (CM 11/11/1964, p.2, JMA 938-4).

In 1966, when another 'Nakba' took place, these endangered houses were evoked – yet this time not only as a monument to the past. In the early hours of 11 March 1966, a flood hit Ma'an, a town located in south Jordan. Within three hours, the flood destroyed its houses, displaced over a thousand families, and killed over a hundred residents. *Falastin* newspaper referred to the disaster as 'the Nakba' (*Falastin,* 12/3/1966) (Figure 27). The scale of destruction prompted the Jordanian government to call for a national campaign for pre-emptory procedures to examine endangered buildings and demolish them in order to prevent similar disasters (CM 6/4/1966, pp.5–6, JMA 938-7).

Figure 27: 'With someone coming from the heart of the Nakba: I lived the disaster and saw it from the air' (under the photo of King Hussain)

(Source: Arabia Weather website; *Falastin*, 12/3/1966)

Following these instructions, the Jerusalem municipality appointed two engineers to prepare a list of such buildings in the city and to submit their recommendation to the council. On 26 March 1966, a Saturday morning, the engineers took a long tour:

> in the neighbourhoods of the Old City, in the Jewish neighbourhood … and we were horrified by what we saw of the residents' miserable conditions as they live in precarious houses with disgusting smells and in a suffocating darkness, exposed to dangers at any minute of possible collapse of one of the walls and the bad health conditions they live in. (CM 6/4/1966, pp.5–6, JMA 938-7)

The engineers provided a list of houses, some of which had to be evicted and demolished immediately. For the houses occupied by refugees, rather than poor residents, they suggested halting the demolition in the light of UNRWA's intention to move the refugees to a camp that it planned to established between Shu'fat and 'Anata (CM 14/10/1964, p.2, JMA 938-4).

Over the following months, a team from the municipality engineering department estimated the costs of the demolitions and considered potential alternative public spaces to be built in their former sites. On 4 January 1967, the municipal council discussed the report, which recommended the demolition of most endangered buildings and the expansion of 'the road leading from Bab al-Magharba to the King David square, called Omar al-Khatab street'. The report noted that 'moving the debris will make it possible to see [the area] in front of the Haram al-Sharif'. In two other locations, the committee recommended establishing a kindergarten and a public park to serve as a 'lung for the Old City', as well as a parking lot to help cater for huge tourist buses (CM 4/1/1967, p.8, JMA 938-9).

The committee's estimate of costs was about 200 thousand Jordanian dinars, which the municipality did not have. The council decided to contact the government to secure the funds. The city engineer proposed presenting the project to the Arab Engineers Committee, which was appointed to work on the Greater Jerusalem planning project and was supposed to come to Jerusalem at the end of June 1967 (CM 4/1/1967, p.8, JMA 938-9; Letter from the Jerusalem governor to the mayor, 3/6/1967, JMA 952-28). The committee never made it to Jerusalem, as Israel occupied the West Bank only weeks before its scheduled arrival.

Between 1948 and 1967, the buildings stood without being renovated. Eventually, the refugees were moved to camps. The story of the wrecked buildings, their location in the city's public space, their representation of the past, and the proposed future alternatives for their sites were all marks of the Nakba space-time. The matrix of colonial national and local pasts and futures created them as a margin in the public space, yet an integral part of the way the city narrated its past and its future.

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In the wake of the Nakba, the area of Jerusalem that remained for Palestinian residents was a complex landscape of continuities and interruptions. New social categories emerged, such as refugees; others were tested while the old social and political hegemony was affirmed and challenged. These social networks, patterns and groups were not self-evident; rather, they were institutionalized and defined by various players, including UNRWA, charities and mukhtars, the press, and the public. The municipality, a central player in these networks, resorted to past patterns and social capital to affirm its authority. Yet its own role as a refugee-institution persistently limited its authority.

The Right to the Past

Between May 1948 and the formal annexation of central Palestine's territories in April 1950, Jordan took gradual measures to incorporate the deprived Palestinian communities and their territories into the state. It offered Jordanian citizenship to the Palestinians, removed 'all travel and customs restrictions across the Jordan', and named 'three Palestinian ministries to the cabinet' (Robins, 2004, p.72). The measures aimed to create 'oppressive inevitability' (ibid) and facts on the ground by the force of law and bureaucracy (Katz, 2005, p.54).

Legal incorporation was essential to the achievement of the annexation. Thus, the military administration was replaced with a civilian one to remove any legal distinction between Jordan and the annexed Palestinian land (Massad, 2001, p.230). This meant incorporating the 'new' communities into a national 'shared time' and imposing a 'presentist temporality' through law (Esmeir, 2012, p.59) to affirm and legitimize Jordanian sovereignty. Accordingly, mandate Palestine's laws that were in force in the West Bank prior to the Jordanian annexation were not cancelled immediately. Yet, to affirm the *present* sovereign despite the validity of the mandate laws, King Abdallah assumed in December 1949 'all powers previously vested in the mandatory power in Palestine' (Robins, 2004, p.72).

This temporal and geographical annexation/unification/incorporation was grounded in Jordan's denial of the right of Palestinians to self-determination in their land after 1948 – a right that was rooted in the past and claimed over the past. Thus, as Joseph Massad

argues, the 'institution of law, as a repressive and ideological apparatus … is needed to guarantee control over time and temporality more generally – not only time as present and future but, just as importantly, time as *past*' (2001, p.19, emphasis added).

In the aftermath of the Nakba war, the communities that remained in central Palestine were subjugated to a form of 'lawfare', as the state resorted 'to legal instruments, to the violence inherent in the law, to commit acts of political coercion, even erasure' (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2007, p.144). In this sense, law became an elementary sphere in the dialectics of erasure and restoration of Palestine. It 'is not a mere repressive manifestation of the political, but it also plays a central productive, albeit regulatory, role: it produces and regulates identity' (Massad, 2001, p.18).

The Palestinian leadership was well aware of the quality of law as a fighting site for and against identity production under the mandate (Likhovski, 2006).[73] It was not the first time that Palestinians had negotiated coercive non-national citizenship and struggled for national identity. For instance, in the 1920s, 'Palestinian nationalists articulated the clear contradiction between liberal citizenship as legislated in the context of a democracy, and colonial citizenship enforced in Britain's overseas possessions' (Banko, 2016, p.57). Contestation over the law as a medium to affirm, produce and banish identity would only persist after 1948.

'Our Palestinian Laws'

Beginning in the early 1950s, as the annexation was not fully institutionalized, talks about unifying the legal systems in both banks were underway. In 1953, the government issued 'the law unifying the laws of both banks of the Hashemite

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[73] Assaf Likhovski's book *Law and Identity in Mandate Palestine* constitutes an important source on law and identity in Palestine. However, Likhovski founded his work on the need to 'undermine the colonizer/native dichotomy' and argued in his introduction that 'the story of law in Palestine cannot be told on the basis of a reductionist framework in which Jews and British worked in tandem as colonizers and the Arabs were merely passive and muted victim' (2006, p.7). Whereas the Arabs indeed were not 'passive and muted', Likhovski's approach fails to consider the way in which Palestinians considered their relation with the mandate and the Zionists as part of a colonial structure, or the ways in which the legal system of this structure deprived the Palestinians of their right to self-determination while facilitating the establishment of a nation-state of the settlers. His approach deploys to some extent a legal abstraction that ignores the political context in which the law is embedded, consequently producing the Palestinian natives as ahistorical and apolitical subjects of the law, and their conflict in and over Palestine as merely communal.

Jordanian Kingdom' (Massad, 2001, p.229). The decision to cancel Palestine's laws in the West Bank was contested by Palestinians, particularly lawyers and bureaucrats, who were immersed in a 'culture of legality' (Comaroff, 2001, p.311). They resisted passing acquiescently through the threshold of Jordanian jurisdiction and called for preserving aspects of the mandate jurisdiction as a way to signify a continuity with, and rootedness in, a familiar past, and to mark a cultural difference between themselves and the new administration.[74]

These attitudes constituted a form of strategic decision-making that was not unusual in the aftermath of regime change, colonial or otherwise, as Lauren Benton shows in her study of New-Mexico's encounter with Spanish colonization in the fifteenth century:

> Wherever one group imposed law on newly acquired territories and subordinate peoples, strategic decisions were made about the extent and nature of legal control. The strategies of rule varied from aggressive attempts to impose a legal system intact, to conscious efforts to retain existing institutions and limit legal change as a way of sustaining social order. Conquered and colonized groups sought, in turn, to respond to the imposition of law with strategies that included accommodation, advocacy within the system, subtle delegitimation, and outright rebellion. (2002, pp.2–3)

The boundaries of political and cultural difference that Palestinian lawyers sought to mark were based on their perception of the mandate legal system as more modern than that of Jordan. On 5 January 1950, the President of the Bar (based in Nablus) addressed the King on behalf of the Bar and lawyers, requesting the freezing of any process that would imply the cancellation of Palestinian laws and the application of the East Bank's law in the West Bank. The lawyers asked for a committee of legal experts to be consulted prior to the application of such a step. The committee should be composed of legal experts 'who are informed about the laws of the two banks and the sources of Islamic and European regulations, including Latin and Anglo-Saxon [laws]' to enable the state to 'enjoy under your Majesty legal reform that is in harmony with the highest legal development' (Hashemite Documents, 1995, p.452).

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[74] Such calls by Palestinians for preserving the previous legal order following colonial administrative changes took place before and after 1948 for different reasons. Following the British colonization of Palestine in 1917, lawyers demanded the preservation of Ottoman laws (Likhovski, 2006, p.186). Following the Israeli occupation in 1967, Palestinians in Jerusalem demanded the preservation of Jordanian law and lawyers boycotted Israeli courts (Bisharat, 1989, pp.145–149).

On 7 January 1950, a group of eight lawyers, mostly based in Jerusalem, issued an additional letter to the King with a direct reference from al-Quran:

> The cancellation of the Palestinian laws without consulting legal experts and considering the opinion of knowledgeable people and notables in Palestine, contrasts with the principles of justice and violates Allah's saying 'and whose affair is [determined by] consultation among themselves'. We demand to continue the application of *our* Palestinian Laws. (ibid, p.453, emphasis added)

In these demands, lawyers appropriated some Palestinian laws, albeit colonial, as a form of continuity with the forms of knowledge and world-views of a familiar past. It could also be argued that this appropriation constituted part of the negotiations of the old community to determine its normative world under the new administration.

It was not only the legal text itself that they demanded be preserved but also the law in practice and administrative traditions that were followed during the mandate. One such tradition concerned the approval of municipality budgets, which was a source of crisis between the Jordanian government and the West Bank municipalities.

According to the mandate Municipalities Ordinance, the central government had to approve municipal budgets. In 1952, Jerusalem's district governor and the Minister of Interior amended Jerusalem's proposed budget without referring to the municipality. The municipal council's members replied as follows:

> Article 77 of the Municipalities Ordinance of 1934 states that the Higher Commissioner has the authority to amend or reject any article in the budget *after* he takes into consideration the opinion of the council. The precedents that followed the enactment of the aforementioned Municipalities Ordinance interpreted this article since it *never* happened before that the Higher Commissioner at any time amended or rejected any article of the budget without referring [first] to the council to comment on what he wanted to amend or reject of the articles. As such, with all due respect, the council sees that the Minister of Interior did not consider the council's opinion in regard to neither the amended nor the rejected articles. (CM 11/7/1952, p.1, JMA 936-4, emphasis added)

It should be noted, however, that the Peel report criticized the mandate local governance system and considered the law to be undeveloped and rigid. Palestinian lawyers and bureaucrats, including Anton 'Atallah and Hussein al-Khalidi, had also criticized mandate laws and their application – for instance, in their testimonies before the Fitzgerald Commission in 1945, as discussed in chapter 4. They were well aware of, and articulate against, the colonial foundations of the mandate laws and their

connection to the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine (Nakkara, 2011, p.86; Likhovski, 2006, p.186).

These debates and the history of the mandate laws, in this case the Municipalities Ordinance, were not absent from debates among Palestinians after 1948 concerning their demands to preserve Palestinian laws under Jordan. The demands to apply mandate laws did not mean applying them without any critique or challenge.

On 25 November 1950, *Falastin* published an op-ed by the Jerusalemite advocate Ahmad Zaki al-Austa, entitled 'The Laws in the Two Banks of the Jordan and Delving in Applying the English Laws'.[75] Al-Austa – like many other Palestinian lawyers who had received their legal education in Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo or London, or under the mandate-established legal education system in Jerusalem[76] – was active in the Palestinians' national protest against the mandate's objectives of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine.[77] For these figures, law was a site for developing political awareness and articulating national arguments.

Al-Austa, who had previously published articles calling for the preservation of Palestinian laws, warned in his op-ed that a literal application of mandate laws would not achieve the goals of those laws but would, rather, render the Palestinians 'like the crow that while imitating the bobwhite's walk, forgot its own'.[78] He conveyed the common argument among his colleagues that the laws represent modernity, progress and development, but should be balanced and applied 'in harmony with the social norms and habits of the [Jordanian] kingdom's residents and in accordance with the economic and commercial situation, and [should] comply with national consciousness and political circumstances' (*Falastin*, 25/11/1950).

Al-Austa particularly criticized how Palestinian courts in the West Bank interpreted and applied mandate laws. Lawyers argued and judges ruled based on mandate

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[75] Al-Austa referred to these laws in the text as Palestinian laws.

[76] This was called the Jerusalem Law Classes and was established in 1920 by Norman Bentwich, the attorney general of Palestine at the time (Likhovski, 2006, pp.110–111).

[77] Al-Austa was a Palestinian lawyer who criticized mandate policies and was one of the Arab lawyers who protested the High Commissioner in 1929 (Abd al-Hadi et al., 1929, Institute of Palestine Studies website).

[78] A well-known Arabic idiom about imitation.

decisions and, at times, against Jordanian rules that took into consideration the circumstances following 'the catastrophe of Palestine and the judicial problems it caused'. Al-Austa criticized such a 'blind' application of the mandate court's rulings, arguing that they failed to consider the colonial history of the mandate courts and their interpretation of laws in accordance with 'Jewish interests based on the political situation that existed in Palestine at the time and according to arguments of Jewish lawyers' (ibid).

The Municipalities Law as a Stage of History

It is within these debates and an active culture of legality that the Jerusalem municipality, and other West Bank municipalities, had to fight for local authority under Jordanian rule. The Jerusalem municipality maintained an established bureaucratic system, as reflected in its resumption of by-laws during the chaotic months following the fall of the New City. Legality was further reflected in the institutional life of the municipality through its internal procedures, bidding process, minute taking, employee appointments, and legal cases.

Upon his appointment of the first council in November 1948, military commander Abdallah al-Tal ordered the council to 'carry out the functions of the municipality in accordance with the Municipalities Ordinance of 1934'. He assumed all duties that the law granted to the district governor (Mayor's memorandum, 24/4/1965, p.9). This situation did not change after the unification of the banks in April 1950, as the mandate Municipalities Ordinance remained the legal frame that regulated local governance in the West Bank until 1955.

To affirm Jordanian sovereignty as part of its gradual annexation measurements, on 1 March 1950, the government amended the Municipalities Ordinance of 1934, substituting the phrase 'The Government of Palestine' with 'The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan'. It also replaced the High Commissioner with the Minister of Interior and the District Commissioner with the District Governor (ibid, p.10).

Yet more substantive changes to the law were to be introduced in the following year, at least according to the 'prevailing rumour' at the time.[79] On 3 January 1952, the Jerusalem municipality discussed rumours concerning the government's intention to amend the Municipalities Law. Accordingly, the municipality decided to draw the government's attention to the need to consider its opinion before unifying the Municipalities Law (CM 3/1/1952, p.5, JMA 936-4).

The Municipalities Law that would be applied in the two banks became the main arena of contestation between the municipality and the central government, as the former was excluded or marginalized from the law-making process. For the municipality, participating in law-making reflected part of being a modern institution, engaged in progressive legal world-views and traditions. However, throughout the whole Jordanian period, not only participation in law-making but also knowledge of the law – both pillars of modern legal systems – were constantly neglected by the central government.

On several occasions and at different stages of Jordanian rule, the Jerusalem municipality was not informed of legal amendments or changes. At times, this led the municipality to apply invalid rules that affected its authority and caused public chaos. The problem was represented by the recurrent failure on the part of the government publisher to supply copies of the Gazette to the municipality. This led several Jerusalem mayors to complain, though without much success. Only a week before the Israeli occupation of the city, on 27 May 1967, al-Khatib complained to the gazette authority that although the municipality had paid for its subscription until December 1967, the Municipal Court had not received any issue of the gazette since December 1966 (Letter from al-Khatib to the officer of the Gazette, 27/5/1967, JMA 943-4).

Knowing the law was thus the first step to fulfilling the municipality's right to participate in law-making. Likhovski argues that dialects of law and identity act not only through the content of the legal norm but also through the process of norm creation. Law-making and legal knowledge both reflect an image of their subjects and

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[79] 'Rumours' were a common theme in the municipality minutes. They seemed to cross the Jordan river between the two banks through local newspapers and other channels, constituting a primary source for the local institution to learn about what was taking place in the capital, Amman – including concerning laws and legal affairs.

makers alike. 'Law, therefore, is partly a stage, a place where the norm creators tell their audience and themselves "a story … about themselves"' (2006, p.3).

Rumours, local newspapers and correspondence between the municipality and the central government continued to deliver uncertain news about the unification of the Municipalities Law. Throughout 1952, the municipality discussed ways to get involved before the law's enactment, such as establishing a committee within the council to give recommendations on the proposed bill.[80]

Accordingly, in October 1952, the municipality pleaded with the district governor for a copy of the bill so that it could prepare recommendations for the committee that the Minister of Interior intended to establish concerning the Municipalities Law (CM 28/10/1952, p.6, JMA 936-4). This was followed by a reminder two months later, hoping that the governor 'considers the request with appreciation and affection' (CM 23/12/1952, p.1, JMA 936-4). In January 1953, the municipality finally received the bill and referred it to the municipal legal subcommittee for its recommendations (CM 27/1/1953, p.9, JMA 936-5).

This encounter reflected how the Jerusalem municipal council perceived its exclusion from the law-making process and consequently from articulating its institutional knowledge through the Municipalities Law. Having only a limited ability to create the law, the municipality sought to tell its own story of the law by other means. It subjugated the law to a historical enquiry and situated it within a narrative that is independent of its creator. In other words, it was the history of the law, not the law itself, that became the stage for the municipality to articulate itself.

On 4 April 1967, Ruhi al-Khatib delivered a lecture in his capacity as the mayor of Jerusalem to student members of the Statesman Club at Birzeit College.[81] The lecture was titled 'The Municipalities Law and Its Relation to the Government'. Although neither a lawyer nor a historian, al-Khatib chose in his lecture to historically contextualize the legislation of the Municipalities Law, as well as its defects and its

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[80] In the meeting of the municipal council on 14 October 1952, council member Ruhi al-Khatib mentioned that he had read in local newspapers about the government's preparation of a new Municipalities Law that would soon be presented before the Parliament (p.9, JMA 936-4).

[81] Birzeit became a university in 1975.

potential for development. Through this contextualization, he created a space for the story of the municipality concerning the law and its relationship with the government (JMA 945-6 (hereafter, Birzeit lecture, 4/4/1967)).

Al-Khatib tended in his speeches as mayor to locate the municipality and its administration within a broad historical context. For instance, in a 32-page memorandum entitled 'Jerusalem Municipal Authority as a Local Government', al-Khatib presented a detailed legal and administrative history of the municipality prior to and during 'the Ottomans, the British mandate, after the partition (15 May – December 1948), and finally under the Arab regime'. Al-Khatib referenced al-'Arif's accounts on the history of Jerusalem. However, most of the historical documentation showed a profound first-hand knowledge of the institution and its legal apparatus. This document not only reflected on the past, but also ended with proposals and aspirations for the future (Mayor's memorandum, 24/4/1965).[82]

This overview, particularly its periodization, located the Jordanian Municipalities Law within a historical context that extended beyond the present of the law and its creators. The description of Jordanian rule as the 'Arab regime' arguably served to exceed the narrow Jordanian national frame by placing the city within a regional Arab frame. In sum, the law's persistent claim for coherence and permanence was interrupted by the temporal orientation of the municipality, which was determined by contextuality and the municipality's historical narration of the law as a stage to tell its story.

The Municipalities' Struggle for Local Authority

The attempts by Jerusalem and other West Bank municipalities to participate in the legislation of the Municipalities Law intensified throughout the years, leading to its final enactment in 1955. As the articles of the bill became clearer, mayors and members of the public expressed their concerns about the law since it deprived the municipalities of crucial authority (*al-Difa',* 30/3/1954). The bill prevented the municipalities from intervening in political affairs (Birzeit Lecture, 4/4/1967, p.3),

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[82] The archive's documentation does not indicate the objective behind this memorandum. However, Naseer Aruri, who interviewed al-Khatib for his book, referred to a memorandum that presented similar information that al-Khatib submitted around the same time to the Seminar on Local Government of Mediterranean Countries (American University of Beirut, 10–15 May 1965) (Aruri, 1972, p.41, fn 26).

authorized the government to appoint the mayor – who did not have to be one of the elected members and could be entirely external – and authorized the Council of Ministers to request the resignation of elected mayors (Aruri, 1972, p.114).

However, the most acute articles of the bill concerned the cancellation of the municipalities' authority to impose taxes, fees or fines on any person based on by-laws, even though the municipalities depended to a large extent after the Nakba on the revenues collected through municipal taxes (CM 4/4/1954, p.2, JMA 936-6). The amendments of this article undermined the municipalities' executive authority and deprived them of their local independent source of income.

In response, the municipalities decided to join forces (CM 30/3/1954, p.5, JMA 936-6). On 3 April 1954, West Bank mayors met in Nablus to review the articles of the bill and articulated a sound critique against it, as 'the Parliament had made fundamental amendments that endangered the entity [kayan] of municipalities at heart and eliminated the objectives expected from them' (CM 4/4/1954, JMA 936-6).

The municipalities insisted on their right to administer their localities and to be endowed with more authority and independence to manage their own affairs, such as the authority to collect municipal taxes, instead of the government doing so, and to set tax rates according to their knowledge and familiarity with their localities. The proposed bill, the mayors persistently argued, would challenge the functioning of their municipalities and the development of their localities (ibid, pp.3–4).

Despite these protests, the Municipalities Law was enacted by the Parliament on 1 May 1955. In his Birzeit lecture in 1967, al-Khatib presented a comprehensive critique of the law and its long-term effects, which could be felt even over a decade after its legislation:

> It is the government that has enacted the law and approves regulations proposed by municipalities according to the law. It is the government that oversees municipal elections and, if necessary, dissolves municipal councils, appoints mayors and dismisses them when necessary. The government approves or declines municipal budgets, including appointing employees according to municipal council decisions. And the government has the right to approve or decline municipalities' projects in accordance with financial regulations. No municipal council can contract any project or purchase any item if it costs more than 100 Jordanian dinars without the consent of the governor or the city's mutasrif or his deputy, and the municipalities are not entitled to commit to any

> project or purchase items exceeding 5,000 Jordanian dinars without the approval of the Minister of Interior for Municipal and Rural Affairs. (Birzeit lecture, 4/4/1967, p.8)

From a historical perspective, the Municipalities Law should be read within the legislative environment of its time. It was enacted during the regime of the conservative Prime Minister Tawfik Abul-Huda, who came to power in mid-1954. Abul-Huda held his position for only one year, through which he pushed for the legislation of several laws that 'subverted the constitution and reversed the liberal measures' adopted by his predecessor (al-Jarbawi, 1991, p.61; Aruri, 1972, p.113).[83]

The joint attempts to change the law continued after its enactment. Jerusalem became a focal point and took the lead in organizing protests by the municipalities of the two banks. In December 1955, the mayors of Nablus, Hebron, Tulkarim, Jenin, Ramallah, Al-Bireh, Beit Jala and Beit Sahour attended a meeting together. The mayors repeated their critique, particularly concerning their authority to collect taxes and fees, and requested the amendment of local election procedures (Minutes of the meeting of the West Bank mayors in Jerusalem, 4/12/1955, JMA 944-22). At this point, some East Bank municipalities that were also affected by the law asked to join the protests (Letter from the mayor of al-Shouneh al-Shamalieh to the mayor of Jerusalem, 6/12/1955, JMA 944-22).

With the financial year 1956/57 coming to a close, the municipalities needed to prepare new budgets for the subsequent year. But, given the undermining of their authority to collect taxes, they could not determine their budgets. In February 1956, the municipalities demanded, again, that the government reinstate their authority to collect taxes and fees, especially in public markets (Letter from the mayors of Amman, Jerusalem, Tulkarim and Nablus to the Minister of Interior, 5/2/1956, JMA 944-22). In March 1956, the Parliament amended the law and reinstated the municipalities' authority to collect fees for their services – but only in relation to a limited list of services (Amendment No. 16 of Municipalities Law, 21/3/1956, JMA 944-22).

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[83] Other legislation included the 1955 Press Law, the Political Parties Law, and the Law of Preaching in the Mosques.

The negotiations over the Municipalities Law persisted. Along the way, the government showed some interest in amending the law and ensuring a wider, more inclusive and more democratic benefit for the public good. The attempts to change the law continued well into the 1960s.[84] Mayors continued to meet and to issue their proposed amendments to Amman, which dealt with them with delay.

By 1961, eleven amendments to the law were made. After the bill became so burdened with amendments that it was difficult for judges and officials to refer to it and its articles, the Prime Minister asked for a new bill to be prepared (CM 17/10/1961, p.7, JMA 937-4). When the new bill was drafted in 1964, the mayors suggested only minor amendments. Most distinguished was the article that allowed women to vote in municipal elections (CM 20/5/1964, p.6, JMA 938-3). In total, the new bill was perceived as marking a progressive and more democratic future for local governance under Jordanian rule:

> This law and its branches are all subject to the amendment and to the expansion of the powers of the municipal councils according to the development of responsibilities between us. We hope that women will participate in elections, council membership and the presidency. The powers of the municipal councils will increase, as required by proper democracy, as is the case in many Western and some Eastern countries as well. (Birzeit lecture, 4/4/1967, p.8)

However, the government did not act swiftly to enact the new law. In 1965, in a speech before representatives of the government, al-Khatib said 'we beg the ministry to release the law from its detention' (Speech in honour of Prime Minister Sa'id Wasfi al-Tal, 29/10/1965, p.2, JMA 945-6). Yet in June 1967, the new Municipalities Law still had not been introduced. Overall, this struggle and the negotiations over the law showed the extent to which the boundaries between the past and the present of the city's administration were neither neat nor fixed.

Labouring the Past

In tracing the past as a right, there may be no better evidentiary path to follow than that of the municipality's workforce. For those workers, the past was impossible to

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[84] The file 'Amendment of Municipalities Law' (JMA 944-22) includes documents up to 1960. However, the memorandum of Ruhi al-Khatib stated that 'Many amendments were introduced to that Ordinance [the Municipalities Ordinance 1955], and therefore it has become necessary to prepare a new ordinance altogether and same is under study now' (Mayor's memorandum, 24/4/1965, p.10).

delineate as a clear-cut distinction between *then* and *now*. Time flow and continuity were materialized through corporal labour, even when the municipality ceased to exist or when its workers were dismissed due to the financial crisis. This continuity was derived from their positions not only as labourers but also as residents of the city, family members and breadwinners who had to continue carrying out daily tasks and meeting living needs after 1948.

The institutional time of the municipality intersected with the collective and private time of the workers, but they did not overlap. In fact, the workers constantly referred to their efforts in the first weeks after the fall of the New City as the means that provided institutional continuity in the first place. Their performance from May to November 1948, as discussed in chapter 4, together with their deployment of protest tools such as strikes, only demonstrate how their experience of being-in-time diverged from that of the institution, which ceased to exist between May and November 1948 – at least in material terms. The argument of becoming the body of the municipality when it actually lost its material existence was at the heart of the workers' claims for the right to the past.

The workforce of the municipality in 1948 was composed of Palestinian administrative employees and manual workers of the mandate municipality who remained in the city. Many of them had served in the Ottoman, the mandate, the Jordanian and the Israeli municipalities. For instance, Yusif Abu Ku', a sewerage department worker, joined the municipality in 1914 as a day worker, became a monthly worker in 1942, and retired in 1955. Yusif did not have a service certificate to prove his start date when the Arab municipality had to determine his pension, so other old employees who 'kn[ew] him very well' testified to that effect (CM 6/8/1957, p.2, JMA 936-11).

When the municipality officially resumed its work under Jordanian rule in November 1948, it could not absorb all workers or meet their labour rights according to the mandate laws. Yet, since the workers shared the belief that their employment was never terminated, they demanded that the municipality meet its obligations towards them (Letter from the Palestine Arab Workers Society to the mayor of Jerusalem, titled ''Ain-Fara workers', 26/28/1949, JMA 950-2).

In this sense, similar to the municipality itself, the workers asked to reiterate the past and preserve it in the present. They demanded that their work experience and their rights to pensions, holidays and salary rises be accumulated and calculated based on the mandate labour laws. They considered their working conditions, especially salary scales, to have been better under the mandate laws – yet not without being critical and resentful of the 'era of the hateful mandate' (ibid).

The municipal council supported the workers' past rights from the early weeks after May 1948. The discourse that Safieh presented to the Jordanian government, since at least July 1948, in relation to the workers' right of the past was consistent throughout the whole Jordanian period. The municipality not only acknowledged the workers' *right to* the past, but also took responsibility *over* the past. The municipality thus supported the workers and tried to manage the crisis of their situation without compromising their rights.

The government initially rejected the past altogether and sought to set anew the temporal legal frames of labour rights. Since the government had authority to approve or dismiss municipal budgets, it constantly interfered by changing or cancelling budget items related to workers and requesting to dismiss as many of them as possible.[85] Most workers were employed in the sanitation and water department, which provided important services to residents. Therefore, the municipality refused the government's solution of dismissing as many workers as possible, as that would have limited municipal services at a time when it was seeking to expand its municipal boundaries (CM 29/1/1952, p.1, JMA 936-4).

The government also interfered by demoting ranks of workers in order to save money. In 1952, the municipal council contested such interference and argued that the workers had reached their ranks after *many* years of work: 'these are acquired rights which they obtained under the law and by their continuous work' (CM 11/7/1952, p.1, JMA 936-4). In subsequent meetings, the minister told the municipal council members that 'this

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
[85] This crisis began with the first municipal council discussed in the previous chapter, which led all its members to resign. Al-'Arif was then appointed as head of the municipal committee to solve the problem.

is your city and those are your workers'. Yet rejecting the past rights of the workers remained the government's policy.

A decade-long negotiation proposed several compromises over how to manage the past. Some proposals suggested that workers who continued to work after 15 May 1948, would be paid retirement fees in accordance with their salary for the years they worked up until 1948. Their labour after that date would be considered *new* work, for which they would be paid regular salaries in accordance with the Jordanian law. However, in 1957, a representative of the Minister of Interior pointed out that such an arrangement did not make sense, since a worker could not also, at the same time, be a retiree (CM 22/10/1957, p.4, JMA 936-11).

At the end of December 1963, the municipality received a response from the government to a list of its demands in relation to fulfilling workers' rights. As for the obligation to pay family allowance as part of salaries, the municipality was reminded that it had not followed the Ministry of Interior's recommendation to reduce the number of workers – following the Arab idiom 'extend your legs as much as your bed allows'. In response, the municipality stated that the number of workers was at the minimum necessary for the services that the municipality provided (CM 31/12/1963, JMA 938-2).

From their side, the workers insisted on their right to the past and to employment, given their sacrifice during the war in which some had died while on duty. In response to the government's position, the workers argued that their demands should be seen as 'rights not alms' (*Falastin*, 6/8/1949) (Figure 28). They particularly emphasized their need for care, as they were suffering from poverty, illness and hunger due to being either unemployed or employed under bad conditions (Letter from the Palestine Arab Workers Society/Jerusalem Workers Council to the mayor of Jerusalem, titled 'Dear the honourable mayor of Jerusalem', 27/3/1949, p.2, JMA 950-2 (hereafter, Letter titled 'Dear the honourable mayor of Jerusalem', 27/3/1949)).

Figure 28: '⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛⬛ workers demand rights not alms!'

(Source: *Falastin,* 6/8/1949)

The municipality workers were organized from the early weeks after the fall of the New City. The Palestine Arab Workers Society,[86] which was involved in their organization, addressed the municipality on 20 March 1949 and asked for a meeting to discuss their issues (Letter from the Palestine Arab Workers Society to the mayor of Jerusalem, 20/3/1949, JMA 950-2) (Figure 29).

Figure 29: Letter from the Palestine Arab Workers Society to the mayor of Jerusalem

(Source: JMA 950-2)

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[86] The Society was established in Haifa in 1925. One mark of continuity was that it continued to use letterhead showing Haifa as its headquarters, even after the fall of the city in April 1948.

The Society claimed continuity with the past based on 'formal agreements between the society, the municipalities and official government departments during the time of the departing government' (Letter titled 'Dear the honourable mayor of Jerusalem', 27/3/1949, p.1). A week later, the municipal workers formed a committee that became the local union of municipal workers and their official mouthpiece, in accordance with the Palestine Arab Workers Society Act (Letter from the Palestine Arab Workers Society to the mayor of Jerusalem, titled 'Union to represent the municipality workers', 27/3/1949, JMA 950-2).

In the early years after the Nakba, the Society focused on resuming basic labour rights such as sick leave, holidays and limited working hours per day (Letter titled 'Dear the honourable mayor of Jerusalem', 27/3/1949, p.1). In 1950, it also demanded the resumption of wages according to mandate salary scales (Letter from the Palestine Arab Workers Society to the mayor of Jerusalem, titled 'Late workers' salaries', 15/1/1950, JMA 950-2), since the workers at the time were receiving only 8 pounds per month – meaning that without support from the Red Cross and charity institutions they could not secure essential needs. The negotiations led to partial success as the municipality agreed to release 50 percent of the delayed salaries in January 1950 (CM 18/1/1950, pp.2–3, JMA 936-2).

However, the overall conditions – especially salaries – were not adequate for the workers and they constantly threatened to strike. The Society acted as a mediator between them and the municipality, which encountered many obstacles in solving the workers' situation (Letter from the Palestine Arab Workers Society/Jerusalem Workers Council to the mayor of Jerusalem, 31/5/1949, JMA 950-2). Although the municipality supported the workers in their negotiations with the government, the power relations of the municipality as the employer determined how the workers and the Society perceived it in the first place.

The manifestation of these power relations was reflected in demands that were at the municipality's discretion, such as providing insurance for workers to cover permanent disabilities and diseases caused by their employment, especially after donkeys were replaced with cars; supplying new boots for workers instead of old ones that were of poor quality; paying holiday and public holiday allowances to daily workers; making working hours continuous; and supplying a bell to those working in garbage

collection. The municipality approved some of these demands and rejected others (CM 7/11/1962, pp.8–9, JMA 937-6; CM 23/1/1963, pp.3–4, JMA 938-1).

<div align="center">∗∗∗</div>

Law is not merely a text, but rather an archive of its making. It preserves familiar worlds and imposes alien ones. It is also a central stage to articulate history and formulate identity. The struggle of the municipality and its workers is constitutive in realizing the temporal orientation of the institution. The interplay between past, present and future was the main realm for the institution and its workforce to contest their incorporation in the system as ahistorical agents. They thus insisted on their right to the past.

Conclusion

This chapter portrayed features of the past in Jerusalem after the Nakba as a multilayered complex network of times, norms, infrastructures, institutions and people. Any perception of a clear-cut break between life before and after the Nakba was hardly true on the ground. The city retrieved its social and administrative skills to rebuild, recover and maintain modern normativity. Yet the conditions that the Nakba produced were not easy to overcome, perceive or accept. These contradictions created some of the aspects of space-time of the Arab City that were mainly responding to and engaging with the past of the city. Without claiming a clear delineation between the past and the future, the next chapter turns to enquiring into how the city imagined and produced its futurity.

Chapter 7

Imagining and Making Futures in Arab Jerusalem

> The Nakba caused the loss of the Arab part of Jerusalem and most of its public services, reduced the number of its inhabitants to approximately 33,000 people, [and] deprived it of commercial areas, hotels and public markets. Over the past 15 years, officials and [ordinary] people had to *compensate for* what was lost, they *set up* a new commercial centre outside the walls, and *encouraged* tourists' movements by opening the Jerusalem Airport and *preparing* several hotels, as well as airlines and tourism companies, and *created* electricity, water and public markets. And the Jerusalem municipality … had its share of *providing* cleanliness, water, roads, sewerage, sidewalks, bus stops, a vegetable market, street lighting and other services, within its limited financial possibilities. (CM 29/4/1964, p.4, JMA 938-3, emphasis added)

To compensate for, to set up, to encourage, to prepare, to create, to provide – all these verbs reflect the process of producing Arab Jerusalem after the city's partition in 1948. They all articulate a movement in time, a transformation towards a future. To emerge from the Nakba, and from the urban emergency it inflicted, the city had to reproduce itself. This ascribed the making of the city with what AbdouMaliq Simone describes as 'the double-edged experience' of emergency. The production of city-space in the shadow of such catastrophic loss reflects 'a process of things in the making, of the emergence of new thinking and practice still unstable, still tentative' (Simone, 2004a, pp.4–5).

Material and discursive production was at stake in this process. In (re)producing its locality, Arab Jerusalem was creating its context through each neighbourhood that it was developing (Appadurai, 1996, p.186), while gradually giving birth to a recovered centre – and centres are never only material (Lefebvre, 2014). Various elements of political and 'social power and of the different scales of organization and control within which particular spaces (and places) are embedded' (Appadurai, 1996, p.186), determined the modes and relations of production of Arab Jerusalem.

The most distinguished feature in the production of Arab Jerusalem, unlike during the mandate period, was the involvement, proactivity and dynamism of Palestinian ahali and their deployment of local knowledge. This local knowledge is the 'knowledge of

how to produce and reproduce locality under conditions of anxiety and entropy, social wear and flux … Local knowledge is substantially about producing reliably local subjects as well as about producing reliably local neighbourhoods within which such subjects can be recognized and organized' (ibid, p.181).

Imagining the future was elementary for the kind of urban agency that (re-)emerged after 1948, and vice versa, as 'agentic processes give shape and direction to *future* possibilities'. In this sense, an 'imaginative engagement of the future is also a crucial component of the effort of human actors' (Emirbayer and Mische, 2002, p.984). Accordingly, imagining a future that determines this form of production is not merely a matter of irrational or romanticized imaginary production. At its core is the 'understanding [of] the limited and yet flexible structure of future possibilities [which] involves the work of identifying patterns of possible developments in an often vague and indeterminate future horizon' (ibid, p.989).

Palestinian imagining of the future has been mostly associated with the nation-state, a general idea of sovereignty that would eventually be realised. Futurity in Arab Jerusalem also revolved around the idea of the state and unification with the city's other part. Simultaneously, it drew a future that had local particular features and 'patterns of possible developments' (ibid). How was the future imagined, facilitated and materialized in Arab Jerusalem? How did it contribute to the conceptualization of a particular *Arab* city?

The primary point of departure in perceiving the city's production of locality and imagining the future is that it was taking place under the authority of the disaster, as the latter 'takes care of everything' (Blanchot, 1995). The city was living an everyday life with a 'quality of something recovered' and in a 'temporality of second chances' (Das, 2006, p.101); yet the Nakba was always present, physically and discursively. Arab Jerusalem was a place that came together as 'a conjunction of many histories and many spaces' (Massey, 1995, p.191).

The concept of *development* that stands at the heart of the projects introduced in this chapter would, therefore, be misleading if only read as part of thinking forward. Since 'even when a certain degree of amelioration, rationalization, or "development" takes place, this double-edged experience of emergency sets in motion a specific way of

seeing, of envisioning the environment that will inform how people, things, places, and infrastructure will be used' (Simone, 2004a, p.5). This is why the chapter ends at the Mandelbaum Gate, after making a full journey in the space-time of the city.

This chapter is divided into five sections, with each examining a different mode of producing the city and leading it into the future. The first section, Developing Arab Jerusalem: The Infrastructure of the Future, discusses developmental projects – primarily those related to infrastructure. It demonstrates how the city sought to create a space of local independence and development. The second section, Local Flows in Arab Jerusalem, discusses the process of resuming water and electricity in Jerusalem after the Nakba. It engages with how local identity was challenged and affirmed through reviving essential infrastructure. The third section, Producing Centrality in Arab Jerusalem, takes us to the city's streets, on a journey in time to witness some flashes of making the commercial centre of Arab Jerusalem. The fourth section, Negotiating Public Use in Arab Jerusalem, shifts the focus from the centre to the margins as it traces how marginalized social groups and their economies were regulated in the city space. It presents the city as a space for negotiations and struggles over basic needs and public use. Finally, the fifth section, Tourism in Partitioned Jerusalem: Imagining the Arab City and Beyond, opens time, space and the imagination as we track the movement of tourists and airplanes across a map of connectivity that situated Jerusalem beyond its local context. Through this very openness, we are reminded that not all destinations were free, as the western side was blocked and the road ended at the Mandelbaum Gate.

Developing Arab Jerusalem: The Infrastructure of the Future

In a radio interview in June 1958, the municipality turned to the city's residents and articulated its 'aspirations for the future':

> The municipality has high aspirations for the future, which aim at planning and developing the city, *connecting* the immortal glorious past with the smiling hopeful future under the Arab Hashemite throne. (Radio broadcast, 'Aspirations of the Municipality for the Future', transcribed by Ruhi al-Khatib, 23/6/1958, JMA 944-24, emphasis added)

The optimism that these words convey is striking. A decade after the Nakba seems to us today too short a distance from the catastrophe to be able to think of a future, let alone be optimistic about one. It is also inconceivable to think of the past as glorious. Yet the optimism that development generated in the morale of the municipality's representatives was not new in Palestine.

In his study of Palestine during the mandate era, Jacob Norris describes how the country was perceived in the colonial imagination as a land of progress 'which witnessed a frenzy of developmental planning as well as a great deal of optimism towards the country's imperial future' (Norris, 2013, p.2).

Although this optimism was primarily an articulation of the colonial government, local Palestinian residents, particularly the local merchant classes, had also developed 'local enthusiasm' and a 'belief in the infrastructural development and the exploitation of nature for economic profit' (ibid, p.22) – a belief that was linked to 'an intellectual fascination with historical progress' (ibid, p.19).

These approaches to development were a product not exclusively of the mandate era but also of the late Ottoman period, as Norris shows with the example of the Palestine Chamber of Commerce's response to delays in Jerusalem's water scheme in 1909. The response stated that the situation was 'detrimental to the economic development of the country and by its nature will hold back our political emancipation and intellectual regeneration' (ibid, p.22).

Local enthusiasm towards development was coupled with the economic thought developed by Palestinian men of capital in the mid-1930s. These men perceived in individual accumulation a benefit for the public good and national prosperity (Seikaly, 2016, pp.34, 124). Their aim was 'to preserve with "energy and vigor" so [as] to restore the country's wellness' (ibid, p.124).

Nevertheless, the mandate government's colonial aims in the developmental schemes in Palestine, along with its commitment to the establishment of a Jewish national home, rejected Arab industrial and developmental enterprise and preferred to rely on Zionist enterprise instead (Norris, 2013, p.23). Furthermore, the settler-colonial structure of the mandate and the Zionist movement in Palestine eliminated any

possibility for Palestinians to become 'developmental subjects' (Seikaly, 2016, p.3). As discussed in chapter 4, the mandate government's perception of Tel Aviv as exclusively endowed with the social spirit to develop reflected this exclusionary colonial development ideology towards the native Palestinians on the local level.

In the aftermath of the Nakba, Jerusalem's infrastructure had to be rebuilt and many other areas had to be developed in order to respond to the drastic changes in population and urban space. Although these developmental projects were primarily an immediate response to basic needs and services, they also involved long-term plans. While the projects represented a survival mode that was shared by many Palestinian localities, especially those of the refugees, the urge to develop was also a way to fulfil the developmental subjectivity that Palestinians were denied during the mandate era, albeit on a much narrower scale.

Despite having colonial traces, the enthusiasm of the Palestinian local demos, al-ahali, in developing their localities after the Nakba should not be thought of as merely a linear strand of development that transferred from the mandate and endured the Nakba. Instead, it should be perceived within the context created by the Nakba as an aspiration to create a public space and develop its infrastructure within a temporality of 'second chances' (Das, 2006) and to create 'a landscape of recovery' (Arif, 2009) in Palestine, particularly partitioned Jerusalem. In many ways, the creation of Arab Jerusalem was conditional on the ability to imagine the future beyond the ruins of the past, through developmental lenses. Clearly, political, economic and natural obstacles set the lines for the fulfilment of many of the aspired projects.

Furthermore, society was not only on the receiving end of development. The negotiations of the city's residents, visitors and tourists in the public space influenced the developmental imagination of the municipality. The public's engagement was not limited to action, but also involved temporal categories such as waiting,[87] being patient, and maintaining hope. The patience of the 'sabereen' residents, as al-Khatib referred to them, constituted what Arjun Appadurai describes as 'a crucial normative guarantee against the ever present risk' (2002, p.30). The 'politics of patience' and

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[87] Waiting is also a technology used for subversion, oppression and subjugation by political power (Peteet, 2018; Joronen, 2017; Auyero, 2011).

hope gave a political meaning to the processes of recovery through development projects.

Imagining and Developing Jerusalem

In another speech broadcast in 1958, the municipality narrated the story of developing the city during the first decade after the Nakba:

> At the outset, the municipality had to work hard to establish the necessary projects to improve the city, provide work for labourers, and raise the standard of health. It had to pave the way for *local capital* to be invested in useful projects, [in order] to provide employment to the population and attract tourists to visit holy places. Therefore, it worked first of all on the establishment of a commercial zone outside the Old City and paved its roads and set up the sewerage system. (Transcribed by Fayiz al-Husseini, 23/6/1958, JMA 944-24 (hereafter, Radio broadcast transcribed by Fayiz al-Husseini, 23/6/1958), emphasis added)

This narration articulated the emergence of local urban identity and the production of city space. As the city's developmental goal sought to connect the past with the future, this 'narrative thread' dismissed the depiction of Arab Jerusalem as a marker of 'sameness in time'. Instead, it presented its 'capacity to *generate meaning over time* so as to hold past, present, and future together' (Benhabib, cited in Lombard, 2013, p.816, emphasis in original).

The municipality emphasized in one of its radio broadcasts that it established an infrastructure that 'had no precedent, even under the mandate', including a wholesale market for fruits and vegetables with cooling storage, and a central bus station outside the Old City walls (Radio broadcast transcribed by Fayiz al-Husseini, 23/6/1958). This broadcast and others that followed stressed that this infrastructure, although a substitute for what was lost in the New City, was not simply a 'compensation' or an 'imitation' of (colonial) modernity.

More importantly, it foregrounded development as an urban quality which is organic to Jerusalem's urban history and its local administration, and not purely a product of the colonial imagination. However, this is not to suggest a clean and deliberate break with colonial developmental ideals, which was neither viable nor desired from the side of the local governance. The case of Palestinian laws evidently illustrated that, but the most remarkable illustration was the Arab municipality's (re-)employment of Henry

Kendall, the city's urban planner during the mandate rule, as a planning consultant of Jerusalem.

In 1961, mayor al-Khatib contacted the British Consulate and asked for a communication channel with Kendall, who was at the time on another colonial mission in Ghana. The deputy mayor explained to the council the 'importance associated with benefiting from the expertise and service of someone like Kendall … who is an expert in urban planning and has experience and full knowledge in planning the city of Jerusalem given his previous work in the country during the mandate' (CM 12/10/1961, pp.3–4, JMA 937-4). Despite his involvement in the de-development of the areas of Arab Jerusalem in the past and being part of the colonial urban planning system,[88] Kendall was invited to *return* to Jerusalem and supervise the work of the planning company that the municipality had hired to conduct aerial mapping of the city. Kendall did return, worked for three years as the town planning adviser of the municipality, and prepared a planning scheme of Arab Jerusalem in 1964. The scheme was adopted by the Jordanian government in 1966 but was never implemented, given the Israeli occupation in 1967 (The Kendall Town Scheme, 1966, PASSIA website).

Enthusiasm for developing and reviving Arab Jerusalem after the Nakba was not enough for the revival of the partitioned city under Jordanian rule. The central government posed administrative, political and financial obstacles for municipal governance. One such obstacle related to the recognition of Jerusalem's local governance as an *a'mana*, a higher form of local governance used for capital cities, rather than just a municipality. In 1956, a year after the enactment of the Jordanian Municipalities Law, the King announced the upgrade of the Amman municipality to the rank of an a'mana (Law number (38) – 1956, JMA 935-19).

The Jerusalem municipality, however, had to fight in order to receive such an upgrade, which suited the 'international high rank of the city and [would] raise its level' (Letter from the mayor of Jerusalem to the district governor, 1/7/1959, JMA 935-19). In 1959, just months before the municipal elections were due, the central government approved

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[88] For further discussion on the role of Kendall in the mandate colonial planning schemes in Jerusalem, particularly his approaches towards the Palestinian residents' urban needs and building, see Crookston, 2017; Barakat, 2016; Gitler, 2003.

the request and Jerusalem became an a'mana.[89] The Jerusalem municipality hoped to be granted more devolved authority and funding as a result of this administrative upgrade. Furthermore, and beyond the status itself, it sought to *re-centralize* the city, which had been the administrative centre of Palestine in the past, within a local, regional and international urban context.

The municipality's relations with the Jordanian state in this area were fluctuating. Throughout the early 1950s, the municipality was concerned by rumours about Jordanian intentions to move government buildings, including the appeal court, to Amman (Moving the court to Amman, JMA 951-4). Such a step would have affected not only the city's symbolic status but also its local economy (CM 4/10/1955, p.7, JMA 936-7). Towards the end of the 1950s, the government's attitude towards Jerusalem was increasingly influenced by the regional changes within the Arab world. Therefore, in 1959, the King and the cabinet gathered in Jerusalem in a 'historic meeting'. In later years, it was also decided to build a government compound in the city (CM 30/3/1963, p.4, JMA 938-1).

Figure 30: 'Royal announcement in the historical meeting of the cabinet in Jerusalem led by his majesty'

(Source: *Falastin,* 21/8/1959)

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[89] For clarity and convenience, I will continue to use the term 'municipality', instead of 'a'mana', in this thesis.

Despite these symbolic upgrades, the city continued to encounter obstacles in its development. The consequences of 1948 led to persistent financial crises for the municipality, yet it continued to plan, seek assistance and push the government to support the city. For example, the municipality planned short- and long-term projects; it sought, negotiated and obtained loans, and it held endless meetings across all governmental bodies to put forward its plans for the city.

The municipality held a pragmatic position in these processes, moving between rationality and emotional pleading for the government's compassion towards Jerusalem's patient residents, as demonstrated in this 1965 speech by al-Khatib to the cabinet and the King:

> And, finally, [we seek] more compassion, compassion of all ministries towards the Jerusalem municipality and support in its financial crisis, to allow it to provide services to the dear city and its patient residents and visitors coming from all over the world, in accordance with standards that suit its holiness and its Arab rule. (Speech in honour of Prime Minister Sa'id Wasfi al-Tal, 29/10/1965, p.2, JMA 945-6)

As time passed, development required long-term projects with objectives that exceeded the narrow time frames of the projects that had been carried out by the municipality in the early aftermath of 1948. In 1965, al-Khatib summarized the 'Prospects of the municipality' and the anticipated projects and goals for the city's future (Mayor's memorandum, 24/4/1965, pp.31–32):

(a)   To appropriate special sites on the Mount of Olives in order to build terraces thereon and plant with olive trees, for the primary purpose of keeping these sites free from buildings and restoring to the mountain its reputation and preserving its religious sanctity.

(b)   To look for genuine sympathisers with Jerusalem with no special ambitions who would give its municipality a loan of three million dinars for a term of 20–30 years and without interest if possible or at 2–5% interest.

(c)   To give women the right to vote and to be nominated for membership of the council, and to have them assume the same rights as men.

(d)   To establish an Arab University in the city to be financed by Arab countries and unbiased friends.

(e)   To achieve the unification of the two sectors of the city under the local administration of its legitimate inhabitants and under a universal Arab rule incorporating Palestine and Jordan.

These projects and their vision began to materialize a projectivity which 'encompasses the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action, in which received structures of thought and action may be creatively reconfigured in relation to actors' hopes, fears, and desires for the future' (Emirbayer and Mische, 2002, p.971). Such projects and aspirations mirrored how Arab Jerusalem saw itself in the future, but also reflected the past in the background. Some projects were basic, such as paving roads and making sidewalks, while others were much more advanced. Some illuminated the traces of the past, while others connected it with the future. But they all possessed a generative quality that endowed the emerging city with a particular present and presence.

By at least September 1966, the municipality was able to implement several developmental plans that transformed the city's identity and the local economy. Among these were water projects that involved fixing old reservoirs and establishing new distribution points; implementing sanitation and public health projects, including fixing and establishing a sewerage system; purchasing modern garbage cars; maintaining and establishing public toilets; and maintaining and reopening the public slaughterhouse. The municipality also established a fire brigade.

Furthermore, the municipality transformed the public space by maintaining and establishing new roads and sidewalks, a wholesale vegetable market, a central bus station, a meat and vegetable storage space, a streetlight system, public gardens, car parks, playgrounds and stadiums. It established a school inside the walls and a base for a public library. Finally, it established a summer residence to encourage Arab tourists to visit Jerusalem, especially from Gulf states, and prepared a master plan to expand the municipal boundaries (Letter from mayor al-Khatib to the Minister of the Interior for Urban and Rural Affairs, titled 'Works from 1949 to 1966', 2/10/1966, JMA 953-29).

According to a 1962 report by al-Khatib, construction activities boomed in the city. Jerusalem witnessed 'the erection of residential and commercial premises, necessitated by the incessant need for compensating the shortage occasioned by the

partition [of the city]. Stability and the relative increase in rents encouraged this tendency, and during the period 1949 to 1962, 5,674 residential rooms and 588 commercial stores were erected' ('Developments in Jerusalem' lecture, 15/5/1963, p.4).

The erection of commercial stores and zones, like those in the Bab al-Sahira area, indicated an active trade movement. According to al-Khatib's report, 'the number of merchants registered with the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce rose from 247 in 1949 to 1,679 at the end of 1962, and their scope of work now comprises all sorts of export and import trades'. Furthermore, while only two banks, the Arab and Ottoman Banks, operated in Jerusalem in 1948, and with limited transaction capacity, by 1962 their number had risen to seven, and 'the deposits at some of these banks … jumped over a million dinars monthly' (ibid, pp.6–7).

Figure 31: 'Influx of villagers into Jerusalem during the 'Eid'

Figure 32: 'Factory for paper boxes in Jerusalem'

(Source: *al-Difa',* 4/4/1958)

Jerusalem was always known for having a service-based economy (Dakkak, 1981, p.145), with a limited industry of simple workshops and crafts for local consumption. This did not change in the years between 1948 and 1967. However, the number of licences issued for crafts and industries doubled between 1949 and 1962, and some modest exporting of shoes, shirts and plastic to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia began around 1962 ('Developments in Jerusalem' lecture, 15/5/1963, p.7) (see Figures 31 and 32 for examples of economic activity in Arab Jerusalem).

To meet its financial obligations and to implement its projects, the municipality relied mainly on short- and long-term loans and some government subsidies. However, the central government was not the only resort. From the early period of Jordanian rule, the municipality realized that material autonomy was a condition for its productivity given the ongoing financial crisis of the fledging state. As a 1958 broadcast stated, the city had to produce infrastructure in order to be able to produce capital. Thus, the municipality continuously sought to develop local capital and market forces to maintain local independence, following, as the mayor suggested, the Arabic idiom 'Your skin is scratched by your own fingernail only, so it's you who must take command of yourself' (CM 25/7/1961, p.2, JMA 937-4).

The municipality constantly sought additional financial resources besides increasing municipal taxes and rates on services. As such, it approached regional and international non-governmental parties that 'care about Jerusalem and are willing to help her' in order to receive long-term loans with minimum interest (CM 21/5/1957, p.4, JMA 936-10).

The search for support extended to international arenas, including demanding that a delegation from the World Bank get involved in the development of Jerusalem (CM 10/5/1955, pp.1–2, JMA 936-7). It also sought donations from 'those who love Jerusalem' – individuals, organizations or governments – including by establishing a committee for fundraising under the name of 'the committee for raising the call for Jerusalem' [lajnat tawjeih al-nida'] (CM 21/5/1957, p.4, JMA 936-10). Furthermore, the municipality proposed in 1961 to produce stamps that held the city's symbols, since 'Jerusalem is a holy city with an international prestige and the whole world rushes to get its souvenirs' (CM 3/10/1961, p.3, JMA 937-4).

The municipality also looked inward to the city and its residents for help in both raising money and implementing development projects. Among its local attempts was initiating a lottery that held the name of the city 'yanasib al-Quds' (CM 2/2/1960, p.8, JMA 937-1), following the steps of other Arab and international cities (CM 21/5/1957, p.4, JMA 936-10). On several occasions, the municipality suggested using a voluntary workforce of residents – especially students and teachers during summer vacations – to help implement its projects, as will be illustrated in the discussion later in this chapter in relation to constructing the street between Bab al-Sahira and Bab al-'Amoud (CM 9/2/1960, p.6, JMA 937-1).

<center>***</center>

This overview of the city's main development plans, ideas, obstacles and achievements has delineated a general background for concrete projects that distinguished Arab Jerusalem. Beyond their materiality, these development projects shed light on perceptions and imaginings of the future, as a condition of generating a context for the city. A close examination of the struggle for the most crucial urban infrastructures – water and electricity – will further demonstrate the particularity of *becoming* Arab Jerusalem and its temporal formation, which can be traced in their flows.

Local Flows in Arab Jerusalem

Jerusalem emerged from the Nakba thirsty and dark. Water and electricity resources fell under the control of Israel in May 1948, and the Arab parts of the city had to survive by themselves. These circumstances forced the municipality to act urgently yet firmly to provide these basic services both immediately and in the long term. While doing that, it was also creating a distinct local identity.

In the Palestinian context, water and electricity infrastructure and provision had played a crucial role in the making of Palestinian subjecthood and the formation of agency prior to 1948 (Lemire, 2011; Meiton, 2019). As Fredrik Meiton discusses, 'for the Palestinians, then, electrification came to participate in the making of a new inside and

outside, constituting Palestine, conceptually and materially, as an object of national politics' (Meiton, 2019, p.11).[90]

After the Nakba, the provision of water and electricity would play a crucial role in making a local identity and a sense of place. In this regard, relations of utilities provision contribute to 'the shaping of the "character" of the place … both by reconfiguring understandings about the capacity of the place (its natural resources and its population) and by transforming that population's relationship with those resources' (Feldman, 2008, p.162).

In addition, the sociability of water and electricity flows and their provision was particularly distinguished in Arab Jerusalem after the Nakba. The flows introduced new rhythms and revived old ones while leaving a rich history of *time flow*. The city had experienced similar excitement and indulgence in new times and its infrastructure during the Great War at the end of the Ottoman era, as Salim Tamari describes while tracing the story of the soldier Ihsan Hasan Turjman:

> The experience of new rhythms of daily life was at the heart of these modernities of war. We have seen that the war created a new sense of time (discreteness) and geography (the decentring of Palestine within the imperial domain); increased people's mobility through the advent of the railroad and the automobile, introduced greater discipline in military work, and conquered the night (through electrification and the positioning of guards on the streets outside the city walls). (Tamari, 2011, p.58)

The Nakba interrupted the flows of electricity and water in Jerusalem, along with their temporalities and their social, political and economic meanings. But the struggle to resume these flows reflects the distinct features of Arab Jerusalem, which rendered it not just a surviving entity seeking to continue. Instead, it produced a particular city with its own identity and temporal orientation. Perhaps the most illustrative marker of this infrastructural-identity is its persistence – albeit restricted – in present-day Jerusalem, such as the Jerusalem District Electricity Company. This infrastructure 'continues to reproduce the political relationships of the times in which they were constructed' (Anand, 2017, p.3).

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[90] Meiton expresses a sound critique of Ronen Shamir's *Current Flow* (2013), which 'explicitly denies any Palestinian agency on the making of the power system, even as he insists on claiming agency for the grid itself' (2019, p.10).

> The flow of electricity has arrived from the Jerusalem Electricity Company after two years of darkness in all parts of the city … Therefore, energy returned to the city and markets stayed awake until the late hours of the night and the city was decorated with a dress of bright lights. (*Falastin*, 12/3/1950) (Figure 33)

(Source: *Falastin*, 12/3/1950)

Darkness was one of the Nakba's many marks on the city's body. The electricity generators of the British Electricity Company that had served Jerusalem and its surroundings fell in the New City after May 1948, and the company could not resume its electricity provision to the Old City for almost two years ('Developments in Jerusalem' lecture, 15/5/1963, p.8). When electricity arrived in the city in March 1950, it was celebrated in the awakened streets and perhaps signified for those late-night walkers the beginning of a *new* time.

For a city that already knew electricity as part of its daily life before the Nakba, this return introduced new patterns of public social gatherings and also revived old ones. Arab Jerusalem retrieved *familiar times*,[91] during which 'electricity had become the

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[91] For the first memories of electricity in Jerusalem when the Notre Dame building was electrified, see Tamari and Nassar, 2003, p.50. For the increasing domestic and commercial consumption of electricity in Jerusalem during the 1930s and 1940s, which was described as a time of 'skyrocketing demands' that peaked after the end of the war in 1944–1945, see Meiton, 2019, pp.196–199.

commodity that "solves everything"', even though blackouts were rolling and affected all parts of the city (Meiton, 2019, p.200). During the final years of the mandate, electricity was perceived by private residents and social and religious institutions as 'a question of life and death'. It was considered crucial for securing their safety and preventing crime (ibid, pp.200–202).

Yet, a few months after the return of electricity, the city, represented by the municipality, clashed with the British-owned Jerusalem Electric & Public Service Corporation, Ltd,[92] which maintained its licence in Arab Jerusalem after 1948. The dispute between the public and the company concerned the strength of the electrical flow, the company's high rates, and its refusal to take into consideration the payments it received from the Palestinian residents before the termination of the mandate (*Falastin,* 11/1/1951).[93]

Towards the end of 1950, the municipality of Arab Jerusalem, along with other municipalities of Jerusalem's district, decided to take steps against the British company and 'provoke public opinion against it in local newspapers' (CM 11/1/1951, pp.1–2, JMA 936-3). Thereafter, the dispute with the British company intensified and became a public affair that was debated in the local press. The tension between the company and the municipality lasted a few years, during which the latter, together with other municipalities of the Jerusalem district, proposed cancelling the company's franchise and establishing a *local* electricity company (CM 14/9/1954, p.3, JMA 936-6) (Figures 34 and 35).

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[92] This was formed by a British company in November 1930, after it bought the venture of the Greek owner Euripides Mavrommatis. Note that this was different from Rustenburg's Palestine Electric Company, which did not operate in Jerusalem (ibid, pp.89–90).

[93] The company was already struggling to keep up with meeting the electricity consumption demands during the last few years before the Nakba (ibid, pp.196–199). In 1946, a legal case was filed by the law firm Messers Bernard Josseoh & Co against the company for rolling blackouts and malfunctions. The Magistrate's Court ruled against the company for having failed to maintain the old equipment and to purchase new equipment. In late December 1947, the British company signed an agreement with the Palestine Electric Company (established by Penhas Rutenberg) to enhance the supply of electricity in Jerusalem (ibid, pp.203–207).

Figure 34: 'Warning to the Electricity Company to cancel its franchise'

(Source: *al-Difa',* 21/11/1950)

Figure 35: 'The response of the Electricity Company in regard to illuminating the city'

(Source: *al-Difa',* 5/1/1951)

In 1955, the municipalities voted on the dissolution of the British company, which was urged to sell its concession to the planned local company to generate electricity (CM 4/1/1955, pp.1–2, JMA 936-7; al-Khatib, 2006, pp.50–52). Thus, the Jerusalem District Electricity Company was officially established and registered as a Jordanian company in 1956 (CM 7/2/1956, p.7, JMA 936-8), after paying 21,000 Jordanian dinars as compensation to the British company ('Developments in Jerusalem' lecture, 15/5/1963, p.8).

The Jerusalem District Electricity Company's shareholders numbered 1,685, with 25.3 percent divided among the district's municipalities and villages (including Jerusalem, Ramallah, al-Bireh, Beit Jala, Beit Sahour and Jericho), while the majority of shares – 74.4 percent – were held by the public. The company's board included representatives of the public and the district's municipalities, which had one representative each – with the exception of the Jerusalem municipality, which had two representatives (al-Madhoun, 1992, p.73).

The *localization*[94] of the electricity company, which serves the cities and villages in the Jerusalem district to this day,[95] constituted one of the most distinguished achievements of Palestinian self-rule under Jordan. The accomplishment was multifaceted, involving the dissolution of the British company's rights, the enactment of the local company's by-laws, the election of members from the municipalities, and the granting of shares to the public while relying on local capital and administration. In other words, this nationalization-like move granted these localities authority and, to some extent, a popular sovereignty, in the absence of a Palestinian national state.

The achievement is particularly important given the history of the British company during the mandate, when it was accused of ethnic discrimination on the grounds of labour and rates, forcing the Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem to intervene (Meiton, 2019, pp.192–195). While they were under the mandate, it was not possible for Palestinians to become part of these modernization and developmental projects. The localization of the electricity company reflected the creation of a potential space – albeit restricted – after the Nakba to fulfil a Palestinian developmental subjectivity.

The localized Electricity Company contributed to the way in which the city imagined and projected itself as a modern city. The history of electricity consumption, beyond that of the company itself, reveals the meeting point between infrastructure and politics and illuminates how city-making was not merely a material affair. Whereas in the early

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[94] It could be argued that it was nationalized as well, since it became a Jordanian company. Yet, as Jordan was not a Palestinian national state and in order to emphasize the role of the Palestinian cities and villages in reclaiming their natural resources, localization better reflects the state of affairs at the time and their politics.

[95] After the 1967 Israeli occupation, the role of the Jerusalem Electricity Company was challenged and extensively limited. The company's role was reduced to acting as a distributer of the Israeli National Electricity Company, whereas it had previously also functioned as a generator of electricity (al-Madhoun, 1992, p.74).

1950s, electricity consumption was limited to the basic illumination of streets across the city, with some neighbourhoods not connected – a source of regular complaints from residents (CM 7/10/1952, p.4, JMA 936-4). Gradually, the city expanded its illumination map in parallel with its expanding municipal boundaries, allowing a supply of electrical light to 'the edges of the municipality's boundary' in the early 1960s (CM 18/7/1962, p.6, JMA 937-6).

It was not only the location and scale of electricity provision that changed but also the purposes of the illumination. In the early 1960s, the municipality embarked on a project of illuminating the external walls of the Old City, particularly the northern side, extending from Bab al-'Amoud to the Burj al-Laqlaq area (CM 27/6/1961, p.4, JMA 937-3). The project aimed to contribute to the development of the city as a touristic destination, while ensuring that the illumination did not interfere with the city's historical, architectural and antique features (CM 26/4/1960, p.8, JMA 937-1). Only a couple of months before the fall of the city in 1967, it was proposed to replace the neon lamps fixed in the Old City's streets and shops with 'oriental lanterns' (CM 29/3/1967, p.6, JMA 938-9).

It was standard for the municipality to turn on the lights fixed on the Old City's external walls on national anniversaries and religious holidays. In 1964, several parties involved in tourism demanded having lights for two hours every weeknight (CM 15/7/1964, p.7, JMA 938-4). Accordingly, the walls were illuminated 'for the purpose of expressing the beauty of the antique walls at night as another touristic attraction in the city' (Mayor's memorandum, 24/4/1965, p.19) and to make the city alive at night (CM 9/9/1964, p.7, JMA 938-4).

Future and Past Waters

It was nature, so it was believed, that 'saved' Jerusalem in 1948 from thirst when the war cut the city from its main water reservoirs and left it at the mercy of luck:

> had it not been for the rain that filled the cisterns of the Old City and the cooperation of the people by dividing it by an [im]provised ration system for more than a year, most of the residents and the refugees should have sought refuge somewhere else. ('Developments in Jerusalem' lecture, 15/5/1963, p.9)

The struggle for localizing natural resources was even more acute in the case of water flows. Jerusalem had always suffered from water shortages because of its topographical location on the top of hills (Tahboub, 2014, p.8; Lemire, 2000, p.129). Since its establishment under the Ottoman rule, the municipality had been preoccupied with water issues that persisted throughout the mandate. For instance, Raghib Bey al-Nashashibi, who became the district and city engineer of the Jerusalem municipality in 1912 and was elected as mayor from 1920 to 1934 under the mandate rule, was 'singularly preoccupied with securing water sources for Jerusalem and its environs' during his post as an engineer. He continued to develop water projects throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Tamari, 2017, pp.52–53).

In 1961, the municipality referred to the water shortage as an existential crisis [azmat kayan] (CM 12/6/1961, p.2, JMA 937-3). Therefore, water became a major source of struggle for local authority between the city and the colonial, national and local parties. This signified a particular 'hydropolitical consciousness', to borrow Lemire's conceptualization of the Artas–Jerusalem water conflict in 1925 (2011). At the core of this form of consciousness, water resources were a constituent element of identity (ibid, p.33). The case of Arab Jerusalem thus illustrates how conflict over water resources in post-1948 Jerusalem shaped a local identity and urban agency.

In 1935, a massive water project was developed in the area of Ras al-'Ain (al-'Arif, 1999, p.439) with the aim of providing a substantive solution to water shortages (Tahboub, 2014, p.13). The mandate government charged development fees to residents who benefited from the water project. After the partition of the city in 1948, the project fell under the control of Israel. Arab Jerusalem's residents had no access to the project, despite their investment in its development (CM 21/4/1953, p.4, JMA 936-5). Consequently, the Arab municipality insisted on its rights in receiving a share of the project's development fund.

Negotiations over the share of the Arab municipality took several years and involved British and Jordanian officials. Israel moved from refusing to release any money to releasing only a small share, which the municipality persistently refused (CM 5/6/1951, p.2, JMA 936-3; CM 3/1/1952, pp.1–2, JMA 936-4). Eventually, in 1955, the Israeli government agreed to divide the amount – a total of 162,000

Jordanian dinars – between the Israeli municipality and the Arab municipality (CM 25/1/1955, p.2, JMA 936-7).

The Nakba war also affected the essential historical water reservoir of Solomon's Pools, located to the south of Jerusalem. The pools were established during the era of the Ottoman leader Suliman the Great (1520–1566) to endow Jerusalem with water security. In the 1870s, the Ottoman Jerusalem municipality 'was able to repair the dilapidated conduits from Solomon's Pool … to make potable water available' (Tamari, 2017, p.53).

Following the partition in 1948, the pipes connecting the pools to the city fell under the control of Israel. Consequently, the Jerusalem municipality began negotiating international parties present in the city in relation to possible ways to resume the water supply, either by using the old pipes – now located under Israel – or by building new pipes to be subsidised by the UN (Figure 36).

(Source: *Falastin,* 27/10/1950)

The attempts to secure funding to connect the pools to Jerusalem lasted for over a decade, during which time the Jerusalem municipality paid an annual rent of 800 Jordanian dinars to the Awqaf, the owner of the pools, and was responsible for their maintenance (CM 11/6/1960, p.2, JMA 937-1). Only in 1961 were pipes finally fixed through the Sur Baher area, but a very low rainfall in the following two years drained the pools. In 1963, the rainfall drastically increased, allowing a daily flow from the pools beginning at the end of 1964 – sixteen years after their disconnection from the city (CM 11/11/1964, pp.2–3, JMA 938-4).

During these negotiations, the city survived by relying on other reservoirs, primarily 'Ain Fara (ibid). The Jerusalem municipality had established this water project during the mandate period and acquired a right for exclusive use of the reservoir for Jerusalem's residents based on legislation from 1926 (CM 21/4/1953, p.3, JMA 936-5).

Figure 37: 'Water from a new spring flows into 'Ain Fara reservoir'
(Source: JMA 935-17)

On 14 May 1949, the Jerusalem municipality signed a 25-year agreement with the municipalities of al-Bireh and Ramallah to supply them with water, including from 'Ain-Fara. For the rest of the Jordanian period, this reservoir became a site of conflict between the municipalities over water rates and allegations that Ramallah and al-Bireh had violated the agreement by supplying water to areas outside their boundaries (CM 10/5/1960, p.5, JMA 937-1).

The main reason for the dispute, however, concerned the allegedly small amount of water that Jerusalem supplied to these municipalities, as it prioritized Jerusalem's residents in the provision of water according to the agreement. The dispute is demonstrated by the Jerusalem municipality's response in 1953 to a request from Ramallah and al-Bireh to benefit from a new spring near the 'Ain Fara reservoir:

> despite considering the residents of Ramallah and al-Bireh our brothers and caring about their interests and about supplying them with water, we cannot abuse the rights of Jerusalem residents and give away the right to ownership of part of 'Ain-Fara springs, as Jerusalem is developing both in terms of space and population, as well as the increase of water consumption among its residents from year to year. (CM 21/4/1953, p.3, JMA 936-5)

In 1961, the Jerusalem municipality again rejected a request from the other municipalities to reduce water rates, while urging them 'not to rely constantly on Jerusalem's water … and to continue trying to secure their needs in the near future from other resources' (CM 30/5/1961, p.4, JMA 937-3). In other words, the Jerusalem municipality was looking to release itself from the agreement, which had seemed feasible in 1949 but was becoming increasingly burdensome and aggravating the persistent water crisis of Jerusalem.

Given its responsibility for pumping and distributing water, the struggle over water and for water was part of the municipality's daily agenda. It also influenced internal relations between the municipality and the residents, since the water shortage rendered water rates higher in Jerusalem than in other cities.

From its early days, the municipality decided to keep water rates low under all circumstances and did not want to consider or treat water rates as taxes, given the essential nature of the resource (CM 8/7/1952, p.2, JMA 936-4). This decision was made against emergency taxes that the municipality had to impose in the early years after 1948, following instructions from the government to increase its revenue. These included temporary taxes on cigarettes (CM 24/8/1949, p.4, JMA 936-1) and taxes on entry through the gates of the Old City – all were exclusively imposed in Jerusalem until April 1950 (CM 18/1/9150, p.1, JMA 936-2) (Figure 38).

Figure 38: Cancellation of the tax imposed on entry through the gates of the Old City
(Source: *al-Difa'*, 2/4/1950)

Thus, in the case of water rates, the municipality sought not to follow the same path as with these emergency taxes. Yet, due to its financial difficulties, water rates were constantly increasing, while the public demanded that they be reduced. In 1964, mayor al-Khatib proposed to the municipal council another increase in water rates in order to cover the shortage in the annual budget. Most members opposed the proposal, stating that the water crisis in Jerusalem was due to the 'neglect' and unfair treatment of the city by the central government. Some of the municipal council members threatened to resign, including al-Khatib himself – although not from his council membership – for failing to secure the budget. The rates were eventually increased, with one member, Subhi Ghosheh, resigning in protest. Another council member proposed using the press to explain to the public the reasons for the increase (CM 23/8/1964, p.2; CM 26/8/1964, p.1, JMA 938-4).

Until the very last days of its work, the Arab municipality was preoccupied with the issue of water. The supply continued to be a source of uncertainty, affecting the lives of residents as well as the development of the city and its 'reputation' as a tourist destination (CM 8/6/1954, p.2, JMA 936-6). Although the municipality initiated excavation projects to search for water in areas around the city (CM 13/7/1955, p.2, JMA 936-7), its lack of financial means was reflected in the constant damage to water motors, the weakness of the water flow, and the intermittent distribution of water.

The municipality's confidence in its ability to secure water for the future continued to be contingent on nature. In February 1967, the municipal council assessed the city's water situation and stated that, following a period of continuous rainfall, spring water had increased and 'we are no longer afraid from its decrease in the future'. Therefore, the municipality agreed to supply water for residents living outside its boundaries (CM 18/2/1967, p.20, JMA 938-9). It is unclear, however, whether the municipality meant the near or the distant future. In any case, the contingent and uncertain future of the water supply in Arab Jerusalem illustrates how futurity had different meanings in the city's imagination, beyond that associated with development and prosperity.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

Overall, between the contingency of nature, colonial legacies, political restrictions and a growing and demanding social body, the struggle for infrastructural development was a distinctive feature of Arab Jerusalem, which was striving to form its local identity. The loss of water and electricity in 1948 and the struggle to resume them demonstrate one of many potentials that the city and its administration were able to realize in making and imagining the future.

Producing Centrality in Arab Jerusalem

With the fall of the New City and the demarcation of the armistice lines in April 1949, the city lost its *centre*. Most prominent was Jaffa Street, where the government offices, businesses and leisure amenities were located.[96] Other commercial centres and busy areas – such as Musrara, Mamilla and Jaffa Gate – were trapped in No Man's Land. Bab al-'Amoud[97] (Damascus Gate), which was adjacent to No Man's Land and the armistice line, was closed for a few years.

The centre thus became the periphery (Caridi, 2015; Hercbergs, 2018, pp.95–101, 109–114) and the need to create a new centre became crucial for the local economy and the making of the city altogether. How do cities build their centres? What does the

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[96] George Hintlian states that from the early 1920s, the beginning of the mandate, 'Arab businesses concentrated around Jaffa Gate and Mamilla while Jewish business began moving up along Jaffa Road to Ben Yehuda and King George [streets]' (Hintlian, 2004, p.27).

[97] For more on the history of this gate, see al-Natsheh, 2005, p.36. I will refer to the gates of the Old City by their Arabic names.

centre represent for the city? Cities operate through centres as 'active and productive, and thus belong[ing] to the workers (*Populaire*)' (Lefebvre, 2014, p.203). Otherwise, they turn mainly into centres of power and decision-making, as are most global cities today. Thus, to understand centres, we need to understand the dynamics of their making and the players who determine them.

In Jerusalem, this investigation begins not in 1948 but a few decades earlier, during the mandate era. As discussed, the colonial production of the New City as the administrative centre of the mandate government was conditioned on restricting other spaces from *becoming* a centre. Accordingly, the Old City and its surrounding areas, which were mainly inhabited by Arab Palestinian residents, were prevented from being developed. Therefore, when the New City as a centre was lost, the making of a new centre after 1948 was, in fact, redeeming the historical right of al-ahali to make their city and its centre.

Indeed, centres are not static. They transfer and transform by the needs of their inhabitants and by those in decision-making positions. George Hintlian describes a similar transformation of Ottoman Jerusalem, as 'after 1860 many of the activities previously contained within the Old City spilled out beyond the city walls, and the centre of commercial activity moved to outside the Bab al-Khalil' (2000, p.231). In his 'attempt to reconstruct the pre-1948 commercial centre of Jerusalem' during the mandate period, Hintlian describes in detail the shops, restaurants, banks, cafés, bookstores, hotels, taxi and bus companies, and other enterprises that were run by the Jerusalem Arab business community of Jaffa Gate and Mamilla, where most of these were concentrated before 1948 (Hintlian, 2004, pp.25–33).

The creation of Bab al-Sahira, particularly Slah al-Din Street, as *a centre* of Arab Jerusalem after 1948 was a process of de-decentralization. It constituted a reclamation of the local residents' right to develop their area according to a particular 'mode of production along with its specific relations of production' (Lefebvre, 1991, p.31), which was developed and transformed by the residents over time. It was the result of persistent negotiations over financial resources, tradition, legal legacy, prices, street width, and aesthetics.

This production of the centre extends the discussion of material infrastructure to people's activities in the city. The discussion approaches the 'complex combinations of objects, spaces, persons, and practices' (Simone, 2004b, p.408) of council members, administrators, municipal workers, residents, consumers, businessmen, fellahat, inspectors, judges and the government more generally, who all took part in making the centre, as infrastructure themselves. In this sense, people are the infrastructure, as the conjunction of their activities becomes a 'platform providing for and reproducing life in the city' (ibid).

Location and dislocation, moving from one place to another and thinking and rethinking the space and its use, were all indicators of the dynamic process, as well as the creation of historical subjects, centres, neighbourhoods and, consequently, contexts:

> as local subjects carry on the continuing task of reproducing their neighbourhood, the contingencies of history, environment, and imagination contain the potential for new contexts (material, social, and imaginative) to be produced. In this way, through the vagaries of social action by local subjects, neighbourhood as context produces the context of neighbourhoods. Over time, this dialectic changes the condition of production of locality as such. Put another way, this is how the subjects of history become historical subjects, so that no human community, however apparently stable, static, bounded, or isolated, can usefully be regarded as cool or outside history. (Appadurai, 1996, p.185)

Negotiations over a centre were also negotiations over *what kind* of a centre would the city have – not only materially, but also culturally. The contested ideals of modernity and tradition, religion and secularism, gender equality, class and social stratification, and more were all part of the parameters that shaped the identity of the centre. It was not uncommon for Jerusalem's neighbourhoods to fight over their identity and their use of the public space, as we learn from the city's history during the Great War. Tamari has insightfully discussed how leisure space was created, paving the way to a 'secularization' of the public sphere (2017, p.55). The municipal park, café and theatre were all part of the city centre at the end of the nineteenth century (Lemire 2017, p.122). Retrieving this rich urban history was indeed part of the city's revival of the centre after 1948.

Bab al-'Amoud and the Struggle for a Centre

The armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan, signed on 3 April 1949 (United Nation website), delineated the boundaries between the two parts of partitioned Jerusalem and designated a No Man's Land area between them. This demarcation also delineated the public space that was left to Arab Jerusalem in the areas outside the walls, as most markets before 1948 were either inside the Old City or in the western parts of the city, such as souq Mamillah and souq al-Shama'a (Al-A'rif, 1999, pp.467–469).

Bab al-Khalil (Jaffa Gate), which together with Jaffa Street represented Jerusalem's modernity before 1948, was also a live commercial and cultural hub. However, in 1948, it was blocked with cement due to its location on the armistice line, rendering it a signifier of defeat, partition and misery. The closed gate became a 'boundary between the residents and their property and dreams in West Jerusalem … and blocked the way to the port and the rail route, and the hope of the city in modernization and development' (al-Ju'beh, 2005, p.81).

Bab al-'Amoud constitutes the main entrance to the Old City through the gates. It had two markets before 1948, including one that extended into the Musrara area (Davis, 2002, p.53).[98] In the competition over centrality between Bab al-'Amoud and Bab al-Khalil, the latter had been 'winning' for over a century until its closure in 1948 (al-Ju'beh, 2005, p.81). After May 1948, Bab al-'Amoud was also closed for several years for security reasons,[99] as it was adjacent to the armistice line, resulting in its paralysis as a live commercial zone (Figure 39).

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[98] For a historical account of the commercial and economic activities inside this gate, see 'Bab al-'Amoud Neighbourhood *Mahle* during the Time of Turkey' in Tamari and Nassar, 2003, pp.42–44. On the building activities around the gate outside the walls, see ibid, pp.86–87.

[99] The city gates had been closed for security reasons before 1948 as well. For instance, until the 1870s, they were closed at night and during Friday prayers. However, the expanding residential areas outside the walls changed these patterns (al-Ju'beh, 2005, p.82).

Figure 39: 'Jordanian tourist map of the Old City of Jerusalem, 1960'
(Source: The National Library of Israel Blog)

The closure of Bab al-'Amoud, which was the only commercial area left for Arab Jerusalem, deprived the city of one of its very few opportunities to revive. Thus, upon a visit of Glubb Pasha to the Jerusalem municipality in mid-1949, mayor Anwar al-Khatib asked him to reconsider the decision to close Bab al-'Amoud, as the 'people wish' to have it opened. Al-Khatib emphasized the 'damage caused by keeping it closed which aggravates the paralyzed commercial activities'. Yet commanders in the Jordanian Army rejected the request on security grounds. Nevertheless, the municipal council pleaded with the mayor to try again to convince the commanders (CM 29/6/1949, p.1, JMA 936-1).

In subsequent months, rumours spread in the city about the Army's intentions to open the gate. However, a three-ton bomb that the Israeli forces had planted about 200 metres to the north-west of Bab al-'Amoud halted such plans. The Armistice Committee, together with Israeli and Jordanian military officers, agreed to defuse the bomb. The date was set for 15 August 1949 at 2 o'clock in the afternoon (Report of the commander of Jerusalem District, 'Procedures to be taken before and after exploding the explosives in No Man's Land in Bab al-'Amoud in Jerusalem', 15/8/1949, JMA 953-1).

International forces, the Arab Legion, the city administration and residents were all shrouded in severe anxiety, for it was expected that the explosion would cause massive destruction to houses and religious and archaeological sites in the area. Mukhtars, doctors, policemen, engineers, the fire brigade, rescue staff and public works employees were all put on the highest level of availability (ibid). Newspapers reported on the preparations and the city held its breath, fearing for the worst.

Residents of neighbourhoods within five yards of the bomb had left en masse. Carrying their furniture, they sought shelter in the houses of relatives in Beit Jala, Bethlehem, Ramallah and Jericho, thus invoking scenes of the near past. They hurried to return to their homes when the authorities decided to delay the operation until 22 August 1949. News of the delay was disseminated through radio broadcasts and the policemen who toured the city, which saw heavy traffic of people and goods (*Falastin,* 16/8/1949) (Figure 40).

Figure 40: 'Postponing the explosion of Bab al-'Amoud explosive'

(Source: *Falastin,* 16/8/1949)

The operation was delayed one more day, until 23 August at 3 o'clock, as the Israeli forces had managed to seize about 1.5 tons of the explosive on the previous day. A curfew was announced in the Old City and some adjacent areas. Residents left again, leaving their windows open to prevent their explosion. A military force was stationed at the tower of the Rockefeller Museum to observe the operation. When the operation ended, the Church of All Nations and other churches outside the area of danger rang their bells to announce its termination (Report of the commander of the Jerusalem District, 'The results of the meeting concerning the explosion of the explosive', undated, JMA 953-1).

The explosion did not cause the expected damage, as most of the affected houses were located in No Man's Land (Letter from the Director of Public Works (Arab side) to the chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, 'Damascus Gate Explosive Damage', 30/8/1949, JMA 953-1). The operation was a relief to the city, as it was believed that the obstacles to opening Bab al-'Amoud had now been removed. Demands to open the gate were not late to arrive.

Alongside the armistice agreement, the removal of the bomb might have marked the end of one era and the beginning of another, as the calls for opening the gate demonstrated. Only two days after the operation, *Falastin* newspaper published an article titled 'When Do You Open Bab al-'Amoud??', in the section 'The Affairs of the City'. The article explained that the gate had to be opened not only because it constituted 'the artery of what was left of the city of prophets', but also because of its importance from a psychological perspective. 'Kamal', the article's anonymous author, therefore demanded that the gate be opened:

> In the name of the suffocated people inside the walls, and in the name of the merchants looking to expand their businesses and revive economic life, and in the name of the nation's morale which we want to keep it strong and high. (*Falastin*, 25/8/1949)

Gradually Bab al-'Amoud was opened until 7 pm, which was later extended until 9 pm, as local newspapers announced at the end of February 1950, given the expected imminent arrival of pilgrims from around the world (*al-Difa'*, 26/2/1950). Commercial activities boomed, while doctors, pharmacists and photographers opened or relocated their shops and clinics to the area following 'the Palestinian war', with high attendance by the public. The cafés that opened in the area constituted a challenge to those professions, as café-goers sat in the streets outside, 'smoking hookah from morning till evening while eating young women and ladies with their eyes' (*Falastin*, 27/5/1950) (Figure 41).

Figure 41: 'C   equest

The harassment of women seeking to enter Bab al-'Amoud persisted. A decade later, *al-Difa'* published an article titled 'The Youth of Today', complaining about women being harassed in the streets of Jerusalem. Furthermore, the municipal council discussed complaints from women about being 'shy' to pass through the gate, given the large number of male café-goers sitting on the sidewalks. As a result, in August 1960, the municipality decided to prevent cafés from having their chairs on sidewalks and to follow a strict enforcement policy in this regard (CM 9/8/1960, p.1, JMA 937-2). This sheds light on women's access to the city's public space. While they were active in protests in the streets, women in Jerusalem were less able to *be* in the city and to move freely, although the growing cultural production and amenities – such as cinemas – provided more urban spaces for them to engage with the city beyond the traditional use of public space.

All these activities showed the increasing movement in the area of Bab al-'Amoud, despite its proximity to the armistice line. From its side, the municipality began to develop the area by repairing the sidewalks in front of the gate (CM 6/2/1951, p.1, JMA 936-3). By the end of 1951, the area of the gate had become active. Its square was initially used mainly as a parking space for private cars, while later the municipality began to discuss its potential for development and to find a substitute for its use as a parking area (CM 1/12/1951, p.3, JMA 936-3) (Figure 42).

Figure 42: Bab al-'Amoud (Damascus Gate), sometime between 1948 and 1958

(Source: Library of the Congress website, LC-M305- M-13659-A [P&P])

In September 1966, mayor al-Khatib updated the municipal council on the construction of a planned bridge at the entrance of the gate (CM 28/9/1966, p.4, JMA 938-8). The bridge appears to have been completed only months before the Israeli occupation in June 1967, as photos taken after the occupation in 1967 show (Figures 43 and 44).

Figure 43: Bab al-'Amoud in 1967

(Source: ISA website)

Figure 44: Bab al-'Amoud square and the road leading to Bab al-Sahira in 1967

(Source: ISA website)

Bab al-Sahira and the Emerging Centre

In early 1952, plans were prepared to build sidewalks between Bab al-'Amoud and the growing hub of the Bab al-Sahira (Herod's Gate) area. Calls for bidders were announced (CM 12/2/1952, p.2, JMA 936-4). The planned sidewalks were among different forms of infrastructure that *connected* past and new centres, which had been lost and created as a result of the Nakba. During that time, Bab al-'Amoud was struggling to retain its centrality while it was shut down. Meanwhile, the centre of the city shifted eastwards, away from the armistice line and towards the area of Bab al-Sahira.

Until late 1948, the Bab al-Sahira area had not been a commercial zone, as the mandate city plan scheme banned building commercial amenities in the area surrounding the walls. The area had six schools, including 'al-Rashidiyya secondary school, Salah al-Din Street, a Muslim cemetery, and the Rockefeller Museum' (Davis, 2002, p.52). Yet a year after the war, this area became 'the beating heart' (*Falastin*, 25/8/1949) of the city, given its relative distance from the border, the closure of Bab al-'Amoud, and the establishment of Jordanian governmental departments there.

In the first weeks following the war, the municipality organized a small bazaar near the Austrian Hospice inside the Old City, but residents complained about vegetable and fruit lorries that blocked al-Wad Street inside the walls. Consequently, in August 1949, the municipality established another market in Bab al-Sahira (CM 24/8/1949, p.5, JMA 936-1).

As the area developed and expanded, the residents' desire to build businesses and commercial amenities increased. In early 1950, only months after the opening of the wholesale vegetable market in the area, a group of Jerusalem's property owners demanded that the municipality designate the area of Bab al-Sahira as a commercial zone to allow them to establish businesses there. In particular, they wanted to reverse a policy dictated by the 'a'don'[100] Norman Bentwich, who served as the first attorney general during the mandate.

The property owners argued that Bentwich had allocated this area exclusively for villas. They perceived the policy as 'a Jewish project that meant to increase the density of the population in the Jewish areas and decrease it in the Arab areas'. Thus, the demand to make this a commercial area meant to 'assist the residents there to join forces; a matter which the national interest necessitates' (*Falastin*, 11/2/1950) (Figure 45).

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[100] 'Mr' in Hebrew.

Figure 45: 'Demands to consider Bab al-Sahira a commercial area / No need to follow the previous law that was enacted for colonial objectives'

(Source: *Falastin*, 11/2/1950)

This demand highlighted the fact that the legacy of the mandate and the consequences of the war were not limited to destruction, but also included legal and political restrictions over the use of public space. In accordance with the need to preserve the Old City and its surrounding area as a 'historical monument', the mandate planning ideology created four planning zones: the Old City, which had to be preserved; a protective belt around it, which had to be preserved as an open space; a larger outer protective belt enclosing that, where any new building had to be in harmony and in scale with the Old City; and the modern city, which was free to develop under the usual town planning scheme (Abu El-Haj, 2001, p.64).

According to Rana Barakat, planning policies in Jerusalem throughout the mandate period were based on an ordinance issued by the military governor of Jerusalem, Ronald Storrs, on 8 April 1918. The ordinance 'restricted all new construction within a 2,500-metre radius of Damascus Gate (Bab al-'Amoud), except by formal permission granted by the military government' (2016, p.25). Barakat mentions that, according to Charles Robert Ashbee,[101] the residents removed trees that were planted as part of the gardens surrounding the walls, as they 'did not seem to want a public garden in their neighbourhood' (ibid, p.29).

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[101] Ashbee was an architect who was appointed by the mandate government as a civic adviser and a secretary to the Pro-Jerusalem Society upon his arrival in Palestine (Barakat, 2016, p.27).

Calls to reverse the mandate planning policies persisted well into the mid-1960s. This can be seen from an election campaign flier from 1965, in which the candidates promised to 'amend the planning regulations inherited from the mandate government, which limit the flourishing of the Arab City and its construction, despite the wishes of al-ahali and the citizens to build their city' ('Please Read This!' flier).

Similar to the debate around the extent of applying the mandate legislation, discussed in the previous chapter, the petition of the property owners showed the layers of history embedded in the city's space. As natives of the city, residents sought to overturn the colonial history by reclaiming their public spaces and determining their *use*. This exemplifies what some legal geographers describe as 'moving places' – when legal places move literally in space 'as a result of the way the people-space-power nexus is legally defined' (Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann, 2014, p.38).

Within a few years, the commercial centre in Bab al-Sahira had grown and the municipality decided to relocate the market of Bab al-Sahira to a different site (Radio broadcast transcribed by Fayiz al-Husseini, 23/6/1958). The new location was selected in the area of Wadi al-Joz, but this site was disputed because it was far from the centre and the land was unsuitable for building a market. Some municipal council members, such as al-'Arif, believed that the planned market would fail (CM 5/5/1953, p.1, JMA 936-5), while land owners near the proposed site did not want the market to be located there (CM 10/1/1953, p.1, JMA 936-5). Most importantly, the vegetable merchants themselves threatened that they would not move to the new location (CM 9/12/1952, p.7, JMA 936-4). However, these objections failed and the new vegetable market was established in Wadi al-Joz[102] in 1955 (Radio broadcast transcribed by Fayiz al-Husseini, 23/6/1958).

The area of Bab al-Sahira continued to grow, attracting more residents and businesses, and generating a centre of the Arab City.[103] A petition submitted to the municipality

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[102] A survey of Wadi al-Joz from 1947 showed more than 70 buildings in the area, which was predominantly residential with not even a single school or place of worship (Davis, 2002, p.53).

[103] It should be noted that this was not the first time that this area had grown and developed as a result of municipal innovation, including having its roads enhanced, sidewalks built, and streetlights installed. See, for example, Tamari, 2017, p.55 and al-Ju'beh, 2005, p.86, on the development of these neighbourhoods during the Ottoman era.

in early 1957 from residents of the area near Bab al-Sahira cemetery[104] demonstrates the process of the centre's constitution as a contestation between tradition and modernity. The petition demanded that the municipality remove a cannon – inherited from the mandate government – from the area, as it posed a danger to the windows of houses and the facades of shops (CM 26/3/1957, p.1, JMA 936-10).

The cannon was used during Ramadan and the Islamic holidays, so it had to be positioned in a *central* place to allow its voice to reach all parts of the city. The municipality discussed the petition but decided that Bab al-Sahira was the 'most suitable' site and that the cannon should not be moved. However, more demands were issued to the municipality, arguing that the cannon disturbed pedestrians, institutions and businesses in the area (CM 29/4/1964, p.2, JMA 938-3).

In late December 1966, complaints about the cannon spread among the commercial and hotel sectors (CM 7/12/1966, p.7, JMA 938-8). A number of hotel owners petitioned the municipality to move it, stating that 'it harms the touristic interest as it is located in the middle of these hotels and disturbs tourists at night'. The municipality finally agreed to move the cannon to another site as a trial, but not before the following year's Ramadan and 'Eid (CM 18/12/1966, p.6, JMA 938-80). But it never did so, as Jerusalem was occupied before these times arrived.

The negotiations around the cannon's site represented a negotiation over not only what constituted a geographical centre, but also what kind of a centre the city aspired to have as it grew. The contradictory world of the centre revolved around tradition and modernization as these tendencies met and diverged, reflecting issues of class, generational gaps and developmental ideals – in sum, a live urbanity, a vivid city-making and a promising projectivity.

The area of the cemetery where the cannon was located is connected to Salah al-Din Street,[105] which extends from Bab al-Sahira to the area of Sheikh Jarrah. It cuts through al-Zahra Street, which was named after the hotel built by the Arab Hotel Association in 1949. As petitions against the cannon's location indicated, more hotels

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[104] Known also as al-Mujahideen cemetery.

[105] The street existed before 1948 and was the residence of a number of wealthy and less wealthy families (Davis, 2002 p.52), but it became a commercial and administrative centre after 1948.

had been built in the area of Salah al-Din Street since mid-1948. Governmental and local institutions, including the Jerusalem Electricity Company, were also located in that street.

In 1952, the municipality prepared a city plan scheme for Bab al-Sahira, which included extending the width of Salah al-Din Street from 12 to 15 metres. The plan was implemented in stages as more buildings erected there, including the post office building (Figure 46). Yet, given the drastic increase in traffic, the need and demand for expanding and improving the street grew (CM 28/8/1956, pp.2–3, JMA 936-9).

Figure 46: 'The post office on Herod's Gate Road (Arab Jerusalem)' – sometime between 1948 and 1958

(Source: Library of the Congress website, LC-M305- SL4-13668 [P&P])

In addition to improving Salah al-Din Street, the municipality embarked on developing the street located between Bab al-'Amoud and Bab al-Sahira, which in the past had been no more than a narrow street with 'nuisances spread along its sides and distorting the beauty of the historical walls'. In late 1957, the municipality embarked on a nine-month project to clean and extend the street to allow traffic in both directions and to establish sidewalks for pedestrians (Radio broadcast, 'Bab al-'Amoud – Bab al-Sahira Street', transcribed by Ruhi al-Khatib, 23/6/1958, JMA 944-24).

The municipality perceived the improvement of this street as a 'live model for constructive reform and beneficial cooperation between the institution and the residents, for the good of the country' (ibid). The street was developed with the assistance of around 100 students from the Youth Organization, which was established by the Ministry of Education in 1957. The students and their teachers spent the summer vacation in Jerusalem volunteering on the project.

In a radio talk, the municipality praised the students by reciting a modified version of al-Mutanabbi poetry: 'You have no horse to gift, nor is there any wealth / So let the handy one be the effort, for conditions do not allow'. The municipality emphasized that the work of the students invoked enthusiasm among other parties to financially support the project, which the municipality did not have enough money to complete (ibid).

A Normative Street – Salah al-Din Street between Modernity and Tradition

Salah al-Din Street would become the main commercial and cultural hub of Arab Jerusalem and a landmark of that era. Was Salah al-Din Street an imitation of, a substitute for, or compensation for Jaffa Street in the New City and the modernity it represented? The dynamic history of Salah al-Din Street's development invalidates this question. The street grew out of its own historical conditions and the context of its residents' negotiations with the city space. Beyond binaries of modern/traditional and old/new, this history demonstrates the capacity that Arab Jerusalem had to generate its own context and identity during times of crisis, and not only to be generated out of one context or another (Appadurai, 1996, p.186) – in this case, the context was the loss of the New City, including Jaffa Street.

The street evolved around a rising Arab cultural identity and, together with the adjacent al-Zahra Street, became a hub for cultural production in the city. The transformation of the street reciprocally shaped and was shaped by leisure activities and the rise of urban institutions that flourished in these streets.[106]

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[106] Tamari argued that leisure and public space reciprocally shaped each other in Ottoman Jerusalem (2017, pp.53–55).

Up until 1966, two of the four daily newspapers that were published in Jerusalem, *al-Difa'* and *Falastin,* were based in Salah al-Din Street, as were several bookshops, including al-Muhtasib (Shqair, 2015). The Palestine Museum, which resumed its work in February 1950 (Figure 47), was also located at the end of the street opposite Bab al-Sahira.

The street also had two Arab cinemas, whereas before 1948 the city's eight cinemas had been located mainly in the New City. Author Mahmoud Shqair documented his early days as a young writer growing out of the cultural experience of Salah al-Din Street:

> On the Street there were two cinemas, al-Hamra and al-Nuzha, as well as a third cinema on al-Zahra Street, the Jerusalem Cinema [al-Quds]. Jerusalemite families regularly attended cinemas, where men and women went to watch Arab and foreign films without reservations. Salah al-Din Street was receiving crowds of female and male cinemagoers almost every day, and the gathering of these groups increased on Fridays and Sundays, and during the Islamic and Christian holidays that the city witnessed and celebrated generously. (Shqair, 2015)

Figure 48: 'Movie house on Herod's Gate road (Arab Jerusalem)' – sometime between 1948 and 1958

(Source: Library of the Congress website, LC-M305- SL4-13669 [P&P])

In addition to the openness and 'unreserved' culture that the establishment of cinemas contributed to the city, tradition and religion were no less a part of its dynamic social fabric. In 1960, religious clerks complained to mayor Ruhi al-Khatib about 'adulterer' photos that cinemas 'compete to show on large boards at the entrance of Bab al-'Amoud and next to churches. In response, the municipality limited cinema ads to boards of the municipality, away from Bab al-'Amoud and places of worship (CM 9/8/1960, p.1, JMA 937-2).

Connecting the City and Beyond

The change in the Palestinian geography after the Nakba required a 'reconstitution of connection services … a new set of spatial relations and new patterns of movement and connection' (Feldman, 2008, p.184). The change of Arab Jerusalem's location after the loss of contact with Palestinian port cities, and the loss of the rail route in the New City, required the establishment of new modes and routes of transportation within Jerusalem and beyond.

Arab Jerusalem, in this sense, was a changing geography as it gradually expanded throughout the Jordanian period. This was reflected in its map of connectivity and the facilities of transportation that allowed or hindered that connectivity. While this section touches briefly on transportation within Jerusalem, the last section of this chapter discusses the Jerusalem Airport.

Centrality required connectivity within the city and beyond in order to keep the centre alive. In 1952, discussions began in the municipality about the need to establish a bus terminal to substitute for the one in the New City. Those travelling by bus to Jerusalem were dropped in various and remote stops on the margins of the city, or they waited for buses in random spots in the city's streets under rain and sun (Radio broadcast transcribed by Fayiz al-Husseini, 23/6/1958).

On 20 May 1957, the bus terminal (Figure 49) was inaugurated in an event that was attended by the military commander, the city's notables, and members of the public. It was followed by a celebratory lunch (CM 14/5/1957, p.2, JMA 936-10). After five years of negotiations over funding, site and design, bidding for contractors, and the actual construction, the terminal was opened on what was then Jericho Road near Bab al-'Amoud. It served lines within both the West and the East Bank.[107] The bus terminal was established on waqf (endowed) land, for which the municipality acquired a right of easement for 30 years. The overall cost of the project was 27,000 Jordanian dinars (Radio broadcast transcribed by Fayiz al-Husseini, 23/6/1958).

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[107] For recollections of travelling through this terminal and the sense of connectivity with other cities and villages and with the Arab world, including Damascus and Beirut, see Hercbergs, 2018, pp.53–54.

Figure 49: 'The bus terminal in Bab al-'Amoud'
(Source: JMA 935-17)

The terminal was designed in a modern way, with roofed stations, 'comfortable and clean seats', and drinking-water fountains. In addition, the station became a commercial zone, as it was designed to include cafés, restaurants and shops (ibid). It also had a scale set on the sidewalk of its main street, like Ramallah and other cities of the world (CM 28/5/1957, p.5, JMA 936-10).[108]

Within just a few years, the station became very crowded. In 1963, the municipality discussed the need to establish two additional bus terminals – one in Sheikh Jarrah, to serve northern cities, and the other on Jericho Road, near Wadi al-Joz, to serve western and southern cities, including Amman (CM 4/12/1963, p.18, JMA 938-2). In mid-1966, this plan was extended to include parking for lorries (CM 26/5/1966, p.9, JMA 938-7). These developments in transportation show the changing geography and boundaries of Arab Jerusalem, as well as the increasing connectivity and centrality of the city as time unfolded.

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The emergence of Bab al-Sahira and Salah al-Din Street as a centre was a product of joint and diverted forces of urban agents, through petitions, protests and municipal

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[108] The scale was installed following a request from a shopkeeper to have it placed on the sidewalk next to his shop. In return, he paid a rent of two Jordanian dinars per year to the municipality.

interventions and insistence on developing Arab Jerusalem. This centre was shaped and determined by reviving certain rituals and activating institutions that were lost in 1948, as well as by preserving traditional and religious hegemony. It was materialized by local capital and developmental thinking that survived the collapse of the city centre in 1948. Perhaps, then, it is safe to argue that the centre of Arab Jerusalem is a marker of both the rupture[109] with the past and its simultaneous continuity.

Negotiating Public Use in Arab Jerusalem

The negotiations over the location of the cannon and cinema ads revealed a contestation over *use* in public space. In her discussion of the ontology of municipal regulations, Mariana Valverde argues that these regulations act on groups of persons to determine control over access to and use of spaces (Valverde, 2005, p.34). She further reminds us that 'there are no physical barriers to shopping and sleeping being done in the same space; the barriers are normative and legal' (ibid, p.52). In other words, it is normativity that determines the use of and accessibility to the public space, be it political or social, such as in the case of gender contestation over the entrance to Bab al-'Amoud.

Defining norms in the city was majorly determined by the 'tourist gaze' and the dynamics of 'seeing and being seen' (Urry, 2002, p.125). Tourism and the tourist gaze significantly impacted the city on a global scale (Judd and Fainstein, 1999). Centuries before 1948, tourism, particularly pilgrimage, and the tourist gaze had been a 'shaper of Jerusalem' (Hintlian, 2019), as the next section of this chapter will discuss in detail. Recounting the Ottoman era, Wasif Jawhariyah described in his diaries how improvements that were introduced by mayor Salim al-Husseini, including tiles and sewerage inside the walls, rendered the city a model of 'cleanliness and beauty, especially for those who visited its holy sites at the time' (Tamari and Nassar, 2003, p.25).

From its side, the municipality was busy recruiting, funding and proposing plans to develop the city and please the tourist gaze. At the same time, it had to negotiate the

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[109] Tamari argues that the transformation of leisure space in Ottoman Jerusalem reflected a rupture with the urban scape of earlier decades (2017, p.55).

production of space with residents, both poor and rich, as we saw in relation to the Bab al-Sahira area. In the process, it needed to produce a normative citizenry, through notions of law and order, public good, and the designation of public spaces as amenities.

The use of public space determines a form of city citizenry, *citadinite*, which 'describes the dynamic identity relationship that city dwellers have with each other and with their urban environment' (Dalachanis and Lemire, 2018, p.7). It reflects a notion of 'cityness' and an ability of residents to 'make a city' together (Sassen, cited in ibid). Narratives of urban development are also concerned with the production of ethical and normative citizenry, as AbdouMaliq Simone states:

> development as a specific modality of temporality is not simply about meeting the needs of citizens. It is also about capturing residents to a life aesthetic defined by the state so that they can be citizens. It is about making [them] ethical beings; about holding people in relations that makes them governable. (2004a, p.7)

In the euphoric production of modernized cities and their centres, many social groups are pushed to the margins, and at times are treated as an anomaly and a nuisance within the developing public space. Arab Jerusalem was no exception, particularly given the social changes and stratification that the Nakba produced in the city's fabric. The Nakba forced refugees and poor residents to develop their own local economy and to create the needed infrastructure for it. This section focuses mainly on these marginalized groups in Arab Jerusalem and their economies and use of the public space after 1948.

Regulating the Poor of the Old City

While some residents were able to keep some of their capital and property to carry out economic enterprises in the partitioned city, others – including poor residents and deprived refugees – had to find their way through the city. Thus, the city witnessed the rise or revival of various poor economies that depended on minimal or no capital in order to produce profit. One such economy was the increasing use of gaps in the walls of the Old City near the main gates, Bab al-'Amoud and Bab al-Sahira, where poor vendors could set up booths to sell basic goods.

Given the economic destitution and the crisis experienced by shops in the months following the fall of the New City, the municipality saw in these gap-booths a way to relieve the impoverished residents. Thus, in 1949, it began the tradition of renting these gaps from the government – their legal owner – and renting them to residents (CM 9/9/1952, p.3, JMA 936-4). In 1955, eleven gaps were rented in Bab al-Sahira and Bab al-'Amoud (CM 5/4/1955, p.9, JMA 936-7).

A contestation over the authority of administering and profiting from the gaps arose between the government and the municipality. In 1952, the government demanded that it be given half the rent generated from the gaps, instead of the municipality receiving it all (ibid). In 1955, the government further decided that it would no longer allow the gaps to be managed by the municipality. Instead, it transferred their administration to the governmental department of land and planning. In response, the municipality argued that the initial need to use the gaps had now passed and so they should be cleared of any booths and kept empty (ibid).

Since the start of this tradition, the municipal council had conflicting opinions about allocating the gaps for such use. Some municipal council members with modernized approaches considered the booths a distortion of the archaeological and ancient appearance of the walls and the gates (CM 9/9/1952, p.3, JMA 936-4). Other members, such as al-'Arif, thought that having booths in the gaps was better than leaving them vacant, attracting garbage and urination (CM 4/12/1963, p.4, JMA 938-2).

Renters of the gaps, unlike the municipality, did not think that the need to rent the gaps had passed, as poverty still prevailed in the city. In 1956, upon receiving eviction

orders from the department of land and planning, they petitioned the municipality 'seeking its mercy' to keep the situation as it was, given that they 'are poor breadwinners for large families and cannot rent shops'. They also stated that vacant gaps would become a source of filth and nuisance. The petition convinced the municipal council to reverse its previous decision and demand that the department renew the rent, 'given the exceptional circumstances in the city' (CM 2/10/1956, p.21, JMA 936-9).

For over a decade, consecutive municipal councils, although convinced of the need to evict the gap booths, failed to do so for 'emotional and legal reasons'. In 1963, the issue was reconsidered, this time by the Tourism Authority, which insisted that the eviction was necessary for tourism reasons and that the gaps should be occupied with large touristic photos and tri-dimensional shapes and maps showing the city's archaeological sites (CM 4/12/1963, p.4, JMA 938-2).

A proponent of this approach argued that 'the tourist does not care about kids' toys, adulterer photos and other dull goods' displayed in the gaps. He claimed that touristic photos and maps would be 'the best display to please the tourist when he begins his tour in the Old City at Bab al-'Amoud'. A representative of the Tourism Authority supported this argument, referring to tourist complaints that commercialism dominated the city's holy places and archaeological sites. On the other side, the head of the Chamber of Commerce argued that the use of gaps by vendors had protected them and that tourism ads could be installed in other spaces (ibid).

The city's poor had to compete with the tourist gaze and interests when claiming their location within the city's public space. Being the primary tourism attraction, the Old City became the main site for such contestation. Processes and plans of development made this less inclusive, as it pushed away 'undesirable' inhabitants. For instance, Bab al-'Amoud and Bab al-Sahira, in particular, were gradually beautified by gardens and other amenities, while peddlers were excluded from these spaces to allow a 'better' and 'attractive' touristic display (CM 16/2/1960, p.8, JMA 937-1).

> I learned that this tribe had lived in Jerusalem for a long time, over a hundred years, and they had lived at this location since 1936. The tribe is known for its poverty and relies for its living on its petty income, as most of its breadwinners work in the Jerusalem municipality's sanitation department. And I have noticed that its members maintain firm bonds that do not allow them to separate from each other, and they do not have the financial means that would allow them to rent rooms or houses, in addition to the difficulties they encounter in finding someone to rent them a house. And I believe that the only solution for this problem is to provide them with tents that they set in a separate place outside the borders of the city, away from the residents' sight. (CM 19/9/1962, p.6, JMA 937-6)

With these words, the head of the social affairs department described the Roma families who lived in Bab Hutta, inside the walls near the area of Burj al-Laqlaq (ibid).[110] A total of 175 persons were living in 33 tin box-houses, in what was described by the chief doctor in Jerusalem as 'unhealthy conditions with only three toilets, resulting in a health calamity and danger for the neighbours in spreading diseases'. Not only doctors, social workers, district governors and residents but also tourists were 'bothered' by these 'filthy tin boxes-houses' and their dwellers. Accordingly, the municipality issued orders to evict them based on the Public Health Law (1940). In response, the dwellers petitioned the municipality to keep them in their places (CM 3/4/1962, p.9, JMA 937-5).

The issue of the Roma dwellers of Bab Hutta was coupled in municipal discussions with another 'similar' case, that of the tin houses of the poor in Bab al-Magharba (Dung Gate). A total of 13 wooden porches, unhealthy and unfit for habitation, were built on the edges of Bab al-Magharba after May 1948. The dwellers were mainly workers who had left their villages looking for work, mostly from the Hebron district, and whose families were living in their villages – excluding two families, one of which was a refugee family (CM 19/9/1962, p.6, JMA 937-6).

Despite the different background of the Bab al-Magharba case from that of the Roma in Bab Hutta, the former's houses were also seen as nuisances that needed to be removed. The head of the social affairs department argued that the houses would affect the reputation of the city from a tourism point of view, since many tourists visited that

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[110] For more on the history of the Roma in Jerusalem, see Peterson, 2003.

area and the tin houses blocked the view of the wall and the Haram al-Sharif. Furthermore, it was argued that the houses caused health hazards, as they were located near a school and the lack of toilets made the dwellings unsanitary. In addition, the density of the houses and their proximity to each other was considered ethically unacceptable, since there were no barriers to prevent the inhabitants seeing and hearing each other (ibid; CM 18/7/1962, p.10, JMA 937-6).

Accordingly, the municipality perceived that no harm would befall the dwellers if they moved away, because they were not refugees and could rent elsewhere (CM 19/9/1962, p.6, JMA 937-6). Nevertheless, mayor al-Khatib stated that the issue was complicated and that it was the municipality's responsibility to secure alternative accommodation for them (CM 18/7/1962, p.11, JMA 937-6).

Over the years, the municipality and other governmental bodies discussed the eviction of the Roma from Bab Hutta (CM 3/4/1962, p.9, JMA 937-5) and the dwellers of Bab al-Magharba, but without success – although, in the latter case, the parties offered some compensation for the dwellers if they would agree to move (CM 3/7/1963, p.18, JMA 938-2).

The main obstacle for settling this matter was the lack of funds to secure alternative accommodation for the 'undesirable dwellers' (Judd and Fainstein, 1999, p.23). In early 1967, the municipality received a letter from the Tourism Authority demanding their removal. In response, the municipal council emphasized that the municipality was the first to raise this issue with the government:

> We assure the chair of the Tourism Authority of our persistent care for the city and its maintenance, but unfortunately, *one hand cannot clap* and there is a need to join practical forces in order to [evict] the tribe's members. (CM 22/2/1967, p.2, JMA 938-9, emphasis added)

In this sense, the public good entailed negotiations and a balance between ethics of care, the tourist gaze, and health and social considerations. Eventually, the lack of means and the 'one hand' that could not clap, according to the municipal council, determined that the 'undesirable dwellers' would stay in what they considered *their* space. Negotiating, instead of enforcing the dry law, was part of how the municipality practised its social authority in these cases.

In yet another site inside the Old City, some owners of shops located in the historical Souq of Aftimos demanded in 1965 that the municipality operate the fountain that stood in the centre of the souq. The shop owners thought that resuming the water flow in the fountain would add beauty and glamour to the souq, which 'all people pass through, especially tourists' (CM 8/9/1965, p.2 [confidential], JMA 938-6).

Although mayor al-Khatib welcomed the idea, during a discussion concerning the request he drew the attention of the council members to a group of Indian and Afghani vendors who for a long time had claimed the fountain and its surroundings as their commercial zone. Operating the fountain would have entailed relocating these vendors, and in that case the municipality would be obligated to find them an alternative site or to compensate them. Thus, the council suggested asking the merchants who proposed the idea whether they would be willing to provide any compensation to the vendors (ibid).

The mayor met with the merchants, who refused to pay compensation. He also met with the vendors and asked them whether they would be willing to move to a nearby site. The vendors said that such a move would disadvantage them, since their location next to Aftimos fountain was a central thoroughfare for people and thus drew attention to their goods. In addition, it was close to the storage space where they kept their goods. Thus, given their poverty, they pleaded with the municipality not to move them. As a result, the council decided to allow the vendors to remain in their location and to leave the issue of the fountain pending until circumstances would allow its operation (CM 20/10/1965, p.5, JMA 938-6).

Law and Disorder in the Streets

Law and order were fundamental for the production of the city space. Law-making and enforcement, as well as social engagement with municipal law, determined municipal authority and visibility in the public space. The Nakba created different forms of disorder and improvised use of the city space. Attempts to resume order and enforcement of municipal regulations began from the early weeks after the fall of the New City, as discussed in chapter 4. However, urban disorder in Jerusalem continued to be a persistent challenge for the municipality, mostly in relation to violations of the

Town Planning Ordinance by residences and businesses, and of the Prevention of Nuisances by-law, especially by vendors (CM 21/11/1962, p.4, JMA 937-6).

The history of the municipality regulating the movement of animals in the Old City best illustrates the complexity of enforcing law and order on the ground. The prevalence of poor and basic economies – such as peddlers and porters using animals, mostly donkeys (Ghosheh, 2013, pp.375–376) – posed challenges for the authorities to regulate their movement in the streets of Jerusalem. From at least 1950, the municipality began to address the increasing reliance on animals, especially inside the Old City where many barns were located.

In January 1951, the municipal council discussed the difficulties it encountered in regulating the movement of animals in the Old City. In an attempt to overcome a lack of compliance with municipal regulations on the part of donkey owners, while also taking into consideration their poor economic situation and livelihood, the council initially decided to neither prevent animals in the Old City nor restrict their entrance to particular times. Instead, it set limited routes for animals inside the Old City. However, this proved to be insufficient, as animals continued to roam all the streets of the Old City (CM 11/1/1950, p.3, JMA 936-3).

Furthermore, the municipality decided in December 1950 to ban all barns inside the Old City and to demand that their owners establish modern barns in locations designated by the municipality outside the Old City. However, for the next decade, no alternative locations were set and only a few barns were closed. As a result, the role of the municipality was limited to supervising the health conditions and licensing of the barns (CM 27/11/1963, p.12, JMA 938-2). Although none of the steps introduced by the municipality worked, it was determined to find a principal solution to eliminate this form of disorder. The dilemma contrasted the municipality's modernized and developmental ideals.

Barns inside the Old City constituted a health hazard, as animal dung and urine deposited in the streets had a negative effect on public hygiene and health. The waste was also believed to be profaning holy sites (ibid). Another major problem concerned the blocking of traffic inside the Old City's narrow streets, as owners would sometimes tie their animals in unsuitable places. This restricted the movement of locals heading

home, worshippers on their way to prayer, merchants opening their shops, students going to school, and tourists wandering around. Animal owners were also criticized for mistreating their animals by overloading them. In addition, residents and the municipality accused animal owners of being rude to locals and to tourists when they complained about their path being blocked (ibid).

In 1954, the council discussed a petition from residents in the Bab al-'Amoud area, demanding that the municipality prevent the passage of animals through the gate – especially when the animals were loaded with construction materials such as metal and wood. The residents proposed to divert the route to Bab al-Magharba, near the Moroccan neighbourhood in the south-east corner of the Old City (CM 28/9/1954, p.1, JMA 936-6).

The municipality sought the advice of the Chamber of Commerce, which recommended that the route through Bab al-'Amoud be kept but restricted to certain hours of the day. As a trial, the municipality decided that animals would not be allowed through Bab al-'Amoud and Bab al-Magharba between 8 am and 5 pm (CM 9/11/1954, p.1, JMA 936-6).

These steps, which preceded official regulation of the movement of animals, demonstrated how the municipality relied on traditional negotiation patterns, where authority would be tested before it was rendered a legal norm. In the following years, as the city sought to encourage tourism, the municipality demonstrated a firmer stand towards animal owners as more governmental parties pushed it to eliminate the 'animal problem'.

In 1961, a committee comprised of representatives of the security, tourism and sanitation authorities met at the district governor's office to discuss the subject. Among their recommendations was that the municipality refrain from using donkeys as transportation when providing municipal services and that it instead use small carts. It was argued that such a step would render the municipality a role model for residents in eliminating animal use in the Old City (CM 24/10/1961, p.5, JMA 937-4). At the heart of this process stood the quest for modernization, not only urban order per se.

The following year, the municipality began using bicycles instead of donkeys for garbage collection in the Old City. It therefore decided to rid itself of six of its 13 donkeys. Two were put to sleep due to old age and the other four were sold at auction (CM 29/8/1962, p.14, JMA 937-6). Other strict steps were recommended as well, including issuing a military administrative order to declare the Old City an area clear of barns, preventing animals from entering the Musrara road, and moving the animal market from its location near the walls to a different area away from archaeological sites.

In order to implement these recommendations, the municipality was instructed to find a parking lot for the donkeys of villagers coming into the city to sell their goods in the wholesale market. It was also decided that until a full ban was imposed, animals would be prevented from entering the Old City between 9 am and 4 pm (CM 24/10/1961, p.6, JMA 937-4). These regulatory steps would not become official by-laws until 1964, since the municipality could not force an immediate change of the situation. It had to negotiate, educate, test and act as a role model in order to be able to enforce such regulations. Thus, it had to implement these steps 'gradually and in stages' (ibid).

Not only the authorities but also the residents constantly complained in local newspapers about the lack of law enforcement in relation to animal movement in the Old City and its impact on tourism. On 1 August 1962, *Falastin* newspaper published a letter titled 'Disturbances in Jerusalem', under the pseudonym 'the Jerusalemite'. The author listed several violations taking place in the city's streets, hoping to receive a response from the municipality. The first on the list was donkeys 'roaming the streets in groups without a leader' (JMA 944-21).

Two months later, on 8 October 1962, *al-Manar* newspaper published an essay titled 'Bab al-'Amoud' under the pseudonym 'the elder'. The author expressed concerns about how violations of municipal order, including donkey dung in Bab al-'Amoud, leave tourists disgusted and potentially cause them harm. A few months later, on 31 December 1962, *al-Manar* newspaper published an essay under the pseudonym 'Khaldoun', titled 'From Our City.' The essay stated that 'a camera caught an interesting scene and documented it for the world. The place: one of the narrow alleys of the Old City. The scene: crowds of people are unable to make their way through, as

two donkeys stood opposite to each other exchanging looks of love'. In a sarcastic tone, the author moved from one street to another, describing what a tourist's camera would document in the Old City of Jerusalem (ibid).

By 1964, some barn owners had been convicted in courts and eviction orders were issued against some of them. However, actual and effective results were limited, as very few barns were evicted and the health conditions of the rest did not improve. As such, it was decided that the district governor would meet with the barn owners and negotiate a time frame to move out of the Old City (CM 27/11/1963, p.13, JMA 938-2).

Among the most important results of the discussions and negotiations related to the movement of animals in the Old City was the municipality's enactment of two new animal-related by-laws. In fact, it was the Minister of Interior who urged the municipality to use its legislative authority, instead of requesting administrative defence orders, to regulate animal movement in the Old City (ibid).

The two by-laws in question were enacted in 1964. The first was the Regulation for Setting Locations of Stables, Barns, Corrals, Poultry Farms and Domestic Birds in Jerusalem; the second was the Regulation for Supervising Animals Used in Transport and Traction in Jerusalem. The by-laws mainly included the aforementioned recommendations as well as further conditions for the use of animals, such as requiring licences for animals and riders, a minimum age of 16 for riders, regular health check-ups for animals, and the inscription of licence numbers on metal tags tied to the necks of animals (CM 18/3/1964, pp.6–7, JMA 938-3).

To what extent were these by-laws enforced on the ground, and how did their enactment and enforcement give way to modern bicycles replacing donkeys? In late 1966, a number of merchants requested the support of the Chamber of Commerce concerning requests addressed to the municipality to allow them to use special carts to move their goods into and around the Old City. In response to the Chamber's enquiry in this regard, the municipality's head of inspectors informed the city council that:

> There is no doubt that most merchants of the Old City have been affected as a result of the recent strict measures taken to prevent animals from roaming the streets, as well as the decreasing number of porters. The proposal to replace

animals with hand-driven carts is a good suggestion, but it is not new as the municipality has been trying to persuade animal owners to use carts in the narrow streets of the Old City [for a long time]. But unfortunately, only a few have accepted. (CM 7/12/1966, p.6, JMA 938-8)

The head of inspectors further explained that there were 15 carts licensed to work in the Old City, from 4 pm to 8 am, and that the municipality would be pleased to grant licences to anyone who would apply – as long as municipal regulations were followed. The municipality concluded that 'it had never been an obstacle in the way of conveying goods to their owners, and it cares as much as merchants care for the flourishment of the commercial and the touristic movement in the city' (ibid).

Although requests for cart licences showed some change in the attitudes of merchants, the regulatory negotiations that spanned over 15 years of the municipality's life did not in fact bring a fundamental change in the overall situation of compliance with municipal regulations. In December 1966, mayor al-Khatib reported to the municipal council that, after assessing the situation with the heads of inspectors and the health department, they had come to the conclusion that many animal owners who had been evicted from the Old City had returned their animals there. The municipal council was, however, determined to continue to apply its by-laws and prevent barns and unlicensed animals in the Old City (ibid).

What is at stake in the history of the regulation of animal movement is the dynamics that determined how municipal law and order were contested and negotiated within the public space of the city. As an essential pillar of modernization, the rule of law was something for which the city strove. At the same time, livelihood, tradition, political conditions and class struggle were equally prominent in delineating the lines of legality and determining its fulfilment.

<center>***</center>

Various ideals, players and forces competed in making the public space of Arab Jerusalem. This section has scratched the surface of the city to explore 'undesirable' groups, sites and phenomena. The question of who owned the city was investigated through the notion of *use* and the attempts of the municipality to regulate it. Municipal law in Arab Jerusalem and the municipality's challenges in enforcing it, reflect the competing ideals between the will of al-ahali, mainly the poor, to make the city

accessible and liveable, and those outsider tourists who significantly shaped how the city looked and how it aspired to look like in the future.

Tourism in Partitioned Jerusalem: Imagining the Arab City and Beyond

There might be no other marker of time and continuity in Jerusalem after 1948 as significant as tourism. The sacred, eternal and heavenly time of pilgrimage could not be interrupted, and Jerusalem as a holy city had to keep up with that time flow. With pilgrimage being the 'shaper of Jerusalem' (Hintlian, 2019), it seemed natural that the tourism economy would be the anchor for the ruined city from the early months after the partition of Jerusalem in 1948. In fact, this was not only a continuity practised by tourists coming into Jerusalem, but also a continuity with centuries of interaction and 'symbiotic interplay between locals and outsiders' (Norris, 2019a, p.7).

The history of Jerusalem as a centre of pilgrimage and tourism explains why the first economic project after the Nakba was a hotel. In Ottoman Jerusalem, tourism was the main source of income. Since finding accommodation was a challenge for the growing number of tourists coming into the city, hotels and other accommodation projects began to expand in the second half of the nineteenth century (Hintlian, 2000, pp.232–233; see also, Rioli, 2018, pp.40–41). The development of tourism continued during the mandate era, with the introduction of Westernized technologies and the advancement of transportation networks. Palestine became an attractive destination for secular tourists as well as for pilgrims (Cohen-Hattab, 2004, p.62). Tourism was also a prominent arena for Palestinians to affirm their identity and claim their history, against the Zionist ideology backed by the British colonial policies in Palestine (Irving, 2019, pp.65–66).

This continuity was interrupted in 1948, however, with the loss of the infrastructure that allowed the path of pilgrimage to the hills of Jerusalem by sea and rail. As such, the industry of buses that was developed under the mandate was decisive in the development of tourism from neighbouring Arab countries after the Nakba (Hintlian, 2019, pp.14–15; Johnson and Shamas, 2018, p.122). Furthermore, the opening of the Jerusalem Airport in 1950 was a turning point in this industry. Mayor Ruhi al-Khatib

described it as a 'blessing', thus endowing secular modern developmental ideals with sacredness.

In parallel, and at odds with the airport and its representation, stood the Mandelbaum Gate as a signifier of loss. It blocked the way of the city to develop and be free, as well as influenced the meanings and objectives of tourism. The gate as the marker of the unsettled future was to be contested through the projection of a confident future, as was reflected by tourism. The contradictions of the closed border to the west and the open borders to the east, south and north shaped the identity of Jerusalem as an Arab city. Central to this identity-making were indeed the material conditions that allowed the tourism economy to flourish, helping the city stand on its feet. But it was also Jerusalem's long legacy of interaction with the world as an important tourist destination, mainly through pilgrimage, that helped the city after 1948 to 'adapt to new ways of defining that importance', as Norris argued in relation to the neighbouring Bethlehem (2019a, p.7).

This 'adaptation of importance' was particularly visible in shaping Jerusalem's political identity as an Arab City, beyond the label 'Jordanian city' that was imposed after 1948. As Massad emphasizes, 'the only sector that was developed at all in the West Bank was tourism. One Palestinian explained it this way: "Since they [Jordan] could not transfer Jerusalem … the only thing they allowed was the development of the tourism industry"' (2001, p.236). The connectivity that tourism allowed for the city with the world, particularly the Arab world, created a transnational context for this frontier partitioned city after the Nakba.

Building Hotels in the Partitioned City

Ahead of Christmas in 1949, the government established a committee chaired by Jerusalem's mayor, Anwar al-Khatib, to ensure the convenience of pilgrims coming to Palestine that year.[111] A meeting held in mid-November 1949 at the municipality office brought together representatives of airline companies in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Beit Jala and Ramallah, as well as tourism and travel agencies, hotels, restaurants,

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[111] I was not able to trace information in the Municipality Archive regarding the first Christmas after the Nakba in December 1948.

souvenir shops, and taxi and bus companies. They discussed creating a 'cooperative plan' among the cities to facilitate that year's pilgrimage and to raise donations and other resources, since the government was unable to provide them with any financial support (CM 14/11/1949, JMA 936-1).

In the same year, Ruhi al-Khatib and others in Jerusalem established the Arab Hotels Association. In August 1949, the Association established the first economic project in Jerusalem after the Nakba, al-Zahra Hotel, which became the first hotel in the Arab City.[112] In the same year, another hotel located at Bab al-Khalil inside the walls was renovated and re-named the Petra Hotel (Figures 50, 51 and 52). The opening of the two hotels and the initiative for a cooperative plan to organize the pilgrimage in 1949 reflect how tourism continued to be central to Jerusalem immediately after the Nakba.

In August 1949, the two newly opened hotels pleaded with the Jerusalem municipality to decrease the costs of their licence to sell alcohol, as they were charged for a full year while only receiving their licence in the second half of the year.[113] The municipal council accepted the request, given the 'exceptional circumstances of the institutions' and in order to 'encourage public projects'. For the purposes of the Crafts and Businesses by-law, the municipality categorized al-Zahra as a 'first-class hotel' (CM 24/8/1949, p.1; 14/9/1949, p.2, JMA 936-1).

Figure 50: 'Dance party in Petra'

(Source: *Falastin,* 9/8/1949)

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[112] The street where the hotel is located was named after the hotel. Following the attack on Port Said in 1956, the municipality decided to call the street Port Said. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan protested the decision, assuming that the street was named after Fatimah al-Zahra, the daughter of the Prophet Mouhamad. In response, al-Khatib clarified that the hotel was actually named after al-Zahra Palace in Andalusia (CM 5/3/1957, p.7, JMA 936-10).

[113] The hotels opened some time in the second half of 1949.

Figure 51: Petra Hotel in 1967 (I)

(Source: ISA website)

Figure 52: Petra Hotel in 1967 (II)

(Source: ISA website)

These networks of early engagements between the municipality, the government and the private sector, less than a year after the partitioning of Jerusalem, distort the distance from the Nakba as perceived today and blur the boundaries between the past and the future. They also suggest continuity with the 'local enthusiasm' that prevailed before 1948 and provide an example of the economic independence that was at the core of the developmental perceptions of Jerusalem's economic sector.[114] In 1965, al-Khatib proudly recounted in detail the progress of tourism since 1948:

> In the second half of 1948, not a single hotel was operating in the city, while now we have 20 hotels and 3 pensions comprising 780 rooms, mostly with private baths and showers, and provided with all facilities to secure comfort and rest to visitors of the city. Compared with 1948, when most tourist activity was in the hands of *foreigners* and not a single company or office was operating in this part of Jerusalem, we now have 28 companies or offices and some of these have branches in some Western countries, and they all have their contributions in the field of propaganda and tourist activities. ('Developments in Jerusalem' lecture, 15/5/1963, p.4; see also al-Khatib, 2006, pp.48–50, emphasis added)

The pride that the development in tourism brought to the city, should be read within the context of Jerusalem as the main 'natural resource' for Jordan's tourism progress (Katz, 2005, p.122). Tourism occupied a central role in Jordan's nation-state project, therefore, to affirm its sovereignty, Jordan appropriated Jerusalem and 'displayed' it to promote itself as the Holy Land, as Katz argues (ibid, pp.118–136; Figure 53).

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[114] See also the essay by Fayeq Barakat of the Chamber of Commerce (1998, p.331).

Figure 53: Jordanian map 1964

(Source: The National Library of Israel Blog)

Tourism constituted an important channel for creating a modernized image of Jordan, regionally and internationally, and leading the country into global markets. The King was portrayed as 'the pioneer of the touristic renaissance [Nahda] in Jordan' (Jerusalem This Week Magazine, 'The Summer in Jordan' issue, 06/1966, p.1, JMA 944-21 (hereafter, The Summer in Jordan issue)) (Figure 54).

Figure 54: 'His majesty the King, the pioneer of the tourism Nahda in Jordan'
(Source: JMA 944-21)

Time was one of the main tools of appropriation, as Jordan claimed a continuity with the past and a sovereignty rooted in time immemorial. To 'sell' Jordan as the Holy Land, an American adviser recruited by the Tourism Authority suggested a 'plan to represent Jordan as an *ageless country*, by constructing an image of Jordan's ancient religious civilizations in a new modern package' (Katz, 2005, p.120, emphasis added).

Temporal ordering through tourism was promoted on a local as well as a national level. As such, Amman had to be produced as ageless to compete with Jerusalem. The aforementioned issue of *Amman al-Massa'* published in 1965 was dedicated to promoting cities in Jordan through essays authored by their mayors. The essay by Amman's mayor was titled 'The Beautiful Capital Which Is Considered Older Than History Itself …', while al-Khatib's essay on Jerusalem was titled 'Jerusalem … How Was It after the Nakba and How Is It Now?' (*Amman al-Massa'* essay).

The temporal framing of each city is indicative of different orientations and positions within the nation-state project. While Jordan promoted the 'geographical space of Jerusalem as a national space' (Katz, 2005, p.119), Jerusalem sought to negotiate this geographical incorporation through trans-local and national connectivity with the world, including the Arab world. In this sense, the city's interest did not necessarily counter the state's interest, nor compete with it; on the contrary, Jerusalem benefited from the tourism boom under Jordan and vice versa (Massad, 2001, p.236).

The Blessing of Flying

The crucial point in the city's tourism economy after the Nakba was the opening and development of the Jerusalem Airport in 1950. The airport was located in the Qalandiya area, 10 kilometres to the north of the city. It was established in the 1920s by the British government to serve as a small military base and was known by the British as 'Kolundia Airfield' (Awwad, 2008b, p.55). In the 1930s, airports were established in Haifa and Lydda to serve as civil airports under the mandate.[115]

On 1 March 1950, Jordan re-opened the small military airport as a civil airport. The airport was still in its 'primitive' state, before it was developed in 1956 ('Developments in Jerusalem' lecture, 15/5/1963, p.5). Two months after its opening, a proposal to change its name to 'Jerusalem Airport' was approved by the government (*Falasti*

port'

(Source: *Falastin,* 18/5/1950)

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[115] For the history and objectives of their establishment, see Norris, 2013, pp.116–120.

According to *Falastin* newspaper, the importance of the airport increased from week to week after its opening due to the smooth movement of different airline companies. Al-Khatib noted in 1965 that:

> At the beginning of its operation [the airport] used to receive small aircrafts of eight or twelve seats. Now aircrafts of 90 seats can easily land on it, and it is connected with the Beirut International Airport by three daily services, and with Kuwait by three regular weekly services, and in addition to that, tens of chartered planes land on it every month. ('Developments in Jerusalem' lecture, 15/5/1963, p.6)

Al-Khatib referred to the airport as a 'blessed activity' that enabled 'many of *our* young men to specialize as tourist guides', with their number rising from 20 to 171 between 1948 and 1962. Also, while only two taxi offices worked in the city in 1949, in 1962 the number rose to ten and more than 300 taxis functioned in the city (for example, see Figure 56). Together, these developments helped to increase the annual number of tourists from 8,000 in 1950 to 210,000 at the end of 1962 (ibid, pp.5–6).

Figure 56: 'Union, Order and Work: All to be found in al-Hamra Taxi'

(Source: *al-Difa'*, 4/4/1958)

This 'blessing' transformed the local economy as tourism become the city's main source of income. It was estimated that in 1966, the income from tourism in Jerusalem amounted to between 5 and 7 million dinars (Van Arkadie, 1977, p.125, cited in Dakkak, 1981, p.145). Tourism encouraged the development of other businesses as well – including the souvenir industry, as 'presents made of olive wood, mother of pearl, embroidery and the Dead Sea stones opened scopes of work to hundreds of residents, and in Jerusalem alone there are now 86 stores undertaking the sale of such presents to visitors' ('Developments in Jerusalem' lecture, 15/5/1963, p.5). One of the Jerusalem Airport's former employees stated that many of these products were exported to other countries (Awwad, 2008a).

The political situation inside and outside Jordan, especially in the mid- and late 1950s, including the 1956 Suez crisis, impacted the situation of tourism in Jerusalem (Johnson and Shamas, 2018, p.123). However, local newspapers still reported active touristic movement in 1958, around Easter time, which witnessed a large number of tourists arriving in Jerusalem. The Tourism Authority demanded that travel agencies renew their work licences (*al-Difa'*, 2/4/1958) (Figure 57). In 1958, the Hilton Hotel became interested in establishing a branch in Jerusalem and its representatives arrived in the city to explore the option (*al-Difa'*, 4/2/1959).

Figure 57: 'Tourists and members of the UN Emergency Force arrived in Jerusalem during Easter / Renewal of licences of airlines companies'

(Source: *al-Difa'*, 2/4/1958)

After 1960, 'travel became easier and Jordan's tourism department began to improve its promotion of the country and its services' (Katz, 2005, p.117). Though initial tourism plans targeted a Western Christian audience, they later addressed Christian and Muslim audiences in the Arab world as well (ibid, p.118). This strategy attracted more groups from Arab countries, including school students and professionals visiting and holding conferences in the city.

The year 1964, in particular, illustrated the political potential of tourism and pilgrimage, with the historic visit of Pope Paul VI to the 'Holy Land' in the first papal pilgrimage ever. His journey included visits to several biblical holy places that were

under the control of Jordan and Israel, which the Vatican did not recognize at that time as a country (ibid, p.128). Both Israel and Jordan used the historic visit to affirm their contested sovereignty over holy sites, especially those located in Jerusalem.[116]

Palestinians in the West Bank also debated how to deploy the papal visit to advocate for their cause. A confidential meeting of the Jerusalem municipal council took place in mid-December 1963 to discuss preparations for and expectations from the visit. Council members emphasized the need to take advantage of the visit 'to the maximum' in order to inform the Pope about the Palestinian cause and the 'acts of the Zionists and their supporters in Christian countries'. Agreeing on these aims, the council then discussed whether to advocate for them through a memorandum or a speech, or – as member 'Ali al-Tazeez proposed – allowing for a delegation of refugees to meet with the Pope or to take him for a tour to one of the refugee camps. Being aware of the practical and political constraints of such a visit, the council eventually agreed on submitting a memorandum to the Pope (CM 11/12/1963, pp.1–2 [confidential], JMA 938-2).[117]

Using tourism as a platform to promote the Palestinian cause regionally and internationally was further recognized as part of the work of the Promotion and Information subcommittee that was established in the inaugural Congress of the PLO in 1964. Among its relevant proposals were the following:

a) providing tourism and travel agencies in Arab and foreign countries with basic information on the Palestinian cause;

b) properly preparing tourist guides in Arab countries, enabling them to explain the Palestinian cause in the right way; and

c) encouraging exploration tours to the remaining parts of Palestine, especially the front lines, localities and refugee camps (Abd al-Hadi, 1992, pp.236–237).

Shifting tourism from a holy sites-oriented venture to a political journey, where the story of the Palestinian past could be weaved into the present, was a shift in the

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[116] For further discussion on the papal visit and its political aspects, see Cohen-Hattab, 2017; Katz, 2003.

[117] Similar calls were also made by the local press, such as *al-Jihad* newspaper. See, Katz, 2005, pp.127–128.

discursive constitution of Palestinian urban agency. In this sense, Jerusalem was not exclusively for Jordanian display, as Palestinians also sought to use tourism in order to display Jerusalem as *their* city. In a way, this revived the Palestinian adjective that was dropped from the city's definition upon the Jordanian annexation.

Connecting to the World … and the Future

The tourism industry also brought about cultural changes within the city and its rural periphery, as it created a labour market for villagers and other urban poor. Patterns of consumption and private economic activities had changed, as Mahmoud Shqair noted:

> I continued to observe this and that development of life in Jerusalem. New hotels were built in the city, and tourists movement increased (some of my village's sons worked in hotels as cleaning workers and cooks, and their English language improved as a result of daily contact with tourists). Cafes, restaurants, clubs and refreshment stores spread outside the walls. New goods appeared in shops and instalment purchase became common, individual investments prevailed, and the pursuit of profit became a goal for many who had become desperate due to poor political conditions and intensified repression, especially after the break of the union between Syria and Egypt. (2009, p.66)

The Jerusalem Airport also became a gate for the city's cultural exchange with the world, as residents travelled for leisure, family, education and business trips (Figures 58, 59 and 60). The extent to which the airport was financially accessible as a transportation platform for non-middle-class and non-elite residents of Jerusalem remains a question that needs further exploration.

Arriving flights had school football clubs and delegations of doctors and engineers, in addition to pilgrims. Famous actors, religious figures and politicians also landed at the airport. A former female employee of the airport recalled:

> Omar al Sharif came to the airport. He spent his vacation in Jerusalem and stayed at the American Colony Hotel during the shooting of 'Lawrence of Arabia' in Jordan. He would approach us to chat and I recall him commenting on our hairdo in his lovely Egyptian accent. He thought that women shouldn't pin their hair up but leave it loose, because a woman's beauty was her hair. Farid al Atrash also came once after he sang for the King in Jordan. He was quite a gentleman. (Awwad, 2008b, p.59)

Figure 58: Jerusalem Airport (I)

(Source: Collection of Youssef Hajjar, 1961 – Awwad, 2008b, p.53)

Figure 59: Jerusalem Airport (II)

(Source: Collection of the Tamari Family, 1961 – Awwad, 2008b, p.54)

Figure 60: Jerusalem Airport (III)

(Source: Collection of Martha Melhes – Awwad, 2008b, p.60)

The increasing connectivity of the city was reflected in the high representation of Arab airlines, such as 'Air Liban and Middle East Airline (in 1964, Air Liban was merged with MEA), Misr Air (Egypt Air), Trans Arabia Airline (the Kuwaiti Airline) and Air Jordan of the Holy Land (now Royal Jordanian)', which all had counters in the airport (ibid, p.55). The advertisement shown in Figure 61 is for the United Arab Airlines, which was established as a combined Egyptian and Syrian airline after the formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958.

Figure 61: Map of daily flights between Jerusalem and other cities

(Source: JMA 944-21)

This map reflected the connectivity of the city with the world. It created a transnational context that linked Jerusalem with other Arab and European urban centres. It represented 'a triumph of Arab postcolonial modernity, building directly on the foundations laid by British colonial development' (Norris, 2013, p.209). The city's temporal orientation had changed as the rhythm of this mobility and connectivity increased. Time was opened after having been so tightly closed and confined to the temporality of loss.

To become an *Arab* city after 1948, Jerusalem needed to affirm its connection to other Arab urban centres and to perform as one. Within this framework, the city was not only on the receiving end of the map but rather produced its context and determined its modes of production. The connection to Arab nationalism through politics was not possible given Jordan's stands, yet the connectivity that tourism allowed re-produced Jerusalem as an Arab city.

This connectivity was not only discursive but was also materialized, as reflected in figures showing the increasing Arab tourism movement in Jerusalem in the 1960s. For instance, the magazine *Jerusalem This Week* published an issue titled *The Summer in Jordan* in 1966, which included essays on several tourist and religious destinations in Jordan. The first was an essay by Ruhi al-Khatib titled 'Jerusalem Invites You to Visit Her'.

In his essay, al-Khatib compared the early years after the Nakba and the 1960s in relation to visitor numbers, indicating that 500,000 people visited Jerusalem in 1965 compared to 'no more than 8,000 in 1950'. He particularly emphasized that whereas the percentage of 'foreigners exceeded the percentage of our *Arab brothers* [in the past], these percentages have become closer to each other in recent years and the percentage of Arab visitors is increasing' (The Summer in Jordan issue, p.1, emphasis added).

Al-Khatib listed a number of factors that contributed to this increase: religious monuments, moderate weather, excellent hotels with accessible prices, a well-connected airport with daily flights to most Arab countries, a roads network connected to all Arab countries, the possibility of moving freely by private car across the country, the availability of summer houses for rent, the assurance of families and parents

towards security, stability and prices, and the government's facilitation of border crossings. Finally, he added, the rise of general Arab awareness in learning about the country, first and foremost Jerusalem, and the desire to observe 'the partition that happened to her and the situation of their Arab brothers that remained there' (ibid). In other words, Jerusalem was not merely to be displayed as a religious or tourist destination. To visit partitioned Arab Jerusalem was, above all, a political performance.

Looking Westward? The Mandelbaum Gate and the Temporality of Loss

The location of the airport changed the destination of the future for the partitioned Arab City, which had its western side blocked by wires and politics and which had lost its sea contact with the world following the fall of the main port cities of Jaffa, Haifa and Acre in 1948. This made the city look towards the east, the south and the north ('Developments in Jerusalem' lecture, 15/5/1963, p.3), whereas before 1948 development had been oriented westward in the direction of the New City. '*In the course of time, …* the siege mentality that gripped the inhabitants of the walled Old City amid the war, … gave way to a northward wave of residential expansion (Hercbergs, 2018, pp.51, 54, emphasis added).

The western side was not completely sealed, however, as the Mandelbaum Gate[118] was set as a crossing point in No Man's Land in 1949. It allowed the movement of people and goods, as well as the weekly Israeli supply convoy to the enclave of Mount Scopus (Cohen-Hattab, 2017, p.884; Abowd, 2004, p.52; Abd al-Jabar, 2003). According to the Armistice Agreement, the armistice line on which it was located was supposed to mark a 'transition towards a peaceful future' (General Armistice Agreement No. 656, Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel, 3/4/1949, Article 12, UN website).

The Mandelbaum Gate should be framed as representing both a temporality of loss and a temporary loss, for it marked both the loss of Palestine and the return to Palestine. The gate set the temporal frame and determined the perception of both the past and the future for Palestinians between 1948 and 1967. From Israel's settler-

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[118] The gate was named after the Mandelbaum family's house, which was in its vicinity and had been established in 1949 (Cohen-Hattab, 2017, p.881).

colonial view, it marked the loss of the Old City and the gap in its foundation story, as well as the bridge of this gap – something which it confirmed in 1967.

The new Israeli state, which sought international recognition to affirm its sovereignty in 1949, aimed to project the gate as a border crossing point between two sovereign states, and not merely a temporary armistice arrangement. At the same time, it did not want the line to be permanent as it sought to extend its territories in the future. This was reflected in discussions among different Israeli authorities about the nature of the gate, and whether civilian or military authority should be in charge (Letter from the representative of the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem to the legal adviser of the ministry, 8/6/1949, p.1, ISA G-276/40).

Foreign consulates, including the American and the French, 'insisted that Jerusalem is not Israel', according to a correspondence between employees of the Israeli Foreign Ministry in June 1949. Therefore, the consulates 'are willing to have military inspection at the crossing point [the Mandelbaum Gate] given that it is an occupied territory of the Israel Defence Forces, but they principally oppose turning the crossing point into an official border of Israel' (ibid).

Although the objective of this position was not accepted from the Israeli point of view, it nevertheless suited the Israeli expansive ambitions, as the foreign office employees explained: 'their [the foreign consulates'] position suits us, we are still unwilling to consider the Mandelbaum checkpoint as the final border of Jerusalem, therefore it should be agreed that it is a military crossing point which is not permanent and might change from time to time' (ibid).

Figure 62: Mandelbaum Gate, the Israeli controlled side

(Source: Photo by David Rubinger/The LIFE Images Collection via Getty Images/Getty Images website)

These discussions led eventually to the transfer of the gate's administration on the Israeli controlled side from the army to the police at the end of 1949. 'This reflected Israel's desire to give the place as much of a civilian character as possible' (Cohen-Hattab, 2017, p.883). According to Cohen-Hattab, this change constituted a 'major factor in the gate's evolution; from that time on, it was used on a regular basis by civilian groups'. Accordingly, he argues that the gate should be seen as a 'bridge' beyond its 'military status' as a 'barrier' (ibid, p.883).

Using archival documentation of the Israeli police and military of that period, Cohen-Hattab shows the active movement and flow of people and goods, and 'no small number of cooperative efforts that took place at the border crossing' (ibid, p.879). He also notes the movement of 'UN, embassy and consulate workers; religious figures; and tourists and pilgrims' through the gate (ibid, p.887). This final group included 'Israeli pilgrims', who received permits to celebrate Christmas and Easter in the Old City (ibid, pp.889–890). These 'Israeli pilgrims' were Palestinian Christian families who became Israeli citizens after the occupation of their cities and villages in 1948.

Finally, 'humanitarian cases' were considered for permits to cross the gate, including cases of 'unification of families, meetings between relatives, weddings, inquiring about the fate of civilians, the passage of patients and returns of prisoners, infiltrators and dead bodies' (ibid, p.890). Although Cohen-Hattab introduces some of the

obstacles posed for Palestinian families, his framing, conceptualization and argument remain grounded in an Israeli perspective that considers neither the political and historical consequences of the Nakba, nor the colonial – not merely 'humanitarian' – framing of the gate.

How do we read the Mandelbaum Gate and its location from the spectacles of those who saw it, lived it, and waited at its steps on the Arab side? Indeed, this thesis does not conceptualize an Arab/Jordanian side and an Israeli side. For the Palestinians, living on either side of the gate, both sides were equally Palestinian land and a home that was transformed by the colonization of Palestine in 1948. One side resembled the return and the other its waiting room; both sides complemented each other. For Palestinians, the gate resembled a barrier not a bridge. The very existence of the gate between empty and destroyed houses (Nassar, 2009, p.37; Habiby, 1984) held the time of the Nakba at a standstill, despite any flow of people or goods.

Figure 63: Mandelbaum Gate, 24 December 1953
(Source: Wagemakers, 2011, p.126)

Since the establishment of the gate, Israel emphasized its 'liberal' policy of allowing Palestinian Christian pilgrimages to cross during holidays, claiming that its 'uppermost goal was to ensure political tranquillity in everything having to do with the Christian groups in Israel' (Cohen-Hattab, 2017, p.890). These crossings, however,

were subject to a permit regime, which involved the intelligence service and arbitrary discretion that kept family lives precarious and separated, without the 'privilege and benefit of knowing the reason' for accepting or rejecting their requests to visit during Christian holidays or to meet family members (Letter from Ass'ad el-Eas to Yosef Kuperman, 11/12/1960, ISA GL-3/14590) (Figure 64).

Figure 64: Letter from Ass'ad el-Eas to Yosef Kuperman, 11/12/1960

(Source: ISA GL-3/14590)

While some groups of visitors were allowed to cross and *return*, others were *not*, as the gate constituted a 'one-way' journey for them. These were the Palestinian families that were separated in the Nakba – namely, those who came under Israeli occupation and those who came under Jordanian rule – who chose to cross the gate to live with their families on either side. Policies of family unification that began in 1949 allowed the return of 'female partners, boys up to the age of 15 and unmarried girls whose families were in Israel, and wives and children whose heads of family were in Jordan went to Jordan' (Cohen-Hattab, 2017, p.891).

Figure 65: 'Mother of a Knesset member moved to Trans-Jordan'
(Source: *'al Ha-Mishmar*, 28/3/1954)

One such case was the mother of the Palestinian author and Knesset member Emile Habiby, who, as part of the Israeli 'family unification' policy, moved in 1954 to live with her family in the Arab side '*forever*' (Figure 65). Habiby, who accompanied his mother to the gate on her last journey, documented this in his short story 'The Mandelbaum Gate', part of his 1968 collection *The Hexad of the Six Days*:

> 'But say, mister, she wants to exit from here'… shouted the Israeli police officer standing cross-armed at the Mandelbaum Gate, when I told him that we came with our mother who 'wants to enter there, after she was permitted to do so', and I pointed to the Jordanian side of the gate. … The police officer pronounced the word 'exit' from between his teeth grudgingly, so as to teach me a lesson. For he wanted to say, exit from heaven is the serious matter, not [the fact of where she is] entering! The customs officer also did not want us to miss the lesson, so he told us when we exchanged goodbye kisses with our mother that 'whoever exits from here will never return'. (Habiby, 1984)

Habiby termed this 'one-way' exit the 'rule of death' when he described the busy movement of the Truce, peacekeeping and UN committees' cars on the road connecting the two sides of the gate. 'For those, the rule of death: whoever leaves never returns, does not apply. Neither does the rule of heaven: whoever enters never exits. As his honour, the peacekeeper, can have his lunch at the Philadelphia Hotel [in Amman] and his dinner at the Eden Hotel [in Israeli occupied Jerusalem] and the polite smile never leaves his face on both ways' (ibid). Between entry and exit, and the 'rule of death' and the 'rule of heaven', the Palestinian separation that began in 1948 was repeated time and again at the gate.

Figure 66: Mandelbaum Gate, the Jordanian controlled side

(Source: Photo by Howard Sochurek/The LIFE Picture Collection/Getty Images website)

The gate resembled a 'one-way' journey also in the sense of being a site for 'dropping off' many Palestinian Arab prisoners of war who had been detained by Israeli forces, such as Yusif Sayigh (R. Sayigh, 2007b, p.29), or those caught in their houses in the occupied western neighbourhoods after May 1948 (Hajjar Halaby, 2013, pp.20–21; Nassar, 2009, p.35).

The gate served as a midway meeting point between 'death' and 'heaven' for separated Palestinian families. These meetings had a prison-like setting, as visits were limited to only 30 minutes and took place under the watchful eyes of the guards (Cohen-Hattab, 2017, p.891). An Iraqi journalist who visited the city in 1965 described the scenes at the gate in an account titled *A Meeting at the Mandelbaum Gate*:

It was a simple gate made of iron wires … dividing one of the streets of Jerusalem. Close to it was a large sign, written in Arabic and English: 'Do Not Walk After This Sign'. We saw [that] near this sign a few people of both genders carrying luggage and food had lined up in a row or sat squatting, and a soldier of the Arab Legion guarded them while they were waiting for their names to be announced to meet their brothers and relatives, who were destined to live in occupied Jerusalem. (Abd al-Jabar, 2003, p.6)

No wonder then that the gate was called the 'gate of tears' by some of its contemporaries (Abu Toubbeh, 1998, cited in Hercbergs, 2018, p.51). Nevertheless, these meetings allowed glimpses of continuity that were interrupted in 1948 as people shared daily news and exchanged ordinary presents:

Gabi recalled the exchange of presents between his relatives. While Uncle Hanna and Aunt Victoria brought fresh fish from the seaport of Jaffa, Gabi's parents carried small coffee cups. As Israeli fast mud coffee slowly replaced the leisurely boiled Arabic coffee spiced with cardamom, it was becoming increasingly difficult to find the small Arabic coffee cups in the market. (Amiry, 2012, p.38)

In many ways, these meetings, with their short-lived interruptions of the colonial time, preserved and revived the quest of return home and its ordinary details, rendering the gate a signifier not only of loss but also of return. From its side, the Arab municipality preserved this hope of return by naming the street leading to the gate 'the Return'.

The Arab municipality also made efforts to incorporate the Jordanian controlled side of the gate, within its developmental plans and projectivity of the touristic city. Through this, it attempted to dictate its own narrative and representation of the gate as a resource for tourism. In 1962, the municipal council discussed a comment from council member Nihad Abu Gharbieh about the lack of public toilets at Sa'd wa Sa'id – the area of the Mandelbaum Gate in Arab Jerusalem. By contrast, argued Abu Gharbieh, 'the occupying side took care of this aspect and provided all means of convenience for tourists' (CM 11/7/1962, p.12, JMA 937-5).

Thus, it was argued that the municipality should establish toilets in the area of the gate for both genders, so that 'tourists would not feel any difference between the two sides and in order to ensure their convenience' (ibid). The following year, in October 1963, toilets were established in parts of a destroyed Palestinian-owned building, with the owner agreeing to this use and signing a renewable lease contract with the municipality (CM 18/3/1964, p.9, JMA 938-3). The destroyed building that became public toilets

at the armistice line articulated the story of a pessoptimistic city that looked to grow from even the most 'mundane' details of the destruction.

In sum, the Mandelbaum Gate stood as a reminder of loss yet it was also perceived as destined to allow the return, which was felt to be imminent in the mid-1960s. At the same time, the gate stood at odds with the desires and dreams of Arab Jerusalem. It resembled the contradictory world of the Arab City that grew on the edge of history, simultaneously hoping for the best while fearing the worst.

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Tourism shaped Jerusalem. It was the anchor of, first, its survival and then its development. It shaped the city's local identity and its transnational projection. Tourism signified a continuity with the past, as the city embarked on promoting itself as a tourist destination. Equally, tourism was a bridge to the future, as the city could extend its map of connectivity beyond the local, through the flow of tourists and tourism economy. By these means, it was able to go beyond the boundaries imposed by Jordan's national project. However, the city was never able to fully fulfil itself, since colonization was never a past as the Mandelbaum Gate showed. It is within this partitioned geopolitical landscape that Arab Jerusalem negotiated the terms of the future through tourism.

Conclusion

This long chapter addressed the question of the future for the partitioned Arab City. It engaged with the question through five different aspects, with development being the general theme, while infrastructure, centrality, the use of the public space and tourism were the manifestations of the city's imagination of the future. It was not only a question of urban post-war revival and the fact that cities, eventually, find their ways. Rather, at stake was a question that delineated the political and social features of a city that aimed to be part of a free nation-state. This quest of being part of, belonging to a larger context, was the subtext that defined the very meaning of development. Not only to continue into the future, but also to take part in creating a particular future, is what the remaking of Arab Jerusalem was about – the story of a persistent city making its own history.

PART IV: DISMANTLING ARAB JERUSALEM

Chapter 8

A Municipality under Occupation

The Colonization of Arab Jerusalem in 1967

Please express a salute of admiration and appreciation to all employees who withstood and held steadfast to their position at the water stations and the fire brigade, sanitation, mechanics and engineering departments and at the municipality building during the fierce fighting … I hope we all continue to make efforts and dedicate [ourselves] to work, each within his area and responsibility, fully committed to undertaking the services we are in charge of, while at the same time keeping our high morale and a deep belief in our love and loyalty to our homeland and to our city, Jerusalem, and its residents and visitors, staying patient and cooperating to relieve the suffering of all. (Letter from mayor Ruhi al-Khatib to his assistant Anton Safieh, 25/6/1967, YBZL.0075.044/007 (hereafter, Letter from al-Khatib to Safieh, 25/6/1967))

Figure 67: 'The Mandelbaum Gate, once separating Israeli and Jordanian sectors of Jerusalem is now a passageway for Israeli heavy armour', 7 June 1967

(Source: Press collect UNIPIX London/ISA website)

Thus, Arab Jerusalem was occupied. The Israeli army invaded the city on 7 June 1967 from different entrances, including that Mandelbaum Gate which the city always suspected. Just days before the occupation, on 24 May 1967, the Arab municipal council held its last meeting. Regular administrative affairs were discussed, including the replacement of water pipes and preparations for establishing the municipal public library. The municipal council also discussed the upcoming municipal elections that were scheduled to take place on 12 September 1967 (JMA 938-9).

On 5 June 1967, upon the declaration of war between Israel and the Arab countries, mayor Ruhi al-Khatib rushed to the municipality building together with a number of employees, including Anton Safieh, Salah al-Din Jarallah, Mouhamad Totah, Ibrahim al-Dajani and civil defence volunteers. The workers of the fire brigade, electricity, water and sanitation departments occupied their workstations. Heavy fighting took place as the Israeli troops occupied the areas surrounding Arab Jerusalem, eventually occupying the Old City on 7 June 1967. During that time, al-Khatib, some of the municipality employees, and others sought refuge in the Latin Monastery near the municipality building. Given the curfew and the fighting, they made their way back to the municipality building whenever this was possible (Al-Khatib, 2006, pp.107–109).

On 9 June 1967, the Israeli military authorities requested the help of al-Khatib to operate the Arab municipal system, especially the sanitation, water and electricity departments. Al-Khatib stated in his diary that he 'did not object, as long as the cooperation is unofficial, led by the desire to provide services to the city and its residents' (ibid). This marked the attitude of al-Khatib and the Arab municipal council towards the role of the Arab Jerusalem municipality during the early weeks after the Israeli occupation. Their wish was to continue to provide services to the residents of the Arab City, while refusing the Israeli occupation and its subsequent annexation of Jerusalem. In the following weeks after the Israeli occupation, many of the municipal employees continued to work, provide services, and report to their supervisors in the Arab municipality under the conditions of war. The municipal council also held meetings and issued calls to the city residents, while being in a state of uncertainty about the future and subject to pressures of the Israeli military authorities.

On 29 June 1967, two days after the enactment of the laws that annexed Jerusalem to Israel, the military authorities dissolved the Arab municipal council and incorporated the employees of the Arab municipality into the Israeli municipality. Several attempts to include some of the Arab council members in the Israeli municipal council failed. Eventually, in 1968, mayor al-Khatib was deported to Jordan. The Arab municipal council continued to consider itself an elected representative of the city's Palestinian residents, as it had before it was dissolved. Ruhi al-Khatib continued to hold his position as mayor of Arab Jerusalem and represented it in regional and international arenas, calling for an end of the occupation and a return of self-rule through the Arab municipality. In Jerusalem, however, no traces of that local self-rule were left. Israel had undermined the work of many elementary political, social and economic institutions in Jerusalem since 1967, in addition to dissolving the Arab municipality.

This chapter tells the story of the Arab municipality in the weeks leading to the Israeli military decision to dissolve it at the end of June 1967. For three weeks, Jerusalem was under military rule, which officially 'terminated' with Israel's annexation of the Palestinian residents and territories of Arab Jerusalem – yet not its municipality. As an elected local public institution, which resembled the fulfilment of a form of Palestinian self-rule, the municipality of Arab Jerusalem could not continue to exist according to the Israeli colonial rationale.

The story of the Arab municipality is inseparable from the city's story since 1967.[119] Documenting the end of Palestinian self-rule in Jerusalem, which had resumed after 1948, sheds light on the epistemological foundations of the Israeli colonial regime in Jerusalem. At the core of this stands a logic that sustained itself over half a century: if expelling the Palestinians was/is not possible, then expulsion would be practised through a process of dismantling their localities and rendering them inaccessible. The deprivation of self-rule was the first step in dismantling Arab Jerusalem and seizing it from its Palestinian residents. Therefore, this account contributes to critical knowledge production that shifts the focus away from the central state policies regarding

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[119] The literature on Jerusalem since 1967 is massive and covers various perspectives and areas. See, for example, Schleifer, 1972; al-'Arif, 1973; Benvenisti, 1976; Dakkak, 1977; 1983; Friedland and Hecht, 1996; Jefferis, 2012; Dumper, 2014; Abowd, 2014; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2015; Asali-Nuseibeh, 2016; Ramon, 2017.

Jerusalem and towards the Israeli municipal institutional and structural violence against Palestinians and Jerusalem as their locale.[120]

Moreover, the story of the dissolution of the Arab municipality contributes to understanding the Nakba not only as events but also as a structure (Wolfe, 2006), constantly constructed by colonial violence and temporal ordering. To transcend the periodization of post-1948 and post-1967 Jerusalem, it is crucial to investigate the dissolution of the Arab municipality not merely as a singular event that ended at the Gloria Hotel where it took place. Rather, the dissolution of the municipal council constituted a foundational step from an Israeli viewpoint in bridging the gap that the loss of the Old City in 1948 created in the city's colonial time. This gap was reflected in a speech of the President of Israel's Provisional State Council, Haim Weizmann, on 1 December 1948:

> An almost unbroken chain of Jewish settlement connects the Jerusalem of our day with the Holy City of antiquity. To countless generations of Jews in every land of their dispersion the ascent to Jerusalem was the highest that life could offer. In every generation, new groups of Jews from one part or another of our far-flung Diaspora came to settle here. For over a hundred years we have formed the majority of its population. And now that, by the will of God, a Jewish Commonwealth has been re-established, is it to be conceived that Jerusalem – Jerusalem of all places – should be out of it? (Haim Weizmann, Israel Provisional State Council meeting, 1/12/1948, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website)

Weizmann's rhetorical question was further emphasized in the diary of David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel. In September 1948, Ben-Gurion stated that the 'loss' of Jerusalem would entail tears for generations. However, in September 1967, Ben-Gurion revisited this statement in his diary: 'in the Six-Day War, the IDF put an end to the "generations"' (Troen and Shalom, 1999, p.217). In other words, in 1967, Israel sought to produce a temporal, and not only territorial, continuity with 1948 as the constitutive event of its sovereignty.

How would such a temporal gap be bridged according to the colonial rationale? Following the territorial occupation, Israel, in a move typical of settler-colonial systems, resorted to law to force the native residents of the city into its national time – that is, a *linear* time that stipulates Israel as the *present* sovereign (Esmeir, 2012,

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[120] For an important discussion of this, see the PhD dissertation of Oscar Jarzmik (2016).

p.59). Peter Fitzpatrick argues that 'temporality is inevitably implicated in the legal fiction [which] maintains the continuity of a law which has become radically different in its operation or effect' (Fitzpatrick, 2001, p.85). Law thus possesses a 'temporalizing force [which] produces, engages and inscribes discontinuities between past, present and future to fortify its authority, sovereignty and legitimacy' (Mawani, 2014, p.69).

Accordingly, a direct uninterrupted link had to be established between the constitutive moment of the foundation of Israel in 1948 and the occupation in 1967. 'Legal fiction' was at once invoked and Israel rushed to annex Jerusalem by enacting on 27 June 1967 a set of laws that declared the application of Israeli civic law in Jerusalem (Ramon, 2017, p.51). This contrasted with the rest of the occupied Palestinian territories, in which Israel created a military regime. From that moment, thus stipulated the Israeli law, Jerusalem became a united city that was part of Israel; it ceased to be Arab Jerusalem. To complete the process, the Israeli military authorities dissolved the Arab municipal council and integrated the Arab municipal employees in the Israeli municipality, as a further colonial step towards dismantling the Arab City and the deprivation of Palestinians' right to self-rule.

Nevertheless, about 70,000 Palestinians were residing in Arab Jerusalem at the time of the Israeli occupation. This caused much tension and anxiety for the Israeli colonial apparatus (ibid, pp.15–57), which encountered a highly politicized urban population that refused to accept the occupation as a fact – even when it was disguised in a civic mask. Thus, legal fiction was deployed, this time to define the city's Palestinian residents as an immigrant community and as newcomers. Israel applied a special and exclusive civic status on Jerusalem's Palestinian residents that legally defined them as 'permanent residents'. This aimed to render the Palestinian presence contingent, incidental, ahistorical and constantly threatened. As 'permanent residents', the Palestinians became non-citizens in their own city. To this day, this status has proved to be one of the most violent colonial technologies in dismantling Arab Jerusalem.

Colonial Municipal Service Provision

In June 1967, during the early stages of the Israeli military operations, the Israeli military commander Uzzi Narkiss phoned Teddy Kollek, then the mayor of the Israeli Jerusalem municipality, and informed him: 'It's a war, but everything is under control. You may well be mayor of a united Jerusalem' (Schelifer, 1972, pp.160–161). A direct relationship was officially established between the Israeli municipality and the military governor of Jerusalem, Shlomo Lahat, beginning on 15 June 1967 (Letter from Kollek to Narkiss, undated, JMA 1331/2 (hereafter, Letter from Kollek to Narkiss)). In its mayor's words, the Israeli municipality functioned as a '"sub-agent" of the military commander' (Minutes of Knesset Interior Committee, 20/6/1967, p.2, KA). As such, the Israeli municipality took upon itself:

> the task of cleaning the Old City from the results of the military operation. In the meantime, until a government decision regarding the annexation would be taken, the municipality will assist with the regular maintenance of municipal services, water supply, street lighting, repairing roads etc. The municipality will operate for this purpose *the existing municipal system* of the Old City. (Letter from Kollek to Narkiss, emphasis added)

Teddy Kollek spoke passionately in the first weeks about the efforts his municipality invested in resuming municipal services in the occupied parts of Arab Jerusalem. His discourse focused, at least publicly, on the role of his municipality and the Arab municipality as *service providers*, without mentioning the public role of the Arab municipality as an elected representative body and its political stand within its community.

This liberal humanistic focus on the 'civilians' and their needs masked the growing tension of the Israeli authorities, given the large number of Palestinian residents who 'remained "stuck" to their places', according to Joseph Weitz, who previously served as the head of the Jewish Agency's colonization department. This was perceived as something that 'may destroy the very foundation of [the Israeli] state' (*Davar*, 9/9/1967, cited in Schleifer, 1972, pp.19–20). Amnon Ramon referred to other Israeli leaders, including Narkiss and Yadin, who expected the residents to 'leave' when the occupation began. According to his analysis, this expectation reflected 'the influence of the 1948 events on the generation of the War of Independence, who anticipated the departure of most of the Arab population' (Ramon, 2017, pp.20, 26).

Teddy Kollek also articulated his concerns about the problems caused by the large number of Palestinian residents in 'unified' and 'mixed' Jerusalem in 1967, compared to other Palestinian cities that were occupied in 1948:

> It is rather ironic that once the dream was fulfilled, Jerusalem might terminate as a Hebrew city if we do not know how to properly address the following: in Haifa, the 'mixed' city, the Arab residents constitute 6% [of the population]. Nazareth is divided into two, Jewish and Arab. Jerusalem became a <u>mixed</u> city, which was joined by approximately 70,000 Arab citizens, and this number causes problems that have no parallel in the whole world. A third of an urban population constituted a month ago an enemy of the other two thirds of the population, to whom we are now obliged to grant full rights. (Draft of a speech titled 'The mayor of Jerusalem Mr. Teddy Kollek – On the first tasks of the Jerusalem municipality – with the unification', undated, JMA 1331/2, emphasis in original)[121]

Kollek's draft captures the essence of the tension as one that was not only about the demographic presence of the Palestinians but was also related to their political agency. Other state officials shared Kollek's concerns and, like him, drew comparisons with Palestinian cities occupied in 1948: 'The fact that there are in the city of Jerusalem 70,000 Arabs obliges the Jewish mayor to think seriously about this subject. … In the city of Haifa there are 200,000 Jews and 12,000 Arabs, and this is a totally different percentage from the one we are talking about now' (Minutes of Knesset Interior Committee, 30/8/1967, p.19, KA). These comparisons demonstrate the tension in relation to the results of the occupation of the Old City in 1967 – unlike the occupation of the New City in 1948 – which led to the depopulation of the vast majority of Palestinians from these parts.

Despite the tensions and uncertainty about how to deal with the large number of Palestinians, Israel continued to emphasize its role as a 'service provider' to the Palestinians in Jerusalem, including in foreign policy statements to the world. This aimed to divert international attention from the act of the occupation towards the civilians and their needs. Thus, Israel focused on its urgent treatment of issues relating to sanitation, food supply, and particularly water supply – the Achilles heel of Jerusalem. The Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister at the time, Abba Eban, emphasized time and again that 'the Old City is now connected with the general water supply system, and all houses are receiving a continuous supply of water – double the quantity

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[121] This is one version among others of the same speech. In another version with the same title, this paragraph was omitted.

available to them in the past' (Letter from the Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister to the UN Secretary-General, 10/7/1967, cited in 'Measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem: Report of the Secretary-General', 10/7/1967, UN website (hereafter, Letter from the Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister to the UN Secretary-General, 10/7/1967)).

This Israeli discourse aimed to present the occupation as a 'humanitarian, almost religious mission' (Segev, 2007, p.482), in line with colonial civilizing mission discourses. As such, it constructed the Arab City and its municipality as backward and needing the salvation of the developed Israeli Jerusalem municipality, while ignoring the former's achievements and leadership. An article by Israeli journalist Uzi Benziman in *Haaretz*, dated 3 October 1967, discussed the attitudes of Israeli authorities in this regard. It referred to the opinion of Meron Benvenisti, who was appointed as the adviser for East Jerusalem affairs in 1967. Benvenisti argued that the Israeli government should consider 'the [Palestinian] social elite that dictated the political tone in the eastern parts of the city, acknowledge their value, and they should be treated in accordance with that'. Benvenisti further detailed the development that Arab Jerusalem witnessed until June 1967 due to the efforts of its leadership, including 'doubling its population since 1948, building 3,000 rooms for tourism and establishing a *relatively efficient municipal system*' (emphasis added). These elements, according to Benvenisti, were ignored by the Israeli authorities that sought to approach Arab Jerusalem in a 'patronizing' manner and 'clearly prioritizing the Jewish interest' (JMA 1699/4).

The 'patronizing' discourses sought to justify the Israeli occupation, particularly the act of annexing Jerusalem, as being in the interests of the civilian population by 'rescuing' them from their thirst and deprivation of urban infrastructure. In his aforementioned letter to the UN Secretary-General, Eban argued that if it was not for the Israeli 'integration of Jerusalem in the administrative and municipal spheres' (that is, the annexation laws), many parts of the Arab City would have been left without municipal services:

> If these measures had not been taken, … the unified public utilities services would not exist. Municipal and administrative facilities would not be extended to some sections of the City, and Jerusalem's residents would still be divided,

> hermetically confined in separate compartments. (Letter from the Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister to the UN Secretary-General, 10/7/1967)

This discourse dismissed not only the efforts of the Arab municipality but also its political position, authority and status as a Palestinian public and social institution. For instance, on 20 June 1967, Kollek briefed the Knesset's Interior Committee on the activities of the Israeli municipality, stating that already, in the 'first days, we helped the municipality of the other side to get organized and we provided it with the things it lacked, in order to be able to provide, from the first day, water, cleanness and sanitation to the residents' (Minutes of Knesset Interior Committee, 20/6/1967, pp.2–3, KA).

When Kollek did speak before the Knesset's Interior Committee about the Arab municipal council as an elected body, he explained very briefly about the Jordanian municipal elections system and the appointment of mayors. Furthermore, Kollek stated, 'we hope, when the city gets united in the very near future, to find full cooperation from the side of the municipality's people there [Arab Jerusalem], something that in fact already exists today' (ibid, p.3). Kollek and other Israeli officials merely assumed the Palestinians to be apolitical subjects of governance and consumers of urban services.

The Arab Municipality's Struggle for Authority under the Occupation

The Arab municipal council members perceived Israel's conversion of the Arab municipality into a mere service provider, with its authority as an elected body dismissed, to be a further step in the occupation's measures to deprive the Palestinians of their right to self-rule. From its side, through the weeks leading to its dissolution, the Arab municipality insisted on its political status, authority and responsibility towards the city's Palestinian residents.

Speculations that preceded announcing the annexation did not indicate clearly what the status of the Arab municipality would be. Nevertheless, the Arab municipal council continued to hold responsibility for delivering regular and urgent municipal services in the areas of Arab Jerusalem. This was reflected in Ruhi al-Khatib's note, only days before the annexation was declared, that 'he was too busy with mundane but essential

matters like drains and electricity to think of the future' (Report from M. Pullar in Jerusalem to the Foreign Office, 22/6/1967, [Confidential] TNA/FCO17/251 (hereafter, Report from Pullar to the Foreign Office)).

This was not, however, a belittlement on the side of al-Khatib. He explicitly stated on behalf of the Arab municipal council, just before it was dissolved, that the council perceived itself as 'the elected representatives of the Arab population of Jerusalem' (Report from I. C. E. Alexander, titled 'Old City, Jerusalem Municipal Council', 29/6/1967, [Confidential] TNA/FCO17/251 (hereafter, Report of Alexander, 29/6/1967)).

The political stance of the municipality was articulated from the first contact with the Israeli military authorities. On 9 June 1967, al-Khatib emphasized that he would not cooperate officially with the Israeli authorities and insisted that his cooperation would be limited to providing service to the Palestinian residents (Al-Khatib, 2006, p.109). Accordingly, during the weeks leading to its dissolution, the Arab municipality carried out its tasks, assuming a continuity of its authority.

The Arab municipality was able to resume its work on 9 June 1967, after a call from the Israeli government via a radio broadcast to employees of the Palestinian public service to attend their departments and resume their duties (ibid). The most acute problem for the municipality workers during this time, according to al-Khatib, was the lack of cars, as all of the municipality's cars had been stolen (ibid). In addition, the Israeli military authorities imposed a curfew between 2 pm and 9 am, which hindered the progress of work (ibid, p.110).

Meanwhile, an Israeli liaison officer named Liesh was appointed to coordinate between the municipality and the Israeli military authorities. Since Palestinian cars were not allowed to move freely in the city, al-Khatib had to wait for the liaison officer's car to pick him up from his house in order to supervise the municipal work, until his car and those of other senior municipal employees were granted permission on 16 June 1967 to travel during the time in which the curfew was lifted (ibid, pp.111– 112, 114).

On 12 June 1967, Liesh drove al-Khatib to the office of the Israeli military governor of Jerusalem. The governor notified him of reports about many Palestinian residents keeping their weapons, in breach of Israeli military orders to hand them in. The commander ordered al-Khatib to demand that residents relinquish any remaining weapons immediately; otherwise, he would consider al-Khatib responsible and would take harsh steps against him and the city in general. When al-Khatib replied to the military governor that his 'responsibility does not exceed public services', he was rudely interrupted by the governor, who noted that he had nothing else to add and ordered al-Khatib to leave the room. Eventually, al-Khatib, who was very upset because of this treatment, had to record a call to the residents – which was broadcast in the city – to hand in their weapons. He also called the council members for an urgent meeting (Al-Khatib, 2006, p.111; Benvenisti, 1976, p.98).

The following day, seven of the eleven members of the Arab municipal council convened and al-Khatib informed them of his encounter with the military governor. Following this, the council members made a number of decisions, including issuing a call to residents to ensure their safety and to notify them that the council was continuing to cooperate with the military authorities to secure services, food supplies, shelter for refugees and the poor, and transportation. At the end of the council's meeting, the Israeli liaison officer was invited to hear from him about the army's demands. A copy of the call, the meeting minutes, and a list of urgent requests of the Arab municipality were delivered to him (Al-Khatib, 2006, p.112; CM 13/6/1967, [Hebrew translation], YBZL.0075.044/007).

The call of the municipal council was broadcast to the city residents, as follows (Figure 68):

1. The council appeals to all the residents of the city to keep calm and restore order and avoid confrontations with persons of the military or civil authorities.

2. The council appeals to all residents of Jerusalem to cooperate with it in bringing the city again to a normal life and it also persistently asks any person in the city who still has a weapon of any kind to leave it outside the entrance of his home during the hours in which the curfew is lifted, according to the orders of the city's military commander, and in order to avoid any military measures against him or against the city.

3. The council announces that it was able during the past days and in cooperation with the ruling authorities to restore water and sanitary services to some parts of the city and that it is working hard to quickly make these services available to the rest of the neighbourhoods.

4. The council also announces that, in cooperation with the electricity company and the military authorities, it managed to resume the electricity flow to many neighbourhoods in the city and hopes to complete the provision of electricity to all the neighbourhoods of the city.

5. The council announces that it is continuing in its efforts with the ruling military authorities in order to secure the rest of the services needed for the city, and it also announces that it is investing its best efforts with the military authorities to restore normal life to the city and its residents as soon as possible.

Figure 68: 'Announcement to al-ahali of Jerusalem from the Jerusalem municipal council'

(Source: YBZL.0075.044/007)

This call, and the circumstances that led to its issuance by the Arab municipal council, show clearly the council members' coerced position and limited authority under occupation. The diary notes of al-Khatib during those weeks of the occupation recorded many such examples, including that municipal employees had to hand over maps of the Old City, financial reports, and reports on the population census to the military authorities (al-Khatib, 2006, p.113).

The Arab municipal employees were also subject to the violence of the occupation and the war, as some were killed, injured or detained during the hostilities (Report from the head of the water department to mayor al-Khatib, 28/6/1967, YBZL.0075.044/007 (hereafter, Report from the head of the water department)). Other employees lacked essential food supplies in their workstations, such as the water and electricity workers who were located in 'Anata and Shu'fat (al-Khatib, 2006, p.114).

However, the abovementioned call of the municipal council and the endurance of the municipal workers reflect the sense of responsibility and a form of 'ethics of care' (Feldman, 2008, p.125) during this time of political and humanitarian crisis, which were articulated through the continuity of service provision. On 25 June 1967, al-Khatib issued a letter to his assistant, Anton Safieh, which demonstrated his heavy emotions about the occupation while at the same emphasizing the responsibility of the 'family of the municipality' to keep the Arab City's local administration under control (Letter from al-Khatib to Safieh, 25/6/1967).

As the city was suffering due to the occupation and the results of war, al-Khatib perceived the continuity of municipal work and the commitment of the workers as part of their 'high morale and a deep belief in our love and loyalty to our homeland, and our city, Jerusalem' (ibid, see the full quote at the beginning of this chapter). These words resonated with the same expressions al-Khatib had used in his 1965 essay 'Jerusalem: How Did the Nakba Leave It … and How Is It Now?' to describe how the city dealt with the colonization of 1948 (*Amman al-Massa'* essay).

The continuity of service provision also represented an affirmation of the Arab municipal council's political agency, authority and legitimacy among Palestinian residents during the coercive rule of the Israeli occupation authorities. In the weeks following the occupation, the Arab municipality carried out its work as a local

authority, following its own procedures and division of labour. This was reflected in al-Khatib's requests from the municipality's departments to submit detailed reports on incidents with workers, losses and their assessments, repairs done by each department since the termination of the military operations, assistance provided by the 'ruling authorities' to each department, and the estimated time for resuming the regular state of affairs (Letter from al-Khatib to Safieh, 25/6/1967).

The priority of the municipality workers in the first days after the war was to collect the bodies of civilians and military officers from the streets within and outside the boundaries of the Arab municipality. They reported burying 180 bodies in the cemetery of Bab al-'Asbat (Lion's Gate), al-Yusufiya, while about 250 bodies were buried on the frontlines (Letter from the administrative assistant of the sanitation department to the mayor, 28/6/1967, YBZL.0075.044/007 (hereafter, Letter from the administrative assistant of the sanitation department)). More than 40 municipal workers carried out this mission under the supervision of the head of the sanitation department and medical doctor Subhi Ghosheh, who volunteered to assist the municipality with the task (Letter from the first clerk of the sanitation department, 28/6/1967, YBZL.0075.044/007 (hereafter, Letter from the first clerk of the sanitation department)).

Major tasks of the Arab municipal workers in subsequent weeks concerned fixing damaged infrastructure, including repairing water pipes, electricity wires, and the public slaughterhouse which was severely damaged. Moreover, municipality workers worked extensively on clearing the streets inside and outside the Old City from rubble, an average of 30 to 36 tons per day over a period of three weeks (9 to 27 June 1967) (ibid; Letter from the administrative assistant of the sanitation department). Such tasks show the extent of hostility that the city had endured during the Israeli military operations.

These reports also showed that an employee's registry was made, covering the period from 9 to 28 June, which indicated that an average of 150 workers attended their work in the health department alone. They worked nonstop from 9 am to 2 pm – except for 26 June 1967, when a curfew was imposed in the city to allow the Israeli authorities

to conduct a census.[122] Salary slips were prepared for June payments in accordance with this registry (Letter from the first clerk of the sanitation department).

The Israeli municipality provided the Arab municipality with some technical assistance (Report from the head of the water department), as well as fuel and diesel for operating vehicles and machines (Report from the technical engineer to the mayor, 2/7/1967, YBZL.0075.044/007). It also made two to three garbage vehicles available for the use of the Arab municipality. To allow Arab municipality workers living outside of the Jerusalem boundaries to reach work, the Israeli municipality provided the required permits and gave them badges (Letter from the administrative assistant of the sanitation department). These workers, however, would soon be defined as 'temporary employees' when the Israeli military dissolved their municipal council.

Despite the actions of the Arab municipality to ease conditions for the Palestinian residents, the situation in the city continued to deteriorate as a result of the occupation. Many residents were left unemployed and were running low on currency. Al-Khatib and other Palestinian local leaders and institutions were busy during these weeks calling for regional and international aid and coordinating its distribution to poor families (al-Khatib, 2006, pp.118–133).

Israel's Dissolution of the Municipal Council of Arab Jerusalem

On 20 June 1967, Ruhi al-Khatib learned that an Israeli broadcast had announced that 'the mayor of the other part [of Jerusalem – that is, the Israeli mayor], his deputy, heads of the municipality departments and the military governor of Jerusalem plan to visit the [Arab] municipality and that the Israeli flag will be raised above its building, so as to announce the unification of the two parts of the city'. The following morning, al-Khatib's assistant, Anton Safieh, confirmed that he had received a phone call from the Israeli municipality notifying him about the visit, which would be 'friendly' to establish 'acquaintanceship' between the two mayors. Safieh was also notified that the Israeli flag would be raised only during the time of the visit (ibid, pp.117–118; Benvenisti, 1976, pp.101–102).

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[122] For more on the 'unholy census', as John Tleel described it (1999), see Ramon, 2017, pp.68–78, and for al-Khatib's critique of it, see Report of Alexander, 29/6/1967.

Upon hearing this, al-Khatib invited the Arab council members immediately to the Arab municipality building. The four members who were able to attend, together with al-Khatib, agreed to affirm in the meeting with the Israelis that their cooperation would be limited to the provision of public service, and to keep politics out of the discussion (Al-Khatib, 2006, p.118). At noon, Kollek and his staff arrived, followed by the military governor and others. Al-Khatib summarized the meeting in his diary:

> The people [qawm] came in at 2 pm. I welcomed them, expressed our gratitude for their assistance in fields of public services such as cleanliness, water and electricity, allowing their gradual return to the city and its houses, as well as for the reduction of the curfew hours. I demanded that the looting should stop, and to allow for the transfer of supplies, and for the facilitation of travel and movement. I also expressed our hope for maintaining peace in the city. Their mayor invited me to visit them at the other part. The military governor repeated his demand to collect weapons. I demanded not to harm nor evict the Arab residents from their homes in the Old City. He said all he can do is to find other places [to live] for those evicted or those who will be evicted. I explained to him that we were not allowed to purchase weapons and that I do not think there are weapons with the residents. (ibid)

A report that seems to have been prepared by al-Khatib summarized the event[123] and mentioned that Kollek stated in his speech that 'cities do not declare war on each other', and that over the twenty years between 1948 and 1967, the Israelis were 'thinking about Jerusalem in their hearts and despite the fierce bombardment by the Arab forces, they have initiated assistance with the municipal services'. Kollek also said that 'they see [the Arab municipality] as a neighbour municipality, which is important for them to continue cooperating with, and that their representatives, many of whom are old friends of [the Arab] workers,[124] will be in constant contact in order to provide more services to the city and its residents'.[125] Following this speech – as stated in the report – coffee was served, there was an introduction of all those present, the speeches were recorded, and photographers from the 'other side' took many photos (Details of the visit of the military governor and the mayor of the other side to the municipality on 21/6/1967, Hebrew translation in handwriting, YBZL.0075.044/007).

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[123] Based on a Hebrew translation of the report.

[124] This refers to the Arab and Jewish workers who used to work together in the mandate municipality.

[125] Benvenisti stated that despite this speech, it was clear to Kollek and to those who accompanied him that 'their hosts were about to be removed from their posts' (1976, p.102).

Figure ... rpart in the Old City, mayor Ruhiel Chatib [Ruhi al-Khatib] when paying a visit to the latter's office today',
21 June 1967

(Source: Associated Press/ISA website)

The Israeli flag was not removed from the Arab municipality building until the next day. Israeli sources stated that the flag was raised on the municipality building with the approval of al-Khatib (Ramon, 2017, p.98). However, a confidential report of Mr. Pullar from the British Eastern Office, which was issued on the day following the visit, 22 June 1967, stated that al-Khatib informed him that he succeeded in persuading Kollek to remove the Israeli flag from the Arab municipality building (Report from Pullar to the Foreign Office). In his diary notes that day, al-Khatib mentioned that the flag was removed following the coordination of Anton Safieh, as the Israelis notified him they would do (al-Khatib, 2006, p.119).

In these notes, al-Khatib also recorded his heavy feelings about what the photo with Kollek (Figure 69) and other reports on the event in Israeli sources, had concealed regarding the meeting and the Israeli flag that was raised on the Arab municipality building:

> How harsh was what I went through yesterday. The world was dark as I was sitting in my office in the municipality building under the Israeli flag. Sitting to my right, the mayor of the other side and to my left the military governor … How cruel were these moments during which I had to be courteous and welcome them, thank them for their help, *imposed* on us, in the fields of cleanliness, water and electricity, and for reducing the curfew hours. I have endured a lot, as have many others, forced, in order to push away additional terror and displacement of the

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defenceless residents of the city, while being patient during the hard times, waiting for the relief to come through the discussions taking place in the corridors of the United Nations. (ibid, pp.118–119, emphasis added)

Al-Khatib, similar to many other residents and public figures in Jerusalem, was aware that Israel's imposition of civic service was a political act to affirm its authority in Jerusalem. Although diplomatic efforts were ongoing, the Israeli army and other authorities sought to utilize municipal services to create facts on the ground. On 22 June 1967, al-Khatib noted that the Israelis connected their water system to the Arab water system at Bab al-Khalil (Jaffa Gate). In his eyes, this indicated that 'they were serious about interfering in our [Palestinian] affairs strategically and gradually, to impose facts on the ground' (ibid, p.119).

On 27 June 1967, the Knesset enacted regulations that annexed Arab Jerusalem, and other territories surrounding it, to Israel. The Law and Administration Ordinance Law (Amendment No. 11) of 1967 applied Israeli jurisdiction to the areas that Israel defined as Jerusalem. The Protection of Holy Places Law of 1967 was meant to reassure the Christian Western world and show Israel's respect of holy sites. The third law, the Municipalities Ordinance Law (Amendment No. 6) of 1967, allowed the boundaries of the Israeli Jerusalem municipality to be extended to include Arab Jerusalem and other areas. This law also included a special article that authorized the Minister of Interior to 'appoint additional councillors from among the inhabitants of the newly-included area' (Ramon, 2017, pp.8–9). This prerogative was never exercised in Jerusalem, however, as will be discussed below.

According to the amendment of the Municipalities Ordinance, the Arab municipality had no legal status, as its municipal territory was now administered by the Israeli municipality. The implementation of this law was immediate. On the day following the amendment, a letter from the head of the workforce department of the Israeli Jerusalem municipality was distributed among the Arab municipality workers. This informed them, in Arabic and Hebrew, that 'if they wanted to work in the [Israeli] municipality, they had to attend to work at 7:30 am on 29 June 1967'. The letter added that the work would be temporary and asked workers interested in permanent employment to fill in an application, which would then be considered by the

municipality (Letter from Y. Halper, no addressee, 28/6/1967, YBZL.0075.044/007) (Figure 70).

Figure 70: Letter from Y. Halper, no addressee, 28 June 1967
(Source: YBZL.0075.044/007)

According to Benvenisti, the Arab workers sought the advice of al-Khatib regarding what to do about this letter. Al-Khatib allegedly replied: 'we are serving the city, and this is a continuation of the service. I suggest that all of you sign. If you continue to work, you will help to maintain the Arab character of the city' (1976, p.104). Although, in his diary, al-Khatib mentions the application referred to in Halper's letter, he does not express his opinion about it (Al-Khatib, 2006, p.122).

Despite the letter to the Arab municipality workers, the mayor and the municipal council members were still not informed of their status. On the same day that the annexation regulations were enacted, al-Khatib issued an invitation to the council members to attend an 'emergency meeting to discuss the current situation', which was scheduled to take place on 29 June 1967 (Invitation letter from al-Khatib, no addressee, 27/6/1967, YBZL.0075.044/007).

On the morning of the planned meeting, the British Consul, I. C. Alexander, visited the Arab municipality building and met with al-Khatib. The former mentioned in a report summarizing the meeting that al-Khatib had stated that 'he had not been informed officially of any change in his status, but had been left to read of this change in the local newspapers'. Al-Khatib added that 'he expected a visit from the Israeli Minister of the Interior, or his representative, to inform him officially of his new status' (Report of Alexander, 29/6/1967).

In response to the British Consul's question as to whether he had been invited to join an enlarged council for 'greater Jerusalem', al-Khatib said that 'he had not hitherto received any such invitation. He understood that the Israeli authorities intended to nominate a number of councillors to represent the Arab population of Jerusalem'. These, he added, 'would, so far as he knew, not necessarily be chosen from among present members of the council. Meanwhile, he considered it to be the case that he and his fellow councillors were still the elected representatives of the Arab population of Jerusalem' (ibid).

Later on that day, 29 June 1967, the Arab municipal council members were summoned by military policemen from their homes to the Gloria Hotel, which was located atop the building of the Arab municipality, since the key for the building could not be located because the guard was absent (Al-Khatib, 2006, p.123; Benvenisti, 1976, p.104). The deputy military governor informed the council members and the mayor that the council was considered dissolved.[126] The military order read as following:

> In the name of the Israeli Defence Army, I have the honour to inform Mr. Ruhi al-Khatib and the members of the Municipal Council in al-Quds (Arab Jerusalem) that the council is henceforth considered as dissolved.
>
> The employees of the Municipality in the different Municipal departments including the administrators and technicians are henceforth considered as temporary employees in the Jerusalem Municipality until their appointment is decided by the Jerusalem Municipality after they submit written applications for work.

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[126] It is worth noting that it was the military authorities, and not the Interior Minister, that dissolved the municipal council, although Israel had imposed its civic jurisdiction on Arab Jerusalem two days before this event (Ramon, 2017, p.99).

In the name of the Israeli Defence Army, I call upon Municipality employees to continue in their work to provide the necessary services to the inhabitants of this city.

I thank Mr. Ruhi al-Khatib and the members of the council for their services during the transitional period from the entrance of the Israeli Defence Army to Jerusalem to this day. (Al-Khatib, 1970, p.32, emphasis in original)

Israeli sources that discuss this event refer to it as 'improvised', 'hasty' and 'undignified' (Ramon, 2017, p.99; Benvenisti, 1976, p.105), having been pushed for by Kollek, who argued that the existence of the Arab municipality after the declaration of the annexation created a 'constitutional anomaly' (Benvenisti, 1976, p.106). According to Benvenisti, it was not the dissolution decision itself that humiliated the Arab members, since they had anticipated that. It was, rather, the circumstances of the dissolution, particularly when they asked to receive the order in writing, since the assistant of the deputy 'took one of the hotel's napkins, wrote out an Arabic translation of the announcement, and handed it to al-Khatib', and by this ended the 'ceremony' (ibid, p.105). In his diary, al-Khatib does not mention such an incident. He briefly notes that the deputy military governor read the order and handed them a copy, while he, al-Khatib, replied by confirming the reception of the order (Al-Khatib, 2006, p.123).

Al-Khatib further mentioned that, with the dissolution order, his official responsibility had ended and his private responsibility had begun (ibid). He was grateful and proud to be able to carry out his duty as mayor without compromising the rights of his city [baladi] (ibid, p.124). John Tleel, whose cousin Dr. Ibrahim Tleel was one of the council members, recalled the event of the dissolution. Ibrahim was at John's house when he had to leave for the meeting with the army. After the meeting, he returned to the house with mayor Ruhi al-Khatib. John Tleel states in his memoir that al-Khatib then notified John's family, with bitterness, about the dissolution of the council, but added:

Thank God [the Israelis] are the ones who relieved me of my office so nobody can ever accuse me of cooperating with them and betraying the city and the King. (1999, p.38)

This dissolution dismantled the Arab municipal system that had been developed over the years by al-Khatib, other mayors, municipal council members and workers. Yet it

was something of a relief for al-Khatib and the council members, given the occupation, as they did not want to be forced as a governance institution to cooperate formally with the Israeli authorities. On the one hand, the municipal council had a public responsibility towards the Palestinian residents. On the other, its stand was in line with the positions of other sectors in the city to reject any integration and cooperation with the Israeli system as a civic, rather than an occupying, regime. In the following months, the dissolved municipal council members continued to cooperate with each other and to meet as council members. In addition to holding campaigns to aid residents in need, they also followed up on workers affairs after those were integrated into the Israeli municipality (ibid, pp.128–131).

Following the dissolution of the Arab municipal council, Israeli authorities were conflicted about how to integrate Palestinian representation into the Israeli Jerusalem municipality. Kollek rejected the proposal to include Palestinians in the Israeli municipal council, arguing that this would not allow the council to discuss 'sensitive' issues and that Palestinian representatives might convey information to 'hostile alien parties' (Minutes of the meeting of the ministerial committee for Jerusalem affairs, 21/6/1967, cited in Ramon, 2017, p.45; Benvenisti, 1976, p.115).

However, a few weeks after the dissolution of the Arab municipality, Anton Safieh, who was integrated into the Israeli municipality, was asked to issue an invitation on 20 July 1967 to seven of the dissolved municipal council members, *excluding* al-Khatib. The invitation, which was printed (in Arabic) on paper with the letterhead of the Arab municipality, was to meet the Israeli assistant administrative officer on 23 July 1967 at his office in Jaffa Street. According to the instructions of the assistant administrative officer, meetings were supposed to take place with each member separately, for half an hour each (Letter from Anton Safieh to Arab municipal council members, 20/7/1967, YBZL.0075.044/007).

Following this, the invited council members and al-Khatib contacted Safieh to inquire about the purpose of the meeting. Safieh informed them that it was in relation to 'taking their opinion on whether they wished to join the [Israeli] municipal council after the annexation of Jerusalem' (Letter from the mayor and the Arab municipal council members to the assistant administrative officer, 23/7/1967, TNA/FCO17/251

(hereafter, Letter from the mayor and the Arab municipal council members to the assistant administrative officer)). In response, the invited members, together with al-Khatib, issued the following letter to the Israeli assistant administrative officer and sent copies to consuls of foreign countries in Jerusalem (Al-Khatib, 2006, p.138):

> … each of us was to be asked whether he wished to become a member of the Jerusalem Municipal Council after the amalgamation of the two parts of the city. We wish to inform you of the following: Any discussion of this subject requires prior consultation amongst ourselves as members of the Jerusalem Municipal Council, inasmuch as we are duly and legally elected by the people of the City of Jerusalem.

> In fact, a number of us, including Mr. Ruhi al-Khatib, mayor of Jerusalem, have met, and after discussing the matter we have reached the following conclusions:

> Discussion of the possibility of joining the Jerusalem Municipal Council under Israeli rule, in the form in which it was announced by the Israeli authorities, would, from our point of view as Arabs, constitute an official recognition on our part of the principle of the annexation of Jerusalem to the sector of Jerusalem occupied by Israel, which we neither accept as a *fait accompli* nor acknowledge. (Institute of Palestine Studies, 2007, pp.95–96; Letter from the mayor and the Arab municipal council members to the Assistant Administrative officer [different version of the translation])

This approach was part of a united stand by the Palestinian political and religious leadership, professionals and their unions, and many individuals who opposed the Israeli occupation and refused to be incorporated in its system.[127] For instance, Hussni al-Ashhab, the head of the Jordanian education department in Jerusalem, and his assistant refused to cooperate with the Israeli Ministry of Education, and the Jordanian Minister of Education called for Palestinian teachers in Jerusalem not to cooperate with the Israeli education authorities (Al-Khatib, 2006, p.147). Similarly, Palestinian lawyers boycotted the Israeli courts system and Bar (Bisharat, 1989, pp.145–149).

There was a distinction from the side of the Jordanian government between professionals, such as teachers and lawyers, and workers in public service. On 7 August 1967, the Jordanian Prime Minster issued a notification to al-Khatib, stating that teachers and judges must not cooperate with the Israeli authorities, but it was,

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[127] It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the struggles of Palestinians in Jerusalem and the West Bank and Gaza more generally following the Israeli occupation in 1967, particularly in relation to the annexation of Jerusalem and its exclusion from the West Bank. A future study would benefit from examining the role of the municipality within this context.

however, fine for workers in public service to continue their work 'as long as they ensured Jordanian entity and did not cause political abuse' (Al-Khatib, 2006, p.148).

This lack of cooperation on the side of the Palestinians created much anxiety for the Israeli authorities, leading to the imposition of emergency regulations in the Palestinian land occupied in 1967 (Figure 71).

Figure 71: 'Concerns among Israeli governmental departments about lack of cooperation on the side of the residents of the occupied territories with the [Israeli] authorities / The members of the municipal council of Arab Jerusalem refused to participate in the municipal council of greater Jerusalem and announced that the annexation measures are violations of the UN Charter / The decisions of the conference of Arab figures, lawyers and judges concern the authorities / Strict procedures oppose the distribution of newspapers and political and party activism in the occupied territories'

(Source: *al-Itihad*, 28/7/1967)

In Jerusalem, which was designated as an annexed territory and part of the civil jurisdiction of Israel, the specific requests of its local leadership and residents included cancelling the annexation; reversing the dissolution of the Arab municipal council and restoring its previous authority; applying the regulations that preceded the occupation; resuming the work of the civic departments that preceded the annexation; and, finally, the integration of Arab Jerusalem into the Israeli military system, similar to other parts of the West Bank, until an agreement on a final political solution would be reached (Excerpts of a letter of Ruhi al-Khatib, *al-Itihad,* 19/9/1967).

In March 1968, Israel deported Ruhi al-Khatib to Jordan. From his exile in Amman, al-Khatib published essays and books that documented Israel's colonial practices in Arab Jerusalem.[128] He also actively represented the city as the mayor of the Arab municipality in international and regional arenas, demanding to end the Israeli

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[128] Al-Khatib also established the first journal specializing in Jerusalem, titled *al-Quds al-Sharif*, which was published between 1985 and 1993 (96 issues in total), ceasing publication only months before he passed away.

occupation. 'Arif al-'Arif documented some of al-Khatib's efforts in this regard. In 1971, al-'Arif wrote 'for God is your abundance and bestowal my brother Ruhi … you are – apparently – the only one among our men residing in Amman who cares about our city Jerusalem and its destiny' (al-'Arif, 1973, p.1206). Although deprived of his home, municipality and city, al-Khatib, like many other Palestinians banned by the Israeli colonization from living in their hometowns, did not give up his struggle to represent Jerusalem and to be a committed citizen even in exile.

As for the Arab municipality workers, these became 'temporary employees' of the Israeli municipality, according to the dissolution order. Benvenisiti stated that all 370 workers of the Arab municipality attended the Israeli municipality's employment department at 7:30 am on 29 June 1967, as had been requested in the letter issued to them by the Israeli municipality on 28 June 1967 (1976, p.131) (Figure 70).

At the end of July 1967, the Palestinian municipal workers were integrated within the Israeli municipality departments. All of their documents were moved with them (Al-Khatib, 2006, p.138). Those Palestinian workers encountered many challenges in the Israeli municipality. Politically alienated, they were demoted in rank and had to fight for their right to the past in relation to employment conditions, including salaries, pensions and holidays (ibid, p.129).

One such example was Anton Safieh, the senior worker who had led the Arab municipality after the departure of the mandate and the loss of the New City in 1948. According to a British report, in July 1967, the Israeli municipality sacked Safieh due to a 'breach of confidence' towards the Israeli authority, after he told the Arab council members the reason behind the invitation of the Israeli assistant administrative officer. The report further mentions that Safieh, who 'was already uncomfortable in his position', did not expect to stay long and he was anticipating retirement (Letter from J. H. Lewen to W. Morris – Foreign Office, titled 'Jerusalem Municipal Council', 27/7/1967, TNA/FCO17/251). A letter from the Israeli head of municipal services to Safieh in January 1968 notified him that his employment would terminate on 1 February 1968 (Letter from the head of municipal services to Anton Safieh, 18/1/1968, JMA 5997).

On 27 July 1967, shortly after they were integrated into the Israeli municipality, several former senior Arab municipality workers – including Salah al-Din Jarallah, Yusif Budeiri and Mouhamad Totah – contacted al-Khatib and complained that they had been distributed among the Israeli workers and had begun to feel 'dissolved' among them. As a result, these workers considered quitting their positions. Al-Khatib advised them to stay, promising to discuss their issue with the (dissolved) Arab council members (2006, p.142).

The next day, the Arab council members met and discussed the situation of the Arab employees in the Israeli municipality. The council members decided to advise the workers to continue in their work. Furthermore, they decided to instruct the representatives of the Arab workers to collect complaints from the workers and to demand justice from their Israeli supervisors. Al-Khatib emphasized that he and the council members were ready to discuss any abuse of their employment rights. Finally, the council members urged the Arab workers to demand weekly holidays on Fridays for Muslim workers and Sundays for Christian workers (ibid).

This coordination demonstrated that the authority and the political and social relations between the Arab municipal workers and the council members extended beyond the institutional structure. Neither the dissolution of the council nor the integration of the Arab workers into the Israeli municipality ended their political agency or their responsibility towards the municipal body and the city.

Moreover, the continuity of the Arab workers in the Israeli municipality was clearly important for their livelihood, as well as being part of their 'habits of bureaucratic practice' (Feldman, 2006, p.82). But it could also be read as part of the way they sought to serve and protect the city, similar to the cooperation of those same workers in May 1948, when Israel colonized most of Palestine, in order to provide the city with urgent services. The dissolution of the Arab municipal council in 1967 was in many ways similar to the loss of the municipal town hall in the New City in 1948, as each was a direct result of Israeli colonial violence.

The occupation of Arab Jerusalem and the deprivation of the Palestinian residents' right to self-rule added to the city's political loss in 1967. The dissolution of the Arab municipality constituted a first step among many that followed to repress all efforts of

al-ahali to be part of their city. This perhaps urged the Arab workers to perceive their continuity in serving the city, albeit in the Israeli municipal system, as a responsibility towards their fellow residents. However, their position in the Israeli municipality was a source of tension and alienation and countered their national and political aspirations and positions, as they rejected the legitimacy of the institution, and its policies and ideologies. It was this *municipality of the occupation* which had forcefully replaced their Arab municipality. Similar to their work under the mandate system, they might have distinguished between 'working *in* government and government itself' (ibid, p.830), in order to carry out their work. Being residents of occupied Jerusalem, which has been living under an extensive colonial regime since 1967, the municipal workers constitute a segment of Jerusalem's Palestinian society that was prevented from freely fulfilling its political right to self-determination.

Conclusion

The dissolution of the Arab municipal council in 1967 was a constitutive colonial event that set the ground for seizing the city from its native Palestinian residents. Since then, no Palestinian representation in the Israeli municipality has ever been achieved, as Palestinians boycott the elections of the 'municipality of the occupation'. Dissolving the Arab municipality in 1967 was not a singular event, nor was the Israeli municipality an exceptional colonial institution. Rather, it was part of Israel's structural violence since 1948. As the struggle of Arab Jerusalem following the Nakba showed, fulfilling self-rule was not only about providing services to the city's residents. Instead, it was about the right to the city and to a national state, in which Palestinians can live free and dignified, able to imagine and produce their own future(s).

Chapter 9

A History of the Future

Conclusion

(Tension. Homicide. Arrest. Ambulances. Fire engines. Victims. Accusations. Prohibitions. Insurrections. Infiltration. Interrogation. Detention units. Apprehension. Prisons. Demolition. Occupation.)

I said to my imagination, 'Be brave,
      and put your hands on the shoulders of al-Quds.'
And I said to al-Quds,
      'Why is it that when I come toward you, I can only walk backward?'

– Adunis, *Concerto al-Quds*[129]

I was tempted to end this thesis at the end of May 1967, just before Israel occupied the rest of Palestine. I wanted to somehow preserve the meanings of Arab Jerusalem as a 'yet to come' Palestinian city. To preserve the right and dream of those waiting for their imminent return home. To preserve the aspiration for the future, projectivity and forward-looking vision. I wanted to preserve all of that, against what colonized Jerusalem became – a city pushing the Palestinians *backward.*

The 1967 occupation, read in conjunction with the Nakba in 1948, rendered Jerusalem, gradually and violently, an unliveable and unreachable place for Palestinians, residents or otherwise. The very meaning of urban citizenship and living as a Jerusalemite had been drastically transformed; it became determined by 'the Jerusalem ID'[130] and by the physical rather than historical existence of Palestinians, according to the Israeli colonial law. Everyday life became heavily colonized, to the extent that the ability to imagine the future was defined by protecting one's existence in the city, rather than by imagining and producing one's city.

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[129] Adunis, 2017.

[130] This refers to the Israeli legal status that was imposed on the city's Palestinian residents after the 1967 occupation.

In bringing this thesis to a conclusion, without being misled by optimism, I argue that the historical account introduced here on Arab Jerusalem is as much a history of the past as it is, fundamentally, a *history of the future*. This framing allows a reading of the history of Arab Jerusalem as not only a part of the expropriated Palestinian past. It narrates stories of Jerusalem and its Palestinian ahali as part of present-day Jerusalem.

Researching and documenting the future considers the ways in which the future was thought of, imagined, fulfilled and deprived of in the Palestinian world. An explicit inclusion of futurity as a theme in historical documentation allows an exploration into the particularities and meanings of the future in the Palestinian context. Such an exploration introduces a native knowledge production that transcends and deconstructs colonial epistemologies of time and challenges the persistent violent colonial present and its domination over Palestinian pasts and futures. This allows for a critical contextual engagement with conceptual frames that were introduced in other colonized native contexts, rather than importing them and applying them *on* Palestine. In other words, such framing would allow for a historical conceptualization of Palestinian futurity.

The physical and political in-betweenness of Arab Jerusalem revealed a particular form of futurity that has been persistent in the Palestinian context, as living in an ongoing state of temporariness waiting for the yet-to-come state; or rather the quasi-state, as it became dictated over the last few decades. This futurity, however, is not confined to the national political frames of the future, as these frames constitute only part of the way the future is produced and imagined by Palestinians. The future continues to be produced by individuals and groups in multiple ways, sites and forms. It is this aspect of the future that this thesis sought to address.

Futurity in Arab Jerusalem was a central theme that emerged from the city's records and was represented in its material and conceptual making. The city's residents and administration shared the projectivity of a future for Arab Jerusalem that would have to be fulfilled in the unity of the two parts of the city and the return of the refugees to their homes under a national Palestinian state.

The path to achieve this future was uncertain, however, and characterized by loss, ambivalence and political constraints. The failure to achieve the future following the

Israeli colonization in 1967, marked it as futile and pushed the theme of futurity altogether to the margins of Palestinian knowledge production and imagination. However, it is this persisting 'failure' of Palestinians to reach their future that emphasizes the need to explicitly explore Palestinian futurity. This is particularly important given that colonial futurity is contingent upon the production of the native's future as one that is failed, unachievable and impossible. Therefore, the end results and what eventually happened to the imagined future of Arab Jerusalem, or otherwise, are only part of what an exploration of futurity means.

The Palestinian political transformation since the 1967 occupation, particularly since the Oslo Accords in 1993, has determined the meanings of futurity and contributed to its marginalization. In this sense, futurity means a suspension of the future, while living in a chronic state of negotiations over its terms. This is particularly true in relation to the designation of the refugees and Jerusalem as 'remaining issues' to be discussed in future permanent status negotiations (Oslo Accords, Article V.3). The failure of the Accords brought these 'remaining issues' into the confinement of the temporary.

Moreover, these political frames excluded parts of the Palestinian geography from the future and its images. For Arab Jerusalem, the future included areas of the city that were occupied in 1948, the New City. This was a constitutive element in imagining the future; it did not resemble only the past but also the future. Whereas current political frames exclude the 1948 colonized geography from their discourses and designate it as past sites of memory, this transformation of the future, its images and its projections shows the Israeli colonial domination over Palestinian temporality, not only over its geography.

Accordingly, a history of the future allows unpacking the concept of the future beyond the general theme of self-determination, sovereignty and the nation-state. It seeks to explore the concept of futurity as part of the quotidian and the phenomenological and to think of the future as an important element in Palestinian agency. This entails deploying a methodology that considers processes of making, temporal orientations, and conceptualization of the future as central research themes. Indeed, this does not

mean to exclude concepts such as self-determination and self-rule. Rather, it would contribute to expanding the perspectives of their exploration and meanings.

Such a research agenda allows us to revisit constitutive temporal concepts of the Palestinian world, such as waiting and temporariness, by exploring the ways they are perceived and practised in different locations and positionalities. It also sheds light on the life and history of various marginalized areas and groups in Palestine, including Palestinians who became citizens of Israel in 1948. For this particular group, to remain home but under a colonial state rendered the future particularly sealed: there is no place to return to, nor is there a state to wait for according to the political conditions Israel had imposed. Thus, a history of the future is elementary to understanding the meaning of living with such temporal orientations.

Through the notion of temporal orientation, this thesis engaged with some aspects of being a Palestinian after the Nakba in Arab Jerusalem. For instance, the notion of self-rule in the case of the Arab City was manifested in its micro-details, whether those were achieved or not. Self-rule was practised through the production of the city as a space of its residents – that is, a site of negotiations over exclusion and inclusion, as well as erasure and restoration. This illuminated the making and preservation of identity and made it possible to grasp a particular form of agency that is oriented towards a future, in the shadow of the absent national state and frames. Urbanity was a productive notion of Palestinian citizenship, which was practised through the restoration of Palestinian identity of the place and recovering its centrality. To a large extent, the city as the material frame of the Palestinian past was rendered a productive space for imagining the future, which embodied aspects of the political meaning of being Palestinian in the absence of the nation-state.

The relationship between the city and the central state emphasized the importance of statehood and how crucial the frame of the state has been for Palestinians. As discussed in chapter 5 in particular, the Jordanian state limited many aspects of Jerusalem's development and prevented the emergence of a Palestinian state. The limited space that allowed some form of Palestinian self-rule in the city emphasized how the state was and remains the frame that determines Palestinian futurity. It also opens up the question regarding how the integration of Palestinians within the Palestinian quasi-state, non-national or colonial state apparatus – like Palestinian refugees in exile and

Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship – shapes, transforms and prevents Palestinian futurity.

Finally, an explicit research on the future allows for a nuanced, and perhaps different, reading of the violent present of Jerusalem. A history of the future contributes to grasping perceptions of the present as a source of continuity of the Palestinian past. This counters the Israeli production of the Palestinian presence in the city as one determined by legal frames and confined to Jerusalem as an ahistorical place. In this sense, the exploration of time is twofold. On the one hand, it exposes how colonial law works through temporal ordering, a subject that is not thoroughly addressed in the studies of Palestine. On the other hand, it reveals how native temporal frames of reference persist and challenge colonial temporalities through the quotidian and alongside the national.

Arab Jerusalem was told as a story in this thesis to create such a native frame through temporal orientation, knowledge, memories and practices – all at the core of what the political means. It traced the time of people before they became heavily confined to colonial legal and political subjectivities. Thus, framing Arab Jerusalem as a history of the future serves to project into the colonial present a non-linear yet continuous presence that the moment of 1967 allegedly cut. In this sense, the Arab City is invoked in the present against the colonized entity of 'East Jerusalem' and its future meanings as a delayed 'negotiable' issue. In fact, looking around the parts of Jerusalem occupied in 1967, one could easily recognize how much Arab Jerusalem was/is a future, not a past.

Such framing allows for the story of the native to be told not only as part of the colonial structure, time and narrative. This would contribute to important critical knowledge production on how to read, write, think, imagine and document Palestinian narratives through the native experience. This is perhaps what renders the *Pessoptimist* such a timely concept, as it introduced a particular notion of agency and its temporality, embedded within the Palestinian context and language. It captured this idea of the Palestinian future and created a space to think through Palestinian particularity, not only through other contexts and frames. To sum up, framing this study on Arab Jerusalem as a history of the future allows us to grasp conditions of Palestinian

continuity and persistence, and not only the occupation as a story of the past and the future.

To conclude this thesis, I would like to propose a number of potential areas of research for future studies in relation to Jerusalem and in general. To begin with, a future study of Jerusalem should explore the meanings of urban agency and citizenship more extensively and over the course of different eras. A nuanced examination of the concepts of self-rule, participation and the making of Palestinian localities would pave the way to understanding different patterns of participation, including local initiatives to provide services when local institutions fail to do so. A departure point for such an inquiry is the viewpoint of the diverse groups of Palestinian residents that make/made the city. Interviews, ethnographies and explorations of personal collections are crucial, as the generation that lived through different eras and can tell this story is passing away.

Studying the city through the notion of urban citizenship would allow for conceptual and empirical reconstruction of the Arab City and make it available for cultural and artistic production in Palestine. In some ways, this will make the city also accessible for the generation that was born into the colonial reality and does not know Jerusalem outside this frame. This is very timely, given the fact that the Palestinian generation that was raised in the shadow of the separation wall and checkpoints over the last two decades does not know Jerusalem. The city gradually became located outside Palestinian geography and beyond the reach of those and many others.

Furthermore, as modernity is a central theme in Palestinian historiography of the city before the Nakba, a prospective engagement with the transformation of the concept after the Nakba is elementary. This requires positioning Jerusalem within the wider Palestinian and Arab context at the time and engaging with questions of connectivity, material culture, Arab nationalism and more. In general, such a study would connect Jerusalem to the wider Arab context and to the anti-colonial movements of the 1950s and 1960s. This is particularly important in order to insert Arab Jerusalem within the scholarship on the urban history of Arab cities. This, in turn, would allow an in-depth examination of urban networking that was underway during the 1960s, as the beginning of this thesis stated.

Finally, a further extensive historical exploration into the political formation of the Arab City with regards to the Jordanian state is needed. Such research requires an examination of Jordanian archival materials and press collections in relation to Arab Jerusalem and the West Bank in general. That would contribute to accounts on the political legacy of Jordan and its role in the Palestinian world since 1948, through local frames and their administration.

In addition to these particular areas of study, other general areas should include researching the field of municipal and local governance in Palestine from a sociological and socio-legal perspectives, before and after the Nakba. It would be interesting to examine municipal archives of other Palestinian cities and villages during the early decades after the Nakba and in general. Within this area, the role of municipal workers is crucial and should be integral to developing the field of labour history in Palestine.

Researching the area of municipal administration would also benefit from contextualizing the municipalities as social institutions within a wider institutional network in urban spaces, such as mukhtars, chambers of commerce, charities, religious institutions and so on. Such examination would engage with the issues of normativity, social surveillance, public order and ethics, while taking into consideration class, gender, and economic and social status. This would extensively enrich urban history studies in Palestine and shift the focus from the general to the particular in these urban spaces.

To end, we need to keep telling our imagination to be brave, to be led by curiosity and a sense of justice towards a future that is *yet to come.*

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