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SEGREGATED, STANDARDISED, REPRESSED: SOCIALISATION AND THE ENTRENCHMENT OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION

Antoine Louette

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

For radicals, structural domination – e.g., sexism, racism, or classism – refers to the disempowerment of social groups by social practices. In recent years, a growing number of critical theorists have drawn on sociological and anthropological work to argue that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to agents' socialisation into these practices. This thesis is sympathetic to this approach, but argues nonetheless that it stumbles over its own account of the contradictory character of socialisation. For if socialisation is contradictory – if agents should be expected to frequent not only social milieux that confirm the schemas of dominating practices, but also milieux that challenge these schemas – then it is unclear how exactly their socialisation in these practices can explain the entrenchment of structural domination. To solve this problem, the thesis suggests that we should pay closer attention to the various influences which structural domination itself has on socialisation. The thesis identifies three such influences, depending on the case at hand: a segregating influence, such that agents do not frequent the milieux that challenge the schemas of dominating practices; a standardising influence, such that there are too few of these milieux for agents to gain critical insight from them; and a repressive influence, such that the critical insights agents gain from these milieux may be psychologically repressed through physical repression.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is concerned with the ways in which socialisation can entrench structural domination. As such, it is a work of critical theory, in the broad sense: its 'task is to illuminate […] injustice in ways that provide a basis for resistance' (Haslanger 2020b, 1; see also Horkheimer 1972 [1937], Geuss 1981). Specifically, it aims at stimulating the emancipation of those social groups who are dominated by some of our current social practices and institutions – those who 'can't breathe'.

These words, made into a political slogan by the Black Lives Matter movement in honour of George Floyd, neatly capture the experience of structural domination: the constant insecurity that comes with vulnerability, the continuous need to anticipate who or what may harm you, the structural inability to relax that obtains when social practices of residential segregation, biased hiring, or educational disadvantage render one particularly vulnerable – to police brutality, for instance, and death by asphyxiation.

Black people like Floyd are not the only group who cannot breathe today: women and workers find themselves in a similar situation. Among other groups, these three constitute the 'big three' of structural domination (Mills 2000, 445; see also Filling unpublished, 1). As members of these groups, agents find themselves socially disempowered, either directly or as a result of a history of injustice towards them (Haslanger 2004, 117): even when they are not at the mercy of a specific policeman, a particular husband, or a single boss, their ability to resist some white, some man, or some capitalist is impaired (Filling, *ibid., passim*).

This can be remedied. Social practices and institutions 'don't just exist of and by themselves', after all: agents impose them on themselves 'by participating in them' or 'accepting them without protest', as Raymond Geuss has put it (1981, 60). So why do we participate in dominating practices, or at any rate fail to change them? Why do we entrench structural domination? For example, why are there relatively few BLM activists, and how can we increase their numbers?

Part of the explanation has to do with repression, no doubt, as well as various collective action problems (see e.g., Celikates 2016, 21). But for critical theorists, the failure to remedy structural domination is largely due to ideology, and more precisely to our socialisation into dominating practices: specifically, to the process by which the milieux in which these practices are enacted teach or inculcate us their schemas – their ideologies – as they embody or actualise them, which in turns prevents us from criticising or challenging them (Haslanger 2017a, Celikates 2016, Einspahr 2010; see also Sewell 1992).

Now, owing largely to Emile Durkheim's *The Rules of the Sociological Method* (1968), until recently socialisation was conceived on the model of 'traditional prejudices', from which the enlightened theorist would free the 'common man' (1968, 31; cf. Horkheimer 1972, 192). Thus Louis

Althusser famously insisted, in *For Marx*, on an 'epistemological gap' between the social scientist and social consciousness (1996, 33–47). And even Pierre Bourdieu sometimes criticised 'the illusion of immediate knowledge', as in *The Craft of Sociology* (Bourdieu et. al. 1991, 13; see also Celikates 2006).

But this view is mainly behind us. As many have argued, following Karl Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia* (1936; see also Geertz 2000, and Celikates 2006), it faces a paradox: since nothing guarantees that the theorist is not herself in the grip of her socialisation into dominating practices, either she does not know better than the common man, or the common man knows more than the Durkheimians suggest. And since the first horn of the dilemma seems to render critical consciousness impossible, many have chosen the second.

Thus Anthony Giddens makes it one of his 'leading theorem[s]' that 'every social actor knows a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member' (1979, 5, emphasis removed; see also 72; see also Scott 1985, 319). And as Robin Celikates approvingly comments, the pragmatic sociology of Luc Boltanski and others rejects 'the idea that social rules are imposed behind the backs of ignorant actors' (2012, 165, referencing Boltanski 1990a; see also Lemieux 2018, 16–17).

Importantly, a fundamental reason behind this shift is the recognition of the contradictory character of (contemporary) socialisation: critical consciousness, agents' as well as theorists', is possible because we typically frequent not only milieux that confirm the schemas of dominating practices, but also milieux that challenge them. As William Sewell has put it, our 'cultural worlds are commonly beset with internal contradictions' (Sewell 2005, 53; see also 1992, 16, and Phillips 2006, 2007), and it is these contradictions which enable us, agents as well as theorists, to criticise our practices (Haslanger 2017a; cf. Lemieux 2018, 17).[1]

Yet this shift, I suggest, creates a major problem for critical theory. In particular, it poses an important challenge to the view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to ideology, and more precisely to our socialisation into dominating practices: as critical theory has checked its pretension to criticise 'from above', or at any rate from the 'right side' of a deep epistemological gap, it has deprived its account of socialisation of much explanatory power regarding the entrenchment of structural domination.

For if socialisation is contradictory – if we should be expected to frequent not just social milieux that confirm the schemas of these practices, but also milieux that challenge them – then it is unclear how exactly our socialisation into these practices can explain the entrenchment of structural

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[1] As Young insisted, 'norms can come from nowhere else' (1990, 5).

domination. In other words, why would agents participate in dominating practices, or accept them without protest, if the rules of these practices are not imposed in some sense 'behind their backs'?

Faced with this problem, some have tended to minimise the role played by socialisation in the entrenchment of structural domination by emphasising other ways in which compliance is secured (e.g., Scott 1985, Abercrombie et al. 1980; see also Martinez-Alier 1971). Thus James Scott, for instance, has insisted on the 'grudging resignation', as opposed to the 'ideological support', that may result from the experience of structural domination (1985, 325). But while there is much to be said for this kind of approach, we should not abandon the view that socialisation into dominating practices is another important factor in the entrenchment of structural domination. For this view, I argue in this thesis, has the resources to solve the problem.

More precisely, it does so provided we pay closer attention than its current proponents do to the 'tainted origin' of contemporary socialisation in structural domination (cf. Geuss 1981, 21), and specifically to the corresponding influences of structural domination on contemporary socialisation: from the segregating effects of the division of labour (e.g., Young 1990), to the standardising logic of market domination (e.g., Graeber 2001, 2005), to the repressive forces of ideological apparatuses that never merely function by ideology (e.g., Althusser 2014 [1970]).

Drawing on this literature, I argue in this thesis that structural domination should serve as more than a mere explanandum. It should be our explanans as well. For it itself does explanatory work, I argue, by shaping our contradictory socialisation in different ways, each of which goes some way to explain our failure to criticise dominating practices. If socialisation into dominating practices entrenches structural domination, I contend, it is because structural domination itself has a certain influence on socialisation – a segregating, a standardising, or a repressive influence, depending on the case at hand.

I make this argument as follows. In chapter 1, I introduce the radical conception of structural domination I will rely on throughout, by contrasting it with the prominent republican conception as recently articulated by Philip Pettit (1999; see also Quentin Skinner 1998 and Frank Lovett 2010). On both views, social practices play a crucial role in structural domination: they impair some agents' ability to resist others. But the views disagree on what exactly this disempowering role amounts to. On the republican view, to dominate someone is to have arbitrary power over her, meaning that, as the practices disempower her, they facilitate others' domination over her. On the radical view we owe to Iris Young (1990), Nancy Fraser (1993), or Sally Haslanger (2004), by contrast, to dominate someone is to impair her ability to resist others, which means that the practices themselves dominate her when they disempower her, whether or not others have arbitrary power over her as a result. This holds even for the kind of indirect arbitrary power which Pettit sometimes hints at (e.g., 2012, 63).

In chapter 2, I turn to the view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to our socialisation into dominating practices, and I present in more details the problem I emphasised above. For while this view is promising, the account of socialisation it relies on needs to be amended if it is to explain the entrenchment of structural domination: the proponents of this view (henceforth the PSCs, for 'proponents of the socialisation conception', e.g., Haslanger 2017a, Celikates 2016, and Einspahr 2010) seem to neglect the fact that theirs is an account of contradictory socialisation, where its contradictions should in principle allow for critical consciousness, and, further, social change. To solve this problem, I argue, we should pay attention to the various influences which structural domination has on socialisation.

In chapter 3, I turn to the first of these influences. Building on the PSCs' reading of socialisation into dominating practices in terms of ideology, I amend their account of socialisation in light of the literature on this topic. Focusing on racism specifically, I draw on the Marxist claim that ideology has its tainted origin in the division imposed by structural domination between the practices of the dominant groups and those of the dominated groups. In this connection, I argue that in this case it is only because structural domination has a *segregating* influence on socialisation that socialisation can entrench structural domination. If white professionals entrench the domination of the biased hiring practices that dominate their black employees, for instance, it is because this domination has segregated white professionals and black employees into two groups who live such different lives that white professionals do not frequent the milieux that would enable them to question the schemas that guide their biased hiring practices.

This solution is not the whole story, however, as I argue in chapter 4. As testified by socialisation into the market, structural domination does not always have a segregating influence on socialisation. But I avail myself of the PSCs' reading of socialisation into the market in terms of the ideology of the market, or fetishism, to amend their account in light of the literature on that topic. Here I draw on those who, unlike the PSCs, understand fetishism not as the ideology of the market, but as the impersonal domination both capitalists and workers suffer in the market (Ripstein 1987, Roberts 2017, Vrousalis 2017). Based on this analysis, I suggest that the PSCs once again neglect the influence of structural domination on socialisation, but that in this case it is because this influence is standardising, not segregating, that socialisation can entrench structural domination: workers and capitalists fail to question the commodity schema at the heart of the market because, as market domination encourages them to make commodity exchange the standard across many milieux in order to maximise profit, it deprives them of the milieux that would help them realise that they are doing the commodifying themselves.

Sometimes, however, structural domination has neither a segregating nor a standardising influence on socialisation, as testified by the socialisation of dominated groups. Thus in chapter 5,

finally, I build on the PSCs' reading of the socialisation of dominated groups as disciplined through ideological apparatuses to amend their account in light of the literature on this third topic. Here I focus on sexism, and draw on Althusser's often overlooked remark about the 'double functioning' of ideological state apparatuses, 'predominantly by ideology, but […] secondarily by repression' (2014 [1970], 251). I argue that the PSCs neglect once again the influence of structural domination on socialisation: in this case, I argue, it is only because structural domination has a *repressive* influence on socialisation that socialisation can entrench structural domination. This influence is such that, through physical repression, the dominant groups may psychologically repress what the dominated groups learn in their own milieux that would help them challenge the dominant cultures. In some philosophy departments for instance, female students fail to question what Kathy Miriam (2007), following Adrienne Rich (1986), has called the law of male sex-right, because the domination of this implicit law may enable male students to repress the critical insights female students have learned from their women's studies classes (see also Saul's 'What It Is Like to Be a Woman in Philosophy' blog, 2021).

This three-fold amendment, I suggest, is what might help us rescue the socialisation conception of entrenchment. In the conclusion to this thesis, I will argue that this amendment implies a slightly different basis for resistance than the PSCs suggest. If challenging our socialisation into dominating practices will prove difficult unless we first minimise the various influences of structural domination on socialisation, then these influences, not socialisation, should be our primary targets. Thus we should not directly target socialisation into the market, for instance, but aim first at the standardising, commodifying processes that prevent us from thinking critically about the market. But I will return to such strategies of resistance in conclusion. For now, let me start with a more thorough analysis of structural domination.

CHAPTER 1

THE RADICAL CONCEPTION OF DOMINATION IN THREE KEY CASES

This thesis is concerned with the ways in which socialisation can entrench structural domination. This will be the focus of chapters 2 to 5. In this first chapter I introduce the radical conception of structural domination I rely on throughout. I do this by contrasting this conception with one of the most prominent accounts in the literature, namely, the republican conception as recently articulated by Philip Pettit (1999; see also Skinner 1998, and Lovett 2010).

Structural domination is a social phenomenon: it concerns social groups, such as classes, races, or genders. Importantly, these groups are not to be understood as 'subjective identities', but rather as 'axes of structural inequality': '[t]hey name structural positions whose occupants are privileged or disadvantaged in relation to one another due to the adherence of actors to institutional rules and norms and the pursuit of their interests and goals within institutions' (Young 2005, 21; see also Einspahr 2010, 15, and Pettit 1999, 124, where he references Young 1990, chapter 2).

These institutions, or social practices more generally, are 'collective enterprises', in which agents coordinate around (e.g., use, allocate) resources on the basis of shared schemas such as rules and norms (Haslanger 2004, 104, and 2017c, 21–3; see also Einspahr 2010, and Sewell 1992).[2] The market is one such practice; so is the police brutality condemned by the Black Lives Matter movement, and so is the sexual abuse recently denounced by the #metoo campaign.

For both republicans such as Pettit (1999) and radicals such as Iris Young (1990), Nancy Fraser (1993), and Sally Haslanger (2004), these and other social practices play a crucial role in structural domination: they impair some agents' ability to resist others. But the views disagree on what exactly this disempowering role amounts to.

On the republican view, to dominate someone is to have arbitrary power over her, which means that, as the practices impair some agents' ability to resist others, they facilitate others' domination over them. On the radical view, by contrast, to dominate someone is to impair her ability to resist others, meaning that the practices themselves dominate her when they disempower her, whether or not others have arbitrary power over her as a result. This holds even for the kind of indirect arbitrary power which may be enjoyed by those who can mitigate the effects of these practices (see Pettit 2012, 63).

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[2] Institutions are a kind of social practice, whose schemas are formalised (e.g., into explicit rules, as opposed to vaguer scripts or norms). Schemas include rules and norms, but also the scripts, concepts, and frames of thinking which anthropologists have brought to light. Resources are things of all sort, including other agents and other schemas, understood as, for example, conceptual resources (see e.g., Haslanger 2017c, and Sewell 1992). I will return to social practices in more detail below and in the following chapters (see especially chapter 2).

To illustrate each of the three ways in which the radical view departs from its republican counterpart, I focus on three cases. In the first case, republicans argue that an agent dominates another due to a social practice, while radicals insist that the practice itself dominates. In the second case, radicals make the same claim, but no one is *directly* dominated according to republicans, since the practice does not confer direct arbitrary power to anyone. In the third case, the radical diagnosis remains unchanged, but here republicans cannot suggest that some enjoy *indirect* arbitrary power either.

I argue as follows. In the first section, I present the republican interpretation of the three core features of domination: unfreedom, unequal power, and duration. For republicans, to dominate someone is to have arbitrary power over them, typically because a social practice impairs their ability to resist. This means that, when you are structurally dominated, on this view, you are unfree from a specific member of another group, who can be expected to foresee that you can never resist him as long as the practice remains unchanged. For you are unfree from arbitrary interference just in case someone can harm you intentionally, at will, and with impunity; and someone is in a position to do that just in case he can be expected to foresee that you cannot resist (including punish) him at any time. Finally, since being in this position depends on the practice, his domination over you lasts as long as the practice remains unchanged.

In section II, I turn to the radical interpretation of the same three core features of domination. For radicals, when a practice disempowers you, it is the practice itself that dominates you. While those who could change this practice would dominate you in its place if they could be expected to foresee its effects, the fact that they cannot be expected to do this means that they do not dominate you. Crucially, neither do those who acquire power over you as a result of your disempowerment, regardless of whether this power is arbitrary: they are part of the dominant group, but since they do not disempower you, they do not dominate you. On this picture too it is from them that you are unfree, this is so whether or not they actually interfere, and your unfreedom lasts as long as the practice remains unchanged. But the fact that their power over you need not be arbitrary means that you may be unfree from a different member of their group at each stage rather than from the same member throughout, none of whom need to be in a position to foresee when exactly you cannot resist (including punish) him specifically.

With this in mind, I then present three cases to highlight these key differences between the two views. In the case I offer in section III, republicans argue that an agent dominates another due to a social practice, while radicals insist that the practice itself dominates. In this case, as a member of the dominated group, you are unfree from a specific member of the dominant group, who owes her ability to interfere with you to a social practice which she can be expected to foresee impairs your ability to

resist her specifically at each stage.[3] That she can be expected to do this sets her apart from those who could change this practice, since, unlike her, they cannot be expected to foresee its effects. In this case, republicans argue that she dominates you, on the grounds that she has arbitrary power over you: she can interfere with you intentionally, at will, and with impunity, since she can be expected to foresee that you cannot resist (including punish) her at each stage. Radicals, by contrast, move beyond what Fraser calls the 'dyad' in which a dominator and a dominated agent are involved (1993) to insist that the practice itself dominates: while those who could change this practice would dominate in its place if they could be expected to foresee its effects, the fact that they cannot leaves only the practice to blame. Even if white managers have arbitrary power over their black employees, for example, for radicals it is the biased hiring practices of our white-dominated economy that do the dominating.

In section IV, I turn to the second case. In this case, the practice does not enable anyone to arbitrarily interfere with another directly, as it did in the first. Here you are unfree from a different member of the dominant group at each stage: a few of them can be expected to foresee that the practice impairs your ability to resist *some* member of their group at each stage, but none of them can be expected to foresee which particular agent you cannot resist, and when. This is because you can resist a number of members of that group at each stage, and none of them has any way to know whether he belongs to this subgroup. In this case, radicals still insist that you are dominated by the practice itself, for the same reason as above: those who could change the practice cannot be expected to foresee its effects, and the few members of the dominant group who can be expected to do this could not change the practice by themselves. But for republicans you are not dominated, and this is because no member of the dominant group has arbitrary power over you or any member of your group: no member of this group can interfere with you at will and with impunity, since even if a few members of this group can be expected to foresee that members of your group could not resist *some* member of their group at each stage, no member of their group can be expected to foresee *which* member of your group could resist *which* member of their group at each stage. Thus radicals suggest that female students are dominated by the implicit law of male sex-right in effect in hyper-masculine philosophy departments, for instance, without any male students having arbitrary power over them as a result (see e.g., Miriam 2007).

Here, republicans may argue that the few members of the dominant group who can be expected to foresee the effects of the practice on the members of the dominated group can indirectly dominate

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[3] Here as below it is 'in some respect' that she can interfere with you and that you cannot resist her. Likewise, here as below it is 'as a member of a group *and only as such*' that one's ability to resist is impaired or that, conversely, one can interfere with others. This formulation abstracts from the way in which one's membership in a group (e.g., women) interacts with one's membership in other groups (e.g., worker or capitalist, black or white, lesbian or straight). The point of this formulation is not to ignore the phenomenon of intersectionality but, on the contrary, to gain insight into the lived experience of those who belong to intersecting groups 'by having the analytical tools to distinguish them', as Haslanger puts it (2012, 9; cf. Crenshaw 1989). I ignore these two caveats for purposes of presentation.

those they know, if they fail to mitigate these effects on them. So in section V, I turn to a case that does not even display this kind of indirect arbitrary power. In this case, a social practice impairs the ability of the members of your group to resist some member of the dominant group at each stage, as above, and you are unfree from various members of that group in turn. But here not even a few members of that group can be expected to foresee that the practice has this effect on you. In this case, radicals insist once again that the practice itself dominates, on the same grounds as above that those who could change the practice cannot be expected to foresee its effects. But for republicans, no member of your group is even indirectly dominated, since no member of the other group who could indirectly interfere with you at will and with impunity could do so intentionally: none of them can be expected to foresee that the practice whose effects they fail to mitigate impairs the ability of the members of your group to resist some member(s) of their group. Thus for example the labour market dominates workers, according to radicals, by organising a systematic transfer of resources from workers to capitalists which no capitalist can be expected to foresee (e.g., Young 1990).

Note that all I do in this chapter is introduce the radical conception of domination I rely on in this thesis, by contrasting it to its famous republican counterpart. In particular, I do not argue in favour of this conception against the republican one, but only use the latter as a counterpoint to clarify the former. Nor do I try to offer an exhaustive analysis of all cases in which radicals might argue that structural domination obtains. I only present three of them, which are chosen because they are crucial to our understanding of the way in which the radical conception differs from the republican one. These three cases will form the basis of my analysis in the next chapters of the ways in which socialisation can entrench domination.

I. THE REPUBLICAN CONCEPTION OF DOMINATION

In this first section I present the republican interpretation of the three core features of domination: unfreedom, duration, and unequal power. For republicans, to dominate someone is to have arbitrary power over them, which (usually) occurs because a social practice impairs their ability to resist. This means that, when you are structurally dominated, on this view, you are unfree from a specific member of another group, who can be expected to foresee that you can never resist him as long as the practice remains unchanged. For you are unfree from arbitrary interference just in case someone can harm you intentionally, at will, and with impunity; and someone is in a position to do that just in case he can be expected to foresee that you cannot resist (including punish) him at any time. Finally, his domination over you lasts as long as the practice remains unchanged since his being in this position depends on the practice.

The republican view can be traced back to Cicero, and has recently been revived by Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit, and Frank Lovett in particular (1998, 1999, and 2010, respectively). Today it

can claim much support in the literature, even among scholars we might think of as radicals (e.g., Einspahr 2010). On this view, and in Philip Pettit's words, '[o]ne agent dominates another if and only if they […] have sway over the other, in the old phrase, and the sway is arbitrary' (1999, 52). Additionally, '[i]t is usually because of the ways a society is organized […], that some people have such power in relation to others that they dominate them […]' (2012, 63). Witness 'the salient vulnerability classes in contemporary society: […] those groups who are rendered particularly vulnerable by virtue of gender or ethnicity or colour or sexual preference […]' (1999, 124, referencing Young 1990, chapter 2).[4]

This has implication for the republican interpretation of the three core features of domination: unfreedom, duration, and unequal power. On this view, you are structurally dominated just in case you are unfree from a specific member of another group who can be expected to foresee that you cannot resist him at each stage of a certain period, this period lasting as long as the practice remains unchanged. Let me elaborate.

I start with *unfreedom*. The claim that to dominate someone is to have arbitrary power over them means that when you are dominated, you are unfree from a specific agent, to whose will you are subjected for the duration of your domination. Since in addition this agent need only *have* arbitrary power over you, you are unfree from him even if he does not exercise this power. Like liberals, republicans believe that an 'interference […] always has to be more or less intentional in character' (Pettit 1999, 52), but unlike liberals, they believe that in order to be unfree it is sufficient that this agent can interfere with you, even if he never does. As Quentin Skinner puts it, the 'essence' of republicanism is the rejection of the 'servitude' of the slave whose master '*could* interfere at will and with impunity' but may well be benevolent (2008, 97, his emphasis).

The same core republican claim implies a certain reading of the second feature of domination, namely, *duration*. For this claim entails not just the *modality* of interference but also its *temporality*: there must be a stage at which you are vulnerable to a specific agent, and at least one further stage at which he would interfere should he so desire (Filling unpublished, 12). Since in fact he can interfere not just at will but also with impunity, we should add at least a third stage: you are dominated not only when you are vulnerable to him and when he might interfere, but also when he would escape punishment should he interfere. Indeed, since he could interfere thanks to a social practice that impairs your ability to resist him, the period during which you are dominated typically lasts as long as this practice remains unchanged (see e.g., Einspahr 2010, 12–3).[5]

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[4] Here the concept of social group is 'a tool for theorising structures more than subject' (Young 2005, 22, quoted in Einspahr 2010, 15; see introduction above). Both Einspahr and Pettit draw on Young.

[5] More precisely, on this view he dominates you as long as the practice is not changed in such a way that either it no longer *impairs your ability to resist* him at each stage *or* he no longer *can be expected to foresee* you cannot resist him at each stage. (For both radicals and republicans, he no longer dominates you if the practice changes *in such a way that it*

Let us now turn to the third feature of domination: the superior power derived from the practice, which, for republicans, must be arbitrary. As we will see in more details in the next section, the many agents who could change the practice for the better cannot usually be expected to foresee that it impairs your ability to resist a specific agent for the duration of the relevant period. By contrast, it must be the case that this specific agent can be expected to foresee this, if he is to have arbitrary power over you: only then can he interfere with you not just intentionally, but also 'at [his] own whim', and without 'being exposed to sanctions' from you or others who would help you (Pettit 1996, 580 and 587; see also Gourevitch 2013, 600). If he cannot be expected to foresee that you cannot resist him at each stage of the period, his power over you 'isn't arbitrary – it's aleatory', as Filling aptly puts it (unpublished, 38).

In addition to this account of direct arbitrary power, republicans have recently hinted at a form of indirect arbitrary power. Thus, for Pettit in particular, 'the way things are organized in a society […]' need not merely 'constitute a structure or pattern that facilitates the [arbitrary] invasion by some people of the choices available to others', as we saw above. It may also 'amount to an indirect, structural form of invasion, we might even say, as distinct from the direct, personal form of invasion that it occasions' (2012, 44).[6] To the extent that 'we may identify invasive hindrances to choice with hindrances that reflect the will of another as to what you should do' (2012, 39), this suggests that someone indirectly dominates you when they can be expected to foresee that the practice impairs your ability to resist them or someone else but nonetheless fail to mitigate these effects, provided they do so at will and with impunity.[7] The thought seems to be that even if they could not change the practice by themselves they could still do something, and to this extent should be held responsible for their failure to do so. Thus any of Rome's citizens would indirectly dominate slaves, Gourevitch suggests, to the extent that they 'engaged in […] the capture and punishment of runaway slaves […]' for example (2013, 601).[8]

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no longer impairs your ability to resist him at each stage, but for republicans neither does he do so even if the practice only changes *in such a way that he no longer can be expected to foresee you cannot resist him at any stage*.)

[6] Put differently, there are two kinds of indirect, structural domination for Pettit. As I read him, however, the first kind is the typical case of republican domination (see also Gourevitch 2013 on the way in which even the classical master's domination depended on the social practices of slavery).

[7] Pettit writes: 'A hindrance that invades your choice between options has to be triggered by your seeking to satisfy your will in that choice, rather than materializing for independent reasons. And while that triggering condition can be fulfilled in the presence of a will that competes with your own will for control of what you do, it is hard to see how it could be met otherwise. Your seeking to satisfy your will in a choice is hardly likely, for example, to trigger the appearance of a natural obstacle to your getting your way. For these reasons we may identify invasive hindrances to choice with hindrances that reflect the will of another as to what you should do' (2012, *ibid.*).

[8] Gourevitch argues that Pettit's account cannot accommodate this case because, on Pettit's view, '[a]n agent interferes intentionally when he knows, or at least ought to have known, that he has the power to interfere in the choices of a *known*, specific agent' (*ibid.*, 600, his emphasis), while 'Roman citizens had no knowledge of and no direct hand in determining which specific slave would be subject to which specific master' (*ibid.*, 601). But Pettit could still argue that by engaging in the capture and punishment of runaway slaves, for example, they indirectly dominated their own slaves who had not run away (whom they know).

So much for the republican conception of domination. On this conception, when you are dominated, you are unfree from a specific agent who can be expected to foresee that the practice impairs your ability to resist him at each stage of a certain period, this period lasting as long as the practice remains unchanged. The key points I made here will be further illustrated in the three cases below. Before I do this, however, I turn in the next section to the radical conception of domination.

II. THE RADICAL CONCEPTION OF DOMINATION

For radicals, when a practice disempowers you, it is the practice itself that dominates you, not those who could change the practice, nor those who acquire power over you as a result, whether or not this power is arbitrary. So, while on this picture too you are unfree from those who are empowered by the practice, the fact that their power over you need not be arbitrary means that you may be unfree from a different member of their group at each stage, rather than from the same member throughout, none of whom need to be in a position to foresee when exactly you cannot resist (including punish) him specifically. In this section, I elaborate on these claims.

The radical view can be found in Marx (*Capital*, I) and in much feminist work (see e.g. Young 1990, Fraser 1993, Haslanger 2004). It is common among activists and critical theorists, though often the former only gesture at it and the latter sometimes focus on oppression instead (e.g., Frye 1983, Young 1990, chapter 2).[9] While for republicans domination is subjection to arbitrary power, for radicals domination is disempowerment. This means that, for radicals, the practice responsible for disempowering you dominates you. Some agents acquire power over you as a result, but they do not dominate you, even if their power is arbitrary: they are part of the dominant group (Haslanger 2004, 110–11), but since they could not change the practice without the help of many others, they cannot be said to disempower you themselves. Neither can those many other agents, for they cannot usually be expected to foresee that the practice disempowers you: as Young puts it, your disempowerment is typically only 'a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions, media and cultural stereotypes, and structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms – in short, the normal processes of everyday life' (Young 1990, 41).[10] This leaves only the practice to blame: domination, for Young, 'consists in institutional

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[9] Oppression is often understood as the *experience* of domination, so that one will say for instance that 'relations and structures of domination […] oppress the majority of the population' (e.g., Mills 2000, 441). Others use 'oppression' and 'domination' interchangeably (e.g., Haslanger 2004, Jugov and Ypi 2019). Inasmuch as one insists on separating oppression and domination, there seems to be two ways to do this: either both can be structural and oppression is about the impairment of self-realisation while domination concerns the impairment of self-determination (e.g., Young 1990); or both are about self-realisation (or cognates, like power-to) as requiring self-determination (power to resist power over), but only oppression is structural (e.g., Frye 1983). Here I follow Young's way of distinguishing between the two, but unlike Young I focus exclusively on domination.

[10] Here Young is writing about oppression rather than domination, but she makes this point about both (see 1990, chapter 1).

conditions which inhibit or prevent people from participating in determining their actions or the conditions of their actions (1990, 38; see also Haslanger 2004, 104 and *passim*).

The radical interpretation of the three core features of domination – unfreedom, duration, and unequal power – follows from this core claim. If, for radicals, domination is typically something a practice does as it impairs your ability to resist, not something that agents do when they can wield arbitrary power over you, then you may be unfree from a different member of the dominant group at each stage rather than from the same member throughout, and no member of that group needs to be in a position to foresee when he is the one that you cannot resist (including punish).

Here, as in the discussion of the republican view, I go through each feature of domination in turn, but this time I start with *duration*, as there is not much to add in this respect. We saw above that the republican claim that someone's arbitrary power over you is usually due to a social practice entails that the period during which you are dominated lasts as long as this practice remains unchanged. In the same way, the radicals' claim that domination is typically what the practice itself does implies that your domination lasts as long as those who could change this practice fail to do so. Thus in Marx's words, for example, '[t]he silent compulsion of economic relations sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker' as '[t]he organisation of the capitalist process of production […] breaks down all resistance': […] it is possible to rely on his dependence on capital, which springs from the conditions of production themselves, *and is guaranteed in perpetuity by them*' (*Capital* I, 1976, 899, my emphasis).

But while radicals offer the same interpretation as republicans of the duration of domination, their view differs when it comes to unfreedom and unequal power. To start with *unfreedom*, the claim that to dominate someone is typically what the practice does as it impairs their ability to resist means that radicals believe, like republicans, and unlike liberals, that you are unfree just because you can be interfered with, even if no one actually does. For Fraser, for instance, women are dominated to the extent that they are 'rendered vulnerable', even if no man exploits their vulnerability (1993, 174). But the absence of an arbitrariness requirement entails that while *some* member of a dominant group must be able to interfere with you *at each moment* of your domination, you need not be unfree from a specific member of that group *for the duration* of your domination (see Filling unpublished, 30). At the limit, the practice may impair your ability to resist a different member of that group at each stage. Thus Fraser argues, drawing on Susan Okin, that 'labor markets that disadvantage women' render them vulnerable 'first' to various suitors 'by anticipation of marriage', '[n]ext […] within marriage' to their husband, 'and finally, […] by separation or divorce […]', to another series of suitors who might exploit the 'precipitous drop in women's and children's standard of living' that usually follows (1993, 174, see Okin 1989, 138).

I turn finally to *unequal power*. Since the radicals' central claim that to dominate someone is typically what the practice itself does as it impairs their ability to resist carries no arbitrariness requirement, whoever can interfere with you at any given moment of your domination need not be in a position to foresee that you cannot resist (including punish) him for the duration of your domination. As we just saw, the practice need not have this effect on you. But this claim also entails that he need not even be in a position to foresee *whether* you will be vulnerable to him *at some point*, or, if you are, *when* exactly that might be: it may just be a matter of luck which member of his group you cannot resist at each stage. Thus to return to Fraser's example: before marriage and after divorce, women are only vulnerable to unwanted suitors when they have run out of opportunities to say 'no', and no suitor can be expected to foresee when that will be, or indeed whether that will occur at all.

This, then, is how the radical conception of structural domination contrasts with the republican one. For republicans, we saw, to dominate someone is to have arbitrary power over them. This usually occurs because a practice disempowers them, and it means that to be dominated is to be unfree from a specific agent who can be expected to foresee that you can never resist him as long as the practice remains unchanged. For radicals, by contrast, to dominate someone is to disempower them, which means that they are dominated by the practice itself, whether or not anyone has arbitrary power over them. Importantly, the absence of an 'arbitrary power' requirement means that you may be unfree from a different member of the dominant group at each stage of the relevant period, none of whom need to be in a position to foresee when exactly you are unfree from him instead of another.

III. THE FIRST CASE: BLACK EMPLOYEES

From this section onward, I turn to three cases of domination to highlight the differences between these two views. The case I present in this section is designed to emphasise that, when republicans argue that an agent dominates another because of a social practice, radicals usually insist that the practice itself dominates.

I mentioned above the analysis of gender domination which Fraser builds from Okin. But it is not the only kind of domination that 'is today being transformed by a shift from dyadic relations of mastery and subjection to more impersonal structural mechanisms' (1993, 180). As Young has argued, for instance, 'dominating racism involv[ing] direct mastery', which prevailed as long as 'race status rules' privileged whites over blacks, has now receded: it is being replaced by a 'metaracism' where 'almost all traces of a commitment to race superiority have been removed, and only the grinding processes of a white-dominated economy and technology account for the continued misery

of many people of color' (1990, 141, drawing on Kovel 1970).[11] Such metaracism may still facilitate direct mastery, but for radicals, this direct mastery is not where the action is.

Imagine that you are a black employee, bossed around by a white manager who knows that you are likely never to enjoy her status in the division of labour.[12] She has enough experience to trust the biased hiring practice of her white-dominated economy to limit blacks like you to more or less menial tasks, either in her firm or in any future job you might get: she knows that the many white professionals in charge of hiring decisions think that blacks are unreliable when it comes to 'deadline-sensitive professional work' (Haslanger 2017a, 4).[13] These white professionals, by contrast, cannot be expected to foresee that their hiring decisions prevent you from enjoying a professional status in the division of labour: your disempowerment is only an effect of 'the grinding processes of a white-dominated economy' in which they are only 'doing their job, or living their life' (Young 1990, 141 and 42).

In this case, you are unfree from a specific member of a group, as long as she can directly interfere with you at each stage of your domination, thanks to a social practice which she could only change with the help of many others but which, unlike them, she can be expected to foresee impairs your ability to resist her at each stage. Specifically, you (and other black employees) are unfree from your white manager to do your work as you please, as long as she can order you about, thanks to a biased hiring practice she could only change with many other white professionals, but which contrary to them she can be expected to foresee prevents her black employees from ever enjoying her status in the division of labour. In this case, republicans argue that the practice facilitates the domination of your manager, a specific agent, over you. By contrast, radicals insist that the practice itself dominates.

Let us start with republicans, who focus on you and your white manager. Republicans argue that she dominates you, and they make this claim on the grounds that she has arbitrary power over you: she can interfere with you intentionally, at will, and with impunity, since she can be expected to foresee that you cannot resist (including punish) her at each stage. In this respect, she is just like Pettit's 'husband who can beat his wife for disobeying his instructions and be subject, at most, to the mild censure of his neighbours' (1999, 58). Just as the husband can trust his neighbours to impose neither 'filters' nor 'penalties' on the ways he behaves towards his wife in his own home (*ibid.*), the white manager enjoys confidence in the impairment of your ability to rise to her level in the firm's hierarchy. As we saw, she knows that the many white professionals in charge of hiring decisions think

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[11] Young also mentions Kovel's 'aversive racism […] of avoidance and separation' (*ibid.*). This will prove relevant in chapter 3, where I argue that the segregating influence which domination has on agents' socialisation into dominating practices explains why agents reproduce these practices and entrench domination.
[12] For examples of how managers might make life hell for employees, see e.g., Gourevitch 2018. For an excellent discussion of the division of labour between professionals and non-professionals as it intersects with race and gender, see Young 1990, 56–8 and chapter 7.
[13] As she notes, this is typically because, being poor, they 'can't afford childcare, depend on public transportation, and often hold more than one job' (*ibid.*). I will return to this case in chapter 3.

that black employees cannot be trusted with deadlines. That she could not change this practice by herself is irrelevant on the republican view.

For radicals, by contrast, it is crucial. This is why she does not dominate, on their view. If she could change this practice by herself, she would dominate you, since she would disempower you. But she cannot, so she does not. Yet neither do those who can change it dominate you, since unlike her they cannot be expected to foresee that the practice disempowers you: to blame them would be 'to assign moral responsibility excessively widely', as Clarissa Hayward would put it (2006, 161–62). The practice, however, disempowers you all the same. As Haslanger has it, 'we don't need a smoking gun' to tell that it does (2004, 105). So while those who could change this practice would dominate you if they could be expected to foresee that they disempower you by failing to change it, the fact that they cannot be expected to do that leaves only the practice to blame. Thus radicals conclude that the practice itself dominates you. In other words, they look beyond your white manager's direct mastery over you to focus instead on the metaracist white-dominated economy that facilitates this direct mastery (see Young 1990, 141; cf. Fraser 1993).

In this first case, then, the two views differ as follows. Republicans argue that a specific agent dominates you because a social practice gives him direct arbitrary power over you. Radicals, by contrast, insist that the practice itself dominates you, because those who could change it cannot be expected to foresee that it disempowers you.

IV. THE SECOND CASE: FEMALE PHILOSOPHY STUDENTS

While the previous case was an instance of the core republican case, the case I offer in this section departs somewhat from republicanism: the practice in focus here does not enable anyone to arbitrarily interfere with another directly, so for republicans no-one is directly dominated. As for radicals, they offer the same diagnosis as above.

Return to Fraser. In arguing that '[the master/subject dyad] is insufficiently structural to account for male dominance in late-capitalist society', Fraser focuses on Carole Pateman's (1988) analysis of the sexual contract (1993, 180). For Pateman, the sexual contract is a liberal 'means of creating social relationships' which promises women the right to use their body as they see fit, but which nevertheless institutes what she calls, after Adrienne Rich (1983), a 'law of male sex-right', which organises the 'orderly access by men to women's bodies' (1988, 5 and 2). As Fraser reads Pateman, this orderly access consists in 'a series of male/female master/subject dyads' which we need to look beyond, to social practices and structural processes (1993, 173). Fraser's practices of choice are 'sex-segmented labor markets, gender-structured social-welfare policy regimes, and the gender division of unpaid labor' (*ibid.*, 175). But let me follow Kathy Miriam in focusing on the law of male sex-right itself, and more precisely on the way in which it renders female students vulnerable to unwanted sex (2007).

For the way in which 'men's implicit right to have sexual access to [women]' disempowers female students is quite different from the way Pateman suggests it disempowers wives (Miriam 2007, 224). In both cases, the male and female students, and the wives and husbands, who could put an end to this implicit law cannot be expected to foresee its effect: in particular, there are too few male and female students taking feminism classes. But while Pateman suggests that in some US jurisdictions the law of male sex-right impairs the ability of wives to resist the same agent for the duration of their domination, namely, their husband (1988, 7), female students, by contrast, are not rendered vulnerable to the same male student for the duration of their domination.[14] Rather, in their case, the law of male sex-right typically impairs their ability to resist various male students in turn. Specifically, it encourages male students to harass female students until at each stage they can no longer resist any more of them, having resisted too many before (see Miriam 2007, 22; see also Filling unpublished, 31–41 on sexual harassment more generally).[15] Faced with unwanted advances, female students can say no, make an excuse, or fight if it comes to that. But eventually their energy runs out, and they find themselves vulnerable to the next approach.[16] Or so the evidence suggests in philosophy, for instance – 'the oldest of the humanities [but] also the malest […]', as Jennifer Saul has put it (2013, see also her blog, 2021).

In this case, as a female student you are unfree from a different member of a dominant group at each stage, a few of whom can be expected to foresee that a practice impairs your ability to resist some member of their group at each stage, but none of whom can be expected to foresee that *he* is the one whom you cannot resist. For you would have been able to resist him had you not exhausted yourself resisting others before. Specifically, you (and other female philosophy students) are unfree from some male student to do what you want with your body as long as some male student can force himself upon you at each stage because an implicit law of male sex-right encourages male students to harass female students until at each stage they can no longer resist any more of them. The few who take feminist classes can be expected to foresee this, but the vast majority cannot. In this case, radicals argue that you are dominated by the practice itself, just like they did above. But republicans do not find anyone with direct arbitrary power to focus on.

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[14] Thus in South Carolina for instance, it would seem that a wife's having unwanted sex with her husband while drugged, or drunk, does not qualify as rape in the eyes of the law (see e.g., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marital_rape_in_the_United_States#South_Carolina, last accessed 09/04/2021). Here, the law of male sex-right impairs the ability of wives to resist their husband for the duration of their domination, much like the white-dominated economy from the previous section impairs the ability of black employees to resist their white manager.

[15] As Miriam writes, '[…] the assumption that men have a right of sexual access to women and girls allows for specific acts of coercion and aggression to take place', even if '[a]s a background understanding of heteronormativity', it 'is not synonymous with those acts' (2007, 225).

[16] Ulli Lust's award-winning graphic novel *Today is the Last Day of the Rest of Your Life* (2013) offers a gripping description of the way women can eventually give in to some man's unwanted advances after resisting several men's. In such conditions, he need only be slightly better looking.

This time let us start with radicals. Radicals insist, for the same reason as above, that the members of your group are dominated by the practice itself: while the many agents who could change this practice would dominate in its place if they could be expected to foresee its effects, the fact that they cannot leaves only the practice to blame. That they cannot be expected to foresee the effects of the law of male sex-right is indicated by Kathy Miriam's description of this right as an '*implicit* right to have sexual access to [women]' (2007, 224, my emphasis). Jennifer Einspahr makes the same point when she characterises it as a '*background* assumption' (2010, 13, my emphasis).[17] Like other men and women today, those who could change the law of male sex-right 'hardly notice their participation in practices that sustain male privilege and power, and even, sometimes, take them to be central to their identities', as Haslanger puts it (2017b, 150). That a few particularly curious students taking feminist classes can be expected to foresee its effect does not make any difference: they could not change it without those who lack their insight. Yet this practice sustains male privilege and power all the same.

While radicals offer a similar diagnosis as above, republicans do not. For republicans can find no direct master/subject dyad to zoom in on. On this view, no female student is dominated, because no male student has arbitrary power over any of them: no male student can interfere with any female student at will and with impunity, since even if a few male students might be expected to foresee that female students could not resist (including punish) *some* male student at each stage, no male student can be expected to foresee which female student can resist (including punish) which male student at each stage. For as Miriam insists, following Pateman, while female students lack sexual freedom from domination, they retain sexual agency (see 2007, 225; see also Einspahr 2010, 13).[18] Indeed, freedom from some sexual interferences, to the extent that they can not only pretend to be asleep, as Miriam suggests (*ibid.*, 222), but also fight or report some male students before they give in, having exhausted their (will)power to resist. Thus in order to have sex with them, as John Filling describes, any male student 'must bide [his] time, husband [his] resources, devise fool-proof strategies, and demonstrate perfect execution. Even then [he] loses far more than [he] wins, [his] few victories depending on

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[17] Both follow Adrienne Rich (1986 and 2004). See also Miriam 2007, 225: '[…] by sex-right we are not talking about a juridical right, nor are we claiming that all people explicitly believe that men have a right to women's bodies – although some still do'.

[18] Jennifer Saul's blog on women in philosophy ('What It Is Like to Be a Woman in Philosophy', 2021) contains various testimonies of female students resisting their sexual assaulters, some of whom are even professional philosophers. For instance, with a male student: 'When I was a first-year graduate student, five or so years ago, I went to a large party hosted at a house where a few male graduate students lived together. Toward the end of the evening, I went to get my coat in one of the bedrooms in the house. As I was reaching to get my coat off the floor, one of these grad students came up behind me and grabbed my breasts. In shock, I didn't move, I didn't breathe. This person proceeded to grope me for a couple more seconds before I turned around and pushed him away and bolted out of the room' ('On being groped', February 2013). Or again, this time involving a professor: 'On the way back to the APA, he said he was going to his hotel room to show me a book on women philosophers which he thought might interest me. I accompanied him to the room, where he proceeded to wrestle me onto the bed saying "don't worry, it's okay, this is okay." Thanks to my martial arts training, I fought him off and fled the room' ('Dear APA, thanks for the memories', November 2010).

forces [he] can neither control nor predict. […] Their power isn't arbitrary – it's aleatory' (unpublished, 38).[19]

In this case, then, the implicit law of male sex-right does not give anyone direct arbitrary power over another – here at least it seems to organise a rather disorderly 'access by men to women's bodies', *contra* Pateman (1988, 2). For this reason, while republicans argue that this law itself dominates female students, republicans would not see it as the kind of 'customary practice' which, in Pettit's words, 'can indirectly facilitate the worst forms of […] domination in a society' (2012, 63).

V. THE THIRD CASE: THE MARKET

Notice, however, that republicans might argue that, in the case above, those who can but who do not mitigate the effects of the practice enjoy *indirect* arbitrary power. Recall from the first section that someone dominates you indirectly when they can be expected to foresee that the practice impairs your ability to resist them or someone else, but nonetheless fail to mitigate these effects at will and with impunity. Those few surprisingly feminist male students who can be expected to foresee that the law of male sex-right impairs the ability of female students to resist some male student at each stage are a case in point: they fail to mitigate the effects of this law on the female students they know, and no one even blames them for it, not to mention stronger forms of resistance and punishment.[20] Female students resist (including punish) the *direct* interference of some of them, as we saw above, but not this kind of *indirect* interference. For this reason, the law of male sex-right 'may amount to an indirect, structural form of invasion', in Pettit's words, 'as distinct from the direct, personal form of invasion that it occasions, where 'we may identify invasive hindrances to choice with hindrances that reflect the will of another as to what you should do' (2012, 44 and 39). By way of contrast, in this section I present a case where republicans cannot even suggest that those who can but who fail to mitigate the effects of the practice enjoy indirect arbitrary power as a result: here, no one can be expected to foresee the disempowering effects of the practice at issue, *viz*. the market.

Imagine that you are a worker. For radicals, economic relations too have shifted 'from dyadic relations of mastery and subjection to more impersonal structural mechanisms', in Fraser's words (1993, 180). Indeed, they have for some time now. While 'in precapitalist societies domination [was] overt and accomplished through directly political means', as Young writes, '[c]apitalist society, on

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[19] Filling is writing about men and women in general, but the case applies to male and female philosophy students in particular – indeed, particularly well, this environment being, as many have noted, 'hypermasculine' (e.g., Haslanger 2008, 217).

[20] Note also that, while female students could also mitigate the effects of the law of male sex-right, and to this extent can also indirectly interfere with themselves or other female students, they would not indirectly self-dominate (should republicans be interested in this kind of auto-domination), since they cannot mitigate the effects of this law at will and with impunity: as David Graeber points out, 'it is widely noted, for instance, that rates of sexual assault increase dramatically at precisely the moments when women begin challenging "gender norms" of work, comportment, or dress' (2015, 60), and the law of male sex-right is one of these gender norms.

the other hand, removes traditional juridically enforced class distinctions and promotes a belief in the legal freedom of persons' (1990, 47). At the same time, though, it lets the market organise 'exploitation', understood as the systematic transfer of resources from workers to capitalists that impairs the ability of workers not to work for some capitalist (*ibid.*, 48). In other words, the market puts workers and capitalists in the same position relative to each other as the law of male sex-right did with female and male philosophy students. The difference is that workers and capitalists are not in the same position relative to the market as students are relative to the law of male sex-right. As philosophy students with access to feminist classes, female students and at least a few male students can be expected to foresee that this law impairs the ability of female students to resist some male student at each stage. By contrast, workers and capitalists as such cannot be expected to foresee that the market organises a systematic transfer of resources from workers to capitalists that disempowers workers. As Young and others have suggested, the market explains why there can be class domination in the absence not just of the kind of 'legally […] sanctioned' group distinctions that are also absent in hyper-masculine philosophy departments, but even of any 'normatively sanctioned' group distinction like the law of male sex-right: class domination is a 'mystery' which no class can be expected to unravel (see e.g., Young 1990, 48). Indeed, the exact workings of exploitation remains a mystery for many Marxist scholars themselves.

In this case, as in the previous one, you are unfree from a different member of the dominant group at each stage because a social practice impairs the ability of members of your group to resist some member of the other group at each stage. But here, not even a few members of the dominant group can be expected to foresee that the practice has this effect on you, any more than those who could change this practice can. Specifically, as a worker the market impairs your ability not to work for some capitalist at each stage by organising a systematic transfer of resources from workers to capitalists, but here not even a few members of any of the classes that could put an end to the market can be expected to foresee that it has this effect on you. In this case as in the previous two cases, radicals argue that the practice that disempowers you, the market, dominates you. But here republicans cannot suggest that those who can but fail to mitigate the effects of this practice enjoy indirect arbitrary power as a result: no one can be expected to foresee the disempowering effects of the market.

Let us once again consider radicals' explanation first. Radicals insist that the practice itself dominates you, on the now familiar grounds that those who could change it cannot be expected to foresee that it disempowers you. As we saw Young suggest, the absence of both legally and normatively sanctioned class distinctions makes class domination a 'mystery' (1990, 48).[21] Marx

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[21] Again, this is not to say that no worker or capitalist foresees that the market organises a systematic transfer of resources from workers to capitalists – only that they cannot be expected to.

himself makes a similar point when he writes that '[t]he *silent* compulsion of economic relations sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker': '[i]n the ordinary run of things, the worker can be left to the "*natural* laws of production" […]' (*Capital* 1976, I, 899, my emphases). It all happens somehow behind the back of workers and capitalists, noiselessly – indeed so much so that they often regard structural domination as merely the way things are (see Filling unpublished, 23–26). They may even come to think that the market 'operates like a force of nature', much like Pettit does when, of a bank that is withholding a loan, he writes that it 'is merely doing what banks have to do […]' (2014, 50–51; see also Lovett 2010, 41–42, and 69).[22]

Indeed, it is for the same reason that Pettit and other republicans do not find any power of arbitrary interference to focus on, direct or indirect. Here as above they would not find any *direct* power of arbitrary interference because no capitalist could get workers to work for her at will and with impunity: no capitalist can be expected to foresee which worker could work for (or quit) which capitalist at each stage. But here republicans would not find any *indirect* power of interference either, for any capitalist who could indirectly interfere with her workers at will and with impunity (by failing to mitigate the disempowering effects of the market on her workers) could not do it *intentionally*: no capitalist, we just saw, can be expected to foresee that the market impairs the ability of workers to resist some capitalist in this respect at any stage.[23] As Pettit puts it, the property distribution organised by the market has 'the aspect of an environment akin to the natural environment': while 'it will certainly affect the range or the ease with which people enjoy their status as undominated agents, and it may warrant complaint on that account, […] it will not itself be a source of domination […] so far as it is the cumulative, unintended effect of people's mutual adjustments' (2006, 139). Each capitalist may well indirectly interfere with each worker at will and with impunity, as they fail to mitigate the disempowering effect which the market has on them. But this does not qualify as indirect domination by republican standards, since none of them can be said to *intend* this indirect interference. The market only 'facilitates the [arbitrary] invasion by some people of the choices available to others' (2012, 44). Unlike the law of male sex-right as understood by feminist male students, it does not amount to 'an indirect, structural form of [arbitrary] invasion […] distinct from the direct, personal form of [arbitrary] invasion that it occasions' (*ibid*.).

In this third and final case, then, republicans cannot even suggest that those who can but who fail to mitigate the effects of the practice enjoy indirect arbitrary power as a result: no one can be expected

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[22] I look in more detail at something like this kind of naturalisation when I focus on fetishism in chapter 4.

[23] Note that insofar as for republicans an interference is by definition intentional, from a republican perspective we should say that while each capitalist may indirectly *worsen the choice set of* workers at will and with impunity by failing to challenge the market, this does not count as an indirect *interference* by republican standards, since none of them can be expected to foresee that the market impairs the ability of workers not to work for some capitalist at each stage.

to foresee the disempowering effects of the practice. Here there is no domination at all for republicans. But there is for radicals.

This concludes my introduction to the radical view of structural domination. I have not argued in favour of this conception against the republican one, but only used the latter as a counterpoint to clarify the former. Nor have I tried to offer an exhaustive analysis of all cases in which radicals might argue that structural domination obtains. I have only presented three of them, which are crucial to our understanding of the way in which the radical conception differs from the republican one.

These three cases will form the basis of my analysis in the next chapters of the ways in which socialisation can entrench structural domination. For while the many agents who could but fail to change dominating practices do not themselves dominate, we will see that they still play an important role in structural domination: they make it last.

CHAPTER 2

CONTRADICTORY SOCIALISATION: A PROBLEM FOR THE SOCIALISATION CONCEPTION OF THE ENTRENCHMENT OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION

In the previous chapter, I offered an account of structural domination as the disempowerment of social groups by social practices. In this chapter, I turn to the widespread view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to our socialisation into these practices (e.g., Haslanger 2017a, Celikates 2016, Einspahr 2010). I argue that while this view is promising, the account of socialisation it relies on needs to be amended if it is to explain the entrenchment of structural domination. The proponents of this socialisation conception of entrenchment (henceforth, the PSCs) seem to neglect the fact that theirs is an account of contradictory socialisation, where its contradictions should in principle allow for critical consciousness and, further, social change.

I argue as follows. In section I, I focus on the entrenchment of structural domination. We saw in the previous chapter that for radicals, to dominate someone is to disempower them, where typically social practices themselves do the dominating. In particular, those who could change these practices cannot usually be said to dominate, to the extent that they cannot be expected to foresee the effects of these practices. Yet even if those who could change these practices do not themselves dominate, I suggest, it is important to realise that they still entrench structural domination as they fail to change them. To illustrate this claim I return to the white professionals and their black employees, the male and female philosophy students, and the workers and capitalists we met in the previous chapter. The white professionals who could but do not change the biased hiring practice that impairs the ability of black employees to rise to their manager's level in the division of labour entrench the domination of black employees. Likewise, the male and female philosophy students who could but do not challenge the law of male sex-right that impairs the ability of female students to not have unwanted sex with some male student(s) entrench the domination of female students. And finally, the same goes for workers and capitalists: as they could but do not change the market, which organises a systematic transfer of resources from workers to capitalists, one that impairs the ability of workers to resist some capitalist(s), they entrench the domination of workers.

But why is it that those who could change these practices fail to do so? In section II, I turn to the view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to the socialisation of agents into dominating practices. On this view, those who could change these practices fail to do so largely because they are taught the schemas of these practices by the milieux in which these practices are enacted. If, for example, the female philosophy students who could challenge the law of male sex-right in effect in their department do not challenge it, on this view, it is because the behaviour of their

fellow male students at college parties confirms this law to them. Likewise, the workers and capitalists who could organise production and exchange differently fail to do so because what they exchange at work confirms the schema that things are commodities *simpliciter*. And if the white professionals do not change their biased hiring practice, in the same vein, it is because they too find some justification at work for its schema that black employees just are unreliable.

Yet this view, I argue in section III, faces the problem which I will spend the rest of the thesis attempting to solve: if, as the proponents of this view suggest, socialisation is contradictory, then it is unclear how socialisation into dominating practices can entrench structural domination. For on this view, those who could change these practices should be expected to frequent not just milieux that confirm their schemas, but also milieux that challenge them, which makes it unclear exactly how their socialisation into these practices can explain the entrenchment of structural domination. Thus on this view, the workers and capitalists who could, but do not, organise production and exchange differently should be expected to exchange not only commodities in the workplace but also favours with neighbours, and gifts with friends or family. This confuses the role played by their socialisation into the market in the entrenchment of its domination. Likewise, the white professionals who could change their biased hiring practice should be expected, not just to deal with apparently unreliable black employees, but also to experience the hurdles that explain the apparent unreliability of their black employees, and so it is unclear how exactly their socialisation makes them reproduce this practice. The same goes for the female students who could but do not challenge the law of male sex-right: they should be expected to frequent not only college parties, but also feminist classes, which should help them challenge this law.

Finally, in section IV, I consider and reject three purported solutions to this problem, before suggesting the beginning of the solution that I will develop in the rest of this thesis. If socialisation into dominating practices entrenches structural domination, I argue, it is not because all milieux confirm the schemas of these practices, or because the challenges raised by some milieux go unnoticed, or again because these challenges do not prompt critical thinking. Rather, as we will see in the following chapters, it is because structural domination itself enables socialisation to entrench domination, by having various influences on socialisation: a segregating, standardising, or a repressive influence on socialisation, depending on the case at hand. The socialisation of white professionals in their biased hiring practice can only entrench the domination of this practice over black employees, for instance, because this domination has segregated white professionals and black employees into two groups, who live such different lives that white professionals do not experience the hurdles that explain the apparent unreliability of their black employees. Similarly, the socialisation of workers and capitalists in the market can only entrench the domination of the market because this domination encourages them and their workers to make commodity exchange the standard not just at

work, but also with neighbours and friends, in order to maximise profit. And the socialisation of female philosophy students in the law of male sex-right can only entrench the domination of this law, finally, because this domination enables male students to repress what female students learn from the women's study groups that should help them challenge this implicit law.[24]

I. THE ENTRENCHMENT OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION

I focus in this section on the entrenchment of structural domination, the term I use to refer to the important role played in domination by those who could, but do not, change dominating practices, even if they do not themselves dominate. To illustrate this role, I return to the male and female philosophy students, the white professionals and their black employees, and the workers and capitalists we met in the previous chapter.

In that chapter, I introduced the radical conception of structural domination by contrasting it to its widespread republican counterpart. On the republican view, to dominate someone is to have arbitrary power over them, thanks to a social practice that disempowers them. On the radical view, by contrast, to dominate someone is to disempower them, meaning that the practice itself dominates them, whether or not anyone has arbitrary power over them as a result. Importantly, while those who could change this practice would dominate in its place if they could be expected to foresee its effects, they cannot be expected to do this, and so they do not dominate.

Return for example to the black employees from the previous chapter, whose white manager can order them around at will and with impunity, thanks to a biased hiring practice that impairs their ability to ever rise to her level in the division of labour. While republicans focus on their white manager, radicals look beyond her to the biased hiring practice that disempowers them. The many white professionals who could change this practice do not themselves dominate, on their view, since they cannot be expected to foresee that the practice impairs the ability of black employees to ever rise to her level in the division of labour.

The same goes for the two other examples I focused on in the previous chapter: the female philosophy students whose ability not to have unwanted sex with some male student is impaired by the law of male sex-right in effect in their department, and the workers whose ability not to work for some capitalist is impaired by the systematic transfer of resources from workers to capitalists that is organised by the market. Unlike the black employees from the previous example, no one has arbitrary power over them, not even indirectly in the case of the workers.[25] But like the black employees, they

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[24] Male students, for their part, are 'segregated' from such classes, much as white professionals are 'segregated' from the milieux that would help them correct their ideological schemas (see chapter 3).

[25] Both male students and capitalists lack *direct* arbitrary power over, respectively, female students and workers, since they cannot be expected to foresee which member of the dominated group will be unable to resist which member of their (dominant) group at each stage. A few male students enjoy *indirect* arbitrary power over the female students they know,

are dominated by the practice that disempowers them (the market or the law of male sex-right). They are not dominated by those who could change this practice (workers and capitalists or male and female students), and this is because the latter cannot be expected to foresee its effects.[26]

It does not follow, however, that those who could but fail to change dominating practices do not play an important part in structural domination. Even if they do not themselves dominate, they still *entrench* structural domination as they fail to change these practices. We saw in the previous chapter that domination spans an extended period of time; specifically, it lasts as long as the relevant practice(s) remain unchanged. Thus even if those who could change dominating practices do not themselves dominate, their role in structural domination remains crucial: when they fail to change the dominating practices, they make domination last. Put differently, they entrench domination as they fail to change these practices.

Return once again to the white professionals from the example above. Even if they do not themselves dominate black employees, they could change the biased hiring practice that impairs the ability of black employees to rise to their manager's level in the division of labour. But they fail to change this practice. And as long as they do, they make the domination of black employees last. In other words, they entrench the domination of black employees, even if they do not dominate these employees.

Likewise, the male and female philosophy students who could but do not challenge the law of male sex-right, which impairs the ability of female students not to have unwanted sex with some male student, entrench the domination of female students, even if they do not dominate them (or themselves, in the case of female students). The same goes for workers and capitalists: as they could but do not change the market, whose systematic transfer of resources from workers to capitalists impairs the ability of workers to resist some capitalist(s), they entrench the domination of workers, even if they do not dominate them (or themselves, again, in the case of workers).

Now, for anyone interested in minimising structural domination, this raises a crucial question. Why exactly do those who could change dominating practices entrench the domination of these practices? Why do workers and capitalists fail to change the market, so that it stops organising a systematic transfer of resources from workers to capitalists? Why do male and female students in philosophy fail to revoke the law of male sex-right? Why do white professionals fail to rectify their biased hiring practices? Repression, no doubt, is part of the reason, as are collective action problems

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we saw in the previous chapter, insofar as they can be expected to foresee the effects that the law of male sex-right has on them but still fail to mitigate these effects at will and with impunity. By contrast, no capitalist enjoys *indirect* arbitrary power over their workers: they cannot be expected to foresee the effects the market has on them, the systematic transfer of resources by means of which it does this being a mystery (see Young 1990, 48).

[26] Put differently, they cannot be assigned moral responsibility. But this is not to say that they are entirely off the hook. While they do not dominate, they entrench domination, and to this extent incur *political* responsibility (see Young 2011, Hayward 2006, Jugov and Ypi 2019).

(see e.g., Celikates 2016, 21, and Haslanger 2017b, 160). But in the next section I focus instead on the view, widespread in critical theory, that the entrenchment of structural domination is also largely due to our socialisation into dominating practices.

II. THE SOCIALISATION CONCEPTION OF THE ENTRENCHMENT OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION

On this view, those who could change these practices fail to do so largely because they are taught the schemas of these practices by the milieux in which these practices are enacted. Put differently, these milieux confirm or justify these schemas to them.

Most proponents of the view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to our socialisation into dominating practices frame this view in terms of ideology. On this understanding, ideology refers to the schemas of dominating practices insofar as agents are socialised into them: to what Stuart Hall calls 'the concepts and language of practical thought which stabilise a particular form of power and domination' (1996, 24, quoted in Haslanger 2017b, 149; see also Celikates 2016, Haslanger 2017a).[27] On this view, as Sally Haslanger puts it, domination can be 'repressive, that is, forced upon individuals through coercive measures' but it is also largely 'ideological, that is, enacted unthinkingly or even willingly by the subordinated or privileged' (Haslanger 2017b, 149; see also Celikates 2016, 21).[28] I will focus on ideology in the next chapter, but the problem should be framed in terms of socialisation. This is so for two reasons. First, not all the proponents of the view under discussion formulate it in terms of ideology (e.g., Einspahr 2010). Second, the sociologists they draw on for their account of socialisation do not tend to frame their views in this way either (e.g., Sewell 1992, Giddens 1984, Bourdieu 1977).

I start with this account of socialisation, before turning to its application in what I have called the socialisation conception of structural domination. This account of socialisation is largely William Sewell's (1992), who himself draws on Anthony Giddens's conception of structures and Pierre Bourdieu's concept of the habitus (Giddens 1984, Bourdieu 1977). As Sewell puts it, one of its main advantages is that it 'overcomes the divide between semiotic and materialist visions of [social practices] (1992, 1).[29] Social practices, on this view, are 'collective enterprises' in which agents coordinate around (e.g., use, allocate) resources on the basis of shared schemas. Schemas can be beliefs, rules, scripts, or ways of thinking. Resources can be virtually anything, including

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[27] Not all the proponents of this view would follow Haslanger (2004) in saying that the practices themselves dominate, hence the definition of ideology as 'the schemas of unjust (e.g., dominating) practices'. Einspahr (2010), for instance, would rather say that they only cause domination. As we saw in chapter 1, I follow Haslanger in this respect.

[28] Haslanger speaks of 'oppression' here, but by she uses the term interchangeably with 'group domination' (see e.g., on the next page, 2017b, 150, or 2004, 1).

[29] Here and below, I will follow Haslanger in speaking of 'social practices' when Sewell speaks of 'structures' (see Haslanger, 2017c, 21).

other agents and schemas (Haslanger 2004, 104; see also 2017c, and Sewell 1992, 7–9).[30] On this analysis, to be socialised into social practices is to be 't[aught]' or 'inculcate[d]' their schemas by the milieux in which they are enacted, because these milieux – or the resources they consist in – 'embody' or 'actualise' their schemas (Sewell 1992, 13; see also Haslanger e.g., 2017c, 22 and 2017a, 7).[31] This in turn explains why social practices can be seen as 'mutually sustaining schemas and resources', as Sewell puts it (1992, 19).

More precisely, socialisation is the last step of a three-step process. First, agents who coordinate around resources thanks to schemas modify the material environment in accordance with these schemas.[32] To borrow an example from Sewell, 'the extent and kinds of resources generated by [and making up] a factory will depend on whether it is owned by an individual capitalist or by a workers' cooperative – in other words, on rules defining the nature of property rights and of workplace authority' (1992, 12). As a result, second, the milieux in which these practices are enacted come to embody, or actualise, the schemas thanks to which the practices are enacted. As Sewell continues, 'a factory is not an inert pile of bricks, wood, and metal. It incorporates or actualises schemas' (*ibid.*, 13). But what this means in turn is, third, 'that the schemas can be inferred from the material form of the factory. The factory gate, the punching-in station, the design of the assembly line: all of these features of the factory teach and validate the rules of the capitalist labor contract' (*ibid.*, 13). That is, they socialise agents into this schema.

The reason why agents turn their social practices into 'mutually sustaining schemas and resources', then, is that '[since] resources are instantiations or embodiments of schemas, they therefore inculcate and justify the schemas as well' (*ibid.*, 19 and 13). With this account of socialisation in mind, let me now turn to the view that the entrenchment of structural domination depends largely on agents' socialisation into dominating practices.

As noted above, most proponents of this view frame it in terms of ideology, where ideology refers to the schemas of dominating practices insofar as agents are socialised in them. Consider Haslanger's discussion of racism, for example. 'What explains the presence and persistence of […] racist beliefs [and other such psychological processes]? It would seem that explanatory work is being done by the idea that we (collectively) "absorb" ideology through socialization': '[t]o become a participant in the social domain, one must learn how to differentiate signal from noise in order to communicate and coordinate', and '[s]ignals depend on information encoded in material

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[30] On this view, institutions are a kind of social practice, whose schemas are formalised (e.g., into explicit rules, as opposed to vaguer scripts or norms).

[31] Put differently, agents are caught up in 'material-symbolic feedback loops' where resources are effects of schemas and schemas effects of resources (Einspahr 2010, 8; see also Sewell 1992, 13). As Haslanger argues, the crucial role played by these loops on this understanding of social practices and socialisation does not sit well with the standard models of individualist social ontology (Haslanger 2020c; cf. List and Spiekermann 2013).

[32] As Young puts it, 'the accumulated effects of past actions and decisions have left their mark in the physical world' (2011, 55).

things, relations, and processes' (2017a, 8 and 7). In other words, '[w]e learn about race and what different races "deserve" by looking around us' (*ibid.*, 17).

Likewise, Robin Celikates endorses the same account of 'the structural dimension of ideology' (2016, 10). Thus he writes, for example, that '[t]he fact that many people perceive and navigate the world in ways that are mediated by binary gender schemas manifests itself in the layout of social space (including built social space), which in turn actualizes and confirms the corresponding schemas (only think of toilets in most public buildings)' (*ibid.*, 9).

Not all proponents of this view frame it as ideology critique, however. Consider Jennifer Einspahr, who endorses Bourdieu's claim that 'the close correspondence between structure and agency (or in Bourdieu's terminology, field and habitus [and in ours, milieux (and their resources) and schemas]) allows conditions of domination to persist because they become embedded in individuals at the level of everyday practice' (2010, 6). 'In other words', she continues, 'agents tend to reproduce the given structures because they have been produced and habituated by those very structures' (*ibid.*; see also 5).[33] Thus 'women were denied access to education based on their purported irrationality', for example, 'but women were in fact being made 'irrational' precisely because they were being denied access to education' (*ibid.*, 7).[34]

Other examples abound. If the female philosophy students we met earlier fail to challenge the law of male sex-right, on this view, it is because the behaviour of their fellow male students, in particular, confirms it to them. This often happens at college parties: as a contributor to Jennifer Saul's famous blog reports, for instance, 'one of [the] grad students [who had organised the party] came up behind me and grabbed my breasts. […] [He] proceeded to grope me for a couple more seconds before I turned around and pushed him around and bolted out of the room' (Saul 2021; see also Miriam 2007, 212–13).[35] In these cases, as Kathy Miriam would put it, they 'see themselves as making decisions in a situation where one factor seems to have been (tacitly) decided on in advance and is thus nonnegotiable, namely, men's right to have sex with them' (*ibid.*, 222). This also socialises male students into this implicit law, 'wholly absorbed in their own gratification' as they are (*ibid.*, 224).

The same goes for the white professionals who could but do not change the biased hiring practice that dominates black employees. As Haslanger suggests, they too find justification for its schema that blacks cannot be trusted with 'deadline-sensitive professional work' because, for

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[33] All these authors speak more or less interchangeably of socialisation and 'material-symbolic feedback loops' (Einspahr 2010, 7; see also Celikates 2016, 9, and Haslanger 2017a, 17, all of whom draw on Sewell 1992, 13). Though the concept of a feedback loop is enlightening in its own right, the concept of socialisation has the advantage of focusing on the core of the loop: the agents themselves, who both learn the schemas from the resources and enable the resources to teach the schemas (by organising them thanks to these schemas).

[34] As Einspahr notes (*ibid.*), this argument was first made by Mary Wollstonecraft (2004 [1792]).

[35] This story is accessible at https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/2013/02/28/on-being-groped/ (last accessed 09/04/2021). I already mentioned it in chapter 1.

structural reasons, blacks might indeed be less likely to meet deadlines at work than whites (2017a, 4).[36] Likewise for the workers and capitalists who could challenge the market: if they fail to do so, on this view, it is because what they exchange at work confirms the current way of organising production and exchange. '[T]he punching-in station', for example, does not just 'teach and validate the rules of the capitalist labor contract', as we saw Sewell write: it also inculcates the schema that things, including their very own ability to work, are nothing more than commodities (1992, 13).

On the socialisation conception of entrenchment, then, the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to our socialisation into dominating practices: while repression and collective action problems no doubt play a role, those who could change these practices fail to do so largely because they are taught the schemas of these practices by the milieux in which these practices are enacted. As we will see in the next section, however, this view faces an important internal problem – the problem which I will spend the rest of the thesis attempting to solve.

III. THE PROBLEM

The account of socialisation on which the socialisation conception of entrenchment relies needs to be amended if it is to explain the entrenchment of structural domination. More precisely, I argue in this section that those who put forward this view seem to neglect the fact that on this account socialisation is contradictory, where its contradictions should in principle allow for critical consciousness and, further, social change. Specifically, on this view those who could change dominating practices should be expected to frequent not just milieux that confirm the schemas of these practices, but also milieux that challenge them, which makes it unclear how exactly their socialisation into these practices contributes to entrenching structural domination.

This problem is internal to the socialisation conception of entrenchment: as the proponents of this view define socialisation, it is unclear how socialisation can explain the entrenchment of structural domination. To be clear, I do not have a problem with the way in which they define socialisation. I only want to insist that they do not pay enough attention to the way in which, on this very definition, it is *contradictory*, and for this reason allows, in principle, for social change. More precisely, what we saw above of Sewell's analysis of socialisation is only one part of the story: the other part shows that more work is needed to explain how socialisation can entrench structural domination, and the proponents of the socialisation conception endorse both parts. I will now elaborate on this internal problem.

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[36] As she notes, this is typically because, being poor, they 'can't afford childcare, depend on public transportation, and often hold more than one job' (*ibid.*). I will return to this case in chapter 3.

Return to Sewell. As we saw above, the reason why social practices consist in 'mutually sustaining schemas and resources', he writes, is that 'if resources are instantiations or embodiments of schemas, they therefore inculcate and justify the schemas as well' (1992, 19 and 13). But as he immediately goes on to insist, 'their reproduction is never automatic. [They] are at risk, at least to some extent, in all of the social encounters they shape – because [they] are multiple and intersecting, because schemas are transposable, and because resources are polysemic and accumulate unpredictably' (*ibid.*, 19).

Put differently, agents may be taught the schema of a given practice by some milieu in which it is enacted, as we saw in the previous section, but chances are that another milieu in which a second practice is enacted will teach them otherwise. This in turn should enable them to question, perhaps even change, the first practice thanks to the second. For as Sewell puts it, 'the schemas to which actors have access […] can be applied to a wide and not fully predictable range of cases outside the context in which they are initially learned' (*ibid.*, 17).

Let me take things one step at a time. What must be emphasised first is that, as Haslanger herself remarks, '[i]ndividuals grow up, study, work, play, and live in different contexts that rely on different social practices. These practices involve different presuppositions, modes of interaction, and conceptual repertoires. Not all of them are consistent' (2017a, 11, referencing Sewell 2005, 52–58). For not only is it 'no longer plausible to claim that the world is composed of 'societies' with their own 'cultures', as Haslanger writes elsewhere (2017b, 153; see also Philips 2006, 2007), even the 'cultural worlds' that remain, in Sewell's words this time, 'are commonly beset with internal contradictions' (Sewell 2005, 53; see also 1992, 16). As Haslanger points out, for example, 'women who work both inside and outside the home often recognize that the expectations and modes of interaction in these two contexts are quite different; in other words, there is a different culture at work than at home […]' (2017a, 11).[37]

Now, this would not be a problem for the view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to socialisation, second, if actors were unable to transpose their 'wide range of different and even incompatible schemas' from one milieu to another (Sewell 1992, 17). But they are. As Sewell continues, '[i]n ordinary speech one cannot be said to really know a rule simply because one can apply it mechanically to repeated instances of the same case. Whether we are speaking of rules of grammar, mathematics, law, etiquette, or carpentry, the real test of knowing a rule is to be able to apply it successfully in unfamiliar cases. Knowledge of a rule or a schema by definition means the ability to transpose or extend it – that is, to apply it creatively' (*ibid.*, 17–18). In other words, it is not

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[37] Indeed, even the cultural worlds we might have taken to be relatively homogeneous are eminently contradictory. To borrow an example from Sewell, '[o]ne need look no farther than the central Christian symbol of the Trinity, which attempts to unify in one symbolic figure three sharply distinct and largely incompatible possibilities of Christian religious experience: authoritative and hierarchical orthodoxy (the Father), loving egalitarianism and grace (the Son), and ecstatic spontaneity (the Holy Ghost)' (2005, 53; see also 1992, 16).

as though the schemas which we learn from a milieu in which a given practice is enacted cannot provide us with insight about another milieu organised according to another practice. They can.[38] Insofar as 'there is a different culture at work than at home', Haslanger herself suggests, '[…] women often notice how changes both at home and at work could make each milieu better, such as more flexible scheduling at work and more fair and explicit divisions of labor at home' (2017a, 11).

It is for this reason, third, that the reproduction of social practices 'is never automatic', as we saw Sewell insist above (1992). This is why '[they] are at risk, at least to some extent, in all of the social encounters they shape' (*ibid.*). Borrowing from another anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss, we can say that to be socialised into social practices is to stand in relation to them like the 'odd-job man' (*bricoleur*) does to the jobs he has to do: as Haslanger comments, we 'us[e] whatever tools are available in new and unexpected ways' (Lévi-Strauss 1966, 17, Haslanger 2017b, 154; see also Balkin 1998, 24).[39] And when the old ways are no longer 'empowered or regenerated by resources', as Sewell concludes, they are eventually 'abandoned and forgotten', just as 'resources without cultural schemas to direct their use […] eventually dissipate and decay' (1992, 13; see also Einspahr 2010, 5).

In short, then, on Sewell's account socialisation is contradictory, and its contradictions should in principle allow for critical consciousness, and eventually social change. As Einspahr approvingly comments, 'Sewell argues that [social practices] shape our possibilities for action in important ways, but never in a way that is fixed or closed, where [social practices] are not susceptible to change. In particular, the transposability of schemas creates the possibility that the exercise of agency will produce change […]' (Einspahr 2010, 5; see Sewell 1992, 13; see also Celikates 2016, 20).[40] Or as Haslanger puts it: 'the fragmentation of social life and the inevitability of occupying multiple social roles provides opportunities for leveraging insights from one practice to critique another or for subtly shifting practices and norms' (2017a, 11).

But this, I want to emphasise now, is a problem for the view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to our socialisation into dominating practices. More precisely, if those who could change dominating practices should be expected to frequent, not just milieux that confirm the

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[38] Sewell's claim that '[k]nowledge of a rule or a schema by definition means the ability *to transpose or extend it*' suggests that there are two ways agents may gain critical insight on one milieu from another, depending on whether the two milieux 'are similarly shaped', as Bourdieu puts it (Sewell 1992, 17, Bourdieu 1977, 83). Either the two milieux are of similar shape, and agents only have to *extend* the schema from the one to the other: in Sewell's term, to *generalise* it, where '[t]o generalise a rule implies stating it in more abstract form so that it will apply to a larger number of cases' (1992, 17n9). Or the two milieux are not similarly shaped – as Sewell notes, this must be determined on a case by case basis – in which case agents will have to *transpose* the schema from the one to the other, where this 'implies a concrete application of a rule to a new case, but in such a way that the rule will have subtly different forms in each of its applications' (*ibid.*).

[39] See also Lessig 1995, 949n19 on social construction.

[40] Einspahr adds: 'Sewell defines agency as "entailing the capacity to transpose and extend schemas to new contexts", a capacity "inherent in the knowledge of cultural schemas that characterise all minimally competent members of society"' (*ibid.*, quoting him at 1992, 13).

schemas of these practices, but also milieux that challenge them, then it is unclear how the confirmation these agents find for these schemas can explain why they fail to change these practices. Public toilets may well actualise and confirm a binary gender schema, as we saw Celikates suggest (2016, 9). But *private* toilets, which are not gender segregated, should challenge this schema; and this complicates the role played by socialisation in the entrenchment of a strict gender divide.

The same goes for the three examples I emphasised above. Return for instance to the workers and capitalists who could challenge the market but do not, allegedly, because what they exchange at work inculcates into them the schema that things – even their very own labour power – are nothing more than commodities (1992, 13). With the two sides of Sewell's account of socialisation in mind, we should expect them to exchange not only commodities in the workplace, but also favours with neighbours, and gifts with friends or family. Yet insofar as the schemas according to which gifts or favours are exchanged contradict the schema that things are nothing more than commodities, we are left wondering how exactly their socialisation at work can explain why they fail to challenge the market.[41]

The same goes for the white professionals who could but fail to change the biased hiring practice that dominates black employees because the black employees they frequent at work might indeed fail to meet deadlines, as we saw Haslanger suggest (2017a, 4). On Sewell's account of socialisation, they should be expected not just to deal with apparently unreliable black employees, but also to experience the hurdles that explain the latter's apparent unreliability: being reliant on public transports, working surrounded by children, or having more than one job, etc. (see Haslanger, *ibid.*). If so, however, it is unclear what work their socialisation in the workplace is really doing in the explanation of the entrenchment of their biased hiring practice.

A similar worry arises with respect to female philosophy students, who would be more inclined to challenge the law of male sex-right in effect in their department if the behaviour of their fellow male students did not confirm this law to them. At college parties in particular, men's right to have sex with them may seem 'to have been (tacitly) decided on in advance and [to be] thus nonnegotiable', as we saw Miriam put it (2007, 222). But this cannot be the whole story, any more than it is in the examples above. As Miriam emphasises, the same female students may well be 'self-defined *feminists*, many of whom have taken women's studies classes and have some analysis of the relation between rape, male power, and women's oppression' (*ibid.*, 223, original emphasis). The same point applies to male students, if to a lesser extent, insofar as we should expect a few

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[41] The gift schema is the basic 'communist' schema of 'from each according to their means, to each according to their needs'. As to the favour schema, it can be described by the colloquial phrase 'you owe me one', where 'one' is a rough, inexact, up-to-us equivalent of the help given (see Graeber 2011, chapter 5). Both schemas differ from the commodity schema, where only mathematically strict equivalents are exchanged, at a price which is not up to any of the exchangers but determined by the market.

(particularly curious) male students to attend such classes. Either way, it is unclear how exactly their socialisation at college parties can explain why they fail to challenge the law of male sex-right.

It seems to me, therefore, that the view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to our socialisation into dominating practices faces an important problem: those who propound this view seem to neglect the fact that on the account of socialisation they rely on, socialisation is contradictory, where its contradictions should in principle allow for critical consciousness and, further, social change.

I spend the rest of the thesis attempting to solve this problem. I will end the next section suggesting how I intend to do this. Before I do that, however, let me first consider and reject three purported solutions.

IV. SOME SOLUTIONS, REJECTED, AND THE BEGINNING OF ANOTHER ONE

If our socialisation into dominating practices entrenches structural domination, I argue in this last section, it is not because all milieux confirm the schemas of these practices, or because the challenges raised by some milieux go unnoticed, or again because these challenges do not prompt critical thinking. Rather, I suggest, it is because structural domination itself has a certain influence on socialisation: a segregating, standardising, or repressive influence on socialisation, depending on the case at hand. In other words, structural domination enables socialisation to entrench structural domination, in a loop.

The first purported solution goes as follows: *If our socialisation into dominating practices can entrench structural domination, it is because these practices are all there is, so that all our milieux confirm their schemas*. According to this solution, socialisation is not contradictory after all, or not to any significant extent: we might be able to question their schemas, but only with schemas from milieux that are part of the problem, and so only with problematic results. There might be social change as a result, but not change away from structural domination. Something like this solution is suggested by Louis Althusser, for example, and by those who understand ideology as a 'totality' that operates at the abstract level of the 'system', or society as a whole (Althusser 2014 [1970]; see also Celikates 2016, 4).[42] The more nightmarish visions of the Frankfurt School – its 'one-dimensional man', in particular – go in this direction as well (Marcuse 2002; see also Leopold 2018, section 4.3.). To focus on an example dear to both Althusser and the Frankfurt school, and to return to workers and

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[42] This is also how Steven Lukes reads Michel Foucault, whom he takes to suggest that 'we are all subjected subjects, "constituted" by power, that the modern individual is the "effect" of power', and that as a result 'it no longer makes sense to speak […] of the very possibility of people being more or less free from others' power to live as their own nature and judgment dictates' (2005, 107). This is not the place to focus on Foucault specifically, but it is worth noting that the proponents of the socialisation conception themselves draw on Foucault and reach different conclusions (see e.g., Haslanger 2019).

capitalists, one might think for instance that they all 'identify themselves' with advanced capitalist society, as Marcuse puts it, and 'have in it their own development and satisfaction' (Marcuse 2002, 13).[43]

This solution, however, cannot be on the table. For one, more recent social theory has moved away from this 'totalising' understanding. As David Graeber has insisted, for instance, '[e]ven in our own market-ridden society there are all sorts of domains – ranging from housework to hobbies, political action, personal projects of any sort – […] where one hears about "values" in the plural sense […]', as opposed to the economic value, singular, that rules over the workplace (2001, 56; see also 2011, chapter 5). For this reason, 'a society of happy slaves, content with their chains […] is a nightmare', as Raymond Geuss famously put it, 'not a realistic view of a state of society which is at present possible' (1981, 83–4; see also Celikates 2016, 20). The proponents of the socialisation conception agree. As Haslanger writes, '[t]here are multiple reasons to avoid the idea that ideology [i.e., the epistemologically inaccurate schemas of dominating practices] functions as a total system governing society as a whole' (2017b, 161). Or in Celikates's words: such 'distortions and blockades will in most cases turn out to be partial rather than total so that in almost all realistic scenarios there will be oppositional forms of consciousness, experience and practice […]' (2016, 20; see also 4).

So much for the first purported solution. Let us turn, then, to the second: *Socialisation into dominating practices can entrench structural domination not because all milieux confirm the schemas of these practices, but rather because agents are not conscious of the challenges that are raised by some milieux*. After all, as we saw Iris Young argue in the previous chapter, domination is 'a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions' (1990, 41).[44] And when Haslanger writes that in order '[t]o become a participant in the social domain, one must learn how to differentiate [materially encoded] signal from noise in order to communicate and coordinate', she adds that in order '[t]o become a fluent participant, this differentiation must occur spontaneously, "unthinkingly"' (2017a, 8 and 7). What this suggests, one might conclude, is that whatever insight agents may draw from contradictory milieux will often go unnoticed. To return for example to white professionals: perhaps they do 'experience' the hurdles faced by their black employees (e.g., they may also be reliant on undependable public transportation), but this 'experience', being unthinking, does not help them challenge their schema that black employees just cannot be trusted with deadlines.

But this would be mistaken as well. From the fact that agents may unthinkingly differentiate signal from noise *within one milieu*, it does not follow that they do so *across milieux,* or indeed that the

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[43] There are of course various differences between Althusser's and Marcuse's understandings of ideology. This is not my focus here, but I will have more to say about Althusser in particular in chapter 5.

[44] Here Young is writing about oppression specifically, but as noted in chapter 1 she makes the same point about domination (see 1990, chapter 1).

'hitch' between any two (contradictory) milieux typically goes unnoticed. As we saw Haslanger herself remark, it is 'the *fragmentation* of social life and the inevitability of occupying *multiple* social roles [that] provides opportunities for leveraging insights from one practice to critique another' (2017a, 11, my emphases). Conversely, while some schemas or aspects thereof might indeed 'be relatively unconscious', as Sewell suggests, they are the ones whose application gives rise to relatively few hitches as they 'are present in a relatively wide range of institutional spheres, practices, and discourses' (1992, 22).[45] To return to my example: while *at work* white professionals may spontaneously think that black employees are unreliable full stop, they will not do so spontaneously *on their way to work* if their commute is plagued by undependable public transports. More generally, when agents frequent some milieu that challenges the schemas of dominating practices, they will tend to be aware of it. Celikates suggests as much when he praises Luc Boltanski's pragmatic sociology on 'the rejection of the idea that social rules are imposed behind the backs of ignorant actors' (2012, 165, referencing Boltanski 1990a). In the same vein, it is one of Giddens's 'leading theorem[s]' that 'every social actor knows a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member' (1979, 5, emphasis removed; see also 72; see also Scott 1985, 319).[46] If structural domination is often due to our 'unconscious assumptions and reactions', as we saw Young put it (1990, 41), this must be explained, rather than assumed as a basic feature of socialisation.

Consider, finally, a third purported solution: *Socialisation into dominating practices entrenches structural domination neither because all milieux confirm the schemas of these practices, nor because the challenges raised by some milieux go unnoticed, but rather because the challenges raised by some milieux do not motivate agents to thwart conventions*. On this proposal, even if agents gain insight from a practice about another, they tend to remain too caught up in the schemas of the latter to 'leverage' this insight for critical purposes. Thus Haslanger suggests, drawing on Virginia Valian (1998, chapter 6), that agents may '[d]isappear the difficult cases', or '[a]llow exceptions to [them]', in order to resolve '[s]chema clashes' (2008, 212–13). Female philosophy students, for example, might seem to disappear their experience of women's studies classes that clashes with their expectation that men have a right of access to their bodies.[47] As Celikates wonders, 'is the assumption that there are [oppositional forms of consciousness and actually existing practices of critique and resistance] not naïve? (2016, 19).

It is not, he suggests – and I concur. Social movements, for one, testify to this. As Haslanger herself puts it, they 'demonstrate ways in which our conceptual resources are inadequate and

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[45] I will return to a related issue in chapter 4.
[46] For Giddens, some of this knowledge 'exists on the level of the unconscious'. But '[m]ore significant for [his analysis of social action]' are 'practical consciousness' and 'discursive consciousness' (*ibid.*).
[47] Haslanger focuses on male students and staff here.

undertake to improve them' (2020a, 1).[48] Indeed, '[c]hang[ing] the schemas' is another way for agents to resolve clashes (2008, 213). To return to female students in philosophy: 'I've been contacted as recently as this year by graduate student women's groups and individual women', Haslanger reports, 'to help them strategize about problems they are facing as women in their programs', including 'alleged sexual harassment' (2008, 211). Social movements, however, are only the tip of the iceberg. As Sewell remarks, 'current scholarship is replete with depictions of "resistance" […], particularly resistance o[f] a decentered sort – those dispersed everyday acts that thwart conventions, reverse valuations, or express the dominated's resentment of their domination' (2005, 54–55). In fact, chances are that some of those everyday acts escape the attention of most observers: '[c]ritique and resistance […]', as Celikates insists, 'do not always find their ways into the official archives, accounts and news stories' (2016, 19). If James Scott's 'hidden transcripts' are to be trusted, for example, there is much more 'resistance' than meets the eye (1990; see also 1985). When agents gain insight from a practice about another, therefore, they also seem to 'leverage' this insight for critical purposes. At any rate, we can conclude with Celikates that '[t]here is at least reason for doubt' (2016, 19).

None of these three purported solutions solves the problem, therefore: if socialisation into dominating practices entrenches structural domination, it is neither because all milieux confirm the schemas of these practices, nor because the challenges raised by some milieux go unnoticed, nor again because these challenges do not prompt critical thinking. On the account of socialisation which the proponents of the socialisation conception of entrenchment rely on, then, the contradictions of our fragmentary socialisation make it unclear how exactly socialisation can entrench structural domination.

It is this problem that I spend the rest of the thesis attempting to solve, on behalf of the socialisation conception of entrenchment. What might help us in this regard? As we saw above, most proponents of the view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to our socialisation into dominating practices frame this view in terms of ideology. But the literature on ideology, and what Geuss has called ideology's 'tainted origin' in structural domination (1981, 21), points to various solutions, from the influence of the division of labour and similar forms of segregation, to the standardisation that comes with the market, to the role of discipline in ideological apparatuses that work not just by ideology, but also by repression (see Althusser 2014 [1970]).

Drawing on this literature, I argue in the following three chapters that structural domination should not merely feature in the analysis as that whose entrenchment is to be explained by socialisation. It should also serve as that which itself does explanatory work to the extent that it shapes our contradictory socialisation. More precisely, if socialisation into dominating practices entrenches

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[48] So does the law itself, Haslanger adds: 'consider the evolving legal definitions of "rape" and consequent changes in sex education and contestation over practices of consent' (*ibid.*).

structural domination, it is because structural domination itself has a certain influence on socialisation – a segregating, standardising, or repressive influence on socialisation, depending on the case at hand.[49] In the next three chapters, I return to each of the examples I started with to illustrate each of these three possible influences.

In chapter 3, I focus on the white professionals whose biased hiring practice dominates black employees. If they entrench the domination of this practice, I argue, it is because this domination has segregated white professionals and black employees into two groups, whose lives are so different that white professionals do not experience the hurdles that explain the apparent unreliability of their black employees. For this reason, they cannot draw on this insight to question the ideology of their biased hiring practice.

In chapter 4, I consider the workers and capitalists who could but fail to change the market. Their socialisation into the market can only entrench the domination of the market, I argue, because the domination of the market encourages them and their workers to make commodity exchange the standard not only at work but also with neighbours and friends, in order to maximise profit. As a result, there are not enough milieux to enable them to question the ideology of the market, or fetishism.

In chapter 5, finally, I return to the female philosophy students who fail to challenge the law of male sex-right in effect in their department. Their socialisation into this law entrenches its domination, I argue, because its domination enables male students to repress, psychologically, the critical insights which female students learn from women's studies classes. Here there are enough milieux to inform their critical consciousness, and they are not segregated from them. But the insights they draw from them are repressed by what Louis Althusser calls the secondary, repressive functioning of ideological apparatuses (2014 [1970]).

In the next chapter I start with the critical theory literature on ideology at its most general. This will help me highlight the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation, and how it can contribute to solving the problem I have emphasised in this chapter.

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[49] As David Graeber has insisted, in particular, 'systematic inequalities ultimately backed up by the threat of force […] invariably produce […] lopsided structures of imagination' (where 'imagination' refers not to 'the production of free-floating fantasy worlds', but rather to the schemas according to which 'we make and maintain [social] reality', (2009, 516 and 523). One might read my analysis of what I call the three influences of structural domination on socialisation as an account of three Graeberian 'structures of the imagination': (1) structures in which some agents do not frequent the milieux that would enable them to question the schemas of dominating practices, (2) structures in which there are too few of these milieux for agents to gain critical insight from them, and (3) structures in which the critical insight agents gain from these milieux is psychologically repressed by physical repression by the dominant groups.

CHAPTER 3

IDEOLOGY AND THE SEGREGATING INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION ON SOCIALISATION

My argument so far can be summarised as follows. In chapter 1, I offered an account of structural domination as group disempowerment by social practices. In chapter 2, I turned to the view put forward by the proponents of the socialisation conception of entrenchment (the PSCs) that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to the socialisation of agents into dominating practices. I argued that, while this view is promising, the account of socialisation which the PSCs rely on needs to be amended if it is to fully explain the entrenchment of structural domination.

In this third chapter, I build on the PSCs' reading of socialisation into these practices in terms of ideology to amend their account in light of the literature on this topic. Focusing on racism specifically, I draw on the Marxist claim that ideology has its tainted origin in the division between the practices of the dominant groups and those of the dominated groups that is imposed by structural domination. In this connection, I suggest that sometimes socialisation can only entrench structural domination because structural domination has a *segregating* influence on it. This segregating influence is such that agents, as members of a dominant group or of a dominated group (though to a lesser extent in the latter case, as we will see), tend not to frequent the milieux of the other group that would enable them to question the schemas of dominating practices.

I argue as follows. I start with the PSCs' reading of socialisation into dominating practices in terms of ideology. On this view, ideology refers to the epistemically mistaken schemas of dominating practices, which agents are taught by the milieux in which these practices are enacted, which in turn leads them to reproduce these practices and entrench structural domination (Haslanger e.g., 2017a, Celikates 2016).[50] Returning to an example I introduced earlier in the thesis, I suggest that the biased hiring practices of white professionals are guided by the epistemically mistaken schema that black employees are unreliable. This schema is epistemically mistaken because, while some black employees might be unreliable in deadline-sensitive professional settings, there are structural reasons for this which are left out by the schema: they often cannot afford childcare, depend on unreliable public transports, or hold more than one job. Yet the apparent unreliability of black employees in

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[50] Not all the PSCs would follow Haslanger (2004) in saying that the practices are *dominating* (or 'oppressive', as she puts it: as we saw above, she uses oppression and group-domination interchangeably). Einspahr (2010), for instance, would rather say that these practices do not themselves dominate but only cause the domination of the dominated groups by the dominant groups. As we saw in chapter 1, I follow Haslanger in this respect, and for this reason adopt this formulation.

these settings nevertheless teaches the schema to white employers, which in turn leads them to reproduce their biased hiring practices and entrench structural domination (Haslanger 2017a, 4).

But as an account of socialisation, I argue in the next section, this view faces the problem I identified in chapter 2. If socialisation works the way the PSCs say it does, then those who are in the grip of ideology should also frequent milieux that would help them correct their ideology (see Sewell 1992, Haslanger 2017a, and Einspahr 2010). If so, however, then it is unclear how they can be in the grip of ideology at all, and how ideology can lead them to reproduce dominating practices. Returning to our example, there is nothing in the PSCs' account of socialisation to suggest that we should not expect white professionals not only to work with possibly unreliable black employees, but also to take public transportations, work surrounded by children, or hold more than one job, and thus correct from this experience the incomplete schema that black employees are unreliable *simpliciter*.

In order to solve the problem, I then, in section III, draw on an important line of Marxist thinking to argue that socialisation does not quite work in the way the PSCs suggest it does, because it may be under the segregating influence of structural domination. More precisely, I argue that those who are in the grip of ideology do not correct it because structural domination, as a historical process exemplified in particular by the division of labour and racial segregation, has divided them into two kinds of groups – dominant groups and dominated groups – who do not frequent each other's milieux. Returning to my example, I suggest that white professionals do not correct the schema that black employees are unreliable *simpliciter* because, as whites and as professionals, they do not actually depend on public transports (or not as much), work surrounded by children, or hold more than one job, as their black employees do.

Yet this, I argue in section IV, cannot be all there is to the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation. For the members of a dominated group, unlike those of a dominant group, often need to cross the divide to frequent the milieux of the other group, insofar as they depend on its members (hooks 1992, Graeber 2015). As in our example, blacks, for instance, often need to work in white firms if they are to find professional jobs. The white professionals they work for, by contrast, do not need to frequent black workplaces any more than they need to take public transportation, work surrounded with children, or hold more than one job. This suggests that if those who are in the grip of ideology do not correct it, it is because, as members of a dominant group or of a dominated group, they do not frequent each other's milieux *unless they need to.* Insofar as the members of a dominated group, unlike those of a dominant group, often need to frequent the milieux of the other group, this entails that the segregating influence of structural domination is weaker on their socialisation than it is on that of the members of a dominant group, and so that they are less vulnerable to ideology than the members of a dominant group. While the white professionals in our example fail to correct their schema that their black employees are unreliable *simpliciter*, their black

employees, by contrast, may learn from their experience working for them that there are structural reasons for their apparent unreliability in this milieu.

Finally, in section V, I defend this analysis against an objection. For one might think that it is unclear why agents can be in the grip of ideology at all, insofar as they have likely read, watched, or heard reports of what would help them correct it, even if they have not experienced any of it first-hand. One might wonder for instance how white professionals can hold the schema that black employees are unreliable *simpliciter* when their black employees no doubt tell them that, when they are unreliable, it is for the structural reasons which they have learnt from their experience working for them. The answer to this objection, I suggest in this final section, is that frequenting a milieu is necessary to challenge a schema which is supported by frequenting another. If white professionals do not depend (as much) on public transport, work surrounded by children, or hold more than one job, for instance, the explanations of their black employees will not change their mind, or if they do change their mind, they will do so only in a superficial way ready to give under pressure (Lai et al. 2016, also Anderson 2010).

Note that all I do in this chapter is argue for my amendment of the PSCs' account of ideology in terms of socialisation in dominating practices. In particular, I do not defend the PSCs' account of ideology against competing accounts in the literature, or attempt a detailed exegesis of Marx's evolving account of ideology. I only argue that the PSCs neglect the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation, despite its being necessary to explain how socialisation into dominating practices (i.e., ideology) can entrench structural domination.

I. THE PSCs' ACCOUNT OF IDEOLOGY

I start with the PSCs' account of ideology in terms of socialisation into dominating practices. On this view, ideology refers to the epistemically mistaken schemas of dominating practices, which agents are taught by the milieux in which these practices are enacted, which lead them in turn to reproduce these practices and entrench structural domination (Haslanger e.g., 2017a, Celikates 2016). To illustrate this view, I return to the vastly incomplete schema that black employees are unreliable, which I introduced in chapter 1: as we saw Haslanger argue, white professionals reproduce their biased hiring practices largely because they are taught this schema by the deadline-sensitive professional settings in which they frequent black employees (2017a, 4).

To begin with, note that the PSCs' understanding of ideology in terms of socialisation into dominating practices differs from the common understanding of the term. In everyday discourse, the term 'ideology' is typically used to refer to partisan political views. On this understanding, liberalism, socialism, and conservatism are ideologies (Freeden 1996, Shelby 2014). The term is sometimes given a negative connotation, as the partisan character of the doctrines is thought to stand in the way

of more pragmatic decision-making (Shelby 2014, 66 and 66n8, Freeden 1996, 17; see also Sartori 1969 and Bell 1962).[51] But either way, ideologies on this understanding belongs primarily to party politics.

On the PSCs' understanding of the term, by contrast, it primarily concerns the broader realm of social practices and agents' socialisation into them. Here as well, however, ideology bears a negative stigma, for it designates specifically the schemas of the dominating practices, insofar as agents are socialised into them (see Celikates 2016, 14, Haslanger e.g., 2017a). In doing this, the PSCs follow the Marxist understanding of ideological schemas as having three related features: first, they entrench structural domination, second, they are epistemically deficient, and, third, crucially, they have a 'tainted origin' in structural domination (Geuss 1981, 21; see also Shelby 2003, and Celikates 2016).[52] Indeed, for the PSCs, ideology entrenches structural domination because it is epistemically deficient, and it is epistemically deficient because agents learn it from dominating practices (see e.g. Haslanger 2017a, Einspahr 2010, Celikates 2016).[53]

To return to an example introduced in chapter 1, Haslanger describes the disempowerment of blacks relative to whites that constitutes racial domination as caused by practices of 'residential segregation, police brutality, biased hiring and wage inequity, and educational disadvantage' (2017a, 16–17). In particular, the epistemically deficient schema that black employees just are unreliable is crucial to the decisions made by the predominantly white professionals in charge of hiring processes. Importantly, this schema does not come from nowhere, but has a tainted origin in white professionals' experience of black employees tasked with 'deadline-sensitive work': due to a lack of resources, black employees might confirm this schema (*ibid.,* 4). This is the 'systematic looping of schemas and resources' (*ibid.*, 17), which we saw socialisation explain in chapter 2.

But let us consider each feature in more detail. First, schemas entrench structural domination just in case dealing with resources according to them reproduces the group disempowerment constitutive of structural domination. To quote Celikates again, on this view, 'ideologies are seen as playing a necessary, or at least supporting, role for the stabilisation and legitimation of social power relations, i.e. for their more or less smooth reproduction' (2016, 14). For example, as white professionals treat black employees according to the schema that they are unreliable, they keep denying them the

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[51] Due to the efforts of Michael Freeden in particular, this negative usage has become somewhat less prevalent in recent years: the role of such doctrines in helping agents make sense of a somewhat messy political reality has been increasingly recognised (e.g., 1996). Such usage remains widespread, however (Shelby 2014).

[52] Only the first and third features distinguish ideology from cultural schemas in general, for all schemas are epistemically deficient in the capacious sense at issue in the first feature: all schemas are incomplete, insofar as they are all simplifications of an otherwise too complex reality.

[53] Geuss focuses on the Frankfurt School, and argues that on their view ideology has its tainted origin in 'reasons which [agents] could not acknowledge' in their society (1981, 20, 22). I focus on the PSCs, who have a different understanding of ideology's tainted origin, *viz.*, in dominating practices. Like the Frankfurt School, and according to Geuss all 'interesting theories of ideology', the PSCs 'assert some connection between two or more of the three [features]' (1981, 22). Indeed the PSCs connect all three features, as the Frankfurt School does (Shelby does too; see e.g., 2003, 164).

resources attached to professional employment (including, as we will see shortly, those required to become reliable), and reproduce the disempowerment of blacks, or more generally non-whites, that constitutes racial domination.[54]

Second, schemas are epistemically deficient when they are straightforwardly false, but not only then. It is sufficient that they should be incomplete. As Celikates puts it, ideologies need not consist in 'false beliefs' only, since 'one-sided reductions of complexity' may be ideological as well (2016, 14; see also Haslanger 2017a and Shelby 2003, 166).[55] The white professionals' schema that their black employees are unreliable, for instance, may not be false in quite the same way as the schema that black employees are genetically untrustworthy.[56] While the latter is straightforwardly false, for the PSCs the falsehood of the former is sometimes best described as a terrible incompleteness: some black employees might prove unreliable in deadline-sensitive professional settings, but there are crucial structural reasons for this which the schema leaves out – they may be unable to afford childcare, depend heavily on public transport, or hold more than one job (Haslanger 2017a, 4).

Third, and crucially, schemas, according to the PSCs, have a tainted origin because agents learn them from the milieux in which dominating practices are enacted. These schemas 'come into existence against the background of social power relations and could only have been acquired under these specific social conditions […]', as Celikates puts it (2016, 14).[57] To return to our example, it is their dealings with black employees whose lack of resources might prevent from being reliable at work that teach white professionals the schema that black employees just are unreliable (see Haslanger 2017a, 17). This last, crucial feature completes the loop between schemas and resources which we saw socialisation explain in the previous chapter, and which constitutes for the PSCs the key to the entrenchment of structural domination (Haslanger 2017a, 17, 2017b; see also Celikates 2016). Deprived of crucial resources, black employees might 'actualise', in Sewell's word, the

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[54] Recall from chapter 1 and 2 that on the PSCs' view, 'resources' in this sense includes other agents (e.g., Haslanger 2017c).

[55] As suggested in n. 52 above, this understanding of epistemic deficiency is so capacious that virtually all schemas are epistemically deficient, since all of them simplify reality to some extent. This is not a problem: ideology's role in organising specifically unjust (e.g., dominating) practices, together with its tainted origin in these very practices, still distinguishes it from schemas in general.

[56] As many have noted and as we saw in chapter 1, this kind of genetic 'dominative racism' has receded in favour of the 'aversive racism' and 'metaracism' I focus on here (Kovel 1970). As Young aptly describes them, 'aversive racism is a racism of avoidance and separation', while in metaracism 'almost all traces of a commitment to race superiority have been removed, and only the grinding processes of a white-dominated economy and technology account for the continued misery of many people of color' (Young 1990, 141). Where dominative racism is still prevalent, in addition, it now 'emphasises the ineradicable cultural pathology of blacks rather than their biogenetic inferiority' (Shelby 2003, 168–69).

[57] See also Celikates' comments (mentioned in chapter 2) on 'the layout of social space (including built social space), which […] actualizes and confirms [binary gender schemas] (only think of toilets in most public buildings)' (2016, 9). In the same vein, but relative to race, recall Haslanger's claim that '[w]e learn about race and what different races "deserve" by looking around us' (Haslanger 2017a, 17; see also Shelby 2003, 165). As I argue in what follows, the difference between their account and my amendment is that, while they focus on the milieux in which dominating practices are enacted, I suggest that we should focus on the division between the milieux of the dominant groups and those of the dominated groups.

schema that they are unreliable, and for this reason 'teach' or 'inculcate' this schema to white professionals (1992, 13; see also Haslanger e.g., 2017c, Einspahr 2010).

For the PSCs, then, ideology refers to the epistemically deficient schemas of dominating practices, insofar as agents are socialised into them – and more precisely, refers to these schemas insofar as agents learn them from the milieux in which these practices are enacted, and therefore reproduce these practices and entrench structural domination. Yet because of its account of socialisation, I argue in the next section, this view faces the problem I identified in chapter 2.

II. THE PROBLEM

Indeed, I argue in this section, if socialisation works the way the PSCs say it does (Haslanger 2017a, Einspahr 2010, Celikates 2016; see also Sewell 1992), then those who are in the grip of ideology should also frequent milieux that would help them correct their ideology. If so, however, then it is unclear how they can be in the grip of ideology at all, and unclear how ideology can lead them to reproduce dominating practices and entrench structural domination. Returning to our example, there is nothing in the PSCs' account of socialisation to suggest that we should not expect white professionals not only to work with apparently unreliable black employees, but also to take public transportation, work surrounded by children, or hold more than one job, and so correct the epistemologically deficient schema that black employees are unreliable *simpliciter*.

We saw in the previous section that agents are in the grip of ideology, according to the PSCs, when they fail to change a dominating practice because the milieux in which this practice is enacted confirm its schema to them. If white professionals entrench racist hiring practices, on this view, it is because the black employees they meet at work might confirm the terribly incomplete schema that they are unreliable *simpliciter*. But if socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, then it is unclear why those who are in the grip of ideology fail to correct their epistemically deficient schemas. For on the PSCs' account of socialisation, they should be socialised into other practices that should help them do that.

More precisely, it is unclear why those who are in the grip of ideology do not happen to test their epistemically mistaken schemas not just in milieux that confirm them, but also in milieux that would prove them to be epistemically deficient. This, crucially, is because in general agents 'have access to heterogeneous arrays of resources', as we saw the PSCs argue in the previous chapter, some of which are not organised ideologically (Sewell 1992, 17; see also his 2005, and Einspahr 2010, 5). As Sally Haslanger insists, '[t]here are multiple reasons to avoid the idea that ideology functions as a total

system governing society as a whole' (2017b, 161).[58] To return to our example, as things stand we should expect white professionals to test the schema that blacks are unreliable *simpliciter* not just against their black employees, who might confirm it, but also against their own experiences of depending on public transports, working surrounded by children, or juggling with several jobs, all of which challenge it.

And if we should expect agents to test this schema not just against milieux that confirm it but also against milieux that challenge it, then we should expect them to correct this schema accordingly. For agents should not be expected to be 'judgmental dopes' who cannot put two and two together, as Harold Garfinkel famously put it (1984, 75; see also Sewell 1992 and Celikates 2016, 22).[59] Thus white professionals should be expected to infer from their own experiences of lacking affordable childcare, depending on public transportation, or holding more than one job that, when their black employees are unreliable at work, it is for these very reasons. In other words, they should correct the 'one-sided reductio[n] of complexity' of which they are guilty (Celikates 2016, 14).

If they can self-correct in this manner, however, then it is unclear how agents can be in the grip of ideology at all, and how ideology can have them reproduce dominating practices and entrench structural domination. If white professionals should be expected not just to work with black employees who might confirm the schema that they are unreliable in deadline-sensitive professional settings, but also to frequent the milieux that explain why black employees might confirm this schema, then how exactly can white professionals fail to correct this schema and, further, challenge their biased hiring practices and the unjust division of labour they support?

In other words, the PSCs' account of ideology in terms of socialisation into dominating practices faces a version of the problem I identified in chapter 2. If socialisation works the way the PSCs say it does, then those who are in the grip of ideology should also be socialised into practices that should help them correct their ideology. If so, however, then it is unclear how they can be in the grip of ideology at all, and how ideology can explain the entrenchment of dominating practices.

III. THE SEGREGATING INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION ON SOCIALISATION (1)

As a first approximation of a solution to this problem, in this section I draw on an important line of Marxist thinking about ideology. I suggest that socialisation does not quite work the way the PSCs suggest it does because of the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation. Those

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[58] Indeed, as we saw Celikates emphasise (in chapter 2), we should bear in mind Raymond Geuss's famous claim that 'a society of happy slaves, content with their chains […] is a nightmare, not a realistic view of a state of society which is at present possible' (1981, 83–84, quoted in Celikates 2016, 20).

[59] In particular, recall from the previous chapter, one of Giddens's 'leading theorem[s]' is that 'every social actor knows a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member' (1979, 5, emphasis removed; see also 72; see also Scott 1985, 319). The PSCs draw on Giddens, via Sewell (1992).

who are in the grip of ideology do not correct the latter, I argue, to the extent that structural domination, as a historical process exemplified by the division of labour and racial segregation, has divided them into two kinds of groups – dominant groups and dominated groups – who do not frequent each other's milieux. Returning to Haslanger's example, I suggest that white professionals do not correct the schema that their black employees are unreliable *simpliciter* because, as whites and as professionals, they do not actually depend (as much) on public transport, they do not work surrounded by children, and they do not hold more than one job.

As noted in section I, much of the inspiration behind the PSCs' critique of ideology comes from the Marxist critique of ideology. Yet the PSCs seem to neglect the fact that for Marx ideology has its tainted origin not simply in dominating practices, as they suggest, but rather in the division between the practices of the dominant group and those of the dominated group that is imposed by structural domination.

If agents 'mystify themselves', on the Marxist view, it is because their 'intellectual horizon' 'reflects' the limits to their 'practical universe' that are 'imposed by the divisions of society into classes', as Etienne Balibar puts it (2014, 95–96; my translation, here and below).[60] If the members of the dominant class are epistemically mistaken about the members of the dominated class, it is largely because intellectual labour has 'become their privilege and speciality' and manual labour the exclusive burden of the members of the dominated class (*ibid.*, 94).[61] If, for instance, 'those evaluating a worker's performance' are 'often not competent to evaluate [it]', Young suggests, it is because 'the division of labor in most large organizations means that [they] often are not familiar with the actual work process (1990, 203).[62]

Though Marx focused on class divisions, this analysis has been generalised to sex and race divisions. As Young puts it, '[t]he sexual division of labor, for example, has created social groups of women and men in all known societies', the 'most common' of which is '[t]he division between caring for babies and bodies, and not doing so (1990, 43, and 1994, 730). This has 'consequences for

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[60] As Balibar writes, Marx's theory of ideology is 'a theory of the classist character of consciousness, which is to say of the limits of its intellectual horizon as it reflects or reproduces the limits to communication which are imposed by the divisions of society in classes (or in nations, etc.)' (2014, 92; my translation, here and below). Such 'boundaries of communication', he adds, refer to each class's 'practical universe' (*ibid.*).

[61] By dominant and dominated classes I mean not only capitalist and working classes but also what is commonly known as the middle and working classes. As Young insists: 'While it is false to claim that a division between capitalist and working classes no longer describes our society, it is also false to say that class relations have remained unaltered since the nineteenth century. An adequate conception of oppression cannot ignore the experience of social division reflected in the colloquial distinction between the "middle class" and the "working class", a division structured by the social division of labor between professionals and nonprofessionals' (1990, 56). Nor can an adequate conception of structural domination and its entrenchment ignore this experience (see Young 1990, 76–81). On the difference between oppression and domination for Young, see the first chapter of this thesis.

[62] This generalises outside of work. To quote Young again: 'Though based on a division of labor between "mental" and "manual" work, the distinction between "middle class" and "working class" designates a division not only in working life, but also in nearly all aspects of social life […] The two groups tend to live in segregated neighborhoods or even different towns [and] to have different tastes in food, decor, clothes, music, and vacations' (1990, 57).

epistemology', Nancy Hartsock insists, insofar as 'the opposition between feminist and masculinist experience and outlook is rooted' in this division (2004, 40 and 43). In particular, men's outlook is that of 'abstract masculinity' to the extent that this division removes them from 'female life activity' (*ibid.*, 44).

The same goes for the division between whites and blacks. As Charles Mills notes, the 'white domination that has continued in more subtle forms past the ending of *de jure* segregation' also has 'consequences […] for the social cognition of these agents, both the advantaged and the disadvantaged' (2005, 175 and 169). According to Elizabeth Anderson, for example, the *de facto* segregation that followed still 'is a fundamental cause of stigmatization' (2010, 65).[63] As '[s]patial segregation entails that whites will […] interact mostly with other whites', for instance, '[t]he shared interpretations of the social world that they build with their peers will tend to exclude blacks' experiences' (*ibid.*, 46–7).[64]

There is more to this broadly Marxist analysis. Its insistence on the fundamental origin of ideology in the divisions of society is enough for my purposes, however.[65] For it suggests a solution to the problem from the previous section. The problem, recall, was that if socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, then those who are in the grip of ideology should also frequent milieux that would help them break free from it. What the above analysis suggests, however, is that socialisation does not work in the way the PSCs say it does. This is because structural domination has a segregating influence on it, such that agents do not frequent the milieux of the relevant dominated group or those

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[63] Anderson also suggests that '[segregation] causes the inequalities that form the basis of racial stereotypes […]' (2010, 65). This is what we saw Haslanger suggest in section I. My point here is that segregation also prevents agents from correcting these stereotypes and therefore explains how they can find themselves in their grip.

[64] Anderson lists six biases 'put into play by segregation' (2010, 65). The first is 'ethnocentrism', which 'is the bias people have in favor of members of groups to which they belong'. The second is the 'shared reality bias', which 'leads individuals to align their perceptions and judgments with those of in-group members, especially if the group is based on personal affiliation'. Next comes the 'illusory correlation bias', which 'disposes people to form stereotypes about a group with which they have little contact on the basis of unusual events, such as sensational crimes, connected to that group'. Another is the 'stereotype incumbency bias', which 'inclines people to form a stereotype of an effective job-holder as having a particular ascribed identity (as of race, gender, or ethnicity) if the incumbents in that job overwhelmingly share that identity'. The fifth is the 'power bias', which 'inclines people in positions of power to stereotype their subordinates, and to actively maintain these stereotypes'. The sixth and last is the 'system justification bias' which 'inclines people to interpret their social world as just, because the thought of living in an unjust world is intolerable' (2010, 46). I focus instead on the process of socialisation as the PSCs understand it, and so on the way segregation keeps whites away from the milieux of blacks and *vice versa*. The biases Anderson mentions reinforce this process, but they are not my focus.

[65] Two features of this view are worth emphasising in this context. First, ideology on this view refers specifically to the idealisations in which the dominant groups can indulge, as they do not frequent the 'nonideal realities' of the dominated groups that would disprove them (Mills 2005, 175). Second, ideology for Marx is (also) inculcated to the dominated groups by the dominant groups themselves, insofar as the division of intellectual and manual labour has afforded the latter a relative monopoly on intellectual production (see Balibar 2014, 92–100, Mills 2005, 175, and Marx 1965, 61 in Scott 1985, 315). I do not endorse these two claims here, however. To start with the second: just as we saw in section II that it was unclear why any agent would fail to correct their ideology if they could frequent milieux that would disprove it, it is unclear why the members of the dominated groups would buy idealisations that are by definition disproved by their own milieux (see also Abercrombie et al. 1980 and Scott 1985). I will return to this argument in chapter 5. As to the first claim, Marx's conception of ideology as idealisations is much narrower than the PSCs' understanding of ideology's epistemic deficiency: not every false or incomplete schema makes the world out to be better than it is.

of the relevant dominant group depending on which group they are 'born into' (Young 1994, 727).[66] 'Society "imposes" dominant and subordinate identities on members of both groups', as Haslanger herself writes in another context (2004, 107n14; see also Mills 2000, 448), and this, I suggest, is an important reason why they can find themselves in the grip of ideology.[67]

To return to our example, this is the reason why white professionals do not correct the schema that their black employees are unreliable *simpliciter*: as whites and as professionals, they do not enact the same practices, or frequent the same milieux, as their black employees. In particular, they do not actually depend on public transports (or not as much), work surrounded by children, or hold more than one job. They may sometimes take public transport, but they also will have their own cars or at any rate can call a taxi when public transport is interrupted or the journey too complicated. Similarly, they can afford childcare or babysitters, and they make enough money from their primary job that they do not need to take another on the side. But as a result of all this, they fail to complete their schema that black employees are unreliable with the structural reasons that explain the possible occurrence of this phenomenon.

As a first approximation, then, the reason why those who are in the grip of ideology do not correct it is that structural domination, as a historical process exemplified by the division of labour and racial segregation, has divided them into two groups – a dominant group and a dominated group – who do not frequent each other's milieux. This is only a first approximation, however. As we will see in the next section, we should rather say that the members of a dominant group and the members of a dominated group do not frequent each other's milieux *unless they need to*; and the members of the dominated group, I will argue, more often need to cross the divide.

IV. THE SEGREGATING INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION (2)

Put differently, the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation, I argue in this section, affects the members of dominant groups more strongly than it does the members of dominated groups. For while the members of dominant groups can afford to remain among themselves, the members of dominated groups need to frequent the milieux of the dominant groups, because they depend on their members (hooks 1992, Graeber 2015). To return to our example, blacks need to frequent white workplaces if they are to find professional jobs. White professionals, by

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[66] As Young puts it: 'A person is born into a class in the sense that a history of class relations precedes one, and the characteristics of the work that one will do or not do are already inscribed in machines, the physical structure of factories and offices, the geographic relations of city and suburb' (1994, 727).

[67] Haslanger does not emphasise the way in which such divisions sustain ideology in this paper, or anywhere else to my knowledge. In her 2017a, she mentions 'residential segregation', as we saw above, but she does not emphasise its crucial role in explaining why whites and blacks can be in the grip of ideology (2017a, 16–17). In her 2017b, she insists on the role of ideology in reproducing segregation, but not on the role of segregation in reproducing ideology (at least not on the role of the kind of segregating processes I focus on here, as opposed to segregation understood more broadly as the general situation of blacks in contemporary USA, see 2017b, 151–3).

contrast, do not need to frequent black workplaces any more than they really have to take public transportation, work surrounded by children, or work several jobs. So while white professionals fail to correct their schema that their black employees are unreliable *simpliciter*, their black employees know, from their experience of working for white professionals, that their apparent unreliability in this milieu has a structural explanation.

To begin with, note that while class society – or gender or race society – imposes dominant and subordinate identities on agents, agents do 'negotiate and transform them' in turn (Haslanger 2004, 107n14; see also Mills 2000, 448). And since these identities are 'differentiated by cultural forms, practices, and ways of life' (Young 1990, 43), as we saw above, this entails that agents sometimes frequent the milieux that are organised according to the practices (cultural forms, ways of life) of the other group.

Both groups, however, have different behaviour in this respect. While the members of a dominant group seldom frequent the milieux of the dominated group, the members of a dominated group, by contrast, often navigate the milieux of the dominant group. For while the members of a dominant group can afford to remain among themselves, the members of a dominated group need to frequent the milieux of the dominant group to the extent that they depend on its members (e.g., for jobs, as in the example I have focused on). As a result, the members of a dominated group tend to be less vulnerable to the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation, and, therefore, to ideology.

David Graeber makes the point particularly well regarding sexism:

> [I]n American situation comedies of the 1950s, there was a constant staple joke: jokes about the impossibility of understanding women. The jokes (told, of course, by men) always represented women's logic as fundamentally alien and incomprehensible. "You have to love them", the message always seemed to run, "but who can really understand how these creatures think?" (2015, 69)

Women, by contrast, did not seem to misunderstand men much. As Graeber continues:

> The reason is obvious. Women had no choice but to understand men. In America, the fifties were the heyday of a certain ideal of the one-income patriarchal family, and among the more affluent, the ideal was often achieved. Women with no access to their own income

or resources obviously had no choice but to spend a great deal of time and energy understanding what their menfolk thought was going on. (*ibid.*)[68]

More generally, it is a matter of standpoint, as many have noted (e.g., Harding 2004; see also Wylie 2003, Hartsock 2004, Mills 2005, Graeber 2015, Jugov and Ypi 2019). Standpoint theory comes in different versions, but according to its original, Marx-inspired formulation, the point is that 'women's labour, like workers' labour, give them access to a privileged perspective on social reality' (Saul 2003, 241).[69] On Hartsock's version of the theory, this is due to the particularly concrete nature of their labour, which prevents them from losing touch with necessity (2004, 41 and 43). This might be right, but here I want to follow Graeber's (not necessarily competing) suggestion instead. On his view, if women – or workers – have access to a privileged perspective on social reality, it is because they are dominated into crossing the divide to frequent the milieux of the other group. After all, they depend on it.

In Graeber's example, women need to frequent men's milieux because they depend on them for income. But this would seem to generalise to anything the members of a dominated group depend on the members of a dominant group for, from coping to survival. For instance, as bell hooks insists, '[a]lthough there has never been any official body of black people in the United States who have gathered as anthropologists and/or ethnographers to study whiteness, black folks have, from slavery on, shared in conversations with one another "special" knowledge of whiteness gleaned from close scrutiny of white people. Deemed special because it was not a way of knowing that has been recorded fully in written material, its purpose was to help black folks cope and survive in a white supremacist society' (hooks, 1992, 165, quoted in Graeber 2015, 71).

Though black employees may not depend on white professionals for anything so radical as survival, for instance, they still depend on them for escaping the 'lower-level, poor-paying jobs' to which they are 'disproportionately assigned' as blacks (Anderson 2010, 27). For this reason, they need to overcome segregation and travel across town to white-dominated professional environments. White professionals, by contrast, do not need to frequent black workplaces any more than they really need to take public transportation, hold more than one job, or work surrounded by children.[70] They have every reason to be content with the income, status, and authority attached to professional

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[68] Here one is reminded of Betty Draper of the TV series *Mad Men*, who trespasses into her husband's home office while he is away to understand what he is up to (2009, season 3, episode 11).

[69] As Mills notes, '[t]he thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group' (2005, 175). In Wylie's helpful argument, plausible versions of this thesis offer non-essentialist definitions of the relevant groups and do not take the epistemic privilege of the dominated groups to be automatic (2003, 28).

[70] As Anderson reports, '89 percent of black-owned firms have workforces that are at least 75 percent minority' (2010, 26).

employment, and have no need to engage in the low-paying, unrespectable, and servile tasks at the lower end of the division of labour (see Young 1990, chapter 7). The result is that while white professionals fail to correct their schema that black employees just cannot meet deadlines, their black employees may learn from their own experience of working for white professionals that, when they are unreliable, there are structural reasons for this: for instance, the office is not well-connected to their neighbourhood, it does not offer affordable childcare, or it does not pay enough for them to give up their other sources of income.[71]

Since the members of a dominated group, unlike those of a dominant group, often need to cross the divide to frequent the milieux of the other group, the account of the segregating influence of structural domination must be modified accordingly. Those who are in the grip of ideology do not correct it, I argue, to the extent that, as members of a dominant group or of a dominated group, they do not frequent each other's milieux *unless they need to.* Insofar as the members of a dominated group, unlike those of a dominant group, often need to frequent the milieux of the other group because they depend on its members, this entails that the segregating influence of structural domination is weaker on their socialisation than it is on that of the members of the dominant group. As a result, they are less vulnerable to ideology than the members of the dominant group.

This, I conclude, is how we should conceive of the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation. The PSCs should emphasise this influence. If my argument is correct, this influence is necessary to explain how socialisation into dominating practices can entrench structural domination.

V. OBJECTION AND DEFENCE

At this stage, one might raise the following objection. One might think that it is unclear how agents can be in the grip of ideology at all insofar as they have likely thought about what would help them correct it, even if they have not experienced it first-hand. One might wonder, for instance, how white professionals can hold the schema that black employees are unreliable *simpliciter,* when their black

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[71] To be more precise, on this qualified account of the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation, black employees may either hold the ideological schema in question before correcting it or they may never hold it in the first place. While in the case of the schema that black employees just cannot be trusted with deadlines the second option may be more plausible, black employees' schemas of the white etiquette prevalent in corporate environments may afford a good illustration of the first option. As Anderson reports, 'if what most blacks see as ordinary frankness is interpreted by whites as confrontational, the straight-talking black worker in the white-dominated environment will be labeled as having an "attitude," and her career will suffer accordingly' (2010, 37). In other words, she will contribute to reproducing the biased hiring practices that dominate her. Yet because they often need to enter these environments, blacks quickly correct their schemas of white etiquette. Indeed, like Michelle Johnson, a black employment lawyer with a great deal of ethnographic knowledge of such environments, they too act as informants for others on how to avoid what whites would consider a *faux pas* (2004, mentioned in Anderson 2010, 36). (I should add that blacks' schemas of white etiquette are epistemically deficient not because white etiquette is universally valid — as Anderson notes, there is no 'panculturally valid standard' of etiquette (*ibid.*) – but because it is valid specifically in the white-dominated corporate environments which blacks often need to frequent if they are to rise in the division of labour).

employees have no doubt told them that when they happen to be unreliable it is for the structural reasons which they have learnt working for them. The answer, I suggest, is the following: frequenting a milieu is necessary to challenge a schema that is backed up by frequenting another. Since, as we saw above, white professionals do not really depend on public transports, nor work surrounded by children or hold more than one job, the explanations of their black employees will not change their mind, or only in a superficial way ready to give under pressure (Lai et al. 2016; see also Anderson 2010, 50).

The problem, recall, was that if socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, then those who are in the grip of ideology should also frequent milieux that would help them break free from it. The solution, I argued above, is that socialisation does not work in the way the PSC say it does, because structural domination has a segregating influence on it. This influence is such that agents, as members of a dominant group or of a dominated group, do not frequent the milieux of the other group unless they need to. Insofar as the members of a dominated group often need to, because they depend on the members of the dominant group, this influence does not affect them as much as the members of the dominant group. All this, however, turns on the claim that in order to correct one's ideology, it is necessary to frequent a milieu that disproves it. Yet one might want to question this claim, and my entire argument with it. Why is it not sufficient to hear, read, watch, or, more generally, only think about what would help them correct ideology, without experiencing such correctives first-hand?

After all, this kind of cognitivist approach is the favoured *modus operandi* of many psychological studies of implicit biases. Lai et al.'s recent comparative analysis of different methods of reducing implicit racial preferences testifies to this (2014). None of the seventeen methods under examination involved going into the field. Some 'led participants to engage with others' perspectives […] by having participants *imagine* the thoughts, feelings, and actions of Black individuals' (1769, my emphases here and below). Another assigned them 'to *fictional* groups with positive Black ingroup members and/or negative White outgroup members'. Yet others 'appealed to egalitarian values […]', for instance 'having participants *think* about multicultural values' (*ibid.*). One operated 'by inducing a positive emotion (elevation)' as participants '*watched* an elevating video' (1769 and 1774). The last provided participants with 'strategies to override or suppress the influence of automatic biases', such as '*saying to themselves silently*, "I definitely want to respond to the Black face by thinking 'good'"' (1769 and 1775).

It is unclear, then, how agents can be in the grip of ideology at all, insofar as they are likely to have been prompted to think about what would help them correct it by what they read, watch, or hear from others, even if they have not experienced it first-hand. To return to Haslanger's example, one might wonder, for instance, how white professionals can hold the schema that black employees are unreliable *simpliciter* when their black employees have no doubt told them that, when they happen to

be unreliable, it is for the structural reasons which they have encountered when doing deadline-sensitive work for them.

The answer, I suggest, is that in order to question a schema that is backed up by frequenting a social milieu, it is necessary to frequent another (contradictory) milieu. Put differently, only a milieu can challenge the epistemic support afforded to a given schema by another milieu. For this reason, newspapers, documentaries, or indeed employees offering detailed excuses for their inability to meet deadlines are all insufficient to help agents correct the ideologies they have learnt from the milieux to which the segregating influence of structural domination limits them. Such cognitive tools may help reinforce a challenge born out of the frequentation of a milieu that contradicts the schema in focus, but they will not prove useful by themselves.

The reason for this claim is, as Sewell puts it, that the schema in focus is repeatedly 'validated' to agents by the milieu in which they enact the practice it guides (1992, 13; see also Haslanger e.g., 2017c, 22). As a result, even if a newspaper article, a documentary, or a conversation with others changes their mind at the time, their everyday social and material environment will soon re-establish the schema in focus.[72] Indeed, this is precisely what happens after the kind of lab-based reductions of racial implicit biases achieved by cognitive psychologists, as another study by Lai et al. convincingly demonstrates (2016). The study 'tested 9 interventions (8 real and 1 sham) to reduce implicit racial preferences over time. In 2 studies with a total of 6,321 participants, all 9 interventions immediately reduced implicit preferences. However, none were effective after a delay of several hours to several days' (1002; see also 1011).

Nor do longer intervention make any difference to racial prejudices in the long run (*ibid.*, 1013). What does, by contrast, is actual, real-life contact between whites and blacks in a milieu that disproves prejudices because it 'incorporates or actualizes' cooperation and equality instead, as Sewell would put it (1992, 13). This, in fact, is the central claim of the famous and widely-supported contact theory that originated with Robin Williams's *The Reduction of Intergroup Conflict* (1947).[73] According to the contact hypothesis, face-to-face contact between members of different groups can reduce prejudice between them, especially when their environment favours 'intergroup cooperation' with an 'equal status' (see Pettigrew and Tropp 2006 for an overview, e.g., 752). On this view, going into the field is necessary to correct epistemically mistaken schemas.

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[72] Not to mention the fact that, in Anderson's words, '[c]ognitive biases tend to kick in when people need to make decisions under time pressure, when they are tired, distracted, cognitively overloaded, or under stress' (2010, 50), and that these are often the conditions in which social practices are enacted.

[73] Contact theory originates from social psychology, first with Williams (1947), and then with Gordon Allport's often cited *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954). The theory is also referred to as 'intergroup contact theory' or 'the contact hypothesis'. The most frequently cited work on the idea is Pettigrew and Tropp (2006), where they review over five hundred studies to prove Allport's basic insight. As Anderson remarks, this and other '[r]ecent metanalyses of hundreds of studies show strong support for the contact hypothesis as applied to numerous group divisions – including racial groups – and contact settings' (2010, 125).

This, of course, is also something that anthropologists have long emphasised.[74] The practice of fieldwork testifies to it. As Anastasia Piliavsky has pointed out (see Iqtidar and Piliavsky 2019), the point of doing fieldwork is to lead to this crucial moment where the researcher's schemas about a situation she used to merely think about, rather than face, are rendered obsolete by her actual dealing with it. Actually, even political theorists are increasingly convinced. As Lisa Herzog and Bernardo Zacka (2017) have insisted, an 'ethnographic sensibility' would be welcome in political theory for precisely this reason (see also Gutnick-Allen 2019). Indeed, the PSCs themselves are committed to this claim, to the extent that it is implied by their account of socialisation in general and ideology in particular. As Haslanger puts it, '[w]hat's often needed [to correct ideology] are new experiences that highlight aspects of reality that were previously masked or obscured' (2017a, 10).

I suggest, then, that we should push back against the objection. Agents can be in the grip of ideology even if they have thought about what would help them correct it, provided that they have not experienced it first-hand. For it would seem that frequenting a (contradictory) milieu is necessary to challenge a schema that is backed up by frequenting another. White professionals do hold the schema that black employees are unreliable *simpliciter,* for instance, even though their black employees no doubt tell them that, when they are unreliable, it is for the structural reasons they have learnt working for them. Since, as we saw above, white professionals do not tend to experience what explains their black employees' apparent unreliability, the explanations of the latter will not change their mind. Or if they will, it will be only in a superficial way, liable to give way in practice.

If agents can be in the grip of ideology despite having likely heard, read, or watched TV about what would help them correct it, then, it is because ideology is actualised or incorporated by the milieux in which the practices it guides are enacted – and, crucially, because the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation prevents them, as members of dominant groups or of dominated groups, from accessing the milieux that actualise or incorporate correctives to it. As we saw above, this is more likely for the dominant groups than for the dominated groups. But the point at this stage is that only (contradictory) experience seems capable of countering (ideological) experience, not distanced cognitive processes such as reading or watching TV.

This concludes my argument for the first amendment to the PSCs' account of ideology in terms of socialisation into dominating practices. I have not defended the PSCs' account of ideology against competing accounts in the literature. Nor have I attempted a detailed exegesis of Marx's evolving account(s) of ideology. I have only argued that the PSCs neglect the segregating influence of

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[74] At least since the reflective turn away from Althusser's (and before him Durkheim's) emphasis on a deep 'epistemological break' between social science and social consciousness (see Althusser 1996, 33-47, 182-84; see also Durkheim 1968, xxxvii, 15, 31, and Celikates 2006 for an illuminating overview).

structural domination on socialisation, despite its being necessary to explain how ideology, understood in terms of socialisation into dominating practices, can entrench structural domination.

CHAPTER 4

FETISHISM AND THE STANDARDISING INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION ON SOCIALISATION

I begin once more with a summary of my argument so far. In chapter 1, I offered an account of structural domination as the disempowerment of social groups by social practices. In chapter 2, I turned to the view advocated by the proponents of the socialisation conception of entrenchment (the PSCs) that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to the socialisation of agents into dominating practices. I argued that while this view is promising, the account of socialisation the PSCs rely on needs to be amended if it is to explain the entrenchment of structural domination. In chapter 3, I built on the PSCs' reading of socialisation in terms of ideology to amend their account in light of the literature on this topic. I suggested that sometimes socialisation can only entrench structural domination because structural domination has a segregating influence on it.

In this chapter I argue that this solution is not the whole story. As socialisation into the market testifies, structural domination does not always have a segregating influence on socialisation. But the PSCs understand socialisation into the market as the ideology of the market, or fetishism, and I avail myself of this reading to amend their account in light of the literature on that topic.[75] Drawing on those who, unlike the PSCs, understand fetishism not as the ideology of the market but as the impersonal domination both capitalists and workers suffer in the market (Ripstein 1987, Roberts 2017, Vrousalis 2017), I argue that the PSCs once again neglect the influence of structural domination on socialisation. In this case, however, it is because this influence is standardising, not segregating, that socialisation can entrench structural domination.

I argue as follows. I start with the PSCs' account of fetishism, showing that like the analytic Marxists (e.g., Cohen 2000, Elster 1986) they see it as the ideology of the market, but that since they understand ideology in terms of socialisation, they understand fetishism in terms of socialisation into the market.[76] On this view, to fetishise the market is to keep commodifying things in the workplace

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[75] I focus on the market, but perhaps the same analysis can be extended to gender. Gender, after all, is also a pervasive practice (see e.g., Lahire 2001, MacKinnon 1982), and as we will see, pervasiveness is crucial to my argument. Also central, however, is the fact that structural domination is responsible for its pervasiveness, so this would have to be demonstrated before my analysis can be extended to gender. The market is a particularly good example, however, both because it is the traditional focus of the analysis of fetishism and because its domination is more obviously responsible for its pervasiveness than may be the case with gender.

[76] More precisely: for the PSCs, ideology refers to the schemas of dominating practices insofar as agents are socialised into them (e.g., Haslanger 2017a, Celikates 2016), so on their view fetishism refers to the schema of the market insofar as agents are socialised into it. Note that not all the PSCs follow Haslanger (2004) in suggesting that the practices do the dominating themselves. Einspahr (2010) would rather say that they only cause the domination of the dominant group, for instance, because her conception of structural domination is republican. As we saw in chapter 1, however, I follow Haslanger in assuming a radical conception of structural domination, on which the practices themselves dominate social

because the schema which things actualise and teach in this milieu is just that they are commodities, not that they are commodities because we commodify them, nor indeed that they are inherently commodities, as the analytic Marxists' theory-focused account has it.

Yet this account of fetishism in terms of socialisation into the market, I argue in the next section, faces the problem which, I argued in chapter 2, affects their view of socialisation in general. If socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, I argue, then the schema which things will actualise and teach should be the *commodity* schema with employers and clients, but the *gift* schema with friends or family, and the *favour* schema with neighbours: a fragmentation from which only Garfinkel's 'judgmental dopes' (1984) would not learn that things in the market are commodities *because they are treated as such in this milieu*. Given this fragmentation, it is unclear why, insofar as they are not judgmental dopes, they fail to correct their commodity schema.

At this stage, one might think of bringing to this problem the solution based on the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation that I offered in the previous chapter. But this, as I we will see in section III, will not do. Structural domination does not have the same segregating influence on socialisation into the market that it has in other cases, I argue, since dominant groups and dominated groups are only segregated from one another: not from the friends, family, or neighbours with whom things actualise and teach the gift schema, or the favour schema (as opposed to the commodity schema). As a result, I conclude, it remains unclear why the commodity schema omits the fact that things are commodities at work because people commodify them.

As an attempt to solve this problem, in section IV I draw on those who argue that fetishism is not the ideology of the market but the impersonal domination both workers and capitalists suffer in the market. Based on their analysis, I suggest that structural domination has another influence on socialisation into the market: not a segregating one but a standardising one. This influence is such, I argue, that things tend to actualise and teach the commodity schema not just at work, but also with friends and neighbours, if not quite (yet) with family: this deprives agents of the discrepancies between milieux that would enable them to include in the commodity schema the fact that things are commodities at work because people commodify them. What explains this influence and the resulting pervasiveness of the commodity schema, I claim, is the one feature of the domination of the market that those who define fetishism as this very domination agree on, despite their disagreements as to who is to be held responsible for it and whether it is arbitrary: namely, that it leads both capitalists and workers to maximise profit.

In section V, finally, I defend this analysis against the objection, from the proponents of the domination conception, that fetishism is not the ideology of the market. This objection is grounded

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groups. Hence my definition of the PSCs' view of ideology as 'the schemas of *dominating practices* insofar as agents are socialised into them', rather than, say, as 'the schemas of unjust (e.g., dominating) practices…'.

in the two claims that the commodity schema which things actualise and teach at work is neither epistemically deficient, since things appear as what they are to those who hold it (Roberts 2017), nor relevant, since fetishism is about activity rather than theoretical understanding (Ripstein 1987). To the first claim, I answer that things may indeed appear as what they are to those who hold the commodity schema, but that it does not follow that things appear as everything that they are to them. This means that while the commodity schema may not be epistemically deficient by inclusion of something which commodities are not, as it is on the analytic Marxist view, it may be epistemically deficient by omission of part of what commodities are, as it is on my view and that of the PSCs. To the second claim, I respond that fetishism may indeed not be about theoretical understanding, but that it does not follow that it is not about understanding at all. This means that while fetishism may not be about the kind of theoretical understanding the analytic Marxists focus on, it may be about the kind of practical understanding involved in activity that the PSCs and I focus on.

Note that all I do in this chapter is argue for an *amendment* to the PSCs' version of the ideology conception of fetishism. In particular, I do not argue that the proponents of the domination conception are mistaken to focus only on domination, or even that the analytic Marxists are mistaken to hold a theoretical view of the ideology of the market, though both claims may be implied by my argument. I only argue that the PSCs once again neglect the influence of structural domination on socialisation, but that in this case it is its standardising, not segregating, influence that explains how socialisation can entrench it in turn.

I. THE IDEOLOGY CONCEPTION OF FETISHISM

I start with the PSCs' account of fetishism, showing that like many analytic Marxists they see it as the ideology of the market, but that since they understand ideology in terms of socialisation, they understand fetishism in terms of socialisation into the market. On this view, to fetishise the market is to keep commodifying things in the workplace because the schema which things actualise and teach in this milieu is just that they are commodities, not that they are commodities because we commodify them, nor indeed that they are inherently commodities, as the analytic Marxists's theory-focused account has it.

To set the scene, let me begin with class domination, move on to the market that supports it, and from there turn to commodification and fetishism. Class domination refers to the situation of the worker who, forced to some extent to sell her labour power to some member of the capitalist class to make a living, finds herself more or less unable to exit a relationship in which the relevant capitalist can get her to do what she wants her to do for as long as she has bought her ability to work (see e.g., Gourevitch 2018). Class domination depends on the market, which organises the systematic transfer of resources from workers to capitalists that impairs the ability of the former not to work for some

capitalist or other. As such, the market explains why there can be class domination without any legally or normatively sanctioned class distinctions (see e.g., Young 1990, 47).[77]

The market is a social practice of commodity production and exchange, that is, a collective solution to a collective problem: the problem is that of making a living without central planning, and the solution the market exchange and competition generated by the commodification of things (Cohen 2000; Roberts 2017, e.g., 78n97; Sewell 1992; Vrousalis 2012). People commodify things – from means of production to products to people's own ability to produce – by reducing them, by means of money and other measuring devices, to units which can be counted, added, compared, and converted into one another, which enables and encourages them to produce and exchange things not as favours or gifts, but as commodities, *viz.* in such a way that no one gives more than *exactly* what she gets (Graeber 2001, 56, 2011, chapter 5, and Sewell 1992, 12–13; see also Ripstein 1987, 736, Heinrich 2012, chapter 3, and Marx, *Capital* I (1976), 1).[78]

With this in mind, we can move on to fetishism. In the analytic literature, the dominant conception is the analytic Marxist conception put forward most famously by Gerald Cohen (2000) and Jon Elster (1986). On this view, fetishism is the ideology of the market.[79] The PSCs share this view, but since they understand ideology in terms of socialisation, their version has a more practical, less theoretical twist than the dominant version. Much is common between the two versions, however, and I begin with this.

According to the three features of the Marx-inspired definition of ideology we saw in the previous chapter, to define fetishism as the ideology of the market is to define it as an epistemically deficient schema of the market, which agents infer from the way things appear to them, and which leads them to reproduce the market and entrench class domination (Cohen 2000, 115, Geras 1971, 78–79, Celikates 2016, 14; see also Haslanger e.g., 2017c).[80] The schema in question is, at the most general level, epistemically deficient insofar as it does not alert agents to the fact that the things they exchange with their employers and clients are commodities *because they themselves commodify them* (cf.

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[77] I focused on this fundamental aspect of class domination in chapter 1. It is this aspect that enables individual capitalists to wield more or less arbitrary power over the workers who have signed a labour contract with them. Before any such contract is signed, however, the power of capitalists over worker is not arbitrary but aleatory (see Filling unpublished). In section IV we will encounter another kind of market domination, one which, unlike class domination, both workers and capitalists suffer from, *viz.*, impersonal domination.

[78] Sewell speaks of 'interconvertibility' as the key feature of commodities, and Ripstein of their 'exchangeability' (respectively 1992, 26, and 1987, 736). As we will see, it is important to notice that their interconvertibility or exchangeability has a mathematical, monetary character, lest we fail to distinguish commodity exchange from exchanges of favours and exchanges of gifts, and therefore assume the pervasive character of commodification instead of conceiving it as the surprising fact that it is. As Sewell insists, it is 'by means of money' that each commodity 'can be converted into any other', the circuit being one of 'monetised exchange' which does not as such have the same claim to pervasiveness as exchange in general (see Sewell 1992, 26, and Ripstein 1987, 735). (For an argument that this claim to pervasiveness is unwarranted even in the case of exchange in general, insofar as 'communist' gift exchange in the family or among friends may not really be exchange at all, see Graeber 2011, chapter 5.)

[79] This view extends beyond the analytic Marxists, as Sobel notes (2016), but I focus on them here.

[80] Together with the impersonal domination from which both workers and capitalists suffer in the market, which I will introduce in section IV.

Cohen 2000, 116, Elster 1986, 57). This epistemically deficient schema, however, is not like a 'hallucination' attributable entirely to a failure of perspicacity on the part of agents, but is rather 'like a mirage', insofar as the external world itself is misleading (Cohen 2000, 115, see also Elster 1986, 56 and 177, Geras 1971, 78–9). In particular, the 'foundation' of exchange-value 'in labouring activity is not [visible]' (Cohen 2000, 116). This schema, finally, explains why agents fail to change the market, thus entrenching class domination: agents will not even think of organising production and exchange differently if they fail to realise that things are commodities only because they themselves commodify them. Thus, as Cohen puts it, '[f]etishism protects capitalism' (2000, 129).

This much is common to the PSCs and the analytic Marxists. The difference between them lies in the exact way in which the ideological schema at issue is epistemically deficient. According to the analytic Marxists, the view is epistemically deficient not merely by omission of part of what commodities are, *viz*. their being commodities because agents commodify them, but by inclusion of something which commodities are not, *viz*. their being commodities 'as an inherent property', or 'autonomously' (Elster 1986, 57 and Cohen 2000, 116, respectively). Insofar as including explanations of this kind is the mark of a theoretical mode of engagement with the world, one on which agents have the time and need to flesh out their views of things by contemplating them, we may say that for the analytic Marxists the ideological view in question is a theoretical view.[81]

For the PSCs, by contrast, the ideological view at issue is much more practical. Since the PSCs understand ideology in terms of socialisation, on their view fetishism can be understood in terms of socialisation into the market. More precisely, since, for them, ideology refers to the schemas of dominating practices insofar as agents are socialised into them, fetishism refers to the schema of the market insofar as agents are socialised into it. According to their account of socialisation, this means that to fetishise the market is to keep applying the commodity schema to things, because in this milieu things 'actualise' or 'incorporate' this schema, and so 'teach' or 'inculcate' it in turn (Sewell 1992, 12–13, quoted in Haslanger 2017c, 22; see also Einspahr 2010).[82] But socialisation helps agents enact social practices, so the schemas at issue, being geared primarily to helping them bring these collective solutions to their collective problems, often focus on what things are, without suggesting anything as

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[81] David Ricardo's labour theory of value is the paradigmatic example of this theoretical view (there are others; see Cohen 2000, 127–29). On any labour theory of value, we can calculate the amount of labour invested in a given product as a proportion of the total labour of a given society, and this is its value for this society (Cohen 1979, 339, Roberts 2017, 78, Graeber 2001, 55). On Marx's version of the theory, we can only do this under capitalism, because it is the only society in which labour is commodified, i.e., reduced to units – of time, reflecting the fact that capitalists pay workers an hourly wage – which can be counted, added, and compared. On Ricardo's version of the theory, by contrast, labour is always reducible to 'man-hours', no matter the mode of production we are in (Ricardo, 1951 [1817], see Graeber 2001, 55). Thus Ricardo's view is mistaken by inclusion of this un-historicised claim (see also Sobel 2016).

[82] For instance: people's ability to work is remunerated by the hour, as evidenced by their payslips (Graeber 2001, 55), and products have a price tag and a standardised aspect that actualise in the material world their monetary interconvertibility.

to why they are what they are (cf. Torrance 1995, 46–47).[83] This is why the commodity schema, for the PSCs, is that things are commodities *full stop*, not that they are commodities *autonomously or not,* any such explanation being outside the immediate concern of agents aiming to make a living.[84] In other words, the commodity schema is epistemically mistaken not by inclusion of something which commodities are not, as it is for the analytic Marxists, but instead by omission of part of what they are. As Haslanger puts it, it 'leave[s] out' the fact that commodities are such because we commodify them, and as such 'obscure[s] [their] social dimension' (Haslanger 2012, 18 and 467; see also Celikates 2016).[85]

This distinction will prove important in section V, when it comes to defending my amended version of the view of the PSCs. Before we get to that, however, I must explain why this view needs amending. So what I want to emphasise to conclude this section is that on this view, to fetishise the market is to keep commodifying things in the workplace, because the schema which things incorporate and teach in this milieu is just that they are commodities, not that they are commodities because we commodify them, nor indeed that they are inherently commodities, as the analytic Marxists hold.

II. THE PROBLEM

With this is in mind, I now begin the argument that this account of fetishism in terms of socialisation into the market needs amending, which will take us to section IV. In this section, I argue that as an application of the PSCs' account of socialisation, it faces the problem I identified with this account

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[83] In Marxist theory, 'what things are' is referred to as the appearance of things, 'why they are what they are' as their essence (see e.g., Torrance 1995, 44). Thus the distinction between appearance and essence should *not* be understood as a distinction between appearance and reality. It is not the case that appearances are what is not real and essences are what is real: both are two parts of what is real, 'such that knowledge of one, the essence, explains why the other is as it is' (*ibid.*). I do not use this vocabulary since the PSCs do not, but their account is manifestly influenced by Marx. On another note, it is worth pointing out that Richard Sobel has recently made a similar distinction between two views of fetishism, calling 'essentialist' the version I call theoretical and 'constructivist' the version I call practical (2016). Sobel, however, has the same theoretical understanding of ideology as the analytic Marxists, and for this reason fails to realise that the practical understanding of ideology can be seen as a version of the ideology conception of fetishism, rather than as an opponent to this view (specifically, one on which the relevant schema is not epistemically deficient in any way).

[84] Haslanger at times suggests that the 'hegemony' of the relevant schema is necessary to explain its epistemic deficiency (see e.g., 2012, 467; cf. Sewell 1992 (discussed in section V below), whom indeed she draws on). But as she does not make it clear that domination is necessary to explain the hegemony, this suggestion conflicts with her claim that schemas are not normally hegemonic. It is this conflict that is at the heart of the problem I emphasised in chapter 2 (see section II below). Note also that to my knowledge she does not focus on capitalist issues strictly speaking, but her account and that of the PSCs more generally is obviously inspired by Marx and related analyses.

[85] Contrast the commodity schema which agents infer from the things they exchange with their employers and clients, to the 'goalpost' schema, which people will infer from the bags they use as goalposts when playing an informal game of football in a park. The commodity schema is that the things agents exchange with their employers and clients are commodities full stop, and leaves out the fact that they are commodities because agents use them as such. By contrast, we should expect the 'goalpost' schema not to leave out the fact that the bags are goalposts because people use them as such. The bags and the milieu are such that the 'goalpost' schema does not omit this crucial fact, while commodities and the market are such that the commodity schema *does* do so. What exactly it means for the market 'to be such' is the focus of what follows. To anticipate, it means that the market is a pervasive practice, because of the standardising influence of structural domination on socialisation.

in chapter 2. If socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, I argue, then the schema that things will actualise and teach should be the *commodity* schema with employers and clients, but the *gift* schema with friends or family and the *favour* schema with neighbours — from which only 'judgmental dopes' would not learn that things on the market are commodities because we use them as such in this milieu but not in others, and correct their commodity schema accordingly. If so, however, then it is unclear how the commodity schema can explain how agents entrench class domination.

To begin with, recall from chapter 2 that, according to the PSCs, agents are socialised into a multiplicity of social practices, some of which are not capitalist. As we saw Sally Haslanger insists in previous chapters, '[t]here are multiple reasons to avoid the idea that ideology [e.g. capitalist schemas] functions as a total system governing society as a whole' (2017b, 161). Indeed, remember Robin Celikates's insistence that we should bear in mind Geuss's famous claim that 'a society of happy slaves, content with their chains […] is a nightmare, not a realistic view of a state of society which is at present possible' (1981, 83–84, quoted in Celikates 2016). In other words, we should expect ideological schemas to be actualised in things in some of the milieux which agents navigate, *but not in others*. Yet if so, crucially, we should also expect agents to learn that things actualise a schema because they themselves incorporate it in things in some milieux but not in others. They are 'knowledgeable' agents, after all (Giddens 1979, 5; see also Celikates 2006, Boltanski and Thévenot 2006), who should be expected to realise that if things actualise different schemas in different milieux, it is only because they themselves apply different schemas to them.[86]

This is particularly clear with the commodity schema. If socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, we should expect this schema to be incorporated in things when people exchange them with their employers or clients, but not when they exchange them with their neighbours, friends, of family. As Graeber (2011) and Cohen (2009) insist, commodity exchange is very different from the kind of exchange that in principle occurs between neighbours, friends, or family. The schema of commodity exchange is not just 'give as good as you get', as in neighbourly exchange, but rather 'give *exactly* as good as you get', price being the expression of this mathematical equivalence made possible by the reduction of things to countable units (Graeber 2011, chapter 5). The discrepancy is even more striking with close friends and family. There, the schema is the 'baseline communist' one, 'to each according to their needs and from each according to their means' (Graeber, *ibid.*; cf. Cohen 2009, 39–45). Thus, in principle, the things which agents exchange with neighbours, friends, or family do not actualise the commodity schema, but the favour schema or the gift schema (as the case

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[86] As I have already emphasised in the course of this thesis, one of the 'leading theorem[s]' advanced by Giddens is that 'every social actor knows a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member' (1979, 5, emphasis removed; see also 72; see also Scott 1985, 319).

may be). When plumbers fix the bathroom of their relatives for free, for example, their ability to work does not incorporate the commodity schema. It is not standardised but personalised, and the plumbers' relatives are not presented with a bill.

Yet, crucially, if, as I just argued, the things which agents exchange with their neighbours, friends, and family do *not* incorporate the commodity schema in the way that the things which they exchange with their employers and clients do, then it is unclear how the commodity schema can leave out the fact that these things are commodities because people commodify them. People, after all, are not 'judgmental dopes', to return to Garfinkel's famous phrase (1984, 75, in Celikates 2006, 30; see also Roberts 2017, 95), and if things incorporate different schemas in different milieux, the discrepancies between things or milieux should help them realise that they do the incorporating themselves.[87] When a plumber fixes her neighbour's kitchen sink because he previously babysat her children and she owes him one, or repairs her parents' bathroom for free, she can hardly fail to infer that *if her ability to work is a commodity at work, it is because she commodifies it by selling it to her employer or clients for an hourly wage*.[88] In other words, we should expect her commodity schema to include the fact that her ability to work is a commodity at work because of herself and her employer, just like we should expect her gift schema and her favour schema to include, respectively, the facts that her ability to work is a gift in family milieux because it has been made so by herself and her parents, or that its being exchanged as a favour in neighbourly spheres is due to her and her neighbours' making it so.

If socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, then, we should expect things to actualise the commodity schema with employers and clients, but the gift schema with family and friends and the favour schema with neighbours. But this suggests in turn that we should not expect agents' commodity schema to limit itself to the fact that things at work are commodities, omitting the further fact that, if they are so, it is because agents themselves commodify them in this milieu. If so, however, then it is unclear how the commodity schema can prevent agents from changing the market for the

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[87] As Celikates notes (2006, 30n38), Garfinkel's point was originally directed at Talcott Parsons. This point is emphasised by many sociologists keen on distancing themselves from what we might call the epistemological elitism of earlier social science, including by those who provide much of the inspiration for the PSCs' account of socialisation, like Giddens (via Sewell). See Celikates 2006 for a helpful survey.

[88] Indeed, by being dominated into selling it. On the PSCs' view, the fact that workers and capitalists are dominated into commodifying their ability to work in the workplace is irrelevant when it comes to explaining the epistemic deficiency of their schema of commodities: on their view, it is their socialisation in the workplace that explains its persistent epistemic deficiency, and it would remain deficient even if agents were not dominated. But this has them run into the problem I highlight in this section, which we met in chapters 2 and 3, and which it is my goal here as it was there to try to solve. As should be clear by now, my strategy is to pay more attention to structural domination and its various influences on socialisation than the PSCs do. Here in particular I will focus on what I call its standardising influence. Still, on my view as well the fact that agents are dominated into commodifying things at work is not paramount to explaining the epistemic deficiency: as we will see, what matters in this respect is the fact that they are dominated into commodifying *other milieux beyond work*.

better, and lead them to entrench class domination as a result.[89] Put differently, since ideology, for the PSCs, refers to the schemas of dominating practices insofar as agents are socialised into them, their account of fetishism as the ideology of the market runs into the problem that affects their view of socialisation.

III. NO SEGREGATING INFLUENCE OF DOMINATION ON SOCIALISATION INTO THE MARKET

Similar problems calling for similar solutions, one might think of bringing to this problem the solution that I offered in the previous chapter, which was based on the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation. But this solution, I argue in this section, will not do. Structural domination does not have the same segregating influence on socialisation into the market that it has in other cases: dominant and dominated groups are only segregated from one another, not from the friends, family, or neighbours with whom things actualise and teach the gift or favour schemas. Therefore, I argue, it remains unclear why the commodity schema omits the fact that things are commodities at work because people commodify them.

Since the PSCs' account of fetishism as the ideology of the market faces the problem I identified in chapter 2 with their view of socialisation, and since we already encountered a version of this problem in chapter 3, one might want to suggest an explanation of the kind I offered in the latter chapter. But this kind of explanation does not work in this case, I argue now, since socialisation into the market is not under the segregating influence of structural domination. As we will see in the next section, it is instead under its *standardising* influence.

The key to the solution I offered in the previous chapter, recall, is the segregating influence of structural domination, which separates social groups from the milieux that would enable them to correct their epistemically deficient schemas. To return to the example I offered there, white professionals live such different lives from their black employees, who due to lack of childcare and long commutes might be unreliable at work, that they never correct the generalisation they infer from this. Here, likewise, one might think that people in general, including the same professionals, are distanced from the milieux where things do not incorporate the commodity schema, and so from the

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[89] Michael Heinrich also notices that if agents are to fetishise commodities in this ideological sense, they must fail to realise that they are doing the commodifying themselves (2012, 74–75). This mistake is 'unconsciously produced', as he puts it (*ibid.*). But because he examines, with Marx, 'a *fully developed* capitalism' (2012, 32, his emphasis), and so a capitalism that has become more or less total, he can only conceive of the relevant social contexts historically (e.g., feudalism before, communism afterwards) rather than simultaneously (e.g., friends, the family, neighbours). For this reason, he fails to see that standardisation is the explanation of such unconsciousness. A similar drawback can be found in Catharine MacKinnon's analysis. She also emphasises the importance of such unconsciousness for fetishism (1982, 541), but does not insist enough that the relevant social relations are not total, but instead cohabit with other relations with which they are often inconsistent (see e.g., 540–42). Both also mention structural domination, but neither highlight its exact mechanism as I try to do here.

discrepancies that would enable them to realise they are doing the commodifying themselves. This, in turn, would explain why the schema they infer from the things they exchange at work omits the fact that these things are commodities because they themselves commodify them.

But this solution cannot apply here, I argue now: domination does not have such a segregating influence on socialisation on the market. Agents are not segregated from the milieux in which, if socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, we should expect things to not incorporate the commodity schema. White professionals, for instance, are segregated from the milieux that would help them understand why their black employees might be unreliable at work, but they are not segregated from the milieux in which they meet their own friends or family. So if the things white professionals exchange with their friends, say, embody the gift schema rather than the commodity schema, as we should expect if socialisation works the way the PSCs say it does, then their schema of the things they exchange with their employers and clients should tell them not just that these things incorporate the commodity schema full stop, but that they do this because they themselves incorporate it in them. Once again, agents are not judgmental dopes: if things are gifts with their friends, but commodities with their employers and clients, it would be surprising that they should infer from either that they are gifts or commodities *full stop*, rather than *because they themselves make them gifts with their friends and commodities with their employers and clients*.

A solution to the problem that appeals to the segregating influence of domination on socialisation, then, is unsatisfying in this case. But the general form of the solution, I argue in the next section, is not. In this case as well socialisation does not work in the way the PSCs say it does, and here as well their mistake is due to their neglect of the influence of structural domination on socialisation. The difference is that when it comes to fetishism, the influence of structural domination on socialisation is not *segregating* but *standardising*, such that the schema which things actualise and teach is the commodity schema not just at work, but also with friends and neighbours, if not quite (yet) with family. This solves the problem, I argue, insofar as it deprives agents of the discrepancies between milieux that would enable them to include, in the commodity schema, the fact that things are commodities at work because agents commodify them themselves.

IV. THE STANDARDISING INFLUENCE OF DOMINATION ON SOCIALISATION

To make the claim that, in this case, socialisation can only entrench structural domination because structural domination has a standardising influence on it, I draw on those who argue that fetishism is not the ideology of the market, but the domination of the market instead. What explains the pervasiveness of the commodity schema and its consecutive incompletion, I suggest, is the one feature of market domination which the proponents of this alternative view agree on, despite their

disagreements as to who is to be held responsible for this domination and whether it is arbitrary in some sense: namely, that it leads both capitalists and workers to maximise profit.

While the ideology conception of fetishism remains the dominant one in the analytic literature, it has recently come under sustained pressure. Roberts (2017), in particular, has built on Ripstein (1987) to argue that '[f]etishism ought to be understood as a form of domination rather than a form of false consciousness' (2017, 85), and Vrousalis has followed suite in his review of Roberts (2017). I will consider their objections in the last section, when I push back against the latter on behalf of my amendment of the PSCs' version of the ideology conception. Before that, however, I need to flesh out this amendment. To this end, I focus on what I take to be the central insight of the domination alternative.

On this alternative view, fetishism is the impersonal domination both workers and capitalists suffer on the market (Ripstein 1987, Roberts 2017, Vrousalis 2017). To be clear, this domination is different from, even if it influences, the class domination I described in section I. As Roberts insists, 'the dominant class in modernity, the class of capitalists, is as subject to impersonal domination as are the laboring classes' (2017, 102). Vrousalis agrees: Roberts, he writes, is right that 'capitalist [or impersonal] domination is not equivalent to class domination' (2017, 379). Ripstein also concurs: according to him, the central feature of this domination is that 'the options of all are limited by the market', not merely those of workers relative to capitalists (1987, 747).

Class domination, we saw, refers to the situation of the worker who, forced to some extent to sell her labour power to some member of the capitalist class to make a living, finds herself more or less unable to exit a relationship in which the relevant capitalist, for as long as they have bought her ability to work, can get her to do more or less what they want her to do (see e.g., Gourevitch 2018; see also Filling, unpublished). The domination in focus, by contrast, is the domination from which both workers and capitalists suffer in the market because of competition, be it to sell one's labour power or one's commodities in general (see Roberts 2017, 88 and Vrousalis 2017, 379).

The complete definition of this impersonal domination is the object of some debate between Roberts and Vrousalis, who disagree as to who is to be held morally responsible for it, and whether it is arbitrary in some sense (see Roberts 2017 and Vrousalis 2017).[90] But let me bypass these

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[90] Vrousalis (2017) argues that capitalists can be held morally responsible for the domination at issue, and he insists that this domination is in an important sense non-arbitrary since it influences class domination in such a way that capitalists cannot interfere as they please with their workers: they must have them maximise profit, on pain of bankruptcy. Roberts (2017), by contrast, claims that no one can be held morally responsible for the domination at issue, and he emphasises the arbitrariness of market fluctuations (these two points enabling him to conclude, on the republican-inspired view he attributes to Marx, that the domination at issue it that of the market). In line with these disagreements, Roberts and Vrousalis take the domination at issue to be impersonal in different senses: for Vrousalis, it is impersonal in the sense that it prevents capitalists from giving a personal flavour to their domination over their workers; for Roberts, it is impersonal in the sense that no one can be held morally responsible for it. On the view I defend, this domination is impersonal in both senses, but Vrousalis's sense has the advantage of emphasising the profit-maximising logic that is crucial to my argument (and which Roberts also recognises, as I argue below).

disagreements to focus on what both Roberts and Vrousalis agree on, and Ripstein as well. This is that both workers and capitalists are dominated into maximising profit. As Vrousalis insists, market competition affects radically the power of the capitalist class over the working class. Without competition, each capitalist can act as a kind of 'absolute monarch' over their workers, relatively unconstrained in the wage they offer and in what they ask them to do. But as soon as they face (perfect-enough) competition, they can no longer determine wages arbitrarily, or have workers do whatever takes their fancy: at this point '[each] is constrained, on pain of competitive disadvantage, to maximise profit, which in turn requires paying [workers] a market-clearing wage', and, I add, exploiting them (2017, 380–81). Roberts concurs, writing for instance that '[t]he capitalist, dominated by market imperatives, is compelled thereby to exploit labor', which by definition entails making a profit (2017, 102). Ripstein agrees as well, emphasising both that the worker 'must make himself marketable and once sold, direct his activity to whatever his employer demands', and that '[t]he employer's options are broader but still limited: On pain of bankruptcy, this demand can only take a single form: produce what is profitable' (1987, 748).

In other words, all the proponents of the domination conception of fetishism agree that in an important respect the domination at issue is 'non-arbitrary' in the sense of 'regulated' – indeed, regulated by one key rule: 'maximise profit' (Vrousalis 2017, 381).[91] If Roberts downplays this aspect, it is only to emphasise that this domination is in another sense arbitrary, *viz*. whimsical. For the two aspects seem to clash, and it is on this apparent clash that Vrousalis insists when he uses the term 'non-arbitrary' to characterise this domination. But the clash is only apparent, as it is quite compatible for the domination that on each view constitutes fetishism to be both arbitrary and non-arbitrary in these senses. The market may have movements that are quite difficult to anticipate and, at the same time, still channel capitalists (and workers in their wake) in one definite direction: that of making profit. As Sewell emphasises, what characterises capitalism is precisely both a 'chronic instability or unpredictability' and 'a continuous dynamic of capital accumulation […]' (1992, 25–26).[92]

Now, Vrousalis also insists, against Roberts, that the agents of this domination are not 'markets or market imperatives', but '[c]apitalists who dominate each other by jointly constituting the "external coercive necessities confronting the individual capitalist"' (2017, 3, quoting Marx 1976, 381). Here

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[91] Frank Lovett, for instance, defines non-arbitrariness in this way: there are rules that constrain the way in which the dominators can use their power over others, so that they cannot get them to do just anything that takes their fancy (see Lovett 2010). We saw in chapter 1 that insofar as workers have to work for *some* capitalist rather than a specific capitalist, no capitalist has arbitrary power over workers in this respect. *After* they have signed a labour contract, however, things are different: bosses enjoy more or less arbitrary power over their workers in various respects (Filling unpublished, Gourevitch 2018). But there is one crucial, indeed, overarching respect in which their power is not arbitrary: they have to maximise profit. It is this aspect that should be emphasised here.

[92] Vrousalis himself notes that '[t]his competition causes long-term prices to fluctuate […] to maintain profit' (2017, 380). As we will see shortly, Sewell sees in 'the commodification of things' the core of this dynamic (1992, 25).

I do not engage in this debate, however, for it would take us too far afield.[93] Instead, I focus on the profit-maximising logic that I have described above. For it offers a solution to the problem identified in section II.

The reason it does, in a nutshell, is the following. If capitalists and workers are dominated into maximising profit, then they are dominated into incorporating the commodity schema beyond the workplace, in as many milieux as competition requires. This in turns deprives them of the discrepancies between milieux that could help them realise that they themselves are incorporating the commodity schema in things, and explains how this schema can fail to include this fact. For as Sewell emphasises, 'the commodification of things' is at the core of the 'continuous dynamic of capital accumulation' and profit maximisation we saw him mention earlier (1992, 25). Capitalists, on pain of competitive disadvantage, have a strong incentive to ensure that as many things are commodified as possible, and so, therefore, do their workers. Only commodities are 'opportunities for profit' after, all, and competition requires capitalists to maximise profit. This is why, in Sewell's words again, 'the commodification of things' has become 'pervasive', that is, 'present in a relatively wide range of institutional spheres, practices, and discourses' (*ibid.*, 25 and 22): the 'chain of commodity exchange' remains 'vast', he writes, as 'the commodity form […] organizes a virtually universal intersection of resources' (*ibid.*, 26). In this respect, it is no surprise that Marx's first description of capitalism in *Capital* is as 'an immense collection of commodities' (1976, chapter 1). The domination identified above turns commodity exchange into a practice that is pervasive in a way few practices ever are.[94]

Now, Sewell seems to take such pervasiveness to result from the fact that the commodity schema is 'exceptionally transposable' (1992, 25), rather than from the profit-maximising logic of the domination which Ripstein, Roberts, and Vrousalis insist on. Sewell nowhere mentions domination, but instead insists that the commodity schema itself 'knows no natural limits' as 'it can be applied not only to cloth, tobacco, or cooking pans, but to land, housework, bread, sex, advertising, emotions, or knowledge […]' (*ibid.*, 25–26). But this seems to me mistaken. Exceptional *transposability* is not exceptional *transposition*, and a motivating force – 'a force that requires it', as MacKinnon puts it

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[93] A word on this debate. Roberts argues that workers and capitalists are dominated by the market because the myriad agents, both workers and capitalists, who enact this practice, or more generally who fail to change it, cannot be held morally responsible for its arbitrary effects since they cannot be expected to foresee them. Vrousalis objects that it is not the market but the capitalists who do the dominating, and that they do it by jointly constituting the external necessities confronting each individual capitalist (and, through them, their workers). In these conditions, one can take the debate to centre on whether the capitalists can be expected to foresee the effects of the market after all, and if so whether they could cease, by themselves, to jointly constitute the external necessities confronting each individual capitalist. Those siding with Roberts would deny one or both of these claims; those siding with Vrousalis would defend both. But both groups would agree that the domination at issue has a profit-maximising logic, whether it is domination by the market or by the capitalist class.

[94] Sewell mentions language as another example of a pervasive practice (1992, 22). But most languages are confined to states or regions, and even within a linguistic region, different social groups have different dialects. In addition, even the most transnational languages (e.g., Arabic, English, Spanish) are not as global as the 'language' of the commodity. A better example, following MacKinnon (1982) and Lahire (2000), is gender.

(1982, 540) – is crucial for the *actual* rather than merely *virtual* pervasiveness of the chain of commodity exchange. This motivating force is the domination with a profit-maximising logic that affects both capitalists and their workers on the market.[95]

Thus while capitalists and workers might try to keep the things they exchange with their family uncommodified at all costs, they will often expand the commodity schema to the things they exchange with friends and neighbours. The magazine *Plumbing Connection* provides a telling example of this phenomenon in an article entitled 'The Deal with Mates Rates', by Brad Fallon (2014). Fallon begins by noting that 'people with trade skills are always faced with the old 'mates rates' dilemma'. He frames the dilemma as follows: 'with a client […] I just roll off the invoice – job well done'; 'however, add a stressed friend, relative or neighbour into the scenario – someone who I see all the time, whether in my street, at school, or socially – and suddenly, I have this overwhelming need to become the not-for-profit, happy to spend my weekend plumbing "for free" emergency plumber'. And so he goes on to offer 'some of [his] most helpful tips for ensuring that [people with trade skills] are adequately paid for the work [they] do'. The tips can be grouped in two categories: making excuses and commodifying, the only exception being the family ('Obviously […], if it is your Mother-In-Law knocking on the door, throw all the rules out and do the job straight away for free'). One good tip, in particular, consists in 'booking the job in during standard work hours with one of [your] staff members'. As Fallon emphasises, this 'change[s] the dynamic of the relationship back from a personal favour to a professional plumbing service'. Other tips go in the same direction.[96] As this example illustrates, capitalists and their staff members are dominated into extending the commodity schema beyond the workplace to as many milieux as competition requires – even with their friends, if not with their mother-in-law.[97]

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[95] In fact, this domination and its logic might even be sufficient for the pervasiveness of the commodity schema. There are at least two reasons for this. First, it seems that if agents are motivated enough to transpose a schema, they will transpose it even if it is not as easy to transpose as the commodity schema. If so, however, then it is the motivating force that is doing the explanatory work, not the schema's exceptional transposability. Second, and more fundamentally, whether the transposability is exceptional or not does not depend on the schema alone, but on its relation to the resource to which it is applied, and therefore on its relation to the schema that is already applied to this resource and which it purports to replace. If friends are used to exchanging some things as favours, for example, then transposing the commodity schema to these things may not be as easy as Sewell seems to suggest, and only agents under the competitive pressures making up the impersonal domination I want to emphasise may be motivated enough to carry out the transposition.

[96] Another tip is particularly telling. 'One last option for working with friends and family', Fallon writes, 'is setting up an exchange system for services': 'we set an agreed hourly rate for each of our services upfront and then we keep a tally of the hours we both work for each other' so that 'when I think [one of them has] spent too much time helping me, I will pay [them] for some of the work'. If this tally was not itself convertible in money, or if they did not keep such exact track of their hours, this practice might stand apart from the market and constitute a counter-practice, one on which agents can draw to question the market. But the tally is convertible into money, as Fallon notes, and the practice has little disrupting potential as it stands.

[97] The intensity of this domination varies both historically and depending on the specific worker or capitalist in focus. Regarding the first kind of variation, neoliberalism is the most recent example of the renewed extension of the market to as many spheres of life as possible (e.g., Harvey 2005, e.g., 2, Brown 2015, e.g., 28, Stedman Jones 2012, e.g., 2, 15; see also Foucault 2010). Regarding the second, a capitalist who has already made a lot of profit is forced to some degree to keep doing so if she is to maintain her position on the market, but less so than if she was struggling to avoid bankruptcy,

But this standardising influence of structural domination on socialisation, crucially, offers a solution to the problem affecting the PSCs' account of fetishism in terms of socialisation into the market. The problem, recall, was that if things incorporate different schemas in different milieux, which they should do if socialisation works in the way the PSCs say it does, then the discrepancies between these milieux should prompt agents to realise that they do the incorporating themselves, and include this fact in their commodity schema. If our plumber fixes her neighbour's kitchen sink because he previously babysat her children and she owes him one, or her parents' bathroom for free, we should expect her schema of her ability to work in the workplace to tell her that it is commodified by herself and her employer. Brad Fallon is a case in point: he complains that 'because I like to "help" my friends', […] it feels wrong to charge them' (2014). But the standardising influence of structural domination offers a solution to this problem. For if the plumber, or any other market agent, is dominated in such a way that she does not, with her neighbours or friends, exchange her ability to work as a favour or as a gift but as a commodity, in just the same way as she does with her employer and customers, then the move from one milieu to the next will be so natural that it will blunt her critical consciousness: specifically, she will not realise that she herself is actualising the commodity schema in her ability to work, and her version of the schema will not include this fact.[98] Fallon's version of the schema, because he has reflected on it, may be sufficiently critical, but he is an exception. Indeed, he insists, 'most friends, neighbours and relatives […] don't actually want a discount or preferential treatment'. In fact, usually they do not even ask him 'to discount [his] prices' (*ibid.*).[99] Unlike him, they may well fetishise commodities.

More generally, I want to suggest the following explanation of the mirage at the heart of fetishism. If the commodity schema is incorporated not just in the things agents exchange with their employers and customers, but also in the things they exchange with their 'friends, relatives or neighbours', as Fallon puts it, then the schema they infer from the commodities they exchange with their employers and customers will leave out the fact that they themselves are responsible for the commodification of

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and even less so than if she was a worker struggling to make ends meet. This is important, because it means that a capitalist in the first situation has more power to improve things, and so bears more forward-looking responsibility in this respect, than a capitalist in the second situation, and both more than the worker (cf. Young 2011). Any of them can only start acting in this way, however, if they do not fail to realise that they are doing the commodifying themselves: in other words, if they are not too socialised into the market because the latter is pervasive across the milieux they navigate.

[98] The same argument could be made about the goods and services which were previously produced by the welfare state and which agents exchanged *as citizens*, such as care services in hospitals. This form of exchange does not involve the keeping of exact accounts: it allows for deficits and debts that (at least before neoliberalism and austerity) do not need to be repaid to the last penny. For this reason, it is close to the way in which neighbours exchange favours. In this respect, Boris Johnson's decision to ask British citizens to 'protect the NHS' by staying at home during the Covid-19 pandemic (rather than to decommodify care services by liberating the NHS from the burden of its growing debt) may be an example of commodity fetishism.

[99] Indeed, there is a risk that the 'exchange system for services' that Fallon has set up with some of his friends will slowly commodify his relations with them in time, so that eventually he himself might no longer notice that he and they are doing the commodifying themselves. They keep an exact track of the hours they work for one another, after all, and the tally of these hours is convertible into money.

commodities. For when a schema is pervasive in this way, there are no hitches between the spheres of activity agents navigate, and they stop noticing that they are applying it themselves: as Sewell puts it, schemas that are incorporated in a relatively wide range of milieux tend to become 'relatively unconscious, in the sense that they are taken-for-granted mental assumptions or modes of procedures that actors normally apply without being aware that they are applying them' (1992, 22; see also 24 ff.). Agents in such a standardised environment are deprived of the prompts that could have helped them realise that they are following the standard, and end up doing so without thinking (cf. Graeber 2005, 431).[100] One might say that the commodity schema, in particular, is reflected back to them by so many things that they become 'naturals' relative to it, applying it 'naturally' to the things that reflect it, aware only that they are exchanging them as commodities, not that they are commodifying them as they do. Their critical consciousness is blunted.

The commodity schema does not alert capitalists and workers to the fact that it is because they commodify them that the things they exchange are commodities, and it does not alert them to this because they incorporate this schema in things without thinking. They do this, in turn, because they are dominated into incorporating this schema in things, not just in the workplace, but pervasively, for instance in friendly reunions and neighbourly encounters, if not in family settings. In other words, the impersonal domination at issue deprives them of the standpoints from which to realise that they are constructing social reality in such a way that they entrench, in a vicious circle, their own domination (see MacKinnon 1982 and Lahire 2001).[101]

The PSCs, I conclude, neglect once again the influence of structural domination on socialisation. In this case, however, this influence is standardising, not segregating. Fetishism, or the ideology of the market understood in terms of socialisation into the market, entrenches structural domination because structural domination, in the form of the impersonal domination Vrousalis, Roberts and Ripstein emphasise, and of the class domination it affects, has a standardising influence on socialisation into the market.

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[100] As Graeber puts it, '[t]he key factor [that explains the mistake] would appear to be […] whether one has the capacity to at least occasionally step into some overarching perspective from which the machinery is visible, and one can see that all these apparently fixed objects are really part of an ongoing process of construction' (2005, 431). In my view, this overarching perspective is attained by navigating different, non-standardised milieux, in which things incorporate different schemas. Graeber does not emphasise here that domination is responsible for agents' incapacity to reach this perspective, but he elsewhere (e.g., 2009, 516ff) insists on the loop between domination and consciousness (or imagination, in his terms).

[101] Bernard Lahire – Bourdieu's 'academic heir' in France – also emphasises the connection between pervasiveness and unconsciousness in the context of gender differences (2001). In fact, one might make the same argument about these differences, where fetishised gender differences would be analogous to fetishised commodities, provided men and women are dominated into gendering themselves in this way (see MacKinnon 1982 and Rubin 1975 for clues as to how this might work).

V. OBJECTIONS AND DEFENCE

Let me finally defend this analysis against the objection that fetishism is not the ideology of the market. The proponents of the domination view ground this objection in the two claims that the commodity schema that things actualise and teach at work is neither epistemically deficient, since things appear as what they are to those who hold it (Roberts 2017), nor in fact relevant, since fetishism is about activity rather than theoretical understanding (Ripstein 1987). In response, I draw on the distinction I made in section I between practical and theoretical understanding to argue that, while this objection affects the analytic Marxist view, it misses the mark as an objection to the view I defend.

More precisely, I argue as follows. To the first claim, I answer that things may indeed appear as what they are to those who hold the commodity schema, but that it does not follow that things appear to them as *everything* they are. This means that, while the commodity schema may not be epistemically deficient through the inclusion of something which commodities are not, as it is on the analytic Marxist view, it may yet be epistemically deficient by omission of part of what commodities are, as it is on my view and that of the PSCs. To the second claim, I respond that fetishism may indeed not be about theoretical understanding, but that it does not follow that fetishism is not about understanding at all. This means that while fetishism may not be about the kind of theoretical understanding which the analytic Marxists focus on, it may be about the kind of practical understanding involved in activity which the PSCs and I focus on.

I owe the first objection to Roberts (2017). The objection goes as follows. To define fetishism as ideology is to say that the commodity schema that things actualise and teach at work is epistemically deficient, as we saw above. But this schema is not epistemically deficient, Roberts argues, since things appear as what they are to those who hold it. As he puts it, this view 'trips over Marx's explicit claim that, in fetishism, "the social relations between [the producers'] private labours appear *as what they are*". Where social relations are mediated by commodities, exchanges *are* the real relations between the producers of commodities' (Roberts 2017, 86–87, quoting Marx, *Capital* 1 (1976), 166, to which he adds the emphasis).

But from the fact that things do appear as what they are to those who hold the commodity schema, it does not follow that things appear as *everything* that they are to those who hold this schema. Everything that they appear to be is true of them, but some facts about them may be left out. Put differently, Roberts's objection applies to the analytic Marxist view – to which it is directed, in fact – but not to my amended version of the view of the PSCs, or indeed to that view itself. For the key to escaping the objection is to characterise the epistemic deficiency of the ideology of the market not as a theoretical deficiency, as the analytic Marxists do, but as a practical one, as I do following the PSCs. On the theoretical reading of Cohen and Elster, recall from section I, the commodity schema does not alert agents to part of what commodities are (*viz*. their social aspect) not just by omission of it, but by

inclusion of something which commodities are not (*viz*. 'autonomously' commodities (Cohen 2000, 116), or commodities 'as an inherent property' (Elster 1986, 57)). Now, to those who hold this schema, things at work do not appear as what they are, since on this schema they appear to be inherently commodities while really they are commodities by social construction. The objection therefore applies to the analytic Marxists's theoretical reading of the ideology of the market, or fetishism. But it does not apply to the practical reading of the PSCs and myself. On this reading, we saw that the commodity schema is epistemically mistaken not by inclusion of something commodities are not, but only by omission of part of what they are, their 'social dimension' (Haslanger 2012, 467; see also 18; see also Celikates 2016). To those who hold the schema understood in this way, commodities do appear as what they are, if not as everything that they are. Therefore my amended version of the view of the PSCs, unlike the analytic Marxist view, escapes the first objection.

The same goes for the second objection, *viz*. that the commodity schema that things actualise and teach at work is irrelevant, since fetishism is about activity rather than theoretical understanding. This objection is raised by Ripstein, who insists, against Cohen and the proponents of the ideology conception, that fetishism 'is the failing associated with practical involvement in the world, not with the virtue of knowledge', because activity and understanding are distinct modes of engagement with the world, and fetishism is about activity, not understanding (Ripstein 1987, 743).

But from the fact fetishism is not about theoretical understanding, it does not follow that fetishism is not about understanding *at all*. Fetishism is not about the kind of theoretical understanding the analytic Marxists focus on, but it can be about the kind of practical understanding that the PSCs and I have in mind. For Ripstein's distinction between activity and understanding is too stark: it misses the fact that activity involves understanding in the form of the schemas which, according to the PSCs, enable agents to enact social practices in general and the market in particular. Put differently, from the fact that 'all social life is essentially *practical*' (Marx, Eighth Thesis on Feuerbach, quoted in Torrance 1995, 45, original emphasis), we should not conclude with Ripstein that fetishism 'is the failing associated with practical involvement in the world' (1987, 743) rather than with any kind of understanding. Instead, we should conclude with Torrance and the PSCs that 'what people observe and how they experience and describe their surroundings depends on their purposes and the problems they face' (Torrance 1995). Enacting a social practice consists in bringing a collective solution to a collective problem, and it is understandable that the schemas agents use to solve these problems may not alert them to more than they strictly need to understand in order to do so (cf. 1995, 47) – at least when structural domination segregates agents from other practices, or indeed when the practice in question is as pervasive as the market because of the standardising influence of structural domination. Thus while fetishism is not about the kind of theoretical understanding the analytic Marxists have in

mind, it can be about the kind of practical understanding involved in activity which the PSCs and myself insist on. Therefore my amendment of the view of the PSC escapes the second objection.

Since, as we saw above, both also escape the first objection, I conclude, *contra* Roberts and Ripstein, that fetishism can be understood as the ideology of the market – provided that ideology is understood practically rather than theoretically, and provided that we can solve the problem I have focused on as I have suggested we should.

Let me end by replacing my argument within the broader argument of this thesis. The problem on which I have focused here is a version of the general problem which, I argued in chapter 2, affects the PSCs' account of socialisation. The problem, recall, is that it is unclear how socialisation, understood as the PSCs suggest we should understand it, can entrench structural domination. In chapter 3, I argued in response that socialisation can do that when structural domination has a segregating influence on it. But structural domination does not always have such an influence on socialisation, we saw in section III. To solve the problem in this case, here I have built on the PSCs' understanding of socialisation into the market as the ideology of the market, or fetishism. In light of the literature on this topic, I have suggested another amendment to their account of socialisation: socialisation can entrench structural domination not just when structural domination has a segregating influence on it, but also when it has a standardising influence on it.

In other words, I have suggested an amendment to the PSCs' version of the ideology conception of fetishism. I have not argued that the proponents of the domination conception are mistaken to focus only on domination, or even that the analytic Marxists are mistaken to hold a theoretical view of the ideology of the market, though both claims are implied by my argument. I have only argued that the PSCs neglect once again the influence of structural domination on socialisation – but that in this case it is its standardising, not segregating, influence that explains how agents can fail to question problematic schemas, and entrench structural domination as a result.

CHAPTER 5

THE 'DOUBLE FUNCTIONING' OF IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES AND THE REPRESSIVE INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION ON SOCIALISATION

Let me begin this final chapter as I began the others: with a quick recap of my argument so far. In chapter 1, I offered an account of structural domination as the disempowerment of social groups by social practices. In chapter 2, I turned to the problem of the entrenchment of structural domination, and more precisely to the view, put forward by the proponents of the socialisation conception of entrenchment (the PSCs), that it is largely the socialisation of agents into dominating practices that leads to the entrenchment of structural domination. I argued that while this view is promising, the account of socialisation on which the PSCs rely needs to be amended if it is to explain the entrenchment of structural domination. In chapter 3, I built on the PSCs' reading of socialisation in terms of ideology to amend their account in light of the literature on this topic. I suggested that in this case socialisation can only entrench structural domination because structural domination has a *segregating* influence on it. But this solution is not the whole story, I noted in chapter 4: structural domination does not always have a segregating influence on socialisation, as socialisation into the market testifies. So I then built on the PSCs' understanding of socialisation into the market in terms of ideology of the market, or fetishism, to amend their account in light of the literature on that topic. I suggested that in this case, socialisation can only entrench structural domination because structural domination has a *standardising* influence on it.

In this final chapter, I argue that this is not the whole story either: sometimes structural domination has neither a segregating nor a standardising influence on socialisation. The socialisation of the dominated groups, which we saw in chapter 3 is less affected by the segregating influence of structural domination, testifies to that. So here I build on the PSCs' account of the socialisation of the dominated groups as disciplined through ideological state apparatuses, in order to amend their account in light of the literature on this third topic. Drawing on Althusser's remark about the 'double functioning' of ideological state apparatuses, 'predominantly by ideology, but […] secondarily by repression' (2014 [1970], 251), I suggest that the PSCs neglect once again the influence of structural domination on socialisation. In this case, I argue, socialisation can only entrench structural domination because structural domination has a *repressive* influence on it. This repressive influence is such that the dominant groups, by means of physical repression, may repress (psychologically) what the dominated groups learn from their own milieux that would help them challenge the dominant culture at issue.

I argue as follows, focusing on sexism (in philosophy) as my main example. I start in section I with the PSCs' reading of the socialisation of the dominated groups as disciplined in ideological state apparatuses. We saw in chapter 3 that the dominated groups are less vulnerable than the dominant groups are to those operations of ideology that depend on large-scale divides, such as the division of labour or racial segregation. But drawing on Louis Althusser's analysis of ideological state apparatuses (2014 [1970]; see also Balibar 2014, 93), the PSCs have suggested that the dominant groups ideologically regulate the socialisation of the dominated groups in turn, through such institutions as the law, the media, the arts, and of course schools and universities (Haslanger 2019, 2014; see also Celikates 2016, Lessig 1995, Stanley 2015). Return, for example, to the female students in hyper-masculine philosophy departments whom we met in chapters 1 and 2. Unlike most male students, they can be expected to attend both sexist parties and women's studies classes, and therefore draw insight from the latter to criticise the former. But the sexist sexual jokes of male staff and students, among other interventions, function to prevent female students from leveraging this insight by reinforcing the expectation that men have a right to their bodies (Haslanger 2019; see also her 2008, Saul 2013).

This focus on the regulative operations of ideological state apparatuses goes some way to remedy the PSCs' neglect of the influence of structural domination on socialisation. But, I argue in the next section, it does not go far enough to avoid the problem I identified in chapter 2. On the analysis of regulation on which the PSCs rely, regulation only works on those who already accept the 'context' of regulation, i.e., the schemas in the cultural background of the schemas to be regulated (Lessig 1995, 958–59; cf. Haslanger 2014, 124–25). Yet as testified by recent accounts of the everyday 'resistance' of subordinate groups, and as the PSCs themselves recognise, in their own milieux the dominated groups contest the cultural background of dominating practices (see e.g., Sewell 2005, 54; cf. Celikates 2016, 19). As Haslanger herself reminds us, in the context of hyper-masculine philosophy departments, for instance, women meet men's sexist sexual jokes with counter-jokes which ridicule men (see 2008, 8). Because of this, however, female students should be expected not to let the sexist sexual jokes of male staff and students hinder their ability to question the law of male sex-right.

At this stage, one might think that the solutions I offered in the two previous chapters could apply here, and so rescue the PSCs' focus on the regulative operations of ideological state apparatuses. In line with chapter 4, one might think that the dominated groups' own milieux actualise, not their subordinate culture, but the dominant culture, because of the standardising influence of structural domination. Or in line with chapter 3, one might think that these milieux have not been so standardised, but that the dominated groups do not frequent them as a result of the segregating influence of structural domination. Either way regulation would work, even if the standardising or

segregating influence of structural domination would do the bulk of the work. Yet I argue in this section that neither of these solutions apply here. Starting with the second suggestion, and as we saw in chapter 3, the segregating influence of structural domination segregates the dominant groups from the milieux of the dominated groups, but it does not segregate the dominated groups from their own milieux. Female philosophy students are not segregated from women's study classes in the same way that most male students are, for instance (see e.g., Miriam 2007, 223). As regards the first suggestion, I point out that the standardising influence of structural domination is limited to anti-market practices and does not affect other subordinate practices. In women's studies classes, for example, feminist philosophy practices have not been replaced by hyper-masculine ones (see *ibid.*).

It remains unclear, therefore, how the dominated groups can fail to use what they learn in their own milieux to question the schemas of dominating practices. To solve this problem, I draw on Althusser's remark about the 'double functioning' of ideological state apparatuses: 'predominantly by ideology, *but […] secondarily by repression*' (2014 [1970], 251, my emphasis). I argue that the dominant groups not only regulate but also repress, through ideological apparatuses, the socialisation of the dominated groups in their own milieux. Female philosophy students are a case in point. Their experience, during '[sexual] encounters with a male partner who often intimidates, humiliates, and uses physical force against them', of 'the "corporeal perception" […] that men have a right to sexual access to them', Miriam suggests, represses the 'analysis of the relation between rape, male power, and women's oppression' that they learn from 'women's studies classes' (2007, 221–23). If they fail to name these encounters 'rape' or 'abuse' and question the law of male sex-right, in other words, it is because, in some cases, physical repression may lead to psychological repression.

At this final stage, one might object on behalf of the PSCs that it is unclear whether they really neglect what we saw Althusser call the 'double functioning' of ideology. So I dedicate the last section to this objection. One might think that Haslanger does not, after all, neglect the fact that ideological state apparatuses also function by repression, since she suggests that education coercively inculcates social meanings (2014, 125). But this, I argue in this final section, would be mistaken. For in the relevant passage Haslanger is not using 'inculcates' in the relevant way. Specifically, she does not mean that the dominated groups come to endorse, or absorb, what they are taught or inculcated. She only means that they become aware of it as something to be grudgingly reckoned with. Put differently, she does not consider the ideological effects of repression, but abandons the terrain of ideology for that of repression. Thus my argument escapes this objection.

Note that all I do in this chapter is argue for an amendment of the PSCs' account of the socialisation of dominated groups as disciplined in ideological state apparatuses. I do not attempt an extended exegesis of Althusser's account of state apparatuses. Nor do I claim that the analysis of the repressive influence of structural domination I build from it exhausts, with the segregating and

standardising influences I focused on in the previous chapters, the set of influences which structural domination can have on socialisation. I only argue that the PSCs once again neglect the influence of structural domination on socialisation, though here to a lesser degree than in their account of ideology or fetishism: they do take account of the non-violent, regulative influence which structural domination has on socialisation, but here it is primarily its violent, *repressive* influence on socialisation that enables the socialisation of the dominated groups to entrench structural domination. Only if more is made of what Althusser calls the 'double functioning' of ideological state apparatuses can their account of the socialisation of the dominated groups as disciplined in such apparatuses explain the entrenchment of domination.

I. THE SOCIALISATION OF THE DOMINATED GROUPS AS DISCIPLINED IN IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES

I begin with the PSCs' reading of the socialisation of the dominated groups as disciplined in ideological state apparatuses. We saw in chapter 3 that the dominated groups are less vulnerable than the dominant groups are to the operations of ideology that depend on large-scale divides such as the division of labour or racial segregation. But drawing on Louis Althusser's analysis of ideological state apparatuses (2014 [1970]; see also Balibar 2014, 93), the PSCs have suggested that the dominant groups in turn ideologically regulate the socialisation of the dominated groups, through such institutions as the law, the media, the arts, and of course school and colleges (Haslanger 2019, 2014; see also Celikates 2016, Lessig 1995, Stanley 2015). I return to the example of female students in hyper-masculine philosophy departments, which we encountered in chapter 1 and 2. Unlike most male students, they can be expected to attend both sexist parties and women's studies classes, and therefore draw insight from the latter to criticise the former. But sexist sexual jokes from male staff and students, for instance, function to prevent them from leveraging this insight, by reinforcing the expectation that men have a right to their bodies (see e.g., Haslanger 2019; see also her 2008, Saul 2013).

The first thing to note is that, for Marx and many Marxists, ideology operates on at least two levels, one of which runs deeper than the other. On the deeper level, ideology results fundamentally from the division of labour as 'the historical condition' of the ideas of the dominant classes (Balibar 2014, 96). On the other, more superficial level, ideology is inculcated to the dominated groups by the dominant classes and their ideological apparatuses, insofar as the division of labour has afforded them a relative monopoly on intellectual production (see Balibar 2014, 92–100, Mills 2005, 175, and Marx 1965, 61; see also Freeden 2003, chapter 1 *passim* but especially 6). In chapter 3, I focused on the deeper level. Here I turn to the more superficial level and its ideological apparatuses: it too plays an

important role in the entrenchment of domination. In particular, I suggest, it makes up for the dominated groups' lesser vulnerability to the deeper operations of ideology.

I argued for the dominated groups' lesser vulnerability to the deeper operations of ideology in chapter 3. As I suggested there, the dominated groups, unlike the dominant groups, often need to cross the large-scale divides on which these operations depend, which affords them a critical eye on dominating practices. I concentrated on black employees, but we can run the same analysis for the female philosophy students I want to focus on in this chapter. On the socialisation conception of entrenchment, these students fail to challenge the law of male sex-right in effect in their department largely because the behaviour of their fellow male students at college parties confirms this law to them. Recall for instance the former first-year student from Jennifer Saul's blog on women in philosophy who reports how 'one of [the] grad students [who had organised such a party] came up behind me and grabbed my breasts' (2021).[102] Yet unlike most male students, who are segregated from women's studies classes, female students such as this one can be expected to attend women's studies classes as well as college parties (see Miriam 2007, 212–13 and 221–22). This in turn enables them to draw insight from the latter to criticise the law of male sex-right actualised in the former (*ibid.*).

The dominated groups' lesser vulnerability to the deeper operations of ideology, however, does not mean that the dominated groups escape ideology altogether. We already saw in chapter 4 that they do not escape it when it comes to the ideology of the market, and I will return to this claim in section III below. But there is more. For drawing on Louis Althusser's analysis of ideological state apparatuses (2014 [1970], see also Balibar 2014, 93), the PSCs have suggested that on the second, more superficial level of ideological operations, the dominant groups ideologically regulate the socialisation of the dominated groups, through such institutions as the law, the media and the arts, or schools and universities (Haslanger 2019, 2014; see also Celikates 2016, Lessig 1995, Stanley 2015). The kind of hyper-masculine philosophy departments I want to focus on in this chapter is one such apparatus, where male students and staff regulate the socialisation of female students.

Consider Haslanger in particular, whose 'starting point for understanding ideology is Louis Althusser's work' (2019, 2). 'Althusser', she notes, 'distinguishes repressive state apparatuses (RSAs) and ideological state apparatuses (ISAs)'. 'RSAs include the "government, administration, army, courts, prisons," which "function by violence" or "massively and predominantly by repression"'. By contrast, she continues, 'ISAs, including religion, education, the family, the legal system, the political system, trade unions, communications/media, and culture ("literature, the arts,

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[102] As I mentioned above, the story is accessible at https://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com/2013/02/28/on-being-groped/ (last accessed 09/04/2021). In such cases, as I noted in chapter 2, female students 'see themselves as making decisions in a situation where one factor seems to have been (tacitly) decided on in advance and is thus nonnegotiable, namely, men's right to have sex with them' (Miriam 2007, 222).

sports, etc.") "function massively and predominantly by ideology"' (*ibid.*, quoting Althusser 2014 [1970], 249-51). 'A crucial difference between an ISA and an RSA', Haslanger insists, 'is that individuals are hailed into a subject position by an ISA, rather than violently forced into it; and it is characteristic of those "good subjects" who respond to the hailing that they take up the norms as binding on themselves. As a result, they do not need to be coercively managed; they work "all by themselves"!' (*ibid.,* quoting Althusser 2014 [1970], 272).

Haslanger's most thorough discussion of an ideological state apparatus, however, is to be found in *Studying while Black* (2014), where she draws on Lawrence Lessig's analysis of the regulation of social meaning to examine the way in which school, as 'a site of intense socialization', 'creates kinds of individuals through a process of discipline, in particular, individuals who […] voluntarily enact the social structures that are to be perpetuated' (110).[103] There she focuses on 'the process of racialization that […] prepares African Americans for the subordinate status they can expect to occupy […]' (*ibid.*). But let me follow her 2019 (and 2008) example and focus on sexism instead: in particular, on the 'graduate student women's groups and individual women' who have asked her to 'help them strategize about problems they are facing as women in their programs, problems that include alleged sexual harassment' (2008, 211).

There are three key aspects to the analysis of Lessig which Haslanger draws on. First, the regulation of meaning operates on the range of social meanings which are embodied by resources as they are used in social practices. Thus the kind of 'violent, and hurtful and really scary' sexual encounters with male students which female students reported to social psychologist Lynn Phillips (2000, 149, in Miriam 2007, 221) signifies a variety of things to them, from 'rape', to 'abuse', to sex in which 'let's just say that things went badly', to unpleasant but normal sex, even to 'wanted' sex (Miriam 2007, 221–22). The same goes for women's studies classes, and feminist philosophy more generally, which can mean a variety of things from 'waste of time' to 'interesting but less so than other topics', to 'cutting-edge philosophy' (see Haslanger 2008). Second, according to Lessig the regulation functions either *via* the 'ambiguation' of the range, or *via* its 'disambiguation' (1995, 1009–10).[104] To disambiguate the relevant range is to emphasise one meaning over the others. To ambiguate it, by contrast, is to maintain or create a convenient blur as to what a resource means.[105] In hyper-masculine philosophy departments, the range of meanings that violent sexual encounters can have is ambiguated so that its understandings as 'rape' or 'abuse' are understood as no more apt

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[103] The term 'discipline' is often associated with Foucault as well as Althusser, and Haslanger mentions both. But since she repeatedly insists that '[her] conception of ideology is Althusserian' (2019, 5, 2020b, 8), here I focus on Althusser.
[104] Lessig writes: 'Sometimes semiotic techniques function by disambiguating a particular action or status —naming it, if you will. (This is tying.) Sometimes they function by giving the action a second meaning. (This is ambiguation)' (1995, 1010).
[105] Recall that on this view resources are things of all sorts, valued (e.g., by male students) or disvalued (e.g., by female students), and including agents themselves (e.g., male and female students).

than any other understandings within the range, such as 'unpleasant but normal sex', or even 'wanted sex' (see e.g., Saul 2013). Likewise, in such milieux 'women's studies' is often disambiguated, along with 'feminist philosophy' more generally, as of lesser value than other philosophical topics (see Haslanger 2008, *passim*).

Third, and finally, both ambiguations and disambiguations can be done in two ways. Each can either operate on the range of meanings directly, or operate indirectly by first aiming at the resources that actualise these meanings. Lessig calls the first way 'semiotic', and the second 'behavioural' (1995, 1008). In philosophy departments both kinds obtain. To start with behavioural interventions, it is for instance through such 'rituals' as having one's feminist journal submissions 'routinely sent back without having been considered by a reviewer' that, on this view, the lesser value of women's studies is disambiguated in the mind of female staff and students (Saul, quoted in Haslanger 2008, 215; the term 'ritual' is Lessig's: see his 1995, 215).[106] Likewise, on this view we should see the various sexist sexual jokes common in hyper-masculine philosophy departments as semiotic interventions, which also function to prevent female students from leveraging what they learn in women's studies classes to criticise the expectation that men have a right to their bodies. Think for instance of Jennifer Saul's story of 'the male philosopher joking about dripping hot wax on his [female] undergraduate student's nipples […] in front of a table full of [laughing] faculty members': 'it made the student feel that the joke was acceptable and that she was oversensitive' (2013).[107] Or again, to consider another ritual: the 'common practice', in Miriam's words, of 'get[ting] the girls to make out just to get into the door of frat parties' functions as a behavioural intervention that disambiguates the meanings of sexual encounters (including lesbian sexual encounters) 'in terms of men's access to women' (2007, 212–13).[108]

Thus while female philosophy students, unlike most male philosophy students, can be expected to attend both sexist environments and women's studies classes, and draw insight from the latter to criticise the former, on this view the regulation of their socialisation by (sexist) male staff and students prevents them from leveraging this insight. In this, they are representative of the dominated groups more generally, whose socialisation, the PSCs suggest, is ideologically regulated by the dominant groups through ideological apparatuses such as school and universities.

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[106] Although Lessig does not mention Althusser (only Foucault: see 1995, 1027n281), his focus on rituals seem to follow on from Althusser's insistence on 'ideological rituals' in *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses* (2014 [1970], *passim*; see also Pallotta 2015).

[107] Or consider Haslanger: 'I've witnessed plenty of occasions when a woman's status in graduate school was questioned because she was married, or had a child (or took time off to have a child so was returning to philosophy as a "mature" student), or was in a long-distance relationship' (2008, 2). Here as well the law of male sex-right is semiotically reinforced, even if in this case the relevant male access is primarily procreative and only secondarily sexual.

[108] I use Lessig's vocabulary to analyse Saul's and Miriam's claims. They themselves do not use it.

II. THE PROBLEM

This focus on the regulative operations of ideological state apparatuses goes some way to remedy the PSCs' neglect of the influence of structural domination on socialisation. But, I argue in this section, it does not go far enough to avoid the problem I identified in chapter 2. On the analysis of 'regulation' on which the PSCs rely, regulation only works on those who already accept the 'context' of regulation, i.e., the schemas in the cultural background of the schemas to be regulated (Lessig 1995, 958–59; cf. Haslanger 2014, 124–25). Yet as testified by recent accounts of the everyday 'resistance' of subordinate groups, and as the PSCs themselves recognise, in their own milieux the dominated groups contest the cultural background of dominating practices (see e.g., Sewell 2005, 54; see Celikates 2016, 19). As Haslanger herself suggests in the context of hyper-masculine philosophy departments, for instance, women meet men's sexist sexual jokes with counter-jokes which ridicule men (see 2008, 8). For this reason, I argue, female students should be expected not to let the sexist sexual jokes of male staff and students hinder their ability to question the law of male sex-right.

On the PSCs' view, we saw above, the dominated groups do not use the schemas they learn in their own milieux to challenge the schemas of dominating practices for the following reason: their socialisation is regulated by the dominant groups through what Haslanger, following Althusser, calls ideological state apparatuses. This focus on regulation, however, is insufficient to avoid the problem I identified in chapter 2. As Lessig insists, the regulation of socialisation works only on those who do not contest the schemas that make up the background, or 'context', of the schema to be regulated (1995, 958–59). But the dominated groups, I argue now, learn in their own milieux to contest the cultural background of the dominant groups. Thus it remains unclear how exactly a socialisation that is contradictory can entrench structural domination, even when it is regulated through ideological state apparatuses.

As I just suggested, the first thing to note in this connection is that the regulation of socialisation is powerless on those who contest the schemas that make up the background, or in Lessig's words the 'context', of the schema to be regulated (1995, 958–59; see also Haslanger 2014, 124). As Lessig puts it, 'actions yield social meanings [just] because they rely for their source upon expectations or understandings not themselves (then) in question – not, as I will use the term, contested' (1995, 959). To adapt one of his examples, consider TfL's campaign against beggars on the London Overground rail network.[109] This is a semiotic regulation of commuters' schema of giving beggars what they ask for. The best way to help, the posters and announcements say, is not to give to beggars on the train, but to donate to the relevant charity instead. Importantly, this intervention assumes the background

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[109] Lessig's example is the New York Train service (1995, 1040). I adapt it to what I have experienced myself. On TfL, see, e.g., https://londonist.com/london/transport/begging-announcements-tfl-trains-tube-stopped (last accessed 09/04/2021). The posters seem to be gone, but there are still vocal announcements, as the *Londonist* article's author points out.

schema that only the end matters, not the means. Only helping beggars matters, it implies, not how one does it. As a result, however, the regulation will fail to convince commuters who care about the means by which they help beggars. Those who would prefer to engage in solidarity rather than charity, for instance, will not be convinced. More generally, the regulation of socialisation only works on those who do not contest the shared schemas that make up the background, or context, of the schema to be regulated.

Yet as testified by recent accounts of the everyday 'resistance' of subordinate groups, and as the PSCs themselves recognise, in their own milieux the dominated groups contest the cultural background of dominating practices. As Young argues, their 'subordinate culture' helps them not only to 'maintain a sense of positive subjectivity', but also to 'assert their own subjectivity' in the face of the dominant schemas (1990, 60 and 63). Indeed, as we saw in chapter 2, and in Sewell's words, 'current scholarship is replete with depictions of "resistance" by subordinated groups and individuals […], particularly o[f] resistance of a decentered sort – those dispersed everyday acts that thwart conventions, reverse valuations, or express the dominated groups' resentment of their domination' (Sewell 2005, 54–55). Witness James Scott, who 'detects "hidden transcripts" that form the underside of peasants' deference in contemporary Malaysia' (*ibid.*, 54, referencing Scott 1985; see also Celikates 2016, 19). Closer to home, North American philosophy, despite being 'more overwhelmingly male than even mathematics', is no exception (Saul 2013). The various testimonies and critiques gathered on Saul's 'What It Is Like to Be a Woman in Philosophy' blog testify to this (2021). So do the 'graduate student women's groups and individual women' who, we saw Haslanger report, have asked her to 'help them strategize about problems they are facing as women in their programs' (2008, 211). Jokes, in particular, are prominent tools of such cultural resistance (Scott 1990, xiii; see also Scott 1985, 41), and women in philosophy tend to make much use of them. As Haslanger herself describes, '[i]t is a familiar joke [in such milieux] that (male) philosophers are poorly socialized' and emotionally unintelligent (2008, 217).

If in their own milieux the dominated groups contest the cultural background of dominating practices, however, then we should expect them to resist the regulation of their socialisation into the schemas of these practices. This is particularly clear in the case of the jokes that ridicule men in philosophy, which I just mentioned. Encouraged by these jokes about male philosophers' awkwardness and lack of emotional intelligence, female students should be expected not to let male philosophers' own sexist sexual jokes hinder their ability to question the law of male sex-right. By ridiculing them as socially inept, such counter-jokes undermine the background understanding of male staff and students as endowed with the authority necessary for their sexual jokes, or other sexist remarks, to function as the ideological (semiotic) regulation of female students' socialisation. Put

differently, these jokes themselves function as 'ideological insubordination' (Scott 1990, xiii, emphasis removed).[110]

While in this case 'resistance' is grounded in mockery, another important strategy is to question the very epistemic grounds on which the dominant groups stand. For as Lessig suggests, acceptance of any schema, background or not, largely depends on whether it can be represented as knowledge: as he puts it, drawing on Foucault, after a schema 'is represented as knowledge, individuals must choose whether to become "unreasonable" by ignoring it, or conform' (1995, 1027n281; see Foucault 1979).[111] Yet just as it is common for the dominated groups to learn and tell jokes about the dominant groups in their own milieux, so do they often learn in the same milieux to contest the representations as knowledge of the schemas into which they are to be disciplined. Indeed, it is an important part of dominated subcultures that their structural position can afford them a privileged epistemic standpoint on this structure, including on knowledge production (see e.g., Wylie 2003, Hartsock 2003, Haslanger 2017b, Graeber 2009). Thus the routine rejection of feminist publications should not be expected to hinder female students' ability to leverage what they learn in women's studies classes to criticise the law of male sex-right: this ritual depends on the background understanding that the male reviewers of mainstream journals are relevantly knowledgeable to adjudicate the value of feminist publications; but this is just what women's studies, grounded as they are in women's experience as women, teach female students to contest.

Indeed, this is precisely what happens with the other ritual I mentioned above, where female students are asked by male students to kiss each other in order to be granted access to fraternity parties (Miriam 2007). This behavioural intervention is premised on a context where male students can influence female students, but at least some of female students reject this background understanding and turn to their women's studies teachers for help. Miriam herself is a case in point, who achieved her 'insight into sexual culture on a university campus' from '[s]everal women students' of hers (*ibid*., 212).

It seems, therefore, that if the dominated groups do not use the schemas which they learn in their own milieu to correct the schemas of dominating practices, it is not because their socialisation is regulated by the dominant groups through what Haslanger, following Althusser, calls ideological state

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[110] David Graeber makes similar comments on activists' jokes, and specifically on the role of 'giant puppets' in demonstrations: these 'ridiculous effigies', he writes, 'are a mockery of the very idea of a monument, and of everything state monuments represent: [their] unapproachability, monochrome solemnity, above all permanence, the state's […] attempt to turn its principles and history into eternal verities' (2009, 490). As they show this ideological operation to be 'ultimately somewhat ridiculous' (*ibid.*), they help protesters and their audience resist the state's apparatuses.

[111] And in modern societies, Lessig's implicit premise goes, most agents have in some shape or form the background understanding that to be 'unreasonable' is something to be avoided. See his discussion of '[t]he second wave of smoking regulation [which] got its social "authority in the research of medical science"': 'This authority itself is a form of social meaning. It flows not directly from "facts" of individual experience, but from an institution of science that can certify the "real" "character of smoking and health"' (*ibid.*, 1028, quoting Gusfield 1993, 54 and 57).

apparatuses. In other words, the PSCs' focus on the regulation that takes place through these apparatuses is insufficient to avoid the problem I identified in chapter 2.

III. NO STANDARDISING OR SEGREGATING INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION IN THIS CASE

At this stage, one might think that the solutions I offered in the two previous chapters could be applied here, and so rescue the PSCs' focus on the regulative operations of ideological state apparatuses. In line with chapter 4, one might think that the milieux of the dominated groups, as a result of the standardising influence of structural domination, actualise not their subordinate culture but the dominant culture. Or in line with chapter 3, one might think that these milieux have not been standardised in this way, but that the dominated groups do not frequent them as a result of the segregating influence of structural domination. Either way regulation would work, even if the standardising or segregating influence of structural domination would do the bulk of the work. In this section, however, I argue that neither solution applies in this case. Starting with the second suggestion, and as we saw in chapter 3, the segregating influence of structural domination segregates the dominant groups from the milieux of the dominated groups, but not the dominated groups from their own milieux. Female philosophy students are not segregated from women's study classes in the way most male students are, for instance (see e.g., Miriam 2007, 223). As regards the first suggestion, I point out that the standardising influence of structural domination is limited to anti-market practices and does not affect other subordinate practices. In women's studies classes, for example, hyper-masculine philosophy practices have not replaced feminist ones (see *ibid.*).

I start with the second suggestion, which appeals to the segregating influence of structural domination. But if the dominated groups who are socialised into the schemas of the dominant groups fail to correct these schemas, it is not because they do not frequent their own milieux as a result of the segregating influence of structural domination. The segregating influence of structural domination does not, of course, segregate *within* dominated groups. As we saw in chapter 3, it mainly segregates the dominant groups from them. If this is so, however, then the dominated groups are not (or at least are less) vulnerable to the deeper operations of ideology, which depend on such a segregating influence of domination. In particular, they can draw on their own milieux to criticise the schemas of dominating practices, including those in the background of the schemas targeted by ideological apparatuses for purposes of regulation.

To return to our example, female students in philosophy are not segregated from the women's studies classes I focus on. Nor indeed, more generally, are they segregated from other feminist communities organised around, for instance, journals or conferences. These subaltern milieux are the milieux of those who suffer from masculine domination. By contrast, men do tend to be segregated

from women's studies classes, and from feminist journals and conferences. Not that women purposefully exclude them, though they sometimes do.[112] Recall from chapter 3 that this is not the sense in which the segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation operates. What keeps men from these milieux, rather, is the sexual division of labour, which separates women and men (or females and males) into distinct social groups such that men, unlike women, do not need to frequent the milieux of the other group (see e.g., Young 1990 and 1994). Nothing pushes male students to attend women's studies classes, for example. By contrast, many female students with an interest in philosophy depend on hyper-masculine philosophy departments, and on fraternity parties if they want to be 'popular'. The resulting 'double consciousness', to borrow W.E.B Du Bois's famous phrase (1969 [1903]), has one advantage, however: they are less vulnerable to the deeper workings of ideology that depend on the sexual division of labour, and in particular to the background understandings of male staff and students as endowed with sufficient authority, influence, or knowledge to efficiently regulate their socialisation.

The kind of segregating influence of structural domination on socialisation which I emphasised in chapter 3, therefore, does not seem to prevent the dominated groups from leveraging what they are taught in their own milieux to correct the schemas of dominating practices. Nor indeed does it prevent them from resisting the regulation of their socialisation through ideological apparatuses as a result.

Or it does not, more precisely, provided that the dominated groups enact their own practices in their own milieux. For maybe they do not, one might think; and maybe this is as a result of the standardising influence of structural domination. Perhaps the milieux of the dominated groups actualise the schemas of the dominant groups, and so cannot provide the dominated groups with critical inspiration against the latter. But this too, I now suggest, would be mistaken. In general at least, structural domination does not have a standardising influence on the milieux of the dominated groups. This claim follows from the analysis carried out in chapter 4. There, I suggested that only socialisation into the *market* is under the standardising influence of structural domination. The reason was that the kind of structural domination which agents suffer from as market agents is the only kind to have the expanding logic necessary for standardisation. For this reason, structural domination affecting agents as blacks and/or as women (rather than as workers, say) does not have any standardising influence on the corresponding subaltern cultures. In particular, what Haslanger calls 'the masculinisation of philosophy spaces' (2008, 219) is not pervasive in the way we saw commodification is. There are many women's studies classes – indeed, there are whole gender studies departments – and no hyper-masculine practice is enacted there, let alone the law of male sex-right.

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[112] One such model of feminist milieu is the famous Italian *autocoscienza* groups documented by Nancy Hirschmann (2006). In these groups, women would first build themselves an enclave free of sexist schemas by excluding men from the groups, which would enable them in turn to mutually raise each other's consciousness of the sexist schemas they were taught in men-dominated milieux (2006, 220; see also Filling 2014).

Because of this, however, female philosophy students can indeed draw critical insight, in the form of counter-jokes or alternative epistemic standpoints, from the subaltern cultures of such milieux.[113]

The exception, of course, is the market case. Market domination has a standardising influence, spreading the practice of commodification across a relatively large number of milieux, some of which are those of the dominated groups. Not only are neighbourly and friendly milieux increasingly commodified, so are various subaltern communities as well. Many among the most radical unions *sell* the famous end-of-demonstration sandwich, after all. As a result, as we saw in the previous chapter, the commodity schema obscures the social dimension of commodities, and so obscures the very fact that commodified exchange could be replaced by more neighbourly or friendly forms of exchange. Now, this exception is a significant one. Commodity exchange is a crucial prop of class domination. But it remains an exception, and in general structural domination does not have a standardising influence on the milieux of the dominated groups.

Yet perhaps, one might object, the pervasiveness of commodification affects not just the anti-capitalism of subordinate cultures, but also, for example, their anti-sexism. For as Sewell remarks, commodification tends to generate competition (1992, 25–26), which has been noted to favour the spread of sexist or racist schemas through what Elizabeth Anderson, following Charles Tilly (1999), has called 'emulation' (Anderson 2010, 8). Thus one might think that if hyper-masculine philosophy departments enjoy a competitive advantage on the academic market, then competing departments will tend to copy this proven model and therefore spread it, as Anderson puts it, 'in neo-Darwinian fashion' (*ibid.*). As a result, the number of milieux 'where women philosophers […] are in the majority' or 'where feminist philosophy […] is valued' may dwindle, the objection goes, and become too few for women to draw critical insight from them (the phrases are Haslanger's; see 2008b, 219). This would in turn render them vulnerable to the semiotic and behavioural interventions characteristic of ideological apparatuses.

But this objection, I argue, would be mistaken. The emulation described by Tilly and Anderson is indeed an important mechanism of the spread of schemas supporting structural domination, but it does not apply here. Or so the evidence suggests. If hyper-masculine philosophy departments did enjoy a competitive advantage on the academic market at some point in the past, they no longer seem to. Jennifer Saul (of all people, as she herself remarks), is encouraging in this respect, in particular because 'the prestigious *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* has

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[113] In chapter 4, I argued that agents' socialisation into gender might also be under the standardising influence of structural domination, provided it can be shown that agents are structurally dominated into performing traditional gender roles across as many milieux as they can. If this were the case, my claim that structural domination does not have a standardising influence on the milieux of the dominated would admit another exception. This, however, would not affect my general point, nor indeed my main example: gender schemas run deeper, in Sewell's terminology, than the kind of hyper-masculine schema at issue here, so that one might be socialised as a man without being socialised into the law of male sex-right (cf. Sewell 1992, 22).

[recently] instructed authors and editors to ensure that women and members of other underrepresented groups are cited' (2013). Or because 'the American Philosophical Association has established a mentoring program, a task force on sexual harassment, and a site visit program to help departments improve their climates for women' (*ibid.*). Even through emulation, then, structural domination does not have a standardising influence on women's milieux in philosophy, and as a result does not favour the regulation of their socialisation.

Neither the segregating nor the standardising influence of structural domination on socialisation, then, prevents the dominated groups from leveraging critical insight from their own subaltern milieux to question the schemas of dominating practices. Nor, therefore – insofar as these schemas make up the context necessary for the ideological regulation of their socialisation to function – does it stop them from resisting in turn the regulative operations of ideological state apparatuses.

IV. THE REPRESSIVE INFLUENCE OF STRUCTURAL DOMINATION ON SOCIALISATION

It remains unclear, therefore, how the dominated groups can fail to use what they learn in their own milieux to criticise the schemas of dominating practices. So in this section I draw on Althusser's remark about the 'double functioning' of ideological state apparatuses – i.e., 'predominantly by ideology, *but […] secondarily by repression*' (2014 [1970], 251, my emphasis) – to suggest that the dominant groups not only regulate, but also repress the socialisation of the dominated groups in their own milieux through ideological state apparatuses. Female philosophy students, I argue, are a case in point. Their experience, during '[sexual] encounters with a male partner who often intimidates, humiliates, and uses physical force against them', of 'the "corporeal perception" […] that men have a right to sexual access to them', Miriam suggests, represses the 'analysis of the relation between rape, male power, and women's oppression' that they learn from 'women's studies classes' (2007, 221–223). If they fail to name these encounters 'rape' or 'abuse' and in doing so question the law of male sex-right, in other words, it is because physical repression may lead to psychological repression.

Neither the segregating nor the standardising influence of structural domination on socialisation, we saw above, prevents the dominated groups from leveraging critical insight from their own subaltern milieux to resist the regulative operations of ideological apparatuses, and question the schemas of dominating practices. But then how can their socialisation through ideological state apparatuses explain why they entrench these practices, as the PSCs suggest? To solve this problem, I suggest that we return to Althusser's *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses* (2014 [1970]).

As we saw Haslanger remark above, Althusser there distinguishes ideological state apparatuses (ISAs) from the repressive state apparatus (RSA). While each of 'the government, the administration, the army, the police, the courts, the prisons, etc.' that make up the repressive state apparatus 'functions

by violence', by contrast, the law, the family, the media, the arts, or the various schools and universities he counts as ideological state apparatuses 'function "by ideology"' (2014 [1970], 249-50).

As Haslanger puts it, 'in modern society, the ISAs are the dominant mode of social management (2019, 2). In particular, they 'very effectively' prepare the dominated groups 'for the subordinate status they can expect to occupy' (2014, 110).[114] On this I agree with her, and with the PSCs more generally. But as Haslanger emphasises that a 'crucial difference between an ISA and an RSA is that individuals are hailed into a subject position by an ISA, rather than violently forced into it' (2019, 2), she does not do justice to a qualification which Althusser insists 'it is essential' to make: the 'determination of the double "functioning"' of each kind of apparatus, and of ideological apparatuses in particular (2014 (1970), 251).[115]

For after remarking that '[t]here is no such thing as a purely repressive apparatus', since '[f]or example the army and the police also function by ideology both to ensure their own cohesion and reproduction, and in the "values" they propound externally', Althusser emphasises that '[i]n the same way but inversely, [...] [t]here is no such thing as a purely ideological apparatus' (2014 [1970], 250–51): 'it is essential to say', he insists,

> 'that for their part the [ISAs] function massively and predominantly by ideology, *but they also function secondarily by repression*, even if ultimately, but only ultimately, this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic. [...] *Thus schools and churches use suitable methods of punishment, expulsion, selection, etc., to "discipline" not only their shepherds, but also their flocks. The same is true of the family ... The same is true of the cultural ISA (censorship, among other things), etc.*' (*ibid.*, 251, my emphases)

Of course, Haslanger does not ignore this qualification entirely. She does note in passing that '[n]o state apparatus is purely one or the other' (2019, 2). But the distinction she chooses to insist on, here and elsewhere, is that 'between oppression that is repressive [...] and oppression that is ideological' (2017b, 149). Indeed, it is typically through this distinction that the PSCs more generally introduce their focus on ideology, and on socialisation more generally (see e.g., Celikates 2016, 20–21). Important as it is, however, this distinction should not detract the PSCs from Althusser's 'essential'

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[114] As noted in section I, Haslanger makes this latter claim specifically about schools and African Americans in the US.
[115] Althusser's text is most famous for his reconceptualisation of ideology as material (or caught up in symbolic-material loops, as the PSCs would put it) so that '[one's] ideas are [one's] material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive [one's] ideas' (2014 [1970], 265). Hence the PSCs' interest in Althusser. But something else is worth noticing: that such ideological rituals function secondarily by repression (*ibid.*, 251).

qualification (2014 [1970]). For this qualification, I want to suggest, can help us solve the problem at issue.

More precisely, Althusser's remark that ideological state apparatuses function 'predominantly by ideology, but […] secondarily by repression' can help us clarify how the dominated groups can fail to use what they learn in their own milieux to criticise the schemas of dominating practices. For while these milieux enable the dominated groups to resist the regulation of their socialisation in ideological apparatuses, they do not enable them to resist the repression of their socialisation which the same apparatuses are also capable of: semiotic and behavioural interventions may have little impact on the critical insights the dominated groups can draw from their subordinate communities, but physical repression, by contrast, *does* sometimes have psychologically repressive effects.[116]

To see more precisely how even ideological state apparatuses 'use suitable methods of punishment […] to "discipline" […] their flocks' (2014 [1970], 251), in Althusser's phrase, return for example to female students in philosophy. We saw above that they should be expected to resist the regulation of their socialisation into the law of male sex-right. In particular, we saw, their reports to their teachers of the making-out ritual of fraternity parties bears witness to their 'resistance' to the regulative functioning of ideological apparatuses. But conversely, I argue now, their failure to report – indeed, to conceptualise – the 'abuse' or 'rape' from which they suffer testifies to their vulnerability to the physically and psychologically repressive functioning of these apparatuses.

Drawing on social psychologist Lynn Phillips' *Flirting with Danger: Young Women's Reflections on Sexuality and Domination* (2000), Miriam suggests that 'one of the more significant questions Phillips's study raises' is as follows: 'Why do these young women consistently resist labeling their sexual encounters as rape or even abuse when they also describe these as encounters with a male partner who often intimidates, humiliates, and uses physical force against them?' (2007, 221–22). In other words, why do they fail to question the background expectation that men have a right of sexual access to their bodies?

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[116] It seems to me that Foucault makes just this point (despite his dissatisfaction with the concept of repression, which he took to obscure the productive aspects of modern power) when he develops Althusser's account in *Discipline and Punish* (1979) (without acknowledging him; see Pallotta 2015, 139). While Haslanger suggests that '[d]iscipline, as Foucault explicates it, works primarily through surveillance, first the surveillance of others, and then self-surveillance' (2019, 2–3), in *Discipline and Punish* Foucault also insists on correction through bodily punishment. Thus as Frédéric Gros has remarked, in addition to 'surveillance', Foucault also emphasises the normalising 'micro-penalty' which our society that 'incarcerates' has substituted for the 'ordeal' prevalent in 'the societies that mark for life' (2017, 72 and 61, my translation, here and below; see also Bert 2016, 47). Far from having disappeared, Gros continues, in disciplinary society '[punishment] is a question of chastising the rebellious body, the indocile body […] for corrective purposes' (2017, 67). The sexual intimidation, humiliation and physical force which the female students interviewed by Lynn Phillips suffer during heterosexual intercourse are micro-penalties of this kind. So are the other forms of sexual abuse reported on Saul's blog (2021). And if, as Jean-François Bert puts it, 'in the dark isolation of the penal universe […] it is [also] a matter of torture, humiliation, food deprivation' (2016, 47, my translation), then even rape should count as normalising punishment in Foucault's sense (see also Mara Marin's claim that '[…] violence against women […] is a statement on and a consolidation of their inferior social status', unpublished, 4).

If I read Miriam correctly, the preliminary solution is to follow Carole Pateman's analysis of the sexual contract, this 'principle of social/sexual association' we briefly encountered in chapter 1 (Miriam 2007, 222; see also Pateman 1988, 5). On this suggestion, 'the liberal ontology of the [contracting] individual' is confirmed to female students by sexual encounters in which they find themselves '"negotiating" and "managing"' sex. This in turns 'reinforc[es]' (and is itself reinforced by) 'men's sex-right', as it 'mystif[ies]' the 'relations of power that precede [their] decision to consent to unwanted sex' (Miriam 2007, quoting Phillips).[117] In other words, '[a]s women and girls are increasingly positioned as the autonomous negotiators of or decision makers in heterosexual relations, men's sex-right becomes less intelligible at an explicit level (Miriam 2007, 225).

But this is only preliminary, I take Miriam to suggest, 'because, as Phillips lets us know, the women students interviewed by her are largely self-defined *feminists*, many of whom have taken women's studies classes and have some analysis of the relation between rape, male power, and women's oppression' (2007, 223, Miriam's emphasis). 'Indeed', she adds, 'male accountability reappears the moment that these women are asked to reflect on *other women*'s stories': '[t]he same women who resisted the label "rape" for scenarios they themselves lived through do not hesitate to use the label for the very same scenarios if they hear it as someone else's story' (*ibid.*, her emphasis, referencing Phillips 2000, 154–55, and chapter 6).[118]

Rather, and crucially, the female students do not question the law of male-sex right despite the critical insights they learn from their women's studies classes, Miriam suggests, because there is 'a clear conflict between their overt feminist beliefs, on the one hand, and their pre-reflexive modes of feeling and knowing, on the other' (2007, 223) – a conflict which is won by their pre-reflexive modes of experiencing physically abusive sexual encounters. '[M]ale accountability disappears in these women's stories', Miriam concludes, 'to the extent that *living through* the heterosexual encounter includes, for these women, the "corporeal perception" in contrast to the propositional claim or belief, that men have a right to sexual access to them' (*ibid.*, her emphasis).

In other words, female students' experience during 'violent and hurtful and really scary' sexual encounters of 'the "corporeal perception" […] that men have a right to sexual access to them' *represses*, Miriam seems to suggest, the 'analysis of the relation between rape, male power, and women's oppression' that they learn from 'women's studies classes' (2007, 221–23). If, put

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[117] Put differently, while 'their freedom [from this law]' requires a capacity to transfigure this situation', Miriam suggests, '[…] freedom in this sense is foreclosed by the meaning of agency in the sexual situations so far described. These women experience agency not as an ability to transform and co-create a social/sexual situation in its very historicity; they experience agency only as the ability to negotiate the terms of a situation they take to be inevitable, namely, a situation defined by men's implicit right to have sexual access to them' (2007, 224). But this begs the question: why do they not use their experience of women's studies classes to challenge this experience of abused agency?

[118] Thus it remains unclear why they do not challenge, thanks to these women's studies classes, the 'liberal ontology of the individual' and its experience of agency 'as the ability to merely negotiate the terms of a situation they take to be inevitable' (Miriam 2007, 222 and 224).

differently, they fail to name these encounters 'abuse' or 'rape' and question the law of male sex-right, it is because physical repression on the part of 'partners who are wholly absorbed in their own gratification and completely oblivious to the women's nonverbal cues – non-linguistic expressions of pain, discomfort, or desire for pleasure' – may sometimes lead to psychological repression (see *ibid.*, 223).

As Althusser suggests, such physical-cum-psychological repression ranges from full-blown violence to 'very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic [forms of repression]' (2014 [1970], 251). Male students' ignorance of female students' 'discomfort or desire for pleasure' are concealed, symbolic forms (Miriam 2007, 223). When their partner 'intimidates' or 'humiliates' them, repression is more overt, but somewhat attenuated compared to the kind of 'violent and hurtful and really scary' sexual encounters reported by one of Phillips's interviewees (Miriam 2007, 222 and 221, quoting Phillips 2000, 149). Either way, however, the result is the same: the psychological repression of the critical insights female students draw from women's studies classes. 'I don't think I could ever call it rape', says the student who experienced male repression at its most extreme (Miriam 2007, 221). Most do not even call it 'abuse' (*ibid.*, 222). In fact, some even 'ru[n] numerous and conflicting fantasies "in the head" in order to reinterpret unwanted sex as "wanted"'(*ibid.*). Whatever the 'suitable methods of punishment', they end up 'discipline[d]' (Althusser 2014 [1970], 251).[119]

Against Haslanger and the PSCs, then, it is not the regulative influence of structural domination that explains how the socialisation of the dominated groups can entrench structural domination. It is the *repressive* influence of structural domination.[120] This third kind of influence complements the analysis of the segregating and standardising influence of structural domination I carried out in the previous two chapters. Here there are enough milieux to inform the dominated groups' critical consciousness, and the dominated groups are not segregated from them, but the insights they draw from them are repressed by the dominant groups.

V. OBJECTION AND DEFENCE

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[119] One could mention other examples. Jennifer Saul's blog on women in philosophy (2021) records several. But the testimony of the former first-year student I mentioned above is worth quoting at greater length. We saw her report that '[a]s I was reaching to get my coat off the floor [at the end of a party], one of [the] grad students [who had organised it] came up behind me and grabbed my breasts'. She adds: 'In shock, I didn't move, I didn't breathe'. […] *For many years I internalized it as something I had no right to resent* ('On being groped', February 2013, my emphasis).

[120] Or more precisely, this repressive influence does the bulk of this work. For it does not altogether replace the regulative operations of ideological state apparatuses on the socialisation of the dominated groups into dominating practices. Indeed, it often enables them. More precisely, repression may create the conditions of successful regulation, to the extent that it leads to a situation where the dominated groups do not contest the schemas in the background of the schemas of dominating practices. When female students' violent corporeal perception that men have a right to sexual access to them represses the critical insights they learn in their women's studies classes, for example, this paves the way for the regulation of their socialisation into the schemas that depend on this perception.

At this final stage, one might object, on behalf of the PSCs, that it is unclear whether they really neglect what we saw Althusser call the 'double functioning' of ideology. The objection builds on Haslanger's suggestion that education coercively inculcates social meanings (2014, 125). It concludes that she does not neglect the fact that ideological state apparatuses also function by repression. But this would be mistaken. For in the passage in question, Haslanger is not using the verb 'inculcate' in the relevant way. Specifically, she does not mean that the dominated groups come to endorse, or absorb, what they are taught or inculcated. She only means that they become aware of it as something to be reluctantly reckoned with. Put differently, she is leaving the terrain of ideology for that of repression, rather than considering the ideological effects of repression. Thus my argument, I conclude, escapes this objection. Let us now consider this objection in more detail.

We already saw how Althusser's qualification regarding the double functioning of ideology does not quite escape Haslanger, even though she only mentions it in passing (2019, 2). But one might think that there is more to it than this. In the course of her discussion of Lessig's analysis of the way in which the educational ideological apparatus reconciles the dominated groups with their subordination, doesn't she insist on just the kind of secondary, repressive functioning of ideological state apparatuses, which I have argued she and the PSCs neglect?

Haslanger writes as follows:

> Education, of course, not only conveys information and academic skills, but also socializes children into a culture. Culturally mandated responses become automatized through repetition, close monitoring, and correction. In other words, education teaches us – inculcates – social meanings. But by Lessig's own lights, it (often) does so coercively, even in cases where the coercion is not represented or commonly viewed as such. Yet surely the inculcation is often experienced as coercive ("stupid," "insulting," and "painful") to the student. (2014, 125)

In this passage, it does seem that Haslanger is emphasising precisely the kind of psychological repression based on physical repression which I have suggested she neglected. But this appearance is misleading, I argue now. For in this passage, she is not using 'teaches' or 'inculcates' in the same way as she does when she follows Sewell's (or Althusser's) use of the term. Specifically, she does not mean that, out of coercion, the dominated groups come to endorse, or absorb, what they are taught or inculcated. It only means that they become aware of it as something to be reckoned with, grudgingly, because others, typically the dominant groups, endorse or absorb it. As she begins the relevant paragraph: 'something can be socially meaningful in a context, and the meaning have social power, even if in the same context it is contested and recognized by some to be arbitrary' (*ibid.*). In

other words, she is not considering the ideological effects of repression, but leaving the terrain of ideology for that of repression.

Indeed, her point in this passage, in her own words, is that

> [a]lthough [she] agree[s] with Lessig that one way (perhaps an especially important way) that social meanings have force is by virtue of seeming "natural" or "necessary," by existing "invisibly" and being "unnoticed" [that is, by relying on a background, or context, of other meanings that are not contested], *another way is for the dominant group to take them for granted and impose them, even if they are not endorsed by everyone in the context, e.g., by those they are imposed upon.* In such cases, the dominant can justify their actions by reference to social meanings, and such justification appears (and functions as) secure *even if the subordinate reject the meanings and justifications in question.* (*ibid.*, 124–25, referencing Lessig 1995, 959–60; my emphases)

Now, this might have ideological effects, as we saw above, to the extent that through such coercion the dominant groups may repress the critical insights which the dominated groups learn in their milieux, and thus inculcate the dominated groups, in the relevant sense of the term this time, the schemas of dominating practices. But Haslanger does not emphasise this, and we are back to the argument I have made in this chapter. It is the repressive functioning of the dominant groups' ideological apparatuses, rather than their ideological functioning, that can explain how the socialisation of the dominated groups as disciplined through these apparatuses can entrench structural domination.[121]

In case further evidence were needed, let me mention the example used by Haslanger to illustrate the passage at issue. Throughout the paper under discussion, Haslanger draws 'on anecdotes reported to [her] by students concerning relatively affluent Black students […]' (2014, 110–11). One of these anecdotes describes the 'clear patterns of [a white teacher] picking on […] Mustapha, an Egyptian student' (112). When she first mentions this example, it is to emphasise the internalising of 'epistemic mistrust' by Jonathan, Mustapha's friend (*ibid.*). But when she returns to it in order to illustrate the passage at issue, she has a different goal. Now she wants to insist that 'when [the teacher] challenges his knowledge of Egypt', Mustapha need not 'accep[t] her imposed social meaning of his comments

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[121] As to the 'ideological', primary functioning of ideological apparatuses, this suggests that it serves mainly to consolidate the dominant groups' own ideologies (cf. Scott 1985, 320; see also Abercrombie et al. 1980, and indeed the remarks from Haslanger which I just quoted).

[…]', but that '[n]onetheless, by virtue of her authority, she coerces his deference and he experiences her as coercive' (125).

In other words, the point is not that Mustapha comes to endorse, or absorb, the meaning that the teacher is to be deferred to. The point, rather, is that he is now aware of this schema as something to be reluctantly complied with because the teacher herself endorses it – and will 'sen[d] him to the Dean's office' if he refuses to comply (which is what happens, when he 'express[s] disbelief that she would disagree with him about [Egypt]' (*ibid.*, 112)). Despite appearances, then, Haslanger's point here does not concern the ideological effects of repression. It concerns repression *simpliciter*, and the fear of repression, in their opposition to ideology. Thus from the fact that she suggests that education coercively 'inculcates' social meanings, we cannot conclude that she does not after all neglect the secondary, repressive functioning of ideological apparatuses. She does do so, to the extent suggested in this chapter. I suggest, therefore, that my argument escapes the objection.

To conclude, let me emphasise once more what I have tried to do. I have not attempted a complete exegesis of Althusser's account of such apparatuses. Neither have I claimed that the analysis of the repressive influence of structural domination which I have offered exhausts, together with the segregating and standardising influences I focused on in the previous chapters, the set of influences which structural domination can have on socialisation. I have only argued that in this case as well the PSCs neglect an influence of structural domination on socialisation, though here to a lesser degree than in their account of ideology or fetishism: they do take account of the non-violent, regulative influence which structural domination has on socialisation; but if my argument holds, here it is primarily its violent, *repressive* influence on socialisation that explains how the socialisation of the dominated groups can entrench structural domination. More precisely, more should be made of what Althusser calls the 'double functioning' of ideological apparatuses if the PSCs' reading of the socialisation of the dominated groups as disciplined in such apparatuses is to explain the entrenchment of structural domination.

CONCLUSION

This brings us to the end of this thesis. If my argument is correct, we can rescue what I have called the socialisation conception of entrenchment – the widespread view that the entrenchment of structural domination is largely due to agents' socialisation into dominating social practices – from the problem I identified at the outset.

This problem, recall, is that, on the account put forward by the proponents of this view (Haslanger 2017a, Celikates 2016, Einspahr 2010), socialisation has a contradictory character, which should in principle allow for critical consciousness and, further, social change. If socialisation is contradictory – if agents should be expected to frequent not just milieux that confirm the schemas of dominating practices, but also milieux that challenge them – then it is unclear how exactly their socialisation into these practices can explain the entrenchment of structural domination.

To solve this problem, I have argued that we should pay closer attention than the proponents of this view have to the various influences that structural domination may have on socialisation. Though there may be many more, here I have focused on three of them specifically. I have argued that if socialisation into dominating practices can entrench structural domination, it is because structural domination can have a segregating, a standardising, or a repressive influence on socialisation, depending on the case at hand.

The segregating influence of structural domination came out in my analysis of the domination of black employees by the biased hiring practices of our white-dominated economy. I have argued that if the socialisation of white professionals into the vastly incomplete schema that black employees just are unreliable can entrench the domination of these practices, it is because this domination has divided black employees and white professionals into two groups who do not frequent each other's milieux unless they need to.

The standardising influence of structural domination was most apparent in the case of our socialisation into the commodity schema that lies at the heart of fetishism, the ideology of the market. Workers and capitalists fail to question the market, I have argued, because its domination encourages them to commodify across the board in order to maximise profit, which deprive them of the milieux that would help them notice that they are doing the commodifying themselves.

Finally, it is in hyper-masculine philosophy departments plagued by the law of male sex-right that I argued we could notice the repressive influence of structural domination. Female students' socialisation into this law can explain why they absorb it despite their socialisation in women's studies classes, I argued, because their corporeal perception of this law during violent heterosexual encounters represses the critical insights they learn in these classes.

No doubt there are other influences of structural domination on socialisation beyond the three I have emphasised. There are also other entrenching factors beyond socialisation, from the fear of physical repression (rather than its psychologically repressive effects) to the silent compulsion of market relations (rather than its consequences on socialisation), through various co-ordination, co-operation, and collective action problems (see e.g., Celikates 2016, 21).

It remains the case, however, that socialisation can play an important role in explaining the entrenchment of structural domination, at least when the critical potential that lies in its contradictory character is cancelled by the influence of structural domination. So if 'the task [of critical theory] is to illuminate […] injustice in ways that provide a basis for resistance' (Haslanger 2020b, 1), what such basis does my analysis suggest? Let me end with some tentative remarks in this connection.

My critique of the socialisation conception of entrenchment has been an internal one, as I have noted, and, in my view as on that of the PSCs, socialisation into dominating practices remains the main target of the struggle against structural domination (see e.g., Haslanger 2017a). If what I have argued is correct, however, then challenging our socialisation into these practices will prove difficult unless we first minimise the various influences which structural domination can have on socialisation. So while socialisation should be the main target, these influences should be the initial target.

In other words, our overall goal remains the 'disruption of the very terms and concepts we use to understand the world', as Haslanger puts it, achieved 'by queering our language, playing with meanings, and monkey-wrenching or otherwise shifting the material conditions that support our tutored dispositions' (2017a, 110). Yet the material conditions we should target first are not the milieux in which dominating practices are enacted, but rather the segregating, standardising, and repressive influences which structural domination has on our socialisation in these milieux.

Does this mean that in order to challenge the entrenchment of structural domination by socialisation we must first challenge structural domination itself, which would defeat the purpose? Luckily it does not, insofar as challenging the various influences of structural domination on socialisation does not require challenging structural domination itself.

Return for example to the biased hiring practices of our white-dominated economy. If my argument has some purchase, we should not confront socialisation into these practices head-on. Instead, we should start with the segregating processes that separate agents into two kinds of groups such that the dominant groups live such different lives from the dominated groups that they fail to correct the prejudices they form about them.

How might we go about doing that? In her discussion of racial segregation, Anderson mentions Strive, a US-based job-training organisation that helps young blacks learn, in work-simulated environments, how to drop the 'game face' that they adopt 'to ward off attacks in their crime-ridden,

segregated neighborhood' (2010, 35).[122] As I suggested in chapter 3, however, it is the members of the dominant groups, rather than the members of the dominated groups, who are most likely to be unable to correct the mistaken schemas they form. So we might want to do the opposite: organise the same kind of attitudinal training for white professionals instead. Specifically, we might simulate dangerous, segregated neighbourhoods, in order to help white professionals learn that what they see as an aggressive posture really is a defensive one. If white companies are as committed to racial equality as they often insist they are, they should welcome interested organisers with open arms.

In chapter 3, however, I focused on another prejudice, the schema that black employees are unreliable *simpliciter*, which I argued that white professionals fail to correct because as whites and as professionals they do not experience what would enable them to do so, such as dependency on unreliable public transports, lack of childcare, or the stress of holding multiple jobs. How can we challenge these specific segregating processes? One might think of finding a way to prevent white professionals from jumping into taxis, or from working from home, whenever public transport malfunctions (hack their Uber account? cut off their internet connection?). But this might prove impractical. More realistically, here as well we might follow Strive's example, and simulate the required environments for training purposes: we might organise mock-meetings where white professionals are asked to bring their children, for example. That would teach them a lesson.[123]

The analysis of fetishism in chapter 4 suggests a similar basis for dis-entrenching the market. Here as well, I argued, we should not directly target socialisation into this practice, but first aim at the standardising, commodifying processes on which I focused: they are responsible for preventing workers and capitalists from thinking critically about the market, as they have them bring up to market standard the various milieux that previously escaped it, such a neighbourhoods or friendship groups.

What can we do, concretely? Recall for instance the 'exchange system for services', which Brad Fallon, the plumber from chapter 4, set up with his friends. Since Fallon and his friends keep an exact track of the hours they work for one another, and since the tally of these hours is convertible into money, I noted there that this system may well end up commodifying their own friendly relations. But provided we do not precisely count our hours and refuse to convert them into money, such a system may have just the opposite effect: it may prove a useful way to transpose neighbourly,

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[122] See also https://strive.org/national-programs (last accessed 09/04/2021).

[123] Of course, we might also campaign for the state to improve public transportation systems, fund childcare, and liberate blacks from the need to hold more than one job. Indeed, we might do this precisely on the ground that it might make them unreliable at work and reproduce their domination. Not only would this be welcome in itself, but it might also help white professionals correct their schema that black employees just are unreliable in deadline-sensitive professional settings, by removing the hurdles that might make it hard for some black employees to always meet their deadlines. But chances are that this strategy puts the cart before the horse: in order to support such state policies, white professionals might have to correct this schema first. If they think that black employees are unreliable *simpliciter*, they might well consider them a lost cause.

uncommodified relations to currently commodified environments and, as a result, help agents realise that commodification is their own doing.[124]

Indeed, the Covid-19 pandemics, for all its drawbacks, might hold similar promises for activists capable of seizing the moment. For the surge in uncommodified help it has caused – from extended furlough schemes to the crucial role played by the NHS – might also increase the uncommodified space from which to think critically about the commodity schema: agents exchange the goods and services produced by the welfare state very much like neighbours do, rather than as merchants repaying their debts to the very last penny. The same might be said of working from home, as people who no longer need to go to work every day may find it much easier to form, or join, neighbourly communities.

Finally, what about the law of male sex-right in effect in some philosophy department? The same analysis obtains, it seems to me. Rather than aiming directly at this law, we should tackle first the physically-cum-psychologically repressive processes whereby the critical consciousness that female students develop in women's studies classes falters.

Thus, pushing for harsh departmental policies against the law of male sex-right, though necessary, might not be the first thing to do. It might serve us better to first focus on women's studies classes: there, feminist teachers should not only give female students the conceptual resources to question this implicit law; they should also teach female students the basics of self-defence, so female students might in turn prevent the male students they have sex with from repressing the critical insights they learn from these classes.

Feminist teachers might teach jujitsu, for example, a crucial part of the toolbox of feminist self-defence since 1908, when Edith Garrud began training the suffragettes of the Women's Social and Political Union (Dorlin 2020). The right to vote is no longer at issue, but – to borrow the title of the short consciousness-raising play where, in a swift move, the woman played by Garrud sobers up her drunk husband – this kind of martial art might well remain *What Every Woman Ought to Know* (1911, see Dorlin 2017).[125]

This, then, is the kind of disrupting strategies one might think of, based on the above analysis of the role of socialisation in the entrenchment of structural domination. My suggestions are only tentative, however, and much more needs to be said before they can form a real basis for resistance. Until then, they only form a basis for further research.

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[124] A similar system is in place in the ZAD (for '*zone à défendre*', or 'zone to be defended') of Notre-Dame-Des-Landes, France. Originally organised to oppose the building of an airport, this occupation protest is home to various charge-free practices such as free shops and 'pay what you can' events (see e.g., Pruvost 2017).

[125] Elsa Dorlin herself is a case in point: she offers practical classes of self-defence besides her theoretical work on the topic (see e.g., Xavier, Lugrin and Ralenti 2020, 132–4).

But at this stage it is no longer my turn to speak: to end with the words of a philosopher to whom I owe a great debt – Iris Marion Young (1990, 5) – this work is 'addressed to others and awaits their response, in a situated political dialogue'.

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