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The Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe: transnational socialism and the launching of the early European institutions

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Abstract

The object of this dissertation is to establish the existence and reach of the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe (SMUSE). The SMUSE was a transnational group of socialists and federalists from a dozen European countries, counting notably Italian Socialist Mario Zagari, French cabinet member André Philip French President Guy Mollet, and Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak. The Movement's members collaborated actively beginning in 1947 with a view to establishing a supranational European community operating on the basis of democratic majority.

Founded in the United Kingdom, it was soon spearheaded by the French, in close collaboration with the French Socialist party. It established a relationship between the internationalist wing of the Labour party and Continental socialists in the late 1940s. In mid-1950 it became deeply involved in the campaign for the European Defense Community and the political umbrella under which the EDC would operate. Beginning in 1955, it functioned as a forum of coordination in the context of the Treaties of Rome.

After the establishment of the European Communities, many of its adherents became leading members of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, and the Movement continued to function as a forum of socialist dialogue and networking into the 1990s.

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I am also indebted to the staff and archivists at the various archives I consulted in Italy, France, Belgium and the UK. In particular, I spent a great deal of time at the "OURS" Socialist archives in Paris, and I extend a personal word of thanks to Frédéric Cépède, who was always helpful despite seeming to singlehandedly bear much of the organizational burden of the institution. I could not possibly have done justice to the relationship between the Socialist Movement and the SFIO without his considerable knowledge and recommendations. I am also grateful for his flexibility with regards to the archive's official opening hours.

I benefitted from the personal help of several scholars who shared their expertise and work with me at various stages, notably Tommaso Milani, Talbot Imlay and Brian Shaev; and of course none of us work in a vacuum, and this work would not be possible without efforts of two generations of historians whose secondary literature underpins this narrative.

List of abbreviations

Below are the most commonly-referenced acronyms related to the Movement

Parent movement

MUSSE (Fr. MEUSE) – Movement for the United Socialist States of Europe (1946-1948)

SMUSE (Fr. MSEUE) – Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe (1948-1961)

MGE – *Mouvement Gauche Européenne* (1961-1973)

MSE-GE – *Mouvement Socialiste Européen-Gauche Européenne* (1973-1993)

National Sections

MSFEUE – *Mouvement Socialiste Français pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe* (1947-1948)

MDSFEUE – *Mouvement Démocratique et Socialiste Français pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe* (1948-1950s)

MGE – *Mouvement Gauche Européenne* (NB: the French section adopted this as its name before the parent-Movement did)

OFGE – *Organisation Française de la Gauche Européenne* (1961 onwards)

Other

GE – *Gauche Européenne* (the Movement's magazine, 1953-1958)

ILP – Independent Labour Party

SFIO – *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* (French Socialist Party)

SPD – *Socialdemocratische Partei Deutschlands* (German Socialist Party)

Introduction

The history of European integration has been thoroughly explored over the last 70 years, and for good reason. Never before in history have a group of states volunteered to give up sovereign prerogatives: the modern European Union, imperfect as it may be, remains a unique phenomenon. There are dozens of major works on the project and its stages, variously describing and explaining the process, many beginning with the Congress of Europe of 1948, but others tracing the idea back to the last part of the 19th Century. A number of primary actors have been identified with the establishment of the first "EU" institutions – Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Paul-Henri Spaak, Jean Monnet – and have consequently been the subject of biographical works centered on their personal contributions. The smaller groupings and informal institutions that facilitated the European project have received somewhat shorter shrift, though several works have drawn attention to the role of Christian Democracy – in particular the *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales* (NEI) – in fostering personal relationships which played out successfully at the transnational level.

The NEI was one of several transnational groups with a broadly integrationist vision that would help found the European Movement; these included Altiero Spinelli's *Movimento Federalista Europeo* (MFE), the Union of European Federalists (UEF), and Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi's Paneuropean Union. Another such group, though an initially hesitant adherent to the European Movement, was the Movement for the United Socialist States of Europe, or MUSSE. While the NEI and other groups are reasonably well known, the MUSSE (later SMUSE) remains to this day one of the more obscure and misunderstood groups involved in the elaboration of the European project. It was founded in 1946 based on a wartime manifesto by two members of the fledgling Independent Labour Party (ILP), but would soon grow to involve the Labour party proper and the French Socialist party (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière, or SFIO), and would survive in various forms for close to 50 years. Its geopolitical orientation evolved rapidly in its first years, from a geopolitical "bridge" position between the emerging power blocs to one that might be described as "Western-leaning

anti-capitalist" focused on the development of an integrated, independent Europe resistant to both the Soviet Union and the perceived exploitative forces of private capitalism.

The Movement had specific continental harmonization goals from the outset: at their preliminary meeting in 1946, they evoked the need for standardized transportation infrastructure; at their first major conference in June, 1947, they called for a central banking system, a common currency, a customs union and the abolition of internal tariffs. In 1949, they folded these into a comprehensive set of institutions and competences that, while ambitious at the time, was remarkably prescient. They resolved to pursue the creation of a European political authority consisting of an executive branch answerable to a directly-elected Assembly of the People and an Assembly of the States, monitored by an independent judiciary. Under control of that authority would be - in addition to the competences above - the harmonization of the primary economic sectors including agriculture, the internationalization of coal and steel, and the supranational control of the atomic sector. It would include a European army under unified command and a common foreign policy; it would include dual European and National citizenship.

The foregoing list of objectives is not exhaustive – certain plans, such as the elaboration of complex democratic structures within each major industry, have never been seriously pursued; and the existing European Union falls short of some of the Movement's goals, notably a more directly democratic repartition of powers at the legislative level. Nevertheless, I agree with the basic premise of neo-federalist historiography in considering that the fact that the modern European Union so resembles the federalist (in this case SMUSE) vision warrants an investigation into the extent to which the MUSSE might have had a role in its development.

It is also important to note that the SMUSE program was not entirely new or unique. As Brian Shaev has noted,[1] the notion of "binding arbitration" (ie functionally supranational judicial structures) brought a number of transnational groupings together as early as 1889; and German theoretician Karl Kautsky called for a raft of federal European structures like the SMUSE's in 1911. In other words, the Movement's goals fell into line with long-standing goals of the non-communist Left in Europe, and broadly

[1] Shaev, Brian. "Liberalizing Regional Trade: Socialists and European Economic Integration" *Contemporary European History* 27.2 (2018). 258-279

with the several other parties with origins in the first half of the 20th Century and who would come together under the European Movement.

The personnel of the organization, meanwhile, such as were in a position to enact the Movement's objectives, is impressive, and only further recommends a thorough examination. Several national parties formally joined the Movement and signed on to its program, most importantly the French SFIO. The Movement soon drew hundreds of adherents from some 18 countries across Europe, (including some on the other side of the Iron Curtain). After its earliest years, when it emulated the strict and exclusionary philosophy of the more radical interwar "Left" movements, it began to attract the participation of certain mid-level Federalists like Henri Frenay and Altiero Spinelli and Christian-Democrats including Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Robert Buron and Heinrich von Brentano. The Movement, once it reached maturity, would functionally be led by a small coterie of higher-profile European personalities, first centered around French Socialist André Philip and then increasingly around Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak. These men had direct access to the levers of power at crucial moments: the former had Churchill's ear at the very dawn of the ill-fated European Defense Community; the latter managed the elaboration of the treaties of Rome in active collaboration with the SFIO government under Guy Mollet. Various members held seats in national parliaments, senates and governments, and played leading roles in the European institutions from their very earliest incarnations: presiding over the Council of Europe (Spaak), heading the ECSC High Authority (Paul Finet), laying the groundwork for direct elections to the European Parliament (Fernand Dehousse) and, eventually, advising and supporting the Delors Commission's campaign for the Treaty of Maastricht (Raymond Rifflet).

Despite all this, the Movement has been the subject of very little scholarship. Wilfried Loth's cursory chapter on the United Socialist States of Europe is the only academic treatment of the movement, and it consists of a short summary of members and conferences followed by the major resolutions, reprinted in chronological order. Loth's treatment ends with the resolutions of a conference in 1953.[2] The online CVCE archive is marginally more comprehensive, including some documentation from 1956.[3]

[2] Loth, Wilfried. "The Mouvement Socialiste pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe (MSEUE)." in Lipgens, Walter, and Wilfried Loth, eds. *Documents on the History of European Integration, Volume 4; Transnational Organizations of Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Struggle for European Union, 1945-1950.* Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991. 277-319.
[3] CVCE.eu. https://www.cvce.eu/search?q=MSEUE

There are scattered references to the Movement elsewhere, particularly in the context of the European Defense Community and the political umbrella under which it might have operated,[4] and in various autobiographical accounts.[5] (There is also a short German Wikipedia page,[6] which, alas, is full of inaccuracies.) Generally, however, a lack of recognition of the group's agency – or even its existence – is a notable feature of historiography on the European integration process, the most recent exception being Talbot Imlay's 2017 chapter on postwar Socialism, to which I will return below.

There are two likely reasons for this lack of historiographical recognition. The first is that, from the archival record, it can be very difficult to recognize as a single entity; the second is that insofar as the movement's primary movers were often high-ranking politicians in their own right, their professional and personal papers, including Movement-related correspondence in both categories, are scattered across a wide range of national and political archives throughout Europe.

The Movement manifests itself under an alphabet soup of acronyms like none since the New Deal, and scholars can be forgiven for not recognizing the connection. Its central organ went through several name changes: as noted, it was baptized as the Movement for the United Socialist States of Europe. English-language documents used the abbreviation MUSSE while the French styled it MEUSE (German and Italian sources would have their own acronyms). In late 1948, the movement decided to collaborate with other integrative movements and recast itself as the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe (SMUSE, or the better known French MSEUE). In 1961 it rebranded itself again as the *Mouvement Gauche Européenne* (MGE), with variations including the term "Socialist" for use in countries that did not denote parties on a left-right spectrum. A final rebrand in 1973 dubbed it "*Mouvement Socialiste Européen (Gauche Européenne),*" or MSE-GE. For the sake of simplicity, I have chosen most often to refer simply to the "Movement."

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[4] Fursdon, Edward. *The European Defence Community*, London: The Macmillan Press, 1980. Griffiths, Richard. *Europe's First Constitution; the European Political Community, 1952-1954*. London: The Federal Trust, 2000. Noël, Gilbert. *Du Pool Vert à la Politique Agricole Commune*. Paris: Economica, 1988.

[5] Griffiths, Richard (ed.). *Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s*. New York: EJ Brill, 1993. The volume includes testimonials by Mario Zagari and Christian Pineau, who both briefly evoke the Movement.

[6] https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sozialistische_Bewegung_f%C3%BCr_die_Vereinigten_Staaten_von_Europa

These name changes either reflected changes in the movement's organizational statutes, or in the political orientation of members it sought to attract. However, the movement's core objectives remained consistent across all these changes, and its membership was remarkably stable. The most notable break was in 1964 (hence the chronological focus of this study), when Spaak, Philip, and General Secretary Enrique Adroher "Gironella" left the Movement. Numerous other high-profile members nevertheless remained, including Altiero Spinelli, Belgian Socialists Raymond Rifflet and Lucien Radoux, Italian PSDI co-founder Mario Zagari, and French SMUSErs Gerard Jaquet and François Mitterrand.

The Movement's semi-autonomous national sections, meanwhile, had their own names which didn't always resemble the umbrella organization's ("*Sinistra Europea*" in Italy; "*Europaische Sozialistische Bewegung*" in Germany). The UK initially used "MUSE," but sometimes informally referred to itself as the "British Centre" and at one time identified itself as the "Labour Committee for Europe."[7] The French section was the most freewheeling with its appellation: initially styled "*Mouvement Socialiste Français pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe*" (MSFEUE), it added the qualifier "*Démocratique*" in 1948 (MDSFEUE); in the late 50s it began to use "*Mouvement Gauche Europeénne,*" before finally adding "*Organisation Française*" (OFGE) in the 1960s. I most often refer simply to national "sections."

(An added complication applying to both the organization and its sections is the fact that not all stationery and letterhead was immediately converted after a change, so that on a given date, the organization might appear under different names.)

Finally, the Movement published a magazine in at least three countries: the French edition, which lasted some five years, was titled "*Gauche Européenne*;" an Italian one, translated as "*Sinistra Europea*," appears to have run for three decades, while a German edition is alluded to by at least three different names in the Movement's archives.

The second obstacle to reconstituting the Movement's history is its constellation of archival repositories. The dominant one, and the primary source of information used in this dissertation is the International Institute of Socialist History (IISG), in

[7] "Conference schedule, May 24-25 1968, London." Amsterdam: IISG MSEUE 47

Amsterdam. It is the only archive to have a dedicated SMUSE record group, and it holds most of the movement's circulars, conference reports, and publications (including virtually the complete run of the Movement's magazine), mainly between 1949 and 1964. It is by far the most valuable source of information on the movement, at least during its most active period in the 1950s.

Two other archives centralize several record sets. The French Socialist establishment was very closely associated to the Movement, and the archives of the French Socialist party (SFIO) and its *Comité Directeur* (including Guy Mollet), are at the *Office Universitaire de Recherche Socialiste* (OURS). The *Fondation Jean Jaurès*, (FJJ), mercifully located in the same offices as OURS, has the papers of related individuals, notably Gérard Jaquet, a leading figure starting in the 1960s. The second collection of related papers are at the European University Institute in Florence, which has a well-catalogued and increasingly digitized collection of papers and correspondence belonging to Paul-Henri Spaak, Fernand Dehousse, Raymond Rifflet, and the European Movement.

A handful of further individual records were consulted for this project. The LSE library in London has the records of the ILP, the Movement's founding party; and the Movement's delicate relations with the Labour Party in the late 1940s can be traced in the Labour Party archives at the People's History Museum in Manchester. Various records can be found at the French *Archives Nationales* and *Archives Diplomatiques* near Paris, including the papers of French cabinet members Christian Pineau (a SMUSEr and member of the Guy Mollet cabinet particularly active during the negotiations on the Treaty of Rome) and André Philip. Founding member Marceau Pivert's papers are in Paris at the *Centre de l'Histoire Sociale du Vingtième Siècle*. Several boxes of documents pertaining to Raymond Rifflet's time as head of the Movement are at the *Université Catholique de Louvain* in Belgium.

Aside from the IISG, few of these record sets clearly identify materials related to the Movement, and none categorize them separately. The discovery process can be tedious and bear very mixed results. The personal papers of participants typically contain either published material or personal correspondence. In the first case, we are seeing the results of discussions, but there are virtually no minutes of the committee meetings where those discussion took place, leaving unanswered questions about internal dynamics and debates. Personal correspondence, often short and functional, leaves much to be desired in the same areas but can contain valuable references to

meetings and personnel. Letters between SMUSErs and non-SMUSErs can be quite instructive since they tend to include details that were not common knowledge outside the Movement itself. In terms of internal debates, the most illuminating material is summaries of conference speeches, where high-ranking member lay out their arguments on particular subjects. These have their limits too, however: first, speeches are not discussions, so while it is possible to discern areas of general disagreement, it is much harder to trace how a final consensus was finally reached. Second, speeches concerning political philosophy and general strategy, prepared ahead of time for an audience in the hundreds, are necessarily more broad and polished than the kinds of discussions among members of a committee, where the more practical concerns – including the topics to be addressed at conferences – are worked out. This leaves a lot of interpretation up to the historian.

Finally, two archives provide some marginal contribution to the present work: the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington DC, where I consulted the Congressional Record to determine the attitude of the American legislature towards financing Europe's Socialist integrationists; and the Bodleian Libraries at Oxford, repository of the papers of Sir Geoffrey De Freitas which yielded little more than confirmation that he was titular head of the Movement for a period of time.

I should note that the foregoing list of archives consulted for this project, though extensive, is not comprehensive. Several other leads could not be pursued for various reasons: the personal papers of Enrique Gironella, a founding member and the Movement's general secretary from 1948 to 1964, have been turned over to the *Partido de los Socialistas de Cataluña*, but numerous requests for information or access have gone unanswered; the same is true of multiple messages to the current *"European Left"*[8] seeking to unearth any records or continuity after 1993. Prospects for further research on the Movement will be outlined in the conclusion.

The last difficulty in telling a complete story of the SMUSE is far more banal: there is likely to be material in the papers of Italian or German members (Mario Zagari, for instance, or Anna Siemsen), which I can't read. Published research from Italians like Antonio Varsori or Sandro Guerrieri, or the chapter on the German section by Norbert

[8] The movement's statutes (https://www.european-left.org/statute/) refer to a "founding congress" in 2004, though it is also a member of the European Movement (https://mouvement-europeen.eu/la-gauche-europeenne/), which describes it as the movement founded in 1947.

Gresch are not included here for the same reasons. It is never possible to cover every single dimension of a given subject in a dissertation, especially considering the long timeframe here, and the material that exists in French and English has provided enough material to fill these pages, but the primary goal of the present work it to establish the scope of the membership and activities of the Socialist Movement, leaving room for further research on the subject. Recent trends (see below) suggest that there is room for a reappraisal of the role of transnational groups in mediating European policies and negotiations, and the SMUSE is an important and poorly understood protagonist in that story.

I describe the origins and evolution of the group through 1964, with an epilogue tracing the outlines of the Movement's activities through the early 1990s; I reveal the movement's agency at some of the key moments of European integration, and I highlight the adherents to the Movement with notable connections to other facets of the European project.

The SMUSE in brief

The Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe[9] was a "movement" largely in name. It was established by a group of individuals numbering in the low double digits, though at its peak in the mid-50s, conferences drew attendees in the hundreds. It had affiliations with several mainstream political parties, though these did not translate to a reliable constituency: the French SFIO was in crisis in the early 50s, with a working-class electorate torn between them and the Communists; the Italians faced a similar dilemma that had already splintered the Socialist party; the British ILP was very small and lost its final Parliamentary seats in January 1948. There were loose ties with Labour, whose leaders tolerated the existence of Keep Left while keeping European pressure groups at arms' length; relations with the German Socialist Party (SPD) were initially cordial, but took a distant back seat to the latter's strategic priorities. Even despite some proportionally broad support from the Belgian political class, the record does not indicate that this translated to much public support for the organisation.

[9] Initially the "Movement for the United Socialist States of Europe", or MUSSE.

On the other hand, the movement and its leaders clearly believed that they had a natural constituency worth repeatedly investing in. Early on, they launched an effort to expand the network to the colonial world; in the early 50s they invested a great deal in redesigning the *Gauche Europeénne* policy journal into a general-audience magazine; finally, in the late 1950s, they would attempt to reinvent themselves by creating a European workers' union. The SMUSE operated under the assumption of a latent working-class constituency, though its active members consisted largely of mid-level members of the European political class.

Comprehensive lists of members have not surfaced, but we can trace the movement's growth through its conferences, held annually from 1947 to at least 1954 and more sporadically thereafter. The trajectory in that first period is fairly steady, with attendance growing from a dozen to several hundred. At its peak in 1953-54, roughly half of the attendees came from the political class, including senators, parliamentarians, and the occasional cabinet minister. The other half, who leave little trace in records of the Movement's day-to-day activities, numbered engineers, academics, trades-unionists, journalists, civil servants, lawyers, jurists and students. The repartition of politicians to what might be termed "civilians" differed from country to country: aside from the occasional SPD representative, the German delegations numbered far more professors and trades-unionists than politicians; the Italians and French were split more evenly; and the Belgians numbered more politicians than civilians. National sections had roughly the same politician-civilian ratios as conference delegations. In 1953, for instance, the German section included former Senator Otto Bach, a Hamburg banker, and Professor Hermann Brill; the Italians included Public Works Minister Giuseppe Romita and two members of the struggling PSDI; the Belgians included once-and-future Foreign Minister Spaak, Senator Fernand Dehousse, and Paul Finet of the ECSC High Authority.

By the mid-50s, the largest delegations - France, Germany, Belgium and Italy - numbered between 35 and 50. The second-tier delegations - Dutch, Austrian and Saarlander, - numbered in the teens. They were complemented by small delegations from a dozen other, largely Eastern-bloc countries.

Nor can the SMUSE properly be called a political party, insofar as, while it propagandised for its members and displayed a certain pride in their professional achievements, it did not run its own political candidates. There is no evidence that the

group ever carried out political research to gauge public opinion or to identify issues that might gain traction, nor that it had a sophisticated understanding of its existing constituency (though it is worth noting that General Secretary Gironella's papers, which are most likely to contain such information, could not be consulted for this project). The initial MUSSE had been more an intellectual exercise than a viable political one, presenting itself as distinct from and opposed to the nationally-based political structures of its time, and this legacy could be felt throughout the Movement's existence. The period under André Philip's leadership produced a politically viable path to the movement's objectives, but it would operate via existing parties and institutions such as Labour, the Strasbourg Assembly, or the European Movement, bypassing the need for public proselytising except in specific contexts.

By the mid 50s, the movement had become a fairly well-articulated political network. Annual conferences produced resolutions that would define the movement's objectives and inform members' domestic political strategies. Between conferences, those objectives were pursued by an international committee and a number of national sections, supervised by an executive committee composed of the Movement's leadership and the heads of a half-dozen sections.

The precise relationship between the executive and the national sections changed over time: dual membership in the SMUSE and domestic political parties created conflicts of interest which kept internal power relationships somewhat fluid. In the earliest days, the movement was run by the ILP, which at that time had little in the way of a national electorate, the result being that ILP and MUSSE objectives could overlap almost completely without doing much harm to the former's electoral position. In France, the situation was more delicate: the significant overlap between SMUSE leadership and the SFIO that developed in the late 40s created a lot of friction, especially when domestic concerns pushed the SFIO to adopt positions that conflicted with the SMUSE's. Guy Mollet's relationship to the Movement is particularly instructive: while he endorsed the Movement's integration objectives and never openly broke with the SMUSE, he nevertheless sometimes held it at arm's length. SMUSE positions articulated in *Gauche Européenne* were the source of some tensions as well, and the Movement agreed to keep the SFIO in mind in its editorial decisions. Perhaps at the furthest end of the spectrum lay the Labour Party. The Labour executive tolerated its Keep Left group,

and its ties to the SMUSE, as long as there was no conflict of interest or the appearance of convergence with the Conservatives, as in the case of the European Movement. They also jealously guarded their autonomy, very much at the expense of transnational engagement. The viability of national sections as agents of SMUSE policy was contingent on domestic constraints, which had to be accommodated lest national-party partners cut ties with the Movement altogether. For this reason, the SMUSE had little concrete leverage or enforcement powers: there is no record of any disciplinary measures either in the Movement's statutes or internal communications, nor of any sanctions or expulsion from the movement.

The result is that the Movement could draw and retain members exclusively by what it offered: a transnational network of well-placed politicians with a shared purpose. This did not happen overnight: there were few concrete avenues for multilateral transnational cooperation in the late 40s, so that the Movement essentially pursued bilateral arrangements. The European Movement provided an early forum, though the SMUSE had held off for some time. There was a great deal of overlap between the SMUSE and members of the other federalist groups involved: notable participants included Altiero Spinelli, who had founded his own movement and was involved with the UEF; the UEF was led at various times by fellow SMUSErs Henri Frenay, Hendrik Brugmans and Raymond Rifflet. These members would help mediate a mutually beneficial relationship with the European Movement and its constituent groups. The launch of the Schuman Plan in 1950 provided the strongest reinforcement to the network in that all six founding members were represented in the SMUSE, and already shared common goals for functionalist expansion of a supranational authority. Through the 1950s the Franco-Belgian axis that launched and shepherded the first few forays into European supranationalism was reflected in a Franco-Belgian axis leading the Movement.

In the simplest terms, the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe was a very well-connected political action committee pursuing integrationist projects, in direct collaboration with certain cabinets, national parties, European institutions, and the wider federalist community. Basic functionalist assumptions – that proto-"European" parties and institutions were inherently powerful and self-sustaining – governed the group's strategic approach. Basic Marxist assumptions that the working

class would inevitably recognise that socialist policies were in its own interest governed its political one.

Historiography

This dissertation does not contradict the record in any major way, nor does it attempt to weigh the relative importance of economic, political and personal factors in the development of Europe. It does, however, add an important layer to the literature in several areas.

It adds to the story of Franco-British engagement in the late 1940s. There is an abundance of existing literature, but much of it is focused elsewhere than on the potential socialist solutions discussed here: most are primarily concerned with cabinet-level relations;[10] Alan Milward and Roger Woodhouse[11] have offered analyses based on economic considerations. P.M.H Bell, in *The Long Separation,*[12] covers a fifty-year period and is concerned primarily with relations between governments. Other works view the relationship primarily through the lens of strategic externalities, notably the questions of Russia, Germany, and the US.[13]

The present work, in looking at contacts at the parliamentary-committee level, reveals a heretofore unacknowledged forum of discussion and cooperation, in particular via the intermediary of Labour's Keep Left group. Kenneth Morgan, in "Labour in Power"[14] identifies forces within the party pushing for a more Eurocentric orientation and a "Third Force" geo-position (Keep Left and the Parliamentary Labour Party). His focus being on the Cabinet's ultimate decisions, however, he misses an opportunity to discuss the policy alignment between those forces and the Continent. John Young's *Britain, France, and the Unity of Europe*[15] might best benefit from the discussion here: he

[10] Greenwood, Sean. *The Alternative Alliance; Anglo-French Relations Before the Coming of NATO, 1944-48.* London: Minerva Press, 1996. Bitsch, Marie-Thérèse. *Histoire de la construction européenne.* Editions Complexe, 1999. Bossuat, Gérard. "Le rêve français d'une Europe franco-britannique." *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps*. 18.18 (1990): 3-11. Web. 20 Oct. 2011.
[11] Woodhouse, Roger. *British policy Towards France, 1945-51*. London: Macmillan, 1995. Also Milward, Alan S. *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1952*. London: Routledge, 2003.
[12] Bell, P.M.H. *France and Britain 1940-1994: The Long Separation.* London: Longman, 1997
[13] Bernier, Serge. *Relations franco-britanniques (1947-1958); étude du comportement d'une alliance*. Editions Naaman, Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada, 1984. Bossuat, Gérard. *L'Europe des Français*. Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris 1996. Bossuat, Gerard: *La France, l'aide Americaine et la construction europeenne 1944-1954*. Comité pour l'histoire economique et financiere; Ministere de l'économie et des finances. Paris 1997. Massigli, René. *Une comédie des erreurs 1943-1956*. Paris: Plon, 1978
[14] Morgan, Kenneth O. *Labour in Power 1945-1951.* Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984.
[15] Young, John W. *Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951*. Rossendale: Leicester University Press, 1984

devotes a great deal of attention to efforts at multiple levels of government, including a section on the "Third Force." The existence and activity of a forum of coordination centrally focused on producing just such a geopolitical alignment is an important part of that story.

This dissertation also establishes the personal connections between actors in the context of the ill-fated European Defense Community and European Political Authority – the existing works cover the agency of some of the Movement's adherents with very little acknowledgement of the Movement itself.[16] The same is true of some of the works on the Treaty of Rome, which draw attention to several relevant members of the Movement without acknowledging their connection:[17] the Guy Mollet government and its foreign policy leaders, widely credited with a decisive commitment to the Treaty of Rome, was composed of SMUSErs, while Spaak, leading the negotiations, was head of the Movement.

The literature on the early European Parliament, and particularly the Socialist Group,[18] can also be complemented by the present work. There has been some recent work on SMUSEr Fernand Dehousse, notably by Umberto Tulli,[19] though no literature existed at the time to establish the connection between Dehousse (and other parliamentarians like Marinus van der Goes van Naters and Maurice Faure) and the SMUSE.

Finally, the positions and activities of the Socialist Movement add to the existing works on international Socialism in the period after World War II. A proper understanding of the SMUSE network – or even an acknowledgement of those links' existence – reinforces the premise that transnationalism was both broad and effective. Most directly concerned is Imlay's recent work, which makes several references to the MSEUE (he uses the French acronym, reflecting the language of his sources)[20] but

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[16] Griffiths, 2000. Fursdon, 1980.
[17] Parsons, Craig. *A Certain Idea of Europe*. Cornell University Press, 2003. Küsters, Hanns Jürgen. *Fondements de le Communauté Economique Européenne.* Luxembourg: Office des publications officialles des Communautés européennes, 1990.
[18] Hix, Simon and Urs Lesse. "Shaping a Vision; A History of the Party of European Socialists." Brussels: Party of European Socialists, 2002. Available at http://urs-lesse.de/History_PES_EN.pdf Shaev, Brian. Estrangement and Reconciliation: French Socialists, German Social Democrats and the Origins of European Integration, 1948-1957." Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburg, 2014
[19] Tulli, Umberto. "Which democracy for the European Economic Community? Fernand Dehousse versus Charles de Gaulle." Taylor & Francis online, 2017.
[20] Imlay, Talbot. "Constructing Europe, 1945-1960" in *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism: European Socialists and International Politics, 1914-1960."* Oxford Scholarship online

nevertheless reflects the current dearth of material on the movement. He provides a short summary of the Movement's engagement with Labour and its affiliation to the European Movement, and touches lightly on the relationship with the SFIO. His coverage peters out in the mid 50s, however, citing a growing "isolation from mainstream Socialism" and the SFIO "losing interest." This overview does a disservice to the SMUSE in not acknowledging the Movement's British origins, its extensive international network, its collaboration with the SFIO in the context of the EDC and the Treaties of Rome, and more broadly its staying power.

Socialist internationalism begs the question of relations between the national socialist parties in various countries. However, the Socialist Movement was a transnational organization with unique means and goals, and insofar as it regrouped personalities more consistently than political parties, the present work engages only briefly with variations between, or conflict within, those parties. It draws to some extent on Imlay, and more so on Brian Shaev's recent work concerning the SFIO and the SPD.[21] He has notably ascribed agency to different forums of Socialist internationalism such as the Socialist International (or its preliminary entity COMISCO), the socialist groups in the various European assemblies, or even Monnet's Action Committee.[22] He identifies important sub-official contacts between the SPD and the SFIO in the late 40s mediated notably by André Philip, Guy Mollet, Gérard Jaquet and Salomon Grumbach (identified as members of COMISCO, though all were also SMUSErs), and credits them, among other things, with creating a public convergence on internationalism in the late 1940s and "foster[ing] a recognition of the challenges of the domestic political contexts in which the other party existed." This piece does not attempt to determine whether COMISCO or SMUSE links were the more salient in this case. However, the fact that the personnel and the objectives of both groups (in this case to win SPD participation in socialist internationalism) were the same, and the argument that the SPD and SFIO benefitted from back-channel contacts despite the political risks, supports the inclusion of both groups in the historiography.

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[21] Shaev, Brian "The Algerian War, European integration, and the Decolonization of French Socialism" in *French Historical Studies* 41-1 (February 2018). Shaev, Brian. *Estrangement and Reconciliation: French Socialists, German Social Democrats and the Origins of European Integration, 1948-1957.* University of Pittsburgh, 2014. Brian Shaev. "Nationalism, transnationalism and European socialism in the 1950s: a comparison of the French and German cases" *History of European Ideas* 46-1. 41-58

[22] Imlay, "Constructing Europe;" Brian Shaev (2020) Nationalism, transnationalism and European socialism in the 1950s: a comparison of the French and German cases, History of European Ideas, 46:1, 41-58

In terms of Socialism more broadly, the Movement, its conferences, and to a greater extent its magazine (absent from the existing secondary literature) functioned as focus groups, where Socialists from various countries could share and compare respective positions. Overall, the SMUSE should be recognized as an important driver of Socialist thought and activism in the late 1940s and 50s, and a useful network of activists thereafter.

In addition to complementing to the story of postwar Socialism, this dissertation might be categorized alongside the work done on the role of Christian Democracy in the post-war period, particularly in the context of the "Geneva Circle."[23] Analogously to how the Circle fostered the development of a relationship between, among others, Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman, the SMUSE fostered connections and allowed a degree of policy coordination between powerful political actors in France and Belgium, perhaps most notably Guy Mollet and Paul-Henri Spaak. If the ECSC owes a debt to the Geneva Circle, I argue, the Treaties of Rome owe one to the SMUSE.

Theoretical approach

European Union historiography has gone through several phases in ascribing credit for the integrative measures discussed herein, none of which have produced an entirely satisfactory framework for understanding the process of European integration. This dissertation borrows elements from several approaches, but it is ultimately a neo-federalist approach – though its conclusions do not suggest generalised federalist origins for the current state of the European Union – cognisant of the shortcomings of its historical antecedents.

The basic premise of the functionalist school developed by Ernst Haas and others in the 1950s and 60s was that integration was a self-reinforcing mechanism insofar as it further empowered supporters of integration and created institutions led by "supranational entrepreneurs" positioned to spur further development. As Moravcsik notes,[24] the approach was brought into question by the observation that integration in fact grew in fits and starts, and that it did not consistently move the locus of decision making from national governments to supranational officials. Thus the functionalist

[23] Kaiser, Wolfram. *Christian democracy and the origins of European Union,* 2007. Kaiser, Wolfram and Michael Gehler. 'Transnationalism and early European integration: The NEI and the Geneva Circle 1947-57', *The Historical Journal*, 44 (2001)
[24] Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe*. Cornell University Press, 1998. 13-14

school could neither accurately describe the process nor have much in the way of predictive value. This dissertation is not a defence of the idea, though it does show that Haas's assumptions about self-sustaining functional expansion were shared by the SMUSE and provided a strong motivation for their strategy .

The notion that functionalist assumptions have some compelling explanatory power, not necessarily in describing the end result, but in explaining the underlying motivations of some of the European project's protagonists, betrays a fundamental premise of this work, which is that perceptions and motivations are more relevant to the historical process than objective truth. The fact that objective factors might track well with particular theoretical models – the evidentiary basis for grand theory arguments – is not proof that these factors spurred individual human actors to action. History is replete with historically consequential but objectively incorrect ideas, from the centuries-long notion that Jewish Europeans were actively damaging the social and economic health of their home countries to the more recent conviction among many Americans that Donald Trump was defrauded of victory in the 2020 presidential election. In other words, I contend that perceptions drive historical change more than facts do, and that the compatibility of perception and truth is close but incidental. This is particularly true in the realm of ideology, which is ultimately – ironically – a theoretical framework of its own. Adherents to given ideology – political, religious or otherwise – are inherently predisposed to reject inconvenient facts as a harmful perversion rather than to critique the ideology itself, and to act on those convictions. For this reason I pay particular attention to describing what motivated the movement internally, often at the expense of a thorough examination of complementary factors in any given historical event, because it has better explanatory power for their behavior.

The federalist approach developed in the 1980s was spearheaded largely by Walter Lipgens, whose work most directly inspired the line of investigation herein. In brief, Lipgens and his colleagues (most notably Wilfried Loth) argue that there existed a number of ideologically-driven transnational groups who worked largely parallel to the normal structures of government to create common ground for international agreements which struck at the foundations of nationalism and state sovereignty. Their contentions have since been largely shunted aside in favour of more prosaic explanations focusing on statesmen and functionaries, and on the economic and

geopolitical externalities in force at any given moment. The best-know "debunking" of the federalist approach is perhaps Alan Milward's *The European Rescue of the Nation State,* which argues that nationalist and economic priorities - not some nebulous fantasy of international harmony implemented by "European saints" - drove the creation of a system that in fact strengthened national power and autonomy while granting only nominal concessions to the supranationalism so cherished by federalist interest-groups. Andrew Moravcsik similarly explains the process of integration as a series of choices by national leaders "who consistently pursued economic interests." These approaches are empirically rigorous and convincing on a macro level: from a distance, economic priorities do convincingly circumscribe the decisions ultimately reached. Moravcsik's "rationalist" approach, in *The Choice for Europe*, is of a particularly scientific character, systematically testing various theories against the negotiations of five major integrative projects. The result of such an approach is to produce a theoretical framework that is best compatible with, or most useful in describing, the events under consideration. But human endeavour cannot be reduced to a theoretical construct: once determined, this "best-fit" approach, rigorous as it might be, throws out the baby with the bathwater in minimising, or indeed ignoring altogether, the role of individuals and groups at the micro level whose actions are deemed either incidental or irrelevant to the bigger picture, an inconsequential aberration in the "true" principles at work. In fact, while these federalist groups did not control very much of the institutional construction process (as compared to the normal institutions of state involved in direct negotiation), this thesis argues that they did play a decisive role in laying the groundwork for integration before state-level negotiation got under way - producing agreement on substance rather than on the final form of the agreements – and in navigating certain national obstacles to international agreement.

Another implicit assumption of federalist historiography is that the federalist groups represented the true will of the people, a will thwarted by political leaders intent on maintaining sovereign powers.[25] The present examination does not corroborate the view that federalism was a grass-roots movement, although it is clear that the SMUSE believed that for all intents and purposes they were just that, and simply needed to raise awareness of their existence among the working class, rather than convincing the latter

[25] Pasquinucci, Daniele. "Between Political Commitment and Academic Research: Federalist Perspectives." *European Union History: Theme and Debates*, Kaiser and Varsori, eds. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 66-84. 73.

of the need to follow their approach. Beginning in the late 1940s, the SMUSE tried - albeit without much demonstrable effect - to become a grass-roots party based in the European socialist constituency. In the late 1950s, they would ultimately explain their failure to rally the working class not as a flaw in their outlook but as the result of Gaullist obstruction and a misunderstanding of the significance of the Rome treaties.

This dissertation also responds to what Moravcsik identifies as a central fallacy in international relation studies,[26] which is the tendency to "assume that [long-term] state preferences are fixed," unaffected by exogenous temporal factors. These factors wreak havoc with grand-theory-style systemic explanations, and Moravcsik rightly rejects such explanations out of hand. The French, protagonists of the first two major integrative projects (the ECSC and the EDC), were particularly prone to inconsistency as result of the highly unstable nature the Fourth Republic, and the negotiations around the Treaty of Rome constitute a glaring example of rapidly-shifting state priorities: the Mollet government that took office midway through the process was markedly more supportive of the project than the preceding administration. Moravcsik's adoption of a "rationalist" approach promises to avoid the pitfalls of systemic explanations by treating each negotiation as distinct. This is doubly flawed. First, while this approach is scientifically sound, it explicitly casts aside any notions of consistency between rounds of negotiation, and in doing so ignores the existence of long-term, ideologically coherent and politically viable conceptions of Europe. These conceptions existed within federalist movements in general and within the SMUSE in particular, though the latter's practical prescriptions went through a significant evolution over the course of 1947-1949, influenced largely by the sharpening lines of the Cold War in the same period. They were debated and fleshed out outside the structures of national politics, yet shared by influential political actors from across Europe, most importantly France and Belgium. These parallel structures afforded political actors the luxury of ideologically-based signposts towards integration despite the shifting externalities that underpin the rationalist approach. SMUSE leadership, including Fenner Brockway, André Philip, Guy Mollet and Paul-Henri Spaak, believed in the viability of the project to the point of devoting considerable time and efforts to the SMUSE program, and this despite – or, I

[26] Moravcsik 1998. 20.

argue, because of – their occupation in sometimes top-level political posts very much subject to the winds of political change.

The second flaw in the rationalist approach is that while Moravcsik treats each *set* of negotiations as largely distinct, he treats each *individual* negotiation as reflecting stable motivating interests, denying new government cabinets any consequential individuality. This is particularly problematic in his treatment of the French position with respect to the Treaties of Rome, to which I will return below.

Another trend undermining the federalist narrative is the string of important biographical works which have weighted EU historiography in favor of the interpretation that individual political actors (Milward's "saints") deserve credit for the commitments undertaken by their respective governments. Some of these arguments are stronger than others. As French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman did in fact have the singular authority to launch what became the ECSC; as manager of the Messina Project, Paul-Henri Spaak had the authority to make the strategic choices to produce acceptable treaties for the EEC and Euratom.[27] The primary issue with these approaches is that nobody operates in a vacuum - despite their job title, there are considerable constraints on political actors: their superiors in government; the political optics of any given proposal, and, in an international context, the degree of convergence with international partners. It was not enough for Schuman to decide on a resource-sharing agreement, for instance: it was necessary to workshop it thoroughly, to send a private emissary to Bonn to confirm that the Germans were on board, to propose it - delicately - at a cabinet meeting for approval, and to choose his words carefully in selling it to the public.

The "great person" approach falters the further the subject is from the levers of power. Jean Monnet, an eminently capable career civil servant with an impressive resume and an even more impressive contacts list could still not personally lead European integration efforts. He was, for instance, commissioned by Schuman to produce a draft proposal for the ECSC; and his idea for an atomic pact had to be introduced to the Six by Paul-Henri Spaak. Fundamentally, biographies address their subjects' character and principles, answering the question as to why they might endorse

[27] European Atomic Community

a particular worldview or how they overcame a particular set of obstacles. But by the very nature of the exercise, biographies rarely tackle the degree to which their subjects are entirely responsible for the things which made them famous, lest by the same token the importance of the biography itself be brought into question. Comprehensive accounts of major historical events should treat biographical subjects as case studies in the circumstances that led to a given event, not explanations of that event in and of themselves. In the present context, the very fact that these personalities operated within national structures meant that had to look to transnational organizations to pursue integrative projects: these groups offered them something they could not accomplish on their own regardless of character or position. The SMUSE includes some high-profile actors subject to biographies of their own, but the approach herein, while recognising individuals' professional capacities, focuses far more on the coordination between them required to overcome external constraints.

The central figure of André Philip constitutes a compelling case study in the degree to which political actors can be substituted for broader forces. By late 1949, after a period of rapid adjustment, Philip took the reins of the SMUSE and moulded it largely in the image of his own convictions. It would be tempting for a biographer to interpret this fact as more significant than it really is. Philip was instrumental – perhaps determinant – in the development of the SMUSE, but he did not control the organization. It predated him and would outlast him. Its participants debated him publicly in print and at conferences, and could be internally critical of his character. The relationship between Philip and the SMUSE was, at best, symbiotic, and while he is perhaps the movement's most active leading figure, the evidence does not support the interpretation that it was an extension of his character. The same is all the more true of Paul-Henri Spaak, subject of several biographical works[28] of his own, and the movement's highest-profile adherent. The story herein suggests that in both cases, the movement was likely worth as much to both men as they were to it.

Besides the shifting trends in EU historiographic approaches, a phenomenon common to any discipline as new information is incorporated into increasingly more comprehensive and sophisticated overviews, federalist historiography of the European

[28] Spaak, Paul-Henri : *Combats Inachevés* ; Dumoulin, Michel: *Spaak*; Huizinga, James: *Mr. Europe*

Union has also been charged with two major academic shortcomings[29]. One is the close connection between early federalist politicians and the historians who wrote about them: federalist and historian John Pinder is a case in point, as are the close contacts between Walter Lipgens and German Christian-Democrat (and SMUSEr) Heinrich von Brentano, or between certain Italian federalist historians and Altiero Spinelli's *Movimiento Federalista Europeo*. Of this charge I can claim innocence. Aside from a grandfather who helped found the French MRP,[30] I have no dog in this race beyond the fact that I live in – and support the general principles of – the modern European Union.

The second charge concerns the restricted source material common to federalist histories. The Lipgens-Loth volumes *Documents on the story of European Integration*[31] may be the most glaring example: they are a collection of the writings and publications of federalist groups, and they draw connections with European developments rather by implication than by tracking causal chains. The arguments are fundamentally teleological: since there now exists something akin to what the federalists envisioned, it stands to reason that those federalists had a hand in producing it. This dissertation could admittedly fall under this umbrella. The source material here is composed overwhelmingly of the internal communications and publications of the SMUSE: I do not weigh these publications against other factors, political, economic or otherwise. I would argue that it is simply too great a task to deal comprehensively with all the archival material related any given event, nor is it necessary to the development of compelling arguments: as Morten Rasmussen has pointed out, Alan Milward's highly regarded works on state sovereignty and national economic conditions are based exclusively on state archives.[32] However, while Milward purports a grand explanation, I explicitly do not claim that the European project can be comprehensively explained by the activities of federalist groups. Instead, I have traced a number of concrete, specific instances of coordination in the context of the SMUSE with direct causal links to results in the

[29] See Pasquinucci 2010

[30] Maurice Schumann, my maternal grandfather, headed the MRP between 1946 and 1949 and assigned Robert Schuman to the foreign ministry in 1948.

[31] Lipgens, Walter, and Wilfried Loth. *Documents on the History of European Integration Volume 4; Transnational Organizations of Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Struggle for European Union, 1945-1950.* Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991. 288.

[32] Rasmussen, Morten. "European Rescue of the Nation-State? Tracing the Role of Economics and Business" *European Union History: Theme and Debates*, Kaiser and Varsori, eds. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 128-149. 131.

political arena, something which Lipgens and his followers were unable to do.[33] This is not a grand theory argument about the development of the EU: it is a tightly focused exploration of the history of the SMUSE establishing that this group had an indisputable part to play in the process of European integration, and that any history of the European Union that does not acknowledge that contribution is incomplete.

Kiran Patel has most recently recast the process of European construction, identifying the development of the European Economic Community in the 1960s as the watershed moment in the modern bloc's history. This approach avoids the teleological pitfalls of looking for a continuous motivating force for a process beginning as far back as the late 19th Century, or at least institutionally with the launch of the Schuman plan. He describes a "densely populated field" of transnational groups and institutions active in the two decades after the war, emphasising that they continued to exist, and indeed multiply, during the 1950s, and that several of them were far larger than, and in some cases direct competitors with, the ECSC. Rather than positing a singular driving force, he invites an examination of the "web of relationships [between] Western European organizations and transnational forums"[34] that influenced the European process. This approach challenges the assumption, implicit in both grand-theory arguments and in federalist historiography, that there exists an objective hierarchy of consequential groups or institutions active in the 1940s and 50s. It suggests instead that these groups ought to be seen as operating on a level playing field, each contributing to a sort of proto-European zeitgeist that did not take a definitive shape until the 1960s. The effort herein dovetails with the consequent need to re-examine the actions of transnational groups, and it leaves little doubt that the SMUSE was an integral part of the proto-European engine of the 1950s.

This leaves the question of at what stage of the process of institutional formation the SMUSE interceded. Moravcsik argues that EU integration history can be understood as the result of three distinct and sequential processes: the formation of national state preferences, negotiations mediated by the balance of power between parties, and the capacity of proto-EU institutions to support the commitments made. This thesis moderates at least the first two stages in small but important ways. The SMUSE's

[33] Pasquinucci 2010. 84
[34] Patel, Kiran, *Project Europe.* Cambridge University Press 2020. 14

primary influence was essentially coeval with the first stage, but this paper challenges the assumption that the formation of national state preferences was located entirely within national structures. Transnational federalist groups, and in specific instances the SMUSE, permitted actors from separate national structures to coordinate their approaches precisely to circumvent these structures. One well-known example of this mechanism was detailed by Gehler and Kaiser in "The Geneva Circle." For a number of years in the late 1940s and early 1950s, high-ranking European Christian Democrats gathered in Geneva, Switzerland, in the utmost secrecy under the umbrella of the *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales*. Block reservations were made and participants travelled incognito and on their own personal authority. The meetings in question were politically risky, especially since they included Germans who, for a time, did not yet have full diplomatic powers. The risks paid off: the relationship between Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer has been credited with facilitating the launch of the ECSC, and meetings continued for several years even after West Germany became a sovereign entity. The SMUSE had analogous results, though there was no need for the kinds of secrecy that characterised the Geneva Circle. Its members developed relationships outside diplomatic channels and developed a shared roadmap, which in turn allowed some crucial moments of international coordination targeted at national considerations.

More than simply an intellectual and policy framework around which political leaders gravitated, the SMUSE can also claim a small measure of influence in Moravcsik's second stage: the negotiation process. As noted above, this thesis suggests that the process cannot be explained entirely by a static quantification of the balance of power within each round of negotiation. In the context of the Treaties of Rome, Moravcsik acknowledges the change in the French government, but posits a set of stable "commercial interests" that homogenized the motivations of the cabinets in question and outweighed any ideological or other factors.[35] This thesis argues that French SMUSERs were more influential in the Mollet government than they've been given credit for, and that they worked together with Spaak to circumvent issues such as France's colonial commitments which, they felt, had they been given importance in the negotiation process commensurate with their centrality to the French economy, threatened to scuttle the process entirely.

[35] Moravcsik, 1998. 103 ff

Scope

This initial scope of this project was limited to the late 1940s and early 50s, based on the minimal secondary work and the impression that the Movement did not achieve very much, if anything, after 1953. The true extent of the Movement's lifespan, and the considerable wealth of its records revealed itself as the research progressed, concomitantly extending the chronology. The work is constrained in part by the typical length of a dissertation, as weighed against a concern to both fully explore the movement and represent as much of the archival material as possible; it is also admittedly limited by the inability to track down every relevant source. Its areas and degree of focus are proportional to the record, and I have prioritized the breadth of the Movement's activities over the depth of any given issue.

I have endeavored to reference any secondary literature that intersects directly with the Movement's efforts, but some of the better-known secondary literature is perhaps less integral than might be expected in a work largely concerned with the building blocks of the European Union. That being said, this work is not designed to retell the story of Europe, nor does it cover all the typical "greatest hits" except insofar as the Movement had anything to do with them (the establishment of the ECSC, for instance, is barely evoked). Major retrospectives such as those by Geir Lundestad, Andrew Moravcsik and Mark Gilbert, for instance, with their necessarily broader coverage and synthesis of the forces at play, feature only sporadically.[36] I have made more use of targeted works like those mentioned above, several edited volumes, and journal articles with an emphasis on contemporaneous ones which reflect the "reality" in which the Movement was operating better than those written with the benefit of hindsight.

The first chapter covers the origins and early stages of the Movement. It had its roots in the London Bureau, where its first members had cut their teeth in the anti-fascist activism of the 1930s and struggled to define an anti-Stalinist Left. Two members of the London Bureau would write a Marxist pamphlet during the Second World War and establish a small movement under the auspices of the British Independent Labour

[36] Moravcsik 1998. Lundestad, Geir "*Empire" by Integration*. Oxford University Press, 1998. Gilbert, Mark. *European Integration; A Concise History*. Plymouth: Rowan & Littlefield, 2012.

Party. A Franco-British collaboration soon developed, which gingerly attempted to find its way into the established political landscape, and to reconcile the founders' original, geopolitically neutral, post-nationalist vision with the fast-evolving American policy towards Europe, notably its increasingly broad anti-Communism and its selective economic largesse. By the end of 1947, the Movement had established ties with both the French SFIO and the British Labour Party's "Keep Left" group, and had articulated a position that, while optimistic, was at least compatible with the geopolitical realities of the emerging Cold War.

The second chapter, covering 1948 and 1949, traces the movement's maturation. During the first half of 1948, the Movement's default orientation was still a Franco-British one, and the Movement's Fenner Brockway was able to bring an encouraging measure of influence to the British government via Labour's Keep Left group. In the event, the Labour connection fell through, and the Movement was left adrift. The result was a completion of the movement's leadership shift to France and the formalization of an approach more conciliatory to the diverse integrationist movements active in the period. The SMUSE would formally join the European Movement and change their name to signal that, if their inspiration was socialist, the sought-after political union did not have to be strictly so. Finally, the movement found an energetic, high-profile leader in André Philip, who presided over the development of a rational, comprehensive program and concrete means for implementing it.

Chapter 3 opens with a discussion of how the French, out of over a dozen adherents to the Movement, came to dominate the SMUSE. An overview of the European political landscape reveals that, in the final analysis, only the French were both disposed and able to engage in the integration process on the terms that had been laid out by the end of 1949. Thereafter, the major part of the chapter concerns the Movement's efforts to establish a European Political Authority beginning in 1950. Its new president, André Philip, was instrumental in launching the EDC project and a number of SMUSErs worked to obtain the inclusion of the treaty article that would have produced a political authority. The Communist and Gaullist opposition had a large part to play in the ultimate rejection of the treaty, but special attention is devoted here to the crippling cleavage in the SFIO, the SMUSE's primary agents in France.

The final main chapter covers the period between 1954 and 1964. It first discusses the role of the Movement's magazine, *Gauche Européenne*, which ran for five

years in the mid '50s. The magazine was concerned primarily with presenting the socialist viewpoint on various aspects of the European project. It went through several incarnations, and while it did not ultimately garner a sufficient audience to stay afloat, it provided a valuable service as a source of information and a forum of debate. The second part of the chapter focuses on the Movement's contributions to the Treaties of Rome. An examination of the Movement's records reveals an important degree of coordination between negotiation leader Paul-Henri Spaak and the French cabinet on several issues, most notably the linking of the two executive branches. The chapter closes with the rapid decline of the movement's institutional vitality, resulting from a combination of factors: a drying up of the Movement's financial resources, a reduction in the movement's access to power, and the establishment of European institutions that constituted a better avenue for the Movement's members.

The Movement would be rather unrecognizable after 1964, but it continued to exist in various forms until 1993. The movement's activity, and therefore its archival record, is far less dense in this latter period; it is also beyond the scope of this dissertation, which is already far more chronologically extensive than had been projected. Nevertheless, in the interest of giving the Movement its due and hopefully spurring further research, the epilogue traces the major stages of the Movement after 1964. There are three: a rather inactive period under British Labour MP Geoffrey de Freitas, a more active one centered on the French section under Gérard Jaquet between the mid 70s and mid 80s, and a final period when longtime SMUSEr Raymond Rifflet put the surviving network to use in service of the projects of European Commission president Jacques Delors, to whom he was an adviser.

Chapter 1

The United Socialist States of Europe

Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of World War II – a war effectively the result of nationalism codified into a political system – there arose a broad spectrum of ideas for some degree of harmonization or integration between the nation-states of the Old World. Marxists predicted a sort of post-nationalist socio-political homogenization; Altiero Spinelli's proposed an integrated "free and united Europe;"[37] America called for a vague "European solution"[38] to the continent's near-existential crisis; and Churchill would soon call for a "United States of Europe" (more on which later). These were widely divergent conceptions, but each was a variation of cooperation across national lines, a breakdown of the exclusively self-interested "national"[39] boundaries that had been a basic premise of political organization in Europe since the late 19th century. Radical for the time, these are nevertheless the ideas that have given rise to the modern European Union, that imperfect but unique grouping of European countries.

In this context, there appeared a small, more-or-less fringe group inspired by the ideas of the interwar Left. Its manifesto was written by two second-tier members of a once-respected breakaway wing of the British Labour Party that had not run a successful parliamentary candidate since 1935. Their rhetoric was aggressively Marxist; their attitude towards the dominant political systems of the day uncompromisingly hostile; their ideas inchoate and outlandish. Considering its general hostility, and its authors' complete lack of political agency, this tract should have stayed relegated to a dusty cardboard box in the basement of some university library – where it in fact

[37] Spinelli, Altiero and Ernesto Rossi. The Ventotene Manifesto. Ventotene: The Altiero Spinelli Institute for Federalist Studies, [s.d.]. p. 75-96.
[38] Marshall, George. Speech at Harvard University, 5 June 1947.
[39] The precise common denominator of "nationhood" (race, religion, language…) differed widely.

survives to this day[40] – a curio of little interest save as an example of political desperation in the chaos of war.

And yet this booklet struck a chord among a few of the re-emerging Socialist politicians of postwar Europe, enough to bring together a small group of people looking for a platform upon which to build a cooperative socialist European program. Over the next two years, enough people stayed united around the basic principles of the manifesto to shape them from an exercise in Marxist dogma into a set of goals that both accepted the status quo, and provided compelling solutions to some real problems. This chapter is the story of that transformation.

This chapter will first discuss the ideological and personal origins of the Movement for the United Socialists States of Europe (MUSSE) in the interwar period. It will then describe the actual establishment of the movement, its founding members and early conferences, and its initial relationship to the parties in power. It will focus heavily on the major reason for the Movement's rocky start: a lack of clarity from the United States as the latter carved out its opening posture in the Cold War. There follows a chronological account of the first 18 months or so of the movement's existence, during which it held several meetings and one major conference where it refined its program, and when it made significant inroads into the political landscape of both France and Britain.

The Movement's origins were somewhat dogmatic and rigid, and its first two years were first and foremost a period of adjustment, as the Movement developed broad potential and prescient ideas about the European project. By the end of 1947, the major ingredients of a successful political pressure campaign – a pertinent message and a national stage – seemed in place.

The promise of Socialism

Socialism saw an encouraging resurgence after the war, establishing the groundwork for an internationalist approach led by France and Great Britain, if they could find a basis of agreement.

De Gaulle's provisional government had included a number of Socialists – not least André Philip as minister of the interior during the war and minister of the economy

[40] Edwards, Bob and F. A. Ridley. *The United States of Europe*. London: LSE, ILP 3/76

soon thereafter. Early in the French Fourth Republic, Léon Blum led an interim government for a month, from December 1946 to January 1947, with a virtually all-Socialist cabinet, laying the basis for the only Franco-British bilateral agreement of the early postwar period. British ambassador Duff Cooper, a "devoted Francophile"[41] had arranged, on his own authority,[42] an official visit by French Socialist representatives to Great Britain, which eventually produced the mutual-assistance treaty signed at Dunkirk in March, 1947, an encouraging sign for Franco-British Socialist cooperation.

The British Labour party won a sweeping victory in the 1945 elections and remained in power through 1951, The French *Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière* (SFIO) gained government representation in late 1946 in the new 4th Republic. The ensuing four years saw no fewer than ten administrations, with tenures ranging from 2 days to 13 months, but the SFIO consistently held about one third of the cabinet seats in the ruling coalition governments. As always in coalition politics, the SFIO had to compromise as a matter of political expediency; the Labour Party, meanwhile, faced a range of opposing pressures on foreign relations and Europe; it was thus difficult for the two to overcome practical pressures and engage on an ideological basis. Starting in 1946, however, what was then the "Movement for the United Socialist States of Europe" (MUSSE) developed and successfully leveraged representation in both the French and British governments.

The MUSSE had held its first meeting under the auspices of the Independent Labour Party (ILP), in May, 1946. Its most valuable member was Fenner Brockway of the ILP,[43] who shortly adhered to the Labour Party and served in the House of Commons. He was a good bridge between the two Labours and would act as something of a Trojan Horse, carrying the MUSSE program into Labour's Keep Left group. As chairman of the international Socialist "London Bureau" (see below) for some seven years between the wars, Brockway also knew some key continental socialists. Brockway's once-and-future collaborator Marceau Pivert, meanwhile, an influential, principled socialist and member of the SFIO's *Comité Directeur,* was the movement's earliest champion in France. A common Socialist outlook had already demonstrated the

[41] Bell, P.M.H. *France and Britain, 1940-1994: The Long Separation.* London: Routledge, 2014. 72
[42] Bell. 74.
[43] "Minutes of ILP Executive committee meeting 12 May 1946" and "ILP NAC meeting, 15-16 June, 1946" London: LSE, ILP/3/34. Brockway, Fenner. *Towards Tomorrow*. Suffolk: Granada Publishing Limited, 1977. 146. Brockway resigned from the ILP in May, 1946 (his last meeting was 16 June) over his party's opposition to the Labour Party. He joined the latter but remained part of the MUSSE.

potential to produce bilateral alignment, and together, the ILP and the SFIO had motive, means and opportunity to influence the foreign policy debate and the direction of Europe.

Roots of the MUSSE

The MUSSE, in its original form, can be understood as a continuation of the quest for a viable non-Stalinist Left which had materialized as the "London Bureau" of the 1930s. Little literature exists on the subject, but I will base this section on Michel Dreyfus' very useful account of the development of the main Leftist movements of the interwar period, including the doctrinal variations that defined them.[44] Ultimately, the heterogeneous and fragmented parties of the interwar Left could not accomplish anything of any great note, constricted by a relative minority status, the unavoidable, fraught relationship with Soviet Communism, and the massive political and economic crises of the 1930s. However, over the course of the London Bureau's existence, we see emerge the central tenets of what would become the MUSSE.

A significant split in the global Marxist movement had followed the establishment of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1919 and its later cooptation by Joseph Stalin. In 1923, Leon Trotsky formed a competing International Left Opposition (ILO), which operated under intense pressure in Russia in the 1920s before being relegated to exile status in the following decade. Meanwhile, a so-called "Vienna International" - derisively called the Second-and-a-half International by the Soviets - held a few conferences in 1921-22 before splintering in turn. A majority of the "Vienna" parties merged with the remnants of the Second International in 1923, creating another direct competitor to the Comintern, the "Labour and Socialist International" (LSI).[45]

Contrary to the Comintern, the LSI did not see itself as a central command organism for the labor forces of the world. The remaining Vienna parties, however,

[44] Dreyfus, Michel. "Bureau de Paris et Bureau de Londres: le socialisme de Gauche en Europe entre les deux guerres." *Le Mouvement social* #112 (July-Sept 1980). 22-55.
[45] See also Daniel Laqua's "Democratic Politics and the League of Nations: The Labour and Socialist International as a Protagonist of Interwar Internationalism." *Contemporary European History* 24.2 (May 2015). 175-192

though unaffiliated with the Soviets, did consider it imperative to organize and manage those forces. These parties regrouped in a unit sometimes referred to as the "Paris International," another loose coalition (in fact also based in Vienna), whose constituent parties began to splinter towards the end of the decade. In 1932, a new coalition called the International Workers' Union (IWU) was formed in Berlin.

As Dreyfus tells it, these latter two groups had several commonalities: 1) unlike the LSI, they envisioned a formalized global labor movement; 2) they considered the existing movements - primarily the Comintern - to have demonstrably failed to harness the global labor movement[46]; and 3) they considered it their primary task to fight the rise of Fascism. In 1933, members of the Paris Bureau and the IWU began to meet in a new forum bearing the unwieldy name of the "International Revolutionary Marxist Center," or, more colloquially, the "London Bureau."[47]

Logistically, the Bureau was managed in London by the Independent Labour Party (ILP), hence the moniker. The grouping was not entirely homogenous, and Dreyfus identifies three main tendencies. The first was towards a reconstituted global workers' movement in the Social-Democratic vein, a position which implied the rejection of the Stalinist model and any sort of coercive unitary structure; the second, led by the ILP, envisioned an independent line with a possible future alignment with the Comintern; the third, largely inspired by Trotsky, envisioned a new anti-Stalinist global unitary movement (eventually, the short-lived "Fourth International") based on strict Marxist-Leninist theory.

The London Bureau's first meeting in 1933 had been prompted by Hitler's election,[48] and so if there was a central unifying factor, it was opposition to Fascism. Within that position, however, there existed another divergence over Capitalism. On one side were those who felt that an effective front against the Fascist tide could only come in collaboration with the existing Capitalist national structures. On the other, the group that eventually prevailed espoused a strictly anti-Capitalist view. In short, the interwar Left, and the London Bureau, struggled to agree on much of anything except militant

[46] Stalin exercised covert influence over a number of international Communist cells, in service of foreign policy goals. Official Soviet policy sought "Socialism in one country," and did not seek to harness world labor in any Marxist sense.
[47] The ILP's Fenner Brockway notes that this was the most commonly used name. The IRMC was only officially constituted in 1935, but Dreyfus argues reasonably that the IWU-Paris Bureau merger occurred *de facto* in '33.
[48] Dreyfus 1980. 33.

antifascism.

Some of the personnel of the London Bureau would remain politically engaged after the war. The Bureau was led and organized by the ILP under the guidance of Fenner Brockway; his colleagues Bob Edwards and Francis Ridley were also leading members. The 1933 meeting had included Trotsky's ILO group, the largest constituent party of which was the Greek Archeo-Marxist Party, led by Dimitrios Giotopoulos, alias "Witte." While Trotsky would not continue to participate, he and Witte had a falling out later that year, and Witte's Archeo-Marxists remained with the London Bureau. French Socialist Marceau Pivert member of the leftist faction of the French SFIO, known as *Gauche Revolutionnaire*, joined the London Bureau in 1935; his offshoot *Parti Socialiste Ouvrier et Paysan* (PSOP) also adhered in 1937.

The Spanish POUM joined the Bureau in 1935, establishing a connection with another central player of the MUSSE: Enric Adroher I Pascual.[49] Adroher had been teaching in Catalonia, writing under the *nom-de-plume* Gironella, when he helped found the POUM in 1935. It is unclear whether he was personally present at any of the London Bureau meetings; he organized and fought alongside the Spanish anti-Franco forces in the mid 1930s until his arrest and imprisonment in northern Spain in May, 1937. During that period, however, the Bureau, and the ILP in particular, spent considerable resources supporting the POUM and affiliated anti-fascist forces in Spain. Among others, Bob Edwards drove an ambulance and helped organize British volunteers; Pivert helped organize those volunteers' trip through France, in both directions; John McNair was briefly arrested in June, 1937, as he worked on logistics in Spain, and Fenner Brockway made a trip later that year to secure the release of some 15,000 prisoners, including some 1,000 POUMistas.[50]

By 1938, the Bureau included independent factions of the British, French, German, Italian and Polish Socialist parties, the Greek Archeo-Marxist Party, the Spanish POUM, and a number of eastern European parties, all complemented by the American Socialist Party and several parties from "the Colonies" (Dreyfus does not specify which ones) in an observer capacity.

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[49] Juste, M. "Adroher I Pascual, Enrique." *Dizie.eu*. Dizionario Storico dell'Integrazione Europea. 2010. http://www.dizie.eu/dizionario/adroher-i-pascual-enrique-gironella/ Retrieved July 30, 2018.
[50] Durgan, Andy. "International volunteers in the POUM Militias." Paper presented at the Conference on the International Brigades, Lausanne, December 1997. https://web.archive.org/web/20090108182707/http://www.fundanin.org/durgan1.htm#A

The last London Bureau meeting was held in April, 1939; the next, scheduled for September of that year, was rendered impossible by the outbreak of World War II. Aside from interrupting the Bureau's activities, the war also scattered some of its members, notably Pivert and Gironella who both ended up in Mexico. By 1938, Gironella had found himself freed from prison in Spain, and ended up in France, where he was interned near Toulouse; in 1940, he found passage to Mexico via Bordeaux.[51] Pivert, in the meantime, had encouraged the French working class to boycott any military activity or preparation: while on a speaking tour in the United States, he was tried *in absentia* and convicted of inciting insubordination, precluding his return. Some months later, a speech he gave at an American Socialist Party rally cost him his US visa; he too would spend the rest of the war in Mexico City,[52] where he met Gironella in September, 1940.[53]

With the London Bureau no longer a working forum, members' programs diverged, constituting something of an ideological break. Gironella tried to form a Socialist union of parties exiled in Mexico. In 1943, Pivert formed the movement "*Socialisme et Liberté;*" and in London, in 1944, Bob Edwards and Francis "Frank" Ridley penned what would become the founding document of the Movement, a new manifesto titled "The United Socialist States of Europe."[54] The two men were members of the ILP and shared certain communist sympathies. During the 1920s, Frank Ridley had sought to join Trotsky's ILO before joining the ILP.[55] Riley was a Marxist revolutionary, and would ultimately drift away from the party he helped found in the late 1940s. Bob Edwards would remain involved into the 1950s. He was not particularly active, but likely had ulterior motives: he was eventually exposed as having longstanding ties to the Soviet Union, and was awarded the Order of the People's Friendship by the Soviet Union.[56]

Edwards and Ridley's program was well in line with, and can be seen as a fusion

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[51] Juste, 2010
[52] Kergoat, Jacques. *Marceau Pivert; socialiste de gauche.* Paris: Les Editions Ouvrières, 1994. 132-35.
[53] Gasteuil, Quentin. "Pivert Marceau, Souverain [nouvelle version] ». *Le Maitron*. Maitron.fr. https://maitron.fr/spip.php?article166971
[54] Edwards, Bob and F.A. Ridley. *The United Socialist States of Europe*. London: National Labour Press Ltd, 1944. In later summaries, the Movement itself would date its foundation to its first congress in 1947.
[55] Gerber, John P. *Anton Pannekoek and the Socialism of Workers' Self-Emancipation, 1873-1960*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. 194.
[56] Sanderson, David. "Veteran MP Bob Edwards was honoured by the Soviet Union." *The Times*, 15 September 2018. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/veteran-mp-bob-edwards-was-honoured-by-the-soviet-union-hdxxx70gw

of, the major tendencies of the London Bureau. It advocated an anti-capitalist, transnational European left, with a program elaborated democratically by its constituent members. This particular combination had been untenable in the 1930s, when the central *raison d'être* of the Bureau had been dealing with Fascism: nobody could concretely combat the Fascist advance other than via the extant - capitalist - governments (though a few militant anti-capitalists in the Bureau had advocated civil wars to overthrow them). The line espoused by the ILP at that time, meanwhile, which held out the possibility of joining the Communist International, conflicted with the anti-Stalinist line that had attracted many of the Bureau's other constituent parties. The final stages of the war resolved these internal contradictions by eliminating Fascism from the equation, except for its comparatively minor manifestation in Spain (which remained a concern), and by producing a short window of time during which the Soviet Union's posture in the world was an open question.

The Edwards-Ridley outlook was solidly Marxist, conceptualizing history as driven by economic relations between classes, predicting the empowerment of the working class and an end to traditional national boundaries, and taking for granted that a generalized socio-economic homogeneity would resolve all human conflicts. Just as the Thirty-Years War had reflected the inability of European feudalism to manage the effects of global commerce, they argued,[57] the present war reflected the inability of the nation-state system to handle the forces of the "Machine Age," or what might today be termed global capitalism. With World War II still raging, they predicted that if the anachronistic Nation-state system, "no more suited to the modern age than Eskimo or Aborigine culture,"[58] was not done away with, there would certainly be a World War III. The Allied pretense to righteousness was ridiculed:

> "The united nations,[59] which include the two most ruthless dictatorships on earth, those of Stalin and Chiang Kai-Shek, are no more fighting for Democracy against Dictatorship than, on the other side, the Germans are fighting for the world supremacy of the

[57] While the war (1618-1648) is often characterized as a religious conflict, a Marxist interpretation (cf Neil Faulkner's "Marxist History of the World") is that commercial development had granted the (Protestant) Czech nobility a sphere of power and autonomy incompatible with the (Catholic) Holy Roman Emperor's attempts at centralization, ultimately leading to the Westphalian solution recognizing the internal sovereignty (or proto-statehood) of the HRE's polities.
[58] A pointed reminder of the racial attitudes of the time.
[59] As in the Allies, not the diplomatic forum.

white ("Aryan") races in collaboration with the Mongolian Japanese and the mongrel races who inhabit Italy and the Balkans."[60]

But more than simply an imperialist war – "the tragic result of the failure of Europe to take the "Moscow Road" between 1917 and 1939"[61] – this conflict was also an inevitable stepping-stone towards world Socialism. The inevitable end-product of history would be a United States of the World, they held, but the war having more or less reset Europe's ideological landscape, the authors proposed to start with the United States of Europe (they would later cite their as their inspiration Lenin's 1926 *Europe and America*[62]). And since Socialism was, and would continue to be, the only way to prevent yet another war, these would be United Socialist States.

Ultimately, the MUSSE was not a direct continuation of the London Bureau, although the MUSSE could not have come about without it. Perhaps "offspring" is the best term. Its principles were a hybrid of the Bureau's, made viable by a new geopolitical context. Its geographic aspirations were confined to Europe, in contrast to the interwar groups outlined above, which all envisioned a global movement. There was some important continuity in the parties and individuals involved in the MUSSE and the Bureau, but it was far from complete, considering the disappearance of some parties and indeed some people. The MUSSE did not try to pick up where the Bureau had left off: at their first meeting, they called for papers establishing new positions, rather than trying to salvage the Bureau's. Finally, in spite of the connections and similarities, nowhere and at no point do the MUSSE or its variants claim any kind of kinship, ideological, personal or otherwise, to the London Bureau.

Foundation

The ILP looked forward to Pivert's return to France in early 1946; having corresponded on a near-weekly basis throughout the war, Fenner Brockway and Secretary John McNair considered waiting for him before calling the first MUSSE

[60] Edwards and Ridley, 1944. 33. Also ref. footnote 57
[61] *Idem.* 8.
[62] Ridley, F.A. *Unite or Perish!* London: LSE, ILP/5/1947-/1-21

meeting.[63] As enthusiastic as Pivert was to reengage in politics, however, the two-month journey from Mexico, in addition to two heart attacks he had suffered while there, saw him much diminished in the first months after his return.

On May 11 and 12, 1946, the ILP held an exploratory meeting, recorded under the title "First meeting of the International Socialist States of Europe." [64] It was a reasonably small affair, but it drew participation from some familiar people, produced at least one resolution and elicited a series of questions to be addressed for the next meeting. For the ILP, Bob Edwards chaired, accompanied by Francis Ridley and John McNair. Jacques Robin of the SFIO attended (presumably in place of Pivert); as did the POUM's Gironella, Germans Heinz Heydorn and Willi Dittmer of the SPD and Student Socialist Movements respectively, Witte (Giotopoulos) of the Greek Archeo-Marxists, and the Dutch Socialist Party's Jef Last. French socialists Claude Bourdet and Simon Wichené attended as well, representing the *Conseil National de la Résistance* and the *Union Internationale Contre le Racisme*. The meeting might be seen as a passing of the torch: while many of the parties were the same, some of the faces had changed.

Notable by his absence was Fenner Brockway: he'd been member of the ILP since 1923, had led the London Bureau, and had been close enough to John McNair and Marceau Pivert to feature prominently in the wartime communication between them. The relationship between the ILP and Labour had been acrimonious, however, and Brockway was just then contemplating a change: on May 12 (the second day of the exploratory conference), he resigned his posts as Political Secretary and as editor of the magazine *New Leader* over the ILP's refusal to work with Labour. He calculated that Socialist principles could better be served from within a party in power, and attended his last ILP meeting in June[65] before rejoining the Labour Party. The overlap between ILP leadership and the MUSSE group would likely have made attendance awkward; but he would remain involved in the MUSSE for some time. His move to Labour would in fact prove advantageous to the Movement: Brockway would develop a close relationship to Labour's "Keep Left" faction (see below), affording the Movement a direct conduit to the party in power.

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[63] McNair and Brockway to Pivert, January 3, 1946. Paris: CHS, 559 AP 29. This record group contains a great deal of wartime and postwar correspondence between these figures.
[64] "Minutes of the first meeting of the International Socialist States of Europe." London: LSE: ILP/3/76
[65] "Minutes of the ILP Executive Committee meeting, 12 May 1946," and "Minutes of the ILP NAC meeting 15-16 June, 1946" LSE: ILP/3/34

Notable by his presence, on the other hand, was Enrique Gironella.[66] Of the eleven men in attendance, Gironella was inarguably to play the most valuable role in the institutional history of the MUSSE; he was General Secretary by mid 1947, and remained so until 1964. For 18 years, he more-or-less singlehandedly managed communication, logistics, publishing and other administrative tasks. He wrote summaries and editorials for the party organs, delivered introductory and keynote speeches at conferences, liaised with affiliated movements, sought out sources of funding, and drove debates on the Movement's orientation, mission and structure. It's hard to imagine the movement ever functioning without him, and perhaps the single most glaring omission from this dissertation is the absence of material from his personal papers. He left France in 1976, after the death of Francisco Franco, returning to his native Catalonia. There, he joined the *Partido de los Socialistas de Cataluña* (PSC), which regrouped a number of the Socialist parties banned under Franco including Gironella's POUM. According to his family, his papers were transferred to the PSC upon his death, but regrettably, repeated inquiries to the PSC over several years have gone unanswered.

The meeting's single surviving resolution rather un-controversially called for the elimination of the displaced-persons camps that still existed in Germany and elsewhere ("The keeping of these men, women and children, victims of fascism, behind barbed wire, in conditions utterly unworthy of a genuine civilization, constitutes a crime against humanity"[67]). By contrast, the proposals to be addressed in the next conference rather more pointedly touched on coal, power, transportation, banking, the monetary system and the Spanish and Jewish questions.

Pivert finally reconnected with the ILP at their "Summer School" conference in Wales in July 1946,[68] where he laid out his positions on French and European socialism. The MUSSE was not yet a wholly functioning organism, but in those early days, the line between MUSSE and ILP business was very blurry. Pivert and the ILP, who saw eye-to-eye, decided that the best way to drum up support for the MUSSE was to expand the ILP newsletter *Between Ourselves* to France; until about 1950, Pivert contributed articles and translated English-language ones into French.

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[66] Primary sources associated to the Movement overwhelmingly refer to him as Enrique Gironella, Gironella, or even a more familiar Giro; his given last name is virtually never used. Some sources, particularly Spanish ones, spell the first name "Enric," and while his full last name was "Adroher I Pascual," even Spanish sources generally just use Adroher.
[67] "Minutes of the first meeting of the International Socialist States of Europe." LSE: ILP/3/76
[68] "Minutes of ILP NAC meeting 4-5 August 1946." LSE: ILP/3/34.

The MUSSE was not alone in trying to reconstitute a European Left after the war. Like the London Bureau, the interwar LSI had also ceased to function during the conflict: headquartered in Brussels, it had technically survived until the German invasion in 1940[69]. In May, 1946, the same month as the MUSSE's exploratory meeting, the Labour Party hosted a conference at Clacton-on-Sea to see what could be salvaged of the LSI.[70] The two SFIO delegates to the conference - Salomon Grumbach, dispatched from Paris, and the London-based reporter Louis Lévy – reported that nobody suggested the creation of an International at that time and that no motions were submitted or passed, concluding that an international labor movement was far from being realized. The Clacton conference did decide to create a liaison office (SILO), headed by Labour's International Secretary Denis Healey, and before a proper International could be reassembled, the movement would be spearheaded by a "Committee of the International Socialist Conference," (COMISCO) led by Labour MP Morgan Philips.

The organization as a whole was spearheaded by Labourites, which goes some way to explaining Labour's subsequent resistance to the MUSSE: it would be a competitor to their eventual International, run by a competing party. Labour was also considerably less concrete in its network and objectives than the MUSSE would be in the same period; Labour's official position as late as mid-1947 was still that "the establishment of a formal Socialist International is not possible at the moment," which functionally limited the organization to a forum of information exchange, but also implies that they felt that work could only properly commence once a sufficient number of parties had adhered. This is coherent in the context of a global movement, which is indeed more in the Marxist spirit than the more restricted geographical scope envisioned by Edwards and Ridley, but the result was that between 1946 and 1951, at a time when the MUSSE was the closest thing to a Socialist international, actively involved in European politics and advocating a concrete, actionable program, the COMISCO was essentially still building a clubhouse.

[69] Sibilev, Nicolai. *The Socialist International*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980. English translation by Nadezhda Burova, 1984. 9.
[70] Parti Socialiste. *38e Congrès National; 29, 30, 31 aout - 1er septembre 1946, Paris; Rapports*. Paris: Librairie du Parti, 1946. OURS

A second meeting of the MUSSE was tentatively planned for the autumn of 1946, but it does not appear to have occurred; the next meeting of the movement (later described as a "preliminary gathering"), was scheduled on February 22-23 1947. It would again be hosted by the ILP, but in contrast to the exploratory meeting of the previous year they now sought official party delegates, and McNair sent out feelers to various groups, including Labour: Morgan Philips' secretary replied curtly that the International Sub-committee had "discussed your conference and decided not to participate."[71]

McNair's overture to the SFIO was somewhat more promising, even if ultimately unsuccessful. The ILP was "extremely anxious" to have some SFIO heavyweights involved, McNair wrote, specifically Guy Mollet or André Philip. Philip, then Economic Minister, was a stretch, but for a fleeting moment, Mollet was slated to attend. However, the SFIO prioritized its relationship with the Labour Party, and Mollet wrote to Healey asking, in essence, for Labour's blessing. Healey's return letter was scathing. He called the ILP "a small and insignificant group […] split by internal dissention" and pointed out that some ILP members (notably Brockway) had recently left because of the group's refusal to work with Labour. Considering the conflict between the two parties over a number of issues, "it would not be desirable for the French party to send a national delegate," he concluded." I strongly advise you not to do so."[72] The SFIO declined the invitation.[73]

The meeting nevertheless went ahead, with 133 delegates in attendance – already twelve times the number present nine months before. Conference documents have not survived in either ILP or MUSSE archives, but the ILP's National Administrative Council seems to have spent most of its next meeting discussing it.[74] One major initiative was launched: an anti-Imperialist congress of representatives from Europe, Asia and Africa, which was intended to extend the program to European colonial holdings, laying the groundwork for a common political outlook on soon-to-be independent countries[75] (see next chapter).

[71] Windle to McNair, 19 Feb, 1947. Manchester: PHM, Healey papers box 10, file 14
[72] Healy to Mollet, 30 Jan 1947. LSE: ILP 14.
[73] Pivert-McNair correspondence Jan-Feb 1947. Paris: CHS, 559 AP 11.
[74] "Annual report of the National Administrative Council of the Independent Labour Party to be submitted at the 55th annual conference, The Town Hall, Ayr, April 5th to April 7th, 1947" LSE: ILP/5/1947-/1-21
[75] "Annual report 1947," in ILP/5/1947-/1-21, LSE, London.

Two principal political orientations came out of the conference. The first and most significant was a dedication to the "Third Front," a position independent from the two major powers and "a powerful instrument for ensuring friendship with and in between the peoples of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R," which also implied a common cause with non-Stalinist communists. This decision was a natural one considering the geopolitical situation of the moment: in these early months of 1947, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Western nations was, on the surface, still a relationship among allies. To be sure, Churchill and Stalin had both publicly argued a year earlier that their two systems were incompatible and that the other side was to be feared;[76] and as we shall see, in early 1947, the upper echelons of US policymaking were already adopting an antagonistic policy towards the Soviet Union. However, public indications were that the two sides could coexist peacefully: the joint occupations of Germany and Korea were proceeding according to plan, and though both sides were doing what they could to influence the political orientation of the counties they had liberated, there were at the time no formal economic or political unions that might properly constitute opposing "blocs." The Third Force promised to be a friend and mediator to both, staving off any eventual conflict.

The second orientations was a commitment to a democratic form of socialist planning, a "planned economy […] carried out through the organic structure of a real social and economic democracy, based on workers' control and not by any authoritarian medium of either monopoly capitalism or totalitarian state bureaucracy."

This opposition to "monopoly capitalism," while most directly a reference to the United States, echoes both the Bureau-era debate over whether to associate with the existing European governments, and the Edwards-Ridley indictment of the Allied governments. McNair, in his statement to the ILP congress, referred specifically to "Anglo-American Capitalism," and while Germany, Greece, Italy etc. were in a state of considerable political flux at that moment, it could – and would – be taken to include the French government as well.

Nor was the MUSSE goal of a unified continent entirely outlandish. Supranational structures had been on the Socialist wish-list as far back as 1889, and in the wake of the

[76] Winston Churchill; speech delivered at Fulton, Missouri, March 1946; Joseph Stalin; speech delivered at the Bolshoi Theater, February 1946.

war, a general post-nationalist thinking was increasingly more mainstream. Churchill's call, in late 1946, for a "United States of Europe"[77] had perhaps the highest public visibility and it was along superficially similar lines to what the MUSSE was proposing. It was something to work with, though the two visions were rather dissimilar. First, Churchill called for a Franco-German nucleus, which was at odds with the MUSSE's default plan for a Franco-British arrangement – not only did Germany yet have nothing like a functioning, representative government, but the MUSSE's organizational abilities were concretely restricted to a Franco-British axis. Churchill also offered up the British Commonwealth as a comparable example, which flew in the face of the centralized decision-making envisioned by the MUSSE. Churchill, it seemed clear, was seeking a very decentralized arrangement, which would essentially rely on a sort of historical and cultural fraternity to generate the political will to act in concert on major economic or foreign policy issues. The MUSSE's socialist planning relied on a much more formal set of links and regulations. Churchill sought a kind of "intergovernmentalism+" and the MUSSE were committed to democratic supranationalism. Some degree of federalism seemed at least likely, but for the moment, the MUSSE staked out a position of principle.

The "third front," or "Third Force," bears some explanation here because it crops up in different forms in the late 1940s. It was proposed as a framework for foreign engagement, but was never an active government policy, nor was it ever clearly articulated in a practical sense. In its simplest and most common form, it is the notion that Europe could, if properly integrated and developed, constitute a bloc to rival the United States and the Soviet Union, or at least capable of resisting their influence. The MUSSE used the term to describe an integrated organism ideologically, financially and politically independent of both the United States and the USSR, and potentially comprising former colonial, non-European countries.

Ernest Bevin implied a different definition in a memorandum of January 1948, in the context of his celebrated Western Union initiative.[78] The Western Union, an ultimately illusory concept that for a moment raised hopes for British leadership of the

[77] Winston Churchill, speech delivered at the university of Zurich, 19 September 1946. Available at https://rm.coe.int/16806981f3

[78] Bevin before House of Commons, 22 January 1948. Available at https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2002/9/9/7bc0ecbd-c50e-4035-8e36-ed70bfbd204c/publishable_en.pdf

integration project, was conceptually European, but not opposed to the US. Bevin's definition of the force in question was the "democratic elements in Western Europe which are anti-Communist and, at the same time, genuinely progressive and reformist, believing in freedom, planning and social justice…" His union of west European countries, however, would be "backed by the Americas and the Dominions."[79]

The difference is not negligible: Bevin's description, despite the socialist elements, effectively precluded the involvement of any of the countries in the Soviet orbit, or the Colonies in an independent capacity. Even if Bevin's Western Union never coalesced, it drew support from Europeanists on both sides of the Channel and thereby contributed to the alienation of the eastern bloc. This had mixed implications for the MUSSE: while it superficially meant that they shared common goals with the British cabinet, the imprecise definition would be a source of confusion and disappointment.

In France, Léon Blum advanced the term "Troisième Force" in 1947 to describe a national-level centrist political coalition between the Communist Left and the Right; it would often be used to describe the French governments of the late 1940s and early 50s.

Overall, the term and its variants ("third force," "third way," "middle way") have been used liberally as a general concept of strength and independence through unity, but while the idea is appealing, it was not universally understood, and never practically implemented.

The American Problem

But while a dialogue on European federalism was certainly in the offing in early 1947, the MUSSE's Third Front orientation was fast becoming anachronistic with respect to the geopolitical trends at work. In hindsight, one could see a certain naïveté in the notion that postwar Communist parties would be free to coordinate programs with Socialists, or to champion the kind of democratic structures envisioned by the MUSSE. But the interwar Leftist movements from which they came had existed on the premise that Stalinism and the Third International were not in fact real Communism – they sought, in a way, to *save* properly Marxist Communism, and this seemed a reasonable

[79] Bevin, Ernest. "Archive: The Third Force Memos" *Democratiya* 8 (2007): 131-153. *Dissent Magazine*. Web. 26 Oct. 2011.

objective when Stalin's personal grip on Communist factions in central Europe was not yet entirely consolidated. The crucial developments in the viability of the Third Force that would trickle out over the next five months came from a source which the MUSSE had not considered: the United States. With the UK heavily indebted to, and dependent on the US, it was a factor that the Labour government could not afford to ignore, and as the US extended support to the rest of Europe, the continent too became subject to American influence.

On February 22, 1946, precisely one year before the MUSSE decided on its Third Force policy, the American *chargé d'affaires* in Moscow George Kennan had laid out, in some 5300 words,[80] why reason or conventional diplomacy would not prevent Soviet expansionism. In the simplest terms: the Soviet foreign policy establishment was self-deluded, Stalin did not receive "anything like an objective picture of the outside world," and the "Soviet party line [was] not based in any objective analysis of [the] situation beyond Russia's borders." The telegram was secret diplomatic correspondence at the time, but Kennan was consulted by the State Department, and was ultimately tapped to head the State Department's Policy Planning Staff in April 1947[81] indicating that the central focus of US policy was already the Soviet Union, and that the executive branch trusted Kennan's analysis. In late February, however, there was yet little overt indication that the US would follow an antagonistic orientation with respect to Communism.

This changed somewhat on 12 March, some three weeks after the MUSSE conference, when the American President articulated the "Truman Doctrine" before Congress. He called, notably, for a significant investment to be made in shoring up the governments of Greece and Turkey. The specifics were restricted in scope: the argument and the aid demanded applied only to those two countries; there were no references to Russia or the Soviet Union; and the single reference to Communists described them very

[80] Nowhere near the oft-cited 8000 words, though adding the definite article and other grammatical omissions where appropriate might go some way to resolving the discrepancy.
Kennan to State Department [aka "Long Telegram"]. Telegram 511, February 22, 1946. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives and Records Administration, Department of State Records (Record Group 59), Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, 861.00/2-2246
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116178.pdf

[81] Pugliaresi, Lucian, and Diane T. Berliner. "Policy Analysis at the Department of State: The Policy Planning Staff." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, vol. 8, no. 3, 1989, pp. 379–394. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/3324930. Accessed 26 May 2020.

narrowly as a group leading terrorists in Greece. Philosophically, however, the speech told a different story: "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Kennan's Long Telegram had laid out the "two planes" of Soviet Foreign Policy: outwardly unaffiliated Communist groups, offering a certain plausible deniability and cover for an innocent official policy carried out through regular diplomatic channels. The MUSSE understood that the sands were shifting, but did not grasp the full implications. The speech signalled that the United States would combat all facets of Soviet policy: not only the Soviet Union's paramilitary agents ("armed minorities"), but also its client regimes and potentially susceptible political parties (all subject to "outside pressures"). The Americans were painting socialism with an exceedingly broad brush, effectively rendering moot the MUSSE's premise that there was a valid wedge between Stalinism and "real" Communism.

There were no MUSSE meetings scheduled until June, but Francis Ridley published a response to the Truman Doctrine in late March, 1947. *Unite or Perish!*[82] addressed the competing conceptions of Europe. He didn't mince words in his appraisal of the intergovermentalist Churchill plan: "It is…obvious that any movement supported by Churchill and his liberal colleagues must inevitably be a capitalist and imperialist movement, however 'left' its slogans may be." More than simple opposition to the form of Churchill's proposed union, we see here vestiges of the old ideological combativeness that had characterized the interwar movements. Capitalism itself was the enemy, and Ridley seems to have held out the hope that the old Capitalist structures and alliances could genuinely be done away with.

With respect to Truman, Ridley blamed America's aggressive behavior for the escalating tensions between East and West. He suggested that a United Socialist States of Europe would eliminate these tensions and that Russia could be brought into the union. He didn't excuse "Russian totalitarianism," but nevertheless doubled down on being a "third camp" between the blocs. He acknowledged the conflict, and, implicitly, the US's superior position, but continued to extend the olive branch to the Communists.

Though consistent with strict principle, this position did also reflect the practical situation of the Movement's constituent parties: the Eastern European parties-in-exile

[82] Ridley, Francis. *Unite or Perish!* 1947. There is no indication of the month, but there are references to the Truman Doctrine and it was distributed by 5 April.

were in a very precarious position wherein they could not afford to antagonize the Soviet Union; the western German representatives, meanwhile, particularly the SPD, rejected any foreign control at all, and sought at least cordial relations with the East lest they antagonize the Soviet occupiers. Sometime between February and the June conference, the Movement sent out an "appeal to the German people" that meshed well with the SPD position: the stifling of German economic potential, they charged, was a crime against both Germany and Europe, a "criminal absurdity" that was simply an attempt by the two global imperialist blocs to prevent a revived Germany from joining one side or the other. The natural answer was to join an independent, centrist bloc that was open to both sides.[83]

McNair argued Ridley's new position at the ILP's annual conference in Ayr in early April, calling for opposition to both Anglo-American Capitalism and Soviet Communism and explaining that "the Third Front is even more important now than during the war and is the only practical and ideal solution to our political difficulties."[84] In its insistence on the viability of a centrist bloc in spite of the signals from the US, and in its wholesale rejection of capitalism, Ridley's pamphlet is symptomatic of a certain ideological obstinacy that impeded the early Movement's ability to engage on a practical level.

In the tentative early months of America's orientation process, to be fair, European policymakers (and idealists like the MUSSE) could be forgiven for not taking America's anti-Communist posture as a *fait accompli*. The MUSSE was not alone in trying to find some accommodation with the Communist world in early 1947. Several Socialist parties in Europe sought, in the immediate postwar period, to bridge the gap between Communist and Socialist parties. In France, the SFIO had resolved at their 1945 National Conference to work towards a reconstitution of the working-class movement and cement solidarity with the Communist Party, with which they worked in the postwar government of national unity.[85] Conflicting ideologies would prevent a rapprochement between them, and the SFIO would acquiesce in the expulsion of the Communist Party

[83] "Appel au Peuple Allemand; comité d'étude et d'action pour les EUSE, secrétariat pour la conférence de Paris." Paris: CHS, Pivert 559 AP 41.
[84] "Annual report of the National Administrative Council of the Independent Labour Party to be submitted at the 55th annual conference, The Town Hall, Ayr, April 5th to April 7th, 1947" in ILP/5/1947-/1-21, LSE, London.
[85] "*38e Congrès National; 29, 30, 31 aout - 1er septembre 1946, Paris; Rapports*." Paris: OURS, Librairie du Parti, 1946. 8.

from government in May 1947. Similarly, separate from the Edwards-Ridley pamphlet, it had been the official position of the ILP that Soviet recalcitrance was a result of American assertiveness and that fences could be mended; yet they too distanced themselves from Communist ideology starting in 1947. The German SPD would be most directly confined to a "bridge" posture, as we shall see, determined to avoid antagonism of either bloc in a bid to prevent a divide between the Western and Soviet zones of the country.

A shift took place, however, sometime between the April ILP conference and the end of May, when the position papers for the MUSSE's June conference went out. Two central tenets of Ridley's vision – radical anti-capitalism and the Third Force position – were scaled down. The MUSSE fell back on the much more practical concerns evoked at the opening meeting of 1946: the rational planning of European economic assets like coal, transportation, and the banking sector.[86] There remain some vestiges of the "third" orientation, implicit in muted criticism of both the US and the Soviet Union and a promise of humanitarian socialist planning, but gone are the aspirations to being a "powerful instrument for ensuring friendship with and in between the peoples of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R…."[87]

In the context of a continent-wide program, the opening paragraph of the MUSSE program asserts that the primordial practical task "will be to [… draw] up a plan of production based on the needs of the people [of Europe] which will previously have been ascertained." We will go into more detail below, but for the moment it was a pleasant surprise to discover that the new policy potentially meshed with a central facet of the announcement by American general George Marshall - now Secretary of State - on the afternoon of June 5. The announcement would ultimately tip the balance, forcing the MUSSE to definitively abandon the more doctrinaire positions advocated by Francis Ridley in favor of *realpolitik*.

In the first instance, the Marshall speech torpedoed any illusions that there could be a Third Force. At an honorary degree ceremony at Harvard University, Marshall

[86] "Preparatory paper for Paris conference of 21-22 June 1947, by the International Committee." Manchester: PHM Healey papers box 10, folder 8
"Annual report of the National Administrative Council of the Independent Labour Party to be submitted at the 55th annual conference, The Town Hall, Ayr, April 5th to April 7th, 1947." P 30. London: LSE, ILP/5/1947-/1-21

announced the US's intention to materially subsidize the recovery of Europe with a European Recovery Program (ERP). Marshall, a military man and a strategist more than a humanitarian, had created the Policy Planning Staff and put George Kennan in charge. Its very first task had been to define a strategy with respect to the reconstruction of Europe. In his first report, Kennan had indicated that "it would be essential that this be done in such as form that the Russian satellite countries would either exclude themselves by unwillingness to accept the proposed conditions, or agree to abandon the exclusive orientation of their economies."[88] Kennan had also predicted in the Long Telegram that while the Soviet Government may pay "lip-service" to general international trade, it would turn a "cold official shoulder" to the "principle of economic collaboration among nations."[89] The final speech would reflect Kennan's premises that the Soviet Union should be treated as an adversary, with which there could be no accommodation… or "bridge."

Like Truman's, Marshall's speech included a sort of diplomatic doublespeak, which signalled an escalated position antagonistic to the Soviet Union itself. On the surface, Marshall offered American aid to all of war-torn Europe, technically including Eastern Europe and the geographically-European administrative centre of the Soviet Union, but the speech included an implicit "out" with respect to the Stalinist bloc: "Any government which manoeuvres to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States."[90] To the extent that the Soviets were liberally looting the countries they occupied, and that the promises of Communism appealed most to peoples facing existentially-threatening poverty, the implication was nakedly anti-Soviet. Marshall further insisted that US aid support a "joint program" produced by "agreement among the countries of Europe" including some commitment to the "part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect" to American contributions. The phasing is innocuous, but this was anathema to the

[88] Director of Policy Planning Staff [Kennan] to Under Secretary of State. 23 May, 1947. Marshallfoundation.org. Retrieved 25 May 2020. https://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/04/First_Recommendation_Policy_Planning_Staff_Aid_to_Western_Europe_Kennan_to_Acheson_May_23_19.pdf

[89] Long Telegram, Part 3, subsection f.

[90] Marshall, G. "The Marshall Plan." Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 5 June 1947. https://www.marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/marshall-plan-speech/ Retrieved 25 May, 2020

independently-controlled, centralized economy which was central to Soviet system, and it essentially precluded the Soviet Union and its satellites from participation in the European Recovery Program. As Kennan had predicted, the Soviets at first feigned interest, before pulling themselves and their clients out of the project on the grounds that it constituted "interfer[ence] in their internal affairs down to determining the line of development to be followed," to the advantage of France and Britain. Without apparent irony, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov charged that "European countries would find themselves placed under control and would lose their former economic and national independence because it so pleases certain strong powers."[91]

If the speech stopped short of signalling overt hostility, one detail further prejudiced the MUSSE's political aspirations: the target of American intervention was no longer just "armed minorities and outside pressures," but more pointedly defined as "governments, political parties, or groups." Beyond the paramilitary threats evoked under the Truman Doctrine, the US would now also target perceived threats in the political arena. It was becoming increasingly difficult to envisage the US and its growing list of clients seriously entertaining a European policy of equivocation or accommodation with the Soviet Union.

The final nail in the "Third Force" coffin would be the publication in *Foreign Affairs*, in July, 1947, of an article which made the public case for an openly anti-Soviet policy of "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian [sic] expansive tendencies."[92] The article's author was George Kennan, now head of the Policy Planning Staff, under the pseudonym "X." Kennan laid out directly the diplomatic quandary he had described in the Long Telegram: a diplomat "cannot hope that his words will make any impression on [the Soviets]. The most that he can hope is that they will be transmitted to those at the top […] But even those are not likely to be swayed by any normal logic in the words of the bourgeois representative. Since there can be no appeal to common purposes, there can be no appeal to common mental approaches. For this reason, facts speak louder than words to the ears of the Kremlin; and words carry the greatest weight

[91] "Statement by Molotov (2 July 1947)" Department of State (Ed.). A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents 1941-1949. Washington: Department of State Printing Office, 1985. 969 p. ISBN 0403000084. p. 807-809. http://www.cvce.eu/obj/statement_by_molotov_paris_2_july_1947-enf692bc11-0049-4b78-ba99-bc0ac81aedeb.html

[92] X. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs* Vol 25, No 4 (July, 1947). 566-582.

when they have the ring of reflecting, or being backed up by, facts of unchallengeable validity." In other words, "there's no talking with these people, only action."

Ironically, the content of the article dated back six months, and was effectively already policy. In January, Kennan had given a talk at the Council on Foreign Relations, a Washington-based think tank with an active relationship with the State and Defense departments, and which publishes *Foreign Affairs*. He had submitted the same content to his superior James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal would become Secretary of Defense in September, 1947). By March 7, the editor of *Foreign Affairs* had already agreed for Kennan to submit a write-up of his talk under a pseudonym.[93] In other words, a fully-articulated public explanation of the explicitly antagonistic position the US would adopt towards Communism in any form had been authorized for publication *before* Truman's Doctrine or Marshall's Plan were presented. The oblique references and restricted terms of those announcements were not the markers of an inchoate policy, despite the MUSSE's interpretation. The Third Force had been dead on arrival.

The MUSSE's newly muted and practical program therefore anticipated the direction of the United States, at least in terms of political objectives. It's less clear whether the group could have anticipated the American strategy for strengthening Europe, which was predicated precisely on rationalizing the allocation of economic resources on a continental scale. It raised the potential of a federated Europe, and even if American motivations were certainly self-interested, they did not necessarily conflict with the *form* of the requisite rationalization.

The US had remained engaged on the continent after the war for several reasons. The ongoing joint occupation of Germany involved a physical military presence; the mistrustful relationship with the Soviet Union entailed a certain amount of contingency planning; and America's wartime economy threatened to collapse unless new markets could be established to replace military requirements. A European continent acting in concert would be something of a panacea: the German question could be resolved quite satisfactorily if it were to become interdependent with its western neighbors; a Europe

[93] Spalding, Elizabeth Edwards. *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism*. University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 2006, pp. 233–298. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt2jcmrx.15. Accessed 27 May 2020.

at full health would be both a valuable deterrent to Soviet expansionism and capable of absorbing surplus American manufacturing.[94]

General Marshall's proposal can be seen as a response to these issues specifically:[95] he evokes the absence of a peace settlement with Germany, expresses opposition to "governments […] which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically," and warns of the "consequences to the economy of the United States" of the economic dislocation in Europe. Marshall also makes references to restoring faith in the economic future of "Europe as a whole," and to drawing up a "European program" for reconstruction. Taken together and stated simply, it was in America's national interest that the Europeans work together.

Two factors would have been deal-breakers for a strictly Ridleyite response. First, the plan would bring a degree of dependence on the United States, effectively aligning Europe in that direction. Second, the products in question would be provided by American companies rather than produced by Europeans, inviting capitalist values and practices. However, Marshall was explicitly soliciting some degree of harmonization of the European economy, a European economic paradigm that the MUSSE happened to be developing at that very moment. Ultimately, the MUSSE's more dogmatic principles were swept aside: though wary of American motives, the ILP's *Between Ourselves* – now effectively the MUSSE mouthpiece – concluded that Europe needed the goods and that America needed the market… "It follows, therefore, that American and European necessities are exactly complementary."[96]

Montrouge

The MUSSE headquarters were in London, and the International Committee established in February 1947 was headed by Bob Edwards and John McNair – the co-author of the manifesto and the head of the ILP respectively. On a material level, the British were in a better position than their French counterparts, if only because they had

[94] Lundestad, Geir. *"Empire" by Integration*. Oxford University Press, 1998. 13ff.
[95] Though the speech, given on June 5th, 1947, emphasizes the dire conditions experienced by the European population, it was drafted at Marshall's request by Soviet expert Charles Bohlen, and informed by a report from the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs and by George Kennan's Policy Planning Staff – it would thus appear to be more a strategic document than a humanitarian one.
[96] "Between Ourselves, July 1947" London: LSE, ILP/5/1947-/1-21

paper(!). Pivert and McNair worked together to overcome the rationing in France by having publications for the group's French audience produced in London. The paper shortage forced Pivert to write microscopically on both sides of incredibly thin, almost transparent paper, and send that to London. Tasked with transcribing these scribblings, McNair was a little nonplussed, but game.[97] Later, French invitations to the February conference also had to be sent from London: Pivert sent over a list of names and addresses, and McNair wrote them up as best he could (his confirmation letter to Pivert included a jocular, expletive-laden tirade about French tenses and accents.[98])

Aside from shouldering the costs of producing materials for the continent, the ILP also undertook a domestic publicity campaign for the USSE. Few materials have survived, and there is no way to know how much was printed or distributed, or to whom, or how much concrete impact it had. However, the ILP strained to make ends meet. The party, and its budget, were small: over the following year, the ILP's MUSSE campaign incurred a net loss equivalent to about £2000, a rather small amount that nevertheless put the party accounts in the red.[99] Any significant expansion of the movement would have been a challenge.

This may go some way to explaining why the next conference, in June 1947, was held in France. Marceau Pivert organized the event in Montrouge, to this day a stronghold of the Left on the southern edge the Paris city limits. However, his colleague Guy Mollet of the SFIO had evidently been rather interested in the MUSSE, and now that the conference was not organized explicitly by the ILP, the SFIO could participate without antagonizing the Labour Party. Mollet now insisted that invitations go out under SFIO letterhead. In this context, it's reasonable to assume that conference materials were produced by the French, marking the beginning of the Movement's transition across the channel.

John McNair attempted a rapprochement with Labour, inquiring of Morgan Philips whether "any of your boys would like to come unofficially." This time, Healey at least entertained the notion, requesting permission from Kenneth Younger. Younger's response was dismissive at best, concluding that the conference materials Healey had

[97] McNair to Pivert, 16 May 1946. Paris: CHS 599 AP 26, "John MacNair"
[98] McNair to Pivert, 25 January 1947 Paris: CHS, Fonds Pivert, record group 559 AP 29. "John MacNair."
[99] "National administrative council of the ILP - income and expenditures account for the year ended 29th February 1948" in ILP/3/36, LSE, London. The ILP earned a little over £263 and spent almost £312. Conversion based on the inflation calculator in2013dollars.com.

sent over were "abstract and doctrinaire" and that "that the socialists are no longer a practical proposition in France, but just a bunch of bloody intellectuals."[100] Healey declined the invitation.

Fenner Brockway was in a marginally more promising position… one of his new colleagues in Labour was Ian Mikardo a member of a low-key Labour faction known as Keep Left, which had published a first eponymous pamphlet in May.[101] It was keeping a low profile for the moment, lest the Labour executive come down on them,[102] but Brockway would shortly be invited to join the "innocuous study group."[103] Mikardo responded positively to the USSE idea and promised to discuss it with the rest of the "Keep Left boys, and see if we can't do something as a group."[104] Pivert would make direct contact before the June conference, and though none of the Labourites attended except Brockway, the MUSSE was beginning to develop a way around the animosity between Labour and the ILP.

Montrouge would attract some 164 delegates from 14 different countries to the MUSSE's two-day conference, on 21 and 22 June, 1947. The leadership had not changed: Bob Edwards chaired with John McNair as treasurer and secretary. Ridley attended, as did Jacques Robin and Gironella. Heinz-Joachim Heydorn, Dittmer, Last and Witte had all been founding members. Pafsanias Catsotas of the Greek Progressive Labor Party[105] was a new face, as was Zygmunt Zaremba, head of the exiled Polish Socialist Party, and several Americans. The only Labourite in attendance seems to have been Fenner Brockway. The proceedings of the conference have not survived, but the resolutions adopted essentially validated the pre-conference paper, except that they would have occasion to address the Marshall Plan.

The general logic and language of the June conference's preparatory paper[106] remains Marxist, with references to class struggle and the bourgeoisie, to the inherent

[100] "Kenneth Younger>Healey 3 June 1947" Manchester: PHM. LP/ID/DH - Healy papers (7), France (SFIO)
[101] Crossman, Richard, Michael Foot and Ian Mikardo. *Keep Left*. London: New Statesman and Nation. May, 1947.
[102] Brockway to Pivert, August 7, 1947. Paris: CHS 559 AP 29
[103] Brockway 1977. 164.
[104] Mikardo to Brockway, June 19, 1947. Paris: CHS, Pivert 559 AP 29
[105] "Proodefticon Ergatotechnicon Comma"
[106] "Preparatory paper for Paris conference of 21-22 June 1947, by the International Committee" Manchester: PHM LP/ID/DH - Healy papers (7) Box 10 file 08: Europe (United Socialist States Of)

"contradictions" of the existing Capitalist system, and to decentralized control by the working class. This material seems well in line with Ridley's orthodox views. However, elsewhere, in a section on the state of Socialism in Europe, the Movement paper argues that most Socialist parties were effectively stuck in a prewar, oppositional mindset, and now needed to become a creative force. "They have often kept to the phraseologies of the past and have not dared to give new thought and reflection to the problems in the reality of their historic setting of today." Tendencies within the movement were pulling in opposite directions. The anti-capitalist language had been moderated somewhat, and there was no more mention of fraternity with European Communist movements (this is at least in part due to the recent expulsion of the Communists from several governments). Nor were they advocating some sort of homogenous super-state like the Ridley-Edwards pamphlet's purportedly inevitable "United Socialist States of the World," instead validating the local variations that developed within (otherwise much-reviled) national boundaries.

Rather than bridging Capitalism and Communism, the group now effectively positioned itself as nonaligned: "Socialist measures will differentiate Europe from American Capitalism" and "the principles of liberty will differentiate Europe from Soviet totalitarianism." Betraying the lingering premise that both blocs were latently hostile, they hoped "it will be by our democratic will that we can take from the USA any justification of their eventual hostility: it will be by our socialist will that we can arrive at the same result with the USSR."

The group continued to predicate its success on Socialist alignment and, with the SFIO already on board, it made some general overtures to the UK. Without naming the Labour party, the program's second point pledged to "further the economic nationalizations nobly realized within the national and capitalist framework of the old Europe." However, there were some misgivings in the MUSSE that Labour's nationalization program was not quite democratic enough. The position paper had elsewhere argued that centralization and top-down nationalizations along the Soviet model simply substituted the old form of capitalist domination for a new totalitarian one... There followed a pointed warning that in giving the government what they

considered undue influence, Labour might "threaten, very gravely, human liberties in the event of their becoming the future structures of totalitarian oppression."[107]

Social-democratic organization of was the most central theme in the MUSSE program, printed in capital letters:

> "POLITICAL DEMOCRACY SHOULD BECOME A GENUINE SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, ALL THE FORCES OF PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION SHOULD BE DIRECTED AND CONTROLLED BY THE WORKERS THEMSELVES AS WELL AS THE PLANS AND MEASURES FOR REALIZING A TRUE SOCIALIST ECONOMY."[108]

The reasoning was explicitly Marxist: this was "the decisive factor in the suppression of class domination without permitting the emergence of a new class." As both Napoleon and Hitler had showed, a unified Europe could only be achieved by the "willing consent of the governed." They further called for a charter of the rights of citizens and European peoples.

The dialogue with Labour revolved around degrees of centralization at the national level, but the Movement in fact aimed at some degree of organization on a continental level, and at defining a new relationship between the constituent nations in terms of sovereign rights. A version of the dialogue was already playing out in Europe, and in the next chapter we will discuss the formation of the European Movement, but the MUSSE did present set of principles in the context of Churchill's aforementioned "United States of Europe." In the Montrouge preparatory paper, the structure of the union is referred to as a "federation," which, while explicitly not intergovernmental, is not a particularly precise term. Technically, it simply describes a system wherein some powers are granted to a central government and others to regional ones; to this day, scholars disagree on the specificities, and the consensus is that there are "numerous overlapping definitions" of the term.[109] On the weaker end of the Federalist spectrum, the initial American "Articles of Confederation" system (1781-1789) consisted of little more than the States contributing, on an essentially voluntary basis, to a central government in charge of little more than the military. One could make a case for something similar in the Holy Roman Empire, though it was largely devoid of a formal

[107] "Preparatory paper," section 2b
[108] "Preparatory paper," section 2b
[109] Law, John. "How can we define federalism?" *Perspectives on Federalism* vol. 5 no. 3, 2013. Available at http://on-federalism.eu/attachments/169_download.pdf

power-allocation structure. Under the modern United States Constitution, the size and responsibilities of government is a matter of continual polemic and fluctuation. On the other extreme of the spectrum, "federation" might be applicable to the Soviet Union insofar as, on paper at least, there existed regional autonomy in the Republics.

The paper was clear about what their union would *not* be: it would not be a simple political union of the kind envisioned by Churchill, nor would it mirror the United States in the sense that the existing bourgeois structures would be scaled up to the continental level. And it would not be the Soviet-style centralized totalitarianism. That said, the precise degree of federation is a little opaque.

They evoked an arrangement on the weak end of the spectrum, wherein "all the forces of production and consumption should be directed and controlled by the workers themselves," in as decentralized a manner as possible, "delegating only to central bodies powers which cannot be exercised locally." There are no explicit examples of these powers, but there are certain specific references in the program that would imply some form of centralization. The only explicit transnational system in the program is a "European banking system with a standard currency," but there was also a trade bloc and the "abolition of tariff walls." However, references to "harmonization" or "rationalization" in cases such as production, transportation, agriculture, or education, imply the existence, at the very least, of international agencies to collect and process the relevant information. What legal authority these agencies would have is not clear, but they would at least have to be paid for out of some central fund, as would any sort of defensive capability, a topic altogether absent from the program. These gaps are not surprising, of course; this document is simply a basis for discussion. Ultimately, "it is the workers, the peasants the technicians and youth who must be called upon to become the driving force," in a campaign led by the Socialist parties of Europe. Finally, the program argues for "liberty of national traits and characteristics," because "one of the great riches of Europe is the immense diversity of national characteristics."

Taken together, the MUSSE program of May-June 1947 has a foot in both worlds. While it argued for programs that would ultimately come to pass, it remained dragged down by its oppositional revolutionary roots. Ridley and Edwards had cut their philosophical teeth in the interwar period, where the international Left consisted of small ideological groups buffeted by variations in Marxist doctrine. Fundamentally, each sought to get the revolution right, which was predicated on there being a revolution in

the first place: finding accommodation with the inevitable losing side was nonsensical, and for that reason, the MUSSE's default position was that there was little use in engaging with the equivocations of what it considered outdated national governments. The program itself, reasonable and actionable as it was, remained couched in boilerplate Marxist exhortations, and Kenneth Younger might be forgiven for calling it "depressing […] abstract and doctrinaire."[110]

The MUSSE was still somewhat inchoate. Its founders believed that the only legitimate political structure was post-national socialism. The war had been proof positive that nationalism and capitalism contained contradictions that would destroy both: insofar as the political leaders of the future would surely abandon these structures, there was no harm in oppositional language and little incentive to adopt a collaborative posture. Such was the legacy of the Ridley-Edwards pamphlet: it denounced the old systems and predicted the new, and Marx's assertion that such a transition was inevitable meant that little attention really needed to be paid to the precise mechanisms of this change. The Movement's members all shared the vision of a new post-national organization, but it fell to Marceau Pivert and his SFIO colleagues – schooled in the ideology, but, crucially, better trained in national politics – to determine how best to produce this new system.

The MUSSE record does not indicate any overt disputes at this stage between the Movement's leaders, perhaps because their responsibilities were somewhat compartmentalized: the Brits provided the inspiration and the seeds of a network inherited from the London Bureau; the French provided a legitimizing international partner and the financial means to grow. The crucial factor in tipping the balance was that the French would increasingly also provide the Movement's strategic direction, but at this stage there was no real conflict between the ends presented by the Brits, and the means proposed by the French.

Be that at it may, Marshall's proposal was very promising, and attendees at Montrouge were greatly encouraged by the French and British announcement, just days before the conference, that they would begin talks with the Soviets. Debate at the conference concluded that it was a step towards joint economic planning, which would

[110] [110] "Kenneth Younger>Healey 3 June 1947" Manchester: PHM. LP/ID/DH - Healy papers (7), France (SFIO)

undermine nationalism in general; second, that the involvement of the Soviets would limit the partition of Europe into two blocs; and third, that the allocation of funds to a common European organism would preempt the kinds of bilateral financial agreements with the US that, in their view, both brought the specter of capitalist influence and might draw Labour Britain away from a European economic paradigm. To that extent, and despite the assumption of ulterior American motives, this initial stage of the ERP's development process was cautiously endorsed at the conference.

That Friday, the Big Three met in person. The following Wednesday, Molotov withdrew.[111]

It was a turning point for the MUSSE. In its July edition, *Between Ourselves* published the MUSSE's updated, official position. First and foremost: "Make known the grave responsibility incurred by the USSR, in, on the one hand, provoking the dividing of Europe in two, and, on the other, prolonging the misery of the Eastern European peoples." [112] Second, this is the moment that they concluded European and American interests were "exactly complementary,"[113] though not without some conditions: public negotiations managed exclusively via an international organization, a European-staffed logistic chain, and no military equipment." This last item highlighted another legacy of the of interwar Socialism: the complete absence of any reference to the military. Anti-militarism was a longtime staple of Socialist internationalism; the Pivert side of the old London Bureau had been rabidly anti-war (Pivert would remain so), and the MUSSE still consistently held that socialism was the only way to avoid another one. And yet, considering the violence to which the Movement's members had been witness since the mid 1930s, the ongoing conflicts in southern Europe, and the increasing tensions between the US and the Soviets, it was beginning to seem naïve that basic defense contingencies were entirely absent from their plans for Europe: one of the markers of the MUSSE's move towards the center, beginning in 1949, would be a concerted campaign for the European Defense Community.

Ultimately, the Franco-British agreement to, and Soviet rejection of, Marshall aid forced the MUSSE to abandon an equal position between the East and West, but it also

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[111] "Statement by Molotov, Paris, 2 July 1947." Available at https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/f692bc11-0049-4b78-ba99-bc0ac81aedeb/publishable_en.pdf. The Montrouge conference ended on June 22; the Big Three met from the 27th to July 2.

[112] "Between Ourselves, July 1947" London: LSE, ILP/5/1947-/1-21

[113] "Between Ourselves, July 1947" London: LSE, ILP/5/1947-/1-21

suggested that the Movement's plans for European economic integration were increasingly feasible.

As it settled on an actionable program, the Montrouge conference also brought two major institutional developments. There had previously been an international committee, essentially tasked with communication, but now that a plan of action had been ratified, its role shifted to an executive one, with the official title "International Committee of Study and Action for the United Socialist States of Europe." Its work would be complemented at the national level by a series of national sections in (at least) Italy, Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The exiled parties would remain represented, though they could not carry out the basic functions of a national section. These functions were, first, to unite the isolated national forces interested in the MUSSE's work: political parties, trade unions and youth groups. Second, they were to target public opinion in support of the United Socialist States of Europe; concretely, this involved generating news coverage, printing and distributing speeches and general information pamphlets, and holding local gatherings. Third, they were to participate in any work determined by the International Committee.

The second major development was the continued shift in leadership from Britain to France. The International Committee remained headed by Bob Edwards, but Marceau Pivert became President of the movement in mid-1947 and the international secretariat went to the Paris-based Gironella. There are several possible reasons for this. Part of the decision likely had to do with finances: as seen above, the ILP had very limited means, and the comparatively better-off SFIO was beginning to shoulder some of the costs. Second, the MUSSE's parties-in-exile (POUM, Polish Socialists, Greek Archeo-Marxists) were all headquartered in Paris. But third and most important, the ILP was not up to it. The party continued to face significant internal conflict… Walter Padley, once of the ILP, found his way to Labour around this time, and Bob Edwards himself, intellectual founder of the Movement, would resign on August 4, 1947 over infighting and "unworthy maneuvers."[114] Edwards was reinstated some weeks later, but three top-level defections in six months reveals a high level of dysfunction within the ILP, which would make taking on a major transnational political leadership role difficult to

[114] McNair to all branches, August 28, 1947. London: LSE, ILP 3/35.

contemplate. Ridley's influence was already on the wane, there was tension between Edwards and his party, and the most valuable MUSSE member in the UK was a Labourite – the ILP ultimately had little to offer in terms of support or activism.

The MUSSE had already been engaged in debate over the Churchill conception of Europe, but in the early stages of Marshall plan development, a newly pertinent question was the details of the American vision: their attitude towards the Communist bloc was now clear, but their attitude towards European organization was less so. The attitude of the United States could be decisive for several reasons. As seen above, the distancing of European Socialist parties from their Communist counterparts coincided with the Truman Doctrine of 1947, which was ultimately defined along political lines; now the Marshall Plan promised untold economic bounty to those countries who would toe their line. Over the next several months, several Europeanist groups would attempt to influence that line.

The Americans never proposed any specifics about the actual form of this cooperation, so it isn't possible to directly contrast an American vision to European proposals, but we can assess the degree of support for the Europeans' likely orientation. The short version is that the American government never articulated, or overtly supported, any particular vision of Europe, though it would find *ad hoc* ways to support integrationists there.

The primary reason the US could not formulate any overt plans is reflected in the Congressional debates, which represented prevailing public attitudes and produced government budgets. With very few exceptions, members of Congress were vociferously opposed to any form of Socialism. During the debates on the Marshall Plan, Senator William Fulbright argued that a federated Europe was imperative, notably because a Marshall plan without political federation and economic alignment would be a "futile gesture bound to result in disaster for Europe."[115] He found support in principle, but when he argued that the US should extend support to socialist parties,[116] he met with

[115] US Congressional Record, January 21, 1948. Washington: National Archives.
[116] He was not entirely alone; Ohio senator Bricker (March 15, 1948) opined that they should ignore political labels in favor of a more transactional approach; Pennsylvania representative Muhlenberg submitted an "extension of remarks" (March 31) arguing against the conflation of "Communism" and "Socialism," and explaining that European Socialism was in fact a potent anti-communist force.

significant resistance. “Communism and Socialism are first cousins,” argued one Congressman; “twin brothers,” or “the same thing,” rejoined others; “experiments in Socialism have always paid off in despotism […] Christianity and Communism do not and can not mix.” [117]

The US Congress had reservations even about Labour and its comparatively moderate socialism. A number of American congressmen spoke against the ERP on the grounds that it would, for example, support a “new British Socialist Empire.”[118] An editorial from the Daily Express was entered into the Congressional Record in mid-April, arguing that British Socialist policy would effectively squander ERP aid; as was a letter by British Conservative MP Waldron Smithers asserting that “the main obstacle to recovery is the economic policy of [Britain’s] Socialist government.” Illinois Representative Brooks campaigned against subsidizing “Socialist governments that […] stifle individual initiative and retard production.”[119]

At the same time, the French SFIO fired broadsides at Labour over incomplete nationalizations, while both the ILP and some Labourites pressured the party to “Keep Left.” Labour thus found itself between a rock and a hard place. Ultimately, according to British Ambassador to France Duff Cooper, Labour decided that economic considerations trumped ideological ones: in addition to placating Congressional bellyaching, pooling resources with the US would be more advantageous than with Europe. The new Bretton Woods system, which had made US dollars the only fixed (read: reliable) currency and given the US significant influence over the International Monetary Fund and the European Bank for Reconstructions and Development, further made positive relations with the US a strategic imperative.[120]

In the years to come, broad-stroke propaganda efforts would reinforce the American public’s shallow understanding of Socialism The Red Scare did nothing to nuance the picture: by 1954, as the SMUSE was at its most productive, even military officials were being interrogated by congress before national television cameras on the mere suspicion of “Communist sympathies.” Communism was further identified as opposed to Christian values. Congress would be moved to add “under God” to the pledge

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[117] *Congressional Record: Proceedings and debates of the 80th Congress, Second Session*. Washington: National Archives. Respectively: Mason, June 14; Ellis, March 29; Smith, March 5; Mason again, April 12.
[118] Woodruff, Roy (R-MI) February 11, 1946. Congressional Record 79-2, A660.
[119] Twyman, Robert (R-IL), January 14, 1948. Congressional Record 80-2. A180.
[120] Cooper, D. *Old Men Forget; the Autobiography of Duff Cooper (Viscount Norwich)*. London: Rupert Hart-Davis 1953. 376.

of allegiance, and "In God we trust" to US currency. All this hampered the US government's ability to subsidize or even endorse European socialists.

There was some American support for integrative efforts in academic circles. In early 1948, Austrian Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi succeeded in the creation of an American Committee for a Free and United Europe, with Fulbright as its president and former ambassador to France William Bullitt as vice-president.[121] It was inaugurated at the NYU faculty club – not quite Ivy League, but close – and its National Board was a diverse group of public officials and educators: the Chancellor of New York University, New-Dealer Robert Moses, former Republican president Herbert Hoover, and conservative congresswoman Clare Booth Luce among others. The political spectrum here was wide, but the Committee came together in support of the upcoming Churchill-led conference at The Hague in 1948, which aimed at the creation of a United States of Europe. What that conference would reveal, however, was the vast chasm between the intergovernmental and supranational conceptions of an integrated Europe, a distinction that would also cleave the unity displayed in New York. The group would exist only briefly, and largely on paper.[122]

Meanwhile, the Labour-run SILO network reported discouraging things about the wider American public's general attitude: "Even intelligent people [in America] are unbelievably naïve […] either we are regarded as Communists or disguised capitalists. There is no sympathy I've met so far for us."[123] American labor unions did respond positively, but they had little political weight. There also existed a Socialist Party and a Social-Democratic Federation in the United States and both sought admission to SILO in 1945-46 but they were very much fringe parties and we have the British reactions: according to Kenneth Rathbone, the American left was "a mess,"[124] and Hugh Dalton sniffed that it seemed "futile to take any official notice of these people unless they can be shown to play a real part in American politics."[125]

There was little comprehension in the United States of the distinction between Stalinist Communism and the evolving position of European Socialist parties. Socialism

[121] New York Times, Apr 24, 1948. p 3.
[122] Aldrich, Richard J. "OSS, CIA and European unity: The American committee on United Europe, 1948-60," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, vol 8, no 1 (1997). 190
[123] Loeb, Edith. Socialist International Liaison Office. Loeb to Healey, 10 Sept, 1947. People's History Museum, Healey 7.
[124] Rathbone to Healey, 9 March, 1946. Manchester: People's History Museum, LP/ID/DH 5/02
[125] Young to Healey, 18 November 1946. Manchester: PHM, LP/ID/DH 5/02.

was not accepted in mainstream American politics, and the American legislature, with its hands on the financial levers, could apply significant pressure *against* Europe's latent political alignment. In the circles where it was accepted, understanding was superficial; and those that did understand it had little representation and even less political agency. The result was that there would be essentially no overt support for the European Left.

Covertly, on the other hand, certain inroads were being explored despite the vociferous anti-Socialism of the legislature. Within a few years of its establishment in 1947, the CIA was finding creative ways to finance – and influence – left-leaning organizations in Europe. Hugh Wilford has described a multifaceted effort by the CIA to counter Communist tendencies in the UK, ranging from personal contacts between American diplomats and British trades-unionists to the creation of the Congress of Cultural Freedoms and the bankrolling of its influential magazine *Encounter*.[126] In the same period, OSS veteran and future CIA chief Allen Dulles would exploit a relationship with leading Belgian industrialist René Boël. The two had met during the war, when Boël had retained the services of the Dulles brother's law firm Sullivan and Cromwell;[127] Boël's position within the European Movement would help bring much-needed support to the European federalist cause.

The Keep Left faction of the Labour Party was short-lived, and, as Brockway put it, "innocuous,"[128] but its Europeanist advocacy nevertheless warrants its appearance in histories of Franco-British engagement.[129] In the second half of 1947, what had begun as a passing relationship deepened. In early August, in the wake of the June Montrouge conference, Brockway was invited to join the group officially, and he found its leaders highly receptive to the MUSSE. Their interests converged over the belief that "the long-term economic prospects for Britain must be as a part of a United European Socialist Economy." The nonaligned positioning established at Montrouge in June appealed to them, as did the eventual resolution on the Marshall Plan. Parliament would be on hiatus over the summer, but Keep Left planned a Fall meeting with Pivert, and were "very ready to cooperate with the USSE."[130] Pivert followed up on 15 October proposing closer

[126] Wilford, Hugh. "Calling the tune? The CIA, the British left and the Cold War, 1945–1960," *Intelligence and National Security*, 18-2 (2003). 41-50.
[127] Interview with Michel Boël (son), October 25, 2017.
[128] Brockway 1977. 164.
[129] Morgan, 1984; Bell, 1997; Woodhouse, 1995…
[130] Brockway to Pivert, 7 August, 1947. Paris: CHS, Pivert 559 AP 29

contacts between Labour and the SFIO, and a meeting would take place on the 25th, the day before an MUSSE International Committee meeting in Paris.[131]

The Keep Left pamphlet's authors saw eye-to-eye with the MUSSE on a number of important points. First, they argued that Britain could no longer rely on the appearance of being a great power, and should not delude itself that it was safe from invasion or atomic war. "Britain and France [were] now partners in a common fate," and separating from France would "destroy […] chances of recovery."[132] This partnership in itself would imply some thorough bilateral planning, and it did not exclude a larger, multilateral framework of the sort the MUSSE hoped for on the Continent. Second, they agreed on the need to combat the threat of Communism. Like the MUSSE, Keep Left generally disagreed with the Truman Doctrine framework, and like the MUSSE they suggested instead a platform of solidarity that included Colonial peoples (maintaining the existing regimes, they argued, would only lead to revolt and an opening for the Soviets). Third, the Conservative policy consisting of "defending the British Empire by making it useful to the Americans"[133] was unacceptable and would engender economically unfeasible concessions, to America's advantage. These last two points functionally constituted a non-aligned position, though the pamphlet didn't use the term.

There were also some significant divergences, however. For one, the mission of Keep Left was to recast Labour's conception of Britain in the world and to reorient its geopolitical strategy; it was not working on a transnational program, beyond collaboration with the French. Both groups sought to align Britain with the continent, but Keep Left's rhetoric was less ideological than the MUSSE's: Ridley and Edwards wrote of a global integration of all peoples on equal footing, while Keep Left argued in the context of British supremacy and the risks of trying to go it alone at a time of vastly reduced means. Both were opposed to American sponsorship and influence but while the MUSSE generally opposed capitalism, Keep Left wanted to avoid being drawn into American conflicts. Their respective attitudes towards the colonies illustrate the distinction most starkly: the MUSSE's upcoming congress of Asian and African countries meant to end imperialism and establish egalitarian relations. Keep Left, on the other hand, promoted the Commonwealth (and its socio-economic stratification), and

[131] "Résumé des questions à soulever…24 Octobre 1947 entre ...Comité International des USS d'E et la delegation du groupe "Keep Left"… Paris: CHS, Pivert 559 AP 41
[132] Crossman *et al.* 38
[133] Crossman *et al*. 35

advocated colonial union not on a co-equal basis but as a source of wealth for Europe.[134] Imperial Preference, far from being anachronistic and dangerous, was to Keep Left "a most valuable bargaining counter which we dare not sacrifice" without trade concessions to ensure British competitiveness in the global marketplace. Despite appearances, Keep Left's adherence to the European orientation was only superficially aligned with the MUSSE's.

Nevertheless, Keep left's engagement with the MUSSE saw some early results. On 28 October 1947, two days after the International Committee meeting in Paris, the British House of Commons held a debate on the economy. The Minister for Economic Affairs,[135] Sir Stafford Cripps, had made a rather pessimistic appraisal of Britain's economic future on the 23rd.[136] Labour MPs R.W. Mackay and Christopher Shawcross, both members of Keep Left, weighed in to advocate integration with the Continent as a solution to Britain's economic difficulties.

Pointing out that the US was outstripping Britain in production and economic power, Mackay argued that only a European free trade zone, with British leadership, could reverse the declining fortunes. "We should go full tilt for a federation of Western Europe. Instead of our Ministers spending their time at Lake Success in demagogic harangues, which are sheer futility today, they should be in Paris working out the structure of a European Federation. There is not one world. There is an American section of the world, a Russian section of the world, but there is also a British and European section too…" Britain could recover its position of leadership by leading the integration of the Continent.

A little later, Shawcross rose in support of Mackay's European integration argument, pointing to the MUSSE's recent efforts. "Quite recently, I have been at a Socialist conference at which representatives attended from almost every free country in Europe, including Poland, Greece and Germany," he began. Faced with the threat of total collapse, and "not prepared to sit back and hope for the best and for dollars from

[134] Shawcross before House of Commons, October 28, 1947. Hansard, HC Deb 28 October 1947, vol 443 cc699-819. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1947/oct/28/government-policy#S5CV0443P0_19471028_HOC_372.
[135] This post only existed for six weeks; Cripps was its only office-holder.
[136] Sir S. Cripps to House of Commons, 23 October 1947. Hansard: https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1947-10-23/debates/055b9e2c-a426-4b82-b3a7-3974178ecdc2/DebateOnTheAddress#293

America, they intend to do something about it. […] there should be formed some federation of those countries in Western Europe which are still under a democratic form of Government […] called the United Socialist States of Europe or the United Democratic States of Europe…"[137] He further pointed out that "the only solution of the German problem is one which incorporated Germany as a part of a federated state in Europe."

Shawcross went on to advocate the inclusion of the Colonies in this European Federation, effectively fusing the USSE idea with Keep Left's valued "imperial privilege" economic structure: "Together with the Commonwealth of Nations of the Empire if they would join with a federated Europe, not only should we not need more dollars from America but we should be able to produce in time and properly organized on a Socialist basis a far greater mass of wealth than was ever dreamed of in the U.S.A."

He closed with what amounted to an extended explanation of the MUSSE's geopolitical orientation:

"I want to make clear that this project of United Socialist States of Europe is nothing like what has been called the Churchill Plan. I found that the opinion of most people on the Continent was that that was a horse that would never run. It could hardly stand up under the weight of its jockey, the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. This United Socialist States is not intended as a military alliance to counter Soviet expansion or Communist infiltration. It is not something to be set up in order to help American Imperialism. It is, on the contrary, to be a third force which will stand between those two and which, if conflict ever comes between them will either stand aside secure in itself or, what is more hopeful, provide a bridge of peace between them. I want to make it clear that this conception which, I hope will be officially adopted in a short time by most of the Socialist Parties of Europe, including the French Socialist Party, is not something which will take the place of what is called the Marshall Plan." [In fact, while some in the Movement conserved that early idealism, it had effectively already abandoned an open attitude towards the Soviets]. Despite the protests of some, the Americans "have no idea of enslaving Europe or exploiting European workers for the benefit of American capitalists. On the contrary, they want to secure liberty in Europe. That view of the Marshall Plan I find also very largely held by the Socialists I met who

[137] The term "democratic" here is likely a French proposal: the French MUSSE section would soon change its name from "Mouvement Socialiste Français pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe" to "Mouvement *Démocratique* et Socialiste…" to attract a broader coalition.

support this project for a United Socialist States of Europe. […] Indeed, the Marshall Plan would be essential for the establishment of any initial stages of any such federation as has been proposed by the hon. Member for North-West Hull [Mackay]."

Michael Foot weighed in in support, but discussion on the issue ended there for the day. This was the highest-level discussion of the MUSSE's program thus far, and a good place to end this chapter.

In a year and a half, the little-known MUSSE graduated from the offices of the ILP to the House of Commons. Despite the initial dismissal – and obstructionism – of the MUSSE by Labour, by the end of 1947, the MUSSE had "a number of good friends in the Labour Party," according to McNair; "Fenner, Padley and Shawcross and others."[138] The British section of the Movement, known as MUSE, still included Edwards, Ridley and McNair of the ILP, but also Brockway and Walter Padley, both former ILPers now in Labour.[139] The Movement had also succeeded in enlisting the endorsement and material support of the SFIO under the leadership of Guy Mollet. In doing so, it had secured a much-needed source of funding, but had also swung the movement's center of gravity from London to Paris.

Despite the dislocation and animosities of the war, the Movement had maintained a network of participants that included Germans, Italians, Greeks, and Poles. Despite its hardline ideological roots, it was proving able to adapt to practical realities. Lambasting political partners (the European Allies) and denouncing the hand that feeds (the US) would no longer do, though for the moment, the non-aligned positioning was hard to abandon.

Also very promising was the fact that their program aligned, at least superficially, with British and American priorities, both important players in the recovery period. So far, it had helped the movement get some visibility and traction in the political mainstream. For all its successes, however, the areas of alignment were all about means, not ends. Labour sought to empower the Colonies – but not for the sake of democratic freedom. The United States wanted Europe strong and internally cooperative – but not

[138] McNair to Gironella, Jan 25, 1948. Paris: CHS, Pivert 559 AP 43

[139] Here we have the first of many national variations on the Movement's name – in this case "Movement for the United States of Europe" - each of which played with the nomenclature for both pith and palatability.

Socialist. In the years to come, the Movement would face stark choices between means and ends. Churchill's European Movement was next on the agenda.

Chapter 2

Growing Pains

The first few years of the MUSSE were, on the whole, encouraging but unremarkable. Two leftist ideologues had published a short political pamphlet as the war drew to a close, which might best be qualified as the position paper for a Fifth International. An intellectual heir of the interwar Left, it was doctrinaire, idealistic, oppositional and revolutionary in the Marxist sense, in that it presumed an upheaval of the political system and therefore did not seek accommodation within it (the relationship with national parties like the SFIO constituted a paradox that would resolve itself only later). In the first year of its existence, the group had assembled a rather loose team of somewhat marginal political characters from the struggling ILP, a few peripheral members of the SFIO, and a handful of exiled academics and politicians from Eastern Europe, most of them members of the pre-war London Bureau. They held some encouraging conferences and made an effort to apply their policies to the situation at hand, buying into the then-popular "Third Force" concept as a vehicle for establishing a form of bridge-Socialism purportedly (perhaps naïvely) acceptable and open to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Initially, the notion was enough to garner positive attention.

As a political organization, they lacked some basic elements. The movement was very small, had virtually no sources of funding, no widely recognizable personalities, and no popular base to speak of. At the time, it was essentially a branch of the ILP, a pointed rival of Labour which actively opposed it, largely precluding any real agency in Britain. Their initial ideological platform also proved unfeasible as post-war US policy towards the Soviet Union – more or less open antagonism – emerged haltingly over the first half of 1947. All-important American political and economic support would be contingent on a fairly clear anti-Soviet orientation. Consequently, the movement was forced to rhetorically moderate its Third Force position almost to the point of irrelevance.

The result of these two dynamics was a transfer of the movement's financial base from London to Paris during the summer of 1947. The SFIO could provide funding and

real access to government and would soon also bring a measure of realism to the movement's platform, turning its revolutionary doctrine into a set of practical policy proposals. No longer exclusively a branch of the ILP, it would also become far more palatable to Labour.

The French SFIO and the British Labour Party had a default kinship, a combination of their common socialist outlook, wartime solidarity, a shared sense of vulnerability as a result of the war and the emergent Soviet threat perhaps best symbolized by the Treaty of Dunkirk, and a joint sense of purpose with respect to stewardship of the European Continent. During the period of this chapter (1948-1949), both parties looked at each other across the Channel with some sense of expectancy, and the MUSSE was able to parley its Franco-British constituency to act as liaison between the two. The actual agency of the MUSSE – a purported Socialist international pushing a vision of joint planning under supranational control – would remain mitigated by two main factors in this period: first, the MUSSE's intermediary in London belonged to Labour's Keep Left faction, which led to the dilution of its message; and second, Labour was jealously stewarding a burgeoning rival International to which both Labour and the SFIO nominally belonged.

The MUSSE was then, and remains today, dogged by a lack of visibility and recognition. This can be excused in the context of the above discussion, when it operated from within established political parties, but its inability to properly represent itself was brought into sharp focus elsewhere as well, as when a well-attended congress on post-colonial relations revealed a misunderstanding of the Movement's most basic premises.

The experience brought the MUSSE face-to-face with political reality. They learned the hard way that the philosophical purism inherited from the movement's founders would get them nowhere, either in Parliament or in the wider world, and the period of this chapter is marked by a rapid maturing of the Movement. The early portion of this chapter covers the initially successful attempts to develop a relationship with Labour, but as this relationship unraveled, the Movement's French section consolidated its leadership, and the group began gingerly to develop a relationship with other European integrationists, a process which culminated in two important steps: a simple but significant name change, signaling that this Movement no longer saw itself as a righteous bulwark of democratic Marxism, but rather as a principled but collaborative

force for European integration; and a concrete program elaborated largely by a new intellectual and political driving force: French Socialist André Philip.

Western Union

The MUSSE had, over the course of 1947, meshed into line with some of the foreign policy positions advocated by the American and British governments. The MUSSE's overriding concern – bringing some degree of unification to Europe – was a priority shared by both Anglo powers, though the variations in reasoning and details would remain an important obstacle as the group squeezed its way into the conversation. Britain's first salvo in terms of European policy took place on 22 January, 1948, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernest Bevin addressed the House of Commons and proposed his new "Western Union"[140] foreign policy initiative. It was only superficially promising.

The viability of the MUSSE program, which involved transnational alignment and planning, depended fundamentally on the buy-in of France and the UK, and on the assent of the US. Without the two major European powers, Europe's capacity as an effective force – both in terms of internal cohesion and of counterbalancing the growing Russo-American hegemony - was all but nil. American assent, meanwhile would ensure that America's economic and strategic largesse could continue to complement European recovery efforts. In France, the SFIO was on board. Labour, however, debating an European or Atlantic orientation, had remained an open question.

At its core, Bevin's Western Union did constitute a European orientation. Two pertinent questions remained with respect to the MUSSE program at this point: Labour's attitude towards the Soviet Union, and whether the European alliance would be intergovernmental, as conservatives advocated, or supranational, as the Socialists and some Christian-Democratic progressives wanted. On the first point, while the Movement had abandoned any notion of being a "bridge," it still sought to present itself as at least neutral towards the Soviet bloc. On the second point, the Movement had been advocating a decentralized system whose decisions were guided by the needs of the

[140] Bevin, Ernest. Address to House of Commons, 22 January, 1948. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1948/jan/22/foreign-affairs

continent as a whole: a supranational structure at the very least, though they had yet to articulate specific organs and competences.

In his introductory speech, Bevin went to some length to portray Western Union as one that would be acceptable to all sides, but he opened with an extended review of Soviet-Western relations since Potsdam, warning that "the Communist process goes ruthlessly on in each country," and that Europe was at risk from an enemy who "thought they could wreck or intimidate Western Europe." He argued that the "Four Powers"[141] structure, where the victorious allies, including the Soviet Union, held an erstwhile joint stewardship in Europe, should be abandoned because the Soviets were being consistently obstructionist and disingenuous, all the while imposing their system on the occupied countries of eastern Europe. In other words, it was now the position of the Labour government that the Soviet Union was a threat to be counteracted. This was more in line with the American viewpoint, rather than the MUSSE's where the Soviet Union was still seen by some as an almost benign bloc with understandable motives, which could be dealt with on a nonthreatening and egalitarian basis.

Bevin's argument leaned heavily on the fallout of the meeting between France, the UK, and the Soviet Union on the Marshall Plan, notably the withdrawal of the Soviets and their clients, and the establishment of the Cominform.[142] "The object of that body and of Soviet and Communist policy is to prevent the European recovery programme succeeding."[143] The MUSSE had not commented on the latter development, but had condemned the Soviet withdrawal from Marshall Plan talks as entrenching a division of Europe. The Movement had yet to declare outright opposition to the Soviet Union, but it was likely that a neutral formulation could be found to reconcile the two positions.

With respect to the second question, the form of the proposed union, Bevin's answer was far more problematic. He described arrangements hinging primarily on a series of bilateral treaties on the model of the 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk. Dunkirk had been

[141] The "Four Powers" refers to the joint European military-administrative structure consisting of France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union.
[142] Or "Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties"
[143] Bevin, Ernest. Western Union Address, House of Commons. Available at https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1948/jan/22/foreign-affairs#S5CV0446P0_19480122_HOC_271

a promising harbinger of Franco-British collaboration, but bilateralism was very much the opposite of what the MUSSE had in mind.

A secondary aspect of Bevin's strategy involved the development of Europe's colonies, so that they might better contribute to Europe's economy. The Movement had, since early 1947, had the colonial issue on their radar: John McNair had floated the idea of a conference that would bring together representatives of the colonized world in an effort to throw off the yoke of imperialism and position themselves as a unified, independent, but complementary force in organizing the global economy. Alas, while the complementarity dimension was a central feature of Bevin's approach, the Foreign Secretary had no intention of allowing Britain's colonies the independence to determine for themselves the best path forward. Even as he argued that there was "no conflict between the social and economic development of those overseas territories to the advantage of their people, and their development as a source of supplies for Western Europe," Bevin explicitly cited London, Paris and Brussels as the centers of decision-making.

A third prong of Bevin's strategy proposed that efforts also be made in the Middle East to "build up […] cooperation in the economic and social fields." Britain was just then preparing to relinquish control of Mandate Palestine, and France had recently turned over control of Syria and Lebanon: a privileged relationship with those regions was up for grabs, as it were. Aside from the reasonable assumption that such "cooperation" would be British-led, this had little impact on the MUSSE, which had never made the slightest reference to the Middle East – it simply never figured into their calculus or their model of an independent socialist Europe.

There were thus some incompatibilities between the existing MUSSE program and Western Union. However, there was some hope that these might be resolved, or, at worst, papered over. After all Bevin's proposal was just that: a proposal to open what was scheduled to be a two-day debate. The MUSSE had a representative in the chamber who might plausibly have swayed opinion towards a different approach to the colonies, or a different structure for international agreements. The MUSSE did get some air-time that day, courtesy of Fenner Brockway and some Keep-Lefters. A close reading bodes poorly for the possibility of a closer partnership between the MUSSE and Labour, although evidence suggests that the MUSSE did not see it that way.

To complicate the picture, a clear understanding of the Movement's objectives was obscured by the confused relationship between Keep Left, the MUSSE and the Labour Party. The MUSSE's conduit into British politics was Fenner Brockway, recently of the marginalized ILP, now a junior member of Keep Left; since he was effectively speaking through the group, his message was to some extent coopted. Keep Left's positions, in turn, were compromised by the latter's junior relationship within Labour, wherein they were mindful not to upset the Party executive. Labour itself, finally, faced off against an opposition Conservative party with both political and ideological incentives to exploit any contradictions and to discredit Labour's policies. All these factors would play out in the extended debate that followed Bevin's speech.

Conservative MP Anthony Nutting spoke first for his party.[144] He admitted having spent the first part of the speech attending to other business outside the chamber, unaware that he would be called upon to respond. After a few negative generalities on Labour's foreign policy thus far, Nutting latched onto a letter from Keep Left, which he had read in that morning's Daily Herald, promoting their ideas for United Socialist States of Europe.[145] Conflating Keep Left's arguments and Bevin's, he launched into a tirade against a Third Force position that did not take Communism for an avowed enemy, and he argued forcefully to align with the United States against such an enemy. A European orientation was now under direct fire. The criticism here was not properly aimed at Bevin, who had been clear in the first part of his speech (which Nutting had missed) on the anti-Soviet dimension of his program. Nevertheless, it led several other Members, on both sides, to join in. Labour MP Gordon Lang, for example, professed that while he was "an unrepentant Socialist," he would defend Christianity against Communism above all; he further opined that the cold war had, in fact, already begun, and that there was simply no time to build up any kind of United Socialist States, or indeed United Conservative States. He too advocated alignment with the United States.[146]

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[144] Nutting to House of Commons, 22 January, 1948. Hansard; available at https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1948-01-22/debates/bec9601c-299e-4d5e-9875-6e97390226a9/ForeignAffairs?highlight=western%20union#contribution-4f283838-4151-48a6-8872-5410d2b09099

[145] Nutting cited this letter penned by "six members of the party opposite." I was unable to find the letter in question, but considering the contents to which Nutting refers, it would almost certainly have been from Keep Left.

[146] Lang to House of Commons, 22 January, 1948. Hansard. Available at https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1948-01-22/debates/bec9601c-299e-4d5e-9875-6e97390226a9/ForeignAffairs?highlight=western%20union#contribution-4f283838-4151-48a6-8872-5410d2b09099

Anthony Eden, Conservative, agreed with the general premise of Bevin's proposal, but also explained that United Socialist States were not feasible. Though the Socialists were a part of most governments, they were almost never a majority: "it would be impracticable, indeed fantastic, to attempt to build the unity of Western Europe solely on a basis of united Western European Socialism." This argument was not properly aimed at Western Union either. Bevin's only allusion to a plan for a united Europe had been that "it is easy enough to draw up a blueprint for a united Western Europe and to construct neat-looking plans on paper. While I do not wish to discourage the work done by voluntary political organizations in advocating ambitious schemes of European unity, I must say that it is a much slower and harder job to carry out a practical program which takes into account the realities which face us, and I am afraid that it will have to be done a step at a time." He did believe that "the time [was] ripe for a consolidation of Western Europe,"[147] but far from referring to or endorsing an existing program, the only the only guiding principle for his union was that it "primarily be a fusion derived from the basic freedoms and ethical principles for which we all stand."[148] The criticism leveled in the Commons made a straw man of Western Union, but it was effectively also an indictment of the MUSSE/Keep Left platform.

Keep Left's Christopher Shawcross muddied things further by taking the bait and coming to the defense of a European orientation. It did nothing to clarify the issue, since his arguments implied that Bevin's was in fact a European Socialist project. They were also somewhat unrealistic. He acknowledged that the conditions in Europe were not perfect, but countered that the Socialist vision of Europe was "an ideal to which all Socialists can with a clear conscience and wholeheartedly devote their work."[149] The prospect of implementing the Socialist project, he continued, was less remote than the Conservative one. The European integration debate at that time was partly framed by Churchill's nascent (and conservative) European Movement, and Eden was closely associated with its founder… Shawcross pointedly reminded his peers that the kind of European program espoused by Keep Left and the MUSSE predated Churchill's, which he characterized as a mere military alliance. Considering the existing ideologies in Europe,

[147] Bevin, Ernest. Address to House of Commons, Jan 22 1948. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1948/jan/22/foreign-affairs#column_395
[148] Bevin, Ernest. Address to House of Commons, Jan 22 1948. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1948/jan/22/foreign-affairs#column_408
[149] Shawcross. Address to house of Commons, Jan 22 1948. Shawcross. Address to house of Commons, Jan 22 1948.

he concluded, "no degree of effective political union in Europe is possible unless it is based on essential Socialist principles."[150]

The tenor of the conversation until then had been a realistic one: members on both sides expressed both urgency and ideological flexibility in light of an undeniable Soviet threat, and yet here was Shawcross arguing that an integrated socialist Europe should be pursued anyway, as a matter of "conscience." Overall, the debate was a blow to the notion of an integrated Europe: Bevin's policy, on behalf of the Labour Party, called for strict anti-Communism and bilateral agreements; Nutting, for the opposition, ridiculed the Third Force; Lang and Eden both argued that it was impossible to build a continental Socialist consensus in time; and Shawcross' defense did little to bolster either Bevin's position or the desirability of a transnational Socialist program.

Perhaps frustrated by the muddled nature of the ruling party's message, Conservative MP Tufton Beamish pointed to failed Socialist International conferences as evidence that the Socialist vision itself was a failure (confusingly, Labour was officially affiliated with the COMISCO, not the MUSSE); he asked rhetorically whether there was a difference between Socialism and Marxism, and whether there was even such a thing as Socialist foreign policy. Here were three pointed indications that Labour, never mind Keep Left and the MUSSE, had failed to define themselves with enough exposure and clarity.

By 10pm that night, a succinct *realpolitik* argument was being made: there could properly be only one foreign policy proposed by any Foreign Secretary, regardless of party: a British one. Socialist conscience and Europe in general should not figure into it. The final word of the night, just short of 11pm, was from Labour's own Hector McNeil: Shawcross, who had valiantly defended the basic principles of transnational socialism over the course of the preceding several hours, was wrong; an essentially bilateral approach composed of small agreements was the best course of action.

It would seem, upon analysis, that the possibility of a British-led MUSSE-style program should have been laid to rest in January, 1948. But the wider debate here had been about Bevin's proposal, and had lasted some seven hours, with only intermittent and often oblique references to the MUSSE or its program. It was not perceived as a

[150] Motte-Radclyffe to House of Commons, 22 January, 1948. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1948/jan/22/foreign-affairs#column_494

referendum on – or a rejection of – the MUSSE; undeterred, they and Keep Left would continue to coordinate on plans for a Socialist Europe in spite of what should have been a clear signal that there was little potential for it.

Bevin, in fact, was very far from endorsing the kind of Soviet-neutral outlook espoused by the MUSSE and some Keep Lefters.[151] He had spent his early career struggling against Communist influence in trade unions; he considered that Soviet totalitarianism was politically imperialist, and that it must be resisted, not accommodated.[152] He had described Western Union quite explicitly in a memo to the Cabinet some weeks before the Commons debate: it was to be a "Western democratic system" with "the backing of the Americas and the Dominions," mobilizing "political and spiritual forces" against the "Russian threat."[153] The Commons debate had evinced some marginal support for a more genteel approach towards the Soviet Union, but the median position in the British legislature, including Bevin's, hewed strongly to the right.

Another memo to his cabinet, a few days after the Czech coup of February,[154] while leaving no doubt about the primacy of the anti-Soviet dimension, nevertheless recommended to "pursue on as broad a basis as possible in co-operation with our French allies, the conclusion of a treaty or treaties with the Benelux countries. We should aim as a matter of great urgency at negotiating multilateral economic, cultural and defensive pacts between the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries, which would be left open for accession by other European democracies." This suggests the kinds of intergovernmental agreements proposed in January, but it did mean that the lines of communication between Labour and the French would remain open.

As it happened, and despite the policy misalignment, much of that communication would be mediated by MUSSE and Keep Left. A number of meetings were held in February and March, on the subjects of a federalist framework, of Labour's "Europe Group," and of the Ruhr.[155] "This is the time to pursue these contacts seriously," Mollet insisted to the SFIO *Comité Directeur*. The SFIO's executive committee was eager; Mollet made efforts to woo Labour General Secretary Morgan Phillips and International

[151] Keep Lefter Michael Foot would, five years later, pen a fawning obituary of Stalin, praising his "monumental" achievements and "superhuman" mind. (Johnson 134)
[152] Johnson, Alan. "Ernest Bevin's Third Force Memos." *Democratiya*, 1 (8) (2007). pp. 131-153
[153] Bevin to Cabinet. "The First Aim of British Foreign Policy." 4 January, 1948. In Johnson, 2007. 136
[154] Bevin to Cabinet. "The Threat to Western Civilization." 3 March, 1948. In Johnson, 2007. 143
[155] The Ruhr river valley was western Germany's industrial heartland and the object of French designs; it would eventually be administered by an international coalition.

Committee head Denis Healey, dispatching high-ranking members to meetings in an effort to show the seriousness of his intentions.[156] Phillips in particular was resistant. Aside from Shawcross, another primary interlocutor on Labour's side was Harold Laski, a devoted Socialist intellectual and lecturer who was nonetheless fading in importance within the Labour ranks. The relationship was cordial, if hesitant. Perhaps due to the disconnect between Labour's official position and the more left-leaning agenda of the mediators, these contacts ultimately yielded little of consequence. Yet there was never a clean break, and the MUSSE continued to meet and hope for a Socialist Europe that included Great Britain.

The Congress of Europe

Rapprochement with Labour was only one of several institutional issues the MUSSE faced as it moved from its original Ridleyite anti-establishmentarianism to more proactive engagement with political vehicles and geopolitical realities in 1948-49. High on the list of potential vehicles a new "Movement for European Unity" (later simply the European Movement), which was planning a major conference in The Hague in the first half of May, 1948. It presented serious issues, and provoked much hand-wringing among European socialists.

The central impetus for the European Movement had come from the Conservative, intergovernmentalist Winston Churchill, and the group's flagship party was his United Europe Movement, headed by his son-in-law, Duncan Sandys. The MUSSE's initial attitude towards Churchill's idea, in late 1947, had been entirely uncompromising, drawing from the radical anti-capitalism of the movement's early days. They saw very starkly the conflicting conceptions of how to unite Europe: "capitalist" alignment predicated on full sovereignty, an activist private sector and an intergovernmental approach, as advocated by Churchill; versus their own vision of socialist alignment predicated on international harmonization and rational planning, with a vastly diminished role for the private sector. This was the kind of distinction lost on casual observers in Europe and the United States, but absolutely central to the

[156] Compte-rendu, SFIO *Comité Directeur* 3 March 1948. Paris: OURS. "Réunions du Comité Directeur, du 27 aout 1947 au 31 mai 1949"

MUSSE, who had warned that "it is by using catch-all terms like "federalism" that you end up in bed with Churchill and Sandys, who want to perpetuate the imperial system on a European scale."[157] Initially, there was no question of participating in the project.

But the idea gathered momentum and high-profile adherents, and the MUSSE soon potentially stood to gain exposure and legitimacy by participating in the conference. One downside was that by diluting its message through collaboration, the MUSSE risked harming the chances of building a properly socialist consensus. In a group for whom ideological purity and anti-establishmentarianism still remained guiding principles, this was troubling. Through early 1948, the MUSSE, the ILP and Keep Left took great pains to emphasize their differences with Churchill's general outlook. In early January, McNair typed a letter to the French arguing against getting too close to Churchill and Sandys, physically underlining in red ink that the two groups were fighting for different things.[158]

In mid-February, Brockway, Edwards and McNair traveled to Paris. Recognizing the moment as "crucial…in the development of our campaign," McNair had asked for a meeting of the full International Bureau to address their relationship to the European Movement conference. The MUSSE did have friends associated to the project: Henri Frenay and Hendrik Brugmans, both once-and-future participants in the Movement, had helped found the Union of European Federalists (UEF), a group that drew support from both liberals and socialists. The UEF had in fact been trying to develop a more formal relationship with the MUSSE, and Frenay had explained to Pivert that while he refused to work *with* Churchill, he did not object to sitting with him "on some committee."[159] The Christian Democratic *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales*, including the MUSSE-friendly Robert Bichet, were also on board. Count Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, head of the Paneuropean Union, also working actively on integration, was ambivalent, but would formally join a month before the Hague congress.

The Labour party's response to the conference, which would circumscribe Keep Left's position, was also informed by its relationship with Churchill. There had been early interest in the idea from several Labourites, and some mixed messaging as to Labour's official position. Perhaps too late – two weeks before the conference – Morgan

[157] "Memorandum from the [British] USSE" re UEF, n.d. (likely December 1947). Paris: CHS, Pivert, 559 AP 41
[158] John McNair to Marceau Pivert and Jacques Robin, 5 January 1948. Paris: CHS, Pivert 559 AP 43.
[159] Henri Frenay to Marceau Pivert, 15 November, 1947. Paris: CHS, Pivert 559 AP 41

Phillips drew a strict line: "the national Executive Committee is unconditionally opposed to any action which might appear to associate the prestige of the governing majority party in Great Britain, however indirectly, with an organization calculated to serve the interests of the British Conservative Party."[160] Labour itself would thus not endorse or engage with the European Movement, though the Executive Committee injunction did not prevent a number of sympathetic Labourites – Keep Left and others – from attending in a personal capacity.[161]

In surveying the European socialist landscape, the MUSSE suddenly saw a lot of common interest as well as shared concerns about Churchill. The group ultimately concluded that the number of *bona fide* socialists could tip the scales towards a consensus they might find acceptable. They still hedged, however: the MUSSE would participate in the Congress of Europe as observers, withholding any endorsement.[162]

The European Movement conference report features only two interventions from the MUSSE, both from Bob Edwards. He argued, as he and Ridley had in *Unite or Perish!* and would again at their colonial congress (below), that only by organizing and pooling resources could anyone hope to rival the United States in productivity and efficiency. Appealing to conscience, as the Movement often did, he argued that anybody still on the fence about Socialist planning ought to make the "starving and ill-clad people of Europe their first consideration."[163]

The final resolutions of the Congress of Europe were encouraging for the MUSSE, though not entirely satisfactory. It was certainly reassuring that the Political Committee had resolved that "the European nations must transfer and merge some portion of their sovereign rights so as to secure common political and economic action for the integration and proper development of their common resources."[164] Here was,

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[160] Phillips to Leslie Hale, MP, 21 April 1948. London: LSE Archives and Rare Books,. http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/archive/Default.htm, Ronald William Gordon Mackay papers. European papers and correspondence 1947-1950, MACKAY/5/1.
[161] "The Congress of Europe in the Hague (7-10 may, 1948); the national delegations. https://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/04bfa990-86bc-402f-a633-11f39c9247c4/7e448519-d026-4405-b985-5dcd5bfa74e2
[162] "Annual report of the National Administrative Council of the Independent Labour Party to be submitted at the 56th annual conference" 27-28 March, 1948. London: LSE, ILP/5/1948 1-14 16-19
[163] Unknown Author. "Europe Unites - The Hague Congress and After" London: Hollis & Carter, 1949. London: LSE, ILP 16/1949.
[164] Congress of Europe: The Hague-May, 1948: Resolutions. London-Paris: International Committee of the Movements for European Unity, 1948. 16 p. p. 5-7.

apparently, an endorsement of their most central practical policy demand, as opposed to the positions evinced by both Churchill and Bevin. The modalities of this merger of sovereign rights was left vague, however, and the resolution remained noncommittal on the eventual political system, referring to a "Union or Federation" throughout. A Charter of Human Rights, also called for in the Political Resolution, had been part of the MUSSE platform since May, 1947.[165] The proposed parliamentary assembly, on the other hand, conflicted with the MUSSE's idea, which was that direct elections were the only acceptably democratic possibility: the Hague committee called for Assemblymen to be appointed by national parliaments.

The Economic and Social resolution was similarly mitigated: echoing Bevin's policy, article 2 declared that the economic ties linking the countries of Europe to their colonies should be "maintain[ed] and progressively adjust[ed]."[166] There were no further details, timeline, or statements of principle, and no hint of colonial autonomy. There was better hope in the articles on economic "union," which cited lowering tariffs and facilitating currency exchange. The articles on production called for common programs in agriculture and an "overall production program" involving all of Europe. That said, frequent references elsewhere to "co-ordination" suggest a basis of intergovernmental agreement, not supranational control.

The Cultural resolution had more to recommend it, with a concerted focus on creating a European consciousness among the youth, which the MUSSE was already doing, at least in theory. It also contained the only overt reference to "supra-state jurisdiction," to be conferred on the body charged with enforcing the human rights charter. A very restricted purview, to be sure, but certainly a step in the right direction suggesting the subsequent possibility of a functionalist expansion of the executive branch.

Overall, the Hague congress produced a consensus that was not antagonistic to the MUSSE's platform, but fell short of reflecting the spirit of the socialist vision. The MUSSE would remain noncommittal for the time being.

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[165] Wilfried Loth. "The Mouvement Socialiste pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe (MSEUE)." in Lipgens, Walter, and Wilfried Loth, eds. *Documents on the History of European Integration, Volume 4; Transnational Organizations of Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Struggle for European Union, 1945-1950.* Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991. 288.
[166] Idem. p. 8-11

Brockway scores

The weekend following the European Movement conference, the Labour party held a retreat in Scarborough, Yorkshire. It was now several months since the contentious debate over Western Union, but in a validation of continued efforts by the MUSSE, Labour made a surprising commitment to European integration in endorsing a proposal by Fenner Brockway.[167]

The resolution opened relatively innocuously, but with language that effectively papered over the differences outlined above between Keep Left's program and Labour's policy as outlined by Bevin in January. There was a call for the promotion of closer integration between the countries of Europe and the liberated peoples of Asia and Africa, which obfuscated the differences between Bevin's imperialist outlook on the colonial problem and the MUSSE's notion of an independent post-colonial coalition. Finding more common ground, the resolution went on to deplore the consolidation of Eastern and Western blocs. Here, the debate over whether the Soviet Union was fundamentally antagonistic was sidestepped and subsumed in more general concerns about hegemonic buildup. Finally, it stated that the "conservative" conception of Western Union - military alliance with the USA against the USSR – would not solve Europe's economic problems, and could only lead to a third world war. Both sides could agree that Churchill had the wrong idea.

The final paragraph, however, constituted a diametric shift from the general consensus that had emerged during the January debate, when members on both sides had belittled the possibility of international policy alignment: the resolution "urge[d] the Labour Party to cooperate with the European Socialist Parties in taking practical steps to achieve the United Socialist States of Europe," and it specifically demanded the establishment of "supranational agencies to take over from each nation powers to allocate and distribute coal, steel,"[168] and other resources. Labour had thus far been content with implementing controls on industrial corporations, and had certainly never advocated giving up sovereignty over these resources. Keep Left had never advocated

[167] "The 3rd European Congress of the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe." London: LSE, ILP 16/1949. 15.
[168] This is the first specific allusion to a supranational coal and/or steel agency by a member of the MUSSE; it would soon feature as an official plank of the party platform.

any kind of supranationality; the closest they had come was in the May, 1947, booklet, which had proposed resolving the German problem by "integrating" its reconstruction into the national plans of its neighbors.[169] Even the Hague Congress had left vague the competences of a supranational structure except in the context of the Human Rights Charter. Supranational control had, however, long been part of the MUSSE program.

Brockway had come to Keep Left from the ILP, in part because the MUSSE's notions on the organization of Europe had a better chance to come to pass with Labour than the ILP; his gamble seemed to have paid off. The MUSSE was delighted, and reprinted the resolution in its entirety in the report for the next European Congress.

Rather than suggesting that Brockway had somehow singlehandedly brought the Labour ship about, it is worth noting that this atypical resolution served a more prosaic political goal as well, capitalizing on the divergences between the intergovernmentalist views espoused by Churchill and the Conservative party, and the more thoroughly federalist ideas of many Europeans present at The Hague. Party Secretary Morgan Phillips had forbidden Labourites from attending the conference explicitly because it would legitimize Churchill.[170] Considering the continent-wide federalist consensus that had since emerged, doubling down now on a commitment to Europe could in fact contribute to marginalizing the leader of the Opposition.

Brockway reported enthusiastically that it would enable the MUSSE to campaign unreservedly in Britain (though he acknowledged that the ILP's still-acrimonious relationship with Labour might make collaboration "a little awkward"[171]). In late May, 1948, then, a concrete call for placing the raw materials of Europe's heavy industry under supranational control had been launched, at a Labour conference, in a resolution penned by a founding member of the MUSSE.

At that moment, with the United Kingdom a key lynchpin in the viability of a unified Europe, and with the SFIO only waiting for their counterparts to engage, Brockway's access to Keep Left was perhaps the group's most important asset.

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[169] Crossman, *et al*. 1947. 41.
[170] Phillips to Leslie Hale, MP, 21 April 1948. London: LSE Archives and Rare Books. Available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/archive/Default.htm, Ronald William Gordon Mackay papers. European papers and correspondence 1947-1950, MACKAY/5/1.
[171] Brockway to Pivert, 24 May 1948. Paris: CHS, Pivert 559 AP 29.

The Colonial Congress

As far as the ILP were concerned, the MUSSE remained "the most important international work in which [they had] been engaged."[172] Aside from salaries, the MUSSE campaign constituted the majority of its annual expenditures, and in June, the ILP finally held the ambitious anti-imperialism conference first proposed by John McNair in April, 1947. Like so many of the MUSSE's projects, the idea had some broad appeal, but faced competition from the more established political center. In fact, the idea of incorporating French and British colonies into a European economic program, a scheme known as "Eurafrica," had been batted around at the cabinet level at least since 1946. It never really got off the ground, but John Kent details a process that lasted through 1956[173] (Sean Greenwood gives the idea only two months[174]). With some variations, the general idea was to jointly coordinate the exploitation of colonial resources to complement Europe's production, a project in line with Bevin's Western Union proposal.

The initial impetus to this joint project had been an effort to dissipate tensions surrounding the Levant Crisis of 1945, when France and Britain had traded fire over the administration of Syria.[175] Discussions evolved slowly, and according to Kent, exploration of the colonial option in Britain was somewhat half-hearted. There were a few technical conferences at the colonial level designed to assess needs and potential, but resolutions were poorly implemented. The Foreign Office demanded oversight of any concrete measures but frustrated the Colonial Office by not providing concrete directions.[176] The French, meanwhile, planned a significant but ultimately truncated exploratory research trip intended to include both French and British colonies headed by Senegalese Assemblyman Amadou Lamine-Gueye. The delegation left in March 1947, a week late, and returned to France a week early. It was not coordinated with the British: French Ambassador René Massigli telegrammed from London, warning that the British would certainly be surprised that they had not been consulted on the matter. A week later, the *Quai d'Orsay* was informed that the British Secretary to the Colonies was

[172] "Annual report of the National Administrative Council of the Independent Labour Party to be submitted at the 56th annual conference, The Cambridge Hall, Southport, March 27th to March 29th 1948" in ILP/5/1948 1-14 16-19, LSE, London.
[173] Kent, John. *The Internationalization of Colonialism; Britain, France and Black Africa, 1939-1956*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992
[174] Greenwood, 1996. 296.
[175] Kent, 1992. 156.
[176] *Idem.* 237.

very busy and that he did not attach much importance to the trip, which he dismissed as too short to be very productive.[177] Upon study, the Foreign Office eventually determined that France did not in fact possess many resources that the British could not themselves obtain, obviating the need for collaboration.[178]

The only concrete dimension of this colonial program was that it would be administered by European governments, and it was during its early stages that the MUSSE had proposed their own conference on the subject, attempting to head off these imperialist tendencies and to create a relationship on a voluntary and egalitarian basis. Bevin's "Western Union" address in January lent McNair's idea new urgency: as noted above, Bevin's conception was almost nakedly exploitative. The Marshall Plan was a factor as well: a principal *raison d'être* of the scheme was to compensate for weak European production, and the US initially supported the use of some Marshall Plan allocations for Colonial development, keeping the scheme alive among French and British governments and further stimulating a Socialist response. On the other hand, emerging nationalism in the Colonies themselves mitigated the possibility of centralized planning, and Bevin's project encountered pushback from the British Board of Trade and from the Treasury. The Americans would ultimately cease to underwrite African development in early 1949.[179]

Against this backdrop, the MUSSE organized the World Congress Against Imperialism in Paris from 19 to 21 June, 1948. It was the largest assembly gathered to date by the MUSSE: 325 people, representing some 37 countries in Asia, Africa and Europe met to attempt to formulate a joint political and economic trajectory for the future. The ILP helpfully produced a comprehensive report.[180] There were representatives from a fairly wide spectrum of political parties, which had pros and cons: on the upside, attendance was high; on the downside, the commonalities between these parties and the MUSSE were superficial, and the general transnational framework proposed by the Movement was not yet feasible. The general premise of the conference was that, given egalitarian relations, shared information, and low trade restrictions, a

[177] "Massigli to Quai D'Orsay 10/03/47," "Renner to Quai D'Orsay 19/03/47." Nantes: Archives Diplomatiques Record Group 357, Dossier 7.
[178] Kent, 1992. 167
[179] Kent, 1992. 188-89.
[180] "Report of the World Congress against Imperialism." London: The National Labour Press, 1948. London: LSE, ILP/5/1948

mutually-advantageous, rational and voluntary trade organization might be created, that would optimize the distribution of resources across the former Colonial world. On its face, this was an attractive project, but it would prove entirely unfeasible.

The first day of the conference was devoted to committee work, developing resolutions to be debated in a general assembly the following day. The political committee's working resolution focused primarily on ending colonial control. Anti-imperialism was the indispensable first step towards world democracy, they argued: all imperialist euphemisms like Protectorates and Dominions should be done away with, as should all racial notions of cultural "unfitness;" and it was the duty of all overseas Socialists not only to work towards their own independence but also to abolish class oppression. This resolution effectively codified the general objectives around which the conference had been called; its content was uncontroversial and its passage almost a formality.

Elsewhere, things were more complicated. The economic committee, led by the UEF's Henri Frenay, recommended the development of agriculture and the coordination of industry in support of it, and called for the involvement of the rural masses in the administration of publicly-owned industries. In the same spirit as the Marshall Plan, the economic resolution included the notion of providing agricultural machinery and finished goods to under-developed countries (the Americans were then still open to contributing to colonial economies). This prompted protest from the French Independent Communist Party, however, that it constituted a simple extension of the Marshall Plan – with all the imperialist strings that would come with it. (Communist opposition to the Marshall Plan would include some fantastical fear-mongering, alleging for instance that Coca-Cola was highly addictive, quite possibly a poison, and the nefarious harbinger of "Coca-colonization."[181]).

The resolutions were progressive by comparison with the way colonial territories had been administered by the metropolitan powers. A number of them were transplanted directly from the MUSSE handbook for Europe: the development of transportation, the coordination of industry, a commitment to full employment… Had they been accepted, it would have constituted a significant validation of the principles and universal applicability of the MUSSE, a step closer perhaps to the United Socialist

[181] Kuisel, Richard. "Coca-Cola and the Cold War: The French Face Americanization, 1948-1953." *French Historical Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring, 1991). p 101.

States of the World, but the reactions of attendees when the resolutions were presented and discussed revealed both poor messaging about the conference and the limits of the MUSSE's ability to address the needs of the world beyond Europe.

The very first speaker at the debate on that Sunday morning, a representative from Ceylon, protested that the prescriptions for lifting his country out of poverty were simply "not based in reality;" the second speaker, representing the British West African Students' Union, argued that there was nothing new in these recommendations and asked for a "more realistic report." (Under fire, Economic Committee chairman Bob Edwards replied defensively that the committee could not be expected to "produce a miracle in seven hours.") Treating the colonial world as ready and capable of adopting a modern Socialist policy was egalitarian and generous, but hopelessly optimistic about the immediate capacity of these polities. Ridley betrayed a lack of understanding of immediate realities, writing dejectedly in the ILP's magazine that delegates "were concerned only with gaining the independence of their countries."[182]

Even the political committee's resolution drew fire, revealing a significant miscommunication with respect to the conference's objective. The conference had been called and organized by the ILP as part of the MUSSE campaign, but its title, and much of its literature, focused only on ending imperialism… the link between the topics and the MUSSE's core values was evidently lost on at least some of those invited. The Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties, for one, raised objection to the constant reference to Socialists in resolution texts: in their estimation, Socialists ought to be considered participants in the conference rather than its whole constituency.

The MUSSE had been able to organize a congress of near-global reach, reflecting a world-socialist ideology that dated back to the Edwards-Ridley manifesto of 1944; but when these general principles had to be turned into practical resolutions, they discovered that the colonial world was simply not ready for it. Its basic prescriptions, elaborated over the previous two years in a European context, did not apply to countries whose history and socio-economic profiles were so different from those of Europe, and for whom the basic conditions of resource-sharing, from simple extraction to the competences of respective executive branches, were not developed. Even those political

[182] Ridley, "What Will Succeed Imperialism?," Socialist Leader, 3 July 1948. Cited in Richard, Anne-Isabelle; "The limits of solidarity: Europeanism, anti-colonialism and socialism at the Congress of the Peoples of Europe, Asia and Africa in Puteaux, 1948," *European Review of History*, 21-4 (2014), 519-537. 519

groups who could agree on the first step towards the MUSSE's global socialist orientation – the end of imperial relationships – did not necessarily see eye to eye on the visions which they aimed to implement.

The MUSSE's "Third Force" complicated matters further.[183] The concept now leaned towards independence from the two blocs, rather than the initial "friendship." This was a difficult proposition for colonial representatives since it would at best cut off sources of economic or political support, and at worst be interpreted as adversarial. It also seemed counter-intuitive, at a time when these parties were working towards independence, for them to reject (purportedly-)anti-imperialist powers while joining a structure organized by the very nations which had subjugated their peoples in the first place. It bears remembering that the French, British and Dutch governments, were all at war in the Colonies. As the head of the Vietnamese delegation pointed out:

"You speak of imperialism, both of the American and the Soviet bloc. However, do not forget that the Americans allowed far-reaching independence and that the Russians never colonised us. The only thing we know from experience is European subjugation."[184]

The conference did not officially end in defeat, but the misalignment between the ideological prescriptions of the Europeans and the practical considerations of the colonial representatives was simply too great. Once again, the MUSSE had been overly optimistic about the immediate feasibility of their plans. The congress nevertheless resolved to establish a Permanent Committee for the for the Congress of the Peoples Against Imperialism (COPAI), including 10-man Permanent Committees, one for each continent, to carry on the anti-imperialist struggle pending the next congress. The European Committee included the usual true believers: Edwards, Brockway, Pivert and Gironella among them. They kept a seat open for a German delegate, though none had attended the conference. Although they dropped out of sight in the MUSSE/SMUSE record, the network launched at Puteaux would have some far-reaching implication. The COPAI network has been credited with facilitating the Bandung Conference of 1955, by which time the peoples represented at Puteaux had overcome the immediate task of

[183] Anne-Isabelle Richard (2014) has analyzed the congress in detail, identifying some of the ideological limits to international Socialism across continents.
[184] Richard 2014. 530.

obtaining independence and establishing diplomatic relations, and the Third Force could function as a useful transnational framework.[185]

Labour reconsiders

In Kenneth Morgan's telling, Keep Left began to lose focus after the Czech Coup of February, 1948.[186] The pacifist approach so valiantly defended in the Keep Left pamphlet, and by Shawcross the previous month in the House of Lords, was given the lie by what amounted to the seizure of Czechoslovakia by Moscow, and it became hard to defend either the cautious wait-and-see approach or indeed some kind of live-and-let-live arrangement. And yet, though both Keep Left and the MUSSE had initially adopted a Third Force orientation, they were not ready to throw in the towel. The Brockway resolution adopted in May had called for a rapprochement between European Socialist parties, and a focus on sharing coal and steel. In an effort to regain momentum, a handful of Keep Lefters including three MUSSE participants (Mackay, Warbey, and Shawcross), petitioned Labour's International Committee to organize a Congress of European Socialists, "to discuss the major issues of Western Union."[187]

The conference would be open to all Marshall Plan countries (though not, curiously, Turkey or Greece). The discussion topics were in fact rather appropriate: a debate between the functionalist and political approaches to integration was important to the MUSSE and relevant to a Labour executive trying to differentiate itself from the Conservatives. A discussion of respective foreign policy objectives already seemed rather overdue; and the means and methods of economic integration on the continent needed to be explored if even the most rudimentary economic alignment was to be implemented. And yet, Labour's International sub-committee ultimately "agreed to decline the suggestion."[188] Part of the reason had to do with the fact that Labourites – most notably International sub-committee chairman Denis Healey – headed the

[185] Richard, 2014, 532. Howe, Stephen. *Anticolonialism in British Politics. The Left and the End of Empire, 1918– 1964*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. 302.
[186] Morgan, Kenneth O. *Labour in Power 1945-1951.* Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984. 65
[187] "Proposed Socialist Congress on Western Union, October 1948" Manchester: PHM, Healey Papers 7 box 12/05
[188] Labour International sub-Committee minutes, 19 October, 1948. Manchester: PHM; Healey Papers 12/05.

COMISCO, and continued to prioritize it as the official vehicle of Socialist cooperation. Rather than follow the initiative of Keep Left and the MUSSE, the sub-committee decided that Morgan Phillips would "sound the views of other Socialist parties."[189]

Just at that moment, COMISCO was also following up on an SFIO proposal very much in the same spirit as the Keep Left proposal (both had traceable MUSSE influence at the time) to create a Socialist Centre for Documentation and Propaganda. It would function as an information center, disseminating the latest projects and ideas; it would support the lobbying efforts of Socialist parties with respect to their governments, and it would consult on the application and effectiveness of the Marshall Plan. In October, Phillips circulated the proposal internationally, but he was met with a lot of passive resistance, especially Scandinavians. Variously: COMISCO ought to be more efficient before embarking on a new project;[190] the Socialist Information and Liaison Office (SILO), established as a preliminary to reconstituting the International, could just take on this new political coordination role;[191] the new mission would be too expensive and have a lot of complicated overlap with the existing offices.[192]

It is worth pausing here to parse the several overlapping interest groups on what is, for the purposes of this chapter, the "MUSSE side." First was the MUSSE itself, which, in mid-1948, was a somewhat opaque organization. Founded in London by ILP members, it was increasingly organized by SFIO-affiliated members in France. Second came the SFIO, part of the French coalition government which had taken the MUSSE under its financial wing. Third would be Keep Left, a faction of the British governing party which operated as something akin to a Trojan Horse for the MUSSE through Fenner Brockway and the participation in the MUSSE of at least three of its other members. The MUSSE was not explicitly the protagonist here: the primary agents of the present push for European Socialist alignment was the SFIO, which, while borrowing the institutional goals of the MUSSE, were also members of COMISCO, which had more legitimacy simply by its association with Labour. Outside observers, notably the Scandinavians whose objections are noted above, could be forgiven for responding

[189] "Minutes from Tuesday Feb 15, 1949." Manchester: PHM Healey Papers_Box 12/05 International sub-committee minutes 1948-1949
[190] Alsing Anderson [Danish] to Phillips 11 November 1948. Manchester: PHM; LP/ID Box 57/8
[191] H. Lie [Norway] to Phillips 11 November 1948. Manchester: PHM; LP/ID Box 57/8
[192] Bjork [Swedish] to Phillips 10 November 1948. Manchester: PHM; LP/ID Box 57/8

skeptically to this inchoate merging of the two rather different approaches to Socialist internationalism.

The central, irreconcilable difference between the MUSSE and COMISCO was that one sought a centralized European program, while the other conception was effectively intergovernmental, and it allowed national parties to have free rein in their domestic programs. The same distinction that had riven the anti-Stalinist Left in the 1920s and 30s – to wit, whether there would be a centralized control organism or a more loosely federated arrangement – remained salient: Labour had picked one side, the MUSSE another, and the SFIO was on the fence.

The SFIO participated in COMISCO even though the Labour-led organization had thus far done very little beyond establish a liaison office. Perhaps in an effort to inject some life into the project, the French were proposing a more proactive approach. As detailed above, the group, already rather behind in fostering any real Socialist dialogue or action, was not particularly enthusiastic in facilitating it, even when prompted.

This left the MUSSE high on the list of promising transnational institutions, but the Labour connection now seemed dead in the water. Labour had picked their vehicle for socialist integration. Despite Brockway, and despite Keep Left, the MUSSE were stymied by Labour's commitment to the COMISCO.

There did remain a generalized unity of purpose between all the interest groups. Much of the disorder could be overcome if the underlying premise of European Socialist cohesion was valid. From a strategic perspective, a successful effort along the lines of the Brockway-penned resolution would depend primarily on the ability of the SFIO to actually enact the program. With that, it would be reasonable to hope that like-minded Socialists on the continent would be encouraged to throw in their lot; but without it, the project might founder, and Labour would have embarked on a contested and ultimately futile project at the expense of a more politically rewarding domestically-focused program. Hedging their bets, Labour carried out some research into the SFIO's prospects in the Fall of 1948 in conjunction with British trade unions. There were no absolute deal-breakers but they found some important weaknesses.[193]

[193] "Notes on joint meeting of Labour Party and Trades Unions representatives on the situation in France, 8 November 1948." Manchester: PHM, Healey papers 7, box 12/05

On the subject of its electoral base, they noted that the SFIO still held a reliable 17% of the French electorate (implying a continued role in the coalition governments of the Fourth Republic), but that its leaders were "middle-class intellectuals" supported largely by "the petit bourgeoisie and white collar workers." Worse, they had a poor connection to organized labor: French labor unions were increasingly teetering towards the Communists, Labour found, and those that were non-Communist were "mostly disgusted with French politics;" and seemed to have given up on the French Third Force coalitions.[194] The ability of the SFIO to develop a relationship with the trade unions, organically or alone, was given "no chance whatever." It was resolved that "giving some working-class meaning to the SFIO" would require lobbying by British trade unionists to push their French counterparts to join the SFIO's ranks. If that didn't work though, Labour decided, it might "reconsider its attitude" towards working with the SFIO.

The SFIO's electoral base aside, the French political landscape offered its own obstacles.[195] Labour's perception was that the Gaullists and Communists were so strong as to force compromise in the centrist coalition cabinets within which the SFIO exerted power. The SFIO alone simply did not have the leverage to push the Socialist agenda… "compared with this central political problem," Labour concluded, "the SFIO's weaknesses of organization are secondary." In the immediate term, Labour would not overtly turn its back on the SFIO or on internationalism, but the scales had tipped in favor of an independent, US-aligned orientation.[196]

The impact on the MUSSE was indirect but important: Labour's strategy was based on its own constraints and on the projected feasibility of a European program; the fact that the MUSSE was pushing this program was essentially incidental, one of convenience and circumstance: there was no sense of loyalty or common purpose towards the MUSSE and no evidence that Labour was wittingly influenced by the MUSSE. A distancing between Labour and the SFIO, however, did harm a strategy that the MUSSE had fallen into rather by default recently: relying on the activism of those two

[194] Here, the term refers to the French coalition government - already in its fifth iteration since January 1947, including most recently a government under Robert Schuman which had lasted all of six days - as opposed to the geo-political orientation.
[195] "Memorandum on International Socialist Policy." Manchester: PHM, Healey papers 7, box 12/06
[196] For further details see Woodhouse, Roger. *British policy Towards France, 1945-51*. London: Macmillan, 1995. Also Milward, Alan S. *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1952*. London: Routledge, 2003. 468-470. Milward details the economic planning rationale that further disinclined Labour from a European orientation.

parties. In its early years, the MUSSE had effectively labored alone, adapting the purist ideological Edwards-Ridley platform into something concrete; even as late as the Hague Conference in May, 1948, the group jealously guarded its legitimacy by refusing to engage with anyone who might be tempted to compromise with the Capitalists and the Imperialists. Around the time of that congress, however, seeing a fair number of like-minded groups, and likely encouraged by the broad Socialist representation that they drew at their own conferences, they fell into fostering dialogue among European Socialists. They had sought to have this dialogue supported, and later organized, by Labour and the SFIO, but it had not worked. By November, André Philip of the SFIO's *Comité Directeur* (and soon of the MUSSE) was calling Labour's position "selfish," though the SFIO determined not to publicly reveal any rift in the socialist consensus.[197] As far as the MUSSE was concerned, then the Labour connection was not working, and the MUSSE would have to find another avenue to produce a Socialist consensus.

In late November, the MUSSE held a meeting of its International Committee. The committee in question still included Bob Edwards and John McNair of the ILP, though not Ridley, who perhaps felt that his revolutionary outlook no longer meshed with the Movement he had spawned. French and Spaniards comprised the largest national groupings. For the French: Marceau Pivert, Gérard Jaquet and Jacques Robin, all founding members, as well as the UEF's Henri Frenay and three others. For the Spanish: General Secretary Gironella, naturally, along with fellow POUMistas Julian Gorkin and Wilebaldo Solano; the party's General Secretary, Rodolpho Llopis, was on the committee as well, though absent that day. Four other Spaniards of varying affiliation rounded out the contingent. Also present: Raphael Ryba, of the Polish Jewish Workers' Party,[198] and founding member Giotopoulos, aka Witte. A handful of other personalities were on the committee, though absent: Yugoslavian socialist Zivko Topalovitch, and Heinz Braun, Minister of Justice in the Saarland government (both of whom would remain associated to the Movement); finally, Italians Tristano Codignola and Enzo Agnoletti, of the Italian Socialist Democratic Party (PSDI).

[197] "Réunion du Comité Directeur, groupe parlementaire, 23 novembre, 1948." Paris: OURS, *Comité Directeur 4 septembre 1946 - 30 Juillet 1947*
[198] Heumos, Peter. *Europäischer Sozialismus im Kalten Krieg; Briefe und Berichte 1944-1948*. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2004. 181.

As a result of that meeting, the MUSSE published a new program in December, 1948,[199] which would mark a final, definitive break with the early, problematic underpinnings inherited from the London Bureau and the Edwards-Ridley manifesto. First, they finally acknowledged the writing on the wall with respect to Moscow: the Soviets had taken Prague in February and had been attempting to blockade western Berlin into submission since June: only the most willfully idealistic could continue to advocate neutrality or pacifism, and the Third-Force-bridge notion was now entirely discredited. Second: until recently, the Movement had wanted to supersede national political structures, while at the same time effectively relying on establishment parties for financial support, agency and legitimacy. It would now fall back on activism at the national level. A third issue was the insistence on strict Socialism: ironically, this was based on a flawed premise similar to that of the Russian Revolution of 1917; to wit, that the revolution would spread, bringing Socialist governments into power across Europe.[200] The MUSSE had recently been counting on a Labour-SFIO axis to anchor that process, but it was clear by November, 1948, that it would not materialize.

From now on, intellectual and political leadership of the Movement would be French: first Pivert and the SFIO, and soon largely André Philip. The MUSSE had been aware of the crises threatening a European socialist consensus: whether it be what they regarded as Labour's short-term outlook; the relative weakness of French Socialists in their respective coalitions; the growing ties between the main Italian Socialist party (PSI) and the Communists; or the German and Austrian Socialist parties fighting to retain their independence.

The December program's preamble opened with a call to all European socialist parties to enact domestic programs "in the perspective of a European program." At the risk of drawing comparison with Stalin's "Socialism in one country," it signals the abandonment of any pretense of develop a European Socialist program with Labour. (The Movement's attempt to apply its principles beyond the borders of Europe had also been less than successful.) Absent a transnational Labour-SFIO anchor, the Socialist parties of Europe were to do what they could within a national framework. From now

[199] "Programme d'Action Socialiste Européenne." Les cahiers socialistes. Revue indépendante de critique sociale. Décembre 1948, n° 22; 5e année. Bruxelles.
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/programme_d_action_socialiste_europeenne_decembre_1948-fr-21381952-0bbb-4248-912d-cd257362da2d.html
[200] Figes, Orlando. *Revolutionary Russia, 1891-1991*. London: Penguin Books, 2014. 142.

on, there would be constituted national sections of the Movement (with myriad acronyms that I will introduce as they become relevant).

The second significant shift of the 1948 program was away from the insistence on socialist purism that had mitigated the MUSSE's engagement with the European Movement: strict socialism was no longer the qualifying criterion for membership in, or indeed collaboration with, the Movement.[201] The French committee of the MUSSE had already worried that their current branding as a "socialist movement" drove away some prospective adherents. Now the group declared that the political entities capable of preserving parliamentary democracy in the face of capitalist encroachment included the Socialists, the Christian Democrats, and non-communist labor unions, even if the latter could potentially be coopted by the ongoing economic crisis. For some time now, certain Christian Democrats, most notably the *MRP*'s Robert Bichet, had been participating in MUSSE conferences. Bichet also headed the Christian-Democratic *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales* (NEI) which figured among the kindred members of the European Movement (the NEI were also, in this period, organizing secretive meetings in Geneva which included German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and French minister Robert Schuman, and which have been credited with enabling the passage of the ECSC;[202] it's not clear if the MUSSE knew of this). In other words, the MUSSE and Christian Democrats were in the same fight and could work effectively together; rather than diluting the Socialist message, joining forces might help forge a better one.

To reflect its new orientation, the movement adopted a new name. What was previously a "Movement for the United Socialist States of Europe" now became a "Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe." Still led by Socialists, it would no longer campaign for an exclusively "socialist" Europe, allowing it to collaborate with Federalists and Christian Democrats who sought what might be termed a "non-denominational" Europe. Hereafter, the group will be referred to by the acronym with SMUSE, except in references to events prior to December, 1948.

The new SMUSE program in question was rather tame by their standards, but consistent with earlier resolutions and broadly acceptable. Again, the Movement was

[201] "Programme d'Action Socialiste Européenne." Les cahiers socialistes. Revue indépendante de critique sociale. Décembre 1948, n° 22; 5e année. Bruxelles. 1.
[202] Gehler, Michael and Wolfram Kaiser, "Transnationalism and Early European Integration: The Nouvelles Equipes Internationales and the Geneva Circle 1947-1957," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Sept 2001), 773-789.

adapting to politically realistic goals. It gave pride of place to a minimum wage, fixed, and adjustable, according to costs of living in each country. Alongside this measure, the Movement advocated following the example of Labour Britain in terms of social security; and imposing - on everyone, not just the proletariat - the "inevitable sacrifices" required in the reconstruction phase. The second major plank of the program was on the collective organization of the European economy. Here they evoked the Marshall Plan, warning against wasting those funds on simply "re-plastering" national economies.

Article three touched on the Ruhr valley, in a direct response to the efforts underway since the London conference of April, 1948, wherein the occupying powers decided to establish joint control of the area.[203] Rather than private property coveted by the "forces of imperialism,"[204] the Movement argued, it should be collectively owned by the German people, and developed as part of a Europe-wide development strategy.

Article four recalls the London Bureau's central preoccupation: the plight of those under oppressive regimes, namely the Spanish – who had mobilized the interwar Bureau – Greeks and eastern Europeans.

Finally, one of the Movement's central policy goals: a European Parliament elected directly and democratically (as noted above, the Hague resolution had proposed that representatives be appointed by national assemblies). This would remain a central goal, pursued actively as long as the Movement was able. Direct elections would become reality only full 30 years later, long after the Movement ceased to exercise any real agency, but in the late 1950s, SMUSErs Fernand Dehousse, Maurice Faure and Marinus van der Goes van Naters led the European Parliament's Political Committee, charged with addressing the electoral system,[205] submitting a report that, while prescient, would sit on the shelf for two decades.

The European Movement

There was one more important decision taken as part of the new program: to join the European Movement. It had been formally inaugurated only that month, some six

[203] The French had been pushing for something similar since February, 1947.
[204] "Programme d'Action Socialiste Européenne." Art. 3
[205] "European Parliament committee on political affairs and institutional questions; suffrage working group" December 1958 – April 1959. Luxembourg: European Parliament Archives; digital, in-house server only as of July 2018.

months after the conference at The Hague. Coudenhove-Kalergi had stuck with the organization, as had the UEF; the *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales,* were also formal members. As discussed, these groups had some ideological kinship with the MUSSE, suggesting that a consensus might be reached in that forum. In June, the uncompromising Marxist outlook of the MUSSE had been reassessed as leading members Jacques Piette and Gérard Jacquet argued that the outright rejection of the European Movement as "bourgeois" was untenable, and that to avoid fading into irrelevance, the movement had to adopt a more conciliatory approach. Some engagement was agreed upon, but Henri Frenay still advised that the Movement only participate as observers.[206]

The International Committee debated the issue again in November and concluded that there were a number of areas in which the European Movement and their own program were compatible. One of those was a push for a European constitution, though this was not evoked in Gironella's application. The rest of them were included in an application letter written by Gironella. He laid out the then-MUSSE's evolving position. Gone were the exhortations to strict Socialist participation in the project; the Movement settled for a role of furthering "socialist solutions" from within an undefined European union. It did, however, still argue in late 1948 that any union should be open to Eastern Europe. Gironella also posited in his letter that there ought to be a European military-political unit to buttress a "third force"[207] positioning between the US and the USSR, even though such a position would not figure in the Movement's official literature until the following congress, and despite the opposition of leading SMUSEr Marceau Pivert. Gironella called for an end to colonial exploitation, and for a minimum of economic planning in the areas of coal, steel, transport, and "key industries." The general secretary of the European Movement replied that the SMUSE's goals were "compatible" with those of the European Movement, especially given that member groups could maintain their entire autonomy in political tendencies.[208] In other words, the SMUSE was free to pursue its agenda, though it would not necessarily get support from the European Movement.

[206] Loth, 1991. 298.
[207] The term, as the Movement used it, now meant "autonomy" more than anything else.
[208] Gironella to Rebattet, 2 Dec 1948; Rebattet to Gironella, 9 Dec 1948. Florence: EUI ME-495

Reservations about the European Movement would remain though. The MUSSE had initially rejected it outright before participating almost reticently, and had then tergiversated for a further six months before requesting admission. Even now, the International Committee agreed that they would not consider themselves bound by any European Movement resolutions they did not agree with. Within two weeks of formal admission, they moved against two structural resolutions that had been proposed.[209] The first was to unify the group under a single message. This was precisely what the Movement had initially feared: the dissolution of their message into some vague and mutually agreeable platitudes. Insisting that the European Movement was for them a "marriage of convenience, designed to establish a basic economic and political framework," they were opposed. The second question was about the European Movement presidency: Duncan Sandys had been evoked as permanent president of the organization. But Sandys – and his relationship to Churchill – had been a *bête noire* of the European Movement from the beginning, and the central reason for which they had held off for so long. They were implacably opposed. Doing so, they argued for the record, would give the illusion of a unified message. Perhaps incongruously, they countered that the presidency should reflect the different elements in the movement – and proposed André Philip.

They were only partially successful. On the first point, the movement did remain federated; on the second, Duncan Sandys was elected president, but there were four honorary presidents as well: Winston Churchill, disappointingly; but also confirmed Italian integrationist Alcide de Gasperi; former French president and *bona fide* Socialist Léon Blum; and Belgian Prime Minister and socialist Paul-Henri Spaak.[210] Spaak and André Philip knew each other had a good working relationship. The two would eventually lead the SMUSE.

The relationship, then, was less than a match made in heaven, and less than a year after joining, Gironella would suggest that they leave the European Movement. And yet they stuck with it through the end of the following decade… One thing that might have contributed to their continued participation, was a recent, and unadvertised, change of policy within the murkier echelons of the United States government; Richard

[209] "Compte-rendu de la reunion du 20-21 février 1949." In "MSFEUE 1949." Paris: CHS, 559 AP 43.
[210] *Who We Are; History*. Europeanmovement.eu. https://europeanmovement.eu/who-we-are/history/ Retrieved Jan 16, 2019.

Aldrich's 1997 essay "OSS, CIA and European unity: The American committee on United Europe, 1948- 60"[211] tells the story. In early 1948, as the European Movement was getting off the ground, Winston Churchill and Count Coudenhove-Kalergi separately and privately petitioned the American government for support for European integration efforts.[212] The United States was just then in the process of forming the Central Intelligence Agency, successor to the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an organism with very little oversight by design. The two most senior officials involved in developing the new intelligence apparatus, former OSS chief William Donovan and National Security Council member Allen Dulles, had both been part of Coudenhove-Kalergi's Committee for a Free and United Europe. As noted in the previous chapter however, the members' grasp of the issue was somewhat superficial, and the group was not very effective.

When Churchill visited the US after the Hague conference to drum up support for the European Movement, the Coudenhove-Kalergi group was effectively replaced by the American Committee for United Europe (ACUE), a new organization run by Donovan and Dulles as part of the CIA's anti-Soviet operations. The ACUE's official goal was to publicize and advocate European integration efforts through lobbying congress and sponsoring research on federalism. These public objectives gave cover for the ACUE's real mission: doing what could not be done publicly and supporting the largely left-leaning European groups working towards uniting Europe.

The ACUE used government funds controlled by the CIA, complemented by private sources such as the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. The qualifications for receiving ACUE funds, once codified, were as follows: groups' "program[s] had to be 'concrete' and [they] had to believe in a rapid rather than a gradual approach to western European integration; including support for: (a) the strengthening of the Council of Europe by gaining greater political authority, (b) the early realization of the basic aims of the Marshall Plan, the Mutual Security Act and the North Atlantic Security Organization. They also had to favor the inclusion of Western Germany within a unified Europe and have the potential to influence a substantial segment of opinion in Europe."[213] The European Movement certainly fit the bill; Churchill spoke at the official

[211] Aldrich, Richard J. "OSS, CIA and European unity: The American committee on United Europe, 1948-60," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, vol 8, no 1 (1997)
[212] Aldrich, 1997. 198-190
[213] Aldrich 1997. 193-194

launch of the ACUE in New York, and Duncan Sandys would initially control the funds. As it happened, they would be sidelined within about a year: both the European Movement's constituent groups and its American backers wanted to move more quickly and more thoroughly than Churchill had ever intended.

Over the next decade, ACUE funds accounted for at least half of the European Movement's annual budget.[214] These funds were thence distributed among the European Movement's constituent groups: upon joining the European Movement, around the time the ACUE was officially incorporated, the SMUSE would be on the receiving end of these American contributions, a windfall well worth some feelings of ambivalence. There is no evidence that the Movement knew of any American financial contributions at the time it decided to apply for membership: the ACUE only began to operate several months after their application, and the first direct evidence that the SMUSE knew of the US role in financing the European Movement came a decade later. Nevertheless, it is certain that the Movement simply could not have financed the considerable expansion it undertook in the 1950s without the stipend it received from the European Movement.

André Philip

As Gironella waited impatiently[215] for a response to their application, a new face appeared at SMUSE gatherings. January, 1949, marks the first recorded appearance of André Philip, SFIO heavyweight and former cabinet minister courted by the MUSSE from its earliest days. His membership, and later his leadership, would reinvigorate the Movement and underpin its greatest successes. Philip had helped found the Fourth Republic, had held cabinet positions, knew some of the major players on the European scene (most notably Spaak), and was an indefatigable advocate of Socialist policy and European integration. He would head the Movement through 1964, during its most active and effective period.

[214] Aldrich, 1997. 185

[215] He wrote in late December, three weeks after their application, enquiring about a decision; his mood can't have improved over the subsequent six weeks of silence.

Philip was born in 1902 to a protestant family and joined the SFIO in 1920. After his baccalaureate, he studied economics in Paris and London before a stint in the US, where he studied theology at Columbia and economics at the University of Wisconsin. He became professor of economics at the university of Lyon in 1926,[216] and subsequently served as *député* of the Rhone *département* from 1936 to 1940.[217] Christian and socialist, Philip co-founded the anti-Fascist "Revolutionary Christian Front," a relatively short-lived and Communist-leaning organization that petered out after the war.[218] A confirmed pacifist, he fought repeatedly during the 1930s for the rights of conscientious objectors. There is no evidence that he was a member of the London Bureau, but his anti-fascism, pacifism, and early flirtation with Communism were well in line with the prevailing tendencies in that organization, and it is perhaps not surprising that John McNair sought him out in the early days of the MUSSE. He also had connections with French industry, notably through Christian-Front co-founder and trades-unionist Maurice Laudrain. He would be described as a "bridgehead" for those interests within the SFIO.[219]

After France's defeat in May, 1940, he refused to recognize Pétain as the legitimate Head of State in non-occupied France. He joined the *résistance* and, starting in 1942, worked to rebuild the French state alongside Charles de Gaulle from London and Algiers. As with many in the Free French Forces, his activities during the war granted him some capital in post-war French politics, and he served three terms as French Economic Minister in 1946 and '47.

In terms of European integration, his most important role in the immediate postwar period may have been his contribution to the Constitution of the Fourth Republic, the preamble of which enshrines a French commitment to international cooperation through a limited abrogation of sovereign rights. French constitutions and statutes dating back to the revolution of 1789 had alternated between an authoritarian approach giving primacy to the executive with little concern for the legal conventions of international relations, and a republican one viewing the state as an embodiment of its

[216] Daniel, Jean-Marc. "André Philip, un socialiste partisan de la rigeur. » *Le Monde*, 28 November 2011. Accessed 21 July 2021. https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/11/28/andre-philip-un-socialiste-partisan-de-la-rigueur_1609933_3232.html

[217] The mandate of the *députés* elected in 1936 was extended through 1942, but insofar as Philip rejected Pétain's authority, his effectively ended in 1940.

[218] Blaser, Klauspeter. "Du christianisme social au socialisme chrétien. » *Autre Temps: Cahiers d'éthique sociale et politique* #62, 75-84. 82.

[219] Ehrmann, Henry. *La Politique du Patronnât français*. Paris : Armand Colin 1959.

population and emphasizing the existence of an international community of peoples.[220] By the end of World War II, the rejection of authoritarianism and the concept of mutual aid and security – and the left-leaning composition of the French Constituent Assemblies - had placed the emphasis squarely on a republican structure. Nevertheless, the precise formulation of the state's place within the framework of international law was the subject of divergent interpretations by the parties involved in the framing of the constitution of 1946. Communists, Socialists and the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (MRP) would elaborate distinct positions.

The Communists demanded absolute control by the elected assembly, in both domestic and international matters. The Socialists also supported the overall superiority of the *Assemblée*, but they envisaged limits to national authority, notably the Constitution itself and the conventions of international relations. Most importantly, however, they were amenable to a mutual curtailment of sovereignty in order to facilitate international integration. The Christian-Democratic MRP did not announce an official position; the next best thing was elaborated in François de Menthon's 1946 *Vers la Quatrième République*.[221] He mentioned little about international law, but though he felt that the French government had a duty to maintain salutary international relations, he argued that a strong executive was necessary to ensure France's rights and to regain its international prestige. His reference to creating a "real society of nations" is unclear, but from the League of Nations context (*Société des Nations* in French), it has been argued that he envisaged an intergovernmental rather than supranational organization.[222]

Philip sat on the Second Constituent Assembly (the first draft of the Constitution having been rejected); its task was to establish the preamble and general principles of the Constitution. Philip's signature achievement was the inclusion in the preamble of the following:

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[220] Deener, David R. "Internationalism, Party Politics, and the New French Constitution." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Aug., 1953), pp. 399-423 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2126104 Accessed: 23/07/2013 06:321953

[221] De Menthon, François. *Vers la Quatrième République*. Paris: Hachette, 1946.
[222] Deener, 1953. 9404.

On condition of reciprocity, France consents to the limitations on sovereignty necessary for the organization of defense and peace.[223]

Philip had savvily insisted on the insertion of this text in the preamble, rather than in the section concerning institutions, specifically to protect it from the whims of the Constitutional Committee which would flesh out the more granular details.[224] It faced opposition from both the Communists and the MRP – the former sought on the contrary to reaffirm France's sovereignty and independence from international norms, while the latter, though more open to internationalism, tried unsuccessfully to reformulate the principle to protect France's national prerogatives. Philip would lead a protracted debate on the issue before it was adopted (a further Philip proposal – that France submit its international disputes to arbitration by international bodies – did not make the cut).

The preamble to the Fourth Republic Constitution was not explicitly given judicial force, but French legal doctrine has historically given it value as principle, and used it as a basis for deciding cases. The Socialist Party of the early Fourth Republic were, as we have seen, certainly the most overt advocates of supranationalism, but the enshrinement in France of the constitutional principle that sovereignty is limited by international solidarity and can be mutually curtailed for the sake of international harmony and security – the bedrock of European integration – can be credited to André Philip.

He served as economic minister in three early Fourth Republic governments. In May, 1948, he attended Congress of Europe and thereafter sat on both the European Movement's Executive Committee and the constituent committee of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe, launched at The Hague, had been a *cause célèbre* in the MUSSE: a representative European governing body had seemed the embodiment of the supranational outlook advocated since the end of the war. André Philip had joined the project immediately and witnessed its development with dejection. There was a parliamentary assembly, but its members were appointed from within national

[223] Preamble to the Constitution of 27 October, 1946. Translation mine.
[224] "Seances de la Commission de la Constitution; Comptes rendus analytiques, imprimés en execution de la resolution votée par l'Assemblee le 2 octobre 1946" (Paris, 1946), p. 126.

assemblies – without the universal suffrage central to both Philip's and the MUSSE's position - and in the case of the United Kingdom, directly by the executive branch. [225] This Assembly, perceived as mere representatives of the ruling class, passed resolutions to a Council of Ministers. Each minister had an effective veto, and even unanimous decisions were not binding on the national governments.

Philip had also been one of the original drivers of the International Authority for the Ruhr,[226] an international consortium charged with supervising the extraction and pricing of the region's industrial resources. Here again, the organization lacked the kind of supranational outlook and structure envisioned by the more progressive voices in the room, including, again, the MUSSE. Nevertheless, Philip had a finger in many pies, and was centrally focused on producing an integrated Europe.

Philip had in fact been courted from the very earliest days of the MUSSE: in preparation for the first international meeting of the Movement for the United Socialist States of Europe, in February 1947, John McNair had written Marceau Pivert specifically asking about the possibility of his attendance. Philip was National Economic Minister in the Léon Blum government at the time, however, and Pivert had advised McNair not to count on it. [227] When the SFIO launched their aborted effort to establish a European propaganda center in the Spring, Philip – a member of the *Comité Directeur* – had been named the French liaison.[228] He'd been the one to qualify Labour as "selfish" when they refused to commit to the project.

In December 1948, the SFIO's opaque relationship to the MUSSE was clarified. To summarize: Marceau Pivert had begun managing MUSSE events in mid-1947, with financial support from the SFIO. The latter had substituted itself for the ILP in the organization of at least one conference, and later made use of the MUSSE connections in London to court Labour. A clear distinction between the two may have been unnecessary, since at least up to 1953, the SFIO and the MUSSE never held any contradictory positions.[229] However, on 1 December, the SFIO's *Comité Directeur* made it

[225] Gerbet, Pierre. "Talk on Council of Europe, 23 January 2004." *CVCE.eu*. Audio. https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/026961fe-0d57-4314-a40a-a4ac066a1801/cdaaa42d-7fea-49df-a8a9-556f9f2c8618/Resources#b7562b3d-0d2e-415c-84a9-0d77466b65a7_en&overlay
[226] Philip, Loic. *André Philip, témoignage de Léo Hamon*. Paris : Beauchesne Éditeur, 1998. 104.
[227] Pivert to McNair, 20 January, 1947. Paris: CHS XXe Siècle. 559 AP 29
[228] "Réunion du 12 Mai, 1948." *Réunions du Comité Directeur du 4 septembre 1946 au 30 juillet 1947*. Paris: OURS.
[229] "Compte-rendu du Comité Directeur," 18 February, 1953. Paris: OURS

plain that there was no official adhesion to the Movement, though it did have four representatives there.[230] The SMUSE was assured that the SFIO would support it as much as it possibly could,[231] and by January, André Philip, member of the *Comité,* was added as a member of the French MUSSE section's executive committee.

This coincided with the increasing alienation of Marceau Pivert from the Movement, though he remained peripheral for several years thereafter. Pivert had embodied the principled attitude of the earlier MUSSE, pacifist and anti-Stalinist but convinced of the possibility of accommodation with Communism.[232] He was committed to the Third Force, and the developments over the course of 1948-1949 had implications for his attachment to both the Movement and the SFIO. Increasingly disillusioned by what he perceived as the SFIO's ideological compromises, he was vocal in his criticism and became increasingly marginalized therein. He was equally dissatisfied with the evolution of the SMUSE towards a more moderated and functionally western-oriented attitude, and André Philip replaced him as head of the French section in early 1949. A consummate pacifist, he would categorically oppose the European Defense Community, in conflict with the Movement's decision to pursue a defense institution in the context of a political authority; and he would move into the SFIO's internal opposition when the latter endorsed the Pleven Plan in 1950. Although he remained involved in both, his convictions as well as increasing health issues would make him an increasingly marginal figure. He would break definitively with the Movement only in June, 1954.[233]

In the perspective of the Movement's history, as we shall see, André Philip was a natural fit: dogmatic, somewhat supercilious, and a little out of touch; lots of good ideas, without necessarily the patience to be truly effective. Capable and devoted, he was nevertheless not above professionally-damaging outbursts over political doctrine.[234] But Philip had experience, connections and commitment. Effectively a free agent now that he

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[230] "Compte-rendu du Comité Directeur," 1 December, 1948. Paris: OURS
[231] French: "de toutes ses forces." Bulletin du Mouvement Socialiste pour les états-unis d'Europe December 1948 (no.2). Paris: OURS: Simple yellow manila folder labelled "71"
[232] Encouraged by Khrushchev's comparatively moderate rhetoric, he would visit the Soviet Union with a socialist delegation in 1956. Despite the repression of Hungary and Poland in that period, he perceived a move away from the old Stalinist domination and held out hope for more positive relations with the Communist bloc.
[233] Gasteuil, Quentin. "Pivert Marceau, Souverain [nouvelle version]" *Le Maitron*. Maitron.fr. https://maitron.fr/spip.php?article166971
[234] In 1957, Philip was expelled from the SFIO for publishing a book highly critical of the party, certain tenets of which were very publicly reprised in the news media.

no longer had a ministerial portfolio, he could – and would – devote considerable time and energy to leading the Movement. He also had two advantages over the movement's previous leaders. In the first instance, he was a well-established and internationally recognized member of the political class, especially by comparison to Marceau Pivert or Fenner Brockway; and in the second, he understood from his years in coalition cabinets the nuanced and compromising nature of government – and had the techniques to navigate them. Finally, he had developed personal connections that would prove highly beneficial. For the SMUSE, he was the man for the job, and for the time.

Within a month of its founding, the executive committee of the French section of the SMUSE (for now dubbed the *Mouvement socialiste français pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe*, or MSFEUE[235]), composed of Pivert, Gironella, Jacques Robin, and Henri Frenay, had nominated him leader. Later that year, on September 3rd, 1949,[236] Philip was named Chairman of the SMUSE. He would lead their 3rd Congress in Paris in November and remain in the top spot until the Movement's initial dissolution in 1964.

It is tempting, based on these factors, to conceive of the SMUSE of the 1950s as André Philip's Movement, but the truth is more nuanced. On one hand, there is no question that Philip had a significant impact on its development: he largely determined the movement's policy objectives between late 1949 and mid 1954; he directly contributed to the marginalization of the British section in late 1950; he likely brought Spaak on board; and he was a well-known public figure who could draw a crowd and campaign effectively. On the other hand, the Movement predated him by some years: by the time he was elected head of the Movement in November, 1949, it had been in operation for some three and a half years. A few of its existing members had worked together since the early 1930s, and the existing leadership (Pivert, McNair, Edwards, Ridley and Gironella), had been collaborating for a half-decade before Philip first joined. The move towards the political center reflected in the name change is not entirely coeval with Philip's involvement, taking place two months before Philip's first recorded meeting and some ten months before he became President: he cannot be credited with joining forces with other integrationist movements, or involvement in the European Movement. Nor did he set policy singlehandedly: during the early 1950s, when Philip

[235] The French section would change its name more than once.
[236] "Résolutions du Comité Directeur du MSEUE, 2 et 3 septembre 1949." Florence: EUI; ME-1924.

and the SMUSE are most closely linked, very public policy debates between Philip and other members were hashed out in *Gauche Européenne* (see next chapter). The SFIO did not consider Philip and the SMUSE to be one and the same either: as far as the *Comité Directeur* was concerned, Philip's personal disagreements with SFIO policy did not equate to a policy conflict between the SMUSE and the SFIO.[237] Enrique Gironella, the "institutional memory" of the movement if there ever was one, did not defer entirely to Philip either, seeking to moderate certain positions and notably recruiting Rifflet to help manage Philip in the context of the European Workers' Movement.[238] After the rejection of the EDC, finally, the Movement struggled to find footing again, and the organizational leadership would increasingly be taken over by the Belgians: after 1954, Philip was no longer driving the Movement's activities.

It would be reductive to describe the SMUSE as an André Philip project, despite his profile. Philip was steered towards the SMUSE by the SFIO *Comité Directeur*. At a time when the British section's importance was waning for lack of domestic influence, Philip was able to provide much-needed direction, but he did not control the Movement, whose existing adherents had long-established ties. Conversely, Philip was somewhat adrift in early 1949. He had been seeking the creation of supranational structures without much success: neither the IAR nor the Council of Europe had come out the way he had hoped. He had not held a cabinet position for two years and future prospects were not promising: the last Socialist in the Economic ministry had been Christian Pineau, who had lasted six days in September, 1948. In January, 1949, he somewhat serendipitously came into contact with a group of like-minded socialist activists from across Europe who already held positions very much in line with his own thinking: they had ties to his own party, offices in Paris, a robust European network, and links to the European Movement. Whether the SMUSE saved Philip or Philip saved the SMUSE is not entirely clear, but there is little question that the relationship was symbiotic, mutually advantageous, and temporary.

NATO

[237] "Compte-rendu du Comité Directeur," 18 February, 1953. Paris: OURS.
[238] Gironella to Raymond Rifflet, 6 January, 1960. Louvain: UCL, Rifflet Farde 98.

The Spring of 1949 saw the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, a mutual defense agreement intended to dissuade the Soviet Union from any adventurism in Western Europe. In March, the SMUSE's Executive Committee released a communiqué outlining their position.[239] As noted above, the group was already privately committed to collective defense, but one designed to ensure independence from the two blocs: in six months, this would appear on the official platform, and a year later, they would throw the whole weight of the organization behind Pleven's proposal for a European Defense Community. This new treaty threatened to render a "European" defense unnecessary, subsumed under an American military umbrella that would effectively align Europe with the United States. Once again, as during the first half of 1947, official American policy threatened to undermine the group's policy objectives.

The response did not overtly categorize NATO as negative. The rationale for NATO was unimpeachable: the Soviets had demonstrated varying degrees of intransigence, violence and obstructionism, and held questionable interpretations of their treaty obligations[240] (they were also unquestionably consolidating a sphere of influence in the east, though the SMUSE was equating this with America's economic and cultural expansion in the west). Germany was divided, most of Europe was weak, and the French military, such as it was, was bogged down in colonies like Indochina, where it was futilely trying to maintain some semblance of control over a few cities on the eastern seaboard of their former dominion. In other words, even the SMUSE could no longer argue that there was nothing to worry about: *some* form of joint military capacity was necessary.

The response only implicitly accepted NATO, but argued that "any military pact carries certain dangers, because it prioritizes strategic and military considerations over the social and political dimensions which alone can bring lasting security and peace."[241] The tensions that existed in Europe could not properly be resolved with a simple security agreement, especially one that would certainly be interpreted as antagonistic by the Soviets. European nations needed defense against attempted aggression, but should

[239] "Communiqué du comité exécutif devant le Pacte Atlantique." Paris: CHS 559 AP 43, "MSEUE mars 49."
[240] See for example the fraught meetings of the "Big Four," where Soviet interpretations of agreements on reparations were the subject of repeated contestation. "Compte-rendu du Conseil des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères, 26 Septembre 1948." Robert Schuman holdings: Cabinet Schuman no 3 ; Archives Diplomatiques, La Courneuve, France
[241] « Comuniqué du Comité executif devant le Pacte Atlantique. » Paris: CHS, 559 AP 43. "MSEUE mars 49." Translation mine.

also to work towards "endowing the world with a stable and peaceful structure."[242] It might be resumed as a grudging acceptance of the basic premise of collective defense while characterizing NATO itself as dangerous and insufficient.

The Third Congress

The SMUSE left little record in the second half of 1949 save a flurry of invitations and position papers centered on their third major congress, scheduled for the first week of November. It was presided by André Philip in his first high-profile turn as leader of the Movement. It came at a delicate moment.

The group's promising relationship with Labour had come to an end and showed no sign of revival. Despite some socialist advances in Europe, the group felt that Britain (along with Scandinavia) had purposefully insulated themselves and their programs from the rest of Europe lest cooperation prove too costly.[243] Labour's encouraging victory in 1945 was manifesting itself in a purely domestic program that had little potential for extension to the rest of the continent. Keep Left, the SMUSE's Trojan Horse, was no longer an effective ally either, despite the publication of a new pamphlet titled "Keeping Left" in 1950.[244] Aneurin Bevan joined the group in 1951, and Brockway describes a gradual drift from the Keep Left group into the Bevan camp, which sought to promote and conserve the (domestic) Socialist achievements of the early Labour administration, notably Bevan's signature healthcare project.[245]

The SMUSE had so far been mere observers in Europe's nascent institutional advances. NATO, the Council of Europe, and the International Authority for the Ruhr had been developed with little to no involvement from the group, though as noted, André Philip had been instrumental in the latter two. As the 1940s drew to a close, their competitors in the *Nouvelles Equipes* had established high-level contacts in Geneva that helped tackle the thorny Franco-German question.[246] The SMUSE were no longer an

[242] *Ibid.*
[243] "Rapport Général de Jacques Robin, 31 Octobre 1949." Paris: CHS, Pivert 559 AP 43, "MSFEUE 1949."
[244] Morgan, 1984.
[245] Brockway, 1977. 164-65.
[246] Gehler and Kaiser, 2001. 773-789.

oppositional group, nor were they exactly passive, but they did remain reactive rather than proactive.

Finally, the Movement was somewhat ideologically inchoate. They had abandoned their original Marxist characterization of the world, wherein Capitalism was something to be actively combatted, and where the precept of ideological purity precluded negotiation or compromise with other groups. Gone too was the principle of neutrality with respect to the Soviet Union, and they had more-or-less begrudgingly acquiesced to the US-led NATO military alliance. Each of these steps constituted something of a retreat from the Movement's initial core principles, but these principles had not yet been repackaged into something coherent – the five-point program of December, 1948 was rather simplistic. To avoid the fate of Keep Left, they would have to formulate a realistic, coherent, and actionable program. The resolutions ultimately adopted at the 3rd Congress were coherent and actionable. They were also prescient, constituting something of a road map to the modern European Union, even if they were not yet entirely realistic.

The congress was reasonably well-attended: 137 participants from 18 countries (a thorough collection of relevant materials exists in Marceau Pivert's papers).[247] The latter figure is instructive: only a year prior, the International committee had been dominated by the French and Spanish with only five other nations represented. The 1949 congress included some notable new faces: Anna Siemsen, of the German SPD, would remain with the SMUSE until her death in 1951; Altiero Spinelli, well-known Italian anti-fascist imprisoned during the war and best known for writing the federalist Ventotene Manifesto attended, as did Paul Finet, Belgian politician and future head of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, joining his compatriot Raymond Rifflet, future head of the Movement. The British contingent numbered 16, including a handful of ILP members and at least three Labour MPs. It did not include Frank Ridley.

Philip's opening speech signaled a much-needed change from the statements of principle that had generally characterized the MUSSE, and laid out a comprehensive plan

[247] "IIIeme Congrès Européen du MSEUE," Paris: CHS, Pivert 559 AP 43 "MSEUE mars 49"

for the economic development of Europe. Europe needed, above all a continental economy. It would involve a common market, and harmonization and planning in all basic industries. Philip called for the establishment of a "veritable European Political Authority with real, though limited, powers." He also, somewhat disingenuously, acknowledged and excused the internal focus of the UK and applauded the creation of the Council of Europe. Both of these in fact pained him. But publicly berating Labour – with Labourites in the room – would do no good; rather his approach left the door open to a change of heart while lending some urgency to the establishment of European unity. As far as the Council of Europe was concerned, it had been a pyrrhic victory but a symbolically important one: concrete evidence that integration was possible.

Philip in fact preempted the concerns of some who had already prepared speeches. Italian anti-fascist activist and veteran of the pre-war anti-Stalinist Left Ignazio Silone, of the PSI, pleaded for concrete measures instead of the "prophetic and idealistic" measures often proffered by the group. Spinelli also demanded the development of a plan of action rather than visions of a future Europe. On the British question: William Warbey, Labour MP for Luton, followed up on Philip's gentle appraisal of his party. He acknowledged some faults in the party leadership, but encouraged the SMUSE to redouble its efforts. Bob Edwards similarly emphasized Labour's ability to expand nationalizations and promote European integration. Finally, Brockway had submitted a paper for the conference, arguing that the Commonwealth system was no longer the appropriate vehicle for Britain's economic assets, and that time would push Britain towards Europe.

Another topic of discussion was the European Movement. Enrique Gironella, in his introductory summary, which detailed the abandonment of the Third Force position and the rebranding from MUSSE to SMUSE, argued that the European Movement was not the best partner in the Movement's quest. He was contradicted, notably by Spinelli, who felt that the Socialist vision could be implemented more easily once the European Movement had established the institutional framework upon which to hang it. Philip, meanwhile had touted the Council of Europe launched at The Hague, implying that the European Movement had produced some positive achievements upon which to build.

The next topic of note was raised by Paul Finet, asking whether enough had been done to create public opinion in favor of the MUSSE, to which the then-president of the Movement's French section Georges Izard added that it was time to develop a real public

relations program. The group had in fact meant to develop such a grass-roots base of support, but thus far its financial situation had effectively precluded it. The lack of visibility had had some negative consequences, as in the House of Commons debate and at the Anti-Imperialism conference, where many had been essentially ignorant of the Movement's basic principles. It was also somewhat embarrassing that a movement focused on the European working class had no popular base of support.

Formalizing the shift that had begun a year previously, the Movement was now publicly "ready to examine with the other movements working for European Unity the implications of this resolution." The principled purism that had characterized – and hindered – the movement was thus officially abandoned. The process had begun with the admission of MRP members, a tentative dialogue with the UEF, and the name change. In the context of the European Movement, despite the misgivings of certain members like Gironella, it was essentially a formality to announce that the political direction of the Movement would no longer be an exercise in applied philosophy but rather a collaborative process including the European Movement and its adherents.

But the most important aspects of the Third Conference were the political and economic resolutions, which laid out a prescient road map for the future EU under an umbrella European Political Authority (EPA).[248] It would circumscribe the Movement's efforts for most of the next decade.

The conference formally resolved to pursue a "popular campaign for a … supranational Political Authority." "All members of the SMUSE are called upon to use every effort to stimulate a vast popular campaign in support of this Federation." "The conception of European federation must have … the maximum support of the masses of the various European countries which alone can prevail against the hesitations of the Governments." It would take a few months to get this campaign under way, but the Movement would devote significant resources in the ensuing years not only to a broad campaign of publications, local conferences, and speaking tours, but also to a public

[248] The 3rd European Congress of the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe (Paris, November 4-6 1949). London: LSE, ILP 16/1949. There were variations on this name depending on the context and time, particularly during the deliberations over the European Defense Community. For simplicity, I have chosen to refer to any European executive branch with indeterminate powers as the European Political Authority. Aside from the rather nebulous "socialist objectives" specified in the present resolution, it is functionally equivalent to other projected executives.

discourse on the application of Socialist principles in the new SMUSE magazine *Gauche Européenne* (see next chapter).

Structurally, the proposal prescribed a bicameral legislature with an executive drawing power from an Assembly of the People, proportionally elected by universal suffrage, and an Assembly of States; the two would have equal powers, the latter ensuring equal representation for smaller nations. Any disputes would be resolved by an independent judicial branch. The precise structure of the SMUSE's EPA thus constituted a supranational organization fairly similar to the eventual Communities.[249]

The political resolution laid out some of the EPA's potential competences. Primarily, there were several references to control of primary resources enunciated in the Economic resolution, including the coal and steel that had been on the table since 1946. This goal would become reality within six months, though there is little evidence of direct SMUSE influence on the process aside from their contributing to a wider consensus supportive of the project.

Projecting only slightly further into the future, the resolution called for the creation of European armed forces under the umbrella EPA. In this case, as we shall see in the next chapter, there is some evidence that the SMUSE policy did in fact have a tangible effect on the proposal and early endorsements of the European Defense Community. The Economic resolution also called for an atomic branch for the EPA: "Europe's atomic energy research and production should be coordinated under centralized controlled and exploited only for peaceful purposes." Here again, the movement would work behind the scenes to support the eventual Euratom. While the Euratom project's launch itself did not feature the intercession of the SMUSE, we shall see in chapter 4 that they did influence the application of Euratom's supranational executive powers to the coeval European Economic Community.

Projecting a little father into the future, the lowering of trade tariffs between member nations was a priority as well. Projecting much farther, at the risk of teleology, the resolution called for a department of foreign affairs and a common foreign policy. Also prescient but optimistic was a call for the establishment of dual national and European citizenship. The Economic resolution called for a common currency and a European bank

[249] The primary differences were majority voting in the council of ministers, which was never fully implemented, and direct elections to the European parliament, which would happen only in 1979.

Taken in its entirety, this program was out of reach; the Political Resolution freely admitted that "the actual balance of the political forces in Europe will probably not allow of this aim being attained immediately." For now, it was functionally a general platform upon which to campaign. In the immediate term, the Movement released a three-point enjoinder to its adherents: "Move on Towards Action."[250] The third point was boilerplate rhetoric about uniting "men and women of good will," but the first two would be enacted almost immediately. First, launch a popular campaign in support of a "Federal Pact." The SMUSE would begin campaigning publicly, first in a few Socialist strongholds, and eventually more broadly across respective countries. The second called for "an offensive within the European Assembly of Strasbourg, in order to strengthen it against the inertia and hesitations of the Council of Ministers." Again, André Philip was the man for the job.

The foregoing program is important one for three main reasons. First, it is a virtual road map to the modern European Union. The argument here is not that the SMUSE somehow laid the foundations of Europe – elements of this program had been evoked individually elsewhere, and there is no evidence of SMUSE pulling the strings in any systematic way. However, history shows that it was a coherent and ultimately feasible program, a feat in itself, especially considering the false starts and wrong turns that the Movement had made thus far. If nothing else, the SMUSE finally had the right idea.

The second – but related – reason, is that very soon, European and American[251] political currents would begin to move in the same direction: the basic outlines of the ECSC, the EDC, and the Treaties of Rome were all exactly in line with the Movement's objectives. When these latter were proposed (and the SMUSE were partly responsible for at least one such proposal), the Movement was already willing and able to respond supportively. More importantly, having established a transnational network that included notable members of the Franco-Belgian political elite in particular, they were also in a position to contribute to the elaboration of the programs, whether or not they eventually made the cut. These objectives, in other words, frame the Movement's actions

[250] ILP 16/1949. One wonders if this phrasing was not an awkward translation from French.
[251] Cf. NSC-68 and the US's "Containment" policy

in the following decade, and they will also guide the following chapters of this examination.

The final reason that this program is important is that it reveals the influence of André Philip, which is absent from the limited historiography on this Movement. Pre-conference materials about coal and/or steel communities referred frequently to the International Authority for the Ruhr, which Philip had worked on during his time as cabinet minister. The focus on the Assembly of Strasbourg (and the injunction to work within it specifically), could only have come with Philip, as he had been closely involved in the elaboration of the institution after The Hague Congress, and was the closest SMUSEr by far.

Conclusion

November, 1949, saw the Movement finally achieve maturity. It had existed for just under three years, if one dates its origin to the first proper conference in February, 1947. By the start of the present chapter, at the very end of 1947, it had already abandoned one of its foundational principles: the revolutionary Marxist anti-establishmentarianism of its founders Francis Ridley and Bob Edwards. As fate would have it, its most effective supporters at the time – Pivert and Brockway – were ultimately professional politicians. A second central tenet – the Third Force - was on the ropes as well, but the Franco-British axis represented by those two figures gave some hope that that the third major tenet – European Socialist unity – might become a reality.

If, in this first phase, the Movement can be characterized as dipping its feet into the fast-moving currents of post-war political reconstruction, the two years since turned out to be very turbulent indeed. The Movement's first foray into national politics in the first part of 1948 was rather shambolic, essentially expecting Brockway and Pivert – one a junior associate of a smallish faction of the Labour Party, and the other a local chapter president of one of the parties in a coalition government – to introduce a vision to be espoused by both nations. The program was almost completely submerged: the SFIO never committed to the program, and neither Labour nor Keep Left ever fully grasped its principles.

The Movement's Third Force position was scuttled by Soviet maneuverings in the first half of 1948. They had attempted, since the previous year, to recast the term as meaning neutrality rather than friendship, but ultimately had to admit that the Soviet Union was manifestly hostile to the democratic forces the Movement stood for. Ridley was out, and while Bob Edwards would remain in the Movement (largely absent from debate or policymaking), his continued participation was likely at least partially informed by his KGB connections.[252]

What remained of the original MUSSE principles in late 1949 was a commitment to supranational European integration (the anti-colonial program was still on the table as of late October, but no notable conferences or campaigns would follow). There is some long-term consistency here dating back to the first conference, notably a call to harmonize transportation and to delegate resource extraction to a common, supranational authority. Now, under the leadership of André Philip, the most experienced member of the Movement, they elaborated a highly comprehensive and eerily prescient program. Ironically, as history would have it, this group which had been essentially been playing catch-up for several years was now rather too far ahead of the curve.

Perhaps most importantly, the Movement also loosened its commitment to centralism inherited from the London Bureau. This was another concession to pragmatism, acknowledging the heterogeneity of the European political landscape, but it would give a certain autonomy and flexibility to the national sections now existing in the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Belgium. As we shall see in the following chapters, the French and Belgian sections would be responsible for the SMUSE's most notable successes. On the other hand, numerous "exile" sections (Poles, Spaniards, Greeks, and Yugoslavs) remained involved for the time being, but would be rather superfluous to the Movement's campaigns.

The final obstacle to success was overcome with another compromise: in joining the European Movement, the SMUSE would find itself on the receiving end of secret monies from the CIA. It was ready for a significant expansion, and some significant success.

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[252] Sanderson, David. "Veteran MP Bob Edwards was honoured by the Soviet Union." *The Times*, 15 September 2018. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/veteran-mp-bob-edwards-was-honoured-by-the-soviet-union-hdxxx70gw

Chapter 3

European Defense and the European Political Authority

By the end of 1949, the SMUSE was poised for its greatest achievements, notably an active involvement in the politics of the European project in the 1950s. After a rocky start, the Movement achieved a level of stability that would carry it through the 1950s and into the early 1960s. The eve of 1950 constitutes something of a reset, however, and this chapter will start by answering two questions begged by that reset. The first is whether the evolution of the Movement's philosophy, described in the first two chapters, warrants the treatment of the new SMUSE as essentially a different movement altogether. The second question is about the supposedly transnational Movement's leadership, and how to explain the fact that it was concentrated in France rather than anywhere else.

The second part of the chapter will cover the SMUSE's activities in the first half of the 1950s. The Movement threw considerable energy and resources into the Pleven Plan – indeed André Philip was a featured player in its genesis – which they conceived as a functionalist ingredient of their real goal, a supranational European Political Authority (EPA). Once the EDC process was under way, they would work towards launching the EPA independently of whether or not the EDC actually passed.

Continuity

Between 1946 and 1949, the underlying principles of the original Movement of the United Socialist States of Europe had changed significantly. The anti-Capitalism, bridge-socialism and ideological purity that had been the pillars of the original manifesto had proven to be non-starters in the fast-moving and heavily US-influenced development of post-war European politics. Such positions had become untenable almost immediately: several original MUSSE members were members of national

governments, and they naturally sought to recruit colleagues. The SFIO sponsored the June, 1947, conference in Montrouge, and Labour's Keep Left became the conduit for MUSSE policies in the UK by January, 1948. Both the French and British were soon beneficiaries of American strategic and economic support, contingent to some degree on adopting positions compatible with US foreign policy. The MUSSE was forced to moderate its philosophy markedly – though ruefully – to align with the American position on the Soviet Union.

These original principles had been a continuation of the oppositional interwar Left and had brought the original members back together in 1946, and it might be asked whether their abandonment – and the renaming of the Movement – constitutes enough of a break to write off the "MUSSE" entirely. Two factors suggest otherwise. First, the political program discussed at the first meeting (as opposed to its philosophical underpinnings) was more or less continuous. Since its origins, the Movement had sought the rational planning of Europe's economic assets under a democratic, supranational executive. This end goal had been elaborated in considerable detail in the years since, but remained entirely consistent throughout.

The second factor is the continuity in membership. New members associated themselves to the evolving movement over the years, but the fact that so many original members remained suggests that its appeal was more in the practical goals it pursued than in the revolutionary spirit it embodied. A central core of members from across Europe would remain devoted throughout the Movement's existence: John McNair (UK), Enrique Gironella (Spain), Jacques Robin (France), Witte (Greece) and Jef Last (Holland) had all attended the preliminary gathering in 1946. By mid-1948, while the Movement was still the MUSSE, Robert Bichet and Henri Frenay (France), Heinz Braun (Saarland), Raymond Rifflet (Belgium), and Mario Zagari (Italy) had all joined. Each would remain involved through movement's initial dissolution in 1964, and Rifflet and Zagari in fact continued to publish, hold conferences, and communicate with the network until 1993.[253]

If the Movement's program and the politicians drawn to it remained consistent, however, the same cannot be said of the manifesto's authors. The pamphlet had been Marxist and revolutionary and took the term "United States of Europe" from Lenin.[254]

[253] Various communications 1992-1993. Louvain: UCL, Rifflet Farde 125.
[254] Ridley, Francis A. "Unite or Perish!" London, ILP Press. 1947. London: LSE, ILP/5/1947-/1-21. 8

One central precept of the Movement's initial philosophy was that it could engage with both systems while retaining some semblance of independence; that philosophical dimension was rendered untenable very early, as described in chapter 1, and Frank Ridley abandoned the movement by late 1948. While Bob Edwards remained a fixture, his later identification as a Soviet agent[255] goes some way to explaining why he continued to attend even as the Movement abandoned the principles he and Ridley had articulated, and as the British section's influence waned significantly. What remained, then, was a Movement true to its goals, but open to the formerly demonized Capitalist nations of the world and recognizant of the Soviet Union's anti-democratic practices.

French leadership

One other aspect of the Movement that must be addressed is the fact that, like the London Bureau, it had purported to constitute a pan-European "Left." If opposition to the emerging capitalist-led system was abandoned, it did not necessarily imply that MUSSE policies could not continue to be articulated and lobbied for on a pan-European basis. A question therefore remains about why, despite participation from the four corners of Europe: from Yugoslavia and Poland to Spain and the UK, the movement ended up being functionally led largely by French individuals. The answer likely originates in the logistical restrictions of the early postwar period.

The years following the war were marked by a serious absence of the resources and infrastructure necessary to mounting an effective movement. One stark piece of evidence is the difficulty Pivert and McNair had in obtaining enough paper to share articles for their respective publications, as mentioned in chapter 1. Meanwhile, the June, 1948, conference had a number of absences attributed to the inability of international delegates to obtain visas or arrange travel.[256] The result of this was that in the first year or so of the Movement's existence, it fell to local representatives to organize events and produce the literature: the French as in the case of Montrouge, and

[255] Sanderson, David. "Veteran MP Bob Edwards was honoured by the Soviet Union." *The Times.co.uk*, 15 September 2018. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/veteran-mp-bob-edwards-was-honoured-by-the-soviet-union-hdxxx70gw. Soviet defector Oleg Gordievsky identified Edwards as a longtime informant and a recipient of the Order of the People's Friendship.
[256] "Report of the World Congress against Imperialism. London: The National Labour Press, 1948" London: LSE, ILP/5/1948 1-14 16-19

the ILP in the case of the Anti-Colonial congress. As the logistical situation improved in the late 1940s, the trend was already in motion.

The second factor that scuttled true pan-Europeanism in the Movement's structure is the fact that whereas the original participants had largely been independent and oppositional figures – avoiding the compromises, but lacking the advantages, of direct political agency – the Movement was soon operating via the intermediary of national governments. Consequently, those on the ground (i.e. Fenner Brockway, André Philip and Guy Mollet) were disproportionately qualified to constructively shape the Movement's strategies and objectives. This begs a final question: why the French rather than any of the other constituent national contingents, which, in late 1949, counted Spaniards, Belgians, Italians, Dutch, Germans, Greeks, Saarlanders and several exiled Eastern Europeans? The answer requires a brief *tour d'horizon* of the Socialist-leaning parties of the late 1940s with membership in the MUSSE and SMUSE.

First off the list of viable leaders were the Eastern European parties: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Ukraine and Yugoslavia all had political representatives at SMUSE conferences at various times. Two Slavs representing "Eastern Europe" sat on the International Committee established in November 1949, and Polish activist Zygmunt Zaremba served on the board of directors of the movement's magazine (see next chapter). With their home countries under Soviet control, however, these parties freely admitted that they had no domestic authority, and that there was nothing anybody could do about it.[257] Even in Yugoslavia, where Tito was carving out an independent position *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union, purported small-scale domestic propaganda efforts turned out to be illusory.[258] The movement, initially promoting a non-threatening openness to the Soviet Union, and later maintaining a more-or-less overt policy of non-alignment, offered a promising opening to these exiles, but they had neither resources nor domestic agency. As such, they could neither contribute to campaigning or effect any actual change.

[257] Polish representative Skrodsky at the 3rd SMUSE conference of November 1949. Paris: CHS, Pivert papers 559 AP 43.
[258] Topalovich to Gironella, 13 December 1954. Florence: EUI, ME 822.

The southern European parties with members in the SMUSE – from Greece, Spain and Italy – each suffered from prohibitive political discord either on a national scale or within Socialist politics. Greece was, in the late 1940s, in the midst of a civil war pitting the established monarchy against the Soviet-backed Greek Communist Party. The conflict erected significant logistical and financial obstacles to any kind of reliable leadership on the part of Greek Socialists, to the point of occasionally preventing travel to conferences. In addition, the Truman Doctrine had elevated the civil unrest from a fundamentally national issue to a Cold War issue, which further polarized the domestic environment and forced other nations – and national parties – to take clear sides. Witte's Archeo-Marxists would run in the 1951 election, garnering a paltry 1,148 votes.[259]

The Spanish political landscape, meanwhile was controlled by Francisco Franco, who had defeated a coalition of Republican and Socialist forces during the Civil War, and whose regime continued to harass, arrest and in some cases torture the political opposition at home. As noted previously, large numbers of expatriate representatives from both Catalan and Spanish parties attended SMUSE conferences, a relationship attributable to the kinship with the London Bureau, which had been an ally in the Civil War (see chapter 1). Two big names would remain affiliated: the best known was Rodolpho Llopis, head of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (*PSOE*), who would eventually sit on the International Committee.[260] The other was POUMista Gironella, unquestionably the most devoted and effective Iberian in the SMUSE. Yet neither had any agency in Spain, and the latter spent the entirety of Franco's tenure in France, returning to Spain only after Franco's death in 1976.

Italy was a different case. Neither an active civil war zone nor a Fascist dictatorship, it tends to feature prominently in the historiography of the European Coal and Steel Community, with Alcide de Gasperi often cited in the same breath as fellow Christian Democrats Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer.[261] Like France, the Italian government went through numerous incarnations in the late 1940s with consistent Socialist representation; like France, the potentially friendly Christian Democrats

[259] Nohlen, Dieter, and Philip Stöver. Elections in Europe: a Data Handbook. Nomos, 2010. 830
[260] He appears on the Committee as of February, 1952. 5th Congress materials, Amsterdam: IISG MSEUE 8
[261] Perkins, Mary Anne. *Christendom and European Identity*. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2004. Royce, Mark. *The Political Theology of European Integration.* Palgrave Macmillan 2017. Judt, Tony. *Postwar; A History of Europe since 1945*. Penguin, 2005.

loomed large in the legislature and cabinets… *un*like France, however, the Italian Socialist Party split very soon after placing second in the elections of 1946 with a 20% share of the vote. A rift appeared in November of that year, when PSI member Giuseppe Saragat publicly attacked the pro-communist wing of his party. At the party congress of January, 1947, a number of PSI members, notably an anti-Stalinist faction led by Mario Zagari, joined Saragat and split off from the party to form what would later become the Italian Democratic Socialist Party (*PSDI*). Zagari hoped that the split would enable the creation of a unified democratic left,[262] but this union did not materialize, and the new faction never did particularly well electorally (it peaked at 7.7% of the vote in its first run in 1948). It did, however, deprive the PSI of the kind of plurality it would have otherwise enjoyed. According to Paul Ginsborg, the PSI was left subordinate to the Italian Communist Party, and the *PSDI* to the Christian Democrats.[263]

PSDI member Ignazio Silone attended the congresses of 1949 and 1952, though his concrete contributions (or indeed agency) are unclear from the archival record. Mario Zagari, on the other hand, was elected to the Italian legislature in 1948, became deputy Secretary of the PSDI in 1949, then went on to hold Cabinet posts in the early 1970s. He was a regular fixture of the SMUSE from at least 1953 and remained affiliated for some 40 years, during which time he edited the Italian variant of the party's publication – *Sinistra Europea.* Despite his position, however, the PSDI's relative lack of importance in the Italian balance of power and the fact that Silone and Zagari were largely alone in their engagement with the SMUSE explain why Italian leadership was hardly on the cards either. Federalist heavyweight Altiero Spinelli, head of the *Movimento Federalista Europeo*, worked frequently with the SMUSE, though he does not appear to have had much political power.

The Benelux countries had marginally more potential, if only because of the customs union and the joint policy apparatus that supported it. Cabinet member and Head of the Luxembourg Socialist Party Michel Rasquin attended SMUSE conferences beginning in 1948. Jef Last, of the Dutch Socialist movement, was a founding member of the Movement and sat on both the international committee and the board of the SMUSE

[262] Griffiths, Richard (ed.). "The Testimony of an Eyewitness: Mario Zagari" In *Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s.* 100.
[263] Ginsborg, Paul. *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943-1988*. Palgrave Macmillan. 104-105

magazine *Gauche Européenne*. The Belgian section, meanwhile boasted some 76 members by November of 1951,[264] including several senators. Notable among them was Fernand Dehousse, who would later be of some consequence as President of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, and head of its Political Committee. Lifelong Europeanist Raymond Rifflet had been an early adherent to the Movement, and headed the Belgian section from its foundation in 1948, but he was very much a junior political actor during the period of this chapter, and was eclipsed beginning in 1952 by the adherence of Paul-Henri Spaak, whose agency will be a focus of chapter 4. Nonetheless, Rifflet would be active as member of the fraternal Union of European Federalists and of the European Movement, and was advisor to European Commission President Jacques Delors in the late 1980s. Rifflet and Zagari, as noted, would ultimately prove the Movement's longest-standing members: the Movement's last archival record dates to late 1993, describing an administrative reorganization naming the two men co-presidents.[265]

Yet for the time being, the Belgians and their neighbors would take a back seat to French leadership. There seems to be no particular reason why none of these countries – namely Belgium, or indeed some "Benelux" combination - took a more active role in the late 1940s aside from their small size and limited resources, an argument made explicitly by Luxembourg in the context of supporting the EPA project.[266]

One major European party, with broad support and political representation that might have carried some administrative burden of the SMUSE or contributing to enacting its program was the German Socialist Party (SPD). In the first elections of the Federal Republic, in August, 1949, the SPD garnered 29.2% of the vote to the Christian Democrats' 31%: Adenauer's very slim electoral majority made him unusually vulnerable to the SPD's criticism. He would, for instance, reject the initial proposal of the European Defense Community, endorsing the SPD position that Germany could not accept an inferior judicial status.[267]

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[264] "Document 894 – Members of the SMUSE," filed in "November 2, 1951." Florence: EUI, RR [Raymond Rifflet] 133.
[265] "Projet de Comité Provisoire". Louvain: UCL, Rifflet Farde 125, "Décembre 1992-1993." Rifflet was sole president through September of that year.
[266] *Gauche Européenne*, April 1953. Amsterdam: IISG, ZK 31205
[267] Europe Unie 3eme année, no. 3, "*La Communauté Européenne de Défense.*" 13. Florence: EUI, FD-143.

SPD MP Heinz-Joachim Heydorn had been a founding member of the Movement, present at the very first preliminary meeting of 1946,[268] and he was joined by an increasing number of his colleagues through the late 1940s and early 1950s. But there were a number of major obstacles to German leadership in the early years. The first and most glaring one was that until late 1949, Germany was under Allied tutelage and was not empowered to work independently on the international stage.[269] The Petersberg Agreement of November, 1949, went some way to restoring German sovereignty, increasing German authority in military matters, virtually ending the industrial dismantling imposed by the Allies, and offering the western Federal Republic of Germany membership in the International Authority for the Ruhr.[270]

In the early years of the Movement, there had been good reason to think that an SPD-SFIO agreement on integration could be brokered. As Brian Shaev recently showed, there was a central point of agreement on internationalizing heavy industry in both countries, and while the notion did eventually see the light with the ECSC, a split between the parties occurred starting in 1948 in the context of the International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR).[271] Essentially, the SPD and the then Pivert-led majority in the SFIO had agreed on a mutual internationalization of the sort that would only emerge a few years later. The IAR, however, only concerned *German* resources and industry. As such, it was opposed by the SPD, who, had no interest in internationalizing "before the others."[272] Schumacher further objected to the measure on the grounds that it would reawaken German nationalism. The official SPD position would be that "an international supervision of production and distribution must […] be applied to all heavy industry in the economic territories of Germany and Western Europe."[273] On the French side, meanwhile, the overly-idealistic Pivert faction found opposition from within the SFIO: party leader Guy Mollet determined that they did not have enough clout within the

[268] "Minutes of the first meeting of the International Socialist States of Europe, May 11-12, 1946." LSE: ILP/3/76
[269] Küsters, Hanns Jürgen. "West Germany's Foreign Policy in Western Europe, 1949-58: The Art of the Possible." In Wurm, Clemens; *Western Europe and Germany; the Beginnings of European Integration 1945-1960*. Oxford: Berg, 1995. 58.
[270] Von Oppen, Beata Ruhm, ed. Documents on Germany under Occupation, 1945-1954. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. 439-442. Available at http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Founding%208%20ENG.pdf
[271] Shaev, Brian. *Estrangement and Reconciliation: French Socialists, German Social Democrats and the Origins of European Integration, 1948-1957.* University of Pittsburgh, 2014.
[272] Schumacher's handwritten comments on a note from Markscheffel to the SPD central committee, 9 April, 1948. Cited in Shaev, 2014. 92.
[273] Shaev, 2014. 93.

French government to enact the more doctrinal version of their positions.[274] In other words, as was typical of the Movement's early years, *realpolitik* prevented the enactment of an overly principled project despite some demonstrable potential.

A second reason was that the SPD prioritized independence, and reunification with the Soviet-controlled eastern part of the country. Several SPD leaders had been imprisoned by the Nazis and considered themselves innocent of the blame implicit in allied influence in the country. They could not bring themselves to reconcile dependence on the US, Europe, or anyone else, with national independence: the SPD's 1948 strategic goals called for full and equal participation in any European scheme, and the cessation of any interference in Germany's internal affairs.[275] In 1949, the SPD pursued a wider electorate by campaigning on a more nationalistic platform, appealing to the widespread desire to see the country reunified – in this context, Soviet control of the Eastern zone meant avoiding alignment, or even overt sympathy, with the West.[276] The net result was that despite a nominal adherence to the ideal of European solidarity and collaboration, the SPD resisted in practice schemes that involved shared responsibility, diluted national prerogatives, or risked antagonizing the Soviet Union. The Petersberg Agreement was viewed as effectively institutionalizing western authority over the country and prompted a heated argument in the Bundestag, at the end of which SPD chairman Kurt Schumacher accused Adenauer of representing the Allies rather than the Germans. The chamber erupted, and Schumacher was suspended from the Bundestag for injury to order.[277] A year later, when Adenauer proposed that the French invest in a 40% stake in the Ruhr as a way to improve relations between the countries,[278] Schumacher accused him of treason and almost assaulted him in the halls of the German parliament.[279]

A third obstacle to German leadership was that the very notion of taking cues from Germany was so politically toxic in that period, particularly in France, that it would

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[274] Shaev, 2014. 92.
[275] Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 1948-1949 (Hanover, 1950. 114-115
[276] Bretton, Henry L. "The German Social Democratic Party and the International Situation." *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Dec., 1953), pp. 980-996 Published by: American Political Science Association. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1951120
[277] "Revues de Presse," September 22-30, 1949. La Courneuve: AN RdP 21.
[278] Granieri, Ronald J. *The Ambivalent Alliance; Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003. 36.
[279] "Compte-rendu de la conference des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères, Novembre 1949." La Courneuve: AN, Cabinet Schuman nº8, AD.

likely never have been tolerated. Three German wars against France in the foregoing 75 years, and the raw wounds of the most recent one, made the average French person justifiably wary of consorting with the enemy. The "Geneva Circle," a forum in which European leaders, notably Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman, met to discuss their respective domestic positions and potential paths forward, was shrouded in the utmost secrecy, involving innocent weekend trips to the Swiss border, unmarked cars and anonymous hotel reservations.[280] This began to change with the launch of the European Coal and Steel Community, but Franco-German rapprochement was punctuated by several false starts, and even the ultimately successful ECSC elaboration process had been kept very low-key. When the French cabinet approved Schuman's project in May, 1950, it was without fully comprehending the implications.[281]

By the end of 1949, the policy alignment between the SPD and the SFIO was fractured, and although productive back-channel communications would continue,[282] the SPD moved publicly into a posture that was effectively oppositional to the contemporary trends in European integration. At the same moment, the SMUSE was finally, and after much hand-wringing, finally moving much closer to those trends. Some members of the SPD continued to attend SMUSE conferences, including Anna Siemsen who remained head of the German section until her death in 1951, but the SPD never officially recognized the SMUSE or contributed its program.

The final candidate for leadership in the SMUSE was of course Britain. The Independent Labour Party had after all been the birthplace of the Movement. In the first years, two issues had made them ill-equipped to exert much leadership. First, the ILP had very limited means: the budget allocated to the MUSSE in 1947 had been about 300 pounds (equivalent to about 10,000 pounds today), far too little to pay for publications, administration and conferences on a European scale.[283] Second, the party had a highly

[280] Gehler and Kaiser revealed the role that the secret "Geneva Circle" played in establishing a rapport between Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer away from the public eye. Furthermore, little more than a dozen people had been privy to the details of the ECSC before the announcement, including American envoy Dean Acheson, informed out of courtesy only the night before.

[281] Foreign ministry staffer Jacques de Bourbon-Busset explained that Prime Minister Bidault played along ("il a joué le jeu"), but that the rest of the cabinet approved without quite grasping what was at issue; nor did the press a few days later when the public announcement was made: "Ils n'avaient pas compris la chose". "Jacques de Bourbon-Busset, interview in Paris, 13 Nov, 1984." La Courneuve: Record Group AO2. Audio.

[282] See Shaev, 2020, esp 49-53

[283] "National administrative council of the ILP - income and expenditures account for the year ended 29th

contentious relationship to Labour which, as described in chapter 1, actively obstructed engagement between Labour and the SFIO. This was overcome only when the latter sponsored the MUSSE itself and obscured the ILP. Soon, a fruitful bilateral relationship was established directly between the SFIO and Labour by the intermediary of Marceau Pivert and Fenner Brockway, somewhat sidelining the ILP.

The "big illusion"[284] with Labour began to crack in early 1950. Labour had abstained from a joint European program in 1948-49, but they had not overtly rejected Europe, leaving some on the continent hopeful that an arrangement was still possible. In the run-up to the general elections of February, 1950, however, Labour published *Let us win through together*, which constituted a break from the lip service theretofore paid to a Europeanist orientation:[285] the very first policy statement is that "the nation's greatest need is to export more, especially to North America." It continues:

> *"Exports must be sold in the right markets at the right price, and imports arranged according to our needs. Only by price control and rationing can fair shares of scarce goods be ensured. Only control over capital investment, distribution of industry, industrial building and foreign exchange can enable us to overcome the dollar shortage and build up a permanently thriving national economy."*[286]

The program goes on to place the economic health of Britain itself – not the European people in general – at the very core of policy. The maintenance of full employment in Britain, rather than the collective economic development of Europe, would determine import-export, monetary, and fiscal policy. The nationalization of the coal industry was held up as a great achievement for the British working man, and the manifesto elsewhere predicted the upcoming nationalization of the steel and concrete industries as well. "Labour will not be content until each public enterprise is a model of efficiency and of social responsibility. The Government must be free to take all necessary steps to that end,"[287] and Labour would "stand firm against any attempt to intimidate us or to undermine our position in the world."[288] In doubling down on British government

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february 1948," LSE: ILP/3/36.

[284] Griffiths, 1993. 102.

[285] The subsequent passage draws from an online reprint of the manifesto (link below). As such, there are no page numbers to cite; I will instead refer to sections by their subheadings. *Let Us Win Through Together: A Declaration of Labour Policy for the Consideration of the Nation*. Labour Party: 1950. http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1950/1950-labour-manifesto.shtml

[286] *Let Us Win…* "Raise Production, Lower Costs"

[287] *Let Us Win…* "THE SOCIALISED INDUSTRIES"

[288] *Let Us Win…* "One World of Peace and Plenty"

control, Labour was effectively removing itself from the ongoing European discussions - and SMUSE policy - concerning international management structures for European heavy industry. It implicitly eliminated any notion that Britain would be willing to curtail its own sovereignty in order to better align with the Continent, a basic premise of the SMUSE – and indeed any European integrationist – project.

There were also negative signals with respect to the SMUSE's (admittedly inchoate) position vis-à-vis the colonial world, which had been to bring it into the European planning structure on an egalitarian basis (McNair's underwhelming colonial conference notwithstanding, the basic principle had not been revised). Bevin's Western Union, as noted in the previous chapter, had already envisioned something less than full equality with Britain's Commonwealth partners, and Labour now elaborated a policy rather reminiscent of Imperial privilege: bulk purchase agreements and long-term contracts, and a search for further sources of raw materials supported by British investment.[289] Rather than looking to its continental partners for long-term stability, and sharing that access with its former possessions, Labour would reinforce the preferential ties it had developed in earlier times. Such an outlook would almost necessarily be detrimental to Britain's other trade partners, especially Continental ones, and it flew in the face of the open market policies advocated by the SMUSE and others.

There is one paragraph in the 1950 platform on the question of European unity: "In Europe, great strides have been taken towards the creation of a new economic and political unity." Perhaps questionably, considering its pointed abstention from the Congress of Europe, it continues: "no country [had] given more leadership to this great movement than Labour Britain." However, "Britain is part of a vast Commonwealth extending far beyond the boundaries of Europe…"[290] If there had been any doubt as to whether Britain would opt for an investment in the fraught, tentative European project, it was thoroughly laid to rest in the run-up to the election of 1950. There would be no risk-taking or experimentation, no collaboration with former rivals, no mutual curtailment of sovereignty, no grand adventures with France, the Netherlands or Germany. Labour would, in its own words "*Put the Nation First.*"[291]

[289] *Let Us Win…* "Unity of the Commonwealth"
[290] *Let Us Win…* "One World of Peace and Plenty"
[291] *Let Us Win…* "Put the Nation First"

Essentially, as of February, 1950, Labour policy openly rejected participation in a supranational European project. André Philip published a long response soon thereafter, in which he called Labour's position "a hard very blow to all the Socialist parties of the continent" and laid out a litany of grievances.[292] The piece was published under SMUSE letterhead, though Philip noted that it was only a personal opinion pending the Movement's next international congress. Nevertheless, it was a somewhat presumptuous move that betrayed either a disproportionate sense of his importance in the movement (he had only been involved for a year or so), or a dejection with Labour so potent that he did not think it necessary to consult his colleagues. In either case, there was to be some significant pushback from the British section. He accused Labour of hypocrisy in insisting that only fully-empowered Socialist parties should be partnered with, pointing out that Labour itself held a very slim majority in Britain, and that they had declared solidarity with the Conservative party and with the decidedly anti-Socialist United States. He reprimanded it for the unannounced currency devaluation of the previous September, engendering economic shocks he asserted were primarily felt by organized labor. He pointed out certain contradictions and logical fallacies, and belabored the fact that Labour's arguments could and had already been used by anti-Socialist forces in Europe. Britain's ties to the Commonwealth also came under fire – France, Philip pointed out, also had overseas territories, which didn't prevent her from being committed to the European idea. The central British position that Europe should function through "voluntary co-operation of sovereign states," he railed, was what had made the League of Nations no more than a "debating society," and it bore "a heavy part of the responsibility for the catastrophe which we have lived through." Finally, he ridiculed the British-led "COMISCO," tasked with reconstituting the Socialist International. It was, he charged, simply a forum for the exposition of Government policy, manned by salaried bureaucrats, and whose resolutions Labour ignored anyway. Labour's arguments, he concluded, were mere "pretext."

The function of the Philip's response was purportedly to discourage other Socialists from following the British model, and he made an effort to be pragmatic: in the midst of his deconstruction of Labour's position, he "reject[ed] any notion of a neutral

[292] Philip, André. "Le Socialisme et l'unité européenne." Mouvement Socialiste Pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe, 1950. Available at https://www.cvce.eu/obj/andre_philip_le_socialisme_et_l_unite_europeenne-fr-1a31fe1f-6be6-4e9f-8cd1-7d1911abfdd1.html.

Europe," and argued that whatever the integration status of Western Europe, it must operate "in narrow solidarity with all democracies, in the context of the Atlantic community." This was an uncharacteristically frank admission of Atlanticism (a personal position that did not reflect the consensus within the SMUSE) and an olive branch of sorts to Labour's leanings; in pursuing European integration, he continued, "we will always seek the participation of the British […] but we will no longer let ourselves be delayed by their hesitations and reservations, and will no longer seek impossible compromises with them."

A corollary to this exasperation with Labour was that there was less incentive for SMUSE coordination with the British, reducing the strategic importance of the British connection or the SMUSE British Centre's priorities. By the autumn of 1950, tensions ran high between the French and British sections. Things were laid out in an October 12 letter from the British to Gironella: "The British Centre [were] unanimously opposed to the decision to embark on a purely federalist approach to the problem of European unity. […] To support the principles of European federalism would completely destroy the whole of the work of the British Center within the Labour movement where there is very little support for the federalist conception."[293] The British Center were evidently still somewhat more dogmatic than their French counterparts, so that while they had signed off on the Movement's reorientation of late 1949, they had remained uneasy with the move away from a properly Socialist vision towards federalism and engagement with the UEF and the *Nouvelles Equipes*. One can safely assume that the aggressive indictment which Philip had published in February, contributed to a feeling of marginalization and frustration. Since then, Labour has openly rejected participation in the nascent ECSC: Zagari would describe a disappointing meeting at Transport House in mid-1950, where the Labour argument boiled down to "we have got the coal and we are keeping it."[294] The loss of Labour as a viable ally – signaled in February and confirmed after the Schuman announcement, left little incentive to compromise in favor of the Movement's British connections. The Fourth Congress had been scheduled – by the French – for Strasbourg in November 1950, to coincide with a meeting of the Consultative Assembly at which the political dimensions of European defense would be

[293] "Edwards/McNair to Gironella, 12 October, 1950." Manchester: PHM. Bob Edwards personal papers: GB 0394 BE; "European Unity"
[294] Griffiths, Richard (ed.). "The Testimony of an Eyewitness: Mario Zagari" In *Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s.* 102.

discussed.[295] Edwards broke openly with the French in his October letter: the British Center would not be ready by then and "will not recognize or attend a conference."

If the British section could claim to have founded the Movement, and if they could, in late 1950, still allude to work being done within the Labour party, it should be noted that concretely, this consisted of contacts with Keep Left. The following months would sound the death knell of those British contribution to the SMUSE's goals. By late October, letters from Marceau Pivert to Brockway and Keep Left were going unanswered, and contributions to French publications was limited to reprints of articles from the *New Statesman* and summaries of debates from the House of Lords.[296] In April, 1951, the Keep Left group was officially disbanded. It was replaced by the "Bevan Group," focused on consolidating domestic achievements until proper Socialism took hold elsewhere – a British variant, perhaps, of "Socialism in One Country."[297] The Bevanites were "extremely chary about anything like formal contact with groups of individuals on the continent."[298] Though there would be some sporadic communication between the French and the Bevanites, little came of it, and it left the French SMUSErs very little incentive to mend fences with their British counterparts. They had a promising program which was by late 1950 well on the way to actualization, influence in the French legislature, productive connections with other members of the European Movement, and a steady new income stream courtesy of the ACUE.[299]

The sum total of the foregoing examination is twofold. First, the Movement embraced a realpolitik approach to the question of European integration, which prioritized substantive progress via established parties at the expense of its initial principled ideological fervor. In most cases, this was an uncontentious and organic

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[295] Klompe, Margaretha. "Political Aspect of European Defense," 5 May 1951. 2. *Parliamentary Assembly*, PACE. http://semantic-pace.net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbnQvbncveG1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4dHIuYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0yMjImbGFuZz1FTg==&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZS5uZXQvWHNsdC9QZGYvWFJlZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUERGLnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTIyMg== See references to resolutions passed November 23 and 24.

[296] Pivert to Ian Mikardo [Keep Left], October 21, 1950; Pivert to Brockway, October 31, 1950. Manchester: PHM. Jo Richardson personal papers: GB 0394 RICH (Jo Richardson and Ian Mikardo), LP/RICH/2/3/3b

[297] Orlando Figes describes this 1924 Stalinist policy as an acknowledgement that the anticipated European socialist revolution was not taking place.

[298] Mikardo to Tom McKitterick, 1 February, 1951. Manchester: PHM. GB 0394 RICH (Jo Richardson and Ian Mikardo), LP/RICH/2/3/5[a]

[299] In December, the first contributions from the ACUE and associated sources were allocated either directly or via the European Movement's Georges Rebattet. See Florence: EUI ME-974. Rebattet to Gironella, December 12, December 27. Rebattet to Monnier, December 26.

development: conference documents reveal few objections from the exile parties, for instance, which seemed content, from their continued engagement, to contribute morally to any constructive project. Relations were somewhat more contentious with certain sections, however, none more so than the British, who resisted compromise even as hopes evaporated that their own national connections would prove fruitful.

Second, but by the same token, by the time the movement was on its feet in 1949, the French SFIO emerged as having both the political will and agency to be a productive avenue for the SMUSE's objectives. From the beginning of 1950, the Movement was largely a French one, and by mid-1951, wholly so. In the same period, the SMUSE began to receive an income stream from the European Movement, which allowed it to act independently, and avoid becoming the transnational wing of the SFIO. It would continue to campaign for a supranational Europe, maintain an international Socialist network, and manage a pan-European dialogue on Socialist approaches to contemporary problems but it was now independently funded, and it was led and administered from Paris under the leadership of André Philip, in partnership with the SFIO.

Moving on: The European Political Authority

As far as the SMUSE were concerned, a European defensive organization (EDC) was inseparable from a political one (EPA), and by the time the EDC draft treaty was completed, it included provisions for the elaboration of the EPA.[300] However, if the two institutions are essentially part of the same story for our purposes, the historiography has tended to treat them separately. Two monographs will feature importantly here: Fursdon's *The European Defence Community*,[301] and Griffith's *Europe's First Constitution*.[302] Without disagreeing with the main arguments of either work, this discussion will add a layer to the story on three fronts. First, while it is often held that

[300] The institution is often referred to as the European Political "Community," notably by Richard Griffiths, which aligns it with the other European "communities." The SMUSE called it an Authority, and insofar as the central dimension we will deal with is its power rather than its constituency, it seems fitting to use the term EPA.
[301] Fursdon, Edward. *The European Defence Community*, London: The Macmillan Press, 1980.
[302] Griffiths, Richard. *Europe's First Constitution; the European Political Community, 1952-1954*. London: The Federal Trust, 2000.

Jean Monnet[303] and René Pleven were the fathers of the EDC proposal, I will show that the idea predated public pronouncements from either man, and that a direct link can be traced back to the Socialist Movement. Second, though this has so far been unacknowledged, the SMUSE was centrally instrumental in the article triggering the EPA component of the EDC treaty, and in endowing the proposed EPA itself with supranational powers. Finally, the EDC's rejection by the French parliament has variously been attributed to a combination of external factors, including opposition from the Communists and the Gaullists, a general popular revulsion at German rearmament, and the mealy-mouthed rhetoric of French *Président du Conseil* Pierre Mendès France. However, a very important internal factor gets rather little press, and it is central to the SMUSE story: the SFIO, the Movement's most important political ally and one of the EDC's biggest cheerleaders, was unable to maintain the party unity that could make or break the project.

The SMUSE program published in November, 1949, included two major schemes that would soon come to fruition: the first was the project of integrating heavy industry, which would see the light in the form of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This was largely the work of the Schuman foreign ministry and hinged on a relationship established between Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer in a context that owes much to Christian Democracy.[304] The other was a formulation for a European defensive organization. Both, in the SMUSE conception proposed in late 1949, were relatively modest but attainable functionalist elements that were necessary in their own right, but would exist under a far more important supranational political umbrella. They were also ideas that had circulated in various forms for some time, so that there was some reason to think they had some chance of succeeding. As regards the ECSC, there is no evidence that Philip or the SMUSE had any direct role in its elaboration. However, the SMUSE's role in promoting the European Defense Community was significant, and has been largely unacknowledged.[305]

[303] See also Cardozo, Rita. "The Project for a political Community." In Pryce, Roy, ed. *The Dynamics of European Union*. London: Croom Helm, 1987.
[304] See Gehler and Kaiser's work on the Geneva Circle
[305] Fursdon, Edward. 1980. Griffiths, 2000.

Fursdon[306] states that Monnet's notions of supranationalism predated André Philip's. While it may be somewhat pedantic to argue about the origin of an idea, it should be noted that the SMUSE had published a detailed blueprint for an EPA penned by André Philip - including an explicitly supranational executive - a year earlier. Richard Griffith directly credits the idea of putting a European army under the control of a supranational authority to Jean Monnet's planning department, sometime between a Council of Europe debate in August, 1950 and Pleven's announcement in October.[307] This fits into a pattern on Monnet which goes largely unchallenged (except by Milward and his dismissive appraisal of the "European Saints"): he is also credited with the European Coal and Steel Community, though the latter was commissioned by Schuman's Chief of Staff Bernard Clappier[308] and had been previewed in very similar terms by others, including the SMUSE, in the months prior to Monnet's initial note to Schuman. Given the number of historians and personalities to have assigned credit to Monnet for the project,[309] there has been little examination of the degree to which he is solely responsible. Monnet certainly had access to members of government and excellent timing, and his job as a civil servant put him in a position to participate in the elaboration of both projects; he also certainly deserves credit for the perhaps less grandiose task of subsequently implementing these fraught projects in such a delicate climate. Nevertheless, one should not conflate those skills with the political agency necessary to actually launch the projects.

The second issue with the historiography is the lack of reference to the SMUSE, an omission attributable to the marked lack of visibility that the movement continues to suffer. Fursdon and Griffith, for example, discuss the agency of Frenay's UEF and of Altiero Spinelli's *Movimento Federalista Europeo* (*MFE*), and both note the intersection of those two movements in the context of the European Movement. As noted, both Griffiths[310] and Fursdon[311] acknowledge some involvement from André Philip. Both the

[306] Fursdon, 1980. 55.
[307] Griffiths, 2000. 56.
[308] Bourbon-Busset, Jacques. Interview, Paris, 13 November 1948. La Courneuve: Archives Diplomatiques, Record group AO2. Audio; track 3.
[309] Elgey, Georgette. *La IVe République; République des Contradictions*, 1965. Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation*. 1969. Adenauer, Konrad. *Memoires 1945-1953*. Trans. Denise Meunier. Paris: Hachette, 1965. 265. Also Monnet, Jean. *Mémoires*, 1976. The (ghost-written) book describes Monnet taking an afternoon walk while on vacation in the Alps in early 1950. Moses-like, he is said to have descended from the mountain with the solution to the Franco-German problem in mind.
[310] Griffiths, 2000. 51, 56
[311] Fursdon, 1980. 13, 54-56

development of an EPA surrounding the EDC, provided for in Article 38, and the ultimate supranational character of that EPA, were, in Griffith's telling, attributable to the intersection work of Paul-Henri Spaak and a number of others. Yet there is no acknowledgement of the single organization that brought these personalities together. It would be a bridge too far to argue that the movement was somehow directing the elaboration of the EPA – Spinelli's and Philip's notions certainly predated their involvement in the Movement – but it is worth trying to parse to what extent the SMUSE's members contributed to the project and to what extent those contributions were coordinated.

In its post-conference pamphlet of November 1949[312] the SMUSE had defined the "supra-national Political Authority" outlined in Philip's opening speech, which would supervise harmonization of industrial production, a common foreign policy institution, and international fiscal alignment. The executive power of the Political Authority was to be derived jointly from two chambers: the Assembly of the People formed by direct elections and universal suffrage, and the Assembly of States ensuring a balanced representation for small states. In other words, its executive would be accountable to the European electorate, as opposed to government representatives. The "Assembly of the States" (eventually the Council of Ministers) sought to counterbalance the demographic advantages of larger nations, but the SMUSE would insist that it operate by majority vote so as to avoid giving veto power to national governments.

The foreign policy institution of this Political Authority was to include a military branch wherein "all high commands will be under the control of the European Authority." And so, in November, 1949, eleven months before René Pleven's proposal of the European Defense Community – and seven months before the North Korean action that spurred that proposal[313] – the Third Congress advocated the creation of a European army under supranational control. They were in fact not out of line with the prevailing winds: the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had visited Europe in August and discussed various modalities for European defense;[314] and a month after the congress, Konrad

[312] *The 3rd European Congress of the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe.* LSE: "ILP 16/1949"
[313] Shortly after the invasion, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson had pulled the French aside and demanded "Germans in uniform by fall 1951" (Sylvie Guillaume. *Konrad Adenauer*. Paris: Editions Ellipse, 2007. 135)
[314] Stars and Stripes "Joint chiefs of staff arrive in Europe; parleys slated in London, Paris." *Stars and Stripes*, 31 July 1949.

Adenauer gave an interview to the Cleveland Plain Dealer in which he opined that Germany ought to contribute to a "European army under command of higher European headquarters."[315] Nevertheless, the SMUSE felt that the political situation in Europe would "probably not allow of this aim being attained immediately," resolving to contribute towards building a European Federation until the balance of political forces allowed their objectives to be implemented. Capitalizing on the new connections, the method of implementation would be "an offensive within the European Assembly of Strasbourg."[316]

As seen from within the SMUSE, the rather quick success of the ECSC proposal in May, 1950, was a validation of the feasibility of the plan. Contemporary events also lent some urgency to a European defense arrangement: Russia's successful nuclear test in late August, 1949; Chairman Mao's victory in October and his transfer of military aid to anti-French forces in Indochina, and most recently the North Korean invasion of its southern neighbor provided an urgency to the SMUSE's project of a supranational authority that would include a defense branch. The wider political dialogue, meanwhile, arrived at the idea through a reverse logic: the pressing need for European defense implied a political entity to run it.

The invasion of South Korea by the North, in June, 1950 was widely (though incorrectly[317]) seen as a direct move by Stalin signaling his expansionist intentions.[318] The largely US-dependent North Atlantic Treaty, with a defensive line along the Rhine and Ijssel rivers, would be insufficient to properly secure Europe in the case of a Soviet invasion (Dutch Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker memorably called the defensive arrangements "sheer, unacceptable nonsense from start to finish."[319]) Fears arose that

[315] United Press "German Army Unit is Offered to West" *New York Times*, 4 December 1949. 23. Available at https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1949/12/04/issue.html
[316] "*The 3rd European Congress of the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe*" LSE: ILP 16/1949
[317] Jung Chang. *Mao, The Unknown Story*. Knopf Doubleday, 211. 340-359. Kim successfully played Mao and Stalin against each other in a bid for permission and support. Stalin left the last word – and ultimate responsibility for supporting Kim – to Mao. The West's general conception of global Communism in this period largely did not acknowledge the balance and tensions between China and the Soviet Union, or the degree of autonomy that this afforded smaller Communist regimes like those of Kim Il Sung or Ho Chi Minh.
[318] Dockrill, M. "The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean War, June 1950-June 1951." *International Affairs*, Summer 1986. 459-460. United States Department of State, *Bulletin*, 3 July 1950. Cited in Fursdon, 1980. 68.
[319] Fursdon, 1980. 79.

the American strategic realignment under NSC-68,[320] with its more diffuse dispersal of US forces, would treat Europe as a buffer, slowing but not stopping a Soviet advance until the United States mobilized enough forces to counterattack. It was clear, however, that an upgraded defensive arrangement would necessarily involve German manpower (indeed, American Secretary of State Dean Acheson would demand it explicitly[321]). Several months before the Pleven plan was announced, the question of how to deal with a universally unappealing restoration of the German military reared its head.

The Council of Europe took up the issue in August, presenting Philip with the opportunity to argue for his supranational conception of European defense. He argued that a European Political Authority under supranational control would provide the solution the German problem. Faced with the recent manifestation of Communist expansionism, Philip intoned, action had to be taken, and a collaboration of national armies – with their separate chains of command – was not an adequate option. The Council of Europe, he said, should create "a European army financed by a European fund fed by European taxes." With a European Army, he continued in reference to Germany, there would be "no more problems of a national character."[322]

The French delegation submitted two proposals the following day advocating a European army run by a European Authority under Democratic control. Neither of those resolutions was endorsed by any British delegate. Despite its reticence to lead Europe, the abstention of Great Britain from such a scheme was a deal breaker, and the proposals almost died. The setback was temporary, however, as within a few days, the SMUSE-European Movement connection paid off when Winston Churchill brought the weight of his stature to the notion by appropriating the spirit of the French proposals. Philip later claimed credit for the reversal, telling French historian Georgette Elgey how he brought the statesman around: "There was a […] dinner with Churchill. He did not want to commit Britain to a European Army. But as I maintained that German rearmament would never be accepted in another context, he gave way."[323] The French withdrew their proposal and Churchill submitted a virtually identical one under his own name:

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[320] Commissioned by Truman, the document was finalized on April 12. https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf
[321] Guillaume, Sylvie. *Konrad Adenauer.* Paris: Editions Ellipse 2007. 135.
[322] Walton, Clarence. "Background for the European Defense Community," *Political Science Quarterly* , Vol. 68, No. 1 (Mar., 1953), pp. 42-69. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2145750
[323] Elgey 1965. 246

> *"The Assembly, in order to express its devotion to the maintenance of peace and its resolve to sustain the action of the Security Council of the United Nations in defense of peaceful peoples against aggression, calls for the immediate creation of a unified European Army subject to proper European democratic control and acting in full co-operation with the United States and Canada."*

It is worth noting here that while it may be surprising for Churchill to advocate the measure, he was not above lending weight to notions to which he did not personally subscribe. The Atlantic Charter was one such instance, wherein he agreed to language endorsing "the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they live," while unequivocally supporting British imperialism. He would almost immediately disavow a universalist interpretation of the statement.[324] In the context of the EPA, Churchill again spoke for what might be termed the greater good, later telling Anthony Nutting "I meant it for [the continent], not for us."[325] In other words, Philip's assertion that he convinced Churchill of the need for a European Army though Churchill may not have believed so of his own accord, is plausible.

An objection from Labour MP Hugh Dalton, on the grounds that the phrase "under proper Democratic control" was unclear, was resolved in an hour by the addition of a clause proffering a European Minister of Defense – further implying a European political organism - and the proposal passed by a margin of 89 to 5. An international debate on the subject of the EDC had been launched.

Two weeks later, in mid-September, Churchill lobbied before the House of Commons, defending the scheme by citing American impatience with Europe and the "horrible plight" Europe was currently in, defended as it was only by the American nuclear umbrella.[326] Only a few days later did Jean Monnet write to Schuman, pitching a

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[324] Crawford, Neta C. *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization and Humanitarian Intervention.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 297.
[325] Fursdon, 1980. 77.
[326] Churchill to House of Commons, September 12 1950.
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1950/sep/12/defence-government-proposals

unified army under supranational control.[327] (At the time, Schuman was under instructions from his government not to agree to German military contributions,[328] and a supranational command structure would render moot the notion of a "German" army.)

Indeed, Pleven explained in his speech introducing the EDC on October 24, 1950, that the proposal was "directly inspired by the recommendations adopted on August 11, 1950 by the assembly of the Council of Europe;"[329] he proposed supranational "political institutions of a united Europe" and a "complete fusion" of military forces.[330] This recommendation was ultimately attributable to Philip. The resolution of the Third Congress to act by the intermediary of the Council of Europe proved successful, and Philip's familiarity with the players involved was a decisive factor in the path from the proposal to the actual launch of the EDC project.

The SMUSE's Fourth Congress went ahead, without British participation, in mid-November, 1950. It attempted to sharpen the priorities that would guide the Movement over the next 15 months.[331] It included committees and some ultimately ineffectual resolutions on recent events in Spain and Italy. The more important discussions centered on the mechanism of European construction spread over three sets of resolutions covering military, political and economic institutions. Taken together they amounted to a more modest, methodical, functionalist vision than before, though these were not entirely coherent.

European integration, it was argued, has been thus far unsuccessful because of the lack of a political authority. The political resolution called for the establishment of a constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage, which would submit a proposal for an EPA to be approved and implemented by January 1952. This would prove optimistic. The military resolution, meanwhile, did not much diverge from the idea outlined in late 1949 and announced by Philip before the Council of Europe in August: a unified army under a European defense minister accountable to a supranational EPA. It did, however,

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[327] Monnet to Schuman, 16 September 1950. Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe. "Monnet correspondence, 1947-1953."
[328] Fursdon, 1980. 85
[329] "Déclaration du Gouverneur français René Pleven le 24 octobre 1950," *Journal officiel de la République française*. Débats Parlementaires, Assemblée nationale. 10.1950. Paris: Imprimerie nationale. p.7118-7119.
[330] Fursdon, 1980. 89.
[331] Fourth Congress of the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe. Amsterdam: IISG MSEUE 7.

call for the appointment of a new political office of European foreign minister, to represent a unified European foreign policy on the world stage.

The "unanimously approved" resolution on economic institutions repeated the movement's perennial calls for specialized authorities covering energy, transport and agriculture, but whereas the EPA resolution would have established an umbrella organization, these authorities were to be individually responsible to a European parliamentary assembly. The archival record does not contain a summary of debate, so it is impossible to trace how such an inconsistency could have been approved unanimously. Perhaps committees were operating entirely independently, perhaps the conference was rushed. Even so, an oversight of this magnitude on an issue of such central importance to the movement suggests that the Movement was still working out its positions.

In the event, this would have little impact on the activities of the SMUSE over the following year for the simple reason that action in these areas were the purview of representatives of national governments, and as it happened, the direct political agency that had once undergirded the SMUSE fell apart in the same period. First, British contributions evaporated entirely. The Labour Party, an already increasingly unreliable ally, had won a very slim majority in 1950. They called a snap election in October, 1951, which they lost to the Conservatives. British participation was seen as vital to the viability of the European defense project, and despite Labour's reticence (for an opaque combination of reasons including issues of sovereignty, economics and national pride), the US had exerted some pressure to participate. Churchill, Conservative leader, had been less than sanguine, and any remaining pressure was definitively relieved a month after the election when the new Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden met with US president Eisenhower on the margins of a North Atlantic Council Meeting in Rome: the latter intimated that the American position had shifted from wanting UK *participation* in the EDC to external *support* for it. At the close of the Rome Conference in November 1951, Eden stated plainly that the UK would not contribute any direct military assets to a European army.[332]

On the French front, the SMUSE suffered a setback in the wake of the French elections of June, 1951. The SFIO performed poorly and decided on a self-imposed exile

[332] Fursdon, 1980. 128.

from government. The previous cabinet had included a number of SMUSE-affiliated Socialists including Guy Mollet (*Vice-Président* and minister to the Council of Europe), Albert Gazier (Minister of Information), Gaston Defferre, and François Mitterrand (though the latter two would only later adhere to the SMUSE).[333] The SMUSE thus lost much of its potential influence during the 18 months of inter-governmental deliberations on the modalities of the EDC treaty, a period in which France was left with a preponderant weight *vis-à-vis* the other nations involved. Nevertheless, the Mollet-led and Philip-influenced SFIO retained a significant presence in the legislative branch, where the acceptance of the treaty would ultimately be decided.

The absence of agency within the executive branches was not as debilitating as it might have been: the French government had committed at the outset to SMUSE's two principal components – supranationalism and the fusion of military forces – and the SMUSE remained centrally preoccupied with raising support among the public for those elements. Although Philip had helped drive the launch of the Pleven plan, the SMUSE's central focus was on a political authority. The EDC was primarily a functionalist ingredient for that Authority, thus many of the delicate details of the EDC treaty revolved around issues which the SMUSE did not fundamentally care about. Intergovernmental negotiations touching on the size of military units, funding contributions and resource allocation were largely incidental to the Movement's goals, though the command structure and the issue of (most notably German) military autonomy had seen a flurry of communication between Marceau Pivert and Brockway in late 1950 when the British position was still undetermined.

In the face of this setback, two things saved the SMUSE. The first was a focus on grass-roots activism resolved at the Fourth Congress. The Movement founded a Youth branch which would involve recruitment and propaganda; it also passed a resolution concerning the European Movement. That resolution opened with a disappointed appraisal of the EM's achievements: while it had notched a significant achievement with the establishment of the Consultative Assembly, it has since been struck with paralysis and was unable to reach resolutions acceptable to all the constituent movements. The SMUSE would thereafter consider the EM to effectively be little more than a liaison office and general propaganda center. At the same time, however, the Congress granted the

[333] Mitterrand would eventually be member of the French Section's *Comité Directeur*, though he may not have joined until early 1956.

International Executive Committee the ability to pursue contacts directly with the *Nouvelles Equipes*, the UEF and the MFE to campaign for supranational institutions. This would lead to the establishment of a sort of sub-committee of like-minded federalist groups within the European Movement (which was beginning to mirror the consequences of the distancing between the UK and the Continent), which would campaign together throughout Europe to raise awareness and public support particularly for the EDC.

Over the course of 1951, the SMUSE's efforts shifted largely to propaganda campaigns undertaken in collaboration with the activist members of the European Movement. Several hundred thousand leaflets were printed and distributed as part of a weeklong effort in March. A monthly bulletin named *Nouvelles de l'Europe* was published beginning in February,[334] which would feature regular articles from André Philip, and several publications came out of the Belgian section of the SMUSE, managed by Raymond Rifflet. These were prompted by developments in the intergovernmental negotiations, but did not diverge appreciably from the central message that whatever the merits of the arguments of the day, a supranationally-controlled army was the solution to Europe's problems both in terms of defense and political cohesion.

The second source of salvation was the relationship between André Philip and Paul-Henri Spaak. It is not clear when the two originally met, but they interacted in the context of both the European Movement and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, and both would be disillusioned with the achievements of these early European institutions. Philip saw an ally in Spaak from the outset, writing him a five-page letter in May, 1950, in the familiar second-person-singular,[335] pushing him to accept leadership of both the EM's Executive Committee and International Council in order to streamline the unwieldy organization. When Spaak faced opposition to re-election in 1950, he would specifically credit André Philip and SMUSEr Marinus van der Goes van Naters for supporting his bid.[336] The relationship was a two-way street: in his memoirs, Spaak also singles out SMUSErs Pierre-Henri Teitgen and Gérard Jaquet as being among the more talented speakers pushing for greater integration. In other words, while he does not mention the SMUSE by name, Spaak had, by late 1950, identified several of its leading

[334] Davies to Philip, 2 February, 1951. Florence: EUI, ME-495.
[335] Philip to Spaak, 23 May, 1950. Florence: EUI, ME-495
[336] Spaak, Paul-Henri. *Combats Inachevés; de l'espoir aux deceptions*. Paris: Fayard, 1969. 34-36

members as Europeanists with whom he saw eye-to-eye. The recognition of the SMUSE itself, which brought these personalities together, cannot have been far behind. (Biographer Michel Dumoulin characterized the result of his experience in the Assembly as a "conversion" to federalism,[337] though if the analysis above is correct, Spaak began throwing his lot in with the federalists during, rather than after, his Assembly mandate.)

In March, 1951, a letter from Georges Rebattet – then treasurer of the European Movement – enumerates the SMUSE representatives on the International Committee of the European Movement: Dehousse, Gironella, Gerard Jaquet and "Paul."[338] I have found no-one with the last name "Paul" associated to either the SMUSE or the European Movement around that time; the use of a first name, meanwhile, suggests someone of such stature that there could be no possible confusion as to who was being referenced. The two most likely candidates are Paul Finet, then high commissioner of the ECSC, and Spaak. In the latter case, it would date his membership in the SMUSE to early 1951.

Spaak's first recorded attendance at an SMUSE function is at the 5th Congress in February, 1952, shortly after he had resigned as president of the Consultative Assembly the previous December.[339] He was duly elected president of the International Committee[340] and remained with the movement for a decade. He and Philip would campaign actively for the EDC, he would collaborate closely with SMUSErs during the elaboration of the treaties of Rome (see next chapter), and would shortly join Philip as co-president of the Movement.[341]

The next major congress was held in February, 1952, in Frankfurt, Germany, shortly before the signature of the EDC treaty. In the two and a half years after Philip's accession to leadership of the SMUSE and its involvement in the European Movement, the group had seen an improvement in the political caliber of its membership. The attendees numbered 147, from 18 European countries, and counted a number of notable personalities.[342] These included Otto Bach and Gerhard Neuenkirch, German senators from Berlin and Hamburg respectively, and the German Minister of Education Dr. Schenkel; Paul-Henri Spaak; Belgian senators Fernand Dehousse and Pierre Vermeylen,

[337] Dumoulin, Michel. *Spaak*. Brussels: Racine 1999. 441-443
[338] Rebattet to Gironella, 10 March 1951. Florence: EUI, ME-1924
[339] Griffiths, 2000. 66
[340] Report on the 5th Conference. Amsterdam: IISG, MSEUE 4
[341] Van Schendel to Pesmazoglu, 1 February, 1962. Florence: EUI, ME-1924
[342] "5th Conference of the SMUSE." Amsterdam: IISG MSEUE 4

and future President of the High Authority Paul Finet; former Spanish Prime Minister Rodolfo Llopis; André Philip and French *député* from Paris Gérard Jaquet; Dutch Senator Geert Ruygers and two parliamentary representatives of the Dutch Workers' Party; as well as Altiero Spinelli, and Bob Edwards and John McNair (despite the British Center having been sidelined, both would continue to participate for some time). A dozen delegates from behind the Iron Curtain attended as well, representing Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Poland and Romania.

The conference would center on the EDC of course, and it also featured a renewed focus on the development of a European Socialist identity, a long-running issue for the Movement.[343] The conference opened with a welcoming speech by the mayor of Hamburg and a reception hosted by the municipality. The members had their meals and lodgings paid for by the SMUSE – a significant improvement in its finances had accompanied membership in the European Movement and its underwriting by the CIA – and were invited to an evening presentation of Brecht's *Trial of Lucullus*.[344] (The European Movement was impressed; a congratulatory letter went out to Gironella the following week reporting word of an "excellent conference" and asking how the European Movement might get hold of the translation equipment employed there).[345]

Gironella gave a summary of the group's progress thus far in his introductory remarks that Friday morning: the SMUSE had committed to the federalist route, a decision formalized at its fourth conference, in November 1950; it had found Italy and West Germany most enthusiastic, and Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries most opposed: having survived the war relatively well, he posited, they had less need to sacrifice any national prerogative to restore themselves. The British-inspired European Movement, he noted, had recently been advocating union that did not involve any supranationality and had given only platonic support to the Schuman plan. Yet Schuman's ECSC and the EDC, according to Gironella, were shining examples of limited, functional and effective integration and were the models to follow. Despite the friendly relationship he was personally building with the European Movement's secretariat,[346] Gironella again

[343] *Idem*

[344] *Lucullus* tells the story of the Roman general seeking admission to the Elysian Fields. Notwithstanding his legendary military victories, he finds that his only truly valuable act was his introduction of the cherry tree to Europe, the moral being that contribution to society as a whole is the only "good" worthy of eternal rewards.

[345] Rebattet to Gironella, Feb 20 1952. Florence: EUI, ME-494.

[346] Gironella and European Movement secretary Robert van Schendel became increasingly familiar, though official correspondence about financial matters between their respective movements remained

posited that the SMUSE's work could be pursued by leaving the European Movement aside and focusing on expanding the ECSC.

André Philip spoke next on the principles of European Socialism. Perhaps aware of some of the early Marxist leanings of the SMUSE, he opened with a disavowal of Marxist principles: Marx had been proven wrong by the fact that the working class had not risen up but was in fact in decline, overtaken to some extent by a new middle class. There would not be an inevitable manifestation of worker solidarity in the form of Democratic Socialism; a moral base would instead have to be intentionally created to unite the working and middle classes (this was something of a jab at the conservative views among the SFIO, more on which later). The great danger facing Socialism, he argued, was that the working class would associate with the owners of production to maintain their own competitiveness, to the detriment of other sectors of the economy or of competing industries. The solution was a technical revolution, with a focus on maintaining the well-being of the working class during the transition, and the expansion of markets to promote growth.

One ultimate goal that he and the SMUSE would work on for the years to come was the establishment of something akin to the eventual European Economic Community: the congress would resolve to pursue a "unified European market organized under a network of supranational economic institutions under the authority of a democratically elected assembly." Here again, the SMUSE committed to one of the European Union's defining features, a half-decade before the Treaties of Rome.

The SMUSE had initially proposed a political umbrella organization at its 3rd Congress in 1949, only second to which they felt further institutions should be developed. The fifth congress, in February 1952, repeated the proposal. Two weeks before the signature of the EDC in May, the International Committee expressed cautious optimism: "The SMUSE approves the rapid creation of a real European defense community. It considers, however, that such a community will be illusory ["*un leurre"*] if it is not supported from the outset by a supranational political organization…"[347] The Resolution on Current Problems ("*Problèmes d'Actualité*") demanded that a European Constituent Assembly be called as soon as possible to elaborate a supranational political authority,

formal. The families knew each-other; Van Schendel recuperated from a bout of appendicitis and angina at Gironella's home, and the Gironellas took vacations to van Schendel's family house in Westende, Belgium.

[347] Résolution du Comité International du Mouvement Socialiste Pour les Etats-Unis d'Europe (mai 1952). Amsterdam: IISG, MSEUE 18

the European Political Community. The Movement again suggested that this could be done by the intermediary of the Council of Europe. For what it's worth, this was less than a sure strategy. As noted above, Spaak had abdicated leadership of the Council of Europe in frustration some months previously. Nevertheless, the Council of Europe remained at the time the only real forum for such a project.

The EDC treaty which was completed three months later on May 27, 1952, was not all that the SMUSE had hoped: supranationalism was not explicit; the Common Assembly (the same as the ECSC's) would have the power to remove the executive Board of Commissioners, but Board decisions, in turn, required the unanimous consent of the Council of Ministers "on all key matters affecting the EDC generally, modifications to any arrangement relative to the European Defense Forces and their associated common equipment programs, on financial arrangements and on the common budget."[348] Despite the effective veto this granted national governments over management of the armed forces themselves, the supranational determination of policies and directives – the ultimate goal anyway – might be salvaged by article 38 of the treaty, which enjoined its Assembly to "examine the problems arising from the co-existence of different agencies for European co-operation already established, or which might be established, with a view to ensuring co-ordination within the framework of the federal or confederal structure."[349] In other words, it would trigger the establishment of some form of EPA, though it did not necessarily imply that this latter would be supranational.

The inclusion of such an article had been the result of intergovernmental discussions between the Italians and French over the course of 1951, in which the SMUSE had little input for reasons discussed above. However, there had been some question before the signature of the EDC treaty of whether article 38 would be enacted immediately upon signature of the treaty, or only when the EDC institution was formally inaugurated. In the latter case, the EDC would function for some time before its umbrella organization was elaborated or enacted: during that period, an intergovernmental structure would govern any issues arising from wider foreign policy dimensions, and there would not necessarily be any institutional alignment with the ECSC – which did have some supranational potential – despite the inevitable intersection of coal, steel, and the military.

[348] Fursdon 1980, 158
[349] Article 38 of the Treaty setting up the European Defense Community, signed May 27 1952

In the former case, however, there was better hope that the control structure for both the ECSC and the EDC might pull the intergovernmental tendencies of the EDC towards a more thorough multilateralism. Ultimately, Article 38 was triggered upon signature of the treaty. Griffiths[350] found that the campaign to support that provision was launched by Spaak and Spinelli in February, 1952, then brought to the European Movement, which recruited the participation of the UEF. The gaping omission – again, likely the result of the SMUSE's historiographical invisibility – is the fact that the SMUSE's 5th conference took place on February 15-17, had been attended by Spaak, Spinelli, and the UEF's Brugmans and Frenay, and that the same conference had resolved to work towards the convening of a European Constituent Assembly as soon as possible.[351] It seems reasonable to assume that this bears some responsibility for the coordinated action undertaken by conference attendees.

A few days after the signature of the EDC the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe met in Strasbourg. The debate pursuant to Article 38, on the form of a possible EPA, was led by Guy Mollet, the SFIO's Sebastien Constant, and Paul-Henri Spaak – all SMUSErs. Despite the lack of faith in the Council evinced by Spaak and others, the resolution published on May 29th conveyed the SMUSE vision:[352] "The Assembly […] considers that the provisions of the Treaty … relative to the determination of the future political structures of Europe [ie Article 38] should be addressed in a special accord, *distinct from the treaty*, but apt to enter immediately into force [and] suggests that the Governments of the Six […] mandate the elaboration of […] a political community *of a supranational character*…"[353] Two notable SMUSErs set to work on drafting the treaty: Marinus van der Goes van Naters, and Gaston Defferre, described by Spaak as "one of the greatest jurists of the Six nations."[354] The Council of Europe gamble had paid off and managed not only to give the proposed Political Authority supranationality, but also to make it independent of the EDC. The latter was a not inconsequential victory in itself for

[350] Griffiths, 2000. 67.
[351] "5eme Congrès, Francfort, 15-17 Février 1952" Amsterdam: IISG MSEUE 4
[352] "Resolution adopted on 10 September 1952 at Luxembourg by the six ministers for Foreign Affairs;" Information and official documents of the Constitutional Committee, in Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Community; published by the secretarial of the constitutional committee, 9 quai Anatole France.
[353] **"**Bulletin d'Information MSEUE: Trois semaines d'activité européenne." Amsterdam: IISG, MSEUE 19. Emphases mine.
[354] Spaak, 1969. 56-57

the Movement insofar as it had prioritized an EPA over its individual institutions, but it was also a hedge against the possibility that the EDC might fail.

The Foreign Ministers of the six ECSC countries (or "Six Ministers") obliged them a few months later, instructing the Common Assembly of the ECSC to draft an EPA treaty.[355] With SMUSErs Spaak, Vermeylen and Dehousse involved, Rifflet wrote to fellow SMUSEr and member of the newly minted ECSC High Authority Paul Finet that there was cause for optimism that a supranational solution might be found.[356] On September 14th, 1952, an Ad Hoc Assembly constituted a Bureau – presided by Spaak – to coordinate and oversee the sub-committees in charge of drafting various sections of the treaty. The process would take 6 months. Spaak delivered the final draft to the Six Ministers in March 1953, reporting happily in the SMUSE's *Gauche Européenne* that the "political monstrosity" of giving veto powers to national ministers had been unanimously rejected, and that the favored method of electing the parliament – another consistent concern of the SMUSE – was by direct secret ballot.[357]

After that date, despite the fact that it did not tie the EPA to the EDC,[358] the draft languished, awaiting and ultimately sharing the fate of the EDC.

Failure

The form of the European Political Authority was a significant success for the SMUSE: it would have supranational authority; it would be accountable to a European Parliament elected by direct popular ballot, and it would regroup institutions touching on heavy industry and defense. Two more projects were being discussed on the margins as well: one covering agriculture ("*Pool Vert*") and the other health ("*Pool Blanc*"), both of which might be subsumed within the EPA. The movement seemed on the brink of achieving goals it had set for itself in 1949, setting the stage for a comprehensive,

[355] Insofar as there existed a supranational body in the form of the ECSC, it had been decided that the ECSC's administration would form the backbone of the EDC, and the EPA.
[356] Rifflet to Finet 10 September 1952. Louvain: UCL, Rifflet farde 106
[357] Gauche Européenne #1 March 1953. 11. Amsterdam: IISG ZK 31205
[358] Article 66 of the EPA treaty draft states that clauses relating to the EDC would come into effect when both the EDC and EPA had been ratified, implying that they were separate and that the latter could come into force independently, without the defense clauses.

functionalist expansion of European federalism. The trick now was to get the treaty ratified.

Hundreds of thousands of pamphlets had been printed and distributed by the SMUSE beginning of 1951, primarily advocating support for the EDC. In 1952, the annual colloquium of the SMUSE's youth branch produced a wide-ranging booklet, published in Paris and disseminated on speaking tours and at European campuses.[359] A separate publication, titled "*Lettre aux militants*," - professing not to be a propaganda tool for any party or union but published at the SMUSE's new headquarters at Rue de Lille, in Paris - was published throughout the early 50s. The entire November 1953 issue of the SMUSE magazine, distributed both independently and through the European Movement, was devoted to the EDC. In the first half of 1954, the SMUSE and their partners in the European Movement collaborated on a flurry of conferences and publications, in a concerted effort to "hammer" (*"pilonner")* France, including a series of 93 public speeches throughout the country in January and February, (20% of which were organized exclusively by the SMUSE). Philip and Paul-Henri Spaak were the most active, speaking on behalf of several of the European Movement's constituent groups.[360]

In March, 1954, the SMUSE organized an event in central Paris at which Spaak and Mollet made major speeches in favor of the EDC. Mollet preached defense and warned that the failure of the EDC would certainly bring about a national German military. Spaak pointed to the shortcomings of the League of Nations and the UN as proof that supranationalism was required for success,[361] and warned of a pro-Russia Germany and American disengagement if it failed. The speeches were reproduced in a pamphlet by the SMUSE and distributed at subsequent events.[362]

By June 1954, the Germans and Benelux had ratified the treaty by fairly wide margins,[363] but the French (and Italians) were still equivocating. The European Movement working group on a supranational Europe solicited an open letter from European Parliamentarians to the French political establishment: "We need France;"

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[359] "La Communauté Européenne de Défense vu par les Jeunes du MSEUE." 1953. Florence: EUI; FD 345.
[360] March 1954 - "*Note pour monsieur Jean Drapier, délégué national du comité d'action, concernant la campagne menée en France en faveur de la ratification de la CED*." Florence: EUI ME-345.
[361] The UN had been dealing with the American refusal to recognize Mao's China, which had engendered a Russian boycott of the organization. The world had recently watched American General MacArthur impose his personal goals on the nominally UN-led Korean War.
[362] *P.H. Spaak et Guy Mollet devant la C.E.D; discours prononcés le 5 Mars 1954 à l Salle des Horticulteurs, Paris*. Imprimerie Cerbonnet for MSEUE, Paris, France, 1954. Amsterdam : IISG MSEUE 32, MDSEUE.
[363] The Bundestag had had the closest split, with 57% in favor; Luxembourg had the widest at 92%.

they wrote, "for both the hardiness of its initiatives and its perseverance in seeing them through."[364]

In France, the SMUSE's greatest asset –and best hope for success – lay in its connections with the SFIO. Party leader Guy Mollet worked and campaigned with the Movement in favor of the project. Gerard Jaquet and Marceau Pivert were members of the party directorate (*Comité Directeur)*, and André Philip remained highly influential. A dozen other lower-tier representatives were also active members of the SMUSE as the EDC vote neared, including Jacques Robin, Georges Izard, Jacques Moreau, Jacques Enock-Levi, Sebastien Constant and SMUSE treasurer René L'Huillier. In spite of the self-imposed exile from cabinet ministries, the significant share of seats it retained in the *Assemblée Nationale,* and the party's official support for the EDC should have played the decisive role in the French legislature.

Unfortunately, the SFIO was not a particularly homogeneous or disciplined group, and at the turn of the 1950s faced an identity crisis. During the Third Force years (1946-1951), the SFIO had generally been the junior partner in the governments, and had found that its colleagues in the coalition were prone to making alliances with opposition parties when the SFIO was too intransigent.[365] The forced compromises that resulted offended the electorate: from 1946 to 1951, it shrank from 4.5M to 2.75M, less than 13% of the population. Many of those lost were blue-collar workers who saw in the Communists a party more loyal to the working class. The decision to step out of government in 1951 was a bid to save the party: they would focus on the *Assemblée* where they could avoid governmental compromise and vote along more loyally socialist lines.[366] The SFIO's strong representation in the *Assemblée* (105 delegates, recently up from 99) should have afforded it considerable influence, but several factors, including France's uneven development in the postwar years, infighting within the leadership, and a lack of party discipline would cripple its ability to vote as a bloc, especially in the context of the EDC.[367]

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[364] Projet de Lettre, [published july 5th] Bauvun>Schlichfing, 29 June 1954. Florence: EUI, ME 345
[365] Zariski, Raphael. "Problems and Prospects of Democratic Socialism in France and Italy". *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18, No. 2, May 1956. 257. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2126984
[366] Zariski, 1956. 258.
[367] Zariski, 1956, 260.

On the electoral side, France's agricultural and industrial sectors were in rapid evolution. Prewar France had coupled protectionism with purchasing guarantees from its overseas territories, allowing these sectors to remain relatively backwards in terms of efficiency and production costs. Due to prewar economic frailties (attributable in part to its underdeveloped industries), the devastation of the war, France's dwindling influence among its former colonies, and the new US-led free-market ideas for international trade, France was forced to engage in rapid modernization to keep pace in the global marketplace and match the military-technological level of its neighbors. This modernization plan,[368] which entailed greater productivity and lower sale prices, was implemented in a geographically uneven way, so that many small-scale rural producers that had constituted the traditional backbone of the SFIO now found themselves competing with new, larger producers in other regions. Some agricultural and industrial workers therefore opposed modernization and economic engagement with more developed nations, instead demanding guarantees on prices and market access. The SFIO's perceived complicity in this program contributed to further flight towards a Communist party now freed from any association with government.[369]

This development resulted in a crisis within the SFIO leadership. By the early 1950s, a doctrinal split had appeared: a conservative faction was led by Guy Mollet – they remained rather Marxist in outlook and opposed the compromises of the immediate postwar years, determined to salvage the party by stricter adherence to its traditional values. On the other side was a faction more indebted to the humanism of Léon Blum and more willing to adapt to the political landscape. Blum's outlook had demonstrable merit: in 1947 he had initiated the Franco-British Treaty of Dunkirk through relations with a Labour leadership whose Socialist character had even then been under attack from many within the SFIO.[370] Blum's general approach, exemplified by the "Philip" wing of the party however, was also what had cost the SFIO part of its working class base to the benefit of the Communists. By 1950, the *Molletistes* enjoyed an overall majority within the SFIO *Comité Directeur* and had decreed the withdrawal from cabinet posts. André Philip and the SMUSE were squarely on the progressive side: they

[368] "Premier plan de Modernisation et d'Equipement" available at https://www.strategie.gouv.fr/actualites/premier-plan-de-modernisation-dequipement
[369] Zariski 1956. 257. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2126984
[370] Despite elation at Labour's recent triumphant victory, discussions within the *Comité Directeur* and at the 38th and 39th *Congrès National* reveal concerns over Britain's nationalization objectives and its decidedly lukewarm signals with respect to international solidarity. Paris: OURS

advocated a working class conscious of its "responsibility towards all," and had resolved to "oppose anything that maintain[ed] economic life at a technologically backwards level and fight any protectionism or outdated forms of production."[371] This faction held the majority among the *Assemblée Nationale* delegates.

This had two contradictory but related consequences. First, the size of the overall Socialist delegation in the *Assemblée* meant that their position had to be heard. When the Pleven government prepared to hold a debate in the *Assemblée*, in February, 1952, on the modalities of French participation in the EDC, a total of six agendas were circulated, one each by the major political parties represented and one by the French government. The government ultimately fused their agenda with the Socialist one in order to favor passage, which, even then, happened by a margin of only 40 votes.[372] Second, it also meant that for the EDC to ultimately pass, SFIO support was essential. But despite their numbers, the large size of the internal SFIO factions was the central source of instability within the party: small dissident groups had historically been marginalized and even expelled[373] but the factions in this case were large enough to allow breaking ranks since severe sanctions or expulsion would cripple the party and its parliamentary power. By the time a first vote on the EDC came up in 1952, each faction – indeed each member – was emboldened to stick to its positions, even in contravention of repeated official directives from the *Comité Directeur*: the anti-EDC crowd in the *Assemblée* ignored the *Comité*'s directive. They received reprimands, and a few were suspended, but nothing much more drastic.[374]

The EDC and the complex range of responses it elicited created a split along new, but no less deep, lines. Perhaps the central concern was the reconstitution of German military power, which evoked deeply personal and long-standing emotions among both the *Assemblée* members and their constituencies. There existed an ultimately false sense of unity in the SMUSE-SFIO: as SMUSE secretary Enrique Gironella explained to Altiero Spinelli in October 1950, endorsement of the EDC plan by the Pleven government had more or less forced Mollet, into line because he was then *Ministre d'Etat*.[375] Albeit for different reasons, then, Philip and Mollet ended up on the same side of the EDC debate;

[371] "*Responsabilité à l'égard de tous."* Florence: EUI; ME-345.
[372] Furdson, 1980. 138.
[373] 1948 had seen the expulsion of the Trotskyist Socialist Youth Movement and the secession of the *Bataille Socialiste* group.
[374] Elgey 1965, 379.
[375] Gironella to Spinelli, October 29, 1950. Florence: EUI, MFE-32.

though Mollet would be unable to bring the rest of his faction along. The EPA exacerbated the mixed feelings within the party. Mollet conceived of the EPA primarily as necessary to the proper supervision of German troops in the EDC, whereas Philip and the SMUSE considered it an imperative European structure that would, almost incidentally, include a military branch. Mollet's focus on defense prompted him to value potential British participation, and he was consequently reticent to accept a supranational EPA. Philip and the SMUSE, meanwhile, had essentially washed their hands of the Brits in early 1950.

There was some evident distance between the two positions within the *Comité Directeur*: already in February 1953, Jaquet, Pivert and Mollet had discussed the degrees of alignment between the SMUSE and SFIO. Though the SFIO had bankrolled the SMUSE in the late 1940s, the fact that they were now members of the European Movement meant that they were self-financed and therefore autonomous. This did not, in and of itself, have much impact on the relationship between the two, but divisive issues began to crop up in 1953. The French Section had been critical of an SFIO vote against federation, which caused some tensions, and some members of the *Comité* had opined that this would worsen the party schism. At the time, and over the objections of those members, the *Comité* had voted to allow a divergence of positions from joint SFIO-SMUSE members in the two contexts.[376] In January, and again in April, 1954, articles critical of the SFIO had appeared in the SMUSE magazine and been roundly condemned by the *Comité*; to mend fences Jaquet had promised that any further articles concerning the SFIO would be submitted to the *Comité* for review. Like the relationship between the SMUSE and its leaders, the relationship with national parties was also symbiotic. For several years, the SFIO had maintained potentially damaging back-channel contacts with the SPD despite significant public policy divergences, in the name of European integration.[377] The relationship with the SMUSE was different in that there was little public awareness of the SMUSE (as opposed to awareness of the SPD), and therefore the relationship had less impact on public perceptions of the SFIO. Nevertheless, the party's accommodation of frontal and potentially schismatic challenges from the SMUSE is part of a larger pattern, suggesting that as in the case of the SPD, Mollet and the *Comité*

[376] "Compte-rendu du Comité Directeur, 18 February, 1953." Paris: OURS, Comptes-Rendus du Comité Directeur.
[377] See Shaev 2020

Directeur valued the opportunities offered by the Movement enough to respectfully disagree while still maintaining the relationship.

Ultimately, the SFIO officially came down in favor of the EDC treaty and its EPA component, and Mollet appeared with Spaak at the SMUSE event in March. Seeking to rally his faction, he argued that there was a Soviet threat, that defense against it required Germany, and that the EDC was the only way to ensure that German military power was manageable.[378] The larger principle was that French national security trumped transnationalism, but he could not paper over all the spaces for disagreement on the grounds that the Soviets were a smaller threat than Mollet supposed, that *any* German military constituted a latent threat to France, or that the creation of a European pact that excluded Great Britain would ultimately be detrimental to French security.

In the last week of May, 1954, as *Assemblée Nationale* debate on ratification of the EDC drew near, the situation was sufficiently delicate that the SFIO's *Comité Directeur* called a special National Congress. After two days of debate, a 57% majority voted to support the EDC. All too aware of the disciplinary crisis, the SFIO published a 19-page, point-by-point defense of its decision in its internal bulletin. It featured a front-page article on the conference, a reprint of the resolution, an inset reminding members of the "absolute necessity of constantly maintaining voter unity," and a pointed reminder of the *Comité Directeur*'s mandate to enforce discipline.[379]

On August 29th, 1954, the *Assemblée Nationale* held its debate. Supporters of the project, conscious of the complexities of supranationalism, argued for postponement of the debate to allow for further negotiations. Adversaries of the EDC countered with a technical maneuver known as "moving the previous question," which, according to the rules of the *Assemblée*, implied rejection of the text under consideration.[380] Despite a final plea by Socialist and newly-minted SMUSEr Christian Pineau,[381] a vote was taken;

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[378] *P.H. Spaak et Guy Mollet devant la C.E.D; discours prononcés le 5 Mars 1954 à la Salle des Horticulteurs, Paris*. Imprimerie Cerbonnet for MSEUE, Paris, France, 1954. OURS

[379] *Bulletin Intérieur du parti Socialiste SFIO; No. 68 à 87; 1954-1956.* 7ff. OURS. *La documentation politique – Bulletin Hebdomadaire du Parti Socialiste SFIO, Nouvelle série; 1949-1955; no. 1 a 163.* N.p. (no. 158; 5-12 June 1954). OURS

[380] Duroselle, Jean. "The Crisis in French Foreign Policy;" *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 16, No 4, October 1964. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1405127. 432

[381] Clesse, Armand. *Le Projet de C.E.D. du Plan Pleven au "crime" du 30 aout*. Baden-Baden: Nomos-Maison d'Edition. 1989. 162 Pineau's first recorded attendance at the SMUSE is in July, 1954. He would go on to the French Foreign Ministry in 1956, playing a role in the elaboration of the Treaties of Rome (see next chapter).

the motion passed by a margin of 319 to 264, with 53 Socialists in support. Absent the depth of the crisis in the SFIO and the impunity this afforded its members, all the Socialists would have voted against and the motion would have been rejected by a margin of 317 to 266. Other forces within France – notably the Gaullists' strident denunciations and the Moscow-backed campaign against a remilitarized Germany[382] – contributed to the opposition, but these are part of the fabric of politics and ordinarily would have been reflected in a simple split along party lines.

The SMUSE had helped develop the European Defense Community and presented it to the European electorate through the Council of Europe, the House of Commons, and the *Assemblée Nationale*; it had shepherded the attendant supranational European Political Authority through the Council of Europe and the EDC's consultative assembly, and helped dote it with supranational authority and a potential independent existence; and it had campaigned widely for years with the support of Paul-Henri Spaak and the SFIO. And yet the SMUSE failed in its flagship project for lack of discipline within the French Socialist Party.

Conclusion

The period between November, 1949, and August, 1954, marks the apex of French agency within the SMUSE. The Movement's founding principles (though not its goals) had been abandoned largely as a result of US foreign policy. Subsequently a marriage of convenience between the SFIO and the SMUSE, coupled with the reluctance of Labour Britain to engage on the federalist road, drew political agency away from the ILP and into the hands of the French section.

The relationship between the SMUSE and the SFIO was initially of significant mutual benefit, though major cracks appeared by the end of the present period. In the early years, the SMUSE had granted the SFIO access to European – notably British – socialists in a forum that was more activist and proactive than the COMISCO. The SFIO, in turn, provided the SMUSE with an early source of funding and an avenue for influencing French government policy. Those benefits broke down in the early 1950s:

[382] Clesse, 1989. 311ff

Labour distanced itself from European solidarity and ultimately gave way entirely to a Conservative government, while the European Movement began to underwrite the SMUSE and the SFIO gave up access to the French executive branch. The balance of power shifted as well; while the SFIO had been the dominant partner, some determined that by early 1952, the SMUSE had stronger public support.[383] The relationship continued based largely on both sides' support for the EDC, and both sides made efforts to be conciliatory despite increasing tensions. It almost paid off.

The Movement's leading figure throughout this period was undoubtedly André Philip; in fact, one is left with the impression that he effectively co-opted the Movement and squeezed out the British in pursuit of his personal vision: the program of 1949 reflected his ideas for the mechanisms of integration and there is little evidence of internal disagreement or compromise. That said, there is a sense of equality in the sense that neither could purse its goals without the other: while Philip gave the Movement heightened legitimacy and visibility, the Movement in turn offered Philip a large network through which to operate. Philip stepped into a network that already had independent contacts with the UEF, the NEI and the MFE, and it is unlikely that he alone could have produced the fusion of these groups' efforts in the context of the European Movement. His efforts within the Consultative Assembly were also complemented by other SMUSE members and associates.

Finally, in the wake of the failure of the EDC, Philip's and the French section's leadership in the SMUSE would wane, leaving the movement intact but its agency increasingly transferred to Belgium.

The first half of the 1950s saw the SMUSE at the peak of its effectiveness in the European project. Philip, Spaak, Spinelli and several other well-placed members of the Movement were integral to the elaboration of the EDC treaty. Philip had a direct role in its proposal, and, in line with the Movement's central preoccupation, there was a coordinated effort to secure the provision for a political authority. The story that has been told concerning these institutions is not inaccurate, but this network deserves a place in it.

The SMUSE had increased in stature in the early 1950s and would maintain its popularity in the second half of the decade despite the failure to deliver the EPA. It was

[383] Keep Left Group Paper, 18 January 1952. Manchester: PHM, LP/RICH/2/2/5

sustained by the continued adherence of high-profile Belgians, Spaak foremost among them, who would take the lead on the project ending in the Treaties of Rome. And it would ensure a legacy stretching into the 1990s by the development of a pan-European Socialist dialogue in the form of its flagship publication, *Gauche Européenne.*

Chapter 4

Rome: Success and obsolescence

"If the treaty is rejected … the very basis of European policy would have to be reconsidered."[384]

- SMUSE, August 1954

The SMUSE was crushed by the failure of the EDC, and in the immediate aftermath, it fell back on a publication launched in early 1953, which had sought to debate and articulate a homogenous Socialist Europeanism, and to raise awareness of the European project. Initially largely a forum for policy positions, it was reinvented in the aftermath of the EDC to target a more diverse audience. The magazine and its degree of success will constitute the first major part of this chapter.

Some eight months after the failure of the EDC, in Spring 1955, the Movement found a new avenue with the launch of the "Messina Project," which produced the Treaties of Rome. It ultimately comprised two functionalist expansions of the European political infrastructure, and though not the political umbrella the Movement had sought, it was in line with the SMUSE's functionalist approach to integration. As we shall see, Paul-Henri Spaak and a number of well-placed SMUSErs in the French Mollet government of 1956-1957 participated in the development of the Treaties and strategized to deliver a supranational European Economic Community (EEC). The arguments in this second section do not contradict the established literature on the Treaties of Rome, but they will draw attention to, and assess the impact of, a number of well-positioned SMUSErs interacting at the top levels of the decision-making process.

The passage of the Treaties ironically had a chilling effect on further SMUSE efforts for several reasons. One of them was loss of interest from the United States,

384 "*Programme d'action "Au Finish" en faveur de la ratification de la CED*," 17 August, 1954. Florence: EUI ME-345.

which translated to the drying up of the European Movement funding that had in turn kept the SMUSE solvent. Another was a generalized sense that a Common Market treaty was a significant and complex step in the right direction, which would require several years to be fleshed out, during which time it was perhaps better to move slowly. A third was the failure of the French Fourth Republic and the return to power of General de Gaulle, a staunch supporter of national sovereignty opposed the dilution of French power corollary to any further expansion of Europe. Analogous to the Conservative victory in the UK in 1951, it froze any French initiatives and presented further projects with a significant obstacle. Finally, the establishment of new transnational institutions provided fresh opportunities for supranational activism on a more concrete and granular level. The Movement's adherents shifted towards these new institutions, reducing the relative usefulness of the SMUSE. The final part of this chapter will trace the dissolution of the SMUSE as a forum of policy coordination.

Gauche Européenne

It had become disappointingly clear after the immediate post-war euphoria that despite the encouraging number of politically influential parties across Europe calling themselves Socialist, they had a wide spectrum of values and goals. A harmonization of these positions would have been the job of a Socialist International, but the highest-profile International had foundered during the war, and though it was theoretically being rebuilt by the Labour-run COMISCO, the project was not advancing very fast or constructively. The MUSSE was heir to the rival "London Bureau," but had never really been in a position to constitute a proper international of its own: any pretense of doing so had been functionally abandoned in the late 40s as the international situation left the French as the primary drivers of the Movement .

Nevertheless, internationalist Socialism was the foundational philosophy of the Movement, and, though sidelined, it had never been officially abandoned. At the SMUSE's fifth congress, in early 1952, Sébastien Constant (SFIO) had concluded his introductory speech with an argument that the role of the SMUSE ought to be to create a European Socialist consensus. He was a recent adherent to the movement, perhaps unaware of its history, so while he presented it as a new idea, it fell on receptive ears. The conference

conducted a preliminary review of the viewpoints represented by attendees. André Philip entertained federating the existing Socialist parties of Europe… Constant countered that there would be inevitable conflict and that in any case Socialism was inherently transnational. Hendrik Brugmans (Dutch, UEF) evoked the need for a new, explicitly anti-Stalinist "Left." He also delicately raised a central conflict within the SMUSE: this new Left would have to resolve "the crisis between Marx and Proudhon." While Marx had preached the abolition of the nation-state, Proudhon had argued for political federation: the SMUSE had waffled between these approaches. Philip notably espoused a form of Proudhon-Socialism, while others including Gironella and Constant advocated a more post-national Marxist variant. The issue would have to be resolved not just to solidify the Movement, whose founding British section had already been alienated over the federalist approach, but also to clarify the basis of its transnational platform. Consensus being evidently beyond reach at the Fifth Congress, a further, permanent discussion forum was needed to iron out the movement's direction. A regular publication was proposed.

There was another, more prosaic advantage to publishing a regular magazine. The Movement's lack of visibility had always been an issue (see the Commons debate of January 1948, or the Colonial Congress later that year… or indeed the Movement's persisting dearth of historiographical representation), and its propaganda thus far had consisted largely of localized rallies seeking to educate and empower voters; it maintained an intra-party circular and published the occasional specialized pamphlet, but it had no regular publications. The Fifth Congress thus resolved to put together a regular magazine, published in French, German and Italian variants, to establish that visibility.

In March, 1953, the SMUSE published the first issue of *Gauche Européenne*, a 26-page, black-and-white monthly magazine introducing itself as the work of a handful of committed activists seeking to define the goals of a united Europe.[385] It purported to be an open forum[386] for like-minded Socialists, Christian Democrats, trade unionists and technocrats to debate ideas. The movement was not exclusionary, willing to fight with the European Right towards common goals (though naturally also ready to fight against it if need be). The directors of the magazine included Belgians Spaak and Dehousse;

[385] *Gauche Européenne* No. 1, March 1953. Paris: OURS 281
[386] In French: "tribune libre"

Dutch socialist representatives Marinus van der Goes van Naters and Koos Vorrink; the Italian socialist Mario Zagari; Hermann Brill and John van Nes Ziegler of the SPD; Bob Edwards; Zygmunt Zaremba representing Eastern Europe; and three Frenchmen: Philip, Gérard Jaquet, and Jacques Robin (managing director). Gironella was made Editor-in-Chief. Initially almost a scholarly journal where relatively high-minded philosophical arguments for various positions were juxtaposed, it evolved in 1955 into a more popularly accessible, news-oriented magazine reporting more consistently the various integrative measures under consideration in Europe. The EDC and EPA naturally featured heavily in early issues, alongside reports on the so-called "*Pool Vert*" (a putative European Agricultural Community), the European Health Community ("*Pool Blanc"*), the Messina project, and on wider issues touching on the Soviet Union, German unification, the United States, etc.

The magazine's presentation of the Socialist dialogue of the early 1950s was noble, and remains valuable for posterity in that it brought together in one place the divergent interpretations of Socialism of some of the bigger names in the field at the time, and Zagari would credit the magazine with "a great contribution towards the technical and economic study of the various arguments."[387] However, there is little evidence that it achieved its principal goal of producing a consensus. The first issue pitted André Philip against Guy Mollet on European institutions: for Mollet , a weak European executive would leave the door open to new members, while Philip countered that a strong executive was necessary for Europe to function at all.[388] No middle-ground was elaborated. The next month, Gérard Jaquet and Gaston Defferre (in favor) went up against Jules Moch and Daniel Mayer (opposed) on the question of the EDC.[389] The April issue saw an 8-page rebuttal of the anti-EDC argument (pointedly titled "*Réponse à Jules Moch*"), but no fusion of positions. When Dutch Socialist Alfred Mozer described Europe's potentially antagonistic position between the Eastern and Western blocs, his essay was subject to a lengthy rebuke by Philip.

The coverage of national politics was no less confrontational: policy contradictions between the SPD, SFIO and Labour were presented, without much note of

[387] Griffiths, Richard (ed.). "The Testimony of an Eyewitness: Mario Zagari" In *Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s*. New York: EJ Brill, 1993. 104.
[388] *Gauche Européenne* #1, March 1953. Amsterdam, IISG ZK 31205.
[389] *Gauche Européenne* #2, April 1953. Amsterdam, IISG ZK 31205.

areas of confluence,[390] Georges Goriely (Belgian, PSB) further described the lack of unity among European Socialists, charging that most had essentially abandoned internationalism;[391] Gironella likewise bemoaned the state of European Socialism in general and of the SFIO in particular;[392] Philip wrote of the shortcomings of the French political establishment and faulted the SPD for its hesitant and contradictory foreign policy;[393] German SMUSErs Karl Schiller, Klaus-Peter Schultz and August Enderle each, separately and over several months, attacked the SPD's response to the EDC.[394] Brian Shaev and Tabot Imlay have recently argued convincingly that, considering the wealth of transnational contacts, there was far less "nationalization" of European Socialist parties than has been postulated,[395] but there is no question that such a perception existed at the time. Paradoxically, at least some transnational socialist collaborations of the early postwar period – and specifically the existence of *GE* – can be explained by the perception that trends were headed in the opposite direction.

Rather than fostering a rapprochement of Socialist parties, however, *Gauche Européenne* limited itself to presenting opposing viewpoints and undercutting those that did not align with the SMUSE; likewise, its recriminatory appraisals of any non-integrationist positions among European Socialist parties did nothing to establish the kind of solidarity that might have produced coordinated projects.

The magazine's coverage of other integrative measures was better suited to the secondary goal of educating the general population. Aside from regular discussion of the EDC process in various countries, the magazine devoted space regularly to the so-called "*Pool Vert*," a catch-all term for the general idea of harmonizing European agriculture. In November 1950,[396] the SMUSE resolved to pursue a supranational agricultural authority accountable to a European assembly, empowered to collect and share information, direct development, and negotiate trade deals with third countries. They were not alone in this goal: both the French and Dutch ministers of agriculture (Pierre Pflimlin and

[390] *Gauche Européenne* #6, October 1953. Amsterdam, IISG ZK 31205
[391] *Gauche Européenne* #3, May 1953. Amsterdam, IISG ZK 31205. Brian Shaev and Talbot Imlay have argued convincingly that this was not the case, but the perception was undeniably there at the time, and
[392] *Gauche Européenne* #10, February 1954. Amsterdam, IISG ZK 31205.
[393] *Gauche Européenne* #5 July-August 1953. 15. *GE* #6, October, 1953. 3. Amsterdam, IISG ZK 31205
[394] *Gauche Européenne* #13, May 1954; #17, November, 1954; and #28, August 1956, respectively. Amsterdam, IISG ZK 31205.
[395] Shaev 2020, Imlay, Talbot. "'The policy of Social Democracy is self-consciously internationalist:' The German Social Democratic Party's Internationalism after 1945." *The Journal of Modern History* 86-1 (2014). 81-123
[396] Noël, Gilbert. *Du Pool Vert à la Politique Agricole Commune*. Paris: Economica, 1988. 214.

Sicco Mansholt respectively) had called for some form of agricultural harmonization since the late 40s,[397] and both plans were launched publicly at around the same time: Mansholt presented his project to the OEEC (of which he was then president) in June, 1950.[398] Socialist and pan-Europeanist, Mansholt envisioned a functionalist integration of the entire European economy by sector, though he proposed the institutions fall under the OEEC umbrella. Pflimlin (Christian Democrat) submitted his version in January, 1951.[399] Pflimlin had initially been aligned with the agricultural unions, which had been early drivers of state-supported agricultural development and harmonization but whose concerns were essentially national.[400] Nevertheless, by the end of 1950, Pflimlin had come around to endorsing supranationality as well,[401] and the two projects fell into the SMUSE's philosophical line.

The deliberations launched under the auspices of the OEEC lasted from 1952 to 1954 and were compatible with the SMUSE's goals. The Movement's chosen inroads, however, were the Council of Europe and its Consultative Assembly, so despite several SMUSErs and SMUSE-adjacent actors on Pflimlin's elaboration committee (Mollet, Maurice Faure, François Mitterrand,[402] Gaston Defferre and Robert Buron[403]), the Movement had little leverage in or engagement with the negotiation process. The EDC loomed largest on the horizon in the period, and the SMUSE's efforts were squarely focused on establishing its political umbrella. That umbrella and its supranational executive would be designed to absorb any and all further communities, including an agricultural one: thus, by comparison with the high-profile EDC, which justified the EPA, the ongoing agriculture discussions were of limited importance. Nevertheless, *GE* provided what might be termed public-service updates regularly. The first mention, in June 1953, saw *GE* argue for a push to get the project into the limelight and build public support, lest it be scuttled by "reactionaries." In October, the magazine laid out the stages of the project thus far; and two further updates blamed stagnant negotiations on the UK before the project foundered (unlike the Pflimlin and Mansholt plans, the British

[397] Noël, 1988. 124.
[398] Noël, 1988. 153.
[399] Noël, 1988. 148.
[400] Noël, 1988. 132.
[401] Noël, 1988. 177.
[402] As noted elsewhere, the beginning of Mitterrand's direct engagement with the SMUSE is unclear; his first appearance in the SMUSE record is a public endorsement in February 1956.
[403] Noël, 1988. 148

"Eccles Plan" rejected supranationality outright, and it insisted that the UK be allowed to maintain its preferential trade arrangements with the Commonwealth.[404]).

Other news updates populated the pages of *GE* as well in the early years, notably on intergovernmental meetings involving the Soviet Union. A few updates on the "Pool Blanc" appeared: this purported "European Health Community" had been launched by French Health Minister Paul Ribeyre, though the initiative was ultimately scuttled by then-Foreign Affairs Minister Georges Bidault, who did not want to "overload the Europe boat."[405] Finally, the magazine covered national-section meetings and published their resolutions.

All in all, the early version of the magazine struggled to reach an audience or to have much impact. In failing to build a constructive consensus, it was reduced to a sort of glorified internal bulletin where the leading figures of the movement expressed fairly long-winded philosophical opinions and denounced outside parties. The coverage of ongoing institutional projects was helpful and appropriate to the SMUSE's mission, though it was short on analysis and neither contained much special insight nor proposed specific strategies. This left the reporting on national-section or even regional meetings, which were of little interest outside the SMUSE.

The magazine, like the SMUSE, generated little money and survived almost entirely on funding from the European Movement. By the early 1950s, the treasurer of the European Movement was Belgian industrialist René Boël, whose personal relationship with CIA director Allen Dulles dated to Boël's wartime stay in the US, when he had retained the Dulles brothers' law firm for a business-expansion project.[406] The CIA was now depositing congressional funds complemented by private donations into a Swiss bank account, which Boël laundered via the European Movement's Youth Branch, of which he was also president. Boël added "Youth Branch" funds to the European Movement's income, without provenance details, and then disbursed the lot among the European Movement's constituent parties. There are no surviving records of GE print runs, but while the EM bought five subscriptions, it appears that the vast majority of GE

[404] Zobbe, Hendrik. "The Economic and Historical Foundation of the Common Agricultural Policy in Europe." Fourth European Historical Economics Society Conference, September 2001. Merton College, Oxford, U.K.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23515195_The_Economic_and_Historical_Foundation_of_the_Common_Agricultural_Policy_in_Europe
[405] *Gauche Européenne* #6, October 1953. 22 Amsterdam: IISG, ZK 31205
[406] Interview with Mickey Boël (son), October 2017, Bruxelles, Belgium.

"subscriptions" were in fact not paid. In January, 1955, Gironella sent a letter to each of the local French sections with an ambitious program to collect 1500 subscriptions in three months. "It is an effort that the French section and the friends of *Gauche Européenne* can accomplish,"[407] he insisted, although the only surviving list of subscribers at the time, for the French region of Charente, shows a total of seven people, five of whom were receiving the magazine for free.[408]

The magazine was overhauled in February 1955, as part of a wider media offensive: Zagari's Italian-language *"Sinistra Europea"* was improved, and a new publication – *Europäische Monatschefte* ("European Monthly') – was scheduled to launch in Germany that November.[409] They also reassessed the form and function of *Gauche Européenne.* It was expanded by about 30 percent, from 26 pages in black-and-white to 34, partly colorized. In the first few months of 1955, Spaak and Raymond Rifflet's contributions in *Gauche Européenne* expounded on the need for a well-educated general population – as noted above, the early version of *GE* could not be described as being of much general interest. This new direction was not entirely divorced from the SMUSE's previous outlook, but it marked a departure from the Philip approach, which was more philosophical and involved a rather impatient attitude towards people who didn't buy in to the European project. A small internal bulletin was launched in parallel to handle intra-SMUSE content like section resolutions. The new edition of *GE* cut back somewhat on the longer position papers in favor of several new features of a more general nature, rolled out over the first half of 1955. In an effort both to make the magazine more accessible, and to foster a sense of European consciousness and solidarity among its readers, there would now be regular background/news features on individual European countries. Philip, who had quit Paris in disgust over the EDC, produced four major centerpiece articles on Yugoslavia to anchor the new format. Gironella wrote frequently on Spain, and Germans SMUSErs contributed on the situation there; smaller one-off

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[407] "C'est un effort que le MDSEUE et les amis de la Gauche Européenne sont en mesure d'accomplir"

[408] If this anecdotal subscription data was at all representative of the pattern across France, Gironella's campaign would require a 350% increase in paid subscribers over three months, when the magazine had already been in circulation for two years. It gives an idea of the feasibility of the endeavor.

[409] "*Campagne Populaire pour la Relance Européenne*." Florence: EUI ME-1924. NB: the name and timeline for the German publication are unclear. The strategic plan called for "European Monthly" to launch in November, 1955, but on 6 May, Belgian SMUSEr Lucien Radoux mentions an existing German variant of *GE* called "*Europa der Arbeit*" ("Workers' Europe"), and there is a reference to a German "*Europa Brücke*" ("Europe Bridge") in documents dated 1960. I found no copies of the German edition in the archives I consulted.

reports covered the rest of Europe and French-African colonies moving towards independence. Each month featured a thematic collection of essays (the French economy, European Communism etc…), multiple features on the political construction of Europe, and a "Lettre de Washington" by American Socialist David Williams,[410] covering Congressional deliberations on European issues.

It was risky for *Gauche Européene* to undertake such a revamping: despite external financial support, the model was not sustainable and there were concerns that the magazine would fold. The first issue of the new magazine included a printed loose-leaf insert from Gironella noting that recipients had received multiple issues for free but that this could not continue indefinitely.[411] In the end, the expanded format only lasted six issues. After a three-month break starting in September, the December 1955 issue returned to 26 pages, though it kept the new editorial direction. The magazine, now in its final form, appeared until July, 1958.

The Treaties of Rome

The Europeanist establishment could not help exploding with bitterness and blame at the failure of the EDC in August, 1954. Some charged that French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France was not properly briefed, nor strong enough to support the project, nor clear enough in his defense in the *Assemblée Nationale*. Philip immediately blamed the media, the Communists, Mendès France, the Gaullists, and public intellectuals (all this in one article)[412] then took an extended working vacation to Yugoslavia.[413] Spaak also blamed Mendès France, as well as French Ambassador to Britain René Massigli, "one of the principal saboteurs of the EDC."[414] *Gauche Européenne* decried nationalism, cowardice, and a 40-year regression of the European project. The

[410] Washington Post obituary, 3 September 2003. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2003/09/03/david-williams/3fab569d-8ea5-43b1-8e6a-933a5a55aaef/ No information accompanies the name in *GE*. Williams was a member of Americans for Democratic Action, and would later serve in the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson presidential administrations.
[411] Insert to *Gauche Européenne* #20, February 1955. Amsterdam : IISG, ZK 31205. Presumably, dues-paying members did not receive this insert. The insert cited here is from the IISG collection in Amsterdam
[412] Untitled article by André Philip, August 31, 1954. Florence: EUI: ME-495
[413] The December, 1954, issue of *Gauche Européenne* (#18) featured the first of four major reports by Philip on Yugoslavia.
[414] Dumoulin, Michel. *Spaak*. Bruxelles: Racine 1999. 489. "un des principaux saboteurs de la CED"

central illustrations in the September-October issue of *GE* were of a weighted toy soldier being pushed over by a giant disembodied finger, only to bounce back upright on the next page.[415] It reflected a sense of helplessness and persecution, and though it put on a brave face, the Movement essentially came to a standstill for several months. France, meanwhile, where the Movement had based its primary political campaigns, would suffer a loss of confidence from Europeanists.

When the SMUSE published its "*relance*" objectives, they were comprehensive but focused on only four countries. Belgium, now the best hope for leading the integration project, was spared any criticism, but the general political goals for the rest of Europe were a) to obtain a Europeanist majority in the 1955 French elections[416], b) to keep the Italian Socialist Party out of the hands of the Communists, and c) to re-orient SPD policy towards integration. The ambitious set of public activities (study retreats, regional meetings, conferences, and publications) were only articulated for Belgium, France, Germany and Italy. The Movement continued to draw increasing numbers of adherents from all over Europe (Baltic representatives had begun attending in 1953 and would remain involved at least through 1957), but the priorities evinced at the beginning of 1955 showed a restricted focus. Despite the Movement's British roots, British participation had all but ended: Bob Edwards, sitting on the International Committee until 1954 despite the 1950 cleavage over the federalist road, was the last Brit to fade from the record. Nor did the Movement campaign actively in Luxembourg or the Netherlands, despite high-placed SMUSErs in both nations. The record does not state why.

The Movement's early goals had been impossibly lofty. Edwards and Ridley had initially proposed the MUSSE as the first step towards an inevitable United States of the World; within two years, the scope was reduced to Europe and its colonial sphere; this too proved unrealistic and as of late 1949, there was no concrete program beyond Europe itself; conflict with the British section and pursuit of the ECSC model starting in mid-1950 further reduced the SMUSE's scope to the Six. The program published in 1955 recognized serious issues with respect to the European project in three of those six

[415] *Gauche Européenne* #15, September-October 1954. Amsterdam: IISG: ZK 31205.
[416] *Gauche Européenne* first endorsed Mitterrand openly in the context of its support for the "*Front Républicain*" coalition. *GE* #28, February 1956. Amsterdam: IISG ZK 31205

nations: a potentially fatal French reticence, fractured and politically impotent Italian Socialist parties, and a functionally anti-Europe SPD. SMUSE strategy now concretely amounted to activism that would salvage the potential of three nations to follow the example of Belgium.

This significant reduction in the Movement's international scope is mirrored in the narrowing of its ultimate institutional goals: initially a monolithic Europe bridging the Capitalist and Communist worlds, they morphed into a supranational and socio-economically integrated continent acceptable to the United States, and since 1949 the Movement was chasing comparatively small – though, crucially, far more realistic – functionalist structures, soon anchored by the ECSC, under a political umbrella accountable to a vested, democratically-elected parliament. It is tempting to write off these developments as a massive retreat, evidence that the SMUSE project was hopelessly misguided from the start. However, while unfeasible at the time, the Movement's goals were not impossible, as evidenced by the eventual passage of European treaties covering early goals like workers' rights, transport infrastructure, the European Parliament, a common currency, foreign policy, a customs union and so on. As described in the previous chapter, the reduction in the Movement's institutional objectives between 1946 and 1954 had very nearly succeeded in producing an EPA. The further step down in early 1955, from chasing a political umbrella to working towards ECSC-style supranational attributes in the discrete economic and atomic institutions of the Messina project, marked the moment when the Movement finally found the balance between its objectives and Europe's political possibilities.

Gauche Européenne's introductory line in 1953, written while the EDC was still under negotiation, had established the movement's next priority: "*Gauche Européenne* appears at the moment when the borders of the Six countries are disappearing before coal and steel, the first stage towards the common market." In the following pages Sebastien Constant (SFIO) elaborated a vision that included free movement of workers, the rationalization of agricultural production, centralized investment by a European bank, and the implementation of a European currency. The administrative apparatus would, as ever, consist of a supranational executive accountable to a directly-elected European parliament.

A SMUSE call for a common market was a continuation, and expansion, of its support for the Agricultural Community discussed above, and like the EDC, it was not

out of line with ideas circulating at the time. The wider European Economic Community (EEC) treaty soon to be elaborated in the Messina project included agriculture and a set of economic powers in line with the Movement's broader political objectives. Moreover, there was a significant difference in the elaboration of the EEC treaty: while the Agricultural Community discussions of 1950-1954 were held under the aegis of the OEEC, an intergovernmental forum designed to distribute Marshall Plan aid, and whose membership encompassed all countries receiving ERP funding, the Messina Project was launched by the six members of the ECSC, a Community predicated on a certain degree of supranationality. The earlier Agricultural Community discussions had included the UK, which blocked any supranational control structures; Messina discussions did not require British assent (even if the potential adhesion of the UK remained a factor and they participated briefly as observers[417]). The SMUSE were fixated on supranationality and democratic control via the parliamentary assembly, both much more likely in the context of the Six than of the OEEC. The Movement's human assets worked within the Consultative Assembly, the Council of Europe, and the High Authority of the ECSC; the key figure of the Messina project was SMUSE president Paul-Henri Spaak, "who supported supranationality much more than the government [he] represented;"[418] and beginning in 1956, the French Mollet cabinet included several SMUSErs in relevant positions, as we shall see below.

For the SMUSE, one major consequence of the failure of the EDC had been the elevation, by default, of Paul-Henri Spaak. Spaak's concrete contributions to the SMUSE since 1952 had been threefold: his participation in general propaganda, both published and spoken; his general guidance of the Belgian Socialist establishment; and his management of the EDC treaty process (his leadership of the European Movement might have been advantageous, though it would be difficult to quantify). André Philip had been the movement's policy leader and most prolific writer, its president, and the liaison between the Movement and the SFIO at the opening stages of European construction when the process had been largely in French hands. With the failure of the EDC, marking

[417] Johan Beyen evoked the British question in his opening remarks at Messina, and British input was solicited as part of the process. Beyen at Messina: Session 1, part 2. Available at: https://www.cvce.eu/obj/minutes_of_the_messina_conference_1_to_3_june_1955-en-ceafc91b-3e9c-4296-97b1-1b808c2c4e3e.html Messina resolution: Part 2, clause 6. Available at: https://www.cvce.eu/obj/resolution_adoptee_par_les_ministres_des_affaires_etrangeres_des_etats_membres_de_la_ceca_messine_1er_au_3_juin_1955-fr-d1086bae-0c13-4a00-8608-73c75ce54fad.html

[418] Parsons, Craig. *The Choice for Europe*. Cornell University Press, 2003. 101

a sudden French unreliability *vis-à-vis* the European project, Philip's position as the Movement's strategic lynchpin disappeared. Nor was Philip particularly gracious or constructive about the situation: as noted, he publicly excoriated a host of people and groups which he held responsible, and then left France for several months. Spaak's immediate future was rosier: Belgium had emerged from the EDC process a clear supporter of further integration; Spaak had been "plugged in" to the European establishment at a higher level than Philip and was well-respected; in early 1955, Spaak was tapped to head Belgium's foreign ministry, the top administrative job held by any members of the SMUSE until that time; finally, Spaak had financial connections in the US that allowed him notably to complement European Movement funds to the tune of some 30 million Francs.[419] Where Philip had been best-placed for the job in 1949; Spaak best encapsulated the Movement's potential by 1955.

There was no institutional recognition of any kind of transfer of power: Philip and Spaak remained co-heads of the movement, and the balance of each man's contributions to the Movement's publications remained as before (if anything, Spaak was less active), but the game had changed somewhat. In late 1949, the Movement had needed a general framework and approach, which Philip provided in the form of the 3rd Congress resolutions: a functionalist approach focused on institutions more than strict orthodoxy, with a strictly democratic, supranational executive. The passage of the ECSC and the launch of further ideas based on the same model validated and focused the Movements' efforts. The precise form of Europe's institutions, however was determined via a multilateral process that required balancing participants' foreign policy, domestic imperatives, public emotions, power politics and political philosophy. Philip, as we have seen,[420] was an ideas man – Gironella characterized him as a great talker ("*causeur*") who was not good at following through on details[421] – and had little patience or considerations for emotion, expediency, or anything he considered apostate Socialism. Philip's legacy was to establish a political orientation and general strategy for the SMUSE, which admittedly failed to carry the EDC through but positioned it effectively for

[419] Dumoulin, 1999. 502.
[420] See the diatribe against Labour in 1950; the uncompromising positions and rebuttals in *GE*; or his 1957 indictment of the SFIO.
[421] Gironella to Raymond Rifflet, 6 January, 1960. Louvain: UCL, Rifflet Farde 98. The term "*causeur*" is vaguely pejorative, connoting a certain detachment.

the Messina project. Spaak signed on to Philip's political and strategic orientation, and was in the right place at the right time to pick up the torch.

This section will look closely at a few stages in the elaboration of the Messina Project, leading to the Treaties of Rome. While the topic is well documented, the historiography suffers from a by-now familiar issue: since the SMUSE is so little known, the role of SMUSE members has never been recognized as such. Two of the largest monographs on the topic, Andrew Moravcsik's *The Choice for Europe* and Alan Milward's *European Rescue of the Nation-State*, justifiably pay very close attention to the economic dimension of the negotiations – I do not disagree with the importance of the economic question, but the role of interpersonal relationships in facilitating agreements should not be overlooked. Edelgard Mahant notes that "the number of concessions made to the French point of view seems astounding," proposing that two factors account for it: first, that the other five governments wished to avoid a repeat of the EDC; and second, that the French interests coincided with those of one or more other the other governments.[422] A third reason might plausibly be the SMUSE network.

A number of French SMUSErs were appointed to the Mollet government in February 1956; collaboration between Spaak and these French members, in the context of the French overseas territories (TOM) and of the supranational executive given to the European Economic Community (EEC), reveal a degree of familiarity and mutual understanding difficult to imagine in a strictly professional context. While I will not argue that the SMUSE is somehow responsible for the Treaties of Rome, the connections established in the years before Messina have a role analogous, at the very least, to that of the Geneva Circle in the launching of the Schuman Plan,[423] and there is compelling evidence that the SMUSE network was directly instrumental in resolving some of the difficulties of the project.

The launch of the Messina project for a common market and an atomic energy agency - both SMUSE goals - had much to do with Spaak's being Belgian Foreign Minister. The notion of placing Europe's atomic research and production under

[422] Mahant, Edelgard. "French and German attitudes to the negotiations about the European Economic Community, 1955-1957." Doctoral Thesis, university of London, 1969. 74.
[423] See Gehler, Michael and Wolfram Kaiser, "Transnationalism and Early European Integration: The Nouvelles Equipes Internationales and the Geneva Circle 1947-1957," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Sept 2001), 773-789.

centralized, supranational control was at least as old as – if not older than – the SMUSE's 3rd Congress resolutions of 1949; a "Common Market," a notion that had cropped up perennially since the late 19th Century, had been advocated in *GE* since early 1953. The magazine had published articles on both in early 1955: one by Spaak in February, campaigning for an economic integration institution,[424] and the other by Robert Lecourt (MRP) in March, proposing expanding the ECSC's mandate to transport and atomic energy.[425] Much of the historiography on the Common Market enacted in the Treaties of Rome traces its origin to Dutch Foreign Minister Johan Beyen, who had been pitching a variation of the idea since 1952.[426] He had little success, however, until sending Spaak a memo in early April, 1955,[427] outlining a plan for an integration of the European economy to be folded into the ECSC structure. SMUSEr Zagari, prioritizing the actual launching of the project, would opine that "the impetus for the creation of the Common Market came from Spaak, the Chairman of the Movement for the United States of Europe."[428] Around the same time, Jean Monnet is credited with approaching Spaak, chastened by France's political climate and its rejection of the EDC, pitching an idea about joint atomic research and development.[429] There remains a valid question as to whether credit properly belongs to the men who wrote the proposals, or the man who set them in motion. In either case, on April 23rd, it was agreed to fuse Beyen's plan with Monnet's and to formulate an official proposal to the rest of the Six.[430]

The Benelux proposal went out on May 18th. It evoked both the economic and social dimensions of what would become the Common Market, and cooperation in the atomic field. Beyen explained to his colleagues at Messina two weeks later that while the Benelux memorandum did not endorse a specific structure for economic integration, the ministers had certainly envisaged that atomic energy would have to be regulated by a supranational executive. In the economic arena, each minister had preferred a

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[424] *Gauche Européenne* #20 February 1955. Amsterdam: IISG, ZK 31205
[425] *Gauche Européenne* #21 March 1955. Amsterdam: IISG, ZK 31205
[426] Milward, Alan. *The European Rescue of the Nation State*. Taylor & Francis e-library, 2005. 171. Parsons, Craig. *A Certain Idea of Europe*. Cornell university Press, 2003. 98. The CVCE summary also cites this date.
[427] CVCE. "The Beyen Plan." http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2007/3/5/197af558-d77d-40aa-b517-ba468d61919e/publishable_en.pdf
[428] Griffiths, 1993. 103.
[429] CVCE. "From the Messina Conference to the Rome Treaties – Full Text." http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2011/11/24/950e8fdc-263d-4ef1-aae2-bd336cfacb54/publishable_en.pdf
[430] CVCE. "The Beyen Plan." http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2007/3/5/197af558-d77d-40aa-b517-ba468d61919e/publishable_en.pdf

supranational economic community, but acknowledged that supranational economic integration would likely elicit strong objections ("not all of them rational"). The memorandum stopped short of excluding intergovernmental institutions, but opined that proper implementation of the concept would require supranationalism.[431] German State Secretary at the Foreign Office Walter Hallstein echoed these sentiments, presenting the choice in stark terms: "integration, or disintegration," but advocated the expansion of the ECSC, as opposed to the creation of new executive organs.

By contrast, the French representative at the time, Antoine Pinay, agreed in principle but echoed a concern raised by others: that another failure would be catastrophic for the European project. He was under explicit instruction to "go ahead along the Euratom road, but not along the road to an Economic Community, which is quite impossible at the present time."[432] Pinay erred on the side of caution on the institutional question, and advocated integration by smaller sectors if it could get the ball rolling more quickly (rather divorced from the broad scope of the economic proposal, which would target a vast range of goods and services). He also argued for leaving the door open to Great Britain, which would require building new institutions outside of the ECSC, a challenge to the coherence of the supranational community. He felt the countercurrents among some of his colleagues, however, who saw more or less eye-to eye on the institutional question, and soon sought to recast his comments: far from being obstructionist, he would insist, he was merely trying to be expedient.[433]

The biggest cleavage in the early stage of the Messina project was between the Benelux-Italian and Franco-German positions: both Pinay and Hallstein were resistant to a push towards supranational institutions; Pinay the more so.[434] Spaak clashed with Pinay in the early evening of June 2nd, charging that the Franco-German proposal essentially froze any forward movement until a series of preliminary studies had been carried out as to the feasibility of various measures. Pinay shot back that one could not simply leap blindfolded into the unknown, and that in-depth studies had to be carried out. Hallstein concurred, explaining that while Germany was not opposed to

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[431] Beyen in "Minutes of the Messina Conference, 1-3 June, 1955." CVCE: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/proces_verbal_de_la_conference_de_messine_1er_au_3_juin_1955-fr-ceafc91b-3e9c-4296-97b1-1b808c2c4e3e.html. 5.
[432] Edgar Faure to Pinay, cited in "The testimony of an eyewitness: Christian Pineau," Griffiths, 1993. 60.
[433] Minutes of the Messina Conference, June 1-3, 1955. 12 Available at: https://www.cvce.eu/obj/minutes_of_the_messina_conference_1_to_3_june_1955-en-ceafc91b-3e9c-4296-97b1-1b808c2c4e3e.html
[434] Dumoulin 1999. 508.

supranational institutions, at present it would be preferable to launch the process via a consultative body.[435] Supranationality in the common market faced an uphill battle.

The Messina conference concluded on 3 June, 1955, with four separate committees working on treaties covering atomic energy, conventional energy, transport, and a common market, still with the understanding that the atomic energy component would adopt a supranational executive. Spaak was elected to oversee the work of these committees. It was also determined that the institutional question, political as it was, should be left up Spaak's supervisory committee, with the more technical details left to the subcommittees. In practice, Spaak provided the leadership. From the outset, when the institutional question was raised by the Euratom drafting committee, Spaak had made it clear that they should operate under the assumption of a structure almost identical to that of the ECSC: an executive Commission, a Council of Ministers, an Assembly, and an arbitration branch. By the end of January, 1956, it was proposed that the Assembly and the arbitration branch could be held in common with the ECSC.

Within ten weeks, the work slated for the atomic energy's technical committee was complete, their next task being the executive organ and its specific purview. Spaak encouraged the committee to address transnational issues involved in Euratom, to wit: common market measures for the goods, investments and labor involved in the atomic field, measures which didn't technically fall under the purview of the atomic energy committee. By November, they officially advocated giving the atomic energy agency "power to create the common market [for nuclear research, material and manpower], including the authority to determine measures to be taken between members of the community and between those members and other countries."[436] Confirming the concerns of many, including Antoine Pinay, British representative Russell Bretherton commented that the measures elaborated by the Atomic committee were so broadly supranational that Britain would be unlikely to join.[437] By the end of the month, the atomic energy working group formally proposed that a Nuclear Common Market be implemented independently, and that the structural details be forwarded to the

[435] Minutes of the Messina Conference, June 1-3, 1955. 14. Available at: https://www.cvce.eu/obj/minutes_of_the_messina_conference_1_to_3_june_1955-en-ceafc91b-3e9c-4296-97b1-1b808c2c4e3e.html

[436] Traité de Rome Nuclear energy commission report 5 November, 1955. La Courneuve : 20QO 594 (P/12929-32) ;

[437] Traité de Rome, Comité directeur, 7 November 1955. La Courneuve: 20QO 594 (P/12929-32)

Common Market working group. Pinay resisted, submitting a note with France's reservations.[438]

The inauguration of the Mollet government in late January, 1956, was a critical development. (Mollet was at that time also president of SMUSE's French section[439]). His personal leanings, beyond the positions he adopted as head of the SFIO, were towards more supranational integration, though he necessarily remained sensitive to public opinion and the necessity of political compromise. The conservative and pragmatic Antoine Pinay left the foreign ministry that month, replaced by avowed integrationist Christian Pineau, then vice-president of the SMUSE's French section. Pineau and Spaak were "old friends"[440] who had known each other since at least 1942[441] and had crossed paths frequently in the context of the SMUSE in recent years. They reportedly spent hours poring over various aspect of the Messina project, and ate dinner *tête-à-tête* on the eve of the Conference of Rome, notably going over aspects of Spaak's speech.[442] Maurice Faure (not to be confused with outgoing president Edgar Faure), appointed *Secrétaire d'Etat*[443] in the Foreign ministry, was also a SMUSEr. He would work closely with Pineau, notably taking an outsize role in the European department at a time when the Suez crisis, the Hungarian uprising and the Algerian independence struggle often monopolized the Foreign Minister's attention. Craig Parsons and Hans-Jurgen Küsters have both ascribed major credit to this new team in terms of making Rome a reality, though without drawing the institutional connection between them, or indeed between them and Spaak[444] (in their defense, while Spaak drew special attention the same three as "committed Europeanists," he did not mention the movement either[445]).

The Mollet cabinet had three other SMUSErs in relevant positions: Gaston Defferre headed the Overseas (or TOM) Ministry; Albert Gazier was in charge of Social Affairs; and finally, Gerard Jaquet, future president of the Movement, was Information

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[438] Comité de l'Euratom, 27-28 November 1955. La Courneuve: 20QO 594 (P12932) Vol 609
[439] Gironella. "Pour le prochain Congrès National." *Bulletin du Mouvement Gauche Européenne*, vol 4 no 24 (April-May 1957). Amsterdam: IISG ZK 31205.
[440] Pineau, cited in Griffiths, 1993. 61.
[441] Desaix thesis. 324. OURS.
[442] Desaix, Jean Frédéric. "Radiographie de l'Homme Politique Européen Christian Pineau, 1904-1995" Doctoral dissertation, Université de Paris VIII Saint-Denis-Vincennes, 1998. 324-329. OURS.
[443] Essentially a specialized deputy.
[444] Parsons, Craig. *The Choice for Europe*. Cornell University Press, 2003. 108. Küsters, Hanns Jürgen. *Fondements de le Communauté Economique Européenne.* Luxembourg: Office des publications officialles des Communautés européennes, 1990. 141.
[445] "Européens convaincus" Spaak, 1969. 92.

Minister, perhaps complementing his role as Managing Director of *GE*, which ran pieces on the EEC and Euratom virtually every month. The Mollet cabinet marked a consequential shift in the balance of opinions over Messina. Whereas in June and September, Benelux and, to a lesser extent, Italy, had faced off against a strong Franco-German front, the next Six Ministers meeting saw the emergence of a distinctly pro-supranational consensus.

But France's recent history could not be ignored, notwithstanding this stacking of the deck, and the UK was seeing a wave of anti-European sentiment. Spaak was careful to manage the political optics. In February, 1956, he called a meeting to discuss the workings of his committee so far, and let it be known to French Ambassador Rivière that there would be mention of linking the EEC to Euratom, which was delicate since it would raise the specter of a supranational executive for the EEC. Rivière passed this along to Pineau under the heading "Secret," noting that in light of the situation, Spaak would avoid putting anything in writing that weekend.[446] Pineau's opening statement to the assembled ministers, meanwhile was positive but also somewhat hedged: to avoid a repeat of 1954, he argued, it was crucial to manage public opinion; there would have to be some "*préparations psychologiques"* and opinion polling in France before things got too far down the line (*Gauche Européenne's* January issue had included four pro-EEC articles, notably by Pineau staffer Robert Marjolin and Monnet collaborator Etienne Hirsh[447]). He reassured his colleagues, however, that the current administration was behind the project, citing Prime Minister Mollet's call for a Euratom treaty as soon as that summer.[448]

One of the perennial issues of the construction of Europe – voting rules in the Council of Ministers – would remain vague. The precise wording of the final document is as follows:

"Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Council shall act by a majority of its members."[449]

This is something of a compromise, but it does emphasize that majority voting is the default option, and it establishes that the decisions of the Communities' legislative

[446] Riviere to Pineau, 6 February 1956. La Courneuve : Archives Diplomatiques, P/7520
[447] Gauche Européenne #27, January 1956. Amsterdam: IISG, ZK 31205
[448] Meeting of Six ministers , 11-12 February 1956 La Courneuve : Archives Diplomatiques, 20QO 594 (P12932)
[449] Treaty of Rome, Article 148-1.

branch should be superior to the prerogatives of its constituent nations. This, concretely, is the difference between an intergovernmental and a supranational organization. It falls short of what the SMUSE would have wanted: the Assembly (or Parliament) was not the central decision-making organ, and the possibility of unanimous voting conserved the potential for member states to block any given measure. On the first point, the SMUSE had not finished working towards a vested Parliament; on the second, it was perhaps simply too much to expect that national governments of the day would not seek to hedge against a runaway Commission or a self-granted expansion of the Community's mandate.

Spaak's management of the rather opaque and highly technical negotiations launched at Messina also let him camouflage one of the more technical issues of the Messina treaties: the institutional link between EEC and Euratom, and in particular the supranational nature of the executive organ. As noted, such supranationality was a hard pill to swallow for many on the Continent, and even more so for the UK, but remained, to the SMUSE and others, the *sine qua non* of a viable Europe. Spaak's workaround had been to propose that the Euratom committee create its own limited "atomic" common market, and to forward the details to the Common Market committee.[450] This would establish ECSC-style supranational administration at least for Euratom without explicitly granting the same executive to the Common Market. The end goal, however, was to do just that. On this point, there was almost certainly some coordination between the SMUSE and the Spaak committee.

In March, 1956, Spaak reasoned that perhaps one could leverage the enthusiasm towards Euratom by making Euratom membership contingent on accepting a supranational EEC.[451] André Philip, who had no involvement in the Mollet government or the Messina project, had proposed making EEC membership dependent on Euratom at a SMUSE National Committee meeting in late February.[452] Philip pointed out the strong support for Euratom, and suggested that SMUSE should campaign to make Euratom contingent to some degree on the Common Market. Almost simultaneously, as the Common Assembly met to endorse the Messina project, Fernand Dehousse, not involved in the Messina negotiations either, also floated the notion of linking Euratom

[450] Spaak Comité Directeur report, 3 October, 1955. La Courneuve: Archives Diplomatiques 20 QO 594
[451] Rivière to Pineau, 7 March, 1956. La Courneuve: Archives Diplomatiques, 248 QO 184
[452] Note by André Philip (dated 23 March, 1956) summarizing the meeting. Saint Denis: Archives Nationales, 625 AP 12

and EEC in order to increase the latter's chances of success.[453] The Belgian Senator was a long-standing contributor to the SMUSE, member of the Consultative Assembly and future president of the Council of Europe, and one of the leading Belgians of the SMUSE.[454] It seems more than coincidental that the idea was raised almost simultaneously by Philip in Paris, Dehousse in Strasbourg, and Spaak at the negotiations in Val Duchesse, Belgium. The SMUSE was fundamentally a forum for coordinating strategy in different decision-making centers of Europe: Philip had managed a multi-pronged approach to the EDC, and Spaak had attempted to rally SMUSE forces behind the ECSC in 1952.[455] This new effort linking Euratom to the Common Market has been characterized, notably by Hanns Jürgen Küsters, as crucial to the success of the negotiations.[456]

The remaining option would be to hold the Euratom executive in reserve on the assumption that the EEC committee would not be able to complete its work in time. They held institutional questions to a low profile throughout. Spaak was Belgian Foreign Minister, Pineau was French Foreign Minister, Dehousse was a senator and Philip was an influential member of the SFIO, but they did not interact in their official capacities: while all of them were in agreement on the strategic approach, Spaak could argue through the end of 1956, truthfully, that none of the *Six governments* ever intended ("*prétendu*") to link the EEC and Euratom, and the elaboration of the treaties was progressing in parallel.[457] His speech makes no mention of the Executive branch. Pineau likewise reassured the Senate in October that the door remained open to enlargement (a reference to British participation) and that there was no talk of a political authority, which was something of a dodge since they did envisage giving supranational political power to the executive branch.[458]

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[453] Dehousse to Common Assembly, 16 March, 1956. La Courneuve: Archives Diplomatiques. 248QO/184
[454] *Gauche Européenne* #3, May 1953: Dehousse's activism was held up as a model by Georges Goriely, listed with Spaak's and Philip's as some of the most constructive in the movement.
[455] Gironella to Dehousse, 28 August 1952. Florence: EUI FD-80.
[456] Küsters, Hans-Jürgen. "Die "relance européenne" und die Römischen Verträge," *Integration*, July 1987. 137. Available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/24217866
[457] Spaak Committee to French Foreign ministry, 11 Dec, 1956. La Courneuve: Archives Diplomatiques 248QO/184
[458] "Discours de Pineau sur la ratification du Traité de Rome," October 1956. La Courneuve: Archives Nationales, 580 AP 12

In early 1956, while the institutional question had still to be laid down in print, the Spaak Committee's work was reviewed by the ECSC Council of Ministers in order to approve the structural changes implied by the Messina project. The Council of Ministers still operated on the basis of unanimity, giving each member an effective veto. France's stated positions and its desire to integrate its overseas territories made it the hardest to win over. The previous administration, and indeed Mollet himself at one time, had been somewhat Anglophile and resistant to the supranational question; and Pinay had urged Spaak to hold off on anything to do with worker movement that might apply to colonial subjects. The new administration was only 6 weeks old at the time of the meeting, operating in the highly treacherous political climate of the 4th Republic. There were also the altogether more tangible corollaries of France's colonial holdings. Like most colonial powers, preferential trade agreements and purchase guarantees underpinned an important slice of the French economy: a common market seeking a homogeneity of resource access could wreak havoc. Also like other colonial powers, France had promised that colonial subjects would eventually benefit from the mother country's tutelage, notably through access to education and employment opportunities, and the free movement of workers in various fields was integral to the viability of both Euratom and the Common Market. Algeria was experiencing a protracted independence movement just then, and while the French state was anxious to placate Algerians – it did not want to lose the colony altogether, having already lost Indochina and feeling Arab-Nationalist pressure on French interests in the Middle East – it did not want to incentivize even larger numbers of French Algerians to migrate into Europe. None of this was lost on Spaak: Belgium has analogous issues with respect to the Belgian Congo. Aside from the population, Congo's uranium would be contentious in the context of Euratom, though by and large, the Congo was so thoroughly subjugated that it was considered very unlikely that it would engender the kind of difficulties then on full display in French Algeria.[459]

The Mollet administration coordinated with Spaak to paper over that difficulty, even if the issue did not disappear altogether. In his early report that February, Spaak had decided to avoid any reference to the French *Territoires d'Outre-Mer* (TOM) at all, and had separately assured Pineau privately that the committee did not intend to make

[459] Dumoulin, 1999. 523.

any specific prescriptions in that area.[460] Meanwhile, Mollet instructed Pineau to accept Spaak's February report, while only raising orally the possibility that some provisions may have to be rolled back because of the TOM.

The Spaak Committee's report was published in April, and a month later a conference took place in Venice to mark its enactment. One of the three main points of contention at Venice would in fact be the French "Overseas" question. It had been a perennial issue in the context of economic integration since at least 1954. One advantage of including the colonies in the Common Market was that investment funds might be spent on African infrastructure, improving prospects for French exports[461] (Belgium had analogous interests in the Congo); another is that it would avoid an economic reckoning from having to finally apply OEEC trade liberalization rules to its colonial arrangements.[462] The ongoing Algerian independence movement might also be resolved by skipping the issue of independence altogether and moving towards an *inter*dependent structure.[463] The issue was so contentious that Spaak had tried to avoid discussing it altogether, meeting privately with SMUSEr Gaston Defferre of the Overseas Ministry the week before, to confirm that they would avoid the question.[464] The issue was unavoidable for the French, but in the interest of avoiding a deadlock, Mollet brought it up in very broad terms to the effect that France reserved the desire eventually to integrate the TOMs; Pineau similarly glossed over the specifics. The issue would remain a significant obstacle, with Luxembourg, Italy and Germany notably reticent to contribute to the proposed overseas investment fund. The issue was not directly addressed until the final meeting of the heads of government in February, 1957, when Spaak formulated a compromise bridging the gap between the French proposal and the reservations of the others.[465]

By the time the Spaak Committee's report was published in April 1956, the new French government's more forthcoming orientation allowed the acknowledgement of a link between the two projects. In a section titled "the Common Market of nuclear

[460] Desaix 1998. 325. Paris: OURS
[461] Mahant, Edelgard. "French and German attitutdes to the negotiations about the European Economic Community, 1955-1957." Doctoral Thesis, university of London, 1969. 63.
[462] Milward, 2005. 191.
[463] Shaev, Brian "The Algerian War, European integration, and the Decolonization of French Socialism" in *French Historical Studies* 41-1 (February 2018). 23.
[464] Defferre to Pineau, May 26, 1956. La Courneuve: Archives Nationales, 580 AP 12
[465] Mahant, 1969. 72

Energy," Spaak explained that Euratom had to be developed in all haste, and that by all means it had to avoid being built within or around the existing national structures. Nor could the free movement of goods, finance and people involved in the Atomic industry wait for the elaboration of the more complex Common Market. Euratom would therefore have to anticipate the creation of this limited common market for technicians and nuclear material, and, he closed, some cooperation would necessarily exist between the two drafting commissions.[466] Spaak's use of the term "cooperation" is ambiguous, and is not a public acknowledgement that the two treaties would have any formal interconnection or that they would share an executive, but it signals that supranationality was no longer the obstacle it had been with the Edgar Faure government. An immediate consequence of this approach from the French strategic perspective was to place Euratom in a position to guide the EEC by default in the context of its executive.

The April report was validated in Venice the following month. In his opening remarks, Pineau proposed to restructure the four existing committees so that the work might be done by a single organism, split into two branches. He further proposed that Spaak lead said organism. Walter Hallstein, speaking immediately afterwards, endorsed the two-branch structure and Spaak's leadership. Though neither Italy, Luxembourg or the Netherlands had made any comment to that effect, Spaak concluded that the ministers were in agreement on the single committee format. The so-called "*action d'urgence*" sectors (transport, labor, etc. as per Messina) were to be subsumed to the Common Market branch, streamlining the overall process but complicating the work of the EEC committee (perhaps coincidentally furthering Euratom's strategic advantage).

As it happened, Spaak's *Comité Directeur* devoted the bulk of its attention to the Common Market treaty over the next nine months. Only halfway through the overall process, the Euratom committee was drafting market measures, and reasserted that it was anticipating a limited common market that would have to be applied immediately. By January 27th 1957, the Euratom treaty was entirely finalized, including its branches and powers.[467] The Common Market committee, however, grappled into February over external tariffs, agricultural provisions, participation in the development fund,

[466] EUI: Direction des affaires économiques et financières; Service de cooperation économique 20QO 594 (P/12928); Traité de Rome - Microfilm place 191 ; report p119

[467] Couve de Murville>Quai d'Orsay Jan 25 1957. « Questions Européennes Internationales - Marché Commun. » La Courneuve : 248QO/185.

transportation issues, the passage from the first to the second phase of the Common Market program, and still latently the inclusion of the TOM.[468] Ultimately, with the deadline looming, the Common Market commission had few options but to adopt the administrative framework produced separately by the Euratom committee. In the last week of February, Spaak felt confident enough to announce publicly that there would indeed be a Common Market. A week later, a meeting of the Commission on Euratom and the Common Market was held at the SMUSE's Brussels office. Light refreshments were served.[469]

One final catastrophe was averted with the cooperation of the three French SMUSErs involved in the negotiations. In early March, the King of the Belgians, and consequently Belgian Prime Minister Van Acker, threatened to reject the final Common Market treaty. The opposition press had mounted an attack on Spaak and the Messina project, arguing that Belgium stood to lose out disproportionately, but the specific issue for the King was a series of disadvantageous tariffs demanded by the French. Mere days before the signing ceremony, Guy Mollet, François Pineau and Maurice Faure arrived in Brussels to hammer out the necessary concessions.[470]

The result of linking, then uniting, the Common Market and Euratom processes, had been to give serious advantages to the Euratom part of the equation, since the Common Market committee was an unwieldy grouping of what had originally been three sub-committees, addressing a wide range of technical issues. Meanwhile, Euratom was fairly streamlined and politically less contentious, and putting the unimaginable power of the atom under supranational control was publicly palatable. Spaak carried Euratom's supranational dimension over from the ECSC, and positioned it to be applied to the EEC as well. Pineau, years later, would describe Euratom as "a smokescreen for the Common Market," and give Spaak special credit for working so accommodatingly with the French government.[471]

Though the SMUSE's modest but significant contributions to the Treaties of Rome have gone entirely unrecognized in the historiography on the subject, it was certainly celebrated within the group itself. Gironella wrote an elated editorial for the front page

[468] Various Jan-Feb 1957. « Questions Européennes Internationales - Marché Commun » La Courneuve : 248QO/185.
[469] Rifflet to members, 28 February, 1957. Louvain: UCL, Rifflet Farde 99
[470] Dumoulin, 1999. 525-526.
[471] "La strategie du gouvernement Guy Mollet par la négociation et la conclusion des Traités de Rome" in *Bulletin de la Fondation G. Mollet* no 13, December 1987.

of the French section's newsletter in April 1957, in the wake of the Rome Treaties' signature, citing a litany of SMUSErs involved in the project. Spaak, Co-President and head of SMUSE's international committee, got top billing, with Maurice Faure in second place along with a handful of current and former SMUSErs in technical committees; finally came Pineau and Mollet, both members of the French section's *Comité Directeur.* During the Treaties' ratification phase, a grass-roots campaign accompanied the French section's endorsement of the Rome project.[472] Several dozen conferences, meetings and rallies were held throughout France in 1957. Weekly meetings were held in Paris on technical issues, and there was mobilization among local leaders and militants in the surrounding suburbs. The eventual passage of the Treaties of Rome marks the SMUSE's most visible success in the construction of Europe.

After Rome

While the SMUSE and its adherents had very directly supported the project, there is a pertinent question about just how much Rome can be considered a victory for the SMUSE. Talbot Imlay, notably, has summarized European Socialists in general as having to "persuade themselves"[473] that Rome was compatible with their goals. The treaties fell short of the more orthodox socialist objectives, but they fulfilled more broadly federalist ones, so the answer with respect to the SMUSE depends on both to what extent there really were "socialist" objectives on the European level, and where the Movement was situated on the socialist-federalist spectrum.

Imlay's review of Socialism after the war, focused closely on the SPD, the SFIO, and Labour, identifies three sequential sources of major cleavage between the European parties: the IAR, the European Movement, and the Schuman Plan. While none of the parties went so far as to reject internationalism in general, the SPD balked on grounds of equality and Labour refused to give up sovereignty. He also delves into the intra-party disagreements between Keep Left, the Europe Group and Labour or between Pivert, Philip and Mollet. A conclusion of these observations must be that there was little in the

[472] "Nos regions vivent, Campagne en faveur de l'Euratom et du Marché Commun." *Bulletin du Mouvement Gauche Européenne* vol 4 no 24 (April-May 1957).
[473] Imlay, Talbot. "Constructing Europe, 1945-1960," in *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism: European Socialists and International Politics, 1914-1960.* Oxford Scholarship Online, 2017. PDF. 309.

way of a comprehensive, unified socialist vision against which to weigh Rome, a point certainly borne out by the present examination and which the SMUSE was attempting to rectify. Imlay's central argument with respect to the Treaties of Rome is that it fell short of what individual leading European Socialists (notably André Philip) really wanted, to the extent that it focused on a customs union rather than the application of a pan-European socialist policies. The Treaties, he shows were only tentatively endorsed by the mainstream Socialist parties, with public statements which framed the treaties as steps in the right direction while masking deep reservations.[474]

Philip's reticence towards the terms of the EEC treaty has important implications for us, because based on Philip's leading position in the SMUSE, it could follow that the Movement itself was ambivalent towards the EEC. It should be borne in mind that while Philip was certainly high-minded and principled, the SMUSE has adopted increasingly adaptable policies since his arrival, at the expense of the left-leaning Socialism, and that the SMUSE was more than just André Philip. The decision to work with other parties had, to some extent turned the SMUSE into a federalist party led by Socialists, which had thrown its weight behind a functionalist expansion of Europe despite the reservations of some of its members (Gironella grumbled consistently about the tradeoffs of joining forces with other movements, and the Brits more or less quit). By that token, the leading activist of the Movement in this period became Spaak, insofar as he was best-placed to enact its objectives. Nor had Philip been among the primary agents of the SMUSE's efforts during the Messina Project; and it might be argued that he had outlived his usefulness when he burned his bridges to the SFIO by publishing "*Le Socialisme Trahi*."[475] The book denounced the fragmentation and lack of discipline in the party, which had cost it the EDC, and the mollification (perhaps *Mollet*fication[476]) of a once-principled party now guided more by politics than orthodoxy. In other words, Philip was no longer the embodiment of the movement's ideology or strategy, and he no longer spoke for the Movement as he had in the first few years of his presidency. The Movement's specific goals at the time, against which success should be measured, were for discrete institutions to have supranational executive powers accountable to a

[474] Imlay, 2017. 350.
[475] The most frequently-cited reason for Philip's split is Mollet's policy on Algeria (Shaev 2014. 38), though the chapter excerpt in general was the central topic at the meeting of the SFIO Comité Directeur.
[476] To coin a pun... Mollet's responsibilities to the French government, to the SFIO, and to the SMUSE, resulted in a somewhat frustrating and occasionally inconsistent approach to the details of integration.

democratically-elected, legislative parliament, and for the eventual creation of a single political authority. In other words, the degree to which the SMUSE's objectives were mitigated had more to do with the institutional shortcomings of the EEC (its limited supranationality and consultative parliament) rather than its lack of a Socialist policy.

In context, the application of supranational authority to the EEC, though it resulted from a successful coordinated effort and overcame widespread and long-standing resistance, can be characterized as limited, but it should be remembered that the EEC was a stepping stone, not an end in itself. The SMUSE engaged on this functionalist trajectory purposefully and with a long-term plan, if perhaps not a fully-articulated strategy, to build further on each institution. As we shall see, SMUSErs continued to work towards these objectives, notably in recommending direct elections to the European Parliament, and participating in the elaboration of the Merger Treaty which fused the three Communities in 1965. Another result of the Movement's efforts was to push the EEC towards a sort of hybrid position on the spectrum between true supranationalism and strict intergovernmentalism, producing an institution that would draw positive engagement from actors across that spectrum.

If the EEC was a step in the right direction, the Movement feared that absent a comprehensive supranational social policy and the means to enact it, the coordination of the European economy would be left, by default to (capitalist) transnational corporations. The Movement's strategy to counterbalance these forces had been the creation of a European Socialist platform, but as we have seen, it was not to be. In May, 1958, the primary forum for creating this consensus – *Gauche Européenne* – ended its run. There had been little to write about since Rome and the continuing coverage of European nations and general issues attracted neither consensus nor the kind of general interest that would keep the magazine afloat. Having failed to produce the foundations of a European socialist political force, the Movement shifted gears in the closing months of 1958.

In November, word came from the General Secretariat that the most important issue for Europe now was the promotion of the agency and responsibilities of the labor force, and that the mobilization of those forces behind a common program was "the

essential task of the moment."[477] The SMUSE would embark on the creation of a European Workers' Movement (*Mouvement Européen du Travail*, or MET). Its goal was to create collective bargaining capacity at the scale of the Six, which would empower the European workforce to participate in the development of new structures under the Rome statutes, and to engage with the multinational corporations that the Movement feared were fast becoming the primary agents of that development.[478] A "'*Europe of the Cartels*" was the new enemy.[479]

With a view to establishing this super-union and its program, the SMUSE arranged a *Congrès Européen du Travail* (CET). It met over three days in May, 1959, at the Palais d'Orsay in central Paris, adjacent to a certain repurposed railway station where, almost exactly a year before, General De Gaulle had announced his return to power.[480] The conference was attended by a little over 130 individuals from the Six nations, representing some 20 political parties and labor unions.[481] Mario Zagari, head of the Italian section, mobilized a coalition of five Italian parties. The spectrum ran from Republicans, represented by Ugo La Malfa, to the Radicals, and included the PSI. Zagari hoped to offer some common purpose to the Italian Center-Left, indeed he was optimistic that the SMUSE could offer some common labor-rights program to Europe as a whole.[482] The French section had the strongest showing: over a dozen labor leaders and respectable delegations from the MRP, SFIO, and Mitterrand's UDSR. Belgium brought a healthy contingent of cadres from the workers' union, half a dozen high-ranking members of the PSB, and several academic and student groups.

While these larger contingents were cause for some optimism, it was immediately apparent that even within the Six, interest in the sort of transnational grass-roots cooperation envisaged by the SMUSE was not universal. Seven delegates represented the German bureau of the SMUSE, second only to France's delegation, but the only representative of German labor was a single member of German metallurgical union, in an observer capacity. Luxembourg brought modest delegations from the CGT and the Socialist Workers' Party, and the Dutch delegation consisted of a single member of the Dutch Workers' Party.

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[477] "Le role du Mouvement Gauche Européene…" Louvain: UCL Rifflet, farde 120.
[478] Rifflet>Belgian section adherents, December 1, 1958. Louvain : UCL Rifflet Farde 97.
[479] This expression occurs frequently, a boogeyman ever poised to co-opt the integration project.
[480] De Gaulle's announcement was on May 19 1958; the CET was held from May 16 to 18, 1959.
[481] "Liste des organisations…" Louvain: UCL, Rifflet Farde 120
[482] "Séance du Dimanche." Louvain: UCL Rifflet Farde 120

André Philip put things bluntly in his opening speech: "The political struggle between the capitalist, conservative and liberal Right, and the Left representing workers, farmers, technicians and consumers, has begun."[483] That struggle was being undertaken at the national level: it was good but insufficient, in his view. Here was an opportunity to coordinate, to show solidarity, to work together across national lines in the great tradition of workers' parties. And while they questioned and quibbled, he intoned, capitalism was getting organized; and where they could potentially drive the policies of progress and quality of life on behalf of all, capitalism was hard at work driving policies of prices and wages at their expense. At stake, he warned, was the fate of democracy itself. The *grandes lignes* of this speech, and the accusatory attitude towards capitalism and nationalism, were vintage Philip. It resonated well with the working-class base, indeed his approach was rather more appropriate in this context than it had been among the necessarily more pragmatic (perhaps implicitly culpable) audiences of a campaign at the national-government level. Other speakers were more moderated: Etienne Hirsch, president of the EURATOM Commission quibbled with Philip's assessment of a slowdown at the ECSC, and Robert Marjolin, MRP SMUSEr and Vice-President of the EEC, cautioned against painting corporations with too broad a brush, urging a more nuanced approach.

The Movement was seeking to refocus on what amounted to a socialist workers' international, but a perennial issue also resurfaced. Somewhat incongruously, Sunday's debate included the issue of Europe's responsibilities towards the developing world, particularly Africa. The discussion was launched by Christian Pineau, still one of the highest-ranking members of the French contingent, who had, until a few days earlier, been Foreign Minister. Framing the project as a guarantor of global peace through equality, Pineau argued for a coordinated approach to helping the developing world and reprised a tenet of the 1956 economic program, suggesting that countries donate some percentage of their GDP to developing their colonies.

Notwithstanding the noble intentions, policy guidance such as Pineau envisaged would not be carried out by a workers' movement, or at least not one focused on a coordinated campaign of engagement with multinational corporations. Logistically, the

[483] "Séance du Samedi matin." Louvain: UCL Rifflet Farde 120

SMUSE was envisaging two very different, though not mutually exclusive, campaigns: one at the organized-labor level designed to shape economic relations with both the Six and the large industrial interests, and one at the executive level designed to shape a common colonial policy. The career trajectories of leading SMUSErs would be relevant: the higher-profile political members of the Movement were far more suited to the political project than to brokering ties between organized labor and private multinationals.

The CET's final resolutions reflected this duality. The principal Plan of Action enjoined labor groups to: a) develop a common approach to social issues; b) elaborate and present common plans to help create continental *conventions collectives;*[484] c) push to expand the public sector; d) elaborate job training and job creation programs; and e) develop links to consumer organizations to protect consumer rights. Below that was a policy statement on underdeveloped countries: European nations should devote 2% of their GDP to the developing world, and the Six should extend bloc-wide trade deals.

Modalities for enacting the labor program underscored the size of the task: the network required simply did not exist. First, they would have to establish formal contacts with enough unions and labor groups; this network would then have to develop common transnational political, economic and social action plans; then create new national committees to lobby and coordinate at the national level… and only then could they claim to have created a new European Workers' Movement. The SMUSE's skill set and communications network, as elaborated over the past 12 years, were not suited to the task it now set itself. The Movement had carried out grass-roots campaigns, but they largely consisted of speaking tours by known personalities and rarely acted in concert with labor – few major unions participated in the SMUSE with any regularity.

The Movement's primary actors had been politicians and academics, and their fora of action were the new transnational institutions: the ECSC High Authority, the Consultative Assembly, the Council of Europe, the EEC and the European Movement. Tellingly, modalities for the Colonial program were not articulated at all; the machinery had worked well recently, and it was perhaps assumed that the political caste that had exercised power in the 1950s would continue to do so in the 60s. In France, at least, this would not be the case: with de Gaulle in power, neither Pineau, Faure nor Philip would

[484] Legislation establishing the rights and responsibilities of all employees in a given field.

serve again in government, nor would the remaining Europeanists have much clout. Spaak, meanwhile, was occupied as General Secretary of NATO and chairman of the Atlantic Council through 1961. He also feuded openly with De Gaulle, a far cry from the collegial Mollet-era atmosphere that had been successful in negotiating the Treaties of Rome, and which did little to alleviate the chilling effect that the general's return to power had on European cooperation. The European Movement, meanwhile, was barely functioning either by early 1960: there was little cash, the treasurer had resigned, and the executive committee had not met in two years.[485]

In the end, the MET would come to little. Rifflet, in charge of the January, 1960 conference, had to reduce his budget significantly. He also faced reticence and conservatism, particularly among the same Dutch and German unions who had shown so poorly at the CET, and found that in general the European Left was not the motivating idea it had once been.[486] The result was an underwhelming 36 attendees, and an admission by Philip (presiding) that there did not yet exist anything like the structured and disciplined workers' movement the SMUSE had hoped to create.[487] A further conference in April, addressing a common agricultural policy, did somewhat better but still did not live up to expectations. Compounding the generally anemic state of the Europeanist institutions as a whole, the reduced power of the socialist establishments backing the MET, and a general conservatism within European labor unions, were the significant changes brought to the labor landscape by the implementation of the Common Market and the increasing engagement of transnational companies; it was not unreasonable to ask how a loose coalition of European minority parties proposed to harness European labor and meaningfully engage with foreign corporate superstructures.

There is an irony in this last, unsuccessful SMUSE campaign. The Movement had, at least rhetorically, always had a focus on the plight of European workers; resolutions called repeatedly for the inclusion of labor unions in European policy, for concrete policies targeting the ability of the working class to travel and work freely, and for the spoils of economic growth to be passed on to workers. In 1951, Gironella had even attempted to rally Spaak, Finet and Dehousse for a workers' union to operate within the

[485] Schuman[president of European Movement] to Philip, 3 February, 1960. Florence: EUI, ME-495.
[486] Rifflet to Vermeylen, 22 December 1959. Louvain: UCL Rifflet Farde 98
[487] *Comité Européen du Travail* conference, 6-7 February 1960. Compte-rendu, day 2. Florence: EUI ME-494

ECSC.[488] And yet, in choosing to pursue their objectives at the national and transnational level, they had failed to develop a working relationship with the groups they sought to help. By the time they tried to help those groups help themselves, they found they had virtually no connection to them.

Accompanying the radically different political situation, economic hardship had also followed the Treaties of Rome. *GE* had been forced to cease publication in May, 1958. By January, 1959, the SMUSE had seen a two-thirds reduction in the number of dues-paying members.[489] There are two possible explanations: a) that members considered Rome a deal-breaking failure, or b) that on the contrary the perception was that the mission was accomplished and there was little more to be done. Considering that membership had not been markedly affected by the failure of the EDC, and that the SMUSE appealed to a wide political spectrum with a relatively simple common denominator, the more likely answer is the second. In either case, on December 15th of that year, Gironella wrote a fatalistic letter to Paul Finet, president of the High Authority of the ECSC. The SMUSE was in a desperate situation, Gironella wrote, "practically condemned to cease all activity." Casting about for some driving purpose, he proposed that rather than dying an "ignominious death" the SMUSE's structure and networks might serve very usefully as a sort of transnational campaign organism working to support the expansion of the ECSC's mandate.[490]

At their executive committee meeting later that week, Gironella presented his perception of the difficulties facing the SMUSE.[491] First, he argued that Europeanist sentiment had cooled somewhat with a reduction of Cold War tensions (new Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had launched a conciliatory "Peaceful Coexistence" policy in 1956, and had recently undertaken a two-week visit to the US). Secondly, the Common Market had, perversely, allowed multinational corporations to participate actively, if not play a guiding role, in European integration; this reduced the government-centered SMUSE's potency. He bemoaned the Gaullist-led Right/Conservative assault on European socialism, and finally noted that, now largely relegated to the political

[488] Gironella>Dehousse, 3 January 1951. Forence: EUI, FD-80. Available at https://archives.eui.eu/en/fonds/149915?item=FD-80
[489] Rifflet> Robert Defossez, 9 January, 1959. Louvain : UCL, Rifflet Farde 98
[490] Gironella to Finet, 15 December, 1959. Louvain: UCL, Rifflet Farde 98
[491] "Bureau executive international, compte-rendu." 20 December, 1959. Louvain: UCL, Rifflet Farde 98

opposition, socialist parties could effectively only be an obstructive force, and not a constructive one. The movement was hemorrhaging members and funds and was having great difficulty getting the MET off the ground.

External sources of funding were drying up too. The American Committee on United Europe, which had provided between half and two-thirds of the funding for the European Movement beginning in 1949,[492] began to wind down their payments after Rome. Baron Boël resigned his position as treasurer of the European Movement at the beginning of 1960, shortly before the ACUE voted itself out of existence entirely, considering that further efforts would be justified only by a "serious reversal of present trends" towards integration.[493]

Facing an existential crisis, the movement's general organizational framework was assessed in a comprehensive survey by Gironella, who concluded in October, 1960, that it could not produce the Movement's stated objectives.[494] The autonomy of national sections had once served a useful purpose in pressuring national governments and in rallying a base of popular support for integration: the range of party affiliations within the Italian and French sections, for instance, corresponded to potent pluralities in the respective legislative branches. However, these pluralities came with complicated ideological baggage and *realpolitik* corollaries, which made it very hard to texture or streamline the Movement's platform. Furthermore, in the current climate, these national parties were increasingly ineffective. In the case of France, "Gaullism" had relegated the Left to a minority, and while the French section could help effect a rapprochement of those forces, it could with difficulty elaborate a unified strategy or carry it through. Italian socialism was similarly fragmented, and the fragile center-left coalition of which Zagari was a member remained wary of influence of anti-European Communists on one end of the spectrum, and Christian-Democratic conservatism on the other. In Germany, the SMUSE's fraught relationship with the SPD had thawed somewhat, but the SPD held the SMUSE at arms' length: open affiliation to both was tolerated by the SPD on the

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[492] Aldrich, Richard - OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe 1948-60. *Diplomacy & Statecraft*. 1st March 1997. 214. I found no SMUSE accounts for this period, and could not determine the exact degree to which it was subsidized by these sources. Gironella was notably cagey about American funding in his Dec 15 letter to fellow SMUSEr Finet: "excuse me for not being more explicit."

[493] Aldrich, Richard - OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe 1948-60. *Diplomacy & Statecraft*. 1st March 1997. 210

[494]. "Quelques reflections sur le passé, le present et l'avenir du MSEUE." 15 October 1960. Louvain: UCL Rifflet farde 122

condition that participation be confined to the German-language organ *Europa Brücke*. Effective coordination of these small parties at the local level was difficult enough; trying to coordinate at a continental level, as the SMUSE aspired to, was nearly impossible. Benelux saw more Socialist agency, but were split on strategy: the Belgian section, headed as it was by government-level activists, pulled towards a more government-centered approach, while Luxembourg and the Netherlands were more focused on the labor side of things.

Defining and enacting a European Socialism, a long-time aspiration of the SMUSE, and the *raison d'être* of the Movement's various publications, seemed a distant and receding prospect. In his October report, Gironella frankly called the notion of creating of a pan-European party "ridiculous" and proposed the creation of a "supranational Fabian Society" comprising a limited number of "real activists."[495] Concretely, this meant ending the Movement's drive to recruit members, raise awareness, or foster a pan-European dialogue. Instead, a "supranational" International Committee would pass its own resolutions, to be pursued by a small number of members within their own countries (this caused deep concern within the SFIO, due to its very close relationship to the Movement, which were not overcome until the following June after clarifying party-members' allegiance[496]). At the same time, it was decided to rename the Movement once again: it would thereafter be named "*Mouvement Gauche Européenne*" (MGE).[497] The new objectives were lofty: this Movement would work towards a European Federation (anticipating a "Global Federation") to which would be granted powers to safeguard the common interest of the citizens of Europe, and to manage a common economic, financial, and social policy, international trade, defense, foreign policy, and a European currency. MGE would specifically support socialist policies like economic planning, investment strategies, development of the public sector, the democratization of education and information, and the participation of labor in all economic and social areas.

It's worth pointing out again, as I did at the beginning of Chapter 3, the Movement's continuity of purpose over the years. MGE's objectives are strikingly similar to those originally established over a decade before by the MUSSE. Edwards and Ridley had launched their program with the prediction of an eventual United States of the

[495] "prétension ridicule." "Necessité d'une reorganization du MSEUE." Louvain: UCL, Rifflet Farde 100
[496] Compte-rendu du Comité Directeur SFIO; 15 February, 22 March, 14 june, 1961. Paris; OURS.
[497] "Necessité d'une reorganization du MSEUE." Louvain: UCL, Rifflet Farde 100. At the national level in countries that did not denote politics on the right-left spectrum, it was the European Socialist Movement.

World;[498] the 1947 resolution had called for a "planned economy […] carried out through the organic structure of a real social and economic democracy, based on workers' control."[499] The 1949 program described a European executive with powers over foreign policy and European defense, managing a single currency and mandated to plan the economy in the interests of the people of Europe,[500] and Constant's vision articulated in *GE* in 1953 was much the same. The creation of the MGE heralded a recognition that their strategy of pursuing these goals by raising public awareness and developing political coalitions at the national and supranational level, was, after over a decade, a failure. The objectives in question remained – if anything, they were more likely now than they had been in the late 1940s – but they would have to be pursued by a massively reduced network of political-class activists.

The expectation that a skeleton crew of politicians could move the needle on the European project was not entirely hopeless, and one last achievement bears mention. One of the Movement's central goals had always been a vested, directly-elected European Parliament, and it had, since 1949, called for activism within what was then the "Assemblée de Strasbourg." Over the years, this assembly had evolved into what might be termed the lower chamber of the European Communities' legislative branch, even if it was little more than consultative, largely appointed by national parliaments, and in a junior position to the upper-chamber Committee of Ministers (it was once memorably described as little more than a "multi-lingual talking shop"[501]). Of the several high-profile SMUSErs who gravitated to the European institutions (Spaak and Philip, Paul Finet, Mollet), six were appointed to the European Parliament including Zagari, Maurice Faure, Lucien Radoux, Fernand Dehousse, Pierre-Henri Teitgen and Marinus van de Goes van Naters.[502] The latter three are credited as central agents in making the European Parliament a driver of European integration federal future,[503] and none more so that Belgian senator Fernand Dehousse.

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[498] Edwards, Bob and F.A. Ridley. *The United Socialist States of Europe*. London: National Labour Press Ltd, 1944. In later summaries, the Movement itself would date its foundation to its first congress in 1947. 8

[499] Resolutions of the first international conference for the USSE, February, 1947

[500] The 3rd European Congress of the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe; summary of resolutions. London: LSE, ILP 16/1949

[501] Farrell, David. "The EP is now one of the most powerful legislatures in the world." 18 June, 2007. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-PRESS&reference=20070615IPR07837

[502] European Parliament records. Luxemburg: European Parliament Archives.

[503] Tulli, Umberto. "Which democracy for the European Economic Community? Fernand Dehousse versus Charles de Gaulle." Taylor & Francis online, 2017. Second section (this is an online format without page or

Dehousse first appears in SMUSE records in 1950, when he, Gironella and Rifflet exchanged a flurry of letters on the proposed structure of the ECSC.[504] He went on to represent the SMUSE on the European Movement's international committee from 1951, sat on *GE*'s editorial staff from 1953, and was described with Spaak as the most active and constructive Belgian in the SMUSE (he sat on Spaak's EPA constitutional committee).[505] Within the Movement, he might be described as a centrist: identifying as a "federalist," he nonetheless considered the latter to include as tight a union as possible. He parses the varying uses of the term in a two-part "Elements of a theory of Federalism" published in GE in June and July of 1955, steeped in technicalities and historic examples. Surveilling the contemporary situation, particularly the degree to which domestic policy could be separated from foreign policy, he ultimately argued that what defined "proper" federalism was the "volume of regulation held by the central government."[506] With this argument, he essentially created a framework within which the more ardent democratic-centralists of the SMUSE could co-exist with the Movement's federalist allies and members, and as such, came as close as anyone to reconciling the Movement's internal Marx-Proudhon contradictions.

His interest in the European Parliament specifically dated to at least 1954, when he had argued in *GE* that the term "parliament" for the ECSC Assembly was a misnomer insofar as the Assembly did not vote on laws and was not elected by popular mandate. He got the opportunity to address the problem when he became president of the European Parliament's Working Group on European Elections in October 1958. The resulting recommendations called for several measures, including a larger set of members to properly represent all Europe's regions, and direct elections. These would provide a "salutary shock" to the system and resolve the lingering supremacy of the intergovernmental Council of Ministers endowing Parliamentarians with the "legitimacy and strength" to make the Council accountable to the Parliament.[507] The Dehousse Convention met objections during the subsequent debate, and direct opposition from de Gaulle,[508] leading to its languishing for some 20 years, but the Convention eventually

line numbers). Available at https://www-tandfonline-com.gate3.library.lse.ac.uk/doi/full/10.1080/02606755.2017.1370571?scroll=top&needAccess=true

[504] Florence: EUI, FD-80

[505] Georges Goriely in *GE* #3, May, 1953. 10. Amsterdam: IISG, ZK 31205

[506] Dehousse in *GE* #25. Amsterdam: IISG, ZK 31205. 32.

[507] Tulli, 2017. Third section.

[508] Tulli, 2017. Fourth secion

achieved a result sought by the SMUSE since 1949, and might properly be counted among the Movement's successes even if it was delayed, and even if it came at a moment when the Movement was unwinding appreciably.

In the trying days of 1959, the Movement was seeing less and less activity; Dehousse's work fell into a specialized area that would not have required SMUSE-wide coordination, and consistent coverage of which might only have appeared in the now-defunct *Gauche Européenne*. The internal bulletin was small and consisted mainly of (generally negative) articles about the state of Europeanism. However, a few weeks after the conclusion of the Committee's work, but before it was submitted, Dehousse presented his results to the SMUSE.[509] The only major quibble was a recommendation that one third of the Assembly be elected by national legislatures, which was less than the direct democratic investiture the SMUSE had sought. The logic was that it would prevent the possibility of opposition developing between the Communities' Parliament and the national legislatures; despite some initial discomfort, the SMUSE endorsed the report without qualification.

Unfortunately, neither the Dehousse committee's work nor the massive downsizing of the Movement were enough to save it. SMUSE financial records for 1961-63 reveal a dire and worsening situation: expenses for conferences dropped from FF 12,183 in 1961 to a mere FF 361 in 1962, to 0 the following year, and travel expenses shrank by 60%. Salaries, amounting to some FF 37,000 in 1962 dropped to 7,000 the following year (Gironella would work *pro bono*). ACUE funds were gone, income from membership dues hovered around 1000 Francs, and subsidies from the European Communities dropped from FF 17,000 to just over 3,000. And yet expenses in 1961 were more than triple their income. The movement stayed afloat in 1962 only by selling their offices at Rue de Lille (ironically doubling expenses on office space). Half of the sale price went to paying off debts. Outside of that sale, the Movement spent close to four times its income in 1962. In 1963, reducing the budget by almost 80% (from FF 50,000 to FF 11,000), and more than halving their rental of office space, was not nearly enough compensate for an anemic projected income of 3,027 Francs.

[509] "Bulletin Interieur, numéro special" March 1960. Dehousse was sick on the day; his speech was read by colleague Raymond Rifflet. Amsterdam: IISG, ZK 31205

By mid-1962, the Movement was referring to itself internally as a "club,"[510] which had seen "reduced activity" for the past four years.[511] In June, 1963, the international committee faced some hard realities, with Gironella characterizing the movement as being in a "near-vegetative state."[512] The options were unappealing: wholesale dissolution, a merger with the UEF, or working towards some kind of Europeanist electoral coalition in France. The meeting disbanded with no definitive answer. Finally, in May, 1964, Gironella called for another "reorganization commission:" he advised members of the MGE that he would be stepping down as General Secretary, after some 18 years, and that Philip would relinquish the presidency.[513] Details of that final meeting have not survived. The name *Mouvement Gauche Européenne* would live on in various forms (see epilogue), but without many of the men who had most centrally embodied the Movement over the years. Gironella, the last founding member of the Movement, and its last connection to the London Bureau, never again participated in the ad hoc, MGE-branded network that was periodically revived thereafter.

Conclusion

It's difficult to pinpoint exactly where things went wrong for the SMUSE. In a sense, it ultimately fell victim to the very nationalist structures that it once aimed to abolish. The Treaties of Rome had been both a blessing and a curse in that they created the central structures necessary to the logistical development of a supranational Europe, satisfying and vindicating the efforts of the movement thus far, but simultaneously made the movement, in its extant incarnation, anachronistic and directionless. Its focus on activism at the level of European governments had been necessary to obtain the creation of the skeletal supranational structure, but was ill-suited to the next steps in fostering democratic participation and harmonization. The SMUSE had defaulted to autonomy at the national level to best tailor methods and strategies to national circumstances, which had borne fruit by the intermediary of a few well-placed members and parties. The

[510] Brochure: "Club Européen de la Gauche," #4, January 1962. Paris: OURS, 107 APO 10
[511] Letter to Charente branch, 1 May 1962. Paris: OURS, 107 APO 10
[512] Compte-rendu du comité international, 21 June 1963. OURS
[513] Gironella to all members, 14 May, 1964. Spaak had participated in the 1961 reorganization, but it is not clear when he officially gave up his post as co-President,.

decline in the role of the SFIO in the de Gaulle years, and Spaak's appointment as General Secretary of NATO deprived the movement of the political agency it had once had. Its network of activists was reduced to a small number of people working in specialized institutions, each with a restricted purview; there were no high-placed political leaders, no major new European projects behind which to mobilize, no opportunities for generalized campaigns or even policy alignment.

The Movement's most significant assets also found themselves much reduced. The SFIO had been the national party with the closest and most fruitful ties to the SMUSE; in the de Gaulle era, the SFIO became far less effective. André Philip proved perhaps overly principled, clinging obstinately to his core values, arguing constantly with others in his own Movement, and unendingly critical of those who disagreed. Expelled from the SFIO in 1957, he would also leave the *Parti Socialiste Unifié*, which he helped found, over the *Comité Directeur*'s attitude towards Algeria.[514] He also split from the European Movement because it had chosen, in his words, to erect hollow institutions rather than debate and develop sturdy and intentional ones.[515] His credentials, philosophy and headstrong attitude had once galvanized an SMUSE looking for some sure-handed guidance in the late 1940s, but as the European project passed into the hands of a politically heterogeneous collection of parties and movements, Philip became a liability rather than an asset. This left Spaak, a committed Europeanist and a skilled negotiator and strategist. Spaak's strength lay in the ability to navigate the political landscape which stymied Philip, but he could not be expected to work without allies – the Belgian Socialist Party, despite a lot of cross-membership with the SMUSE, did not have the kind of formal, symbiotic relationship that the SFIO had with the Movement. Individual leadership of the SMUSE shifted towards Belgium in this final period, but did not bring with it the political power that had accompanied the Movement's relationship to the SFIO. Spaak's appointment as NATO secretary in May, 1957, effectively decapitated the Movement.

The Movement found itself increasingly impotent at the political level, and became financially insolvent as well, in the wake of the Treaties of Rome. The MET would have resolved this issue satisfactorily, creating a politically powerful working

[514] Philip to Edouard Depreux [Natl Sec of Parti Socialiste Unifié], 1 July 1962. La Courneuve : 625AP13
[515] Interviews with Francis Jeanson [son-in-law]; July 1969 and May 1970. La Courneuve: Archives Nationales, 625AP13

class movement expected to generate enough interest and income to survive.[516] And yet, for all its ideology, the SMUSE had never been a workers' movement, and the dawning of the European Economic Community was too turbulent a time for it to become one.

In its early years, the European Movement had found the group to be a useful source of information: inquiring about the reliability of Greek socialists, access to Eastern European politicians, or even, on behalf of the Council of Europe, a summary of potential partners among the Spanish parties working towards European unification; all the fruit of the movement's early years when it had sent feelers out into the far reaches of Europe. Meanwhile, a respectable range of notable personalities were drawn to the Movement: not just high-profile persons of the moment like Mollet, Spaak or Spinelli, but lifelong Europeanists like Raymond Rifflet, François Mitterrand and Mario Zagari, whose public profiles would continue to rise after its initial dissolution. These high-profile, ambitious men saw a movement with strong personalities, fairly simple, broadly acceptable goals with respect to the European institutions, and the demonstrable potential to transcend their restrictive domestic political establishments.

Internally, the movement was surprisingly cohesive, with very few defections over the years (the British Center being a notable exception); its objectives too had remarkable staying power, remaining largely identical over the movement's last decade-and-a-half. But fast-moving externalities, with which the movement had struggled since its inception, proved its undoing. The Movement's strategic adaptability brought it as far as Rome, but they could not find a way to adapt to the combination of the EEC, the return of Gaullism, and economic ruin. Despite concerted and repeated efforts, the Movement ultimately foundered in the face of massive and simultaneous strategic, political and financial obstacles.

Yet, while the institutional identity of the Movement came to an end in 1964 with the departure of Gironella and the dissolution of the Secretariat, the Movement's network did not. Building a better Europe remained a goal in the next decades, and the Movement's various members continuously found ways to reactivate the network. It became fragmented, with records spread even more disparately than those of the

[516] Compte-rendu du Comité International, 21 June, 1962. Louvain: UCL, Rifflet Farde 100

SMUSE, but a fair exploration of the movement requires a complete story. The movement's legacy is compiled in the epilogue.

Chapter 5

Epilogue

There is a degree of arbitrariness in ending the SMUSE story with Gironella's departure in 1964: On one hand, in an institutional sense, the movement was unrecognizable after becoming the "Mouvement Gauche Européenne" (MGE) in 1961; yet on the other, even after 1964, many of the people associated with the Movement beforehand remained so afterwards, most notably Gerard Jaquet of the SFIO, Raymond Rifflet of the PSB, and Mario Zagari of the PSDI.

The time constraints of this project have prevented a thorough examination of the Movement over the three decades after 1964, and there are several avenues for further research which will be detailed in the conclusion, but some things are clear from a superficial review of the archival record. The first is that the movement never again saw the kind of regular institutional activity that had characterized its early period. Meetings were regular but less frequent, there little evidence of a discernible program, and there is nothing to suggest the kind of government-level coordination that the Movement was able to muster in the 1950s. A significant reason for this is the establishment and consolidation of coordination between the Socialist parties within the European Parliamentary Assembly (EP) - after all, coordination at the European Level had always been a primary goal of the SMUSE and the existence of a Socialist Group starting in 1952 overlapped somewhat with the SMUSE. The principal activities of the Movement in that early period were carried out at the national-executive level, but once the political climate at the executive level became resistant to Europe in the late 50s, the possibilities offered by the assemblies was comparatively more promising. The first part of this epilogue will trace direct contributions of SMUSE members in the context of the European Parliament.

The second major takeaway is that while the Movement would never be as potent as in the 1950s, it still drew a broad adherence, and could complement the Socialist

Group in a few ways. The Socialist parties were already national parties, with the same kind of constraints that had made coordination in the SMUSE challenging; in addition, there had to be some coordination between the parties and the national governments as represented in the Council of Ministers. Many senior figures in the early Socialist Group continued to meet in the context of the MGE. The GE also notably organized a large conference in 1974 on the subject of electoral strategy for the upcoming direct elections to the European Parliament. As the Community dealt with enlargement, the Single European Act and the treaty of Maastricht, the MGE remained a source of support for Socialist priorities. There are few scoops, but an overview of the Movement's later years remains warranted.

This epilogue will consist of a series of vignettes highlighting the sporadic and comparatively superficial archival evidence of the Movement after 1964. Three phases can be identified: a brief, largely obscure period immediately after the initial dissolution of the MGE in 1964, in which the Movement was nominally headed by Labour MP Sir Geoffrey de Freitas. Within 5 years, Gérard Jaquet, longtime SMUSEr and member of the SFIO, took the reins, leading a movement closely linked to the new French *Parti Socialiste*. This period lasted into the mid 1980s. Finally, Belgian SMUSEr Raymond Rifflet assumed a leading role the Movement in the late 1980s. Rifflet, working as advisor to EU Commission President Jacques Delors, first used the network in support of the Single European Act, and thereafter held periodic lunches and maintained a newsletter with the remaining members. He became the Movement's last known president in 1992, with a final newsletter dated December, 1993.

The European Parliament

There was an inherent difficulty in maintaining an SMUSE-style organization after the early 1960s. In the latter years of the SMUSE, many of the Movement's members had become members of the European Parliamentary Assembly. Simon Hix's 1995 essay on the Socialist Group provides a useful retrospective and helps situate the SMUSE/MGE therein.[517] The history of socialist groupings within European

[517] Hix, Simon and Urs Lesse. "Shaping a Vision; A History of the Party of European Socialists." Brussels: Party of European Socialists, 2002. Available at http://urs-lesse.de/History_PES_EN.pdf

Community's various assemblies dates back to the Common Assembly of the ECSC, when Guy Mollet was elected president of the coordination bureau for Socialist representatives from among the Six.[518]

Socialist collaboration continued, but its early agency was complicated first by the EDC debacle, then the passage of the Treaties of Rome (which prompted the launching of an unwieldy collaboration between the existing liaison bureau, national delegates from Socialist parties of the Six, and members of the Socialist Group itself), and the recalcitrance of General de Gaulle.[519] Nevertheless, a number of the Movement's members gravitated towards the European Parliamentary Assembly and its sub-committees in the late 50s and early 60s. Fernand Dehousse had headed the Political sub-committee's work on elections to the European Parliament. SMUSErs Maurice Faure and Marinus van de Goes van Naters were also regular fixtures of the Political Committee through most of the 1960s, the latter spending eight years as vice-president. Belgian SMUSEr Lucien Radoux sat on the judicial committee as well as several economic ones.[520]

In its early years (1952-1957), the European Assembly was new and untested, its purview restricted narrowly to coal and steel, and its role strictly consultative. Though it was natural for the various political persuasions represented in the Assembly to establish some formal contacts, they had very little prospective agency with respect to SMUSE objectives until the Treaty of Rome added the Common Market to their purview in 1958. SMUSErs Guy Mollet and Gerard Jaquet were two-thirds of the SFIO delegation to the ECSC assembly, and worked with a number of SPD delegates of higher rank than those associated with the SMUSE. However, the SMUSE in the mid-1950s pursued rather different outcomes. The Assembly-based relationship produced significant convergence on issues like increasing the power of the Assembly, or industrial workers' housing.[521] The SMUSE, in the same period, was focused on details of the EDC, and, from 1955, on supporting and shaping the Messina project, both beyond the competence of the Assembly. In other words, there was very little overlap between the potential of the Socialist Group and the SMUSE during the first six years of the Assembly, and there is little in the SMUSE record to suggest that they put stock in its potential or sought formal

[518] Hix, 1995. 9-10.
[519] Hix, 1995. 12ff
[520] Members of the European Parliamentary Assembly. Luxembourg: EPA.
[521] Shaev 2014. 204.

contacts with it. Things changed drastically in 1958, when the SMUSE's loss of funding and government agency coincided with the expansion of the Assembly's powers to encompass a much wider spectrum of the European economy. The European Assembly would now afford much more direct potential than the shrinking SMUSE, and members who had pursued shared objectives within essentially intergovernmental structures in the SMUSE now pursued the same within the Assembly.

As noted in the previous chapter, Dehousse had produced the report recommending direct elections to the European Assembly (despite languishing for some 15 years, it was eventually endorsed in 1974,[522] and enacted 5 years later). In the early 60s, a proposal had been made for the fusion of the Communities' executive branches as well as a fusion of the three existing treaties. The former came to pass in the form of the Merger Treaty of 1965, following the recommendations of a Political Commission which included Faure, van Naters and Dehousse. The SMUSE had ceased to function as a forum of policy coordination by then, and the Merger Treaty was finalized during the De Freitas period. In retrospect, this treaty simultaneously validated the 1949 strategy of activism in through the European Assembly and cemented the obsolescence of the SMUSE itself. In fusing both the executive branches and the Council of Ministers of the three Communities, the Merger Treaty in fact created the political umbrella that the Movement had pursued since 1950.

Not all these efforts were entirely successful, naturally: the corollary to the Merger Treaty – a treaty to fuse the three Community treaties themselves – encountered serious trouble as a result of the 1965 Empty Chair Crisis, when De Gaulle boycotted the council of ministers in order to solidify France's autonomy and primacy within the communities. The result was to crater the political feasibility of the fusion treaty.[523] Shortly after the signature of the Merger Treaty, Dehousse prepared a report on behalf of the political committee laying out the process by which such a treaty might be prepared. He proposed a maximalist interpretation of the communities' goals, to "increase and accelerate European Integration," including in the political sphere. He proposed to include provisions for fiscal and monetary policy, as well as joint policies on

[522] Hix, 1995. 25.
[523] Wellenstein, Edmund. *Interview*. The Hague, 27 August 2009. Available at https://www.cvce.eu/en/unit-content/-/unit/b9fe3d6d-e79c-495e-856d-9729144d2cbd/19cfb8e9-d59e-46cf-bca8-1c39b198864e#aeb2a82c-689e-456b-896a-cea252a3450b_en&overlay

scientific research and technological progress.[524] The proposed provisions of this fusion would eventually come to pass, but only some 25 years later.

In 1969, De Gaulle's resignation seemed to presage a renewal of the European project. On that occasion, onetime SMUSEr and then-head of the Socialist Liaison Bureau Lucien Radoux co-authored a proposal to create a more active Socialist dialogue by establishing a number of annual conferences. The notion saw some resistance (notably from the German SPD, who feared that it would impact the autonomy of national parties and potentially constrain their behavior in the Council of Ministers), but it did lay the groundwork for more frequent contacts between Socialist parties and the Socialist representatives in the European Parliament.[525] These contacts were increasingly formalized in the early 1970s, until a report, again authored by Lucien Radoux, inaugurated the "Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community" (CSPEP). Robert Pontillon, newly of the MGE, represented the *Parti Socialiste* as one of the Conference's Vice Presidents.[526] The Confederation would spend the next four years attempting to develop a unified Socialist platform for the direct elections of 1979.

De Freitas

Even if the European Parliamentary Assembly was not a panacea for the Socialist vision, it nevertheless represented a concrete and productive inroad. It had contributed to the unwinding of the SMUSE in the late 1950s, and complicated the role of the MGE's new president, British Labour MP Geoffrey De Freitas, who took over in 1964. Curiously, De Freitas had never before been associated with the movement, or at least does not appear anywhere in the SMUSE records used in this project. It is difficult to trace any direct connection to the SMUSE, but he did work in the same circles as Philip and Spaak in the 1950s. While an MP for Lincoln, from 1950 to 1961, he had been member of the UK council of the European Movement, heading its European Youth Campaign until the latter was dissolved in mid-1959;[527] additionally, he had been delegate to the Council of Europe from 1951 to 1954.[528] In both cases he would likely have crossed paths with

[524] Dehousse, Fernand, rep. "Note en vue de l'élaboration du rapport sur la fusion des Communautés." Luxembourg: EPA.
[525] Hix, 1995. 19.
[526] Hix, 1995. 22
[527] Robert Schuman to de Freitas, 6 June, 1959. Oxford: BOD, de Freitas papers box 26.
[528] Biographical note. Oxford: BOD, de Freitas papers box 26.

André Philip, who was delegate to both organizations in the same period. He was also delegate to the NATO Parliamentarians' conference from 1955 to 1959, a period which overlapped partially with Spaak's time as General Secretary; he would later refer to Spaak as a "good friend."[529]

Between 1961 and 1964, as the MGE was sputtering to an end, de Freitas had served as British High Commissioner to Ghana, then Kenya. He returned to England in 1964, having been invited by the Labour Party of Kettering to run in the forthcoming general election.[530] The exact date of his return is not clear, but, he gave remarks at a luncheon for SMUSEr Altiero Spinelli, in late September, where he was listed on the program as "President of the Mouvement Gauche Européenne."[531]

The circumstances of his elevation to the Movement's presidency are a mystery but a few clues point to why he might have been tapped. He identified as a Fabian,[532] was an experienced Labourite, and was by 1964 well qualified in African affairs. Those three characteristics would seem to recommend him for a role in reinvigorating the Movement: first, the cash-strapped MGE had recast itself as a "supranational Fabian Society;" second, the SMUSE had once had a fruitful relationship with Labour, and the latter's recent renewed interest in Europe seemed to offer a chance at refreshing the relationship; and third, the Movement's interest in Africa had returned to the fore in the early 1960s. On paper at least, de Freitas would appear a logical choice to rejuvenate the Movement.

Sir Geoffrey's records reveal exceedingly little: beyond confirmation of his title are only a few remarks. At Spinelli's luncheon, he advocated the creation of a "European Social-Democratic Party," which would "act for [national parties] in those areas which are of essentially international concern." In another speech some four years later, at a conference on the UK's relationship to the Common Market, he explained that MGE's task "remains the same" as it always had been: "a full economic and political union responsive to the will of a directly-elected European parliament." There is no record in

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[529] De Freitas, Speech on European Unity. Oxford: BOD de Freitas papers, box 26.
[530] Miall, Leonard. "Obituary: Helen de Freitas," *The Independent*, 17 December, 1998. https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/obituary-helen-de-freitas-1191854.html
[531] Program dated "Tuesday 29 September." Oxford: BOD, de Freitas papers, box 27. (The 29th of September fell on a Tuesday in 1964 and in 1970. The earlier date is consistent with a campaign ahead of the general election on 15 October,).
[532] Undated lyrics. Oxford: BOD, de Freitas papers, box 26. The lyrics in question are an altered version of a drinking song associated to a dinner in his honor, with references to Sir Geoffrey's personal life and referring to him as "Fabian Geoffrey."

his papers of any positions or innovations beyond the foregoing formulations of the Movement's general goals. Nor is there any correspondence with SMUSERs, any letters under MGE letterhead, or evidence of any conferences or meetings. It would appear then that his presidency was little more than a holding action, or at least that he was not particularly sanguine about the movement or its potential.

There had continued to be an international secretariat, headed by Jacques Enock-Levi, which held a "first meeting" of the "Bureau de la Gauche Européenne" in mid 1967. A year later saw an conference in London hosted by the Labour Committee for Europe, described as the Movement's "British section,"[533] which De Freitas chaired. The conference was opened by de Freitas and British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, and centered on conveying the support of both the Continental socialists and of Labour for a "European democratic and supranational community." The prospect of the UK joining the EEC would be a central feature of the conference.[534] This meeting, though nominally an "MGE conference" does not seem to have yielded (or have been designed to yield) a concrete policy or plan of action; as such, it was more a networking opportunity. A real international conference came together slowly, with exploratory correspondence beginning in November, 1970; the conference was pushed back at least three times before eventually taking place at the end of January, 1972. It was held in Paris, under the auspices of the *Parti Socialiste* (as PS Party Secretary, François Mitterrand hosted dinner on the first night), and notably attracted delegates from Norway, a first for the Movement. The conference topics are not clear from the MSEUE archives in Amsterdam, but speakers included De Freitas, Jaquet, Zagari, Spinelli, Rifflet and Labour MP Arthur Palmer.[535]

A pivotal International Bureau conference was held at the luxurious St Ermin's Hotel in London in early 1973,[536] working on a policy towards the Third World, a European Socialist Industrial policy, and the role of Socialist parties more broadly in the construction of a democratic Europe. The conference also produced new statutes and yet another new name for the Movement. Henceforth, it would be known as the "*Mouvement Socialiste Européen (Gauche Européenne)*" (MSE-GE). It would have an International Executive comprised of a President and a General Secretary, and three Vice

[533] Conference schedule, may 24-25 1968, London. Amsterdam: IISG, MSEUE 47
[534] Conference schedule, may 24-25 1968, London. Amsterdam: IISG, MSEUE 47
[535] 29-30 Jan 1972 Colloquium Schedule. Amsterdam: IISG MSEUE 48
[536] Jaquet to Salomon, 29 November, 1972. Paris: Fondation Jean Jaurès, Jaquet 1 RE 5

Presidents, and would meet five times per year. A new International Bureau would also be constituted and meet twice a year. This bureau would be charged broadly with defining the actions of the Movement as a whole and of holding Study Seminars on questions of contemporary interest. It also defined a system of membership dues, tiered according to the financial resources of each party. The French section was exempted on the grounds that the PS had been subsidizing the movement since 1969 to a tune in excess of the top-tier contribution (the British section received no such exemption). Finally, it was clarified that national sections would work autonomously within the scope of their respective national parties.

Taken together, these new statutes constitute a return to the pre-1961 SMUSE model, and while De Freitas spoke at the conference itself, there is no subsequent record of him in the archives I consulted. Instead, just as the SMUSE had in the late 1940s, the MGE gravitated back across the channel in the mid 1970s, where the French Socialists held financial leverage.

Jaquet

Gerard Jaquet had joined the Movement early, had been committed to the early "Socialist-International" format of the organization, and had long functioned as a senior representative in the SFIO *Comité Directeur*, especially after the break with Philip in 1957. The final "Fabian" reorganization proposed by Gironella in 1961 had caused some consternation both for Jaquet and for the SFIO (which had until then maintained full support for the Movement) because Gironella's proposed structure would have seen a small central committee hand down instructions to national sections and associated parties, rather than regular congresses at which competing ideas might be proposed and deliberated. The *Comité Directeur* had discussed the issue in February, 1961, issuing a temporary injunction against dual membership in the SFIO and MGE. At the same meeting, Jaquet had declared himself ready to quit the Movement altogether, though he intimated that he might be willing to head up an independent French Gauche

Européenne[537] (the SFIO and MGE resolved the conflict in June, 1961[538] and Jaquet would remain nominally associated to the Movement).

As noted, Jaquet collaborator Jacques Enock-Levi had become General Secretary of the French MGE by mid 1967; he would soon also take on the secretariat of the wider MGE.[539] Jaquet returned to the record in 1969, when the *Organisation Française de la Gauche Européenne* (OFGE), would become closely associated to the new *Parti Socialiste*, which succeeded the SFIO in 1969. The record here is still is rather thin, characterized unfortunately by a singular lack of resolutions or conference minutes, and illuminated largely by personal correspondence from the papers of Jacquet at the *Fondation Jean Jaures* in Paris.

One of the first major OFGE events was a colloquium on the so-called Werner Plan.[540] Launched by the European Communities' Council of Ministers and elaborated by Luxemburg Prime Minister Pierre Werner, it established a ten-year plan for a step-by-step economic and monetary union. The plan was formally published on October 8, 1970, and the OFGE held a conference in February, 1971 in Suresnes, just west of the Paris city limits. Robert Pontillion, a new member of the Movement, had been mayor of Suresnes since 1965; he would become senator for the *Hauts-de-Seine* in 1977,[541] and was briefly president of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament.[542] A collection of photographs survive, showing some 75 attendees. There appears no associated literature in the archives, so it is impossible to know what was said or decided.

Photographic record reveals that OFGE had conserved many of its former members (including Jaquet, Albert Gazier, Georges Goriely, Maurice Faure, Sebastien

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[537] "*Compte-rendu du Comité Directeur*," 15 February, 1961. Paris: OURS.
[538] "*Compte-rendu du Comité Directeur*," 14 June, 1961. Paris: OURS. The exact arrangement between the two parties is not clear, but the Comité considered the matter resolved and invited all its members to once again work with the MGE.
[539] Enock-Levi to Malfatti, 26 November, 1970. Florence: EUI, RR20. There is a two-year gap between in the record between evidence of his holding the national and international secretariats, though Gironella had always filled both roles.
[540] "Colloque de la Gauche Européenne – 1971" Paris: Fondation Jean Jaurès online collection. https://archives-socialistes.fr/app/photopro.sk/archives/doclist?fpsearch=gauche+europ%C3%A9enne&use_armaform=TRUE&xupd_fpsearch=TRUE#sessionhistory-1599593753076. The length of the conference is unclear, evidenced solely by a series of photos dated on a single Saturday. A banner behind the dais says "journées d'étude" in the plural, suggesting it may have been a weekend affair.
[541] Bonnin, Judith. "Pontillon, Robert Eugène". *Le Maitron.* Maitron.fr. https://maitron.fr/spip.php?article158818
[542] His term lasted from January 1979 to March 1980. "Former PES presidents." *PES.*org. https://web.archive.org/web/20071009211637/http://www.pes.org/content/view/917 (Archived from the original)

Constant and Robert Buron) and was now closely associated with the nascent Parti Socialiste (PS), which had fused the SFIO with several other parties over the course of 1969. Attendees included Alain Savary, veteran of the Mollet government and briefly European Parliamentarian, François Mitterrand and Pierre Mauroy, each of whom would head the PS (Mitterrand would be on OFGE's Comité Directeur by 1974[543]). Savary and Mauroy had never before been associated with the Movement, nor had former Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France, who also spoke at the congress. He had notably run for the presidency in 1969 on an American-style "ticket," alongside SMUSEr Gaston Defferre, and would be an active supporter of François Mitterrand over the next decade.[544]

The dynamics between OFGE and the wider MGE are opaque, though as noted, the latter, or its patron Parti Socialiste, appears to have funded the whole organization. The MSE-GE reform of 1973 appears to have cemented the primacy of the OFGE as the driving member-organization.

The largest MSE-GE conference on record took place in late November, 1974, and its work centered on electoral strategy for direct election to the European Parliament. Based on the few records surviving in Robert Pontillon's papers,[545] it is likely to have been organized for, and financed by, the Socialist Group. The only list of national delegates names 22 Germans, including four members of the European Parliament: Gerhard Flamig (listed as vice-president of MSE-GE), Horst Gerlach, Ludwig Rosenberg (Vice-President of the EP), and Manfred Michel (General Secretary of the Socialist Group). There is also reference to 5 representatives of the Northern Ireland Labour Party, Ireland having joined the European Community the previous year – it was the only time Irish Socialists would be associated with the Movement. The conference lasted three days and included 2 nights' board for attendees (including rooms at the Hilton for some dignitaries), three receptions, and simultaneous translation in four languages. Spouses were welcome as well. All this suggests that funding was not of great concern – the MSE-GE collected dues in this period, but the record does not suggest it could afford such an outlay.

[543] Jaquet to various news outlets, 24 April, 1974. Paris: Fondation Jean Jaurès, Jaquet 1 RE 12.
[544] Krakovitch, Raymond. "Mendès France, Pierre Isaac Isidore." *Le Maitron*. Maitron.fr. https://maitron.fr/spip.php?article147602
[545] Three documents, dated 22 and 28 November, 1974. Paris: Fondation Jean Jaurès, Pontillon 8 FP 7/214

A conference of this scope is so out of character with the MSE-GE after the 50s that it seems reasonable to propose that the Movement was tapped as organizer, perhaps with financial support, by the CSPEP. MSErs Pontillon, Defferre, Radoux, Flamig and Zagari were all in the upper echelons of the Socialist Group, and the SMUSE had once held conferences of this size on an annual basis, though never at a Hilton. This conference remains a notable outlier for the Movement after the late 1950s, but is an indicator of its later usefulness as a networking facilitator. The conference proceedings and resolutions remain an open question.

Jaquet became delegate to the European Parliament between 1979 and 1984, (and Vice-President of the same between 1979 and 1982), and there is some evidence that the MSE attempted to cultivate relations with the European Commission during his time as head – including a few contacts with Commission presidents Franco Malfatti (1970-1972), Sicco Mansholt (1972-1973) and François-Xavier Ortoli (1973-1977) – although it is not clear that they came to very much. By and large the Movement in the Jaquet period remained peripheral to the European institutions. A notable example of the kind of antagonistic purism that had always characterized the movement came at a 1976 colloquium on the "Tindemans Report" on furthering the integration of the EC. Written by Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans, the report advocated, among other things, a common monetary and fiscal policy, some foreign policy alignment, and a common education policy.[546] The MGE's reaction was overwhelmingly negative. The group's conclusions were formalized in a report by André Salomon of the PS *Comité Directeur*, was derisive and reminiscent of André Philip:[547] he determined that it was not critical enough of the default Atlanticist current in Europe, did nothing to address the fact that capitalist enterprises were a leading force in the integration of the European economy, and lacked a coherent political vision for Europe. The report, he concluded, was merely a plan for a supranational organization to help capitalist nations resist an increase in the agency of the working class.[548]

[546] Deschamps, Etienne. "The Tindemans Report" *CVCE.eu*. Available at: https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/63f5fca7-54ec-4792-8723-1e626324f9e3
[547] Salomon would notably leave the PS in 1979 and publish a highly critical book attacking the party's Socialist character.
[548] Salomon, André. "Le Rapport Tindemans." Paris: OURS 7 EF 79/3

In 1979, the OFGE published comprehensive a "Program for a Socialist Europe"[549] that included a pessimistic appraisal of the state of the European Communities. Veto-voting in the Council of Ministers informed by national technocrats meant that the European project was being led by intergovernmental agreements at the Council level rather than supranational ones at the Commission level. It also included the usual indictments of capitalist forces, multinational corporations and a general Atlanticist orientation. The program was a comprehensive effort to bring the Communities into line with the letter and spirit of the Treaties of Rome, but while it was certainly in the spirit of the Movement, the fact that it was published under the auspices of the OFGE raises questions about the extent to which the program was pursued at the European level.

Rifflet

In the mid 1950s, the center of gravity of the SMUSE had shifted from France to Belgium because Spaak had had a direct role in the development of the European project. Thirty years later the MSE-GE's center of gravity shifted again from France to Belgium, this time because the PSB's Raymond Rifflet was working inside a European Commission pushing the Single European Act.

Rifflet had been national secretary and member of the International Executive Bureau of the SMUSE since 1947. As member of the PSB, he worked primarily in the Belgian Ministry of Education, after which he was tapped to be European Commissioner Jean Rey's *Chef de Cabinet* in 1967; he would remain at the Commission as adviser to Commissioners Jenkins, Thorn, and Delors.[550] There is little to indicate just when Rifflet took on a leading role in the MSE, but he was vice-president by 1987, and at that point he began to send letters to members to support the package of proposed reform that followed ratification of Delors' Single European Act (SEA); he would also organize an MGE meeting in Brussels that June.[551] A colloquium took place in late April, 1988, at which Rifflet was described as "President" (Rifflet had described Jaquet as "International

[549] Gateau, Elizabeth and Thomas Philippovich. "*Un Projet Socialiste pour l'Europe*." Organisation Française de la Gauche Européenne. Paris: Imprimerie de l'Entreprise, 1979. Amsterdam: IISG, Bro 828-11 Available at https://archives-socialistes.fr/themes/archives/static/pdfviewer/?docid=112437&language=fra
[550] Vayssière, Bertrand. "Raymond Rifflet, européiste et eurocrate," *Journal of European Integration History*, 23 - 1 (2017), pp.47-70. Available at https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01592219/document
[551] Rifflet to members, 24 May, 1987. Florence: EUI, RR 87

President" only a month prior, and the exact hierarchy in unclear). The one-day colloquium involved some forty members and featured European Parliamentarians and trade unionists discussing elements of social and economic cohesion elicited by Delors' proposed reform package.[552] Rifflet continued to tap the MGE network in support of the Delors policies at least through the end of 1988 and continued thereafter to use the MGE network to support the work of the European Commission. After the SEA and its subsequent reforms, the central topic was the treaty of Maastricht. Over the course of 1992, Rifflet organized a number of "lunch-debates" centered on elements of that treaty, featuring relevant personalities, notably president of the Socialist Group Jean-Pierre Cot, (Cot had married European Parliamentarian Raymonde Dury, who had been associated to the movement since the 1980s) and Rifflet's son Luc from the Belgian Ministry of European Affairs.[553]

A final reinvention of the MGE's role in European affairs began in October, 1992. At one of Rifflet's lunches between members of the Socialist Group and the MGE, he proposed to establish the Movement as a liaison between the Parliament and the European Movement, so ensure adequate Socialist representation in the latter.[554] The MGE was accepted as a member, but faced financing difficulties, which Rifflet apparently overcame by becoming member of the European Movement executive, upon which the European Parliament agreed to cover membership dues.[555] Rifflet's papers don't describe the relationship in any detail.

Rifflet would remain the prime mover of the MGE until about 1993. Jaquet fades from view in the late 80s, and Rifflet remains best placed in the European context, officially acceding to the presidency in late 1992 or early 1993.[556] The Movement was much reduced in number in this latter period: the "general assembly" of February 1992 comprised 10 attendees, with 6 excused; the previous GA had been a year before.[557] The *Comité Directeur* meeting of later the same year numbered 7, with 2 absences. The group

[552] "Problèmes posés par la cohesion économique et sociale dans la perspective du grand marché Européen sand frontiers." Florence: EUI, RR 88
[553] "Procès-Verbal de la réunion du Comité Directeur," 19 September 1992 Louvain-la-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain, Rifflet farde 125
[554] "Letter re EP Socialists - MSE Lunch, 22 October 1992. Louvain-la-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain, Rifflet farde 125
[555] Rifflet to Orsello and Blumenfeld [EM gen sec and tres], 11 January 1993. Louvain-la-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain, Rifflet farde 125
[556] The European University Institute's online biography gives the year 1992; Rifflet announces it to the European Commission on 15 March, 1993. Louvain: UCL Rifflet farde 125)
[557] "Procès-Verbal de l'assemblée Générale," 18 February 1992 Louvain: UCL, Rifflet farde 125

described itself as "heterogenous," though it apparently maintained a fairly broad network: the SPD was a member, and it had "association" in France, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Greece, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Austria and Italy.[558] Rifflet's papers don't list any specific names, but the Italian Mario Zagari remained actively involved into the early 90s. He was still publishing his "*Sinistra Europea*" magazine and had, in early 1993, organized a conference drawing some 50 attendees.[559] One of the very last pieces of evidence lists Rifflet and Zagari as co-presidents.

The archival record of the movement once known as the MUSSE ends unceremoniously with a "Lettre du Président," the last of several two-page news-letters which Rifflet began sending upon his accession to the presidency in 1992. This last surviving missive, dated September 1993,[560] is unremarkable except insofar as it betrays no sense of demise, and it strikes some very familiar notes. He opens with urgent encouragement to begin work on the new European Union's economic institutions without tolerating equivocations from national governments over potential further enlargement or catering to special interests. He continues with a reminder of the importance of broad-based participation in the upcoming elections to the European Parliament, and he closes with a very optimistic appraisal of the feasibility of the next stage in European construction, announcing the imminent submission of a draft EU constitution – a decade early. It was every bit as impatient with national government inertia, as optimistic about the arrival of radical change, and as committed to democratic participation in a post-national Europe, as the movement had been at its founding over 45 years before.

Conclusion

To some extent, the Movement's trajectory after 1964 mirrors its trajectory beforehand, and this latter period ought probably be the subject of a study of comparable length. The Movement remained consistently engaged with, though largely peripheral to, the continuing European project. Its institutional fortunes were subject to

[558] Rifflet to Claes [head of the Party of European Socialists], 14 May, 1993. Louvain: UCL, Rifflet farde 125
[559] Zagari to Copetti, 31 March 1993. Louvain: UCL, Rifflet farde 125
[560] "Lettre du Président, Juin-Septembre 1993." Louvain: UCL, Rifflet farde 125

larger forces that it did not control, and it underwent a series of reforms and reinventions to remain relevant. It began as a somewhat inchoate grouping based in London, with French support, and whose earliest value had been as a bridge between the two; it then shifted towards Paris, which produced its most comprehensive set of policies; and it eventually defaulted into the hands of Belgians who were driving the concrete integrative measures of the moment. Its institutional peak, from about 1973 to 1980, was only slightly shorter than that of the SMUSE (1949 to 1958)

The major difference between the early and latter lives of the Movement was that many of its most ardent activists, having worked towards the establishment of the European institutions – most notably the development of a (potentially-)democratic legislative body – found their way into those institutions. Fernand Dehousse and Lucien Radoux (Belgium), Maurice Faure (France), Marinus van der Goes van Naters (Netherlands) and Mario Zagari (Italy) moved into the European Parliament, where they worked, as they had in the SMUSE, towards consolidating a European Socialist program. In that context, however, they still found that the old network, with its institutional memory and organizational abilities, could be a constructive partner in establishing contacts below the official level. That distance from the official level allowed the Movement to act as a sort of "Shadow" Socialist Group analogous to British Shadow governments: freed from the constraints of political compromise and niceties, it could criticize, and propose ideologically-based Socialist programs, even if these had little official weight.

Ultimately, however, the MGE and its successor MSE-GE were never as potent as the SMUSE had been. The existence of a European parliamentary assembly with a comprehensive European economic purview to some extend obviated the need for an SMUSE-style transnational socialist group. The European Communities were now far larger and more complex than the European environment in which the SMSUE had worked and succeeded. The political actors who had launched the EDC and Messina Projects has been few, and had not been subject to the same international pressures that came to bear on further projects. SMUSE-fostered interpersonal relations between a restricted group of decision-makers in France and Belgium had been able to appreciably influence the development of the proto-European Community, but when further decisions involved a post-Rome hierarchy with its institutionalized national concerns,

and the addition of new member states, it became impossible for the group to influence all the necessary power-brokers.

Conclusions

"*If we ever thought that all that would one day lead to the United States of Europe, we very well knew that the route would be long, that it was a long-term perspective.*"

- Christian Pineau[561]

With one notable exception, the SMUSE was composed of individual socialist personalities who were to some degree dissatisfied with the agency of their respective national structures. For some, this was because their national structures had no agency to speak of: Poles, Balts, Yugoslavs and Spaniards flocked to the SMUSE in the vain hope of doing something about the domestic impotence of their own parties.

Others sought to produce a transnational political system that was fundamentally incompatible with the national systems within which their parties operated. As Conservative MP Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe pointed out in January 1948, there could not be a "Socialist" or a "Conservative" foreign policy; "there is only a British one."[562] The same is true in any country. A committed Europeanist like Fenner Brockway, who left the ILP because of its lack of agency, was frustrated even within Labour when Keep Left failed to produce a European orientation and petered out to pursue the domestic gains of Aneurin Bevan in socialized healthcare.

Others still simply could not find satisfaction in the parties they had: Marceau Pivert, Mario Zagari, Enrique Gironella and André Philip all at one time broke ranks to found parties more responsive to their personal convictions. Even the towering Paul-Henri Spaak – Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of Belgium, President of the UN General Assembly, President of the Council of Europe, President of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community, head of the negotiations that

[561] Griffiths, 1993. 58
[562] Mott-Radclyffe to House of Commons, 22 January 1948. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1948/jan/22/foreign-affairs#S5CV0446P0_19480122_HOC_365

produced the Treaties of Rome – joined and wrote for and campaigned with and headed this movement, perhaps because it alone promised to help "finish the battles"[563] and deliver a democratic, supranational Europe.

These people often labored in relative obscurity, with few truly outstanding achievements to claim. And yet they labored on, in some cases for decades (Raymond Rifflet attended his first meeting at age 29, and his last at 73), in some cases when they might plausibly have had better things to do (see Spaak's resume above), and in some cases when they may have had more promising avenues for their objectives (notably the European Parliament). In retrospect, what the Movement offered that no other avenue could, from the Foreign Ministry to the European Commission, was the ability to act as a loyal transnational socialist opposition, a sort of shadow socialist party that could meet and publish unencumbered by domestic or political concerns.

The notable exception to the Movement's constituency of individuals was the SFIO. While it is certainly true that the Movement owed a great deal of its success to the party, the power dynamics tended to favor the Movement. The SFIO decided to bankroll the Montrouge conference because the MUSSE had contacts with Labour, which the SFIO sought to exploit. The Movement and the SFIO happened to generally see eye-to-eye over the next decade or so, but the SMUSE did not depend on the French: Mollet, as head of the SFIO, and Philip, as head of the Movement, supported the EDC for rather different reasons; the SFIO did not direct SMUSE policy or strategy; and *Gauche Européenne* could be critical of the party (though they eventually came to a cordial arrangement). When the Movement changed its statutes in 1961, it did so without input from or consideration of the SFIO (or the new *Parti Socialiste Unifié*).

Unencumbered, the Movement could, at every stage, present ideologically-grounded positions. These had a twofold advantage: first, they were divorced from national politics, and therefore had a degree of palatable neutrality; second, the very existence of joint positions offered a general direction to international integrative efforts. The movement was aggressively oppositional in its early years, but even once it became somewhat more mainstream it could be undiplomatically critical of parties it did not consider properly socialist. It also could be narrowly focused on issues it considered most important, as with the campaign for the Political Authority corollary to the EDC,

[563] Cf. his memoires, titled "*Combats Inachevés*" properly translated as unfinished battles.

which all but ignored nationally-charged debates about troop contributions and command structures. It would continue to act as a Socialist bellwether to the last, drawing support for the Delors legislation of the late 80s and early 90s that, to one degree or another, required national concessions to the benefit of a more supranational Europe.

It would be a mistake to think that the members of the Socialist Movement genuinely thought they could change the world in a day – the 1949 program acknowledges openly that the time was not ripe for comprehensive change, and Pineau's quote at the top of this chapter confirms that the Movement's adherents played a long game. Concretely, the movement's campaigns were fairly narrowly focused, its achievements significant but somewhat obscure. Additionally, the lack of reference to the SMUSE in Spaak's memoirs, and the understated references by other SMUSErs like Zagari and Pineau suggest that they conceived of the whole affair with a certain moderation and modesty. Nevertheless, one cannot escape the conclusion that this network, reaching so thoroughly throughout the early European machinery, facilitated the construction of the modern European Union.

The early SMUSE constitutes something of a missing piece in Socialist internationalism. In its earliest form, and despite not identifying as such, it was a direct continuation of the London Bureau of the 1930s. It is common to mark the Second World War as an important breaking point in political ideology, citing the end of Nationalism as a political system, the dawn of European transnationalism; the twilight of the French and British Empires with the loss of Indochina and India. These justify the starting of a new chapter in the history of Europe. In the case of the history of international Socialism, the story frequently centers on the Labour-led Socialist International, which was a (comparatively late) revival of the interwar Labour and Socialist International. The fact that it came back together so slowly, however, obscures any process of transition. The London Bureau, meanwhile, produced an offspring much faster that the LSI, and the early "MUSSE" years offer a glimpse of the unmistakable evolution of the interwar Left into something that could interact meaningfully with the new status quo.

The contents of *Gauche Européenne,* meanwhile, constitute an important collection of position pieces from across the socialist spectrum in numerous countries. It

is limited by its short existence, and while it was certainly read by those same leading Socialists, it is impossible without further research to determine exactly how widely distributed it was or the degree to which it had any influence beyond the SMUSE. For posterity, however, surely a monthly collection of essays from Europe's leading socialists is valuable in its own right.

The present story also invites a word about early US policy towards Europe. It is widely acknowledged that the US was able to pull strings, both economically – as in the Marshall plan – and politically – as in the Italian elections of 1948, – to further its general strategic goals. The immediate postwar Left, as represented by the MUSSE, was also deeply impacted by American policy moves, though Soviet intransigence clearly also bore a certain degree of responsibility for the Left's move towards the center. The US legislative branch never approached the global Left with any degree of nuance, but the US intelligence community did find strategic advantages in the new European center-left. In one of its very first acts, the CIA orchestrated the funneling of congressional and private funds to socialist parties in the European Movement (there is more than a little irony in a rabidly anti-Socialist American legislature and the Rockefeller foundation bankrolling a deeply anti-capitalist SMUSE). The US was, it is easy to forget, something of a novice in hegemonic affairs in the late 1940s, and while the intelligence community understood – and had the luxury of acting on – variations in the political landscape, the government may have erred in not taking more notice of a burgeoning anti-Stalinist center-left at the heart of European affairs.

Two of the Movement's most effective pursuits – Franco-British rapprochement and the EDC – ultimately came to naught, and dissecting a failure is less satisfying than dissecting a success, but the foregoing examination does offer some useful insights on both fronts. The first is the impression that Labour may have scuttled the possibility of a more productive relationship with the continent by being so thoroughly dismissive of the ILP's efforts to broker a dialogue. Ernest Bevin's Western Union, for instance had some elements compatible with the emerging international Socialist consensus, but the debate was muddled by a general misunderstanding of the positions respective to Bevin, Keep Left, and the SMUSE, and Labour consistently resisted overtures from both the French and the ILP. Labour's decision some time later to give up on working with the SFIO altogether was based at least in part on their appraisal that the Socialists were a

spent force in France – an awareness of the SFIO's links to a wider, active socialist community might have changed their calculus.

In terms of the EDC, this examination shows that the SMUSE was far more deeply involved than has been acknowledged. In 1949, the SMUSE had resolved to work within the Council of Europe to make its European Political Authority a reality. In August, 1950, Philip advocated a supranational defense community before the Council, then lobbied Churchill to endorse the idea. Churchill did so and the Council passed a resolution in support. Though Monnet is given credit for proposing the same idea in mid-September, René Pleven, in his announcement, cited the Council of Europe as the direct inspiration for the EDC. The second concrete contribution was the inclusion of language triggering the development of a supranational political authority separate from the EDC. A close examination reveals that leading SMUSErs, notably Spinelli and Frenay, were involved in including the clause launching an EPA immediately upon signature of the EDC treaty. When that process was launched, another group of SMUSErs worked to specify the putative EPA's "supranational" character and set it in motion. In other words, the SMUSE consisted of the right people at the right time and in the right place, and who collaborated across borders to push an agenda. Despite the ultimate failure of the project, it should be recognized that the SMUSE was an effective force for Europe.

The Treaties of Rome were perhaps the culmination of what the SMUSE could concretely hope to achieve, even if the precise form of the institutions fell somewhat short of the direct democratic mechanisms they had wanted. The Movement was, as with the EDC, able to produce some targeted adjustments to the process. The arrival of the Mollet government and its decidedly pro-European foreign policy staff in early 1956 has been widely acknowledged as decisive. The SMUSE records furthermore show that these men knew and understood each other well, able to work around touchy issues like the French colonies, and capable of coordinating a multifaceted campaign in support of linking Euratom to the EEC while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. Once again, the historiography has recognized the importance of these factors, but has not acknowledged the role of the SMUSE network therein.

The epilogue is intended to establish the *grandes lignes* of the Movement after 1964; its longevity alone recommends a further examination of the period. Despite the transition of many of its members to the European Parliament, there remained a role for the MGE, both as a "loyal opposition" and as a way of rallying like-minded activists

outside the official purview of their respective structures. This continued to be the case into the 1990s, when, even though the Party of European Socialists was well established and Rifflet benefitted from the highly visible podium of a newly powerful European Commission, he found it useful to rally the MSE-GE network to support further integrative policies.

The foregoing conclusions point to a larger point about this historiography, which is the tendency to edify certain individuals in the launching of the early European institutions (this is, of course, hardly confined to Europe). The circumstances surrounding these projects, are simply too complex to be accurately boiled down to the work of single individuals. There are national governments, with specific cabinets, who appoint committees and subcommittees; these work internationally within often ad hoc structures, sometimes in dialogue with new organs like the Council of Europe or the pressure groups of the European Movement. The work and accomplishments of the SMUSE reveal the degree of coordination necessary to move the needle: theirs was a multifaceted approach which coordinated across borders and party lines, and via several transnational structures. Historiography by its nature seeks to synthesize complex events, and so it is both tempting and convenient to use popular short-hand titles like the "*Plan Schuman*" (ECSC) and the "*Plan Pleven*" (EDC), or to pile responsibility on personalities like Jean Monnet. However, tying ideas with long, complicated gestations and elaboration processes to the individual who made them public doesn't do justice to the mechanisms involved, nor, I would argue, are they useful for drawing applicable skills from the study of history. The recent work on European Christian Democracy is in some ways a response to this objection, and further work on the center-left as represented by the SMUSE would add to the body of work on the transnational activism that underpinned the creation of Europe.

In the final analysis, it is clear that the SMUSE contributed concretely to the development of the European Union: specific actors, recognized to have played pivotal roles, relied on the network, as did the SFIO and the PSB; it produced Socialist answers to contemporary problems that functioned as signposts for Socialist politicians across Europe; it ran public-awareness campaigns although in the grand scheme of things, the exact significance of the movement will require some more work: exactly how large was

the movement? What was its impact on the domestic landscape of its adherents? What did the Movement's conferences and publications contribute to Socialist internationalism as a whole? How effective was the collaboration with the European Movement? Answering the questions above, seeking to assess with precision the reach and effect of the movement, will require a more pointed examination of the materials presented herein, but likely also require the inclusion of further sources.

The exploration of Gironella's papers, assuming he kept the relevant documents during the 11 years from the end of his secretaryship to his return to Span, would likely reveal a great deal more about the Movement. He is visible here only in what he has written for general consumption either in conference documents or publications or correspondence sent to members whose archives are available. It is likely that he would have received material relevant to the membership, organization, and financing of the movement: comprehensive lists of members in various countries and subscription numbers for *Gauche Européenne* would help paint a better picture of the movement's reach than is currently available. Gironella also produced the documents outlining organizational restructuring, though it is unlikely that he was sole decision-maker: internal deliberations about the movement's structure and directions might illuminate the movement's general strategy and its perception of the European center-left in general (deeper study of the Jaquet and Enock-Levi papers at OURS/FJJ could fill these gaps too). Gironella was also the central link to the Spanish Socialists in exile, notably to PSOE general secretary Rodolfo Llopis, offering a window into Spanish socialism in the Franco years. Gironella returned to Spain in 1975 and passed away in December, 1987. According to his daughter-in-law, his papers have been given to the *Partido de los Socialistas de Cataluña*, based in Barcelona, Spain. He was the subject of a short biography published in Spanish in 1999.[564]

While the British, French, and Belgian stories are well represented here, two other national stories – Italian and German – are less visible. Mario Zagari joined the Movement in the late 1940s, remained a member until shortly before his death in 1996. He also published a magazine, *Sinistra Europea*, which, while initially reprinting articles from *Gauche Européenne*, outlasted the latter by some decades. Zagari was an early adherent to Giuseppe Saragat's anti-Communist offshoot Socialist party in Italy. He

[564] PUIG, Lluís Maria de. *Gironella, la izquierda europeísta*. Madrid, 1999.

would go on to hold a number of cabinet posts and serve in both the Italian and European Parliaments. A thorough examination of his relationship with the SMUSE would complement any biographical works, but might also help place the offshoot Italian Socialists in the context of the existing international Left of the period. The same might be true of the SPD: relations between the SPD and other national parties has been told, notably by Shaev, Imlay et cetera, but several SPD members attended SMUSE conferences, there was a national section run at one time by SPD member Anna Siemsen, and there was a German-language publication. The German section was renamed the Anna Siemsen Circle after 1951 and the SPD had, by the 1990s, officially joined the group.[565] Some work on the movement exists in German, notably a 1976 chapter by Norbert Gresch.[566]

There are also likely to be some useful added dimensions to work on the Delors Commission and specifically the Treaty of Maastricht based on Raymond Rifflet's use of the movement network. His personal papers are frustratingly scanty, with nary a list of members and few clues as to the network's reach, but insofar as he worked to drum up support for the Delors Commission, there may be clues in the Delors archives at the EUI and the Jacques Delors Institute.

The final piece of the puzzle, if there is one, would be to find out if there is any continuity between the later MSE-GE and the current "European Left" (EL). The European Movement website describes this latter as having been formed in 1947, though the EL site refers to a founding congress in 2004. There are some historical materials that might elucidate the connection, though a number of emails have gone unanswered. Another potential lead is Raymond Rifflet's son Luc, the very last living person I have found to have participated in the MSE-GE. I have been unable to track him down in person, but he has some papers at the UCL in Louvain-la Neuve.

Beyond the movement itself, the present work dovetails with a few other areas of exploration. First, any review of the European Movement could potentially benefit from

[565] Rifflet to Willy Claes [President of the Party of European Socialists], 14 May, 1993. In describing MSE-GE, Rifflet states that the SPD "considers itself a member," while French, Spanish, Italian, Belgian and Portuguese members participated on a personal basis.

[566] Gresch, Norbert *Zwischen Internationalismus und nationaler Machtbehauptung – Die europäische Zusammenarbeit der Sozialdemokratischen Parteien.* In: *Zusammenarbeit der Parteien in Westeuropa. Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen politischen Infrastruktur?* Bonn: Europa Union Verlag 1976. 143-249

a greater focus on the SMUSE. There is evidence that the SMUSE was a valuable resource for the European Movement in terms of contacts with political parties at the early stages, and in terms organizing conferences. The European Movement's internal dynamics might also be illuminated by the fact of the SMUSE working directly with the UEF and the MFE, thereby almost constituting a movement within a movement. Second, Fernand Dehousse is being recognized as a valuable player in the early European Parliament: any thorough examination of his contributions ought to take into account the relationships he had with other parliamentarians from other countries (Faure, van Naters et al.) which predated the existence of the Parliament. His philosophical orientation might be illuminated by the numerous articles he wrote for *Gauche Européenne*, notably a series on the subject of federalism.

Whether or not the history of the European Union can be rewritten in any meaningful way based on the existence of the SMUSE, there is something instructive in its existence. It is instructive because it shows that transnationalism predated and ultimately produced the institutions that formalized it, in spite of the national structures that fought to fend it off. Conservatives like Churchill and De Gaulle were famously reticent to abdicate any form of sovereignty (despite the former's constantly-cited call for a United States of Europe), but even Labour and the SPD could obstruct the drive to supranationalism. However, the mere prospect of transcending nationalism was enough to spur the creation of groups, staffed by committed personalities of the center-left and center-right, who did not wait for national governments to reinvent themselves, but seized a brief moment of post-war soul-searching to build the foundations of a new, post-nationalist system.

Bibliography

Archival records

The archives are presented in rough order of historiographical usefulness to this and any future research.

International Institute of Socialist History [IISG]. Amsterdam, Netherlands

By far the largest collection of materials related to the Movement are here, under the rubric "MSEUE;" I have referenced MSEUE 4, 7, 8, 18, 19, 32, 47, and 48.

Virtually the complete print run of the magazine *Gauche Européenne* is collected under record group ZK 31205.

Office universitaire de recherche socialiste [OURS], Paris, France.

The OURS has the archives of the SFIO and its members. The filing system is inconsistent but the archivist is very knowledgeable.

The records of the SFIO central committee for the relevant period is bound, in roughly annual increments, under *Compte-rendu du comité directeur.*

Other records used herein fall under boxes "71" and "281;" 107 APO 10, and 7 EF 79/3.

The OURS also has an extensive library which includes:

Desaix, Jean Frédéric. "Radiographie de l'Homme Politique Européen Christian Pineau, 1904-1995" Doctoral dissertation, Université de Paris VIII Saint-Denis-Vincennes, 1998.

P.H. Spaak et Guy Mollet devant la C.E.D; discours prononcés le 5 Mars 1954 à la Salle des Horticulteurs, Paris. Imprimerie Cerbonnet for MSEUE, Paris, France, 1954 [pamphlet]

Bulletin Intérieur du parti Socialiste SFIO; No. 68 à 87; 1954-1956.

La documentation politique – Bulletin Hebdomadaire du Parti Socialiste SFIO, Nouvelle série; 1949-1955; no. 1 a 163

European University Institute [EUI], Florence, Italy.

Records relative to Fernand Dehousse are labeled "FD;" I have referenced FD 80, 143 and 345

Records of the European Movement are under "ME;" I have referenced ME 494, 495, 822, 974, and 1924

The European Federalist Movement is labeled MFE; I have referenced MFE 32

Documents related to Raymond Rifflet are under RR. RR 20, 87, 88, and 133 are used herein.

Université Catholique de Louvain [UCL]. Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

Raymond Rifflet's papers are collected in a number of "fardes;" I have referenced Fardes 97, 98, 99, 100, 106, 120, 122 and 125

London School of Economics and Political Science [LSE]. London, England

The LSE holds the ILP's records; I have referenced ILP 3/34, 3/36, 3/76, 5/1947, 5/1948, 14 and 16/1949

I also used [Alexander] Mackay 5/1

Centre d'histoire sociale du Vingtième Siècle [CHS]. Paris, France

The CHS has an extensive collection of Marceau Pivert's papers, under record group 599 AP; I have referenced 599 AP 11, 26, 29, 41, and 43.

Fondation Jean Jaurès [FJJ], Paris, France

I have referenced the Gérard Jaquet collection: Jaquet 1 RE 5 and 1 RE 12,
as well as Robert Pontillion's papers in Pontillon 8 FP 7/214

People's History Museum [PHM], Manchester, England:

The People's History Museum hold the archives of the Labour Party and its members.

I have referenced those of Denis Healey (Boxes 5, 10 and 12);
those of Jo Richardson (LP/RICH 2/2/5, 2/3/3b, and 2/3/5a);
Those of Bob Edwards (GB 0394 BE "European Unity"); and
International Department box 57.

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Relevant records are scattered under numerous call numbers:

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AO 2 [Audio]
20 QO 594 (P/12929-32)
Related to Christian Pineau : P/7520, 248 QO 184, and 580 AP 12;
Related to André Philip : 559 AP 43 ; and 625 AP 13

Archives Nationales [AN], Saint Denis, France.

I have referenced a few of André Philips' papers found in 625 AP 12.

National Archives and Records Administration [NARA], Washington, DC

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