

The London School of Economics and Political Science

**From Kartosuwiryo to Sungkar:
The evolution of Indonesia's Darul
Islam movement, 1928-1993**

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the ideological evolution of the Darul Islam (DI) movement in Indonesia. It argues the movement was defined by two core ideas: *hākimiyya* and *jihad*. While these ideas are not unique to Indonesian militant Islamists, this dissertation aims to examine how each concept was understood, interpreted and transformed by key DI leaders from the Indonesian independence struggle to the final years of the Suharto regime.

Beginning with Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo's bid to establish an Islamic state in opposition to Dutch rule, this dissertation assesses how DI defined and promoted an understanding of *hākimiyya* and *jihad* through the works of classical ideologues to form a cohesive doctrine. Following Kartosuwiryo's death in 1962, this thesis outlines how these ideas were reinterpreted by subsequent leaders, ultimately resulting in a split within the movement and the formation of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in 1993.

This dissertation argues the accelerated globalisation of the 1970s gave Indonesian Islamists unprecedented exposure and access to the teachings and works of hard-line Salafist groups and Wahhabi preachers and organisations in the Middle East. The selective adoption of their interpretations of *hākimiyya* and *jihad*, and the introduction of related concepts such as *taḳfīr* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*, reinvigorated DI after Kartosuwiryo's execution. While the material for this ideological revival largely appeared from foreign sources, the movement's new intellectual leader, Abdullah Sungkar, with help from his close friend, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, largely applied these ideas in response to growing state repression and the perceived secularisation of Indonesian society.

Finally, this dissertation argues the ideology of DI was shaped through participation in conflict. Periods of struggle against the Dutch in the 1940s, the Republican government in the 1950s and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan between 1985 and 1991 led to significant transformations in the beliefs of DI members. Notably, the Afghan conflict cemented the increasingly *taḳfīri* outlook of Sungkar's faction, narrowing their conceptualisation of *jihad*. These ideological transformations proved to be sufficiently severe leading to a rupture within DI and the formation of JI.

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Abbreviations

ANRI	Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia
AABRI	Arsip Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
BAKIN	Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara
DDII	Dewan Dakwah Islamiya Indonesia
DI	Darul Islam
Golkar	Partai Golongan Karya
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
NII	Negara Islam Indonesia
NU	Nahdatul Ulama
PNRI	Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia
PSI	Partai Sarekat Islam
PSII	Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia
RI	Republik Indonesia
SDI	Sarekat Dagang Indonesia
SI	Sarekat Islam
TII	Tentara Islam Indonesia
TNI	Tentara Negara Indonesia

Glossary

<i>Amir</i> (Ar./In)	A leader, ruler or commander
<i>‘Aqida</i> (Ar.)	The core beliefs of the Islamic faith
<i>Bay’ah</i> (Ar./In. <i>Bayat</i>)	Pledge of allegiance to a caliph or <i>amir</i>
<i>Bid’a</i> (Ar.)	Heretical or deviant innovation
<i>Bughāb</i> (Ar./In <i>Bughat</i>)	Transgressors or rebels who oppose a legitimate Islamic authority
<i>Dakwah</i> (In./Ar. <i>Dawa</i>)	lit. Call; Proselytisation
<i>Dar al-harb</i> (Ar.)	Abode of war; usually refers to areas that are not under the control of an Islamic ruler
<i>Dar al-Islam</i> (Ar.)	Abode of peace; usually refers to areas under the control of an Islamic ruler
<i>Fatwa</i> (Ar.)	Legal opinions, which are often non-binding, issued by a <i>mufti</i>
<i>Fiqh</i> (Ar.)	Islamic jurisprudence
<i>Hadīth</i> (Ar.)	The compendiums of the actions, sayings, teachings and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad
<i>Hijrah</i> (Ar.)	lit. Migration; primarily refers to the Prophet Muhammad’s flight from Mecca to Yathrib, later renamed Medina, in 622
<i>Hākimiyya</i> (Ar.)	Securing Allah’s rule and sovereignty on earth
<i>Hudud</i> (Ar.)	Punishments prescribed under Islamic law
<i>Hukum Islam</i> (In.)	Islamic law
<i>Ijtihād</i> (Ar.)	Independent reasoning
<i>Iman</i> (Ar.)	lit. Belief or faith; refers to the six articles of faith of Islam, namely belief in the existence of Allah, angels, prophets, books of which God is the author, the day of judgment and predestination
<i>Jihad</i> (Ar.)	lit. Struggle or to exert effort; often used to refer to a war or physical confrontation against enemies of Islam
<i>Jābīyyah</i> (Ar.)	The state of ignorance in which the people of Arabia lived before the advent of Islam in 610
<i>Kafir</i> (Ar.)	Disbeliever
<i>Kufr</i> (Ar.)	Disbelief
<i>Kitab Kuning</i> (In.)	lit. Yellow books; refers to religious texts, so called because the originals were published in Arabic rather than Romanised script on

	paper that had aged having been brought back from the Middle East. Often sold in bookshops known as <i>toko kitab</i> s
<i>Majelis shūrā</i> (Ar./In.)	Consultation council
<i>Mantiqi</i> (In.)	Regional administrative units, which are in turn subdivided into smaller districts known as <i>wakalah</i>
<i>Masyumi</i> (In.)	Org. <i>Masjumi</i> (<i>Majelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia</i> , Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations); refers to the main Islamic party in Indonesia between 1945 and 1960
<i>Mujahidin</i> (Ar.)	Plural of <i>mujahid</i> ; those who engage in <i>jihad</i>
<i>Munafiq</i> (Ar.)	Hypocrite; someone who purports to be a Muslim but hides their disbelief or fails to fully implement or follow Islam’s teachings.
<i>Murtad</i> (Ar.)	Apostate; someone who has consciously renounced their Islamic faith
<i>Negara Islam Indonesia</i> (In.)	Islamic State of Indonesia
<i>Pancasila</i> (In.)	The five principles that form the ideological basis for the Indonesian state and were introduced by President Sukarno in 1945
<i>Pesantren</i> (In.)	Islamic boarding school
<i>Refomasi</i> (In.)	lit. Reformation; refers to the period after the fall of General Suharto’s New Order regime
<i>Shari’a</i> (Ar.)	Islamic law; derived from the <i>Qur’an</i> , <i>sunna</i> and other sources of jurisprudence
<i>Shirk</i> (Ar.)	The sin of idolatry or polytheism
<i>Sunna</i> (Ar.)	Actions, experiences, sayings and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, which are recorded in the <i>hadith</i>
<i>Taghut</i> (Ar.)	A false god or idol; usually applied to tyrannical rulers or governments
<i>Takfir</i> (Ar.)	The excommunication of a fellow Muslim
<i>Taūhid</i> (Ar.)	Monotheism; The oneness of God and core belief of the Islamic faith
<i>Ulama</i> (Ar./In. <i>Ulema</i>)	Plural of <i>alim</i> ; refers to religious scholars or clerical authorities
<i>Ummah</i> (Ar.)	lit. Community; refers to the global community of Muslims
<i>Usroh</i> (In./Ar. <i>Usra</i>)	lit. family; refers to a cell-like organisational structure or small groups

Wālā' wa-l-barā', (Ar.) Loyalty and disavowal; devotion and denunciation for the sake of
Allah

A Note on Transliteration and Translation

A thesis primarily concerned with ideology, Islam and Indonesia will unavoidably use terminology, jargon and proverbs in Arabic and Indonesian. This thesis has generally followed simplified guidelines provided by the *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (IJMES), except for where there are common spellings of personal names, places, etc. in English. Where Arabic words are cited in other English-language texts, the source's own transliteration is used.

The thesis has largely adhered to the conventions of modern Indonesian spelling, introduced through the 1972 reforms, unless quoting directly from a source. Dutch-influenced spellings of names or titles are retained where individuals have expressed a strong preference for them or where an organisation is more commonly known through these spelling conventions. In accordance with Javanese and Sundanese practices, this thesis uses an individual's first name after the initial mention of their full name. For those of Arabic heritage, this thesis uses their surname in subsequent references.

All translations from Indonesian to English are my own, unless stated otherwise.

Introduction

*I am a child of DI/NII who is ready to sacrifice myself for Islam. Remember, o mujahidin of Malingping, how our imam, SM Kartosuwiryo built and upheld and proclaimed the independence of the Islamic State of Indonesia with the blood and lives of martyrs...*¹

Iqbal, Jemaah Islamiyah member and Bali bomber, 2002

This statement by one of the perpetrators of the bombings in Kuta, Bali on 12 October 2002 is revealing in spite of its brevity. In justifying his attack, the bomber hints at the complex and mutable ideology that underpins and motivates militant Islamists in Indonesia. Iqbal, alias Arnasan, alias Acong, was a member of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network. Founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Indonesian clerics in self-imposed exile in Malaysia, on 1 January 1993, the JI sought to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia.

Unlike numerous other Indonesian Islamist political parties and civil society groups, JI members were willing to use violence to achieve their goal. The network was responsible for some of the deadliest attacks in the country, including the bombing of the Jakarta Stock Exchange on 13 September 2000, a series of attacks targeting churches on Christmas Eve 2000, the bombing of the Australian Embassy on 9 September 2004, another coordinated attack in Bali on 1 October 2005, and the explosions at Jakarta's JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton hotels on 17 July 2009. Their willingness to attack both domestic and foreign state and military targets and civilians – including fellow Muslims – illustrates the JI's expansive definition of a legitimate target and shows that violence was central to their mission to create an Islamic state.

This embrace of violence helped to shape JI into one of the deadliest and most effective terrorist organisations in post-colonial Southeast Asia. However, as Iqbal's last testament demonstrates, the network was not the first to try to establish an Islamic state through force. Sungkar and Ba'asyir created the network after breaking away from Darul Islam (DI), a movement created by Sekarmaji Marjan (SM) Kartosuwiryo in West Java between 1947 and 1948. DI fought to liberate Indonesia from colonial rule and, subsequently, to replace the Republic led by President Sukarno and other nationalists with the *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia).

¹ Iqbal, alias Arnasan, alias Acong, 'Final Testament', in Chiara Formichi, *Islam and Asia: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), p.225

While the revolt led by Kartosuwiryo began in West Java, it expanded to encompass Central Java, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, and Aceh. These regional rebellions are interesting in their own right, but not the concern of this thesis. None of the other insurgencies were actively part of the DI for the entire duration of its conflict with the Dutch and subsequently the Republic of Indonesia. As Greg Fealy notes, ‘the period when all five areas were actively part of the DI movement was less than four years...from 1953 to 1956-7’.² The beliefs and motivations of those participating in the regional revolts were varied, complex, and thus difficult to examine cohesively. As this thesis is concerned with development of Islamist militant ideology, the West Java DI movement offers the clearest case study of the role of Islam in shaping the beliefs of the participants.

Kartosuwiryo not only founded the DI but was the primary architect of its belief structure, producing significant works that would determine the movement’s ideological trajectory long after his death. He began his career as part of *Partai Sarekat Islam* (PSI, Islamic Union Party) in 1927, an anti-colonial political party that arose out of an Islamic labour organisation, the *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (SDI, Islamic Trading Union). While Iqbal lionised Kartosuwiryo as the father of an uncompromising militant Islamist movement, Kartosuwiryo began his career as a mainstream anti-colonial Islamic nationalist who often cooperated with Sukarno and other Republicans. His path to leading a protracted rebellion against the state and his adoption of a severe interpretation of Islamic principles is a clear example of the non-linear development of DI’s ideology.

This pattern of both working with the Republican state while simultaneously opposing its foundational principles continued long after Kartosuwiryo’s death and the movement’s military defeat in West Java in 1962. Senior DI militant commanders often reached accommodations with the Republic rather than carrying on an unyielding but ultimately futile fight for a true Islamic state. Framing this as a pragmatic decision to preserve what was left of their movement, these men subsequently participated in violent pogroms against suspected members of the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia) and other enemies of General Suharto, who took power in 1965. Despite DI leaders espousing a doctrine deeply rooted in purity of belief, these choices illustrated the malleability of their ideology in practice.

² Greg Fealy, ‘Half a century of violent jihad in Indonesia: a historical and ideological comparison of Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah’ in Marika Vicziany and David Wright-Neveille, eds. *Terrorism and Islam in Indonesia: myths and realities* (Clayton: Monash University Press, 2005), p.17

This period of co-optation quickly came to an end when factions within the movement proved unwilling to accept the paradox of working with a regime that they sought to replace. The Suharto government's crackdowns on religious freedom, alongside the introduction of new Islamist ideas from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, helped to spur DI's resurgence by reinvigorating the commitment of members who had once fought for an Islamic state and attracted a new generation of recruits.

With the DI too weak to launch a new insurgency, its fragmented leadership – which now included both old hands and new members like Sungkar, a newcomers from the Dewan Dakwah Islamiya Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council), a non-violent Islamist group – focused on proselytisation efforts and small-scale, sporadic attacks against government facilities, businesses and minority religious groups.

Propelled by internal frustrations over its past collaboration with the government, new foreign ideas, and an energised and restored membership base, the DI was slowly revived in the 1970s. Various DI groups conducted sporadic, small-scale attacks on entertainment venues and churches and conducted *fa'i* robberies (the confiscation of property from non-believers or enemies of Islam) throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, waves of arrests decimated the group and led to numerous leaders fleeing the DI's strongholds in West Java. Sungkar and Ba'asyir, who had been in and out of legal trouble since 1978, fled to Malaysia in 1985. The men maintained close links with their comrades back home while establishing a new *pesantren* (religious boarding school). Despite this newfound energy, the DI made little tangible progress in reviving its insurgency or achieving its ultimate goal of replacing the Indonesian Republic with an Islamic state.

Thing began to change when Sungkar and Ba'asyir met with Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a prominent Afghan *mujahidin* commander during in 1985 trip to Peshawar, Pakistan. Working with the Palestinian ideologue Abdullah Azzam, Sayyaf had begun running training camps for foreigners willing to join the mujahidin in their fight against the Soviet Union. The two Indonesians capitalised on this opportunity to gain military training and combat experience for DI members. By the end of 1985, the first cohort of DI cadres had arrived in Pakistan. Although many individual participants spoke of a desire to help their fellow Muslims defeat a godless invader, Sungkar and Ba'asyir saw the opportunity primarily as a means of strengthening DI in its struggle against the Indonesian government.

In total, ten groups of DI members, varying in size between ten and fifty-nine, trained in Pakistan and later, Afghanistan, between 1985 and 1991. This amounted to about 200 Indonesians, including Imam Samudra, Huda bin Abdul Haq, alias Ali Ghufron, alias Mukhlas, and his brother, Ali Amrozi bin Haji Nurhasyim, who would go on to plan the attacks in Bali. The Afghan experience was transformative for DI participants, hardening their interpretations of *jihad* and forging an internationalist outlook as the men met militants from across the Middle East and South Asia. This growing sense of transnational solidarity coupled with increasing tensions between the DI's core leadership in Indonesia and the exiles in Malaysia over the conceptualisation of an Islamic state and how best to achieve it, ultimately led Sungkar and Ba'asyir to break away, establishing JI on 1 January 1993.

These conflicts over the scope of an Islamic state, its membership, and crucially, the process for realising it have always been at the core of the battle for control of the ideology of the Islamist movement in Indonesia. Assessing the origins of these ideas and examining their relative importance are thus critical in order to understand the group's belief structure.

By beginning with Kartosuwiryo's first forays into the anti-colonial Islamist political scene in 1928, this thesis investigates the origins of the DI's ideological tenets and situate their creation within a period of considerable activism and contestation amongst opponents of the colonial regime. While Islamist groups remained on the fringes of the nationalist movement, Kartosuwiryo's contributions to PSI were prolific and established his core beliefs; namely that Indonesian independence could only be attained and its future ultimately secured by placing Islam at the heart of the anti-colonial struggle and by establishing a state founded on *shari'a* (Islamic law).

In choosing to conclude this study with the splintering of the movement and formation of JI in 1993, this thesis covers a complete arc of its ideological development across the final decades of colonial rule and near half-century of Indonesian independence. The breakaway of Sungkar's faction cost DI significantly. The men, who provided scholarly prestige and charismatic leadership, took the majority of the movement's Afghan war veterans with them, depriving DI of its most skilled combatants. While their new group retained significant elements of the DI's original ideological framework, the men continued to modify its core and ancillary tenets, eventually dropping NII as the name of their desired state.

While the DI remains an active organisation in Indonesia today, its role and capabilities have been substantially diminished. It has not claimed responsibility - nor been blamed by the authorities - for any attacks in three decades. The group has failed to successfully transition into an influential, non-violent political organisation. As such, the 1928-1993 period represents the movement's heyday and is crucial to the study of the origins and development of its ideology.

With these themes and timeframe in mind, this thesis identifies the core concepts that underpin the ideology of the DI movement and explores their evolution from 1928 to 1993. It will analyse the ideational origins of the DI's worldview and each tenet's significance to the group's overarching belief structure. Additionally, it will provide a diachronic study of these concepts, examining their evolution as different leaders come to the fore. As such, it explores how DI commanders distinguishing their ideology from that of their predecessors and how they incorporated and indigenised ideas promulgated by foreign ideologues.

This research is premised on two notions: first, that DI's leadership was not irrational but rather held a broadly coherent set of scripturally-grounded beliefs; second, that this ideology was central to the movement's foundation and its survival in post-colonial Indonesia. In order to analyse this, this thesis asks the following questions: How did the leaders of the DI movement define particular concepts at various points in the group's history? How and why did they arrive at these interpretations? How did these particular conceptualisations effect the DI's actions? In order to answer these questions, this thesis will examine the construction and evolution of the movement's ideology from its foundations to its eclipse by JI. In centring DI's ideological arc, this thesis differentiates itself from much of the existing literature, which largely studies the movement through the lens of social movement theory.

Thesis arguments

The central contention of this thesis is that the concepts of *hākimiyya* (securing God's sovereignty within the political system) and *jihad* (holy war) form the core tenets of the DI's ideology. While the precise interpretation of these two ideas shifted throughout the group's history, their importance to the leadership, made clear in their writings and sermons, did not wane. Bolstering these core concepts were two adjacent beliefs; *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* (loyalty and disavowal for the sake of God) and *takefir* (excommunication), which are primarily concerned with the protection of the faith. While less prominent in the works of the movement's key ideologues, these nevertheless

served to reinforce the core concepts, particularly *jihad*, by more clearly defining the DI's membership, its enemies, its conventional practices, and crucially what beliefs were deemed acceptable within the ideological frame.

Although DI leaders referenced other ideas often taken to be foundational Islamic beliefs such as *'aqeedah* (doctrinal belief), *imān* (faith), *taubīd* (belief in the oneness of God), and other concepts with deep significance for Islamic jurisprudence, notably *ridda* (apostasy), *bid'a* (heretical innovation), they did not discuss them with any rigor or regularity. Additionally, when these ideas were mentioned, DI members' interpretation did not stray meaningfully from those of other Muslim groups. This lack of focus, coupled with unoriginal conceptualisations, suggests that these beliefs played a marginal or peripheral role in the DI's ideology. As such, any discussion of these concepts will be subsumed under the broader analysis of the core and adjacent ideas.

In order to explain the core position of *hākimiyya* and *jihad* in the hierarchy of concepts that make up the DI's ideology, this thesis begins with the two premises mentioned earlier: that DI leaders held a clear belief structure grounded in religious scripture; and that these beliefs, configured in a particular order, helped the group to survive and adapt through periods of significant repression. After clarifying these points, this thesis will put forward three arguments to elaborate how these ideas were derived and interpreted by DI leaders at various points in the movement's history how they affected the group's aims and operations.

First, this thesis argues that the interpretations adopted by DI leaders were often the result of intertwining global and local dynamics. Kartosuwiryo and Sungkar were aware of trends and developments in the Middle East and South Asia, and quickly imported new ideas promulgated by the leading contemporary ideologues. However, these concepts were not imbibed wholesale nor the importation driven by a desire to create or join an established transnational group. DI leaders were selective in incorporating concepts into their group's belief structure and adapted foreign ideas to local contexts in order to legitimise them and ensure buy-in from Indonesian supporters.

As such, this thesis will largely focus on how DI writings and sermons constructed and articulated the ideas of *hākimiyya* and *jihad* differently from how they were understood by Islamist ideologues in the Middle East and South Asia. It will highlight shared ideational foundations derived from core Islamist texts relied on by most militant *Islamist* groups as well as unique deviations arising from local circumstances. It will be argued that the DI's adoption of foreign ideas accelerated as

globalisation facilitated faster travel and communication. As such, Kartosuwiryo's early conceptualisation of *hakimiyya* and *jihad* appears to have fewer foreign influences than his successors', who not only had access to the publications of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Wahhabi scholars from Saudi Arabia but could also travel to Middle Eastern religious institutions. This also illustrates the need to assess each idea in relation to its specific historical and social context.

The second argument advanced by this thesis contends that conflict drove significant shifts in the movement's understanding of its core and adjacent beliefs. The struggle for independence against the Dutch and Japanese in the 1940s, the protracted insurgency against the Republican state between 1948 and 1962, and the war in Afghanistan from 1985 all resulted in the narrowing of the movement's conceptualisation of an Islamic state, its understanding of *jihad*, and the boundaries of acceptable behaviour for its followers. Arbitrary persecution and disproportionate penalties issued by the authorities also radicalised the thinking of DI leaders. Kartosuwiryo and Sungkar seem to have been transformed to varying degrees by their experiences of state harassment and mistreatment, leading them to leave non-violent Islamist groups and embrace violent action. Regardless of whether DI initiated conflict, the presence of conflict in its members' daily lives undoubtedly shaped their worldview and bolstered a belief that *jihad* was not only a religious obligation but necessary for achieving an Islamic state given the futility of non-violent approaches.

The final argument put forward by this thesis is that the ideology of the DI movement was an elite project. The group's belief structure was ultimately shaped by its leaders; primarily Kartosuwiryo from 1928 to 1962 and Sungkar from 1978 to 1993. According to DI and JI members interviewed, it was Sungkar rather than Ba'asyir who contributed to the later evolution of the group's ideology, and he took the lead in making consequential decisions for his faction. Academic research supports this view with Greg Fealy, Sidney Jones, Quinton Temby, and Solahudin among others, crediting Sungkar (rather than Ba'asyir) with JI's formation.³ Furthermore, it was Sungkar, rather than Ba'asyir who took the time to record sermons, thus detailing his thoughts on concepts like *takefir*, for posterity, before his flight to Malaysia in 1985.

³ Fealy, 'Half a century of violent jihad in Indonesia: a historical and ideological comparison of Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah', p.25; Sidney Jones, 'New Order Repression and the Birth of Jemaah Islamiyah' in Edward Aspinal and Greg Fealy, eds. *Soeharto's New Order and its Legacy: Essays in honour of Harold Crouch* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2010), p.40; Quinton Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah', *Indonesia*, 89, (April 2010) p.36; Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013), pp.149-151

Rank and file members of the group had little influence on the group's ideological tenets. Even other senior figures, like Aceng Kurnia only made contributions to the group's understanding of ideas like *tauhid*, which were limited in their analysis and propagation. Significantly, these ideas were not taken up by subsequent leaders, and remained marginal in the hierarchy of concepts that made up the movement's ideology. Other top commanders, like Ajengan Masduki, who became the group's *imam* (leader) in 1987, appear not to have published or proselytised their own interpretations of the group's ideological tenets. As such, the group's ideology was designed by an elite few within the upper echelons of the organisation.

This is not to say that lower ranking members shared an identical understanding of the ideology espoused by their superiors, or were manipulated into believing them unquestioningly. They were, of course, able to ascribe their own meaning to events, notably in rationalising their decisions to fight in Afghanistan. However, these minor deviations were largely confined to individual members, who lacked the wherewithal to broadcast any new interpretations they may have had. The dominant voices within the organisation maintained their hegemony over the construction of the ideology through their respected status as scholars and in their capacity as competent leaders. Their control was reinforced by the hierarchical nature of the militant organisation itself. As such, this thesis is primarily concerned with the belief structure consciously created by Kartosuwiryo and subsequently Sungkar through their writings and sermons, rather than the diffused understanding held by the rank and file.

These arguments are rooted in the belief that militant Islamist leaders in Indonesia had significant intellectual agency in designing their ideology. In other words, it rejects the notions that these men were incapable of rational thought, unwitting pawns of larger groups in the Middle East, or are simply mentally ill. While their ideas are outside mainstream political thought in Indonesia, DI leaders frequently displayed the ability to reason and eloquently contest the views of non-violent Islamists and the government.

Related to this, the writings and sermons of DI leaders throughout the movement's history demonstrate that the centrality of religion to their goals and its role as the foundation of their ideology. Kartosuwiryo, Sungkar, and others continually justified violent actions with reference to Islamic scripture and saw their faith as a means of addressing the social ills of the day. While they responded to political events around them, Islam was a sincerely-held foundational principle rather than a rhetorical tool to motivate supporters or gain recruits.

Original Contribution

In identifying the core and subordinate concepts that make up the ideology of the DI and charting their evolution, this PhD establishes a new historical narrative that deepens scholarly research in several fields. First, it advances a more thorough and comprehensive understanding of the DI as an organisation driven by a coherent set of scripturally-grounded beliefs. Few accounts of the DI offer a complete overview of the group's arc, let alone its ideological development, from its conceptualisation by Kartosuwiryo to the breakaway of Sungkar and Ba'asyir. Existing research often focuses largely on DI leaders' grievances and operational tactics and ends with its military defeat at the hands of the Republican government. Whenever the DI is acknowledged as a forerunner to JI, the links between the groups are only sketched out in broad terms.

As such, this thesis enriches the existing scholarship by providing a comprehensive overview of the group's ideological trajectory. It situates the group's leaders as reacting to both classic Islamic scholarship and contemporary domestic and international circumstances. By isolating the concepts that influenced and drove the DI's establishment, this thesis shows that this form of militancy was rooted in modern concepts of nationalism, anti-colonialism, and Islamism.

In explaining the development of these ideas, this research shows how the group prioritised certain ideas over others, creating a systematic, hierarchical, and complex belief structure. This structure guided and shaped its aims and actions, motivated new recruits – particularly those without pre-existing kinship links to the group – and sustained existing members in times of hardship. Ultimately, it facilitated the DI's fragmentation. This thesis is unique as no study of the DI or JI has established the core features of their ideology, explained their order and relationship to each other, or offered concrete assessments of the individual components of this ideological framework. Moreover, in contrast to the few pieces that do attempt to tackle and explain the role of ideology in the group, this thesis provides a rationale for the selection of the group's primary beliefs and how they work to reinforce each other.

Furthermore, in centring the Islamic roots of DI's ideological tenets, this thesis counters depictions of DI as driven by material grievances, devoid of religious knowledge, or lacking intellectual rigor. It contests the notion that DI leaders' use of Islamic concepts was merely a recruiting device or an attempt to gain legitimacy. Not only did they have a clear understanding of religious scripture, they were capable of modifying these concepts in accordance with political circumstances. By

highlighting the DI's grasp of religious teachings and the evolution of these concepts, this thesis also undercuts the notion that the JI's formation was predominantly a product of internal personality clashes, foreign ideas or a product of an international militant network. Instead, it advances a more complex conceptualisation of the group as having synthesised a unique belief system by both drawing on a long legacy of domestically-produced religious knowledge and engaging with new ideas and debates originating from the Middle East and South Asia.

Using the lens of intellectual history, this thesis enhances our understanding of how Islamist militant groups mobilise and sustain themselves over long periods. Studies on the ideological development of Islamist militant and terrorist organisations are limited by comparison with analyses of their operations, recruitment methods, and mobilisation processes, and this research lays the foundation for moving beyond these conventional paradigms. In this respect, the DI's longevity makes it a useful case study as it demonstrates how ideology both guided the group's aims, operations and targeting patterns and was responsive to and shaped by external circumstances. In exploring the limits of its rigidity, this thesis complicates the existing understanding of the role of militant groups' ideology, which largely ignores or fails to demonstrate how beliefs are translated into concrete aims and actions.

Investigation into the role of ideology in militant groups outside of the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia rare in the available literature. In focusing on the ideological development of a group founded in South East Asia, this research challenges the notion that militant organisations based in the so-called 'periphery' of the Islamic world – an ironic and inaccurate term, since Indonesia is the world's most populous Muslim country – are merely passive consumers of ideas generated in intellectual centres like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Instead, this research will demonstrate how DI leaders used ideas first conceptualised abroad and interpreted them for a local context. Additionally, it will show how these leaders sometimes arrived independently at similar conclusions to counterparts abroad due to similar political circumstances including anti-colonial struggles, autocratic dictatorship, and state repression. As such, it furthers the development of a broader international history of Islamist militancy, in which 'peripheral' groups like the DI bolstered and contributed to the intellectual traditions of a wider global movement.

The occasional convergence of thought between DI ideologues and their contemporaries overseas also highlights how a society's material circumstances can fuel the adoption of some of the ideological tenets of militant Islamism. In understanding how the DI was able to successfully

embrace and fuse domestic and foreign concepts, this research has contemporary relevance for governments attempting to prevent domestic groups from aligning themselves with beliefs promoted by global Islamist militant organisations such as Islamic State or Al-Qaeda.

Additionally, this thesis adds to the understanding of the DI's place in a broader discourse on Islamist organisations and activism in Indonesia and Islamists' response to state repression. While often treated as a separate phenomenon due to its eventual rejection of the political system and embrace of violence, the DI's trajectory shows how an ideology rooted in Islamic precepts can be a powerful mobilising and radicalising force within Indonesian society.

In numerous ways, the group's ideas reflected the beliefs of other, larger Islamist organisations. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the DI, the *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* (PSII, Indonesian Islamic Union Party), and *Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia* (Masyumi, Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) both advanced anti-colonial ideas, supported a state-building project informed by Islamic principles, and advocated armed resistance to returning Dutch forces. By the 1970s, the DI leadership's ideas regarding *takefir* and their anti-Western and anti-Christian values were similar to those of leading figures in state-backed organisations like Muhammadiyah. As such, this research makes the argument for acknowledging the commonalities between the non-violent and violent forms of Indonesian Islamism, which helped to facilitate DI's revival and recruitment.

The DI's embrace of violence serves as a useful rebuke to the woolly notion that Indonesian conceptualisations of Islam are somehow inherently more tolerant, liberal or apolitical than those elsewhere. While it is tempting to see the radicalisation of Kartosuwiryo and Sungkar as the result of Western imperialism or indoctrination by foreign ideologues, this process cannot be divorced from ideas developed and injustices felt domestically. Their stories illustrate the phenomenon of 'glocalisation', the process by which foreign narratives resonate with pre-existing worldviews and local political conditions and are contextualised and adopted into the domestic discourse.⁴

⁴ For a full account of the concept of glocalisation, see Roland Robertson, 'Mapping the Global Condition: Globalisation as the Central Concept', *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol.7:2 (1990), pp.15-30; Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: The search for a new Ummah* (London: Hurst, 2004), Fawaz Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Kirsten E. Schulze and Joseph Chinyong Liow, 'Making jihadis, waging jihad: transnational and local dimensions of the ISIS phenomenon in Indonesia and Malaysia', *Asian Security*, 15: 2 (2019), Bryce Liodolt, 'Managing the Global and the Local: The Dual Agenda of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 34: 2 (2011), Jean-Luc Marret, 'Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb: A "Glocal" Organization', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 31:6 (2008)

Finally, the significance of this research crosses disciplinary boundaries. While relevant to scholarship on militancy and terrorism, it also has implications for Indonesian and intellectual history, and for the study of Islamism. It contributes significantly to understanding the role of ideology in the emergence and development of a militant Islamist group fighting anti-colonial, anti-state, and eventually transnational struggles across the second half of the twentieth century. As the DI's successors continue to pursue the creation of an Islamic state, explaining their predecessors' belief structure and trajectory is essential in comprehending the dynamics of militant Islamism in Indonesia today.

Biographies

At the heart of this thesis are the ideas embraced and developed by two men, Sekarmaji Marjan Kartosuwiryo (1905-1962) and Abdullah bin Ahmad Sungkar (1937-1999), who led the DI and its successor. Their contemporaries and subordinates saw them as charismatic leaders and fiery preachers. Deeply committed to the promotion of Islam in Indonesia, both were willing to use violence to achieve their ends. Decades after their deaths, militant Islamists and their supporters continue to use hagiographies published on internet forums, books, and even Facebook fan pages and Instagram hashtags to commemorate their contributions to the cause of bringing about an Islamic state in Indonesia. This section will give a brief overview of their lives.

S.M Kartosuwiryo

Kartosuwiryo was born in Cepu, a small district in Central Java, into a relatively middle class family - his father was an opium trader.⁵ Details of his early life are sparse with few credible biographies to draw on.⁶ Chiara Formichi attempts the most comprehensive and thorough research of his life but only focuses on his religious thought and political activism after he joined PSI in 1927. Nevertheless, the sources generally agree that Kartosuwiryo received a bilingual education in Dutch and Indonesian but had no real Islamic education to speak of. A bright student, he was eventually admitted to the Surabaya Medical School, the *Nederlandisch-Indische Artsen School* (NIAS) in Surabaya when he was eighteen.⁷

⁵ Chiara Formichi, *Islam and the Making of a Nation: Kartosuwiryo and Political Islam in 20th Century Indonesia* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p.1

⁶ As explored more fully in the historiography section of this thesis (see: Analytical Framework), there exist only two biographies of his life, both riddled with factual errors. Additionally, both pieces were explicitly funded by the Republican government seeking to discredit Kartosuwiryo, thus compromising the neutrality of their research.

⁷ *Idem*, p.18

It is unclear what exactly resulted in Kartosuwiryo's expulsion from his medical training around 1926, but around 1927 he began frequenting the home of Umar Said Crokroaminoto, a prominent nationalist. Crokroaminoto hosted a renowned salon in Surabaya where budding Muslim intellectuals and anti-colonial activists would gather and debate.⁸ Crokroaminoto had founded the SDI, a batik traders' union, in 1911. By the time of Kartosuwiryo's arrival, the organisation had evolved into a budding political party, the PSI. Kartosuwiryo quickly rose within the ranks of the PSI, becoming a committed Islamic nationalist, despite his lack of formal religious training.

The PSI embraced a Modernist Islamist worldview under the leadership of Crokroaminoto's successor Agus Salim. Islamic modernism is a school of thought that grew out of a Muslim reformist movement largely based in Cairo. Its key thinkers, Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), called for the use of Western scientific advances to strengthen of Islamic societies in order to resist colonialism. Simultaneously, they advocated the strengthening of Islam by purifying its practice. They believed that the basis of laws in society should be rooted in direct readings of the Qur'an and the *hadith*, the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, rather interpretations set out by the four schools of Islamic legal scholarship.⁹

Given the paucity of information, it is only possible to speculate about what drove Kartosuwiryo to embrace Islam, particularly its role as a political force, at this point in his life. As a young man from the lower *priyayi* class (as Formichi notes, 'a status earned through [his father's] employment in the colonial administration'), it is likely he was an *abangan* (literally, the brown or red ones), 'a Javanese term used to describe those Muslims whose adherence to Islam was seldom more than a formal, nominal commitment'.¹⁰ It may simply be the case that at some point in his education in Dutch schools or medical college that Kartosuwiryo encountered friends who were more religiously inclined, or that he simply chanced upon Modernist literature that was increasingly in circulation in Indonesia, often brought back by pilgrims returning from Mecca. According to Kevin Fogg, this literature was growing in circulation because there was a marked increase in

⁸ Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation*, p.25

⁹ A full account of Sarekat Islam's trajectory from its origins as a batik trader's union to a Modernist, Islamist political party will be explored in Chapter 1.

¹⁰ Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation*, p.1 and M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200* (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001), p.207

Muslims performing the *hajj* to Mecca between 1920 and 1929 as well as a substantial rise in the numbers of young Indonesians studying in Egypt and Arabia in that same period.¹¹

Few scholars have been able to pinpoint any dates of Kartosuwiryo's belated religious education. In some instances, it appears that he either taught himself ('mostly through Dutch-language books' since he could not speak or read Arabic) or perhaps received tutelage from Crokroaminoto, Salim or others at the salon.¹² Regardless, his inability to engage with the core texts of Islam in its original language – the language of the Prophet – would have been anathema to Modernist Islamists, who increasingly made up the ranks of SI. The Modernists saw engaging directly with Revelatory texts as the key route to attaining a proper understanding of the faith.

Kartosuwiryo also received lessons from several Traditionalist religious scholars, such as Yusuf Taujiri, Mustofa Kamil and Ramli.¹³ In contrast to the Modernists, Traditionalist Islamic teachers advocated an '[acceptance] of the four Sunni Schools of Law as valid guides to knowing Islam...[recognising] that these legal traditions are subject to change and redefinition. It commonly involves tolerance towards locally derived cultural expressions, acceptance of mysticism and a gradualist approach towards greater Islamisation'.¹⁴ Complicating things further, Solahudin claims that Kartosuwiryo 'studied Sufi teachings, possibly becoming a follower of the Qadariyah Tarekat, a Sufi order', though he does not provide any further information regarding the content of these teachings, details about Kartosuwiryo's level of involvement, or explain when this occurred.¹⁵

Collectively, these accounts suggest that in the years following Kartosuwiryo's expulsion from medical school, he became curious about Islam and set about studying it from a variety of angles. This has led many scholars to believe that this varied background somehow compromised Kartosuwiryo's commitment to SI's and later DI's strict Modernist worldview. This stance is particularly curious given Kartosuwiryo's actions and the thoughts he consistently expressed in his writings in the year's following his membership of SI.

It is likely that, while Kartosuwiryo dabbled in various forms of Islam in the 1920s, by the end of the decade he had largely settled in the Modernist camp. By 1928, Kartosuwiryo was the editor of

¹¹ Kevin Fogg, *Indonesia's Islamic Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), p.34

¹² Solahudin, *The roots of terrorism in Indonesia*, p.29

¹³ Idem, p.30

¹⁴ Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opposition in Java*, p. 514

¹⁵ Solahudin, *The roots of terrorism in Indonesia*, p.30

Fadjar Asia, PSI's newspaper, which aimed to convince readers of the need to end colonial rule and the create an independent Islamic state of Indonesia. It is unlikely he would have attained this position within the SI movement without being committed to their ideas and interpretation of Islam. Given how much discretion he had in exercising editorial judgement over the four years that the paper ran, it is notable that he does not appear to have written articles or published pieces by others promoting Sufi ideas (or indeed non-Modernist ones).

Solahudin, who wrote an excellent and comprehensive account of the DI and JI, nevertheless asserts that Kartosuwiryo's 'understanding of Islamic mysticism would greatly influence his later thinking'.¹⁶ It is unclear what Solahudin means by this because he fails to provide any explanation or evidence of how Sufism factored into Kartosuwiryo's ideological development during his years in SI or when he established the DI. Neither Kartosuwiryo's own writings nor foundational DI documents mention Sufi scholars, highlight Sufi thinking on jurisprudence, or include any other ideas unique to this form of Islam. If it is indeed correct that Kartosuwiryo had any personal connection to these traditions, then he seems to have kept them private and not to have let them undermine his commitment to Modernist thought.

Following the closure of *Fadjar Asia* in 1932, Kartosuwiryo kept a lower profile and a spate of ill health kept him away from public advocacy. The SI movement had little success in advancing the cause of decolonisation and was wracked by intra-party disputes as to how best to move forward. Nevertheless, by 1936, Kartosuwiryo was back to publicly advancing the case for the creation of an Islamic state, putting forward programmes of action and making speeches in West Java. While these gained traction in Islamist circles, they still had little or no tangible success in weakening Dutch rule.

The SI movement's continued failures and its decision to join an alliance with secular, nationalist parties to petition the Dutch government for self-rule in 1938 were a source of great frustration for Kartosuwiryo. His pronounced opposition to the pact resulted in the party leadership expelling him in 1939. His activities between 1939 and the invasion of Indonesia by Japan in 1942 were limited. According to Solahudin, he established the Suffah Institute, a Traditionalist Islamic boarding school which was 'an unrealised PSI program intended to be a "place of education,

¹⁶ Solahudin, *The roots of terrorism in Indonesia*, p.30

teaching and training for party leaders to implement the law and commands of Islam”¹⁷. However, the project was shut down by the invading Japanese forces in March 1942.

The invasion marked a watershed moment for the Indonesian independence movement by ending nearly 400 years of Western imperial interference and domination. While the Japanese denied Indonesia outright independence, they allowed anti-colonial leaders to participate in daily governance and propaganda efforts, thus giving them the opportunity to gain significant experience. Exiled nationalist figures were allowed to return, provided that they did not oppose Japanese dominance. Ultimately, the occupation was important in undermining local perceptions of Dutch superiority. As Elson writes, through practical and symbolic acts, such as the removal of Dutch as an official language and reforms to the legal system, the Japanese helped to strengthen feelings of anti-Westernism and foster a sense of Indonesian solidarity.¹⁸

Despite the Japanese authorities' initial hostility to Kartosuwiryo's project, he was allowed to return to his initial career as a journalist and advocate. He published numerous pieces for *Soeara MLAI* (The Voice of MIAI), a political magazine run by the Majelis Islamil a'la Indonesia (MIAI, Indonesian Muslim High Council), a Japanese-backed organisation for Islamic groups. MIAI would form the basis of the Islamic political party Masyumi following the end of the Japanese occupation. While these writings for *Soeara MLAI* were undoubtedly subject to much censorship, Kartosuwiryo appeared willing to make compromises with a new regime that had theoretically promised self-governance and had successfully ousted the hated Dutch. His writings were largely confined to the extolling the virtues of Islamic charity and other non-controversial topics.

This brief period of mild political advocacy ended abruptly as Allied forces made headway in Asia. Sensing that Japan's defeat was imminent and that there was the potential for real independence, Sukarno and other nationalists began drafting a constitution for an independent Indonesia. This constitution saw a future Indonesia as a federation, guided by the principles of *Pancasila*, a concept created by Sukarno that affirmed a belief in God, but did not specify Islam as the basis of the state. There were no provisions for the implementation of *shari'a* or Islamic governance structures. The Islamist movement's failures to secure Indonesia's future as an Islamic state during the constitution writing process and the Indonesian Revolution against the Dutch, radicalised Kartosuwiryo.

¹⁷ Solahudin, *The roots of terrorism*, p.31

¹⁸ R.E. Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.101

By 1946, Kartosuwiryo and other Masyumi leaders frustrated with the lack of progress in negotiations with the returning Dutch colonialists, began calling for a holy war. Initially Kartosuwiryo interpreted this as an internal, spiritual struggle, and encouraged Indonesian Muslims to better the practice of their faith in order to resist the Dutch. However, the increasingly brutal tactics of the Dutch forces in 1947 and 1948 pushed Kartosuwiryo away from this pacifist approach. In March 1948, he along with senior Masyumi officials moved to Cirebon, West Java to establish a consolidated Islamic military force called the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII, Indonesian Islamic Army), which he believed could take control of the republic.

As the TII gained limited success in establishing a base in West Java, Kartosuwiryo released the *Kanun Azasy Negara Islam Indonesia* (Constitution of the NII) on 27 August 1948, seemingly hoping that it would serve as the eventual basis for the Indonesian state at the conclusion of the Indonesian Revolution. The document served as a culmination of Kartosuwiryo's beliefs in the need for an Islamic state in an independent Indonesia, based on a Modernist, Islamist principles. The NII/TII's limited success at keeping the Dutch out of their stronghold stood in stark contrast to the failures of the nationalist leaders led by Sukarno. By 1948, most nationalist leaders had been rounded up and arrested, leading Kartosuwiryo to remark that there had been 'only two groups at war: the Islamic State of Indonesia and the state of the Netherlands'.¹⁹ The nationalists' failure to expel the Dutch confirmed in Kartosuwiryo's mind that only an Indonesian Islamic State could successfully lead the people of Indonesia to freedom.

However, the nationalists were quickly released following increasing pressure on the Dutch by the UN and the United States in early 1949. By May 1949, Sukarno had secured an agreement for the transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia (RI). The basis of the RI would be the constitution drawn up by the nationalists at the end of the Second World War, effectively creating a pluralist, largely secular Republic.

With few options remaining other than to continue his struggle for an Islamic state, Kartosuwiryo gathered his remaining followers in West Java, and on 7 August 1949 declared the formation of the Negara Islam Indonesia known in other words, as ad-Daulatul Islamiyyah, or Darul Islam.²⁰ The declaration effectively marked the start of the DI's 13-year struggle against the Republic of

¹⁹ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Negara Islam Indonesia Maklumat no. 7', 23 December 1948, Arsip Penumpasan DI-TII JaBar, folii, AABRI

²⁰ Cornelius Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1981)p.3

Indonesia. While difficult for the nascent Republican government in Jakarta to subdue in its entirety, Kartosuwiryo's forces were largely confined to rural strongholds in West Java.

Through a series of pacts with other disaffected groups, with varying levels of commitment to Kartosuwiryo's interpretation of an Islamic state, the NII grew to encompass other rebellions in South Sulawesi, Aceh, and South Kalimantan. However, as van Dijk points out, the motivations of the leaders of these subsequent rebellions were disparate, and frequently rooted in local or even personal grievances against the Sukarno and the government in Jakarta.²¹ Kartosuwiryo did not meaningfully lead these varied and geographically separate groups, nor was he able to impose his constitution, much less interpretation of Islam on these rebellions. Resultantly, as mentioned in the initial section of this introduction, it is not useful to treat these as a unified whole.

While Kartosuwiryo's forces held out successfully against the Republicans for over a decade, Sukarno's forces were eventually able to consolidate their hold over Java by 1962. Kartosuwiryo was captured in June 1962 and swiftly executed by a firing squad on 5 September that same year. While his death marked the end of Indonesia's longest Islamist rebellion, surviving DI members and a new generation of Islamist activists kept alive his dream of creating an Islamist state.

In the years following his death, several biographies and academic studies reopened the question of Kartosuwiryo's commitment to Islamism and Modernist principles. Military-sponsored biographies by Amak Sjariffudin and Pinardi, as well as scholars such as Cornelius van Dijk and Karl Jackson routinely made the point of highlighting Kartosuwiryo's inclinations towards 'traditional' beliefs and his embrace of Javanese mysticism.

However, their accounts of Kartosuwiryo's religious beliefs are wholly inadequate. Sjariffudin and Pinardi, for example, do not examine Kartosuwiryo's written texts. Instead, their critique of his religious practice has largely been confined to noting that he carried amulets with him to ward off evil spirits alongside other traditional symbols of power and influence such as a *keris* (dagger, usually with a curved blade) and *cundrik* (a smaller dagger with a straight blade).²²

By emphasising these aspects of Kartosuwiryo's apparent embrace of syncretism, Sjariffudin and Pinardi appear to be trying to undermine his commitment to a 'pure' conceptualisation of Islam

²¹ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Negara Islam Indonesia Maklumat no. 7', 23 December 1948, Arsip Penumpasan DI-TII JaBar, folii, AABRI

²² Sjariffudin, *Kisab Kartosuwiryo*, pp.20-21

and thus his aim of building an Islamic state in Indonesia. However, given that they were writing biographies commissioned and supported by the military which had arrested Kartosuwiryo just a year prior to their publication, it is unlikely that these arguments came from a place of good faith. The biographies appear to be attempts to delegitimise Kartosuwiryo and his movement, rather than an honest or compete appraisal of his thoughts and actions.

A slightly more comprehensive critique is attempted by van Dijk and Jackson. Van Dijk writes that Kartosuwiryo ‘professed [an] ability to assure invulnerability to bullets through special incantations’,²³ collected allegedly magical swords and believed that spirits roamed the forests around his camps.²⁴ These syncretic practices alongside his Sufi beliefs, van Dijk argues, ‘definitely does not seem to fit into the atmosphere’ of SI’s Modernist approach to Islam.²⁵ Instead, Van Dijk argues support for Kartosuwiryo’s cause was not due to his religious beliefs or a desire for an Islamic state, but rather the material concerns and discontent among the peasantry about the level of inequality.

Jackson similarly argues that Kartosuwiryo’s Sufism is evidence that he was not truly Muslim, instead positing that Islam supplies ‘a panoply of symbols that can be used to legitimize the leaders and ignite political action’.²⁶ Kartosuwiryo’s desire to defend Muslims through the establishment of a state was merely ‘a cry that can be used to galvanise’ action.²⁷ Thus, Jackson argues that the motivating factor in the conflict was not religion, and that people were compelled by traditional authority figures or coerced by physical threats into participating.

Both men are right that Kartosuwiryo never embraced a strict Modernist approach in his presentation to DI members on the battlefield, and that he seemingly incorporated syncretic and animistic beliefs, as was customary in Javanese society and his *priyayi* background. However, an embrace of these practices should not be grounds for invalidating his overarching commitment to the Modernist principles that underpin his ideology or his calls for the establishment of an Islamic state of Indonesia.

²³van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam*, p.122

²⁴Ibid, p.123

²⁵van Dijk, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam*, p.27

²⁶ Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion*, p.126

²⁷ Ibid

Moreover, the explicit content of these ‘Sufi’ beliefs are never explained or elaborated on. It is unclear from both texts the degree to which Kartosuwiryo understood or articulated Sufi theology or how it influenced his political project. Additionally, both men entirely fail to engage with the state-building project and ideological framework set out by Kartosuwiryo in the years preceding the outbreak of the rebellion, seemingly ignoring his many writings and proclamations about the need for an Islamic state.

Given Kartosuwiryo’s years of participation in nationalist-Islamist organisations, his advocacy in SI publications, and subsequent DI documents that attempt to lay out a framework for this nascent state, it seems disingenuous to argue that Islam was simply a post-hoc explanation for a power grab by Kartosuwiryo or, in Van Dijk’s words, a convenient ‘rallying point for resistance rather than a political project’.²⁸ As Formichi rightly points out, Van Dijk only asks why individuals fought against the Indonesian Republic rather than why they fought for the DI. This analysis ignores the movement’s aims and ideological development.²⁹

Despite this blind spot, van Dijk’s work is still a worthy study as the first academic text on DI. He provides a comprehensive assessment of power-relations through the impact of agricultural reforms on the living standards of West Javanese peasants and brings into focus the wider social factors that affected support for Kartosuwiryo. Jackson’s work, on the other hand, is riddled with methodological errors. Jackson claims to be able to accurately map political attitudes through an intensive series of surveys. At least 19 local village administrators and some 200 villagers participated in three-hour long interviews conducted in 1969.³⁰ While claiming that this method is comprehensive due how long it took to complete, Jackson does not appear to acknowledge the potential that the data he gathered was compromised in any way by the participants’ incomplete memories of the movement, personal biases, unwillingness to be wholly truthful, or fear of disappointing authoritative-seeming researchers who descended on their villages.

His treatment of the villagers’ religious understanding is similarly dubious, broadly categorising them into four groups (Modernist, Traditional orthodox, nominal Muslim and syncretist) based on their responses to six multiple choice questions.³¹ Putting aside the issue of whether six multiple choice questions can allow a researcher to meaningfully grasp an individual’s religious worldview,

²⁸ van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam*, p.391

²⁹ Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation*, p.7

³⁰ Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion*, p.39

³¹ Idem, p. 340

the text does not clearly define these four categories, which Jackson seems to have invented himself.³² Furthermore, fewer than ten pages are devoted to the study of DI ideology or the beliefs held by its members and leadership.

Instead, as succinctly noted by Ruth McVey in her article skewering Jackson's work, he seems 'almost entirely concerned with the contradiction between religious and modern (that is, western liberal) elements' and '[it] is taken as axiomatic that there is a contradiction, for religion – or at least Islam – cannot be modern'.³³ Worryingly, Jackson appears to be arguing that 'whatever its adherents might think, Islam is form without content – a vehicle for something else'.³⁴ Given these methodological flaws and misunderstanding of Islam, it is unsurprising that Jackson concluded that neither religion nor Kartosuwiryo himself played a significant role in the outbreak of violence. Although van Dijk and Jackson's works are regarded as key texts in the study of DI, their decision to downplay or ignore the religious motivations for the conflict appears unfounded and ill-judged.

Abdullah Sungkar

Far less has been written about Abdullah Sungkar, despite the prominence of the militant group that he founded. The lack of written sources and comprehensive biographical data until his rise to prominence in the DI movement makes it difficult to paint a complete picture of his early life or to precisely date events. Nevertheless, in the course of researching this thesis, numerous DI and JI members who knew him all remarked on his intelligence, wit, and charm. This hints at his personality, suggesting that he was a charismatic leader and skilled orator, capable of motivating supporters to lay down their lives in service of the creation of an Islamic state.

Sungkar was a product of the schools established by Indonesian Modernists at the turn of the century. Born in Solo in 1937, he attended a primary school run by the al-Irsyad movement and was a member of their scout troop as a teenager.³⁵ He would continue his affiliation with the organisation throughout the early years of his career as an Islamist activist, indicating that he believed that *dakwah* (proselytisation) would be the key to changing the hearts and minds of Indonesians and garnering support for creation of an Islamic state.

³² Ibid

³³ Ruth McVey, "Review: Islam Explained Reviewed Work(s): Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior. by Karl D. Jackson", *Pacific Affairs* 54, No. 2 (1981), p.263

³⁴ Idem, p.264

³⁵ Ibid

The al-Irsyad movement was established in 1914 by, and largely composed of, members of the Hadhrami community: individuals from the Hadhramaut region in Yemen and their descendants.³⁶ Al-Irsyad promoted reforms to the practice of Islam in Indonesia, with a particular emphasis on education. This was because the organisation's leadership began 'from the basic premise that Muslims in general, and Hadramis in particular, found themselves in a state of backwardness and ignorance' and thus needed 'instruction or guidance'.³⁷ Al-Irsyad schools 'stressed Arabic language and Islamic education' and used 'textbooks imported from the Middle East', even when teaching non-religious subjects such as history.³⁸ Older students read 'Abduh's works, eschewing traditional 'classical texts of Islamic jurisprudence'.³⁹

Sungkar left the al-Irsyad network briefly. After primary school, he completed his secondary education at the Modern Islamic School, another Modernist institution, in 1951. During that time, Sungkar held leadership roles in the Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (GPPI, Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement), an Islamist youth group with close ties to Masyumi.⁴⁰ Upon graduation in 1957, he worked selling *batik* to support his family.

During his travels around Java, he met Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, another Hadrami, who would go on to become his lifelong friend and collaborator in the DI and JI. Interviews with DI and JI participants as well as material in the secondary literature indicate that Ba'asyir played a subordinate role to Sungkar, and made only nominally contributions to the ideological development of the movement.

Sungkar's stint as a batik salesman was short-lived. Together with Ba'asyir, Sungkar returned to the al-Irsyad movement in the mid-1960s and served on its board as part of its religious outreach division while Ba'asyir acted as its general secretary in Solo.⁴¹ The two men were a natural fit for the organisation as members of the Hadhrami community themselves.

As part of his work with al-Irsyad, Sungkar, Ba'asyir and their friend, Hasan Basri, established a radio station called the Radio Dakwah Islam ABC (al-Irsyad Broadcasting Commission Islamic

³⁶ Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening: Community and Identity in the Netherlands East Indies, 1900-1942* (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Programme Publications, 2004), pp.52-53

³⁷ Idem, p.56

³⁸ Idem, p.80

³⁹ Idem, p.81

⁴⁰ ICG, 'Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia', *Indonesia Briefing* (Jakarta/Brussels, 8 August 200), p.6

⁴¹ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, pp.81-82

Proselytisation Radio) in 1967. This venture appears to have been short-lived; Solahudin writes '[other] members of al-Irsyad in Solo were not fond of the trio because they considered their preaching to be too hard-line'.⁴²

Forced out, Sungkar and Ba'asyir subsequently established Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Surakarta (Radis; Surakarta Islamic Proselytisation Radio) with the assistance of Abdullah Latif, the founder of Yayasan Pendidikan Islam dan Asuhan Yatim/Miskin (YPIA; the Al Mukmin Islamic Education and Shelter for Orphans and the Poor Foundation). Another of Sungkar's confidants, claimed that the men preached about the issues of the day, but said in an interview that he could not recall specific details as to the content of their sermons. However, a *Tempo* magazine report gives some indication of the provocative nature of their sermons, quoting Ba'asyir as saying:

We Indonesians live as if we were riding an air-conditioned bus. It's all cool and comfortable but we are actually heading towards hell. And the driver is... Suharto!⁴³

Despite these strong words, the authorities did not shut the station down until 1975.⁴⁴ This suggests that government and security officials did not see the broadcasts as a significant threat for the majority of their time on air and therefore unlikely that Sungkar, or even Ba'asyir, was explicitly advocating violent interpretations of *jihad* on air or speaking of the need for Muslims to take up arms against perceived oppressors in more general terms during this period.⁴⁵

In addition to their work with al-Irsyad, Sungkar and Ba'asyir taught in local religious schools, once again showing their faith that *dakwah* would be the key to building support for an Islamic state in Indonesia. Sungkar and Ba'asyir ran a daily religious study group at the Solo Grand Mosque, continuing to spread their interpretation of Islam.

In line with this commitment to proselytisation, the men joined the DDII shortly after its foundation in 1967. Established by former Indonesian prime minister Mohammad Natsir, the organisation was a vehicle to advocate for an Islamic state amidst increasing hostility to Islamist groups by the Sukarno regime. The regime had already banned Masyumi in 1960, and thus Natsir

⁴² Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, pp.82-83

⁴³ 'Perjalanan Seorang Ngruki Dua', *Tempo*, 27 October 2002

⁴⁴ ICG, 'Al-Qaeda In Southeast Asia', p.6

⁴⁵ According to Solahudin, the Solo military authorities closed down the station for fears that Sungkar and Ba'asyir's criticisms of man-made, as opposed to Islamic, law and diatribes against the legitimacy of secular, non-Islamic, government presented a challenge to Suharto's rule. Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, p.83

had to find new avenues to continue his propagation efforts. Mentored by Natsir, Sungkar rose through the DDII's ranks and was appointed head of its Solo branch in 1970. Ba'asyir followed along, acting as Sungkar's deputy there.

Despite these early commitments to non-violent activism, the political repression of the Sukarno and Suharto governments appears to have slowly pushed Sungkar to his breaking point, causing him 'to find common cause' with DI.⁴⁶ As noted above, while Sungkar moved on to work with the al-Irsyad network following the banning of Masyumi, the event was still a source of grievance. Sungkar even mentioned it in his defence plea at his 1982 trial, criticising the government for its 'manipulation' of political parties and civil society organisations to serve their own ends.⁴⁷ Sungkar renounced his DDII membership in 1976, fully embracing the DI's militant Islamism.

His entry into the organisation facilitated a change in the group's ideology. Steeped in the teachings of the Egyptian Modernist Sayyid Qutb and the Arabian ideologue Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, Sungkar concretised the group's belief in the need for violent *jihad* to bring about an Islamic state. He championed new concepts like *takfir* and *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* that would justify and expand the group's range of legitimate targets.

Barely two years into his membership of the DI, Sungkar was arrested on 10 November 1978 on charges of subversion and for failing to adopt the national ideology of *Pancasila*.⁴⁸ A few days later, Ba'asyir was arrested as well. The men spent the next few years in and out of prison awaiting their trial in 1982. They were eventually convicted, but their sentences were subsequently reduced to three years and ten months, the equivalent to their period in detention before the trial.⁴⁹ However, in 1985, prosecutors successfully appealed the reduced sentences, paving the way for Sungkar and Ba'asyir's re-arrest.⁵⁰

In this period of uncertainty, Sungkar seemingly recorded a series of sermons before fleeing to Malaysia to avoid a return to prison in 1985. The precise date of these recordings is not known as they were uploaded anonymously onto the website, *Internet Archive*. The few political events mentioned in the recordings, such as references to foreign and Afghan mujahideen fighting the

⁴⁶ Jones, 'New Order Repression and the Birth of the Jemaah Islamiyah', p.40

⁴⁷ Abdullah bin Ahmad Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, and Irfan Suryahardy, *Perjalanan hukum di Indonesia: Sebuah Gugatan* (Yogyakarta: Ar-Risalah: Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Masjid (BKPM), 1982), p.91

⁴⁸ ICG, 'Al-Qaeda In Southeast Asia', p.7

⁴⁹ *Idem*, p.9

⁵⁰ *Idem*, p.11

Soviet Union, suggest that they were made sometime between 1984 and 1985, but this is difficult to determine with total accuracy.⁵¹ What is clear from Sungkar's statements is that he believed that he was being watched by intelligence officers, saying in one recording that 'there is an intelligence officer here, investigating preachers like me', and that he was still in Indonesia at the point of the recordings, referencing recent trips to cities like Solo and Surabaya.⁵²

Nevertheless, given the lack of written documents by Sungkar, the recordings are some of the only sources available that provide direct insight into his political thought and beliefs. Sungkar does not appear to have left behind a comprehensive written record of his political ideology, at least in his initial years as an activist. Fellow DI and JI members, even those considered to be close friends, do not appear able to provide much insight into his beliefs prior to his membership of these organisations. These men largely met Sungkar for the first time while in DI or JI *pesantren* (religious boarding schools) and were often significantly younger and occupied subordinate positions within the group's hierarchy. They seem to have been unwilling to probe into the backgrounds of their elders and superiors.

However, this lack of written material is not particularly unusual or unique to Sungkar. Few, if any, of Indonesia's leading militant Islamists appear to have committed their political philosophies or ideologies to paper. Separatist leaders who joined the DI movement such as Daud Beureueh and Kahar Muzakkar did not leave behind a large corpus of written work.⁵³ Similarly, DI leaders such as Aceng Kurnia, Syahirul Alim and Abdullah Muhammad Masduki (alias Ajengan Masduki) neither produced a substantive corpus of written work themselves or even oversaw the publication of significant volumes detailing the group's ideological beliefs.⁵⁴ Kartosuwiryo, through his writings for PSI and Masyumi, was an exception to this trend. When probed in interviews about the lack of written records, several DI members simply shrugged or said the production of texts was 'not necessary'.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Abdullah Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 4', undated, *Internet Archive*, https://archive.org/details/audio_abdullah_sungkar/U_Abdullah_Sungkar_4.mp3, accessed: 13 February 2020

⁵² Abdullah Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 3', undated, *Internet Archive*, https://archive.org/details/audio_abdullah_sungkar/U_Abdullah_Sungkar_3.mp3, accessed: 13 February 2020

⁵³ For a discussion on the lack of written sources discussing Kahar Muzakkar's rebellion in South Sulawesi and a reliance on oral sources see: Barbara Sillars Harvey, 'Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950-1965', PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1974, pp.7-8, pp.181

⁵⁴ Solahudin's work *NII sampai JI: Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2011) makes numerous references to interviews with sources within the DI and JI movements to clarify theological concepts these men promoted. In contrast, there are significantly fewer references to pamphlets, books and other texts these individuals wrote.

⁵⁵ Interview with Ahmad Sajuli, Jakarta, 20 July 2018

These men were reluctant to commit their ideas to paper: they had pragmatic concerns, and believed in the power of oratory over the written word. It is likely that these individuals viewed the cost and effort of producing pamphlets and books too onerous for little pay off in terms of their proselytisation efforts; perhaps believing that potential supporters would be disinclined to read lengthy texts. The men may have had concerns that printing such incendiary material might engendered further repression from the security.

Instead, DI leaders strongly believe that they wielded the greatest influence through preaching, and – like those who received a religious education in *pesantren* – placed great ‘emphasis on the oral transmission even of written texts’.⁵⁶ AK, a close friend of Sungkar’s said in an interview that Sungkar was ‘more convincing when he spoke... quite powerful’ and that he ‘did not like writing’.⁵⁷ This disinclination towards writing and a belief that they were better able to persuade potential recruits through preaching in mosques, schools or small study groups ultimately resulted in a paucity of write sources for historians to assess. Bearing this in mind, this chapter makes a unique contribution to the study of DI’s ideology upon the entry of Sungkar into its leadership circle as it examines some of the only existing material directly produced by Sungkar himself.

The content of Sungkar’s 1980s sermons relates to the personal conduct of Muslims, the denunciation of heretical behaviour, the Republican government and other enemies of Islam, as well as the need for an Islamic state and the implementation of *shari’a*, and thus illustrate the influence of *salafi* and *Wahhabi* ideas on his thinking. It is not clear why Sungkar recorded these sermons when he did. Temby, citing an anonymously recorded interview with Adung, Sungkar’s driver, posits that he may have been trying to inspire a revolution similar to the 1979 uprising in Iran.⁵⁸ Given the timing of their alleged recording, it is also plausible that he simply wanted to spread and preserve his message in case he was made to return to jail. Nevertheless, these recordings provide a clear overview of Sungkar’s thinking, particularly on the issues of *takfir* and *al-walā’ wa-l-barā’* during his initial years as a DI member.

Sungkar and Ba’asyir left Indonesia in April 1985. The men set themselves up in a rental house in the Bandar Baru Bangi area of Kuala Lumpur with help from Natsir. Numerous DI members went

⁵⁶ Martin van Bruinessen, ‘“Traditionalist” and “Islamist” *pesantren* in contemporary Indonesia’, in Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen, eds. *The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and Transnational Linkages* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), p.221

⁵⁷ Interview with AK, Jakarta, 4 October 2019

⁵⁸ Temby, ‘Jihadists Assemble: The rise of militant Islam in Southeast Asia’, PhD Dissertation (Canberra: Australian National University, 2017)p.128

with them, establishing a small community of exiles.⁵⁹ Sungkar was soon connected with Abdul Wahid Kadungga, a former personal secretary of Natsir's who told him about a potential opportunity to further his struggle against the Indonesian state.⁶⁰ Kadungga had recently been to Afghanistan and had met Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian ideologue and leader of the foreign *mujahideen* fighting the Soviet Union. Kadungga told Sungkar that Azzam was running military training programmes for foreign fighters.⁶¹ According to Solahuddin, Sungkar leapt at the opportunity to equip his followers with the skills necessary for armed conflict against the Indonesian state.⁶²

While sympathetic to the plight of the Afghans, Sungkar first and foremost saw his decision to send DI cadres to Afghanistan through the lens of his own struggle against the Indonesian government. Sungkar swiftly organised a meeting with Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, an Afghan militant leader in Peshawar to nail down the details of this plan. Sayyaf's organisation, the al-Ittihad al-Islamy would pay for travel of DI members and their accommodation. The men would then train alongside Sayyaf's camps on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, but would not participate in front-line combat against Soviet forces.⁶³ Sungkar was ecstatic and by the end of 1985, the first DI members flew to Peshawar. In total, ten batches of DI recruits would train in Afghanistan between 1985 and 1991, learning valuable combat skills to further their *jihad* in Indonesia.

Despite this progress, Sungkar simultaneously faced problems back in Indonesia with the senior DI leaders who did not join him in his flight to Malaysia. In 1987, the organisation's consultative council appointed Ajengan Masduki as the new DI imam over Sungkar. The men did not get on personally but had significant disagreements over the best way to achieve an Islamic state.

Sungkar, frustrated by the DI's lack of progress since its rebellion was crushed by the state in 1962, believed that a change in tactics was necessary. Influenced by Egyptian ideologues, Sungkar began to believe that the DI's organisational structure, which was largely unchanged from Kartosuwiryo's Islamic state with 'ministers' and 'battalion commanders' stationed around the country, was not fit for purpose given the DI did not have a territorial base. Instead, he advocated for the creation of a clandestine group, organised into various cells that would preach, wage *jihad* against the

⁵⁹ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, p.129

⁶⁰ Ibid

⁶¹ Ibid

⁶² Ibid

⁶³ Idem, p.131

Indonesian state, and facilitate the creation of small communities where members could lead lives in line with group's ideology. Repeatedly rebuffed by Masduki, Sungkar – along with Ba'asyir, and numerous members who had fought in Afghanistan – officially left the DI in 1992, and announced the formation of the Jemaah Islamiyah on 1 January 1993.

Sungkar died of natural causes in 1999. He had returned to Indonesia a year earlier following the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998 and the beginnings of Indonesia's latest democratic experience. While he had laid the ground work for a successful *jihadist* organisation, he did not come close in his lifetime to achieving an Islamic state.

Thesis Structure

This thesis is organised into seven chapters. The initial chapter focuses on the thesis' analytical framework. It outlines key issues in the historiography of Islamism and Indonesian militancy and explains the methodology that underpins this thesis.

The subsequent chapters each focusing on a different aspect of the DI's ideology between 1928 and 1993. Chapter One focuses on the foundational idea of *hākimiyya* and its conceptualisation and understanding by Kartosuwiryo. It analyses the broader roots of *hākimiyya* in Islamist discourse and how Kartosuwiryo came to see it as the solution to colonial oppression. It thus establishes the core objectives of DI and how the group attempted to actualise this belief with the establishment of the NII in 1949.

Building on this, Chapter Two examines the concept of *jihad*, which Kartosuwiryo saw as essential to the formation and security of the NII. In his early career as an Islamist activist and politician Kartosuwiryo initially embraced the plurality of meanings associated with *jihad*, but his definition narrowed to a purely physical struggle with the onset of the Second World War. Kartosuwiryo understood *jihad* as a defensive war to ensure the freedom of Indonesian Muslims and as the only means of establishing the Islamic state. It was thus an obligation for all Muslims to participate in this conflict against foreign invaders and subsequently against nationalists and co-religionists who failed to uphold God's will on earth.

Chapter Three then examines the adjacent concepts of *takfīr* and *al-wala' wa-l-barā'*, which serve to protect and preserve Islam. Kartosuwiryo belatedly embraced these concepts to facilitate compliance

and loyalty among members. This chapter explores how these ideas resonated with a new generation of recruits, particularly Abdullah Sungkar. It examines the similarities and differences between these men's interpretation of *takfir* and *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* and identifies the points at which foreign ideas were incorporated amid a period of growing Islamisation in Indonesia.

Chapter Four returns to the concept of *jihad*, and how the group embraced a broader, non-violent understanding of the term in order to account for their comprehensive defeat by Sukarno's troops and the death of Kartosuwiryo. The chapter then goes on to examine how the group slowly returned to a conceptualisation of *jihad* as the sole means of achieving *hakimiyya* following increasing repression by Suharto and the induction of Abdullah Sungkar into the group. It focuses on the impact of Sungkar's *salafi*-influenced ideas, which led the group to revert to physical violence against the state and civilians deemed to be enemies of Islam.

Chapter Five continues to examine the concept of *jihad* in light of Sungkar's decision to send DI members to participate in the conflict against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It will examine the apparent impact of participating alongside the *mujabideen* and the influence of the teachings of the Palestinian ideology Abdullah Azzam on the DI's understanding of *jihad*. It demonstrates that despite these developments, DI leaders remained focused on Indonesia as their primary theatre of conflict, largely reinforcing the conceptualisation of *jihad* as a means to *hakimiyya* initially forged during Kartosuwiryo's leadership.

Finally, Chapter Six re-examines the conceptualisation of *hakimiyya* under Sungkar's leadership in order to account for his decision to leave DI. The group had lacked a territorial stronghold since Kartosuwiryo's death and its members were scattered across Indonesia and Malaysia. This fundamentally altered the group's understanding of how best to achieve an Islamic state. Coupled with this, tensions between Sungkar and DI *amir*, Ajengan Masduki (also known as Abdullah Muhammad Masduki), over what constituted an Islamic community, an Islamic state and its actualisation, eventually saw the breakdown of the organisation and the establishment of JI as an alternative path to realising *hakimiyya*.

Across these chapters, this thesis advances new arguments in the scholarly research on Indonesian militant Islamism and the role and conceptualisation of ideology in the DI movement. Through examining the various components that make up the group's belief structure, it challenges the conventional understanding of Islamist groups operating outside the so-called core of the Middle

East. It illustrates their ability to create a unique ideological framework, influenced as much, if not more, by domestic circumstances than foreign events, and thus is relevant for not only Indonesian history but larger discourses on global Islamist militancy and terrorism studies in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Analytical Framework: Historiography and Methodology

The primary focus of this thesis is an exploration of the core and secondary concepts that make up the DI's ideology, namely *hākimiyya* and *jihad* as well as *takfir* and *al-walā wa-l-barā*. In order to account for how these ideas were interpreted and adapted by Kartosuwiryo and later Abdullah Sungkar, an analytical framework must first be established. This chapter will thus explore the three key concepts that ground the arguments across this thesis, namely Islamism, theories of ideology, and the practice of intellectual history. The precise definitions and conceptualisations of these terms will be outlined in the initial section of this chapter.

This chapter will then examine the relevant historiography. It will look at the debate over whether the JI should be considered a product of global Islamist militancy or a domestic phenomenon, the role of ideology in Indonesian militancy, and the debate regarding whether the DI was a truly religiously inspired movement. It will also situate the DI within the wider political Islamist landscape in Indonesia, contrasting the group with non-violent movements. Finally, this chapter will evaluate the key sources used in this thesis and elaborate on its methodology, highlighting the role of archival sources and oral histories.

Core Concepts

The analysis undertaken in this thesis is grounded in the concept of Islamism and its relationship to militancy, ideology, and intellectual history. The analytical framework of this thesis is constructed using particular conceptions of these complex terms and practices, drawing on the theories outlined below.

Islamism and Militancy

This thesis has thus far described the DI as a militant Islamist organisation. In doing so, it has deliberately eschewed using terms like terrorism, *Wahhabism*, *salafism* or *salafi-jihadist* to define the group's political outlook, aims, and actions. While the DI's ideology contained elements of these concepts, they rarely manifested consistently across the entire period under study. By contrast, Islamism, sometimes referred to as political Islam, sufficiently broad as to encompass the evolution of the group's ideology from its inception to its fragmentation. Simultaneously, the term retains enough specificity to avoid being a meaningless descriptor.

In conceptualising Islamism, this thesis draws heavily on the work of Mohammad Ayoob, Quintan Wiktorowicz, and Gilles Kepel. Islamism is ‘a form of instrumentalisation of Islam by individuals, groups and organisations that pursue political objectives’.⁶⁴ It is underpinned by the belief that Islam should be the primary, or indeed sole, basis for constructing and organising the state and society. At its core, it views the establishment of an Islamic state – often within the territorial boundaries of an existing nation-state – and the implementation of *shari’a* as the sole means by which God’s temporal power can be secured on earth. Only through an Islamic state can Muslims practice their faith and live truly in accordance with God’s will.⁶⁵

Islamists include a wide variety of civil society organisations, trade unions, political parties, as well as violent, non-state actors. These groups do not agree on tactics, but they share a desire to return to the past in order to shape the present and future. As Guilain Denoeux notes, Islamism attempts to provide ‘political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest upon reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition’.⁶⁶ This reinvented past relies on a romanticised notion of a largely mythical Islamic golden age. Islamists have largely dehistoricised and decontextualised Islam by separating its beliefs – and the development thereof – from the political and social milieu of the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the first four righteous caliphs.⁶⁷

Islamism’s intellectual origins are, in fact, quite modern. Writing in response to both the decline of the Ottoman caliphate and British and French colonisation of the Arab world in the nineteenth century, Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), argued for Islamic revival and reform in order to fend off the Western threat and secure Muslim political autonomy.⁶⁸ Their doctrine, which came to be known as Islamic Modernism, conceded that the West had achieved scientific and technological superiority, and that ‘the Muslim religion has tried to stifle science and stop its progress’.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Mohammad Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008), p.2

⁶⁵ Mahmoud Haddad, ‘Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashid Rida’s Ideas on the Caliphate’, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 117:2 (Apr – June 1997), p.256

⁶⁶ Guilain Denoeux, ‘The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam’, *Middle East Policy*, 9:2 (2002), p.61

⁶⁷ Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst, 2004), p.25

⁶⁸ For more on the Modernists see: Antony Black, *The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001); Ahmad Dallal, ‘Appropriating the past: Twentieth-Century Reconstruction of Pre-Modern Islamic Thought’, *Islamic Law and Society*, 7:3 (2001), pp.325-358; Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (New York: Warner Books, 1991)

⁶⁹ Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, ‘Religion versus Science’, in Mansoor Moaddel and Karan Talattof, eds. *Contemporary Debates in Islam* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000), p.25

As such, they argued that Muslims should learn from and adopt these advances while simultaneously stripping Islam back to its fundamentals, removing innovations and superstitions in order to strengthen and purify the faith.⁷⁰ These aims were not necessarily at odds with each other, with the Modernists arguing that the original teachings of Islam accorded with scientific rationalism and positivism and that the Islamic state established by the early caliphs had institutions akin to those of modern liberal democracies. Finally, Islamic Modernists saw Islamic unity as the first step to defeating Western imperialism and reconstructing an Islamic polity. Ultimately, these men had a highly political understanding of Islam's role in society and its ability to bring about societal change.

Afghani, Abduh and Rida

Nikki Keddie, Elie Kedourie and Rudi Matthee have been instrumental in analysing the ideas of Afghani. In particular, Keddie's seminal work, *Sayyid Jamal Ad-Din "Al-Afghani": A Political Biography* presents the most thorough and comprehensive overview of Afghani's life and political thought. Born in either 1838 or 1839 in Iran (though he would later claim Afghanistan), Afghani came to prominence as a vocal opponent of Western imperialism.⁷¹ He 'was impressed by the power of the West', particularly its scientific and technological advances, and believed the Muslim world should 'revive its former openness to intellectual innovation, including borrowing from non-Muslims' in order to restore itself and regain its independence.⁷²

However, Afghani was wary of completely aping the West. He instead attempted to find Islamic origins for the reforms he promoted, arguing that 'the Koran hinted at such things as railroads and the germ theory' in order to illustrate that Muslims were capable of scientific advancement and military conquest.⁷³ In harking back to an idealised version of the days of the Prophet Muhammad and the early caliphs, Afghani not only tried to inspire Muslims with their past glories but made the argument that it was only through wider unity and solidarity that they could defeat Western

⁷⁰ Mohammed Abduh, 'The Necessity of Religious Reform' in Mansoor Moaddel and Karan Talattof, eds. *Contemporary Debates in Islam* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000), p.47

⁷¹ Nikki R. Keddie *Sayyid Jamal Ad-Din "Al-Afghani": A Political Biography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p.10

⁷² Idem, p.62

⁷³ Nikki R. Keddie *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p.42

imperialism.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, as Keddie points out, Afghani's commitment to pan-Islamic solidarity often vacillated over the course of his life. Particularly during his time in India, Afghani would advocate strongly for Islamic nationalism, encouraging Indian Muslims to form a domestic political union rather than rallying together with the co-religionists abroad.⁷⁵

Elie Kedourie is more circumspect about Afghani's contributions during his lifetime to Islamic revivalist thought. Instead, Kedourie argues that Afghani's ideas were largely spread posthumously, as he spent most of his career as an obscure and 'middling official in the Egyptian public service'.⁷⁶ Instead his protégé Abduh, and indeed Abduh's own student, Rida, worked to 'magnify Afghani's position' in society and through their own writings created a comprehensive biography.⁷⁷ Moreover, Kedourie casts doubt on the view that Afghani was primarily concerned with the reform of Islam. Kedourie highlights Afghani's penchant for indulging in brandy, associating with people of a variety of religious backgrounds and the incorporation of Sufi thought in his writings, which all imply that his place in the canon of Muslim orthodox reformers may be misplaced.⁷⁸ While it may be the case that some of his personal behaviour might be castigated by hard-line *salafis*, that should not diminish the importance of the ideas he helped to establish and promote, nor should it be a sufficient basis to fully undermine Afghani's commitment to Islamic reform.

Afghani's desire to promote Muslim unity and the restoration of a strong caliphate was apparent during his exile from Egypt. Together with Abduh, he established a secret society, 'Al-Urwa al-Wuthqā (*The Firmest Bond*) in Paris in 1884.⁷⁹ In the society's journal, the men promoted a 'return of Islam to a pure and pristine state as embodied by the early community of the pious ancestors (*al-salaf al-sālih*)'.⁸⁰ To Abduh, unity amongst Muslims was a significant cause of this early community's success, because once members do not 'follow its shared beliefs and pursue their own egotistical interests', collapse is inevitable.⁸¹ Resultantly, Abduh saw Muslim unity not only as a good in and of itself, but as a key defensive instrument against future foreign incursion.

⁷⁴ Rudi Matthee, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and the Egyptian National Debate', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 21: 2 (1989), p.151

⁷⁵ Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, pp.55-56

⁷⁶ Elie Kedourie, *Afghani and 'Abduh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam* (London: Frank Cass, 1966), p.5

⁷⁷ Kedourie, *Afghani and 'Abduh*, p.3

⁷⁸ Idem, p.18

⁷⁹ Oliver Scharbrodt, *Islam and the Baba'i Faith: A comparative study of Mubammad 'Abduh and 'Abdul-Baba 'Abbas* (London: Routledge, 2008), p.71

⁸⁰ Ibid

⁸¹ Idem, p.76

Additionally, Abduh made the case that religion must be at the centre of an Islamic revival since without their beliefs, Muslims would not be able to ‘stimulate their thirst for knowledge’, and thus would fall behind their non-Muslim rivals.⁸² In this respect, Abduh makes the case that Islam is essential for the continuation of progress – particularly scientific advancement – and plays a central role in inspiring Muslims to better themselves and their communities.

Like his predecessor, Abduh saw the necessity of not only reforming education, but modernising religious authority. Oliver Scharbrodt and Mark Sedgewick both note that ‘Abduh feared that the *ulama*, stuck in their traditional scholasticism, would become intellectually isolated... if they did not open their education to modern subjects’.⁸³ Resultantly, Abduh not only called for significant reforms at the University of Cairo, but when appointed Grand Mufti he overhauled the *shari’a* court system. In both instances, Abduh advocated for the use of modern textbooks, standardised training for teachers and judges, and attempted a clear codification of *shari’a*.⁸⁴ These efforts to improve religious education and the judiciary through the adoption of ‘Western’ administrative practices highlighted Abduh’s belief that Islam was not antithetical to modernisation.

As Malcolm Kerr notes, these reforms were not conducted simply to strengthen the state, improve the efficiency of the judiciary, or boost the quality of education. Instead, underpinning Abduh’s efforts was a belief that a strong Islamic state capable of administering justice, enforcing laws, and educating its citizenry would enable believers to enjoy ‘the material rewards of righteousness’.⁸⁵ While he infrequently references an Islamic state as the guarantor of the ability to lead a life truly in line with the Islamic faith, his argument is clear: this ‘structure did exist in the Golden Age of early Islam, and can exist again when Muslim society is transformed’.⁸⁶ In this regard, Abduh’s Islamism sees reform as a means of enabling Muslims to actualise their faith completely in the temporal realm.

Moreover, Abduh’s Islamic state is a top-down affair. Rather than mobilising grassroots support for change, Abduh’s writings – and indeed most of the Modernists – indicate a belief in the power of a reformist agenda enacted by a religious political elite. These efforts required experts like well-trained judges, teachers and functionaries, whose implementation and enactment of reforms would

⁸² Idem, p.77

⁸³ Idem, p.136

⁸⁴ Mark Sedgewick, *Muhammad Abduh* (London: OneWorld Publications, 2010), pp.126-128

⁸⁵ Malcolm Kerr, *Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p.114

⁸⁶ Kerr, *Islamic Reform*, p.152

benefit the masses. Abduh's focus on state reform from the top probably reflected the conditions of his time. With most Arabs relatively poor and uneducated, he believed that it was thus necessary to mobilise religious elite to bring about change.

Rida, Abduh's direct disciple, continued these arguments into the early twentieth century. Rida was not only the most prolific of these scholars, but was clearest in his attempt to create a systematic framework for the revival of a caliphate. As Kerr argues, while Abduh 'paid little attention to the classical doctrines of the Caliphate and the technical aspects of legal methodology', Abduh's key contribution to Modernist Islamist thought was to encourage Muslims to 're-examine traditional institutions of government and law as they had presumably existed in the great days of the Caliphate'.⁸⁷ More explicitly in *Al-Manār*, Abduh argued that 'it is religion that was the cause of [Muslim] sovereignty and well-being, turning away from it was what landed them in misery'.⁸⁸

Rida believed that an 'awakening of the Arab was an essential prerequisite for the renaissance of Islam', and 'only through an Arab nation could the strength of Islam be restored'.⁸⁹ Rida's focus on the Arabs was due to his belief that it was Arabs who had developed Islam. Eliezer Tauber highlights the explicitly Arab-chauvinist attitudes inherent in Rida's proclamations, stating that he believed that Arabs had created the great caliphates only to have non-Arabs 'introduce all the foreign influences and spoil it'.⁹⁰

In his book, *Al-Khilāfa au al-Imāma 'l-Uẓmā* (The Caliphate or Supreme Imamate), Rida provides a detailed account of what this Arab state would look like. He lists the various qualities a potential caliph must possess, his duties ('to protect Islam from innovation and promote its laws and beliefs'), the process for electing a caliph and the qualifications of the electors, and the obligation of the Muslim community to create a caliphate.⁹¹ Additionally, he believed that a revived caliphate would require a 'seminary for the training of qualified jurists and potential caliphs', various bureaucracies to conduct everything from the writings of *fatwas* to the collection of *zakat* and the creation of propaganda and missionary work.⁹² Rida's detailed descriptions of his prospective state

⁸⁷ Idem, pp.153-54

⁸⁸ Kerr, *Islamic Reform*, p.155

⁸⁹ Eliezer Tauber, 'Three approaches, one idea: religion and state in the thought of 'Abd Al-Rahman Al Kawakibi, Najib 'Azuri and Rashid Rida', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 21: 2 (1994), p.196

⁹⁰ Tauber, 'Three approaches, one idea', p.197

⁹¹ Kerr, *Islamic Reform*, pp.161-69

⁹² Idem, p.183

highlight not only his belief that a caliphate is necessary for the spiritual well-being of Muslims but also his ability to incorporate ideas from Western state administrative structures.

Despite their best efforts to modernise Islam and revitalise the Muslim community in the face of European imperialism, the modernist project ultimately failed. These earnest attempts at reform and calls for change amounted to very little by the end of Rida's life in 1935. Nevertheless, many of their ideas – particularly their belief that the early days of Islam provide solutions for the present – have found significant purchase among conservative Muslims, violent and non-violent alike.

In calling for a return to a 'pure' form of Islam, some Modernists, most notably Rida, were often referred to as *salafis*, a term derived from the first three generations of Muslims (*al-salaf al-salib*), who knew the Prophet personally and experienced the birth and early growth of Islam. *Salafis* see this as a time where the most authentic and orthodox form of Islam was practiced. This is largely predicated on a much-quoted *hadith* (the compendiums of the actions, sayings, teachings and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad) where the Prophet Muhammad describes these cohorts as 'the best of [his] community'.⁹³

Like Islamism, the term *salafism* is broad. It encompasses groups that reject the state entirely and seek to overthrow it with violence, those willing to participate in the state in order to change or challenge it through non-violent means (like civil society groups or unions) and quietists, who may advise or challenge a government in private or eschew political engagement entirely.⁹⁴ Regardless of their approach to politics, *salafis* share similar beliefs, seeing *tauhid* (the unity of God) as the singularly most important aspect of their creed and 'rejecting a role for human desire and intellect in understanding how the immutable sources of Islam should be applied to the modern world'.⁹⁵

While all *salafis* support the creation of an Islamic state, its establishment is not necessarily the primary focus of their activities. As Noah Salomon argues, Islamists believe that the creation of a devout Muslim society is the logical outcome of the establishment of a state rooted in Islamic structures of governance and the implementation of *shari'a*. By contrast, *salafis* see the Islamic state as only possible after society is already sufficiently 'reverent and doctrinally pure'.⁹⁶ This leads to a

⁹³ Sahih Muslim, Book 31, Number 6159

⁹⁴ Shiraz Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea*, (London: Hurst, 2016), p.10

⁹⁵ Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'Anatomy of the Salafi Movement', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 29:3 (2006), p.234

⁹⁶ Noah Salomon, 'The Salafi Critique of Islamism: Doctrine, Difference and the Problem of Islamic Political Action in Contemporary Sudan', in Roel Meijer, ed. *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (London: Hurst, 2009), p.15

greater focus on individual behaviour in order to ensure that *tauhid* is protected. Adherents must personally emulate the Prophet and the first three generations of believers, copying their actions as laid out in the Qur'an and *hadith*. Crucially, this also means interpreting the Qur'an in a manner that 'emphasises a direct interface with the text of revelation' and ensuring that the manifold forms of unbelief, including interpreting portions of the revealed texts as metaphorical, are contested and defeated.⁹⁷ This strict interpretation of these texts means *salafis* are significantly less tolerant of different readings or doctrinal debates, and comparatively more willing to engage in *takfir* (the process of excommunication) than their Islamist counterparts.⁹⁸

DI leaders do not consistently conform to *salafism's* emphasis on reproducing the behaviour of the Prophet and his followers or to the strict textual interpretation of revealed texts. Instead, it would be more accurate to consider them Islamists who saw the state as an instrument of the divine. DI leaders sought to establish an Islamic state through the capture and transformation of the existing Indonesian polity. They intended to use state structures, like an Islamic education system, the leadership of an *amir* (leader), a governing consultative council, and above all, the implementation of *shari'a*, to teach, encourage, and compel Muslims to lead pious lives. The DI's willingness to use force to overthrow foreign occupiers or illegitimate governments is what set them apart from other non-violent Islamists.

Maududi and Qutb

According to Kepel and Wiktorowicz, this acceptance of violence has been largely shaped by two key ideologues, Abul A'la Maududi (1903-1979), and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who carried the Islamic Modernists' legacy into the twentieth century. The men departed from non-violent Islamists by developing an intellectual framework that clearly divides 'true' Muslims from self-proclaimed Muslims who were really *kuffar* (disbelievers, or infidels), thus legitimating the killing of fellow Muslims, particularly national leaders, on the grounds of apostasy.

Moreover, both men made the explicit case for the promulgation of an Islamic state as the means by which Muslims could truly exercise freedom of religion and ensure God's sovereignty on earth. They argued that Muslims are obligated to bring about this state through *jihad* in order to both

⁹⁷ Bernard Haykel, 'On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action' in Roel Meijer, ed. *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (London: Hurst, 2009), p.36

⁹⁸ Salomon, 'The Salafi Critique of Islamism: Doctrine, Difference and the Problem of Islamic Political Action in Contemporary Sudan', p.156

ensure the primacy of God and to demonstrate their loyalty to their faith. While they had significant success in bringing many ‘educated youths with a secular background’ to their cause, their teachings failed to have a significant impact on convincing traditional *ulama* to adopt their ideology and support their cause.⁹⁹

Maududi, a Pakistani journalist and politician, believed that the decline of the *umma* (global Muslim community) was the result of Muslims practising a corrupt interpretation of Islam, soiled by un-Islamic concepts and practices such as nationalism and democracy.¹⁰⁰ In adopting forms of government where men rule over men or tolerating non-Islamic forms of government in their communities, Muslims had insulted God. This was due to Maududi’s belief that the ‘domination of man over man... was the origin of all the troubles of mankind’, as a result of man’s usurpation of God’s position as the sole object of worship.¹⁰¹ This usurpation was tantamount to disbelief as it saw man desiring to act as a god and thus contravening the very notion of *tauhīd*.

Resultantly, Maududi came to believe that Muslims now existed in a state of *jābiliyyah*. According to Jan-Peter Hartung, the term in Islamic scholarship refers to the ‘period of ignorance, heathendom and polytheism (*shirk*) before man came to know about the conclusive revelation of God’s fundamental oneness and His commandments’.¹⁰² Maududi broadened this definition, writing that ‘*jābiliyyah* in Islam comprises every course of action which runs counter to the Islamic culture, Islamic morals and conduct, or Islamic mentality’, illustrating that his definition of *jābiliyyah* meant any ‘ignorance towards God, His Prophet, and the revelation, or the pre-Islamic period of “lawlessness”’.¹⁰³ In addition to a broad ignorance of God, Maududi ‘subsumed polytheism, as well as monasticism, and finally every panentheist tendency’.¹⁰⁴

Maududi saw Islam as a totalising belief structure that encompasses all facets of life, and thus which could ‘never coexist with *jābiliyyah*’.¹⁰⁵ Maududi believed that the present period of decline dated from the first *fitna* (rebellion) following the assassination of the caliph Uthman in 656. In order to overcome this state of ignorance, Maududi, like the Modernists before him, called for an

⁹⁹ Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst & Co, 2002), p.59

¹⁰⁰ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2006), p.34

¹⁰¹ Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, ‘The Political Theory of Islam’ in Mansoor Moaddel and Karan Talattof, eds. *Contemporary Debates in Islam* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 264-265

¹⁰² Jan-Peter Hartung, *A System of Life: Maududi and the Ideologisation of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.63

¹⁰³ Idem, p.66

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

¹⁰⁵ Idem, p.71

Islamic renewal. However, his proclamations for reform were quite vague. This was probably because Maududi was far less optimistic than Rida, Abduh and Afghani about the potential for successful reform. As Hartung notes, Maududi was quite pessimistic, believing only an ‘Ideal Man’, who was ‘better able than all preceding *mujaddid* (renewers) could truly bring about change.’¹⁰⁶ Given this belief that only a truly extraordinary Muslim could end this state of *jāhiliyyah*, it is unsurprising that Maududi gave little thought to the process of reform itself.

Instead, his primary contributions to the development of Islamist thought revolved around diagnosing the problems with Muslim societies in his own time and defining the conditions under which Muslims could truly flourish. In Maududi’s understanding Muslims could only truly actualise their faith when they ‘individually and collectively, surrender all rights and overlordship, legislation and exercising authority over others’ and ‘[authority] rests with none but Allah’.¹⁰⁷ Maududi saw God’s absolute sovereignty (*hākimiyya*) on earth as thus fundamental for Muslims to be able to practice pure Islam. According to Maududi, ‘the prime function of the Creator, after calling the universe into being, was to issue rules and regulations for its functioning’.¹⁰⁸

More importantly, Maududi believed that Muslims had to demonstrate their faith by striving for the creation of an Islamic state. Like many revivalist thinkers, Maududi believed that it was insufficient for Muslims to simply profess their faith, but that they were required to demonstrate it through action.¹⁰⁹ As God’s representatives on earth, the community of believers had to work to ensure that *shirk* and other forms of disbelief were vanquished and had no room to thrive. The creation and development of an Islamic state was thus a duty incumbent on all Muslims as a profession of their faith and ensured salvation in the afterlife.

In order to achieve this state, Muslims’ first step would be to engage in *jihad* to ‘destroy all States and Governments anywhere on the face of the earth which are opposed to the ideology and programme of Islam’.¹¹⁰ Once these foes have been eliminated, a true Islamic state could be established, initially in a few countries. This would then be expanded until a ‘universal revolution’ is successful.¹¹¹ Ultimately, Maududi saw Islam as ‘a militant ideology and programme which seeks

¹⁰⁶ Idem, p.82

¹⁰⁷ Maududi, ‘The Political Theory of Islam’, p.270

¹⁰⁸ Hartung, *A system of life*, p.102

¹⁰⁹ Idem, p.107

¹¹⁰ Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, *Jihad in Islam* (Lahore: Islamic Publications), p.9, <http://www.islamistwatch.org/texts/maududi/maududi.html>. Accessed: 20 March 2020

¹¹¹ Idem, p.24

to alter the social order of the whole world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and ideals.¹¹²

In this respect, his ideological contribution is significant because he explicitly linked the attainment of *ḥakimiyya* to engagement in a physical *jihad* against the enemies of Islam. As noted above, as Muslims were required to demonstrate their faith by working to bring about an Islamic state, Maududi believed their participating in a physical struggle was a religious duty, joining ‘the usual five so-called “pillars of faith” (arkān) as the sixth and besides the Islamic creed, the most important one’.¹¹³

In line with classical scholarship, Maududi justified these conflicts on the grounds that they were legitimate wars against unbelievers. However, Maududi departed from classical scholarship on *jihad* in that he did not confine his definition of *jihad* to defensive war. Instead, Maududi argued that, since Muslim authority is ‘self-evident’, the promotion of an Islamic state through an offensive war is thus justified for the ‘sake of the common good’.¹¹⁴

In this respect, Maududi’s contributions to the development of Islamism are significant as he sees the development of a political Islam as a revolutionary endeavour, explicitly linking the promotion of an Islamic state to physical combat. Moreover, he articulates clearly that Muslims are duty bound not only to support the creation of an Islamic state to ensure God’s sovereignty on earth but to participate in *jihad* in order to demonstrate their faith.

Like Maududi, Qutb believed that Muslims, particularly nationalists, had lost their way, and existed in a state of *jābiliyyah*.¹¹⁵ Qutb had read Maududi’s works, namely *Jihad in Islam*, *The Principles of Islamic Government*, and *Islam and Jābiliyyah*, which had been translated into Arabic in the early 1950s, and extensively quoted them in his own writings.¹¹⁶ He similarly argued that Muslims’ failure to follow Islamic law and their ‘subservience to man rather than to Allah... denotes rejection of the divinity of God and the adulation of mortals’ rendering them no longer Muslims.¹¹⁷

¹¹² Idem, p.8

¹¹³ Hartung, *A system of life*, p.210

¹¹⁴ Idem, p.18

¹¹⁵ Kepel, *Jihad*, p.25

¹¹⁶ Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘A Genealogy of Radical Islam’, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 28:2 (2006), p.79

¹¹⁷ Sayyid Qutb, quoted in Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp.23-24

As William Shepard notes, Qutb was affronted by societies governed by men because he ultimately saw *jāhiliyyah* as the ‘*hakimiyyah* of humans’ while true Islam ‘is the *hakimiyyah* of God’.¹¹⁸ Qutb’s understanding of *hakimiyya*, was not only freedom from the rule of men, but freedom from ignorance of God. As Sayed Khatab argues, to Qutb *hakimiyya* ultimately represented liberation through complete submission to God.¹¹⁹ Resultantly, to Qutb, *hakimiyya* was the basis of Muslim faith. As he argued in his trial:

There is no *hakim* (sovereign) other than Allah, there is no *hukum* (rule) except the *hukum* of Allah, and there is no *shari’a* (law) except the *shari’a* of Allah.¹²⁰

Qutb’s writings go on to describe various types of *jāhili* societies. In addition to rejecting God, he argued that these ‘backward’ societies included those that ‘put material concerns above all others, whether in a theoretical way, as the Marxist do... or in a practical way as the Americans and others do’, those which were ‘characterised by uncontrolled sexual expression’, and those that encouraged ‘women to abandon their families and children for jobs’.¹²¹ These societies not only have usurped God’s authority but perverted the course of mankind. More explicitly than Maududi, Qutb went on to decry the complicity of so-called Muslims in the creation of modern *jāhiliyyah*. He argued that while ‘they do not formally worship beings other than God, in practice they give political and social authority to others than God’, merely respecting religion but failing to give it authority.¹²²

While Qutb argued that these *jāhili* societies were un-Islamic, he refrained from explicitly labelling the leaders of these fallen places *kaḥfirs* (apostates) for failing implement Islamic law and institute an Islamic state.¹²³ Regardless, as John Calvert argues, describing these leaders and the societies they presided over as ‘ignorant’ ‘was a serious indictment’.¹²⁴ He went further than contemporary ideologues like Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and even Maududi, in asserting that Muslim societies had ‘completely given over to modern forms of paganism’.¹²⁵

¹¹⁸ William Shepard, ‘Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of "Jāhiliyya"', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol 35:4 (2003), p.525

¹¹⁹ Sayed Khatab, *The Power of Sovereignty: The political and ideological philosophy of Sayyid Qutb* (London: Routledge, 2006), p.54

¹²⁰ Khatab, *The Power of Sovereignty*, p.198

¹²¹ Shepard, ‘Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of "Jāhiliyya"', p.527

¹²² Idem, p.528

¹²³ Idem, p.529

¹²⁴ John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islam* (London: C.Hurst & Co, 2010), p.220

¹²⁵ Ibid

Given these transgressions, Qutb justified *jihad* against these regimes for failing to bring about true Islamic states. Like Maududi, he believed that Muslims were obligated to participate in *jihad* in order to end the period of *jābiliyyah* and bring about an Islamic state. He saw this as a defensive conflict to '[emancipate] human beings from the shackles of false and fabricated masters' thus ensuring God's sovereignty.¹²⁶ Muslims had to participate not only to ensure their ability to fully actualise their faith in an Islamic polity but to demonstrate their commitment to God. *Jihad* in Qutb's understanding was the practice of a ritual duty, a kind of worship to ensure God's will.¹²⁷

While Qutb agreed with classical scholarship that *jihad* was permissible as a defensive war when Muslims were under threat, he argued that Modernist readings of Islamic texts were incorrect in putting forth 'apologetic definitions that regard *jihad* as primarily a spiritual struggle aimed at the taming of base desires and inclinations'.¹²⁸ Instead, like Maududi, he believed that these definitions of *jihad* as a defensive or spiritual struggle undermined Islam's mission to proselytise and expand. In *Milestones*, one of his key texts completed in prison, Qutb argued that *jihad* was the instrument of Islamic revolution and 'the means by which people will attain their freedom' as it would clear all obstacles preventing the implementation of *shari'a* and the creation of an Islamic state.¹²⁹

Once again echoing Maududi, Qutb saw *jihad* as rooted in the concept of *hakimiyyah*. It was a fundamental duty given that he believed that *hakimiyyah* to be the foundational concept of the Islamic faith. *Jihad* to bring about or sustain *hakimiyyah* was thus a fundamental obligation like the other five pillars of Islam. He argued that Muslims thus had an individual and collective duty to participate for the struggle to defend and expand an Islamic state around the world.

Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab

While Qutb drew heavily on Maududi, both men heavily referenced the works and ideas of two pre-modern ideologues, Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Ibn Taymiyya and Wahhab contributed significantly to the later thinkers' understanding of what behaviour constituted disbelief and how these transgressions contributed to a state of *jābiliyyah*. Resultantly,

¹²⁶ Sayyid Qutb, 'War, Peace and Islamic Jihad, in Mansoor Moaddel and Karan Talattof, eds. *Contemporary Debates in Islam* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000), p.242

¹²⁷ Khatib, *The Power of Sovereignty*, p.53

¹²⁸ Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islam*, p.222

¹²⁹ Idem, p.222 and 178

they were deploy concerned with the purification of Islam. Moreover, both men established for later *salafis* the primacy of *taubid*, and the duty of Muslims to worship God exclusively.

Ibn Taymiyya's writings were not only hugely significant to *salafis* of Qutb and Maududi's era, but remain prominent today among Islamist militants from al-Shabaab to Islamic State. Ibn Taymiyya was a Sunni scholar, jurist and activist who notably developed a robust interpretation of *taubid* and promoted *jihad* against the Mongols during their invasion of Arab lands in the early fourteenth century. Jon Hoover's work is the first substantive English language text to examine Ibn Taymiyya's beliefs. Ibn Taymiyya wrote widely, but as Hoover observes, several themes recur:

his struggle against innovation in religious practice and theology, his reform-minded appeal to the foundational sources of Islam, his Sunni-sectarianism over Shi'ism and Christianity, and his apologetic conviction that Islamic revelation corresponds to reason.¹³⁰

Ibn Taymiyya argued that Islam could not be practiced without state power, because God's commandments such as the declaration of *jihad*, the enforcement of penalties for transgressions, economic redistribution, and so on, could not be exercised without a caliph.¹³¹ Resultantly, Muslims were duty bound to establish and uphold an Islamic state as it was the only mechanism by which their religion could be properly put into practice, thus ensuring 'perfect spiritual and temporal prosperity'.¹³²

Ibn Taymiyya believed that the Muslim societies of his time were prone to incursions by non-Muslims because they had failed to practice a true version of Islam. Instead, he lamented that innovations such as rituals, superstitions and a 'lax observance' of Islamic law were to blame for the collapse of Islamic regimes.¹³³ As such, Ibn Taymiyya's work stressed the purification of Islam, particularly practices of worship. He took aim at Sufis, describing practices such as worshiping shrines as innovations, and routinely criticised the ruling Mamluks for falling short of Islamic ideals, particularly through the inconsistent application of *shari'a*. He argued that failure to adhere to and implement God's laws consistently, and instead enacting man-made ones, was tantamount to disbelief or at least a contravention of obedience to God and God alone.

¹³⁰ Jon Hoover, *Ibn Taymiyya* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2019), p.14

¹³¹ Antony Black, 'Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328): Shari'a Governance (al-siyasa al-shar'iyya)', *The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), p.159

¹³² *Ibid*, p.60

¹³³ Hoover, *Ibn Taymiyya*, p.45

This was because he believed that, above all, Muslims need to worship God and God alone (*tauhid al-ilahiyya*) as God is the sole creator.¹³⁴ By participating in spiritual retreats, visiting graves, practicing ancestor worship, or asking for the intercession or veneration of saints or other pious people, Sufis and others who transgress were ultimately worshipping things or people other than God alone. This expansive interpretation of what could be considered an un-Islamic practice contained the seeds of the appeal of Ibn Taymiyya's writings for the nineteenth century Modernists, who would seek to emulate the alleged purity of the righteous caliphs and the Prophet.

Despite his misgivings about the practices of the Sufis and the Mamluks, Ibn Taymiyya refrained from declaring either group apostates outright.¹³⁵ Conversely, he denounced the Mongol invaders as apostates and called for a *jihad* against their invasion and governance. He wrote three *fatwas* decrying the Mongol incursions, which serve as a significant development in the understanding of *jihad* among *salafis* since he was justifying a rebellion against (nominally) Muslim rulers.

In his first and second *fatwas* Ibn Taymiyya declared that true Muslims had an obligation to resist the Mongols for they had failed to adhere to or uphold Islam despite their self-proclaimed conversion to the faith. *Jihad* was justified on the grounds that they must be fought until their conceptualisation of Islam was sufficiently purified. While Ibn Taymiyya largely agreed with classical scholarship that life under a tyrannical, albeit Muslim, ruler was preferable to living amidst civil strife or non-Islamic rule, he nevertheless justified rebellion against Muslim rulers when their actions compromised the sincerity of their commitment to their faith.¹³⁶ His reasoning illustrated that '*takfir* of Muslim rulers is an important, if not essential part in legitimising rebellion'.¹³⁷

Ibn Taymiyya's conceptualisation of *jihad* saw it as a concept that served to protect Islam from innovations or the worship of something other than God alone. He understood *jihad* to have 'both inner and outer aspects', a *jihad* to control oneself and a *jihad* against external enemies. Both were conducted to 'punish omission of duties and forbidden acts'.¹³⁸ This understanding of *jihad* was ultimately defensive, and it was incumbent on the whole community to participate, particularly when an invading force enters Muslim lands, 'commits well-known atrocities' and 'refuses to abide

¹³⁴ Idem, p.94

¹³⁵ Idem, pp.62-63

¹³⁶ Joas Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jibadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.60

¹³⁷ Ibid

¹³⁸ Hoover, *Ibn Taymiyya*, pp.191-192

by any clear and universally accepted Islamic law', after being called upon to implement it.¹³⁹ Those who failed to participate in this defensive or 'involuntary' *jihad* would be criticised by God, and denounced hypocrites.¹⁴⁰ Those who were unable to fight, such as women and children and the disabled, were encouraged to 'fight with words and acts'.¹⁴¹

Nevertheless, Yahya Michot cautions that Ibn Taymiyya's conceptualisation of *jihad* is far from straightforward as it also includes a link with *hijrah* (literally, departure or migration, referencing the Prophet's flight from Mecca to Medina in 622 to escape persecution). Michot correctly points out that implicit in Ibn Taymiyya's writings is a calculation of when to fight and when to flee as he disavows 'ill-considered and risky ventures'.¹⁴²

Given the constant incursions the Mamluks faced, Ibn Taymiyya's conceptualisation of *jihad* as an all-encompassing struggle for an Islamic community is unsurprising. However, stripped of this context, the clarity of his call and the universal obligation he appears to impose on Muslims to engage in *jihad* against the enemies of Islam, broadly defined, has resulted in his writings gaining significant traction among modern *jihadist* groups. Instead, Ibn Taymiyya did not see a failure to engage an enemy in *jihad* as consistently a sin. He offered a more nuanced view of *jihad* that saw it ultimately a force for eradicating sin and saving Islam. This could be achieved through physical conflict but by the 'quitting of sin', thus legitimising flight as a form of *jihad*.¹⁴³

Ibn Taymiyya's writings – particularly his disdain for innovation – greatly influenced the ideas of Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab, a religious scholar from central Arabia. Like Ibn Taymiyya, Wahhab believed that Islamic societies had regressed as a result of the widespread practice of innovation. This brought Muslim societies back to a time of *jāhiliyyah* and thus required purification and a 'restoration of the true meaning of *tauhid*'.¹⁴⁴ Wahhab saw God as the sole lord and creator of all worlds and thus required direct worship, 'unaccompanied by any attempt at interpretation'.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, Wahhab saw the declaration of belief in God as insufficient for one to be considered a

¹³⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, 'Fatwa on the Mongols' (702/1303), published in Richard Bonney, *Jihad: From Qur'an to bin Laden* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) p.424

¹⁴⁰ Ibn Taymiyya, 'Jihad' in Rudolph Peters, ed. *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), pp.44-45

¹⁴¹ Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism*, p.58

¹⁴² Yahya Michot, *Muslims Under Non-Muslim Rule, Ibn Taymiyya on fleeing from sin; kinds of emigration; the status of Mardin: domain of peace/war, domain composite; the conditions for challenging power* (Oxford: Interface Publications, 2006), p.21

¹⁴³ Idem, p.17

¹⁴⁴ Stephane Lacroix, *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011), p.11

¹⁴⁵ Hamid Algar, *Wahhabism: A Critical Essay* (New York: Oneonta, 2002), p.30

Muslim, and instead argued that this proclamation ‘must be expressed in worship, which must be dedicated only to God, with no intermediary’.¹⁴⁶ In this respect, he went beyond what most scholars believed about the requirements for being a member of the Muslim community.

Given his central belief that Islam requires the worship of God without interference, Wahhab was far less accommodating than Ibn Taymiyya of minority Muslim sects or individuals who practiced ancestor worship, asked for intercessions, and other such innovations. Wahhab denounced those as violations of the faith, referring to those who did so as polytheists or apostates, and thus enemies of Islam and potential targets of *jihad*.¹⁴⁷ Like Ibn Taymiyya, Wahhab wrote extensively about what practices constituted a violation of *tauhid*. Wahhab decreed that the practice of intercession, the ‘seeking of blessing by saints, martyrs and other exalted persons’, visits to tombs, the construction of domes over such tombs, all constituted *shirk*.¹⁴⁸ As Algar surmises, Wahhab decreed that ‘whenever an action of devotion involves, in any fashion at all, an entity other than the worshiper and God’, the individual has failed to practice his primary duty to worship God and God alone.¹⁴⁹

Olivier Roy has been particularly critical of Wahhab, and to a lesser degree Ibn Taymiyya, for their broad-brush approach to decrying a range of practices un-Islamic. According to Roy, Wahhab’s limited and unnuanced scholarship facilitated and indeed legitimised anti-intellectualism amongst his followers and discouraged centuries of scriptural interpretation and debates.¹⁵⁰

Nevertheless, this sweeping definition meant that Wahhab saw a sharp delineation between Muslims and *kufr*, as well as *tauhid* and *shirk*, erasing the prospect of tolerance or the existence of ‘grey areas’, within the practice of the Islamic faith. He articulated this through the principle of ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’, which demanded that ‘Muslims must encourage their coreligionists to follow the principles of Islam and must admonish them when they stray from the right path’.¹⁵¹ As Stephane Lacroix notes, the principle ‘has obvious subversive implications if it is used against the political and religious authorities’.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁶ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, p.11

¹⁴⁷ Algar, *Wahhabism*, p.34

¹⁴⁸ Idem, p.32

¹⁴⁹ Ibid

¹⁵⁰ Roy, *Globalised Islam*, p.171

¹⁵¹ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, p.12

¹⁵² Ibid

Wahhab, unlike any of the ideologues explored before, had unusual access to political power and the means to implement his ideology. As Olivier Roy notes, Saudi Arabia is unique for being both a 'tribal patrimonial estate (the only country in the world to be named after its ruling family) and the centre of an official transnational religious movement (Wahhabism)'.¹⁵³ Initially, Wahhab had an agreement with the amir of 'Uyaynah, who agreed to introduce his reforms, including most controversially, the payment of *zakat*, calculated on the basis of 'apparent wealth (such as agricultural produce) and concealed wealth, stored in gold and silver'.¹⁵⁴

However, Wahhab was soon exiled following pressure on the amir by local chiefs. He quickly met and formed an alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud in Dir'iyah, central Arabia in 1744. Crudely, the pact granted Wahhab control over religious affairs, while Saud led political and community matters. Ultimately, the pact gave Saud religious legitimacy with Wahhab's ideas eventually forming the basis of the Saudi state. In the initial development of this alliance, Wahhab's willingness to denounce those who failed to adhere to his strict interpretation of Islam often justified Saud's expansionist ambitions, leading the latter to declare *jihad* frequently against large areas of Arabia on the grounds that rival tribes were heretics or unbelievers.

Wahhab's direct access to the power of his nascent state reinforced his conceptualisation of Islam as a religion imposed and regulated from the top. In this respect, Wahhab reflects Ibn Taymiyya's understanding that only through an Islamic state and leader can the beliefs and practices of Muslims be regulated and consistently enforced, thus ensuring against the proliferation of *shirk*. Wahhab's influence has endured, with his descendants holding in posts in the religious leadership of the first Saudi realm (1744-1818), its successor (1824-91), and the current state of Saudi Arabia (1932 to present).¹⁵⁵

While these men all helped to provide the intellectual framework militant groups use to justify their actions, Ayoob, Kepel, and Wiktorowicz stress that the formation of these organisations can also be linked to non-ideological factors. All three stress that the adoption of this framework was the result of a combination of disillusionment and repression, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s. Across the Muslim world, many were disappointed by the lack of economic progress and the concentration of political power following the end of colonialism.¹⁵⁶ Given both the failure of

¹⁵³ Roy, *Globalised Islam*, p.66

¹⁵⁴ Madawi al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.16

¹⁵⁵ Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi*, p.98

¹⁵⁶ Kepel, *Jihad*, p.66

Arab states to successfully challenge external enemies like Israel and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's crackdowns on Islamist organisations, many turned from nationalism to a radicalised form of political Islam as a means of rectifying these inequities.¹⁵⁷

Ayoob, Kepel, and Wiktorowicz have used their conceptualisation of Islamism with its 'preoccupation with capturing the state in order to change society' and its drift towards violence following state repression and disillusionment with conventional politics, to assess groups operating in the Middle East and South Asia. This thesis adopts and applies their ideas to the DI, contending that while the group operated on the so-called periphery of the Islamic world, its trajectory was largely similar to their counterparts in the centre.

Ideology

Since the investigation of the DI's ideology forms the backbone of this thesis, an attempt must be made to first define the concept. 'It's almost a routine' as Teun A. van Dijk notes, to begin the study of ideology with 'a remark about the vagueness of the notion and the resulting theoretical confusion'.¹⁵⁸ True to form, this thesis acknowledges the disparate notions and conceptualisations of ideology as well as the debates that surround its study in a variety of academic fields, but contends that - despite this mess - ideology remains a necessary and important means of studying the individual components that shape political thinking.

This thesis' assessment of ideology is informed by Michael Freeden's work on the morphology of ideology. As such, it rejects the conceptualisation of ideologies as static structures, but instead views them as combinations of concepts arranged in a cohesive system. As argued by the Cambridge School and proponents of transtemporalism, the meanings of these concepts may change over time. Ideologies are necessary to give direction to entire societies, groups or even to individuals; socialising and integrating them into a large whole. They also serve to legitimise a particular leader, social structure, or belief. As such, ideologies are 'produced by, directed at, and consumed by [social] groups'.¹⁵⁹ Finally, in legitimising and motivating groups to action, ideologies are undoubtedly linked with the concept of power and form the bridge between political thought and action.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁷ Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam*, p.86

¹⁵⁸ Teun A. van Dijk, *Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach* (London: Sage Publications, 2000), p.vii

¹⁵⁹ Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), p.22

¹⁶⁰ Idem, p.76

Ideologies are made up of core and adjacent concepts.¹⁶¹ As this thesis will demonstrate, the ideas that make up the core of DI's ideology – *hākimiyya* and *jihad* – are crucial to the establishment of its belief structure. These fundamental concepts are buttressed by adjacent ones, *tafīr* and *al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ*. The adjacent concepts derive some of the particulars of their meaning through their association with the core beliefs. For example, the linguistically ambiguous term, *al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ* broadly means loyalty and disavowal for the sake of Allah, and has often been used to guide the personal conduct of Muslims.¹⁶² However, when placed in DI's ideological frame, with *hākimiyya* and *jihad* at its core, the group has conceptualised *al-walāʾ wa-l-barāʾ* to mean a collective obligation to God and fellow group members, and a responsibility to confront those who disavow or insult God. Since this requires members to take up arms in service of their faith, it reinforces the obligation to engage in *jihad*.

This differs from a Marxist conceptualisation that views ideology as a product of class and power structures. Marx and Engels argued that, by controlling the physical means of production, the ruling class of a society also controlled 'the means of mental production'.¹⁶³ Resultantly, the narratives generated were distortions of reality, that expressed contemporary economic power and enabled the ruling class to assert and maintain power over the masses. Their content, as such, was unimportant.

The Marxist scholars Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser and Terry Eagleton build on this interpretation, emphasising ideology's function as a tool of legitimation and influence.¹⁶⁴ While these thinkers agree that ideologies are used by elites to legitimate their power, they argue that – since these ideologies are rooted in the real structure of the state – the content of these beliefs is worthy of study on its own terms.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶¹ Idem, p.78

¹⁶² Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism*, p.111

¹⁶³ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology, Part 1 and Selections from Parts 2 and 3*, ed. Christopher John Arthur (New York: International Publishers, 2004), p.64

¹⁶⁴ For more on their respective interpretations see: Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Newell-Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd, 2005); Louis Althusser, *Essays on Ideology* (London: Verso, 1993); Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction* (Oxford: Routledge, 2013)

¹⁶⁵ Louis Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards and Investigation)', in eds. Arandhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, *The Anthropology of the State: A Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp.92-94

While modern scholarship on ideology agrees with the Marxists' view that ideologies reflect the political, social, economic and cultural forces of their time and accepts that ideology serves the function of influence and legitimation, a Marxist framing is ultimately a narrow conceptualisation. Ideology, as this thesis demonstrates, can be created by groups without access to formal state power and fulfils more roles than simply perpetuating the worldview of a ruling class. As Freedden notes, ideology is 'the most basic of political phenomenon', undertaken by a variety of groups and who are attempting to organise their 'perceptions, beliefs and pre- and misconceptions about the political world'.¹⁶⁶

Despite the extensive research on the subject of ideologies, few scholars have attempted to properly analyse its role within militant or non-state groups. This thesis applies some of the approaches used by Shiraz Maher, Thomas Hegghammer, and Joas Wagemaker to assess the construction and development of DP's belief structure.

Drawing on the works of Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss and particularly Karl Mannheim, Shiraz Maher's ground-breaking work, *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea* was the first to attempt a comprehensive overview of the conceptualisation and role of ideology in militant Islamism. While not grounded in the ideology of any particular militant Islamist organisation, Maher's approach traces the creation of *salafi-jihadism*, examines its core components and their evolution and accentuates its differences from other forms of Islamism. Maher sees *salafi-jihadism* as:

a *total* ideology, given the universality of its nature – based, not least, on Islamic universalism – towards a desire to consume and aggregate the entirety of both human existence and organisation within its systems¹⁶⁷

This is akin to totalitarianism with tendencies towards Leo Strauss' concept of brutal nihilism due to 'its desire to forcibly replace everything other than itself'.¹⁶⁸ Maher thus illustrates how this absolutist ideological framework guides the actions of its adherents as they seek to obliterate not only their detractors but the very idea of relativism and ambiguity for adherents of Islam.

Like Maher, Thomas Hegghammer and Joas Wagemakers stand out as some of the few scholars to have attempted to systematically interrogate the ideology of militant Islamism. Unlike Maher,

¹⁶⁶ Freedden, *Ideologies and political theory*, p.551

¹⁶⁷ Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism*, p.26

¹⁶⁸ Idem, p.27

Hegghammer and Wagemakers each focus on a single individual. Hegghammer analyses Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian scholar responsible for the mobilisation of foreign militants to Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s, while Wagemakers addresses Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the Jordanian ideologue and mentor to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, later leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Both works focus on the development of an individual's ideology, its impact on the formation of Al-Qaeda and AQI and the global *jihadist* movement. Maher's, Hegghammer's and Wagemaker's work reflects a renewed focus on the role of ideology in the study of Islamist militancy and terrorism and underlines its applicability to the study of individual groups.

While scholars including Kepel, Olivier Roy, Fawaz Gerges, and Marc Sageman have explored aspects of Islamist or *salafi-jihadist* thought and its effect on the actions of militant groups, their approaches conceptualise ideology as immutable and unresponsive to the prevailing political, economic and cultural climate. Additionally, they assume that groups simply cherry-pick particularly violent passages from Qur'anic scripture or alternatively single out or misinterpret texts from Islamic scholars and ideologues, rather than building a cohesive and responsive structure. For example, Kepel writes that these groups '[used] texts of the faith to further their own objectives' without ever exploring how particular passages were selected and interpreted by the groups themselves or explaining how this differs from other political organisations.¹⁶⁹ While these studies assert they are interested in the role of ideology, they often fail to do the basic work of establishing the components of the ideology, explaining how these were agreed upon, or assessing how a group's ideology evolves.

Despite these shortcomings, Kepel, Roy, Gerges and Sageman are notable for their willingness to conceive of ideology as an important concept worthy of research. The study of ideology has been largely side-lined in favour of a focus on operational capabilities, practical objectives, the radicalisation process and network formation.¹⁷⁰ This lack of exploration highlights the limitations of the current literature. This should not be taken to imply that this thesis sees ideology as the primary causal factor of militancy and terrorism in all circumstances. Instead, it sees ideology as

¹⁶⁹ Kepel, *Jihad*, p.72

¹⁷⁰ Large surveys of militancy and terrorism published over the past two decades have barely mention the concept of ideology in accounting for the rise and longevity of such groups around the world. See: Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Martha Crenshaw, *Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Process and Consequences* (New York: Routledge, 2011); Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, *A History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007); Tore Bjorgo, ed. *The Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* (Oxford: Routledge, 2005); Walter Reich, ed. *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1998)

an important, and overlooked, lens through which groups should be examined in order to provide a complex and nuanced account of the reasons for their foundation, motivations, and durability.

Intellectual History

In order to properly assess the construction and evolution of DI's ideology, this thesis relies primarily on methods advanced by intellectual historians. The study of intellectual history, sometimes referred to as the history of ideas, generally examines 'what people in the past meant by the things they said and what these things "meant" to them' and explores the evolution of these concepts and potential patterns or trends over time.¹⁷¹

This attempt at a simple definition elides the significant debates over what constitutes intellectual history as well as the numerous and rancorous methodological conflicts within the field. As Richard Whatmore notes, '[there] has never, however, been any unanimity about the use of this term.'¹⁷² Nevertheless, the complexity of these debates is unsurprising given the field has existed '[under] various labels – the history of wisdom, the history of thought, the history of the human spirit and so on... for over two centuries'.¹⁷³ Adding to this complexity, as Allan Megill notes, 'intellectual history has more often than not appeared as a hybrid genre crossing disciplinary boundaries'.¹⁷⁴ However, the refusal to be bound by any one discipline is often paired with grandiose claims like 'all history is the history of ideas', which have created tensions with more widely-studied strands of historical research.¹⁷⁵

The field grew in prominence in the middle of the twentieth-century, thanks in large part to Arthur O. Lovejoy, an American philosopher at Johns Hopkins University. Lovejoy advanced a pragmatic doctrine, where ideas served primarily, if almost exclusively, as answers to philosophical problems.¹⁷⁶ His conceptualisation of the history of ideas thus saw the reduction of larger, 'trouble-breeding and usually thought-obscuring' concepts into smaller components known as 'unit

¹⁷¹ John Burrow, letter to Anthony D. Nuttal, 3 February 1978, Burrow Papers, Special Collections, University of Sussex Library, Box 11, 'Correspondence T-Z', cited in Cesare Cuttica, 'Eavesdropper on the Past: John W. Burrow (1935-2009), Intellectual History and Its Future', *History of European Ideas*, Vol 40:7 (2014), p.914

¹⁷² Richard Whatmore, *What is Intellectual History?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), loc.729 Kindle edition

¹⁷³ David R. Kelley, *The Descent of Ideas: The History of Intellectual History* (Oxford: Routledge, 2017), p.1

¹⁷⁴ Allan Megill, 'Intellectual History and History', *Rethinking History*, Vol 8:4 (2004), p.550

¹⁷⁵ R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p.317

¹⁷⁶ Arthur O. Lovejoy, 'The Thirteen Pragmatisms', *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, 5:1 (2 January 1908), pp.5-12

ideas'.¹⁷⁷ These foundational 'unit ideas' were 'definite and explicit' and could be isolated and tracked through time.¹⁷⁸ In this sense, Lovejoy saw these elemental ideas somehow always existing, transcending time itself, and 'not always, or usually corresponding to terms which we are accustomed to use in naming'.¹⁷⁹ As such, this version of the history of ideas lent itself to the study of 'big history' where historians could trace a grand narrative of a particular concept over large swathes of time.¹⁸⁰

In contrast, Quentin Skinner, John Dunn, Richard Tuck, James Tully, J.G.A Pocock and the others who make up a loose group of intellectual historians known as the 'Cambridge School' disputed Lovejoy's methods, and called for a synchronic approach instead. Skinner's landmark work, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas' excoriates Lovejoy's diachronic methods, and advances a form of historical contextualism. While there are differences within the Cambridge School, its proponents largely agree that a historical text can only be understood within its intellectual and linguistic context. As Skinner writes, scholars must:

confront, in studying any given text, what its author in writing at the time he did write for the audience he intended to address, could in practice have been intending to communicate by the utterance of this given utterance.¹⁸¹

Resultantly, true understanding of a work can only be gleaned by examining the language used by the author. While language is a resource giving authors the opportunities for action, it is also constrained by the political, economic, social, cultural factors of its time.¹⁸² For the members of the Cambridge School, language provides both structure and agency for its historical subjects.¹⁸³

Skinner's critiques of Lovejoy's approach hold valuable lessons for the study of intellectual history. In assuming that an 'ideal type' of any given doctrine exists, with unchanging, 'unit ideas', scholars

¹⁷⁷ Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p.6

¹⁷⁸ Idem, pp.14-15

¹⁷⁹ Idem, p.5

¹⁸⁰ For a comprehensive overview of Lovejoy's theories see: Arthur O. Lovejoy, 'The Historiography of Ideas', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Societies*, 78:4 (1938), pp.529-543; Arthur O. Lovejoy, 'Reflections on the History of Ideas', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1:1 (1940) pp. 3-23; Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001)

¹⁸¹ Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', *History and Theory*, 8:1 (1969), p.49

¹⁸² J.G.A. Pocock, 'The Reconstruction of Discourse: Towards the Historiography of Political Thought', *Comparative Literature*, 96:5 (December 1981), pp.959-980

¹⁸³ Robert Lamb, 'Quentin Skinner's revised historical contextualism: a critique', *History of the Human Sciences*, 22:3 (2009), p.55

are likely to pay ‘insufficient notice to the determinative role of context for meaning’.¹⁸⁴ Moreover, defining an ‘ideal type’ assumes that there is some form of logical progression or growth towards an end state. This teleological framework may draw readers towards the view that earlier thinkers ‘hit upon’ but did not fully articulate ideas that later become crucial, thus imbuing them with a form of clairvoyance or simply misreading what they were in fact saying. This view deprives scholars of the agency to advance or create their own arguments, leaving them as mere conduits for concepts.

Additionally, scholars ought to be wary of assuming the universality of any concept since they are likely to bring their own expectations of the culture they are studying into their assessment. Finally, they should be careful not to create a cohesive narrative from disparate remarks made by a particular thinker where one may not have existed, nor credit a writer for advancing an argument simply because they used similar words to another.¹⁸⁵

Although the criticisms advanced by the Cambridge School are valid and important contributions to the study of intellectual history, they too inevitably have limitations. In arguing that ideas are context bound to their particular time periods and language structures, Skinner and his colleagues appear to deny the existence of universal concepts, going as far as to claim that ‘there are no perennial questions in philosophy’.¹⁸⁶ This poses two distinct problems. First, as Robert Lamb notes, ‘[whether] or not philosophical problems “last a long time” is something that cannot simply be asserted’ but instead can and should be proven empirically, ‘not least because it seems so obvious that many such problems or questions do occupy philosophical attention for a long time’.¹⁸⁷ This is problematic when applying the Cambridge School’s doctrine to the study of Islamic – or indeed, any religious – political thought. Questions of interpreting the Qur’an and *hadith* have circulated since the death of the Prophet in 632.

Second, as Peter Gordon argues, the contextualists assume that there is ‘only one native context in which [an idea] is properly understood’ to the exclusion of all others.¹⁸⁸ Islamic theological scholarship – while by no means alone in this regard – often faces the challenge of translating and

¹⁸⁴ Peter E. Gordon, ‘Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas’, in Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn, eds. *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.34

¹⁸⁵ Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, *History and Theory*, 8:1 (1969), pp.3-53 and Kari Palonen, *Quentin Skinner: history, politics, rhetoric* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003)

¹⁸⁶ Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics: Vol. 1, Regarding Method* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.88

¹⁸⁷ Lamb, Quentin Skinner’s revised historical contextualism: a critique’, p.61 and p.68

¹⁸⁸ Gordon, ‘Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas’, p.38

transliterating, which take place across various geographies and time periods. By assuming there is only one point at which the ‘true’ meaning is unearthed, historians would lose the plurality of contexts that give the idea its meaning, in favour of ‘one particular holistic and self-contained environment’.¹⁸⁹

Given these limitations, this thesis draws largely from more recent scholarship that welcomes the return of ‘big history’, while heeding some of the warnings of the Cambridge School. This approach, pioneered by historians like David Armitage, Samuel Moyn, Darrin McMahon, and others, calls for a rapprochement between Lovejoy’s methods and the Cambridge School.

This is achieved through the examination of concepts through the lens of transtemporal history, which traces ideas across ‘temporal frontiers, paying due attention to the key moments at which they shift their shapes and change their colours in different local settings, while still retaining a recognizable form’.¹⁹⁰ In this respect, it recognises the impact of the language of a particular time period, the goals of the speaker or writer to persuade or to legitimise a particular idea, and their agency to do so while also ‘reconstructing contexts across time – transtemporally – to produce longer-range histories, which are neither artificially punctuated nor deceptively continuous’.¹⁹¹ The debates surrounding each concept may take place in a particular context, but collectively they form bridges that create a narrative that stretches through decades.

With regards to this thesis, the examination of the conceptualisation of ideas such as *hakimiyya*, *jihad*, *takfir* and *al-wala’ wa-l-bara’* takes place in specific moments. These ideas were defined and articulated by individual DI leaders, who were both constrained by their domestic political circumstances and in dialogue with their contemporaries and predecessors in the wider Muslim world. Rather than treating each concept as eternal and each set of actors as unable to imbue them with their own specific interpretations, this approach uses historical moments like leadership changes and political or military setbacks to illustrate how each idea was approached and shaped across time with provable links to its forerunners and future incarnations.

¹⁸⁹ Idem, p.39

¹⁹⁰ Darrin M. McMahon, ‘The Return of the History of Ideas?’ in *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History* in Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn, eds. *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.26

¹⁹¹ David Armitage, ‘What’s the Big Idea? Intellectual History and the *Longue Durée*’, *History of European Ideas*, 38:4 (2012), p.499

While these approaches are useful, they have, like Lovejoy and the Cambridge School, largely focused on European intellectual history, particularly studies of Enlightenment thinkers. Scholarship of Islamic intellectual history, while robust, has remained largely on the side lines of these methodological debates. This marginalisation is likely due to a combination of Eurocentrism on the part of the established proponents of these schools as well as the difficulties caused by efforts to treat Islamic intellectual history as a cohesive whole. While this predicament is not unique to the field, it is a reminder to consider Islamic intellectual history on its own terms with its own traditions and debates. Crucially, it is necessary to be wary of attempts to reduce the multiple strands of Islamic intellectual histories, each in turn made up of numerous movements, to a homogenous bloc.

Bearing this in mind, this thesis draws on the work of Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi' to provide some structure to these innumerable topics. Focusing on the study of Islamic intellectual history from the nineteenth century onwards, Abu-Rabi' identifies four movements as having defined debates within the field, namely; nationalism, Islamism, Westernisation, and state ideology.¹⁹² These currents are all affected by specific national circumstances, unique colonial and decolonisation experiences, and other specific factors. But they all largely revolve around the larger question of the purpose and structure of the state in contemporary Muslim society.¹⁹³ While Abu-Rabi's work remained at the theoretical level, this thesis will illustrate how these four currents went on to shape the development of each tenet of the DI's ideology.

Finally, the works of Carool Kersten, Michael Laffan and Chiara Formichi are instructive guides to researching Islamic intellectual histories in Indonesia. All three point out that scholars of Islam, particularly Westerners, often fail to acknowledge Islam as an important force in the country's political landscape. Many either assume that other identities – like ethnicity – take precedence or that Islamic practice has been sufficiently bastardised through the influence of animism, Buddhism and other local traditions. As such, researchers should remember that:

Islam has been reformulated by every community which has ever embraced it. In the process, they have added their own particularisms to the Muslim world and compounded the multiplicity of the living forms of religion.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹² Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi' 'Contemporary Islamic Intellectual History: A theoretical Perspective', *Islamic Studies*, 44:4 (Winter 2005), p.504

¹⁹³ Idem, p.507

¹⁹⁴ Michael Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The umma beneath the winds* (London: Routledge, 2003), p.9

It is fairly obvious that Islamic thought in Indonesia should not be judged as more or less authentic or accurate on the basis of how closely it accords with the views espoused by thinkers in the traditional Islamic centres in the Middle East. But these scholars raise a more subtle and significant point; the reformulation of Islam in Indonesia is a constant and non-linear process. As Kersten notes, ‘tradition, modernity and postmodernity are not necessarily successive stages in intellectual history or bound by linear progression’.¹⁹⁵ In keeping with such approaches, this thesis assesses how DI leaders’ ideas shifted with changing political circumstances, despite their claim to espouse a total and immutable belief structure rooted in Islamic scripture.

Historiography

Indonesian militant Islamists have often been relegated to the margins of the literature on the global *jihad* and Islamism. Terms like ‘second front’ and ‘periphery’ are routinely used to describe their position (alongside other Southeast Asian militants) in this discourse, thus emphasising the notion that militant Islamism was imported from a central core rather than produced indigenously.¹⁹⁶ This designation ignores the fact that Indonesia has a long history of indigenous militant Islamist movements, including the Padris in western Sumatra, who opposed Dutch colonial encroachment in the 1820s and 1830s. As Kirsten Schulze and Tom Smith argue, it is better to conceive of Indonesia as an ‘alternative centre’ for Islamist violence, discarding biases that see Middle Eastern clerics and militants as sole source of beliefs that guide Islamist militancy.

Jemaah Islamiyah: Global Islamist Militancy or Home-Grown Phenomenon?

From occupying a ‘marginal position within mainstream academic circles’, the literature on terrorism and militant Islamism grew exponentially in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks.¹⁹⁷ As Andrew Silke points out, ‘over 90 percent of the entire literature on terrorism will

¹⁹⁵ Carol Kersten, *Islam in Indonesia: The contest for society, ideas and values* (London: Hurst), p.7

¹⁹⁶ Works by Ken Conboy, *The Second Front: Inside Asia’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Network* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2006); John Gershman, ‘Is Southeast Asia the Second Front’, *Foreign Affairs*, 81:4 (2002); Catharin E. Dalpino, ‘Second Front, Second Time: Counter-Terrorism and US Policy toward Southeast Asia’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 15:2 (2002), offer a small sample of this pervasive trend.

¹⁹⁷ Magnus Ranstorp, ‘An academic field of old problems and new prospects’, in eds. Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning, *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p.13

have been written since 9/11' with Islamist militancy accounting for 57.3% of those studies.¹⁹⁸ This growth has resulted in an abundance of comprehensive and critical work on all aspects of the subject as well as many cultural objects, including films, books, and other media articles.¹⁹⁹

A significant portion of this academic interest has focused on understanding the causes of militancy (particularly the tensions between individual, group and societal level explanations), groups' recruitment, and the means by which states can combat this phenomenon. As noted earlier, this has often come at the expense of other areas such as ideology.²⁰⁰ Martha Crenshaw accounts for this emphasis, arguing that '[theories] of conflict usually focused on causes rather than outcomes, and research on terrorism followed this tradition'.²⁰¹ Less charitably, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman characterised this research agenda as 'counterterrorism masquerading as political science'.²⁰²

Regardless, the vast majority of this literature has focused on al-Qaeda and more recently, the Islamic State. In his overview of the terrorism studies literature between 2007 and 2016, Bart Schuurman laments this overemphasis, pointing out that al-Qaeda remained the most frequently used keyword in the 2,552 articles he surveyed. Its pre-eminent position only declined in 2016 when it was finally overshadowed by Islamic State.²⁰³

This narrow focus on a small set of actors is compounded by an equally tight geographic focus. Schuurman's study finds that the Middle East and North Africa received the lion's share of attention from scholars, accounting for 43.8% of all articles on terrorism and militancy produced in that period.²⁰⁴ Asia, defined broadly as the space between Afghanistan and Japan, was the focus of just 19.1% of the scholarship over the same period. However, Schuurman points out that articles on Afghanistan and Pakistan dominate the literature on Islamist militancy in that region, rather than Southeast Asian states. Most significantly, the 19.1% figure represents an average over

¹⁹⁸ Andrew Silke, 'Research on Terrorism: A Review of the Impact of 9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism', in *Terrorism Informatics: Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security, Series: Integrated Series in Information Systems*, eds. Chen Hsinchun, Edna Reid, Joshua Sinai, Andrew Silke, and Boaz Ganor (Boston: Springer, 2008), p.28

¹⁹⁹ Stuart Croft, *Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.9

²⁰⁰ Ranstorp, 'An academic field of old problems and new prospects', p.9

²⁰¹ Martha Crenshaw, *Explaining Terrorism: Causes, processes and consequences* (New York: Routledge, 2011), p.193

²⁰² A.P. Schmid and A.J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature* (Amsterdam and New Brunswick: SWIDOC and Transaction Books), p.182

²⁰³ Bart Schuurman, 'Topics in terrorism research: reviewing trends and gaps, 2007-2016', *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 12:3 (2019), p.469

²⁰⁴ Idem, p.471

the period. As he notes, ‘the percentage of articles looking at Asia has decreased somewhat, going from 21.7% in 2007 to 10.7% in 2016’.²⁰⁵

Given the outsized focus on al-Qaeda and terrorism in the Middle East in this field, it is unsurprising that research on Islamist militancy in Indonesia has been limited, and frequently framed in terms of its relation to the former. In the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesian militants have been largely cast as creatures of a violent, global Islamist movement led by al-Qaeda with its roots in the *jihad* against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Exemplifying this so-called ‘globalist’ school of thought are Rohan Gunaratna, Zachary Abuza, Bilveer Singh, as well as journalists like Maria Ressa and Mike Millard.

Abuza refers repeatedly to the JI as ‘Al-Qaeda’s regional arm’ and part of al-Qaeda’s ‘global network’, rather than an entity with its own distinct history and agenda.²⁰⁶ Similarly Rohan Gunaratna acknowledges that the group’s ‘roots can be traced back to the Indonesian rebellion in the 1950s led by Darul Islam’, he does not, despite his paper’s title, actually explore the links between the two groups, ideological or otherwise.²⁰⁷ Like Abuza, he credits the war in Afghanistan with giving JI members ‘a sense of belong to an international Islamic brotherhood’ which ‘increasingly “Arabized” their outlook ‘and developed a strong orientation towards the Middle East, most notably towards Saudi Arabia and Egypt’.²⁰⁸ In an interview with Millard in his book, *Jihad in Paradise*, Gunaratna went on to explicitly claim the JI ‘were al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian network’.²⁰⁹ Millard’s book never once mentions DI, much less any Islamist militancy in Indonesia prior to the 2002 Bali bombings.

Greg Fealy and Carlyle Thayer point out that while these researchers argue that the JI is a creature of Al-Qaeda, ‘Rohan Gunaratna, Zachary Abuza... devote little or no space in their texts to defining [these links]’.²¹⁰ Instead, Fealy and Thayer argue that that the JI ‘was not subordinate to Al-Qaeda’ since ‘JI leaders [made] their own decisions about operations, neither receiving nor seeking direction from the Al-Qaeda central leadership’.²¹¹ Instead, they highlight the legacy of the

²⁰⁵ Ibid

²⁰⁶ Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of terror* (Boulder; Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003) p.9 and p.26

²⁰⁷ Rohan Gunaratna, ‘The Ideology of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah’, *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, no.1 (2005), p.75

²⁰⁸ Ibid

²⁰⁹ on, *Jihad in Paradise: Islam and politics in Southeast Asia* (Armonk, New York; M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p.41

²¹⁰ Greg Fealy and Carlyle Thayer, ‘Problematising ‘linkages’ between Southeast Asian and international terrorism’ in William Tow, ed. *Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus?* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.212

²¹¹ Idem, pp.222-225

Darul Islam rebellions, indicating the history of using violence to attempt to create an Islamic state in Indonesia. They note the operational links between the two groups with JI leaders often coming from ‘strong Darul Islam families’.²¹²

This focus on the kinship ties between the DI and JI movements are significant and well-trodden territory.²¹³ Indeed, there is a tendency to overemphasise these linkages, suggesting that it was somehow inevitable that these individuals would become part of the movement rather than acknowledging the agency of the individuals involved and the appeal of the group’s evolving ideology to those outside the families of Darul Islam participants.²¹⁴

The most extensive investigations into the JI’s origins have been pursued by researchers in think tanks and non-governmental organisations. Sidney Jones and Solahudin’s work at the ICG and now at the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) provides rich detail on JI members who are descendants of Darul Islam cadres, the complex marriage network that binds the organisation together, and the personal rivalries that lead to the factionalisation of the movement.²¹⁵ These reports give academic researchers substantive source material, but often fail to provide a frame or narrative structure for this information. While often fascinating, the sheer amount of detail presented leads to an overemphasis on the rivalries and relationships between individual personalities and hyper local developments, such as the impact of the appointment of a village imam. Though important in their own right, these often come at the expense of an exploration of overarching ideologies, policy developments or consideration of the influence of foreign events.

Ideology and Indonesian Militancy

Using this research background, Solahudin published his ground-breaking book, *The Roots of*

²¹² Ibid

²¹³ See: Julie Chernov-Hwang and Kirsten Schulze, ‘Why They Join: Pathways into Indonesian Jihadist Organisations’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 30: 6 (2018) pp.911-932; Noor Huda Ismail, ‘The Role of Kinship in Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiya’, *Terrorism Monitor*, 4:11 (2006), *The Jamestown Foundation*, <https://jamestown.org/program/the-role-of-kinship-in-indonesias-jemaah-islamiya/>, accessed 2 June 2020; Noor Huda Ismail, ‘Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah and Regional Terrorism: Kinship and Family Links’, *The Asia Pacific Journal*, 5:1 (2007), pp.1-10; Sulastri Osman, ‘Jemaah Islamiyah: Of Kin and Kind’, *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 29:2 (2010), pp.157-175; Michael King, Haula Noor, and Donal M. Taylor, ‘Normative support for terrorism: The attitudes and beliefs of immediate relatives of Jema’ah Islamiyya members’, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 34:5 (2011), pp.402-417

²¹⁴ Fealy and Thayer, ‘Problematising ‘linkages’ between Southeast Asian and international terrorism’, p.225

²¹⁵ See: ICG, ‘Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia’; ICG, ‘Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing’, *Asia Report 92* (Jakarta/Brussels, 22 February 2005); ICG, ‘Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous’, *Asia Report*, no.63 (Jakarta/Brussels, 26 August 2003)

Terrorism in Indonesia, in 2013. It remains one of the few substantial explorations of the ties between the DI and the JI. Solahudin goes beyond the operational and familial linkages to tackle the role of ideology in the JI's formation, providing significant detail on the intra-group conceptual debates and the material that was referenced by those involved. His unprecedented access to group members resulted in substantive interviews and gave him access to material published by DI leaders, providing new insights into the development of the group's ideology during understudied periods in the movement's history. For example, Solahudin was able to procure a document detailing Aceng Kurnia's – one of Kartosuwiryo's deputies and close aid – doctrine of *tauhid* in the years following Kartosuwiryo's death, demonstrating that the latter 'gave rise to a strong *takfiri* strand in Darul Islam thinking'.²¹⁶

However, as a journalist and researcher, the work is ultimately descriptive rather than analytical, lacking assessments of how the Dutch authorities, Japanese occupying forces, and the Indonesian state influenced the group's ideology. Additionally, Solahudin does not provide a framework to interrogate the hierarchy and relationship between the concepts that make up DI's belief structure, explain how and why these evolved under various leaders, or thoroughly investigate the role played by domestic or foreign ideologues or Islamist groups.

Quinton Temby's as yet unpublished dissertation and article, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah', builds on Solahudin's work, providing a comprehensive account of the group's evolution. While his dissertation takes a geographical approach to explaining the mobilisation of *jihadists* in Southeast Asia, he persuasively demonstrates how a combination of 'overwhelming Suharto regime repression', 'the emigration of key leaders' and the rapid globalisation and Islamisation of Malaysia led to the transnationalisation of a previously domestic movement.²¹⁷

His article, however, also goes into the beliefs of the movement in greater detail, arguing that Sungkar and Ba'asyir's contribution to the movement was the introduction of *salafist* beliefs honed during their time as activists in the non-violent Islamist movement. While packed with interesting detail about the group's development, he does not fully engage with the conceptual origins and content of the ideas espoused by JI leaders, instead simply attributing them to the usual suspects of Maududi, Qutb and other leading Islamist thinkers. This is not unusual for works purporting

²¹⁶ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, p.78

²¹⁷ Quinton Temby, 'Jihadists Assemble: The rise of militant Islam in Southeast Asia', PhD Dissertation (Canberra: Australian National University, 2017), p.245

to engage with the ideology of the DI or JI. Numerous scholars will correctly note that thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyya and Abdullah Azzam played some role in developing the JI's ideology, but only insofar as name dropping those thinkers or very superficially outlining the content of a belief or set of beliefs.

The DI and Islam

The debate among scholars of the JI tends to revolve around the degree to which they see Islamist ideas as indigenously produced or the product of foreign ideologues and experiences. By contrast, those writing about DI, particularly its initial manifestation as a rebellion or insurgency, have tended to downplay the role of Islam or ideology more generally in the conflict.

Research on the group in this phase is significantly less developed, with only a handful of individuals publishing on the subject. Cornelis van Dijk's *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, published in 1981 remains the only academic text to offer an assessment of the movement across Indonesia. Edward Aspinall's *Islam and Nation*, Karl Jackson's *Traditional Authority, Islam and Rebellion*, and Hiroko Horikoshi's article 'The Dar-ul-Islam movement in West Java (1942-62): An experience in the historical process', provide accounts of the rebellions in Aceh and West Java respectively. There has been little significant academic research on Darul Islam fighters in South Sulawesi.

Nevertheless, these partial accounts of the rebellions as well as van Dijk's book argue that the rebellion was not motivated by a religious ideology, but rather 'opposition to the increasingly pervasive influence of the Central Government' and a 'conflict over territorial autonomy'.²¹⁸ Jackson, for example, claims that participants of the conflict were more likely to be 'mobilized by an appeal to traditional authority than to ideology, economic interests, or even basic value differences'.²¹⁹ As discussed in the previous chapter, Van Dijk offers a marginally more generous interpretation of the role of Islam, arguing that while it was a motivating factor, the content of the religious beliefs of DI leaders and followers was insufficiently puritanical and did not '[live] up to the standards of orthodox Islam'.²²⁰ However, his assessment of the nature of the beliefs of leaders

²¹⁸ van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam*, p.3

²¹⁹ Jackson, *Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980) p.185

²²⁰ van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam*, p.395

like Kartosuwiryo was not grounded in any of Kartosuwiryo's own words, but instead relied entirely on hearsay spread by his critics that he allegedly engaged in mystical Javanese practices.

Thus far, only Chiara Formichi's work, *Islam and the Making of a Nation: Kartosuwiryo and Political Islam in 20th Century Indonesia* has successfully challenged this reductive narrative. Formichi convincingly argues that by 'failing to take seriously the role of religion', many scholars have missed its role in conferring legitimacy on rebel leaders, motivating recruitment and of a genuine desire among large swathes of the population to create an Islamic state.²²¹ Most importantly, she appeared to be the first scholar to engage with Kartosuwiryo's writings as a PSI newspaper editor through to his political pamphlets and eventual declarations as leader of the NII. As such, she successfully '[brought] religion back into the analysis' of the movement through Kartosuwiryo's writings and framing of his anti-colonial movement.²²²

Political Islam in Indonesia

A full account of the political Islamic landscape in Indonesian in the twentieth century would fill several books. Given Indonesia's size and diversity, it should be no surprise that Islamist movements run across the Indonesian political spectrum. While this thesis' focuses on the most violent, it is important to remember that the vast majority of Islamic groups are not, and use the ballot box and civic activism to promote their cause.

M.C. Ricklefs's masterful *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: c.1930 to the Present* provides the most comprehensive overview of the developments and groups that have attempted to drive political change in Indonesia without resorting to violence. The country's oldest mass Islamic organisations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, the Revival of Islamic Scholars), are the leading examples of this non-violent approach to Islamic activism. Founded in 1912 in Yogyakarta, Muhammadiyah 'grew to become the foremost Modernist Islamic organisation in Indonesia'.²²³ While keen to promote the view that Islam should be purified through a return to understanding the faith directly from its original Qur'anic scripture, rather than through interpretations in the four Sunni schools of law, the organisation has holistically 'eschewed political involvement'.²²⁴ Instead, Muhammadiyah's leaders believe that they could best influence Indonesian Muslims and

²²¹ Formichi, *Islam and the Making of a Nation*, p.3

²²² Ibid, p.6

²²³ Ricklefs, *Islamisation and its opponents in Java*, p.19

²²⁴ Ibid

purify their faith through the provision of education and social services. They had not been without success; by the mid-2000s the organisation had 25 to 30 million members.²²⁵

In many ways, Muhammadiyah's mirror is NU, which was formed in 1926 to defend Traditionalism in response to the rise of Modernism. Traditionalists believe that Islamic laws should include interpretations beyond Qur'anic scripture and be 'sensitive to social conditions'.²²⁶ They are also largely tolerant of local Javanese practices and frequently '[defended] religious practices under attack from reformers'.²²⁷ While initially based in Java, NU has become Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation.

In addition to Muhammadiyah and NU, smaller Islamic political organisations sprung up during the interwar period. These include Sarekat Islam (which will be examined separately in Chapter 1) and Persatuan Islam (Persis, Islamic Union), which was established in Bandung West Java in 1923. Persis argued against growing communist forces in Indonesia, claiming that the ideology was incompatible with Islam. The group also fomented anti-Christian sentiment.²²⁸ Persis' leadership appears to have thrived on entrenching social cleavages within Indonesian society, and issued numerous polemics about the various threats to Indonesian Muslims.

As Kevin Fogg notes, the rise of Muhammadiyah, NU, Persis and Sarekat Islam in the early twentieth century illustrated both the increased organisation of pious Muslims as well as the politicisation of Islam in Indonesia.²²⁹ These groups appear to have responded to growing concerns among Indonesian Muslims who felt the need to safeguard their beliefs against an array of forces. Fogg argues that these groups 'connected Muslims to co-religionists beyond their village in a concerted way', introducing them to a national, or potentially global, community and fundamentally changing the practice of Islam in Indonesia.²³⁰

Opportunities for participation in formal politics during Dutch colonial rule were obviously limited. While Muhammadiyah was seemingly content to avoid participation in formal politics after independence, many other Islamic political movements were keen to try their hand at governance.

²²⁵ Fealy, Hooker and White, 'Indonesia', p.41

²²⁶ Greg Fealy, 'Wahab Chasbullah' in Greg Barton and Greg Fealy, eds. *Nabdlatul Ulama: Traditional Islam and modernity in Indonesia* (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), p.5

²²⁷ Jeremy Menchick, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p.51

²²⁸ Menchik, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia*, p.45

²²⁹ Fogg, *Indonesia's Islamic Revolution*, p.31

²³⁰ Idem, p.33

Numerous Islamic political parties, including NU, Masyumi – an amalgamation of Islamic political parties established during the Japanese occupation in 1943 – and PSI, participated in the country's first elections in 1955.

Despite their enthusiasm, Islamic political parties got slightly less than 44 percent of the vote.²³¹ This turned out to be the high point of electoral success for Islamic political parties. Greg Fealy, Virginia Hooker and Sally White make the important observation that throughout Indonesia's history 'Islam's impact upon politics and the state...has been far less than its statistical dominance might suggest'.²³² While Indonesian Muslims make up nearly 87% of the population, the country's Islamic parties have never bested this performance in subsequent general elections, 'nor have they succeeded in their efforts to Islamise' the nation.²³³

Formal political participation grew increasingly difficult for Islamic political parties in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. Sukarno's embrace of authoritarianism and turn to 'Guided Democracy' in 1957 and Suharto's subsequent coup reduced the ability of Islamic parties to have any input in government. Sukarno disbanded Masyumi in 1960 and in 1973 forced the merger four Islamic political parties to create the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party). According to Fealy, Hooker and White, the regime 'stripped the party of its Islamic symbols and content'.²³⁴

In 1982, Sukarno went on to decree that all Indonesian organisation should have 'only a single ideological foundation which must, of course, be *Pancasila*'.²³⁵ Most organisations had little choice but to cooperate. NU, for example, accepted these realities and chose to compromise with the state. In 1983, the organisation withdrew from the PPP and opted to retreat from parliamentary politics, returning 'to the original socio-religious purpose of the organisation'.²³⁶

Nevertheless, Suharto's repression had unintended consequences for political Islam in Indonesia. While he successfully throttled formal political participation, Islamist groups had significant success in spreading their message through grassroots organisations. The 1970s and 1980s saw the rise of 'campus Islam', with numerous university-based movements arising including the Gerakan

²³¹ Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia*, p.179

²³² Greg Fealy, Virginia Hooker and Sally White, 'Indonesia', in Greg Fealy and Virginia Hooker, *Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), p.41

²³³ Ibid

²³⁴ Idem, p.45

²³⁵ Ricklefs, *Islamisation and its Opponents in Java*, p.224

²³⁶ Idem, p.227

Tarbiyah (Education Movement), Hizbut Tahrir (Liberation Party) and Jemaah Tabligh (Preaching Community).²³⁷ Revivalist movements like DDII, which is examined more fully in Chapter 3, and the Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia (LDII) were established in 1976 and 1982 respectively.²³⁸ These movements promoted a Modernist worldview, publishing, sharing and facilitating the discussion of texts from clerics based predominantly in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The campus organisations in particular modelled themselves on the cell structure pioneered by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. They prioritised *dakwah*, often promoting the faith in small group settings, thus avoiding close scrutiny by state authorities.

By the time the Suharto regime collapsed in 1998, many of these groups, notably Hizbut Tahrir, had established far-reaching networks across the country as well as links with branches abroad. According to Ken Ward, Hizbut Tahrir was able to fully exploit the democratic freedoms on offer in the immediate aftermath of 1998.²³⁹ In contrast to the DI and JI, the group has been able to conduct a ‘sustained, peaceful campaign to convince Indonesia’s Muslim population of the need for a caliphate’ and the imposition of Islamic law.²⁴⁰

The group has also managed to achieve significant influence in state organisations such as Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of the Ulama), has staged effective campaigns against minority Muslim groups like the Ahmadiyahs, and helped to promulgate conservative laws targeting religious and sexual minorities.²⁴¹ In many respects, Hizbut Tahrir and other radical, non-violent organisations in Indonesia today have had far more impact on Islamising society than DI or JI ever did.

Sources and Methodology

Charting the ideological history of a clandestine, militant group is unsurprisingly difficult. The ongoing nature of militant Islamism in Indonesia makes it an especially sensitive topic that must be approached with due regard for the privacy of DI members and participants in conflicts, possible interference by the Indonesian state, and pragmatic considerations of physical security. This is exacerbated by the fact that many of the members of these organisations are still alive, with

²³⁷ Fealy, Hooker, and White, ‘Indonesia’, p.48

²³⁸ Ricklefs, *Islamisation and its Opponents in Java*, p.238

²³⁹ Ken Ward, ‘Non-violent extremists? Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* Vol 63:2, p.156

²⁴⁰ Ibid

²⁴¹ Idem, p.157

some living in a legal grey area due to their participation in conflicts abroad or in illegal activities in Indonesia itself.

Given these circumstances and the fact that the DI operated as a clandestine organisation, this study is fundamentally limited to interviews with group members and to their writings, sermons, and other non-archival sources. These must often be assessed carefully since they are, by nature, works of propaganda. As a highly hierarchical and secretive movement, the group obviously did not maintain a structured archive. Moreover, many DI members, even senior figures, did not have access to records, if any were kept, nor were they privy to all facets of the organisation.

This incomplete record is compounded by a lack of access to information stored in conventional archives much of the government's assessments of the DI and militant Islamist activity remain largely classified. The available government records – namely military documents regarding surveillance and encounters with DI militants, interrogations conducted by police officers, and court transcripts of indicted DI members – are also deeply problematic having been created by an authoritarian regime subject to limited legal oversight and scrutiny.

Resultantly, this thesis has balanced fragmentary – and frequently contradictory – sources against one other to piece together a cohesive picture of the organisation's ideology. Indeed, this thesis' methodology is part of its originality. It employs a comprehensive assessment of the oral histories of DI members and non-archival sources such as sermons and texts produced by the group. These are supplemented by traditional archival sources produced by the government, military, non-violent political organisations, and newspapers, that fill in the gaps and provide context for the documentary evidence created by DI members. Bolstering traditional historical research methods, this thesis draws on practices from the fields of anthropology, sociology, and political science.

Non-Archival Documents

In order to clearly assess how ideas were formed and developed by DI leaders, this thesis relies on non-archival documents produced by the organisation itself. These included websites hosting collections of Kartosuwiryo's writings and DI's foundational documents, autobiographies (or hagiographies) published by DI or JI members, and translated collections of key Islamist ideologues primarily based in the Middle East.

Much of this material was explicitly designed as propaganda to inspire followers, recruit and radicalise new members, or justify the group's actions. Resultantly, it is clearly biased to favour the organisation's, and particularly the leadership's, point of view. While this would make them problematic sources for assessing an organisation's actions, this thesis focuses on how the DI's ideas were created and altered over time. As such, these obvious biases do not prevent the documents from providing insight into how DI leaders understood and sought to present the group's worldview to lower ranking members and to outsiders. Whether or not the beliefs presented in this material reflect real material conditions is inconsequential insofar as this project is concerned with assessing the leadership's internal struggles over its belief structure.

Another challenge posed by the sources is that much of the material created by DI leaders can only be found online. For example, speeches and pamphlets written by Kartosuwiryo during his time as a member of PSII and Masyumi have not been maintained by traditional archives but instead hosted on blogs, social media accounts, and websites run by individuals who appear to support establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. The identities of those running these sites, their affiliations, and their motivations are difficult to ascertain. Nor is it clear how they obtained these pamphlets or transcripts of speeches.

As such, this material must be approached with care in order to ascertain its authenticity and trustworthiness. This thesis attempts to overcome some of these limitations by using multiple websites, rather than just a single source, to obtain the same document. While it is possible that all of these sites are sharing the same erroneous or falsified documents, these odds are lowered by cross-checking sites run by a variety of users. Additionally, ascertaining the credibility of these sites was another means by which these sources could be verified. Highly trafficked websites or social media pages provided some assurance that outright forgeries would be spotted, or at least debated and discussed. Furthermore, if these sites hosted some documents that could be checked against physical copies, this again improved the probability that the other sources were legitimate. Finally, some of this material can be verified through some secondary sources, which reference the same content, and may quote identical passages.

While there is no fool-proof method for ascertaining whether sources found online are real and authentic, this thesis is ultimately interested in investigating the trends and debates about the DI's core ideological concepts. Although an individual source, like a pamphlet, may not be wholly

accurate, it is unlikely to deviate significantly or undermine the trends found in more substantive sources produced by the organisation, nor challenge an overarching trend.

Some key documents were also obtained from the Islamic publishing industry affiliated with DI and JI in Jakarta. These publishing houses are small businesses, often run by individuals, that market their wares on Instagram and blogs and sell books via e-commerce websites like Tokopedia or small bookshops called *toko kitabs*. According to an International Crisis Group (ICG) report published in 2008, these publishers are mainly based in the city of Solo and are not directly run by either group. Instead, they function as a loose syndicate, publishing material from a wide variety of Islamic viewpoints. They appear to be motivated more by a desire to conduct *dakwah* (proselytisation) than by a profit motive.²⁴² Indeed, these publishers often produce books in small quantities for limited periods. Few, if any, ship overseas, often confining themselves to their local communities. This requires researchers to either have considerable luck in being close by when a book is released or to have a network within the community which is willing to purchase the book and hold on to it until a research trip can be arranged and the material collected. Resultantly, sourcing books from the time period under consideration was often not possible.

Popular texts such as *Tarbiyah Jibadiyah* (Jihad Education), the collected writings and lectures of Abdullah Azzam, are still in print and easy to obtain. The twelve-volume text is particularly significant both because Azzam was an important figure in global Islamist militant ideology, and because his role in the Afghan *jihad* and personal interactions with Indonesian fighters who trained in the camps during the conflict mean that his writings had an outsized impact on the DI's belief structure in the 1980s. Furthermore, the collection was published by Al-Alaq, a publishing house established by Ikhsan Miarso, the JI *wakalah* (territorial subunit) commander of Solo and a former Afghanistan veteran. Al-Alaq has been responsible for the publication of texts that make up the core curriculum of JI *pesantrens* and training programmes, thus providing some insights into the key influences on the group's ideology.

While these texts are useful in understanding the sources that made major contributions to Indonesian militant thought, Martin van Bruinessen notes that the majority of the nine hundred or so *kitab kuning* (religious texts) used in *pesantren* curricula across the country are small (quarto-

²⁴² ICG, 'Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry', *Asia Report*, no. 147 (Jakarta/Brussels, 28 February 2008), pp.1-2

sized) and unbound, with only a fraction available in print from the publishers.²⁴³ Furthermore, it is unclear which of these smaller texts were used in DI-affiliated *pesantrens* and considered significant by teachers. In interviews, DI members who taught or were schooled in these institutes remembered the titles of major works by high-profile foreign *salafi* ideologues, but few recalled the names of these *kitab kuning* or suggested they were significant in comparison to the well-known thinkers such as Maududi or Qutb. As such, this thesis can only speak to DI's thought as shaped by these more established texts. This is not necessarily problematic since the writings of DI leaders indeed reflect this bias towards these famous ideologues, but it must be acknowledged that some nuance in the assessment of its ideology is potentially lost without the input of these smaller texts.

Finally, this thesis relies on autobiographies written by DI and JI members. These works are usually published by the same set of Islamist publishers with relatively small print runs. Popular works are readily available and remain in print today, including *Aku Melawan Teroris* (I Fight the Terrorists) and *Satu Jihad Sejuta Vonis: Mengungkap Al Haq Menghalau Al-Batil* (One Jihad One Million Verdicts: Revealing the Truth and Banishing the Wrong) by Imam Samudra, and *Mimpi Suci Di Balik Jeruji Besi* (A Sacred Dream Behind Bars) by Mukhlas (alias Ali Ghufron, alias Huda bin Abdul Haq), another JI member convicted for his role in organising the Bali bombings. However, works by low-profile members are difficult to obtain after their initial print run since these small publishers, with their precarious financial model, are unlikely to be willing or able to stock publications that did not sell. As such, it is important not to overstate the importance of any one of these texts, which may represent only that particular individual's belief structure. However, taken collectively, the works still provide a shared understanding of the group's ideology and the trends and concepts that preoccupied its members at a given point.

These works were often written while their authors were in detention and provide insight into their understanding of concepts such as *jihad*. They also offer first-hand accounts of their experiences travelling to Pakistan and Afghanistan to train in the camps during the late 1980s. As with any memoir, particularly one designed to also function as propaganda, these works can be blighted by inaccurate memories, outright dishonesty, and retrospective bias, whereby accounts are influenced by later events or developments. As such, they must be approached with some scepticism and a clear understanding of their intended purpose. For example, Imam Samudra and Mukhlas are prone to overstating their friendships and connections to more famous militants like

²⁴³ Martin van Bruinessen, 'Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script Used in the Pesantren Milieu (Comments on a New Collection in the KITLV Library)', *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde*, 146 (1990), p.230

Osama bin Laden or Abdullah Azzam, and embellishing their combat experience and bravery. However, these are easily clarified or challenged in interviews with other DI members who were also present at the time. Despite these flaws, these works give some sense of what motivated these individuals; their understanding of the movement's ideological precepts; and what they read and were taught prior to, during, and after their time in the conflict.

Oral History

In addition to these non-archival written sources, this thesis relies extensively on oral histories in order to fully understand and assess the ideology of DI. Like memoirs, oral histories are potentially marred by faulty recollections of events, retrospective bias, lies, or an unwillingness to discuss the full scope of an event with someone the interviewee does not fully trust. Nevertheless, given the clandestine nature of the organisation, the lack of a traditional archive, and the fragmented nature of the available published documents, oral histories are essential to fill in the gaps on the record.

This thesis relies on the testimonies of a dozen DI members, the vast majority of whom were active in the 1980s and 1990s, and most of whom defected to JI in 1993. Interviews were often conducted with the same interviewee more than once in order to build trust, to gain nuance and further details, and to ascertain the consistency of their responses. All of the interviewees had experience in speaking with either journalists or academic researchers, and so were familiar with the ethics conventions for obtaining consent, indicating when comments were on or off the record, and requesting anonymity. Even so, time was taken to repeatedly clarify the differences between journalistic and academic practices, particularly around the purposes of the interview, the intended readership, and the scope of the research agenda.

While efforts were made to interview more of the older members and those that stayed with DI, these interviews were few and far between due to the difficulties of building trust, finding suitable interlocutors to make introductions, and the time constraints imposed during research trips. As such, the biases of those who were interviewed must be weighed carefully to reflect their allegiances and thus interpretation of events, particularly those relating to the DI's breakup.

The hierarchical nature of the organisation means that this thesis prioritises the perspectives of leaders and senior members of the organisation over lower-ranking personnel, which goes some way in accounting for the small number of interviewees. While the absence of regular members'

voices may pose problems for accurately assessing how the ideology was received more widely, DI – and Islamist militant organisations in general – was not a particularly plural or democratic organisation. The creation and dissemination of the group’s belief structure was almost exclusively the responsibility of leaders like Kartosuwiryo, or at broadest a small cabal. While the insights of junior members and their personal interpretation of the ideology imposed from on high are interesting, this ultimately lies beyond the scope of this thesis.

In addition to these interviews, this thesis relies on an archive of sermons recorded by Abdullah Sungkar in the 1980s. As Charles Hirschkind notes, ‘Islamic cassette sermons are commonly associated with the underworld of militants and radical preachers’, serving as ‘a tool of ideological indoctrination and a vehicle for the transmission of militant directives’.²⁴⁴ This is because recordings are able to ‘proliferate beneath the radar of law enforcement’ and are a powerful means of disseminating messages since ‘sermon listening recruits the body in its entirety, requiring one to pay attention’ and respond to the rhetoric.²⁴⁵

Islamic scholars (and indeed ordinary Muslims) have engaged in an oral tradition since the advent of the religion, through sermons, music, and recitations of the Qur’an among others. Cassette sermons are not only a continuation of these traditions but an important means by which those without those without access to formal education can engage with ideas and arguments in Islam. As Hirschkind points out, this has often led elites to look down on cassette tape sermons due to ‘their association with the lower classes’ and the assumed risk that they might manipulate and exploit of these individuals.²⁴⁶

Since the 1970s, the production and consumption of sermon tapes has been widespread among Islamic revivalists, militant or otherwise, as a ‘vehicle of contestation’.²⁴⁷ These types of sermons flourished in Egypt, pioneered by preachers such as Abd al-Hamid Kishk, who forged new relationships with their congregants and potential congregants through the mass production and commoditisation of his sermons.²⁴⁸ As state control extended over religious institutions in Egypt, the ability to record oneself gave preachers the opportunity – regardless of whether they wanted to critique the state or not – to avoid oversight and establish a direct relationship with listeners.

²⁴⁴ Charles Hirschkind, *The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and the Islamic Counterpublics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p.3

²⁴⁵ Idem, p.4 and p.25

²⁴⁶ Idem, p.16

²⁴⁷ Idem, p.10

²⁴⁸ Idem, p.145

A comparison can easily be made with Indonesia in the 1970s and 1980s as the Suharto government cracked down on Islamists' participation in political life and pushed for ideological hegemony through the promotion of the state ideology of *Pancasila*. This centralisation of religious authority, coupled with greater control over the dissemination of mass media, likely made the recording of sermons one of the few means by which preachers critical of the state could reach their followers and spread their messages.²⁴⁹

Moreover, the cassettes give listeners significant options as to when and how to engage with sermons. Hirschkind writes that the tapes 'may be listened to alone in the relative silence of one's bedroom or in aurally saturated environments' outside.²⁵⁰ Listeners have the ability to curate their experience by absorbing their preachers words well beyond sitting in a mosque. As such, the tapes potentially have the power to reach and influence listeners more effectively as listeners can pick moments where they are most amenable to receiving its messages.

Sungkar's recordings should be seen as part of this tradition within Islamic revivalism. His sermons, replete with personal asides, the occasional joke, and passionate denunciations of the state, not only provide listeners with insights into his worldview, but serve as a form of entertainment. They are engaging and compelling sources. This is enhanced by the fact that listening is a deeply personal activity, which helps to forge an intimacy with the speaker and gives his thoughts authenticity and immediacy.

Ultimately, these sermons, which largely cover issues of personal behaviour, are some of the only sources that give a direct account of Sungkar's beliefs since, as noted in the introduction, he did not appear to write much down and expressed a preference for the oral transmission of his thoughts. Though largely undated, references to contemporary events suggest that they were recorded before his flight into exile in Malaysia in 1985.

Matters are further complicated by the fact that the sermons are hosted on the Internet Archive (archive.org). This website aims to be a digital library providing 'Universal Access to All

²⁴⁹ M.C. Ricklefs *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History, c.1930 to the Present* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), p.208. Ricklefs writes the 'pervasive dullness of television programmes under Suharto – its programmes mainly about development, always about the government's view of things, and always emphasising the unity of Indonesia and the army that must prevail among its ethnic and religious communities'.

²⁵⁰ Idem, p.10

Knowledge’, and allows any individual with an account to upload material.²⁵¹ While several interviewees (and other researchers familiar with Sungkar) have attested to the veracity of the recordings, it is unclear who uploaded this material, how they obtained it, and why they uploaded it. Even so, the tapes provide us with the clearest view of Sungkar’s understanding of *hakimiyya*, *takfir* and *al-wala’ wa-l-barā’*.

Traditional Archives

Finally, this thesis relied on conventional archives in Indonesia to ground the analysis of the DI’s ideology. These archives often acted as supporting rather than principal sources of DI leaders’ interpretations of their ideological tenets by virtue of being run by the Indonesian state, which unsurprisingly centred its own beliefs and perspectives rather than those of the insurgent force it fought to destroy.

Moreover, individual ministries and institutions – particularly those involved in domestic and foreign security operations – have significant discretion over the management and release of their archival files. For example, many documents relating to the DI during its early years as an insurgency under Kartosuwiryo and the government operations against it remain classified in the military archives. Police and military records relating to the group’s subsequent incarnation as a clandestine militant group, including those covering the surveillance of its members, potential co-optation and alliances, and security operations targeting DI personnel, have also not been released. Nevertheless, government archives do contain some documents written by DI leaders themselves, thus giving us an opportunity to hear from these men in their own words.

The *Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia*’s (PNRI, National Library of the Republic of Indonesia) periodical collection was of huge relevance to this thesis, housing a nearly complete collection of *Fadjar Asia*, a PSI publication. Kartosuwiryo began writing for the paper on 2 April 1928 as a regular columnist before becoming editor a year later. He published his final piece in May 1930. Over this brief period, he published over 120 pieces, mainly on the need for independence and the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia. The articles are the earliest surviving writings by Kartosuwiryo and show his early political development within PSI and the non-violent Indonesian Islamist movement. Moreover, these pieces form the basis for his thinking on the concept of *hakimiyya*, the key tenet of the DI movement’s belief system.

²⁵¹ Internet Archive, ‘About’, <https://archive.org/about/>, Date Accessed: 21 March 2020

Similarly, the *Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia* (ANRI, National Archive of the Republic of Indonesia) in Jakarta provided significant resources for understanding the initial phases of the DI movement. The *Pemerintah Darurat RI, 1948-1949* (Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 1948-1949), the *Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia Serikat, 1949-1950* (Cabinet of the President of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, 1949-1950), and the *Kabinet Presiden, 1950-1959* (Presidential Cabinet, 1950-1959) collections held key documents published by DI as the group concretised its formation. These include its founding constitution and penal code and illustrate how Kartosuwiryo sought to realise his ideology. While the vast majority of the records in these boxes were available, some appeared to have not been declassified or are simply missing. However, the catalogue suggests these were documents related to the government's response to the movement, rather than materials authored by Kartosuwiryo or other DI members.

Finally, a small selection of supporting files were obtained from the *Arsip Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia* (AABRI, Military Archives of the Republic of Indonesia) archive. These were interrogation depositions of several of Kartosuwiryo's subordinates between August and October 1982. While they mainly contain accounts of the operations allegedly conducted by the suspects, they provide a small glimpse into their motivations and beliefs as the men justify their actions to their interrogators.

However, these sources are only useful in limited circumstances. First, they provide only a small snapshot of the whole investigation since most of the documents associated with the arrests and portions of the interrogation remained classified for security purposes. Second the information contained within must be treated with great care as it was likely gathered under significant duress or even torture. This need not render the source wholly illegitimate, but it requires further work to corroborate them using information obtained in less coercive circumstances.

Chapter 1 | *Hākimiyya*: The Need for An Islamic State of Indonesia, 1928-1949

The Qur'an states that there are two acceptable sources of legitimate political authority. Firstly, authority resides with the Prophet Muhammad due to God's anointment of him as His chosen and loyal messenger.²⁵² In addition to this designation, the Prophet's authority flows from the free covenant (*bay'ah*) made by his followers, who pledged to 'obey God and obey the Prophet'.²⁵³ However, in the absence of the Prophet's physical rule, Muslim thinkers in recent centuries have had to grapple with the question of how the *umma* could manifest God's sovereignty on earth.

These questions took on considerable urgency for Islamists in the nineteenth century with the advent of European colonialism and the decline of the Ottoman caliphate. The Islamic modernists, the most important thinkers of which were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, and Muhammad Rashid Rida, led the intellectual effort to revitalise political and legal thought among Muslim scholars, in the hope of creating strong states that maintained their 'nation's religion, culture, laws and language, and its national character'.²⁵⁴ As discussed in the introduction, their works had a profound impact on global Islamist thought, shaping anti-colonial discourse and influencing the structure of independent Islamic states.

This chapter examines the Kartosuwiryo's understanding and application of the concept of *hākimiyya* to the Indonesian political context from his beginnings as an Islamist politician in 1928 to his decision to establish the NII in 1949. While Kartosuwiryo did not explicitly use the word *hākimiyya*, the ideas he promoted and described align closely with the popular conceptualisation of the term as developed and advanced by Rida, Maududi, and Qutb. Resultantly, despite the term's absence from his writings in this period, it is nevertheless the most relevant concept to summarise his beliefs on the necessity of constructing an Islamic state to ensure the primacy of God in the temporal realm. He argued that only through living in a totalising religious state, guided by *shari'a* and Islamic legislative structures could Indonesian Muslims lead lives truly in line with their faith.

This chapter then explores the impact of Islamic Modernism on his understanding of the term during a period when major events, including the Japanese occupation in 1942 and the Indonesian Revolution against the re-imposition of Dutch colonial rule between 1945 to 1949, cemented his

²⁵² Qur'an, 3:80-3:82

²⁵³ Qur'an, 4:59

²⁵⁴ Rashid Rida, 'Renewal, renewing, and renewers', in Charles Kurzman, ed. *Modernist Islam, 1840-1940: A Sourcebook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.78

belief in the need for an Islamic state in Indonesia. This chapter's overarching claim is that Kartosuwiryo was primarily motivated by a desire to protect Islam and secure *hākimiyya* through the creation of an Islamic state and enactment and enforcement of *shari'a*. The implementation of God's sovereignty on earth thus formed the central tenet of the DI's belief structure.

This chapter argues that Kartosuwiryo believed that Muslims could only truly realise their faith in the temporal realm and secure their passage to the afterlife by living in an Islamic state governed by *shari'a*. Securing God's sovereignty ensured Muslims' temporal empowerment, allowing them to live free from the oppression of foreign forces, including colonialism and Western culture. It advances the argument that Kartosuwiryo's conceptualisation of an Islamic state in Indonesia became less welcoming and inclusive over time. The establishment of the NII marked the culmination of this trend, with Kartosuwiryo believing that Islam could only thrive when free from foreign influence. Finally, this chapter posits that Kartosuwiryo's understanding of an Islamic state was grounded in territorial nationalism rather than pan-Islamism.

These arguments will be presented in three sections. The chapter will begin with a brief examination of *hākimiyya* in the Islamist thought of the nineteenth century and its adoption by Islamists in the Dutch East Indies in early 1900s. Building on this understanding, it will go on to show how Kartosuwiryo interpreted *hākimiyya* during his years as an Islamist activist as part of the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union, SI) movement. Finally, it will examine how his understanding of *hākimiyya* was shaped by periods of significant conflict with the Japanese, Dutch and finally, the Indonesian Republic, resulting in the creation of the NII. In this way, this chapter demonstrates why many scholars' failure to consider the role of religion and specifically, the conceptualisation of *hākimiyya*, in the history of the DI has resulted in an incomplete understanding of the group and the development of Indonesian militant Islamism.

***Hākimiyya* in nineteenth and twentieth century Islamist thought**

Hākimiyya refers to the concept of realising and securing God's sovereignty in the political system. As noted in the introduction Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi was the primary contributor to the development of this concept. He came to believe that the absence of God and religion at the centre of a political system results in 'tyranny, despotism, intemperance, unlawful exploitation, and inequality'.²⁵⁵ At a minimum, achieving *hākimiyya* requires the creation of a state governed through

²⁵⁵ Maududi, 'Political Theory of Islam', p.268

Islamic institutions and an Islamic legal system, with citizens abiding by *shari'a*. Beyond ensuring that the rule of God was assured – viewed as a good in its own right – *hakimiyya* would allow Muslims to freely live pious lives, ensuring their temporal security and eternal salvation. An Islamic state would, in short, ensure both the spiritual and the physical security of Muslims, guarding against both foreign domination and un-Islamic forces.

Hakimiyya and the Modernists

While *hakimiyya* was popularised and developed significantly by Maududi in the early twentieth century, it has a longer intellectual history. In his most famous work, *al-Abkam al-Sultaniyya* (The Ordinances of Government), the tenth century Iraqi jurist Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi advanced the notion that Muslims had an obligation to secure God's rule on earth. He wrote that *hakimiyya* '[means] to protect the right of God that we have been entrusted with against His enemies'.²⁵⁶ The thirteenth century scholar Ibn Taymiyya similarly argued that state power and faith in God could not be separated, writing that it was 'a duty to consider the [state] as a form of religion'.²⁵⁷ Building on the arguments advanced by Mawardi, he wrote that it was necessary not only to protect God's will but that 'when state and religion are completely engaged... perfect spiritual and temporal prosperity is ensured'.²⁵⁸

Advancing these ideas, the modernist like al-Afghani, 'Abduh, and Rida, contributed significantly to the development of how *hakimiyya* would be discussed and approached by Islamists in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The modernists' ideas emerged in a period of significant international upheaval, which saw the decline of long-established Muslim empires and the rise of the Westphalian system of states. The relative weakness of traditional Muslim-majority societies in the international system, and the establishment of Western-backed, non-Islamic regimes in much of the Muslim world has persisted into the twentieth and twenty first centuries. As such, many contemporary Islamists still believe that the modernists' depictions and diagnosis of – as well as solutions to – the problems afflicting their societies remain relevant today.

²⁵⁶ Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi, 'The laws of Islamic government', in Shiraz Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea* (London: Hurst, 2016), p.171

²⁵⁷ Henri Laoust, *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques d'Ibn Taymiyya* (Cairo: Institut francais d'archeologie orientaliste, 1939), p.174

²⁵⁸ Idem, p.177

At its core, the mission of Islamic modernism was to revive Islamic societies so that they could resist further invasion and potentially free themselves from infidel colonial domination. The modernists advocated the renewal of Islamic societies through internal reforms of the religion, its practices and outlook. Afghani led this charge, arguing that sclerotic, orthodox methods of Islamic education had ‘tried to stifle science and stop its progress...thus halting the philosophical or intellectual movement’ and needed to be upended.²⁵⁹

His disciple, ‘Abduh, advances these principles, advocating *ijtihad* (independent reasoning), particularly for jurists making legal decisions, so as to return to the Qur’an and *hadith* rather than relying on imitations and orthodox interpretations.²⁶⁰ Rida, a student of ‘Abduh’s, furthered this, arguing that the Qur’an and *hadith* should serve as the primary guides for understanding Islam, claiming that the four Sunni schools of legal thought did not provide anything more than dogma.²⁶¹ The men argued that centuries without religious reform had ultimately led to ‘laziness’ and national weakness, which had facilitated Muslim societies’ domination by European colonialists.²⁶² As such, their movement attempted to free Islam from orthodoxies that stymied the ability of its clerical class and its adherents to thrive in the modern world.

The modernists’ support for internal reform was coupled with a desire to reform Muslim societies externally, thus facilitating socio-political change. To that end, the men advocated pan-Islamism, arguing that Western imperialism could only be effectively resisted through Muslim unity. Rida in particular saw pan-Islamism as a means by which Muslims could ‘protect the moral boundaries of the community of Muslims and the political independence of the holy cities in the face of the power of empire’.²⁶³ Similarly, Afghani and ‘Abduh saw colonialism as a destructive force that ‘heightened a sense of difference among Muslims of different client states’, and led to the growth of nationalist ideologies.²⁶⁴ ‘Abduh did not believe that a true sense of solidarity and kinship could be achieved on the basis of these ‘material’ beliefs, which would only result in groups trying to destroy others.²⁶⁵ He argued that these divisions could only be overcome if Muslims renounced

²⁵⁹ al-Afghani, ‘Religion versus Science’, p.25

²⁶⁰ Muhammad Abduh, ‘The Necessity of Religious Reform’ in Mansoor Moaddel and Karan Talattof, *Contemporary Debates in Islam: An Anthology of Modernist and Fundamentalist Thought* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp.49-50

²⁶¹ Aharon Layish, ‘The contribution of the Modernists to the secularization of Islamic law’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 14:3 (1978), p.263

²⁶² Abduh, ‘The Necessity of Religious Reform’, p.49

²⁶³ John Willis, ‘Debating the Caliphate: Islam and Nation in the Work of Rashid Rida and Abul Kalam Azad’, *The International History Review*, 32: 4 (December 2010), p.729

²⁶⁴ Michael Francis Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The umma below the winds* (London: Routledge, 2003), p.119

²⁶⁵ Ibid

these false allegiances and formed ‘a new Islamic solidarity, creating a single *umma* and desiring only the protection and preservation of the *shari’a*’.²⁶⁶

This spirit of renewal, anti-colonialism, and Islamic solidarity underpinned the modernist conceptualisation of *hākimiyya*. In the eyes of the Modernists, an Islamic polity – be it a state or a revived, Pan-Islamic caliphate – was necessary ‘as a means of power and safety’ for Muslims that would ensure the protection of their faith.²⁶⁷ In their vision, this polity would incorporate elements of European scientific progress and enquiry, but use them to build a bulwark against secularism.

Of the three leading Modernists, it was Rida who devoted the most attention to the question of what an Islamic state would actually look like. In his treatise, *Al-kihāfah an’al-imāmat ‘al-uzmā* (the Caliphate or Supreme Imamate), Rida cited numerous *hadiths* and *ijmā* (a consensus of Islamic legal scholars on a point of law) to contend that Muslims had an obligation to pursue the creation of such a state.²⁶⁸ Rida argued that a true caliphate had only existed under the *Rashidun* caliphs, claiming that the subsequent corruption of the *ulama* had contributed to Islamic societies’ failure to flourish in later eras.²⁶⁹ As such, the paucity of candidates who would meet the requirements of a leader in the mould of the *Rashidun* would make the revival of a modern caliphate difficult.²⁷⁰

Given these constraints, Hamid Enayat argues that Rida’s innovation was to advocate instead for an independent *al-bukūmat al-Islāmiyyah* (Islamic state) rather than a traditional emirate or *wilayat* (province run by a governor) which is usually associated with a caliphate in some form, in line with the new nation-states of his day.²⁷¹ While this distinction was not clearly outlined, Rida saw the creation of an Islamic state as a middle path to enabling Muslims to live in societies governed by *shari’a*, which he believed would be sufficiently flexible to allow for ‘legal renovation’ and thus capable of ‘coping with the growing complexity of modern life’.²⁷² In attempting to adapt an Islamic polity for the modern age, Rida, building on the works of his predecessors, provided a blueprint for Islamic nationalists around the world to copy or adapt to their own circumstances. In drafting this treatise, Rida argued that Muslims had a religious duty to establish a structure that

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Abduh, ‘The Necessity of Religious Reform’, p.46

²⁶⁸ Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought: The Response of the Shi’i and Sunni Muslims to the Twentieth Century* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005) p.71

²⁶⁹ Idem, p.73

²⁷⁰ Idem, p.75

²⁷¹ Idem, p.77

²⁷² Idem, p.78

implemented and enforced *shari'a* and was governed by Islamic institutions and led by Muslims, since this was crucial for the community's temporal and spiritual well-being.

Maududi and Qutb

Maududi contributed significantly to the development of the modern conceptualisation of *hakimiyah* among Islamists. As noted in the introduction, he believed that Muslims now existed in a state of *jābiliyyah* due to numerous transgressions in the practice of their faith, including their failure to promote and live under an Islamic state. Maududi had an expansive definition of what constituted un-Islamic practices, which he believed included 'every course of action which runs counter to the Islamic culture, Islamic morals and conduct, or Islamic mentality'. Resultantly, his definition of *jābiliyyah* solely meant any 'ignorance towards God, His Prophet, and the revelation, or the pre-Islamic period of "lawlessness"'.²⁷³

In particular, Maududi saw the promulgation of man-made laws, as a contravention of *shari'a* and thus a failure to obey God. Moreover, he believed that men declaring themselves rulers and claiming authority through the ballot box or some other form of legitimation were ultimately usurping God's place as the only true maker of laws and sole object of worship. These practices were akin to polytheism and thus *shirk*.²⁷⁴ Ultimately, Maududi made the case that secular regimes – or Islamic regimes that failed to live up to Islamic ideals – were both fundamentally contraventions of God's will and also particularly exploitative towards Muslims since they would naturally lead to corruption and barbarism.²⁷⁵

Maududi thus believed that the only way Muslims could practice pure Islam and end this state of *jābiliyyah* was through the establishment of an Islamic state. Maududi's conceptualisation of *hakimiyah* placed God's absolute sovereignty at its core and required man's unquestioning obedience.²⁷⁶ Maududi saw God's primary function, 'after calling the universe into being', as being the issuing of rules and regulations.²⁷⁷ Resultantly, man must submit to these divine laws as a sign of devotion to, and worship of, God. In practice this meant not only following *shari'a* but ensuring its promulgation through a caliph and caliphate. The Islamic state served as a conduit through

²⁷³ Hartung, *A System of Life*, p.66

²⁷⁴ Idem, p.67

²⁷⁵ Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism*, p.177

²⁷⁶ Hartung, p.67

²⁷⁷ Idem, p.209

which God's commands would flow to humanity. The caliph, as the trustee of God, would actualise God's commands thus enabling Muslims to lead truly Islamic lives in the temporal realm.²⁷⁸ An Islamic state was thus a means of empowerment since Muslims would not be persecuted within their own societies but free to fully actualise their faith.²⁷⁹

Maududi believed that *hākimiyya* could only truly be attained through *jihad*. Rather than confining his definition of the term to the defence of Islam or the protection of Muslims, he argued explicitly that Islam was a revolutionary force, meant to spread and 'realise God's ultimate sovereignty and subsequently man's assigned place as God's faithful servant' across the world.²⁸⁰ Resultantly, since living under God's reign was the ultimate aim of any Muslim, it was incumbent upon them to help bring about an Islamic state. Maududi explicitly argued that *jihad* was the 'sixth, and besides, the Islamic creed, most important' of the pillars of Islam as it was crucial to bringing about or expanding an Islamic state.²⁸¹

Sayyid Qutb read Maududi's work extensively and, as explored in the introduction, held a similar view to Maududi regarding *jābiliyyah*. Like Maududi, he believed that an Islamic state was essential for the successful practice of Islam, writing that 'religion cannot be rightly practiced in isolation from society'. Muslims required a full 'social legal and economic system' because Islam was essentially a political religion.²⁸² Qutb spelled out this political philosophy in *Social Justice in Islam*, arguing that 'the theory of government in Islam is based on the testimony that there is no god but God'.²⁸³ As such, divinity belongs solely to God and those who profess their faith, 'thereby confess that sovereignty (*hākimiyyah*) in human life belongs to God alone'.²⁸⁴

Resultantly, Islam encompasses a faith and a state in one. As Sayed Khatab summarises, Qutb saw God as the 'supreme legislator and ultimate source of governmental and legal authority', with government 'specifically designed to implement Islamic law', and enforce God's decrees.²⁸⁵ Moreover, Qutb did not separate *hākimiyyah* from *tauhid*, arguing that a belief in God's sovereignty 'over the universe, life and humanity is an integral part of tauhid'.²⁸⁶ As such, Qutb saw a belief in

²⁷⁸ Idem, p.108

²⁷⁹ Maher, *Salafi Jihadism*, p.185

²⁸⁰ Hartung, p.18

²⁸¹ Idem, p.211

²⁸² William E Shepard, *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam* (Leiden: EJ Brill, 1996), p.8

²⁸³ Idem, p.111

²⁸⁴ Idem, p.112

²⁸⁵ Khatab, *The Power of Sovereignty*, p.8

²⁸⁶ Idem, p.26

hākimiyya as a fundamental component of belief in Islam, akin to the profession of faith.²⁸⁷ Man was thus compelled to worship and serve God through an adherence to his laws (*shari'a*) and the promulgation of this state. In turn, an Islamic state grants Muslims complete and total religious freedom, allowing them to fulfil their obligations to their faith unmolested.

More explicitly than Maududi, given this link with *tauhid*, Qutb entwined the idea of servitude or subjugation to God (*'ubudiyyah*) closely with *hākimiyyah*. Because Muslims were required to submit to Allah as a profession of their faith, they were also compelled to submit to his sovereignty via obedience to Islamic laws and state structures.²⁸⁸ In doing so, Qutb makes it clear that the Muslim faith cannot be fully actualised without an Islamic state to serve, which underscores the necessity of creating or advancing one. In turn this renders *jihad* a fundamental principle as well, since *'jihad* is based on *hākimiyyah*'.²⁸⁹ Similar to Maududi, Qutb saw *jihad* as an obligation on all Muslims to bring about or protect an Islamic state as a manifestation of their belief in and devotion to God.

The spread of Islamic Modernism in the Dutch East Indies

In Indonesia, local Islamists saw clear parallels between the conditions described by the Modernists and their own colonial experience under Dutch rule. In a speech at al-Azhar University in 1958, the literary figure, politician, and cleric Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (known by his initials as Hamka), spoke of how the Modernists 'made a contribution – and not a small one – to the development of the Indonesian people and the building of an Islamic spirit', helping his countrymen to properly understand and practice their faith by '[fighting] stagnation and antiquation, and [combating] blind obedience'.²⁹⁰ Hamka argued that Indonesian independence was only achieved through stripping their faith of *bid'a* (heretical innovation) and emphasising a reliance on the Qur'an and hadith as the true source of understanding of Islam.

The spread of Islamic modernism to Southeast Asia gained momentum in the early 1900s. According to M.C Ricklefs, between 8,000 to 15,000 residents of the Dutch East Indies journeyed to Mecca for the *hajj* (the pilgrimage made by Muslims to Mecca, and one of the five pillars of

²⁸⁷ Ibid

²⁸⁸ Idem, p.46

²⁸⁹ Idem, p.198

²⁹⁰ Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah, *Pengaruh Muhammad Abduh di Indonesia: Pidato diucapkan sewaktu akan menerima gelar doctor honoris causa dari Universitas Al Azhar di Mesir pada tgl. 21 Djanuari 1958*, Pidato.net, 22 November 2016, https://pidato.net/4680_hamka-pengaruh-muhammad-abduh-di-indonesia-2, Accessed: 4 May 2018

Islam) each year between 1912 and 1930.²⁹¹ In addition to the numerous publications produced by Modernists in the Middle East, the travellers were the ‘major vehicles for the spreading of Modernist ideas’.²⁹² Both Ricklefs and Michael Laffan point out that the individuals who embarked on this arduous journey – and who consumed the literature produced by the *ulama* (religious scholars) – were generally wealthier, urban residents of the archipelago.²⁹³ As such, the spread of Modernism was generally confined to cities like Jakarta (then Batavia), Yogyakarta, and Surabaya.

Many scholars and students from the islands also travelled to study in the intellectual centres of Saudi Arabia and Egypt in particular. They produced numerous publications such as *al-Imam* (primarily distributed in Singapore), *al-Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta), and *Pembela Islam* (Bandung), in both Arabic and Malay, helping to spread the Modernists’ teachings to their co-religionists back in the Malay-Indonesian world.²⁹⁴ *Al-Manar* (The Beacon), the journal edited by ‘Abduh and Rida was also distributed widely in Southeast Asia, advancing ideas of Islamic community, the threat posed by Islamic orthodoxies and traditions, as well as anti-colonial themes.

Alongside this burgeoning intellectual discourse came the formation of Islamic Modernist activist groups. In 1912, the Muhammadiyah movement was established in Yogyakarta by Ahman Dahlan. Influenced by ‘Abduh’s teachings, the movement created schools quickly spread to ‘almost all major cities and towns in Java’.²⁹⁵ The group promoted the Modernists’ teachings, emphasising a return to the foundational sources of Islam – the Qur’an and *hadith* –purifying Muslims’ understanding of their religion in Indonesia. However, in its initial years, the group largely stayed out of politics, believing instead in the power of reforming the archipelago through community groups and education. The spread of Modernist ideas in the cities of the Dutch East Indies meant that Muhammadiyah came to represent the polity’s ‘urban middle and upper class Muslims’.²⁹⁶

In contrast, SI, which had been established just a year earlier, embarked on a decidedly more political path. Initially created as a batik traders’ union (Sarekat Dagang Islam) to combat Chinese influence in the industry, the organisation quickly developed into an anti-colonial force under the

²⁹¹ Ricklefs, *Islamisation and its opponents in Java*, p.19

²⁹² Ibid

²⁹³ Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia*, p.47 and Ricklefs, *Islamisation and its opponents in Java*, p.19

²⁹⁴ Ahmad N. Amir, Abdi O. Shuriye, and Jamal I. Daoud, ‘Muhammad Abduh’s Influence in Southeast Asia’, *Middle East Journal of Scientific Research*, 13 (2013), p.125

²⁹⁵ Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises Over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town, c.1910s-2010* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2012), p.5

²⁹⁶ Ahmad Najib Burhani, ‘Liberal and Conservative Discourses in the Muhammadiyah: The Struggle for the Face of Reformist Islam in Indonesia’, in Martin van Bruinessen, *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the Conservative Turn* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013), p.107

leadership of Umar Said Cokroaminoto.²⁹⁷ Cokroaminoto was a Dutch-trained civil servant who took over the leadership of the party and moved the organisation's headquarters to Surabaya in 1912. In the process, the organisation's name was shortened to just Sarekat Islam, broadening its scope from a labour movement to an anti-colonial, political outfit.²⁹⁸

Throughout this transition, Cokroaminoto maintained the organisation's initial focus on the wellbeing of the local population, arguing that Islam provided the solutions to the practical problems of economic hardship and inequality.²⁹⁹ Cokroaminoto's charismatic leadership, shrewd ability to reach across social cleavages, and careful balancing between socialism and Islamism helped the organisation to attract 'followers among all classes, urban as well as rural. Muslim traders, workers in cities, *kyai* [traditional Islamic teachers] and *ulama* [religious scholars], even some *priyayi* [the Javanese aristocracy], but above all peasants, were drawn into this first – and last – political mass movement in colonial Indonesia'.³⁰⁰ Under his watch, SI grew rapidly across Java and spread to the rest of the colonial polity.

Though he was an impressive ideologue and leader, Cokroaminoto's organisation was filled with tensions between socialist-leaning nationalists and Islamists, who were divided over the future of the organisation and the shape of the independence struggle. Laffan argues that the 'tenor of the Sarekat Islam meetings began to change' around 1918 with members expressing increasingly open hostility towards the Dutch and advocating a more virulent form of ethnic nationalism, which challenged the Chinese presence and their control of a disproportionate share of wealth in the Dutch East Indies.³⁰¹

This rise in hostile rhetoric was followed by acts of violence as workers staged anti-Chinese riots in Kudus in October 1918 and subsequently demonstrated against economic injustice in West Java and Central Sulawesi.³⁰² The resulting violence gave the colonial authorities a pretext to jail Cokroaminoto in 1919, allowing Agus Salim to take the reins of the movement. Under Salim's leadership, the organisation increasingly adopted an Islamic Modernist worldview, moving further

²⁹⁷ Hiroko Horikoshi, "The Dar ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1948-62): An Experience in the Historical Process", *Indonesia*, 20 (1975), p.60

²⁹⁸ Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Athens and Singapore: Ohio University Press and the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), p.16

²⁹⁹ Michael Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and colonial Indonesia: The umma below the winds* (London: Routledge, 2003), p.167

³⁰⁰ Harry J Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945* (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd, 1958), p.41-42

³⁰¹ Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and colonial Indonesia*, p.187

³⁰² Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) p.115

away from its socialist roots. By 1923, the party had expelled members who were also affiliated with PKI on the grounds that their loyalty to the pan-Islamic cause could not be split.³⁰³

Buoyed by these intellectual developments, the SI under Salim began publishing a newsletter called *Doenia Islam* (World Islam) in December 1922, which echoed 'Abduh's claim that the *Rashidun* caliphs were 'natural democrats whose use of consultation (*shura*) anticipated by thirteen centuries the parliamentary process'.³⁰⁴ Even the name of the publication, *Doenia Islam*, was seemingly 'an attempt to place [SI's] activities in the context of the wider Islamic world'³⁰⁵ and again highlighted the turn towards pan-Islamic ideals.

However, support for a transnational caliphate appeared short-lived. The abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in March 1924 became a focal point for disputes within the organisation as to whether SI should pursue the restoration of the caliphate or embrace nationalism. While the organisation created a caliphate committee in the aftermath of the Ottoman collapse to study the issues and their impacts, the committee did not appear to produce anything of substance and enthusiasm soon waned.³⁰⁶

By 1927, these pan-Islamic ideals appeared completely absent from the organisation's ideology. Instead the SI had begun to call for 'national freedom based on Islam', arguing that 'the achievement of national sovereignty now ranked as a duty of their Islam'.³⁰⁷ The organisation's structural changes also appear to reflect its growing shift towards nationalism. At its national congress in Madiun in February 1923, members voted to change the group's name to Partai Sarekat Islam (PSI, Islamic Union Party), which was later switched to Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII, Indonesian Islamic Union Party) in 1930, indicating a growing desire to identify the movement with the peoples within the territorially defined boundaries of the Dutch East Indies rather than a larger global *umma*.

³⁰³ McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, p.181

³⁰⁴ Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and colonial Indonesia*, p.210

³⁰⁵ Idem, p.207

³⁰⁶ Solahudin, *The roots of terrorism in Indonesia*, p.29

³⁰⁷ Abdul Karim Pringgodigdo, *Sedjarah Pergerakan Rakjat Indonesia* (Djakarta: Pustaka Rakjat, 1950), p.52 and Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and colonial Indonesia*, pp.196-197

Kartosuwiryo's early understanding of *hākimiyya*

As noted in the introduction, Kartosuwiryo's early years were fairly mysterious and his entry and rise in the Sarekat Islam movement not particularly well document. Nevertheless, by 1928, Kartosuwiryo's position within the movement had been firmly established. He appears in a listing in *Fadjar Asia*, the movement's publication, due to his contributions to the 'Indonesian Students' Mutual-Help Committee'.³⁰⁸ He soon began writing for the paper, was eventually made a regular columnist and, in 1929, the editor.³⁰⁹ His first article, '*Vergadering ISDP*' (ISDP Meeting), was published in *Fadjar Asia* on 2 April 1928.

These articles, about 120 in total, provide a comprehensive means of establishing the foundations of Kartosuwiryo's thoughts on the relationship between Islam and nationalism and the role of Islam in state building. Kartosuwiryo also wrote numerous articles on the themes of Islamic modernism, economic inequality, social justice, and the impact of colonial policies on Indonesians. The ideology he began to shape was thus rooted in anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism as much as it was in Islamic modernism and nationalism.

Unlike nationalists like Sukarno, Kartosuwiryo did not see anti-Westernism and independence from colonial rule as an end in and of itself. Instead, independence from the Dutch was a necessary first step so that indigenous Muslims could begin the process of securing political sovereignty for God. In one of his first articles for *Fadjar Asia* entitled '*Agama dan Politiek*' (Religion and Politics), Kartosuwiryo concocted an imaginary debate between two Muslims (one a civil servant in the colonial administration and the other a religious figure) over whether religion should be a private matter. The latter convinces the former that 'religion is political', because 'religion embodies rules, rules for this world and the hereafter' and that political Islam is necessary because the Dutch had 'a policy named *Kersteningspolitiek*, aimed at Christianizing the Indonesian population'.³¹⁰

This initial article is significant as it demonstrates that Kartosuwiryo felt a need to make the case to his fellow Muslims that Islam should not be separated from the political realm. Instead, his argument that Islam 'embodies rules, rules for this world', reflects an understanding, later echoed by Maududi, that faith requires respect for and adherence to God's legal sovereignty. While

³⁰⁸ Ruth McVey, "Review: Islam Explained Reviewed Work(s): Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion: A Study of Indonesian Political Behavior. by Karl D. Jackson", *Pacific Affairs* 54, No. 2 (1981), p.263

³⁰⁹ S.M Kartosuwiryo, 'Selamat djalan', *Fadjar Asia*, 2 May 1929

³¹⁰ S.M Kartosuwiryo, 'Agama dan Politiek', *Fadjar Asia*, 3 April 1928

Kartosuwiryo does not explicitly reference *hakimiyyah*, the article suggests that he was attempting to build an argument in favour of the submission to God's laws in the temporal realm. Given that in 1928, it was unlikely that he would have encountered Rida's writings on *hakimiyya* (which would have only been available in Arabic) and that Maududi's and Qutb's work on the subject were only published significantly later, it seems Kartosuwiryo was independently thinking along similar lines.

In addition to advocating for the need for a political Islam, Kartosuwiryo also appears to have been implying that this need was a defensive one. In raising the example of *Kersteningspolitiek*, Kartosuwiryo suggests to his readers that Muslims need to be protected from foreign incursions in the spiritual realm as much as they needed to be defended against more tangible forms of colonial encroachment. As such, Kartosuwiryo appears to be arguing that nationalism without a religious dimension would be insufficient in ensuring the security of Muslims in all realms.

Kartosuwiryo's subsequent writing in *Fadjar Asia* became more explicit in demanding that Islam occupy a central place in the Indonesian independence struggle. For example, in a piece published on 12 September 1928 he declared that the nation could not simply be 'based on being anti this or that', but required something more.³¹¹ Nationalism, he argued, was simply a tool for creating the conditions for an independent nation governed under *shari'a* and led by a 'government based solely on our glorious Islam'.³¹² Without Islam as the basis for the new political unit, Indonesians would '[live in] the world of darkness'.³¹³

The use of the term 'world of darkness' suggests that Kartosuwiryo saw a state without God's law as the basis of its political structure akin to a state of despair. While he does not use terms like *jahiliyyah*, the notion of darkness suggests he saw this world as lacking God's light and guidance, and thus similar to the state of the world before God's revelations. Resultantly, in making the case that an Islamic state was necessary to save Muslims from this darkness, Kartosuwiryo once again demonstrates that he was at least thinking in similar terms to contemporary and later proponents of the concept of *hakimiyya*. His writings and analysis were, admittedly, theologically unsophisticated compared to Rida, Maududi, and Qutb, but this may be due to his lack of comprehensive religious training and the constraints of writing short articles in *Fadjar Asia*.

³¹¹ S.M Kartosuwiryo, 'Faham Koeno dan Faham Moeda', *Fadjar Asia*, 12 September 1928

³¹² Ibid

³¹³ Ibid

Kartosuwiryo reiterated this position following PSI's youth congress on 27 and 28 October 1928. In an article entitled '*Lahir dan bathin*' (Outer and inner), he wrote that Islam is 'the religion of the Indonesian nation' and 'acts as a bond between the groups and peoples that have settled in our homeland, Indonesia', illustrating once again his longstanding commitment to an independent Indonesia, with Islam playing a central position in society, law and governance.³¹⁴

This theme remained central to Kartosuwiryo's writing in *Fadjar Asia* in 1929 and 1930. He continued to press and develop the argument that Islamic law could only be enforced if Indonesians had independence in a territorially defined unit. He stated that prioritising the sovereignty of an Islamic state was essential so that Indonesians '[could] follow Islamic *shari'a* in its most perfect and complete way, in all matters'.³¹⁵ Furthermore, he argued that Islam would ensure true freedom for the people, '[liberating them] from all forms of slavery, humiliation and subjugation'.³¹⁶ In this respect, Kartosuwiryo's reference to the idea that an Islamic state with Islamic laws 'ensured true freedom', mirrored Maududi and Qutb's later belief that freedom was fundamentally submission to God's rule because this would free Muslims from the tyrannical rule of men.³¹⁷

The consistency with which Kartosuwiryo's writings call for an Islamic state in the Dutch East Indies undermines claims by scholars such as van Dijk and Jackson that DI was not a self-consciously Islamist political project. Across many years, Kartosuwiryo showed a clear and unwavering commitment to the need for an Islamic state in Indonesia to ensure spiritual and temporal liberty through the implementation and observance of *shari'a* under an Islamic government. He argued that this liberty would ultimately enable Muslims to lead lives truly in line with their faith and was thus an obligation for them to pursue.

In this respect, while Kartosuwiryo did not explicitly use the term *hākimiyya* in his writings for *Fadjar Asia*, his writings nevertheless show that his beliefs closely aligned with the concept, indicating it remains the best lens by which to understand this component of his ideology. Additionally, his continued allusions to the concept indicate that, while it is unclear if he ever personally read the publications of Modernist thinkers based in the Middle East, he was likely to have been familiar with their points of view through numerous Malay-language pamphlets. His

³¹⁴ S.M Kartosuwiryo, 'Lahir dan bathin', *Fadjar Asia*, 29 October 1928

³¹⁵ S.M Kartosuwiryo, 'Lagi tentang oelil amri', *Fadjar Asia*, 24 May 1930

³¹⁶ S.M Kartosuwiryo, 'Keber'atan ra'iat', *Fadjar Asia*, 27 April 1929

³¹⁷ Khatab, *The Power of Sovereignty*, p.54

writings on the need for sovereignty rooted in Islamic law and governance clearly reflect the ideas put forward by these Modernist thinkers. In his writings in *Fadjar Asia* between 1928 and 1930, Kartosuwiryo echoed the claims advanced by ‘Abduh and Rida, that only a strong state with Islam at its core could provide power, security, and prosperity for Muslims.

While Kartosuwiryo could not have drawn on the ideas of Maududi on account of the latter’s work being published after he had stopped writing for *Fadjar Asia* and the lengthy delays of translating works into Indonesian, he reached similar conclusions about the need for an Islamic state in the late colonial period. Kartosuwiryo’s arguments calling for the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia and the implementation of *shari’*a to ensure the future liberation of Muslims from the ‘chaos of godlessness’ and the resulting economic and political hardship, aligned with Maududi’s belief that non-Islamic governance would inevitably result in the oppression of Muslims.³¹⁸

Like Maududi, Kartosuwiryo believed that establishing God’s sovereignty was crucial in order to avoid the ‘tyranny, despotism, intemperance, unlawful exploitation, and inequality’ that prevail when men rule over men.³¹⁹ These repeated references to the tyranny of man’s rule once again suggest that Kartosuwiryo believed that man’s usurpation of God’s place as the maker of laws, ultimately resulted in barbarism and chaos. Similar to Maududi, Kartosuwiryo also reflected the concern that secular systems are particularly exploitative, associated with declines in moral standards and fundamentally corrupt. Kartosuwiryo thus appears to have been warning his readers that not only was sovereignty in the political realm for God alone to possess, but that secular laws would ensure their oppression at the hands of other men.

Kartosuwiryo argued that the implementation of Islamic governance and law were essential, since without them Muslims would wander in a state of ‘darkness’ - which again suggested that securing *hākimiyya* was crucial for the preservation of the faith.³²⁰ Reiterating this argument, Kartosuwiryo stated that, Islamic nationalism meant the ‘[pursuit of] prosperity of the one God, one belief, one Prophet, one flag of Islam’ rather than just the ‘freedom and promotion of one people’.³²¹ As such, Kartosuwiryo believed that nationalism and the state should serve a larger, ideological purpose, and not just its citizens’ individual interests.

³¹⁸ Kartosuwiryo, ‘Keber’atan ra’iat’, *Fadjar Asia*, 27 April 1929

³¹⁹ Maududi, ‘Political Theory of Islam’, p.268

³²⁰ S.M Kartosuwiryo, ‘Faham Koeno dan Faham Moeda’, *Fadjar Asia*, 12 September 1928

³²¹ Kartosuwiryo, ‘Islamisme, nasionalisme dan internasionalisme I’, *Fadjar Asia*, 3 November 1928

Instead, he argued that the goal of the state was to ensure the promulgation of God's sovereignty on Earth. Similarly, Maududi saw *hākimiyya* as more than just liberation for the individual and the nation from colonial oppression, writing that an Islamic state would 'release the human soul from its fetters' and deliver a 'social organisation based on human equality... in which all men should become servants of the one real Lord'.³²² As such, both men argued for liberation from the tyranny of the oppression wrought by man so that Muslims could be free and openly serve God.

These parallels are not presented to suggest that Kartosuwiryo influenced Maududi (or later *salafi* writings on *hākimiyya*) but rather to argue that both men were part of a broader strain of political thought taking root in Muslim societies on the basis of the writings of the Egyptian Modernists. Kartosuwiryo's writings also reflect a willingness to incorporate these foreign ideas in domestic debates. The idea of establishing an independent Indonesia, with Islam as the basis of the state, was both a political tool used to inspire and bind together the peoples of the Dutch East Indies and a sincerely-held belief shared by a variety of anti-colonial movements like Persis and Muhammadiyah.³²³ As such, Kartosuwiryo's nascent ideas about the concept of *hākimiyya* in the 1920s and 1930s place him at the heart of that political movement, and not an outcast or extremist (as the Indonesian state would later allege), or a messianic figure standing above the day-to-day political debates of his time (as successive generations of Islamic militants have claimed).

Islamic nationalism and pan-Islamism in Kartosuwiryo's conceptualisation of hākimiyya

While these early writings give a strong sense of Kartosuwiryo's commitment to the ideas that would later be popularised by Maududi and Qutb as *hākimiyya*, he provided little detail about how he expected that an Islamic Indonesian state to be structured. By the late 1930s, the SI movement was in disarray, wracked by infighting and the fallout from a controversial decision to adopt a policy of non-cooperation with the colonial administration.³²⁴ Additionally, the party's leadership was in turmoil following Cokroaminoto's death in 1934 and Salim's 1936 ousting, due to his support for continued cooperation with the colonial government. Amidst this fractious political climate, Kartosuwiryo began the work of theorising the day-to-day workings of an Islamic state.

The first issue to resolve was whether this state would be nationalist enterprise or part of a wider transnational caliphate. In 1924, the SI had formed a caliphate committee but enthusiasm for this

³²² Maududi, 'Political Theory of Islam', p.269

³²³ Ibid

³²⁴ Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation*, p.56

project quickly diminished. Nevertheless, the idea of allegiance to a global *umma* never fully died and Kartosuwiryo's own thoughts appeared to reflect the difficulties of reconciling national ambitions with obligations to a globe-spanning religious brotherhood. Ultimately, Kartosuwiryo's actions appear to have prioritised a struggle rooted in territorial nationalism, but he never fully renounced a commitment to Islamic internationalism.

Kartosuwiryo first notes Muslims' transnational commitment to each other in July 1928, writing that, regardless of whether they were 'white or black or yellow', Muslims, could 'understand [each other] with a glance or look'.³²⁵ He then argued in September that PSI 'committed each and every bone in its body to pan-Islamism'.³²⁶ However, these commitments do not appear in any sustained way in his subsequent writings or in the movement's actions. Kartosuwiryo's writings remained focused on the plight of Muslims in the Dutch East Indies, neither spending much time on events abroad, nor situating Indonesia in the context of wider anti-colonial struggles in the Arab world and beyond. Despite its short-lived committee, the PSI does not appear to have made any sustained efforts to liaise with groups abroad. Kartosuwiryo continued to make clear that the '[spirit] of nationalism certainly exists in Islam. National pride is part of faith in Islam'.³²⁷

However, this did not stop Kartosuwiryo from occasionally invoking the concept of pan-Islamism, seemingly as a rallying cry for his readers, or making further attempts to reconcile the two forces. He asserted that Islamic nationalism was more complex than other forms of nationalism, allowing for those committed to its aims to hold allegiance to both the nation-state and a global Islamic community due to the fact that his version of nationalism was 'grounded in Islam, unrestricted by territorial borders... skin colour, language, etc.'.³²⁸ Different Islamic societies were, ultimately, committed to the same objective: ensuring God's sovereignty and glory on Earth.³²⁹ Whether Kartosuwiryo truly believed that this amorphous form of pan-Islamism could co-exist with his Islamic state in the longer term is not clear. Nevertheless, his occasional attempts to reconcile the two shows that he never committed fully to Islamic nationalism either. Instead, his writings suggest that he continued to inhabit a grey area, fuelled by a belief that there was a solution to this puzzle.

Hijrah to hākimiyya

³²⁵ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Perdjalan ketanah soetji', *Fadjar Asia*, 20 July 1928

³²⁶ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Kartosuwiryo, 'Aniajaan dan siksaan', *Fadjar Asia*, 26 September 1928

³²⁷ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Barisan Moeda', *Fadjar Asia*, 6 February 1929

³²⁸ Kartosuwiryo, 'Islamisme, nasionalisme dan internasionalisme I'

³²⁹ Ibid

After a spell of ill health earlier in the decade that likely stymied his writing and participation in SI, Kartosuwiryo appears to have attempted to concretise his vision of an Islamic state in the mid-1930s.³³⁰ In September 1936, Kartosuwiryo drafted a pamphlet, *Bosoer Sikap Hidjrah PSII* (Pamphlet on the PSII's *Hijrah* Stance) for PSII members. The document was meant to explain the party's non-cooperation policy towards the Dutch. It was divided into two parts, with the first largely focused on a retelling of the Prophet Muhammad's flight to Medina. Kartosuwiryo then linked this story to PSII's own *hijrah* in the form of its non-cooperation with the Dutch and spiritual withdrawal from *kufr* (disbelief; denial of the articles of faith in Islam) politics in order, like the Prophet, to forge a community of likeminded believers in a secure base. From this, he envisioned that a 'new era' would arise and this would be the beginning of the Islamists' triumph.³³¹

In the second part, Kartosuwiryo elucidated PSII's objectives and intended programme of action, arguing that the path to an Islamic state would be predicated on three concepts; namely *jihad*, *imān* (faith) and *tauhid*.³³² This required individuals to develop 'character, strength, intelligence, skill' so they can conduct *jihad al-nafs* (a *jihad* against oneself to master emotions, desires, and thoughts).³³³

Despite an in-depth discussion of the meaning of each of these ideas, Kartosuwiryo does little to spell out how they would shape the content and form his Islamic state. Nevertheless, the document is crucial as it demonstrates that Kartosuwiryo viewed the attainment of an Islamic state as intrinsically linked to the performance of a non-violent, spiritual *jihad* to decolonise the minds of Muslims in Indonesia.³³⁴

Through this process, Muslims would embark on a form of *hidjrah* in their minds, just as the Prophet did before them, to establish a pure Muslim community away from the unbelievers who dominated wider society.³³⁵ As such, the building of an Islamic state was predicated on Muslims first conducting *hijrah* through a spiritual *jihad*. Without this action of self-betterment, an Islamic state, in Kartosuwiryo's conceptualisation, would never be fully realised since society would not

³³⁰ Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation*, p.48

³³¹ S.M Kartosuwiryo, 'Brosoer Sikap Hidjrah PSII: Bagian 1', 10 September 1936, <https://serbasejarah.wordpress.com/2010/09/19/catatan-sejarah-syarekat-islam-bag-1/>, accessed:1 December 2019

³³² Discussion of the relationship between *hakimiyya* and *jihad* in this document will take place in the following chapter.

³³³ Ibid

³³⁴ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Brosoer Sikap Hidjrah PSII: Bagian 2', 10 September 1936, *Al-Chaidar.blogspot.com*, published: 16 July 2009, <https://alchaidar.blogspot.com/2008/09/sikap-hidjrah-psii-ii.html>, accessed: 6 December 2019

³³⁵ Ibid

be ready to accept the tenets of *shari'a* or to truly live in accordance with the principles laid down by God, rendering the state vulnerable.

Kartosuwiryo's understanding of the attainment an Islamic state involved Muslim leaders creating governance structures and implementing and enforcing Islamic law. However, the *Sikap Hidjrah* pamphlet indicated that he also saw the need for a bottom-up movement through which individuals would spiritually prepare themselves to live in this state. As such, in the pamphlet he calls on the PSII to build and strengthen faith in the community through the promotion of 'teaching and education' and the provision of information through 'multilevel paths'.³³⁶

He also argued that the party would be responsible for practicing Islamic politics and creating an Islamic economy, facilitating an individual's ability to successfully pursue their own struggle in the path of God.³³⁷ Although he did not clarify what exactly Islamic politics or Islamic economics would look like in practice, their inclusion in the pamphlet illustrates the totalising nature of religion in this state, in which no sphere could be separated from Islam.

Just four years after the publication of the *Sikap Hidjrah*, Kartosuwiryo wrote a companion piece entitled *Daftar Oesaha Hidjrah* (List of *Hijrah* Efforts). In this pamphlet, Kartosuwiryo intended to lay out a programme of action to achieve an independent Islamic state in Indonesia. The document was largely a summary of what Kartosuwiryo had advocated over the past 12 years, such as the promotion of the understanding of Qur'anic scripture, deepening Indonesians' connections with Muslims around the world, and of course, implementing *Shari'a* and Islamic governance so that Muslims could lead fully Islamic lives in '*darul Islam*' (abode of Islam, an ideal Islamic state).³³⁸ The pamphlet went slightly further than the *Sikap Hidjrah* insofar that it placed a greater emphasis on *dakwah* (proselytisation) and charity, ostensibly as a means of promoting PSII's cause.

While these documents offered little in the way of new ideological developments relating to the need for an Islamic state or ensuring God's sovereignty, their publication formalised Kartosuwiryo's overriding message that the reason why Muslims in the Dutch East Indies required independence from their colonial masters was so that they could build a sovereign nation, in which there would be fusion of religion and the state. Without an Islamic state, Muslims would not be

³³⁶ Ibid

³³⁷ Ibid

³³⁸ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Daftar Oesaha Hidjrah', *Internet Archive*, undated, https://archive.org/stream/UsahaHijrah/UsahaHijrah_djvu.txt, accessed: 7 December 2019

able to fully express their faith and live up to the tenants of Islam. He argued that, even under the governance of an independent but non-Islamic state, Muslims would still be subject to some forms of oppression, again highlighting the tyranny of man-made law and by contrast, the security and freedom that adherence to God's laws provided. These increasingly hard-line views would thus make it difficult for Kartosuwiryo to compromise with nationalist forces as Dutch rule crumbled in the wake of the Japanese occupation in 1942.

Kartosuwiryo's Understanding of Hākimiyya, 1942-1949

Kartosuwiryo only produced two substantive pieces of writing setting out his conception of *hākimiyya* between the onset of the Second World War and the end of the Indonesian Revolution in 1949. In July 1946, he gave a speech in Garut, West Java entitled '*Haloean Politik Islam*' (Direction of Political Islam) to a gathering of Masyumi activists. The speech, subsequently printed as a pamphlet by Masyumi that same year, outlined Kartosuwiryo's thinking on the need for an Islamic state in light of Sukarno's declaration of independence and the return of colonial forces.

Increasingly frustrated with the actions of Sukarno and his nationalist, Republican government's failure to expel the Dutch, Kartosuwiryo released a *Kanun Azasy* (constitution) for the prospective NII on 27 August 1948. He declared the formation of his state on 7 August 1949, issuing a *bukum pidana* (penal code) shortly after. These two documents, together with Kartosuwiryo's decision to found the NII, do not illustrate a substantive change in the understanding of *hākimiyya* he had before the war. However, their publication showed that he had come to see the futility of waiting for the slow, incremental progress of individual citizens or small communities building momentum towards the achievement of *hākimiyya* by waging their internal *jibads* as part of their *hijrah*.

The Japanese occupation as an opportunity for state building

By the end of the 1930s, Kartosuwiryo's standing in PSII and the wider Indonesian nationalist movement was on shaky ground due to his continued refusal to abandon his *hijrah* policy. PSII leaders had decided to participate in the Gabungan Politik Indonesia (GAPI, Indonesian Political Federation), an alliance of nationalist parties and groups formed in 1938, which petitioned the Dutch for limited self-government.³³⁹ Kartosuwiryo, who had advocated non-cooperation for years, saw the decision to participate in the federation as a significant betrayal of the Islamist

³³⁹ Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia*, p.95

nationalist cause. These fractures led to his eventual expulsion from the party in 1939.

However, the Japanese occupation provided Kartosuwiryo with opportunities to revitalise his political career as they ‘seemed in fact more ready to make concession to Islamic, rather than to nationalist... demands’, at least initially.³⁴⁰ This seems to have been driven by the belief that they could win popular backing for their occupation by supporting the faith. The Japanese authorities revived the Majelisul Islamil a’la Indonesia (MIAI, Indonesian Muslim High Council), an umbrella organisation for Islamic groups established in 1937, before replacing it with Masyumi in 1943. Masyumi helped to unite the country’s large Islamic groups, including Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. The support given to Islamist leaders by the Japanese forces enabled them to participate alongside religiously neutral nationalists in governance activities and debates over the future of the Indonesian state.

Despite his hostility to cooperation with the Dutch, Kartosuwiryo was far more pragmatic in his approach to working with the Japanese. Writing in *Soeara MLAI (Voice of MLAI)*, the bi-weekly magazine of MIAI, he pledged support for the Japanese war efforts.³⁴¹ He does seem to have been cognisant of this contradiction, writing that working with the Japanese was still collaboration, ‘whether one liked it or not’³⁴². This willingness to compromise, however, illustrates how Kartosuwiryo was responsive to political realities and not dogmatic about the means by which an Islamic state in the Dutch East Indies would be established. Unlike the Dutch, the Japanese appeared willing to tolerate and even promote some level of Islamist-led state building projects for their own objectives in the war. After years of making little headway with his project to establish an Islamic state, it is likely that Kartosuwiryo welcomed the prospect (however slight) of advancing his cause.

In addition to supporting an Islamic state under the wider Japanese-led Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty sphere,³⁴³ Kartosuwiryo established an institution within MIAI to manage the collection and distribution of *zakat* (obligatory alms) payments, a practical manifestation of the economic policies he had advocated when writing the *Sikap Hijrah* pamphlet.³⁴⁴ Through these activities, it appears that Kartosuwiryo had found his way back into the Islamic nationalist movement.

³⁴⁰ Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia*, p.101

³⁴¹ S.M Kartosuwiryo, ‘Bekal bathin dalam perdjoengan’, *Soeara MLAI*, 1 March 1943

³⁴² Ibid

³⁴³ S.M Kartosuwiryo, ‘Benteng Islam’, *Soeara MLAI*, 1 September 1943

³⁴⁴ S.M Kartosuwiryo, ‘Gambar soesoenan baital-mal M.I.A.I.’, *Soeara MLAI*, 1 July 1943

Despite these positive developments for Islamic nationalists, their ascendancy under Japanese rule was short-lived. As the Allies advanced across the Pacific, Japanese prime minister Koiso Kuniaki, seemingly in a bid to keep Indonesians on side, declared on 7 September 1944 that the country would soon be granted independence. Islamic nationalists responded, forming the Badan Untuk Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan (BPUPK, Committee for the Investigation of Independence) on 1 March 1945 to begin the work of structuring a newly independent Indonesia. The committee's make up was evidence of the shifting fortunes of the Islamic nationalists, with 'territorial nationalists...rather conservative in temper, authoritarian in disposition and by the standards of the day, aged' men forming the majority of its 62 members.³⁴⁵

Even so, by the end of its first session on 1 June 1945, the committee had readily accepted Sukarno's Pancasila, five principles of *kebangsaan* (nationalism), *perkemanusiaan* (humanitarianism), *permusyawaratan-perwakilan* (deliberation among representatives), *kesejahteraan* (social welfare) and *ketuhanan* (belief in one God), as the ideological principle of the state.³⁴⁶ The adoption of these principles helped to set Indonesia on a path towards building a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state, rather than one that based its legal framework and governance structures on Islam.

The Islamic nationalists were dealt a further blow when the sub-committee tasked with beginning the process of drafting an Indonesian constitution crafted a preamble, known as the *Piagam Djakarta* (Jakarta Charter), on 22 June 1945. According to the document, only adherents of Islam would be obliged to follow Islamic law, which signalled that Islam would be important to the foundations of the new state, but did not cement its primacy.³⁴⁷

Ultimately, exempting non-Muslims confined the reach of *shari'a* to a specific group of Indonesians. This meant that the Indonesian *umma* would be unable to completely enforce its legal structure, requiring some compromises with secular legislation and the interests of minority groups. It thus brought into question whether the new state would be a truly Islamic polity that could provide Muslims with the structures they required to live in accordance with God's will at all times and guarantee the practice of their faith. The adoption of the charter was hotly debated

³⁴⁵ Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia*, p.105

³⁴⁶ B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p.22

³⁴⁷ The Jakarta Charter, 22 June 1945, published in Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, p.243

during the BPUPK's second and final session in July 1945. Despite concerns from Islamic nationalists that the charter did not go far enough in cementing the importance of Islam to the new state, its uneasy compromise remained.³⁴⁸

Japan's surrender to Allied forces on 15 August 1945 radically altered the Indonesian nationalists' timeframe. Rather than an orderly and considered transition to independence under the auspices of the Japanese, Sukarno and other leaders rushed to declare independence on 17 August to consolidate their authority. The BPUPK was transformed into a legislative body and Sukarno encouraged the formation of political parties.³⁴⁹ By the time British troops arrived to reassert control in Java in September 1945, Sukarno had assembled a cabinet for the nascent republic.³⁵⁰

The return of European forces to Indonesia was met with stiff resistance from both religiously neutral and Islamist nationalist groups, marking the beginning of a chaotic period known as the Indonesian Revolution. The period was characterised by rebellions and riots across the country, which targeted the returning European colonialists as well as local groups viewed as sympathetic to the Dutch such as the Eurasians and the ethnic Chinese community. Due to the weaknesses of the newly established Republican government, little of this fighting was centrally coordinated, with most conducted by local militia forces, gangs, and other disorganised and disparate groups, most of them poorly armed and barely trained. While accurate figures are hard to obtain, it is estimated that between 45,000 and 100,000 Indonesians died in the conflict between August 1945 and the eventual Dutch withdrawal in December 1949.³⁵¹

The return of colonial forces following a period of relative autonomy for Islamic and religiously neutral nationalist groups under Japanese rule was a radicalising experience for all Indonesians. The next chapter will give a more complete account of the revolution, the effect it had on reshaping Kartosuwiryo's understanding of *jihad*, and his increased willingness use violence to attain his long-held aim of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia.

In addition to clashes with Dutch forces, this period was characterised by a breakdown in relations between the nascent Republican government and Kartosuwiryo's group in West Java. While the BPUPKI draft constitution - which accepted *Pancasila* as the ideological basis of the state - had

³⁴⁸ R.E. Elson, "Another look at the Jakarta Charter controversy of 1945" *Indonesia*, 88 (2009), p.118

³⁴⁹ Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation*, p.83

³⁵⁰ Ibid

³⁵¹ Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.98

been formally adopted following Sukarno's declaration of independence, Kartosuwiryo continued to press the case that Indonesian Muslims would only truly be free under the auspices of an Islamic government guided by *shari'a*.

It was against this background of growing violence and political setbacks for the Islamist movement that Kartosuwiryo gave his Garut speech in July 1946, arguing that participation in politics was a 'sacred obligation' for Muslims, who had a 'duty to govern [their] own country and an obligation to [become] an independent nation'.³⁵² The speech, which was subsequently published by the Dewan Penerangan Masyumi Daerah Priangan (Priangan Regional Masyumi Information Office), was known as '*Haloean Politik Islam*'. Organised into seven sections, the pamphlet stated that it was 'a much-needed guide for Masyumi and its branches, especially in this time of revolution [and] rapid social change'.³⁵³

The document provides a clear illustration of Kartosuwiryo's priorities and plans for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. Kartosuwiryo began by giving an overview of the country's political situation before arguing that the struggle for independence would consist of two parts; first, the expulsion of the Dutch so that the country could be 'free from foreign imperialism' and second, the struggle for the ideology of the new state.³⁵⁴

Remarkably, Kartosuwiryo argued that after independence, Indonesia would be a sovereign republic where the 'voice of the people matters most'.³⁵⁵ He conceded that if the people chose to follow the ideological paths of socialism, communism or nationalism, whichever triumphs would 'determine the political direction of the state'.³⁵⁶ While Kartosuwiryo hoped that 'by the grace of God' Islam would prevail in this contest, he did not suggest that he would undermine or overthrow the Republic if the people chose another path.³⁵⁷ Moreover, he told Masyumi supporters to avoid 'fanaticism' in their pursuit of an Islamic state, arguing that this would be like a 'disease that threatens the unity of the nation'.³⁵⁸

This suggests that, a year into the Indonesian Revolution, Kartosuwiryo prioritised unity among

³⁵² S.M Kartosuwiryo, 'Haloean Politik Islam', *Biar sejarah yang bicara...*, 26 December 2010, <https://serbasejarah.wordpress.com/2010/12/26/haloean-politik-islam/>, accessed: 8 September 2019

³⁵³ Ibid

³⁵⁴ Ibid

³⁵⁵ Ibid

³⁵⁶ Ibid

³⁵⁷ Ibid

³⁵⁸ Ibid

Indonesians in order to win the anti-colonial struggle. This does not mean that he had given up on the establishment of an Islamic state. Indeed, at the end of the third section of his speech, he briefly contrasts the triumph of Islamic sovereignty if Muslims prevail in the political struggle with a situation in which Indonesians were ‘subjugated to the sovereignty of the people’ if nationalists or communists won out. This contrast between Islamic sovereignty and the sovereignty of the people reflects the dichotomy embedded in Modernist writings about *hakimiyyah*; God’s sovereignty ensures freedom whereas man’s results in subjugation. Nevertheless, Kartosuwiryo kept this warning brief, focussing on the removal of the Dutch from Indonesia as a necessary first step towards achieving an Islamic state. He was, for the moment, willing to work those who might later be his ideological competitors in the subsequent struggle to define the character of the state.

His plea to supporters to refrain from fanatical attacks on religiously neutral nationalists who disagreed with them and his stated desire to accept whatever system eventually prevailed in the independent state may have also been an attempt to signal to those outside his movement that he could be a trusted partner in the revolution. It could simply have been a move to head off internal dissent about Masyumi’s strategy of cooperation with non-Islamists groups or a sign of how confident he was that Islam would inevitably prevail as the state’s ideology after independence.

Kartosuwiryo argued that Masyumi members must take part in two revolutions; a national revolution and a social revolution. In the first, they would have to use both diplomacy and war ‘in their fight for freedom’.³⁵⁹ Significantly, he argued that the second, social, revolution would have to take place through a personal *jihad*. Masyumi members, and presumably Muslims across Indonesia, would be obliged to better themselves spiritually in order to ‘transform [themselves] into “independent souls”’ and decolonise their minds of any foreign influence that remained after the colonialists themselves had departed.³⁶⁰ Only after having done so could they truly start the work of building an independent Indonesian republic based on Islam. In this respect, Kartosuwiryo appeared to be echoing the ideas of the Modernists, particularly Rida, who argued that a state without a truly pious population would be Islamic in name only.

Subsequently, Kartosuwiryo reiterated arguments he had made earlier in his career, stating that only through the creation of an Islamic state could Muslims enjoy safety in this world ‘but also in the world of the hereafter’ and that the government needed to ‘ensure that Islamic law is enforced;

³⁵⁹ Ibid

³⁶⁰ Ibid

in its broadest and most perfect sense'.³⁶¹ The document highlights Kartosuwiryo's consistent understanding that a world without respect for God's laws, as enforced through a state, would result in Muslims forevermore being subject to the insecurity and whims of man-made laws, which would ultimately prevent their spiritual salvation.

Once again, Kartosuwiryo demonstrates in his writings that while he did not use the term explicitly, he believed and advocated for principles consistent with *hakimiyya*, seeing respect for God's rule as the only form of salvation. Moreover, by arguing that Muslims' safety would be compromised in the afterlife, Kartosuwiryo suggests that living in an Islamic state is a necessary condition for living a truly Islamic life. In this respect, he implies that the promotion and creation of an Islamic state is a fundamental duty of Muslims, akin to worship and other obligations adherents are required to fulfil in order to profess their faith.

However, this goodwill and desire for unity among Indonesian nationalist groups crumbled just a year later. In July 1947, Dutch forces intensified their efforts to recapture Indonesia through an offensive known as the First Dutch Police Action (also known as the First Dutch Aggression). Dutch forces initially landed in West Java, slowly isolating the area from political activity and military support from the Republican government based in Yogyakarta. Given that Kartosuwiryo's stronghold was in West Java, the event contributed to the Islamists' feelings of abandonment and resentment towards a seemingly ineffective national government.

With no end to the conflict in sight, the Republican government and the Dutch came under significant diplomatic pressure from the newly-created United Nations (UN) and the government of the United State of America. On 17 January 1948, the two sides signed the Renville Agreement, under which the Republic was 'left holding a large part of the traditionally food-deficient province of Central Java, the Banten residency... half of Madura, and the poorest part of Sumatra' while the Dutch gained control over the majority of West and East Java, including the areas occupied by Kartosuwiryo's followers.³⁶² Republican troops subsequently abided by the deal by retreating back to Central Java, but Islamic forces remained unwilling to cooperate.

The withdrawal of Republican troops left Islamic forces as the only resistance to the Dutch in these areas. On 1 March 1948, Kartosuwiryo, together with senior Masyumi officials, gathered in

³⁶¹ Ibid

³⁶² Horikoshi, "The Dar ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1948-62)", p.69

Cirebon to begin the creation of a unified political and military force to regain control from the colonialists. They announced the dissolution of Masyumi and that Kartosuwiryo would now serve as the *imam* (leader) of the region's Islamic community. They declared the creation of the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII, Indonesian Islamic Army), which would be formed out the various militia groups in the area. This new political force would aim to '[take] control of the Republic' and prepare to establish a new democratic Islamic state.³⁶³

The intensification of the conflict strengthened Kartosuwiryo and his followers' newfound resolve and commitment to the formation of a state with religion as its guiding principle. It also led to their increasing disillusionment and lack of faith in the Republicans government's ability to deliver freedom to Indonesians.

The establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia

Kartosuwiryo's newly consolidated force had some initial success, capturing territory in and around West Java between March and May 1948. After establishing a relatively secure base, its leadership could engage in basic state building. On 27 August 1948, Kartosuwiryo released the *Kanun Azasy Negara Islam Indonesia* (Constitution of the NII) for his prospective state. The document served as the culmination of his ideas of *bakimiyya* that he developed since his entry into political life in the late 1920s. It is a Modernist Islamic text, as it incorporates and attempts to reconcile Islamic ideals with secular state structures.

The constitution's preamble begins with a potted history of the formation of the independent Indonesian state and of West Java in particular. Kartosuwiryo wrote that in separating West Java from Republican control due to the Renville Agreement, the local Muslim population, led by his TII, could begin a 'second revolution' to actualise an Islamic state in Indonesia through *jihad*.³⁶⁴

Kartosuwiryo spent much of the constitution laying out the political structures of this new Islamic state. The document is comprehensive, covering an extensive list of issues ranging from the powers and duties of the executive to the management of natural resources. As one might expect, the Qur'an and the *hadith* would constitute the basis for all laws and citizens would be obligated to

³⁶³ Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation*, p.116

³⁶⁴ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Kanun Azasy Negara Islam Indonesia', 27 August 1948, no page number; Arsip Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (AABRI), Darul Islam, no. 9

enforce and follow them, but non-Muslims would still be guaranteed religious freedom.³⁶⁵

At the apex of political power sat the *imam*, who was obligated to follow and enforce *shari'a* and govern in accordance with Islamic principles, but otherwise had nearly unconstrained power. Articles 11 to 17 laid out that the *imam* would preside over a *dewan syuro* (executive committee), and a *dewan fatwa* (advisory council) which was made up of seven *muftis*.³⁶⁶

The *imam* would have the power to issue decrees, and as leader of the country's armed forces he had the power to declare war. In times of crisis or a state of emergency, sole authority would rest in the *imam* and his appointed advisors, the *dewan imamab*. The *imam* would be elected by the *majelis syuro* (parliament), which also had the power to create and approve laws and so served as a nominal check on the *imam's* power.³⁶⁷

The constitution laid out the economic and social arrangements of the new state. Harking back to SI's socialist roots, the document decreed that citizens 'had the right to work, a livelihood which provides decency', as well as a social safety net and appropriate education.³⁶⁸ The state would play a very interventionist role in the economy, controlling the production levels of important goods as well as regulating water and other natural resources. In this respect, the document reflects the goals of contemporary, non-Islamic constitutions, going beyond the concerns and structures of a traditional emirate or *wilayat*. In this respect, the Modernist influence on Kartosuwiryo's thinking can be seen as he attempts to grapple with issues that confronted states in the twentieth century, and to solve them using Islamic governance structures.

Continuing in this vein, the NII constitution adopted much of the language of the constitution of the Indonesian Republic. For example, in Article 33, the NII constitution set the official language of the nation as 'Bahasa Indonesia' rather than Arabic. This likely reflected pragmatic considerations; while Arabic was the language of the Prophet and the texts of Revelation, Bahasa Indonesia was the most widely spoken language in the archipelago.³⁶⁹ It also made provisions for a national flag, identical to the Indonesian Republic's, but with a crescent in the centre.

³⁶⁵ Idem, p.1

³⁶⁶ Idem, pp.1-3

³⁶⁷ Idem

³⁶⁸ Idem, p.5

³⁶⁹ Ibid

The constitution ultimately demonstrated that authority and power did not rest with the citizens or even the government, but with God alone. As such, it made clear that the primary aim of the construction of an Islamic state was to facilitate the ability of Muslims to abide by God's laws and Islamic principles by adhering to *shari'a*, which dictates all aspects of life from financial and economic arrangements to social matters such as education and charity. Enforcing shari'a would ultimately prevent Muslims from residing in a condition of *jāhiliyyah* and saving them from the unjust, tyrannical rule of foreign or *kafir* leaders.

In issuing the NII constitution, Kartosuwiryo thus posed a direct challenge to the Republican state as well. Despite his earlier '*Haloean Politik Islam*' speech, he now appeared unwilling to let other ideologies prevail in setting the course for an independent Indonesia. Furthermore, by centring Islam, his proto-state was based on a substantially different ideology from that of the religiously neutral nationalists' *Pancasila* and their vision of a plural Indonesia.

Despite the publication of the constitution and growing tensions with Republican forces after the Renville Agreement, Kartosuwiryo refrained from officially proclaiming the formation of the new state. However, the launch of *Operation Kraai* (Operation Crow) by the Dutch on 19 December 1948, appears to have finally destroyed Kartosuwiryo's faith in the Republicans as a viable force to lead Indonesia to freedom. While Kartosuwiryo's TII continued to consolidate its hold on West Java, this second Dutch military offensive occupied the Republican capital, Yogyakarta, and captured Sukarno, Prime Minister Sutan Syahrir and other key leaders.³⁷⁰ In response, Kartosuwiryo declared the NII and the Dutch remained in a state of war, denouncing efforts to negotiate with the colonialists or engage in diplomatic efforts.³⁷¹

This position once again put Kartosuwiryo at odds with the Republicans, who were simultaneously engaging in talks with the Dutch upon the release of their key leaders and waging guerrilla warfare. Tensions between the two sides came to a head quickly in 1949, just as the conflict with the colonialists was reaching a denouement. In January, NII denounced the Republican leadership for abandoning the people of West Java, calling their soldiers an illegal militia and 'an "obstacle" to the Islamic revolution'.³⁷²

³⁷⁰ The men were released and the Republican government reinstated in January due to international pressure and anger at the Dutch authorities' violation of the Renville Agreement.

³⁷¹ Al Chaidar, *Pemikiran politik proklamator negara Islam Indonesia*, pp. 556-7

³⁷² Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation*, p.129

This increasingly confrontational rhetoric was followed up by Kartosuwiryo's demand for uncontested control over West Java in February, when he decreed that Republican forces could 'either leave [West Java] or join the ranks of the Darul Islam'. There were increasing reports of clashes between troops on both sides.³⁷³ As Republican leaders returned to the negotiating table in March, Kartosuwiryo denounced their efforts as futile and lambasted Sukarno and his cabinet for selling the country out to the Dutch.³⁷⁴

By August, the relationship between the NII and the Republicans was beyond repair. Kartosuwiryo saw the Republican state as fundamentally compromised by its participation in the protracted negotiating process and too weak to ever overthrow the Dutch. On 7 August 1949, he officially declared the formation the Negara Islam Indonesia 'known in other words, as ad-Daulatul Islamiyyah, or Darul Islam'.³⁷⁵

In issuing the proclamation, a slightly revised version of the constitution, and an accompanying penal code, Kartosuwiryo was attempting to create the institutions and enforcement mechanisms needed to bring his theoretical state into being. While the constitution focused on the theoretical structure of the state, the relationships between various branches of government, their powers and relationship to the citizenry, the penal code dealt with matters of more immediate relevance to most Indonesians, spelling out the law as it would apply in their daily lives.

The proclamation and the penal code reflected the circumstances under which they were written. The proclamation explained how Indonesia has been in a state of war since the end of the Japanese occupation and declared that *Perang Suci* (holy war), would continue until the 'disappearance of colonialism and slavery; the [expulsion] of all enemies of God, enemies of religion and enemies of the state of Indonesia' and 'the perfect and complete application of Islamic law throughout fully sovereign Islamic State of Indonesia'.³⁷⁶ As such, the text goes on to declare that Islamic martial law would apply until these aims were met.

Similarly, the penal code placed a lot of emphasis on martial law, detailing in its first three sections who would be considered an enemy, the penalties for various crimes against the NII, the system

³⁷³ Ibid

³⁷⁴ Idem, p.131

³⁷⁵ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Proklamasi berdirinja Negara Islam Indonesia', 7 August 1949, no page number, AABRI DI no. 14

³⁷⁶ Ibid

of judgement, conduct in battle, how to treat prisoners captured, and bounty secured in victory.³⁷⁷ However, much of the code still related to everyday issues of crime and punishment. For example, Kartosuwiryo dedicates two articles in part six of the constitution to dealing with adultery, spelling out the punishments including stoning, whipping and jail time for those found guilty.³⁷⁸ In providing guidance and regulation on quotidian topics, the code signalled the totalising vision of Islam in the personal and public lives of citizens and affirmed of the state's Islamic identity.

The code was structured largely in line with conventional Islamic criminal jurisprudence, with sections on *hudud* (capital offenses or crimes against God with punishments clearly stipulated in the Qur'an and *Sunnah*), *qisas* (crimes related to physical assault and murder, which are punished by retribution or *diyya*, monetary compensation) and *ta'zir* (acts that are prohibited in the Qur'an or *hadith* or infringe public standards and are thus given discretionary punishments).³⁷⁹ Kartosuwiryo largely followed convention in stipulating various punishments for *hudud* offenses, such as death for apostates who fail to repent and the amputation of the right hand and left foot of those who steal but do not injure their victims.³⁸⁰

However, he did occasionally exercise discretion, illustrating once again his willingness to sacrifice some degree of religious purity for the sake of greater political ends. While the penal code stipulates that the consumption of alcohol is punishable with 40 lashes in line with the conventions on *hudud* offenses, it exempts *arrack*, a distilled alcohol generally made from rice in Indonesia, when given 'to treat a disease on the advice of a doctor'.³⁸¹ This suggests that he was willing to compromise on some issues, sacrificing some doctrinal purity for pragmatic benefits.

Through the consolidation of territory and the release of the NII constitution and penal code, Kartosuwiryo had effectively created a small, but functioning state. The weakness of the Republican government and its geographical separation from West Java allowed him to put into practice the ideology that he had begun conceptualising in his early days as an SI activist and writer at *Fadjar Asia*. The adoption of the penal code was a particularly pivotal moment, since it provided a concrete manifestation of the implementation and enforcement of *shari'a*. This was a crucial component in Kartosuwiryo's conception of *hakimiyya*, since it ensured that Muslims would not

³⁷⁷ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Hukum Pidana', 7 August 1949, DI no. 19, AABRI

³⁷⁸ Ibid

³⁷⁹ Etim E. Okon, "Hudud punishments in Islamic criminal law", *European Scientific Journal*, 10, no 14 (2014), p.228

³⁸⁰ Kartosuwiryo, 'Hukum Pidana', 7 August 1949

³⁸¹ Ibid

follow man-made laws but instead be able to lead lives worthy of God by fully adhering to the edicts laid down in the Qur'an and *hadiths*, under the guidance of an Islamic government.

Conclusion

Over a twenty-year period, Kartosuwiryo advanced his understanding of why an Islamic state was necessary, building the case that only through the adoption and observance of Islamic law and governance could Indonesians truly be free and secure. This need to ensure the temporal and spiritual well-being and safety of his fellow Muslims underpinned his drive to establish an Islamic state and fight for its continued existence against encroachment from both colonial and religiously neutral Indonesian nationalist forces. While he did not explicitly use the term *bakimiyyah*, these beliefs are nonetheless consistent with its popular Modernist conceptualisation. His writings, speeches and actions clearly demonstrate that he articulated and promoted few, if any, other concepts to the same degree, cementing *bakimiyya*'s place as the cornerstone of the DI's ideology.

In chronicling the evolution of Kartosuwiryo's understanding of *bakimiyya*, it is evident that political realities shaped his definition of the concept. He often held beliefs and positions similar those of his religiously neutral nationalist and non-violent Islamist counterparts, putting him squarely inside the mainstream of Modernist, Islamic political thinking of his time. His willingness to participate in congresses, constitutional deliberations, and propaganda efforts alongside Republican leaders and to cooperate with the Japanese occupation authorities show that his ideology was never completely set in stone nor was he above trading the consistency and purity of his beliefs for opportunities to create his Islamic state.

Kartosuwiryo's project was grounded in a thorough understanding of Modernist Islamic political thought. His willingness to work within Islamist groups from SI to Masyumi illustrated his commitment to fusing religion and state building. While he lacked formal Islamic schooling, Kartosuwiryo's advocacy and writing demonstrates that he was clearly engaged with and had knowledge of the key debates taking place in Modernist circles in the Middle East and Indonesia. As such, Islam was crucial to his understanding of anti-colonialism, nationalism and formed the ideological basis of his independent nation.

Chapter 2 | *Jihad*: The Obligation to Secure the Islamic State of Indonesia, 1928-1962

Kartosuwiryo did not give much thought to the concept of *jihad* when he began his career as an activist and journalist in Surabaya. On the rare occasions when he did write about the subject in the 1920s and 1930s, his interpretations remained well within the mainstream of normative Islam. He preached a non-violent interpretation of *jihad*, calling on Muslims to lead pious lives and free themselves, at least within their own minds, from colonisation.

This conceptualisation of *jihad* shifted dramatically as Dutch forces attempted to reassert control over the archipelago at the end of the Second World War. Kartosuwiryo began advocating armed resistance to the colonial regime and, subsequently, to the newly-independent Indonesian republic, seeing *jihad* as the only path to achieving an Islamic state. While he hewed to a narrow conceptualisation of *jihad* as a physical struggle throughout the DI's 13-year insurgency, Kartosuwiryo never fully discarded the term's non-violent interpretations. This flexibility ultimately provided DI leaders with the means to sustain their movement following their military defeat and Kartosuwiryo's execution in 1962.

This chapter examines Kartosuwiryo's conceptualisation of *jihad* and the evolution of his interpretation from his beginnings as an Islamist activist in 1928 to his execution as the leader of a rebellion against the Indonesian state in 1962. It situates his understanding of the idea within the wider context of anti-colonial movements inspired by the classical doctrines of *jihad*. Ultimately, his interpretation of *jihad* as meaning a physical conflict laid the foundations for DI's embrace of militancy as the main path to achieving an Islamic state in Indonesia.

While Kartosuwiryo came to see *jihad* primarily through the lens of conflict against the enemies of Islam, he never fully abandoned its non-violent meanings. Resultantly, this chapter argues that the concept's plural meanings allowed him the flexibility to strategically deploy different interpretations in response to changing military and political circumstances. This malleability was crucial to DI's ability to survive and adapt, particularly in the wake of its military defeat and Kartosuwiryo's death. Kartosuwiryo's various interpretations of *jihad* should not be taken to mean that he had no concrete definition of the term. This chapter argues that, regardless of whether he was emphasising *jihad*'s violent or non-violent aspects, he always saw the concept as a tool to achieve *hakimiyya*. The goal of establishing God's sovereignty on earth thus made *jihad* a collective

obligation for all Muslims and at times, a form of worship itself. Finally, he conceived of *jihad* as a defensive struggle to liberate Muslims from oppressive colonial rule and later infidel leadership.

These arguments are presented over the course of four sections. This chapter begins with a brief examination of the classical interpretations of *jihad* and how anti-colonial Islamist movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries used them to justify rebellion. It then traces Kartosuwiryo's initial understanding of *jihad* from his years in PSI in 1928 until the beginnings of the Indonesian Revolution in 1945. The third section analyses the impact that the revolution and the growing dominance of secular nationalists had on narrowing Kartosuwiryo's conceptualisation of *jihad* to that of a violent, physical conflict. Finally, this chapter considers the malleability of his interpretation and what this meant for the group at the end of the insurgency.

Classical *jihad* and anti-colonial resistance

Muslim scholars of antiquity were instrumental in crafting a doctrine of *jihad* that maintained significant appeal among Muslim reformers and anti-colonial agitators in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, before beginning a discussion on *jihad*, it is necessary to situate the concept within a broader understanding of the legal conceptualisation of an Islamic state and its world order.

The Islamic law of nations

Majid Khadduri, the foremost scholar on this subject, begins from the premise that Islam is predicated on 'the concept of authority', since the community of Muslims 'cannot survive without [it]'.³⁸² This authority takes the form of a set of 'divine commands, endowed by a Supreme Legislator, constituting its "fundamental law" or "constitution"'.³⁸³ In turn, 'Allah is the supreme, though not the direct, ruler of the state'; that duty falls to a caliph, who administers and enforces divine law.³⁸⁴

With these premises in mind, Khadduri argues that the Islamic state is unique because it is first and foremost 'an instrument for achieving... an ultimate religious objective, the proselytisation of

³⁸² Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the law of Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1955), p.5

³⁸³ *Ibid*

³⁸⁴ *Idem*, p.11

mankind', by granting order and salvation to all who accept Islam.³⁸⁵ Resultantly, the Islamic state is a 'necessarily imperial' and 'expansionist state striving to win other peoples by conversion'.³⁸⁶ Its religious legal framework is, at least in theory, universal, it is 'intended to apply... to all people of every time and place'.³⁸⁷

As such, the laws that govern an Islamic state's relations with other states are not 'a system separate from Islamic law', but merely an extension thereof.³⁸⁸ This Islamic law of nations, or *siyar*, is thus an integral part of the 'Islamic *corpus juris*, binding upon all who believe in Islam'.³⁸⁹ *Siyar*, the plural of *sira* (path), can mean a narrative account or biography of an individual but as used most readily by Islamic scholars denotes the 'complete set of principles, rules and practices governing Islam's relationships with other nations'.³⁹⁰

Khadduri, alongside Saba Habachy and Mohammad Talaat al Ghunaimi, notes that classical Islamic law 'recognises no other nations than its own'. Instead it divides the world into spheres of *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*; the former refers to the house or abode of Islam, a polity where Muslims can practice their religion freely under the guidance of *shari'a* and Islamic structures of governance, while the latter are areas that remain 'in a state of nature'.³⁹¹ Given its duty to expand and proselytise, an Islamic state engages in constant war with the lands of *dar al-harb*, until Islam is triumphant in turning these areas into *dar al-Islam*. As such, *dar al-Islam* is a state of peace, where Islamic law is upheld and promulgated through an Islamic state.³⁹² In this respect, it is unsurprising that classic and contemporary Islamic theologians and jurists have prioritised the study of the laws of war. *Jihad* is fundamentally the primary mechanism of achieving this end point as it is the 'legal device designed to achieve Islam's ideal public order'.³⁹³

³⁸⁵ Majid Khadduri, ed., *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p.5

³⁸⁶ Ibid

³⁸⁷ Mashood A Baderin, 'The Evolution of Islamic Law of Nations and the Modern International Order: Universal Peace through Mutuality and Cooperation', *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Vol. 17:2 (2000), p.57

³⁸⁸ Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations*, p.6

³⁸⁹ Ibid

³⁹⁰ Idem, p.8

³⁹¹ Majid Khadduri, 'The Islamic System: Its Competition and Co-existence with Western Systems', *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, Vol. 53 (1959), p. 49. See: Saba Habachy, 'Comments of Dr Saba Habachy', *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at its annual meeting*, Vol. 53 (1959), p.59, and Mohammad Talaat Al Ghunaimi, *The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), pp.156-158

³⁹² Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations*, p.17

³⁹³ Ibid

It is important to bear in mind that initially, classical scholars believed that the laws of war would be temporary, ‘on the assumption that the Islamic state was capable of absorbing the whole of mankind’, and there would then no longer be a need for *jihad*.³⁹⁴ The failure of Islam to achieve universal conquest, however, necessitated the creation of a legal framework for interacting with non-Islamic states.

Writing in the 700s, the jurist Abu Hanifa (founder of the Hanfi school of jurisprudence) appears to be the first to develop a comprehensive treatise governing Islam’s relations with the non-Islamic world as the Islamic empire expanded rapidly. Using the life and conduct of the Prophet Muhammad as a model, he began to define the conduct of the state in its relationships with other communities (*siyar*). For example, he argued that women who married outside the fold should be ‘forced to return to Islam’ and be punished with beatings or imprisonment.³⁹⁵ He also decreed that preachers of other faiths could pass through Islamic territory but not reside within it.³⁹⁶ His missives reflected both the triumphalist spread of Islam throughout the Arabian peninsula as well as the anxieties prompted by ongoing contact with non-believers.

These ideas were built upon by Hanifa’s disciple, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani, possibly the most important jurist to write on these issues. Writing in the mid-700s, his works, particularly *Al-Siyar Al Kabir*, are the most comprehensive treatise of international law and *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence).³⁹⁷ Shaybani ultimately saw conflict with non-Islamic states as a ‘tool for peace’, and argued that an Islamic state was justified in undertaking war for either the protection of Islam or its promotion.³⁹⁸ His work is preoccupied with justifying the conditions for conflict and just war, prescribing the conduct of combatants, examining the duties and obligations of the Islamic community in times of conflict, and analysing the processes for managing the end of conflict, like the treatment of prisoners and division of spoils.

Nevertheless, an Islamic state could not be expected to (and, indeed, did not) consistently win its wars, nor be involved in constant state of conflict. As Khaled Bashir argues, a significant portion of Shaybani’s work is concerned with ‘peace-making tools’ such as the laws governing the creation of pacts and treaties, the grounds for trading relationships, and the rights of minorities in Islamic

³⁹⁴ Idem, p.5

³⁹⁵ Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Nations*, 151

³⁹⁶ Idem, p.159

³⁹⁷ Khaled Ramadan Bashir, *Islamic International Law: Historical Foundations and Al-Shaybani’s Siyar* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), p.1

³⁹⁸ Bashir, *Islamic International Law*, pp.129-134

lands.³⁹⁹ As Labeeb Ahmed Bsoul notes, Shaybani believed that treaties were not only permissible under Islamic law, but were essential tools of an Islamic state's foreign policy.⁴⁰⁰ Indeed, an Islamic state was obligated to respect the promises it made in these treaties, unless the actions of the other party violated their terms.⁴⁰¹ Shaybani was also pragmatic, encouraging flexibility in negotiations and in the implementation of their conditions.⁴⁰² Thus Shaybani's writings not only provided a guide for how Islamic rulers should conduct themselves in times of war and at the conclusion of conflict, but advanced a nuanced conceptualisation of the Islamic law of nations not defined by a binary divide between an Islamic state and its enemies, but rather one in which compromise and accommodation is often necessary to preserve peace and the state itself.

Jihad in the Qur'an

With this context in mind, an in-depth examination of the concept of *jihad* is now possible. Jihad's literal meaning is to strive, struggle or exert effort to achieve a laudable or praiseworthy goal. This is usually taken in the context of striving in the path of God. The term appears 41 times in 18 out of the 114 *surah* (chapters) of the Qur'an.⁴⁰³ It is used in five ways, which are listed here in descending order of frequency: striving as a result of one's faith (21 times), offensive and defensive wars (12 times), a solemn oath (five times), resisting the pressure of non-Muslim parents to abandon Islam (two times), and physical strength (once).⁴⁰⁴

The term appears for the first time in *Al-Baqarah* (The Cow), the second *surah* of the Qur'an, with the decree that 'those who have believed and those who have emigrated and exerted themselves in the cause of Allah – these can indeed expect the mercy of God'.⁴⁰⁵ The term appears again in the eighth and ninth *surah* with Muslims assured that that 'those who believed, emigrated, and struggled in the cause of God' would be given relief and God's blessing.⁴⁰⁶

³⁹⁹ Idem, p.216

⁴⁰⁰ Labeeb Ahmed Bsoul, *The Formation of Islamic Jurisprudence: From the Time of the Prophet Muhammad to the 4th Century* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p.171

⁴⁰¹ Ibid

⁴⁰² Bashir, *Islamic Internatinoal Law*, p.226

⁴⁰³ Emad M. Al-Saidat and Mohammad I Al-Khawalda, 'Jihad: A Victim of Policy and Misinterpretation', *Asian Social Science*, 8:7 (June 2012), p.205

⁴⁰⁴ Ahmed Al-Dawoody, *The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), p.56

⁴⁰⁵ Qur'an, 2:218

⁴⁰⁶ Qur'an, 2:218

In these initial *surah*, *jihad*'s meaning is construed as either a physical conflict undertaken for defensive purposes or the act of striving and enduring hardship for one's faith in the context of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers fleeing persecution from non-Muslim tribes. *Jihad* is also presented as a necessary religious undertaking for the Prophet and his followers. Beyond articulating their commitment to their faith, Muslims can, and often should, physically demonstrate and manifest their commitment to God through *jihad*. Finally, these early chapters discuss the concept in the context of determining when it is just and appropriate to engage in a defensive struggle. For example, retaliation against an enemy is justified in *Al-Hajj* (The Hajj), the twenty-second *surah*, when Muslims are 'driven out of their homes without just cause'.⁴⁰⁷

However, the distinctions between defensive and offensive struggles are not always clear cut. In *Al-Anfal* (The Spoils of War), the eighth *surah*, which was revealed to the Prophet following the Battle of Badr in 624, unbelievers were given a choice to desist and have 'past sins...forgiven' or face further attack.⁴⁰⁸ In this sense, the Qur'an justifies the fight against the Quraysh in Badr as a defensive struggle to respond to previous acts of persecution and prevent future ones.

Nevertheless, the subsequent verse appears to contradict this justification, claiming that Muslims should carry on fighting until there is an end to unbelief in God [*fitnah*]. In this sense, the struggle takes on an offensive meaning, with Muslims obligated to fight unbelievers on the basis of their refusal to convert and accept Islam. As Ahmed Al-Dawoody points out, this is contingent on the meaning of the word '*fitnah*'. If Muslims are likely to be persecuted 'until they recant, Muslims are required to fight... until they enjoy complete freedom to worship God without fear or the need to hide their beliefs', rendering the conflict a defensive struggle once again.⁴⁰⁹

The verses clearly show the difficulty in coming to a consensus over the meaning of *jihad* given that the term itself is malleable and that the Qur'an can be interpreted in numerous ways. Additionally, bearing in mind the concerns of the Cambridge School of intellectual history, it is difficult to ascertain the accurate meaning of a concept without fully knowing and situating the language within its historical context. In the instances in the Qur'an where *jihad* is used in relation to an offensive or defensive conflict, scholars may not be able to completely understand its use by the participants as a result of paucity of sources beyond the Qur'an itself. In the instance of the Battle of Badr, historians are unlikely to glean a full picture of the Muslims' or the Quraysh's aims,

⁴⁰⁷ Qur'an, 22:39-40

⁴⁰⁸ Qur'an, 8:38

⁴⁰⁹ Al-Dawoody, *The Islamic Law of War*, p.62

the extent to which leaders on both sides felt a need to convert the other party to their beliefs, or the motivations for the conflict beyond religious grounds. Without this historical context, it is difficult to come to firm conclusions as to what conditions determine *jihad* as an offensive or defensive struggle and whether it is ever justifiable to undertake *jihad* against infidels solely on the grounds of their lack of faith.

The classical doctrine of jihad

Islamic scholars of antiquity attempted to impose some order given the numerous uses of *jihad* in the Qur'an and the lack of clarity around its intended meaning or meanings. This scholarship was largely consolidated into a legal doctrine in the four Sunni schools of thought on *fiqh* – Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali. It has focused on determining who was obligated to participate in *jihad*, who or what were legitimate targets, other prohibitions, the division of spoils, when it was permissible to retreat or request help from non-Muslims, and under what conditions to end the conflict. In clarifying *jihad's* meaning and its practice, these scholars saw *jihad* as the primary 'instrument which would transform *dar al-barb* into *dar-al Islam*'.⁴¹⁰

The issues these scholars focused on reflected the conditions under which they were devised. During the late eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries Muslim rulers governed large swathes of territory stretching across the Middle East, North Africa, Southern Europe, and South Asia. Scholars like 'Abdallah b. al-Mubarak, Malik Anas, Abd al-Rahman al-Awza'i, and Muhammad al-Shaybani, primarily analysed the question of *jihad* through the lens of empire and state power, rather than as authorised and exercised by a small community or group. As Khadduri points out, by conceptualising *jihad* as something to be performed by the community, it consequently turns *jihad* into a state instrument.⁴¹¹ Its declaration was the prerogative of a caliph or *amir*, a figure with legitimate authority over the polity, who was best placed 'to serve the common interests of the community', with its ultimate aim being the 'universalisation of [Islam] and the establishment of an imperial world state'.⁴¹²

Examining the various conditions under which *jihad* could take place, the specific obligations and conduct of participants, and the requirements for ending a conflict could easily fill several doctoral theses. Instead, this section will briefly elaborate on two issues raised in this literature that continue

⁴¹⁰ Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Nations*, p.15

⁴¹¹ Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, p.61

⁴¹² Al-Dawoody, *The Islamic Law of War*, p.76 and Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, p.51

to emerge in the writings of nineteenth and twentieth century Muslim anti-colonial ideologues, namely the obligation to participate and justifications for engaging it.

As Rudolph Peters writes, this classical scholarship largely viewed *jihad* as *fard kifayah* (collective obligation), incumbent upon all Muslims with few exceptions.⁴¹³ This is based on verse in the second *surah*, which reads:

Fighting has been enjoined upon you, although it is a matter hateful to you.

And yet, perhaps, you may hate something – and it is good for you.

And perhaps, you may love something – and it is harmful to you.

God knows, and you do not.⁴¹⁴

Resultantly, it is not for individuals to decide whether they want to participate or not; this duty is imposed on them by God and his temporal enforcer, the caliph.

However, this does not mean that every Muslim has to participate in all circumstances. The jurists, particularly twelfth century scholar ‘Ala al-Din al-Kasani, argued that the Qur’an in the fourth *surah* acknowledged it would not be prudent for all the believers to go forward and fight, but instead that only some need to participate in combat. It is justifiable that some stay at home as the Qur’an states that they too are promised a reward in eternity, which would not be the case if *jihad* was incumbent on all. As such, only some fraction of the community must undertake *jihad* for the sake of the collective, thus fulfilling the non-combatants’ duties as well as their own.⁴¹⁵

Moreover, some classes of Muslims are exempted from participation. These included, among others, minors, the mentally unwell, women, the ill or disabled, and those who cannot afford to leave their families.⁴¹⁶ Given that not all who are able to participate in *jihad* need to do so, these exemptions suggest *jihad* in these writings was primarily aimed at fulfilling a state purpose (like securing a border or expanding territory) rather than demonstrating individuals’ dedication to God.

⁴¹³ Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), p.30

⁴¹⁴ Qur’an 2:216

⁴¹⁵ Mairaj Syed, ‘Jihad in Classical Islamic Legal and Moral Thought’, in Jacob Neusner, Bruce D. Chilton, R.E. Tully, eds. *Just War in Religion and Politics* (Maryland: University Press of America, 2013), p.144

⁴¹⁶ Rudolph Peters, *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History* (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1979), pp.15-17

These arguments regarding *jihad* as a collective obligation become even more pronounced with the encroachment of the Mongols onto Muslim lands in the thirteenth century. Writing in response to the Mongol invasion of Syria, the jurist and philosopher Ibn Taymiyya conceived of *jihad* as ‘a just and defensive war launched and waged by Muslims whenever their security was threatened in the *dar al-Islam* by infidels and heretics’.⁴¹⁷ He argued that defensive or ‘involuntary’ *jihad* was necessary when an invading force enters Muslim lands, ‘commits well-known atrocities’ and ‘refuses to abide by any clear and universally accepted Islamic law’, after being called upon to implement it.⁴¹⁸

Given the desperation of the situation, Ibn Taymiyya saw fewer avenues for individual Muslims to excuse themselves from participation. He began his chapter on *jihad* in his work *Governance according to God’s Law in reforming both the ruler and his flock*, by emphasising the potential for punishment for ‘both individuals and collectives’ that failed to fulfil their duty to defend Muslim lands against unbelievers. He argued that God ‘criticised those who fail to participate in [*jihad*] and called them hypocrites and sick in their hearts’.⁴¹⁹ These threats of sanction are not accompanied by any acknowledgement of the exemptions listed in the Qur’an or made by other legal scholars. Ibn Taymiyya’s work indicates that in times of particularly significant or existential threat to an Islamic polity, the obligations on Muslims to participate grew stronger.

Unlike his predecessors in the ninth and tenth centuries who wrote at the apex of Islamic military power, Ibn Taymiyya did not have the luxury of discussing wars of conquest or expansion. Most of the classical legal scholarship conceived of *jihad* as a means of ‘strengthening Islam, [protecting] believers and voiding the earth of unbelief’.⁴²⁰ However, classical scholars had largely skirted the issue of *casus belli*. Scholars in the Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali schools claimed that aggression against non-Muslims was legitimate, particularly to end the persecution of Muslims. Similarly, Asma Afsaruddin notes that the early Medinan scholars Ata b. Abi Rabah and Abd Allah ibn Umar cite Qur’anic scripture to show that Muslims have a duty to fight unbelievers unless they are willing to subjugate themselves to Muslim rule. Additionally, jurists in the Seljuk period (1037-1196)

⁴¹⁷ Richard Bonney, *Jihad: From Qur’an to bin Laden* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) p.121

⁴¹⁸ Ibn Taymiyya, ‘Fatwa on the Mongols’ (702/1303), published in Richard Bonney, *Jihad: From Qur’an to bin Laden* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) p.424

⁴¹⁹ Ibn Taymiyya, ‘*Jihad*’ in Rudolph Peters, ed. *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1996), pp.44-45

⁴²⁰ Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, p.10

encouraged Muslims to attack ‘hostile polytheists with whom the first generation of Muslims did not have pacts’.⁴²¹

Although these scholars stipulated that there were limits on the targeting of unbelievers (e.g. women and children were exempt), they often shied away from grappling with the question of what specific actions – beyond direct attacks – constituted a legitimate threat to Islam, or when wars of expansion were permitted. Rudolph Peters accounts for the broadness of their interpretation of *casus belli* by arguing that, while the Qur’an is ‘not clear’ as to whether Muslims must fight unbelievers ‘only as a defence against aggression or under all circumstances’, classical scholarship largely dispensed with these ambiguities.⁴²² Peters notes that in general, these jurists believed there was an ‘unconditional command to fight the unbelievers’, based not only on a selective reading of the scripture but also ‘the pre-Islamic concept that war between tribes was allowed, unless there existed an existing truce between them’.⁴²³

Ibn Taymiyya’s work continues this trend, largely justifying *jihad* as a defensive struggle against a broadly defined enemy, stating ‘Fighting is only against those who fight us’.⁴²⁴ He saw it as something to be primarily directed by state authorities. While it was still a collective obligation, individuals were generally only obligated to act once those in power had determined that a transgression had occurred.⁴²⁵ Michael Cook notes that underpinning this stance is a ‘structural disposition to cooperate with the state, and it is cooperation rather than confrontation that is the keynote of his political thought’.⁴²⁶

While construing *jihad* as a defensive struggle, Ibn Taymiyya maintained a broad definition of who constituted an enemy of Islam, arguing ‘whoever goes against God and the Prophet is a *muhàrib* [someone who attacks Muslims]’.⁴²⁷ In addition to non-Muslim aggressors, Ibn Taymiyya called for the punishment of Muslims who opposed legitimate Islamic rule (*bughah*, rebels or

⁴²¹ Asma Afsaruddin, ‘Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought and History’, *The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion* (2016), p.3

⁴²² Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, p.3

⁴²³ Asma Afsaruddin, ‘Jihad and Martyrdom in Islamic Thought and History’, *The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Religion* (2016)

⁴²⁴ Al-Dawoody, *The Islamic Law of War*, p.78

⁴²⁵ Michael Cook, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.155

⁴²⁶ *Ibid*, p.150

⁴²⁷ Mohd Farid bin Mohd Sharif, ‘*Baghy* in Islamic Law and the Thinking of Ibn Taymiyya’, *Arab Law Quarterly*, 20:3 (Jan 2006), p.295

transgressors) and believed that it was only through *jihad* that this defiance could be defeated.⁴²⁸ His work thus helped further legitimate attacks by Muslims against their co-religionists.

Justifying Rebellion

The works of these classical thinkers helped to shape the later interpretation of *jihad* in response to the advent of Western colonial rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Once again, *jihad* was framed as a legitimate means of defending against encroachment by infidel forces. Beginning in South Asia, the loss of territorial control to the British following the Battle of Plassey in 1757 prompted theologians such as Shah Abdul Aziz, Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi, and Shah Ismail to argue that the territories conquered by the British were *dar al-harb* (abode of war).⁴²⁹ Anti-colonial struggles were waged by groups like Tariqa-I Muhammadi, who called on supporters to make *hijrah* to the Northwest Frontier. From that territorial base, the group distributed propaganda ‘extolling the virtues of *jihad* against unbelievers’ and conducted attacks against the British forces until it was completely suppressed in 1883.⁴³⁰

In Indonesia itself, revolts against the Dutch often attempted to root their struggles within an Islamic frame, with religious leaders playing a key role in the conflict.⁴³¹ For example, in Aceh, the ‘*ulama* [religious scholars] declared the fight against the Dutch to be a holy war, and participation in that fight incumbent upon all Muslims’.⁴³² The invading forces were routinely described as ‘*kaphe Belanda*’, ‘infidels’ and ‘enemies of God’.⁴³³

Christine Dobbin provides another example through her work on the Padri movement, a puritanical Islamist worldview anchored by the group’s struggle against local elites and subsequently, the Dutch colonisers.⁴³⁴ The Padris were a group of religious pilgrims who returned from Mecca to Minangkabau, West Sumatra in late 1803 or 1804 and attempted to impose *shari’a* on their community and rid it of *adat* (customary law). The men appear to have been influenced by revivalist Islamist thought during their time in Mecca, particularly the teachings of Ibn Abd al-

⁴²⁸ Ibid, p.297

⁴²⁹ Malik, “Islamic Discourse on Jihad, War and Violence”, p.68

⁴³⁰ Peters, *Islam and colonialism*, p.49

⁴³¹ Kevin M. Fogg, “The Fate of Muslim Nationalism in Independent Indonesia”, PhD dissertation, Yale University, 2012, p.157

⁴³² Edward Aspinall, *Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p.25

⁴³³ Idem, p.26

⁴³⁴ Christine Dobbin, ‘Islamic Revivalism in Minangkabau at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century’, *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 8:3 (1974), pp.330-331

Wahhab, and desired a return to a pure interpretation and implementation of the Qur'an and *sunnah*, 'discarding all innovations'.⁴³⁵ Upon returning from Mecca, the Padris' launched a campaign against the local elite that resulted in attacks against a wide range of local customs and laws.⁴³⁶ The conflict only concluded in 1837 following significant interventions by Dutch forces, who feared that a religious movement influenced by foreign Islamic teachings would destabilise their client relationships with the local ruling elite.

The Java War (sometimes referred to as the Diponegoro War) was a significant revolt against colonial rule framed as a religious struggle. According to Peter Carey, '[widespread] millenarian expectations caught the imagination of the peasantry', who - facing numerous economic and social hardships - rallied behind the charismatic leadership of Diponegoro, who 'posed as a Javanese messianic king' to contest Dutch rule between 1825 and 1830.⁴³⁷ Diponegoro issued a *perang sabil* (a declaration of war in the way of God) against the Dutch and motivated his followers by asserting that their fight was to 'raise up the high state of the Islamic religion in Java'.⁴³⁸

However, the overwhelming military power of the European colonialists eventually reduced the appeal of calls for explicit, physical confrontation. Instead, *jihad* began to largely take the form of passive resistance and non-cooperation. For example, though Algerian resistance leaders like Ahmed Bey and Abdal Qadir invoked *jihad* when leading military resistance against the French in the 1830s, Qadir began to de-emphasise this physical aspect of the conflict when he was later exiled in Morocco. Instead, he argued that Muslims had an obligation to refrain from collaborating with the colonialists and a duty to emigrate from *dar al-kufr* (land of the infidels) to *dar al-Islam*.⁴³⁹

In this respect, *jihad's* numerous meanings and manifestations allowed anti-colonial movements to still embrace the term without necessarily engaging in military conflicts that they were likely to lose. With few options available, acts of non-cooperation, emigration and improving oneself as a Muslim, took on new meaning as acts of resistance and ultimately a form of anti-colonial *jihad*.

Kartosuwiryo's initial conceptualisation of *jihad*, 1928-1945

⁴³⁵ Ibid

⁴³⁶ Michael Laffan, 'The tangled roots of Islamist activism in Southeast Asia', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 16:3 (2003), pp.339

⁴³⁷ Peter Carey, 'The Origins of the Java War (1825-30)', *The English Historical Review*, Vol.91:358 (1976), p.52

⁴³⁸ Idem, p.76

⁴³⁹ Richard Bonney, *Jihad: From Qur'an to bin Laden* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) p.181

Kartosuwiryo had little interest in creating or explicating a doctrine of *jihad* prior to the Indonesian Revolution. He rarely wrote about the concept, preferring instead to focus on building a case for the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia. Despite *jihad*'s relative unimportance to Kartosuwiryo during this period, he did express some views about its purpose and form. Firstly, Kartosuwiryo conceived of *jihad* as a non-violent struggle and an act of worship. It was through this quest for spiritual betterment that Muslims would embark on their *hidjrah* away from an un-Islamic society, making their first step towards the achievement of an Islamic state. Secondly, it was an act that all Muslims had a duty to engage in, indicating that Kartosuwiryo saw it as a collective obligation for the country's Islamic community. Finally, *jihad* was an anti-colonial activity, undertaken to purify oneself from the Western influences and beliefs contrary to Islam.

Kartosuwiryo's regular column in *Fadjar Asia* offers little insight into his thoughts on *jihad* during his initial years with PSI. The concept was never mentioned in the numerous articles he wrote for the paper between 2 April 1928 and 24 May 1930. The paper, as mentioned in the first chapter, afforded Kartosuwiryo a daily means of promoting his ideas and reaching fellow PSI members and Islamist activists across the Dutch East Indies. Kartosuwiryo wrote on a huge range of issues, including the brutality of colonial policies, the plight of poor Muslims, his opposition to the establishment of a national bank and his mistrust of irrigation systems.⁴⁴⁰ While the topics covered were numerous and varied, the articles generally advanced Kartosuwiryo's belief that Indonesia ought to be an independent state where Muslims were free to practice their faith under the protection of an Islamic governance structure and *shari'a*.

Resultantly, the omission of any discussion on *jihad* is notable. It suggests that either Kartosuwiryo did not believe he had anything useful to contribute on the issue or that he did not think it was a significant or useful concept in the struggle against Dutch colonial rule between 1928 and 1930. Kartosuwiryo's early writings indicate that, rather than being a fixed concept in his ideology, *jihad*, unlike *hākimiyya*, underwent a significant transformation in terms of its importance to and centrality in his belief structure. This transformation highlights the importance of recognising ideologies as flexible rather than static structures, particularly over long time periods. Moreover, it demonstrates the impact of events and conflict in shaping the trajectory of an ideological framework.

⁴⁴⁰ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Kepentingan ekonomi di dalam perdjoeangan kita', *Fadjar Asia*, 3 September 1928; S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Bank Nasional', *Fadjar Asia*, 27 August 1928; S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Irrigatie meroesak pertanian?', *Fadjar Asia*, 9 October 1928

Prior to the Indonesian Revolution, Kartosuwiryo produced only two pieces of writing that spoke to his understanding of *jihad*; the *Brosoer Sikap Hidjrah PSII* published on 10 September 1936 and the *Daftar Oesaba Hidjrah PSII* published in March 1940. As noted in the first chapter, the *Sikap Hidjrah* pamphlet was written at the apex of Kartosuwiryo's power within the PSII following the 1935 ousting of Agus Salim, the party's president and his former mentor. Agus Salim had tried to get Kartosuwiryo and other PSII leaders to moderate their attitudes for fear of antagonising the Dutch and prompting a crackdown.⁴⁴¹

The pamphlet marked the beginning of PSII's full embrace of a policy of non-cooperation and non-engagement with the Dutch colonial administration. The *Daftar Oesaba Hidjrah* was published as a companion piece to the *Sikap Hidjrah* pamphlet. It laid out the party's agenda for the transformation or *hijrah* (emigration) of Indonesian society, at least spiritually, away from a world governed by infidel colonialists to one guided by *shari'a* and the principles of an Islamic life. The concept was modelled on the Prophet's own flight from Mecca to Medina to establish the first Islamic community. Both documents were signed by Kartosuwiryo and attribute authorship to him alone. The analysis of *jihad* in both pamphlets is comparatively brief, in contrast to arguments made in favour of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. Nevertheless, Kartosuwiryo's thoughts on *jihad* are remarkably consistent in both documents.

Jihad as a non-violent struggle in the path to hākimiyya

In the *Brosoer Sikap Hidjrah*, Kartosuwiryo confined his discussion of *jihad* to the pamphlet's second half. After establishing the party's reasons for resisting participation in Dutch-controlled institutions and political life and telling the story of the Prophet's flight to Medina, the second part establishes the party's aims and programme. Kartosuwiryo began the section with a discussion of the meaning of *jihad*, noting that it has been often misunderstood or reduced (often by Westerners) to the spread of Islam by the sword.⁴⁴² He then referenced 18 passages of Qur'anic scripture in a bid to establish *jihad*'s true meaning as 'earnest effort... in the way of Allah, towards Truth and Reality, in line with the teachings of Islam'.⁴⁴³ This included exercising patience, thinking through one's thoughts and actions carefully, and practising charity. It was through the practice of these deeds that God would be exalted and praised.

⁴⁴¹ Formichi, *Islam and the making of the nation*, p.56

⁴⁴² Kartosuwiryo, 'Brosoer Sikap Hidjrah PSII: Bagian 2', 10 September 1936

⁴⁴³ Ibid

Kartosuwiryo's emphasis on a non-violent interpretation of *jihad* appeared to be driven to some extent by a desire to challenge what he perceived as the negative Western definitions of the term. In his opening paragraph, he wrote that the association of *jihad* with war meant that Westerners assumed Islam was practiced by 'mere brutes'.⁴⁴⁴ While his conceptualisation of *jihad* as a non-violent and primarily personal act of contemplation and striving to do good acts may have served his party's practical aim of advocating non-cooperation with the Dutch political system, his opening paragraphs suggest that he was also trying to counter these negative stereotypes and present his co-religionists as civilised and considered practitioners of their faith.

Kartosuwiryo was keen to stress that *jihad* was a positive struggle through which individuals could continuously grow. Muslims were obliged to reject *shirk* (the practice of idolatry or polytheism) and commit themselves to learning about *tauhid*. These efforts to master, '*jihad al-naf*', which Kartosuwiryo defined as *jihad* against oneself, were to take place on an individual, spiritual plane rather than through physical struggle against non-believers. In Kartosuwiryo's understanding, this was the 'Greater *jihad*' (*jihad al-akbar*) wherein Muslims 'worked diligently' to rid themselves of 'foul, low and despicable passions' while fostering 'strength, intelligence, [and] skill'.⁴⁴⁵

Kartosuwiryo saw continuous struggle for improvement as more than just an obligation for the individual to demonstrate their faith in God, but an act of enduring worship (*'ibāda*), akin to prayer. He made this argument by firstly arguing that participating in this earnest effort was 'tangible'. Muslims could demonstrate their engagement in *jihad* through 'acts in the form of good or charitable deeds' or conquering their own passions and desires. But it 'would be difficult to call [those efforts alone] worship' if a Muslim's 'heart is empty of faith'. To be considered worship, true *jihad* must encompass both these elements – concrete attempts at betterment of the self and the community combined with strong belief in God. In Kartosuwiryo's understanding, *jihad* encompassed more than a struggle to better one's relationship with God and practice as a Muslim, but also served a larger purpose demonstrating devotion.

In striving for God in this manner, Kartosuwiryo argued that this 'greater *jihad*' was 'no different from the aims and objectives of the *Hidjrah*' as the Prophet fled from Mecca to Medina, to avoid persecution from the non-Muslim tribes that controlled the city. His flight marked the start of a

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid

new era for Islam and the beginnings of the path to the creation of an Islamic state. *Jihad* as a struggle for spiritual betterment thus formed the basis of the party's new political programme. Their quest to 'perfect [their] Islamic practices' rather than engage with an un-Islamic system imposed by the Dutch would be akin to the Prophet's flight from a society governed by infidels.⁴⁴⁶ While this move was not a physical departure, it would still signal a new beginning as Indonesian Muslims left ignorance and oppression behind and followed God's command. Kartosuwiryo made the claim that a physical *hijrah* was unimportant and potentially meaningless if *jihad* (in the form of the purification and improvement of oneself as a Muslim) was not conducted simultaneously. Given this logic, PSII's priority would be to focus on this self-betterment rather than seeking to establish a physical base elsewhere.

Although it is likely that Kartosuwiryo saw the betterment of Muslims as a noble duty and genuinely conceptualised *jihad* in this manner, his exhortations for the party's members to turn inward also reflected his movement's limitations. Dutch authorities note that the death of Cokroaminoto and the ousting of Agus Salim from PSII had caused the movement to haemorrhage members, with the number of party branches falling from 140 in 1934 to 90 in 1935.⁴⁴⁷ It is plausible that this inward-looking interpretation of *jihad* reflected the fact that PSII had few, if any, options to truly confront the Dutch or move towards their stated aims of an independent Indonesia and the creation of an Islamic state. Kartosuwiryo's vigorous calls to engage in self-betterment for the sake of God and party may have thus been one of the only ways he could hold together a party in decline, and provide some semblance of pseudo-political action for his followers to engage in.

Although Kartosuwiryo did not completely repudiate the use of violence in the *Brosoer Sikap Hidjrah*, he argued that violence was the 'small *jihad*' (more commonly referred to as the lesser *jihad*) and a 'negative and destructive' force, which could be only undertaken for self-defence'.⁴⁴⁸ He did not specify the conditions under which a physical conflict could be undertaken, either because the matter was not worth exploring or because he was trying to avoid engaging PSII members in a debate over whether violence was permissible. Nevertheless, by referring to it as a 'small' and 'negative' struggle, and one that should not take 'precedence' before the 'Greater *jihad* against oneself', he clearly discouraged readers from interpreting the term in this manner.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁴⁷ Formichi, *Islam and the making of the nation*, p.56

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid

It is difficult to fully understand why Kartosuwiryo made this choice to diminish *jihad*'s associations with physical conflict, given the clear link the term has with warfare in the Qur'an and classical Islamic jurisprudence. It is plausible that, in addition to genuinely believing that personal betterment for the sake of God was the more important struggle, Kartosuwiryo had pragmatic reasons for emphasising non-violence. By arguing that physical conflict was the 'small *jihad*' in the *Sikap Hijrah* pamphlet, he could have also been attempting to push back against calls from PSII members who supported a more hard-line or confrontational approach with the Dutch government, which PSII was unlikely to win.

Regardless, the shorter *Daftar Oesaha Hijrah* pamphlet continued to reinforce Kartosuwiryo's preference for defining *jihad* as a non-violent endeavour. The document stated that PSII was committed to its *hijrah* policy of spiritually relocating from 'Mecca-Indonesia' to 'Medina Indonesia', through *jihad*, which was once again taken to mean a purification of the beliefs and actions of Indonesian Muslims rather than a physical conflict or spatial migration.⁴⁴⁹

Jihad as a collective obligation

In addition to conceptualising *jihad* as a non-violent act, Kartosuwiryo saw participation in this process of striving in the path of God as an obligation for all Muslims in Indonesia. In the *Sikap Hijrah* pamphlet, Kartosuwiryo wrote that mastering the greater *jihad* against oneself was not only a duty for individual Muslims but for 'one's own household, the people in the village and in the country'.⁴⁵⁰ In listing out these various groups and increasing the scale, Kartosuwiryo showed that he expected Muslims to participate as a collective, with each group's efforts cumulatively growing and impacting the greater whole.

Similarly, in the *Daftar Oesaha Hijrah*, Kartosuwiryo argued that the move from 'Mecca-Indonesia' to 'Medina-Indonesia' would be a collective struggle because the full realisation of Islamic life requires the participation of an entire community.⁴⁵¹ In order to achieve *tauhid* (unity) PSII members had to commit themselves to unity and full submission to God (*jihad ubudiyah*), to spreading education, to provide charity and to striving for improvements in one's society (*jihad ijtimaiyah*).⁴⁵² Kartosuwiryo saw it as necessary for PSII members to, at very least, engage in *dakwah*

⁴⁴⁹ Kartosuwiryo, 'Daftar Oesaha Hijrah', March 1940

⁴⁵⁰ Kartosuwiryo, 'Brosoer Sikap Hijrah: Bagian 2', 10 September 1936

⁴⁵¹ Kartosuwiryo, 'Daftar Oesaha Hijrah' March 1940

⁴⁵² Ibid

(proselytisation) through education and charitable acts as part of their *jihad*. This would ensure that all who lived within their society were given some assistance by the party in mastering their struggle in the path of God and facilitating the purification of the entire community.

However, this formulation of *jihad* as a community-wide undertaking remained under-developed by Kartosuwiryo in these documents. In neither pamphlet did he discuss the consequences for a society if some members fail to participate, nor whether there were any exemptions for certain groups within a polity, as was the norm in classical doctrines on *jihad*. This may be because Kartosuwiryo believed that, since this was a largely internal struggle to purify one's faith, all members of the community could participate to some extent. But the text's lack of explicit discussion makes it difficult to come to any definitive conclusions on these specificities.

Jihad as an anti-colonial struggle

Although Kartosuwiryo preached non-violence, he still saw *jihad* as a means of liberating Muslims, at least mentally, from a society governed by foreign infidels. Like the Prophet Muhammad and his followers who fled from Mecca to ensure they could practice their faith unimpeded, PSII would also have to participate in a *hijrah*; using lives of piety and subservience to God to escape their society in order to reunify religion and politics until an Islamic state could be attained.

This effort, formalised by Kartosuwiryo as a *Program Djihad*, must thus be understood as a non-violent political struggle against the colonialists. In the *Sikap Hijrah* pamphlet, Kartosuwiryo blamed the Dutch (and the West in general) for separating religion from politics. With this link broken, Muslims were unable to lead full and complete religious lives, which require political and legal systems reflecting their beliefs and reinforcing their practices.⁴⁵³

In calling on Muslims to commit to *jihad* and purify their faith in their hearts, Kartosuwiryo was encouraging an extraordinarily radical act of decolonisation. This plea to return to a true form Islam would require his followers to completely change their way of thinking and to reject a mindset defined by colonial hierarchies of racial and Christian superiority, secular education, and non-Islamic norms, values, and practices. The renunciation of these modes of thinking would, if done completely, result in PSII members – and potentially other Indonesian Muslims – living, at least intellectually and spiritually, in a decolonised world structured according to Islamic precepts.

⁴⁵³ Kartosuwiryo, 'Brosoer Sikap Hijrah: Bagian 2', 10 September 1936

This mental shift would mark the beginning of an Islamic community in thought and thus set the party on the path to eventually achieving an Islamic state.

Kartosuwiryo's repeated attempts throughout the *Sikap Hidjrah* pamphlet to define *jihad* as more than just warfare in defence of Islam indicates that he did not see outright conflict as productive or likely to achieve his desired outcome of an Islamic state in this period. By broadening the definition to include daily acts of worship and encouraging individuals to lead their lives in line with their Islamic faith, *jihad* in Kartosuwiryo's conceptualisation was a means by which his supporters could still resist colonialism.

As demonstrated in the earlier section, Kartosuwiryo was not alone in conceiving of *jihad* as an anti-colonial activity, with numerous movements in the Muslim world using the idea as a means to rally and justify resistance. Based on his writings in *Fadjar Asia* and the pamphlets he wrote for PSII, Kartosuwiryo does not appear to have engaged much with the writings of ideologues or leaders of contemporaneous Islamist anti-colonial movements. Resultantly, it is difficult to know with certainty the degree to which he was aware of these struggles or how much kinship he felt with them and their ideas.

Despite – or, potentially, because – of this lack of engagement, Kartosuwiryo's conceptualisation of *jihad* stands out as a unique contribution for its commitment to a non-violent interpretation. By contrast, South Asian resistance leaders and ideologues such as Mawlānā Fadl-i-Haqq Khairābādī, who issued a fatwa against the British colonialists in 1857, as well as Maududi, called on Muslims to engage in a physical and violent form of *jihad* to 'annihilate all tyrannical and evil systems in the world' as part of a 'programme of destruction and reconstruction, revolution and reform'.⁴⁵⁴ Kartosuwiryo did not choose to use another term to describe resistance to colonial rule. Instead, in both the *Sikap Hidjrah* and *Daftar Oesaba Hidjrah* pamphlets, he uses *jihad* in terms of describing PSII's programme of non-cooperation with the Dutch, suggesting that he saw value in it, perhaps as an emotive, rallying cry or as a means of lending religious legitimacy to his cause. Regardless, the term's numerous meanings make it perfectly suited for his application of it as a form of defensive resistance to colonial subjugation.

This stance may be largely the result of PSII's circumstances and the state of the wider Islamist movement in Indonesia. With the Dutch maintaining a monopoly on force and the marginalisation

⁴⁵⁴ Maududi, *Jihad in Islam*, p.17

of Islamism within the Indonesian nationalist movement, it is unlikely that Kartosuwiryo or other groups would have been able to successfully carry out an armed revolt against the colonialists.

It is also probable that Kartosuwiryo was restricted from publicly advocating for violent *jihad* because he or PSII members feared a backlash from the colonial administration. These fears appeared evident in Agus Salim's fight with Kartosuwiryo and other PSII members over the creation of the non-violent *hijrah* policy in 1935. As Formichi notes, Salim was concerned 'that the government would further limit the party's activities if it did not assume a more moderate attitude'.⁴⁵⁵ Given that internal debates within the party were heated even when discussing a policy of passive non-cooperation that did not explicitly call for violence, and animated by fears that the Dutch could take punitive action, it is unsurprising that Kartosuwiryo eschewed a violent conceptualisation of his anti-colonial *jihad*.

World War II

Kartosuwiryo published little in the years following his ostracism from PSII in 1939 and the outbreak of World War II. However, the war provided him with new opportunities to reassert his position in the Islamic nationalist movement. His willingness to work with the occupying Japanese administration meant he was able to participate in Masyumi activities, including writing for their publication *Soeara MLAI* from March to December 1943. Kartosuwiryo saw the Japanese as a largely positive force due to their expulsion of the Dutch and their promotion of 'common welfare and prosperity' in Asia.⁴⁵⁶ In his writings for Masyumi, he repeatedly praised the Japanese government and returned to the theme of the potential for economic prosperity under their rule.⁴⁵⁷

However, Kartosuwiryo did not appear to explore *jihad* as a topic in his writings in this period. His writings in *Soeara MLAI* largely centred on issues of personal behaviour such as *fard al-ayn* (legal obligations that must be performed by Muslims, like prayer and fasting). The avoidance of a topic like *jihad* may have been the result of self-censorship and a desire to avoid confrontation with his new imperial masters, or he could have seen the issue as unnecessary given that he welcomed Japanese rule.

⁴⁵⁵ Formichi, *Islam and the making of the nation*, p.57

⁴⁵⁶ Kartosuwiryo, 'Bekal bathin dalam perdjoengan', *Soeara MLAI*, 1 March 1943

⁴⁵⁷ For more on this view, see: S.M Kartosuwiryo, 'Kewadajiban oemmat Islam menghadapi "doenia baroe"', *Soeara MLAI*, 15 May 1943 and Kartosuwiryo, 'Benteng Islam', *Soeara MLAI*, 1 September 1943

Kartosuwiryo may have genuinely believed that the Japanese forces would eventually grant independence to an Islamic state of Indonesia given their support, particularly in the initial phase of the occupation, for Islamist groups and their state-building efforts. Nevertheless, these speculations are difficult to substantiate given the paucity of sources or external accounts of Kartosuwiryo's thinking during this period.

Kartosuwiryo's initial understanding of *jihad* was considerably under-developed in comparison to his conceptualisation of *hakimiyya*. His limited writings on the topic between 1928 and 1945 illustrate that when he did think about the concept, it was usually in terms of *jihad* as a struggle for a more pious community or closer personal relationship with God. In bettering themselves as Muslims, Kartosuwiryo believed Indonesians would thus be one step closer to achieving an Islamic state. It was necessary that all Muslims in the archipelago take part in this endeavour. While this conceptualisation prioritised a non-violent struggle, it was nevertheless still a form of anti-colonial resistance aimed at ridding Indonesian Muslims of values and beliefs inculcated by the Dutch.

Radicalisation through conflict, 1945-1949

While still preaching his non-violent interpretation of *jihad*, the Second World War did offer Kartosuwiryo his first opportunity of combat training. As Allied forces made progress in their Southeast Asian campaign, Japanese officials in Indonesia began facilitating the formation of Islamic militia groups and provided training and equipment in a bid to create auxiliary troops. These groups, including Pembela Tanah Air (Peta, Defenders of the Fatherland), Hizbullah, and Sabillah, were created between 1943 and 1944 and gave large numbers of young men religious tutelage as well as the requisite skills to resist the returning colonialists following the war's end. In Bandung, Kartosuwiryo 'took advantage of this opportunity... and in 1945 reactivated the Suffah Institute to arm and train youths who had joined Hizbullah'.⁴⁵⁸ It was through these guerrilla units that Kartosuwiryo would find a core of dedicated fighters to support and join his cause.⁴⁵⁹

This opportunity to train and engage in physical resistance against colonial rule began the shift in Kartosuwiryo's thinking on *jihad*. This transformation was rapid. After initially embracing a limited form of physical violence at the end of World War II, he came to see *jihad* almost exclusively as defensive, physical conflict by July 1947 with the advent of the First Dutch Police Action. In 1948,

⁴⁵⁸ Solahudin, *The roots of terrorism*, p.32

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid

in the wake of the Renville Agreement signed by the government of the Netherlands and the Sukarno-led administration, Kartosuwiryo declared the formation of the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII, Indonesian Islamic Army) and released a constitution for an eventual Islamic state in Indonesia. He declared the foundation of the NII on 7 August 1949, setting his movement on a collision course with the Indonesian Republic.

This section will thus examine the narrowing of Kartosuwiryo's interpretation of *jihad*, illustrating the impact of external events in spurring his embrace of violence as a legitimate tactic of resistance. While the form of *jihad* had changed, Kartosuwiryo's conceptualisation of the term remained squarely defensive and an obligation incumbent on all Muslims. Rather than being a gradual and incremental process that would somehow lead to the creation of an Islamic state, Kartosuwiryo's understanding of *jihad* took on a new urgency. It was only through a physical struggle that Muslims in Indonesia would be able to attain *hakimiyya*. Over a four-year period, his conceptualisation of *jihad* moved quickly from a non-violent struggle, largely conducted on an individual level, to one that entailed physical conflict against foreign, un-Islamic forces and even other Muslims who did not support his vision of an Islamic state.

Haloean Politik Islam and the Perang Sabil

As the colonial powers attempted to re-establish their hold over Southeast Asia following the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945, Kartosuwiryo continued to develop his ideas on *jihad*. Between the end of the war and the retreat of the Dutch in December 1949, Kartosuwiryo drafted two key documents that showed the evolution of his thinking on the subject; the '*Haloean Politik Islam*' in July 1946 and a *perang sabil* in 1947.

As discussed in Chapter 1, Kartosuwiryo gave a speech in Garut, West Java entitled '*Haloean Politik Islam*' in July 1946. In addition to his thoughts on *hakimiyya*, the speech outlined Kartosuwiryo's thinking on *jihad* in light of Sukarno's declaration of independence and the return of colonial forces. Despite the threat posed by the Dutch, Kartosuwiryo hewed closely to the positions he had held prior to World War II, emphasising non-violent resistance and the collective participation of all Muslims in this personal, spiritual quest.

Kartosuwiryo began his speech by elaborating the differences in political culture between the West and Islam, emphasising that the nature of Islam was all-encompassing and prevented a separation

of religion and state in the lives of Muslims. Indonesians required both ‘*de facto*’ independence from Dutch rule and ‘*de jure*’ independence, which could only come with the implementation of an Islamic political system and *shari’u* thus ensuring God’s will on earth.⁴⁶⁰ In order to achieve both forms of independence, Kartosuwiryo argued that Indonesians needed to engage in both a national and a social revolution, which Kartosuwiryo referred to as ‘*jihad al-asghar*’ (lesser *jihad*) and ‘*jihad al-akbar*’ (greater *jihad*) respectively. A national revolution, entailing physical resistance against the Dutch, was ultimately less important than the social revolution, which required all Muslims to engage in a ‘change in attitude and spirit’.⁴⁶¹

This formulation reflected much of Kartosuwiryo’s thinking from the pre-war period. Not only did he see these forms of *jihad* as a tool to achieve independence and *hākimiyya*, he continued to emphasise the value of non-violence and personal betterment as the most important means by which this Islamic state would be achieved. While Kartosuwiryo conceded that in the face of Dutch encroachment, *jihad al-asghar* should, temporarily, take priority, this did not exempt Muslims from participating in the other, greater *jihad*. These struggles should thus be pursued in tandem in order to truly achieve freedom.

The speech also reflected Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisation of this struggle as an obligation for all Muslims in Indonesia. Once again, he argued that ‘whether they want to or not, every Muslims must feel obligated to participate in the national revolutions’.⁴⁶² This formulation echoes verse 216 in the second *surah* which reads that ‘Fighting has been enjoined upon you, although it is a matter hateful to you’ and indicates that Muslims may not have a choice as to whether they want to participate in *jihad* or not, as only God can decide.⁴⁶³ This is reinforced later in the speech when he reiterates that all Muslims have a ‘duty’ and ‘sacred obligation’ to govern themselves and participate in politics.⁴⁶⁴ By joining these revolutionary *jihads*, Muslims were both participating in a collective enterprise to achieve their freedom and demonstrating their commitment to their faith. Without the participation of all, particularly in a social revolution to purify the hearts and minds of the faithful, Indonesians would never be truly independent.

⁴⁶⁰ Kartosuwiryo, ‘Haloean Politik Islam’, 1946

⁴⁶¹ Ibid

⁴⁶² Ibid

⁴⁶³ Qur’an 2:216

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid

The ‘*Haloean Politik Islam*’ speech indicates that Kartosuwiryo believed that a largely similar course of action to what he advocated in the pre-war period could be used to counter colonial rule in the post-war period. While he acknowledged that a greater emphasis must now be placed on the physical, national rebellion, he did not give up on advocating non-violent, personal struggle. His speech clearly demonstrated that he still regarded this as the greater *jihad* and the key to the attainment of an Islamic state after the end of Dutch rule.

However, Kartosuwiryo appears to abandon these fairly restrained positions following the First Dutch Aggression in July 1947 as the colonial forces intensified their efforts to recapture the archipelago. Kartosuwiryo, who was now the vice-president of Masyumi in West Java, issued a *perang sabil* shortly after the police action began. The phrase, which translates as ‘war in the way of God’, is ‘a hybrid term derived from the Malay word for war and the Arabic saying *jihad fi sabilillah*’ and has frequently been used to rally colonised Muslims against foreign forces.⁴⁶⁵

This *perang sabil* marked a return to the ideology and tactics of movements that struggled against the Dutch in the early years of colonial occupation. The Javanese prince Diponegoro used the term *sabil* to rally his troops during the Java War (1825-1830) against encroaching Dutch forces. Diponegoro believed that *jihad* was a ‘war against non-believers who [had] attacked, displaced and robbed Muslims’.⁴⁶⁶ During the Achenese war (1873-1912), the doctrine of *Perang Sabil* was codified in a text known as *Hikayat Perang Sabil* (the Epic of the Holy War), to ‘motivate Achenese fighters in the war against the Dutch’.⁴⁶⁷ However, once Dutch rule was consolidated, Islamic groups generally turned away from physical confrontation, choosing instead to pursue a path of non-violent *jihad*, similar to the ideas espoused in Kartosuwiryo’s *Bosoer Sikap Hidjrah* in 1936.

It is likely that Kartosuwiryo would have been aware of the numerous *fatwas* (legal opinions) authorising *jihad* and *perang sabil* issued following the return of Dutch forces, which urged Indonesians to defend their homeland from encroachment. For example, the government in Aceh issued a *perang sabil* in 1945 calling on Indonesians to resist the colonialists who ‘will enact efforts to destroy our pure Islamic religion’⁴⁶⁸. Similarly, the NU branches of East Java issued a *fatwa* on 21 October 1945, which argued that *jihad* ‘[became] mandatory for every Muslim (*fardlu‘ain*)’ to

⁴⁶⁵Joshua Gedacht, “Holy War, Progress, and “Modern Mohammedans” in *Colonial Southeast Asia*, Vol. 105:4 (2015), p.448

⁴⁶⁶Taufiqur Rahman, “The trajectory of the discourse of *jihad* in Indonesia”, *Analisa Journal of Social Science and Religion*, Vol 1:2 (2016), p.166

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid

⁴⁶⁸ Idem, p.162

‘oppose the Dutch and their accomplices who wish to re-colonise Indonesia’.⁴⁶⁹ This *fatwa*, known as the *Resolusi Jihad* (Jihad Resolution) appeared to galvanise Indonesian Muslims, particularly the members of Hizbullah and Sabilillah, who engaged the British forces spearheading the Western powers’ bid to retake the Dutch East Indies in a three week-long battle.

Given this febrile atmosphere, it is surprising that Kartosuwiryo held off declaring his own *perang sabil* for as long as he did. Nevertheless, its language and tone largely followed the blueprint of earlier *fatwas* issued by other Islamist groups and carries within it some of the concepts espoused by foreign ideologues. In the brief document, Kartosuwiryo argued explicitly that Indonesian Muslims must engage in ‘a war for the defence of the sovereignty of the country and the purity of religion, [and] a war to fight any attempt to colonise any nation’.⁴⁷⁰ Furthermore, they must ‘rise up and fulfil their obligation to establish *dar al-Islam* and implement *bukum Islam* [Islamic law]’, once again emphasising the collective obligation to participate in this conflict.⁴⁷¹

The document makes no mention of a greater *jihad* to purify one’s beliefs and practice of Islam, which signals that Kartosuwiryo had clearly abandoned any pretence that an internal struggle could result in the attainment of a *de facto* or *de jure* Islamic state. He made it clear that the physical expulsion of the Dutch was his primary aim, pledging to work with any group, regardless of their religious orientation, that opposed colonial rule and supported the creation of an independent Indonesia. Kartosuwiryo acknowledged that in the aftermath of this conflict, these other groups, namely secular nationalists, might prevail as the governing force. However, he stated that he was prepared to accept this result as long as Muslims were free to practice their faith. Nevertheless, he did not elaborate further on what would constitute a breach of this condition.

This explicit focus on the need to win a physical conflict against the Dutch, even at the expense of the creation of an Islamic state, signalled a huge transformation in Kartosuwiryo’s understanding of *jihad*. Kartosuwiryo had gone from downplaying *jihad*’s association with war and emphasising a definition of peaceful struggle to gradually acknowledging and advocating the term’s more violent and militaristic connotations. It is clear that Kartosuwiryo’s ideology was not static, but rather was shaped by the circumstances he found himself in.

⁴⁶⁹ Idem, p.164

⁴⁷⁰ S.M Kartosuwiryo, *Perang Sabil*, August 1946, ‘Keterangan ringkas tentang Perang Sabil S.M. Kartosuwiryo’, Arsip Jogja Documenten 1946-1948 no. 243, ANRI

⁴⁷¹ Ibid

It is also important to recognise that Kartosuwiryo's *perang sabil* received widespread support from the Indonesian Republican administration, highlighting the relatively mainstream position of both his status within the Indonesian independence movement and his conceptualisation of *jihad*. For example, the head of the defence ministry's office for military justice, Major Kasman Singodimedjo, said that Kartosuwiryo's declaration was 'straight away right' for Indonesian Muslims, thanked him, and referred to him as a 'brave and courageous' son of Indonesia.⁴⁷² Despite Kartosuwiryo's status as the forefather of Indonesian Islamist militancy, messages of support like this show that he did not consistently occupy the position as a rebel fighter nor was his ideology always unacceptable to government officials.

Betrayal and the Renville Agreement

While conflict with the returning Dutch forces had a radicalising effect on Kartosuwiryo, domestic forces played a role in narrowing his conceptualisation of *jihad*. When he issued his *Perang Sabil* in August 1947, Kartosuwiryo did not actively oppose the secular nationalists led by Sukarno and his self-declared Indonesian government. Indeed, he had advocated cooperation and even indicated his willingness to accept their rule following the expulsion of the colonialists. However, a breakdown in relations between the nationalists and the Islamists over the signing of the Renville Agreement in January 1948 served as a further radicalising event for Kartosuwiryo and solidified his embrace of a violent interpretation of *jihad*.

The Renville Agreement, which was signed by the Republican and Dutch authorities after significant US pressure on 17 January 1948, alienated the Islamists physically and psychologically. Under the terms of the deal, West Java – where Kartosuwiryo and most of his Masyumi followers were based and engaged in combat against Dutch forces – was largely surrendered to the colonialists alongside major cities in East Java. With the Republican government essentially confined to Central Java and its troops slowly withdrawing, Islamic nationalists saw the agreement as a betrayal of the Indonesian revolution.

However, the absence of Republican troops and the inability of the Dutch to completely secure the area allowed Masyumi's West Java branch – with Kartosuwiryo at the helm – to operate with relative impunity. He seized his chance. By February, representatives of various Islamic groups

⁴⁷² Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation*, p.106

including Masyumi, NU, Muhammadiyah and Persis, had gathered in Pangwedusan, Cisayong, to discuss coordinating an Islamic resistance to the Dutch.

The following month, Kartosuwiryo decreed that West Java's political and military apparatus would be unified, leading to the disbanding of Masyumi and the establishment of an Islamic army, the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII, Indonesian Islamic Army). With Kartosuwiryo installed as the *imam* of the region, the movement began making plans to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. These developments, complete with Kartosuwiryo's transformation into a religious and military leader, illustrate how far he had come in terms of his embrace of the so-called 'lesser *jihad*' as a legitimate means of bringing about an Islamic state.

Over the course of six months, the TII had established a territorial stronghold in West Java. With a secure base, Kartosuwiryo was able to release the *Kanun Azasy* for the prospective NII on 27 August 1948. The document, which was examined in greater detail in the previous chapter, was meant to serve as a blueprint for the future independent Islamic Indonesia and covered all matters relating to the state's structure, legal framework, and relationship with its citizens.

While Kartosuwiryo did not extensively expound on *jihad* in the constitution, he did acknowledge in its *muqaddimah* (preamble) that the Islamic state was in a state of war against the Dutch, having been subjugated for many years. Although this situation was not ideal, it had a 'sacred purpose' to create an Islamic state in Indonesia. As such, citizens of the NII were obliged to perform their 'sacred duty' of establishing an Islamic state and participating in an 'Islamic Revolution' to liberate the country from Dutch rule.⁴⁷³

Although brief, this preamble showed how Kartosuwiryo had come to see a physical, violent revolution as the only means of overthrowing the Dutch and attaining an Islamic state. In this respect, *jihad* was the key instrument for the attainment of *hakimiyya* in Indonesia, highlighting its newfound centrality in the doctrine of Kartosuwiryo's movement. Furthermore, by beginning the document with a description of Indonesia's colonial history and occupation by the Japanese in World War II, Kartosuwiryo frames the need for rebellion as a defensive and anti-colonial struggle for the liberation of Indonesia's Muslims. Finally, in repeatedly referencing the 'sacred' nature of

⁴⁷³ Kartosuwiryo, 'Kanun Azasy Negara Islam Indonesia', 27 August 1948

the act that he wished all Muslims in the country to engage in, Kartosuwiryo again framed *jihad* as both an extremely important way of demonstrating one's faith and a collective obligation.

The document appears to have been primarily drafted by Kartosuwiryo, although this cannot be ascertained with certainty. One indication of the limited number of participants involved in its creation was a report produced by the Ministry of the Interior about Kartosuwiryo's movement between 1946 and 1948. According to this report, seemingly few, if any, other renowned Islamist leaders were present with Kartosuwiryo in West Java. It states that Islamist and Republican leaders outside West Java received copies of the *Kanun Azasy*, indicating that they were not consulted in its development, or not until it was in its final form.⁴⁷⁴ The Ministry of Interior's series of reports on the activities of Kartosuwiryo's group within West Java during this period makes no mention of other prominent activists or ideologues in his camp.

Moreover, Kartosuwiryo does not appear to have had significant correspondence with other Islamists around the country, beyond sending them his literature. Similarly, neither Indonesian-language biographies by Pinardi, Amak Sjariffudin, and Al-Chaidar nor Western scholars like Chiara Formichi, Holk Dengal, or Cornelius van Dijk mention the contribution of other ideologues to the creation of the *Kanun Azasy*. While not conclusive, the absence of other contributors in the secondary literature and scant evidence of their presence in primary sources, suggests that Kartosuwiryo's contribution to the creation of document was at very least significant.

While it is possible that scholars with significantly more religious training were in Kartosuwiryo's base in West Java to assist him, by the 1940s, after decades of participation within SI circles, writing and editing for *Fadjar Asia*, and steeped in Islamist advocacy, it is likely that he was himself capable of crafting a short constitutional document. As noted in the previous chapter, the document focuses heavily on the practicalities of organising the state, rather than providing strong religious justification. It ultimately served as a reflection of the political system Kartosuwiryo hoped to install – a state structured around a single *amir* with extensive political and military power – rather than as a scholarly text. Even if other scholars did play some role, the lack of acknowledgement or any indication that the document was a product of a group of ideologues, suggests that Kartosuwiryo was keen to demonstrate that he above all shaped the DI's ideology.

⁴⁷⁴ Kementerian Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia, 'Ichtisar gerakan DI/Kartosuwiryo', Yogyakarta, 24 July 1950, ANRI

The events of the final year of the Indonesian Revolution solidified Kartosuwiryo's belief that a violent *jihad* was fundamental to the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. On 19 December, Dutch forces invaded Republican-held territory in Central Java, seizing the capital, Yogyakarta, and taking leading figures such as Sukarno hostage.⁴⁷⁵ According to a report produced by the Ministry of the Information on 20 September 1950, the creation of the NII was 'predicated' on the assumption that, for all intents and purposes 'the Republic of Indonesia had dissolved'.⁴⁷⁶ The Republic's defeat also provided Kartosuwiryo with an opening to position himself and his movement as the rightful leader of the fight for an independent Indonesia.

The very next day, Kartosuwiryo declared in a statement issued in the name of the NII, that the *ummah* were ordered to begin a 'holy war, a total war' against the Dutch 'until the invaders were completely wiped-out', claiming that this was the only way to bring about independence and an Islamic state in Indonesia.⁴⁷⁷ He issued another statement on 21 December 1948, announcing with sadness that the 'Republic of Indonesia fell as a state' and there was 'no other way' for the Indonesian *ummah* to attain independence other than through *jihad fi sabilillah' illah* (*jihad* in the way of God).⁴⁷⁸ In a final statement on 23 December 1948, he reiterated these points and argued that throughout the entirety of the Indonesian Revolution, there had been 'only two groups at war: the Islamic State of Indonesia and the state of the Netherlands'.⁴⁷⁹

These statements serve as the clearest indication of the transformation of Kartosuwiryo's understanding of *jihad* and the importance of conflict in driving these shifts in interpretation. Far from being an afterthought, the concept of a physical *jihad* had become central to his belief structure, serving as the key tool to establish an Islamic state. By 1948 he was interpreting it in line with classical Islamic doctrine, emphasising its meaning as a physical struggle to defend a Muslim society from non-Muslim aggressors, and a duty incumbent on all his co-religionists.

⁴⁷⁵ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Negara Islam Indonesia Maklumat no. 5', 20 December 1948, Arsip Penumpasan DI-TII JaBar, folii, AABRI

⁴⁷⁶ Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 'Keterangan dan tanggung djawab penjusun', 20 September 1950, Serie: II/DI, Hal: Darul Islam, Yogyakarta, No. 16 and No. 17, ANRI

⁴⁷⁷ Kartosuwiryo, 'Negara Islam Indonesia Maklumat no. 5'

⁴⁷⁸ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Negara Islam Indonesia Maklumat no. 6', 21 December 1948, Arsip Penumpasan DI-TII JaBar, folii, AABRI

⁴⁷⁹ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Negara Islam Indonesia Maklumat no. 7', 23 December 1948, Arsip Penumpasan DI-TII JaBar, folii, AABRI

Moreover, his statements build a case that only the NII could lead the *jihad* to realistically achieve independence for Indonesia. They effectively asserted that there were only two real actors in the fight to control Indonesia since the capture of nationalist leaders nullified their ability to lead the revolution. This is reinforced by his argument in the final statement issued on 23 December that only two groups had participated in the conflict for its entire duration, suggesting that even before they were captured, the Republican leadership's tactics of peaceful negotiation, in some instances, invalidated their claim to be true fighters for the cause of Indonesian freedom. In this respect, Kartosuwiryo exploited the power vacuum left by the detention of the Republican government to claim his position as the rightful leader of the independence movement.

These statements also demonstrate once again Kartosuwiryo's belief that cooperation with the colonialists in any manner was unacceptable. This idea, which first emerged in the 1930s as he led PSII on its *jihad* of non-cooperation, was brought to its logical conclusion in these statements, where attempting to negotiate or engage with the Dutch invalidated the legitimacy of a group's struggle. *Jihad* to Kartosuwiryo consistently meant engaging in a process of rejection of non-Islamic values and practices. It was an act of purifying one's thoughts and deeds, thus reaffirming and demonstrating commitment to faith and devotion to God.

Republican leaders' actions in the months after their release from Dutch captivity in January 1949 condemned them further in Kartosuwiryo's eyes. Realising they were not going to win Indonesia's freedom through irregular warfare alone, the Republicans returned to the negotiating table with the Dutch. Coupled with the signing of the Renville Agreement months earlier, this tipped Kartosuwiryo over the edge, leading him to begin a period of 'triangular warfare' attacking both the Dutch and Republican forces.⁴⁸⁰

Despite the escalating conflict with DI, the Republicans continued to make progress with the Dutch, eventually coming to an agreement for the transfer of sovereignty during talks in May 1949. This diplomatic success was seen once again by Kartosuwiryo as a betrayal of the revolution and the Indonesian people. By agreeing that the Republic would be subsumed within a larger United States of Indonesia, Kartosuwiryo and his followers believed that the country would never truly be independent as this federal structure allowed for the Dutch to continue exploitation through a divide and rule strategy.⁴⁸¹

⁴⁸⁰ Holk Dengel, *Darul Islam dan Kartosuwiryo: Langkah perwujudan angan-angan yang gagal* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995), p.86

⁴⁸¹ van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam*, p.92

Given this hostility towards both the Republicans and the Dutch, Kartosuwiryo finally decreed on 7 August 1949 the official formation the Negara Islam Indonesia ‘known in other words, as ad-Daulatul Islamiyyah, or Darul Islam’.⁴⁸² He explained that Indonesia had been in a state of war since the end of the Japanese occupation and declared that *Perang Suci* (holy war), would continue until the ‘disappearance of colonialism and slavery; the [expulsion] of all enemies of God, enemies of religion and enemies of the state of Indonesia’ and the perfect and complete application of Islamic law throughout fully sovereign Islamic State of Indonesia.⁴⁸³ As such, the statement went on to declare that Islamic martial law would apply until these aims were met.

The proclamation illustrates how Kartosuwiryo’s understanding of *jihad*, in comparison to *hākimiyya*, evolved largely in response to political circumstances and conflict, rather than through thorough intellectual debates. This is not to argue that his ideas about *jihad* were devoid of engagement with the debates about the term in political Islam, but rather that these shifts in position were prompted by the changing circumstances of the Indonesian revolution.

Structuring jihad: The hukum pidana

Alongside the proclamation of the NII, Kartosuwiryo released an updated version of the constitution as well as a *hukum pidana*. The document covered a wide range of legal issues, but focused heavily on martial law, reflecting the circumstances under which it was written. The document signalled the seriousness of his endeavour, demonstrating that the NII had the capacity to engage in state building through the construction of a legal code and a belief that it had the right and power to enforce these rules.

While largely focused on day-to-day crimes and punishments, the penal code helped to concretise parts of Kartosuwiryo’s interpretation of *jihad* that had thus far been underdeveloped. On the issue of who was obligated to participate in *jihad* in the NII, the *hukum pidana* stipulated in Article 1 of its second chapter that adherence to martial law was ‘one of the five pillars of *jihad*’ and that all able-bodied adult men were obliged to participate in the war against the NII’s enemies.⁴⁸⁴ Referencing the Qur’an, only those who are blind, weak, or have ‘an infectious disease’ would be exempted from the fight. Failing to adhere to martial law through spreading un-Islamic

⁴⁸² S.M. Kartosuwiryo, ‘Proklamasi Berdirinja Negara Islam Indonesia’, 7 August 1949, DI no. 14, AABRI

⁴⁸³ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, ‘Hukum Pidana’, 7 August 1949

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid

propaganda, propaganda that ‘undermines the security, order and welfare of the country’, those who worked with the enemy as spies or in other capacity, would be arrested.⁴⁸⁵

Although not an unusual definition of who was obligated to participate in combat, the notion that citizens must obey martial law as a ‘pillar of *jihad*’ illustrated how Kartosuwiryo was using the concept to ensure compliance with his state’s policies.⁴⁸⁶ Adhering to martial law was thus framed as a greater religious struggle and a sign of piety and demonstration of faith, likely limiting opportunities for dissent and rebellion within his own ranks.

For the first time, the code also explicitly defined the enemies of Islam beyond the Dutch colonialists. It decreed that *jihad* was permissible against hypocrites who professed belief but undermined Islam by working with its enemies (*munafiq*), sinners who did not adhere to God’s law (*fasiq*), those who rebelled against legitimate Islamic authority (*bughab*), and anyone who was a ‘tool of the colonial power’.⁴⁸⁷ In justifying these categories, the code references the verses in the *surah At-Tabrīm* (The Banning), which state that Muslims should ‘strive against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be harsh upon them’, and the *surah As-Saff* (The Ranks) that warns against ‘extending [hypocrites] affection while they have disbelieved’. As such, if these individuals were caught and tried, their punishment would be death.

This inclusion of numerous categories of Muslims illustrated a marked shift in Kartosuwiryo’s thinking and conceptualisation of *jihad*. Given Kartosuwiryo’s inability to understand Arabic and the paucity of translations of Ibn Taymiyya’s work into Indonesian during this period, it is unlikely that he read Ibn Taymiyya’s first *fatwa* approving *jihad* against Muslims who failed to adhere to Islamic rule and collaborated with the infidel forces. Even so, the penal code echoes Ibn Taymiyya’s understanding of which Muslims could be legitimate targets of attacks. This illustrates the potential within Qur’anic scripture on *jihad* to engender similar interpretations and justifications of who constitutes an enemy of the faith across radically different time periods and contexts. Like Ibn Taymiyya before him, Kartosuwiryo adeptly moulded these verses to suit his circumstances and legitimise his state’s legal system.

From being a struggle against non-believers and foreign oppressors, Kartosuwiryo’s conception of the legitimate targets of a *jihad* had expanded to encompass Muslims deemed to have

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid

transgressed against the Islamic community or state in some way. The code thus justified attacks against the Republican state, many of whose leaders and supporters were themselves Muslims and obligated NII members to potentially kill their co-religionists. This was a clear expansion of the scope of the NII's enemies, requiring NII members to fight both a war against an external force as well as a domestic threat, blurring the line between a defensive and offensive *jihad*.

Although Kartosuwiryo did not explicitly use the term *takfir* in the penal code, the document alludes to the concept in justifying the killing of other Muslims on the grounds that their transgressions constitute a major breach against an Islamic community. The code permits the NII authorities to kill their fellow Muslims who conspire with the state's enemies and thus committing rebellion against a legitimate Islamic authority and thus God. As such, it does not consider their shared faith to be a mitigating factor, rendering them no different from non-believers who act against the NII. However, these nascent *takfiri* ideas remained marginal since Kartosuwiryo did not clarify in the document whether he considers those who have transgressed against the state still Muslim and the process by which one could be stripped of their faith and thus made eligible for slaughter.

The adoption of the penal code represented a hardening of attitudes among DI leaders and members, reflecting Kartosuwiryo's narrowing definition of *jihad* and uncompromising vision of the Indonesian revolution and the state that should arise from it. Kartosuwiryo began his career as an Islamist activist paying little attention to the concept of *jihad* and conceiving of it largely as a non-violent, personal struggle, but by the mid-1930s he moved on to viewing it as a collective obligation to non-violently oppose colonial rule. The Indonesian Revolution radicalised his thinking and prompted a reformulation of his conceptualisation of *jihad*. While retaining its sense of collective duty and anti-colonial interpretation, Kartosuwiryo viewed *jihad* as a violent, physical conflict and the only means by which an Islamic state would be achieved. This resulted in an expansion of the legitimate targets for a *jihad*, namely other Muslims who opposed Kartosuwiryo's state or supported the development of a secular republic.

From intransigence to pragmatism, 1949 to 1962

Kartosuwiryo wrote little between 1949 and 1962, presumably focusing his energies on his guerrilla campaign and maintaining his state in West Java. The actions of the DI indicate that there was little, if any, change to his conceptualisation of *jihad* until the final few months of his life. Once

again, events drove changes in his conceptualisation of *jihad*. With the prospect of defeat at the hands of the Republican government after a 13-year conflict, Kartosuwiryo redefined the concept once again as a form of non-cooperation and intellectual resistance. This change allowed his movement to sustain itself after his execution on 5 September 1962.

Resistance to Republican rule

The chance that Kartosuwiryo and his movement would be able to negotiate with the Republicans, let alone the Dutch, to find a compromise to end the conflict was increasingly slim as 1949 drew to a close. The Dutch and the Indonesians signed The Hague Agreement on 2 November 1949 paving the way for the transfer of sovereignty and the recognition of an independent Indonesia on 27 December 1949. The treaty brought an end to the bloody revolution and at long last brought independence to Indonesia.

Having previously objected to the idea of an independent Indonesia structured as a federal state, it was unlikely that these developments would have appeased Kartosuwiryo and the DI. At all stages of his career as an Islamist activist, Kartosuwiryo believed that any form of collaboration with the colonialists was tantamount to heresy, and continued to define *jihad* as non-cooperation and resistance. The Republican government, preoccupied over the past few years with its struggle against the Dutch, was at a loss as to how to deal with the DI as the movement continued to spread throughout West Java and openly engage Republican forces attempting to impose control after the Dutch retreat.

Initially, the government appeared to favour some sort of appeasement, or at least was willing to broker a truce in order to defeat the Dutch. Between December 1948 and the end of 1949, Vice President Mohammad Hatta apparently sent two letters to Kartosuwiryo, asking if DI and the Republican government 'could elaborate a common strategy of defence against the Dutch; if Kartosuwiryo was interested in receiving a Republican medal for combat; and if he would reconsider his position on the Republic once an independent state of Indonesia was established'.⁴⁸⁸ Kartosuwiryo did not deliver a response.

⁴⁸⁸ Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation*, p.149

These peace overtures continued but simultaneously, ‘the army was (successfully) conducting small-scale anti-Darul Islam operations’ between March and May 1950.⁴⁸⁹ This dual strategy of both sending senior government officials, including Mohammad Natsir, the prime minister and an Islamist sympathetic to Kartosuwiryo’s desire for an Islamic state to forge compromises such as the granting of an amnesty or rewards for Kartosuwiryo himself and simultaneously targeting the group’s forces in West Java continued until 1955.

While Kartosuwiryo abstained from negotiations with the Republicans, he did attempt to forge relationships and alliances with other like-minded Islamists. Kartosuwiryo met and formed an uneasy alliance with Acehnese leader Daud Beureueh, South Sulawesi commander Kahar Muzakkar, and Kiyai Hadjar of South Kalimantan. Muzakkar committed himself to DI in 1952, while Beureueh declared that ‘Aceh was “separating” from the Indonesian republic and instead joining with the Negara Islam Indonesia’.⁴⁹⁰ The reasons for the revolts in Aceh and South Sulawesi are complex, as were the motivations and ideologies of their leadership, although their initial participation in the conflict was couched in religious terms.⁴⁹¹ The men often resisted Kartosuwiryo’s leadership and agitated for greater autonomy, with Beureueh declaring in 1955 that Aceh was a ‘federal state’ within the NII.⁴⁹²

The groups’ disparate motivations, as well as their relative autonomy regarding their conduct throughout the conflict, makes it difficult to analyse the bloc as a cohesive entity, much less provide a substantive characterisation of its ideologies in totality. Furthermore, there is very little evidence that their writing and participation in the DI significantly impacted the thinking of subsequent generations of DI leaders, with Kartosuwiryo’s writings and teachings making up the bulk of the group’s thinking on its core concepts. The DI in West Java and the ideas of its leader, Kartosuwiryo, continued to be the core.

⁴⁸⁹ Idem, p.152

⁴⁹⁰ Edward Aspinal, *Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p.32

⁴⁹¹ van Dijk, *Rebellion under the banner of Islam*, p.340; For an in-depth analysis of the outbreak of the Acehnese revolt see: Nazaruiddin Sjamsuddin, *The Republican Revolt: A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p.34 and Aspinal, *Islam and Nation*, pp.32-48. Similarly, for Sulawesi see: Barbara Sillars Harvey, ‘Tradition, Islam and rebellion, South Sulawesi 1905-1965’, PhD thesis, Cornell University, 1974 and Harvey, *Permesta: Half a rebellion* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University Press, 1977)

⁴⁹² Aspinal, *Islam and Nation*, p.33

Indonesian political society was also changing rapidly during this period, further isolating the DI movement. Numerous Islamists organisations (Masyumi and a reconstituted PSII among them) looked to the 1955 elections as the key opportunity to attain power and transform the country into an Islamic state. Masyumi and PSII's participation in mainstream, democratic politics illustrated how far Kartosuwiryo had gone in alienating himself from the organisation and its ideological stance.

However, the failure of Islamist parties to form a government following elections in September likely reinforced Kartosuwiryo's belief that he was right not to have engaged with the political process to achieve an Islamic state. With 20.9% of the vote, Masyumi was the second largest party in the legislative assembly. However, with the nationalist Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), PKI and NU with 22.3%, 18.4% and 16.4% respectively, no stable governing majority could be formed, which thwarted the prospect of bringing about an Islamic state via the electoral system.⁴⁹³

This belief was likely to have been strengthened with the decline of constitutional democracy. With the revolts in West Java, South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan and Aceh continuing, the collapse of numerous cabinets and the failure to establish a permanent constitution, Sukarno used these opportunities to centralise power. On 9 April 1957, he announced a policy of 'Guided Democracy', aimed at continuing the struggle of the Indonesian revolution. This resulted in the imposition of martial law on 14 March 1957, the banning of most political parties, including Masyumi, the nationalisation of key industries, and the demise of the federal structure of the country.⁴⁹⁴ During this period, Islamic political activity was sharply curtailed. Where this activity was permitted, it was dominated by the traditionalist NU, who were 'careful to engage only in social, economic, education and religious roles'.⁴⁹⁵ The prospect of establishing an Islamic state through electoral political means appeared all but dead as the decade came to an end.

Kartosuwiryo did not issue many written or oral statements between the handover of sovereignty and his capture by Republican forces on 4 June 1962, making it difficult to fully assess any ideological shifts and developments during this period. Nevertheless his unwillingness to negotiate

⁴⁹³ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, p.305

⁴⁹⁴ For a full account of this period in Indonesian history see: Daniel S. Lev, *The transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian politics 1957-1959* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966)

⁴⁹⁵ Allan A. Samson, 'Islam in Indonesian Politics', *Asian Survey*, 8, no.12 (1968), p.1003

with the Republic or compete in elections, and his continued attacks on government forces suggested that his conception of *jihad* remained focused on the need to continue to expand and protect the nascent Islamic state he had built in West Java and a belief that engagement with the government and non-violent Islamists through the political process was treasonous and futile.

Kartosuwiryo's penal code and refusal to engage with the political process thus continued to illustrate his understanding of *jihad* as an anti-colonial, defensive process even in the post-colonial era. His refusal to participate in 'man-made' political structures or endorse the participation of his former allies showed the steadfastness of his belief that, while Indonesia was now an independent state, true freedom only came from the establishment of an Islamic state.

The experience of Guided Democracy demonstrated that, even if constitutional provisions protecting Muslims' freedom to conduct themselves as they saw fit were made, these would be insufficient, because man-made laws could ultimately be changed by the machinations of later administrations. As such, Kartosuwiryo's position that it remained a duty to engage in *jihad* to remove 'any oppression or obstruction of [Muslims] exercising their faith, [which impaired] the foundation of some of the pillars of Islam', formed part of a continuum of Islamic scholars opposing British rule in India to resistance movements in Algeria, Egypt, and the Caucasus.⁴⁹⁶

The hope and pragmatism of Hidaybiyyah

By the early 1960s, Kartosuwiryo's movement had been pushed out of most of their territorial strongholds in West Java as the army adopted an 'active-offensive' strategy. The military even co-opted the civilian population, using them as human shields and preventing DI from receiving supplies.⁴⁹⁷ Increasingly isolated, Kartosuwiryo was captured on 4 June 1962 and executed on 5 September that same year.

Kartosuwiryo recognised the looming potential for defeat. Once again, he was responsive to his circumstances and adapted his interpretation of *jihad* to the prevailing political and military conditions. In 1959, he issued a communiqué to DI members, telling them that 'in the event of such a disaster', they should 'continue the fight as long as Pancasila is still there' and as they remained 'in a state of *jihad*'.⁴⁹⁸ These fighting words were however tempered by pragmatism.

⁴⁹⁶ Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, p.51

⁴⁹⁷ Formichi, *Islam and the making of a nation*, p.168

⁴⁹⁸ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Wasiat Imam Negara Islam Indonesia', 1959, *Amanat dan Wasiat Imam Asy-Syahid Sekarmaji*

Although he encouraged followers to continue to challenge the Republic, he simultaneously compared the possible defeat of DI to the Hudaibiyyah treaty that created a ten-year ceasefire between the Prophet Muhammad and Quraysh tribe of Mecca in March 628.

The Hudaibiyyah treaty was a deal negotiated between the Prophet and the Quraysh, which allowed Muslims access to Mecca to perform the hajj. The Muslims had ‘humiliated Mecca and quashed opposition in Medina’ leading the Prophet to believe ‘it was time to abandon the jihad and begin a peace offensive’.⁴⁹⁹ He led unarmed volunteers to Mecca, held in 628 by the defeated Quraysh, and made camp near the city at Hudaibiyyah. Faced with overwhelming numbers of pilgrims and a desire to avoid bloodshed in the city as the guardians of the sacred Kabah shrine, the Quraysh relented, striking a compromise with the Muslims.

The Hudaibiyyah treaty is seen as the ‘classic example’ and ‘model for subsequent treaties’ in *fiqh*.⁵⁰⁰ According to Khadduri, the treaty set the template for future pacts signed by Muslim governments and authorities. This is somewhat ironic as the Hudaibiyyah treaty made ‘no attempt’ to give details as to the wider application of its provisions.⁵⁰¹ Islamic judicial scholars saw treaties as specific documents, with their content having no bearing on whether they could be considered permanently binding or time limited.⁵⁰² Instead, their duration was determined by who Muslims were negotiating with. Based on the text of the Hudaibiyyah treaty, Hanafi and Shafi’i schools argued that ‘a peace treaty with the enemy should not exceed a period of ten years’.⁵⁰³

The Hudaibiyyah treaty is also significant in Islamic jurisprudence as it illustrated that the power to strike such accords lay in the hands of the Prophet, his successors and their designated field commanders.⁵⁰⁴ Seeking peace was permissible as long as it ‘serves Muslim interests, is a valid instrument, the provisions of which must be binding upon all Muslims’.⁵⁰⁵ While Muslim authorities had to strictly follow the terms of the agreement after it was agreed, they retained the right to abrogate treaties if the other party violated the terms of the accord first.⁵⁰⁶ In the case of

Marijan Kartosuwirjo, published: 28 July 2016, <https://ahkamsulthaniyah.com/2016/07/28/amanat-dan-wasiat-imam-asy-syahid-sekarmaji-marijan-kartosuwirjo/>, accessed: 6 January 2020

⁴⁹⁹ Armstrong, *Islam*, p.19

⁵⁰⁰ Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, p.203

⁵⁰¹ Idem, p.219

⁵⁰² Ibid

⁵⁰³ Ibid

⁵⁰⁴ Idem, p.203

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid

⁵⁰⁶ Idem, p.204

the Hudaibiyah treaty, the Quraysh eventually broke the pact when their ally Banu Bakr attacked an ally of the Prophet and his followers.⁵⁰⁷

It is unclear how deep Kartosuwiryo's knowledge on Islamic jurisprudence and treaty-making went, but invoking Hudaibiyah treaty demonstrated that he had at least some awareness of its function as significant legal tool. The Hudaibiyah precedent ultimately provided an opening for a reinterpretation of the understanding of *jihad* among DI members, many of whom remained at large due to a general amnesty issued by the Sukarno government at the end of the conflict.⁵⁰⁸

The analogy with the Prophet's compromise was a good fit for the DI's circumstances and made the prospect of surrender more palatable, since DI members could conceptualise it as a temporary truce rather than true defeat. Additionally, if any who were aware of the ten year limit on truces with the enemy, may have been mollified that they could soon resume their struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. As such, the meaning of *jihad* transformed from immediate and mandatory participation in war against infidel forces under the terms of the NII penal code to a conceptualisation in which resistance need not necessarily mean physical conflict. This was, in some ways, a return to Kartosuwiryo's interpretation of the term in his early years as a PSI activist.

Furthermore, the fact that the signing of the treaty was contested by some of the Prophet's followers could have also helped Kartosuwiryo pre-emptively curtail criticism from some DI members who wanted to continue the struggle. Sahih al-Bukhari's hadith collection, which details the Prophet's treaty negotiations, indicates that the Prophet's followers were initially resistant to the Hudaibiyah treaty, seeing it as a source of shame. Zakyi Ibrahim writes that the treaty's provisions, which required compromises by the Muslims were 'considered to be grossly unfair'.⁵⁰⁹ These included forcing Muslims who were in the midst of their pilgrimage to Mecca to return to Medina immediately and the dismissal of all Meccans who had defected to the Muslims without first obtaining permission from their tribal elders.⁵¹⁰ Despite these protestations, the Hudaibiyah treaty served as a useful propaganda tool for the Muslims. In showing restraint and a desire to maintain peace, the Prophet's actions apparently convinced many Bedouin to convert to Islam and

⁵⁰⁷ Baderin, 'The Evolution of the Islamic Law of Nations and the Modern International Order', p.61

⁵⁰⁸ Solahudin, *The roots of terrorism in Indonesia*, p.47

⁵⁰⁹ Zakyi Ibrahim, "A Sociopolitical Analysis of the Verses of Peace: Qur'Ān 8:61-62", *International Journal of World Peace* 30, no.1 (2013), p.107

⁵¹⁰ Ibid

gave the Muslims the pretext to seize Mecca in 630 when the Quraysh flouted the treaty by attacking Muhammad's followers.⁵¹¹ If faced with resistance, Kartosuwiryo could have invoked how the Prophet's followers eventually came to see the benefits of this compromise and patience in eventually achieving their aims.

In referencing the Hudaibiyyah treaty, Kartosuwiryo was able to mould the DI's conceptualisation of *jihad* in line with the political realities for his successors. The Hudaibiyyah treaty showed that a temporary truce with an enemy can be a more strategic option than using force, as stated in the Qur'an, as 'a conspicuous victory'. This once again highlights Kartosuwiryo's pragmatism and his willingness to compromise in the service of his longer-term goal of keeping his movement alive in order to eventually establish an Islamic state.⁵¹² In this respect, the flexibility of the meaning of *jihad* ensured that it consistently remained a tool in the service of *hākimiyya*. Crucially, it illustrated to Kartosuwiryo's supporters that the present compromise did not preclude the use of force in the future and the group could bide its time before launching a successful attack.

In comparing his movement's situation to that of the Prophet's in 628, Kartosuwiryo also provided hope to his successors. The Prophet's decision to negotiate with the Quraysh was not conducted from a position of strength, as both sides found themselves in a stalemate.⁵¹³ However, in 1962 DI was a weakened force, barely holding on to territory in West Java and most of its leadership had been captured. The comparative with the Prophet's situation was thus very flattering, and provided members with an alternative narrative; they were not defeated but instead actively choosing to end their violent struggle, in line with the actions of the Prophet himself. The Prophet and his followers were unarmed when they attempted to enter the Quraysh stronghold in Mecca and cleverly negotiated a temporary peace. As such, Kartosuwiryo's followers could interpret the analogy to see their own situation as not one of defeat but rather a pragmatic choice legitimised by Qur'anic scripture. Indeed they could even countenance some cooperation with those whom they had previously deemed infidels.

The culmination of the Kartosuwiryo's invocation of the Hudaibiyyah treaty came in the form of the *Ikrar Bersama* (Joint Proclamation) signed by 32 senior Darul Islam members on 1 August 1962.⁵¹⁴ In exchange for amnesty, the men renounced their ties to the movement, stating they had

⁵¹¹ Karen Armstrong, *Islam*, p.20

⁵¹² Qur'an, 48:1

⁵¹³ Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, p.203

⁵¹⁴ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, p.44

been ‘misguided and wrong’ and pledged allegiance to the Republican government. According to an ICG report, one signatory later stated that this level of cooperation with the government meant that ‘the Islamic State of Indonesia was buried by the worldly facilities that the enemy provided’.⁵¹⁵

Kartosuwiryo’s ability to adapt his own conception of *jihad* in the weeks leading up to his death showed that the ideology of DI was never completely fixed. The term is polysemous and has ‘an emotional connotation that goes beyond [its] meaning’, thus allowing Kartosuwiryo and his followers some leeway in adapting its meaning to different circumstances.⁵¹⁶ In doing so, the group could, to some degree, maintain coherence and legitimacy amongst its followers by illustrating to them that their core beliefs remained intact and as seen above, accommodate some level of dissent.

In adapting his earlier conception of *jihad* as an active and violent struggle, Kartosuwiryo was also able to exercise some control, albeit in fairly constrained circumstances. Despite their military defeat, the DI was left with sufficient agency to redefine a core component of its ideology rather than abandoning it entirely or allowing for the full co-optation of the organisation by another group, including the state itself.

Kartosuwiryo’s invocation of the Hidaybiyyah treaty to some degree preserved his group’s interpretation of *jihad* as a violent struggle against infidel forces as viable, and left it ready to be invoked in the future. This again gave his followers a sense of hope that their dream of an Islamic state was not over. The conclusion of Kartosuwiryo’s own will appeared to embody both meanings with an exhortation to supporters to ‘resist Sukarno’ if they wanted ‘to have a prosperous Indonesia and the blessings of Allah’.⁵¹⁷ Nevertheless, Kartosuwiryo remained vague about the form of this resistance, providing room for flexibility in its interpretation.

By the time of his execution, DI’s interpretation of *jihad* had been stripped of its urgency to participate in active combat against the Indonesian Republic. The primacy of physical conflict was instead replaced by a commitment to other forms of resistance, which could even take the form of cooperating with, or at least temporarily acquiescing to some demands of the enemy. As such, the obligation to participate in physical *jihad* was removed until the movement’s senior figures declared that the time was right to resume the conflict.

⁵¹⁵ ‘Recycling militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian embassy bombing’, *Asia Report* No. 92 (Jakarta/Brussels, 22 February 2005), p.3

⁵¹⁶ Paul Ricoeur, ‘The fragility of political language’, *Philosophy Today*, 31, no. 1 (1987), p.35

⁵¹⁷ Kartosuwiryo, ‘Wasiat Imam Negara Islam Indonesia’, 1959,

Ultimately, Kartosuwiryo's attempts to reshape a core component of DI's ideology in the weeks leading up to his death sowed the seeds for the fracturing of the movement. Some members, including senior leaders such as Djaja Sujadi and Kadar Solihat, supported his reframing of *jihad* from *jihad fī sabilillah' illah* to *jihad fillah* (a spiritual, non-violent struggle) but refused to sign the *Ikrar Bersama*, claiming it to be a betrayal of the organisation's goal of eventually overthrowing Republican state.

While the men did not agree with working with the government, they seemingly did not break away to form a separate organisation at this point and participated in leadership gatherings throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s.⁵¹⁸ They continued to voice opposition to the DI's involvement with the military and challenged believers in *jihad fī sabilillah' illah* for claims to the leadership of the DI movement. As such, Kartosuwiryo's decision to reframe the group's understanding of jihad opened space for continued contestation of the term's meaning, and again its polysemous character allowed for both sides of this divide to claim legitimacy and accuracy in their interpretation.

The inability of either side to impose its interpretation of *jihad's* meaning onto the wider group is likely to have accounted for some of the group's inaction in the 1960s. Without a clear interpretation of one of the DI core ideological tenets, the leadership had a limited ability to inspire followers to act.

Conclusion

Kartosuwiryo's conception of *jihad* went through substantial evolution over the course of his life. The concept was almost an afterthought when he first began his political activism calling for the establishment of an Islamic state, often referring to it as a 'lesser' form of *jihad* and promoting a non-violent definition of personal betterment.

The catalyst for the increasing salience of *jihad* within the DI ideology was the opportunity afforded to Islamic groups by the Japanese during the Second World War and the violence of the Indonesian Revolution. By training and arming Islamic fighters against Western forces, Kartosuwiryo was given some leverage in his quest to establish his Islamic state. The weakness of the Republican

⁵¹⁸ Temby, "Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia", pp.14-15

government in the face of Dutch aggression and its willingness to compromise on issues such as the structure of political power in an independent Indonesia thus helped to confirm Kartosuwiryo's belief that *jihad* was the only way forward. These circumstances helped to bring about a more militant conception of *jihad*, requiring the participation of all Muslims.

As such, Kartosuwiryo's understanding of *jihad* was largely reliant on the circumstances he found himself in. By the end of the conflict, and with DI on the ropes, Kartosuwiryo returned to a non-violent understanding of the term, allowing his forces to make the necessary compromises to survive. Kartosuwiryo appeared to grasp intuitively that *jihad's* malleable definition allowed it to grow and wane in significance according to the needs and circumstances of the group. As such, it was an essentially reactive component of the DI ideological framework.

Chapter 3 | *Takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*: Defining the Enemy

DI leaders knew that the defence of Islam would require more than armed conflict against the Indonesian Republic. They understood that the protection of their faith rested as much on guarding against perversion from within the community of followers, as it did on shielding Islam from external physical and spiritual threats. To that end, the concepts of *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* were crucial in shaping the movement's understanding of the boundaries of Islam and justifying separation from – and attacks against – the wider community of Muslims in Indonesia.

This chapter analyses how DI leaders conceptualised *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*, arguing that their definitions of these ideas evolved in response to changing domestic political circumstances and increasing connections with the works of foreign Islamist ideologues and organisations. It posits that Kartosuwiryo only began embracing aspects of *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* after he proclaimed the foundation of the NII. As such, his conceptualisation and application of these terms was primarily shaped by and linked to the wartime situation DI members found themselves in. The ideas were useful tools to differentiate between rightful adherents of Islam and those who supported their Dutch or Republican enemies, thus furthering the group's understanding of the *jihad* they were engaged in. The belated incorporation of these concepts into the DI's ideological frame signals that, although they were significant, they performed a supporting role to the core concepts of *hakimiyya* and *jihad*. While Kartosuwiryo's exploration of these concepts remained relatively superficial and underdeveloped, it nevertheless served to strengthen a Manichean worldview, ensuring loyalty from his followers and helping to justify the group's isolation from and, indeed, attacks against mainstream Muslim society.

While Kartosuwiryo's understanding of *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* was shaped by conflict and their role in the DI's early ideology largely confined to that circumstance, Abdullah Sungkar had a significantly more expansive conceptualisation and application of these two ideas. Sungkar embraced and promoted a much more sophisticated interpretation of *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*, based largely on the teachings of the Islamic scholar Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In broadening the group's understanding of who counted as an apostate or performed *shirk* (denying the oneness of God by engaging in polytheism or denying His existence or authority), Sungkar established the justification for attacks on a broader range of targets, including Muslim civilians. Nevertheless, his inclusion of these concepts into the DI's ideology in the 1970s and 1980s had the same overarching purpose as Kartosuwiryo's; to

underscore the movement's dualist belief system; to act as tool of in-group control; and to legitimate censure of and violence toward other Muslims.

These arguments will be presented over the course of three sections. This chapter will begin with an examination of the origins of *takfīr* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* as concepts within Islam. It will then assess how these ideas were selectively adopted and interpreted by Kartosuwiryo during the Indonesian Revolution and his subsequent insurgency against the Republican state. Finally, the re-conceptualisation of these ideas by Sungkar will be examined, highlighting his use of concepts initially spread by the Saudi state and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

The foundations of *takfīr* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*

Takfīr and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* are both concepts concerned with the protection of the Islamic faith. Like *jihad*, these ideas form the more practical aspects of the DI's ideology insofar as they can be performed and observed in the daily lives of the group's members. While *hākimiyya* was always a core part of the DI's belief structure, it remained largely unrealised and served as a goal for members to strive to.

Takfīr: Defining belief

Takfīr is the act of one Muslim declaring another to be an apostate. It is a serious allegation since if the accused is found guilty, they are stripped of 'all legal and civil rights (i.e. inheritance, child custody, and marriage to a Muslim) and [it] justifies the shedding of his or her blood'.⁵¹⁹ The practice also carries risks for the accuser, who would themselves be committing apostasy if they falsely or incorrectly denounced a true believer.⁵²⁰ The interpretations of *takfīr* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* relied on by Islamist militants and ideologues find their 'antecedents in the Salafī traditions, principally emanating from the works of scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya or 'Abd al-Wahhab'.⁵²¹

Despite the certainty with which numerous clerics, militants, judges, and governments have excommunicated fellow Muslims, the practice of *takfīr* remains hotly contested. The Qur'an repeatedly denounces as hypocrites those who profess faith but do not truly believe, and claims

⁵¹⁹ Hussam S. Timani, *Takfīr in Islamic Thought* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017), p.x

⁵²⁰ Mohamed Badar, Masaki Nagata and Tiphane Tuani, 'The Radical Application of the Islamist Concept of *Takfīr*', *Arab Law Quarterly*, Vol. 31 (2017), p.133

⁵²¹ Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism*, p.171

that they will 'be in the lowest depths of Hell'.⁵²² It also calls on Muslims to strive against the unbelievers', as they have committed a great sin.⁵²³ Nevertheless, the Qur'an provides little consistency in the application of punishment, much less a clear definition of apostasy itself.⁵²⁴ Some verses in the Qur'an 'visualise repeated apostasies and reversions to the faith, without mention of any punishment for any of these defections on earth'⁵²⁵ while others indicate that only God has the right to judge this sin.⁵²⁶ Similarly, the *hadith* provide contradictory teachings, in some cases arguing that insulting a believer with the charge of apostasy is itself a sin against God.⁵²⁷

Given this lack of clarity, Islamic theologians have extensively debated the grounds for declaring another Muslim an unbeliever, the various (if any) punishments to be meted out, and the legitimacy of this process. Hussam S. Timani attempts to summarise some of this discussion, proposing that there are at least ten different types of *kufr*, while Shiraz Maher suggests that there are at least '70 different acts which can constitute *kufr* in general'.⁵²⁸ These are categorised into two groups; the major *kufr* (*al-kufr al-akbar*), who expresses a 'straightforward disbelief in God and His message' and must be punished through excommunication, and the minor *kufr* (*al-kufr al-asghar*), whose 'punishment is left to God on judgement day'.⁵²⁹ While these lists of offenses appear extensive, Patricia Crone argues that beyond an agreement that denying the core tenets of Islam constituted apostasy, numerous Muslim sects and scholars throughout Islam's early history 'disagreed over precisely what [these tenets] were or whether 'disagreement over points of law could make a person an infidel too'.⁵³⁰

In addition to disputing what constituted unbelief, Muslim jurists have historically faced difficulties in determining how to properly prove apostasy. Beyond explicit expression through confession or proclamation, determining what is in the hearts and minds of a believer appears to be a near impossible task. As such, from its earliest uses, *takfir* appears to be largely a political tool to determine and police the boundaries of Islamic communities. The Kharijites, a sect initially affiliated with the Prophet's nephew and son-in-law Ali, were the first group to attempt to methodically practice *takfir*, classifying their opponents as infidels on the basis of violating God's

⁵²² Qur'an, verse 4:145

⁵²³ Qur'an verse 9:73

⁵²⁴ Qur'an, verse 4:145 and Qur'an verse 9:73

⁵²⁵ S.A. Rahman, *Punishment and Apostasy in Islam* (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2006), p.39

⁵²⁶ Qur'an, verse 4:94

⁵²⁷ Badar, Nagata and Tueni, 'The Radical Application of the Islamist Concept of Takfir', p.136

⁵²⁸ Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism*, p.73

⁵²⁹ Timani, *Takfir in Islamic Thought*, p.8

⁵³⁰ Patricia Crone, *Medieval Islamic Political Thought* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), p.392

rules.⁵³¹ This interpretation of *takfir* was not only politically expedient but marked the first time that an Islamic movement had ‘established the principle that legitimacy was not necessarily derived through either the Caliph or the Caliphate’ but could instead be determined independently of political leaders or the state, by individuals convinced of their ‘personal righteousness’.⁵³²

Ibn Taymiyya built on these precepts, providing much of the intellectual foundation for attacks against other Muslims, particularly Muslim rulers. In response to the Mongol invasion of the Mamluk empire, Ibn Taymiyya issued a *fatwa* (legal opinion) justifying rebellion against the invaders, despite the fact that they themselves identified as Muslims. As noted in the previous chapter, Ibn Taymiyya had largely eschewed calling for rebellion against ineffective or corrupt Muslim leaders.

However, in the case of his first *fatwa* summoning Muslims to resist the Mongols (popularly known as the Mardin *fatwa*), Ibn Taymiyya argued that the invading forces were not properly Muslim. He claimed that, despite their conversion to Islam, the Mongols still ruled based on their own legal code and did not implement *shari’a*.⁵³³ In failing to implement *shari’a*, which Ibn Taymiyya believed was ‘a fundamental part of being a Muslim’, the Mongols had ceased to be Muslims and thus were infidels whose rule could be legitimately contested.⁵³⁴ Ibn Taymiyya’s contribution to this discourse was thus to develop *takfir* by introducing two ideas, namely: that any serious failure of religious obligation was an offence, and that Muslims who failed in their religious obligations were much worse than polytheists or members of other monotheist groups, and were thus worthy of the harshest punishments.

Sayyid Qutb capitalised on Ibn Taymiyya’s conceptualisation of *takfir* in the 1950s to contest the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian president from 1954 to 1970. Qutb argued that, in failing to secure *hākimiyya* by implementing *shari’a* and Islamic political structures, Muslim leaders had led their countries astray, falling back into a state of *jāhiliyyah*. Writing in his seminal work, *Milestones*, he argued:

⁵³¹ Crone, *Medieval Islamic Political Thought*, p.387

⁵³² Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism*, p.78

⁵³³ Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi*, p.60

⁵³⁴ *Ibid*

[A]ny society is a *jāhili* society if it does not dedicate itself to submission to Allah alone in its beliefs and ideas, in its observances of worship, and in its legal norms. According to this definition, all the societies existing in the world today are *jāhili*...

Lastly, all the existing so-called “Muslim societies” are also *jāhili* societies. We classify them among *jāhili* societies not because they believe in other gods besides Allah or because they worship anyone other than Him, but because their way of life is not based on submission to Allah alone. Although they believe in the Oneness of Allah, still they have relegated the legislative attribute of Allah to others and submit to this authority, and from this authority they derive their systems... Allah Most High says concerning such rulers: “Those who do not judge according to what Allah has revealed are unbelievers”.⁵³⁵

Like Ibn Taymiyya before him, Qutb believed that ‘obedience to the *Shari’ah* of Allah is a necessary condition for harmony... no individual or group of individuals can be truly Muslim until they wholly submit to Allah’.⁵³⁶ Like the Mongols of Ibn Taymiyya’s day, Qutb believed that contemporary ‘Muslim’ leaders had voided their status as Muslims by failing to implement *shari’a*. In casting them outside the fold of the faith, Qutb legitimated attacks – physical or otherwise – against them.

Qutb’s understanding of what constitutes disbelief – seemingly anything that was not Islamic – and thus forms grounds for excommunication was incredibly broad. This may account for his interpretation’s appeal among groups discontented with or persecuted by their ruling class, and seeking to legitimate revenge. Charles Tripp, Gilles Kepel, Leonard Binder and Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi begin this line of reasoning. They compellingly argue that Qutb’s embrace of *takfir* as a justification for violence against the state grew not only out of Ibn Taymiyya’s work, but was heavily shaped by his radicalising experience of imprisonment and torture at the hands of the Egyptian state.⁵³⁷

⁵³⁵ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (American Trust Publications, 2005), pp.59-61

⁵³⁶ Idem, p.67

⁵³⁷ Charles Tripp, ‘Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision’ in Ali Rahnema, ed. *Pioneers of Islamic Revival* (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp.154-83; Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp.28-30; Leonard Binder, *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Developmental Ideologies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p.174; Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* (Albany: State University of New York), pp. 138-166

The idea of prison as a radicalising space has been examined at length by Andrew Silke, Clark Jones, and Michelle Butler, among others.⁵³⁸ Silke, who has written most extensively on the topic, argues that for numerous ideologues – Islamists or otherwise – who oppose the state, prison represents ‘another battleground in the struggle against the state’, where these individuals face intense conditions and ‘the relentless proximity’ of state power.⁵³⁹ Resultantly, prison becomes a space where the authorities attempt to break the resolve of inmates, who in turn fight to preserve their belief structure, often committing themselves even more fervently to their cause.

These patterns appear largely applicable to the development of Qutb’s understanding of *takefir* during his time in prison. As Kepel points out, the inmates lived in constant terror.⁵⁴⁰ Guards routinely massacred prisoners, subjected them to backbreaking labour, and failed to provide basic sanitation.⁵⁴¹ Seemingly in response to these horrors, Qutb rationalised that ‘the guards and torturers in the concentration camp had forgotten God...but revered Nasser in his stead’.⁵⁴² Rather than merely being ignorant of God and existing in a state of *jāhiliyyah*, the torture and mistreatment encouraged Qutb to see the actions of his captors as a sign of obedience to Nasser, rather than to God.

Similarly, Barbara Zollner explicitly states that ‘the very context’ of Qutb and his followers in the Muslim Brotherhood’s radicalised understanding of *takefir* was ‘Gamal Abdel Nasser’s prisons’.⁵⁴³ She goes on to argue that ‘there is ‘no doubt that torture convinced him that the state–system, and particularly Nasser, was evil’ and these experiences ‘correlate... to organisational adjustments and ideological discussions’.⁵⁴⁴ She builds a much deeper analysis of Qutb’s ideological trajectory during this period, pointing out that he initially supported Nasser during the Egyptian revolution in

⁵³⁸ For more on patterns of radicalisation see: Andrew Silke, ed. *Prisons, terrorism and extremism: Critical issues in management, radicalisation, and reform* (Oxford: Routledge, 2014); Andrew Silke and Tinka Veldhuis, ‘Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons: A Review of the Recent Research and Critical Research Gaps’, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol 11:5 (2017), pp.2-11, Clarke R. Jones and Raymond E. Narag, *Inmate Radicalisation and Recruitment in Prisons* (London: Routledge, 2018), Michelle Butler, ‘Using Specialised Prison Units to Manage Violent Extremists: Lessons from Northern Ireland’, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol 32:3 (2020)

⁵³⁹ Charles Tripp, ‘Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision’ in Ali Rahnama, ed. *Pioneers of Islamic Revival* (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp.154-83; Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp.28-30; Leonard Binder, *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Developmental Ideologies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p.174; Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* (Albany: State University of New York), pp. 138-166

⁵⁴⁰ Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, p.28

⁵⁴¹ Ibid

⁵⁴² Ibid

⁵⁴³ Barbara Zollner, ‘Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Internal Struggle’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol 39:3 (August 2007), p.411

⁵⁴⁴ Zollner, ‘Prison Talk’, p.412

1952.⁵⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood in the years immediately following Nasser's takeover and the isolation and torture he and his fellow members faced in prison, hardened his belief that the government of Egypt, particularly Nasser, was the 'prime enemy' as they 'represented the epitome of un-Islamic conduct'.

This is not to argue that Qutb's thought had no traces of *takfiri* content prior to his imprisonment. Qutb apparently completed 33 *suras* of his seminal work *In the Shade of the Quran* years before his imprisonment, and had already authored numerous books and articles on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood. In these texts, he often relies on a strict and totalising dichotomy between Muslims and non-Muslims, arguing that 'one is either a Muslim and accepts all this [this referring to the primacy of *shari'a* in all aspects of life] or is not a Muslim, there is no middle term'.⁵⁴⁶

Nevertheless, as William Shepard, Barbara Zollner, and John Calvert argue, Qutb sharpened and consolidates his view on *takfir* during his in prison. Calvert, for example, notes that in his earlier work 'Qutb did not deny the existence of Islam in either state or society', indicating that Egypt and its leaders, were not completely in a state of *jāhiliyyah* and thus not apostates.⁵⁴⁷ By contrast, his writings in *Milestones*, completed while in jail, Qutb argued that this state of ignorance could not be defeated by preaching alone. Instead, believers must

abolish the dominion of man, to take away sovereignty from the usurper and return it to Allah, and to bring about the enforcement of the Divine shari'a and the abolition of man-made laws. Those who have usurped the authority of Allah and are oppressing Allah's creatures are not going to give up their power merely through preaching.⁵⁴⁸

In doing so, Qutb demonstrated a clear belief that Nasser and his ilk were irredeemable. Having usurped God's power, they not only preventing the implementation of God's laws and ensuring his sovereignty on earth but were wilfully ignorant of this truth.

Writing primarily while jailed in the hospital of Liman al-Turra prison, Qutb was 'at the heart of the discourse among prisoners', who 'eagerly adopted the concept of *takfir*'.⁵⁴⁹ In this respect,

⁵⁴⁵ Idem, p.414

⁵⁴⁶ Shepard, 'Sayyid Qutb's Doctrine of "Jāhiliyya"', p.532

⁵⁴⁷ Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islam*, p.219

⁵⁴⁸ Qutb, *Milestones*, pp.47-48

⁵⁴⁹ Zollner, 'Prison Talk', p.417

Qutb's development *takefir* and its widespread appeal among inmates also lay in its ability to account for the prisoners' perceived persecution by their ostensibly Muslim jailers. Their captors 'were ignorant of the principles of justice laid down by Koranic ethics and had placed themselves outside of Islam', and thus opened themselves up to charges of heresy and persecution by 'true' Muslims.⁵⁵⁰ In his captivity, Qutb thus successfully 'mainstreamed' *takefir* in 'radical circles to combat and confront the state'.⁵⁵¹

While his interpretation of *takefir* was extreme, Qutb stopped short of openly and directly calling for violence against the Egyptian state in his publications. Later Egyptian ideologues would not be so restrained. By the late 1970s, the Egyptian militant movement al-Gama'ah al-Islamiyah (GI) was using this interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya's work alongside Qutb's writings to justify attacks against the government, particularly the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. According to Gilles Kepel, GI's roots lay in the Islamist student activist groups that developed in Egyptian universities after the Muslim Brotherhood's renunciation of violence.⁵⁵² In a pamphlet entitled *Al Farida al-Ghaiba* (The Hidden Imperative or The Mission Obligation), GI 'chief theorist' Abdessalam Faraj took Ibn Taymiyya and Qutb's ideas to their logical extreme by calling for '*jihad* against any ruler failing to implement the precepts of Islam, even if he calls himself a Muslim'.⁵⁵³ In openly advocating for *jihad* against nominally Muslim leaders who failed to implement Islamic governance and law, Faraj had simply made plain the logical outcome of Qutb and Ibn Taymiyya's writings.

J.J.G Jansen's close analysis of *Al Farida al-Ghaiba* reinforces this point. According to Jansen, the pamphlet takes Qutb's arguments to their logical extreme, arguing that '[the] ruler of such a non-Islamic state...cannot be called a Moslem, even if his subjects may be Moslems'.⁵⁵⁴ Anwar Sadat, in particular commits a grievous sin as he was 'born as a Moslem [thus] became guilty of apostacy'.⁵⁵⁵ Given these transgressions, Muslims have a duty to engage in *jihad*, not only to punish those who have transgressed but because they have thwarted the formation of an Islamic state, which would enable them to fulfil their religious obligations in their entirety.⁵⁵⁶

⁵⁵⁰ Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, pp.28-29

⁵⁵¹ Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism*, p.87

⁵⁵² Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, p.139

⁵⁵³ Kepel, *Jihad*, p.86

⁵⁵⁴ J.J.G Jansen 'The Creed of Sadat's Assassins: The Contents of the "Forgotten Duty" analysed', *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol 25:1 (1985), p.8

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid

⁵⁵⁶ Idem, p.7

What is notable about these arguments is that they focus on justifying attacks against the state as embodied by its leadership, often taken to be represented by a single individual who has failed in his duty as Muslim to implement *shari'ah* and Islamic governance. What is unclear in these texts is the implications for those working within or living within this *jāhili* state. It seems plausible given Qutb's broad definition of un-Islamic behaviour that Muslim judges, lawyers, civil servants, police officers, or soldiers, who participate in state structures, enforce laws or protect its institutions, could also be deemed infidels for their part in imposing man-made law. Alternatively, their collaboration or co-optation could be read as a less severe transgression, meaning they could be punished on the grounds of working with an enemy of Islam, but ultimately not excommunicated. Even less certain is the designation of Muslims who passively accept the rule of infidel leadership because they are unable or unwilling to protest. Would this inaction be held against them such that it forms the basis of a charge of disbelief? Or is it simply a minor transgression, or perhaps not a violation at all?

Takfīr can be a useful tool for demarcating who is no longer a Muslim and thus establishing the threshold for being a part of the Islamic community. However, the above conceptions of the term ultimately apply it to leaders rather than to civilians, and are less clear on those who occupy a plethora of spaces within a regime.

Al-walā' wa-l-barā': Defining commitment

Given *takfīr*'s limitations in establishing the status of Muslims who exist within or even support a non-Islamic state or ruler, *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* provides another means by which the boundaries of the community of the faithful can be policed. At its simplest, the term is taken to mean loyalty and disavowal, or alternatively devotion and denunciation. According to Joas Wagemakers, who has written one of the few texts on the concept as it is utilised by militant Islamists, it 'is not clear whether walā and barā were initially connected or if they came to be seen as two different sides of the same coin later on'.⁵⁵⁷

Regardless of how the fused term came into being, the concept provides no room for Muslims to exist in a grey area; they must fully commit to their faith and their fellow Muslims while simultaneously disavowing everything and everyone outside of these. According to Muhammad Said al-Qahtani, a Saudi Arabian religious scholar and author of *Al-walā' wa-l-barā' According to the*

⁵⁵⁷ Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi*, p.148

Aqeedah of the Salaf, the seeds of the term lie in the fact that the ‘love [of God] is the source of loyalty and hatred [of God] is the source of opposition’.⁵⁵⁸

First published in 1984, al-Qahtani’s work ranks among the most popular works on the subject of *al-walā’ wa-l-barā’*, and is read and cited widely by *salafis* and non-*salafis* alike.⁵⁵⁹ Al-Qahtani argues that *al-walā’ wa-l-barā’* ‘constitute essential elements in [the declaration of faith in God, the central tenant of Islam]’.⁵⁶⁰ Resultantly, displaying ‘devotion to and love of God and His Prophet, and hate towards heresy, transgression, and immorality’ are integral to being a Muslim as they are professions of one’s faith.⁵⁶¹

Moreover, al-Qahtani argues that since ‘Islam is actively concerned with the sincerity of devotion to Allah’, believers must guard against actions or thoughts that threaten their faith because these would ultimately threaten the entire community of the faithful.⁵⁶² He goes on to describe 20 different types of ‘alliances’ that endanger the Muslim community, including ‘contentment’ (i.e. a willingness to tolerate a variety of beliefs and faiths other than Islam), ‘agreeing with [non-Muslims] on some points of disbelief’, and ‘taking disbelievers as friends’.⁵⁶³

Stephane Lacroix summarises these ideas on *al-walā’ wa-l-barā’* well. Fundamentally, Muslims are obligated by their faith to ‘encourage their coreligionists to follow the principles of Islam and must admonish them when they stray from the right path’.⁵⁶⁴ Due to the communal nature of Islam, individual transgressions are not only harmful to the person who has erred but the wider community as it impinges on their faith. As such, the principle fosters an ‘in-group’ mentality and a sense of solidarity amongst adherents of Islam, while creating a clear boundary with those outside the fold.

Given this quality, the concept has been utilised and developed by leaders of political entities throughout Islamic history to ensure compliance and support for their regimes, or to rally support against enemies both outside and within their territories. In this respect, Ibn Taymiyya once again

⁵⁵⁸ Muhammad Said al-Qahtani, *Al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ According to the Aqeedah of the Salaf: Part 1* (London: Al-Firdous Ltd, undated), p.33

⁵⁵⁹ Mohamed bin Ali, ‘The Islamic Doctrine of Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ (Loyalty and Disavowal) in Modern Salafism’, PhD Thesis, University of Exeter (2012), p.211

⁵⁶⁰ al-Qahtani, *Al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ Part 1*, p.33

⁵⁶¹ Ibid

⁵⁶² Muhammad Said al-Qahtani, *Al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ According to the Aqeedah of the Salaf: Part 2* (London: Al-Firdous Ltd, undated), p.111

⁵⁶³ al-Qahtani, *Al-walā’ wa-l-barā’ Part 2* (London: Al-Firdous Ltd, undated), pp. 112-123

⁵⁶⁴ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, p.12

played a leading role in shaping this idea, publishing numerous texts on how to determine acceptable Islamic practice and beliefs. In his work *Al-furqān banya awliyā' al-Rahmān wa-awliyā'* (The Decisive Criterion Between the Friends of Allah and the Friends of Satan), Ibn Taymiyya relies on Quranic scripture to establish his first premise that 'the firmest bond of faith [is] "loving for the sake of God and hating for the sake of God"'.⁵⁶⁵

According to Wagemakers, Ibn Taymiyya also 'devoted an entire book [Enjoining Right and Forbidding Wrong] to calling on Muslims to refrain from religious innovations, particularly in the celebration of religious festivals and adhere to the "straight path" (*al-sirāt al-mustaqīm*) or risk sullyng the purity of their religion'.⁵⁶⁶ Furthermore, he argued that Muslims should refrain from 'participating in the outward customs of non-Muslims'.⁵⁶⁷ To Ibn Taymiyya, it was crucial that Muslims kept their practices different from those of people from other faiths. This boundary was crucial for preventing Muslims from, unintentionally or otherwise, sliding into practices that would compromise their faith and blur the boundaries between Muslims and heathens. As such, Ibn Taymiyya understood *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* as a tool to help Muslims maintain the purity of their beliefs.

However, Ibn Taymiyya's conceptualisation remained largely personal, with little enforcement of the concept by the state. In contrast, Lacroix demonstrates that the clerical authorities of the nascent Saudi state played a significant role in developing the idea politically in the nineteenth century. While Abd al-Wahhab introduced the idea of 'commanding right and forbidding wrong', it was a relatively minor principle in his ideological framework.⁵⁶⁸

Instead, Lacroix argues that it was al-Wahhab's grandson Sulayman bin Abdallah Al al-Shaykh, who first starkly outlined the concept when he demanded that his community challenge Egyptian incursions into their territory. He claimed that true a Muslim had to demonstrate an 'unconditional loyalty to his coreligionists and a complete break with the infidels', in this case meaning the Egyptians.⁵⁶⁹ As such, the concept was utilised to ensure social stability and a commitment to a rigidly defined form of Islam, as well as the disavowal of potential competitors or threats.

⁵⁶⁵ Diego R. Sarrío 'Spiritual anti-elitism: Ibn Taymiyya's doctrine of sainthood (*walāya*)', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 22:3 (2011), p.278

⁵⁶⁶ Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi*, p.149

⁵⁶⁷ Idem, p.150

⁵⁶⁸ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, p.12

⁵⁶⁹ Idem, pp.12-13

While the concept was used primarily by the Saudi state to consolidate its hold on its populace and quell dissent within its ranks, Islamists opposed to the rule of so-called infidel regimes also co-opted it for their own purposes. The Jordanian Islamist activist and ideologue, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (who would go on to mentor al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi), developed his understanding of the concept while studying in Saudi Arabia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As Wagemakers points out, al-Maqdisi's use of the term generally 'does not represent a clear break with its history', despite his opposition to the Saudi state.⁵⁷⁰

However, he was responsible for two significant developments to Islamic militants' understanding of the term. Firstly, he clarified that displaying 'right' or 'correct' Islamic behaviour, and thus loyalty to other Muslims, went beyond the actions of an individual. Entire countries, and particularly their ruling class, could also be subject to the same standard. For example, al-Maqdisi argued that it was 'forbidden for Muslim states to help 'infidel' countries or call on them for aid', as it was ultimately a sign of demonstrating friendship or loyalty with infidels.⁵⁷¹ Secondly, he used *al-walā wa-l-barā* as a 'tool to frame the legislation of "man-made laws" as *kufr* and the laws of their legislators as *taghut* [idols or false deities]'.⁵⁷² In this respect, al-Maqdisi posits that, as only God can be worshiped, efforts by governments – and those that uphold them, like 'legislators...the army, and the secret service' – to create or enforce non-Islamic legislation constituted a form of *shirk*.⁵⁷³ As such, these individuals must be condemned by true Muslims and cast out of the fold.

In this respect, *al-walā wa-l-barā* together with *takfir* are collectively useful concepts for determining the boundaries of Islam and the behaviour expected of those within the faith. Together, they provide groups or states with the ability to build a shared identity and belief system and to police dissent by utilising peer pressure and coercion to ensure conformity with their belief systems. Moreover, they provide a mechanism for determining what sort of ideas or behaviours put someone or something outside the boundaries of the faith, thus justifying violent action against those individuals or communities.

⁵⁷⁰ Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi*, p.153

⁵⁷¹ Ibid

⁵⁷² Idem, p.165

⁵⁷³ Ibid

Kartosuwiryo's understanding of *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*

Before exploring Kartosuwiryo's conceptualisation of *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*, this section will first examine the existing scholarship covering these ideas in the DI's early history. It will argue that the existing scholarship's limited engagement with these topics should not be taken to indicate that these ideas were of little importance to Kartosuwiryo and his insurgency. Instead it shows that researchers have belittled or overlooked secondary – but still significant – components of the DI's ideology that served to bolster the group's understanding and pursuit of its core beliefs of *hākimiyya* and *jihad*.

Limited scholarship on the role of takfir and al-walā' wa-l-barā' in DI ideology

Little effort has been made to understand Kartosuwiryo's beliefs regarding *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*, either in his early career as an Islamist activist or during his tenure as a commander of an insurgency. As noted earlier, early research on the organisation included little effort to consider, much less to centre, the role of Islam in motivating DI leaders and their followers.

Of the few works that do – notably Chiara Formichi's comprehensive study of Kartosuwiryo's political activism, Solahudin's history of the JI, and Quinton Temby's paper, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah' – the authors pay scant attention to the component parts of his ideology and their relationship to each other, beyond examining, to greater or lesser degree, his conceptualisation of *jihad*. Formichi's aim was largely to examine Kartosuwiryo's life as a mainstream Islamist nationalist, and so charting the ideas that underpinned his insurgent movement and their legacy was beyond the scope of her research. While Solahudin acknowledges that *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* played a role in Kartosuwiryo's thought, he conducted limited research into Kartosuwiryo's writings on the concepts. Even in the more comprehensive Indonesian-language version of the text, his treatment of both is fairly superficial.

Temby's paper traces the development of the DI network over the second half of the twentieth century, but examines its trajectory through the prism of its desire for and conceptualisation of an Islamic state. His PhD thesis touches more on the concept of *takfir* but only insofar as it attempts to discredit Solahudin's claim that 'aspects of Salafi jihadism were developed independently in Darul Islam as early as the 1950s', prior to the spread of al-Qaeda's global Islamist doctrine.⁵⁷⁴

⁵⁷⁴ Temby, 'Jihadists Assemble', p.113

However, this thesis contends that Temby's work misunderstands *takfir* as a concept and misinterprets Solahudin's claim of a link between its manifestation in Kartosuwiryo's thought and in later *salafi-jihadist* ideology.

Temby misunderstands *takfir*, claiming that it is simply 'a pejorative term' used to denounce both Muslim governments and the Islamist militants that challenge them.⁵⁷⁵ This stance ignores the vast body of scholarship, written by Muslim thinkers – Islamists, *salafis*, or otherwise – who have advanced a sophisticated understanding of the concept as a necessary tool in demarcating the boundaries of the faith and a process by which Islam itself is protected. Temby bases his claim on two paragraphs from Thomas Hegghammer's chapter 'Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries', which contends that in 'classical Islamic jurisprudence, *takfir* is an extremely serious measure that can only be pronounced by qualified religious authorities under very specific circumstances'.⁵⁷⁶ As such, the broader Muslim public views it as a 'clearly pejorative term that connotes rebellion and extremism'.⁵⁷⁷ Hegghammer's work – and by extension Temby's – seems to deny the work done by Ibn Taymiyya and Qutb in contesting the assertion that only legitimate authorities, rather than individuals, have the right to excommunicate an individual. Moreover, Hegghammer's interpretation starts from a flawed foundation, since the Qur'an itself explicitly allows ordinary Muslims to engage in *takfir*, while also cautioning against its reckless use.

While Ibn Taymiyya and Qutb's views may be on the margins of mainstream Islamic political thought, their work has clearly developed *takfir* into a concept that is widely relied upon by ideologues and militant organisations. Hegghammer and Temby may disagree with the content of this thought but its ideational development by these thinkers and its widespread use by militant groups indicates that it is more than just a 'pejorative term'. Moreover, numerous researchers, including Gilles Kepel, Olivier Roy, Shiraz Maher, and Joas Wagemakers have made the case that *takfir* has been a significant part of militant Islamist or *salafi-jihadist* thought, evolving into a quasi-doctrine. Maher, after tracing the concept's development from antiquity, recognises that various groups 'have constructed a number of different rules for declaring *takfir* against someone' but despite these differences, the 'concept has become an intrinsic and essential feature of the contemporary Salafi-Jihadi movement'.⁵⁷⁸

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid

⁵⁷⁶ Thomas Hegghammer, 'Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries' in Roel Meijer, ed. *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (London: Hurst, 2009), p.247

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid

⁵⁷⁸ Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism*, p.106

Temby is correct to argue that researchers must be careful not to assume that DI leaders who used the term in the initial years of their insurgency were employing it in exactly the same way that *salafi-jihadists* or other militant organisations would do later. However, Solahudin does not appear to be making that point either. He simply states that Kartosuwiryo's conceptualisation of the term *takfir* 'echoed' in the ideas of later *salafi-jihadists*.⁵⁷⁹ This seems far less contentious as a statement than the strawman argument put forward in Temby's work.

Kartosuwiryo's conceptualisation of takfir

Kartosuwiryo does not appear to mention the concept of *takfir* explicitly in the articles he wrote during his time at *Fadjar Asia* between 1928 and 1929. Instead, he largely focused on anti-colonial themes, blamed the Dutch for economic hardship and the denial of political rights, and simultaneously called for an Islamic state. While he challenged Indonesian nationalists, who advocated the creation of a secular (or at least religiously neutral) state, he refrained from declaring them apostates. Instead, Kartosuwiryo encouraged them to re-examine their beliefs and accept his view that Islam was not a private matter but instead 'must have something to do with politics', and, indeed, would serve as their 'best weapon' to ensure their freedom.⁵⁸⁰ Moreover, Kartosuwiryo's columns often presented these arguments as discussions between two imaginary individuals, indicating that he was seeking to persuade Muslims to come round to his point of view, thus expanding his body of supporters, rather than narrowing the group through an exclusionary process like *takfir*.

Similarly, in his '*Haloean Politik Islam*' pamphlet published in 1946, Kartosuwiryo called on his followers in Masyumi to complement their idealism with 'realism', in order to achieve their goal of a free Islamic Indonesian Republic.⁵⁸¹ He warned them to refrain from engaging in 'fanaticism' or dividing the nationalist movement by demanding ideological conformity and commitment to the creation of an Islamic state.⁵⁸² As noted in Chapter 1, Kartosuwiryo went so far as to claim that he would accept the decision of the Indonesian population if they chose to adopt an alternative ideology like socialism or nationalism as the basis for an independent Indonesia.⁵⁸³ Even after the

⁵⁷⁹ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, p.16

⁵⁸⁰ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Bertoeker Fikiran: Agama dan Politics', *Fadjar Asia*, 3 April 1928

⁵⁸¹ Kartosuwiryo, '*Haloean Politik Islam*', 1946

⁵⁸² Ibid

⁵⁸³ Ibid

end of the Second World War and the early months of the Indonesian Revolution, Kartosuwiryo's writings still implied that Muslims could be a part of the *umma* even if they did not support an Islamic state.

However, conflict once again acted as a radicalising force for Kartosuwiryo, leading him to adopt and implement a much more stringent view of *takfir*. The concept quickly moved from being non-existent in his conceptualisation of the DI's ideological framework, to an essential component that supported the group's core tenets of *hakimiyya* and *jihad*. *Takfir* provided Kartosuwiryo with the means of delegitimising the Republican government in the wake of the Renville Agreement of January 1948, and a justification for resisting their authority after the Dutch retreat in December 1949. Finally, it served as a tool for Kartosuwiryo to ensure ideological conformity and loyalty from his own supporters.

As Solahudin notes, one of the clearest manifestations of *takfir* in the DI's belief structure appears in the group's penal code. In Article 2.2, Kartosuwiryo decrees that 'anyone who does not comply with the regulations of the government of the Islamic State of Indonesia is a *bughāb*'.⁵⁸⁴ Similarly, Article 2.3 states that anyone who fails to 'observe the laws of Islam is a *fāsik* [impious for violating Islamic law]' while Article 2.4 says those who are 'tools of the occupiers' are enemies of the state.⁵⁸⁵ In the following set of articles, the code made clear that those who were found guilty of committing the above offenses would be 'subject to severe punishment' namely banishment or death.⁵⁸⁶ Muslims would be given opportunities to repent and ordered to better their religious practice, but if they refused they would be deemed an 'enemy of Islam'.⁵⁸⁷ Kartosuwiryo justified these punishments by citing Qur'anic scripture, notably *surah* 9:73, which states that Muslims have a duty to 'fight against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be harsh upon them. Their refuge is Hell and wretched is the destination'.⁵⁸⁸

Although Kartosuwiryo refrains from using the terms '*riddal*' and '*irtidād*' to describe acts of apostasy, or the word *kufr* to describe these transgressions as acts of disbelief, his language still indicates that he viewed his coreligionists who did not support the Islamic state as enemies, rebels and, at the very least, impious Muslims. While he did not explicitly call for stripping them of their

⁵⁸⁴ Kartosuwiryo, 'Hukum Pidana', August 1949

⁵⁸⁵ Kartosuwiryo, 'Hukum Pidana', August 1949

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid

⁵⁸⁸ Qur'an 9:73

faith, he nevertheless proclaimed that anyone found guilty of these crimes would be put to death, facing the same punishment as those who renounced their faith explicitly or invalidated their claim to being a Muslim on account of their actions. The reference to *surah* 9:73 also indicates that, while the code may not have used the traditional language of apostasy, Kartosuwiryo still saw these transgressions as similar as the *surah* itself references the sin of disbelief and states that the appropriate punishment for such an offence is death.

While Temby was right to point out that in a strict sense the penal code confines the application of *takfir* to a period of war – the articles are grouped under the heading ‘Islamic Law During Wartime’ – it seems implausible that Kartosuwiryo would ever give up this provision in a time of peace given the totalising and undemocratic nature of his Islamic state as set out in his constitution. Given that the DI continued to view itself as being in a state of conflict with the Indonesian Republic for the remainder of the twentieth century, it would be incorrect to characterise the group’s use of the concept as ‘limited’.⁵⁸⁹

Solahudin notes that these principles were put into practice between 1949 and 1958 when DI forces staged 47 attacks on the Cipari boarding school run by Yusuf Taudjiri, one of Kartosuwiryo’s former religious teachers.⁵⁹⁰ Taudjiri consistently rejected Kartosuwiryo’s leadership and the creation of the NII, thus opening himself up to charges of apostasy for resisting the authority of an allegedly legitimate Islamic state. Kartosuwiryo continued to launch these attacks despite his former relationship with Taudjiri and his wife’s apparent close friendship with Taudjiri’s daughter. The incidents indicate that Kartosuwiryo was unwilling to tolerate dissent of any sort, and that he prioritised adherence to his code and beliefs above his personal relationships. Moreover, his willingness to attack a school, in addition to state targets, showed that he had a broad conceptualisation of what actions constituted unbelief, and that he aimed to tackle transgressions at all levels of society, not just those made by government leaders.

The penal code primarily also served to act as a check on Muslims living within Kartosuwiryo’s territory. While it theoretically applied to Muslims across the archipelago, its application and enforcement would ultimately be confined to the areas actually controlled by the DI. The code thus served to demonise those – like Republican nationalists – who resisted the creation of the Islamic state in Indonesia, but it also, crucially, aimed to police the behaviour of the average

⁵⁸⁹ Temby, ‘Jihadist Assemble’, p.114

⁵⁹⁰ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, p.37

Muslims of West Java, ensuring their compliance with Kartosuwiryo's rule. In this respect, the code represents a deviation in terms of Kartosuwiryo's understanding and application of the idea of *takfir* from that of a classical jurist like Ibn Taymiyya, who largely focused on the need to excommunicate insufficiently pious leaders. Kartosuwiryo's penal code expands the term's application by making the threat of *takfir* possible in the lives of everyday people.

About 18-months after his declaration of the formation of the NII, Kartosuwiryo released a political manifesto, entitled *Heru Tjokro Bersabda: "Indonesia Kini dan Kelak"* (Heru Tjokro Speaks: Indonesia Now and in the Future; Heru Tjokro was one of Kartosuwiryo's nicknames). In it he argued that the nationalists had been trying to 'kill and destroy the spirit of Islam' since the beginning of the Indonesian Revolution.⁵⁹¹ The 48-page document repeatedly refers to Sukarno and other nationalist leaders as '*murtad*' (apostates) for failing to implement *shari'a*.⁵⁹² It claims that this had resulted in the politics of the Indonesian Republic being 'destructive and negative' and in the government 'spreading misery'.⁵⁹³ NII members thus had a duty to fight this un-Islamic force for the good of the people of Indonesia, in order to see the implementation of God's law and the creation of an Islamic structure of governance to ensure temporal and spiritual well-being.

The document makes an explicit case for stripping Sukarno and the nationalist leadership of their identity as Muslims. In failing to implement *shari'a* once the Dutch had been vanquished, the nationalists had invalidated their claim to be true practitioners of their faith. In this respect, Kartosuwiryo echoes the argument made by Ibn Taymiyya centuries before; that implementing Islamic law is crucial to one's identity as a Muslim ruler. This argument once again reinforces the idea that *takfir* had become an important tool for Kartosuwiryo to legitimate his *jihad* against a regime that, despite being led by self-proclaimed Muslims, was causing suffering to his countrymen. Embedded in this argument is the expectation that while any non-Islamic regime would inevitably fail to better the lives of its subjects (either by failing to implement *shari'a* or through outright oppression), Muslims leaders at least ought to know better. A self-proclaimed Muslim leader who fails to create a true Islamic polity has thus committed an even greater transgression than his ignorant, non-Muslim counterparts.

⁵⁹¹ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Manifest Politik Negara Islam Indonesia - Heru Tjokro Bersabda: "Indonesia Kini dan Kelak"', 17 February 1951, p.6

⁵⁹² Idem, p.26

⁵⁹³ Idem, p.37

Kartosuwiryo's integration of *takfir* into his ideological frame may have occurred late in his political development, but it nevertheless became an important tool in justifying the DI's continued insurgency against the Indonesian Republic after its liberation from the Dutch. Additionally, the concept provided him with a tool for ensuring compliance from his followers and a means of harshly punishing dissenters, thus ensuring control in a difficult period of conflict.

Furthermore, it shows that Kartosuwiryo's DI had embraced *takfir* long before its use by *salafi-jihadist* groups, or even ideologues like Qutb, who popularised the concept in radical Islamist circles. This is not to suggest that the DI's later understanding of the term after Kartosuwiryo underwent no subsequent evolution or was not influenced by foreign sources. Instead, *takfir*'s long history in Islamic discourse and use as a tool by both dissidents and governing elites made it an appealing concept for appropriation by groups like the DI.

Kartosuwiryo's understanding of al-walā' wa-l-barā'

Like *takfir*, the concept of *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* played a limited role in Kartosuwiryo's early writings. While he was the editor of *Fadjar Asia*, Kartosuwiryo did not seem particularly concerned with maintaining ideological purity among Muslims. Indeed, in an article published on 31 October 1928, he argued that for Islamist nationalists to prohibit 'relations with other parties, who are not in line with [PSI's] principles', even when these groups 'sincerely extend their support and assistance', would 'only give rise to a narrow worldview and hatred of others'.⁵⁹⁴

Furthermore, he argued that this 'arrogance' would 'lead to hatred' and prevent the formation of the broad coalition necessary to liberate Indonesia from the Dutch.⁵⁹⁵ As noted earlier, his '*Haloean Politik Islam*' speech touched on the same themes, once again prioritising widespread agreement and cooperation between Islamists and religiously neutral nationalists. In seeing the Dutch as the greatest threat to Indonesian freedom, Kartosuwiryo adopted a very pragmatic approach, encouraging broad cooperation across all sectors of society.

However, this support for working with other Indonesian nationalist groups was paired with a strict policy of non-cooperation with the Dutch. As examined in the previous chapter, Kartosuwiryo used his *Sikap Hijrah* and *Daftar Oesaha Hijrah* pamphlets to encourage his

⁵⁹⁴ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Pertjaja kepada diri sendiri dan...', *Fadjar Asia*, 31 October 1928

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid*

supporters to embark on a spiritual *hijrah* and fight a personal *jihad* to decolonise their minds and remove themselves from a world governed by colonial structures, values, and modes of thought. In this respect, Kartosuwiryo was attempting to build a committed group of ‘true’ Muslims, committed to the foundation of an Islamic state through the bettering of their spiritual practices and dedication to God. While not particularly well developed, his idea of building a community of likeminded Muslims through this spiritual flight hinted at the beginnings of creating an ‘in-group’ dedicated to the cause of Allah, while simultaneously – albeit passively – denouncing the non-Muslim colonial state and its structures.

On a more practical level, the publication of the *Sikap Hijrah* pamphlet in 1936 marked the triumph of his political strategy of non-cooperation within the PSII movement. Having forced out Agus Salim – who favoured working within the *Volksraad* (People’s Council; a legislature with limited advisory powers) – the previous year, Kartosuwiryo’s takeover meant that the PSII was now committed to shunning the Dutch-run political process. In pushing Salim out of the organisation and instituting his *hijrah* policy, Kartosuwiryo was clearly laying out the obligations of party members.

Nevertheless, these events do not indicate that Kartosuwiryo had a particularly well-developed conceptualisation of *al-walā’ wa-l-barā’* in his initial years as an Islamist politician. Kartosuwiryo understood that the first priority of Indonesian nationalists, regardless of their ideological orientation, was the removal of the Dutch from the archipelago. As such, he was willing to work with any and all who opposed Dutch rule, whatever their doctrinal differences. His split with Agus Salim was over the latter’s belief that cooperation would lead to political gains, rather than a dispute over Islam.

Once again, the experience of conflict in the Indonesian Revolution would alter Kartosuwiryo’s outlook. Embittered by the concessions made by the Republican nationalists in the Renville Agreement and their embrace of Pancasila rather than Islam as the foundation of the independent state, Kartosuwiryo began to define the boundaries of membership in the Muslim community in increasingly narrow terms, while demanding higher levels of commitment from its members.

At its most basic level, Article 1 of the NII constitution released on 27 August 1948 proclaimed that citizens had to pledge *bayat* to Kartosuwiryo as their *imam*. Their commitment would be to

the Islamic state, its leader, and through him to God alone.⁵⁹⁶ This precluded support for the Republican nationalists who were also still engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Dutch, and committed Kartosuwiryo's followers to what he would later call 'triangular warfare' against both the Dutch and the majority of their fellow Indonesians.⁵⁹⁷ Beyond voicing their support for Kartosuwiryo's cause, Muslims were also required to participate actively in the fight to establish and preserve the NII as laid out in the *hukum pidana*. In addition to calling for the execution of hypocrites and those who actively worked on behalf of the enemy, Article 7 of the code stipulated that those who were obligated to fight but failed to do so (or who fled from the battlefield) would be punished by banishment or death.⁵⁹⁸ Their failure to live up to their obligation to fight for God's polity meant that their claim to be a Muslim was voided.

While these laws applied to a wartime scenario, they clearly spelled out the obligations of membership within the community of the faithful. The struggle against the enemies of the NII (and thus, of God, for they resisted his divine rule) required the complete commitment of its citizenry. This entailed denouncing or even killing those who made overt transgressions against the state, as well as demanding that DI members lay down their lives for the state. In this respect, Kartosuwiryo's constitution and penal code used *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* much like al-Shaykh in 1818, when he demanded that the Wahhabi community 'fight to the death against the Egyptians' who were seen as 'not true Muslims' and had invaded the Arabian Peninsula.⁵⁹⁹ *Al-walā' wa-l-barā'* thus served as a useful tool for the authorities to martial support for their cause on account of serving God, while simultaneously threatening expulsion from the group for failing to act.

Kartosuwiryo invoked the concept more explicitly in his 1951 political manifesto. In it he wrote that DI supporters must abide by the principle of 'distinguishing and separating – in accordance with the Quran'.⁶⁰⁰ This would allow them to separate 'good from false truth peddled by a wicked *Imam*', '*kufr* and *taghut* from the honest' and above all 'Islam from apostasy'.⁶⁰¹ Written in the midst of the insurgency, these directives for true Muslims to separate their faith from impurities served to reinforce their commitment to the NII and reinforce distrust of the Republican state. Kartosuwiryo's words also highlight the totalising, Manichean worldview fostered by *al-walā' wa-*

⁵⁹⁶ Kartosuwiryo, 'Kanun Azasy Negara Islam Indonesia', 27 August 1948

⁵⁹⁷ Kartosuwiryo, 'Manifest Politik Negara Islam Indonesia - Heru Tjokro Bersabda: "Indonesia Kini dan Kelak"', 17 February 1951, p.35

⁵⁹⁸ Kartosuwiryo, 'Hukum Pidana', August 1949

⁵⁹⁹ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, p.12

⁶⁰⁰ Kartosuwiryo, 'Manifest Politik Negara Islam Indonesia - Heru Tjokro Bersabda: "Indonesia Kini dan Kelak"', 17 February 1951, p.24

⁶⁰¹ Ibid

l-barā'. Kartosuwiryo and his followers existed in a world where there was a constant struggle between good and evil, with no grey areas. Muslims could only commit fully to their faith and support their co-religionists. Failing to do so would result in being cast outside the fold and punished for their lack of belief.

Beyond serving as a tool of in-group control and out-group demonisation, Kartosuwiryo's interpretation of *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* required more than just passive support for Islam. Followers were required to demonstrate the highest commitment to their faith by supporting their fellow Muslims – in this case by fighting alongside them – and being willing to lay down their life for God. This was thus a positivist interpretation that required continuous action on the part of adherents. Additionally, Kartosuwiryo had transformed his conception of disavowal from passive non-cooperation in the face of colonial subjugation to active contestation with the enemies of Islam on a physical battlefield. In this respect, Kartosuwiryo showed that his interpretation differed from Ibn Taymiyya's highly personalised construction of the concept, using it to ensure positive compliance and loyalty to his agenda in a militarised situation.

Sungkar's conceptualisation of *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*

Steeped in Modernist Islamist and *salafi* teachings, Abdullah Sungkar's induction into the DI in 1976 would have profound implications for the ideological trajectory of the group. Although he was only formally inducted into DI in December 1976, he was - like his close friend and colleague Abu Bakar Ba'asyir - already well known in Islamist circles as a prominent advocate for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia and fierce critic of the Republican government.

Sungkar's ideas about *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* were well established prior to his membership of the DI on account of his work with the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII; Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council), which spread *Wahhabi* and *salafi* teachings in Indonesia. This section will briefly illustrate his background in the DDII Modernist network, established by his mentor, Mohammad Natsir, before exploring his views on *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*.

The DDII and Mohammad Natsir

The DDII was founded 1967 by Mohammad Natsir, Indonesia's fifth prime minister and a former head of Masyumi. According to Noorhaidi Hasan, '[from] its inception, it became the Indonesian

representative of the Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami', the Muslim World League (MWL), an initiative established by the government of Saudi Arabia to promote its own *Wahhabist* interpretation of Islam.⁶⁰² The DDII, as a result of its Saudi connections, 'provided the Islamists with a well-funded and efficient infrastructure for their Islamic propagation efforts'.⁶⁰³

The organisation operated with a cell-like structure in which 'campus mosques continued to play a central role as nodal points for a new type of network inspired by...Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood' with smaller study circles acting as *usroh*, 'family-like mini-communities of dedicated propagandists'.⁶⁰⁴ The DDII, in addition to *Wahhabist* teachings, helped to popularise *salafist* ideas from the Arab world, particularly Egypt, by publishing Indonesian translations of works by Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Sayyid Hawwa, Mustafa al-Siba and the Pakistani ideologue, Abul A'la Maududi.⁶⁰⁵ It criticised the practice of Sufism and the incorporation of local traditions like Javanese mysticism into the forms of Islam advocated by Traditionalist organisations like NU, claiming these practices were *bid'a*. The organisation also 'distributed scholarships enabling Indonesian students to attend universities in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan'.⁶⁰⁶

As noted in the introduction, Sungkar joined the DDII soon after its creation. He was quick to adopt the ideas and methods of the Muslim Brotherhood, establishing a *pesantren* called the Al Mukmin in Gading Kidul on 10 March 1972.⁶⁰⁷ The school eventually relocated to Ngruki, a hamlet in Solo, and was renamed the Ngruki Islamic boarding school (Pondok Ngruki). By now, it was clear that Sungkar had embraced the Salafist worldview. His preaching during this period reflected the influence of the *Wahhabi* and *salafist* scholarship promoted by the DDII. He advocated for the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia and was hostile to polytheism, Javanese cultural practices, minority Muslim sects, Westerners, Jews, and Christians.⁶⁰⁸

Along with Ba'asyir, he also devised a curriculum designed to give students a 'pure understanding of the Islamic faith' so that they would be able to live each day in accordance with Islamic law.⁶⁰⁹ The *pesantren* was made up of three programmes, the Kulliyat al-Mu'allimin (KMI), the Kulliyat al-

⁶⁰² Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), p.40

⁶⁰³ Carol Kersten, *Islam in Indonesia: The Contest for Society, Ideas and Values* (London: C. Hurst and Company Ltd; 2015) p.75

⁶⁰⁴ Idem, p.76

⁶⁰⁵ Hasan, *Laskar Jihad*, p.40

⁶⁰⁶ Kersten, *Islam in Indonesia*, p.77

⁶⁰⁷ Solahudin, *The roots of terrorism in Indonesia*, p.83

⁶⁰⁸ Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java*, pp.182-184

⁶⁰⁹ Zuly Qodir, *Ada Apa Dengan Pesantren Ngruki?* (Yogyakarta: Pondok Edukasi, 2003), p.28

Mu'allimat (KMA) and the Madrasah Aliyah Al-Mukmin (MAAM), which followed the national curriculum to varying degrees. KMI and KMA focused primarily on religious teachings but included a few mathematics and science classes as well.⁶¹⁰ In contrast, 70% of the curriculum at MAAM focused on secular topics, following a model the Department of Religious Affairs created and promoted. While Sungkar prohibited the flying of the Indonesian flag and singing of the national anthem at his school, his curriculum design showed at least some willingness to abide by some of the regulations handed down by government officials prior to his association with DI.⁶¹¹

According to Nasir Abas, the former head of *JI Mantiqi* III, Sungkar had the utmost admiration for Natsir, seeing him as a mentor.⁶¹² A prominent member of the Islamist community, Natsir frequently worked within the confines of Indonesia's political structures. While a cabinet official, Natsir was committed to 'maintaining a unified and independent Indonesian state' and worked closely with Sukarno to reign in the Darul Islam rebellions, despite his sympathies for their cause.⁶¹³ Natsir held roles in government as the Minister of Information between 1946 and 1949 and eventually prime minister between 1951 and 1952.⁶¹⁴

Nevertheless, Natsir's alignment with the Sukarno government did not last. The president's increasingly autocratic tendencies coupled with his own doubts about the use of *Pancasila* in an overwhelmingly Muslim nation pushed him first into leading Masyumi out of government and into parliamentary opposition in 1955. Natsir's continued criticism of *Pancasila* and Sukarno's concept of 'Guided Democracy' in 1957 resulted in sustained harassment in the state-controlled press.⁶¹⁵ According to Fogg, pro-Sukarno gangs protested outside Natsir's home and 'stones shattered his front window several times in the course of a month'.⁶¹⁶ His family received numerous threatening phone calls to him and one of his nephews was arrested on 'trumped up charges'.⁶¹⁷

By 1957 Natsir had had enough of the intimidation, fleeing his home in Jakarta for Medan, 'where sympathy for Masjumi was very high and where personal attacks by Communist-leaning groups

⁶¹⁰ Noorhaidi Hasan, 'The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign', *South East Asia Research*, 18:4 (2010), p.686

⁶¹¹ For a comprehensive account of the structure of Pondok Ngruki, see: Farish A. Noor, 'Ngruki Revisited: Modernity and its Discontents at the Pondok Pesantren al-Mukmin of Ngruki, Surakarta', Working Paper 139, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Singapore, 1 October 2007

⁶¹² Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019

⁶¹³ Audrey R. Kahin, *Islam, nationalism and democracy: A political biography of Mohammad Natsir* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), p.89 and p.74

⁶¹⁴ Fogg, 'The Fate of Muslim Nationalism in Independent Indonesia', p.116

⁶¹⁵ Kahin, *Islam, nationalism and democracy*, p.111-112

⁶¹⁶ Fogg, 'The Fate of Muslim Nationalism in Independent Indonesia', p.377

⁶¹⁷ *Ibid*

were less likely'.⁶¹⁸ Alongside other Islamist politicians like Burhanuddin Harahap and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Natsir allied himself Ahmad Husein, a Central Sumatran military commander, who had begun denouncing the government in Jakarta for allegedly appropriating Sumatra's natural resources and for 'general political disfunction'.⁶¹⁹

On 10 February 1958, these disaffected military men, anti-communist groups and Islamist politicians gathered together to issue an ultimatum to the Jakarta government, calling for a new cabinet and a return to the spirit of the Indonesian revolution. As the government failed to respond to their demands, Ahmad Husein declared the formation of the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI, the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia).⁶²⁰ The declaration prompted retaliatory military action from Jakarta on 20 February. The ensuing violence prompting Natsir and the PRRI leadership to flee to rural towns or the jungles of West Sumatra, where they would attempt to mount their resistance.

Despite his sympathies for Kartosuwiryo and his cause, Natsir does not appear to make any attempt to engage him and the DI as part of a wider struggle against Sukarno. There does not appear to be any correspondence in archival sources between the two men nor communication between DI representatives and Natsir's Masyumi faction. Additionally, Kahin notes that there was 'little effort to enrol Kartosuwiryo's Darul Islam in their ranks and West Java does not appear among the component states' of the PRRI nor Natsir's successor revolutionary state, the RPI (Republik Persatuan Indonesia, or United Republic of Indonesia), declared on 8 February 1960.⁶²¹

There is also scant evidence that the DI attempted to engage Natsir. According to Holk Dengel, the DI did attempt to establish contact in the late 1950s, but nothing came of its efforts.⁶²² Kartosuwiryo's limited writings and DI communiques issued during the 1950s and 1960s do not reference Natsir, the West Sumatran rebellion, or the RPI. This is not to suggest that Kartosuwiryo was unaware of these developments, but is an indication that achieving intra-group cooperation to resist the government in Jakarta across many disparate provinces of the archipelago was fundamentally a difficult exercise.

⁶¹⁸ Ibid

⁶¹⁹ Ibid

⁶²⁰ Idem, p.380

⁶²¹ Kahin, *Islam, nationalism and democracy*, p.136

⁶²² Dengel, *Darul Islam dan Kartosuwiryo*, p.186

Natsir's rebellion was ultimately brief. By 1959, government forces had taken Central Sumatra. Natsir and his family were forced out of the jungle the following year, but only surrendered themselves to the authorities on 20 September 1961.⁶²³

However, Natsir's treatment at the hands of the state differed dramatically from his domestic and foreign contemporaries, Kartosuwiryo and Qutb, and from Sungkar's persecution in the ensuing decades. Kahin writes that between 1961 and 1963, Natsir spent his time largely under house arrest or in detention with his wife. He was allowed to write numerous essays and articles, store books, receive visitors, and never faced serious interrogations. He was even released briefly in 1964 to attend his daughter's wedding.⁶²⁴

The overthrow of Sukarno in 1965 effectively ended Natsir's detention, and he was granted complete freedom in July 1967.⁶²⁵ While his time in prison spanned the better part of the 1960s, Natsir did not emerge with a set of more radical beliefs nor a desire to resume his rebellion. With Sukarno ousted and the threat of communism vanquished through the mass killings of 1965-1966, Natsir attempted to return to parliamentary politics, establishing the Committee for the Rehabilitation of Masyumi in 1966.

Natsir's experiences stand in stark contrast to his domestic contemporaries, such as Kartosuwiryo and Sungkar, and foreign counterparts, like Sayyid Qutb. Kartosuwiryo, Sungkar and Qutb all faced significant harassment and persecution by their governments, in large part owing to the public expression of their theological and political beliefs and criticism of the state. All three were imprisoned and Kartosuwiryo and Qutb were eventually executed. This experience of persecution, harassment and imprisonment was ultimately radicalising for all of these men, who came to believe that politicians and state officials were not just hostile to Muslims and the actualisation of an Islamic state, but also were heretics and infidels.

While Natsir faced similar harassment and persecution by the Indonesian government, his experiences, as described above, were not as harsh as that faced by Kartosuwiryo, Qutb or Sungkar. This relatively lenient treatment in prison, coupled with the eventual overthrow of the regime that put him there, seemingly blunted the potential for a more radical turn in his ideology and an embrace of *takfiri* principles.

⁶²³ Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism, and Democracy*, p.151

⁶²⁴ Idem, p.151-2

⁶²⁵ Idem, p.155

It also seems plausible that Natsir was temperamentally different to these three men. He appeared less willing to viciously condemn his political opponents or see them as heretics when they embraced non-Islamic forms of governance. For example, when it became clear that Sukarno would not tolerate multiparty competition nor the return of Masyumi, Natsir opted not to challenge New Order through civil disobedience, nor to preach publicly (and even privately) that Sukarno and his regime were not true Muslims, nor call for or return to armed rebellion.

While Natsir could have easily calculated that public opposition to the New Order would be difficult, or even futile, his decision to establish the DDII in 1967 illustrated his willingness to work within the confines of an unreceptive, and at times overtly hostile, regime, and potentially exploit its gaps. In establishing the DDII, Natsir believed that ‘preaching [was] a way to engage in politics’, and returned to demonstrating a commitment to non-violent advocacy and some forms of democratic political norms, namely the engagement in civil society and activism.⁶²⁶

Sungkar’s embrace of takfīr

Unlike his mentor, Sungkar was never part of the Indonesian political establishment. As noted in the introduction, Sungkar was raised in Modernist Hadrami circles and was unsparing in his criticism of the Suharto administration and of Indonesian society more generally. These criticisms largely revolved around Sungkar’s rejection of democracy and nationalism. He saw these concepts as fundamentally antithetical to Islam and eventually, grounds for *takfīr*, as they undermined the notion that God’s rule and laws were supreme.

His efforts to spread these opinions brought him into regular confrontations with the Sukarno government, as the security services routinely surveilled his propagation efforts. As noted in the introduction, the authorities shut down Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s radio station, Radis, in 1975 after the men repeatedly made provocative statements about the government’s treatment of Muslims and questioned political leaders’ commitment to their faith.⁶²⁷ Despite this, there is little evidence to suggest that Sungkar actively advocated for Sukarno and his government to be excommunicated, nor that he called for violent action to bring about an Islamic state in Indonesia prior to 1976.

⁶²⁶ Idem, p.168

⁶²⁷ ICG, ‘Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia’, p.6

While his opinions were fiery and uncompromising, his sustained involvement in youth organisations, media networks, educational institutions, and other political bodies, often with Ba'asyir by his side, indicates that the men believed – at least until 1976 – that the creation of an Islamic state could be achieved through political participation and building support for their cause through education and outreach. Natsir's willingness to appoint Sungkar as the head of the Solo branch of DDII in 1970 suggests that the men likely shared a common belief in using the power of *dakwah* to shape the Indonesian political process, rather than challenging the state through mass demonstrations or more violent forms of political protest.

Nevertheless, the Indonesian government's constant interference to stymie his own proselytisation efforts and broader grievances that Muslim political parties were unable to have a fair chance at political participation, played a significant role in Sungkar's decision to leave the DDII in 1976 and join the DI. These moves by the regime likely convinced Sungkar that there were few opportunities to change the system through his work with Islamist political organisations.

Sungkar's arguments in his defence plea at his 1982 trial testified to this line of thought. It featured a laundry list of anti-democratic measures targeting Muslim parties and political interests. For example, he detailed at length his anger at the government's 1970 decision to prevent former Masyumi leaders from taking up positions in its successor, the newly formed Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi, Indonesian Muslim Party) and its January 1973 decision to merge all Muslim parties into the Partai Persatuan Indonesia (PPP, United Development Party). This move came alongside an agglomeration of nationalist, non-Islamic parties into the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI, Indonesian Democratic Party) to serve as the official opposition to the ruling Golkar party. To Sungkar, these incidents, along with the government's alleged use of 'special operations... [and] exceptional figures such as Ali Moertopo and Sujono Humardani', were evidence of the state 'hijacking' Muslim political parties, causing them to lose elections.⁶²⁸

Additionally, Sungkar claimed that the government was failing to honour the rights of Muslims to practice their faith as they saw fit, as guaranteed by the constitution. In particular he cited the introduction of a 1974 law allowing interfaith marriage. He described the law as 'disgraceful' and designed as yet another attack on the Muslim community.

⁶²⁸ Abdullah bin Ahman Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, and Irfan Suryahardy, *Perjalanan bucum di Indonesia: Sebuah Gugatan* (Yogyakarta: Ar-Risalah: Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Masjid (BKPM, 1982), p.91

Crucially, Sungkar appeared to have seen increasingly little political space to successfully oppose and resist the Suharto government or advocate for the implementation of *shari'a*. The closure of his radio station, Radis, in 1975 prevented them from proselyting to a mass audience. While campus *usroh* networks continued to flourish, it is likely that Sungkar understood the limits of his reach and activism so long as the state was committed to thwarting real political competition. It is difficult to say with certainty, given the paucity of sources, that Sungkar, unlike Natsir, lost hope in a non-violent struggle. But Islamist groups had made little progress towards achieving an Islamic state in Indonesia 27 years after the end of Dutch colonial rule. It is likely that this lack of progress spurred them to try a different path.

Sidney Jones and Quinton Temby have made similarly convincing arguments regarding how repressive state action resulted in the radicalisation of Sungkar. Jones is most forthright about the link, writing:

It is questionable whether a man like Abdullah Sungkar, JP's founder, would have made common cause with the DI if the New Order government had allowed a party like Masyumi, the largest Muslim party before its banning by Sukarno in 1960, or any party headed by Mohammad Natsir to function freely.⁶²⁹

Temby adds to this, arguing that Sungkar's protests in court show his frustration with the political process and with Suharto's heavy-handed tactics.⁶³⁰ Citing Mohammad Hafez's work *Why Muslims Rebel*, Temby concludes that 'Islamist movements become militant when confronted with a combination of political and institutional exclusion and repression'.⁶³¹

This thesis largely agrees with their assessment. Building on this, this thesis adds that Sungkar's transformation was not unique among Indonesian Islamist activists. He appears to have followed a similar path to Kartosuwiryo, whose embrace of *takefir*, which supported a violent interpretation of *jihad*, also occurred as he began to hit the limits of peaceful resistance and lobbying ultimately repressive regimes, whether the Dutch colonial administration or an increasingly authoritarian Sukarno-led government after independence.

⁶²⁹ Jones, 'New Order Repression and the Birth of the Jemaah Islamiyah', p.40

⁶³⁰ Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah', p.30

⁶³¹ Ibid

However, this thesis slightly differs from Jones and Temby's readings, arguing that the repressive political circumstances created by these regimes only go some of the way to explaining why Kartosuwiryo and Sungkar embraced an expansive definition of *takfir* as well as a narrow, violent definition of *jihad*. The uncompromising and totalising nature of their ideology is also to blame. Their belief structure, namely the need to ensure the implementation of *shari'a* and an Islamic political structure at any cost, resulted in an ideology that sees state control as a zero-sum game. Given this uncompromising world view, Sungkar finally broke with the DDII in 1976 to join the DI, becoming the head of its branch in Solo. He installed Ba'asyir as his deputy. His radicalisation and embrace of *jihad* will be examined in greater detail in the subsequent chapter.

Sungkar's conceptualisation of takfir

As noted above, Kartosuwiryo's understanding of *takfir* was primarily constructed in (and defined by) a state of war. Those who opposed his rule and the legitimacy of the NII were seen to be defying God's authority and were thus *kuffar*. This broad definition allowed for the widespread application of *takfir* during the NII's insurgency. It served as means of ensuring loyalty and mainly focused on controlling the political behaviour of Kartosuwiryo's fighters and those living within his territory by presenting dissent as a form of unbelief, punishable by death.

By contrast, Sungkar's contribution to the development of *takfir* in the DI's ideological frame was to refine its application, singling out specific groups and practices for condemnation. This conceptualisation reflected the fact that the DI was no longer attempting to ensure the loyalty of an army or the compliance of a large civilian population, but also that Sungkar saw *takfir* as a means of purifying an individual's practice of Islam, rather than just ensuring their loyalty to the wider cause. In this sense, Sungkar was attempting to impose and standardise the beliefs of his followers to an even greater degree than Kartosuwiryo, who demanded loyalty to God (and practical support for his regime), but showed little interest in micromanaging the quotidian thoughts of his followers.

In Sungkar's sermons, recorded sometime before his flight to Malaysia in 1985 to avoid a return to prison, he lays out his interpretation and understanding of *takfir* and *al-wala' wa-l-barā'*. As explored more fully in the analytical framework, these recordings served as a means by which Sungkar could reach his supporters and those beyond the DI network and spread his ideas. The recordings mirror the practices of Egyptian ideologues in the 1960s and 1970s, who also attempted to bypass state oversight in the face of the consolidation of religious authority and knowledge by

the Egyptian state from the 1950s onwards'.⁶³² While Sungkar never stated if he had listened to sermons by Egyptians or if he or DI members had access to their recordings in Indonesia, given his familiarity with the practices and tactics of Egyptian Islamist movements, it is likely that he was aware of the spread of cassette sermons there.

With regards to the *takfir*, he examines four major themes: (1) the illegitimacy of contemporary Indonesian leaders, (2) the status of Muslims who support leaders who do not uphold Islamic law, (3) forms of un-Islamic behaviour, and (4) the practices of Muslim minority sects.

In repeatedly returning to these four themes, Sungkar clearly defines for DI members what is *kufr*, its manifestations, and (in some cases) how to respond. While he never advocates open rebellion or violence against the state or minority religious sects – perhaps due to the precarious nature of his legal situation or fears, as noted earlier, of government surveillance – he does reference numerous passages in the Quran that call for hypocrites and disbelievers to be harshly punished or that say that they will suffer in the afterlife. While Sungkar stops short of directly inciting attacks, he still manages to signal to his followers that these are serious crimes against the faith, and a basis for ex-communication.

Sungkar, like Kartosuwiryo before him, defines Muslim leaders who fail to implement *shari'a* and Islamic governance structures as '*murtad*'.⁶³³ These leaders have, he argued, failed in their duty as Muslims to guide their people and ensure their physical and spiritual well-being. In one sermon, Sungkar asks his listeners the rhetorical question of whether '[Suharto and his cabinet] understand *shari'a*?' or if they are 'ignorant about *shari'a*'.⁶³⁴ He responds that the distinction does not matter since '[in] either case, he is not implementing it'.⁶³⁵ Sungkar continues to build this line of argument, saying that 'all legal decisions belong to God alone' and that 'worshiping God means obeying God's law'.⁶³⁶ As such, the ostensibly Muslim president and legislators have defied God by creating and implementing laws based on other sources of legitimacy. Sungkar thus makes it clear for DI members that implementing Islamic law is the key determinant of being a legitimate Muslim leader.

⁶³² Hirschkind, *The Ethical Soundscape*, p.55

⁶³³ Abdullah Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 1', undated, *Internet Archive*, https://archive.org/details/audio_abdullah_sungkar/U_Abdullah_Sungkar_1.mp3, accessed: 22 January 2020

⁶³⁴ Ibid

⁶³⁵ Ibid

⁶³⁶ Ibid

Sungkar continued to reinforce the notion that the only way for a leader to be legitimate, be accepted by Muslims, and be a practicing Muslim himself is through implementing *shari'a*. In subsequent sermons, he claimed that 'your leaders are actually Allah, the prophets and the believers... those who do not submit to Allah's law are not believers', thus again excommunicating the Muslims that made up the government of Indonesia.⁶³⁷ The cumulative effect of these denunciations was likely to have convinced DI members of the legitimacy of their struggle against the state and the righteousness of their *jihad* against an enemy who threatened them temporally and spiritually.

Sungkar was also relatively direct in telling his congregants how to respond to such leadership. He stated that Muslims can only grant their full support to a government 'when all power belongs to Allah'. As such, they could not give their backing to the Indonesian Republic because, 'Muslims are not supposed to support *kuffar*'.⁶³⁸ Non-cooperation would not be enough. Sungkar encouraged his followers to be 'hostile' to the government for its failure to implement Islamic law and claimed the government would collapse, 'unless they have the full support of Muslims'.⁶³⁹ While he did not specify what hostility or the withdrawal of support from the government would look like in practice, he called on his supporters to resist and to deny the legitimacy of the Republic.

By claiming that the government's leadership had committed a sin so severe that it negated their faith, Sungkar – like Qutb and Kartosuwiryo before him – justified rebelling against an ostensibly Muslim regime. This also served to undercut arguments, often made in classical Islamic jurisprudence, that prioritised stability or support for leaders, even if corrupt or inept, on the basis of their shared belief in Islam. In this respect, Sungkar's interpretation of *takefir* served to bolster arguments for the necessity of *jihad* against the government, highlighting the concept's supportive role in the structure of the group's ideology.

In the same sermon, Sungkar also condemned Muslims who supported the government, referring to them as 'fools' and 'hypocrites' for 'choosing infidel leaders'.⁶⁴⁰ His use of the word 'choosing' is particularly significant since Indonesia had not held genuinely free and fair elections since 1955, so actively casting a ballot in favour of the government was not an option seriously available to

⁶³⁷ Abdullah Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 16', undated, *Internet Archive*, https://archive.org/details/audio_abdullah_sungkar/U_Abdullah_Sungkar_16.mp3, accessed: 13 February 2020

⁶³⁸ Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 1'

⁶³⁹ *Ibid*

⁶⁴⁰ *Ibid*

Indonesian Muslims. Given this situation, it is likely that Sungkar saw Muslims' failure to actively protest against the government as a form of passive or tacit support for its rule. This stance created a binary division where Muslims either joined the DI in opposing the government and fighting for *shari'a* or were condemned themselves as apostates.

Sungkar would reiterate these arguments in at least three other sermons recorded in this period. For instance, he claimed that it was 'impossible' for God to 'command us to obey an unfaithful government', once again highlighting there was no reason to respect or tolerate Suharto's rule.⁶⁴¹ Additionally, he claimed that hypocritical citizens who wrongly believed that 'following an infidel will bring glory while following fellow Muslims will not and bring the insult in life instead'.⁶⁴²

He cautioned that Muslims' support, in whatever form it took, for such non-Islamic regimes would lead them 'to go to hell for they are misled by their leaders'.⁶⁴³ Moreover, he told his listeners that even if they personally adhered to the basic tenets of their faith, this would not absolve them from this sin. He argued that '[p]eople who have prayed, have fasted, have given alms, have made hajj, have done all kinds of things, but if they choose an infidel as their leader, trust him to become their protector, that is when they have become hypocrites'.⁶⁴⁴ As such, he, like Kartosuwiryo, elevated opposition to an infidel regime as a key requirement to be considered a true Muslim. This, once again showed an attempt by a DI leader to ensure conformity of thought amongst followers and to demand an active show of support for the DI's resistance to the state.

Where Sungkar went further than Kartosuwiryo was in using *takfir* as a tool of ensuring doctrinal purity. These ideas have roots in work of 'Abd al-Wahhab, whose key work, *Kitab at-Tauhid* focused largely on trying to cleanse the practice of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula, thus ensuring *tauhid*. al-Wahhab's work lists numerous acts that constitute unbelief, including 'supplicating pious living or dead people, seeking their intercession, making vows to them, offering sacrifices and praying at their tombs, and attributing to the dead... the power to harm or give benefit'.⁶⁴⁵ Furthermore, he included the 'belief in, practice, teaching and learning of magic, astrology, and divination, the use

⁶⁴¹ Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 16'

⁶⁴² Abdullah Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 10', undated, *Internet Archive*, https://archive.org/details/audio_abdullah_sungkar/U_Abdullah_Sungkar_10.mp3, accessed: 20 February 2020

⁶⁴³ Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 1'

⁶⁴⁴ Ibid

⁶⁴⁵ Ahmad Dallal, 'The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750-1850', *Journal of American Oriental Society*, 113: 3 (July – Sept 1993), p.350

of amulets and talisman', and numerous other actions that sought the intercession of someone or something interceded or supplanted a direct relationship with God.⁶⁴⁶

Through his time at the DDII, Sungkar would have been well acquainted with this work. His sermons speak to the concerns listed by 'al-Wahhab, encouraging supporters to renounce such practices, and using *takfir* to remove excommunicate those refused. As such, *takfir* served to purify and protect the faith. Sungkar advocated that Muslims should not worship at sacred tombs, lamenting that they were 'now open everywhere'.⁶⁴⁷ He also lamented that Muslims were increasingly participating in un-Islamic traditions such as getting married 'dressed in Western style'.⁶⁴⁸ To Sungkar, the performance of these 'habits', both old and new, was 'all *bid'a*...wrong, and belong[ed] in hell'.⁶⁴⁹ Those who engaged in this '*bid'a* have made their own law, and those who make their own law means they have committed *kufr*'.⁶⁵⁰

In this respect, Sungkar was much more prescriptive and dogmatic than previous DI leaders, clearly defining the boundaries of acceptable personal behaviour for Muslims. Not content with condemning such practices, Sungkar also argued that those who engaged in them had committed such grave errors that they had invalidated their faith. The focus on such quotidian matters such as wedding attire illustrated how Sungkar's interpretation and application of *takfir* was totalising. Since Muslims could be judged, and indeed excommunicated, for any aspect of their thoughts or deed – no matter how small or personal – this understanding of *takfir* gave Sungkar and the DI greater scope to judge and condemn potential enemies.

Finally, Sungkar's sermons also indicate that he believed that minority Muslim sects were heretical and worthy of censure. In one sermon, he spent nearly 45 minutes discussing the apparent dangers of the Shia ideology, arguing that its true purpose was to undermine Sunni Islam. He warned listeners that the Shia were sending 'missionaries to work in Indonesia to spread their ideology'.⁶⁵¹ Its teachings were work of '*rafidah*' (splitters, a pejorative term to refer to the Shia) who had 'grudge grow[ing] for centuries'.⁶⁵² Once again, in singling out the Shia for their supposedly heretical practices, Sungkar narrowed the boundaries of the faith to only include Sunni Muslims who

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid

⁶⁴⁷ Abdullah Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 2', undated, *Internet Archive*, https://archive.org/details/audio_abdullah_sungkar/U_Abdullah_Sungkar_2.mp3, accessed: 12 February 2020

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid

⁶⁵¹ Abdullah Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 4'

⁶⁵² Ibid

adhered to his strict conceptualisation. In claiming the Shia were deviant, Sungkar stoked distrust and set the theoretical and religious foundations for violence directed against the community.

From these sermons, Sungkar's conceptualisation of *takefir* largely conformed to Kartosuwiryo's interpretation as it saw a Muslim leader's failure to implement *shari'a* as a *kufr* act. Sungkar also clarified that Muslims had to completely reject this apostate system or risk being excommunicated themselves for expressing even tacit support for an un-Islamic regime. However, Sungkar went further than Kartosuwiryo, defining some non-political acts as constituting disbelief and heresy. Drawing on the work of the *Wahhabis*, Sungkar conceptualised *takefir* as a tool for purifying and defending Islam, which necessitated policing the non-political thoughts and behaviours of his supporters in addition to their political actions. This interpretation of *takefir* thus served to support DI's understanding and pursuit of *jihad* as the primary mechanism for achieving an Islamic state and the need to base that state on surrendering all authority to God.

Sungkar's interpretation of al-walā' wa-l-barā'

Based on his sermons, Sungkar's understanding of *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* draw heavily on interpretations advanced by Ibn Taymiyya and Abd al-Wahhab. While they bear similarities to Muhammad Said al-Qahtani's conceptualisation, it is unlikely that Sungkar was aware of Qahtani's work in the 1970s and early 1980s, as the latter's book was only published in 1984. Sungkar's followers and students made no mention of Qahtani as a source of inspiration or an essential text for DI or later JI recruits when questioned during interviews, nor do other scholars of the JI's early years mention Qahtani's work as an influential book.

This is not to argue that Sungkar was never influenced by Qahtani or was entirely unfamiliar with his work. It is likely that given the popularity and spread of *Al-walā' wa-l-barā' According to the Aqeedah of the Salaf*, that Sungkar would have encountered it during his sojourn in Saudi Arabia in 1985 or following his exile to Malaysia in the late 1980s or 1990s. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that it was an influence on Sungkar's initial conceptualisation of *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*.

Like Kartosuwiryo, Sungkar primarily used *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* as a tool of in-group control, that reinforced his followers' Manichean understanding of the world. The concept also served as a powerful mobilising force, encouraging DI members (and Muslims in general) to better their practice of their faith and support each other in this pursuit. Sungkar introduced the concept to

the group's ideological framework, broadening its application to cover a wider range of personal beliefs and actions during a time when members were not actively engaged in armed conflict against the state. In doing so, he increasingly made Islam the only legitimate basis of a Muslim's relationship with others inside and outside the faith, drawing heavily on Ibn Taymiyya and Wahab's interpretations on the concept.

Muslims were thus encouraged to form closer bonds amongst themselves, while simultaneously distancing themselves from situations or people that were un-Islamic. This loyalty to Muslims and disavowal of the non-Muslim world would reduce the spheres in which Muslims could exist in a state of ambiguity with non-Muslims or with un-Islamic ideas and practices, strengthening DI members' Manichean view of the world. This once again helped to ensure a cohesive and loyal movement but also fostered a polarised climate, in which DI supporters could not possibly accept or exist in a non-Islamic polity. As such, the themes that run through Sungkar's sermons with regards to *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* can be divided into two groups; firstly, the requirement to actively resist the un-Islamic Indonesian Republic, and secondly, the requirement to support fellow Muslims by practicing Islam correctly.

Sungkar repeatedly stresses that 'there must be a straight line drawn between Muslims and those that claim to be Muslim but do not enforce *shari'a*'.⁶⁵³ If Muslims fail to 'respect that straight line', they 'will be among those who are misled'.⁶⁵⁴ He makes a similar proclamation in another sermon, stating that '[t]here are two types of government in this world. One is the government with faith in Islam and the other is the government of infidels'.⁶⁵⁵ Like Kartosuwiryo, he makes this division explicit for his listeners. In failing to understand and respect this division, Muslims would be engaging in a form of *shirk*, led astray by *murtad* rulers, and thus condemned to hell.

Given this situation, Sungkar encourages Muslims to 'take care of [themselves], protect [themselves] from the punishment of God. The punishment of Allah will not only affect the wrongdoers. If the wrongdoers are not prevented, they can do wrong everywhere, and we will be punished by Allah for not preventing the wrongdoers'.⁶⁵⁶ He told Muslims to take action to ensure that they do not engage in un-Islamic practices by supporting an infidel government. This is not

⁶⁵³ Abdullah Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 1'

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid

⁶⁵⁵ Abdullah Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 16'

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid

just for their own sake in the afterlife, but also for the benefit of the wider Muslim community. Sungkar thus effectively added social pressure to an individual's religious duty to actively participate in the resistance against the state.

In the same sermon, he reminded his listeners that '[y]our actions affect others', emphasising the collective obligation that Muslims have to one another.⁶⁵⁷ He furthered his argument in another sermon, stating that Muslims must also be 'very careful in choosing their friends' as making 'friends with the wrong people will result in danger, especially when we choose a leader'. His words highlight the importance of social networks in shaping the views of Muslims and the need to be around likeminded individuals who have similar ideas about the type of government they want.

In this respect, he used *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* to narrow the DI members' worldview, preventing them from co-existing with those with different political ideas for fear of engaging, perhaps unwittingly, in a sinful act that may result in ex-communication. Underpinning this idea is the notion that by simply doing nothing, Muslims will somehow come to think and behave like an infidel, once again emphasising the requirement for positive action to resist the government.

In addition to these ideas about engaging in active measures to protect the oneself and the *umma* from un-Islamic influences, Sungkar also called on his supporters to practice Islam 'correctly' by drawing further away from those that do not. In one sermon, Sungkar cautioned listeners about engaging in interfaith 'reconciliation' efforts, arguing that performing the religious rites of another faith 'is not the way of life taught by the Qur'an' and it was 'stupid logic' to believe that all religions were equal.⁶⁵⁸ In condemning these efforts to bring different groups together, Sungkar emphasised the need for his community of believers to separate themselves from non-Muslims, even in the most benign scenarios. This would, once again, close down avenues for DI members to co-exist peacefully, or even tolerate the presence of, non-Muslim groups in their society.

It also indicates that Sungkar thought that Muslims' belief was incredibly fragile, and potentially sullied by even the most non-threatening of actions. This theme is repeated in at least five other sermons in which he reminds Muslims to be wary of the environments in which they find themselves, because even if '[s]omeone is well educated about Islam at home and at school... he will start to work, socialise, etc. and it is then possible that his environment will not allow him to

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid

⁶⁵⁸ Abdullah Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 8', undated, *Internet Archive*, https://archive.org/details/audio_abdullah_sungkar/U_Abdullah_Sungkar_8.mp3, accessed: 25 January 2020

do what was taught to him by his household and at his school'.⁶⁵⁹ These warnings were meant to keep his listeners in a heightened state of tension and alertness at the possibility that, in passively existing in a non-Islamic state, they might fall prey to dangerous and sinful thoughts and deeds.

He developed this line of thought in another sermon, arguing that:

[Muslims] must be absolutely sure that the food comes from *halal* sources. That is how believers do things. They are always afraid their religious practice will not be acceptable to God. They always check and recheck repeatedly, in contrast to hypocrites who always continue to do evil but always feel safe.⁶⁶⁰

Once again, he encouraged Muslims to be aware of the risk of straying from God's true path when engaging in any aspect of life. In telling his listeners that true believers 'check and recheck' constantly, he promoted unceasing self-policing and vigilance in order to ensure that their practice of Islam is pure.

However, in order to maintain an acceptable environment for the flourishing of Islamic life in the absence of an Islamic state, he also called on believers to act collectively. Muslims are told to 'invite [their] families... to come back on the right track, pray and stay away from sinful things. By inviting them back, [his listeners] have protected [their] faith and [they] will not have been influenced to violate *shari'a*'.⁶⁶¹ As such, Sungkar encouraged the building of community among Muslims, strengthening their commitment to their faith while simultaneously withdrawing from non-Islamic practices and society. In this respect, his promotion of *al-wala' wa-l-barā'* served as a tool to assist in the building of a solid base for the achievement of *hakimiyya*.

Sungkar's use of *al-wala' wa-l-barā'* ensured that supporters were constantly affirming their faith by rejecting and distancing themselves from un-Islamic concepts, practices and even people. They were encouraged to do so not just for the sake of their own spiritual well-being but also for the wider Muslim community. As such, the concept was an effective tool for shoring up support for his movement and ensuring that a pure form of Islam was adhered to and policed by the members

⁶⁵⁹ Abdullah Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 4'

⁶⁶⁰ Abdullah Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 15', undated, *Internet Archive*, https://archive.org/details/audio_abdullah_sungkar/U_Abdullah_Sungkar_15.mp3, accessed: 22 January 2020

⁶⁶¹ Abd Abdullah Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 12', undated, *Internet Archive*, https://archive.org/details/audio_abdullah_sungkar/U_Abdullah_Sungkar_12.mp3, accessed: 26 January 2020

themselves. In this respect, Sungkar effectively used *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* to develop a community of dedicated followers from which an Islamic state could, eventually, be built.

Conclusion

Although Kartosuwiryo adopted the concepts of *takfīr* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* belatedly, he nevertheless demonstrated they were effective tools for ensuring control and loyalty among both those fighting for the NII and among those it claimed as citizens. While his conceptualisation of these ideas was not as fully developed as his ideas on *hakimiyya* or *jihad*, they still played an important role in justifying the group's continued insurgency by ex-communicating the Muslim Republican leadership of Indonesia, and thus reinforcing the core ideas of the DI's belief structure. Kartosuwiryo used both concepts to ensure that support for his movement was never merely passive, but instead that supporters were required to demonstrate the highest commitment to their faith by being willing to lay down their life for Islam.

Abdullah Sungkar later refined Kartosuwiryo's ideas. His key contribution was adapting the use of these concepts to a period when the DI no longer controlled territory nor was engaged in an outright insurgency, by applying them to the daily lives of its members, thus ensuring purity of belief and ideological conformity among his followers. He focused on ensuring that DI members were clear on the boundaries of their faith and on justifying the continued rejection of the Indonesian state's legitimacy. In doing so, he laid the groundwork for attacks against both the state and also civilians who, in his view, had committed grave sins by tacitly supporting the regime or engaging in one of the numerous practices he deemed as un-Islamic.

Chapter 4 | Expanding *jihad*: Reconceptualising warfare after Kartosuwiryo, 1962-1979

The death of Kartosuwiryo had profound implications for the conceptualisation of *jihad* among militant Islamists in Indonesia in the 1960s and 1970s. This chapter will focus on the group's struggles to define *jihad* in the wake of his death and how the ascent of Abdullah Sungkar helped to cement the DI's understanding of the concept as a violent physical struggle against a broad array of enemies.

Like Kartosuwiryo, Sungkar embraced the necessity of *jihad* to establish an Islamic state, mainly because of increasing political repression by the authorities. However, his acceptance of the DI's vision of *jihad* was not merely passive. His background in Modernist activism and his experience persecution by the government and subsequent exile in Malaysia led him to define the enemies of Islam more broadly, expanding the range of targets for the group.

This chapter argues that there were significant continuities in how these Kartosuwiryo and Sungkar understood *jihad*. Like Kartosuwiryo before him, Sungkar eventually came to interpret the concept as a defensive and physical struggle to defeat the enemies of Islam in Indonesia. He also saw participation in this conflict as an obligation for all Muslims. Similarly, Sungkar conceptualised *jihad* as the sole means by which an Islamic state would be established in Indonesia. Sungkar did not merely repackaged Kartosuwiryo's ideas for a new era. His understanding of *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*, as explored in the previous chapter, helped him to create and promote an understanding of *jihad* that rested on a broader definition of what actions constituted *kufr* and thus who could be considered a *kafir*. As such, Sungkar expanded the range of legitimate targets compared to the range in Kartosuwiryo's time as the *imam* of DI.

Once again following a similar ideological trajectory to Kartosuwiryo, Sungkar gradually excluded non-violent interpretations of *jihad* his understanding of the idea. Both men experienced significant disappointment in advancing their goal of Islamising Indonesian society while operating as activists in the mainstream political process. They adopted increasingly uncompromising stances following experiences of heavy-handed repression by the authorities. As a result, domestic, rather than foreign, developments predominantly drove Sungkar's transformed thinking on *jihad*, at least in their initial years of membership in the DI movement.

This chapter makes these arguments over the course of three sections. This chapter begins by examining why numerous DI factions chose to interpret *jihad* as a non-violent struggle in the wake of Kartosuwiryo's death in 1962. It subsequently analyses how some DI leaders had already begun to push back against this pragmatic understanding of *jihad* and were increasingly willing to target minority religious groups and security forces prior to Sungkar's leadership. Finally, it will examine the transformative impact of Sungkar's membership on the DI's interpretation of the concept between 1976 and 1979 as Sungkar loses faith in non-violent methods to achieve an Islamic state.

Stasis: DI's pragmatic interpretation of *jihad* after Kartosuwiryo, 1962-1968

In the nearly 15 years following Kartosuwiryo's death, the DI remained largely leaderless due to state co-optation, repression and constant internal divisions over how to interpret *jihad*. The movement eventually split into two factions. A smaller group, led by Djaja Sudjadi, a senior DI figure and former NII minister of finance, advocated Kartosuwiryo's early conceptualisation of *jihad* as a spiritual struggle and supported non-violent non-cooperation with the Indonesian state. The other group, which included far more of Kartosuwiryo's top lieutenants, prioritised resuming a physical conflict and had fewer qualms with working with the state in order to take advantage of its material benefits to revitalise its ranks. Despite their differences, neither side appeared to make any effort to adjust or revise either of Kartosuwiryo's conceptualisations of the term.

The flexibility of Hidaybiyyah

Kartosuwiryo's execution on 5 September 1962 left DI in disarray both logistically and ideologically. He did not have a designated successor and 32 of his top lieutenants had signed the *Ikrar Bersama*, a declaration which pledged allegiance to the Indonesian government in exchange for amnesty, compromising their ability to subsequently lead the organisation. Kartosuwiryo had attempted to formalise the group's military command structure in the event of his death. On 7 August 1959, he issued a decree stating that 'if for one reason or another, [the *Komandemen Perang Seluruh Indonesia* (All-Indonesia Military Commander)] is unable to carry out his duties... a replacement may be taken among the K.Ts', a reference to the *komandemen tertinggi* (high commanders) or 'those of a position is considered equal', seemingly opening the position up to commanders of regional forces outside the group's stronghold in West Java. This meant that there

were numerous individuals with potentially legitimate claims to the group's leadership.⁶⁶² Their indecision in the wake of Kartosuwiryo's death resulted in a leadership vacuum for over a decade.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Kartosuwiryo's final communiqué to DI members told them that 'in the event of such a disaster', they should 'continue the fight as long as Pancasila is still there' and that they remained 'in a state of *jihad*'.⁶⁶³ Kartosuwiryo had significantly narrowed his and the movement's understanding of *jihad*, from a non-violent interpretation that centred on improving oneself spiritually a form of anti-colonial protest to one that saw violent, physical conflict as the only route to ensuring *hākimiyya*.

Nevertheless, Kartosuwiryo's interpretation of the concept was also pragmatic and responsive to political circumstances. As Republican forces closed in on the group's stronghold in West Java in 1959, he once again tried to reframe the concept of *jihad*, broadening its interpretation to encompass its non-violent meanings. While he reminded his followers not to give up the fight against the government, he also tacitly acknowledged the realities of their situation, and that military defeat was almost inevitable.

In the same document, Kartosuwiryo made references to the Hudaibiyah treaty that created a ten-year ceasefire between the Prophet Muhammad and Quraysh tribe of Mecca in March 628. The Qur'anic example was used to convince DI members to lay down their arms without shame and bide their time before resuming conflict at a more favourable moment. The story provided hope to Kartosuwiryo's followers by reframing their defeat as a voluntary, temporary cessation of hostilities to preserve their organisation for the eventual resumption of *jihad*. As such, Kartosuwiryo maintained that *jihad* remained a critical tool for the attainment of *hākimiyya*, but its manifestation as a physical conflict could be deprioritised in favour of other forms such as a personal, spiritual struggle.

Jihad Fillah

Even in 1975 – 13 years after Kartosuwiryo's death – some DI members continued to advocate for the use of non-violent *jihad* to attain *hākimiyya*, while downplaying the need to manifest this

⁶⁶² S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Ma'lumat Komandemen Tertinggi Nomor: 11', *Komandemen Tertinggi Angkatan Perang Negara Islam Indonesia*, 7 August 1959, in Al-Chaidar, *Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia S. M. Kartosuwiryo* (Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1999), pp.625-626

⁶⁶³ Kartosuwiryo, 'Wasiat Imam Negara Islam Indonesia'

struggle as a physical conflict. Led by Djaja Sudjadi, this faction urged others within the group to approach the resumption of military conflict against the government with caution and continued to invoke Kartosuwiryo's words to make their case.

Sudjadi had fought alongside Kartosuwiryo until his surrender and served as the NII's minister of finance. His former position and membership of a group of senior DI figures tasked with running the non-military functions of the NII, signalled his high standing within the organisation. However, unlike Kartosuwiryo, Sudjadi does not appear to have had credentials as a notable scholar or learned religious figure.

In a document entitled *Tjataan Djihad* (Notes on *Jihad*), Sudjadi, wrote that non-violent *jihad* should be prioritised.⁶⁶⁴ He had come to advocate a more moderate path of attaining an Islamic state, arguing that Kartosuwiryo's surrender had triggered a period of '*jihad fillah*', a spiritual jihad without the use of arms, similar to the Prophet Muhammad's signing of the Treaty of Hudaibiyya.⁶⁶⁵ This would give DI 'room and opportunity...to make preparations to continue to struggle', reiterating Kartosuwiryo's position that the relinquishing of arms would be a temporary state until victory could later be assured.⁶⁶⁶

In this regard, Sudjadi's move to interpret *jihad* as non-violent, spiritual struggle, harked back to Kartosuwiryo's interpretation of *jihad* in the 1930s as part of PSI, when he saw spiritual purification and non-cooperation as a form of *jihad* against the colonial Dutch authorities. However, Sudjadi does not appear to have developed this concept any further beyond referring to it as a spiritual quest and a means of buying time for the group to reorganise.

Like Kartosuwiryo's 1962 decree, this his vague reinterpretation of *jihad* gave DI members the ability maintain an ideological opposition to the Indonesian state but removed the requirement to pursue a physical *jihad* that they were, in Sudjadi's eyes, still not yet capable of winning. This emphasis on a spiritual rather than physical struggle was thus an act of self-preservation for the DI. The slippery and multifaceted nature of *jihad* thus permitted committed DI militants to lay

⁶⁶⁴ Interview with AR, a former DI member, Jakarta, 9 October 2019. I was unable to verify AR's position within the organisation and the extent of his participation in its activities, although he claimed to have known Djaja Sujadi. Nevertheless, his description of Sujadi's role broadly aligns with accounts in other texts, see: Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, pp.49-50 and pp.52-53

⁶⁶⁵ Djaja Sudjadi, 'Tjataan Djihad', Unpublished Manuscript (c.1975), p.81 in Quinton Temby, 'Jihadist Assemble: The rise of militant Islam in Southeast Asia', PhD Thesis, Australian National University (2017) p.72

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid

down their arms once again, secure in the belief that they were not wholly renouncing the struggle for an Islamic state.

This attempt at reinterpretation by Sudjadi illustrates that, regardless of whether it was taken to mean a spiritual or physical conflict, *jihad* was still a critical component of the DI's ideological framework in 1975. Rather than renouncing their commitment to the idea altogether, Sudjadi's reframing shows that he still saw *jihad* as both a critical tool for achieving an Islamic state in the future and a concept that had purchase with his membership. Moreover, his reframing of the concept left open the possibility of the resumption of violence when circumstances favoured the group's victory.

Nevertheless, the commitment to this interpretation of *jihad* was short-lived. An interview with a former DI member indicates that Sudjadi did not appear to have a strong enough following within DI to impose his understanding of the term on the organisation as a whole.⁶⁶⁷ The testimony of this member, whose accounts may be biased or based on faulty memories, may not be enough for us to be able to say with certainty how widely-shared Sudjadi's interpretation was among DI members at the time. However, Sudjadi's dislike of many of his former DI comrades, as chronicled by Solahudin, and his eventual decision to leave the organisation, gives weight to the idea that his non-violent interpretation of *jihad* held little purchase.⁶⁶⁸

The enemy of my enemy

Most DI commanders who had served as members of the NII's military high command or were '*komandemen wilajah*' (regional commanders), unlike Sudjadi, advocated a return to violent confrontation with the Indonesian state. Led by Aceng Kurnia, senior DI members such as Adah Djaelani Tirtapraja, Ateng Djaelani, Ules Sudjai, Djaja Sujadi Wijaya, Danu Muhamad Hassan, Zaenal Abidin, Toha Mahfud, and Dodo Mohamad Darda began meeting in the late 1960s to revive the moment, intending to embrace a more militaristic interpretation of *jihad* akin to Kartosuwiryo's understanding of the term as he proclaimed the foundation of the NII in 1949.

However, many of these men had also signed the *Ikerar Bersama* in 1962, pledging loyalty to the Republic and acknowledging that the DI movement had been 'wrong and misguided, and had

⁶⁶⁷ Interview with AR, a former DI member, Jakarta, 9 October 2019.

⁶⁶⁸ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, p.54

sinned against the people of West Java'.⁶⁶⁹ In exchange, they received amnesty from prosecution. Despite this apparent acquiescence, these men would later go on to participate in violent anti-state activities in the late 1970s and 1980s. This suggests that their decision to sign the 1962 declaration was a pragmatic choice to compromise given the defeat of their rebellion, and did not indicate a true change of heart.

These DI members demonstrated huge pragmatism in signing the *Ikrar Bersama*. They were willing to sign their names to a document renouncing their commitment to an Islamic state and to swear allegiance to an enemy in order to keep themselves and their movement alive in service of one day reviving mission to create an Islamic state in Indonesia. A more ideologically inflexible and uncompromising doctrine would have likely resulted in their choosing to die for their beliefs, or at least serving incredibly long prison terms. Instead, their actions indicated that martyrdom was not a core component of their conceptualisation of *jihad* at the time, nor did they appear to believe that death or incapacitation would serve their goal of creating an Islamic state in Indonesia.

This pragmatism became a hallmark of their relationship with the Indonesian state during this period. Indonesian politics had undergone radical change in the last few years of the DI insurgency. By 1957, President Sukarno had introduced 'Guided Democracy': he dismantled the federal state and replaced the elected parliament with a fully appointed body. He suspended elections and dissolved political parties.⁶⁷⁰ By 1963, Sukarno had appointed himself president for life and 'increasingly favoured the PKI',⁶⁷¹ aligning himself more publicly with the communists. He allowed them to take control of major news organisations, such as the Antara news agency, and installed sympathetic leftists in the political parties that remained.⁶⁷² With the communists in ascendance, rumours of a coup began circulating throughout the country in 1965.

On 30 September 1965, a group of military officers based in the Halim air force base in Jakarta attempted to kill seven generals. The men succeeded in murdering all but one, precipitating a response from a faction of senior military officials led by Major-General Suharto.⁶⁷³ Suharto denounced the group, labelling the action a coup and using the opportunity to take control of the

⁶⁶⁹ ICG, 'Recycling Militants in Indonesia', p.2

⁶⁷⁰ Donald Hindley, "Political Power and the October 1965 Coup in Indonesia", *Journal of Asian Studies* 26:2 (February 1967), p.241

⁶⁷¹ David Easter, "'Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling': Western Covert Intervention in Indonesia, October 1965 – March 1966", *Cold War History* 5:1 (February 2005), p.56

⁶⁷² *Ibid*

⁶⁷³ Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.157

country. The details surrounding the plot's origins, the extent of PKI involvement, the role of anti-Communist Western powers, and Suharto's own ambitions remain hotly contested.⁶⁷⁴ But regardless of the plot's origins, the events of 30th September set in motion the demonisation of the communists and their eventual massacre. The military, often aided by vigilante groups, targeted anyone affiliated with or accused of having affiliations with the Communist Party. The estimated death toll ranges from 400,000 to 500,000 people between October 1965 and March 1966.⁶⁷⁵

In this period of upheaval, some military officials saw in DI a potential ally. Despite years of animosity, these officers appear to have believed that they could harness the group's anti-Sukarno and anti-communist sentiments. At very least, the officers' actions suggest that they were confident that a sufficient financial incentive would overcome any potential ideological obstacles and secure the DI's cooperation.

For DI members, the overtures to work with the military against the PKI presented an opportunity to regain weapons and funds, and to observe the workings of (and potentially infiltrate and exact revenge on) some of those responsible for their perceived persecution. The trade-off was a willingness to work alongside and – even take orders from – the army that caused their defeat just a few years earlier.

In participating in this activity, DI members once again showed great flexibility in their conceptualisation of *jihad*, choosing to work with the military and slowly regroup, rather than taking the weaponry and quickly resuming their conflict with the state. It also meant that members could continue to practice a form of physical *jihad*, aimed, if not at the state itself, at an enemy of Islam: godless communists.

It is also likely that the DI understood that resuming direct hostilities with the state would result in the group's annihilation, and again demonstrated that they were unwilling to sacrifice themselves for their cause at this juncture. The remnants of the organisation appear to have prioritised survival and the long-term actualisation of their aims of an Islamic state. It also indicates that their understanding of *jihad* remained pragmatic – the group ultimately appears to have still viewed it as a tool to achieve *hākimiyya* rather than a worthy pursuit in and of itself.

⁶⁷⁴ For a detailed discussion on the debates surrounding the outbreak of the coup attempt see John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'État in Indonesia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006)

⁶⁷⁵ Robert Cribb, 'Genocide in Indonesia: 1965-66', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 3:2 (2001), p.233

According to Geoffrey Robinson, the notion that DI militia groups would have had significant autonomy to pursue their own local interests and agendas is ‘mistaken, and with rare exceptions, these militia groups and death squads operated under army direction and control’.⁶⁷⁶ Kill lists were ‘often prepared by the army and then passed along to vigilantes’⁶⁷⁷ and militia groups were ‘mobilised, armed trained and supported by the army’.⁶⁷⁸ Quinton Temby’s work also makes this argument, writing that a close advisor to General Suharto, Ali Moertopo, encouraged a close relationship with the group, making Danu Hasan, a senior DI member, his main point of contact and using him and his men to ‘pursue pro-Sukarno officials who had gone into hiding’.⁶⁷⁹ DI members were also likely to have acted out of self-preservation, cooperating to avoid arrest or punishment. Individuals who resisted and attempted to carry on the fight against the state, such as Ahmad Sobari (a DI district head in Priangan Timur in West Java) and Opa Mastopa (a regiment commander in Rajapolah, Tasikmalaya) were swiftly arrested by the authorities when their actions were discovered.⁶⁸⁰

Those who cooperated were indeed rewarded. An ICG report notes that the military also ‘offered weapons in exchange for help in attacking suspected communists (PKI) in West Java, Aceh, and North Sumatra’.⁶⁸¹ Additionally, the men received far more than weapons and training from the state as compensation for their help in defeating the PKI. During his trial on charges of subverting the Indonesian state, Haji Ismail Pranoto (alias Hispran) admitted that he knew Danu and Ateng Djaelani were on the government’s payroll when they organised and participated in the pogroms. According to Hispran ‘[one] gets a salary and a car, one distributes kerosene for the whole of West Java’,⁶⁸² showing he knew that Danu was being paid like a civil servant and that Ateng had attained his position as the Bandung municipality chairperson of the Association of Oil and Gas Companies (Gapermigas) in 1968 with support from the Siliwangi military command’.⁶⁸³ Some DI figures even believed that the reason for their favourable treatment by the military so soon after their defeat was a sign that the military genuinely supported their cause for an Islamic state. This perception

⁶⁷⁶ Geoffrey B. Robinson, *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965-66* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), p.160

⁶⁷⁷ *Idem*, p.155

⁶⁷⁸ *Idem*, p.160

⁶⁷⁹ Temby, “Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah”, pp.6-7

⁶⁸⁰ ICG, ‘Recycling Militants in Indonesia’, pp.2-3

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid*

⁶⁸² ‘Pecahnya Sesepuh DI’, *Tempo*, 30 September 1978

⁶⁸³ *Ibid*

was aided by the fact that Ali Moertopo had fought alongside some DI members as part of the Hizbullah militia during the Japanese occupation period.⁶⁸⁴

It is difficult to gain insight into how these individuals negotiated these apparent contradictions: they worked so closely under the military, and even profited from the newly installed Suharto government. Many of the DI members who participated in the violence against purported PKI members have since died and few, if any, chronicled this period. Nevertheless, Kartosuwiryo's final, pragmatic conceptualisation of *jihad* may have provided them with a means of rationalising their collaboration.

It would be easy to write off these men as insufficiently committed to the DI cause or to suggest that their understanding of the ideology (or the ideology itself) was not robust, but most of them did return to forms of conflict against the state in the late 1970s. As such, it is likely that they did believe that stockpiling weaponry and funds for the future would put them in a better position to eventually launch their *jihad* against the state, as their former leader had suggested.

The DI's lack of a clear military or spiritual leader hindered the group's ability to wholly alter or put forward a competing ideological interpretation to Kartosuwiryo's understanding of *jihad*. The group remained effectively leaderless between 1962 and 1968, with the ICG noting that Kartosuwiryo's deputies 'bickered' and the 'rank-and-file... were left rudderless'.⁶⁸⁵ With the men focused on maintaining some semblance of a cohesive organisation, it was understandable that they paid little attention to theological debates and had little time to craft treaties extolling the virtues of *jihad* in all its various forms.

Spoiling for a fight: An end to a pragmatic interpretation of *jihad*, 1968-1976

As the group entered the 1970s, Kartosuwiryo's malleable definition allowed for numerous DI members to justify their co-optation by state security services. However, the Suharto regime's increasing intolerance of Muslim political organisations and perceived embrace of religious minorities, particularly Christians, would push numerous DI leaders to push for an increasingly confrontational approach with the government. Similar to Abdullah Sungkar's increasing disillusionment with peaceful political activism as a means of achieving an Islamic state, younger

⁶⁸⁴ ICG, 'Recycling Militants in Indonesia', p.3

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid

DI members were beginning to contest the approach of their predecessors, ultimately embracing violent *jihad* against the state as ideologically consistent with the group's primary aim of achieving God's sovereignty on earth.

Getting their money's worth

While the group achieved little in terms of its ideological development in the years following Kartosuwiryo's death, DI members that cooperated with the government did manage to reap some rewards. By 1968, Aceng Kurnia, one of Kartosuwiryo's most trusted deputies, established the Penggerak Rumah Tangga Islam (PRTI, Islamic Household Movement) with the aim of bringing the DI leadership back together. An ICG interview with one PRTI participant revealed that, after some deliberation, Aceng Kurnia decided to ask the Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (BAKIN, State Intelligence Agency of Indonesia) 'to support a get-together with DI leaders'.⁶⁸⁶ BAKIN consented, giving the group the requisite funding to host the reunion.

On the face of it, the intelligence agency's decision to cooperate with the militants appears odd. However, Lieutenant Colonel Ali Moertopo had been engaged in a long-running scheme to entice DI members into President Suharto's Golkar party ahead of the 1971 election. Moertopo has been referred to by Ken Conboy as Suharto's 'trouble shooter'. When the DI reunion took place, BAKIN officials reportedly gave speeches to the assembled militants extolling the virtues of joining Golkar.⁶⁸⁷ According to Conboy, Ali Moertopo had been courting elements within the group since 1965, wooing them as he did Ateng Djaelani, with business contracts, and other forms of financial gain.⁶⁸⁸ This strategy appeared largely successful, at least in the short-term. Moertopo's deputies claimed that '[of] the twenty-six core leaders in the movement... a third were cooperative'.⁶⁸⁹

This reprieve from persecution, coupled with an influx of funds and weapons, helped DI re-establish its structure, even though the government was fully aware of its activities. In 1973, DI leaders from West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh gathered at a house on Mahoni Street in Tanjung Priok for a meeting.⁶⁹⁰ According to Gaos Taufik, the DI's Medan commander, who was deposed

⁶⁸⁶ Idem, p.4

⁶⁸⁷ 'Pitut dan Ali Murtopo Ditolak Jadi Saksi', *Pikiran Rakyat*, 2 June 1978

⁶⁸⁸ Kenneth J. Conboy, *Intel: Inside Indonesia's Intelligence Service* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing Asia, 2004), p.142

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid

⁶⁹⁰ 'Keterlibatan Daud Beureuh', *Sinar Harapan*, 10 January 1978

as a witness at the trial of Timsar Zubil, a DI member who participated in several attacks on civilians, on 10 January 1978, the 'West Java DI/TII leader Adah Jailani proposed that Teuku Daud Beureuh take up the DI/TII's leadership again'.⁶⁹¹ Daud Beureuh agreed to take on the position temporarily and became the group's acting imam, largely due to his seniority in the militant Islamist movement.

Daud had been a leading figure in the resistance against the Dutch in Aceh. By 1953, he and his followers in Aceh issued a statement announcing that the province was separating from the Indonesian Republic and joining the NII. Although part of NII, Daud operated autonomously, announcing in 1955 that the province was a 'federal state' rather than an integral part of the NII.⁶⁹²

He was installed as the titular head of the organisation in 1973. But he 'did not authorise' the formation of regional combat or battalion commands for the resumption of a *jihad* against the Indonesian state due to a lack of preparedness and resources.⁶⁹³ The decision not to engage in military conflict once again highlights the strategic acumen of the group's leadership. The lack of urgency to confront the state militarily suggests that, in the 11 years following Kartosuwiryo's death, the physical performance of *jihad* was, like the preservation of his Islamic state, an aspiration.

A change of heart

However, Daud was either overruled or relented shortly after the initial meeting. The group began to reorganise itself into a military command structure, indicating that it had not given up on the concept of a physical *jihad* entirely. Instead, *jihad* remained essential to the realisation of *hākimiyya*, but it needed to be performed slowly and with guarantees of success. The group returned to the structure largely based on the one established by Kartosuwiryo in 1949. It once again divided the country up into seven zones of war, overseen by an 'All Indonesia War Command' led by a supreme commander, who oversaw regional heads.⁶⁹⁴

These preparations and the use of militaristic language indicate that the group had not given up its belief that *jihad* was the sole means of realising an Islamic state. The fact that the DI's new leadership focused on slow but steady combat preparations rather than using their connections

⁶⁹¹ Ibid

⁶⁹² Aspinal, *Islam and Nation*, p.31

⁶⁹³ 'Keterlibatan Daud Beureuh' *Sinar Harapan*, 10 January 1978

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid

with the armed forces to lobby the government politically – or even revive *dakwah* efforts – suggested that a militaristic interpretation of *jihad* was now central to the group’s identity.

This rapid switch from cooperation with the state to a desire to violently oppose it is largely unaccounted for in the literature on the DI and JI. Few, if any written sources exist from this period, and few participants remain alive and willing to participate in interviews. Part of the explanation may lie in the fact that like Sungkar and other Islamists, DI leaders were increasingly appalled by the apparently un-Islamic laws being promulgated by the Suharto government. Solahudin speculates that the ‘rapid industrialisation’ of Aceh as well as the ‘influx of Western companies’ following the discovery of oil in the region affected Daud deeply, causing him to act to stop the spread of sin.⁶⁹⁵ Several DI members arrested by the police on 8 January 1977 would later tell the authorities that, by 1975, Daud had advocated the creation a ‘*Barisan fi Sabilillah*’, a fighting front, seemingly disregarding his earlier caution.⁶⁹⁶

Regardless, of whether their so-called ‘temporary’ imam really advocated this, the actions of DI members indicate that they supported resuming their violent struggle against the Indonesian state. In order to make up for their lack of resources, DI members sought assistance from foreign governments. During Timsar Zubil’s trial (who a *Sinar Harapan* news report identified as a ‘leading *Jihad* Commander’) Dainuri Saleh, the ‘fourth assistant in the North Sumatra DI/TII Regional Combat Command’ claimed that DI had sent a letter to the Libyan ambassador in Kuala Lumpur.⁶⁹⁷ The letter, signed by Daud Beureuh, ‘requested the aid of 12 billion as well as weapons and other military equipment from the president of Libya’.⁶⁹⁸ Following a visit to Aceh to consult with Daud, Dainuri Saleh and Rifai Ahmad were told the group required the aid to ‘equip the [TII] and to revive the DI’ and that it ‘was sorely needed to fight against the RI [Indonesian Republic] government’. Another witness, identified only as RA, the son of the leader of Central Java DI branch, said the group subsequently requested ‘300,000 light weapons and the most modern heavy weapons’ from the Libyans.⁶⁹⁹ These pleas to the Libyan government went unanswered.

The group also tried to acquire money and weapons through criminal activity during this period. In the same trial, another witness, identified as Anwar Jerri (‘fourth assistant in the North Sumatra

⁶⁹⁵ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, p.58

⁶⁹⁶ ‘Pecahnya Sesepuh DI’, *Tempo*, 30 September 1978

⁶⁹⁷ ‘Hubungan Luar Negeri’, *Sinar Harapan*, 11 January 1978

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid (Additionally, this request seems to have no bearing on reality. \$12 billion, presumably US dollars, would have been 68% of Libya’s GDP in 1976, according to UN figures.)

⁶⁹⁹ ‘Mencari Senjata’, *Sinar Harapan*, 18 January 1978

DI/TII Regional Combat Command'), planned to steal 6 million Rupiah from a company called PT Milano.⁷⁰⁰ However, the plan failed because the would-be thieves were unable to secure a vehicle. Nevertheless, the men were successful in gathering small arms, such as 'a Colt .38... along with six grenades', an FN .32 pistol, and smaller sums of money.⁷⁰¹ These efforts led to plans to 'sabotage the arrival of President Suharto in Medan in 1975 when he came to inaugurate a plywood plant, as well as to bomb a bridge and set fire to the Medan fair' but were stopped due to unspecified reasons.⁷⁰²

Even though many of these plans had come to nought, they show that many of the group's top commanders and members were ready to resume a violent and physical *jihad* against the Indonesian government. Based on their methods and target selection, this *jihad* appeared to have been conceptualised in the same manner as Kartosuwiryo's challenge to the Dutch colonial administration and subsequently the Republican government. Timsar Zubil argued in his trial that 'there was a consensus' among DI leaders of the need 'to implement *shari'a* in Indonesia' and 'as a Muslim, it was his duty to challenge the current laws and regulations of the Indonesian Republic'.⁷⁰³

It is clear that in both periods, DI leaders rationalised their rebellion on the grounds that the authorities had failed in their duty to uphold Islamic laws and practice Islamic governance for the benefit of the predominantly Muslim population. Through the reformation of a national command structure as well as formally writing to and requesting aid from other states, DI leaders in the 1970s conceived of themselves as equals to the government of an Indonesia. This not only conferred legitimacy to the group in the eyes of its members, elevating its position from a small band of rebels to an organisation with equal status and claim to control of Indonesia.

Expanding *Jihad*: Sungkar and Ba'asyir join DI, 1976-1979

Sungkar's interpretation of *jihad* showed many continuities with Kartosuwiryo and previous DI leaders. His key contribution to its development in the group's ideological framework, however, was to successfully link the concept together with *takfir and al-wala' wa-l-bara'*, thus expanding the range of legitimate targets for the group. These ideas had already begun to circulate among DI members prior to the arrival of Sungkar, indicating the prevalence of *salafi* material being promoted

⁷⁰⁰ 'Hubungan Luar Negeri', *Sinar Harapan*, 11 January 1978

⁷⁰¹ Ibid

⁷⁰² 'Mencari Senjata', *Sinar Harapan*, 18 January 1978

⁷⁰³ 'Rencana NII' *Sinar Harapan*, 6 January 1978

in Indonesia at the time, but they had not been fully codified or developed by existing members, many of whom were jailed as he entered the organisation.

Thus, rather than introducing ideas that were completely novel, Sungkar found an organisation with a receptive audience for their teachings and interpretation of *jihad*. During his initial years, he was able to more cogently present and link these three concepts together due to his background as preachers and teachers.

Embracing non-traditional conflict

Despite aspirations to fight the Indonesian state as an equal force, the reality was that DI was still far too weak to effectively carry out a military campaign. Between 1976 and 1979, despite the formation of a formal military command structure, the organisation only conducted sporadic, small-scale bombings, occasionally killed individuals purportedly working for the state, and targeted religious minorities. They made little progress toward their long-term goal of bringing about a theocratic regime in Indonesia. DI was not even able to sustain a low-level insurgency that would engage the Indonesian military in a guerrilla campaign. This was both due to its lack of access to weaponry and funding (particularly after their requests to the Libyan government went unanswered) and continued infiltration and surveillance by the government itself.

As such, the movement's attempts to reconceptualise *jihad* in the aftermath of its revival was once again shaped by the limitations of its circumstances. In contrast to the arguments put forward by Sidney Jones, Solahudin and Quinton Temby, it is posited here that the evolution of DI's understanding of *jihad* had begun before the involvement of Sungkar. Jones and Temby are particularly strident in attributing all ideological development during this period to Sungkar. Jones wrote that 'by itself, DI could not have produced JI. It was a parochial, ideologically unsophisticated guerrilla movement' that would require the assistance of a 'highly educated, Modernist Muslim urban elite' to fully transform.⁷⁰⁴ This is not to downplay the significant role Sungkar subsequently played in changing the DI's understanding of *jihad*, but rather to acknowledge that he entered the organisation at a time of ideological upheaval, driven largely by the circumstances the existing membership found itself in, and thus found a receptive audience for his beliefs. Ultimately, Sungkar was able to provide a framework for these new ideas, thus crafting an expanded understanding of *jihad* within the movement.

⁷⁰⁴ Jones, 'New Order Repression and the Birth of the Jemaah Islamiyah', p.40

DI's embrace of asymmetric conflict and the targeting of both religious minorities and Muslims deemed to have transgressed had begun prior to the entry of Sungkar. DI leaders had spent the period between 1962 and early 1976 largely regrouping and reorganising its members into a military command structure once again, and they made few innovations in terms of their interpretation of *jihad* from Kartosuwiryo's at the height of the insurgency. This appeared to change in 1976 when the group began to branch out from attacks against government officials, security forces and other state institutions.

In October 1976, DI militants attacked the Baptist-run Emanuel Hospital in Bukittinggi by planting a bomb in a toilet.⁷⁰⁵ The attack does not appear to have caused significant damage or casualties. In his trial in January 1978, Timsar Zubil admitted that he had ordered DI members to:

set fire to churches in Pekanbaru and West Sumatra, throw grenades into churches, theatres, a bar and a school in Medan, set fire to the Java Christian Church in the Sei Rotan village.⁷⁰⁶

These attacks were all conducted in the months following the bombing of the Baptist hospital. This rise in activity also marked a change in the DI's targeting patterns and heralded a significant shift away from Kartosuwiryo's interpretation of *jihad*, even prior to the arrival of Sungkar. In bombing cinemas, places of worship, and even targeting traditionalist mosques, DI members acting under Timsar's orders demonstrated a willingness to view civilians, regardless of their religious background, as legitimate targets. This represents a departure from the group's former respect for and adherence to traditional conduct in warfare, as spelled out in its 1949 penal code, which generally prohibited attacks on non-combatants, particularly women and children. While DI members did attack civilians during its insurgency, the inclusion of laws of conduct during war in its penal code suggested that Kartosuwiryo was at least theoretically committed to refraining from indiscriminate attacks.

While Timsar does not appear to have explicitly referenced any *salafi* scholarship during his trial, the group's targeting patterns in the mid-1970s indicated that they were beginning to adopt some ideas from radical *salafi* scholarship into its conceptualisation of *jihad*, namely the concepts of *al-*

⁷⁰⁵ 'Aktivitas Teror', *Sinar Harapan*, 6 January 1978

⁷⁰⁶ *Ibid*

wala' wa-l-bara' and *takfir*. In targeting places of apparent vice, such as bars, or Christian-run hospitals and churches, the group appears to have been drawing a hard line between that which was pure and good and anything even potentially un-Islamic.

This delineation seemingly reflected the nascent incorporation of *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* into the group's interpretation of *jihad*. By destroying these places of sin and danger, DI members under Timsar's command were ultimately demonstrating their commitment to God by removing un-Islamic practices from their society and protecting Muslims from potentially being tempted by one of these establishments, or inadvertently participating in un-Islamic activity.

Quinton Temby, citing Timsar's deposition file during his 1978 hearing, states that Timsar ordered these attacks in 1976 as 'shock therapy' for Indonesian society and the Suharto regime.⁷⁰⁷ In justifying the attacks as such, Timsar and his DI cadres saw the accommodation of Christians and the spread of drinking establishments and cinemas as signals that his society had become immoral and hedonistic. The attacks were thus an attempt to save Muslims from these sins, demonstrating a willingness to protect their co-religionists and denounce un-Islamic practices. Timsar's justification for his attacks has strong parallels to Sayed Qutb's lamentations that societies ruled by un-Islamic governments exist in a state of *jahiliyya* with corrupt leaders who are either unable or worse, unwilling to tackle these perceived social ills.

Timsar and other DI cadres from this period did not leave a comprehensive written record and few are still alive and able to give interviews, making it difficult to ascertain with certainty the extent to which Qutb's scholarship and notions of *takfir* and *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* motivated these attacks. Nevertheless, far as their targeting patterns serve as a guide, these DI members appeared to have been slowly embracing the idea that there was no room in an Islamic state for the inclusion of non-Muslims. As such, their conception of *jihad* increasingly focused on purging Indonesian society of these un-Islamic elements (whether minority religious groups or un-Islamic behaviours) as much as on overthrowing the Republican state. While Kartosuwiryo had advocated the expulsion of the Dutch and condemned their promotion of the Christian faith, his constitution and penal code had suggested that non-Muslims would still be able to live in his Indonesia if they accepted NII rule and paid *jizya* (a special tax on non-Muslims).

⁷⁰⁷ Temby, 'Jihadists Assemble', p.75

In this new conception, however, Muslims were increasingly obligated to undertake a violent *jihad* to protect their faith from sin and transgressions, rather than merely purifying their own personal faith or taking non-violent actions to improve their community. They now had a duty act not only to express their disavowal by confronting and eradicating the sinful but to demonstrate their commitment and loyalty to their in-group, thus keeping them safe.

No transgression was deemed too small to go unpunished. For example, Timsar Zubil chose to attack the Riang cinema because 'he was aggrieved that it had shown an Egyptian film he thought denigrated Islamic teachings'.⁷⁰⁸ In doing so, he demonstrated that an individual's obligation to *jihad* was totalising. Since failing to respond to even seemingly minor infractions or insults to the faith would indicate a Muslim's failure to show loyalty to his God and his co-religionists, policing the boundaries of the faith and protecting it from danger became constant necessities.

The attacks on NU-affiliated or government-built mosques indicated another significant evolution in DI's conceptualisation of *jihad*. The explicit targeting of other Muslims signalled that *takefir* was becoming increasingly crucial to group's understanding of *jihad*. While Kartosuwiryo had eventually come to embrace the idea of *takefir*, his application of the concept was more circumscribed than his successors', generally limiting its application to condemning enemies while engaged in an armed struggle against them. In explicitly targeting Muslims outside of a warzone, Timsar's faction was redrawing the boundaries of the group's definition of who constituted a true Muslim and what practices were Islamic, thus creating an in-group of true believers and an out-group of heretics. For instance, participation in a government-backed competition, regardless of its religious content, would now indicate that those involved were practicing a corrupted form of Islam, sullied by the involvement of an un-Islamic state.

Nevertheless, these ideas of *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* and *takefir* were never fully articulated or concretised into a doctrine alongside *jihad* by figures in this revitalised version of DI. However, the group's changing tactics and targeting patterns suggest that DI leaders had firmly moved away from guerrilla warfare against the conventional military forces of the Republic, prioritising instead the targeting of religious minorities and Muslim civilians deemed to have transgressed. This shift was probably the result of a combination of these new ideas and an adaptation to the realities of their situation. Lacking a guerrilla army, money, arms, or a territorial stronghold, the group was now forced to take its *jihad* into more urban settings. Sungkar's contribution to the group would be to

⁷⁰⁸ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism*, p.63

use his background as a teacher and a religious scholar to clarify and articulate these concepts as they applied to *jihad* in a far more structured and considered manner.

While revitalised, the surge of activity in 1976 came at great cost to the leadership of DI. The attacks quickly resulted in a series of raids by the government. Timsar Zubil was the first to be arrested on 16 January 1977.⁷⁰⁹ Most of the senior leadership, including Hispran, Gaos Taufik, Dodo Muhammad Darda, Danu Muhammad Hasan, and Ateng Djaelani, were rounded up by June that same year. Those that were not caught up in the police dragnet quickly fled. By 1978, the group's imam, Daud Beureueh, was placed under house arrest, leaving the organisation in disarray.

The arrests not only created space for new leaders to emerge but presented an opportunity for the reshaping of the group's ideology. Many of those arrested had worked closely with Kartosuwiryo in the NII and were keen to carry on his legacy, rarely deviating from his teachings. Their removal from the organisation thus presented an opportunity for newcomers with different ideas to stamp their own mark on the group.

In this period of upheaval and uncertainty, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were formally inducted in December 1976. Their decision to embrace the organisation, particularly during this period of violent revival, marked a clear end to their commitment to a non-violent struggle to create an Islamic state in Indonesia. According to AK, this decision was clear when Muhammad Natsir told Sungkar he could no longer be a member of DDII as long as he was a member of DI.⁷¹⁰ Sungkar promptly renounced his DDII membership, breaking with Natsir's commitment to non-violence and political engagement.

Linking jihad, al-walā' wa-l-barā' and takfīr

As noted above, Sungkar was not introducing entirely new concepts to DI members, but had instead found a receptive audience for the *salafī*-inspired doctrine that they had honed at Pondok Ngruki. Sungkar did not explicitly call for violence against the Indonesian state while teaching general lessons in the *pesantren* or in public sermons. In his public sermons, Sungkar tended to focus on the concepts of *takfīr*, *al-walā' wa-l-barā'*, and *hākimiyya*, deriding nationalism as a corrupt ideology, explaining its incompatibility with the Muslim faith, and discussing various forms of *shirk*

⁷⁰⁹ *Tempo*, 'Penerjun Itu Dihukum Mati', 18 March 1978

⁷¹⁰ Interview with AK, Jakarta, 4 October 2019

and other un-Islamic practices. Sungkar's reluctance to speak on *jihad* outside of these small groups was likely due to concerns about security, particularly since he had already been censured for speaking about less incendiary topics at the al-Irsyad radio station.

His teachings regarding the necessity and justification of *jihad* were reserved for a few trusted students as they were being indoctrinated into the DI movement. These discussions usually took place at extra-curricular *pengajian* (Islamic study sessions) in small groups with existing DI members, often in the homes of the teachers.⁷¹¹ As Kirsten Schulze and Julie Chernov Hwang note, these sessions were 'tightly controlled' and 'aimed at establishing a completely reliable and committed membership bound by loyalty not just to the *amir* but also to their fellow *ikhwan* [brothers]'.⁷¹² As such, discussions of *jihad* were reserved for when participants had been through numerous sessions, often over the course of several months.

Interviews with DI and JI members who attended these sessions in Indonesia prior to Sungkar and Ba'asyir's flight to Malaysia, suggest that, in private, Sungkar's thoughts on *jihad* had been shaped by his personal experience and the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁷¹³ Though few could remember the specifics of these lessons, or were willing to disclose further information, they claimed that Sungkar discussed extracts from *Jundullah* (Army of God) by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader Said Hawwa, Maududi's *Jihad in Islam*, and Sayyid Qutb's *Milestones* and *In the Shade of the Qur'an* in these sessions. These texts are unlikely to have been the only ones referenced, but participants did not offer up additional sources on *jihad* during these interviews.

There are further complications with determining a comprehensive list of texts that influenced Sungkar's thinking on *jihad* in his initial years as a DI member. Members like Ahmad Sajuli bashfully admitted that they did not actually read everything assigned, illustrating the possibility that texts that were key to Sungkar may have simply been forgotten by those he taught.⁷¹⁴ As noted earlier, Sungkar rarely gave public speeches on the topic, nor did he write much of his ideology down, so first-hand accounts of his thoughts on *jihad* are scarce.

⁷¹¹ Interview with Ali Imron, Jakarta, 2 October 2019

⁷¹² Hwang and Schulze, 'Why They Join: Pathways into Indonesian Jihadist Organisations', p.914

⁷¹³ Although all the interviewees mention Ba'asyir's presence alongside Sungkar, none credited him with developing or enhancing a conceptualisation of *jihad*.

⁷¹⁴ Interview with Ahmad Sajuli, Jakarta, 16 July 2018

Nevertheless, the three texts mentioned above provide some insight into his thinking on *jihad*. As Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo have noted with regards to the JI's interpretation of *jihad*, the use of these texts shows a greater reliance on twentieth century Islamist scholarship rather than classical *fiqh* compared to previous DI leaders.⁷¹⁵ This thesis broadly agrees with this assessment, but as noted above DI members had already begun to embrace *salafi* ideas spread by more contemporary ideologues prior to the arrival of Sungkar into the organisation. This indicates that the division was not as stark as Fealy and Bubalo suggest.

Firstly, there are again notable overlaps between Sungkar and Kartosuwiryo's beliefs. Sungkar embraced *jihad's* definition both as a physical and spiritual struggle, though he placed emphasis on the former. His use of Said Hawwa's work in his teaching supports this. Hawwa calls on Muslims to draw 'a sharp distinction between the forces of truth and falsehood, light and darkness, good and evil' and, like Qutb, argued that Muslim states were backsliding towards ignorance.⁷¹⁶ Hawwa had several remedies for this situation and thus advocated a wide-ranging conceptualisation of *jihad*, seeing its practice encompassing non-violent struggle for personal betterment (*jihad al-nafs*), persuasion and reasoning (*jihad bil lisan*), and a political *jihad*, which entailed the participation in civic action in order to shape public opinion.⁷¹⁷

However, he did not exclude the possibility of a physical *jihad* against enemies of Islam. Indeed, Hawwa argued that violence was sometimes necessary to overthrow an infidel regime or to protect Muslims from an invading force.⁷¹⁸ Sungkar's extensive *dakwah* efforts can be seen in this mould as a non-violent *jihad* to educate and persuade his fellow Muslims to come around to their ways of thinking. Similarly, in preaching extensively and publicly challenging the government over its unwillingness to implement Islamic law and governance, he was engaging in the non-violent promotion of their faith through civil discourse, akin to Kartosuwiryo's writings in *Fadjar Asia* and work with PSII and Masyumi.

The way in which Sungkar advanced the DI's understanding of *jihad* was his articulation of a relationship between *jihad*, *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* and *takefir*. All three concepts are fundamentally concerned with the protection of the Islamic faith. *Al-wala' wa-l-bara'* creates an in-group and an

⁷¹⁵ Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, 'Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia', *Lowy Institute For International Policy*, Paper 05 (Alexandria: Longueville Media), p.87

⁷¹⁶ Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, 'The Qur'anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The View of Sayyid Qutb', *Middle East Journal*, 37:1 (Winter, 1983), p.18 a

⁷¹⁷ Idem, p.27

⁷¹⁸ Itzhak Weismann, 'Sa'id Hawwa and Islamic Revivalism in Ba'hist Syria', *Studia Islamica*, 85 (1997), pp.149-150

out-group, forcing participants to demonstrate their loyalty to their God and their co-religionists, while condemning that which lies outside it. *Takfir* establishes the boundaries of what is Islamic and what is not, and thus serves as a means to protect the community of believers from traitors within its midst. Finally, *jihad* is the ultimate tool in defending a community of Muslims from both internal and external threats.

Sungkar's use of Qutb and Maududi in his teachings gives some indication as to the source material for this conceptualisation. Both men argue that a physical and spiritual struggle is necessary to bring about God's rule on earth. Societies that fail to respect God as the sole authority will perpetuate great suffering and injustices against their citizens, and thus must be challenged.⁷¹⁹ Maududi began from the premise that 'Islam is a revolutionary ideology and programme which seeks to alter the social order for the whole world' for the good of all people.⁷²⁰ As such, the purpose of '*jihad* is to eliminate the rule of an un-Islamic system and establish instead an Islamic system of state rule', thus securing *hākimiyya*.⁷²¹ Similarly, Qutb argued that *jihad* is both 'striving through fight and striving through preaching' and a tool to '[sweep] away tyranny and [bring] real freedom to man'.⁷²² Without *jihad* and the participation of Muslims, the community was doomed to continue to live in a state of *jābiliyyah*.

The two ideologues saw *jihad* as a totalising force and were unconcerned by debates about its offensive or defensive nature. Qutb argued that it could not be a 'defensive movement in the narrow and limited sense' for Islam's true nature was not only to preserve and protect Muslims but to liberate them from all tyranny.⁷²³ This conceptualisation thus opened the door to staging attacks on a wider variety of targets, no longer constrained by a definite objective of expelling an invading force from a territory, or simply toppling an un-Islamic ruler from power. Maududi made similar arguments, stating that Muslims must defend and protect certain principles but also launch 'an assault on the principles of the opponent' in order to 'abolish the government which sustains these principles'.⁷²⁴ In Maududi's conceptualisation of the term, there can be no security for Muslims until the achievement of *hākimiyya*. As such, all un-Islamic belief, even when held by those unconnected to the current rulers, should be challenged on the grounds that it perpetuates an un-Godly and threatening system to Muslims. This duty was thus incumbent upon all Muslims, with

⁷¹⁹ Qutb, *Milestones*, p.28

⁷²⁰ Maududi, *Jihad in Islam*, p.5

⁷²¹ Idem, p.22

⁷²² Qutb, *Milestones*, p.39

⁷²³ Idem, p.43

⁷²⁴ Maududi, *Jihad in Islam*, p.26

seemingly no limit to what could be considered an un-Islamic principle or act.⁷²⁵ While Maududi and Qutb's primary target was an un-Islamic state, their totalising and uncompromising interpretation of *jihad* introduced the theoretical possibility of struggling against any aspect of society to challenge un-Godliness and by proxy the infidel state as well.

Given this theoretical framework, Sungkar contributed significantly to DI's understanding of *jihad* by expanding the boundaries of what was un-Islamic, and thus a legitimate target for the group's operations. For example, his 1982 defence plea offers one of the clearest arguments for the excommunication of Indonesian government officials and their associates. Sungkar began by arguing that 'an ideal Islamic state is one that is based on pure Islamic law', and that any state which premises its legitimacy on something man-made is attempting to subvert God's will by claiming to be above (or at very least equal to) God.⁷²⁶ The government's promotion of *Pancasila* as a state ideology was thus a form of idolatry, since the state was forcing Indonesian Muslims to worship and respect something other than God.⁷²⁷ As such, those that promote *Pancasila* are themselves idolators and can be excommunicated from the faith.

Similarly, Sungkar argued later in his plea that the state demanding that civil servants show loyalty to Golkar alone, compelling educational institutions to raise the national flag, and sing the national anthem each day, forced Muslims to express devotion to something other than God.⁷²⁸ In each instance, Sungkar built a case that the Suharto administration was promoting a form of idolatry, and so its officials could not be seen as Muslims and would be 'punished in hell for eternity' for their actions.⁷²⁹ In describing the government as such, Sungkar seemingly drew heavily from the works of Qutb. Qutb made a similar argument that Sungkar could have easily paraphrased, writing that '[all] sovereignty belongs to God alone' and 'there is no law other than God's law; all authority belongs to God'.⁷³⁰ As such, governments that failed to implement *shari'a* were clearly apostates and legitimate targets for rebellion.

In making the case that Indonesian officials, and Muslim civilians that complied with their rule, were apostates, Sungkar, like Qutb before him, appeared to be laying the groundwork to sanction violence against the state and society. Qutb wrote that in order to establish the kingdom of God

⁷²⁵ Ibid

⁷²⁶ Sungkar, Ba'asyir, and Suryahardy, *Perjalanan hukum di Indonesia*, p.91

⁷²⁷ Idem, p.92

⁷²⁸ Idem, p.93

⁷²⁹ Idem, p.101

⁷³⁰ Qutb, *Milestones*, p.14

on earth, Muslims must '[take] power from the hands of its human usurpers'⁷³¹ and 'deliver blows at the political forces that make men slaves of something that is not Allah'.⁷³² While Sungkar did not articulate the logical conclusion of the declaration of the state as an apostate regime, he nevertheless commends Qutb's work, referencing its ideas repeatedly at his trial and in earlier sermons, suggesting that he largely agreed with its arguments.

In addition to delineating the state as an un-Islamic force, Sungkar also took issue with religious minorities and syncretic practices, which he believed undermined Islam. In his sermons, Sungkar routinely condemned various Javanese rituals or Western practices adopted by Muslims across Indonesia. In a sermon recorded sometime in the mid-1980s, he lamented that 'Sacred tombs are now open everywhere!' and that 'grand marriages, with people dressed in Western style' were taking place frequently.⁷³³ He cautioned his listeners to beware of '*bid'a* that has struck everywhere' and claimed that those participating in these rituals would 'clearly be tortured by Allah'.⁷³⁴ While Sungkar did not call for attacks targeting these individuals in these sermons, his diatribes condemning those who practice them as polytheists, served to legitimise persecution from those within his group.

Sungkar also invoked the concept of *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* in his sermons, explaining to his listeners that certain actions distinguished true Muslims from non-Muslims. Sungkar gave the example of Muslim teachers who 'were told to teach the PMP [civic education about *Pancasila*]' and in doing so taught the children that 'All religions are good. All religions are true'.⁷³⁵ According to Sungkar, their hypocritical actions and failure to condemn those who believed in pluralism meant that 'God [would] not speak to them on the Day of Resurrection' and 'they [would] have a painful punishment'.⁷³⁶ This was a topic Sungkar returned to repeatedly. In another sermon, he claimed that Muslims in Syria had failed their faith and community, becoming 'hypocrites who made infidels into leaders', instead of showing loyalty to their co-religionists.⁷³⁷

Framed in this manner, Sungkar established a test for his followers; to support Suharto and the Indonesian state would ultimately demonstrate disloyalty to other Muslims. Implicitly, his

⁷³¹ Idem, p.18

⁷³² Ibid

⁷³³ Abdullah Sunkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 2'

⁷³⁴ Ibid

⁷³⁵ Abdullah Sunkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 5', undated, *Internet Archive*,

https://archive.org/details/audio_abdullah_sungkar/U_Abdullah_Sungkar_5.mp3, accessed: 20 January 2020

⁷³⁶ Ibid

⁷³⁷ Abdullah Sunkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 12'

followers ought to resist or condemn Suharto to also prove their commitment to their co-religionists. In this respect, Sungkar does not see any grey zone in which Muslims could faithfully practice their religion on an individual level but tolerate allegedly un-Islamic leadership. The stark division of the world into two camps (those loyal to Islam and those against it) once again served to facilitate conflict by clarifying to his supporters who was on their side and who was deemed an enemy and a potential target for an attack.

Throughout this period, Sungkar never explicitly called for *jihad* in public. Nevertheless, his contribution to the development of the concept in DI's ideological framework was significant, since they facilitated an understanding within the organisation of who was a true Muslim and simultaneously, who or what was outside the fold. The introduction and linking of these ideas with *jihad* thus provided a clear justification for the targeting of government personnel, state employees, security forces, and physical sites owned or operated by the state. Additionally, his interpretation of *takfir* and *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* also allowed for the targeting of civilians who may tacitly support the government or religious minority groups whose very presence allegedly undermined the formation of an Islamic state. His beliefs would ultimately go onto expand the range of targets available to DI as it entered the 1980s.

Given that the basis of his teachings on *takfir* and *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* were localised applications of the works *salafi* scholars, rather than truly novel innovations, they would have been easy for DI members understand and grasp. Even before Sungkar's arrival in the group, it is likely that DI members would have begun to encounter these concepts, perhaps in a less structured manner. As noted in the previous chapter, DDII had begun translating and disseminating these *salafi* works throughout the 1970s, and 'Darul Islam activists also met with several Brotherhood figures who came to Indonesia'.⁷³⁸

Still, it is difficult to ascertain how widespread the knowledge of *salafi* texts was in the organisation prior to Sungkar's membership. In interviews, some DI activists were often unable to recall the specific texts they referred to in their outreach sessions and recruitment efforts. Instead, these men said they sometimes spoke of Kartosuwiryo's exploits, apparent heroism and writings about the need for an Islamic state to inspire their listeners.⁷³⁹ A consequence of Sungkar's involvement with DI was that he was able to promote his *salafi* interpretations of these concepts and could do so in

⁷³⁸ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism*, p.93

⁷³⁹ Interview with AR, a former DI member, 25 July 2018

a structured manner. His preaching in Pondok Ngruki and his promotion of a *usroh* network system within DI meant they could systematically issue these works as training material.

As such, the DI understanding of *jihad* took on an increasingly *salafist* bent. Not only was *jihad* a tool for establishing an Islamic state, it was now also a means of policing the boundaries of the faith and a way of demonstrating one's commitment to a pure interpretation of Islam. Sungkar helped to legitimise attacks against the government but also the targeting of religious minorities such as Christians or even other Muslims who incorporated syncretic practises into their faith. Followers were encouraged through the concept of *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* to demonstrate their commitment to their co-religionists by condemning those outside of these increasingly narrow boundaries of what was Islamic, thus ultimately extending the obligations under *jihad*.

Conclusion

DI's conceptualisation of *jihad* between Kartosuwiryo's death and the induction of Abdullah Sungkar went through a gradual evolution. While the organisation never renounced its aim of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia through violent *jihad*, its military defeat at the hands of the government meant that for most of the 1960s the organisation entered a period of stasis, too weak to continue their struggle. By invoking the Prophet Muhammad's own experience of biding his time before taking action with the Treaty of Hudabiyya, the organisation created the ideological space to temporarily deprioritise a key part of its worldview while still remaining a relatively cohesive body.

New funding and cooperation with the government allowed the movement to regroup and begin to see violent *jihad* as central to its identity once more. The authoritarian tendencies of the New Order government throughout the 1970s only helped to solidify DI leaders' belief that *jihad* was the only solution. This repression had also served to radicalise Abdullah Sungkar, who had shown little interest in his early days as a *salafi* preacher in advocating violence against the state. Nevertheless, his persecution and anger at the apparent marginalisation of Muslim organisations in Indonesian society served as a catalyst for him eventually embracing a violent interpretation of *jihad* and joining DI in 1976.

While Sungkar was critical in formalising the group's understanding of the relationship between *takfir*, *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* and *jihad*, DI members had already begun to embrace these concept. It is

likely, given the popularity and recent translation of *salafist* and *Wahhabist* scholarship, in no small part promoted by the DDII, that DI members were also reading the writings of Qutb, Maududi, and Wahhab. Nevertheless, the organisation remained deeply factionalised and its leaders unable or unwilling to concretise a comprehensive interpretation of *jihad* in this period

Resultantly, Sungkar's key contribution to the group's ideological evolution during this period was to elucidate a clearer conceptualisation of *jihad* as a form of physical and violent resistance to the enemies of Islam. While this interpretation showed many continuities with Kartosuwiryo's in the 1940s and 1950s, his ability to link it to the concepts of *takfir* and *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* helped provided the DI with a cohesive ideological framework to guide its aims and actions into the next decade. More importantly, the incorporation of the ideas of *takfir* and *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* expanded the range of legitimate targets for the group's attacks, particularly at a moment where they were unable to confront the state directly.

Chapter 5 | Global *Jihad* with Caveats: The True Impact of Afghanistan, 1979-1989

The Afghan *jihad* is routinely touted by academics, journalists and numerous analysts at think tanks as a foundational moment for Indonesian Islamists, allegedly creating a new violent interpretation of *jihad* and resultantly spurring the creation of an internationally-oriented militant organisation, the Jemaah Islamiyah. While undoubtedly a pivotal moment for the DI and its successor organisation, the Afghan conflict's role in advancing the group's conceptualisation of *jihad* is greatly overstated.

Sungkar's decision to send men to participate in the Afghan *jihad* in 1985 was primarily motivated by domestic considerations rather than a desire to assist their fellow Muslims in their fight against the Soviet Union. Having fled to Malaysia with Ba'asyir to avoid another stint in prison in April 1985, Sungkar came to believe that the DI's efforts to revive the movement and re-engage the Indonesian state in armed conflict had come to naught over the past decade. The war between the Soviet Union and Afghan *mujahideen* thus provided an opportunity to give DI members combat experience and potentially build connections with groups for support in the future. These aims illustrated that Sungkar prioritised overthrowing the Indonesian government above a commitment to a transnational, militant Islamist movement and showed that his conceptualisation of *jihad* remained largely unchanged as the conflict wore on.

This chapter firstly argues that Sungkar's understanding of *jihad* was largely set before his decision to send his followers to participate in the conflict in Afghanistan. His interpretation hewed closely to Kartosuwiryo's understanding, embraced by the group from the 1940s until the latter's death in 1962. While a physical *jihad* was an obligation incumbent on all DI members, it was ultimately a means to an end. In this conceptualisation, *jihad* was the primary mechanism for achieving an Islamic state within the boundaries of Indonesia.

Resultantly, this chapter will propose that, rather than contributing to the group's ideological development, participation in the conflict was significant for more practical reasons. DI members gained valuable skills and training that they would have been unable to glean in Indonesia or in exile in Malaysia. While these men forged connections with other *mujahideen*, they were not sent to further the creation of a transnational militant group. Finally, this chapter will argue that the role played by Abdullah Azzam, the chief ideologue of Afghan conflict, in shaping the DI's interpretation of *jihad* has been both overstated and underexplored. His writings and teachings

largely supported thoughts already promulgated by Sungkar and Kartosuwiryo. Given that he did not introduce concepts that were significantly new or alien to the Indonesian fighters, and that their motivation for participating in the conflict was primarily to gain skills to wage a *jihad* back in Indonesia, it is unlikely that his ideology played a significant role in facilitating the eventual split between the DI and JI in 1993.

This chapter makes these points over the course of three sections. It begins by examining how Sungkar consolidated his interpretation of *jihad* among DI cadres in the early 1980s as the Suharto government intensified its crackdown on the organisation. In this context, it examines Sungkar's reasons for sending men to participate in the conflict in Afghanistan. The second section examines the ideology of Abdullah Azzam and his apparent role in furthering the DI's understanding of *jihad*. The final section compares Azzam's teachings on the subject with Sungkar's and indeed Kartosuwiryo's, illustrating the limited divergence between the trio.

Revolutionary fervour: *Jihad* at home

By 1979, the DI had adopted an increasingly confrontational approach towards the Suharto government. As discussed in the previous chapter, much of this anti-state fervour was driven by a revived membership and the widespread introduction of *salafi* teachings. It was also a response to a period of aggressive '*Pancasila*-isation' of public life in Indonesia by the New Order regime, which ultimately convinced Sungkar and his followers that Islamists working within the system were unlikely to achieve their aims.

Sungkar and his followers thus believed that only violent *jihad* could successfully bring about an Islamic state in Indonesia. This was because the government's actions demonstrated that not only were they too tolerant of the rights of minorities and non-Islamic practices, they were actively hostile to Muslims themselves. The growing strands of *takfir* thought in the group's ideological framework thus helped to reinforce the notion that the Suharto regime's actions showed it was un-Islamic, and thus obligated true Muslims to rise up and defeat it through *jihad*.

The imposition of state ideology

Relations between the Suharto government and Islamists of all stripes had been rocky throughout the 1970s as the government sought further control over the practice of Islam. Its decisions to

thwart the formation of a successor organisation to Masyumi in 1968 by preventing senior figures such as Natsir from taking up posts, to force the agglomeration of all Muslim political parties into the PPP in 1973, and to create the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Islamic Scholars Council) in 1975 as a means of monitoring and appointing religious scholars, showed a clear desire to control religious life in Indonesia and prevent Islam from becoming a political force that could challenge the New Order.

By 1978, Suharto had begun a push for greater ideological control in Indonesia, through a formal programme called *Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila* (Guidelines for the Instilling and Implementation of *Pancasila*). These guidelines sought to curtail dissent, particularly among Muslim groups. It declared that

Islam teaches us to be obedient to Allah, his Messenger and the *ulil-amri*. *Ulil-amri* means the legitimate government... Because of this, the obedience of the Islamic community in Indonesia towards the legitimate government of Indonesia is regarded as a religious obligation.⁷⁴⁰

In May 1982, Suharto decreed that ‘all Indonesian organisations should have only a single ideological foundation... *Pancasila*’.⁷⁴¹ This posed a problem for numerous Islamic groups of all stripes. Organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah had to make public proclamations of acceptance, thus undermining their belief that only God could be the basis of one’s ideology.

Moreover, this campaign confirmed DI members’ suspicions that the state was actively hostile to Islam and that there was no legitimate way of being an Islamic activist in mainstream Indonesian society. For example, Sungkar condemned NU leaders in a sermon released sometime in the mid-1980s, claiming that ‘they were recruited by the government to convert Muslims into apostates’ as a result of the new guidelines.⁷⁴² In another, he derided Muhammadiyah’s decision to accept the guidelines, saying that they ‘must be subsidised by the government and thus obey all the regulations. It’s like a pet dog that is tied by its neck’.⁷⁴³ The imposition of the guidelines thus confirmed for DI members that it was impossible to be involved in formal politics without

⁷⁴⁰ M.C Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History, c.1930 to the Present* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), p.224

⁷⁴¹ *Idem*, p.224

⁷⁴² Abdullah Sunkar, ‘U Abdullah Sungkar 5’

⁷⁴³ Abdullah Sunkar, ‘U Abdullah Sungkar 1’

cooperating with the government and resultantly selling out your principles and your fellow Muslims in order to survive.

Iranian inspiration

Adding to the group's desire to confront the government was the success of the Iranian revolution at the start of 1979. Although protests had been taking place against the Shah since 1977, his flight into exile on 16 January 1979 gave hope to DI members that they could achieve their aim of establishing their own Islamic state in Indonesia. In interviews, DI members often recalled reading the pamphlets and magazines published by the newly established government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, none appeared to be able to recall the title of any specific publication or the details of the content published.⁷⁴⁴

Nevertheless, some DI members believed that the regime could be toppled with through the 'power of popular revolution' rather than through *jihad* alone.⁷⁴⁵ The events in Iran showed that targeted acts of aggression could serve as the tipping point for a largely non-violent mass uprising against a *takfiri* regime. Indeed, these factions within DI planned to force Suharto into exile, like the Shah of Iran, or assassinate him in order to kick-start the revolution at home. Afterwards, DI members and their allies would assume positions of power within the new regime and purge the remnants of the New Order. The revolution would thus culminate in the proclamation of an Islamic state and the implementation of *shari'a*.⁷⁴⁶

In this febrile moment, DI members began pursuing their *jihad* with a new urgency. Rather than preparing for total war, DI members met in August 1982 in Jakarta to plot the assassination of Suharto, in line with their idea to inspire popular revolution and to punish the president for undermining Islam through his promotion of *Pancasila*. The group created numerous plans and engaged in several attempts to kill the president, failing at each juncture to successfully carry out their plots or inspire a mass uprising. For instance, they planned to attack the president as he drove

⁷⁴⁴ Solahudin mentions that the DI members were particularly taken with a magazine published by the Iranian Embassy in Jakarta called *Yaum al-Quds*, but copies no longer appear to be available. For more, see: Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, p.102

⁷⁴⁵ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, p.102

⁷⁴⁶ Rifki Rosyad, *A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgency Movement Among the Youth in Bandung, Indonesia* (ANU E Press, 2007), pp.47-50.

through Jalan Cut Mutia, a central street in Jakarta or to detonate a bomb at the newly restored Borobudur Temple when Suharto presided over its reopening on 23 February 1983.⁷⁴⁷

Despite their failures, these attempted attacks indicate that a new understanding of *jihad* was truly entrenched in the DI movement in the early 1980s. The targeting of Suharto as an idolater due to his imposition of *Pancasila* shows how *takfir* had become closely embedded in the group's interpretation of *jihad*. Rather than merely justifying their attacks on the grounds that Suharto, as a Muslim, had failed to implement and uphold Islamic governance and *shari'a*, the DI now went a step further, proclaiming that he was a traitor to his faith and thus a threat to Muslims in Indonesia.

Moreover, the choice to plan an attack against Suharto at Borobudur, a Buddhist temple, signals an increasing intolerance of minority faiths within the country. Borobudur, which was constructed in the ninth century, predated the arrival of Islam to the country. As such, Suharto's celebration of its reconstruction was anathema to Islamists as it represented the Qutbist notion that the Muslim leadership of the state had slid back into an age of *jāhiliyyah*.

Hijrah and jihad

In addition to these failed plots, Sungkar and Ba'asyir had spent much of the 1970s and first half of the 1980s in and out of police custody in Indonesia. The pair had their first run in with the authorities in 1975, when their radio station was shut down on account of their anti-government proclamations. Sungkar was actually arrested and detained for the first time in 1977 for apparently encouraging his followers to refrain from participating in the elections that year.

The two men were arrested again on 10 November 1978 for allegedly supporting Hispran, a Komando Jihad figure, charged with subversion of the Indonesian state. Their trial, held in 1982, saw Sungkar use the public platform offered to give a blistering critique of the state, referencing numerous *salafi* scholars such as Qutb, Maududi, Hawwa, among others to justify his belief that the Suharto government was illegitimate. His defence plea, along with Ba'asyir's, was compiled in a book by Irfan Suryahardy entitled *Perjalanan Hukum di Indonesia: Sebuah Gugatan* (A Legal Journey in Indonesia: A Lawsuit). The book became a key text distributed to DI recruits in the aftermath of Sungkar and Ba'asyir's flight to Malaysia.⁷⁴⁸

⁷⁴⁷ 'Five Arrested in Borobudur Temple Bombing', *Associated Press*, 24 January 1985, <https://apnews.com/article/92ac125c672daca2dd701ecfd577c71d>, accessed: 24 January 2020

⁷⁴⁸ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019

Both men were initially sentenced to nine years in prison, but had this reduced to three years and ten months after an appeal later that same year.⁷⁴⁹ They existed in a legal limbo as the prosecution attempted to repeal the reduced sentence. By March 1985, a court in Jakarta overturned the revised sentence. This would have resulted in a return to prison but the men fled, first to Jakarta and then to Malaysia in April 1985, apparently on the advice of Mohammad Natsir, Sungkar's old mentor and DDII leader.⁷⁵⁰ According to Nasir Abas, the former head of *JI Mantiqi III*, Natsir helping the men find their feet in Malaysia, placing them in the care of a trusted friend and introducing them to his contacts in the Islamist lecture circuit.⁷⁵¹

Sungkar and Ba'asyir's self-imposed exile in Malaysia would form another phase in the evolution of DI's understanding of *jihad*. Their experience of the Indonesian legal system and flight from the country underscored their pre-existing beliefs that the government was corrupt and intent on persecuting Muslims. A violent revolution was thus necessary to 'ensure justice for Muslims' and establish an Islamic state in its place.⁷⁵² In this respect, Sungkar remained committed to the core definition of *jihad* espoused by Kartosuwiryo.

Ultimately, he believed, Muslims in Indonesia required an Islamic state in order to lead lives fully in accordance with God's will. Sungkar worked hard to provide analysis to demonstrate the Suharto government's lack of legitimacy, as noted in his sermons in the previous chapter. He made the case repeatedly in his sermons during the mid-1980s. For example, in one he claimed that as 'all power belongs to God, and we as Muslims cannot support the disbelievers, the Indonesian government will never have the full support of Muslims'.⁷⁵³ He added that the Ministry of Religion was staffed with 'people who are ignorant and not knowledgeable' and were a 'group of fools', unable to truly advise and make laws for Muslims.⁷⁵⁴

Sungkar's sermons argued that, not only was the government illegitimate because it was unwilling to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, but government officials could not really be considered Muslims in the first place. Sungkar often referred to them as '*munafiqun*', deriding them for going on *hajj* or performing prayer but really seeking 'wealth and power in this world' or indulging in

⁷⁴⁹ ICG, 'Al-Qaeda In Southeast Asia', p.9

⁷⁵⁰ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019

⁷⁵¹ Ibid

⁷⁵² Interview with Ali Imron, Jakarta, 2 October 2019

⁷⁵³ Abdullah Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 1'

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid

vice.⁷⁵⁵ To Sungkar, these people were not truly Muslim, but were only pretending in public settings. In using the term, he was referencing Qur'anic scripture, which describes *munafiqun* as often more dangerous to Muslims than their non-Muslim enemies, and thus worthy of the highest punishments, such as death. Sungkar's desire to expose and excommunicate his enemies set them apart from Kartosuwiryo and more traditionally-minded members of DI.

Pragmatism and opportunity

Sungkar's exile in Malaysia and the failure of failure of DI cells to successfully conduct large attacks in Indonesia convinced the him that the group needed to drastically change its approach. Sungkar seemingly returned to the idea that *jihad* should take the form of a quasi-military conflict against the state in order to be effective, and began to make plans to prepare their supporters for this kind of warfare. It is unclear why they thought this was the best form of conflict to train for. None of the Afghan alumni interviewed were able to provide a clear answer, mainly speculating that Sungkar was disillusioned after the failures of the past few years in Indonesia.

Whether intentional or not, this decision once again aligned Sungkar's conceptualisation of *jihad* with Kartosuwiryo, who had seen the conflict between the NII and the Indonesian Republic as – at least conceptually – a clash of equal forces. This would mean that, in line with normative Islamic thought, the authorisation of such a conflict would be dictated by a rightful authority, with combatants adhering to the laws of war laid out in the Qur'an and Hadith. Sungkar's view that the government of Indonesia was un-Islamic and thus needed to be overthrown once again aligned them with mainstream writing on a defensive conceptualisation *jihad*. The behaviour of the government and its apparent oppression of its Muslim citizens meant that only *jihad* could 'stem the corrosive tide of defiance while safeguarding Islamic principles.'⁷⁵⁶ Thus DI members could not afford to sit back and wait while their fellow Muslims suffered, and the only way to ensure and protect their freedom would be to then install an Islamic state.

According to both Nasir Abas and Ahmad Sujali, a senior DI member who was among the first few groups to travel to Afghanistan, the decision to participate in the Afghan conflict was driven largely by pragmatism and opportunity rather than any desire to help the Afghans defeat the Soviets.⁷⁵⁷ These accounts are supported by Solahudin's work, which states that DI cadres

⁷⁵⁵ Abdullah Sunkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 8'

⁷⁵⁶ Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism*, p.34

⁷⁵⁷ Interview with Ahmad Suljali, Jakarta, 16 July 2019 and Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 21 July 2018

travelling to Afghanistan were told that ‘they were not being sent to Afghanistan to wage war on the Soviet Union but for military training’.⁷⁵⁸ These skills would be used to wage *jihad* in Indonesia in the future.⁷⁵⁹

In this regard, Sungkar’s understanding of *jihad* remained squarely focused on the territory of Indonesia at this juncture. He was largely uninterested in pan-Islamic solidarity, and did not conceive of *jihad* as obligating them to fight on behalf of oppressed Muslims beyond the boundaries of their nation-state. It is also unclear how realistic Sungkar thought the group’s chances of success were. Perhaps still buoyed by the success of the Iranian revolution and the global admiration for the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, he believed they could accomplish something similar in Indonesia.

The decision to send recruits to Afghanistan emerged as a result of circumstance. Sungkar together with Ba’asyir travelled widely seeking financial and military support for their cause after their arrival in Malaysia. With a letter of introduction from Natsir, the men met with the Saudi Ambassador to Malaysia, who then enabled them to travel on to Saudi Arabia to seek financial assistance from wealthy donors, just as the Afghan mujahedeen had. The men stopped in Pakistan en route to Saudi Arabia, allowing the men to make further contacts. While there, they met Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the powerful Afghan commander and politician who ran an organisation facilitating the travel of foreign fighters to Afghanistan.⁷⁶⁰ Sayyaf offered them the possibility of participating in a military training programme. Sungkar’s followers would be given financial assistance to cover their travel and accommodation, and even a small stipend.⁷⁶¹

Given the global attention focused on the Afghan conflict and the number of wealthy donors it attracted, it was unlikely that Sungkar would have been able to establish a similar programme closer to home. Moreover, his focus on the practical elements of the experience such as securing the requisite funds for airfare and accommodation, their training regimes and the limits on their members’ time spent in the training camps, highlights his locally bound conceptualisation of *jihad* during this period.

⁷⁵⁸ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism*, p.134

⁷⁵⁹ Similar accounts of Ba’asyir and Sungkar’s reasoning to send men to Afghanistan for training rather than to support the anti-Soviet *jihad* have been provided by Quinton Temby, Kirsten Schulze, Julie Chernov Hwang, and Sidney Jones, among others.

⁷⁶⁰ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism*, p.131

⁷⁶¹ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 21 July 2018

While Ba'asyir has subsequently claimed in more recent interviews that the DI chose to send fighters to Afghanistan to 'assist their [the Afghans] struggle',⁷⁶² this appears to have been of secondary importance compared to acquiring the requisite skills to overthrow the Indonesian state. Recruits pledged allegiance to Sungkar and were told that they were going to learn skills to eventually return and fight the *thabut* regime in Indonesia.⁷⁶³ The fact that few Indonesians actually got frontline combat experience underscored that training was the primary motivation for their participation in the Afghan conflict.

An individual's journey

When he landed in Karachi, Pakistan in 1986, Ahmad Sajuli had already fulfilled one of his lifelong ambitions: to ride on an aeroplane. He had taken a circuitous route to arrive in the busy port city. A DI member and a follower of Sungkar and Ba'asyir, Sajuli had left Sumatra earlier that year, travelling by boat to Malacca, Malaysia, before joining his mentors in their self-imposed exile in Kuala Pilah, a rural town about an hour south of Kuala Lumpur.

After a few weeks of additional religious education, Sajuli pledged *bayat* to Sungkar, promising to acquire and learn combat skills to further the cause of *jihad* against the Indonesian government upon his return. Sajuli then travelled back to the Malaysian capital for a few weeks before heading to Harby Pohantum Mujahidin Afghanistan al-Ittihad al-Islam, a military training camp, near the Pakistani town of Pabbi, near the Afghan border.⁷⁶⁴

Sajuli's journey to join the growing number of foreign militants fighting alongside the Afghan mujahedeen was typical of the Indonesians from Sungkar and Ba'asyir's network that travelled to the country between 1985 and 1991. Most had never previously left Indonesia, much less travelled on an aeroplane. Indeed, until Afghanistan this new generation of aspiring Indonesian Islamist militants had never participated in any form of military training or even seen a conflict zone.

⁷⁶² Scott Atran, 'The Emir: An Interview with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Alleged Leader of the Southeast Asian Jemaah Islamiyah Organization', *Janestown Foundation: Spotlight on Terrorism*, 3:9 (2005), pp.14-15

⁷⁶³ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 21 July 2018

⁷⁶⁴ Interview with Ahmad Sajuli, Jakarta, 20 July 2018

While Sajuli attended the camp in its original location in Pabbi, it was moved to the town of Saada, Pakistan in 1987 to be closer to the border with Afghanistan. Following the defeat of the Soviet Union and growing cooperation with al-Gama'ah al-Islamiyah (GI), an Egyptian militant Islamist movement, DI members participated in a GI-run training camp in Khowst, Afghanistan, in 1990, before establishing their own base in Torkham, Nangahar province later that year. However, these endeavours were short-lived as the rising violence of the Afghan civil war made it difficult for the military training programme to continue. The DI training camp was finally closed in 1992.

The experience was undoubtedly life-changing. In addition to the glamour of foreign travel and the excitement of encountering new people, food, and customs, the war offered thrilling adventure and fostered a deep camaraderie with their fellow fighters, both Indonesian and foreign. The men's experience also gave them a sense of purpose and status upon their return to Southeast Asia. They were no longer simply members of a closed and ineffectual anti-government movement, but lauded as scrappy veterans who had played their part in winning a righteous conflict to defend innocent Muslims against a tyrannical and oppressive empire.

Building an army

Nevertheless, these grand ideas were balanced against the reality that the Indonesian recruits were there to learn skills to help their *jihad* back home. Ahmad Sajuli lamented the lack of frontline action, saying that 'most days were tiring – like boot camp'.⁷⁶⁵ Few fighters were allowed to return to Afghanistan after they had completed their training, further indicating that their ultimate purpose was to serve DI's agenda back in Indonesia.

The Afghan conflict gave Sungkar exactly what he desired. The men he sent later returned to Southeast Asia with the requisite skills to strike back against the Indonesian state. They had learned to handle small arms such as AK47s and M16 rifles, light weapons like anti-tank rifles and grenade launchers, and how to build improvised explosive devices. They developed other practical skills including map reading, basic reconnaissance, field communication, and combat engineering.⁷⁶⁶

The war also gave these men, as well as Sungkar, the opportunity to build connections with the wider militant Islamist community. These new links with groups such as the Egyptian militant Islamist movement, GI, as well as the Afghan mujahedeen commander and leader of the Ittehad-al-Islami Baraye Azadi Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan), Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, provided them with additional training opportunities and a limited source of funds and weapons to further their struggle back in Southeast Asia.

According to Nasir Abas, while these connections linked the DI to a vast global network of militant Islamists, Sungkar and the majority of his men, were not particularly interested in or showed signs of wanting to create or join an international movement. Instead, they continued to

⁷⁶⁵ Interview with Ahmad Sajuli, Jakarta, 16 July 2018

⁷⁶⁶ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 21 July 2019

conceive of *jihad* as the primary tool overthrow of the Indonesian state, largely unchanged from their conceptualisation in the decades prior.⁷⁶⁷

Shaping *jihad*: Assessing the impact of the Afghan conflict and Abdullah Azzam's ideas

In terms of providing opportunities for military training and access to resources, the Afghan conflict was hugely significant for individual men who fought and vastly improved the operational capabilities and finances of Sungkar's faction. Veterans of the conflict are often very willing to talk to researchers and journalists about their experience, keen to reminisce about a time when they felt they were important and contributing to a sacred and successful cause. This emphasis from the participants themselves, coupled with the profound impact of defeat of the USSR, the formation of al-Qaeda, and the advent of a globalised *jihad* movement, have all contributed to the view held by many researchers and journalists that participation in the conflict and exposure to the beliefs of its chief ideologue, Abdullah Azzam, altered the beliefs of Sungkar and his men and was thus the primary motivation for their decision to split with the rest of the DI movement.

This rationale for the growing divide between Sungkar and the rest of DI has been perpetuated in academic scholarship on the JI's origins by Greg Barton, Bilveer Singh, and Scott Atran. Singh, for example, argues that 'the United States condoned the mobilization of *jihadists* all over the world, including Southeast Asia [to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan]. The AJAI [al-Jemaah al-Islamiyah] is believed to have been created in this context'.⁷⁶⁸ Singh does not clarify whether he believes the JI was formed in Afghanistan itself or if the participants returned home to subsequently establish the organisation, nor does he explain how the founders' ideology differed from the DI members who did not participate. Similarly, Barton writes, without reference to any specific evidence, that 'the concept behind [their] struggle ... had long been much greater than a merely local, Southeast Asian one', claiming that Sungkar had always aspired for a transnational Islamic state, grounded in a form of globalised *jihadist* ideology.⁷⁶⁹

These arguments do not seem to have much factual basis. As noted above, DI members who trained in Pakistan report, report in their own words that they were sent to Afghanistan by Sungkar with explicit directions to acquire the skills needed to fight a *jihad* back in Indonesia. This argument, that DI leaders saw the Afghan struggle as an opportunity to advance their domestic struggle, has

⁷⁶⁷ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019

⁷⁶⁸ Singh, *The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to Islamist Extremists*, p.52

⁷⁶⁹ Greg Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia* (Singapore: Ridge Books, 2004), p.15

also been made by several others, including Sidney Jones, Solahudin, Kirsten Schulze, and Julie Chernov Hwang. While the way that DI members who participated in the conflict understood *jihad* may have globalised over the course of their time abroad, it would be incorrect to argue that they entered the conflict with this interpretation of *jihad* in mind.

Even if some DI members and their leaders desired an Islamic state across the region, or even a global caliphate, the primary aim upon their return to Southeast Asia was to first establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. Ultimately, their experience in Afghanistan appeared to deepen existing beliefs rather than creating a new ideological framework for this segment of the Indonesian militant Islamist community.

The narrative of Afghanistan as an ideological catalyst

Abdullah Azzam occupies a central position in most writings on the foundations of the JI, with many journalists and scholars crediting him with significantly influencing the group's ideological framework. However, this thesis argues that his role has been both overstated and simultaneously under explored. Although Azzam contributed significantly to the development of a global *jihadist* ideology and the creation of a movement in Afghanistan, his influence on Indonesian participants of the conflict, and most importantly Sungkar, was less pronounced than much of the literature suggests. His writings and teachings largely supported thoughts already promulgated by Sungkar (and, indeed, by Kartosuwiryo before him). Given that he did not introduce concepts that were significantly new or alien to the Indonesians and that their motivation for participating in the conflict was primarily to gain skills to wage a *jihad* back in Indonesia, it is unlikely that his ideology played a significant role in facilitating the split between the DI and JI.

Few academic texts or journalistic accounts have thoroughly considered the ideological roots of the JI, much less the role that ideology played in its split from the DI. Most of these works tend to give a potted history of the group's origins, briefly citing the group's 'roots in the DI movement' and referencing the fact that 'virtually all of JI's senior leadership had spent time in Afghanistan', purportedly embracing a new ideology developed by the leaders of the *mujahedeen*.⁷⁷⁰ A typical example of the vagueness with which academics have treated the role of ideology in JI's formation is found in Rohan Gunaratna's paper 'The Ideology of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah'.⁷⁷¹ In spite of its

⁷⁷⁰ Barton, *Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia*, pp.13-15

⁷⁷¹ Gunaratna, 'The Ideology of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah', pp.68-81

title, Gunaratna pays little attention to the faction's beliefs and values prior to and during its split with DI. Instead, he covers this terrain briefly, writing simply that 'JI's roots can be traced back to the Indonesian rebellion in 1950s led by Darul Islam' and that Afghanistan 'opened the gateway for JI members to become ever more politicized and radicalized' but does not provide any information regarding the tenants of DI's beliefs that were carried on or disregarded by JI or what principles were added or enhanced by the Afghan experience.⁷⁷² When it came to Sungkar's decision to go his own way, supported by Ba'asyir, Gunaratna only states that the two sides split '[after] a dispute with the Indonesian-based DI leader named Ajengan Masduki'.⁷⁷³ The contours of this disagreement are never explained.

Others are even less thorough. The journalist Mike Millard, writing about the rise of militant Islamism in Southeast Asia in his book *Jihad in Paradise*, scarcely mentions Afghanistan and the Indonesians that went to fight in the conflict, and leaves out Sungkar and Masduki entirely. Similarly, the academic Giora Eliraz's *Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension* makes little mention of split between the groups, claiming that it was the 'formative collective experience of global *jihad*', under the tutelage of Abdullah Azzam that resulted in the JI's formation.⁷⁷⁴ Finally, Zachary Abuza appears to characterise the group as wholly a product of al-Qaeda. He argued that JI members wanted 'their *jihad* to be part of a global *jihad*' and that al-Qaeda capitalised on this sentiment to 'establish a local affiliate in 1993-1994', seemingly ignoring the long history of Islamist militancy in Indonesia.⁷⁷⁵

Even works that give a more thorough treatment of JI's ideological origins, such as those by David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, assert that Azzam had an influential role in changing the ideology of Indonesian militants who fought in Afghanistan but do little to explore the nature of those ideas or the role they played in shaping the dispute between JI and DI leaders⁷⁷⁶ Instead, vague assertions such as 'the ideas of Abdullah Azzam also affected theo-political thinking in Southeast Asia' and 'Azzam was especially influential', are common.⁷⁷⁷

⁷⁷² Idem, pp.69-70

⁷⁷³ Idem, p.70

⁷⁷⁴ Giora Eliraz, *Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension* (Brighton and Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2013), p.37

⁷⁷⁵ Zachary Abuza, 'Learning by Doing: Al-Qaeda's Allies in Southeast Asia', *Current History*, 103:672 (2004), pp.171-172

⁷⁷⁶ David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, 'Ideology, Networks and Political Region: Structure and Agency in *Jemaah Islamiyah*'s Small World', *Politics Religion and Ideology*, 13:4, p477

⁷⁷⁷ Idem, p.474

In other cases, such as works by Syaifudin Zuhri, Raden Cecep Lukman Yasin, and Ken Conboy, Afghanistan is viewed as the primary catalyst for the '[transformation of] the ideological orientation of Indonesian jihadists'.⁷⁷⁸ These scholars have emphasised that the men were given significant 'religious and ideological indoctrination' and 'embraced a more militant view of jihad brought about by [Sungkar's] association with Afghanistan'.⁷⁷⁹ As little information is provided about the actual ideology preached by Sungkar, much less by other DI leaders, works like these suggest either that there was little ideological content in their struggle against the Indonesian state or it was of little consequence prior to Afghanistan.

Academics providing analysis on other aspects of JI have also tended to credit the Afghan experience, and Azzam personally, with inspiring the creation of the group or at least providing its ideological foundations. Noor Huda Ismail, Vedi Hadiz and Andi Rahman Alamasyah, have claimed at various turns that Sungkar sent recruits to 'join [the] coalition with other jihadists from Muslim countries in the battlefield against atheist-Russian armies', to 'support the fight against the Soviet Union' or to 'help the Afghan mujahideen'.⁷⁸⁰

Sidney Jones and her team at the ICG, who produced a series of in-depth reports on the JI and its inner workings between 2002 and 2013, also refer to the role that Azzam's works played in the ideological indoctrination of JI recruits as well as those who attended the group's *pesantren* and study groups. They write that in the 1980s, Azzam's lectures were often circulated as photocopied pamphlets.⁷⁸¹ By 2000, a complete collection of Azzam's works was published by the Pustaka al-Alaq publishing company, run by Ikhsan Miars, a JI member who had fought in Afghanistan between 1987 and 1990.⁷⁸² The works were collectively titled *Tarbiyah Jihadiyah* (Jihad Education) and were 'translated by Abdurrahman, possibly another name for Ikhsan himself'.⁷⁸³ According to the ICG '[these] books remain the staple of al-Alaq. They are used as teaching materials in JI

⁷⁷⁸ Syaifudin Zuhri, 'The changing paradigm of Indonesian jihadist movements from al-'Aduww al-Qarib to al-'Aduww al-Ba'id', *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 4:2 (December 2010), p.255

⁷⁷⁹ Raden Cecep Lukman Yasin, 'Jemaah Islamiyah Jihadist Movement in Indonesia', *Jurnal el-Harakah*, 9:2 (May-August, 2007), p.139 and Kenneth J. Conboy, *The Second Front: Inside Asia's Most Dangerous Terrorist Network* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing (Asia) Pte Ltd, 2006), p.62

⁷⁸⁰ Syaifudin Zuhri, 'The Changing Paradigm of Indonesian Jihadist Movements: From al-'Aduww al-Qarib to al-'Aduww al-Ba'id', *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 4:2 (2010), p.255; Vedi Hadiz and Andi Rahman Alamasyah, 'Three Islamist generations, one Islamic state: the Darul Islam movement and Indonesian social transformation', *Critical Asian Studies*, 49:1 (2017), p.11; Noor Huda Ismail, 'Al Qaeda's Southeast Asia, Jamaah Islamiyah and Regional Terrorism: Kinship and Family Links', *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 5:1 (2007), p.3

⁷⁸¹ ICG, 'Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry', p.1

⁷⁸² Idem, p.3

⁷⁸³ Ibid

schools, discussion groups and training programs and are sold around the country in bookstores and through JI distributors'.⁷⁸⁴

While the ICG reports were careful not to overstate the impact of Azzam's ideology on JI, they nevertheless show that he played an important role in the group's ideological cannon. However, despite the prominent position of his works and the relative depth with which most ICG reports delve into other aspects of the JI network, these reports still do not fully examine the actual content of Azzam's teachings or provide a detailed assessment of how they were used, incorporated or understood by JI members in creating their belief structure. For instance, only one report out of the over 30 papers on the JI produced by the ICG devoted a paragraph to summarizing Azzam's ideas on *jihad*.⁷⁸⁵

As such, numerous scholars appear to believe that the Afghan conflict served as a catalyst that changed the ideology of (or introduced new ideas to) the Indonesian militants who fought there and thus set the stage for a schism within the DI. Despite imbuing these new concepts with huge significance, few, if any, appear to analyse, or even catalogue what these beliefs actually were. As such, this section will begin with an examination of Azzam's writings, in particular, his understanding of *jihad*, in order to provide a foundation for an assessment of whether these ideas were indeed new to the Indonesians who participated in the conflict and if they were actually adopted by these participants, thus altering their ideology.

Introducing Abdullah Azzam

Born in Palestine in 1941, Abdullah Azzam was a militant, an academic and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁷⁸⁶ Azzam studied Islamic law at Damascus University, enrolling in 1962.⁷⁸⁷ He subsequently worked as a teacher back in Palestine but this was disrupted by the outbreak of the Six Day War on 5 June 1967.⁷⁸⁸ The war was hugely significant for Azzam, since it forced him to flee to Jordan as a refugee. It was also the moment, as Thomas Hegghammer and Sebastian Schnelle argue, that he began to earnestly contemplate the prospect of armed struggle. He took up arms against the Israeli state between 1969 and 1970, joining with Islamist *Fedayeen* members.

⁷⁸⁴ Ibid

⁷⁸⁵ ICG, 'Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous', p.5

⁷⁸⁶ Kepel, *Jihad*, pp.144-5

⁷⁸⁷ Sebastian Schenelle, 'Abdullah Azzam, Ideologue of Jihad: Freedom Fighter or Terrorist?', *Journal of Church and State*, 54:4 (2012), p.627

⁷⁸⁸ Thomas Hegghammer, 'Abdallah Azzam and Palestine', p.364

However, following a crackdown by Jordanian officials known as Black September in 1970, Azzam withdrew from armed struggle and returned to academia, enrolling in a doctoral programme at Al Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. Upon his graduation in 1973, he taught *shari'a* at the University of Jordan for seven years before briefly moving to the Abd al-Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where he allegedly taught and befriended Osama bin Laden.⁷⁸⁹ Azzam's unique background as both a resistance fighter and scholar gave him the requisite standing to become a leader among the mujahedeen who travelled to Afghanistan in the 1980s. His time at Saudi Arabia's premier university also put him in good standing with the Kingdom's authorities, giving him access to a reliable source of funds for his operations.

Having obtained a position at the International Islamic University of Islamabad, Azzam moved to Pakistan in 1981 and began to organise the response of numerous Arab humanitarian efforts on behalf of the Afghan people. He created the Council of Islamic Coordination, publishing recruitment literature to mobilise foreign support for the Afghan *jihad* and would routinely return to the Arab world to preach about the conflict and the plight of the Afghan people, thus raising awareness for his cause.⁷⁹⁰

Azzam's salary at the university was paid for by the Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami (Muslim World League, MWL), a global non-governmental organisation funded by the Saudi government. The organisation would go on to provide Indonesian Islamists with their first connections to Azzam via Mohammad Natsir, Indonesia's fifth prime minister and a former leader of Masyumi and the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII). As noted in Chapter 4, Natsir, who was a close friend of Abdullah Sungkar, served as the MWL's deputy chairman in the 1980s. Natsir's status and connections helped to facilitate meetings between Sungkar and Ba'asyir and senior Saudi clerics and government officials as well as with militant leaders on the ground in Pakistan and Afghanistan.⁷⁹¹

By 1984, Azzam had established a logistics office for foreign fighters, the Afghan Services Bureau, to facilitate their travel to Pakistan, their training and education, and their eventual deployment to the battlefield to confront Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In that same year, Azzam issued one of

⁷⁸⁹ Keppel, *Jihad*, p.145

⁷⁹⁰ Thomas Hegghammer, 'The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad', *International Security*, 35:3 (Winter 2010/2011), pp.85-86 pp.53-94

⁷⁹¹ Jones, 'New Order Repression and the birth of the Jemaah Islamiyah', p.45

his seminal works, *The Defence of Muslim Lands: The first obligation after Iman*, a fatwa in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, concretising his worldview and interpretation of *jihad*. The work went on to become a seminal text for global Islamist militant movements. Indonesians who fought in the conflict often recall the teachers in the classrooms at Camp Saddah reciting sections of his work or providing photocopies of his writings to students.⁷⁹² Others claim to have listened to Azzam preach in the camp himself.⁷⁹³

The ideology of Abdullah Azzam

Azzam's ideology began from the premise that *jihad* was an essential obligation and form of worship for Muslims. Quoting Ibn Taymiyya, Azzam began by arguing that 'the first obligation after Iman [faith] is the repulsion of the enemy aggressor who assaults the religion and the worldly affairs'.⁷⁹⁴ In doing so, Azzam raised the level of importance of the concept of *jihad*, arguing that after belief in Islam itself, *jihad* was the single, most fundamental duty of Muslims.

Azzam echoed these arguments in subsequent texts. In *Join the Caravan*, he wrote that '*jihad* is the highest peak of Islam' and 'the most excellent form of worship, and by means of it the Muslim can reach the highest of ranks'.⁷⁹⁵ In describing *jihad* as a form of daily worship, Azzam made the case that it should also be a routine feature of Muslim life, rather than a sporadic or rare event. Azzam was not the first scholar to argue that *jihad* should be seen as an unexceptional form of worship, incumbent on Muslims to perform regularly. Azzam drew on the work of medieval scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Nuhaas, as well as twentieth century ideologues like Sayyid Qutb. Azzam also quoted Qutb, who argued that:

If *jihad* were a passing phenomenon of Islam, the Messenger of Allah would not have said the following words to every Muslim until the Day of Judgement, 'Whoever dies neither having fought in *jihad*, nor having made up his mind to do so, dies on a branch of hypocrisy'.⁷⁹⁶

⁷⁹² Interview with AS, Afghan alumni and former DI and JI member, Jakarta, 24 July 2018

⁷⁹³ Interview with Ahmad Sajuli, Jakarta, 20 July 2018

⁷⁹⁴ Abdullah Azzam, *The Defence of Muslim Lands: The first obligation after Iman* (Unpublished; c.1984)

⁷⁹⁵ Abdullah Azzam, *Join the Caravan* (Unpublished; c.1987)

⁷⁹⁶ Sayyid Qutb, *In the Shade of the Qur'an*, vol. 2, quoted in Azzam, *Join the Caravan*

While Azzam's arguments for the notion that *jihad* ought to be considered the pinnacle of worship were not necessarily new, their consolidation and repetition in his texts and sermons indicated the primary role that they played in the ideology he was imparting to the generation of Islamic militants who learned and served under him in South Asia.

Where Azzam actually broke new ground was by explicitly linking faith with constant action, particularly though engaging in *jihad*. In arguing that Muslims must see *jihad* as a routine act, like daily prayer, he was encouraging an expression of faith that was reliant on active rather than passive expressions of belief.⁷⁹⁷ In an undated publication entitled *The Taubid of Action*, Azzam wrote that '*Taubid al-ulubiyya* [oneness of divinity] is only affirmed through stances taken in life'.⁷⁹⁸ This indicated that, while he believed that professions of faith were necessary, they were insufficient in demonstrating true belief because they were purely theoretical declarations and thus easy to perform. As such, action was the only way of truly demonstrating the sincerity of one's commitment to Islam.

This argument thus reinforced the notion that *jihad* was indeed the pinnacle of a Muslim's expression of faith since it was a physical act of worship and an entire 'way of life for the pious predecessors',⁷⁹⁹ rather than a mere articulation of belief. As such, *jihad* became a key route through which Muslims could realise *taubid*. Reflecting on his time on the battlefield, Azzam argued that God was testing his faith by asking him to risk his life for God. He warned followers not to fear anything other than God, for that fear would be an expression of belief in a power other than God.⁸⁰⁰ Those who shirk from this physical demonstration of their faith through *jihad* or lost their nerve in battle could thus be considered insufficiently pious or unable to fulfil their religious obligations. As Shiraz Maher argues, 'Azzam developed an understanding of *taubid al-ulubiyya* that is closely tethered with the idea of fighting for the sake of Allah'.⁸⁰¹ It was only through a demonstration of sacrifice could faith really be demonstrated.

Azzam's second unique contribution to the development of the concept of *jihad* related closely to his argument that it was a means of fulfilling one's obligations as a Muslim. Azzam explicitly argued

⁷⁹⁷ Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea* (London: Hurst and Company, 2016) p.148

⁷⁹⁸ Abdullah Azzam, *The Taubid of Action*

⁷⁹⁹ Azzam, *The Defence of Muslim Lands*

⁸⁰⁰ Azzam, *The Taubid of Action*

⁸⁰¹ Ibid

in *The Defence of Muslim Lands* that seeking help from *mushrikun* (polytheists) was unacceptable, even if Muslims were losing or weak, since such a request ‘forfeits the ultimate aim of jihad’.⁸⁰²

However, he did make some exceptions. Referencing the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence, he noted that if three conditions were met, namely that ‘the rule of Islam must have the upper hand’, ‘Muslims must be stronger than the combined group of *mushrikun*’, ‘the *kuuffar* [unbelievers] must have a good opinion of the Muslims and the Muslims must feel safe from their treachery’, and finally ‘the Muslims must be in need of the *kuuffar* they are asking help from’.⁸⁰³ The precise nature of these exceptions indicated that Azzam thought that Muslims could legitimately seek help from non-believers in only very limited circumstances. In limiting the avenues for seeking external help, Azzam reinforced the idea that *jihad* is the ultimate profession of faith as Muslims should be willing to sacrifice themselves for their God.

Azzam also strengthened the idea of *jihad* was a means of establishing a solid base for the flourishing of Islam. Writing in *Join the Caravan*, Azzam argued that the:

establishment of the Muslim community on an area of land is a necessity, as vital as water and air. This homeland will not come about without an organised Islamic movement, which perseveres as consciously and realistically upon *jihad*, and which regards fighting as a decisive factor and as a protective wrapping.⁸⁰⁴

Without *jihad*, Azzam did not believe that it was possible to successfully defend Muslims, much less establish an Islamic state. Not only was *jihad* crucial for *hākimiyya*, it was obligatory and the only realistic path to achieving a long-term security for Muslims. Nevertheless, Azzam’s writings on what this eventual Islamic state would look like remained relatively sparse. Little of his work attempted to lay out or describe the contours of the Islamic state that would be established after infidel enemies or corrupt Muslim government were defeated.

While Azzam provided little material on the construction and day-to-day administration of an Islamic state, his final contribution to the discourse of militant ideology was potentially his most significant. In his writings throughout the late 1980s, Azzam built a comprehensive doctrine for the globalisation of *jihad*. Building on the idea that *jihad* was both a fundamental religious obligation

⁸⁰² Azzam, *The Defence of Muslim Lands*

⁸⁰³ Ibid

⁸⁰⁴ Qutb, *In the Shade of the Qur’an*, vol. 2, quoted in Azzam, *Join the Caravan*

for all Muslims (particularly wherever Islamic lands were threatened) and one of the highest forms of worship, Azzam popularised the notion that *jihad* had to be universal. He wrote:

Jihad must not be abandoned until Allah alone is worshipped. *Jihad* continues until Allah's Word is raised high. *Jihad* until all the oppressed peoples are free. *Jihad* to protect our dignity and restore our occupied lands. *Jihad* is the way of everlasting glory.⁸⁰⁵

In this respect, Azzam appeared to advocate for a near-perpetual struggle to liberate Muslim lands from perceived oppressors. It was, in his view, a totalising conflict. It is unclear how long Azzam believed these conflicts would take, but he believed that all Muslims, regardless of their country of origin, had an obligation to participate, whether in combat roles or at least financially or spiritually. Few exemptions were given; only those who had to support their own families or were prevented from doing so by their home governments were excused from fighting.⁸⁰⁶

Azzam's promotion of *jihad* as an obligation without borders accorded well with long-standing *Salafi* opposition to nationalism, particularly that espoused by contemporary Arab leaders. In this respect, Azzam's ideology draws on a long tradition of work advocating pan-Islamism, beginning with the Modernists such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mohammed Abduh, and Rashid Rida, as well as *salafists* like Sayyid Qutb, Abu al-Ala al-Maududi, and Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj. Azzam's own experiences in Palestine in exile in Jordan after the multiple defeats of Arab governments by the new state of Israel between 1948 and 1973 also significantly contributed to this outlook.

Azzam lamented that by pursuing nationalist agendas, Muslims have failed to obey God's commands and were thus doomed to fail.⁸⁰⁷ By failing to centre God in their struggle to liberate Palestine for instance, nationalist leaders had not only betrayed the Muslim cause but allowed it to be 'appropriated' by godless forces like communism and liberal nationalism, which were impotent in the face of Israeli might.⁸⁰⁸ Similarly, he regarded pan-Arabism as a 'kind of fantasy or delusion' since without Islam at its core or a 'collective Muslim effort', it would be impossible to become a successful society.⁸⁰⁹ His calls for Muslims to 'let [their] vision pass beyond geographic borders

⁸⁰⁵ Abdullah Azzam, quoted in McGregor, "Jihad and the Rifle Alone", p.98

⁸⁰⁶ Azzam, *Join the Caravan*

⁸⁰⁷ Azzam, *Defence of Muslim Lands*

⁸⁰⁸ *Ibid*

⁸⁰⁹ Azzam, *Join the Caravan*

that have been drawn up for [them] by the *Kuffar*⁸¹⁰ not only reflected this history of pan-Islamic thought but used it as a basis for combat mobilisation. Azzam's innovation was to fuse an identity that was already, by its very nature, not geographically bounded with an obligation to participate in the defence of Islam globally. As Gilles Kepel argues, Azzam 'unflaggingly reminded his readers that Palestine and Afghanistan were part of the same struggle'.⁸¹⁰ As such, he was able to reinforce a transnational identity, membership of the global *ummah* (community), among his supporters.

Azzam's demand for the involvement and support of the global *ummah* was truly without precedent. It reflected not only the necessity of *jihad* in his conception of Muslim identity and the performance of one's faith and duty to God, but also the circumstances of an increasingly globalised world. His requirement that all able-bodied Muslims journey to a conflict zone was made possible by the availability of air travel, improved communications networks, mass media, and international financial systems. Indeed, his own Afghan Services Bureau was reliant on the same global structures to broadcast his cause, organise the funding and travel of militants, and supply them with a stipend, housing and arms throughout the conflict. The international force he constructed in Afghanistan was as much a product of his ideology as it was dependent on the conditions of the period.

Selective interpretations: Comparing Azzam and the Indonesians

The conflict in Afghanistan and the ideology of Abdullah Azzam were undoubtedly significant for militant Islamists around the world. Participation in the conflict helped to socialise and radicalise numerous young men into an international community that shared a collective consciousness based on a violent *salafi* ideology. This was especially true for the Indonesians among the first two batches of recruits sent to Afghanistan by Abdullah Sungkar. The men were taught by instructors from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Arab world, often giving them their first interactions with non-Indonesians.⁸¹¹

Their combat skills also improved exponentially. According to Nasir Abas, Indonesians first did basic training covering six areas (infantry, artillery, engineering, cavalry, communications and logistics) following a system established by the British for training local forces under the raj. However, they then specialised in either infantry or engineering (bomb-making) classes for the rest

⁸¹⁰ Kepel, *Jihad*, p.151

⁸¹¹ Conboy, *The Second Front*, p.45

of their time in the camp.⁸¹² In this respect, the Afghan experience played an outsized role for the Indonesian militant Islamist movement, and particularly for those sent by Sungkar. Unlike most DI members, these men became vastly more capable of engaging in some form of guerrilla warfare against the Indonesian state upon their return.

Ideologically, Afghanistan served to reinforce many of DI's pre-existing beliefs among the Indonesians that participated. At its most basic level, Abdullah Azzam's conceptualisation of the Islamist struggle against a hostile, ungodly empire, supported DI's division of the world into a Manichaeic binary of *dar al-harb* and *dar al-Islam*. Similarly, Kartosuwiryo had explicitly written in the DI's *Hukum Pidana* that an *ummat Negara Islam* (community of the Islamic State) stood against the *ummat penjajah* (community of the coloniser) and *ummat kafirin* (community of the infidel), reflecting a belief that there was no possibility for Muslims to exist safely in a world outside of an Islamic state.⁸¹³

Defensive jihad

This binary division of the world thus set the stage for the development of a doctrine that required true Muslims to defend and protect their lands from the encroachment of evil forces. Azzam's doctrine of *jihad* as a sacred duty and obligation for all Muslims again reinforced some elements of DI's ideology. While comparatively less sophisticated than Azzam's theology, Kartosuwiryo's penal code required (with very few exceptions) that all able-bodied Muslim men participate in a *jihad* against colonial and subsequently Republican forces to establish the NII. Kartosuwiryo drew on a similar classical, predominantly defensive interpretation of *jihad* that saw the struggle against non-Islamic forces governing Muslim lands as a duty of all Muslims (*fard al-ain*).

While Kartosuwiryo had initially embraced a wider conceptualisation of *jihad* that included a non-violent struggle for self-improvement and becoming closer to God, by the time of his insurgency he had come to define *jihad* as an exclusively physical struggle against un-Islamic forces. As examined in Chapter 4, this definition was subsequently revised just before his death to allow for a pause in the movement's pursuit of war against the Republican state due to their lack of resources following their defeat. Nevertheless, the definition remained narrow and left the group committed, at least in theory, to a physical *jihad* over the longer term. In this respect, Azzam's understanding

⁸¹² Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019

⁸¹³ S.M. Kartosuwiryo, 'Hukum Pidana', August 1949

of the concept reinforced this shift within the DI movement. In the conclusion of *Join the Caravan*, Azzam made clear that the meaning of *jihad* in Qur'an was not plural and should only be used to refer to a physical struggle against the enemies of Islam. He wrote:

The saying, 'We have returned from the lesser *jihad* (battle) to the greater *jihad* (jihad of the soul),' which people quote on the basis that it is a *hadith*, is in fact a false, fabricated *hadith* that has no basis. It is only a saying of Ibrahim ibn Abi 'Abalah, one of the Successors, and it contradicts textual evidence and reality.⁸¹⁴

While significantly more developed than Kartosuwiryo's own writings on the topic (or those of his successors in the DI movement) Azzam's stripping down of *jihad's* meaning to only a physical struggle against un-Islamic forces accorded well with DI's own commitment to conflict against the Dutch and subsequently the Indonesian Republic. These too found echoes in Azzam's work, *Defence of Muslim Lands*, in which he wrote that a defensive *jihad* was an obligation for all Muslims (*fard al-ain*) as they had a duty to repel infidel forces from Islamic lands including (though not limited to) Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir, the Philippines, Chad, and Eritrea and to liberate societies from Muslim rulers who had failed to implement *shari'a* and uphold *hākimiyya*.

Jihad as a means of realising hākimiyya

This need to see God's sovereignty guaranteed on earth in order for Muslims to fully actualise their religion resonated deeply with DI recruits, who were already steeped in this messaging due to the legacy of Kartosuwiryo and Sungkar's own doctrine. Kartosuwiryo wrote extensively throughout his career about the necessity of *hākimiyya*, arguing that an Islamic state was the only way Muslims could be guaranteed freedom from slavery in their lands.⁸¹⁵ Like Azzam's struggle for a free Palestine and Afghanistan, he saw the removal of the Dutch as more than just an anti-colonial liberation struggle, but rather an opportunity to create an abode of Islam for Indonesian Muslims. Again, coming out of these traditions in the DI network, recruits in Afghanistan were likely to have been broadly supportive of Azzam's messaging, seeing parallels with their own struggles at home.

⁸¹⁴ Azzam, *Join the Caravan*

⁸¹⁵ Kartosuwiryo, 'Keber'atan ra'iat', *Fadjar Asia*, 27 April 1929

However, this shared belief in the necessity of establishing an Islamic state, free from the interference of non- or un-Islamic forces, throws into sharp relief some of the key differences in the ideological approaches of Azzam and Sungkar. To begin with, Sungkar sent his cadres to Afghanistan with the explicit aim of the men using the opportunity to gain the requisite skills to fight and successfully overthrow the Indonesian state upon their return. Nasir Abas, Ali Imron, Ahmed Sajuli and Adung, among other JI participants of the conflict have noted that regardless of when they travelled to the conflict, Sungkar emphasised that they were being ‘sent for military training’ in order to conduct *jihad* upon their return to Indonesia.⁸¹⁶ DI cadres sent to Afghanistan were, more often than not, far from the front-line and unlikely to engage in direct combat with Soviet forces. According to Solahudin:

Indonesian students were not permitted to take part on the front line and typically fought with artillery in the rear. Sayyaf [the commander of the al-Ittihad al-Islamy troops] argued that Indonesians need to be spared so they could fight when they returned to Indonesia.⁸¹⁷

While this decision did not entirely ensure there were no Indonesian casualties throughout the conflict, there were seemingly only two deaths among the ten batches of DI fighters who travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan between 1985 and 1991.⁸¹⁸ Additionally, rather than pledging allegiance to Azzam, other leaders of the Afghan mujahedeen, or even the DI imam in Indonesia, the men instead swore an oath to Sungkar, pledging to ‘listen and obey the orders of God and His Messenger in easy and difficult times’.⁸¹⁹ The men were thus bound to Sungkar’s agenda and almost all returned to Indonesia or Malaysia within three years. The incident highlights not only the power of Sungkar’s hold over the men, but the autonomy of his operation in Malaysia. While he predominantly sent existing DI members to Afghanistan, he drafted in others, like Nasir Abas and Ali Imron, who had no pre-existing ties to the group.

Sungkar’s decision to send men to participate in the Afghan conflict was motivated by a desire to provide his followers with an opportunity to train and prepare for a *jihad* back in Indonesia. This rationale put him at odds with Azzam’s belief that the conflict was about liberating Muslim lands from non-Muslim imperialism. Azzam had also hoped that following their success in Afghanistan,

⁸¹⁶ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019

⁸¹⁷ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, p.136

⁸¹⁸ Ibid

⁸¹⁹ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta 3 October 2019

the mujahideen would continue as a force to liberate other areas such as Palestine. As such, Sungkar appeared far less committed to being a part of the so-called caravan, instead prioritising his own local struggle.

Furthermore, although Azzam had stressed that the first phase of the *jihad* in Afghanistan was directed against Muslim rulers who had betrayed their faith and their fellow Muslims, he was less supportive of conflict in other societies ruled by so-called deviant or pro-Western Muslim leaders. Fawaz Gerges posits that this may be because Azzam's 'main source of finance came from Saudi Arabia' and thus he 'could not just bite the hand that fed him... he had neither an independent financial patron nor grievances against the house of Saud'.⁸²⁰ As such, Afghanistan was the pragmatic choice to begin to build a transnational force of Islamist militants. It offered the potential to create a territorial base and opportunities to 'to train on every type of weapon'.⁸²¹ These skills could then be used to help liberate Palestine, which Azzam saw as his next struggle.

Sungkar's focus throughout the 1980s on preparing for a battle against the Indonesian government and seeming disinterest in being a part of a long-running global Islamic struggle to liberate Muslim lands from non-Muslim occupiers thus sat uneasily alongside Azzam's agenda. Despite Sungkar's numerous sermons critiquing nationalism, he nevertheless seemed content to pursue the establishment of an Islamic society within the territorial boundaries of the existing Indonesian Republic during this period. While Sungkar routinely criticised the United States for its support of un-Islamic governments, and lambasted Christians and Jews in statements published in the 1990s, his 1980s sermons suggest a distinct disinterest in global events.

Over the course of the 16 sermons available (which total about nine hours of audiotape) Sungkar rarely references specific international political events. Instead, his statements were vague, as if he intended their content to be timeless. It may have been the case that he did not think it necessary or interesting to delve into the details of American support for Israel. But regardless of his intent, the content of his sermons suggests that, despite his exile in Malaysia, his focus remained squarely on the Indonesian state and he displayed a lack of attention or interest in the international realm.

Among his followers, while several expressed their concerns for the plight of the Afghan people and the Palestinians during their time in Afghanistan, few appeared to have made long-lasting

⁸²⁰ Gerges, *The Far Enemy*, p.135

⁸²¹ Asaf Maliach, 'Bin Ladin, Palestine and al-Qa'ida's Operational Strategy', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 44:3 (2008), pp.367-368

bonds with the local fighters or with militants from other networks. This appeared to be the result of poor language skills, with few speaking Arabic, or indeed any language other than Bahasa Indonesia. This limited their interactions with other foreigners and prevented them from learning in mixed classrooms, as did as the segregation of Indonesian fighters into their own barracks and the general prohibition against DI members fighting on the front line. Few, if any, of the men interviewed appeared to lament coming back to Southeast Asia or appeared interested in joining another foreign liberation movement. This quasi-segregation meant that the Indonesians were ultimately unintentionally insulated from a core element of Azzam's ideology; the creation of pan-Islamic solidarity and the pursuit of a collective military agenda to liberate Muslim lands.

The continued focus on Indonesia as the primary location to enact *ḥākimiyya* therefor suggests that Sungkar's ideology was largely unchanged by developments in Afghanistan. It thus seems highly unlikely that the conflict motivated their split from the DI movement back in Indonesia, particularly as their objectives and focus of the scope of their intended conflict remained the same.

Takfīr and jīhad

A final difference between Azzam's ideology and Sungkar's was their approach to the concept of *takfīr* (excommunication). Azzam's approach tended to be far more forgiving, since he saw preserving unity in the global *umma* as necessary to his larger aim of liberating Muslim lands from *kuffar* forces. As such, he supported using *takfīr* sparingly to reduce the creation of divisions and strife within the Muslim community. For example, in *The Defence of Muslim Lands*, Azzam offered several pragmatic responses to the question of whether it was acceptable to fight alongside Muslims with low or poor levels of Islamic education, who may smoke or 'wear talismans'. First, Azzam argued that compassion and understanding were paramount since Muslims all over the world 'have similar problems' and it is acceptable, or indeed necessary, to overlook these shortcomings when 'confronting the greater harm' He wrote that 'jihad in a nation with sin and errors' was preferable to Russian victory.⁸²²

He went on to argue that a desire for purity in all Muslims would allow their enemies to take advantage and gain the upper hand, lamenting that '[if] only Muslims had fought in Palestine, in spite of the corruption, that was present in the early stages'. He made it plain that he was largely uninterested in pursuing strict standards for Muslim behaviour in these circumstances, writing that:

⁸²² Azzam, *Defence of Muslim Lands*

[It was] obligatory to fight alongside any Muslim people as long as they are Muslims. It does not matter how bad or corrupted they are as long as they are fighting the *Kuffar*, People of the Book or Atheists.⁸²³

Conversely, Sungkar favoured a much more stringent and puritanical approach. In his sermons, he routinely railed against Muslims who actively or tacitly supported the Suharto regime, describing them as living in a state of *jābiliyyah*, easily influenced by ‘lies, made up beliefs like *Pancasila*’ and prone to ‘selective’ interpretations or innovative readings of Qur’anic scripture. His sermons frequently mentioned his hatred of common Javanese cultural practices such as *selapanan* and *tedbak sithen*, ritual gatherings and prayers held to bless children when they are slightly over a month old.⁸²⁴

Alongside these other condemnations, his belief that Muslims who supported Indonesian nationalism were effectively practicing ‘serious idolatry’, illustrates how little tolerance Sungkar had for deviations from his rigid conceptualisation of the practicing of Islam. That he was willing to excommunicate people for engaging in historic cultural practices and pagan traditions, even if they still identified as Muslims, runs counter to the argument made by Azzam to overlook these indiscretions as long as these people were helping to overthrow a common enemy.⁸²⁵

This uncompromising attitude suggests again that the influence of Azzam’s teachings in Afghanistan were more limited than many scholars have posited. Sungkar was sufficiently confident in his teachings and interpretations that he was able to selectively adopt elements of Azzam’s work and promote it in his *pesantren* network while discarding large portions of it that did not accord with his agenda.

Moreover, the DI’s experience in Afghanistan illustrates the clear hold that the two men had over their cadres, who seemingly returned diligently, largely retaining Sungkar’s teachings. In interviews, none of the DI cadres who travelled to Afghanistan suggested that they learned anything contrary to their leaders’ ideology while abroad, though this may be because they did not want to present discord within their ranks to a researcher or simply could not recall or were less interested in the philosophical disputes between Azzam and Sungkar. Regardless, the episode showed that the

⁸²³ Ibid

⁸²⁴ Abdullah Sungkar, ‘U Abdullah Sungkar 5’

⁸²⁵ Ibid

development of DI and subsequently JI's ideology remained squarely in the hands of its leadership, and was not driven from the ground up.

Conclusion

At the start of the 1980s, the DI had returned to an understanding of *jihad* that narrowly defined the concept as a violent, physical struggle, akin to the definition preached by Kartosuwiryo from the 1940s until his death in 1962. This was largely because the group's members had come to see the futility of peaceful advocacy as the Sukarno government attempted to impose a national ideology that alienated Islamists of all forms. The Iranian revolution provided further inspiration that small acts of violence could spark a wider societal uprising against a corrupt regime.

Despite the failures of these plots to materialise and Sungkar and Ba'asyir's continued legal troubles, the organisation's understanding of the concept had concretised into an obligation for all true Muslims to pursue. *Jihad* was not only a means of professing one's faith, but the primary mechanism for overthrowing a tyrannical, un-Islamic regime and bring about an Islamic state for the good of all Muslims.

Given these developments, the argument that participation in the Afghan conflict from 1985, or the teachings of Abdullah Azzam in particular, created or gave DI members a new understanding of *jihad*, rings hollow. In many respects, Azzam's understanding of *jihad*, often reducing it to a struggle against un-Islamic forces, aligned with and reinforced the beliefs of the DI members who participated in the conflict. Elements of his ideology that did not accord with Sungkar's, or even Kartosuwiryo's, were quickly disregarded or downplayed, given the control and respect that Sungkar had over his followers and the fact that they often only spent brief stints in Afghanistan before returning to Indonesia or Malaysia. Afghanistan played a significant role in enabling DI members to enact their own *jihad* against the Indonesian state through the skills they acquired and the connections, and ultimately resources, that they were able to procure from foreign groups. Nevertheless, the role that the conflict played in the development of the DI's ideology was limited.

Chapter 6 | Reimagining *Hākimiyya*: Preserving or Creating the Islamic State of Indonesia? 1985-1993

Given that neither Abdullah Azzam's ideology nor the participation of DI members in the Afghan conflict were the primary reasons for Sungkar's decision to leave DI, this final chapter will explore alternative explanations for the split and the creation of the Jemaah Islamiyah. By the mid-1980s, Sungkar and Ba'asyir, isolated in Malaysia, away from the key command structure of the DI, found themselves increasingly at odds with their counterparts in Indonesia over how best to create an Islamic state.

Although Sungkar agreed with the rest of the DI that *hākimiyya* was an essential goal, he no longer thought the NII, with its military command structure and pseudo-state functionaries, was the right vehicle by which to achieve it. The DI had largely kept the organisational structure of Kartosuwiryo's wartime state, maintain a series of regional and sub-regional commanders. Sungkar did not think that this diffuse entity was capable of overthrowing the Indonesian government, much less spreading its ideology effectively. Most significantly, he did not see it as an Islamic state in any meaningful sense, since it lacked any territory and the ability to impose Islamic governance and *shari'a*.

Resultantly, this chapter will argue that Sungkar's decision to break away and form the JI was due to a fundamentally different understanding of the importance and utility of the NII in achieving *hākimiyya*. Sungkar understood *hākimiyya* to be, as described by Maududi, temporal empowerment, where God's laws and sovereignty were enacted so that Muslims could lead pious and fulfilled lives in accordance with their faith. In order to achieve this, the state's leaders, its caliph and *majelis shūrā*, should have complete territorial control in order to impose and enact *shari'a*. The DI's failure to hold territory for a small base, let alone an entire state, showed that it had not come close to achieving its goal of an Islamic state and could not be thought of as such.

Secondly, this chapter will argue that divisions within the DI were already becoming apparent prior to the return of its members from Afghanistan. These disagreements were exacerbated by the fact that, by the 1980s, Sungkar's idea of how to attain *hākimiyya* was largely influenced by concepts espoused by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the teaching of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Finally, this chapter will propose that Sungkar believed that the best path towards the attainment of *hākimiyya* was through the building a smaller, more agile organisation. Based on the

writings of the Brotherhood and Wahhab, Sungkar came to embrace the creation of a community of like-minded Muslims who would lead a life of piety, creating a proto-Islamic state like the one formed by the Prophet and his followers in Medina. Sungkar came to think that *hakimiyya* could only be realised by taking a bottom-up rather than top-down approach. This community would not only practice Islamic values, but also actively oppose the existing state through engaging in a physical *jihad*.

This chapter will make these arguments over two sections. It will begin by examining the personality clashes and the ideological differences between Sungkar and the DI leaders who remained in Indonesia. Secondly, through an examination of the group's foundational documents, this thesis will analyse the impact of the Egyptian *salafis* on Sungkar's desire to create an Islamic state initially through the establishment of small communities as a form of *hijrah* and the incorporation of *jihad*.

Personal or ideological? Assessing the reasons for the JI break away

Scholars examining the origins of the JI often pay little attention to the group's foundational moment. Many, like Rohan Gunaratna, indicate simply that 'after a dispute with the Indonesian-based DI leader named Ajengan Masduki, Sungkar formed JI in 1993', providing little detail about the nature of the disagreement or examining if there was more to it than a clash of personalities.⁸²⁶ Others argue that the group emerged out of the participation in the Afghan conflict. Greg Barton exemplifies this school of thought writing that in 1992, Sungkar 'travelled to talk with the mujahidin in Pakistan, asking Southeast Asian fighters whether they stood with him and Ba'asyir or with the old DI set'.⁸²⁷ Barton does not give any context for why Sungkar was asking the men to pick between the two groups.

Nevertheless, their writings are indicative of these narratives about the JI's origins, which see the group as either a manifestation of Sungkar's personal ambitions or a creature of the Afghan *jihad*. In either event, scholars have routinely failed to engage with the group's ideological origins, specifically at the point of the rupture between the two sides. This section thus attempts to shed light on this period in greater depth, examining both the personality clashes between Sungkar and

⁸²⁶ Gunaratna, 'The Ideology of Al-Jema'ah Al-Islamiya', p.70

⁸²⁷ Greg Barton, 'The historical development of Jihadi Islamist thought in Indonesia', *Report Series: Radical Islamic Ideology in Southeast Asia*, Combatting Terrorism Centre at West Point (2009), p.44

Masduki and how these clashes were ultimately rooted in different understandings of how best to achieve *hakimiyya*.

Sungkar's decision

According to Nasir Abas, the decision to break with DI was made by Sungkar, with little involvement from Ba'asyir, who Abas characterised as 'not a leader, not strong like Abdullah Sungkar'.⁸²⁸ The fallout was the result of long-simmering personal tensions with Ajengan Masduki, who was appointed the DI's leader over Sungkar in November 1987, as well as frustrations with over the DI's commitment to the preservation of the NII.⁸²⁹ Interviews with other DI members for this thesis and accounts in Solahudin's work support the view that a combination of personality clashes and understandings of *hakimiyya* resulted in the split.⁸³⁰

However, the limits of these accounts must also be taken into consideration. Between Masduki's appointment on 4 November 1987 by the DI's *majelis shūrā* and Sungkar's announcement declaring the formation of the JI on 1 January 1993, there do not appear to be extant records of written communication between the pair, recordings of phone calls, or any first-hand accounts of their meetings by other members. This was presumably due to concerns that letters, calls or other forms of communication might be intercepted by the Indonesian authorities. Additionally, many of Sungkar's close associates were training in Afghanistan during this period or simply not privy to these discussions among the most senior members of the DI.

Although these second, or sometimes third-hand accounts are imperfect, the similarities in their narratives are striking and suggest that there is some truth to them. Furthermore, those interviewed generally refrained from passing judgment on either Sungkar or Masduki in their assessment of the breakdown in the relationship, even though they were generally closer to Sungkar. This suggests that they were making at least some attempt made to present the situation as neutrally as they could, or at least we attempting to give the appearance of neutrality.

⁸²⁸ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019

⁸²⁹ Ibid

⁸³⁰ For Solahudin's account of these events see: Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, pp.149-151

The personal

None of those interviewed could specify the exact point when relations soured between the two men. According to Nasir Abas, who met Masduki for the first time while the latter was on a visit to Afghanistan in 'late 1987 or early 1988', things appeared fairly amicable.⁸³¹ Ali Imron and Ahmad Sujali both claimed on separate occasions to have heard 'gossip' while in Afghanistan about a rivalry between Sungkar and Masduki but could not recall when this began.⁸³² AK, a close friend of Sungkar's, claimed that Sungkar was 'irritated' with Masduki by 1989 but did not believe that the animosity had begun before then.⁸³³ Lower ranking members claimed they did not know about the personal tensions until Zulkarnian (alias Aris Sumarsono), a commanding officer who had been part of the first group of DI members to go to Afghanistan, asked them to pick between the two organisations in January 1993.⁸³⁴

Masduki had been a part of the DI movement 'from its early days', according to Solahudin, and had been a district commander in Tasikmalaya, West Java, one of the group's traditional strongholds.⁸³⁵ He was known by his honorific title, Ajengan, meaning 'a person with deep religious knowledge', because many older DI members believed he was a religious scholar.⁸³⁶

According to Ali Imron, one of the points of contention between the two men after Masduki took power was the allegation that Masduki practiced 'mysticism' and 'went to caves to hear whispers'.⁸³⁷ Similarly, Nasir Abas claimed that he 'did not know if it was true' but had also heard 'stories of Masduki doing *guna-guna*' (voodoo or witchcraft).⁸³⁸ Neither men claimed to know when these rumours started, who was behind them, or if the stories were true.

Nevertheless, given the increasingly *takfiri* stance of many DI members, particularly those who had been under Sungkar's tutelage, these allegations were problematic for the organisation's new imam. Regardless of their veracity, the impression that Masduki was engaging in allegedly un-Islamic practices rendered him vulnerable to charges of being an apostate or at very least insufficiently committed and knowledgeable of 'true' Islamic values. It was widely known that

⁸³¹ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019

⁸³² Interview with Ahmad Suljali, Jakarta, 16 July 2019 and Ali Imron, Jakarta, 2 October 2019

⁸³³ Interview with AK, Jakarta, 4 October 2019

⁸³⁴ Interview with AS, Jakarta, 18 July 2018

⁸³⁵ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, p.147

⁸³⁶ Abdullah Sungkar, 'U Abdullah Sungkar 4'

⁸³⁷ Interview with Ali Imron, Jakarta, 2 October 2019

⁸³⁸ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019

Sungkar was opposed to these practices and had repeatedly criticised those who practiced them in his sermons.⁸³⁹

Solahudin claims that Sungkar confronted and ‘repeatedly warned Masduki to abandon Sufi teachings, but Masduki refused’, though it is not clear where this information came from or if there is any proof that Masduki was actually engaging in these practices. It is equally plausible that the allegations were a smear campaign conducted by Sungkar or his allies in the organisation to discredit Masduki and thus elevate themselves. A similar tactic was used by the Indonesian government to discredit Kartosuwiryo upon his death with allegations that he was a mystic and insufficiently committed to Islamism.⁸⁴⁰

Masduki appears to have retaliated by spreading rumours that Sungkar needed to be side-lined for being unprofessional, untrustworthy and corrupt. According to Nasir Abas, Sungkar served as the NIP’s minister of foreign affairs during this period. In this role, he had discretion over which individuals were sent to Afghanistan and control over the funds provided by Abdullah Azzam’s services bureau. As Nasir Abas explained, Sungkar was accused of misappropriating funds, ‘sending three men on the budget meant for one’ and allegedly pocketed the difference.⁸⁴¹ Ali Imron defended Sungkar, claiming that - although he heard the rumours of Sungkar ‘stealing money’- he ‘could not be completely sure’ if it was true.⁸⁴² Ali Imron claimed it was more likely that Sungkar was just trying to ‘use the money efficiently’ though he added that ‘people in my batch complained they got their allowance in rupees not US dollars like the earlier batches’, and seemed to take this as evidence that Sungkar was corrupt.⁸⁴³

Whether or not these allegations were true, the damage to Sungkar’s reputation was done. He ranted to his followers, according to Nasir Abas, about his exclusion from the top ranks, exclaiming ‘I found the donors! I found the training centres! I have the relationships! How can he [Masduki] replace me?’.⁸⁴⁴

⁸³⁹ Interview with AS, Jakarta, 18 July 2018

⁸⁴⁰ Formichi, *Islam and the making of the nation*, p.184

⁸⁴¹ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019

⁸⁴² Interview with Ali Imron, Jakarta, 2 October 2019

⁸⁴³ Ibid

⁸⁴⁴ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019

The ideological

This personal antipathy was compounded by significant ideological differences over the question of the NII and the best path to achieving *hākimiyya*. Nasir Abas claimed that he was told about this point of contention between the two men by Zulkarnian when he was informed about Sungkar's decision to break away. In his telling, in '1991 or early 1992, Sungkar in his capacity as foreign minister, was ordered by Masduki to open up several embassies 'in countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Palestine and more Arab nations' and send representatives on behalf of the NII.⁸⁴⁵ AK, a close friend of Sungkar's, said that Sungkar was deeply displeased with the idea, apparently saying at some point in 1992:

We cannot claim we are a state! How can we have a state, where is the area that we control? We do not control anything! So, we cannot say we are a country. It is wrong.⁸⁴⁶

AK did not make clear whether these remarks were said to him personally if they were intended for a wider audience. However, the account appears similar to one provided by Nasir Abas, who said that 'the structure of the organisation of that time had ministers for this, ministers for that, ministers for everything. They gave positions like the structure of the government of Indonesia. Abdullah Sungkar said back then "we cannot use this anymore. It does not make sense"⁸⁴⁷. Additionally, Solahudin found that in an anonymously recorded interview with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 2004, Ba'asyir suggested that this was a key source of tension between the two sides as Masduki believed the NII continued to exist but the 'enemy, namely the Republic of Indonesia, had seized its territory'.⁸⁴⁸

The above suggests that there were substantive divisions, and not just personal vendettas, between the two men. This is not to argue that their dislike of each other played no role or could not have been the more important factor in driving the split. However, it does point to the fact that ideological differences over the utility of the NII in the achievement of *hākimiyya* played some role in causing the JP's split.

⁸⁴⁵ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019

⁸⁴⁶ Interview with AK, Jakarta, 4 October 2019

⁸⁴⁷ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019

⁸⁴⁸ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism*, p.151

Fundamentally, it appears that Sungkar did not see the existing NII as fit for purpose in the late 1980s. Although organised as an Islamic state with an imam at its apex, a *majelis shūrā*, numerous ministers with portfolios, and a military hierarchy divided into regional divisions, the NII had no territory to speak of, no people to govern and no ability to impose its laws. Solahudin has characterised these objections as Sungkar holding a ‘*salafi* view that an Islamic state had to control territory and uphold Islamic law in that territory’.⁸⁴⁹ However, this does not appear to be a uniquely *salafi* principle, with classical Muslim jurists seeing *dar al-Islam* as a ‘legal construct that has a territorial dimension’.⁸⁵⁰ As such, Islamic law and the practice of the Islamic faith can only be guaranteed, ‘where it is protected by a Muslim ruler’.⁸⁵¹ Without this ruler’s control over an area, attempts to implement *shari’a* are futile.

Despite the NII’s state-like organisational structure, it was clearly unable to implement or enforce *shari’a*, thus failing at one of the core components of *hakimiyya*. Additionally, while it attempted to mimic the institutions of a fully sovereign Islamic state, in reality its ministers had no power to implement Islamic policies that affected citizens in any meaningful sense. Finally, its military was clearly unable to protect its ‘citizens’ from a non-Muslim aggressor, seeing as the Indonesian Republic had full control over its claimed territory. On all three counts, the NII was not a useful vehicle for the attainment of *hakimiyya*.

It is not clear why Masduki and older DI members believed that this structure was useful or worth clinging to beyond the symbolic power that came from it having briefly held territory towards the end of colonial rule and the early years of the Republic. Whether its leaders planned to somehow use its this governance and military structure to regroup and takeover Indonesia are also unknown due to a lack of written, oral and non-archival sources. Even if these justifications were accessible, it is highly unlikely that any such plan would have worked given that sporadic and low-level attacks by the group’s members had routinely resulted in mass arrests in the 1970s and 1980s, crippling the organisation.

In light of these failures, Sungkar’s decision to part ways with the group makes sense on a personal, pragmatic, and ideological level. The organisation had managed to regroup – insofar as it had a leadership structure and new members – since its military defeat in 1962, but still lacked territory

⁸⁴⁹ Ibid, p.149

⁸⁵⁰ Manoucher Parvin and Maurie Sommer, ‘Dar al-Islam: The Evolution of Muslim Territoriality and Its Implications for Conflict Resolution in the Middle East’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 11:1 (1980), p.4

⁸⁵¹ Idem, p.5

or the resources to take it from the Indonesian state. Its efforts to attain *hākimiyya* were stymied further by the fact that many members were either in prison or, like Sungkar and Ba'asyir in exile abroad. Finally, it was not clear what keeping up the pretence of the NII meant for the realisation of God's sovereignty on earth, other than to remind DI members that even with their self-declared state, they could not implement *shari'a* or ensure that Muslims lived in accordance with the ways of the Prophet. Sungkar seems to have thought that the group's leadership – which had tarred his reputation and which he believed was engaging in idolatry – was insufficiently committed to truly pursuing *hākimiyya*.

Hākimiyya* through community and *jihad

Sungkar appears to have made the decision to leave DI at the end of 1992, bringing along with him most of his followers in Malaysia and winning the backing of the majority of those in the training camps in Afghanistan.⁸⁵² He announced the formation of his new organisation on 1 January 1993, taking its name and structure from the name from Egyptian *salafi* militant group, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (GI, Islamic Community), which cooperated with JI members in military training camps in Afghanistan in 1990.⁸⁵³

The group's aims were codified in the group's manifesto, *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jamā'ah Al-Islāmiyah* (PUPJI, the General Guidelines for the Struggle of *Al-Jamā'ah Al-Islāmiyah*), in which the group pledges to re-establish the caliphate through '*imān, hijrah and jihad fi sabillab*'.⁸⁵⁴ Published in 1996, the manifesto concretised Abdullah Sungkar's ideas about *hākimiyya* in the early years of the group's formation. Elena Pavlova's excellent piece discussing the significance of the document describes it as a 'reference manual for senior JI cadres' and functions 'simultaneously an organizational charter, an operational handbook, and a religious-strategic programme'.⁸⁵⁵ She adds that the document was most likely 'drafted by a committee of religious scholars, rather than a single individual' due to the 'text's irregular cadence, the differences in writing style among the various sections, and the insertion of extraneous material at the end of the pamphlet'.⁸⁵⁶

⁸⁵² Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, p.151

⁸⁵³ Idem, pp.8 and 141

⁸⁵⁴ *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jamā'ah Al-Islāmiyah* (PUPJI), 30 May 1996, p.13, *Internet Archive*, <https://archive.org/stream/Pupji-GeneralGuidelinesForTheStruggleOfJamaahIslamiyah/Pupji-englishRevision4#page/n5/mode/2up>, accessed: 15 March 2020

⁸⁵⁵ Elena Pavlova, 'From a Counter-Society to a Counter State Movement: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 30:9 (2007), p.780

⁸⁵⁶ Idem, pp.780-781

Although the document calls for the re-establishment of the caliphate as its end goal, its primary focus is the building of a *jama'ah* (community) as the first step in this process.⁸⁵⁷ Formed by righteous leaders, this community would be strengthened so that it could serve as a *qā'idah salābah* (solid base) for the promotion of the group's aims.⁸⁵⁸ This community would be fortified by *tarbiyah* (religious education), *dakwah* (proselytisation), *hijrah*, *jihad*, and *tajnid* (military mobilisation). The document lists between six and eleven steps in each section relating to this initial stage of 'preparing to establish the state'.

However, it refers to only eight steps in the section regarding the 'maintenance of the state', which encompasses sections on the formation of this new Islamic state, its 'substantiation', foreign relations, and eventual establishment of the caliphate. The lack of emphasis on these later stages makes it clear that while the long-term goal may be the re-establishment of the caliphate, the JI in its initial years was clearly focused on the steps it would need to take to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. It is clear from the document that Sungkar's ideas of how to achieve *hākimiyya* rest squarely on the creation of a community of likeminded individuals, who would be able to live pious lives within this mini society, and the pursuit of violent *jihad* against the infidel regime occupying their land.

Community

The agenda specified in PUPJI for the achievement of an Islamic state in Indonesia reflected the arguments put forward in three books that were particularly influential for Abdullah Sungkar in the late 1980s. According to Solahudin, Sungkar relied heavily on *At Thoriq ila Jama'atil Muslimin* (The Path to an Islamic Community) by Hussain bin Muhammad bin Ali Jabri, *Al Manhaj Al Haraki Li Sirah An Nabawiyah* (The Method of Struggle According to the History of the Prophet's Struggle) by Munir Muhammad Al Ghadhban, and *Mitsaq Amal Al Islami* (Guide to Islamic Deeds) by Najih Ibrahim, Ashim Abdul Majid and Ishamudin Darbalah.⁸⁵⁹

At Thoriq ila Jama'atil Muslimin and *Al Manhaj Al Haraki Li Sirah An Nabawiyah* argued for the achievement of *hākimiyya* through a 'long and difficult path', a series of stages designed to build and strengthen a community so it is able to then take on and overthrow the enemies of Islam and

⁸⁵⁷ PUPJI, p.15

⁸⁵⁸ Ibid

⁸⁵⁹ Munir Muhammad Al Ghadhban *Al Manhaj Al Haraki Li Sirah An Nabawiyah* (Jordan: Maktabah al-Manar, 1997), pp.6-8

establish and Islamic state and eventually a caliphate.⁸⁶⁰ These texts along with PUPJI indicate that Sungkar's conceptualised attaining *hākimiyya* through *fiqh sirah*; the concept of using the life of the Prophet as a model to follow for the building of an Islamic community by making slow and steady gains until a movement was strong enough to defeat its enemies.⁸⁶¹

At Thoriq ila Jama'atil Muslimin takes as its starting point that the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate opened the door to 'destruction' for Muslims and thus created a need to recapture the past glory of Muslim societies.⁸⁶² Most importantly, it argues that only through the creation of an Islamic state can 'the rights of Muslims to live in peace and prosperity be realised'.⁸⁶³ The first step to recreating the caliphate must be the creation of a community of believers and the growth of this community through *dakwah*, which 'can be done secretly or openly, or a combination of both, at the next stage of [the community's] formation'.⁸⁶⁴ This community could begin at the household level, before expanding outwards over time, eventually encompassing the globe.

Similarly, Munir Muhammad Al Ghadhban argues in his text that victory and the establishment of an Islamic state requires a five-stage process. Like Hussain, Munir argues that in the initial stages of building a community, members may need to 'preach secretly and keep [their] organisational structure a secret' in order to thwart their enemies.⁸⁶⁵ Subsequently, they may preach openly, but should still keep their organisational structure hidden. Taking his cues from the Prophet Muhammad's own struggle, Munir believed that the third stage of the fight to build an Islamic state required a period of *hijrah*, which could be performed through physical separation but would more likely take the form of mentally and spiritually distancing oneself from the rest of society.⁸⁶⁶

These two texts provide Sungkar with a path to the achievement of *hākimiyya*, prioritising the development of a community of likeminded followers, something that he was already building in exile in Malaysia. This plan stood in stark contrast to the workings of the DI back in Indonesia, which had a top down structure and seemingly put little emphasis on creating a small community within which they could begin to implement of their beliefs or values. In this respect, Sungkar's conceptualisation of *hākimiyya* was no longer achieved through a top-down approach where *shari'a*

⁸⁶⁰ Hussain bin Muhammad bin Ali Jabri, *At Thoriq ila Jama'atil Muslimin* (Jakarta: Robbani Press, 2004), p.64

⁸⁶¹ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, pp.151-152

⁸⁶² Idem, p.2

⁸⁶³ Idem, p.41

⁸⁶⁴ Idem, p.121

⁸⁶⁵ Munir Muhammad Al Ghadhban *Al Manhaj Al Haraki Li Sirah An Nabawiyah*, p.35

⁸⁶⁶ Ibid, p.62

and Islamic governance was imposed from above and spread through the population. Instead, this new approach prioritised a grassroots movement, inculcating Islamic values among those closest in physical proximity to him, before branching out secretly.

The prioritisation of a local community not only highlights the JJ's continued focus on a domestic struggle – which its leaders believed would take a long time to achieve – but Sungkar's *salafist* approach to understanding the implementation of *hākimiyya*. As Noah Salomon argues, *salafis* in contrast to Islamists believe that the purification of doctrine is fundamental to political work and as such, 'transforming the social body' must precede the transformation of the political system.⁸⁶⁷

This idea of the need to purify society prior to developing an Islamic state finds its roots in writings of Sayyid Qutb. While these arguments by Islamists regarding the spiritual and moral decline of resulting in the failures of Muslim societies during the colonial period are well-trodden, Qutb's work builds on this, introducing the concept of *jāhiliyyah*. Qutb argued that Muslims living in a non-Islamic state or a society had regressed morally and may as well be pagans having slipped so far from the tenants of Islam.⁸⁶⁸

Given this state of affairs, an adherence to Islamic laws and values must be re-established to not only 'control the animal desires' of people, but to also give 'full opportunities for the development and perfection of human characteristics'.⁸⁶⁹ While only the complete implementation of *hākimiyya* and the enforcement of *shari'a* can truly guarantee that man will be free from servitude and able to practice his faith as God intended, those who are truly committed Muslims should initially 'separate [themselves] from the *jāhili* society and become independent and distinct' from that unit.⁸⁷⁰ As such, the first stage in the achievement of *hākimiyya* can only happen through a small group of individuals choosing to practice Islam 'correctly', and like the Prophet before them, performing a kind of *hijrah* and separating themselves from the godless heathens as best they can.

Sungkar appeared to have taken on board these ideas. His priorities from attempting to create a state structure like the NII to building a social movement from the ground up shows how his thinking about *hākimiyya* evolved since joining the DI. Sungkar emphasised *tarbiyah* and *dakwah* in the building of his new community, thus rooting out and correcting un-Islamic practices and

⁸⁶⁷ Salomon, 'The Salafi Critique of Islamism', p.151

⁸⁶⁸ Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism*, p.181

⁸⁶⁹ Qutb, *Milestones*, p.76

⁸⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p.32

thoughts. In PUPJI, both are mentioned in the document calling for a ‘system of Islamic education’ to be implemented in the newly established community, which would include direct and indirect proselytisation with individuals required to speak with those within and outside the community one-to-one, lectures by senior members of the community, and the spread of the group’s message through ‘print and electronic mass media’.⁸⁷¹

It also echoes Kartosuwiryo’s conceptualisation of how an Islamic state would be established in Indonesia during the colonial period. In his 1936 *Sikap Hijrah* pamphlet, Kartosuwiryo advocated that every individual Muslim undertake a spiritual *hijrah* and participate in a non-violent, *jihad* to decolonise their minds. This process would not be guided by an institution or state, but rather done on from the ground up. While Kartosuwiryo never fully elaborated on the mechanism by which this would result in the overthrow of the Dutch, he too encouraged the building of a strong Muslim community through this process.

Like Kartosuwiryo before him, Sungkar also adapted his ideology to the circumstances. Knowing that DI had struggled to make progress against the Indonesian Republic by preserving the NII’s state structure, these *salafi* ideas of requiring community purification before political action, suited him well at a moment where his organisation was new and weak.

Alongside *At Thoriq ila Jama’atil Muslimin* and *Al Manhaj Al Haraki Li Sirah An Nabawiyah*, the book *Mitsaq Amal Islami* by the Egyptian GI, provided a practical guide for structuring this new community. Working alongside GI members in Afghanistan from 1990, Sungkar’s men gained assistance in military training matters as well as advice on organising their resistance movement in Indonesia.⁸⁷² Like the Indonesians, GI members sought to return to Egypt to overthrow the military regime having gained the requisite skills in Afghanistan.⁸⁷³

Citing an anonymous interview with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Solahudin writes that JI used the book as a foundational text such that it was ‘of the same form’ as GI.⁸⁷⁴ Indeed, PUPJI’s initial pages list out the ten principles for the basis of JI’s struggle, nine of which are wholly taken from *Mitsaq Amal Islami* and ordered identically. This model was based on ‘adopting the *jama’ah* as the method

⁸⁷¹ PUPJI, pp.137, 144 and 145

⁸⁷² Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 3 October 2019

⁸⁷³ Ibid

⁸⁷⁴ Solahudin, *The roots of terrorism in Indonesia*, p.154

of struggle', as opposed to a top-down state structure.⁸⁷⁵ In these small groups, members could conduct *dakwah* and live amongst other likeminded individuals, supporting each other's efforts to become better Muslims and strengthening their commitment to the cause of an Islamic state. The effects of this book can clearly be seen in PUPJI again, which states that the formation of the *jama'ah* is the first step to the establishment of an Islamic state and calls for personal and territorial development to be initially carried out by the *jama'ah*.⁸⁷⁶

Jihad

However, unlike Kartosuwiryo in the 1930s, Sungkar was not naïve enough to believe that the purification of individual thought and a small community's behaviour would magically bring about an Islamic state. He believed that *Jihad musallah* (armed *jihad*) would have to be conducted alongside *dakwah* to 'build strength' in the community.⁸⁷⁷ In these initial stages, this would not entail direct confrontation with the enemies of Islam, but members of the community would have to train and prepare for such an eventuality.

While PUPJI does not provide detailed descriptions of the activities that must be undertaken by those in the community to prepare for this armed struggle, it quotes liberally from the Qur'an to justify physical conflict in the name of Allah. This was emphasised in the classroom as well. *Tarbiyah Jihadiyah* remained a core text in the JI's training programmes. Writing in the introduction to the text, Abu Rusydan (alias Thoriquidin), a former DI member who went to Afghanistan as part of the second batch of militants in 1986 and eventually became an instructor in the JI's camps in the Philippines, reminded readers that '*jihad* [was] a way of life' for Abdullah Azzam and encouraged them to follow his example through the creation of a 'strong foundation'.⁸⁷⁸

Sungkar's commitment to the use of *jihad* as one of the primary tools for the achievement of *hakimiyya* had not changed, even with the establishment of this new organisation. Moreover, his decision to keep some of his followers, like Abu Rusydan and Nasir Abas, in Afghanistan even after the end of the conflict in 1989 and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, suggests that although he believed the movement was not yet ready to take on the Indonesian state, he thought that

⁸⁷⁵ Najih Ibrahim, Ashim Abdul Majid and Ishamudin Darbalah, *Mitsaq Amal Islami* (Solo: Al-Alaq, 2005), p.203

⁸⁷⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷⁷ Idem, p.16

⁸⁷⁸ Abu Rusydan, 'Pengantar Tokoh', in Abdullah Azzam and Abdurrahman Al-Qudsi, *Tarbiyah Jihadiyah* (Solo: Jazera, 2015), p.xiv

preparations for the physical struggle must occur concurrently with the building of his community, rather than being put off to a later date.⁸⁷⁹

On a practical level, this set him apart from post-Kartosuwiryo DI leaders, who also believed that *jihad* was the key to attaining *hākimiyya* but do not appear to have had a concrete plan in place to train and equip their members to fight for it effectively. However, the belief in an armed struggle as the primary means of attaining an Islamic state is one of the long ideological continuities between DI and JI leaders. From Kartosuwiryo's *perang sabil* in 1947 to Sungkar's decision to send DI members to train in Afghanistan, leaders of the DI movement have remained largely committed to the idea that *hākimiyya* would be unattainable through peaceful means or that the participation in activities like elections, would compromise the essence of the movement. As such, the means by which *hākimiyya* was pursued mattered almost as much as the attainment of the Islamic state itself.

Conclusion

The breakup of the DI and establishment of the JI in 1993 highlighted both strong continuities in DI and JI leaders' understanding of *hākimiyya* as well as significant differences in the methods by which it should be pursued. Abdullah Sungkar did not fundamentally add much to the content of the idea as it was first defined by Kartosuwiryo. He strongly believed that an Islamic state was necessary for the security and betterment of Muslims, but believed that the DI leadership was unwilling and unable to make the necessary changes to their organisational structure after decades of failure. Nevertheless, he fundamentally believed that *hākimiyya* would only be achieved, after much preparation, through *jihad*, as signalled by his willingness to send his followers to Afghanistan for protracted periods of time to gain the skills needed to fight the Indonesian state.

Where he differed from his predecessors was his willingness to sacrifice the NII and the symbolism of Kartosuwiryo's short-lived state for a new model, predicated on building up a small grassroots movement. This fundamentally *salafi* approach, set him apart from his Islamist predecessors, who believed that *hākimiyya* could be achieved from the top-down through the creation of the governance structures and institutions of an Islamic state, even though they lacked substantive power in practice. This difference of approach and belief was the primary driver of his decision to break away from the group and establish the JI.

⁸⁷⁹ Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 21 July 2018

As such, this chapter rejects an understanding of the DI's fragmentation that prioritises the ideology of external figures such as Abdullah Azzam, or simple personality clashes between Sungkar and other DI officials. DI leaders were fundamentally responding to domestic considerations and ideological differences within their own movement. The Afghan conflict, while certainly a meaningful experience for the members that participated, did not fundamentally reshape the group's internal dynamics or significantly alter its ideology.

Conclusion

From his cell in the Nusakambangan maximum-security prison in August 2014, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS) 'caliph' Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi, marking a new phase in the ideological evolution of militant Islamism in Indonesia. By that point, Abdullah Sungkar had been dead for nearly 15 years and the JI was a shadow of its former self. After the group had conducted a slew of deadly and high-profile attacks on civilian targets, often Western tourists, in the 2000s, security officials cracked down, arresting or killing many high-profile members. The network appears to be in a period of stasis – unable or unwilling to conduct attacks in service of their agenda – much like the DI after its insurgency was quashed. Nevertheless, members that have so remained at large continue to do *dakwah* – quietly – in the hopes of someday reviving their cause and eventually attaining *hākimiyya* through *jihad*.

This thesis has demonstrated the importance and appeal of these ideas to the DI as conceptualised by its key leaders and ideologues from its early foundations to its eventual fracturing. While Kartosuwiryo and Sungkar emphasised different aspects of *hākimiyya* and *jihad*, the two concepts always formed the bedrock of the organisation's ideology. This thesis' most basic contention is that only through an examination of the DI's ideological structure, and the process by which its leadership arrived at their respective understandings of the tenets that make up the ideology, can we fully understand the history of the movement.

This history has been revealed through a distinctive methodology that combined an analytical framework rooted in intellectual history and a wide range of difference sources, including formal archives, interviews with participants, and reams of propaganda material shared on the internet. This study of the process by which ideology was constructed, interpreted, and applied by DI leaders in different periods has revealed their rich understanding of religious scripture and shrewd ability to borrow concepts that have roots in many countries and time periods. It thus demonstrates that the beliefs of the DI movement should be taken as seriously as an ideological project as that of groups based in the traditional centres of the Muslim world.

As chapter one demonstrated, the scholarship of the Islamic Modernists had a considerable impact on the foundations of the movement's conceptualisation of *hākimiyya*. From his beginnings as an activist in a Modernist political organisation, Kartosuwiryo argued that independence from colonial rule and Western influence was not sufficient for ensuring the freedom of Muslims in Indonesia. This was merely the necessary first step to ensure that Muslims could begin the process of securing political sovereignty for God. Kartosuwiryo called for the creation of an Islamic state

and the implementation of *shari'a* to ensure that Muslims were not subject to the tyranny of man-made laws, but instead free to serve God completely. It was only through an Islamic state that man could live wholly as a Muslim in the way that God intended, thus ensuring salvation in the afterlife. The failure of the Indonesian Republic to implement *shari'a* and Islamic structures of governance thus put Muslims in danger of living in sin. These views were crucial in motivating Kartosuwiryo to form the DI and declare the independence of the NII.

As Chapter 2 showed, the violence of the Indonesian Revolution had a radicalising effect on Kartosuwiryo, convincing him of the need to engage in an armed *jihad* to ensure the creation of an Islamic state. While Kartosuwiryo had previously adopted a broad, nuanced understanding of the meaning of *jihad*, the conflict with the Dutch and subsequently the Republican government led to a narrowing of his interpretation. Regardless of what form his conceptualisation of *jihad* took throughout his career, Kartosuwiryo consistently saw it as the single, most important tool of realising an Islamic state in Indonesia. In order to be successful, *jihad* thus required the participation of all Muslims in society, striving collectively to improve themselves spiritually or to physically remove the obstacles to the creation of their state.

Chapter 3 explored how Kartosuwiryo belatedly adopted the ideas of *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* to compliment *jihad* in the protection of the Islamic faith into the DI's ideological framework. He saw these ideas primarily as useful tools to ensure political compliance from his supporters and those living within his territory as well as a means to demonise his enemies and justify the group's continued struggle. His use of these two concepts, while not particularly innovative in his interpretations, show that the DI had begun to embrace some *salafī* and *Wahhabi* ideas prior to the rapid globalisation of Islamism in the 1960s and 1970s, and their popularisation by organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood.

Steeped in these ideas from his days as an activist with the DDII, Abdullah Sungkar found a natural home in the DI after giving up on peaceful resistance against an increasingly repressive Indonesian state. His understanding of *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* was far deeper than Kartosuwiryo's and his contribution to their development in the group's ideological framework was to ensure their application to the everyday lives of DI members. Sungkar thus went further than Kartosuwiryo in defining numerous non-political acts as constituting disbelief and heresy, expanding the number of opportunities the group had to engage in *jihad* to purify Islam in Indonesia. This also had the effect of encouraging disavowal of all non-Islamic things, thus limiting the spheres in which his followers could engage with those outside of the DI. While embracing an expansive understanding of *takfir*, Sungkar like Kartosuwiryo saw these ideas primarily as tools to build loyalty among

followers and ensure commitment in the fight to achieve an Islamic state.

This expansive understanding of *takefir* and *al-wala' wa-l-barā* was fused with *jihad* during the years Sungkar spent in the DI's top echelons. In seeing more actions as violations against the principles of Islam, the group conducted more attacks targeting civilians, believing this to be another just means of opposing the Indonesian Republic and its supporters. Additionally, Sungkar was subject to greater levels of government surveillance and repression, leading to a narrowing of his conceptualisation of *jihad*, much like Kartosuwiryo's decades before. With no good options for Islamists to pursue their agenda through advocacy or the ballot box, Sungkar saw armed rebellion as the only way of attaining *hākimiyya*.

To that end, the war between the Soviet Union and the Afghan mujahedeen provided an opportunity for his recruits to train and gain the necessary skills to eventually resist the Indonesian state. Chapter 5 makes the case that Sungkar was thus driven by a desire to secure *hākimiyya* in Indonesia rather than, as some argue, motivated by a larger pan-Islamic cause. *Jihad* was, once again, a means of achieving a tangible political goal.

Given this revitalised commitment to *jihad*, Chapter 6 demonstrated that Sungkar came to see the NII and its claims to being a functional state as absurd and a hindrance to the group's ultimate objective of securing *hākimiyya*. His willingness to sacrifice this historic institution showed that he had come to see the attainment of *hākimiyya* as a bottom-up process, which would require the purification of society rather than the imposition of state-led rules. His disillusionment with the NII led to conflicts with the DI leadership, and ultimately to his decision to leave and form the JI.

Over the course of the five chapters, this thesis has demonstrated how the core concepts that make up the DI's belief structure were formed by its key ideologues and how these ideas related to each other over time. Only through distilling the essence of each concept can the overarching ideology of the group be appreciated and thus this thesis provides a more thorough understanding of the DI's worldview than has previously been attempted.

It must be acknowledged that both key DI leaders contributed to each concept with different degrees of thoroughness and knowledge. As such, the development of these ideas has never truly been straightforward or resulted in improvements or clarifications to every belief. What is clear, however, is that when major shifts in understanding did occur, they came as a result of conflict – or at least the threat of it. This thesis has contended that it is the very flexibility embedded in each part of the DI's ideology that has provided the group with the resiliency necessary to weather these

periods and endure in some form.

Finally, this thesis has contributed to the nascent field of scholarship examining the ideology of terrorist and militant organisations. In using intellectual history to systematically examine each component of the DI's ideology and explore their origins within the wider realm of Islamist literature, it demonstrates both the ingenuity of local actors as well as potential commonalities with Islamist groups operating in vastly different contexts. It demonstrates that ideology is an important lens through which these organisations should be examined, in addition to more conventional analyses of their organisational structures, capabilities, and tactics.

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