

The London School of Economics and Political Science



**The European External Action Service's influence in European
security and defence policy:
Understanding the role of its relational capital**

Eleonore Heimsoeth

A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of
Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

London, March 2021

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 95 824 words.

Statement of use of third party for editorial help

I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Hallie Detrick and Sasha Milonova.

Abstract

Ten years after its institutionalisation, there remains little understanding of the European External Action Service's (EEAS) role, its impact and the extent of its influence in the European security and defence policy-making process. This thesis aims to address this gap by answering whether, to what extent and how the EEAS has the ability to purposefully steer and shape European security and defence policies so that policies' development and/or outcome is affected. More specifically, what enables or constrains the EEAS's ability to influence policies?

In juxtaposition to the dominant discourse that highlights the EEAS's scarce material capital, this thesis argues that in order to understand the EEAS's influence in the policy-making process, it is necessary to analyse its relational capital, defined as the capabilities and resources the institution derives from its networks. The thesis explains how (1) the EEAS's reach across the governance structure derived from its embeddedness in a policy's network governance and (2) the use of its networks, may be as conducive for policy impact and/or influence as its formally derived material capital. While the first structural assessment delineates the extent of influence the EEAS may have, the second actor-centric assessment offers a more granular understanding of how and to what effect the EEAS uses its intra- and inter-institutional networks. It assesses how the EEAS mobilises intangible assets such as its human and social capital to wield trust and information. Drawing on 77 elite interviews, three case studies are studied, namely the drafting and implementation of the EU Global Strategy, the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Civilian CSDP Compact - tackling the 'strategic', civilian and military components of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The findings of the thesis corroborate that capabilities derived from and resources mobilised through its relational capital enables or constrains the EEAS's ability to shape and steer policies, and more significantly, explains the variation in the extent of influence observed.

This research offers a two-fold contribution to the academic literature. Theoretically, by highlighting the relevance of relational over material capital for understanding an institution's influence in European policy-making, it introduces an overlooked yet highly relevant approach to European Foreign Policy. Empirically, it offers an in-depth understanding of the role, impact and influence of the EEAS in an increasingly informal, transgovernmental European security and defence governance.

Acknowledgements

Early on in my PhD journey I was told writing a PhD is like creating a sculpture: One starts with a deformed block and *peu à peu* one moulds and sculpts until a discernible form emerges. What I was not told, was that this was no Michelangelo or Rodin sculpture - the idea that academic exploration could parallel a harmonious and efficient process, working at the direction of a master visionary pursuing her or his plan in minute detail was fictitious. I learned that a PhD tended to be more akin to a Giacometti-style figure - an oeuvre which emerges after a multi-pronged process of plastering, denting and re-plastering.

Supervisors scan the work's foundations to ensure its robustness, survey the applied materials, point out deformities, and impart the techniques which build and sharpen the work. I am so deeply grateful to both my supervisors Dr Spyros Economides and Dr Federica Bicchi, who have patiently accepted and tirelessly accompanied this process, prodding all the dents and cracks. Their recommendations have significantly contributed to the amelioration of this thesis. I am especially thankful for the continuous support and occasional 'franc-parler' to confidently move ahead.

I also wish to thank a number of friends, colleagues and fellow academics who have accompanied this journey, shaping my research at various stages. First and foremost, my peers at the LSE: Nicola degli Esposti and Alessandro Guasti, who, with Jacklyn Majnemer, accompanied me during 'the doctoral life', and taught me how to achieve academic objectives all while taking a step back and enjoy late evenings and long debates. My four years would not have been the same without Emmanuelle Blanc, the steady companion through stormy clouds and sunshine, who, together with Kiran Phull, Irena Kalhousová and Julia Himmrich, guided me through the inevitable ups and downs of writing a PhD. I am also thankful to the 'EU girls in IR', Irene Morlino, Carlotta Clivio and McKenzie Ratner for continued words of encouragement and fits of laughter. Lastly, I wish to thank my Berlin-based friends, who have been by my side during the final stretch in-midst of the pandemic, continuously murmuring the needed 'just keep going', pampering me with small acts of kindness leading to moments of happiness in stressful times; for this I am indebted to Kerry Prior, Julia Mühlenbein, Josephine Kittner, the Westend Crew and Dominic Stanley.

My academic journey would not have been the same without the support of Nicola Chelotti, Heidi Maurer, and Katarina Lezova who have been of support throughout various stages of the process. For a vastly enriching environment, I would also like to thank the LSE community, in particular staff and students of the International Relations Department. Particular thanks are due to the International Relations Department for their financial support. Finally, my thesis could not stand without the interviewees, who have given me their time and candidly shared their experiences and opinions.

I would not be where I am today without my family: first and foremost, the unwavering support of my father and brother, who have stood like a rock in the tumultuous surf; two of my role models, my aunts Stephanie v. Dallwitz and Emmanuelle Cerdelli; et ma très chère mamie Estelle pour les confidences et bons conseils.

A ma mère
Qui restera une source d'inspiration, d'amour et de persévérance

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	1
Acknowledgements.....	2
List of Abbreviations.....	7
List of Figures.....	10
Chapter 1 – Introduction.....	11
I) The puzzle.....	11
II) The research questions	12
III) The argument in a nutshell.....	15
IV) The contribution to the literature	17
V) The roadmap of the thesis.....	21
Chapter 2 – The EEAS in the European security governance: what defines it? 24	
I) Introduction	24
II) The ‘nature of the beast’: a challenged politico-administrative institution.....	25
A. Ambitious mandate, ambiguous tasks	26
B. The EEAS’s establishment: a ‘functionally autonomous body’?	28
III) Evolution – from contestation to consolidation.....	35
A. The early years of contestation	36
B. The 2013 Review: towards normalisation	37
C. The current status quo: a consolidated institution	40
IV) The locus of and means for influence in the policy-making process.....	43
A. The EEAS acting on a political, policy and administrative level	45
B. The EEAS in security and defence policy-making.....	46
V) Conclusion.....	51
Chapter 3 – Theorising the EEAS’s conditions for influence.....53	
I) Introduction	53
II) Defining and assessing policy influence in a multi-level governance framework	54
A. Defining influence as purposefully seeking policy change	55
B. The means for influence on a policy level: juxtaposing material versus relational capital.....	57
III) Understanding influence through the EEAS’s relational capital	61
A. Assessing and utilising the EEAS’s relational capital.....	61
B. The interplay between network structure and network use: the emergence of virtuous cycles for influence	70
IV) Understanding the EEAS’s ability to shape and steer policies in practice	74
A. Political leadership and the EEAS’s roles in the policy-making process.....	75

B.	Enabled or constrained: mechanisms towards influence in security and defence.....	76
V)	Methods	81
A.	Network boundary.....	82
B.	Qualitative methods in network theory.....	83
C.	Relational data: data analysis and data collection strategy	85
VI)	Conclusion.....	91
Chapter 4 - A case of high influence:the EU Global Strategy as a catalyst for change.....		93
I)	Introduction	93
II)	Setting the scene: background and context.....	97
III)	Policy initiation: grasping the momentum in order to define one's legacy.....	99
A.	Leadership in context: policy intentions and the HR/VP's interest.....	100
B.	From building one's fort... ..	105
C.	... To forging deeper relations in an emerging governance network structure	108
IV)	Formulating and negotiating the Global Strategy: managing and brokering content and form	111
A.	A favourable position: channelling and controlling the information flow	112
B.	Crafting the Global Strategy – whose content?	114
C.	Building legitimacy for acceptance: the use of human capital	118
V)	Implementation and policy output: actions speak louder than words	122
A.	The HR/VP and the EEAS strengthening security and defence: beyond jumping on the bandwagon.....	123
B.	The EEAS taking ownership: institutional changes	127
VI)	Conclusion.....	130
Chapter 5 - A case of punching above its weight: the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the EEAS		132
I)	Introduction	132
II)	Setting the scene: background and context.....	135
III)	Agency in the initiation of PESCO: the EEAS catalysing PESCO?.....	137
A.	Continuing the conversation from the EUGS to the IPSD: the Franco-German motor after Brexit.....	139
B.	Questioning leadership and agency from the HR/VP and the EEAS's top echelons.....	141
C.	Negotiating the 'Notification establishing PESCO': the EEAS as facilitator	148
IV)	Translating the informal to the formal – overcoming informal small groupings?	150
A.	The EEAS semi-embedded in the policy network governance: curtailed to the political dimension.....	152

B.	Negotiating the political framework: setting the pace and generating a virtuous cycle of cooperation.....	157
V)	Policy implementation: from the Annual Reports to becoming a ‘hub of information’	163
VI)	Conclusion.....	165
Chapter 6 – A case of punching below its weight: The EEAS in the Civilian CSDP Compact.....		167
I)	Introduction	167
II)	Setting the scene: background and context	170
III)	Policy initiation: placing the Compact on the agenda.....	172
A.	No interest, no leadership, no progress from the EEAS	173
B.	A ‘Civilian PESCO’ pushed by small group of member states	178
IV)	Policy consolidation and negotiation: from a difficult start onward to a ‘bumpy process’.....	181
A.	Intra-institutional incoherence – seeking to connect the synapses	183
B.	Not bridging the gaps: council presidencies’ leadership and mediation	186
C.	Shaping the content: information flow, knowledge management and expertise.....	191
V)	Towards policy implementation: building a bridge while crossing it.....	196
A.	The EEAS bridging the gaps.....	197
B.	Knowledge management: Resources too scarce to provide conceptual clarity?.....	202
VI)	Conclusion.....	204
Chapter 7 – Conclusions: The EEAS as a carriage driver.....		206
I)	Introduction	206
II)	Overview of the three cases: when and what influence?	208
III)	Understanding the variation in the extent of influence	214
A.	The role of leadership, intra-institutional cohesion and preferences – acting across hierarchies.....	215
B.	Structure: the EEAS’s embeddedness in the policy network governance.....	217
C.	The role of the EEAS on the policy/administrative level: wielding human and social capital.....	222
IV)	The EEAS: Quo vadis?	226
V)	Conclusion.....	230
Annex 1 – List of Interviewees		232
Bibliography.....		236

List of Abbreviations

ARC	Annual Review Conference
CARD	Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CCC	Civilian CSDP Compact
CDP	Capability Development Plan
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CivCom	Council Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CoE	European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management
COREPER	Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to the European Union
CPCC	Civilian Policy and Conduct Capability
CROC	Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DG ECHO	DG for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DG GROW	DG for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs
DG NEAR	DG for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
DG RELEX	DG for External Relations
DG TRADE	DG for Trade
DPD	Defence Policy Directors
DSG	Deputy Secretary General
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDAP	European Defence Action Plan
EDF	European Defence Fund
EDIDP	European Defence Industrial Development Programme
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union

EUGS	EU Global Strategy
EUISS	European Union Institute for Security Studies
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMCWG	EU Military Committee Working Group
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
FPI	Foreign Policy Instrument
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IPSD	Implementation Plan on Security and Defence
ISP	Integrated Approach for Security and Peace
JAP	Joint Action Plan
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDICI	Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument
NIP	National Implementation Plan
OCCAR	Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement / Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation
PESCO	Permanent Structured Organisation
PMG	Politico-Military Group
POC	Point of Contacts
PRISM	Prevention of Conflicts, Rules of Lay/Security Sector Reform, Integrated Approach, Stabilisation and Mediation
PSC	Political and Security Committee
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
RELEX	Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors
SecDefPol	Security and Defence Policy Division
SNA	Social Network Analysis
SND	Seconded National Diplomat

SNE	Seconded National Expert
SPD	Security Policy Directors
SPU	EEAS's Strategic Planning Unit
TEU	Treaty of the European Union

List of Figures

- Figure 2.1 Staff Number and Composition of the EEAS (2013-2019)
- Figure 2.2 EEAS budget (2011 - 2020)
- Figure 2.3 The three levels for policy influence by the EEAS
- Figure 3.1 Understanding relational capital
- Figure 3.2 The EEAS's position at the periphery, as a broker or as a mediator
- Figure 3.3 The virtuous cycle for influence through brokerage
- Figure 3.4 The virtuous cycle of cooperation through mediation
- Figure 3.5 Relational capabilities and resource composition: overview
- Figure 3.6 The EEAS's roles in the policy-making process
- Figure 3.7 The EEAS's extent of influence in three scenarios
- Figure 3.8 The EEAS's influence in the EU Global Strategy
- Figure 3.9 The EEAS's influence in PESCO
- Figure 3.10 The EEAS's influence in the CCC
- Figure 4.1 Timeline of the process leading to the EU Global Strategy
- Figure 5.1 Timeline of the policy development of the Permanent Structured Cooperation
- Figure 6.1 Timeline of the Civilian CSDP Compact
- Figure 6.2 Overview of key commitments of the CCC and inter-institutional divisions
- Figure 7.1 Overview: The EEAS's influence in the EUGS, CCC and PESCO
- Figure 7.2 Overview of the EEAS's embeddedness in the three cases
- Figure 7.3 The extent of influence according to the EEAS's embeddedness

Chapter 1 – Introduction

I) The puzzle

At the ten-year anniversary of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in January 2021, little celebration was on display. Whether due to continued disappointments in the European Union's (EU) ability to act concertedly and forcefully on the global stage, or due to a growing resignation regarding the EEAS's actual abilities and impact, the excitement that accompanied its establishment in January 2011 has clearly waned. And yet, ten years after its institutionalisation, we have little systematic understanding of the role, impact and possible influence the EEAS has on foreign, security and defence policy. The review of its success is mixed, with instances where the EEAS has emerged as an influential actor, and others where it has not been able to leave a mark.

Indeed, while there have been cases where the EEAS has punched far above its weight, such as in the implementation of the EUNAVFOR anti-piracy mission (Bueger, 2017; Papaioannou, 2018), in Myanmar (Brandenburg, 2017) or in Iran (Bassiri Tabrizi & Kienzle, 2020), we observe time and time again occurrences where the EEAS has not been successful in steering or shaping a coherent European foreign and security policy. For instance, labelled as Black Monday for the EEAS, on February 4th, 2019 'a fatal blow was dealt to the EU's attempts to be taken seriously on a global stage' (Politico, 2019), when, first, EU member states could not agree on a joint statement during a summit with the Arab League foreign ministers. Second, due to Italy's and, by extension, then-High Representative Mogherini's opposition, no decision was taken on a Joint Position on Venezuela. Third, unable to agree, the EU remained silent on the US's withdrawal of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (Politico, 2019).

What leads to this discrepancy and how can these variations in the extent of influence be best explained? Considering the EEAS has neither strong formal powers nor control over material capital, what can explain the occasional influence observed? The answer provided in this thesis will centre on the institution's relational capital, here defined as the capabilities and resources derived from its networks. Like tentacles, the flexibility, strength and use of the EEAS networks, in terms of their reach and authority, will define the extent of influence it may exert. Positioned as a bridge between the supranational and intergovernmental worlds in a multi-level, administrative governance, we draw attention to this 'networked'

institution's social and relational characteristics. It is surprising that its relational attributes have not yet been addressed, considering they are its key defining feature (Bachmann, 2016; Balfour & Raik, 2013). Interestingly, they are also perceived as being the EEAS's strongest attributes by Commission officials. They are quick to highlight that the strongest assets of the EEAS are its 'networks', specifically its 'networking abilities' and their access to all Foreign Ministries within a day (#12). EEAS officials, however, after minutes of contemplation, argue that their strongest attributes are what may be perceived as the minutiae of daily negotiation dynamics, namely the continued effort placed in building and upholding trust among policy actors (#5,7,13,37,68,69).

II) The research questions

This thesis' guiding research question builds on three steps, tackling first the role and function the EEAS has in the policy-making process; second, understanding when, how and the extent to which the EEAS can exert influence; and third, delineating what may enable or constrain the EEAS's ability to shape and steer policies.

First, the EEAS sits at the crossroads of administrative, diplomatic and crisis management coordination duties. Best conceptualised as an 'interstitial' institution by Bátora (2013), the EEAS has significant challenges and opportunities built in due to its unusual hybrid institutional structure. 'Emerging at the interstices' of varying organizational fields, it is able to '[recombine] physical, informational, financial, legal and legitimacy resources' from other actors (Bátora, 2013:601). While this provides fertile ground for institutional innovation, interstitial institutions are carriers of ambiguity and heterogeneity (ibid:601). While the EEAS's challenging institutional features and the handicaps they pose have often been explored, the materialization of this 'interstitial' institution has not been properly understood (Bátora, 2013:599).

What difference has its involvement had on the policy-making dynamics? More concretely, what role and function has the EEAS adopted in the policy-making process? As a first step, this thesis aims to systematize the EEAS's impact and involvement in the policy-making process. Based on the international public administration literature, this thesis builds on the assumption that the EEAS's mere involvement as a (hybrid-)administrative body will have an effect on the policy-making process. Administrative capabilities, such as its chairing, drafting and agenda-setting capabilities, sets the baseline of our understanding of the EEAS's undoubted independent administrative effect (Eckhard & Ege, 2016). Yet, as a compound, interstitial politico-administrative institution, does its multi-level, cross-boundary reach

affect policy's development beyond its administrative capabilities? Defining 'influence' as intentionally steering and shaping policies to such an extent that their development and/or outcome is significantly affected, this thesis goes a step beyond simply assessing the impact incurred through its administrative capabilities.

A number of factors have deterred further research on the question of the EEAS's means for influence. First, its heterogeneous staff composition hampers the development of an *esprit de corps*, putting in question the institution's ability to even forge a cohesive interest and pursue policy preferences. Second, as its primary role is to support the efforts of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP) in coordinating a coherent European foreign policy, it can be questioned whether the EEAS acts as policy entrepreneur or 'simply' executes the HR/VP's commands. The effects of the HR/VP's agenda-setting powers have been addressed by a number of studies, yet few link its reliance on the EEAS in the pursuit of policy preferences, or the EEAS's independent effect on policy developments (see, for instance, the edited Volume bei Amadio Viceré, Tercovich & Carta, 2020). As the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) action is decided unanimously by member states and the remainder of EU actions by the Commission (e.g. development, humanitarian aid, trade and enlargement), is there even room to manoeuvre?

Third, research on the EEAS's influence has been deterred by the fact that it has few formal powers and no control over administrative and operational resources. While it was created 'functionally' autonomous, it is 'organisationally' dependent (Gatti, 2016; Blockmans & Hillion, 2021). Without material capital, nor strong statutory powers, how can the EEAS exert influence? How, when and to what extent can the EEAS actually exert influence, considering it must ensure member-states, and increasingly the Commission's, buy-in? Lastly, this thesis seeks to explain why we see variation in the extent of influence by the EEAS. By examining the means through which the EEAS influences policies, we ask what enables or constrains the EEAS's influence.

While less evident at first glance, it is of particular interest to home in on the EEAS's role, impact and possible influence in the security and defence arena. It is an issue area where the EU has made significant strides since the initiation of a number of defence initiatives after the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in summer 2016, and has the potential to continue to grow in the next couple of decades. As a 'by-product' of the EUGS numerous new initiatives have been initiated to strengthen European security and defence. Among those are the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), in the military stream, and the Civilian CSDP Compact

(CCC), in the civilian stream of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which will act as case studies in this thesis. We would expect the EEAS's influence to be 'less-likely' because member states retain a tight grip on all questions pertaining to security and defence issues. In the 'last intergovernmental' pillar, the spectre of widely diverging national ambitions, interests and capabilities hampers concerted efforts towards a harmonization of European security and defence policy. Yet, it has become evident that the EU and its member states approach towards their foreign, security and defence policy has become more systematic and strategic. More or less subtle, yet significant institutional changes have accompanied member states' need to respond concertedly vis-à-vis transboundary threats. Accompanied by a more systematic approach to European security policy, one observes 'a European turn to strategy, to the development of a 'strategic actorness'' (Economides, 2017: 222; Sperling & Economides, 2017; Novotna, 2017).

Concomitantly, concrete institutional and procedural changes have allowed the European Union faster and more effective coordination mechanisms which have led to the increase of efficient cooperation between actors. The EEAS has shaped several developments, most notably spearheading the pursuit of a 'comprehensive' and 'integrated' foreign and security policy (Faria, 2014; Sheriff & Hauck, 2014; Tercovich, 2014; Koops & Tercovich, 2020; Csernaton, 2021). Indeed, surprisingly, the EEAS has been gaining more traction in security and defence matters, with one capital-based member state official arguing that the development of CSDP became the institution's *raison d'être*, being 'the area where the EEAS can do the most and, in effect, does the most' (#36). With the increased institutionalisation through, for instance, the establishment of a Crisis Platform, the incorporation of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and Operational Headquarters of Civilian Missions (CPCC), and even the creation and strengthening of an Intelligence Unit, the EEAS has entrenched its position in the otherwise fragmented European security governance.

In an area where the EEAS has the least prerogatives, it becomes all the more revealing to understand how the EEAS contributes to overcomes member states' objections, and to grasp why and how the EEAS has been able to steer and shape security and defence policies. This research would contribute to a broader debate on European governance – honing into the EEAS's role and potential influence in security and defence would provide a deeper understanding on how it positions itself in an environment where one observed a renewed prevalence of small, informal ad hoc coalitions of member states (Aggestam & Bicchi, 2019).

III) The argument in a nutshell

In juxtaposition to the dominant academic discourse, which solely addresses the EEAS's limited formal powers and scarce material capital, this thesis argues that to fully grasp the EEAS's influence, we must address its relational capital, meaning the capabilities and resources derived from its networks. The analysis provided proposes that (1) the capabilities derived from the EEAS's embeddedness in the networked governance, and (2) the resources drawn from its networks, may be as conducive for policy impact and/or influence as formally derived material capital. While the first structural assessment delineates the extent of influence the EEAS may have, the second actor-centric assessment offers a more granular understanding of how and to what effect the EEAS uses its intra- and inter-institutional networks. Addressing policy networks is relevant because they reflect the communication flow, a defining factor in the policy-making process. As medium through which the EEAS affects policy dynamics, the position it occupies in a policy network governance and the nature of its interactions reflect and affect how relevant information for policy-making is transmitted.

To differentiate whether the EEAS moves beyond having a generic effect, i.e., impacting the process, to actually exerting influence, we must first address whether it acts cohesively and purposefully steers or shapes policies' direction across hierarchies. Thus, as a necessary condition, it becomes relevant to assess whether the institution acts concertedly, both vertically and horizontally. Then, capabilities derived from the structural assessment on the EEAS's network reach provides us with a first insight into the extent of influence the EEAS *can* have. The EEAS's embeddedness in the formal and informal policy network governance is based on the EEAS's position in the network and the frequency and depth of interaction in inter-institutional relations. The policy network governance defines the realms within which the actor acts on a particular policy. The EEAS's embeddedness in a policy's network governance reflects the communication flow and how policy-making dynamics unfold, because it reflects how, from where, and through whom information is passed. From its structure and the EEAS's position, we derive the cross-organisational reach the EEAS's networks could draw from when seeking to steer a policy's direction on the political level or shape a policy's content or process on the policy/administrative level.

Crucially, networks are not only the portrayal of the EEAS's reach, but also the medium through which the EEAS mobilises intangible assets to yield information and trust. In other words, the EEAS's networks are not only resources to draw from but also a means to achieve a specific end. Analysing how networks are used is important, for it highlights

whether and how the EEAS mobilises intangible assets – here, its social and human capital – to affect the policy-making process. Simply put, social capital is the use of trustworthiness and trust to generate a ‘virtuous cycle of cooperative behaviour. Human capital is the skill of EEAS officials to build on their gathered information (including political, procedural or any policy-relevant expertise) to shape the policies. Direct or indirect relational resources are ‘harvested’ and mobilised through the EEAS’s social and human capital. Relational resources that are of relevance for our study are information and trust. Information here is understood as a broad term encompassing not only procedural knowledge, policy-relevant expertise (e.g., subject-matter, technical), but also political knowledge, meaning an understanding of the political sensitivities among policymakers. The EEAS will significantly affect the policy-making dynamics through its human and social capital. They are a reflection of the EEAS’s relational capital: carried through their interactions and reflective of the nature of their relationship, social and human capital generate an increase in relational resource exchange, affect the information flow and, most crucially, have positive externalities on negotiation outcomes.

Analytically, the thesis disaggregates the EEAS’s involvement in the policy-making process on the political, policy and administrative level, delineating three loci for influence. Next to its relational capital, which the EEAS wields on the policy level, the EEAS can enact a (co-)leadership role through and with the HR/VP on the political level and utilise its administrative capabilities. From these three factors, we derive five roles the EEAS can play in the policy-making process. On the political level, the EEAS’s top echelons, jointly with the High Representative, can set important incentives by articulating visions, framing, and agenda-setting, and pursuing those strategically through the institutional tools at its disposal (Schroeder, 2014). On the policy level, the EEAS’s embeddedness in the policy network governance may define whether it can play a brokering or mediating role. As broker, the EEAS uniquely bridges between a group of actors. Brokerage is correlated with unique acquisition and use of information, which allows it to canalise the information flow to its advantage. Adopting the mediator role means mediating between the parties to the mutual benefit for all. Lastly, on an administrative level, it can use its administrative role of chairing, time-managing and drafting of reports to hinder or facilitate the administrative process around policymaking.

Whereas the EEAS’s embeddedness explains the ‘quantity’ of relational power it could have, its role in the network structure and the use of its social and human capital highlights the ‘quality’ of the EEAS’s relational capital. Assuming the HR/VP and EEAS have a preference and are pursuing a policy goal, it is when wielding its relational and administrative

capabilities across hierarchies that the EEAS is most influential. More specifically, when placed centrally, wielding its social and human capital and using its administrative duties to its advantage is when the EEAS influences the policy-making process.

The dominant discourse on European defence points towards a stronger role and more influence in the civilian rather than military stream of CSDP. However, as the empirical chapters show, we observe that in policy areas where the EEAS has proportionally more material capital and ‘expertise’ – namely, civilian CSDP, and in our analysis specifically in the development of the Civilian CSDP Compact – it has been less influential because of intra-institutional competition, a side-lined position in a predominantly informal policy network governance structure and the lack of leveraging social or human capital, resulting in failure to bridge intra- and inter-institutional cleavages. On the contrary, despite little manpower and no prior expertise, the EEAS has had a surprising amount of influence in the development of PESCO. Albeit limited, the HR/VP and EEAS have cohesively leveraged their agenda-setting and framing powers, as well as their ability to intervene in different intergovernmental fora. Frequent interaction between the HR/VP, the Deputy Secretary General for CSDP and crisis management and the Chair of the Political and Security Committee have allowed the EEAS to uphold the momentum after the launch of a number of defence capability developments and exert sustained pressure to seek an inclusive PESCO initiation. It is especially its mediation, through its social and human capital, as well as leveraging strategically its administrative capabilities across levels, that have contributed to the rapid turnover of the political framework of PESCO and convinced member states to be more precise in defining the binding commitments.

In simpler words, the EEAS’s strength lies in its networks, not only its cross-organisational and cross-boundary reach, but also in the ability to mediate and broker among the policy actors, generating in certain circumstances virtuous cycles of cooperation. The variation of influence can be explained by the relational capabilities and resource constellations, defined by the EEAS’s position in and characteristics of the policy network governance, concomitantly with whether and how it mobilises human and social capital to leverage trust and information.

IV) The contribution to the literature

This thesis aims to offer a systematic understanding of the EEAS’s role, impact and potential influence in the policy-making process through its relational capital, specifically in the area of security and defence. It contributes to broader debates on European security governance

and European Foreign Policy Analysis literature. It adds to the literature by expanding our understanding of the EEAS's position in the 'transgovernmental' European governance and its subsequent effect on the policy-making dynamics.

The most valid understanding of the environment within which foreign, security and defence policy-making is situated builds on the multi-level governance approach spearheaded by Hooghe and Marks (2001,2003) and applied by Smith (2004) in the domain of foreign policy. Emerging as 'an advanced form of transgovernmentalism' (Mérand, Hofmann, Irondelle, 2010, 2011; Keohane & Nye, 1974), EU policies are shaped by growing cross-border, cross-boundary and multi-level interaction of national and EU officials (Hooghe & Marks, 2001, 2003; Smith, 2004; Thurner, 2017; Börzel & Heard- Lauréote, 2009). Rather than seeing a single authority making policies, one observes a heterarchical structure of actors with varying degrees of coherence spread across the hierarchical ladder, with different commitments to EU norms and power resources (Smith, 2004:743).

Since the institutionalisation of the post-Lisbon foreign policy apparatus, a number of changes have occurred, notably the emergence of an administrative dimension to the security governance structure, the expansion of transgovernmentalism in the security and defence area and, despite the centralisation of coordination power around the EEAS, the intensification of informal, ad hoc coalitions of member states (Aggestam & Bicchi, 2019). These developments lay bare the lack of understanding on the role and impact of the now consolidated politico-administrative institution – a significant lacuna for our broader assessments on the European security governance and for our understanding of the security and defence policy-making dynamics.

With regards to the evolving governance structure, a new 'administrative' dimension arose. Trondal and Peters' (2013) administrative governance approach highlights the interdependency of politico-administrative authorities across levels. The concept of multi-levelled administration emphasizes the need for vertical and horizontal coordination, thus re-emphasizing the interconnected nature of European policy-making (see also Benz, Corcaci & Doser, 2016; Curtin & Egeberg, 2008; Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). There is, however, one caveat to the International Public Administration scholarship. It places too much importance on administrative aspects of policy-making, not sufficiently taking into consideration the nature of interaction between 'interdependent' actors. In other words, power politics and the nature of interactions within policy networks' governance systems are neglected. As a politico-administrative institution, it is relevant to assess the patterns and dynamics of the political as well as administrative capacities of the EEAS.

Concomitantly, as EU foreign and security policy-making has evolved into a complex fusion of intergovernmental, supranational and transgovernmental institutional forms (Smith, 1998), we observe that EU foreign and security policy-making is formulated by more or less entrenched transgovernmental networks (Wallace & Reh, 2015; Chelotti, 2016:174; Cross, 2011,2013; Mérand et al. 2010, 2011; Hofmann, 2012; Hollis, 2020). Transgovernmental cooperation is defined by Keohane and Nye (1974) as the process by which sub-units of governments engage in direct and autonomous interaction separate from nation states. This is a function of highly cooperative and institutionalized inter-state relationships (Risse-Kappen,1995:12-13). They are more informal than coalitions or committees, and reflect patterns of interaction through which information, shared culture and trust flows (Thurner & Binder, 2009). The modes of interaction in these networks are focussed on deliberation and persuasion (Risse-Kappen, 1993:311; Tömmel 2011).

While the existence of transgovernmental networks in the European security governance is manifest, their modality of action, relevance and policy-impact is yet to be grasped (Thurner, 2017). While networks have become self-evident in our understanding of European governance and European foreign, security and defence policy-making, applying network theory has not. Network studies have been applied in European Union studies (Thurner, 2017), but not in European foreign, security and defence policy. Apart from the often-cited network analysis by Mérand et al. (2010, 2011), which has been carried out prior to the EEAS, there is little understanding of the relevance of transgovernmental policy networks during the policy-making process. Their study highlights the complex constellation of security and defence actors that ‘feature cross-border, cross-level ties’ (ibid:121). While security and defence continued to be ‘dominated by state actors’, the governance was seen as heterarchical and characterised by ‘weak transgovernmentalism’ (Mérand et.al, 2010). Evidence suggests that the trend towards stronger transgovernmentalism has become more important in the post-Lisbon governance (Nugent, 2017:318; Wallace & Reh, 2015:109-111). Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty and more generally pursuit for a comprehensive foreign and security policy ‘created fertile ground for the process of transgovernmentalism’, even in the domain of security and defence (Cross, 2013:389; Amadio Viceré et al., 2020:266). For instance, in the ‘most notoriously guarded area of national sovereignty and security,’ we observe that a European intelligence space has consolidated around transgovernmental network of intelligence professionals around the Intelligence Centre, which is anchored in the EEAS (Cross, 2013, Hillion & Blockmans, 2021). What role and effect has the EEAS had in these transgovernmental networks, and how embedded is it vis-à-vis the increasing capital-to-capital diplomacy?

Lastly, the dual development of, on the one hand, an entrenched EEAS connecting and coordinating a greater number of actors in the formal policy-making process and, on the other hand, the rise of informal practices by small groupings of member states, initiating and leading forward discussions on salient policy issues outside of Brussels, has raised new questions regarding the EEAS's relevance in the policy-making process. With the normalisation and routinization of the EEAS's functioning, it has consolidated itself as the politico-administrative bureaucracy and emerged as 'hub for collective action', coordinating not only member states' positions, but also the actions of the Commission and other relevant agencies (Furness & Gänzle, 2017: 487; Csernaton, 2021, Interview #64). Since the institutionalisation of the post-Lisbon governance structure, a more comprehensive approach to foreign and security policy has emerged, leading to an increasingly interconnected and interdependent foreign, security and defence policy-making apparatus. Signs of more systematic crisis management are also the result of a clearer, more pragmatic vision of EU foreign, security and defence policy, adequate institutional streamlining and reshuffling, which culminated in improved inter-agency coordination and cooperation.

However, while a centralization of coordination power can be observed around the EEAS, this has not translated to a centralization of foreign policy-making. One observes an informalisation of aspects of the policy-making process – at times by the HR/VP or the EEAS, such as in the case of drafting the EU Global Strategy (EEAS, 2016b) – yet more significantly through the emergence of informal, ad hoc coalitions of member states initiating and feeding policy actions¹ (cf. #64; Aggestam & Bicchi, 2019; Aggestam & Johansson, 2017; Young, 2020; Bassiri Tabrizi & Kienzle, 2020). Leadership in foreign policy-making is changing with the existence of split leadership between member states and the EEAS (see also Aggestam & Bicchi, 2019; Aggestam & Johansson, 2017). Indeed, core groups of member states 'chart the path of foreign policy', sometimes without properly informing the HR/VP or the EEAS (Blockmans, Wessel, Chaban et.al., 2021:2). The tendency of groups of member states to informally agree on one position prior to bringing the issue to the European level has been noted in several recent cases and is particularly relevant in security and defence issues. This raises a number of questions, especially with regards to the relevance and role of the EEAS.

¹ While this is not a new phenomenon *per se*, it can be argued that there has been a renewed predominance more recently (Aggestam & Bicchi, 2019; Young, 2020; Bassiri Tabrizi & Kienzle, 2020; Amadio Viceré, Tercovich & Carta, 2020). Why this is so warrants further research. One might however postulate that –as will be argued in the subsequent chapters– this is also the result of a challenging relationship between foreign ministries and the HR/VP, or more generally not sufficient initiative-taken from sides of the EEAS.

Beyond bridging the gap in the literature, this research offers a two-fold contribution to the academic literature. Theoretically, by juxtaposing the relevance of relational over material capital in understanding an institution's influence in European policy-making, it introduces an overlooked, yet highly relevant approach to European Foreign Policy Analysis and International Public Administration literature. Bridging the macro- and micro-lenses in policy influence, it straddles structuralist and actor-centric approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis, highlighting the complementarity of both when addressing an institution's influence in policy-making. Methodologically, this thesis calls for a reappraisal of qualitative network analyses. The trend towards a 'quantitative' Social Network Analysis, while valuable, remains too descriptive and does not allow for a detailed understanding of the functioning and intricacies of relationships and interactions among policy actors (Belotti, 2014).

Empirically, it offers an in-depth understanding of the role, impact and influence of the EEAS in an increasingly informal, transgovernmental European security and defence governance. Building on 77 interviews across key European security and defence actors, the thesis provides the first network analysis since the EEAS's institutionalisation. The three case studies assess the extent of the EEAS's influence in the drafting and implementation of the EU Global Strategy, the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Civilian CSDP Compact - tackling 'strategic', civilian and military components of CSDP. The multi-case analysis offers robust findings for understanding the role played by the EEAS in Brussels or in member state capitals, as well as the means for influence across the political, policy and administrative levels. As will be concluded in Chapter 7, the EEAS's relational capabilities and resources are indeed relevant for our understanding of when, why and how the EEAS has exerted influence on the policy-making process.

V) The roadmap of the thesis

This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapters 2 and 3, we provide the conceptual and theoretical backdrop. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 empirically assess to what extent and how the EEAS has been able to steer and shape the development of the EUGS, the PESCO and the CCC in the policy initiation, consolidation (i.e. negotiation) and early implementation stages. Chapter 7 concludes with a multi-case comparative analysis.

After presenting the institution's ambitious yet ambiguous mandate, Chapter 2 traces the EEAS's evolution from a highly contested institution to a now consolidated politico-administrative one. This chapter discusses its organisationally dependent institutional features. As particular handicaps for the EEAS's ability to sustainably shape European policy, the lack of control over material resources, a highly heterogeneous and fluctuating staff

composition and the lack of direct in-house expertise will be addressed. To systematize our analysis, it disaggregates the ability for influence on the political, policy and administrative level and reviews our knowledge of the EEAS's implication in the security and defence policy-making process.

Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework and theoretical backdrop of the thesis. It introduces the relational capital argument and the two pillars that constitute it, namely the capabilities derived from its network structure and resources wielded through its network utilisation. This chapter proposes that the variation in the extent of the EEAS's influence, meaning its ability to purposefully steer and shape policies' direction, is explained by possible relational capability and resource constellations. It proposes different network patterns and interaction dynamics, delineating when and why the EEAS may exert strong, limited or no influence. It also discusses the thesis' qualitative methodological approach.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 assesses the HR/VP's and EEAS' extent of influence in the initiation, consolidation and early implementation stages of the EUGS, PESCO and the CCC. More importantly, it tests the relevance of the relational capital argument, and how the EEAS's position in the policy network governance and network use enables or constrains the EEAS's ability to purposefully steer and shape policy. Chapter 4 on the EUGS offers a case of strong influence. Acting as an insulated and cohesive clique around the HR/VP, the EUGS team acted as broker in a decentralised policy network governance, channelling and controlling information from member states and the Commission. Over time, sustained human and social capital further allowed the EUGS team to gain member states acceptance of an unorthodox process through convincing argumentation.

Chapter 5 hones in on the role of the EEAS in the case of PESCO. In this case, the EEAS's involvement oscillates between policy impact (i.e., leaving a mark through its administrative functions), and influence (i.e., purposefully steering and shaping the policies' development.) While its influence was limited, the EEAS punched above its weight. Its involvement was curtailed to the political dimension of PESCO, which as a policy spans across a military and industrial-defence dimension. Within the political realm, the EEAS used its capabilities derived from its position on all three levels and acted strategically across hierarchies. These capabilities include setting the agenda and framing on the political level, and mediating and facilitating on the policy/administrative level. Relational resources played a crucial role: in line with mediatory activities, it mobilised social and human capital, enhancing the communication flow and hence the decision-making dynamic. By combining its administrative powers and relational resources, the EEAS contributed to the rapid turnover of PESCO.

Chapter 6, on the EEAS's influence on the development of the Civilian CSDP Compact, is an example of no substantial influence. Intra-institutional competition within the EEAS and obstruction of taking ownership contributed to a greater fragmentation of the policy network governance. Rather than utilising its formal, central position, the EEAS was on numerous occasions outmanoeuvred by a small group of like-minded states, wielding their relational capital to achieve their preferred outcome. The informal embeddedness of some EEAS policy advisors did not translate into formal embeddedness, hampering the establishment of cooperative relationships among member states and between the EEAS and member states. The structure of the policy network governance compounded by strained relations among actors severely hampered the flow of information. Unable to sufficiently mobilise intangible assets such as trust, knowledge and expertise as a consequence of the lacking cohesion and embeddedness in informal network structures, the EEAS was not able to exert much influence, despite greater manpower and expertise in civilian CSDP (Dijkstra, 2013).

Chapter 7 juxtaposes the relational capital of the EEAS in all three cases and draws conclusions about this approach's relevance to understanding the variation of influence. Intra-institutional coherence remains a necessary condition for influence, a condition that is not always met. When positioned centrally in the policy network governance, the EEAS is either able to control information and broker policy solutions to its advantage. In this position, it can influence the policy content due to a 'competitive advantage' in procedural, political and/or policy-relevant expertise. Or, acting as mediator, it engenders a virtuous cycle of cooperation among member states, generating trust and using persuasive means, affecting the policy-making dynamics. The EEAS's influence is exponentially higher when leveraging intangible assets through its networks, concomitantly with wielding political leadership and administrative capabilities. In other words, it is when utilising all tools tactically across hierarchies that it has the strongest effect on policy development.

Chapter 2 - The EEAS in the European security governance: what defines it?

I) Introduction

Little is known about the EEAS's actual policy impact and influence. The literature has thus far addressed the EEAS's challenging institutional features (e.g. Gatti, 2016; Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018; Bátora, 2013; Juncos & Pomorska, 2013, 2014; Henökl, 2015), its effects on inter-institutional cooperation in forging a more coherent external action (e.g. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet & Rüger, 2012; Petrov, Pomorska & Vanhoonacker, 2012; Furness, 2013; Bicchi, 2013; Blockmans & Russack, 2015; Blom & Vanhoonacker, 2015), and the longer-term reverberations on European diplomacy or security policy (e.g. Bicchi & Maurer, Spence; Bátora & Spence; Smith, Keukeleire & Vanhoonacker, 2016; Economides & Sperling, 2018). Only few have addressed the effect the EEAS's establishment has had on the policy-making process (Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra & Maurer, 2010:4; Chelotti 2015; Fuurness & Gänzle, 2017). This chapter aims to review our knowledge about the EEAS and draws first conclusions on its involvement in the policy-making process thus far, honing in specifically on security and defence issues, in the decade since its institutionalisation. It discusses its strange institutional characteristics, its position in an increasingly intertwined and interdependent governance and makes sense of an inconsistent portrayal on its effects on the policy-making process in the academic literature

Contested from the onset, the EEAS has been established with little control over resources, a heterogeneous and fluctuating staff composition and split portfolios with the Commission. It's hybrid institutional nature has certainly curtailed its actions. Placed in an increasingly transgovernmental, networked environment, the EEAS has, despite contestation, consolidated into an entrenched politico-administrative institution. The EEAS has emerged as 'hub for collective action', and has been able to draw from a variety of different foreign policy fields (Furness & Gänzle, 2016; Bátora, 2013). As 'quasi-diplomatic corps' (Duke, 2012b), this 'organizational hybrid' bridges the gap between the intergovernmental and supranational dichotomy (Balfour, Carta, & Raik, 2015; Carta, 2012; Duke, 2012; 2011:45). It is proposed here that too little attention has thus far been placed on the benefits of its 'interstitial' and composite nature. Its coordinating position must be more closely addressed, with particular attention to its social characteristics.

This chapter will first address ‘the nature of the beast’ by providing a short overview of the EEAS’s tasks, institutional features and its challenging establishment. Second, it will assess the EEAS’s journey from contestation to normalisation and consolidation. Lastly, it will assess the EEAS’s involvement in the EU’s security and defence, disaggregating its role in the policy-making process on the political, policy and administrative level.

II) The ‘nature of the beast’: a challenged politico-administrative institution

The creation of the HR/VP and the EEAS is one of the most innovative features of the Lisbon Treaty. The highly political negotiations around its establishment demonstrate the significance of this body. In itself, the EEAS is only mentioned once, in a subparagraph of the Lisbon Treaty – a sign that conveys its lower legal standing and the intention not to create a new ‘institution’ under EU statute. As a ‘Service’ it should be ‘[a] functionally autonomous body of the European Union, separate from the General Secretariat of the Council and from the Commission with the legal capacity necessary to perform its task and attain its objectives’ (Council of the EU, 2010). However, power struggles established an institution with challenging institutional features, dependent on member states and the Commission’s material resources – negotiated particularly so that the EEAS would not benefit from too much autonomy or power. The lack of financial resources, a highly heterogeneous, fluctuating staff composition and split foreign and security portfolios with the Commission have raised the question of whether it would be able to fulfil its ambitious mandate to ensure coherent and coordinated European external action.

This section addresses the EEAS’s hybrid nature. The EEAS has emerged as a networked institution both inside and outside Brussels. Despite its ‘interstitial’ nature, it has, over time, carved out space and consolidated its position between the Commission and the member states (Bátora, 2013; Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018). Ten years after its institutionalisation, it is entrenched in the multi-level, administrative governance, straddling the duties of an international public administration and a Foreign Ministry. The combination of its tasks and duties are unique and, with the evolution of European foreign policy-making, ever evolving. Its hybrid nature places it at a crossroad, able to draw on practices from a variety of different foreign policy fields, such as diplomacy, development, defence or crisis management (Bátora, 2013; Missiroli, 2016a).

Before assessing how the EEAS has adapted its position based on the challenging institutional features, we will first discuss the ambitious objectives and ambiguous tasks of

the EEAS, and then question how the EEAS has over time consolidated and entrenched its position despite its challenging institutional features.

A. Ambitious mandate, ambiguous tasks

‘In fulfilling his mandate, the HR shall be assisted by a European External Action Service’
(Treaty of the European Union, Article 27(3)).

The mandate defined in the Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service is ambitious, yet vague (Council of the EU, 2010). While the Council Decision does not clearly define any substantive tasks, one derives that the EEAS’s duties span a wide set of responsibilities. The institution’s *raison d’être* is to assist the HR/VP in ensuring consistency in European external action; and, *a priori*, coordinate actors involved in the policy-making process, through ‘supporting’ and ‘cooperative’ activities (Council of the EU, 2010). The EEAS is located at the crux of institutional interdependencies, assisting the High Representative in conducting and formulating policy proposals in CFSP/CSDP, supporting member states in policy and administrative terms and cooperating with the various actors involved to ensure a coherent European external action.

The mandates of HR/VP and EEAS are intrinsically inter-linked. According to the Lisbon Treaty (Article 27(3)), the EEAS shall support the HR/VP in fulfilling its mandate, (1) in conducting the development of the CFSP, including CSDP, (2) in its capacity as President of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and (3) in its role as Vice President of the Commission in charge of coordination of other aspects of the Union’s external action (Council of the EU, 2010 Article 2). Acting ‘under the authority of the HR/VP’, the EEAS shall ensure the coherence between the different areas of the EU’s external action, having the right of initiative in CFSP and CSDP matters (Council of the EU, 2010). The HR/VP’s Cabinet, the Strategic Planning Unit and Inter-Institutional Relations Unit are all anchored in the EEAS’s top echelons. Consequently, by linking the EEAS’s top-echelons with the tri-hatted position of the HR/VP places the EEAS’s top-echelons onto the political level. With 139 EU Delegations across the globe, the EEAS has a wide span of diplomatic ties.

With regards to the EEAS’s tasks and objectives, whilst not spelled out explicitly, they all revert back to the EEAS’s main mandate to ensure the consistency between the different areas of the Union’s external action. The EEAS’s key assignment delineated in the Council Decision is to do this through ‘cooperation’. The EEAS is called to ‘support’, ‘cooperate’ or ‘consult’ with actors involved in the Union’s external action, namely the diplomatic services of the member states, the European Council president and the services of

the Commission (Article 2(2); Article 3). As Balfour and Raik (2013:13) rightfully argue, this mandate places the EEAS in a dilemma. On the one hand, the EEAS is expected to ‘coordinate (...), provide leadership, and develop new ideas and policy entrepreneurship’ (Balfour & Raik, 2013: 13). On the other hand, it is ‘not supposed to challenge national foreign policy, to step on the toes of national diplomacies, or interfere with national priorities and interests’ (ibid).

This complex inter-institutional framework causes significant difficulties as it does not establish a clear hierarchy between actors when it comes to foreign, security and defence matters². Indeed, ‘since the allocation of ‘tasks’ between the EEAS and others external relations players is vague’, frictions are almost inevitable (Blockmans & Hillion, 2013:16). For the EEAS to be able to engage with its mission and for the member states to achieve their wish to be a stronger, more cohesive actor on the world stage, smooth interaction is essential. To understand the success or failure of doing so, it becomes relevant to analyse its cooperation abilities, and by extension its inter-institutional relationships and ability to interlink relevant actors.

Based on these premises, it needs to strike a balance between very different sets of duties. Faced with coordinating and implementing an atypical external policy, its activities straddle political, policy and administrative dimensions. It needs to respond to expectations that are traditionally addressed either by international secretariats or foreign ministries, or, more recently, by defence structures. This is exemplified by its organigram: while the top-echelons are meant to be structured like a ‘Managing Board’ and act like an international public administration, the EEAS is divided in three Directorate Generals (DG), tackling first, economic and global issues, composed of thematic sub-entities, second political affairs which is composed of geographical sub-entities, and third, for Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and crisis response. Thus, its tasks are split between those of an international secretariat (e.g. organising and chairing intergovernmental meetings, drafting preparatory reports, as well as, in some cases, implementing decisions) and tasks which normally concern foreign ministries (e.g. information gathering, strategy development and advising the decision-makers) (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018:146). Addressed in greater detail below, the third pillar for CSDP and crisis response has witnessed the most evolution – most recently to account for the recent surge of new security and defence initiatives that have arisen since the EUGS in 2016. To respond to changing needs and to offer more streamlining and coherence among the European security and defence mechanisms, this DG was restructured in March 2019. It is structured around three sub-divisions that represent the policy, planning and

² For an in-depth legal discussion see Blockmans and Russack (2013: 8ff) and Gatti (2016).

operations strands in security and defence policy. It ‘[resembles] more and more the traditional structure of a Defence Ministry’ (Koops & Tercovich, 2020:294).

B. The EEAS’s establishment: a ‘functionally autonomous body’?

From the outset, the EEAS’s establishment was strongly contested (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018; Pomorska and Vanhoonacker, 2015). As alluded to previously, the hybrid and complex nature of the EEAS is the result of power struggles between EU member states and Commission. Due to very little preparatory work and a lack of clear delineation of competences in the Lisbon Treaty, many procedural and practical uncertainties were built in at its genesis and have persisted throughout the formative years of the EEAS. The precise nature, status, scope and set-up became object of arduous negotiations between these actors soon after the treaty’s ratification. Member states, the Commission and the European Parliament all sought to gain or retain control (Missiroli, 2016a; Koops & Tercovich, 2020:286). While discussed in greater detail elsewhere (Gatti, 2016; Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018; Murdoch, 2012), this section will briefly review the reasons for the power struggle and address the longer-term repercussions on its nature, design and institutional resources.

i. Understanding ‘the original sin’³

The challenging institutional features of the EEAS resulted from time-consuming and arduous negotiations between the twenty-eight member states, the Commission and a tenacious European Parliament (for a detailed analysis see Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018; see also Lequesne, 2015; Spence & Batora, 2015; Spence, 2012). Committing the ‘original sin’, member states and the Commission, with the approval of the European Parliament, established the EEAS as an organisational dependent body with scarce material resources and challenging institutional features (Hillion and Blockmans, 2021:19; Gatti, 2016:103-192; Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018).

The member states created ambiguity surrounding the EEAS’s areas of competence and mission, ‘both as an instrument to keep the door open for autonomous action and as a form of guarantee against further ‘supranationalization’ of the field of foreign policy’ (Balfour, 2015:205). Indeed, one of the major reasons for the Council to institutionalise the EEAS was to strip the Commission from increasing its power. They sought to create a body which would be a Service at their disposal rather than an autonomous institution. The Commission, a ‘well-known self-aggrandisseur’, had for over 60 years continuously built its own ‘External Service’

³ Hillion and Blockmans (2020:19)

(Kelemen, 2002:98). The expansion of the Commission delegations is one example of the gradual expansion of its global reach. The network of delegations that were created by the Commission, and later relocated under the umbrella of the EEAS, was originally built as an effective system of executing project management for external action, such as for development and aid (Spence, 2016: 43; Gatti, 2016:92).

The Commission, however, wielded its leverage by successfully negotiating to keep key external action portfolios, namely for development (DG DEVCO), humanitarian aid (DG ECHO), trade (DG TRADE) and the neighbourhood and enlargement (DG NEAR). As a compromise, however, the Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) Service remained located in the Commission, though still headed by the HR/VP. This incomplete merger of foreign policy portfolios would lead to repeated inter-institutional battles and increased policy complexity (EEAS, 2013). It soured relations from the outset and established an atmosphere of mistrust, which would last for most of the first HR/VP Catherine Ashton's term and significantly hampering the institution's first years (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018). The results of the negotiations on the EEAS's establishment led many to question what the institution's realms of action would be.

ii. A 'functionally' autonomous, yet organisationally dependent body

The majority of publications on the EEAS address issues of the EEAS's 'autonomy' – understandably so, as it was the subject of 'major controversy' during the negotiations around the Council Decision establishing the EEAS (Christoffersen, 2012, Gatti, 2016; Furness, 2016; Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018). While the legal independence of the EEAS is highlighted on numerous occasions in the Council Decision establishing the EEAS, setting out that it is a '*functionally* autonomous body', its actual autonomy has been put into question (Gatti, 2016; Blockmans & Hillion, 2013:6; Furness, 2013). As Blockmans and Hillion's (2013:6) argue, qualifying the autonomy as *functional* raises the question of whether it stands in opposition to being *organisationally* autonomous: "functioning" refers to carrying out its tasks of formulating policy proposals, information-gathering, etc., which the EEAS does autonomously from the Commission, whereas organisation refers to elements such as 1) the Staff and Financial Regulations ..., 2) accountability to the European Parliament, and 3) the fact that it is 'under the authority' of the HR' (ibid). In a similar vein, Gatti (2016) differentiates between the EEAS's *operational* autonomy, i.e., the ability to conduct substantive operations free from external control, and the EEAS's *administrative* autonomy, i.e., the capacity to manage internal issues. With regards to its *administrative* autonomy, it is a 'hybrid', enjoying ample autonomy

to adopt decisions and engage with other bodies in the management of administrative issues, yet constrained as its budget, rules that apply to the EEAS and information security is determined by the Parliament and the Council (Gatti, 2016:139). While a mixed picture arises when it comes to its administrative autonomy, the EEAS can be seen to have some degree of operational autonomy because it has sufficient ‘margin of independence’ (ibid:139, 191).

The functions and tasks with which it has been mandated, coupled with challenging institutional features and scarce resources, lead to a complex picture regarding the EEAS’s abilities to act as a ‘functionally autonomous body’. The Commission retains control over the operational budget, has ownership of major foreign policy portfolios and influence over staffing and nominations of staff (for a detailed analysis see Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018:163). The European Parliament has ‘the weight of political oversight mechanism’ and budgetary control over spending. The member states have significant control over staffing and nominations, setting the budget and retaining the decision-making powers. Over the years, however, it has also become evident that the EEAS has scoped out more leeway for action (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018). Hence, as such the EEAS is ‘sufficiently independent not to be considered as an ‘agent’ of the HR/VP, the Council, or the Commission, yet remains significantly curtailed by its formal structure and limited material resources (Gatti, 2016:190). As a consequence, the EEAS’s ability to effect European external action in a relevant way has been questioned (e.g. Wouters & Duquet, 2012; Smith, 2013; Gatti, 2016, 95ff). Indeed, its ability to play a major role vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council is hindered, because the EEAS relies on other actors for financial or political decision-making and expertise. Three aspects are worth particular attention, namely: the lack of control of material resources, a highly heterogeneous and fluctuating staff composition and lastly, as a consequence of split portfolios and lacking resources, little direct in-house expertise. These factors are decisive on many fronts and deserve further analyses on EEAS’s potential influence.

First, the lack of control over financial resources plays an important role in restricting the EEAS’ scope of action. The resources available are kept in check and closely scrutinised by Member States and/or the Commission and European Parliament. With no control over budgetary resources, the EEAS is therefore often portrayed as institutionally weak and dependent. The EEAS’s own budget amounts to €694.8 million, mainly to cover salaries, running costs, security, and common costs for the EU Delegations (See Figure 2.2 for the evolution of its budget see page 41) (EEAS, 2019a). In 2019, the EEAS total staffing amounted to approximately 4474 people. Of those, 2082 worked in the Headquarters (46,54%) and 2392 in Delegations abroad (53,46%) (EEAS, 2019a). The Delegations are further supplemented with 3797 Commission employees, bringing the total staff for the Delegations

to nearly 6197 people (EEAS, 2019). As former HR/VP Ashton said: ‘in most delegations the staff who are EEAS may be only one. The rest are Commission development people doing fantastic work, but they are not mine’ (quoted in Spence, 2012: 126). By 2019, Commission officials in EU Delegations still significantly outweighed EEAS officials in EU Delegations (See Figure 2.1).

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total staff</i>	<i>HQ</i>	<i>EUD</i>	<i>COM@ EUD</i>
2013	3474	1598	1876	3500
2014	3478	1547	1931	3447
2015	4187	1926	2261	3541
2016	4237	1953	2284	3591
2017	4067	1990	2077	3616
2018	4169	2048	2121	3717
2019	4474	2082	2392	3797

Figure 2.1 Staff Number and Composition of the EEAS (2013-2019)*

While the budget appears to increase, the real costs continue to increase exponentially, especially for the missions of EEAS officials sent abroad (#51). Hence, while the EEAS monitors and implements its own dedicated administrative budget, it remains under sustained pressure to cut. The EEAS has been cutting down especially on geographical desk officials (#74). Financial droughts have shown considerable consequences in terms of staffing and for the communication infrastructure (cf. #1, 27, 71, 74). In other words, ‘it is torn between growing expectations in terms of delivery and constant requests to make savings’ (Hillion & Blockmans, 2021: 19).

Moreover, the EEAS does not have any control over operational resources: on matters of CFSP and CSDP, the European Parliament and member states have the ultimate decision-making powers, while other instruments for external action lie in the hands of the Commission (Missiroli, 2016a: 14,34). Before the 2020 EU budget, the FPI Service managed the CFSP financing tools, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the Partnership Instrument, the election observation missions and several other financial instruments that are all vital for the EU’s capacity to leverage and act on the global stage. It is a ‘service of the European Commission which works alongside the EEAS’, but also ‘reports directly to the [HR/VP] [...] works very closely with the EEAS and with EU

* Source: Annual Activity Reports of the EEAS, respectively (EEAS, 2013b; EEAS, 2014a; EEAS, 2015a; EEAS, 2016a; EEAS, 2017a; EEAS, 2018a; EEAS, 2019a; EEAS, 2020a).

Delegations' (European Commission, 2017). This was ground for confusion and questions on who, in the end, would control and influence the budget allocations. The administrative budget fragmentation and Commission management led to substantial turf battles and more efficient and closer collaboration [between the FPI] and the EEAS was called for (EEAS, 2013a: 9). Evidence suggests that the interaction between the FPI and the EEAS has improved, yet a deeper understanding about the nature of interaction between EEAS officials and FPI officials is lacking since the FPI offices moved to the EEAS Headquarters (#7,33,39). The FPI is very involved in discussions that involve civilian operational questions and they continue to have an important say in contractual and budgetary questions. As recruitment of officials for missions remains with the EEAS, cooperation between the two is needed. While calls to fully integrate the FPI into the EEAS, as suggested by the German Bundestag for instance, would generate important synergies and streamlining between financial instruments (Blockmans & Hillion, 2021:20).

On other external action portfolios, such as financial instruments linked development cooperation or the neighbourhood, the EEAS is bound to the Commission. Regional programmes are prepared jointly, however the status quo continuously challenges the subordination/superiority of one or the other body: the responsibility ultimately remained with the respective Commissioners, but guidelines and programmes are developed in the horizontal units located within the DG for economic and global issues in the EEAS. However, the success of this division of labour is very dependent on the cooperativeness of respective sub-units. An important innovation is the establishment of the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), which has been developed in very close cooperation between the EEAS's top echelons (#70; Blockmans & Hillion, 2021:21). NDICI merges previous financial instruments into one comprehensive instrument under one legal basis, overcoming bureaucratic hurdles, introducing more instruments – and most interestingly offering more space for the EEAS to wield some control over financial spending (#70, Blockmans & Hillion, 2021:20-21). Not yet operational, the tri-logue between the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council is still underway at the time of writing. Despite possible simplification, for the most part, the decision-making on resource allocation for EU external action remains to the most part with other actors with whom the EEAS must engage cooperatively.

Second, the body's composition is highly heterogeneous and witnesses a lot of fluctuation. Both at Headquarters and in the Delegations the staff is highly heterogeneous (Lequesne, 2015a). As decided during the negotiations, EEAS staff must draw its employees not only from the Commission and the General Secretariat, but must also include a

‘meaningful presence’ (i.e. a third of its staff) of Seconded National Diplomats (SNDs)⁵. The heterogeneity of staff leads to heterogeneity of norms, values and motivations amongst colleagues (Duke, 2012; Spence, 2012, 2015). As argued by Juncos and Pomorska (2014), in the EEAS’s early years, the heterogeneous staff composition negatively affects the EEAS’s performance, as no *esprit de corps* developed. A strong *esprit de corps* among EEAS ranks is crucial as it ‘is bound to improve the internal coherence of the new Service as it facilitates internal co-ordination and cross-functional co-operation’ (ibid: 315). Without continued efforts to strengthen the communication, leadership, trust, training and public image, the heterogeneous staff composition would not bode well for the institution’s efficiency and coherence. Henökl (2015) argued that that competing organisational logics within the EEAS may also lead to slightly different decision-making behaviours. He argued that SNDs have more propensity to be member state-oriented, while supranational recruits tend to be more community-minded.

The SNDs and Seconded National Experts (SNEs)⁶ are often perceived to be the ‘Trojan Horses’ of member states. This depiction, however, is somewhat simplistic. Conversations with SNDs/SNEs and EEAS officials note that this interpretation has not been much observed in practice (#21,69,71). Rather it depends on the issue at hand and the level of hierarchy. Not often do the nationalities of SNDs/SNEs coincide with the points of particular interest for a specific member state. From conversations with Commission and EEAS officials, Gatti (2016:185) concludes: ‘MS usually do not send instructions to the EEAS through their officials... Most seconded diplomats are faithful to the EEAS’s mandate.’ Henökl’s (2015: 691) study corroborates that the SND/SNE pay far greater attention to the political signals of the HR/VP, the Commission and the Foreign Affairs Council than their national governments’ political stance. It seems that low-ranking national officials and even heads of divisions ‘get Europeanised’ over time. Of course, if one ‘climbs the hierarchy, the national element augments’ (Commission official, quoted in Gatti, 2016:184). Official at the top have varying degrees of allegiance, depending on their personal inclinations: ‘while some are very European, others are closer to their national administration’ (ibid). Member states have an interest, and will continue to have an interest, in influencing the activity of the EEAS, however they also second officials to boost the EEAS’s performance and reinforce ties between national administrations and European bureaucracies, thus fostering communication channels (Gatti, 2016: 182-183).

⁵ This objective has been reached since 2013. SNDs are seconded for four years, with the possibility to extend their secondment to up to eight years.

⁶ SNEs are experts sent from national ministries of defence and home affairs for four or eight-years and indispensable to conduct CSDP.

Indeed, the diverse group of officials which compose the EEAS are united in their support of the idea of a stronger European voice in the world and believe that the EEAS is the best way to achieve a coherent, effective and legitimate European foreign policy (Juncos & Pomorska, 2013). Despite stark differences between traditional national diplomats and ‘Euro-diplomats’, these diplomats create an epistemic community, sharing attitudes and causal beliefs (Spence, 2012:133; Cross, 2011; Keapuolani & Cross, 2007; Hillion & Blockmans, 2021:19). Thus, while it is true that diversity makes the construction of an internal homogenous culture difficult, this diversity can also add value: it brings know-how, political knowledge and perspectives from the respective member states.

Having addressed the heterogeneity of staff composition – an aspect that also warrants more thorough research – it is relevant to shortly address the concurrent, correlated effect of the high fluctuation of its staff. The consequence of recurrent change in officials is that no institutional memory can be formed. More specifically, the high fluctuation raises doubt as to whether expertise and ‘lessons learnt’ remain with the EEAS. The question of whether the institution can learn is particularly important for crisis management and security and defence issues, where the staff is predominantly composed of SNDs and SNEs.

This leads us to our third point, which is of particular importance when it comes to understanding the potential influence of the EEAS on policy formation: the struggle for the EEAS to establish itself as a knowledge and expert hub. As has been noted by HR/VP Ashton herself: ‘virtually all of the expertise and capacity to manage external aspects of [thematic] policies remained in the Commission services’ (EEAS, 2013a:8). As an issue of particular importance for the EEAS’s ability to shape policies, it is important to distinguish between procedural knowledge, policy-relevant expertise (i.e., subject-matter, technical) and political knowledge (i.e., an understanding of the political sensitivities among policy-makers). There remains little research on the role of expertise and information in the EEAS (for notable exceptions, see Bicchi, 2014a and 2014b; Blom & Vanhoonacker, 2021).

A few different dynamics arise: first, the role of expertise and information is different when it comes to more traditional foreign policy issues, and security and defence matters. Moreover, the staff composition is different to the extent that the EEAS’s DG for CSDP and crisis response is to a large majority composed of seconded officials from member states. The seemingly negative effect on the rotation policy of SNEs is especially dominant in the civilian and military crisis management branch (Blom & Vanhoonacker, 2021:131). As mentioned above, the regular fluctuation has as consequence the difficulty to guard an institutional memory – a recurring issue for the EEAS in civilian crisis management for instance (see pp. 185ff). Without adequate institutional measures lessons learnt and the institution’s memory

comes and goes with SNEs. However, Blom and Vanhoonacker's (2021) study also highlights that the EEAS has proven itself to be 'an expert on experts' (Blom & Vanhoonacker, 2021) – at least in their case study on the use of information by the EEAS's Asia-Pacific geographical desks. Whether the expertise must be located and 'brandmarked into the institutional memory' or whether being 'experts on experts' suffices must be further researched, and will to some extent be addressed in the empirical analyses.

In conclusion, the EEAS started its journey through contestation, which left it with challenging institutional features that are a clear handicap to a coherent European foreign, security and defence policy. The following section will address to what extent this view of the EEAS – dependent on member states and Commission – is still justified a decade since its implementation. Has it been able to position itself in the interstices and bridge the numerous gaps that needed bridging in the EU foreign, security and defence structure? How has it positioned itself and, more importantly, what role has it adopted in the policy-making process given its challenging institutional features? The existing literature extensively elaborates on the institutional factors, but the social characteristics, which would lie at the core of its coordinating duties, have not yet been addressed. Especially considering that its 'core' mandate is to coordinate and implement a coherent European foreign and security policy, the main question is whether the EEAS has the adequate social characteristics to do so. To answer this question, we must analyse its structural position in the system and its relationships with the relevant actors in the decision-making process.

III) Evolution – from contestation to consolidation

Since the EEAS's inauguration on January 1st, 2011, there have been three observable phases of its development. The first was the early stage of intense contestation and competition shortly after its establishment. The second phase represents the couple of years around the 2013 Review on the EEAS, that culminated in several inter-institutional agreements and intra-institutional rearrangements. The third phase describes the current status quo, one in which the EEAS became a consolidated bureaucracy, effectively promoting coherence on an administrative level through coordinating the member states and the Commission's activities (Morgenstern-Pomorski 2018; Gatti, 2016; Henökl, 2014; Bátorá, 2013). Turf battles have mostly given way to routine inter-institutional coordination, yet bureaucratic politics remain. As it is highly relevant to this thesis, particular attention will be paid to the development of the crisis management and CSDP structures.

A. The early years of contestation

In the first couple of years after its establishment, inter-institutional competition hindered the execution of foreign and security policies (Balfour, 2015; Spence, 2012). Several scholars have outlined the strenuous relationship and ardent fight of the Commission vis-à-vis the new body (e.g. Henökl, 2014; Lequesne, 2015). The Commission saw the EEAS as competition, especially in portfolio and budget management, where the major turf battles ensued. The harsh conditions that the Commission created for the EEAS in its early days left a sour aftertaste: the ambiguous framework and the myriad of insecurities left the EEAS staff disillusioned (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018:146).

It was not only relations with the Commission, however, that hampered the EEAS in the early years. Working with the national governments ‘[proved] to be one of the most serious setbacks to the first step of the EEAS’s existence’ (Balfour & Raik, 2013:1). The member state governments, particularly the foreign ministries, reluctantly engaged with the EEAS. A strong concern in academic texts was member states’ ambivalent positions vis-à-vis the EEAS, refraining from delegating competencies and reluctant to hand over competences (Koeth, 2013; Helwig, 2013). Member states fulfilled the same tasks as those delegated to the EEAS, leading to duplication, contradiction and incoherence (Dijkstra, 2017). Consequently, a sense of mistrust by EEAS officials was established vis-à-vis the Commission and Council, challenging inter-institutional relations (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018:187).

With the establishment of the EEAS came the responsibility to find a fitting institutional structure to ensure a more consistent and coherent European crisis management system. Among the first tasks of the HR/VP Ashton, ‘institutionalising the crisis management and crisis response structures stood out as both a persistent and particularly fundamental challenge’ (Koops & Tercovich, 2020:288). The establishment of the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department (CROC) emerged as an important first structure and ‘developed far-reaching institutional innovations’, such as the crisis platform (Koops & Tercovich, 2020:289). While this platform facilitated information-sharing and strongly shaped the coordination and coherence in crisis response by bringing all major actors together, there remained important challenges regarding the institutionalisation of the EEAS in the governance framework. This is also due to the ‘convention-defying’ approach of HR/VP Ashton in establishing and conducting the EEAS and unorthodox leadership of the Crisis Response Department (ibid:286-89). It is in particular the inability to ‘build lasting coalitions with the policy establishment’ and ‘foster strategic relationships in a highly politicised environment’ that further hampered the EEAS’s position in the broader security

governance (ibid:290, 293). Nevertheless, as a first institutional set-up CROC succeeded in linking together dispersed instruments and policy actors and offering a step towards a more coherent foreign and security policy.

B. The 2013 Review: towards normalisation

With the 2013 EEAS Review⁷ and the appointment of the new HR/VP Federica Mogherini, a new phase towards consolidation began. The two-year Review, carried out in 2013, gave time for reflection and engendered a shift in gears; the contestation of the early years started to slowly ebb. A great number of actors in the realms of EU foreign policy criticised the then status-quo. In particular the bad relationship with the Commission struck the deepest cord, for it was mentioned in the European Parliament Review, the European Court of Auditors and by member states. Even the usually-restrained HR/VP Ashton highlighted the intense and recurring turf battles with the Commission as the main impediment to the EEAS's functioning, highlighting the dysfunctional institutional arrangements (European Court of Auditory, 2014; European Parliament, 2013; EEAS, 2013a). Not least because of the intra- and inter-institutional rearrangements that emerged in response to these criticisms, a more collaborative and routine environment emerged which diminished turf battles and thus improved the EEAS's capacity to promote faster cooperation between member states and the Commission (Gatti, 2016).

Intra-institutionally, the lack of horizontal coordination in the early years was detrimental for the effectiveness of the EEAS (Lehne, 2015). To improve its functioning, the incoming HR/VP Mogherini 'initiated a full review of the organisational set-up of the EEAS and sought to identify strengths and weaknesses of the set-up inherited by Ashton' (Koops & Tercovich, 2020:291). Building on Ashton's 2013 Review recommendations, Mogherini initiated the streamlining of top management positions towards a pyramid structure, establishing one Secretary-General position and three Deputy Secretary Generals covering CSDP and crisis response, political affairs, and economic and global issues. Moreover, it established clearer and shorter reporting lines (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018:188; Koops & Tercovich, 2020:292). While it led to an ever steeper ladder in hierarchical terms, EEAS staff noted an improvement in internal decision-making processes (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018:170).

While keeping institutional mechanisms and innovations from Ashton's tenure (e.g. the crisis platform), Mogherini, and her newly appointed Deputy Secretary General for CDSP

⁷ As set out in the 'Council Decision establishing the EEAS', the High Representative carried out a Review on the institution's organisation and functioning (Conucil of the EU, 2010a; EEAS, 2013).

and Crisis Response (DSG) Serrano, revised the crisis management structure. The ‘CSDP universe’ was ‘transferred *en bloc* to the EEAS’ without changing the chain of command, which remained under the intergovernmental purview of member states (Csernaton, 2021:91). Under the authority of the DG for CSDP and crisis response several previously unconnected structures found new positions (for instance the Intelligence Centre, the Security and Conflict prevention directorate). These changes amounted to a consolidation by ‘moving from a structurally semi-attached grouping of units to the level of managing directorate’ (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018:140). It is during this period that the EEAS would emerge as leading actor, spearheading the ‘comprehensive approach to European external action (Koops & Tercovich, 2020; Tardy, 2017c). Taking ownership of coordinating the intergovernmental and community-stands of European foreign policy, the EEAS sought to develop comprehensive responses to external conflicts and crises, specifically bridging the security-development nexus (EEAS & Commission, 2013, 2016). Significant strides were made to improve the efficacy and coherence of the EU’s crisis management and more broadly foreign and security policy (Blockmans & Laatsit, 2012; Tardy, 2017c; Sheriff & Hauck, 2014).

In addition to intra-institutional arrangements, HR/VP Mogherini – contrarily to HR/VP Ashton – relied on appointing advisors that were deeply embedded in the Brusselite foreign and security community, embedding the institution closer to the Commission and the member states (Koops & Tercovich, 2020: 291-292). Familiar with foreign policy circles, Mogherini brought ‘far-reaching personal connections across EU and NATO’ (ibid). While appointing close, trusted advisors to her cabinet, she also: 1) appointed a ‘Commission man’ Stefano Manservigi as Head of Cabinet, 2) placed EEAS officials into central advisory positions, such as German-nationals Oliver Rentschler into the Cabinet and Helga Schmid, who later served as Secretary General and 3) accepted French Diplomat Alain Le Roy as Secretary General (Koops & Tercovich, 2012:292). Her appointments were ‘tactical calculations to retain close strategic links to one of the most important EU member states [and the Commission] and points towards her capacity to build alliances’ (ibid). In contrast to HR/VP Ashton, who had an ‘unorthodox’ approach in establishing and leading the EEAS that often side-lined EU officials’ experience, Mogherini’s leadership approach, both in political and institutional terms, was ‘a return to orthodoxy’ for the EU’s ‘epistemic community’, which eased tensions (ibid: 287-291).

Inter-institutionally, this phase could be described as a *rapprochement* at the political level. Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker wished to integrate the work of the HR/VP more closely with that of the Commission (#64). Mogherini’s voluntary move back into the Berlaymont building, the Commission’s Headquarters, showed her commitment to be more

closely involved in the Commission's external actions. On the administrative level, bureaucratic questions 'subsided over the first period of consolidation as routine operating procedures were established and accepted by the Commission and the EEAS' (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018:173). It took both institutions a couple of years to establish the final 40 page-long 'Working Arrangements between Commission Services and the EEAS in relation to External Relations Issues' (European Commission, 2012). Its focus was purposefully 'rather bureaucratic' and highly technical in nature.

Numerous questions remained open – 'either because answers still needed to be worked out in practice, over time, or because some questions hadn't even been imagined at that moment in time' (Commission official, quoted in Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018: 141) – but it was a big step towards stabilising relations. The Working Arrangements led to the decline of tension and ameliorated the inter-institutional cooperation in the higher and lower echelons. Inter-service groups intensified and cooperation increased. Since then, rare are the occasions where the functioning of the EEAS is hampered by the Commission, yet tensions still arise occasionally (and will continue to do so) on higher political levels (cf. #7,64). Overall, the Commission is seen as more reliable than the Council and member states, yet there remains a high level of mistrust on policy coordination. The relationship is defined by a 'fragile power balance' (Tannous, 2015) and 'co-optition', simultaneously involved in competition and cooperation.

The foreign ministries and European Council have become more accepting of the need to take a back seat, noting the usefulness of the EEAS, especially in coordinating and mediating among member states, both in Brussels and abroad (Johnson, 2013; Balfour & Raik, 2015:33). Mostly aimed at harvesting and increasing the potential of the EEAS, several groups of member states worked to address early instances of inefficiency and contradictions, even if political commitment to common action remained fragile (Balfour & Raik 2013:37). Through early exercises of division of labour, foreign ministries and the EEAS worked on burden-sharing arrangements and strategies to avoid duplication and rationalisation of services (Balfour & Raik, 2015: 33). Whereas the member states remain categorically opposed to increasing the EEAS's resources, there have been signs of willingness to work towards building economies of scale, especially through making better use of the network of EU Delegations (ibid:39). Member states more generally started to approve of the EEAS's ambition to forge an overarching strategic foreign policy (cf. #4,5,27) and have especially seen the benefit of the new role of EU Delegations abroad (Johnson, 2013; Austermann, 2014).

In sum, the intra- and inter-institutional changes incited after the 2013 Review moved the EEAS, and the EU foreign and security governance system more generally, towards a

more unified structure (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018:9). It started to establish itself as an ‘autonomous administrative organisation’ (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018:160) capable of adding value to the policy making process.

C. The current status quo: a consolidated institution

Not only is the EEAS now an integral part of an executive administrative structure, but it has also consolidated its standing as a ‘self-interested organisation’ and a ‘coordinating actor’. After nearly a decade of ‘institutional adaptation’, the EEAS and the crisis management structures have ‘reached a stable form’ (Gatti, 2016; Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018; Koops & Tercovich, 2020:296). It succeeded in carving out its own space, increase its budget and establish crisis management and response as core thematic focuses. As a member state representative described: ‘we have to come to grips with the idea that [we have created an institution that] to a certain extent will expand its competences and capabilities’ (citation by delegates in Chelotti, 2015:25).

It has become increasingly evident that the EEAS, now a consolidated bureaucracy, delineates and even expands its grounds for action. According to Morgenstern-Pomorski (2018:136-144) and in line with standard assumptions of bureaucratic behaviour, where internal characteristics and processes are the driving forces behind the bureaucracy’s functioning, the EEAS has aimed to maximise its budget, restructured its institutional set-up and defined and pursued priorities. Despite general opposition of member states and an originally much lower budget proposal by the Commission, the organisation has continuously managed to increase its budget (see Figure 2.2). While it is unclear whether there will be a sustained expansion of its budget, ‘it is mainly of importance that the organisation has tried to obtain it and succeeded against the explicit wishes of some stakeholders’ (ibid:138). Other studies corroborate the expanding powers of the EEAS. Henökl and Trondal’s (2013:21) work highlights the almost ‘strategic investment’ that is given to the EP’s perceptions of the EEAS’s added-value. The EEAS has worked towards ‘[acquiring] desirable tasks and [shedding] undesirable ones’ by adopting the HR’s preferences for the organisation’s structure, more specifically the focus on crisis management structures (ibid:139; Tercovich, 2014). This will become particularly evident in our empirical analyses: there has been a slow progression towards strengthening the EEAS’s crisis management and CSDP functions over the more traditional diplomatic functions under HR/VP Mogherini. This has been visible not least through a shift in resource allocation: geographical desks have been under sustained pressure to cut costs, yet the CSDP division personnel has continued to grow (#37,74).

<i>Budget (million €)/year</i>	<i>EEAS HQ</i>	<i>EEAS DEL</i>	<i>Total (% increase on previous year)</i>
2011	188	276.1	464.1
2012	184.1	304.5	488.6 (+5.3%)
2013	195.81	312.95	508.76 (+4.1%)
2014	212.9	305.7	518.6 (+1.9%)
2015	218.9	383.9	602.8 (+ 16.2% – incl. COM transfers)
2016	222.7	413.4	636.1 (+5.5%)
2017	236.7	423.3	660 (+3.8%)
2018	249.7	428.8	678.5 (+2.8%)
2019	249.7	445.1	694.8 (+2.4%)
2020 (draft)			731.1 (+5.2)

Figure 2.2 EEAS budget (2011 - 2020)^s

The EEAS established increasingly routinized relations with all actors. As steadfast ally, the EEAS has cooperative links with the European Parliament – a relation that is increasingly solicited (#24; Spence, 2016:40; Gatti, 2016:178; Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018:175ff). Relations with the Council Secretariat have also normalised – an important relationship considering the role the Rotating Council Presidencies continues to play in foreign, security and defence matters (ibid). Also coordination with the foreign ministries improved: at the lower echelons, collaboration was reported in overall positive terms; even abroad, diplomats have noted the betterment of coordination through the new roles of EU Delegations (Johnson, 2013; Bueger, 2016; Austermann, 2014). The EEAS is more *à l'écoute*, aiming to bring added value to European diplomacy, and working towards facilitating member states meetings. Still, trust remains to be strengthened (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018). With regards to the relationship between the Commission and the EEAS, both institutions have become intricately bound through procedural processes, ever more so since the implementation of the ‘comprehensive’ and, more recently, the ‘integrated’ approaches. The integrated approach called for closer cooperation on internal and external security issues and was pushed forward in the EU Global Strategy.

To better facilitate crisis response and management, further institutional restructuring of the security and defence division occurred in December 2015 and again in March 2019. The main changes to the crisis management procedures in CSDP pushed to anchor further the ‘comprehensive’ and introduce an ‘integrated’ approach to security policy

^s Data drawn from Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018:137, for the years 2011-2016; the following years are drawn from the respective Annual Activity Reports (EEAS, 2016a; EEAS, 2017a; EEAS, 2018a; EEAS, 2019a).

– the latter of which was high on the HR/VP’s agenda (Koops & Tercovich, 2020:294). Measures included closer alignment and harmonisation of civilian and military planning processes so as to compress timing and streamline planning, coordinating and operational capacities. In accordance with priorities set out in the EUGS (see page 93), the EEAS readjusted its manpower according to its needs. Most notably there has been an increase in manpower devoted to the ‘integrated approach’, defence policies and instruments, at the expense of personnel working at geographical desks (#64; Debuysere & Blockmans, 2019). Rationalising various crisis management tools, a division for ‘Prevention of Conflicts, Rules of Law/Security Sector Reform, Integrated Approach, Stabilisation and Mediation’ (PRISM) was established in January 2017 and anchored under the direct authority of the DSG for CDSP and Crisis Response (Koops & Tercovich, 2020:293).

This sub-unit aimed to improve the coordination of the relevant policies and tools across the organisations to foster an integrated foreign and security policy, meaning strengthening prevention and mediation in crisis management and bridging the internal-external security nexus. An important part of PRISM was the establishment and coordination of the ‘Guardians of the Integrated Approach’, a working group between EEAS and Commission officials who sought to enhance the operational capacity of an integrated approach to external conflict. In March 2019, PRISM was upgraded to a fully-fledged Directorate Integrated Approach for Security and Peace (ISP) responsible for crisis response and planning and increased from 30 to 90 staff (Debuysere & Blockmans, 2019). ISP was established in parallel to the ‘policy pillar’, the Directorate Security and Defence Policy (SecDefPol), which relates to all matters of security and defence, most notably the PESCO, counter-terrorism and security partnerships. Crucially both these pillars are headed under the same Director and Managing Director, meaning that ‘it will no longer be necessary to turn to an over-solicited Deputy Secretary General in order to engage in intra-service deconfliction’ (ibid). This restructuring was significant to streamline intra-institutional and inter-institutional coordination, yet crucially aimed to strengthen the EEAS’s position vis-à-vis increasingly assertive Commission (#9,38,43).

To summarise, the pursuit of a comprehensive and integrated approach has increasingly intertwined the work of the Commission and the EEAS. Both of these approaches have been accompanied by institutional changes. Several scholars note the important progress in linking relevant players within the EU apparatus since the implementation of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ and thus moving past simply being a “paper-tiger” – ‘the articulation of policies and the use of multiple instruments to facilitate coordination and synergies between activities across policy areas is now part of the policy mantra’ (Faria, 2014:

5; Sheriff & Hauck, 2014). Tardy (2017:2) notes: ‘inter-agency coordination has never been as institutionalised and tangible as it is today, despite all the well-known structural difficulties’. Continuously adapting its institutional framework has allowed for faster and more effective coordination mechanisms, which have led to the increase of efficient coherence and cooperation between actors. As this thesis will address, in an evolving governance framework, the EEAS has also adapted to the shifting governance by anchoring itself closer to the European Council, strengthening its ties to capitals, and albeit less frequently, circumventing the Political-Security Committee (see also Maurer & Wright, 2021).

While the EEAS’s contestation has not fully subsidized – and most likely never will as the EU foreign, security and defence structures continue to evolve – it has established itself as a politico-administrative institution. Through its consolidation it has entrenched itself into the networked, multi-levelled governance. The EEAS has emerged as a networked actor able to act as ‘hub for collective action’ and increasingly expanding its reach into Commission grounds through the comprehensive and integrated approach (Bachmann, 2016; 2017). Relations and interactions lie at the core of its mandate. As the interest of this thesis is about the EEAS’s effect on the policy-making process, let us shift our attention towards its involvement in the policy-making process. What consequences do these developments have on the role of the EEAS, its policy impact and potential influence?

IV) The locus of and means for influence in the policy-making process

Let us first briefly address how the literature treats the EEAS’s impact and possible influence on the policy-making process. The few studies that provide insight into the EEAS’s actual effect on the policy-making process can be roughly categorised into three bodies: first, rational choice institutionalist or principal-agent analyses; second, public administration scholars; and third, practice-based approaches. Whether portraying the EEAS as a rational (Furness, 2013; Henökl, 2014, 2015) or social body (Lequesne, 2015; Bueger, 2016), studies question whether the EEAS can be a decisive player in the policy-making process. There is an overarching agreement that the EEAS’s capacity to engender policy change will differ from one policy area to another due to formal and informal institutional factors having a restraining impact on its capacity to act.

However, rather than honing in on when and how the EEAS impacts, and possibly influences policies, studies question the extent to which the EEAS is able to act vis-à-vis its institutional constraints. Principal-agent theorists, for instance, argue that the EEAS is ‘tightly controlled’ by the member states and that the EEAS’s potential, especially in CSDP,

is 'very limited', playing 'no agency role' (Kostanyan, 2016: 26; Furness, 2013:123; see also Kostanyan & Orbie, 2013; Henökl, 2014, 2015 and for an empirical application Nováky, 2015). Others studies have highlighted the EEAS's emergence as a consolidated, self-interested 'decision-shaper', such as in the case of the EUNAVFOR anti-piracy mission (Papaioannou, 2018:101). Indeed, case studies using bureaucratic or practice-based approaches have provided insights into specific instances where the EEAS has indeed been able to shape policies. Concrete examples of where the EEAS was able to play a determinant role in steering policy direction include surprisingly cases in security policies.

Bueger (2016) and Papaioannou (2018) provided insight on how EEAS officials emerged as core actors in the field of counter-piracy practice. Bueger (2016) delineates how the EEAS pro-actively engaged and asserted itself as a leader in the EUNAVFOR mission in Somalia. Brandenburg (2017) study on EU mediation in Myanmar argues that the ultimate outcomes in policy-making was the result of innovative thinking, where a small group of EEAS officials shifted the focus of the problematisation of the country's developments by prioritising the ethnic conflict and aimed to engage Burmese officials in the conflict mediation, while still working within the political rationality of the Comprehensive Framework towards Myanmar that had been decided by the Council (ibid:12; Cooper, 2017). These findings stand in opposition to the principal-agent theorists' claim that the EEAS has 'no agency role' in CSDP (Furness, 2013:121). Principal-agent theorists neglect the increased institutional interdependencies and intertwinements that have arisen in the last couple of decades. This approach has indeed been criticised for not sufficiently taking into account 'agency', especially those of 'de novo bodies' in the EU framework, such as the EEAS or other specialized agencies (Brickerton et al. 2015; Delreux & Adriaensen, 2017). International Public Administration literature, however also has limitations, neglecting the political pressures dynamics behind bureaucratic action. These approaches also do not provide for a holistic understanding, neglecting the an administrative, multi-level and networked governance framework, which has been accompanied with rise of transgovernmentalism.

Thus, insights thus far do not provide us with a systematic understanding on the EEAS role, extent of policy impact, and possible influence. In part this is due to the gap in the literature, in part due to conflicting approaches in understanding the EEAS's leeway for action. and in part due to a shift in policy-making dynamics and continuously evolving duties of the EEAS. This section aims to systematize the EEAS's involvement in the policy-making process and delineates first insights into its role, impact and potential influence. Disaggregating the EEAS's involvement on the political, policy and administrative level, this section argues that the EEAS can (co-)steer policies' direction through political leadership or

high-level entrepreneurship on the political level, and shape policies, processes and/or outcomes through their policy/administrative involvement.

A. The EEAS acting on a political, policy and administrative level

The EEAS is involved at all stages of the policy cycle. Building on the conceptualisation of a politico-administrative institution supporting the HR/VP, the EEAS is involved in EU foreign, security and defence policy-making on three levels: the political, the policy and the administrative level.

At the political level, the HR/VP, the EEAS's Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-Generals (DSG) interact with Foreign Ministers and Defence/Security Policy Directors (DPD/ SPD), respectively. The HR/VP may set important political incentives in steering the 'doctrinal'/strategic outlook, orienting and framing the strategic discussion through its tri-hatted position (Morillas, 2011; see Edited Volume by Amadio Viceré, Tercovich & Carta, 2020). While limited to CFSP and CSDP, the EEAS supports the HR/VP's right of initiative. In its supporting role to implement the HR/VP's mandate, the EEAS is able to 'proactively generate novel policy ideas, notably in line with the coherence mandate' (Article 18(4) TEU; Article 2 EEAS Council Decision). This has been used sparingly – the most well-known example being the HR/VP's initiative to launch the process around drafting the EUGS – or, more interestingly, proposing the European Peace Facility, an off-budget fund to finance operations that have military or defence implications. Several actors, including the HR/VP, the Cabinet and the (Deputy-)Secretary-Generals are well positioned to place issues high on the agenda (Dijkstra, 2013; Mérand et al. 2010, 2011).

At the policy level, EEAS officials are involved in policy formulation, negotiation and implementation. During the policy's consolidation stages, when policy documents and council text are drafted, it provides procedural, political and policy-relevant expertise. This expertise needs to match member states' political expectations. An often overlooked aspect of the EEAS's abilities is its 'participative rights' in policy shaping in all areas of EU external action (including environment, energy policy, etc.), based on its involvement in providing preparatory material (Blockmans & Hillion, 2013:10, 13). In practice, this may be quite crucial with regards to the EEAS's ability to influence policies, especially due to its interstitial position. We observe the materialisation of this participation in various ways, for instance, through the increased use of Joint Communications between the Commission and the EEAS (Ondarza & Schler, 2017; Van Vooren, 2012). The implementation stage, when not delegated to member states, also relies on the EEAS officials' policy and administrative functions.

The policy level is closely interrelated with the administrative level. The EEAS officials shape policies by managing the procedural dimension of the negotiating and implementation stages, chairing intergovernmental discussions in the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Politico-Military Group (PMG) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom) and drafting policy texts.




Figure 2.3 The three levels for policy influence by the EEAS

B. The EEAS in security and defence policy-making

The institutional set-up of European security and defence has drastically evolved since the Cologne European Council in June 1999, where the European Security and Defence Policy, the precursor of CSDP, was established. Since, member states have been envisaging ‘autonomous action backed up by credible military capabilities and appropriate decision-making bodies’ (European Council, 1999b:37). Historically reluctant to integrate defence, as the states’ most sovereign area, the development of CSDP has been focussed on creating crisis response tools, rather than defence capabilities. In Tardy’s (2018:119) words, ‘[European] security and defence has in practice turned into an over-dominant security track and a parallel under-developed defence track’ (for detailed analyses about CSDP’s evolution see Smith, 2004; Howorth, 2007, 2014; Grevi, Helly & Keohane, 2009; Moser, 2020). Hence, while crises management structures developed – as seen above, spearheaded by the EEAS – actual capabilities have remained with member states. The previous section provided insights of the EEAS’s position in and impact on the changing European security governance. This section

will aim to discern more clearly the EEAS's role in the current security and defence policy-making process.

It has become discernible in the previous section that as European security and defence policy evolved, so too did the EEAS's role – moving past the sole focus on the civilian and military crisis management tools of CSDP, towards coordinating a more comprehensive and integrated approach. More recently, significant strides on strengthening the EU's security and defence have been made. Following institutional and policy developments of the EU Global Strategy, renewed impetus was given to strengthen European capabilities mechanisms. Next to developing the institutional set-up, by implementing PRISM for the integrated approach or creation an (non-executive) military Headquarter (MPCC), renewed impetus was given on two policies in particular. Tackling civilian and military capabilities and operationality, member states established the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in December 2017 and the Civilian CSDP Compact (CCC) in November 2018. Both these policies in their own right aimed to strengthen member states' military and civilian capabilities, and develop harmonisation and interoperability of European forces. Despite the EEAS's central position in the European institutional set-up, little attention has been given to its role in the development of these policies – a gap we aim to address in this thesis.

The EEAS has similar duties in foreign, security and defence matters – administratively and in coordinating the actors. There remains an a few important differences, however, in security and defence matters, including the technical nature of deliberation, different policy-making dynamics among member states because of the salient and sensitive nature of the policies and the fact that resources allocation is predominantly under the prerogative of member states and has remained scarce. Just like in foreign policy matters, the EEAS sits at the centre of CSDP's institutional set-up, and is involved on the political, policy and administrative level. As mentioned, it chairs all intergovernmental committees that discuss matters pertaining to CSDP, namely ministerial foreign and defence meetings, the PSC, and its supporting working groups the PMG and CivCom. All dossiers from the PSC pass, often pro forma, through the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which is supported by the Council's Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX), who deals on all legal and financial matters (Grevi, Helly & Keohane, 2009). With the creation of Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) in 2009 (now merged into the new ISP Division), the EU Military Staff (EUMS) in 2001 and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity (CPCC) in 2009 the preparation and drafting of planning documents for CSDP were delegated to European bureaucracies. Their role is to propose options for EU

action in international crises by leading the crises management procedures (for detailed explanation see Lintern, 2017).

Specifically with regards to the military-defence architecture, the highest military body, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) comprises member states' Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) and provide the HR/VP and the PSC with military advice. The EUMC is supported by the EUMS. The EUMS is under the direct authority of the HR/VP, yet works under the direction of the EU Military Committee. It is officially part of the EEAS, but is situated in an independent, secured building. It is the source of military expertise within the EEAS and manages all military components of CSDP administratively. The Requirement Catalogue by the EUMS aims to offer a detailed list of requirements of what capabilities are needed to be able to carry out differing European military missions. These are structured according to five scenarios that range from small interventions to large-scale peace keeping missions (#11).

Lastly, since its creation in 2004 the European Defence Agency (EDA) has developed into a significant actor in the field as it has emerged as an expertise and knowledge hub. The EDA's aim was to 'enhance coherence among EU Member States in military production and operation under a common framework on defence and security' and was hence 'considered a rather important step in the future development of European military resources' (Violakis, 2018:174). This aim translates into a focus on the development of defence capabilities; the promotion and enhancement of European armaments cooperation; the strengthening of the European defence, industrial, and technological base; the creation of a competitive European defence equipment market; and research aimed at leadership in strategic technologies for future defence and security capabilities (ibid; European Union, 2004).

With the creation of the ISP and SecDefPol Division in March 2019, the EEAS is now more than ever positioned to tackle not only military and civilian dimension of CSDP, but also entrench a more coherent foreign, security and defence policy, etching the intergovernmental and community-oriented strands of EU external action closer together. The institutional rearrangement in March 2019 established closer links between ISP, as strategic planners of a comprehensive, integrated security and defence policy and SecDefPol, who act as policy planners and experts. The CPCC, as the Operational Headquarters for all civilian CSDP missions, counts a total of 80 staff in Brussels, and around 2 000 staff in the field (EEAS, 2019c). As an operational Headquarter, CPCC delineates the Operations Commander for civilian missions, issues instructions, provides advice and technical support and recruits field personnel (Moser, 2020:68). With CPCC and the EUMS, the EEAS houses policy officers who act as expert bureaucracies. On the premise that the EEAS acts intra-institutionally cohesively, this give it the opportunity to connect the dots between a

heterogeneity of political and institutional influences and introduce innovative policy solutions due to their unique overview (cf. Csernaton, 2021; Bátor 2013).

With the rise of bureaucratic institutional developments in security and defence, scholars called to reassess the impact of ‘supranational’ EU officials on a domain that has remained intergovernmental for decades. Studies highlighted the administrative impact that EEAS officials may play in ESDP (Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra & Maurer, 2010) in civilian CSDP (Bossong & Benner, 2010) and in CSDP more generally (Dijkstra, 2013, 2014). Their administrative capacities and in particular their informational advantage as well as the development of expertise sheds light on EEAS officials’ ability to shape policies. Information is indeed a crucial resource in policy-making.

The EEAS has emerged as an information hub in foreign policy more generally, but over time also in the development of expertise in security matters. Through a wide reach of networks from EU Delegations, field missions and (often forgotten) Seconded National Experts or Diplomats, the EEAS has been capable of gathering, processing and sharing information, ultimately creating ‘European knowledge’ (Bicchi, 2012, 2014; Dijkstra & Vanhoonacker, 2011: 12). Blom & Vanhoonacker (2015:20) argue that ‘informational asymmetries resulting from the interplay between Brussels branch and its external delegation will lend the EEAS opportunities for informal, yet substantial policy influence’. In line with these findings, Blom and Vanhoonacker further add that the ‘EEAS accumulates its expertise from a wide scope of sources ranging from member states, [non-governmental organisations], think tanks, academics and last but not least the European Commission’ (ibid:135). Blom and Vanhoonacker’s (2021:138) case study on the expertise of the EEAS’s Asia-Pacific department offers another surprising assessment that ‘the EEAS is indeed able to perform as an expertise driven organisation’. However, they do not ‘own’ expertise. They are rather ‘experts on experts’ – able to identify sources that can complement gaps in their knowledge and translate those into politically relevant information (ibid:137). They know where subject matter can be sourced, and are effectively ‘experts on experts’ (ibid:139).

Previous assessments on the EEAS had emphasised its inability to draw on expertise, either due to its youth or due to being outmatched by member states information gathering tools and the Commission’s expertise. Indeed, these analyses, however, relied on a too narrow understanding of ‘information’. Rather than relying on technical or ‘policy-relevant’ expertise, it is especially important to address its political knowledge and procedural expertise, which relies on a comprehensive, integrated overview of EU external action. Considering the above-mentioned challenges of retaining expertise in the EEAS, specifically in the security and defence realms, it will be of particular interest for us to assess the role of information and

expertise in our analysis. This thesis' findings highlights that the EEAS's strength lies in their procedural expertise and political knowledge and their ability to seek out policy-relevant expertise.

For Dijkstra (2013:11-12), reasons for influence by EU officials in security and defence is the informational advantage in terms of policy-relevant, procedural and political expertise, as well as 'strong content expertise in civilian crisis management compared to member states'. He goes on to argue that due to the EU officials' 'position' and 'content expertise', they 'exert substantial influence in the shaping of the agenda', in particular having more influence in the civilian than military stream (ibid:12). This assessment about EU officials' extent of influence in security and defence was done prior to the EEAS and refers to Council Secretariat officials that moved to the EEAS. Interestingly, our findings on the EEAS's influence on the Civilian CSDP Compact (CCC) only partially coincide with Dijkstra's (2013) findings. Whilst the officials have indeed been able to offer some procedural, political expertise relevant for drafting the CCC, their influence has been curtailed because of conflicting interests between EEAS sub-units (see pages 184ff).

On the administrative level, the EEAS derives much power from its chairing and agenda-setting powers. Through its secretarial functions, it can play a consequential role in the facilitation or hindrance in the policy-making process. As a politico-*administrative* institution, whose major task is to act as a 'semi/hybrid' international secretariat, the EEAS administrative capabilities remain an important additional variable to consider, as they remain the single most used mechanism for shaping the processes and content of policies. By purposefully managing the policy process administratively, the EEAS is enabled to influence the process in accordance with its preferences. Its administrative duties allow it to set parameters such as timing of meetings, time allocated to speakers, when to cut off the speakers list and so forth. Moreover, supporting EEAS officials draw up reports and analyses, which significantly affect the baseline of discussion during policy drafting. As of late, they have also been delegated more responsibilities with regards to holding member states accountable by following up on the implementation of policies. As will be elaborated on in our empirical analyses, this is the case in PESCO and the CCC; member states progress is monitored and assessed by the EEAS. In short, the EEAS may significantly facilitate or hinder the policy-making process through these administrative capabilities.

Thus, we can derive two conclusions. First, the EEAS's roles in security and defence are derived 1) on the political level, from and in conjunction with the HR/VP's right of initiative and leadership, 2) on the policy level, from its interstitial, coordinative position, whereby it

reconnects and repurposes policy-relevant, political and procedural information and 3) on the administrative level, from its administrative duties.

Second, when assessing the EEAS's influence in the policy-making process, for foreign, security and defence policy-making alike, it is not sufficient to place sole focus on formal institutional restraints. When assessing an institution's effect on policy development, formal capabilities and material resources are indeed decisive on many fronts. There is little doubt that the statutory powers and formal institutional resources of the EEAS matter – there is disagreement, however, on the extent to which these are determinant, enabling or constraining features of the EEAS's ability to influence policies. Now firmly entrenched in the public administration and public policy literature, assessing an institution's 'formal' autonomy does not translate into its *de facto* autonomy (Yesilkagit & van Thiel, 2008). Hence, while the extent of its influence can depend on formal institutional capabilities and material resources, it is proposed here that these are not the defining features of the EEAS's policy influence. Rather than seeing its hybrid, interstitial position solely as a handicap, this thesis looks at the social characteristics and capabilities of the EEAS, specifically through assessing the use of its networks and relationships.

Relying solely on institutional factors is not sufficient. Based on the understanding of the EEAS being embedded in a transgovernmental, networked governance (see pages 17-19), this thesis argues that to understand the extent of influence of the EEAS we must grasp its inter-institutional relations. This thesis proposes that the EEAS's policy impact and potential influence depends on the interaction dynamics and, specifically, on how the EEAS is able to mobilise and use its networks, which emanate from its interstitial position. Especially in an environment that is defined by transgovernmental networks, it becomes relevant to analyse relational capital of the EEAS, meaning the competences it derives from its networks and relations. Thus far understudied, this thesis argues that to understand the EEAS's role, impact and potential influence, we must address its embeddedness and use of networks within the multi-level, increasingly informally networked governance. How to theorise this, and assess influence through the EEAS's relational capital, will be the focus of the next chapter.

V) Conclusion

Our understanding on the EEAS's impact and possible influence is still limited. The majority of studies have honed in on the challenging institutional features, but have not assessed how these affect the EEAS's role and the extent of its influence throughout the policy-making process. A now consolidated politico-administrative institution, the EEAS has grown into an

actor that has at times successfully impacted the foreign, security and defence policy-making process. The few studies have not, however, given us sufficient insight into what role and effect the EEAS has truly adopted. A decade after its institutionalisation is an opportune time to address this gap.

On the political level, the HR/VP and senior EEAS officials can contribute through their right of initiative and agenda-setting powers. With regards to the extent of influence the EEAS exerts on the policy and administrative level, past reviews offer a mixed picture. On the one hand, it lacks 'in-house expertise'. On the other, it has become a hub of European knowledge in that it is the 'expert on experts' (Blom & Vanhoonacker;2012; Bicchi, 2014a). Moreover, due to a lack of *esprit de corps*, the EEAS's ability to act as one to pursue policy goals concertedly is in question. It has become evident that its administrative duties give the EEAS the administrative capabilities to facilitate and hinder the process, as well as impacting the process through drafting reports and chairing roles. Are these capabilities sufficient for purposefully and sustainably steering and shaping policies developments? For this, we lack a sufficiently robust, systematic empirical understanding of the role and effect the EEAS plays at the policy initiation, consolidation/negotiation and implementation stages.

As this thesis aims to answer to what extent, when and how the EEAS is able to exert policy influence in security and defence matters, it becomes relevant to question what influence means in this context - a context where disaggregating a sole actors' influence is barely feasible because of the interconnectedness of many actors. The next chapter aims to offers a conceptual and theoretical discussion on how policy influence by the EEAS can be understood. What explains greater or lower policy influence? What enables or constraints an institution's ability to steer and shape policies' direction?

Chapter 3 - Theorising the EEAS's conditions for influence

I) Introduction

It is particularly challenging to assess the extent of an actor's impact and its influence in a multi-level, networked environment. This thesis introduces an underutilised yet highly relevant approach to studying the EEAS's influence in the transgovernmental, multi-level context of EU foreign policy: drawing from network theory it argues that the EEAS's ability to exert policy influence lies in its relational capital, i.e. the capabilities and resources it derives from its network. Relational approaches focus on interaction patterns and social ties that concatenate, aggregate and disaggregate dynamic organisational structures, at the same time as they shape individuals' behaviour, affect the flows of communications and are moved by power relations (Tilly & Goodin, 2009: 438-439). Based on this approach, this chapter first addresses *why and how* the EEAS exerts policy influence. This is achieved by examining the means through which the EEAS can influence policies, with 'influence' defined as intentionally steering and shaping policies to affect the development and/or outcome of policies themselves. Second, it aims to explain *the extent to which* and *what enables or constrains* the EEAS's ability to shape and steer policies, embedding the relational capital argument in the broader politico-administrative context.

Juxtaposing the EEAS's formal powers and material capital with its relational capital, this chapter makes the case that the EEAS's relational capital is more conducive to grasping the extent of and conditions for its influence, unveiling the multi-faceted roles the EEAS adopts throughout the policy-making process. This approach argues that to grasp the ability of the EEAS to shape and steer, one must analyse: 1) the EEAS's embeddedness in the policy network governance and 2) how it uses its network's reach. In other words, influence derived from an institution's relational capital is linked to two aspects: first, the capabilities drawn from its position in the network structure, and second, the resources drawn based on the nature of its relationship with other actors. The latter depend on the quality of the networks and the networks' utilisation. Analysing how networks are used is important as it highlights whether, and if so how, the EEAS's relational capital is used to yield information and trust. The EEAS may leverage intangible (relationally derived) assets to do so, namely human and social capital. Hence, on the one hand, the reach of the EEAS's networks in a policy's network

governance portrays the extent of influence it can have. On the other hand, networks are also the medium through which the EEAS affects policy dynamics. The communication flow during the policy-making process is strongly affected by the relational capital of the EEAS; it becomes relevant to assess whether and how it mobilises and wields relational capital to steer and shape policy direction.

As elaborated in the last chapter, the EEAS steers and shapes policies on three levels: the political level, the policy level and the administrative level (page 45). On the political level, the EEAS's top echelons, jointly with the High Representative, can set important incentives by articulating visions, developing interests, and pursuing them strategically through the institutional tools at its disposal (Schroeder, 2014). On the policy level, the embeddedness of the EEAS in the policy network governance may define whether it can play a brokering or mediating role, mobilising its human and social capital to its advantage. By purposefully using its human and social capital with and among member states it can shape political content or decision-making dynamics. Lastly, on an administrative level, it can use its administrative role of chairing, agenda-setting and drafting reports to manage, hinder or facilitate the administrative process of policymaking. The constellation of when and how the EEAS uses these relational capabilities and resources explains the variation in policy influence.

The chapter is structured as follows: The first section offers conceptual clarity on how policy influence is defined. The second section explains the means for policy influence by introducing the relational capital argument, developing how the EEAS's embeddedness in the policy network governance and the use of its networks affects the extent of influence it can have. The third section empirically illustrates how the composition of relational capabilities and resources enable or constrain the EEAS's ability to steer and shape policies.

II) Defining and assessing policy influence in a multi-level governance framework

Why is an actor able to influence a policy, i.e. able to purposefully steer and shape a policy to such an extent that its development and/or outcome is affected? What enables or constrains an actor's influence on policy formation or implementation? The vast, often overlapping literatures of European Foreign Policy Analysis, (International) Public Administration and public policy analysis, have grappled with these questions for decades, identifying a myriad of factors that affect the (European) foreign policy-making processes on a micro, meso or macro level and reasons why an actor (be it an individual, bureaucracy or an institution) can exert influence. This section assesses firstly, how policy influence, specifically by a politico-

administrative institution such as the EEAS, can be understood, and secondly how it can be assessed in a multi-level, transgovernmental governance framework.

A. Defining influence as purposefully seeking policy change

For the EEAS, influence means having the ability to purposefully steer and shape policies to such an extent that the policies' development and/or outcome is affected. The definition deviates from most definitions that conceptualise influence as 'autonomous action'⁹, meaning an actor's 'ability to translate its preferences into authoritative actions, without external constraints' (Maggetti & Verhoest, 2014: 239; Maggetti, 2007; Verhoest et al., 2004). Building on a principal-agent approach, Furness's (2013:104) study on the EEAS's ability to act autonomously defines its influence as being able to 'take decisions that may restrict the freedom of other actors in the system to pursue their own interest'.

Due to the specific nature of EU's foreign policy and the EEAS's mandate to ensure a coherent and coordinated foreign policy, it is not advisable to start from the premise that the EEAS would act autonomously. EU policies often emerge as compromises; they are the result of an iterative, transboundary negotiation process. Similarly, the EEAS's influence must be understood as a dynamic process, rather than an outcome *per se*. The EEAS's influence is placed on a continuum, oscillating between outright influence and mere policy impact. Both concepts of 'policy influence' and 'policy impact' are elusive. They have been defined in numerous ways and at times used interchangeably. As a politico-administrative institution, the EEAS's involvement with secretarial functions 'implies that the structures, rules, interests and characteristics of those working in these administrative bodies have an independent effect on the policy substance' (Eckhard & Ege, 2016: 969). The institution has been *impactful* if it has affected a policy generally through its involvement as a supporting secretarial or bureaucratic actor. The institution has exerted *influence* if it has cohesively and intentionally pursued the policy change, sustained the pursuit over a long period of time, and significantly affected the policy's content or outcome.

Intra-institutional cohesiveness in the pursuit of policy preferences

Policy influence is correlated with preference formation (Bauer & Ege, 2016; Maggetti & Verhoest, 2014; Carpenter, 2001). Especially in a networked environment, where actors influence each other, one must find a link between action and change. Identifying the

⁹ Building on the literature about the concept of 'bureaucratic autonomy', public administration scholars have been prolific in publishing studies on circumstances around agencies' ability to act autonomously (Maggetti & Verhoest, 2014; Carpenter 2001; Trondal & Veggeland, 2014).

motivations behind a specific action by either a community or an individual confers credibility to purposefully driven policy changes. Without a leader (e.g., a high-level policy entrepreneur) who defines broader institutional preferences or policy goals, there may be no preference formation and no ‘purposeful’ pursuit of a specific policy goal – and consequently no influence. (We will return to the significance of playing a leading role in steering policy direction below.) The development of institutional preferences and goals and their cohesive pursuit is not a given within the EEAS, which has several competing institutional behavioural logics among its staff (Henökl, 2014).

Concomitantly, policy influence is only successful if the institution acts cohesively, both vertically and horizontally, following the leader or entrepreneur’s preference or policy goal. Intra-institutional cohesiveness means acting as a tightly knit policy community, ‘with more restrictive membership and greater insulation from other institutions’ (Sutton, 1999: 7; Atkinson & Coleman, 1992). The cohesion and trust among the leader or entrepreneur and the bureaucratic structures of the EEAS is crucial for ‘getting things done’ (Koops & Tercovich, 2020:279). To develop and pursue preferences, ‘bureaucracies must have a high degree of insulation from other actors in the political system’ (Ellinas & Suleiman, 2012). With increased political insulation, administrators have more ‘freedom to be selective in their interactions’ (Reenock & Gerber, 2008:417). In practice this look like the EEAS staff having the ability to be selective and strategic in the extent of their interactions with member states or Commission officials while they are devising and executing policy.

Intra-institutional cohesion also means not being stricken by bureaucratic politics and resisting ‘capture’ by member states interests. Acting as a cohesive unit pursuing a joint sense of mission, as opposed to one stricken by bureaucratic politics, makes an institution less malleable to other players trying to control it (see also Carpenter, 2001:24). Member states’ capture of the policy process has been noted more than once in empirical case studies (e.g. in the case of Ukraine EU Advisory Mission, see Novaky, 2015). It is also often assumed that the placement of Seconded National Diplomats can facilitate member states’ intrusion into institution (pp. 33-35.; Nováky, 2015). If bureaucratic politics or member states’ capture prevail, one may still perceive limited policy influence engendered by an individual policy entrepreneur who acts specifically on his or her own terms. This would mean that the EEAS, as an institution, does not have an overarching and systematic ability to engender policy influence, but an individual’s entrepreneurship may lead to policy change on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, in order to pursue influence the EEAS must be cohesive and express clear and consistent preferences.

What leads to policy change?

Policy influence goes hand-in-hand with policy change¹⁰, whether that change entails amending aspects of a policy's content or outcome, i.e., shaping policy, or enacting larger policy innovation and setting the direction of a given policy domain, i.e., steering it (Hall, 1993; see also Mohr, 1969; Torfing & Ansell, 2017). The conceptualisation of policy change in this thesis derives from and amends Hall's (1993) conceptualisation, which differentiates between first-order policy change, where small technicalities within a policy are adapted, second-order policy change, where the approach to a policy is shifted, and third-order policy change, where policy goals are redefined in a full-fledged paradigm shift (Hall, 1993:278-279).

Whether policy changes are of first-, second- or third-order, it is necessary to form a 'policy coalition' to engender policy change (Kingdon, 1984, 1995/1995; Sabatier 1988; Mintrom & Norman, 2009). However, policy coalitions do not explain policy influence. Pursuing and engendering policy influence is grounded in the ability to secure the cooperation of various intra- or inter-institutional units *for a specific purpose*, or with a particular intent, through either cooperative, persuasive or coercive means. The rationalist-sociological divide in institutionalist studies outlines different reasons why actors involved in policymaking accept policy change: cooperative, convincing, persuasive means and rational argumentation (*Deliberation*) or coercive means of creating a costly alternative for non-cooperation (*Bargaining Politics*) (Risse, 2000; Risse & Kleine, 2010; Majone, 1989; Müller, 2004). Whether through cooperative or coercive means, pursuing influence relies on the interaction between the players involved in policymaking. As it is through constant interaction that actors shape the observations of their counterparts, it becomes necessary to understand the nature of the relationship and interaction patterns.

B. The means for influence on a policy level: juxtaposing material versus relational capital

Based on the above definition, this section addresses what means allow an actor to exert policy influence. What affects the ability to forge multi-actorial coalitions that can coerce or persuade actors to accept a policy change that one actor pursues? The constellation of an institution's capabilities and resources affects the interaction dynamics between actors involved (Ingold & Leifer, 2016) and hence the ability of actors to persuade or coerce one another. An institution's policy influence is exerted through an increase in the direct or

¹⁰ The literature uses the concepts of 'policy change' and 'policy innovation' 'widely and ambiguously' (Mohr, 1969:111), and can be placed under the umbrella term of policy transformation. While acknowledging the difference, this thesis will, for sake of simplicity, use only the term 'policy change' to refer to any policy transformation.

indirect resources and formal or informal capabilities. The dominant discourse on the extent of an institution's influence centres on the institution's formal/material capital, i.e., the formal institutional powers and material resources derived from its mandate. This thesis introduces an underutilised approach to studying an actor's influence by arguing that the EEAS's ability to exert policy influence lies primarily in its relational capital, i.e. the capabilities and resources it derives from its network.

The literature has tended to frame the analysis of discretionary power of domestic and international institutions in terms of principal-agent theory. Building on 'formal-legal' analyses, most studies have analysed how formal characteristics and material resources explain institutions' discretionary power (or the extent of its bureaucratic autonomy, e.g. Carpenter, 2001; Yesilkagit & Thiel). The formal decision-making rules and institutionally derived formal authority define the discretionary leeway of an institution and portrays the influence of an 'agent' (Tsebelis, 2002; Pollack, 1997; Johnson & Urpelainen, 2014). Material resources, such as financial and operational resources, manpower and expertise, shape the ability to direct and steer policies (da Conceicao-Heldt, 2013; Biermann & Siebenhüner, 2009). Size, wealth and availability of resources are needed to push an actor's policy influence (Mansfield, 1963; Mytinger, 1965; Hage & Aiken, 1967; Rogers, 1962). How resource-dependent an actor is understandably impacts the actor's strength to act. The formally derived allocation of resources is instrumental because it not only establishes organisational dependencies, but also determines power dynamics (Jackson, 1983:256).

Based on this account and on the limited material resources at its disposal, the EEAS would have barely any ability to influence policy, which has deterred further analyses of the EEAS's potential influence. As a result of power struggles, the last chapter explained why the EEAS is perceived as institutionally weak. Due to its lack of financial resources, fluctuating and heterogeneous staff composition and limited manpower it is resource-dependent vis-à-vis the Commission and member states (see pp. 32ff). Considering the EEAS's lack of organisational resources (albeit with some variation on a case-by-case basis), its leeway for action has understandably been portrayed as meagre. The EEAS's lack of control over its own scarce resources has played an important role in restricting its scope of action. For instance, operational financial resources are still managed by the FPI within the Commission. Thus, this approach argues that the lack of material resources deprives the EEAS of the ability to play a sufficiently influential role to impact European foreign, security and defence policy; its actions are curtailed by member states or it is too dependent on the Commission, which benefits from substantially more resources and technical expertise.

Rather than solely emphasizing the (limited) material resources of the EEAS, this thesis highlights its relational capital, meaning the capabilities and resources it draws from its networks. Considering the interstitial position of the EEAS in a governance system defined by transgovernmental and increasingly informal decision-making, this thesis proposes that the EEAS's relational capital offers a better explanatory variable to understand the means for and extent of policy influence. The concept of relational capital is rooted in relational approaches and network theory, an undervalued theoretical framework within EU foreign policy studies¹¹. While challenging institutional features have often been seen as a handicap, the EEAS's interstitial position does offer an under-appreciated strength, namely its networks. In the words of a Commission official, unlike to the Commission, the EEAS can speak to all member states' foreign ministries within an afternoon: 'they are very good at networking' (Interview #12).

Network science, 'the scientific approach to the study of network dependencies and associations' (Belotti, 2014:5), builds on the premise that social relationships 'shape, enable and constrain political action' (Victor, Montgomery & Lubell, 2017:2). Social relations, transactions, interactions, conversations - in short social ties - constitute the regularities in empirical phenomena in social sciences. Networks 'generate durable ties and practices through constitutive processes of social interaction or by shaping the opportunities and obstacles to exchange and cooperation' (Clemens & Cook, 1999:446). Scrutinising the benefits or limitations the EEAS draws from its networks can explain how and why policies developed the way they did by unveiling policy dynamics: the flow of communication is channelled through networks. How the network is structured or used will affect the information flow (encompassing political, procedural and policy-relevant information), and thus the negotiation process.

Crucially, networks are not only the portrayal of the EEAS's reach, yet also the medium through which the EEAS mobilises intangible assets from its relational capital to leverage information and trust to affect the communication flow in policy-making dynamics. In other words, the EEAS's networks are not only resources to draw from but also a means to achieve a specific end. In the following section we will elaborate how the EEAS's reach

¹¹ Vantaggiato (2018:1) argues in her study that 'informal networks constitute a compensatory mechanism for lacking resource'. For instance, in her study on European regulatory agency, argues that actors with low to medium resource allocation are associated with higher network activities to compensate for lower staff resources and acquire information and expertise (ibid). While the functioning and duties of regulatory agencies are quite different from the EEAS, it is worth exploring this avenue of study. In policy studies, recent research has been assessing the role of networks in the resolving policy problems (Christakis and Fowler, 2011), whereas International Relations studies have started to move past merely describing the structure of networks, using network analysis to explore the interconnectivity and interdependency among states (see Victor et al., 2017: 10-11).

across the governance structure and the use of its networks may be as conducive for policy impact and/or influence as its formally derived material capital.

Moreover, it becomes relevant to address what resource constellation, derived from its material and relational capital, explains the extent and conditions for policy influence. Ingold and Leifer (2016:2) convincingly argue that ‘actors are perceived as influential because of both their institutional power and their structural power, derived from their positions in the policy network’. In other words, both institutional power (such as material resources and formal authority) and structural determinants (such as network structure and relational characteristics) are ‘jointly responsible for policy dynamics and outcomes’ (ibid; see also Pappi and Henning, 1999; Lin, 2001). When juxtaposing material and relational capital, one should not frame it as an either/or debate, but rather question which resource constellation explains greater or lower policy influence. In this thesis, I will home in on its relational capital composition, which is composed of relational capabilities and resources constellation derived from the EEAS’s networks.

Network analysis offers a particular advantage for our study. Studies about bureaucrats’ impact and/or influence on the policy process address either macro-level institutional or administrative/bureaucratic designs and resources (structural perspective, *holism*) or micro-level characteristics and abilities of individuals (agency-based perspective, *individualism*). These two approaches offer useful assessments, especially in purely national or intergovernmental contexts. However, while policy influence is pursued by individuals, numerous actors must coalesce intra- and inter-institutionally. While differentiating between the cause and effect of networks¹², network studies converge around three ontological ‘irreducible elements’ that interrelate: a) individual elements, such as individuals or cohesive sub-units; b) the relationships between those elements; and c) macro-patterns that constitute the network structure, formed through the interconnectedness and dependencies among the elements (Barnes et al., 2013:52).

Helping to bridge the ‘micro-macro divide’ (Eulau & Rothenberg, 1986), network studies provide a valuable meso-level approach that allows us to shift away from purely individual or institution-based research. Looking at actors’ interaction patterns unveils the dynamic interrelation between the micro and macro scale (ibid). By questioning the embeddedness of actors in a constantly moving shape, they are placed in and hence constrained by a dynamic structural framework that they alone cannot fully disrupt.

¹² Governance network theorists suggest that networks explain phenomena. They question the flows within networks through the conceptualisation of the nature of networks and the relationships within them. The Policy Network Analysis school applies network theories as epistemological stance; network theories are bound to specific phenomena, they are the cause of the development of phenomena (Belotti, 2014; Brandes et al. 2013:5).

Moreover, network studies allow us to overcome the formal-informal worlds (Thurner, 2017:591; Pappi, 1993). This is of particular importance due to the heterarchical structure and informal patterns we observe in European security governance (see pages 20-21).

III) Understanding influence through the EEAS's relational capital

The theoretical approach proposed in this chapter marries two camps in network studies: governance network theories and policy network analyses (see Fawcett & Daugberg, 2012; Belotti, 2014). Marrying a structural approach with an acknowledgement of the actorness of individuals within networks is recent in network studies. As Koppenjahn and Klijn (2004:16-17) explain, network theory has seen two schools emerge that rarely interrelate: one that assesses the 'quantitative' reach of networks and the other highlighting the 'qualitative' nature of networks. On the one hand, scholars focus on mapping the morphological characteristics of networks and the processes that create them, whilst not questioning their effects on policy-making dynamics (see for instance Blau, 1982; Laumann and Knoke, 1987). These studies are often descriptive in nature as the focus lies in mapping patterns of interactions, laying greater importance on unveiling the reach of networks rather than analysing the nature of interaction and how intangible assets are transferred. On the other hand, studies focused on qualitative aspects of networks examine the strategic interaction process, the management of a policy's development and the 'policy game' (Koppenjahn & Klijn, 2004:17). I argue that characteristics of a node's embeddedness in the network's structure and the nature of its interaction within this network (network utilization) both affect policy outcome (Belotti, 2014; Crossley et al., 2015; Serageldin & Grootaert, 1999).

Before addressing what explains variation in policy influence, this section will assess why and how the EEAS is able to exert influence through its relational capital and address where the EEAS may exert policy influence.

A. Assessing and utilising the EEAS's relational capital

I define the relational capital of a politico-administrative institution in a networked governance as the resources and capabilities it derives from its networks. The process of creating and using 'capital' is expected to affect or yield 'productive services' (Solow, 1999). In our context, relational capital is representative of the ability to mobilise relevant resources to steer and shape policy-making. These include direct and indirect resources that make the achievement of a specific end more attainable. There are two dimensions in understanding the EEAS's influence in the EU through its relational capital: first, the EEAS's position in the network structure and second, how the EEAS uses its networks. Both affect policy outcome.

The first, more structural assessment sets the broader strokes of the EEAS's reach and authority in the policy governance, defining the extent of influence the EEAS *can* have. By mapping network structures, we examine the capabilities the EEAS can draw from its embeddedness in the broader policy network governance. The EEAS's embeddedness is based on its position in a given network as well as the frequency and depth of interaction in inter-institutional relations. It tells us the reach the EEAS's networks could draw from when seeking to steer a policy's direction on the political level or shape a policy's content or process on the policy/administrative level. Assessing the policy network structure reflects where and how policy-making dynamics unfold because it reflects the communication flow among actors. It reflects how, from where and through whom information passes and evolves.

The second aspect homes in on the actor-centric dimension of networks and questions the nature of the relationships. Analysing how the EEAS's networks are used is important as it highlights whether and how the institution mobilises intangible assets to affect the policy-making process. Direct or indirect relational resources are 'harvested' and mobilised through interactions with other actors. Relational resources that are of relevance for our study are information and trust. Information here is understood as a broad term encompassing not only procedural knowledge and policy-relevant expertise (e.g., subject-matter, technical) but also political knowledge, meaning an understanding of the political sensitivities among policy-makers. To grasp whether and how the EEAS wields relational resources to achieve a specific end, we must look at its use of human and social capital. Human and social capital contribute to the EEAS's relational capital. When mobilised, these intangible assets leverage trust and information, directly affecting the information and interaction.




Figure 3.1 Understanding relational capital

i. Network structure: the EEAS's embeddedness in the policy network governance

The EEAS's embeddedness is represented through the mapping of its inter-institutional relationships, unveiling the governance of a policy network. Certain broader conclusions can be drawn from mapping a policy network governance. Network governance is the formal and informal patterns between the most relevant actors involved in the policymaking process (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992:8, Klijn & Koppenjahn, 2000:138). Sorensen and Torfing (2000) argue that network governance is a relatively stable horizontal structure of interdependent actors that have some degree of operational autonomy and who interact and/or negotiate with one another to achieve a specific result. A policy network governance defines the realms within which an actor acts on a particular policy. It is not static; a policy network governance is hence not innate but may evolve over time. Such networks have some institutional characteristics. They have a self-regulating capacity and contribute to public governing, i.e., they deal with public policy (ibid; Parker, 2007; Klijn & Koppenjahn, 2006).

Characteristics of a policy's network governance reveal the network's cohesiveness. By assessing the existence or lack of relationships, the frequency of interaction and the depth of connection between actors involved in the policy-making process, we observe the reach of an actor's network and its embeddedness in the policy network governance. To assess the EEAS's embeddedness in a policy's network governance it is necessary to determine what network theorists call the density of the network ties and the EEAS's centrality in the network. Simply put, the density of the network governance evaluates the frequency and depth of actors' interactions. Crucial for our analysis, the structure and density of ties among the policy actors reflects the flow of communication and transmission of information, which consequently impacts a policy's development.

Moreover, assessing a policy's network governance addresses whether the policy network is cohesive or divided into 'cliques'. A clique is a number of actors that are particularly more connected to one another, in contrast to others within the network (see Belotti, 2014; Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2018; Crossley et al., 2015). Membership within a clique '[makes] the diffusion of information within them very quick and the potential for collective action much greater' (Crossley et al. 2015:13). Whether the network is divided into 'cliques' affects how the information flows in the policy network. Cliques in a governance network are exclusionary and fragment the overarching governance architecture, affecting the institution's policy influence to such an extent that it leads to siloisation, lack of communication and potentially duplication of policymaking.

Network analysis uses different terms, with slightly deviating approaches, to assess the fragmentation in network structures. For instance, a similar term to ‘clique’ used by network theorists is sub-group, meaning a group of individuals that ‘attract each other’ (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1964). While not exclusionary to other groups, there is nonetheless a proclivity for deeper and more cooperative interaction. Several examples of sub-groups spring to mind in the context of EU foreign, security and defence policy, such as the varying institutional orientations inside the heterogeneous staff in the EEAS whereby SNDs are bound to have stronger ties with Council representatives, and former Commission officials upholding closer ties with Commission Directorates-General (DGs). In a similar vein, scholars have addressed the emergence of epistemic communities despite heterogeneity in the broader European security community (Spence, 2012; Cross, 2007, 2011, 2013).

Determinants of policy network characteristics go hand in hand with an actor's position in the broader network governance structure and its implications for knowledge transfer. For network theorists, ‘a node's position is a source of opportunities and advantages’ that it accrues simply by virtue of its position in the network; the ‘potential consequence of [an actor's] centrality’ has been linked to giving them the opportunity to act as gatekeepers as they have greater autonomy, control, visibility and involvement (Borgatti, Evert & Johnson, 2018:190). Centrality in a network gives the actor the ability ‘to catch what is passing from node to node’ (ibid). In other words, it offers the possibility to control the flow of information, whether by filtering it or colouring it while passing it along (Borgatti, 2005). Consequently, it would be advantageous for the EEAS to be placed centrally in the policy network governance. Contrarily, if the EEAS is placed at the periphery of the network it would be excluded and play a less relevant role. This is the case, for instance, when states cooperate mini-laterally and only sporadically with the EEAS. Whether central placement in a network has positive outcomes depends first on the cohesiveness of the network and second on whether the relations are cooperative (Borgatti, Evert & Johnson, 2018:290-291). For instance, a central position in a dispersed network structure or one with several cliques is crucial in the coordination of the actors, the diffusion of information and coalition-building. Similarly, in a network where all nodes interact frequently with each other, and where all actors are holders of the same information, a central placement is less valuable (Bonacich, 1972; see also Borgatti, Evert & Johnson, 2018:194). As we will elaborate further below, this contributes to our understanding of the EEAS's relational capabilities constellation.

I argue that, if placed centrally, the EEAS can adopt one of two roles: that of a broker or that of a mediator. To act as a *broker*, the EEAS would have to uniquely bridge a gap

between different groups of policy actors¹³, formal and informal. In this position, an actor is best positioned for full control of information, as it links all actors together while they do not interact amongst each other (Burt, 1992:45; 2005; Kadushin, 2012). Adopting the *mediator* role means mediating between the parties, to the mutual benefit of all. In a mediator role, all actors interact with each other, the network structure is ‘dense’ and information flows freely (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973; Bonacich, 1972). Contrarily, in the brokering position, we do not observe much interaction amongst groups of actors on a particular issue. This could include, for instance, when member states’ representatives rely on the EEAS to engage with EU Delegations, EU agencies or Commission officials in the drafting of policy texts. Another example specific to the area of security and defence is the EEAS’s direct link with civilian missions on the ground. While the EEAS does not hold much ‘subject-matter’ expertise (Blom & Vanhoonacker, 2021:130), it can build on the procedural, political and technical expertise of its civilian operational headquarters, and by extension the missions on the ground.

Examining the position of the EEAS offers a first step in explaining which role the institution has adopted and the impact its position may have on policy-making. If the EEAS is in a central position (formally or informally) in the policy network and able to play the role of broker or mediator, then it would have a greater ability to shape policy direction. On the contrary, if the network structure is dispersed, lacking cohesiveness, and/or the EEAS is positioned at the periphery, then the EEAS has little ability to exert policy influence.




Figure 3.2 The EEAS’s position at the periphery, as a broker or as a mediator

¹³ Burt (1992: 45, 2005) calls structural holes a lack of direct connection between two actors: ‘Players with relationships free of structural holes at their own end and rich in structural holes at the other end are structurally autonomous. These players are best positioned for the information and control benefits that a network can provide’.

The relevance of the EEAS's embeddedness in the policies' network governance offers a one-sided, descriptive understanding of the ability for brokerage or mediation. It is also the basis for asking what ties the EEAS may have, with whom, for what use and to which effect. This is to emphasise that network studies must also observe the 'value' of network ties. Here the authority and diversity of its networks' reach matters.

Granovetter's (1973, 1983) celebrated work entitled 'The Strength of Weak Ties' was a seminal first step in that direction. Noting that frequency of interaction is not the sole explanatory variable of value in a network, Granovetter (1973, 1983) offered important insight into the value of 'weak ties': infrequent yet deep and authoritative relations. Whether an important resource for information (Djelic, 2004) or a source of collaborative engagement, weak ties can be an important stream for relational resources. 'Strong' ties, i.e., those with whom interaction is more frequent, do not necessarily have more value, as 'those to whom we are strongly tied tend to be tied to one another [...] and therefore have access to exactly the same information as we do' (Crossley et al., 2015:35). By using 'weaker' ties, actors have access to and may yield from different pools of resources.

The EEAS has a direct access to member states' permanent representations and their national foreign ministries. For instance, when negotiations in the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on paragraphs regarding North Korea in Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions hit a stalemate in July 2017, the PSC Chair contacted the EEAS's Secretary General Helga Schmid, who in turn contacted the Swedish Director General for Political Affairs to resolve the crisis, circumventing discussions among Permanent Representatives in the PSC. The swift, informal and direct e-mail exchange (in French) highlights the closeness among individuals, despite infrequent interaction (#6, cf.27). Whereas the relationship between Helga Schmid and the Swedish Secretary General is not frequent, it is nonetheless crucial. By shifting the locus of negotiation, it had a powerful impact in brokering among member states and successfully led governments to agree on the terms of negotiation at hand. It effectuated a policy solution by using its 'weak' ties.

In line with Batora's (2013:599) conceptualisation of the EEAS as an 'interstitial' institution, 'recombining physical, informational, financial, legal and legitimacy resources', Lin's (2002) study adds that it is the variety of actors one can connect to, and draw from, that provides the real added value. Equally then, for the EEAS, having relations with respective counterparts in, for instance, the Legal Department of the Council Secretariat, the Foreign Policy Instrument, the Human Resources Department, or officials in the field in a particular mission allows it to draw from a much bigger pool of resource (e.g., knowledge hub/ expert groups) and may give it comparative advantage. Hence, the position of an actor and the

strength of ties that link actors together are representative of the reach and relevance of its networks.

ii. Network utilisation: the use of social and human capital

The second pillar of my relational capital approach analyses how the EEAS utilises its reach. In other words, it addresses how the networks are used and what effect the nature of the interactions has on the EEAS's impact on policy-making dynamics and its ability to shape and steer policies. More concretely, is the EEAS able to utilise its relational capital; does it utilise its position in the networks to purposefully shape and steer policies? As noted above, networks are not only the portrayal of the EEAS's reach and authority in a policy network governance, but also the medium through which intangible assets, such as its human and social capital, are mobilised to wield indirect relational resources, namely trust and information (Crossley et al., 2015:3). Especially in policy negotiation and decision-making, information and trust are two crucial resources. Information here should be understood as a broad term encompassing not only procedural and policy-relevant 'expertise', but also political knowledge (i.e., an understanding of the political sensitivities among policy-makers) (Walker & Biedenkopf, 2021:127; Lindvall, 2009; Page, 2010; Tallberg, 2008). The nature and quality of the interaction, i.e. whether actors interact cooperatively or competitively, affect the patterns of communication, flow of information and the willingness and ease of agreeing on policy decisions. If actors capitalise on one, the other or both they become important assets that will undoubtedly affect the policy dynamic.

Information and trust are 'harvested' or 'mobilised' through social and human capital. Simply put, social capital is the use of trustworthiness and trust to generate a 'virtuous cycle of cooperative behaviour'. Human capital is the skill of officials to build on their gathered information (including, political, procedural or any policy-relevant expertise) to shape policy's development, for instance through providing conducive text proposals. Policy-making dynamics are strongly affected by actors' human and social capital. They are a reflection of an actor's relational capital: carried through their interactions and reflective of the nature of their relationships, social and human capital generate an increase in relational resource exchange, affect the information flow and, most crucially, have positive externalities on negotiation outcomes. Member states will agree policy changes and/or overcome their objections based on conviction, persuasion (human capital) or trust (social capital). Let us briefly assess how human and social capital reflect the EEAS's ability to influence a policy's development.

Human capital is here defined as non-transferable skills and agency-specific expertise to utilise information to shape and advance the policy-making process, notably through

offering the best possible or innovative policy solutions (Bertelli & Lewis, 2013:224). Due to the hybrid role of the EEAS, as a ‘diplomatic actor’ and as one coordinating and ensuring coherence among member states, an important role is its ability to ensure policy decisions are taken with optimal speed and above the lowest common denominator. In simple terms, it is one’s skill to utilise knowledge in a specific situation. More specifically, this concept refers to a professional skill coupled ‘with fleeting social alchemies’, showing that actor has a ‘feel for the game’, i.e. showing political and technical sensibilities (Cornut, 2018; Crossley, 2001; Kuus, 2015). In studies about diplomats’ strength, competence is linked to ‘the social attribution of practical mastery of the local rules of the game, which takes the shape of an ability to craft compromises, take initiatives or herd others in ways that locally resound with others (Pouliot, 2016:62).

The actual use of this technical competence is dependent on social competences (Bourdieu, 1984:409). In this vein, wielding human capital also means mobilising the substance of relations, playing ‘strategically’ with ties, especially cordial, cooperative ones (Cornut 2018:723). An actor’s human capital is seen when certain actors are ‘socially skilful in getting others to cooperate, manoeuvring around more powerful actors, and generally knowing how to build political coalitions in life’ (Fligstein, 2001:107). An awareness of member states’ proclivities can help anticipate or manage their patterns of behaviour. Numerous scholars highlight the importance and skill of being able to ‘play’ with time and space in negotiations (e.g., Bourdieu, 1977) – especially in the context of EU foreign policy (for an example see Bachmann, 2016, 2018).

Whether actors act cooperatively also stems from the existence, acquisition and mobilisation of ‘social capital’. Social capital – broadly derived from Putnam (1993:167) – looks at social characteristics of an actor that are fostered through and within social networks, which improves the efficiency of a group and facilitates collective action. The application of ‘social capital’ is broad and the concept has been used widely and eclectically¹⁴. However, all studies highlight the central importance of the notion of trust. The understanding is that the existence of social capital in a community reflects a trustful relationship, generating cooperative behaviour within the group. For our study, on the one hand, the EEAS must be seen as ‘trustworthy’, a ‘confidant’ for member states (a trustful actor); on the other hand, it becomes relevant to observe whether it is able to generate trust among decision-makers,

¹⁴ In the academic literature, relational capital is closely related to – and has at times been conflated with – (relational) social capital (Huhtamäki & Russell, 2013). Huhtamäki and Russell (2013) provide a thorough overview of the ‘definitionally chaotic’ field (Fine 2001,2010) and juxtapose the various definitions of relational and social capital (for our study of interest see for instance Duparc, 2012; Adecco, 2007; Dyer and Singh, 1998). Tendentiously, relational capital has been used in managerial studies, whereas social capital is more deeply embedded in social theory and Social Network Analyses.

especially in regard to contentious, politically sensitive issues. Establishing a trustful relationship among policy-makers has positive long-term reverberations on the process of policy-making itself: it positively affects information exchange and cooperation between actors heightens the network's cohesiveness, and improves the efficiency of policy development (Ostrom 1998:12, see also Keohane, 1984; Milgrom, North & Weingast, 1990). The existence or establishment of social trust within groups 'reflects a positive perception of the generalised other and confidence that others will interact and behave decently' (Svendsen, 2018:15). The acquisition and diffusion of trust strengthens cooperative behaviour, understood as an 'intensive exchange of important information and joint work towards the development of common positions' (Mérand et al. 2011:127; see also Crossley et al., 2015:3). Trustworthiness among actors involved in policy-making enhances knowledge transfer because interactions lead to more reciprocal and productive cooperation and contribute to a sense of commitment towards a specific collaborative project. Actors are consequently more likely to seek consensus (Ostrom, 1998; Ladrech & Sabbatier, 2005:500). This leads to an environment which creates opportunities otherwise not available (Coleman, 1990; Ostrom, 1998). We will explain further below how it may lead to a 'virtuous cycle' of interaction in European policy-making, and influence for the EEAS below.

While we can observe each aspect independently, social and human capital often go hand-in-hand and feed into each other: skilled negotiators and officials have highlighted the importance of having trustful relationships to find agreement or be successful in negotiations (Walker & Biedenkopf, 2021). At the same time, trust alone is not sufficient to ensure that agreement is found. To convince member states to agree on a decision that does not lie in their immediate interest, EEAS officials adhere, consciously or unconsciously, to skilful tactics to find policy solutions. Closer cooperation due to trust-generation can hence be expanded further, especially when the EEAS is in a favourable position (an aspect we will elaborate further below). Leveraging relational resources through social and human capital reflects 'good intuitive understanding of group dynamics and collective action, making them abler to induce cooperation and collaboration, constructing reproducing and changing emergent social interactions for their own advantage' (Cornut, 2018:730), thus helping to overcome member states' objections.

In sum, it becomes relevant to analyse whether, and if so, how, the EEAS has mobilised its social and human capital in order to enact change either in the policy process or directly on the policy content. I proposed here that lacking human or social capital negatively affects the EEAS's impact on the policy-making process, and significantly curtails its ability to shape policies. With inadequate political, procedural or policy-relevant expertise, the EEAS risks

being overtaken by the Commission or member states expertise, which will also render national experts more reputable and legitimate in a policy's formulation. Similarly, if the relationship among member states or with the EEAS is strained or distrustful, negotiations will at best strenuously find the lowest common denominator, and at worst be postponed or fail. By contrast, wielding human and social capital gives the EEAS a greater ability to yield policy change through its acquisition of information and its effect on the communication flow in policy-making dynamics.

Let us summarise. By assessing the network structure, we derive the EEAS's embeddedness in the policy network governance and by analysing the policy network's utilisation, we grasp whether and how the EEAS mobilises its human and social capital to wield relational resources, such as information and trust. Both of these factors reflect and affect the flow and use of information respectively. This will in turn impact the communication flow, a defining factor in the policy-making process. More crucially, it tells us the extent of impact and influence the EEAS can have.

To differentiate whether the EEAS moves beyond having a generic effect – i.e. impacting the process – to actually exerting influence we must address whether it cohesively and purposefully steers or shapes policy direction across the political, policy and administrative level. The EEAS's intra-institutional cohesion and embeddedness in the policy network governance delineates the extent of potential influence it can have in the multi-actored, multi-levelled governance. It tells us the probability of the EEAS being influential as it draws a picture of the reach and authority it has across policies' network governance. How it uses its position, as well as whether and how it wields its social and human capital, explains the variation within the EEAS's extent of influence. Whereas the EEAS's embeddedness explains the 'quantity' of relational power it could have, its role in the network structure and the use of its social and human capital highlights the 'quality' of the EEAS's relational capital. Assuming the HR/VP and EEAS have a preference and are pursuing a policy goal, it is when placed centrally, wielding its social and human capital, and using its administrative duties to its advantage that the EEAS influences the policy-making process.

B. The interplay between network structure and network use: the emergence of virtuous cycles for influence

We have argued above that the EEAS's relational capital is derived from the capabilities and relational resources it draws from its networks – capabilities being dependent on the EEAS's embeddedness in a policy's network governance, and resources dependent on the networks'

use to wield intangible assets. The EEAS's relational capabilities, such as its ability to act as broker or mediator, and resources, such as trust and information wielded through its social and human capital, are derived from its networks. This section aims to understand the interplay between the EEAS's embeddedness in the policy network governance and the use of its networks. The relevance of the EEAS's social and human capital varies according to the its embeddedness. The 'relational capabilities and resources composition', i.e., 1) the constellation of the EEAS's position, derived from its embeddedness in the policy network governance, in concomitance with 2) its use of social and human capital, guides the EEAS's ability to use its networks to effect change and steer and shape policies. Specifically, we will assess what mechanisms – virtuous cycles for influence – may emerge when the EEAS either a broker or mediate role.

In the formal negotiation stage, we expect the EEAS to be centrally positioned, due to its formal administrative role. (Certainly, there is a distinction to be made between formal and informal embeddedness, and embeddedness at the policy initiation and implementation stages, yet for the sake of illustration we will here focus on the negotiation stage.) Influence through its relational capital goes beyond the formal administrative powers provided to the EEAS. As chair and drafter, these administrative capabilities comprise formal procedural tasks, including the power to schedule and set the agenda of meetings, close the speakers' list on a particular point of debate or impose time limits per speaker, and announce decisions on the rules of procedure (Walker & Biedenkopf, 2020:441). While administrative duties certainly offer bureaucrats means to impact the process in their own right, they do not reflect whether the EEAS has succeeded in going beyond its administrative duties, helped to overcome member states' objections, and shaped and steered policies based on their preferences.

The EEAS may be positioned to play a brokering or mediating role, however, to be successful in their pursuit, they must create coalitions and persuade, convince, or even coerce the other actors involved in the policy-making process. It does so through its social and human capital. Consequently, when centrally positioned and mobilising relational resources through its social and human capital, the EEAS will have a stronger influence because it engenders virtuous cycles in the policy's development. We observe two likely relational capabilities and resource composition that engenders either a mechanism representative of a rationalist approach or representative of a constructivist approach.

Acting as broker is a self-interested endeavour, showing a clear tendency towards a strategic actorness by the HR/VP and EEAS pursuing a preferred policy goal that goes beyond member states' preferences. The EEAS will be most influential if it adopts a brokering

role and mobilises, in particular, human capital to wield political, procedural or policy-relevant information to its advantage. Brokerage is associated with the unique acquisition and use of information. This consequently gives the EEAS the ability to utilise political and/or policy-relevant expertise in the policy formation and negotiation stage. In other words, it can exploit its brokering position as it canalises the information flow during the policy formation stage. In these circumstances, ‘control and power is granted by being able to play off others who are more constrained’ (Kadushin, 2012:104). If it is additionally trusted by member states, who would give the EEAS the legitimacy needed, it may more easily form policy coalitions and persuade (either through trust-generation or rational arguments) policy-makers to adopt a policy shift.

A broker is placed in a favourable position and has a unique overview of the policy, political and technical-related information. With human capital, the broker may use argumentative means to seek support for policy decisions. Consequently, the broker’s unique bridging role places it in a favourable position, able to utilise its competences and information control to affects the process and, in particular, policy content.



Figure 3.3 The virtuous cycle for influence through brokerage

When acting as mediator we expect more cooperative and dutiful engagement of the EEAS vis-à-vis member states, driven to mediate and facilitate among member states’ negotiations. To be a successful mediator, one must be trusted and seen as legitimate among the negotiating parties – mediation is hence related to the EEAS’s ability to be trustworthy and generate trust among actors. An actor must be ‘perceived as reasonable, acceptable, knowledgeable and able to secure the trust and cooperation of the disputants’ (Bercovitch & Houston, 1996:26; see also Walker & Biedenkopf, 2020). Negotiating parties accept the establishment of cooperative bonds based on their trust vis-à-vis the mediator, making the needed coordination for decision-making in policy-making smoother and transitive (Walker & Biedenkopf, 2020;

Putnam, 2000). Not only does trust facilitate cooperation; it ensures information is shared more easily and others' red lines (vulnerabilities) are respected (taken into consideration). Positive externalities include sharing information, coordinating activities and 'the willingness to accept vulnerabilities by ceding control over parts of the process' (Serageldin & Grootaert, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Walker & Biedenkopf, 2020:442). Crucially, trust consequently correlates with stakeholders' confidence in the legitimacy of consensus-based decision-making (Ladrech and Sabbatier, 2005:500; Walker & Biedenkopf, 2020). Embodying a mediator role, in conjunction with social capital, ensures a virtuous cycle of cooperativeness.




Figure 3.4 The virtuous cycle of cooperation through mediation

A virtuous cycle of cooperation emerges when trust and strengthened communication arises concomitantly. Member states, who have similar access to the same information, benefit from a mediator to find common agreement in negotiations. To generate trust and strengthen communication among policy actors, the mediator can seek to create 'safe spaces', a locus for informal mediation practices. As a central, trusted actor, a mediator may skilfully and persuasively lead policy actors to acquiesce to policy developments. As such, the effect of the EEAS playing the role of mediator affects the policy process, shaping a policy's development.

Relational Capabilities and Resource Composition		Activities	Consequence	Result
Brokering	Favourable network position + Human capital (i.e. skill, competence & expertise)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Argumentative means to seek support for policy decision ▪ Support and policy-coalitions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ability to control and manage the process, affecting especially the policy's content 	Very influential
Mediation	Favourable network position + Social capital (i.e. trust)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Informal mediation practices, creating 'safe spaces' ▪ Persuasive, skilfully bringing together the information collected from the member states and other actors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Creating virtuous circle of cooperation, affecting especially the policy's negotiation process ▪ Successful negotiation outcome 	Influential

Figure 3.5 Relational capabilities and resource composition: overview

Thus, network structure and the assets belonging to and transferred through the network are mutually constitutive. Flows of tangible and intangible assets themselves may affect the longer-term evolution of network structures. Over time actors' relationships evolve, which in turn endogenously and iteratively change the network structure. Indeed, nodes are interlocked in a 'spatial way' and in a 'temporal way' (Belotti, 2014:2). By questioning the embeddedness of actors in a constantly moving shape, they are placed in and hence constrained by a dynamic structural framework that they alone cannot fully disrupt. Let us address how this applies to our empirical analysis.

IV) Understanding the EEAS's ability to shape and steer policies in practice

As argued in the last chapter, the EEAS is able to steer and shape policies on the political, policy and administrative level (p. 45). While assessing the EEAS's relational capital is relevant on all levels, the incentives of the political leadership on the political level and its administrative capabilities are two particularly relevant factors that must be taken into consideration. After shortly addressing the means for influence through political leadership, we recap the five roles that the EEAS can adopt in the policy-making process. Then, we delineate when we may expect the EEAS to be enabled or constrained to steer and shape policies.

Thus, analytically, we observe two different dynamics for influence that may develop independently, yet act as building blocks for stronger influence. First, as will be discussed below, the political leadership of the HR/VP can significantly steer policy direction through agenda-setting powers, framing strategies to seize windows of opportunity and mobilise support for political decisions. Second, building on the previous section, the resource constellations, in particular relational capabilities and resources derived from the EEAS's embeddedness and its networks' use. Specifically, the *extent of* influence is explained by the EEAS's intra-institutional cohesion, i.e., that it acts cohesively across hierarchies, and by its embeddedness. It is here proposed that the variation within the extent is explained by whether and how the EEAS mobilises its intangible assets, i.e., its human and social capital. Whether independently or in combination with the institution's relational capital, administrative duties have, as expected, an additional consequential impact on the process of a policy's development.

A. Political leadership and the EEAS's roles in the policy-making process

Let us first shortly address how the HR/VP and the EEAS's top echelons can exert influence by steering policies on the political level through leadership functions. It is now widely established that leaders of an organisation can set significant impulses in steering policy direction. Beyond merely setting an organisation's preference, they can have substantial entrepreneurial and reinforcing effects on particular policy issues. Tömmel (2013:795; 2017, 2018) argues that political leadership in the EU is reliant on the interplay between institutional settings (i.e., the formal procedural decision-making powers and constraints), situational factors (i.e., the specific political context) and personal qualities. Two factors are relevant in assessing how the HR/VP and the top echelons of the EEAS influence the policy dynamic on the political level: first, their 'activities', or what can be done through their role as an 'independent' head of organisation, and second, its position and relational capital.

Understanding successful leadership goes beyond personal characteristics: duties linked to the position, 'tactics, and circumstantial factors need to be taken into consideration' (Schroeder, 2014:345; Traub, 2007). The HR/VP may develop strategic thinking, articulate vision and frame strategies to seize windows of opportunity and seek to mobilise support for political decisions (Schroeder 2014; Béraud-Sudreau & Panier, 2020; Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, 2013). However, strong leadership must not solely be seen as a result of entrepreneurial measures. The leader's effectiveness in pursuing his/her strategic vision will not only depend on the use of policy planning capacities that are at his/her disposal (e.g. agenda-setting), but also on the choice of advisors (Kowert, 2002) and his/her relational capital. For instance, in the absence of extensive formal power, Catherine Ashton, Federica

Mogherini and their predecessor HR Javier Solana concentrated on using personal relationships and mobilising informal over formal networks (Helwig, 2015:91-92). Similarly, as will be explored in the empirical analyses, HR/VP Mogherini relied extensively on her personal network, and on that of her Head of Cabinet (Koops & Tercovich, 2021). Lastly, in line with the relational capital approach, the HR/VP's leadership is dependent on how deeply embedded and connected he/she is with the Commission and member states' foreign ministers, and whether he/she can tacitly use his/her relationships to achieve preferences or policy goals. The HR/VP's relations with member states explain the extent and success of his/her policy influence. Leadership styles, but crucially also the social and human capital of the HR/VP and the EEAS's top echelons will shape the trust in and influence of the governing officials and has an important effect on the complex relationship between the leaders and the institution intra-institutionally.

Adding to the HR/VP's leadership abilities, the relational capital of the EEAS and the EEAS's administrative power (pp. 49-50) allow us to identify the following roles that the EEAS can adopt and through which it consequently affects the policy-making process: 1) On the political level, acting cohesively with/through the HR/VP, it can act as a 'leader'; 2) On the policy level, especially during the negotiation stage it may be either a 'mediator' or 'broker'; and 3) On the administrative level, it can 'hinder' or 'facilitate' the process. Depending on what roles the EEAS adopts throughout the process, we will trough which means and to what extent the EEAS has impacted, and even influenced the policy process.

Political Level	Policy Level	Administrative Level
LEADER	BROKER	FACILITATOR
(NO LEADER)	MEDIATOR	HINDERER

Figure 3.6 The EEAS's roles in the policy-making process

B. Enabled or constrained: mechanisms towards influence in security and defence

This section aims to give us a clearer indication of the conditions under which the EEAS is most enabled to exert influence and/or significantly impact the process. Let us remind ourselves that as a necessary condition for influence, the HR/VP and EEAS must purposefully pursue a specific end – in other words act with intention. Assuming there is a

purposeful pursuit of a policy goal, if the EEAS is cohesive yet unsuccessful in establishing its authority across supranational and intergovernmental organisational boundaries, its policy influence will be low. The multi-layered foreign and security policy-making mechanisms are such that for a policy change to be enacted, member states, the Commission, or respective agencies that contribute to the implementation of the policy must buy into the policy change. Lacking embeddedness translates into the EEAS not being 'central', nor sufficiently 'connected' to the other spheres where related policy aspects are discussed. This is especially the case where the policy governance is divided in several cliques (siloed). From a structural network governance perspective, we identify three scenarios that define the extent of influence the EEAS may have: first, centrally embedded, second, semi-embedded, and third, at the periphery. The broader the EEAS's reach, the higher the extent of influence the EEAS *can* have. Influence is exerted when the EEAS then utilises its networks to achieve a specific end.

Hence, the 'actor-centric factors' intervene to offer a more nuanced and gradual understanding of the EEAS's relational capital in the day-to-day policy-making processes. Analysing the nature of the relationship offers insight into the quality of the networks: it explains for what and how the relations are used. It becomes relevant to analyse whether and how social and human capital is mobilised to acquire and leverage trust and information in order to enact policy change throughout a policy's development. Having elucidated how the EEAS networks' reach and authority across intergovernmental and supranational spheres frame the extent of policy influence, the use of relational resources (and administrative capabilities) may exponentially and sustainably strengthen the EEAS's ability to shape and steer policies or, on the contrary, explain why no influence has been exerted. The reason why these are intervening rather than conditioning factors are because they strongly affect the impact and influence the EEAS may have in the negotiation and formation stages. The combination of these will affect the EEAS's effect on the policy-making process differently. The two other factors – leadership and administrative capabilities – also play a role for the institution's influence. For strong influence, the EEAS is reliant on strong and active executive leadership on the political level by the HR/VP and/or the EEAS's top echelons. Similarly, using the administrative powers may exponentially affect whether we see an increase of influence, depending on whether and how it hinders or facilitates the policy-making process administratively.

Intervening variables Scenarios	POLITICAL LEVEL	POLICY LEVEL		ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL	Results
	Leadership	Position	Relational resources Social and human capital	Administrative capabilities	
Intra-EEAS cohesion & EU centrality and Embeddedness					INFLUENTIAL
Intra-EEAS cohesion & Lack of centrality and embeddedness					LIMITED, INTERMITTENT INFLUENCE
No intra-EEAS cohesion					LITTLE, COMPETING INFLUENCE

Figure 3.7 The EEAS's extent of influence in three scenarios

In the first scenario, an intra-institutionally cohesive institution is deeply embedded in the policy's network governance, meaning in the locus of policy-making where the policy options discussed and negotiated. This setting offers the EEAS the most ability to be very influential. This is the scenario we expect to observe in the case on the EEAS's influence in the drafting of the EU Global Strategy, which was initiated and drafted insulatedly by a clique around the HR/VP (Chapter 4). The EEAS was in the driving seat: uniquely positioned to collect and utilise information, seen as trustworthy and legitimate, while managing the process administratively. Under these circumstances we expect the EEAS to be highly influential, able to shape the policies' direction in accordance with its preferences and to its advantage. The salience of policy issues certainly continues to matter, not least as member states' interests and respective red lines are tougher to overcome. However, its ability to wield information and knowledge should enable it to overcome member states' objections, either through procedural means (i.e., deciding on the process) or persuasive means (i.e., through engendering a virtuous cycle of cooperation or convincing argumentation). Considering it is acting cohesively and its network is far-reaching and embedded beyond organisational boundaries, it should be able to mobilise strong and weak ties to its advantage, whilst utilising its relational resources such as information or trust.

EU Global Strategy Scenario 1	POLICY LEVEL	ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL	Consequence
Highly cohesive and Embeddedness			INFLUENTIAL Highly influential Influential

Figure 3.8 The EEAS's influence in the EU Global Strategy

The possibility and extent of policy influence becomes less straight forward when the institution loses its embeddedness. This is the case we expect to see in both the negotiation around PESCO and the CCC. In these scenarios, the EEAS is not as deeply embedded either because it is placed at the periphery or because its networks are not as far-reaching within the policy network governance. As the reach and authority remains limited, the influence should be more intermittent and limited in time and scope – meaning we should see influence limited to the aspect of the policy that is negotiated within the intergovernmental committees that the EEAS chairs and supports, rather than having a far-reaching EU-wide influence whereby the Commission and the national capitals also adapt to and adopt policy change. In the case of PESCO, for instance, we observe that, anchored in the political dimension of PESCO's development, the EEAS was only semi-embedded in the overarching policy network governance which spanned a military and industrial-defence dimension. In these situations, there is a risk of being overpowered or outmanoeuvred by the member states' relational capital. Considering the EEAS is not the only actor able to utilise its relational capital, we should expect the fact that it is curtailed in its reach, diminishing its ability to acquire intangible resources and engage in persuasive or coercive exchange. The influence should be more local and intermittent, dependent on the existence and use of its human and social capital. This shows the importance of the EEAS's continuous effort to bridge gaps that arise from the fragmentation and consequent siloisation of EU foreign and security policy. With regard to the EEAS's reach across boundaries, the role of the Commissioner's Group for External Action and the EEAS officials' attendance of additional (e.g., comitology) meetings

is important. This becomes relevant especially when observing that member states tactically utilize different fora to bring forward their interests strategically. On the flipside, however, it is also increasingly frequent that EEAS officials are in direct interaction with capital officials to circumvent deadlock in intergovernmental committees in Brussels. This has been the case in the recent push to strengthen European security and defence capabilities that was pursued after the EU Global Strategy in 2016.


PESCO Scenario 2	POLICY LEVEL	ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL	Consequence
Highly cohesive & Partial Embeddedness	<div> MEDIATOR + Use of social & human capital + Administrative capabilities </div> 		LIMITED INFLUENCE Influential Positive impact

Figure 3.9 The EEAS's influence in PESCO

Lastly, the case of the Civilian CSDP Compact shows us the most curtailed scenario for policy influence, namely when the EEAS lacks intra-institutional cohesion. If the EEAS is not intra-institutionally cohesive, we should expect it to have very little ability to significantly shape or steer policy direction. Any influence or impact should be very low and limited in time and space. Individuals or sub-units should still be able to impact the policy, but their influence would lead to smaller policy changes. Due to its administrative powers, the EEAS may in this third scenario still have policy impact yet limited to no influence. With bureaucratic politics or competing interests within the EEAS, sub-units compete for influence and are in a bargaining position as any other member states (Bach, de Francesco, Maggetti & Ruffing, 2016; Ellison, 2006). Rather than any institutional influence, we would expect to see individuals or sub-units within the EEAS to have a stronger or lesser impact. The relationship with member states who engage with diverging sub-units in the EEAS is tedious. We should see conflicting approaches negatively impacting any development in a policy.

CCC Scenario 3	POLICY LEVEL				ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL	Consequence
No intra-institutional cohesion	<div> <div>BROKER (EEAS, CPCC)</div> <div>MEDIATOR (EEAS, CMPD)</div> </div>				<div> <div>+</div> <div>Administrative capabilities</div> </div>	<div>COMPETING INFLUENCE</div> <div>Competing influence/ Little impact</div>

Figure 3.10 The EEAS's influence in the CCC

These three scenarios delineate the extent to which the EEAS may mobilise its relational capital. How the EEAS mobilises its relational capital, and what role it adopts, may further explain variations within these three scenarios. The capabilities and resources the EEAS draws from its position, whether and how it leverages its social capital and human capital, and its administrative powers will define variation of influence. The variations in the extent of influence will be affected by which role the EEAS adopts, and whether and how it wields intangible assets. In other words, its use of information and trust as intangible assets can, in combination with its administrative capabilities, explain why the EEAS has been very influential (Scenario 1), or had limited (Scenario 2) or no influence (Scenario 3). The leverage of information and trust explains the intent and intensity of interest to the extent that the EEAS uses the gathered information as a broker. The behaviour would be equated with adopting a logic of consequence. If successfully paired with conducive administrative capabilities, such as managing the process and changing it accordingly, or hindering procedural execution, it will heighten the EEAS's ability for policy influence.

V) Methods

The above discussion sets important premises for our choice of methods. First, the locus of our network study must be delineated and the boundaries drawn. The multi-levelled, multi-actorial dimension of European foreign policy means that innumerable actors are interrelated and interconnected. Specifying the network boundaries demarcates which actors are most

relevant in our study. Second, the methodology must encompass both a structural network perspective, assessing the EEAS's intra-institutional cohesion and inter-institutional reach, and an actor-centric assessment for grasping networks' utilisation. Solely mapping network patterns does not suffice because the theoretical framework encompasses an important role for the leveraging of intangible assets. Third, it must offer room to collect data straddling the micro, meso and macro scale¹⁵. The data collected must be informative a) regarding the individuals' characteristics and features, b) regarding dyadic relationships, regarding the frequency of interaction and the purpose of interaction and c) the dependencies between or lack of relationships that create macro-patterns. Fourth, it must take into account the temporal evolution of relevant network ties.

A. Network boundary

A major challenge in network studies is setting its boundaries. To a certain extent the policy network governance is naturally delineated as 'networks [that] form around social worlds, interactions among individuals who are involved in a specific set of activities, overlapping interests and shared aim' (Belotti, 2014:63, Crossley, 2011). Our study's network boundary will naturally be located among patterns of interactions oriented toward the accomplishment of the policy-making process (Belotti, 2014; Crossley, 2011)¹⁶. However, in the case of European security and defence, this still implies an innumerable amount of key actors, especially when understanding policymaking in a broader sense. The governance network span is broad in terms of types of actors and their geographical locations. Transnational actors, such as transnational defence industries, experts' groups for hybrid threats, or even, in the case of civilian CSDP, the involvement of national institutions, such as judges, police etc., have become increasingly relevant as the EU aims to pursue a more integrated foreign and security policy. A mis-specified network boundary may exclude a set of relevant entities, which has significant ramifications for the overall study (Butts, 2008:17).

¹⁵ Looking at the actors' interaction patterns unveils the dynamic interrelation between the micro-level, agency-based perspectives and macro-level, structural analyses (Barnes et al. 2013:52; Eulau & Rosenberg, 1986). Studies about bureaucrats' impact and/or influence on the policy process address either, on a macro level, institutional or administrative/bureaucratic designs and resources (structural perspective, holism) or on a micro level, individuals' characteristics and abilities (agency-based perspective individualism). These two approaches offer useful assessments, especially in purely national or intergovernmental contexts. However, while policy influence is engendered and pursued by individuals, it must coalesce with numerous actors intra-institutionally and inter-institutionally. While differentiating in the cause and effect of networks, network studies converge around three ontological 'irreducible elements' that interrelate: a) individual elements, such as individuals or cohesive sub-units; b) the relationships between those elements and c) macro-patterns that constitute the network structure, formed through the interconnectedness and dependencies among the elements (Barnes et al., 2013:52). Looking at the actors' interaction patterns unveils the dynamic interrelation between the micro and macro scale (ibid).

¹⁶ Exogenously defined network boundaries are common in intra-organisational studies (e.g. Krackhardt & Stern, 1988; Lazega, 2001).

To assess the extent of the EEAS's influence on the policy-making process, the theoretical framework posits that I study the EEAS's second-zone ego-network. An ego-network, in opposition to whole networks, is centred on a single actor, an ego – here, the EEAS. A second-zone ego-network assesses the direct relations between the EEAS and its 'alters', i.e., its counter-parts (e.g. member state officials in Brussels or capitals, Commission or other EU agency officials), while also collecting the relations between them (Barnes, 1972). By gathering information about alter-alter relations, we aim to observe how actors other than the EEAS engage with each other. For instance, this approach also questions whether the Commission interacts more regularly with EU agencies, or whether capital-to-capital diplomacy or member states to Commission communications forgoes the EEAS. In other words, it observes the most direct network around the EEAS.

As we aim to understand the EEAS's use of networks for policy influence it suffices to portray the EEAS's ego-network, instead of the whole network structure of the EU security and defence governance. Studying alter-alter relations accounts for the possible exclusion of the EEAS; it demarcates the EEAS's position in the overarching structure and specifically whether it may act as a broker, as a mediator, how dense its relations are in contrast to the Commission and so forth. However, it limits the analysis in so far that transgovernmental actors, such as industries and or think tanks that do not directly interact with the EEAS or have a direct implication in the policy-making process, are not addressed. For our study, the benefits of studying the EEAS's ego-network, rather than the whole network outweighs the costs.

B. Qualitative methods in network theory

The methods applied in network analysis are divided in two camps, representative of the two above-mentioned schools that arose in network studies. The two camps of scholars advocate either for a quantitative, statistical analysis of network structure through Social Network Analysis (SNA), or for a more systematic use of qualitative methods 'so as to tip balance back towards detailed and rich descriptions of social networks, their functioning and intricacies' (Belotti, 2014: 4; see also Brint 1992; Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994; Crossley, 2010). The 'paradigm war' has in part generated 'a general lack of interest from qualitative researchers in approaching and adopting a network perspective' (Belotti, 2014: 4; Kirke, 2010).

Despite its ethnographic origins (Barnes, 1954; Mitchell, 1969), a common misconception of network science is that the methods accompanying it is an unequivocal use

of SNA¹⁷ (Brandes, Robins, McCranie & Wasserman, 2013: 3). This is mostly due to SNA's ability to model network structures. However, there are important limitations to SNA, both with regard to data analysis and data collection (limitations are discussed in depth in scholarly textbooks such as Belotti, 2014; Borgatti et al., 2018; Crossley et al., 2015; Hanneman & Mark, 2005).

Studying and 'measuring' associations and dependencies is no easy feat, especially in such a convoluted geographically vast and multi-actored environment. For SNA to offer robust findings, data gathering must be extremely accurate, both in terms of quality and quantity. There are three main limitations in SNA data gathering which justify the choice to not adopt this method. First, the sheer quantity of data collection required for an empirically robust set is unlikely to be achieved in transgovernmental settings such as the EU security and defence setting, as access to individuals is not guaranteed and would not span the sufficient number of nodes. Second, gathering reliable, quantifiable information about the frequency of interaction and of the value of its networks is challenging. EEAS and member state officials feel uncomfortable sharing their interaction patterns in great detail (this might be explained by the fact that it unveils their negotiation tactics). Data gathered in environments with high frequency of interaction among a great number of actors has a tendency to be unreliable when reported (Madsen, 2011:380). Due to the very full agenda of officials in Brussels, recollection of the exact patterns of interaction, especially when collected months or years after the fact, is particularly unreliable. Lastly, SNA data gathering tools, such as surveys, 'lack the sensitivity to be able to explore difference, inconsistency and, often, meaning in an argument' (Stroh 2000:197). A crucial aspect in our study is to understand the use of its networks, specifically whether and how the EEAS is able to establish trust and cooperative engagement through social capital and human capital. For this study, SNA is not the right tool. Quantitative research often fails to take into account context dependencies (Belotti, 2014; Edmonds, 2012). The main added value of SNA is the 'exactitude in measuring' social ties, which in our case is unlikely and not necessary.

Instead, this thesis uses a qualitative approach to analyse the EEAS's ego-network. Qualitative methods give flexibility to the explanations for a policy's development and a thick description of the use of relational capital. Qualitative network research does not empirically 'measure' social ties, but relies on triangulated, weighted approximation. In the vast scholarship of network studies, some have relied on approximate qualitative analyses¹⁸ to

¹⁷ Social Network Analysis is the application of network analysis to the study of interconnected patterns of relations among two actors, individuals or groups (Belotti, 2014; Borgatti et al., 2018; Scott, 2007).

¹⁸ See for instance analytical sociological network studies, that rely on agent-based approaches to network studies and do not empirically measure social ties.

grasp network structures (e.g. Hedström, 2005; White 2008:20). These rely in part on assumptions about the underlying mechanism in interaction dynamics. Indeed, approximation of network dimensions and reasonable assumption in interaction patterns emerge to help deduce the emergence and frequency of relations (e.g. Hedström, 2005, Kadushin, 2012). While there is no doubt that approximation must be used with caution, especially considering the exploratory nature of our study, one may assume that within European negotiation dynamics, certain member states would interact more frequently among themselves. In our case for instance, it would mean member states with long lasting political alliances, historical ties on a given foreign political issue or similar (geopolitical) interest coordinate more closely in negotiations. Such an approach simplifies the analysis to the extent that it reduces complexity to abstract representation of the network structure.

C. Relational data: data analysis and data collection strategy

Let us shortly address what data was collected, how it was collected and how it was analysed. We will first discuss the qualitative, pluralistic methodological approach. By studying the extent and conditions enabling or constraining the EEAS's influence in the security and defence area, the thesis tackles a 'less-likely' scenario (see page 14). To 'tap causality' one should 'follow the chains of interactions...as they evolve in time and space, to connect individuals, resources and institutions' (Lamont & Swindler, 2014: 156-157). To strengthen the causality claims across time and space, and hence strengthen the generalisability of findings, we propose to do a multi-case analysis.

Data analysis: multi-case analysis for causal-process observation

The natural advantage of case study analysis is its exploratory nature; it allows for an in-depth contextual analysis of a policy's development (Gerring, 2011). However, while it is suitable to elucidate causal mechanisms and generate paradigms or hypotheses, its exploratory nature is less suited for testing hypotheses. The generalisability of findings is arguably much more restricted because of the singularities that one case study brings with it (ibid: 1142-1144). Rather than defining causal effects, single case studies highlight causal mechanisms. For this reason, it becomes imperative to introduce within our case study, a multi-case analysis. Seeking 'within-case' variation, a multi-case analysis examines different facets of a case study (cases within a case study). We would expect variation in the extent of policy influence from a case-by-case basis because the EEAS's embeddedness in networks and the nature of its relationships vary from policy issue to policy issue. In the policy domain of security and defence, the EEAS is involved in three types of policies: strategic policies (of EU

external relations), operational questions (carrying out civilian and military missions, or crisis response and management mechanisms), and defence capacity-building policies. To have a comprehensive picture of the EEAS's policy impact, it is valuable to process-trace examples within each of those three types of policies where the EEAS is involved. Moreover, considering its consolidation in the governance framework and establishment of inter-service agreements only took place after the 2013 Review (see pp. 37ff), the cases should take place after 2014 – which means under High Representative Mogherini. It was member states that mandated the incoming High Representative review the 2003 European Security Strategy, which resulted in the EU Global Strategy (2016). In the subsequent years, a great number of initiatives to strengthen the European security and defence sector arose, two of which are most fitting for our research: the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which aims to strengthen European defence capabilities, and the Civilian CSDP Compact (CCC), which intends to improve and facilitate better civilian crisis management structures, notably in the operational dimension.

It is by comparing the variation in causal mechanisms across cases that one may derive a reliable estimate of causal effects, which in turn offers more robustness in the generalisability of our findings. Causal-process observation¹⁹ based on network dynamic observations aim to add inferential leverage to link the actor's use of relational capital in the context of the policy's development. Casual-process observations – as opposed to data-set observations, which SNA would provide – places more emphasis on the empirical foundation of qualitative research, analysing trajectories of change and causation (Collier, Brady and Seawright, 2010). Certain benefits, dangers and limitations must be addressed. A major value of process tracing is the various contributions this analytical tool offers: not only does it assess the explanatory value of previously identified concepts (or hypotheses), but also offers important leeway to discover alternative means for explanation. The latter offers an important safeguard against explanatory bias in causal analyses and helps overcome the 'standard problem' of quantitative research, namely missing variables. To overcome bias that ill-applied causal-process observation may bring, numerous benchmarks must be met. One must find 'recurring empirical regularities' which should be observable across cases (Collier, 2011:825; Waltz, 1979:1). This is why Sollier (2011:825) advocates for 'within-case analyses' to be able to infer casual-processes. Rather than simply establish a pattern in the relationship between, for instance, the EEAS's position and its use of information and/or trust to wield influence, this relationship must be found repeatedly across cases. By applying my theoretical

¹⁹ Causal-process observation and process tracing are 'two facets of the same research procedure' (Collier, 2011:832).

model to three policies within the security and defence case study, I aim to strengthen the robustness of findings.

Second, especially considering the dynamic nature of network and relations, one needs to be mindful of the temporal dimension of our analysis. To simplify the analytical process, I disaggregate each policy in three stages: the policy initiation, formation (often linked to negotiation) and implementation stages. While process-tracing does take into consideration the ‘temporal sequence of events’, it is in its application ‘static’ in that that ‘snapshots’ of a specific moments in time are analysed (Collier, 2011:825). Hence, it is of particular importance to be aware of the dynamic and evolutionary nature of relationships. Especially as the EU’s security and defence community is rather small and closed²⁰, once a dyadic relationship among two nodes is established it has more depth and anchorage. Because of the long-term perspective in security cooperation and/or defence capability building, networks’ participation and the nature of relations in this domain are slow-moving. Considering the usual lengthy longevity of the policy issues addressed in this policy area we expect that evolution within network dynamics would occur among a small number of actors over time, which is why grasping the evolution of the network structure and the relationship among actors comprising the networks over time is of relevance. Two aspects may assist in deriving the right causal inferences: first, establishing a timeline that lists the sequence of events and a ‘good narrative’ helps explore the evidence that may confirm or disconfirm causal ideas (Collier, 2011: 828-829). Second, grasping actors’ motivations may lay bare the causal mechanisms of cause and effect (Reykes & Beach, 2017).

Data collection: interviews, participant observation and documentary evidence

Based on the above discussion, we propose to gather multiple-perspective interviews with actors involved most closely in the policy-making process so as to not only have an overview of interaction patterns, but examine the nature of the relationships and how the communication patterns, specifically information flow, is affected by the EEAS’s relational capital. A total of 77 interviews were held between December 2018 and July 2020, spanning across all institutions involved in the policy-making processes. The interviews, most of them in-person, lasted between 30 and 90 minutes and were held in English, German, or French. They were held anonymously and confidentially and were therefore not recorded. When needed, interviews were followed up via e-mail, or occasionally with second interviews.

²⁰ A ‘closed’ network means that the network is not easily accessible for new individuals or high in fluctuation.

I used semi-structured, multiple-perspective interviews to ensure the triangulation of subjects' accounts (Vogl, Schmidt & Zartler, 2019). In line with our relational approach, multiple perspective interviews use relational units as unit of analysis. Interviews conducted separately offer insights into subjects' interrelations and 'joint life' in complex systems while giving the individuals the ability to express their own views and address their agency in the interrelatedness (Eisikovits & Koren, 2010). Hence, 'the interview covers both an individual and a relationship level' (Vogl, Schmidt & Zartler, 2019:612). Considering the structural and actor-centred dimension of relational approaches, this is the most appropriate data collection approach. It is especially relevant to have observational consistency across organisations when it comes to assessing the EEAS's reach and reliable understanding of the information flow in the policy-making process (not least to fathom whether it is leveraged through the EEAS's social and human capital).

The data collection strategy in multiple perspective interviews does not differ from conventional approaches to interview data collection. As mentioned above, the network boundaries include alter-to-alter relations so as to have an indication of interaction patterns of network flows outside the EEAS's reach. Multiple perspective interviews increase the robustness of findings by fortifying the validity of results (Kendall, et al. 2009; Santoro, 2014:127).

For our case, semi-structured interviews are the best means to interview officials because they a) '[increase] the comprehensiveness of the data and [make] data collection more systematic' by delimiting in advance the issues to be explored, b) give the opportunity to discuss issues that the researcher had not anticipated, c) give the interviewer freedom to adapt to the particular circumstance of the interview and 'decide how to best use the limited time available', which leads to d) the positive externality of making interviews 'remain fairly conversational and situational' while offering room to establish a better connection between interviewer and interviewee, which ought to establish a more trustful interaction – an fundamental aspect in a domain where information is often of sensitive or confidential nature (see Patton, 2002: 343, 349; Braun & Clarke, 2018:236).

Two aspects must be taken into consideration to strengthen the value of semi-structured interviews. Elite interviews have a risk of leading us to overemphasise the role of individuals in shaping the outcomes. We must be mindful to take into consideration relational explanations and 'meso or macro levels of reality' (Lamont & Swindler, 2014:162). Indeed, elite interviews are one of the most common data gathering tools in qualitative research because they provide the most detailed explanations for the causes and motivations of agents' behaviour. The danger is that information gathered 'solely' represents individuals'

experiences and perspectives, rather than offering generalisable findings (Stroh, 2000:207). It is important to highlight here that interview questions do not aim to paint the ‘mental maps’ of interviewees, but instead the holistic picture that arises from the quantity of interviews. In other words, ‘it is not about what is going on inside one person’s head, but what is going on inside *lots* of people’s heads’ (Luker: 2008:167). Pattern recognition and triangulation of information is key.

To overcome the common pitfalls of interviews – e.g. focussing on the views of the individuals, biased narrative-adoption etc. – the interview guide revolved around three aspects of social network relations: a) social relations, defined as ‘continuous processes of iterative interactions that stabilise in durable and recognisable relationships’, and interactions, defined as ‘discrete events that can be counted over a period of time’ (Belotti, 2014:43); b) actors’ attributes, such as for instance the nationality of officials or their institutional affiliation; and c) tangible and intangible resources or assets that flow across ties (Borgatti et al, 2009). While acknowledging the limitations of every researchers’ subjectivity, I aimed to overcome the dangers of ‘co-construction’ of interview data by using semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions to allow for the interviewee to highlight non-identified variables. I also triangulated several interviewees across organisational boundaries, as well as the with systematic primary documentary research.

Based on the networks’ boundary specification, as a first step I relied on ‘sampling for range’, complemented with the ‘snowballing’ technique (Coyne, 1997, Weiss, 1995). Considering that in an ego-network analysis, the population is finite, interviews can be sampled (Belotti, 2014). I identified and systematically reached out to actors involved in the policy-making process. For the cases studied, I contacted officials within the EEAS’s respective sub-units, the national representatives within the Politico-Military Group (PMG) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom). If involved, I also spoke to Commission or other EU agency officials. I also reached out to the CFSP/CSDP Directors based in Foreign Ministries of the most implicated and relevant member states²¹. Lastly, I have reached out to a few PSC Ambassadors, however, I predominantly focussed on speaking to the PMG and CivCom officials as they attended and followed PSC meetings when their files were being discussed. Apart from two regulations in the case of PESCO, which were predominantly

²¹ As expanded upon in the empirical chapters, the policy case-studies, namely PESCO and CCC, saw only an average of 10-12 member states continuously engaged and interested in policy-development. The capitals with whom I have spoken were of those countries that strongly shaped the process throughout in both cases, these include Berlin, Paris, Rome, Stockholm. I was also able to gain limited insight into the point of view of Amsterdam and Brussels through confidential accounts of third parties.

discussed in the PSC and COREPER, the bulk of negotiations took place in the PMG and CivCom. Considering the increasingly transgovernmental nature of policy-making, I have, when necessary, included relevant non-governmental actors. Considering that the role of experts and think tanks were instrumental in the case of the Civilian CSDP Compact, I aimed to also include the views of the most implicated think tanks. Similarly, for the case of PESCO, I have spoken to representatives of defence industries. While they have not had a direct impact on the political dimension of PESCO (i.e. the political commitments), they play a vital role in the overarching intentions to strengthen European industrial defence projects.

While vital as a first step, solely relying on sampling interviewees can lead to important gaps in mapping accurate interaction patterns (see for instance Saunders et al. 2017; Sim, Saunders, Waterfield & Kingstone, 2018). I have also listened to interviewees' recommendations of who the key individuals were. This was of particular use and importance considering the increasing informality of policy-making and the fact that individuals who arise as key nodes in a policy's development are rarely reflected in institution's organigrams. When possible, I have attended conferences or workshops, organised and attended by practitioners. On occasion, this has allowed me to complement and solidify the analysis, offering a 'behind-the-scenes' insight on interaction patterns and clique behaviour. These include the European Defence Summit, a workshop organised by the EUISS and the Finish Presidency on the Civilian CSDP Compact, and an academic-practitioners dialogue on the EEAS and international diplomacy (EURDIPLO project).

The interviews were held on the grounds of confidentiality and anonymity and were not recorded (with the exception of three interviews with high-ranking officials who agreed to be recorded due to the length and importance of the interview for all three case studies). The references that are noted in the thesis are based on notes taken during the interviews; to ensure anonymity they have been numbered (see Annex 1 for list of interviewees, their institutional affiliation, rank and time and date of the interview). While transcribed notes from recorded interviews are often more specific and richer in detail, they have, in my experience, also significantly curtailed the comfort of interviewees to speak about the policy issues of sensitive nature. The choice of prioritising the confidentiality of the interviews was important because some cases, such as PESCO, have been of a particularly sensitive nature. Moreover, the question guide around the frequency and nature of interaction among individuals and officials is particularly revealing of negotiation and strategizing tactics, which officials did not necessarily feel at ease to divulge.

To supplement my interview data, I used primary data for all three cases. First, I assessed all Foreign Affairs Council agendas and press conferences from mid-2014 to mid-

2019. Moreover, the agendas and the outcomes of proceedings of the meetings of the EU Military Committee Working Group (EUMCWG) and the PMG that took place from July 2017 to December 2018, were of particular use to supplement research on the case of PESCO due to its politically sensitive and confidential nature. In a similar vein, I corroborated findings for the Civilian CSDP compact with all relevant documents²². Lastly, especially for triangulating findings on capital-to-capital interaction on the political level, I used the Factiva database to gather an overview of further supplementary evidence from reliable news outlets in English, German and French. This has been of particular use, as capital-to-capital interaction outside of the EU framework is reported and on occasion valuable governmental or EU sources are quoted.

VI) Conclusion

This chapter argues that in order to understand the EEAS's impact and influence on the EU foreign policy-making process it is necessary to analyse its relational capital, meaning the capabilities and resources it derives from its networks. This chapter proposes that the variation in the extent of the EEAS's influence, meaning its ability to purposefully steer and shape policies' direction, is explained by its relational capital. Rather than emphasising its formal-material capital, this chapter has argued that first, the EEAS's embeddedness in a policy's network governance and second, its networks' utilisation must be analysed in order to grasp the extent of and conditions for the EEAS's influence. It is proposed that the EEAS's reach and authority across the governance structure, as well as the nature and use of its relations, is as conducive for policy influence as its formal powers and material resources, if not more so. The constellation of direct and indirect resources in a policy network explains how policy dynamics unfold, and how influence travels. Consequently, the combination of roles the EEAS adopts may skew the variation of the extent of influence. How it uses its networks to acquire and mobilise intangible assets such as information and trust, and how it wields those assets explains under which circumstances it is enabled or constrained to exert influence.

Influence is a dynamic process and lies on the same spectrum as policy impact. The EEAS may, throughout one policy cycle, oscillate between impacting, i.e., having an effect, influencing, purposefully steering and shaping policies. For influence, the EEAS must be intra-institutionally cohesive and pursue a preference or policy goal. This thesis investigates whether the EEAS purposefully and cohesively pursues an interest by utilising its relational

²² Due to the confidentiality of documents (Limité) they have not been quoted nor referenced.

capital. The EEAS can purposefully shape and steer policies on three levels. On the political level, the High Representative, with the support of a cohesive EEAS, can steer policies through its leadership capabilities. On the policy level, it can shape a policy's content at the negotiation stage, embodying either a brokering or mediating role, wielding intangible assets to leverage trust, by being trustworthy and inducing trust, or policy-relevant, political and procedural information, tacitly using its knowledge to offer policy solutions. On the administrative level, it can shape the policy by facilitating or hindering the process logistically.

Aspects related to the network structure and utilisation explain the effect and role the EEAS adopts in the policy-making cycle. Mapping the network structure, we derive the EEAS's embeddedness in a policy's network governance which tells us the EEAS's networks' reach and authority. By analysing its networks utilisation, we grasp whether human and social capital is mobilised to leverage intangible assets, namely trust and information. The extent of influence will depend on the depth of embeddedness of the EEAS in the policy network governance. In other words, the EEAS's reach and authority explains to what extent the EEAS can use its relational resources to exert influence because it tells us how far and deeply connected it is with relevant actors. While not monopolising the use of intangible assets – after all member states, too, act in the sphere and are holders/recipients of information and trust – the EEAS's involvement throughout space (inter-institutionally and across hierarchies) and time (throughout the policy cycle) gives it the ability to actively orchestrate the policy process.

Delving deeper into the EEAS's position and how it uses its social and human capital also highlights what role it plays in the policy-making process. Whether it adopts a brokering or mediating role, and how it mobilises its social and human capital to leverage its knowledge and/or trustworthiness affects the flow of communication, because it affects how information is transmitted during the policy-making process. How information is transmitted and used, which is dependent on the EEAS's position and its social and human capital, gives us insight into the conditions for influence. Which role they adopt gives us insight into how and why the EEAS can shape policies, whether it has a positive or negative impact or whether it may exert policy influence.

Chapter 4 - A case of high influence: the EU Global Strategy as a catalyst for change

I) Introduction

This chapter describes how HR/VP Mogherini, Special Advisor Natalie Tocci and a small group of EEAS officials significantly influenced the making of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) published in 2016. The EUGS is a primary example of how the combination of leadership and a favourable composition of relational capabilities and resources explains the extent of and reasons for a very high degree of influence by the HR/VP and a small group of EEAS officials.

The EUGS is a key policy document. The Strategy builds around five priorities that highlight a shift towards a more security-oriented Union. It starts with prioritising 1) the security of its citizens, 2) the 'state and societal resilience' in its Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods and 3) promoting an integrated approach to conflicts. It further aims to 4) strengthen regional governance and a 5) establish a multilateral rules-based order. Faced with a drastically different geopolitical stage than in 2003 – when its precursor, the European Security Strategy, was published – one can argue that the EUGS led to a 'paradigmatic shift' in EU foreign, security and defence policy (Interview #36). Setting a new 'ambition of strategic autonomy', the Strategy sets out a doctrinal approach to EU foreign policy that centres on European citizens' security and the resilience of partner countries, shedding (to an extent) its normative-transformative discourse (Cross, 2016; Juncos, 2017). With significant focus on the need to acquire force projection, it emphasises capacity-building and pushes for a more 'integrated', 'joined-up' foreign, security and defence policy. The result of an unorthodox process, the writing of the Strategy was accompanied by an extensive outreach process inside and outside EU institutions.

Building on the findings of numerous studies on the EUGS that highlight Mogherini's entrepreneurship (e.g. Mälksoo, 2016; Morillas, 2019; Barbé & Morillas, 2019; Sus, 2016; Tocci, 2017; Amadio Viceré, Tercovich & Carta, 2020), this chapter offers an insight into how the embeddedness and relationships of the EUGS team – Tocci and the top echelon of the EEAS – in a unique network governance allowed them to steer the process and shape the content in accordance with the HR/VP's and Tocci's interest. Despite resistance from

member states and competition from the Commission, they successfully pursued an autonomous process and strongly influenced the EUGS because of their centrality and cohesiveness in an emerging network governance, the support of key stakeholders on the political level, and the ability to, over time, leverage human capital on the policy/administrative level.

The leadership/entrepreneurial duo, Mogherini and Tocci, had jointly high influence as they steered on the political level by expanding the mandate, framing the narrative and using their relational capital to mobilise support for political decisions. On the policy level, the small, cohesive EUGS team, led by Tocci and EEAS officials, devised an insulated and de-centralised drafting process, positioning themselves centrally, as a broker. Able to act as gatekeepers, controlling the information flow by canalising member states' input, they were able to pursue this process due to their intra-institutional cohesion and relational capital. To overcome member states' significant objections to the highly controlled and centralised drafting process and ensure, ultimately, their buy-in, they drew from personal, informal and cooperative networks with key stakeholders. These included the Commission's top echelons and key member states including Germany, Italy and the Dutch Council presidency. Most notably, Tocci was able to mobilise her own and the team's human capital: knowing 'when to speak to whom' to ensure the gradual acceptance strengthened Tocci's legitimacy as sole author. Despite a continuous opaque process, Tocci was able to convincingly argue for choices adopted, both with regard to process and content. Member state representatives and EU officials acknowledged the skill and value of Tocci's analytical rigour.

As the following sections show, these factors were at play in the three phases of policy initiation, formulation and implementation. After a short overview setting the scene (Section II), we will observe how the policy initiation phase (Section III) from late 2014 to June 2015 was emblematic of a strong leadership/entrepreneurial duo of HR/VP Mogherini and Special Advisor Tocci. While drafting the precursor document to the EUGS, the Strategic Assessment, the establishment of a cohesive intra-institutional clique with Tocci as central figure facilitated the management of an insulated writing process. The ties and connections established defined the intra- and inter-institutional dynamics at the second phase and significantly shaped the narrative and themes of the Strategy. Section IV addresses the EUGS formulation stage, which was accompanied by an extensive outreach process from summer 2015 to its publication in June 2016. It highlights how the EUGS team was able to establish themselves as a broker and, despite increased tensions on the political level, gain member states' support. Section V, on the EUGS's implementation, questions to what extent the HR/VP and the EEAS were able to utilise the EUGS as a 'vehicle for change'. The HR/VP

used the EUGS's implementation as an excuse to set the agenda in accordance with her interests on the political level; the EEAS used the EUGS as a 'legitimising tool' to extend its influence in community-areas and financial instruments.




Figure 4.1 Timeline of the process leading to the EU Global Strategy

II) Setting the scene: background and context

Calls to revise the European Security Strategy (ESS) (2003) were pushed to no avail by different groups of member states on two occasions since the late 2000s. Both attempts were unsuccessful because member states disagreed on the need for a revision and feared that the divisions among member states would become too apparent. As a result of Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt's²³ mobilisation, a first opportunity to revisit the Strategy appeared when the December 2007 European Council mandated then HR Solana 'to examine the implementation of the Strategy with a view of proposing elements on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements to complement it' (European Council, 2007:24). Under the French Council Presidency in 2008, President Nicolas Sarkozy reinforced the advocacy for revising – i.e. rewriting – the ESS (#48, 58, 65, Biscop & Coelmont, 2013:12). Their calls 'did not meet with universal enthusiasm' and saw strong resistance in particular from two large member states, Germany and the United Kingdom (Biscop, Howorth & Giegerich, 2009: 3; Tocci, 2017:10). With the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by the Irish electorate in June and the exacerbation of intra-EU tensions about Russia in August 2008, 'appetite for a thorough strategic debate became even weaker' (Biscop & Coelmont, 2013:13). As a consequence, a 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy' was drafted in 2008. As an institutionally led document, both process and outcome did not meet expectations²⁴ (#57; Biscop, 2009: 5-6). To the disappointment of many inside and outside the institutions, the debate remained low-key for more than half a decade.

A new impetus was given in 2013: under the auspices of the Italian, Polish, Spanish and Swedish foreign ministries, the report 'Towards a European Global Strategy' was published by four major think-tanks: the Polish Institute of International Affairs, Elcano Royal Institute, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and the Italian Istituto Affari Internazionali, of which Natalie Tocci was Deputy Director (IAI, PIIA, ERI, SIIA, 2013). Other think tanks and publications joined in, such as the Dutch Clingendael Institute and Carnegie Europe (Dempsey, 2012; Helwig, 2015). However, a full-fledged strategic revision was hindered once again, as incumbent HR/VP Ashton was not considered to be the right individual for the job: she was not keen on taking this task at the very end of her tenure and

²³ In the fall 2007, Bildt argued that 'adopting a revised document at 27 would increase ownership, since the ESS had been adopted at 15, before the 2004 enlargement, even though all accession countries were involved in the debate' (Biscop & Coelmont, 2013: 12).

²⁴ Another concern was that the method pursued by Solana and ESS author Robert Cooper, could not be replicated and that member states' involvement in the negotiation process would result in a worse, unreadable document – an issue that arose again in the making of the EUGS (for a detailed analysis of the process see Biscop & Coelmont, 2013: 12-13).

member state officials believed she lacked leadership and vision (#62, 65). Therefore, member states kept the issue on the back burner as a low-priority topic for fear of creating additional divisions in Europe (Helwig, 2015). Thus, whereas the first attempt failed out of member states' divisions, the second failed out of lack of leadership. Just as it had in 2008, in December 2013 the European Council made a vague note of the need to reassess the challenges the EU was facing.

A reassessment of the EU's security framework was indeed sorely needed: the Arab Spring (2011) and the Maidan crisis (2013) and subsequent annexation of Crimea (2014) showed Europe's inability for rapid, assertive and common action. With the return of geopolitics and the emergence of hybrid threats, member states became more attuned to the necessity of strengthening not only the EU's internal security, but also its ability to become a more forceful and active player on the world stage. Against the backdrop of half a decade of financial and economic uncertainty as a result of the European debt crisis and the failure to find common solutions to increasing migration flows, the EU was in a context of multiple crises, 'altering the EU's self-perception in multiple domains' (Barbé & Morillas, 2019:754; see also Youngs, 2018, Palacio, 2015; Garton Ash, 2015). In December 2013, for the first time since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the European Council met to discuss European defence, calling for 'increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP; enhancing the development of defence capabilities and strengthening Europe's defence industry' (European Council, 2013:2). For many, the December 2013 Council Conclusions on security and defence provided hope for tackling issues of defence spending, stronger coordination and the development of capabilities. What Mogherini later used as a mandate for the strategic revision was an inconspicuous invitation from the Council to the HR/VP 'to assess the impact of changes in the global environment' and to report 'on the challenges and opportunities' (European Council, 2013:4).

By the time Mogherini was appointed in October 2014, the European continent was perceived to be surrounded by a 'ring of fire' (The Economist, 2014). Talk of the broader strategic orientation of EU's action in the world and the need for a White Book on Defence, identifying European military capability shortfalls, became ubiquitous²⁵. The need for a strategic rethink was defensive: faced with 'a wobbly internal and external environment', member states' positions converged based on transboundary security threats and the diminishment of internal cohesion on the continent (official quoted in Barbé & Morillas,

²⁵ Leading the efforts to reinvigorate European security and defence was, among others, former HR Solana who chaired a Task Force on Defence starting autumn 2014. He held several presentations of their Report 'More Union in European Defence' across Europe. It offered various proposals to strengthen defence cooperation (Solana, Blockmans & Faleg, 2015).

2019:759; Morillas, 2020). A ‘compelling geostrategic context and a clear political awareness of it’ was urging member states to act and explains their willingness to invest in a strategic reflection process (Tocci, 2017:11; see also Sus & Nitoiu, 2019). In particular, the desire for a forceful reaction to Russia’s annexation of Crimea became a key mobilising factor (#57, 62).

III) Policy initiation: grasping the momentum in order to define one’s legacy

The period between Mogherini’s appointment and the official mandate to ‘prepare an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy’ in June 2015 is key to understanding the extent of Mogherini and Tocci’s influence (European Council, 2015). The duo influenced the development of the EUGS through leadership/entrepreneurial measures and by shaping the network governance that emerged with the introduction of the Juncker Commission in November 2014.

This section argues that having articulated a vision for the Strategy-making process, they were able to drastically influence the process thanks to the capabilities and resources derived from Mogherini’s leadership and the EUGS teams’ relational capital. It shows that Mogherini, and *de facto* Tocci, pursued a clearly defined vision in both process and content. In line with our definition on successful leadership (pp. 75ff), the duo was able to 1) steer the policy, 2) form a cohesive clique and 3) shape the policy network governance. During the initiation period, Mogherini and Tocci steered the policy by articulating a vision, pursuing a strategic plan to expand the mandate provided by the 2013 European Council, devising an insulated working method and setting the narrative that transpired in the Global Strategy. Significantly, this period laid important foundations for the use of the EUGS team’s relational capital. The initiation period is key as it defines how the EUGS team was able to position itself within newly defined inter- and intra-institutional network dynamics. This in turn allowed them to pursue a personalised, highly centralised and insulated writing process. The clique that formed around Tocci in the emerging governance network comprised senior EEAS officials from the Cabinet and the Strategic Planning Unit (SPU). This clique was able to shape the policy network governance, placing itself at the centre, and mobilise support from key stakeholders. These favourable network conditions and the clique’s administrative capabilities allowed them to act as broker during the Strategy-writing stage (see pp. 70ff).

A. Leadership in context: policy intentions and the HR/VP's interest

The increasingly opportune context which heightened member states' threat awareness helped the newly appointed HR/VP Mogherini to 'give the necessary political push' to set the overall political direction and act a catalyst to revise the outdated ESS (Morillas, 2019:140). Mogherini and Tocci emerged as a crucial leader-entrepreneur duo, harvesting the opportunity to fit both their ambitions. Embodying a leading role on the political level, HR/VP Mogherini, and *de facto* Tocci, were able to steer the process and narrative. As will become evident in this section, a clear intention was set, a vision was articulated, a strategic plan and steps to achieve it were developed, and support for the pursuit of the plan was mobilised (Schroeder, 2014:356). Mogherini and Tocci devised a process which not only carved out more autonomous leeway for the duo, but one which facilitated the channelling of the HR/VP's interest and Tocci's vision, in turn strengthening the EEAS's position in the broader architecture.

The idea of revising the ESS originally came from Natalie Tocci, whom the newly appointed HR/VP had asked to join the team as Advisor. Tocci had already proposed Mogherini's mandate could specifically include the revision of the 2003 ESS a month before the new HR/VP's appointment. Mogherini responded positively 'immediately and unambiguously' (Tocci, 2017:1), assigning Tocci the role of orchestrating and writing a new security strategy. Like any newly appointed HR/VP, Mogherini was aware of her legacy. Crucially, with the strategy was for Mogherini and the EEAS's top echelons found the right tool to set guidelines for intergovernmental and community foreign policy strands – an opportunity to engender change, both institutionally and conceptually (#58, 68, 71, 72). Mogherini was 'smart to find the right person and the right vehicle to help her' – someone politically committed to her, rather than to either the Commission or to a member state (#65; Koops & Tercovich, 2020:281).

A first step was to forge and expand the mandate. The 2013 Council Conclusions' vague invitation 'to assess the impact of changes in the global environment' and to report 'on the challenges and opportunities' was barely a mandate for the revision of a strategy (European Council, 2013:4). Yet it offered a platform to build on and express her intention to build a 'shared strategic outlook' (Mogherini, 2014b). Both in her written answers and in her hearing, she set out creating a 'long-term vision' and engendering a 'strategic reflection' that 'could eventually lead the way to a new European Security Strategy' as a top priority. During her parliamentary hearing in October 2014, Mogherini 'used terms that were deliberately vague, because the mandate in 2013 was not one for a strategy' (#57). Knowing that her appointment was controversial due to her positions vis-à-vis Russia, Mogherini did not want

to overstep the boundaries at that early stage (Tocci, 2016:463; Panichi, 2014). However, there was a clear understanding that the Strategy-making process gave her the opportunity to '[leave] a personal footprint' on EU foreign policy (Morillas, 2020:235).

The mandate interpretation was much debated among the HR/VP, Tocci and top EEAS officials. Top-level officials debated at the end of 2014 how the 2013 Council Conclusions could be interpreted and what process should accompany the drafting of the document. There was disagreement on the interpretation of the mandate. Three procedural points of contention arose in intra-institutional discussions. First, while some high-level officials within the EEAS bureaucracy proposed using the 2013 Council Conclusions as a mandate for rewriting the strategy straight away (in a similar format to the 2008 ESS Review), others – Tocci amongst them – argued against it (#57). In line with then Head of Cabinet Stefano Manservigi and Tocci, Mogherini decided not to follow the stance of others in the EEAS Management. According to Tocci (2016:463) there were several reasons not to rush the process, most notably the risk of souring relations with member states. Moreover, Mogherini (and Tocci) preferred a more comprehensive process, for which an explicit mandate was needed.

Second, officials disagreed to what extent this strategy would be a strategy by and for the HR/VP and member states, or only of the HR/VP – a question that was never officially clarified and became the root cause of soured relations with member states (#64, cf. 57, 58, 67, 70). Similar to the discussion on mandate interpretation, there were contrasting interpretations between Head of Cabinet Manservigi, the EEAS's SPU and Tocci on one side, and the EEAS's Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary Generals on the other. In the end, for Mogherini and her close advisors, the strategy was seen as being the best tool for the HR/VP to leverage change, leading the strategy to be a HR/VP document, rather than a document by the HR/VP *and member states* (cf. #58, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 71, 72). Ownership of the strategy was set to be solely with the HR/VP; the main motivation being that issuing the strategy under the sole responsibility of the HR/VP would be 'a reference for action, rather than a politically binding document' – an interpretation member states and high-level EEAS officials did not share (#70, cf. 62, 64).

Third, there were extensive deliberations on the extent and means through which the Commission should be implicated (#70). Mogherini and her Head of Cabinet, Manservigi, saw the EUGS as an opportunity to 'put the Commission to work', precisely to show that without using the Commission tools, a global strategy would be 'meaningless' (#70). Still, the intention was to use the EUGS as means to leverage the Commission tools and policies. This also explains why conceptually the EUGS was expanded to fit Mogherini's ambitions: to the

disappointment and surprise of some – including member states – Mogherini and Tocci pushed the strategy to be a ‘global’²⁶ strategy, rather than merely a ‘security’ strategy. Discussions about its framework did not face much resistance with the Commission leadership, as the compromise proposed by Mogherini and Tocci was that a specific security and defence-oriented policy document be created after the EUGS (#57). However, member states had specifically circumscribed the strategy to security and defence only and would throughout the initial stage of the strategy recurrently emphasise that the reflection exercise should be limited to security discussions, rather than addressing a global external action strategy (Morillas, 2020:235-237).

As will be explained in the next section, we start seeing here the emergence of an ‘EUGS clique’: a group of close advisors to HR/VP Mogherini who forge tight-knit interaction patterns, privileged information exchange and exclusionary decision-making on the Strategy-making process and form. In early January 2015, Mogherini and her closest advisors decided to pursue a two-step approach, first writing a strategic assessment and then drafting a Global Strategy. This period was a time to ‘test a working method’ and to discern how the second step of creating the strategy could unfold (Tocci, 2016:463). Tocci started working on the Strategic Assessment straightaway in January (Tocci, 2017:11-12).

Beyond merely expanding the mandate and autonomously deciding on process and form, Mogherini and Tocci successfully framed the strategy, thus capitalising on the window of opportunity that was arising due to increased threats from the South and East. They strongly steered the tone of the discourse around the EUGS through the Strategic Assessment. As the precursor document to the EUGS, the Strategic Assessment set the narrative; it framed subsequent discussions in accordance with the views and interests of Mogherini and Tocci. Written by Tocci without any interaction with member states, it did build on advice given by a specially formed ‘Ginger group’ which was composed of approximately eight individuals, including members of Mogherini’s Cabinet, the SPU, the Commission Secretary-General’s Cabinet and a few other relevant officials from different institutional affiliations, often with personal ties to Tocci or Manservigi. The Ginger group offered ‘diversity in temperament and outlook’ (#72). With representatives of different institutional affiliations, it is unsurprising that perceptions of the EU’s strength and needs diverged: from confident, technocratic visions highlighting the instruments of EU prowess to calls for more ‘realistic’ assessment of geopolitical weaknesses of the EU. The group drafted possible outlines

²⁶ In Mogherini’s words ‘global’ is ‘not just intended in a geographical sense: it also refers to the wide array of policies and instruments the Strategy promotes’ (EEAS, 2016b:94).

together, but more importantly also discuss the effects the Strategic Assessment should have (#72, cf. 58). The importance of language and framing already mattered in the Strategic Assessment with some Commission and EEAS-oriented officials seeking to paint a more optimistic picture, whereas Tocci opted for the alternative ‘wake-up call’ approach (#72, cf. 58).

The Strategic Assessment planted several seeds and anchored the overarching philosophy that prevailed in the Strategy. Mogherini and Tocci used the Strategic Assessment to raise questions and introduce perceptions of the EU’s role on the world stage. Three aspects showcase how the two women’s ideas and perceptions shaped the Strategy’s content and implementation itself: 1) its call for a re-evaluation of EU foreign policy’s *raison d’être*; 2) Mogherini’s pursuit to implement a more ‘joined-up/integrated’ European foreign policy and 3) the emphasis of the need for an actionable EU, calling for concrete reforms and hence highlighting the intention to develop an ‘actionable’ document (EEAS 2015c; Dijkstra, 2016).

First, the re-evaluation of the EU’s *raison d’être* in foreign policy led to a new meta-narrative and a pragmatist turn, which would become hallmarks of the EUGS (#36; Davis Cross, 2016; Barbé & Morillas, 2019; Juncos, 2017). For instance, shifting away from the formerly normative language and discourse of the EU, the document starts with an unusually explicit assessment that the EU has the ‘responsibility to protect its citizens, while promoting its interests and universal values’ (EEAS, 2015c:2). Through their analysis of the Strategic Assessment, Tocci raised the question of what the EU could and should achieve on the world stage²⁷. By questioning what is and should be possible in the EU’s external action, the document emphasises the decline of soft power and the need for more ‘leverage’ and influence of the EU (Mogherini, 2015d EEAS, 2015b:9-11,16-17; Legrand, 2016). Tocci laid the groundwork for a vision and story of a more assertive, introspective and ‘pragmatic, yet principled’ EU. The assessment implicitly calls for a new understanding of Europe’s *raison d’être*, moving away from ‘its cosmopolitan and transformative vision’ towards a more securitised foreign policy approach (Barbé & Morillas, 2019:759-760).

Second, Mogherini’s preference to pursue a ‘global’, rather than simply ‘security’, strategy and a more ‘joined-up’ and ‘integrated’ foreign policy were also introduced in the assessment. In line with the above argument that Mogherini, Tocci and the EEAS’s top echelons aimed to leverage the Commission’s tools, they expanded their mandate beyond

²⁷ The document lists the many forms of new security threats facing Europe across seven pages (EEAS 2015c:8-10) and in conjunction with the ‘Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation’ (EEAS 2014b) offers a harsh evaluation of the EU’s and member states’ limitations.

focussing on a security-related strategy (see also Morillas, 2020). The Assessment offered a much more comprehensive understanding of the EU's foreign policy arsenal (pp.6-8). For instance, the document assesses *all* EU instruments, rather than solely focussing on CFSP and CSDP tools. When possible solutions to the challenges faced are addressed, the document focusses much attention on how other instruments, such as trade, sanctions, diplomacy, energy, humanitarian aid and development, can be leveraged (EEAS, 2015c:20). Concomitantly, the Strategic Assessment urged a 'joined-up' approach to Europe's external action. Making a case for what would later be called an 'integrated' approach, it argued that concerted external action must be established through 'closer links between enlargement, neighbourhood, migration, energy, CT and security and defence policies', as well as bridging the internal-external security nexus (EEAS, 2015c:18). The primary purpose of an integrated approach to external action was to '[avoid] the traditional silo mentalities in the CFSP and Commission-led external relations' (Barbé & Morillas, 2019:762).

Noting the advantage of having a 'outsider'/think tanker as author, an EU official involved in the process noted that ideas such as the integrated approach 'certainly did not emerge from a practitioner; no one in Brussels would have had this idea' (#67). The focus on an 'integrated' approach can indeed be linked back to Mogherini, who pursued this view of EU foreign policy-making, and Tocci, who, as a 'think tanker'/academic,²⁸ was well acquainted with the research suggesting that closer interconnection between the different institutional strands was needed for a more coherent foreign, security and defence policy. Much of Mogherini's approach to the EU's foreign and security policy can be traced back to her former position as Italy's foreign minister. Faced with migration issues as foreign minister²⁹ and being HR/VP at the height of the migration crisis, 'she lamented the constant and erratic mode of foreign policy reaction' (Tocci, 2017:16 and 2016:461). Pushing for the concept of an integrated foreign policy was the lever through which Mogherini saw her opening to enact fundamental change in how EU foreign policy operates (ibid).

Lastly, throughout the document the authors instilled a sense of urgency. Pushing against a narrative that it should highlight all that was already being done which simply needed better integration, it was suggested a realistic, 'shock-effect' approach would be – and ultimately was – more effective in mobilising member states (#58, 72). Indeed, the decrease

²⁸ Tocci's academic and 'think-tank' background was often noted as significantly shaping the style and content of the Strategy (#62, 65, 70, 71, 72).

²⁹ The most tangible solution to the migration issue needed to be complementary and tackle both the root causes of migration and provide short-term humanitarian and security solutions. In early 2014, when Italy held the Council presidency and she chaired the informal Gymnich FAC in August, she expressed her view of the necessity of more strategic, comprehensive regional approaches to tackle the root causes of instability (i.e. strengthening their 'resilience') and the need to protect European citizens (Mogherini, 2014c).

of soft power influence and a lack of defence capabilities highlighted the outdatedness of policies and the need for adaptation to new realities, especially in the use of instruments. The Strategic Assessment identified as major challenges the lacking sense of policy direction, the lack of flexibility due to too-heavy procedural requirements, the inability of leveraging change on the world stage consistently, coordination of the multitude of voices, and capability shortfalls. The document emphasised the need for actionability, influence and leverage of the European Union on the world stage (EEAS 2015c:51, also Tocci, 2016:462), offering a glimpse of the intention to develop a policy-oriented strategy (Dijkstra, 2016). In order to overcome these challenges, the Strategic Assessment calls for a ‘common, comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy’.

In sum, Mogherini and Tocci had clear preferences and pursued a policy goal, and as a leader-entrepreneur duo initiated and steered the initial stage of the policy process. The HR/VP was able to act as leader and be successful due to the five factors we identified as necessary to be influential (see pp. 75ff). We have just seen that the duo developed strategic thinking on how to best proceed, articulated a vision engrained in the Strategic Assessment, and framed a narrative to forge a united vision vis-à-vis numerous new threats, seizing the window of opportunities (cf. #58, 68, 70). Moreover, as will be elaborated in the next sections, she was surrounded by ‘a very good team’, who was able to mobilise support for the Strategy. Thanks to full support and trust from Mogherini, a clique emerged, an ‘EUGS team’ of sorts, which was deeply embedded in an emergent network governance and could wield strong relational capital. Led by Tocci, it comprised, among others, the Head of the SPU, Conte, and the Head of Cabinet, Manservigi. With a clear aim in mind, Tocci’s entrepreneurship was able to steer and shape the process on the policy level via the establishment and mobilisation of policy networks. They purposefully devised a process that allowed the Strategy to become her vehicle to engender change.

B. From building one’s fort...

Crucially, the policy initiation stage established lasting intra- and inter-institutional connections which would be upheld throughout the second phase of the strategic reflection. Mogherini and her advisors’ networks were far-reaching, bringing the EEAS closer to both the Commission’s top echelons and the big member states’ foreign ministries. We see two particular developments: First, as an ‘insider-outsider’³⁰ the first phase was crucial for Tocci

³⁰ While being appointed Special Advisor to the HR/VP, Tocci kept her position as Director of the Italian think tank Istituto Affari Internazionali, and was based in Rome.

to define and build her network. Tocci's trump card was having the full backing and rare trust of Mogherini and she became 'the central figure' in the policy network's governance (#72, 73). Second, due to the good working relationship between Tocci, Manservigi, Conte and the Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), Antonio Missiroli – (coincidentally) all Italians – a tight-knit, cohesive and exclusionary clique emerged.

At this stage, Tocci expanded her network, and by extension relied on the relational capital of the EUGS team. Within the EEAS's top echelons, Mogherini's Cabinet and the SPU became important allies in the long run. Their close, frequent interactions led to deep, friendly and cooperative ties, emerging as key to anchoring Tocci in the institutional framework, both intra- and inter-institutionally. As a relative outsider at first – both within the EEAS and vis-à-vis member states – Tocci's main asset became her close, cooperative tight-knit relationship with Manservigi and Conte, and by extension their respective divisions and networks. Branded by a member states official as a 'band of Italians' (#65), the 'EUGS team' forged a clique. This significantly impacted the input and insights Tocci received, as well as curtailed the involvement and influence of actors outside of the close team.

Offering the institutional anchorage Tocci lacked, the SPU was especially relevant in ensuring that the 'right people were spoken to at the right time' (#57, cf. 58). The SPU offered its knowledge about how to navigate inter- and intra-institutional interactions, both in terms of hierarchy and timing. They offered an institutional sensibility to know when to speak to whom in order to ensure stakeholders' feeling of ownership and inclusion in the process – an aspect that became crucial to smoothen the waves with member states who were dismayed at the insulation of the process devised. Their insights were crucial for Tocci to 'show presence' and 'lend an ear' to the relevant committees, e.g. the Military Committee, in the right order. She relied on and worked very closely with the SPU and Manservigi, who subsequently also shaped inter-institutional relations.

Tocci's relationship with other EEAS officials was at first less cooperative, if not strenuous. Her appointment was met with scepticism by some EEAS top management officials as they saw her as an 'imposter'; with others she disagreed on what the form and process the Strategy should take, as highlighted above (#57, cf. 70, 72, 73). EEAS officials were at first opposed to having an 'outsider' take over the role of drafting a document that was meant to be coordinated by the EEAS. Questions about the liability of her role were raised. It took several months, if not years, for certain individuals at the higher echelons of the EEAS to accept her role and position as Special Advisor to Mogherini, one who had carved much leeway for autonomous action.

The fact that relationships with other EEAS top officials were less cooperative further reinforced the clique behaviour observed: information was predominantly shared amongst themselves and exchange was predominantly the result of prior personal connections. Tocci defined and built networks by relying on her own and the EUGS team's networks, which in turn affected the content. For instance, despite it being the talk of the town, the Security and Defence Division of the EEAS was barely involved during early or later discussions on the development of European security and defence – despite having published a commendable and detailed 'Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation' in November 2014 as implementation measures of the 2013 Council Conclusions (Popowski, 2014; EEAS, 2014b). This can again be explained by the strenuous relationship between the two consecutive Deputy-Secretaries General of CSDP with Mogherini and Tocci (#57, 65).

Typical of clique behaviour, information exchange became increasingly more exclusive. The cohesiveness amongst these individuals was accompanied by an insulated deliberation process. The process Tocci devised in late 2014 was solely discussed with the SPU and Mogherini (#57, 58). While Mogherini remained involved in the process and occasionally weighed in with suggestions, comments and views, she trusted Tocci and the SPU to design the process, a rare asset to receive from Mogherini (#58 cf. 57,67,70,73). The composition and use of the Ginger group offers a further example of Tocci using, building and expanding her network. Rather than using the 'Group of Wise Persons'³¹ that was proposed by then-Secretary General Le Roy, Tocci included in this 'group of chosen ones' personal acquaintances of hers and individuals close to Mogherini and Manservigi (#72, 73). The creation of a 'Group of Wise Men', while welcomed by some in the EUGS team, was 'rapidly short-circuited by Mogherini' who wished to have the whole process centralised around Tocci (#73, cf. 58, 72). Though an exaggeration, a high-ranking senior EEAS official noted the Strategy was the result of a dialogue between Tocci and Mogherini (#72). An 'in-group' and 'out-group' emerged, however – and those who were 'in' were those part of Tocci and other EUGS team members' close networks.

We observe a frequent, exclusive exchange among Mogherini, Tocci and the SPU (and at times the Cabinet). The EUGS team and individuals invited by them (e.g., Ginger group) exchanged thoughts and forged ideas. Their approach and opinions converged around process, form and the narrative of the Strategic Assessment (#70, 71, 72, 73; Tocci, 2017). As highlighted, the Strategic Assessment was meant as a 'wake-up call', an aspect discussed in

³¹ Members, who were personally invited by Le Roy, included, among others Pierre Vimont, former Executive Secretary-General of the EEAS from 2010 to 2015, Robert Cooper, former Senior Advisor to HR Solana, and Pierre Defraigne, a former senior European civil servant in DG Trade.

the Ginger group (#72). In contrast, other top ranking EEAS officials were not systematically involved; although they gave their opinions they were not taken much into consideration, and at a later stage even the Managing Board did not see the full text of the Strategy (#73). As will be argued, the tight-knit, supportive clique permitted Tocci to pursue the insulated working method, which not only steered the process, but significantly shaped the Strategy's content.

C. ... To forging deeper relations in an emerging governance network structure

Having highlighted the intra-institutional relations – the emergence of a clique around Tocci, Conte and Manservigi who showed a proclivity to involve Commission officials while excluding some other high-level EEAS officials– we will here address the inter-institutional interactions. This section argues that the EUGS team's network reach and authority in the Commission led to Commission President Juncker and his Secretary-General Office's support, while keeping the process insulated. The involvement of the Commission in the policy-making process entailed a careful balance: securing the Commission's support while *de facto* excluding it from the insulated writing process Mogherini and Tocci pursued. We will further observe how inter-institutional engagement significantly contributed to shaping the emerging policy network governance.

Indeed, the early steps of the EUGS team were unfolding in an emergent, new governance network. The establishment of Juncker's Commission came at a time when Mogherini initiated and carried out significant intra- and inter-institutional reforms, which further consolidated the EEAS's position in the foreign and security architecture. Generally, the governance network shifted in favour of a closer embeddedness of the EEAS in the Commission, most notably with the appointment of Manservigi, and close ties to the German, Italian and French Foreign Ministries, due to the appointment of Oliver Rentschler as Deputy-Head of Cabinet, Stefano Conte at the Head of the SPU, and Alain Le Roy as Secretary General. Within this evolving structure, the EUGS team was able to forge the policy network governance drawing from the EUGS team's relational capital.

With regard to inter-institutional interactions, it is noticeable how closely connected Tocci was with the Commission as a result of the EUGS team's networks. Indeed, Manservigi and Conte were key in setting up the inter-institutional network reach. Having worked in the EEAS already under Ashton, Conte had a broad network which Tocci drew upon throughout the process, which also included a great number of Commission officials (#57). Manservigi played a particularly important role here as former Commission man whose authority was crucial in bringing Mogherini and the EEAS closer to the Commission (Blockmans &

Russack, 2015:6; König, 2015:12). Espousing a pro-active VP role and linking both institutions closer together was Manservisi's 'mission', as he was deeply embedded in the Commission and friendly with Juncker and Michel Barnier, who would be appointed as Special Advisor for European Defence and Security Policy.

Manservisi succeeded in getting the Commission's political buy-in while securing full ownership of the Strategy to the EUGS team. Mogherini and Manservisi actively sought the Commission's cooperation, yet wanted to avoid any binding ownership claims by the Commission (#70). It was agreed with Juncker personally that while the Commission would be on board, contributions would not be approved by the College of Commissioners – otherwise the VP-position of Mogherini would be bound to decisions of the College, incompatible with its 'HR' role vis-à-vis member states. Moreover, it was also agreed with the Commission that developing the defence agenda, potentially even write a White Book on Defence, would wait until after the Global Strategy: Mogherini and the EUGS team successfully argued that first a coherent 'big picture' was needed, wherein defence as one 'bit' would be complementary (#57, 70). After all, one 'should not be putting the cart in front of the horse' (#57). The cooperation at this stage is rather revealing: the involvement of the Commission's top echelons highlight 'that there was a clear acceptance that the Strategic Assessment and the policy consequences deriving from it would not only impact the member states but the totality of the EU, including the Commission' (Morillas, 2019:139).

This relationship, however, remained frail. While seeking to break the EU's silo mentality and pursuing a more 'integrated' approach, HR/VP Mogherini was reluctant to be too close – especially as the Commission became visibly more pro-active on defence. Indeed, while overarchingly cooperative, the relationship between Mogherini and Juncker tensed between the middle and end of 2015 when the Commission started gearing up to define its European Agenda on Security³² and work on defence. Mogherini became 'sceptical' after the appointment of Michel Barnier as Special Advisor on matters of security and defence and Juncker's divisive call for a 'European army' (#70; Duke, 2017:178; Robinson & Shotter, 2015). The reluctance of Mogherini and the EEAS was based on the justified fear that a too-visible Commission in the defence policy space undermined her work with and trust received from member states – which was already waning based on their impression she was too close to the Commission (Koops & Tercovich, 2002:295).

In lower echelons, relations between the EUGS team – in particular Tocci– and Commission officials started on very good footing. Many connections were made directly by

³² Adopted in April 2015, the European Agenda on Security aims to improve the EU's response to security threats, tackling in particular hybrid threats such as terrorism, disrupting organised crime, and fighting cybercrime.

an EUGS team member; a Commission Taskforce was established and became ‘very useful’ (#57), many Commission officials were ‘very enthusiastic and very supportive of the process’ (#68). This split between the leadership and policy/administrative levels is one that became increasingly relevant throughout the process. It highlights how network dynamics may unfold differently on different levels because of different relational capital of the HR/VP and respective EEAS officials. We thus also expect varying effects on their ability to respectively steer or shape the policy process. The EUGS team’s good and close relations to the Commission and more strained relations with the rest of the EEAS’s top echelons explains the significant involvement of the Commission from the outset of the process, and the total lack of involvement of member states. While Foreign and Defence ministers continued to be briefed about the strategic review³³, there was no interaction between Tocci and member states during the writing of the Strategic Assessment. The Strategic Assessment was not at all at the forefront of discussion among member states until late spring 2015. Terrorism, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Libya, or the need to strengthen European Defence and Security more generally remained the key issues on top of the agendas.

Be it due to the publication of the Strategic Assessment as ‘wake-up call’ in June 2015, the increased urgency to converge on a strategic vision on European foreign policy, or a combination of both, spring 2015 brought with it a proliferation of member state-led discussions on the strategic review process. Indeed, whether coincidentally or not, the Assessment’s publication led to a growing commitment to the process among EU member states (#65). By May 2015, member states had started to discuss the strategic review in various formats: bilaterally, minilaterally and in various committee fora (e.g. Chiefs of Defence at the EU Military Committee, the EU Security Policy Directors). Once first drafts of the Strategic Assessment were circulated and then-Secretary General Le Roy announced that a mandate for a new, wider European foreign and security strategy was forthcoming³⁴ (Le Roy, 2015), bilateral discussions started. For instance, in mid-May, a Hungarian parliamentary group visiting Berlin discussed with then-Secretary of State Michael Roth that the review of the strategy needed to handle the Russia-Ukraine war and ISIS; a week later, the Latvian Foreign Minister discussed the review with the Head of Europe Division of the Chancellery Meyer-Landruth as one of their EU Presidency’s priorities; early June saw the Romanian

³³ In addition to short discussions at the FAC on April 20th and May 18th, Dr Missiroli, Director of EUISS presented the Strategy Review proposed by the HRVP to EU Security Policy Directors at the informal biannual meeting in Riga on April 25th and Chiefs of Defence also discussed the review of a European Security Strategy in their biannual meeting in the EU Military Committee on May 19th.

³⁴ On May 6th, Le Roy said that one of the key issues discussed at the upcoming EU Summit at the end of June would be the strategic review, already highlighting that it would go beyond reviewing the European Security Strategy: ‘The goal, if possible, is to get the HR a mandate from the EU summit to prepare a new European Security Strategy. It will probably be wider. We will call it the new European Strategy on Foreign Policy and Security with the intention to presenting it in the first half of 2016’.

Foreign Minister discuss the importance of strengthening the Euro-Atlantic space, within the Strategy's review process with the Dutch Foreign Ministers and so forth (BBC, 2015). Member states certainly became more attuned to and aware of the process that was looming. However, the fact that the EUGS team had already been discussing the main storyline of the Strategy for just under a year, and that they made the unilateral 'decision' that it be an 'HR' document, gave member states little ability to drastically change either process or narrative.

In sum, the first of the two-step 'strategic rethink' process was like an incubation period, where process and tone were devised, networks built, and the policy network governance forged around a cohesive, insulated clique. The first section highlights the clear interests and intentions Mogherini, Tocci and the EUGS team to use the EUGS as a policy document to enact change. Leadership/entrepreneurial initiatives not only expanded the mandate, shaped the narrative, and allowed the EUGS team to devise and manage the process, but also were crucial in establishing favourable network constellation and forging the policy network's governance. Unsurprisingly, by initiating, leading and managing the process, Tocci and the EUGS team were placed centrally, giving them the opportunity to act as gatekeepers and have greater autonomy and control (Borgatti, Evert & Johnson, 2018:190). As the SPU remained the administrative manager of the process, they also shielded Tocci from too much direct interaction with other stakeholders. The cohesive EUGS team was able to insulate the process due to their role and position in the network. Assessing the emergence and forging of a network around Tocci through the EUGS team highlights the reach and authority of their ties, especially with the Commission. Crucially, due to the support both intra-institutionally (from Mogherini) and inter-institutionally (from the Commission's leadership), the cohesive clique was able to devise an insulated writing process, through which they could strongly influence the Strategy-writing process.

IV) Formulating and negotiating the Global Strategy: managing and brokering content and form

The Strategy-writing stage lasted from autumn 2015 until its publication in summer 2016. The extensive outreach process was divided between the 'public outreach' and, more important for the sake of this analysis, the 'core' outreach process, namely discussion rounds with member states, the Commission and EEAS officials. This section assesses how the interactions and network dynamics evolved, solidifying the EUGS's team brokering role and hence enabling them to canalise member states involvement and control the information flow throughout the Strategy-writing stage. A broker is best positioned for full control of

information, uniquely bridging actors, and hence has a much more advantageous position to shape the policy's content than other policy actors (Burt, 1992:45; see page 65.). Ideas and input were assessed and included in a less-than-systematic manner, leaving the EUGS team and Tocci to decide what to include or leave out. Crucially, however, the acceptance of this insulated process from dismayed member states was only possible due to the EUGS team's human capital. They succeeded in engaging member states and Commission officials whilst remaining in full control of the Strategy's content. By remaining accessible and providing convincing arguments, Tocci gained legitimacy, securing the support of key stakeholders to ensure the Strategy would not be rejected.

A. A favourable position: channelling and controlling the information flow

The process pursued solidified Tocci and the EUGS team's embeddedness in the policy network governance. The EUGS team established a process that canalised and controlled member states information and kept tight control over the process. Beyond being insulated and controlled, the writing process was also de-centralised and resulted in the isolation of member states. Centrally placed and administratively managing a diffuse and far-reaching outreach process, the team brokered a Strategy text that was mostly in line with the above-mentioned interest of Mogherini and storyline of Tocci's Strategic Assessment. The continued coherent and trustful relationship between all actors within the EUGS team, as well as the unconditional support from Mogherini, helped Tocci push through her vision for process and content – despite member states' dismay.

The 'unorthodox' process gave control to the EUGS team in two ways: first, where and with whom Tocci discussed the Strategy and second, how she interacted with and channelled member states' information. As an involved EEAS official noted, 'we, who were in contact with everyone at the same time, we benefitted from this process' (#58). National diplomats on the other hand expressed that accepting the process was 'challenging'; another – less diplomatically – remembered member states feeling the Strategy being 'shoved down their throats' (#62, 68). In order to apprehend the trap of a highly technical, bureaucratically negotiated text, Tocci ultimately proposed a format which allowed the EUGS team to be the central node in the structure. By asking member states to appoint Points of Contacts (POCs), rather than discussing the Strategy within the PSC, Tocci purposefully sought out first, individuals who were based in the capitals and second, a group of officials that she could solicit much more frequently and extensively than PSC ambassadors: 'Neither COREPER nor PSC were likely to commit in practice' (Tocci, 2016:466). The consequence was, first, direct links to capitals and secondly, it isolated member states. The individual POCs were a

heterogeneous group, often not knowing one another. Insulating the communication, the tying node was their respective counterpart in the EUGS team. Indeed, member state officials often complained that ‘they felt too much in the hands of the EEAS when it came to reflecting their inputs into the strategy’ (Morillas, 2020:237). To ‘steer the input’ the EUGS team used two tools of communication that further insulated the deliberation process: at the initial stage, questionnaires and at a later stage, once chapters started to be formed, so-called ‘confessionals’ (Tocci, 2016:466). To apprehend the fast issuance of non-papers by member states, questionnaires were sent out at the beginning of December 2015 and all returned by the third week of January. As a central actor in the policy network governance they canalised the member states’ involvement and were able to control, filter and ‘colour’ the information stream (Borgatti, 2005; see pp. 64ff).

The team canalised the information exchange by insulating and de-centralising the channels of information. Negotiations on the chapters themselves were done by meeting POCs either individually or in small groups. The POCs met jointly a total of seven times during the drafting phase (López-Aranda, 2017:74). In the seven meetings, discussions were structured according to the questionnaires sent out by the EEAS. Rather than discussing and negotiating the text collectively, the team offered summaries of the Strategy’s chapters in small groups of member states, hence isolating and de-cluttering discussions. Certain member states, such as Poland, regretted the limited possibility to discuss aspects of the Strategy with other POCs (Sus, 2016:343). While the direct, extensive exchanges between the EUGS team and capitals through the ‘confessionals’ were in hindsight applauded (#36, 48, 54, 67), at the time the dismay about the process among member states was exacerbated as their opinions communicated in the ‘confessionals’ were not directly reflected in the final text (López-Aranda, 2017:75).

As a consequence, a new process of socialisation outside Brussels emerged. Isolating and insulating member states through the confessional method and the presentation of ‘summaries’ of chapters to groups of member states at the same time, national POCs that were clustered in small groupings established informal coalitions among themselves, thus forging a denser informal network. Indeed, the decentralised process had broader repercussions. To a certain extent, member states reinforced direct capital-to-capital ties and forged new coalitions. Member states grew increasingly interconnected, building strengthened informal networks between the Points of Contacts, who often were individuals based in the Ministries’ Strategic Planning Units, and who had barely ever interacted with one another. The POC-group was very heterogeneous. Being composed of either representatives of a member states’ Strategic Planning Unit, the European Correspondent, or the respective PSC ambassador,

individuals rarely knew each other and were not tightly connected. While European Correspondents and PSC Ambassadors already knew each other, Strategic Planners socialised and built lasting ties, for instance deeper links between Bulgaria and the Netherlands (#65) and between Polish, Danish, Swedish and Romanian representatives, who issued a joint paper (Sus, 2016:344). This socialisation highlights that in this particular case, the drive for intergovernmental exchange was high and fostered capital-to-capital exchange. Whether as a result of tying new connections through an increased socialisation of the process, in dismay of Mogherini's governing style or just as a parallel-evolving dynamic (#64, 65; Sus, 2016), deeper capital-to-capital ties emerged (cf. #48, 65).

The Brexit referendum offered a 'wonderful excuse' to push for such an 'unorthodox' process; member states did appreciate that in an extraordinary time, an extraordinary method was needed (#57). The centralised and almost-secretive process surrounding the text was justified by the importance of hindering any leaks that could have been exploited by the press (successfully so) (ibid). This process placed the EUGS team, with Tocci as central orchestrator, in a favourable position to broker between the HR/VP vision and member states' inputs. The fact that the EUGS team was also 'managing' the administrative process gave them all additional administrative advantages, including the ability to set the agenda during the meetings. Concomitantly, a process of socialisation took place among actors in national Foreign Ministries that previously did not interact.

B. Crafting the Global Strategy – whose content?

The outreach process undeniably showed the effort the team took to ensure involvement and a feeling of ownership by member states (#74; Sus, 2016:343). Tocci (2016:466) explained that 'while the skeleton of the Strategy and its driving philosophy came from the HR/VP and her team, the flesh and the bones came from Member States and the Commission'. A more fitting description of the Strategy's content is that of 'a collage of ideas' (#57). The question, however, is which – or rather whose – ideas? A particular challenge in this analysis is that the assessment of the usefulness and inclusion of content drawn from member states, individuals or events is difficult to grasp (cf. #57, 58, 67). Due to the above noted process the writing of the Strategy was not transparent; 'the terms of action' in the writing process remained unclear (#68). The process established allowed the SPU, as gatekeepers, to scan the masses of input received through the extensive outreach process to fit the conceptual structure that Tocci and Mogherini had set out for themselves. The Strategy's philosophy and the text's ideas were affected only to a limited extent by the outreach process, relying instead on the personal

networks and assessments of Tocci and the SPU. This section proposes that the extensive interactions were a ‘strategic compensation’ for enforcing the above-described insulated writing process in order to work towards the acceptance, rather than rejection of the Strategy after its publication.

For Mogherini and Tocci it was crucial to have member states’ ownership of the Strategy. The outreach process was a ‘political necessity’ to ensure member state buy-in. It aimed to ‘create a level of comfort’ with member states and the Commission; most of the outreach events were ‘pro forma’ to give people the sense that all are being listened to, taken into account and ‘caressed’ (cf. #57, 58, 72). As officials involved in the drafting of the Strategy acknowledged, only a few of those events directly fed into the actual text of the Strategy (#57, 58, 67). The text was solely written by Tocci, who received feedback from the SPU and EUISS – reinforcing the perception that this group of people acted as broker, meaning they picked and chose what input to use.

Without downplaying the role that the public outreach process³⁵ played, it is notable that the numerous events and accompanying publications had a limited effect on the Strategy itself. The process was comprehensive and far-reaching. By engaging the public and national elites across Europe it certainly contributed through generating awareness and reflection on European foreign policy. The impact of this outreach process, however, was mostly useful to craft what could be defined as a ‘narrative surrounding the narrative’. Despite shaping the overarching discourse of strengthening European security or debating the role of interests and values, the outreach process was a means to have engaging discussions among European actors, while giving the impression of their involvement in the strategic rethink (cf. #57, 58, 67). An example showing the extent of networking-interaction of the EUGS team occurred during the ‘Inter-parliamentary Conference on CFSP and CSDP’ organised by the Dutch Presidency in The Hague in April 2016, the last month of the outreach process. In a workshop on the EUGS, Tocci spoke about how the EUGS was being created and addressed the topics that were raised, including the former priorities of the Eastern Partnership, threats from the East and the MENA region, the inclusion of the Maritimes Security Strategy of the Far East and the role of defence developments (Sebej, 2016). In many respects, the gist and content of the Strategy was already written – yet the outreach process continued. Other than strengthening their understanding of the realms of the debate and member states’ positions

³⁵ The events took place from the beginning of September 2015 until April 2016. The list of events showed the effort to be inclusive geographically and encompassing thematically. Ministries of Foreign Affairs of each member states co-organised events with national think tanks or universities in coordination with the EUISS and SPU. Over 50 events across the EU took place. A wealth of written contributions and opinion pieces were published (Missiroli, 2016b).

in them, few of the interventions were incorporated in the Strategy-writing process (#58, 67, 70).

For Tocci (2016:466), ‘the core of the work regarded the official institutions’. While keeping tight grip on the text of the Strategy, giving the feeling of ownership remained nonetheless key. Member states were very keen to be involved – more than anticipated by the EUGS team. Indeed, the ‘core’ outreach process with member states snowballed into a much more extensive process than planned. In Summer 2015, a tentative roadmap outlined less than a dozen conferences that could take place in member states with specific thematic foci (#57). In the end, however, almost all Foreign Ministries of member states co-organised discussion rounds with the SPU. Yet throughout the process, the EUGS team kept control of these events. Their administrative duties as co-organisers allowed them to facilitate the discussion. The EUGS team framed themes and questions in accordance with ‘the themes of the Strategic [Assessment]’ to ensure that the subject and questions tackled be useful for the deliberations around the Strategy (#57, cf. 67). Several of the ‘core’ meetings did not provide any depth in content as discussions remained rather ‘basic’, not least as ‘individuals did not know one another’ (#57). Still, these events were crucial in giving those individuals the sense of involvement and strengthen member states ownership. Tocci copied-and-pasted snippets of member states’ responses of questionnaires and non-papers to give them the impression of ownership. By using the exact wording, contributors ‘would read themselves’ in the Strategy, which ‘would likely increase their support for it’ (Tocci, 2016:467).

Instead, personal networks played a much more significant role in feeding the author with ideas. It is only normal that not every individual offered insightful and innovative thoughts; however, what is more peculiar in this situation is the extent to which personal networks were used in the Strategy-making process, both regarding whose input was sought out, and who in the end had the privilege of seeing the final text version. Tocci drew from her own and the SPU’s far-reaching personal networks inside and outside of the institutions (cf. #57, 58, 61, 67, 72). For instance, Conte introduced Tocci to individuals he believed relevant throughout the process – not only the Directors of DGs, but also lower-ranking, knowledgeable and interesting people (e.g. Luigi Soreca, then Deputy Director in DG Home or Koen Doens in DG DEVCO) (#57). Equally, there was ‘no systematic involvement’ of the EEAS Geographical Desks, ‘it depended’ (#67). Moreover, individual think tankers had a direct impact: Tocci included in the process in particular EUISS officials and individual Brussels-based think tankers (#57, 61, 67). They were among the few to see a full (hard copy) version of the Strategy, even prior to member state officials. While on paper the ‘core’ outreach process aimed to systematically engage with key actors, in practice the feedback that

was included and worked into the draft came from trusted, known individuals deemed experienced, knowledgeable or 'thinking outside the box'. In the end, it came down to what ideas and concepts were deemed innovative, useful and fitting the views of the EUGS team.

Despite negotiating the text formulation of a few contentious issues, most notably on Russia, the Strategy was crafted by Tocci herself, with occasional input from Mogherini and substantial feedback from the EUGS team. Typical of clique behaviour and the capabilities derived from a brokering position, they were able to draw from the vast information flow provided whenever it was deemed interesting. One example was picking the concept of 'principled pragmatism' from the 'three or four' meetings with the EEAS Managing Board, which, like others, was not given sight of the Strategy text (#58). Certainly, member states' opinions and red lines were incorporated, but Mogherini's interest steered and Tocci's philosophy strongly shaped the Strategy's content. As an EU official noted, they 'exercised the process smartly': the outcome is a compromise of Mogherini's ambitions, watered down by member states' conflicting ambitions (#58, cf. 68). The EUGS team safeguarded Tocci's insulation during the writing process. As organisers of the outreach process, the EUISS (for the external process) and SPU (for the 'core' process) became gatekeepers behind which Tocci was able to write the Strategy. As an important ally to Tocci, they were the only ones having sight of full drafts and gave feedback on the text itself, highlighting what 'would or would not fly' (#67). The central figure in a deeply embedded tight-knit clique, they were able to control the information flow and insulate the writing process. This places the EUGS team in the right setting to broker among actors, i.e. use the information to their advantage.

These sections have shown that in a de-centralised network structure, the EUGS team continuously positioned themselves centrally, forging the policy network structure. Their formal and informal networks' reach was diverse and broad. The network structure reflected the information flow being bundled by the EUGS team. Coupled with their administrative powers, they were able to devise a process to channel and control member states' information; the themes discussed during the outreach process were defined by the team, based on preconceived ideas developed in the Strategic Assessment. Thus far we have tackled how the network structure and interaction patterns reflected the ability of the EEAS to control and insulate the writing process, and drastically shape the Strategy's process and content. The HR/VP and EUGS team, acting cohesively, acted as leader, broker and facilitator, even managing the administrative process. They steered and shaped the Strategy on the political, policy and administrative level. Crucially, the ultimate acceptance by member states, who were dismayed by their 'exclusion' from leading the process at first, shifted due to the human

capital the EUGS team was able to wield over time. The next section will address how legitimacy vis-à-vis Tocci emerged.

C. Building legitimacy for acceptance: the use of human capital

As this section argues, the EUGS team's human capital ensured political acceptance of the Strategy. Over time the EUGS team and Tocci's human capital increased member states' support, ensuring the acceptance of the unorthodox process and the Strategy. Human capital is the skill of officials to build on their gathered information (including, political, procedural or any policy-relevant expertise) and political sensibilities to shape and advance a policy's development by convincing policy actors, either through argumentative means or by mobilising support (see pages 68ff.; Cornut 2018). As a broker wielding human capital, argumentative means are used to convince actors involved and to build support. In the context of the EUGS, Tocci and the team were 'persuasive', ensured that member states felt listened to, and built credibility around their skill through continuous justifications for their decisions (cf. #62, 65, 68, 72, 74; Sus, 2016:343). Moreover, the Commission, the Dutch Presidency and Germany's support emboldened Tocci's pursuit of an unorthodox, insulated writing process.

Disaggregating the political and policy/administrative levels, we observe that the nature of relationships between the respective actors evolved differently, however: while relations between Tocci and the EUGS team and those stakeholders at the political and policy level improved, those between the HR/VP and the Commission and Foreign Ministries came increasingly under strain. Mogherini's pursuit of carving out more autonomy led to competitive relations with the Commission; she was not successful in mending and stabilising relations with Foreign Ministers. The fact that member states by and large approved the Strategy, despite an insulated, opaque writing process, was the result of the favourable relational capabilities and relational resources composition: the EUGS team and Tocci were able to garner support for a document they strongly influenced due to their ability to wield their human capital throughout the process. The centrality and insulated position of Tocci in relation to the EUGS writing process was possible due to the support and close, cooperative involvement of the Dutch Council Presidency, Germany and Italy. While the process met with strong resistance from member states, over time (for the most part) legitimacy vis-à-vis the process and Tocci emerged, and her reputation and legitimacy rose due to her human capital.

Interactions with the Dutch Council Presidency were frequent and cooperative, building and interacting on the structure of the Strategy (#65). Tocci and the EUGS team

also worked very well with the Dutch Council Presidency in early 2016. The Netherlands was not only a strong advocate for the need of a ‘real global strategy’ rather than ‘yet another security strategy’, but also supported the ‘unorthodox’ approach (#65). As the EUGS team was predominantly Italian, and Conte was a Seconded National Diplomat from Rome, it is unsurprising that ties with Rome remained close. More interesting, however, is the extremely close relationship Tocci forged with Germany. Germany’s and the team’s relations were very close, not least because Germany strategically placed an SND into the SPU in October 2015. Having just undergone its own foreign policy strategic ‘Review 2014’ process, ‘having their mole’ in the SPU was a ‘win-win’ situation: Germany had a much deeper insight into the process, while the SPU gained the experience of an official who had co-orchestrated a very similar process (#58, cf. 62, 67). It was particularly important for Germany to shape the Strategy as it remains a crucial pillar in the foreign, security and defence policy (Béraud-Sudreau & Pannier, 2020:8). Not only was Tocci already friendly with German PoC Thomas Bagger, she also established a good working relationship with PSC Ambassador Flügger (#62, 67, 72). Bagger, who was then Head of the German Strategic Planning Unit, had pursued a similar outreach process to the one proposed by Tocci for the EUGS during the ‘Review 2014’ process and was supportive of the pursuit of such an ‘unorthodox’ process (#57, 67). The support of these countries facilitated and strengthened Tocci’s position.

In addition to key stakeholder support, over time Tocci also gained legitimacy from other member states. ‘Member states got to know Tocci’, who successfully explained, argued and convinced them her choices were the right ones (#62, cf. 65). She very clearly ‘fought for her positions’ and was ‘persuasive’ and ‘able to convince’ member states (#62, 65, 68; Morillas, 2020). That Tocci was very easily reachable further alleviated grievances. The facility of engaging with Tocci electronically or in person whenever she was in Brussels eased tension. Indeed, Tocci successfully ‘calmed member states down’ (#62, cf. 68). Despite not sharing the text with member states, she established clear communication. It is important to highlight that PSC Chair Walter Stevens played a valuable additional mediatory role, offering further transparency and trust in the process.

The fact that member states only ‘welcomed the presentation of the Strategy, rather than ‘endorsed’ it, as Mogherini proposed in the original Draft Conclusion, is to some extent a rebuke of Mogherini’s governing style (cf. #62, 68). Two reasons explain why member states agreed on ‘welcoming the presentation of the Strategy, rather than ‘endorsing’ or ‘welcoming’ it. First, some member states were ‘not comfortable with some of the elements mentioned in the Strategy’, especially on certain passages that were programmatic and needed additional detail (#68, cf. 62). In particular, the contentious issue of ‘strategic autonomy’

hindered full endorsement. Interestingly, the inclusion of the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’ was significantly strengthened only after the Brexit referendum. The full text of the EUGS was circulated for the first time on June 26th, 2016 – three days before the European Council on the 28th-29th of June (Tocci, 2017). As a high-ranking official noted, in the two days between the Referendum and Mogherini’s spontaneous, unilateral decision to present the Strategy³⁶, ‘we added several references to this concept, because the Brits were the ones resisting the most’ (#73). This last-minute inclusion highlights the influence of the EEAS’s top-echelons’ involvement in drafting the document and explains some member states’ reluctance to officially endorse the document.

The second reason was a more general rebuke of the increased autonomy Mogherini carved out (#68, cf. 62, 65, 73). Some member states felt that she aimed to carve out too much autonomy through her proactive and frequent use of her VP-hat while neglecting the ‘inter-governmental corridors of power in Brussels’ (Koops & Tercovich, 2020:295). The means through which Mogherini pursued ‘her’ Strategy was just a precursor to an increasingly tense relationship with the Foreign Ministers, who did not feel heard. As a PSC Ambassador explained, the EUGS insofar as it represented blessing for more independence for Mogherini was refused. An apparent disconnect with Foreign Ministers emerged due to her governing style, which showed little interest in ‘hearing’ and listening to member states (#68, 69, 73, cf. 18, 72). While assessments of her legacy in the end strongly diverge, there is an agreement that the communication between HR/VP and Foreign Ministers during her tenure needed improvement (cf. #18, 38, 43, 56, 65, 68, 73).

Similarly, while interaction dynamics with mid- to lower-ranking Commission officials stayed cooperative and offered meaningful insights on the lower policy-level, competition in the higher-echelons grew. Throughout 2016, when the Commission started developing the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP), competing agendas on security and defence emerged. Numerous studies have highlighted the proactive, political role Juncker’s Commission played in the Commission’s entrepreneurial role in defence (e.g. Béreaud-Sudreau & Pannier, 2020; Haroche, 2019). Relations between HR/VP Mogherini and the Commission became ‘very competitive’ and grew increasingly strained (#55, 72). The EDAP, officially presented at the end of November 2016, had been in discussion since spring 2016 (Mogherini, 2016d). To strengthen the European industrial defence sector,³⁷ the Commission

³⁶ There had been debates over whether the presentation should be postponed due to the Brexit referendum, but Mogherini personally decided to move forward with the presentation (Tocci, 2017; Morillas, 2020:238).

³⁷ Already the 2013 December Council Conclusions linked in its first paragraph the strengthening of European citizens’ security and the fragmented European defence markets, which jeopardised the European defence and security industry (Council of the EU, 2013: 2). Next to increasing the effectiveness and impact of CSDP and enhancing the development of capabilities, the third key pillar of the Conclusions was strengthening Europe’s defence industry.

proposed to financially support European industrial defence projects and substantially fund research and development projects through the establishment of a European Defence Fund (EDF). The April 2016 FAC/Defence showcased that several member states and the HR/VP remained critical vis-à-vis the initial discussions, not least as using the budget to fund defence was against the treaties³⁸. As will be discussed below, immediately after the publication of the EUGS, the EEAS started working on the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (IPSD), which proposed a number of policies and initiatives to strengthen European defence. Competition between those two institutions transpired on a working level in the summer of 2016 when the EDAP and IPSD were being drafted simultaneously. As a high-ranking EEAS official involved acknowledged, the fact that the Commission's work on the EDAP was kept close to their chest might have been the result of the EEAS not closely involving them throughout the EUGS and IPSD process (#55). There certainly was 'some interaction', yet 'no synchronisation' (ibid).

As expected, when a broker wields its human capital, we see substantial influence (see page 72). We have in this section showcased how the cohesive, insulated clique around Mogherini and Tocci, the EUGS team, and their far-reaching networks gave them the ability to pursue an unorthodox, opaque process. Their embeddedness in the policy network governance, centrally positioned with de-centralised ties to capitals, placed them in a favourable position to broker among member states and Mogherini's interests. The network structure and their embeddedness allowed them to control the flow of information and member states' input, hence influencing the content. Building network coalitions and gaining legitimacy through Tocci's human capital ensured member states played along and ultimately accepted the end product.

We can draw a few conclusions. First, it is the intra-institutional cohesion and inter-institutional reach of the EUGS team that explain the extent of influence they had: mobilising a great number of actors and de-centralising the process led to a socialisation process and generated a 'narrative around the narrative' that significantly contributed to the importance laid on the Strategy. Second, the team's position as broker and the nature of relations during the process explains why they were able to be so influential, notably in shaping the Strategy's

³⁸ Then-German Defence Minister von der Leyen highlighted in surprisingly critical tones that more clarity as to whether and how financial means would be available to the Commission needed to be clarified as soon as possible (von der Leyen, 2016). At a press conference, Mogherini emphasised that she 'shared with member states the sense of frustration that legal aspects' of the Commission's proposal still needed to be improved. However, responding to a journalists' follow-up question, she defended that as VP of the Commission she saw 'no inter-institutional problems ...rather there is strong determination on the political level – all want this instrument as quickly as possible' (Mogherini, 2016d). Outside of media limelight, however, Mogherini and member states alike called for more coordination with the EU Global Strategy. Mogherini's scepticism vis-à-vis the Commission grew (#70).

content, while garnering credibility and legitimacy. Third, despite an increasingly challenging leadership role, the EUGS team still had the ability to shape the policy's content. This shows that inter-institutional dynamics can unfold differently on the political and the policy/administrative level.

V) Implementation and policy output: actions speak louder than words

Despite critiques of the infeasibility of implementing the EUGS and the lack of concrete objectives and prioritisation (Smith, 2017:511; Pedi, 2019; Benediek, 2016), the focus on its operationalisation has led the EU to make significant strides in the application of various EUGS priorities (Barbé & Morillas, 2019:134; Morillas, 2019). There is broad consensus among officials across various institutions in Brussels and in a few capitals that a great number of initiatives from member states and the EEAS emanated from EUGS (#20, 22, 36, 39, 42, 48, 54). The EUGS 'became the vehicle' that engendered a number of significant developments (national official quoted in Morillas, 2019:134). The EUGS 'became both a tool for policy inspiration and for ... the convergence of subsequent policy initiatives' (ibid).

This section will address how HR/VP Mogherini successfully leveraged the EUGS to transform her ideas into action and how the EEAS used its implementation to enact changes, expanding its influence both in relational and financial terms. Certainly, the changes did not arise solely *because* of the Strategy. The geopolitical context and discussions that ensued from the outreach process generated an important momentum among member states, which, in turn, contributed to a 'paradigmatic shift' in EU foreign, security and defence policy (#36). Mogherini's leadership success was not only in engendering change through her agenda-setting powers, but also in framing many developments as a legacy of the EUGS. Equally, the EEAS used the EUGS as a 'legitimising tool' to initiate and justify the acceleration of institutional changes that were to its advantage. The EUGS was used as justification to expand the EEAS's reach and, concomitantly, strengthen the institution's autonomy. It had a lasting effect on the EEAS's position in the foreign, security and defence architecture.

The pursuit of 'implementing' the EUGS allowed the EEAS to expand its reach in matters of inter-institutional coordination and intra-institutional coherence (i.e. pursuing policy changes horizontally, across institutions, and vertically, within the administrative levels of the EEAS and relevant Commission DGs). First, changes occurred at an institutional level, affecting the policy-making process, because the EEAS justified expanding its involvement (reach) in community-related defence policies and the review of financial

instruments. Second, the ‘implementation’ of the EUGS shifted the approach of EU foreign and security policy conceptually to align it with the Strategy. Mogherini continued to use her leadership position and Tocci, with the relational capital acquired in the previous two years, continued to use the EUGS to enact change. The EEAS’s lower echelons followed suit.

A. The HR/VP and the EEAS strengthening security and defence: beyond jumping on the bandwagon

Whether due to the sense of urgency to act by member states or to the pursuit of the implementation of the EUGS’s security aspects, the EUGS ‘has a proud track record’ especially in the security and defence area (#54, cf. 36, 22). However, when assessing changes that have occurred since the EUGS’s launch, a dual picture arises. On the one hand, concrete examples of institutional and policy changes that ensued from the Strategy are visible. On the other, the Annual Reports also awards the EUGS successful policy changes, which were the result of ongoing processes or of member-state led initiatives (EEAS, 2017, 2018b). This can be explained by the fact that with the Annual Reports, Mogherini linked the EUGS’s success to her legacy; it became her duty to show results (#17, 47).

On the political level, Mogherini used her position as Chair of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) to set the pace and capitalise on the momentum generated by the Franco-German motor and the Commission’s pursuit to further its purview over defence-industrial policy (Fiott, 2020; Béraud-Sudreau & Pannier, 2020). ‘Surfing the wave’, she also seized the opportunity to strategically re-position herself in the debate by anchoring the discussion in the framing of the EUGS. Both 1) her position and policy-planning capabilities as leader, in particular by setting the pact to steer the process and 2) regaining control of the process by re-instating Tocci and her relational capital gave her the ability to leave a mark on the IPSD. Two weeks after presenting the EUGS, Mogherini brought up the issue of following up the EUGS at an informal lunch at the FAC, despite it not being officially on the agenda (Council of the EU, 2016a; Council of the EU, 2016b). During this session, she expressed her intent to present a framework and timeline on how to operationalise the security and defence strands by Autumn (Council of the EU, 2016b, 2016c). Also at the September 2016 Gymnich meeting, she expressed her intent to propose a roadmap for the EUGS’s Implementation by the end of the following week as she ‘[aimed] to have first operational results by spring next year’ to coincide with the First Report on the Implementation of the Strategy (Mogherini, 2016a). In effect the HR/VP and EEAS’s top echelons had started working on a roadmap for the EUGS’s

implementation just after the Strategy's adoption in summer 2016³⁹ (Tocci, 2017:86). It set concrete deadlines on all five priorities set out in the Strategy. In line with Mogherini's above-mentioned policy interests, implementing an 'integrated'/joined-up Union and strengthening Europe's security and defence were prioritised. The roadmap prioritised the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, to be agreed in the FAC/Defence in November, with a view to being endorsed at the December European Council; then, work on strengthening the internal-external nexus as of September 2016 with an emphasis on 'implementing and updating' strategies on migration, counter-terrorism, and the regional strategy for Syria and Iraq by end of 2016. Work on 'Resilience' and numerous other issues, such as cyber-security, were slated to start in 'First/Second Semester 2017.

Once plans moved forward in late August, Mogherini set a very tight schedule and repeatedly placed the issue as the first agenda item at the FAC. She discussed specifics of the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence at the informal summits with Foreign and Defence Ministers in early September and with Defence Ministers in late September. Her intention to ensure a quick turnover was clear through her expression of the wish to have concrete results by end of the Slovakian presidency, at the end of 2016: 'I see a very clear window of political opportunity from now to next spring to make this file advance' (Mogherini, 2016b).

Mogherini's success was to frame a great number of policy initiatives as from the result of the Strategy, whereas in effect she successfully jumped on the bandwagon of member states' or EEAS officials' policy initiatives. Nevertheless, latching onto rapidly developing proposals that developed in network clusters around DSG Serrano, she did work closely with the EEAS (intra-institutional cohesion) for a rapid turn-over on the security and defence portfolio specifically. Indeed, the IPSD emanated from a small inter-institutional group close to the EEAS which played off of the Franco-German publication of the non-paper 'A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties', which called for a European Security Compact on June 27th 2016, two days after Mogherini's presentation of the Strategy and four days after Brexit.

On the policy/administrative level, initiative to start working on the implementation was taken in August 2016, by the 'leading men' in the security and defence community. The EEAS's DSG Pedro Serrano, Chairman of the EUMC Michail Kostarakos, European Defence Agency (EDA) Director Jorge Domencq, Chairman of the PSC Walter Stevens, and an official of DG Grow informally debated how to best harvest the momentum and draft an Implementation Plan (#57). The original plan was that former EUMC Chairman de Rousiers

³⁹The Roadmap was leaked on the blog Bruxelles2.eu under the link <https://club.bruxelles2.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/feuilleteroute-strategieglobale@ue160922.pdf> [accessed last on 10th March 2021]

be the coordinator and author of the IPSD. It soon became apparent, however, that internal frictions and personal disagreements within the group made the choice inconceivable, not least as Rousier's personal agenda did not coincide with the HR/VP's. Despite Tocci's initial reluctance, she was 'reinstated' as the author of the Implementation Plan – an unlikely move as she was not an expert or familiar with the technical or institutional terrain of this role. The motivation for Mogherini and Serrano to 'ask' Tocci at the Bratislava Gymnich meeting on September 6th was twofold: First, she sought someone she trusted (#57). Second, all agreed that here too an 'insider-outsider' should be lead author so that no one institutional affiliation would be prioritised.

Establishing a more trustful working relationship with Serrano during the Strategy's initiation and formation helped Tocci in being able to choose with whom she would work. Considering the IPSD had to be more technical and specific in content, Tocci requested the support of former PMG Chair Arnoult Molenaar. During the drafting of the Strategy, a good personal bond was established between Molenaar and Tocci. He had very good relationships with member state representatives and was seen by all within the EEAS and the member states as trustworthy, experienced and competent. As a former PMG Chair and 'conceptual mind', Molenaar became 'the man' for questions on security and defence (#21, 28, 38, 44, 50, 57). As 'the best drafter of the EU' he played a crucial role in drafting the IPSD, several PESCO documents and later the Civilian CSDP Compact (#44). However, the choice of Tocci and Molenaar, an EEAS 'intergovernmentalist'-minded official, would affect the priorities, style and content of the Plan. Networks evolve, yet nodes are locked in 'spatial' and 'temporal ways' (see page 74). Here, Mogherini succeeded within a dense group of cross-boundary individuals to place Tocci in a preeminent position. Tocci in turn *de facto* drew on Molenaar's human and social capital to draft the IPSD. However, the Molenaar's anchoring within the political, intergovernmental sphere, as then-PMG Chair, led to a 'bias' towards a more political document, rather than an operational one, as the military community would have preferred. In a hierarchical institution, the peripheral position of the military community within the 'traditional' EEAS structures led to them having less influence.

In the period leading up to the implementation of the security and defence chapter of the EUGS, the most contentious issue was whether and to what extent the Implementation Plan should be quantitative – setting concrete targets as the Helsinki Headline Goals did. There are several reasons why the Headline Goals were not revised. First, Mogherini needed a rapid 'win' and saw the immediate momentum for quick implementation. In the context of Brexit, the timing was right, and there was no time to waste. Second, there was too big a risk of only being able to agree on numbers that were lower than the Headline Goals (#57). Third,

there was a strong motivation to broaden a security-focussed strategy beyond CSDP policy, as Germany, France and Finland in particular advocated that it should encompass neutral countries and tackle hybrid threats.

More broadly, for the EUGS team and other involved EEAS officials, ‘the main aim of the IPSD was to imagine possible missions and operations that the Union should be able to carry out’. Focus was also placed on connecting civilian and military structures, and speeding up deployment capabilities (EEAS, 2016b:47). In addition to promoting defence, cyber-security and counterterrorism, energy and strategic communication were too strongly stressed. The possibility of ‘enhanced cooperation’ as noted in the Strategy (ibid:48) was only one among many initiatives. The understanding of Mogherini, the EEAS and member state representatives was more holistic and less technical (to the disappointment of a small military/expert community): it was more political and, most importantly, in line with the priorities defined in the Global Strategy. After all, the first priority of the Strategy stated that, for European security, ‘an appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy’ is needed (p. 9). Rather than having a EU-wide assessment of how to tackle the military shortfalls as the few military officials in the EU preferred, i.e. setting EU-wide priorities both in terms of industrial and military capability needs, the IPSD became more ‘political’ in pushing for a more ‘rapid and effective’ CSDP. Focus was also placed on streamlining institutions and encouraging force generation.

Written by Molenaar within more or less two months (from the Bratislava Summit in early September to its adoption in mid-November), the IPSD was discussed in only three PSC sessions. Despite clear pressure from Mogherini – and the Franco-German motor – discussions were very tense. By the end of October, it still seemed unlikely that any agreement would be found between member states before Christmas (#57). The rapid turn-over was a mix between external pressure and the mediating abilities of the PSC Chair and Molenaar, combining social and human capital respectively. The determining factor that ended the stalemate on the most contentious issue, namely the prevalence of NATO over strengthening a European ‘strategic autonomy’, was Trump’s election on November 8th. Indeed, issues of security and defence predominantly progress due to external pressures and shifting power relations at the global stage (Howorth, 2013; Howorth & Smith, 2016). The success in forming the IPSD, which engendered a cascade of new security and defence policies – among them the establishment of the operational Headquarter (MPCC) and PESCO – was linked to the changing international context related to Trump’s election. The Commission’s introduction of the EDAP in November 2016 was a ‘big shift’, and the push from big member states was a key contributing factor. But Mogherini and EEAS top officials such as DSG

Serrano and PSC Chair Stevens (co-)led by taking advantage of an opportune moment yet again, setting the agenda on a tight timeframe. ‘Security and defence discussions were kept on the table thanks to the EUGS and its clear timelines and deliverables (Morillas, 2020:239). Equally, the EEAS mobilised inter-institutional alliances across the security and defence community to start the discussion and skilfully mediated among member states.

B. The EEAS taking ownership: institutional changes

On an institutional level, the EEAS took ownership of driving the implementation process and gaining more autonomy in the process (Morillas, 2019, 2020). Specifically, it provided EEAS officials with the opportunity to expand their reach and authority. The EUGS empowered the EEAS to pursue important changes institutionally and thematically. In 2017, 2018 and 2019, shifts in the intra-institutional apparatus and in its relation towards the Commission emerged. The EUGS strengthened the coherence and unity of the institution which felt emboldened by it. As the Commission was becoming more prominent on the security agenda, the Strategy became ‘the hook used by the EEAS to become more vocal’ (#57). All three pillars of the EEAS (global issues, geographical desks and CSDP) claimed ownership of the EUGS by referring to it in almost all official documents issued. As intended, the Strategy also allowed the EEAS to edge its way into some of the Commission’s portfolios, because it was specifically a document produced by the HR/*Vice-President*.

A notable example of the EEAS’s use of the EUGS to expand its reach is when it used the Strategy to ensure it kept a seat at the negotiation table of the European defence industrial development programme (EDIDP). The EDIDP was negotiated through the Comitology process under the Bulgarian presidency. Being part of the competition industry sector, the Commission’s DG Grow called into question the observer status of both the EEAS and the EDA, arguing the programme was beyond the remit of their competencies. Internal disputes and competition among the Commission and the EDA in this sector are not new, and the EDA was successfully excluded from the negotiations on the premise that the participation of the EDA Board, representing all member states, would lead to the duplication of member states’ positions in the negotiation process. The EEAS, on the other hand, successfully argued that where money used for the implementation of the Strategy was allocated, they had the right to be involved (#41).

The priority shift brought about by the EUGS also offered the EEAS the justification for institutional growth and institutional restructuring in line with pursuing a more integrated, ‘joined up’ foreign and security policy. Most significantly, the new sub-unit, PRISM (Prevention of conflict, Rule of Law/Security Sector Reform/Integrated Approach,

Stabilisation and Mediation) was established. PRISM grew rapidly and became a full-fledged division of the EEAS with the March 2019 re-structuring (see pages 42ff). PRISM, jointly with Commission, issued the 'EEAS - Commission Services Issues Paper on the Integrated Approach', discussed with member states in June 2017 (EEAS and Commission, 2017:17). Officially, this meant that fragile states and crisis situations should receive a multi-phase, multi-dimensional, multi-level and multi-lateral approach (EEAS, 2016b:28-29). In practical terms this translated to narrowing the EEAS's focus on 'resilience' and conflict prevention and linking the various strands and respective instruments closer together (#31).

Concomitant with the establishment of PRISM, the Early Warning System of the EU was revised and greater synergies and links between the EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism and the Commission's Emergency Response Coordination Centre were established (#16; EEAS, 2017:19). Moreover, the EU adopted an amended Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) in December 2017 (Bergmann, 2017, 2018). The IcSP funds assistance to crisis response with particular emphasis on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The IcSP furthers EU policy in that it provides the EU with a significant first-response capacity, specifically for crisis response, conflict prevention and crisis preparedness (European Commission, 2021). In essence it aims to ensure greater flexibility and early action. It has already made valuable contributions to stabilisation efforts and conflict prevention, preventing the escalation of violence by contributing to the strengthening of partners' capacities (Bergmann, 2018). As a 'bridge-building' instrument, it aims to overcome the divide between the Commission and EEAS 'as both are involved in the decision-making and implementation procedures of IcSP-funded interventions' (ibid: 1). In line with bringing more interlinkages across instruments, one important innovation was the establishment of a single Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). Proposed in June 2018, it aimed to 'give the EU more coherence' (cf. #70; EEAS, 2018b:16, see also page 32). Uniting all instruments under one legal basis, under the political authority of the HR/VP, it simplifies the actionability of European external action. The creation of NDICI was strongly pushed by EEAS officials, who remained closely involved in the negotiation process (#70; Blockmans & Hillion, 2021:21). This crucially affects EEAS involvement in the distribution of financial mechanisms, which has always remained a Commission prerogative.

With regards to practical applications of the EUGS, EEAS officials across various geographical desks highlight the EUGS allowed to act as a springboard to review and guide policies (cf. #71, 72, 74). Not only where policy lines 'inspired by the Strategy' (# 71); the EUGS gave more political gravitas to the EEAS's work. Within the remit of implementing an 'integrated' approach, bridging the internal and external security nexus two examples of

how EEAS officials ‘harvested’ the EUGS for change can be noted. The first pertains to the external dimension of the Agenda of Migration. In a time where calls for more securitization towards tackling root causes of migration, an EEAS official argues that Mogherini can be credited with the development of a more comprehensive approach, pushing for the development of partnerships with origin and transit countries (#72, cf. 71). Indeed, for EEAS officials it became crucial to communicate more clearly to DG Home what ‘is politically at stake’ in third countries, especially those with conflict area (#74). Second, the Strategy allowed Managing Directors of the geographical desks to revise regional and country-specific approaches, notably for the MENA and in particular the Sahel region (#71,74; Bargués-Pedreny, 2019). For example, the pursuit of a ‘joined up’ and integrated approach gave the EEAS more leeway to coax DG DEVCO and DG ECHO to shift their activities in the Sahel region. With an increased need to be involved in conflict prevention, the EEAS devised with DG DEVCO means to ensure their involvement in fragile or conflict zones. The EEAS was crucial to offer the political and security analysis of the situation on the ground, and more broadly ‘gave them the political backup’ – delineating more clearly the added-value the EEAS offers to the Commission’s external action (#74, cf. 70). The EEAS further defined which zones and sectors work done by DG DEVCO should focus on –an aspect that is not always evident as the Commission remains adamant to focus on job growth, trade and investment. So as to enforce more successfully an ‘integrated’ approach the EEAS established and chairs a Sahel Task Force, which is attended not only by the Commissions but also officials from the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The rationality behind ‘structuring the talk’ is to generate more trust and ensure a solution-oriented approach. In sum, the EUGS has allowed EEAS officials to strengthen and utilise their political gravitas, sharpening the comprehensive and integrated approach of EU’s external policy.

The EUGS has helped the HR/VP and especially the EEAS to pursue actions that would permit them to expand their reach and pursue their interest. Certainly, the EUGS is not ‘a bible that [member states] carry around’ (#62), and it is questionable whether capitals have ardently pursued its implementation (Biscop, 2021). Yet in its most direct form of implementation it has had a significant effect. It has allowed the HR/VP to set incentives on the political level by setting the agenda on the integrated approach and by pursuing member states’ convergence to strengthen European security and defence. The EEAS took ownership of the Strategy. As such, the document resulted from the relational powers of the EUGS team and then was transferred to the EEAS which used it to expand its relational reach. The legitimacy of the Strategy has allowed EEAS officials to expand their reach in Commission

portfolios. While during the policy initiation and formulation stage we only see little EEAS influence (in effect solely the SPU and Cabinet were involved), in the implementation stage, the institution has adopted the Strategy, using it as a legitimising tool to expand its reach.

VI) Conclusion

This Chapter has analysed why and how the HR/VP and the EUGS team was able to significantly influence the EUGS process and content and subsequently use it as lever to engender a number of political and institutional changes. The extent of influence was visible because HR/VP Mogherini was able to enact her leading role on the political level while having the support of a highly cohesive team on the policy/administrative level.

The team was able to pursue Mogherini and Tocci's vision, because of 1) their networks' reach, both personal and through the extensive outreach process, 2) their position in the network, acting as broker, i.e. gatekeeper, controlling the information flow by canalising member states' input and 3) their ability to establish cooperative relations, mobilising support and using their human capital and persuasive means to ensure member states' acceptance. This case is unique in that 1) the process took place in midst of an emerging network governance due to the establishment of a new Commission and 2) it is a type of policy that arguably has less direct relevance for member states' interests, as its implementation does not necessarily have direct implications on the national level. Still, as highlighted in the implementation stage, it gave both the HR/VP and the EEAS the ability to further their control and influence respectively.

It is clear that the team's networks' reach and ensuing interaction dynamics significantly shaped the outcome of the Strategy. Assessing the position of key players in the policy network governance, and especially their relationships to one another, showcased the importance of relational resources in explaining the extent of influence around both process and content. With the support of a small, cohesive and networked EUGS team, Mogherini and Tocci successfully carved out autonomous leeway for the Strategy-writing process. Mogherini's leadership on the political level was complemented by a small, highly cohesive EUGS team working on the policy/administrative level to broker the process between her ambitions and those of member states. Tocci, as the central figure, was successful in pursuing an insulated working process due to the support of Mogherini's leadership and her anchoring in the formal and informal network governances of the EUGS team. The team acted as both a 'shield' and a 'connector' to speak to the right people at the right time. The initiation phase was important as it positioned and embedded Tocci in the broader governance structure: this

period was key for her to devise an innovative process that strongly curtailed member states' leveraging power and allowed her set the tone for ongoing discussions through the Strategic Assessment.

A 'virtuous cycle' of cooperation through the combined use of brokerage and human capital emerged. Human capital gave the EUGS team the ability to overcome member states' objections. Information control and persuasive argumentation allowed them to filter what ideas would be incorporated into the Strategy, but also garnered legitimacy and support for the process. That Mogherini increasingly lost her footing in both formal and informal networks, in contrast to Tocci, shows the importance of embeddedness. This became increasingly obvious after the resignation of both the Secretary-General and Head of Cabinet, who provided very important bridges into the Commission and vis-à-vis capitals, respectively. Nevertheless, by drafting a comprehensive and policy-oriented strategy and tying her legacy to its implementation, Mogherini 'inaugurated a process towards an increased autonomy of the EEAS in a traditionally intergovernmental policy' prior even to the policy formulation stage (Morillas, 2019:410). This is one of the main lessons to draw for the EEAS as an institution: while the institution as a whole was barely involved in the process, it was able to capitalise on the EUGS as leveraging tool to expand its reach into community-related foreign policy areas. It is now involved in areas where it previously was not able to exert authority.

Chapter 5 - A case of punching above its weight: the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the EEAS

I) Introduction

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is intended to improve the member states' military assets and defence capabilities – tackling one of the most sensitive issues of nation-states' core powers (Council Notification, 2017: 3). As one of the most flexible templates for deeper member state cooperation in a treaty text, it sets out to be fully led by member states and voluntary in its participation (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017: 18). The vision and framework of this structured cooperation is clearly set out in the Lisbon Treaty. Its objectives are: defence harmonisation; to enhance the availability, interoperability and deployability of forces; to overcome capability shortfalls; to increase investment expenditures on defence equipment; and joint development of military equipment programmes (Protocol 10, Art.2).

PESCO tackles political, military and industrial aspects of defence. Its framework builds on two pillars. First, member states agree to 20 common binding commitments, including for instance pledges to increase defence budgets and safeguard strategically deployable units. Second, comprising at least three member states, PESCO projects are developed to tackle capability shortfalls, increase inter-operability and thus the robustness of European defence cooperation. Operationally, PESCO aims to improve and facilitate the EU's ability to run complex military operations. With regard to developing defence capabilities, PESCO works towards addressing capability shortfalls and pool resources in the development of future technologies directed at new hybrid threats (Fiott, Missiroli, & Tardy, 2017: 38).

The EEAS's extent of influence in the formation of PESCO oscillated on a fine line between policy impact and policy influence. As a reminder, an institution has *influence* when it purposefully and sustainably pursues policy change, subsequently affecting the policy's content or outcome significantly. The institution has *impact* if it affects the policy more generally as a supporting administrative actor. This chapter argues that, surprisingly, the EEAS and HR/VP were influential in steering the process of developing PESCO, yet their influence was constrained to the policy's political framework. One would expect the HR/VP and the EEAS to have little influence in the case of PESCO. First, it was enshrined in the

Lisbon Treaty as member state-led process. Second, the EEAS had neither material resources nor expertise in this domain of defence.

Nevertheless, while not affecting the policy content *per se*, the HR/VP and EEAS, purposefully and successfully pursued the rapid adoption of PESCO, despite resistance from certain member states. The main impetus for content discussions resulted from capital-to-capital diplomacy. HR/VP Mogherini leveraged her leadership position, acting in tandem with the EEAS to ensure rapid progress and wielding human and social capital during negotiations. The institution acted vertically cohesively, yet horizontally there remained a gap between the political and military groups anchored in the EEAS. Despite limited influence, the EEAS shaped the policy's development due to its relational resources. Notably, the EEAS was able to leverage trust and information during the policy consolidation stage through its human and social capital, engendering a virtuous cycle of cooperation among member states, despite strongly diverging interests.

After providing some background information, this chapter addresses three main stages in the establishment and development of PESCO (Section II). Section III juxtaposes the effect of the HR/VP and the member states in the initiation and early policy development of PESCO. From Autumn 2016 to December 2017, the mostly informal discussions initiated on the political level led to the establishment of the broader PESCO framework. The debates prior to issuing the Notification centred on whether PESCO should be an inclusive or exclusive process for the 'most capable and willing' member states, and whether it should be anchored within existing EU structures or a new governance framework. Section IV turns to the second phase of policy consolidation, between January 2018 and Summer 2019, zooming in on the policy and administrative role adopted by the EEAS during the drafting and negotiation stages. Within a little over one year, the legal and political framework of PESCO was drafted, negotiated and agreed. This included the Council Recommendation concerning a Roadmap for the implementation of PESCO in March 2018; the Council Decision establishing the common set of governance rules for PESCO projects in June 2018; and a Council Recommendation concerning the sequencing of the fulfilment of the more binding commitments in the framework of PESCO and specifying more precise objectives in October 2018. Finally, Section V addresses the first steps of implementation in January 2019 and the effect that the HR/VP's Annual Review and the institutionalisation of the PESCO Secretariat had on the adoption and development of PESCO projects and binding commitments.




Figure 5.1 Timeline of the policy development of the Permanent Structured Cooperation

II) Setting the scene: background and context

Despite slow, gradual convergence, European defence is seen as a national prerogative. As the ‘last intergovernmental pillar’, member states remain the key actors (Howorth, 2014; Meijer & Wyss, 2018). CSDP ‘has grown predominantly as a security – rather than defence – policy’; it has remained centred on strengthening ‘capacity’ rather than joint operations and interoperability (Tardy, 2018; Adams & Guy Ben-Ari, 2006:4-5). EU member states have shied away from military harmonisation and seeking synergies in defence capabilities. Military and industrial defence cooperation was – and to an important extent still is – mostly done within bi-, tri- or mini-lateral frameworks outside of the EU framework. NATO (for military coordination) and OCCAR⁴⁰ (for industrial cooperation) remain the preferred settings for mini-lateral interaction (Violakis, 2018:252).

The origins of PESCO lie in the Convention of the Future of Europe (2004) and are now codified in the Lisbon Treaty, where the provision for PESCO is listed alongside several provisions for a common security and defence policy, including the EU’s Mutual Defence Clause (Article 42(6) and 46, TEU). Despite earlier attempts to initiate PESCO⁴¹, the political will and external pressure to initiate this advanced form of integration was missing.

Article 46 and Protocol 10 of the TEU define the institutional setup and process through which PESCO can be initiated. PESCO is a member-state led process that can be initiated only by member states ‘willing and able’ to make commitments on military capabilities. For the HR/VP and the EEAS, unsurprisingly, the mandate is minimal. Following a Notification to the Council and HR/VP by member states, a Council Decision for the establishment of PESCO shall be passed by Qualified Majority Voting. With regard to the HR/VP, the Protocol merely ‘[recalls] the importance of the High Representative ... being fully involved in proceedings’. Otherwise, it is officially only through the involvement of the EDA, headed by the HR/VP, that any further involvement is guaranteed. According to the Protocol, the EDA ‘shall contribute to the regular assessment of participating member states’ contributions’ (Article 3).

By 2016, the need for strengthening European defence became increasingly evident. As set out in Chapter 4, the focus on strengthening European security and defence aimed to respond to global security challenges (see pages 96ff.; Fiott, Missirolli & Tardy, 2017:20). The driving force for deeper defence cooperation can be traced back to the momentum

⁴⁰ The Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation is an international organisation that facilitates major industrial-defence equipment programmes among its member states, notably Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK.

⁴¹ During the ‘Praline Summit’ in 2010, the Trio Presidency of Belgium, Hungary and Poland outlined how cooperation in defence could be made more effective and inclusive (Biscop & Coelmont, 2011). Similarly, in May 2011, Italy and Spain requested that HR/VP Ashton put PESCO on the FAC agenda (Blockmans & Crosson, 2019:3).

accompanying the EUGS and IPSD – two documents that clearly set out the necessity for PESCO (cf. #42, 48, 54, 56). The EUGS ‘allowed to open a new [defence] chapter’ and ‘the atmosphere was ripe’ (#54, 56). While numerous officials highlight that PESCO did not ‘originate’ in the EUGS (‘ideas had been floating around prior’ (#55)), it was a ‘by-product’ (#36 cf. 18, 21, 20, 22, 35, 36 42, 46, 47, 54, 68). The EUGS set an important impetus, ‘raised the awareness’, and ‘gave a sense of urgency’ for the need to strengthen European defence (#54). On PESCO, however, nothing was yet set in stone. As Fiott, Missiroli and Tardy (2017:20) highlight, ‘even in the EUGS, the language continued to reflect a residual uncertainty over the feasibility of PESCO’. The Strategy only stated that ‘*enhanced* cooperation between member states should be explored in this domain’ (EEAS, 2016b:11, emphasis added).

It was the Franco-German call for a ‘European Security Compact’ (June 2016) that set the ball rolling (Ayrault & Steinmeier, 2016). Calling for ‘stronger and more flexible crisis prevention and crisis management capabilities’, it was the first official document to highlight that ‘to conduct civil and military operations more effectively’ and for ‘the EU to be able to rely on employable high-readiness forces ... member states willing to establish permanent structured cooperation in the field of defence or to push ahead to launch operations should be able to do so’ (Ayrault & Steinmeier, 2016:4). The paper highlighted the two countries’ intention to reinvigorate the European project after the ‘watershed moment’ of Brexit and to ‘prevent the silent creeping erosion of our European project’ (ibid:1). Taking a holistic approach to revamping the European defence apparatus, PESCO was outlined in the framework of deploying missions more effectively and listed alongside a call for revisions of the strategic assessment of capabilities priorities, reaffirmation of collective defence budgets, spending more for research and technology, and more flexible crisis prevention and management structures. Other countries such as Italy and Finland also issued non-papers proposing measures to strengthen European defence: Italy sought a ‘powerful and usable European Force, that can also be employed in support to NATO or UN operations’, where such a ‘joint permanent European Multinational Force’ should be created by ‘available member states willing to share forces, command and control, manoeuvre and enabling capabilities (Italian Ministry of Defence, 2016); Finland called for closer coordination of national defence plans, the creation of a European defence research programme, a European Semester for defence policy, and improvements in security of supply.

However, the language of the non-papers differed. For instance, Germany was keen to establish a European Defence Union, Italy proposed a reform of the Battlegroup concept and the creation a permanent headquarter for CSDP missions, and Finland, much more

reserved in its language, proposed a restricted EU military headquarter, only responsible for non-executive military missions. Reflective of the strong divergences in interests and ambitions, two structural issues arose for the development of PESCO. First, concerning the ambition to tackle capability shortfalls there was no joint prioritisation as to which capabilities should be tackled first, not least as no joint threat assessment had been developed. Second, ‘clashing philosophies’ and ‘diverging views as to what PESCO is and what it should be’ accompanied the process. Some prioritised the political commitments, others the development of projects

III) Agency in the initiation of PESCO: the EEAS catalysing PESCO?

This section will address the policy initiation stage, from the first informal deliberations in autumn 2016 to December 2017, when the Council Decision establishing the Permanent Structured Cooperation was agreed (Notification by participating member states, 2017; Council of the EU, 2017d). The first significant step forward was the adoption of the Council Conclusions on the IPSD in November 2016. This built on the Franco-German, Italian and Finish non-papers, but also resulted from the HR/VP and EEAS’s entrepreneurial role in operationalising the EUGS’s implementation (see pages 121ff.). After a year of intense discussion, initially among member states – notably the PESCO 4 – and then on the EU level with Mogherini, as ‘mother’ of the EUGS, and the Commission, as ‘father’ of the EDF, the second step was made at the 19th Franco-German Ministerial Council in July 2017. This led to a third step, namely the negotiations on the specifics of the Notification of the Council that resulted in the Council Decision establishing PESCO, which were held informally under EEAS auspices.

To say PESCO resulted from member states pushing the agenda forward would be too simple. Three parallel yet complementary conversations were being held. The first conversation emanated from the EUGS and the ensuing IPSD, strongly shaped by the HR/VP and her entourage (See Chapter 4). The previous chapter highlighted Mogherini’s extensive influence and ownership of the EUGS’s narrative and how the its implementation helped her pursue her agenda. The IPSD allowed Mogherini to frame proposed ideas not only in working strands that were a compromise to all, but also to establish very concrete deliverables linked to her legacy (cf. #17, 47, 36). Hence, the successful implementation of PESCO emerged as a primary interest of Mogherini and she was keen to keep the ball rolling. The second conversation was between member states, first and foremost between France and Germany, who would emerge as driving forces in initiating the process of PESCO. The third conversation concerned the Commission’s EDAP. The Commission’s shift of mindset was

critical for PESCO to move forward, and the EDF as a financial incentive for industrial defence-capacity building played a crucial role in convincing France to agree to engage more seriously in the discussions around PESCO (#54, 55). The focus on the business dimension of industrial defence and burden-sharing made PESCO more attractive (#54, 55). The timeline shows how interwoven these conversations were.

As a consequence of these three simultaneous conversations, this period was defined by a loose network with a core node between France and Germany, which expanded in mid-autumn to include Spain and Italy. As highlighted in the previous chapter, a clique around DSG Serrano, including Walter Stevens, the PSC Chair, Jorge Domecq, Head of the European Defence Agency (EDA), Michail Kostarakos, Chairman of EU Military Committee (EUMC) and officials from the Commission's DG Grow⁴² had initiated a conversation on future proposals on security and defence policies (see page 124). Two parallel network structures in Brussels and between capitals, primarily Berlin and Paris, developed.

This section argues that while discussions about the governance and political commitments of PESCO are the result of Franco-German led discussions, the leadership of HR/VP Mogherini and entrepreneurship of DSG Serrano set an important mark in the rapid translation from mere possibilities into concrete proposals. It addresses the extent to which the HR/VP and DSG contributed to a rapid turn-around, exerting sustained political pressure on member states. The HR/VP exerted significant influence through both her relational and institutional capacities. First, the HR/VP, together with the EEAS 'rode the wave' of the EUGS and the Franco-German proposal on strengthening European security and defence cooperation. The HR/VP and EEAS (co-)led by setting the agenda across hierarchies and framed the narrative to seize the window of opportunity. Second, the HR/VP utilised her multi-hatted position in intra- and inter-institutional relations to concertedly heighten the discussion in various fora. The more concrete and serious the idea of launching PESCO became the further embedded the HR/VP and DSG Serrano became in the policy network governance. Inter-institutionally, Mogherini coordinated with Juncker and Commissioner Bienkowska, built close ties with the defence ministers of the PESCO 4, and acted in concert with the EEAS across all hierarchies to ensure the rapid pace (cf. #20, 55, 68, 70). While not shaping the content *per se* – indeed, the Council Conclusion establishing PESCO was fully taken from the member-state written Notification establishing PESCO – it can be argued that the HR/VP and the EEAS carved out a more prominent (albeit limited) role than provided by Protocol 10 (Notification, 2017; Council of the EU, 2017d).

⁴² DG Grow stands for the Commission's Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs.

Before zooming in on the role and relevance of the HR/VP and DSG Serrano over time, embedding themselves into the policy network governance, let us shortly address the capital-to-capital diplomacy at the foundation of the conversation around PESCO.

A. Continuing the conversation from the EUGS to the IPSD: the Franco-German motor after Brexit

There remains no doubt that the Franco-German motor was crucial in giving gravity to the debate on strengthening European defence. French officials are quick to highlight that serious discussions about PESCO came from Germany, which needed a multilateral political framework through which they could strengthen their military and defence capabilities. (#54). Indeed, the German White Paper of July 2016 explicitly calls for the enhancement of CSDP structures, the integration of civilian and military capabilities, the strengthening of the European defence industry and a focus on Permanent Structured Cooperation (German Federal Government, 2016:73). It indicates an important shift in the country's approach to security and defence – showing an awareness and willingness to strengthen its defence policy. France's initial reluctance to endorse a bureaucratic and rigid cooperation mechanism explains the country's persistence in pursuing the European Intervention Initiative, a fast and flexible defence cooperation mechanism, rather than PESCO. While conscious of systemic pressures and agreeing on the need to strengthen the European integration process, the two countries had significantly diverging visions, interests and strategic cultures. At the core of their divergence laid the debate about how 'structured' PESCO should be. In particular, the countries disagreed about whether it should be exclusive or inclusive, i.e. whether it should aim to encompass a great number of EU member states or strictly pursue membership by the most militarily capable.

Not only were they the first to offer concrete proposals for a revision of current European defence structures with the proposal of a 'European Security Compact' in June 2016, they also proactively reached out and engaged with other member states (Ayrault & Steinmeier, 2016:4). France and Germany's shuttle diplomacy in the summer and early autumn of 2016 played an important role in shaping the first phase of PESCO's policy initiation. French and German diplomats reached out to their colleagues bi- and mini-laterally, contacting Spain and Italy first, but also the Netherlands, the Baltics, Norway (on Germany's part, e.g. in Riga, September 2016), and the Visegrad Four (on France's part in June and August 2017) (Euractiv, 2016; Gros-Verheyde, 2017a; Szalai, 2017). The Northern and Eastern European countries were particularly critical to engage in any deeper defence integration which could undermine the NATO Alliance. German Foreign Minister

Steinmeier's trip to the Baltic States in Riga in mid-September aimed specifically to quell the fears that discussion might overturn the pre-eminence of the NATO Alliance; similarly, then-Defence Minister von der Leyen travelled to Norway to reinforce continued defence ties with NATO members (Baczynska & Emmott, 2016). This extensive pan-European network dynamic is one example of how member states led the discussions in the first stage.

In Autumn 2016, Italy and Spain rallied behind France and Germany, as 'they had shared ambitions' (#54). That interests became aligned between Germany and Italy specifically became visible when von der Leyen called for a 'Schengen of Defence' and Pinotti spoke of a 'Union for the European Defence, pursuing a model resembling the Schengen Agreement' (Rettman, 2016a). Like France, Spain was interested in funding defence capabilities and reforming the EEAS's crisis management structures. Building on industrial defence efforts was an important part of the conversation (#54). Plans became more concrete when the Commission proposed the European Defence Fund on November 30th, 2016. Juncker's ambitions in defence played an important role in the development of PESCO, setting a particular incentive for France and Spain (#54, 56). To quieten Northern and Eastern fears, the Defence Ministers of the PESCO 4, sent a letter to all EU member states in October 2016, reassuring them that neither an 'EU army' nor duplicating NATO was their objective. They argued that the EU needed to enhance its ability to autonomously assess its security environment and consolidate a European defence industrial and technological base to develop military capability, because the EU 'most probably [will in the future] have to launch missions of military and/or civilian character in regions [where] NATO does not consider taking action' (see Beesley, 2016). Throughout the first period of policy initiation fewer than 10 member states showed interest in PESCO. Adopting a 'wait-and-see' approach, several member states closely observed 'the Franco-German plan' (#35, 48, 56; Czech News Agency, 2016).

Strong divergence⁴³ remained between those resisting deeper integration, such as the Atlanticists, (e.g. the Baltic countries, Slovakia, the United Kingdom and Poland), those having reservations such as Austria, Ireland and Sweden, and those supporting the Franco-German proposition, such as Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Finland (Emmott, 2016; Rankin, 2016; Beesley, 2016b).

⁴³ For instance, Slovak Secretary of State Ondrejcsák highlighted that member states were split on the steps forward: 'when it comes to details, the unanimity is far more difficult, or impossible to reach. Despite the common goal, we still diversify in visions and plans concerning defence cooperation, financing CSDP missions and operations, EU Battle Groups and form of support of our partner countries' (Ondrejcsák in EDA, 2016). Another EU Diplomat said that it is especially the financing of the missions and operations, the reform and structure of operational headquarter(s), and the development of the European defence industry (AgenceEurope, 2016b).

In sum, as expected and legally mandated, the first scoping discussions on PESCO were predominantly discussed among member states. The central node, France and Germany, built coalitions across Europe, mobilising capital-to-capital ties outside of Brussels. The shuttle diplomacy and reassurances of the PESCO 4 placed the locus of discussion among member states, especially between mid-2016 and mid-2017. Prior to the launch of the Notification of establishing PESCO, signed in November 2017, there was ‘no expectation that the HR/VP and the EEAS would get engaged’ (#54, cf. 36). However, in parallel with the intergovernmental process, the HR/VP and DSG Serrano also built coalitions and slowly deepened their embeddedness in the conversations between member states.

B. Questioning leadership and agency from the HR/VP and the EEAS’s top echelons

Beyond bi- or mini-lateral discussions, this section argues that HR/VP Mogherini and the EEAS had a catalytic role in pressuring member states to act through sustained leadership and concerted cohesive intra-institutional efforts. Moreover, despite being at the periphery of discussions, over time and through political incentives the HR/VP and EEAS successfully anchored themselves closer to the informally held discussions among member states.

During 2017, three issues about the institutional framework of PESCO remained particularly contentious: would it be an inclusive process; should an additional institutional infrastructure be created; and to what extent should reaching the (NATO) 2% target be explicitly referenced. While never made explicit, the HR/VP and EEAS preferred an inclusive PESCO, within the EEAS’s institutional framework (cf. #55). The fact that both PESCO is inclusive and anchored in the EU framework is also due to an increasing involvement of EEAS officials. As a high-ranking French diplomat highlighted, for PESCO, Mogherini and the EEAS were ‘instrumental in guiding the initiative and in not leaving it as a virtual idea, but to making it more practical’ (#54). France’s ‘caving in’ to accept an inclusive rather than ambitious PESCO was partially due to the fact that ‘it was difficult not to do anything at all because of the momentum’ (#54) – which might also explain why so many other reluctant countries signed the Notification establishing PESCO. This and the subsequent sections will argue that the EEAS’s increased embeddedness and cooperative, trusted relationships with member states made them ‘useful’ and an added value, significantly helping member states overcome their reservation.

i. Adopting a leading role

In accordance with our conceptualisation of leadership role (see page 74ff), Mogherini utilised her position as Chair to ensure a rapid turnover not only through her agenda-setting powers, but also in framing PESCO as one of three pillars in the 2016 ‘Winter Defence Package’, and reaching out and coordinating closely with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg and the Commission. She established a framework for the development of defence initiatives (PESCO among them) into a tripartite work strand that constituted the ‘Winter Defence and Security Package’, as a means to accommodate the strongly diverging priorities and interests of the member states. The three pillars of this approach were: 1) following up on the IPSD, meaning strengthening European defence, notably harvesting the ‘political window of opportunity’ (Mogherini, 2016b) to establish the MPCC and PESCO, 2) work on the Commission’s European Defence Action Plan that led to the EDF, and 3) develop EU-NATO relations (Mogherini, 2016a). While framing is not decisive in decision-making, it complements and heightens pressure on member states – including recalcitrant member states – to act. Linking the three packages together in one ‘Winter Defence Package’ allowed the HR/VP to keep all member states on board and convince them to adopt a ‘package deal’.

Throughout 2016 and 2017, member states felt that the HR/VP was accelerating the agenda. Concerned for her policy legacy, Mogherini created urgency by emphasising tight deadlines for further progress. In November 2016, the exploration of the potential for permanent structured cooperation was taken forward ‘in matter of weeks’, despite only approximately 10 member states being in favour of PESCO at this stage (#35, 48, 56; Mogherini, 2016e). Indeed, by recurrently placing the issue high on FAC agendas, Mogherini set herself and the member states a very tight schedule – ensuring a pressured, rapid pace. From the publication of the EUGS until late 2017, almost every FAC featured security and defence as the first items on the agenda⁴⁴. Military defence integration remained the first or second item on the agendas of the FAC in October 2016, joint Foreign and Defence Council in November 2016, and the FACs in March, April, May, June and July 2017. Equally, the issue was the first one raised in the Press Conferences for the respective meetings.

Her ambition to push PESCO was felt by member states, the EU Military Committee and EEAS staff alike (#17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 28). Member states complained about too-tight scheduling and continued ‘push’ by the HR/VP and EEAS (cf. #17, 21, 32, 44, cf. 18, 22, 28,

⁴⁴The FAC in December 2016 did not, as the issue was discussed at length at the November FAC, where not only was the Implementation Plan presented but also the Council Conclusions on implementing the EUGS in the area of Security and Defence, awaiting the endorsement of the December European Council. The endorsement of the European Council in December 2016 expected results in spring 2017 – sufficient time to figure things out, which is why both the January and February 2017 FAC meetings did not discuss PESCO specifically.

32, 42, 47). As a national official noted, ‘the EEAS seems to be ‘in a hurry’ (#21). Specifically, the proposal to consider PESCO and create a Military Headquarter in the Implementation Plan of the EUGS was felt by some member states to be somewhat rushed (Tocci, 2017: 96). For some, further propositions such as the European Peace Facility put forward by the HR/VP were perceived as a step too far (#18). Mogherini defended her push at the EUISS Annual Conference in June 2017: ‘In these last weeks I have had the strange feeling of hearing people say: “Could we slow down a bit, please?” And you know - no. No, not really. Not really because it is not the time for taking things slowly. It is the time for putting all the energy in it, thinking carefully, strategically – as we always say and think – but going fast.’ (Mogherini, 2017b).

Moreover, after the adoption of the IPSD, the EEAS and HR/VP set a political impulse by having the EEAS issue a Food for Thought paper on PESCO in January 2017 and the EEAS/EDA sending out questionnaires on PESCO in March 2017. The Food for Thought paper outlined key lines of inquiry related to the governance, commitments and legal aspects of PESCO and was sent to foreign ministries. The questionnaire, drafted by the EEAS and EDA, was sent to defence ministries and asked for general comments and reflections about governance, concrete project proposals and common commitments (#50). Part of the exercise was to prompt discussion within countries’ governments, the majority of which remained sceptical, and to steer debate among the member states. But it also provided the EEAS with a picture of the state of play. Although the Food for Thought paper did not leave a strong mark in the capitals, officials based in Brussels highlighted the importance it played in outlining possible avenues of development (#46, 50). Considering that the legal and institutional backdrop of several of the defence initiatives were unclear, the EEAS paper set a first framework on which member states could build during informal discussions throughout 2017. The Food for Thought paper and the questionnaire sparked a coherent narrative showing a strong tendency towards an ‘ambitious-inclusive’ PESCO (#50).

ii. Using the HR/VP’s relational capital

The HR/VP and DSG Serrano contributed to help along the PESCO process by coordinating and cooperating across institutions, as well as across hierarchies. While not being part of the content discussions that were led by France and Germany, Mogherini and Serrano used their position formally and informally to push the process forward. Building on the three-pillar framing of the ‘Winter Defence Package’, Mogherini used her tripartite position to the fullest – she even capitalised on her fourth and often forgotten role as Director of the European Defence Agency and of the European Military Committee throughout 2016 and 2017 (e.g.

AgenceEurope, 2016a). This section will assess how, despite being on the outskirts of the predominantly informal policy network's governance, over time the DSG's involvement allowed the EEAS to move toward the centre of the network, beyond its statutory prerogatives. Increasingly more embedded in the informal governance of the policy network, the EEAS's top echelons successfully tied themselves to informal discussions among member states and anchored themselves more centrally.

On the political level, for the 'Winter Defence Package' to work, close coordination with the Commission, NATO and the EDA was needed. Mogherini and her Cabinet were in close coordination with Juncker and his Cabinet on matters of defence, and on PESCO specifically (#20, 24, 55, 70; European Commission, 2018). As a high-ranking EEAS official highlighted, there was 'full support from Juncker' for concerted action (#55). First, they coordinated agendas, wielding the Commission's incentives when useful (#13, 70). This can first be seen in Juncker's public interventions, for instance in his 2016 State of the Union, where he not only reiterated his proposal for a European Defence Fund, but also called to explore the possibilities of PESCO at the upcoming Bratislava Summit (Juncker, 2016:8). Similarly, when negotiations on the Notification establishing PESCO started in summer 2017, Juncker called to 'wake up the Sleeping Beauty of the Lisbon Treaty' (Juncker, 2017). When Juncker thought to renew his call for a 'European army', the top echelons of the EEAS successfully 'suggested to Juncker to tone down the visibility' (#13, 70). More importantly, there was an explicit agreement from within the Juncker team that the EEAS would work with member states to define the Level of Ambition (defined in the IPSD) and that the Commission would help incentivise them (#55). Mogherini was at first sceptical of Juncker's, fearing too-close collaboration with the Commission would discredit her 'intergovernmental' HR-hat and lead to mistrust from member states (#55, 70). However, 'at the end there was a convergence of intentions': if the EEAS wished to strengthen the EU's and its own political and military capital, strengthening the industrial defence sector would have to go hand in hand (#70). Coordination became increasingly frequent and cooperative at Cabinet level.

On the working level, the EEAS ensured that Commissioner Bienkowska, who was working on the European Defence Action Plan, would attend the FAC/Defence throughout 2016 and 2017 – and more significantly attend the EDA's Annual Conference. Despite a competitive relationship between the EDA and the Commission (Fiott, 2015; #11), they cooperated well together (#55, 70). Bienkowska's attendances 'were instrumental' in pushing the process forward and helping to overcome member states' objections (#70) Highlighting 'the division of labour', she reiterated the need for foreign and defence ministers to agree on

the Implementation Plan so that the COM could act as enabler and accelerator at the EDA Annual Conference in November 2016: ‘A strong industrial base... will enable the support for the development of strategic capabilities, identified in the follow-up of the [EUGS]’ (Bienkowska, 2016).

Second, Mogherini and her Cabinet reached out to NATO ‘to calm down certain member states’ (#55). Mogherini already had a wide network across NATO and the EU upon her arrival (Koops & Tercovich, 2020). Just days after Brexit and the launch of the EUGS, Secretary General Stoltenberg attended the informal EU Council Summit (in advance of the upcoming EU-NATO Warsaw Summit)⁴⁵ (Mogherini, 2016a). The fact that Mogherini had a personal relationship with Stoltenberg facilitated coordination⁴⁶. As many member states feared duplication with NATO, Mogherini ensured that Stoltenberg would participate in most joint Foreign and Defence Minister Council Meetings. At Bratislava she reiterated: ‘We found common ground and consensus among the EU Ministers today on the need to strengthen the European defence cooperation, and this in full complementary with the work we do with NATO. It is not by chance again that today we discuss at the same time the implementation plan on the European Defence and the implementation of the Joint Declaration that EU and NATO signed in Warsaw’ (Mogherini, 2016g). Anchoring the Commission and NATO closer to the discussion had important effects for the acceptance and engagement of member states. France, for instance, was originally only interested in the commitments, notably committing within the EU to the 2% defence investment pledge, and ‘not optimistic’ about the buy-in for PESCO projects. However, because of the increasing clarifications around the Commission’s initiatives, France’s position shifted (#54).

Finally, let us turn to the relationship between Mogherini and high-level EEAS officials and member states. One notices a shift of approach vis-à-vis member states, and the role and interaction patterns in 2017. While in the second half of 2016, as France and Germany were informally scoping possibilities, the approach was rather laid-back⁴⁷ and behind the scenes, the HR/VP and Serrano became more pro-active to ensure the initial plans agreed in the IPSD would move ahead. While still on the sidelines of bi- and mini-lateral discussion, which remained the major arenas for shaping its governance, their informal

⁴⁵ The EU-NATO Summit in Warsaw took place on July 8-9th 2016. At the Summit, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg, President of the European Council Tusk and President of the Commission Juncker signed a Joint Declaration to strengthen EU-NATO Cooperation. It called for ‘boosting the ability to counter hybrid threats’, ‘broader operational cooperation’, notably better coordinating actions in the Mediterranean, ‘coherent complementary and interoperable defence capabilities’ and to ‘facilitate a stronger defence industry and greater defence research and industrial cooperation’, among other things (EU & NATO, 2016).

⁴⁶ Mogherini had an exchange of views with NATO on the agenda at the first FAC meeting, which was organised with defence Ministers in November 2015.

⁴⁷ The HR/VP frequently reiterated that it was a member state-led process, showing her intention not to overstep (e.g. Mogherini, 2017b).

involvement became more predominant, not least when the EEAS emerged as ‘neutral territory’ on the Notification on PESCO.

The increased engagement of EEAS officials across various intergovernmental fora is striking. For instance, in November 2016, the HR/VP attended an informal meeting of the EU Military Committee, discussing with military representatives the implementation of the security and defence chapters of the EUGS, as discussions within the Military Committee would fuel decisions to be taken in the upcoming November FAC/Defence (AgenceEurope, 2016a). She ‘spoke at length’ on the Permanent Structured Cooperation, the idea of an annual review to coordinate capability development, and the need to reform the command structure of EU missions and operations (ibid). By remaining proactive in engaging with Defence Ministers and Defence Policy Directors after the adoption of the IPSD, the DSG further generated a continuous stream of information exchange. Beyond simply ‘being briefed’ (#36, cf. 54), one can debate whether in times where the interested member states were discussing whether PESCO should be anchored in existing European structures or new ones created, the increasingly close involvement of DSG Serrano, respective PSC and PMG Chairs might have tilted the balance towards anchoring PESCO inside EEAS structures.

Let us recall that relations between Mogherini and the foreign ministries were to a certain extent tense due to the insulated process of drafting the EUGS (see p. 119ff). In particular, Mogherini had difficulty finding acceptance in the latter half of 2016 (#62). Some disapproved of the focus on defence – and concomitantly the deeper and more frequent ties Mogherini built with Defence Ministries and her prioritisation of attending the European Council, even asking to meet heads of governments rather than foreign ministries when travelling to capitals (#59, cf. 56, 73). In one such example, at the height of deciding to launch PESCO, Mogherini was present at a PESCO 4 Defence Ministerial meeting on July 13th, 2017. This was the day of the 19th Franco-German Ministerial Council on Security and Defence, which is widely regarded as the ‘formal’ start of PESCO. At the meeting, France and Germany proposed a list of steps intended to satisfy both an ‘inclusive’ and ‘ambitious’ PESCO, proposing more than a dozen possible PESCO projects, as well as first proposals of common commitments.

Mogherini tied close bonds with the other (female) incumbent Defence Ministers: France’s Florence Parly, Germany’s Ursula von der Leyen, Italy’s Roberta Pinotti, Spain’s María Margarita Robles Fernández and The Netherlands’ Jeanine Hennis-Plaschaert. Their meeting on the same day as the Franco-German Ministerial Council on Security and Defence was significant (Clemenceau, 2017). This meeting set a mark in tying closer bonds between

France, Germany, Italy, Spain⁴⁸ and the HR/VP. The fact that these women ‘got along so well together’ has been seen as a factor that allowed Mogherini and Juncker to pursue her agenda (#20). Jean-Yves Le Drian, then French Minister of European and Foreign Affairs and predecessor of Florence Parly, noted that not only did close friendship unite them, but also their candour and openness (Clemenceau, 2017). Just one week later, on July 21st, those four countries sent a letter to the HR/VP setting out a proposal on necessary commitments – supported by four other countries (unsurprisingly the Netherlands, and Finland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic). There is disagreement on the relevance of Mogherini’s presence at that meeting. Some argued it was merely her political calculations and her ego or ‘that it was an acknowledgement that the developments were in compliances with EU frameworks’ (#36, 62). Others speculated that the meeting might have led France to accept to an ‘inclusive’, rather than exclusive PESCO (#50). The meeting highlights however the embeddedness of the HR/VP, interestingly, beyond the prerogative of her mandate.

While negotiations were led by France and Germany – mostly through very tough negotiations amongst themselves – HR/VP Mogherini and DSG Serrano were regularly briefed and informed by senior officials from the capitals (#36, 54). During 2017, the PESCO 4 emphasised the importance of supporting Mogherini in her job (Gabriel & Von der Leyen, 2017) and their satisfaction with the process (Pinotti, 2017; Ayrault, 2017). In parallel, DSG Serrano became increasingly proactive in his relations with the Defence Policy Directors (DPD) and Security Policy Directors level, and was frequently, informally in touch. Considering the DPD-level discussions were a major factor in the discussion of PESCO it becomes relevant to understand the formal and informal interaction patterns (#17, 20, 21, 47, 56).

It is notable that DPD levels are chaired by the Rotating Presidencies, and attended by Serrano. Interestingly, usually a driving force to push the agenda forwards, the Maltese and Estonian Council Presidencies did not play a significant role in this period (#17, 47). Ensuring continuity, Serrano became a crucial node, supervising and coordinating across hierarchies. Especially in the second half of 2017, when the Notification of establishing PESCO was being negotiated in informal member state-led workshops, Serrano attended all meetings. In sum, we see a gradually increasing involvement of the HR/VP and the DSG through both informal and formal relations. It can be argued that this skewed member states’ discussions in two ways: first, by exerting sustained pressure and setting the agenda, Mogherini set the pace; second, it convinced more member states to overcome objections,

⁴⁸ The Netherlands were not able to attend.

thus ensuring a more inclusive and comprehensive development. Significantly, while at first it was debated whether PESCO should even take place within existing EU structures, member states decided to organise the discussions on the Notification establishing PESCO in the EEAS. Several reasons can explain this decision: a small member states were seeking a 'neutral' force facilitating the conversation, especially vis-à-vis France. Concomitantly, member states trusted in the capabilities of the Chairs. Lastly, as 'Spiritus Sanctus', DSG Serrano offered 'a vision' – for better or worse (depending on member states) (#62).

In sum, a mixed picture arises. it is important to emphasise that member states undoubtedly led the discussions. While Mogherini used her relationships tactically, tense and emotional discussions among defence ministers is what truly pushed certain member states to agree. As an official involved recalled, after Brexit, the Dutch and German Defence Ministers, who in person are good friends, had very frank, outspoken disagreements on whether further integration was the right way forward (#62). For Germany, it was crucial to show that Europe is able to function and move forward in times of crises. Mogherini did not strongly contribute conceptually, however, she was 'politically savvy' and knew how to speak to the media and make use of her networks – using her friendship with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg and VP role in the Commission, as well as relying on the 'Spiritus Sanctus' in the EEAS. She was more than just a by-stander, representing a piece of the puzzle.

C. Negotiating the 'Notification establishing PESCO': the EEAS as facilitator

The final decisions on the specificities of the Notification and Council Decision officially launching PESCO were discussed in informal seminars in Brussels between August and mid-November 2016. The participants were often expert officials from member states, at the DPD-level or PSC ambassadorial level. The period around the drafting of the Notification on the Permanent Structured Cooperation best encapsulates the policy network's governance for the policy initiation stage. It highlights the necessity of the EEAS in this case, despite it being a member-state led process. On the one hand this period shows, how far the EEAS had succeeded in increasing its reach into a member-state led process, embedding itself more centrally into the discussion; on the other hand, it sets important premises for the next stage of the negotiation, the policy consolidation stage. Prior to officially launching PESCO, the EEAS's added value was to act as facilitator among member states; drawing from and building trustful relationships and legitimacy about its role and added value. This would allow the EEAS to act as mediator in the formal negotiation stage.

In the lead up to the Notification, several member states organised and chaired informal meetings outside of the EU framework. The network structure at this point was

very dense. Interaction dynamics were frequent and conversations were held on all levels (#50). The Notification, which would be used as text for the Council Decision establishing PESCO, was agreed through Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). Under QMV negotiations dynamics are very different. In this context, several smaller member states felt unease vis-à-vis the PESCO 4 alliance. As the number of member states increased, smaller member states started to call for the negotiations to be mediated by a 'neutral' force, for fear that the process would be too heavily influenced by French interests.

This led to the decision to hold discussions in the EEAS building with the EEAS chairing the intergovernmental settings. In the few meetings that occurred at the operational level, for instance, the PMG Chair Pierre Van Aubele was specifically asked to act in his personal capacity as he was seen as trustworthy and a good chair (#13, 17, 18). However, EEAS officials had to act in their personal capacity (#13) because there were no legal grounds for them to play a role in a member-state led process. Interestingly, we here see the prevalence of the EEAS's relational capital, specifically the relevance of the Chairs' social and human capital, over the formal statutory rules.

Yet, at this stage their involvement only shaped the process, rather than the policy content. Member state officials also highlight that the EEAS lower-level officials played little role, apart from a 'logistical point of view' (#17, 13). Indeed, the EEAS's understanding of its role was to 'open the door' (#55). As such, they were not mediators or drafters of the Notification document, but facilitators. As a reminder, we differentiate between the administrative 'facilitator' role and the 'mediator' (or broker) role by their functions and activities (see page 74). They have differing effects on the communication flow and differing abilities to use information. As a facilitator, the EEAS uses administrative duties; as mediator it uses inter-personal activities, such as trust generation and persuasion. In this case, the document was drafted by the PESCO 4 (predominantly France and Germany), shaped and negotiated among member states. Smaller member states repeatedly reached out to Germany specifically to ensure their interests were taken into consideration in the draft's content (#35, 42). As a national officials highlight, the drafting of the Notification, which lies at the foundation of the Council Decision, is one of the rare occurrences where member states so fundamentally 'wrote' EU legislature (#35). Thus, at this stage, the EEAS was embedded, but not central to the discussion. Its involvement in the conversation was important to facilitate the arduous negotiations administratively on the working level. Still, the fact that they were involved at all is the result of the HR/VP and DSG's reach and the nature of relations between member states and the Chairs, who were perceived as trustworthy and a legitimate presence.

In sum, the conversation on strengthening European defence was one anchored in a tripartite dialogue between member states, the HR/VP and Juncker's Commission. Hence, the culmination of France and Germany's alignment of interests for greater defence cooperation, a Commission President in favour of an 'EU army' (Juncker, 2015), and finally Mogherini harnessing her institutional triple-hatted position and agenda-setting role all led to a swift implementation of ideas for strengthened defence cooperation. Mogherini's legacy and personal interest have been a crucial driving force. The entrepreneurial leadership and interest of Mogherini and DSG Serrano catalysed the process. Tight scheduling and agenda-setting powers prioritised PESCO and the creation of a military Operational Headquarter as priorities. Despite remaining historically an area with no resources for 'supranational' institutions, the HR/VP used her position and relational resources both, intra-institutionally, within the small EEAS team, and inter-institutionally, with defence ministers of the PESCO 4 and Commission President Juncker.

While not shaping the content, Mogherini and Serrano's position and network reach slowly embedded them closer to the centre of the policy network's governance. Their political incentives and frequent interactions contributed, heightened and prolonged the momentum, framing the conversation and contributing to member states overcoming their objections or feeling pressure to do so. Capital-to-capital diplomacy remained crucial, yet it was the complementarity of these conversations that mattered. All levels worked jointly. The Notification and Council Decision establishing PESCO, which defined the framework of PESCO's development were fully discussed by the member states. The EEAS's influence was, as expected, limited, because it was not centrally positioned and not embedded. Nevertheless, according to our definition, it was able to steer the policy's direction because, on the political level at least, it utilised its networks' reach and coordinated across institutions. In certain respects, the EEAS has even expanded its reach through its position and played a role in the informal negotiations on the Notification. An aspect that becomes visible at this stage and highly relevant at the next is the vertical cohesion within the EEAS. The EEAS started to become a more significant player once the *informal* member-state driven dimension needed to be translated into the *formal* setting of concrete policy.

IV) Translating the informal to the formal – overcoming informal small groupings?

In the policy consolidation stage, the EEAS's facilitation of the process gave it a strong positive impact, and even limited influence. That its influence was limited can be explained by its constrained network reach, being only semi-embedded in the policy network governance. Yet, the joint use of tactical administrative capabilities across hierarchies and wielding social and human capital led to the EEAS's ability to shape and advance the policy's development.

The PESCO 4 continued to be key actors in shaping PESCO's content. Leadership by small, informal groups of member-states through the presentation of non-papers did not disappear (Aggestam & Bicchi, 2019). Quite the opposite, the issuance of non-papers by various small groups occurred on almost all issues of relevance. The role of informal small groupings shifted, however: whereas member states previously led the negotiation and discussion fully, in the consolidation stage the EEAS did. France, which was a key driving force in early 2018 until the summer, significantly slowed the process, despite having set the Roadmap of concrete dates and milestones (#68). A capital-based French official acknowledged the key role the EEAS played to 'keep the ball rolling' (#54). Indeed, as a member state official highlighted, in particular 'the drive that before came from the member states, now comes from the EEAS' (#21). DSG Serrano who 'should only be supporting, was eventually driving' (#21).

The influence remained limited to the political dimension of PESCO, however. While in the previous section the EEAS was not fully embedded because of the informal capital-to-capital diplomacy, during the consolidation phase the EEAS continued to be only semi-embedded due to its limited network reach across organisational boundaries. While the EEAS officials based in the DG for CSDP and crisis management formed a cohesive clique with the PMG and PSC Chairs, there was little coordination or horizontal cohesion with the 'military' strand of the EEAS. For instance, the EUMS, a strand under direct authority of the HR/VP, is based in a different, secured building. Thus, while the policy network's governance was far-reaching, the EEAS was not centrally positioned in it. This becomes relevant for this analysis insofar as member states have – to varying degrees – a much more holistic and strategic approach to the development of PESCO than the EEAS.

While constrained to the political framework negotiations, the EEAS has nonetheless been able to influence PESCO's development because of 1) the vertical cohesion across hierarchies – while pursuing the goal of a successful and rapid turn-over of PESCO (and other defence initiatives) they engaged tactically across levels – and 2) its instrumental role as mediator between drastically diverging interests. The mediating clique, led by DSG Serrano and composed of the Chairs of the PSC and PMG, and Molenaar (as representative of the

PESCO Secretariat), leveraged both their human and social capital. Their involvement was crucial to helping member states overcome their objections, specifically in the making of policies that defined the political framework of PESCO. The documents negotiated are the 'Recommendation concerning a Roadmap for the implementation of PESCO', 'Decision establishing the common set of governance rules for PESCO projects', 'Recommendation on the Sequencing of Commitments', and 'Decision establishing the general conditions under which third States exceptionally be invited to participate in individual PESCO projects' (the latter of which, rather than being approved in December 2018 as expected, was solely agreed in October 2020). The EEAS emerged as a trusted, cooperative actor, mediating and facilitating contentious negotiations. That the EEAS was proactively seeking to establish trust with and among member states established cooperative engagement among member states and between the EEAS and national representatives. The EEAS's involvement led to a virtuous cycle of cooperation. Next to wielding social capital, it wielded human capital. Member state officials have on numerous occasions highlighted the political sensitivities, awareness and skill of the EEAS officials, who offered great policy solutions on several occasions.

A. The EEAS semi-embedded in the policy network governance: curtailed to the political dimension

By observing the broader network governance of PESCO more generally, one observes a disconnect between the three realms that PESCO encompasses, namely the political, military and industrial worlds. As highlighted, PESCO cannot be assessed in isolation: it tackles not only political defence matters, but also military and industrial-defence capability issues. These three pillars were discussed in different realms which the EEAS did not cohesively reach – especially once the negotiations were tied to the Commission's EDF and the EDA-controlled process on the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD).

The tripartite structure of the PESCO Secretariat in theory aims to bridge the civilian/political, military and industrial worlds. It is successful in doing so only to a certain extent. Its structure intends to achieve the dual aim of increasing the EU's operational and industrial defence capabilities. Chaired by either the Deputy Secretary General (DSG) for CSDP and Crisis Response Serrano, or Molenaar, now Director of the Security and Defence (SecDefPol) division⁴⁹, it also includes the EUMS and the European Defence Agency. The

⁴⁹ During negotiations, the EEAS's sub-division responsible was located the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMDP) was a sub-unit. The DG for CSDP and Crisis Response was re-structured in March 2019 to make the Directorate-General more suited facing the numerous security and defence developments among other aims.

EUMS supports and assesses the development of the operational aspects of PESCO, both with regard to the implementation of the common binding commitments and the operational project proposals and compliances. On the other side of the table, the EDA assesses the capability development side of PESCO. The EEAS then has the role of ensuring the overall coordination – both on the day-to-day level when drafting the text discussed in the PSC or PMG, and during the Annual Review of the progress of member states implementing PESCO. Until summer 2019 the EEAS's sub-division of the PESCO Secretariat had only DSG Serrano, drafter Molenaar, and two occasional support staff working on PESCO.

Member states and EU officials alike have highlighted the united front the Secretariat presented (while it is worth noting that some member state representatives did not even notice the PESCO Secretariat in any capacity) (#21, 28, 42, cf. 22, 23). During the height of the negotiations, in 2018, they met every week to exchange information and efforts of coordination despite visibly diverging positions have been noted by member states (#28, 37, 46 cf. 44). Moreover, when DSG Serrano spoke publicly, the EUMS or EDA would, for instance, send bullet-points or share the presentation slides. There was an active exchange of information. While their aim was to bring 'everything together', the real challenge remains the very different mandates between the EEAS's SecDefPol division, the EDA and the EUMS (#37). There was a 'gentlemen's agreement' – a division of labour: the EEAS focusses on 'introducing the policy-elements' and taking care of 'the politics'; the EUMS and EDA focus on the technical elements (#37). After all, the technical expertise and knowledge of potential military and defence capabilities' synergies remains centred around the EUMS, national military staff at the EUMC and the EDA (see page 48).

However, there was no deeper coordination, nor convergence on prioritization and discernment of means for better coherence. Relevant EEAS individuals were not relevantly linked with the EUMS or the EDA, despite being part of the EEAS and the PESCO Secretariat pro forma. More generally, the EUMS rarely attended PMG meetings and the EEAS was not directly informed about PESCO project-related discussions. The PMG and PSC Chair rarely interacted with military strand (#18, 19, 20). In a broader context the EEAS did not engage strategically with the EUMS, the EDA or the Commission. The EDA on the other hand has been noted to strategically interact in the broader governance structure to its advantage: with the Commission (Fiott, 2015) and with the Security and Defence Subcommittee of the European Parliament (Calcaras, forthcoming).

Moreover, Member state and EU officials across the board have highlighted that the EUMC and EUMS were not deeply embedded in the policy network governance and in the EU defence/military architecture more broadly (cf. #12, 19, 20, 21). Despite the EUMS being

organisationally part of the EEAS, and the EUMC an advisory body for the HR/VP and PSC, there is a disconnect between the civilian policy-planning officials and technical military officials. Despite the fact that any form of closer military or broader defence integration on a European scale was a highly political move, it is surprising to see how segregated the small 'military' community is from the rest of the CSDP community. Indeed, the traditional tension between civilian and military cultures in Europe is not new: 'Problems of communication and coordination between civilians and the military have become a distinctive feature of a CSDP viewed as flawed as design' (Faleg, 2017: 70; Norheim-Martinsen, 2010, #17).

The lack of cohesion among these actors has broader repercussions for achieving PESCO's aim. In order to make PESCO 'useful' for the EU's defence capabilities-gaps must be identified, yet prioritization among these actors diverge. For instance, for the assessment of the PESCO projects, the EUMS developed five security and defence scenarios according to which the EU's joint military operational capabilities are benchmarked. The EDA follows priorities set out in its Capability Development Plan (CDP), (2008, 2014, 2018), which 'is designed to identify the types of defence capabilities EU governments may need to acquire for future strategic contingencies' (Fiott et al. 2017:42). While the former focusses on military needs for EU interventions abroad, the latter focusses more on technological advancement.

Thus, the intra-institutional horizontal cohesion, specifically between the DG for CSDP and crisis management and the military strand in the EEAS is not strong. Officials on both sides of the spectrum openly acknowledge the ensuing challenges (#11, 14, 19): the clusterisation, siloisation and on some occasions duplication of discussions and policy-making is indeed the result of the challenging interface between the military and political worlds (#17, 23, 42). Consequently, the EEAS's role and ability to shape policy-making is limited to the political framework of PESCO, i.e. the governing rules and binding commitments, that are being discussed in the PSC and PMG, rather than the PESCO projects that are discussed within the EUMC and amongst Defence Policy Directors, administratively supported by the EUMS and EDA. The trilateral development of the defence capabilities of the member states – and the diverging priorities of those three actors – has been a crucial factor hampering the coherent development of PESCO. Calls for greater consistency and coherence amongst those strands have been repeated (#14, 22, 28, 32, 42, 44), yet the clashes have also been seen as 'inevitable', not least as they perpetuate among many member states on the national levels (#17, 20, 37, 42, 46). Certainly, while the overarching coordination must be ensured by the political level, it is the working level, notably the PESCO Secretariat, specifically the DSG for CSDP and crisis management as coordinator, that has the overview of those three strands.

As central node, it is in the position to tie the developments of these policies together and could emerge as information hub. However, as long as there is no unified agreement on the prioritisation of which capabilities shortfalls to tackle first – which must be carried out on the political level – unified action is unlikely.

Due to the EEAS's sole focus on the political side of PESCO, it misperceives its centrality in this policy network governance. By not being aware of military and industrial realms of the debate, the EEAS remains unable to act vis-à-vis the holistic perspective member states and their capitals retain. Member states' 'strategic' use of the different realms allows them to mould and shape the overarching defence capability structure beyond the EEAS's grasp. The additional lack of resources curtails the policy/administrative level's ability to 'zoom out' of being a 'policy-crunching machinery'. The PMG Chair and drafter were once even prevented from carrying out their administrative duties due to being blind-sided with decisions taken in other venues (lest it be able to ensure a coherent synchronisation of the three branches' development).

For instance, while it has been noted as exceptional (#20, 28), negotiations on the Council Decision on third country participation in PESCO projects had to be halted in the PMG on the grounds that an agreement, conflicting with the discussion in the PMG, had already been decided in the EUMC. Based on a report of the EUMS that was allegedly very politicised, national military representatives in the EUMC pushed forward a discussion, that was ongoing in parallel in the PMG. The same issue was discussed in two different committees, and while the discussions had different proclivities and foci, they touched the same roots of highly political issues. Some countries used this strategically to their advantage, able to do so also because their civilian and military officers were more centralised and coordinated both in their capitals and in Brussels. Indeed, some national officials ensure very close coordination of positions between the military and civilian negotiating officials, which allows them to ensure a strategic approach to using the various committee realms to their advantage – the French and Cypriots being striking examples.

The disconnect around the military realm, the industrial realm and the political realm is only bridged by those member states who not only have smooth coordination between their defence and foreign ministries, but also between the Military Representatives and civilian diplomats in the Permanent Representative. Considering this is the case particularly for France and Cyprus, two countries that have significant national interest in this issue, they have been instrumental in strategically using this to highlight the relevance of member states' relational capital.

While intra-institutional horizontal coordination must be strengthened and deepened to overcome silo-mentality, we observe that the network structure also reveals the emergence of a sub-group among the policy planners, i.e. among the PMG Chair and PMG representatives. Contrary to a clique, a sub-group is a group of individuals that 'attract each other', which leads to a proclivity for deeper and more cooperative interaction (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1964; page 64). We observe that the information flow was smoother and more frequent among PMG national representatives and EEAS Chairs, than within the PESCO Secretariat. The frequency of meetings, and consequent socialisation, is one explanation why the highly heterogeneous group of PMG representatives have created a smoother interaction pattern. Indeed, a particularity of this committee is that representatives have diverging backgrounds, sent from either national foreign or defence ministries, and who, consequently, have either a political or military background.

The national permanent representatives of the PMG are either dispatched from the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and represent countries that in themselves have varying degrees of homogeneity within their national coordination between these ministries. Some PMG officials were assigned to follow the comitology discussions on the financing instruments of industrial capability projects (EDIDP and EDF) that were negotiated with the Commission's DG Grow; others attended the deliberations and assessments of the PESCO projects with the EUMC and EDA. Because of the trusted and cooperative environment within the PMG – an aspect we will discuss below – information flowed freely. Thus, first, the PMG Chair, if needed, relied on national representatives, among others, to be kept in the loop. This shows on the one hand deep embeddedness in the formal political discussion, but also lack of information flow between PESCO Secretariat members. Second, considering the very frequent, cross-fertilisation (discussion was occurring across levels), the network remained dense. Leveraging information, such as a broker would, was not possible in this network structure. The EEAS did not have a monopoly on information; on the contrary it fed off, relied on and worked with the information provided by member states. Hence, in order to be influential, the EEAS would have to – and ultimately did – act as mediator.

We can draw a few conclusions from this section: first, as applicable as the relational capital argument is for the EEAS, it is so for member states as well. The more central and cohesive member states are, the higher the likelihood they act tactically across the multi-levelled governance. Second, considering the divisions between the military and civilian/political realms are just as relevant on the national level, there is only so much the EEAS can do to

overcome broader cohesion among all strands. Similar to the Civilian CSDP Compact case we address in the next chapter, lack of connection on national level is often visible on EU level (see page 199). Overcoming national inter-ministerial gaps and coordinate among various strands remains a mammoth task that to some extent must be led by member states, yet would also benefit from more intentional, proactive engagement.

B. Negotiating the political framework: setting the pace and generating a virtuous cycle of cooperation

The composite politico-administrative nature of the EEAS became particularly visible in the second stage of PESCO. The impartiality, trust and ‘excellence’ of the two key EEAS officials were a cross-cutting theme and remained constant (#16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24, 28). Being very aware of the different sensibilities of member states, the EEAS wielded both human and social capital. Having the trust and perceived legitimacy from member states, the Chair also used its position to tactically using timing and agenda-setting to accelerate or halt negotiations, in accordance with the wishes of the higher echelon within the EEAS to ‘get things done’ and ensuring swift implementation (#17, cf. 21, 68). This was also possible due to the intra-institutional cohesion and frequent cooperative interaction among the EEAS officials.

i. Vertical intra-institutional cohesion: setting the pace, acting across hierarchies

Despite the fact that policy documents were negotiated on the policy/administrative level, Mogherini’s involvement did not relent during the policy consolidation stage. We saw in the last section that the HR/VP and EEAS were acting cohesively. They continued to act tactically across hierarchies; officials confirmed that there was extensive information exchange and intra-institutional coordination (#59, 68). Across hierarchies we observe coherence between Mogherini, Deputy Head of Cabinet Rentschler, Serrano, the PSC Chair, PMG Chair and Arnoult Molenaar, who drafted the document texts.

Mogherini was very involved in the PSC discussions and received daily updates from the PSC Chair personally until the end of her mandate by the PESCO Secretariat (#37, 68). She would clearly communicate when she was dissatisfied with countries’ positions (#59, 68, 70). On a few occasions, the PSC Chair had instructions to find a different agreement despite having almost reached consensus within the PSC, infuriating PSC Ambassadors (#59; see also Maurer & Wright, 2021). One observes a strategic use of the EEAS’s multi-levelled engagement. When needed to overcome a blockade, the EEAS ‘on a few important occasions’ would directly reach out to Defence Policy Directors through DSG Serrano (#68). Similarly,

the PMG Chair, who remained in very close coordination with the PSC Chair and DSG Serrano, would sometimes ‘use them’ to talk to PSC ambassadors directly in informal settings (#13). There was a strategic engagement across hierarchies to ensure a smooth and rapid agreement among member states.

Intra-institutional cohesion and close coordination became very apparent in the tight-knit group of individuals working on PESCO within the EEAS. The frequent interaction, coordination and close bond between the relevant Chairs, the EEAS section of the PESCO Secretariat and DSG Serrano was very close and smooth (#13, 17, 18, 21, 22, 28). The PMG and PSC Chair cooperated to ensure rapid and swift turn-over in the negotiation of legislative texts, the latter of whom would use its positional advantage to seek out to contact individual PSC ambassadors if a particular national permanent representative was particularly challenging in the PMG. Pressured by the upper echelons, the PSC and the PMG Chairs ensured rapid turnover leading to double the amount of hours of meetings of the PMG, especially between September 2018 and December 2018 (reaching up to three times a week, meeting from 10am to 7pm). Member state officials noted the strategic use of administrative capabilities by the Chairs, especially with regard to the length of meetings, keeping member states to exert pressure on them (#18). Lastly, the cohesiveness and coordination that was particularly noted amongst member states was that of the PMG Chair and Molenaar, as drafter of policy texts (#13, 18). Numerous member state officials highlighted the ‘very good working relationship between the two’ (#18, cf. 21). They in turn cooperated closely and fruitfully with the Council and EEAS Legal Service, which was very important due to the unknown legal nature of PESCO.

Working cohesively and tactically across hierarchies gave the EEAS the ability to wield its relational capital. First, it reached directly to capitals through Serrano’s connection to the DPD. Although this did not happen frequently, he did use this avenue on a few important occasions. This is a typical example of the relevance of the EEAS’s weak ties, revealing that it is not solely the frequency of the interactions the matter, but also the ability to mobilise infrequent yet authoritative ties (see p. 66; Granovetter, 1973). Weak ties are just as valuable to understanding interaction patterns, and a possible means of influence through relational capital. Moreover, coupled with administrative capacities, intra-institutional cohesion also allowed the HR/VP and DSG Serrano to pursue their interest in seeing PESCO progress rapidly.

ii. A virtuous cycle of cooperation: wielding social and human capital

In the case of PESCO, the EEAS adopted a mediator role, engendering a virtuous cycle of cooperation because of the social and human capital wielded by the intra-institutionally cohesive EEAS clique. It facilitated cooperative interaction between member states through enhancing trust and understanding between negotiating parties. In the actual negotiation of the texts, the Chair derived a lot of legitimacy and trust from his expertise, knowledge and sense of understanding.

As mediator, the EEAS engaged in typical activities that were trust-enhancing. As per our theory chapter, a mediator succeeds in creating a trustful environment, strengthening cooperative behaviour among member states and hence strengthening communication among the actors. Beyond merely using their administrative capacities, a mediator's engagement leads to a change in the policy's development to the extent that negotiating actors are more willing to seek consensus. As mediators, the PSC and PMG Chair sought to create the right atmosphere, meaning both creating a positive, trustful environment within the Committees, and by seeking to keep member states' trust, and by informally creating 'safe spaces' (#13, 21, 69, cf. 28). Both Chairs repeatedly organised informal meetings with smaller groups of member states who were on opposing sides. For example, the PSC Chair would organise informal breakfast with member states who were posing particular challenges to find agreement (#21, 68). Similarly, during the most contentious negotiations on third-country participation, significant progress was made due to the mediatory activities by the PMG Chair and Molenaar. In addition to regularly calling upon member states to aim to find agreements informally in smaller groups, the Chair summoned an informal meeting for the eight or nine countries that were most opposed to the agreement. This meeting was held under the premise that it was informal, without having instructions from the capitals. Aimed at easing the tension, it was 'helpful in understanding' the positions of the opposite camp, and to 'have sympathy' with the other side (#21, 22, 28). Despite strongly diverging views, some divisions were overcome due to significant efforts to diffuse tension and 'innovative' and 'creative' solutions proposed by the Chair. The informal meetings initiated by the Chair allowed member states 'to have broader perspectives' and generated trust between the individual national representatives (#21). We will address below why, however, no decision on this issue was found before October 2020, and what this means for the limitations of the EEAS's relational capital.

An additional factor to the clique's social capital, was their human capital, meaning their ability to utilise the information available to smoothen policy development through, for instance, providing conducive text proposals. One success for the rapid turnover was their having 'a great number of alternative language proposals consistently lined up' (#68).

Member states' opinions converged: clear explanations and convincing argumentation by the PMG Chair and Molenaar ensured the best possible solutions were found in various contexts (#13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 28, 69, cf. 28). One national official admitted that while it first seemed that the Chair was partial to one group, regular intervention to justify the proposed text formulations, with the support of the Legal Counsellors provided clearer evidence that what was proposed by the EEAS was not in favour of one party but rather impartial and seeking the best possible solutions. They were 'very well prepared' and 'presented sound arguments' (#23). Continuously offering 'sound judgements', they were moreover able to offer very good text proposals. For instance, while the issue was not finalised within the PMG, the Chair 'was an instrumental force in finding balance' between the two starkly opposing groups on third-country participation (#22). Another member state official reiterated that the 'instrumental' role the EEAS played, specifically as it allowed 'in 99% of the cases not to agree on the lowest common denominator' (#28). A majority of issues were overcome because of 'very creative solutions on text formulations...and because of the organisation [sic] of informal meetings that allowed [member states] to have broader perspectives' (#22). As argued in our theoretical framework, a virtuous cycle of cooperation emerges when a mediator successfully strengthens cooperative engagement (see page 75ff). Coupled with human capital, as has been the case here, we observe that the EEAS shaped the policy's development, affecting and steering the process. While not influencing the policy content, the EEAS played an instrumental role in the development of the political dimension of PESCO's policy progression.

With regard to administrative capabilities, the EEAS played a facilitating role. Member states highlighted the importance and helpfulness of the EEAS continuously sending document texts on time, further generating goodwill and trust in the relationship. However, the EEAS also successfully combined its relational resources and administrative capabilities to shape policy content. For instance, especially during the negotiations on the 'Council Recommendation concerning the sequencing of the fulfilment of the more binding commitments in the framework of PESCO and specifying more precise objectives', the EEAS was able to shape policy content, notably in defining the 'progress indicators' for assessing the specific deliverables of the commitments. They argued that they would need more information to unpack the commitments as they were the ones that would make an assessment on progress through the Annual Review process. As with the first Food for Thought Paper in January 2017, the EEAS clique relied on their close cooperation with the Legal Counsellors, and justified that 'legally/procedurally' it was their necessity to report on the implementation. In other words, they successfully argued that the commitments needed to be

more detailed, specific and clearly defined so as to be able to assess what would be required for their achievements (#37). This led to member states ‘defining more precise objectives’ [progress indicators] based on which the Annual Reports, drafted by the EEAS, would be able to hold member states accountable. Consequently, they leveraged their ‘administrative implementation power’ to shape the skeleton of the assessment format. For the EEAS this meant two things: first, it shaped the assessment format and through persuasion/argument convinced member states to be more detailed and specific in the commitments; it led the way to overcoming the objections of member states who opposed too-detailed and/or quantifiable commitments. Second, it increased its means to hold member states accountable in the implementation stage.

Thus, it has become evident that the EEAS both left an important impact on the process through its administrative capacities and responsibilities and influenced the policy process through its combined facilitating and mediatory role. Shaping the content of governance elements and significantly contributing to member states finding agreement, the EEAS went beyond simply impacting the process. Certainly its administrative capabilities and responsibilities in this instance have shaped PESCO’s governance elements. By defining a detailed sequencing of commitments for the Review process, the EEAS positioned itself to receive more information in the implementation stage to be able to assess member states’ progress, and thus augmented its accountability mechanisms. The EEAS also significantly contributed to member states overcoming their objections through mediatory activity, engendering through its social and human capital a virtuous cycle of cooperation. Contrarily to brokerage, in mediation information is not monopolised; it is not used to extend an already advantageous position, yet it is pursued with a specific preference and policy goal in mind. Hoping to benefit from the momentum that had been created through the EUGS and by the Franco-German motor, the EEAS sought to ensure a rapid implementation of PESCO and wielded various politico-administrative tools at its disposal to ensure the formation stage progressed accordingly. They were successful in doing so thanks to, first, the continued trust engendered through their ‘listening’ abilities and legitimacy, and, second, due to innovative and convincing text propositions, which often went – according to member states – beyond the lowest common denominator (#28, cf. 18, 21, 46, 68). Their influence, however, remained limited to steering and shaping the process.

There remains a clear and important limitation to the extent of the EEAS’s influence. First, the content discussions were to a large extent the result of negotiations by member states, who informally continued capital-to-capital discussions (#36). Throughout the drafting and negotiating period, member states, and especially the PESCO 4, continued to

‘feed the debate’ by sending non-papers on all above noted documents, except the Recommendation for the roadmap for the implementation (cf. #21, 28). The drafting of those non-papers was done by the capitals, with little involvement even of national Permanent Representatives (#20, 21, 28). In the case of PESCO, policy texts drew significantly on member states’ non-papers (contrary to the case of the Civilian CSDP Compact (page 194)). For similar reasons as those elaborated above, the EEAS had clear intentions to build on member states’ input and did so successfully. This was a self-reinforcing approach: as member states felt heard and understood, trust also allowed them to be open-minded to the EEAS’s suggestions. Even in the case of PESCO, member states ‘have the willingness to change, yet they must just know why’ (#23).

Second, there were important limitations to the EEAS’s influence because its reach is curtailed not just by its networks’ semi-embeddedness across the military and industrial-defence realms, but also due to formal institutional limitations. Council Decisions, in our case specifically the ‘Council Decision establishing the common set of governance rules for PESCO projects’ and the ‘Council Decision on third-country participation’, were agreed in COREPER, which is chaired by Council Presidencies. This set formal, legal limitations to the EEAS’s reach. On the Decision on third-country participation, negotiations were deadlocked because of the geopolitical, socio-political, and economic implications for member states. Negotiations became increasingly technical in nature and deliberations took time both on EU and national levels. France, Spain, Cyprus and Greece were opposed to allowing third-country participation which would go beyond the remit of ‘exceptional participation’. Their reasons for taking this stance differed. For instance, Cyprus was fundamentally opposed to allowing any Turkish participation in the projects and France was not keen to share the competitive market with American or British defence industries. On the other extreme were countries such as Sweden, the Netherlands and Poland, which were keen to include NATO allies in project developments and protect their small, independent yet diversified defence industries (against the French industries). Member states acknowledged that based on the non-papers proposed on this issue, the two views were very difficult to reconcile, and discussions were close to failing several times (#22, 48). This issue was highly politicised as seen in the above-noted political discussion pushed forward by France in the EUMC discussion. While progress was made in PMG and PSC respectively, final discussions in COREPER branched out again – re-opening politically sensitive issues. Ultimately, when it comes to legal acts, negotiation dynamics differ: they span an entirely different network, which the EEAS does not reach.

V) Policy implementation: from the Annual Reports to becoming a 'hub of information'

At the time of writing, it is too early to draw any major conclusions on the implementation of PESCO as results will only appear years, if not decades down the line. Moreover, as a member-state led process, the implementation of PESCO depends on the political will of member states (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:27).

The EEAS holds a potentially relevant role on the policy/administrative level: As part of the PESCO Secretariat, it evaluates progress on the implementation of PESCO's binding commitments and the projects annually. The EDA, EUMS and EEAS's SecDefPol jointly assess the operational progress, scrutinising in particular 'issues of availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of forces' in reference to each of the 'binding commitments' (Fiott, Missiroli, Tardy, 2017:32). This evaluation draws from member states' National Implementation Plans (NIPs) wherein member states detail how they aim to fulfil the binding commitments. While important to hold member states accountable, there are procedural challenges that make this process potentially less relevant. Crucially, member states set their own objectives in their NIPs. Hence, they can set differing objectives from one area to another, which, due to diverging ambitions and prioritisations, leads to very different levels of engagement, and concomitantly to differentiated integration. If member states complete the NIPs, an outcome that is not guaranteed, this could lead the PESCO Secretariat, and the EEAS in general, to emerge as a hub of information, from which synergy potential and innovation can emanate.

Blockmans and Crosson's (2019:23) study reveals the 'clustering' among participating member states and a significant drop in activity by participating member states as a result of differing levels of ambition, willingness to use military force, foreign policy orientation and scope of action for the executive branch in military-security decision-making. With PESCO projects 'becoming more ambitious, costly and exclusive', Blockmans and Crosson (2019:24) identify two scenarios: either a 'European defence more closely defined along French-industry lines' or, 'if political momentum is lost due to growing indifference by participating state governments', a leading role on the technical level by the Commission's newly created DG Defence. Next to political will, the main challenge for the successful implementation of PESCO remains the lack of coordination and cohesion among various defence initiatives, specifically the overall synchronisation of cycles between PESCO, the Commission-controlled EDF (which wields the financial lever), and the EDA's Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), which was initiated in conjunction with PESCO to provide an assessment of the existing defence capabilities and shortfalls to identify potential cooperation areas (#11,

35, 42, 47). CARD plays an important role in identifying the capability shortfalls that should be tackled by PESCO. Strengthening – and crucially institutionalising – coordination among these three defence initiatives, which are representative of the above identified three silos, would significantly improve cohesion. The network structure at this stage highlights a lack of coherence and interconnectedness: while there has been interaction among the individuals based in the PESCO Secretariat, there is no willingness for coordination within the EDA sub-units that coordinate PESCO and CARD (#35) and frequently observed competition between the EDA and the Commission (#11, 12, 19). With a lack of agreement on which capability shortfalls to prioritise, conflicting strategic visions and clashing philosophies challenge the implementation of PESCO.

The first Annual Report was presented and discussed in March 2019. It was written by the PESCO Secretariat, with the EEAS's SecDefPol division taking the lead. The Annual Report 'describes the status of PESCO implementation', by providing an 'aggregated assessment on the NIPs, key findings and recommendations' (EEAS, 2019b:2). Due to the EEAS's ability to rely on the 'progress indicators' set in the Council Recommendation on the sequencing of commitments, it was able to ask member states to 'review and update, as appropriate' their NIPs by January 2019 (#37). As requested by the Council Conclusions of November 2018, in early April 2019 the Secretariat presented a Report on the Lessons Learnt from the 2018 Project Cycle delineating short-, medium- and long-term recommendations. The Council adopted the Recommendation assessing the progress on the commitments early May. Negotiations on the Recommendation ran smoothly, and member states continue to be content with the quality and smoothness of progress (cf.#35, 42, 46). With the Report, the EEAS set a guiding framework for upcoming developments (#42).

As in the implementation stage, the NIPs are sent directly to the PESCO Secretariat as it is the central actor to assess the implementation. Hence, the PESCO Secretariat can emerge as the 'hub of information' – gathering a broad overview (#47). By leading the process around the Annual Review, the PESCO Secretariat will over time amass information and develop expertise (#46). There are questions, however, over how relevant this role will be in the future, as ultimately political will and resource allocation for the implementation must come from member states. For the first Annual Review, only nine NIPs were submitted on time, the others with some to significant delay. Having to report on so many defence initiatives (e.g. CARD, NIPs for PESCO, NIPs for the Civilian CSDP Compact), there is a 'reporting fatigue', leading EDA, EUMS and even member state officials to raise doubts about the quality on their own member states' NIPs (#42). Smaller member states, too, have

expressed their inability to respond fully to the NIPs, because they lack capacity and expertise.

Whether or not the PESCO Secretariat emerges as a ‘hub of information’, a more critical performance indicator will be the progress in cohesiveness among the three actors (the SecDefPol division in the EEAS’s DG for CSDP and crisis response, the EUMS, and the EDA). First observations following the Annual Report reveal that coordination has been more institutionalised, more frequent and more fruitful. This results not least from the Report on the Lessons Learnt from the 2018 Project Cycle, which, written by the PESCO Secretariat, called for greater coherence between PESCO, CARD and the EDF among other things (EEAS, 2019b:3). However, as noted, the issue rests on the fact that the prisms through which PESCO’s progress is assessed often diverge because of the different mandates (cf. #37). Without a clear prioritization of which capabilities gap to be tackled, little coherence can emerge.

VI) Conclusion

This chapter’s assessment on the role and extent of influence by the EEAS on PESCO’s development offers a more nuanced picture of the subtle ways in which the EEAS was decisive in ensuring the rapid turn-over of a sensitive, member-state led policy issue. The alignment of its leadership, relational and administrative resources on the political, policy and administrative levels has made member states acknowledge that without the EEAS, PESCO ‘would not be where it is now’ (#13, cf. 17, 18, 20, 21, 28, 32, 36, 42). Interestingly, despite involving only a handful of EEAS officials with little prior expertise, the EEAS still played a significant role in steering the consolidation of PESCO’s political framework due to its relational capital. However, the influence was limited, which can be explained by the policy issue, network structure and the relational capabilities and resource composition.

The HR/VP and the EEAS exerted sustained pressure and kept up the momentum after the drive by member states ebbed, giving way to starkly diverging interests and ambitions (cf. #18, 21). Very challenging negotiations on the implementation of technical aspects of PESCO slowed the process down (#13), yet the cohesive effort by the EEAS, concertedly utilising its relational and administrative capabilities across hierarchies, pressured member states ‘to get it done’ and ensured progress in the policy consolidation stage. Crucially, EEAS officials’ human and social capital was decisive in the negotiation process, yielding trust and information from member states. As a mediator, wielding social and human capital they engendered a virtuous cycle of cooperation among member states, affecting the policy’s negotiation process and contributing to its successful development. The

EEAS's involvement affected the policy's development, while not shaping the policy content *per se*. The content and form of PESCO was decided and fully negotiated by member states. Key initiatives to endorse PESCO and proposals on the governing structure and binding commitments were led by the small group of France, Germany, Italy and Spain – despite their starkly diverging ideas and interest in European defence cooperation.

Hence, while the EEAS's intra-institutional cohesion and its network use acted as enabling forces, we observe that the structural delimitations of the EEAS's network reach remain the crucial constraining power. Specifically, the disaggregated network structure, the EEAS's semi-embeddedness in the policy network's governance and the inability to overcome structural holes hampered not only the extent of the EEAS's influence, but also the overall coherence of the development of PESCO, the success of which is intricately tied to the development of accompanying defence initiatives. Despite a 'light coordination' within the PESCO Secretariat, deeper schisms across institutions and between member states hamper the institution of an overarching coherence across the political, military and industrial-defence realms that PESCO straddles.

Chapter 6 - A case of punching below its weight: The EEAS in the Civilian CSDP Compact

I) Introduction

The previous two chapters have studied two cases in which the EEAS had a degree of policy influence in the security and defence dimension. In this chapter we look at the development of the Civilian CSDP Compact⁵⁰ (CCC), a policy aiming to strengthen and bolster EU's civilian CSDP, where contrary to expectations the EEAS had limited influence. We would expect the EEAS to have policy influence for numerous reasons. Civilian crisis management has been a central part of the EEAS's CSDP Division: with an Operational Headquarters for the civilian CSDP Missions, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) anchored in the EEAS, operational planning, execution and expertise of civilian crisis management are on paper centralised. As primary focus of the EEAS's operational foreign policy capability, it benefits from proportionally more material resources, manpower and know-how. These elements should have allowed the EEAS to influence the policy's direction - yet it did not.

The CCC, established in November 2018, aimed to 'take a qualitative and quantitative leap forward in civilian CSDP' (Council of the EU, 2018a:2). Three factors led to the push for improving civilian crisis management structures: firstly, reform was overdue, secondly, burden-sharing in resource allocation was unsustainable and, thirdly, security threats were becoming increasingly hybrid. Thus, the Compact outlines a number of commitments clustered into three pillars aiming to render civilian CSDP more capable, more effective, flexible and responsive, and more integrated. Initiated by the Germano-Swedish duo, the Compact underlines the need of member states to enhance resource availabilities by increasing the total number of seconded experts that constitute the bulk of mission personnel. The Compact also highlights the need to improve the operationability of mission – as called for by the French. It commits to review faster operational decision-making, streamline Human Resource management, and deploy flexible and modular mission so as to respond more swiftly throughout conflict cycles. In line with the EUGS and pushed in particular by Mediterranean countries and Hungary, the Compact also calls for a 'more joined-up civilian

⁵⁰ In this chapter, I will use 'CCC' and 'the Compact' interchangeably, to refer to the Civilian CSDP Compact

CSDP', promoting civil-military synergies and seeking an integrated security policy (Council of the EU, 2018b), in order to bring internal security matters, such as migration and hybrid threats, closer to civilian CSDP missions.

The initial reluctance and obstruction to take ownership of the subject, coupled with intra-institutional competition between CPCC and CMPD, led to a fragmented and clustered policy network. The EEAS was neither able to mediate nor facilitate the policy process. A small, informal group of like-minded states emerged, significantly shaping process, form, and content. Indeed, rather than utilising its formal, central position, the EEAS was on numerous occasions outmanoeuvred by a small group of like-minded states, wielding their relational capital to achieve their preferred outcome. The informal embeddedness of some EEAS policy advisors did not translate into formal embeddedness, hampering the establishment of cooperative relationships among member states and between the EEAS and member states. The structure of the policy network governance, compounded with strained relations among actors, severely hampered the flow of information. Unable to sufficiently mobilise intangible assets such as trust, knowledge and expertise as a consequence of the lacking cohesion and embeddedness in informal network structures, officials had no social and human capital to leverage. Within the EEAS, only individual actors have intermittently been able to shape certain aspects related to the Compact's development on a policy and administrative level.

After a short overview providing background information on civilian CSDP (Section II), a section on policy initiation (Section III) addresses how obstruction by the EEAS's political and administrative levels hindered the emergence of the Compact and caused a like-minded group of member states to circumvent the EEAS to shape process, form and content. The subsequent section (Section IV) depicts the challenging network structure and intra- and inter-institutional relations that accompanied the policy negotiation that led to the establishment of the Compact in November 2018. A last section (Section V) provides a preliminary assessment on the EEAS's increased impact and new role-adoption in the Compact's implementation.




Figure 6.1 Timeline of the Civilian CSDP Compact

II) Setting the scene: background and context

Considering civilian crisis management has often been considered to be EU's *forte*, the EU's 'power projection' abroad is anchored predominantly in the use of civilian means (Howorth, 2014; Faleg, 2017; Tardy, 2017; Drent, 2011; Merlingen & Ostrauskaité, 2008). Empirically, civilian crisis management remains the most developed and used tool in CSDP. While its emergence has gone largely unheralded, 'the EU's achievement in assembling these instruments, however relative and inadequate, is nevertheless remarkable' (Howorth, 2014:71). Between 2003-2015, civilian crisis management solidified itself as central part of CSDP, in institutional, conceptual, strategic and operational terms. Over time and with the creation a civilian Operational Headquarter for the civilian CSDP Missions, the CPCC and CMPD, the EU has witnessed an evolutionary process of learning 'by doing' (Faleg, 2017:4; see also Juncos 2006; Grevi et al. 2009). Significant steps towards conceptual and institutional development occurred (Faleg, 2017; Bossong, 2013; Bossong & Benner, 2010). By June 2019, 24 civilian missions have been deployed with 11 currently operational (EEAS, 2019a; EEAS, 2019b). Their purpose has centred on strengthening capacity-building and strengthening the rule of law (security sector reform, strengthening good governance, fighting organised crime, counter-terrorism and border management) done pre-eminently through monitoring, mentoring, advising and training or in some cases the provision of equipment (Tardy, 2017b:12).

However, despite constituting 'the bulk of EU's role as a global security provider', it remains since its origins the 'ugly duckling' of CSDP – neglected and overshadowed by recurrent military debates (Faleg, 2017:94-95). In addition to it suffering from 'under-conceptualisation, weak visibility and level of scepticism' from higher-level politicians (Tardy, 2017b: 9), civilian CSDP has witnessed recurring and new challenges in crisis management capabilities (e.g., resource allocation) and responsiveness (e.g., operationability). The combination of the real need for reform and the shift in EU's security approach since the EUGS mobilised some member states, those with historically close roots in civilian crisis management, to pursue reforms in the civilian strand. Just as civilian crisis management evolved in reaction to closer military integration in the 1990s⁵¹ (Howorth, 2014), so too has the CCC resulted from Sweden and Germany's push for a 'civilian PESCO' (#36,47,48). With

⁵¹ Since its inception the push for a civilian CSDP and the emphasis of peace-building operations is mostly pushed and pursued by a few countries prone to civilian and 'normative' foreign policies. With the intention of balancing the 'militarization' of the EU that seemed to be occurring in the 90s, which fundamentally contradicted 'the deeply-etched ethos [of the EU] as a civilian actor relying on normative and transformative power' (Howorth, 2014:15), the evolution of the civilian strand of the EU's external security policy can to this day be explained as the result of consternation by neutral and anti-federalist countries (e.g. Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden for the former and Denmark, UK for the latter) (Dwan, 2002).

a fresh scrutiny of European security and defence through the IPSD, and a heightened focus to strengthen European defence and military capabilities, the countries that usually pursue peace-keeping and civilian foreign policies coalesced to ensure equal determination and effort in establishing an ambitious and strategic reform agenda for the civilian strand of CSDP. Yet, to this day deep divergences between member states in terms of ambitions, interests, capabilities and intentions in civilian crisis management remain (Böttcher, 2019).

It is surprising how similar some issues addressed in the Civilian Headline Goals 2008⁵² (December 2004) and the CCC are, most notably issues relating to resource allocation in form of Seconded National Experts (SNEs), to their deployment, or procedural questions of coherence and coordination mechanism (Council of the EU, 1999a, 1999b, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2018a, 2018b). However, the languages in which they are couched has changed, not least as the nature of threats and approach of member states has evolved. While the European Council in Feira (2000) prioritised four areas (policy, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection), civilian CSDP is now much more security-focussed, seeking to ensure local ownership and resilience of external partners first and foremost (see Juncos, 2020:77)

While the core issues have not changed *per se*, the EU crisis management needs have evolved. Simply put, the issues that are echoed in the CCC can be categorised in the need of a quantitative leap in staff resources and speedy deployability, and a qualitative leap in decision-making and cohesiveness. Civilian CSDP relies on resources made available by member states. Experts deployed to missions (e.g. policy officers, border guards, prison officers, judges...) consisted of SNEs from member states or directly contracted staff by the EU. Due to a decrease in interest and commitment from member states, the total number of staff for EU civilian missions has reduced by three times since 2010 (Pietz & Vorrath, 2018). In 2010, civilian missions counted 2100 SNEs; in 2018 only 700 SNEs. While in 2010, only 17% of CFSP budget was allocated to contractual staff for civilian missions, in 2018 it accounted for 42%. For missions in Africa, staff allocation is under 55%; of those most are contracted. Moreover, only 10 member states⁵³ provide 75% of all SNEs; 2 member states provide 28%, 5 member states offer 52% (Smit, 2019).

The issues that have motivated the reform proposals have often developed concomitantly. First, next to a drastic decline in numbers, seconded national experts were

⁵² To reinvigorate civilian crisis management, in December 2004, member states agreed on the 'Civilian Headline Goal 2008' (CHG). Amongst other, the CHG agreed to provide more personnel for six priorities, namely police, rule of law, civil administration, civil protection, monitoring missions and support for EU special representatives.

⁵³ Smit's (2019:8) multi-year data gathering study assesses the evolution of civilian capabilities. From it we learn that the largest personnel contributors are currently Poland, Sweden, Germany, France, Denmark, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands, Romania and the United Kingdom. Poland is the largest contributor to civilian CSDP because it deploys an approximately 100-member formed police unit to EULEX Kosovo.

mostly offered by the same countries who evidently had experience in civilian, peace-keeping operations. Second, in contrast to internal crisis management structures such as FRONTEX, seconding experts in civilian CSDP needs to be financed by the member states' budget - a burden member states are increasingly unwilling to shoulder. With a new mandate and budget, FRONTEX's hiring of 10 000 new officials stands in direct opposition to civilian SNE deployment. Strikingly, FRONTEX's new mandate gives its staff prerogative to act outside EU borders, an aspect that prior was solely granted to missions. Third, costs of contracted staff, which are hired by the EEAS, is exponentially against the tide of a shrinking CSDP budget (in real terms), putting the FPI and EEAS under sustained financial pressure. Fourthly, with the rise of transboundary threats and volatile crises situations, the mission's decision-making procedures have proven to be too rigid.

Placed in an environment of increased securitization and politicization (Costa, 2019; Maurer, 2021), the Compact morphed into an overarching reform-portfolio 'catering to the different needs of various member states' and EU actors (#37). Whereas the original push for reforming civilian CSDP was to improve burden-sharing and increase capabilities, the Compact evolved into a comprehensive overhaul, due to opposing needs and interest of member states. Its three pillars aim to make civilian CSDP (1) *more capable*, which refers to member states need to increase contributions to civilian CSDP, notably by seconding more staff and strengthening their training; (2) *more effective, flexible and responsive* civilian CSDP, which calls the EEAS and FPI's to review operational procedures, i.a. to make mission mandates 'modular and scalable' and improving decision-making; (3) *more joined-up*, addressing cooperation between all actors especially with focus on Commission services and JHA actors to bridge internal-external security threats.

III) Policy initiation: placing the Compact on the agenda

This section hones in on the phase of policy initiation, from autumn 2016 to April 2018. Especially due to a disproportionate focus on the military strand after the IPSD, a small group of member states, led by Germany and Sweden, wished to strengthen and reinvigorate civilian CSDP (#36,47,48). This period significantly defined early inter-institutional relations, and forged deeper schisms in an already fragmented policy governance structure. We observe that due to the reluctance of the EEAS to anchor the issue in the formal structures, an important part of the CCC developed in informal fora between member state officials where only a few lower-level EEAS officials were involved. Hence, the EEAS was not deeply embedded in the policy network governance. Moreover, the inability of the EEAS to offer the right mediatory

framework, strained relations between member states and the EEAS, leading to an environment of distrust.

Despite member states wanting the EEAS to take a leading role, specifically due to its formal central position in the civilian CSDP governance framework, the EEAS's disinterest and even unwillingness had negative reverberations on the EEAS's ability to steer and shape the policy. Indications of, first, an inconsistent interest and a heterogeneous playing field within the EEAS staff; second, lacking coordination, even competition, between the policy-strand in the CMPD and the operational-strand in the CPCC; and third, frequent fluctuation of staff, offer a picture of a rather complex network structure and convoluted policy network governance. Significant delays, obstruction on the policy/administrative level, as well as numerous unsuccessful attempts to mobilise the EEAS's leadership to take ownership of the process (cf. #38,39,76) led a small group of member-states to short-circuit the EEAS. By contacting Special Advisor Tocci informally to write the Concept Paper, which laid the groundworks of content and form of the Compact, member states used their relational capital to forge the policy network governance.

A. No interest, no leadership, no progress from the EEAS

We will briefly assess how the lack of interest and scepticism in the higher echelons of EEAS, coupled with resistance on the lower-levels, significantly delayed and hindered policy initiation and development and placed the EEAS from the outset in an unfavourable place to utilise either relational or administrative capabilities. Three aspects delayed and hindered the policy initiation: (1) neither Mogherini nor the EEAS's top echelons were interested pursuing an agenda on civilian CSDP, (2) DSG Serrano and relevant EEAS officials were sceptical as to the added-value of reforming civilian CSDP and unwilling to either take up a leading role or invest resources into its pursuit and (3) in the lower-echelons, administratively, reluctance significantly delayed the publication of working documents called for by the Council. As a consequence, member states took matters into their own hands. This led to longer-term structural impediments for the policy's development: it led to an emergence of a fragmented and informal policy network governance structure, in which the EEAS was not centrally embedded.

The IPSD identifies two steps for civilian crisis management within the framework of setting capability development priorities. The first centres on the HR/VP proposing to '[revisit] the Feira priority areas' so as to respond better transboundary and hybrid threats. The second focusses on the need to enhance the responsiveness of civilian crisis management through identifying requirement needs, to ensure more effective and rapid force generation,

strengthen capacities and improve the training of mission staff (HR/VP, 2016a: 11, 17-18). In line with the EUGS's narrative, the IPSD entrenches civilian crisis management into the EU's integrated approach (HR/VP, 2016a: 3, 11; Council of the EU, 2016). However, the accompanying Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions adopting the IPSD in November 2016, highlighted some member states' dissatisfaction, adding precision on a more comprehensive, specific and robust revision agenda (Council of the EU, 2016:7-8). The Council Conclusions invited the HR/VP 'to make proposals as early as possibly by spring 2017 on further improving the development of civilian capabilities' for rapidly deployable and well-trained experts. The conclusions gave a fairly precise mandate asking the proposals to include a) a review of priority areas of civilian CSDP to assess the relevance of Feira priorities in light of new security threats, b) enhance responsiveness to new challenges, namely through rapid force generation and fast deployment and c) identifying the required capabilities by revising the Civilian Capability Development Plan (CCDP), including the establishment of concrete timelines for implementation (Council of the EU, 2016:7).

HR/VP Mogherini and DSG Serrano were neither interested to pursue this matter, nor placed it on the agenda, despite recurrent calls by member states (#43, 55). Despite having the possibility to have played a dominant role, the HR/VP and the EEAS's top echelons were disinterested in strengthening civilian CSDP. The previous two chapters have highlighted that HR/VP Mogherini pursued an agenda that focussed on implementing an 'integrated' approach and contributing to the rapid turnover of further military integration measures. In 2017 changes did occur within the realms of crisis management⁵⁴, but they tackled issues pursuant to Mogherini's agenda for a more integrated, joined-up EU security policy rather than address civilian crisis management. With a focus on integrating and strengthening the military and defence structures of CSDP, civilian CSDP was not deemed sufficiently relevant to be prioritised⁵⁵. This is especially visible in the year 2017 when three subsequent Council Conclusions requested, in increasingly urgent terms, that the HR/VP

⁵⁴ Early 2017 did provide small steps of progress for crisis management more broadly: firstly, on bringing civilian and military crisis management structures closer and secondly, on the Integrated Approach. Yet revisions of crisis management structures focus again mostly on military structures with the creation of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC). A notable change occurred with the creation of the Joint Support Coordination Cell (JCSS), tasked to ensure synergy and coherence between civilian and military missions. On Integrated Approach, as noted, the HR/VP established PRISM (EEAS, 2017: 17, see page 42). Improvement of EU's reactivity in crisis management, hence, did move forward – but not in civilian crisis management as requested in the Council Conclusions.

⁵⁵ For Mogherini 'the idea that Europe is an exclusively 'civilian power' does not do justice to an evolving reality' (Federica Mogherini 2016, Foreword to the EUGS). The language of the EUGS and the IPSD showcase that the civilian CSDP was not much in the forefront of discussions. Mentioning the civilian CSDP only on the 47th of 51 pages of the EU Global Strategy sets the mark on its prioritization very low, despite being referenced as the 'trademark of CSDP' (EUGS, 2016:47). The mention of which capabilities are needed for the EU moving forward leave little scope for imagination, ranging from investing in Intelligence and Surveillance to high-end military (EUGS, 2016: 44-45).

and the EEAS take the initiative to offer reform proposals (Council of the EU, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d).

Throughout 2017, member states continued to call for change in increasingly urgent formulations in the subsequent Council Conclusions of March and May 2017 with little avail (Council of the EU, 2017a; 2017b). In March 2017, underlining the importance of ‘taking work forward swiftly... it *requests* the [HR/VP] and, where relevant the Commission, working together with Member States, to present concrete proposals to enhance responsiveness [...] review Feira priority areas for missions’ (Council of the EU, 2017a: 3). Aiming to set a deadline, the next FAC in May should revert back to the issue so as to aim for approval at the June European Council. Here again, however, the issue had to be postponed as no proposals were offered; it ‘invites’ the HR/VP to ‘submit by December 2017 concrete proposals on key requirements for civilian capabilities’ and ‘submit proposals with the intention to take concrete steps by December 2017 for implementing a multi-layered approach to a more responsive civilian CSDP, including concrete options for the creation of a core responsiveness capacity’ (Council of the EU, 2017b:8).

In parallel, member states, notably Germany and Sweden, became very proactive, and ‘lobbied’ Secretary-General Schmid and especially DSG Serrano; be it meeting Serrano bilaterally, informally reaching out to him at FAC, and by ensuring that their Deputy Policy Directors raised the issue again at meetings; all channels were tempted to mobilise a more proactive role of the EEAS – without success (#39, 47, 60). As a PSC ambassador noted, DSG Serrano was ‘willing’, yet simply did not sufficiently care about civilian CSDP to ensure it be anchored in their broader agenda (#60, cf. 39, 48).

The reluctance and scepticism in the upper echelons of the EEAS to take leadership and ownership was as important a factor in restraining the policy’s development. Rarely ever placing civilian CSDP on the agendas at the FAC/Defence meetings that took place between late 2016 until late 2017, the lack of interest and ambition in civilian CSDP is visible in the HR/VP’s role too: she mentioned the Compact only once at press conferences in the 18 months after the publication of the EUGS. Neither she nor DSG Serrano exuded particular interest, nor hindered its development *per se* (cf. #55, 60). As a high-ranking EEAS official noted the Compact could not ‘benefit from the momentum’ that was occurring ‘as it was not the spirit of the time’. There was an element of time and feasibility: EEAS officials involved in the process were following other files, among other PESCO – scarce resources remained a relevant curtailing power which will become increasingly relevant throughout the next sections.

Unpacking the EEAS, the picture is more blurred. Some officials from CMPD and CPCC understood (with reservation) the relevance of tackling systemic issues. One observes that while some individual officials started interacting with some member states on the issue and established trusting ties, senior figures did not. Crucially, more senior EEAS officials were uninterested, some even unwilling to work on civilian CSDP. Significantly, the Head of the Sub-Division for civilian capabilities and concepts (CMPD.2), who in effect became 'Chef de file' was disinclined to work on it. Numerous interviewees highlight the fact that 'for the longest time [he] did not believe in the Compact' and 'did not see the need to put forward initiatives' (#36, cf. 39, 41, 43, 55, 60). For numerous EEAS officials, most notably DSG Serrano, the challenge of civilian CSDP was member states lacking incentives to provide the missions with the necessary staff, resources and political will, rather than a need of revising decision-making structures and operationability (cf. #37, 43, 50, 53, 67). For another EEAS official, 'nothing new needs to be invented, there is simply a lack of resources'. The human resource management revisions which member states call for just add to the issue that there was no staff, arguing that the problem is the very strong differentiation in burden-sharing and simply the lack of it (#51, cf. 50, 76).

For others there was a disbelief that significant structural change could occur, notably because civilian CSDP missions are so reliant on the 'goodwill of member states'. For them the 'issue was slightly exhausted', 'ever-recurring' and 'more cumbersome' (#52, cf. 55, 68). Not only was civilian CSDP 'already active' and 'strongly developed' (in comparison to the underdeveloped military capacities), but for civilian CSDP 'it is the member states that need to bring the goods to the picnic' (ibid). There was also a clear reluctance to tackle the Compact in its form, especially as it was snowballing into a comprehensive agenda with clear demarcations among member states.

Over time, the disconnect and disagreement between the EEAS and member states grew bigger. The EEAS was not embedded in the conversations that were occurring. At this stage the EEAS was neither sufficiently aware of member states' expectations, nor offered satisfactory policy proposals. This culminated in October 2017, when after the numerous deadlines had passed, the EEAS presented a Working Document on 'Priorities for civilian crisis management'. This document 'that should have been presented months' prior' was, as a EEAS official later acknowledged, 'clearly rejected' by the member states (#52). The discussion highlighted that approximately 12 member states, many of whom had been coalescing, were unhappy and requested a much more ambitious and structured reform proposal. These countries emerged as a loose group of like-minded states (#43, 52). The like-

minded group included Germany, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Estonia at its core and on occasion supported by Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Portugal, Spain. While these 'member states already knew what they wanted' (#52), the EEAS had not sufficiently communicated with and grasped the sensitivities of all member states to offer the right policy incentives (#52, cf. 43, 51, 62).

At that PSC meeting, DSG Serrano emphasized that while the EEAS would pursue the demand of member states to establish a Roadmap with a clear timeline, the discussions would have to be based on past 'lessons learnt'; he saw the issue of capabilities less with member states not having availabilities, but rather with the lack of political will to mobilise the necessary personnel to overcome the gaps. He added that if member states would agree on a civilian mission, they should also accordingly deploy seconded national experts. By putting the ball back into member states court and deferring responsibility, the process became member-states led. As will be addressed in the next section, the Germano-Swedish duo played a leading role in establishing this policy's informal, clustered network governance.

On request of member states, the November 2017 Council Conclusions set a roadmap and timeline. It established the three phased framework that would lead to the CCC – explicitly mentioned for the first time in these conclusions. A Concept Paper should be presented by 'early 2018'. By spring 2018 member states expected a Civilian Capability Development Plan (CCDP), that would lay out the next steps in the development of civilian capabilities. Lastly, member states agreed that a Civilian CSDP Compact, with political commitments should be agreed still in 2018. It further underlines its resolve by adding that when needed high-level discussions should support the process (Council of the EU, 2017c:9).

The delayed policy initiation had two consequences for the policy network governance. First, the hindrance and push-back of the EEAS led member states to pursue the development of the Compact informally, shifting the policy discussion outside the formal EEAS structures. Hence, in the emergent policy network governance, the EEAS did not capitalise on capabilities that its central position could offer – missing an opportunity to act as leader or mediator/broker. Second, it laid bare and even reinforced intra- and inter-institutional cleavages. Among member states an increasing cleavage between the member states leading in civilian foreign policy and others, emerged. It also revealed, however, that the EEAS prioritised issues and worked towards shedding policy portfolios that were not in its interest. Yet as the next section highlights, it becomes evident that member states can wield their own relational capital and continue develop policy informally. By not taking ownership to (co-)lead, nor being centrally positioned in the initial stage, the EEAS had much less leeway to exert influence.

B. A ‘Civilian PESCO’ pushed by small group of member states

The establishment of an informal policy network governance led the EEAS to 1) be only semi-embedded in a disjointed policy governance and 2) not be deeply embedded in the conversations because of the lack of vertical cohesion within the EEAS amidst a fragmented network governance. As argued in our theory chapter, lacking centrality in a policy network governance does not provide the EEAS with capabilities to control the process (see pages 64ff). Reflective of the information flow, a fragmented network structure leads to disrupted information flow, which in turn hampers a smooth policy development. The emergence of this fragmented policy network had two longer-term repercussions: with no central node able to mediate between the numerous actors, nor the ability to manage the information flows, negotiations were not streamlined and knowledge and expertise not canalised successfully. As a consequence, it was member states who significantly steered and shaped the development of the Compact by setting the agenda, defining process, content and form.

In autumn 2017, the loose group of like-minded states, led by Germany and Sweden, increased informal bi- and mini-lateral discussions. They formed a clique, thus sharing information among each other, leaving out others. Ideas were being discussed transnationally, either in capital-to-capital interaction, or in informal workshops organised by capitals (#38, 39, 41, 43). Countries that coalesced into the like-minded groups interacted more frequently. The like-minded group significantly defined the process and form of the Compact. As member states remained unsatisfied with the ‘slow’ progress offered by the EEAS, member states led by mobilising their network to ensure a timely progression of the Compact. Not only did they do so by creating more space for exchanging ideas (e.g., organising informal workshops), but also by short-circuiting the EEAS bureaucracy, inviting EUGS author Tocci to write the ‘Concept Paper’ in early 2018. The like-minded group had built a closer link with ‘the few EEAS officials that had open ears’, notably those involved in drafting the relevant documents in CMPD (#43). A handful of interested CMPD and CPCC officials had been since 2017 pursuing formal and informal discussions on strengthening civilian capabilities and responsiveness. However, those EEAS officials were not able (or willing) to facilitate or mediate on this file, either because they were wrongly positioned to ensure greater ownership, oversaturated with work or unable to bridge the deep intra-institutional or inter-institutional divides (#38, 40, 43, 51, 52).

To maintain the momentum that the November 2017 Conclusions brought, Germany organised of an informal workshop in Berlin in January 2018 and reached out to Tocci –

building a coalition and weight around the policy issue. The workshop, organised by the German Foreign Ministry, was an important forum to bring together CivCom representatives of the like-minded group and the few relevant CMPD and CPCC officials respectively. Ideas had been ‘floating around’ for a while, and were brought together in the discussion. To further strengthen the coalition, Estonia and Austria were brought on board as they were holding, with Finland, the Trio Presidency from July 2018 until December 2019 onwards. Building a coalition, this forum gave the opportunity to make significant headway regarding content, form and process. It is also at this forum that the idea to develop a Concept Paper emerged, and that the concept ‘Compact’ as umbrella term should be used (#39).

The rationale behind involving Tocci was to make the file more appealing to the political level. Moreover, ‘the EEAS was oversaturated’ and would have delayed the process even further (#62). They worked towards shifting the narrative closer to the EUGS narrative (cf. #34, 38, 43, 45, 49, 51, 52). Indeed, the EUGS became a key ‘legitimizing force’ for the Germano-Swedish argument that strengthening civilian CSDP is necessary. It also became a crucial force for the narrative in the Concept Paper. Building on the relationship Germany established with Tocci during the EUGS, then PSC-ambassador Flügger capitalised on their friendly, cooperative relationship to ensure that the policy issue got more credibility in the higher echelons of the EEAS, out-manoeuvre slow progress in the lower-echelons of the EEAS and anchor the topic into the narrative of the EUGS and its pursuit for a more integrated, forceful EU foreign and security policy. Germany strategically used its past connection to expand the policy network’s reach and authority, aiming to establish Tocci as connecting node upwards to the political levels of the debate. Certainly, ‘by putting her brand on it’ and speaking in the name of Mogherini, Tocci helped ‘generate momentum’ not least as she met twice with PSC ambassadors. It ‘placed weight on the issue’ (#37, cf. 39, 43). Despite reluctance to accept member states’ request to write the Concept Paper, there was a clear drive behind Tocci to also anchor strengthening civilian CSDP to the EUGS’s successful implementation (#43, 57, 62).

Tocci’s exchange with national representatives and a handful of EEAS officials at the January 2018 Workshop in Berlin was important as she ‘provided the big picture’ and ‘articulated what mattered’ (#43). However, in reality her interest in taking this portfolio was contained – considering her involvement was limited to the 5-page introduction of the Concept Paper (of a total of 24 pages outlining operational implications of potential new commitments) and her presence at only a handful of formal or informal meetings in 2018. She ‘quickly laid-low afterwards’ (#52, cf. 49). Nevertheless, her involvement led to confusion with EEAS officials. As she was an ‘(insider-)outsider’ and no expert in the field, CMPD and

CPCC officials highlighted that her role raised important questions as to who was leading the process (#52). It did not lead to more intra-institutional cohesion nor clear leadership and direction from the top echelons, as despite Tocci's involvement no further interest was sparked in Mogherini (#57).

Indeed, the Workshop created an 'in-group' and an 'out-group' among member states. This becomes particularly evident when observing the interaction patterns of Tocci during the drafting process of the Concept Paper. Tocci did not reach out to member states systematically. From conversations with member states, very uneven patterns of interaction were reported with either Tocci or other EEAS officials involved in the drafting. Several member states did not interact directly with the drafters (#33, 38, 39, 43). Others, such as Sweden and Germany interacted frequently with relevant EEAS officials (#38, 39). As the depth of connection that started to be established among these member states and the EEAS attendees led to more frequent and fruitful interaction it is no surprise that the concerns of those present were more strongly highlighted in the Concept Paper. Not only their frequency of interaction was of relevance; as an EEAS official involved in the drafting highlighted, those member states also had more 'innovative ideas'; their expertise in civilian crisis management was 'helpful' and relevant (#37).

For the majority of member states, the Concept Paper 'finally' offered the right framework. For others, however, it was 'a political standing' pushing forward issues of human resources and the humanitarian dimension – or in other words concerns of notably Sweden, Germany, Finland, Denmark and other countries who provide the bulk of seconded expert staff (cf. #33, 38, 39). Hungary, for instance, issued a statement expressing concern that the Concept Paper did not serve as a common platform for discussion. At this stage the increasingly internal divisions between the 'insiders', aka the 'like-minded group' and the 'outsiders' led to significant frictions in the development of the negotiations. Rather than mending intra-institutional and inter-institutional gaps, silos were not broken – they became more entrenched.

In sum, contrarily to expectations that the EEAS led, brokered and facilitated the process, significant delay and lack of interest of the EEAS made it a hinderer to the policy's initial development. The emergence of a fragmented policy network governance in which the EEAS did not take ownership of its centrality because of lack of interest and intra-institutional disunity consequently led the policy formation to occur outside formal EEAS structures. Indeed, the locus within the policy network governance shifted to informal fora among member states, leading the EEAS to solely be semi-embedded. Member-states became key

players in defining the process, form and content of the Compact, leading the discussion primarily within the group of like-minded. Typical of a network structure with clique behaviour, it laid the foundation disjointed information channels, diffuse knowledge management, thus making finding agreement all the more difficult.

IV) Policy consolidation and negotiation: from a difficult start onward to a ‘bumpy process’

After the Concept Paper, presented in April 2018, member states and the EEAS negotiated the CCC, based on three pillars: a) calling on member states making civilian CSDP more capable, by increasing the number of SNEs available, b) calling on the EEAS to make civilian CSDP more responsive, effective and flexible by deploying modular and scalable missions and enhancing mission Human Resource management and c) calling on the Commission, to implement an integrated approach, by seeking synergies between civilian CSDP missions and Commission services, as well as Justice and Home Affairs actors. It was officially established in November 2018. The Compact was an ‘iterative process’; its consolidation was tedious to craft, due to its comprehensive and technical nature (#33, 34, 45, 56). Several formal and informal workshops, attended by EEAS, national representatives from Brussels and capitals and experts (think tank or academics), deliberated throughout this consolidation period. In the lead up to the CCC, the Civilian Capabilities Development Plan (CCDP), written by CMPD in confessional-style interaction with member states, was presented to member states in September.

The ‘bumpy’ process continued to be ‘cumbersome’, ‘slow’ for member states and EEAS officials alike (#52, 39, 34, cf. 33, 38, 43, 49, 52, 62). Two key challenges that remained were, first, working towards bridging gaps (literally and figuratively) and second, combining know-how/expertise in providing conceptual clarity and policy innovations. The fissures in the Compact that needed to be bridged ran up, down and sideways – institutionally and conceptually. Up until and after the establishment of the Compact member states still lamented the lack of ‘conceptual clarity’ (#33, 38, cf. 34, 40). As an EEAS official highlighted, the numerous issues led to shifting alliances among all actors involved in the negotiations.

This section argues that while the EEAS became central in the negotiations because of its formal central position, it was not able to draw benefit from its relational capabilities or wield relational resources. Despite its tripartite involvement in civilian CSDP – through first, chairing intergovernmental committee meetings, second, supporting strategic-policy drafts and third, managing the operational dimension of civilian missions – the EEAS was not able to play an influential role in the policy’s development. Rather, 1) ‘perverse intra-institutional

competition' and institutional incoherence, 2) difficult information flow between the EEAS and CivCom members because of lacking human and social capital and 3) a 'clusterized', diffuse network of knowledge and expertise significantly curtailed the EEAS's influence.

The particular challenge in the CCC case was that both network structure and the nature of relationships among actors were challenging. Being co-constitutive, contrary to a virtuous cycle, a pernicious cycle of cooperation arose: in a fragmented and diffuse network, relations were strained due to little trust and credibility. While roughly pursuing a unified aim to lessen the financial burden civilian missions posed on the EEAS, the EEAS was not a unified actor. Being unable to influence the process cohesively, we see scattered, inconsistent instances of impact by some EEAS officials. While parts of the EEAS, most notably the centralising node of the CivCom Chair and a senior figure in CMPD were bureaucratic hindrances, other parts, such as policy officers in CMPD were able to contribute to the process by mediating among the most diverging groups of member states. As will be elaborated, one observes small instances influence, specifically shaping the policy's content. The impact and extent of influence, however, differs also due to the diverging roles of CMPD and CPCC. Where the latter acted on occasion as mediator, CPCC became a broker with strong influence. Due to lacking communication and lacking 'institutional memory' in the EEAS, negotiation often relied on CivCom representatives' expertise and knowledge.

	Summary of Key commitments	Intra- and inter- institutional divisions
Pillar I A More Capable Civilian CSDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Increase in contribution and review of national procedures... to enhance availability and participation of national experts in civilian missions (§1,2) ➤ Increase jointly ... the total share of seconded experts to at least 70% ➤ Develop capabilities, including mission support capabilities, specialised teams and strengthen training of experts (§4,5,6) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Division among member states, i.e. like-minded group vs. others ➤ Division btw EEAS/CPCC and member states (on 70% increase of seconded officials)
Pillar II A More responsive, effective and flexible Civilian CSDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Deploy civilian missions with modular and scalable mandates, where appropriate with (semi-)executive tasks (§8) ➤ Review and streamline planning and decision-making steps to promote swifter operational decision-making ➤ Enhance Human resource management by reviewing the EEAS recruitment procedures (§10) ➤ Be able to launch a 200 personnel mission within 30 days after a Council decision, fully staff the Core Responsiveness Capacity and make the Strategic Warehouse fully operational (§11,12) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Division btw EEAS/CPCC and member states (on specialised team) ➤ Division within EEAS: CMPD versus CPCC (on Strategic Reviews) ➤ Division between EEAS and COM/FPI
Pillar III More joined-up Civilian CSDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Strengthen shared analysis and situation awareness (§17) ➤ Implement an integrated approach, foster synergies and complementarity btw civilian-military dimension (§18,19) ➤ Promote closer cooperation and synergies between civilian CSDP missions, Commission services and JHA actors as well as ensure operational output by building on targeted mini-concepts (§21) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Division among member states, e.g. DK, HG vs. Nordics (on gathering and sharing data for JHA actors during civilian missions) ➤ Division between EEAS and JHA actors

Figure 6.2 Overview of key commitments of the CCC and inter-institutional divisions

A. Intra-institutional incoherence – seeking to connect the synapses

The main challenge for the EEAS's influence in civilian CSDP – and for that matter positive support for the development of the CCC – is the lack of intra-institutional communication, coordination and cooperation. Intra-institutional coherence is a necessary condition for policy influence; it ensures sub-units work towards a common goal, build common coalitions, share

information and able to insulate the writing process, resisting member states capture (see page 56).

Disagreements between the policy planning divisions, CMPD, and the operational, tactical division, CPCC, affected the policy content's development. CMPD attends to the strategic planning of civilian crisis management; officials have a procedural and political expertise based on their role drafting crisis response options because they draft mission-planning policy documents. Operational planning and the conduct of missions is managed by CPCC, who has technical, policy-relevant expertise. National representatives noted in particular lack of communication and 'the perverse competition' between the CMPD and CPCC officials (#38, 39, 40, 41, 63). The lack of smooth interaction and cooperation among those two sub-units were a major hindrance for a swift, efficient and impactful policy development. The lack of cooperation in decision-making may be linked to numerous factors, such as the lack of embeddedness and authority of the Chair during the negotiations, as well as the steep hierarchical nature of the EEAS, in which 'no one is senior enough to make decision' (#63). But silo-mentality in civilian crisis management has been noted a few times, there is a stark disconnect between both these entities, not only in terms of their mind-set and prioritisation, but also due to lack of coordination, interaction and coherence (Faleg, 2017, Moser, 2020:48).

Intra-institutional competition was becoming increasingly apparent in the early months of 2018, after the Concept Paper and the Civilian Capability Development Plan (CCDP) was being drafted. CMPD took ownership to draft the CCDP, a document meant to define the more generic capability needs, as well as list the operational expertise required, CMPD organised bilateral discussions with all member states' capitals. However, the CPCC was expected to introduce how required capabilities could be developed, offering a range of tools such as training or possible incentives to improve resource availability. Considering CPCC is the unit managing operations, it is surprising that this document was not led, or at least co-led, by the unit that should have had the deepest insight as to where the capability shortfalls lie. Despite a lot of praise of member states of the comprehensiveness of the document, which was drafted in 'the confessionals style' allowing member states 'to be heard', it did not offer a precise overview of capability shortfalls (#33, 36, 49, 52).

In effect, 'there was irritation' between CMPD and CPCC as to who should be leading the CCC's file (#52). It is only by the end of 2018, after several impactful interventions by CPCC that they agreed to 'co-lead'. As a CPCC official argued, if systematic cooperation and coordination does not occur with CMPD, formalised on rules and procedures, i.e. more frequent attendance in CivCom for direct interaction with member states, must be mobilised.

In other words, CPCC ensured to strengthen their position and standing in establishing closer links to member states because as the tactical unit it can offer know-how into tactical calculations and challenges. Those two sub-units vied for influence, by seeking to directly interact with member states more strongly. Member states acknowledged that CPCC had more ‘realistic ideas’ (#38, 39, 41). Monitoring the missions on the ground gives CPCC an insight and expertise what works on the ground. A crucial example of intra-institutional competition is the negotiation around Commitment 8 in the Council Conclusions establishing the Compact which calls for the ability to deploy ‘modular and scalable missions’ so as to make civilian CSDP more flexible and responsive. Both CMPD and CPCC were supportive of developing adaptable missions, yet disagreed on assessing and reviewing mandate objectives. It was only after the third reading that it emerged that CPCC was opposed to CMPD’s text formulation, that sought allow for flexibility in missions after ‘strategic reviews’, assessments written by CMPD (#38, 53).

To increase ownership over shaping the missions, CPCC argued for longer and modular mandates without reviews to overcome long deliberations. For member states they argued convincingly that writing generic aims, which often takes several weeks, do not reflect reality on the ground when security-related questions need to be addressed rapidly. CMPD, as author of the strategic reviews, were opposed to the option to set longer mandates, as in their view tactical planning did not allow for a more holistic, strategic vision in crisis management. In other words, it would take away their influence in shaping mission mandates (#38, 39, 52). The difficulty to have a coherent outcome resulted in a very imprecise text formulation, yet one slightly in favour of CPCC’s demands: ‘Such mandates should allow for activation of additional tasks, projects or modules within the scope and objectives of the missions, upon PSC decision where applicable and *subject to strategic analysis*, with due consideration for crisis management procedures. Mission mandates and their duration should be aligned with mission objectives and the situation on the ground (Council of the EU, 2018b:7). The translation into practice still has to be tested; needless to say that the interpretation of what the compromise formulation of ‘strategic analysis’ in the end diverges.

The overall credibility of the EEAS was undermined by lacking coherence and strong intra-institutional competition. Diverging interests within the EEAS hampered not only the EEAS’s cohesion; the lacking cooperation and interconnectedness slowed down the negotiations. ‘CPCC and CMPD did not talk to each other’, thus information flow impeded furthering a trustful relationship both inside the EEAS, and between member states and the EEAS (#43). As will be addressed in the following section, in the early steps of the Compact’s

implementation one observes improvement, because of new appointments with cross-fertilization between CMPD and CPCC officials.

B. Not bridging the gaps: council presidencies' leadership and mediation

The lack of intra-institutional coordination went beyond the competition between CMPD and CPCC, and included coordination and cooperation with the Chair of CivCom. A crucial node between member states and the EEAS, Chairs can play a significant role in the extent of influence the EEAS has because they are on paper the central node. They bring all information streams (political, procedural and policy-relevant) together, coordinate and facilitate among member states decision-making, and link back to the relevant sub-units inside the EEAS. Member states officials, especially those holding the Council presidencies, highlighted on numerous occasions the challenging communication within the EEAS: not only were intra-institutional decision-making processes extremely time-consuming, but at times member states also had on occasion to act as mediators between the EEAS's sub-units (cf. #38, 39, 41, 43, 63). In the case of the CCC, the information stream and communication flow was not centralised. This was part of the reasons why fostering a more cooperative and conducive negotiation environment within the CivCom was challenging in 2018. Another reason was the nature of relations, specifically that neither relational resources, i.e. information and trust, nor administrative capabilities were sufficiently mobilised. Honing in network dynamic during the negotiations among member states, we derived that despite the EEAS's default central position in intergovernmental negotiations, it has not been able to 'embody' a mediatory⁵⁶ role or facilitating role, in parts because neither trust and information as relational resources were able to flow.

For smooth negotiation, member states need to be understood, their sensitivities taken into account, and they have to have the impression to be heard. This was not the case for most of the negotiation stage, because of a very challenging relationship between the Chair and CivCom representatives. Moreover, there was no consistency and continuity in which EEAS officials attended CivCom meetings: 'EEAS officials attending CivCom meetings were often changing' (#41). Rather than having the EEAS mediate and facilitate negotiations around the Compact, Council Presidencies played a crucial role replacing the EEAS in these roles. While the EEAS *helped* streamline and coordinate ideas to a certain extent in an environment where member states had starkly diverging needs, major communication challenges emerged.

⁵⁶ As a reminder, due to the dense network, i.e. very frequent and continuous interactions among all actors involved, the EEAS Chair and CMPD cannot act as broker as they do not unique bridge groups of actors involved in the negotiation.

i. Chairing versus mediating: the role of the EEAS in CivCom

It was perceived by many member states officials that at the time of negotiations around the Civilian CSDP Compact, the Chair neither sufficiently facilitated (procedurally) negotiations, nor mediate sufficiently between the member states. The relationship between the Chair and member states was problematic for three reasons: firstly, not embodying the traditional characteristics of chairs procedurally; secondly, a perceived lack of knowledge and understanding of member states' positions and sensitivities, and consequently, a lack of trust.

Due to numerous, significant diversions among member states positions, and some would argue 'strong personalities' among national representatives (#34, cf. 38, 39, 43), the divisions among member states became personal and politicised, making a mediatory and facilitator role in the negotiations all the more necessary. Due to a 'negative', 'very politicised' and 'divided' intergovernmental committee, formal CivCom meetings were not deemed to be the right setting to have an exchange of ideas (#33, 43). The repercussions of the formation of the like-minded group, formalised at the January 2018 Workshop in Berlin, had as consequence that 'group think emerged, that has been difficult to overcome and affected decision-making' far after the establishment of the CCC (#43). Some member states, especially France, became 'particularly unconstructive'. In this context, the EEAS was not perceived as a facilitating force, yet due to administrative delays and intra-institutional incoherence rather seen as a hampering force.

Procedurally, the Chair did not act in line with the expectations of duties of a chair; tasks such as structured and time-managed negotiations, or concluding, summarizing and agreeing on next steps after meetings were not carried out. CivCom meetings, both formal or informal, remained 'highly disorganised' or leaving too little time for all member states to take the floor. Meetings ended without concluding what next steps should be taken. For instance, a formal meeting on means for use of the EU Civilian Training Group's expertise and competences, or an informal meeting in Bucharest on the concept of 'Specialised Teams' left member states dissatisfied based on organisational grounds. Discussion on 'Specialised Teams' - particularly contentious amongst member states – left too little time for member states to take the floor (#33, 34). Just as EEAS officials prior had lacked sufficient understanding of the different needs and sensitivities prior to the Concept Paper, there was a perception that the chair was not particularly strong in 'reading the room' (cf. #38, 41, 43). Member states felt that their positions were not heard and sensitivities not accounted for. Seeking out knowledge amongst certain member states, the Chair for instance contacted Austria, as Presidency holder, to inquire what the like-minded group's position on certain

issues were (#43). It must be highlighted that an important cause for the slow progression was the lack of material manpower to support the Chair – and the overarching comprehensiveness of the Compact. We will address this aspect further below.

The Chair was neither useful in helping bridge the divide between the like-minded group and the ‘outsiders’, ‘it did not play the bridging function’ (#39), nor offered any compromise solutions, or any policy innovations. Policy ideas were proposed by member states, in particular CivCom representatives that were very knowledgeable in the field such as Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands (#38, 39, 43, 63). Member states called to hold more informal negotiations to allow more open conversation, because formal settings were ‘too politically loaded’ (#33, 36, 43). Member states officials condemned the lack of space to openly discuss in detail and depth policy ideas, workshops offered informal settings for more fruitful discussions. These settings offer important additional socialisation spaces; an aspect particularly relevant in this committee where relations between delegates were characterised as particularly distrustful and tense. These tactics are also crucial for actors to be able to play, formally or informally, a mediating role.

Instead, Council Presidencies became key players in moving the Compact’s negotiations forward, both in terms of organising informal workshops and in mediating among member states (#38, 41, 43, 63). Especially Austria, who held the Presidency in the second half of 2018, played a crucial role – taking up a mediator role that was not provided for by the EEAS (#38, 41). The Austrian CivCom delegate was very proactive, and, in contrast to the Chair, was deeply embedded, aware of the different national sensitivities. Significantly, ‘she took over the role as mediator’ and ‘sought to have a balance between the difference positions of member states’ by ‘offering good solutions’ (#38, 41, 43). While not as influential, the Estonian and Bulgarian presidencies also contributed to the development of the Compact by either ensuring the it was on the agenda of the Security/Defence Directors (Bulgaria) or also aiming to find compromises between member states (Estonia) (#38, 41).

Circumventing the CivCom, wherein senior CMPD officials and the Chair were deemed hindering rather than aiding the process, the Presidencies organised several informal workshops, often in cooperation with the EUISS, to offer more space to discuss the numerous aspects that needed more ‘conceptual clarity’. One noteworthy example is when the Austrian and Finnish representatives (who were holding the two upcoming presidencies) jointly tried to organise an additional workshop for May 2018, prior to the establishment of the CCDP. Their motivation was in part because there was a feeling that there was not sufficient knowledge exchange and constructive dialogue. Senior CPCC officials opposed the organisation of such a workshop as he deemed it would be scheduled too early. To push the

agenda forward, Austria and Finland circumvented the EEAS, by proposing the scheduling of the workshop directly in the PSC – with success. Council Presidencies hence played a crucial role in the advancement of the Compact. It is not by coincidence that it was then agreed that the Annual Review Conferences, which monitored the implementation of the Compact, be organised at the end of years; Austria (2019), Germany (2020) and Sweden (2023) could ensure the continuation of the CCC's implementation by keeping the momentum up. While organising informal conversations is an integral part of Council Presidencies, what is striking here is the juxtaposition between member states utilising their relational capital to influence the process to their interest and overcome the obstacles the EEAS posed.

ii. Mediating to keep member states around the table: the role of CMPD

While the EEAS was not influential, individuals were able to exert occasional impact. Indeed, some in the EEAS offered subtler ways of 'influence' on the most contentious issues of negotiations. CMPD influenced the Compact through coordinative and argumentative means towards a fairer, more feasible Compact. It is especially in managing diverging ambitions of the like-minded group that CMPD was able to shape the continuation of the development of the Compact. Certain EEAS officials involved aimed to slow the process down. However, the motivation of this was to a certain extent to curb-down the like-minded groups' ambitions and in certain cases pushed back against their influence. This was necessary in order to find common ground among member states. Espousing a mediator role, when the Chair did not, some EEAS officials took a more dominant role, and contributed with compromise proposals. This was possible most among other through the involvement of Arnoult Molenaar during the drafting of the Council Conclusion establishing the CCC. As already showcased in both previous Chapters, he benefitted from legitimacy, trust and consequently significant skill to wield social and human capital contributing in overcoming the divides (#43).

As highlighted member states have very different ambitions and capabilities (Böttcher, 2019). It is in mediating between a heterogeneous group of countries' opportunities and abilities, that the CMPD helped find an agreement, especially between the most ambitious countries – such as Sweden, Finland and Germany - and countries who did not have a strong and developed history of civilian foreign policy, notably Eastern and smaller member states. Simplifying the picture, there is an enduring 'dichotomy' of how much attention should be placed on the problem that civilian missions do not have sufficient staff and resources versus the need to address transboundary issues that also challenge internal security matters. The Baltics and Eastern European countries laid particular attention to minimise commitments in increasing resources for civilian missions, yet pushed for more ambitious progress on

assessing hybrid threats. For Hungary for instance, the Compact remains primarily of interest from a security point of view, where issues of migration and illegal border crossing take predominance. Consequently, their attention was particularly drawn to the third pillar of the Compact introducing 'mini-concepts' tackling transboundary threats. In contrast, countries from the North argue that a strengthened civilian CSDP needs more resource allocation, and so not wish to override their Feira principles by prioritizing solutions for new transboundary threats. Sweden's prioritised that the Compact accounted for fairer resource provisions and reallocating contributions. The issue is not solely to increase money and resources, but rather 'linking up what is already there' and ensure better training and expertise for mission staff (#33, 49, 51).

In this regard, EEAS/CMPD has been successful in its coordinating capacity during the negotiations of the Council Conclusions establishing the CCC. It was mediating in the sense that it ensured all countries stayed at the table. To overcome 'too ambitious and counterproductive' expectations from Sweden and Germany, the EEAS/CMPD convey their 'too simplistic understanding' to move the discussions of the Compact forward (#51). Consequently, one can argue that the EEAS has only to a limited extent helped mediate between the starkly diverging ambitions in as far as they explained to key drivers, such as Sweden in particular, that the majority of countries first had to establish necessary legislation and mechanisms to facilitate secondment of experts (#49, 51).

Second, they helped find agreement on setting the timeframe by when the Compact should be implemented. As EEAS officials highlighted, the request of the Compact to ensure that member states re-adapt their internal structures, legislation, decision-making procedures and in some respect, awareness and mind-set, needed much more time than what more ambitious countries envisaged. Frameworks allowing SNEs to partake in an EU mission do not even exist. The majority of EU countries have no legislation and budgetary opportunities to offer the special status of employment that would ensure such a secondment. After all policemen, rule-of-law/ democratization experts, judges all work under very different employment rules; duty of care, insurances, career prospects and code of contract are just some aspects that need to be addressed. It was especially CMPD officials that offered these as arguments in order to convince ambitious countries to agree to the second semester of 2023 as a deadline for the CCC's implementation.

The reason why the assessment on the EEAS's influence on the Compact's negotiation is mixed, is because there is a strong divergence of human and social capital among EEAS officials interacting with member states. Some were helpful, offering interesting new ideas,

supportive and seeking synergies. Others were hampering the process administratively, and were unwilling or unable to establish trustful and cooperative relations with member states. The EEAS did not act as key mediator on content negotiations per se, as the Chair 'did not feel the room' and understand member states sensitivities. Administratively, member states felt it continued to hinder the process (#33, 34, 41, 43).

In line with the conceptual framework, information flow and trust for cooperative cycle of policy development was hampered because of unfavourable network structure and challenging communication between the EEAS and member states. While the role and support of the EEAS was improved significantly in the policy consolidation stage, the diffuse network led to an emergence of various clusters hampering communication and information flow even further. Both, the fragmented, diffuse and clustered network governance hampered communication and the relationship between member states and the chair, and some other EEAS officials, were unconstructive. The EEAS failed to offer the right communication channels because of the lack of human and social capital of the Chair, and the lack of organising informal workshops as 'safe spaces' for de-politicised conversations. The next section will delve deeper into the effects this had on the negotiation stage of the Compact.

C. Shaping the content: information flow, knowledge management and expertise

We addressed how intra- and inter-institutional relations hampered the right information flow, both with view of managing member states' needs (sensitivities) and offering the right environment to gather and exchange expertise. The tediousness of progress in a technically complex and comprehensive negotiation was also due to the fact that 'information flow with the EEAS was a major challenge' (#43). Information here includes knowledge about member states' positions, but also know-how in European civilian CSDP and expertise in aspects related to civilian crisis management. It has been highlighted above why the EEAS has not been able to mobilise sufficiently member states' sensitivities. This section will hone in on the use and leverage of know-how and expertise.

It must be highlighted that the compact led the actors to some extent into uncharted territory, specifically when it came to the third pillar structures addressing cooperation between CSDP-JHA actors in the field. Moreover, a major aim of the Compact itself was to identify and collect data, e.g. in terms of capability shortfalls. In some form, the construction of the Compact –or what it aimed to achieve– was like a dog chasing its tail: proposals to overcome capability shortfalls were given, yet without clearly identifying what those capability shortfalls were, or sufficient understanding of how previously elaborated 'empty vessels' could contribute to overcoming the mentioned gaps. For instance, without a clear

understanding of which and how many experts were needed to tackling hybrid threats, it was difficult to define what new training measures were needed, or, for instance, whether specialised teams would be more useful than the already existing 'Visiting Experts' Programme etc. (#53).

Expertise in civilian crisis management does not lay squarely within the EEAS. Indeed, 'expertise' in the domain of civilian CSDP is not confined to EEAS officials, but to a very significant degree also to some national CivCom delegates, capital experts and delegates from JHA actors. Expertise lied within individuals in the EEAS, in CivCom and in the capitals (#40, 45, 51). Policy solutions and innovations for the Compact depended on the extent of embeddedness, as well as interconnection between the experts and EEAS officials drafting the Compact. In the case of CMPD, the 'personnel carrousel' was to a certain extent a blessing as some officials, who started and arrived when the Compact was initiated, over time became not only increasingly familiarised with the policy issue, but also built closer relations with member states, in particular senior CivCom representatives. Senior CivCom delegates become experts in the field, as they develop over time an understanding of what is needed and of major issues (#45).

The Council Conclusions establishing the CCC are not only a compromise solution (#37,43), but also the result of over a year of knowledge and expertise exchange among an expansive and diffuse network of experts. EEAS did give input in 2019 as both CMPD and CPCC offered a couple of ideas for the Compact (#38, 39, 40, 41, 45). Two factors explain the limited influence of the EEAS, which are revealing that networks and direct interaction matter more in shaping the policy, than formal or informal spaces, such as workshops. First, certain CMPD officials being able to draw from direct, informal ties with some CivCom experts and utilising their expertise. These informal personal connections were more influential than workshops and non-papers. Especially Molenaar, as drafter of the Council Conclusion, built and drew from ideas of CivCom representatives, who were experts in civilian crisis management (#37, 49, 53). Second, CPCC in particular was able to use more technical know-how and operational expertise to shape the Compact, especially on the contentious issues. CMPD and CPCC influence was limited in time and scope, because it depended on the individuals' expertise and/or their connection to other key experts.

For instance, Molenaar, as Acting-Director of CMPD, and a couple of his colleagues, who jointly drafted the Council Conclusions establishing the Compact, were well connected with senior CivCom representatives. EEAS officials were frequently in touch with expert directly and informally. As a CMPD official involved highlighted, the role of the EEAS was

not necessarily to create new information, but to draw from information given and listen to those who provide good ideas, such as Sweden and Germany. For instance, ‘the great ideas of Sweden’, such as the Specialised Teams, were included in the Council Conclusions despite CPCC highlighting that the usefulness is questionable (#37,53). Indeed, several individuals, EEAS and national officials alike highlighted how influential Sweden was in providing ideas in the Compact (#37, 39, 63). Similarly, the expertise of individual CivCom representative in the discussions were also invaluable. For instance, the Danish representative has been heralded as quite influential in shaping the discussions not only due to the vast knowledge of the technicalities of civilian CSDP, but also because of his deep connections with officials in the CPCC and CMPD (#39, 43). Significantly, however, to the dismay of some it has also been noted that the Danish representative who benefits from great legitimacy due to his/her expertise, was coalescing with the Deputy Head of Operations for the EU’s CPCC, who was a SNDs from Denmark. Personal bonds through SND in this case seemed to participate in steering policies’ direction (#39, 40).

The interconnectedness between individuals and EEAS officials were at times more impactful than the numerous workshops and non-papers of member states (#37). In contrast to the effect non-papers had on the PESCO negotiations (page 162), in this context non-papers did not drastically affect or shape the policy document texts (#37, 39). This is so because the EEAS officials’ understanding of their role, and their commitment/connectedness to member states was different. What actually shaped the policy’s content were the good ideas provided by individuals, who interacted most frequently with the drafters, such as for instance Sweden and Denmark. Simply put, the interconnectedness of the drafter of the CCC and ‘the experts’ that were mostly CivCom representatives played a more important role in shaping the policy’s content.

On several important occasions, workshops and non-papers by member states occurred after the EEAS had already drafted the respective document text. Not only was it the case with the January 2018 workshop that had to be postponed for logistical reasons and could not feed into the subsequent Council Conclusions. The October 2018 workshop in Austria is another example. While it was highlighted to be a very useful discussion forum among member states, the EEAS had already internally drafted the November Council Conclusions on the Compact – the ideas and thoughts that were discussed in this context were not added in the Compact. While the workshops might only have had an inconsistent effect on EEAS officials and the drafting of policy texts per se, they still play an important role for national permanent representatives’ exchanges – and as will be seen in the next section to share best practices and lessons learnt. While the workshops were important fora

to establish more trust and cooperative relations between CMPD officials and CivCom representatives, their ‘content-impact’ depended on timing.

CPCC, as Operational Headquarter of civilian missions, played a different role than CMPD, who is more frequently active in CivCom and leads in writing policy texts. Considering the EU has deployed 22 missions since 2003, it has substantial experience in both successful and less successful civilian and civilian-military missions. As the Compact’s intended to improve the efficiency and functioning of such missions, it would be expected that the knowledge that the EEAS has amassed since 2011 would be helpful in devising or shaping the content of the Compact. The experiences of CPCC allowed them to act as broker on issues pertaining to civilian capability needs and recruitment and training of SNEs. For member states, CPCC provided more ‘realistic ideas’ and convincing arguments (#39, 41).

This was notably the case on two of the most contentious issues. Firstly, as elaborated above CPCC offered more convincing arguments with regards to the question of mandate revision. Another example is CPCC’s proposal to increase the SNEs ration by 70% - what is now seen as the ‘flagship provision’ (#52, 53; Faleg, 2020:138). The most contentious issue in the negotiation of the Compact was how binding the commitments should be and whether quantitative targets should be set⁵⁷. All member states agreed that the number of SNE needed to be raised, yet there were stark disagreements as to how politically binding the commitments should be (#38, 43). Despite strong resistance from countries outside of the like-minded group, CPCC argued that a clear commitment of 70% was needed, providing jointly with the FPI the needed data. While, France and Greece succeeded in watering down the commitment, by adding that the number of SNEs be increased ‘jointly’ by 70%, CPCC had an important weight in tilting the discussion in favour for setting quantitative targets. In December 2018, the ration of secondees/contracted staff composition in mission was by 58/42%. Considering member states bear the costs of SNEs, if successfully implemented, this will significantly address the budgetary capacities of CPCC, who thus far sustained unproportioned costs for contracting agents (#51, 53).

However, despite these important examples, they remain intermittent examples. On other issues, where one would expect to see influence, it has remained limited because of a weak institutional memory within the EEAS, in particular in CPCC. Indeed, the EEAS has difficulties storing its institutional memory. The final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal

⁵⁷ The schism between the like-minded group versus the others was only overcome when a compromise solution between Germany and France was found. Germany, and several of the like-minded group, wanted to have a legally-binding Council Decision, yet due to the strong resistance of France in particular, who did not want to increase their secondment for internal security matters, it was agreed to set some quantitative targets, in a Council Conclusion.

2008 already highlighted in 2007 that ‘lessons from the CHG 2008 process as well as from EU-led operations and exercises could be learned and implemented more systematically’ (Council of the EU, 2007a:8). As the lack for sustainable and effective lessons-learned mechanisms remained apparent, the subsequent ‘New Civilian Headline Goal 2010’ identified ‘a robust and systematic lessons-learned process’ as primary objective for improving the quality of civilian ‘ESDP’ and where ‘immediate action’ should be taken (Council of the EU, 2007b:3). ‘Only since 2009 did the EU invest in more formalised lessons-learning processes, which led to more systematic information gathering and more in-depth conceptual discussions’ (Bossong, 2013:94). Yet, regular review processes in civilian crisis management ‘has remained haphazard and limited to capacity expansion or mission support requirements’ (ibid). Even former HR/VP Catherine Ashton underlined as primary need in the context of civilian CSDP ‘structures that allow to store and shape experiences (Ashton, 2014:13). The lessons-learned mechanism remains ad hoc, which became a curtailing factor for the EEAS to provide the support and knowledge expected for greater conceptual clarity. Indeed, part of the motivation of the Compact was ‘to *finally* learn from the best practices’ (#41, cf. 40, 63).

In sum, CMPD and CPCC did shape to a certain extent the final outcome – it remained limited and not preponderant vis-à-vis expertise provided by member states (#38, 39, 41). Despite limited knowledge management, CPCC (and the FPI) offered more know-how and expertise on tactical challenges, which gave them the ability to broker on a few questions directly linked to civilian mission management. CMPD officials rather offered a couple of policy ideas/innovations, such as the mini-concepts. CMPD’s strength, however, lied in their informal interconnectedness with relevant ‘expert’ CivCom officials, who were often part of the like-minded group. EEAS officials, especially CMPD, relied on experts from member states, often senior CivCom representatives or SNDs in the EEAS (#33, 37, 39, 40, 41, 43,45).

Concluding, the complexity and convolutedness of the policy governance structure does not paint a straightforward picture. It becomes evident however, that the lack of cohesion and diffuse expertise hamper quite drastically smooth policy consolidation and negotiation. The EEAS’s intra-institutional competition and lack of coordination added further hindrances in an already tense and uncooperative environment.

The extent of influence of the EEAS was limited; it offered some new ideas, such as scalable and flexible missions, and succeeded in introducing or leaving things out of the draft that were against their interest. However, the policy changes introduced are compromise solutions, rather than the result of a purposeful pursuit of the institution’s preferred outcome. Crucially, intra-institutional competition and uncooperative inter-institutional relations

hampered the EEAS's ability to steer and significantly shape the Compact. It is important to highlight that the Compact's comprehensive rearrangement of civilian CSDP's functioning is a complex policy issue by nature. Adding to that negative interaction dynamics among member states, the whole endeavour was due to be challenging. The EEAS did fail in managing and mediating the process as 'neutral' force. This was also due the Chair's lacking human and social capital, i.e. misunderstanding of member states' sensibilities, interests and needs, as well as the inability to engender trust with and among member states.

Throughout 2018 and in early 2019 we witness a 'personnel carousel' inside the EEAS. The three anchor-points for Civilian CSDP in the EEAS were replaced. March 2019 saw a general restructuring of the EEAS crisis management and CSDP Division. The relevant Heads of Divisions in CMPD and CPCC were replaced with individuals closer to the CCC file and, more importantly, the CivCom Chair was replaced in mid-2019. These appointments were significant in network-terms: the nature of the relationships between member states and the EEAS in all three anchor points were significantly improved as the newly appointed officials were able to utilise previously gained social and human capital. Not only were they more closely involved and interested in the CCC file, yet their skill and previously established trustworthiness was key in establishing a more cooperative relationship later on, notably in the implementation stage. This would generally shift gears for the development of the CCC file: the EEAS became embedded, intra- and inter-institutional relations improved.

V) Towards policy implementation: building a bridge while crossing it

This section will address the first steps of implementation of the Compact, which is scheduled to be fully implemented by 2023. As an EEAS official highlighted, in many respects implementing the Compact meant walking over a bridge that is still being built. Several ideas still needed to be 'translated into reality' (#33, 34, 41, 53). The lack of 'conceptual clarity' of several proposed new concepts, such as the mini-concepts, the specialised teams or how the EU Civilian Training Group can be utilised, accompanied the first steps of the CCC's implementation throughout 2019. Two main tasks lay ahead, first facilitating the implementation by mediating and bridging the gaps at national and EU levels and second, provide knowledge and expertise by gathering information and assessing data. So as to increase member states' ability to second national experts it remained vital to bridge existing gaps between Foreign Ministries and line Ministries (e.g. Interior, Justice Ministries, or respective governmental bodies responsible for dispatching needed experts). Additionally, further expertise, data management, and best practices needed to be gathered and assessed.

The Council Conclusions establishing the Compact indicated that by early spring 2019 the EEAS and Commission should present a Joint Action Plan (JAP) ‘laying out concrete steps to be taken by the Union institutions to contribute to a coherent implementation’ and ‘include proposals...for improving operational aspects’. Member states should develop National Implementation Plans to initiate a ‘dynamic and interactive process at national level’ so as to implement the first pillar of the Compact. They should hold Annual Review Conferences (ARC) in the second half of each year until the full implementation of the Compact. The EEAS should in the ARC provide a Civilian Annual Report on Capabilities (CARC), drawing from the JAP and the NIPs. The review ‘should identify capability gaps, help address them through a cooperative effort between EU and member states, as well as among member states...[and] support member states in improving the availability of capabilities required’ by sharing of best practices and lessons learned (Council of the EU 2018b:10-11).

The EEAS started to take ownership in the implementation stage, not least because of deeper and more cooperative ties with newly appointed EEAS officials. The EEAS took the lead, both in terms of engaging with member states, but also in terms of addressing commitments that the EEAS needed to tackle. In contrast to the policy initiation and consolidation stage, the EEAS officials started to adopt a clearer role of facilitator and mediator, not least as its role conception changed. Certainly, member states also called on the EEAS to take ownership in the Council Conclusions; in light of the preparation of the ARC Helsinki, who was taking up the Council Presidency, instructed their officials to not let the EEAS succeed in pushing the ARC’s organisation onto the Presidency (#63, 66). Similar to the earlier stages of the process, member states expected and wanted the EEAS, as central actor, to take the lead. The EEAS was ‘were very much in the lead’ and ‘orchestrating’ the ARC (ibid). This offered the EEAS to be more forceful in steering the implementation stage. Especially by combining its administrative capacity with its mediating powers, was the EEAS able to steer the implementation process. The policy network was stabilised and increasingly cohesive. The EEAS took ownership and became embedded and a central node in terms of interaction. The challenge in information control, however, remained. Tendencies of anchoring knowledge management in capitals emerged with the establishment of a Centre of Excellence on civilian crisis management, tasked to collect data and assess best practices.

A. The EEAS bridging the gaps

Since the establishment of the CCC, a normalisation of relations arose, not least due to personnel changes. The March 2019 re-structuring of the EEAS’s CSDP division (see page

42) re-positioned EEAS officials that had built since 2017 close and trustful relationships with member states on the Compact to more senior positions. Concomitantly a new Chair in CivCom was appointed. The EEAS coupled relational resources with its administrative capabilities, positively affecting the development of the Compact. It set the agenda and created space for informal, constructive exchange, while the nature of the relationships and the leveraging of social and human capital improved. A stronger facilitator and mediatory role was adopted. Due to deeper and more cooperative ties between the policy actors, the policy network governance became more cohesive and less fragmented. Hence, more deeply embedded and able to wield relational capital, the EEAS's ability to shape and steer the Compact's direction also improved. An important role for the EEAS in the implementation of the CCC is to 'guide member states' on the national level by 'inciting' closer interconnectedness between Foreign and Line Ministries, and on an EU-level '[bring] different Council groups together' (#51, 52). EEAS officials highlighted that Compact is about 'building systems on inclusively offering collective way for civilian CSDP to remain sustainable' (#52). In a certain way, this downplayed the necessity of intra-institutional reforms, which member states called for in the second pillar.

With the JAP and the CARC significant headway was made because it helped make the implementation process much more concrete and allowed to keep track of progress. Offering a comprehensive overview, the EEAS succeeded with the CARC to initiate what member states understood its core function to be, namely to have an overview of data and to actively record it. Indeed, while some were disappointed that the ARC was 'slightly underwhelming', there is overall agreement that it set processes in motion (#66). The EEAS, thanks to the initiative and support of the Finnish Presidency, ensured the CARC set 'waypoints'. Originally an idea from Helsinki who proposed it on the DPD-level, it was then discussed at an informal CivCom meeting in Helsinki (#63). The EEAS adopted the Finnish proposal to establish 'waypoints' in the CARC despite critique from Sweden and Germany. They argued singling out certain aspects over others undermined the comprehensiveness of the Compact. For the EEAS, it was a helpful approach to break down the implementation process and 'make it more practical and structured' (#63, 66).

The EEAS became active in providing support and assistance by developing an indicative NIP template and took initiatives to organise workshops dedicated to addressing issues reported by member states in the NIPs (e.g. in March 2020 the EEAS organised a workshop on capacity development to discuss possible financial incentives for secondment in civilian CSDP missions, rather than FRONTEX (#77)). As such NIPs have become a centralised tool of communication – with benefits and costs. On the one hand, NIPs and

questionnaires remain the main tools for the EEAS to gather insights into and engage with member states' positions. On the other hand, however, it is an easy way to not seek further direct engagement with capitals. Indeed, in capitals it remains that direct interaction with EEAS officials, as had been done during the EUGS or for the CCDP is the best form of engagement (#36, 56, 57). A 'confessional-style' dialogue is the preferred interaction pattern by capitals. Capitals have the impression of being heard and able to better emphasize and interact with EEAS officials.

Instruments such as Questionnaires and NIPs are not mirroring the reality on the ground; as a capital-based official highlighted, their NIP extensively develops the 'best practices' of the country, yet does not highlight the remaining challenges. They do not offer a truthful depiction of national intra-institutional challenges that need to be overcome in order to achieve the needed reforms. Moreover, NIPs are voluntary and member states were at first not willing to share them amongst each other. Indeed, by the time of the ARC in 2019 only 7 member states had shared their NIPs, by January 2020, 12 and by June 2020, 15 (#51, 66, 77). Whilst these are important limitations, the fact that the ARC was planned to be centred around the presentations of NIPs exerted pressure on national capital officials. By mid-2020 'all member states are working on it' (#64). EEAS officials started contacting member states' capitals to ensure steady progress, as some member states requested a more active EEAS to support them in the development of their NIPs and their implementation on national level (#77). This is an important development that highlights the continued strengthening of ties among EEAS officials and capitals, contributing to a more expansive network-reach in security and defence.

Being the penholder of the CARC allowed the EEAS some leeway in steering the implementation. EEAS officials set the agenda by placing particular emphasis on the first pillar of commitments. Both CMPD and CPCC officials in their own ways pressured member states. Seeking a more mediatory tone, Molenaar (in line with DSG Serrano's original critique) highlighted that while ambition to deploy more personnel more rapidly is laudatory and necessary, this is only possible if member states have the political will to do so. For instance, in workshops, he asked 'what are guidelines on how to achieve this?' (#76). In line with their broker role during the negotiation, one observes more friction between CPCC and the member states. On frequent occasions the Head of CPCC held member states responsible for the success of the implementation of the Compact. He voiced in informal, formal and bilateral sessions redundantly that despite the requested CPCC restructuring, civilian CSDP would not improve if CPCC is not able to receive and train SNEs (#43, 63, 76). Addressing

member states, he argued that while member states have requested the Compact, and CPCC has taken measures, in the end the Compact is not 'for free': 'we will come at the end with the bill' (#76).

To address shortcomings in the second pillar of the Compact - tackling human resources, recruitment and operational issues - the CPCC engendered several processes to address its own shortcomings. By November 2019, CPCC had undertaken significant steps, in restructuring and reviewing recruitment procedures – measures that have not gone unnoticed by member states (#63, 66). Prior to the ARC, CPCC reached out to all Human Resources officials in EU missions and organised a meeting co-jointly with the CivCom Chair and the Finnish CivCom representative (#63). The meeting aimed to start a discussion and human resources issues on the ground. CPCC re-structured internally, adding a dedicated human resources division which worked towards optimising the use of human resources made available by member states and sped up the recruitment process. By 2019, to further facilitate recruitment and selection procedures a 'Goalkeeper/Registrar database' was being developed, bi-monthly human resources statistics were going to be produced and CPCC envisaged establishing a platform for human resources management in missions to digitalise and standardise the administrative process. The Head of CPCC, made it abundantly clear, however, that in turn any shortcomings would be faulty of member states not holding up their side of the agreement by neither providing the capabilities nor the political will. Uncooperatively, relations among CPCC and member states remained tense, the failure of efficient and successful civilian crisis management the result of a blame-game among those providing resources, and those operationalising them.

Whether it is due to (peer) pressure, the right incentives and/or more cooperative engagement from sides of the EEAS progress is emerging, both on national level between Foreign Ministries and Line Ministries and among member states, sharing best practices and lessons learnt. Several member states officials highlight that NIPs and questionnaires have had positive effects and lead to better cooperation and more active engagement with line ministries (#43, 77; Böttcher 2020). A SecDefPol (former-CMPD) official forecasted that by the ARC 2020, the share of SNEs could have increased by 6% in total, and for some member states to up to 10%⁵⁸ (#66). There is much deeper embeddedness among all actors involved and the EEAS has adopted the central role it is able and requested to take. The EEAS's engagement has left an impact, facilitating to their abilities within and among member states.

⁵⁸ These numbers however may fall short because of possible and likely cuts in member states budgets due to the COVID-19 pandemic (#67).

It has over time learned that direct engagement with capitals is not only wished for by member states in this particular case, but also offers more control.

The mediatory capacity of the EEAS improved in formal and informal CivCom meetings. Especially the Chair became a central player in establishing a more trustworthy and cooperative exchange. The Chair became more proactive and built stronger links, embedding herself in the architecture. In addition to its mediatory role, the EEAS also facilitate further exchanges by being proactive using its administrative capacities. Adopting a more assertive Chairing role, not only did she offer good compromises and policy solutions, but also clearly defined next steps (#65). The Chair was pro-active in creating more spaces for exchange, coordinating in cooperation with the Finnish presidency or CPCC (#43,63,66). The EEAS established 'a voluntary process' where member states can share experiences informally. Where previously Presidencies were seeking to offer more 'safe spaces' to exchange in a less-politicised manner experiences, the EEAS is now taking the lead. Regular informal workshops are chaired by voluntary member states, for which the EEAS provides input. Both the administrative role and connector role of the EEAS which can jointly offer added-value play hand-in-hand. However, as will be addressed further below, conceptual clarity as well as intra-institutional silo thinking still curtail the smooth progress of all aspects of the Compact.

Informal workshops continued to be important hubs where knowledge exchange took place. Yet here again the EEAS remained only one actor among many to offer valuable advice. Formal and informal CivCom meetings became increasingly about exchanging experiences and best practices among member states. Significantly, there is 'much more exchange of best practice' among member states (cf. #63, 76). Some member states started sharing NIPs among themselves and with the EEAS. Except offering an entry of conversation through the NIPs, the exchange of best practices is 'not pushed by the EEAS' as they 'might be a bit shy to be a teacher' (#63). After all, as an EEAS official highlighted, 'the EEAS is no expert in legislation-building' (#51, cf. 76).

An important added-value of the EEAS/CMPD, is that staff working on the Compact was majoritarilly SNDs from the Nordics. Their close ties to their capitals, who in effect offer best practices and shared lessons learnt. For instance, a Finnish SNDs offered valuable advice on building legislation to facilitate secondment of experts to Romania (#76). With the added-value of having an overview, the function of the EEAS was to connect the member states with the necessary information and facilitate in one of the most crucial aspects for the Compact's implementation.

One aspect that however was not progressing in the implementation are intra-institutional aspects. While there had been progress in the relationship between the EEAS and member states, the intra-institutional competition on Strategic Reviews of mission mandates remained palpable. Both the JAP and the State of Play assessment remained vague and showed that no cohesive and joint approach was taken. Thus, the well-documented silos between policy planning and operational officials has not been overcome (Faleg, 2017).

B. Knowledge management: Resources too scarce to provide conceptual clarity?

For the implementation of the Compact, knowledge management remains vital. The CARC offers first insights into capability shortfalls, however, there remains a ‘surprising amount of unclarity’ not only in the specificities of capability needs but also in the implementation of the mini-concepts, cooperation with JHA actors in the field, what training is needed for deployed staff, and the possible use of specialised teams (#33, 34, 38). For conceptual clarity and a clearer capability shortfall analysis, the EEAS will have to move beyond generic task lists in the CCDP so as to identify gaps more clearly. For this, a deeper strategic conversation about aims and priorities on European crisis management needs to be sought (one of Germany’s Council Presidency aims, by pursuing the ‘Strategic Compass’, which aims to foster a strategic culture by creating a confidential prioritisation in European security policy).

As highlighted above, ‘much of the expertise does not exist and need yet to be developed’ (Dijkstra, 2019). EEAS reporting in light of the ARC and their effort to mediate best practice exchange started to strengthen its knowledge management. There is an understanding that ‘someone has to have a collective understanding’ – and the EEAS is best placed for this (#51). Knowledge management can only be strengthened, however, if intra-institutional cooperation is established. This includes sharing and coordination the strategic and operational strand of civilian CSDP, and established close cooperation with another hubs of knowledge, namely the European Security and Defence College. In other words, the network of experts across Europe needs to be more strongly anchored in Brussels and streamlined, establishing the EEAS as central knowledge manager.

However, member states felt the need to give the EEAS ‘a lending hand’ (#66). Throughout the process member states took up an important role of information gathering and reporting on civilian CSDP by mandating think tanks to do so. For instance, Sweden cooperated with SIPRI, Germany with the DGAP and Ireland commissioned ISSAT/DCAF (Böttcher, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c; 2020; Smit, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; ISSAT 2018). Crucially, Germany established a European Centre of Excellence for civilian crisis management (CoE), to ‘provide tangible support for the goals of the civilian CSDP Compact’ (Auswärtiges Amt,

2018). As a 'service provider' it intends to 'cooperate closely with the crisis management structure of the EEAS'. Its main task, however, is knowledge management to 'define standards for tasks and procedures in an EU civilian crisis management mission' (ibid). In other words, it aims to offer space and create the institutional memory of collecting, archiving, analysing and sharing best practices. The relations established between the EEAS and the CoE will be crucial in the implementation of the Compact.

A major motivation for member states to support the EEAS is the awareness of the lacking resources. Throughout the initiation, consolidation and implementation of the Compact it was noted on numerous occasions that the EEAS was 'oversaturated' and would not have the capacity to provide the extensive support that would be needed, both in terms of providing conceptual clarity and pursuing the procedures needed for information gathering, analysing and knowledge management. Indeed, the comprehensiveness and technicality of most of the 22 commitments of the Compact should indeed not be underestimated. The scarce resource allocation by the EEAS was an important curtailing factor; within both CMPD and CPCC only between 2-4 individuals worked on the Compact directly, while in parallel working on numerous other dossiers, such as PESCO or renegotiating the mandate of Operation Sophia. It is unclear whether the scarce resources allocation is due to lack of prioritisation or lack of resource. In this case in particular lacking material resources undoubtedly played an important factor in curtailing the EEAS's ability to coordinate and shape the policy's development.

It would be too simple to argue that the lacking manpower were the sole reasons for the tedious development of the policy, however. Here the relational capabilities and resources composition was also significantly unfavourable for the EEAS's impact and influence. In the last Chapter on PESCO, we saw that with only 2-3 officials actively shaping the policy, the EEAS positively impacted the development through mediation, continued intra-institutional cohesiveness and embeddedness. The issues at hand did not see less division, however, the number of actors and number of issues to tackle was lesser. As such, rather than solely emphasizing the lack of manpower, it is here proposed that the embeddedness and ability to engender virtuous cycle give the ability to significantly contribute to a policy's development even with little manpower. In this case, the lack of control and coordination in a fragmented network was just as relevant a factor as the lacking manpower.

In summary, intra-institutional cohesiveness, i.e. continued engagement and coordination among all EEAS sub-units continues to be a pre-condition for influence. When espousing a mediator role, coupled with its administrative power, the EEAS can have some influence in the development of a policy. The increase in the EEAS's influence is to an

important extent linked to the fact that the policy network governance was able to consolidate itself, thanks to time and personnel change. While time does not necessarily equate trust, time is an important factor that may lead to more routinized and constructive engagement. As penholder of the CARC and organisers of the ARC, much leeway for agenda-setting is given to the EEAS. CPCC remained a pro-active broker, not least as its *'raison d'être'* is more stringently tackled by the Compact. The increased ownership is in parts the result of member states requesting for more EEAS ownership, and the continued organisations of workshops to uphold momentum. It remains that while the consolidation of a slightly more unified policy network and deeper embeddedness of the EEAS has played an important role in strengthening the EEAS's position and ability to steer the policy's development, its scarce resources were a strongly curtailing factor.

VI) Conclusion

The Civilian CSDP Compact had a rough awakening – it is no exaggeration to emphasize the struggle and complexity that led to the format it has now. A 'bumpy processes', strongly diverging ambitions between member states, and a lack of interest or resources from high-level EEAS or national politicians all played a role. To understand, however, the extent and reasons for the EEAS's lack of influence one must hone in on its intra-institutional (in)cohesion, embeddedness in the policy network structure and the nature of its relationships.

The failure of influence is especially surprising considering the centrality, proportional manpower and experience the EEAS has in civilian CSDP. Member states looking to strengthen civilian CSDP did not have an end-product in mind and asked for the EEAS to take a leading role. Yet, the EEAS's was unable to mobilise the capabilities its central position offered because of a disinterest on the EEAS's top echelons, lacking intra-institutional cohesion and, concomitantly, the fragmented policy governance. Without intra-institutional cohesion, both vertically and horizontally, the early stages defining process, content and form were starkly influenced by the like-minded group, led by the Germano-Swedish duo. The initial steps led to an even more fragmented policy governance and distrustful and uncooperative relations.

An informal, clustered policy governance, in combination with strained relations inside the EEAS, between the EEAS and member states, and among member states, hampered the flow of intangible assets, notably of expertise. The technical complexity and novelty needed a more cohesive web of experts to achieve conceptual clarity of ideas. It is only over time that network cohesion grew and more cooperative engagement was able to ensue, enabling the EEAS's to steer the Compact and hold actors accountable. While one can

correctly argue that the extent of influence and ability to support the Compact's development was strongly curtailed by the lack of resource allocation, the power of the EEAS here did not manifest itself in reinventing the wheel, but rather to ensure it kept turning – through connecting, mediating and, when possible brokering. In this endeavour, only specific sub-units and individual entrepreneurs were able to shape aspects related to the policy's content. By being neither able to utilise its administrative powers, nor leverage relational resources, the EEAS was only able to impact the development.

Chapter 7 – Conclusions: The EEAS as a carriage driver

I) Introduction

While on foreign policy issues, scholars have compared the HR/VP and EEAS's role to an orchestra conductor (Bendiek, 2014; Grant, 2007), in security and defence the EEAS can be perceived as a 'carriage driver' who facilitates the journey – an often-bumpy ride – by directing and reining in the horses, accelerating or slowing down the journey. Despite being neither the horses, the driving force, nor the passengers who decide what the destination is, they may propose or choose various paths towards the desired destination. The carriage driver can be inconspicuous, fading in the décor, yet also be an ally, a confidant, a reliable source for information and an adept navigator. He is placed on top of the chariot, with the best view of the terrain. He ought to make sure all arrive safely, in one piece.

The last three empirical chapters on the policy-making process of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Civilian CSDP Compact (CCC) offered a multi-faceted view of the role, impact and influence of the EEAS. The analyses showed that the EEAS *can* be influential and (co-)steer the agenda. While it is still not an actor that controls the tides, it is one that takes advantage and 'rides the waves'. Indeed, when the right relational capabilities and resource composition is achieved, it can leverage the currents to shape and steer policy direction and affect policy-making dynamics. Contrary to expectations that the EEAS would not exert much influence due to its scarce material capital and challenging institutional features, we observed that the EEAS left an important imprint on the policy-making process in European security and defence since 2016. More significantly, findings corroborate that capabilities and resources derived from its relational capital enable or constrain the EEAS's ability to shape and steer policies. The variation in the extent of influence is thus explained by the relational capabilities and resource composition, which defines whether, to what extent and how the EEAS leverages the capabilities and resources its position and networks in the policy network governance offers. In short, while the EEAS's influence is variable and circumstantial, it can significantly shape and steer policies' direction because of its relational capital.

The ground premise of this analysis has from the outset been that the EEAS will have an impact through its administrative duties. The thesis aimed to take it a step further by

examining to what extent and how the EEAS is able to influence policy, defined as intentionally and cohesively steering and shaping policies such that the policy's development is significantly and sustainably affected. The conceptual and theoretical framework (Chapter 3) proposed that to understand the EEAS's extent of influence, it is necessary to analyse its relational capital, defined as the capabilities it derives from its embeddedness in the policy network structure and the resources it draws from the use of its networks. The EEAS's intra-institutional cohesion and embeddedness in the policy network governance delineates the extent of influence it can have in the multi-level, increasingly networked European security governance. Mapping the extent of the EEAS's reach across boundaries it delineates how likely it is to be successful in steering and shaping policies. The variation in the EEAS's effect on the policy negotiation process is explained by its wielding of human and social capital to yield relational resources, notably trust and information. Crucially, both these pillars reflect the communication flow and affect the information flow respectively, which significantly plays into policy-making dynamics.

This chapter will offer a comparative analysis of the three empirical chapters to draw conclusions on the EEAS's role, impact and what enables and constraints the EEAS's influence. It argues that, combined with the leadership abilities of the HR/VP and the administrative capabilities of the EEAS, the EEAS's position in the multi-level governance and its networks are its major strength. The EEAS has been most successful in steering and shaping policies' development when it acted strategically and cohesively across the hierarchies, i.e. concertedly on the political, policy, administrative levels, utilising its networks and the respective relational capabilities. Jointly, the HR/VP and EEAS can engage with member states not only across hierarchies – at times circumventing and reverting policy issues to be discussed on a higher or lower policy level – but have increasingly been in direct contact with member states' Ministries of Foreign Affairs. The EEAS is enabled to purposefully shape and steer policies when it is 1) embedded in a network with broad reach, 2) uses its position to control the communication flow and 3) able to leverage social and/or human capital to coalesce with or help overcome member states' or the Commission's objections. In effect, the EEAS can be most impactful during the formal policy consolidation stage, when wielding its relational capital and administrative powers jointly, or when involved from the outset, at the policy initiation stage, where it can significantly contribute to shaping the policy network governance.

This chapter unfolds as follows. The first section gives a short overview of whether, when and to what extent influence has been observed. The second section addresses the scenarios and mechanisms that have enabled or constrained the EEAS and explains why we

observe variation through the relational capital argument. Lastly, we take stock on the EEAS's status quo in the changed European security governance and discuss ways forward, for the institution as such and for the academic literature more generally.

II) Overview of the three cases: when and what influence?

Interestingly, evidence suggests that the explanation of why and to what extent the EEAS has been able to steer and shape the development of the EUGS, PESCO and the CCC is not primarily the result of its material resources and formal-legal powers. Rather, as suggested in the theoretical chapter (Chapter 3), the EEAS's embeddedness in a policy's network governance and its leveraging of relational resources through its relationships has stronger explanatory value for the extent of its influence on policy. Contrary to expectations, we have observed that despite scarce material capital and challenging institutional features, the HR/VP and EEAS has left an important imprint on the developments in the European security and defence since 2016.

As a policy area which touches on core sovereignty features of member states, EU security and defence cooperation is a 'less-likely' case for assessing the EEAS's policy influence. Member states have not only strongly diverging interests but also different ambitions and capabilities, and the Commission has increasingly been encroaching on the last intergovernmental pillar. Having little to no material resources and with challenging institutional features, one would expect the EEAS to have difficulties implementing its mandate, which is to coordinate and implement a coherent EU foreign and security policy. Theoretically, one would expect the EEAS to play a slightly more dominant role in the civilian stream of the CSDP, as it has been supporting and implementing civilian missions since the EEAS's inception, benefiting from relatively more resources, and gathering technical know-how, expertise and political information.

However, the analysis of the three case studies suggests a different picture. We observed an inverse correlation between the extent of material capital and the EEAS's extent of influence. Contrary to the expectations, the EEAS has been able to intentionally steer and shape the developments in the European security and defence policy since 2016. Rather than seeing greater influence and effect in the development of the Civilian CSDP Compact, where the EEAS has greater material power and expertise, it is in the case of PESCO that the EEAS was 'instrumental', significantly contributing to the rapid turnover and able to 'guide the initiative' and make 'ideas more practical' (#54, cf. 36).

In our analyses, the EEAS's (albeit limited) influence has been aided by the HR/VP's leadership. It has also become evident that the EEAS left significant marks on the policy-making process through its relational capital. While some member states initiated, pushed for and hence significantly moulded policies, the HR/VP and EEAS have also been successful in pursuing their agenda and policy preferences. They have acted as an important agenda-setter, driving the carriage through times of upheaval by brokering or mediating during policy negotiations and ensuring all member states with diverging interests stayed around the table until agreements that often went beyond the lowest common denominator, were reached.

We have delved into three case studies that represent different levels of EEAS's influence: firstly, a case of strong influence by the HR/VP and EEAS on the drafting and implementation of the EUGS; secondly, a case of limited influence in the development of PESCO; and lastly, of intra-institutionally competing interests, resulting in little impact in the case of the CCC. We argued that a necessary condition for policy influence is that the institution cohesively pursues policy preferences, defined by a leader or high-level policy entrepreneur, resulting in a policy change. Following Hall (1993:278-279), we categorised three levels of policy change: changing smaller technicalities within a policy's content during negotiations (first-order change), shifting the approach towards the policy (second-order changes) or more significant doctrinal changes (third-order changes) (see p. 57). Due to the hybrid nature and tri-levelled involvement of the EEAS on the political, policy and administrative levels, it may have the ability to 1) (co-)steer policies on the political level through the leadership of the HR/VP and entrepreneurship in the EEAS's top echelons or 2) shape policies' process and/or content through its relational capital on the policy and administrative level. Figure 7.1 offers an overview of concrete evidence of influence, the means through which it was achieved and the subsequent outcomes.

Harvesting the conducive timing, the HR/VP and a highly cohesive EEAS strategically pursued the strengthening of the security-defence cooperation of EU member states, with a particular inkling for military and defence questions. There was a clear prioritisation in terms of investing time and resources into defence capability issues. The HR/VP and the EEAS's top echelons had a preference for – and in the case of the HR/VP, an interest in – the successful implementation of the EUGS and a number of defence initiatives. The EUGS, written by Special Advisor Tocci, is a strong legacy of the HR/VP Mogherini and the small EUGS team. While the strategy is an endogenous product of the global shift to geopolitical challenges, Chapter 4 highlighted how the leadership/entrepreneurship of the HR/VP and the relational capital of the EUGS team enabled them to significantly steer and

shape the outcome, not only in terms of content, but also with regards to the process of writing the Strategy. The influence of the HR/VP and EUGS team on the Strategy text and the EEAS's implementation of the Strategy led to a third-order change. Indeed, a 'paradigmatic shift' in European external action ensued, shifting the EU's doctrinal approach to foreign policy and engendering concrete institutional changes, especially in anchoring internal security measures closer to external ones. It reinvigorated the debate on European security and defence capability development. Indeed, its success lay in its actionability and subsequent 'implementation' in Brussels, acting as vehicle for change (cf. #36, 47, 56, 72). Both the HR/VP and EEAS and member states were able to capitalise on the momentum to engender a number of changes, some pursued by the HR/VP (e.g. the creation of a 'military Operational Headquarter' and a European Peace Facility), others initiated by member states, notably the featured case studies of PESCO and the CCC.

The HR/VP leadership and the EUGS team's relational capital allowed them to steer on the political level by designing and controlling the process and to shape the Strategy's content. By devising an insulated process, the EUGS team shaped the policy network governance. The network structure positioned the EUGS team, and Tocci in particular, as a broker, able to canalize member states' input and weave in the HR/VP's priorities. On the policy/administrative level, the use of human capital, defending and 'fighting' for policy choices, as well as the skill to establish legitimacy vis-à-vis dismayed member states, ensured the acceptance of the final product by member states, despite significant dismay at the process. The capabilities derived from its embeddedness, closely connected to the Commission's top-echelons, the EEAS's position as broker to control the information flow and use human capital resulted in the ability to strongly shape the process and content of the EUGS.

	The EEAS's influence concretely	Means and Outcome
EUGS	<p>Steered on the political level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Designed and controlled process <p>Shaped on the policy/administrative level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Wrote content Used EUGS's implementation as leverage for increasing reach and institutional leeway 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Devised an insulated writing process and isolated member states, able to 'control' the process and information flow Network Structure gave EEAS opportunity to act as broker As Broker, weaved in priorities of HR/VP in strongly shaping content On policy/administrative level, network reach and social and human capital led to acceptance by member states and the Commission 'Rode the wave and ensured the next one would come' (#37) with sustained effort for implementation <p>➔ 3rd order change</p>
PESCO	<p>Steered on the political level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Set the pace <p>Shaped on the policy/administrative level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Affected process significantly on policy/administrative level, through combined use of social/human capital and administrative powers Convinced member states to be more detailed and specific in the binding commitments due to their (administrative) duty to assess the National Implementation Plan (NIPs) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strategic agenda-setting across hierarchies (from FAC, to PSC, to PMG) and intra-institutional cohesion and coordination led to sustained pressure on member states, affecting the process Coordinated with the Commission's EDAP program Mediated among member states: use of social and human capital engendered virtuous cycle Proposed best possible solutions in text formulation proposals <p>➔ 2nd order change</p>
CCC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No interest: hindrance and slowing down of the process 'Small' technical content change on the Compact (CPCC) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At first, slowing down process; at a later stage, mediating among member states to ensure implementation Technical know-how of CPCC (unique position in link to all civilian missions) - convinced member states to increase number of SNEs sent by member states <p>➔ 1st order change</p>

Figure 7.1 Overview: The EEAS's influence in the EUGS, CCC and PESCO

There was also a clear intention behind the HR/VP and the EEAS's top echelons to swiftly and successfully implement PESCO, preferably within the existing structures and as an inclusive framework. Despite no legal prerogatives or material capital, the EEAS had a significant, positive impact and was, to a limited extent, able to steer the policy's development by playing the role of (co-)leader, mediator and facilitator. As a member-state led process, the EEAS broadened its network reach and became involved in the initiation stage by acting as a 'neutral' facilitating body during the last stages of negotiations on the Notification establishing PESCO. Evidence suggests that the HR/VP's (co-)leadership and EEAS's involvement still strongly affected the overall pace and policy process (in Hall's (1990) terms, a second-order change). The EEAS contributed to steering the direction and significantly affected the pace of policy development. Strategic and cohesive intra-institutional coordination across hierarchies (from FAC, to the PSC, to the PMG) led to sustained pressure on member states. Member states highlighted that the EEAS was 'instrumental' in the policy negotiation stage, successfully mediating among member states. It affected the process significantly on the policy/administrative level, through combined use of social/human capital and administrative powers. Their ability to engender a virtuous cycle of cooperation and to propose continuously different policy solutions contributed to a swift turn-over. Concretely, despite initial reluctance from several member states, the EEAS convinced member states to be more detailed and specific in the binding commitments due to their (administrative) duty to assess the National Implementation Plans. However, the extent of influence was curtailed due to its semi-embeddedness within the policy network governance and the fact that the legally-enforceable policy documents were either pre-negotiated in RELEX, or continued to be negotiated in COREPER. Despite the PESCO Secretariat and its light coordination among its constituent parts, the EEAS's DG for CSDP, the EUMS and the EDA, deeper structural gaps between the political/civilian, military and industrial-defence realms were not bridged.

Lastly, the extent of impact of the EEAS in the case of the CCC is limited to its hindrance and delay, as a result of lack of interest within the EEAS's top echelons, as well as a lack of intra-institutional cohesion and inability to bridge the numerous inter-institutional gaps. We would expect the EEAS to be able to shape and steer policy direction in this case because of proportionally higher material resources and expertise after a decade of monitoring and coordinating civilian response. However, contrary to expectations, the EEAS had barely any influence and only moderate policy impact. The internal competition in a disaggregated policy network governance made the EEAS unable to bridge inter-institutional cleavages.

Highly heterogeneous EEAS staff embeddedness and different extents of human and social capital led to differing roles and extents of impact, only occasionally shaping policy content. There was a highly incohesive approach within the EEAS: while some officials on the lower echelons were embedded in early talks with member states, more senior officials were reluctant to work on the policy. The EEAS only belatedly established a cohesive network and worked on strengthening the quality of relations with and among member states. Indeed, at the implementation stage, we observed more constructive and cooperative engagement among member states due to the mediating activities of CMPD, which helped overcome member states' objections. On the larger scale, the HR/VP and EEAS failed to fully postpone the CCC's development, despite being at the centre of coordinating and implementing civilian missions. Due to the lack of intra-institutional cohesion the EEAS approach and effect on the policy's development remained messy until the adoption of the Compact. With regards to actually shaping the policy's content, we can note that the CPCC engendered first-order change; most notably they convinced member states to increase the number of SNEs to 70% (see page 195).

Before addressing the reasons that explain the variation of influence, let us briefly address three case specificities revealing how contextual factors delineate an actor's ability to leverage relational capital. First, as highlighted in the methods section (pages 80ff), the three cases represent different policy types. As a strategic document, the drafting, negotiation and implementation of the EUGS differs to the development of operational policies such as PESCO or the CCC. The process that accompanied the EUGS, and which ultimately gave the HR/VP and the EEAS influence over it, cannot be replicated in daily negotiations. Equally, the EUGS is 'not a bible that is carried around' (#62). The relevance of the 'yet another EU strategy' that does not set sufficiently clear prioritisation and concrete steps has been put into question (Smith, 2017; Biscop, 2021). This is based on the premise that strategic direction has been challenging in EU's external action, which is known for reactivity and crisis management, rather than foresight (Howorth, 2010:463; Biscop, 2012). Despite having highlighted that the 'appropriation' of the EUGS by the EEAS has provided it with a 'legitimizing tool' to expand its influence, the actual implementation of the EUGS's five priorities would need a more far-reaching assessment. While it does not change the relevance of the HR/VP and EEAS's extent of influence in the policy-making process, there is a point to be made regarding the output the EEAS's influence on European foreign policy more broadly: simply as a 'paper', it would not necessarily affect member states' national foreign policies.

Second, in line with the argument that the three cases represent different policy types, it is important to highlight that PESCO, as a policy, is set on a different legal foundation than civilian CSDP. COREPER and RELEX, chaired by a rotating presidency, discuss and make final decisions on crucial legal texts, where EEAS has no say. It is set as a ‘member-state led’ process in the Lisbon Treaty Article. This difference must be taken into consideration in the analysis of inter-institutional dynamics, more specifically the relationship between the EEAS and EU member states. Third, policies unfolded differently not least due to varying political relevance. The development of the Permanent Structured Cooperation was highly anticipated and politicised. Historically, civilian CSDP has always been the ‘ugly duckling’ of CSDP (Faleg, 2017). While Civilian CSDP Compact has been proposed and initiated by a group of member states who aimed to counterbalance the defence developments with more civilian, peace-building powers, it did not receive as much public and political interest. With less political pressure from the top-echelons, change was not perceived as urgent and progress was less rapid.

Rather than negating the predominance of the relational capital argument, however, they highlight the co-constitutive nature of the structural and agential aspects. These factors affect the network’s reach (e.g., the legal foundation setting a hard limit, hence curtailing, networks’ reach) and give us an indication as to the expected frequency or authority of interaction (e.g. politically relevant issues will see more senior levels engaging more frequently).

III) Understanding the variation in the extent of influence

To understand the extent and variation of influence for the EEAS, it is worth disaggregating the leadership, relational capability and resource composition and administrative capabilities that comprise the building blocks of influence. Acting concertedly with the HR/VP’s leadership may play a significant role in the EEAS’s influence. For this, the institution must act intra-institutionally in a coherent manner.

In line with the argument proposed in the theoretical chapter, we observed that, first, the EEAS’s extent of influence is delineated by its embeddedness in the policy network structure. It indicates the EEAS’s reach and authority and is derived from its position in the network structure, as well as the depth and frequency of interaction with policy-makers. The further the networks reach, the more likely the EEAS is able to coalesce with and draw from its relations. Second, whether it mobilises intangible assets, such as social and human capital, in its interaction with member states to yield trust and information, gives us an insight into

the use of its networks and the effect it has on policy dynamics. Both these pillars play a crucial role, as they affect the communication flow, specifically the information flow and interaction dynamics. After addressing the relevance of leadership and intra-institutional cohesion for strong influence, this section will assess both pillars respectively.

A. The role of leadership, intra-institutional cohesion and preferences – acting across hierarchies

While the HR/VP's political relevance in the security and defence developments might seem meagre vis-à-vis the Commission's monetary incentives to establish the European Defence Fund, her leadership and, conjointly with the EEAS, relational capital was an asset that has thus far been underestimated in the development of the security and defence initiatives that cascaded after the publication of the EU Global Strategy. In the case studies presented, we have seen that the HR/VP and the EEAS's top echelons can act cohesively with clear intentions in pursuit of their agenda. It is how the HR/VP and the EEAS's top echelons used their position that is striking, both intra-institutionally and inter-institutionally. The political and policy/administrative levels have worked hand-in-hand, with increased involvement of the HR/VP in the PSC, and the EEAS becoming a more confident actor benefitting from its dual politico-administrative nature. However, for strong influence, especially horizontal intra-institutional cohesion remains a necessary condition – an aspect that remains to be strengthened in the EEAS.

High Representative Mogherini kept a very close grip on security and defence issues that interested her. Mogherini and the security and defence community were anticipating and eager to push forward coordination, harmonisation and operationalisation of a stronger common security and defence. While pursuing a more 'integrated' security policy and the establishment of PESCO, the MPCC and the EPF had been a high priority for Mogherini and Serrano from the outset, strengthening the civilian CSDP pillar was not. On the contrary, the higher and lower-echelons of the EEAS were, at best, disinterested, and at worst, opposed to a German-Swedish push to strengthen the military and civilian capabilities in parallel. The HR/VP's integrationist agenda, which she has been able to enshrine into the EUGS through an insulated writing process, has been subtly yet cohesively pursued across the political, policy and administrative levels.

Indeed, Mogherini was very involved in the works of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), to the extent that she wanted to have an update after every meeting (#68). Notably the coordinated action across the different levels – the FAC, the PSC and the PMG – has highlighted a tactical use of relational and administrative capabilities. This is also,

however, why it would be too simplified to subsume the HR/VP's leadership abilities with the EEAS's influence. While the HR/VP and the EEAS's Managing Board is able to steer policies on the political level and the EEAS is able to shape policies on the policy/administrative level. Both players are reliant on each other, and benefit significantly one from the other.

As Gatti (2016:139) anticipated, the EEAS enjoys ample autonomy from the HR/VP because of the tri-hatted position of the HR/VP. Both Special Advisor Tocci and DSG Serrano who acted as lead entrepreneurs in the EUGS and PESCO case respectively benefitted from significant leeway for action. Especially the role that Deputy Secretary-Generals and Managing Directors play in taking initiative has also become evident (cf. #27, 59). More importantly, they are in many respects form the conceptual backdrop on which policies built. Tocci has shaped the philosophy behind the EUGS (#57, 62), DSG Serrano was 'the spiritus sanctus' – he had the 'visionary force' behind numerous defence initiatives (cf. #55, 62) and Molenaar, as 'best drafter of the EU, was the conceptual mind behind the Concept paper on strengthening civilian CSDP and on numerous PESCO policy texts (#44, 57). Certainly, the EEAS is enabled and, in a sense, reliant on the political support to be able to influence policies. However, the HR/VP too cannot act alone and has significantly benefitted on the EEAS's entrepreneurship.

Crucially, EEAS officials – rather than the HR/VP, whose relations became increasingly strained with the Commission and Foreign Ministers – helped to overcome member states' objections through their inter-institutional relations. The human and social capital of EEAS officials was as crucial to ensuring member states found common ground, be it through arguments or conviction/persuasion – an aspect we will discuss in greater detail below. Vis-à-vis the member states, the dual nature of the EEAS as a politico-administrative institution is hence an advantage. While incentives must be set on the political level, it is as important that the working level is perceived as 'neutral' – a force working with member states, rather than in juxtaposition to them. Providing legitimacy, it ensures the EEAS's ability to help overcome member states' objections, despite – at times – pursuing a political agenda.

Having the 'house in order', i.e. having vertical and horizontal intra-institutional cohesion, is a necessary condition for influence. While we have seen strong vertical cohesion, the EEAS's horizontal coherence must still be improved. This has been seen in the PESCO and the CCC cases, where division between policy planning and operational strands remain disconnected. Hence, responding to numerous early publications on the EEAS's *esprit de corps*, it remains true that one observes instances where the EEAS is not one cohesive actor. This

is, however, not necessarily solely due to its tri-partite staff composition, but can be due to its 1) steep hierarchical management structure, 2) lack of communication and integration among the operational and policy-strands in European security and defence, and 3) its youthfulness. The EEAS is ‘still learning to connect the synapses’ (#53). As an EEAS official highlighted, incentives for more ‘intra-institutional cohesion must come from leadership’ (#74). With the new leadership, signs of improved horizontal coordination have been noted, yet efforts to bridge the continued stark gaps between the geographical desks, the DG for CSDP and crisis management, and the military and civilian operational ‘Headquarters’ must be continued if the EEAS aims to ‘join-up’ the different strands of EU’s external action (#74). Time will tell whether the newly created ISP Division will continue to strengthen its ability to interact and cooperate with old and new actors in the European security architecture to harvest the benefits of its ‘interstitial’ position. Coordinate with its ‘sister-units’, however, remains a precondition for ensuring a fully integrated EU foreign, security and defence policy.

B. Structure: the EEAS’s embeddedness in the policy network governance

The extent of influence of the EEAS is delineated by its embeddedness in the policy network structure. Assessing the policy network structure reflects where and how policy-making dynamics unfold, because it gives a reflection of the communication flow among actors. Indeed, the frequency and depth of connectedness among policy actors reflect the information flow among policy actors. Concomitantly, it reveals the position of the EEAS in the policy network governance and the ability of the EEAS to leverage its position to affect the information flow and, hence, the negotiation dynamics.

Indeed, assessing a policy network’s structure has allowed us to grasp the extent of the EEAS’s reach and its embeddedness in the policy network governance. As proposed in Chapter 3, the more embedded one is in a network and the further the networks’ reach, the higher the ability to engender a second or third order change, as it engages both supranational and intergovernmental actors, thus building the multi-actorial coalition needed for policy change. Figure 2 and 3 give an overview of how the intra-institutional cohesiveness, as a necessary condition for influence, and the embeddedness of the EEAS apply to the three cases.

	Intra- EEAS cohesion	Embeddeness in EU network governance
EUGS	Highly cohesive	Embedded
PESCO	Highly cohesive	Partial embeddedness
CCC	Not cohesive	(Dis-jointed)

Figure 7.2 Overview of the EEAS's embeddedness in the three cases

The EUGS case is representative of the first scenario, which offers the HR/VP and the EEAS, here its top echelons, the highest likelihood of being very influential. As a policy initiator, the EUGS team forged the policy network governance in midst of an emergent governance network under the Juncker Commission. The extent of influence the EEAS could exert was due to its deep ties in the Commission, direct links to member states' capitals and vast outreach process. The EUGS case is particularly interesting for assessing the role of the relational capital of the HR/VP and the EEAS's top echelons. Indeed, engaging and coalescing inter-institutionally is necessary to build a broad multi-actorial policy coalitions needed in European foreign, security and defence policy. In both cases where we observed policy influence, the HR/VP and the EEAS engaged tactically in inter-institutional relations.

The HR/VP and her (first) Cabinet's close connection to the Commission became an important added value in strengthening the EEAS's position in the foreign and security governance, because it established much deeper and more frequent ties among the relevant actors. The first Head of Cabinet Manservisi brought his personal relational capital, which became an important added value in the first two years of the HR/VP's tenure, as it secured a cooperative relationship among both institution's top echelons. The rapprochement to the Commission was crucial to embed the EEAS closer to instruments through which the EU could leverage its external action. Cooperative relations on the top echelons also aided the coordination and incentivisation of defence initiative. Moreover, the EUGS and PESCO cases show the crucial need to establish and maintain good working relations with the Foreign and Defence Ministers. For instance, the establishment of close ties between Mogherini with the four female Defence Ministers of the PESCO 4 reveal the HR/VP's embeddedness in a process that was member-state led. The insulated writing process of the EUGS which led to the exclusion of member states from the writing of the Strategy led to strained relations between

the High Representative and the Foreign Ministries which subsequently hampered her leeway for action.

While it is tempting to argue that the success to engender PESCO is due to the Commission's European Defence Action Plan, specifically the proposal to establish the European Defence Fund, it is too simple of an assessment. The strength of the EEAS comes from its ability to talk to every Foreign Ministry in one day. This is not exclusively the role of the EEAS's Secretary General and Deputy Secretary-Generals, who interact formally and informally with member states' Political, Security or Defence Deputy Directors, but increasingly also Managing Directors and EEAS officials in the lower-echelons (cf. #7, 11, 27, 49, 51). Indeed, it has become evident that the Commission, too, benefits from, and even relies on, the 'political capital' that the EEAS has to offer, notably through its ability to offer political analyses and assessments, and its closeness to the member states, the Council and, when necessary, the European Parliament (cf. #16, 24, 27, 70, 71, 73, 74). The EEAS's position in the European security governance does place it in a unique position where policy-relevant, procedural and political expertise come together and provide a holistic view of the EU's political and technical abilities in foreign, security and defence policy. To take advantage of it must act horizontally and vertically cohesively and be deeply embedded in the policy network governance – both aspects are not frequently the case.

		POLITICAL LEVEL	POLICY LEVEL		ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL	Results
		Leadership	Relational Resources Social Capital Human Capital		Administrative Capabilities	
EUGS	Intra-EEAS cohesion & EU centrality and Embeddedness					INFLUENTIAL
PESCO	Intra-EEAS cohesion & Lack of centrality and embeddedness					LIMITED INFLUENCE
CCC	No intra-EEAS cohesion					LITTLE, COMPETING INFLUENCE

Figure 7.3 The extent of influence according to the EEAS's embeddedness

While the EEAS was deeply embedded in the case of the EUGS, in the case of PESCO, it was only semi-embedded at various stages of the policy cycle, and thus its reach and

authority remained limited. When the EEAS is not as deeply embedded in the policy governance, the influence is more local and limited in time and space. Considering aspects related to PESCO were discussed in realms the EEAS did not reach, its embeddedness was curtailed to the political discussions, in particular around its binding commitments, mediating during the negotiation of the political foundation of PESCO. First, the EEAS was not embedded in the member-state led negotiations at the initiation. Second, key documents that would be enshrined in EU law were pre- or post-negotiated in the RELEX working group or COREPER, chaired by the Rotating Presidencies. Third, aiming to strengthen European defence capabilities, PESCO developed in three realms – the political, military and industrial-defence – the latter of which the EEAS did not reach.

While there is ‘a gentlemen’s agreement on the division of labour’ (#37), i.e., basic coordination among the PESCO Secretariat (which is composed of the EEAS, EUMS and EDA, headed by the HR/VP), there was little cohesiveness amongst the actors, curtailing the EEAS DG for CSDP’s reach to the political realm. The three actors acted within their silos and the information exchange was curtailed, despite the fact that the EUMS is *pro forma* part of the EEAS and acting under the authority of the HR/VP. Member states’ point of view, negotiating aspects related to PESCO in different fora, was not matched by the EEAS, who was not holder of the same information but relying on member states to be informed about developments in different realms. Indeed, the network structure has highlighted that countries whose political, military and industrial-defence strategies were centrally coordinated in the capitals and tactically carried out through the Permanent Representations in Brussels were more enabled to wield their relational capital.

In the case of the CCC, while the EEAS is centrally placed in matters of civilian CSDP and embedded in the discussions around the Compact, it had conflicting results because of the lack of intra-institutional cohesiveness. Be it at first in the policy initiation stage, where divergent interests arose between the policy officers on the lower-echelons of the EEAS and officials on the higher-echelons, or during the negotiation stage, where the policy-strand in the CMPD and the operational-strand in the CPCC competed over shaping aspects related to the policy, the EEAS did not act cohesively. As mentioned, this is certainly not the sole reason for the slow and strenuous policy negotiation. However, it still emphasises the importance of intra-institutional cohesion and coordination within the EEAS, and the relevance of the EEAS to be involved from the early stages. The CCC case also shows that centrality does not mean influence and that embeddedness without ‘taking control’ is a possibility. Neither the Chair, nor CMPD (who in itself witness personnel change and an internal restructuring) took ownership during the negotiation of the Compact. Despite member states increasingly urging

the EEAS to take a more prominent role, progress was slow because the EEAS did not coordinate internally and was not able to bridge intra- and inter-institutional gaps. It is only after the formal establishment of the Compact that the EEAS embodied its role as a central actor, either in the case of CMPD aiming to mediate among the starkly diverging ambitions and abilities of member states, or in the case of the CPCC, brokering between member states and its own interests, tied to the operationalisation/ implementation of civilian missions and CMPD. The main drawback – other than that it hinders the progression of the policy and bares a lack of communication and coordination within the EEAS – is that conversation between EEAS officials and member states became sequestered, too. The flow of communication was hampered because of the CivCom's Chair lack of embeddedness; flow of information did not travel smoothly due to the fragmented network structure. Similar to the inability to build cross-organisational policy-coalitions in PESCO, multi-actorial coalitions cannot take place within the same policy domain.

In sum, EEAS's network reach delineates the extent to which it can derive relational resources and mobilise support, i.e. build multi-actorial coalitions. As policy network governances are strongly shaped at the policy initiation stages, it is when the EEAS is engaged from the outset that it will be able to position itself favourably to contribute to forging the policy network governance, as well as the policy's form and shape. Consequently, for strong influence, the EEAS should be engaged in the policy-making cycle from the outset.

From a conceptual network perspective, we have observed that it is more revealing to assess the EEAS's embeddedness, rather than solely its centrality, to grasp the extent of influence. There are two reasons for this. First, solely assessing an actor's centrality does not reveal how it uses its central position. We have seen that despite formal centrality in the CCC case, the EEAS was not able to exert policy influence and could not take advantage of the capabilities derived from its position, namely informational advantages. Second, of particular strength for the EEAS, as 'interstitial' institution, is its ability to mobilise strong as well as weak ties from a variety of actors (see p. 66.; Granovetter, 1973, 1983; Lin, 20020). Despite inherent challenges, drawing from divers organisational fields allows the EEAS to 'introduce innovation' (Bátora, 2013). Centrality in a dense network, where all actors are connected one with the other, is less relevant than when one is in the sole disposition to bridge different actors from different fields. Hence, it is by assessing the nature of interactions and the use of its networks that we receive a more granular understanding of the mechanisms behind various relational capabilities and resource compositions.

C. The role of the EEAS on the policy/administrative level: wielding human and social capital

After assessing network structure, we must understand the nature of the relationship and the networks' use to grasp whether and how it wields human and social capital to yield relational resources. It tells us how the EEAS affects the information flow, and consequently the policy-making dynamics. The EEAS's role is most prominent in formal policy formation settings and during the negotiation stages due to combined use of its relational resources and administrative powers. During the policy consolidation stage, it has become apparent that especially if acting with a particular intent, the EEAS has been able to achieve it by mobilising social and human capital, as well as administrative capacity jointly. These intangible assets may have virtuous or pernicious effects on the flow of communication, affecting the negotiations and ability to find consensus. Let us briefly assess how the communication flow was facilitated or hampered by the EEAS and how the (lack of) utilisation of its social and human capital affected the negotiation stage.

The communication flow was positively impacted in the case of PESCO, when the EEAS 1) mediated among member states through trust-building exercises, argumentative and persuasive means and innovative policy solutions, and 2) facilitated the communication and negotiation process administratively. In other words, the EEAS controlled the negotiations and was crucial in helping find consensus (cf. #44). In the case of PESCO, it was evident that the role the EEAS played, and correspondingly the way it wielded social and human capital, was crucial in positively affecting the information flow and the willingness of member states to find agreement. By pursuing mediatory activities that sought to strengthen the capacity to find consensus, notably strengthening trust among individuals and advocating for/ against possible policy solutions (e.g. text formulations, design structures), the EEAS contributed to a smooth and constructive negotiation and decision-making on the policy-level.

Due to their trustworthiness and their embeddedness, EEAS officials acted as mediators. Creating a virtuous cycle, the Chair Van Aubel and drafter Molenaar succeeded in establishing trust among actors, leading to positive cooperative engagement despite starkly differing interests. Moreover, they built on legal advice provided through in-house counsel, drew from their political and policy expertise and were skilful in finding innovative text solutions, as well as tactically proposing them in the negotiations. Typical behaviour of successful mediation by chairs (Walker & Biedenkopf, 2020), they adopted informal mediation practices, swiftly and continuously drafted compromise proposals, which was possible due to social and human capital. Skilfully and innovatively using the information collected from the

member states or the legal counsel of the EEAS draws on their human capital; forging a trustful and cooperative environment among member states builds on their social capital. 'When parties trust a chair to act as mediator, they will be more willing to accept her proposals than when she is distrusted' (ibid: 443). In the case of the CCC, the chair was mistrusted: member states had the impression that she was not sufficiently aware of the different positions of member states. Moreover, the tasks as chair to set objectives, rules of procedure, timelines, and conclude meetings were not carried out satisfactorily.

To strengthen consensus-finding practices, the PMG Chair would recurrently incentivise member states to discuss proposed text formulations among themselves in scheduled breaks during their often day-long sessions. More significantly, the EEAS sought to actively create 'safe spaces' among the most divided member states (cf. #13, 21, 28, 45, 67). For instance, to foster and strengthen negotiations, the PMG Chair invited representatives of member states of two opposing camps for informal conversations. At those meetings, representatives could exchange views confidentially without having instructions from their capitals. This led to easing tensions and was 'helpful' to 'have sympathy' and 'understand different positions' (#21). As national diplomats highlighted, it specifically contributed to being open-minded and more appreciative of their opponents' positions.

EEAS officials used information skilfully when proposing text formulations, based on their understanding of different members' sensitivities, political clashes and differing philosophies. In other words, they channelled member states' needs and 'controlled' the process by concomitantly utilising their social capital and administrative duties. EEAS officials were 'strategic' and purposeful in their mediating tactics, to the extent that EEAS officials understood their role as 'feeding [member states] information', disseminating ideas and 'letting them flourish' (#37, cf. 13, 17, 54). Indeed, to gauge member states' positions, the Chair had, in the case of PESCO, sent draft texts prior to committee meetings, giving member states time to reply with comments and, based on those, drafted a next text. In committee meetings, the Chair would pre-empt negative repercussions by explaining choices and justifying why certain options were not possible for either legal or political reasons. Significantly, the Chair and drafter would then propose several different solutions, as well as highlighting that choices not accepted could, for instance, be used in footnotes or for future reference. As a test to member states, the Chair would also propose to keep particularly sensitive issues in 'brackets' (e.g. [...]) and put it to the PSC.

Furthermore, their sensible use of comments received from member states – often pre-empting clashes among member states (cf. #23, 18) gave EEAS officials legitimacy among member states. For instance, EEAS officials would explain why they did not take into

consideration certain text amendments sent in by member states, because they were incompatible with other member states' red lines. The sensibility and alertness of EEAS officials, as well as astute ability to explain and justify certain choices in text proposals, helped to convince officials to find consensus. As a member state official highlighted, they are generally willing to agree on positions of other member states, but would request to know why. Hearing the arguments ensured member states understood 'there was no hidden agenda' (#23). The EEAS's contributions were 'instrumental' to finding decisions that went beyond the lowest common denominator (e.g. #22, 28). Hearing explanations and justifying choices through legal, institutional or political arguments, the EEAS Chair and EEAS PESCO Secretariat strengthened their legitimacy as a 'neutral' mediator (#21, 23). Even when it stood in opposition to their preferred outcomes, officials were convinced by EEAS text proposals.

In parallel to engaging in trust-building exercises (social capital) and providing convincing arguments or innovative text proposals (human capital), the EEAS used his administrative chairing powers to support his endeavour: he used time for informal communication. While the communication and deliberation throughout the negotiation stage is channelled through the actors' relational capital, it has become apparent how administrative duties are often used to supplement the EEAS's intentions. Utilising the administrative capacities became an important tool for the Chair, most notably in setting the frequency and length of negotiation sessions. The administrative duties, unsurprisingly, contribute to a smooth communication flow. The fact that drafts were always on time, communication was clear and, especially, that policy proposals were convincingly presented and explained contributed to a more trustful and cooperative environment.

In contrast to the PESCO case, the communication flow was much more challenging in the CCC case. Here too, only a few member states were committed to the cause, and within member states, we observed stark diverging interests and intentions. The complex nature of the policy and the lack of data were important factors hindering the decision-making process. The EEAS was 'not in control' – in part due to intra-institutional discord, but also simply because of a lack of streamlining communication, coordination and a systematic channelling and structuring of information. Building bridges between the two camps in the CCC case was far more challenging, due to data and technical knowledge not being readily available, the administrative hindrances to creating spaces for member states and/or experts to informally exchange views and ideas, and the lack of mediation. As explained in Chapter 6, key mediatory activities were organised and carried out by the rotating presidencies. Rather than EEAS officials, the Austrian representative acted as mediator. Sensible and aware of member states sensitivities, the Austrian representative proposed text formulations that formed the basis for

agreement. Especially because of the comprehensive nature of the policy, and the need to gather and assess data to forge technical opinions, creating informal spaces to gather and exchange ideas in a non-politicised environment was important. The Council presidencies and member states aimed to organise informal workshops. During the negotiations, when it came to technical issues, CPCC and FPI specifically were lauded for offering valuable information and arguments for the deliberation and policy formation. CMPD emerged at a later stage as a ‘mediator’, ensuring that all member states stayed at the negotiation table. They acted ‘as neutral arbitrator’, mediated on finding consensus on a timeline between the most ambitious member states and most constrained. The EEAS could not in unison capitalise on the institutional social or human capital in the negotiation and policy formation due to a lack of intra-institutional coordination and political interest.

In conclusion, the EEAS has tools at its disposal, but does not always fully use them due to the youthfulness of the institution, the lack of capacity to ensure the comprehensiveness and quantity of policies they work with, and/or the occasional inability to leverage human and social capital. Nevertheless, the EEAS has offered an important added value to European foreign policy.

The crux of the EEAS’s added value in our case was its ability to ensure member states came together and stayed around the table to overcome their objections. Member states remain very divided in security and defence matters, and have very different interests, capabilities and ambitions. In fact, in both cases of PESCO and CCC, only approximately half the member states were truly interested and actively involved. This sheds an important light on the role and opportunities for the EEAS. A capital-based member state official argued that the EEAS can act like a ‘strict disciplinarian’ (*Zuchtmeister*), ensuring member states progressed jointly and kept track of progress made (#36). While anecdotal, this viewpoint is relevant to a broader point, already highlighted by Morgenstern-Pomorski (2018). The EEAS’s purpose is understood differently by different players. Smaller member states seek the EEAS’s engagement as it is a ‘neutral’ force. For them, the EEAS’s involvement strengthened their ability to counter-balance France’s – or more generally big member states’ – assertive stance. Indeed, evidence suggests that while the EEAS is not always the sole mediator in negotiations (see e.g. Germany in the informal deliberations on the Notification establishing PESCO or Austria in the case of the CCC), member states on the policy level trust EEAS officials and expect more from them than ‘administrative support’.

Especially because the policies were of a sensitive nature and stark diverging interests among member states existed, several national officials wished for EEAS involvement,

especially during negotiation stages. It places the EEAS in a conflicting position, where it is expected to march in the first row, yet not outpace member states. In the case of PESCO, smaller member states wanted the EEAS to counter-balance France's influence. Similarly, when matters on the Civilian Compact became increasingly tense, member states turned to the EEAS to mediate amongst the different capabilities and ambitions. However, member states also expect the EEAS to have 'an overview' and act as 'information hub'. The EEAS must play a crucial role in gathering, providing and assessing information. In security and defence, the need for this is more striking because member states are scattered across a wide spectrum in terms of needs, ambitions and capabilities. Capability gaps must be more clearly identified – both in the military and civilian streams (an aspect that, in defence matters, is done through CARD, and carried out by the EDA). Especially in close coordination with the EUMS and EDA – which warrants improvement – the EEAS can have the view from above on the arsenal that is at the EU's disposal. Hence, rather than perceiving the relationship in a principle-agent fashion, it is rather one of alliance, complementarity, in some cases, almost co-dependency.

To build on the analogy of the EEAS as a carriage driver, in security and defence, the EEAS has become an integral part of the picture: it ensures all passengers are on board, has an overview of the terrain and may propose different paths to arrive at the destination. It influences which path should be taken and at which pace, but ultimately the passenger, the member states, will decide what the destination is. Without it, moving forward would be possible, but more cumbersome. When '*en route*' the EEAS may ensure they circumvent pot-holes or take a detour – as it has done by proposing the establishment of the European Peace Facility or pushing for the MPCC, both of which were against the grain of several member states. Yet this remains possible only if the EEAS succeeds in building coalitions, if it is able to convince member states to overcome their objections through persuasive or argumentative means. Metaphorically, member states must be coaxed to sit in the same carriage – and stay on board throughout the journey. The final section ponders on what our findings mean for the EEAS, for EU foreign, security and defence policy-making and for the academic literature more generally.

IV) The EEAS: Quo vadis?

We have witnessed the gradual maturity of the EEAS from toddler, to pupil, to now almost a young adult. Indeed, in the ten years since its establishment, the EEAS has come a long way: it is on its path 'from self-doubt to self-assertion' (Hillion & Blockmans, 2021). It has

learned to work with its challenging institutional features, and while they remain an important hindrance for the EU foreign, security and defence apparatus, the EEAS has, on occasion and increasingly so, learned to draw from, reposition and increase its resources, both in material and relational form. Most importantly, it has prioritised issues that increased its institutional relevance, most notably in the security and defence apparatus. In other words, the EEAS has entrenched itself closely to the Commission and capitals – yet with equidistance. It has slowly tilted away from being solely a ‘policy-crunching’ machine and has become more political, seeking to implement a joined-up, integrated foreign, security and defence policy. This has become especially visible in the EEAS’s involvement regarding regional approaches, for instance, towards the Sahel region or in the proposal to initiate an EU-China Connectivity Strategy (#26, 70, 72, 74, see p. 129). Hence, its added-value stems specifically from its interstitial position and from the relational capital of its staff. However, institutional and broader structural aspects continue to hinder its full capitalization.

There is a general agreement that, within the remit of possibilities – constrained by the broader structural challenges that the European foreign, security and defence apparatus faces – the EEAS has the potential to succeed (#18, 70, 71, 73). However, a clearer delineation of tasks is necessary if resources are not bolstered. Whether that is done through defining a narrower scope of duties by member states (#64) or a starker prioritisation of areas by the EEAS’s top echelons (#70, 71), the position of the EEAS gives it the opportunity to play a significant role. While a starker use of its right of initiative or engagement in its participative rights would be beneficial, keeping the EEAS staff below 5000, with only about 2000 staff working in headquarters makes it challenging for its staff to consider and propose more ‘innovative’ policy proposals (EEAS, 2020a). Revising the EEAS structure should hence focus on increasing manpower, including SND and SNEs, who provide knowledge and valuable links to capitals. Marrying its relational and material resources would allow the EEAS to work better towards coordinating and implementing a coherent European foreign and security policy as the EEAS remains dependent on the political clout and relational capital that its staff and leadership offer. Strengthening its staff composition, in number and training, and streamlining its mode of functioning, i.e. continue to devise ‘institutional innovations’ and take initiatives, would allow the EEAS to make significant strides towards improvement.

New modes of interaction between the EEAS and member states have become visible, with an increased wish from capital-based officials to have more direct interaction with EEAS officials and vice-versa. It is too early to make a full assessment of the success rate of the closer connection between the EEAS and member state-based officials. The ‘confessional’ style of interaction, which has been done in the drafting process of the EUGS and the Civilian

Capability Development Plan (CCDP), has been well received in the conversations with capital-based officials (#33, 49 56) Especially when it came to the capability development issues, two officials based in Berlin and Rome highlighted that more direct interaction between EEAS officials and the capitals should be encouraged (#36, 56). The direct interactions feed back into the EEAS's relational capital, as it provides them with an insight and overview of the possibilities and challenges across the EU. Moreover, confessional style interaction offers the EEAS deeper insight into the challenges of effectuating a more 'integrated' foreign policy because of competition or lack of coordination among ministries on national levels. Crucially, this shows that the EEAS expands and utilises its networks' reach. Especially if meetings with the EEAS in capitals were to take place not only with the Foreign Ministries but, for instance, with Defence Ministries and Line Ministries, the EEAS could ensure a more integrated and Europeanised security and defence policy. The direct links between the EEAS with Foreign Affairs Ministries is an interesting observation which warrants further research. From conversations it becomes evident that also geographical desk officers are increasingly in contact with capitals which hints at the fact that this is not a development that occurs only in the security and defence realm (# 6, 27, 68, 71).

Finally, the story of the EEAS is a story of expectations management. Just as European foreign policy suffers from a capability-expectations gap, so does the EEAS (Hill, 1993). With a modern twist to the 'carriage driver analogy', a member state official once noted 'the EEAS is like a good car, with a good pilot, but which seems to be stuck in second gear' (The European Institute, 2013). It would be more fitting to say that the EU foreign policy system remains stuck in second gear. The EEAS can in certain circumstances act like oil to grease the system, and keep the 'engine' turning; however, it cannot modernise the system by itself. The legal complexity and institutional fragmentation of the European foreign policy apparatus sets stark limitations to the EEAS's reach and sets barriers on the gradual convergence among actors. This sets important barriers on the extent of its influence too.

Two broader shifts in foreign, security and defence policy-making raise important questions on the future of the EEAS and warrant further research. First, ad hoc and informal groupings of member states are significantly shaping policy-making (Aggestam & Bicchi, 2019). It seems the EUGS, PESCO and the CCC incited further Europeanisation. A trend towards stronger capital-to-capital diplomacy has been observed, with new 'alliances' emerging (e.g. Sweden's stronger transgovernmental ties vis-à-vis France, after the highly divisive discussion on 3rd country participation in PESCO projects, or deeper transnational ties with Germany's defence industries (#48, 5)). However, this development also raises question on the role of the EEAS. Indeed, with the emergence of informal leadership practices

by EU member states in parallel to the formal leadership functions of the HR/VP and the EEAS, a 'paradox in EU leadership' arises (Aggestam & Johansson, 2017). Whether due to socialization, a trend towards de-Brusselisation or, more generally, an increasing trend of informal governance in international relations (Westerwinter, Abbott & Biersteker, 2021), the meaning and consequences of this informationalisation in European foreign and security governance requires more research about.

Second, decision-making of security and defence matters trends increasingly towards the European Council on the political level and COREPER on the policy level (Maurer & Wright, 2020). Despite the parallel trend of securitization and the EEAS's pursuit of an integrated approach, this trend curtails the EEAS's involvement in the policy-making process, as these policies are discussed in committees chaired by either Council Presidencies or the Council Secretariat. This discrepancy has been noted among decision-makers too. In November 2019, the French COREPER ambassador raised doubt about the viability to have the HR/VP and EEAS chair intergovernmental fora in security matter, proposing to revert back to Council Presidencies chairing the Foreign Affairs Council. While trends towards a rapprochement between the PSC and COREPER have been noted (# 62, 70; also Maurer & Wright, 2020), this development may have broader consequences for the EEAS. More broadly, to further develop our understanding of the EEAS's embedded in this changing governance, it is valuable to home in specifically on the extent of coordination and interaction between the EEAS, Council Presidencies and the Council Secretariat. In our case studies we have observed that cooperation with Council Presidencies played a crucial role in the case of the EUGS and the CCC, yet was not at all in the case in PESCO. Moreover, a more systematic understanding on the relevance of the EEAS's occasional presence in comitology sessions is needed to better grasp the expanse of its reach. While the EEAS have been able to safeguard its seat at the table in the comitology process of the EDIDP on grounds of 'implementing the EUGS' (page 126), there is no understanding yet on the consequence this presence may have.

Thus, while the relational capital argument has proven viable in our case and is expected to hold in foreign policy matters, more research must be done to complement a holistic understanding on the variation of the EEAS's extent of influence. Indeed, important differences between foreign policy and security and defence policy exist. While the formal the policy-making process and the EEAS's role does not differ, negotiation dynamics, the role of information (in terms of gathering and communication) and technical knowledge, and the network governance does.

Indeed, the findings of this thesis have opened the door for avenues of research on the EEAS's relational capital argument. First, as networks and negotiations remain context

dependent, the strength of the EEAS's relational capital would be more rigorously tested in a different context. The EEAS has been able to capitalise not only a favourable context but able to initiate new policies and implement institutional changes through the EUGS. The Strategy has acted as a significant lever through which the EEAS was able 'to ride the wave and ensure the next one was coming' (#37). Hence, it was placed in a particularly favourable context. More research needs to be done to solidify our understanding on whether and how the EEAS is able to implement policy changes in contexts that are less favourable.

Second, the governance structure and position of the EEAS changes in foreign policy issues. With the added role of EU Delegations, who act as important sources of information and coordinators on the ground, new network dynamics arise. What is the extent of impact and/or influence in foreign policy issues where the policy network governance is vaster and farther reaching than Brussels and its member states? How does vertical and horizontal intra-institutional cohesion differ in issues of foreign policy? Considering resources have been reallocated towards the DG for CSDP and crisis response, how can the EEAS draw from and leverage relational resources, considering the broader network span and vaster network structure? Most importantly, implementation in foreign policy differs drastically – what role can and does the EEAS play? Lastly, to better grasp the uniqueness of the EEAS's relational capital, it would be interesting to assess the Commission's or Council Secretariat's relational capital and compare findings.

V) Conclusion

This thesis has shed light on the relevance of the EEAS's relational capital and aimed to offer a more nuanced view of its role, impact and influence in the policy-making process. We have argued that the variation in the extent of its influence can be explained through the EEAS's embeddedness in the network structure and network utilisation. Both these pillars may significantly affect the communication flow. In an environment where multi-actor collaboration is *sine qua non*, understanding the policy-making dynamics across the multi-levelled governance and where and how the EEAS affects those is key – both to grasp the role it has adopted, but also to grasp how it has impacted and influenced a policy's development and/or outcome. This deviates from the dominant narrative which argues that the extent of influence is dependent on its formal-legal statutory powers and its material capital.

The EEAS is influential in European security and defence when it is enabled to do so in favourable relational capabilities and resources compositions. The extent of the EEAS's

embeddedness in differing policy network structures and the use of its networks explains the variation of influence observed. It also highlights the versatility of roles and functions the EEAS adopts through the various stages: (co-)leading or hindering a process on the political level, contributing through its mediator role to a virtuous cycle of cooperation or utilising its brokering role to its advantage on the policy-level, and acting as facilitator or hinderer on the administrative level. Whether and how it wields its human and social capital vis-à-vis policy actors has strong explanatory value for the effect the EEAS has on the development of negotiations. This provides the academic world with much scope for further research, pertaining to the EEAS's ability to leverage its relational capital in the coordination and implementation of foreign policy, its interconnectedness with capitals, and in its continued engagement to implement a more integrated approach.

The EEAS remains a young institution placed in a complex, fragmented and constantly evolving European foreign and security governance. Both, its role and the development of a stronger European security and defence will take time to bear fruit. Still it is evident that the EEAS is capable of acting as more than an 'efficient inter-state coordination' instrument. The integrated approach and the new impetus set in the EU's civilian and military crisis management structures are likely to lead to more forcefulness of the EU. This is particularly relevant in times when the EU and its member states are seeking to act more geopolitically on the global stage: as an interstitial institution, the EEAS can significantly contribute to the coherence and reactivity of the Union's external policy.

Annex 1 – List of Interviewees

Nr.	Institutional affiliation	Position	Date
1.	EEAS/ EU Delegation	Head of EU Delegation	23.07.2012
2.	EEAS official	Head of Division, Geographical Desk; Former Head of EU Delegation	31.07. 2015
3.	EEAS/ EU Delegation	Policy officer, Head of Financial and Contracts Division	03.08.2015
4.	EEAS official	Senior Advisor to High Representative	10.04.2017
5.	EEAS official	Head of Division, Geographical Desk	06.04.2018 <i>and</i> 27.04.2018
6.	Capital-based Member state official	Former Intern, Foreign Ministry	13.05.2018
7.	EEAS official	Head of Division, CSDP and crisis management	16.05.2018
8.	Commission official	Support Group to Ukraine	25.04.2018
9.	Commission official	DG Grow Former EEAS official	26.04.2018
10.	EEAS official	Policy officer, Strategic Communication Taskforce	24.10.2018
11.	EU Military Staff official	Head of Division	30.11.2018
12.	Commission official	DG Grow	04.12.2019
13.	EEAS official	Political and Security Committee Team	06.12.2018
14.	European Defence Agency official	Head of Division	06.12.2018
15.	Member of European Parliament	Committee member on Foreign Affairs (AFET)	07.12.2018
16.	Council Secretariat official	Policy Officer	10.12.2018
17.	Member state official	PMG Representative	11.12.2018
18.	Member state official	PMG Representative	11.12.2018
19.	EU Military Staff	Policy officer	13.12.2018

20.	Member state official	EUMCWG/HTF Representative, Military Representative	13.12.2018
21.	Member state official	PMG Representative	14.12.2018
22.	Member state official	PMG Representative	14.12.2018
23.	Member state official	PMG Representative	14.12.2018
24.	Parliament Secretariat, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union	Director and Policy officer	17.12.2018
25.	EEAS official	Strategic Communication Taskforce	17.12.2016
26.	EEAS official	Head of Division, Geographical Desk, Former Head of EU Delegation	18.12.2018
27.	EEAS official	Managing Director, Geographical Desks	19.12.2018
28.	Member state official	PMG Representative	19.12.2018
29.	French defence industry employee	Policy Analyst	14.04.2019
30.	Member state official	Former Military Representative	10.04.2019
31.	EUISS	Policy Analyst	15.04.2019
32.	Member state official	PMG Representative	16.04.2019
33.	Member state official	CivCom Representative	16.04.2019
34.	Member state official	CivCom Representative	16.04.2019
35.	Member state official	PMG Representative	17.04.2019
36.	Capital-based Member state official	Director, Foreign Ministry	24.04.2019
37.	EEAS official	Senior Policy officer	25.04.2019
38.	Member state official	CivCom Representative	25.04.2019
39.	Member state official	CivCom Representative	02.05.2019
40.	Member state official	CivCom Representative	02.05.2019
41.	Member state officials	CivCom Representative and First Secretary	03.05.2019

42.	Member state official	PMG Representative	03.05.2019
43.	Member state official	CivCom Representative	03.05.2019
44.	Member state official	PMG Representative	03.05.2019
45.	Member state official	CivCom Representative	26.04.2019
46.	Member state official	PMG Representative	26.04.2019
47.	Member state official	PMG Representative	26.04.2019
48.	Capital-based Member state official	Director, Foreign Ministry	10.06.2019
49.	Capital-based Member state official	Policy officer, Foreign Ministry	05.06.2019
50.	EUISS	Policy Analyst	24.07.2019
51.	EEAS official	Policy Officer Crisis management and Planning Directorate	25.07.2019
52.	EEAS official	Policy Officer, Crisis management and Planning Directorate	29.07.2019
53.	EEAS official	Policy Officer, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability	29.07.2019
54.	Capital-based Member state official	Director, Foreign Ministry	30.07.2019
55.	EEAS official	Cabinet member	04.11.2019
56.	Capital-based Member state official	Director, Foreign Ministry	07.11.2019
57.	EEAS official	Senior Advisor to High Representative	08.11.2019
58.	EEAS official	Senior Official, Strategic Planning Unit	08.11.2019
59.	Capital-based Member state official	Director, Foreign Ministry	15.11.2019
60.	French defence industry employee	Senior Policy Analyst	15.11.2019
61.	Think tanker/ Academic	Director	08.12.2019
62.	Member state official	PSC Ambassador	09.12.2019
63.	Member state official	CivCom Representative	11.12.2019

64.	Member state official	PSC Ambassador	10.12.2019
65.	Academic	Researcher, Hertie School of Governance	10.03.2020
66.	Capital-based Member state official	Policy Officer, Foreign Ministry	13.01.2020
67.	Capital-based Member state official	Former Seconded Diplomat to the EEAS	13.03.2020
68.	EEAS official	Former Political and security committee team	08.05.2020
69.	EEAS official	Former Political and security committee team	11.05.2020
70.	Senior EEAS official	Former member of Cabinet under HR/VP Mogherini	12.05.2020
71.	EEAS official	Head of Cabinet in Commission's DG, Former Deputy Managing Director, Geographical Desks,	12.05.2020
72.	EEAS official	Senior Advisor, Geographical Desks	15.05.2020
73.	EEAS official	Senior Official, EEAS Managing Board	20.05.2020
74.	EEAS official	Deputy Managing Director, Geographical Desks	08.06.2020
75.	European Defence Industry Summit		06.12.2018 Brussels
76.	Workshop 'Civilian CSDP - assessing progress and identifying priorities for the implementation of the Civilian CSDP Compact'		19.07.2019 Brussels
77.	DGAP Workshop 'Crisis Prevention: Making 2020 Count. Strengthening the EU's Civilian Missions in Times of Global Crisis'		06.06.2020 Online

Bibliography

- Adler, E. and Pouliot, V. (2011). International practices. *International Theory*, 3(1), 1-36.
- Adler-Nissen, R. (2015). Towards a Practice Turn in EU Studies: The Everyday of European Integration. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54(1), 87-103.
- Agence Europe (2015). *Battlegroup use is not the most urgent matter to be resolved, says general de Rousiers*. Agence Europe, 21.05.2015.
- Agence Europe (2016a) *EU Chiefs of defence meet with counterpart from Myanmar to discuss situation in his country*. Agence Europe, 08.11.2016. <https://global-factiva-com.gate3.library.lse.ac.uk/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=EURDIP0020161109ecb800001&cat=a&ep=ASE>
- Agence Europe (2016b). *Ministers to discuss American elections, Turkey and EU Global Strategy*. Agence Europe, 11.11.2016. <https://agenceurope.eu/en/bulletin/article/11666/4>
- Aggestam, L. and Bicchi, F. (2019). New Directions in EU Foreign Policy Governance: Cross-loading, Leadership and Informal Groupings. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 57(3), 515-532.
- Aggestam, L. and Johansson, M. (2017). The Leadership Paradox in EU Foreign Policy. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 55(6), 1203-1220.
- Aghion, P. and Tirole, J. (1997). Formal and Real Authority in Organizations. *Journal of Political Economy*, 105(1), 1-29.
- Allison, G. (1971). *Essence of decision explaining the Cuban missile*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Allison, G. and Halperin, M. (1972). Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications. *World Politics*, 24(1), 40-79.
- Amadio Viceré, M., Tercovich, G. and Carta, C. (2020). The post-Lisbon high representatives: an introduction. *European Security*, 29(3), 259-274.
- Ashton, C. (2014). The Role of the European External Action Service in a global Network of crisis Rooms. In Pawlak, P. and Ricci, A. (Eds.), *Crisis Rooms: Towards a Global Network?* (pp. 151-186). Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.
- Austermann, F. (2014). *European Union delegations in EU foreign policy*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ayrault, J.-M. (2017). Déclaration de J.-M- Ayrault, Ministre français des Affaires étrangères, au

- Conseil des Affaires étrangères ayant lieu [Video, 06.03.2017].
<https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/events/20170306-foreign-affairs-council-march-2017/declaration-fr-ayrault>
- Ayrault, J.-M. and Steinmeier, F.-W. (2016). *A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties*.
- Bach, T., De Francesco, F., Maggetti, M. and Ruffing, E. (2016). Transnational Bureaucratic Politics: An Institutional Rivalry Perspective on EU Network Governance. *Public Administration*, 94(1), 9-24.
- Bachmann, V. (2016). Spaces of Interaction: Enactments of Sociospatial Relations and an Emerging EU Diplomacy in Kenya. *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 4(1), 75-96.
- Baczynska, G. and Emmott, R. (2016). *Germany, France seek stronger EU Defence after Brexit: Document*. Reuters, 12.09.2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-defence/germany-france-seek-stronger-eu-defense-after-brexid-document-idUSKCN11I1XU>
- Balfour, R. (2015). Change and Continuity: A Decade of Evolution of EU Foreign Policy and the Creation of the European External Action Service. In R. Balfour, C. Carta. and K. Raik (Eds.), *The European External Action Service and National Foreign Ministries* (pp.31-44). Farnham/ Burlington (VT): Ashgate.
- Balfour, R. and Raik, K. (2013). *Equipping the European Union for the 21st century*. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
- Balfour, R., Carta, C. and Raik, K. (2016). *The European External Action Service and National Foreign Ministries*. London: Routledge.
- Barbé, E. and Morillas, P. (2019). The EU Global Strategy: The Dynamics of a more Politicized and Politically Integrated Foreign Policy. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 32(6), 753-770.
- Bargués-Pedreny, P. (2019). Mogherini, the queen of resilience reaches the end of her mandate. CIDOB opinion 604. Barcelona Centre for International Affairs.
- Barnes, J. A. (1954). Class and Committee in a Norwegian Island Parish. *Human Relations*, (7)1, 39-58.
- Bassiri Tabrizi, A. and Kienzle, B. (2020). The High Representative and directorates in European foreign policy: the case of the nuclear negotiations with Iran. *European Security*, 29(3), 320-336.
- Bátora, J. (2013). The 'Mitrailleuse Effect': The EEAS as an Interstitial Organization and the Dynamics of Innovation in Diplomacy. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(4), 598-613.
- Bauer, M. W. and Ege, J. (2016). Bureaucratic autonomy of international organizations' secretariats.

- Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(7), 1019–1037.
- Bauer, M. W. and Trondal, J. (2015). *The Palgrave Handbook of the European Administrative System*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Bauer, M., Knill, C. and Eckhard, S. (2017). *International Bureaucracies. Challenges and Lessons for Public Administration Research*. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- BBC Monitoring (2015). *Romanian, Dutch defence ministers discuss military cooperation, aid to Ukraine*. BBC Monitoring, 04.06.2015. <https://global-factiva-com.gate3.library.lse.ac.uk/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCEUP0020150604eb640015s&cat=a&ep=ASE>
- Beach, D. (2004). The Unseen Hand in Treaty Reform Negotiations: The Role and Influence of the Council Secretariat. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11(3), 408–439.
- Beesley, A. (2016a). *Italy and Spain warm to EU Defence co-operation*. Financial Times, 12.10.2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/ddad201e-50c9-36fc-b694-8e9522fb9323>
- Beesley, A. (2016b). *EU takes step towards limited Defence Co-operation*. Financial Times, 14.11.2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/dbcf9240-aa8f-11e6-9cb3-bb8207902122>
- Beesley, A. and Barker, A. (2016). *Brussels wants EU Defence Bonds*. Financial Times, 15.09.2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/10b14fa2-7a76-11e6-ae24-f193b105145e>
- Behrendt, J. (2011). *Civilian Personnel in Peace Operations: From Improvisation to Systems?* Policy Briefing. Center for International Peace Operations.
- Belotti, E. (2014). *Qualitative Networks: Mixed Methods in Sociological Research*. London: Routledge.
- Bendiek, A. (2014). *The Networking of European Foreign Policy: From Cacophony to Choir?* Comments 48, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
- Bendiek, A. (2015). *Review 2014: Grundpfeiler deutscher Außenpolitik und weltweite Erwartungen*. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
- Bendiek, A. (2016). *The Global Strategy for the EU's foreign and security policy*. SWP Comments 38, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
- Benz, A. (2015). European Administration as a Multilevel Administration: A Conceptual Framework. In Bauer, M. and Trondal, J. (Eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of the European Administrative System*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- Benz, A., Corcaci, A. and Doser, J. W. (2016). Unravelling multilevel administration. Patterns and dynamics of administrative co-ordination in European Governance. *Journal of European Public*

Policy, 23(7), 999–1018.

- Benz, A., Corcaci, A. and Doser, J. W. (2017). Multilevel Administration in International and National Contexts. In Bauer, S., Knill, M. and Eckhard, C. (Eds.), *Internatinoal Bureaucracy. Challenges and Lessons for Public Administration Research* (pp. 151–178). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Béraud-Sudreau, L. and Pannier, A. (2020). An ‘improbable Paris-Berlin-Commission triangle’: Usages of Europe and the Revival of EU Defense Cooperation after 2016. *Journal of European Integration*, 1–16.
- Bercovitch, J. and Houston, A. (1996). The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence. In Bercovitch, J. (Ed.), *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation* (pp. 11–35). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Bergmann, J. (2017). *Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development (CBSD): Securitising EU Development Policy*. Briefing Paper 24/2017, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Bonn. <https://www.die-gdi.de/en/briefing-paper/article/capacity-building-in-support-of-security-and-development-cbsd-securitising-eu-development-policy/>
- Bergmann, J. (2018). *A bridge over troubled water? The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and the security-development nexus in EU external policy*. Discussion Paper, No.6/2018, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), Bonn. <https://www.die-gdi.de/en/discussion-paper/article/a-bridge-over-troubled-water-the-instrument-contributing-to-stability-and-peace-icsp-and-the-security-development-nexus-in-eu-external-policy/>
- Bevir, M. (2009). *Key Concepts in Governance*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Bicchi, F. (2011). The EU as a community of practice: foreign policy communications in the COREU network. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 18(8), 1115–1132.
- Bicchi, F. (2012). The European external action service: a pivotal actor in EU foreign policy communications? *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(2), 81–94.
- Bicchi, F. (2014a). Information exchanges, diplomatic networks and the construction of European knowledge in European Union foreign policy. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 49(2), 239–259.
- Bicchi, F. (2014b). EU Foreign Policy and the Politics of Information. In Blom, T. and Vanhoonacker, S. (Eds.), *The Politics of Information. The Case of the European Union* (pp.211–228). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bickerton, C.J., Hodson, D. and Puetter, U. (2015) The new intergovernmentalism: European integration in the post-maastricht era. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 53(4), 703–722.

- Bienkowska, E. (2016). *Participation of Elzbieta Bienkowska, Member of the EC at the European Defence Agency Annual Conference*. [Video, 10.11.2016]. <https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-128741>
- Biermann, F. and Siebenhuner, B. (2009). *Managers of Global Change*. Cambridge, Massachussets: The MIT Press.
- Biermann, F. and Siebenhuner, B. (2013). Problem solving by international bureaucracies: the influence of international secretariats on world politics. In Reinalda, B. (Ed.) *Routledge Handbook of International Organization*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Biscop, S. (2007). *The ABC of European Union Strategy: Ambition, Benchmark, Culture*. Egmont Paper, No. 16. Brussels: EGMONT – The Royal Institute for International Relations.
- Biscop, S. (2009). The European Security Strategy: Now Do it. In Biscop, S., Howorth, J. and Griegerich, B. (Eds.), *Europe: A Time for Strategy, 5-14*. Egmont Paper, No. 27. Brussels: EGMONT – The Royal Institute for International Relations.
- Biscop, S. (2012). *Raiders of the Lost Art: Strategy-Making in Europe*. Security Policy Brief No. 4. Brussels: Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations.
- Biscop, S. (2016). *The EU global strategy: realpolitik with European characteristics*. Security policy Brief, No. 75. Brussels: EGMONT – The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Biscop, S. and Coelmont, J. (2011). CSDP and Ghent Framework. The indirect Approach to the Permanent structured Cooperation. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 16(2), 149-167.
- Biscop, S. and Coelmont, J. (2013). *Europe, Strategy and Armed Forces: The Making of a Distinctive Power*. New York: Routledge.
- Biscop, S., Howorth, J. and Giegerich, B. (2009). *Europe: A Time for Strategy*. EGMONT Paper, No. 27. Brussels: EGMONT – The Royal Institute for International Relations.
- Blockmans, S. and Crosson, D. (2019). *Differentiated integration within PESCO – clusters and convergence in EU defence*. CEPS Research Report. Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Blockmans, S. and Hillion, C. (2013). *EEAS 2.0. A legal commentary on Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service*. European University Institute Working Paper 2013/3.
- Blockmans, S. and Hillion, C. (2021). *From self-doubt to self-assurance. The European External Action Service as the indispensable support for a geopolitical EU*. Report by the Task Force ‘EEAS 2.0’. CEPS Publication. Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Blockmans, S. and Laatsit, M.-L. (2012). *The European External Action Service: Enhancing*

- Coherence in EU External Action? In Cardwell, P.J. (Ed.), *EU External Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era* (pp. 135-159). The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press.
- Blockmans, S. and Russack, S. (2015). *The Commissioners' Group on External Action – Key political facilitator*. Special Report. No 125/ December 2015. Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Blockmans, S., Wessel, R., Chaban, N., Goldner Lang, I., Durán, G., Orbie, J. and Pomorska, K. (2021). A Note from the Editors EFAR@25: Between Change and Continuity. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 26(1), 1-4.
- Blom, T. and Vanhoonacker, S. (2015). The European External Action Service (EEAS) the New Kid on the Block. In Bauer, M.W. and Trondal, J. (Eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of the European Administrative System* (pp. 208-223). Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- Blom, T. and Vanhoonacker, S. (2021). The Role of Expertise in the EU's Emerging Diplomatic System. In Abazi, V., Adriaensen, J. and Christiansen, T. (Eds.), *The Contestation of Expertise in the European Union* (pp. 123-143). Springer International Publishing.
- Bonacich, P. (1972). Factoring and Weighting pproaches to status scores and clique identification. *Journal of Mathematical Sociolody*, 2, 113-120.
- Booth, K. and Wheeler, N. (2008). *The Security Dilemma: fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Borgatti, S.P. (2005). Centrality and Network Flow. *Social Networks*, 27(1), 55-71.
- Borgatti, S., Evertt, M. and Johnson, J.C. (2018). *Analyzing Social Networks*. (2nd Ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.
- Börzel, T. A, and Heard-Lauréote, K. (2009). Networks in EU Multi-level Governance: Concepts and Contributions. *Journal of Public Policy*, 29(2), 135-151.
- Bossong, R. (2013). EU Civilian Crisis Management and Organizational Learning. *European Security*, 22(1), 94-112.
- Bossong, R. and Benner, T. (2010). The Case for a Public Administration turn in the Study of the EU's Civilian Crisis Management. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17(7), 1074-1086.
- Bott, E. (1957). *Family and Social Network: Roles, Norms, and External Relationships in ordinary urban Families*. London: Tavistock Publications.
- Böttcher, C. (2019a). The Compact Roadmap: Towards a New Level of Professinoalization in Civilian CSDP. *DGAP Kompakt*, 11.
- Böttcher, C. (2019b). The First Year of the Compact. How the Review Process Can Make Civilian

- CSDP More Capable. *DGAP Kompakt*, 20.
- Böttcher, C. (2020). Exploring EU Member States' Good Practices. Incentives for More Secondment into Civilian CSDP Missions. *DGAP Analysis*, 5.
- Böttcher, C. and Wolf, M. (2019a). Divided in Diversity. Overcoming Europe's Incoherence in National Approaches to Civilian CSDP. *DGAP Analyse*, 3.
- Brandenburg, N. C. (2017). EU Mediation as an Assemblage of Practices: Introducing a New Approach to the Study of EU Conflict Resolution. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 55(5), 993-1008.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1986). The Forms of Capital. In Richardson, J. (Ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education* (pp. 241-58). New York: Greenwood.
- Bourdieu, P. (1987). *Distinction: A social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. London: Routledge.
- Bourdieu, P. (1996). *The Rules of Art. Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (2000). *Pascalian Meditations*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Brint, S. (1992). Hidden meanings: cultural content and context in Harrison White's structural sociology. *Sociological Theory*, 10(2), 194-208.
- Brok, E. (2009). *Rapport sur les Aspects Institutionnels de la Mise en Place du Service Européen d'Action Extérieure*. Brussels, Belgium: Parlement européen commission des affaires constitutionnelles.
- Bueger, C. and Gadinger, F. (2014). *International Practice Theory: New Perspectives*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bueger, C. (2016). Doing Europe: Agency and the European Union in the field of counter-piracy practice. *European Security* 25(4), 407-422.
- Carroll, D. (2011). *Catherine Ashton for a second term at the EEAS?* Public Service Europe, 06.09.2011. <https://web.archive.org/web/20120326111350/http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/811/catherine-ashton-for-a-second-term-at-the-eeas>
- Cameron, F. (2016). The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post- Westphalia. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29(1), 343-345.
- Carpenter, D. (2001). The Political Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy: A Response to Kernell. *Studies in American Political Development*, 15(1), 113-122.
- Carta, C. (2012). *The European Union Diplomatic Service. Ideas, preferences and identities*. Abingdon:

Routledge.

- Caughey, D., Cohon, A. and Chatfield, S. (2009). *Defining, measuring, and modeling bureaucratic autonomy*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 02.04.2009.
- Chelotti, N. (2015). *The Formulation of EU Foreign Policy. Socialization, negotiations and disaggregation of the state*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Chelotti, N. (2016). Transgovernmental networks and rationalist outputs? The partial social construction of EU foreign policy. *European Security*, 25(4), 524–541.
- Cherrier, N. (2012). The European External Action Service is now an effective instrument for policy coordination over 27 countries. *LSE Blogs*, 27.07.2012.
<https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2012/07/27/eeas-policy-coordination/>
- Christensen, T. and Laegreid, P. (2006). *Autonomy and regulation: Coping with agencies in the modern state*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Christofferson, S. (2012). The Creation of the European External Action Service. In J.P. Jacqu  (Ed.) *A Man for All Treaties: liber amicorum en l'honneur de Jen-Claude Piris*. Brussels: Bruylant.
- Chivvis, C. S. (2010). *EU Civilian Crisis Management: The Record so far*. Santa Monica: RAND National Defence Research Institute.
- Clemens, E. S. and Cook, J. M. (1999). Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 25(1), 441–466.
- Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 94, 95–120.
- Coleman, J. S. (1990). *Foundations of Social Theory*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Coppola, V. (2019). Speech/ Intervention on Panel X at the Workshop ‘Civilian CSDP – assessing progress and identifying priorities for the implementation of the Civilian CSDP Compact’, organised by the Finnish Presidency and the EUISS on 19.07.2018 in Brussels.
- Cornut, J. (2018). Diplomacy, agency, and the logic of improvisation and virtuosity in practice. *European Journal of International Relations*, 24(3), 712–736.
- Council of the EU (1999a). Non-military Instruments of Crisis Management. 11044/99, 16.09.1999.
- Council of the EU (1999b). Non-military Crisis Response Instruments available in EU Member States. 12323/99.

Council of the EU (2005). Ministerial Declaration. Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference. 14713/05 (Press 306). Brussels, 21.11.2005.

Council of the EU (2007a). Final Report on the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. 14807/07. Brussels, 09.11.2007.

Council of the EU (2007b). New Civilian Headline Goal 2010. 14823/07. Brussels, 09.11.2007.

Council of the EU (2010a). Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. 2010/427/EU. Brussels, 26.07.2010.

Council of the EU (2010b). Press release 2998th Council meeting Justice and Home Affairs, 6855/2/10 REV (Press 42) [Press Release]. europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-10-42_en.pdf

Council of the EU (2015a). Outcome of the Council Meeting. Foreign Affairs Council 3382nd Council Meeting. 8084/15. Luxembourg, 20.04.2015.

Council of the EU (2016a). Revised Version No1 of Provisional Agenda of the 3482nd meeting of the Council of the European Union (Foreign Affairs). 11262/16 REV 1. Brussels, 18.07.2016.

Council of the EU (2016b). Background Brief. Foreign Affairs Council. Press Office – General Secretariat of the Council. Brussels, 18.07.2016.

Council of the EU (2016c). Outcome of the 3482nd Council Meeting. Foreign Affairs. 11355/16. Brussels, 18.07.2016.

Council of the EU (2016d). Council Conclusions on Implementing the EU Global Strategy in the Area of Security and Defence. 14149/16, Brussels, 14.11.2016.

Council of the EU (2017a). Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on Progress in Implementing the EU Global Strategy in the Area of Security and Defence. Brussels, 06.03.2017.

Council of the EU (2017b). Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on Security and defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy. 9178/17. Brussels, 18.05.2017.

Council of the EU (2017c). Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on security and defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy. 14190/17. Brussels, 13.11.2017.

Council of the EU (2017d). Council Decisions establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and determining the List of Participating Member States. 14866/17. Brussels, 08.12.2017.

Council of the EU (2018a). Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on strengthening civilian CSDP – Council Conclusions (2018). 9288/17. Brussels, 28.05.2018.

- Council of the EU (2018b). Foreign Affairs Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting with the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact. 14305/18. Brussels, 19.11.2018.
- Costa, O. (2019). The Politicization of EU External Relations. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 26(5), 790–802.
- Cross, M. (2010). *Cooperation by Committee: the EU Military Committee and the Committee for Civilian Crisis Management*. Occasional Paper 82. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
- Cross, M. D. (2011). Building a European Diplomacy: Recruitment and Training to the EEAS. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 16(4), 447–464.
- Cross, M. D. (2013). A European Transgovernmental Intelligence Network and the Role of IntCen. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 14(3), 388–402.
- Crossley, N. (2001). The Phenomenological Habitus and Its Construction. *Theory and Society*, 30(1), 81–120.
- Crossley, N. (2010). The Social World of the Networks: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Elements in Social Network Analysis. *Sociologica*, 1.
- Crossley, N., Belotti, E., Edwards, G., Everett, M., Koskinen, J. and Tranmer, M. (2015). *Social Network Analysis for Ego-Nets*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Curtin, D. and Egeberg, M. (2008). Tradition and innovation. Europe's accumulated executive order. *West European Politics*, 31(4), 639–661.
- Csernaton, R. (2021). The Evolving Role of the European External Action Service in Security and Defence. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 26(1), 87–100.
- Damro, C. (2007). EU Delegation and Agency in International Trade Negotiations: A Cautionary Comparison. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(4), 883–903.
- Dasgupta, P. and Serageldin, I. (Eds.) (1999). *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*. Washington: The World Bank Publications.
- Davis Cross, M. (2016). The EU Global Strategy and Diplomacy. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 37(3), 402–413.
- Debuysere, L. and Blockmans, S. (2019). *Directorate ISP: No Deus Ex Machina for the EU's Integrated Approach*. PeaceLab, Blog. 05.06.2019. <https://peacelab.blog/2019/06/directorate-isp-no-deus-ex-machina-for-the-eus-integrated-approach>
- Delreux, T. (2011). *The EU as International Environmental Negotiator*. London: Routledge.

- Delreux, T. and Adriaensen, J. (2018). Twenty years of principal-Agent research in EU politics: How to cope with complexity? *European Political Science*, 17(2), 258–275.
- Dempsey, J. (2012). *Why is There No New EU Security Strategy?*. Judy Dempsey's Strategic Europe. 26.06.2012. <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/48947>
- Dijkstra, H. (2012) The influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence. *European Security*, 21(3), 311–327.
- Dijkstra, H. (2013). *Policy-making in EU Security and Defence*. London: Palgrave Macmillan
- Dijkstra, H. (2016). Introduction: One-and-a-half Cheers for the EU Global Strategy. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 37(3), 369–373.
- Dijkstra, H. and Vanhoonacker, S. (2011). The changing politics of information in European foreign policy. *Journal of European Integration*, 33(5), 541–58.
- Domisiewicz, R. (2012). A Giant with Feet of Clay? The EU's Ability to develop Capabilities for Civilian Crisis Management. *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, 12(4), 5–22.
- Drent, M. and Zandee, D. (2016). *After the EUGS: mainstreaming a new CSDP*. ISSUE Alert 34. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
- Duchêne, F. (1972). Europe's Role in the World Peace. In Mayne, R. (Ed.), *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen European Look Ahead* (pp. 32–47). London: Fontana.
- Duke, S. (2000a). *The Elusive Quest for European Security. From EDC to CFSP*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Duke, S. (2000b). Political Community to Uncommon Security. In Duke, S. (Ed.), *The Elusive Quest for European Security* (pp. 82–125). Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Duke, S. (2008). The Future of EU-NATO Relations: A Case of mutual Irrelevance through Competition? *Journal of European Integration*, 30(1), 27–43.
- Duke, S. (2012). Diplomatic Training and the Challenges Facing the EEAS. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(1), 95–114.
- Duke, S. (2014) Reflections on the EEAS Review. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 19(1), 23–44.
- Duke, S. (2017). *Europe as a Stronger Global Actor: Challenges and Strategic Responses*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Pagrave Macmillan.
- Dwan, R. (2002). EU Policing for Peace Operations: What does it mean? *Discussion Paper* no. 23. European Interdependence Research Unit.

- Durkheim, E. (1964). *The Division of Labour*. New York: Free Press.
- Eckhard, S. and Ege, J. (2016). International bureaucracies and their influence on policymaking: a review of empirical evidence. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(7), 960-978.
- Economides, S. (2017). The EU security strategies: consistency or contradictions? In Economides, S. and Sperling, J. (Eds.), *EU security strategies: extending the EU system of security governance*. London: Routledge.
- Edmonds, B. and Meyer, M. (2012). Context in social simulation: why it can't be wished away. *Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory*, 18(1), 5-21.
- Egeberg, M. and Trondal, J. (2009). Political leadership and bureaucratic autonomy: Effects of agencification. *Governance*, 22(4), 673-688.
- Ekengren, M. (2015). What Can EU Civil Security Governance Learn from the Common Security and Defence Policy and the European Defence Agency. In Bossong, R. and Hegemann, H (Eds.), *European Civil Security Governance. Diversity and Cooperation in Crisis and Disaster Management* (pp. 233-255). Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- The Economist (2014). *Europe's ring of fire*. The Economist, 20.09.2014.
<https://www.economist.com/europe/2014/09/20/europes-ring-of-fire>
- Ellinas, A. and Suleiman, E., (2012). *The European Commission and Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ellison, B. (2006). Bureaucratic Politics as Agency Competition: A Comparative Perspective. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 29(13), 1259-1283.
- Emirbayer, M. and Goodwin, J. (1994). Network Analysis, Culture and the Problem of Agency. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 99(6), 1411-1454.
- Emmott, R. (2016). *Europeans rally around Defence Plan after Campaign swipes by Trump*. Reuters, 14.11.2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/eu-defence/europeans-rally-around-defence-plan-after-campaign-swipes-by-trump-idINL8N1DF2J0>
- Emmott, R. and Siebold, S. (2016). *Britain's Fear of European Army muddles EU Defence Plan*. Reuters, 27.09.2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-defence/britains-fear-of-european-army-muddles-eu-defense-plan-idUSKCN11X00G>
- EUISS (2015). *Annual Activities Report*. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
- Euractiv (2016). *Germany and France seek stronger EU Defence after Brexit*. Euractiv.com with Reuters, 13.09.2016. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/security/news/germany-and-france-seek-stronger-eu-defence-after-brexit/>

- European Commission (2005). *A Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice*. COM(2005)491 final.
- European Commission (2018). *President Juncker reorganises his close team; European Commission appoints new Secretary-General* [Press Release, 21.02.2018].
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_1004
- European Commission (2021). *The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace responds rapidly to Crises, builds Peace and prevents Conflict around the World*. https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/what-we-do/instrument-contributing-stability-and-peace-preventing-conflict-around-world_en
- European Communities (1992). Report to the European Council in Lisbon on the likely Development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy with a view to Identifying Areas open to Joint Action vis-à-vis particular Countries or Groups of Countries, Annex I in Lisbon European Council Conclusions. Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 6/1992.
- European Commission (2012). Working Arrangements between the Commission services and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in relation to External Relation issues.
 SEC(2012)48
- European Commission (2017). *Service for Foreign Policy Instrument*. <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/>
- European Council (1999a). *Helsinki European Council. Presidency Report on Non-military Crisis Management of the European Union*. Presidency Conclusions.
- European Council (1999b). *Cologne European Council Declaration on strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence*, Annex III of Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Cologne, 04.06.1999.
- European Council (2000). *Santa Maria da Feira Presidency Conclusions*. Santa Maria da Feira, 19-20.06.2000.
- European Council (2008). *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World*. Brussels, 11.12.2008
- European Council (2011). High Representative Catherine Ashton visits the new EU Situation Room. Press Release, 18.07.2011.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/123911.pdf
- European Council (2013). European Council Conclusions on security and defence. Brussels, 19.12.2013.
- European Council (2015). European Council Conclusions, 25-26.06.2015. Brussels, 26.06.2015.
- European Council (2016). European Council Conclusions, 15.12.2016. EUCO 34/16. Brussels,

15.12.2016.

European Court of Auditors (2014). The Establishment of the European External Action Service. *Special Report No.11*. ECA: Luxembourg.

European Defence Agency (2016a). *Slovak EU Presidency at EDA Annual Conference: “Common solutions are needed on defence”*. <https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2016/11/10/slovak-eu-presidency-at-eda-annual-conference-common-solutions-are-needed-on-defence>

European External Action Service (2013a). European External Action Service Review. Brussels, 13.06.2013.

European External Action Service (2013b). *Annual Activity Report 2013*. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/3625/annual-activity-reports_ko

European External Action Service (2014a). *Annual Activity Report, 2014*. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/3625/annual-activity-reports_ko

European External Action Service (2014b). Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation. 15562/14. Brussels, 18.11.2014

European External Action Service (2015a). *Annual Activity Report 2015*. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/3625/annual-activity-reports_ko

European External Action Service (2015b). Security and Defence on the agenda at Riga Informal Meeting'. EEAS News stories. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/1806/security-and-defence-on-the-agenda-at-riga-informal-meeting_id

European External Action Service (2015c). *Strategic Assessment report. The European Union in a changing global environment. A more connected, contested and complex world*. Brussels, June 2015.

European External Action Service (2016a). *Annual Activity Report 2016*. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/3625/annual-activity-reports_ko

European External Action Service (2016b). *Shared Vision to Common Action: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*. Brussels, June 2016.

European External Action Service and Commission (2016c). *Taking forward the EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflicts and crises – Action Plan 2016-17*. Joint Staff Working Document, 11408/16.

European External Action Service (2017). *From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy. Year 1*. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/49750/eu-global-strategy-%E2%80%93-year-1_en

- European External Action Service (2017a). *Annual Activity Report 2017*.
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/3625/annual-activity-reports_ko
- European External Action Service (2018a) *Annual Activity Report 2018*.
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/3625/annual-activity-reports_ko
- European External Action Service (2018b). *Implementing the EU Global Strategy. Year 2*. Brussels, June 2018.
- European External Action Service (2019a) *Annual Activity Report 2019*.
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/3625/annual-activity-reports_ko
- European External Action Service (2019b). *The European Union's Global Strategy. Three Years on, looking Forward*. Brussels, June 2019.
- European External Action Service (2019c). *Annual Report on the Status of PESCO Implementation*. 7864/19. Brussels, 25.03.2019.
- European External Action Service (2019d). *Military and civilian missions and operations*.
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en .
- European External Action Service (2019e). *Civilian CSDP missions: Europeans on the ground provide security in our neighbourhood*. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/64429/civilian-csdp-missions-europeans-ground-provide-security-our-neighbourhood_en
- European External Action Service (2019f). *The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)*.
[https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en/5438/The%20Civilian%20Planning%20and%20Conduct%20Capability%20\(CPCC\)](https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en/5438/The%20Civilian%20Planning%20and%20Conduct%20Capability%20(CPCC)).
- European External Action Service (2019g). *The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD)*.
<https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/>
- European External Action Service (2020a). *Annual Activity Report 2020*.
https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/brazil/3625/annual-activity-reports_ko
- European External Action Service and Commission (2017). *The EU Integrated Approach to external conflicts and crises*. EEAS-Commission services Issues Paper for PSC. EEAS, 02.06.2017.
- The European Institute (2013). *European Affairs*, December 2013. European Institute at the University of Maryland. <https://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/archive/sort-by-date-2/190-ea-december-2013/1826-the-european-external-action-service-comes-of-age-an>

assessment

European Parliament (2013). European Parliament recommendation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and security Policy and Vice President of the Commission, to the Council and to the Commission of 13.06.2013 on the 2013 review of the organization and functioning of the EEAS.

European Union (1992). *Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version)*, Treaty of Maastricht, 07.02.1992, Official Journal of the European Communities C 325/5, 24.12.2002.

European Union (2003). *European Convention*, Article III-208 (ex-Article 20) Paragraph 3.

<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00727.en03.pdf>

European Union (2004). *Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency*. Official Journal of the European Union.

European Union and NATO (2017). *Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. Warsaw, 09.07.2016.

Faleg, G. (2017). *The EU's Common Security and defence Policy. Learning Communities in International Organizations*. Brussels: Palgrave Macmillan.

Faleg, G. (2020). The 'Civilian Compact'. Three scenarios for the future. In Fiott, D. (Ed.), *The CSDP in 2020* (pp. 135-145). Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.

Faria, F. (2014). What EU Comprehensive Approach? Challenges for the EU action plan and beyond. *ECDPM Briefing Note 71*, October 2014. <http://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/BN71-What-EU-Comprehensive-Approach-October-2014.pdf>

Fine, B. (2001). *Social Capital versus Social Theory: Political Economy and Social Science at the Turn of the Millennium*. London: Routledge.

Fine, B. (2010). *Theories of Social Capital: Researchers Behaving Badly*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fiott, D. (2015). The European Commission and the European Defence agency: A Case of Rivalry? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 53(3), 542-557.

Fiott, D., Missiroli, A. and Tardy, T. (2017). *Permanent Structured Cooperation: What's in a Name?* Chaillot Paper, 142. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.

Fligstein, N. (2001). Social skill and the theory of fields. *Sociological Theory*, 19(2), 105-125.

Freire, M.R. (2008). The European Security and Defence Policy. History, Structures and

- Capabilities. In Merlingen, M. and Ostrauskaitė, P. (Eds.), *European Security and Defence Policy. An Implementation Perspective* (pp. 9-24). London and New York: Routledge.
- French Ministry of Armed Forces (2018). *European Intervention Initiative*.
<https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgris/international-action/l-iei/l-initiative-europeenne-d-intervention>
- Furness, M. (2013). Who controls the European External Action Service? Agent Autonomy in EU External Policy. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 18(1), 103-126.
- Furness, M. and Gänzle, S. (2017). The Security-Development Nexus in European Union Foreign Relations after Lisbon: Policy Coherence at Last? *Development Policy Review*, 35(4), 1-18
- Gabriel, S. and von der Leyen, U. (2017). Joint Doorstep Germany. Press Briefing at the Foreign Affairs Council on 06.03.2017. <https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/events/20170306-foreign-affairs-council-march-2017/joint-doorstep-de-gabriel-and-von-der-leyen-part-1>
- Gatti, M. (2016). *European External Action Service. Promoting Coherence through Autonomy and Coordination*. Leiden, Boston: Brill Nijhoff.
- German Federal Government (2016). *White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*. Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defence, 2016.
- Giddens, A. (1999). Elements of the Theory of Structuration. In Elliott, A. (Ed.), *The Blackwell Reader in Contemporary Social Theory* (pp. 119-30). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Granovetter, M. (1973). The Strength of Weak Ties. *American Journal of Sociology*, 78(6), 1360-1380.
- Granovetter, M. (1983). The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited. *Sociological Theory*, 1, 201-233.
- Grant, C. (2007) Constitutional Fudge. Opinion Piece. *The Guardian*, 19.06.2007.
- Grevi, G., Helly, D. and Keohane, D. (Eds.) (2009). *European Security and Defence Policy: The first 10 years (1999-2009)*. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
- Gross, E. and Juncos, A. (2011). *EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Roles, Institutions and Policies*. London: Routledge.
- Gros-Verheyde, N. (2017a). *La coopération structurée permanente à portée de main*. Bruxelles2, 20.08.2017. <https://www.bruxelles2.eu/2017/08/25/la-cooperation-structuree-permanente-a-portee-de-main/>
- Gros-Verheyde, N. (2017b). *Français et Allemands définissent des critères communs pour la coopération structurée permanente*. Bruxelles2 Pro, 13.07.2017.

- Hanneman, R. A. and Mark, R. (2005). *Introduction to social network methods*. Riverside, CA: University of California.
- Haroche, P. (2020). Supranationalism strikes back: A Neofunctionalist Account of the European Defence Fund. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 27(6), 853-872.
- Hawkins, D. and Jacoby, W. (2006). How agents matter. In Hawkins, D.G., Lake, D.A., Nielson, D.L. and Tierney, M.J. (Eds.), *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* (pp. 199-228). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Helly, D. (2015). *A wider scope beyond security and closer to citizens?*. #EUGlobalStrategy2026. Blog Post, 16.10.2015. ECDPM. <https://ecdpm.org/talking-points/eu-global-strategy-2016-eeas/>
- Helwig, N. (2013). EU foreign policy and the High Representative's capability–expectations gap: a question of political will. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 18(2), 235– 54.
- Helwig, N. (2015). *The EU Global Strategy on foreign and security policy*. Comment 13/2015. FIIA.
- Helwig, N. (2017). Agent interaction as a source of discretion for the EU High Representative. In Delreux, T. and Adriaensen, J. (Eds.), *The Principal-agent Model and the European Union* (pp. 105-129). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Henökl, T. and Trondal, J. (2013). *Bureaucratic structure, geographical location and the autonomy of administrative systems. Evidence from the European External Action Service*. ISL Working Paper No. 7. Department of Political Science and Management, University of Agder.
- Henökl, T. and Trondal, J. (2015). Unveiling the anatomy of autonomy: dissecting actor-level independence in the European External Action Service. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 22(10), 1426-1447.
- Henökl, T. E. (2014). The European external action service: Torn apart between several principals or acting as a smart “double-agent”? *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 10(4), 381–401.
- Henökl, T. E. (2015). How do EU Foreign Policy-Makers Decide? Institutional Orientations within the European External Action Service. *West European Politics*, 38(3), 679–708.
- Hill, C. (2015). *Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century*. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- High Representative/ Vice President (2016a). *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence*. Doc. 14392/16. Brussels, 14.11.2016
- High Representative/ Vice President and the Commission (2016). Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats. A European Union response. JOIN(2016)18 final. Brussels, 06.04.2016.

- Hill, C. (1993). The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 31(3), 305-328.
- Hillion, C. and Blockmans, S. (2021). *From Self-doubt to self-assurance. The European External Action Service as an indispensable support for a geopolitical EU*. Report by the Task Force EEAS 2.0, CEPS, SIEPS, FES. Brussels, January 2021.
- Hix, S. (1998). The study of the European Union II: the 'new governance' agenda and its rival. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 5(1), 38-65.
- Hoffmann, A.M. (2002). A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 8(3), 375-401.
- Hofmann, H.C. and Türk, A.H. (Eds.) (2006). Conclusions. Europe's integrated administration. In Herwig, C.H. and Türk, A.H. (Eds.), *EU Administrative Governance*. Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
- Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2001). *Multi-level Governance and European Integration*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2003). Unraveling the Central State, But How? Types of Multi-Level Governance. *IHS Political Science Series*, 97(2), 27-87.
- Hocking, B., Melissen, J., Riordan, S. and Sharp, P. (2012). *Futures for Diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy in the 21st Century*. The Hague: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
- Howorth, J. (2001). European Defence and the Changing Politics of the European Union: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(4), 765-789.
- Howorth, J. (2007). *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Howorth, J. (2010). The EU as a Global Actor: Grand Strategy for a Global Grand Bargain? *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(3), 455-474.
- Howorth, J. (2013). European Global Strategy in a World of Power Transition. In Goldmann K., Howorth, J., Menon, A. and Gross, E., *European Global Strategy in Theory and Practice: Relevance for the EU*. Swedish Institute of International Affairs Occasional UIPapers, no.14, 11-16, Stockholm.
- Howorth, J. (2014). *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (2nd Ed.). Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Howorth, J. and Schmidt, V. (2016). No. 50. In Missiroli, A. (Ed.), *Towards an EU Global Strategy*.

- Consulting the Experts* (pp. 107-108). Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.
- Hysing, E. (2014). How Public Officials Gain Policy Influence- Lessons from Local Government in Sweden. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 37(2), 129-139.
- ISSAT (2018). *Mapping of EU Member States' Systems of Secondment to Civilian CSDP*. The International Security Sector Advisory Team. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
- Istituto Affari Internazionali, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Elcano Royal Institute, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (2013). *Towards a European Global Strategy. Securing European Influence in a Changing World*. European Global Strategy. Rome, Warsaw, Madrid, Stockholm. http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/egs_report.pdf
- Italian Ministry of Defence (2016). *Italy's Vision for a Stronger European Defence*. http://www.difesa.it/EN/Primo_Piano/Pagine/xx.aspx.
- Jachtenfuchs, M. (1995). Theoretical perspectives on European governance. *European Law Journal: Review of European Law in Context*, 1(2), 115-33.
- Jachtenfuchs, M. (2001). The Governance Approach to European Integration. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39(2), 245-64.
- Johnson, T. (2013). Institutional Design and Bureaucrats' Impact on Political Control. *The Journal of Politics*, 75(1), 183-197.
- Juncker, J.-C. (2015). Halten Sie sich an Frau Merkel. Ich mache das. *Welt am Sonntag*, 08.03.2015. <https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article138178098/Halten-Sie-sich-an-Frau-Merkel-Ich-mache-das.html>
- Juncker, J.-C. (2016). *State of the Union Address*. Brussels, 14.09.2016.
- Juncker, J.-C. (2017). *Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Defence and Security Conference Prague: In Defence of Europe*. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_17_1581
- Juncos, A. (2020). Beyond Civilian Power? Civilian CSDP two Decades on. In Fiott, D. (Ed.) *The CSDP in 2020* (pp. 74-87). Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
- Juncos, A. E. and Pomorska, K. (2013). In the face of adversity': explaining the attitudes of EEAS officials vis-à-vis the new service. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(9), 1-18.
- Juncos, A. E. and Pomorska, K. (2014). Manufacturing Esprit de Corps: The Case of the European External Action Service. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(2), 302-319.

- Kadushin, C. (2012). *Understanding Social Networks. Theories, Concepts and Findings*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Kausch, K. (2016). *The EU global strategy in the Shadow of Brexit*. Carnegie Europe, 07.07.2016.
- Keapoulani, M. and Cross, D. (2007). A European Epistemic Community of Diplomats. In Sharp, P. and Wiseman, G. (Eds.), *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society*. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kelemen, D. R. (2002). The Politics of 'Eurocratic' Structure and the New European Agencies. *West European Politics*, 25(4), 93-118.
- Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J. S. (1974). Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations. *World Politics*, 27(1), 39-62.
- Klijn, E.-H. and Koppenjahn, J. (2000). Public management and policy networks: Foundations of a network approach to governance. *Public Management Review*, 2(2), 135-158.
- Klijn, E.H. and Koppenjahn, J. (2006). Institutional design. Changing institutional features of networks. *Public Management Review*, 8(1), 141-160.
- Koeth, W. (2013). The Serbia-Kosovo Agreement on Kosovo's Regional Representation and the 'Feasibility Study': A Breakthrough in EU-Kosovo Relations? *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 18(1), 127-144.
- König, N. (2015). *Resetting EU External Action: Potential and Constraints*. Policy Paper 125. Jacques Delors Institute Berlin.
- König, N. and Walter-Franke, M. (2017). France and Germany: Spearheading A European Security and defence Union? *Jacques Delors Institute. Berlin. Policy Paper 202*.
- Koops, J. and Macaj, G. (2015). *The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor*. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Koops, J. and Tercovich, G. (2020). Shaping the European External Action Service and its post-Lisbon crisis management structures: An assessment of the EU High Representatives' political leadership. *European Security*, 29(3), 275-300.
- Koppenjan, J. and Klijn, E.H. (2004). *Managing Uncertainties in networks. A network approach to problem solving and decision making*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Kostanyan, H. (2016). Analysing the Power of the European Union's Diplomatic Service: Do the EU Member States Control the European External Action Service? *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 11(1), 26-48.

- Kostanyan, H. and Orbie, J. (2013). The EEAS' discretionary power within the Eastern Partnership: in search of the highest possible denominator. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 13(1), 47-65.
- Kowert, P.A. (2002). *Groupthink or Deadlock: When do leaders learn from their advisors*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Kuhn, T. (1970). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kuus, M. (2015). Symbolic power in diplomatic practice: Matters of style in Brussels. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 50(3), 368-384.
- Kydd, A. (2005). *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Laffan, B. (1997). From Policy Entrepreneur to Policy Manager: The Challenge Facing the European Commission. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 4(3), 422-438.
- Lazarsfeld, P. and Merton, R. (1964). Friendship as Social Process. In Berger, M., Abel, T. and Page, C.H. (Eds.), *Freedom and Control in Modern Society* (pp. 18-66). New York: Octagon Books.
- Lazega, E., Jourda, M.T., Mounier, L. and Stofer, R. (2008). Catching up with big fish in the big pond? Multi-level network analysis through linked design. *Social Networks*, 30(2), 157-76.
- Le Roy, A. (2015). *EEAS Secretary General: EU will present a new security strategy in 2016*. RIA Novosti, 05.05.2015. <https://ria.ru/20150505/1062733743.html>
- Legrand, J. (2016). *Does the new EU Global Strategy deliver on security and defence?* In Depth Analysis. European Parliament Think Tank, 06.09.2016.
- Lehne, S. (2015). *Are Prime Ministers Taking Over EU Foreign Policy?*. Carnegie Europe.
- Lehne, S. (2016). *The EU Global Strategy, a Triumph of Hope Over Experience*. Carnegie Europe.
- Lequesne, C. (2015). EU foreign policy through the lens of practice theory: A different approach to the European External Action Service. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 50(3), 351-367.
- Lewis, J. (2010). How Institutional Environments facilitate Cooperative Negotiating Styles. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17(5), 648-64.
- Lin, N. (2001). *Social capital: a theory of social structure and action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lin, N. (2002). *Social Capital*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lindblom, C. (1986). *The Policymaking Process*. Englewoods Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

- Lindstrom, G. (2006). *The Headline Goal*. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
- Linnenkamp, H. and Möllig, C. (2013). *A Doable Agenda for the European Defence Council 2013 – Three Proposals*. SWP Comment. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/european-defence-council-2013/>
- Lintern, S. (2017). What Civilian-Military Synergies? In Tardy, T. (Ed.), *Recasting EU civilian crisis management*. Issue Report, 31. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
- Linvall, J. (2009). The Real but Limited Influence of Expert Ideas. *World Politics*, 61(4), 703-730.
- López-Aranda, R. (2017). *Una nueva estrategia exterior para la Unión Europea*. Cuadernos de Estrategia, 184. Madrid: Institute Espagnol de Estudios Estratégicos.
- Lowndes, V. (2010). The Institutional Approach. In Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (Eds.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (pp. 60-79). Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Madsen, P. (2011). Survey Methods for Network Data. In Carrington, P. and Scott, J. (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Social Network Analysis* (pp. 370-388). London: SAGE.
- Maggetti, M. (2007). De facto independence after delegation. A fuzzy-set analysis. *Regulation & Governance*, 1(4), 271-294.
- Maggetti, M. and Verhoest, K. (2014). Unexplored aspects of bureaucratic autonomy: A state of the field and ways forward. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 80(2), 239-256.
- Majone, G. (1989). *Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Majone, G. (2001). Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance. *European Union Politics*, 2(1), 103-122.
- Mälksoo, M. (2016). From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: External Policy, Internal Purpose. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 37(3), 374-388.
- Manchin, J. (2015) Overview of crisis Rooms. In Pawlak, P., Ricci, A. and Mahmoud, A. (Eds.), *Crisis Rooms: Towards a Global Network?* (pp. 151-186). Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.
- March, J. and Olsen, J.P. (1984). The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life. *American Political Science Review*, 78(3), 734-749.
- March, J. and Olsen, J.P. (2011). Elaborating the 'New Institutionalism. In Goodin, R.(Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Science* (2nd Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R.A.W. (Eds.). (1992). *Policy Networks in British Government*. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (2010). *Theory and methods in political science* (3rd Ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Maurer, H. (2021). The European External Action Service. In Riddervold, M., Trondal, J. and Newsome, A. (Eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of EU Crises* (pp. 357-372). Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Maurer, H. and Wright, N. (2021). Still Governing in the Shadows? Member States and the Political and Security Committee in the Post-Lisbon EU Foreign Policy Architecture. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1-17.

McCarthy, C. (2010). Comment on Nick Crossley/3. *Sociologica*. Volume 1.

Meijer, H. and Wyss, M. (2018). *The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Menon, A. and Sedelmeier, U. (2010). Instruments and Intentionality: Civilian Crisis Management and Enlargement Conditionality in EU Security Policy. *West European Politics*, 33(1), 75-92.

Mérand, F., Hofmann, S. and Irondelle, B. (2010). Transgovernmental Networks in the European Security and Defense Policy. *European Integration Online Papers* 14.
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.php/eiop/article/view/2010_005a

Mérand, F., Hofmann, S. and Irondelle, B. (2011). Governance and State Power: A Network Analysis of European Security. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 49(1), 121-147.

Merlingen, M. and Ostrauskaitė, R. (2006). *European Union Peacebuilding and Policing*. London and New York: Routledge.

Merlingen, M. and Ostrauskaitė, R. (2008). *European Security and Defence Policy. An Implementation Perspective*. London and New York: Routledge.

Mintrom, M. and Norman, P. (2009). Policy entrepreneurship and policy change. *Policy Studies Journal*, 37(4), 649-667.

Mische, A. (2003). Cross-talk in movements: reconceiving the culture-network link. In Diani, M. and McAdam, D. (Eds.), *Social Movements and Networks*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Missiroli, A. (2016a). *The EU and the World: Players and Policies Post-Lisbon. A Handbook*. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Missiroli, A. (Eds.) (2016b). *Towards an EU Global Strategy. Consulting the Experts*. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.

- Mogherini, F. (2014a). European Parliamentary Hearing on the Appointment of the High Representative. Brussels, 06.10.2014.
- Mogherini, F. (2014b). Answers to the EP Questionnaire to the Commissioner-Designate Federica Mogherini. Brussels, 06.10.2014.
- Mogherini, F. (2014c). *Press Conference – Part 3 (Q&A)* at the Informal Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (Gymnich) in Milan [Video, 30.08.2014].
<https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/events/20140829-informal-meeting-of-foreign-affairs-ministers-gymnich-august-2014/press-conference-part-3-q-a-1-129>
- Mogherini, F. (2016a). *Press Conference – Part 2*, at the Informal Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers (Gymnich) in Bratislava [Video, 02.09.2016].
<https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/events/20160902-informal-meeting-of-foreign-affairs-ministers-gymnich/press-conference-part-2-538>
- Mogherini, F. (2016b). *Press Conference – Part 3 (Questions and Answers)*, at the Informal Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers (Gymnich) in Bratislava [Video, 02.09.2016].
<https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/events/20160902-informal-meeting-of-foreign-affairs-ministers-gymnich/press-conference-part-3-q-a-1-227>
- Mogherini, F. (2016c). *Informal Defence Ministers Meeting in Bratislava: arrival and doorstep by Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and President of the Council* [Video, 27.09.2016]. <https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/shotlist/I-126691>
- Mogherini, F. (2016d). *Press Conference* at the Informal Defence Ministers Meeting in Bratislava [Video, 27.09.2016]. <https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-126543>
- Mogherini, F. (2016e). *Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council.*
https://eeas.europa.eu/regions/asia/14821/node/14821_zh-hans.
- Mogherini, F. (2016f). *Press Conference – Part 2* at the Informal Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers, Gymnich [Video, 02.09.2016].
<https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/events/20160902-informal-meeting-of-foreign-affairs-ministers-gymnich/press-conference-part-2-538>
- Mogherini, F. (2016g). *Remarks by the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at a joint doorstep with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Informal EU Defence Ministers meeting.* Brussels, 27.09. 2016. <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/10560/remarks-by-the-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-at-a-joint-doorstep-with-nato-secretary-general-jens-stoltenberg-at-the-informal-eu-defence-ministers-meeting--en>

- Mogherini, F. (2016h). *Press Conference following the Foreign Affairs Council (defence) on 19.04.2016 in Luxembourg*. <https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/events/20160419-foreign-affairs-council-defence-april-2016/press-conference-part-2-q-a-1-57>
- Mogherini, F. (2016i). *Arrival and Doorstep by Federica Mogherini*, Informal Defence Ministers Meeting in Bratislava [Video, 27.09.2016]. <https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/shotlist/I-126691>
- Mogherini, F. (2017). *The EU Global Strategy: Translating vision into action*. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/namibia/28575/speech-hrvp-mogherini-2017-european-union-institute-security-studies-annual-conference-eu_ja
- Mogherini, F. (2017b). *Press Conference at the Informal Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers, Gymnich*. 08.09.2017. <https://www.eu2017.ee/political-meetings/informal-meeting-defence-ministers-and-informal-meeting-foreign-affairs>
- Molenaar, A. (2019). Speech/ Intervention at the Workshop ‘Civilian CSDP – assessing progress and identifying priorities for the implementation of the Civilian CSDP Compact’, organised by the Finish Presidency and the EUISS on 19.07.2019 in Brussels.
- Morgenstern-Pomorski, J.-H. (2018). *The Contested Diplomacy of the European External Action Service*. London: Routledge.
- Morillas, P. (2011). Institutionalization or Intergovernmental Decision-Taking in Foreign Policy: The Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 16(2), 243- 257.
- Morillas, P. (2019). *Strategy-Making in the EU. From Foreign and Security Policy to External Action*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Morillas, P. (2020). Autonomy in intergovernmentalism: the role of de novo bodies in external action during the making of the EU Global Strategy. *Journal of European Integration*, 42(2), 231-246.
- Morth, U. (2011). Competing Frames in the European Commission – the Case of the Defence Industry and Equipment Issue. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 7(2), 173-189.
- Moser, C. (2020). Unpacking the Civilian Dimension of EU Security and Defence. In Moser, C. (Ed.), *Accountability in EU Security and Defence* (pp.19-83). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Müller, H. (2004). Arguing, Bargaining and All that: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations. *European Journal of International Relations*, 10(3), 395-435.
- Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, G. and Rüger, C. (Eds.). (2011). *The High Representative for the EU*

- Foreign and Security Policy: Review and Prospects*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Murdoch, Z. (2012). Negotiating the European External Action Service: Analyzing the external effects of internal (dis)agreement. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50(6), 1011–1027.
- NATO (2006). *Berlin Plus Agreement*. North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- Natorski, M. and Pomorska, K. (2017). Trust and Decision-Making in Time of Crisis: The EU's Response to the Events in Ukraine. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 55(1), 54–70.
- Notification by Participating Member States (2017). Notification by Ministers on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy. Brussels, 13.11.2017.
- Nováky, N. I. (2015). Why so Soft? The European Union in Ukraine. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 36(2), 244–266.
- Nugent, N. (2017) *The Government and Politics of the European Union* (8th Ed.). Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ondarza, N. and Scheler, R. (2017). *The High Representative's 'double hat': How Mogherini and Ashton have differed in their links with the Commission*. LSE EUOPP blog, 16.03.2017.
<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2017/03/16/high-representative-mogherini-ashton/>.
- Orbie, J. (2006). Civilian Power Europe. Review of the Original and Current Debates. *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 41(1), 123–128.
- Osborne, P. (2013). We were all wrong about Baroness Ashton: she may have saved the Iran nuclear talks. *The Telegraph*, 27.09.2013.
- Ostrom, E. (1995). Self-Organization and Social Capital. *Industrial and Corporate Change*, 4(1), 131–159.
- Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association. *The American Political Science Review*, 92(1), 1–22.
- Page, E. (2010). Bureaucrats and Expertise: Elucidating a Problematic Relationship in Three Tableaux and 6 Jurisdictions. *Sociologie du Travail*, 52(2), 255–273.
- Palacio, A. (2015). *A Strategic Rallying Cry for Europe*. Project Syndicate. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/eu-security-strategy-solidarity-by-ana-palacio-2015-07>
- Panichi, J. (2014). *Federica Mogherini – Italy's Scapegoat*. Politico, 24.08. 2014.
<https://www.politico.eu/article/federica-mogherini-italys-scapegoat/>

- Papaioannou, N. G. (2018). *The European External Action Service in the Evolution of the EU as a 'normative power': A Case Study of Somalia*. [Doctoral dissertation, University of Surrey]. University of Surrey Research Repository.
- Pappi, F.U. (1993). Policy-Netze: Erscheinungsform moderner Politiksteuerung oder methodischer Ansatz. In Héritier, A. (Ed.), *Policy-Analyse* (pp. 84-94). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Parker, R. (2007). Networked governance or just networks? Local governance of the knowledge economy in Limerick (Ireland) and Karlskrona (Sweden). *Political Studies*, 55(1), 113-132.
- Parkin, J. (2012). EU Home Affairs Agencies and the Construction of EU Internal Security. *CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe*, 53. Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Peterson, J. (1992). The European technology community. Policy networks in a supranational setting. In Marsh, D. and R.A. W. Rhodes (Eds.), *Policy Networks in British Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Peterson, J. (1995). Decision-making in the European Union: Toward a framework for analysis. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2(1), 69-93.
- Petrov, P., Pomorska, K. and Vanhoonacker, S. (Eds.). (2012). Special Issue: The Emerging EU Diplomatic System: Opportunities and Challenges after Lisbon. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(1).
- Pietz, T. (2018). The Civilian CSDP Compact: Strengthening or Repurposing EU Civilian Crisis Management. *IAI Commentaries* 18. Istituto Affari Internazionali.
- Pietz, T. and Vorrath, J. (2018). *CSDP Compact: Reinventing EU Civilian Crisis Management?* German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 19.12.2018. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/point-of-view/2018/csdp-compact-reinventing-eu-civilian-crisis-management/>
- Pinotti, R. (2017). *Departure and Doorstep, Italy* [Video, 06.03.2017]. <https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/events/20170306-foreign-affairs-council-march-2017/departure-and-doorstep-it-pinotti-1-3>
- Pirozzi, N. (2012). EU Performance in Civilian Crisis Management. In Whitman, R. and Wolff, S. (Eds.), *The European Union as a global conflict manager* (pp. 189-208). New York: Routledge.
- Pollack, M.A. (2003). *The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the EU*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pollack, M.A. (2007). Principal-Agent Analysis and International Delegation: Red Herrings, Theoretical Clarifications and Empirical Disputes. *Bruges Political Research Paper*, No.2.
- Popowski, A. (2014). Press Conference at the Informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers, on 9-

10.09.2014 in Milan. <http://italia2014.eu/en/news/post/informale-difesa/>

Pressman, J. and Wildavsky, A. (1973). *Implementation: how great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

Preston, T. (2001). *The president and his inner circle: leadership style and the advisory process in foreign policy-making*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling Alone*. New York: Touchstone.

Radaelli, C. (2017). *Technocracy in the European Union*. London: Routledge.

Rankin, J. (2016). *EU scales back plans for military HQ as it unveils crisis response blueprint*. The Guardian, 14.11.2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/14/eu-scales-back-plans-for-military-hq-as-it-unveils-crisis-response-blueprint>

Raube, K. (2012). The European Action Service and the European Parliament. *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(1), 65-80.

Raustiala, K. (2002). The architecture of international cooperation: transgovernmental networks and the future of international law. *Virginia Journal of International Law*, 43(1), 1-92.

Renard, T. and Biscop, S. (2010). *A Need for Strategy in a Multipolar World: Recommendations to the EU after Lisbon*. Security Policy Brief, 5. Brussels: EGMONT – The Royal Institute for International Relations.

Rettman, A. (2016a). *Italy lays out 'Vision' of EU Army*. EU Observer, 29.06.2016. <https://euobserver.com/foreign/135235>

Rettman, A. (2016b). *Finland calls for 'pragmatic' EU Defence*. EU Observer, 27.09.2016. <https://euobserver.com/foreign/135244>.

Reykers, Y. and Beach, D. (2017). Process-Tracing as a Tool to Analyse Discretion. In Delreux, T. and Adriaensen, J. (Eds.), *The Principal-Agent Model and the European Union* (pp. 255–281). Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rhodes, R.A.W. and Marsh, D. (1992). New directions in the study of policy networks. *European Journal of Political Research*, 21(1-2), 181-205.

Riddervold, M. (2016). (Not) in the Hands of the Member States: How the European Commission influences EU Security and Defence Policies. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54(2), 353-369.

Risse-Kappen, T. (1995). *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Risse-Kappen, T. (1996). *Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and*

- Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 34(1), 53–79.
- Risse, T. (2000). Let's Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics. *International Organization*, 54(1), 1–39.
- Risse, T. and Kleine, M. (2010). Deliberation in negotiations. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17(5), 708–726.
- Robinson, D. and Shotter, J. (2015). *Jean-Claude Juncker Calls for Creation of EU Army*. Financial Times, 08.03.2015.
- Sabatier, P. (1988). An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Therein. *Policy Sciences*, 21(2/3), 129–168.
- Scharpf, F. (1997). *Games Real Actors Play. Actor-centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Scherrer, A., Jeandesboz, J. and Guittet, E.P. (2011). *Developing an EU Internal Security Strategy, fighting terrorism and organised crime*. Study prepared for the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament.
- Schmitz, G.P. and Schult, C. (2015). Iran nuclear talks: The Unsung Chief Diplomat. *Spiegel Online*, 01.10.2015.
- Scott, J. (2007). *Social Network Analysis: A Handbook*. London: Sage Publication.
- Scott, J. and Carrington, P. (2016). *The SAGE Handbook of Social Network Analysis* (2nd Ed.). London: Sage Publications.
- Sebej, F. (2016). Compte-rendu of the First Workshop on the Strategic Review by Frantisek Sebej at the Inter-parliamentary Conference on CFSP and CSDP, The Hague.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vaFxbhq-wM0&list=PLRsJFV2H8Ei9frb77WoiPCnEFtTfDJviy&index=24>
- Serageldin, I. and Grootaert, C. (1999). Defining social capital: An integrating View. In Dasgupta, P. and Serageldin, I. (Eds.), *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
- Shalal, A. (2016). *Germany urges Britain to stop blocking closer EU Defence Ties*. Business Insider, 17.11.2016. <https://www.businessinsider.com/r-germany-urges-britain-to-stop-blocking-closer-eu-defence-ties-2016-11?IR=T>
- Shepherd, A. (2016). CSDP and internal-external Nexus. In Chappell, L., Mawdsley, J. and Petrov, P. (Eds.), *The EU, Strategy and Security Policy. Regional and strategic challenges* (pp. 87–103).

New York: Routledge.

- Sheriff, A. and Hauck, V. (2014). A more peaceful and secure world: a more effective response to violent conflict and insecurity. In Engel, P., Grevi, G., Messner, D. and Watkins, K. (Eds.), *Our Collective Interest. Why Europe's problems need global solutions and global problems need European action* (pp. 27–38). European Think Tanks Group (DIE, ECDPM, FRIDE, ODI).
- Sjursen, H. (2006). What Kind of Power? *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), 169–181.
- Slaughter, A.-M. and Hale, T. (2010). Transgovernmental networks and multi-level governance. In Enderlein, H., Wälti, H. and Zürn, M. (Eds.), *Handbook on Multi-Level governance* (pp. 358–369). London, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Smit, T. (2019). *Towards a More Capable European Union Civilian CSDP*. Policy Brief. SIPRI
- Smit, T. (2020a). *Increasing Member State Contributions to EU Civilian CSDP Missions*. Policy Brief. SIPRI
- Smit, T. (2020b). *Increasing Women's Representation in EU Civilian CSDP Missions*. Policy Brief. SIPRI
- Smith, K. (2017). A European Union Global Strategy for a changing World? *International Politics*, 54(4), 503–518.
- Smith, M.E. (1998). Rules, Transgovernmentalism, and the expansion of European political cooperation. In Sandholtz, W. and Stone Sweet, A. (Eds.), *European Integration and Supranational Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, M.E. (2004). *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy. The Institutionalisation of Cooperation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, M.E. (2004). Toward a theory of EU foreign policy-making: multi-level governance, domestic politics, and national adaptation to Europe's common foreign and security policy. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11(4), 740–758.
- Smith, M.E. (2013) The European External Action Service and the Security–Development Nexus: Organising for Effectiveness or Incoherence? *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20 (9), 1299–315.
- Smith, M.E., Keukeleire, S. and Vanhoonacker, S. (Eds.) (2016). *The Diplomatic System of the European Union. Evolution, change and challenges*. London: Routledge.
- Smith, S. and Clarke, M. (1985). *Foreign policy implementation*. London: G. Allen & Unwin.
- Solana, J., Blockmans, S. and Faleg, G. (2015). *More Union in European Defence. Report of a CEPS Task Force*. CEPS Publication. Centre for European Policy Studies.

- Solow, R. (1999). Notes on social capital and economic performance. In Dasgupta, P. and Serageldin, I. (Eds.), *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
- Sorensen, E. and Torfing, J. (2005). *Netværksstyring: fra government til governance*. Frederiksberg: Roskilde Universitetsforl.
- Spence, D. (2012). The early days of the European External Action Service: A Practitioner's View. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, 7(1), 115–134.
- Spence, D. (2015). The EEAS and its Epistemic Communities: The Challenges of Diplomatic Hybridism. In Spence, D. and Bátora, J. (Eds.), *The European External Action Service: European Diplomacy Post-Westphalis* (pp. 43–64). Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Spence, D. (2016). The European Commission's External Service. In Smith, M. Keukeleire, S. and Vanhoonacker, S. (Eds.), *The Diplomatic System of the European Union. Evolution, change and challenges* (pp. 29–45). London: Routledge.
- Spence, D. and Batora, J. (2015). *The European External Action Service. European Diplomacy Post-Westphalia*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sperling, J. (2018). The European Union and the Grand Security Strategy for Post-Westphalian Governance. In Economides, S. and Sperling, J. (Eds.), *EU Security Strategies: Extending the EU System of Security Governance*. New York: Routledge.
- Steinmeier, F.-W. (2014a). Speech by Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier at the opening of the conference Review 2014 – A Fresh Look at German Foreign Policy in Berlin on 20.05.2014. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/140520-bm-review2014/262344>
- Still, K., Huhtamäki, J. and Russell, M. (2013). Relational capital and social capital: one or two fields of research? In *Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Intellectual Capital, Knowledge Management and Organisational Learning, ICICKM 2013* (pp. 420–428). Academic Conferences International (ACI).
- Stroh, M. (2000). Qualitative Interviewing. In Burton, D. (Ed.), *Research Training for Social Scientists* (pp. 196–214). London: Sage Publications.
- Sus, M. (2016). Member States as Strategy-Maker or Strategy-Taker? Analysing Polish Involvement in the Development of the EU Global Strategy. *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, 45(1), 337–350.
- Sus, M. and Nitoiu, C. (2019). Introduction: A strategy in EU Foreign Policy. *International Politics*, 56(3), 259–271.

- Svendsen, G.T. (2018). *Trust*. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.
- Szalai, P. (2017). *Natalie Loiseau: France has ignored Eastern Europe for too long*. Euractiv Slovakia, 29.08.2017. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/interview/nathalie-loiseau-france-has-ignored-eastern-europe-for-too-long/>
- Tallber, J. (2008). Bargaining Power in the European Council. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46(3), 685-708.
- Tannous, I. (2015). The EEAS, EU External Assistance and Development Aid: Institutional Dissonance or Inter-Service Harmony? In Spence, D. and Bátora, J. (Eds.), *The European External Action Service: European Diplomacy Post-Westphalis* (pp. 123-139). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tardy, T. (2011). *Cooperating to build peace: The UN-EU inter-institutional complex*, Geneva papers research series, 2 (May 2011). Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).
- Tardy, T. (Ed.) (2017a). *Recasting EU civilian crisis management*. Issue Report No. 31. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
- Tardy, T. (2017b). The New Forms of Civilian Crisis Management. In Tardy, T. (Ed.), *Recasting EU civilian crisis management*. Issue Report, 31. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
- Tardy, T. (2017c). The EU: from comprehensive vision to integrated action. Brief ISSUE, 5, 1-4. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
- Tardy, T. (2018). Does European Defence really matter? Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Common Security and Defence Policy. *European Security*, 27(2), 119-137.
- Techau, J. (2015) *The Steinmeier Review of German Foreign Policy*. Carnegie Europe.
- Techau, J. (2016). *The EU's New Global Strategy: Useful or Pointless?* Carnegie Europe.
- Tercovich, G. (2014). Towards a Comprehensive Approach: The EEAS Crisis Response System. *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 22(3), 150-157.
- Tereszkiewicz, F. (2016). The Role of COSI in the European Union's Internal Security Area: The Initial Years of Activity. *Studia I Materialy, Miscellanea Oeconomicae*, 20(4).
- Turner, P. W. (2017). Networks and European Union Politics. In Victor, J.N., Montgomery, A. and Lubell, M. (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Networks* (pp. 589-607). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Turner, P.W. (2006). *Die graduelle Konstitutionalisierung der Europäischen Union: Eine quantitative Fallstudie am Beispiel der Regierungskonferenz 1996*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

- Thurner, P.W. and Binder, M. (2009). EU Transgovernmental Networks: The Emergence of a New Political Space beyond the Nation State ? *European Journal of Political Research* 48(1), 80-106.
- Thurner, P.W. and Pappi, F.U. (2009). Domestic and International Politics during EU Intergovernmental Conferences: Bridging the Gap between Negotiation Theory and Practice. *Negotiation Journal* 22(2), 167-185.
- Tilly, C. and Goodin, R. (2009). Overview of Contextual Political Analysis. In Goodin, R. (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Sciences* (pp. 431-459). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tocci, N. (2015). Towards an EU Global Strategy. In Missiroli, A. (Ed.), *Towards an EU Global Strategy: Background, Process, References*. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies.
- Tocci, N. (2016). The Making of the EU Global Strategy. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 37(3), 461-472.
- Tocci, N. (2017). *Framing the EU Global Strategy: A stronger Europe in a fragile world*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tom, D. and Adriaensen, J. (2017). Introduction. Use and Limitations of the Principal-Agent Model in Studying the European Union. In Delreux, T. and Adriaensen, J. (Eds.), *The Principal-Agent Model and the European Union* (pp. 1-34). Cham: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics.
- Tömmel, I. (2011). Transnationalism in European Governance and Policy-making. In DeBardeleben, J. and Hurrelmann, A. (Ed.), *Transnational Europe promise, paradox, limits* (pp.57-76). Houndmills, Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tömmel, I. (2013). The Presidents of the European Commission: Transnational or transforming leaders. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(4), 789-805.
- Tonra, B. (2001). *Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign Policy in European Union*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Torfig, J. (2012). Governance Networks. In Levi-Faur, L. (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (2012). Official Journal C 326 , 26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390.
- Trömmel, I. (2017). The standing President of the European Council: Intergovernmental or supranational leadership? *Journal of European integration*, 39(2), 175-189.
- Trömmel, I. (2018). Political Leadership in Turbulent Times – The Commission Presidency of Jean-Claude Juncker. In Ege, J., Bauer, M. and Becker, S. (Eds.), *The European Commission in turbulent times: assessing organizational change and policy impact* (pp.133-157). Baden-Baden:

Nomos.

- Trondal, J. and Bauer, M. (2017). Conceptualizing the European multi-level administrative order: capturing variation in the European administrative system. *European Political Science Reviews*, 9(1), 73–94.
- Trondal, J. and Peters, B. (2013). The Rise of European Administrative Space: Lessons Learned. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(2), 295–307.
- Trondal, J. and Veggeland, F. (2014). The Autonomy of Bureaucratic Organizations: An Organization Theory Argument. *Journal of Information and Organizational Sciences*, 5(2), 55–69.
- Uslaner, E. M. (2002). *The Moral Foundations of Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Vooren, B. (2012). *Europe Unplugged: Progress, potential and limitations of EU external policy three years post-Lisbon*. Report, SIEPS.
- Valentine, G. (1997) Tell me about...: using interviews as a research methodology. In Flowerdew, R. and Martin, D. (Eds.), *Methods in Human Geography* (pp. 110–126). Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman.
- Vanhoonacker, S. and Pomorska, K. (2013). The European External Action Service and agenda-setting in European foreign policy. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 20(9), 1316–1331.
- Vanhoonacker, S. and Pomorska, K. (2015). Resisting the European External Action Service. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 20, 21–38.
- Vanhoonacker, S., Dijkstra, H. and Maurer, H. (2010). Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy: The State of the Art. In Vanhoonacker, S., Dijkstra, H. and Maurer, H. (Eds.), *Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy*. European Integration online Papers (EUoP), 14, (Special Issue 1), 1–34.
- Venema A. and Romijn, H. (1992). *Declaration of the Member States of the Western European Union on the role of the WER and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance* in Documents on International Security Policy, 05.1989 – 12.1991. Brussels, Netherlands Atlantic Commission, NATO Office of Information and Press.
- Verhoest, K., Peters, B., Bouckaert, G. and Verschuere, B. (2004). The study of organisational autonomy: A conceptual review. *Public Administration and Development*, 24(2), 101–118.
- Violakis, P. (2018). CSDP vs. NATO. In *Europeanisation and the Transformation of EU Security Policy* (pp.151–185). New York: Routledge.
- Visegrad Group (2015). *Bratislava Declaration of the Visegrad Group Heads of Government for a Stronger CSDP*. The Visegrad Group. <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015/bratislava->

[declaration.](#)

- Von der Leyen, U. (2016). Arrival and doorstep at the FAC (Defence) on 19.04.2016 in Luxembourg. <https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/videos>
- Von der Leyen, U. and Le Drian, J.-C. (2016). *Revitalizing CSDP: towards a comprehensive, realistic and credible Defence in the EU*. Non-Paper by the German Federal Government and French Republic.
- Walker, H. and Biedenkopf, K. (2020). Why Do Only Some Chairs Act as Successful Mediators? Trust in Chairs of Global Climate Negotiations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 64(2), 440-452.
- Wallace, H. and Reh, C. (2015). An Institutional Anatomy and Five Policy Modes. In Wallace, H., Pollack, M.A., Roederer-Rynning, C. and Young, A.R. (Eds.), *Policy-making in the European Union* (7th Ed., pp. 72–109). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Weber, M. [1922] (1978). *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. [Roth, G. and Wittich, C. (Ed.)]. Berkley: University of California Press.
- Weibel, C. M., Heikkilä, T., deLeon, P. and Sabatier, P. (2012). Understanding and influencing the policy process. *Policy Science*, 45(1), 1-21.
- Weingast, B. and Moran, M. (1983). Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking in the federal trade Commission. *The Journal Of Political Economy*, 91(5), 765–800.
- Western European Union (1992). *Petersberg Declaration*. WEU Council of Ministers. Bonn, 19.06.1992.
- Western European Union (1994). *Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a common European Defence Policy*. Noordwijk Council Conclusions, 14 November 1994.
- Westerwinter, O., Abbott, K.W. and Biersteker, T. (2021). Informal governance in world politics. *The Review of International Organizations*, 16(1), 1–27.
- Wientzek, O. (2017). *Glimmer of hope for the Common Security and Defence Policy*. Facts & Findings No. 236, Prospects for German Foreign Policy. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
- Wisniewski, E. (2013). The Influence of the European Parliament on the European External Action Service. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 18(1), 81–102.
- Wong, R. and Hill, C. (2011). *National and European foreign policy: Towards europeanization*. London: Routledge.
- Wouters, J. and Duquet, S. (2012) The EU and International Diplomatic Law: New Horizons? *The*

Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 7(1), 31–49.

Wright, M. (1993). Review. Reviewed Work(s): Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations. Bernd Martin and Renate Mayntz; Policy Networks in British Government by David Marsh & R:A:W: Rhodes. *The American Political Science Review*, 87(2), 529–530.

Yesilkagit, K. and van Thiel, S. (2008). Political influence and bureaucratic autonomy. *Public Organization Review*, 8(2), 137–153.

Youngs, R. (2018). *Europe reset. New Directions for the EU*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Youngs, R. (2020). EU foreign policy and energy strategy: bounded contestation. *Journal of European Integration*, 42(1), 147–162.

Zandee, D. (2018). *PESCO Implementation: The next Challenge*. Policy Report, Clingendael. Netherlands Institute of International Relations.