

The London School of Economics and Political Science

**Curating Knowledge:**

**International Relations Expertise and the End of the  
Cold War in East Germany**

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# Abstract

Post-1945 stability has confused us about the status of expert knowledge in studying world politics: we think that our studies about war, peace and international security are above events, and in command of them. But attention to past moments of crisis and transformation reveals a complex relation between the two. It shows that expert knowledge about world politics is transformed by events, commanded by them at least as much as it is in command of them.

The end of the Cold War is one such moment of crisis and transformation. How did the ideological victory of the West impact the possibilities and impossibilities of thinking and knowing the international? How did the major geopolitical shifts of the time reshape what is considered 'truth', 'science' or 'knowledge' in international relations, and what is considered 'political', 'ideological' or 'biased'? Academics, experts and intellectuals are the visible social carriers of these questions, and their fate is the symbol of the shifting limits of speech and thought's acceptability.

Drawing on interviews and archival research, this PhD thesis focuses on the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and examines the making and breaking of its international relations experts during and after the Cold War. It shows how states make experts and what happens to meaning-making elites once they no longer fit with new political structures: How did the GDR produce international relations academics, scholars and intellectuals, and what role did they play within the global Cold War confrontation? What happened to those same experts once the Cold War ended and the GDR went through both a democratic revolution and a (re)unification with West Germany? Tracing in particular the various mechanisms at play in the post-89 marginalization of the 'fallen' GDR experts, elites of a no-longer-existing order, the thesis aims at linking their individual fates to the wider geopolitical forces at play in shaping the possibilities and impossibilities of researching and knowing 'the international'.

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# Abbreviations

|          |   |
|----------|---|
| AALA     | Zeitschrift “Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika”                                |
| BIOst    | Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien        |
| CPSU     | Communist Party of the Soviet Union                                       |
| DA       | Zeitschrift “Deutsche Außenpolitik”                                       |
| DASR     | Deutsche Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft                      |
| DSS      | Dresdner Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitspolitik                           |
| DVPW     | Deutsche Vereinigung für Politikwissenschaft                              |
| FDGB     | Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund  |
| FDJ      | Freie Deutsche Jugend   |
| FDP      | Freie Demokratische Partei  |
| FU       | Freie Universität   |
| FRG      | Federal Republic of Germany   |
| GDR      | German Democratic Republic  |
| HRV      | Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung                                       |
| HU       | Humboldt Universität  |
| IIB      | Institut für Internationale Beziehungen                                   |
| IMEMO    | Институт мировой экономики и международных отношений                      |
| IPW      | Institut für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft                        |
| IV       | Internationale Verbindungen   |
| MAH      | Ministerium für Außenhandel   |
| MfAA     | Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten                                |
| M/L      | Marxismus/Leninismus  |
| NVA      | Nationale Volksarmee  |
| SED      | Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands                                |
| SPD      | Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands                                   |
| SWP      | Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik   |
| UP       | Universität Potsdam   |
| ZENTRAAL | Zentraler Rat für Asien- Afrika- und Lateinamerika Wissenschaften der DDR |
| ZK       | Zentralkomitee  |



# Introduction

Post-1945 stability has confused us about the status of expert knowledge in studying world politics: we think that our studies about war, peace and international security are above events, and in command of them. But attention to past moments of crisis and transformation reveals a complex relation between the two. It shows that expert knowledge about world politics is transformed by events, commanded by them at least as much as it is in command of them.<sup>1</sup>

The end of the Cold War is one such moment of crisis and transformation. How did the ideological victory of the West impact the possibilities and impossibilities of thinking and knowing the international? How did the major geopolitical shifts of the time reshape what is considered 'truth', 'science' or 'knowledge' in international relations, and what is considered 'political', 'ideological' or 'biased'? Academics, experts and intellectuals are the visible social carriers of these questions, and their fate is the symbol of the shifting limits of speech and thought's acceptability.

Drawing on interviews and archival research, this PhD thesis focuses on the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and examines the making and breaking of its international relations experts during and after the Cold War. It shows how states make experts and what happens to meaning-making elites once they no longer fit with new political structures:<sup>2</sup> How did the GDR produce international relations academics, scholars and intellectuals and what role did they play within the global Cold War confrontation? What happened to those same experts once the Cold War ended and the GDR went through both a democratic revolution and a (re)unification with West Germany? Tracing in particular the various mechanisms at play in the post-89 marginalization of the 'fallen' GDR experts, elites of a no-longer existing order, the thesis aims at linking their individual fates to the wider geopolitical forces at play in shaping the possibilities and impossibilities of researching and knowing 'the international'.

## Knowledge: a relational approach

Let's start by looking at the following two scenes. In the early 1980s, Raimund Krämer was a young researcher at the IIB, the GDR's elite diplomatic training institution. A product of the IIB, he had completed his five-year studies in International Relations there, and was about to be awarded a PhD in 1981 on Peru's foreign policy and a *Habil* later in 1985 on the topic of peace and security in Central America. As a young researcher, he was carrying some of the institute's teaching workload, working on his own research projects and participating in the IIB's publication activities. His first journal article was published in 1981 on the border conflict between Ecuador and Peru. It had occurred to his department that it would be good for the institute to have a publication covering that topic, and so the task fell onto Raimund Krämer. The Soviet Union was not involved

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<sup>1</sup> I have adapted some of the language from Tarak Barkawi, "War and History in World Politics," in *The Oxford Handbook of History and International Relations*, ed. Christian Reus-Smit et al (forthcoming), 8.

<sup>2</sup> I have adapted some of the language from Andrew Bickford, *Fallen elites. The military other in post-unification Germany* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

in the conflict and the GDR had no stakes in it either. Raimund Krämer was free to write his article in whichever way seemed appropriate. Proud of his achievement, the article was published in AALA (*Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika*), the GDR's area studies journal. But as a frustrated Raimund Krämer soon discovered, the publication of his article was also the end of the story. The article provoked no-one's interest and triggered no reactions, neither good nor bad.<sup>3</sup> Around the same time, he received the chance to publish a piece on Reagan's foreign policy in Latin America. This time, the journal was DA, *Deutsche Außenpolitik* (German foreign policy), the GDR's top publication venue for international relations. Landing an article in there was a feat, an achievement, something to be proud of; it conferred prestige and interest. But as Raimund Krämer would soon find out, the prestige came at a price: the journal's editors demanded far-reaching revisions and changed, cut and rewrote the piece beyond recognition of the original. Publishing in DA, *Deutsche Außenpolitik*, meant entering the political sphere. and it required the adoption of and adaption to its written and unwritten rules.<sup>4</sup> And so Raimund Krämer learned an important lesson: the greater your freedom as an academic, the lesser your impact and prestige.

Fast-forwarding twenty years to the early 2000s, Raimund Krämer had become a figure of exception: not only had he made the transition from GDR to united Germany as an academic and now worked as an honorary professor at the University of Potsdam, but even more impressively, he was one of only a handful who had been able to both remain in academia and continue working in their original field of expertise, international relations. The unification with West Germany had been a blessing and a curse. A blessing because of the newly found freedom to write and speak as one pleased, and a curse because most East German academics were crowded out of academia and kept out of the dominant circuits of international relations knowledge production. Also, as Raimund Krämer soon found out, Western academia turned out to have dynamics of its own. Yes, one could think and write and publish as one pleased. But thinking and writing and publishing on certain topics was more rewarding than others. The *Zeitgeist*, particular fashions in topics of interest and manners of thinking, as well as the neoliberal focus on money along with the power of funding bodies did set limiting parameters to one's possibilities and options as a researcher. If one wanted to be accepted or invited to conferences, carry out large research projects, hire multiple researchers to help carry out these projects, publish in popular publication venues, receive additional funding, be seen as competent or even recognized as an important name in the discipline, get the accolades of the university's director and all the material and immaterial benefits that came with it – then one had to adapt and adjust one's research interest and manner of writing and framing written work. Studying the militaries in Latin America made you look old-fashioned and redundant at a time when projects on queer subjects of resistance were 'in'. Ignoring 'climate' as an area of enquiry in funding applications was a sure way to get rejected. Political dynamics and interests shaped the provision of research funds, and funding in turn structured and impacted the possibilities and impossibilities of research.<sup>5</sup> And so, Raimund Krämer re-learned an important lesson: the greater your desire as an academic for impact, prestige, status and reputation, the higher the pressures to adapt and adjust.

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<sup>3</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 2-3.

<sup>4</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 11.

<sup>5</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 7-8.

These two scenes highlight something important. When looking at the relation between power and knowledge, when looking at the relation between politics and academia, it does not suffice to say that dictatorships restrict knowledge production and that democracies allow freedom of thought. Regime type certainly makes an impact, but it is only one part of the picture. Crucially, it obscures more than it illuminates. As we have seen in the two scenes above, being a researcher in the former GDR and being a researcher in the post-1990 united Germany presented some important similarities, despite the obvious differences. First, the researchers' very capacity for action and their ability to do 'academic things' was created and enabled by their position in an 'academic' space, a network of relations tying together different processes of knowledge production, consumption and dissemination. In the GDR, as in the post-1990 united Germany, this meant acquiring the correct education along with all the social and cultural capital necessary to actually access the 'academic' network and carry out the actions and activities associated with 'academic' behaviour. The researchers' very agency and capacity to act 'academically' was thus enabled by the networks of relation that they were forming part of. This does not mean, however, that their capacity for action was entirely determined by the networks of relations they were embedded in. It was created, enabled and shaped by them, but not overdetermined. There was room to manoeuvre within the space created by the networks. In the GDR, this meant that if the Soviet Union was not implied in a specific geopolitical event, the room for interpretation widened. In post-1990 united Germany, it meant that if research could be carried out without the need for a large team or additional funding, the choice of topic and method of enquiry widened.

The core of the above can be summarized in the following thesis statement: knowledge systems must be thought of in relational rather than essentialist terms. We gain little understanding from thinking about them as simply 'democratic' or 'dictatorial'. Instead, knowledge systems ought to be thought of as relational configurations enabling and structuring knowledge production, consumption and dissemination. If we think about knowledge systems in relational terms, it also follows that we cannot confine our analysis to the limits of nation-states boundaries. A relational analysis must necessarily, by its very nature, be 'intersocietal', 'global' or 'international'. But, what does such an 'international' perspective on knowledge systems look like?

## Contribution

In this thesis, I propose to develop *a global geopolitics of knowledge production* that allows us to think about power/knowledge from an international perspective. This global geopolitics of knowledge is based on the assumption that knowledge is highly contextual and can therefore only be understood as meaningful in relation to context. It is also based on the assumption that the boundaries of this context are not static or eternal but are made and remade throughout time, and that the 'international' is the force that remakes and reshapes these relations most fundamentally. I propose to understand the role of the international onto power/knowledge relations through the three nexuses of war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge. These put forward three different ideal-typical depictions of the manner in which knowledge spaces can be structured and organized. In short, they detail how war, revolution and colonization shape and impact the parameters within which knowledge production takes place, and thus, ultimately, knowledge production itself.

Next to this theoretical contribution, I also offer a study of the transformation of the GDR's international relations knowledge system throughout war, revolution, and an asymmetrical unification with West Germany. Drawing on interviews and archival research, I examine the functioning of international relations knowledge production in the GDR and use the ideal-typical lenses of war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge, and colonization/knowledge to organize and make sense of these dynamics. During the Cold War, the GDR system of international relations expertise was organized through a system of antagonistic exchange. Knowledge about international relations had to fit a strict pattern of friend/enemy distinction, yet researchers needed to simultaneously be able to transcend these distinctions and question them in order to perform their roles well. During the times of revolutionary upheaval in the GDR, knowledge production about international relations became strongly polarized and oscillated between the various contending poles of authority. Researchers had to straddle a divided country and multiple loyalties in order to be able to continue working and stay relevant. Finally, during the asymmetrical unification with West Germany, the GDR's whole system of knowledge production was dismantled and replaced with the West German one. In a process of hierarchical orientation, GDR experts had to fully adapt to a new system that treated them as second-class citizens in order to stand a chance. In short, the war, revolution and colonization-like events that the GDR went through all shaped and formed its configurations of international relations knowledge production in different ways, impacting the type and form of scholarship produced as well as the possibilities and impossibilities of international relations research.

In putting forward this theoretical and empirical analysis, my thesis makes a number of contributions. Theoretically, it contributes to the bodies of scholarship on power/knowledge, sociology of knowledge and relational theory, as well as to international relations disciplinary history, international relations disciplinary sociology and Global IR literature. Empirically, it contributes in particular to literature on the GDR, Cold War history, and the global 1989.

On a theoretical level, the contributions can be organized into two types: those that contribute to the existing literature on the basis of a focus on *relational* dynamics, and those that contribute to the existing literature on the basis of a focus on their *international* aspect. The current sociology of IR and global IR literature are characterized and limited by their substantialist approach. Broadly speaking, they operate on the basis of two contradictory spatial models: American universalism and nation-state centrism. American universalism describes how the discipline's alleged international scope in fact covers "American parochialism".<sup>6</sup> That IR is an "American social science" has been most famously coined by Hoffmann,<sup>7</sup> and still constitutes a reference point for discussion.<sup>8</sup> That the US "has acted as the centre of gravity for the social sciences"<sup>9</sup> is the now

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<sup>6</sup> Brian C. Schmidt, "Epilogue," in *International Relations in Europe. Traditions, perspectives and destinations*, ed. Knud Erik Jørgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen (London: Routledge, 2006), 254.

<sup>7</sup> Hoffmann (1977).

<sup>8</sup> See for instance Miles Kahler, "International Relations: Still an American Science?," in *Ideas and Ideals: Essays in Honor of Stanley Hoffmann*, ed. Linda B. Miller and Michael J. Smith (Boulder: Westview, 1993); Steve Smith, "The Discipline of International Relations: Still An American Social Science," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 2, no. 3 (2000); Robert M. A. Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jarvis, eds., *International Relations - Still an American Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); Peter Marcus Kristensen, "Revisiting the 'American Social Science' - mapping the geography of International Relations," *International Studies Perspectives* 16 (2015).

<sup>9</sup> Duncan Bell, "Writing the world: disciplinary history and beyond," *International Affairs* 85, no. 1 (2009): 20.

unquestioned standard for IR, a disciplinary “truism”.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, surveys show that top-ranked journals and scholars are based in the US, and that most textbooks in use throughout the world tend to be American.<sup>11</sup> The second spatial model for IR is that of nationally differentiated IRs. A trend starting in the past two decades, this literature has come to question the American dominance of the field by retrieving national histories under the assumption that “IR is quite different in different places”.<sup>12</sup> Following Kristensen,<sup>13</sup> the literature can be divided into a body of work that intends to retrieve ‘European’ histories from the supposed ‘American’ dominance<sup>14</sup> and a body of work that intends to retrieve ‘non-Western’ histories from the supposed Euro-American dominance of the field.<sup>15</sup> In a similar way there is abundant and growing literature on Chinese IR, Japanese IR, Indian IR etc.<sup>16</sup> This is where we can also locate the Global IR literature.<sup>17</sup> The main problem with these bodies of literature is the way in which they reify knowledge by attaching it to essentialized constructions of space, culture or race.<sup>18</sup> This is problematic, as it replicates imperial techniques of division and domination,<sup>19</sup> but also because it offers a truncated understanding of knowledge’s actual entanglement with various overlapping networks of power relations. This is where the ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ approach developed in this thesis comes into play. It contributes to these debates by presenting an alternative model based on a *relational* instead of substantialist approach and thereby avoids the truncations and simplifications of the ‘Global IR’

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<sup>10</sup> Felix Rösch, ed. *Emigré scholars and the genesis of international relations. A European discipline in America?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 1.

<sup>11</sup> Kristensen, 246-47. See also Kjell Goldmann, "Im Westen Nichts Neues: Seven International Relations Journals in 1972 and 1992," *European Journal of International Relations* 1 (1995); Ole Waever, "The sociology of a not so international discipline: American and European developments in International Relations," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998); Ersel Aydinli and Julie Mathews, "Are the Core and periphery irreconcilable? The curious world of publishing in contemporary international relations," *International Studies Perspectives* 1 (2000); Marijke Breuning, Joseph Bredehoft, and Eugene Walton, "Promise and performance: an evaluation of journals in International Relations," *International Studies Perspectives* 6 (2005).

<sup>12</sup> Waever, 723.

<sup>13</sup> Kristensen, 249.

<sup>14</sup> Waever; Knud Erik Jørgensen, "Continental IR Theory: The best kept secret," *European Journal of International Relations* 6 (2000); Jörg Friedrichs, *European Approaches to International Relations Theory: A house with many mansions* (London: Routledge, 2004); Knud Erik Jørgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen, eds., *International Relations in Europe. Traditions, perspectives and destinations* (London: Routledge, 2006).

<sup>15</sup> Aydinli and Mathews; Arlene Tickner, "Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 32, no. 2 (2003); Arlene Tickner and Ole Waever, *International Relations Scholarship around the World: Worlding Beyond the West* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *Non-Western International Relations Theory. Perspectives on and beyond Asia* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

<sup>16</sup> See for instance Tingyang Zhao, "Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept 'All-under-Heaven' (Tian-xia)," *Social Identities* 12, no. 1 (2006); Yaqing Qin, "Why is there no Chinese International Relations Theory," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, no. 3 (2007); Navnita Chadha Behera, "Re-Imagining IR in India," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, no. 3 (2007); Navnita Chadha Behera, "International Relations in South Asia: Search for an Alternative Paradim," (Tousand Oaks: Sage, 2008); Takashi Inoguchi, "Are there any theories of International Relations in Japan?," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7, no. 3 (2007).

<sup>17</sup> Amitav Acharya, "Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions, and Contributions," *International Studies Review* 18 (2016); Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, *The making of Global International Relations. Origins and evolution of IR at its centenary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Amitav Acharya, "Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories Beyond the West," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 39, no. 3 (2011); Acharya and Buzan; Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Why is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction," in *Non-Western International Relations Theory. Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (Abingdon: 2010).

<sup>18</sup> Tarak Barkawi and Ayse Zarakol, *Global IR: Should it be anti-Western?*, *Millennium Conference* (London: 2018); Christopher Murray, "Imperial dialectics and epistemic mapping: From decolonisation to anti-Eurocentric IR," *European Journal of International Relations* 26, no. 2 (2020).

<sup>19</sup> Murray.

and ‘sociology of IR’ models. The scholarship on power/knowledge, sociology of knowledge and relational theory, as well as international relations’ disciplinary history, on the other hand, largely converges around a different problem: a tendency towards methodological nationalism. Methodological nationalism describes the “all-pervasive assumption that the nation-state is the natural and necessary form of society in modernity.”<sup>20</sup> A bias of enquiry whereby the nation-state is seen as the natural container of research, it is problematic because it “analytically separates relations that might not have been separate at all” and thereby distorts analysis.<sup>21</sup> This is where the ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ approach developed in this thesis comes into play. It contributes to these debates by presenting an alternative model based on an *international* instead of a national approach and thereby avoids the truncations and simplifications inherent to scholarship operating with a nation-state framework.

On an empirical level, the main contributions of this thesis are to offer a *revisionist* history of the GDR and to *write the ‘East’ back in* to the histories of knowledge production. As such it aligns with recent historical scholarship aiming at retrieving the history of Eastern Europe from the triumphalist post-1989 narratives of liberal superiority and ‘end of history’.<sup>22</sup> As the further chapters will expand on, the writing of GDR history is a contentious field, still polarized between East and West. Writing with regards to human rights conceptions, Ned Richardson-Little puts it this way: “Public discourse in the media in reunified Germany also depicted West German conceptions of human rights as objectively correct, with any deviations from these norms understood as politically suspect.”<sup>23</sup> To generalize his point, Western representations of GDR history still count as objectively correct and any deviation from them as politically (and morally) suspect. With regard to knowledge production this translates into an orthodox history presenting GDR knowledge production as ideological and any deviant representation claiming the contrary as suspect. Chapter 4 on ‘Colonization/Knowledge’ in particular will further explore the ideology/science dichotomy underwriting this. In practice, though, this translates into a polarized publication field. Most accounts of academia in the GDR are either rendered by Western actors, often those who had been involved in the unification process and were offering orthodox accounts<sup>24</sup> or by marginalized Eastern academics offering alternative accounts of their experiences.<sup>25</sup> These latter accounts range from full counter-expositions to part-revisionist

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<sup>20</sup> Daniel Chernilo, "Social Theory's Methodological Nationalism. Myth and reality," *European Journal of Social Theory* 9, no. 1 (2016): 6-7.

<sup>21</sup> Julian Go, "For a postcolonial sociology," *Theory and Society* 42, no. 1 (2013): 36.

<sup>22</sup> See in particular James Mark et al., *1989: A Global History of Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Ned Richardson-Little, *The human rights dictatorship. Socialism, Global Soliarity and Revolution in East Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

<sup>23</sup> Richardson-Little, 258.

<sup>24</sup> See for example Michael Greven and Dieter Koop, eds., *War der Wissenschaftliche Kommunismus eine Wissenschaft? Vom Wissenschaftlichen Kommunismus zur Politikwissenschaft* (Opladen, 1993); Hermann Wentker, *Aussenpolitik in engen Grenzen: die DDR im internationalen System, 1949-1989* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007); Wilhelm Bleek, *Geschichte der Politikwissenschaft in Deutschland* (Muenchen: C.H. Beck, 2001).

<sup>25</sup> See for example Ulrich van der Heyden, "Geschichtswissenschaft und Historiker in der DDR in (Selbst-)Zeugnissen," *Monatshefte* 107, no. 2 (2015); Stefan Bollinger, Ulrich van der Heyden, and Mario Kessler, *Ausgrenzung oder Integration? Ostdeutsche Sozialwissenschaftler zwischen Isolierung und Selbstbehauptung* (Berlin: Trafo, 2004); Ulrich van der Heyden, "Die Afrika-Geschichtsschreibung in der ehemaligen DDR: Versuch einer kritischen Aufarbeitung," *Africa Spectrum* 27, no. 2 (1992); Heyden, "Geschichtswissenschaft und Historiker in der DDR in (Selbst-)Zeugnissen."; Werner Röhr, *Abwicklung: das Ende der Geschichtswissenschaft der DDR* (Berlin: Edition Organon, 2011-2012); Erhard Crome, ed. *Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der DDR* (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009); Erhard Crome and

narratives that accept the basic orthodox premise of 'ideology' but try to carve out some spaces within that narrative and recover pockets of 'science'. With this PhD thesis, I aim to offer a *revisionist* account of GDR history in that I depart from the classic Western orthodox interpretation, and in particular its underlying East/West dichotomy of ideology vs science. Instead, I aim to offer a narrative that takes both sides of the picture seriously and investigates academic knowledge production in the GDR as a practice, with a focus on the way in which research and expertise were generated, circulated, and used. In addition to offering a revisionist account of GDR history, an important contribution lies in *writing the 'East' back in* to the history of knowledge production, and into the disciplinary history of international relations in particular. Many histories of the international have ignored the role of the Soviet Union and of the socialist 'second world' in general in fashioning the global institutions in existence today.<sup>26</sup> Virtually all accounts of international relations disciplinary history ignore, or rather forget, the Soviet Union under the explicit or implicit assumption that scholarship was not free and that all they had on offer was communist ideology.<sup>27</sup> When focusing on the GDR, we can say that it definitely had a functioning system of international relations knowledge production, responsible both for the formation of functional international relations elites and for the generation of various 'knowledge items,' such as books, journals, conferences and so forth, meant to both satisfy a domestic and international demand for information and an expectation to perform 'science.' Additionally, the exchange with the West, and with West Germany in particular, was crucially important for example in the development of peace research on both sides of the Cold War division. It also played a role abroad, as the GDR trained diplomats from various socialist countries across the world, using the various products of its international relations research expertise to do so.

## Sources

The empirical parts of this thesis are based on the analysis of archival sources, interviews, and other primary documents such as legal documents, reports, books, newspapers, and journal publications.

Visited archives include the Potsdam University archives which hold the materials of the IIB, the HRV and the University of Potsdam; the archives of the German ministry of foreign affairs; the Chicago University archives for the Quincy Wright papers on post-WWII political science; and the private collection of Prof. Gerhard Göhler, former board member of the German political science association DVPW (1985-1991).

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Jochen Franzke, *Die Osteuropaforschung der DDR in den achtziger Jahren. Strukturen und Schwerpunkte*, vol. 5, *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien* (Köln: 1991).

<sup>26</sup> With regards to human rights and to the international economic architecture, see respectively: Richardson-Little; Johanna Bockman, "Socialist Globalization against Capitalist Neocolonialism: The Economic Ideas behind the New International Economic Order," *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development* 6, no. 1 (2015); Johanna Bockman, *Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011).

<sup>27</sup> See for instance the note in Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Daedalus* 106, no. 3 (1977): 48.: "I leave aside countries like the Soviet Union and China, in which it would be hard to speak of free social science scholarship!"

As listed in Appendix A, interviews have been carried out with 25 different interlocutors, 14 of which socialized in East Germany and 11 of which socialized in West Germany. With the exception of two politicians, and two diplomats, all of them were academics. Interview lengths varied between 1h07 and 4h16. All translations from German to English are by the author, except where otherwise stated. Initial interviewees were found by contacting the editor and some authors of *“Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule,”*<sup>28</sup> an edited volume on the IIB composed of short informative chapters and reflection pieces by former students and academics of the institute. Further contacts snowballed either as direct recommendations from the interviews, or through inspiration as where to search further. Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, with a similar set of initial questions covering the interviewees experiences pre-1989, during the period of change of 1989–1991, and post-1991. Given the polarized nature of the debate surrounding the GDR, mixing East and West interview partners and interview perspectives has been an important and conscious element in the choice of interviewees. With regards in particular to the dynamics described in chapter 4 ‘Colonization/knowledge’, I have made sure to interview actors from all sides of the equation. I interviewed, amongst others, the only two East German academics who made it to a permanent post at the University of Potsdam post-1990, the two West German academics who became the chairholders in International Relations at the University of Potsdam post-1990 and the Brandenburg minister of science, research and culture responsible for closing down the IIB.

Much of the empirical research in this PhD is focused around the IIB, the GDR’s former elite diplomatic training facility. This focus is due to the multivalent nature of the IIB: it was both a teaching and a research facility. It was connected to political institutions, but also remained relatively independent. All topics relevant to international relations were covered there, and specialized researchers had contacts with colleagues from other institutions through various working groups. The IIB had external contacts to similar institutions abroad, yet was not primarily focused on those. During the times of the GDR’s revolutionary upheaval it went through a full transformation and partly spilled over into the new University of Potsdam post-unification. As such, almost all the important processes and dynamics under study in this PhD thesis played out at the IIB and can thus be studied in one location. However, it is important not to make the mistake of overemphasizing the role or the importance of the IIB. As Erhard Crome notes, two equally restrictive interpretations of the IIB are regularly put forward: either that the IIB was the GDR’s only institution of importance with regards to foreign policy analysis, or that the IIB was irrelevant in the first place because it worked for a foreign affairs ministry with no real decision-making power.<sup>29</sup> Both of these interpretations are incorrect: the IIB was only one of multiple players in the field of international relations expertise, and the IIB did have influence, despite the ministry of foreign affairs’ limited decision-making power. The empirical chapters in this thesis aim at balancing the analysis between a focus on the IIB and an incorporation of the other relevant institutions.

Because of the various changes and transformations that the GDR’s elite diplomatic training facility, the IIB, went through during its time of revolution and unification with West Germany,

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<sup>28</sup> Crome.

<sup>29</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 2.



its denomination also changed twice, as depicted in the table below. Pre-1989 it was called IIB (*Institut für Internationale Beziehungen*/Institute for International Relations), and it was formally attached to the DASR, the GDR's Academy for Statecraft and Law, where bureaucrats were trained for the local political administration. Formally, the IIB ceased to exist in early 1990 when the DASR was reformed and transformed into the HRV, a College of Law and Administration. At that time, the old "IIB" ceased to exist and was transformed into the 'Political Science and International Relations' section of the HRV. After the unification with West Germany this 'Political Science and International Relations' section of the HRV was *de jure* closed down, but *de facto* continued to exist initially as the political science division of the Potsdam University's faculty of economic and social sciences.

| Cold War<br>Pre-1989                                     | Revolution<br>1990   | Unification<br>Post-1990   |
|--|--|--|
| IIB<br>(the GDR's elite diplomatic<br>training facility) | 'Political Science and<br>International Relations' section | Faculty of economic and social<br>sciences, division of political<br>science |
| DASR<br>(Academy for Statecraft and Law)                 | HRV<br>(College of Law and<br>Administration)              | UP<br>(University of Potsdam)  |

For the purpose of clarity, I have chosen to keep the denomination IIB throughout this thesis. I use it in particular in chapter 3 'Revolution/knowledge' and chapter 4 'Colonization/knowledge', despite the fact that it had ceased to exist as "IIB" at that point in time. This is problematic, as it reifies an entity of which I am precisely trying to expose the change and evolution. Yet using the correct denomination at the various points in time would probably confuse the reader and burden the text with additional explanations. Hence the choice for keeping the denomination IIB throughout this text.

## Chapter Overview

The remainder of the thesis is organized into five chapters: a theory chapter and four historical chapters examining international relations knowledge production in the GDR during the times of the Cold War, revolution and unification with West Germany respectively.

Chapter 1, '*Geopolitics and Knowledge: Rethinking power/knowledge from an international perspective*' lays out the theoretical contribution of this thesis. It proposes a model of what an international perspective on power/knowledge could look like by putting forward a 'global geopolitics of knowledge production'. This model regroups the three ideal-typical relations of war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge. Each of these images describes three different constellations of knowledge orders and three different manners in which IR expertise networks can be structured and configured. War/knowledge describes a situation in which a knowledge space is tightly bounded, yet antagonistically oriented towards an enemy space. Revolution/knowledge describes a situation in which a knowledge space experiences a severe polarization from within and a split into various poles of authority. Colonization/knowledge, finally, describes a situation in which a knowledge space is taken over by another and experiences a process of disaggregation and hierarchical orientation.

Chapter 2, *'War/Knowledge: The Global Cold War and International Relations Expertise in the GDR pre-1989'*, uses the war/knowledge framework to analyse the GDR's system of international relations expertise during the global Cold War. It shows the system's bounded yet multifaceted organization of International Relations knowledge production pre-1989. By looking at the three different functions of knowledge as constitutive, instrumental and performative, it also demonstrates how the Cold War system of international relations knowledge production was based on a simultaneous reproduction and transcendence of a friend/enemy distinction deeply engrained into research and teaching activities.

Chapter 3, *'Revolution/Knowledge: Revolutionary Upheaval and International Relations Expertise in the GDR 1989-1990'*, uses the revolution/knowledge framework to analyze the GDR's system of international relations expertise during its phase of revolutionary upheaval in 1989/90. It shows how the GDR's international relations knowledge production became deeply polarized in the wake of its revolution and subsequently had to navigate an unstable split space in which it had become an unwanted, yet somewhat still needed representatives of the old order. With the revolutionary forces' final takeover, all the previous networks and relations of knowledge production were thoroughly reconfigured and re-organized, with the surviving units reorientating around Western standards as a way to legitimize their existence in the new GDR.

Chapter 4, *"Colonization/Knowledge: Asymmetrical unification with the West and International Relations Expertise in the ex-GDR in 1990, Part 1: Winding down the old"*, uses the colonization/knowledge framework to analyze the ex-GDR's system of international relations expertise during its asymmetrical unification with West Germany. It shows how the GDR's system of international relations knowledge production was almost entirely dismantled and how the GDR's former international relations experts and expertise were crowded out of academic circuits of knowledge production and excluded from dominant discourses, networks and decision-making spaces.

Chapter 5, *"Colonization/Knowledge: Asymmetrical unification with the West and International Relations Expertise in the ex-GDR after 1990, Part 2: Building the new"*, uses the colonization/knowledge framework to analyze the ex-GDR's system of international relations expertise during its asymmetrical unification with West Germany. It shows how the West German infrastructure of international relations expertise was transferred onto the formerly East German territories and examines the processes of individualization and disaggregation as well as the principle of *tabula rasa* underwriting this hierarchical transfer of structures from West to East.

# CHAPTER 1

## Geopolitics and Knowledge:

### Rethinking power/knowledge from an international perspective

Post-1945 stability has confused us about the status of expert knowledge in studying world politics: we think that our studies about war, peace and international security are above events, and in command of them. But attention to past moments of crisis and transformation reveals a complex relation between the two. It shows that expert knowledge about world politics is transformed by events, commanded by them at least as much as it is in command of them.

Scholarship in the discipline of international relations has paid increased attention to this relation, putting forward various readings of disciplinary development in relation to its social and political context. While providing important and long overdue accounts, this scholarship also remains strangely nation-state-centric, offering readings of disciplinary development largely in relation to *domestic* social and political context.<sup>30</sup> In other words, international relations offers a reading of its own development that lacks an international perspective. This is somewhat ironic: where, if not in the discipline of international relations, would one expect a reading of disciplinary history offered from an ‘international’ perspective?

Accordingly, the questions raised in this chapter are: how can we think about the relation between international relations and the discipline of international relations without falling back to the familiar container of domestic politics and already formed nation-state boundaries? What does an international perspective on power/knowledge entail? The analysis in this chapter is divided into two parts. First, I examine the current accounts of disciplinary development in international relations with regards to their treatment of ‘the international’. As lined out above, I suggest that they have remained limited in their use of the ‘international’ as a perspective of analysis. Accordingly, the second part of this chapter puts forward a model of how to think through the relation between ir and IR, between geopolitics and knowledge. In what I call a ‘global geopolitics of knowledge production’, I propose to rethink the development of international relations scholarship through the three ideal-typical images of war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge.

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<sup>30</sup> With the notable example of Isaac Kamola’s work, which is primarily concerned with the emergence of the ‘global’ imaginary currently underpinning International Relations. See Isaac Kamola, *Making the World Global. U.S. Universities and the Production of the Global Imaginary* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019); Isaac Kamola, "Why Global? Diagnosing the Globalization literature within a political economy of higher education," *International Political Sociology* 7 (2013).

## Power/knowledge in recent IR scholarship

Scholarship in international relations has started paying increased attention to the complex relation between knowledge and power,<sup>31</sup> thereby following a wider trend in the social sciences to re-read the genesis and further life of social thinking in its wider social and political context.<sup>32</sup>

Underwriting this trend in the social sciences is a turn in the sociology of knowledge itself to understand knowledge as neither pure and disinterested nor as mere reflection of society and politics. Instead, power and knowledge are seen as co-produced and entangled.<sup>33</sup> This “new” sociology of knowledge can be characterized by four principles.<sup>34</sup> First, by a principle of symmetry which commits to studying all knowledge claims, successful and marginalized ones alike. Second, by a rejection of the internal/external distinction which means that an analysis of the production of knowledge will not be based on the separation between a ‘true’ reality and a separately constituted and well-bounded area of ‘science’ or ‘knowledge’. Any distinction between the two is considered constructed; factors from both spaces are taken seriously and included in the analysis. Third, by a principle of situatedness which foregrounds localism through close attention to the local conditions that shape the genesis of knowledge claims. Finally, by a principle of contextualism which acknowledges the fact that a specific piece of knowledge acquires meaning only in relation to other knowledge claims.

This focus on the co-production and entanglement of power and knowledge stands in contrast to earlier conceptions, which drew on a strong demarcation between reality and its representation in knowledge. To appropriate Ricoeur’s terms, these earlier representations approached the relation between the two either through a hermeneutics of faith or a hermeneutics of suspicion<sup>35</sup>, assuming it to either be a pure and truthful representation or a distorted depiction of the reality it claims to represent.

In this section my concern is with the scholarship that studies IR disciplinary development in relation to its social and political context. I focus here in particular on Stanley Hoffman’s account of IR as an American social science,<sup>36</sup> Robert Vitalis’ and Patricia Owen’s work on the role of race

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<sup>31</sup> Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015); Nicolas Guilhot, ed. *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Patricia Owens, *Economy of Force: Counterinsurgency and the Historical Rise of the Social* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Kamola, *Making the World Global. U.S. Universities and the Production of the Global Imaginary*; Patricia Owens, “Women and the History of International Thought,” *International Studies Quarterly* 62, no. 3 (2018).

<sup>32</sup> Ido Oren, *Our Enemies and US. America’s Rivalries and the making of political science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); S.M. Amadae, *Rationalizing capitalist democracy. The Cold war origins of rational choice liberalism* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003); Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the future. Modernization theory in cold war America* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

<sup>33</sup> Charles Camic and Neil Gross, “The New Sociology of Ideas,” in *The Blackwell Companion to Sociology*, ed. Judith Blau (Blackwell Publishing, 2001); Charles Camic, Neil Gross, and Michele Lamont, eds., *Social Knowledge in the Making* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011). See also Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Kristoffer Kropp, “A Sociology of Knowledge Approach to European Integration: Four Analytical Principles,” *Journal of European Integration* 37, no. 2 (2015).

<sup>34</sup> Adler-Nissen and Kropp.

<sup>35</sup> Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the human sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and philosophy: An essay on interpretation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970). See also Ruthellen Josselson, “The hermeneutics of faith and the hermeneutics of suspicion,” *Narrative Inquiry* 14, no. 1 (2004).

<sup>36</sup> Hoffmann.

and gender in the development of international relations,<sup>37</sup> as well as on Nicolas Guilhot's historical reading of the origins of political realism in IR<sup>38</sup> and Isaac Kamola's analysis of the emergence of the global imaginary underwriting current IR.<sup>39</sup> All these accounts share a focus on 'the international' as the *object* of analysis, or rather as a 'once-removed' object of analysis: the focus of analysis is not international relations but the discipline that studies international relations. Uses of the 'international' as the *framework* of analysis have remained largely implicit, but I suggest that we can nonetheless understand and classify them along the categories of 'scale of analysis', 'global power structure' or 'imagined horizon'.

## Scale of analysis

Work that draws on 'the international' as a scale of analysis frequently does so to explicitly counter issues of methodological nationalism,<sup>40</sup> and its corollaries of metrocentrism and analytical bifurcation.<sup>41</sup> This can take two different forms: a focus on interaction and entanglement or a widening of the unit of analysis itself. Comparative history and transnational history for instance expand the 'scale of analysis' by focusing on interaction and connection. Their object is to correct the single focus on one unit alone, and they do so by looking beyond its borders and putting it in conversation with other units of analysis. Comparative history puts two or more units into a conversation, comparing and evaluating developments in each unit in relation to the other units. Transnational history, in turn, tends to focus on one unit of analysis alone and put it into conversation with all relevant extra-unit context. On the other hand, we find approaches such as world-system theory or the 'multiple modernities' scholarship that widen the 'scale of analysis', not by looking beyond the border of the unit in question, but by enlarging the unit under consideration. The multiple modernities approach enlarges the unit in question to the scale of civilizations, while world-system theory enlarges it to the scale of 'world-economies' and 'world-empires'.<sup>42</sup>

From the body of IR scholarship focused on power/knowledge, I argue that we can understand Guilhot's recourse to 'the international' as a weak form of expanding the scale of analysis. His work focuses on the tradition of political realism,<sup>43</sup> arguing against reading it as eternal wisdom

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<sup>37</sup> Vitalis; Robert Vitalis, "The Noble American Science of Imperial Relations and its Laws of Race Development," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 52, no. 4 (2010); Robert Vitalis, "The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American International Relations," *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2000); Owens, "Women and the History of International Thought."

<sup>38</sup> Nicolas Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment. Political Realism and International Relations in the Mid-Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Guilhot, *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory*.

<sup>39</sup> Kamola, *Making the World Global. U.S. Universities and the Production of the Global Imaginary*; Kamola, "Why Global? Diagnosing the Globalization literature within a political economy of higher education."

<sup>40</sup> For issues of methodological nationalism, see the classic essay by Chernilo.

<sup>41</sup> For issues of analytical bifurcation and metrocentrism, see Go; Julian Go, "Beyond metrocentrism: From empire to globalism in early US sociology," *Journal of Classical Sociology* 14, no. 2 (2014).

<sup>42</sup> For a depiction of comparative history, transnational history, world-system theory and multiple modernities in relation to their 'global' outlook, see Sebastian Conrad, *What is global history?* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016), 37-61.

<sup>43</sup> Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment. Political Realism and International Relations in the Mid-Twentieth Century*; Guilhot, *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory*.

and proposing instead to see it as a historical phenomenon. It does so by tracing the emergence of the political realism we know to post-WWII America. The emergence of political realism was a conscious intellectual move drawing on counter-enlightenment themes to counter America's Cold War liberalism and its concomitant cult of science in the post-war year. In what Guillhot terms the 'realist gambit' he shows that in order for this attack to be successful, it had to incorporate some elements of both political liberalism and scientific culture, thereby ironically and dialectically emptying itself of some of its core content and thus transforming its proposed realist counter-theory of international relations into a "component of liberal modernity,"<sup>44</sup> a hybrid realist-liberal construction.

'The international' does not play any major role in Guillhot's story. The centre of his story is post-WWII America. Its main actors are US based and they form networks around American institutions such as the Centre for the Study of American Policy in Chicago, the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia, the Rockefeller Foundation, and US-based journals such as the Journal of Conflict Resolution. But Guillhot's narrative does not essentialize the boundaries of America, connecting post-WWII America to interwar Europe through his centring of the narrative on émigré scholars and their previous experiences in continental Europe. Guillhot's story might therefore be evaluated as a weak form of incorporating 'the international' as a scale of analysis.

### *Global power structure*

Understanding 'the international' as a global power structure leads to different scholarship than understanding 'the international' as a different scale or framework. This literature focuses on the workings of structural or discursive power,<sup>45</sup> while understanding each of these forms of power as global, for instance, the world-spanning structures or discourses of Marxism, dependency theory or feminism. From the body of IR scholarship focused on power/knowledge, I place Hoffman's argument in this category as well as the work by Vitalis and Owens.

Stanley Hoffman's classic essay argues that international relations is predominantly "An American Social Science," as the title states. This is not an essentializing argument about 'American IR' as it has since been interpreted to be, but rather an argument about the connections between the institutions of a specific academic discipline with a specific society at a specific point in time, which acknowledges the global interconnections between ideas and people that constituted that specific society.<sup>46</sup> Underwriting this argument is an assumption about the connection between the international status of the US and the production and dissemination of American forms of knowledge about international relations. Hoffman's connection is essentially a one-way connection from power to knowledge. The US occupies a pre-eminent position in the international system with no significant constraints to its use of global power, and its political elites have adopted a global outlook. This structures knowledge production in that it gives scholars the "motivation" and the "impulse necessary" to "turn individual efforts into a genuine scientific enterprise."<sup>47</sup> The

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<sup>44</sup> Guillhot, *After the Enlightenment. Political Realism and International Relations in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, 17.

<sup>45</sup> For a typology of different understandings of power, see Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics" *International Organization* 59 (2005).

<sup>46</sup> Tarak Barkawi and Ayse Zarakol, *Working paper* (2018).

<sup>47</sup> Hoffmann, 49.

reverse is happening in other countries with no geopolitical prominence: “[w]hen political elites are obsessed only with what is happening to their country, because it lacks the power to shape what is happening elsewhere, or because this lack of power has bred habits of dependence on another state (such as the United States) or because (as in the case of Japan and West Germany) there are severe constraints on the global use of the nation’s power, the chances are that the scholars will not have the motivation or receive the impulse necessary to turn individual efforts into a genuine scientific enterprise, and will either turn to other fields with more solid traditions and outlets (such as, say, electoral behaviour in France and Britain) or merely reflect, more or less slavishly, and with some delays, American fashions; or else there will be often brilliant individual contributions, but unconnected and unsupported.”<sup>48</sup> In short, Hoffman makes an argument about the “intellectual dependence” of scholars on “the status of their country and on the ambitions of its political elite.”<sup>49</sup> I classify this as a power/knowledge analysis that utilizes ‘the international’ in the sense of a global power structure. Hoffmann’s analysis is informed by a view of world politics structured by powerful and less powerful states, with the US at the top. It is the position in the structure that determines the content and the rise to prominence of scholarly enquiry on international relations.

Another type of scholarship drawing on ‘the international’ as a global power structure is the kind produced by Vitalis and Owens. Instead of relating knowledge to positionality in a global power structure, this type of scholarship focuses on structures of oppression, such as the ones defined by race or gender. While these are examined within predominantly national contexts (the US for Vitalis, the UK for Owens), the structures of oppression at work are implicitly or explicitly assumed to be global, which leads to the classification of this literature in the category conceptualizing ‘the international’ as a global power structure.

Vitalis’ work focuses on the role of race in the history of the discipline of international relations, focusing both on the role of ‘race’ and ‘race relations’ as a factor or unit of analysis in scholarship and on the role of race as a disabling structure that first marginalized black scholars in the discipline of international relations and then entirely wrote them out of its history. For the purpose of this classification, the latter one is of importance. Here Vitalis traces the active role played by black scholars and intellectuals in the US-American pre-WWII debates in international relations. His work features scholars such as W.E.B. Dubois, Alain Locke, Franklin Frazier, Ralph Bunche, Rayford Logan Harold Isaac and Merze Tate, whom Vitalis partly terms the Howard School of international relations because of their professional affiliations with Howard University. They stand out by their critique of “the supposed truths of racial science” as well as by their critique of “the role racism played in sustaining imperialism.”<sup>50</sup> While these scholars had access to prestigious higher education, with PhDs from Harvard, MIT and so forth, the professional system of international relations remained a segregated white space. Their work and ideas were often ignored or subsumed under the category “work of a Negro,”<sup>51</sup> a marginalization leading to their ultimate erasure from the history of international relations.

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 48-49.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>50</sup> Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics*, 12.

<sup>51</sup> John Hope Franklin, as cited in *ibid.*, 10.

Owens' work on historical women in international relations focuses on recuperating the ideas and writings of women writing about international relations. They did not form a homogenous category, and their thought is not reducible to one position, though their work often dovetailed the discipline's main concern until the post-WWII area: colonial administration. One example is the scholarship of LSE-based Lucy Mair, whose world-leading expertise on colonial administration was retrospectively written out of the history of international relations just as colonial administration was erased from IR's past. Owens' work is concerned with writing the contribution of historical women back into the discipline of International and in doing so also traces their erasure and writing out of it. As with Vitalis' work, I argue that we can understand these efforts as drawing on an understanding of 'the international' as operating through globally reaching structures leading to the inclusion of some and exclusion of others into the space of academic knowledge production about international relations.

### *Imagined horizon*

Finally, understanding 'the international' as an imagined horizon is another distinct angle of approach in conceptualizing its workings and effects. The international in this conception does not have truth value nor does it accurately represent world reality; it is seen instead as an ideological construction that serves specific purposes. Postcolonial theory is an example here that points to the construction of the 'global' as a tool of domination. Because the world is effectively constituted by 'difference' between people, cultures and regions, but 'the international' or 'global' narrative erases this difference and instead constructs it as homogenous, this legitimizes forms of Western domination.<sup>52</sup>

From the body of IR scholarship focused on power/knowledge, I argue that we can understand Kamola's work<sup>53</sup> as conceptualizing 'the international' in this way. Kamola argues that, during the Cold War, international relations understood 'the international' through the building blocks of states, areas and regions. This led to a research agenda focused on development and modernization 'of' these building blocks. Nowadays, however, the dominant understanding of 'the international' is 'the global'. This translates into research agendas focused on globalization. Kamola asks how this shift came about and traces its origins to American business schools in the 1980s concerned with turning the world into a global single market, in which higher education amongst others could be a commodity internationally accessible to purchase and offer. As the material foundation of higher education itself became reorganized along the lines of global commodification, the imagination of the world as 'global' rose to prominence. Kamola's story moves between the World Bank, Harvard Business School, African higher education, New York University, the Social Science Research Council, as well as private and philanthropic funders amongst others. As such it is a very American story, but with some connections to African higher education and to institutions of global governance. Given these aspects, Kamola could have also featured as a weak example of an extension of the scale of analysis. Through his emphasis on the material relations within which knowledge production takes place, he may also feature as a weak example of 'the international' as

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<sup>52</sup> For a depiction of postcolonial theory in relation to its 'global' outlook, see Conrad, 37-61.

<sup>53</sup> Kamola, *Making the World Global. U.S. Universities and the Production of the Global Imaginary*; Kamola, "Why Global? Diagnosing the Globalization literature within a political economy of higher education."



a global power structure – at least given the fact that these material relations exceed nation-state boundaries and single locations.

### *Understanding the ‘international’ from a relational perspective*

Power/knowledge readings of international relations have conceptualized ‘the international’ as either a scale of analysis, a global power structure or an imagined horizon. By assuming the units that make up world politics, all three of them lean towards a substantialist approach to conceptualizing ‘the international’. The focus is on questions such as: which units and forms of interactions should one include in analysis (the scale of analysis understanding)? Which dynamics are not reducible to the units themselves but exceed them (global power structure understanding)? Which narratives structure the relations between units (the imagined horizon understanding)?

In opposition to this, the recent turns to global history<sup>54</sup> and global historical sociology<sup>55</sup> have understood and utilized ‘the international’ in a different way. By focusing on “the *transnational* and *global* dynamics that enable the emergence, reproduction, and breakdown of social orders whether these orders are situated at the subnational, national, or global scales,”<sup>56</sup> these approaches have adopted a relational understanding to ‘the international’. Relational thinking is a line of thought that puts relations and social interactions at the centre of analysis, instead of the traditional ‘units,’ ‘entities’ or ‘things’ such as social systems, societies or individuals.<sup>57</sup> Going against both methodological and phenomenological individualism, it assumes that social systems, societies or individuals are made by social interaction, not pre-given units. Following Emirbayer,<sup>58</sup> we can understand this division between ‘relationalism’ and ‘substantialism’ as the key distinction line in sociological theory, and as I argue here, approaches to understanding ‘the international’. In the next section I develop a reading of power/knowledge based on such a relational understanding of ‘the international’. This involves putting forward an ideal-typical model of three different ways in which knowledge spaces can be formed.

## Towards a global geopolitics of knowledge production in international relations

As argued above, histories of international relations that put the discipline into its socio-political context have remained limited in their analytical treatment of the ‘international’. In response to this, I propose to develop *a global geopolitics of knowledge production* that allows us to rethink power/knowledge from an international perspective.

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<sup>54</sup> Conrad.

<sup>55</sup> Julian Go and George Lawson, eds., *Global Historical Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>57</sup> Mustafa Emirbayer, "Manifesto for a relational sociology," *American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 2 (1997); Charles Tilly, "International Communities, Secure or Otherwise," in *Security Communities*, ed. Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon, "Relations Before States: Substance, process and the study of world politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 3 (1999); Andrew Abbott, "Things of Boundaries," *Social Research* 62, no. 4 (1995).

<sup>58</sup> Emirbayer; Jackson and Nexon.

This global geopolitics of knowledge is based on the assumption that knowledge is highly contextual and can therefore only be understood as meaningful in relation to context. It is also based on the assumption that the boundaries of this context are not static or eternal but are made and remade throughout time and that the ‘international’ is the “hammer”<sup>59</sup>, the force, that remakes and reshapes these relations most fundamentally. I propose to understand the role of the international onto power/knowledge relations through the three nexuses of war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge. These put forward three different ideal-typical depictions of the manner in which knowledge spaces can be re-spatialized. In short, they detail how war, revolution and colonization reshape the parameters within which knowledge production takes place, and thus, ultimately, knowledge production itself.

War, revolution and colonization have arguably been some of the most powerful historical forces in bringing about change. They go beyond the established boundaries of what is known and accepted, and tear the fabric of world order apart only to build it anew, on their own terms. As such one could understand them as concrete instantiations of an abstract ‘international’. However, the war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge nexuses described by a global geopolitics of knowledge production are meant to be heuristic devices, not historically accurate depictions. They each describe how a specific type of context – determined by war, revolution and colonization respectively – configures and sets the parameters for knowledge production. In that sense, I understand them to work in the fashion of ideal-types, meaning that they feature elements which are found in concrete historical situations. However, a concrete historical situation will always exceed the ideal-type; the ideal-type will never be found in its true form in reality.<sup>60</sup> The war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge are meant as conceptual frameworks through which concrete historical situations can be interpreted and compared. As such the global geopolitics of knowledge I put forward is a collection of three different ideal-typical situations through which to understand the way in which ‘the international’ impacts knowledge production by setting and reshaping its parameters and orientation. War, revolution and colonization are of course not the only transnational forces shaping knowledge production: other events such as plagues, technology changes, or economic crises may have a similarly important impact on knowledge production. But my concern here is with the three configurations that have most purchase in untangling and illuminating the GDR power/knowledge relations explored in the following chapters.

The term “geopolitics of knowledge” has been used by decolonial thinkers and is in particular associated with Walter D. Mignolo’s work.<sup>61</sup> It speaks to the notion that knowledge is not neutral but reflective of a specific position within a highly stratified and hierarchical world order. In that sense, this ‘decolonial’ concept of a geopolitics of knowledge can be ordered into a wider family of

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<sup>59</sup> I borrow the term ‘hammer’ from Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton, “Powers of War: Fighting, Knowledge, and Critique,” *International Political Sociology* 5 (2011): 133.

<sup>60</sup> On ideal-types as a mode of theorizing, see Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations. Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 152-46; Nigel Dodd, *Social Theory and Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 35.

<sup>61</sup> See Walter D. Mignolo, *The darker side of western modernity: global futures, decolonial options* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011); Walter D. Mignolo, “Prophets Facing Sidewise: The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference,” *Social Epistemology* 19, no. 1 (2005); Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

structurally determined theories of knowledge where thought is a function of one's location within a particular type of structure.<sup>62</sup> The 'decolonial' geopolitics of knowledge assumes that the 'modern' world we live in is a deeply hierarchical world formed by centuries of European colonial expansion. It is formed by the hierarchy between North and South and within states between nationalist and subaltern spaces. This "colonial difference" structures knowledge production by putting every individual onto an axis of difference: one is either situated in a position of power or in a position of subalternity. The knowledge that is formulated from either one of these spaces is different in content and in design. The knowledge claims formulated from the positions of power support the existing hierarchies and subordinations, while the knowledge claims articulated from the positions of subalternity are necessarily critical of hegemonic perspectives.<sup>63</sup> The key question for the 'decolonial' geopolitics of knowledge thus becomes: "From which location in the colonial divide are knowledges produced? Nationalist and colonialist discourses are thinking from a power position in the colonial divide of the modern/colonial world, while subaltern subjects are thinking from the subordinate side of the colonial difference. Colonialist discourses reproduce the North/South global colonial divide, while nationalist discourses reproduce an internal colonial divide within national formations."<sup>64</sup>

I agree with and share a number of assumptions made by this 'decolonial' geopolitics of knowledge whose term I adopt: that knowledge is not formulated from a 'neutral' position, that location and context matter, that power structures play a role and that the difference between subaltern and hegemonic spaces is relevant. However, I also differ on a number of points: I disagree with an over-deterministic reading of structure, as well as with a reading of power limited to its structural aspects. I would argue that the difference between hegemonic spaces and subaltern spaces is not as clear-cut as it is made out in the 'decolonial' geopolitics of knowledge. I also question the assumption that being in a subaltern position means that one is automatically and only 'critical', or that being in a 'hegemonic' position means that one is automatically and solely reinforcing the structure of domination over subaltern spaces. Most importantly, though, I argue that colonial dynamics are not the only determinant of knowledge production. To work out a truly global geopolitics of knowledge, we need to go beyond a sole focus on coloniality. As such the global geopolitics of knowledge I put forward here differs from the 'decolonial' geopolitics of knowledge sketched out in that it also encompasses the relation between war/knowledge and revolution/knowledge. My concept, though, is not only a quantitative expansion of the term to more spheres of power/knowledge relations, it is also substantively different in that it puts forward a relational, not a structural, argument. In my reading, the 'decolonial' geopolitics of knowledge is based on a substantialist argument that reifies the structure of 'colonial difference' and makes everything, including knowledge production, secondary to it. In contrast to this, I base my concept of a global geopolitics of knowledge production on relational thinking.

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<sup>62</sup> See in particular Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD, 1954).

<sup>63</sup> Ramon Grosfoguel, "Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge, and global coloniality in the modern/colonial capitalist World-System," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 25, no. 3 (2002): 208-09.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 209.

### *Relational thinking and the sketching of a global geopolitics of knowledge production*

How do the war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge nexuses function? In short, war, revolution and colonization reset, remake, and reshape the context within which knowledge production takes place. This gives a structure and orientation to knowledge activities, thereby impacting all aspects of knowledge production. The longer and more complex answer draws on relational theory. Following relational theory, war, revolution and colonization are sets of events and occurrences, which we can also term processes. As we know from relational theory, sets of events and occurrences affect change by recasting entities and by recasting the configurations these are embedded in.<sup>65</sup> Accordingly, war, revolution and colonization, as understood in the nexuses above, reshape knowledge formation by generating or re-casting the entities involved in it and by setting the initial configurations and networks that these entities are embedded in. Both aspects of the process are detailed below.

How exactly do processes, i.e. sets of events and occurrences, generate entities? For Abbott,<sup>66</sup> this encompasses multiple steps: first, social interaction between various actors creates points of difference between unconnected sites, then these points of difference are hooked up together into boundaries or proto-boundaries. Only when a rationalizing story emerges to justify why the in-group situated within the boundary necessarily must be a unit, does the social entity fully come into being. Let's illustrate this with Abbott's example of 'social work', an entity that did not exist in the 1870s, but developed rapidly in the decades thereafter. Following Abbott, processes, events, social interactions and so forth first generated points of difference within the different sites that existed at the time and which we can now in hindsight connect with social work: psychiatric work, kindergartens, friendly visiting and probation. In psychiatric work, differences emerged between men and women exercising the profession; in kindergartens, between the scientifically trained staff and the volunteers; in friendly visiting, between church-affiliated groups and non-church-affiliated groups and in probation, between those working with adults and those working with children. The second step in the emergence of 'social work' took place when actors started combining these points of difference into a boundary or proto-boundary. In the case of 'social work', this happened when actors linked the women practising psychiatric work with the scientifically trained members of staff in kindergartens, the non-church actors involved in friendly visiting and the child workers active in the field of probation. A boundary was thus drawn between an 'in' and an 'out' group. Following Abbott, the social entity of 'social work' however only emerged fully once the in-group started developing justifications and rationalizations for why it is that these people belonged together naturally in this field. So, following Abbott, boundaries precede entity formation. The steps are: process, i.e. sets of events and occurrences generate difference, difference is linked up into boundary, and boundary is rationalized to become entity. As we can see with the example of 'social work', whenever this process happens in a social space that is already structured and filled with social entities, changes of structure will happen through the delegitimization of previous differences and through the emphasizing and highlighting of other differences. Previously separated entities, such as psychiatry, kindergartens, friendly visiting and probation, will become connected into new entities ('social work'), and existing entities, such as the unity between female

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<sup>65</sup> Jackson and Nexon, 302.

<sup>66</sup> Abbott.

and male workers in psychology etc., will become divided through the emphasis of a previously unimportant difference.<sup>67</sup> I propose to follow Abbott in suggesting that war, revolution and colonization are sets of events that either generate or emphasize/delegitimize existing differences within multiple sites and then draw these differences-made-prominent together into a bounded space while rationalizing this boundary as natural and important.

War, revolution and colonization do not only create the ‘things’, ‘entities’ or ‘substances’ involved in knowledge activities; they also set the initial configurations and networks that these entities are part of. Tilly details this process with regards to international communities.<sup>68</sup> Social processes consist of ties that actors create and use as they interact. These sets of ties, he suggests, can be broken down to the following essential ones: chains, hierarchies, triads, paired categories and organisations. Once these ties multiply and compound to form larger network structures we get configurations. War, revolution and colonization, I argue, multiply and reconfigure social ties between actors, linking them to one another in new ways. They lay down an initial set of tie configurations within which subsequent knowledge activities circulate and take place. Studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising become formed in specific ways by the networks they are embedded in.

War, revolution and colonization all generate the entities and configurations giving shape and meaning to knowledge activities but they all do so differently. The war/knowledge nexus, I argue, pitches two antagonistic and sharply bounded spaces against each other in diametrically defined ways. The colonization/knowledge nexus describes the almost opposite situation where one space takes over the other. The revolution/knowledge nexus, finally, is a combination of the previous two dynamics within the same bounded space: a previously bounded but polarized entity splits into two with one of the new entities subsequently taking over the other. The following figure presents a visual depiction of the ideal-types.

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<sup>67</sup> *ibid.*, 872.

<sup>68</sup> Tilly, in *Security Communities*.




Figure 1 The three ideal-typical constellations of geopolitics/ knowledge

## War/Knowledge

The war/knowledge nexus describes how wars shape the way in which we think about international relations. They do so by recasting the relevant parameters within which knowledge-making activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising take place. A war situation means that these knowledge-making activities will take place within an antagonistic space where each of the contenders will be defined in relation to the respective other. Like a negative mirror image, activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising will be characterized by their orientation towards and against the enemy and these same activities in the enemy space. Its core logic is enemy formation and that dynamic will inform both the ‘social entities’ involved in knowledge activities and the networks they are part of.

Underwriting this conceptualization of the war/knowledge nexus is an assumption about the ontology of war as antagonistic exchange and the expectation that the resulting process of

differentiation inherent to that antagonistic exchange is deeply generative for political life.<sup>69</sup> In so conceptualizing power/knowledge, I draw on the work by Barkawi and Brighton, in terms of their ontological assumptions about war as well as in terms of their conceptualization of the relation between war and the production of truth claims, termed war/truth.<sup>70</sup>

Following Barkawi and Brighton the main element defining the ontology of war is fighting. It is the focus on fighting that turns analysis wherein war only plays a “secondary effect” to a form of analysis fully centred on war.<sup>71</sup> Fighting generates two different types of relation to truth and knowledge. The first one can be characterized as “instrumentalized strategic thought.” It describes the way in which war, as an immediate, concrete experience of life and death, canalizes thought towards survival. War forces analysis to either “getting it right or facing ruin on the battle field.”<sup>72</sup> Political leaders, strategists and soldiers who engage in war produce truth and knowledge claims about war that serve the purpose of prevailing, the purpose of emerging from the war situation alive and victorious.<sup>73</sup> This type of knowledge production is characterized by the fact that it is part of conducting war, that it is instrumental to war and as such “never fully exterior to *an order war itself creates*.”<sup>74</sup> This is problematic because it generates an “order of knowing and being” that occludes other such orders.<sup>75</sup>

The other relation between war and knowledge goes beyond the questions of death and survival generated by battle. It exceeds the direct instrumentality of war in that it triggers change in those involved in it. It is human beings who are touched by warfare, and it is their previously fixed and set identities inscribed in a stable social order that become profoundly shaken and disrupted. They emerge from war with new identities and new views about the order of society. Previous identities, roles and social forms of order lose meaning. This is how war changes and remakes both the human beings and the social and political order they are part of, thereby thus remaking “truth and knowledge order[s].”<sup>76</sup> For Barkawi and Brighton the first relation between war and truth is problematic, while the second is productive.<sup>77</sup> This is what they propose to call war/truth, a conceptual pairing that “enables the tracing of the intimacy between the battlefield and the wider social, political, and cultural field war helps constitute.”<sup>78</sup> Its premise is that war disorders and then reorders knowledge: “like a societal centrifuge, [it] has the power to draw in resources - intellectual,

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<sup>69</sup> For a depiction of this position and the presentation of an alternative position see Astrid Nordin and Dan Öberg, “Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 43, no. 2 (2015).

<sup>70</sup>70 Barkawi and Brighton. See also Shane Brighton, “War/Truth: Foucault, Heraclitus and the hoplite Homer,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26, no. 4 (2013); Josef Teboho Ansong and Tarak Barkawi, “Utile forms: power and knowledge in small war,” *Review of International studies* 40 (2014).

<sup>71</sup> Barkawi and Brighton, 134.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 136.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 135.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 136.


<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 127.

scientific, social, economic, cultural, and political - and unmake and re-work them in ways that cannot be foreseen.”<sup>79</sup>

In conceptualizing the core logic of war/knowledge as enemy formation, I also take inspiration from Ido Oren’s analysis of the development of political science in the US around WWI, WWII and the Cold War.<sup>80</sup> In his work, Oren links a moment of enemy formation to a subsequent delegitimization of theories, ideas or branches of enquiry that are seen to stand in connection with that new enemy. State-theory and administration science, for instance, were a key component of early political science in the US and their genealogy was clearly linked to Germany. This became a problem once the US and Germany faced each other as enemies during WWI and WWII, leading to the disappearance of state-theory from the core of political science after WWI and to the disappearance of public administration from the core of political science after WWII. Similarly, before the Cold War, concepts of democracy in the US encompassed both ‘social’ and ‘behavioural’ components. Once the US declared the Soviet Union to be an enemy, its concept of democracy lost the ‘thick’ social dimension to retain only the ‘thin’ behavioural element. Crucially, Oren does not link change on the content level to actual warfare, or for that matter to regime change in the respective country, but to enemy formation. Content changes in knowledge production happened once Germany or the Soviet Union started to be perceived as and understand them as enemies.

Following the idea of war as antagonistic and generative, the war/knowledge nexus describes the process whereby a specific formation of knowledge production is reshaped and restructured into an antagonistic pattern. The borders of that knowledge formation become sharply bounded, and it becomes firmly oriented towards and against its contending enemy knowledge formation. In short: it inscribes a logic of antagonistic exchange to knowledge production based on a process of enemy formation.



Chapter 2 illustrates the war/knowledge nexus by offering a reading of knowledge production in the GDR in relation to the Cold War setting. This raises the question: can the situation of the GDR until 1989 be considered to be inscribed in a war setting? This question of course hinges on whether to consider the Cold War confrontation a war, despite there not having been any direct physical battle or blood shedding between Soviet and US troops – or in the case of the GDR, despite the GDR army not being involved in active battle. The general agreement leans towards

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 137.

<sup>80</sup> Oren.



understanding the Cold War as “an East-West antagonism rooted in irreconcilable ideologies, structured on geographical partition and strategic deterrence, and fought in a variety of spheres (from alliance diplomacy and political manipulation to development projects, from cultural and intellectual confrontations all the way to bloody ‘proxy wars’ in allegedly ‘peripheral’ areas).”<sup>81</sup>

Two different arguments in favour of reading this description as ‘war’ are being put forward.<sup>82</sup> The first one focuses on the aspects of battle and blood shedding, highlighting how it is only a Eurocentric approach to the Cold War that can lead to its description as a ‘long peace’.<sup>83</sup> When discarding the Eurocentric lens, one can see that the ‘long peace’ in the Atlantic North “went hand in hand with highly destructive wars in the global South, which accounted for almost all of the estimated 20 million war casualties in the period of 1945-90.”<sup>84</sup> The other argument focuses on the ontology of war, arguing that “[w]hen seen as a contest for hegemony [...] the Cold War fully retains ‘its war-like character’ as a key, defining feature of its origins and development as a deep East-West antagonism.”<sup>85</sup>

Europe and Germany in particular played a central role in the Cold War in that the origins and solutions of the conflict ultimately resided in Europe, with the partition and ultimate (re)unification of Germany its prominent symbol.<sup>86</sup> For Germany, the Cold War was very much an intra-German conflict, a ‘German Cold War; between East and West: “the position as Cold War border region par excellence, with the fault line between socialist East and capitalist West dividing the German nations into two antagonistic states, had the paradoxical effect of creating a sharp line of demarcation separating the two states, while simultaneously establishing a lasting zone permitting contact and interaction between them.”<sup>87</sup> At the core of the intra-German Cold War was the *Hallstein* doctrine, which started as a West German mission to prevent the diplomatic recognition of the GDR, but later evolved into a world-wide campaign against anything that would assign positive value to the GDR. It deeply structured GDR/FRG interactions, hijacking considerable financial and human resources to contest the other’s legitimacy to represent Germany.<sup>88</sup> Referring to the post-Cold War marginalization of ex-GDR diplomats from the newly all-German diplomatic service, former GDR diplomat Otto Pfeiffer refers to the petty nature of the intra-German Cold War confrontation:

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<sup>81</sup> Federico Romero, “Cold War historiography at the crossroads,” *Cold War History* 14, no. 4 (2014): 689.

<sup>82</sup> For a prominent reading of the Cold War confrontation as war, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>83</sup> For a reading of the Cold War as a long peace, see John L. Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

<sup>84</sup> Romero, 693. See also Paul Thomas Chamberlin, *The Cold War's Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace* (New York, NY: Harper, 2018).

<sup>85</sup> Romero, 690.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 697.

<sup>87</sup> Stephen J. Scala, “Divided, but not disconnected: German experiences of the Cold War,” *Cold War History* 12, no. 1 (2012): 176. On the German Cold War see also Mathias Stein, *Der Konflikt um die Alleinvertretung und Anerkennung in der UNO: Die Deutsch-deutschen Beziehungen zu den Vereinten Nationen von 1949 bis 1973* (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2011); William Gray, *Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

<sup>88</sup> Werner Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin. Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955-1973. Aus den Akten der beiden deutschen Aussenministerien* (Duncker&Humblot, 2001).

*“It was part vengeance, I can say this openly. There is a book by FRG diplomat Werner Kilian in which he depicts how some FRG embassies spent more than half of their resources on keeping the GDR down, up to petty things like having the FRG military attaché in Lissabon hide with binoculars in the dunes, in order to observe whether the GDR boats leaving Portugal perhaps raised the GDR flag too early. [...] They were simply mad at us [...]: we had given them so much trouble.” (Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 12-13)*

Ultimately, however, it does not matter for the purpose of this analysis whether we label the Cold War as war. The war/knowledge nexus does not describe an ontological but a heuristic connection; we do not need to label the Cold War as war in order to employ the war/knowledge nexus for analysis. In order to investigate the link between power and knowledge during the time period of the Cold War, it only matters whether the Cold War situation de facto comes close enough to a sharp bounding of knowledge spaces against each other in an antagonistic form for the nexus to be of relevance. Because this is empirically and historically the case, the colonization/knowledge nexus is helpful in understanding the dynamics at stake. Indeed, “[i]n each camp, political and cultural elites articulated their fear of war, and the corresponding strategies to prevent and deter it, not only in relation to the adversary’s military means and posture but to their own deeply held convictions about the inherently expansive and dangerous nature of the opposite system, symptomatically perceived as ‘totalitarian’ or ‘imperialistic’.”<sup>89</sup>

### ***Colonization/Knowledge***

The colonization/knowledge nexus describes how colonization reshapes the way in which we think about international relations. It does so by recasting the relevant parameters within which knowledge-making activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising take place. Colonizing dynamics mean that these knowledge-making activities will take place within a strongly hierarchized space whereby a formerly independent knowledge space becomes absorbed and entirely oriented towards another knowledge space. Activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising will be characterized by a reorientation around the new pole of authority, with the institutions and organizations formerly bundling these knowledge-making activities falling apart, imploding, reorganizing or reorienting themselves within the new context. The networks that they are embedded in will change as well, developing new international alignments, and connecting to knowledge actors within the new formation that they have become part of. The core logic of colonization/knowledge is hierarchical orientation, and that dynamic will inform both the ‘social entities’ involved in knowledge activities and the networks they are part of.

In so describing the colonization/knowledge nexus, I draw on George Steinmetz’s extension of Bourdieusian field theory to the scale of empires.<sup>90</sup> Steinmetz focuses on the relation between the fields of metropole and colony, arguing that modern colonial empires can be conceptualized by three different types of field extension from metropole to colony. Either the metropole’s field is extended in a straightforward manner to the colonial territory, the metropole’s field produces a colonial subfield, or the colony develops a new field specific to itself. For academic fields, though,

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<sup>89</sup> Romero, 689.

<sup>90</sup> George Steinmetz, "Social fields, subfields and social spaces at the scale of empires: explaining the colonial state and colonial sociology," *The Sociological Review Monographs* 64, no. 2 (2016).

Steinmetz argues only the first two modes of relation are relevant. Academic fields are either extended from metropole to colony or they develop a colonial subfield. As examples of metropole field extension, Steinmetz lists settler institutions like the colleges in the 13 American colonies, scientific practices like psychological testing for work motivation, aptitude and intelligence, as well as the export of curricula in the Nazi *Reichsuniversitäten* of Eastern Europe or in the colonial universities of French Algiers and British Bombay.<sup>91</sup> These describe processes of transfer with little to no changes in form. As examples of metropole fields that develop a colonial subfield, Steinmetz lists the colonial sciences. Instead of just transferring the field of medicine to the colonies, medicine for instance developed the colonial subfield of tropical medicine. This included a move away from studying “diseases in the tropics” to studying “tropical diseases”.<sup>92</sup> French sociology is another example of a metropole field that developed a colonial specialization. It retained its connection to the field of sociology, as the scholars located in the subfield were trained in the same places, published in the same outlets and competed for posts in the same institutions as their colleagues from the general field of sociology. At the same time, it had its own specificities, as the scholars from colonial sociology distinguished themselves by their empirical focus on both metropole and periphery, by their attention to issues of race, by their critique of what we now dub ‘methodological nationalism’, as well as by a valorization of fieldwork.<sup>93</sup>

In conceptualizing the mode of transfer of knowledge fields from metropole to colony, I also draw on the revisionist ‘colonial knowledge’ scholarship’s attention to the role of the colonized in this process.<sup>94</sup> Where classic postcolonial literature<sup>95</sup> assumed their passivity in the process of imposition, depicting them as mere ‘native informants’, the revisionist literature highlights the role and agency of indigenous intellectuals within the colonial process. In a ‘collaborationist’ mode, colonized intellectuals played a role in shaping the process, bringing in their own epistemic practices and forms of knowledge into a highly unequal form of exchange.

Following these bodies of scholarship, the colonization/knowledge nexus describes the process whereby a specific formation of knowledge production is restructured by absorption into another formation. Echoing Steinmetz’s work, this can happen to varying degrees, from full absorption, whereby all parameters of the colonizing formation are transferred, to part-absorption, where the parameters become those of the colonizing formation but retain some specificity as colonial sub-formation. Intellectuals, scholars, and experts from both the absorbing and the absorbed sides of this ‘colonial’ divide will take part in the historically concrete process of ‘takeover’ with varying degrees of agency and with varying desire, possibility and power to shape the process.

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
<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 105-06.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 106.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 110.

<sup>94</sup> For an overview of the positions, see Phillip Wagoner, "Precolonial Intellectuals and the Production of Colonial Knowledge," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 4 (2003).

<sup>95</sup> See in particular Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Books, 1978); Bernard Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Nicholas Dirks, *Castes of mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).



Chapter 4 illustrates the colonization/knowledge nexus by offering a reading of knowledge production in the space of the former GDR in relation to the process of post-Cold War German (re-)unification. This raises the question: is the term colonization appropriate to describe the process that has taken place in the territory of the former GDR from 1990 onwards? The arguments in favour of reading the unification of Germany as colonization can be divided into a phenomenological argument and an ‘objective’ argument focused around a logic of effect. Cooke for example argues that while it remains debatable whether or not the reunification was indeed a colonial act, it matters that the reunification has been perceived as such and that these perceptions of colonization and a language of colonization have penetrated culture.<sup>96</sup> Dümcke and Vilmar on the other hand have prominently argued for a reading of the German unification as what they term ‘colonialization’; a process similar to colonization. They argue that, despite a lack of physical violence, a focus on the effects of a colonial situation shows four crucial elements applicable to the GDR: “the destruction of an ‘indigenous’ economic structure,” “the exploitation of available economic resources,” “the social liquidation of not only the political elite but also the intellectuals of a country,” and “the destruction of [...] a population’s identity.”<sup>97</sup> As former GDR colonial historian Van der Heyden puts it:

*“When using the lens of colonial history to examine the takeover of Eastern academic institutions by Western academics, I come to the theory of a colonization of the GDR [...] If I look at the definitions [of colonization] that I have collected so far, I think that in the East of Germany we have experienced the same that overseas countries did in the 19<sup>th</sup> century: the replacement of the functional elites, replacement of values etc.” (Interview Van der Heyden, 2020: 8)*

<sup>96</sup> Paul Cooke, *Representing East Germany since Unification. From Colonization to Nostalgia* (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2005), 2,11.

<sup>97</sup> Wolfgang Dümcke and Fritz Vilmar, *Kolonialisierung der DDR: Kritische Analysen und Alternativen des Einigungsprozesses* (Münster: Agenda Verlag, 1996), 13. The translation is by Cooke, 2.

Hoerschelmann also highlights how 'East Germans' were silenced in a supposedly egalitarian public space during the process of unification and "captured in degrading, essentialising stereotypes not unlike those critiqued in the post-colonial literature".<sup>98</sup>

The arguments against a reading of the unification of Germany as colonization mirror the ones in favour of it. On the one side we find narratives arguing that perceptions of colonialization are false perceptions and distortions of a 'true' and positive reality. Cooke bundles different arguments and narratives aimed at disproving suggestions of colonization. They highlight the economic gains East Germany obtained through the unification, in particular if comparing the levels of consumer power and social security to those in other post-communist states. They also highlight the ways in which East Germans have supposedly developed a more coherent identity since the unification of Germany.<sup>99</sup> The aim is to demonstrate that claims of economic exploitation or identity disruption are wrong but that the unification process was, overall, a positive, not a negative event. Perceptions of colonization despite these 'demonstrably' positive events are constructed as varying versions of false consciousness: ungratefulness, nostalgia, or a result of unrealistic expectations.<sup>100</sup>

On the other side, we find narratives focused on a logic of intent and consent as opposed to the narratives of effect and consequence put forward by the colonization argument. Ultimately, this argument reduces the question of colonization to agency and consent: if the 'colonized' wanted and consciously sought out the 'colonization', then they are not 'colonized'; if they had not wanted it and consciously opposed it, then it would be considered an act of colonization. Because the GDR held free and democratic elections and because the resulting majority vote was cast in favour of politicians clear about their intention to unite with West Germany on West German terms, the unification of Germany is not deemed a colonial situation.<sup>101</sup> As Misselwitz points out, it is part of the specific dialectic of this revolution that the GDR citizen first made the GDR their own and then exchanged it for the unification.<sup>102</sup>

The process of unification with West Germany parallels many elements of a colonial situation, but is not reducible to it either, exceeding it in many ways. Misselwitz's analysis through the lens of the word pair *Schulden* ('debt') and *Schuld* ('guilt') perhaps best captures the situation. His analysis points to the way in which the recourse to the principle of non-recognition during the process of unification nullified everything positive that was grown in or had been built in the East, leaving the ex-GDR to bring only 'negatives' to the negotiation table: *Schulden* ('debt') and *Schuld* ('guilt'). These negatives were then divided between East and West. The East was discharged of debt and charged with guilt, while the West discharged itself of any immaterial moral legacy and responsibility, taking on the material burden only.<sup>103</sup> As such the process of unification traded in

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<sup>98</sup> Kathrin Hoerschelmann, "Breaking ground - marginality and resistance in (post) unification Germany," *Political Geography* 20 (2001): 987.

<sup>99</sup> Cooke, 4-11.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> For examples of this position, see *ibid.*, 4.

<sup>102</sup> Hans-J Misselwitz, *Nicht länger mit dem Gesicht nach Westen. Das neue Selbstbewußtsein der Ostdeutschen* (Bonn: Dietz, 1996), 24.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 34.

legal and material stability for a psychological and political problem: the higher the asymmetry of dependence in the former, the stronger the latter.<sup>104</sup>

In order to investigate the link between power and knowledge during the process of German unification, it does not ultimately matter whether we term it to be colonial or not. To draw on the colonization/knowledge nexus established above, it only matters whether the situation comes close enough to the restructuring of a knowledge space through the takeover by another such knowledge space for it to be applicable. Because this is empirically and historically the case, the colonization/knowledge nexus is helpful in understanding the dynamics at stake.

### *Revolution/Knowledge*

The revolution/knowledge nexus describes how revolutions reshape the way in which we think about international relations. They do so by recasting the relevant parameters within which knowledge-making activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising about international relations take place. Revolutionary events mean that these knowledge-making activities will take place within a polarized space characterized by multiple split poles of sovereignty: the previously stable incumbent and the upcoming challenger. It also means that they will take place within an unstable space that gradually shifts from the former to the latter pole of authority. Knowledge-making activities will be characterized by a back and forth between both poles, but also by the fact that the actors, institutions and organizations bundling these knowledge-making activities will partly implode, reorganize or reorient themselves within this shifting context. The networks that they are embedded in will change as well, developing new international alignments, connecting to processes of change elsewhere, but also engaging with new counter-revolutionary forces, domestic and foreign. As such the revolution/knowledge nexus combines the two patterns of war/knowledge and colonization/knowledge: it pitches two polarized, sharply bounded spaces against each other and at the same time describes a situation where one of these spaces takes over the other.

In so describing the revolution/knowledge nexus, I draw on Charles Tilly's definition of revolutions as being composed of two elements: a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary outcome.<sup>105</sup> Tilly's revolutionary situation describes a splitting of original sovereignty and hegemony into at least two power blocs, the incumbents and the contenders. These power blocks each garner significant support from citizens and compete over state power, making incompatible and competing claims to state control. The revolutionary situation is thus defined by a situation of multiple sovereignty. This happened for instance, Tilly illustrates, when Lithuania asserted its sovereignty within the Soviet Union in 1990, when coalitions amongst skilled workers, bourgeois and intellectuals mobilized and successfully controlled some portions of the state in the 1848 revolutions, or when the English gentry split into different blocks, the Cavaliers and the

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>105</sup> Charles Tilly, *European Revolutions 1492-1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). For other definitions or delimitations of the term revolution see Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (London: Penguin, 1963); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Eric Selbin, "Stories of Revolution in the Periphery," in *Revolution in the Making of the Modern World*, ed. John Foran, David Lane, and Andreja Zivkovic (London: Routledge, 2008); George Lawson, "Reform, Rebellion, Civil War, Coup d'état and Revolution," in *Revolutionary Movements in World History*, ed. James DeFronzo (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2006); Fred Halliday, *Revolutions and World Politics* (London: Palgrave, 1999).

Roundheads, and effectively controlled parts of the state in 1640.<sup>106</sup> Tilly's revolutionary outcome takes place after a period of struggle, when state power is transferred from incumbent to contender. Full sovereignty is re-established to one party alone with no other contender to state power. This does not have to entail a clean cut between old and new, however, as Tilly notes that a transition from revolutionary situation to revolutionary outcome is more likely to occur if members of the incumbent party defect to the contenders. The other important factor leading from revolutionary situation to revolutionary outcome is connected to military power: revolutionary situations are more likely to turn into revolutionary outcomes if the contenders acquire military power or if the incumbent's military power either remains neutral or defects to the other side.<sup>107</sup> Following Tilly, a full revolutionary process thus encompasses the splitting of sovereignty, a phase of struggle and the re-establishment of sovereignty under new banners.<sup>108</sup>

I also draw on the work by Halliday and Lawson, who have pointed out the inherently international dimensions of revolutions, drawing out their embeddedness in wider processes of change.<sup>109</sup> Revolutionary situations are inherently international by "the role of 'abnormal times' in heightening demands for revolution; the unstable alignments prompted by shifting client-patron relations; the rise and fall of revolutionary waves".<sup>110</sup> Revolutionary processes are inherently international by "the brokerage role of revolutionary entrepreneurs, the externalization and internationalization of revolutionary repertoires, the closeness of the dynamic between revolutionary and counter/revolutionary forces".<sup>111</sup> Revolutionary outcomes, finally, are inherently international by "the relations among revolutions, counter-revolution, and war, as well as the material aid and more intangible aspects of 'demonstration effect' that revolutions afford to other states".<sup>112</sup>

Following these two bodies of scholarship, the revolution/knowledge nexus describes the process whereby a specific formation of knowledge production is restructured by splitting into two or more contending poles of knowledge production – with one of these poles ultimately taking over the other ones.

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<sup>106</sup> Tilly, *European Revolutions 1492-1992*, 10-14.

<sup>107</sup> *ibid.*, 14-16.


<sup>108</sup> *ibid.*, 9.

<sup>109</sup> Fred Halliday, "Revolutionary Internationalism and its Perils," in *Revolution in the Making of the Modern World*, ed. John Foran, David Lane, and Andreja Zivkovic (London: Routledge, 2008); George Lawson, *Anatomies of Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); George Lawson, "Revolutions and the International," *Theory and Society* 44, no. 4 (2015); George Lawson, "A Global Historical Sociology of Revolution," in *Global Historical Sociology*, ed. Julian Go and George Lawson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

<sup>110</sup> Lawson, "Revolutions and the International," 311.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, 313.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, 315.



Chapter 3 illustrates the revolution/knowledge nexus by offering a reading of knowledge production in the GDR in relation to the process of upheaval and change taking place in 1989-90. This raises the question: do the events in the GDR in 1989/1990 qualify as a revolution? They were not utopian, and they were not violent. Some have argued that they were part reform, part revolution, calling them reolutions.<sup>113</sup> Marxists would see 1989 as counter-revolution. Habermas has coined the term ‘rectifying’ (*nachholende*) revolution,<sup>114</sup> while Lawson puts forward the concept of negotiated revolutions.<sup>115</sup>

What to call the events of 1989 is a political issue.<sup>116</sup> So far, the Western interpretation has dominated the readings of 1989, which is a narrative that Mark et al. have coined the “myth” of 1989.<sup>117</sup> It has set and solidified the meaning of 1989 through the interpretive framework of Western liberalism, reading it as a victory of liberal democracy and free markets over dictatorship. It interprets the events of 1989 as a shift “from immobility to mobility, passivity to activity, the old to the modern, obsolete planning to the market, and inertia to development”.<sup>118</sup> The actors of

<sup>113</sup> Timothy Garton Ash, "Revolution: The Springtime of Two Nations," *The New York Review of Books* (June 15, 1989).

<sup>114</sup> Jürgen Habermas, "Nachholende Revolution und linker Revisionsbedarf: Was heisst Sozialismus heute?," in *Die Nachholende Revolution: Kleine Politische Schriften VII* (Frankfurt am Main: 1990).

<sup>115</sup> George Lawson, "Negotiated Revolutions: The prospects for radical change in contemporary World Politics," *Review of International studies* 31, no. 3 (2005). Lawson argues against a substantialist argument of revolutions as necessarily, essentially being utopian, violent, class-based and so forth in favour of a historical and contextual reading that sees them as dynamic processes embedded in local and temporal specifics. Following this reading, the events of 1989 do qualify as revolutions. They share some characteristics with the classical revolutions but differ from them in five crucial points: the insurgent states are actively welcomed by their neighbours and other states in the international system; they pursue a politics of normalcy, aiming to catch up with the rest instead of pushing through novel utopian visions; they reject violence and accept mutual dependency; the revolutionaries and the old regime negotiate the transition together; the resulting state is weaker and less bureaucratic than the previous.

<sup>116</sup> For e.g. Communist reformers dubbed the events “turn” (*Wende*), whereas German dissidents preferred the term “peaceful revolution” (*friedliche Revolution*). See Mark et al., 11, footnote 34.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.



change in this narrative are ordinary people and civil society actors. They are depicted as primarily desiring to integrate a West they still need to catch up to, requiring Western aid to do so. This narrative of 1989 also sketches the East as an isolated, blank space cut off from the world to which globalization was to be brought to (by the West) in 1989.<sup>119</sup> The spatial imaginary underpinning this myth is heavily Western-centric and relies on an expansionist narrative: it was a Western ‘wind of change’ that came upon the East, liberating it from its anachronistic dictatorships and bringing with it modernity, freedom and prosperity.<sup>120</sup> As the terms anachronistic and modernity indicate, the temporal underpinnings are those of linear progress from Eastern Communism to Western liberalism. This narrative legitimized and normalized said mix of free markets, liberal democracy and a globalization on Western terms as the only viable model for statehood and world order.<sup>121</sup> It has also nurtured and confirmed ideas about Western superiority and has become central to our understandings of what ‘the West’ means and represents in the post-Cold War world.<sup>122</sup>

In this narrative, two elements in particular about the events of 1989 are lost. The first is that the actors of change were to a large extent reform-oriented communist elites, not just civil society actors, and the second is that the East German and Eastern European actors involved in the events had agency of their own independently of the West.<sup>123</sup>

I propose to read the role of communist elites, party members and other actors closely affiliated with state institutions through the lens of Tilly’s catalysts. As we have seen, following Tilly, revolutionary situations with multiple claims to sovereignty occur frequently, but they rarely lead to revolutionary outcomes. It is often only elite defection and/or the military’s neutrality that acts as catalyst and turns an attempted revolution into a successful one. Former SED member and professor Wilfried Schreiber argues in that direction:

*“These events brought about doubts. To whom? To the party members. Today you learn at school: the ‘Wende’ of 1989, the fall of the old regime, was the work of courageous Christians who took to the streets. Yes, they did act in this way. But the crucial element was the change in the mass consciousness of the party members. The SED had around 2 million party members for a population of 18 million. [...] I was part of a state institution, I was a soldier and I was a member of the party at the military’s political college. I cannot remember anyone there who was not a member of the SED. But we all asked the question: how are things going to continue? Things cannot continue this way?” (Interview Schreiber, 2020: 10-11)*

Poorly understood, the role of the SED, the official party of the GDR, was crucial in the process, partly because it also structured the reaction of the armed forces not to intervene:

*“We imploded, nothing else. And this so-called civil movement – they occupied an empty spot. They walked into an open door, only pushing it open wider than it already was. The fact that there was no use of violence*

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid., 1-2.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 5-8.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., 238.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., 1-2. On this point, see also Stephen Kotkin, *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment* (New York: Modern Library, 2009).

*means in other words that a change of thinking and a separation from the Soviet hardliners had already taken place” (Interview Fischer, 2020: 11)*

The second element that gets lost in the liberal Western narrative of 1989 is that the East German and Eastern European actors were able to be ‘more Western than the West’ of their own accord, not needing help to do so, but also that their agendas were complex, contradictory and multiple – and not necessarily only embodiments of an eternal yearning for ‘superior’ Western modes of being.<sup>124</sup>

*In the Western perception, the GDR was by that time only seen as a phenomenon in transition [...] From this perspective, the GDR ended [...] with the fall of the Berlin wall. Celebrating the fall of the Berlin Wall expresses the Western perspective on the GDR: ‘They want to come to us, all they want to do, is to come to the West.’ After the fall of the Berlin Wall this was taken for granted and the rest was seen as a matter of detail. Which is a huge problem. Not only because it is a matter of respect with regards to the democratization of the GDR from within, but also because it is a matter of accepting that this society had interests of its own after 40 years of dictatorship (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 3)*

At first the GDR revolutionaries were congratulated for their courage to claim their freedom, but with the unification to West Germany they became absorbed into new narratives that erased their agency. As Misselwitz argues, they were suddenly expected to show gratitude to the West, as if they hadn’t been the ones to bring an end to the GDR in the first place.<sup>125</sup> At the same time, as the general interpretive frame to understand the GDR gradually became Stasi-centric, the revolutionaries of 1989 were reframed as victims, and naïve ones on top of that. This depiction reinforced previously held assumptions about a total lack of freedom in the GDR<sup>126</sup>

So, do the events in the GDR qualify as a revolution? We have recovered revolutionaries with their own agency from a story of Western-bestowed freedom. And from a story of non-relevance, we have recovered defecting elites ensuring the success of the revolution. As such the GDR storyline fits the criteria established earlier to count as a revolution. Ultimately, however, this does not matter. In order to investigate the link between power and knowledge during the upheavals of 1989/90, it does not matter whether we term it to be revolutionary or not. To draw on the revolution/knowledge nexus established above, it only matters whether the situation comes close enough to the restructuring of a knowledge space through its internal split into two contending poles, coupled with an ultimate takeover of one pole by the other. Because this is empirically and historically the case, the revolution/knowledge nexus is helpful in understanding the dynamics at stake.

## Conclusion

In this chapter I have developed the idea of a global geopolitics of knowledge production, which is a re-reading of power/knowledge from an international perspective. This has involved sketching out the three ideal-typical relations of war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and

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<sup>124</sup> Mark et al., 1-2.

<sup>125</sup> Misselwitz, 25.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., 15-16.

colonization/knowledge. Each of these describe how knowledge production about international relations functions in different geopolitical contexts. War/knowledge describes a situation in which knowledge production about international relations is shaped by antagonistic exchange and enemy formation. Revolution/knowledge describes a situation in which knowledge production about international relations is shaped by polarization and splitting sovereignty. Colonization/knowledge, finally, describes a situation in which knowledge production about international relations is shaped by hierarchical orientation.

Developing this global geopolitics of knowledge production serves two purposes. First, it is meant to support the analysis of East German geopolitics/knowledge relations put forward in the following chapters. Organizing these around the war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge ideal-types helps make sense of the multitude of different, criss-crossing and entangled processes. As is the case with ideal-typical theorizing, the depictions of the relation between geopolitics and knowledge are not meant to be ‘true’ depictions of reality. They are meant to be helpful, cutting through the complexity of a historical situation that will always exceed them and providing insight about some of the core dynamics underwriting it. The following chapters on war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge will illustrate this. Developing this model of a global geopolitics of knowledge also serves another purpose. In putting forward a framework of how to think about knowledge in relation to geopolitics, it proposes an alternative to modes of thinking that either do not understand knowledge production in relational terms or, where they do so, fail to understand that this necessarily must entail an ‘international’, ‘global’ or ‘intersocial’ perspective. A relational perspective on knowledge production is necessarily ‘international’/‘global’/‘intersocial’ – not in the sense of prescribing a scale of analysis, but in the sense of rejecting any boundaries as essential or given, including national-state boundaries.

## CHAPTER 2

### War/Knowledge:

# The Global Cold War and International Relations

## Expertise in the GDR pre-1989

*“The foreign policy apparatus was much more experienced. We knew that the ‘classic opponents’ were people who saw things in the same way that we did. From a diametrically opposite perspective, of course, but they were thinking just as rationally and sensibly as we did.” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 5)*


*“The relationship between research and politics was multifaceted and ambivalent. A simplified formula could be: the less strategic-political relevance for the Soviet Union, the freer the research. When researching areas of high political relevance, such as the foreign policy of the Soviet Union - what kind of research could we do there? We wrote about their (official) activities and reproduced their statements. [...] In the department on Western Europe, [research] leaned in the other direction, it became more solid, more professional. Solid analyses were required in this domain: We wanted to know what was really going on.” (Interview Krämer, 2019b: 3,6)*

In the early 1970s, Lutz Kleinwächter attended his ‘theory of international relations’ class. This was a compulsory component in his studies to become a diplomat at the GDR’s elite Institute for International Relations, the IIB. Topic of the day: geography and maps. The professor arrived and instead of starting to lecture, he asked all the students to take ten steps back. He pointed to the map of the world hanging at the front of the classroom and asked: “Can you still see the GDR on the map?” The students were a little unsettled. From where they were standing, the GDR was not really visible. His next question went further: “Can you still see Germany?” The students could not. “This,” the professor proceeded to explain, “tells you something about Germany’s importance in world politics, it tells you something about the GDR’s importance in the world.” The students looked uneasily at each other, silently wondering whether the professor was out of his mind. They had all grown up with great pride in the GDR, and the professor’s casual irony clashed with much of what they had known and believed up to that point.<sup>127</sup> In due time, of course, they would all learn to elegantly navigate the tensions of a job that simultaneously required a defence of the GDR and a flexibility of mind in understanding the realities it operated in. This episode is symptomatic for the dynamics at play during the GDR’s involvement in the global Cold War: researchers, academics and intellectuals had to navigate an antagonistic system of meaning that required a simultaneous reproduction and transcendence of its boundaries and parameters.

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<sup>127</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 12.

This chapter explores the relation between power and knowledge in the GDR during the global Cold War.<sup>128</sup> It makes sense of the events at hand by organizing them through the lens of the ideal-typical relation between war and knowledge sketched out in chapter 1. As laid out there, war/knowledge describes how wars shape the way in which we think about international relations. They do so by recasting the relevant parameters within which knowledge-making activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising take place. A war situation means that these knowledge-making activities will take place within an antagonistic space where each of the contenders will be defined in relation to the respective other. Like a negative mirror image, activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising will be characterized by their orientation towards and against the enemy and these same activities in the enemy space. Its core logic is enemy formation, and that dynamic will inform both the ‘social entities’ involved in knowledge activities and the networks they are part of.



This chapter is divided into four parts. A first section presents the stable and bounded, yet multifaceted and interwoven system of GDR international relations knowledge production. The subsequent sections examine three different aspects of foreign policy expertise along the categories of constitution, instrumentality and performance. The goal of these sections is to demonstrate how the Cold War’s antagonistic friend/enemy distinction was inscribed into all these different aspects of international relations knowledge production, but also forced scholars and researchers into an unstable zone which required a simultaneous reproduction of dogma and transcendence of its limits.

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<sup>128</sup> The focus in this chapter lies on the Cold War dynamics from 1970 onwards and thus describes processes and dynamics concerning the last twenty years of the GDR’s existence. GDR foreign policy and knowledge production changed substantially around the 1970s with the increasing international recognition of the GDR, which demanded, amongst others, a much-widened pool of diplomats and experts to staff the increasing demand for expertise. The IIB’s five-year degree started in 1970, replacing earlier and shorter degrees, and the IPW was founded in 1971 through the merging of three earlier institutions.

## Spatialization

A first characteristic of the war/knowledge situation was the boundedness of its system. The GDR during the Cold War featured a well-ordered and well-organized system of knowledge production in the field of international relations. Bounded, however, did not mean monolithic. Knowledge production in international relations was spread across multiple institutions, and these institutions were associated and served various institutions of the political and social life.<sup>129</sup> This mirrored the fact that political life in the GDR, as in many communist systems, was not monolithic. First, the GDR was built on a double structure of state and party. State institutions, such as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (hereafter referred to as MfAA), stood next to the party institutions, such as – in the field of international relations – the department of international liaison (*Internationale Verbindungen*) under the leadership of SED central committee secretary Hermann Axen. The state structures were of course subordinated to the party structures, but this did make for a more complex system of relations and interactions. Second, the members of the Politbüro formed the de-facto power centre of the GDR's political system, yet also competed amongst each other for influence and power.<sup>130</sup> From the outside, the SED seemed like a monolithic and totalitarian structure. From the inside, things were complex, and often contradictory.<sup>131</sup>

*“There were turf wars in every scientific institution. These turf wars were also carried out with the help of the party organizations. And nobody should think that the SED was simply a totalitarian structure. The SED featured high degrees of internal party democracy. Open discussions in the respective party groups were possible up to a certain degree. But if someone fell in disgrace, they got punished with all the tools of party discipline. This was the ambivalence and double-sidedness of this structure. That is also the same ambivalence that existed within the state security apparatus [the Stasi]. So, seen from the outside, it all looks monolithic. But there was some real fighting going on inside. And the ones at the top did not always necessarily win.”*  
(Interview Fischer, 2020: 15)

Each of the *Politbüro* members had resources at their disposal and drew on the support and knowledge of the various academic institutions dedicated to the study of international relations to support their efforts in this process.<sup>132</sup> Conversely, each academic institution had its own internal rivalries and conflicts, and the involved academics also used the different party organs and organisations to their own ends in these conflicts.<sup>133</sup>

### IIB

The GDR's MfAA had a research and teaching facility attached to it: the Institute of International Relations (*Institut für Internationale Beziehungen*), hereafter referred to as IIB.<sup>134</sup> Formally, the IIB was

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<sup>129</sup> See in particular the account in Erhard Crome and Raimund Krämer, "Die Außenpolitik der DDR - eine vorläufige Bilanz," in *Die verschwundene Diplomatie*, ed. Erhard Crome, Jochen Franzke, and Raimund Krämer (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009).

<sup>130</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 1.

<sup>131</sup> Interview Schreiber, 2020: 3.

<sup>132</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 1.

<sup>133</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 15.

<sup>134</sup> For literature on the IIB, see Crome; Stephen J. Scala, "Understanding the class enemy: Foreign policy expertise in East Germany" (University of Maryland, 2009); Markus Beyer, *Außenpolitische Deutungsverwaltung im SED-Regime. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der DDR* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, 2015); Sven Olaf Jacobsen, *Von der Deutschen*

attached to another institution of higher education, the Academy of Statecraft and Law (*Deutsche Akademie für Staat und Recht*), DASR, but in practice stood under the jurisdiction of the MfAA. The IIB had a dual character as both research and teaching facility: its main functions were to train diplomats for the GDR's diplomatic service as well as to carry out research in the field of international relations for the MfAA.<sup>135</sup> Its internal organisation in thematic departments mirrored the organisation of the MfAA.<sup>136</sup> While it thus covered all topics relevant to international relations, something particularly important for the breadth and quality of teaching, the importance and relevance of its research mirrored the importance and relevance of the MfAA. High-level politics were monopolized by Erich Honecker in the party's central committee ZK and its respective department of international liaison under Hermann Axen and Günter Sieber. As such relations with the Soviet Union or the US were not the purchase of the MfAA. Its relevance lay in the low-level, daily 'normal' foreign policy. In particular, expertise about the UN, disarmament and similar topics was only available at the MfAA. As such, the IIB pooled particular expertise around these topics and its research in these areas was particularly relevant.<sup>137</sup> With the MfAA being subordinate to the party, the IIB's work and research thus also reached the department of international liaison at the central committee ZK and was, to a certain degree, of relevance there. Of medium size, the IIB regrouped around 210 members of staff, of which around 120 were researchers, 50 were language teachers and language specialists, and 40 were non-academic support staff.<sup>138</sup>

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### *IPW*

The department of international liaison under Hermann Axen was not the only player in the field of international relations at the central committee. Another important player was the department of West Relations under Häber, and after his political marginalization, under Gunter Rettner. Closely connected to this department was the Institute of International Politics and Economy (*Institut für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft*), hereafter referred to as IPW.<sup>139</sup> The IPW was the GDR's other major centre of research on international relations with a clear mission and specialization to study the enemy. Its remit was research on 'imperialism' and in particular the imperialism of Western Europe and West Germany.<sup>140</sup> In the socialist alliance's division of labour, it was the IMEMO in the Soviet Union that has primary responsibility in studying the US; East Germany is responsible for West Germany.<sup>141</sup> The IPW had a dual character as both research facility and political actor in the relations with the West and West Germany in particular. Despite

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*Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft "Walter Ulbricht" zur Juristischen Fakultät der Universität Potsdam. Zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Wendezeit.*, vol. 25, *Potsdamer Rechtswissenschaftliche Reihe* (Berlin: Frank & Timme, 2006).

<sup>135</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 1.

<sup>136</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 1.

<sup>137</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 2.

<sup>138</sup> Helmut Matthes, "Aufgaben und Platz des IIB," in *Die Babelsberger Diplomatschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der DDR*, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009), 31.

<sup>139</sup> Wolfgang Schwarz, "Neues Sicherheitspolitisches Denken in der DDR (1980-1990). Das Institut für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft," in *Neues Denken in der DDR*, ed. Erhard Crome and Lutz Kleinwächter (Potsdam WeltTrends, 2014); Michael B. Klein, *Das Institut für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft der DDR in seiner Gründungsphase 1971 bis 1974* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999); Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, ed. *DDR Handbuch* (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1985), 653-54.

<sup>140</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 1.

<sup>141</sup> Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 653-54.

its close cooperation with the central committee's department of Western affairs, the IPW's research was also used by the ministries of foreign trade (MAH) and foreign affairs (MfAA), the trade union (FDGB), the GDR's other parties in the form of the *Nationale Front der DDR*, as well as by the 'league for friendship amongst people' (*Liga für Völkerfreundschaft*), the GDR's societal organization orchestrating solidarity relations with people across the world. Despite being the biggest organization of its kind, grouping together around 400 researchers, the IPW did not have a monopoly position on the topic; the central committee's very own academy for social sciences (*Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED*), hereafter referred to as AfG, also had an institute for the study of imperialism.<sup>142</sup> The IIB also had a department on Western Europe (and Japan), as well as a research group on American foreign policy, and the various research and teaching institutions of the military concerned themselves also with the West through the lens of military technology and armaments.

### Military institutions

Next to the MfAA and to the central committee's various departments of expertise, the GDR's army NVA (*Nationale Volksarmee*) also had its own organizations.<sup>143</sup> Three of these had the right to supervise and confer PhDs and were thus part of the field of knowledge production in the areas of peace, security and military affairs: the military academy located in Dresden, the military's political college in Berlin, and the GDR's institute for military history in Potsdam.<sup>144</sup> The military academy in Dresden (*Militärakademie "Friedrich Engels"*) was the institution for the training of all the higher-ranking military staff. Lower-ranking militaries had their colleges separated by function: land, air and sea.<sup>145</sup> Training covered all the military topics but also a solid social science foundation, where research and teaching touched on questions of war and peace. The military academy's focus lay on the army and unlike the IIB or IPW did not touch on broader questions of international relations, nor did it interact with many actors and stakeholders.<sup>146</sup> But as further sections will expand, the philosophers of the military academy will grow to take an important place in debates around questions of war and peace in the Cold War confrontation of the 1980s. The military's political college in Berlin (*Militärpolitische Hochschule*) was dedicated to the training of the military's political officers, a function that encompassed the political education of soldiers as well as the provision of pastoral care. This college was not geared towards research despite supervising PhD research and was primarily focused on teaching and training.<sup>147</sup> The Institute for Military History (*Militärgeschichtliches Institut der DDR*) in turn was primarily geared towards research and the

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<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

<sup>143</sup> Wolfgang Scheler, ed. *Die Militärakademie in der demokratischen Revolution und Militärreform*, ed. Die Militärakademie in der demokratischen Revolution 1989/90. Aufbruch und Ende, DSS-Arbeitspapiere, vol. 114 (Dresden: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft SICHERHEITSPOLITIK e. V., 2015); Alwin Loose and Wolfgang Scheler, "Philosophen an der Militärakademie. Der Philosophielehrstuhl an der Militärakademie "Friedrich Engels". Reminiszenzen ehemaliger Mitglieder," *DSS-Arbeitspapiere* 109 (2014); Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft SICHERHEITSPOLITIK e.V., "Militärakademie "Friedrich Engels". Historisch-kritische Nachbetrachtung zum 50. Jahrestag ihrer Gründung," *DSS-Arbeitspapiere* 95 (2009).

<sup>144</sup> Interview Schreiber, 2020: 1.

<sup>145</sup> Interview Schreiber, 2020: 1.

<sup>146</sup> Interview Schreiber, 2020: 2

<sup>147</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 6; Interview Schreiber, 2020: 4.



supervision of PhD theses by military personnel. This institute formed part of the circles of historical research and as such was more widely embedded in the GDR's academic circles.

### Universities

A last type of institution not formally allocated to any specific political institutions was the universities. Relevant in the area of international relations were the history and the area studies departments. Area studies were spread by region across the GDR: Latin America was taught and researched at the university in Rostock; Africa and the Middle East in Leipzig and Berlin; and Asia at the Humboldt University (HU) in Berlin.<sup>148</sup> Diplomatic staff were also recruited from amongst the area studies students, who were more proficient in rare languages and rare area specializations than their IIB counterparts or the GDR students educated in Moscow at the IMEMO. Area studies were also partly represented at the IIB, whose department on "Developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America" covered research and teaching on these areas as well. The various institutions cooperated and coordinated through the Central Council for the Study of Africa, Asia and Latin America (Zentrale Rat für Asien- Afrika- und Lateinamerika Wissenschaften der DDR), ZENTRAAL, which was located at the IIB. The main function of this council was to make research on developing countries usable by political decision-makers and political actors as well as to allow the latter control and guidance of the former.<sup>149</sup> Colonial history, of course, straddled both areas. But history departments also engaged with IR-relevant topics. In the early days of the GDR an institute specialized in the analysis of developments in the socialist 'brother states'. This institute had then been closed down for political reasons, and with the argument that the socialist 'brother states' knew best what was going on in their own countries.<sup>150</sup> But later, after the developments in Czechoslovakia in 1968, some of the respective researchers were regrouped at the Leipzig University in a history faculty and studied 'the East'. Officially as historians, focusing on socialist revolutions, but de facto their point of focus was also on current political developments. As in most disciplines, their research was coordinated and pooled together through a scientific council, in this case the 'council for socialism research' attached to the central committee's social science academy. This council then had working groups on the different countries, where researchers from different institutions came together.<sup>151</sup>

### Relations between institutions

The GDR's landscape of knowledge production on international relations thus encompassed a number of discrete institutions and working groups. All of them were internally well-organized entities who engaged with each other and with the relevant political and societal stakeholders in manifold ways. With regards to the political sphere, each institution displayed varying levels of

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<sup>148</sup> For literature on the GDR area studies see: Kerrin Gräfin Schwerin, "Die Südasiawissenschaften in der DDR – Eine Bilanz," in *Wissenschaft und Wiedervereinigung, Asien- und Afrikanwissenschaften im Umbruch*, ed. Wolf Hagen-Krauth and Ralf Wolz (Berlin: 1998); Detrich Reetz, "Entwicklung und Stand der Asienwissenschaften in der DDR," *Asien. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur* 38 (1991); Crome and Franzke; Dörte Ahrendt-Völschow, "Die Lateinamerikawissenschaften an der Universität Rostock von 1958 bis 1995," *Rostocker Informationen zu Politik und Verwaltung* 23 (2004); Ulrich van der Heyden, *Die Afrikanwissenschaften in der DDR. Eine akademische Disziplin zwischen Exotik und Exempel. Eine wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchung*. (Hamburg: LIT, 1999).

<sup>149</sup> Renate Wünsche, "Das IIB und der ZENTRAAL," in *Die Babelsberger Diplomatschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der DDR*, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam WeltTrends, 2009), 181.

<sup>150</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 1.

<sup>151</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 1.

closeness or distance to political stakeholders, varying levels of depth of engagement and varying levels of diversity and quantity of different contact partners. With regards to contacts amongst each other, these took place mainly through topic specializations, as similar topics across universities were often regrouped and coordinated through working groups. The various institutions also differed in their division of tasks between research and teaching, as well as in their contact with foreign stakeholders. The IPW for example had close contact with Western actors and West Germany in particular. Some of their researchers would go on regular trips to West Germany to meet with politicians and analysts. The IIB, on the other hand, had virtually no contact with the West but cooperated with the various socialist institutions and stakeholders ‘in the East’.<sup>152</sup>

But all the institutions also stood in a certain relation of rivalry and competition towards each other. The researchers at the universities or at the academy of sciences had a distanced relationship with the ruling party. They also distrusted their more ‘politically’ engaged colleagues at the IIB and IPW for their connections with the MfAA and the central committee respectively.<sup>153</sup> But differences also existed within the university landscape between colleagues who worked more or less closely with sources and thus also saw each other as more or less political – with the colleagues taking sources seriously seeing themselves as more ‘scientific’ and ‘less political’ than their colleagues who used sources more sporadically in support of their theoretical constructions.<sup>154</sup>

The IPW also stood in a position of rivalry with the other institutions close to power, in particular with the central committee’s very own institutions of research and teaching, such as the central committee’s academy of social sciences AfG (*Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED*) and the party academy “Karl Marx” (*Parteihochschule*). In particular, the IPW clashed with these two institutions around the question of how cooperative or separate a pan-European security architecture should be. The IPW saw West Germany as a necessary partner for common security while the AfG and the party academy considered West Germany mainly as a ‘class enemy’ opposed to the very existence of the GDR.<sup>155</sup> Rivalries amongst Politbüro members led to the closure in 1982 of the GDR’s main international relations journal, “German foreign policy” (*Deutsche Außenpolitik*).<sup>156</sup>

The military’s academic staff, were not well regarded by the other ‘academic’ institutions. They stereotyped all militaries as not capable of critical reflection and only capable of carrying out orders. They certainly were not considered ‘scientists’ or ‘academics’.<sup>157</sup> The IPW was suspect to the other institutions in other ways. Many assumed or suspected the IPW to be an organ of the Stasi. This was not true, but with the IPW’s mission of finding out everything it could about the West, and in particular West Germany, some blurring between institutions did take place. Part of the IPW’s tasks for example lay in examining West German parties, including their internal differences and positions – information that would of course be useful and handy for the secret service in placing their own informants. The IPW’s research certainly served all institutions needing its analysis and

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<sup>152</sup> Interview Ersil, 2019: 7.

<sup>153</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 15.

<sup>154</sup> See Interview Van der Heyden, 2019: 1.

<sup>155</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 11-12.

<sup>156</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 11.

<sup>157</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 3.

it drew on all material available to them, regardless of where it came from.<sup>158</sup> The IIB researchers in turn came across as ‘arrogant’ and were perceived to consider themselves as being the only real intellectual elite of the GDR. This did not go down well with other researchers who saw both the limits of their knowledge claims – the IIB for instance bracketed economic questions largely out of their analysis, and had not much understanding of economic issues – as well as the limits of their impact, as many of the studies written by the IIB would never be used in political circles.<sup>159</sup>

Finally, IIB and IPW stood in positions of rivalry with regard to their political influence. The IPW was located in Berlin, close to the central committee. IPW researchers and central committee members of the ‘international liaison’ department would regularly go lunch together. That was a different quality of connection than between the IIB and the MfAA. The IIB was located in Potsdam, which meant that West Berlin was geographically located between the two. If a ministerial official wanted to visit the IIB, or if IIB researchers needed to visit the MfAA, it took them a one-and-a-half-hour train ride to get to one another, having to circle all the way around West Berlin. As such the IIB was felt to be ‘far away’ and this translated in a certain independence and leeway in the allowed thinking but also in a reduced impact on political decision-making. This bothered some colleagues at the IIB, including Prof. Stefan Dörnberg, director of the IIB from 1977 to 1982, who tried to have the IIB location moved to Berlin, but to no avail.<sup>160</sup>

In order to understand and make sense of this complex interwebbing system of knowledge production, consumption and dissemination in the GDR, the following section approaches it through the three lenses of ‘science as a weapon’, ‘science as a resource’ and ‘science as a performance’.

## Science as a weapon: Becoming international relations experts

*“The line between follower and perpetrator is a fine one. I have to say of myself that I was also a co-perpetrator in that I defended this ideology offensively. I only disassociated myself from it very, very late. I don't know what everyone else claims, whether they say that they had always been against it.” (Interview Fischer, 2020: 14)*

One way of looking at the different institutions, actors and practices involved in GDR international relations knowledge production is through the lens of science’s constitutive role in forming its experts. In order to practice ‘science’, one had to become a ‘scientist’. In order to ‘be’ an international relations expert, one had to ‘become’ one. This section turns to teaching and training and examines how the GDR has ‘made’ its international relations experts. It also explores the idea of ‘science as an effective weapon’, the conception that required its experts to simultaneously reproduce and transcend the system.

Training international relations experts both for the practical tasks of diplomacy and for the academic tasks of research and education focused on the creation of ‘socialist personalities’ who would use “science as an effective weapon” (*Wissenschaft als eine wirksame Waffe*) in the fight against

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<sup>158</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 5.

<sup>159</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 3.

<sup>160</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019: 2-3.

imperialism.<sup>161</sup> This meant that they were expected to be able to use the ‘scientific’ tenets of Marxism/Leninism in the diplomatic and academic confrontation with their Western opponents, but also to put their specific international relations expertise to use in that confrontation. In short, their expertise was a weapon in the Cold War confrontation.

In order to do so, international relations experts had to learn two things. First, they had to understand, internalize and reproduce official ideology and official interpretations. They had to become skilled at using the framework of Marxism/Leninism to study, analyze and write about international relations, so that they could defend the GDR’s positions in the ‘diplomatic’ and ‘academic’ confrontation with the enemy. Yet at the same time, precisely in order to be good at this task, they also needed to transcend the framework and go beyond its limitations and restrictions. They had to learn to use it flexibly and with a certain mental distance.

This section examines the various elements of international relations training that led to the double effect of internalization and transcendence of the friend/enemy framework. It organizes these elements around the two lenses of ‘method’ and ‘abroad’.

### *Method*

One way in which the simultaneous internalization and transcendence of the Cold War friend/enemy framework was achieved can be examined through the lens of ‘method’. Three elements played a role here: a temporal distinction over the course of a five-year training between ‘internalize first, transcend second’; a focus and intensive tutoring around analytical methods and skills; open and critical discussions within a strict and structured environment.

### *Temporal progression*

A first way of transmitting the delicate balance between internalization and transcendence lay in spacing these two elements out temporally. This is how the international relations training at the IIB proceeded. The five-year study program had been introduced to the GDR in 1970 in the wake of its increased international recognition. Previously, a four-year programme had been in place, which in turn had already replaced the shorter training programmes of the GDR’s first years.<sup>162</sup> The first cohort of the new five-year degree started with their studies in 1970 and graduated in 1975. The five years of study gave the students the occasion to ingest a lot of content: the first two years were dedicated to the foundations, the last three years to international relations specialization,<sup>163</sup> or to put it differently, year one and two were dedicated to the internationalization of the Marxist/Leninist framework and outlook on international relations, while years three to five were designed to transcend this framework.

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<sup>161</sup> “die Wissenschaft als eine wirksame Waffe für die Gestaltung der entwickelten sozialistischen Gesellschaft und für die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Imperialismus zu handhaben verstehen.” See: Studienanleitung für die 2. Matrikel des ausenpolitischen 5-Jahresstudium, Fach: Wissenschaftlicher Kommunismus, 1972/73. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

<sup>162</sup> Joachim Krüger, “Die ersten Jahre der Lehrtätigkeit,” in *Die Babelsberger Diplomatschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der DDR*, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam WeltTrends, 2009).

<sup>163</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 13. See also Jochen Franzke and Lutz Kleinwächter, “Das fünfjährige Außenpolitikstudium,” in *Die Babelsberger Diplomatschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der DDR.*, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009).

### Year one and year two: “Basics”

In the first year of their study, students had to focus on three main components: complete their compulsory foundational training in Marxist-Leninist theory, start with introductory courses in international relations and begin with intensive language training. The compulsory training in M/L, Marxism-Leninism, included three courses and made for a total 284 hours of teaching throughout the year: ‘Marxist-Leninist philosophy’, ‘History of the German worker’s movement’ and ‘Key issues of the international worker’s movement’. Introductory courses in international relations included three courses and made for a total of 154 hours of teaching throughout the year: ‘History of international relations’, ‘Key issues in international relations theory I’ and ‘Socialist world system I.’ Language training, finally, made up the bulk of the teaching with some 390 hours per year.<sup>164</sup>

|   | Year 1: Topics   | Hours per year | Exam |
|---|--|----------------|------|
|   | 1-week introductory seminar: evaluating the documents of the VII. SED party convention (1 <sup>st</sup> week of September) | 1 week         |      |
| 1 | Introduction to the methods of scientific study  | 20             |      |
| 2 | Marxist-Leninist philosophy  | 128            | Yes  |
| 3 | History of the German worker’s movement and key issues of the international worker’s movement                              | 100            | Yes  |
| 4 | Marxist-leninist political economy I   | 56             |      |
| 5 | History of international relations   | 78             | Yes  |
| 6 | Key issues in international relations theory I   | 46             |      |
| 7 | Socialist world system I   | 30             |      |
| 8 | Foreign language training  | 390            |      |
| 9 | Sports   | 78             |      |
|   | End of year internship in industrial production  | 4 weeks        |      |

*Table 1 IR Curriculum: IIB 1<sup>st</sup> year of study*

In the second year, the students finished their compulsory studies in Marxist-Leninist theory. They continued taking international relations courses and language training, and started with a specialization that would carry through their whole studies. The compulsory training in M/L, Marxism-Leninism, included three courses and made for a total of 253 hours of teaching throughout the second year: ‘Political economy of capitalism and political economy of socialism’, ‘Scientific communism’ and ‘Socialist cultural politics’. Courses in international relations included four courses and made for a total of 154 hours of teaching throughout the year: ‘Key issues in international relations theory II’, ‘Socialist world system II’, ‘GDR foreign policy: strategy and tactics I’ and ‘Imperialist countries’. Language training still made up the bulk of the teaching with some 438 hours per year. Finally, the specialization training was introduced with 20 hours of class and a one-week internship at the IIB respective department.<sup>165</sup>

|   | Year 2: Topics   | Hours per year | Exam |
|---|--|----------------|------|
| 1 | Political economy of capitalism and political economy of socialism | 92             | Yes  |
| 2 | Scientific communism   | 143            | Yes  |

<sup>164</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 1. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

<sup>165</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 2. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

|    |   |     |     |
|----|---|-----|-----|
| 3  | Socialist cultural politics (evening lectures)  | 18  |     |
| 4  | Key issues in international relations theory II   | 10  | Yes |
| 5  | Socialist world system II   | 50  |     |
| 6  | GDR foreign policy: strategy and tactics I  | 56  | Yes |
| 7  | Imperialist countries   | 48  |     |
|    | One-week research 'internship' at a specialized department of the institute to kick off the specialization track    |     |     |
| 8  | Specialization  | 20  |     |
| 9  | Foreign language training   | 438 |     |
| 10 | Sports  | 66  |     |
| 11 | Key aspects of the creation and functioning of the socialist state institutions of the GDR (internship preparation) | 10  |     |
|    | End of year internship: social and political internship in a local state institution                                |     |     |

Table 2 IR Curriculum: IIB 2<sup>nd</sup> year of study

The stated goals for the student's first two years of training were to empower the students to carry out "scientifically grounded", yet "offensive" debates with imperialist and social-democratic positions about the GDR's foreign policy. In these first two years, this was trained by focusing on internationalizing the fundamental tenets of Marxist/Leninist international relations analysis.

This meant acquiring knowledge about the international class struggle and understanding how structure and superstructure affected international relations. Students had to learn how to analyze international class power relations and understand the historical place, the role and the responsibility of the socialist world system in the global revolutionary process, as well as the role of the Soviet Union as a main force in the socialist world system. Students had to learn to use the Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism to analyze the development of imperialist countries and of the imperialist system, to understand the development of the contradictions immanent to imperialism, as well as to understand the economic foreign policy of state-monopole imperialism. They were expected to be able to carry out a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the general crisis of capitalism and its international system, of the relation between imperialist domestic and foreign policy, of the foundations of its anti-socialist tendencies and in particular of its anti-GDR orientation.<sup>166</sup> Overall, the first two years were meant to solidify the students' conviction that imperialism was "the main enemy of all peoples" and "the main obstacle of any societal progress"; the students had to be specifically educated for conscious and active hatred towards the exploitative system of capitalism and its aggressive politics.<sup>167</sup>

### Years three and four: "Practice"

In the third year, the focus moved onto the acquisition of targeted foreign policy knowledge. Next to a Marxist-Leninist colloquium of 28 hours over the course of the year, the training in international relations included four courses and made for a total of 234 hours of teaching throughout the year: 'Socialist world system III', 'Imperialist world system', 'GDR foreign policy II' and 'Developing countries in Africa and Asia I'. Language training made up the bulk of the

<sup>166</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 2. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

<sup>167</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 2. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

teaching with some 346 hours per year. Finally, the specialization training continued with the implementation of two one-week internships after each term at one of the following departments: “Socialist States”, “Capitalist States of Western and Northern Europe”, “Foreign Policy of the American States”, or “Core Issues of International Relations”.<sup>168</sup>

|   | Year 3: Topics   | Hours per year | Exam |
|---|--|----------------|------|
| 1 | Marxist-Leninist colloquium  | 28             |      |
| 2 | Socialist world system III   | 54             | Yes  |
| 3 | Imperialist world system   | 94             | Yes  |
| 4 | GDR foreign policy II  | 38             | Yes  |
| 5 | Developing countries in Africa and Asia I  | 48             |      |
| 6 | Foreign language training  | 346            | Yes  |
| 7 | Sports   | 60             |      |
|   | One-week research ‘internships’ at the institute after each term (term 5 & term 6) |                |      |
|   | First “short” foreign policy internship  | 6 weeks        |      |

Table 3 IR Curriculum – IIB 3<sup>rd</sup> year of study

In the fourth year, students continued taking international relations courses and language training, while continuing training in their area of specialization. Next to a Marxist-Leninist colloquium of 18 hours over the course of the year, the training in international relations increased to six courses and made for a total of 262 hours of teaching throughout the year, with a particular new focus on the international legal architecture: ‘Developing countries in Africa and Asia II,’ ‘International Law’, ‘International Organizations’, ‘Diplomatic law and consular law’, ‘Protocol’ and ‘International Economic Law’. Language training, still important, continued with 258 hours of teaching per year. Finally, the specialization training increased with 56 hours during the year.<sup>169</sup>

|    | Year 4: Topics   | Hours per year | Exam      |
|----|--|----------------|-----------|
| 1  | Marxist-Leninist colloquia (in particular history of the CPSU) | 18             |           |
| 2  | Developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America II      | 76             | Yes       |
| 3  | International law  | 60             | Yes       |
| 4  | International organizations                                    | 60             | Oral only |
| 5  | Diplomatic law and consular law                                | 30             |           |
| 6  | Protocol   | 16             |           |
| 7  | International economic law                                     | 20             |           |
| 8  | Foreign language training                                      | 258            | Yes       |
| 9  | Sports   | 132 (??)       |           |
| 10 | Specialization   | 56             |           |
|    | Second “long” foreign policy internship between year 4 and 5   | 3 months       |           |

Table 4 IR Curriculum, IIB 4<sup>th</sup> year of study

In the third and fourth year, the focus lay entirely on international relations and on putting knowledge and skills into practice. The official focus was “to consolidate, amplify, and expand further scientific insights and political convictions” and “to achieve their implementation into

<sup>168</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 3. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

<sup>169</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 4. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

active action and behaviour”. In short, the focus lay on a more practical training, in particular with regards to legal knowledge and its application.

More particularly, students had to learn how to deal with “imperialist strategies and tactics” in the practice of international organizations and state relations, and how to closely cooperate with the Soviet Union and the other socialist states to thwart those imperialist strategies and tactics. These skills and knowledge elements were transmitted and practised in particular by focusing teaching around the following core issues: the growing role of the working class, and the strategy and tactics of the Marxist-Leninist party in the conquest, consolidation and development of the working class’ power. The importance of the close alliance between the socialist states, the role of the international working class and the national liberation movement as well as the role of the national anti-imperialist liberation movements as an integral part of the revolutionary world process. Students had to understand the objective processes in the formation of international organizations, and learn to see them as a result of the internationalization of the productive forces operating under the conditions of the transition from capitalism to socialism. They had to master the Marxist-Leninist approach and assessment of the international conflict between socialism and imperialism in the field of universal international organizations; of the development tendencies of the political and economic power relations, of the policies of the socialist states in these organizations. Students had to acquire a good knowledge of law and understand it as an object and instrument of the global class struggle between socialism and imperialism in the field of inter-state relations as well as understand it as the result and expression of the progressive change of the international power in favour of socialism and see the main contribution of the Soviet Union in this development process. Teaching had to transmit the determined struggle of the Soviet Union and the states of the socialist community to deepen the “progressive” content of international law and thereby make it an ever more effective weapon in the struggle for the consolidation of peace and the enforcement of the principles of peaceful coexistence.<sup>170</sup>

The increasing focus on practice naturally brought elements of self-reflection with it. Having to learn how to deal with “imperialist strategies and tactics” in practice meant getting more and more acquainted with the enemy ‘imperialist’ positions. It meant having to engage in debates with that other position. Looking at practical contexts involved acknowledging problems and limitations. In short, it provided a natural transition between a simple reproduction of the learned content to a more flexible and reflective engagement with it.

#### Year five: “creative” application

The fifth and last year of study was organized differently from the previous years. First, the teaching year only started in December instead of September, because students had to finish their foreign policy summer internship placements. Teaching took place over a period of three months from mid-December to mid-March. The rest of the year was dedicated to 10 weeks of “master’s” dissertation writing (*Diplomarbeit*), its defence and the final study exams. With regards to the three months of teaching, these were focused on advanced issues and topics. Next to a Marxist-Leninist colloquium of 18 hours and some allocated 40 hours to study recent party documents, 140 hours of teaching time were dedicated to advanced issues in international relations, 24 hours of

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<sup>170</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 4. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.



specialization training, including research colloquia, and some 112 hours of advanced language training.<sup>171</sup>

| Year 5: Topics  | Hours per year | Exam |
|---|----------------|------|
| Second “long” foreign policy internship between year 4 and 5          | 3 months       |      |
| Marxist-Leninist colloquia  | 18             |      |
| Reserved free time to study the party documents                       | 40             |      |
| Key & transversal issues in international relations                   | 52             |      |
| GDR foreign propaganda (“Auslandsinformation”) and cultural diplomacy | 50             |      |
| Organization and methods of the diplomatic service                    | 38             |      |
| Foreign language training   | 112            |      |
| Sports  | 24             |      |
| Research colloquia  | 12             |      |
| Specialization  | 12             |      |
| Writing the master’s thesis (“Diplomarbeit”)                          | Ca.10 weeks    |      |

*Table 5 IR Curriculum, IIB 4th year of study*

The official goals for year five were to further enable “the wide and complex application, deepening, consolidation and expansion” of acquired knowledge, skills, abilities and class-conscious behaviours acquired during the course of the whole study. Its goal was for students to be able to analyze the fundamentals of the international power relations “in their complexity, dynamics, specifics, and current manifestations.” Students had to be further trained in their strategic thinking, their tactical abilities in foreign policy and foreign propaganda, and their creative ability to practically put all their acquired knowledge and skills to use. The knowledge and abilities for “an offensive, partisan, convincing and flexible presence and demeanour in the ideological class struggle” had to be strengthened so that the students would be able to deal “with all variants of reactionary, anti-communist and anti-Soviet ideology”.<sup>172</sup> In short, by the end of their studies, students were expected to “creatively” use their knowledge for a “flexible” engagement in the Cold War confrontation.

## ***Skills***

An important focus of the training at the IIB lay on skills and methods. Marxist/Leninist theory was of course the official and primary focus of learning. But in order to achieve that balance between simple reproduction and transcendence, analytical skills were seen as crucial.

This started in year one with a dedicated class transmitting methods of scientific study.<sup>173</sup> In this course, students were meant to learn how to read and work with books, articles and political documents; how to write summaries, note down and quote key text elements; how to prepare a class and what to do after a class. Students were also taught methods for working with content: how to write a prospective plan, how to structure a presentation and summarize its main points, and how to prepare a ‘talking contribution’ with a written note or in free speech. The course taught how to use the facilities and the help available on campus such as the library and all the documents

<sup>171</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 5. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

<sup>172</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 5. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR 13045.

<sup>173</sup> Einführung in das Wissenschaftliche Arbeiten. Potsdam University Archives, ASR 13045.

available there. Students also learned how to produce a piece of scientific writing: how to write a bibliography and reference; understand the function and construction of a content overview, of a preface and an introduction, how to build up a personal knowledge database with cards, document collections and extracts from texts, as well as how to organize a piece of scientific work. The course put these skills into practice by asking the students to write short analyses of historical processes, of strategic and tactical party decisions, of Soviet foreign policy documents.

In year two, students were expected to be able to systematically analyze and use the documents of the Soviet party and state leadership as well as other Soviet primary sources. They were expected to be able to analyze the social and class structure of countries and analyze statistical materials. They had to master scientific methods of collecting materials and learn how to work with the document and information collections available at the institute. They had to be able to scientifically justify their arguments and reasoning in oral discussions and written work. Finally, they were expected to start working with primary source materials in short assignments.<sup>174</sup>

In year three, the following skills and abilities had to be practised or newly introduced: the systematic evaluation of the documents of the GDR's party, of the CPSU and of other brother state parties. The systematic and purposeful study of Soviet original literature; the theoretical analysis of given problems, the scientific assessment of theoretical and current foreign policy issues and problems. In terms of methods of analysis, students had to be able to analyze the social and class structure of different countries, analyze foreign policy documents; know the distinction between strategic and tactical goals, and be proficient in the analysis of statistical materials. Students were required to independently solve assigned short-term tasks, be proficient in their use of a scientific apparatus (bibliography, references, footnotes, and quotes), the "free" (sic) interpretation of specialized foreign policy topics, and work with original language literature in the solution of study assignments, depending on areas and languages of specialization.<sup>175</sup>

In year four, expectations increased. Students had to develop deeper analytical and prognostic thinking. Students were now expected to be able to draw on various forms and methods for "independent scientific work" and a "creative application of Marxist-Leninist theories". In particular, they were expected to have the ability to deal "scientifically" with the political-ideological, economic and legal conceptions of the imperialist states and the differentiated attitude of the developing countries and to push through the socialist states' position. They had to be able to develop and defend their assessments of various source materials such as resolutions, declarations, documents, and so forth. This was to be developed and trained through practical exercises on international law issues and in particular through exercises aimed at training tactical methods and thinking agility in dealing with imperialist-revisionist, as well as with Maoist interpretations of state relations in a UN work type of setting. Students had to acquire exact knowledge of international legal norms and legal methodology, as well as develop basic skills in legal thinking and in the application of international, diplomatic and consular law and international commercial law. On a practical level, this had to be trained through learning how to prepare talking notes, memoranda, explanations, 'circulaire' letters and various other bureaucratic formats. All of

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<sup>174</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 2. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

<sup>175</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 3. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

this was now to be done by systematically using primary sources in their original language, especially in Russian.<sup>176</sup>

At the end of year five, the students were expected to have reached high methodological levels of analysis and showcase their ‘creativity’ in their final master’s thesis (*Diplomarbeit*) written in their area of specialization. This was evaluated on the basis of the following five criteria. First: has the candidate solved the scientific research problem allocated to him or her – if so how, and to what degree of quality? Second: What contribution did the candidate make to the department's research tasks? Third: What is the level of the candidate’s skills? This included analytical skills, practice-oriented thinking, the use of Soviet and other foreign-language literature, linguistic expressiveness, and the mastering of the norms of independent scientific work. Fourth: How well did the candidate ‘creatively’ apply Marxist-Leninist knowledge to the solution of his or her research tasks? How well does the candidate master the latest developments in this area (party conclusions, speeches by leading comrades, etc.)? Fifth: Which political-ideological attitude and dominant character traits characterized the candidate in the process of researching and writing the thesis?<sup>177</sup>

Throughout the years, these skills were taught and practised through intensive tutoring. Thirty to 40 students per cohort studied at the IIB, and they were usually divided in two seminar groups of around 20 students.<sup>178</sup> Given that it was a five-year study programme, some 150 to 200 students were usually present at the IIB. With a total number of around 120 academic staff and some 50 language teachers, the student/staff ratio was excellent. The specialization study in particular offered very small group work and intensive tutoring, as the group sizes usually varied between two and six students. Because writing assignments were evaluated on the basis of quality, and because students were supposed to succeed in their study and ‘get through’, much of the teachers’ work and time went onto student coaching and support, making sure they understood the materials and turned in their work.<sup>179</sup>

The specialization study allocated students to a particular area of specialization corresponding with their planned later area of employment, and matched their various internship requirements. In the specialization training, students were taught particular content knowledge, but were also particularly coached in the methodical skills necessary to perform well. One of the first required activities of the specialization training was to write an essay at the end of the semester. This was to be the student’s first essay in international relations, as previous ones in year one had been in M/L. As such, students were particularly coached for this first exercise. In the specialization area “International Organisations” for instance, the essay was meant to train the format of “documentation” (*Dokumentation*), a format required for work at the MfAA. The task was to write an essay composed of two parts: an analysis and a collection of relevant documents. Good essays would be put to use at the MfAA. The aim was to teach and train a particular format of writing, but also to foster familiarity with the type of sources students would need to be familiar with in their specialization – in this case UN materials. Students had to learn how to read, assess and

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<sup>176</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 4. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

<sup>177</sup> Kriterien zur Evaluation von Diplomarbeiten, 15.5.1976. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

<sup>178</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 20.

<sup>179</sup> Interview Ersil, 2019: 9-10.

analyze UN documents, provide an assessment based on M/L argumentations as well as describe the positions of the Soviet Union and other socialist states on that respective issue. Relevant sources included UN yearbooks, UN general assembly collections of resolutions, Soviet resolution drafts and special statements, GDR MfAA assessments and so forth. Students were coached how to do so on a five-step basis. In step one, students had one month to read UN yearbooks and other UN primary materials and produce and turn in a descriptive paper summarizing how the respective topic allocated to them had been treated, debated and discussed in the security council or general assembly. In step two, students had another month to work out a concept paper on how to examine and analyze the resolutions and decisions that had been taken by the UN. After turning this paper in and receiving feedback, students had another month to carry out a descriptive examination of the resolutions and decisions and turn that paper in. After receiving feedback on this, students would have another month to write their analysis of the resolution and decisions. After turning it in and receiving another round of feedback on it, students had a last month to incorporate the feedback, carry out revisions and compile everything into the “*documentation*.”<sup>180</sup>

These various skills were put into practice during the students’ practical placements and internships. At the end of each study, students had to complete practical internship placements during their summer holidays. At the end of year one, students had to complete a four-week internship in industrial production as part of the international student brigades.<sup>181</sup> At the end of year two, students were sent to complete a social and political internship in a local state institution.<sup>182</sup> At the end of year three, students were placed at the MfAA or, in some cases, at international relations press and media outlets, in order to complete a first ‘short’ foreign policy internship of six weeks.<sup>183</sup> Finally, at the end of year four, students had to complete a second ‘long’ foreign policy internship of three months. This internship took place at the MfAA in the department corresponding to their area of specialization and put into practice all the acquired skills.<sup>184</sup>

### ***Open and critical discussions***

*“We approached problems a little bit more openly and clearly than most were used to. That came from our training. We had a slightly different view and that was not always easy.” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 3)*

Finally, classes themselves were generally open and critical. The curriculum and content were officially ‘dogmatic,’ but in the practice of class discussions, many topics were talked about and discussed openly and critically. This included the attitude of not assuming anything to be a universal truth. Not all classes conveyed this, but many did.<sup>185</sup> This was even noticeable in Marxism/Leninism classes which they all had to complete in their first two years of study, and which were generally more ‘boring.’ These classes were not taught by former diplomats. But even

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<sup>180</sup> Arbeitsplan für die Erarbeitung der Semesterarbeit im Fach „Internationale Organisationen – Spezialgebiet Völkerrecht/Recht der Internationalen Organisationen,” 15.11.1972. Potsdam University Archive, ASR 13044.

<sup>181</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 1. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

<sup>182</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 2. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

<sup>183</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 3. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

<sup>184</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 4. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

<sup>185</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 12.

there, due to the special nature of the IIB, the teachers were more interesting and better qualified than regular M/L teachers at other institutions as they were assigned experienced activists:

*“We had classic subjects, e.g. ‘History of the labour movement’, which sounds absolutely boring. But it was taught by the colleagues Libera and Köstner. The latter had been a member of the ‘National Committee Free Germany’ and had been parachuted out of the Soviet Union into Germany. They were old and had been in the Resistance. So, of course, they put on a show in class. They taught normally, but also discussed problems”*  
(Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 18-19)

Almost all the international relations professors had practical experience abroad, having been posted as diplomats to various embassies, often for years or decades. This gave them a different outlook on things and differentiated them from teachers at other institutions. Many of them used irony and humour to convey the limits and tensions between official ideology and practical reality.<sup>186</sup> This is where the opening story of this chapter fits in. Lutz Kleinwächter and his classmates were confronted by the professor’s open acknowledgment that the GDR was not a very important player in world politics – a statement that went against their socialization up to that point. They had grown up with the idea that the GDR was an important, great and positive force in the world. And they had to be convinced of it in order to be chosen for their studies. But now they needed to recast that conviction in a new frame, and it was a difficult and challenging process for many.

One important aspect was the reflection on the Soviet Union, including its Stalinist crimes. A topic denied and tabooed in the GDR at large, the Stalinist crimes were a difficult topic also approached at the IIB:

*“Nowadays you can read about the problems of the Stalinist crimes. But they taught us that. From day one. That was a form of teaching that partly shocked us. And made us desperate. Some did not understand it. Which created difficulties. [...] The result of this was that during our course of study – if you wanted to – a certain distance built up towards this system. Or to the problems of socialism.”* (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 18-19)

This created debates and sometimes also difficulties amongst the students. Some remained caught in dogmatic positions and could not deal with this openness. Being unable to process the information, they discarded it as falsehood or agitation.<sup>187</sup> English language learning was another such area of confrontation, as the language classes included exposure to original language broadcasters such as the BBC. Some of the more ‘dogmatic’ students, often the ones coming from a radical left family background, were uneasy with this, as listening to Western broadcasting was not allowed in the GDR:

*“We all listened to the BBC. To learn English, of course. Then some [students] got upset because it was a Western broadcaster. The dogmatics. Completely stupid. Because they came from radically left homes. The English teacher came in, turned on the BBC and said, ‘Summarize this’. They called in a party meeting and*

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<sup>186</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 12-13.

<sup>187</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 19-20. See also Wolfram Adolphi, "Fünf-Jahres-Studium Außenpolitik 1971-1976 (2. Matrikel)," in *Die Babelsberger Diplomatschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der DDR*, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam WeltTrends, 2009), 86.

*discussed it the whole night. Then the next day someone from the MfAA came, from the party. He said: 'Let's not make this bigger than it is. You need to study a lot, please keep your focus on that.' So these were some of the little conflicts between students."* (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 19-20)

Overall, the critical openness of the class discussions proved to be an important element in manoeuvring the students towards mastering the balance between 'dogma' and 'reflexion', between reproduction and transcendence of the official ideology. The effect and impact of these methods were different from student to student, of course, and the student body was distributed on a spectrum from the more 'dogmatic' to the more 'critical', though the differences were not necessarily always clear-cut. Positions and views differed from topic to topic, from issue to issue. But overall a sense of solidarity and community around the common task of representing the GDR as diplomats and foreign policy experts prevailed.<sup>188</sup>

### ***Abroad***

While a focus on method proved to be an important component in training the practical and academic foreign policy experts of the GDR, the orientation, contact and exposure to 'abroad' proved to be another crucial element. This happened through the study focus on other countries and areas, in particular in the field of area studies, as well as through contact with foreign sources and actual travel and exposure to foreigners and foreign places.

### ***Regional specializations: knowing the world***

One important part of the GDR's system of foreign policy education lay in its expert regional specialization. Unlike the West German diplomatic system, which recruited and trained generalists, GDR diplomats and most foreign policy experts were specialists with strong language skills and area specialization. Diplomats who spoke the regional languages did not need translators and were able to connect better with their local partners as well as provide better regional analysis.<sup>189</sup> This was implemented in the GDR by hiring diplomats not only from amongst the IIB graduates, but also from amongst area studies students and from amongst the East German international relations graduates from the IMEMO in Moscow.

In the GDR, specialized regional knowledges were taught at the IIB but also at the area studies faculties of the universities in Berlin, Leipzig and Rostock. At the universities, area studies students fully studied the language, country and region in question. A big emphasis lay on language acquisition, and the levels of language fluency at the end were very high.<sup>190</sup> Thomas Ruttig, for example, completed a five-year degree in Afghanistan studies and was fluent in Dari and Pashto by the end of his degree, which also included a half-year stay in Afghanistan. Students in the area studies departments were taught in very small groups and tutored intensively. In his Afghanistan studies degree, for example, Thomas Ruttig sat in a cohort of seven.<sup>191</sup> The GDR had excellent contacts with national liberation movements all across the world, and these political connections

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<sup>188</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 20.

<sup>189</sup> Interview Ruttig, 2019: 10.

<sup>190</sup> Interview Ruttig, 2019: 2.

<sup>191</sup> Interview Ruttig, 2019: 9.

also led to an offering in many niche languages and specializations.<sup>192</sup> Regional studies, however, did not include any general international relations training, which was transmitted at the IIB and the IMEMO.

Every year, the students selected for a study in international relations had to be divided between those going to the IIB in Potsdam and those going to the IMEMO in Moscow. In order to do this, first-year students had to take an intensive, multi-months-long Russian language course. Those who were good at language learning and performed well at the tests were subsequently sent for their studies to Moscow to the IMEMO. There they would specialize in a difficult or rare language, while those with poorer language skills were sent to the IIB with a specialization in European languages.<sup>193</sup> The IIB taught Russian, English, French, Spanish and Arabic; the IMEMO offered studies in almost every official language of the world. Around half of a year's student recruits were sent to the IMEMO, and the other half to the IIB.<sup>194</sup> The choice of language determined the area specialization, choosing Spanish for instance led to a specialization in Spain or Latin American countries.<sup>195</sup>

At the IMEMO, foreign policy experts were trained with a stronger regional focus than at the IIB. About half the study time was dedicated to language learning, the other half to subjects such as history of international relations, contemporary history, history of the Soviet Foreign Policy, political economy, philosophy, global economic and financial relations as well as the history of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The study also included specialized historical and cultural training both about the area and the specific country under study.<sup>196</sup> Language levels at the end of the study were very high; students were generally fluent in their language of choice, whether Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese and so forth.<sup>197</sup>

At the IIB, the primary focus lay on international relations, but each student was allocated a specialization, and language training was an important part of education. The specialization training allocated each student to a special area of focus determining their later job postings. The specialized area of focus thus allocated each student to a research department at the IIB, a later department at the MfAA or in certain cases at the press and media agencies, as well as a specific language training combination. Specializations existed in the following areas: socialist states, security/disarmament, international organizations, international law, Arab States, the US, Latin America, consular and diplomatic law, and "foreign information" (*Auslandsinformation*), the latter of which directed students to press and media postings.<sup>198</sup>

The MfAA was involved in the selection of students, their work placements and trajectories. Students were put on specific thematic and functional pathways, though things did not always go as planned. While studying in Moscow to become a GDR diplomat, Wolfram Wallraf, for example,

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<sup>192</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 8-9.

<sup>193</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 5.

<sup>194</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 24.

<sup>195</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 1.

<sup>196</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 5.

<sup>197</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 5.

<sup>198</sup> Festlegung der Spezialisierungsrichtungen für den 1. Kurs des Fuenfjahresstudiums am IIB. Potsdam University Archive, ASR – 13044.

married a ‘Soviet citizen’. This was an act of insubordination; diplomats were not supposed to marry foreigners. Wallraf was demoted and set on the path of becoming a scholar instead.<sup>199</sup> After his studies at the IIB, Lutz Kleinwächter was sent to start his career at the MfAA, first at the US department, then at the UN department. However, he quickly ran into trouble and was ‘punished’ and sent back to the IIB to do a PhD before being allowed to return to the ministry.<sup>200</sup>

The specialization training started in year two and comprised targeted classes regrouping all the students of a speciality, usually two to six students per area. It also required students to start writing essays every year in their specialization area and receive special coaching on this, particularly also on how to find and use primary sources. This culminated in their having to write their “master’s thesis” (*Diplomarbeit*) on a topic from their specialization. Additionally, the specialization determined placement in the IIB internal research internships and the policy internship placements at the MfAA, during which, in turn, they also had to collect information for the completion of their “master’s thesis”.<sup>201</sup>

In the specialization course on ‘Arab States’, for example, the advanced fourth-year classes included the discussion of the following topics: how the Middle East problems were being dealt with at the UN, the positions of the various Arab states on how to solve the Middle Eastern conflict, the role of natural resources and economic independence in the conflicts, the current problems faced by national liberation movements in the Middle East, and the role of the North-African Arab states in the relations with Africa.<sup>202</sup> In the specialization course on ‘Latin America’, for example, the advanced fourth-year classes included the discussion of the following topics: the current state of relations between the GDR and Latin American states, contemporary problems in Latin America, the different communist parties, resources and economic independence from imperialist states, ideological currents in Latin America, national liberation movements, China’s strategy and tactics in Latin America.<sup>203</sup> Overall, these strong specializations meant that each diplomat, researcher and foreign policy expert had a unique profile and quasi-monopoly in their specialization.<sup>204</sup> It also meant that they had all been intensively exposed to other cultures, other political, cultural and economic systems, different histories and mentalities. This gave a basis for comparison, which, in turn, provided perspective and distance to one’s own system.

### *Western sources*

Another type of exposure to ‘abroad’ was through the use of Western sources. At the IIB, most courses were based on the familiarization with and use of primary sources, including Western ones where relevant. For example, session 20 of the course ‘Imperialist countries’ on United Kingdom

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<sup>199</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 4.

<sup>200</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 6.

<sup>201</sup> Studienjahresprogramm 3. Jahr der 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

<sup>202</sup> Themenplan für das Spezialstudium Arabische Staaten, Studienjahr 1973/74, I. Matrikel, IV. Studienjahr. Potsdam University Archive, ASR – 13044.

<sup>203</sup> Themenplan für das Spezialstudium Lateinamerika, Studienjahr 1973/74, I. Matrikel, IV. Studienjahr. Potsdam University Archive, ASR – 13044.

<sup>204</sup> See Interview Wallraf, 2019: 6; Interview Ruttig, 2019: 3.



was based on the examination of the following six primary sources:<sup>205</sup> an extract of a declaration of prime minister Harold Wilson from 1967, an extract of a British-Italian declaration from 1969, an extract of a declaration of prime minister Edward Heath from 24.05.1971, an extract from the British government's white book on "the UK and the European Communities" from 1971, an extract from an interview with the British foreign secretary Alec Douglas-Home published in the West German venue "Der Spiegel", and an extract from the speech of prime minister Edward Heath in front of the national press club in Washington in 1973.

Western sources were sometimes also used as study material. As Thomas Ruttig at the HU for instance later found out, much of his study materials on Afghanistan had been based on West German sources. In the 1960s and 1970s, Afghanistan had been an important partner of FRG development cooperation and in the wake of these connections, much sociological and anthropological research had been carried out. Lesson plans had been based on a mix of Marxist and Western sources on Afghanistan.<sup>206</sup> The lens of Marxism had both positive and negative aspects, as it gave some interesting analytical tools but also restricted the possibilities of talking about certain things, though the small circle of 7 students allowed for a certain degree of freedom of discussion.<sup>207</sup>

Another type of exposure to Western sources lay in learning about Western 'bourgeois' theories of international relations. At the IIB, this was covered in the course "theoretical problems of international relations". The course elaborated on the main branches of 'bourgeois' international relations theory and how to critique them, and looked in particular at its strategic components and its influence on Western strategies. The focus lay on training and sharpening the ability to critique the theoretical and ideological foundations of 'imperialist strategies' and the ability to critique its philosophical and political sources.<sup>208</sup> While this was part of the teaching curriculum, it did not actually play any prominent role in most people's later research and specialization. Because of their overall strong practical focus, knowledge production did not have to engage in theoretical debates with Western models on a regular basis.<sup>209</sup> But academic debates were certainly carried out around theoretical issues. For instance: did growing regional cooperation necessarily lead to an increase of regulation and formalized interaction? Were the premises of functionalism correct? Various researchers at the IIB had different views on issues such as these, and informal discussions were carried out around these points.<sup>210</sup>

### *Going abroad*

Finally, an important manner of contact with the world 'abroad' was through actual trips and stays abroad. These allowed some freedom and contact with different people. This included long-term study placements such as the five-year studies at the IMEMO in Moscow, summer internships in

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<sup>205</sup> Lehrmaterial zum Thema 20 des Lehrprogramms Imperialistische Länder für die 2. Matrikel 3. Studienjahr, Dr. Dankert, September 1973. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

<sup>206</sup> Interview Ruttig, 2019: 3.

<sup>207</sup> Interview Ruttig, 2019: 4.

<sup>208</sup> Lehrprogramm "Theoretische Grundfragen der internationalen Beziehungen", 2. Matrikel. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13045.

<sup>209</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 19.

<sup>210</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 19.

the Soviet Union, research stays at local universities, conference attendance and job placements at various embassies. Going abroad gave a more critical perspective, an outsider's look into the GDR<sup>211</sup>

One of the most confronting experiences lay in travelling to the Soviet Union for the first time. Studying at the IIB involved completing an internship every year during the summer vacations, and one of these internships took place in the Soviet Union. The trips were organized in a small group format and regularly triggered heightened discussions, due to the unsettling nature of the trip. The IIB students had been chosen for their studies by the youth organization FDJ and the SED on the basis of their positive attitude towards the system, as demonstrated by their family background, learning performance, general development over the years and behaviour in the FDJ youth groups. This included all types of students, from the highly intelligent, reflective and critical to narrow-minded radicals and extremists.<sup>212</sup> Students all had to have a positive relation to the GDR, but beyond that, they all came with their individual biographies.<sup>213</sup>

When travelling to the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s from the GDR for the first time, the confrontation with its reality was shocking to many because it contrasted so strongly with the image propagated in the GDR. Depending on their background and horizon, this affected students differently.<sup>214</sup> Some were better prepared than others to stomach this, but for a number of students, this was the total collapse of everything they knew and believed in. As a result of this experience, every year a handful of students either left their studies voluntarily or were reallocated to another study. Others became more cynical and others, still, turned more radical in their convictions and support for the system.<sup>215</sup>

Other experiences were perhaps less confronting, but did provide important changes of perspectives. Studying at the IMEMO in Moscow for instance enabled a different view on the 'real socialism', its nature and its limits, good and bad.<sup>216</sup> Up into the 1980s, foreign students at the IMEMO studied in the same classes as their Soviet counterparts. This enabled insight into Soviet foreign policy thinking, as things were discussed and debated with much more openness than back home in the GDR. The secret agreements of the Hitler-Stalin pact, still a taboo in the GDR, were discussed openly in Moscow. Professors, who often had practical diplomatic experience, talked openly about the Soviet Union's concrete interests in various foreign policy issues:

*"They did not mince their words. That was the inner circle, there was no more ideology or propaganda. [...] I can remember Professor Mirsky's lectures on the Middle East and the Palestine question, how he was weighing the various options for action. Professor Petroff taught Japanese foreign policy and also thought out loud about how to solve the Kuril problem. It would have been inconceivable in the GDR to simply discuss*

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<sup>211</sup> See for example Interview Wallraf, 2019: 21; Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 2; Interview Krämer, 2019b: 1.

<sup>212</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 19.

<sup>213</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 6.

<sup>214</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 19.

<sup>215</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 19.

<sup>216</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 2.

*such internal matters with students, but they had no problem with it. A great power is simply much more self-confident than a small country.” (Interview Wallraf, 2019: 25-26)*

Thomas Ruttig, the Afghanistan specialist, spent a half-year in Kabul studying at the local university and living in the student halls with other Afghan students. In their first meeting with the GDR ambassador, the ambassador showed him and his classmates a map of the city in which all the forbidden areas had been crossed out in red. Their allocated student hall, however, was located right in the middle of such a red-crossed zone. They decided to interpret this as indirect and unofficial permission to go wherever they pleased and chose to roam free around Kabul.<sup>217</sup> Half of their days were spent at the university. For the rest of the time, they had been tasked with the collection of materials for their Masters’ theses (*Diplomarbeit*), which meant a lot of time spent in the general library. Thomas Ruttig had picked a topic on Afghanistan’s opposition movements in the 1940s and 1950s, a topic chosen because it opened the possibility to study opposition movements, a topic otherwise difficult in the GDR. Over time, he made good contacts and came in touch with various figures of the opposition sitting out an internal exile at the academy of sciences. They passed on many documents and primary sources, and Thomas Ruttig was able to write a thorough study on his chosen topic.<sup>218</sup>

Conferences were another manner of travelling abroad. The amount of freedom differed according to the topic and the country of destination. When travelling to London to an IISS conference on European security, special directives specified one’s radius of action: did one just present a pre-prepared paper, or did one have to engage in the conversations? Were there special topics and approaches that one had to bring into the conversation? Was one allowed to make comments about one’s institute of origin? Could one contact or communicate with Western press or media outlets? All these points and questions were determined beforehand.<sup>219</sup> Other conferences were less high-stakes. As a Japan expert, for instance, Wolfram Wallraf was able to travel to Moscow and freely debate with colleagues at conferences about their East Asia themed papers. For something like this, there was no need to get pre-approval for his contributions. Ongoing topics at these conferences included whether or not Japan would become a military power again and how to solve the Kuril Islands dispute. Leaning towards one side of the argument or the other in the context of such a conference was irrelevant for the GDR, and so Wolfram Wallraf had a lot of freedom in this context.<sup>220</sup>

Overall, knowing the realities of other places, studying them and travelling there gave most researchers a more flexible and creative outlook on the reality of their own system and helped most of them achieve that balance between ‘dogma’ and ‘reflection’. Having this orientation, though, made many international relations experts suspicious to others who were not. The scientists at the Academy for Statecraft and Law (the DASR), which the GDR was formally attached to, always saw the IIB with suspicion, precisely because their gaze was oriented away from the GDR<sup>221</sup> Accordingly, all its institutions, including the IIB, also stood under surveillance by the

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<sup>217</sup> Interview Ruttig, 2019: 5.

<sup>218</sup> Interview Ruttig, 2019: 5.

<sup>219</sup> See for example Reisedirektive für Dr Dietrich Kleitke, 21.10.1976. Potsdam University Archive, ASR 13242.

<sup>220</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 10.

<sup>221</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 27.

Stasi and the KGB.<sup>222</sup> And coming back home with a wider understanding of things meant that one had to navigate the political waters at home carefully.<sup>223</sup>

## Science as a resource: Studying the enemy

A second way of looking at the various different institutions, actors and practices involved in GDR knowledge production about international relations is through the lens of instrumentality. Beyond its constitutive role in ‘making’ experts, international relations knowledge production was also valuable as a resource, in particular when it came to studying the enemy. Engaging with and understanding the other side of the friend/enemy distinction, proved to be both a valuable resource for political decision-making, but at the same time also a centrifugal force of differentiation: realizing that the enemy was not so different from oneself led to a questioning of central Cold War ideology.

The IPW, the *Institut für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft* in Berlin, was the institution dedicated to studying the enemy. It was primarily a research institution, and students joined to do their PhDs there after having completed their studies elsewhere, often at the IIB, the IMEMO or in other disciplines at the universities. The IPW was divided into three parts dedicated to the study of economy, international relations and ideology respectively. This was a result of its creation in 1971, whereby three formerly independent institutions had been put together. It comprised 400 staff members, of which around 150 were researchers.<sup>224</sup> In the economic sections of the IPW, some focus of analysis also lay on capitalist development countries, but the institute’s main purchase was the FRG, the US, international organizations such as NATO or the EU and then, to a lesser degree of importance, the UK, France and Japan.<sup>225</sup> The IPW’s task was to analyze Western countries, monitor changes and developments and study their decision-making processes as far as it was accessible in public sources.<sup>226</sup> Their task was also to present the results of their analyses in such a way that they would be usable and useful.<sup>227</sup> Until the beginning of the 1980s this also had to be presented in a framework that was ideologically determined, namely within the framework of the idea that ‘imperialism’, thereby meaning ‘the West’, was intrinsically incapable of peace and had to be forced to be peaceful by a coalition of Western leftist and other peace-oriented forces in the world to be peaceful.<sup>228</sup>

‘Studying the enemy’ was not only the task of the IPW, though. It included research on specific Western countries, but also the study of general security themes such as issues of armament, disarmament and the arms race. The MfAA had a UN department as well as a department on “fundamental issues” (*Grundfragen*), which covered security topics, similar to the ministry of defence department on “fundamental issues”.<sup>229</sup> This expertise was mirrored at the IIB. In their

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<sup>222</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 15.

<sup>223</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 7.

<sup>224</sup> Schwarz, in *Neues Denken in der DDR*, 55.

<sup>225</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 7.

<sup>226</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 1.

<sup>227</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 1.

<sup>228</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 1.

<sup>229</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 6.

department, “fundamental issues” researchers studied military questions, American foreign policy, investigated Reagan’s “Star-Wars” programme and so forth.<sup>230</sup>

## Sources

‘Studying the enemy’ was premised on the ability to actually ‘study’ the enemy. This meant full access to Western sources was needed, and both institutions provided these. At the IPW, all Western political science and security politics journals such as *Foreign Policy* as well as many West German publications on the topic were available.<sup>231</sup> The IPW also had extensive contact with Western institutions. IPW researchers regularly went on research trips to West Germany and visited in particular the ISFH research institute in Hamburg and the HSFK research institute in Frankfurt. They also met with the political research think tanks of the left, and of the conservative spectrum, as well as with politicians of different convictions. All of this was done with the aim to understand the other side, understand their problems and their expectations of the GDR<sup>232</sup>

The underlying idea was that more than 95% of what one could know or needed to know about the other side was publicly accessible. This is why the IPW’s focus was to assemble and analyze all those publicly available sources, including through the personal contacts with Western partners.<sup>233</sup> The rest of the information was provided by the HVA, the GDR’s secret service, and materials from both sides of enquiry came together at the office of director Max Schmidt.<sup>234</sup>

The situation was comparable at the IIB and at the military institutions, minus the personal contacts abroad, which were a prerogative of the IPW.<sup>235</sup> Researchers at the IIB had everything they needed at their disposition. They could take out any Western books they wanted, though the daily Western newspapers had to be consulted at the library.<sup>236</sup> Additionally, they also had sources from the foreign office and all the local embassies at their disposition.<sup>237</sup>

## Output

The output of research found its way into a mix of internal reports, including travel reports and internal studies for the central committee, and for the ministries of foreign affairs and foreign trade, as well as external publications and public talks.<sup>238</sup> Internal studies and external publications differed. Before becoming the assistant to the IPW’s director, for example, Wolfgang Schwarz had been an expert on NATO affairs. NATO organized meetings twice a year in the spring and in the fall. Meetings took place from Friday evening to Saturday noon and communiques were released at the end of their meetings. Wolfgang Schwarz picked those communiques up at ADN, the GDR’s state news agency and had to deliver an internal summary and analysis by Monday morning.

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<sup>230</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 2.

<sup>231</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 1.

<sup>232</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 2.

<sup>233</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 5.

<sup>234</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 7.

<sup>235</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 6; Interview Schreiber, 2020.

<sup>236</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 9.

<sup>237</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 27-28.

<sup>238</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 7-8.

The international information went to the central committee and on the basis of that information, Wolfgang Schwarz would then write up a longer study meant for external publication a month later in the *IPW-Berichte*, the journal published by the IPW. But not everything of the internal communication was made public; he had received instructions as what to keep and what to cut out.<sup>239</sup>

SED party conferences in particular required a lot of internal studies, and every trip to the West had to be thoroughly documented, and analyzed, with the travel report promptly filed in one day upon return.<sup>240</sup> External publications included regular publications in *IPW-Berichte*, the monthly journal, as well as in *IPW-Vierteljahresberichte*, the journal that came out four times per year. Next to this, researchers had to regularly participate in book publications, edited volumes, and conference contributions. Public talks were required on a regular basis, whereby each researcher had to go and give talks all throughout the GDR to the employees of factories and other economic institutions, such as power plants, constructions sites and so forth. Sometimes IPW employees would be sent to assist in international political negotiations and contribute to the respective working groups.<sup>241</sup>

At the IIB, internal studies also tended to be written in very open and explicit ways, and certainly so in the departments concerned with ‘studying the enemy’ which were the “Western Europe & Japan” departments as well as the department concerned with “fundamental issues” (*Grundfragen*). There, internal memos and studies were not censored. The analyses of specific power relations, power constellations and current situations were written in a straightforward way. They would never be published and did receive a secrecy classification.<sup>242</sup> These studies then went on to the international liaison department at the central committee, as well as to the MfAA and the defence ministry, as well as sometimes to the secret services.<sup>243</sup> While not getting published, these internal studies were often the basis for later articles or other external publications, after some editing and re-writing.<sup>244</sup> In other cases, though, the difference between internal and external output did not vary much.<sup>245</sup> In short, researchers were required to move and operate in many different output fields and straddle all their various requirements.<sup>246</sup>

### *Freedom of analysis*

Being officially commissioned to study capitalism and imperialism, the researchers doing so had a certain weight and influence on decision-making processes. But in order to provide good analysis, they could not afford to have ideological blinders, which gave them a certain degree of freedom in their research and in their writing.<sup>247</sup> Rigorous scientific work was expected at the IPW, whose main task was to analyze Western sources and monitor ‘the enemy’. Researchers there had to learn

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<sup>239</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 7-8.

<sup>240</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 7-8.

<sup>241</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 8.

<sup>242</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 6.

<sup>243</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 6-7.

<sup>244</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 6-7.

<sup>245</sup> Interview Ersil, 2019: 3.

<sup>246</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 8.

<sup>247</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 4.

how to examine sources minutely, determine how important or unimportant they were and look at them without ideological prejudice:

*“[My director] didn’t tell this to me directly, that would not have been possible, but indirectly, so to speak. He taught me to keep my ideological blinders in the drawer wherever possible. If I already know in advance: everything in the West is evil anyway – to put it simply – then I don’t need to examine it. Then I already know everything and only need to scout for bits and pieces that fit this scheme.” (Interview Schwarz, 2019: 9)*

The freedom of thought and research extended to the younger researchers, who had a lot of leeway to experiment with ideas and accordingly received protection from the director.<sup>248</sup> Independently of any official restrictions, though, researchers were of course never fully ‘objective’ in the sense that their writings all reflected personal history, experience, education and tradition.<sup>249</sup>

The leeway and freedom of analysis always stood in a relation of tension with official narratives, and between researchers’ orientations. Divisions within the IPW existed between the ‘ideological’ economy and ideology departments and the somewhat more ‘liberal’ international relations department, though each of these departments were also internally divided between those in favour of cooperation and those in favour of confrontation with the West.<sup>250</sup> However, the IPW’s director from 1973 to 1990, Max Schmidt, was an important protagonist of the ‘new thinking’ in the GDR and in its public media. This influenced the mood and orientation of the whole institute,<sup>251</sup> despite the underlying tension between those who saw the IPW function in supporting the party and those who saw it in providing independent analysis.<sup>252</sup>

Research about ‘the enemy’ was overall valued and well received. At the MfAA, for instance, IIB research on armament and disarmament was appreciated and drawn on. Research on Western Europe and West Germany was also received well, in contrast to the studies and memos authored by the researchers studying ‘socialism’ in neighbouring states. These did not generate much interest and were largely ignored by the political practice.<sup>253</sup>

### ***Knowing the class enemy, transcending the boundary***

As we have seen in the previous section, the foreign policy experts were much more experienced than other researchers due to their contact and orientation with the world beyond the GDR’s borders. They had seen, met and talked to the ‘class enemy’ and found that they were human too. The ‘enemy’ looked at things from a diametrically opposite perspective, but they did think about the same problems in the same rational and sensible manner. This triggered a process of differentiation in the GDR, whereby those who had had the international experience of getting acquainted with the reality of the opponent, developed a more nuanced relation with the official

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<sup>248</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 3-4.

<sup>249</sup> Interview Ersil, 2019: 11.

<sup>250</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 3.

<sup>251</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 12.

<sup>252</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 6.

<sup>253</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 2-3.

ideology and started thinking about reform alternatives.<sup>254</sup> This included having to understand how to communicate with the other side. Talking about peaceful coexistence, even when meant literally and seriously, signalled to the West an aggressive communist intention. Using the Western terms antagonistic cooperation, however, signalled to the West a real intention of acting peacefully.<sup>255</sup>

As such, the Cold War dynamics split politicians and researchers into pro-cooperation and pro-confrontation advocates. The latter were particularly upset at the former, because cooperation made it harder to uphold the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology:

*“Our anti-capitalist hardliners cursed us: ‘You are destroying our ideology, we cannot cooperate with these imperialists.’ This was more or less how they put it, and we had to convince them by saying: ‘Don’t be crazy, this way of proceeding actually divides people over there. And it divides in a real, not an artificial way, it divides them into Cold War hardliners and those who want a security partnership’” (Interview Fischer, 2020: 5-6)*

As Siegfried Fischer highlights, the Cold War dynamics not only split East German researchers and politicians into two camps, they also did the same with the other side. Studying the enemy thus triggered a process on both sides of the divide whereby the involved were forced to go beyond their horizon of knowledge and understanding. Engaging with the ‘other’ side gave them perspective and distance towards their own.

## Science as a performance: Enacting the global alliances

A third way of looking at the different institutions, actors and practices involved in GDR international relations knowledge production is through the lens of performativity. Beyond its constitutive role in ‘making’ experts and its instrumental role in providing knowledge and information to decision-makers, GDR international relations knowledge production also played a performative role, both by inscribing the GDR into its wider system of alliances and by demonstrating the GDR’s currency as a knowledge producer.

### *Unwelcome science*

*“The Soviet Union, the GDR and later the Federal Republic – it is of course not 100% the same – all shared the same tendency not to listen to scientists. Because they are too complicated, they have to explain everything down to the smallest detail, and you often don’t get any specific recommendations. ‘Do it this way, do it that way.’ they always say that you also have to consider this and that. And they cannot handle this on the diplomatic political level. That is system-independent, the GDR was deeply anti-science when it came to social sciences and results contradicted ideology (in internal discussion it was occasionally more open). The same is, I would say, to 90% also true in the political reality of the Federal Republic of Germany, as I have experienced it.” (Interview Rüttig, 2019: 22)*

In general, the GDR did not really value research and science as a guideline for politics. Researchers and academics were too lengthy, too complicated, did not give clear instructions for

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<sup>254</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 5.

<sup>255</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 2.



action. The practical experts of international relations at the MfAA used three main sources of international relations 'knowledge' instead: the knowledge basis acquired during their studies, the internal analyses circulating within the ministry and compiled from the country reports sent in by the respective embassies, and the daily press news, which included the illegal use of Western sources such as DPA and Reuters.<sup>256</sup>

As we have seen in the previous section, some areas of research were relevant for the political practice, especially when they provided insight and knowledge about the Cold War enemy. There, science and research had instrumental value for politics as a resource. Many other areas of enquiry, though, were not relevant to political practice. After delivering studies about these topics to the MfAA, one did not generally get feedback, especially not positive.<sup>257</sup> The staff there generally considered themselves to be the 'smarter' ones<sup>258</sup> and they certainly were the better-informed ones, having updates about the latest news at all times.<sup>259</sup> In these 'irrelevant' areas of enquiry, the relation with the MfAA was not generally a very stimulating or fruitful one. While personal sympathies and friendships did exist, MfAA employees did not, as a general rule of thumb, regard the IIB researchers very highly, and the other way around.<sup>260</sup> The MfAA treated IIB staff with distance; they were not allowed to come and go at the ministry as they pleased. When coming for a meeting all the way from Potsdam, they were treated as visitors and had to wait in the lobby to be picked up.<sup>261</sup> They were disparagingly seen as 'academics' writing 'academic' papers with little practicable use.<sup>262</sup>

But regardless of its actual importance for political decision-making, scientific practice had to be justified by its practical use for politics. As such the IIB heads of department had to go to the MfAA regularly and report. Yearly research plans had been drafted and they had to account for the research done to meet the plan:<sup>263</sup>

*"I was regularly at the MfAA – at least once a month – and talked to people and was also invited to meetings and to present our work. Once a year the moment came when it would be decided which topics our colleagues in the MfAA wanted us to work on in the next year. Most of the time, these meetings were not particularly well prepared, and it was decided quite spontaneously which topics should be researched in the coming year. That is then what became the plan. When the work was finished, nobody could really remember why this particular topic had been commissioned." (Interview Wallraf, 2019: 8)*

As the quote above shows, research in the areas without clear political relevance was not taken too seriously by the MfAA. It was something that needed to be done, something one had to have a plan for, commission and then hear back from. Despite its lack of direct relevance, it was a practice that needed to be kept up and everyone needed to play their part, because research was formally a

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<sup>256</sup> Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 10-11.

<sup>257</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 8.

<sup>258</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 8.

<sup>259</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 27.

<sup>260</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 8.

<sup>261</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 2.

<sup>262</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 2.

<sup>263</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 8.

part of the system.<sup>264</sup> In these areas, research would not necessarily be commissioned for a specific instrumental information need, but because of certain events like an anniversary or an important political visit that required the existence of a publication.<sup>265</sup>

### ***Allegiance to the Soviet Union: Dependent and Independent Areas of Enquiry***

Within this type of research done for the sake of research and for the sake of having publications, much leeway was possible in principle. However, the degree of independence in these areas of knowledge production stood in direct relation to the GDR's, and hence the Soviet Union's, geopolitical interests. The closer to the Soviet Union's interest, the more dependent the research, the further from its interest, the more independent its research.

*“The relationship between research and politics was multifaceted and ambivalent. A simplified formula could be: the less strategic-political relevance for the Soviet Union, the freer the research. When researching areas of high political relevance, such as the foreign policy of the Soviet Union – what kind of research could we do there? We wrote about their (official) activities and reproduced their statements. [...] In the department on Western Europe, [research] leaned in the other direction, it became more solid, more professional. Solid analyses were required in this domain: We wanted to know what was really going on.” (Interview Krämer, 2019b: 3,6)*

In that sense, GDR research also performed its alliance with the Soviet Union by aligning knowledge production into the fold of its allies' interest.

At the end of the dependence spectrum was research on the Soviet Union. Here publications on its foreign policy were limited to a rendition of facts about its activities and declarations.<sup>266</sup> Next in line were the other allied socialist countries. Here, research followed alliance politics, and nothing critical was published. Researchers of socialist countries were not taken very seriously by their other colleagues. While they knew a lot and had good internal analysis, their publications only featured what the political sphere wanted to hear or already knew.<sup>267</sup> Closely related developing countries on a 'socialist' path of development could not be written about freely. Bilateral treaties with the GDR had been signed, and in cases such as these it became important to demonstrate that the respective countries were on the right path to socialism. Factors such as ethnicity were discarded in favour of class relations.<sup>268</sup> Cuba was another such example. Following the MfAA's classification, Cuba, Mozambique and Angola were categorized as 'socialist', not 'developing' countries and thus studied in the department for socialism research.<sup>269</sup> Cuba was a problem for enquiry: the Cuban revolution did not confirm to the communist model. So, the area specialists for Latin America had to straddle the tension between Cuban reality and communist orthodoxy.<sup>270</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 27.

<sup>265</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 5.

<sup>266</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 3.

<sup>267</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 2-3.

<sup>268</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 2.

<sup>269</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 2, 5-6.

<sup>270</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 4.

China was a different case. Because of the break with China, and the subsequent enmity between the GDR/Soviet Union and China, research had to focus on China's political action in developing countries so as to prove its negative impact. As such, this impacted the choice of research topics, including also the discontinuance of previously begun research. In one case at least, a PhD dissertation on China had to be interrupted, because this was not wanted anymore by the Soviet Union.<sup>271</sup>

Research on 'developing' countries sat somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, varying according to the country and current situation. Work on Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico was more constrained, whereas work on Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia was freer:<sup>272</sup>

*"In Argentina, the militaries could not be criticized if they had just signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union for deliveries of wheat. Wheat was the Soviet Union's big problem. In Chile, on the other hand, you could criticize the military. There were good reasons for it."* (Interview Krämer, 2019b: 3)

On the other side of the spectrum lay the research that was of no interest to either the MfAA or central committee and that one could call "*l'art pour l'art*",<sup>273</sup> i.e. research done for its own sake without practical relevance, as was Raimund Krämer's 20-page study on the border conflict between Ecuador and Peru. In these cases, one did have to conform to the political framework on a very broad level, but the actual research and analysis could go in whichever direction the researcher thought appropriate.<sup>274</sup>

Western countries of lesser importance to the GDR and to the Soviet Union could also be analyzed with a greater degree of freedom. On a political level, it did not matter too much whether one evaluated current political development in France one way or another.<sup>275</sup> Japan was another case where research was relatively free and could be solid, as long as one stayed clear of the Kuril Islands problem. People really wanted to know what was happening in Japan, and so proper research was possible.<sup>276</sup> The question about Japan's fast rise to modernity, for example, could be dealt with quite freely. One had to quote the general secretaries of the SED and of the CPSU in the introduction, but in the main part of the publication one did not have to reference it anymore.<sup>277</sup> Scholarship about Japan did not revolve around ideological debates, but more around theoretical schools or empirical puzzles: in the 1970s, for example, Japan's economic rise was explained by the interconnections between the economic, politic and bureaucratic tops and the strong state guidance – as described by Chalmers Johnson's "MITI and the Japanese Miracle". But in the 1980s, the neoliberal wave with Milton Friedman brought forward a different, radically opposite explanation for Japanese growth: the Japanese industry made it to success not because of, but despite state bureaucratic control. These were the debates and they were free of East/West ideological polemic.<sup>278</sup> One of Wallraf's last research projects revolved around Japanese parties and

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<sup>271</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 2.

<sup>272</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 3.

<sup>273</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 2.

<sup>274</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 2-3.

<sup>275</sup> Interview Ersil, 2019: 7.

<sup>276</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 6.

<sup>277</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 6-7.

<sup>278</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 18.

investigated the various explanatory factors behind their fluctuating nature. Hypotheses involved the electoral, system, political culture, and so forth, but not ideological East/West divisions.<sup>279</sup>

### *Global alliance system*

The Cold War's antagonistic logic led to the formation of hierarchical alliances on both sides of the conflict. These constellations of alliances were "very diverse, asymmetrical, and yet to a certain extent mirroring each other."<sup>280</sup> The GDR cultivated close ties with national liberation movements across the globe and pursued alliance relations with many newly independent countries in Asia and Africa. International relations expertise played a role in performing and upholding this alliance system. Just as research and teaching played a role in enacting the GDR's allegiance to the Soviet Union – by sending students to be trained in Moscow and by respecting its geopolitical interest in publication outlets – it also played a role in enacting the GDR's alliances with 'Third World' countries.

In particular, the GDR offered training programmes for foreign diplomats. These had ostensive instrumental value, as they directly contributed to the knowledge and skills of foreign diplomats. But they also had a strong symbolic value: in carrying out these training programmes, the GDR was enacting its alliance loyalties. Teaching both locally and in Potsdam, training took place in particular with the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Democratic Kampuchea, and with the People's Republics of Angola, Yemen, Benin, Mozambique and Congo.<sup>281</sup> This gave IIB researchers the opportunity to confront other perspectives and opinions from within Potsdam,<sup>282</sup> though contact remained limited beyond the few teaching hours.<sup>283</sup>

Most of these training programmes took place in Potsdam for the duration of a few weeks to a few months, on a one-off or yearly recurring basis. The cooperation with Mozambique was an exception to this, however. With a duration of twelve years until 1989 and an average of three IIB staff members posted in Maputo, this was an exceptional project of support in comparison to the other, shorter training programmes offered. The GDR had been supporting Mozambique's national liberation movement FRELIMO for a long time before Mozambique became independent of Portugal and the FELIMO took over the government. Extensive bilateral treaties ensued, with the GDR sending material support for Mozambique's socialist development.<sup>284</sup> Amongst many other cooperation projects, the GDR also agreed to support Mozambique in training the diplomats it now direly needed as a newly independent country. The IIB was tasked with training Mozambican diplomats in Maputo and help establish a centre of international relations for this purpose.

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<sup>279</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 20.

<sup>280</sup> Romero, 691.

<sup>281</sup> Lektoreneinsätze von Lehrkräften des IIB zur Qualifizierung außenpolitischer Kader in verschiedenen Staaten. PA AA, MfAA ZR1280/14. See also Interview Kleinwächter, 2019 and Helmut Busch, "Ausländerstudium," in *Die Babelsberger Diplomatschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der DDR*, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009).

<sup>282</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 12.

<sup>283</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 6.

<sup>284</sup> Ilona Schleicher, "Das Solidaritätskomitee der DDR und Mosambik: Unterstützung des Befreiungskampfes und Entwicklungshilfe," in *Die DDR und Afrika. Zwischen Klassenkampf und neuem Denken.*, ed. Ulrich van der Heyden, Ilona Schleicher, and Hans-Georg Schleicher (Hamburg: Lit, 1993).

In 1978, Günther Thole left for Mozambique with the task of helping build up its diplomatic training facility – the future ISRI Maputo. In doing so, his task was to teach international relations to Mozambican students – a mix of young school graduates and experienced political actors – so that they could become diplomats and act as multipliers building their own diplomatic training facility. At the beginning, there were many problems. Thole did not speak Portuguese well, there were no translators available, and the new Mozambican government could barely find enough candidates to spare for training. The differences between the students were enormous: unlike those who could be spared from ministry and government work, those who just graduated from high school had not much previous methodical skills or training, nor much knowledge about current international political processes. Thole's teaching concentrated on delivering two courses: one on Marxist/Leninist core knowledge about world revolutionary processes and one on contemporary problems in international relations. He also introduced a weekly press review to keep up with the international news, and this proved a popular teaching tool. His Mozambiquan partners were particularly interested in what he had to say about the problems of African countries, about China, and about the people's rights for self-determination. Thole was careful in what he said and how he said it.<sup>285</sup> In his report back home, he wrote:

*"I choose my words carefully, make sure the translations are done with exactitude, and I do not mention anything that could point to diverging views and interpretations between the GDR and PRM. I coordinated with comrade Ipolito how we are going to deal with China in the training sessions (presentation of objective facts, no ideological engagement with Maoism)."*<sup>286</sup>

He also paid attention not to accept teaching any practical and 'apolitical' courses, such as diplomatic and consular practice. To his Mozambican partners he argued that an experienced practitioner would be a better teacher. The real reason, though, lay in wanting control over all the courses of a more 'political' nature, so that he could explain and present the Marxist/Leninist position as well as the positions of the socialist countries on that specific issue.<sup>287</sup>

In 1979 he was joined by another colleague, and by 1980 a rotating team of around three IIB researchers would be permanently posted in Maputo until 1989. While being one of the few foreigners in Maputo in 1978, with the exception of a Swedish advisor who was "not a reactionary, not a full reactionary,"<sup>288</sup> the presence of foreigners from all parts of the world trying to influence the development of Mozambique increased every year. Over time, the political situation in Mozambique also deteriorated. After becoming independent from Portugal, the Mozambican FRELIMO government under Samora Machel had taken on Marxist/Leninist principles. From the start, though, the country had also been immersed in a civil war with the RENAMO, the Mozambican anti-communist opposition. Over the years the civil war would worsen, with the tensions between 'anti-communists' and 'communists' increasing and Mozambique slowly sliding towards the 'imperialist' camp.

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<sup>285</sup> Günther Thole, Erster Bericht, 18.04.1978. PA AA, MfAA ZR 626/89.

<sup>286</sup> Günther Thole, Erster Bericht, 18.04.1978. PA AA, MfAA ZR 626/89.

<sup>287</sup> Günther Thole, Information über den Kurs für außenpolitische Kader in Tanzania, 16.09.1978. PA AA, MfAA ZR 626/89.

<sup>288</sup> Günther Thole, Erster Bericht, 18.04.1978. PA AA, MfAA ZR 626/89.

In 1982, the highest-ranking IIB researcher in Maputo, Klaus Lingner, reported back. The situation in Mozambique was worrisome, “critical” even. The country’s economic hardship was increasing, and the imperialist direct and indirect pressure, including economic sabotage, had grown stronger.<sup>289</sup> More worrisome, though, Klaus Lingner noted that the imperialist enemy had moved into the offensive. In order to discredit the orthodox Marxist/Leninist positions, they did not push for a ‘capitalist’ position. Rather, they used the more discrete tactic of insisting that Mozambique ought to take on its own version of Marxism/Leninism, a version tailored to its own concerns and problems:

*“Since we are already talking about Marxism-Leninism, the opponent is moving into the offensive in this domain and uses as a tool the question of the ‘right’ application of M/L in the PRM. The problem is very complex, because it is connected to real and existing problems of development, and many cannot bear the ‘wrong notes’ in what they are saying. This is only the beginning of our problems and they come from the source at the university, which you also know. Despite their clever staging, it is old wine in new bottles, the issue of ‘specific socialisms’.”*<sup>290</sup>

A big challenge of the job resided in the fact that for Mozambicans, Marxism-Leninism was only one approach amongst many. They had access to literature from East and West and were debating and comparing both perspectives. Much of the teaching time, so Klaus Lingner complained, went into “ideological debates” when students wanted to know the truth about certain facts they had read in Western literature and see what his position on it would be. A big problem was that the available Marxist literature did not deal with any of those facts and thus almost discredited his work:

*“Sometimes I am consumed by anger, when I consult our own books and materials. Despite the fact that the students know very little otherwise, they do have very detailed ‘knowledge’ of the imperialist interpretations (e.g. Rumania/Jugoslavia 1944/1959; cult of personality). If you look in our own books to freshen up your memory, you can only laugh. Nothing happened! I am happy to still have some of my own bits of knowledge about it, or else their trust in me would be gone fast. We probably still have to wait a few years for some good historiography.”*<sup>291</sup>

In the meantime, the efforts increased to not only train diplomats, but to set up a whole institute. The idea was to transfer the IIB’s five-year curriculum to Maputo, in a “de-Europeanized” manner.<sup>292</sup> The curriculum was sent over by the end of 1984, and in 1985, the *Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais* (ISRI) was officially opened,<sup>293</sup> though it would still need a while to be fully staffed and operating. For the IIB researchers, the situation worsened from year to year, as more and more Western IR teaching staff would arrive and students were mainly exposed to Western sources. *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* in the Soviet Union did not help and created much uncertainty

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<sup>289</sup> Brief von Klaus Lingner an Horst, 2.5.1982. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13260.

<sup>290</sup> Brief von Klaus an Christel und Günther, 10.04.1982. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13260.

<sup>291</sup> Brief von Klaus und Edith an Christa und Günther, 24.06.1983. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13260.

<sup>292</sup> Brief von Günther an Horst, 14.04.1984. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13260.

<sup>293</sup> Prof. Dr Klaus Lingner Arbeitsgruppe MfAA – Maputo, 18.06.1985. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13260.

amongst the students.<sup>294</sup> With the end of the GDR, the East German support to Mozambique in the field of international relations would be abruptly interrupted.

The example of the GDR's support to Mozambique demonstrates the role of particular international relations training in performing a particular role and place in the international alliance system.

## Conclusion

During the Cold War confrontation with the West, the GDR's system of international relations expertise formed a tightly organized, yet multifaceted network of knowledge production, circulation and consumption. It was composed of four different nodes of activity. First, the generalist elite diplomatic training facility IIB, which was closely affiliated with the MfAA, trained experts and produced research for the various ministries involved in international relations as well as for the central committee. Second, the research institute dedicated to studying the 'enemy', the IPW in Berlin, had close ties to the central committee and provided analysis and insight to a number of stakeholders. Third, a number of military institutions provided both research and training and were connected thematically to the other institutions around issues of war, peace and security. Finally, the historians and area studies experts operating at the various universities of the GDR also provided teaching and research and were thematically connected to the other institutions of international relations knowledge production around issues of development and regional expertise. All these various institutions were internally well-organized entities engaging with each other and with the relevant political and societal stakeholders in manifold ways. With regards to the political sphere, each institution displayed varying levels of closeness or distance to political stakeholders, varying levels of engagement and varying levels of diversity in contact partners.

Beyond bounding the GDR's system of international relations expertise into a stable network of knowledge production, consumption and dissemination, the Cold War antagonism also structured its content and orientation along a friend/enemy distinction. Researchers and experts had to navigate a system that required them to both reproduce and transcend this distinction in order to do their work well. This dynamic played a central role in all the different aspects of international relations expertise, which this PhD thesis has examined along the three aspects of constitution, instrumentality and performance. International relations expertise played a constitutive role in forming the GDR's academic and practical foreign policy experts. Designed to use 'science as a weapon', they had to learn to simultaneously reproduce and transcend the Marxist/Leninist interpretation of international relations propagated by the GDR in order to engage verbally with their enemies in diplomatic and academic settings. As such, they needed to acquire a 'creative' and 'flexible' handling of the international relations' Marxist/Leninist interpretive frame. International relations expertise also played an instrumental role in providing knowledge and insight about the Cold War enemy. Here, the Cold War antagonism led to the valorization of all research providing insight and analysis about the West, while devaluating research without practical use in 'knowing'

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<sup>294</sup> Zur Entwicklung des Hochschulinstituts für Internationale Beziehungen (ISRI) in Maputo (VRM) im Jahre 1988, 10.1.1989. Potsdam University Archive, ASR-13260.

the enemy. Through studying and analysing the West closely, researchers were led to the realization that 'the others' were not so different from oneself. Instead, they behaved like a negative mirror image: thinking about the same problems, studying things in similar ways, with similar goals – but in a diametrically opposite manner and oriented against the GDR and its socialist alliances. As such, the Cold War antagonism led researchers studying the West into the difficult position of having to uphold dogma while clearly understanding its limitations and dangers. Finally, international relations expertise also played a performative role in enacting the GDR's alliances abroad. Here knowledge production, consumption and dissemination about international relations played a role both in presenting the GDR as a serious knowledge producer and as a reliable partner in alliance politics. This found an expression in the limitations and restrictions of publication freedom in the function of the Soviet Union's geopolitical interest, but also in the transmission of Marxist/Leninist international relations expertise across a wide network of alliances with African and Asian socialist states.



# CHAPTER 3

## Revolution/Knowledge: Revolutionary Upheaval and International Relations Expertise in the GDR 1989-1990

*“It was a mass event [...] also attended by the party functionaries of the whole district. 600 people. I was standing on stage and my knees went weak: I knew instantly how thin the line was that I was navigating. But I went on with it – dead silence. I have never again had such an effect on an audience.” (Interview Fischer, 2020: 7)*

*“These were tumultuous times. The only constant was change. We were caught in a fever between September/October 1989 and German unification in October/November 90. These were incredibly intensive times.” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 4)*


In January 1990, captain at sea and philosophy professor Siegfried Fischer signed a petition pleading for the complete demilitarization of the GDR. Many of his colleagues at the GDR's military academy were not pleased. They had very different views on issues of peace and security. They were shocked by his move, and they protested. A few days later Siegfried Fischer got disciplined: he received a travel ban, and severe restrictions on his ability to carry out research and to speak publicly. Just half a year earlier this would probably have had dramatic consequences for his private and professional life, but the time was ripe: the GDR was in the middle of a revolution. The oppositional forces in favour of demilitarization co-governed the country and lodged a formal protest. On March 12, Siegfried Fischer was released of all sanctions.<sup>295</sup> This event is symptomatic of the dynamics at play during the GDR's revolutionary upheaval 1989-90: researchers, academics and intellectuals became divided on issues of war, peace and foreign affairs. They had to navigate a dramatic political environment split between old powers and oppositional powers and a political climate that changed by the day: no-one knew what the outcomes of the process were going to be, but no-one, including academia, was left untouched by it.

This chapter explores the relation between power and knowledge in the GDR during these times of revolutionary upheaval. It makes sense of the events at hand by organizing them through the lens of the ideal-typical relation between revolution and knowledge sketched out in chapter 1. As laid out there, revolution/knowledge describes how revolutions recast the relevant parameters within which knowledge-making activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising about international relations take place. Following the revolution/knowledge nexus, this takes place in a three-step process. It describes, first, how knowledge-making activities will take place within a polarized space characterized by multiple poles

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<sup>295</sup> Rüdiger Wenzke, ed. *Staatsfeinde in Uniform?: widerständiges Verhalten und politische Verfolgung in der NVA* (Berlin: CH Links Verlag, 2005), 457; Scheler, 98-101.

of sovereignty: the previously stable incumbent and the upcoming challenger(s). This is Tilly's 'revolutionary situation'. Second, this also means that knowledge-making activities will take place within an unstable space that gradually shifts from the former to the latter pole of authority in an uneasy phase of struggle and cohabitation. Knowledge-making activities will be characterized by a back and forth between both poles, but also by the fact that the actors, institutions and organizations bundling these knowledge-making activities will partly implode, reorganize or reorient themselves within this shifting context. This is Tilly's 'revolutionary struggle'. The networks that they are embedded in will change as well, developing new international alignments, connecting to processes of change elsewhere, but also engaging with new counter-revolutionary forces, domestic and foreign. Finally, the revolution/knowledge nexus also describes how, once the 'revolutionaries' take over, knowledge activities will reorganize and reorient, structured by this new pole of authority.



The revolution in the GDR can be analytically and chronologically divided into the three phases described above. Everything started with the Gorbachev reforms in the Soviet Union in 1985. These triggered a slowly growing division in the GDR between pro-Gorbachev reformers and anti-Gorbachev hardliners culminating in the autumn of 1989 with the step down of Erich Honecker from the GDR's leadership. The next half a year was marked by a phase of struggle and cohabitation between a communist reformer government and the oppositional forces grouped around the round tables co-governing the country. It all came to a conclusion in April 1990 when the results of the first free and democratic elections in the GDR were interpreted as a vote to dissolve the GDR and unify with West Germany: the 'pro-unification' revolutionaries took over.

This chapter is organized into three parts, reflecting the three steps of revolutionary dynamics in the GDR: first, polarization and split; second, struggle and cohabitation and third, takeover by the pro-unification revolutionary forces. Each section details how the political dynamics at play impact knowledge activities, both by transforming the actors and institutions involved in it and by changing the relations and networks between all the relevant actors.

## The revolutionary situation: polarization and split

The first phase of the revolutionary dynamics in the GDR lasted until October 1989. This was the ‘revolutionary situation’ where a unified entity split into different poles of authority, all claiming sovereignty over the same territory. This phase was marked by an increasing polarization in the GDR and ultimately by a split between the incumbent regime led by Honecker and the oppositional movements taking to the streets. This phase ended in October 1989 when Honecker stepped down from power and a new ‘reformer’ government under the leadership of Hans Modrow subsequently took over.

### *Polarization in academia*

The dynamics in this phase were primarily political, but the polarization underwriting it did not leave academia untouched. The polarization in the GDR can be dated back to Gorbachev’s ascent to power in 1985 and to Honecker’s refusal to follow his internal politics of change. While approving of Gorbachev’s international reforms, the GDR leadership disapproved of the internal reforms initiated in the Soviet Union, fearing that it would undermine and destroy the system.<sup>296</sup> Gorbachev’s reforms delegitimized Soviet hardliners and undermined the all-powerfulness of the SED party. Honecker’s refusal to follow the Soviet line leads to critical distance and doubt not only within large sections of the population but also within some of its functional elite.<sup>297</sup> Turning against the Soviet Union undermined their long-term ideological indoctrination:

*“Since our earliest infancy we absorbed the following phrase together with the breast milk we were fed: ‘Learning from the Soviet Union means learning to win.’ And then the party said – concretely this was Kurt Hager: ‘No, if my neighbour renovates his house, this does not mean I need to renovate mine.’ That was the argument they used. Everyone with some understanding of politics stood aghast at this. That was the moment when our internal firmness and conviction started to crumble.” (Interview Schreiber, 2020: 11)*

This led to an internal process of change for many and a division between Gorbachev’s supporters and his detractors. For many party members or supporters of the regime this was not a radical moment of turning against the GDR, but rather the start of a gradual process of change leading to a more critical and reflexive attitude:

*“My experience of change began around 1986. It was not a transition from loyal scientist to regime opponent, but rather a development towards a more critical approach to the model of socialism practised in the GDR. Many sensible ideas that came from Moscow were basically blocked in the GDR. That irritated me and made me angry – at least after the Soviet magazine Sputnik was banned in the autumn of 1988. After that – when I look back now – a certain process of transformation began in me.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 2)*

One important step in this process was the censoring in 1988 of a small magazine called Sputnik. Sputnik had been reporting very openly about the situation in the Soviet Union. The central committee shut the magazine down under the charge of defeatism. Unexpected by the leadership, this led to an outcry across all intellectual circles of the GDR, including the military intellectual

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<sup>296</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 14.

<sup>297</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 11.

circles. The centre point of outrage is the underlying pronouncement of general suspicion: whether one supports the regime or not, whether one supports the Soviet Union or not – suddenly everyone, independently of their actual loyalty, was considered suspect. This had a devastating effect.<sup>298</sup>

Not everyone experienced this polarizing dynamic in the same way, the same intensity or for that matter, at the same time. For many, it only became apparent in 1988 or 1989. Amongst those who noticed it the earliest were the scholars whose research was impacted by Gorbachev's domestic and international reforms: the researchers studying 'socialist countries' and the researchers busy with 'security politics', i.e. with questions of war and peace, arms race and disarmament.

At the IIB, the department of 'socialist countries' had been for many years a laughing stock for their colleagues: these were the 'weirdos' claiming to study the socialist brother states, but what kind of research can they do? They were not considered real scientists by the other departments. For all the derision they faced, they were amongst the first to actually notice glasnost and perestroika. Their focus was on Gorbachev's domestic politics, which they followed closely and analyzed intensively<sup>299</sup> – albeit secretly, in the form of internal discussions that never left the perimeters of the IIB. The department became increasingly divided between 'reformers' and proponents of a 'Chinese solution':

*"There was a sort of group of 'reformers' who thought that perestroika was, overall, a good socialist reform project, though of course not in every aspect. But the point was to transfer those ideas to the GDR and to implement them here. The head of department and a few others, including myself, were part of this group. Others supported the 'Chinese' solution with the argument that reforms will lead to a loss of power. If reforms were to be allowed at all, then slowly, carefully and certainly not bottom-up, but top-down. [...] For that group, retaining power was the main factor, for the other group societal change was the important one: how can we change this society in such a way that it is acceptable for a majority of people? These were the debates behind the scenes."* (Interview Franzke, 2019: 4)

From 1986 onwards, the 'reformers' supporting Gorbachev's politics of perestroika dominated the department. Those sceptical of the reforms remained defensive and in the background. But as the effects of the reforms became clearer over time, they became more vocal until the rupture moment of October/November 1989. After that time, both groups stopped exchanging and communicating, even though business as usual continued otherwise for a little longer in the department.<sup>300</sup>

The other group of scholars concerned with Gorbachev's reforms were the analysts focusing on questions of war and peace, arms race and disarmament. While they had little attention for glasnost or perestroika, they did focus on Gorbachev's international reforms. These reinforced dynamics at play in the department since the early 1980s.<sup>301</sup> At stake was a change in scholarship from thinking security in terms of confrontation to thinking it in terms of cooperation. Such a move involved redefining 'imperialism' from inherently belligerent to inherently endowed with the

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<sup>298</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 11.

<sup>299</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 1-2

<sup>300</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 4.

<sup>301</sup> See Chapter 2.

capacity for peace, as well as thinking from the end: if everything went wrong and a nuclear war became a reality, then both Germanies would be annihilated. Gorbachev's ascent to power and Honecker's support of Gorbachev's security politics led to a number of concrete political changes: in 1986 the West German socialist party SPD and the East German state party SED met for a number of talks and exchanges and published a common position paper. In 1987, the Warsaw pact decided on a new military doctrine, which led, in turn, to the GDR deciding on needing one as well.<sup>302</sup> These political changes triggered two types of changes: first a differentiation between military reformers and military hardliners, and second, the reorganization of military reformers from different institutions into a new powerhouse.

### ***Political and military reformers versus military hardliners***

After the 1987/88 Warsaw pact military doctrine renewal, the GDR Politbüro decided that it needed one as well. The developments of the last decade in the area of security thinking meant that this task was not left to the military alone, but a small group of civilians were included in the process. These were recruited from the IIB, the MfAA and the IPW. The group convened in Straußberg at the ministry of defence and debates split between military reformers, mainly represented by the civilian experts, and military hardliners, mainly represented by the NVA army generals:

*"We were sitting there with the NVA generals and fought exactly about this question: what happens if a war breaks out and how should we evaluate all the insights that we now have about it? [...] At that point in time the militaries were no longer able to say: you civilians can think whatever you want, we will just do whatever we want. Instead, they had to engage with us. And they could not write position papers on their own anymore. As a result, the goal of avoiding war became the conditio sine qua non of this military doctrine." (Interview Schwarz, 2019: 11)*

The 'reformers' endorsed cooperation and disarmament, a political agenda based on reform, and focused on the ultimate goal of maintaining peace at all costs. The 'hardliners' instead saw war and war preparation as a necessary option. The 'reformers' were in that case indirectly backed up by Honecker's position on these issues: the GDR leadership had concluded that however much one prepares for war, war on German territory will mean its total annihilation. While this analysis is not supported by all in the defence ministry, the 'hardliners' had to follow official guidelines.<sup>303</sup> And the 'reformers', particularly those associated with the IPW, used the leeway in their favour and pushed their agenda forward. As Schwarz details, this meant associating a new, perhaps provocative idea or suggestion with a Honecker quote to make it bulletproof:

*"Once the secretary-general had come to this opinion and issued some speeches on the topic that offered plenty of leeway for interpretation, we were the ones who not only knew how to use this leeway; we were the ones who used it to push its boundaries and our agendas forward. Our system worked as follows: if you formulated a new interesting idea, all the Cold War hardliners would use any option available to them to shut you down. Through internal discussions for instance or by excluding you from publishing. But if you opened your*

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<sup>302</sup> Interview Schreiber, 2020: 10; Interview Schwarz, 2019: 1-2.

<sup>303</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 2.

*reflections with a public quote from the secretary-general, they stayed put, because this could quickly backfire against them. If you had the secretary-general to back your claims, no one tried to argue against you. This is how the system worked. Quite undemocratic but also really bizarre. When you had to navigate such a system, you had to learn to assess its limits and learn where to push them.” (Interview Schwarz, 2019: 10)*

All the statements by the secretary-general could be found in *Neues Deutschland*, which became the place to browse and find adequate references and quotes. Quotes such as ‘this infernal stuff needs to go’ – in reference to Pershing 2 cruise missiles – were very valuable, and were used extensively by the ‘reformers’ to preface their agenda focused on mutual arms reductions and disarmament.<sup>304</sup>

### ***A regrouping of reformer split groups***

In addition to pitching military reformers against military hardliners, the polarization process also leads to a regrouping of ‘reformer’ split groups from different institutions into a new powerhouse. We have already seen how the military doctrine talks bound researchers together from IIB, IPW and the MfAA. General institutional connections and exchanges between those organizations already existed before, as we have seen in chapter 2. But the polarizing dynamic intensified these relations and generated a new type of connection, binding the ‘reformers’ from across these institutions closer together.

Another type of connection soon emerged as well. The philosophers at the military academy had quietly been developing critical work in the domain of war, peace and security. They were double outsiders in their field, both within the field of defence, where the defence ministry, army leadership and the top layers of the military academy did not allow for any deviance or freedom in thinking,<sup>305</sup> and within the wider field of academia, where no-one wearing a uniform was credited with independent or critical thinking.<sup>306</sup> They emerged into the polarizing security debate late, against the resistance of their own leadership and to the surprise of the researchers from other institutions.<sup>307</sup>

An explaining factor for this is their lack of publication outlets, since their ideas were not welcome in the publication outlets of the defence field: the military had no business studying peace; their domain of enquiry had to be war.<sup>308</sup> However, this drove the philosophers to build alliances with similar-minded analysts from other domains:

*“That is why we had to find allies to fight back against our own narrow-minded military leadership. But we had to find the right allies. Peace-oriented church groups that were already under surveillance would not do. We had to find respected GDR scientists, even though scientists of course did not have much currency in our military circles. Minefields wherever we looked.” (Interview Fischer, 2020: 6)*

The idea was to draw on and reference allied publications, in order to strengthen our own ideas, give them weight and help disseminate them better. But also to access their platforms and publication networks. As such, philosophers at the military academy were very familiar with the

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<sup>304</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 10.

<sup>305</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 2.

<sup>306</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 3.

<sup>307</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 2.

<sup>308</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 5.

researchers at the IPW and the IIB, having scrutinized them extensively, but were largely unknown to the latter until they reached out:

*“The moment that we started engaging with the topics of security politics, foreign politics and peace politics, we needed to have recourse to different people; to professionals, to specialists. And we found them at the IIB, we found them at the IPW. [...] And they stood under our special scrutiny. We wanted to know: who is who? Does this person only have a big mouth, or are they serious, can we count on them? If this person publishes, can we cite them and base ourselves on them in order to strengthen our points and get them across better? That is why we knew them much better than they knew us. And that is also why they were surprised when we appeared suddenly within a short time frame.” (Interview Fischer, 2020: 3-4)*

It all came together in October 1987 when the head of the IPW, Max Schmidt, created the Council for Peace Research. There had been earlier formats of course, but this one encompassed all GDR research relating to issues of war and peace. And Max Schmidt makes a point of including militaries, even though the army as a wider institution has no interest in engaging. The connections came about from a match between Max Schmidt’s eagerness to have them on board and the individual’s interest to connect into the debates without any backing or awareness of their home institutions. This pushed the reform-oriented military analysts onto the international debate.<sup>309</sup> The Council for Peace Research thus bundled together the ‘reform’ oriented researchers from different institutions: universities, amongst which in particular the philosophers from the HU in Berlin; the philosophers from the military academy and the researchers from IIB and IPW.<sup>310</sup> And as the issue of utter nuclear destruction looms large in the last years of the Cold War, the views and ideas of this group gained traction. They were invited to speak across society: schools, factories, cultural institutions, etc. all want to understand what is going on. Especially in the autumn of 1989, many still turned to the old meaning-making elites to shed clarity onto the situation.<sup>311</sup>

*“After I came back [from Geneva in October 1989], everything was of course very turbulent. We were being heavily requested to give lectures with the prompt: “Explain the situation”. We gave lectures in various organizations, institutions, in the party, etc. It was not uncomplicated: the type of lecture, the way of presenting things ... you had to be careful and look out whether it matched the audience’s horizon.” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 3)*

They needed to straddle their own clarity of vision and commitment to reforms with the specific’s audience horizon of understanding: what is their grasp on the situation, how far can the speaker go? Unlike the researchers focused on socialist states and domestic reforms, those studying issues of peace and security had a large outreach and connected with the wider concerns and trends of the GDR’s development.

The first phase of revolutionary dynamics was thus marked by the slow emergence of new actors in the existing knowledge networks. These came into existence through a division of researchers – but not a splitting of institutions – into reform-oriented and status-quo-oriented researchers.

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<sup>309</sup> Interview Schreiber, 2020: 2.

<sup>310</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 5.

<sup>311</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 1,7; Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 4.

While the status-quo-oriented researchers carried out business as usual within the existing structures, the reform-oriented researchers started seeking out connections and formed new thematic groups of like-minded researchers. The new groups started existing in parallel to the traditional groups and networks, but were also connected by the double affiliations of their members.

## Revolutionary struggle and cohabitation

*“It was like a startled flock of chicken. The hierarchies did not work anymore, but there was no clarity about the future of the GDR nor about the future of the IIB. Everyone made their own thoughts and plans.”*  
(Interview Franzke, 2019: 6)

The second phase of the revolutionary dynamics in the GDR lasted about five months. It started with the takeover of the ‘reformer’ government under Modrow in November 1989 and ended with its self-dissolution in favour of the first freely elected government of the GDR in April 1990. This was the phase of ‘revolutionary struggle’ which ultimately determined whether a revolutionary situation would translate into a revolutionary outcome. This phase in the GDR was marked by three different poles of power at play: first, by the old elites remaining in power, despite their ‘reformer’ branch taking over. Second, by the new government’s close cooperation with the oppositional groups and their ‘round tables’ in an effort to reform the GDR. Third, by the progressive emergence of the new ‘pro-unification’ force that would ultimately win the democratic elections in April and feared that reforms will not be enough to tame the old elites.

In the field of knowledge production, a number of things happened. Nominally, business as usual continued. The institutions associated with knowledge production in the field of international relations – the IIB, the IPW, the universities – continued to exist, but in a somewhat changed version. Their embeddedness in the wider political and social context loosened up and they started to disintegrate from within as expertise becomes personalized and many of the scholars, experts and researchers moved between the three poles of power at play. The following sections examine the dynamics at hand through the lens of the IIB.

### *Disintegration*

While continuing to function nominally, the IIB started to slowly disintegrate. It all started with student protests in the autumn. They went on strike in the student halls and refused to leave their beds in the morning. Their main objects of protest were the traditional hierarchies at the institute and their domination by ‘old’ men:

*“The students at the IIB did not want to continue in the same way that it had always been. They protested against the teaching plan and partly also against the teachers. [...]. The students did not want the ‘old men’ anymore – to say it in a pointed way. The whole domain of foreign policy and diplomacy was (and is) very much dominated by men,”* (Interview Krämer, 2019a: 1)

The leadership at the IIB knew something needed to change. They found a solution in the figure of Raimund Krämer, who was about to take on a central position in the changes ahead. Raimund Krämer was part of a younger generation of IIB researchers that was academically fully qualified but not yet in a position of leadership. A product of the IIB itself, he had been awarded a PhD in



1981 on Peru's foreign policy and a *Habil* in 1985 on issues of peace and security in Central America. He arrived back at the GDR in 1989 after a four-year placement at the GDR embassies in Nicaragua and Cuba. Due to a sports injury he was on sick leave until October and came back to the IIB in the middle of growing turmoil. After a short stint at his home department, 'developing countries', he was quickly made deputy head of teaching and tasked with appeasing the student protests.<sup>312</sup>

This propelled Raimund Krämer into the circle of leadership at the IIB, which consisted most prominently of the institute's director and former ambassador to Mozambique, Prof. Matthes; the coordinator for research Prof. Hänisch and the grey eminence responsible for matters of personnel and the one pulling the strings behind the scene, Prof. Klett.<sup>313</sup> From that moment on, a number of dynamics unfolded. First, the old circle of leadership disintegrated. One after the other, the professors Matthes, Hänisch and Klett departed on sick leave. Officially and nominally still in power, they de facto disappeared one after the other, leaving Raimund Krämer in charge.<sup>314</sup> This was a wider trend in the GDR, and all across institutions, with higher-ranking functionaries stepping down from their positions of leadership<sup>315</sup> or retreating as they were overwhelmed by the unfolding dynamics.

As such, in this phase of the revolution, the traditional hierarchies did not work anymore, the old model was finished, but no new template had come to replace the old one. The institute resembled a "startled flock of chicken", everyone being busy with themselves and their own future.<sup>316</sup> This is a second dynamic at play during this period, with the revolution having an individualizing effect:

*"The break [between hardliners and reformers] took place in November 1989. After that time everyone did their own thing and tried to defend their professional existence or build a new livelihood. Since December 1989 I have felt more or less like a lone wolf. I had no group that I felt I belonged to. This would only change with the election of Raimund Krämer and the effort to build something new at the IIB." (Interview Franzke, 2019: 6)*

The dynamic between content reformers and content hardliners marking the first phase of the revolutionary upheaval was over. They had nothing to talk about anymore, they stopped exchanging and communicating, and formed no unity anymore – even though business as usual otherwise continued for a little longer in the department.<sup>317</sup> The differences became more personal and moved to a private level, especially as a first wave of colleagues officially left the SED, ripping apart earlier collegial or friendly relations:

*"These were fast-paced times. They brought deep changes to our professional lives but also to our personal lives. It [Leaving the SED] often meant the end of personal relations. Some would not greet you anymore or*

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<sup>312</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 1.

<sup>313</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 1.

<sup>314</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 1.

<sup>315</sup> Interview Schreiber, 2020: 12.

<sup>316</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 6.

<sup>317</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 4.

*become outwardly hostile; this was a very tough time. You had to be a very strong person to make it through; it was not as simple as one might imagine.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 5)*

Running parallel to this, a first round of colleagues were leaving the IIB as they were receiving other offers or perspectives elsewhere and deemed them to be more future-proof than the uncertain pathway at the IIB. A number left to go to the HU or other academic institutions, or they made the plunge to West Berlin.<sup>318</sup> A number of other colleagues left quietly because they had a strong history or deep affiliation with the Stasi and sensed it is better to disappear.<sup>319</sup> These were around 20 colleagues of a total of around 120 leaving the IIB.<sup>320</sup>

### ***Loosening embeddedness***

Underwriting the changes within the IIB was its progressively loosening embeddedness within the social and political context. The Cold War dynamics had the IIB firmly settled in a tight network of relations. It used to be formally a part of the Academy for Statecraft and Law, but with an independent status and a strong connection to the foreign ministry. The recruitment of students, the teaching plans, the research needs and so forth were tightly coordinated with the foreign ministry, with the departments at the IIB mirroring those at the foreign ministry. It featured regular publications in regular journals and book series, along with regular cooperation with other institutions both domestic and foreign, while being firmly inscribed in a regular outreach programme within GDR society. Above all, it was clear that whatever the IIB published was understood to be the official position of the GDR, and publications could not and would not contradict political statements. This embeddedness started to loosen up in this phase of the revolutionary dynamic until becoming entirely disconnected at the end of it. Jochen Franzke remembers the last visit at the IIB by a high-ranking member of the politburo, Werner Krolkowski, in late October:

*“This [SED] party congregation was bizarre. Werner Krolkowski was perplexed and overwhelmed, unable to answer the simplest questions. His cluelessness about the future direction of the institute was clearly visible.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 4-5)*

Within the politburo, Werner Krolkowski was the one in charge of the Academy for Statecraft and Law that the IIB was formally embedded in. Noteworthy here was his inability to give any explanation, confirmation or guidance whatsoever. The meeting was symbolic for the beginning disconnection between the IIB and the political institutions it was so firmly embedded in previously. In December, the SED, the GDR’s formerly all-powerful and all-dominating party, decided to give up its leading function in all of the country’s institutions. It chose a new leadership, changed its name to PDS and became one party amongst others that competed for power and authority in a democratic manner.<sup>321</sup> Across all universities in the GDR, the formerly compulsive 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> year courses of scientific Marxism were removed from all curricula, and a wave of renewal and reform went through all institutions. The Academy for Statecraft and Law (ASR)

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<sup>318</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 4.

<sup>319</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 2.

<sup>320</sup> Übergabe- und Übernahmeprotokolle IIB, 04.07.1990. Potsdam University Archive, UP14164.

<sup>321</sup> Interview Schreiber, 2020: 4, 11-12.

formally transformed into a new institution, the College for Law and Administration (HRV).<sup>322</sup> This was a symbolic change from an institution formerly directly dedicated to training the country's bureaucrats for the local and regional political administration to an independent academic college. On paper the change is significant, though in practice not much changed at first: most of the same staff remained and the curriculum remained largely unchanged. But many trends started that the next phase of revolution would then build on. The IIB was reframed as a political science institution. It became the black sheep of the HRV,<sup>323</sup> an institution mainly composed of lawyers who see their claims of being an 'apolitical' institution threatened by the IIB's supposedly stronger political affiliation.<sup>324</sup> Employee numbers became relevant, since a 'regular' college was supposed to have a different student/staff ratio and there was no funding to provide for all the former employees. The whole institution including the IIB – now called the political science section at the HRV – had to half their staff.<sup>325</sup> Democratic renewal<sup>326</sup> and democratic elections were called for, and these took place later in April. In his inauguration speech, the HRV's new director Steding emphasized that a rupture with the past needs to take place.<sup>327</sup> The change in politics demanded a change in academia:<sup>328</sup>

*"We are not standing outside of this process, but in the middle of it and are permeated by it. The extent to which we get involved in this process and change with it ourselves is decisive for the role and future of our institution."*<sup>329</sup>

In particular, he called for a change in the academic practice to take place: academic disputes should be open-ended and not follow a pre-scripted pattern whereby the 'winner' of the debate has been previously determined and where the older academics' views trump those of the younger even when there are no good arguments for them.<sup>330</sup> But he also called for the institution to examine its past and take responsibility for it,<sup>331</sup> as well as become politically neutral and independent so as to be able to exercise scientific enquiry in a critical manner:<sup>332</sup>

*"We shall no longer serve a political authority, never again abandon the function of science to be critical of politics, not engage in sterile interpretations of ideology, but we shall serve mankind, and true humanism shall determine our thoughts and actions. With this in mind, we shall research and teach at this university"*

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<sup>322</sup> Though the HRV's new director already gave his inauguration speech in February and many changes were made in January, the HRV officially only came into existence on the first of March 1990, see: Stand und konzeptionelle Überlegungen zur Entwicklung der Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung. Potsdam University Archive, Karton 176.

<sup>323</sup> Beschlußprotokoll über die außerordentliche Beratung des Direktors des IIB mit den Abteilungsleitern am 13.03.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV7255.

<sup>324</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 4, 7.

<sup>325</sup> Beschlußprotokoll über die außerordentliche Beratung des Direktors des IIB mit den Abteilungsleitern am 13.03.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV7255.

<sup>326</sup> Rolf Steding, „Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Hochschule“, 05.02.1990. Potsdam University Archives, ASR7220, p.16.

<sup>327</sup> Rolf Steding, „Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Hochschule“, 05.02.1990. Potsdam University Archives, ASR7220, p.2.

<sup>328</sup> Rolf Steding, „Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Hochschule“, 05.02.1990. Potsdam University Archives, ASR7220, p.4.

<sup>329</sup> Rolf Steding, „Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Hochschule“, 05.02.1990. Potsdam University Archives, ASR7220, p.1.

<sup>330</sup> Rolf Steding, „Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Hochschule“, 05.02.1990. Potsdam University Archives, ASR7220, p.8-9.

<sup>331</sup> Rolf Steding, „Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Hochschule“, 05.02.1990. Potsdam University Archives, ASR7220, p.7.

<sup>332</sup> Rolf Steding, „Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Hochschule“, 05.02.1990. Potsdam University Archives, ASR7220, p.2,8.

*and initiate today changes with long-term effects. We can only survive in changing circumstances if we ourselves change.”*<sup>333</sup>

The move from IIB to the political section at the HRV was thus a significant symbolic step in detaching it from its previous embeddedness in a social and political system. The process of gradual disconnection came to a conclusion in March, when the MfAA informed the IIB (then HRV) that they would not be employing their graduates anymore.<sup>334</sup> This was a crucial moment that finalized the break between the IIB and the MfAA. Training the GDR's diplomats had been the first and foremost task of the institute. In that time, the structures for publication changed as well. In January, the editorship of AALA, the GDR's foremost regional studies journal became vacant, as its coordinating political institution ZENTRAAL had been dissolved, and its editor-in-chief asked to be released of this function.<sup>335</sup> In March, Horizont, the main foreign policy journal, announced that it will profile itself as an independent institution.<sup>336</sup>

Between the tops of the old hierarchies becoming dysfunctional, parts of the regular staff leaving, and the formal restructuring of the IIB into a 'political science' section along the formula of 'old wine in new bottles', those who remained did continue with their work, upholding "business as usual".<sup>337</sup> The buildings and the material infrastructure, after all, still existed, and students sat in the classrooms:

*“At the same time, it was always clear that we had to continue teaching, that we could not leave everything to fall apart. We continued to show up to work and the IIB continued to function in principle until German unification, despite slowly disintegrating.”* (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 4)

The department continued to plan its research activities, deciding in January on its upcoming research programme and on seven top issues for upcoming research: 1/the erosion of bipolarity in the world and its consequences for GDR foreign policy, 2/conflict resolution, 3/new conception of Europe 4/KSZE II, 5/ disarmament concept of the GDR, 6/ GDR UN Politics, 7/GDR-FRG confederation and German questions.<sup>338</sup> Scientific output along these lines continued to emerge from the IIB:

*“Slowly everything was dissolving. But the institute continued to function despite all this. We wrote studies; even in June, July we still worked on research outlines. For the round tables, for the ministries. Since all the [political] institutions were still functioning. And everyone made sure that things kept going, as we can see in hindsight. [...] With all the dynamics at play, the GDR still remained highly organized and prudent. All the important social forces at play shared an awareness that there should not be any massive collapses. One had to keep working, things had to remain in order. Whatever happened, it had to happen without*

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<sup>333</sup> Rolf Steding, „Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Hochschule“, 05.02.1990. Potsdam University Archives, ASR7220, p.8.

<sup>334</sup> Beschlußprotokoll der Beratung des Direktors des IIB mit den Abteilungsleitern am 19.3.1990. Potsdam University Archive, Karton 176.

<sup>335</sup> Beschlußprotokoll der DB des Direktors mit den Abteilungsleitern am 10.1.1990, IIB, 17.01.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV ohne Nummer.

<sup>336</sup> Beschlußprotokoll der Beratung des Direktors des IIB mit den Abteilungsleitern am 19.3.1990. Potsdam University Archive, Karton 176.

<sup>337</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 5.

<sup>338</sup> Beschlußprotokoll der DB des Direktors mit den Abteilungsleitern am 10.1.1990, IIB, 17.01.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV ohne Nummer.

*violence, [...] without falling into a civil-war-like situation or to mass strikes. No one wanted that.”*  
(Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 4)

At the same time contacts to Western institutions multiplied, as the West was courting its Eastern counterparts. In January, for instance, the IIB received offers of study spaces for one to two employees from the diplomatic academy in Vienna. The West German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung offered to come and give talks, and the Volkswagen-Stiftung offered to cooperate. The IIB was asked to make a proposal on the topic of European security politics. The UK embassy signalled willingness to cooperate with IIB beyond the usual language training.<sup>339</sup> This was a time when West Germany invited the GDR scholars to come visit, sought out contacts and showed interest in their expertise – much unlike later dynamics:

*“The acting GDR professors would become irrelevant after the March elections. But back then no-one expected that to happen. That is why our Rektor accorded them audiences like at a Mogul court, and we had regular visits from GDR scholars. But after the March elections, this all stopped – then we’d simply be ‘too busy’ and not have time. [...] We knew they weren’t important anymore, and that they would disappear soon.”* (Interview Elsenbans, 2019: 3)

These dynamics enabled a number of GDR scholars to attend conferences, meetings and exchanges in the West, especially around their topics of expertise. Those involved in issues of security politics got to attend some of the first inter-German officer exchanges,<sup>340</sup> while experts on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were invited to the respective West German institutions, amongst which were the BioSt in Bonn, the West German MfAA and relevant conferences to talk about Russia and the Soviet Union.<sup>341</sup> These exchanges required translation skills, as the East German actors had to explain not only what East Germans said, but also what they meant.<sup>342</sup>

### **Round tables**

The most important political development of that time, though, was the phenomenon of the ‘round tables’, the forum where the oppositional movements of the autumn revolution articulated their visions for a renewed GDR alongside a number of other social forces and de facto co-governed the GDR. Misselwitz characterized this phase of the revolution as that of the double government Modrow/round tables.<sup>343</sup> The issue of that time was that the reform government of Modrow lacked democratic legitimacy and that the GDR’s population, including the oppositional movements, did not trust the state institutions of the GDR anymore. The round tables offered a solution by involving the opposition in government decisions. They included representatives of the old and of the new parties, as well as representatives of different newly formed social organisations, churches, as well as intellectuals, artists and well-known public figures. None of these were elected or had democratic legitimacy, but they functioned as a counter power and

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<sup>339</sup> Beschlußprotokoll der DB des Direktors mit den Abteilungsleitern am 10.1.1990, IIB, 17.01.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV ohne Nummer.

<sup>340</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 12.

<sup>341</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 9.

<sup>342</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 1.

<sup>343</sup> Misselwitz, 51-52.

controlling force, taking part in legislative and executive tasks.<sup>344</sup> Next to a general round table involved directly in government, many thematic round tables came into being to deal with specialized issues. Relevant for the domain of international relations are the thematic round tables on security politics and development politics. Because the round tables were the epicentres of political reform and of the efforts to renew the GDR, they drew to them a number of those scholars and experts that were previously labelled reform-oriented. The political horizon underlying these round tables was a reformed GDR. Egon Bahr visited the IIB in January and sketched the goals under review: a confederation, not a unification with West Germany.<sup>345</sup>

These round tables were relevant because they engendered a further yoking together of reform groups from various origins. Let's take the example of the round table on security politics. Though originally started to exercise some form of democratic control over the NVA, the GDR's army,<sup>346</sup> the military round table's ultimate concern was to develop a new military doctrine for a reformed GDR.<sup>347</sup> Participants included army officers (from the military's political college and the ministry of defence, including the defence minister, as well as the head of the newly nominated head of the committee to reform the military), the parties and organisations represented in the *Volkskammer*, the GDR's parliament (*SED/PDS*, *CDU*, *LDPD*, *NDPD*, *DBD*, *FDJ*, *FDGB*, *DFD*, *VdgB*), many newly formed protest movements and organisations (*Neues Forum/Deutsche Forumspartei*, *Demokratie Jetzt*, *Initiative für Frieden und Menschenrechte*, *Grüne Partei der DDR*, *Grüne Liga*, *Vereinigten Linke*, *Die Nelken/Aktionsbündnis Vereinigte Linke- AVL*, *Demokratischer Aufbruch*), Christian organisations (*Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR*, *Berliner Bischofskonferenz*, *Christlich/Demokratische Jugend / CDJ*), some traditional GDR organisations (*Friedensrat der DDR*, *URANLA*), organizations representing soldiers (*Verband der Berufssoldaten der DDR*, *Gewerkschaft der Armeeangehörigen*, *Soldatensprechen*), and lastly the research institutions: IPW, IIB and the HU in the form of the *Gruppe Friedensforschung* and the *Unabhängige Initiativgruppe Friedens/ und Konfliktforschung*, as well as Dr Günter Hillmann, representative of the foreign ministry.<sup>348</sup>

Most of the researchers involved in this platform already knew each other closely from their cooperation in the Council for Peace Research – a process detailed earlier, whereby the reform-oriented scholars in the field of security policy had become yoked together in a new institution. In the military round table this already formed group then became associated with members of oppositional protest and church groups interested in issues of peace and security, as well as with those state officials invested in the peace movement. While these three groups had had contact in earlier years and were partly familiar, it is the round table that cemented their connection and association.<sup>349</sup>

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<sup>344</sup> Wilfried Schreiber, "Von einer Militärdoktrin der Abschreckung zu Leitsätzen entmilitarisierter Sicherheit (1987-1990). Ein Zeitzeugenbericht," *DSS-Arbeitspapiere* 86 (2007): 230-32; André Hahn, ed. *Der Runde Tisch - Schule der Demokratie*, ed. Stefan Bollinger, Das letzte Jahr der DDR. Zwischen Revolution und Selbstaufgabe (Berlin: 2004).

<sup>345</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 1-2

<sup>346</sup> Hahn.

<sup>347</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 2.

<sup>348</sup> Schreiber, 33, 37-39.

<sup>349</sup> See *ibid.*, 45.

Thematically, this continued and pushed forward the work of the reform-oriented scholars and experts from the Peace Council.<sup>350</sup> The main lines around which all participants rallied were the goal to resolve the military confrontation in Europe and work towards a de-militarization of international relations.<sup>351</sup> Main lines were the assurance of peace through disarmament and the establishment of a cooperative security architecture in Europe. Three elements in particular are noteworthy: reformulation of NVA tasks as only oriented towards ensuring *external* security, a move away from limiting the use of nuclear weapons to banning *all* use of nuclear weapons, and a move away from mutual disarmament to the willingness of *unilateral* disarmament if necessary.<sup>352</sup> These debates were very much also public debates characterized by openness, and all documents were made public.<sup>353</sup>

This revolutionary phase in the GDR was too short for this new approach to translate into actual politics, but it was nonetheless representative of changing modes of thinking in military and security circles while at the same time providing a framework and blueprint for the military to attach themselves to and identify with.<sup>354</sup> With the SED's self-removal from the NVA, the GDR's army had become free-floating. As we will see later, the round tables were also the places where the connections between reform-oriented researchers and opposition groups were forged, alliances which will partly carry over in the next phase of the revolution and beyond the dissolution of the GDR.

While the researchers and experts at the round tables partly still represented their home institutions, they were also increasingly there as individuals with their own political motivation and own political expertise. This is characteristic of this phase of the revolution, where knowledge production oscillates between its traditional 'home' and the new political venues of reform. The resulting tension is exemplified with Thomas Ruttig's experience at the round table on development politics. An expert on Afghanistan, he had studied the country for five years at the HU, including becoming fluent in Dari and Pashto, and then worked for the MfAA. During the revolutionary phase of upheaval, they sent him back home to do a PhD. Instead he became involved with oppositional groups and attended the round table on issues of development politics:

*"Once they noticed that everything was coming to an end, they told me to go write a PhD, which I did. But I also became politically involved and sat at the round table on development politics during the transition period. There I indirectly contributed to the new draft GDR constitution; we worked on the section on development politics for one of the five oppositional movements which I represented. [...] At one of these sessions they invited representatives to come and attend, and I turned out to sit there representing an oppositional movement while at the other side of the table sat the deputy minister of foreign affairs who had to report on various issues. He was utterly amazed when he saw me there – he thought I was writing my PhD." (Interview Ruttig, 2019: 8)*

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<sup>350</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 11.

<sup>351</sup> See Schreiber, 45.

<sup>352</sup> See *ibid.*, 47-49.

<sup>353</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 6

<sup>354</sup> Schreiber, 7.

The in-between phase of revolutionary struggle and cohabitation is marked by a restructuring of the actors that emerged in the previous revolutionary phase and by a reshuffling of the relations between them. On the one hand we saw the new group of reform-oriented academics merging with the peace and security interested members of the oppositional movements and coming to power through the round tables. This automatically changed their relations to actors involved. At the same time the old structures continued to co-exist and knowledge actors had to manage this double structure, either explicitly choosing for one side or straddling the space between the two.

## Revolutionary outcome and takeover

In the last phase of the revolutionary dynamics, the oppositional movements took over. This was the ‘revolutionary outcome’ where power moved from the incumbent to the former contestant. For the GDR, this last phase began with the first free and democratic elections in the GDR on 18 March. The election’s results, though, were surprising.<sup>355</sup> The vote did not go in favour of those oppositional parties who dominated the autumn protests and sat at the round tables during the winter, trying to reform the GDR:<sup>356</sup> they “sat too early and too long at the table of power, thereby allegedly demonstrating to the wider population their weakness in effectively unhinging the system.”<sup>357</sup> But the vote also did not go to those in favour of a unification with West Germany under equal terms, whereby East and West would craft a new constitution together.<sup>358</sup> Instead, the votes were in favour of those parties supporting a unification with West Germany under West German terms, and the election results were interpreted as a choice for dissolving the GDR.<sup>359</sup> This decision meant that great speed in turning the decision into reality was possible: all the GDR needed to do was say “yes”.<sup>360</sup> This ultimate giving up of the GDR by the GDR is what Misselwitz points out as the dialectic of the revolution:<sup>361</sup> the GDR’s population purposefully and forcefully took its sovereignty from the SED regime, only to relinquish it again in favour of a fusion with the West. After the elections, the timeline sped up at an increasing rate: what seemed at the beginning like a long process of conversion turned out in the end to take only a half year. The unification with West Germany on 3 October 1990 ended the revolution.

In the area of knowledge production, this means that the time of polarization was over. There was no more moving back and forth between various parallel competing poles of authority. The focus

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<sup>355</sup> The political mood in the GDR changed in January 1990 when the oppositional movements occupied the Stasi central. The SPD and the other parties dominating the events so far radically lost power. The wider population developed a new attitude of “no more experiments.” This is when the mood swings towards unification and the street slogans changed from “we are the people” to “we are one people.” This led to the dramatic electoral victory of the parties in favour of a fast, asymmetric unification with the West. See Interview Gießmann, 2020: 5.

<sup>356</sup> The election date of March 18 1990 was set already on the 29<sup>th</sup> of January 1990 at the round table. It was pushed through against the wishes of the civil society groups by the various political parties hoping for electoral victory, all of which, by that time were backed up by their West German counterparts. Misselwitz, 44.

<sup>357</sup> Ibid., 42-43.

<sup>358</sup> Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 3.

<sup>359</sup> Misselwitz, 44.

<sup>360</sup> Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 3.

<sup>361</sup> Misselwitz, 24.



was set and clear; the GDR was structured by a new political regime that was primarily oriented towards West Germany. This trickled down to all levels of knowledge production. In the field of international relations, this created a new landscape that we can approach through four different angles.

First, the ‘revolutionaries’ took over the MfAA. In that process they sharply delineated themselves from the diplomatic corps that they took leadership over. In relational terms, this meant that a previously bounded social entity – the MfAA – split up into two parts with the new leaders and the old staff becoming de facto separate entities. They related in new ways as the new leaders remained somewhat dependent of the old staff’s expertise, who, in turn, had no other outlet for their expertise.

Second, the relationship between the MfAA and the various institutions surrounding it changed. Ties were cut or personalized between the ministry and previously connected GDR institutions, while new ties – both institutional and personal ones – were formed between the ministry and previously unconnected groups, inside and outside the GDR.

Third, the ‘revolutionaries’ in the MfAA formed part of the wider ‘revolutionary’ takeover but inhabited a marginalized position within this wider movement. They advocated taking time, not rushing a union with the West and certainly not doing so on unequal terms. Their independent agenda thus had to operate within a new networked structure that worked against them. This impacted the effectiveness and possibilities of knowledge production that was channelled through the MfAA as it was robbed of its impact.

Fourth, the GDR institutions previously connected to the MfAA needed to find new ways of surviving now that they were cut off from this network. They did so by reforming themselves so as to be compatible within a new Western-dominated network of knowledge production. They reshaped their institutions according to new standards, becoming ‘more West than the West’.

### ***The new MfAA***

A biochemist by training, Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz lost his academic post at the HU in 1981 for political reasons. It had been made clear to him that he had no future at a socialist university. As a result, he went to the *Kirchliche Hochschule Berlin*, the GDR’s ‘church university’, to study theology. This was one of the few educational places in the GDR with political freedom. His studies included history and philosophy, and he soon became involved in the independent peace movement. Despite being under surveillance by the Stasi, he was allowed to go to the United States in 1987 for a postgraduate study in order to research the relation between politics and religion in the USA. The trip – his first experience in the West – sharpened his perception of the GDR’s problems. He became fluent in English and discovered how Europe and Germany were being perceived abroad. These were skills about to become important: in March 1990 he was elected to the GDR’s parliament as part of the SPD, the social-democratic party, and was tasked to become the party’s expert in matters of foreign policy. After the social-democratic party SPD became part of the coalition government and got the MfAA as part of the coalition agreement, Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz became state secretary of foreign affairs. He and the new minister of foreign affairs, Markus Meckel, had already known each other for more than a decade through the activist circles

they both frequented.<sup>362</sup> Becoming responsible for the GDR's foreign policy in the last half year of its existence presented them with two main challenges: the disturbing fact that no-one took the GDR seriously anymore, and, the difficult choice between two equally unappealing types of advisers for their close teams: drawing on the GDR's old expert elites or hiring West German foreign policy advisers. While they could pick their team, there was one group of experts they could not choose for but inherited with the post: the diplomatic corps at the MfAA.

A common challenge facing all revolutionaries coming to power is finding a balance between the old and the new. This includes dealing with key staff, and diplomats certainly count as such. When Markus Meckel, Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz and his team took over the MfAA, they felt like invaders:

*"The situation was of course absolutely unusual and without precedent. At first, we felt that we were occupying a foreign institution. Until then, we had simply been politicians sitting in the parliament Volkskammer – and no preparatory talks had been held. On the part of the public, the expectation was: you are the new guys, you are the good guys, how can you work with 'them'? There was also an expectation from the West: how can you leave 'them' in there? But we had to be able to act immediately." (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 5)*

At first, they tried to work without the old experts. But the 2+4 negotiations were legally complex, and they quickly needed to involve some of the old GDR's diplomatic experts:

*"To give an international frame to the German reunification, the 2+4 negotiations took place with the four powers and the two German states. The foreign partners asked [Markus Meckel] why he didn't bring his legal specialists from the MfAA with him. He had previously just refused to take the head of the legal and contract department [to the negotiations]. And then, because he had no expertise in this domain, he had to bring him along after all." (Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 7)*

It is not just that the new team lacked specialized expertise in certain topic areas such as international law; they also needed to go through a steep learning curve: what was possible, what was doable and what could be achieved in a given situation? They entered office with many ideals and expectations, and the experienced diplomats knew what could be rationally achieved:

*"Then I learned more and more that the people in the MfAA had a qualified, rational view of the issues we had to deal with. They were often better informed and more rational in their analysis and important for our decision-making as political actors. If we said: we want this and that, they slowed us down in our idealism and therefore advised us well." (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 5)*

And so the GDR's old diplomatic personnel, the practical experts of international relations, ended up preparing the technicalities of the 2+4 negotiations. Some experts, some departments – depending on the issue at hand – were involved in the new tasks at hand. But what the 'revolutionaries' did not do was include and involve the whole institution of foreign affairs, or draw on all the available resources.<sup>363</sup> As a result, the foreign policy bureaucracy became divided into various discrete circles of expertise:

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<sup>362</sup> Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 1-2.

<sup>363</sup> Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 10.

*“There were several oddly separate communication circles in the MfAA. There was the established bureaucracy, which ultimately prepared the entire two plus four negotiations in a technically very solid manner, but had no say in anything else. Then there were the peace researchers who had direct access to the minister, but who were ultimately not heard either, because the GDR itself no longer had any political leeway. And then there were a couple of advisors like me. It was evidently a classic breakdown situation.” (Interview Wallraf, 2019: 12)*

But the old diplomats felt rejected and excluded – despite their loyal support of the GDR’s new political course and their clear expertise on the subject matter. Particularly the fact that the overwhelming majority were willing to support the new foreign policy goals increased the feeling of rejection – as well as the fact that it was not some foreigner, but their very own minister marginalizing them:<sup>364</sup>

*“This is where our marginalization began. Already by our own new minister.” (Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 6)*

Symbolic for that interaction was the fact that after becoming minister of foreign affairs, Markus Meckel did not contact the existing ministry to engage in preliminary talks as other newly appointed ministers did. The reason behind this was that he and his newly formed core team of advisors needed to clarify their own political line before engaging with the institution they were taking over. They needed to figure out their own position, their goals, values and procedures.<sup>365</sup> In that process they drew on help and advice from some of the IR experts of the IIB young reformers:

*“The fact that there were no preliminary talks with the MfAA staff before the takeover was not unprofessional, but fitted the situation. We first had to clarify our political line in a closer circle. We also included a number of scientists from the IIB in Potsdam: Raimund Krümer, Jochen Franzke, Wolfram Wallraf etc. We already had contact with them in the run-up to the Volkskammer’s election, as from the SPD party congress in February, our own structures started developing in different policy areas. They offered to act as consultants, but also with the interest to be actively involved. So there was an exchange with younger scientists who had studied international relations in the GDR and of whom we had the impression that they were also deliberately looking for a new course of policy.” (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 5)*

Underlying this is a virulent public debate about the way in which old GDR officials should be treated, whether they should still be involved in politics.<sup>366</sup> The diplomats were tainted by their service of the old regime and by assumptions about their affiliation with the Stasi.<sup>367</sup> Both sides didn’t know whether they could trust each other:

*“Of course, there was the issue of loyalty hanging in the air. We didn’t know them, we had no experience dealing with them. And they had no experience dealing with us either.” (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 5-6)*

When deciding whom to work with and whom to trust in the diplomatic service, Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz needed to rely on his gut feeling about people and personality. Ultimately, he drew the

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<sup>364</sup> Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 3-5.

<sup>365</sup> Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 5.

<sup>366</sup> Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 10.

<sup>367</sup> Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 3-5.

line between owning up past responsibility or erasing it: those who claimed to have always been against the system as closet oppositionals did not win his trust. But those who owned up their support to the past system while convincingly demonstrating commitment and loyalty to the new regime won his trust.<sup>368</sup>

In this last phase of the revolution, the ‘revolutionaries’ took over the MfAA. In that process they sharply delineated themselves from the diplomatic corps over whom they took leadership. In relational terms, this meant that a previously bounded social entity – the MfAA – split into two parts with the new leaders and the old staff becoming de facto separate entities. They related in new ways as the new leaders remained somewhat dependent on the old staff’s expertise, who, in turn, had no other outlet for their expertise.

### ***New knowledge networks***

While the ‘revolutionaries’ in power at the MfAA had to deal with the staff they inherited, they did have the power to choose their close team of advisors, as well as their relations with other knowledge providers. As such, the relation between the MfAA and the various institutions surrounding it changed. Ties were cut or personalized between the ministry and previously connected GDR institutions, while new ties – both institutional and personal ones – were formed between the ministry and previously unconnected groups, inside and outside the GDR.

In their choice of advisors, the ‘revolutionaries’ at the MfAA had to decide between East German advisers from the old elites that they tried to consciously distance themselves from or West German advisers of whom they were suspicious and from whom they tried to remain independent. They found a two-way solution. Instead of recruiting West German experts from the political establishment, they turned to West German academics: peace researchers who seemed to be independent enough from the West German political establishment and the East German academics and peace researchers, but who also seemed to fit with the political line of peace, disarmament and collective security they tried to put forward.<sup>369</sup> To this group they added a few hand-picked East German experts chosen on the basis of reform-oriented expertise and a personality match. Two of them were from the old GDR international relations institutions: Dr Schwarz from the IPW and Dr Wallraf from the IIB. Dr Schwarz, whose former expertise at the IPW included monitoring developments at the NATO and being the right hand of the institute’s director, had been involved in talks with the Christian peace conference for many years prior to the upheavals. He had made a good impression; a week after the March elections, they called him to join the team:

*“Eight days after the Volkskammer election I got a call from a young man I knew from the Christian Peace Conference – a coalition of left-wing Christians from the GDR – with whom the SED had also been in dialogue with. In the previous years I had attended many panel discussions there. These had always been relatively free discussions. Someone from this Christian Peace Conference called me and said, ‘I am going to become head of foreign and security policy.’ The young man in question was an engineer specialized in water management. But he was interested in issues of peace, peace policy, security, disarmament. He said: “Do you*

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<sup>368</sup> Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 6.

<sup>369</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 4-5.

*want to join?" [...] I said: 'I was at the IPW, I am a party member of the SED'. He said: 'Everything has been discussed with the head of state De Maiziere who said: Just make sure not to get all your experts from the SED.' The point is, if you look at the oppositional civil society movements of that time, many of which took over the leading positions: if they really wanted to have competence, then they could either get it from the [West German] Federal Republic – and they overpowered us at all levels – or you looked for the competence of your own people. The department of foreign and security policy under Thilo Steinbach didn't want anyone from the West looking over his shoulder and advising him in what way. [...] That is how I became deputy head of the Department for Foreign and Security Policy in the prime minister's office as it was then called." (Interview Schwarz, 2019: 3)*

The other expert was Dr Wallraf from the IIB. An expert on Japan, he studied international relations in Moscow, which made him fluent in Russian and somewhat knowledgeable about the Soviet Union. He stumbled into his post by chance: while playing tennis he got in touch with someone who had contacts in the newly formed social-democratic party, SPD. Through these connections he heard that they were searching for experts on foreign policy and he was able to meet Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz.<sup>370</sup> Put on board of the 2+4 team, he was tasked with figuring out up to what point the Soviet Union would be willing to accept an eastward expansion of NATO. He travelled to Moscow, spoke with decision makers and advisers and wrote the GDR's report on the political mood of the Soviet Union relating to NATO's expansion.<sup>371</sup> But the few experts on the team recruited from amongst the old elites were quickly pushed to the margins of the decision-making centre; they were tainted by their previous political affiliation. The West German peace researchers called the shots.<sup>372</sup> Amongst them was Prof. Ulrich Albrecht from the FU, an expert in research on armament, arms limitation and de-armament, who organized the internal circle of advisers. The second important figure was Dr Peter Schlotter, an expert from the West German Peace Research Institute PRIF in Frankfurt. Others, like West Germany's famous peace researcher Prof. Dieter Senghaas, were invited to come for individual consultations.<sup>373</sup> The West German peace researchers were also sought after because they could give information about the West German political establishment and their views and positions, but without being a part of it themselves. Ultimately, the new advisory team around foreign minister Markus Meckel was around 30 people strong and composed of four different groups. There was a core group of trusted political companions,<sup>374</sup> a group of West German advisors from academia, peace research and the MfAA, and there was a third group recruited from the political environment of GDR oppositionals and reformers. The technical personnel were recruited from amongst Markus Meckel's personal acquaintances.<sup>375</sup> While all these made up the close team of advisors, another group was also relevant: the diplomats and foreign policy experts working at the MfAA headquarters in Berlin.

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<sup>370</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 12-13.

<sup>371</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 2-3; Interview Wallraf, 2019: 12-13.

<sup>372</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 12-13.

<sup>373</sup> Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 9.

<sup>374</sup> Markus Meckel, Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz, Carl-Christian von Braunmühl, Helmut Domke, Petra Erler and one or two others.

<sup>375</sup> Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 9-10.

At the same time, things were moving at the IIB. On 27 April, elections to renew its leadership were held. Assuming that he would win, the candidate affiliated with the SPD had already arranged his first post-election meeting: a consultation with Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz at the MfAA.<sup>376</sup> But these were new times and the elections took a surprising turn: with 71 of 93 valid votes, Raimund Krämer was elected instead to be the IIB's new head.<sup>377</sup> Having navigated the IIB as acting director through its previous phase of upheaval, he did not actually plan on running, but was heavily encouraged to do so and joined the list late.<sup>378</sup> This was the "small revolution at the IIB."<sup>379</sup> In the months running up to the elections, those remaining active at the IIB had been divided: should they try to reattach the institute to the changing political infrastructure of the country and be a policy advice think tank or should they stay away from politics and become a neutral academic institution? Raimund Krämer had been advocating for the IIB to become an academic institution detached from politics.<sup>380</sup> Despite his doubts about the appointment at the MfAA, he attended the scheduled meeting, but quickly realized that the IIB was not welcome anymore.<sup>381</sup> This was a turning point for Raimund Krämer: the meeting made it clear to him that however much the IIB tried to reform itself, whether or not it had competence, expertise or a democratically renewed structure, it was perceived and judged by others as a part of the old elites. From then on, the course was set. In order to survive, the IIB needed to be an independent institution and work hard on becoming a model academic faculty. The goal was to become a political science faculty with a specialization in international relations, thereby following the blueprint of Western standards.<sup>382</sup>

Regrouping around Raimund Krämer, the mood at the IIB changed. There was purpose and direction again at the institute. Careful optimism, even.<sup>383</sup> The core group consisted of two handfuls of colleagues, all of them in their mid-thirties or early forties. They possessed the necessary academic credentials, having been awarded their *habil* and having had extensive work experience at the IIB. Some of them, but not all, were already somewhat more senior, having been deputy heads of department or even in one case head of department for a short while before the upheavals of 1989 began.<sup>384</sup> Those from a younger generation still busy writing their dissertations would never finish their PhDs.<sup>385</sup> Those of the older generation were mostly either unable to accept change, withdrew out of themselves or had been removed. They had been in power too long to have credentials in the new world that was being built. Only a few remained and supported the effort of renewal.<sup>386</sup>

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<sup>376</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 3.

<sup>377</sup> Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung, Wahl Niederschrift über die Wahl des Direktors der Sektion Politikwissenschaften, 27.04.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV7196.

<sup>378</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a.

<sup>379</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 5-6.

<sup>380</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 2.

<sup>381</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 3.

<sup>382</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 3.

<sup>383</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 5-6.

<sup>384</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 2; Interview Wallraf, 2019: 11.

<sup>385</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 1-3

<sup>386</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 7.

The relation with the new MfAA became both individualized and irrelevant. Ties to the former centre of gravity were effectively cut, despite some low-intensity, irrelevant forms of connection remaining:

*“It was now clear that the CDU party was in power and that the CDU was approaching Genscher, or rather, West Germany. And this was the end of it. Memos kept being fed into the MfAA, but they played no role whatsoever and that is why the connection to the MfAA was loose.” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 8)*

Writing memos and sending them to the MfAA was a central element to previous interactions and remains an engrained pattern of habit, despite it having lost any meaning or significance. In addition to this shadow of past times, two types of connections remained. The first connection was between IIB researchers like Wolfram Wallraf who left their home institution to join the team around Markus Meckel and Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz but remained in touch with their former colleagues on a personal level. Another type of connection is the one between those IIB researchers who stayed at their home institution but maintained their former personal and professional connections to the now marginalized diplomats at the MfAA:

*“I myself retained a close relationship with the Foreign Ministry almost until the end. That didn't have much to do with our institute anymore, but with the fact that I knew all the people from the UN department, the US/Japan department and the policy department from working together previously. I continued going there for information and to get materials. I discussed things with them. But that was more on a personal level, the professional and the personal were bleeding into each other. In that sense, I still had a connection to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, as many others with similar connections did too. But many at the IIB also did not have these connections, for example my colleague Raimund Krämer, whose main focus was on the IIB. But he had also been tied to the IIB from the start. He did have a connection to the Foreign Affairs Ministry through the Latin America department via Nicaragua and Cuba and so on, but it was not an intensive contact.” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 8)*

While the IIB set out on the path of renewal, the IPW was falling apart. From the March elections onwards, it stopped playing a role in the GDR's politics.<sup>387</sup> Being first and foremost a research think tank geared towards advising and supporting political institutions it had no place in a new order of things where the old was consciously rejected and institutions and elites from the past order were undesirable. While continuing to exist on paper until the summer, the IPW's researchers started to fall into two camps: those who hung onto the old structures and those who had been at odds with them and embraced the new developments.

*“The structures [of the IPW] were literally crumbling. Those who had never been very productive stayed longest. Those who had had issues with the structures in place because they could not fully develop or work the way they wanted, tried early on to channel their expertise and influence where it was valued and asked for.” (Interview Gießmann, 2020: 5-6)*

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<sup>387</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 5; Interview Schwarz, 2019: 2.

The latter group was also the one who enjoyed research and felt invested in their topics of expertise. To stay relevant, they followed two strategies: they personalized their expertise and they tried – but failed – to reform the IPW.

The personalization of expertise was a wider trend in those last months of the GDR. Institutions like the IIB or IPW or research groups at the universities functioned as part of the ordered networks of knowledge production that were relevant pre-revolution. The revolutionary events reshuffled these structures, and the old institutions became irrelevant. But the people making up these institutions didn't disappear; they re-aligned and re-clustered in new formats. Following their topics of expertise, many researchers and experts flocked around the relevant people and places who were in need of their content expertise. Some institutions were more open than others; the defence ministry under Eppelmann, for instance, was more open to receive advice than the MfAA under Meckel. But overall, these were busy and hectic times, they participated in expert rounds, worked for the *Volkskammer*, the GDR's parliament, for the new parties that have just formed and they advised various MPs.<sup>388</sup>

*“The IPW actually didn't play a role anymore after March. That was the time when the new government personalized the advisory functions. After 18 March I worked mainly in the Volkskammer. The need for advice based on the expertise available at the IPW became personalized. As an organization, the IPW itself no longer played a role. And once the process of unification became immediate, Western advisors played a bigger role than those from the East.” (Interview Gießmann, 2020: 5)*

The other strategy was to adapt by reforming the institution itself. It is, again, the middle-aged generation that took the initiative. Their core idea was to save the IPW by finding a prominent Western expert to take over the leadership of the institution. From their previous job they had plenty of contact with Western institutions and experts. They had good relations with West German social-democrats, with peace researchers, with opposition leaders. They knew who they needed for the job, who would have the power to make the IPW a credible institution in these new times. Talks took place with a number of candidates: prominent West German newspaper correspondents, former IISS directors and professors at the West German university of the armed forces.<sup>389</sup> But the IPW as an institution was not politically wanted anymore. All the candidates declined the offer.<sup>390</sup> During the times of the German-German Cold War, the IPW had played an important political role. Not just as a research institute, but as a low-key contact point: West German politicians wishing to speak with Erich Honecker would often start by giving a talk at the IPW. This symbolic meaning of the IPW was probably part of the reason for closing it down.<sup>391</sup>

The decision to wind down the IPW was made in the summer of 1990, and its formal closure took place in early October just before the German unification:<sup>392</sup>

*“The IPW had already been dissolved by the last GDR government during the summer. My wife had been working there as a research assistant. [...] The entire workforce was simply dismissed. Social buffer – that*

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<sup>388</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 9.

<sup>389</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 15; Interview Gießmann, 2020: 6.

<sup>390</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 4.

<sup>391</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 14-15.

<sup>392</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 4.



*didn't exist in the GDR. Severance payments were another thing that did not exist in the GDR, so people were put on the street with no employment perspective whatsoever. Apart from the one exception that I am aware of [...] none had a chance to continue with their professional career. The choice was to either retire if you were old enough for it or look for something completely different.” (Interview Schwarz, 2019: 4)*

With the closure of the IPW, 400 employees lost their jobs. This decision was taken by the GDR's government before the unification with West Germany. No rules or regulations were applicable for the situation; the researchers' careers were all ended.<sup>393</sup>

This last phase of the revolution, the 'revolutionary outcome', completely reconfigured the networks of knowledge production surrounding the GDR's MfAA. Ties between the MfAA and the institutions previously connected to it were severed. The IPW was shut down, the IIB was cut off and the departments of area studies at the universities became irrelevant. Some of these former ties were personalized through the connections between individuals who went to join the 'revolutionaries' at the MfAA or through the connections between IIB researchers staying at their home institutions but maintaining their old ties to the now marginalized diplomats at the MfAA. At the same time it created a new set of ties with West German advisers who were previously disconnected from the GDR's dominant networks of knowledge production, but did have weak sets of ties with the oppositional peace movements. This former boundary between two distinct networks of knowledge circulation was partly dissolved as the West German peace researchers integrated the advisory team at the GDR's MfAA.

In relation to the dynamics of the previous phase of the revolution, this meant that the group of reform-oriented peace and security analysts that came together in the first two phases ultimately failed to establish themselves in the outcome phase. The previous sections followed how the reform-oriented security analysts of various institutions were bound up together under the roof of the peace research council during the polarization phase of the revolution and how they in turn gained political momentum in the 'struggle and cohabitation' phase when they were hooked together with the peace and security-oriented individuals from the oppositional movements. In the last phase of the revolution this last step reversed as the 'revolutionaries' in power preferred the association with the West German peace researchers. The group formed in the first phase of polarization, though, continued to exist:

*“[T]here was a group called ‘Demilitarization of Security’ which included colleagues from the Babelsberg IIB, from the IPW and also from the Dresden Military Academy, who tried to develop a coherent overarching concept for security in Central Europe. They saw their work as an alternative to the [...] predominantly illusory models of the West German peace research that were circulating at that time, and which achieved a very strong advisory position for the last GDR government. [...] Because of a lack of resources, it was an ultimately foreseeable failed attempt to bring together the intellectual leadership figures in the GDR in the field of security-relevant peace research and to develop ideas, unencumbered by the institutional hierarchical structures that existed before.” (Interview Gießmann, 2020: 4-5)*

Having lost political momentum, it ultimately failed to establish itself within the new networks of knowledge production that formed and set in the last phase of the revolution. It was the models

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<sup>393</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 16.

of the West German peace researchers, not those of the GDR reform-oriented peace and security scholars, that became politically dominant.

### *The wider context*

Back at the MfAA, newly appointed minister Markus Meckel assumed that the GDR would continue to exist for a while. The March elections did mean that the ultimate goal was a unification with West German, but at that time most people thought this would take another five years. In any case it was long enough to be active in the field of international relations as an independent power with an independent agenda.<sup>394</sup> Over the course of the following months, it became clearer and clearer that this would not be the case. The biggest task ahead were the 2+4 negotiations, and Markus Meckel and his team soon realized that one of their big challenges was to deal with the fact that no-one in the West took the GDR seriously.

The Western powers involved in the 2+4 talks had a minimal agenda: all they wanted was to agree on when to give up their special rights.<sup>395</sup> But the GDR approached the issue from a different angle. After its constitution following the March elections, the GDR Volkskammer issued a statement about its historical responsibility, which also included an acknowledgement of the existing ties to its Eastern Neighbours:

*“If you look at the unanimous statements of the Volkskammer, they stand for an awareness of history that is clear about the point that this is not just about a national history, but about a European question. And that’s why our former allies and our relationship with them are an important part of what we bring to this marriage [with West Germany]. [...] From this we derived the foreign policy maxims of the coalition agreement and took our first steps. We moved into the Foreign Affairs Ministry on 19 April. The first unofficial visit was to [West German] Foreign Affairs Minister Genscher. But for the first official visit we went to Warsaw shortly afterwards.” (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 3-4)*

The GDR saw 2+4 primarily as negotiations about the post-Cold War order of Europe, especially in relation to questions of military and security. This is the forum where all the powers needed for it are assembled and could develop ideas. It should not just be about Germany. Poland especially wanted guarantees about the borders with Germany. There were issues around Germany’s military status, nuclear weapons, the stationing of foreign troops. All this needed to be addressed and, showing solidarity for the concerns of its Eastern neighbours, the GDR pushed for it to happen. Together with Poland and Czechoslovakia they proposed to create a ‘European zone of security in Europe’ embedded in the CSCE.<sup>396</sup>

But Markus Meckel, Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz and his team quickly realized what the main constraint was that was impeding any serious foreign policy: the GDR had become irrelevant; no-one took them into account anymore.<sup>397</sup>

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<sup>394</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 12.

<sup>395</sup> Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 4.

<sup>396</sup> Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 4.

<sup>397</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 3.

*“I was a member of the negotiation delegation under Foreign Minister Meckel in Moscow, and nobody took us seriously.” (Interview Wallraf, 2019: 2-3)*

The unequal position of the GDR in diplomatic negotiations was underscored by its lack of secret service support. Because of the revolutionary dismissal of the Stasi, the GDR was the only power at the table with no confidential information about the other ones. Yet everyone else was well informed about the happenings in the GDR's new foreign ministry: when Markus Meckel, Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz and his team moved into the MfAA building they learned that all the lines were being tapped by the Soviets:

*“We were faced with the problem of what to do now, since we did have to make telephone calls. A West German company offered to set up a completely new telephone network for us. This was then done with the active help of the [West German] Federal Chancellery for the entire GDR government. I later heard that the person who did this on the part of the Federal Chancellery was also responsible for secret services. As such we could count on the [West German secret service] BND being better informed than ourselves about what was going on in our house.” (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 7)*

The last phase of the revolution re-formed and re-set the knowledge networks at play in the GDR. It had reshaped the entities involved in it, splitting the MfAA into a revolutionary centre and marginalizing diplomatic corps, but also leading to tremendous transformations within institutions like the IPW, the universities and, as we will see in the next section, the IIB. But it also changed the connections between all these entities in terms of the relations between various institutions and actors, but also in terms of the hierarchies between them. In this section we saw how the GDR was catapulted into a new international constellation where it was powerless to the point of irrelevance, at least to the Western actors who shaped the events. This impacted the knowledge networks we have seen so far: while ideas, memos, studies and advice were developed and circulated within them, they gained no traction because the GDR ultimately had no independent power or impact anymore:

*“The translation of scientific analysis and the drafts developed from it into practical politics was not to be achieved with a few people only. It would have required a much broader approach, in terms of personnel, politics and media. We didn't even have time to rebuild the existing diplomatic corps. We had to do everything straight away, almost instantly.” (Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 9)*

While the West German peace researchers thus had a central influence on the ideas and policies of the GDR's foreign affairs minister Meckel, their ideas never translated into meaningful political action. Their timeline was too short, and the political odds were stacked against them:

*“Then there were the peace researchers who had direct access to the minister's ear, but because the GDR itself no longer had any political leverage, they were not heard either. [...] Some advisors, such as Ulrich Albrecht, a well-known West German peace researcher, had probably hoped that the path to a peaceful German foreign policy could be taken with [foreign minister] Meckel.” (Interview Wallraf, 2019: 12)*

While the political weight and leverage of the knowledge networks oriented around the GDR's political institutions diminished its impact and ultimate chance of survival, we see in the next section that others like the IIB took on a different strategy. They saw another knowledge network, the West German academic political science network, as offering a better chance of survival, and

thus worked hard to transform themselves as an entity and to establish ties to integrate in this network.

### ***Reforming the IIB: Western Orientation***

*“What sort of East German institution would have simply waited for the Westerners to come and say: ‘Ok, we’ll just go away and you come?’” (Interview Muszynski, 2019: 11)*

We have seen that GDR institutions like the IPW or the IIB that were previously connected to the MfAA had been cut off from these networks. They needed to find a new mode of relevance in order to survive. Institutions like the IPW that did not, simply disappeared. But, unlike the IPW, the IIB was not just a research and advisory institution attached to the political realm – it was also a teaching and training facility. This allowed the IIB to fall back onto a different template, namely West German academia, and integrate into the network of knowledge production formed by West German academia. Accordingly, the IIB reformed, aiming to become a classical West German political science department, perhaps with a retained specialization on international relations. Working towards this goal involved carrying out two main types of changes, personnel changes and curriculum changes, along with finding access points to the Western academic networks. These changes partly started in the previous revolutionary phase, but they took up speed after the IIB’s April election. While the team of reformers around Raimund Krämer originally expected a timeline of around five years to reform before a unification with West Germany, the timeline accelerated and in August 1990 it became finally clear that it would take place within the year, on 3 October.<sup>398</sup>

### ***Sizing down: Cutting the staff in half***

The main challenge in becoming a political science ‘department’ of West German modelling was size.<sup>399</sup> A West German department of political science typically featured four or five professorships, each of which were allocated an average of two to three members of staff of various levels of seniority. This made them 12 to 20 people strong. The IIB, however, featured around 120 researchers, of which around 40 were senior members and 80 more were junior members, as well as around 50 language teachers and 40 ‘technical’ staff members, including secretaries, librarians, documentarians and IT experts.<sup>400</sup> The first goal, however, was not to reduce these numbers to the exact West German standards, but simply to half them, as this was the budget that had been made available for the year 1991.<sup>401</sup>

By the time Raimund Krämer took over the IIB in April, the total amount of staff on his hands was already reduced; he had around 100 members of staff left to handle.<sup>402</sup> By turning into the political science section of the HRV, the IIB had slimmed down as part of the overall

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<sup>398</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 4.

<sup>399</sup> Interview Muszynski, 2019: 5.

<sup>400</sup> Matthes, in *Die Babelsberger Diplomatschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der DDR*.

<sup>401</sup> Vorstellung zu den Aufgaben und zur strukturellen Gliederung eines Instituts Politische Wissenschaften/Internationale Beziehungen an der Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung, 29.03.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV7161.

<sup>402</sup> Übergabe- und Übernahmeprotokolle IIB, 04.07.1990. Potsdam University Archive, UP14164.

reorganization of its home institution: the IIB's former department of 'world economy' had been moved to the HRV's economists, the IIB's former areas of international law and media law had been moved to the HRV's jurists, the IIB's former area of diplomatic practice had been moved to HRV's philosophers and psychologists, the IIB's former department of information and documentation had been moved to the HRV's information centre, and finally, the IIB's former department of foreign languages had become its own unit within the HRV that answered directly to the director.<sup>403</sup> Many of these changes had been desired and pushed for by the respective staff members: the international lawyers imagined they had a better chance of surviving the upheavals as lawyers, those studying 'world economy', that they had better chances as economists, etc.<sup>404</sup> But some colleagues also left silently because of their former strong affiliation with the Stasi<sup>405</sup> or simply because they saw better opportunities outside of the IIB or wanted to take part in the political renewal of their country. Of the latter group many had remained formally at the IIB, despite actually being involved in politics. But many of these came back to the IIB in this last phase of the revolution, disillusioned about their impact and the possibilities available to them. Clustering again around Raimund Krämer, they hoped to channel their expertise at the IIB.

So by the time Raimund Krämer took over the IIB, his task was to half his staff from 97 to around 50-60. Ultimately they would succeed, managing to lay off 42 staff members, and remaining with 55,<sup>406</sup> but it was a rough time with severe conflicts.<sup>407</sup> The first ones to go were the very young and the very old:

*"The turnover at the IIB was high at that time – but differentiated according to age groups. The pressure to lay off staff increased. Very young colleagues, some of whom wanted to do their PhD with me, hardly had a chance or tried to take advantage of other professional opportunities. Then the very old, who either retired or were about to retire, were the first to be released from employment."* (Interview Franzke, 2019: 6)

The colleagues close to retirement were the first targets of reduction aims. Not just at the IIB, but in the whole of the GDR, pre-retirement rules had been put in place since February: women from the age of 55 onwards and men from the age of 60 could and should go into pre-retirement.<sup>408</sup> Over time, the pressure at the IIB and the HRV increased: everyone who could retire or go into pre-retirement was urged to voluntarily do so.<sup>409</sup> Most of them did not want to, but would ultimately have no choice.<sup>410</sup> In May, all the staff decisions were finalized and approved by the HRV's scientific council.<sup>411</sup> In June they were put into action: the laid-off staff were fired, their last

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<sup>403</sup> Beschlußprotokoll der Dienstberatung des Direktors des IIB mit den Abteilungsleitern am 19.04.1990, Potsdam University Archive, HRV ohne Nummer.

<sup>404</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 8.

<sup>405</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 9.

<sup>406</sup> Übergabe- und Übernahmeprotokolle IIB, 04.07.1990. Potsdam University Archive, UP14164.

<sup>407</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 12.

<sup>408</sup> Grundsätze und Maßnahmen für Personalentscheidungen an der Sektion Politische Wissenschaften und Internationale Beziehungen, 31.08.1990. Potsdam University Archive, Karton 176.

<sup>409</sup> Protokoll der Dienstberatung des Rektors am 28. Mai 1990, Rektorat 30.05.1990. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13439.

<sup>410</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 9.

<sup>411</sup> Grundsätze und Maßnahmen für Personalentscheidungen an der Sektion Politische Wissenschaften und Internationale Beziehungen, 31.08.1990. Potsdam University Archive, Karton 176.

working day set to be 31 August 1990.<sup>412</sup> Of the 41 staff members leaving the IIB, 17 went into pre-retirement, 14 were fired, five had temporary contract that were not renewed, five left to get retrained in a new employment area and one left for medical reasons.<sup>413</sup> But not all the remaining 55 colleagues were equally active. Around 25 to 30 colleagues still showed up,<sup>414</sup> while only 10 to 12 were properly involved and active.<sup>415</sup>

### *Curriculum changes: From IR to political science*

*“The great thing about these times compared to today was that you had a very small window of time where you were very free. So you could create a curriculum or examination regulations or an institute structure within eight weeks. That was really nice.” (Interview Wallraf, 2019: 2)*

*“There were memos and memos and memos. I remember, I wrote plenty of them.” (Interview Muszynski, 2019: 12)*

The other important step in becoming a political science department was to actually reorient the content from international relations to political science. In the spring of 1990, in the earlier phase of the revolution, the IIB had already reformed its curriculum into a freer version of international relations. But these times were over now and once Raimund Krämer came into office, it was clear that the focus needed to be political science:

*“In February/March we evaluated foreign policy and diplomacy courses of the kind that existed in England, Moscow or the USA and wanted to draw inspiration from them. The focus was on IR. We had hoped to develop an original international relations course, because [there was a West-German article arguing] that there were no IR curricula in Germany despite them being needed. We saw an opportunity for ourselves! But from May onwards it became clear to us that the (long-term) perspective of German unity meant a complete reorientation towards (normal) political science.” (Interview Krämer, 2019a: 5)*

There were two steps in the process: in the spring and early summer of 1990 the IR curriculum was toned down and political science components were added to it. At that point German unification was still a long-term perspective. The curriculum was officially approved by the GDR government later in the summer and became the only officially sanctioned political science programme of the GDR, with around 120 students registering to study political science in the autumn semester.<sup>416</sup> Once it became clear that German unification was not a long-term perspective but a very short-term one, the process sped up and a new wave of revisions came into play. In September/October a revised curriculum with even less IR and more West-German political science was drafted, but not yet implemented, as the unification dynamics would lead the process elsewhere.

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<sup>412</sup> Grundsätze und Maßnahmen für Personalentscheidungen an der Sektion Politische Wissenschaften und Internationale Beziehungen, 31.08.1990. Potsdam University Archive, Karton 176.

<sup>413</sup> Übergabe- und Übernahmeprotokolle IIB, 04.07.1990. Potsdam University Archive, UP14164.

<sup>414</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 9.

<sup>415</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 2.

<sup>416</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 7; Interview Franzke, 2019: 7; Interview Crome, 2019: 3.

In February, a new curriculum had been developed.<sup>417</sup> The degree was called ‘political science with special knowledge in the area of international law and international relations.’ Despite the nod to political science in the title, it was in essence still an IR curriculum. The goal was to train students to work in international organizations in the areas of politics, economics and culture; as scientific advisors and analysts in internationally oriented governmental and parliamentary bureaus; experts in parties, political movements, foundations, legal cabinets; as media consultants for domestic and international processes; as international experts for the industry, commerce, banking and finances in national and international contexts; as well as for work in international legal affairs. Half of the study would be focused on targeted language training and language acquisition and the other half on content coursework. The coursework was divided into six areas: 1/Theory of international relations and politics; 2/History (international relations, general and German); 3/ Law and international relations (international law, diplomatic and consular law, international economic law, state, constitutional and administration law); 4/ World economy and international relations (economics, international economic structures and current world economic processes); 5/Regional studies (USA and Western Europe; URSSR and Eastern Europe; Asian-pacific region; developing countries of Asia, Afrika and Latin America); 6/ Diplomacy and international negotiations.

In March/April, a new curriculum was developed. It was still heavily oriented around international relations, but the pressures to make it more ‘political science’ became visible. In its curriculum explanations, the IIB became more defensive, highlighting how essential international relations is as a traditional component of political science.<sup>418</sup> The main challenge was how to turn a degree and a departmental structure based on existing staff with existing expertise into something that it was not yet. In March, the solution was found by reorganizing the IIB’s expertise into three domains: theory, regional experts, and everyone else. The ‘theory’ part was relabelled ‘general political science’; the ‘regional experts’ became ‘domestic politics and comparative political science’ and everyone whose expertise could not be switched around was put in the category ‘International Relations’. The IIB was thus restructured as follows: the area of ‘general political science’ received four chairs (political theory, political sociology, methods in empirical political research and history and theory of international politics), the area of domestic politics and comparative studies received five chairs (Theory of Political Systems and System Comparison; Politics and Political Systems in Germany; Politics and Political Systems of Developed Industrial Countries; Politics and Political Systems in Eastern Europe; Chair of Politics and Political Systems in Developing Countries) while the area of international politics received six chairs (Global Problems and International Politics; International Security and Disarmament; International Organizations and Administration; Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE Process); European Integration Structures; Development Policy).<sup>419</sup>

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<sup>417</sup> Vorlage für die Dienstberatung des Direktors mit den Abteilungsleitern am 22.02.1990, Programm für ein fünfjähriges Studium an der Sektion Völkerrecht und internationale Politik, 15.02.1990. Potsdam University Archive, Karton 176.

<sup>418</sup> Vorstellung zu den Aufgaben und zur strukturellen Gliederung eines Instituts Politische Wissenschaften/Internationale Beziehungen an der Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung, 29.03.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV7161.

<sup>419</sup> Vorstellung zu den Aufgaben und zur strukturellen Gliederung eines Instituts Politische Wissenschaften/Internationale Beziehungen an der Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung, 29.03.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV7161.

This curriculum proposition met the resistance of the HRV's director. His handwritten annotation on the curriculum plan asked, "Why still focus on IR? Why not real political science?"<sup>420</sup> He wanted the IIB to be structured around three different areas of focus: political theory, domestic politics and IR, including comparative politics. He did not want an expanded IR domain, nor a large quasi-IR domain of comparative politics.<sup>421</sup> Over the next months, the framing of core areas went back and forth, but ultimately the core areas were settled around political theories, political sociology, comparative political systems, and IR.<sup>422</sup> These were not given equal weight, though, as existing scholars retained their original expertise, albeit in a somewhat different accentuation. In total, 14 chairs were agreed upon, and 11 of these were staffed with existing IIB experts. The remaining three had to be hired in:<sup>423</sup>

1. Political Theories: nk
2. History of International Relations: Prof. Dr sc. J. Kruger
3. Theory of International Relations: Prof. Dr sc. M Müller
4. Theory of Political Systems and System Comparison: nk
5. Domestic Politics and Political Systems in Germany: nk
6. Political Systems in Eastern Europe: Dr sc. J. Franzke
7. Political Systems of Western Industrial Societies: Doz. sc. W. Wallraf
8. Political Systems of Developing Countries: Prof. Dr sc. W. Hundt
9. Global Problems and Politics: Prof Dr sc. H. Mardek
10. International Security Policy and Disarmament: Prof. Dr sc. W. Kubiczek
11. International Organizations and Administrations: Doz. Dr sc. W. Kötter
12. Development Politics: Doz. Dr sc. R. Krämer
13. European Integration and Security Policy: Prof. Dr sc. W. Stock
14. German Foreign Policy: Prof. Dr sc. K. Montag

The chairs were not allocated to any one core area, presumably to make the unequal distribution less visible. But the blueprint solution underlying the curriculum changes from IR to political science revolved primarily around a recycling of area experts into comparatists. In August, all the further documents needed for a proper degree were made available, including a detailed course syllabus for the autumn and study and examination rules (the *Studienordnung* and *Diplomprüfungsordnung*).<sup>424</sup> Many other universities also tried to develop political science degrees, but they did so on the basis of the subject area of Marxism/Leninism. The IIB was the only one to develop it from an IR perspective. They were also the only institution whose political science

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<sup>420</sup> Vorstellungen zu den Aufgaben und der strukturellen Gliederung eines Instituts Politische Wissenschaften/Internationale Beziehungen an der Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung, Vorlage für die Sitzung des Wissenschaftlichen Rates der Hochschule am 17/18 April 1990. Potsdam University Archives, UP Sammlung Steding 4.

<sup>421</sup> Beschlußprotokoll der Dienstberatung des Direktors des IIB mit den Abteilungsleitern am 19.04.1990, Potsdam University Archive, HRV ohne Nummer.

<sup>422</sup> Position des Wissenschafts Rates der Sektion Politische Wissenschaften und Internationale Beziehungen der Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung zur Teilnahme an der Bildung der Brandenburgischen Landesuniversität (BLH), 05.07.1990. Potsdam University Archive, ASR7231.

<sup>423</sup> Gesamtübersicht über die Lehrstühle der Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung, 15.06.1990. Potsdam University Archive, UP22843.

<sup>424</sup> Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung, Sektion Politische Wissenschaften und Internationale Beziehungen, Studienordnung der Fachrichtung Politikwissenschaft, Diplomprüfungsordnung für den Studiengang Politik wissenschaft, Potsdam-Babelsberg, 08.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV ohne Nummer.



degree was officially recognized by the GDR's De Maizière government.<sup>425</sup> They heavily advertised the new degree and got around 120 new students to enrol, among whom were some applicants from the FRG and many foreign students from Poland who had previously been in the GDR.<sup>426</sup>

### *Accessing Western networks*

Having largely modelled its content and size on the West German standards, the IIB now needed to integrate in the relevant academic political science networks of West Germany. It did so in three main ways: by hiring West German staff, by seeking out contact with and evaluation from the West German political science association, and by developing institutional contacts with other political science faculties, in particular with the Otto-Suhr Institute at the FU in Berlin.

Moving to political science from the discipline of international relations meant that the IIB had two main blind spots: they had no credible experts on Western political theory available, nor did they have credible experts on the legal constitution of West Germany or West German domestic politics. The point about credibility was particularly sensitive when it came to political theory, since Western political theory was understood in West Germany to be a discipline critical of power and critical of politics. Because of their status as former elite institutions of a system understood to be unfree and dictatorial, any GDR expert able to understand and teach political theory would not be credible. The solution was to hire West German staff to cover these areas and help them navigate the new networks of West German academia.

At the same time, in West Germany, the academic exchange institution DAAD was setting up an exceptional fund to support West German staff wishing to go to the GDR, to assist its academic institutions in their reform projects. It was funded by the federal government of the FRG who has approved DM 5,2 Mio for the DAAD to support the university cooperation with the GDR. This is meant to 1/support scientists from the FRG to teach at GDR universities (4,5 Mio), 2/support exchanges of scientists (0,5 Mio), and 3/support GDR members of university to attend summer schools and internships in the FRG (0,2Mio). These were meant to be exceptional funds that were not to be extended in this form after 1991.<sup>427</sup> The goal of the programme was “to compensate for ideological, scientific, technical or equipment-related deficits in university education and university research in the GDR, as well as to prepare scientists and young academics for the primary tasks involved in restructuring the economy and society.”<sup>428</sup> Applications worked in three ways. An interested West German academic could make a preliminary arrangement with GDR universities, then apply to the DAAD. An interested GDR university could ask the DAAD to find them

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<sup>425</sup> Position des Wissenschafts Rates der Sektion Politische Wissenschaften und Internationale Beziehungen der Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung zur Teilnahme an der Bildung der Brandenburgischen Landesuniversität (BLH), 05.07.1990. Potsdam University Archive, ASR7231; see also Interview Crome, 2019: 3.

<sup>426</sup> Position des Wissenschafts Rates der Sektion Politische Wissenschaften und Internationale Beziehungen der Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung zur Teilnahme an der Bildung der Brandenburgischen Landesuniversität (BLH), 05.07.1990. Potsdam University Archive, ASR7231; see also Interview Krämer, 2019a: 3; Interview Franzke, 2019: 7.

<sup>427</sup> Letter from Prof. Dr Theodor Berchem, DAAD, to the rectors and presidents of West German and West-Berlin Universities, 20.05.1990. Potsdam University Archives, UP17337.

<sup>428</sup> Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, Programm „Hochschulförderung DDR“, Förderung von Wissenschaftlern aus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu Lehraufgaben an Hochschulen in der DDR Potsdam University Archive, UP17337.

relevant scholars, or an interested West German scholar could ask the DAAD to match them with an interested university.<sup>429</sup> The application deadline was 31.07.1990 for procedure 1, and is 30.06.1990 for the other two procedures.<sup>430</sup> Economic, IT and social science disciplines were favoured and a close match between the scholar's expertise and the institution's needs were desired.<sup>431</sup> But the DAAD was not the only actor at play. All the West German political foundations started subsidizing exchange programmes with the East, a lot of money was made available and many high-profile West German professors 'went East' for a semester or more:

*"There was obviously money available everywhere at the time. And especially for lecturers going to teach in the East. Some of them were top-class academics. And Potsdam was considered a good address in the East. So Prof. Haftendorn for example from the OSI [at the FU Berlin] was here too. I invited her to give the opening speech of the 1990 fall semester." (Interview Krämer, 2019a: 6)*

At the IIB, Dr Krämer received and shared information about the DAAD offer in June,<sup>432</sup> and they were urged by the HRV to make use of it,<sup>433</sup> which they did. For the academic year 1990/91, they were allocated twelve West German guest staff, while the HRV's legal departments got eleven and the HRV's economists got four:<sup>434</sup>

1. Dr Hubertus Buchstein (political theories and sociology)
2. Prof. Dr Hans Lothar Fischer (market economy, sectoral structure policies)
3. Prof. Dr Gerhard Göhler (political theories)
4. Prof. Dr Helga Haftendorn (contemporary methods and theoretical problems in international relations, European security and German foreign policy)
5. Dr Reinhard Hildebrandt (the international relevance of the Berlin problem)
6. Prof. Dr Christine Kulke (gender relations in politics and society)
7. Dr Roman Legien (mechanisms of communal politics and democracy within parties)
8. Prof. Dr HJ Mengel (introduction to the relation between law and politics)
9. Doz. Dr Bernhard Muszynski (totalitarianism)
10. Dr Hartmut Salzwedel (time and personality, groups and collectives)
11. Frau Ingeborg Siggelkow (sociological theories and methods)
12. Alparslan Yenil (social market economy)

Of particular interest in this process was the figure of Dr Bernhard Muszynski, who did not just come for an exchange semester, but insisted on getting formally hired by the IIB in August, while the GDR was still in existence. He started in September and was tasked to set up the area of

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<sup>429</sup> Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, Programm „Hochschulförderung DDR“, Förderung von Wissenschaftlern aus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu Lehraufgaben an Hochschulen in der DDR Potsdam University Archive, UP17337.

<sup>430</sup> Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, Programm „Hochschulförderung DDR“, Förderung von Wissenschaftlern aus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu Lehraufgaben an Hochschulen in der DDR Potsdam University Archive, UP17337.

<sup>431</sup> Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, Programm „Hochschulförderung DDR“, Förderung von Wissenschaftlern aus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu Lehraufgaben an Hochschulen in der DDR Potsdam University Archive, UP17337.

<sup>432</sup> Beschlußprotokoll der Beratung des Direktors mit den Lehrstuhlleitern am 13.06.90. Potsdam University Archive, Karton 176.

<sup>433</sup> Protokoll der Dienstberatung des Rektors am 11.06.1990. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13438.

<sup>434</sup> Übersicht zum gegenwärtigen Stand der Vorbereitung des Einsatzes von Gastdozenten aus der BRD und Westberlin im Studienjahr 1990/91 an der HRV, Potsdam 15. 08.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV7172.

political theory.<sup>435</sup> His focus was consciously set on democracy theory, and he aimed at exploring all variations and variants of it as well as exploring Marxism in all its breadth, including all the versions previously unavailable in the GDR.<sup>436</sup> But he was not only there to build a branch of enquiry that no one else at the IIB would have the credibility to do; he was also there as someone who knows the Western academic system and could help the IIB to navigate it:

*“I was probably a very good buy for them. As a political scientist, I see these things in terms of interests anyway, so it was a give and take. I was on the one hand interested in actively participating in this transformation and on the other hand, in establishing myself somewhere. Their interest was to reform themselves in such a way that they would have a future. I had also told them that I was not inexperienced in the Western system.” (Interview Muszynski, 2019: 1)*

These ‘first Westerners’ like Bernhard Muszynski quickly became important players as in-between figures who translated between East and West. They were usually not established professors, but fully qualified academics in search of a permanent post. They knew which institutions in Germany had funding available for academic projects and – crucially – how to write a successful project proposal. Thanks to them, the IIB was able to attract some funding for short-term projects in the months to come and was thus able to provide buffer spaces for many of the colleagues that had been laid off:

*“There is also the chapter of the ‘first Westerners’. They weren’t professors, but lecturers. They had extensive knowledge of third-party funding opportunities and ABM. At that time there was a lot of money for ABM projects at the university for academics, perhaps also to prevent the Eastern intellectuals from starting a revolution. But seriously: this meant that many colleagues got paid work again, even if not for a long time. We looked at the forms and asked ourselves what to write in there. The ‘first Westerners’ knew it, and we received funding.” (Interview Krämer, 2019a: 6)*

Through hiring West German staff, and in particular through those ‘first Westerners’ who came and settled in the East, the IIB increased its legitimacy in Western eyes, but also incorporated individuals who helped them enter and access the Western system. The IIB also applied this strategy to other contacts. There was a flurry of offers and information available: offers for a two-year study in Essen, invitations and offers from FAO, EG commission, IISS to be in touch and attend events, information about recycling professionally through engaging in administrative studies, or by integrating the private sectors that were particularly interested in foreign language knowledge.<sup>437</sup> But the most important institutional contact that the IIB sought out was with the political science institute of the FU Berlin:

*“It was during this time that we made our first contact with the Otto Suhr Institute in West Berlin (OSI). It started very early. I went there for the first time in the autumn of 1989. At that point something began*

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<sup>435</sup> Aktennotiz Dr Krämer, Gespräch mit Herrn Dr Bernhard Muszynski, Potsdam 14.08.1990. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13457; Beschlußprotokoll der Beratung des Direktors mit den Lehrstuhlleitern am 05.09.90. Potsdam University Archive, Karton 176.

<sup>436</sup> Interview Muszynski, 2019: 11-12.

<sup>437</sup> Beschlußprotokoll der Beratung des Direktors mit den Lehrstuhlleitern am 27.09.1990. Potsdam University Archive, Karton 176.

*that would become very important the following year. [The relation with the OSI] was a strategically important factor for us: on the one hand, from a content perspective, in relation to teaching programmes; on the other hand, in relation to the connection with the colleagues at OSI. A pleasant to friendly relationship.” (Interview Krämer, 2019a: 2)*

The political science institute OSI at the FU Berlin was the biggest and closest player in the region and would provide important support both in terms of sending out necessary teaching staff, partly through the DAAD exchanges, but also in providing content feedback on the reforms and in involving the IIB in content debates and discussions.<sup>438</sup> Help in crafting the course syllabus for the autumn of 1990 was particularly important, and Prof. Büttner, dean of political science at the FU, gave input.<sup>439</sup> This was important both in terms of ensuring the content was compatible with West German standards but also in terms of involving West German actors and increasing their stakes in the IIB. The new course syllabus for example was sent to various other stakeholders to inform them about the reforms and changes at the IIB and put the IIB on the agenda as an important player.<sup>440</sup> The IIB also integrated in the group that exchanged and somewhat coordinated political science teaching and research in the region of Berlin and Potsdam.<sup>441</sup>

The relation with the OSI at the FU was surprising as it was a politically ‘left’ institution. Its students and staff were quite radically left:

*“I went to the Otto Suhr Institute of the Free University for the first time in the spring of 1990, but I could only shake my head: everything was covered with posters about the revolution, many students and many professors were still very left to radically left at the time. That was extremely strange to me.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 10)*

As the IIB would soon find out, they were usually faced with rejection from politically left West German actors. Conservative academics and other actors in the knowledge field were much more cooperative and open for exchange than their leftist colleagues – with the exception of the OSI at the FU.<sup>442</sup>

*“The West German left was not on our side - we had “messed up” the socialism project. Real socialism had ruined the idea that they were fighting for. They blamed us for that, and it was noticeable. They didn't want anyone from the East.” (Interview Krämer, 2019b: 9)*

Next to hiring staff, receiving content input and support with accessing West German academic networks, the IIB also sought out contact with the West German political science association DVPW. The DVPW was an important player which we will get to know better in the next chapter on colonization/knowledge. They were about to formally evaluate the new political science degree put together by the IIB. Unification with West Germany arrived too quickly for it to play a real

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<sup>438</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 2; Interview Franzke, 2019: 10.

<sup>439</sup> Letter from Dr Krämer to Dekan Prof. Büttner, FU, 08.08.1990. Potsdam University Archive, UP22914.

<sup>440</sup> Letter from Dr Wilhelm Bruns, FES to director Dr Krämer HRV, 28.08.1990. Potsdam University Archive, UP22914.

<sup>441</sup> Position des Wissenschafts Rates der Sektion Politische Wissenschaften und Internationale Beziehungen der Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung zur Teilnahme an der Bildung der Brandenburgischen Landesuniversität (BLH), 05.07.1990. Potsdam University Archive, ASR7231.

<sup>442</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 2.

role in the revolution dynamics as the evaluation took place in October. But the contacts were made and the prospect of evaluation was an important one, as the IIB needed to assert itself both within the HRV against the jurists who wanted to push them out, and towards the GDR's government, whose endorsement and official authorization they needed.<sup>443</sup>

## Conclusion

During the phase of the GDR's revolutionary upheaval, the East German system of international relations knowledge production became severely polarized. Researchers, experts and academics had to navigate a field divided between pro-Gorbachev supporters and anti-Gorbachev hardliners. In particular, all the fields of international relations knowledge production oriented around studying the enemy or touching upon issues of war, peace and security, became divided between those upholding the old dogma and those proposing a new reinterpretation of the old frameworks. The latter pushed for various degrees of cooperation instead of confrontation and proposed redefinitions of the former Marxist/Leninist interpretive frames, such as the conceptual extension of 'imperialism' to also include the West's innate ability for peace. Once the situation escalated in the autumn of 1989 and the old leadership stepped down, the GDR was governed by the fragile alliance between reformer socialist government and oppositional forces gathered around a 'round table' system. At the same time, as the population's faith in this double-government waned, the GDR's various political parties were gaining support and increasingly partnered up with their West German counterparts, whose power and influence in the process grew accordingly. In this phase, the GDR's experts, researchers and academics had to navigate a highly unstable and explosive environment in which they had to straddle and orientate between different stakeholders and audiences. The old practices had to be upheld to a certain degree, while the former institutions of international relations knowledge production such as the IIB and IPW started to disintegrate from within. In short, a process of disaggregation and reaggregation took place in which old institutions and entities split and various cross-institutional sub-groups formed into new committees, working groups and organizations. For example, the reform-oriented security experts of the IIB, IPW, and the military institutions came together to form working groups, which in turn allied with the security-interested sub-groups of the oppositional movements.

Once the revolutionary forces in the form of the Western-oriented political parties won and took over the GDR, its international relations researchers, experts and academics had to adapt to a new situation in which their expertise was still needed but not politically desired anymore. In choosing whom to hire as their new international relations advisors, the revolutionaries now in charge of the MfAA were divided between two equally unappealing options: re-hiring their old experts, representatives of the old regime, or enlist West German advisors. They found a rather unconventional compromise in appointing West German professors, specialists in peace research, because they seemed to provide enough distance to both the West German establishment and the old East German *nomenklatura*. The IPW did not survive this hostile last phase of the revolution and was closed down, rejected on the basis of its strong affiliation with the old system. The IIB survived the changes by radically reforming, detaching itself from the GDR's political networks

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<sup>443</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 7-8.

and finding legitimacy and status in a re-orientation around Western academic procedures and standards.

In short, during the GDR's revolutionary upheaval, both the entities involved in knowledge production and their regular sets of relations were severely shaken and reconfigured. New avenues of research opened up while others closed down. Some academics were crowded out, while others were catapulted to power. Some institutions fell apart, some split, some reorganized, and some disappeared while the relations between all experts, researchers and academics transformed. Previous boundaries such as the division between East and West began to function in new ways, while new boundaries, such as the one between reformers and hardliners, emerged.

## CHAPTER 4

### Colonization/Knowledge:

### Asymmetrical Unification with the West and International Relations Expertise in the ex-GDR in 1990,

#### Part 1: Winding Down the Old

*“The core of the GDR’s structure fell out and the connections to [that core] vanished. The [remaining] individual elements floated freely and then docked onto the other system’s outer perimeter. Many East German institutions were absorbed by the other system when they had connection points to dock onto, which doesn’t necessarily have to be a bad thing. And that is why there are few institutions that remained genuinely East German.” (Interview Wallraf, 2019: 28)*

*“These were times where you had to take your chances. Where you had to reinvent yourself, where you had to take a leap of faith. We all had the right age and the necessary verve.” (Interview Fischer, 2020: 16)*

In early 1991, Wolfgang Schwarz received a phone call: „Do you have a job?” The GDR had ceased to exist only a few months earlier and with the dissolution of his home institution, the IPW, Wolfgang Schwarz was practically unemployed. “They are retraining NVA army officers for business administration and urgently need staff. You should give them a call!” A former NATO expert and assistant to the IPW’s director, Wolfgang Schwarz was no stranger to the military sector, nor to the administration of a big institution. A few weeks later he had become deputy director of the newly set-up business academy dedicated to the re-training of former NVA officers.<sup>444</sup> Lutz Kleinwächter had a comparable experience. Through connections he had heard about the re-training of NVA army officers, and that they urgently needed teaching staff. Within five days of his first phone call, he was scheduled in to teach. The subject: economics. He had the right personality for the job. Not only was he an experienced lecturer, but his previous IIB specialization in armament and security issues meant that he had had plenty of experience with officers and other stakeholders in the defence sector. He knew how to engage with them. But economics? He took out his old IIB course scripts on ‘the political economy of capitalism’ from the shelf. Within a few days he would have to refresh the subject, map out some 70 hours of teaching materials, and prepare detailed lesson plans. He added a few notes here and there to his old scripts and started training former NVA and Stasi army officers in the basics of economics.<sup>445</sup> These stories are symptomatic for the dynamics at play during the times of German unification post 1990: former GDR researchers, academics and intellectuals had to deal with the complete collapse of their previous structures and learn fast how to navigate a new environment in which they had become less-valued citizens. A willingness to radically change their career and the ability to wittingly use all


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<sup>444</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 5.

<sup>445</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 12.

their available resources allowed most of them to build a new life in the new Germany. But only very few of them were able to stay active in their original field of expertise, international relations.

This chapter explores the relation between power and knowledge in the GDR during its asymmetrical unification with West Germany. It makes sense of the events at hand by organizing them through the lens of the ideal-typical relation between colonization and knowledge sketched out in chapter 1. As laid out there, this does not mean that the process of German unification is a colonial one, but rather that the theoretical model of colonization/knowledge is helpful in making sense of its core dynamics. Colonization/knowledge describes a process in which an asymmetrical situation of takeover recasts the relevant parameters within which knowledge-making activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising about international relations take place. Following the colonization/knowledge nexus, these knowledge-making activities will take place within a strongly hierarchized space whereby a formerly independent knowledge space becomes absorbed and entirely oriented towards another knowledge space. Activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising will be characterized by a reorientation around the new pole of authority, with the institutions and organizations formerly bundling these knowledge-making activities falling apart, imploding, reorganizing or reorienting themselves within the new context. The core logic of colonization/knowledge is hierarchical orientation, and that dynamic will inform both the “social entities” involved in knowledge activities and the networks they are part of.



On 2 October 1990, at midnight, the GDR ceased to exist. From then onwards, Germany only existed as one unified country. By agreement, the terms of this unification were asymmetrical: the GDR dissolved and it integrated the legal, political, economic and social order of the FRG. In addition to this explicit asymmetry, the process of unification was also implicitly based on what we might call a premise of non-recognition.<sup>446</sup> For a long time, this premise had been the official structuring principle of the inter-German Cold War, whereby both East and West tried to deny

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<sup>446</sup> Misselwitz, 32-33.



the other's right to exist. Instead of disappearing at the end of the Cold War confrontation, however, the principle of non-recognition was arguably brought into the unification process by West Germany. In practice, this involved ignoring the GDR's existence for the past 40 years and acting as if the communist regime had never happened, so as to erase from memory the very fact that a separation had ever existed. The use of the premise of non-recognition had three broad consequences.<sup>447</sup> First, that all the legal rulings made in the GDR had to be reversed, including a reversal of all decisions concerning ownership rights and conditions back to the situation pre-1949. Second, it established that the East had to catch up on 40 years of missed development, the blueprint of which was to be found in the West. Third, that the GDR had to start from scratch, with 1990 being their year zero. This entailed the de facto devaluation of everything that had been made, developed or grown in the GDR. However different the post-unification lives and careers of all former GDR citizens were, they all shared one experience: that of a devaluation and delegitimization of their biographies, including that of all previously meaningful work achievements and life goals. This happened both through the formal dissolution of institutions, organizations and structures but also more subtly through the importing of cultural and social standards of the West.<sup>448</sup>

On the level of knowledge production, the dissolution of the GDR meant that all its former networks and structures stopped working. The “core” that had given meaning and direction to the system disappeared. As a result, students, teachers, researchers, institutions, journals, publishing processes – in short, all the elements making up the system of knowledge production – were left free-floating. They continued to exist but had not, at first, any meaningful new attachments. The process of asymmetrical unification with West Germany gradually changed this. All the GDR's remaining free-floating units of knowledge production – i.e. the students, teachers, researchers, institutions, journals, publishing processes etc. – were attached to an unchanged West German system and went through a process of re-aggregation in which they had to dock onto whichever connection points were available to them.<sup>449</sup> In some cases this meant that formerly East German units such as the IIB had to dissolve, because there was no meaningful place for them in the West German system. In these cases, the individuals, venues and objects that had made up the former unit were left free-floating and had to find new ways to integrate the West German system. In other cases, this meant that formerly East German units such as the Humboldt University in Berlin (HU) were able to find a meaningful place in the West German system, in the case of the HU in the context of the university system. In cases such as these, however, the unit did not remain as it had been previously and was required to go through a process of change so as to function well in the new system.

This part of the PhD thesis examines the processes at play in the field of international relations knowledge production during the time of German unification by organizing them into two chapters: “winding down the old” and “building the new”. Having one knowledge space being taken over by another means that two processes run in parallel: the disappearance of the old space's structures and their replacement by the new space's structures. As such, this chapter, “Winding

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<sup>447</sup> Ibid., 34-35.

<sup>448</sup> Ibid.

<sup>449</sup> See the description in: Interview Wallraf, 2019: 28.

down the old”, focuses on the strings of events surrounding the dismantling of the GDR’s infrastructure of international relations expertise. Focusing in particular on the IIB, it examines the principle of hierarchical orientation as it played out in the process of winding down the East German institutions of international relation knowledge production, in particular the IIB. It is organized in four parts. Part one, “To keep or to close down?”, explores the first months of unification. It looks at the ex-GDR’s institutions’ efforts to adapt to the new system through full adaptation as well as at the distribution of decision-making power over the question of whether to keep or to close down the GDR’s former institutions. Part two, “Three discourses”, examines the emergence of three discursive strands underwriting the closure of the East German system of international relations knowledge production. Part three, “Free-floating elements”, traces what happened to the individuals who had been part of the East German system of knowledge production once their institution was shut down. Finally, part four, “Can the ‘fallen’ experts speak?”, probes their possibilities to still engage with international relations, despite no longer forming part of its official networks.

## To keep or to close down?

*“It ended in shock and disillusionment at the end of November 1990, when it was decreed that the IIB would be dissolved” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 7)*

Once the GDR dissolved and its former territories integrated the legal, political, economic and social order of West Germany on 3 October 1990, the main question became whether to keep or to close down its former institutions of international relations expertise. The political and geographical de- and re-aggregation of the GDR into federated states meant a division and thus diffusion of decision-making power about the future of its institutions. This section focuses on the IIB and details how the principle of hierarchical orientation worked in its efforts to adapt to its new provincial context by becoming “more Western than the West”.

### *Decision-making power*

The geographical and political reorganization of the GDR’s former territories played an important role in the disaggregation of its international relations expertise networks. A previously centralized country with local administrations, the GDR integrated a political order structured by the principle of federalism. What was previously one unit was split into five federated states, with East Berlin additionally integrating the already previously existing state of Berlin. Each of these states developed their own executive, legislative and judicial capacities, with elections for their new government being held on 14 October 1990.<sup>450</sup> For the IIB, this meant that it was now allocated to the state of Brandenburg, of which Potsdam became the capital, and that it was now dependent on Brandenburg’s rules, regulations and decision-making, since matters of education fell within the responsibility of the respective German states, not the federation. On 22 November 1990, the new government of Brandenburg began its work.<sup>451</sup> It was a coalition government between three

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<sup>450</sup> Hinrich Enderlein, “Die Re-Integration ost- und westdeutscher Wissenschaft am Beispiel Brandenburg. Ein politischer Erfahrungsbericht,” in *Die Kunst des Vernetzens*, ed. Botho Brachmann et al. (Berlin: Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2006), 436.

<sup>451</sup> Ibid.

parties and the liberal party FDP received the ministry of science, research and culture. They nominated Hinrich Enderlein as the new minister for this domain, and Hinrich Enderlein thus became the politician responsible for deciding which institutions to keep and which to close down in the state of Brandenburg, a decision leading to the ultimate closure of the IIB.

The figure of Hinrich Enderlein illustrates some of the blurring of boundaries characteristic for this first phase of unification. Born in “East” Germany during WWII, his family fled from Brandenburg to the “West” at the end of the war and he grew up in what soon became West Germany. Holding a university degree in history, political science and Slavic history, he spoke Russian and spent some time in the Soviet Union as part of a study grant.<sup>452</sup> This mixed background would later earn him the epithet “Wossi”, a mix between the German colloquial expressions “Wessi” (Westerner) and “Ossi” (Easterner).<sup>453</sup> Before 1989, his political career took place in the West. He was a member of parliament for the liberal party FDP in the state of Baden-Württemberg for 16 years, with special expertise in higher education. When the turmoil in the GDR started, the West German liberal FDP minister of education in Bonn asked him to join the team, and Enderlein was tasked to help dissolve the GDR ministry of education. This allowed Hinrich Enderlein to gain experience in the field of university politics at the West German federal level. When the elections took place in Brandenburg, he became the liberal party’s Western advisor tasked with advising them during the coalition talks. All parties had to send in three politicians for their coalition talks: the party’s state level leader, one designated party member responsible for the coalition negotiations and one member of the “Western” party branch assisting as advisor. The Eastern liberal politicians were impressed by his skills and knowledge, and when their party received the science, research and culture ministry, they offered him the post.<sup>454</sup>

Not only was the GDR’s former territory thus split into various states, each of these also became governed by parties and politicians that were only partly “Eastern”. This was the result of the unification dynamics whereby the GDR’s parties were merged with their Western counterparts. This process led to new ties being formed between East and West and a blurring of former boundaries. As part of another unification dynamic, each new “Eastern” state was informally partnered up with one “Western” state governed by the same political party. The latter were supposed to advise, mentor and support the respective “new” states, giving them both material and immaterial support. In the case of Brandenburg, the partner state was Nordrhein-Westphalen and their ministry delegated employees to the new Eastern states to help build the ministerial bureaucracies. This partnership created a set of individualized ties between East and West, with networks that would later partly impact hiring patterns in the Eastern universities.

Besides the geographical and political reorganization of the GDR, the unification treaty also reordered the GDR’s academic landscape in a direct way. Institutions like the military academy which formed part of another institution – in this case, the military – were treated as part of that overarching institution. But all the other “free-floating” institutions were divided into research and teaching institutions, with the responsibility for the former being allocated to the federal level and

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<sup>452</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 1-2.

<sup>453</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 9.

<sup>454</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 1-2.

the responsibility for the latter being allocated to the state level. Research institutions like the academy of sciences were thus allocated to the federal level and regulations about what to do with them were established in the unification treaty. Institutions like the IIB, which were both research and teaching institutions, were assigned to the “teaching” institutions category and thus allocated to the state level – in the case of the IIB, Brandenburg. When the unification treaty was crafted, the states did not yet exist. Therefore, no detailed regulations were agreed on as how to proceed with regard to the “teaching” institutions, beyond the fact the new states would be responsible for dealing with them and that they would have until the end of the year to decide whether to keep or dissolve the GDR’s old educational facilities.

Coming into office on 22 November, the new government of Brandenburg had only a few weeks before the end of December to decide whether to keep or close down the GDR’s higher education institutions. In Brandenburg, there were two of them: The College of Law and Administration HRV, which hosted the reformed IIB, and the PH, which was one of the GDR’s top institutions for the training of schoolteachers across all disciplines. Ultimately, they would take over both the PH and the HRV as institutions, but close down the latter’s economic and political science sections – the political science section being the IIB’s official denomination since its reform in early 1990 during the GDR’s revolutionary upheaval.

### *Hierarchical Orientation: Becoming more Western than the West*

Back at the IIB, the “reformers” from the previous chapter on revolution/knowledge now found themselves operating under West German rules and regulations, assigned to a provincial federated state not interested in anything “international”, and with their fate and future left to the new government’s full disposal. In the hope of surviving unification, they reacted to this situation by “hierarchical orientation”, i.e. by a full submission to Western standards and full transformation into a Western-looking institution. They put intensive effort into turning their already Western-oriented curriculum into a model political science curriculum “more Western than the West”. In response to the panicked atmosphere at the IIB and the feeling of uncertainty about their future, they put the implementation of further personnel cuts on hold, and started to promote and defend their new degree and curriculum as widely as possible, using all the typical Western tropes.

The hierarchical orientation of the IIB in these first weeks after unification can be seen with regard to its faculty and curriculum design. By the time of the unification with West Germany, the IIB already had a Western-oriented political-science curriculum, despite a remaining strong focus on international relations. Now the IIB started implementing curriculum changes that turned it into a model political science faculty “more Western than the West”.<sup>455</sup>

First, it changed its name. Where it was previously called a “political science and international relations” section, it now became a “political science” section only.<sup>456</sup> Then it adapted the structure of both curriculum and faculty to fully reflect the West German “standard” model of splitting

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<sup>455</sup> Konzeption zur inhaltlichen und strukturellen Profilierung des Faches Politikwissenschaft an der Hochschule, vorlage für die Tagung des Wissenschaftlichen Rates der Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung am 16.10.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV7213.

<sup>456</sup> Konzeption zur inhaltlichen und strukturellen Profilierung des Faches Politikwissenschaft an der Hochschule, Vorlage für die Tagung des Wissenschaftlichen Rates der Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung am 16.10.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV7213.

political science into political theory, domestic politics, comparative politics and international relations. This standard model was based on a memorandum of 1961 and its reformalization in 1987 by the *Kultusministerkonferenz*, the West German institution responsible for coordinating teaching across all German Länder.<sup>457</sup> The IIB implemented the model by merging domestic politics and comparative politics into one area of study, leaving it structured around the three areas of political theory, comparative political systems and international relations.<sup>458</sup> This was a change from an essentially IR curriculum with some political science framing attached to it, to an essentially political science curriculum with some IR specialization attached to it. The consequence of this was that even more IR staff would need to be laid off and that even more new “Western” staff would need to be hired to cover the now expanded areas of political theory and domestic politics.<sup>459</sup>

In a bid for survival in the new system, the IIB also took over all the West German arguments as to why a political science degree and faculty were necessary in the Land of Brandenburg. Because of the political reorganization of the former GDR territories, the IIB was now set not on a federal level but on the provincial level of a federated state. Because the states had no foreign policy responsibility, they had no interest in international relations research and teaching – their interest was in law and administration.<sup>460</sup> A key line of argumentation was the classic post-WWII West German trope of political science as a science of democracy. Offering political science curricula supposedly would help educating an otherwise undemocratically minded society how to think, act and behave “democratically”. Drawing on that trope, the IIB highlighted how, in regard to the GDR’s undemocratic past, the development of a political science faculty and degree in Brandenburg was crucial in managing its transition to democracy.<sup>461</sup> Furthermore, the argument highlighted how political science was a natural and obvious part of the West German higher education landscape, implying that the degree was needed for Brandenburg to “look” Western. The implemented curriculum and faculty changes ensured “a strict orientation to the West German standards of the discipline”.<sup>462</sup> Additionally, practical elements were highlighted. Even though Berlin already had a strong political science faculty at the FU, they didn’t have enough capacity to meet the demand, making Potsdam a welcome addition to reduce the pressure on Berlin. Brandenburg would also benefit from the degree because the IIB would provide well-educated and much needed staff in the domains of public administration, education, political parties, media and so forth.<sup>463</sup>

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<sup>457</sup> Konzeption zur inhaltlichen und strukturellen Profilierung des Faches Politikwissenschaft an der Hochschule, Vorlage für die Tagung des Wissenschaftlichen Rates der Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung am 16.10.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV7213.

<sup>458</sup> Fachbereich Politikwissenschaft, Beschlußprotokoll der Beratung des Direktors mit den Lehrstuhlleitern am 7.11.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV7253.

<sup>459</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 7-8.

<sup>460</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 4.

<sup>461</sup> Politikwissenschaftliche Forschung und Lehre im Bundesland Brandenburg im Vorfeld der Gründung einer Landesuniversität, 10.1990. Potsdam University Archive, Karton 176.

<sup>462</sup> Politikwissenschaftliche Forschung und Lehre im Bundesland Brandenburg im Vorfeld der Gründung einer Landesuniversität, 10.1990. Potsdam University Archive, Karton 176.

<sup>463</sup> Politikwissenschaftliche Forschung und Lehre im Bundesland Brandenburg im Vorfeld der Gründung einer Landesuniversität, 10.1990. Potsdam University Archive, Karton 176.

As part of another element of strategy, the IIB also tapped into West German political science debates around the unity of the discipline. As we will see later, political science in West Germany had had a difficult history of developing and maintaining its identity, struggling in the past with member groups wanting to splinter away from the discipline. The IIB used this context to highlight how their voluntary implementation of a model political science curriculum would help support the unity of the discipline. At the same time, they also weaponized the debate in opposite ways, highlighting the individual character of each political science faculty in West Germany and claiming the right for an individual flavour in Potsdam.<sup>464</sup>

In order to further achieve full adherence to the West German model, further personnel cuts were necessary.<sup>465</sup> But the uncertainty about the IIB's future made for a "dramatic" mood at the IIB:<sup>466</sup> would their home institution HRV come up for them or would they throw them under the bus to ensure their own survival?<sup>467</sup> They decided it was time to lobby for their own survival, getting in touch with politicians and the wider media, in order to raise awareness and inform about their Westernization and the importance of their survival.<sup>468</sup> They also lobbied the HRV's rector and insisted that he represent them fairly and fight for them in the political decision-making process.<sup>469</sup> With regard to personnel questions, it was ultimately decided that everyone should retain their posts until a political decision had been made about the future of the IIB: if it was to be shut down, then all employees would benefit from the social regulations put in place, but if it survived, then the personnel changes would be further implemented.<sup>470</sup>

This section aimed to explore one aspect of the "hierarchical ordering" at play during the unification dynamics. It has outlined how, after the GDR merged into West Germany, the IIB worked hard to transform and adapt so that there would be no need to close them down. In order to ensure their survival, they fully oriented around the Western model, only to be shut down regardless, as we will see in the next section.

## Closing down IR: three discourses

*"First and foremost, it was a very consciously and very purposefully precipitated change of elites. This was the relatively mild punishment that the enemy had to endure. I have no illusions about this. Sometimes we discussed this with colleagues or friends after one or two drinks: what would it have been like if our side had won? Then the last ones would have come back out of the re-education camp after 10 years. That is at least*

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<sup>464</sup> Konzeption zur inhaltlichen und strukturellen Profilierung des Faches Politikwissenschaft an der Hochschule, vorlage für die Tagung des Wissenschaftlichen Rates der Hochschule für Recht und Verwaltung am 16.10.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV7213.

<sup>465</sup> Protokoll der Tagung des Wissenschaftlichen Rates vom 16.10.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV7208.

<sup>466</sup> Sektion Politische Wissenschaften und Internationale Beziehungen, Beschlußprotokoll der Beratung des Direktors mit den Lehrstuhlleitern am 24. 10.1990. Potsdam University Archive, Karton 176.

<sup>467</sup> Letter from Dr Krämer, director of the political science department to Prof. Steding, rector of the HRV, 30.11.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV7320.

<sup>468</sup> Fachbereich Politikwissenschaft, Beschlußprotokoll der Beratung des Direktors mit den Lehrstuhlleitern und Mitgliedern des Wissenschaftlichen Rates des Fachbereichs (FB) am 28.11.1990. Potsdam University Archive, ASR7228 A74.

<sup>469</sup> Letter from Dr Krämer, director of the political science department to Prof. Steding, rector of the HRV, 30.11.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV7320.

<sup>470</sup> Rektorat, Protokoll der Dienstberatung des Rektors vom 14. November 1990. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13438.

*how it was with the Vietnamese. There have seldom been smart winners in history. It went the way it went, and the ones affected had to pay the price” (Interview Schwarz, 2019: 22)*

In 1990, most institutions making up the GDR’s infrastructure of international relations expertise were dissolved. Those institutions considered the most “political” had already been closed down during the times of revolutionary upheaval. This concerned in particular institutions like the Stasi’s and the central committee’s training facilities, but, as we have seen in chapter 3 on revolution/knowledge, the IPW was also closed and ceased to exist before the two Germanys united, with all its staff going straight into unemployment. The next one to be closed down was the GDR’s MfAA along with its practical infrastructure of knowledge and expertise in the field of international relations. It ceased to exist at the same time as the GDR, and because practically none of its diplomats were taken over by the Western diplomatic service, this group of experts also entered unemployment on 3 October 1990.<sup>471</sup> Unlike the MfAA, the GDR’s military was at first taken over by its Western counterpart. After a process of evaluation, a part of its military staff was kept, and the other was sent to be retrained and find employment elsewhere. The teaching facilities of the military were closed down by the end of the year, and this meant the end of the military academy in Dresden and the end of the NVA’s political college in Berlin. The military’s historical institute in Potsdam, however, was taken over and continued to exist, though in a changed form. Finally, the university structures holding in particular the area studies were dealt with in a decentralized form, with each new state making its own decision. Overall, all universities were kept as institutions, but their staff were dealt with differently. Either everyone was laid off at first and then some of the former staff were rehired after a thorough process of evaluation, or everyone was kept at first and then laid off slowly in a grinding process of evaluation. We will look at the dynamics in the post-1990 East German universities in part 2 “Building the new”. The IIB, which we will turn to in this section, took on a hybrid form: it was closed down as a structure on 31 December 1990, and all its staff laid off, but some of them were then rehired as part of the newly built University of Potsdam.

### *Dissolving the IIB*

On 22 November 1990, Brandenburg’s newly appointed minister of education, Hinrich Enderlein, stepped into office.<sup>472</sup> The state of Brandenburg had been created out of nothing just a few weeks earlier and there was no “ministry” yet to speak of. Only one telephone had a connection to the West. The team was small: two staff members came with Minister Enderlein from his previous post in the West German capital and he had one personal assistant whom he knew from his political past in Baden-Württemberg. The partner state of Nordrhein-Westphalen would soon send staff from their own ministries, who were all promised a promotion if they served for two years in the East.<sup>473</sup> Other difficulties arose from the constraints they faced. Much of their leeway was restrained by the legal framework imported from the West. Any creativity or novelty was

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<sup>471</sup> On the GDR’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs closure, see for instance Raimund Krämer and Wolfram Wallraf, “Diplomat oder Parteiarbeiter? Zum Selbstbild einer Funktionselite in der DDR,” *Deutschland Archiv* 26, no. 3 (1993); Arne C. Seifert, ed. *DDR-Diplomaten und die deutsche Einheit. 25 Jahre VIP*, vol. 52 (Verband für Internationale Politik und Völkerrecht, 2015).

<sup>472</sup> Enderlein, in *Die Kunst des Vernetzens*, 436.

<sup>473</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 7.

restricted by the tight limits of the West German blueprint.<sup>474</sup> Another limiting factor was the now all-German *Wissenschaftsrat*, the science council. Composed of politicians and academics, its task was to advise political institutions across all levels of the federation on matters of research and science. In the process of unification, it advocated for a total accommodation and adaptation of universities to Western standards.<sup>475</sup> Where leeway for innovation was found, the West German disciplinary associations formed another conservative bulwark against any deviance, with the arguments of tradition and preservation of quality.<sup>476</sup> In short, the dynamics of unification led to the clear expectation that everything in the Eastern territories should be done like in the West, and anything that exceeded the model was to be dissolved and liquidated.<sup>477</sup> Within this framework, Minister Enderlein and his team's starting tasks were set: they needed to fulfil the stipulations of the unification treaty. This meant in particular making a fast decision about the higher education institutions falling under their jurisdiction and then drafting a legal framework for higher education in Brandenburg.<sup>478</sup> Underwriting the decisions they were about to make was their agenda to turn Brandenburg into a strong player in the field of science and higher education, partly to compensate for the loss of Brandenburg's industry,<sup>479</sup> and partly to retain the young generation by offering them attractive possibilities.<sup>480</sup>

The decision was quickly made; two staff sessions had to suffice.<sup>481</sup> They decided to take over the pedagogical "teacher training" university PH, as well as the HRV, but without the IIB, which was to be shut down. The decision to shut down the IIB was not a difficult one to make. The IIB in many people's perception was a *Kaderschmiede*, a forge of elites. It was an institution controlled by those in power to reproduce the GDR's political system and to produce a reliable generation of new recruits for the foreign policy establishment.<sup>482</sup> It was seen as a political institution, a pillar of Stalinism and an instrument of dictatorship.<sup>483</sup> There was a general sense and expectation in the West that these types of institutions could not be carried over into the new Germany. The decision therefore did not require much debate or discussion. There was a sense of obviousness and self-evidence about the fact that the IIB had to go: the former diplomatic training facility of the GDR could not become an institution of the new Germany.<sup>484</sup> The radical rupture with the old elites symbolized the departure from the GDR's ideology to the wider public and proved that the old

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<sup>474</sup> Hinrich Enderlein, Uni Potsdam - 20 Jahre, speech delivered at the 20th anniversary of the University Potsdam, 2010, 3.

<sup>475</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>476</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>477</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>478</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 11.

<sup>479</sup> Enderlein, Uni Potsdam - 20 Jahre, speech delivered at the 20th anniversary of the University Potsdam, 2.

<sup>480</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 5.

<sup>481</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 8.

<sup>482</sup> Interview Bürklin, 2020: 5.

<sup>483</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 15.

<sup>484</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 2,9,12.



system had been abolished.<sup>485</sup> Its function of “elite change” was to build a bridge between the need to reject the past and the task of building a future:<sup>486</sup>

*“This was exactly the object of our efforts. That is why we acted in the way we did, as I said, we tried to retain the qualitative changes that had been made [...] but at the same time we also had to draw a clear cut line with the past, which does mean that there is no perspective for the College [HRV] to continue existing as a whole”*<sup>487</sup>

Back at the IIB, the shock and disillusionment were palpable.<sup>488</sup> For almost a year they had worked tirelessly, completely westernizing their structure, curriculum, research orientation, networks and purpose. In a painful process of renewal, they had laid off half of their colleagues. They had implemented everything that they had learned or been told about the West German system, accepting it and working hard to adhere to all its standards. And yet it was not enough.

On 12 December, the HRV’s director Rolf Steding came to visit the IIB after a meeting at Brandenburg’s ministry of science, research and culture. A decision had been made: the IIB was going to be shut down. Rolf Steding’s assessment was that this was a political decision through and through and it bore no relation to the quality of the IIB’s renewal efforts.<sup>489</sup> A reformer figure himself, he had been elected by the HRV during the revolutionary times to democratically transform the institution and give it a future. The decision to wind down the IIB went against his personal sense of justice and morals, and he refused to execute the political decision of shutting down the IIB. Instead of sending out the letters of dismissal, he resigned from his post.<sup>490</sup>

*“After my election as director, I started working [...] to renew the HRV. With this goal in mind, I went up to and beyond my limits, putting measures in place that profoundly hurt the lives of many employees, and I had to put up with lasting personal hurt and trauma myself [...] I ask of you to understand that it is unacceptable for me to take up a position of director only in order to end up as a ‘liquidator’. I feel that this is a degradation and it offends my dignity. In the name of all the employees for whom I was a director, I would like to also express my dissent with the undignified way of their ‘dismissal’ from the university”*<sup>491</sup>

### **Three discursive strands**

Closing down the IIB needed to be publicly justified. In a mid-January parliamentary question and answer session in which Minister Enderlein was tasked to explain the closing of the IIB, we can

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<sup>485</sup> Misselwitz, 57.

<sup>486</sup> Ibid., 62.

<sup>487</sup> Landtag Brandenburg, 1. Wahlperiode, 8. Sitzung. Plenarprotokoll 1/8, 16. Januar 1991, p.277.

<sup>488</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 7.

<sup>489</sup> Fachbereich Politikwissenschaft, Beschlußprotokoll der Beratung des Direktors mit den Lehrstuhlleitern und Ratsmitgliedern am 12.12.1990. Potsdam University Archive, ASR7227.

<sup>490</sup> Letter from Rektor Prof. Steding, HRV to Hinrich Enderlein, Brandenburg Minister of science, research and culture, Potsdam 20.12.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV 7311.

<sup>491</sup> Letter from Rektor Prof. Steding, HRV to Hinrich Enderlein, Brandenburg Minister of science, research and culture, Potsdam 20.12.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV 7311.

see the three discursive strands of “quality”, “personal integrity” and “political networks” develop that would be of importance all throughout the process of change in the ex-GDR during the following months and years. These discursive strands describe how the GDR was perceived, approached and filtered in the new all-German space. This included representations by formerly ‘Western’ actors and individuals as well as representations by many ‘Eastern’ actors and individuals – a result of the preceding revolutionary dynamics described in chapter 3. While elements of all of three strands could be found across all levels and areas of society, they tended to concentrate in certain areas. The sphere of academia approached the GDR primarily through the lens of a competence discourse of “quality”, the sphere of society through the lens of a moral discourse of “personal integrity” and the sphere of politics through the lens of a winner discourse centred around the threat of “political networks”.

The discursive strand of “quality” referred to the content and form of knowledge production. Its implicit standard was the West German model. It applied to individual scholars’ qualitative and quantitative publication activities, a faculty or department’s structure and organization, and to teaching curricula and teaching contents. This manner of filtering and approaching the GDR was most prevalent in academia, where all things GDR were seen through the filter of “quality”. With regard to the closure of the IIB, Minister Enderlein argued that the “quality” of their reforms was the main reason why the jurists of the HRV were allowed to survive while the IIB had to be shut down. The decision to measure and evaluate quality in that case had been delegated to the science council *Wissenschaftsrat*, who evaluated the legal, but not the political, sections of the HRV. Minister Enderlein and his team made their decisions on the basis of the information available to them. And the available information did not feature the political section.<sup>492</sup>

We can see two dynamics at play here. The first one relates to the networks prevalent in determining the relevant standards of quality. Unlike the political sections of the HRV, the legal sections at the HRV had had the full backing of their West German equivalents and the respective professional associations from a much earlier point in time onwards.<sup>493</sup> As a result, the *Wissenschaftsrat* in Cologne recommended keeping the legal faculties.<sup>494</sup> The second dynamic starting to become visible was an individualization of the concept of quality. For Minister Enderlein, there was a distinction between the institution HRV and the individual reformers active at the IIB. The first one needed to go; the second one had a chance to stay.<sup>495</sup> This was very different from the reformers’ own views, who worked on changing and modernizing their institution and saw their works and efforts as tied into the institution. In their view, closing the IIB meant rejecting their efforts and competence.

The discursive strand of “personal integrity” referred to the degree of closeness with a system assessed to be unjust, immoral and dictatorial. While it was acknowledged that every GDR citizen had to navigate the coordinates of its social, cultural, economic and political system, it was assumed that each and every one of them had choice about the level of support that they gave to the system.

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<sup>492</sup> Landtag Brandenburg, 1. Wahlperiode, 8. Sitzung. Plenarprotokoll 1/8, 16. Januar 1991, p.276.

<sup>493</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 18.

<sup>494</sup> Letter from Rektor Prof. Steding, HRV to Hinrich Enderlein, Brandenburg Minister of science, research and culture, Potsdam 20.12.1990. Potsdam University Archive, HRV 7311.

<sup>495</sup> Landtag Brandenburg, 1. Wahlperiode, 8. Sitzung. Plenarprotokoll 1/8, 16. Januar 1991, p.277.

Particularly important in this regard was the Stasi, the GDR's secret service tasked amongst others with the surveillance of the population. Here different technical gradations were made with regard to affiliation with the Stasi, though ultimately anyone associated with the Stasi ended up being tainted.<sup>496</sup> This manner of filtering and approaching the GDR was quickly becoming the primary mode of interpreting all things GDR across all domains and sectors. However, it was most prominent in the media and society more generally, where all things GDR were seen increasingly seen through the filter of "personal integrity" and degree of affiliation with the Stasi. With regard to the closure of the IIB, Minister Enderlein argued that the new University of Potsdam, which was in the process of being set up, would be based not only on the principle of academic quality, but also on the principles of personal and political integrity (*persönliche politische Integrität*) and upholding high standards regarding its democratic development.<sup>497</sup>

The discursive strand of "political networks" refers to the GDR in terms of its past existence as a communist regime and its embeddedness in a communist alliance system. This discursive strand which we could also variably term as "old elites" or "former enemy" was very different from the "personal integrity" one: it was not focused on individuals, nor was it located on a moral register. Instead, it was a mode of seeing that foregrounded the GDR and its former citizens as elite networks and cliques threatening to remain in power. This manner of filtering and approaching the GDR was most prevalent in the sphere of politics, where the GDR still had a lingering quality of former "enemy". It played a particular role in the dissolution of the GDR's diplomatic corps and MfAA as well as in the refusal to take over any of the former GDR's diplomats into the new all-German diplomatic service.<sup>498</sup> Even the revolutionaries who had taken over the MfAA in the spring of 1990 were rejected in a consciously chosen break in continuity.<sup>499</sup> With regard to the IIB, its former connections in the East were disregarded or seen as threatening. In the parliamentary question and answer session, Minister Enderlein was asked whether he was aware that the IIB used to have excellent relations abroad and, if so, whether he planned on making use of these connections. The question was met by the ironical pronouncement of the minister that he was "not quite sure whether all these contacts that existed do fit with the future manner of conducting research at this university".<sup>500</sup> The university would seek out connections as it saw fit and as served the quality purposes of the university. The response was met with applause from all the major parties represented in parliament.<sup>501</sup>

## Free-floating elements

Academics, experts and intellectuals are the visible social carriers of ideas, thoughts and knowledge. What happened to them after the institutions and networks they were formerly part of were disbanded? What happened to the IIB staff after their home institution was shut down?

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<sup>496</sup> Misselwitz, 13-16.

<sup>497</sup> Landtag Brandenburg, 1. Wahlperiode, 8. Sitzung. Plenarprotokoll 1/8, 16. Januar 1991, p.278.

<sup>498</sup> Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 3-5.

<sup>499</sup> Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 6-7.

<sup>500</sup> Landtag Brandenburg, 1. Wahlperiode, 8. Sitzung. Plenarprotokoll 1/8, 16. Januar 1991, p.277.

<sup>501</sup> Landtag Brandenburg, 1. Wahlperiode, 8. Sitzung. Plenarprotokoll 1/8, 16. Januar 1991, p.277.

The social provisions of the unification treaty meant that they all continued to receive 70% of their former salaries for another half year before falling into the regular German unemployment scheme.<sup>502</sup> By the time of its dissolution, the IIB only counted 55 of its original staff members. Initially, 20 of them found temporary re-employment at the newly founded University of Potsdam, though the numbers shrank with almost every new term, ultimately leaving only four of the former IIB researchers employed permanently at the University of Potsdam. The rest found employment elsewhere.

### *Staying at the University of Potsdam*

When the decision to wind down the IIB was made, the idea was to find a “solution” with Berlin’s political science infrastructure, so that Potsdam’s 141 students would be able to transfer there.<sup>503</sup> This early idea did not go through as it faced resistance from two different sides. On the one hand, the FU in Berlin rejected the idea. Their own interest lay in the development of a strong political science in Potsdam. A strong political science in Potsdam equalled many new vacant posts in an overcrowded German academic landscape. It meant at least five professorships, each of which would be endowed with two or three assistant posts.<sup>504</sup> This was particularly interesting to the staff at the FU, since a job in Potsdam would mean being able to continue living comfortably in Berlin, while having an easy commute to the well-kept facilities of Potsdam.<sup>505</sup> On the other hand, the students protested. They were afraid for their future, disapproved of their institute’s closure and wanted to stay in Potsdam. Twenty-two students asked to switch their studies to law, a now safer course of study.<sup>506</sup> But the rest remained and protested. The minister responded by offering them a “study warranty”, the guarantee that they would be able to continue and complete their studies. In practical terms this meant that, in opposition to the original plans, political science would need to be on offer after all at the newly created University of Potsdam. It also meant that until a full political science degree was developed and set in place, the minister would need to rely on the IIB study blueprint as well as on its staff to be able to comply with the promise towards the students.<sup>507</sup> This change of plan meant that, ultimately, the difference between closing the political sciences and retaining the legal sections did not matter so much on a longer-term practical level, though of course its real significance resided on the symbolic level. Ultimately, the legal sections would go through further procedures of vetting and evaluation to reduce their staff to a small core, while the political science section would go through procedures of vetting and evaluation to rehire a small core of staff to further carry the teaching needs ahead.

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<sup>502</sup> Fachbereich Politikwissenschaft, Beschlußprotokoll der Beratung des Direktors mit den Lehrstuhlleitern und Ratsmitgliedern am 12.12.1990. Potsdam University Archive, ASR7227.

<sup>503</sup> Fachbereich Politikwissenschaft, Beschlußprotokoll der Beratung des Direktors mit den Lehrstuhlleitern und Ratsmitgliedern am 12.12.1990. Potsdam University Archive, ASR7227.

<sup>504</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 8.

<sup>505</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 4.

<sup>506</sup> Brandenburgische Landeshochschule, Studiengang Politikwissenschaft, Doz. Dr habil. Raimund Krämer, Empfehlungen für die Fortsetzung des Studienganges Politikwissenschaft der Brandenburgischen Landeshochschule im Sommersemester 1991, Potsdam den 21.01.1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292.

<sup>507</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 11.

In early 1991, Raimund Krämer was appointed as change manager, both to coordinate the short-term provision of teaching and to support the establishment of the new political science degree with a certain degree of continuity for the students involved.<sup>508</sup> Later he would be joined by various structure and curriculum commissions, along with the appointed founding dean, Prof. Rohe from Nordrhein-Westfalen, whose task it was to set up the University of Potsdam.<sup>509</sup> Once the new political science faculty would be established and all the posts open for application, the IIB staff would be welcome to apply in a procedure strictly following all the West German standards as well as a newly introduced emphasis on “quality”.<sup>510</sup>

But as of early 1991 Raimund Krämer was still alone in a leadership position at the now *de jure* dissolved IIB but *de facto* existing “entity”, aiming to avoid chaos and to provide teaching continuity.<sup>511</sup> The winter semester syllabus had been set in the autumn and thus only required rehiring the relevant staff by putting those necessary for teaching on temporary contracts for the remaining few months.<sup>512</sup> The next step involved determining which courses would be needed in the summer semester and hiring – again on the basis of temporary contracts – the relevant staff for that semester.<sup>513</sup> While Raimund Krämer was earmarked to lead this, it had to be done with close Western cooperation: the (West) German political science association DVPW and the political science faculty at the FU in Berlin.<sup>514</sup>

### *Rehiring staff*

For the summer semester of 1991, they decided to rehire relevant IIB staff to teach the bulk of courses in international relations and comparative politics, with the addition of one or two prominent West German IR or comparative politics professors to teach additional seminars or courses.<sup>515</sup> The IIB staff had to apply with one or multiple course proposals by mid-February.<sup>516</sup> A commission composed of two delegates from the FU Berlin, Potsdam’s new rector and Raimund

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<sup>508</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 6, 11.

<sup>509</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 6.

<sup>510</sup> Landtag Brandenburg, 1. Wahlperiode, 8. Sitzung. Plenarprotokoll 1/8, 16. Januar 1991, p.276.

<sup>511</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 11.

<sup>512</sup> Landtag Brandenburg, 1. Wahlperiode, 8. Sitzung. Plenarprotokoll 1/8, 16. Januar 1991, p.276.

<sup>513</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 3.

<sup>514</sup> Brandenburgische Landeshochschule, Der Rektor, Konzeption zur Fortsetzung des Studienganges Politikwissenschaft im Sommersemester 1991 und zur Gründung des Fachbereichs Politikwissenschaft an der Brandenburgischen Landeshochschule, Potsdam 28.01.1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292; Landtag Brandenburg, 1. Wahlperiode, 8. Sitzung. Plenarprotokoll 1/8, 16. Januar 1991, p.276.

<sup>515</sup> Brandenburgische Landeshochschule, Studiengang Politikwissenschaft, Doz. Dr habil. Raimund Krämer, Empfehlungen für die Fortsetzung des Studienganges Politikwissenschaft der Brandenburgischen Landeshochschule im Sommersemester 1991, Potsdam den 21.01.1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292.

<sup>516</sup> Brandenburgische Landeshochschule, Bet. Bewerbung für Lehrtätigkeit im Sommersemester 1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292.

Krämer evaluated these proposals<sup>517</sup> on the basis of fit with the Potsdam University's teaching needs, quality and personal integrity of the applicants.<sup>518</sup>

Next to international relations, which, given the IIB's expertise continued to be a de facto area of specialization,<sup>519</sup> explicit attention was given to political science methods and to the "political system of Germany".<sup>520</sup> These areas were to be covered by nine guest staff from the FU Berlin, who were seen to provide the necessary "high" quality level corresponding to Western political science standards in Germany and the equivalence of student performance across Germany.<sup>521</sup>

Thirty of the IIB's 55 remaining members of staff showed interest in remaining in academia and submitted course proposals. Seventeen were accepted and hired on a temporary contract with hourly paid rates; 13 were rejected.<sup>522</sup> Assessment of personal integrity played an obvious role in the decision-making, and it correlated with position on the career ladder. The IIB distinguished between two categories of seniority: the professors and lecturers on the one hand, and the assistants, regular and senior, on the other hand. Position in academic hierarchy became a shorthand for personal integrity: 71% of those rehired for the summer semester 1991 were assistants, while 77% of those rejected for rehire were from the category professor/lecturer.<sup>523</sup> The same procedure continued for the winter semester 1991/92, where a total of 27 former IIB staff members applied and 14 of these were hired, alongside four Western academics. Twelve were put on temporary working contracts, and two were paid on the basis of an hourly paid rate.<sup>524</sup>

In the meantime, around 40 students left the degree. A group of 80 soldiered through the year until the fall, when new applicants were taken in.<sup>525</sup> Study conditions were of high quality. The staff/student ratio was excellent with three or four students per seminar group and many high-profile visiting staff, including from the US and England.<sup>526</sup>

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<sup>517</sup> Brandenburgische Landeshochschule, Der Rektor, Konzeption zur Fortsetzung des Studienganges Politikwissenschaft im Sommersemester 1991 und zur Gründung des Fachbereichs Politikwissenschaft an der Brandenburgischen Landeshochschule, Potsdam 28.01.1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292.

<sup>518</sup> Protokoll über die Sitzung der Kommission zur Vorbereitung des Sommersemesters für den Studiengang Politikwissenschaft 19.2.1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292.

<sup>519</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 5.

<sup>520</sup> Brandenburgische Landeshochschule, Studiengang Politikwissenschaft, Doz. Dr habil. Raimund Krämer, Empfehlungen für die Fortsetzung des Studienganges Politikwissenschaft der Brandenburgischen Landeshochschule im Sommersemester 1991, Potsdam den 21.01.1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292.

<sup>521</sup> Brandenburgische Landeshochschule, Der Rektor, Konzeption zur Fortsetzung des Studienganges Politikwissenschaft im Sommersemester 1991 und zur Gründung des Fachbereichs Politikwissenschaft an der Brandenburgischen Landeshochschule, Potsdam 28.01.1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292.

<sup>522</sup> Bewerbungen für die Lehrtätigkeit im Sommersemester 1991. Potsdam University Archive, UP22911; Dozenten im Sommersemester 1991 im Studiengang Politikwissenschaft. Potsdam University Archive, UP2291.

<sup>523</sup> See the numbers in: Bewerbungen für die Lehrtätigkeit im Sommersemester 1991. Potsdam University Archive, UP22911; Brandenburgische Landeshochschule, Kommission zur Festlegung des Sommersemesters, Studiengang Politikwissenschaft, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 28.02.1991, Anlage 1, Lehrveranstaltungen auf Honorarbasis im Sommersemester 1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292.

<sup>524</sup> Kommission zur Festlegung des Wintersemesters 1991/92 im Studiengang Politikwissenschaft, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 18.6.1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292; Studiengang Politikwissenschaft, Bewerbungen für Lehrangebote für das Wintersemester 1991/1992. Potsdam University Archive, UP22911.

<sup>525</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 11.

<sup>526</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 5.

## Content

The following 13 courses by former IIB staff were accepted for the transition summer semester of 1991: Japan in the system of international relations; transformation processes in Eastern Europe; the crisis of perestroika; armament and disarmament since 1945; the EC's economic process of unification; introduction to comparative politics; introduction to international relations; core issues in the international economic order; the political parties of France in international comparison; gender theories; the East-West conflict in Europe post 1945; conflict regulation in international relations; and comparative development strategies.<sup>527</sup>

The course contents at that point were very “Western”, in the sense that they followed and matched with West German formats, standard formulations and typical course expectations. For instance, the course “introduction to comparative politics” presented, analysed and compared the different theories and approaches to comparative politics and illustrated these with contemporary examples of transformations, including, for instance, the transition from autocratic to democratic structures in Latin America.<sup>528</sup> The course “comparative development strategies” analysed, compared and evaluated the development strategies of Argentina and South Korea, so as to construct different models of development with the students. The course “Japan in international relations” transmitted knowledge about Japan's capabilities and positions in world politics, in particular in relation to the US, USSR, China and EC states.

The literature list given out to prepare for the exam *Vordiplom* in June 1991 features 32 titles, all of which were Western books and textbooks.<sup>529</sup> Exam questions for the core module “International politics” featured the following three prompts: “The principles of collective security and their applicability to the prevention and settlement of international conflicts”, “Explain options for ensuring security in Europe after the end of the East-West conflict” and “Consequences of global problems for world peace and international security – what challenges arise for international politics?”<sup>530</sup> Exam questions for the course in “comparative politics” (WS91/92) included the prompts “Compare the political systems of liberal democracy and real socialism according to their institutional structure, functionality and basic values of political culture”, “Compare the parliamentary system, the system of institutional separation of powers and plebiscitary democracy according to institutional structure, functioning and political culture”, “Name at least 3 criteria to categorize government types”, “Name the differences between institutional, social and individual power holders” and “Name the differences between dictatorship and democracy.”<sup>531</sup> Exam questions for the core module International Relations in the WS 1991/92 included the following questions: “Identify the essential differences between the schools of ‘political realism’ and ‘functionalism’ in the theory of international relations. Explain their importance for the analysis

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<sup>527</sup> Brandenburgische Landeshochschule, Kommission zur Festlegung des Sommersemesters, Studiengang Politikwissenschaft, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 28.02.1991, Anlage 1, Lehrveranstaltungen auf Honorarbasis im Sommersemester 1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292.

<sup>528</sup> Auszug aus dem kommentierten Vorlesungsverzeichnis. Potsdam University Archive, UP2291.

<sup>529</sup> Literaturliste zur Vorbereitung der Vordiplom-Prüfung (Auswahl). Potsdam University Archive, UP22911.

<sup>530</sup> Prof. Dr Kubiczek, Dr Kötter, Klausurthemen zum Kernbereich „Internationale Politik“. Potsdam University Archive, UP22911.

<sup>531</sup> Dr Krämer/Dr Wallraf, Klausurthemen zur Einführungsvorlesung im Kernbereich Komparatistik. Potsdam University Archive, UP22911.

and prognosis of international politics”, “Does the end of the Cold War also mean the resolution of the East-West conflict; Which opportunities and risks arise from the social upheaval processes in Central and Eastern Europe for European peace?” and “Explain the idea, fundamentals and functional conditions of collective security and present their practical relevance for the solution of conflicts in today’s world.”<sup>532</sup>

### *Leaving international relations*

As we have seen, a small number of IIB researchers found short-term employment in the newly set up University of Potsdam. But the majority of the remaining 55 became unemployed, just as the IPW’s 400 researchers had before them, as well all of the GDR’s diplomats and all of the teachers and researchers at the military academy, and many were about to be at the area studies departments across the former GDR universities. What happened to them?

At the beginning, funding was set into place by the German government to support research projects, the two most important being the ABM and WIP projects. ABM projects funded concrete research projects for a specific time of two, maybe three years. One had to apply with a research proposal and regularly account for its outcomes. Topics were set from general socio-political areas, such as development cooperation or employment questions. Securing employment in one such ABM project was considered a good and safe preliminary outcome, as it secured survival over the first couple of years after losing previous GDR employment.<sup>533</sup> Though different in terms of technicalities, funding details and so forth, the WIP projects worked similarly through funding short-term research for the period of one, two, or maybe three years.<sup>534</sup> The ABM and WIP projects allowed many of these recently unemployed researchers and experts to find temporary employment more or less in their former areas of expertise. Crucially, they prevented the simultaneous mass unemployment of all East German intellectuals. Because of the small-scale nature of the funded projects, and their variable lengths, this also contributed to the general individualization and diffusion dynamics of the unification period:<sup>535</sup>

*“It is important to know that one of the strategies of the West German establishment was to set up a relatively large number of programs of different lengths in which those [East Germans who had lost their jobs] could take part. As a result, everyone became unemployed at different times. The core element [of this strategy] was that [the East Germans taking part in these programs] all tried to find new employment during that time – not in their old positions, but somewhere else – and many did find new jobs” (Interview Elsenhans, 2019: 8-9)*

All of those who did not make it into one of these temporary research projects, or only made it for a short period time, had to either retire or retrain.<sup>536</sup> Most of those close to their retirement age had already been sent to pre-retirement during the cuts and changes of the revolutionary dynamics.

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<sup>532</sup> Kubiczek/Kötter, Klausurthemen Bereich Internationale Politik. Potsdam University Archive, UP22911.

<sup>533</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 9; See also Interview Fischer, 2020: 25.

<sup>534</sup> Interview Bürklin, 2020: 11.

<sup>535</sup> Interview Elsenhans, 2019: 8-9.

<sup>536</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 25.



Due to a lack of alternatives, anyone left who was eligible for retirement or pre-retirement took that path. Except for the few trying to make it in academia, everyone else retrained or branched out into entirely new directions, or at the very least had to acquire new credentials and qualifications:<sup>537</sup>

*“In principle, within six months I had to get myself to realize that I had to do something completely different. I was 38, 39 at the time. I had to spend another couple of decades working. In principle, the two options available were to start your own business – but on what basis? – or, which happened 100 thousand times back then, to retrain” (Interview Schwarz, 2019: 5)*

While few of the GDR’s former international relations experts stayed in the former field of expertise, few fell into unemployment. Most of them spoke many languages, knew much about the West and its realities, and their training had fostered analysis and critical thinking skills useful in any kind of system.<sup>538</sup> Especially those who had studied the West had “mentally” lived in its realities for many years.<sup>539</sup>

*“During the time of the unification, we almost all de facto lost our jobs. But, de facto we also all quickly got back on our feet and into employment. There were exceptions, of course, and many negative things happened, no question about it. And we were angry about many things” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 13)*

### The adult education sector

One type of employment that many went to was the wider education sector and the adult education sector in particular. With half the GDR having to retrain and requalify, teachers were needed to carry out these trainings and qualifications.<sup>540</sup> Academics in general had good teaching experience and the ability to learn new subjects fast, which made them good candidates for these posts. Two of these in particular attracted some of the former IIB staff: the teacher training attached to the University of Potsdam and the retraining of ex-NVA army officials in Berlin.

The teacher training at the University of Potsdam<sup>541</sup> was built by Bernhard Muszynski, the West German hired by the IIB during the revolutionary times to build the political theory part of their newly installed political science curriculum. He was part of the first wave of West Germans going East at a time of chaos and insecurity, the wave of the “knights of good fortune”. He and the others who had tried to find their luck in the East lost out to the dynamics of unification. As we will see in the next section “Building the new”, none of them were able to get any of the good professorial posts, who all went to what he termed “the official church”. Despite both being Western, the groups distrusted and disliked each other. Like the conquistadores in Latin America the posts and privileges of the “new land” went to the second-wave Westerners who came with powerful networks behind their backs and crowded out the first-wave Westerners who had come

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<sup>537</sup> Interview Schreiber, 2020: 14.

<sup>538</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 5.

<sup>539</sup> Interview Schreiber, 2020: 9.

<sup>540</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 8.

<sup>541</sup> For a comprehensive overview, see Manja Orlowski, *Das Unterrichtsfach “Politische Bildung” in Brandenburg. Eine qualitative und quantitative Studie* (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2006).

more or less solo to the East as adventurers. Feeling he would get marginalized by the second wave of West Germans, Muszynski knew he had to find a new base for survival. Having good contacts at the federal centre for political education, he managed to attract very important funding for Potsdam to establish a centre for adult education aimed at retraining East German schoolteachers.<sup>542</sup> In particular the GDR's old school subject of citizenship education had been abolished and instead political education had been introduced. The East German teachers needed to receive qualification in this subject. Similarly, the GDR school subject of astronomy had been abolished and Russian language training had become obsolete. Now teachers had to know English and French.<sup>543</sup> The funding that Muszynski attracted was very large and it was the very first round of external funding that the young University of Potsdam received, conveying him a certain standing and the ability to build the centre relatively independently.<sup>544</sup> This programme offered the possibility for Eastern academics needing an exit to either retrain and become schoolteachers or to get involved in the programme itself as administrators or as teachers. The University of Potsdam had too many staff from taking over the PH and the jurists of the HRV. Muszynski's programme was a part solution to this problem: it gave new employment to around 30 people from the University of Potsdam as part of the team and retrained some other 50–55 University of Potsdam academics as teachers, alongside the 3000 to 4000 from other institutions.<sup>545</sup>

The training programme for ex-NVA army officers was set up by the round table on military affairs during the GDR's revolutionary times. Once it had become clear that the GDR's future was set towards a unification with Germany it also soon became clear that not all NVA soldiers would have a future in a unified army. The 2+4 treaty stipulated that the new German army could only be 340,000 men strong. Both armies combined, however, were around 600,000 men strong. It soon became clear that many of these would need to be offered good alternatives and these would involve retraining and requalifying to become fit for new jobs.<sup>546</sup> It was a matter of high priority as it addressed the high problem of potentially dissatisfied soldiers mutinying or revolting. A civil war was to be avoided at all costs.<sup>547</sup> In order to prevent this, the officers in particular were offered a two-year high-quality programme to retrain in economics and business administration so as to find good posts in the German economic sector. Over 2000 NVA and Stasi officers were thus retrained in Berlin between 1991 and 1995 through a practice-oriented programme featuring multiple internship placements as well as the fast-paced acquisition of the basics needed for posts in the industry, local and foreign commerce, local and international businesses, banking, finance etc. The highly skilled officers were in high demand and around 95–97% found new employment instantly upon completing the programme.<sup>548</sup> They were disciplined, obedient, often spoke multiple languages and had special skills, knew how to fly helicopters, handle large machinery and equipment, and were often trained engineers or the like.<sup>549</sup> The requirements of the programme

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<sup>542</sup> Interview Muszynski, 2019:3.

<sup>543</sup> Interview Muszynski, 2019:3,6.

<sup>544</sup> Interview Muszynski, 2019:6.

<sup>545</sup> Interview Muszynski, 2019:8.

<sup>546</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 9.

<sup>547</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 10.

<sup>548</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 8-9.

<sup>549</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 9-10.

meant, in reverse, that teachers and trainers were needed to ensure its success and that much funding and financing was available. The programme offered good and lucrative contracts and became an interesting option for a number of the GDR's former academics.<sup>550</sup> The programme required people who could teach well and, above all else, who had the right personality to engage military officers and understand their situation and realities.<sup>551</sup> For the hired teachers and trainers this meant a fast-paced first couple of years, in which they had to teach themselves the materials that they were about to pass on. The challenge did not lie in understanding the materials: they only had to teach basics and their training in the GDR had taught them how to learn anything. The challenge lay in the short time frame, in having to prepare large amounts of material, develop course plans within days, and then acquire the taught materials oneself just before passing them on to the officers in training.<sup>552</sup> As we saw in the introduction, in this way Lutz Kleinwächter, an IIB specialist on armament and disarmament, started teaching economics and European integration, recycling, at the beginning, his old IIB course materials.<sup>553</sup> The programme had been attached to a then small institution, called “bbw *Bildungswerk der Wirtschaft in Berlin und Brandenburg*”. This was structure generated and funded by the association of private sector companies tasked to provide specialized training to its personnel. Thanks to the success of the officer training, which was completed in 1995, the bbw continued to grow and turned, in the 2000s, into an “applied university” (*Hochschule*) specialized in providing applied trainings for the economic sector. Once the programme ended, many of the East German academics who had found employment there as a trainer had acquired enough qualifications themselves to continue as lecturers and trainers in the field, teaching at the various universities, colleges and universities of applied sciences that Berlin and Brandenburg had to offer, including the growing bbw. Ultimately, this enabled some, as Lutz Kleinwächter did, to stay in the higher education sector and even become professors by taking the detour of retraining and changing specialization.<sup>554</sup>

### Economy, business and industry

While the education sector thus offered a number of employment possibilities, most East German international relations specialists found new employment in the economic sector, working for businesses or in the industry.<sup>555</sup> The insurance sector was a popular option,<sup>556</sup> but many also went into consulting, offering their regional expertise and language skills to the only stakeholders interested and able to hire them – foreign companies. Those who had studied in the Soviet Union or spoke Russian well were especially able to find employment options in business consulting abroad.<sup>557</sup> Chance and luck also played a role – one former international relations expert became a factory owner after his grandfather's tobacco company had been returned to him, another

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<sup>550</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 8

<sup>551</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 16.

<sup>552</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 12.

<sup>553</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 18.

<sup>554</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 9.

<sup>555</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 13.

<sup>556</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 13.

<sup>557</sup> Interview Schreiber, 2020: 8-9.

became a zoo director in South Africa, because her husband was a zoologist and she lost her post at the MfAA, and someone else started advising a Russian oligarch.<sup>558</sup>

Overall, the economic sector did not care about political affiliation, nor did it carry ideological prejudice.<sup>559</sup> In fact, having worked for the GDR government and having been in the SED party was seen as a plus: it told future employers that they were reliable, disciplined and punctual – no troublemakers. Their “undemocratic” qualifications, often coupled with high skill and specializations made them particularly attractive for businesses.<sup>560</sup> Even potential Stasi affiliations did not carry the same weight as in other domains. One former diplomat hired by a company producing sports equipment to liaise with clients from the Middle East was even told that experience with secret services was a plus when involved in the Middle East.<sup>561</sup> Many also managed to work their way up as a result of their East German “political” understanding of society: they took on functions that no West German wanted to take on, such as representing their company in the trade organizations.<sup>562</sup>

### State and political functions?

While the (West) German economic sector did not have much ideological prejudice against the East German academics, the reverse was true for the political sphere. This differed of course from political space to political space, but the former international relations experts in particular experienced the political parties and the MfAA as closed off and deeply hostile environments.<sup>563</sup> They saw and interpreted this as a manifestation of a victor’s mentality still stuck in the Cold War friend/enemy logic, enforcing their peace on their former opponents.<sup>564</sup>

*“At least with regards to the possibility of working in the state-political or in the state-institutional area, that is where the exclusion took place. We joined [West Germany] and up until the middle-management level, all leadership positions were replaced. There was no room for an ‘Easterner’, that’s how we can put it. Our pathway was via the economy, via specific economies. The possibilities were generally limited, that had nothing to do with [being part of] the army. A higher-level function in the state-political area, including higher education and the military, was excluded from the start. And this has remained in principle the case to this day” (Interview Schreiber, 2020: 9)*

*“On the political level, things worked as follows: these two elites had waged war against one another for 40 years at the most intensive level, up to the degree of personalized hatred and disputes. Looked at from an individual perspective, I can understand that they thought of themselves as the winners. Why should they give anything to someone who is already on the ground? But in the long run it is a miscalculation and it is problematic from the perspective of individual humanity” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 9)*

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<sup>558</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 19.

<sup>559</sup> Interview Schreiber, 2020: 9.

<sup>560</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 15

<sup>561</sup> Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 10.

<sup>562</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 13.

<sup>563</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 10.

<sup>564</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 10.

In the first years of unification, a few found employment as parliamentary assistants to MPs.<sup>565</sup> These options often came up as a result of previous connections or networks, and it allowed them to continue working in their former domain of expertise. Of course, these positions afforded only low pay and they were entirely geared towards the needs of the respective MP, not allowing for much freedom in research and thinking. Another option lay in becoming a civil servant and working in the administration of ministries and other state institutions at a low to intermediate level, especially for the federated states.<sup>566</sup> Senior positions there remained in general closed off for East Germans.<sup>567</sup> The states' central institutions for political education were another option for some to find employment.<sup>568</sup>

Other options were found by going abroad. Many former East German diplomats were able to find employment in temporary projects and missions of the OSCE. By working as election observers, they were able to capitalize on the specialist area knowledge acquired in their previous careers.<sup>569</sup> This was done with part affiliation to the German diplomatic service, whereby they remained independent consultants paid for through project budgets. Speaking Russian as well as some other local languages, they were sent to Eastern Europe and Central Asia in particular.<sup>570</sup> The diplomatic service, as we have already seen, remained closed to the former East German diplomats, with two very small exceptions. First, the GDR's diplomats working for the UN in New York were able to stay. Had they been dismissed alongside all their other colleagues, then Germany would have lost these spots at the UN. They decided to keep them. The other exception were those diplomats with rare language skills that Germany happened to need at that time. However, only the very young who had freshly started in the GDR diplomatic service were taken over.<sup>571</sup>

International organizations such as the UN or the EU also proved hard to access institutions, partly because the delegation principle went through the respective national states, and thus through a hostile German MfAA. But some possibilities remained. In the case of Thomas Ruttig, he applied directly to the UN when they needed qualified staff for their UN mission in Afghanistan. An accomplished Afghanistan expert speaking Dari and Pashto fluently, Thomas Ruttig was hired for the job. Being seen as not having any loyalty to a specific government was an asset for the mission. Later, when the mission's leader was hired as head of the EU mission in Afghanistan, he took Thomas Ruttig with him. He enabled Ruttig's employment with the German MfAA, as a dispatchment from an EU state was a requirement for the post. This is how, through the detour of the UN and later the EU, a former GDR diplomat was temporarily rehired to the German diplomatic corps.<sup>572</sup>

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<sup>565</sup> See for instance Interview Fischer, 2020: 12; Interview Gießmann, 2020: 1.

<sup>566</sup> See for instance Interview Franzke, 2019: 11; Interview Krämer, 2019a: 9.

<sup>567</sup> Interview Schreiber, 2020: 9.

<sup>568</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 12.

<sup>569</sup> Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 10.

<sup>570</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 14.

<sup>571</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 14.

<sup>572</sup> Interview Ruttig, 2019: 18-19.

## The societal sphere

In a wider societal sphere, a source of employment for former GDR international relations experts was journalism and publishing. Producing content for newspapers, journals or the radio as well as organizing and managing their publication was another type of work that capitalized on their former writing and thinking skills, and in some cases on their former specializations.<sup>573</sup> Wolfgang Schwarz, for instance, found employment working for a real estate magazine. Over time, he managed to add a foreign policy column to the magazine, publishing interviews with analysts and politicians that he knew from his former networks as a security politics expert.<sup>574</sup> Some journals and magazines, but also some discussion clubs and research circles, were set up initially with the direct or indirect help of project money and project funding from the ABM or WIP programmes described earlier. Thomas Ruttig, for example, set up a magazine on development politics for an NGO network he had met during the round table sessions on development politics, using ABM project money.<sup>575</sup> This network had been active in the GDR under the protestant church's cover, and the GDR's revolutionary phase brought Ruttig into contact with them. Siegfried Fischer, as another example, supported the creation of the Berlin Institute for Transatlantic Security, BITS, an institute financed through publications and project funding. He also contributed to the establishment of a Security Academy financed through ABM project money, which in turn indirectly enabled his involvement with BITS.<sup>576</sup>

## Can the “fallen” experts speak?

In the previous section we have seen how most of the GDR's international relations experts lost their jobs during the process of unification, but we have also seen how they were able to quickly find new employment, though generally not in the field of international relations. To what extent were they still able to engage in debates and conversations of their former field of expertise? What role were the former international relations experts of the GDR still able to play in discussions and debates around foreign policy and international relations?

To answer this question, it is helpful to borrow from debates around speech act theory and distinguish between a speaker and an audience.<sup>577</sup> The idea here is that the researchers, academics or experts who spoke, wrote and produced output did not do so in a vacuum. They were surrounded by various networks of institutions, groups and actors, which they may or may not have been connected with. But for their words and writings to carry weight and impact, these needed to reach an audience, i.e. enter relevant networks where they would be received and taken up accordingly. The distinction between speaker and audience also means that in a first step the researchers, academics or experts who analyse international relations needed to produce output

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<sup>573</sup> See for instance Interview Schwarz, 2019: 5; Interview Fischer, 2020: 16; Interview Ruttig, 2019: 16-17.

<sup>574</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 19.

<sup>575</sup> Interview Ruttig, 2019: 8

<sup>576</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 13, 25.

<sup>577</sup> For an overview of the debates and how to use the categories of locutionary silencing, illocutionary disablement and illocutionary frustration to describe various elements of silencing, see Sarah Bertrand, "Can the subaltern securitize? Postcolonial perspectives on securitization theory and its critics," *Can the subaltern securitize? Postcolonial perspectives on securitization theory and its critics* 3, no. 3 (2018).

and “speak” in some form that was made available to the audience. So, the question about the role and impact of the GDR’s former international relations experts in discussions and debates around foreign policy and international relations can be separated into two sub-questions: Can the “fallen” GDR experts in international relations speak? Can the “fallen” GDR experts in international relations be heard?<sup>578</sup>

### *Can the “fallen” GDR experts in international relations speak?*

Interest, identity and means were the three important factors playing a role in the East German academics’ continued engagement with international relations. Interest and enjoyment of studying international relations played an important role: when the GDR ended, it became apparent that many of those who had been researchers or scholars in the field of international relations did not necessarily enjoy their profession. Those who had not enjoyed their job as much took the opportunity to start something new, especially because no easy or straightforward way existed to continue their old profession. Those who had enjoyed their job previously or thought they could enjoy it in the new conditions tried longest and hardest to stay engaged, even when their new profession took them into new subject areas. Some remained prolific writers and others turned away radically from their past lives. In his personal experience, Raimund Krämer thought that around 80% of former IIB researchers turned their backs on international relations and around 20% stayed engaged with the topic area.<sup>579</sup> This was partly to do with having an “academic” personality and enjoying research or teaching, but partly with a personal need to break with the past or remain connected to it, a process everyone experienced differently.<sup>580</sup> The breakdown of their old lives and the devaluation of their past lives and achievements impacted them all, and for some this meant forgetting the past and not looking back. Identity thus played an important role, both in terms of identity with their general GDR past and in terms of identity with the role of international relations expert. Third, their individual capacity to engage in international relations analysis also played an important role. Those few who managed to stay in academia, as we will see in the next section “Building the new”, had an easier time engaging with international relations, though many of them had to change or modify their areas of expertise and all of them had to spend considerable time catching up with Western CV requirements and acquiring the necessary social capital for making it in academia. Those who left academia and retrained in a new profession were faced with limited capacities to engage. Starting a new job in a new field in a new system required all their attention and energy. The new system was not giving them any starting bonus and they had to work hard to prove themselves. As a result, the vast majority did not engage with international relations any more.<sup>581</sup> Those who did were either retired or did it on a voluntary basis alongside their day jobs, as a form of intellectual engagement:

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<sup>578</sup> I borrow language here from both Bickford and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *Can the Subaltern Speak?*, *Marxism and Interpretation of Culture* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988).

<sup>579</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 10.

<sup>580</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 9-10.

<sup>581</sup> Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 13.

*“That is when we founded WeltTrends - the journal and the publishing company. As a friend of mine once put it, we needed an escape from the stupidity of our daily lives. And that is why we did it, but it was self-exploitation” (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 13)*

Their continued engagement with international relations took place in the form of unremunerated volunteer work,<sup>582</sup> revolving around three areas: writing, organizing discussion circles and setting up journals or publishing outlets.

### Journal and publication companies

The most important of these initiatives in the field of international relations is and was the international relations journal WeltTrends. In the first years of unification, many of the former IIB international relations specialists tried publishing in West German journals, with varying success. The West German publication outlets were not particularly welcoming and one journal in particular, the left-oriented *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, was difficult to access and publish in.<sup>583</sup> Partly in reaction to this, they decided to set up their own journal,<sup>584</sup> which was set up in collaboration with researchers from the Western Institute in Poznań, Poland. From the start, the journal was not conceived as a leftist or political venue, but rather as a specialized foreign policy journal open to various political positions and aiming at the intelligent debate of current issues.<sup>585</sup> Many of the key actors behind WeltTrends had experienced the GDR's restrictions and censorship negatively and insisted on designing and enforcing an autonomous publication venue, not affiliated with any political institution or actor.<sup>586</sup> One of the journal's biggest achievements was to survive the unification years and establish itself, while remaining independent.<sup>587</sup> As such WeltTrends can be seen as the perhaps most successful of all these platforms.

### Associations of ex-international relations specialists

Another important form of engaging with international relations was through the creation of associations dedicated to providing discussion circles as well as specialized publication opportunities for their members. The three most important ones in the field of international relations were the one set up by former diplomats (*Verband für Internationale Politik und Völkerrecht*), the one set up by former researchers and academics of the military academy in Dresden (*Dresdner Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitspolitik*), and the one set-up by former IIB members (originally called *Politischer Club Potsdam* and later renamed *WeltTrends e.V.*), whose main purpose quickly became the development and support of the journal WeltTrends.

The association set up by former GDR diplomats, the *Verband für Internationale Politik und Völkerrecht*, was originally put in place in February 1990 during the last phase of the GDR's existence, once it became apparent that its diplomats might not be taken over by the West German MfAA. Its first aim was the creation of an interest group dedicated only and specifically to the

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<sup>582</sup> Interview Schreiber, 2020: 12.

<sup>583</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 4.

<sup>584</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 11.

<sup>585</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 8; Interview Elsenhans, 2019: 14.

<sup>586</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 11.

<sup>587</sup> Interview Muszynski, 2019: 14.



interests of diplomats and come up for their interests during the process of unification. Its second original aim was to facilitate the GDR's diplomats' re-employment in a new field, which they thought would be West German companies. They contacted a West German recruiter and first trainings on how to apply and succeed at job interviews took place. The West German company was very interested: successful scouting and placing of ex-diplomats in West German companies would have been lucrative business for them. But, as anecdotal evidence suggests, West German foreign affairs minister Genscher intervened and prevented high-ranking takeovers of ex-GDR diplomats wherever he could:<sup>588</sup>

*"Genscher's decision was a big disappointment for them and they were really upset because Genscher had prevented them from making big money with us. The company's director came to visit us one day and said, these are his words: nothing can be done, you guys are screwed" (Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 13)*

After this episode all the younger diplomats still of working age left the association and Berlin in search of a job elsewhere to support themselves and their families. Only the retired GDR diplomats remained, and the average age of the association rose considerably within a short amount of time. As a result, their aims and activities changed. They reoriented and transformed into a platform dedicated to debates, discussions and information about foreign policy in general and the foreign policy of the GDR in particular.<sup>589</sup> They organized publications and public talks to which they invited various speakers, from amongst their own group of ex-diplomats, but also from the German MfAA and foreign diplomats.<sup>590</sup> Sustained by member contributions and voluntary work, the ultimate purpose was perhaps to showcase their expertise<sup>591</sup> in a country that had rejected and marginalized them. Due to the increasing age and passing away of its members, the association was ultimately dissolved, its files transferred to the national archives and the publication rights conferred to WeltTrends.<sup>592</sup>

The association set up by the reform-oriented researchers and academics of the GDR's military academy, the *Dresdner Studienkreis Sicherheitspolitik*, DSS, functioned similarly to the one set up by the former diplomats. Its focus, however, lay primarily in publishing scientific analyses and studies, and less so on organizing evening talks or public talks. The DSS was founded in 1990 as the successor organization of an interdisciplinary research group formed during the GDR's revolutionary upheaval. This research group was located at the military academy in Dresden but was open to all researchers, lecturers and professors from various institutions and disciplines who could come together to explore the possibilities of demilitarizing security. Once the military academy was closed, the group reformed into the DSS. DSS's ultimate aim was to promote a peace-oriented approach to security and military affairs and over the years it cooperated with various peace-oriented activist groups. Founded in 1990, it dissolved again 25 years later due to the advanced age of its members, having published 115 studies. As with the VIP, its files were

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<sup>588</sup> Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 13-14.

<sup>589</sup> Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 13-14.

<sup>590</sup> Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 10, 15.

<sup>591</sup> Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 13-14.

<sup>592</sup> Interview Pfeiffer, 2019: 14.

transferred to the national archives after its dissolution and the publication rights conferred to WeltTrends.<sup>593</sup>

### Rosa-Luxemburg political foundation

Former GDR international relations experts also partly regrouped around the far-left party's think tank, the Rosa-Luxemburg political foundation, RLS. The RLS attracted in particular those East German academics who had been close to the central committee, in particular those coming from the military's political college, or the central committee's academy for social sciences AfG,<sup>594</sup> the teacher training facility PH, or the military's historical research institutions,<sup>595</sup> but also gave room to a wide array of professors and academics from other institutions or critical persuasion.<sup>596</sup> The RLS provided, in particular, the possibility to write and publish and to be part of political debates. But once the foundation received more funding with the Left Party's representation in parliament, they also needed regular staff to organize and carry out their own research on various topics including international relations. After almost a decade still working at the University of Potsdam, former IIB Eastern Europe specialist Erhard Crome became the RLS's head of the international peace and security division.<sup>597</sup> While regrouping a variety of different leftist positions, the RLS remained a political foundation, with all the elements that come with it. This made it a less attractive option for some of the former international relations experts who had grown wary of power and fixed ideological positionings, preferring a separation between political protest and analysis.<sup>598</sup> At the RLS, despite all the leftist orientation, East/West differences remained, increased over time by the ageing of the ex-GDR members.<sup>599</sup> Important positions within the RLS, including in particular the foreign representations, were covered by Western members, with Eastern members often having fewer chances at good posts in the left Rosa-Luxemburg foundation.<sup>600</sup>

### *Can the "fallen" GDR experts in international relations be heard?*

Through the dynamics of unification, the GDR's old structures of knowledge production in the field of international relations disappeared. With the old structures gone, all knowledge and skills acquired in the old system remained attached to the individuals who had been part of the old structures. In order to play a role again, these would have to be institutionalized again and set into a meaningful new structure. But the new system built up in the East, often under the leadership of actors socialized in the West, was not focused on re-institutionalizing the old:<sup>601</sup>

*"I believe that these first three, four, five years were very much shaped by ideological disputes, and especially in the social science field led to a fundamental distrust or concern in the old Federal Republic and also in circles of the political opposition in the GDR, that these structures would be preserved, that the political*

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<sup>593</sup> Interview Schreiber, 2020: 18.

<sup>594</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 12

<sup>595</sup> Interview Ersil, 2019: 6.

<sup>596</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 12.

<sup>597</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 4.

<sup>598</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 27.

<sup>599</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 12.

<sup>600</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019b: 11.

<sup>601</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 10-11

*thinking of the GDR sciences would continue to exist. And this meant that once the structures had been destroyed and the people were gone, then they are gone forever. They are then no longer part of the networks, they are no longer part of the important discourses, they are no longer part of the institutions. And you can't just make up for that" (Interview Gießmann, 2020: 10–11)*

Because these former experts were not as a whole re-institutionalized in the dominant networks, in the dominant discourses, in the dominant institutions, they remained largely without access to them. What they said or wrote did not, in general, reach the relevant places and people any more. The discussion circles of retired former experts, in particular, remained independent from the other circles and networks of discussion connected to politics and mainstream media.<sup>602</sup> The few individuals who succeeded did so because they managed to reintegrate relevant structures, find employment at important institutions and acquire the social capital necessary to address audiences in ways relevant to them. Overall, it is helpful to distinguish between those who articulated themselves as part of a group identifying in some form with the former GDR (such as the associations lined out in the previous section) and those who articulated themselves as individuals, on the basis of their knowledge and expertise. Here the latter had much higher chances of being heard, while the former were more easily discredited. However, even there, two additional things sometimes played a role. First, a mismatch between the views and topics of interest on both sides. In short, the message sent out by the speaker was not the message that the audience wanted to hear. Second, a disqualification of the speaker's credentials for being socialized in the East and for their past employment, leading to a distortion of their message and the inability of the audience to accept their points.

First, the mismatch between the views and topics of interest on both sides played a role in disconnecting the ex-GDR academics and researchers from their respective audiences. Let's have a look at two examples. Before deciding to leave Germany entirely and work as a consultant for foreign companies, Siegfried Fischer tried to make it in Germany in his old domain of expertise – security politics. He worked as a journalist, was even part of a radio show. It was the time of the war in Yugoslavia, but no-one was interested in his points. The “eternal peace” and the “end of history” mentality had taken over and audiences were not interested in anyone flagging up potential issues and problems or issues relating to security.<sup>603</sup> Thomas Ruttig, the Afghanistan expert who managed to build a successful second career through the international detours of the UN and EU, had similar experiences to those of Siegfried Fischer within the context of Germany. His analysis and points about Afghanistan were ignored because they went against the grain of both the government's positions and dominant knowledge producers. Despite being an internationally recognized and respected expert speaking fluent Dari and Pashto, Thomas Ruttig was only occasionally invited to official discussion rounds or consultancy sessions and rarely to any with political weight. Since 2016, his assessments of the situation in Afghanistan in particular went against the official knowledge facts underwriting the German immigration and refugee policies.<sup>604</sup> In his case, his (in)ability to connect with the dominant and relevant audiences was less a function

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<sup>602</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020.

<sup>603</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 14.

<sup>604</sup> Interview Ruttig, 2019: 22–23.

of his East German socialization than of his critique of the German military and political involvement in Afghanistan.<sup>605</sup>

Second, a disqualification of the speaker's credentials for being socialized in the East led to the inability of many audience members to accept their points. The ultimate disqualifier, of course, was and still is the Stasi label. Anyone afforded the label Stasi was "burnt", and their only option was to disappear.<sup>606</sup> Remaining active in their former areas of work became very difficult as they would discredit both themselves and anyone associated with them. But even without that label, having worked for a GDR state institution was enough as a disqualifier. For example, whenever publishing something or making a point in a discussion, Siegfried Fischer's past stood in the way. As a former NVA army officer and philosophy professor at the GDR's military college, he was immediately disregarded. In the eyes of most, this meant he must be either a "communist extremist" or a "military idiot".<sup>607</sup> While not necessarily immediately as obvious as in Siegfried Fischer's case, their past usually meant that what they were saying or writing was already given meaning to and interpreted by others, independent of the actual context:

*"Whenever I say something, a judgement is immediately passed: He is the 'leftist' one, or he is the 'red' one, or he is the 'weird' one, or he is the 'radical' one, he already said the same things 30 years ago. Of course, this is not the case! I constantly upset everyone on the left side of the political spectrum, and I constantly upset everyone on the right side of the political spectrum. Sometimes twice a day. Early in the morning I'll go to the peace discussion group at the [leftist think tank] RSL. They talk about armament and arms exports and the militarization of society. Then I say: What you are talking about - that's not a militarization of society. These are not good things, but we should not exaggerate – compared to England, for example, Germany is in a completely different position. Then they say: we knew you'd be like that, you are way too soft, etc.! On the same day in the evening go to a discussion group at the [conservative think tank] KAS. There they have all their NATO experts who say: we didn't make the 2% percent; the Germans are too weak. And then I stand up and say: but Germany has already done this, that, that and that. And then their response is: we don't need your left opinion! The same day. About the same thing. Some exaggerate in one direction, others in the other. If you say something against it, you will be criticized by both sides. It's like this every day"* (Interview Kleinwächter, 2019: 24)

## Conclusion

During the phase of the GDR's asymmetrical unification with West Germany, the East German system of international relations knowledge production was entirely dismantled. Most of its institutions were closed down, the experts and academics formerly operating in it had to find work in new domains and all the networks, ties and connections across institutions as well as between institutions and political stakeholders were dismantled. The vast majority of the GDR's former experts took on new professions to assure their material survival and stopped engaging with international relations. Those who continued engaging with their former area of expertise did so

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<sup>605</sup> Interview Ruttig, 2019: 24.

<sup>606</sup> Interview Schwarz, 2019: 4.

<sup>607</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 16-17.

in an unequal space in which their words and writings carried little weight, and remained separate from the dominant discourses, actors and decision-making processes of the new Germany.

This chapter has examined the relation between power and knowledge in the former GDR during its asymmetrical unification with West Germany. It organized the events at hand through the lens of the ideal-typical relation between colonization and knowledge sketched out in chapter 1. In doing so, it has shown how the principle of hierarchical orientation has played a role in the dismantling of the East German international relations infrastructure. In part 1, hierarchical orientation shaped the attitudes and behaviours of the East German academics trying to adapt to the new situation by fully orienting to the Western standards. It shaped the attitudes and behaviours of the East and West German actors involved in closing down the Eastern institutions and it structured the various discourses of inferiority (incompetence, amorality, danger) used to apprehend the East German international relations experts. Finally, it played a role in crowding them out of the dominant international relations analysis networks, both the academic and political ones, and in displacing them into a subaltern parallel system of knowledge production and dissemination disconnected from its dominant counterparts.

## CHAPTER 5

### Colonization/Knowledge: Asymmetrical Unification with the West and International Relations Expertise in the ex-GDR after 1990, Part 2: Building the New

*“[T]he general dilemma of this new beginning in the new states was: to what extent do you take into consideration the individuals and to what extent do you give priority to the quality of the new?” (Interview Keck, 2019: 6)*

*“Anticommunism merged with Stasi-anxieties, personal gains with arrogance” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 9)*

In the summer semester of 1993, West German professor Werner Jann started his new post at the University of Potsdam as a chairholder for “Administration and Organization”. He was the second of the newly hired chairholders to arrive in Potsdam’s newly built political science division. The mood was good, there was a sense of excitement in the air: they were building a new university from scratch, and this opened up many possibilities and opportunities. Upon arrival, he quickly learned that there were still a few academics from the GDR’s former IIB employed on temporary contracts. Given that his chair came with funds for two posts, the University of Potsdam soon came with a request: “We still have a few ‘leftovers’ from the old academy, they have all been evaluated positively [...] Have a look at them, we’d be grateful if you could take one of them.” And so, Werner Jann proceeded to talk with a couple of those academics “from the old academy” to see whether there might be a good match. None of them seemed open to doing something new, though, as working for him would require a reorientation into “administration and organization”. Until he spoke with Jochen Franzke. The two immediately got on well and Jochen Franzke said, “I’ll do it!”<sup>608</sup> An expert on socialist countries, Jochen Franzke had had enough time since 1990 to see that his former area of expertise had become entirely discredited and that a career in international relations would be near to impossible in this new Germany. He took his chance when offered the possibility to stay in academia, even if this involved having to start from scratch in an entirely new domain of expertise. After a series of 17 temporary employment contracts up to 1996 he received a permanent post,<sup>609</sup> and ultimately became a recognized expert in the field of local administration, even making it into *The Economist* in 2019.<sup>610</sup> This story highlights a number of the dynamics at play in this chapter. After the asymmetrical unification with West Germany, the knowledge infrastructure in the former East German territories was entirely reconfigured along West German lines and most of the posts filled with academics socialized in the former FRG. In

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
<sup>608</sup> Interview Jann, 2019: 3.

<sup>609</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 12.

<sup>610</sup> Interview Jann, 2019: 3. See also: “Autumn of the coalition,” *The Economist*, 31 Aug 2019, 2019.

order to stay in academia, the few East German international relations experts still remaining on temporary contracts would need to learn and adapt fast, change or tweak their domain of expertise, build a model Western curriculum and cope with both precarity and low status.

Following the lead of chapter 4, this chapter explores the relation between power and knowledge in the GDR during its asymmetrical unification with West Germany, but this time focuses on the dynamics surrounding the transfer and transplant of Western structures to the East. It makes sense of the events at hand by organizing them through the lens of the ideal-typical relation between colonization and knowledge sketched out in chapter 1. Colonization/knowledge describes a process in which an asymmetrical situation of takeover recasts the relevant parameters within which knowledge-making activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising about international relations take place. Following the colonization/knowledge nexus, these knowledge-making activities will take place within a strongly hierarchized space whereby a formerly independent knowledge space becomes absorbed and entirely oriented towards another knowledge space. Activities such as studying, teaching, researching, writing, publishing and advising will be characterized by a reorientation around the new pole of authority, with the institutions and organizations formerly bundling these knowledge-making activities falling apart, imploding, reorganizing or reorienting themselves within the new context. The core logic of colonization/knowledge is hierarchical orientation, and that dynamic will inform both the “social entities” involved in knowledge activities and the networks they are part of.



This chapter, “Building the new”, focuses on the way in which the principle of hierarchical orientation played out in the transfer and implementation of a new Western infrastructure of knowledge production into the former East German territories. It focuses primarily on the newly founded University of Potsdam, which was built and inaugurated post-1990 in Potsdam. It examines, first, the transmission of Western structures onto the University of Potsdam and its underlying *tabula rasa* principle. It then turns, second, to the hiring patterns and the restaffing of the University of Potsdam’s political science faculty, including the individualization dynamics underwriting it. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the patterns and reasons accounting for which former GDR academics made it in the new system, and which did not.

## Transmitting Western Structure

Post 1990, Western academic structures were transferred and imposed onto the universities operating in the ex-GDR space, regardless of whether these were new creations as in Potsdam<sup>611</sup> or had been taken over as, for instance, the *Humboldt University* in Berlin. Regarding IR, this was done in particular by transferring and imposing the structure of West German political science, the disciplinary formation holding and encompassing foreign policy analysis and international relations.

The transmission of a West German political science structure to the ‘Eastern’ territories of the former GDR was based on the *tabula rasa* principle.<sup>612</sup> *Tabula rasa* assumed that no equivalent structures worth building upon existed in the GDR and that the West German structures could simply be exported East. The *tabula rasa* principle emerged through the combination of two elements: the re-spatialization of academic structures and the development of a discourse of ‘quality’ in academia. The re-spatialization of academic structures through the process of German unification regrouped the former East German international relations infrastructure under the wing of the closest West German equivalent: the discipline of political science and its gatekeeper, the West German political science association DVPW. The discourse of ‘quality’ developed in academia as a way of approaching the GDR’s academic space and making sense of it. Based on the articulation of the opposition between science and ideology, or rather quality and ideology, it assumed, first, that the GDR’s academic production was ideological and, second, that quality and ideology were not compatible.

### *Re-spatializing the context of international relations expertise*

In the GDR, international relations operated as an independent field. As we have seen in chapter 2, it was spread across multiple institutions: the IIB, the IPW, the universities and institutions of the military being the most prominent centres of international relations expertise. These institutions criss-crossed and engaged with one another in various relations of cooperation and rivalry, and stood in various relations of distance and proximity to a wide array of political stakeholders, ranging from the various members of the central committee’s *Politbüro* to the different ministries, including the tight connections with the MfAA’s practical expertise on international relations.

In West Germany, there was no such free-floating field. Since the end of World War II, international relations had been a set component of the discipline of political science. Having had to establish itself in a fight against the jurists, sociologists and economists, post-World War II political science developed a strong identity as ‘integrative science’. As the sphere of politics could not be understood through the lens of one aspect alone, it needed a discipline attuned to all its facets. And the analysis of a state’s foreign policy formed one such aspect from the start.<sup>613</sup> The

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<sup>611</sup> On the creation of Potsdam University, see Barbara Marshall, *Die deutsche Vereinigung in Akademie: West- und Ostdeutsche im Gründungsprozess der Universität Potsdam 1990-1994* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2016); Jacobsen; Manfred Görtemaker, *25 Jahre Universität Potsdam: Rückblicke und Perspektiven* (Berlin-Brandenburg: Be.bra Wissenschaft Verlag, 2016).

<sup>612</sup> Interview Misselwitz, 2020: 7-8.

<sup>613</sup> Interview Göhler, 2019:7.



discipline's fragile unity had been questioned for the first time again during the 1968 movement, dividing it between a 'Marxist' and a 'bourgeois' wing. It was questioned again in the 1980s, when applied policy research threatened to splinter the discipline's core into a myriad of expertise areas.<sup>614</sup> The West German political science association DVPW had internalized this anxiety about its identity and, when the moment of German unification arrived, its main goal was to preserve the unity of the discipline, both to prevent any potential splintering and to ensure the legitimacy of the discipline and its continued survival. At the time of unification, the DVPW counted around 1,600 members and spanned most of the discipline. The leadership circle counted around 12 active members dividing the tasks at hand, and the handling of the disciplinary development in the new member states became the particular responsibility of the leadership trio of Beate Kohler-Koch, Bernhard Blanke and Gerhard Göhler.<sup>615</sup> Their main fear was that each university and institute in the GDR would develop their own versions of 'political science', with questionable compatibility with the West German standard model. All across the former territory of the GDR, political science degrees and institutes had been sprouting out of the ground and with the financial support of the DAAD and other political foundations, Western professors and academics were offering all sorts of courses labelled as 'political science'. The main problem of this, in the eyes of the DVPW, was its unstructured and unregulated format. The DVPW felt mandated to intervene and guide the process into a rational and transparent format.<sup>616</sup> Given the contested history of the discipline, the DVPW feared a loss of reputation, should the GDR institutes not live up to the West German standards.<sup>617</sup>

In the process of unification, the former Eastern institutions were attached and dissolved into their comparable counterparts in the West. Where no direct counterpart could be found, the closest equivalent would have to do. In the case of the field of international relations, this meant that it docked onto the disciplinary field of political science. Political science acted as an organizational, interpretive and normative category.

### *Organizational*

Political science acted as an organizational category in the sense that it concretely organized the formation of international relations in the GDR's former Eastern territories. Keeping international relations as a separate field wasn't even thought about, or discussed. The DVPW had neither an interest in seeing IR as separate, nor any manner of conceptualizing IR as separate from political science.<sup>618</sup> This mindset ensured that no independent discipline of international relations could emerge, and that international relations was always thought of as a subdiscipline of political science. It ensured that the form and content of enquiring into 'international relations' would be consistent with the form and contents developed in the subdiscipline of 'international relations,' with its usual fields and issues of enquiry, including a close connection with the study of Germany's foreign policy.

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<sup>614</sup> Interview Göhler, 2019:7.

<sup>615</sup> Interview Göhler, 2019:9.

<sup>616</sup> Interview Göhler, 2019:8.

<sup>617</sup> Email Interview Wewer, 07.02.2020.

<sup>618</sup> Interview Göhler, 2019:6.

Moving international relations into the field of political science was part of a wider process in which disciplines and fields of studies were re-organized. For IR, this meant that it found itself put into the group of ‘political science’ together with the discipline of Marxism/Leninism. Pre-1990, IR had had virtually no connections with Marxism/Leninism beyond the fact that students had to take M/L foundational courses in their first two years of study. While IR was thus grouped together with Marxism/Leninism, it was separated from the discipline of area studies that it did have close connections to pre-1990. Area studies was kept out of political science and treated as a separate discipline.

The discipline of Marxism/Leninism played an important role. We have seen in chapter 2 that Marxism/Leninism was a core course for first- and second-year undergraduate students and as such also played a role at the IIB. But it remained quite separate from ‘international relations’ and was not understood to be part of the same discipline or field of enquiry. Because of Marxism/Leninism’s embeddedness in political philosophy, however, its docking point to the West German system also became political science. Already during the revolutionary dynamics of 1989/90, many of the philosophy faculties responsible for the Marxism/Leninism training rebranded themselves as political science in an attempt to survive the system change. These attempts were received with fear in West German political science circles. In their view, ‘scientific communism’ was not a science but a tool of ideological indoctrination. If they labelled themselves as ‘political science’ and then integrated the West German field, they had the potential to discredit the discipline as a whole:

*“[I saw] how the GDR colleagues marched into the West in the autumn of 1989 and told everyone that scientific communism was political science. And the DVPW was terrified that all these East German would-be political scientists would join [their association] and form a majority.” (Interview Elsenhans, 2019: 3)*

These developments were particularly threatening for the IIB researchers, who had also re-oriented into political science. They soon realized how dangerous the claims of the former Marxism/Leninism experts were for their own credibility:

*“There were certainly justified fears amongst the Western political scientists which, to be honest, I also shared, because we had an incredible number of Marxism-Leninism teachers in the GDR, including at the IIB, at the [DASR] academy, and also at the teacher training institute in Potsdam. These ML teachers left their previous ML institutes in droves in the autumn of 1989 and tried to get into the newly emerging political science institutions. Raimund Krämer had, thank God, opposed these efforts since March 1990, so that only very few came to the IIB. That was very dangerous, because most of them had neither the educational nor the theoretical-methodological background necessary to engage in political science. But for the short term, they just tried to get a new ‘stamp’ so that they no longer had to apply for posts with their old M-L certificates.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 8)*

Because they had both rebranded themselves as political science and were both operating as fields with theoretical docking points to political science, ‘international relations’ and ‘scientific communism’ became part of the same new field. So the new area of ‘political science’ originating from ‘international relations’ and the new area of ‘political science’ originating from scientific communism were associated with one another and put in the same category of ‘East German would-be political science’. And because ‘political science’ with roots in scientific communism was by far numerically dominant, a slippage occurred whereby the category ‘East German would-be

political science' became understood as solely originating in 'scientific communism' with the IR sub-branch being forgotten.

While international relations was merged with scientific communism, it also became separated from area studies. In the West German understanding, area studies were not 'political science' and they therefore also did not have a place in the discipline. If a specific location, as for instance the university of Leipzig, had both a strong area studies programme and a newly developed political science curriculum based on 'scientific communism', the two were handled as entirely separate disciplines. From the perspective of the DVPW, their concern was to establish a clean political science degree consistent across East and West.<sup>619</sup> If specific universities wanted to offer a side option with specialization in a specific area, that was considered a possible option, but none that concerned the DVPW:

*"[Area studies] was a kind of decorative accessory, to put it a little harshly. Following the principle: If you want it, you are welcome to do it, but it is not our problem. We believed it was our task to create a structure in which, according to our understanding, political science was rationally structured in its core areas."*  
(Interview Göhler, 2019: 6)

Area studies in the GDR had no formal equivalent in West Germany, no professional association or political leverage of the kind that could have taken it under its wing and protection. Despite having specialized expertise in many areas where West Germany was lacking, this lack of correspondence to a structure it could fall into led to a marginalization of area studies during the process of unification and an ultimately much slower process of transition and re-organization.<sup>620</sup> It also did not help that area studies split internally during the process of unification into a wing focused on literature and linguistics and a wing focused on socio-political developments. Because of its association with the GDR's political system and ideological structure, the socio-political branch of area studies became more problematic, and the discipline also tried to survive by recentring around linguistics and literature.<sup>621</sup> This also led to a further differentiation and distancing from international relations.

### ***Interpretive***

Beyond its role as an organizational category, 'political science' also acted as an interpretive category. It led to a situation whereby no academic development in the GDR could be looked at, interpreted or evaluated on its own terms. Any consideration, interpretation or evaluation became absorbed by the category 'political science'. This meant that all debates about GDR research and teaching revolved around one question: was this political science? Correspondence to political science became the only criteria through which international relations, but also 'scientific communism', could be understood. Underlying the interpretive frame was an equation of 'political science' with elements such as 'freedom', 'apolitical', 'speaking truth to power', 'pure science', 'unbiased', 'analytical', 'open-ended', and so forth. So if academic performances in the GDR were to be considered 'political science' they would need to be 'free', 'apolitical', 'unbiased' etc.

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<sup>619</sup> Interview Göhler, 2019: 6.

<sup>620</sup> Interview Elsenhans, 2019: 9-11.

<sup>621</sup> Interview Elsenhans, 2019: 9.

Conversely, anything not deemed to be 'political science' would then be 'unfree', 'political', 'ideological', 'an extension of power and politics', 'biased' and 'pre-determined'.

This led to two things: West German actors arguing against the existence of political science in the GDR, and GDR actors arguing for the existence of political science in the GDR.

The West German political scientists involved in the unification dynamics had spent considerable time and effort debating whether 'scientific communism' was actually a science and whether it was, more specifically, political science.<sup>622</sup> Their conclusion was that 'scientific communism' was not a science but in fact an ideology and that therefore no political science had existed in the GDR. By extension, this also meant that the form of political science emerging from international relations had been 'ideological' and not 'political science'. We can see this same line of argumentation in the science council's evaluation of political science in East Germany. Tasked by the federal government to assess the status of all disciplines in the former GDR territories, the science council formed working groups that visited different locations,<sup>623</sup> though not Potsdam, and took into consideration various information materials about the current state in the planning and developing of the new universities/subject areas.<sup>624</sup> Their assessment is worth quoting:

*"The economic and social sciences are among those subjects in which a fundamental reorientation in terms of personnel and content is necessary, because the existing degrees of study were one-sidedly geared towards Marxist-Leninist social theory and the centrally administrated state-monopolized economy. The taught subjects were largely isolated from the scientific development of the West, restricted in their area of study and methodologically narrow. They therefore lack important conditions for scientific performance."*<sup>625</sup>

*"Political science, as defined by the standards of pluralistic and democratic states, did not exist in the GDR. The units that did exist with high levels of staff, namely scientific socialism/communism, served specifically the goals of a comprehensive political indoctrination of all university staff in the GDR as well as the self-justification of the political system and its ideology. It is understandable that political science as a scientific subject in the universities of the new states – unlike in sociology – cannot connect to any existing structures."*<sup>626</sup>

This process of defining East German 'political science' as ideological was supported by a system of evaluations, whereby the publications of the respective academics were evaluated against West German criteria. They were found to be lacking both in terms of quantity and quality, as evaluated all across East Germany, focusing primarily on the field of Marxism-Leninism.

Quantity was determined by the number of published monographs and journal articles. These were found to fall short of the West German standards:

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<sup>622</sup> See for example Greven and Koop.

<sup>623</sup> These are: the HU Berlin, the TU Dresden, the University in Halle-Wittenberg, the university in Jena, the university in Leipzig, the Handelshochschule in Leipzig, the Hochschule für Ökonomie in Berlin.

<sup>624</sup> Wissenschaftsrat, "Empfehlungen zum Aufbau der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften an den Universitäten / Technischen Universitäten in den neuen Bundesländern und im Ostteil von Berlin, März 1991," in *Empfehlungen zur künftigen Struktur der Hochschullandschaft in den neuen Ländern und im Ostteil von Berlin* (Köln 1992). p.58

<sup>625</sup> Ibid. p.58

<sup>626</sup> Ibid. p.61-62.

*“And then we looked at their publication lists and there was nothing! Of course, one could not publish so easily in the GDR. Paper was scarce, we were told. So they could not publish endlessly. Ok, so then we said: let's look at the manuscripts in their desk drawer (as we knew from the inner emigration under National Socialism). But there weren't any”(Interview Göhler, 2019: 3)*

Quality was determined by the amount and type of citations and overall references. The quality of the reviewed work was then deemed to be poor for a lack of citations, or, when citations were included for being solely ‘ideological’ citations of Lenin or last party congress:

*“Have a look at the [GDR] publications and see for yourself how they were using footnotes, references and other elements of good citation practice. And if there are none or it is limited to a quote from Lenin or from the last party congress ... Of course, we knew that in the GDR, [references] like these to be made in the introduction and in the conclusion, because everything had to be anchored ideologically. I would accept that because I know that this is how things were done. But then I looked at the middle part: What has been processed there, what comes out of it?” (Interview Göhler, 2019:13)*

On the other side, this prompted the IIB’s reformers to also engage in the conversation and demonstrate that international relations, in the GDR, had in fact been political science.<sup>627</sup> Their arguments revolved around the distinction between form and essence: while there had not been any political science in the form that is usual in West Germany, the essence of political science – impartial analysis of socio-political developments across the world – had been a key component of research and teaching activities at the IIB and IPW:

*“Political science was never added to [international relations], it was always there. [...] Obviously we always did political science in the traditional sense at the IIB, even if it wasn't called that in the GDR. If I examine the relation between nationalities in the Soviet Union and analyze the problems that arise from it, then this is political science. When I write about the leadership styles of the general secretaries of the Communist Parties, it is political science, or when a colleague writes about the conflicts in the Balkans between the socialist countries there, it is also political science. In the GDR, the state-oriented science of the international relations was at its core political science. Denying this served as a defence shield for some West German colleagues in order to get rid of us.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 8)*

## **Normative**

Political science also became the normative frame to evaluate GDR academic knowledge production in the areas of enquiry associated with it. Because political science was associated with the ‘science’ side of the ‘science/ideology’ dichotomy, it became good and desirable to be labelled as ‘political science’ and a disqualification when labelled not to be. As such, international relations became normatively associated with political science in two ways. First, in the sense of whether international relations as an independent field of study showed the qualities and attributes associated with political science. Second, in the sense of whether an independent discipline of international relations was desirable or possible. Here the idea of a loose discipline of international relations was threatening, as it needed ‘political theory’ to know what was right and wrong and

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<sup>627</sup> See for example Erhard Crome et al., "Zum neunmonatigen Versuch eines Aufbaus der Politikwissenschaft in Potsdam im Jahre 1990," in *Die Babelsberger Diplomatschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der DDR*, ed. Erhard Crome (Berlin: WeltTrends, 2009).

make good moral judgement. Any efforts to create a separate field of international relations were seen as threatening, not just in the organizational sense of splitting up the wider discipline, but also in the normative sense of disjoining international relations from political theory.<sup>628</sup>

### *Setting up the new universities in the East*

The *tabula rasa* principle indicated that no political science equivalent to the West German model had existed in the GDR. Because of the organizational, interpretive and normative effects of the discursive use of West German political science as a point of reference, it could both be concluded that the GDR had no previous traditions of political science that one could build on or take over and that the development of political science in the East according to Western standards was necessary and desirable.

The transfer of West German political science to the Eastern territories was conceptually and temporally divided into a three-step process: first transfer and establish the structure of political science, then set the teaching contents, then decide about whom to hire as academic staff.<sup>629</sup> This section examines the first two steps of setting up structure and content at the University of Potsdam. Four main actors played a role in this process: the West German political science association DVPW, Brandenburg's ministry of education under the lead of minister Hinrich Enderlein, the all-German science council *Wissenschaftsrat* seated in Cologne, and the various committees of the University of Potsdam itself tasked with actually setting up the newly founded university.

#### Political science association DVPW

As we have seen, the West German political science association DVPW played an important role in setting the standards of what political science should look like at its core and ensuring its standardization across all locations in the East ("*gemeinsame Grundstruktur*").<sup>630</sup> Its function was thus as standard-setter and coordinator. Later, the ministerial bureaucracies of the respective states took over once they had become functional.<sup>631</sup>

In the earlier stage of the process, before the East German institutions were dissolved, the DVPW had been in direct contact with the respective East German political science departments, advising, helping out, sending staff, and coordinating across locations. With the dissolution of the East German institutions, its direct power and influence disappeared. Now new structures were going to be established, and the committee responsible for this would be appointed by the federal ministries of education through a chain of committees. Threatened with losing its grip on the process, and facing the heightened power of political actors to make decisions about their discipline, the DVPW insisted with the ministries and the new university directors that the political science structure committee of each new university would need to feature at least one member of

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<sup>628</sup> Compare with Interview Göhler, 2019: 6, 8-9.

<sup>629</sup> Interview Göhler, 2019:1.

<sup>630</sup> Interview Göhler, 2019:8.

<sup>631</sup> Interview Göhler, 2019:10.

the DVPW.<sup>632</sup> In Potsdam, Prof. Göhler would become the responsible DVPW contact point<sup>633</sup>. It is in this sense that the DVPW successfully influenced the process: by having a representative with voting power sit at the actual committees making the decisions about the structures of the degree.<sup>634</sup> More subtly, their power also resided in naming and shaming; in that sense no ministry or university would have wanted to strongly go against the organization's explicit recommendations.<sup>635</sup> Beyond this, the DVPW did not play much of a role going forward, and certainly not anymore once all the important professors were hired in the next step.<sup>636</sup>

### Ministry of education

The ministries of education of the respective states played another important role in the process. In the case of Potsdam, we have already discussed Hinrich Enderlein, Brandenburg's new minister responsible for higher education. He and his team's role resided in drafting the legal framework underwriting higher education, and, importantly, appointing the directors of the newly set-up universities as well as, together with the newly appointed directors, setting up a 'founding senate' (*"Gründungssenat"*), which is the organ responsible for making all the decisions regarding the building and setting up of the new universities.<sup>637</sup> In Potsdam, minister Enderlein chose professor Rolf Mitzner to be the new director of the University of Potsdam. A GDR professor of chemistry at the PH, the GDR's teacher training facility in Potsdam, Rolf Mitzner is part of the reformer movement of his institution. During the revolutionary upheaval of 1989/90 he was elected as the PH's new director to democratize and reform the institution.<sup>638</sup> As the new University of Potsdam was built on a merger of the old PH and the old legal sections of the HRV, appointing the democratically elected reform-director was a no-brainer: Hinrich Enderlein wanted to build the academic infrastructure in Potsdam as quickly as possible, director Mitzner was democratically elected, seemed competent and the two had a strong personal click from the beginning.<sup>639</sup> Together with the newly appointed director Rolf Mitzner, they decided on the 'founding senate', the organ responsible for setting up the new university, trying to achieve a good mix between East and West as well as between natural and social sciences/humanities.<sup>640</sup> It was, in turn, this founding senate that would appoint the specific committee responsible for setting up the structure of the political sciences in Potsdam and decide who would sit on that committee.

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<sup>632</sup> Letter from Prof. Dr Beate Kohler-Koch, chairwoman of the DVPW, Betr. Politikwissenschaft in den neuen Bundesländern, Mannheim 22.01.91. Potsdam University Archive, UP22914; Prof. Beate Kohler Koch, DVPW Vorsitzende, Zwischenbericht, Aufbau der Politikwissenschaft in den neuen Bundesländer, Mannheim 22.01.91. Potsdam University Archive, UP22914.

<sup>633</sup> Prof. Beate Kohler Koch, DVPW Vorsitzende, Zwischenbericht, Aufbau der Politikwissenschaft in den neuen Bundesländer, Mannheim 22.01.91. Potsdam University Archive, UP22914.

<sup>634</sup> Interview Göhler, 2019:9.

<sup>635</sup> Email Interview Wewer, 08.05.2020.

<sup>636</sup> Interview Jann, 2019: 8.

<sup>637</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 10.

<sup>638</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 9-10.

<sup>639</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 10.

<sup>640</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 11.

### The Science Council (“*Wissenschaftsrat*”)

Another important actor in this process was the all-German, formerly West-German, science council *Wissenschaftsrat* seated in Cologne. Following article 38.1 of the unification treaty, the science council was tasked to evaluate all the newly created universities and issue discipline-specific recommendations of how to go forward in the “necessary process of renewal”.<sup>641</sup> While not binding, its recommendations carried weight: their fulfilment came with financial support. Whenever the science council issued a recommendation, it also recommended its financing.<sup>642</sup> While higher education was and still is a matter for the respective federated state, the financing of half the costs of setting up a new institution was to be funded by the federal level – granted they approved of the project.<sup>643</sup> With his ambitions to build three new universities in Brandenburg, along with five colleges of applied sciences, this was a lot of money that minister Enderlein could not bypass.<sup>644</sup> The recommendations of the science council thus carried weight.<sup>645</sup>

The science council was composed of three groups: scientists, politicians from the federal level and education ministers from the state level. While the scientists had a majority by one vote, decision-making typically required a lot of negotiation.<sup>646</sup> While the unification dynamics meant an expansion of the science council to include the newly elected East German science ministers, not many changes were made to the composition of the body of scientists. Not more than a handful of East German scientists were included. As a result, the science council’s view and position were very ‘Western’.<sup>647</sup>

The science council recommended building political science in the former Eastern territories. The arguments were the same as the ones used by the IIB in October 1990 to try and assure its survival. First, political science was a natural and self-evident component of all democratic-pluralistic industrial societies. Second, the radical transformations of the socialist countries in Eastern Europe towards pluralistic constitutional political orders would need to be supported by political science research. Third, a region such as East Germany where the free scientific analysis and reflection of its political order was tabooed, was in particular need of scientific analysis. Political science offered the necessary concepts, questions and methods for this research. In this sense, political science contributed to the development of a democratic political culture in the new states. Fourth, political science provided the technical basis for training teachers, in whose hands the political education in schools would reside.<sup>648</sup>

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<sup>641</sup> Wissenschaftsrat, in *Empfehlungen zur künftigen Struktur der Hochschullandschaft in den neuen Ländern und im Ostteil von Berlin*. p.58

<sup>642</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 5.

<sup>643</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 3.

<sup>644</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 5.

<sup>645</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 3.

<sup>646</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 6.

<sup>647</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020: 12.

<sup>648</sup> Wissenschaftsrat, in *Empfehlungen zur künftigen Struktur der Hochschullandschaft in den neuen Ländern und im Ostteil von Berlin*. p.73-74.



The science council recommended building a political science degree in at least one university of each of the new Eastern states, featuring the classical four professorships.<sup>649</sup> A particular focus of these new political science degrees was to lie in public policy and public administration, since all the new Eastern states would need to rebuild their local political administrative structures from scratch, and this process would require well-trained personnel.<sup>650</sup>

### The University of Potsdam

The fourth important player was the University of Potsdam itself and more specifically the committee responsible for building the political sciences at the university. Its main function in the process under examination here was to make decisions about the structure of the newly built political sciences. This new structure combined both the standard political science layout pushed for by the political science association DVPW and the focus on public policy put forward by the science council.

In July 1991, the University of Potsdam set up the ‘structure’ committee responsible for building the social sciences in Potsdam.<sup>651</sup> It was headed by Prof. Karl Rohe, the appointed ‘founding dean’ responsible for setting up the political sciences. Karl Rohe came from Essen in NRW, Brandenburg’s partner state. Next to Prof. Rohe, it was composed of two West German professors recommended respectively by the political science association DVPW and by the sociology association, two other West Germans already teaching in Potsdam, as well as Dr Krämer from the former IIB and a student representative. The structure commission was appointed for the whole social sciences (political sciences and sociology), whereas the hiring committees would be composed of two separate committees for political science and the social sciences respectively.<sup>652</sup>

This structure committee decided to focus the political sciences on public policy and organizations. This decision was based on the science council’s May recommendation to have political science not with a social science focus but with a public policy and international institutions focus. They also followed the science council’s recommendation not to mix political science and sociology into one degree, partly because this was the approach followed by the HU in East Berlin. They chose to follow these recommendations, partly because the neighbouring disciplines of law and economy were willing to cooperate and because the already existing political science degree seemed like a good basis to build on while accentuating the focus on public policy and public administration. In comparative terms, this focus also distinguished them from their close competitors in Berlin: the FU in West Berlin had a big classical political science while the HU in East Berlin was developing a combined social science degree mixing sociology and political science. Developing a political science curriculum focused on public administration gave Potsdam an edge and distinctive

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<sup>649</sup> Ibid. p.74-75

<sup>650</sup> Ibid. p.75-76.

<sup>651</sup> Universität Potsdam, Der Gründungsbeauftragte für Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften, Positionspapier zu Aufbau, Lage und Perspektiven der Sozialwissenschaften (Soziologie und Politikwissenschaft) an der Universität Potsdam. Potsdam University Archive, UP12180.

<sup>652</sup> Universität Potsdam, Der Gründungsbeauftragte für Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften, Positionspapier zu Aufbau, Lage und Perspektiven der Sozialwissenschaften (Soziologie und Politikwissenschaft) an der Universität Potsdam. Potsdam University Archive, UP12180.

advantage.<sup>653</sup> While this thus played a role in setting the tone about the official profile that Potsdam should develop – public administration, not IR – its latter role was much less strong than here suggested. Public administration was not traditionally a part of political sciences in Germany, and many of the hired faculty members followed their own agendas, resisting the pull towards a public administration profile.<sup>654</sup>

## Filling the structure

Once the Western structures and contents of political science had been transferred East, they needed to be filled with relevant staff. These were mostly hired in the West, but partly also re-hired from the previous Eastern academics. The main logic underwriting this dynamic was that of an individualization of competence.

### *Individualization of competence*

The dynamic of asymmetrical unification was composed of two elements. On the one hand, the old networks and connections that formed the former separate unity fell apart and disaggregated. On the other hand, the now free-floating elements of the old system docked onto the networks and connections of the new system as best as they could. The previous section examined the latter, looking at the connection process whereby East German ‘international relations’ became attached to West German ‘political science’. This section looks at the other side of the dynamic, the disaggregation of formerly connected elements in the GDR.

In the first part of this chapter, ‘winding down the old’, we had already looked at the political disaggregation of the GDR into federated states. This process meant that universities were not coordinated and needed on a national level anymore, but were instead inscribed in a system of significance located at the state level. For the IIB, for instance, this means that their international relations competence did not stand anymore in relation to nation-level foreign policy decision-making, but instead in relation to the framework and scale of a state. As the states are lacking in foreign policy autonomy and are instead geared towards local administration, this meant that the jurists with their focus on public administration had much better chances of survival in this framework than an institute oriented towards the analysis of places and processes wholly unconnected to the state. It also meant that the re-building of political science described in the previous section ‘transmitting Western structure’ would be smoother when oriented along the principles of public administration and organization than around the principles of international relations.

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<sup>653</sup> Universität Potsdam, Der Gründungsbeauftragte für Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften, Positionspapier zu Aufbau, Lage und Perspektiven der Sozialwissenschaften (Soziologie und Politikwissenschaft) an der Universität Potsdam. Potsdam University Archive, UP12180.

<sup>654</sup> Interview Jann, 2019.

## *Chaos of disciplines*<sup>655</sup>

But the process of disaggregation also included other aspects in addition to the political dimension. In relation to academia we can see how disciplines started to position themselves against one another. We had already seen how, during the revolutionary dynamics and the first phases of unification, the lawyers of the HRV worked hard to separate themselves from the international relations specialists of the IIB. Their efforts included both a discursive separation between international relations and legal specialists, but also a separation in concrete physical terms, in that they tried to kick the IIB out of their institution, the HRV. This is what Raimund Krämer terms “the internal Eastern quarrels,” a contestation dynamic whereby each remaining ‘Eastern’ group or unit claimed for itself distance from the former regime and accused the other groups or units instead of closeness to the regime.<sup>656</sup> Once it became clear that the pedagogical university in Potsdam, the PH, would be merged with the HRV and de facto with the IIB, this dynamic of rivalry started to take over the relation between PH and HRV:

*“I know that the problem back then was always the PH. Because the PH was so much bigger in every respect. That is the first point. Second, the PH itself was a problem. They had been founded by [Margot Honecker] the wife of the chairman of the State Council and were a favourite child of hers, but they enjoyed acting as if they were apolitical. Which they definitely were not. The College of Law and Administration [HRV], on the other hand, was [portrayed] as the source of evil, there were considerations to disband it completely, similarly to the [Stasi] University in Golln. That had to be prevented. [...] The decisive factor was that the location [of the IIB/HRV] was maintained and that its basic structure was retained. And this was a success, not against the Westerners, but against the PH.” (Interview Muszyński, 2019: 12)*

Because two previously independent but peacefully coexisting units were merged into one, and because this process of merging was chaotic, not well planned out and threatened the survival of each unit and the people attached to it, a process of competition was set in motion. The PH would highlight the HRV’s lineage as a place of ‘evil’, the elite institution designed to indoctrinate all of the GDR’s bureaucrats, while the HRV would point to the PH’s close affiliation and monitoring by Margot Honecker, wife of Erich Honecker and one of the least popular politicians of the GDR.

This translated more particularly into a rivalry between the sociologists of the PH and the ‘political scientists’ from the IIB, once they became merged together, alongside the economists, into a faculty for economic and social sciences. This process did not, at first, provide any clarity about the status of sociology. It was clear to the economists that they would have to be a part of this, to fill the ‘economic’ side of the faculty. But what exactly did ‘social sciences’ mean? Through the minister’s ‘study guarantee’ to the political science students, that discipline had already received some form of covering and assurance about the future. But sociology’s place in the ‘social sciences’ was still to be debated and they also wanted “a piece of the big cake” of which the political sciences already had taken a chunk.<sup>657</sup> And so the sociologists tried to push out the political scientists, arguing that the FU in former West Berlin already featured a massive political science department,

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<sup>655</sup> I borrow the term from Andrew Abbott, *Chaos of disciplines* (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2001).

<sup>656</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 11.

<sup>657</sup> Interview Krämer, 2019a: 10.

while the political scientists argued against a mixing with sociology under the argument that the disciplinary standards of political science had to be upheld.

While the social sciences were splintering up into subgroups trying to push one another out, another rivalry developed between the natural and the social sciences. As with the previous one, the key of this rivalry lay in the underlying bid for survival all disciplines were thrown into during the unification dynamics. It revolved around the question of how 'a-political' and therefore more scientifically valid they were. The natural scientists had an easier claim there. We can see the effects of this in the overall higher numbers of natural scientists retaining a post in academia, despite the natural sciences also being very severely affected by cuts and by a devaluation of expertise. It is symptomatic for the situation that when choosing the new director for the newly created University of Potsdam from amongst Eastern academics, the choice fell onto a chemist.

### *Chaos of academics*

While the disciplines started to fight on their own and against one another, the process of disaggregation went even further, breaking down the group of East German academics into individuals, while regrouping them into new distinctions such as young/old and Stasi/non-Stasi. These would play a distinctive role in determining who would get to stay in academia.

The process of individualization was set in motion by the various evaluations of East German academic structures taking place in 1989-90. This process of individualization can be described in three, almost dialectical, steps. The first step in this process of disaggregation was to evaluate East German political science and find it to be lacking in quality, ultimately judging that there had not been any 'real' political science in the GDR. We have seen this in the previous section on the concept of the *tabula rasa*. The next step was to determine that East German academics should nevertheless be included into West German academia – not on the principle of quality, but on the principle of humanity:

*"[T]he general dilemma of this new beginning in the new states was: to what extent do you take into consideration the individuals and to what extent do you give priority to the quality of the new?" (Interview Keck, 2019: 6)*

A trope of incompatibility between the old and quality was developed. Incorporating old staff would thus always mean poorer quality. Nevertheless including them would thus need to be done on the basis of something else: humanitarian considerations for the individual, personal fate of the respective scholars. Finally, the principle of humanity was translated into a concrete practice of picking out those individuals deemed to have been morally worthy and to show the promise of future quality. In a synthesis between quality and humanity, these elements were found, academically, in scholarship that modified or went against the grain of existing dogma. In short in a scholarship that exhibited a 'critical' attitude. For example, the GDR's existing dogma stated that imperialist states were intrinsically wired for aggression. If a piece of scholarship instead explored the conditions in which imperialist states could be seen to also have an intrinsic desire for peace,

then this would be considered as a piece of ‘critical’ scholarship, denoting the intelligence, complex thinking and moral integrity of the academic in question.<sup>658</sup>

While the group of ‘East German academia’ thus disaggregated both into discrete disciplines as well as up to the level of the individual as the unit of evaluation and judgment, new categorizations and grouping also emerged, in particular the groups of young versus old and Stasi versus non-Stasi.

In chapter 3 on revolution/knowledge, we already saw how the revolutionary dynamics re-organized academics along generational lines. Then, academics were divided into three groups: the young, the old and the middle group. The young academics, meaning PhD students or assistants with recent PhDs but no Habils, did not have enough standing to play a role. The old academics, high in the academic hierarchies, were discredited symbolically as they were standing for that which the revolution was against. That left a middle generation of academics in their 30s and 40s, fully qualified yet not established enough in the higher levels of the hierarchy to take up a vacant position in their institutions and assume the role of reformers. With the colonization/knowledge dynamics, a similar, yet different situation unfolded. Strong distinctions were made by those in hiring commissions and by those evaluating East German academics between the ‘old’ and the ‘young’:

*“This meant that we didn’t have any big discussions about the older colleagues because there was nothing to discuss. In our opinion, we couldn’t let them loose on the students. At least we could expect the younger ones to catch up to all that was necessary.” (Interview Göhler, 2019: 13)*

The ‘young’ of this time period corresponded with the younger segment of the ‘middle’ generation from the revolutionary period. But the basis of this distinction between generations was now found in their future potential. All the academics, irrespective of young or old, are judged to be lacking and to be poorly performing according to the West German standards, but they are separated on their assumed ability and willingness to learn. This was different from the earlier revolutionary dynamics where the generations were mostly separated on the basis of practical capability for action and willingness to respond to the situation at hand and takeover.

Another distinction already present at earlier times, but amplified at this stage of the unification process, was the distinction between scholars previously affiliated with the Stasi and scholars that were not. The Stasi had played an important role in the revolutionary dynamics as symbol and target of the upheaval, but it was not the centre of the dynamics. The revolutionary upheavals had been centred around the efforts to renew and reform the GDR, and the Stasi was one such element of contention needing to be changed. But during the unification dynamics, the topic of the Stasi developed into a full discursive register slowly drawing everything else in.<sup>659</sup> In January 1992, the Stasi archives were opened. From then onwards the public had access to the files, and the civil servants, including academics, could be checked. After 1992, a discursive shift took place. From then onwards, everything GDR would be seen under the topic ‘Stasi’. As Misselwitz highlights, the paradox, the power and influence of the Stasi, reached its climax after it had disappeared. The

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<sup>658</sup> See Interview Gläßner, 2020: 11.

<sup>659</sup> See chapter 4.

opening of the Stasi files marked not the end, but the beginning of an endless story.<sup>660</sup> The revolutionaries of 1989 morphed from heroes to naïve victims pursued and surveilled even in the private sphere of their bedrooms.<sup>661</sup> Opening the Stasi files created a division amongst the broad alliance of oppositionals that the Stasi had always wanted to achieve, but never managed to. Now the former opposition split into various parties and had to decide whether to side with their former GDR enemies against the West and the swallowing dynamics of unification, or to side with the West and collaborate in the dismantling of their former country.<sup>662</sup> One's relation with the Stasi, as documented by the files and folders of the archive, became the first and most powerful criterium defining the East Germans in the new unified Germany.<sup>663</sup> Up until 1992, the Stasi was one factor amongst others. The fact that some East German academics had an affiliation with the Stasi was not a widely spread fact or seen as a problem to think about or to solve. It certainly played no role in the political science association DVPW's discussions.<sup>664</sup> From 1992 onwards, however, it became the only legitimate way to understand the GDR. One after the other, revelations of 'uncovered' former Stasi informants made the news.

### *Hiring the new professors*

In building new universities in the former territories of the GDR, West German staff structures were imported. The West-German system featured a strong distinction between professorial and non-professorial staff (the "*Mittelbau*" or middle structure). The numerically far superior non-professorial staff were hierarchically allocated to the professorial staff in a pyramidal structure: each professor would form the top of a pyramid, with non-professorial staff allocated to them as well as PhD students and student assistants. Because of this hierarchical pyramid structure, the few professors were the ones holding power in the faculty of economic and social sciences. Differences in status existed amongst the professorships, which were divided into C4 and C3 professorships, with C4 corresponding to a full professorship and C3 to a type of adjunct professorship.<sup>665</sup>

As in the other newly built or re-built universities of the East, the University of Potsdam proceeded to first hire the flagship C4 professorships, then the C3 professorships and then, in a last step, make decisions about the non-professorial staff.<sup>666</sup> Hiring professors in the West German academic system is and was a long-winded procedure. In order to hire for an advertised professorship, a hiring committee needed to be set up. This was to be composed of at least four professors, ideally two from the East and two from the West, a representative of the non-professorial staff and one representative of the students. After the job talks, the hiring commission made a shortlist, which ranked the top three candidates. The list first had to go for approval to the senate/founding senate, and then to the minister who had the right to choose which of the three candidates to approve. If the minister found none of the candidates adequate, he could ask for

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<sup>660</sup> Misselwitz, 14.

<sup>661</sup> Ibid., 15-16.

<sup>662</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>663</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>664</sup> Interview Göhler, 2019:12.

<sup>665</sup> Interview Jann, 2019: 4.

<sup>666</sup> Interview Elsenhans, 2019: 7.

other names to be proposed, or start the procedure again from scratch. Once the minister made his choice, negotiations with the selected candidate would start, and – if successful – this would lead to a professorial appointment, with the professor then becoming a civil servant.<sup>667</sup>

### *Hiring committee*

In Potsdam, all the structures necessary for starting the hiring process in political science were ready and set in place by early 1992. All professorships in the field of political science were being hired, including two professorships for international relations, one C4 full professorship and one C3 adjunct professorship. Following the guidelines, the hiring committee for political science was composed of seven members, five professors, one non-professorial member and one student.<sup>668</sup> While a balance between Eastern and Western members was meant to be achieved, the founding senate struggled to achieve that balance and find enough Eastern candidates deemed acceptable. They solved the problem by including an Eastern junior member of staff as the non-professorial member, Dr Renate Schmidt from the old IIB, who had finished her PhD just in time while the revolutionary events unfolded in the GDR. As for the professors, Prof. Tomala, a professor from Poland and expert on Germany, was chosen to represent the East. The justification for choosing him was scribbled on the side notes of the hiring commission's documents: "No comparable candidates from the former GDR in this discipline [could be found]. Not only Westerners [should be included]."<sup>669</sup>

In terms of the balance between political interference and academic autonomy, Brandenburg's minister of education Enderlein did not interfere much in the hiring process, largely leaving the university to make its own decisions.<sup>670</sup> The hiring committee was thus differently composed than the structure committee, in which figures such as Raimund Krämer or Gerhard Göhler still participated.<sup>671</sup> The dominating figure in this hiring commission was professor Gerhard Lehmbuch, by that time president of the West German political science association DVPW.<sup>672</sup> The hiring procedures were carried out under pressure from two sides. First, there was the general time pressure of wanting to build the new university as soon as possible, as well as the time pressure coming from the fact that students from the previous GDR institutions IIB/HRV were still studying political science and that they needed to be offered a proper degree.<sup>673</sup> Second, there was financial pressure on the university as a whole. Instead of following the model of other states like

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<sup>667</sup> Interview Bürklin, 2020: 8-9; Richtlinien des Gründungssenates für die Bildung und Tätigkeit von Berufungskommissionen während der Gründungsphase der Universität, Beschluss des Gründungssenats vom 10. April 1992. Potsdam University Archive, UP12112.

<sup>668</sup> Prof. Lehmbuch (Uni Konstanz), Prof. Grawert (Uni Potsdam), Prof. Jäger (Uni Freiburg), Prof. Rohe (Uni Essen), Prof. Tomala (Polnisches Institut für Internationale Politik Warschau), Dr Schmidt (non-professorial, Uni Potsdam), Herr Hoferik (student, Uni Potsdam). See: 10. Beschlußprotokoll der Tagung des Gründungssenats der Universität Potsdam vom 20. März 1992, Potsdam den 24.03.1992. Potsdam University Archive, UP13750.

<sup>669</sup> Letter from Bärbel Schneider to the rector of the University Potsdam, Prof. Rold Mitzner, Re: Vorschlag für die Besetzung der Berufungskommissionen Soziologie und Politikwissenschaft, 26.02.92. Potsdam University Archive, UP19426.

<sup>670</sup> Interview Enderlein, 2020:4.

<sup>671</sup> Interview Göhler, 2019:5.

<sup>672</sup> Interview Göhler, 2019:1.

<sup>673</sup> Interview Göhler, 2019: 6.

Sachsen, where all GDR institutions had been dissolved and East German academics only rehired where needed and where appropriate, the state of Brandenburg chose to follow the different path of keeping most of the previous institutions (the PH and the legal sections of the HRV, but not the IIB or the HRV's economic sections) and then slowly reducing the personnel. This procedure was much more costly for the universities than on other states, as they paid much longer for staff that would have been laid off in other states.<sup>674</sup> Keeping everyone was not an option, since West German academic structures typically featured a quarter or a fifth of East German staff.<sup>675</sup>

These pressures impacted all decision-making by the new actors at the university trying to build the new structures and hiring their new colleagues. Many of their decisions had to be made fast and with limited information. They were local decisions, contingent on local situations and local considerations. Werner Jann, the West German professor hired in 1992 to fill the chair in political science, administration and organisation, described the decision-making process of these first years in Potsdam as perfect illustrations of garbage-can theory. All the actors involved had their own goals and interests, such as his own interest to strengthen public policy and administration in the *Fakultät*. They carried these into decision-making moments coming up with every new problem at hand and under the influence of overall limited but incrementally new information, such as new evaluations by the science council or new budget guidelines. As a result, the decisions made as a whole did not unfold along centrally pre-planned lines.<sup>676</sup>

One of the important decision-making criteria in the process was the goal of making political science in Potsdam as strong as it could be. Because the University of Potsdam was now a player in the German and in the (Western) international academic market, its benchmark for success lay in performing well according to those standards.<sup>677</sup> The surest and safest way of doing so lay in hiring academic staff well versed in this new system of reference and bringing the social capital necessary to succeed in it, including their own connections and networks in it. Re-hiring East German staff whose main connections led to the former Eastern networks who had in turn become obsolete, did not present itself as a good pathway to lead the newly built University of Potsdam to success.<sup>678</sup> And with an attractive geographic location near Berlin, which was already tipped off to become Germany's new political capital, the advertised posts attracted the attention of many, including many nationally and internationally (in the West) renowned scholars.<sup>679</sup>

### *Mixing the old and the new*

Faced with the question as how to mix old and new staff, the University of Potsdam drafted a ratio for all the hires in 1992: out of 89 C4 professorships advertised across the university, 10 had to be filled with East German academics (11%), and out of the 70 C3 professorships advertised

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<sup>674</sup> Interview Bürklin, 2020: 4.

<sup>675</sup> Interview Gläßner, 2020: 8.

<sup>676</sup> Interview Jann, 2019: 8. For more information on garbage can theory, see: Werner Jann, "Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, 'A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice'," in *The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Public Policy and Administration*, ed. Martin Lodge, Edward C. Page, and Steven J. Balla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

<sup>677</sup> Interview Bürklin, 2020: 9-10.

<sup>678</sup> Interview Bürklin, 2020: 9-10.

<sup>679</sup> Interview Bürklin, 2020: 6.



across the university, 37 ought to be filled with East German academics (53%).<sup>680</sup> In the upcoming two IR hires, the full professorship C4 would be appointed from the West and the adjunct professorship C3 from the East.

The C4 professorship was meant to be the flagship post for international relations, both with a generalist orientation and with the aim to increase the standing of Potsdam. With regard to the C4 professorship, the decision to advertise for the post was made in January<sup>681</sup> and in May, six candidates were invited for job talks.<sup>682</sup> By June 1992, the job talks for the professorships were concluded and the lists of shortlisted candidates were completed.<sup>683</sup> The three candidates who made the final list were international star professor Friedrich Kratochwil and German IR star professor Volker Rittberger, sharing the number one spot; and, on number two, FU professor and dean Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen.<sup>684</sup>

Why did no-one from the former GDR get offered the job? First of all, six GDR international relations experts did apply, and one of them made it to the job talks. Of the five who applied, four came from the IIB and one from the former IPW, their areas of specialization being either European security politics, or area specialization on Eastern Europe or Third World countries.<sup>685</sup> The listed reason for not inviting them to the job talk was their “too narrow specialization on their respective focus areas.”<sup>686</sup> As the flagship ‘general IR’ professorship for the University of Potsdam, the selection committee preferred candidates able to cover the whole field of international relations. The only candidate invited to the job talk, Wolfgang Kubiczek, did not make the final list partly for the same doubts about his ability to cover the breadth of the discipline, but partly also because of the committee’s assessment that his current work was not up to West German standards of research and that he would not be able to catch up fast enough to those standards. The committee members also did not like his talk, which they deemed to be based on politically founded thesis statements, instead of the necessary ‘theoretical and scientific grounding’.<sup>687</sup> Overall, though, the main reason for not hiring any of the East German candidates lay in the strength of their competition. Their competitors brought assets to the table none of them could

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<sup>680</sup> 12. Beschlußprotokoll der Tagung des Gründungssenats der Universität Potsdam vom 15./16. Mai 1992, Potsdam, den 21.05.1992. Potsdam University Archive, UP13750

<sup>681</sup> Berufungskommission Internationale Politik, Berufungsvorschlag zur Besetzung der Professur (C4) Internationale Politik, 27.07.95. Potsdam University Archive, UP19426

<sup>682</sup> Protokoll der 1. Sitzung der Berufungskommission Politikwissenschaft am 13. und 14.05.1992. Potsdam University Archive, UP19426

<sup>683</sup> 13. Beschlußprotokoll der Tagung des Gründungssenats der Universität Potsdam vom 12./13. Juni 1992, Potsdam den 16.06.1992. Potsdam University Archive, UP13750

<sup>684</sup> Protokoll der 3. Sitzung der Berufungskommission Politikwissenschaft vom 26-28.06.1992. Potsdam University Archive, UP19426

<sup>685</sup> Dr Jochen Franzke (University of Potsdam/Focus: political systems and foreign policy of Eastern Europe), Dr Sergej Henke (University of Potsdam / Focus: political systems and foreign policy of Eastern Europe), Dr Wolfgang Schwarz (former IPW Berlin/ Focus: European Security), Dr Dieter Thielemann (former IIB Potsdam/Focus: security politics), Frau Dr Raina Zimmering (University of Potsdam / Focus: Third World problematique). See: Protokoll der 1. Sitzung der Berufungskommission Politikwissenschaft am 13. und 14.05.1992. Potsdam University Archive, UP19426

<sup>686</sup> Protokoll der 1. Sitzung der Berufungskommission Politikwissenschaft am 13. und 14.05.1992. Potsdam University Archive, UP19426

<sup>687</sup> Protokoll der 3. Sitzung der Berufungskommission Politikwissenschaft vom 26-28.06.1992. Potsdam University Archive, UP19426

boast: prestige and respect in West German and international academic circles; connections, power and networks in those same circles; as well as research projects and agendas valued by the relevant peers in the West, and the ability to attract funding and reputation to the University of Potsdam.<sup>688</sup>

The C3 IR professorship did not have to fulfil the status functions of the C4 professorships. It was advertised as a post in comparative politics with a focus on East Asia. Here the University of Potsdam tried to achieve a balance between old and new staff and mixing the two, and the founding senate along with the political science committee chose to fulfil the quota and hire an East German academic.<sup>689</sup> The content orientation of this professorship was designed specifically so as to fit one of the IIB's experts: Wolfram Wallraf, an expert on Japan and East Asia.<sup>690</sup> With little time to make decisions, a lot of pressure to build up a good faculty, and some good experts at hand, many of the presents thought "why not?" and decided to formally hire East German ex-IIB Japan expert Wallraf onto the adjunct professor post.<sup>691</sup>

The post was advertised one year after the C4s, at the end of January 1993. Nine applications for the post were sent in.<sup>692</sup> The hiring committee was the same as for the C4 professorships, with the difference that all the newly hired C4 professors had been co-opted to the committee and were now part of the decision-making. Because all the professorships except for IR had been hired, this meant that the hiring committee for the IR C3 post was composed almost exclusively of non-IR political scientists. The committee decided not to request an external evaluation and recommendation about the candidates. First, because the situation was deemed to be unambiguous/uncontroversial, with Wolfram Wallraf being the only candidate fitting the post. Second, because Prof. Wilhelm Bürklin was considered to have enough expertise in the area of East Asia and was tasked to write these evaluations himself. The job talks took place in May 1993 and three candidates were shortlisted, with Wallraf on number one.<sup>693</sup>

The arguments named in favour of Wallraf were as follows: his language skills, being fluent in Japanese, his stays abroad, his personality type deemed to be that of a scientist 'only pursuing knowledge and insight', the analysis in his research being rich in primary sources and materials, and up to the Western standards. Wallraf was also in the running for other prestigious jobs, was renowned in Western circles, had a breadth of knowledge about East Asia in general and was thus not narrowly specialized. Since 1990 his expertise had been re-oriented through the lens of comparative political science. Also, he only had to marginally change his research programme after the system change, which was interpreted as a marker of quality for his work. His listed total amount of publications was 31, an acceptable number with regards to Western standards, he could

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<sup>688</sup> Interview Bürklin, 2020: 6, 9-10.

<sup>689</sup> 12. Beschlußprotokoll der Tagung des Gründungssenats der Universität Potsdam vom 15./16. Mai 1992, Potsdam, den 21.05.1992. Potsdam University Archive, UP13750

<sup>690</sup> Interview Jann, 2019: 4-5,10.

<sup>691</sup> Interview Jann, 2019: 5.

<sup>692</sup> Berufungskommission Politikwissenschaft, Berufungsvorschlag zur Besetzung der Professur (C3), Vorlage für die Sitzung des Gründungssenats der Universität Potsdam am 10./11. Juni 1993. Potsdam University Archive, UP19431

<sup>693</sup> Wallraf, Sandschneider and Foljanty-Jost. See: Berufungskommission Politikwissenschaft, Berufungsvorschlag zur Besetzung der Professur (C3), Vorlage für die Sitzung des Gründungssenats der Universität Potsdam am 10./11. Juni 1993. Potsdam University Archive, UP19431

boast 14 years of teaching experience, and he was already filling in as temporary substitute for that same C3 professorship.<sup>694</sup>

### *Why was IR hired so late?*

Had the International Relations C4 and C3 hires gone through as planned, then two things would have happened in favour of the former IIB staff. First, Wolfram Wallraf, a former IIB expert on Japan and East Asia, would have become a professor of International Relations in the new united Germany. An adjunct C3 professor with less standing than his C4 colleague, but still with autonomy and with the ability to make hiring decisions about the non-professorial staff allocated to him. Beyond the fact that with this, a former IIB expert would have become professor and accessed an important post, it is also easy to imagine that he would have hired some of his former colleagues, thus giving more of the old staff the possibility to remain in academia. Second, had the C4 full professorship been filled with one of the top two candidates on the list, the reputation and power of the respective candidate could have both stemmed some of the pressures towards public administration and helped attract funding and projects. This could have led to the establishment of a strong centre of international relations, with the capacity to absorb a few of the former IIB staff willing and able to perform in the new system.

### **C4 Professorship**

But contingency hit. After a long period of negotiation, the two top-listed candidates for the full C4 professorship declined the offer. The third and last candidate on the list, West Berlin professor Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen, dean of the FU's prestigious political science institute, had since been uncovered as a former Stasi informant.<sup>695</sup> Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen had since resigned his post, been arrested and put to trial. The University of Potsdam thus had to start the hiring procedure for the C4 International Relations professorship again from scratch. In November 1994, almost three years after it was first advertised, the University of Potsdam advertised again for the C4 professorship in International Relations.<sup>696</sup> At that point in time, four years after unification, the early requirements of mixed committees were not relevant anymore. The hiring committee was composed of Western academics,<sup>697</sup> and only four of the 49 applications for the post came from academics of the former GDR.<sup>698</sup> Only top West German candidates made the interview shortlist.<sup>699</sup> After long periods of failed negotiation with the two top-ranked candidates, both of

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<sup>694</sup> Berufungskommission Politikwissenschaft, Berufungsvorschlag zur Besetzung der Professur (C3), Vorlage für die Sitzung des Gründungssenats der Universität Potsdam am 10./11. Juni 1993. Potsdam University Archive, UP19431

<sup>695</sup> Benno Kirsch, "Die Akte Jacobsen. IM "Hoffmann" und das MfS," *Zeitschrift des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat* 8, no. 14 (2003). See also Interview Göhler, 2019:12.

<sup>696</sup> Berufungskommission Internationale Politik, Berufungsvorschlag zur Besetzung der Professur (C4) Internationale Politik, 27.07.95. Potsdam University Archive, UP19426

<sup>697</sup> Professors: Prof Behrmann, Prof. Bürklin, Prof. Döring, Frau Prof. Haftendorn (FU Berlin), Prof. Welfens. Non-professorial: Frau Dobner, Dr Döhler. Students: Herr Hülsemezer, Herr König (Stellvertreter). Other staff: Frau Eichler. See: Berufungskommission Internationale Politik, Berufungsvorschlag zur Besetzung der Professur (C4) Internationale Politik, 27.07.95. Potsdam University Archive, UP19426

<sup>698</sup> Berufungskommission Internationale Politik, Besetzung von Professorenstellen. Potsdam University Archive, UP19426

<sup>699</sup> Berufungskommission Internationale Politik, Berufungsvorschlag zur Besetzung der Professur (C4) Internationale Politik, 27.07.95. Potsdam University Archive, UP19426

whom famous West German professors of International Relations, the job was offered to Harald Fuhr who successfully took up the post.<sup>700</sup>

Following the assessment of the hiring committee, Fuhr combined solid political science foundations with the practical experience of having worked at an international organization – the World Bank.<sup>701</sup> As such, the main argument in favour of Harald Fuhr was his fit with the public policy and public administration profile that the political sciences in Potsdam were trying to achieve. Harald Fuhr specialized in public administration, had practical experience working at the World Bank and thus had extensive knowledge of international public policy, which made him fit the profile extremely well.<sup>702</sup> The University of Potsdam had been trying to work on a profile distinct from that of the FU and HU in Berlin. It did so by setting its focus on the practical training and practical knowledge of their students, so they would be attractive candidates on the job market outside of academia. In his job talk, Harald Fuhr emphasized this combination of theoretical and practical knowledge, and his willingness to play a role in that profile.<sup>703</sup> At this stage of the process, thus, the two criteria for hiring were the fit with the faculty's profile and 'excellence' within the matrix of West German political science standards.

### C3 Professorship

While the appointment of the originally selected candidates for the C4 professorship did not go through, the appointment for the selected C3 candidate did not succeed either. During the hiring procedure, it had been uncovered that appointed C3 professor Wolfram Wallraf had had contact with the Stasi during his former life at the IIB. As a result of this, he had to leave academia. In May 1995, the University of Potsdam offered the post to the scholar placed second on the hiring list,<sup>704</sup> but the offer came too late and the candidate was not interested anymore. The University of Potsdam had to advertise for the position again.

But this time, the university's founding senate had finished its work and had become a regular university 'senate'. Allocating professorial posts to East Germans was not on the radar of activity anymore. Also, by that time, most East German scholars had found new posts and occupations, mainly outside of academia.<sup>705</sup> The C3 professorship was renamed to "International Organization and international policy research," and its focus was thus set towards the general public policy focus that the *Fakultät* was trying to achieve. Advertised in July 1995, 28 applications were received. The hiring committee was the same as for the second round of C4, and after the job talks, three West German candidates were ranked on the final list.<sup>706</sup> Ultimately, the C3 post was offered to

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<sup>700</sup> Interview Jann, 2019: 2.

<sup>701</sup> Berufungskommission Internationale Politik, Berufungsvorschlag zur Besetzung der Professur (C4) Internationale Politik, 27.07.95. Potsdam University Archive, UP19426

<sup>702</sup> Interview Jann, 2019: 2-3.

<sup>703</sup> Interview Fuhr, 2019: 1.

<sup>704</sup> Letter from UP Rector Prof. Dr Rolf Mitzner to the Brandenburg Minister of Science, Research and Culture, 19.05.1995. Potsdam University Archive, UP19431

<sup>705</sup> Interview Bürklin, 2020: 7.

<sup>706</sup> Berufungskommission Internationale Organisationen und Internationale Politikfeldforschung, Vorlage für die 29. Sitzung des Senats der Universität Potsdam 08.02.1996. Potsdam University Archive, UP19431

and accepted by Otto Keck.<sup>707</sup> Otto Keck was seen as an internationally demanded expert in the field of nuclear politics. He had published in peer-reviewed journals, which were considered to be publications that were hard to get into. He was valued by scholars from more than just one school of thought. His work on nuclear politics arguing that fast breeder reactors are not economically advantageous had been strongly used in the field of politics, influencing decision-making about subventions not only in Germany but in other Western European countries as well. His work was based on thorough archival research and hitherto unusual materials and statistics from ministries as well as on interviews with stakeholders. Methodology wise, he belonged to the group of recognized game theorists.<sup>708</sup> For all those reasons, Otto Keck was seen as fitting the post. In this case, the main rationale for hiring was thus again both an overall fit with the West German political science matrix of requirements and a specific fit with the faculty of economic and social sciences' public policy focus: Otto Keck knew one policy area well, namely nuclear politics, and was familiar with all the decision-making processes involved there. As such, he was seen as a good fit with the existing colleagues.<sup>709</sup>

### ***Non-professorial staff***

Two dynamics characterized the treatment of non-professorial staff: their allocation to professorships, and their use in supporting the functioning of the faculty until the hiring procedures had been completed.

### **Partnering up**

Traditionally, in the West German system, non-professorial academics were allocated to professorial staff to support them in their teaching needs. This principle was transported to the former GDR territories. As a result, non-professorial IIB staff in Potsdam were allocated to professorial staff. Instead of being hired on an independent basis, the West German blueprint was strictly followed and the non-professorial IIB staff were hierarchically allocated to work under the direction of the newly hired professors. Except for the area of international relations, all the other professors of political science were hired swiftly. In Potsdam each professor was typically allocated the financial means for two members of staff. Upon starting their new position, they were asked to choose at least one of their two members of staff from amongst the East German staff.

*“When I arrived as a [newly-hired Western] professor, I was told: we still have a few “leftovers” from the old [GDR] academy, they have all been evaluated positively. I have to say that I no longer know who evaluated them and how. I was told: have a look at them, we’d be grateful if you could take one of them, but you are not obligated to do so. I spoke with a couple of them [...] but did not get the impression that they were open for something new. Then I spoke with Franzke and we immediately got on well. I told him that he would have to do something completely new. He said: I’ll do it“ (Interview Jann, 2019: 3)*

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<sup>707</sup> Letter from Dekan Prof. Dr Werner Jann to Herr Brandt, Brandenburg ministry of science, research and culture, 28.02.1997. Potsdam University Archive, UP19431; Interview Keck, 2019: 8.

<sup>708</sup> Berufungskommission Internationale Organisationen und Internationale Politikfeldforschung, Vorlage für die 29. Sitzung des Senats der Universität Potsdam 08.02.1996. Potsdam University Archive, UP19431

<sup>709</sup> Interview Jann, 2019: 2-3.

As we see from the quote above and the duo Jann/Franzke, partnering up non-professorial IIB staff with newly hired Western professors partly also meant having to completely re-orient and retrain, a move not everyone was willing to make. In the case of Jochen Franzke, this meant giving up being an IR scholar and becoming a specialist in administrative science instead – a switch which ultimately allowed him to have a second academic career in the newly united Germany. But partnering up hierarchically superior West German professors with hierarchically inferior East German non-professorial staff did not always go well. In one case, a great personality match led to long-term cooperation. In another, the East German academic left and yet another ended in a lawsuit. Part of the problems of the arrangement resulted from the relation of super- and subordination, which forced IIB staff to do assistant-type work and restricted their autonomy. Parts of the problem resulted from differing views about research quality and others still from personality clashes.<sup>710</sup>

This partnering up expresses the hierarchical orientation of the unification dynamic. Clustering hierarchically superior professors from ‘the West’ with hierarchically inferior academic staff from ‘the East’, expresses an asymmetrical relation on all levels: personal, symbolic, and material. Especially with regards to the content orientation, the IIB staff had been quite free in their teaching and research during the first years of the transition, until the professorships were filled.<sup>711</sup> And while those holding professorships were entirely autonomous and free to teach and research as they wish, especially for this first generation of professors in Potsdam,<sup>712</sup> this was not the case with their non-professorial staff, who were – by the nature of the chair-holder system – partly subordinate to their plans and visions.

### Filling in

In the area of international relations, the professorships remained vacant for many years before being filled. As we have seen, between unification in 1990 and the C4 professor in International Relations at the University of Potsdam coming into office in 1997, seven years lapsed. Between unification in 1990 and the C3 professor in International Relations at the University of Potsdam starting his job in 1999, eight and a half years passed. During that time, regularly changing substitutes filled in for the vacant professorships and the remaining IIB staff helped relieve the IR teaching workload. The work conditions, though, were precarious. After the IIB was closed, they were re-hired on the basis of temporary contracts. First a few months to complete the term, then about a half-year for the next term, then one-year contracts, then three-year contracts etc.<sup>713</sup>

*“In the end, I had a total of 17 such employment contracts up to 1996 – which is actually not allowed under German law, but of course it can still happen in practice. Until the staff council of the University of Potsdam said at the occasion of my 18th employment contract: ‘Are you crazy?’ They ensured that I got permanent employment, I think that was in 1996 or 1997. For me personally, this meant that the transition period*

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<sup>710</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 4-6.

<sup>711</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 4.

<sup>712</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 23; Interview Keck, 2019: 8.

<sup>713</sup> Interview Crome, 2019: 3.

*from one system to the other was concluded and life became easier. It was quite an exhausting time, because for a very long time I was not able to make any plans about the future.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 12)*

The precarity was draining, and many of those involved had families with young children.<sup>714</sup> This was another expression of the hierarchical ordering prevalent throughout the unification dynamics. First, there was a general difference in stability/precarity between professorial and non-professorial staff, but the East/West difference was mapped onto this distinction. While in Germany all non-professorial staff thus had more precarious living conditions than professorial staff, the fact that in the formerly Eastern states most ex-GDR academics remaining in academia obtained non-professorial posts only led to a de facto hierarchical division. Second, while some of the non-professorial staff in the Eastern states were “West German”, their conditions differed from those of the East German scholars in that their temporary contracts were usually longer than a few months.

Another expression of hierarchical ordering could be found in the slow crowding out of almost all remaining GDR scholars from the faculty of economic and social sciences. As shown in Appendix A, a total of 20 IIB staff found employment at the University of Potsdam, though never more than 17 at one time. The numbers decreased fast, and within a period of 10 years went down from 17 in the summer semester of 1991 to four in the summer semester of 2001.<sup>715</sup> Especially in the first years, the numbers went down rapidly. In the summer semester of 1991, 17 former IIB staff were re-employed; in the following winter term of 1991/92, the numbers went down to 14, two years later in the winter semester of 1993/94, 10 had remained; one year later in the winter semester of 1994/95, seven; from the winter semester of 1995/96 onwards, the numbers remained stable at around six for a while until reaching the final number of four 10 years later in the summer semester of 2001. Why did the numbers diminish in this way? One important factor was to be found in the precarity of the posts themselves: anyone finding more stable employment elsewhere would leave. Another reason for the East German staff to leave resided in the fact that they were not necessarily made to feel valued at a university that considered them more of a burden than an asset. Being in a hierarchically inferior position to the West German professors, with all the limitations this brought, was not necessarily agreeable. Differences also resided in whether or not one could see a future perspective in academia. Someone like ex-IIB Jochen Franzke, who had had an early personal click with the newly appointed West German professor for public administration Werner Jann, was able to retrain from scratch under the mentorship of someone willing to support and enable his second career. Not everyone had this willingness or the personal click. In other cases personality clashes led to staff leaving or the university simply did not renew the contracts.

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<sup>714</sup> See for instance Interview Krämer, 2019a: 6.

<sup>715</sup> The numbers are combined and compiled from the following sources: Vorlesungsverzeichnisse der Universität Potsdam SS1992 bis SS2001; Brandenburgische Landeshochschule, Kommission zur Festlegung des Sommersemesters, Studiengang Politikwissenschaft, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 28.02.1991, Anlage 1, Lehrveranstaltungen auf Honorarbasis im Sommersemester 1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292; Kommission zur Festlegung des Wintersemesters 1991/92 im Studiengang Politikwissenschaft, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 18.6.1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292.

## Who makes it in academia?

*“On the whole, I would say that the word ‘annihilated’ is an adequate one to describe what happened to some parts of the GDR sciences. I just can’t claim it for myself. Because, as I said, I was lucky at some crucial moments or made the right decision. Or because the education [in the GDR] wasn’t bad either? Or because the people who had the power to make decisions disregarded any concerns [about me being from the GDR]? I don’t know. It is all speculation now. But I would maybe point to the fact that I did not have to hide much of what I wrote as a scientist before 1990 and after 1990. In the end, personal integrity was the most important thing.” (Interview Gießmann, 2020: 10)*

Who of the former East German experts on international relations made it in academia after 1990? What were the reasons behind their success? Which problems did they face?

The two underlying processes underwriting East German scholars’ integration in the unified German academic sector were individualization and diffusion. The logic of individualization ensured that they were not treated as a group and that no general agreements or solutions were found for them. Instead they were handled on an individual basis. Each and every one was of them was assessed along various criteria ranging from qualification to personal integrity. The logic of diffusion meant that because all the East German structures disaggregated and all the researchers were treated as individuals, they each had to find individual solutions to their problems. Former colleagues all made different choices, they lost sight of each other, found temporary employment running out at different times, and thus experienced hardships and success at different moments and in different places. All the old structures were individualized, diffused, dispersed:

*“The revolutionary theories proved right – everything dispersed. At first everyone received some money and from 1996/ 1997 onwards the [subsidized] projects came to an end. There was no new money, but somehow everyone had built up a new life in the meantime. A few went abroad. I know that some got a professorship in Austria or Colombia. Apparently, it was easier for East German social scientists there.” (Interview Krämer, 2019a: 10)*

### **Difficulties in the new system**

Many different factors came together as to why so few East Germans made it the new unified academic system.

First, the asymmetrical nature of the unification structurally disadvantaged East Germans, independently of the goodwill of many of the involved West German actors.<sup>716</sup> The East and the West German academic systems simply valued and thus incentivized different forms of qualifications and achievements. But because the West German criteria of quality were applied to their East German colleagues as part of the decision for an asymmetrical form of unification, this meant that however much merit East German achievements or qualifications may or may not have had on their own terms, they were always found lacking when compared to the West German standards. This played a role in disqualifying the academic CVs of many East German academics. Two elements in particular played a role: publication lists and international qualifications. Because

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<sup>716</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 13.



West German hires were centrally based around publication lists and because publication lists had not been part of the academic currency in the GDR or of the East German social capital, the mismatch disadvantaged many. Either their publications lists were too short, or too politically compromised. At the time of unification, the later successful Jochen Franzke's publication list was composed of four items: his PhD dissertation, his *Habilitation*, and two commentaries on international legal treaties between the GDR and African states. He had no chance whatsoever of success in any type of job interview or be on one level with Western colleagues who had been assiduously building their publication lists over many years; his past work had been channelled in internal papers and studies, political briefings and teaching work.<sup>717</sup> A similar issue was that of developing 'Western' course plans and materials for new topics. While required in application processes, the former East German academics still had to get through the materials themselves and catch up on the topic areas before being able to boast various lecture series in a job talk.<sup>718</sup> Similarly to publication lists, East German CVs also lacked sufficient 'international qualifications' to match the West German standards. While GDR academics did go abroad, this was usually for their studies or for field research purposes. In the case of the IIB, this could also be for practical placements at the respective embassies. However, on average, GDR academics published less in international journals, or in journals of other countries, and did not go on frequent research stays at other institutions abroad. In short, the structure of the Eastern bloc did not allow for the same Western logic of a 'competition of ideas' between and within countries. In the West German academic job market, however, 'international qualifications' were considered an important factor of quality, and purely East German CVs, with little to no international qualifications, were seen as problematic.<sup>719</sup>

Second, and relatedly, the social and cultural capital of GDR scholars differed from that of their Western colleagues, and made it much harder for them to navigate the West German academic establishment. With regards to the use of scientific language, for example, GDR scholars of international relations had no problems using terms like geopolitics or 'political space'. In the West Germany of the early 90s, these were still tabooed terms, however, due to their close association with the Nazi area. This disqualified research proposals until they learned not to use these words.<sup>720</sup> Other examples of this included a lack of negotiations skills, as Jochen Franzke found out when asked to take on the additional position of dean of studies at the faculty of economic and social sciences. His Western colleagues would have negotiated for advantages in return of accepting the position, but Jochen Franzke was used to the GDR, where you were expected to simply accept whatever post or function was allocated to you:

*"Nobody wanted to do the job [become dean of studies] because it was clear to everyone that it would mean a lot of work and there was no supporting staff [allocated to the post] yet. Nothing, it was a completely new post. Then they asked me and in a weak moment I said yes. Again, as someone from the East, I just said yes without thinking twice about it, now [in hindsight] I am upset about it. My Western colleagues would*

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<sup>717</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 13.

<sup>718</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 13-14.

<sup>719</sup> Interview Elsenhans, 2019: 6.

<sup>720</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 15-16.

*have said: I want more money, I want more employees, I want a new office. But that is when my Eastern socialization came through; that's just what you did.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 24)*

But more concretely in terms of specific ‘academic’ skills, Eastern academics did not know how to write successful project applications to attract funding, were not up to date on the latest research methods considered important for quality research, especially large empirical studies, and, importantly, they lacked the networks crucial in West Germany to succeed academically.<sup>721</sup>

Third, former involvement with the Stasi disqualified many academics. In Potsdam, all academics had to sign a document agreeing that their employment contracts could be ended at any time, if evidence was found that they had cooperated with the Stasi. These agreements have remained in place up until today.<sup>722</sup> West German hires were also wetted for potential Stasi involvement, however, this naturally affected East German academics more strongly. This procedure meant that many East German scholars who had cooperated with the Stasi silently left of their own accord or did not apply for higher positions in order for no further investigations or revelations to take place.

Finally, a merging of two powerful actors’ interests also contributed to the marginalization of many East German academics. On the one hand, students experienced the unification through the lens of both material anxieties about their future prospects of employment and immaterial anxieties through the experience of the fast devaluation of East German social and cultural capital, including their academic degrees. In order to assure a prosperous future, the unification dynamics left them with two options: go study in the West to receive Western diplomas, or stay East but demand the implementation of degrees recognized as equivalent to the West German ones. The latter involved in particular the demand for Western curricula and Western academics and professors:

*“If they had kept the East German colleagues, the East German students would all have left to go West. The students would not have stayed in Leipzig if they had received the stamp: ‘studied political economy with an ex-GDR Marxist’.” (Interview Elsenbans, 2019: 17)*

*“I then applied for a position in Leipzig in 1993 and although I had good chances to get the job, the students there made sure that I did not get the professorship. They said: we want to have a proper Western professor, only he can guarantee a good education, who knows what we would be taking on with this strange Easterner who was at the IIB for so long? I can understand their attitude, that was the fear of the students at the time: that they would somehow get caught up in some dynamics of the reunification that they had nothing to do with. They wanted a properly trained Westerner who also had networks and who could help them find a job. So they did not act out of bad will, but rather had understandable motivations from a student’s point of view.” (Interview Franzke, 2019: 13)*

At the same time, the newly elected politicians of the ‘Eastern’ states had an interest both in making the universities perform strongly in the new system and to retain as many students as possible so as to avoid all the negative effects attached to a brain drain and to the loss of the younger generation.<sup>723</sup> The students’ interest in survival combined with the ministries’ interests in retaining

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<sup>721</sup> Interview Fuhr, 2019: 5.

<sup>722</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 13.

<sup>723</sup> See Interview Enderlein, 2019.

the students and build thriving universities thus contributed to the marginalization of East German academics without this necessarily being their explicit intention.

### *Who makes it?*

Given these various difficulties, what were the reasons leading to some East German academics making it in academia?

First, the ability and willingness to start from scratch and go through the exhausting process of un-learning and re-learning the trade played a crucial role in being able to stay in academia. An important factor with this, of course, was age. The majority of those who did make the jump into Western academia were those in the 'middle' age range in their thirties and early forties. Their younger age meant more enterprising energy, more chances in a process that marginalized the old, and a longer timespan until retirement, which forced them to act and ensure their survival.<sup>724</sup> Connected to this point was also a personal question of attitude: those who remained positive, daring, adaptive and took their chances had higher chances of succeeding than those who complained or stuck with what they knew.<sup>725</sup> Un-learning and re-learning the trade included learning what to cite and how to cite it,<sup>726</sup> for the somewhat younger getting another degree, as for example doing a second PhD or going West for a Habilitation,<sup>727</sup> but also getting some form of foreign or international qualification as guest or research fellows.<sup>728</sup> The most important part was to publish, and to publish frequently, so as to build a publication list comparable to West German standards. Jochen Franzke, for example, who branched out into the field of administration, had had the opportunity to collaborate with his allocated West German professor on a number of research projects, all of which allowed him to publish. By the end of the 1990s, within a ten-year time period since unification, he had built a CV with a publication list acceptable to Western standards.<sup>729</sup> Those who managed to make it in academia also speedily built new networks and in some cases were able to draw on some old connections. Some of the former IPW researchers, for instance, had, due to the nature of their previous research on the West, good connections to important Western players and politicians who valued their acumen and quality as researchers and were able to provide them with contacts and opportunities after 1990.<sup>730</sup> But these were individualized contacts that few were able to capitalize on. Almost all had to start from scratch, and those successful long-term quickly started attending and organizing relevant conferences, integrating publication circles, making contacts with relevant researchers abroad and taking on roles in research associations and networks.<sup>731</sup>

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<sup>724</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 7.

<sup>725</sup> See Interview Gießmann, 2020: 7; Interview Bürklin, 2020: 12; Interview Fischer, 2020: 16

<sup>726</sup> Interview Göhler, 2019:13.

<sup>727</sup> Interview Bürklin, 2020: 8.

<sup>728</sup> See for example Interview Krämer, 2019a: 6; Interview Wallraf, 2019: 3.

<sup>729</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 14.

<sup>730</sup> See for instance Interview Gießmann, 2020: 1; Interview Schwarz, 2019: 20.

<sup>731</sup> See for instance Interview Franzke, 2019: 21; Interview Wallraf, 2019: 3, 17.

Second, and relatedly, those who made it in academia all built relevant, sharp research profiles. Content wise, three strategies were successful: the ‘native informant’ strategy, the ‘old expertise in new packaging strategy’ and the ‘change of specialization strategy’.

One successful strategy was that of the ‘native informant’. Here the East German academics capitalized on their knowledge of the GDR and other ‘Eastern’ states. They took on the role of experts explaining to a Western public what was happening in the Soviet Union or in the transition of other Eastern states. Siegfried Fischer for example authored and co-authored a few books on the military dynamics at play in the Soviet Union (‘The Soviet Union’s military legacy,’ ‘The downfall of the Soviet Union’s military power’).<sup>732</sup> Hans-Joachim Gießmann used his knowledge of and access to the NVA army archives to chronicle the dissolution of the GDR’s entire military structure (‘The GDR’s unpleasant legacy’).<sup>733</sup> This tactic was particularly effective for those who had in-depth expertise of high politics issues, especially in the domain of military or security matters.

Another successful strategy was to repackaging old expertise in new frameworks. This particularly concerned area specialists who were in some cases able to launch new careers in comparative politics.<sup>734</sup> This involved both widening the empirical focus to more countries or regions, but also acquiring the foundations of comparative politics. In Potsdam, Raimund Krämer and Wolfram Wallraf in particular quickly retrained to fill the faculty of economic and social sciences’ teaching needs. They developed a lecture series on ‘the analysis and comparison of political systems’ in which they presented different political systems and all corresponding explanatory models, including all-important thinkers starting from Plato.<sup>735</sup> This tactic was particularly effective for those whose former domain of expertise was not problematic but simply needed to be made both relevant and intelligible for West German academic frameworks. Being a regional expert in Japan or Latin America, such as Wallraf’s or Krämer’s specializations, was not a reason to disqualify a candidate, nor was it looked down upon, as opposed to those who had for instance been specialists in socialist countries.<sup>736</sup>

Finally, those whose topic of expertise was not in demand or not respected anymore had to fully change their specializations. This also concerned those who saw chances open up elsewhere and decided to take them. Changing topic was a safe way to make a new career in academia. We have already seen the example of Jochen Franzke who decided to take his chance when an opportunity arose to work closely with Prof. Werner Jann to become an expert in public administration.<sup>737</sup> Similarly, Lutz Kleinwächter rebranched into economics and eventually became a professor. This worked because he stepped back from the dead end of Potsdam and took a detour through the retraining former NVA army officers in economics.<sup>738</sup> Both had to work intensively to catch up

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<sup>732</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 17. Title translations by the author.

<sup>733</sup> Interview Gießmann, 2020: 10. Title translation by the author.

<sup>734</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 16.

<sup>735</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 3.

<sup>736</sup> Interview Wallraf, 2019: 18.

<sup>737</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 12.

<sup>738</sup> Interview Fischer, 2020: 26.

with the new material, being ahead of their students by only a week of course material at the beginning.<sup>739</sup>

To conclude, let's look back to the IIB and the University of Potsdam. We have seen that only four of the former 120 IIB international relations experts made it long term at the University of Potsdam. How did they manage to stay? Two of them made it through the detour of administration. This means that they were put on administrative posts and thus worked primarily in the non-academic part of university administration. However, at the same time they continued offering a reduced number of courses as a side activity in their respective former area of specialization.<sup>740</sup> The administrative post brought stability and safe employment and also enabled the permanent stay. The other two former IIB members who remained on a long-term basis at the University of Potsdam were Raimund Krämer and Jochen Franzke, who remained as full academics on permanent posts. Both had branched out into new topics, Raimund Krämer by re-focusing his expertise on Latin America into comparative politics, and Jochen Franzke by becoming a public administration expert. They were also both conferred honorary *außerplanmäßige* or *apl* professorships, which awarded them some prestige but fell short of the advantages a normal professorship would carry. As such they were the only ones from the IIB to receive and keep professor titles, even though the honorary professor title was no real 'professorship'. These were conferred to Raimund Krämer as a reward for his role in the transition years and to Jochen Franzke for taking on the function of dean of studies over a number of years.<sup>741</sup>

*"At the time I saw it a little bit as a positive assessment of my work, but now I am not sure whether that was really the case. The professorship is not connected to any [material advantage]. It's just a [sign on a] business card; I realize that now when I get my pension notifications. It is just a formal denomination. With these honorary professorships, the state of Brandenburg found a cheap way to fill allegedly 'professorial' positions. In reality, I am on a temporary non-professorial staff position that will disappear once I retire, like Raimund Krämer's. Well, it is a misleading label, but I played along, because the title of professor naturally sounded good, and since then I have been able to get an appointment at my hairdresser's much faster than before." (Interview Franzke, 2019: 24)*

While this does not necessarily speak badly of the university of Potsdam – full professorial hires of internal candidates were generally frowned upon – it is indicative of the level up to which former IIB researchers were able to rise to. On the one hand it shows the possibilities: some made it up to an "apl." professorship level. On the other hand, it shows the limitations: only two did so, of which only one with an official focus on IR. Looking at the four who 'made it', we can therefore interpret this as another expression of the hierarchical ordering characteristic for the unification dynamics, with two of them succeeding through taking on non-academic posts, and the other two making it up to the level of honorary professorships but not to full professorships.

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<sup>739</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 12.

<sup>740</sup> Interview Bürklin, 2020: 5.

<sup>741</sup> Interview Franzke, 2019: 12.

## Conclusion

During the phase of the GDR's asymmetrical unification with West Germany, the East German system of international relations knowledge production was entirely dismantled. In its stead, the considerably different West German system of international relations knowledge production was established. This new system was confined to the universities without much connection to either political stakeholders or other cognate disciplines, especially as diplomats were recruited primarily from amongst jurists, not political scientists. International Relations went from being an independent field of study in the GDR to a tightly confined sub-category within the organizational, interpretive and normative boundaries of 'political science'. While a number of exceptions did make it in the new system, becoming professors or recognized experts in other ways, these were exceptions and not the rule.

This chapter has examined the relation between power and knowledge in the former GDR during its asymmetrical unification with West Germany. It organized the events at hand through the lens of the ideal-typical relation between colonization and knowledge sketched out in chapter 1. In doing so, it has shown how the principle of hierarchical orientation has played a role in the rebuilding of an international relations infrastructure in the formerly Eastern federated states of Germany. In part 2, hierarchical orientation played a role in defining West German political science as the organizational, interpretive and moral point of reference according to which IR needed to be measured, and it played a role in legitimizing the transfer of the West German academic structures onto the East. Hierarchical orientation also shaped to a large extent the hiring procedures of the new or reformed universities in the East. These hiring procedures privileged academics with West German social and cultural capital, as well as typical West German CVs and Western networks, thus marginalizing the East German candidates. Underlying these hiring procedures, hierarchical orientation also played a central role in the evaluation procedures which measured East German research quality according to West German standards and individualized competence in a way that reduced the quality of scholars to their ability or inability of catching up to these standards.

## CONCLUSION

Expert knowledge about world politics is transformed by events, commanded by them at least as much as it is in command of them. By looking at the system of international relations knowledge production in the GDR through times of war, revolution and quasi-colonial takeover we have seen that each of these situations impacted the possibilities and impossibilities of thinking, writing, publishing and teaching. The Cold War oriented thinking, research and teaching around an antagonistic friend/enemy division that researchers, experts and academics had to reproduce yet simultaneously also transcend. The revolutionary dynamics polarized political and academic positions. They reformed and reshaped the networks of knowledge production that the researchers, experts and academics needed to adapt to in order to stay relevant. The asymmetrical unification with West Germany dismantled the GDR's former system of international relations expertise, marginalizing its experts and expertise.

During the Cold War confrontation with the West, the GDR's system of international relations expertise formed a tightly organized, yet multifaceted network of knowledge production, circulation and consumption. It was composed of four different nodes of activity. First, the generalist elite diplomatic training facility IIB, which was closely affiliated with the MfAA, trained experts and produced research for the various ministries involved in international relations as well as for the central committee. Second, the research institute dedicated to studying the 'enemy', the IPW in Berlin, had close ties to the central committee and provided analysis and insight to a number of stakeholders. Third, a number of military institutions provided both research and training and were connected thematically to the other institutions around issues of war, peace and security. Finally, the historians and area studies experts operating at the various universities of the GDR also provided teaching and research and were thematically connected to the other institutions of international relations knowledge production around issues of development and regional expertise. All these various institutions were internally well-organized entities engaging with each other and with the relevant political and societal stakeholders in manifold ways. With regards to the political sphere, each institution displayed varying levels of closeness or distance to political stakeholders, varying levels of engagement and varying levels of diversity in contact partners. Beyond bounding the GDR's system of international relations expertise into a stable network of knowledge production, consumption and dissemination, the Cold War antagonism also structured its content and orientation along a friend/enemy distinction. Researchers and experts had to navigate a system which required them to both reproduce and transcend this distinction in order to do their work well. This dynamic played a central role in all the different aspects of international relations expertise, which this PhD thesis has examined along the three aspects of constitution, instrumentality and performance. International relations expertise played a constitutive role in forming the GDR's academic and practical foreign policy experts. Designed to use 'science as a weapon', they had to learn to simultaneously reproduce and transcend the Marxist/Leninist interpretation of international relations propagated by the GDR in order to engage verbally with their enemies in diplomatic and academic settings. As such, they needed to acquire a 'creative' and 'flexible' handling of their international relations' Marxist/Leninist interpretive frame. International relations expertise also played an instrumental role in providing

knowledge and insight about the Cold War enemy. Here, the Cold War antagonism led to the valorization of all research providing insight and analysis about the West, while devaluating research without practical use in 'knowing' the enemy. Through studying and analyzing the West closely, researchers were led to the realization that 'the others' were not so different from oneself. Instead, they behaved like a negative mirror image: thinking about the same problems, studying things in similar ways, with similar goals – but in a diametrically opposite manner and oriented against the GDR and its socialist alliances. As such, the Cold War antagonism led researchers studying the West into the difficult position of having to uphold dogma while clearly understanding its limitations and dangers. Finally, international relations expertise also played a performative role in enacting the GDR's alliances abroad. Here knowledge production, consumption and dissemination about international relations played a role both in presenting the GDR as a serious knowledge producer and as a reliable partner in alliance politics. This found an expression in the limitations and restrictions of publication freedom in function of the Soviet Union's geopolitical interest, but also in the transmission of Marxist/Leninist international relations expertise across a wide network of alliances with African and Asian socialist states.

During the phase of the GDR's revolutionary upheaval, the East German system of international relations knowledge production became strongly polarized. Researchers, experts and academics had to navigate a field divided between pro-Gorbachev supporters and anti-Gorbachev hardliners. In particular, all the fields of international relations knowledge production oriented around studying the enemy or touching upon issues of war, peace and security, became divided between those upholding the old dogma and those proposing a new reinterpretation of the old frameworks. The latter pushed for various degrees of cooperation instead of confrontation and proposed redefinitions of the former Marxist/Leninist interpretive frames, such as the conceptual extension of 'imperialism' to also include the West's innate ability for peace. Once the situation escalated in the autumn of 1989 and the old leadership stepped down, the GDR was governed by the fragile alliance between reformer socialist government and oppositional forces gathered around a 'round table' system. At the same time, as the population's faith in this double-government waned, the GDR's various political parties were gaining support and increasingly partnered up with their West German counterparts, whose power and influence in the process grew accordingly. In this phase, the GDR's experts, researchers and academics had to navigate a highly unstable and explosive environment in which they had to straddle and orientate between different stakeholders and audiences. The old practices had to be upheld to a certain degree, while the former institutions of international relations knowledge production such as the IIB and IPW started to disintegrate from within. In short, a process of disaggregation and reaggregation took place in which old institutions and entities split and various cross-institutional sub-groups formed into new committees, working groups and organizations. For example, the reform-oriented security experts of the IIB, IPW, and the military institutions came together to form working groups, which, in turn allied with the security-interested sub-groups of the oppositional movements. Once the revolutionary forces in the form of the Western-oriented political parties won and took over the GDR, its international relations researchers, experts and academics had to adapt to a new situation in which their expertise was still needed but not politically desired anymore. In choosing whom to hire as their new international relations advisors, the revolutionaries now in charge of the MfAA were divided between two equally unappealing options: re-hiring their old experts, representatives of the old regime, or enlist West German advisors. They found a rather unconventional compromise in



appointing West German professors, specialists in peace research, because they seemed to provide enough distance to both the West German establishment and the old East German *nomenklatura*. The IPW did not survive this hostile last phase of the revolution and was closed down, rejected on the basis of its strong affiliation with the old system. The IIB survived the changes by radically reforming, detaching itself from the GDR's political networks and finding legitimacy and status in a re-orientation around Western academic procedures and standards. In short, during the GDR's revolutionary upheaval, both the entities involved in knowledge production and their regular sets of relations were severely shaken and reconfigured. New avenues of research opened up while others closed down. Some academics were crowded out, while others were catapulted to power. Some institutions fell apart, some split, some reorganized, and some disappeared while the relations between all experts, researchers and academics transformed. Previous boundaries such as the division between East and West began to function in new ways, while new boundaries, such as the one between reformers and hardliners, emerged.

During the phase of the GDR's asymmetrical unification with West Germany, the East German system of international relations knowledge production was entirely dismantled. Most of its institutions were closed down, the experts and academics formerly operating in it had to find work in new domains and all the networks, ties and connections across institutions as well as between institutions and political stakeholders were dismantled. In its stead, the considerably different West German system of international relations knowledge production was established. This new system was confined to the universities without much connection to either political stakeholders or other cognate disciplines, especially as diplomats were recruited primarily from amongst jurists, not political scientists. International relations went from being an independent field of study in the GDR to a tightly confined sub-category within the organizational, interpretive and normative boundaries of 'political science'. While a number of exceptions did make it in the new system, becoming professors or recognized experts in other ways, these were exceptions and not the rule. The vast majority of the GDR's former experts took on new professions to ensure their material survival and stopped engaging with international relations. Those who continued engaging with their former area of expertise, did so in an unequal space in which their words and writings carried little weight, and remained separate from the dominant discourses, actors and decision-making processes of the new Germany. Throughout this process, the principle of hierarchical orientation played a structuring role, both in 'winding down the old' and in 'building the new'. It shaped the attitudes and behaviours of the East German academics trying to adapt to the new situation by fully orienting to the Western standards. It shaped the attitudes and behaviours of the East and West German actors involved in closing down the Eastern institutions, and it structured the various discourses of inferiority (incompetence, amorality, danger) used to apprehend the East German international relations experts. Finally, it played a role in crowding them out of the dominant international relations analysis networks, both the academic and political ones, and in displacing them into a subaltern parallel system of knowledge production and dissemination disconnected from its dominant counterparts. Hierarchical orientation also played a role in defining West German political science as the organizational, interpretive and moral point of reference according to which East German international relations expertise needed to be measured up and it played a role in legitimizing the transfer of the West German academic structures onto the East. Hierarchical orientation also shaped to a large extent the hiring procedures of the new or reformed universities in the East. These hiring procedures privileged academics with West

German social and cultural capital, as well as typical West German CVs and Western networks, thus marginalizing the East German candidates. Underlying these hiring procedures, hierarchical orientation also played a central role in the evaluation procedures which measured East German research quality according to West German norms and individualized competence in a way that reduced the quality of scholars to their ability or inability of catching up to these norms.

This analysis of the war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge processes at play in the evolution of GDR international relations expertise between 1970 and 2000 is meant to showcase a relational approach to the analysis of knowledge systems. By focusing on the aggregation and disaggregation of people and processes into units of knowledge production, consumption and distribution as well as by highlighting the formation and dissolution of knowledge networks throughout war, revolution and ‘colonization’, this PhD thesis has aimed at showing the highly contextual and changing nature of knowledge networks. Because a relational approach is necessarily also ‘international’/‘global’/‘intersocietal’, the analysis of the last chapters also showcased the importance of not taking any boundaries as essential or given. As laid out in chapter 1, this thesis has put forward a re-reading of power/knowledge from an international perspective, not through an understanding of the international as either an extended scale of analysis, a global power structure or an imagined horizon. Instead, it has offered a reading from the perspective of the ‘international’ as a relational category, i.e. from the perspective of the ‘international’ as a type of force that makes and unmakes social orders. The ‘global geopolitics of knowledge’ put forward here describes three ways in which a specific type of context – determined by war, revolution and colonization respectively – configures and sets the parameters for knowledge production. War/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge are meant to work as conceptual frameworks through which concrete historical situations can be interpreted and compared. This is the theoretical contribution of my PhD thesis. The ‘global geopolitics of knowledge’ I put forward is a collection of ideal-typical situations through which to understand the way in which ‘the international’ impacts knowledge production by setting and reshaping its parameters and orientation.

Thinking through GDR power/knowledge relations with the help of the three ideal-types of war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge has proven highly useful in making sense of the complex and multifaceted reality and changing nature of its international relations expertise system. However, as with all models, it also comes with limitations. Some of them are due to the nature of the model, others to the time constraints faced in developing it. I identify the following six points of reflection and also touch upon avenues for further research.

*Reflection 1.* The model I put forward is dynamic in the sense that it depicts a moment of re-spatialization, which is a moment of change. With change being an inherently temporal category, the model includes a temporal dimension. Yet it depicts only one moment in time – a moment of change. It does not delineate how we transition out of it and what happens next. In other words, its temporal dimension is not fully fleshed out. This is important because the significance of the model hinges partly on its relevance beyond the events themselves. We might term this issue the ‘order of peace’ problem. Barkawi and Brighton use the term to describe the way in which war

imprints its “order of battle” to the subsequent time of peace.<sup>742</sup> The point is that war, and for that matter revolution and colonization too, unmake and then remake societies. They restructure social order, leaving solid traces and imprints long after the events themselves took place. But how exactly they leave traces across time and remain relevant in the subsequent ‘order of peace’, the model so far does not address.

Less important, but perhaps similarly vague is the depiction of the process leading to the re-spatialization captured by the war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge nexuses. I have established the core logic of each as consisting of enemy formation, polarization and hierarchical outlook. Ontologically speaking, each of these begin before war, revolution and colonization and bleed into them. Heuristically speaking, war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge do not have to overlap with a formal war, revolution or colonization setting, but they do not start either with some antagonism, polarization or hierarchy. They come into play once the situation described is sufficiently antagonistic, polarized or hierarchized. But when is point of sufficiency reached?

*Reflection 2.* Do the ideal-types need to be refined into sub-types? Do we need a decolonization/knowledge nexus to complement the colonization/knowledge nexus and if so how does it differ conceptually from revolution/knowledge? And what about the link between victory/knowledge and defeat/knowledge as subtypes to war/knowledge? This question partly links with the issue of temporality and thus needs to be worked out more fully. What are the outcomes of, for instance, the war/knowledge dynamic, once the conflict is over? It seems that victory will be more likely to present a knowledge situation that irreflexively transfers the order of battle to the order of peace, because it is not recognized as such. In opposition to this, defeat is likely to trigger a wider variety of knowledge reactions because it is more confronting. Defeat might prolong the antagonistic war dynamics, but it might also trigger new forms of positive orientation towards the victor. We might term this the ‘sub-type’ problem.

*Reflection 3.* It is almost too banal to note that war, revolution and colonization are not discrete social processes but instead frequently overlap or cause one another. Revolution can lead to war, war can lead to colonization, colonization can lead to revolution, just as processes of war, revolution and colonization are frequently simultaneously taking place. Yet it does not suffice to point out that the distinction between war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge is a heuristic, not an ontological separation between the three. Because the distinction is conceptual does not mean that war, revolution and colonization cannot bleed into one another conceptually. Revolution/knowledge describes a temporal sequence that combines elements of war/knowledge and then colonization/knowledge. But the problem here links more fundamentally with the already noted issue of temporality. The outcome of war might just reinscribe the ‘order of battle’ into the ‘order of peace’, but it might also – through defeat – lead to modified dynamics of positive reorientation along the lines of the former enemy. How different is this from the colonization/knowledge nexus? We might term this the ‘conceptual distinction’ problem.

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<sup>742</sup> Barkawi and Brighton, 139.

*Reflection 4.* Power and knowledge are co-constitutive; knowledge claims are deeply entangled with the social and political reality they are embedded in. This is essentially a two-way story. Yet the story behind the ideal-types presented here is a one-way story from power to knowledge. It depicts how social processes of change re-structure and re-shape the context within which knowledge production and knowledge dissemination takes place. This ignores the manifold flows of interaction taking the reverse route from knowledge to power. Knowledge claims often underwrite the processes of enemy formation, polarization and hierarchical ordering residing at the core of war/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge. We might term this the ‘co-constitution’ problem.

*Reflection 5.* War/knowledge, revolution/knowledge and colonization/knowledge are heuristic devices narrowing down the complex and manifold connections between war and knowledge, revolution and knowledge, and colonization and knowledge to one type of connection only. This is a reductive move with the problematic effect of occluding other types of constitutive relations. While the impact of war, revolution and colonization on knowledge formation exceeds the one put forward in the geopolitics of knowledge model, the reverse is also true. More ‘international’ moments than just war, revolution and colonization impact knowledge formation. As Owens has shown,<sup>743</sup> general social disorder, strikes, suicides and insurgencies are important moments in pushing the development of the social sciences forward. Social thought reacts to these moments of unrest in an effort to re-establish the disturbed order. This deeply impacts the content of ideas: “[c]oncepts like community, authority and alienation appear as basic sociological categories, but they reflect a desire for integration and order in the face of the social upheaval generated by capitalism and empire.”<sup>744</sup> We might term this issue the ‘reduction’ problem.

*Reflection 6.* Finally, we can raise the determinism question: what is the relation between contingency and determinism in the geopolitics/knowledge model I propose? The model firmly establishes three different ways in which the context of knowledge production is structured by war, revolution or colonization. But how strongly does the specific structure and orientation of a knowledge context impact the knowledge content? The geopolitics of knowledge model establishes some general connections: war/knowledge means that the knowledge content is determined by the antagonistic orientation against the ‘enemy’ knowledge formation, colonization/knowledge means that the knowledge content is determined by its orientation towards the metropole, while revolution/knowledge means that knowledge content is determined by a deep polarization and split within a previously homogenous knowledge context. Beyond these general points of structure, knowledge context and knowledge content evolve in ways that are often contingent and more often than not non-rational. Actors have individual agendas, limited insight and serious time constraints. If we take the example of the establishment of the University of Potsdam post-1990, the general colonization/knowledge pattern structured the establishment of the new post-unification knowledge infrastructure of the former GDR. It determined the orientation of that process along West German lines. But the actual details of the process took place in contingent ways.

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<sup>743</sup> Owens, *Economy of Force: Counterinsurgency and the Historical Rise of the Social*.

<sup>744</sup> Tarak Barkawi, "The social in thought and practice," *Security Dialogue* 47, no. 3 (2016): 188.

To conclude, let's turn our attention to the 'geopolitics of knowledge' model's wider applicability. In this thesis it has been used in the context of the GDR's system of international relations expertise. How applicable or useful would it be in other contexts? Further research is needed, and a synchronic, diachronic and contrapuntal expansion of this study could present an interesting next step. A synchronic expansion could involve the study of the same processes in Eastern European states, perhaps Poland or Czechoslovakia. How did war and revolution impact the organization of their system of international relations expertise? A diachronic expansion could involve looking at Germany at the critical historical juncture of losing WWI and WWII. How did war, revolution and defeat impact international relations knowledge production in post-WWI Germany and how did war, defeat and occupation impact international relations knowledge production in post-WWII Germany? A contrapuntal expansion could involve looking at the history of Mozambique during the same time frame. As we have seen, the GDR was involved in training Mozambican diplomats and establishing a diplomatic training facility in Maputo after Mozambique gained independence from Portugal. How did colonization, revolution and war impact Mozambique's system of international relations expertise?

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# Appendix A

Sources: List of Interviewees

|    | Name                   | Date       | Length | Socialization                        | Work                                   |
|----|------------------------|------------|--------|--------------------------------------|--|
| 1  | Bernhard Myszynski     | 18.02.2019 | 1h42   | West                                 | HRV/UP                                 |
| 2  | Erhard Crome           | 19.02.2019 | 1h13   | East/IIB                             | IIB                                    |
| 3a | Raimund Krämer         | 05.06.2019 | 1h52   | East/IIB                             | IIB                                    |
| 3b | Raimund Krämer         | 18.11.2019 | 1h49   | East/IIB                             | IIB                                    |
| 4  | Lutz Kleinwächter      | 18.06.2019 | 2h58   | East/IIB                             | IIB                                    |
| 5  | Wolfram Wallraf        | 20.06.2019 | 2h37   | East/IMEMO                           | IIB                                    |
| 6  | Jochen Franzke         | 01.07.2019 | 2h07   | East/IIB                             | IIB                                    |
| 7  | Gerhard Göhler         | 01.07.2019 | 1h46   | West                                 | FU                                     |
| 8  | Thomas Ruttig          | 21.08.2019 | 2h16   | East/HU                              | MfAA                                   |
| 9  | Hartmut Elsenhans      | 22.08.2019 | 2h38   | West                                 | Uni Leipzig                            |
| 10 | Otto Keck              | 22.10.2019 | 2h42   | West                                 | UP                                     |
| 11 | Otto Pfeiffer          | 25.10.2019 | 4h16   | East/IIB                             | MfAA                                   |
| 12 | Wolfgang Schwarz       | 18.11.2019 | 2h42   | East/IIB                             | IPW                                    |
| 13 | Harald Fuhr            | 20.11.2019 | 1h15   | West                                 | UP                                     |
| 14 | Werner Jann            | 22.11.2019 | 1h31   | West                                 | UP                                     |
| 15 | Wilhelm Ersil          | 22.11.2019 | 2h48   | East/HU                              | IIB                                    |
| 16 | Hans-Joachim Gießmann  | 09.01.2020 | 1h25   | East/HU                              | IPW                                    |
| 17 | Siegfried Fischer      | 24.02.2020 | 3h38   | East/<br>Militärakademie             | Militärakademie                        |
| 18 | Uwe Halbach            | 24.02.2020 | 1h07   | West                                 | BiOst/SWP                              |
| 19 | Hinrich Enderlein      | 25.02.2020 | 2h23   | West                                 | Minister                               |
| 20 | Hans-Jürgen Misselwitz | 25.02.2020 | 1h43   | East/Kirchliche<br>Hochschule Berlin | Staatssekretär<br>MfAA 1990            |
| 21 | Ulrich van der Heyden  | 26.02.2020 | 2h13   | East/HU                              | HU                                     |
| 22 | Wilhelm Bürklin        | 26.02.2020 | 01h50  | West                                 | UP                                     |
| 23 | Wilfried Schreiber     | 27.02.2020 | 2h47   | East/<br>Militärakademie             | Militärpolitische<br>Hochschule Berlin |
| 24 | Gert-Joachim Gläßner   | 28.02.2020 | 1h48   | West                                 | FU/HU                                  |
| 25 | Göttrik Wewer          | 08.05.2020 | Email  | West                                 | DVPW                                   |



## Appendix B

IIB staff evolution at the University of Potsdam from the summer semester of 1991 to 2001:<sup>745</sup>

|    |                   | SS91 | WS91<br>/92 | SS92 | WS92<br>/93 | SS93 | WS93<br>/94 | SS94 and<br>WS94/95 | SS95 | From<br>WS95/96 to<br>WS98/99 | From SS99<br>to WS00/01 | From<br>SS01 |
|----|-------------------|------|-------------|------|-------------|------|-------------|---------------------|------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|
| 1  | Renate Schmidt    |      |             |      |             |      | X           | X                   | X    | X                             | X                       | X            |
| 2  | Wolfgang Kötter   | X    | X           | X    | X           | X    | X           | X                   | X    | X                             | X                       | X            |
| 3  | Raimund Krämer    | X    | X           | X    | X           | X    | X           |                     | X    | X                             | X                       | X            |
| 4  | Jochen Franzke    | X    | X           | X    | X           | X    | X           | X                   | X    | X                             | X                       | X            |
| 5  | Erhard Crome      | X    | X           | X    | X           | X    | X           | X                   | X    | X                             | X                       |              |
| 6  | Sergej Henke      | X    | X           | X    | X           | X    | X           | X                   | X    | X                             |                         |              |
| 7  | Wolfram Wallraf   | X    | X           | X    | X           | X    | X           | X                   | X    |                               |                         |              |
| 8  | Wolfgang Kubiczek | X    | X           | X    | X           | X    | X           | X                   |      |                               |                         |              |
| 9  | Lutz Schrader     | X    | X           | X    | X           | X    | X           |                     |      |                               |                         |              |
| 10 | Lutz Kleinwächter | X    | X           | X    | X           | X    | X           |                     |      |                               |                         |              |
| 11 | Raina Zimmering   | X    | X           |      | X           | X    |             |                     |      |                               |                         |              |
| 12 | Claus Montag      |      |             |      | X           | X    |             |                     |      |                               |                         |              |
| 13 | Walter Stock      | X    | X           | X    | X           | X    |             |                     |      |                               |                         |              |
| 14 | Dieter Thielemann | X    |             | X    | X           |      |             |                     |      |                               |                         |              |
| 15 | Brigitte Schwöpe  | X    | X           | X    | X           |      |             |                     |      |                               |                         |              |
| 16 | Hans-J. Bethke    | X    | X           |      |             |      |             |                     |      |                               |                         |              |
| 17 | Klaus-Uwe Gunold  |      | X           |      |             |      |             |                     |      |                               |                         |              |
| 18 | Frank Talkenberg  | X    |             |      |             |      |             |                     |      |                               |                         |              |
| 19 | Klaus Schmidt     | X    |             |      |             |      |             |                     |      |                               |                         |              |
| 20 | Dietrich Kleitke  | X    |             |      |             |      |             |                     |      |                               |                         |              |
|    |                   | 17   | 14          | 12   | 14          | 12   | 10          | 7                   | 7    | 6                             | 5                       | 4            |

<sup>745</sup> The numbers are combined and compiled from the following sources: Vorlesungsverzeichnisse der Universität Potsdam SS1992 bis SS2001; Brandenburgische Landeshochschule, Kommission zur Festlegung des Sommersemesters, Studiengang Politikwissenschaft, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 28.02.1991, Anlage 1, Lehrveranstaltungen auf Honorarbasis im Sommersemester 1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292; Kommission zur Festlegung des Wintersemesters 1991/92 im Studiengang Politikwissenschaft, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 18.6.1991. Potsdam University Archive, ASR13292.